American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War

American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War Siobhán McEvoy-Levy America...

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American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War

Siobhán McEvoy-Levy

American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy

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American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War Siobhán McEvoy-Levy

© Siobhán McEvoy-Levy 2001 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2001 by PALGRAVE Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE is the new global academic imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division and Palgrave Publishers Ltd (formerly Macmillan Press Ltd). ISBN 0–333–80051–6 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data McEvoy-Levy, Siobhan, 1968– American exceptionalism and US foreign policy : public diplomacy at the end of the Cold War / Siobhan McEvoy-Levy. p. cm. Enlargement of author’s thesis (Ph. D.)—University of Cambridge, 1999. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0–333–80051–6 1. United States—Foreign relations—1989– 2. United States—Foreign relations administration. 3. United States—Politics and government– –1989– 4. Rhetoric—Political aspects—United States. 5. Public relations and politics—United States—History—20th century. 6. National characteristics, American—Political aspects. 7. Cold War. I. Title: American exceptionalism and U.S. foreign policy. II. Title. E881 .M39 2000 327.73—dc21 00–052422 10 10

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Printed in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

To Andy, Rose and Patrick, Roisin, Eamonn, and Connall

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Contents Acknowledgements

ix

Introduction

1

What is public diplomacy? Analytical approach and major findings Public diplomacy and policy: A special relationship Rhetoric and models of foreign policy analysis Recurring themes The structure of the book

1

(R)evolution of an Idea

23

The recurring theme of American exceptionalism Debating exceptionalism at the end of the Cold War Conclusion: normative and rhetorical challenges

2

Rhetoric of Reconstruction: Containment, Union, and Exceptionalism Introduction Rhetoric of reconstruction: `moving beyond containment' Rhetoric of reconstruction: the metaphor of the American Civil War Rhetoric of reconstruction: American exceptionalism Conclusion

3

4

2 3 8 13 19 21

23 32 43

46 46 49 56 61 64

Crisis, Community, and the Persian Gulf

71

Introduction The `defining moment' Building community World War Two analogies Purging Vietnam The Gulf War and American exceptionalism Conclusion

71 72 73 78 81 84 88

The Soviet Crises and US Public Diplomacy, April 1991 to November 1992 Introduction The Soviet crises

96 96 97

vii

viii Contents

The summer summits The Soviet coup and US `spin control' Rhetorical strategies after the coup The end of the Soviet Union The Presidential campaign and American exceptionalism Conclusion

5

The Clinton Reconstruction of 1993: Domestic Renewal and the Global Economy Introduction The Clinton vision of dystopia Rhetoric of reconstruction: the `war effort' of 1993 Rhetoric of reconstruction: Soviet±American normalization Rhetoric of exceptionalism and credibility Conclusion

Conclusion: American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy Transitional community-building and elite legitimacy Exceptionalism and Bush public diplomacy Exceptionalism in Clinton public diplomacy Crisis management Building sympathetic public ecologies The shifting meanings of exceptionalism (Re)creating the nation Towards soft hegemony?

99 102 104 106 108 114

119 119 123 128 133 136 138

143 144 146 151 154 156 157 159 162

Notes

165

Bibliography

210

Index

249

Acknowledgements This book is based on my PhD thesis which was written at the University of Cambridge under the supervision of Professor Geoffrey Lee Williams. Warmest thoughts and gratitude are offered to Geoffrey who was my constructive critic and supportive friend throughout the writing of the thesis. I would also like to sincerely thank Philip Towle of Cambridge for his helpful revision suggestions and John Dumbrell of Keele University for his insightful comments on a draft. To Craig Auchter, Andrew Levy, and David Mason, all of Butler University, who read successive drafts of this work and provided numerous cogent written comments, I am eternally grateful. George Lopez of the University of Notre Dame who read and commented on conference papers based on this study also provided invaluable insights and is owed an even larger thank-you for time taken in general mentorship. Many thanks are also long overdue for Michael Cox and Bob Eccleshall who inspired me as a student at Queen's University, Belfast and encouraged me to do graduate work. My master's and doctoral studies were enabled by a grant from the Department of Education in Northern Ireland and thanks are extended to all involved there. The final changes to the manuscript were, among other projects, enabled by a Visiting Fellowship at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame in 1999±2000 and I gratefully acknowledge the support of then Acting Director of the Institute Robert C. Johansen. For all of those who gave of their time in personal interviews I extend sincere appreciation. Of course, none of the foregoing should be associated with any errors contained in the text and I am solely responsible for the interpretations therein. For their friendship, loving support, and good humor at various times, in different places, during the writing of the book, I extend heartfelt thanks to: Atsuko Abe, Joyce Janca-Aji, Aron Aji, Paul Atkins, Jason Beck, Tristan Anne Borer, Nylie Bradford, Terri Carney, James Cooper, Dave Culbert, John and Marie Darby, Alex Escobar, Sioban Farrell, Munis Faruqui, Mary Hayes, Catherine Hocking, Per Laleng, Walter Levy, Teresa Marti, Clare McGinn, Tony McKibben, Richard Mole, Barbara Nave, Claire and Nate Newkirk, Pratima Prasad, Soma Sen-Gupta, Maureen Sherlock-Glynn, Scott Swanson, Richard Trethewey, Jason Trumpbour, Janice Williams, Tanya WilliamsonSnowden, Ken Tsutsumibayashi, Deborah Wolff; and to the students, too many to name individually, at Butler University and the University of Notre Dame who I have had the pleasure to teach and to learn from. This book is dedicated with love to my husband Andrew Levy, to my parents, and to my sister and brothers; for all they have done and continue to do, I would like express my deepest gratitude. ix

Nothing was inevitable. Managing these historic transformations, both to create new possibilities and to ensure a peaceful transition to a new, vastly safer world, required very active American leadership. Letter of Resignation of James A. Baker III as Secretary of State, 13 August 1993 We must be careful not to use words that will outstrip our capacity to back them up. That is a grave error for any great nation, and one I will try to not commit. William Jefferson Clinton, question and answer session with the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis, 1 April 1993

Introduction

Since 1990 much has been written about the practical challenges ± military, political, diplomatic and economic ± faced by a state released from an armed stand-off by the collapse of its opponent. However, discussion and analysis of the United States' post-Cold War foreign policy has largely ignored an important body of data ± the documentary evidence of the United States' official response to the ending of the Cold War as found in the speeches, statements and interviews of key members of the Bush Administration and later in those of the Clinton campaign and Administration. Focusing on the challenges of role-setting and consensus-building that the end of the Cold War produced for the United States foreign policy elites, this study offers a systematic examination of this transitional public diplomacy. In doing so this book examines the history of a specific and crucial time and place in recent world history, more generally provides insight into the workings of political administrations and how political actions are conditioned by a dynamic created between the attracting call of historical memory and the demands of immediate experience, and finally provides a model, and an illustration of a model, for how rhetoric may be utilized to enhance our understanding of American foreign policy. While it is reasonable to be cautious about the use of rhetoric as a means of policy analysis, it is hoped that this study highlights the utility of such a focus. A rhetoric and theme-centered approach, when used in conjunction with established foreign policy process models, may be a valuable tool for explaining and understanding United States foreign policy. Currently it is undervalued as such a tool but, given the importance of public diplomacy to the survival and effectiveness of administrations, it is particularly useful in a US context. In national elections, the rhetorical effectiveness, image and presence of a candidate are clearly important deciding factors, but in the second half of the twentieth century these factors became essential to the success of entire presidencies. When foreign policy involves the combat of `compassion fatigue',1 pressure from global media2 and competition with other global rhetoric entrepreneurs and freelance diplomats,3 a means of 1

2 American Exceptionalism & US Foreign Policy

awarding analytical priority to rhetoric, a key tool in these endeavors, becomes necessary. Furthermore, public diplomacy can have unintended consequences. US rhetoric is often a primary means by which other international leaders, governments and organizations evaluate the United States and its intentions. This is particularly true of countries that do not have a close relationship with the United States or for whom private diplomacy is intermittent or contentious. For example, in 1998 the Economist reported that the Serbian government's military operations in the province of Kosovo were allegedly encouraged by the United States' public description of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as `terrorists'.4 It is not necessary to accept without question the implication of rational action contained in public diplomacy but neither is it possible to dismiss such rhetoric as meaningless or lacking in consequences. Regardless of whether United States' officials mean what they say or not, US public diplomacy is instrumental either in creating international stability or in undermining it. This alone legitimizes a careful and sensitive analysis of US foreign policy rhetoric.

What is public diplomacy? The rhetoric or public diplomacy (these terms are used interchangeably in the book) of US government officials differs from private diplomacy (although they support each other) in that it is not only exposed to media analysis but specifically designed for media consumption. It is a response to, and a product of, a complex network of elements (overly demarcated but illustratively described as system level, state level and individual level factors), such as changes in the international distribution of power, bureaucratic infighting, the personality and experiences of elites, and competition and coalitions with other rhetorical and policy èntrepreneurs' and `policy networks' both domestic and extra-national.5 Tehranian places public diplomacy as a `top-down process' alongside `people diplomacy' (citizens/nongovernmental actors) and `virtual diplomacy' as the products of a global communications revolution that now supplement traditional diplomacy between governments.6 `Mediated' accounts of events from the press, and even ostensibly `non-political' messages such as films and prime-time television, may be termed `political communication'.7 Some of these are examined in Chapter 1. But this study focuses on official speeches, reports, hearings, `public' letters and statements and press conferences. Even when apparently part of a `ritual' or `ceremonial' event, such persuasive communication has a purpose and often multiple purposes beyond its surface function. In this sense it is strategic. `Strategic political communication', according to Manheim, is a `subset' of political communication which he defines as `the creation, distribution, control, use, processing, and effects of information, as a political resource, whether by governments, organizations

Introduction 3

or individuals'.8 The strategic communicator exploits knowledge of the media, human psychology, public opinion, and culture `to shape and target messages so that their desired effect is maximized' and their unintended effects are minimized, and employs techniques such as `media management, grassroots organizing, image control, and lobbying'.9 Thus not only governments, but individuals, organizations, and suborganizations within government (the President, the State Department, or foreign policy doves in the Defense Department, for example), legislators, lobby groups, a variety of non-governmental organizations, research institutions, corporations, the media and independent academics and policy entrepreneurs engage in competitive strategic political communication. The use of rhetoric by all these actors occurs in intricate complementarity with the policy-making process. Directed towards other states, their publics, and the initiator's own publics, the primary vehicles of governmental public diplomacy are speeches, statements, interviews, strategic symbolic appearances such as wreath-layings, document-signings, foreign visits, and wider cultural, educational, or commercial initiatives and exchanges. This study focuses on the efforts of US government officials to construct and maintain shared beliefs about international affairs, establish interpretive control in the rhetorical-political sphere, and build elite and public consensus through the use of persuasive oral communication.10 The public speeches and statements of the US President, Secretary of State and their staffs have at least the following purposes: setting the policy agenda and promoting particular policies; proposing new directions or even doctrine; maintaining established postures and substituting reassuring rhetoric for concrete policy decisions; influencing the actions of other states, or groups or individual actors within them, and cementing friendships and alliances; attempting to build international and domestic consensus; mobilizing for war; and winning elections. In times of transition especially they are the vehicles not only for the implementation of `pragmatic strategies' but also for the articulation of rallying visions linking past, present, and future endeavors.

Analytical approach and major findings The findings of this study suggest that US political administrations are primarily reliant on their public diplomacy skills in two related ways. Cumulative routine rhetoric creates a climate of belief, a consensus on broad values, which supports and enables the contingent use of rhetoric for addressing specific foreign policy issues and international events. Where public diplomacy is concerned, community-building both precedes and enables crisis management. Periodically, in times of grave crisis, such as war, and in times of slow-breaking crisis, such as international political transformation, the public diplomacy of a President or Secretary State have deterrence, mediation, threat and counter-threat, alliance-building, and ally-supporting


functions. On a day-to-day basis, such official statements have a broader scope. While still concerned, at a lower pitch, with deterrence, mediation, and alliance-maintenance, they are mostly mood shapers, the vehicles for explication of values, grand strategies and overall postures ± what the United States stands for, its purpose and interests. This is necessary ground-work, preparatory agenda-setting, in a broad sense, in an effort to make policymaking easier and create a sympathetic ecology (or ecologies) ± of experts, commentators, and general public ± which is easier to appeal to and persuade in times of crisis. Although the language of crisis is now routinely used by politicians to sell their programs and inspire support,11 study of the President and State Department's public diplomacy between 1989 and 1993 shows how they perceived, and adapted to, a genuine historical turning point. But as this study will show US foreign policy does seem to be conditioned, and sometimes constrained, by the idea of American exceptionalism. A rhetoric and themes-based approach is a useful supplement to established models for foreign policy analysis because it aids the identification of basic driving forces and the motivating ideas, myths and ideals of different Administrations and thus enables a consideration of the constraints and possibilities of future US foreign policy. The conception of the social function of myth used in this study is influenced by Durkheim and Geertz.12 The constructivist approach in international relations,13 for which Durkheim is often acknowledged as one of the major intellectual ancestors, emphasizes the mutually constituting relationship between agents and structures, the effects of cultural values and rules on the shaping of political institutions and creation of political legitimacy.14 This study may be placed within this evolving school of thought.15 In particular, this study draws on Durkheim's theories on the role of religion (and by extension civil religion as in the US case) in legitimating political systems and policies.16 The book examines how political and communication elites in the United States evoked the idea of American exceptionalism for the purposes of community-building (in the Durkheimian sense). It identifies both `collective shock' and what may be termed `general effervescence' as a result of the end of the Cold War. It considers the continuity and discontinuity of the idea of American exceptionalism which although routinely evoked and transgenerational is fluid and dynamic. And it considers the extent to which, and how, concepts of the `sacred' and the `profane' shape the public diplomacy and by extension foreign policy of the United States. `The metaphors a nation employs reveal much about how its perceives reality', as William Leuchtenberg has stated: The unconscious choice of symbols bares the bedrocks of its beliefs. Moreover, the words people use are not neutral artifacts; they shape ideas and behavior. Just as the psychoanalyst listens for slips of the tongue

Introduction 5

or strange incongruities of ideas to help him understand the patient, or the literary critic studies the symbols in a poem or novel, so the historian finds it rewarding to explore the imagery a particular period has used, consciously or unconsciously to interpret its experience.17 As Leuchtenberg suggests, official rhetoric, even where seemingly reiterating hackneyed themes, often reveals an effort to improvise and innovate to suit a changing environment. Chilton has demonstrated with techniques from the study of linguistics ± semantics, pragmatics and discourse analysis ± that examining the metaphors of security discourse allows one to chart dialogues and contests between political actors (states, international institutions, publics).18 Beyond community-building and deterrence strategies the most significant feature of the rhetoric studied for this book was its reliance on recurring `para-ideological' themes. `Para-ideological' is understood and used here in the manner suggested by Claus Mueller. Mueller argues that it is difficult to isolate ideology in an advanced industrial society but possible to detect à collective belief system' in the form of à generalized acceptance of consumer patterns and a diffuse, abstracted agreement about political institutions'. He finds that `collective imagery rooted in material and social compensations and slogans of a ``para-ideological'' nature have taken over some of the functions of traditional ideologies', listing images such as `the great society', `defense of democracy', `power to the people', `law and order', and `the silent majority' as examples.19 In the period both Administrations utilized themes derived from the idea of American exceptionalism in attempts to secure their Presidencies and to maintain a global leadership role for the United States. This adaptive use of American exceptionalism is meaningful beyond a purely strategic function. The similarities of the two administrations' rhetoric on many foreign policy issues illustrated the existence of an institution of rhetoric with deep roots. The differences revealed real divergence in their concerns, styles and values. But the maintenance and recasting of the exceptionalism theme points to the existence of enduring principles which not only influence US foreign policy but are themselves shaped by the United States' relations and actions abroad. This study offers evidence that American exceptionalism is more than a `frame' in foreign policy rhetoric. It concludes that as a para-ideology or value-strategy syncretization,20 American exceptionalism has the potential both to foster and prevent international peace and stability. In addition, an examination of speeches or statements can provide information about what a given Administration identifies as the source and strength of its power and how it perceives the United States' place in the world. At the very least it provides evidence of how certain US elites wish the United States to be viewed either at home or abroad. The emphases and priorities of these statements may be used to identify an administration's overlapping and


interrelated system, state or individual level concerns. They also enable the role of `nation' conceptions to be examined in relation to these three levels. In the cases studied here, system level concerns include international stability, US leadership, Soviet stability and global economic conditions and relations. State level concerns include the need for public consensus on US leadership responsibility and ability, bureaucratic infighting, national economic conditions, and national elections. The individual level factors include post-Cold War cognitive dissonance, Bush and Clinton's personal experiences, and their political generations and socialization. It is possible to draw some conclusions about the relative importance of these factors by studying the thematic content, occasion and intended audiences of official speeches. But as these case studies illustrate the lines between system, state and individual level concerns are blurred, particularly in the case of the Clinton Administration the policy of which to some extent transcends the oft critiqued structuralist compartmentalization.21 The American exceptionalism theme rhetorically links each of these three levels, and its association with the `nation' not only provides access to culture level analysis but allows analysis of how system, state, and individual level influences constitute and are constituted by the ìmagined community'.22 In this sense political speeches are guides to policies, not because of their direct relationship to policies necessarily, but because of what they reveal about the priorities of a given administration and their layers of `para-ideological' allegiances. However, speeches and press conference statements sometimes do have a direct relationship to policies and this relationship is also investigated in the study. This book considers the degree to which the end of the Cold War was a consensus-shattering and paradigm-breaking event for US policy elites. It provides an analysis of how government officials, and in particular Presidents, exert their influence by using their public speaking time to build sympathetic public ecologies as well as for crisis management. Critically examining the `para-ideological' phenomenon of American exceptionalism in official rhetoric, it argues that the words of high level US officials do have meaning, consequences for policy, and implications for international peace and stability. The study of such public diplomacy is vital if the influences on and nuances of US foreign policy are to be fully understood. In addition, the trend in US international leadership away from expensive, unpopular, largescale military interventions to offers of more limited interventions, logistical or moral support suggests an increasing reliance on `soft power'23 and that consequently Administrative rhetoric will only increase in influence, and in importance for scholars. The public diplomacy of the President, Secretary of State, and high level State Department personnel in each Administration, as found in selected cases between 1989 and 1993, was the focus of this study. It has not been attempted to analyze the views and public diplomacy of Administration

Introduction 7

officials in other capacities, although some members of the Defense Department, CIA, and National Security Agency have been referred to in passing to illustrate either a similarity or difference with the perspective of the State Department or President. But the focus has been on those with the clearest international diplomatic functions in an effort to emphasize the relations between domestic consensus-building and foreign policy and how public diplomacy, in both crisis and routine forms, is an essential support to private diplomacy whether crisis or routine. It has not been attempted to document in detail the United States' public diplomacy beyond the Transatlantic area except in the case of the Persian Gulf War. Many other relationships might have been subject to rhetorical analysis in this way ± for example, US public diplomacy towards Japan and China in the period, with the Central and Latin American countries, or towards non-state actors. However, the speeches, statements and interviews given by key members of these Administrations on the end of the Cold War, US±Soviet relations, conditions in the former Soviet states, and the significance of these changes for the United States and international stability in general, constituted the vast majority of their rhetorical output in this period. Most were given in domestic venues or on visits to European/postSoviet states or as addresses at meetings of international institutions. Each could be seen as both a domestic political speech and a foreign policy statement or intervention. The division between spheres is of course increasingly irrelevant in practice and when considering the community- and continuity-building functions of official pronouncements in discrete cases it becomes clear that US official rhetoric is shaped by institutionalized macro-considerations beyond the immediate strategic imperative. The development of case studies dealing first with the collapse of the Eastern bloc, then with the Persian Gulf crisis, the Soviet Coup and transitional Presidential election reflect the dominant concerns of the Administrations between 1989 and 1993. They suggest a Transatlantic focus, a preoccupation with stable transition in the Soviet Union (and not for example with the unstable and disintegrating Yugoslavia), and the building of domestic consensus and political power bases. The focus of this study is these Administrations' public diplomacy towards different audiences in an ìmagined' and hoped for Transatlantic/post-Soviet community (comprising different sectors of the American public and interest groups, Western European allies in their State and institutional forms, Eastern European governments and peoples, the Soviet Union and CIS). An important feature of this rhetoric was its putative universality which is significant in broader US foreign and economic policy as is the blurring found in this rhetoric between notions of American and Transatlantic exceptionalism. The use of a phrase or idea on one occasion alone was not considered to be significant unless it clearly was a counterpoint or contradiction to some previously recurring theme. Rather the frequently recurring themes, the


occasion, and the intended audiences of the speeches are the main units of analysis. The case studies are based on a comprehensive analysis of Presidents Bush and Clinton's domestic and foreign addresses, statements, and remarks as compiled in the Public Papers of the President 1989 to 1994, and selected addresses and statements of other officials as collected in the Department of State Bulletin (later Foreign Policy Bulletin), Current Policy, White House Press Releases, releases from the United States Information Service (USIS), and Vital Speeches of the Day. These are supplemented with interviews, conducted by the author, in which former government officials and policy analysts offered their recollections and evaluations of the period. However, the citation of their remarks in no way constitutes an endorsement by them of this study or its central claims. The analysis is rooted in a synthesis of existing literature on political communication, international relations and foreign policy analysis, and the history of the idea of American exceptionalism.

Public diplomacy and policy: A special relationship Much scholarship and debate has occurred about the relationship between rhetoric and policy and the uses or abuses of rhetorical privilege. Often the accusation is made that official rhetoric is a smokescreen employed in `the legitimization of regimes and the acquiescence of people in actions they had no part in initiating'.24 Others argue that US political rhetoric is essentially democratic and substitutes for violent conflict enabling change to occur in an òrderly' fashion.25 It can `reflect serious deliberation about the common good'.26 But most agree that political rhetoric is a form of political action and not simply its substitute. Kenneth Burke, leading the study of ideological or doctrinal ìnvestments' in political language, observed that the role of rhetoric was `to sharpen up the pointless and blunt the too sharply pointed'.27 This approach emphasizes both the strategic diplomatic, even community-building functions of political rhetoric, and a seemingly inherent dynamic towards functional dissembling. Two types of analysis have traditionally been employed in studies of political communication. Rhetoric has been examined in terms of its `manifest functions' ± the purpose attributed to it by the speaker ± and for its `latent objectives' ± the private interests or institutional interests served.28 Both approaches contain problems of subjectivity and access to information about the policy-making process. Larson points out that `representational' analysis of language can be biased by the private codes, strategic aims, and exaggeration of foreign policy elites, although her focus is on the private papers and communications of these elites rather than on public diplomacy. Larson argues that combining the `representational' and ìnstrumental' approaches with a focus on the ìnstrumental' context is the best methodology.29 This study attempts to combine a `manifest' and `latent' analysis by examining the declaratory strategies and policies of official rhetoric within

Introduction 9

its international and domestic political contexts, and by examining the latent `para-ideological' and cultural elements of this rhetoric which is manifest in the themes routinely employed. Transition and rhetoric It is particularly important in periods of political transition to closely study the rhetoric of elite òpinion makers',30 whether non-governmental `sentinels', identified by Harold Lasswell as a commentating class who raise the alarm at moments of shifting circumstances or peril,31 or the governmental elites charged with responding in policy to changing circumstances and to the pressures of media and public opinion. In a period of political transition the analysis of political rhetoric may provide, as Edelman, Medhurst and Leuchtenberg have suggested, evidence of the speaker's view of the strategic environment. But as Robert Jervis points out, it should not be presumed that rhetorical strategies, rational or not, have no influence on the beliefs and attitudes of individual policy-makers and on the policy-making process itself. In strategic political communication, and particularly at an interstate level, deception is often necessary. One side-effect of deception of this kind is that orators may come to be persuaded by their own arguments: Only a few people are cynical enough to prevent their own views from being clouded by what they say, not only in public but also to their subordinates. [. . .] Decisionmakers who say they feel encircled not only often act in a way to make this prophecy self-fulfilling, they often come to believe that the evidence supports this view.32 A similar phenomenon of institutional acculturation is reported by Carol Cohn who describes how the adoption of customary professional jargon (in her case the language of nuclear war and deterrence used by defense intellectuals) stimulated substantial shifts in her thinking about defense issues.33 In Cohn's case even firm ideological opposition and scholarly distance was broken down by immersion in a community of discourse. Familiar conceptual frameworks or socially integrating conversions are particularly alluring in times of domestic or geopolitical transition when, as Henry Kissinger has put it: `the old order is obviously disintegrating while the shape of its replacement is highly uncertain'. In such circumstances, Kissinger claims, `what passes for planning is frequently the projection of the familiar into the future'.34 Elections also constitute transitions and may or may not constitute a political sea-change or crisis transition. However, election success is only the first hurdle for any Administration, and incumbents are required to make a consistent effort to control how the policy agenda is set and how their policies are reported. To that end the strategies of the election campaign are often retained as `the model for governing', campaign staff


become government advisors,35 and transition strategies merge into the routine. Routine rhetoric More speeches are made in response to shifts in public opinion and positive events and less speeches accompany stable polls and poor economic conditions. But overall, research has shown that regardless of style or content, the act alone of making a speech improves a President's popularity, adding on average three percentage points to his/her approval rating.36 The `routine appeal to public opinion' by US governmental officials developed in tandem with the evolution of the mass media in the early twentieth century.37 The use of speech-writers was institutionalized under the administration of Calvin Coolidge in 1923. Coolidge set the precedent whereby speeches were written by staff and only edited by the President.38 Today this division of labor mostly endures, although this depends on the inclinations of individual Presidents, and for important addresses such as inaugurals and the State of the Union, he/she usually assumes some of the writing responsibilities.39 The broadcasting of speeches, first on radio and later on television, dramatically increased the size of audiences and made it more important for official addresses to be strategically designed to have broad appeal and cause minimal offence both at home and abroad.40 Not only are speech-writers important shapers of the President's image, they are also charged with constructing his/her `rhetorical legacy'.41 And according to Tulis, `the speechmaking shop has become an institutional locus of policy-making in the White House, not merely an annex to policymaking'.42 Indeed, on occasion, consultants, advisors or speech-writers can `write in' a commitment to their favored policy as a means of influencing the decision-making process.43 The organization which has developed around the creation of official speeches means that the speeches themselves now have a `corporate' identity,44 and are treated as `documents' which reflect `the joint decisions of an administration'.45 The consequences of this arrangement for rhetorical innovation are profound. Inoffensive, ultra-moderate, compromise rhetoric is often the result of the `group-think' procedures which dominate modern speech-writing.46 As a result strategic rhetoric rarely breaks new ground; and, as this study demonstrates, even in a period of transition, perhaps especially in such a period, speech-writers take refuge in familiar metaphors, analogies, and frames of reference which also contribute to the circumscribing of policy. Transitional rhetoric becomes standard procedure The evolution of the Truman Doctrine provides an important case study of transitional rhetoric, illustrates the relationship between rhetoric and the development of foreign policy, and shows how external international con-

Introduction 11

ditions after World War Two made official speeches vital foreign policy instruments. The decision of the Truman Administration to provide aid for Greece and Turkey in 194747 illustrates how internal debate can be decisively ended and a consensus for a new policy created by the persuasive rhetoric of a participant in the policy-making process. It also demonstrates how the necessity of persuasive public rhetoric to justify a policy can crucially shape the character of that policy. Such rhetoric may not fully reflect the reasoning of the involved decision-makers but rather their view of what constitutes a compelling argument. However, beyond the justification of a single policy, rhetorical interpretations can set paradigms which have long-term consequences for policy in general. Rhetoric employed to cope with crisis transitions can become routine. A crucial meeting was held at the White House on February 27, 1947, at which Secretary of State George C. Marshall made the case for Greece/Turkey aid to congressional leaders. Marshall's interpretation of the issue was apparently matter-of-fact, describing the importance of Greece as an ally, justifying aid on this issue and on humanitarian grounds, and pointing out that support for Turkey would enable the maintenance of British influence in the area and prevent a Soviet gain. However, his presentation was so unpersuasive, according to Dean Acheson, that the then Under Secretary felt compelled to intervene. In desperation I whispered to him [Marshall] a request to speak. This was my crisis. For a week I had nurtured it. These congressmen had no conception of what challenged them; it was my task to bring it home. [. . .] In the past eighteen months, I said, Soviet pressure on the Straits, on Iran, and on northern Greece had brought the Balkans to the point where a highly possible Soviet breakthrough might open three continents to Soviet penetration. Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest domestic Communist parties in Western Europe. The Soviet Union was playing one of the greatest gambles in history at minimal cost. It did not need to win all the possibilities. Even one or two offered immense gains. We and we alone were in a position to break up the play. These were the stakes that British withdrawal from the eastern Mediterranean offered to an eager and ruthless opponent.48 It was Acheson's vivid interpretation which, according to his own memoir and that of Joseph M. Jones, changed the minds of the congressmen. Arthur Vandenburg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, pledged support if the situation was explained to Congress and the public in the same terms that Acheson had used in his meeting with them. Thus,


Acheson's successful rhetorical interpretation of events during internal debate became the basis for Truman's public speech asking for aid to Greece and Turkey, the speech which articulated the Truman Doctrine. These policy-makers were not only competing with each other for interpretive control, they were also competing with an emerging media interpretation of Soviet placatory behavior and with the American public's seeming complacency. Leffler recounts that some policy-makers referred to the need to `shock' or èlectrify' the American public into supporting aid.49 Acheson's interpretation was successful in forging a consensus among a circle of policy elites not only because they found it to be inherently persuasive, but also because it promised to be convincing to the wider public. Top officials were instructed to make the case to important journalists, newspaper owners, and member of the business community. Truman established a special committee to prepare an address in which there was to be `no hedging', `hesitation' or `doubletalk'.50 The resulting speech to a Joint Session of Congress on March 12, 1947 not only succeeded in obtaining $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey policy but was also praised by the media as an `historic landmark in American foreign policy' as important as the Monroe Doctrine and the US participation in World War Two.51 There was not unanimous and uniform praise for the policy or the speech,52 but the Administration had achieved interpretive control. The majority of Congress and the American people accepted the speech's basic premises. Controlling the policy representation, the President and State Department had control over policy-making. And the speech also set a standard for future policy. In the public information campaign on aid to Greece and Turkey, President Truman's speech was the single most important event in securing a short-term policy success and in the long-term setting what amounted to a policy agenda. Thus Acheson's presentation to Congressional leaders had long-term policy consequences even though it was only intended to sell the policy of aid to Greece and Turkey. As with internal efforts at persuasion, rhetorical initiatives to gain interpretive control over the policy image are part of the process of testing a policy's viability in public. `Trial balloon' statements can be used sometimes to gauge public and broader congressional attitudes to a proposed policy. Other times, as the Greece and Turkey case demonstrates, the `trial balloon' is launched internally, even unintentionally, and the success or failure of this test determines the tone of the wider campaign. Of course, an Administration's determination to implement a particular policy is a spur to a rhetorical campaign. The crafting of rhetoric bridges the gap between the policy decision and the public presentation. However, as this case shows, the public presentation needs may also shape policy decisions.53 As this case also illustrates, the development of the `rhetorical presidency'54 was intricately bound with the development of a Cold War. The Cold War increased the power of rhetoric and raised the stakes of any official

Introduction 13

utterance. And in this period the President's ability to influence international opinion became increasingly important.55 Added to this, the administration of John F. Kennedy marked the emergence of the `television star' President.56 In the period, the White House began to offer special services to the press such as formal and informal briefings, press releases, interviews, and transcripts in an attempt to control media coverage. Barilleaux claims that the television media is `non-neutral' and will tend towards a negative analysis if the Administration is passive. Presidents seek to circumvent congress and organized interests by addressing the public directly through the news media but also need to preempt or neutralize media criticism. Ronald Reagan is said to epitomize success in this area. He was the first to establish a White House Office of Communications within which all aspects of presidential public relations could be organized, from speech-writing to the scheduling of press conferences. In his first term Reagan only gave half as many press conferences as his predecessor while actively practicing ìmage manipulation'.57 Such ìmage manipulation' often takes the form of strategically planned Presidential appearances ± for example Reagan's visit to a Normandy beach on the fortieth anniversary of D-Day,58 Bush's Malta Summit with Gorbachev held aboard ship on a stormy sea (discussed in Chapter 2), and Clinton's homage at the grave of John F. Kennedy on the day of his inauguration.59 These provide powerfully symbolic visual images that are supplemented with strategically crafted rhetoric. During wars, image management is a central element of military strategy, and as war making has become a more high-tech activity the techniques used for image management have also become increasingly sophisticated.60 Both post-Cold War Presidents have perpetuated the `rhetorical presidency'.

Rhetoric and models of foreign policy analysis Each of the established models for explaining the US foreign policy process suggest that the relationship between rhetoric and policy is a complicated one. Rhetoric is the means by which policy is presented and shaped as a result of the competition between policy-makers; policy-makers compete for control over speeches because this equals control over policy (bureaucratic politics model); rhetoric is the means by which policy-makers create a climate of belief amongst the public and other policy entrepreneurs which aids their policy implementation (incremental and agenda-setting models); rhetoric is to some extent a product of the personalities and experiences of policy-makers, as are their policies, and therefore is a reflection of personal values and motivations (personality/psychological model); and it is created not only by individual leaders, such as a President, but also by institutions of speech-writers, and influenced by organizational norms and operative traditions such as may exist in the State Department. It is therefore possible to


identify an establishment of rhetorical themes (organizational process model); rhetoric creates order out of the chaos of policy-making competition and contributes to a policy's, a president's and a country's success by presenting a rational, prudent, and unified administration (rational actor model). Taken together the different relationships between rhetoric and policy demonstrated by the established models of the foreign policy process suggest that speeches and statements can and should be examined for (1) their `para-ideological' significance and (2) their significance in strategic political terms, that is, how they support and further the broad and narrow policy aims of an administration. Bureaucratic politics A competition for influence over speech-writing and making occurs amongst numerous policy-makers and advisors according to the bureaucratic politics model.61 Policy is often made in the midst of this struggle for control over the contents and tone of a speech, a process which Dean Acheson likened to `guerrilla warfare'.62 As a result of bureaucratic politics, official speeches can become `vehicles for the formation of policy' with speech-writers acting as `brokers' between different advisors or policy-makers.63 Sometimes Presidents use speeches to shift the course of foreign policy without consultation with other members of the bureaucracy. Such `new directions' speeches are prepared in secret amongst a few key staff and consultations only occur at a very high level minimizing the possibility of internal objections.64 Presidents may also use speeches to settle bureaucratic infighting by publicly giving a `hunting license' to one faction by making reference in a speech to the approach they favor.65 Similarly `trial balloon' statements or background briefings are used to test public reaction to a policy and/or to test methods of `softening' anticipated repercussions. Background briefings can be used by officials wishing to pressure a President into supporting some position. The official speaks to the media, giving `the impression' that a certain policy is a fait accompli. If public support seems forthcoming the President may be unwilling to reverse a popular policy.66 Incrementalism The incremental decision-making model emphasizes that policy is made through a `process of trial and error', by muddling through, with a shortterm focus.67 Because of the complexity of the problems that policy-makers face and the lack of certainty about the future or the consequences of policy change, limited options are considered when making policy decisions and only those options which are minimally different from existing policy are given serious consideration.68 This can promote incrementalist media strategies. Since the press will shape the structure of debate on policy, officials find themselves in constant struggle for control over interpretation. Such a strategy is evident in President Clinton's explanation of his approach to the

Introduction 15

media: ìf I am not there with a message, someone else is, with their message'.69 While Presidents sometimes attempt to change the attitudes of the public, policy is also shaped by the official view of the public's unchangeable preferences. Thus, a gradual, carefully built but relentless case is made to the public. As with incremental policy in general, this rhetoric follows tried and tested courses and changes only marginally over time and from policy to policy. This model finds policy-making and speech-making to be fundamentally conservative and status quo oriented. Organizational process model Similarly, according to the organizational process model of decision-making, the views and, thus, the policies proposed by government officials are limited because of a process of institutional conditioning and recruitment and training procedures which create òrganizational parochialism'.70 It is argued that this is particularly the case with the military and foreign service. Hierarchical structures in these institutions promote conformity in thought and activity. Policies are affected by institutional self-interest, the need to justify ongoing practices and expenditures, the desire to increase the power of the institution, or to maintain its existence. Policies are curtailed by perceptions of what is or is not compatible with the institution's èssence' (essential mission) or are implemented without sanction or alteration through routine procedures.71 The organizational process and bureaucratic politics model are often blended in analysis of foreign policy-making.72 Incrementalism could clearly be seen as a process (rather than a distinct model) in both. Agenda-setting Where bureaucratic politics is a competition between individuals and groups within and between different organizations or institutions of government, such as State, Defense, and the President's office, agenda-setting is a wider struggle between an administration and a variety of external `policy entrepreneurs' for control over how a policy is understood by the public and the choice of the venue within which it will be debated.73 In competition with each other and with government officials, these `policy entrepreneurs' ± interest or lobby groups, or committees in Congress, for example ± seek to establish a `policy monopoly', that is control over how a policy is understood by the public, the `policy image', and over the `policy venue', that is where a policy will be debated and decisions made. The challenge for would-be policy monopolists (Presidents included), according to Baumgartner and Jones, is to find a `powerful supporting idea' that will not only give their policy credibility, but also lend credibility to their role as the policy-proposer: These buttressing ideas are generally connected to core political values which can be communicated directly and simply: such as images of progress, participation, patriotism, independence from foreign domination,


fairness, economic growth which no one taken seriously in the political system can contest. If a group can convince others that their activities serve such lofty goals, then it may be able to create a policy monopoly.74 Where incremental decision-making models underline that policy is made gradually through piecemeal adjustments, `trial and error', and `muddling through', agenda-setting scholars emphasize that public attention is anything but incremental. On the contrary, they argue, previously marginal and uninteresting issues `burst' on to the political scene to suddenly make news headlines and preoccupy officials. Issues are propelled to the top of the agenda by `focusing events, chance occurrences, public-opinion campaigns by organized interests, and speeches by public officials'. Public attention may not ensure that a policy will be made in response, but where policy does follow it will not be made incrementally.75 Edelman views such `disruptive acts of agenda access' as symbolic obscurantism designed to produce mass acquiescence.76 Baumgartner and Jones suggest that an examination of agenda-setting and `negative feedback' (the process of gradual policy change as a result of the mobilization and then countermobilization of different interest groups) reveals that agenda-setting and negative feedback ìnteract' to create a relatively stable political system punctuated periodically `by short bursts of dramatic change [that] alter forever the prevailing arrangements in a policy system'.77 Thus for Presidents and their key staff, speech-writing and making is part of a struggle for control over interpretation. Sometimes this struggle occurs within the bureaucracy; sometimes it occurs between the President and Congress, lobby groups and the media; and sometimes such a struggle for interpretive hegemony occurs in both arenas simultaneously. The same issue may be described in different ways depending on the target audience. Examples of this are discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Constituencies are broadened, according to Cobb and Elder, in a series of concentric circles. In the strategic rhetoric of policy-makers, issues are explained ìn broader and broader terms' to mobilize `larger and larger groups'. Firstly an issue is debated amongst specialists, then amongst the attentive public, then the informed public, and finally the general public.78 It can be expected that when the aim is to mobilize the entire nation in support of US international leadership and also to attain international support, the rhetorical explanations of the salient issues will be sweeping because `those wishing to mobilize broad groups attempt to focus on highly emotional symbols or easily understood themes'. When àrcane' or complex rhetoric is used, the aim is not to mobilize but to restrict debate.79 In the long term, the aim of policy elites is to ìnsulate themselves from the political system' by creating and maintaining consensus in support of their authority in specific policy areas.80 In this battle, rhetoric and the use of symbols are vital strategic tools.

Introduction 17

Personality/psychology/political experience models It has also been argued that the goals of policy-makers are influenced by their personalities, their backgrounds, and the generations to which they belong. The defining political or foreign policy events of the period when an individual comes of political age are said to shape that individual's views of politics and foreign policy ever after.81 Thus, political formation and hence policy preferences will be very different for those who come of age during the Depression, World War Two, Vietnam, or the Persian Gulf War. Other scholars have suggested that psychological traits of an individual, developed not just as a result of political education but due to other long-standing environmental influences such as religious upbringing, ethnicity, or class, may influence a leader's predispositions and/or lead to misperceptions which affect policy. Policy-makers' `belief systems' form filtering lenses that influence not only the character and focus of policies designed but the kind of information considered by decision-makers in the process.82 Personality types, `cognitive styles' and òperational codes' may also determine how different alternatives are weighed and how policy is implemented.83 Group dynamics in decision-making have been found to limit options considered and conservatively constrain foreign policy.84 More recently, Shapiro et al. have shown through computer simulations that there is a relationship between the discursive practices of decision-makers, shaped by their values, beliefs and statuses in the decision-making group, and the public debate over policy.85 However, an analysis of President Bush's rhetoric during the Persian Gulf War (see Chapter 3) illustrates the difficulty of attributing a rhetorical style to personality or personal experience. For example, some commentators suggested that Bush's speeches and statements displayed his personal investment in the war, his own anger and bellicosity, and sense of self-righteousness. However, these are features of a particular genre of political rhetoric ± the wartime mobilization. Personality may influence how a President handles the speech-writing process and the extent to which he/she is involved at all. For example, Reagan, although `hands-off' where policy discussions were concerned, took an active part in speech-writing.86 Eisenhower and Johnson also were serious speech-crafters. Nixon permitted only a small circle to be included in the speech-drafting process, but Carter entertained so many ideas and drafts that a coherent final product was almost impossible to produce.87 Speechwriters, although influential, assume the roles of `subordinate collaborator[s]' and the delivering official (President or other) is ultimately responsible for the content and tone of a speech.88 The historical personality (and legacy) of a President or Secretary of State, for example, is a composite creation which may be a product of image-making necessity driven by community-building and crisis management concerns. This adds an intriguing element to the study of the personality/psychology dimensions of


foreign policy-making. The attempt to live up to a politically expedient personality may also shape policy to match. Alternatively, as Jervis has suggested, policy-makers may come to believe their own rhetoric even if initially aware that it was cynically designed to serve a particular purpose. Rational actor models Rational actor approaches neglect political conflicts, bureaucratic conflicts and personal conflicts. Rather they presume that policy is made by a unified body of decision-makers, acting prudently in pursuit of clear goals and having rationally weighed all of the options. According to such models, decision-makers plan ahead, learn from the past, and then choose the policy likely to produce the best possible overall outcome. Although this may be a simplification of the policy-making process, a unitary rational actor strategy is an important element of the speech-making process. The speech-making process makes order out of the chaos of policy and policy debate. In creating the illusion of clear goals it also sometimes creates their reality, just as the `trial balloon' technique often ties a President to a policy. As the bureaucratic politics approach shows, competition between policy-makers for control over policy and over speeches is based on the evidence that, once made public, a policy is provided with concreteness. Although a speech may be a compromise response to conflicting goals within the bureaucracy, it reaches the public as a policy made on the basis of governmental consensus, rational decisions, the weighing of all of the options, forward planning, an understanding of and analysis of past policies, and an appreciation of history. Sometimes it amounts to an administration's brave face rather than its strategic plan. But most often it is both. All of the examples in this study illustrate how, as public diplomacy, the speeches and statements of the President imply that an administration is rational and unified even when that may not have been the case. Indeed it is essential that they do so. Clearly, an event viewed through the lenses of the bureaucratic politics, organizational process, agenda-setting, personality and rational actor models will be explained very differently by each. Graham Allison demonstrated this in his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis.89 It is significant that, despite the tendency of each of these models to draw different, sometimes contrasting, conclusions about the characteristics, causes and significance of an event, each explicitly or implicitly refers to the importance of rhetoric. However, each model provides different explanations of why rhetoric is important. The bureaucratic politics model emphasizes its strategic nature and its value as a political resource, a powerful tool for those who wish to influence policy from within government. The incremental and agendasetting models also underline the strategic purpose of rhetoric and its consensus-building role but describe a broader competition for interpretive control involving the media, Congress and other policy elites. These

Introduction 19

approaches are most useful for uncovering the strategies of officials as they respond to alternative arguments and for considering how they judge threats to their interpretative control. The incremental model, like the organizational process model, finds that rhetoric is rarely innovative but conservatively aimed at slowing and controlling the processes of change. The organizational process model suggests that a rhetorical establishment or tradition exists from which policy-makers draw previously successful images, phrases, and analogies. The personality model underlines rhetoric's revelatory qualities; it reveals a speaker's personal experience and beliefs. The rational actor model omits reference to rhetoric but all policy speeches cry rational action. Thus, whether rationality is in reality the driving force, the public is persuaded that it is; and in trying to deceive others, some policy-makers may also come to deceive themselves. Considering the rhetoric of government officials from a rational actor point of view is useful for gauging how others will view US foreign policy. Analysts attempting to understand the significance of rhetoric through content analysis and comparison with past speeches and policy will join world leaders, international organizations, transnational and subnational groups of both political and commercial nature, especially those that do not have access to US government by other means. A comprehensive understanding of US foreign policy requires analysis drawing from each of the areas emphasized by these different models discussed above. And although rhetorical analysis is implied in each, a more deliberate focus on rhetoric would be valuable.

Recurring themes The importance of rhetorical analysis lies in what it may add to our understanding of US foreign policy when studied critically and used in synthesis with these models of the US foreign policy process. A rhetorical themes focus helps break down the artificial compartmentalization of elements of the policy-making process implied in the models described above. Ernest May provides the rationale for the development of a rhetoric-centered approach. He recommends ànalysis of words commonly used in government' because èach word has not only roots and current definitions but also connotations partly traceable to past contexts', and these connotations change with the contexts and personnel of US foreign policy.90 Henrik Larsen has developed and tested a discourse analysis methodology that emphasizes how state interests and external pressures are `filtered' through foreign policy discourses (in France, Britain and Germany) and finds that `discourse is a domestic structural factor which frames foreign policy'.91 A recurring themes approach enables a consideration of the `relationship' between political rhetoric and the social, cultural, and historical context within which political elites operate and design public appeals. For example, US Presidential rhetoric is not just a product of competition and collaboration between


official policy-makers and policy entrepreneurs. It is also a `relationship' developed between the `foremost rhetor', as Elshtain has called the President, and the United State' people, culture, and history.92 Rhetorical focus allows examination of the ideological or para-ideological impulses of US policy over time and identification of ethnocentric, militarist or gendered foreign policy thinking and the degree to which this is reflexive or determined. The organizational process and agenda-setting models could provide this, but do not because of their foci, the first on standard operating procedures and the narrower ideology of departments, and the second on the adversarial talents of different policy entrepreneurs. The bureaucratic politics model does not attempt to do this, nor does the incremental model. The rational actor model denies that ideologies or para-ideologies are influential. Additionally a rhetorical themes focus provides material for an analysis of how foreign policy is àdaptive' to the international environment and whether it can be `transformative',93 and how exogenous and endogenous forces interact to create US foreign policy, and to shape the discourse of international politics and international relations in general.94 Constructivist analyses of international politics, for example, suggest that `states learn from one another' and from `non-state actors'.95 Like state interests, governmental rhetoric is increasingly influenced by ideas and discourse emerging from a global society of states, organizations, corporations, and multiplyaligned elites in different modes of competition and dialogue. Chilton illustrates this in his study of the `common European house' metaphor in the security debates and institution-building of policy elites from Russia, the US and Western Europe in the late 1980s/early 1990s.96 Recurring themes that suggest deeply embedded national institutions of rhetoric, as found in this study, are especially interesting in the context of complex dialogues between and within èpistemic communities'.97 And it must be presumed that an official seeking to persuade the public will use language or evoke ideas which he or she expects to have meaning for the public.98 In this case, as Michael Hunt points out, ìnterpretive naiveteÂ may reside not in taking rhetoric seriously but rather in failing to listen carefully for its recurrent themes and values'.99 Most of the `para-ideological' themes identified in the course of this study are far from new, but the products or adaptations of traditions of American political thought reaching back to the Puritans. Like ideologies and religions such `para-ideologies' have a `stabilizing' function in society and normally operate to the benefit of the dominant class or group. A study of rhetorical themes, the speeches in which they appear, the audiences to whom they are addressed, and the historical and political contexts in which they are used by policy-makers, may aid scholars in identifying the shifting priorities of US administrations and their interlocking system, state, and individual level concerns as well as the `para-ideological' nature of their communications and their nation-constituting functions.

Introduction 21

Rhetorical themes are developed as part of a strategy and reflect present traumas and concerns, historical successes, operative traditions, and the leader's personality. In this regard, it is interesting to note the differences in the themes most often employed by Bush and Clinton. For example, Bush used Lincoln, World War Two and Cold War themes in 1989, and Hitler and Vietnam themes during the Persian Gulf War. Clinton's early speeches were dominated by New Covenant and New Deal themes. The differences in policy focus, political experience and para-ideology suggested by the contrasts in these recurring themes make the mutual reliance of Bush and Clinton on an overarching message of American exceptionalism even more significant. These themes were not window-dressing; they defined presidencies and to a significant extent created these Administrations' historical legacies. From the moment of their utterance they became publicly accessible, official documents of the Administration's posture and policies. Efforts to `spin' ill-received pronouncements or diplomatic faux-pas also became part of the historical record, as Bush's `chicken Kiev' speech and Brent Scowcroft's retraction demonstrated (see Chapter 4). The dynamic mutual shaping relationship between rhetoric and cultural practice or organization also helps explain the finding of this study that the place of Àmerican exceptionalism' in the US foreign policy process is as a value-strategy syncretization with broad community-building functions.

The structure of the book Chapter 1 traces the historical evolution of the theme of American exceptionalism in the foreign policy rhetoric and related actions of US Administrations and then examines the rhetorical and ideational context created by the end of the Cold War for a policy-making establishment conditioned by such rhetoric and history. Chapters 2 through 5 examine in detail the rhetorical themes and strategies of the Bush and Clinton Administrations in four discernable phases of the Cold War to post-Cold War transition. Chapter 2 focuses on the immediate reaction of the Bush Administration to the revolutions in Eastern/Central Europe, its relations with the Soviet Union and its Republics, and its promotion of the reunification of Germany and the maintenance of NATO. In Chapter 3, the focus is on the Persian Gulf War, the so-called `first test' of US power in the post-Cold War period. Chapter 4 focuses on the Soviet coup, the weakening power of Gorbachev, instability in and the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the insecurity of its nuclear weapons and materials. In Chapter 5, the Clinton Administration's redefinition of US foreign policy as co-equal to domestic policy in a global economy is considered through an examination of the rhetorical traditions and innovations during the Administration's first year in office. The question of whether a rhetorical shift and policy change can be


identified with the election of President Clinton is considered. Having identified one common recurring but variegated theme ± American exceptionalism ± the conclusion to the study considers what the domination of this theme in US public diplomacy suggests about US foreign policy.

1

(R)evolution of an Idea

The recurring theme of American exceptionalism American exceptionalism is a ubiquitous theme of US politics from state and local to national arenas with deep cultural roots. Numerous scholars and commentators, both foreigners and American-born, as well as political and religious leaders have evoked this idea, which implies the United States' moral superiority as well as the uniqueness of its origins, political system, social organization and values and cultural and religious characteristics. It has been used to legitimize both idealist and pragmatic, domestic as well as foreign policies. For the most part, where exceptionalism has been cited by US leaders it has justified, or rallied approval for, an internationalist foreign policy. But the idea of exceptionalism has also legitimized isolationism and has been the spur for periods of national disillusionment and `selfcondemnation'. Originating in the Puritan vision of the New World `city on a hill', the idea of American exceptionalism evolved in tandem with an evolution in the United States' power. From explaining the United States' God-ordained mission to be a reforming counter to European corruptness, exceptionalism has been evoked to account for, or to enable, US leadership during every important period of geopolitical transition since the late nineteenth century. The pervasiveness of the idea makes American exceptionalism the `para-ideological' umbrella beneath which extend such related concepts and phrases as `manifest destiny', `city on a hill', Àmerican dream' and `new world order'. Other recurring motifs of US foreign policy rhetoric discussed in this book, such as `moral responsibility', Àmerican credibility', `protection and extension of democracy', `containment', èxorcism of Vietnam', are also derived from this `para-ideological' root. The theme of American exceptionalism is `para-ideological' because it is a crystallization of a set of related ideas which explain the world and the US role therein. It does not have the coherence of an ideology nor has it been codified as a means towards some definable political end, but it underwrites much of US foreign policy. 23


Americans do not embrace ideologies, according to Richard Hofstadter, because America is an ideology.1 To state that America is an ideology is to argue that a set of ideas that epitomize the American way of life and values (usually freedom, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire are listed2) drive every policy decision; that it is relative to these ideas that the world is explained. Such a claim does not necessarily undervalue the importance of factors such as bureaucratic politics, organizational process, agenda-setting, and international system pressures, for by its nature an ideology functions both within and between these processes. This `religious' but theoretically non-sectarian (nationally incorporative and universalistic), political but non-partisan `creed' has not prevented conflict. It has often been the basis for conflict about domestic and foreign policies and the spur for conflict between the United States and those identified as òther' or enemy. But it has also simultaneously offered the means to resolve conflict through community-building in the domestic arena most especially, but also by extension in an international community of states. Tensions between promotion of freedom and tolerance and promotion of homogenization and control, between overconfidence and self-doubt, and, as Stanley Hoffman has put it, between a desire for harmony and a contradictory pull towards violence3 destabilize American exceptionalism as a coherent idea as does the contradiction between sovereignty-maintaining and globalizing impulses. Alexis de Tocqueville was the first to explicitly refer to America as èxceptional' relative to all other countries,4 but the uniqueness and moral superiority of America is referred to in the earliest writings of the Puritan colonists. In 1630, Massachusetts Bay Colony Governor John Winthrop described the Puritan mission to be a moral beacon for the world: `For wee must Consider that wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people are uppon us'.5 The Great Migration of 1630 consisted of pilgrims who left with a positive sense of mission, of being a chosen people blessed by a covenant with God. They embarked upon àn errand into the wilderness' as Samuel Danforth proclaimed in 1670.6 And even when Puritan influence declined, an important legacy was left in the shape of a belief in the American mission to be a secular moral exemplar if not a religious one.7 The Puritan idea of American exceptionalism was further enhanced by Enlightenment ideals; the American mission to remake the world in its image was justified not just by God but by reason and in the cause of progress and human perfectibility. Yet even at this stage there were two strands to American exceptionalism, one which entailed remodeling the world according to American ideals and another which envisaged the promotion of American superiority `within the limits of the established international order'.8 According to Varg, idealism in US foreign relations was dominant during the Revolution, decreased under Washington, and became dominant again under Jefferson. Varg pinpoints tensions in

(R)evolution of an Idea 25

domestic politics and changing economic interests as the chief influences on the extent to which idealism was a driving force of policy. But despite internal disagreements about the details of policy, and although idealism competed with realism, there was consistently broad consensus on American exceptionalism. Defined in contrast to the Old World of feudalism, aristocracy, and intolerance, the United States was a new order based on reason, freedom, virtue, and equality before the law.9 The Monroe Doctrine, enunciated in 1823 and policy by 1860, illustrates how the idea of American exceptionalism and the perception of European `threat' not only spurred separation from Europe but also legitimized expansion on the American continent and in the Far East. By the end of the nineteenth century, the United States was an imperial power having acquired the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, and part of Samoa. The `manifest destiny' justification was again an extension of the idea of American exceptionalism. John L. O'Sullivan, writing in the Democratic Review in 1845, described the annexation of Texas as `the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions'.10 The phrase `manifest destiny' was used by Massachusetts congressional representative Robert C. Winthrop on January 3, 1846, during congressional debate on a resolution for a joint occupation of the Oregon Territory with Great Britain. Winthrop opposed the resolution and cited as justification of his position `that new revelation of right which has been designated as the right of our manifest destiny to spread over the whole continent'.11 Like Frederick Jackson Turner's `frontier thesis',12 the `manifest destiny' idea implied that the United States' expansion was, guided by Providence, a predestined mission which could not be neglected. Turner argued that a distinctive American character and democracy were created as a result of the settlement of the frontier. The frontier's `wilderness' was not only a haven for the development of democracy and equality, but a `crucible' for ethnic mixing: `The frontier is the line of the most rapid and effective Americanization. In the crucible of the frontier the immigrants were Americanized, liberated, and fused into a mixed race, English in neither nationality nor characteristics.'13 Taken to its extreme, the `manifest destiny' belief became a mystical statement of racial destiny. The United States' place was at `the head of the constructing and redeeming nations of the earth'; otherwise the world would disintegrate into `barbarism and night'.14 The evolution of the United States from a continental power to a global power was accompanied by an evolution in the idea of exceptionalism. Globalist exceptionalism included the imperative not just to preserve America's safety and ensure its economic development but to reorganize the world to spread American values and in doing so, further international peace. This had always been implicit in early American exceptionalism, as Thomas Paine stated in his Common Sense in 1776: `we have it within our


power to begin the world all over again', but this globalizing strain found concrete expression in US policy during an era of World Wars. Distaste at the implicit imperialism of `manifest destiny' produced a return to the `rhetoric of redemption' which had typified earlier Puritan exceptionalism. Rather than declaring a religious/racial destiny to civilize the world, the new `redeemer nation'15 would promote an international order based on selfdetermination, justice, and peace. Wilsonian exceptionalism, as expressed in his `Fourteen Points', exhibited the same religious fervor as previous declarations of US mission: `The people of the United States [. . .] are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything they possess. The moral climax of this, the culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.'16 Exceptionalism was evoked to justify American intervention in World War One, and to justify isolationism in the inter-war period. In 1941, Henry Luce predicted that the twentieth century would be remembered as the Àmerican century' and urged involvement in World War Two both out of duty and to take advantage of the United States' natural right to order international affairs: `to accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit'.17 World War Two, a turning point which launched the United States as a truly global power and inflated the United States' exceptionalism, also provided a practical and ideological challenge to it in the shape of the Soviet Union. In a private statement in 1946, General Douglas MacArthur described the United States' nascent struggle against Communism as a sacrifice which would bring salvation: `Christ, even though crucified, nevertheless prevailed.'18 The doctrines with which the United States was to chart its course through the Cold War emerged from a diplomatic and policy-making community that was afflicted both by the burden of responsibility for national and international security and by the `para-ideological' force of American exceptionalism. Luce's declaration of an Àmerican century' had been debated and derided but in the abstract was still a popular notion. However, as the early foreign policy documents of the Cold War illustrated, amongst government advisors and decision-makers the Àmerican century' and American exceptionalism were not foregone conclusions. Dulles' `Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What to Do About It' in Life magazine (1946), Kennan's `Long Telegram' (1946) and `X' Article in Foreign Affairs (1947), Clark Clifford's Memorandum to Truman (1946) and Truman's speech to Congress on Greece and Turkey in 1947, all described a new era that was both momentous and terrifying. By the time National Security Council Paper 68 was published in 1950, there was consensus about the US mission to contain and push back (ùnalterable counterforce' implied both) the Soviet Union.


NSC 68 served to cement that resolve, secured increased spending to further it, and justified cuts in domestic expenditure.19 The architects of the Cold War were, according to Gardner, àrchitects of illusion'. Having mapped their environment, wrongly in Gardner's view, Àmerican policy-makers developed a series of rationales, expedients, and explanations which grew into the myths and illusions of the Cold War'.20 However, the `myths and illusions' which evolved in the process of adapting to the post-war world were not new commodities constructed to suit immediate purposes. Policy was formed under the influence of old ideas adapted to a changing environment and filtered through the experience of World War Two.21 Exceptionalism remained an important theme. Exceptionalism had always been predominantly the `nationalistic' expression of a distinctly American sense of identity which relied on a comparison with a corrupt, dangerous òther'. It continued to be this but was in part also transformed by the challenge of the Soviet Union. The `two systems' approach emerging from the Washington-Monroe era entailed a repudiation of the politics and diplomatic practices of a backward Europe in decline. However, the Soviet system which challenged American exceptionalism during the Cold War was perceived to be a powerful counterpoint. In other words, it was another exception to the decline of the old world powers. Could there be more than one? Clearly, the `para-ideological' idea of American exceptionalism is of significance in the clash between the US and Soviet Union. Kennan's `Long Telegram' had emphasized the point that the danger of the Soviet Union lay in its attractiveness to the `tired and frightened' peoples of Europe. Kennan, as well as proposing that Communism should be met with ùnalterable counterforce' wherever it appeared, also insisted that the maintenance of Americans' belief in their own exceptionalism was of vital strategic importance: Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale, and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqueÂs. [. . .] We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of the world we would like to see than we have put forward in the past. It is not enough to urge the people to develop political processes similar to our own. [The people of Europe] are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than the Russians to give them this. And unless we do, the Russians certainly will.22 Hans J. Morgenthau's contribution to the evolution of US foreign policy in the post-war period illustrates the cultural pervasiveness of exceptionalism. In Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau outlined his `six principles of political


realism', one of which was a repudiation of both the `chosen people' and `manifest destiny' forms of exceptionalism: There is a world of difference between the belief that all nations stand under the judgement of God, inscrutable to the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is always on one's side and that what one wills oneself cannot fail to be willed by God. The lighthearted equation between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence is morally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the Biblical prophets have warned rulers and ruled.23 Morality flowed from the pursuit of the national interest not some abstract need for ideological dominance or conversion, Morgenthau maintained. But the Realist critique had itself a Jeremiadic tone. It was part, Morgenthau stated in 1952, of a struggle over `the nature of all politics and [. . .] the American tradition in foreign policy'.24 Realism was a revealed religious mystery, `not conducive to understanding', he stated, especially by those who rejected the truth and remained aligned with idealist superstition. Morgenthau linked international order with prior national order which rested on moral nationalism.25 In the absence of an integrated international society, in particular, the attainment of a modicum of order and the realization of a minimum of moral values are predicated upon the existence of national communities capable of preserving order and realizing moral values within the limits of their power.26 However, exaggerating the supremacy of this aspect of American exceptionalism would undervalue an important consistency in the idea as it was applied to US foreign relations in this period. For example, in 1955 Frank Tannenbaum (in a debate with George Kennan about realism vs morality in US foreign policy) described the Àmerican Tradition of Foreign Policy' in the following exceptionalist terms: If we see the world differently from other people, it is because time, place, and fortune have wrought their own special imprint upon the American conscience, and endowed our folk with an ethical basis peculiarly their own. The elements of the American tradition were unchanged, according to Tannenbaum, from those expounded by the Founders.27 As in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, exceptionalism during the Cold War had shifting meanings and applications; it underwrote both realist and idealist foreign policy theories; as well as a rhetorical tool, it


appeared to be an enduring value of American foreign policy that both legitimized the Cold War crusade and stimulated the backlash against Cold War policies in the 1960s and 1970s. Both orthodox and revisionist theories of the origins of the Cold War contain at their cores a conception of American exceptionalism. In the orthodox view, the United States' cause was the righteous and inevitable one.28 Revisionist historians contended that exceptionalism was a large part of the motivation for the United States' aggressive expansion abroad. Exploitation of other countries was driven by the unflinching conviction of the United States' moral right to have its national prosperity be ensured.29 This arrogant exceptionalism undermined humanitarian motives when they existed. William Appleman Williams, for example, argued that a deep American impulse to help others and principles of selfdetermination, and the missionary aspects of the Puritan idea of a `city on a hill' had been perverted into imperialism.30 Ronald Steele made a similar point when describing the United States' àccidental empire' which had occurred because it àppealed to a deep rooted instinct in our national character ± an instinct to help those less fortunate and permit them to emulate and perhaps one day achieve the virtues of our own society'.31 This view was not based on àrrogance', argued Steele, but on genuine altruism. Even among these critics of exceptionalist-driven foreign policy, and of the `myth' of exceptionalism, there was the conviction that the United States was uniquely situated, even destined, to be a force for change and the amelioration of the suffering of foreign peoples. Indeed, their displeasure stemmed from their disappointment in this regard. This original contradiction or tension of exceptionalism, the tension between its promotion of freedom and tolerance and its universalizing, homogenizing qualities, was exemplified in the rhetoric of John F. Kennedy.32 As these examples also suggest, another important feature of Cold War American exceptionalism was that it was extended to include Western Europe. Ironically, as hemispheric dominance was replaced with global power, American exceptionalism, which had defined the United States in opposition to Europe, became Transatlantic exceptionalism as well. With the Americanization of the West during the Cold War period exceptionalism was extended. Arguably this was part of the original logic of the Puritan exceptionalism. It is significant that Transatlantic exceptionalism remained intact up to the Cold War's end circa 1989±91, while American exceptionalism steadily eroded beginning in the 1960s. Vietnam undermined American exceptionalism, and cynicism about domestic political institutions simultaneously evolved with this disillusionment about US power abroad. Americans rejected the `perverted dream' of world salvation and examined their own èvil', according to Stanley Hoffman.33 The momentum of exceptionalism which had been to this point a national consensus was stopped. In the 1970s academic descriptions of American decline, and its destiny to become àn ordinary country',34 also included predictions of `the end of American


Exceptionalism'. Daniel Bell's article of this title written in 1975 proclaimed: `There is no longer a Manifest Destiny or mission. We have not been immune to the corruption of power. We have not been the exception.'35 However, as American credibility was weakened, Western Europe's credibility was augmented in particular due to German Ostpolitik measures and a normalization in relations between Western Europe and the Soviet Union in the 1970s. American exceptionalism seemed crucially disabled but it endured in altered form in the rationale and rhetoric of the Transatlantic movement and its European-based institutions, and was nationally revived under Carter. Carter's attempts to reaffirm US `moral stature' entailed a focus on human rights, nuclear disarmament, and the global economy. This departure in American foreign policy was supported by the reintroduction of the exceptionalism theme. In referring to the United States' ùnique self-definition which has given us exceptional appeal',36 Carter promoted a policy of global order-building and de-emphasized the US±Soviet confrontation. Carter's rhetoric proposed a spiritual renewal of the United States which would lead inevitably to the augmentation of the United States' power. A return to basic principles, according to Carter, would illustrate that the United States' foreign policy interests and mission lay in global, humanitarian intervention in the broadest terms. Speaking at the University of Notre Dame in 1977, Carter employed the traditional formula of failure and selfdeprecation leading to renewed moral purpose: Being confident of our future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear [. . .] This approach failed, with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty. But through failure we have now found our way back to our own principles and values, and we have regained lost confidence.37 The divinely sanctioned missionary role of the United States has always been tempered with a rhetoric of `self-flagellation'.38 The Puritan missionaries experienced disappointment, according to Miller, because they did not succeed in redeeming Europe. And their bewilderment and confusion is recorded in a `literature of self-condemnation' as comprehensive as the triumphal `city on a hill' proclamations.39 Boorstin argues that it was not the `manifestness' of the United States' national identity but rather ùncertainty' which was `the great motive and emotive power of the national life'.40 Manheim states that American pride and sense of moral superiority has always been balanced by periods of `widespread self doubt and sense of insecurity that gives rise and direction to attempts at social purification when domestic problems and international uncertainties coincide'.41 Then threats, like the Communist threat, become òrganizing symbols for intensely


patriotic introspection and largely reflexive exercises in collective self doubt [or] self-flagellation'.42 (One might also find the 1990s focus on the sexual mores and activities of President Clinton to illustrate this phenomenon of social purification in times of uncertainty ± the accession of the first post-Cold War, even anti-Cold War, President and global geopolitical restructuring.) Accompanying the acquisition of empire is the dilemma of the àlmost chosen people', as Lincoln described the United States, riven by faith in its God-given responsibility and self-conscious self-doubt. In the rhetoric of exceptionalism there is clearly exhibited `the existential tension between an instinct towards violence to eliminate obstacles and the aspiration of harmony' which is one of the `two great faults' of American foreign policy, according to Stanley Hoffman, the other being the oscillation between isolation and intervention.43 And as illustrated above, exceptionalism also influences this second characteristic of US foreign policy. Carter's vision of peaceful order-building amidst international complexity and interdependence sat uncomfortably with the unambiguous opposition to the spread of American influence and values in states like Iran and Nicaragua. It also sat uncomfortably with the rhetoric of personal, domestic `sacrifice' which Carter brought to his energy policy proposals. The complexity of Carter's worldview, which was shaped by, and reflected in his choice of, Vance and Brzezinski as advisors and speech-writers, appeared contradictory when offered in speeches (this was to some extent also the fault of the Vance-Brzezinski competition for speech-writing control). Ronald Reagan reinvigorated American exceptionalism in a way Carter had been unable, with the remarkably orthodox rhetoric of the `nation of destiny' and the `shining city on a hill'. He even quoted Thomas Paine: `we have it within our power to begin the world all over again'.44 Exceptionalist rhetoric was also used by Reagan's aides and congressional Republicans. It was part of a fullscale campaign to make exceptionalist ideas once again the foundation for domestic and foreign policy. Perhaps the success of this campaign was implied in a Roper poll of the American public in 1983, in which 81 per cent of Americans reportedly believed that the United States had a `special role' in the world.45 However, as the preceding suggests such sentiments tapped into a longer-standing attachment to exceptional status. Although in the twentieth century exceptionalism has been predominately evoked by Democratic Presidents, since Reagan it has had supra-partisan use. The evidence illustrates that exceptionalism is often and most successfully employed as a tool for community-building during times of transition. Crises of confidence, because of failure or unexpected success, have historically been accompanied by evocations of American exceptionalism. All of the aspects of exceptionalism described above ± the `city on a hill', `manifest destiny' and `redeemer nation', òrder and community-building', `self-flagellation' and renewal ± can be found in the post-Cold War public diplomacy of both the Bush and Clinton Administrations and all of these


elements can be found in the discourse of the US communication elite on the end of the Cold War.

Debating exceptionalism at the end of the Cold War The events of 1989 in the Soviet Union and East-Central Europe provided opportunities for rethinking, even transformation, but they also created staggering difficulties of reconceptualization for elite consensus-builders. The end of the Cold War provided both a challenge to and a vindication of American exceptionalism. Adjoining the paradigm-shattering shift in international affairs was the routine necessity of agenda-setting and governance. The Bush and Clinton Administrations competed with numerous members of the communication elite for control over how the end of the Cold War would be interpreted. As Cold War institutions both official and unofficial, and interest groups which had defined themselves in relation to the Cold War, attempted to reorient themselves, these opinion makers formed a group most crucial to the Administration's attempts to manage public opinion and create consensus.46 An examination of their discourse on the end of the Cold War finds different elements of the American exceptionalism idea represented and several recurring concerns emerge: concern over the desirability and ability of the United States to maintain a `missionary' role in the world; disagreement about the proper balance between military and domestic economic issues; agreement about the importance of Presidential leadership and consensus-building; fear of US inadequacy in the global economy; confusion about foreign policy postures and enemies; nostalgia represented by criticism of Bush but rehabilitation of Carter and Nixon; philosophical pseudo-millennialism exemplified by Fukuyama's ènd of history' thesis. In reviewing this discourse the aim is to set the rhetorical scene, to identify the issues and ideas which form the context of engagement for the Bush and Clinton Administrations' public diplomacy.47 What is our manifest destiny? The media and academic debate about the end of the Cold War, often semiphilosophical, discussed the nature of enemies and the roles they played in creating political consensus,48 and focused in waves on the major changes in US social and governmental organization or, critically, on its unchanging features. Structural change to counter changing global economic dynamics, for example at the level of school curricula and training, was foreseen.49 Similarly, official Cold War agencies were reported to be in processes of adaptation to a new context of uncertainty about postures and enemies, with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) possibly shifting focus to `less traditional threats' such as narcotics trafficking or global climate change50 or even collaborating in operations with the Russian KGB.51 The Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United States


Information Agency (USIA) announced thorough reviews of their counterSoviet activities.52 Budget-related institutional struggles were reported between Radio Free Europe and Voice of America.53 There was to be change at the Pentagon's National Security Agency ± the United States' largest intelligence gathering body ± which, while continuing to monitor Soviet military capabilities and political developments, was investigating how its global electronic eavesdropping network might be used to monitor world trade and financial transactions.54 Although there was much opposition in Congress, the Senate Intelligence Committee commissioned a study on èconomic espionage' from the CIA to be completed by early March 1991. President Bush abolished the Reagan-appointed White House advisory board on intelligence matters, replacing it with a new panel reported to be less conservative and given the mandate of examining intelligence roles in relation to non-Cold War security challenges.55 However, intelligence budgets, planned far in advance, were still oriented to Cold War preoccupations and methods of operation. Indeed one member of the House Intelligence Committee admitted that the US was `still operating in somewhat of a shell-shocked condition. We're still doing lots of old work even though it may not be necessary.'56 Proving the point the Pentagon's customary overview of threats and postures provided at the beginning of each new Administration provoked controversy in early 1990. This document, which purported to provide policy guidance up to 1997, stated that global rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union would continue and that the United States would be required to counter the long-term strategy of the Soviets which was to expand its network of overseas bases and to recruit `subservient regimes'.57 A Pentagon official admitted that some of the report's recommendations did seem inconsistent with current Soviet behavior. One defense planner, analyzing the document, described a Pentagon suffering from an ìdentity crisis', `rudderless' without the Cold War and `scrambling to justify the [. . .] current force structure and all these glamorous programs'.58 As the official Cold War agencies redefined themselves, so too did those interest and protest groups which had defined themselves in opposition to the Cold War. For example, some peace groups attempted to form new coalitions around domestic issues such as housing, pollution, AIDS and homelessness. Other organizations such as the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, Freeze Voter, Space Watch, and the Committee to Save the ABM Treaty ceased operations completely. There were dramatic decreases in membership of many protest groups. According to the War Resisters League and the National Mobilization for Survival, Gorbachev diplomacy removed `the fear factor' which had previously mustered support for antiwar movements. Changing political preoccupations were clearly registered with suppliers of anti-Cold War accoutrements, for example, the public demand for `Stop the Cruise Missile' and ÙS/USSR Disarm' badges had


completely ceased by June 1990, according to one major supplier who explained that reproductive rights and environmentalism had become more lucrative investments.59 Similarly, the government agency devoted to arms control, the Nuclear Freeze Advisory Board, found itself under the streamliners' scrutiny and charges of ìrrelevance'.60 The seeming failure of the socialist model accelerated a process of fragmentation into interest-based factions, pro- and anti-abortion, pro- and anti-environmentalism, libertarian, populist, isolationist, internationalist, unilateralist groups, or as one commentator described it, their `balkanization' into `single-issue republics'.61 George F. Will gleefully perceived the end of the Cold War to have signaled the conclusion of the `long march of the West's ``progressive'' intellectuals'.62 But Democrats hoped that the political focus would switch to issues such as the environment, education, and economic competitiveness which were considered to be `traditionally Democratic' areas of interests. Reports that the Democratic Party was gaining confidence, and now considered themselves in touch with the nation after years of alienation under Reagan,63 were balanced by the àggravation' felt by some in the Party that in terms of policy there was now nothing to separate them from the Republicans.64 However, there were some hopes that since the Cold War had `delegitimized' left-wing politics, its end might enable a revival.65 On the opposite side of the political spectrum, similar readjustments and anxieties were reported. At Rand, a spokesperson claimed, every project had been affected.66 Indeed conservative think-tanks and policy proposing institutions like the Heritage Foundation, Rand, and the Hudson Institute had begun the process of budgetary reorientation in favor of domestic political issues.67 Among conservatives there was a deepening division between traditionalists and a body of self-proclaimed revolutionists and it was debated whether the conservative movement would splinter without the unifying Soviet threat.68 Defense contractors were reported to be eagerly restructuring their `product lines and services' in preparation for new `threat and conflict scenarios [. . .] evolving from a world-wide context to that of regional and local situations'.69 However, the cost in terms of job losses in the defense industries was also expected to be substantial. In assessing the consequences of the end of the Cold War for Washington Cold Warriors, one commentator predicted that national security experts, strategists, and geopoliticians would be replaced with economists, lawyers, and diplomats as the key policy-making and advisory personnel.70 The potentially traumatic effects of such a transition were discussed from another perspective when in a popular newsmagazine, some of the country's leading scholars considered `the Cold War's cultural legacy'. An historian at Tufts University, Martin Sherwin, described the Cold War as `fundamental to American culture. It affected every aspect of American life and its cultural residue is going to take a long time to replace.' Referring to the reported


increase in fear of economic dominance by Japan and Germany, historian Paul Boyer perceived that the United States was reverting to a World War Two mentality: À lot of pre-cold war modes of thinking are suddenly rushing back'.71 Anxiety about confrontations, military as well as economic, with Japan and a resurgence of racist stereotyping of an Asian threat are easily identified in popular-scholarly works and media commentary.72 Interviews with Hollywood film-makers predicted that environmental polluters, narcotics dealers and terrorists would eventually fill the celluloid threat vacuum. But, hitting on a key temptation, in the short term they still anticipated a reinvention of the Soviet threat. One film producer explained: `You can attribute to a rogue agent all the characteristics we used to attribute to a whole society'.73 One Newsweek columnist observed that the Cold War's end was linked to an imminent identity crisis and ambivalence about this shift transcended partisanship. The United States had defined itself ìn contrast to the East' and found not only `selfdefinition' but also à purpose, [and] an idea of our proper role in the world'.74 Is the shining city in decline? The `city on a hill' was in peril in the declinist texts of the late 1980s and early 1990s such as Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and Walter Russell Mead's Mortal Splendor and Òn the Road to Ruin. Winning the Cold War, Losing the Economic Peace' in Harper's Magazine in 1990.75 Mead in observing the Reagan Administration in the late 1980s had declared `declining empires indulge in the politics of spectacle'.76 One response was the revival of the Àmerica First' slogan mainly undertaken by Patrick Buchanan in 1991 and explained in his article in the Washington Post entitled `Now that Red is Dead, Come Home America', offered neo-isolationism as the response to transitional uncertainty.77 George F. Will claims that the Àmerica First' campaign was launched within two days of the Soviet Union's collapse.78 Such a position reflected the seriousness of American concerns about their economic well-being and the United States' ability to compete in the global financial arena. But others such as Joseph Nye, author of Bound to Lead, argued that the Gulf crisis proved the declinists wrong.79 Nye argued that `the critical question' in 1990 was not whether the United States possessed the power necessary to lead, but whether it had `the political leadership and strategic vision to convert these power resources into real influence in a transitional period in world politics'.80 Other prominent revivalists concurred, such as Henry Nau, The Myth of America's Decline.81 Nau argued that the United States needed `to establish a new link between domestic purpose and foreign diplomacy' by rejecting both declinist and messianic thinking. But US influence remained attached to its exceptionalism ± that of its domestic system.


America leads today, less by sheer size of resources and dominance of international institutions, than by its domestic purposes and procedures, which are widely admired and increasingly emulated around the world. In short, America leads by knowing what it stands for politically and by getting its own house in order economically.82 The `city on a hill' should not retreat to preserve itself but continue to be a beacon and example to the world, was the US government (through USIA) position shown in its decision to refocus its efforts on training Eastern Europeans in entrepreneurship, trade unionism and labor management, educational curriculum reform, press freedom, and legislative and judicial reform. This new agenda would also include projects to assist with philosophical reeducation in the former Soviet bloc including the translation into Polish, Hungarian and Russian of `seminal works' on American democracy such as the Constitution and the Federalist Papers.83 The ideological component in this agenda was as clear as the institutional self-interest. In the editorial pages of the New York Times and Washington Post, it was alternately argued that the United States now had no need to play the superpower and that it had less ability to do so,84 that it was the world's ònly remaining superpower' with new `freedom and responsibility',85 and that it was `more hegemonic' in the 1990s than it had been in the so-called `golden age' of the 1950s.86 It was argued that the US economy would be revived in a normalized system of international politics due to increased trade with the Soviet Union, India, and China.87 Another perspective was it would be only one pole within a highly competitive triad of powers ± the US, European Community and Japan. Alice Rivlin (a Brookings Institution economist and later a key decision-maker in the Clinton Administration) argued the United States would be required to find `flexibility' and `statesmanship' in order `to shift identities and become a builder of coalitions', engaging in global `cooperative problem solving'.88 William Pfaff argued that the United States was only a partial `superpower'. Although it possessed the required `material, industrial and military resources', and though it perceived itself to be à model for others', it still had to prove its order-making capacities, its political willingness to endure leadership expenditures, in the post-Cold War period.89 The rationale for remaining a superpower, according to William Safire, was to prevent another country from becoming `number one'. The United States would have to increase its economic power to achieve this: `We are still organized according to old functions rather than new missions', stated Safire, proposing a new `Council of Economic Intervention'.90 Self-flagellation and self-renewal The decline versus revival debate did not just focus on the United States' relative wealth and productivity. It also addressed the more philosophical issue of the United States' health as a nation. Some expressed the fear that


the West was in moral decline, spiritually exhausted and losing courage.91 American Christian missionaries flooding into Eastern Europe and the USSR to mixed receptions illustrated the difficulties associated with any shift away from messianism.92 It was reported that they saw American and Soviet problems as similar and caused by a `moral collapse'. `Their crisis is one of achieving democracy and ours is one of sustaining it', stated Kent Hill, director of the Institute on Religion and Democracy in Washington, DC.93 Some predicted à Post-Superpower Stress Syndrome', primarily afflicting military officials, but generally a consequence of a loss of recognition, power and prestige.94 One prominent editorialist argued that the United States wasn't `too martial', as some claimed, but `soft and decadent and unwilling to sacrifice'.95 Decline, if it occurred, would be the result of domestic degeneration both moral and infrastructural. The familiar self-flagellation strain of American exceptionalism could be found in criticism of the Bush Administration for not moving fast enough to provide a response in kind to Soviet glasnost and perestroika. In particular there was concern over President Bush's effective dismissal of two congressional initiatives intended to make it a requirement for the President to consult Congress on all covert operations and diplomatic missions.96 Other charges of èxcessive secrecy' involved alleged `distortions' in the official history series `Foreign Relations of the United States'.97 There was evident impatience with the persistence of Cold War structures and the increasingly anachronistic practices, such as ideological tests for foreign visitors, `look-out' lists of names kept by the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization service, and restrictions on travel to countries such as Cuba and Vietnam.98 While such dissatisfaction may also be seen as a symptom of the long-standing post-Vietnam distrust of government, the Eastern European revolutions and the Soviet overtures for peace catalyzed demands for a review of established behavior and certainly constituted a climax of the pressures for an overhaul of governmental practice and thinking. In considering how the United States might come to terms with its involvement in the Cold War, a Washington Post columnist wondered: How did it happen? Was it necessary? Were incomparably costly and avoidable mistakes made? Most important, how do we learn the lessons and where do we go from here? These are not academic questions; they affect the lives of every American. But [. . .] there is precious little effort being made to come to grips with them or to chart a new course for the future [. . .] While Europe, driven by a resurgent new Germany, moves ahead rapidly into the future, the United States remains mired in problems of the past. Not least among them are the historic levels of debt accumulated during the 1980s and the collective price of the Cold War that Americans have borne for the last two generations.99


Yet the international political transformations were also seen to have created opportunities for national domestic regeneration. Referring to the Eastern European revolutions one magazine editor hoped that a similar rebirth could happen at home.100 Yet, on both the political left and the political right, there was a reluctance to accept that a permanent peace was unfolding. There were frequent arguments that glasnost and perestroika were unreliable touchstones for directing American foreign policy as well as denials of the Cold War's end. Leading conservative commentators, such as William F. Buckley and George Will, argued that the Cold War could not be declared over until Communism had been completely overturned in all regions of the world. Others claimed that `the form and character' of the Cold War system of international relations would not substantially change and, therefore, neither should policy. The development of a `mixed system' in Europe was predicted, one in which multipolarity was `grafted on to' the old bipolarity. Cold War balance of power arrangements would persist. It was argued that since both the Soviet Union and the United States would continue to have a `vital strategic interest' in preventing each other from becoming the dominant power in Europe, there would always be mistrust. And if realist theory was correct, then there would also always be competition and conflict.101 However, neoconservative Irving Kristol argued that the US should `rethink foreign policy' in terms of `nationalism'. Recalling that after World War Two the New York Times had changed its traditional format to devote the first pages of the newspaper to international news in recognition of the importance of world events to American security, he stated that with the end of the Cold War, he now found such international headlines ìrritating'.102 At one conference held in April 1990, the debate over whether or not the Cold War had ended, and if it had been won by the United States, threatened to provoke a split in the conservative movement. Delegates at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Washington, DC were divided between those who welcomed the Soviet and East European changes as an American triumph (for example, Newt Gingrich and Jeanne Kirkpatrick) and others who believed that glasnost and perestroika were bluffs designed to weaken and subvert the United States and NATO (for example, Senator Jesse Helms and John Lenczowski of the Council for Inter-American Security). One delegate told the conference: Òur leaders are intoxicated by a spirit of premature selfcongratulation which has clouded their judgement and blinded their eyes to ominous reality', but was derided by others who stated ìt's time to gloat. There is just one superpower.'103 Like some conservatives many left-wing commentators were also skeptical that Cold War politics and strategies had been divested. Veteran peace campaigners complained that the Cold War was `dissolving primarily on the other side',104 and that it was ìn some places as cold ± or as hot ± as it ever has been' due to a conservative preoccupation with maintaining the


right to intervene abroad.105 The Bush Administration's insistence on the inclusion of East Germany in NATO, for example, was perceived as `nothing if not a continuation of cold war strategies'.106 It was repeatedly charged that the Bush Administration was trailing the Soviet Union in making practical changes to military budgets and deployments. Some perceived the Administration to be `committed to perpetuating the warfare state', and suggested that it would attempt to preserve `half a Cold War', if a whole one could not be sustained.107 A Progressive editorial warned that educators might soon have to monitor school textbooks for distortions and misrepresentations of Third World countries as they had done during the Cold War under the US± Soviet Textbook Study Project.108 The left measured success in the Cold War by a domestic yardstick. The real question, they argued, was not which superpower had won the arms race but which society would be the ultimate `victor' in prospering beyond the Cold War.109 Order and community-building Yet many liberals and conservatives agreed on the need to replace the Cold War system with some other system of order maintenance and the formulation of new organizing principles, concepts and goals. For example, the liberal Nation stated: `The Cold War was a political and ideological system for organizing and ordering world power, and it is undergoing a profound evolutionary transformation that will produce no clear triumph or defeat. [. . .] The United States has a major role to play in the construction of the new system of power and politics that will replace the cold war order.'110 Some suggested that the left was `losing the war of ideas', that it needed to ìnnovate and introduce ideas' in order to contribute to `the agenda for foreign and military policy' and that it had failed to do so in the past, superseded by conservative bodies such as the Committee on the Present Danger, the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute. If this did not occur, it was suggested, Cold War politics would continue: `fossilized ways of explaining reality are supplanted only when something meaningful and understandable is offered in their place'.111 Conservatives, also, bemoaned the loss of `conceptual frameworks' which provided `ways of explaining the world and ordering priorities', and argued that without a new `paradigm' or à model' it would be difficult to make judicious policies.112 Indeed, President Bush's perceived lack of vision was the focus for much of the early criticism of his Administration. While `post-Cold War' President Bush was criticized, Cold War presidents Carter and Nixon were rehabilitated at conferences and in the media in what seemed to be one further proof of the dismantlement of the Cold War. At Hofstra University, President Carter was reevaluated at a three-day conference and previously criticized `qualities', in particular his èthics', were applauded as newly desirable Presidential attributes. While Carter was reconstructed as a freelance peacemaker, Nixon was resurrected as an expert on geopolitics, writing numerous opinion pieces


prescribing a new foreign policy stance for the United States based on orderbuilding and pragmatism.113 Yet, having moved beyond disbelief that the Cold War was over, many scholars and commentators perceived the US triumph to have been a `pyrrhic victory'.114 From one perspective the Cold War's resolution served to reveal domestic problems, from another, the unwelcome result of triumph was international disorder.115 The best-known defense of the `pyrrhic victory' idea examined the consequences of the end of the Cold War for Europe and the Transatlantic alliance. In two articles published in the summer of 1990, the first in International Security and the second, entitled `Why We Shall Soon Miss the Cold War', in Atlantic Monthly, John Mearsheimer explained why there would soon be widespread nostalgia for the stable `long peace' of the Cold War. Mearsheimer's proposition was that the end of the Cold War would mean the onset of ùntamed anarchy' in international relations, a Hobbesian `war of all against all', with increasing incidences of violent `hypernationalism' amidst an inherently unstable international system of jostling states and shifting alliances.116 Many commentators made comparisons between the post-World War Two reconstruction of Europe, which had confirmed the United States as the leading world power, and the post-1989 period in which the US was again considering its strategic requirements as Europe was remade.117 And those nostalgic for the Cold War invariably referred to the 1950s when, it was perceived, the United States mission had been unambiguous and its capabilities unquestioned. One columnist wrote: `The 1950s were the last time when things seemed, more or less, under control. Life seemed more orderly and more capable of being ordered. There was a clarity to our strivings and a certainty of success that have since vanished.'118 The most pessimistic predictions described the prospects for the East as àt best, severe political turmoil and economic disarray; at worst, massive bloodshed and a return to some form of harsh totalitarianism'.119 Fears of a regionally destabilizing collapse of the Soviet Union were said to òutweigh' any old hopes of a full and decisive defeat of the United States' Cold War rival.120 Very quickly the triumph had lost its novelty, as the President of the Atlantic Council in Washington put it later: `The end of the Cold War produced disorder. We forgot that the tyrants we were pledged to oppose were keeping order in their part of the world and we were too short-sighted to realize that when they stopped doing that we would have perhaps even bigger problems.'121 Opinion polls suggested that a division between optimism and pessimism existed among the general public. There had been little variation in public responses to the question: Ìn view of the recent changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, do you think the cold war is over?' between November 1989 and April 1990, with the majority, consistently around 55 per cent, saying `no'. However, between April and October 1990 there was a gradual


but persistent rise in consensus that the East±West relationship was irreversibly changed. By the autumn of 1990, polls suggested that for the first time, the majority of Americans believed the Cold War to be at an end. The majority of Americans were also sanguine about German unification, 54 per cent accepted that the newly United Germany was a `peace-loving nation, willing to fight only if it thinks it has to defend itself'.122 And from January 1990, a sizeable proportion of those polled, 46 per cent, had believed it unlikely that the United States would be engaged in a nuclear war within the decade. However, cautious optimism about international affairs contrasted sharply with record levels of pessimism about the future of the United States itself. Americans were more pessimistic about the future of the United States than at any time in the last decade. Four out of ten expected the next five years to be in a general sense `worse' than the previous five (in 1984, two out of ten had been pessimistic).123 By the end of 1990, New York Times columnist Flora Lewis perceived that the `smug euphoria' of 1989 had disintegrated, and that Americans were now experiencing `depression, a sense of guilt, fears of decline and dilapidation'. This, argued Lewis, was the inevitable `hangover' which followed à period of intoxication'.124 The ènd of history' Providing contrast with Mearsheimer's pessimism was another frequently discussed and controversial academic analysis by Francis Fukuyama. `The End of History?' was an exploratory thesis first published as an article in a small circulation neo-conservative journal, The National Interest, in the Summer of 1989.125 Repeatedly described as `brilliant' even by those commentators who believed the thesis was fundamentally flawed (the majority), Fukuyama's article was reviewed and commented upon in numerous fora ± all of the national newspapers, the mainstream news magazines such as Time and Newsweek, across the spectrum of political affairs magazines such as The New Republic, The Nation, The National Review, and in specialist publications such Technology Review, The Chronicle of Higher Education and business magazines Maclean's and Fortune.126 It was discussed at conferences and in collections of academic articles,127 and translated into French, Dutch, Japanese, German, Italian and Icelandic.128 At the end of 1989 Fortune magazine named Fukuyama as one of the year's 25 `most fascinating people'.129 In 1992 the thesis reappeared as a scholarly work of philosophy, The End of History and the Last Man, and it was again reviewed in all of the national newspapers,130 and described as a `landmark work' and `the first book of the post-Marxist millennium'.131 It was reported that Fukuyama's ideas had aroused international interest, particularly in Latin America. In Chile, `Fukuyamismo' was adopted into the language to mean `support for liberal institutions in politics and economics'.132 Even Salvadoran rebels, still fighting, were reportedly familiar with the phrase ènd of history' but dismissed it


as àbsurd', stating that capitalism had not yet satisfied the `moral or material needs' of people in the Third World.133 There is no question that although widely derided, Fukuyama's ideas were broadly disseminated within the United States and abroad and achieved acceptance at least as a unit of currency in debate about the `post-Cold War' period. By 1992 `the end of history' had become the disposable phrase to describe developments in contexts as diverse as analyses of literary trends, debates on educational standards, concern for the future of historical scholarship, letters-to-theeditor of the New York Times on sports, and numerous news stories and comments situating themselves, albeit laconically, `here, at the end of history'. For example, referring to the post-Cold War danger of weapons proliferation one writer described `the yard sale at the end of history', and at the end of 1992 the first couple-elect, Bill and Hillary Clinton, were described by one commentator as newly ascendant meritocrats, à sort of `ènd of history'' American elites'.134 Some feared that `the end of history' thesis created àn illusion of well-being';135 others worried that, if correct, the theory `froze' the United States ìn monstrous social and economic decline'.136 There was a school of thought, exemplified by Strobe Talbott (later to become an Ambassador-at-large and Deputy Secretary of State under Clinton), that dismissed Fukuyama's suppositions as post-Cold War `giddiness', `nuttiness' and `the beginning of nonsense'; but also described them as `pernicious' and à combination of arrogance and shortsightedness'.137 But perhaps the most revealing evaluation of Fukuyama's thesis was made in the first wave of its publicity in 1990 when Christopher Hitchens described the Ènd of History?' as a `Kennan X-article' for the post-Cold War period.138 In 1947, the United States was in a period of transition, on the verge of a Cold War, uncertain about its foes and unsure about its worldly responsibilities. Kennan's article, which provided the rationale for containment, shaped the next 42 years of American foreign policy. On the cusp between Cold War and post-Cold War, `the end of history' offered a replacement for the Cold War frames of reference which Kennan had inspired, and attempted to explain the United States' situation in the period of transition after the Soviet and East European capitulation. Certainly there were fears among those on the left that Fukuyama's thesis did provide à window on the American neo-conservative mind', as Peet has argued, and that it might reflect the thinking of policy-makers in the Bush Administration.139 However, on the response to the article, Fukuyama himself has commented that the most remarkable phenomenon was the extent of the criticism from both the left and the right. He felt that the article had had little impact on policy-makers; èxcept that it gave foreign ministers and heads of state a good line: `às you can see, this is not the end of history'' ', and was not a `Kennan X-article'. However, he stated `roughly speaking both the Bush and Clinton Administrations have accepted a lot of the premises


of the article, which is that democracy encourages peace and therefore we want to help build democracy in the former Soviet states, because that is good strategically and politically. But I think they would have come to that conclusion whether I had written the article or not.'140 Although the conflict in the former Yugoslavia eventually signalled the end of `the end of history' as an intellectual hinge for discussions of world affairs and American foreign roles, the Fukuyama phenomenon illustrated clearly the intellectual consternation which characterized late 1989 and 1990. In the transition to the post-Cold War period the attention to Fukuyama's work reflected the trauma associated with change, the collective introspection and probing of the meaning of the past and progress which has been associated with all passages into `new eras'. Fukuyama constructed an ambivalent vision of end-of-century international relations and human development, a vision given credibility by its philosophical grounding in the works of eminent European theorists ± Hegel, Kojeve, Marx, Weber ± but which was, in fact, a remarkable elucidation of classic `new era' preoccupations, many of which are considered to be uniquely American. It was based on an American narrative of messianic destiny, grand example and the power of ideas, and an inspirational belief in the universal and universalizing power of the American ideals of democracy and freedom (hence, history would end when American values had been universally recognized and inculcated); it was based on the fear of ideological opposition now finally being alleviated by the development of a liberal-democratic `consciousness and culture', and on a subtle and underlying allusion to the crossing of a frontier, a world on the threshold of a new enlightened state of understanding or gnosis; it was based on a distinction between the newly enlightened self ± the West, reaching the end of history ± and the violence-mired other, the still-historical regions of the Third World; it was based on a vision of progress but also expressed ambivalence about the consequences of change.141 All embracements or rejections of `the end of history' idea considered it within the context of confusion and displacement about the American role in foreign affairs and American identity. Thus, as one reviewer perceived it, `The End of History' was a `poem', a `narrative' such as human beings consistently created at moments of transition to tell the story of a period's beginning and end and to create the ìllusion of order'.142

Conclusion: normative and rhetorical challenges Is exceptionalism primarily a rhetorical device or a value? Its long-standing centrality to the discourse of the US policy and communication elite suggests that it is both and not just because the words used to explain policy may themselves shape thinking or because institutionalized rhetoric reflects compound strategic successes. Institutionalized rhetoric also reflects and constitutes the collective memory.143 It would be a mistake to look at the


media elite as either rational, self-interested, history-wielding strategists or `cultural puppets pulled by the strings of deep-set values' alone, and fail to see them as ìnescapably historical'.144 This felt historicity is illustrated in their uses of the various strands of exceptionalism rhetoric, interwoven and overlapping, para-ideological rather than ideological, incoherent and contradictory on occasion, deeply traditional and value-laden but also pragmatic and circumstantial. Exceptionalism has shaped the overall thrust of American foreign policy, not just as a result of agenda-setting `bursts' or crisis public diplomacy of US governmental officials but because of its routine evocation in the wider culture which maintains public ecologies sympathetic to the exercise of power abroad and expenditures to support such a leading role. In fact, in the US setting, where consanguinity is absent and cannot be the rallying theme, the nation must be imagined on the basis of its non-corporeal aspects ± as a nation of one mind, spirit, and aspiration or by its rejection or transformation of past attachments (Old World Europe, Cold War Europe, for example). Since the idea of American exceptionalism remains essential from a nation-building perspective, exceptionalism the value and exceptionalism the strategy inform and shape each other. In the period from late 1989 to the end of 1993 the Cold War was divested and a `post-Cold War' era began to emerge. That this new era should be described `post-Cold War' is instructive, for it underlines the intellectual confusion and conceptual poverty that was the legacy of the Cold War. The institutionalization of the rhetoric of American exceptionalism amongst the US policy and communication elite meant that the end of the Cold War provided both normative and rhetorical challenges. Perhaps those who participated in these debates may be viewed as Lasswell's `sentinels', a commentating class who raise the alarm at moments of shifting circumstances or peril.145 Perhaps they are better seen as the maintainers of the status quo, complicit in a hegemonic project by virtue of their class or socialization. Amongst those who defined themselves either in relation to, or against, the Cold War, and were now embarked upon a difficult process of redefining their essential mission, one must also include the President, Secretary of State and their staffs. As the representatives of the United States in a rapidly transforming global environment, these officials had the difficult task of serving the interests of the United States and international stability, while also addressing domestic concerns about the consequences of the end of the Cold War. The following case studies explain how they did so through the skilful use of public diplomacy, managing crises, and building communities of support for a role of qualified internationalism. Significantly, the themes of their rhetoric speak to the wider debate that was occurring amongst the communication elite and non-governmental agenda setters. They include a consideration of the United States' mission, the importance of domestic and international community-building, the definition of a new geo-economic


foreign policy, and the necessity of domestic renewal. Their public diplomacy also exhibits the tensions and contradictions of exceptionalism rhetoric found in other national policy mission debates ± isolationism and internationalism, harmony and violence instincts, and arguments for both tolerant pluralism and order through homogenization. The Bush Administration and less directly, though clearly, the Clinton Administration responded not only to the post-Cold War national and international environment, as they saw it, but also to the competing interpretations of the end of the Cold War which emerged from the foreign policy community of media commentators and academics in the period.

2

Rhetoric of Reconstruction: Containment, Union, and Exceptionalism

America must lead in managing change.1 Normalization must occur on the basis of western values.2

Introduction This chapter examines how Bush Administration officials, and the President in particular, evaluated and conceptualized the transitional period in international relations, between January of Ànnus Mirabilis' 1989 and the beginning of August 1990, and how they worked to define and shape a new era in US foreign policy. August 1990 was a month distinguished by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. It was also the month of President Bush's speech at the Aspen Institute in Colorado,3 where he outlined a new national security strategy for the United States. Both of these occasions may be described as either the symptom or signal of a new era in American foreign policy. They, therefore, suggest a logical cut-off point in a discussion of official first interpretations of the Cold War to post-Cold War transition. An examination of official rhetoric during this period demonstrates how the loss of Cold War interpretive frames was accommodated within a process of `self-renewal' and `self-correction', as first suggested by Secretary of State Baker,4 and how, through a rhetoric of reconstruction, the US±Soviet relationship was officially redefined. Soviet glasnost and perestroika, and the transfers of political power in Central and Eastern Europe during 1989, inspired profound conceptual dislocation amongst the United States' governmental elite. For example, Secretary Baker described a `more reassuring' world but à less familiar one. Unlike the last forty years [. . .] the task before us is [. . .] more complex and more nuanced. It has become less susceptible to the grand gesture, the single solution, or the overarching doctrine.'5 In this evaluation, the Cold War was remembered with some degree of nostalgia, as the era of the simple mission and the just cause to which all other complexities could be subsumed. There was disagreement of course amongst different government 46

Rhetoric of Reconstruction 47

departments about whether the changes were permanent. The Pentagon predicted that rivalry would continue.6 National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Defense Secretary Cheney were publicly skeptical about Gorbachev.7 However, at least one military commander took a converse view. General Colin Powell argued that it was possible to remove the ` `èvil empire'' filters' that had conditioned America's worldview, because the USSR was now neither an ènemy' nor à real and present danger'.8 And Central Intelligence Agency director William Webster testified to Congress that the changes in the Soviet Union would be reversed only if Gorbachev was deposed.9 However, a Defense Policy Panel of the House Armed Services committee was divided between optimists and pessimists. Having produced a report entitled `The Fading Threat: Soviet Conventional Military Power in Decline', all Republican members of the panel refused to endorse it.10 As this suggests, not only the practical arenas of military planning, economic policy and political allegiances were affected by the revolutions of 1989 but also certain fundamental `para-ideological' convictions were challenged. Indeed, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger had complained that the changes were intellectually overwhelming: `The mind can only absorb so much change before numbness sets in and we begin to lose perspective.'11 As demonstrated in Chapter 1, amongst the wider foreign policy elite there were also many differing views. The challenge which these differing interpretations of the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe posed to the Bush Administration and its policy was twofold. The criticism of Bush's handling of foreign policy threatened to undermine the President's Soviet diplomacy. It also made Bush's position within the Republican Party more difficult. Challenges from within his own Party had plagued Bush in the early months of his election campaign and prior to the 1988 election he had made strategic speeches aimed at each of the Republican party constituencies he needed to win over ± the far right, `Reagan Democrats' and `suburban independents'.12 After election, Bush used à strategy of appeasement through appointment', selecting prominent conservatives to serve in key positions in the Administration.13 But the difficulty of holding together a diverse Republican party remained and was exacerbated by the loss of the unifying Soviet menace. Administration officials recall that Bush was more concerned about how domestic criticism would hamper his effectiveness as a manager of foreign policy than he was about his standing in domestic public opinion. US press coverage was scrutinized by the Soviet leadership (as well as other world leaders), thus it was essential for the Administration to exert as much control over that output as possible.14 Against these pressures the Bush Administration's public diplomacy aimed to reconstruct the US±Soviet relationship without declaring the Cold War over, persuade skeptics that Gorbachev was sincere, avoid liberal accusations that old practices remained and conservative complaints that despite the Soviet and Eastern Europe conversions, communism remained intact in


countries on three continents. But there was evident conceptual dislocation in the Administration's evaluation of this period first in a nostalgia discourse lamenting the loss of Cold War stability (and portraying the Cold War in mechanistic, structural or doctrinal terms) and, then, in the language of celebratory redemption. In response to the challenge that the end of the Cold War posed to an entrenched American posture of alertness, active internationalism, and psychological and military strength, the Bush Administration pragmatically redefined the United States' international role by stressing the benefits of continuity. Amidst the argument and debate Secretary of State Baker assumed the role of optimistic new era-ist, envisioning a `new age of reason' and the creation of à newly democratic international society'.15 One recurring feature of this emerging official interpretation was the characterization of the Cold War as a disruption of an established and rational pattern of relations with other states. Baker referred to the èast± west stalemate, which [had] disfigured international politics'.16 Bush stated that, with the new deÂtente, `balance [had] been restored in the international system'17 and later described the legacy of the Cold War as à landscape of moral destruction'.18 Although throughout 1988, and even in 1987, there had been a softening of official rhetoric in response to the Gorbachev initiative, it was not until the collapse of the Warsaw Pact seemed imminent in mid-1989 that statements became substantially `post-war' in tone. This rhetoric of reconstruction took four forms. The first formula ± a promise to `move beyond containment' ± entailed a reevaluation, sometimes a revision, of the Cold War and was explicit in its aim of preserving the status (quo) of NATO. The Administration's rhetorical focus was on the European-centered `first Cold War', as Fred Halliday has defined it, the period between 1945 and the mid to late 1960s.19 The Administration did not focus on the more antiSoviet, arguably more dangerous, and Third World centered Cold War II. Such an approach served the strategic diplomatic project at the time which was aimed at stabilizing the very uncertain transition in the East, but it also cautiously suggested, with US conservatives most likely in mind, that while the European Cold War was ending with the failure of Euro-communism, proxy conflicts in opposition to communism in other parts of the world would continue. The second rhetorical formula focused on normalizing relations with the Soviet Union and led ultimately, at the Malta summit, to the full rhetorical rehabilitation of the Soviets as companions in peacemaking. The third formula was the characterization of the United States and the West as exemplars, `magnets' and `models' responsible for the Soviet surrender and the East European revolutions. The extensive use of this rhetoric by President Bush in domestic speeches following the Malta Summit will be examined. Finally in describing and predicting a new international order under American management and based on ascendant American values these officials also contributed to a restorative discourse. It will be


demonstrated that, in each of these forms, the rhetoric of reconstruction was both strategic and confessional or revelationary, in that it revealed political motives as well as the existence of a body of operative cultural symbols or myths.

Rhetoric of reconstruction: `moving beyond containment' Initially, the focus was on affirming the continued utility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which, as a Cold War construct, was now certain to come under abolitionist scrutiny. An examination of official addresses in the year leading up to the Malta Summit demonstrates how this defense of NATO was pursued through a revisionist re-evaluation of the Cold War itself. The speeches, statements and remarks (by President Bush, Secretary Baker and from assorted second tier officials) were given at a variety of domestic and foreign venues ± Washington, DC (14), New York City (4), Connecticut, Massachusetts, Texas, Wyoming (2), Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, Mainz, Moscow, Paris, London, Tokyo, Rome, Copenhagen, Brussels and Vienna. Some had a purposeful `Transatlantic alliance' theme, the remainder were statements on broad strategy and stance, extra-European foreign relations, remarks welcoming visiting dignitaries, or replies to reporters in official news conferences. The regime changes in Eastern/Central Europe and the Soviet Union were ubiquitously interpreted as occasions of `momentous' historical importance. By late 1989 the general consensus was that they signaled a `new era' of international relations. However, President Bush consistently declined to declare the Cold War over ± a position he maintained until after the Persian Gulf War in 1991.20 He told reporters that he wanted `to avoid words like ``cold war'' ' because they had àn implication'. Ìf someone says cold war to me, that doesn't properly give credit to the advances that have taken place in this relationship', he said in January 1989, a week after his inauguration.21 By December and the end of the first year of his Presidency, Bush insisted that there was `no question' the United States now enjoyed a `vastly improved' relationship with the Soviet Union, and he perceived a strategic environment `far different than at the depths of the Cold War'.22 When prompted, the president cited `complacency or arrogance',23 ùncertainty, unpredictability',24 and ìnstability'25 as the new enemies. The official refrain between 1989 and 1990 was not that the Cold War had ended but that its main players were now `moving beyond containment'.26 This, one official admitted to the New York Times, was merely à public relations tool', employed in the absence of òverarching strategy'.27 However, as a substitute for òverarching strategy' or policy, the `moving beyond containment' motif was significant both for what it revealed and for what it obscured. The Bush Administration's adherence to a containment-centric


definition of US participation in the Cold War belied `roll-back' and barely permitted a mention of Ronald Reagan.28 On one occasion Baker referred vaguely to the àchievements' of `the Reagan years' but immediately reverted to mantric evocations of containment and its transcendence.29 `DeÂtente' merited a reference, appearing in a Baker speech on the new thaw, as an example of conciliation dissolved. `The margins of error after years of compounded blunders are very thin', he warned, `that is why we dare not repeat the mistakes of the 1970s.'30 But no other period or event of the Cold War was recalled. Instead, Bush emphasized the achievements of `the wise men' ± `Truman, Eisenhower, Vandenberg and Rayburn, Marshall, Acheson and Kennan'.31 Later Vietnam would become a recurring motif in discourse on the Persian Gulf War, but in this transitional period official rhetoric remained highly diplomatic and placatory. In a policy vacuum, a concentration on `containment' was the best conservative option. It was a reminder that the Cold War had been about American resolve and the execution of `grand strategy',32 that it had begun in the wake of a near-global hot war and been a response to rampant instability; that it had been managed, made safe, contained by United States leadership. Such rhetoric familiarized change and made the future seem manageable. The official consensus was that the changes in US±Soviet relations were a vindication of containment, `the fulfillment of over 40 years of US policy', as Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs (and later Ambassador to the Court of St James) Raymond Seitz described it.33 `We are seeing today a period of change, greater than at any time since the immediate post-Pacific war era', Robert Kimmit, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, told a Japanese audience.34 Repeated analogies, comparing the current period to the end of World War Two, emphasized the challenges faced by the allies after the war and the eventual stability of the `post-war' order they would build. Baker suggested that the difficulties of building order after World War Two would be replicated in the post-Cold War period.35 He laid out the challenges of the new era in the form of an historic choice between good and bad alternatives: More democracy or the failure of democracy [. . .] growing international economy or disadvantageous protectionism; [. . .] transnational dangers tackled or not [. . .] renewing the Atlantic Alliance or missing a costly opportunity [. . .] stability or volatility.36 This Trumanesque menu of options offered two ways of life ± a liberal, capitalist, democratic utopia or a dystopia of disorderly competition between states and a spiral of conflict. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger predicted a ten-year `transitional period' during which `the patterns of the post-war era' would ùndergo significant adjustment'. And, like Baker, he also presented a world `poised' between `great chances of positive gains' and the potential for global `deterioration'.37 These rhetorical


choices communicated a sense of crisis averted (the Cold War) and of a new and equally urgent challenge ± the rebuilding of the post-Cold War world. Aimed at mobilizing domestic and international support for a US leadership role, `moving beyond containment' became the catch-all term for the United States' changing global policy. And all elucidations of this `moving beyond containment' policy focused on the relegitimization of NATO for a new era. In defense of NATO In defense of NATO Bush emphasized the stability and order engendered by the Cold War. It had been an `historic peace, [. . .] the longest period of peace the continent has ever known', and à long peace', an epithet most famously given to the conflict by historian John Lewis Gaddis. This `long peace' had been made possible by the NATO `shield'. But now the `peace of armed camps' could be replaced with à real peace [. . .] a peace of shared optimism'.38 The Cold War's success as a `long peace' was officially remembered by the NATO members after the crossroads North Atlantic Council Meeting in London in July 1990. The London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance pledged to èxtend the long peace'.39 Assurances of peace, past and future, stressed the benefits of continuity ± in organizations, leaders and strategies. The President repeatedly emphasized that stability had been, and would be, dependent upon the continued existence of the Atlantic Alliance. The key strategic component of the United States' Cold War, `that noble, common cause called NATO', had been more than a military and political alliance. In Bush's definition it had embodied a spiritual and ideological function as the collective expression of western ideals and beliefs, the `shared heritage, history and culture' of its members.40 It was also the vehicle for the realization of these ideals through `the practical sharing of risks and burdens and a realistic recognition of Soviet expansionism'. And it had shaped the historical development of Europe, keeping a `long peace' and providing à way for Western Europe to heal centuries-old rivalries, to begin an era of reconciliation and restoration'.41 Endowed with conciliatory and restorative power, NATO was offered as the historical solution to danger and insecurity. Continued peace was made concomitant with the recurrence of traditional patterns of policy and strategy ± the maintenance of a NATO security system. While Bush portrayed the Cold War as a `long peace', Baker described it as à constant struggle; a contest of superpower strength' and a battle of `values and visions'.42 The contending ideologies were delineated in the simplest of terms ± one was a creed of freedom, the other a doctrine of anti-freedom. While taking credit for the imminent success of the former vision (through durability of conviction and military preparedness), the administration also began to distance itself from the conflict by objectifying the Cold War as an historically imposed collective experience in which cause or blame were


irrelevant. In Baker's explanation the Cold War had become detached from its protagonists and developed a dynamic of its own. Its beginning had been inevitable and unavoidable because `the world had been confronted by two distinctly opposing views'. `Confronted' with two incompatible ideologies, the international system had been forced to splinter and divide to accommodate them. The United States and its allies in Western Europe held the vision of free peoples, living under the rule of law, their individual freedoms protected: `[However] Our vision was not the only vision. There was another view opposed to the values most cherished by the West. And the competition between the two visions gave us the difficult legacy with which we live today.'43 In a clash of visions, the Baker history implied, neither individuals nor nations could be to blame, for they were the victims of historical forces. And as both Bush and Baker emphasized, history's latest unfolding had introduced a new phase of ènlightenment', a `renaissance' in which the superior and logical vision had triumphed. In such circumstances, Baker argued (via NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner), the United States and Europe could be again either the `victims of world historical development' or the managers of history.44 And, echoing Bush, he was insistent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Àmerica must lead in managing change'.45 Bush administration officials produced tradition-affirming critiques of the developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But while frequently referring to `transformation' and `change', the administration emphasized what had not changed and accentuated the enduring legacy of the Cold War ± insecurity and the Transatlantic alliance. Their concession to the ending of the Cold War was a reformulation of the alliance mission. The concept `creative responsibility sharing',46 which was devised to replace the conventional `burden-sharing', entailed a redefinition of the traditional NATO rationale. Baker described it as embracing issues such as `how we define threats to our security, how we divide up responsibilities, and who we engage in responsibility sharing'. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Robert Kimmit asserted that the concept, when applied to Japan, meant that `working together' the US and Japan `would contribute to the world, each in its own way'.47 While he identified new strategic circumstances (such as the existence of `transnational dangers', ecology, terrorism and narcotics-related security issues, regional conflict and weapons proliferation), `creative responsibility sharing' would operate within the old Cold War strategic structures.48 Eagleburger addressed the structural practicalities of the new era particularly concerning the other European-based institutions ± CSCE, EC and WEU. Although some concessions were made towards a more active defense role for the Europeans, he was unequivocal in his assurance to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that `NATO's primacy in security matters' would remain intact. Eagleburger evoked the 1986 Single European Act


as evidence of European support for this status quo but anticipated some future NATO/EC òverlap' in the areas of defense procurement and the evolution of the CSCE. He also underlined the WEU's recognition of the ìndivisibility of the transatlantic relationship'. `The need for a strong American voice in Western affairs will not be diminished', he maintained, `the President will remain the pre-eminent spokesman for the free world in the decade ahead.'49 Baker concurred, stating that it was essential `that an American President be seen to be leading the alliance',50 and linking a successful Èast±West policy' with the maintenance of strong `West±West policy'.51 This claim for US primacy in post-Cold War Transatlantic security relations was accompanied by announcements that a `normalized' relationship with its former Cold War enemy was now possible. `Normalization' Secretary Baker had, in June of 1989, broached the normalization issue by tying it to the issue of self-determination. `[A] new age of normalized relations', he had insisted, would depend on free elections and selfdetermination for Germany and eastern Europe.52 This was an old-style Cold War demand. By October of 1989 normalization had not lost its conditions but the emphasis was on dually advantageous American±Soviet cooperation. They would cultivate `points of mutual advantage' to augment what, it was now suggested, had always been a somewhat symbiotic relationship.53 Baker had first referred to this search for `points of mutual advantage' in a news conference detailing the aims of the Wyoming Ministerial in September 1989.54 The policy was developed in a speech entitled `Points of Mutual Advantage: Perestroika and American Foreign Policy' which Baker delivered to the Foreign Policy Association later in 1989 and further elaborated on in the Senate in 1990.55 `No relationship', Baker asserted, `has been more difficult or, ultimately, more promising' than that between the US and USSR. It had been `promising', he suggested, because through shared peril and responsibility (the peril of, and potential responsibility for, nuclear annihilation), both had been `compelled [. . .] to search for common interests'. The very nature of the Cold War relationship had made peace inevitable, Baker suggested, in a miraculous reversion from orthodox Cold War rhetoric on the staunchness of the Soviet Union and the impossibility of reconciliation. The policy of seeking `mutual advantage', while it seemed almost oxymoronic against a backdrop of Cold War competition, was on second analysis a strategy of joint control, not far removed from the sphere of influence arrangement of the previous 44 years. Thus, the Administration's initial instinct in normalizing relations with the Soviet Union was to replicate a Cold War-style system of division and management. Yet, while the Soviet Union was still courteously described as a `superpower' it was made clear that the US, as victor, would set the terms of the peace. `Normalization', said Baker, `must occur on the basis of western


values.' `Reconciliation through self-determination can only be achieved in peace and freedom. Normalization must occur on the basis of western values with the end result being a people integrated into the community of European nations.'56 Ìt is in our long-term foreign policy interest for more people around the globe to share our core values', Baker instructed the Senate Finance Committee in a statement on US±Soviet Relations in the light of perestroika and Soviet economic reform.57 He listed these `core values' as `democracy and self-determination, respect for individual rights and freedoms, economic liberty, reliance on market economy, and peaceful resolution of conflicts', but feared that Western policies would àt the most be capable of forcing minor corrections in the course of reform'. [The Soviets] are not pursuing freedom for freedom's sake. Their aim is to modernize the Soviet Union, but their frame of reference is not the age of reason or the spirit of enlightenment. They are the descendants of other great Russian modernizers, like Peter the Great and Alexander II, fundamentally rooted in the unique Russian experience.58 It was essential then to influence the Soviets at a level beyond practical policy ± to influence them ideologically. Thus, post-containment, the United States' new aim was the re-education and integration of the Soviet Union into a liberal, democratic, capitalist, community of nations.59 Bush described this as a goal èvery bit as ambitious as containment was at its time' and one which contained `tremendous promise for international stability'.60 This emerging concept of international society in which security would be achieved through cohesion and shared values within a legal framework, and in which the development of regional power groupings would be destabilizing, preceded and prefigured the idea of a new world order. The emphasis on American management, the US as a `catalyst' for East European reconstruction,61 adherence to `the rule of law', the development of `legal codes' and the protection of individual rights suggested an order-driven approach.62 Indeed, Baker had stated that the US would lead in `building a new order' in Asia63 and Assistant Secretary Seitz had referred, in October of 1989, to the United States' intent to be instrumental in the creation of a `new order in Europe'.64 The `new order' vision was the culmination of the foreign policy and national security review which had been begun within a month of Bush's inauguration. Baker had announced in Moscow in May that the review was over and that there would be à considerable degree of continuity'.65 Previously, the Administration's foreign policy vision had seemed only to follow that of Gorbachev. Baker's description of Bush's European vision for the 40th Anniversary NATO Summit was that it would be about `common values' and `some sort of concept of a common European house, as Mr Gorbachev has explained it'.66 The resulting new vision was of a `substantive core' of `common western values' designed to texturize and improve Gorba-


chev's concept of the `common European house' which had been `narrow' and `territorial'. NATO was at the heart of this vision as `the shield to protect those values' and the òrder' they would produce.67 At the year's end Baker outlined the àrchitecture' of a `new Europe and a new atlanticism' to rest primarily on NATO and a US presence but also on the EC and CSCE. This new security architecture would provide à legitimate stable order'.68 The legitimacy required for order was, according to Baker, `the legitimacy of democracy' ± a theme he returned to on several occasions in 1990.69 Clearly, in most of these early references to a post-Cold War era, history and tradition are employed as cautious responses to uncertain political developments and with the political purpose of justifying the maintenance of established institutions. Indeed, Eagleburger warned the Senate Foreign Relations committee: `we must guard against any premature erosion of the public consensus around long-term alliance defense positions and hard-nosed, realistic arms control policies. This will not always be an easy task.'70 The Administration's recognition of the difficulties of maintaining a strong Europeanentangled defense capability in peacetime ± anticipating domestic and international pressure for a build-down ± was accompanied by a focus on the `normalization' process now under way with the Soviet Union and, simultaneously, the depiction of a now far more complex and dangerous environment. This tendency increased as the 1992 Presidential election approached and Bush was under pressure to justify such heavy attention to foreign policy. However, the tactic was undermined, ironically, because of its own inherent contradictions. On the one hand this public diplomacy highlighted Bush's success and prowess in the field of foreign affairs but on the other it portrayed an enduring global dystopia in which foreign policy experts were impotent. One difficulty that the Administration faced in maintaining its policy of stability building was that other foreign policy elites in the media and academia, particularly the optimists, challenged the Bush Administration's interpretation of dangers that accompanied the end of the Cold War. For example, Francis Fukuyama's argument (as discussed in Chapter 1) about `the end of history' posed a direct challenge to the Bush Administration's practical position of cautioning against premature relaxation about the success of the American mission. And in many speeches the Bush Administration appeared to directly question his arguments.71 In the months leading up to the Malta Summit `history' was frequently evoked to explain the new condition of East± West thaw. These were not only references to the lessons of `history'. In official rhetoric `history' had been overcome. Baker envisioned the Berlin Wall being `relegated to history'. Bush described it as a `monument' and foresaw the banishment of war `to the province of distant memory'.72 Eagleburger described those countries not moving towards democratic capitalism as òn the wrong side of history'. They would, he told a meeting of OAS foreign ministers, be condemned to the `garbage can of history'.73 However, triumphalism in mid-to-late 1989 was muted. Instead, the Cold War was re-


evaluated in a way that underplayed the antagonism and legitimized the Soviet Union as an international actor of note and an equal in, as Baker put it, à contest of superpower strength, [. . .] values and visions'. This diplomatic courtesy also, conveniently, began the process of Soviet rehabilitation which by the Malta Summit would allow President Bush to employ myth and metaphor in an embracement of his former enemy.

Rhetoric of reconstruction: the metaphor of the American Civil War Officially, the Cold War ended in April 1991. It was declared òver' by President Bush after the US victory in the Persian Gulf, a hot war in which the Soviet Union was cast as an ally. However, without a formal declaration of the Cold War's end the United States had been engaged in a public process of reconciliation with the Soviet Union long before the Malta Summit in December 1989. Malta and a later summit in Washington were post-war peace conferences in a non-conventional sense. Here, the conflicting parties met to divine the future contours of a changing international system, discuss interim arrangements for order and stability and normalize their relations after decades of antagonism.74 But the United States was not in a position to dictate terms as it would have been as a victor in a conventional post-war situation and the officials involved were aware of the delicate nature of the normalization they were involved in.75 For this reason, in normalizing its relations with the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration chose a strategy of rehabilitation. Between 1989 and mid-1990 the ìmplacable' Soviet enemy and èvil empire' was reconciled as an ally and partner in peacemaking. Bush stated that the Malta Summit would be à constructive act ± guiding brave pilgrims on their journey to a new world of freedom'.76 The Malta Summit At Malta, the United States' experience of the Cold War and its evolving deÂtente with the Soviet Union were explained with the use of a recurring historical analogy. The speeches and statements of President Bush were littered with allusions to the unification and reconstruction of the United States after its Civil War (1861±5), and the trials and achievements of Abraham Lincoln. The summit had been scheduled to take place as alternated meetings aboard the USS Bellknap and the Soviet cruiser Slava, but unusually violent storms caused a transfer to the more stably anchored Soviet passenger liner Maxim Gorky, and the cancellation of ceremonial events and some meetings. In a remarkable exercise of image-management the Bush team incorporated the organizational difficulties caused by the storm into a narrative of the summit which emphasized success in the face of crisis, inspired leadership, and renewed unity. This narrative primarily relied upon the use of an American Civil War metaphor. In some instances the metaphor was


used to warn of the dangers of disintegration and disharmony in the Western alliance, or of the potential for disorder in Eastern Europe. In others, the Civil War was evoked to describe the Cold War itself, as a struggle of warring brothers now being resolved by Bush and Gorbachev as the visionaries and peacemakers. The Civil War-inspired image of untenable disaffection, which would lead first to disorder and then reconciliation, had been used early in 1989 by Secretary Baker. Baker had quoted Lincoln, ` `À house divided against itself cannot stand'' ', at the Vienna ministerial meeting on arms control. And he had extrapolated to argue that a divided Europe was, also, ultimately insupportable.77 Like Lincoln, President Bush referred often to an historic responsibility and a `test' which would determine the future of his descendants; European reunification, for example, was described in this way as a `test' of America's `complacency.'78 By Malta, allusions to à house divided' and the historic `test' were recurring motifs, along with a portion of Abraham Lincoln's Annual Message to Congress of 1 December 1862: Às our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthral ourselves, and then we shall save the country.' Attention to Lincoln's words preceding and following this excerpt demonstrate that Lincolnian images and ideas were echoed and alluded to at Malta, even when the relevant passages were not directly quoted: The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. [. . .] we cannot escape history. We [. . .] will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass, will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation.79 On the eve of the summit, on board the USS Forrestal, Bush informed the crew that the superpower conference was a meeting for their generation and àll the generations to come' and spoke of the `patience and personal sacrifice' which would be necessary to achieve permanent peace.80 In emulation of Lincoln, Bush repeated the image of a `stormy present', a symbol energized by the real storm which disrupted the summit proceedings, and emphasized the difficulties of the transition from Cold War to a new era of peace. Where Lincoln had recognized the obsolescence of old `dogmas', made irrelevant in the transition from `quiet past' to `stormy present', Bush was struggling with the transition from `long peace' to an era of ùncertainty' and ùnpredictability' ± an admission he made in a press conference three months later.81


The peacemakers On more than one occasion he confirmed his identification with Lincoln by referring to a favorite painting in the Lincoln Bedroom of the White House. This painting, by George Healy, was named `The Peacemakers'. It portrayed Lincoln, with two generals and an admiral, meeting near the end of the Civil War, a war that according to Bush `had pitted brother against brother'. In Bush's interpretation, the battle, symbolized by the storm, continued to rage while the meeting took place. However, he assured his audience that the rainbow in the painting's background was à symbol of hope' and confirmation that the storm would pass. It reassured him, he said, `that the cause of peace will triumph and ours will be a future free from both tyranny and fear'.82 These images were reproduced in the President's report on the summit in Brussels. `The seas were as turbulent as our times', he told the assembled foreign officials, `but it was not an ill wind carrying us on our mission. No, it was the winds of change ± strong and constant, profound [. . .] as the sun broke through the clouds at Malta, we could see a new world taking shape, a new world of freedom.'83 And he recounted this story of `The Peacemakers' painting again on his return to Washington. `Lincoln abolished slavery, and he saved the union', Bush recalled in his introductory address to the Presidential Lecture Series. The image might have better suited Gorbachev in 1989, but it was now clear that Bush had adopted an affinity with Lincoln that surpassed the stagemanaged comparisons at Malta. In Bush's definition, Lincoln was à strong man ± an arm wrestler, a rail splitter' and yet also possessed à mix of kindness and humility. He was at once a hard and gentle person, a man of grief and yet of humor.'84 And increasingly in his speeches Bush also began to define himself in these terms. He told the Catholic University that he was `not yet tested as Abraham Lincoln was' but understood `that faith can make all things possible for a nation and a people'.85 Similar imagery of being `tested' was frequent in Bush's Persian Gulf rhetoric. Marlin Fitzwater has described the official press conferences during the Persian Gulf War as `staged and scripted' events which were carefully designed to promote a complex agenda and address a range of sympathetic and unsympathetic audiences.86 There is no reason to conclude that the Malta Summit was not similarly designed. But what strategy becomes apparent behind the staging and scripting? And what does this strategy and the choice of images reveal about the Administration's interpretation of world affairs in late 1989? Clearly, the self-aggrandizement in Bush's comparisons between himself and Lincoln have a legitimizing function. In portraying himself as the peacemaker, strong man and moral leader, it is certain President Bush hoped to mobilize support and approval at home both for his leadership in general terms but more precisely approval for his foreign policy of deÂtente. But the self-characterization also performed a confidence-


building function at an international level. The Civil War analogy as a whole contributes to a sense of crisis ± a crisis of great historical import. But it also has further persuasive appeal and stabilizing power. First, it implies deep division requiring the healing power of a great leader. In this sense it is both self-aggrandizing and reassuring because the declaration of a crisis implies that the orator already has the answers or at least the ability to avert the proclaimed crisis. Second, the US Civil War analogy suggests a commonality of experience ± a war of brothers ± and hence the possibility of reconciliation. It also contains an obvious play on the contrast between a `cold' conflict and a now `civil' conflict. Third, and perhaps most crucially, it makes a subtle moral differentiation between the participants. Thus Bush is not only a model of leadership but also the leader of the righteous cause. The upgrading of the Soviet Union, first to a `brother in arms' and then to potential partner in peacemaking creates an expectation of resolution and a settlement in which unity and order can be restored. Therefore the analogy is not only reassuring in that it predicts peace and stability. It also reflects favorably on the Administration as the successful managers of crisis and danger. And it is clearly in the tradition of `redeemer nation' exceptionalism. As a rhetorical device, then, the US Civil War analogy in President Bush's statements during and after the Malta Summit had a clear strategic function combining the policy of community-building and crisis management with a rhetoric of crisis and community. The Malta Summit was constructed as a spectacle of warriors turned peacemakers, of statesman-like co-operation between leaders even against a backdrop of some Soviet domestic opposition and a still raging Cold War. Mikhail Gorbachev was willing to `think anew' in the cause of peace. At Malta, Gorbachev (as Shevardnadze had done at Wyoming in September) made clear that the Soviet Union accepted that continuing `change' in Eastern Europe should be peaceful and that they would not seek to direct it, and he was cautious but not intransigent over the reunification of Germany. The United States also demonstrated reciprocal `new thinking' in the period, for example, in December, Secretary Baker publicly stated that the US would support a Soviet intervention in Romania, if necessary to ensure victory for the revolutionary movements.87 There was also increasing common ground over Central America with Moscow pledging to end arms supplies to Nicaragua. However, the status of the Baltic Republics remained an area of contention. Through employment of myth and metaphor, both Bush and Gorbachev were elevated above the fray. Having once been `brother pitted against brother', they were now engaged on a mission of peace. However, as in the painting, war continued. Although superficially platitudinous, this rhetoric did seem to reveal important views of the strategic environment; for example, it is possible to identify a perception of international instability, a belief that international peace and stability required the spread of American values and continued military strength, and that Amer-


ican experience could explain change elsewhere in the world and offer a model for its future stabilization. But Bush also appeared to believe that peace would produce new difficulties for the United States, most immediately in justifying an expansive world role. Indeed, on one occasion after the summit he admitted to a group of students: Ìf I signal to you there's no Cold War, then [the next question will be] ``What are you doing with troops in Europe?'' '88 Like Lincoln, then, Bush perceived a `trial'. His task was to achieve peace, a union of the United States and the USSR against common dangers, without threatening two other important kinds of unity ± the domestic consensus and the Transatlantic security alliance. Economic power, military readiness, and conventional diplomacy remained vitally important for the United States' credibility and effectiveness in foreign policy in this period. But in the end this unity at home and amongst the western allies, as well as the confidence of the Soviet Union, could only be achieved with successful public diplomacy that was convincing in its portrayal of American exceptionalism and its desire and ability to lead. The reconstitution of the Soviet Union as a partner and ally in response to a very uncertain Soviet future and to instability in the world in general was in one way a conservative response to the changes taking place in 1989 but in another way it was a radical policy. On the one hand, it seemed to be a recreation of the Cold War bipolar world order on friendly terms, a policy that was status quo oriented even if the dual hegemony component was a facade. On the other hand it was also revolutionary and a risk. Such a partnership was anathema to some in the United States (members of Bush's own party) who did not trust Gorbachev and some in the Soviet Union, particularly hard-line opponents of Gorbachev, who believed the United States intended to destroy their country. The normalization of relations with the Soviet Union required a rhetorical campaign that underplayed and in some cases obliterated mention of a 45-year-old military, political, economic, and ideological conflict that had had some effect on every aspect of American life, and had shaped the careers and political and foreign policy views of most of the Bush Administration officials. As an exercise in stability and confidence building this summit may serve as an example of benign US intervention. Relying on public diplomacy, the United States was able to shape not only its relations with the Soviet Union and former satellites but also to shape its internal conditions and policy by stabilizing Gorbachev's position with moderates in the country and by enabling the enhancement of his international status. It also suggests that there are ideologically confessional attributes to official rhetoric as well as strategic ones. The actors involved interpreted and explained their experience and their mission within a `vocabulary of motives'89 derived from shared experiences of the Cold War and collective learned memories of other transforming events in American history. More than a discrete and cynical strategy, this rhetoric suggested an underlying belief in exceptionalism. A paradigm of conflict and resolution


constructed from the American experience of Civil War and Reconstruction was applied to the Cold War and relations with the Soviet Union. Malta crystallized a post-Cold War rhetoric of reconstruction rooted in a myth of war as a means for producing honorable and ethical peace.

Rhetoric of reconstruction: American exceptionalism For the New Year Bush delivered a special message to the people of the Soviet Union. In it he anticipated à new century and a new millennium', based on `co-operation' and the universal values of human rights, democracy and the free market. And he emphasized their participation as allies in World War Two.90 Rhetorically at least the USSR had been fully rehabilitated. Thus, in 1990 the focus shifted towards a third form of reconstructive rhetoric which portrayed the United States as the exemplar and model which had made this rehabilitation possible. The US had a ùnique role', said Baker, and was `simultaneously a tribune for democracy, a catalyst for international cooperation and the guardian of America's national interest'.91 Eagleburger stated that the US had been the `model' of development for Western Europe and would now be the model for the East.92 Eastern Europe was `psychologically' as well as materially dependent on the West said Seitz.93 `We Americans believe we have a special role in the world', Kimmit maintained in Tokyo.94 But parallel with this recognition of its exceptional role was a perception that the United States had become a victim of its own eminence. Eagleburger acknowledged that the evolution from a bipolar to a multipolar world had been accompanied by the rise of new centers of economic power in Europe and Asia. As a result, America could no longer count on `the luxury of unilateralism', but was forced into a posture of defensive co-operation to ensure that its interests were not `discriminated against' in the economic sphere and to preserve its physical security against `multifaceted global problems'. These problems were èxpensive and complex' and, he warned, `too great for our nation to manage alone'.95 The dominating State Department stance was that the United States was vulnerable, that the new strategic environment was chiefly characterized by uncertainty and unpredictability, that the solution of problems required international co-operation, but that the US should safeguard its position by taking a lead on foreign issues. `We must protect, manage, and enhance our assets in this transitional period', Baker attempted to persuade the Senate Foreign Relations Committee while testifying on behalf of the Administration's foreign affairs budget request for Financial Year 1991. Listing five key foreign policy challenges for the 1990s ± the promotion of democratic values and market principles, creation of peace in a secure global environment, encouragement of co-operative efforts to protect against transnational threats, and the reshaping and renewal of the United States' alliances ± Baker concluded that these budget ìnvestments' would preserve à US lead-


ership role for the next century', and ensure the continued influence of the United States' `fundamental values'.96 He emphasized the point again in a budget statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee: `This request is intimately linked to our ability to protect American values and interests into the next decade'.97 In his Senate testimony he had stated that the request was wedded to the United States' ability `to project American values and interests'. State Department officials consistently asserted that in a post-Cold War period bipartisanship and `constructive consultation' were still essential to reach consensus on foreign policy and national security matters.98 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney also stressed the need for co-operation between the different branches of government at a conference on the Presidency and Congress: Now of all times, it is crucial to contain disagreement. When the stakes have to do with leadership of the free world, we cannot afford to be paralyzed by an intramural stalemate.99 The Senate and House Committees eventually authorized direct aid for Eastern Europe of $535 million ± twice as much as the Administration had asked for.100 The need to `contain disagreement', and gain bipartisan and public support for foreign policy initiatives and spending also partly explains why, in the first half of 1990, President Bush persistently focused on the United States' exceptional qualities and its instrumental role in defeating communism. Bush rejected all suggestions of US decline as èlitist theories'.101 And, for a mainly domestic audience, he aggressively promoted American exceptionalism. After the Malta Summit Bush went out to the country and in almost every domestic context referred to the transformations taking place in the Soviet sphere. An examination of the President's public addresses at domestic venues (20) in the six months between December 1989 and June 1990 reveals a reflexive concentration on international issues. In each case he stressed how the United States had been the example and catalyst for the political changes in the East; although the delineation of America's exemplary and catalytic qualities varied to fit the particular constituency he was addressing. When speaking to the Catholic University of America or the National Religious Broadcasters Association he emphasized how the East European demonstrators had been motivated by religious faith.102 But when addressing the American Farm Bureau Federation the focus was on their rush to buy previously denied fruit and vegetables.103 An audience of engineers were told that `the microchip' had been `the instrument of liberty' and the National Academy of Sciences heard how the changes in Eastern Europe (and South Africa) demonstrated that `the eye of technology proved


more powerful than chisels for breaking down barriers; etching the idea of freedom on the psyche of humanity; and setting off a wondrous, hopeful, political chain reaction world-wide'. Ìntegrated circuits', Bush claimed, had made the unimaginable possible.104 The media were also congratulated for their role. While official organs, Radio and TV Marti, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America received special attention, the US press corps in general were described as a `peace corps' for an information era.105 They had produced a borderless arena of ideas which had both inspired and assisted the grassroots resistance movements. The National Association of Manufacturers were told that `freedom' was `made in America'. Persistence in promoting free trade and investments had made transformation possible.106 Similar victory speeches were made to the Associated General Contractors of America and the National Association of Agricultural Journalists, speeches with almost solely foreign policy content in which questions on farm policy were deflected to the secretary for agriculture.107 Bush even referred to the example of the American civil rights movement, whose anthem, `We Shall Overcome', had been taken up in Eastern Europe.108 Only once in six months were the experiences of the East Europeans held up as an example to be emulated by Americans. They had proven that unity could overthrow àny system', Bush told the National Governors' Association, arguing that it would take similar co-operation between the Governors and the President to assure the success of the Administration's new education plan.109 Even when asked a direct question on a domestic issue, Bush reverted to the Eastern European developments. Visiting a youth group in Cincinnati, he was asked about `the sense of hopelessness' among young people in the country and what the President could do `to create a more hopeful environment'. While first mentioning the role of the family, `fundamental values' and the war against drugs, Bush finally outlined what he described as his `philosophy' or `theory' on the problem. The sense of hopelessness he maintained was a legacy of both the Vietnam war and `that post-Watergate period that increased a certain national cynicism'. All this, however, could now be transcended because, said Bush: `We're coming into a new period. We look around the world, and we see the darndest, most dramatic changes moving towards values that have made this country the greatest: freedom, democracy, choice to do things.'110 It was, the audience must have felt, an unhelpful answer. But of all his evaluations of the United States' role in the Cold War this was the closest Bush had come to acknowledging the domestic ramifications of his country's post-1945 foreign policy. The United States had been à shining example' and a `guiding force' for the East Europeans, maintained Bush, `not as a nation but as an idea'. And in the new era the United States would be responsible for maintaining this revolution. `We must export our experience ± our two centuries of accumulated wisdom on the workings of free government', he stated, announcing


the establishment of a `Citizens Democracy Corps'.111 The `Citizens Democracy Corps' was to be a commission made up of representatives from the private sector and volunteers to work in the field ± all Americans. It was designed to provide advice and technical assistance for Central and Eastern Europe, to act as a `clearing-house' for US private volunteer assistance programs, and to co-ordinate the efforts of private donors, businesses, volunteer organizations and educational institutions. It would, Bush emphasized, finish the work the United States had begun upon liberating the occupied East after World War Two. After 1945, the United States had been `firm in [its] belief in America's destiny as leader of the free world'. After 1989, said Bush, the US was still called upon `by millions' to maintain its traditional leadership role.112 The US had been at the forefront of the post-World War Two reconstruction and was again confronted with the task of `reconstruction and reconciliation':113 Às Americans we have always believed that our foremost goal was to prevent another world war. To do so we still need to remain fully engaged.'114

Conclusion Due to a cessation of hostilities with the Soviet Union, some United States' government officials experienced profound conceptual dislocation. This was expressed as intellectual `numbness', ùncertainty' about future policy and posture, and nostalgia for the simplicity and familiarity of Cold War frames of reference. However, the period was also characterized by a redemptive reevaluation of the Cold War and the rehabilitation of the Soviet Union as an ally. This Cold War revisionism was remarkably swift (beginning in mid1989). By early 1990, having made peace with the USSR at the Malta Summit, official rhetoric, in particular the domestic pronouncements of President Bush, then reverted to a body of familiar concepts and reference points which emphasized US exceptionalism and its unchallengeable destiny as world leader. In addressing the strategic need to `mobilize popular support and immobilize opposition',115 it seems that the Administration perceived the most effective path to be one of reliance on tried and tested persuasive tactics, drawing on perceived common memories and values. The official response to cognitive dissonance experienced in the transition from Cold War to post-Cold War international relations was the rhetorical memorialization of the superpower conflict. In ceremonies and statements the Cold War was committed to the realm of memory and became history. But the story of its end was constructed (for future remembrance) with the aid of analogies derived from two transitional American pasts ± the World War Two to Cold War transition and the American Civil War ± and using the concept of American exceptionalism which has been a recurring motif in American political and religious discourse since the founding of the Republic. Thus the end of the Cold War vindicated the


policy of containment which had been conceived after World War Two and again required the rebuilding of Europe; the end of the Cold War was a crisis, similar to the American Civil War, which would be followed by renewed unity; and the end of the Cold War justified American claims to exceptionalism and legitimized continued US primacy in international affairs, as its exceptionalism ordained. There may be a strikingly banal circularity in the way in which these quasi-mythological examples of past triumph over adversity, and manifest destiny, were adapted and offered as familiar but new explanations of the United States' Cold War and as novel but familiarized post-Cold War plans. However, the study of these recurring themes does illustrate how traditions of speech are modified and that there is a multiply reconstituting relationship between ideational shifts, US foreign policy, and the circumstances of international relations and domestic politics. The Bush Administration's public diplomacy studied in this chapter illustrates both cognitive dissonance and the strategic use of rhetoric to recreate consonance. Like theory which, as Eagleton has argued, is activated when accepted intellectual and social practices come unstuck,116 the evocation of a `cultural-symbol system'117 seemed to fill the policy gap created by an unscheduled transformation in political and military habits of behavior, and was the response to `dissonance' experienced by the foreign policy elite. Indeed, certain officials publicly stated that the `moving beyond containment' theme was such a stop-gap, stabilizing, rhetorical tool. The incrementalism of Bush foreign policy and the familiarity of the rhetorical themes employed in this period illustrate the extent to which this was a revolutionary period. These themes made sense of the new world of international relations and were comforting reminders of US power and success. As this chapter illustrates, even when nascent departures in foreign policy stances could be observed, the rhetoric employed to explain these new stances was certainly still imbued with versions of some very familiar themes. This evidence suggests that there is a body of institutionalized rhetoric which US policy-makers may have drawn on. Able only to identify vague enemies such as ùncertainty' and ùnpredictability' from without, and `complacency' and àrrogance' from within, the Administration portrayed the end of the Cold War itself as the enemy. Thus the early theme of postCold War redemption was overtaken by a desire for familiarity and manageability which translated into a rhetoric of American primacy. Manageability clearly required NATO-provided order, and stability under American supervision. However, familiarity demanded not just order but also license to pursue an activist and sometimes interventionist foreign policy. The political and public consensus which had sanctioned the forceful export of democracy during the Cold War was now invalidated. Therefore, a central need was to define a national security interest or orientation that would `persuade people that they should be willing to risk their children's lives in


foreign operations'.118 To this end the rhetoric of government officials was aimed at containing disagreement at a national level and in various international fora, maintaining a western union of shared values and interests that would absorb the former Soviet bloc, and forging domestic consensus for an internationalist orientation based on a vision of America's exemplary singularity. In outlining a new international identity and posture for the United States, the Bush Administration reformulated the theme which had, in the past, persuaded the American people of their special role in the world, that of `redeemer nation' exceptionalism. Yet, an adapted organizational process model does not explain the innovations in rhetoric and policy of the Administration. Although familiar or slightly modified rhetorical themes might be used such as American exceptionalism or `moving beyond containment', they were employed to further policies which were objective departures from convention, such as the rehabilitation of the Soviet Union as a partner and ally. And this model's emphasis on the inculcated norms of behavior and speech underemphasizes the important conscious strategic function of such rhetoric for crisis management or to build community. As the rhetoric studied in this chapter illustrates, even when familiar themes were reproduced they did undergo adaptation to suit the circumstances. Because these are not simple reproductions they might be considered para-ideological rather than ideological. In this regard, the study of Administrative public diplomacy alongside the predominant discourses amongst the communication elite both at an international and at a national level may be revealing. For example, Bush was competing with other discourses about the significance of the Soviet empire's collapse and the ability of the United States to remain a leading world power as well as fending off critiques of his own Administration and policies. On occasion Administration officials directly addressed and debunked academic analyses of the United States' decline, the coming war with Japan, and `the end of history'. Clearly, then, the study of public diplomacy particularly in the context of a broader discourse on international affairs can illustrate the process of agenda-setting. The agenda-setting model is most useful in explaining the process by which these officials came to employ `containment', ùnion' and èxceptionalism' as rhetorical devices in a strategic reconstruction of the US±Soviet relationship and the subsequent attempted consolidation of national pride and internationalist purpose. But how does the study of public diplomacy provide evidence useful for determining the motivations of these officials; not just that they were engaged in agenda-setting but what they were attempting to achieve in gaining control of the foreign policy agenda? Different analytical perspectives will yield different conclusions. It is possible to offer a radical explanation, that these officials desired to ensure United States hegemony and unlimited access to the markets and minds of the newly exploitable post-Communist regions. A conservative explanation


would be that healthy skepticism and concern for national security, in a period of geopolitical flux, required psychological readiness to match military preparedness. A liberal explanation would suggest that they were wellmeaning pragmatists, concerned with preserving international order and stability by inspiring and motivating international co-operation. It is this third explanation which an analysis of public diplomacy most appears to support, not just because public diplomacy is a tool which Administrations often use for stability building but also because the predominant theme of this rhetoric was American exceptionalism in the `redeemer nation' tradition and because the targets for this rhetoric were remarkably broad. Between late 1989 and mid-1990, Bush Administration officials gave speeches in person in the following locations: Washington, DC (14), New York City (4), Boston, Denver, Wyoming (2), New London, CT, Orlando, FL, Cincinnati, OH, Los Angeles, CA, Palm Springs, CA, Stillwater, OK, Columbia, SC, Des Moines, IA, Houston, Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, Mainz, Moscow, Paris, London, Tokyo, Rome, Copenhagen, Brussels, Vienna, and Malta. Many more were given in the form of statements and press conferences. And all placed heavy emphasis on, even if they were not devoted to, international engagement, `Transatlantic alliance', and international community themes. A clear campaign of community and stability building can be identified both in the content of the speeches made on these occasions and by the breadth of the audiences targeted. This may be at least partly because the purpose of such rhetoric is to encourage exactly this liberal analysis of the rational, stability promoting activities of government officials. This public diplomacy was obviously a response to the interpretations of other actors both domestic and international. In 1990, US òpinion makers' consistently expressed dissatisfaction. Bush was accused of having `no clear policies and no clear principles',119 of having a `noblesse oblige' attitude to policy-making120 and being ìnnately cautious'.121 He lacked the `vision and imagination' required to make use of the post-Cold War opportunities,122 failed `to provide inspiring leadership',123 and was ineffectual and disinterested with domestic policy.124 In some media reports Bush was compared to Carter as a President who could not satisfy his party's extremist wings and was therefore destined to be a `lame duck'. Baker was criticized for lacking the `grand design' approach to foreign policy.125 However, as one conservative commentator admitted, the major critics of Bush foreign policy were `yesterday's most redoubtable hawks and interventionists' who found themselves in confusion at `the sudden disappearance of the Cold War'.126 As shown in Chapter 1, alongside reluctance to accept the East±West thaw as permanent, there was impatience with remaining Cold War habits and practices among the communication and policy elite. There was fear of a loss of identity leading to American impotence or irrelevance in international


affairs and international, even domestic, disorder. There was insecurity due to the absence of a vision or grand design to replace the Cold War framework for understanding the world. This cognitive dissonance, when combined with the continuing post-Vietnam crumble of the foreign policy consensus (indeed, the atomization of consensus into single-issue interest groups), posed a challenge to both post-Cold War Administrations. For Bush the task of selling policy to Congress and the American people was made more difficult by the end of the Cold War, and the role of official rhetoric was therefore made more important. The public diplomacy of Bush did not just have an important strategic function in ensuring the success of their individual foreign policy initiatives, but also in reconstructing national consensus in a period of flux and uncertainty. Abstract and conceptual thinking were vital to effect a stable transition and a renewal of American posture and purpose. In this, the Administration adopted a conservative middle way which contrasted revealingly with the most pessimistic predictions of American decline, war with Japan and/or the Muslim world, and the most optimistic ones, for example the presumption of the universal ascension of democracy and capitalism. The Bush Administration was competing not just with the alternative views of the American media and other commentators about the meaning of the changes in the East, and their criticism of Bush foreign policy style, but also with the international agenda-setting of Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev was popular with the American media and public, and received numerous accolades.127 The Bush Administration's approach was one of caution and subtlety in rhetoric to match incremental policy change. While Bush acknowledged the establishment of a `living memorial' to the Cold War in the historic arms control agreements reached at the Washington Summit (30 May ± 2 June 1990), he would still only say that the `Cold War must end',128 that the summit represented `the beginning of the end of the Cold War'.129 And by the Houston Economic Summit in July 1990 he referred only to the `post post-war era'.130 In contrast, Gorbachev appeared to be the visionary and catalyst for change. He was acclaimed during his visit for the Washington Summit and received five humanitarian awards ± the Albert Einstein Peace Prize, the Martin Luther King Jr Non-Violence Peace Prize, the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Freedom Medal, the `Man of History' Award from the Appeal of Conscience Foundation, and the Martin Luther King Jr International Peace Award from Friends World College.131 And he was unequivocal about the status of the Cold War. `The Cold War has been left behind', the Soviet leader insisted in his address at Stanford University, ànd it is not worth squabbling over who won the victory'.132 While Gorbachev was rewarded for the pursuit of peace, finally earning the Nobel Prize in October 1990, Baker received the awards for Cold Warriors ± the Hans J. Morgenthau and George Kennan prizes.133 Bush was offered no official accolades until after the Persian Gulf War, when he received the


Elie Wiesel Foundation Humanitarian Award. In the context of such Soviet magnanimity and charisma, the Bush Administration was required to not only achieve political and public unity behind its foreign policy stance of gradual, orchestrated evolution towards a new era of international affairs (the stated position of `caution' combined with `carefully calibrated' management of the strategic situation was hardly inspirational), but also to foster pride in American achievement and leadership, and maintain the idealism and expansive sense of American identity necessary to sanction future expenditures of American resources in the international arena. This suggests a contingency-related explanation for the emphasis on American exceptionalism as a reconstructive rhetoric that implied national success as well as international power and purpose. The United States had made peace with the Soviets, as the London Declaration and Houston Summit in July of 1990 formally acknowledged.134 Yet Gorbachev's popularity and a growing media perception that the Bush Administration made foreign policy in reaction to Moscow required some attempt to take the initiative in finding an American equivalent to perestroika and glasnost. Then-Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater has explained how this was certainly his own preoccupation during the period. Indeed, a desire to counter Gorbachev's pervasive favorable publicity caused Fitzwater to make the now infamous accusation that the Soviet leader was a `drug-store cowboy' on arms control ± `making promises he couldn't keep'.135 However, the rhetoric of American exceptionalism, which President Bush employed in all domestic addresses in the first half of 1990, was a significantly more subtle strategy for `containing disagreement' and countering Gorbachev diplomacy. In attempting to set the agenda in favor of the United States and in favor of internationalism, the post-Malta domestic speeches of President Bush consistently utilized the theme of American exceptionalism in a Wilsonian `redeemer nation' tradition. This illustrated not just the political self-interest of a President wishing to counter domestic criticism of his presidency, or the desire to balance Gorbachev's successful international diplomacy, or to create a climate of belief in US power and confidence that international stability would be maintained in a precarious period. It also illustrated the para-ideological drives of American foreign policy for it promoted peace through an American-led community of states and order through the value of Àmerican democracy'. The transitional rhetoric of the Bush Administration between 1989 and August 1990 was, like the rhetoric of the Cold War, clearly strategic and paraideological; then rhetoric had been a mechanism for waging war by other means. It was now the primary vehicle for creating a sense of stability and for legitimizing both the Bush Administration and NATO. The domestic political and global geopolitical challenges were obvious and entwined: how to appear both conciliatory and resolute, open to change and alert to the dangers of new aggression or opportunism. How to portray the disintegra-


tion of the Soviet empire as a triumph of US, Republican and Bush foreign policy without forfeiting the rationale for continued international engagement. How to support Gorbachev and ensure his political survival while balancing American opinion that was divided between more and less aid and involvement. The interim answer was a strategic rhetoric of reconstruction which promised to `move beyond containment' though not beyond Cold War-style readiness and strength; which rehabilitated the Soviet Union as a companion in peacemaking but elevated the United States as the catalyst and exemplar producing change; and which created the outline for a new order based on American values and requiring American management. The extent to which the para-ideological features and hegemonic implications of this public diplomacy were intended or unintended consequences of the stability-building program is considered in more detail in Chapter 3.

3

Crisis, Community, and the Persian Gulf

What you don't want to do is appear to be held hostage in the White House.1 America has never been comfortable fighting wars for limited objectives. World War I was cast as the war to end all wars; World War II was to usher in a new era of permanent peace to be monitored by the United Nations. Now, the Gulf War has been justified in similar terms deeply embedded in American tradition.2 No one in the whole world doubts us anymore.3

Introduction The reiterated themes of the Bush Administration's rhetoric of reconstruction ± containment, union, and exceptionalism ± continued to have important crisis management functions as the Persian Gulf crisis unfolded. Hussein's actions illustrated that neither American public diplomacy nor American `hard' power was a sufficient deterrent to aggression in the postCold War world. However, the Administration's community-building rhetoric in late 1989 and early 1990 had proved effective in stabilizing East±West relations and, to a certain extent, internal conditions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It can be argued that it also succeeded in creating an international and domestic climate which made possible the Gulf coalition-building and mobilization. The Administration's forging of a partnership with the Soviet Union was important in this regard. But the difficult crisis management task which the Administration faced should not be underestimated. While the Administration's Persian Gulf victory was achieved with multiple foreign policy instruments ± military, diplomatic and economic ± the public diplomacy component was essential. The Persian Gulf crisis illustrated the vital role of rhetoric as an accompaniment to military action and as a form of intervention in itself. Although President Bush did not benefit electorally, the Persian Gulf War furthered the development of 71


domestic and international ecologies sympathetic to the United States' leadership. It therefore built upon the Administration's community and stability building policies and public diplomacy of late 1989 and early 1990. This chapter examines how, from the US side, the Gulf War was waged rhetorically, and how the Administration persuaded the American public, Congress, and the international community that this operation was necessary and just. The themes and historical analogies which the Administration evoked to mobilize support for the Gulf operations serviced not just geopolitical and domestic mobilization needs but also longer-term legitimacy requirements.

The `defining moment' Paradoxically, it seems that it was both necessity and greed, insecurity and overconfidence, as well as the constraints and opportunities posed by the end of the Cold War that prompted Hussein's military invasion.4 The same could be said of the United States' response. As President Woodrow Wilson had expressed, on the eve of another era of international transition, war could be à dramatic representation, a symbol of a thousand forms of duty'.5 Bush quoted the same lines in a speech at a memorial service for Gulf War dead in June 1991.6 In the public diplomacy of the Bush Administration during the Persian Gulf War many forms of `duty' were expressed. This rhetoric reflected the complicated origins of the crisis and the interests involved. Chief among the United States' many publicly stated concerns was that if Hussein's action went unchallenged it would set a bad precedent for the post-Cold War world, and encourage other regional aggressors, creating more problems for the United States in the long term. Iraqi success would mean that moderate, pro-western governments could be eliminated in the region. Iraq could hold the world to ransom for oil and, if Saudi Arabia was invaded, Hussein could control half the world's oil supply. It was possible that Iraq had not only chemical and biological weapons but also could have nuclear weapons capabilities within 18 months.7 Bush had clearly outlined the United States' `duty' in 1989 and early 1990. The responsibility for maintaining international order was reiterated but also qualified in a pivotal address at the Aspen Institute in Colorado in August 1990. At Aspen the President announced a new era in US foreign policy which was explicitly linked with the Persian Gulf crisis. As after World War Two, when the new era of Cold War arrived with the emergence of a new threat, Bush announced a new era to coincide with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The invasion was characterized as typical of the threats which were inevitably arising, ùnpredictably', to jeopardize the infant new order. In this `post-post-war era', as both Bush and Baker still described it, new strategic circumstances would necessarily be accompanied by changes in defensive capabilities. And this, they acknowledged, would mean cuts and restructuring. Bush announced that by 1995 the United States' security

Crisis, Community, and the Persian Gulf 73

requirements could be fulfilled by an active force 25 per cent smaller than its current size. This would leave the US with its smallest military since 1950 and suggested that, where US influence in the shaping of a new order was concerned, time was of the essence. When questioned in December about whether the US would in five years' time be able to deploy a force of similar size and with similar rapidity, Bush by his own admission `hedged', stating that the Gulf operation was `pushing it up to the edge of the envelope'.8 Defense Secretary Cheney suggested that the Gulf crisis proved it was premature to begin defense cuts.9 Therefore, along with the geopolitical and geo-economic interests which the war served, there also existed the necessity to shape public opinion in favor of international engagement and expenditure. A disengagement faction in the domestic communication elite, as well as the differing demands from old allies like the United Kingdom and Israel and new ones like the Soviets, the first counseling assertion, the second caution,10 provided a substantial public relations challenge. Therefore, the public diplomacy of the Gulf crisis had to serve many purposes. Certainly, whether it was perceived as the last conflict of the Cold War or the first of the post-Cold War era, the Gulf crisis offered the possibility for highly profitable symbolism. In the Persian Gulf, the United States was able to make the definitive statement of intent, demonstrate American resolve, superior military capabilities, and coalition-building skills, and attempt to manage the evolution of the new international system in a way that would facilitate future policing. As Bush stated on announcing the deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia on 8 August: Ìn the life of a nation, we're called upon to define who we are and what we believe'.11 When it was over, he stated that the war had also resulted in a victory for `the forces of order', and a legitimization of the United States as the international leader, as guarantor of the status quo, and as the manager of history. `No one in the whole world doubts us anymore', Bush announced in the spring of 1991. The United States had emerged from the war with `re-established credibility'.12 It was also a `defining moment' and provided à rare opportunity' for progress to be made towards international co-operation. In this public diplomacy it is possible to identify not just crisis management consisting of threats, deterrence, international coalition-building, and domestic mobilization, but also multi-level domestic community-building aimed at securing sympathetic ecologies of support for future international leadership and interventionism. Even during crises, attention is given to the long-term aim of building community, which is, after all, essential for facilitating the management of future crises.

Building community International co-operation was most striking in the formation of the Gulf coalition and in the US±Soviet compact of opposition to Iraq which enabled


the successful use of the United Nations. For Baker, this consensus demonstrated that the Cold War was over. President Bush was more reticent. However, he acknowledged that the Gulf crisis would be èasier to solve', than it might have been five years or a decade earlier, because of this new affiliation with the Soviets.13 Seitz described the collaboration as evidence that `the old Cold War pattern was broken'. In October, at the United Nations General Assembly, Bush finally announced that the Cold War would be `formally buried' upon the reunification of Germany (2 October)14 ± a re-union achieved through agreement with the Soviets.15 Therefore, the Cold War ended in the autumn of 1990, as a regional hot war with Iraq loomed. For the first time since 1945, the Soviet Union and the United States were managing a crisis às partners'.16 The concord between the United States and the Soviet Union had been rhetorically and symbolically formed by late 1989. The East±West deÂtente was formalized at the first new era `peace conference' at Malta. But by October 1990, the US±Soviet relationship had moved `beyond containment', beyond even `the search for points of mutual advantage', to a quest for `pathways of co-operation'. Areas and issues of common concern were Èurope', regional conflict, economic reform, arms rivalries, human rights and democracy. The proposed `pathways of co-operation' were defined by Baker as `mechanisms and processes, built on democratic values and practices'. At the Helsinki Summit, although there were differences in approach to the Gulf crisis, there were not only `points of mutual advantage' but `mutual understanding', an apparent conclusion to the normalization process which had begun at Malta.17 Receiving the George Kennan award, Baker recommended a re-examination of the `software' of the Cold War (its `strategy and doctrine'). And he proposed a working group on deterrence, reassurance, and stability.18 A community of nations theme had been the basis of Bush's early rhetoric of Soviet±American normalization, and both phrases were synonyms for a `new world order'. As Baker explained to the American Committee on US±Soviet Relations, a `normal' relationship, leading to `genuine partnership', could be constructed within the context of a new international order, or as his President described it, a `new partnership of nations'.19 Bush expressed the hope that, having been chastised, Iraq would become à peaceful and co-operative member of the family of nations', just as the Soviet Union was being incorporated back into the international community.20 This was in a limited way a popular theme. It received favourable review from some of the American commentators who had criticized the Administration's lack of post-Cold War vision.21 However, at the end of 1990, new uncertainty was inserted into the US± Soviet relationship. The resignation of foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, in protest at what he perceived as impending dictatorship in the Soviet Union, shocked and dismayed the Administration.22 Shevardnadze had been the chief architect of the Soviet Gulf policy, and `the glue' which


had bound Bush±Gorbachev co-operation.23 The United States was particularly concerned that the most likely new appointee to the foreign ministry ± Yvegeni Primakov ± was a vocal critic of US policy in the Gulf and had been pushing for linkage between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Israeli± Palestinian conflict. In the end, Gorbachev chose Alexander Bessmertnyk, the Soviet Ambassador to the US, reportedly stating `the Americans trust this man, and that's important to us now'. Bessmertnyk had been by far the United States' preferred candidate.24 Gorbachev's consideration for the United States was routinely reciprocated by President Bush. The United States continued its program of building and maintaining trust. The family of nations/new world order motif reflected the official view that stability could best be maintained within a tight-knit network of states, sharing values and interests. It was employed during the Gulf crisis to mobilize and maintain an international coalition, and to persuade conservative skeptics in the USSR that there were practical benefits to be gained from partnership with the United States. After the Gulf War, this was also the message which the Administration offered to the Soviet people (as discussed in Chapter 4). While Operation Desert Shield was in place, Secretary Baker visited Moscow to aid the construction of à solid front' between the US and USSR and send à signal of solidarity and determination'.25 This cementing of solidarity was facilitated by certain Cold War policy changes. The Jackson±Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, which prevents countries which restrict emigration from obtaining official credit and access to credit guarantee programs, was waived for the Soviet Union in December 1990, in order to allow Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) guarantees for $1 billion to be awarded for the purchase of US agricultural products. The White House described the measure as `further progress toward the normalization of the US±Soviet economic relationship'. A technical assistance program was also set up to help with the distribution and marketing of food in the USSR, along with a medical assistance program and the establishment of associative status for the Soviet Union to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.26 The President had earlier lifted restrictions on Soviet business people, allowing them to work and reside in the United States, and described the change as another element in the building of à more normal economic relationship'.27 Strategic considerations also prompted Bush to refuse to approve textiles legislation (H.R. 4328) which would have negatively affected key Gulf allies Turkey and Egypt, stating that they were ìndispensable to [US] efforts to forge an historic alliance to resist Saddam's aggression against Kuwait'.28 Bush described the proposed bill as `reprehensible at a time when the United States' highest international priority is to strengthen international co-operation'.29 These measures were indicative of the Administration's awareness not just of the need to stabilize the Soviet Union (which, in an example of successful


agenda-setting by the Bush Administration, was now likened in the press to the United States' reconstruction of Western Europe after World War Two),30 but also their broader acceptance of the vital role the Soviets would take in sanctioning the United States' foreign policy. As Steinbruner has stated, the Gulf crisis demonstrated how `changes in the `àrt'' of foreign policy-making are forced by events': `Two weeks before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait their [the Bush Administration's] inclination to use multilateral mechanisms of any sort, let alone the UN, would be near zero'.31 However, it was clear from the President's rejection of textiles legislation, and his public explanation that the bill threatened his efforts to build and maintain an international coalition, that multilateralism was emerging as a key foreign policy device by the end of 1990. A vital task of the coalition-builder is the shaping of domestic and international opinion. Therefore, this development increased the significance of official rhetoric; and union, shared interests and values, family of nations, and new world order became the recurring images of the Administration's public diplomacy. However, the strategic reconstruction of the US±Soviet relationship at times conflicted with the imperative of portraying the potential international dystopia of rogue states and new/old threats.32 As the Wall Street Journal reported, the Administration considered the Iraqi invasion to be à powerful impulse towards reshaping US forces to meet the real dangers in the world'.33 And any restructuring of forces or reorientation of policy would require public agreement that real dangers did exist. Opposition to the war, although downplayed in most contemporaneous media reports and analyses and particularly by the television media, should not be underestimated.34 There was no straight partisan split. A bipartisan ensemble of legislators and ex-national security officials, for example, was brought together by Democratic Representative Stephen J. Solarz (NY) to work in support of the President.35 But opposition united right-wing isolationists, left-wing anti-interventionists, assorted trade protectionists and libertarian free-marketeers,36 and liberal and some conservative religious (Christian) groups.37 Pressure came not only from those opposed to action but also from pro-interventionists who balked at US caution.38 By November, the US mission had changed from one that was defensive to one that was offensive, and the rhetorical challenge was complicated by a decline in public support (from 82 per cent in August to 52 per cent) and congressional pressure for hearings.39 While it was possible for the Administration to exhibit calm resolve, the appearance of national unity was a less predictable commodity. Bush feared that à handwringing operation' in Congress would `send bad signals'.40 Brent Scowcroft perceived that the Administration's military problems were much less than its public relations problems. Dick Cheney also believed that they had failed to find the appropriate rhetorical rationale for the operations. Bob Woodward summarizes Cheney's reasoning thus:


The Administration still had not found a successful formula for speaking to the various publics out there. It was trying to keep the American people behind the policy, and explain to the troops what was being done and why, while attending to the Congress, the United Nations and the Arabs. It was also trying to manage the Israeli problem. Saddam was attempting to link resolution of the Kuwait question with resolution of the Palestinians' grievances against Israel. It was difficult to come up with one single message to speak with equal credibility and force to all those groups.41 Faced with the need to create consensus or, at the very least, the appearance of unity, Bush redrafted his election campaign manager Roger Ailes. Ailes' brief was to advise him on how the United States' position on the Gulf should be presented to both the American and the international public.42 Bush's rhetoric was thus saturated with assurances that the nation was of one mind and that, at a time of crisis, such co-operation was the moral position. Such rhetoric had the dual role of convincing the Iraqis that the Administration was not hampered by public opposition and reminding Americans of their duties. When possible Bush quoted Senator Arthur Vandenberg: `Politics ends at the water's edge', describing it as a `noble principle' which had been forgotten in the wake of Vietnam.43 Fearing that the national debate on the Gulf would suggest weakness, Bush prompted Fitzwater to make a public statement directed to Hussein; he was to assure him that `diversity ought not to be confused with division'.44 Support for the Republican party and the Gulf deployment was tied to patriotism and consideration for soldiers in the field. Preceding the fall congressional elections, Bush evoked the troops in the Middle East who, even while serving their President and nation in a foreign country, had already sent in their postal ballots. However, he expressed a desire `to separate support for the Persian Gulf policy from the pure head-on-head confrontation of domestic politics'.45 Such rhetoric, which was evidently designed for partisan gain but also claimed to be above politics, contained two emotional appeals. First, it made predictable links between the safety of US forces and the support of the American people. Second, it made a virtue of responsibility and referred to how unity of resolve and common commitment was demonstrative of US exceptionalism. Scholars have identified a `rally-around-the-flag effect', which spontaneously occurs when a war is in progress.46 However, the Bush Administration's rhetoric seemed designed to produce a more enduring `rallying' of the American public behind a renewed global leadership role and behind a renewal of the nation's confidence, sense of purpose, and material wellbeing. These goals were furthered by appealing directly to the public's collective memories of past conflicts and using the `para-ideological' theme of American exceptionalism. In an attempt to foster a Gulf consensus, the Bush Administration consistently referred to two era-defining wars. The first, World War Two, was employed as an analogy for the Gulf crisis and was


directed to both domestic and international communities. The second, the Vietnam War, was evoked for a domestic audience and with the design of countering a malaise which Bush believed seriously afflicted the United States. On numerous occasions the President referred to the `disunity and division' produced by the Vietnam era. Indeed, at his inaugural he had referred to the Vietnam experience as a psychological affliction, stating: à nation cannot long afford to be sundered by memory'. Now he appealed to the nation's collective memory of the Vietnam experience and offered the Persian Gulf War as a purgative. In the following pages each of these characteristics of the Administration's public diplomacy is examined in detail, beginning with the World War Two analogy, then analyzing the Vietnam comparisons, and finally by outlining how the Gulf crisis was presented as a catalyst for building national as well as international community.

World War Two analogies The dismantling of the Cold War provided the possibility that a `bad peace' would be constructed in its wake. This perception was particularly strong amongst policy-makers who had come of age politically in the aftermath of World War Two.47 In cases of ìnsatiable' aggression, according to the newly rehabilitated former President Richard Nixon, war might be undesirable, but à bad peace' was worse, because it could lead to war of even greater magnitude.48 According to Nixon, the period after 1989 closely resembled that after 1945. Beschloss and Talbott have detailed how, on several occasions during this period, former President Nixon was consulted by President Bush on foreign policy issues.49 Explaining the American operations in the Gulf in January 1991, Bush declared: Àt stake is the kind of world we will inhabit'.50 Baker told the House Foreign Affairs Committee in early September 1990 that the United States was poised àt a critical juncture in history', that the Iraqi invasion was òne of the defining moments of a new era', and à political test of how the post-Cold War world will work'. It is an era in which new hostilities and threats could erupt as misguided leaders are tempted to assert regional dominance before the ground rules of a new order can be accepted. Accordingly, we face a simple choice: Do we want to live in a world where aggression is made less likely because it is met with a powerful response from the international community, a world where civilized rules of conduct apply? Or are we willing to live in a world where aggression can go unchecked, where aggression succeeds because we cannot muster the collective will to challenge it?51 Identical to public speeches on the necessity of reconstructing a new relationship with the Soviet Union and maintaining a leadership role, Secretary


Baker explained why the United States was in the Gulf by emphasizing the precariousness of the international system. We live in one of those rare transforming moments in history [. . .] Saddam Hussein's aggression shattered the vision of a better world in the aftermath of the Cold War. [. . .] Hussein is trying to drag us back to the 1930s. [. . .] the bright promise of the post-Cold War era could be eclipsed by new dangers, new disorders, and a far less peaceful future. [. . .] If his [Hussein's] way of doing business prevails, there will be no hope for peace in the area.52 Baker repeatedly stated that it was essential not only to transcend the Cold War but also to leave earlier conflicts behind. He argued that the `bad peace' of World War One had led to World War Two, the `bad peace' after 1945 produced Cold War. Despite repeated references to the Cold War, Hussein was assigned not to the role of Stalin, but to that of Hitler, and Iraq had invaded Kuwait in `blitzkrieg fashion'.53 In October, during a series of Republican fundraising appearances preceding the fall congressional elections, the President repeatedly contended that, from his reading of history, there was à parallel between what Hitler did to Poland and what Saddam Hussein [had] done to Kuwait',54 and that the international coalition was `dealing with Hitler revisited'.55 Hussein must pay for the pain and hardship he has caused. The world will hold him accountable, just at it held Adolph Hitler accountable in the wake of the destruction of World War II.56 The Hitler analogy was used extensively by the media. Between 2 August 1990 and 15 January 1991 it appeared in the Washington Post 121 times and in the New York Times 107 times.57 However, characterizing Hussein as Hitler, and comparing the invasion of Kuwait to the Nazis' aggression preceding World War Two, also made a negotiated settlement difficult; for any arbitration or compromise would have appeared as appeasement.58 Rhetoric that is persuasive in one forum, for example in domestic mobilization, may be provocative or inhibiting in another, such as in conflict resolution. Iraq was `pathological'59 and infantilized as `the bully of the neighborhood'.60 On one occasion, Hussein was even described as worse than Hitler.61 To validate this characterization, Bush propagated the story of ìncubator babies' murdered by Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait City. This was an accomplished example of war-time propaganda, which had been prepared by the Public Relations firm Hill & Knowlton under contract by the Kuwait government, and was retold to House of Representatives Human Rights Caucus by an unnamed teenage witness. The witness was later revealed to


be the daughter of the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States. The ìncubator babies' story was repeated in almost every Presidential address in October.62 And the Vice-President and General Schwarzkopf referred to the incident, as did seven senators in the debate on the 12 January resolution to authorize war.63 This propaganda was directly linked to declining support for military engagement amongst the public and in Congress.64 Photographs of Kuwaiti torture victims, courtesy of Hill & Knowlton, were displayed for United Nations members preceding their vote on whether to sanction the use of force and again for the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 8 January prior to its vote on use of force.65 In response to public opinion polls which showed that the American public were most fearful about the possibility of Iraq becoming a nuclear power,66 the Administration repeatedly stated, from November 1990, that Hussein was on the verge of acquiring a nuclear capability.67 The Administration made its case by emphasizing that the Gulf War illustrated that à dark evil' still threatened peaceful international order.68 In the weeks and days preceding the congressional vote on authorizing the use of force, Bush officials repeatedly declared that the Iraqi action was regressive and anachronistic, à throwback to another era', a `dark relic' from a `dark time'. This was described as a time of World War and Cold War, when nuclear and biological weapons, described as `dark machines', were deployed by `despots' who presided over the `Dark Ages'.69 The situation was `black and white', `the facts clear', `the choice unambiguous', a case of `right vs wrong `.70 The world is once again faced with the challenge of perfect clarity. Saddam Hussein has given us a whole plateful of clarity, because today, in the Persian Gulf, what we are looking at is good and evil, right and wrong.71 The example of World War Two, which was evoked as a reminder of the consequences of aggression left unchecked (both that of the Third Reich and that of Stalin), was closely linked with the aim of order maintenance. Bush explained that èvery act of aggression' which was not penalized caused damage to the regulative system in world affairs and `strengthened the forces of chaos and lawlessness'.72 Hussein's action was àn assault on the very notion of international order'.73 `What is at stake is more than one small country', Bush insisted. At risk was à big idea: a new world order'.74 Bush's public diplomacy emphasized that Desert Shield was important because it showed that the United States would not be intimidated.75 The invasion required him to answer the question: `Where does America stand?' Our action in the Gulf is about fighting aggression and preserving the sovereignty of nations. It is about keeping our word and standing by old friends. It is about our own national security interests and ensuring the peace and stability of the world. A half-century ago our nation and


the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who should ± and could ± have been stopped. We are not about to make the same mistake twice.76 The Gulf crisis was a warning against isolationism.77 It was a reminder to remain prepared and outward oriented, because ùnchecked, uncontrolled aggression would be world war tomorrow'.78 The United States' public diplomacy during the Persian Gulf crisis was a near parody of hegemonic exceptionalism. In this, it contrasted with the skilful international stability and community-building rhetoric directed towards the Soviet Union in late 1989 early 1990. The Administration offered three rationales for the Gulf operations: a `strategic' rationale, legitimizing a `police action' in the Gulf to deter adventurism and preserve international order;79 an economic rationale, as Baker stated on numerous occasions, to maintain access to oil, prevent a recession, and protect American jobs; and a `diplomatic' rationale, to use the opportunity `to foster a coordinated international response' and thus set a precedent for foreign policy by coalition.80 It was necessary for the United States not only to establish credibility of one kind with potential rogue states, the ìnternational outlaws and renegades' that Bush condemned from the outset of the Persian Gulf crisis;81 but also to renew credibility with conservative elements in the Soviet Union who remained suspicious of US interventionism, and with traditional allies and domestic constituencies among whom there was debate as to the likelihood and/or desirability of American leadership.82 This was essential not just for the success of the Gulf operations but as part of the Administration's long-term setting of the domestic agenda in favor of continued international engagement. However, such long-term agenda-setting was hampered by the legacy of Vietnam.

Purging Vietnam The Vietnam War posed the most significant historic challenge to the idea of American exceptionalism. As a result, this US defeat was afforded intensive rhetorical exposure during the Gulf crisis, appearing both in direct references and implicitly in catch-phrases, where no American could mistake the meaning. Mentions of casualties were, for the most part, absent from official statements as might be expected, but so too was the convention of appealing for stoicism in the face of necessary sacrifice. Even at the height of the mobilization effort Bush did not call upon the general public to bear `sacrifices',83 and when references were made to possible losses or to the `hardships of war', they were on all occasions addressed to military audiences.84 The strategic aim was to portray the Gulf War, in comparison to Vietnam, as `the Perfect War'.85 A key element of this myth of perfection was the creation of an holistically satisfying rationale for the operation. Baker reiterated that


if war came, the casi belli would be both realist and idealist, challenges to both the United States' `moral principles' and its `material interests'. Bush expressed the realist/idealist combination as one of safeguarding `civilized values' abroad and èconomic strength' at home, that is, national interest tied to expansive idealism.86 Though Bush and Baker emphasized that the United States' actions would be in consideration of the `long run' stability of the Middle East,87 both also studiously avoided a commitment to long-term involvement. Official rhetoric was replete with assurances that the war would be of short duration, quickly decisive, and requiring the minimum casualties, and that it had been inspired by an equilibrium of concrete national interests and ethical considerations. Thus, while Hitler may be `revisited', the Administration guaranteed that there would be no return to Vietnam. References to the United States' experience in Vietnam appeared in official speeches and statements from the beginning of the Persian Gulf crisis and took three forms. First, Vietnam was presented as the archetypal symptom of a lack of order. In explaining Operation Desert Shield to Pentagon personnel, the President emphasized that the aim was to create ìnternational order', defined as à common code and rule of law that promotes co-operation in place of conflict'. He argued that where order was absent `the rule of law' was overtaken by `the law of the jungle'. Thus even flawed order was preferable to none at all.88 The rule of law/law of the jungle comparison became a leitmotiv of official public pronouncements. In this way the crisis was depicted as a struggle between order and chaos, with Vietnam and its `jungle law' providing the model of disorder. Second, many assurances were given that, in contrast to Vietnam, there would be no constraints on the President's power to implement a successful foreign policy. Bush perceived that there was still residual Vietnam angst amongst the public which made them uneasy about military engagement: People remember a protracted war. They remember a war where individuals were asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back. This will not be that kind of confrontation. [. . .] I don't think support would last if it were a long, drawn-out conflagration.89 The Administration confronted the public's collective memory of Vietnam in a manner designed to diminish this reluctance to support war. The guarantee, `this will not be another Vietnam', was repeatedly given in the months leading up to the Gulf War and while it was in progress. Three examples demonstrate how this claim was articulated. Two days after the Iraqi invasion, Bush assured reporters: `my hands aren't tied [. . .] in any way',90 ± an overt allusion to arguments that the Vietnam operation had failed because the executive had been hampered by public and political opposition. This position was publicized by one pro-war lobby group, the


Coalition for America at Risk, which took full-page newspaper advertisements to also display the message ± `Don't tie the President's hands'.91 As the crisis progressed, Bush continued to mention this alleged cause of the Vietnam defeat. In November, the President reworked the `no constraints' theme, insisting that he would not sanction a partial operation: If one American soldier has to go into battle, that soldier will have enough force behind him to win and then get out as soon as possible [. . .] I will never ± ever ± agree to a halfway effort.92 And he emphasized how, due to the end of the Cold War, a new strategic environment and changed patterns of alliance made a repeat of Vietnam an impossibility: This will not be another Vietnam. This will not be a protracted, drawn-out war. The forces arrayed are different. The resupply of Saddam's military would be very different. The countries united against him in the United Nations are different.93 In January, announcing to the nation that Operation Desert Storm had begun, the President again promised: `This will not be another Vietnam [. . .] Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back.'94 The Vietnam War was portrayed as a conflict that had been winnable but which had not been won because of a failure of national will and the peculiar strategic conditions of the Cold War. In 1990, the Cold War element, Soviet patronage of `rogue' states, was removed. Following this logic, the key variable in assuring a successful military action was public tenacity. In underlining the Vietnam experience, Bush dared the public and his opposition to show ambivalence and risk stimulating a repeat of the `debacle' which had been as collectively traumatizing as any conflict in the nation's history. Indeed, Bush promised that such bad memories could be purged through military triumph. The third category of references to Vietnam suggested that success in the Gulf would exorcise the `Vietnam syndrome' and allow veterans of that war to be finally rehabilitated as national heroes.95 Bush assured a gathering of Reserve officers: `When the brave men and women of Desert Storm return home, they will return to the love and respect of a grateful nation'.96 By February 1991, with the war satisfactorily òn course', Bush acknowledged that a `Vietnam syndrome' had indeed existed but was confident that it would be overcome as a result of the action.97 He perceived that the nation was unifying `like no other time since World War Two' and forecast, as a result, a `new American century'.98 By 1 March, he was able to announce: `By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for


all'.99 Not only would the Gulf War not be ànother Vietnam', there would, said Bush, `be no more Vietnams'.100 At the war's successful conclusion, troops returning from the Gulf were congratulated by the President: `You not only helped liberate Kuwait, you helped this country liberate itself from old ghosts and doubts'.101 And this exorcism was linked to a renewal of US credibility. It had been `fashionable to question America's decency' before the Gulf War, said Bush, but now, `no-one in the whole world doubts us anymore'.102 The Vietnam War provided a lesson of how national disunity could have disastrous consequences, and the Administration accepted that as a result of Vietnam, war-making had become more difficult.103 The establishment of consensus was a practical necessity because it led to congressional support, but a durable consensus, one that would sustain an operation until its successful completion, required national cohesion at an even higher level. It required the persuasion of the mass public that war was not just a government pursuit, but a communal activity. But this necessity conflicted with the aim of constructing `the perfect war' which, as a depersonalized, clinical, computer conflict,104 had lost the sense of communal effort, shared hardship and collective achievement which in the past had not only supported war efforts but also the post-war reconstruction. Perhaps it was this contradiction between the depersonalization of the war and invocations of national patriotism which later crippled the Administration's attempts to capitalize on the Gulf victory for domestic political advantage. The aim of achieving national unity behind a Persian Gulf War inspired the Administration to attempt a strategic exorcism of the Vietnam War. In this cause the practical Gulf success was essential, but rhetoric had a complementary function. Clearly the use of the Vietnam analogy was designed to appeal to and mobilize a domestic audience for the operations in the Gulf. But after a Gulf cease-fire on 21 February 1991 was announced, the rhetorical purging and reclaiming of the Vietnam experience was transformed into a rhetoric of domestic renewal.

The Gulf War and American exceptionalism The Bush Administration immediately identified four positive repercussions of their success in the Persian Gulf War. First, announcing to Congress that the War had ended, Bush asserted that it was now possible for the post-1945 Marshall Plan to be extended across the continent of Europe; in effect, the Cold War was also finally over.105 Second, the Gulf victory demonstrated that the `first test' of the post-Cold War period had been `passed'.106 Third, Hussein was `totally discredited', while the United States enjoyed `re-established credibility'.107 However, a fourth beneficial consequence also emerged in official rhetoric. Along with the revival of United States' credibility as an intervening power, the Administration argued that the success


in the Gulf disproved suggestions of American decline and also created the opportunity for a domestic renewal. In the appropriate contexts, the Gulf operation was described as a divinelyordained `just war' in which the United States and its allies were òn God's side'.108 America was à nation founded under God'.109 However, more often exceptionalism was rendered in secular form. Baker argued that it would be an àbdication' for the United States to fail to fulfil its leadership responsibilities, to reject a destiny acquired by previous success and proven ability: America's involvement in world politics came about from conviction based on hard and terrible experience. We're not in the game just to play one inning and then go home. We cannot be short of breath for the long haul. And whatever the noise of naysayers, our moral principles and our material interests make us a leader.110 Only American engagement can shape the peaceful world our people so deeply desire.111 In victory speeches after the war Bush proclaimed that the crisis had proven that the United States had a `responsibility' to `reform the world'. In a speech at the Annual Southern Baptist Convention Bush told two stories, the first reported that there were over 1000 conversions to the Baptist faith amongst the American servicemen and women serving in the Gulf, the second recounted how a Baptist church in Virginia and an American helicopter pilot in the Gulf had helped reunite a Kurdish girl with her parents after ten years of separation. The second story was a deflector, neglecting the real conditions of the Kurds in Iraq which were the subject of much post-war criticism of the Administration's Gulf policy. The first, and the general tone of the speech, suggested that the Gulf action had inspired an American spiritual renewal. Bush argued that the Gulf demonstrated that American values were àscendant',112 that US foreign policy had a `moral dimension' that was àn extension of American ideals' and that required the United States `to remain active, engaged in the world'.113 Indeed, in his most significant post-war address at Maxwell Airforce Base, the President defined the `New World Order' by saying: Ìt really describes responsibility imposed by our successes'.114 This speech was the first of four addresses in April, May and June which outlined the concept of `New World Order' and which justified non-intervention on behalf of the Kurds and Shi'ites in Iraq. However, Bush also suggested that with revived responsibility for the ordering of international relations ± a consequence of both the end of the Cold War and victory in the Gulf War ± the United States would undergo a domestic transformation. He portrayed the Persian Gulf operation as `simply the American character in action', preparation for `the next American century' and the precursor to à renewed America'.115 In an address to the Nation in


June on domestic policy, the President described how Americans had `felt a bracing surge of American optimism and determination' and had `regained a sense of ourselves and our values'.116 Before and during the war, it was argued that Gulf success relied upon unity, consensus, and `cohesion' at home. Bush had stated that the United States' international influence would be determined by its strength as a nation, its domestic stability.117 On occasion the Gulf operations were even described as police actions to protect home and hearth.118 However, after the war, home and hearth were again evoked as the beneficiaries of the victory. Bush declared that the United States was not ìn decline'. It had been `transformed' by its Gulf experience, by `confronting an enemy abroad'.119 The practical, logistical superiority of the US military in the Gulf was offered as evidence that national degeneration was a figment of scholarly imaginations. Such èlitist theories' were contradicted, declared the President, by the United States' technological mastery (epitomized by the Patriot Missile) which had ìn one day wiped out the idea that young Americans are not smart enough for the 21st century'.120 A disavowal of decline was also the theme of the President's Economic Report for 1991.121 It was argued that the Gulf War had exhibited the United States' tenacity and resolve and its talents for coalition-building, organization and strategic planning. Such endowments could be applied to other crises, in other fora. The war provided a model for domestic reconstruction, as the President suggested at a Crime Summit in 1991: Just look at what we've done in the Gulf ± pilots, our missile men, the impressive logistics, and diplomatic operations. The kind of moral force and national will that freed Kuwait City from abuse can free America's cities from crime. As in the Gulf, we need creative and strategic thinking to free our cities from crime. And as in the Gulf, this means assembling an unprecedented coalition. We've got to cooperate, really cooperate, on a level never before seen ± Federal, State, and local prosecutors; Federal, State and police; Governors; Mayors; and the new corps of neighborhood peacekeepers, the community leaders who have stood up to violence and despair.122 Bush perceived the task of domestic reform in military and global politics terms; it was `to take back [the] streets' and `liberate [. . .] neighborhoods from the tyranny of fear'. He suggested that the Gulf triumph could be used to mobilize for the creation of domestic order. The co-operative relationship between the US and the USSR was submitted as an example of pragmatic reconciliation for the purposes of problem-solving: If old adversaries like the Soviet Union and the United States can work in common cause; then surely we who are so fortunate [. . .] ± Democrats,


Republicans, liberals, conservatives ± can come together to fulfil our responsibilities.123 Bush suggested that the Administration's success in building a coalition of diverse international interests might be reproduced in a national forum. He recommended the application of `that same sense of self-discipline, that same sense of urgency' to domestic problems,124 and blamed Congress on his prevailing inability to activate a `domestic Desert Storm'.125 In a speech at West Point which was dedicated to the issue of racial equality and minority representation in the armed forces (a source of controversy during the Gulf crisis), Bush again made the connection between international success and the potential for domestic reconstruction: Àmerica's magnificent military has helped secure the peace abroad. Our challenge now is to heal the wounds and the scars at home.'126 Speaking to the National Education Goals Panel about the Administration's educational reform initiative called America 2000, Bush described being àrmed' for `battle': Our kids give us a great secret weapon. They are the best natural resource of any nation on Earth. We've seen our young people perform in the Persian Gulf, and we've seen what they can do. And they inspire us to reinvent our educational system.127 Democrats also made the comparison between international success and domestic challenges. John Kerry, a Democratic senator, and both a veteran and critic of the Vietnam War, argued that the Persian Gulf crisis had provided `martial distractions' which obscured `the real battle for our way of life here at home'.128 Other liberals attempted to use the Gulf as a political tool for underlining domestic problems. Then-Mayor of Boston Raymond L. Flynn exploited the United States' success in the war to make a plea about domestic disorder and the need for urban reform. In article entitled Òperation ``Domestic Order''', Flynn proposed that the United States' determination during international crises be replicated in its handling of domestic social challenges.129 Flynn combined conventional liberal rhetoric with the militaristic imagery of a `marshalling' of resources and the achievement of order. He appealed to a constituency of veterans, their families, and the internationalist public by indicating pride in the President's leadership. However, stating that only `many', and not all Americans, were proud, did not alienate those (himself, it seemed, included) who were not proud. He emphasized the need for a compelling domestic agenda, às bold and as aggressive as those that were put in place when our troops came home from World War Two and Korea'. Accentuating a positive interpretation of US activities abroad ± citing military successes and ignoring Vietnam ± Flynn underlined occasions of triumph over injustice, which would, in themselves, contrast with domestic reality. While juxtaposing the successes of foreign


policy with the failures of domestic policy, Flynn was persuasive without being critical of foreign policy, or explicitly blaming domestic problems on the expenditure of governmental time and resources on international affairs. His article exemplified the strategic uses of rhetoric and demonstrated another pressure on the Administration ± the danger that the Persian Gulf War would be appropriated for use against them in the strategic rhetoric of their opponents. Indeed, during the 1992 Presidential election campaign, candidate Clinton directly attributed domestic economic difficulties to President Bush's concentration on foreign policy. Here again international order was contrasted with national disorder, a contrast taken further by Clinton who enhanced the power of the analogy by implying that one was the consequence of the other. Clearly the Bush Administration had hoped that the domestic benefits of Persian Gulf success would be psychological; that the Gulf victory would incite a new sense of American exceptionalism that would galvanize support for prominence on the international scene and secure Bush's re-election. However, the Gulf success, and the contrast between rhetorical claims of renewal and domestic realities, also provided fodder for Bush's political adversaries. The ability of the Bush Administration to mount a superlative propaganda campaign in war-time suggests that it was not ignorance of the strategic potential of official rhetoric which contributed to their electoral defeat, but rather, their failure to combine a coherent rhetorical strategy with a shrewd evaluation of the concerns of the public to be persuaded.

Conclusion The Bush Administration's public diplomacy during the Persian Gulf crisis reveals a desire for order, predictability, familiarity and manageability, a conservative institutionalized tendency to view present circumstances in terms of past crises or successes, and the perceived responsibility to exercise caution, to `carefully calibrate' and manage change. It illustrates organizational processes at work and para-ideology. Despite the obvious dangerous precedent which an unchecked invasion by Hussein would have set, the potential economic turmoil which power changes in the Middle East could precipitate, and the potentially devastating nuclear threat, there were other choices than use of force for the United States: such as the further reliance on sanctions, use of UN mediation, diplomatic endeavors, and compromise when offered such a deal through the Soviets.130 That the United States did not take any of these routes but also did not attempt to remove the Iraqi leader from power illustrates both assertiveness and restraint. It is possible to explain this policy in terms of incrementalism: having sent troops to Saudi Arabia to contain Hussein's ambitions, climate and terrain conditions and the oncoming season of Islamic pilgrimages to Mecca and


Medina (which necessitated a withdrawal by the summer), may have made a war inevitable once those troops were in place. An incremental approach also explains the pragmatic withdrawal after the ground war before `missioncreep' set in. And it is possible to view both the assertiveness and restraint of this policy as driven by World War Two and Cold War experiences: the appeasement of Hitler, the success of containment policies, and the failure in Vietnam. Some commentators have emphasized the role of personality/psychology illustrated in the manner in which the `world vs Iraq' theme was gradually replaced as the crisis extended with a òne-on-one, American±Iraqi, George Bush vs Saddam Hussein confrontation'.131 They have perceived a deep emotional investment in the conflict on the part of President Bush,132 and have argued that his `passionate' rhetoric was proof of his personal involvement and even òbsession' with the crisis.133 Some have suggested that Bush's personal investment was due to his `wimp' image, which had plagued him during the 1988 presidential primaries, and his belief in Presidential prerogative.134 Such analyses imply that the Administration's focus on American credibility in the post-Cold War world was an extension of the President's personal desire to increase his own credibility as a leader. Clearly there were domestic political and electoral explanations for some of the President's public diplomacy during the crisis, for example many of his speeches in November were in support of Republican congressional candidates as well as Gulf War mobilization addresses. And after the withdrawal from the Gulf, the President's electoral campaign involved attempting to capitalize on the military victory. However, the assertion that Bush's personality may explain not just rhetoric but also Gulf policy is difficult to document through a study of public diplomacy. Although Bush did personalize the stand-off, with comments such as `consider me provoked' and sometimes shifting to the first person singular (`they can't criticize me', `that's my posture'),135 he focused on building public ecologies of support for the operations by portraying them as not just his war but as a national and international responsibility. Recent statements by key participants in the Persian Gulf War have provided further clarification of the Bush Administration's intentions in the Gulf and how these intentions were mirrored in official rhetoric. These suggest that it is more appropriate to consider this rhetoric within the context of the agenda-setting model. For example, the Hitler analogy, according to General Colin Powell, was primarily used for its power to persuade Americans to support the war.136 The same point has been made by Francis Fukuyama who was a member of the State Department's policy planning staff. You have to build support in Congress particularly for policies that are either expensive or that might get the country into war and it's almost


never been the case that you could build that kind of support purely on a realpolitik basis. You saw that in the case of the Gulf War. Any time someone suggested that we were intervening for the sake of oil, you would be denounced. But on the other hand if you said that Saddam Hussein was the next Hitler, and you wanted to save the Kuwaiti people, then that sold a lot better.137 Along with Hitler analogies, the possibility of Hussein's nuclear capability was introduced. Preceding the vital congressional vote on use of force in January 1991, official rhetoric reproduced stories of rape and infanticide which replicated British and American propaganda in World War One and successfully induced public and congressional horror. The indications in some polls that 40 per cent of Americans born after 1945 expressed an unwillingness to fight in defense of their country for àny cause'138 may help explain the context of this public diplomacy. However, driving this agenda-setting was not just the mobilization motive but the multiple burdens associated with the Soviet Union's surrender. At a system level, these pressures included a greatly altered global distribution of power, a crisis of instability between the center and the Republics within the USSR, and an adjoining threat of nuclear weapons/material proliferation, as well as the possibility that Hussein's action would be the first of many similar attempts to test the post-Cold War power vacuum. At a state level, there were conflicting domestic pressures, some for a reduced international role, burden-sharing, even isolationism, and others for engagement, even unilateral activism. There were demands for the US to take more of the initiative in promoting co-operation with the Soviets, who appeared to have mastered international diplomacy and public relations often at US expense, and appeals for skepticism and caution in dealing with the USSR (many coming from within the Administration, particularly from national security and intelligence personnel). Public and political pressure for a post-Cold War economic dividend was also a concern. In fact, as shown in Chapter 1, it was possible to identify a broad-scale transformation in American society, exemplified by the rapidity with which the relevant interest/lobby groups and public institutions restructured and redefined their agendas to reflect the changing geopolitical realities. Domestic political interests meant that it was necessary to promote a sense of stability, to reassure the American people they were in transition to a safer and more prosperous world. Postwar analogies were therefore appropriate. And a nationally unifying military victory might also be a `temptation' as Tucker and Hendrickson have suggested.139 References to Vietnam in this public diplomacy were more than tactical, according to Robert Gates, and revealed real governmental concerns, particularly a concern with avoiding a `quagmire'. The Administration perceived three potential `quagmires' in the Gulf, in the shapes of American support


for the rebelling Kurds and Shi'ites, attempting to overthrow the Hussein regime, and becoming involved in nation-building.140 And despite the Administration's rhetorical attempt to exorcise the Vietnam syndrome at home, according to Gates and General Norman Schwarzkopf, it was this fear of a quagmire which shaped their decision to end the war without engaging in any of these activities. Perhaps this suggests that a study of rhetoric not only illustrates the official uses of history for political persuasion, and as strategies for public mobilization, but also how it may reveal official fears and preoccupations particularly when it entails evocations of history. Schwarzkopf has explained how he and President Bush had perceived that with their objectives achieved more easily than they had thought possible, it was circumspect to withdraw before that success was jeopardized. Thus the Gulf cease-fire, which some officials, military personnel and allies believed to have been premature, was motivated by a desire to avoid a `quagmire', to end the war while success and `credibility' were still guaranteed.141 This suggests that although the Administration itself did not believe that the Gulf War had exorcised the Vietnam syndrome it was a useful persuasive trope that functioned comparatively to underline the Gulf success. However, the reclamation of Vietnam had a broader purpose because it assisted in the reclamation of American exceptionalism. The third focus of this chapter was the recurring theme of American exceptionalism. It was employed at crucial stages of the operation when rhetoric was at its most vivid and memorable. For example, on 1 February, prior to the ground war, the President made three speeches to military bases in the south of the country, all of which explained that the reason for the United States' involvement was its exceptionalism: `We are there because we are Americans, part of something that's larger than ourselves', he said, adding that as a result the US had acquired `new credibility'.142 These speeches, which were televised live on popular morning chat shows, inspired an upsurge of popular fervor in support of the ground operation. And as the war was in progress and winding down, it was depicted as both an opportunity for overcoming history, purging Vietnam, and for changing history, effecting a national renewal. The Gulf crisis illustrated that successful crisis management involved not just military power and access to economic resources or backing, but also effective public diplomacy. At the international level, effective crisis management entailed the building and maintaining not just of coalitions for the moment but of enduring `friends' and alliances.143 Similarly, at the domestic level, appeals to public collective memories of the Second World War, Vietnam, and the collective belief in American exceptionalism not only functioned as familiarizing devices, for creating a sense of order and stability, or to stimulate public mobilization in a time of crisis, but also to build consensus and long-term domestic support for international involvement. Effective peacetime public diplomacy also creates a public climate of belief that enables future crisis and conflict management. The Bush Administra-


tion's rhetoric of reconstruction in late 1989 and early 1990 fulfilled this function. Its public diplomacy was influential in the establishment of a US± Soviet partnership that was key to the Administration's Gulf success. Domestic public diplomacy in this period also emphasized American exceptionalism and memorialized the Cold War as the success of American responsibility, resolve, and superior values. This large-scale agenda-setting assisted the Administration's Gulf War mobilization by emphasizing American exceptionalism and the risk, given the changing international system, of letting such exceptionalism languish. The Administration's crisis management style is illustrated in its attempts to mobilize wider and wider spheres of support for the Gulf operations. An examination of the number and venue of the speeches and statements between July and December of 1990 shows that the President's output increased steadily from 58 in July to 137 in November, the month of the congressional elections but also of the change in US mission in the Gulf from a defensive to an offensive one. In November there was a decline in public support (from 82 per cent in August to 52 per cent) and pressure in Congress for hearings on the operations.144 The venues of these speeches and statements were also revealing. In August most addresses were given in Washington (suggesting a focus on the attentive public, foreign policy establishment, and the necessity of staying close to the capital in a crisis). This corresponded with numerous conversations with foreign leaders, mainly by telephone, in August. But by September there were more bilateral meetings with foreign leaders than telephone conversations, and, in terms of public diplomacy, there were an increasing number of foreign addresses and increasing number of speeches in domestic cities other than Washington, DC. In October there was close to a 50±50 split between speeches in Washington and those given in other domestic locations. In November there were still fairly equal numbers of speeches given in these locations, but 40 per cent of the President's total speaking time was taken up abroad. In December there was an almost 50±50 split between speeches given in Washington, DC and those given in international venues.145 On hearing of the invasion of Kuwait, the President telephoned over 25 different foreign leaders.146 But in the months after the invasion there were not only private meetings with these foreign leaders but numerous public addresses, first in Washington to the foreign policy establishment, government personnel, and in the form of media statements, and then the cultivation of broader community support through personal visits and addresses around the country. Although a large proportion of November's domestic speeches were ostensible fundraisers to support Republican congressional candidates, all of these speeches were used by the President to promote his Persian Gulf policy and contained all of the themes discussed above. Finally in November and December, half the President's speaking time was taken up with addresses to foreign audiences and/or statements made from abroad.


This illustrates the phenomenon that Cobb and Elder have analyzed in their study of agenda-setting, the effort by policy-makers to mobilize `larger and larger groups'.147 And it suggests that additionally, for foreign policy crises, the international public become another sphere to be targeted. Cobb and Elder also illustrated how, as attempts are made to enlarge the constituency of support for a policy or stance, the policy is described in `broader and broader terms'. This was evident in the Bush Administration's changing descriptions of the crisis, for example, in August the crisis was described in a constrained and factual manner as a question of achieving four objectives: the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of the Kuwaiti government; the long-term stability of the Middle East region; and the protection of American citizens abroad. However, by September the operations were also portrayed as challenges to wider stability of the international system and the maintenance of US power; the `first test' of the United States' `mettle', the `first crisis' of the new era, and the `first assault' on US plans for a new world order. By January of 1991 Bush stated: Àt stake is the kind of world we will inhabit'.148 The practical success of the war, and the rhetoric of the Gulf crisis itself, set the agenda in favor of continued internationalism but not in favor of Bush's Presidency. The Administration's attempts to link foreign policy success with domestic potential, to inspire a widespread sense of national rebirth and to fortify support for Republican government, was a failure. Polls for the period suggested ambivalence amongst the public when asked to consider international responsibilities and domestic issues together.149 While the beginning of war had produced a substantial rise in national optimism and consumer confidence, a rise which increased again at the war's end,150 support for Bush diminished as the Gulf War receded in the public's memory.151 While at the onset of the war, 50 per cent of the public claimed that they thought about the Gulf crisis at least once in every hour, by the time of the New Hampshire primary vote, only 7 per cent of Republicans questioned in an exit poll claimed that the Gulf War had affected their vote. Post-war euphoria deflated quickly as the public's interest shifted towards economic issues.152 The Soviet Coup and the disintegration of the Soviet Union by the end of 1991 was a distraction which along with these economic concerns more convincingly explains the disinterest than the theory that `disillusionment' was due to the failure of the US to remove Hussein from power.153 By the time of the Presidential election, some polls suggested that the public `resented' Bush for not applying the same leadership and dedication to combat domestic economic decline as that used during the Gulf War.154 Although the number of Americans who believed the US was going in the right direction increased from 19 per cent in October 1990 to 58 per cent by the end of February 1991 (a level of national optimism last reached at the commencement of President Reagan's second term in office), amongst women and African-Americans the levels of optimism were significantly


lower. Only 53 per cent of women polled, compared to 63 per cent of men, answered that the US was moving in the `right direction', and only 27 per cent of African-Americans polled said `right direction' compared to 67 per cent who answered that the United States was `seriously off course'.155 As unwilling immigrants, African-Americans have historically had much lower levels of tolerance for the idea of American exceptionalism and higher levels of distrust for government than other groups in American society, according to Seymour Martin Lipset.156 The Persian Gulf War was controversial amongst many African-Americans because of the disproportionate number of African-American soldiers in the field. It was also seen by some as a `racist' war. Women and African-Americans made up a crucial pro-Clinton constituency in the 1992 Presidential election. The uses of Gulf and post-Gulf rhetoric to promote a post-war domestic reconstruction of the United States foundered on the rocks of domestic reality. There had been no positive `transformation at home' as Bush suggested, and not even a transformation of a negative kind, which might have mobilized support for a reconstruction. The Persian Gulf War was not like other wars of American experience, and in the end did not resemble the conflicts to which it was rhetorically compared. The brevity and minimal American casualties, professional, all-volunteer military of the Gulf War, meant that it was not directly experienced by the majority of the public. The United States had suffered few war-time privations, no conscription, no assault on its own sovereignty. The deliberate and successful attempt to make the Gulf War like no other war, and particularly unlike the Vietnam War, militated against a post-war mobilization of the populace in support of a second Bush Presidency. Nevertheless, while the Persian Gulf War's symbolic utility as catalyst for American domestic renewal proved too fantastical to endure in the popular imagination, the rhetorical waging of the Gulf War did legitimize a posture of international engagement which survived a Presidential election and the change in Administrations in 1992/3. This rhetoric set the tone of future discourse about the United States' international role. Even many critics of Bush foreign policy argued within the parameters of an organizing principle such as `new world order versus new world disorder'. Thematic touchstones, such as `responsibility for reconstruction', `the purging of Vietnam', `the new world order', and `renewed American exceptionalism', were adopted into the political lexicon, and have since structured media and academic analyses of the United States' role in the world. They also became the basis of early Clinton foreign policy. Despite domestic economic preoccupations, the American public continued to support a posture of qualified internationalism that was modeled on the Gulf operations. One post-war poll demonstrated that the majority of the public believed that the US had a responsibility to intervene in conflict zones or in case of invasion of one state by another, as long as it did so using


multilateral mechanisms.157 And five to one believed that, despite the Cold War's end, it was still necessary to maintain a military alliance with Western Europe.158 However, according to polls, the public were divided about whether the United States could take a `world policeman' role and whether they believed that `the best way to ensure peace is through military strength'.159 For foreign policy makers, the continuing Soviet upheaval of the post-Gulf period contained the potential for further international crises,160 but a Presidential election campaign required a shift in focus away from these global events to domestic issues. In 1992, Bush campaign rhetoric wavered between a peacetime response of community-building, which emphasized American, Republican, and Bush Administration achievements in ending the Cold War and winning the Gulf War, and a crisis response, which warned of future international challenges. Such a rhetoric neither built confidence nor instilled fear, both of which results might have been more successful in mobilizing support for a Bush re-election.

4

The Soviet Crises and US Public Diplomacy, April 1991 to November 1992

As Americans, we feel we have a destiny to lead, to show the way by ideals, not just to ourselves but to the entire world.1 Public support for an internationalist foreign policy will not be automatic following the demise of the evil empire. It will not be immediately apparent to most Americans why we should continue to shoulder global responsibilities [. . .] We may not be prepared psychologically to support an activist foreign policy on behalf of prosaic objectives such as international stability, or a morally neutral one such as the national interest.2 We are entering one of the most unstable, unpredictable, challenging and dangerous periods of international relations since World War II and perhaps in our history.3

Introduction Despite President Bush's optimism as troops returned from Desert Storm, new foreign crises unfolded in late 1991 which again necessitated the careful planning of official appearances and rhetoric. Although Yugoslavia disintegrated into warfare and a scale of human suffering unheard of in Europe since World War Two, it received comparatively little attention from the Administration. The Bush Administration had from 1989 been planning for `nightmare scenarios' in the Soviet Union.4 By late 1991 the steady disintegration of the Soviet Union, the coup, and Gorbachev's resignation seemed to provide these scenarios exactly. Despite the Gulf success and the complete US±Soviet reconciliation into partnership which had accompanied it, the ongoing friction between the center and the secessionist Republics in the USSR continued to produce `profound anxiety' amongst American government officials.5 Since 1990, the Administration had been concerned that Gorbachev would be unable to continue as leader unless perestroika produced practical results for the Soviet people. In testimony to the Senate early in that year, the veteran Soviet expert George F. Kennan had stated that he 96

Soviet Crises and US Public Diplomacy 97

believed Gorbachev would have already been deposed `were it not for his international prestige, which constitutes an important asset for the Soviet state'; and senior US officials agreed with Kennan's analysis.6 However, the Soviet leader's domestic standing had been further damaged by the failure of his diplomatic initiatives in the Gulf, which Soviet conservatives interpreted as evidence of the country's impotence in the face of American hegemony. If Gorbachev was removed, US officials feared they would not only lose the leader they had cultivated but might also be confronted with the problem of how to monitor the security and location of Soviet nuclear weapons. Thus, the Administration's foreign policy priority was to help Gorbachev maintain domestic support. The Administration carefully controlled its public appearances, statements, and relations with the Russian President Boris Yeltsin, to bolster Gorbachev's position. Its second priority in late 1991 and 1992 was securing a victory in the Presidential election campaign. This chapter examines the rhetorical unfolding of these priorities and the combination of interests and `para-ideologies' that they revealed.

The Soviet crises The Bush Administration had two interrelated international strategic objectives in the post-Gulf period ± to boost Gorbachev's domestic credibility, and keep him in power, in the hope that this would prevent the disintegration of the USSR into a chaos of warring Republics and proliferating nuclear missile technologies and materials. Beschloss and Talbott have reported how President Bush's loyalty to these two aims dictated the US position on the Baltic Republics' secession attempts. While Bush wrote privately to Gorbachev threatening to terminate economic aid if he continued to use force to suppress the independence movements, the Administration's public statements remained strictly neutral and uncritical.7 Polls taken in mid-1990 had also given the Administration reason to be confident that the American people considered measures to maintain stable Soviet±American relations to be more important than United States' support for the Baltic independence movements.8 And, although the US postponed the summit scheduled for February 1991 in opposition to the Baltic crackdown, Beschloss and Talbott reveal that the Administration agreed with the Soviets on `language' which `would present the postponement as a mutual decision, blaming the Gulf War and obstacles that had arisen in arms control'.9 In President Bush's words, the United States' priority was to `preserve the relationship with Gorbachev as much as possible' and to avoid making any ìrrevocable' threats or promises.10 Bush had informed his aides that in the interests of guaranteeing the security of Soviet nuclear weapons (possibly targets of dissident groups) it was essential that Gorbachev `remain in overall charge'.11


Excerpts from the State of Union Address in 1991 demonstrate how rhetoric was wielded for the strategic purpose of maintaining a stable US±Soviet relationship, while implicitly informing the USSR of its suspicions about their intentions, and also suggesting to a domestic audience and its allies that the United States was not naively receptive to all Soviet advances. Although mostly dedicated to the Persian Gulf War, the address was amended by Bush and Baker at the last minute to include a paragraph referring to the Baltics situation. In this paragraph Bush described recent `representations' from the Soviet Union which might result in a peaceful resolution. This referred to his meeting with Soviet foreign minister Alexander Bessmertnyk, who had stressed his government's intention to honor their commitment to peaceful change made at the Malta, Washington, and Helsinki summits. In order to suggest `skepticism', the President had selected the word `representations' himself, and added the line `we will watch carefully as the situation develops', according to Beschloss and Talbott.12 The inclination of the Bush Administration to privately put pressure on Gorbachev, whilst publicly reiterating that the relationship was a co-operative partnership, extended beyond the Gulf War and beyond the necessity of preserving Soviet support for the duration of military actions. In the post-Gulf period, the Administration continued to rhetorically position Gorbachev as the United States' associate in an historic process of orderly transition from Cold War to `post-Cold War'. According to Gorbachev, towards the end of the Gulf War the US±Soviet relationship had become increasingly brittle. Bush had disregarded both Soviet opposition to the ground war and the Primakov peace plan. To powerful Soviet conservatives, particularly those in the military, this marginalization of the Soviet Union suggested that the United States had à larger and more sinister plan in the Middle East'. Indeed, some of them believed that the Gulf was a `testing ground' for American military technology which would eventually be used against the Soviet Union.13 The Bush Administration had attempted to soften the rejection by describing the Soviet peace plan to the international media as `helpful' and ùseful' and explaining in detail to Gorbachev that they had dismissed his plan because of Iraqi intransigence over an unconditional withdrawal. In a White House meeting Baker had said: `We're going to need these guys when the war's over to help us on the Middle East. Let's let them down easy on the Gulf, not rub their noses in the fact that we're telling them to butt out. If we're going to tell them to go away, let's make sure they don't go away mad.'14 However, the Administration understood that Gorbachev had been weakened by the failure of his peace initiatives, and that hard-liners in the Soviet state desired to destabilize `the pattern of co-operation' between the United States and the USSR. They also recognized the necessity of Soviet collaboration in fostering the Arab±Israeli peace process after the war, and in maintaining the momentum of Eastern European reconstruction. Thus, after the Gulf War, the


President's instruction regarding American policy towards the Soviet Union was: `Let's see if we can help the Soviets get out from under the shadow of being tools of US policy'.15 In pursuit of this objective the Administration continued the rhetorical reconstruction of the US±Soviet relationship as it had been begun in late 1989. While this rhetorical reconstruction was enhanced with practical Persian Gulf co-operation and `partnership' in regard to Nicaragua, Cambodia, Namibia, and Afghanistan, it was now also complicated by internal developments in the Soviet Union. The election of Boris Yeltsin as the President of the Russian Republic in June 1991, and the persistence of the independence movements, were interpreted by some members of the Administration as unequivocal signals that the United States needed to rapidly `diversify [its] investments'.16 However, Bush was reluctant to dilute the United States' Soviet diplomacy by looking further than Gorbachev. Secretary Baker visited the Soviet Union in March 1991 in an attempt to strengthen Gorbachev's position in the prelude to a nationwide referendum on whether the Soviet Union should remain one nation. It was hoped that the visit of a high level US official would suggest to the Soviet people that Gorbachev's diplomacy could secure a valuable international injection of aid and assistance.17 However, former President Richard Nixon, who visited the Soviet Union shortly after Baker, attempted to persuade Bush that the United States should cultivate both Yeltsin and Gorbachev. This was also the position and advice of the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock. Yeltsin was eventually invited to Washington by Senate leaders Robert Dole and George Mitchell.18 However, during Yeltsin's visit, Bush carefully paid tribute to Gorbachev, emphasized that his initiatives ± glasnost and perestroika ± had enabled the end of the Cold War, and was at pains to depict the Russian and Soviet presidents as partners, who not only co-operated with the United States but with each other, and who were equally concerned with their country's best interests. One public compliment to Yeltsin seemed designed to enlighten him on the importance of public image (an area in which some in the White House believed Yeltsin was lacking). Bush told him `democracy' was all about making àn impression' with the public.19

The summer summits In subsequent international forums Bush maintained a strategically integrative rhetoric, which increasingly portrayed the Cold War as a mere difference of opinion. For example, at the G7 Summit he described how different current American±Soviet relations were from the Cold War, which by his admission was a rhetorical battle, a war of words and ideas, of `guys' standing each other off in the United Nations.20 Bush's prime concern, related to key staff Baker, Scowcroft and Sununu, on his first visit as President to the Soviet Union was to create no difficulties for Gorbachev.21 At the Moscow Summit


in July 1991, official rhetoric was replete with references to US±Soviet `cooperation' and `partnership'. When speaking in Kiev, Bush referred to Ùkraine' rather than, with the definitive article, `the Ukraine', which his advisors had warned suggested `colonial status'.22 Yet he also addressed his Ukrainian audiences as `Soviet peoples' and referred to Russia and Ukraine as `Soviet Republics'.23 Two practical and symbolic announcements were made: Bush and Gorbachev signed a START agreement and announced that they would be `co-sponsors' of a Middle East Peace Conference at the end of the year (they had secretly agreed to jointly host such a conference in September 1990, in the midst of the Gulf crisis).24 In his remarks on signing the START Treaty Gorbachev referred to the difficulties he would share with Bush in achieving ratification. Both would face domestic criticism, he said. Bush described how the treaty would provide for their `mutual security' and was made possible because `neither side [had] won unilateral advantage' with the end of the Cold War.25 On another occasion for intended comic effect, he had commiserated with the Mayor of Moscow, Gavril Popov, saying ìf his problems are anything like the problems of the cities in the United States, he's going to need our best wishes'.26 Throughout the visit, Bush consistently emphasized that the US±Soviet relationship had developed `from confrontation to friendship', that it was based on `mutual respect and personal trust', and that it was a `partnership as peacemakers and peacekeepers'.27 He expressed `respect and admiration' for Gorbachev who had displayed ùncommon vision and courage', and announced that the United States and the Soviet Union would `pursue shared goals: a stable world no longer polarized, mutually beneficial economic ties, co-operation on everything from weapons proliferation to environmental problems'.28 Bush told the Moscow State Institute for International Relations that the process of economic normalization between the United States and the USSR was almost complete, and that `the crowning proof' of the Cold War's end had been their co-operation in the Persian Gulf. The United States would support `the forces of reform and freedom wherever they are found', he said, and referred to the Baltics by urging the Soviet Union to make à clear and unequivocal commitment to peaceful change' and entreating both sides to engage in `good faith negotiations'. Bush described the responsibility which lay with both Americans and Soviets to jointly create international stability, but he particularly praised Gorbachev for having `changed the world'.29 Nevertheless, according to Bush, the United States remained the model for this transformation. In the `post-Cold War' period, he contended, the Àmerican Dream' had become à universal dream'.30 When Bush spoke to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Ukraine in Kiev, his intention was to foster dialogue between Moscow and the Republics `without encouraging secessionism'. This was a task which required a thoughtfully crafted speech. The President worked on the address himself


and the result was controversial both in the United States and the Soviet Union. Portraying the Cold War as an unreal, choreographed spectacle, Bush stated that in the past the US and the USSR had been èngaged in duels of eloquent bluff and bravado'. The superpower confrontation had been mere `fireworks' and was yielding to a different and subtler àrt', a `quieter and far more hopeful art of co-operation'.31 In his desire to help Gorbachev, Bush had himself written a section praising the Soviet leader, and which was `sensitive to Gorbachev's problems'.32 As a result, the speech lectured that freedom and independence were not necessarily synonymous, that Americans would not support secessionist movements that sought to establish their own systems of tyranny, and warned that nationalism could be `suicidal'. Urging adherence to the `Nine-plus-One' agreement,33 Bush counseled that trade wars between the Republics and the center would be `ruinous'. Isolationism would be a `hopeless course', he said, and firmly stated that US economic investment would be directed towards a union of Soviet republics: American investors and businessmen look forward to doing business in the Soviet Union, including the Ukraine. We've signed agreements this week that will encourage further interaction between the US and all levels of the Soviet Union. The President made it explicit that the United States preferred stability and considered the maintenance of a union or at least federation of Republics to be the best arrangement with which to attract US aid and support: ùltimately, our trade relations will depend on our ability to develop a common language, a common language of commerce'. Ukrainians and some elements of the American press vilified the address claiming that it proved Bush's `timidity' and his susceptibility to influence from Gorbachev. William Safire of the New York Times coined the term ` ``Chicken Kiev'' speech' to describe it. Indeed Bush's interpretation was so badly received in the United States that in an ùnprecedented' public display of damage limitation, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft wrote an article in the editorial pages of the New York Times to explain the President's real position.34 `Mutual advantage' and collaboration remained the central themes of Republican/Administrative discourse on US±Soviet relations. Both traditional internationalists and skeptical conservatives adopted the rhetorical motif of US±Soviet partnership. Safeguarding the co-operative relationship was essential to the maintenance of security in the `new world order', Republican senator Robert Dole stated in an attempt to popularize an activist American foreign policy. The Gulf War was the paradigm which proved the benefits of Soviet compliance for the furtherance of American interests: Òne needn't look back any further than the Gulf War to understand the Soviet capacity to contribute to a safer world through responsible policies ± or its potential


to jeopardize the safety of the world should it opt for irresponsible policies'.35 The President's National Security Strategy Report published in August 1991 was accompanied by a statement which acknowledged the ìnescapable priority' which the Administration awarded to its strategic relationship with the Soviet Union. The report recognized that the strategy of containment should be `modified to reflect geostrategic realities'; it also recommended support for `the constructive evolution of the Soviet Union' and acknowledged that the ìnternalization of the Soviet Union' would alter the United States' fundamental alliances. It described an increasingly interdependent international system but stressed that US leadership was still necessary, made recommendations for smaller, more mobile forces for use in regional conflicts, insisted that NATO was ìndispensable', and that American vital interests lay in ensuring an open and inclusive international economic system and stability in the Middle East, East Asia and the Pacific. The United States' basic and enduring interests were listed as territorial integrity, economic prosperity, stable alliances, and world order. But the report's elucidation of the wider purpose of the United States security strategy attempted to create a connection between the nation's foreign policy and its national values and domestic policy, a connection which hinged on the spread of American ideals: Our response to strategic challenges has always been shaped by what we are as a people, for our values are the link between our past and our future, between our domestic life and our foreign policy, between our power and our purpose. Our responsibility as a nation remains not only to protect our citizens and our interests, but also to help create a new world in which our fundamental ideals not only survive but flourish. That is the essence of our national security strategy.36 This feature of the report prefigured a theme of `foreign policy-is-domestic policy' which the Administration would utilize during the 1992 election campaign.

The Soviet coup and US `spin control' A coup against Gorbachev had been predicted by Shevardnadze and Nixon in March 1991 and in June the Mayor of Moscow, Gavril Popov, had warned the American Ambassador Jack Matlock that a hardline take-over was imminent. However, neither Bush nor Baker had been convinced and all forecasts proved false.37 A week after the announcement of the United States' National Security Report and two days before the proposed signing of the Union treaty in the Soviet Union, a coup was orchestrated by Yanayev, Pavlov, Khryuchov, Yazov, Pugo, Valeri Boldin and Oleg Baklanov, most of


whom had already been vocal opponents of Gorbachev, and one of whom, Khryuchov, had warned the United States (via Nixon) several months previously that a coup was inevitable. In response to the Soviet coup, Bush was initially cautious. Scowcroft suggested the adjective èxtraconstitutional' rather than ùnconstitutional' or ìllegitimate' to describe the takeover.38 In interviews with the press from Kennebunkport, the President adopted a `wait and see' position. Bush also perceived that American domestic confidence and sense of wellbeing was linked to the public's perception of international stability and referred to the necessity of assuring the American people that the situation did not signal a resumption of the Cold War. The muted response appeared designed to not only keep the Administration's options open regarding which faction they would support in the USSR but also to prevent anxiety at home. Indeed, the President admitted that he had not used the hotline to contact Moscow during the crisis, fearing that it would cause alarm amongst Americans who associated it with the most dangerous years of the Cold War.39 This is not a time for flamboyance or show business or posturing on the part of any country, certainly not the United States. We have disproportionate responsibilities in handling these matters with confidence and a cool, and I think, informed way.40 He favored, he said, `diplomacy in a prudent fashion, not driven by excess, not driven by extreme'. However, due to negative media coverage of Bush's circumspection, some comparing it to the Administration's inaction in the case of the violent suppression of democratic protesters in Tiananmen Square, the President was advised to return to Washington `for a highly visible day of presidential leadership' and `spin-control'.41 Having met with Governor Sununu, General Scowcroft, Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates, Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of Defense Atwood, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Kerr, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Lehman and other representatives from the National Security Council, Treasury, and Department of Defense, and having spoken with a number of world leaders (Chancellor Kohl, Presidents Ozal, Havel, Walesa and Mitterand, and Prime Ministers Mulroney, Major, Andreotti, Kaifu, Gonzalez, and Lubbers, who was also EC President)42 a statement on the coup was drafted. Since the Administration's most recent information had suggested that the coup was badly organized, it was decided that a more assertive line could be adopted. Thus the statement described the coup as ùnconstitutional' and ìllegitimate' and contained an endorsement of a request which had come from Yeltsin calling for US support of Gorbachev and the `restoration of


legally elected organs of power'. The statement reiterated the United States' support for continued reform, including democratization, economic development, and `peaceful reconciliation between the center and the Republics'. It emphasized US support for `constitutionally elected leaders', and its opposition to the use of force to suppress the elected leadership or against either the Republics or Eastern Europe. It ended with the assertions that the US had `no interest in a new cold war' but that economic aid and investment was dependent on a return to constitutional procedures.43 At his next news conference, the President had omitted the cautious phrasing èxtraconstitutional coup' and instead stated that `the unconstitutional seizure of power' had marginalized the Soviet Union and placed it àt odds with the world community'.44 Roman Popadiuk, the National Security Council spokesman, described these carefully worded statements as `diplomacy through the media', a means of informing Yeltsin and the coupplotters where US support lay.45 By the next day, 21 August, the coup was declared over.46 Immediate official comment recognized the enhanced stature of Yeltsin and took a position in support of negotiated self-determination for the constituent Republics of the Soviet Union, which now appeared to be an inevitability.47 However, Baker's statement following the NATO Ministerial meeting not only described the crisis as a vindication of NATO's role às a firm bulwark for our common security [. . .] which permits all its members to respond to crises of this sort calmly, firmly, and effectively'; but also that the coup's failure would demonstrate the strength of the `fundamental principles and democratic values' which the alliance had promoted throughout the Cold War, and which had `now planted themselves firmly in the soul of our former adversary'.48 Thus, according to American official rhetoric, the coup's failure was again evidence of the power of American ideals and American exceptionalism.

Rhetorical strategies after the coup By 23 August, despite its hopes, the Administration accepted that Boris Yeltsin had replaced Gorbachev as the significant political power broker in the inevitably disintegrating Soviet state. The Republics of Ukraine, Belarus (Byelorussia), Moldova (Moldavia), Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyztan (Kirghizia), and Tadzhikistan declared independence and Gorbachev had resigned as General Secretary of the Communist Party. However, the Bush Administration still hoped for a federation of the Republics, or at least a slow disintegration so that the location of nuclear weapons could be monitored, and continued to try to bolster Gorbachev's position by waiting as long as possible for him to recognize the Baltics before granting US recognition.49 Ì don't want to be part of making a mistake that might contribute to some kind of anarchy inside the Soviet Union', was Bush's public explanation.50 As in the early transition period, it was reported that this crossroads in Soviet


politics had produced `profound anxiety' amongst the President's `senior advisors'.51 They continued to warn of the dangers of American disinterest, as well as to emphasize the necessity and inevitability of a Russian/CIS± American collaboration. During his visit to Moscow in September, Baker stated that the Administration's priority was to find ènhanced opportunities for co-operation' with both Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Both leaderships agreed to mutually cease supplies of armaments to Afghanistan as a step towards ending the conflict and both pledged to offer humanitarian assistance to help the repatriation of refugees and the nation's reconstruction.52 In a televised address to the nation on 27 September, President Bush announced an American initiative to create capital in international security from the recent Soviet crisis. He proposed large reductions in the size and constitution of US nuclear deployments and invited Soviet reciprocation. He also suggested that co-operative efforts be made to enhance the security of nuclear weapons and materials by discussing environmentally responsible storage, transportation, dismantlement and destruction of weapons, and procedures for safeguarding command and control mechanisms from unauthorized access.53 The initiative and its rhetorical accompaniment appeared to be designed to test the new political situation in the USSR, and to rapidly re-establish the `pattern of cooperation' which had been well developed prior to the coup. There was both a challenge and a warning to the USSR, and in its pledge to monitor Soviet responses the address reproduced the ìmplied skepticism' clause of Bush's State of the Union 1991 passage on the Baltics.54 For a domestic audience it offered both the opportunity for defense cuts and the promise of vigilance: As we implement these initiatives we will closely watch how the new Soviet leadership responds. We expect our bold initiatives to meet with equally bold steps on the Soviet side. If this happens, further co-operation is inevitable. If it does not, then an historic opportunity will have been lost. Regardless, let no one doubt we will retain the necessary strength to protect our security and that of our allies and to respond as necessary.55 As well as testing the ground regarding Gorbachev's position, this initiative would also hopefully provide Gorbachev with a `fig leaf behind which to conceal the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the non-Russian republics'. Beschloss and Talbott record that one of Bush's intentions in proposing reciprocal arms reductions was to reinforce Gorbachev's position with the Soviet military who were opposed to unilateral cuts.56 In his own television address, Gorbachev made a rapid counter proposal in a bid to solidify his international and domestic status. At the conclusion, he made a point of recounting Bush's endorsement of his leadership: `The US President gave a positive assessment of our proposals and expressed satisfaction with our


approach towards solving key problems in world politics'.57 However, both initiatives were lost amidst the Soviet state's restructuring. In fact, it was not until Yeltsin's visit to Washington in June 1992 that the START Treaty was again seriously negotiated.58

The end of the Soviet Union The Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in September 1991 was, it was widely expressed, èmblematic' of how far the US±Soviet relationship had progressed since 1989. Baker described the event thus: This conference demonstrates vividly the end of the Cold War and the flowering of US±Soviet partnership in resolving regional conflicts. Where we once competed, we now co-operate. Where there was once polarization there is now co-ordination. What was once unthinkable ± the United States and the Soviet Union cosponsoring a process of peace in the Middle East ± became a reality this week.59 The United States perceived itself to be in the role of facilitator and catalyst for peace, according to Bush, but also as the promoter of the Soviet Union as a partner and power broker on the world stage.60 However, despite their cooperation in promoting peace in a region which had formerly been one of the most dangerous arenas of the Cold War, and despite the enthusiastic American endorsement of Soviet involvement, the lackluster performance of the Soviet delegation suggested that the partnership was far from one of equals. Indeed, unable to meet their share of the costs of the conference, the Soviets were forced to accept financial help from the US to pay for their own delegates' expenses.61 In early December, Baker stated in a CBS Television interview that `the Soviet Union as we've known it no longer exists', but the mistranslation which reached Gorbachev and omitted the words às we've known it'62 demonstrated the difficulties of controlling the effect which official statements could have on international diplomacy. Gorbachev interpreted it as disloyalty towards himself and the partnership. Indeed, he had on several occasions before accused Bush of undermining his credibility.63 However, by December, due to the rapidly diminishing influence of Gorbachev and the increasing pressure of domestic politics, the protection of Gorbachev's position had become a less practical and less essential priority. Nevertheless, in an effort to promote stability, official rhetoric continued to emphasize partnership. Building an international coalition based on `the diplomacy of collective engagement' and maintaining the US±Soviet `partnership' were the Administration's priorities as Baker's speech at Princeton at the end of 1991, entitled Àmerica and the Collapse of the Soviet Empire: What has to be done', expressed. Baker stressed the necessity of the United


States remaining a `model' for the former Soviet Union but also listed areas of US±Soviet co-operation, stating that they had been: [. . .] partners in facilitating the unification of Germany; partners in seeing Central and Eastern Europe peacefully liberated from communism's stranglehold; partners in negotiating radical reductions in conventional and nuclear weapons; partners in ending regional conflicts from Central America to southern Africa to Cambodia; partners in reversing Iraqi aggression and in promoting Arab±Israeli peace.64 The United States' aim would be to `mobilize a coalition in support of freedom' just as it had forged the Cold War alliance against Stalinism. To this end a Coordinating Conference was proposed to which the advanced industrial nations, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the members of the Gulf War coalition, and the international financial institutions would be invited to discuss how best to provide humanitarian assistance. Again the argument was made that an investment of funds and resolve similar to that made during the Cold War was necessary to ensure post-Soviet stability, particularly to control and destroy weapons of mass destruction. The indivisibility of the fates of the United States and the USSR was underlined. For the third time this century, we have ended a war ± this time a cold war ± between the great powers. [. . .] We again stand at history's precipice. [. . .] Now the Western nations and the former Soviet Union stand as awkward climbers on a steep slope. Held together by a common rope, a fall towards fascism or anarchy in the former Soviet Union will pull the West down too. Yet, equally as important, a strong and steady pull by the West now can help them to gain their footing.65 As a result of the Coordinating Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States, which took place in January 1992, a short-term airlift of emergency humanitarian assistance, named Operation Provide Hope, was organized. The operation, which German foreign minister Hans Deitrich Genscher compared to the Marshall Plan and the Berlin airlift, was portrayed as a crisis measure to prevent chaos.66 In his statement on Gorbachev's resignation in December, Bush depicted the end of the Cold War as a joint achievement: `Working together, we helped the Eastern Europeans win their liberty and the German people their goal of unity and freedom' which had produced a legacy of continued collaboration in Kuwait, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Namibia, and in the Arab± Israeli conflict.67 At Scowcroft's urging, Bush had decided not just to issue a statement but make a personal address to the nation. This Christmas Day address evaluated the events of the previous three years as òne of the greatest dramas of the 20th century'. Bush expressed gratitude to Gorbachev and


praised his ìntellect, vision and courage'. But as well as paying tribute to Gorbachev for his role in ending the Cold War, the President also repeatedly emphasized that the American contribution had been due to `containment', the principle and determination of each successive Administration, and the strength and patriotism of the American people throughout the Cold War.68 And half of the speech was devoted to outlining the terms of the United States' relationship with the new Commonwealth of Independent States. Thus, Bush looked forward to working in èqually constructive ways' with Gorbachev's successors and in announcing official recognition of the new member states of the CIS, Bush distinguished between Russia, which the US welcomed as à free, independent, and democratic' state under the `courageous' leadership of Boris Yeltsin; Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Kygrgystan, which were recognized at a lesser level as having made `specific commitments' and which would in the near future be rewarded with diplomatic relations and UN membership; and Moldova, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan, Georgia and Uzbekistan, which were recognized at a third level as states with which the US would establish diplomatic relations once they had `made commitments to responsible security policies and democratic principles'.69 Although later Bush would underplay Gorbachev's role and refer to the Cold War as an American victory, his speech on Gorbachev's resignation did set a pattern for official public diplomacy in 1992 which attempted to tie important recent international events ± the end of the Cold War, the US± Soviet normalization, Gorbachev's initiatives, and the United States collaboration ± to the exceptionalism of the American system and people. In a long speech in south Texas on 27 December, the President expounded upon the freedom from fear which had been gained as a result of the East±West thaw which was now complete and stated that Àmerican leadership, American ideals [had] literally reshaped the world'.70 In the New York Times, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resignation of Gorbachev were described as a tragic drama: `The fall of a giant state, owing largely to its own human flaws, has the quality of tragedy'.71 In comparison to Gorbachev, the editorial argued, Bush lacked vision and acted às if he and his country need take no responsibility for the future'. Such criticism suggested to the Administration that it needed to improve its `spin control' at home. In 1992, key administrative officials and influential former presidents made the argument that successful leadership when in power, and victory in elections, required pre-eminence in the art of public persuasion.

The Presidential campaign and American exceptionalism In 1992 Bush on occasion focused on the issue of domestic pessimism and recognized that it was linked to economic insecurity (an argument that had been implicit in the 1991 National Security Strategy Report).72 This was a


theme which dominated the Presidential campaign and which was tested out as a rallying call at the Republican Party fundraisers in the fall of 1991. Like Clinton, he repeated that foreign and domestic policy were ìnseparable'. When I talk with foreign leaders about new markets for American products, is it foreign policy or domestic? When I meet with groups of Latin American leaders, as I did in Cartagena, to help try to keep drugs out of American schools and neighborhoods, is that foreign policy or is that domestic policy? When Desert Storm reignited Americans' faith in themselves, was that just foreign policy? No. It demonstrated our special role as the world's preeminent moral, political, economic, and military power.73 He added that it was essential that the United States remain à moral beacon for other countries' and that isolationism be rejected.74 Bush campaign rhetoric was dominated by two themes which had been employed for strategic purposes since 1989, and which linked foreign policy to domestic policy. The first was the theme of exceptionalism, which was defined thus by Bush: Às Americans, we feel we have a destiny to lead, to show the way by ideals, not just to ourselves but to the entire world'.75 In the 1992 State of the Union Address, Bush announced that the United States was recognized by the world as the òne sole and pre-eminent power', and that it was acknowledged for the `prudent use of power'. In contrast with his carefully designed statement for the resignation of Gorbachev, Bush did not refer to the joint Soviet±US effort to end the Cold War, but emphasized that the Cold War had resulted in a US victory.76 A second feature of the Bush campaign rhetoric was the conflation of the recent tumult of Soviet history with that of the United States' national development. Early in 1991, when the Administration had been debating the relative merits of Yeltsin and Gorbachev, George Kolt, the head of the office of Soviet Analysis at the CIA, and Fritz Ermarth of the National Intelligence Council, had argued that Yeltsin was a Russian George Washington for a country experiencing its own 1776 revolutionary struggle for independence. However, Brent Scowcroft made a Civil War analogy, arguing that the Soviet Union was in a period of instability similar to that of the United States in 1861, and that Gorbachev was an Abraham Lincoln charged with preventing secession and holding the Union together.77 By the end of 1991, the situation in Eastern Europe was described in official rhetoric using the revolutionary struggle analogy. In a speech in Virginia, the President had observed: `The framers of our Constitution confronted problems not unlike those that the Central and Eastern European constitution writers face today. The framers had to grapple with ethnic and religious differences, regional interests, issues of where power should lie and how to contain conflict.'78 In a 1992 speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Bush stated: Ìn


the ordeal of the long-suffering peoples of the Soviet empire, we see glimpses of this Nation's past. In their own hopes and dreams, we see our own.'79 And whether the Soviet disintegration had resembled the American revolution with Yeltsin as Washington, or whether it could be better compared with the American Civil War, in which case Gorbachev was a failed Abraham Lincoln, the message was the same ± the United States had been the model for Soviet transformation.80 Believing that only they understood and could operate a `responsible' foreign policy, the Administration's view in 1992 was that the key challenge was `to make their case convincingly to the American people'. As Eagleburger suggested leadership was not simply following public opinion, it was shaping it. During the Cold War, foreign policy elites and experts had been educated in international challenges and responsibilities, argued Eagleburger, but now the task was to educate the general public in preparation `for integration into a sophisticated and intensely competitive global economy'. This was the United States' `number one foreign policy challenge', he said, to make Americans `more cosmopolitan', `better-educated' with foreign interests and language skills, and in the process shape a public `more likely to understand and sustain the kind of creative global leadership role which we are going to continue to need in the post-Cold War era'.81 Persuading the American public was a challenge and so too was maintaining influence internationally. `Getting our way' in the post-Cold War world, Eagleburger attempted to persuade business executives in another address, would require `compromise and engagement', sharing global responsibilities, and acting as à leading and galvanizing force behind international co-operation and collective action' according to the Gulf War model.82 In a similar vein, former President Nixon argued in a private memorandum distributed to key national security personnel83 (but later highly publicized in a conference on the United States' role in the world), that US engagement, particularly in support of Russia, could be justified with a well-formed argument. American involvement could be sold to Congress and the American people, he maintained, in much the same way as Truman had secured aid for Greece and Turkey in 1947 by winning both the support of Democrats who had opposed military foreign aid and that of conservative Republicans who had opposed foreign aid entirely.84 Leadership, he had stated in the memo, was `not simply to support what is popular but to make what is unpopular popular, if that serves America's interests'.85 Nixon was essentially requesting a new Truman Doctrine, an appeal with which, it appeared, at least Eagleburger had some sympathy. He recognized that the United States' difficulty was that victory in the Cold War had left the US `searching for a new rationale to determine [its] place and purpose in the world' and that an important debate about the èxistential purpose' of American foreign policy was occurring.86 President Bush's response was


that while he agreed with the fundamentals of Nixon's argument, it was à time of constrained resources'.87 In his speech to the same conference, he stated that the challenge was `to square the responsibilities of world leadership with the requirements of domestic renewal': To maintain popular support for an active foreign policy and a strong defense in the absence of an overriding single external threat to our nation's security and in the face of severe budgetary pressures, [. . .] carrying our leadership role in determining the course of the emerging world is going to cost money. But like any insurance policy, the premium is modest compared to the potential cost of living in a warring and hostile world.88 Robert Gates, director of the CIA, told the conference that he expected that more radical change and upheaval would occur before `the form and patterns of the new era settle into place'.89 Therefore, in 1992 the Bush Administration concentrated on `making the case' for American activism in maintaining international order, arguing in a perceived context of financial constraints and public disinterest, but also in the perceived context of their own responsibility for setting the parameters for peace in a period of historic and potentially perilous transition. This case was based on a reiteration of familiar arguments about being on `the precipice', the verge of a new era in which freedom and stability should not be taken for granted. Accordingly, the Cold War had been à stark test of the global community's ideals'.90 The official position was that the current period in international affairs was as dangerous às any we have faced this century', and that the reversal of the Eastern European and Soviet revolutions `could plunge us into a world more dangerous than the dark years of the Cold War'.91 Weapons proliferation and the potential for aggression or civil war were listed as the key threats. Eagleburger stressed that the `margin of error' had diminished: `We will pay more for our diplomatic mistakes than in the past and we will therefore need a foreign policy that is more nuanced than in the past'.92 The necessity of `hard work, tough negotiation, sacrifice and the courage of convictions' was emphasized, qualities which, it was insisted, only the experienced Bush Administration possessed.93 But the Administration also attempted to `make the case' for global involvement by linking it to domestic renewal and prosperity. And again the example of the Persian Gulf was employed to this end. Bush pledged `to use the same kind of leadership' which had produced a `return of American pride' in its military prowess to combat social problems.94 During the Gulf War, the US had exhibited `sacrifice and common purpose' and had `thought and felt and cared as one nation'. These qualities, Bush stated, could be found again to benefit the United States.95 In a domestic Republican Party


fundraising address, Bush listed the United States' foreign policy successes ± Panama, the Gulf, support for democrats in the Soviet Union, nuclear initiatives ± and then added àt home, we seek nothing less'.96 At a Bush-Quayle fundraiser in Houston, Texas the President emphasized: `The pride we felt in our fighting men and women [in Desert Storm] and in ourselves shouldn't be trivialized as something ``foreign'' '.97 And in an address to the nation on Veterans Day, Bush again referred to how the Gulf War had `set Americans free by renewing our faith in ourselves', and how the United States had `never been more united'.98 Again he insisted that the Cold War had not simply ended but had been `won', and argued that the success of Desert Storm contradicted `talk of decline'.99 He implied that if domestic issues had not yet received the same attention as international issues it was not the fault of the Administration: If you hear people in Congress gripe that they can't get their job done by March 20th, remind them we won the Gulf in 44 days. Surely Congress can pass my urgent domestic program in 52. Remember, Congress can act with lightning speed when it wants to.100 Speaking to groups of manufacturing industry workers, Bush pledged to use the United States `new found credibility', acquired during the Gulf War, to gain access to more foreign markets and create more American jobs.101 The implicit message of all official rhetoric in the early transitional period was made explicit in the campaign of 1992: Àmerican leadership changed the world. Republican leadership will change America.'102 Bush reiterated that the United States had won the Cold War and Gulf War because it `did not shirk responsibility', had never in its history `turned its back on a challenge', because Àmericans don't cut and run. We compete.'103 Thus, the President argued, protectionism was a `retreat from economic reality' and his opponents were waving `the white flag of surrender' by suggesting it was necessary to `close shop'.104 He attempted to atone for the `duels of eloquent bluff and bravado' comment by recalling the Cold War as `not simply some mundane competition' but à struggle for the mind of man'.105 However, perhaps these contradictions of his campaign rhetoric made it inherently unpersuasive. On the one hand, Bush optimistically proclaimed a `new era, freed from the burden of East±West conflict',106 referred repeatedly to the American victory in the Cold War and the removal of the threat of nuclear attack, and boasted of success in the Persian Gulf and how it had renewed American pride and credibility. On the other hand he emphasized that another lesson of the Gulf was that à strong defense' was a prerequisite to peace and that `security means forward deployment',107 that there was a need `to remain vigilant'; `the specter of mass destruction remains all too real'; òur world is still a dangerous world, rife with far too many terrible weapons [. . .] regional conflicts, destabilizing renegade regimes


that are on the horizon, terrorism, human rights'.108 He argued that `the world still remains a dangerous place',109 and that `the fundamental facts of geopolitics don't change'.110 He provided examples of domestic disorder, on some occasions without seeming to recognize the irony of his use of phrases employed in condemnation of Saddam Hussein to condemn violence at home. For example this excerpt from Bush's remarks on the Los Angeles Riots: `Violence and brutality destroy order. They destroy the rule of law' or his pledge that economic hard times `will not stand'.111 On other occasions he made his opponents' arguments for them, for example stating that it was more dangerous for American servicemen and women on the streets of the United States than in the Middle East,112 or declaring: Peace in the world, it's fine, but it's not enough. If people don't feel safe in their own backyard, it doesn't seem to matter. What do you say to an elderly woman who watches the Berlin Wall fall on television right before her eyes but is afraid to walk into her neighborhood grocery store? What do you say to kids in our cities who hear of the Russians reducing nuclear weapons but then have to walk through a metal detector at school every single morning? What do you say to these Americans?113 His answer to the question was: `You say, `Ènough is enough''. Let's put an end to the lawlessness. Let's get rid of the drugs. And let's say sayonara to the crack dealers and criminals. We can help with legislation. You can help in your neighborhoods and in your local institutions. But let's pledge to make America safe again.' On one occasion Bush admitted in response to a reporter's question on whether the war with Congress was more difficult than that with Iraq that `yes' it was ìn terms of making decisions'. Bush explained that his job as commander in chief was easier because he did not have `to worry about a subcommittee wanting to take a look' at his decisions about how the war should be prosecuted.114 The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia obviously illustrated that `new world order' proclamations were premature and made the Administration's rhetoric of values and missions seem hollow. Reflecting their policy status, the Balkan wars were not the subject of major speeches and most of Bush's statements on them came in response to reporters' questions. In these the Vietnam syndrome, supposedly exorcised after the Persian Gulf crisis, reappeared as an explanation for caution about involvement. Although the United States would `play its role' in the Balkans it would `not be a forward-leaning role', according to Bush who in explanation stated: The United States is not going to inject itself into every single crisis, no matter how heartrending, around the world. I am not interested in seeing


one single United States soldier pinned down in some kind of guerrilla environment.115 I do not want to see the United States bogged down in any way into some guerrilla warfare. We lived through that one.116 There were `burning memories' of the concentration camps of World War Two, stated Bush upon learning of those in Bosnia, but there was `no easy or simple solution' to the Yugoslav situation. It was `complex' and required `containment'.117 While he maintained that the United States was `the sole superpower' he cautioned that `that doesn't mean that the way you lead is to dictate'.118 US troops would not be used `to solve political problems' but there would be `vigorous diplomacy'.119 In the same statement Bush related the US role in the Balkans to its role in maintaining Russian/CIS stability ± emphasizing again that diplomacy but not force would be used.120 Bush stated that foreign policy issues should be kept òut of the political arena' because they were `too very, very, important' but that domestic issues on the other hand were appropriate for partisan debate. He criticized his electoral opponent's emphasis on domestic economics as merely `political rhetoric'.121 Clinton demonstrated that a challenger may be electorally successful in declaring a domestic emergency and making a strategic `call to arms' as a response to national decline. As the incumbent President Bush would always have had difficulty justifying or benefiting from the declaration of a domestic crisis on his own watch. Instead he attempted to both take credit for a new era of `post-Cold War' peace and to warn that this peace was fragile. The ambiguity of Bush's message, whether a product of residual cognitive dissonance (the àbsence of a clear purpose', as Eagleburger put it, which could be communicated to the public), or of overconfident complacency, or simply of its too close to reality description of a highly uncertain period in international relations, contributed to its failure. It was overshadowed by an unambivalent opposition campaign, which was conceived and planned with precision in a `War Room',122 and executed with an almost revolutionary zeal.

Conclusion The Bush Administration's public diplomacy in the period between the end of the Gulf War and the Presidential election of 1992 had the primary aims of maintaining Soviet stability and preserving the life of the Administration. Both of these involved community-building and crisis management. In the spring of 1991, the rhetoric of reconstruction which had characterized the early transition period (late 1989 to mid-1990) was again employed to emphasize that the United States and the Soviet Union were now engaged in a partnership based on mutual respect and the achievement of mutual benefits. The summer visit of President Bush to the Soviet Union, which the


Administration considered a crucial opportunity to promote dialogue between the center and the Republics, produced descriptions of the Cold War which were revisionist and unpopular in the United States.123 This illustrated the Bush Administration's willingness to sacrifice domestic support and consensus for the development of community with the Soviets. The Administration ùnderstood quite well that in a certain sense the foreign policy of a country is less the private communications through ambassadors and governments and more the public explanation of what the purposes of the country are'.124 This was particularly important during visits to the Soviet Union because it was not clear who were the emerging leaders and since, beyond Gorbachev's immediate circle, there were not close relations between the Administration and officials from Russia or the other Republics. Bush's Persian Gulf operations had led some opponents of Gorbachev to argue that their country was under threat from the United States. Clear, unambiguous statements were essential for managing the crisis of the Soviet disintegration but sometimes these conflicted with the objective of community-building. In attempting to foster a reconciliation between Moscow and the secessionist movements and support for the Union Treaty, Bush went further than ever before in depicting the Cold War between the superpowers as a staged performance, `duels of eloquent bluff and bravado', which had been replaced by openness and honesty. Certainly rhetoric was no longer employed to wage war against the Soviet Union. Now, however, it was employed in support of Soviet stability. Some members of Bush's foreign policy team believed this to be a mistake, but Bush was committed to a policy of not humiliating the Soviets with triumphalism and, in particular, increasing the prestige of Gorbachev. The US position regarding Boris Yeltsin was shaped by the needs of Gorbachev. During Yeltsin's visit to Washington in September 1989, while he was still a member of the Soviet parliament, the Administration did not follow the ùsual protocol' for opposition leaders because, according to Marlin Fitzwater, they feared it would provide à platform for dissent' against Gorbachev.125 Indeed, the preservation of the status quo was a primary function of official pronouncements both abroad and at home. The official American response to the Soviet coup, which involved the use of the term èxtraconstitutional' in the early stages of the crisis and later changed to ùnconstitutional' when seeking to demonstrate support for Yeltsin, was an example of this strategic use of rhetoric. Although there was clearly a crisis management function for rhetoric during the coup, the focus of the public diplomacy of the Bush Administration in this period may be best described as community-building. The Bush Administration's rhetoric of reconstruction was also employed to support and sell in the United States practical measures to aid the Soviets and foster international stability. In this case of domestic agenda-setting the emphasis was again on how the United States would either enable or disable the development of a community of values and aims in the post-Cold War world. In the


international affairs budget request for fiscal 1993, the President sought $620 million in new appropriations for assistance to the republics of the former Soviet Union; in particular, $500 million to deliver humanitarian aid and technical assistance, $100 million to promote economic and democratic reforms, $10 million to provide Development Assistance for the poorer republics and to fund the Food For Peace, `Farmer-to-Farmer' program in which American farmers and agribusiness specialists traveled to the former Soviet Union to offer training and advice.126 More than half of the budget was devoted to economic development and humanitarian assistance, 19 per cent for military assistance (a decrease in absolute terms of 11 per cent), and 13 per cent for diplomatic activities. The State Department's statement on the budget described a shift from a strategy of containment to one of collective engagement. Such a posture was legitimized by the end of the Cold War and by the success of collective engagement during the Persian Gulf War. It was emphasized that the United States' contribution was ònly part of a global response, with over 50 nations and multilateral institutions committed to providing over $27 billion to the new independent states'.127 Thus community-building was justified, and motivated, by American interests as well as ideals. Most important policies were linked with this project of communitybuilding. In 1992 the US remained focused on the issue of the security and disposition of Soviet nuclear weapons. Indeed, during Senate hearings on the United States' efforts to dismantle and monitor nuclear and chemical weapons in the CIS, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn, stated that he could think of `no more urgent national security challenge'.128 During the same hearings, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Stephen J. Hadley, outlined the Administration's policy, which was based on co-operation and the inclusion of the CIS into à democratic community of nations', again also referred to as `the new world order'.129 It remains in our interest to anchor the new states of the former Soviet Union firmly into the West and to ensure that they abandon forever their totalitarian past and join the broader community of nations committed to democratic values. It is this vision ± of a global community of nations with shared values and principles ± which defines the new world order. But as the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Reginald Bartholomew, underlined, the support of `the American taxpayer' for American assistance to the CIS required à sense that there is in fact cooperation' ± that the Republics were making an equal effort to safeguard and destroy weapons, and that they were complying with agreements made in this area.130 Development of community, or at least a sense of it, was necessary not just for the furtherance of international stability but also to


foster US domestic support for a posture of international engagement. Polls at the end of 1991 had shown that most Americans were not fearful that the Soviets might lose control of their nuclear weapons. The majority of Americans supported US reductions in short range nuclear weapons as an incentive for the Soviets to reciprocate, but did not believe the Soviets could be trusted to make arms cuts without the encouragement of a formal treaty.131 Americans were also in favor of reducing foreign aid,132 and were opposed to buying Soviet nuclear weapons as an anti-proliferation/weapons reduction measure.133 Creating à sense' that co-operation was taking place, as Bartholomew had intimated, was therefore a domestic as well as an international policy objective. Official rhetoric on the issue of Soviet stability and nuclear weapons was clearly designed not only for an international audience but also to engage domestic interest and support. During his time in office, President Bush visited and traveled extensively in Western and Eastern Europe, the Far East and the Middle East, North, South and Central America, taking on the world statesman/chief diplomat role which was natural to him. Yet, despite Bush's foreign policy successes in this period, in particular negotiating the Start II Treaty with Yeltsin to eliminate three-quarters of 20 000 nuclear warheads by the year 2003,134 he failed to win the 1992 Presidential election. Beschloss and Talbott conclude that Bush lost in large part because he was unwilling to take advantage of Soviet weakness, because he placed international stability above electoral victory.135 And Moore also states that although the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union did not always converge, Bush placed a priority on `regularizing' their diplomatic relations.136 The focus of the President's public diplomacy illustrated without question this priority of maintaining post-Soviet regional stability and there was tangible complacency in his rhetoric and actions regarding domestic issues. For example, he proposed that Secretary Baker, and not the President, undertake the task of domestic order-building.137 And Bush was condemned as woefully out of touch for his statement that the nation which he wished to build would be `closer to the The Waltons than The Simpsons'.138 While Bush is seen to have made àn indispensable contribution' to ending the Cold War, èxercising restraint' in his relations with the Soviets and `coaxing' the Soviet Union into `worldwide surrender',139 these efforts and the careful rhetoric employed to support them were directed towards an otherwise distracted public. The Cold Warrior was out of fashion, and politicians and leaders in general were mistrusted by the public. Bush was fated to take responsibility for an historical transition in international affairs but having done so was unable to reconcile his experience and talents with the new environment he had helped create. This was in part because of a general American cynicism about government: a Cold War hang-over originating in Vietnam, Watergate and Iran-Contra. Indeed Bush himself had recognized this `malaise' in early 1990.140 But in 1992, a Time/CNN poll found that the majority of Americans


had little or no confidence that the government told the truth (63 per cent), 40 percent stated that President Bush did not usually tell the truth, and 36 per cent felt that candidate Clinton was not truthful.141 This suggests that Clinton's election was not a result of any public perception of his inherent suitability for office, but that his focus on economic renewal and his charismatic public diplomacy were a combination ideally suited to a post-war reconstruction effort. In a context of transitional anxiety, and skepticism about government motives and abilities, public diplomacy acquired an importance beyond the explanation and justification of policy. It was a medium for reassuring and enlivening the nation. Although Bush and Clinton, like their predecessors, drew from a common reservoir of analogies, images and myths to make their cases to the American and international publics, where Bush had employed the language of peace and reconciliation to win the war, Clinton used the language of war to suggest how the United States could win the peace. This reflected the different traditions of exceptionalism from which they drew. In Clinton's case, the tradition was that of the fiery jeremiad, goading the populace back to their God-ordained path, remaking America into an economic and social project with global appeal beyond the Cold War. In Bush's case it was the exceptionalism of Paine and Wilson, `to remake the world' directly, which was rejected as an undesirable and impossible project.

5

The Clinton Reconstruction of 1993: Domestic Renewal and the Global Economy

The end of the Cold War did not bring us to the millennium of peace.1 Lamentably, at the end of the cold war, the wars that are being waged on so many streets in America have made millions of people insecure in their daily lives and movements.2 We have the opportunity to remake the world. For this new era, our national security we now know will be determined as much by our ability to pull down foreign trade barriers as by our ability to breach distant ramparts. Once again, we are leading. And in doing so, we are rediscovering a fundamental truth about ourselves: When we lead, we build security, we build prosperity for our own people.3

Introduction In the second half of 1991 and throughout 1992, United States government officials continued to define how their country would reorient itself to face the challenges of a post-Cold War world. As it advanced, this process of practical and philosophical adaptation remained focused on `the end of the Cold War', in particular on changing Soviet/Russian±American relations, but also, by 1991, on the lessons and legacies of the Persian Gulf War. However, there was extraordinarily little foreign policy debate during the 1992 electoral campaigns. This chapter focuses on the Clinton Administration's definitions of the United States' interests and its articulation of a vision of order through a renewal of community. It examines the similarities and differences in the themes of Bush and Clinton public diplomacy. A conventional wisdom of the 1992 Presidential Election holds that the Clinton campaign's emphasis on domestic economic renewal set a tone which made Bush's emphasis on foreign policy a controversial issue and forced the incumbent uncomfortably into a focus on domestic affairs. Certainly, in the heat of the campaign, Clinton did imply that there was a causal link between the Bush Administration's attention to foreign policy and 119


domestic economic decline. This was politically judicious, as electoral victory proved and pre-electoral analysis of voter concerns had predicted. Following the Georgia and Florida primaries, exit polls had shown that while 70 per cent of Democratic voters considered jobs and the economy to be important issues, only 2 per cent were interested in foreign affairs.4 Indeed, during the primaries, all of the Democratic front-runners had promoted a `look homeward' agenda. This disinterest demonstrated the necessity of a public diplomacy campaign to promote interest in international engagement and also illustrated the difficulties that would be encountered by any candidate who was so focused. Therefore, although Bush was by temperament and employment experience more engaged with international issues, he had recognized the potential benefits of acknowledging the ìntimate interrelationship' between domestic and foreign policy.5 And if the Bush campaign had been led by a Clinton initiative on domestic renewal, then the Clinton campaign was equally influenced by the Bush positions on foreign affairs. For strategic purposes, Clinton emphasized the domestic during the campaign. In office, however, he too underlined the need to create a balance. Of all the Democratic candidates, Clinton's stance on international affairs had most closely resembled that of the mainstream foreign policy establishment. For example, the Bush Administration had proposed $50 billion in military cuts over five years, Clinton $100 billion, Paul Tsongas $105 billion and Jerry Brown $150 billion. On troop withdrawals from Europe, Bush had suggested a residual force of 150 000, Clinton 75 000, Tsongas 50±90 000, and Brown had proposed a remaining force of only 1000 as part of àn exchange program' in which 1000 European troops would be stationed on American soil in return. Clinton, alone of the Democratic candidates, had stated in January 1991 that he would have reluctantly voted to authorize the use of force against Iraq.6 Clinton's `New Covenant for National Security' speech, the address which first defined his stance on foreign affairs, had referred to the necessity of transcending the conceptual demarcation between domestic and foreign policies. And in the press, the `New Covenant' speech was noted mainly for its frank endorsement of most of Bush foreign policy.7 Clinton's criticisms of the process of Bush diplomacy and his realpolitik8 were outweighed by the areas of apparent shared concerns. In April 1992, Clinton's speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York was assertively in favor of assistance to the newly independent states and, thematically, contained remarkable resemblances to the `manage or be mastered by history' motifs which had characterized many Bush and Baker addresses: History is calling upon our nation to decide anew whether we will lead or defer; whether we will engage or abstain; whether we will shape a new era or instead be shaped by it.9

The Clinton Reconstruction of 1993 121

Unless we work to shape events, we will be shaped by them, often in ways that put us at risk.10 Clinton also emphasized the importance of the United States' àffirmation of international leadership'.11 Therefore, to argue that Clinton and Bush were both concerned with international stability and domestic renewal in the broadest terms is not simply to state a truism but rather to emphasize that to categorize Clinton as `the domestic president' and Bush as `the international affairs president' would be inaccurate. Nevertheless, the `New Covenant for National Security' speech was only one of three given at Georgetown University. According to Woodward, Clinton put most effort into the `New Covenant for Economic Change' speech.12 Clinton's Radio Address to the nation on the day after the World Trade Center bombing in New York City in February 1993 is also illustrative. Although the first three paragraphs of the address refer to the bombing the remaining eight returned to the scheduled economic theme. The President made the link with the following statement: `Feeling safe is an essential part of being secure, and that's important to all of us. I also want to take this opportunity this morning to talk about another crucial aspect of our security, our economic security.'13 The important distinction between the approach of each of these Administrations to `post-Cold War' policy making, both domestic and foreign, was that, as Cox has succinctly described it, Bush's modus operandi was `geopolitical' and Clinton's was `geo-economic'.14 Yet while the different policy focus of each Administration ± domestic/global economic in the case of Clinton and geopolitical in the case of Bush ± was its distinctive feature, the strategic rhetoric which each administration employed to explain the Cold War, and the consequences of its end, exhibited remarkable similarities. The Clinton Administration's strategic rhetoric, like that of the Bush Administration, had a reconstructive purpose and was dominated by a motif of domestic renewal. Like Bush, Clinton also evoked the ideas of American exceptionalism and responsibility and linked the preservation of American power and prestige with the maintenance of American credibility. However, where Bush had emphasized the necessity of achieving international (and later domestic) order, Clinton placed the emphasis on `control', and the ability of Americans to shape their own futures, particularly their èconomic destiny'. Management of international order was seen as a necessary foundation for national renewal. The Bush Administration's ambivalent evaluations of the Cold War as both a disruption of the established pattern of the United States' international relations and a stable, predictable `long peace' which would be missed, had by 1993 become the official conventional wisdom. Like Bush, Clinton's public pronouncements emphasized that the Cold War had been an unsought but necessary and moral struggle. At his inaugural ceremony, Clinton described how a generation of Americans had been `raised in the


shadows of the cold war'.15 He stated that on the one hand the Cold War had cast a `nuclear shadow' across the world and required an enormous sacrifice of domestic funds to provide for defense. But on the other hand it had been a period of `purpose and clarity', and the economic cost had been offset by psychological gains, for the Cold War had demonstrated the potency of American principles and the achievements made possible by determination. Victory in the Cold War had been achieved by the employment of a `long term strategy': We were in it for the long run, not to win every day, not to know what every development in every country would be. We had clear principles, clear interests, clear values, a clear strategy.16 Like Bush, Clinton asserted that a similar resolve and clarity of interests, values and strategy would be required in the `post-Cold War' era. Clinton also recalled the `long peace', the wisdom of Truman who had proven that peace could only be maintained with investment, and the work of Vandenberg, Acheson, and Marshall whose `statecraft' ± NATO, the IMF, World Bank, and GATT ± had produced international stability and American prosperity.17 These examples support the organizational process model in that they suggest that, as Hinckley has argued, Presidential public discourse is crafted within the context of a `rhetorical establishment', and that `past speeches become part of the Presidential institution, shaping the expectations of new office holders and their advisers, regardless of their partisan differences'.18 This argument is also made by Hart who provides the examples of Franklin Roosevelt who `wrote the basic political hymnal used by his eight successors ± no matter what their party', and Dwight Eisenhower, whose speeches showed àn unmistakable legacy of New Dealism imprinted upon them'.19 Kuklick describes an òperative tradition' within the diplomatic community.20 According to Wander, the interaction of officials with the public via political rhetoric is a `ritual' which exhibits a continuity of both images and issues.21 The following analysis demonstrates that the legacy of Bush's transitional rhetoric of reconstruction resonates in President Clinton's political discourse. However, while there were many inherited features, Clinton was also rhetorically creative. And both the similarities and innovations of Clinton's rhetoric reflect an interpretation of the strategic environment which was strikingly different from that of President Bush. In the Bush interpretation the end of the Cold War had produced cognitive dissonance because the United States had been forced from a comfortable status quo position to an uncomfortable reckoning with a rapidly unrecognizable international system. Clinton addressed the cognitive dissonance which he claimed Americans were experiencing in the post-Cold War period due to the contradictions between their domestic economic conditions and claims that the


United States had won the Cold War. Thus the central strategic objective of the Clinton campaign, and the Clinton Administration's attempts to sell its economic program in 1993, was to convince Congress and the public of the possibility of deliverance from a domestic dystopia. Clinton rhetoric thus had two repeated themes ± the portrayal in apocalyptic terms of a nation in decline and disorder, and the offering of an activist program for salvation and renewal. In many ways, then, Clinton adopted the role of the `secular jeremiad' comparing present degeneration with American exceptionalism and raising the possibility of revival through a compact or covenant.22

The Clinton vision of dystopia Where Bush had warned of an international dystopia, Clinton spoke of disorder which was both foreign and domestic. `The end of the Cold War did not bring us to the millennium of peace', Clinton stated, reiterating the pessimistic Mearsheimer.23 On the contrary, `chaos' had been the result, because the removal of the Cold War glacier had lifted the lid from `many cauldrons of ethnic, religious, and territorial animosity',24 and resulted in a nationalistic `backlash' round the world. Quoting Isaiah Berlin, he described the problem as one of `wounded nationalism' which was `like a bent twig forced down so severely that when released, it lashes back with fury'.25 Many of the new international threats defied prediction: `There is no sonar, no radar that can enable us to fathom all the changes in terrain over which we are about to set sail'.26 Therefore, the Clinton strategy was to prescribe measures which would provide security amidst this environment of uncertainty. These measures were listed as the promotion of democracy, the expansion of American markets and the protection of the natural environment.27 He referred to an era of `sweeping changes' and to the inevitability of `profound structural changes' in the American economy to meet the new era's challenges.28 Yet, while Bush had compared the international order created by the Persian Gulf victory with disorder at home in an attempt to mobilize efforts for a domestic renewal, Clinton portrayed US efforts to bring stability to conflict zones abroad as ironic counterpoints to a situation of increasing domestic turmoil: `We're debating how we can keep peace in Somalia when the mortality rate is greater in some neighborhoods in the United States of America'.29 Thus along with a description of international disorder, Clinton set out a vision of domestic dystopia. `The system', he stated, was `broken down', and the proof was a catalogue of national failings: The United States, the world's strongest economy, has the third worst record in the Western Hemisphere for immunizing its children against preventable childhood diseases, [. . .] has higher rates of adult illiteracy and school dropout and dysfunction among adults than most of its major


competitors, and the highest rate of incarceration of any country in the world.30 We're losing our competitive edge in the world. At home, our highway and mass transit systems are falling into disrepair; cities deteriorating; rural areas suffering; and families [. . .] feeling enormous strains.31 Although the United States had won the Cold War, it was still unclear whether it could remain the winner in peacetime: Will we and our children really have good jobs, first-class opportunities, world-class education, quality affordable health care, safe streets? After they have fully defended freedom's ramparts, they want to know if they will share in freedom's bounty. [. . .] Could it be that the world's most powerful nation has also given up a significant measure of its sovereignty in the quest to lift the fortunes of people throughout the world? [. . .] It is ironic and even painful that the global village we have worked so hard to create has done so much to be the source of higher unemployment and lower wages for some of our people.32 Ninety thousand people [were] killed in America in the last four years alone, in any year more than we ever lost in any given year in the war in Vietnam.33 In attempting to set the terms of the post-Cold War debate to highlight domestic economic and social issues, Clinton described the nation as crippled by ìnsecurity and fear',34 suffering èconomic stagnation' and `coming apart with violence' due to Cold War `neglect'.35 Therefore, the `post-Cold War' period was, like other post-war periods, a time for reconstruction. This challenge and a deficient political system had prompted him to run for President, stated Clinton, portraying himself both as a Truman and a Franklin Roosevelt. He described how the world was poised at an historic `turning point' which resembled that after World War Two: Forty-eight years ago, the world's nations stood devastated by war or exhausted by its expense. We are at a similar moment today. The momentum of the Cold War no longer propels our daily actions. And with daunting economic and political pressures [. . .] many of us are turning to focus greater attention and energy on our domestic needs and problems, and we must. But putting each of our economic houses in order cannot mean that we shut our windows to the world. The pursuit of self-renewal [. . .] is absolutely crucial because unless the great industrial nations can recapture their robust economic growth, the global economy will languish.36


There were a couple of years after World War Two when we had to work out what our foreign policy was going to be, when we had to develop the institutions necessary to carry that foreign policy out, when we had to work through in our minds what America's responsibilities at home were. And we are going through the same period now.37 He also reiterated the lessons of World War One, that the United States had `paid the price' for isolationism in trade restrictions and a depression, the rise of Fascism in Europe and finally embroilment in another war, and insisted: `We must help our publics to understand this distinction: Domestic renewal is an overdue tonic, but isolationism and protectionism are still poison. We must inspire our people to look beyond their immediate fears toward a broader horizon.'38 The recent international transformations, not only in the Soviet Union but also in the Middle East and South Africa, had presented the United States with a `moment of high decision' equivalent to that following the two world wars. As the model for his `post-war' policies, Clinton pointed to Franklin Roosevelt, who as president had attempted `to lift the spirits of the country'.39 This theme of `historic transformation', which linked international with national change, was prominent in the first few months of the Administration, particularly in speeches outlining the Administration's objectives regarding domestic economic renewal.40 History according to Clinton, in Jeremiadic form, provided both opportunity and reckoning; like individuals, nations would be `judged by history'.41 Using the language of crisis,42 Clinton described a period as critical, and eradefining, as any of the great junctures of the American past. Nothing short of a struggle for survival was implied in the President's insistence that the United States was forced to embrace `change'. But also in Jeremiadic form, it was assured that America would be able to do so because of its èxceptionalism': No less than those who founded the Republic or fought to keep it together in the Civil War, we, too, must have the vision and courage to change, to preserve our unchanging purposes in a dynamic and difficult world. [. . .] This Nation has endured and triumphed over a bloody Civil War, two World Wars, the Great Depression, the civil rights struggles, riots in our streets, economic problems and social discord at home and great challenges abroad.43 Two elements of this Independence Day address, which contained many of the ideas and images of Clinton's inaugural speech, were particularly noteworthy. The first was Clinton's reference to the United States' ùnchanging purposes'; the second his description of the United States' trials and hazards since World War Two. In this recollection, neither the Cold War nor the Soviet Union are mentioned but distilled to `great challenges abroad', and placed alongside a list of social and economic transformations, a similar


revisionist interpretation to that of Bush and also with a community-building function. Yet the reference to the United States' ùnchanging purpose' evoked images of a preordained mission. In the `post-Cold War' world, the United States' exceptionalism shone in stark contrast to the disorderly disintegration of pluralistic experiments elsewhere. Comparing the United States with the former Yugoslavia, Clinton declared that it was àn incredible tribute' to the United States that it remained bound together and unified ìn diversity'. Although again he provided a litany of US ills ± impoverishment, lack of health care, the absence of a social safety net, government debt, unemployment, underpayment, and environmental damage ± and identified à crisis of belief' due to a lack of trust in government, he also provided hope of a `recovery'. In summary, the solution was the restoration of a sound economy and the renewal of popular confidence in democracy ± the two pillars from which order would be created out of chaos and crisis. Adapting the words of another President ± Abraham Lincoln ± Clinton stated: Òur cause today is to put our house in order [. . .] surely a house in disarray will not provide shelter and a home'.44 Baker and Bush had employed Lincolnian images to describe the necessity of national unity and the cohesion of international collective security organizations. Clinton adapted the familiar phrase, returning it to a focus on domestic harmony and prosperity. He argued that putting the United States' economic house in order was the only means of preserving American leadership.45 These aims ± revitalizing American leadership through building a new economic order ± were highlighted in Administration pronouncements during the debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Clinton promoted NAFTA by referring to the post-World War Two period in which the United States had rebuilt its former enemies and as a result increased global trade which had `created the prosperity of the American middle class'.46 In a letter to Congressional leaders, the President explained: After World War I, the United States chose the path of isolation and protectionism. That path led directly to the Depression, and helped set the world on the path to World War II. After World War II, we chose to engage with the world, through collective security and expanded trade. We helped our allies rebuild, ushered in a period of unprecedented growth, and prevailed over communism.47 The current period was a similar `defining moment'. The United States' unity behind NAFTA was important diplomatically. Rejection would `set back' the US relationship with Latin America and particularly Mexico `for years to come'. It would, Clinton had written, damage the United States' image and credibility and impair its ability to exert international influence:


It would send a signal that the world's leading power has chosen the path of pessimism and protectionism. It would gravely undermine our ability to convince other countries to join with us in completing the Uruguay Round, which is essential to expand trade and enhance global growth. In conclusion, the letter stated that rejecting NAFTA would `put us on the wrong side of history'.48 On signing NAFTA into law, the President described the debate and bargaining as à symbolic struggle for the spirit of our country'. He compared NAFTA's trade accords to the `new order based on collective security and expanded trade' which the United States had built after World War Two. And he quoted President Truman's remarks in 1949 upon the signing of one of the charter documents of the North Atlantic Treaty in which NATO was described as à bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of Government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for our citizens'. NAFTA, according to Clinton, was a bulwark with a similar function in the post-Cold War period, when the `grim certitude of the Cold War' had been replaced with `the exuberant uncertainty of international economic competition'.49 This public diplomacy emphasized that US international leadership was essential not just for international stability, which was the basis of Bush's argument, but also for national well-being. These would be achieved, Clinton argued, if the United States remained an international leader but focused on managing the global economy. Like Bush, Clinton emphasized that American exceptionalism as well as American interests made such a policy desirable. According to Clinton, Americans were losing faith in their exceptionalism because of economic insecurities. He argued that in the post-Cold War period `most Americans [were] working harder for less' and were `vulnerable to the fear tactics' which had been employed by opponents of NAFTA:50 It is at root a reflection of the deep ambivalence the American people now feel as they look toward the future. So that in a profound way at this moment in time, NAFTA has become the catch-all for the accumulated resentments of the past, the anxieties about the future, and the frustrations of the present.51 According to Clinton the question was: having `won' the Cold War, would the United States fail because it was ùnprepared for the changes that are remaking our world'?52 Being prepared required investment in jobs, training, and technology but it also meant continuing in its historic mission of promoting democracy, and NAFTA enabled both. Clinton endorsed the liberal notion, most fully explained by Doyle and Russett, that democracy is conducive to peaceful behavior: `Democracies rarely wage war on one another. They make more reliable partners in trade, in diplomacy, and in


the stewardship of our global environment, [and they are] more responsive to their own people and to the protection of human rights.'53 In his inaugural address, Clinton had described the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to `reinvent America', a transformation which was made possible because American democracy was not only `the envy of the world' but also `the engine of our own renewal'.54 According to Elizabeth Drew, much of the Inaugural Address was aimed at the Perot constituency which Clinton needed to build a broader base of support. References to deficit reduction and criticism of Washington, as well as the change and renewal themes, were targeted at these groups.55 A domestic revival was linked to the United States' exceptional qualities and global status. Having described the domestic dystopia, providing a vision of crisis for which `change' was the only solution, and having underlined how American exceptionalism was the motor for change, Clinton employed another strategic theme, a peacetime `call-to-arms', to mobilize support for his economic reconstruction policies.

Rhetoric of reconstruction: the `war effort' of 1993 Though both Bush and Clinton attempted to mobilize support for a post-war reconstruction, only Clinton explicitly used the language of war. The election campaign had been conducted from a `strategy center' in Little Rock, Arkansas which was designated the `War Room' and its chief weapon had been the `populist sword'.56 In office, announcing his Economic Program, the President urged Americans to `stay informed and stay involved', to be `vigilant and vocal': We recall the many times in our history when past Presidents have challenged this Nation from this office in times of crisis [. . .] This is nothing less than a call to arms to restore the vitality of the American dream.57 He appealed for `patriotism', insisting that this was `make-or-break time' for the nation.58 Àt stake' in this crisis, he declared, was the United States' `control of [its] economic destiny'.59 And he offered àn arsenal of new ideas' in a new national investment strategy,60 and reminded Americans that they were òn the frontlines' of a movement for change.61 They must `pull together' to `lift the country's spirits and prospects'.62 President Clinton's initiatives in the first months of his presidency, which were promoted using military metaphors, were fundamentally reconstructive ± they included the Headstart program, extensive immunization drives, national investment programs, and a proposal for a new national service organization. Making $300 million available for non-defense technology research in 1993, the President also proposed the conversion of military technologies to civilian uses such as domestic policing and environmental protection: `Military


security technology can now be used to help police officers on the streets and in their patrol cars to be safer and to solve crimes and to find missing children more rapidly'.63 It was proposed that DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Products Agency, would revert to its old title, the Advanced Research Products Agency, and be given à new mission' to develop `dual-use technologies'. Clinton suggested an ìntegrative' approach ± research focused on both the strengthening of defense and the provision of economic security. National security, foreign policy and domestic policy had collapsed into one, he argued, while speaking to the defense community at Los Alamos: There is a peacetime commercial mission for these labs. And there is a national defense mission for these labs. And the line between those two missions is coming down fast. Under a proposed new technology policy these laboratories were to work in conjunction with the departments of Energy, Defense and Commerce.64 Such restructuring and innovation would be traumatic, Clinton acknowledged; although the end of the Cold War was a cause for `celebration' it had also produced `dislocation' amongst defense industry personnel.65 Job losses could be expected as the defense industries contracted and due to changes in world trade, but the President promised that there would be safeguards to ensure the transition did not create hardship.66 Those who had helped win the Cold War would not be `left out in the cold', he assured the defense interest groups.67 But it was necessary for the defense industries as well as the United States in general `to literally reimagine and reinvent the way Government works'.68 This he described as a war effort, `the post-Cold War effort', which entailed the dual task of rebuilding the economy and preserving the United States' international position, described in slogans as `the American dream' and Àmerican leadership' respectively. On other occasions this endeavor was referred to as the `recovery' effort.69 The new National Service program was inspired by Kennedy's Peace Corps but also by the Depression-era initiative of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who had established a `Civilian Conservation Corps', Clinton recalled, to offer Americans `the chance to build their way out of depression'. However, Clinton's national service program would be more ambitious than these, with a proposed 100 000 participants involved in domestic programs ± eight times the annual number of Peace Corps volunteers.70 His aim was to `rebuild' America from the grassroots and to revive a sense of community, whilst also establishing an overarching Àmerican foreign policy of engagement for democracy'.71 This double call to arms/call to reconstruction theme dominated Clinton speeches in the first six months of his presidency. Speaking at the Cooper Union, the President referred to Lincoln's speech at the same venue in 1860, and reminded his audience of Lincoln's entreaty to the nation to `stand by' its responsibilities:


America has endured in form and spirit because in times of crisis and challenge, leaders have asked the hard questions and given the strong answers. And the American people have rallied. And the President made a similar rallying call in outlining his Administration's goals to Congress: It has been too long, at least three decades, since a President has come and challenged Americans to join him on a great national journey, not merely to consume the bounty of today but to invest for a much greater one tomorrow.72 Clearly referring to President Kennedy, Clinton maintained the use of the force for transformation motif which had been electorally successful. Linking himself to Kennedy, Clinton suggested that a generational shift was under way and in the process portrayed himself as dynamic leader and troubleshooter.73 He did not, as Bush had done, dismiss the public's anxieties, but addressed popular fears and suspicions about the global economy, stating that he understood that Americans had `mixed feelings': `We worry about our own prosperity being so dependent on events and forces beyond our shores'. In the face of such insecurity, Clinton argued that it was possible to take control. The `making change our friend and not our enemy' slogan, which had been refined in the campaign, epitomized this approach.74 Clinton's strategy was to encourage a belief among the American people that security lay not in preserving old ways but in embracing change: What I've been trying to hammer home and in explicit terms since the health care speech, is that there has to be a level of security afforded to Americans if they're going to be able to change. [. . .] You can watch in individual lives how difficult it is for people to change their habits, even when they know they should, if they are insecure personally. The same is true of a family or a community or a nation. If you spend all your time waiting for the other shoe to drop, expecting something bad to happen, not expecting something good to happen, feeling that what you now have can be taken away from you by some arbitrary force, it is very difficult to have the space, the mental space and the emotional space, to think about the changes that are bearing in and what initiatives you should take. And so an enormous part of my job as your President is not only to keep pushing this agenda of change [. . .] but to be able to explain to the American people what it is we have to change and why.75 The security I seek [. . .] is not the absence of risk. It is the presence of opportunity. It is not a world without change but a world in which change is our friend and not our enemy. [. . .] We must be builders and believers, the architects of new security to empower and embolden America.76


Where Bush urged stoicism and resolve (`we do not cut and run'), Clinton ordered a war-time mobilization with the activist command: `we must compete, and not retreat'.77 In using the mobilizing language of war and crisis, Clinton's objective was to inspire a neo-internationalist mood which would facilitate policies designed to increase the United States' global competitiveness. The crisis rhetoric also validated innovation. And innovation in the form of the conflation of foreign and domestic policy was offered as an urgently needed maneuver. Clinton outlined this process in terms of `security': `There is no longer an easy division between our national security at the end of the cold war [. . .] and our economic and social security'.78 It was stated that trade should be managed as à priority element of American security'.79 And èconomic security', according to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, had been promoted to à primary foreign policy goal'.80 In numerous addresses the President underlined that the exigency of global competitiveness had made the old division between domestic and foreign policy redundant.81 The economic crisis which Clinton identified for the United States was a `global crisis', a symptom of à period of change and ferment' worldwide.82 The establishment of the National Economic Council was intended to institutionalize the new foreign policy-is-domestic policy approach. First headed by Robert E. Rubin, the NEC was designed to encompass representation from the Departments of Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, HUD, Transportation, Energy and EPA as well as the Secretaries of Treasury, the OMB and the Council of Economic Advisors.83 Among other tasks the Council was given the brief of assisting in defense conversions, particularly in the relocation of personnel to the civilian workforce, a task which, it was recognized, was potentially controversial and difficult.84 As Cox argues, it also served `to counterbalance the bureaucratic weight of the National Security Council'.85 Clinton made this linkage between the NEC and national security policy: À great deal of our security is in the economic area. And there was no regular discipline mechanism by which all economic decisions were considered in terms of their impact on one another, and the United States could develop a coherent policy.'86 In the Clinton Administration, therefore, the Secretary of the Treasury would serve on both the National Security Council and the National Economic Council, and the new position of advisor to the President for economic policy was to `rank on a par with the national security advisor'. These were the words of the memoranda written by Warren Christopher outlining the duties of the job. However, on paper the description was later curtailed and rather than act as àn implementer' of economic policy, it was stated that the economic advisor was required to `monitor implementation of the president's economic agenda'.87 In his announcement, the President portrayed the NEC's creation as an emergency measure in a period of crisis:


If we do not regain control of our economic destiny, we will soon lose the ability not only to provide for a future for our children but to lead the world that has come to look to us.88 It was the personal conviction of first NEC head Robert Rubin that social and economic decline should be equated with crisis. He had reportedly wondered `why isn't the underclass as much a crisis as Vietnam?'89 President Bush had depicted the end of the Cold War as victory for the American establishment and a vindication of its doctrines. In Bush's version of the end of the Cold War, the superpowers were the peacemakers in a revolution from above. The perception of a top-down reconstruction of stability was compatible with a traditionalist view of international relations in which statesmanship, force and diplomacy were the motors of change. While Clinton tampered little with this rendition of recent international history, his rhetorical analysis of the consequences of the Cold War revealed a different set of allegiances. In the Clinton narrative of the Cold War, economic policy had been sacrificed in the shadow of overweening national security considerations. A central element of his campaign, therefore, was the promise of a `coherent strategy' which would restore new and proper balance to the process of American policy-making. That Bush officials had also on occasion portrayed the Cold War as a `distortion' or a period of `perverse coherence'90 strengthened the appeal of Clinton's proposal for an ìntegrative' or holistic, healing policy. Clinton proposed to ìntegrate' environmental, national security and economic policies and established a special White House Office on Environmental Policy to support this aim.91 Such an approach also complemented the 1990s revival of spiritual environmentalism, the so-called `new age' concern with global harmony which, it was controversially suggested, Clinton endorsed in weekend retreats. The `Renaissance Weekends' which were held at Hilton Head, South Carolina involved seminars, recreation and networking, as well as `bonding' sessions for members of the Administration, according to Elizabeth Drew.92 Where Bush emphasized the need for òrder' in a general sense, a solution which could be imposed, Clinton placed emphasis on Americans having `control' over their own destinies, and self-consciously denied a desire to shape the future of other nations.93 Especially during the campaign, but even in office, Clinton adopted an opposition stance, which imitated the East European grassroots movements with its intellectual populist terminology and its invitation to exert revolutionary change from below.94 Clinton rhetoric was literally conceived of as a narrative by his consultants who used the epithets `The Story' and `The Journey' to describe the elements of administration speeches and strategically orchestrated television interviews through which his policies were to be explained to the public and Congress.95 Since in the Clinton narrative the Cold War was responsible for the United States' reduced means and insecurity in the global marketplace, he had essentially


campaigned against the Cold War. In office he maintained the position of the post-war leader who would rebuild the country out of ruins. Thus the Cold War confrontation would give way to an era of global economic competition.96 Yet, like Bush, Clinton offered the examples of the 1920s and 1930s as periods of failure, and the 1940s and 1950s as the decades of American success. And he also referred with regret to the loss of Cold War conceptual frameworks: `The necessity of surviving in a bipolar world gave an organizing principle to what we did and didn't do'.97 This rhetorical contradiction becomes more pronounced when President Clinton's public diplomacy regarding the former Soviet Union is examined.

Rhetoric of reconstruction: Soviet±American normalization The Clinton Administration inherited a Cold War settlement in which the precedent of American leadership within a Soviet/Russian±American partnership had been set. The Clinton position regarding Boris Yeltsin mirrored that of Bush, and appeared in public to entail unconditional support. When Yeltsin dissolved the Russian parliament in September 1993, the official US statement described the action as a `response to a constitutional crisis that had reached a critical impasse and had paralyzed the political process'.98 The Clinton Administration intended to be resolute in their commitment to Yeltsin for as long as he represented the forces of reform. The successes of neo-fascist Vladimir Zhirinovksy's party in the parliamentary elections at the end of 1993 hardened this resolve.99 Like Bush, Clinton portrayed the US±Soviet/Russian relationship as a `mutually advantageous' or `mutually beneficial' `partnership'. Such a portrayal, Clinton admitted to reporters, was essential to convince the public and Congress that there was a US interest in providing aid for Russia.100 Since Clinton had been elected on a pledge to put American economic troubles before foreign aid, it was essential to portray such assistance as an investment with benefits for the donor as well as the recipient. Thus Clinton, like Bush, argued that there was `both selfinterest and high duty' in the allocation of foreign aid.101 He preferred, he said, to refer to it as àn investment program, not an aid program': Like all investments there is some risk. But there's far less risk with a far greater potential of return than the $4 trillion we spent looking at each other across the barrier of the Cold War.102 Clinton's proposal for a `grand alliance' beyond Cold War, a new `policy of economic and strategic partnership',103 was accompanied by a strategic rhetoric which warned of the dangers of disorder if reforms in the region failed. American domestic renewal, it was argued, was dependent upon international peace:


If Russia were to revert to its old ways or plunge into chaos, we would need to reassess our plans for defense savings. That would mean less money for creating new businesses and new jobs, less for preparing our children for the future, less for education.104 The Persian Gulf operation was evoked as an example of how the United States had been able to mobilize on behalf of peace and, it was implied, on behalf of American prosperity. Russia, Clinton argued, was of equal geopolitical and geo-economic importance: `Just as we mobilized the world on behalf of war in the Gulf, we must now mobilize the world on behalf of peace and reform in Russia'.105 But unlike Iraq, Russia could be engaged as à partner in global problem-solving'.106 On occasion the necessity of promoting this alliance necessitated the strategic omission of the `Cold War' from the Administration's rhetorical version of Soviet history. As Congress debated whether, and how much, aid should be given to the former Soviet Union, Clinton underplayed the US±Soviet antagonism. Paying tribute to the Soviets, the President stated: `Your whole history has been punctuated with suffering on a scale unknown to the American people'. While he recalled their struggles against Hitler and Napoleon, he made no mention of Stalin or the Cold War, for now the United States and Russia were `bonded' together by many shared characteristics and fates: We are both rooted deeply in our own land. We are both built of diverse heritage. We are both forever struggling with the responsibilities that come with vast territory and power. We both have had to deal with the dilemmas of human nature on an immense scale. That may be why there has been so little hatred between our people, even across the decades when we pointed weapons of mass destruction at each other's lands.107 The 1989 revolutions and the disintegration of the Soviet Union were characterized as a `rebirth' of `material, political and spiritual' proportions, `miracles' which had `redemptive value'.108 President Clinton's rehabilitation of the former USSR as a partner in suffering and responsibility extended the paradigm established by the Bush Administration in which the `superpowers' had been delineated as collaborators for peace. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 4, this motif had so frequently structured official discourse that by 1991 it appeared to be also representative of official thinking, as Bush's `duels of eloquent bluff and bravado' gaffe in Ukraine had suggested, and as subsequent accounts of Bush±Gorbachev relations have supported.109 By the time the Clinton Administration entered office, the Àmerican±Russian partnership' slogan was a rhetorical commonplace and the official memorialization of the Cold War was complete. Yet, this rhetorical strategy did not persist simply because it had become part of a rhetorical tradition. It also continued to have a distinct political rationale.


The Clinton Administration was required to fully abandon the Cold War and its obligations before reorienting to fight a new war for economic superiority on two European and East Asian fronts. The Administration's primary rhetorical focus was on the linkage between domestic renewal and global economics. This strategic rhetoric supported the central policy pledge which Clinton had made during the election campaign ± the commitment to a policy which would revive the United States as a powerful, competitive leader in the global economy. And in 1993 this had become the consuming task of his Administration. However, this top priority would be jeopardized if the Administration was unsuccessful in fostering stability within the Soviet Union and stable bilateral relationships with the successor states. Most of the Administration's international security concerns ± the proliferation of technology and weapons of mass destruction,110 volatile conditions in the Middle East111 and on the Korean peninsula,112 international terrorism, ethnic disputes and Balkan fragmentation ± had an actual or potential Russian dimension.113 These interests required that the Cold War antagonism be completely abandoned ± relegated to history ± and that Russia be harnessed into an American shaped new world order. In Clinton's version of the new world order, in which the United States was neither willing nor able to act as the `world cop', a secure and integrated Russia had several important parts to play. As Cox delineates, it was a barrier to the potential ambitions of (usually unspecified) nations in the Eurasian `heartland'; a secular dam to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism; and a general stabilizer in a still uncertain world in which the United States was seeking to reduce costs.114 Clinton emphasized both the international fruits of US±Soviet goodwill ± the recent cooperation in the Persian Gulf, Middle East, Cambodia, El Salvador and on environmental problems ± and also the debilitating consequences of any reversal in Russian reform, in particular the massive increases in defense spending which would again divert funds from jobs, education, business and new technologies.115 The complex challenges and interests represented by the former Soviet Union exemplified the foreign policy and domestic policy conflation. Therefore, in his first year in office, President Clinton continued the reconstruction of the US±Soviet relationship. The motivation for this rhetorical strategy of normalization and reconciliation was threefold. First, Clinton was concerned to maintain Russian stability and to prevent a hard-line challenge to Boris Yeltsin, for rising tensions in the region would jeopardize his domestic renewal plan; second, to this end it was necessary to maintain public and congressional support for engagement with Russia, as well as monetary aid which was perceived and portrayed as a small ìnvestment' against chaos; and third, the memorialization of the Cold War, which accompanied the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union, enabled and justified a shift in policy-focus from international politics to the global economy. As the President stated, the Cold War confrontation could thus give way to an era


of global economic competition.116 Though Clinton appeared more inclined than Bush to update Cold War laws and practices, ordering à comprehensive review of all Cold War statutes and other limitations' on the US±Soviet relationship,117 one staple of the United States' Cold War offensive strategy ± public diplomacy ± was to remain a crucial element of American foreign policy. Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, the Voice of America, and Radio and TV Marti would be maintained but undergo a `rebirth' to `reflect the post-Cold War era'. The Cold War had been partly won by the `power of [American] ideas', Clinton stated, again echoing Bush. Although there would be budget cuts, government broadcasting services would be utilized for `fostering democracy and civic reconstruction'.118 While public diplomacy remained important for promoting American interests abroad and international stability, it was also an element of a reconstruction drive at home

Rhetoric of exceptionalism and credibility The theme of Àmerican exceptionalism' also endured under Clinton in his statements that the United States would continue to be a `pivot' and model inspiring change towards democracy, that it would retain à leadership role',119 and that it was still `the world's only superpower'.120 Yet, while emphasizing that the United States had a ùnique position' in the world, that it was a `fulcrum for change and a pivot point for peace', Clinton also underlined that due to reduced financial circumstances, the US could not become involved in every conflict, and would have to carry less of the burden for promoting international peace and stability.121 Like Bush, Clinton argued that American success in the Cold War was due to stoicism and an embracement of responsibilities, and that success reaffirmed American principles and validated American activism but also created responsibilities. And like Bush, Clinton recommended a reclamation of past resolve and determination to cope with present and future challenges. Clinton argued that Americans were à people of action',122 and that the American national character was defined by `work, family, faith, opportunity, responsibility, and community'.123 But he argued that Americans had `lost sight of their sacred mission, and broken faith with the covenant'.124 Both Bush and Clinton shared the overarching aim of maintaining power in an increasingly unfamiliar world. And the issue of American `credibility' was central to this objective. As Bush had justified the Persian Gulf operations, Clinton described the Somalia operation. It was not only a humanitarian action to build òrder and security' but also a test of American authority. Premature withdrawal would have lasting consequences in terms of American influence: Our credibility with friends and allies would be severely damaged. Our leadership in world affairs would be undermined at the very time when


people are looking to America to help promote peace and freedom in the post-cold war world. And all around the world, aggressors, thugs, and terrorists will conclude that the best way to get us to change our policies is to kill our people. It would be open season on Americans.125 At its conclusion, Clinton again attempted to explain the Somalia operation as a successful mobilization of international resources on the Gulf model.126 Being seen to have `lived up to the responsibilities of American leadership' was an essential element of maintaining US `credibility' with `friends and allies' and therefore not only an element of crisis management but also of community-building which was vital to enable the management of crises in the future. President Clinton's announcement of his punitive action against Iraq, in response to its plan to assassinate former President Bush, also made the point that American security was reliant upon its `credibility': From the first days of our Revolution, America's security has depended upon the clarity of this message: Don't tread on us. A firm and commensurate response was essential to protect our sovereignty, to send a message to those who engage in state-sponsored terrorism, to deter further violence against our people, and to affirm the expectation of civilized behavior among nations. [. . .] The cold war has ended, the world is not free of danger. And I am determined to take the steps necessary to keep our Nation secure. We will keep our forces ready to fight. We will work to head off emerging threats, and we will take action when action is required. That is precisely what we have done today.127 Credibility also lay in maintaining a formidable defense capability, and though Clinton favored cuts to defense and international affairs budgets, he suggested that `post-Cold War' security might be even more expensive than the Cold War.128 Thus, he agreed on the need for à strong defense', appropriately redeployed and restructured in recognition of the new security challenges, before `defense savings' were considered. As with his preference for an integrated national/international policy, early in the campaign Clinton adopted a posture which encompassed several options, for example allowing the United States to set flexible defense projections `to meet threats that could be either heightened or reduced down the road'.129 Credibility concerns and solutions were also evident in the Administration's initial policies towards the former Yugoslavia described as `containing the conflict to Bosnia' and `pushing for a political settlement'. When questioned by a reporter about whether the policy of providing safe havens as a stepping stone to a territorial solution would draw US forces into à Vietnam-type quagmire', Clinton stated that the policy àctually decreases that risk':


The American people should be reassured that we have limited the possibility of quagmire and strengthened the possibility of ending the ethnic cleansing and the possibility of limiting the conflict.130 Lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims was linked with a plan to `contain the conflict and expedite it'.131 But the emphasis was strictly on no lasting commitment of ground troops: Ì don't want to see the United States get in a position where we are recreating Northern Ireland or Lebanon or Cyprus'.132 On another occasion when questioned by a reporter about whether the Administration's policy on Bosnia was ìndecisive' and `not tough enough' as some in Congress accused, Clinton pointed to the example of successful foreign policy with Russia, then explained the difficulties of dealing with `people who had been fighting each other for centuries', and finally emphasized his domestic economic priorities: Ì think the American people know one thing: that I'm on their side.'133 When asked whether he condemned ethnic cleansing he described it as àn outrage' and àn idea which should die' but emphasized caution in making verbal commitments to action: `We must be careful not to use words that will outstrip our capacity to back them up. That is a grave error for any great nation, and one I will try to not commit.'134

Conclusion The continuities in public diplomacy between the Bush and Clinton Administrations appear to outweigh the discontinuities. It might be argued that Clinton's analysis of the international political consequences of the Cold War's end was a derivative rendition of Bush Administration preoccupations. Certainly this was the position of his critics, who accused him of having arrived in office without a foreign policy and devoid of understanding on geopolitical issues. Yet some continuity was inevitable given the realities of the strategic environment and US interests. In the campaign, Clinton had implemented a strategy of `neutralizing' foreign affairs issues by endorsing most of Bush foreign policy, and thus enabling a focus on domestic economic issues. This was particularly the case regarding the NAFTA agreement.135 And Clinton's explication of the interdependent relationship between domestic renewal and the new era's global economy was distinctive. Clinton continued the program of international community-building which Bush had begun, particularly with regard to Russia, but his focus was on the development of a domestic community of belief in American exceptionalism and the desirability of international engagement, qualified with a focus on global economic engagement. According to Clinton, `credibility' was the product of a strong foreign policy but it also hinged on economic success and a plan to reduce the national deficit.136 The


institutionalization of the foreign policy/domestic policy conflation in all administration procedures and particularly in the NEC demonstrated that this innovation was practical as well as rhetorical. The Bush Administration had refused to accept that the debate about a `post-Cold War' foreign posture should be driven by economic imperatives.137 Clinton believed that economic imperatives should not only be the key elements of that policy debate, but that they were also the reasons for the debate. And his electoral victory suggested that not only did he successfully set the agenda in regard to this issue, but that his instinct regarding popular interests and concerns was sound. According to Ryan, the rhetorically successful politician is: One who shares, more than shapes, the common concerns of the time; who reads, more than restructures, public sentiment; who reinforces, more than readjusts, the audience's values and beliefs.138 Clinton understood public preoccupations in a way Bush did not, and therefore spoke to the public mood, building a rhetorical strategy on already existing concerns. However, Clinton also addressed and molded the emergencies of the moment. The Clinton campaign turned on the motif of `change', and although such appeals are rarely electorally successful, this strategy worked. Rachel Holloway attributes the success of this rhetorical tactic to an historic shift in national mood away from the `private interest' period of the Reagan era, into a `public purpose' period.139 As the basis for her argument, Holloway draws on Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr's The Cycles of American History. During a `private interest' period, Schlesinger perceived, `class and interest politics subside; cultural politics ± ethnicity, religion, social status, morality ± come to the fore'. Eventually this produces social division and the desire for a renewed `sense of community' which leads to a `public purpose' period with a focus on issues of equality, freedom, social responsibility, and the common good. In this cycle `the emphasis on public and community turns attention away from the privates lives of officials and citizens and to their public involvements and commitments'. If this is the case, then the Bush campaign's attack on Clinton's character was a strategy which clashed with the emerging `public purpose' spirit, and Clinton's `New Covenant', which emphasized a revival of community through both èconomic opportunity and responsibility', was wholly compatible with the national mood. Clinton worked hard to create the sense of a `generational shift' similar to that which occurred upon the election of John F. Kennedy, and to portray himself as a dynamic figure in comparison with Bush, who was represented as the epitome of status-quo inertia.140 The Clinton strategy of offering hope, making assurances of change, emphasizing the difficulties but promising that it was possible to take `control' of the United States' fate in the


global economy, contrasted with Bush's notable defensiveness when questioned about the United States' domestic problems. Clinton consistently emphasized partnership, how his Administration would work together to foster bipartisanship, and how the task of renewing the United States required a compact, a `New Covenant' between government and the people. He always used the first person plural `we' when explaining his policies. Bush always used Ì' and stated what `his' position was.141 Larry Smith finds similarities between Clinton's rhetorical strategy and that of Ronald Reagan, `both told a story that placed its leading character not in the heroic role, but as an agent of a heroic principle'.142 While Clinton claimed an understanding of the public's concerns, Bush seemed indifferent. Clinton conducted a strikingly `new era' campaign, providing an unprecedented level of public access to information about his policies by focusing upon and repeating his economic and social proposals under the headline of `The Plan' on every public occasion, and by using the computer Internet to distribute information about his campaign.143 These details of the election campaign illustrate that, to some extent, generational differences explain the subtle variations in Clinton/Bush definitions, including their para-ideological definitions, of the best way towards achieving domestic and international stability. Bush as a traditionalist had referred to the Cold War security and foreign policy models ± containment, NATO, the Harmel Doctrine ± more often than Clinton. For Bush, the `fundamental facts of geopolitics' were unchangeable, and therefore major innovations in his approach to both foreign policy making and public diplomacy were unnecessary. Even though Clinton's first instinct regarding the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia was `to try to contain it',144 he made less use of historical examples and avoided traditional geopolitical or diplomatic terminologies and frames of argument. This furthered his generational-change image. He portrayed himself as a problem-solving manager with a non-ideological but global perspective; a `technocratic realist' in the mould of John Kennedy (another president said to have risen to power during a generational shift). Wander describes the `technocrat' as a product of `the university intellectuals, government bureaucrats, and skilled professionals who formed part of the coalition which brought the Kennedy administration into power': If problems in foreign affairs were simple, direct, mere matters of holding to sure principles, such an expert would not be needed, but the problems observed were, in what has become a familiar term, `complex'. [. . .] Where prophetic dualism took its stand on principle, technocratic realism (Dulles called it `calculated expediency') began with a hard-headed look at American interests. Such interests, it concluded, were ill-served by military conflict. Economic competition was infinitely more desirable. Thus it stressed èfficiency' over `morality'. [. . .] In the place of war and the threat of war, America offered the world technical assistance.145


But Clinton's public diplomacy, like Kennedy's, was highly moralistic and seemingly based on ideals. The study of the public diplomacy of Clinton and Bush illustrates how, despite their generational differences and the differences in their social origins, political socialization, and political parties, they shared not only common rhetorical traditions but also a motivating sense of American exceptionalism. In private Clinton compared himself with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, describing how he had offered `hope' to the American people, before he had been able to provide òpportunity'.146 In the 1930s Roosevelt had vigorously campaigned to secure support for his New Deal using `the analogue of war', as William Leuchtenberg has detailed. As Clinton appealed for a revival of Cold War and pre-Cold War resolve, Roosevelt had pointed to the example of World War One: The War was remembered as a time of movement and accomplishment. [. . .] President Roosevelt sought to restore national confidence by evoking the mood of wartime: the feeling of national unity above any claim of partisan or private economic interest because the very interest of the country was imperiled. [. . .] The New Deal hoped to arouse the same sense of devotion to the nation and the same spirit of sacrifice that had been displayed in the war. [. . .] Many conceived the New Deal not simply as a new kind of economic mobilization but also, as the war had been, a venture in `nation-saving'.147 Clinton's rhetoric contained similar references to the necessity of economic mobilization for national salvation.148 Providing a basis for these comparisons, several chroniclers of Clinton's ascendancy point to the enormity of the United States' economic and social problems by 1992±3, particularly in the areas of public education, health care, poverty and unemployment, job security, and the environment and foreign investment.149 In such a crisis, as Kissinger had suggested, the successful leader would be one who could convincingly define and prescribe òrder'.150 `Telling people what they want to hear in context that makes the message seem credible' is the basis of successful political language according to Murray Edelman.151 The employment of war metaphors provided a sense of urgency and a promise of decisive action to revive American exceptionalism. Thus, not only did such a strategy offer hope, it was also useful for `draining internal antagonisms onto a common national enemy'.152 In this case, the national enemy was economic decline produced by vague `global forces' and the Cold War, and there was, therefore, no necessity for the `scapegoating' which is often a feature of such rhetoric.153 Clinton had targeted his election campaign towards southern conservatives but in office was required to build a much broader base, reconciling conservative and moderate Democrats as well as those who had


supported Ross Perot,154 and `war' and `crisis' terminology were useful for rallying such a constituency. This chapter illustrates how campaign combativeness was injected into the agenda-setting process during governance. Since 1993, governance under the Clinton Administration has been dominated by strategic public diplomacy, not just in the now infamous domestic setting, but also increasingly at an international level in the shape of community-building (NATO expansion, for example) and conflict resolution (Bosnia and Northern Ireland). This approach reflects the realities facing any American President attempting to build sympathetic domestic ecologies in support of international involvement. Increasing reliance on diplomacy and public diplomacy as foreign policy instruments reflects the public's tolerance for soft engagement as a means to reduce the need for military engagement. The Clinton Administration has fostered an evolution (begun under Bush) in US foreign policy away from the stance of the `fixer' to that of the `manager', but it has not discarded American exceptionalism as a rhetorical tool, nor seemingly as a defining value. This is examined in the conclusion.

Conclusion: American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy

In a period of consensus- and paradigm-shattering transition, the Bush and Clinton Administrations both drew from a common institution of rhetoric for strategic political purposes. Their public diplomacy between 1989 and 1993 reflected, and in some cases responded to, a conceptual dislocation in the US communication elite, as well as external geopolitical shifts and the routine demands of domestic politics. However, these strategies were also influenced by normative artifacts, dynamic but embedded in elite foreign policy discourse and crystallized in the idea of American exceptionalism. American exceptionalism is an institutionalized but evolving value-strategy syncretization or para-ideology. It functions in US foreign policy rhetoric as a tool for building sympathetic public ecologies, chiefly at home but also abroad, which enable the exercise of American power in a broader sense. It also reflects, legitimizes and perpetuates a national identity based on a sense of uniqueness and a right to leadership, a belief in the moral superiority and the good motives of the United States, a concern for order and stability in the world, a desire to manage international affairs and to universalize Àmerican values'. The chief significance of the recurrence of the theme of American exceptionalism in US public diplomacy lies in how it can be both value and strategy at once and what this illustrates about the dynamic between normative and interest-based concerns in US foreign policy. Although the United States is not exceptional as regards the phenomenon of paradigmatic individuals using rallying cultural themes, identity-building in reaction to collective shock, and the existence of a system of meanings that constitute identity, politics and policy, these rudimentary communitybuilding processes attached to increasingly technically sophisticated media and a singularly impressive power portfolio, have important implications for the conduct of US foreign policy and by extension for international peace and stability. The soft-hegemony implied both by the forms of exceptionalism used by the Bush and Clinton Administrations in the post-Cold War period and by the operational emphasis on public diplomacy as a leverage tool can be traced not just to a shift in hard interests and capabilities as a 143


result of the end of the Cold War but also to a less tangible crisis of identity. Clinton foreign policy in his first term involved the public diplomacy of the Jeremiad on an international scale with limited and restrained commitments of military personnel. Instead he focused on managing global economic relations and the use of diplomacy and public diplomacy to shape the world in a less overt way than his predecessors. One Clinton foreign policy advisor has suggested that the United States is becoming more Èuropean' in adopting this management approach in contrast with its traditional approach of being a `fixer'.1 If this is true it may illustrate the ways which US foreign policy is shaped by external influences in leadership style and (para-)ideology. Yet this emerging soft-hegemonic stance can be traced to the Bush Administration's use of public diplomacy/diplomacy to successfully normalize relations with the Soviet Union. In a broader sense it can be tied to the United States' experience of becoming the `sole superpower'. But most fundamentally it is related to an evolution in the para-ideology of American exceptionalism. It may be conjectured that soft hegemony through public diplomacy/ diplomacy is a solution to the operational ambivalence of historical American exceptionalism ± involvement and moral righteousness but caution and aloofness may be combined. This is not to say that US foreign policy is not driven by interests, but rather that the definition of the United States' interest is strongly influenced by an underlying and powerful para-ideology of American exceptionalism. However, the motive of felt responsibility and ability to improve and universalize the American experience or way of life ± confident exceptionalism ± does not outweigh insecure exceptionalism ± fear of contamination or quagmire. They constitute each other repeatedly. In addition, changing interests also legitimize rhetorical and ideational shifts. Successful rhetoric ± such as the public diplomacy towards the FSU/ CIS ± creates new interests or recreates old interests ± and in this case promoted foreign policies of involvement without commitment. These conclusions are examined in more detail below.

Transitional community-building and elite legitimacy When the Bush Administration entered office it acquired the leadership of the world's most powerful country during the greatest international upheaval since World War Two. As Garber and Williams point out, although Bush had substantial foreign policy experience, `by the end of 1991, the world in which he had gained most of his experience had largely disappeared'.2 And in 1989 and early 1990 the Administration admitted to confusion associated with a loss of the familiar conceptual frameworks for understanding and ordering US foreign policy.3 Examination of contemporaneous media and academic comment (Chapter 1) illustrates that this was not solely a phenomenon afflicting a governmental elite. This may be explained with

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reference to Leon Festinger's theory of `cognitive dissonance'.4 Festinger defined `dissonance' as a state of `being psychologically uncomfortable', a condition which motivates efforts `to try to reduce dissonance and achieve consonance' and, in its group form, is à uniform reaction' in the masses due to àn event [. . .] which unequivocally invalidates some widely held belief'. The end of the Cold War may provide an example of how such `dissonance', an awareness of inconsistencies between beliefs and the operational environment, can occur at an elite and a national level. As Festinger's theory suggests, it might be expected that under such conditions a first response would be denial ± a refusal to recognize the causes of dissonance, in this case, perhaps, to question the veracity of claims that the Cold War has ended. But it might also be expected that there would be attempts to rebuild `consonance'. In a threat or policy vacuum, when previous paradigms for understanding international affairs have become fatally flawed, the construction of a new conceptual and discursive framework ± the framework within which policy is presented to the public and also formulated ± might be expected. Responsibility for this falls mainly on the policy-making elite and, as the public face of the Administration's policy and posture, on the President. The experience of `cognitive dissonance' in this unexpected postwar period affected a broader band of policy entrepreneurs and òpinion makers', former Cold Warriors and anti-Cold War activists alike. Samuel Huntington has also referred to a state of `cognitive dissonance' as a perpetual feature of the US politics as a result of the gap or tension between the ideas of liberal democracy and the reality of US institutions (such as foreign and intelligence services, military and police). He argued that attempts to `come to terms with this dissonance' often result in `moralism, cynicism, complacency, and hypocrisy'.5 In the post-Cold War period, then, it can be argued that this inherent, elemental dissonance of US politics combined with a transitional burst of dissonance produced by the end of the Cold War. Evidence for such a conclusion can be found in the content and uses of the public diplomacy of the Bush and Clinton Administrations. Their rhetorical campaigns although focused on discrete issues such as the Soviet Coup, Persian Gulf War or the Presidential election consistently provided broader responses to post-Cold War intellectual dislocation. They competed with the US communication elite for control over how the end of the Cold War would be interpreted and to provide answers to the questions: Is the Cold War over? What did the Cold War achieve? Who or what is the new enemy? What is the national interest? What new foreign policy posture is possible or desirable? How can the United States heal itself after the Cold War and/or maintain its primacy? Underpinning many of these considerations was an expectation of global and national disorder linked to a debate about US decline and revival, and for a brief period at least, an attraction to grand explanations of the international system-changes in terms of historical forces. Francis Fukuyama's


prediction of `the end of history' provides perhaps the best example of this kind of hypothesis. (In fact, the Bush Administration vigorously distanced itself from Fukuyama's theories and in practice adopted a rhetorical strategy which was the antithesis of his thesis ± both emphasizing the tumultuous continuance of history and calling for a renewal of history.6) As shown in Chapter 1, these were familiar questions and concerns, part of a wellinstitutionalized tradition of discourse that revolved around contested claims of exceptionalism and loss of exceptionalism. In a period of uncertainty, the theme of American exceptionalism ± a rhetorical institution with broad, suprapartisan appeal ± was the obvious strategic choice for promoting a consensus about the United States' international role and responsibilities. It appeared in both Administrations' public diplomacy in several ways, each of which reflected different historical manifestations of exceptionalism, namely the recurring ideas of `the city on a hill', `manifest destiny', `redeemer nation', `community and order-building', and `renewal through selfflagellation'. Although to some extent artificial compartmentalizations (these themes overlap), the categorizations made below illustrate well the layers of meaning attached to the idea of American exceptionalism and important differences in its policy-related applications.

Exceptionalism and Bush public diplomacy The `city on a hill' When it was used to explain the United States' contribution to the revolutions in Eastern Europe, exceptionalism was evoked in the Puritan `city on a hill'/exemplar tradition. Various members of the Bush Administration argued that American economic success, political freedom, and military power had stimulated dissent and then revolt in the East. However, different versions of the exemplar role were offered. Some emphasized the United States' moral and political example and stabilizing force, others its economic example, and some highlighted a paternal guardian role. As shown in Chapter 2, Secretary of State Baker described the ùnique role' of the US as à tribune for democracy, a catalyst for international co-operation and the guardian of America's national interest'.7 Deputy Secretary Eagleburger stated that the United States had been the `model' of development for Western Europe and would now be the `model' for the East.8 Another US official described how Eastern Europe was `psychologically' as well as economically dependent on the West.9 In 20 domestic addresses between December 1989 and June 1990, President Bush explained how the United States' example and stoicism ± whether it was the religious faith of its people,10 the hard work of American agriculturists,11 the skills of its engineers and scientists,12 the professionalism of the American media and the dedication of US information services,13 the entrepreneurship of American business,14 or

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the principles and tactics of the American civil rights movement15 ± had catalyzed the Eastern European revolutions. In one way these 20 speeches were classically post-war, celebratory, and commemorative. They also performed a standard partisan political function. But most significantly they constituted a community-building rhetorical campaign focusing on the necessity of US international leadership. Perhaps the clearest evocation of this form of exceptionalism appeared in Bush's speech at the University of South Carolina in 1990, when he described the US as à shining example' and a `guiding force' for the East Europeans, `not as a nation but as an idea'.16 As discussed in Chapter 3, the Persian Gulf operation was described as a divinely ordained `just war' in which the United States, à nation founded under God',17 and its allies were òn God's side'.18 However, in a clear departure from Reagan's emphasis, a theme of secular, post-Puritan, Enlightenment exceptionalism was most often evoked by the Bush Administration. Predicting the end of Vietnam-inspired cynicism, Bush's vision was one of progress towards the universalization of American values. The world, he had stated, was `moving towards values that have made this country the greatest'.19 In the post-Cold War period, he stated in a speech in Moscow, the Àmerican Dream' had become à universal dream'.20 In the 1992 Presidential campaign, Bush stated that Àmerican leadership' and Àmerican ideals' had `literally reshaped the world';21 that it was essential that the United States remain à moral beacon for other countries' and reject isolationism;22 and that the US had à special role as the world's preeminent moral, political, economic, and military power'.23 The redeemer nation This declaratory policy as outlined in the National Security Strategy Report published in August 1991 (and discussed in Chapter 4) identified American exceptionalism as a fundamental motivating idea behind US foreign policy and one that rationalized continuing international involvement. In practical terms this entailed maintaining a Transatlantic community, building a normal partnership with the Soviet Union, supporting the geopolitical status quo in the USSR, and intervening in the Persian Gulf to prevent the destabilization of the region and deter future challenges to ìnternational law and order'. To support each of these broad policies the rationale of American redemptive power was employed. In the `redeemer nation' tradition, Bush compared 1945 with 1989, arguing that in each case the United States' `destiny' had been to organize the post-war `reconstruction and reconciliation'.24 At the Malta Summit (see Chapter 2) Bush's portrayal of himself as Lincoln, who àbolished slavery, and [. . .] saved the union', again emphasized the messianic role of the United States.25 Bush repeatedly made use of a Civil War analogy, `the house divided against itself', to warn against a disintegration of the Transatlantic alliance and to emphasize the benefits of US±Soviet normalization.


This transposition of American experience on to Europe provides another example of the universalizing tendency of American exceptionalism. The use of illustrations from the United States' own history to explain events in the Soviet Union, for example a Civil War analogy which placed Gorbachev as Lincoln attempting to hold the Union together, or a 1776 analogy with Yeltsin as a Russian George Washington (discussed in Chapter 4), were further examples of this tendency. In one address Bush noted that the Soviets were referring to the Federalist Papers `to find new ideas and inspirations' for their reconstruction.26 Although Bush initially favored the Civil War analogy, by the end of 1991 he had converted to a revolutionary theme which was more appropriate to events unfolding in the Soviet Union. His rhetoric mirrored his changing policy towards the Soviet Union, which had shifted from preservation of the status quo to management of the inevitable change in status of the Soviet Republics. In this case, US public diplomacy, while not always employed to directly shape events, did have a stabilizing purpose. The theme of an èrrand into the wilderness' to redeem the world from `barbarism and night', as Senator Beveridge had put it in 1900, was also widely evident in the Administration's public diplomacy. For example, there were many references between 1989 and 1991 to the `dark ages' of the Cold War, and its `legacy of moral destruction'.27 As Chapter 3 shows, similar imagery abounded in Bush's Persian Gulf public diplomacy: the Iraqi action was described as an anachronism, a `dark relic' from a `dark time', when `dark machines' (conventional and nuclear weapons), were deployed by `despots' who presided over the `Dark Ages' (World War Two and the Cold War).28 The `barbarism and night' evoked by turn of the century leaders reappeared as `the forces of lawlessness and chaos'29 which only the United States could combat.30 Victory speeches after the Gulf War proclaimed that the crisis had illustrated the United States' `responsibility' to `reform the world'. It demonstrated that American values were àscendant',31 that US foreign policy had a `moral dimension' which was àn extension of American ideals' and which required the United States `to remain active, engaged in the world'.32 Analysis of the US response to the Soviet coup illustrates another way in which the Administration interpreted international events in the light of perceived American redemptive power. For example, Baker cited the resolution to the coup as evidence that western values had `now planted themselves firmly in the soul of our former adversary'.33 But the portrayal of the challenges of the end of the Cold War, in particular German and European reunification, as a `test' of American apathy,34 may have revealed a perception that redemption for the United States itself was also at stake in this period. `Renewal through self-flagellation' The accompaniment of missionary exceptionalism with a rhetoric of `selfflagellation' has been a feature of US political rhetoric since the Puritans. In the post-Cold War period this was also the case; for example Eagleburger's

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reference to the intellectual `numbness' which the changes in East-Central Europe had wrought in 1989,35 seemed to reflect this tradition. Baker's rhetoric also reflected this tradition in 1990 when he described the process of `selfrenewal' and `self-correction' which the United States was embarked on as a result of the end of the Cold War.36 Bush's description of the new enemies of the post-Cold War period as `complacency or arrogance', ùncertainty, unpredictability', and ìnstability',37 provided further examples of this introspection linked to environmental challenges. The challenges which the end of the Cold War created for the United States were manifold. From the `clarity' of the Cold War emerged `multifaceted global problems' and a loss of rationale for US leadership. There was often expressed concern (and much public diplomacy was aimed at addressing this concern) that the US public did not appreciate the importance of continued international leadership.38 This concern helps explain the ubiquity of the exceptionalism theme in the Administration's public diplomacy. The idea of exceptionalism has been integral to the development of an American sense of identity; it has moral, emotive force, and historical weight. Hence, exceptionalism rhetoric had more than a short-term mobilizing function during the Persian Gulf War and was also employed with the aim of effecting a longer-term èxorcism of Vietnam'. The crisis was, as Bush often stated, a `defining moment' that would allow the US `to define who we are and what we believe'; the Persian Gulf operations would be instrumental in creating a post-Cold War identity for the United States by practically and rhetorically dispelling the Vietnam syndrome.39 As shown in Chapter 3, three types of references to Vietnam in Bush's Gulf rhetoric illustrated this purgative agenda. First, Vietnam and its `jungle law' provided the model of disorder which was contrasted with a model of order, namely the United States and its promotion of the `rule of law'.40 The Gulf was a `test' of which order would prevail in the post-Cold War period. Second, many assurances were given that, in contrast to Vietnam, there would be no constraints on the President's power to implement a successful foreign policy. Official statements emphasized that the war would be short, decisive, with limited casualties, and that a balance of considerations ± both moral and interest-based ± had influenced the decision to intervene. The guarantee that `this will not be another Vietnam' was repeatedly given during the crisis. It was most succinctly pledged in Bush's announcement to the nation on the commencement of Operation Desert Storm: `This will not be another Vietnam [. . .] Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back.'41 Third, Bush declared that the Gulf success displaced the `Vietnam syndrome', liberating the United States along with Kuwait, and enabling a `new American century'.42 This success had renewed US moral superiority and credibility, as Bush announced to the returning troops in March 1991: `No one in the whole world doubts us anymore'. Bush's declaration that the United States now had `re-established credibility' was a reclamation of the exceptionalism perceived


lost in Vietnam.43 That later in the Administration the `quagmire' fear was again instrumental in justifying a policy of non-involvement with the former Yugoslavia (discussed in Chapter 4) underlines the extent to which values (deeply-held guiding ideas) and strategies (short-term, utilitarian tools) are overlapping but highly dynamic in US foreign policy. After the war, the `reclaimed exceptionalism' theme was applied to domestic policy speeches. Bush portrayed the Persian Gulf operation as `simply the American character in action', preparation for `the next American century', and the precursor to à renewed America';44 it had stimulated a `surge of American optimism and determination' and renewed confidence in US `values';45 it had `transformed' the United States.46 A `domestic Desert Storm' was now possible.47 Polling data for the period suggests that there was a temporary increase in the American public's sense of well-being as a result of the Gulf success and overwhelming support for international intervention. But the failure of Bush to activate operation `domestic Desert Storm' ensured that, by the time of the Presidential election, the Gulf War `rallying effect' had dissipated.48 Despite the rhetoric of renewal and the attempted purging of Vietnam, Bush's Gulf War public diplomacy, and his post-Cold War rhetoric in general, contained very little of the `selfcondemnation' or `self-flagellation' which historically has been characteristic of Jeremiadic exceptionalism. Although the stop-gap declaratory policy of `moving beyond containment' entailed some self-analysis, this was not exactly in the tradition of `self-flagellation'. Order and community-building: a manifest destiny The emphasis on American management, the US as a `catalyst' for East European reconstruction,49 adherence to `the rule of law', the development of `legal codes', and the protection of individual rights reflected the Wilsonian peace and order-building approach.50 The Bush Administration envisioned an order consisting of a `substantive core' of `common western values' with NATO as `the shield to protect [those] values'.51 In the tradition of order and community-building, the Bush Administration employed `partnership' and `community of nations' themes which were synonyms for `new world order'. The `new world order' was defined by Bush in his post-Gulf speech at Maxwell Air Force Base as an extension of the United States and the Transatlantic Alliance. The `new world order', he stated, `really describes responsibility imposed by our successes'.52 Bush had ascribed a spiritual and para-ideological function to NATO, as a collective expression of the western ideals and beliefs which had conciliatory and restorative power.53 In the community-building rhetoric of Bush and Baker in 1990, the post-Cold War era was repeatedly defined as a `new enlightenment', a `renaissance', and a new àge of reason' from which à newly democratic international society' would evolve.54 However, as in earlier periods, partnership and community were envisaged in the context of the ascendancy of

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Àmerican values'. `Normalization' with the Soviet Union would depend upon their acceptance of `western values' and their integration in `the community of European nations'.55 Baker's statement to the Senate Finance Committee on perestroika and economic reform was explicit about this: Ìt is in our long-term foreign policy interest for more people around the globe to share our core values'.56 He listed these `core values' as `democracy and self-determination, respect for individual rights and freedoms, economic liberty, reliance on market economy, and peaceful resolution of conflicts'. Baker emphasized that the Soviets were embracing change for pragmatic reasons ± they needed to modernize ± and were not motivated by ideals or ideology.57 Therefore, a vital role for the United States was to fill this void and influence the Soviet Union at the level of ideas. One of the United States' post-Cold War aims was the re-education and integration of the Soviet Union into a liberal, democratic, capitalist, community of nations.58 This foreign policy, Bush stated, was containment's replacement but it was èvery bit as ambitious'.59 Emulating Truman's 1947 speech to Congress on providing aid to Greece and Turkey, Baker offered a choice between a liberal, capitalist, democratic utopia and a dystopia of uncertainty and competition60 (see Chapter 2). This communicated the sense that a crisis was averted and that there were now new and equally urgent challenges. The messianic aspects of this discourse are obvious. The order being defined and planned was an American-managed order. The official position was that the United States' choice would determine whether `history' would `return with a vengeance' in the shape of ethnic conflict and national rivalries, or whether `history' would be `transcended' and a stable new world order established. At the Middle East Peace Conference at Madrid, Bush emphasized `the tragic lessons' of isolationism and stated that the task of the peacemakers was to ensure that `history' was not their `master'.61 At the UN he described how the end of the Cold War had produced `the resumption of history', `the revival of history,' and `history's renewal'.62 In one apparent reference to Francis Fukuyama's thesis, the President stated that `this is not the end of history'.63 This community and order-building rhetoric contained Cold War and pre-Cold War elements. It sometimes maintained the manicheanism most often associated with Cold War discourse, but also part of the earlier racist worldview of Beveridge and others, particularly during the Gulf Crisis, when the situation was `black and white', `the facts clear', `the choice unambiguous', a case of `right vs wrong'.64 It had `manifest destiny' qualities, claiming the right to extend US values across the globe, but also revived the tradition of Wilsonian exceptionalism.

Exceptionalism in Clinton public diplomacy There are many similarities in the public diplomacy of the Bush and Clinton Administrations. Yet the ways in which each evoked the idea of American


exceptionalism, and the emphasis given by each to a national renewal as a result of the end of the Cold War, illustrated important para-ideological differences. The `city on a hill' Like Bush, Clinton drew from the `city on a hill' tradition, as his Inaugural Address illustrated. In it he described American democracy as not only `the envy of the world' but also `the engine of our own renewal'.65 The United States was a `pivot' of democracy, it had à leadership role',66 and was still `the world's only superpower'.67 In an early speech to the United Nations, Clinton stated that the United States had a ùnique position' in the world, and was a `fulcrum for change and a pivot point for peace'.68 However, most of Clinton's speeches also balanced descriptions of American exceptionalism with warnings of decline. While Bush evoked exceptionalism in order to deny there was a decay in American status or abilities, Clinton offered it as a solution to American decline. Where Bush had denied there was a crisis, Clinton had outlined the emergency in vivid terms, and provided an optimistic analysis of how salvation could be achieved. In several speeches (discussed in Chapter 5), Clinton argued that Americans were à people of action',69 and that the American national character was defined by `work, family, faith, opportunity, responsibility, and community'.70 But he argued that Americans had `lost sight of their sacred mission, and broken faith with the covenant'.71 These references to a `covenant' best distinguish Clinton's public diplomacy from that of Bush. Where Bush drew most heavily from the Wilsonian version of the `redeemer nation' and the order and community-building tradition of exceptionalism, Clinton's foreign policy was in the Jeffersonian tradition, entailing the `safe and limited projection of American power abroad'.72 But Clinton's rhetoric also returned to an original Puritan form ± the Jeremiad. Clinton used this American rhetorical tradition to structure his `critique' of the Bush Administration, to outline his crisis policy solutions, and to mobilize the public and Congress in support of these policies.73 Originating in the Puritans' emulation of the biblical prophet Jeremiah, a Jeremiad entails criticism of decadence and a warning of decline unless the people return to their roots, or their original God-ordained destiny. As Smith defines it: The jeremiad is a rhetorical form that frames social problems in the logic of God's covenant with a chosen people. In their most inclusive sense, jeremiads depict a people chosen by God who formed a covenant to undertake a sacred mission or errand. The problems afflicting them are characterized as divine tests of their worthiness or as punishment for straying from their mission and covenant.74

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According to this definition, the rhetoric of both Bush and Clinton qualified as Jeremiads. However, Clinton placed more emphasis on the `suffering' of the chosen people, a traditional feature of this kind of rhetoric. `Renewal through self-flagellation' Clinton argued that Americans were a `chosen people' with a divine destiny but the focus of Clinton's public diplomacy in 1992 and 1993 was less on the US as a `redeemer nation', and more on the `self-flagellation' leading to renewal aspects of the exceptionalism tradition. Some of this renewal rhetoric was related to the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which were portrayed as God-ordained deliverance.75 There were references to the United States' ùnchanging purposes' as a model of stable, successful diversity remarkable in contrast with other nations (Clinton used Yugoslavia as an example). However, Clinton's public diplomacy was domestic in focus and compared present degeneration, in Jeremiadic fashion, with the tradition of American exceptionalism, raising the possibility of revival through a compact or `covenant'. The Clinton strategy was to describe a domestic wasteland but then promise `recovery'. As Chapter 5 documents, the majority of his speeches in 1993 described a United States which was riddled with ìnsecurity and fear',76 suffering èconomic stagnation' and `coming apart with violence' due to Cold War `neglect'.77 Even more explicitly than Bush, Clinton used the analogy of World War Two, comparing himself to Roosevelt and Truman, to create the rationale for a new administration. Although he used war and crisis language as part of this `post-war' reconstruction effort, he also employed community-building rhetoric, similar to that of Bush, during the election campaign and, later in his Administration, in foreign policy. Although Clinton described the United States' `manifest destiny' to be a global economic leader, self-condemnation was often clear in his appraisal of the Cold War. For example, during the campaign Clinton identified himself with East European grassroots revolutionaries and claimed the same intellectual populist position. In office this stance was also adopted to help promote his economic policy as demonstrated by a memorandum written in early February 1993 by Clinton consultants Paul Begala, Mandy Grunwald, Stan Greenberg, and James Carville. Suggesting that `the urgency' of the election campaign should be reconstructed in selling the Administration's economic plan, their document stated that in announcing that economic conditions were much worse than he had anticipated, `the President's attitude should be as outraged and betrayed as the attitude of the free Russians when they saw firsthand how the Communists screwed up their country'.78 This was to be done without mentioning Bush or other Administrations by name, hence the focus on the Cold War as the general cause of American decline. Yet the Clinton response was not a strategic withdrawal from international engagement. Identifying a need for the United States to develop a `larger


sense of purpose and strategy' than it had during the Cold War,79 Clinton created a foreign policy based on a `geo-economic synthesis'.80 Elucidated in his speech to the UN General Assembly, this foreign policy recognized that traditional security concerns could not be divorced from concerns generated by the evolution of a competitive global economy. Clinton argued that a GATT agreement would create jobs; Middle East peace would enable the region's `great economic potential' to be freed; Russian stability and democracy would `not only make the world safer, [but] also help to expand the world's economy'; and increased economic growth along with political openness in China would be beneficial both in the region and worldwide. Ì do not mean to announce some crusade to force our way of life and doing things on others or to replicate our institutions',81 Clinton had announced (author's emphasis). The United States remained committed to the spread of democracy through capitalist economic development, but the implication was that it would not be pursued through use of (military) force.82 Clinton seemed to endorse the Fukuyamian view that universal democracy would be the culmination of human history.83 The belief that universalizing American values would promote peace determined US involvement in the Middle East peace process which, according to Clinton, was designed `to shape the attitudes of the people who live in the region'.84 During a visit to the Far East, the President stated that the United States' key world role lay in `setting an example, offering hope, and providing inspiration'.85 Clinton evoked the exceptionalism of the United States to critique Bush domestic policy and both explicitly and implicitly, the United States' Cold War priorities. As a rhetorical tool, exceptionalism functioned to legitimize a change in government and in policy focus.

Crisis management Beyond the macro-crisis which the two post-Cold War Administrations addressed ± was the Cold War over, what would its end mean for the United States' international role, and for their domestic political fortunes? ± several other cases of crisis management have been examined in this study. Between 1989 and 1992, the Bush Administration utilized public diplomacy to support and sell practical measures to aid the Soviets/Gorbachev and foster international stability and to mobilize domestic and international support for the Persian Gulf War. Clinton Administration officials used the language of crisis repeatedly during the Presidential campaign and to further their domestic economic plans and NAFTA during 1993. We can see limited failures and limited successes in all of the cases studied, but most striking is that Presidents and their agents persuade in public (as well as through private diplomatic channels, and one form supplements the other) for the strategic purposes of crisis management and community-building, and that in doing so they not only evoke fundamental values but shape and recreate them.

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Public diplomacy is important to the routine workings of government. Rhetoric is employed to test policies, to resolve bureaucratic disagreements, and to compete with other policy entrepreneurs as well as to mobilize public support for policies or postures or to win elections. To some extent it shapes an Administration's historical legacy. It certainly reflects and recreates the national identity. It has a vital role as a foreign policy instrument. But it is perhaps most important during transitional periods when both communitybuilding and crisis management are necessary. Examples from Chapter 4 clearly illustrate crisis management uses of public diplomacy. During the Soviet coup it was demonstrated that rhetoric was an important foreign policy tool, that it could buy time, give warnings, and set conditions, and that it could selectively make public, and therefore binding, measures which had been agreed between parties in private. Initially cautious in its public declarations, the Bush Administration used the term èxtraconstitutional' rather than ùnconstitutional' or ìllegitimate' to the describe the attempted coup, a strategy which was circumspect and tactically intelligent in the early hours of the crisis when it was not clear whether the Administration would be required to accept the plotters as the new Soviet government. James Baker records in his memoir that the Administration also encouraged Yeltsin to make a `public commitment' to ensure the command, control and storage safety of nuclear weapons, to curb nuclear proliferation, and to help ratify the START and CFE treaties, perceiving that such a commitment would èstablish a standard to which we would hold them in the future'.86 Bush's Address to the Nation on the resignation of Gorbachev at the end of 1991 provides another example of value-strategy syncretization in what may be loosely termed a crisis management address. The speech not only performed a ceremonial, commemorative function, marking the end of Gorbachev's tenure and expressing appropriate praise and respect for an international leader of his stature; it also laid out the terms and conditions for the United States' relationship with the new Commonwealth of Independent States, and it linked the dramatic Soviet transformation from totalitarian state to emerging democracy to the exemplary status of the United States. During and after the coup attempt, rhetoric was shaped to build confidence domestically, amongst allies, and in the Soviet Union. With the rise of Yeltsin and Soviet disintegration, the targets of United States' rhetorical diplomacy changed but the core themes of this rhetoric ± partnership and co-operation, and US exceptionalism ± remained unchanged. As values and strategies overlap in US rhetoric, so too do the crisis management and community-building functions of this public diplomacy; in fact, they are essentially mutually supporting. Building community entails the fostering of shared values as well as interests, and public diplomacy and the employment of existing rallying para-ideologies have a vital role in this task. Effective crisis management involves the long-term fostering of sympathetic publics inclined to support a President's foreign policies because they have


already accepted the desirability of his/her general stance or posture. Thus, community-building by evoking para-ideologies precedes and enables crisis management.

Building sympathetic public ecologies Addressing national and international concerns through routine diplomacy, creating sympathetic public ecologies, is perhaps the most important way in which a President manages foreign policy by attempting to create an environment conducive to his/her exercise of power. Between 1989 and 1992 several kinds of community were identified and promoted by Bush: a broad international community/global society, the Transatlantic community/NATO, a community of interests/partnership-building with Gorbachev and then the Soviet successor states, a domestic community of belief in US leadership and exceptionalism, and several domestic communities of electoral support. In 1992±3, Clinton sought to build a domestic coalition in support of his Presidency and economic revival. This entailed attempting to build a domestic community of post-Cold War populists and maintaining existing foreign policy communities at home and alliances abroad. Most significantly he pursued a `crisis' public diplomacy to influence the public mood and enable his election. The cases studied in this book show that within one `crisis', for example the Persian Gulf War, a broader exercise of rallying public support around thick-cut values continues in preparation for other contingencies. `Political community' is promoted, according to Samuel Huntington, when there are `procedures' for `maintaining order, resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders'87 and ìnstitutions involving and reflecting the moral consensus and mutual interest'. The marks of an institutionalized procedure, according to Huntington, are àdaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence'.88 This study has illustrated how the rhetoric of American exceptionalism constitutes such a community-building institution. However, in community-building rhetoric, particularly when exceptionalism is evoked, there may lie the seeds of future crises as well as the means to rally support against them. For example, Bush's public diplomacy in 1989 and early 1990 in relation to the Soviet Union may have signaled to those already inclined to believe it (such as the Iraqi leadership), that the United States would be soft-hegemonic ± concerned to shape the world according to US `values' but also not inclined to intervene with force ± and focused on macro-issues such as reframing the superpower relationship. Bush's emphasis on avoiding a `quagmire' that was essential for building communities of support for the Persian Gulf War and Clinton's successful rallying around geo-economic concerns made later community-building in support of a Bosnia intervention more difficult. Equally important are the implications of this beyond these signals about operational strategy and posture; the implications of a

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rhetoric which reproduces images of dominion, racial categorization and òtherness', and privileges masculine and military power and order over justice; which depicts international relations in the language of control even when, in practice, policies pursued are ones of co-option and community-building. The idea of American exceptionalism is a normative artifact deeply embedded, but dynamic, in US foreign policy discourse. Policy makers may be said to cynically act based on a by now well-established public belief in US exceptionalism.89 However, the formulation of these goals often suggests exceptionalist reasoning as well as strategizing. The human and financial expenditure of the United States not only in wars and arms development but also in humanitarian operations and peacekeeping illustrates the influence of exceptionalism thinking (the confident variety) which maintains a resolve and credibility-saving posture even when accompanying strategic or economic rationales break down. The seemingly contradictory exaggerated fear of quagmire, rhetoric of the quagmire, and related circumscription of policy also reflects exceptionalism thinking (the insecure variety); both are directly related. The consistency of the use of exceptionalism in this public diplomacy suggests that it is a para-ideological element (values shape strategic goals) of an operative tradition shared by a foreign policy (and communication) elite, acculturated into a community of ideas, even if initially skeptical, in part because of the identity shaping power of language. Exceptionalism is best viewed as a value-strategy syncretization.

The shifting meanings of exceptionalism However, although there is an historically static dichotomy between confident and insecure exceptionalism in this discourse, the ways in which exceptionalism is used rhetorically and the ways in which exceptionalism influences policy differ depending on the other influences and concerns which individual Administrations and Presidents bring to the process of governance. In the period studied, the legitimacy of both Administrations was maintained through community-building rhetoric and treating the period as a crisis, but an analysis of this public diplomacy also shows how their views of the crisis differed. For Bush it was about the destabilization of the international status quo, possibilities that rogue powers would take advantage of the shift and power vacuum (and that included such rogue challenges as the Clinton campaign for the Presidency). Clinton portrayed his candidacy as a post-war rehabilitative bourgeois revolution. The crisis, for Clinton, involved dealing with the ravages which the Cold War had wrought on the social and economic fabric of the United States as well developing geoeconomic strength. Bush used a Cold War triumph model to explain American exceptionalism. Clinton's public diplomacy revealed a more ambivalent analysis of the


Cold War and this ambivalent posture was the basis for his argument about how exceptionalism could only be preserved with a shift in policy focus. Bush defined exceptionalism as steadfastness and the ability and duty to build international stability. Clinton defined it as economic well-being, competitiveness and dynamism. Thus, it was possible for policies with different foci ± the geo-economic and the geopolitical ± to be driven by the same aim of exceptionalism. Clinton's exceptionalism was nationalist and populist, containing evocations of the Àmerican dream' and an Àmerican revival'. Bush's exceptionalism was internationalist and elitist in focus, promoting a `new world order', or a `community of nations'. Clinton's was in the tradition of `self-flagellation' and the Jeremiad; Bush's drew most heavily from the `redeemer nation' and order-building tradition of exceptionalism. The differences in the rhetoric and political/policy strategies of Bush and Clinton may be traced to the generations to which they belong, and their personal and their political experiences. For example, Bush's èxorcism of Vietnam' theme during the Gulf War was a rhetorical innovation which reflected the importance of the Vietnam era in his political education and career, suggested that he viewed Vietnam as a failure of will and public support, and illustrated that he was conscious of the utility of the image for implicitly critiquing Clinton, who had avoided military service in Vietnam. The heavy emphasis by Bush on `no appeasement' themes and allusions to Hitler during the Gulf crisis, was certainly strategic but also reflected his own military experience and personal recollections of World War Two.90 His emphasis on the `redeemer nation' and order and community-building themes also reflected a World War and Cold War political education. On the other hand, Clinton studiously avoided references to Vietnam ± his weak issue from a political point of view ± and focused instead on analogies with the New Deal and earlier post-war reconstruction, arguing that the Cold War had diverted the United States from its original and true destiny as an exemplar of success and tolerance. More than simply liberal versus conservative, and though they reveal just how close these postures are in the US political system, these positions reflect many interests and influences. The generations to which Bush and Clinton belong and their political socialization, Bush in the intelligence and foreign policy establishment and Clinton in academia and state government, appear to affect their attitudes to the Presidency and politics (paternalist/elitist vs consensus-building/populist), their attitudes to foreign policy (a key concern of President and an Administrative priority vs a State Department concern and a coequal partner with domestic policy), and their attitudes to the media (access teamed with strict control of information versus ambivalent, creative, guerrilla warfare). Generation and socialization also to some extent explain their para-ideological views of the international system/environment. The public diplomacy and policy of President Bush suggests that he perceived the international environment as an unstable system on which it was

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necessary and desirable to put order from above, hence his instinct to involve Gorbachev in a program of superpower and great-power stabilization. Clinton's public diplomacy and policy reveal a perception of the international system to be interdependent and competitive but also revolutionary, in the midst of change that had to be channeled and controlled to the United States' advantage. This approach, and Clinton's oppositional status, inevitably entailed a more aggressive use of public diplomacy. Indeed, Clinton's expertise in the area of public diplomacy, his use of the Internet during the election campaign, and his attitude regarding the utility and mutability of media coverage, which differed so entirely from that of Bush, also underlined their generational differences. These characteristics illustrate once again the many layers and craftmanship of such public diplomacy and the highly strategic nature of a President's rhetorical choices; they often illustrate `spin control'. But they also reflect personal values and convictions. The public diplomacy of both reveals how rhetoric, while used to create narratives of rational action in support of particular policies, also incorporates personal and professional particulars. Clearly exceptionalism, while a common theme, has shifting shades of meaning and different policy consequences, depending on the other interests, experiences and values which these Presidents brought to the office and which influenced them from inside. It is possible then to locate the influence of individual policy makers by studying the rhetoric of an Administration. However, since such rhetoric is often the product of numerous writers filtered through the greater corporate power of Presidential values and interests, it is more useful to consider these appearances of exceptionalism for what they reveal of legitimacy politics.

(Re)creating the nation Since the purpose of public diplomacy is to persuade or convert a group or constituency to believe in and support particular goals, its themes must tap into as well as shape the existing moods and inclinations of the constituency to be rallied. To enable the exercise of power by an elite over the longer term such rhetoric must be concerned with maintaining and re-creating the nation. Applying Durkheim, the manifestation of exceptionalism through the medium of US public diplomacy, as documented in this study, serves `to strengthen those sentiments which, if left to themselves, would soon weaken' by `bring[ing] those who hold them together and put[ting] them in closer and more active relations with one another'.91 The function of elite rhetoricians is similar to that of the paradigmatic individuals in Durkheim's study of religious community-building who in the process of enlivening the community become even more confirmed of the power and truth of their claims. Durkheim also provides valuable insights on the shaping of collective identity associated with traumatic events. Ùnder the influence of some


great collective shock', states Durkheim, social interactions multiply and a `general effervescence results which is characteristic of revolutionary or creative epochs'.92 Such effervescence enhances the development of a communal identity and may result in violent outward expressions. In the frenzy of debate about the significance of events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1989, it is at least possible to find such a process of identityshaping èffervescence'. Was the Persian Gulf War a similarly explainable `violent outward expression' of collective shock and recovery? There is, as shown in Chapters 2 and 3, some evidence to support this claim. But as Durkheim underlines, there is the routine influence of existing social/cultural structure to be considered: `We speak a language that we did not make; we use instruments that we did not invent; we invoke rights that we did not found; a treasury of knowledge is transmitted to each generation that it did not gather itself.'93 In the United States the evolution of collective memories and shared systems of meaning is not simply a `top-down' phenomenon. Grassroots movements and other influences emerging from the popular culture have over time shaped the national identity. Increasingly, external influences, ideas emerging from international institutions or transnational advocacy groups for example, may affect domestic and foreign policies in ways that may cumulatively alter the prevailing national purpose or stance over the longer term. Although important, this has not been the focus of this study. The (re)creation of the US national identity based on ideas of exceptionalism, particularly in times of crisis or transition, primarily involves a struggle of national elites (though, sometimes as in the case of Bush and Gorbachev, of international elites) for interpretative control. The evidence of this study suggests that the recurring theme of American exceptionalism reflects and recreates a moral and practical universe for US policy and communication elites in part because of their belief, and experience, that familiarity breeds consent (that is, for political, strategic reasons) and in part because of their social and political statuses. It is possible to apply Durkheim further to argue that insecure exceptionalism reflects a perception of a `profane' world and that confident exceptionalism expresses a sense of `sacred' purpose.94 In fact, Durkheim's identification of a demarcation between worlds of ìmperious and helpful' forces, of the `sacred' and the `profane', describes very effectively the manichean worldview of threatening òther' and divine self that has so clearly been a characteristic of US foreign policy discourse. What is the significance of this? First, it suggests that the United States is hardly exceptional in making sense of the world in terms of its goodness and mission contrasted with external chaos and malignancy.95 On the one hand this is a rather rudimentary process of meaning making with social cohesion effects, on the other, as Durkheim emphasized, it is central to the secular legitimation process of all forms of social organization regardless of their levels of technology or interdependence. However, having made sense of the world in this

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way, the United States exhibits a less common desire to change it. Additionally, the military, economic and communications power of the United States means that it is uniquely capable of projecting its vision of a `profane' and `sacred' world and acting abroad on the basis of claims of moral superiority. In other contexts such a vision might be turned inwards only for purposes of social management. The end of the Cold War offered the opportunity and the necessity for a shaping of the collective memory about the Cold War and about the United States' historic role and mission in the world. In this regard it is important to note that there were remarkable similarities in the rhetoric of Bush and Clinton, despite their policy differences and different leadership styles. Both referred to the Cold War as a period of purpose and clarity but also a period of `darkness' and `distortion'; both argued that American success in the Cold War had been due to American exceptionalism; both asserted that victory had reaffirmed the superiority of American values and validated American activism as well as creating new responsibilities; both endorsed the post-World War Two Transatlantic system of collective security, free trade, and political openness as the model for future international orders; both considered the Gulf War to have been necessary and to have increased American prestige; both portrayed the US±Soviet/Russian relationship as a `mutually advantageous' or `mutually beneficial' `partnership' and referred to shared histories and values; both employed images of frontier-crossing. For Bush, the `next frontier' was still in Europe, at the interface between East and West, and the United States' mission was to spread democracy.96 Clinton described `the global economy' as the `new frontier' and spoke of pushing back `the frontiers of knowledge' and offering Americans `the right and the power to explore the frontiers of science and technology and space',97 but he also maintained a commitment to spread democracy. Both warned of the likelihood of `post-Cold War' disorder ± though Bush emphasized the international challenges and Clinton described a domestic dystopia. Both identified a central role for ideas, and para-ideological influence, in the stabilizing of international relations.98 This official public diplomacy in dialogue and competition with that of the communication elite has produced some enduring `conventional wisdom': (1) the Cold War was primarily a contest of rival ideas/social systems. Each side acted in good faith, driven by similar motives, but the Soviets were misguided; (2) the United States' steadfastness in the support of principle, its refusal to be swayed or contaminated, explains its eventual victory; (3) as a consequence of the Cold War, the capitalist/democratic way of life has been proven to be the superlative form of socioeconomic and political organization but a conservative position of maintaining US superiority is preferable to revolutionary one of spreading such values unless it can be done diplomatically; (4) the US role in the Cold War should be considered in light of World War Two, not its later manifestations in Vietnam and Latin America,


as conservative, defensive and sensible; (5) the Cold War maintained global peace and stability and prevented hot wars, as the recent upsurge in ethnic conflicts and civil wars has illustrated; (6) foreign policy making during the Cold War was easier because the cause and enemies were clear, and the required responses straightforward ± containment in particular was uncomplicated in pursuit and execution. Vietnam policy entailed deviations away from the original containment doctrine and therefore resulted in failure; (7) NATO is the proven vehicle for effective intervention but prior lipservice must be paid to broader multilateralism in acknowledgement of the changed strategic environment. The possible long-term effects of these presumptions shaped and solidified between 1989 and 1993, rooted as they are in a longerstanding sense of American exceptionalism, are briefly the subject of the next section.

Towards soft hegemony? Can the reluctance to intervene, or support interventions in Bosnia and Rwanda in the early 1990s be linked with long-standing attitudes to Europe and power-sharing, and fear of `profane' but alluring others that threaten a recurring `quagmire'? May it be linked to post-Cold War ambivalence and self-flagellation about exceptionalism, and perceptions that the lessons of the Cold War were `containment works', àct on principle', `choose a side and stick with it'? Operational coding that promotes prudence but shortcircuits when the `sacred' and `profane' are blurred are also relevant here. There is a tight relationship between elite legitimacy and a society's cultural values. The relationship between `cultural system, institutional order and individual conduct' is a `constitutive' one,99 and it is dynamic and evolutionary. The Clinton Administration has initiated and participated in several limited uses of force ± police action and humanitarian ± including eventually Bosnia. It has been highly active and engaged in foreign affairs at the levels of international economic institutions, military alliances, routine diplomacy, and, increasingly, in both official mediation in foreign conflicts and the provision of supporting proxies/track-two diplomats (see the WTO deliberations, NATO expansion, Northern Ireland, and the Dayton Process). In many ways the evolution of US foreign policy after the Cold War has seen a reaffirmation of traditional dichotomies ± the historic tension, as Hoffman has put it, between a desire for harmony and an instinct for violence remains, a sense of the sacred and profane is evident in the development of a `rogue states' foreign policy since 1993; and in the contrast between this policy and conflict resolving diplomacy of the Clinton Administration as in Bosnia/Dayton (1995 and after) and Northern Ireland. However, the recent US involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process has provided a discrete test case of a `soft' power intervention, one

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which offers intriguing possibilities for the future exercise of US power abroad. While the economic incentives offered by the United States (mostly from private investors) may constitute a `hard power' device, the `soft power' elements ± official visits, speeches, statements, use of mediators and intermediaries for example ± were the structuring and framing devices. The Northern Ireland case shows, as theorized by Nye, how `soft power' intervention is useful if one state (or other actor) wishes to influence another when ìntense relationships of mutual influence exist between [them]' and `force is irrelevant or unimportant as an instrument of policy'.100 `Soft' forms of power increase in importance as the state is in semi-retreat and corporations and transnational networks increasingly shape the actors, norms, and dynamics of the international system. A policy of `soft' intervention might be compatible with the strengthening modus operandi of a global political system that increasingly relies upon competitive agenda-setting and `spin control', as well as potentially relevant to the post-Cold War strategic environment, in which confidence and community-building may be the only affordable approaches to preventing and defusing multiple, simultaneous tensions and conflicts. Increasing reliance on diplomacy and public diplomacy as foreign policy instruments reflects the US public's tolerance for soft engagement as a means to reduce the need for military engagement. As early as 1993, Presidential Decision Directive 25 stated that for some UN peacekeeping operations the United States would offer its ùnique capabilities', listed as logistics, intelligence, public affairs and communications, rather than a commitment of forces. It might be argued that this is a potentially or relatively `non-violent' form of intervention. However, such an approach might be seen by allies to be lacking sufficient commitment and may be perceived as cultural and ideological imperialism or retrograde paternalism. Such an approach could not be successful without accompanying economic measures from some source(s), whether as aid, investment, or sanctions. It would not solve the problem of which states or agencies would put troops on the ground if necessary. Indeed, some would argue that it might dangerously slow responses to military threats.101 In the Northern Ireland case the United States' cultural links with Ireland and the absence of a history of domination/imperialism between them made a `soft power' intervention more likely to be a success. But this would not hold true for another country where the history of its relationship with the United States is less romanticized, intertwined, supportive, or benign. Yet, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake reportedly saw the Northern Ireland intervention as à struggle for the soul of American foreign policy'.102 And as this study of the centrality of the idea of exceptionalism to US foreign policy shows, some form of hegemony is almost essential for the United States ± part of the institutional and cultural soil. A `soft' hegemony expression of American exceptionalism could be perceived as its culmination for it


suggests a balance between the maintenance of a missionary role and national well-being. Soft hegemony may provide the solution to the historical dilemma of American exceptionalism ± how to have involvement without commitment, control without contamination, perhaps even appropriation without moral peril. While potentially nationally and ideologically satisfying in this way, such a development would undoubtedly be greeted with deep ambivalence abroad. The United States' diplomacy and public diplomacy already has inordinate influence on international relations. Official public diplomacy is the face that the US government presents to its people and the United States presents to the world. It is essential to the development of sympathetic public ecologies that enable the uses of US power abroad. Even if it was created without thought or strategizing (and the evidence suggests that the opposite is true), this public diplomacy has deep consequences. It creates confidence and clarity at home and abroad, or it fosters insecurity. And what the United States says it will do influences the action/policies of other states (whether the US means what it says or not). This is particularly true of countries which do not have strong ties with the United States or where private diplomacy is scarce or especially charged, difficult, or contentious. And as in the past, the use of the exceptionalism theme has the potential to further peace or to promote unstable international relations. As the primary cultural/para-ideological influence on US foreign policy, one which incorporates entrenched conceptions of power, difference/deviance, and progress, it merits continuing analysis.

Notes Introduction 1 Susan D. Moeller, Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death (New York: Routledge, 1999). 2 See Robert I. Rotberg and Thomas G. Weiss (eds), From Massacres to Genocide: the Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises (Washington, DC & Cambridge, MA: Brookings Institution & The World Peace Foundation, 1996). 3 See, for examples, Alicia Barcena, `The Role of Civil Society in Twenty-First-Century Diplomacy', in James P. Muldoon Jr, JoAnn Fagot Aviel, Richard Reitano and Earl Sullivan (eds), Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations Today (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), pp. 190±200; and Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). 4 Reported in `The fire is being rekindled', Economist, 7 March 1998, p. 55. It was further reported that `Foreign ministers of United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia are to meet next week to ensure [Serbia] gets no more garbled messages'. 5 For findings and discussion of the role of domestic coalition-building, societal structure, and state institutions (but not culture and media) in shaping the foreign policies of the United States, Japan, France, and Germany, see Thomas RisseKappen, `Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies', World Politics, 43, July 1991, pp. 479±512. 6 Majid Tehranian, Global Communication and World Politics. Domination, Development and Discourse (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 63±6. 7 Robert E. Denton and Gary C. Woodward, Political Communication in America, 2nd edn (New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 9, 11. 8 Jarol B. Manheim, `The War of Images: Strategic Communication in the Gulf Conflict', in Stanley A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War. Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (Pittsburgh/London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), p. 156. 9 Manheim, `The War of Images', pp. 166±7. 10 This approach has been influenced by those of Mary E. Stuckey and Frederick J. Antczak, `The Battle of Issues and Images. Establishing Interpretive Dominance', in Kathleen E. Kendall (ed.), Presidential Campaign Discourse. Strategic Communication Problems (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995) and Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 103±4. 11 See Denise M. Bostdorff, The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 5±6, 8; and Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 181. 12 See in particular Emile Durkheim's, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (New York: The Free Press, 1965); and Clifford Geertz, Ìdeology as a Cultural System' in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973). Also very useful and perceptive on these issues is Enrico

165

166 Notes

13

14

15 16

17 18 19 20

21

22

Augelli and Craig N. Murphy, `Consciousness, Myth and Collective Action: Gramsci, Sorel and the Ethical State', in Stephen Gill and James H. Mittleman (eds), Innovation and Transformation in International Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Many different units of analysis are possible, for example, ideas and/or discourse, norms or identities may be the focus or the emphasis may be on the social construction and interplay of relations between individuals and institutions, between various state institutions, between states themselves, or between states and non-state actors. Constructivism has also been called `reflectivism' and `critical reflectivism', and post-structuralists, feminists and critical theorists, as well as the `LSE' or English school of International Relations, are often considered part of this very broad church. See for examples, Wendt (1999), Ruggie (1998), Kubalkova, Onuf & Kowert (1998), Larsen (1998), Ashley, Linklater, and Sylvester in Steve Smith et al. (1996), Finnemore (1996), Katzenstein (1996), Friedman & Starr (Routledge, 1997), Lapid & Kratochwil (1996), Onuf (1989), and Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez & Boli (1987). For a good discussion of this see Hans-Peter Muller, `Social Structure and Civil Religion: Legitimation Crisis in a Late Durkheimian Perspective', in Jeffrey C. Alexander (ed.), Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 129±58: 131. For a similar analytical approach in political communication studies, called constructionism see Ann N. Crigler (ed.), The Psychology of Political Communication (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1998) for a useful study in this field. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, pp. 240±3. For another study of US foreign policy drawing on a Durkheimian model of myth see, Stephen W. Twing, Myths, Models, and US Foreign Policy: the Cultural Shaping of Three Cold Warriors (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998). William F. Leuchtenberg, `The New Deal and the Analogue of War', in John Braeman, Robert Bremner, and Everett Walters (eds), Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century America (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1964). Paul A. Chilton, Security Metaphors. Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House (New York etc.: Peter Lang, 1996). Claus Mueller, The Politics of Communication: a Study in the Political Sociology of Language, Socialization, and Legitimation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 101, 108. Although exceptionalism could be seen as a synthesis, a blend (of thesis ± value and anti-thesis ± strategy) producing a coherent new ideational product different from its component parts and in which component parts are not readily observable, I prefer syncretization which suggests a joining of value and strategy in a dynamic process of continuing creation perhaps on the way to a completed synthesis. Dalby, for example, discusses this issue in the light of US security discourse. See Simon Dalby, `Security, Modernity, Ecology: the Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourses', Alternatives. Social Transformation and Humane Governance, 17, 1992, pp. 95±134: 106. Benedict Anderson's study of the development of nationhood conceptions is useful here, see Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).

Notes 167 23 The term `soft power' describes an intangible resource, an ability to persuade based on reputation, ideological, cultural, or institutional attractiveness. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr, `Soft Power', Foreign Policy, 80, Fall, 1990. 24 Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 103±4; Paul E. Corcoran, Political Language and Rhetoric (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1979), p. 204. 25 Denton and Woodward, p. 11. 26 Glen E. Thurow and Jeffrey D. Wallin, Rhetoric and American Statesmanship (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press/Claremont Institute, 1984), p. 5. 27 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 115. 28 See Denton and Woodward, pp. 11 and 16. Closely related but not directly equivalent categories have been termed `representational' and ìnstrumental' forms of communications, see Ithiel de Sola Pool, `Trends in Content Analysis Today', in de Sola Pool (ed.), Trends in Content Analysis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), pp. 189±233. 29 Deborah Welch Larson, `Problems of Content Analysis in Foreign Policy Research: Notes from the Study of the Origins of the Cold War Belief Systems', International Studies Quarterly, 32, 1988, pp. 241±55: 248±50. 30 James N. Rosenau perceived public opinion in terms of moods and divided the public between òpinion makers', `the attentive public', and `the mass public', see Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York, 1967), and National Leadership and Foreign Policy: a Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 12±13. Gabriel Almond identified general public, attentive public and interest elites and described a division within government between administrative and political elites. Existing apart from these five groups and addressing each group he located a communication elite. See Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950). 31 Lasswell describes `specialized ``leaders''' similar to those found in some animal societies who stand apart from the herd or flock and create a disturbance whenever a dangerous change occurs in their surroundings thus stimulating the ` ``followers'' to adapt in an orderly manner', Harold D. Lasswell, in Lyman Bryson (ed.), The Communication of Ideas (New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1948) reprinted in Wilbur Schramm and Donald F. Roberts (eds), The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, revised edition (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972) pp. 84±99, and in particular p. 86. 32 Robert Jervis, Ìmages and the Gulf War', in Stanley A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War. Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), p. 175. See also Joseph Frankel's analysis of how an ìnterpretation' of a `perceived psychological environment' forms the foundation of policy-making and implementation, in National Interest (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), p. 110. 33 Carol Cohn, `Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals', SIGNS 12:4, Summer 1989, pp. 687±718. 34 Henry Kissinger, `Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy', in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy: a Reader in Research and Theory (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 262, 264. 35 Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 187.

168 Notes 36 Lyn Ragsdale, `The Politics of Presidential Speechmaking, 1949±1980', American Political Science Review, December 1984, via Hinckley, Barbara, The Symbolic Presidency. How Presidents Portray Themselves (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 25; and Dennis Simon and Charles Ostrom, `The Politics of Prestige: Popular Support and the Modern Presidency', Presidential Studies Quarterly 18:4, Fall 1988, pp. 742±55. 37 Tulis, pp. 181±2. This phenomenon is also identified in different ways by Samuel Kernell, Going Public (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1987); George Edwards, The Public Presidency (New York: St. Martins Press, 1983); Barbara Kellerman, The Political Presidency (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Theodore Lowi, The Personal President (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); and Ryan Barilleaux, The Post-Modern Presidency: the Office after Reagan (New York: Praeger, 1988). For further discussion of the development of the mass media see Stephen Ponder, Managing the Press. Origins of the Media Presidency, 1897±1933 (New York: St. Martin's 1998). 38 Denton and Woodward, p. 232. 39 Ibid., p. 232. 40 Denton and Woodward, p. 229. 41 Ibid., pp. 231±2. 42 Tulis, p. 187. 43 Denton and Woodward, p. 234. 44 Denise M. Bostdorff, The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), p. 13. 45 Denton and Woodward, p. 253. 46 Ibid., p. 243. 47 The exact evolution of the decision has been fully documented in Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford: University of California Press, 1992), p. 144. 48 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 219 ; see also Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks: February 21±June 5, 1947 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1964). 49 Leffler, p. 145. 50 Leffler, p. 145. Louis Halle argues that Truman's `salesmanship' priority resulted in the speech being badly written and incoherent, The Cold War as History (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 119. 51 `Daily Summary', 13 March 47, Record Group 69, Public Opinion Studies, box 3, Leffler, p. 145. 52 See, for example, Stephen E. Ambrose, The Rise to Globalism (Baltimore: Penguin, 1989), in particular, p. 87. 53 A detailed study of the rhetorical origins of the Cold War between 1945 and 1950 is provided by Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr, The Cold War as Rhetoric: the Beginnings, 1945±1950 (New York: Praeger, 1991). 54 Tulis. 55 Jarol B. Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: the Evolution of Influence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 6. 56 Ryan J. Barilleaux, The Post-Modern Presidency: the Office after Reagan (New York: Praeger, 1988), pp. 130±1; and Denton and Woodward, p. 55. 57 Barilleaux, pp. 135, 138. 58 Ibid., p. 136.

Notes 169 59 Rachel Holloway, À Time for Change in American Politics: the Issue of the 1992 Presidential Election', Robert E. Denton, Jr (ed.), The 1992 Presidential Campaign: a Communications Perspective (London: Praeger, 1992), pp. 143±4. 60 See Manheim, `The War of Images', pp. 163±5. 61 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (New York: HarperCollins, 1971), pp. 162, 172. 62 Acheson, `The President and the Secretary of State', in Don K. Price (ed.), The President and the Secretary of State (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1960), p. 44, quoted in Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 192. Another recent employee of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff described it as `more like tank warfare'. Fukuyama, interview with the author. 63 Denton and Woodward, p. 248; Tulis, p. 187; for historical examples see Denton and Woodward, pp. 246±8. 64 Examples are provided by Halperin, p. 190. 65 Ibid., p. 189. 66 Ibid., p. 187. See examples from the Johnson era provided in Philip Goulding, Confirm or Deny. Informing the People on National Security (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 323±33 and Halperin, p. 188. 67 Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: the Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 5. 68 David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision. Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (London: Free Press of Glencoe/Macmillan, 1963), pp. 71±9. 69 William Jefferson Clinton, quoted in Bob Woodward, The Agenda. Inside the Clinton White House (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 313. 70 Allison, p. 81. 71 Ibid., p. 83; and John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 71±3. 72 John Dumbrell (with a chapter by David M. Barrett), The Making of US Foreign Policy, second edition (Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 19. 73 Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 6±7, 31. 74 Ibid., p. 7. 75 Ibid., p. 10. 76 Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 104±5. 77 Ibid., p. 10. 78 Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics: the Dynamics of Agenda Building (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1983); and Baumgartner and Jones, p. 36. 79 Baumgartner and Jones, pp. 30, 36. 80 Ibid., p. 43. 81 Sarah MacManus, Young v. Old (Boulder: Westview, 1996), p. 222. 82 Ole Holsti, `The Belief System and National Images', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6, 1992, pp. 244±52. See also, Steve Smith and Richard Little (eds), Belief Systems and International Relations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). 83 Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1968), p. 165; Thomas L. Brewer and Lorne Teitelbaum, American Foreign Policy (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1997), p. 29; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Deborah Larson, Origins of Containment: a Psychological Expla-

170 Notes

84 85

86 87

88 89

90

91 92 93 94

nation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); James David Barber, Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1985); Graham Shepherd, `Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1969±1984: a Second Test of Interpersonal Generation Theory', International Studies Quarterly, 32, 1988, pp. 91±123; Alexander George, `The `Òperational Code'': a Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and DecisionMaking', International Studies Quarterly, 13:2, 1969, pp. 190±221; David G. Winter, `Presidential Psychology and Governing Styles: a Comparative Psychological Analysis of the 1992 Presidential Candidates', in Stanley A. Renshon (ed.), The Clinton Presidency: Campaigning, Governing and the Psychology of Leadership (Boulder: Westview, 1995). See Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); and Janis and Leon Mann, Decisionmaking: a Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977). In this case Norwegian oil policy is studied. See Michael J. Shapiro, G. Matthew Bonham and Daniel Heradstveit, À Discursive Practices Approach to Collective Decision-Making', International Studies Quarterly, 32:4, December 1998, pp. 397±419. Tulis, p. 190. Denton and Woodward, pp. 237, 244. Carter's 1979 speech at the US Naval Academy is said to exemplify this problem, for it exhibited an ìncompatible mixture' of Zbigniew Brzezinski's hawkish stance regarding the Soviet Union and Cyrus Vance's more accommodating position. Denton and Woodward, p. 253. Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power (New York: Atheneum, 1963), note on p. 25. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: HarperCollins, 1971). Allison applied the rational actor, organizational process and bureaucratic politics models to an analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and argued that these models complemented one another. The rational actor model illustrated `the broader context, the larger national patterns, and shared images' which had influenced US policy. The organizational process model uncovered the `routines that produce the information, alternatives, and action'. The bureaucratic politics model provided evidence of how individuals in government and their competing interests and politics affected the foreign policy. Each model provided the `context' for the application of the other model. Allison concluded that the best use of these models for analyzing foreign policy would be to apply them simultaneously to a given case. pp. 258±9. See `Lessons' of the Past: the Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 178; and also, Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: the Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: The Free Press, 1986). Henrik Larsen, Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis. France, Britain and Europe (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 198. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Real Politics: at the Center of Everyday Life (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 90. James N. Rosenau, `Foreign Policy as Adaptive Behavior. Some Theoretical Notes for a Theoretical Model', Comparative Politics, 2:3, 1970, pp. 365±87. Much of the work in this area has focused on uncovering the meanings and implications of canonical texts in the academic/policy orthodoxy of international relations. See for important examples, David Campbell, Writing Security: United

Notes 171

95 96 97 98 99

States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Jill Steans, Gender and International Relations (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998); V. Spike Peterson (ed.), Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992); James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds), International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings on World Politics (Lexington, MA: Lexington Press, 1989); and the valuable collection of essays compiled by Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman (eds), Post-Realism: the Rhetorical Turn in International Relations (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1996). Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1996), p. 12. Chilton, Security Metaphors, pp. 417±21. See Peter Haas (ed.), Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination: Special Issue of International Organization, 46:1, 1992. R. A. Bauer and C. L. Zimmerman have demonstrated that this is so in `The effect of an audience upon what is remembered', Public Opinion Quarterly, 20: 1956, pp. 238±48. Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 15. Hunt demonstrates how a conviction of national greatness, a fear of revolution, and a sense of racial hierarchy have shaped US foreign policy from its earliest times.

1 (R)evolution of an Idea 1 Hofstadter, quoted in Michael Kazan, `The Right's Unsung Prophet', The Nation, 248, 20 February 1989, p. 242, quoted in Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: a Double-Edged Sword (New York: Norton, 1997), p. 18. 2 As they are in the most recent exploration of Àmerican exceptionalism', by Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: a Double-Edged Sword, p. 19. 3 Stanley Hoffman, Primacy or World Order. American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), p. 6; and Gulliver's Troubles or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 181±4. 4 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J.P. Mayer, trans. George Lawrence (New York: Perennial, 1988), p. 35. 5 Winthrop, À Model of Christian Charity', 1630, reprinted in David A. Hollinger and Charles Capper (eds), The American Intellectual Tradition, Vol I, 1630±1865 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 15. 6 Perry Miller, Errand Into The Wilderness (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 1; and The Life of the Mind in America. From the Revolution to the Civil War (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1965), p. 49. 7 Richard M. Merelman, Making Something of Ourselves. On Culture and Politics in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 7. 8 William Earl Weeks, `New Directions in Early American Foreign Relations', Diplomatic History, Winter 1993, 17:1, p. 81; and Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx, The Character of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Vintage, 1998), pp. 241±2. 9 Paul A. Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1963), pp. 1±2; Carl Degler, Out of Our Past: the Forces that Shaped Modern America, third edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), pp. 495±6.

172 Notes 10 Daniel Bell, `The End of American Exceptionalism', quoted in his `''American Exceptionalism'' Revisited: the Role of Civil Society', The Public Interest, Spring 1989, 95, p. 42. 11 Jarol B. Manheim, Deja Vu. American Political Problems in Historical Perspective (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), p. 201. 12 Turner, `The Significance of the Frontier in American History', Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1893 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1894), pp. 201, 216, quoted in Richard White, `Frederick Jackson Turner and Buffalo Bill', in James R. Grossman (ed.), The Frontier in American Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 13. 13 Ibid. 14 Beveridge, Speech in the Senate, 9 January 1900, quoted in R.J. Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), p. 672. See also Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy. 15 See, Ernest Lee Tuveson, Redeemer Nation: the Idea of America's Millennial Role (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). 16 Woodrow Wilson, `Fourteen Points' Speech to Congress, 8 January 1918, reprinted in Marc A. Genest, Conflict and Cooperation. Evolving Theories of International Relations (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1996), p. 151. 17 Luce, quoted in Irving Louis Horowitz, `Histories, Futures, and Manifest Destiny', Society, July/August 1994, p. 12. 18 Forrestal Diaries, pp. 177±8, quoted in Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945±1980, fourth edition (New York: John Wiley, 1980), p. 67. 19 Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 356. 20 Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion. Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941±1949 (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970), p. x. 21 For a discussion related to this see John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe. Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 3. 22 George Kennan, Excerpts from Telegraphic Message from Moscow of February 22, 1946, in Memoirs: 1925±1950 (New York: Pantheon, 1967), p. 559 (Emphasis added). 23 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace, fifth revised edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978). 24 Morgenthau, Ànother ``Great Debate'': the National Interest of the United States', American Political Science Review, XLVI:4, December 1952, p. 961. 25 Morgenthau, `The Moral Dignity of the National Interest', in R.M. McIvor et al. (eds), Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture (New York: Harper, 1947), pp. 38±9. 26 Morgenthau, `The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: the National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions', American Political Science Review, XLVI:4, December 1950, p. 854. 27 Frank Tannenbaum, The American Tradition in Foreign Policy (Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Press, 1955), quoted in Armin Rappaport (ed.), Issues in American Diplomacy (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 15±16, 22±8. 28 See, Arthur Schlesinger Jr and Hans J. Morgenthau (eds), The Origins of the Cold War (Waltham, MA, 1971), pp. 43±5; Schlesinger, `Leninist Ideology and Stalinist Paranoia', in Thomas G. Paterson (ed.), The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1970), pp. 96±106.

Notes 173 29 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell, 1959), p. 11. 30 Ibid., pp. 9 and 306; and Williams, The Roots of Modern American Empire: a Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York: Random, 1969). 31 Ronald Steele, Pax Americana (New York: Viking Press, 1967), p. 16. 32 Tami R. Davis and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, `Citty Upon a Hill', Foreign Policy, Spring 1987, p. 26. 33 Hoffman, Primacy or World Order. American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), p. 21. 34 Richard Rosecrance (ed.), America as an Ordinary Country. US Foreign Policy and the Future (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976). 35 Bell, p. 205. 36 Quoted in Davis and Lynn-Jones, p. 27. 37 Quoted in Mike Bowker and Phil Williams, Superpower DeÂtente: a Reappraisal (London: SAGE/RIAA, 1988), p. 171. 38 Robert Endicott Osgood described the `ritual of flagellation' that accompanies foreign policy failures, see Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: the Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974), p. 307. 39 Miller, pp. 14±15. 40 Boorstin, p. 274. 41 Manheim, p. 266. 42 Ibid., p. 214. 43 Hoffman, Primacy, p. 6; Gulliver's Troubles, p. 181. 44 Reagan, Address to a group of evangelical Christians in Orlando, Florida, 1983, quoted in Davis and Lynn-Jones, p. 28. 45 Davis and Lynn-Jones, pp. 28, 29±30. 46 For an analysis of the role of the media in agenda-setting and `framing' as a rhetorical process and of the news media as a `political institution', see, Jim A. Kuypers, Presidential Crisis Rhetoric in the Post Cold-War World (London: Praeger: 1997), pp. 35±51, and Timothy E. Cook, Governing with the News: the News Media as a Political Institution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 47 What follows is an analysis of the ideas and arguments in news stories and opinion pieces which were catalogued under the key-words ènd of the Cold War' in the US National Newspaper Index for 1990 or found in specialized periodicals and scholarly books of the period. This is a substantially shortened version of this analysis, the full text of which may be found in the appendix of Siobhan McEvoy, Àmerican Exceptionalism and United States Foreign Policy: the Public Diplomacy of Bush and Clinton 1989 to 1993', doctoral dissertation, Cambridge University Library, Cambridge, UK. 48 See, for example, Henry Grunwald, `We Can Manage Without an Enemy', Washington Post, 8 March 1990, p. A27. 49 Ìn a Fast-Changing World, History Textbooks Become History', New York Times, 31 October p. B6; Peter Baker, À World to the Wise. High School Students Get Crash Course in Global Economic Competition', Washington Post, 5 March 1990, Business Section, pp. 1 and 30. 50 George Lardner, Jr, `CIA Seeks to Define New Role', Washington Post, 13 November 1990, pp. A1, 4.

174 Notes 51 CIA director, William Webster Speech to the Baltimore Foreign Affairs Council, reported in Lardner; and Stephen S. Rosenfeld, `The Paradox of Espionage', Washington Post, 19 January 1990, p. A21. 52 Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, ÙS±Soviet Scholarship Race Slows', Washington Post, 20 July 1990, p. E5. 53 Dale Russakoff, Ìn Europe, Changing with the Audience', Washington Post, 11 January 1990, p. A21. 54 Michael Wines, `Security Agency Debates New Role: Economic Spying', New York Times, 18 June 1990, pp. A1, 6; William Safire, `Spies of the Future', New York Times, 16 March 1990, p. A35. 55 Michael Wines, `Bush Scraps Intelligence Board, Appointing a New Panel of 6', New York Times, 17 July 1990, p. A6. 56 Dan Glickman, Democratic congressman from Kansas, quoted in Wines. 57 Patrick E. Tyler, `New Pentagon ``Guidance'' Cites Soviet Threat in Third World', Washington Post, 13 February 1990, p. A1, 9. 58 William W. Kaufmann, professor emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), quoted in Tyler, `New Pentagon', p. A9. 59 Laurie Goodstein, Ànti-War Movement Suffers Peace Deficit. Activists Turning Attention to Home Front', Washington Post, 3 June 1990, p. A3. 60 Steve Twomey, `Peace Board Put on the Defensive', Washington Post, 20 April 1990, p. B1. 61 Corn; Charles Krauthammer, `What's Left of the Left. After Socialism, an Agenda for Fracturing American Society', Washington Post, 21 December 1990, A19. 62 Will, Ènd of the ``Progressive'' Pilgrimage', Washington Post, 1 March 1990, p. A25. 63 Robin Toner, `For the Democrats Something Seems Missing: Fear', New York Times, 5 February 1990, p. A17. 64 Michael Oreskes, Èmpathy's Drawback: No Room to Disagree', New York Times, 13 February 1990, p. A18. 65 Alvin P. Sanoff, `The Cold War's Cultural Legacy', US News and World Report, 18 June 1990, pp. 48±50. 66 E.J. Dionne Jr, ` ``Defense Intellectuals'' in a New World Order', Washington Post, 29 May 1990, p. A10; and Roy J. Harris, `Peace games; after the Cold War, Rand remakes itself as a civilian expert; famous defense think tank now studies drug abuse, schools, teen sex habits; but the transition is bumpy', Wall Street Journal, 18 June 1993, p. A1. 67 Interview with Jeffrey B. Gaynor. 68 Richard Bernstein, Ìf They've Won, Can Conservatives Still Be Important?', New York Times, 14 January 1990, p. E24. 69 Probe International press release in Harper's Magazine, 281: 1684, September 1990, pp. 34 and 36. 70 Maynes, `For a New Foreign Policy', New York Times, 23 May 1990, p. A29. 71 Alvin P. Sanoff, `The Cold War's Cultural Legacy', US News and World Report, 18 June 1990, pp. 48±50. 72 See, for example, George R. Packard `The Coming US± Japan Crisis', Foreign Affairs, 66:2, Winter 1987±8, pp. 348±67; Pat Choate's Agents of Influence (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1990); Steven Schlossstein, The End of the American Century (Chicago: Congdon & Weed Inc, 1989) (in particular pp. xiii, 454, 457, 463, 480), and George Friedman and Meredith Le Bard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); and commentary in Michael Kinsley, `Reinventing the Yellow Peril', Washington Post, 6 September 1990, p. A27; Edwin McDowell, Àfter

Notes 175

73 74

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83

84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

the Cold War, the Land of the Rising Threat', New York Times, 18 June 1990, p. C3; Jim Hoagland, Òur Strange View of Asia', Washington Post, 11 December 1990, p. A23. Carl D'Angelo quoted in Carla Hall, `Vanishing Villains. Hollywood Casts Around For Replacement Rogues', Washington Post, 15 April 1990, pp. G1, 2. Meg Greenfield, `How the ``West'' was lost: with the threat from the East evaporating, what is the rationale for our involvement in the world?', Newsweek, 23 July 1990, p. 70; and Ìt Wasn't War, It Isn't Over', Washington Post, 10 April 1990, p. A23. Walter Russell Mead, Òn the Road to Ruin. Winning the Cold War, Losing the Economic Peace', Harper's Magazine, March 1990, pp. 59±64. Walter Russell Mead, Mortal Splendor: the American Empire in Transition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), p. 209. Buchanan, `Now that Red is Dead, Come Home America', Washington Post, 8 September 1991, pp. C1 and C4. Will, `Buchanan Takes Aim', Washington Post, 11 December 1991, p. A25. Joseph S. Nye, `No US Isn't in Decline', New York Times, 3 October 1990, p. A33; Nye, Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic, 1990), p. 239. Nye, Bound to Lead, p. 260. Henry R. Nau, The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy in the1990s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). Nau, p. 371. John M. Goshko, ÙS Aid to Eastern Europe Far Exceeds Original, Modest Offer', Washington Post, 20 July 1990, p. A14; and Judith Havemann, `Panel Suggests Eventual Termination of Radio Free Europe', Washington Post, 17 May 1990, p. A39. Tom Wicker, `The ``Super'' Concept', New York Times, 25 November 1990, Section 4, p. E11. Jim Hoagland, `The New World Order', Washington Post, 15 November 1990, p. A25; Dimitri Simes, `How Much Can Each Side Deliver', Washington Post, 9 September 1990, p. D1. Charles Krauthammer, `Misplaced Malaise', Washington Post, 9 March 1990, p. A23. Hobart Rowan, `Large Trade Surpluses Possible with Soviet Union, China and India', Washington Post, 21 February 1990, p. A8. Alice M. Rivlin, `New World, New Progress', Washington Post, 10 April 1990, p. A23; Rivlin had served as director of the Congressional Budget Office from 1975 to 1983. William Pfaff, `The Might, and Sense, of a Superpower', International Herald Tribune, 14 December 1990. See also his `Redefining World Power', Foreign Affairs, Winter 1991, pp. 34±48. William Safire, `Staying a Superpower', New York Times, 5 February 1990, p. A19. Charles Colson, Ìf Communism Fails, Do We Win?', Christianity Today, 33:14, 6 October 1989, p. 64. `No More Bad Guys?' Editorial, Christianity Today, 33:8, 12 May 1989, p. 16. Arthur D. Moore, Àfter the Thaw. Following Years of Secrecy and Stealth in Penetrating the Iron Curtain, Christian Ministries Struggle to Adjust to NowOpen Doors', Christianity Today, 34:7, 23 April 1990, pp. 21±4; and Àn Overdose of Glasnost. As Well-Meaning Westerners rush into Eastern Europe and the Soviet

176 Notes

93 94 95 96 97

98 99 100 101 102 103 104

105

106 107 108 109 110 111

Union, they may be hurting as much as helping', Christianity Today, 34:11, 20 August 1990, pp. 34±6. Quoted in Henry Allen, `Lost in Glasnost. The Cold War May Be History, but the Spoils are Spoiled', Washington Post, 12 March 1990, p. C1. Michael T. Klare, `The New World War', The Progressive, November 1990, 54:11, pp. 14±16. Charles Krauthammer, `No We're Not Spending Too Much on Defense', Washington Post, 28 September 1990, p. A27. Michael Wines, `Bush, to Guard Secrecy, Kills Espionage Agencies' Budget', New York Times, 1 December 1990, p. 10, and `Bush Says Bill Ignores His Powers', New York Times, 17 February 1990, p. 3. Al Kammen, `Historians Say Secrecy Distorts Foreign Policy Chronicle', Washington Post, 16 April 1990, p. A13; Warren I. Cohen, Àt the State Dept., Historygate', New York Times, 8 May 1990, p. A29; `History Bleached at State', editorial, New York Times, 16 May 1990, p. A20; Helen Dewar, `Senate Panel's Quest: Filling Gaps in History of Foreign Relations', Washington Post, 11 June 1990, p. A13. Anthony Lewis, Àfter the Cold War', New York Times, 10 July 1990, p. A20; `Still a Cold War for Aliens', Editorial, New York Times, 10 July 1990, p. A19. Haynes Johnson, `Refiguring the Cold War', Washington Post, 20 July 1990, p. A2. Lewis H. Lapham, Ànnus Mirabilis', Harper's Magazine, 280: 1676, January 1990, pp. 8±11. See Harries and Buckley, Ìs the Cold War Really Over?', and Peter W. Rodman, Ìs the Cold War Over?', Wilson Quarterly, 13:1, Winter 1989, pp. 39±42. Irving Kristol, Ìn Search of Our National Interest', Wall Street Journal, 7 June 1990, p. A14. Kristol, `The Challenge of a Political Reversal', Wall Street Journal, 17 December 1990, p. A8. See report in David Corn, `Rift on the Right: Life without the Red Menace', The Nation, 9 April 1990, pp. 484±7. Noam Chomsky, `The Dawn, So Far, Is in the East', The Nation, 250:4, 26 January 1989, pp. 130±3; E.P. Thompson, `History Turns on a New Hinge', The Nation, 250:4, 29 January 1990, pp. 117±22; `Beyond Summitry', Editorial, The Nation 250: 4, 18 June 1990, pp. 843±4; Joseph P. Manguno, `Warm Breezes Blowing From Europe Do Little to Thaw the Korean Cold War', Wall Street Journal, 12 January 1990, p. A8.; Tim Shorrock, `How Long Yet for Korea's Cold War?' The Nation, 28 January 1991, p. 82.; Andrew Kopkind, `The Old Gringos', The Nation, 27 November 1989, p. 625. `Some Like it Hot', Editorial, The Nation, 249: 22, 1989, pp. 775±6; `Half a Cold War', The Progressive, 54:3, March 1990, pp. 8±9; `Still Out in the Cold', Editorial, The Nation, 249:22, 25 December 1989, p. 774. Stephen van Evera, `The Case Against Intervention', Atlantic Monthly, July 1990, pp. 72±80. `Beyond Summitry'. `Half a Cold War', The Progressive 54:3, March 1990, pp. 8±9. `Stacking the Texts', The Progressive, 54:7, July 1990, p. 8. Katrina Vanden Heuvel, `Time to Turn Our Energies Inward', The Progressive, 54:11, November 1990, pp. 35±6. `Beyond Summitry', The Nation, 18 June 1990, p. 843. Pam Solo, `Rejecting Cold War Politics', The Progressive, 53:1, January 1989, pp. 18±19.

Notes 177 112 Owen Harries and William F. Buckley, Ìs the Cold War Really Over?', National Review, 10 November 1989, pp. 40±5. 113 Andrew L. Yarrow, `Kindly Reflections on the Carter Era', New York Times, 19 November 1990, p. A14; Sam Roberts, Àn Ex-President Bridging a Chasm as Volunteer', New York Times, 13 December 1990, p. B1; Art Harris, `Citizen Carter', Washington Post, 22 February 1990, pp. B1±2; Ann Devroy, `Nixon Library Dedicated as 3 GOP Presidents Praise `Àrchitect of Peace'' ', Washington Post, 20 July 1990, p. A5; Carla Hall, Àt Nixon's Library, a Staff Reunion', Washington Post, 20 July 1990, pp. D1 and 5. 114 Christopher Lasch, `The Costs of Our Cold War Victory', New York Times, 13 July 1990, p. A27. 115 Ibid. 116 John Mearsheimer, `Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security 15:1 (Summer 1990) pp. 5±56, and `Why We Shall Soon Miss the Cold War', Atlantic Monthly (August 1990), pp. 35±50. 117 See for example, Craig R. Whitney, `Promise of Yalta: Redeemed at Last?', New York Times, 17 July 1990, p.A1.; R.W. Apple, Jr. `The New Embrace. US Moves to Help Cold War Rival Much as It Aided World War Two Foes', New York Times, 13 December 1990, p. A22. 118 Robert J. Samuelson, `The Deceptive Decade', Washington Post, 7 March 1990, p. A27. A similar argument was made in Alvin P. Sanoff, `The Cold War's Cultural Legacy', US News and World Report, 18 June 1990, pp. 48±50. 119 `Half a Cold War', The Progressive, 54:3, March 1990, pp. 8±9. 120 John M. Goshko, ÙS Stake in Gorbachev's Survival Rises. Baltic Situation Causes Most Concern', Washington Post, 21 January 1990, p. A30. 121 Interview with David C. Acheson. 122 New York Times/CBS NEWS Poll, New York Times, 16 October 1990, p. A12. 123 Michael Oreskes, Às Election Day Nears, Poll Finds Nation's Voters in a Gloomy Mood', New York Times, 4 November 1990, pp. 1 and 34; Allen, `Lost in Glasnost. The Cold War May Be History, but the Spoils are Spoiled', Washington Post, 12 March 1990, p. C1. 124 Flora Lewis, `For a Sober Balance', New York Times, 1 December 1990, p. 25. 125 Francis Fukuyama, `The End of History?', National Interest, Summer 1989, pp. 3±18. The National Interest has a circulation of 5600. 126 Fukuyama, Àre We at the End of History?', Fortune, 15 January 1990, pp. 75±6, 78; Fukuyama, `Hussein Has Not Revived History', New Republic, 1 October 1990, p. 10; James Atlas, `What is Fukuyama Saying?', New York Times Magazine, 22 October 1989, pp. 38, 42, 54±5; Jonathan Alter, `The Intellectual Hula Hoop: Why the Hyping of ``The End of History'' Says More About Washington Than the Theory Itself', Newsweek, 9 October 1989, p. 39; Rae Corelli, `Scholars Debate Whether History Has Ended', Maclean's, 2 October 1989, pp. 56±7; Samuel C. Florman, `The End of History?', Technology Review 93:3, April 1990, p. 70; William F. Buckley, `The End of History', National Review 41:22, 24 November 1989, p. 62; John Gray, `The End of History ± or of Liberalism?', National Review 41: 20, 27 October 1989, pp. 33±6; Harvey J. Kaye, `The Concept of the `Ènd of History'' Constitutes a Challenge to the Liberal Consensus in Scholarship and in Public Life', Chronicle of Higher Education, 36:8, 25 October 1989, p. A 48; Samuel Huntingdon, `The Future of History: the Errors of Endism', Current, June 1990, pp. 18±24; Huntingdon, `No Exit: the Errors of Endism', National Interest 17, Fall 1989, p. 4; Lewis Lapham, Èndgames', Harper's Magazine,

178 Notes

127

128 129 130

131

132 133 134

135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142

November 1989, pp. 10±14; Christopher Hitchens, `Minority Report', The Nation, 25 September 1989, p. 302; `Time to Call History a Day', Economist, 16 September 1989, p. 48; Strobe Talbott, `The Beginning of Nonsense', Time, 11 September 1989, p. 39; John Elson, `Has History Come to an End? A Provocative Case: Democracy Has Outlived Communism', Time, 4 September 1989, p. 57; Ìs History Over?' National Review, 41:16, 1 September 1989, pp. 14±16. For example, the journal History Today hosted a discussion of the idea over five issues and from a variety of international perspectives; see History Today, July, August, September, October, December 1991 issues. A number of well-known neoconservatives and some liberals commented on Fukuyama's ideas; Bloom et al., `Responses to Fukuyama', National Interest, Fall 1989, pp. 3±16, 93±100. See also Timothy Burns (ed.), After History? Francis Fukuyama and his Critics (Lanham, MD: Rowen & Littlefield, 1994). Atlas. Labich et al., `The Year's 25 Most Fascinating Business People', Fortune, 1 January 1990, pp. 62±72. Robert Reich, Ìs Liberal Democracy the Hallmark of Our Era?', Wall Street Journal, 6 February 1992, p. A12; William H. McNeill, `History Over, World Goes On', New York Times Book Review, 26 January 1992, p. 14; Judith Weinraub, `Beginning at the End', Washington Post, 16 March 1992, p. C1; George Gilder, `Four Cheers for Liberal Democracy', Washington Post, 12 January 1992, X, p.1. Gilder. The book remained in the New York Times Best-Seller List for five weeks, outselling Richard Nixon's Seize the Moment, and enjoying popularity equal with both Al Gore's message of environmental crisis, Earth in the Balance, and Art Spiegelman's classic Maus II, see New York Times, 26 April 1992, 7, p. 30. It was named one of the New York Times `Notable Books of the Year' for 1992, New York Times, 6 December 1992, p. 57. Weinraub. James LeMoyne, Òut of the Jungle ± in El Salvador, Rebels With a New Cause', New York Times, 9 February 1992, 6, p. 24. Michiko Kakutani, `Critic's Notebook; Making a Literary Lunge into the Future', New York Times, 21 February 1992, p. C1; Lynne V. Cheney, `The End of History', Wall Street Journal, 20 October 1994, p. A26; Kaye, Higher Education Chronicle; Albert L. Weeks, `Patriotic Fervor is Genuine', New York Times, 1 March 1992, Sports 8, p. 9; Tom Clancy and Russell Seitz, `Nuclear Ubiquity: the End of Atom Secrecy', Washington Post, 5 January 1992, p. C1; Nicholas Lemann, `The Smart Club Comes to the White House', New York Times, 29 November 1992, p. 11. See Craig R. Whitney, `The World; the New Era Still Demands Bold Strokes of Leadership', New York Times, 5 July 1992, 4, p. 3. Huntington, Current. William F. Buckley, `The End of History', National Review, 24 November 1989, p. 62. Talbot, Time. Christopher Hitchens, `Minority Report', The Nation, 25 September 1989, p. 302. Richard Peet, `Reading Fukuyama: Politics at the End of History', Political Geography, 12:1, January 1993, 64±78, p. 65. Interview with Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama, National Interest, p. 18. Atlas.

Notes 179 143 See Michael Schudson's arguments on this point in `Ronald Reagan Misremembered' in David Middleton and Derek Edwards (eds), Collective Remembering (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 108±19: 118. 144 Michael Schudson, Watergate in American Memory: How We Remember, Forget and Reconstruct the Past (New York: Basic Books/HarperCollins, 1992), p. 55. 145 Harold D. Lasswell, in Lyman Bryson (ed.), The Communication of Ideas (New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 1948) reprinted in Wilbur Schramm and Donald F. Roberts (eds), The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, revised edition (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972) pp. 84±99, and in particular p. 86.

2 Rhetoric of Reconstruction: Containment, Union, and Exceptionalism 1 James Baker, Statement prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 20 June 1989, Bulletin, August 1989. 2 James Baker, Address to the Foreign Policy Association, New York City, 16 October 1989, Current Policy, 1213; and Address Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, 4 May 1989, Bulletin, July 1989. 3 Bush, Remarks at the Aspen Institute Symposium in Aspen, Colorado, 2 August 1990, Public Papers of the President (hereafter PPP). 4 Baker, `Democracy and American Diplomacy', Address to the World Affairs Council, Dallas, Texas, 30 March 1990, Department of State Press Release and Current Policy, 1266. 5 Baker, Address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors Convention, Washington, DC, 14 April 1989, Current Policy, 1162. 6 Patrick E. Tyler, `New Pentagon ``Guidance'' Cites Soviet Threat in the Third World', Washington Post, 13 February 1990, pp. A1, 9. 7 `For Soviets, Cheney Has Top 10 List', Washington Post, 20 July 1990, p. A17. 8 `Powell Says Defense Needs Massive Review,' Washington Post, 7 May 1990, pp. A1, 8. 9 Patrick E. Tyler, `CIA's Webster Says Soviet Military Threat Declining', Washington Post, 24 January 1990, p. A4. See also, Text of Statement to Senate Armed Services Committee, US Information Service Press Release entitled `Webster Says Soviet Strategic Might Still Be a Threat', 24 January 1990. The press headlined Webster's statement that the Soviet military threat had diminished, while the official text of the testimony highlighted the need for a strong intelligence capability in the face of a continued strategic challenge. 10 Molly Moore, `Bipartisan Panel Splits on Soviet Military Threat', Washington Post, 7 July 1990, p. A18. 11 Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Àmerica's Opportunities in Eastern Europe', Remarks before American Chamber of Commerce's International Forum, Washington, DC, 16 February 1990, Current Policy, 1250. 12 Duffy and Goodgame, Marching in Place: the Status Quo Presidency of George Bush (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), pp. 16, 22±8. See also, Dilys M. Hill and Phil Williams (eds), The Bush Presidency. Triumphs and Adversities (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 34, for analysis of the influence of different factions within the Republican right wing on the Bush Presidency. 13 See Hill and Williams, The Bush Presidency, p. 34. 14 Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, pp. 248±9.

180 Notes 15 James Baker III, `Democracy and American Diplomacy', Address to the World Affairs Council, Dallas, Texas, 30 March 1990, Department of State Press Release; and Address at Charles University, Prague, Czechoslovakia, 7 February 1990, Current Policy, 1248. 16 James Baker, Address to the Foreign Policy Association, New York City, 16 October 1989, Current Policy, 1213. 17 Responses to Questions Submitted by Xinhua of China, 16 February 1989, Dept of State Bulletin, May 1989. 18 Bush, Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina, Columbia, 12 May 1990, Current Policy, 1277. 19 See Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War, 2nd edition (London: Verso, 1986), pp. 20±2. 20 Baker also refused to describe the Cold War as over but during a visit to Moscow did say that it was `certainly moving in that direction', News Conference, Moscow, 11 May 1989, Bulletin July 1989. 21 George Bush, News Conference, Washington, DC, 27 January 1989, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 30 January 1989. 22 George Bush, Question and Answer Session with Reporters in Malta, 3 December 1989, PPP. 23 George Bush, Remarks at a Question and Answer Session at the Annual Dinner of the Business Council, 21 February 1990, PPP. 24 George Bush, President's News Conference Following Discussions with Prime Minister Toskiki Kaifu of Japan in Palm Springs, California, 3 March 1990, PPP. 25 Òur enemy today is uncertainty and instability, so the alliance will need to maintain a sound collective military structure with forces in the field, backed by larger forces that can be called upon in a crisis', Bush, Oklahoma State University Commencement, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 4 May 1990, CP 1276. 26 George Bush, Address at the Coast Guard Academy Graduation Ceremony, New London, Conn., 24 May 1989, Current Policy, 1178; Bush, Address at Boston University Commencement Ceremony, Boston, Mass., 21 May 1989, Current Policy, 1171; George Bush, Remarks on Departure for North Atlantic Council Meeting in Rome, 26 May 1989, Department of State Bulletin, 89: 2149, August 1989; Bush, Address at Texas A&M University's Commencement Exercises at College Station, 12 May 1989, Bulletin, 89: 2148, July 1989; Bush, Address before Polish Parliament, Warsaw, 10 July 1989, Bulletin, September 1989; Address at Karl Marx University of Economics, Budapest, 12 July 1989, Bulletin, September 1989; James Baker, Address Before the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 8 June 1989, Current Policy, 1181; Baker, Address Before the Foreign Policy Association, New York City, 16 October 1989, Current Policy, 1213; Robert M. Kimmit, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Address Before the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, Tokyo, 9 October 1989, Current Policy, 1221. 27 The report appeared in the New York Times, 10 September, 1989, p. 16, and was recounted in Richard A. Melanson, Reconstructing Consensus. American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War (New York: St. Martins, 1992), p. 211. 28 Melanson also makes this point, p. 211. 29 Baker, National Press Club. 30 Baker, Foreign Policy Association. 31 Bush, Texas A&M University. 32 Bush, Coast Guard Academy.

Notes 181 33 Raymond G.F Seitz, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, Statement for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 3 October 1989, Current Policy, 1220. 34 Robert M. Kimmit, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, address before the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, Tokyo, 8 October 1989, Current Policy, 1221. 35 Baker, National Press Club. 36 Baker, Address to the 1989 American Society of Newspaper Editors Convention, Washington, DC, 14 April 1989, Current Policy, 1162. 37 Eagleburger, Statement before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 12 June 1989, Current Policy, 1194. 38 Bush, Boston University. 39 London Declaration, 6 July 1990. PPP. 40 Bush, Remarks on Departure for North Atlantic Council Meeting in Rome, 26 May 1989, Bulletin, August 1989. 41 Bush, Address at Rheingoldhalle, Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, 31 May 1989, Current Policy, 1179. 42 Baker, Address at Vienna Ministerial, 6 March 1989, Current Policy, 1154; and Address Before the 1989 American Society of Newspaper Editors Convention, Washington, DC, 14 April 1989, Current Policy, 1162. 43 Baker, Vienna Ministerial. 44 Ibid. 45 Statement prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 20 June 1989, Bulletin, August 1989. 46 Baker, National Press Club. 47 Robert M. Kimmit, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Address Before the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, Tokyo, 8 October 1989, Current Policy, 1221. 48 Baker, National Press Club. 49 Eagleburger, American Chamber of Commerce. 50 Baker, News Briefing, London, 1 June 1989, Bulletin, August 1989. 51 Baker, American Society of Newspaper Editors. 52 James Baker, National Press Club. 53 Baker, News Conference, Department of State, 19 September 1989, Bulletin, November 1989. 54 Baker, Wyoming Ministerial, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 22 and 23 September 1989. 55 Baker, Foreign Policy Association, New York City, on 16 October 1989, Current Policy, 1213; Baker, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 1 February 1990, Current Policy, 1245. 56 Baker, Foreign Policy Association, New York City, 16 October 1989, Current Policy, 1213; and Address Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, 4 May 1989, Bulletin, July 1989. 57 Statement prepared for Senate Finance Committee, 4 October 1989. Bulletin, December 1989. 58 Ibid. 59 White House Factsheet on the new National Security Strategy Report, 20 March 1990, PPP. 60 Bush, Coast Guard Academy, 24 May 1989, Current Policy, 1178. 61 Baker, American Society of Newspaper Editors and Foreign Policy Association. 62 Declaration on East±West Relations, Summit of the Arch, Paris, 14±16 July 1989. Bulletin, September 1989. Baker clarified the meaning of `rule of law' as `the

182 Notes

63 64 65

66 67 68 69

70 71 72 73 74

75 76 77 78 79 80 81

supremacy of laws written through democratic processes, applied in an equal fashion, applied by independent judiciaries', see, Baker, Remarks Before CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension, Copenhagen, 6 June 1990, Current Policy, 1280. Baker, Address Before the Asia Society, New York City, 26 June 1989, Bulletin, August 1989. Raymond G.F. Seitz, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, Statement to the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 3 October 1989, Current Policy, 1220. Baker, Interview by Tass and Izvestiya, Moscow, 11 May 1989, Bulletin, July 1989. `Continuity' had been Baker's prediction from the beginning of the policy review, see Interview with Leslie Stahl on `Face the Nation', 26 February 1989, Bulletin, May 1989. Baker in interview with Morton Kondracke for PBS program American Interests, 19 April 1989, broadcast 22 April, Bulletin, June 1989. Baker, News Conference, White House, 23 May 1989, Bulletin, July 1989; Bush, Statement and Question and Answer Session, Brussels, 29 May 1989, Bulletin, August 1989. Baker, Address to Berlin Press Club, Berlin, Germany, 12 December 1989, Bulletin, December 1989. Baker, Address at Charles University, Prague, Czechoslovakia, 7 February 1990; and Address Before the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, upon receiving the Seventh Annual Hans J. Morgenthau Memorial Award, New York City, 14 May 1990, Current Policy, 1278. Eagleburger, American Chamber of Commerce. This was pointed out by Fukuyama himself. Interview with the author at George Mason University, Washington, DC, 17 October 1997. Baker, Vienna Ministerial; Bush, Rheingoldhalle, Mainz; and Bush, Boston University. Eagleburger, Statement Before a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States (OAS), 24 August 1989, Bulletin, November 1989. The Wyoming Ministerial, 22±23 September, was an important prologue to these summits and provided an occasion for broad-ranging talks on US±Soviet relations prior to fuller dialogue. Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze discussed arms control and disarmament, regional conflict, human rights, co-operation on atomic energy, international terrorism, co-operation on bilateral and international environmental problems, and narcotics trafficking. Interview with Fukuyama. Address to the American People from Camp David, Maryland, on 22 November 1989, Vital Speeches LVI:5, 15 December 1989. Baker, Address at Vienna Ministerial, 6 March 1989, Current Policy, 1154. Bush, Boston University, 21 May 1989, Current Policy, 1177. Abraham Lincoln, From the Annual Message to Congress, 1 December 1862, in Cuomo and Holzer (eds), Lincoln on Democracy (New York: HarperCollins, 1990) pp. 264±9. Bush, Remarks to the Crew and Guests on the USS Forrestal in Malta, 1 December 1989, PPP. Bush, News Conference Following Discussions with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan, PPP.

Notes 183 82 Ibid. 83 Bush, Remarks at Welcoming Ceremony in Brussels, 3 December 1989, PPP. 84 Bush, Remarks Introducing the Presidential Lecture Series, Washington, DC, 7 January 1990, PPP. 85 Bush, Remarks at Catholic University of America Anniversary Dinner, Washington, DC, 12 December 1989, PPP. 86 Fitzwater, interview on television program Investigative Reports, A&E, 23 July 1995. 87 See Don Oberdorfer, Àltered Superpower Ties Exemplified by Romania', Washington Post, 1 January 1990, pp. A1, 27. 88 Bush, Question and Answer Session with Students at John F. Kennedy High School in Denver, Colorado, 8 December 1989, PPP. 89 The term is used by Thomas Bender in `The Cultures of Intellectual Life: the City and the Professions', in John Higham and Paul K. Conkin (eds), New Directions in American Intellectual History (London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1979), p. 181. 90 Bush, New Year's Message to the People of the Soviet Union, 1 January 1990, PPP. 91 Baker, Confirmation Hearing Address Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 17 January 1989, Bulletin, April 1989; and Address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors Convention, Washington, DC, 14 April 1989, Current Policy, 1162. 92 Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Statement before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 22 June 1989, Current Policy, 1194. 93 Seitz, House Foreign Affairs Committee. 94 Kimmit, Toyko. 95 Eagleburger, American Chamber of Commerce. 96 Baker, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 1 February 1990, Current Policy, 1245. 97 Baker, Testimony Before House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, 22 February 1990, USIS Press Release, February 27, 1990. 98 Baker, Statement Before Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Washington, DC, 1 May 1990, Current Policy, 1274; Baker, Senate Foreign Relations, 1 February 1990; Kimmit, Statement Before Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, 27 February 1990, Current Policy, 1260. 99 Cheney, Address to the Federalist Society Conference on the Presidency and Congress, 19 January 1990, Vital Speeches LVI:I, 15 March 1990. 100 John M. Goshko, ÙS Aid to Eastern Europe Far Exceeds Original, Modest Offer', Washington Post, 20 July 1990, p. A14. 101 Bush, Interview with Foreign Journalists, Washington, DC, 1 April 1990, PPP. 102 Bush, Remarks at the Catholic University of America Anniversary Dinner, 12 December 1989; Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters, 29 January 1990, PPP. 103 Bush, Remarks to the American Farm Bureau Federation in Orlando, Florida, 8 January 1990, PPP. 104 Bush, Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Charles Stark Draper Prize for Engineering, 20 February 1990, PPP; Remarks to National Academy of Sciences, 23 April 1990, PPP.

184 Notes 105 Bush, Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Broadcasters in Atlanta, Georgia, 2 April 1990, PPP. 106 Bush, Remarks to National Association of Manufacturers, 15 March 1990, PPP. 107 Bush, Remarks at White House briefing for the Associated General Contractors of America, 24 April 1990; Remarks at a Question and Answer Session with the National Association of Agricultural Journalists, 24 April 1990, PPP. 108 Bush, Remarks on the Signing of the Martin Luther King, Jr, Federal Holiday Proclamation, 9 January 1990, PPP. 109 Remarks to Members of the National Governors' Association, 26 February 1990, PPP. 110 Bush, Question and Answer Session with the Youth Collaborative Mentor Group in Cincinnati, Ohio, 12 January 1990, PPP. 111 Bush, Commencement Address at University of South Carolina, Columbia, 12 May 1990, Current Policy, 1277. 112 Bush, Remarks to Chamber of Commerce in Cincinnati, Ohio, 12 January 1990, PPP. 113 Bush, News Conference, Washington, DC, 13 March 1990, PPP; and Address to Congress, 31 January 1990, PPP. 114 Remarks at Republican Fundraising Dinner in Los Angeles, California, 6 February 1990, PPP. 115 Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) pp. 103±4. 116 Eagleton, Talking Liberties (Channel Four Broadcasting Support Services: 1992). 117 Geertz, Ìdeology as a Cultural System', in The Interpretation of Cultures; Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 218. 118 Interview with Elliot Abrams. 119 Elliott Abrams, `Bush's Unrealpolitik', New York Times, 30 April 1990, p. A17. 120 Interview with Andrew Natsios, 11 January 1995. See also Duke University's James David Barber, `The Silver Spoon in Bush's Mouth, and Policies', New York Times, 27 January 1990, p. A27. 121 Andrew Rosenthal, `Bush Yields to an Impulse to Stay Cautious about the Soviets', New York Times, 11 February 1990, Section 4, p. E2. 122 See Richard Gephardt, `Bush's Lack of Vision', Washington Post, 7 March 1990, p. A18; Robert Shogan, ÙS Urged to Aid Soviets, E. Europe', Los Angeles Times, 7 March 1990, p. A5; and George F. Will, `The Empty Presidency', Washington Post, 21 January 1990, p. B7. 123 Charles Peters, `Disturbing Signs from the Bush Team', New York Times, 15 January 1990, p. A17. 124 Mary McGrory, `Two Contrasting Bushes', Washington Post, 16 August 1990, p. A2; Edward Luttwak, `Bush Has the Momentum, But What About His Mess at Home?', Washington Post, 9 September 1990, p. D1. 125 Richard J. Cattani, `Baker's Foreign Policy Style', Christian Science Monitor, 8 March 1990, p. 18. 126 Joshua Maravchik, `New Isolationism, Same Old Mistake', New York Times, 28 August 1990, p. A21. The author was a fellow of the American Enterprise Institute. 127 See Ann Devroy, `Gorbachev's US Itinerary Poses Scheduler's Nightmare: Free Time', Washington Post, 23 May 1990, p. A6; David Hoffman and Ann Devroy, `Gorbachev to Tour Parts of US after Summit', Washington Post, 15 May 1990, p. A7; Andrew Rosenthal, `Gorbachev's Surprise: an Extra Day for Tours, and

Notes 185

128 129 130 131 132 133

134 135

Breakfast with Reagan', New York Times, 16 May 1990, p. A8; ÙCLA Hears Soviet ``Messenger of Peace'' ', New York Times, 18 June 1990, p. B9. Bush, Dinner Toasts, Washington Summit, 1 June 1990, Bulletin, July/August 1990; and Remarks on signing of Soviet±United States Bilateral Agreements, Washington Summit, 1 June 1990, PPP. Bush, Fundraising Breakfast for Governor Terry Branstad in Des Moines, Iowa, 8 June 1990, PPP. Bush, Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for the Houston Economic Summit, 9 July 1990, PPP. `Gorbachev Receives Five Humanitarian Awards', Washington Post, 2 June 1990, p. A15. Mikhail Gorbachev, speech at Stanford University, California, 4 June 1990, Bulletin, July/August 1990. Baker received the George Kennan Award from the American Committee on US± Soviet Relations on 19 October 1990, Foreign Policy Bulletin, Nov/Dec 1990. He accepted the Seventh Annual Hans J. Morgenthau Memorial Award from the Committee on American Foreign Policy on 14 May 1990, Current Policy, 1278. See London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, 14 July 1990, PPP; Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for the Houston Economic Summit, 9 July 1990, PPP. Fitzwater, Call The Briefing! Reagan and Bush, Sam and Helen: a Decade with Presidents and the Press (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 229±43.

3 Crisis, Community, and the Persian Gulf 1 Bush, Exchange with Reporters Aboard Air Force One on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 10 August 1990, PPP. 2 Henry Kissinger, `False Dreams of a New World Order', Washington Post, 26 February 1991, p. A21. 3 Bush, Remarks to Returning Troops in Sumter, South Carolina, 17 March 1991, PPP; Bush, Remarks to American Legislative Exchange Council, 1 March 1990, PPP; Bush, News Conference, 5 February 1991, PPP. 4 Hussein's complex rationales for the invasion of Kuwait are usefully summarized in Kendall Stiles, Case Histories in International Politics (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 138±50. 5 Wilson, speech at Brooklyn Navy Yard; and Bush, Remarks at a Memorial Service for Those who Died in the Persian Gulf, in Arlington, Virginia, 8 June 1991, PPP 1991: I. 6 Bush, Remarks at a Memorial Service in Arlington, Virginia for Those who Died in the Persian Gulf Conflict, 8 June 1991, PPP. 7 Stiles, p. 140. 8 Bush, News Conference with Regional Reporters, 18 December 1990, PPP. 9 Jenifer Warren, Ìraqi Move Confirms Need for US Arms Spending, Cheney Says', Los Angeles Times, 13 September 1990, p. A13. 10 Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: the Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (New York: Little, Brown, 1993), pp. 253±5. 11 Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, 8 August 1990, PPP.

186 Notes 12 Bush, Remarks to Returning Troops in Sumter, South Carolina, 17 March 1991, PPP; Bush, Remarks to American Legislative Exchange Council, 1 March 1990, PPP; Bush, News Conference, 5 February 1991, PPP. 13 Bush, News Conference, 14 August 1990, PPP. 14 Bush, Address Before 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 1 October 1990; Address to the German People on the Reunification of Germany, 2 October 1990, PPP; Remarks at the Ministerial Meeting in New York City of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1 October 1990, PPP. 15 Serge Schmemann, `Gorbachev Clears Way for German Unity, Dropping Objection to NATO Membership', New York Times, 17 July 1990, A1. 16 Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, statement to the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, 9 October 1990, USIS Press Release, 10 October 1990. 17 Bush, Joint News Conference with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Helsinki, 9 September 1990, PPP. 18 Baker, Remarks on receiving the George Kennan Award from the American Committee on US±Soviet Relations, 19 October 1990, Bulletin, November/December 1990. 19 Ibid. 20 Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf, 16 January 1991, PPP; and Remarks to the Raytheon Missile System Plant Employees in Andover, Mass., 15 February 1991, PPP. 21 See for example, David Hoffman, `Summit Decision Signals Superpower Cooperation', Washington Post, 2 September 1990, p. A1; and Los Angeles Times (editorial), 8 August 1990. 22 Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: the Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (New York: Little, Brown, 1993), pp. 295±7; Jim Hoagland, Àrchitect of a New Era', Washington Post, 21 December 1990, p. A19. 23 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Èxit the Georgian', Washington Post, 21 December 1990, p. A19; see also, Don Oberdorfer, Àltered Superpower Ties Exemplified by Romania', Washington Post, 1 January 1990, pp. A1, 27. 24 Beschloss and Talbott, p. 311. 25 Bush, News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 8 November, 1990, PPP. 26 Bush, Remarks on the Waiver of the Jackson±Vanik Amendment and on Economic Assistance to the Soviet Union, 12 December 1990 (Executive Order 12740, 29 December, Waiver under the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the Soviet Union, 56 F.R. 355), PPP; White House Fact Sheet on the Waiver of the Jackson±Vanik Amendment, 12 December 1990, PPP; White House Fact Sheet on the Medical Assistance Program for the Soviet Union, 12 December 1990, PPP; White House Fact Sheet on Technical Assistance in Food Distribution and Marketing for the Soviet Union, 12 December 1990, PPP; Excerpt of a White House Fact Sheet on the Soviet Union and International Financial Institutions, 12 December 1990, PPP. 27 Bush, Statement Announcing the Lifting of Restrictions on Soviet Business People in the United States, 13 August 1990, PPP. 28 Bush, Letter to Congressional Leaders on Textile, Apparel, and Footwear Trade Legislation, 17 September 1990, PPP. 29 Bush, Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Textile, Apparel, and Footwear Trade Act of 1990, 5 October 1990, PPP.

Notes 187 30 See for example, R.W. Apple Jr, `The New Embrace: US Moves to Help Cold War Rival Much as it Aided World War II Foes', New York Times, 13 December 1990, p. A22. 31 John Steinbruner, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, in an interview with the author, 10 January 1995. 32 Bush, Remarks at the Arrival Ceremony for Helsinki Summit, Finland, 8 September 1990, PPP. 33 Albert Wohlsetter and Fred Hoffman, `Confronting Saddam: a Model Danger', Wall Street Journal, 9 August 1990, p. A10. 34 The marginalization of critical voices has been documented and critiqued in many sources but a particularly thorough analysis may be found in Douglas Kellner, The Persian Gulf TV War (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992). 35 Washington Post, 9 December 1990. 36 E.J. Dionne Jr, Òdd Alliance Questions Gulf Policy. Coalition of Left and Right Unseen Since the Eve of World War II', Washington Post, 13 November 1990, p. A1. 37 See the multitude of articles and editorials of this subject in Christianity Today and The Christian Century. In 1991, the Persian Gulf War and aftermath was discussed in editorials in every issue of The Christian Century. 38 See for example, Josef Joffe, `How Saddam Won the War', Wall Street Journal, 31 October 1990, p. 14. 39 Bob Woodward, pp. 324±5. 40 Bush, News Conference, 30 November 1990, PPP. 41 Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), p. 323. 42 Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media, Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War (New York: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 5. 43 Bush, Remarks at Republican Campaign Rally in Mashpee, Massachusetts, 1 November 1990, PPP; Remarks at Republican Party Fundraising Breakfast in Burlington, Massachusetts, 1 November 1990, PPP; Remarks at a Fundraising Breakfast for Representative Stan Parris in Alexandria, Virginia, 31 October 1990, PPP; Remarks at Fundraising Dinner for Senatorial Candidate, Pat Saiki in Honolulu, Hawaii, 26 October 1990, PPP; Remarks at Campaign Rally for Gubernatorial Candidate Pete Wilson in Los Angeles, California, 26 October 1990, PPP; Remarks at a Republican Reception in Cincinnati, Ohio, 2 November 1990, PPP; Remarks at a Republican Campaign Rally in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 3 November 1990, PPP; Remarks at Republican Campaign Rally in Tyler, Texas, 5 November 1990, PPP; Bush, Remarks at Fundraising Breakfast for District of Columbia Mayoral Candidate Maurice Turner, 24 September 1990, PPP. 44 Marlin Fitzwater, Statement on President Bush's letter to President Hussein, 12 January 1991, PPP. 45 Bush, Q and A with Reporters, White House, 8 November 1990, PPP. 46 Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War, p. 70. 47 Ernest May has demonstrated this phenomenon in several different case studies of US foreign policy from World War Two to Vietnam. May, `Lessons' of the Past: the Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). 48 Nixon, Address to the Republican Congressional Committee, New York City, 7 December, 1990, Vital Speeches, LVII:12, 1 April 1991. 49 Beschloss and Talbott, pp. 140 and 354±7; see also William Safire, `The New Despotism', New York Times, 12 March 1992, p. A23.

188 Notes 50 Bush, Radio Address to the Nation on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 5 January 1991, PPP; Message to Allied Nations, 8 January 1991, PPP. 51 Baker, Statement Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 4 September 1990, Bulletin 1:2, September/October 1990. 52 Baker, Address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, 29 October 1990, Bulletin 1:3, November/December 1990. 53 Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing Deployment of US Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, 8 August 1990, PPP. 54 Bush, Remarks at a Republican Fundraising Breakfast in Burlington, Vermont, 23 October 1990, PPP. 55 Bush, Remarks at Republican Rally in Manchester, New Hampshire, 23 October 1990, PPP; Remarks at a Republican Campaign Rally in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 3 November 1990, PPP. 56 Bush, Remarks at a Fundraising Dinner for Gubernatorial Candidate John Rowland in Stamford, Connecticut, 23 October 1990, PPP; Remarks at a Fundraising Breakfast for Representative Stan Parris in Alexandria, Virginia, 31 October 1990, PPP. 57 Manheim, `The War of Images', p. 169. 58 Betty Glad makes this same point in `Figuring Out Saddam Hussein', in Whicker, Pfiffner and Moore (eds), The Presidency and the Gulf War, p. 67. 59 Bush, Address to the Nation on the Iraqi Statement on Withdrawal from Kuwait, 27 February 1991, PPP. 60 Bush, News Conference, Washington, DC, 18 January 1991, PPP; Bush, Interview with Middle Eastern journalists, 8 March 1991, PPP. 61 Bush, Remarks at Republican Campaign Rally in Mashpee, Massachusetts, 1 November 1990, PPP. 62 See Public Papers of the President for that month. According to Kellner, Bush mentioned the story eight times in 44 days, p. 67. 63 Kellner, pp. 67±71; and Jarol B. Manheim, `The War of Images: Strategic Communication in the Gulf Conflict', in Stanley A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War. Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (Pittsburg/London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), p. 169. 64 Taylor, War and the Media, p. 162 and Kellner, p. 70. 65 Kellner, pp. 70±1. 66 Raymond A. Moore, `Foreign Policy', in Dilys M. Hill and Phil Williams, The Bush Presidency: Triumphs and Adversities (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 30. 67 Bush, Remarks to Allied Armed Forces Near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 22 November 1990, PPP; News Conference, 30 November 1990; Q and A with reporters, 14 December 1990, all PPP. The Administration has since been proved correct about this. 68 Bush, Open Letter to College Students on the Persian Gulf, 9 January 1991, PPP. 69 Bush, Address Before the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 1 October 1990, Current Policy 1303. 70 Bush, Open Letter to College Students. 71 Bush, Remarks to Officers and Troops at Hickam Air Force Base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 28 October 1990, PPP. 72 Bush, Remarks at Fundraising Barbecue for Representative Bill Grant in Tallahassee, Florida, 6 September 1990, PPP. 73 Bush, Message to Allied Nations on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 5 January 1991, PPP.

Notes 189 74 Bush, Address Before Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 29 January 1991, PPP. 75 Bush, Address to 91st National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Baltimore, Maryland, 20 August 1990, Current Policy, 1294. 76 Bush, Address to employees at the Pentagon, 15 August 1990, Current Policy, 1293; Question and Answer Session at a White House Briefing for Representatives of the Arab-American Community, 24 September 1990, PPP. 77 Bush, Remarks to the Federal Assembly in Prague, Czechoslovakia, 17 November 1990, PPP; Bush, Remarks to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, in Paris, 19 November 1990, PPP. 78 Bush, Remarks at Republican Campaign Rally in Waco, Texas, 5 November 1990, PPP. 79 Bush, President's News Conference, 8 August 1990, PPP. 80 Baker, House Foreign Affairs Committee. 81 Bush, Remarks and Exchange with Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, 5 August 1990, PPP. 82 Beschloss and Talbott, pp. 340±1. 83 Bush, Veterans; and Pentagon. 84 Bush, Remarks to Community Members at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in Goldsboro, Georgia, 1 February 1991; Fort Stewart Air Force Base, Georgia, 1 February 1991, PPP. 85 This is Kellner's phrase adapted from the ironic title of James William Gibson's The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam (Boston/New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986). 86 Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, Washington, DC, 11 September 1990, Current Policy, 1298. 87 Baker, House and World Affairs Council. 88 Bush, Pentagon. 89 Bush, News Conference with Regional Reporters, 18 December 1990, PPP. 90 Bush, Remarks and Exchange with Reporters on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 3 August 1990, PPP. 91 For example, Washington Post, 12 December 1990, p. A34. 92 Bush, News Conference, 30 November 1990, PPP. 93 Ibid. 94 Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf, 16 January 1991, PPP. 95 See for example, Bush, Remarks to Veterans Service Organizations, 4 March 1991, PPP. 96 Bush, Remarks to the Reserve Officers Association, 23 January 1991, PPP. 97 Bush, Exchange with Reporters at Kennebunkport, Maine, 17 February 1991, PPP. 98 Bush, Remarks at a Meeting of the American Society of Association Executives, 27 February 1991, PPP. 99 Bush, Remarks to the American Legislative Exchange Council, 1 March 1991, PPP. 100 Bush, Radio Address to the Nation on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 5 January 1991, PPP. 101 Bush, Remarks to Returning Troops in Sumter, South Carolina, 17 March 1991, PPP. 102 Bush, Remarks to Returning Troops.

190 Notes 103 Baker, Question and Answer Session Following Statement, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 17 October 1990, Bulletin, November/December 1990. 104 Daniel Hallin, `TV's Clean Little War', Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 47:4, May 1991, pp. 16±20; Samuel Florman, Èngineers and the Nintendo War', Technology Review, 94:5, July 1991, p. 62; and Frank McConnell, `Nintendo from Hell: the Gulf War on the Tube', Commonweal, 118:4, 22 February 1991, pp. 134±5. 105 Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Crisis, 6 March 1991, PPP. 106 Ibid. 107 Bush, Remarks to American Legislative Exchange Council, 1 March 1991; and Radio Address to the United States Armed Forces Stationed in the Persian Gulf Region, 2 March 1991, PPP. 108 Bush, Remarks at Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters, 28 January 1991, PPP. 109 Bush, Remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast, 31 January 1991, PPP. 110 Baker, LA World Affairs Council. 111 Baker, House Foreign Affairs Committee; Bush, State of the Union, 1991, PPP. 112 Bush, Remarks at the Annual Southern Baptist Convention in Atlanta, Georgia, 6 June 1991, PPP. 113 Bush, Remarks at Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New Haven, Conn., 27 May 1991, PPP. 114 Bush, Remarks at Maxwell Airforce Base War College in Montgomery, Alabama, 13 April 1991, PPP. 115 Bush, State of the Union 1991. 116 Bush, Radio Address to the Nation on the Administration' s Domestic Agenda, 22 June 1991, PPP. 117 Bush, Address Before Joint Session of Congress, Washington, DC, 11 September 1990, Current Policy, 1298. 118 Ìf armed men invaded a home in this country, killed those in their way, stole what they wanted and then announced the house was now theirs ± no one would hesitate about what must be done. And that is why we cannot hesitate about what must be done halfway around the world: in Kuwait.' Bush, Open Letter to College Students. 119 Ibid.; and also Remarks at Gridiron Dinner, 23 March 1991, PPP. 120 Bush, Remarks at a Question and Answer Session at a Meeting of the Economic Club, New York City, 6 February 1991, PPP; Bush, Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy Commencement Ceremony in Colorado Springs, Colorado, 29 May 1991, PPP; Bush, Remarks to Members of the Defense Community at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, 11 June 1991, PPP. 121 Bush, Message to Congressional Leaders Transmitting the 1991 Economic Report, 12 February 1991, PPP. 122 Remarks at Crime Summit, March, 1991, PPP 1991: I. 123 Ibid. 124 Bush, Joint Session of Congress on Cessation, 6 March 1991, PPP; Bush, Remarks at the California Institute of Technology Commencement Ceremony in Pasadena, California, 14 June 1991, PPP. 125 Bush, Remarks at a Fundraising Dinner for Senatorial Candidate Bob Kasten in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 17 June 1991, PPP. 126 Bush, Remarks at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony in West Point, New York, 1 June 1991, PPP.

Notes 191 127 Bush, Remarks to the National Education Goals Panel, 3 June 1991, PPP. 128 Remarks by Senator John F. Kerry, 24 October 1990, Bulletin, November/December 1990, pp. 45±7. 129 Flynn, Òperation ``Domestic Order'', Devising a Fair Federalism', Commonweal, 19 April 1991, pp. 251±6. 130 Beschloss and Talbott, pp. 337±40; Stiles, p. 142. The Soviet peace plan entailed an end to sanctions before Hussein's withdrawal and did not provide for Iraqi reparations to Kuwait. 131 Stephen S. Rosenfield, Àn American Show: Internationalism Fades in the Gulf', Washington Post, 21 December 1990, p. A19. 132 See Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), pp. 229, 255, 260, 298, 302, 317, 318, 337, 350. 133 John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 52. 134 See Marcia Lynn Whicker in Whicker, James P. Pfiffner and Raymond A. Moore (eds), The Presidency and the Gulf War (Westport, Conn./London: Praeger, 1993), p. xv; and Jean Edward Smith, George Bush's War, pp. 163±4. 135 Examples from News Conference, 30 November 1990, PPP. 136 Powell, interview on The Gulf War, produced by Eamonn Matthews and broadcast on BBC 1 on 16 January 1996. 137 Fukuyama in interview with the author. 138 Charles Colson, Ìf Communism Fails, Do We Win?', Christianity Today, 33:14, 6 October 1989, p. 64. `No More Bad Guys?', Editorial, Christianity Today, 33:8, 12 May 1989, p. 16. 139 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The Imperial Temptation: the New World Order and America's Purpose (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), p. 16. 140 Gates, interview The Gulf War, BBC 1, 16 January 1996. 141 Schwarzkopf, interview, The Gulf War, BBC 1, 16 January 1996. 142 Bush, Remarks to the Community Members at Fort Stewart, Georgia, 1 February 1991, PPP; Remarks to the Community Members at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in Goldsboro, North Carolina, 1 February 1991, PPP; Remarks to Community Members at Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station in North Carolina, 1 February 1991, PPP. 143 Galvin, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, 102nd Congress, First Session, 7 March 1991 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1991) S. Hrg. 102±64. p. 129. 144 Bob Woodward, pp. 324±5. 145 See the Public Papers of the President for this period. 146 Over the total period he met with 61 foreign leaders on 103 occasions and others at the Houston Economic Summit, NATO London Summit, Helsinki Summit, Paris CSCE, and UN General Assembly. 147 Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics: the Dynamics of Agenda Building (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1983), p. 36. 148 Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, 8 August 1990, PPP; Address Before Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, 11 September 1990, PPP; Address to the 91st National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Baltimore, Maryland, 20 August 1990, PPP; Remarks at Fundraising Dinner for Gubernatorial Candidate Pete Wilson in Los Angeles, California, 18

192 Notes

149

150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160

September 1990, PPP; Remarks at Fundraising Luncheon for Gubernatorial Candidate George Voinovich in Cleveland, Ohio, 27 September 1990, PPP; Bush, Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Deployment of Additional United States Armed Forces to the Persian Gulf, 16 November 1990, PPP. In one poll, five to one disagreed with the statement `the US should mind its own business [. . .] and let other countries get along as best they can', but four to one of the same sample agreed that `we shouldn't think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems'; Gallup for CNN and USA Today, 6±9 January 1992, reproduced in Cattani. Mueller, p. 70 and Tables 202, 203, and Figs 6 and 7, pp. 294, 295, 378±9. Mueller pp. 160±1; and `Lucky or Good? Foreign Tests May Show Which Bush Is', Wall Street Journal, 20 April 1991, p. 1. Mueller, pp. 104, 159±60, 212±14. See Mueller, pp. 105±6, 265±71, 278±9, 212±13, 336. Mueller, ibid. and Duffy and Goodgame, Marching in Place, p. 169. WP/ABC poll in February 1991, see David S. Broder and Richard Morin, `National Optimism Surges on War Success', Washington Post, 28 February 1991, p. A33. Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: a Double-Edged Sword (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp. 113±49. CBS/New York Times, 5±7 October, 18±22 November, 1991, in Richard J. Cattani, Àmerica in the World', Christian Science Monitor, 6 March 1992, pp. 18±19. CBS/New York Times, 5±7 October, reproduced in Cattani. Time/CNN/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, 7 March 1991; Princeton Survey Research Associates for Times Mirror, 3±7 January 1992, in Cattani. Galvin, Hearings, p. 142.

4 The Soviet Crises and US Public Diplomacy, April 1991 to November 1992 1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8

Bush, Remark to the Public Administration Groups on Public Service, 24 October 1991, PPP. Lawrence Eagleburger, Speech to George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, 21 November 1991, European Wireless File (USIS press release), 21 November 1991. General John Galvin, Senate Hearings, 1991, p. 142. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: the Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (New York: Little, Brown, 1993), p. 316; and Duffy and Goodgame, Marching in Place: the Status Quo Presidency of George Bush (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 187. Ann Devroy in the Washington Post, 1 September 1991, quoted in Beschloss and Talbott, p. 444; R.W. Apple Jr, `The Sense of Triumph Fades, Uncertainty and Unease Grows', New York Times, 29 December 1991, section 4, p. 1. John M. Goshko, ÙS Stake in Gorbachev Survival Rises: Baltic Situation Causes Most Concern', Washington Post, 21 January 1990, p. A30. Beschloss and Talbott, p. 320. E.J. Dionne Jr, Àmericans Tepid Towards Lithuania', Washington Post, 24 April 1990, p. A20. However, the one million Americans of Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian descent did mobilize as a significant lobby group, Paul Valentine and Carlos Sanchez, `Baltic Americans Remember Heritage, Plan Demonstrations',

Notes 193

9 10 11 12 13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

34

Washington Post, 29 May 1990, p. A9; Dana Priest, `Soviet Foreign Policies on Protesters' Agenda', Washington Post, 29 May 1990, p. A9. Beschloss and Talbott, p. 322. Beschloss and Talbott, p. 319; see also, ÙS Stake in Gorbachev Survival Rises: Baltic Situation Causes Most Concern', Washington Post, 21 January 1990, p. A30. Beschloss and Talbott, p. 316. Beschloss and Talbott, pp. 325±6. For the speech and this passage in full see Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 29 January 1991, PPP. This was the view of Defense Minister Yazov and of General Moiseyev of the Armed Forces General Staff, according to Beschloss and Talbott, pp. 340±1. By the time of Baker's visit in March 1991, Gorbachev's conservative opponents also included the KGB Chairman, Interior Minister, Prime Minister and Vice President. Beschloss and Talbott, p. 354. Beschloss and Talbott, pp. 338±9. Beschloss and Talbott, p. 341. Condoleeza Rice, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and a number of second tier officials at the State Department were the most insistent on diversification, see Beschloss and Talbott, p. 345. Beschloss and Talbott, p. 351. Beschloss and Talbott, pp. 345±61. Bush, Meeting with Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin, 20 June 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:1, July/August 1991. Bush, Interview with Soviet journalists, 25 July 1991, PPP. Beschloss and Talbott, p. 408. Ukrainians and the 750 000 Ukrainian-American (mainly Republican) voters in the United States were highly sensitive to this distinction, Beschloss and Talbott, p. 416. Bush, Remarks at Arrival Ceremony, Kiev, Ukraine, 1 August 1991; Remarks to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Ukraine in Kiev, 1 August 1991, PPP. Bush, News Conference with Gorbachev, Moscow, 31 July 1991, PPP. Bush and Gorbachev, Remarks at the Signing of the START Treaty, 31 July 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:1, July/August 1991. Bush, Remarks at Dinner Hosted by President Bush, Moscow, 31 July 1991, PPP. Bush, Remarks at the State Dinner, Moscow, 30 July 1991, PPP. Bush, Remarks at the Arrival Ceremony in Moscow, 30 July 1991, PPP. Bush, Address to the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, Moscow, USSR, 30 July 1991, Vital Speeches LVII:22, 1 September 1991. Bush, Remarks to Soviet and United States Businessmen in Moscow, 31 July 1991, PPP. Bush, Remarks to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Ukraine in Kiev, Soviet Union, 1 August 1991, PPP. According to Beschloss and Talbott, Bush explained his motivation thus in a conversation with Brent Scowcroft as the speech was being drafted, pp. 417±18. The `Nine-plus-One' agreement made between Gorbachev and the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan, afforded the Republics greater autonomy and more control over national decision-making if they remained within the Soviet Union. Beschloss and Talbott, p. 418.

194 Notes 35 Robert Dole, Address to Town Hall of California, 31 May 1991, Vital Speeches LVII:18, 1 July 1991, pp. 547±9. 36 Bush, Statement on the National Security Strategy Report for 1991, 13 August 1991, Official Text (USIS); National Security Strategy Report, White House Fact Sheet, 13 August 1991 (USIS). 37 Beschloss and Talbott, pp. 353 and 354. 38 Beschloss and Talbott, pp. 430±1. 39 Bush, Remarks on Attempted Coup in the Soviet Union and Exchange with Reporters in Kennebunkport, Maine, 19 August 1991, PPP. 40 Bush, Remarks on Attempted Coup, 19 August 1991, PPP. 41 This was Scowcroft's advice according to Beschloss and Talbott, pp. 430±1. 42 Statement by Deputy Press Secretary Popadiuk on the Attempted Coup in the Soviet Union, 19 August 1991, PPP. 43 White House Statement on the Attempted Coup in the Soviet Union, 19 August 1991, PPP. 44 Bush, News Conference in Kennebunkport, Maine, on the Attempted Coup in the Soviet Union, 20 August 1991, PPP. 45 Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, Marching in Place (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992) p. 196. 46 Bush, Exchange with Reporters in Kennebunkport, Maine, on the Attempted Coup in the Soviet Union, 21 August 1991, PPP. 47 Bush, Exchange with Reporters in Kennebunkport, Maine, 22 August 1991, PPP. 48 Baker, Statement Following NATO Ministerial Meeting, 21 August 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:2, September/October 1991, p. 17. 49 The date for Gorbachev's recognition of the Baltics had been set for 30 August. The US recognized on 2 September. 50 Bush, News Conference with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada in Kennebunkport, Maine, 26 August 1991, PPP. 51 Ann Devroy in the Washington Post, 1 September 1991, in Beschloss and Talbott, p. 444. 52 Baker, Joint Press Conference with President Gorbachev in Moscow, 11 September 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:2, September/October 1991, p. 36. US±Soviet Statement on Afghanistan, 13 September 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:2, September/ October 1991, p. 37. 53 Bush, Address to the Nation on United States Nuclear Weapons Reductions, 27 September 1991, PPP. 54 Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 29 January 1991, PPP. 55 Bush, Address to Nation, 27 September 1991, PPP. 56 Beschloss and Talbott, p. 446. 57 Televised Statement by President Gorbachev, 5 October 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:2, September/October 1991. 58 Beschloss and Talbott, p. 446 fn. 59 Baker, Remarks at Closing of Third Day of Peace Talks, 1 November 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:3, November/December 1991, p. 21. 60 Bush, Opening Session, Madrid; Baker, Closing Session; Bush, News Conference with Mikhail Gorbachev in Madrid, Spain, 29 October 1991, PPP. 61 Beschloss and Talbott, p. 447. 62 Beschloss and Talbott, p. 452.

Notes 195 63 For example, on the occasion of Bush's questioning of the `creditworthiness' of the Soviet Union at a meeting of farm-state broadcasters in April 1991, Beschloss and Talbott, p. 378. 64 Baker, Address to Princeton University, 12 December 1991, Official Text (USIS). 65 Baker, Address to Princeton University. 66 Food, shelter, medical, technical, and energy assistance was provided. Bush, Remarks to Coordinating Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States, 22 January 1992, PPP; Baker, Address to Opening Session of Conference, 22 January 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:4/5, January±April 1992, p. 29; Joint Press Conference Concluding the Conference, 23 January 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:4/5, pp. 31±40; Fact Sheets on Working Group's Conclusions, 23 January 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:4/5, pp. 40±3; Fact Sheets: US Government Activities, 23 January 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:4/5, pp. 43±5. 67 Bush, Statement on the Resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as President of the Soviet Union, 25 December 1991, PPP. 68 See also Remarks to Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, 7 December 1991 and Remarks to World War Two Veterans and Families in Honolulu, Hawaii, 7 December 1991, PPP. 69 Bush, Address to the Nation on the Commonwealth of Independent States, 25 December 1991, PPP. 70 Bush, Remarks to Bee County Community, Beeville, Texas, 27 December 1991, PPP. 71 Tom Wicker, À More Desperate Struggle', New York Times, 29 December 1991, section 4, p. 9. 72 Bush, Remarks at Fundraising Dinner for Senator Christopher S. Bond, St Louis, Missouri, 13 November 1991, PPP. 73 Bush, Remarks at the Bush-Quayle Fundraising Dinner in Houston, Texas, 31 October 1991, PPP. 74 Bush, Remarks at the Bush-Quayle Fundraising Dinner in Dallas, Texas, 1 November 1991, PPP; Bush, Remarks at Bush-Quayle Fundraising Luncheon, New York City, 12 November 1991, PPP; Bush, Remarks to the Future Farmers of America, Kansas City, Missouri, 13 November 1991, PPP; Bush, Remarks at a Fundraising Luncheon for Senator Frank H. Murkowski, 11 December 1991, PPP; Bush, Interview with Harold Green of KABC-TV in Los Angeles, California, 17 December 1991, PPP; Bush, Remarks to the Bee County Community, Beeville, Texas, 27 December 1991, PPP; Bush, Remarks Upon Departure for Asian/Pacific Nations, 30 December 1991, PPP; Bush, National Policy Conference, 11 March 1992. 75 Bush, Remark to the Public Administration Groups on Public Service, 24 October 1991, PPP. 76 Beschloss and Talbott, p. 464. 77 Beschloss and Talbott, p. 349. 78 Bush, Remarks at a Luncheon Commemorating the Bicentennial of the Bill of Rights at Montpelier in Orange County, Virginia, 16 December 1991. 79 Bush, Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 9 April 1992, PPP. 80 Remarks at the Arrival Ceremony in Kiev, Soviet Union, 1 August 1991, PPP; Address to the Nation, 27 September 1991, PPP. 81 Lawrence Eagleburger, Speech to George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, 21 November 1991, European Wireless File (USIS press release), 21 November 1991.

196 Notes 82 Eagleburger, Speech to Business Week Symposium, 3 October 1991 (USIS Press Release), 7 October 1991. 83 Leslie Gelb, `Nixon's Tricky Crusade', New York Times, 13 March 1992, p. A31; Daniel Schorr, `How to Lose the Cold War', New York Times, 10 March 1992, p. A25; Thomas L. Friedman, `Nixon Scoffs at Level of Support for Russian Democracy by Bush', New York Times, 10 March 1992, pp. A1, 10; William Safire, `The New Despotism', New York Times, 12 March 1992, A23. The memorandum, reportedly entitled `How to Lose the Cold War', was sent to 50 people whom Nixon considered to be influential in policy-making. This list included Brent Scowcroft but not James Baker. Indeed the memo criticized Baker's Russian-aid conference. 84 Nixon, `The New World', speech delivered to the National Policy Conference on America's Role in the Emerging World, Washington, DC, 11 March 1992, European Wireless File (USIS), 16 March 1991. 85 Nixon, quoted in Safire. 86 Eagleburger, Speech to George Washington University. 87 Bush, President's News Conference, 11 March 1992, PPP. 88 Bush, speech delivered to the National Policy Conference on America's Role in the Emerging World, Washington, DC, 11 March 1992, PPP. 89 Gates, Address to National Policy Conference on America's Role in the Changing World, 12 March 1992, European Wireless File (USIS). 90 Bush, Message to Congress on Environmental Goals, 24 March 1992, PPP. 91 Bush, President's News Conference on Aid to the States of the Former Soviet Union, 1 April 1992, PPP. 92 Lawrence Eagleburger, Speech to George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, 21 November 1991, European Wireless File (USIS). 93 Remarks at a Question and Answer Session with the Singapore Lecture Group, 4 January 1992, PPP. 94 Bush, State of the Union Address, 28 January 1992; Remarks at Question and Answer Session at a Town Hall Meeting in Exeter, New Hampshire, 15 January 1992, PPP. 95 Bush, Remarks at the Points of Light Celebration in Orlando, Florida, 30 September 1991, PPP. 96 Remarks at a Fundraising Dinner for Governor Buddy Roemer in New Orleans, Louisiana, 30 September 1991, PPP. 97 Bush-Quayle Fundraiser, Houston, Texas, 31 October 1991, PPP. 98 Bush, Address to the Nation Commemorating Veterans Day, 9 November 1991, PPP, and also in Remarks at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, 11 November 1991, PPP. 99 Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 28 January 1992; Remarks to Southern Republican Leadership Conference, Charleston, South Carolina, 21 February 1992; Remarks at Bush-Quayle Campaign KickOff at Bethseda, Maryland, 24 February 1992; Remarks at Bush-Quayle Fundraising Dinner in Los Angeles, California, 25 February 1992, PPP. 100 Remarks to the National Grocers Association, Orlando, Florida, 4 February 1992, PPP. Bush had made a less refined statement of the same argument in a post-Gulf War address on domestic policy in June 1991, Bush, Remarks on Administration's Domestic Policy, 12 June 1991, PPP. 101 Remarks to Tropicana Employees in Bradenton, Florida, 3 December 1991, PPP; Remarks to Peavey Electronics Employees in Meridian, Mississippi, 3 December

Notes 197

102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109

110 111 112

113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122

1991, PPP; Remarks to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in Chicago Illinois, 10 December 1991, PPP; and Remarks to the Illinois Farm Bureau in Chicago, Illinois, 10 December 1991, PPP. Bush, Southern Republican Leadership Conference. Bush, Remarks at the Bush-Quayle Campaign Kick-Off at Bethesda, Maryland, 24 February 1992, PPP. Remarks at Bush-Quayle Fundraising Dinner in Chicago, 16 March 1992, PPP. Bush, Remarks to the National Association of Evangelicals in Chicago, Illinois, 3 March 1992, PPP. Munich Economic Summit Declaration, 7 July 1992, PPP. Remarks at United States Naval Academy Commencement Ceremony in Annapolis, Maryland, 27 May 1992, PPP. UN Security Council, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:4/5, January±April 1992, pp. 83±5. Bush, State of the Union; Bush, Remarks at the Texas State Republican Convention, Dallas, 20 June 1992, PPP; Quayle, Address to Annual Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, 2 March 1992, European Wireless File (USIS), 3 March 1992; Speech to UN Security Council, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:4/5, January±April 1992, pp. 83±5. Bush, Remarks at the Texas State Republican Convention, Dallas, 20 June 1992, PPP. Bush-Quayle Fundraising Dinner in Philadelphia, 11 May 1992, PPP; and State of Union Address, 28 January 1992, PPP. Bush, Remarks at the Twelfth Annual Crime Stoppers International Conference in Louisville, Kentucky, 2 October 1991, PPP; Bush, Remarks at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy Commencement Ceremony in Quantico, Virginia, 30 May 1991, PPP. Bush, Remarks at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah, 18 July 1992, PPP. Bush, Interview with Linda Douglas of KNBC, Jim Lampley of KCBS, and Paul Moyer of KABC in Los Angeles, California, 15 June 1991, PPP. Bush, News Conference for Foreign Journalists, 2 July 1992. Bush, News Conference, 7 August 1992. See also the statements after a Camp David meeting with the British Prime Minister in Remarks with Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom, 26 December 1992. Statement on Humanitarian Assistance to Bosnia, 2 October 1992; Bush, News Conference, 7 August 1992; Statement by Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater on the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, 28 August 1992. Bush, News Conference in Munich Germany, 8 July 1992. Ibid. Ibid. News Conference, 7 August 1992. The `War Room' was the term used by Clinton staff for the floor in the Democratic Gazette building in Little Rock, Arkansas which was the center of Clinton campaign operations and, according to Woodward, was originally so-named by Hillary Clinton. The Agenda, p. 54. A film-documentary of the same name follows the Clinton campaign from behind-the-scenes and, in focusing on the roles played by the campaign manager James Carville and the communications director George Stephanopoulos, provides details of how the day-to-day planning, drafting and redrafting of speeches formed an integral part of a highly orchestrated crusade. The War Room, Pennebaker Associates and McEttinger Films, directed by Chris Hegedus and D.A. Pennebaker (Vidmark:1993) VM5894.

198 Notes 123 Fukuyama has recounted how the speech was also a cause of dispute within the Administration. It was part of Bush's program to support Gorbachev's position and maintain the status quo in the Soviet Union. Others in the Administration believed this to be short-sighted. Interview with the author. 124 Fukuyama, State Department, Policy Planning Staff, interview with the author. 125 Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, Marching in Place, pp. 188 and 190. 126 These funds were requested in addition to $860 million already secured under existing legislation and which included approximately $210 million in food assistance, $100 million of Department of Defense funds for transportation and humanitarian relief, $400 million in Defense funds to facilitate the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons, $30 million to provide medical supplies through the Agency for International Development and $120 million in AID and Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funds for technical assistance activities. State Department Budget Statement, 29 January 1992, European Wireless File (USIS), 30 January 1992. 127 Ibid. 128 Hearings on Àssisting the Build-Down of the Former Soviet Military Establishment' Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, 102nd Congress, Second Session, 5, 6 February 1992 (USGPO: Washington, DC, 1992), 5 February 1992, p. 1. 129 Hearings, 5 February 1992, p. 20. 130 Hearings, 5 February 1992, p. 34. 131 ABC News/Washington Post, 16±21 October 1991, reported by Cattani, Àmerica in the World'. 132 CBS News/New York Times, 5±7 October 1991. Between 1973 and 1991 the majority of Americans (between 65 and 76 per cent) stated in surveys that they believed the United States gave too much foreign aid, Cattani, Àmerica in the World'. 133 Time/CNN/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, 16 January 1992, Cattani, Àmerica in the World'. 134 Raymond A. Moore, `Foreign Policy', in Dilys M. Hill and Phil Williams, The Bush Presidency. Triumphs and Adversities (London: Macmillan, 1994). 135 Beschloss and Talbott, pp. 468±74. 136 Moore, p. 168. 137 Rachel L. Holloway, À Time for Change in American Politics: the Issue of the 1992 Presidential Election', in Robert E. Denton Jr (ed.), The 1992 Presidential Campaign: a Communication Perspective (Westport, Conn./London: Praeger, 1992), p. 160. 138 See his Remarks at the Annual Convention for National Religious Broadcasters, 27 January 1992, PPP. 139 Beschloss and Talbott, pp. 473±4. 140 Bush, Question and Answer Session with the Youth Collaborative Mentor Group in Cincinnati, Ohio, 12 January 1990, PPP. 141 Marcia Lynn Whicker, in Hill and Williams, p. 38, from Paul Gray, `Lies, Lies, Lies', Time, 5 October 1992, p. 32.

Notes 199

5 The Clinton Reconstruction of 1993: Domestic Renewal and the Global Economy 1 Clinton, Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Breakfast, 8 October 1993, PPP; Remarks at the American University Centennial Celebration, 26 February 1993, PPP; Remarks at the Dedication of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 22 April 1993, PPP; and Radio Address to the Armed Forces, 12 March 1993, PPP. 2 Remarks to the Conference of Business for Social Responsibility, 21 October 1993, PPP. 3 Clinton, Signing NAFTA Implementation Act, 8 December 1993, PPP. 4 Clinton won the election with 43 per cent of the popular vote and 370 electoral votes. Theodore J. Lowi and Benjamin Ginsberg, Embattled Democracy. Politics and Policy in the Clinton Era (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), p. 14. 5 For example, Bush, Remarks at Bush-Quayle Fundraising Luncheon, New York City, 12 November 1991, PPP; Bush, Remarks to the Future Farmers of America, Kansas City, Missouri, 13 November 1991, PPP; Bush, Remarks Upon Departure for Asian/Pacific Nations, 30 December 1991, PPP; Bush, National Policy Conference, 11 March 1992. 6 Don Oberdorfer, `Democrats Grope in All Directions for a 90s Foreign Policy', International Herald Tribune, 17 March 1992. 7 Clinton, `New Covenant', Georgetown University, 12 December 1991, European Wireless File (USIS). 8 In particular he criticized Bush's focus on the cultivation of personal relationships with foreign leaders, his maintenance of the Cold War practice of supporting proAmerican governments regardless of their political system, his rapid renewal of diplomatic relations with China after the Tianamen Square killings, and his failure to come to the aid of the rebel Kurds in Iraq. 9 Presidential Candidate Bill Clinton, Speech to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1 April 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:6, May/June 1992, pp. 12±14. 10 Clinton, UN General Assembly. 11 Clinton, Speech to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1 April 1992. 12 He was advised for the speech by Robert Shapiro, an economist from the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington, DC but wrote the final draft of the speech himself in consultation with Hillary Clinton after rejecting several other versions. Woodward, The Agenda, p. 29. 13 Presidential Radio Address, 27 February 1993. 14 Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War. Superpower Without a Mission? (Chatham House Papers, RIIA/Pinter, 1995), p. 22. 15 Clinton, Inaugural Address, 20 January 1993, PPP. 16 Clinton, Address to American Society of Newspaper Editors, Annapolis, 1 April 1993, PPP. 17 Clinton, Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation Act, 8 December 1993, PPP. 18 Barbara Hinckley, The Symbolic Presidency. How Presidents Portray Themselves (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 23. 19 Roderick P. Hart, The Sound of Leadership. Presidential Communication in the Modern Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 19.

200 Notes 20 Bruce Kuklick, `Tradition and the Diplomatic Talent: the Case of the Cold Warriors', in Leila Zenderland (ed.), Recycling the Past. Popular Uses of American History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), pp. 116±17. 21 `The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy', in Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander, and Robert L. Scott, Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 153. 22 Craig Allen Smith, `The Jeremiadic Logic of Bill Clinton's Policy Speeches', in Stephen A. Smith (ed.), Bill Clinton on Stump, State, and Stage: the Rhetorical Road to the White House (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1994), pp. 74±5. 23 See John Mearsheimer, `Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security 15:1 (Summer 1990) pp. 5±56, and `Why We Shall Soon Miss the Cold War', Atlantic Monthly (August 1990), pp. 35±50. 24 Clinton, Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Breakfast, 8 October 1993, PPP; Remarks at the American University Centennial Celebration, 26 February 1993, PPP; Remarks at the Dedication of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 22 April 1993, PPP; and Radio Address to the Armed Forces, 12 March 1993, PPP. 25 Clinton, UN General Assembly. 26 Clinton, Radio Address to the Armed Forces, 12 March 1993, PPP. 27 Clinton, Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Annapolis, 1 April 1993, PPP; Clinton, News Conference with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, 26 March 1993, PPP. 28 Clinton, Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Breakfast, 8 October 1993, PPP. 29 Clinton, Remarks at the Democratic Governors Association Dinner, 1 February 1993, PPP. 30 Clinton, Remarks to the Children's Defense Fund, 11 March 1993, PPP; Radio Address, 23 October 1993, PPP. 31 Clinton, Presidential Radio Address, 20 March 1993, PPP. 32 Clinton, Remarks at the American University Centennial Celebration, 26 February 1993, PPP. 33 Remarks at the Executive Leadership Council Dinner, 21 October 1993, PPP. 34 Clinton, Remarks to Justice Department Employees, 29 April 1993, PPP. 35 Remarks on NAFTA to Employees of Lexmark International in Lexington, 4 November 1993, PPP; Radio Address, 27 February 1993, PPP. 36 Clinton, UN General Assembly. 37 Clinton, Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Dinner, 21 October 1993, PPP. 38 Clinton, UN General Assembly. 39 Clinton, Remarks to the Office of Management and Budget Employees, 3 February 1993, PPP; Remarks on the Economic Program in Hyde Park, New York, 19 February 1993, PPP; Remarks to Justice Department Employees, 29 April 1993, PPP. 40 See in particular, Remarks on the Economic Program in St Louis, Missouri, 18 February 1993, PPP; Remarks on the Economic Program in Hyde Park, New York, 19 February 1993, PPP; Radio Address, 27 February 1993, PPP. 41 Clinton, Address Before Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals, 17 February 1993, PPP; Speech to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1 April 1992; UN General Assembly.

Notes 201 42 See for example, Clinton, Remarks to Business Leaders, 11 February 1993, PPP: `Today we face a crisis which, while quieter, is every bit as profound as those we have faced in our past'; and his Address to the Nation on the Economic Program, 15 February 1993, PPP. 43 Clinton, Remarks at an Independence Day Ceremony in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 4 July 1993, PPP; Clinton, President's News Conference with Prime Minister Tansu Ciller of Turkey, 15 October 1993, PPP; and Inaugural Address, 20 January 1993, PPP. 44 Clinton, Remarks at the Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science and Art, New York City, 12 May 1993, PPP; Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Flag Day Proclamation, 14 June 1993, PPP. 45 Clinton, Remarks at Dinner Honoring the New Jersey Congressional Delegation, 4 February 1993, PPP; Radio Address, 19 June 1993, PPP; Remarks at the Northeastern University Commencement Ceremony in Boston, Massachusetts, 19 June 1993, PPP; Radio Address, 17 July 1993, PPP. 46 Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Supplemental Agreements to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 14 September 1993, PPP. 47 Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders on NAFTA, 15 November 1993, PPP. 48 Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders. 49 Clinton, Signing NAFTA Implementation Act, 8 December 1993, PPP. 50 Clinton, Supplemental Agreements to NAFTA; Clinton, President's Radio Address, 13 November 1993, PPP. 51 Clinton, Remarks at the Wall Street Journal Conference on the Americas in New York City, 28 October 1993, PPP. 52 Clinton, Radio Address, 13 March 1993, PPP. 53 Clinton, Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 27 September 1993, PPP; Clinton, Address to the Newspaper Association of America in Boston, Mass., 25 April 1993, PPP; Clinton, UN General Assembly; and Clinton, Georgetown. See Bruce Russett and Michael W. Doyle, `The Democratic Peace', International Security, Spring 1995, pp. 164±84. 54 Clinton, Inaugural Address, 20 January 1993, PPP. 55 Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: the Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 16. 56 This was Clinton campaign consultant Paul Begala's term to describe their economic strategy. Woodward, The Agenda, p. 28. 57 Address to the Nation on the Economic Program, 15 February 1993, PPP. Reviving the Àmerican Dream' was a leifmotif of presidential speeches. See also, for example, Remarks to the Community at Los Alamos, New Mexico, 17 May 1993, PPP; Remarks on Cuban Independence Day, 20 May 1993, PPP; Remarks to Conference on the Future of the American Workplace in Chicago, Illinois, 26 July 1993, PPP. 58 Clinton, Remarks and a Question and Answer Session on the Economic Program in Chillicothe, Ohio, 19 February 1993, PPP. 59 Clinton, Address to Nation on Economic Program; Remarks to Treasury Department Employees, 18 March 1993, PPP; Remarks to the Democratic Members of the House of Representatives, 20 July 1993, PPP. 60 Clinton, President's Radio Address, 6 March 1993, PPP. 61 Clinton, Remarks to the Legislative Conference on the National League of Cities, 8 March 1993, PPP. 62 Clinton, Remarks to the Cleveland City Club, 10 May 1993, PPP.

202 Notes 63 Clinton, Remarks to Westinghouse Employees in Linthicum, Maryland, 11 March 1993, PPP. 64 Clinton, Remarks to the Community at Los Alamos, New Mexico, 17 May 1993, PPP. 65 Clinton, Remarks on the Economic Program in Santa Monica, California, 21 February 1993, PPP; Remarks to the Community in Alameda, California, 13 August 1993, PPP. 66 Clinton, Radio Address, 6 March 1993, PPP. 67 Clinton, Los Alamos; American Legion Boys. 68 Clinton, Remarks to Westinghouse Employees in Linthicum. 69 Clinton, Remarks to the Legislative Conference of the National League of Cities, 8 March 1993, PPP; Remarks at a Town Meeting in Detroit, 8 February 1993, PPP. 70 Clinton, Remarks at a Reception Honoring Senator Dianne Feinstein in San Francisco, California, 20 November 1993, PPP; Clinton, Remarks at Democratic National Committee Breakfast, 8 October 1993, PPP. 71 Clinton, American Legion; Radio Address, 1 May 1993; Clinton, Remarks on National Service at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, 1 March 1993, PPP; Clinton, Address to the Newspaper Association of America in Boston, Mass., 25 April 1993, PPP; Clinton, Georgetown. 72 Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals, 17 February 1993, PPP. 73 Much of Clinton's campaign rhetoric, which had focused on his `problem-solving' abilities and work ethic, laid the basis for this strategy. Holloway, pp. 148±9. 74 This slogan was omnipresent in Clinton rhetoric throughout 1993, though typical examples of its use may be found in his Inaugural Address, his speech to the Coast Guard Academy, or in his Remarks at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, 12 October 1993, PPP. See also, Clinton, Remarks on the Economic Program in Hyde Park, New York, 19 February 1993, PPP; Remarks on the Economic Program in Santa Monica, California, 21 February 1993, PPP; Remarks and a Q and A Session with Silicon Graphics Employees in Mountain View, California, 22 February 1993, PPP; Remarks at the American University; Remarks on the Observance of the 250th Anniversary of the Birth of Thomas Jefferson, 13 April 1993, PPP. 75 Clinton, Coast Guard; Democratic National Committee; President's Radio Address, 9 October 1993, PPP. See also, Clinton, Remarks on Cuban Independence Day, 20 May 1993, PPP. Clinton, Remarks to Treasury Department. 76 Clinton, Remarks at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, 12 October 1993, PPP. 77 Clinton, American University; Clinton, Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation Act, 8 December 1993, PPP. These provide good examples of the use of this phrase, though it too was almost ubiquitous. 78 Clinton, Remarks to the Community in Sacramento, California, 3 October 1993, PPP. 79 Clinton, American University. 80 Warren Christopher, News Conference, 26 February 1993, European Wireless File (USIS), 2 March 1993. 81 Clinton, Georgetown; Inaugural; Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Annapolis, 1 April 1993, PPP; Radio Address, 3 April 1993, PPP; Remarks

Notes 203

82

83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96

97 98 99 100 101 102 103

104 105 106 107 108 109

to the National Education Association in San Francisco, California, 5 July 1993, PPP; Remarks to the US Coast Guard in Seattle, Washington, 20 November 1993, PPP. See President's News Conference with Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan in Tokyo, 6 July 1993, PPP; Remarks to Democratic Members of the House of Representatives, 20 July 1993, PPP; Interview with Texan media, 28 July 1993, PPP. See, Remarks on the Establishment of the National Economic Council, 25 January 1993, PPP. See Remarks to Westinghouse Employees in Linthicum, Maryland, 11 March 1993, PPP; and Teleconference Remarks with the US Conference of Mayors, 22 June 1993, PPP. Cox, p. 17 and fn. 26, p. 129. Remarks to the Export-Import Bank Conference, 6 May 1993, PPP. Woodward, The Agenda, p. 63. Clinton, Remarks to Treasury Department Employees, 18 March 1993, PPP. The Agenda, p. 63. Raymond G.H. Seitz, Ambassador to the Court of St James, International Celebrity Lecture, Durham Castle, Durham, 18 March 1992 (USIS press release). Clinton, Remarks Announcing the Creation of a White House Office on Environmental Policy, 8 February 1993, PPP. On the Edge: the Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 32, 48. Clinton, UN General Assembly. Woodward, The Agenda, p. 112. Woodward, The Agenda, pp. 113, 118±19, 315. Clinton, Remarks Announcing the Defense Conversion Plan and Exchange with Reporters, 2 July 1993, PPP; Remarks to the AFL-CIO Convention in San Francisco, California, 4 October 1993, PPP; Remarks at the American University Centennial Celebration, 26 February 1993, PPP. Clinton, Democratic National Committee. Statement on the Situation in Russia, 21 September 1993, PPP. Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, revised edition (New York: Little, Brown, 1994). pp. 484±5, 493. Clinton, Exchange with Reporters in Vancouver, Canada, 3 April 1993, PPP. Clinton, Press Conference, Vancouver, Canada, 3 April 1993, PPP. Clinton, Q and A with Russian Reporters in Vancouver, Canada, 4 April 1993, PPP. Clinton, Radio Address, 3 April 1993, PPP; Clinton, Statement on advancing US Relations with Russia and the other Newly Independent States, 23 April 1993, PPP; News Conference with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia in Vancouver, Canada, 4 April 1993, PPP. Clinton, Statement on advancing US Relations with Russia and the other Newly Independent States, 23 April 1993, PPP. Clinton, Radio Address, 3 April 1993, PPP. Clinton, Newspaper Editors. Clinton, Newspaper Editors. Clinton, Newspaper Editors. Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels.

204 Notes 110 The Administration intended `to weave' non-proliferation measures ìnto the fabric of all our relationships within the world's nations and institutions', UN General Assembly. 111 The Administration hoped that with the help of the private diplomacy of individuals, groups, and businesses they would be able `to shape the attitudes of the people who live in the region'. Clinton, Remarks on the Israeli±Palestinian Declaration Principles, 13 September 1993, PPP; Remarks on the Israeli±Palestinian Declaration of Principles and Exchange with Reporters, 10 September 1993, PPP. 112 See Clinton, Remarks to Korean National Assembly in Seoul, 10 July 1993, Remarks to the Seattle APEC Host Committee, 19 November 1993, PPP. 113 Clinton, Address to Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, 12 December 1991, European Wireless File (USIS). 114 Cox, p. 58. 115 Clinton, Statement on advancing US Relations with Russia and the other Newly Independent States, 23 April 1993, PPP. 116 Clinton, Remarks Announcing the Defense Conversion Plan and Exchange with Reporters, 2 July 1993, PPP; Remarks to the AFL-CIO Convention in San Francisco, California, 4 October 1993, PPP; Remarks at the American University Centennial Celebration, 26 February 1993, PPP. 117 See this statement and changing policies on export controls, nuclear weapons, and multilateral assistance to the Soviet Union; Message to Congress Reporting on the Continuation of Export Control Regulations, 27 April 1993, PPP; Clinton, News Conference with President Boris Yeltsin and Question and Answer Session with Russian Reporters in Vancouver, Canada, 4 April 1993, PPP; UN General Assembly; Clinton, Statement on Advancing US Relations with Russia and the other Newly Independent States. 118 Clinton, Statement on International Broadcasting Programs, 15 June 1993, PPP. 119 Clinton, Inaugural. 120 Clinton, Congress. See also Clinton, Remarks at an Independence Day Ceremony in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 4 July 1993, PPP. 121 Clinton, UN General Assembly. 122 Clinton, Presidential Radio Address, 20 March 1993, PPP. 123 Clinton, Remarks to the National Governors' Association, 2 February 1993, PPP. 124 Smith, p. 79, quoting Remarks to the Democratic Leadership Council, New Orleans, 2 May 1992 (Internet: Sunsite, 1992). 125 Clinton, Address to the Nation on Somalia, 7 October 1993, PPP. 126 Clinton, Remarks on Welcoming Military Personnel Returning from Somalia, 5 May 1993, PPP. 127 Clinton, Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters, 26 June 1993, PPP. 128 Cox, p. 27. See also, Clinton, Remarks to the Crew of the USS Theodore Roosevelt, 12 March 1993, PPP. 129 Clinton, Georgetown. 130 Remarks on Bosnia and an Exchange with Reporters in Manchester, New Hampshire, 22 May 1993. 131 News Conference, 14 May 1993. 132 Exchange with Reporters on Bosnia, 21 May 1993. 133 Ibid.

Notes 205 134 Question and Answer Session with the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis, 1 April 1993. 135 Woodward, The Agenda, p. 55. 136 Clinton, Democratic Members of the House. 137 See, Eagleburger, Address to George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, 21 November 1991, European Wireless Fire (USIS). 138 Halford Ross Ryan, `The 1988 Bush±Dukakis Presidential Debates', in Robert V. Friedenberg (ed.), Rhetorical Studies of National Political Debates, 1960±1988 (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 145. 139 Rachel L, Holloway, À Time for Change in American Politics: the Issue of the 1992 Presidential Election', in Robert E. Denton Jr (ed.), The 1992 Presidential Campaign: a Communication Perspective (Westport, Conn./London: Praeger, 1992), pp. 129±67. In a `public purpose' period, as Holloway states, pp. 131±2. 140 Particularly useful in creating such an image was the film-footage of Clinton, as a schoolboy, meeting and shaking hands with Kennedy. See Holloway, pp. 143±4, and 148±9. 141 Holloway, pp. 159±60. 142 Larry D. Smith, `The New York Convention. Bill Clinton and `À Place Called Hope'' ', in Stephen A. Smith (ed.), Bill Clinton on Stump, State, and Stage (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1994), pp. 201±22. 143 Craig Allen Smith, pp. 73±100. 144 Clinton, Remarks at a Town Meeting in Detroit, 10 February 1993, PPP. 145 Philip Wander, `The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy', in Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander, and Robert L. Scott, Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 166. 146 Woodward, The Agenda, p. 109. And Hillary Clinton also drew comparisons between herself and First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, whom she perceived to be a crusader and innovative reformer, according to Woodward, `Happy Talk', The Sunday Times, 30 June 1996, section 3, pp. 1±2. 147 William F. Leuchtenberg, `The New Deal and the Analogue of War', in John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and Everett Walters (eds), Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century America (Cincinnati, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964), pp. 137±8. 148 Clinton, À New Covenant for Economic Change', Address to Georgetown University, 20 November 1992, quoted in Woodward, p. 30. 149 See John Hohenberg, The Bill Clinton Story. Winning the Presidency (Syracuse University Press, 1994), pp. 272±3; John Brummett, Highwire. From the Backroads to the Beltway ± the Education of Bill Clinton (New York: Hyperion, 1994), pp. 7±8; and Theodore J. Lowi and Benjamin Ginsberg, Embattled Democracy. Politics and Policy in the Clinton Era (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), p. 9. 150 Henry Kissinger, `False Dreams of a New World Order', Washington Post, 26 February 1991, p. A21. 151 Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 113. 152 Leuchtenberg, p. 136. 153 Denise M. Bostdorff, The Presidency and the Promotion of Foreign Crises (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 11±12. 154 Lowi and Ginsberg, p. 18.

206 Notes

Conclusion: American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy 1 Dr Daniel Hamilton, Department of State. Briefing for Atlantic Council, 2 June 1995. 2 Steve Garber and Phil Williams, `Defense Policy', in Dilys M. Hill and Phil Williams (eds), The Bush Presidency (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 184. 3 See discussion in Chapter 2. The theme is also well addressed in George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf/Random House, 1998). 4 Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1957), pp. 3 and 262 in particular. 5 See Huntington, Àmerican Ideals versus American Institutions', Political Science Quarterly. The Journal of Public and International Affairs, 97:1, Spring 1992, pp. 1±72 (36). 6 Senator Moynihan remarked that it was unlikely the Administration would endorse any theory which would have put them out of a job. See James Atlas, `What is Fukuyama Saying?', New York Times Magazine, 22 October 1989, pp. 38, 42, 54±5. 7 Baker, Confirmation Hearing, 17 January 1989, Bulletin, April 1989; and Newspaper Editors, 14 April 1989, Current Policy, 1162. 8 Eagleburger, Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 22 June 1989, Current Policy, 1194. 9 Seitz, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 3 October 1989, Current Policy, 1220. 10 Bush, Catholic University, 12 December 1989, PPP; Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters, 29 January 1990, PPP. 11 Bush, American Farm Bureau Federation, 8 January 1990, PPP; Associated General Contractors of America, 24 April 1990, PPP; National Association of Agricultural Journalists, 24 April 1990, PPP. 12 Bush, Presentation Ceremony, 20 February 1990, PPP; National Academy of Sciences, 23 April 1990, PPP. 13 Bush, National Association of Broadcasters, 2 April 1990, PPP. 14 Bush, National Association of Manufacturers, 15 March 1990, PPP. 15 Bush, Martin Luther King Jr Federal Holiday Proclamation, 9 January 1990, PPP. 16 Bush, University of South Carolina, 12 May 1990, Current Policy, 1277. 17 Bush, National Prayer Breakfast, 31 January 1991, PPP. 18 Bush, National Religious Broadcasters, 28 January 1991, PPP. 19 Bush, Youth Collaborative Mentor Group, 12 January 1990, PPP. 20 Bush, Soviet and United States Businessmen, 31 July 1991, PPP. 21 Bush, Bee County Community, 27 December 1991, PPP. 22 Bush, Bush-Quayle Fundraiser, 1 November 1991, PPP; Bush-Quayle Fundraiser, 12 November 1991, PPP; Future Farmers of America, 13 November 1991, PPP; Fundraising Luncheon for Senator Frank H. Murkowski, 11 December 1991, PPP; Interview with Harold Green of KABC-TV, 17 December 1991, PPP; Bush, Bee County Community, 27 December 1991, PPP; Departure for Asian/Pacific Nations, 30 December 1991, PPP; National Policy Conference, 11 March 1992. 23 Bush, Bush-Quayle Fundraiser, 31 October 1991, PPP; Public Administration Groups on Public Service, 24 October 1991, PPP. 24 Bush, Chamber of Commerce, 12 January 1990, PPP; News Conference, 13 March 1990, PPP. 25 Bush, Presidential Lecture Series, 7 January 1990, PPP.

Notes 207 26 Address to the Nation, 27 September 1991, PPP. 27 Bush, United Nations, 1 October 1990; University of South Carolina, 12 May 1990. 28 Bush, Address Before the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 1 October 1990, Current Policy, 1303. 29 Bush, Fundraiser for Representative Bill Grant, 6 September 1990, PPP. 30 See, for example, Bush's State of the Union Address, PPP 1991. 31 Bush, Annual Southern Baptist Convention, 6 June 1991, PPP. 32 Bush, Yale University, 27 May 1991, PPP. 33 Baker, NATO Ministerial Meeting, 21 August 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:2, September/October 1991, p. 17. 34 Bush, Boston University, 21 May 1989, Current Policy, 1177. 35 Eagleburger, American Chamber of Commerce's International Forum, 16 February 1990. 36 Baker, World Affairs Council, 30 March 1990, Current Policy, 1266. 37 Bush, Business Council, 21 February 1990; News Conference with PM Toshiki Kaifu, 3 March 1990; Oklahoma State University, 4 May 1990. 38 See, for example, Eagleburger, George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, 21 November 1991, European Wireless File (USIS press release), 21 November 1991. 39 Address to the Nation announcing the deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia in August 1990. 40 Bush, Pentagon, 15 August 1990, PPP. 41 Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf, 16 January 1991; News Conference, 30 November 1990; Remarks and Exchange with Reporters on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 3 August 1990; News Conference with Regional Reporters, 18 December 1990, PPP. 42 Bush, Exchange with Reporters at Kennebunkport, Maine, 17 February 1991, PPP; American Society of Association Executives, 27 February 1991, PPP; American Legislative Exchange Council, 1 March 1991, PPP; Remarks to Returning Troops in Sumter, South Carolina, 17 March 1991, PPP. 43 Bush, Sumter, South Carolina, 17 March 1991, PPP. 44 Bush, State of the Union 1991. 45 Bush, Radio Address, 22 June 1991, PPP. 46 Ibid.; and also Gridiron Dinner, 23 March 1991, PPP. 47 Bush, Fundraiser for Senatorial Candidate Bob Kasten, 17 June 1991, PPP. 48 Duffy and Goodgame, Marching in Place, p. 169. 49 Baker, Newspaper Editors and Foreign Policy Association. 50 Declaration on East±West Relations, Summit of the Arch, Paris, 14±16 July 1989. Bulletin, September 1989; Baker, CSCE Conference, 6 June 1990, Current Policy, 1280. 51 Baker, News Conference, 23 May 1989, Bulletin, July 1989. Bush, Brussels, 29 May 1989, Bulletin, August 1989. 52 Bush, Maxwell Airforce Base War College, 13 April 1991, PPP. 53 Bush, Germany, 31 May 1989, Current Policy, 1179. 54 Baker, Czechoslovakia, 7 February 1990, Current Policy, 1248. 55 Baker, Foreign Policy Association, 16 October 1989, Current Policy, 1213; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4 May 1989, Bulletin, July 1989. 56 Senate Finance Committee, 4 October 1989, Bulletin, December 1989. 57 Ibid. 58 White House Factsheet on National Security Strategy Report, 20 March 1990, PPP.

208 Notes 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

80 81 82

83 84 85 86 87

Bush, Coast Guard Academy, 24 May 1989, Current Policy, 1178. Baker, Newspaper Editors Convention, 14 April 1989, Current Policy, 1162. Bush, Middle East Peace Conference, 30 October 1991, PPP. Bush, United Nations, 24 September 1991, Official Text, USIS. Bush, Swearing-In Ceremony for Robert Gates as Director of Central Intelligence Agency, 12 November 1991, PPP; Republican Congressional Fundraising Dinner, 28 April 1992, PPP. Bush, Open Letter to College Students on the Persian Gulf, 9 January 1991, PPP. Clinton, Inaugural Address, 20 January 1993, PPP. Clinton, Inaugural. Clinton, Congress, 17 February 1993, PPP. Clinton, United Nations, 27 September 1993, PPP. Clinton, Radio Address, 20 March 1993, PPP. Clinton, National Governors' Association, 2 February 1993, PPP. Smith, p. 79, quoting Remarks to the Democratic Leadership Council, New Orleans, 2 May 1992 (Internet: Sunsite, 1992). Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx: the Character of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Vintage, 1998), pp. 241±2. Smith, p. 97. Craig Allen Smith, `The Jeremiadic Logic of Bill Clinton's Policy Speeches', in Stephen A. Smith (ed.), Bill Clinton on Stump, State, and Stage: the Rhetorical Road to the White House (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1994), pp. 74±5. Clinton, Newspaper Editors, 1 April 1993, PPP. Clinton, Justice Department, 29 April 1993, PPP. Remarks on NAFTA to Employees of Lexmark International, 4 November 1993, PPP; Radio Address, 27 February 1993, PPP. Woodward, The Agenda, p. 112. Clinton, Exchange with Reporters and News Conference with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, 5 February 1993, PPP; News Conference with Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan, 16 April 1993, PPP; Clinton, Waseda University in Tokyo, 7 July 1993, PPP; Press Conference with European Community Leaders, 7 May 1993, PPP; Clinton, Newspaper Editors. Cox, p. 22. Clinton, United Nations, 27 September 1993, PPP 1993: II. Christopher, News Conference, 26 February 1993, European Wireless File (USIS), 2 March 1993; State 2000: a New Model for Managing Foreign Affairs. Report of the US Department of State Management Task Force, December±January 1992±93, US Department of State Publication, 10029, pp. 96±7. See also Engagement and Enlargement. United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, June 1995. Quoting Franklin Roosevelt, Clinton insisted that democracy was not simply a phase of human history but that ìt is human history', UN General Assembly. Clinton, Israeli±Palestinian Declaration Principles, 13 September 1993, PPP; Israeli±Palestinian Declaration of Principles and Exchange with Reporters, 10 September 1993, PPP. Radio Address, 10 July 1993, PPP. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy. Revolution, War and Peace, 1989±1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1995), p. 571. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 8±9.

Notes 209 88 Huntington, p. 12. 89 See Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: a Double-Edged Sword (New York: Norton, 1997). 90 See Chapter 3 and letters reproduced in Bush, All the Best, George Bush. My Life in Letters and Other Writings (New York: Scribner/Lisa Drew, 1999), pp. 483±5. The analogy is also used in Bush, A World Transformed. 91 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: The Free Press, 1965) p. 241. 92 Ibid., pp. 240±1. 93 Ibid., p. 242. 94 Durkheim suggested that consciousness of contradictory forces both ìmperious and helpful' in a social actor's environment produces `the impression that we are in relations with two distinct sorts of reality and that a sharply drawn line of demarcation separates them from each other: on the one hand is the world of profane things, on the other, that of sacred things.' Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, p. 243. 95 For another example, see Gil Merom, Ìsrael's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism', Political Science Quarterly. The Journal of Public and International Affairs 114:3, 1999, pp. 409±34. 96 Bush, University of South Carolina, 12 May 1990, PPP; University of Texas at Austin, 19 May 1990, PPP; Liberty University, 12 May 1990, PPP; Newspaper Editors, 9 April 1992, PPP. 97 Clinton, Rutgers University, 1 March 1993, PPP; Telephone Conversation with Crew of the Space Shuttle Endeavor, 22 June 1993, PPP; Communication Technology Demonstration, 22 July 1993, PPP; Dedication of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library Museum, 29 October 1993, PPP. 98 Clinton, International Broadcasting Programs, 15 June 1993, PPP. 99 Hans-Peter Muller, `Social Structure and Civil Religion: Legitimation Crisis in a Late Durkheimian Perspective', in Jeffrey C. Alexander (ed.), Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 129±58: 131. 100 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, `Complex Interdependence, Transnational Relations, and Realism: Alternative Perspectives on World Politics', in Charles W. Kegley Jr and Eugene R. Wittkofp (eds), The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives, first edition (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 249. 101 On this point see the critical volume by William G. Hyland, Clinton's World: Remaking American Foreign Policy (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999). 102 O'Clery, The Greening, p. 239.

Bibliography The following abbreviations have been used throughout the bibliography: PPP ± The Public Papers of the President USIS ± United States Information Service

Speeches, addresses and statements President George Bush: News Conference, Washington, DC, January 27, 1989, PPP 1989: I. Responses to Questions Submitted by Xinhua of China, February 16, 1989, Current Policy, 1213. Address at Texas A & M University Commencement Exercises at College Station, May 12, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, July 1989, pp. 16±17. Address at Boston University Commencement Ceremony in Boston, Massachusetts, May 21, 1989, Current Policy, 1171. Address at the Coast Guard Academy Graduation Ceremony in New London, Connecticut, May 24, 1989, Current Policy, 1178. Remarks on Departure for the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Rome, Italy, May 26, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, August 1989, p. 11. Address at Rheingoldhalle in Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, May 31, 1989, Current Policy, 1179. Address before the Polish Parliament in Warsaw, Poland, July 10, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, September 1989, pp. 24±7. Address at Karl Marx University of Economics in Budapest, Hungary, July 12, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, September 1989, pp. 37±40. Address to the 44th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, September 25, 1989, PPP 1989: II. Address to the American People from Camp David, Maryland, November 22, 1989, Vital Speeches of the Day, LVI: 5, December 15, 1989, pp. 130±2. Remarks to the Crew and Guest on the USS Forrestal in Malta, December 1, 1989, PPP 1989: II. Question and Answer Session with Reporters in Malta, December 3, 1989, PPP 1989: II. Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony in Brussels, December 3, 1989, PPP 1989: II. Question and Answer Session with Students at John F. Kennedy High School in Denver, Colorado, December 8, 1989, PPP 1989: II. Remarks at the Catholic University of America Anniversary Dinner in Washington, DC, December 12, 1989, PPP 1989: II. 1990: News Year's Message to the People of the Soviet Union, January 1, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks to the American Farm Bureau Federation in Orlando, Florida, January 8, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks introducing the Presidential Lecture Series in Washington, DC, January 7, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks on the Signing of the Martin Luther King Jr Federal Holiday Proclamation, January 9, 1990, PPP 1990: I.

210

Bibliography 211 Question and Answer Session with the Youth Collaborative Mentor Group in Cincinnati, Ohio, January 12, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks to the Chamber of Commerce in Cincinnati, Ohio, January 12, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters, January 29, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks at the Republican Fundraising Dinner in Los Angeles, California, February 6, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Charles Stark Draper Prize for Engineering, February 20, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Question and Answer Session at the Annual Dinner of the Business Council, February 21, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks to the National Governors' Association, February 26, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks to the American Legislative Exchange Council, March 1, 1990, PPP 1990: I. News Conference following discussions with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan in Palm Springs, California, March 3, 1990, PPP 1990: I. News Conference in Washington, DC, March 13, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks to the National Association of Manufacturers in Washington, DC, March 15, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Interview with Foreign Journalists in Washington, DC, April 1, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Broadcasters in Atlanta, Georgia, April 2, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks to the National Academy of Sciences, April 23, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks at White House Briefing for the Associated General Contractors of America, April 24, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks at a Question and Answer Session with the National Association of Agricultural Journalists, April 24, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Address at Oklahoma State University Commencement in Stillwater, Oklahoma, May 4, 1990, Current Policy, 1276. Address at the University of South Carolina Commencement in Columbia, South Carolina, May 12, 1990, Current Policy, 1277. Dinners Toast at the Washington Summit, June 1, 1990, Foreign Policy Bulletin July/ August 1990, pp. 3±4. Remarks on Signing of the Soviet±United States Bilateral Agreements at the Washington Summit, June 1, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks at a Fundraising Breakfast for Governor Terry Branstad in Des Moines, Iowa, June 8, 1990, PPP 1990: I. Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for the Houston Economic Summit, July 9, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at the Aspen Institute Symposium in Aspen, Colorado, August 2, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks and Exchange with Reporters on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, August 3, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks and Exchange with Reporters on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, August 5, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, August 8, 1990, PPP 1990: II. News Conference, August 8, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Exchange with Reporters Aboard Air Force One on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 10, 1990, PPP 1990: II.

212 Bibliography Statement Announcing the Lifting of Restrictions on Soviet Business People in the United States, August 13, 1990, PPP 1990: II. News Conference, August 14, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Address to Employees at the Pentagon, August 15, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Address to the 91st National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Baltimore, Maryland, August 20, 1990, PPP 1990: II/Current Policy, 1294. Remarks at a Fundraising Barbecue for Representative Bill Grant in Tallahassee, Florida, September 6, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at the Arrival Ceremony for Helsinki Summit in Finland, September 8, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Joint News Conference with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Helsinki, Finland, September 9, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Address before Joint Session of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, Washington, DC, September 11, 1990, PPP 1990: II/ Current Policy, 1298. Letter to Congressional Leaders on Textile, Apparel, and Footwear Trade Legislation, September 17, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at Fundraising Dinner for Gubernatorial Candidate Pete Wilson in Los Angeles, California, September 18, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at Fundraising Luncheon for Gubernatorial Candidate George Voinovich in Cleveland, Ohio, September 21, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at a Fundraising Breakfast for District of Columbia Mayoral Candidate Maurice Turner, September 24, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Question and Answer Session at a White House Briefing for Representatives of the Arab-American Community, September 24, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at the Ministerial Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, October 1, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Address before the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, October 1, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Address to the German People on the Reunification of Germany, October 2, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Message to the House of Representatives Returning with Approval the Textile, Apparel, and Footwear Trade Act of 1990, October 5, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at a Republican Fundraising Breakfast in Burlington, Vermont, October 23, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at a Republican Rally in Manchester, New Hampshire, October 23, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at a Fundraising Dinner for Gubernatorial Candidate John Rowland in Stamford, Connecticut, October 23, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at a Fundraising Dinner for Senatorial Candidate, Pat Saiki in Honolulu, Hawaii, October 26, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at a Campaign Rally for Gubernatorial Candidate Pete Wilson in Los Angeles, California, October 26, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks to Officers and Troops at Hickam Air Force Base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, October 28, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at a Fundraising Breakfast for Representative Stan Parris in Alexandria, Virginia, October 31, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at a Republican Campaign Rally in Mashpee, Massachusetts, November 1, 1990, PPP 1990: II.

Bibliography 213 Remarks at a Republican Party Fundraising Breakfast in Burlington, Massachusetts, November 1, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at a Republican Reception in Cincinnati, Ohio, November 2, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at a Republican Campaign Rally in Albuquerque, New Mexico, November 3, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at a Republican Campaign Rally in Tyler, Texas, November 5, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks at Republican Campaign Rally in Waco, Texas, November 5, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Question and Answer Session with Reporters at White House, November 8, 1990, PPP 1990: II. News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis, November 8, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks to the Federal Assembly in Prague, Czechoslovakia, November 17, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in Paris, November 19, 1990, PPP 1990: II. News Conference, November 30, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Deployment of Additional United States Armed Forces to the Persian Gulf, November 16, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks to Allied Armed Forces Near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, November 22, 1990, PPP 1990: II. News Conference, November 30, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks to Reporters in Caracas, Venezuela, December 8, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks on the Waiver of the Jackson±Vanik Amendment and on Economic Assistance to the Soviet Union, December 12, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Question and Answer Session with Reporters, December 14, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Remarks to Reporters Following Discussions with Allies on the Persian Gulf Crisis, Washington, DC, December 17, 1990, PPP 1990: II. News Conference with Regional Reporters, December 18, 1990, PPP 1990: II. 1991: Radio Address to the Nation on the Persian Gulf Crisis, January 5, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Message to Allied Nations, January 8, 1991, PPP 1991: I. News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis, January 9, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Open Letter to College Students on the Persian Gulf, January 9, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Exchange with Reporters on the Telephone Conversation with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, January 11, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf, January 16, 1991, PPP 1991: I. News Conference, Washington, DC, January 18, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks to the Reserve Officers Association, January 23, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters, January 28, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast, January 31, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks to Community Members at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in Goldsboro, Georgia, February 1, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks to Community Members at Fort Stewart Air Force Base, Georgia, February 1, 1991, PPP 1991: I.

214 Bibliography Remarks to Community Members at Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station in North Carolina, February 1, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Radio Address to the Nation, February 2, 1991, PPP 1991: I. News Conference, February 5, 1991. PPP 1991: I. Remarks at a Question and Answer Session at a Meeting of the Economic Club, New York City, February 6, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Message to Congressional Leaders Transmitting the 1991 Economic Report, February 12, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks to the Raytheon Missile System Plant Employees in Andover, Massachusetts, February 15, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Exchange with Reporters at Kennebunkport, Maine, February 17, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Address to the Nation on the Iraqi Statement on Withdrawal from Kuwait, February 27, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks at a Meeting of the American Society of Association Executives, February 27, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks to the American Legislative Exchange Council, March 1, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks at Crime Summit, March, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks to United States Armed Forces Stationed in the Persian Gulf Region, March 2, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks to Veterans Service Organization, March 4, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Address before a Joint Session of Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf War, March 6, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Interview with Middle Eastern Journalists, March 8, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks to Returning Troops in Sumter, South Carolina, March 17, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks at the Gridiron Dinner in Washington, DC, March 23, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks at Maxwell Airforce Base War College in Montgomery, Alabama, April 13, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Address at the University of Michigan Commencement Ceremony in Ann Arbor, Michigan, May 4, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks at Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New Haven, Connecticut, May 27, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy Commencement Ceremony in Colorado Springs, Colorado, May 29, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy Commencement Ceremony in Quantico, Virginia, May 30, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony in West Point, New York, June 1, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks to the National Education Goals Panel, June 3, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks at the Annual Southern Baptist Convention in Atlanta, Georgia, June 6, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks at Swearing-In Ceremony for Henry Catto as Director of the United States Information Agency, Washington, DC, June 7, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks at a Memorial Service for Those who Died in the Persian Gulf, in Arlington, Virginia, June 8, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks to Members of the Defense Community at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, June 11, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks at the California Institute of Technology Commencement Ceremony in Pasadena, California, June 14, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Interview with Linda Douglas of KNBC, Jim Lampley of KCBS, and Paul Moyer of KABC in Los Angeles, California, June 15, 1991, PPP 1991: I.

Bibliography 215 Remarks at a Fundraising Dinner for Senatorial Candidate Bob Kasten in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, June 17, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Remarks on Meeting with Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin, June 20, 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:1, July/August 1991. Radio Address to the Nation on the Administration's Domestic Agenda, June 22, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Interview with Soviet Journalists, July 25, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at the Arrival Ceremony in Moscow, July 30, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at State Dinner in Moscow, July 30, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Address to the Moscow State Institute for International Relations in Moscow, July 30, 1991,Vital Speeches of the Day, LVII: 22, September 1, 1991. News Conference with Gorbachev in Moscow, July 31, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks with Gorbachev at the Signing of the START Treaty, July 31, 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:1, July/August 1991, pp. 19±20. Remarks at a Dinner Hosted by President Bush in Moscow, July 31, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks to Soviet and United States Businessmen in Moscow, July 31, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at Arrival Ceremony in Kiev, Ukraine, August 1, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Ukraine in Kiev, August 1, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at the Babi Yar Memorial in Kiev, Ukraine, August 1, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Statement on the National Security Strategy Report for 1991, August 13, 1991, USIS Official Text. Remarks on the Attempted Coup in the Soviet Union and Exchange with Reporters in Kennebunkport, Maine, August 19, 1991, PPP 1991: II. News Conference on the Attempted Coup in the Soviet Union in Kennebunkport, Maine, August 20, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Exchange with Reporters on Attempted Coup in the Soviet Union in Kennebunkport, Maine, August 21, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Exchange with Reporters in Kennebunkport, Maine, August 22, 1991, PPP 1991: II. News Conference with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada in Kennebunkport, Maine, August 26, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Address to the 46th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 24, 1991, USIS Official Text. Address to the Nation on United States Nuclear Weapons Reductions, September 27, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at the Points of Light Celebration in Orlando, Florida, September 30, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at a Fundraising Dinner for Governor Buddy Roemer in New Orleans, Louisiana, September 30, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at the Twelfth Annual Crime Stoppers International Conference in Louisville, Kentucky, October 2, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks to the Public Administration Groups on Public Service, October 24, 1991, PPP 1991: II. News Conference with Mikhail Gorbachev in Madrid, Spain, October 29, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at the Opening Session of the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid, Spain, October 30, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at Bush-Quayle Fundraising Dinner in Houston, Texas, October 31, 1991, PPP 1991: II.

216 Bibliography Remarks at the Bush-Quayle Fundraising Dinner in Dallas, Texas, November 1, 1991, PPP 1991: II. News Conference during the NATO Summit in Rome, Italy, November 8, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at a Luncheon Hosted by Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of The Netherlands in The Hague, November 9, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks to the American Community in The Hague, November 9, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Address to the Nation Commemorating Veterans Day, November 9, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, November 11, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at the Swearing-In Ceremony for Robert Gates as Director of Central Intelligence, November 12, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at Bush-Quayle Fundraising Luncheon in New York City, November 12, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks to the Future Farmers of America in Kansas City, Missouri, November 13, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at the Fundraising Dinner for Senator Christopher S. Bond in St Louis, Missouri, November 13, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks to Tropicana Employees in Bradenton, Florida, December 3, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks to Peavey Electronics Employees in Meridian, Mississippi, December 3, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks to Pearl Harbor Survivors Association in Honolulu, Hawaii, December 7, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks to World War Two Veterans and Families in Honolulu, Hawaii, December 7, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in Chicago, Illinois, December 10, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks to the Illinois Farm Bureau in Chicago, Illinois, December 10, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at the Fundraising Luncheon for Senator Frank H. Murkowski, December 11, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks at the Luncheon Commemorating the Bicentennial of the Bill of Rights at Montpelier in Orange County, Virginia, December 16, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Interview with Harold Green of KABC-TV in Los Angeles, California, December 17, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Statement on the Resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as President of the Soviet Union, December 25, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Address to the Nation on the Commonwealth of Independent States, December 25, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks to Bee County Community, Beeville, Texas, December 27, 1991, PPP 1991: II. Remarks Upon Departure for Asian/Pacific Nations, December 30, 1991, PPP 1991: II. 1992: Remarks to the Australian Parliament, Canberra, January 2, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks at a Question and Answer Session with the Singapore Lecture Group, January 4, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul, January 6, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks at a Question and Answer Session at a Town Hall Meeting in Exeter, New Hampshire, January 15, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks to the Coordinating Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States, January 22, 1992, PPP 1992: I.

Bibliography 217 Remarks at the Annual Convention of Religious Broadcasters, January 27, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Address before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks to the National Grocers Association in Orlando, Florida, February 4, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks to Southern Republican Leadership Conference, Charleston, South Carolina, February 21, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks at Bush-Quayle Campaign Kick-Off at Bethseda, Maryland, February 24, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks at Bush-Quayle Fundraising Dinner in Los Angeles, California, February 25, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks to the National Association of Evangelicals in Chicago, Illinois, March 3, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks at National Policy Conference on America's Role in the Emerging World, Washington, DC, March 11, 1992, PPP 1992: I. News Conference, March 11, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks at Bush-Quayle Fundraising Dinner in Chicago, March 16, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Message to Congress on Environmental Goals, March 24, 1992, PPP 1992: I. News Conference on Aid to the States of the Former Soviet Union, April 1, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 9, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks at the Annual Republican Congressional Fundraising Dinner, April 28, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks at a Bush-Quayle Fundraising Dinner in Philadelphia, May 11, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks at United States Naval Academy Commencement Ceremony in Annapolis, Maryland, May 27, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Remarks at the Texas State Republican Convention in Dallas, Texas, June 20, 1992, PPP 1992: I. Press Conference with Foreign Journalists, July 2, 1992. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, July 6, 1992, pp. 37±8. News Conference in Munich Germany, July 8, 1992, PPP 1992: II. Remarks at a Question and Answer Session with Outdoor Groups in Salt Lake City, Utah, July 18, 1992, PPP 1992: II. Remarks at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah, July 18, 1992, PPP 1992: II. News Conference, August 7, 1992, PPP 1992: II. Statement on Humanitarian Assistance to Bosnia, October 2, 1992, PPP 1992: II. Remarks with Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom, December 26, 1992, PPP 1992: II. Secretary of State, James Baker III: Confirmation Hearing Address before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 17, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, April 1989, pp. 10±13. Interview with Leslie Stahl on Face the Nation, February 26, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, May 1989, pp. 10±23. Address at the Vienna Ministerial, March 6, 1989, Current Policy, 1154. Address to the World Affairs Council in Dallas, Texas, March 30, 1990, Current Policy, 1266. Address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors Convention in Washington, DC, April 14, 1989, Current Policy, 1162.

218 Bibliography Interview with Morton Kondracke on American Interests, PBS Television, April 19, 1989, broadcast April 22, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, June 1989, pp. 14±18. Address before the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, May 4, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, July 1989, pp. 36±9. News Conference in Moscow, May 11, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, July 1989, pp. 30±3. Interview with Tass and Izvestiya in Moscow, May 11, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, July 1989, pp. 33±4. News Conference at the White House, May 23, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, July 1989, pp. 21±4. News Briefing in London, UK, June 1, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, August 1989, pp. 41±4. Address before the National Press Club in Washington, DC, June 8, 1989, Current Policy, 1181, pp. 55±61. Statement prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 20, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, August 1989, pp. 61±4. Address before the Asia Society in New York City, June 26, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, August 1989, pp. 64±6. News Conference on the Wyoming Ministerial at Department of State, September 19, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, November 1989, pp. 39±43. Statement prepared for the Senate Finance Committee, October 4, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, December 1989, pp. 20±6. Address to the Foreign Policy Association in New York City, October 16, 1989, Current Policy, 1213. Address to the Berlin Press Club in Berlin, Germany, December 12, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, December 1989. 1990: Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 1, 1990, Current Policy, 1245. Address at Charles University in Prague, Czechoslovakia, February 7, 1990, Current Policy, 1248. Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 22, 1990, USIS Press Release, February 27, 1990. Statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, May 1, 1990, Current Policy, 1274. Address before the National Committee on American Foreign Policy upon receiving the Seventh Annual Hans J. Morgenthau Award, New York City, May 14, 1990, Current Policy, 1278. Remarks before the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension in Copenhagen, Denmark, June 6, 1990, Current Policy, 1280. Statement before the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Turnberry, Scotland, June 7, 1990, Current Policy, 1284. Question and Answer Session Following Statement to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 17, 1990, Foreign Policy Bulletin, November/December 1990, pp. 43±5. Remarks on Receiving the George Kennan Award from the American Committee on US±Soviet Relations, October 19, 1990, Foreign Policy Bulletin, November/December 1990, pp. 16±19. Address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, October 29, 1990, Foreign Policy Bulletin 1:3, November/December 1990, pp. 49±51.

Bibliography 219 1991: Address to the Aspen Institute in Berlin, June 18, 1991,Vital Speeches of the Day, LVII: 19, July 15, 1991, pp. 578±82. Statement Following the NATO Ministerial Meeting, August 21, 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:2, September/October 1991, p. 17. Joint Press Conference with President Gorbachev in Moscow, September 11, 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:2, September/October 1991, p. 36. Remarks at the Closing of Third Day of Peace Talks on the Middle East, November 1, 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:3, November/December 1991, p. 21. Address to Princeton University, December 12, 1991,USIS Official Text. 1992: Address to Opening Session of the Coordinating Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States, January 22, 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:4/5, January±April 1992, p. 29. Joint Press Conference Concluding the Coordinating Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States, January 23, 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:4/5, January± April 1992, pp. 31±40. Remarks after Meeting with the Foreign Minister of Bosnia-Hercegovina, April 12, 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin 3:1, July/August 1992, pp. 27±8. Statement on the Fighting in Bosnia-Hercegovina, May 4, 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin 3:1, July/August 1992, p. 28. Remarks at the Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States in Lisbon, May 24, 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin 3:1, July/August 1992, pp. 30±31. Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger: Statement before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in Washington, DC, June 22, 1989, Current Policy, 1194. Statement before a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington, DC, August 24, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, November 1989, pp. 67±9. Remarks before the American Chamber of Commerce International Forum in Washington, DC, February 16, 1990, Current Policy, 1250. Speech to the Business Week Symposium, Washington, DC, October 3, 1991,USIS Press Release, October 7, 1991. Speech to George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, November 21, 1991, USIS European Wireless File, November 21, 1991. Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Robert M. Kimmit: Address before the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan in Tokyo, October 9, 1989, Current Policy, 1221. Statement before the Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Appropriations Committee, February 27, 1990, Current Policy, 1260. Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, Raymond G.F. Seitz: Statement for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 3, 1989, Current Policy, 1220. Statement to the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 9, 1990, USIS Press Release, October 10, 1990. US Ambassador to the Court of St James, Raymond G.F. Seitz: International Celebrity Lecture, Durham Castle, Durham, March 18, 1992, USIS Press Release. Defense Secretary, Richard Cheney: Address to the Federalist Society Conference on the Presidency and Congress, January 19, 1990, Vital Speeches of the Day, LVI:I, March 15, 1990, pp. 334±6.

220 Bibliography Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Jack Kemp: Address to the Lincoln Fellowship of Pennsylvania in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, November 19, 1990, Vital Speeches of the Day, pp. 166±8. Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control: Address to the Reserve Officers' Association, Washington, DC, April 18, 1990, USIS Press Release, April 20, 1990. Senator Robert Dole: Address to Town Hall of California, May 31, 1991, Vital Speeches of the Day, LVII: 18, July 1, 1991, pp. 547±9. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Robert Gates: Address to the American Newspaper Publishers' Association, May 7, 1991, USIS Press Release. Address to the National Policy Conference on America's Role in the Changing World, March 12, 1992, USIS European Wireless File. Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs and Counselor, Robert B. Zoellik: Testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, October 2, 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:2, September/October 1991, p. 43. Press Secretary, Marlin Fitzwater: Interview on Investigative Reports, A & E Television, July 23, 1995. Statement on President's Export Control Initiatives, December 13, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Statement on President Bush's Letter to President Hussein, January 12, 1991, PPP 1991: I. Statement on the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, August 28, 1992, PPP 1992:II. Deputy Press Secretary Roman Popadiuk: Statement on the Attempted Coup in the Soviet Union, August 19, 1991, PPP 1991: II. President Nixon: Address to the Republican Congressional Committee in New York City, December 7, 1990, Vital Speeches of the Day, LVII: 12, April 1, 1991, pp. 357±60. Address to the National Policy Conference on America's Role in the Emerging World, Washington, DC, March 11, 1992, Vital Speeches of the Day, LVIII: 15, May 15, 1992, pp. 450±3. Ambassador J. Kenneth Blackwell: Address to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, January 27, 1992, USIS European Wireless File. US Representative to the CSCE, John C. Kornblum: Remarks to the CSCE Plenary Session, May 6, 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin 3:1, July/ August 1992, pp. 28±30. President William J. Clinton: 1991±2: `New Covenant' Address to Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, December 12, 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin, November/December 1992, pp. 2±8. Speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York, April 1, 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:6, May/June 1992, pp. 12±14. Remarks to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, California, August 13, 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin, November/December 1992, pp. 12±17.

Bibliography 221 Acceptance Address, Democratic National Convention, New York, July 16, 1992, Vital Speeches of the Day, August 15, 1992, pp. 642±5. Address to Institute of World Affairs, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, October 1, 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin, November/December, 1992, pp. 19±23. Address to North Carolina State University, October 4, 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin, November/December, 1992, pp. 37±43. Statement on Most-Favored-Nation Status for China, September 14, 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin, November/December, 1992, pp. 18±19. 1993: Inaugural Address, Washington, DC, January 20, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks on the Establishment of the National Economic Council (NEC), Washington, DC, January 25, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks at the Democratic Governors' Association Dinner, February 1, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to the National Governors' Association, February 2, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Employees in Washington, DC, February 3, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks at a Dinner Honoring the New Jersey Congressional Delegation, February 4, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Exchange with Reporters and News Conference with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, February 5, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks Announcing the Creation of a White House Office on Environmental Policy, February 8, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks at a Town Meeting in Detroit, Michigan, February 8, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to Business Leaders in Washington, DC, February 11, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Address to the Nation on the Economic Program, February 15, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals, February 17, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks on the Economic Program in St Louis, Missouri, February 18, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks at a Question and Answer Session on the Economic Program in Chillicothe, Ohio, February 19, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks on the Economic Program in Hyde Park, New York, February 19, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks on the Economic Program in Santa Monica, California, February 21, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks at a Question and Answer Session with Silicon Graphics Employees in Mountain View, California, February 22, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks at the American University Centennial Celebration, February 26, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Presidential Radio Address, February 27 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks on National Service at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, March 1, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Presidential Radio Address, March 6, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to the Legislative Conference on the National League of Cities, March 8, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to the Children's Defense Fund in Washington, DC, March 11, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to Westinghouse Employees in Linthicum, Maryland, March 11, 1993, PPP 1993: I.

222 Bibliography Remarks to the Crew of the USS Theodore Roosevelt, March 12, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Presidential Radio Address, March 13, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to Treasury Department Employees, Washington, DC, March 18, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Presidential Radio Address, March 20, 1993, PPP 1993: I. News Conference with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, March 26, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis, April 1, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Question and Answer Session with the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis, April 1, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Presidential Radio Address, April 3, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Exchange with Reporters in Vancouver, Canada, April 3, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Press Conference in Vancouver, Canada, April 3, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Question and Answer Session with Reporters in Vancouver, Canada, April 4, 1993, PPP 1993: I. News Conference with Boris Yeltsin of Russia in Vancouver, Canada, April 4, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks on the Observance of the 250th Anniversary of the Birth of Thomas Jefferson, April 13, 1993, PPP 1993: I. News Conference with Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan, April 16, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks at the Dedication of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, April 22, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Statement on Advancing US Relations with Russia and the other Newly Independent States, April 23, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Address to the Newspaper Association of America in Boston, Massachusetts, April 25, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Message to Congress Reporting on the Continuation of Export Control Regulations, April 27, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to Justice Department Employees in Washington, DC, April 29, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks on Welcoming Military Personnel Returning from Somalia, May 5, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to the Export-Import Bank Conference, May 6, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Press Conference with European Community Leaders, May 7, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to the Cleveland City Club, Cleveland, Ohio, May 10, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks at the Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science and Art, New York City, May 12, 1993, PPP 1993: I. News Conference, May 14, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to the Community at Los Alamos, New Mexico, May 17, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks on Cuban Independence Day, Washington, DC, May 20, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Exchange with Reporters on Bosnia, May 21, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks on Bosnia and an Exchange with Reporters in Manchester, New Hampshire, May 22, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks on Signing the Flag Day Proclamation, Washington, DC, June 14, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Statement on International Broadcasting Programs, Washington, DC, June 15, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Presidential Radio Address, June 19, 1993, PPP 1993: I.

Bibliography 223 Remarks at Northeastern University Commencement Ceremony in Boston, Massachusetts, June 19, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Teleconference Remarks to the United States Conference of Mayors in Washington, DC, June 22, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters, June 26, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks Announcing the Defense Conversion Plan and Exchange with Reporters, July 2, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Presidential Radio Address, July 3, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks at an Independence Day Ceremony in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, July 4, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to the National Education Association in San Francisco, California, July 5, 1993, PPP 1993: I. News Conference with Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan in Tokyo, July 6, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks and a Question and Answer Session at Waseda University in Tokyo, July 7, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Presidential Radio Address, July 10, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul, July 10, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Presidential Radio Address, July 17, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to Democratic Members of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC, July 20, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Telephone Conversation with the Crew of the Space Shuttle Endeavor, July 22, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks at a Communication Technology Demonstration, July 22, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to the American Legion Boys Nation, Washington, DC, July 24, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to the Conference on the Future of the American Workplace in Chicago, Illinois, July 26, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Interview with the Texan Media, July 28, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to a Conference on the Future of the American Workplace in Chicago, Illinois, July 26, 1993, PPP 1993: I. Remarks to the Community at Alameda, California, August 13, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks on the Israeli±Palestinian Declaration Principles and Exchange with Reporters, Washington, DC, September 10, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks on the Israeli±Palestinian Declaration Principles, Washington, DC, September 13, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Supplemental Agreements to the North American Trade Agreement, September 14, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Address to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, September 27, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks to the Community in Sacramento, California, October 3, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks to the AFL-CIO Conference in San Francisco, California, October 4, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Address to the Nation on Somalia, October 7, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks at the Democratic National Committee Breakfast, Washington, DC, October 8, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Presidential Radio Address, October 9, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, October 12, 1993, PPP 1993: II.

224 Bibliography News Conference with Prime Minister Tansu Ciller of Turkey, October 15, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks to the Conference of Business for Social Responsibility, October 21, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks at the Executive Leadership Council Dinner, October 21, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Dinner in Washington, DC, October 21, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks at the Wall Street Journal Conference on the Americas in New York City, October 28, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks at the Dedication of John F. Kennedy Presidential Library Museum in Boston, Massachusetts, October 29, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks to NAFTA Employees of Lexmark International in Lexington, November 4, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Presidential Radio Address, November 13, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Letter to Congressional Leaders on NAFTA, November 15, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks to the Seattle APEC Host Committee, November 19, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks at a Reception Honoring Senator Diane Feinstein in San Francisco, California, November 20, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks to the US Coast Guard in Seattle, Washington, November 20, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation Act, Washington, DC, December 8, 1993, PPP 1993: II. Secretary of State Warren Christopher: News Conference, February 26, 1993, USIS European Wireless File, March 2, 1993. Senator John F. Kerry: Remarks during Senate Debate, October 24, 1990, Foreign Policy Bulletin, November/ December 1990, pp. 45±47. Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev: Speech at Stanford University, California, June 4, 1990, Foreign Policy Bulletin, July/ August 1990. Televised Statement, October 5, 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:2, September/October 1991.

Declarations, agreements, treaties, official fact sheets/reports, hearings Declaration on East±West Relations, Summit of the Arch, Paris, July 14±16, 1989, Department of State Bulletin, September 1989. Joint Statement following the Wyoming Ministerial in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, September 22±23, 1989; and Agreements on `Mutual Visits Between the Inhabitants of the Bering Straits Region', and `Bering Straits Regional Commission'. Department of State Bulletin, November 1989. White House Fact Sheet on the New National Security Strategy Report, March 20, 1990, PPP 1990: I. The London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, July 6, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Executive Order 12735, November 16, 1990, Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation, 55 F.R. 48587, PPP 1990: II. White House Fact Sheet on the Waiver of the Jackson±Vanik Amendment, December 12, 1990, PPP 1990: II.

Bibliography 225 White House Fact Sheet on the Medical Assistance Program for the Soviet Union, December 12, 1990, PPP 1990: II. White House Fact Sheet on Technical Assistance in Food Distribution and Marketing for the Soviet Union, December 12, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Excerpt of a White House Fact Sheet on the Soviet Union and International Financial Institutions, December 12, 1990, PPP 1990: II. Executive Order 12740, December 29, 1990, Waiver under the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the Soviet Union, 56 F.R. 355, PPP 1990: II. Hearings on `Changes in the European Security Environment' before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, 102nd Congress, First Session, February 26, 27, March 7, 1991 (Washington, DC: USGPP, 1991) S. Hrg. 102±64. White House Fact Sheet on the National Security Strategy Report, August 13, 1991,USIS Official Text. White House Statement on the Attempted Coup in the Soviet Union, August 19, 1991, PPP 1991: II. US±Soviet Statement on Afghanistan, September 13, 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:2, September/October 1991, p. 37. Fact Sheets on Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States Working Group's Conclusions, January 23, 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:4/5, January±April 1992, pp. 40±3. Fact Sheets: US Government Activities, January 23, 1992, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2:4/5, January±April 1992, pp. 43±5. Hearings on Àssisting the Build-Down of the Former Soviet Military Establishment', before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, 102nd Congress, Second Session, February 5 and 6, 1992 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1992). State Department Budget Statement, January 29, 1992, USIS European Wireless File. Munich Economic Summit Declaration, July 7, 1992, PPP 1992: II. Presidential Decision Directive 25, State Department, 1993. State 2000: a New Model for Managing Foreign Affairs. Report of the US Department of State Management Task Force, December 1992 (released January 1993), US Department of State Publication, 10029. Engagement and Enlargement. United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, June 1995. Guy Farmer, USIS analyst, `Human Rights a Cornerstone of US Foreign Policy', USIS Press Release February 11, 1992.

Interviews Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs and Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the Reagan Administration; interview at the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, January 11, 1995. David C. Acheson, President of the Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington, DC, January 12, 1995. Richard Allen, Institute for East±West Studies, New York, December 27, 1994. Dr Stephen Burman, Research Staff, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, August 2, 1994. Mr James Blair Cunningham, Director European Security and Political Affairs, US Department of State, June 20, 1995 (group interview, Atlantic Council Washington Discussion Series).

226 Bibliography Mr Jonathan Davidson, Head of Academic Affairs, Delegation of the European Commission, Washington, DC, June 20, 1995 (group interview, Atlantic Council Washington, Discussion Series). Dr Francis Fukuyama, Policy Planning Staff, US Department of State, Rand Corporation; interview at George Mason University, Washington, DC, October 17, 1997. Dr Jeffrey B. Gaynor, Director, Moscow office, former counselor for International Affairs, director International Resources Bank, director Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, Fellow of the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, January 12, 1995. Dr Gary Geipel, European Specialist, The Hudson Institute, Indianapolis, Indiana, January 18, 1995. Dr Daniel Hamilton, Policy Advisor to Assistant Secretary Richard C. Holbrooke, Director of the Office of Policy and Public Outreach, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, US Department of State, Washington, DC, June 20, 1995 (group interview, Atlantic Council Washington, Discussion Series). Ambassador G. Philip Hughes, former Ambassador to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Deputy Secretary of State, member of Security Council staff for Latin American Affairs and Deputy Foreign Policy Advisor for the Vice-President in Reagan and Bush Administrations, currently Executive Director of the National Council of World Affairs Organizations, Washington, DC, January 9, 1995. Mr Clarence Juhl, Director for NATO Policy, US Department of Defense, Washington, DC, June 19, 1995 (group interview, Atlantic Council Washington, Discussion Series 1995). Andrew S. Natsios, President Bush's special coordinator for Somali Relief and assistant administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID), currently VicePresident of World Vision, Washington, DC, January 11, 1995. Lt General William E. Odom, former Director of the National Security Agency from 1985 to 1988, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence 1981±5, Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinkski 1977±81, currently Director of National Security Studies for Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, and Adjunct Professor at Yale University, Washington, DC, January 11, 1995. On the national security council Odom worked on strategic planning, Soviet affairs, nuclear weapons policy, telecommunications policy and Persian Gulf security issues. Dr Andrew Pierre, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, January 6, 1995. Dr Simon Serfaty, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, January 9, 1995. Ms B. Erica Schlager, Counsel for International Law, US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, DC, June 19, 1995 (group interview, Atlantic Council Washington, Discussion Series). Dr John Steinbruner, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, January 10, 1995. Unattributable, Policy Planning Staff, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, July 18, 1994. Dr Philip Yasinski, Japan±Asia Forum, Washington, DC, October 17, 1997.

Conference addresses by: (author's own notes) General Andrew J. Goodpaster, former Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; Defense Liaison Officer and Staff Secretary to the President of the United States; Commander of the 8th US Infantry Division in

Bibliography 227 Germany; Assistant to the Chairman. Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Joint Staff, US Army; Commandant of the National War College; Deputy Commander of US forces in Vietnam; Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; currently Co-Chair of the Atlantic Council of the United States, Address to Atlantic Council Washington Discussion Series, Washington, DC, 1997. Dr Richard Haas, Director of National Security Programs, Council on Foreign Relations. Address to European Security Seminar: European Security and the Transatlantic Bridge: Towards the New Century, June 21, 1995. A Western European Union/ Atlantic Council Conference. Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs. Address to European Security Seminar: European Security and the Transatlantic Bridge: Towards the New Century, June 21, 1995. A Western European Union/ Atlantic Council Conference. Joergen Kosmos, Defense Minister of Norway. Address to European Security Seminar: European Security and the Transatlantic Bridge: Towards the New Century, June 21, 1995. A Western European Union/Atlantic Council Conference. Joseph Nye Jr, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Address to European Security Seminar: European Security and the Transatlantic Bridge: Towards the New Century, June 21, 1995. A Western European Union/Atlantic Council Conference. Hon. Malcolm Rifkind, QC, MP, Secretary of State for Defence of UK. Address to European Security Seminar: European Security and the Transatlantic Bridge: Towards the New Century, June 21, 1995. A Western European Union/Atlantic Council Conference. Hon. Jean-Clausel Rosembert of the Consulate General of Haiti (Chicago), `Post-Intervention Haiti: Prospects for Democracy and Development', Address to Indiana Council of World Affairs, Indianapolis, Indiana, January 18, 1995. Dr Joris Voorhoeve, Defense Minister of the Netherlands. Address to European Security Seminar: European Security and the Transatlantic Bridge: Towards the New Century, June 21, 1995. A Western European Union/Atlantic Council Conference.

Newspaper and magazine articles Elliott Abrams, `Bush's Unrealpolitik', New York Times, April 30, 1990, p. A17. Henry Allen, `Lost in Glasnost: the Cold War May Be History, but the Spoils Are Spoiled', Washington Post, March 12, 1990, p. C1. Jonathan Alter, `The Intellectual Hula Hoop: Why the Hyping of ``The End of History'' Says More About Washington Than the Theory Itself', Newsweek, October 9, 1989, p. 39 ÐÐ , `Clippings from the Media War: Why the Press was one of the Gulf's Casualties', Newsweek, March 11, 1992, p. 52. Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, ÙS±Soviet Scholarship Race Slows', Washington Post, July 20, 1990, p. E5. R.W. Apple Jr, `The New Embrace. US Moves to Help Cold War Rival Much as it Aided World War II Foes', New York Times, December 13, 1990, p. A22. ÐÐ , `The Sense of Triumph Fades, Uncertainty and Unease Grows', New York Times, December 29, 1991, section 4, p. 1. James Atlas, `What is Fukuyama Saying?', New York Times Magazine, October 22, 1989, pp. 38, 42, 54±5.

228 Bibliography Stuart Auerbach, `CIA Sees Hardships in E. Europe. Economic Reforms Could Take Years', Washington Post, May 17, 1990, p. A39. Peter Baker, À World to the Wise. High School Students Get Crash Course in Global Economic Competition', Washington Post, March 5, 1990, Business Section, pp. 1, 30. James David Barber, `The Silver Spoon in Bush's Mouth, and Policies', New York Times, January 27, 1990, p. A27. Richard Bernstein, Ìf They've Won, Can Conservatives Still Be Important?', New York Times, January 14, 1990, p. E24. David S. Broder and Richard Morin, `National Optimism Surges on War Success', Washington Post, February 28, 1991, p. A33. Arie R. Brouwer, `The Church's Ministry in Time of War', The Christian Century 108:8, March 6, 1991, pp. 251±4. George K. Brushaber, `War Cry', Christianity Today, 35:1, January 14, 1991, p. 14. Patrick Buchanan, `Now that Red is Dead, Come Home America', Washington Post, September 8, 1991, pp. C1 and C4. Richard J. Cattani, `Baker's Foreign Policy Style', Christian Science Monitor, March 8, 1990, p. 18 (World Edition Weekly, 9±15 March 1990). ÐÐ , Àmerica in the World', Christian Science Monitor, March 6, 1992, pp. 18±19. John Le Carre, `Spying . . . the Passion of My Time', QQ 100:2, Summer 1993, pp. 269±72. Lynne V. Cheney, `The End of History', Wall Street Journal, October 20, 1994, p. A26. Noam Chomsky, `The Dawn, So Far, is in the East', The Nation, 250:4, January 26, 1989, pp. 130±3. Tom Clancy and Russell Seitz, `Nuclear Ubiquity: the End of Atom Secrecy', Washington Post, January 5, 1992, p. C1. Warren I. Cohen, Àt the State Dept., Historygate', New York Times, May 8, 1990, p. A29. Charles Colson, Ìf Communism Fails, Do We Win?', Christianity Today, 33:14, October 6, 1989, p. 64. Rae Corelli, `Scholars Debate Whether History Has Ended', Maclean's, October 2, 1989, pp. 56±7. David Corn, `Rift on the Right: Life Without the Red Menace', The Nation, April 9, 1990, pp. 484±7. Carolyn Hughes Crowley, `Writing for Peace', Washington Post, April 18, 1990, p. C5. Lyn Cryderman, `Weeping over Baghdad', Christianity Today, 35:5, April 29, 1991, p. 12. Christopher B. Daly, `Soviet Space Exhibit Opens in Boston', Washington Post, June 2, 1990, p. C10. Ann Devroy, `Gorbachev's US Itinerary Poses Scheduler's Nightmare: Free Time', Washington Post, May 23, 1990, p. A6. ÐÐ , `Nixon Library Dedicated as 3 GOP Presidents Praise `Àrchitect of Peace'' ', Washington Post, July 20, 1990, p. A5. Helen Dewar, `Senate Panel's Quest: Filling Gaps in History of Foreign Relations', Washington Post, June 11, 1990, p. A13. E.J. Dionne Jr, Àmericans Tepid Towards Lithuania', Washington Post, April 24, 1990, p. A20. ÐÐ , ` ``Defense Intellectuals'' in a New World Order', Washington Post, May 29, 1990, p. A10. ÐÐ , Ìsrael's Backers Alarmed by US Policy', Washington Post, September 6, 1990, p. A36.

Bibliography 229 ÐÐ , Òdd Alliance Questions Gulf Policy. Coalition of Left and Right Unseen Since the Eve of World War II', Washington Post, November 13, 1990, p. A1. John Elson, `Has History Come to An End? A Provocative Case: Democracy Has Outlived Communism', Time, September 4, 1989, p. 57. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Èxit the Georgian', Washington Post, December 21, 1990, A 19. Samuel C. Florman, `The End of History?', Technology Review 93:3, April 1990, p. 70. ÐÐ , Èngineers and the Nintendo War', Technology Review 94:5, July 1991, p. 62. Thomas L. Friedman, `Nixon Scoffs at Level of Support for Russian Democracy by Bush', New York Times, March 10, 1992, pp. A1, 10. Gilbert Fuchsberg, `Business Schools Wary of Foreign Influx', Wall Street Journal, January 3, 1991, p. B4. Francis Fukuyama, Àre We at the End of History?', Fortune, January 15, 1990, pp. 75±6, 78. ÐÐ , `Hussein Has Not Revived History', New Republic, October 1, 1990, p. 10. Gerald F. Geib, `Split between Kissinger and Brzezinski on Iraq Reflects Search for New Foreign Policy Consensus', Wall Street Journal, December 17, 1990, p. A10. Leslie Gelb, `Nixon's Tricky Crusade', New York Times, March 13, 1992, p. A31. Richard Gephardt, `Bush's Lack of Vision', Washington Post, March 7, 1990, p. A18. ÐÐ , `How Dare I Criticize the President?', Washington Post, March 21, 1990, p. A21. George Gilder, `Four Cheers for Liberal Democracy', Washington Post, January 12, 1992, X, p. 1. Laurie Goodstein, Ànti-War Movement Suffers Peace Deficit. Activists Turning Attention to Home Front', Washington Post, June 3, 1990, p. A3. John M. Goshko, ÙS Stake in Gorbachev's Survival Rises. Baltic Situation Causes Most Concern', Washington Post, January 21, 1990, p. A30 ÐÐ , ÙS Aid to Eastern Europe Far Exceeds Original, Modest Offer', Washington Post, July 20, 1990, p. A14. Paul Gray, `Lies, Lies, Lies', Time, October 5, 1992, p. 32. Meg Greenfield, `How the ``West'' was Lost: With the Threat from the East Evaporating, What is the Rationale for our Involvement in the World?', Newsweek, July 23, 1990, p. 70. ÐÐ , Ìt Wasn't War, It Isn't Over', Washington Post, April 10, 1990, p. A23. Henry Grunwald, `We Can Manage Without an Enemy', Washington Post, March 8, 1990, p. A27. Carla Hall, `Vanishing Villains. Hollywood Casts Around For Replacement Rogues', Washington Post, April 15, 1990, pp. G1, 2. ÐÐ , Àt Nixon's Library, a Staff Reunion', Washington Post, July 20, 1990, pp. D1, 5. Art Harris, `Citizen Carter', Washington Post, February 22, 1990, pp. B1±2. Roy J. Harris, `Peace Games; after the Cold War, Rand remakes itself as a civilian expert; famous defense think tank now studies drug abuse, schools, teen sex habits; but the transition is bumpy', Wall Street Journal, June 18, 1993, p. A1. Mark O. Hatfield, Àn Agenda for Global Reconciliation: Beyond Containment', Christianity Today, June 18, 1990, pp. 29±35. Judith Havemann, `Panel Suggests Eventual Termination of Radio Free Europe', Washington Post, May 17, 1990, p. A39. David Heim, `Theologizing on the Gulf: the Bishop's Advantage', The Christian Century, 107:36, December 12, 1990, pp. 156±7. Fred Hiatt and Margaret Shapiro, ÙS±Japan Ties at Lowest Point Since War', Washington Post, February 12, 1990, pp. A1, 16.

230 Bibliography Bill Hicks, Òn the Warpath', Times Educational Supplement, June 14, 1991, p. 34. Christopher Hitchens, `Minority Report', The Nation, September 25, 1989, p. 302. Jim Hoagland, `President Bush Needs a Prime Minister', Washington Post, October 23, 1990, p. A21. ÐÐ , `The New World Order', Washington Post, November 15, 1990, p. A25. ÐÐ , Òur Strange View of Asia', Washington Post, December 11, 1990, p. A23. ÐÐ , Àrchitect of a New Era', Washington Post, December 21, 1990, p. A19. David Hoffman and Ann Devroy, `Gorbachev to Tour Parts of US After Summit', Washington Post, May 15, 1990, p. A7. ÐÐ , `Summit Decision Signals Superpower Co-operation', Washington Post, September 2, 1990, p. A1. Josef Joffe, `How Saddam Won the War', Wall Street Journal, October 31, 1990, p. 14. Haynes Johnson, `Refiguring the Cold War', Washington Post, July 20, 1990, p. A2. Michiko Kakutani, `Critic's Notebook: Making a Literary Lunge into the Future', New York Times, February 21, 1992, p. C1. Al Kammen, `Historians Say Secrecy Distorts Foreign Policy Chronicle', Washington Post, April 16, 1990, p. A13. Robert Kaplan `The Coming Anarchy', Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, pp. 44±76. Harvey J. Kaye, `The Concept of the `Ènd of History'' Constitutes a Challenge to the Liberal Consensus in Scholarship and in Public Life', Chronicle of Higher Education, 36:8, October 25, 1989, p. A48. Charles Kimbal, `Prospects for a Post-war Order', The Christian Century, 108:2, April 10, 1991, pp. 396±7. Michael Kinsley, `Reinventing the Yellow Peril', Washington Post, September 6, 1990, p. A27. Henry Kissinger, `False Dreams of a New World Order', Washington Post, February 26, 1991, p. A21. Michael T. Klare, `The New World War', The Progressive, November 1990, 54:11, pp. 14±16. Gabriel Kolko, Òbsessed with Military ``Credibility'' ', The Progressive, March 1991, pp. 24±6. Andrew Kopkind, `The Old Gringos', The Nation, November 27, 1989, p. 625. Charles Krauthammer, `Misplaced Malaise', Washington Post, March 9, 1990, p. A23. ÐÐ , `No We're Not Spending Too Much on Defense', Washington Post, September 28, 1990, p. A27. ÐÐ , `What's Left of the Left. After Socialism, an Agenda for Fracturing American Society', Washington Post, December 21, 1990, A19. ÐÐ , `Bless our Pax Americana', Washington Post, March 22, 1991, p. A25. Irving Kristol, Ìn Search of Our National Interest', Wall Street Journal, June 7, 1990, p. A14. ÐÐ , `The Challenge of a Political Reversal', Wall Street Journal, December 17, 1990, p. A8. Carol Labich et al. `The Year's 25 Most Fascinating Business People', Fortune, January 1, 1990, pp. 62±72. Saul Landau, `Rethinking the Idea of Revolution', The Progressive, 54:11, November 1990, p. 30. Lewis H. Lapham, Èndgames', Harper's Magazine, November 1989, pp. 10±14. ÐÐ , Ànnus Mirabilis', Harper's Magazine, 280: 1676, January 1990, pp. 8±11. ÐÐ , `Trained Seals and Sitting Ducks', Harper's Magazine, May 1991, pp. 10±16.

Bibliography 231 George Lardner Jr, `Cold War Adversaries Discuss Co-operation', Washington Post, November 11, 1990, p. A4. ÐÐ , `CIA Seeks to Define New Role', Washington Post, November 13, 1990, pp. A1, 4. Christopher Lasch, `The Costs of Our Cold War Victory', New York Times, July 13, 1990, p. A27. Nicholas Lemann, `The Smart Club Comes to the White House', New York Times, November 29, 1992, p. 11. James LeMoyne, Òut of the Jungle ± in El Salvador, Rebels With a New Cause', New York Times, February 9, 1992, p. 24. Anthony Lewis, Àfter the Cold War', New York Times, July 10, 1990, p. A20. Flora Lewis, Òn or Off the World', New York Times, February 20, 1990, p. A21. ÐÐ , `For a Sober Balance', New York Times, December 1, 1990, p. 25. Edward Luttwak, `Bush Has the Momentum, But What About His Mess at Home?', Washington Post, September 9, 1990, p. D1. Frank McConnell, `Nintendo from Hell: the Gulf War on the Tube', Commonweal 118:4, February 22, 1991, pp. 134±5. Edwin McDowell, Àfter the Cold War, the Land of the Rising Threat', New York Times, June 18, 1990, p. C3. Mary McGrory, `Two Contrasting Bushes', Washington Post, August 16, 1990, p. A2. William H. McNeill, `History Over, World Goes On', New York Times Book Review, January 26, 1992, p. 14. Joseph P. Manguno, `Warm Breezes Blowing From Europe Do Little to Thaw the Korean Cold War', Wall Street Journal, January 12, 1990, p. A8. Joshua Maravchik, `New Isolationism, Same Old Mistake', New York Times, August 28, 1990, p. A21. Arno J. Mayer, Èurope after the Thaw', The Nation, 250: 14, April 9, 1990, pp. 473 and 486. Charles W. Maynes, `For a New Foreign Policy', New York Times, May 23, 1990, p. A29. Walter Russell Mead, Òn the Road to Ruin. Winning the Cold War, Losing the Economic Peace', Harper's Magazine, March 1990, pp. 59±64. Larry Minear, `Rippling Consequences of the Gulf War', The Christian Century 108:8, March 6, 1991, pp. 251±4. Paul Mojzes, `The Rehabilitation of Religion in the USSR and Eastern Europe', Christian Century, 107:1, January 3±10, 1990, pp. 15±18. Arthur D. Moore, Àfter the Thaw. Following Years of Secrecy and Stealth in Penetrating the Iron Curtain, Christian Ministries Struggle to Adjust to Now-Open Doors', Christianity Today, 34:7, April 23, 1990, p. 21±4. Molly Moore, `Bipartisan Panel Splits on Soviet Military Threat', Washington Post, July 7, 1990, P. A18. Tom Morton, `The Wages of War', Christianity Today, 35:3, March 11, 1991, pp. 54±5. Carol Muske, `Passion, Politics and Secret Rituals', New York Times, April 19, 1992, p. 10. David Neff, `Love Thy (Arab) Neighbor', Christianity Today, October 22, 1990, 34:15, 1990, p. 22. Barry Newman, Às Capitalism Takes Root, Dreams Grow Among Many Poles. They Long for Tract Houses, Bright Red Cars, Things American ± Circa 1955', Wall Street Journal, May 18, 1990, p. 1. Joseph S. Nye, `No US Isn't in Decline', New York Times, October 3, 1990, p. A33. Don Oberdorfer, Àltered Superpower Ties Exemplified by Romania', Washington Post, January 1, 1990, pp. A1, 27.

232 Bibliography ÐÐ , `Democrats Grope in All Directions for a 90s Foreign Policy', International Herald Tribune, March 17, 1992. Michael Oreskes, Àpproval of Bush, Bolstered by Panama, Soars in Poll', New York Times, January 19, 1990, p. A20. ÐÐ , Èmpathy's Drawback: No Room to Disagree', New York Times, February 13, 1990, p. A18. ÐÐ , Às Election Day Nears, Poll Finds Nation's Voters in a Gloomy Mood', New York Times, November 4, 1990, p.1 and 34. Charles Peters, `Disturbing Signs from the Bush Team', New York Times, January 15, 1990, p. A17. William Pfaff, `The Vietnam Syndrome: an Incomplete Exorcism', International Herald Tribune, March 15, 1991. ÐÐ , `What if the World called ``Leader'' and Nobody Stood Up', Los Angeles Times, October 7, 1990, p. M7. ÐÐ , `The Might, and Sense, of a Superpower', International Herald Tribune, December 14, 1990. Edward Plowman, `Glasnost Opens Way for Graham', Christianity Today, 33:12, September 8, 1990, p. 61. Dana Priest, `Soviet Foreign Policies on Protesters' Agenda', Washington Post, May 29, 1990, p. A9. Rosemary Radford Ruether, `The Dangerous Illusions of Victory', The Christian Century, 108:10, March 20±27, 1991, pp. 318±19. Robert Reich, Ìs Liberal Democracy the Hallmark of Our Era?', Wall Street Journal, February 6, 1992, p. A12. T. R. Reid, `Japan, Soviet Union, in Rare Joint Move, Condemn Iraqi Actions', Washington Post, September 6, 1990, p. A30. Alice M. Rivlin, `New World, New Progress', Washington Post, April 10, 1990, p. A23. Sam Roberts, Àn Ex-President Bridging a Chasm as Volunteer', New York Times, December 13, 1990, p. B1. Eugene Rochberg-Halton, `Cold War Victims Deserve a Memorial', New York Times, March 10, 1990, p. 25. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, `The Paradox of Espionage', Washington Post, January 19, 1990, p. A21. ÐÐ , `Living with Uncertainty', Washington Post, February 23, 1990, p. A23. ÐÐ , Àn American Show. Internationalism Fades in the Gulf', Washington Post, December 21, 1990, p. A19. Andrew Rosenthal, `Bush Yields to an Impulse to Stay Cautious about the Soviets', New York Times, February 11, 1990, p. E.2. ÐÐ , `Gorbachev's Surprise: an Extra Day for Tours, and Breakfast with Reagan', New York Times, May 16, 1990, p. A8. ÐÐ , ÙS Fears Spread of Soviet Nuclear Weapons', New York Times, December 16, 1991, p. A15. Hobart Rowan, `Japanese ``No Man'' ', Washington Post, January 18, 1990, p. A23. ÐÐ , `Large Trade Surpluses Possible with Soviet Union, China and India', Washington Post, February 21, 1990, p. A8. ÐÐ , `Capitalism Called Only Soviet Hope', Washington Post, December 22, 1990, A12. Dale Russakoff, Ìn Europe, Changing with the Audience', Washington Post, January 11, 1990, p. A21. William Safire, `Staying a Superpower', New York Times, February 5, 1990, p. A19. ÐÐ , `The New Despotism', New York Times, March 12, 1992, p. A23.

Bibliography 233 ÐÐ , `Spies of the Future', New York Times, March 16, 1990, p. A35. Robert J. Samuelson, `The Deceptive Decade', Washington Post, March 7, 1990, p. A27. Alvin P. Sanoff, `The Cold War's Cultural Legacy', US News and World Report, June 18, 1990, pp. 48±50. Kathy Sawyer, `Superpowers Might Swap Space Travellers in Study', Washington Post, February 4, 1990, p. A15. Jacob M. Schlesinger, ÙS and Japanese Trade Negotiations Prepare for a Time of Bare Knuckles', Wall Street Journal, February 20, 1990, p. A21. Serge Schmemann, `Gorbachev Clears Way for German Unity, Dropping Objection to NATO Membership', New York Times, July 17, 1990, p. A1. Daniel Schorr, `How to Lose the Cold War', New York Times, March 10, 1992, p. A25. Robert Shogan, ÙS Urged to Aid Soviets, E. Europe', Los Angeles Times, March 7, 1990, p. A5. Tim Shorrock, `How Long Yet for Korea's Cold War?', The Nation, January 28, 1991, p. 82. Ken Sidey, ÙS, Soviet Scholars Study Ten Commandments', Christianity Today, 34:4, March 5, 1990, p. 34. Dimitri Simes, `How Much Can Each Side Deliver', Washington Post, September 9, 1990, p. D1. Pam Solo, `Rejecting Cold War Politics', The Progressive, 53:1, January 1989, pp. 18±19. Frank Swoboda, ÀFL-CIO: Give Soviets Favored Trade Status', Washington Post, February 22, 1990, p. A29. Strobe Talbott, `The Need For New Thinking', Time, April 10, 1989, p. 58. ÐÐ , `The Beginning of Nonsense', Time, September 11, 1989, p. 39. E.P. Thompson, `History Turns on a New Hinge', The Nation, 250:4, January 29, 1990, pp. 117±22. Alan Tonelson, `Clinton's World', Atlantic Monthly, February 1993, pp. 71±4. Robin Toner, `For the Democrats Something Seems Missing: Fear', New York Times, February 5, 1990, p. A17. Steve Twomey, `Peace Board Put on the Defensive', Washington Post, April 20, 1990, p. B1. Patrick E. Tyler, `CIA's Webster Says Soviet Military Threat Declining', Washington Post, January 24, 1990, p. A4. ÐÐ , `New Pentagon ``Guidance'' Cites Soviet Threat in Third World', Washington Post, February 13, 1990, pp. A1, 9. Paul Valentine and Carlos Sanchez, `Baltic Americans Remember Heritage, Plan Demonstrations', Washington Post, May 29, 1990, p. A9. Katrina Vanden Heuvel, `Time to Turn Our Energies Inward', The Progressive, 54:11, November 1990, pp. 35±6. Stephen van Evera, `The Case against Intervention', Atlantic Monthly, July 1990, pp. 72±80. James M. Wall, `Crying Wolf over Saddam Hussein', The Christian Century, 108:4, January 30, 1991, pp. 99±100. ÐÐ , `The Cold Is Over, But ``Demons'' Remain', The Christian Century, 107:25, September 5±12, 1990, pp. 787±8. ÐÐ , Ànother Failure in a Bankrupt Foreign Policy', The Christian Century, 108:13, April 17, 1991, pp. 419±20. ÐÐ , `Seeing Reality in the Middle East', The Christian Century, 108:15, May 1, 1991, pp. 475±6.

234 Bibliography ÐÐ , `Hussein's Designs, Bush's Intentions', The Christian Century, 108:8, March 6, 1991, pp. 251±4. ÐÐ , `Winning the War, Losing our Souls', The Christian Century, 108:11, April 3, 1991, pp. 355±6. ÐÐ , `Deadly Duo: Nationalism and Public Ignorance', The Christian Century, 108: 12, April 10, 1991, pp. 387±8. ÐÐ , `Making Linkage Work for Peace', The Christian Century, 108:6, February 20, 1991, pp. 187±8. Jenifer Warren, Ìraqi Move Confirms Need for US Arms Spending, Cheney Says', Los Angeles Times, September 13, 1990, p. A13. Albert L. Weeks, `Patriotic Fervor is Genuine', New York Times, March 1, 1992, Sports 8, p. 9. Judith Weinraub, `Beginning at the End', Washington Post, March 16, 1992, p. C1. Tom Wicker, `The ``Super'' Concept', New York Times, November 25, 1990, Section 4, p. E11. ÐÐ , À More Desperate Struggle', New York Times, December 29, 1991, section 4, p. 9. Craig R. Whitney, `Promise of Yalta: Redeemed at Last?, New York Times, July 17, 1990, p. A1. ÐÐ , `The World; the New Era Still Demands Bold Strokes of Leadership', New York Times, July 5, 1992, 4, p. 3. George F. Will, `The Empty Presidency', Washington Post, January 21, 1990, p. B7. ÐÐ , Ènd of the ``Progressive'' Pilgrimage', Washington Post, March 1, 1990, p. A25. ÐÐ , `Buchanan Takes Aim', Washington Post, December 11, 1991, p. A25. George C. Wilson, Ìn Hanoi, an Act of Healing', Washington Post, June 16, 1990, p. B7. Michael Wines, `Bush Says Bill Ignores His Powers', New York Times, February 17, 1990, p. 3. ÐÐ , `Security Agency Debates New Role: Economic Spying', New York Times, June 18, 1990, pp. A1, 6. ÐÐ , `Bush Scraps Intelligence Board, Appointing a New Panel of 6', New York Times, July 17, 1990, p. A6. ÐÐ , `Bush, to Guard Secrecy, Kills Espionage Agencies' Budget', New York Times, December 1, 1990, p. 10. Albert Wohlsetter and Fred Hoffman, `Confronting Saddam: a Model Danger', Wall Street Journal, August 9, 1990, p. A10. J. Dudley Woodberry, Òur Turn in Babylon', Christianity Today, 35:3, March 11, 1991, p. 24. Bob Woodward, `Happy Talk', The Sunday Times, June 30, 1996, section 3, pp. 1±2. Andrew L. Yarrow, `Kindly Reflections on the Carter Era', New York Times, November 19, 1990, p. A14. New York Times/CBS NEWS Poll, New York Times, October 16, 1990, p. A12. `Powell Says Defense Needs Massive Review', Washington Post, May 7, 1990, pp. A1, 8. `For Soviets, Cheney Has Top 10 List,' Washington Post, July 20, 1990, p. A17. Ìn a Fast-Changing World, History Textbooks Become History', New York Times, October 31, p. B6. `History Bleached at State', Editorial, New York Times, May 16, 1990, p. A20. ÙS±Soviet Environment Ties Widen', Washington Post, January 13, 1990, p. A16. `Stacking the Texts', The Progressive, 54:7, July 1990, p. 8. `Still Out in the Cold', Editorial, The Nation, 249:22, December 25, 1989, p. 774. `Some Like it Hot', Editorial, The Nation, 249: 22, 1989, pp. 775±6. `Half a Cold War', The Progressive, 54:3, March 1990, pp. 8±9.

Bibliography 235 `Still a Cold War for Aliens', Editorial, New York Times, July 10, 1990, p. A19. `Beyond Summitry', Editorial, The Nation, 250: 4, June 18, 1990, pp. 843±4. `No More Bad Guys?' Editorial, Christianity Today, 33:8, May 12, 1989, p. 16. Àn Overdose of Glasnost. As well-meaning Westerners rush into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, they may be hurting as much as helping', Christianity Today, 34:11, August 20, 1990, pp. 34±6. `Glasnost Lost?', Christianity Today, April 29, 1991, pp. 34±5. `Peaceniks and Prophecy Mongers', Christianity Today, 35:6, May 27, 1991, p. 88. `Time to Call History a Day', Economist, September 16, 1989, p. 48. `The fire is being rekindled', Economist, March 7, 1998, p. 55. `Lucky or Good? Foreign Tests May Show Which Bush Is', Wall Street Journal, April 20, 1991, p. 1. ÙCLA Hears Soviet ``Messenger of Peace'' ', New York Times, June 18, 1990, p. B9. `Best Seller List', New York Times, April 26, 1992, 7, p. 30. `Notable Books of the Year', New York Times, December 6, 1992, p. 57. Harper's Magazine, 281: 1684, September 1990, pp. 34, 36. Advertisement, Washington Post, December 12, 1990, p. A34.

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236 Bibliography Alexander George, `The `Òperational Code'': a Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making', International Studies Quarterly, 13:2, 1969, pp. 190±221. Peter Haas (ed.), Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination: Special Issue of International Organization, 46:1, 1992. Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, `Summits and the Constitution of an International Public Sphere: the Reagan±Gorbachev Meetings as Televised Media Events', Communication, 12, 1991, pp. 249±65. Daniel C. Hallin, `TV's Clean Little War', Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 47:4, May 1991, pp. 16±20. Owen Harries and William F. Buckley, Ìs the Cold War Really Over?', National Review, November 10, 1989, pp. 40±5. Ted Hopf, `The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', International Security, 23:1, Summer, pp. 171±200. Ole Holsti, `The Belief System and National Images,' Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6, 1992, pp. 244±52. Irving Louis Horowitz, `Histories, Futures, and Manifest Destiny', Society, July/August 1994, p. 12. Samuel P. Huntington, Àmerican Ideals versus American Institutions', Political Science Quarterly. The Journal of Public and International Affairs, 97:1, Spring 1992, pp. 1±72. ÐÐ , `No Exit: the Errors of Endism', National Interest 17, Fall 1989, p. 4. ÐÐ , `The Future of History: the Errors of Endism', Current, June 1990, pp. 18±24. ÐÐ , `The Clash of Civilizations', Foreign Affairs, Summer, 1993, pp. 22±49. George Kennan, `The Sources of Soviet Conduct', Foreign Affairs, July 1947, pp. 869±84. Robert O. Keohane, Ìnternational Institutions: Two Approaches', International Studies Quarterly, 1988:32, pp. 379±96. Joseph Lepgold and Timothy McKeown, Ìs American Foreign Policy Exceptional? An Empirical Analysis', Political Science Quarterly. The Journal of Public and International Affairs 110:3, 1995, pp. 369±84. John Mearsheimer, `Back to the Future. Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security, 15:1, Summer 1990, pp. 5±56. ÐÐ , `Why We Shall Soon Miss the Cold War', Atlantic Monthly, August 1990, pp. 35±50. Richard A. Melanson, `The Social and Political Thought of William Appleman Williams', Western Political Quarterly, 31:3, 1978. Gil Merom, Ìsrael's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism', Political Science Quarterly. The Journal of Public and International Affairs 114:3, 1999, pp. 409±34. Kenneth Minogue, Ùneasy Triumph', National Interest, Winter 1992±3, pp. 81±3. Hans J. Morgenthau, `The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: the National Interest vs Moral Abstractions', American Political Science Review, XLVI:4, December 1950. ÐÐ Ànother ``Great Debate'': the National Interest of the United States', American Political Science Review, XLVI:4, December 1952. John Nerone and Ellen Wartella, Ìntroduction to Studying Social Memory', special issue of Communication, 11:2, 1989, pp. 85±8. Pierre Nora, `Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire,' Representations 26, Spring 1989, pp. 7±25. Joseph S. Nye Jr, `Soft Power', Foreign Policy, 80, Fall 1990. George R. Packard, `The Coming US±Japan Crisis', Foreign Affairs, 66: 2, Winter 1987±8, pp. 348±67.

Bibliography 237 Richard Peet, `Reading Fukuyama: Politics at the End of History', Political Geography, 12:1, January 1993, pp. 64±78. William Pfaff, `Redefining World Power', Foreign Affairs, Winter 1991, pp. 34±48. Lyn Ragsdale, `The Politics of Presidential Speechmaking, 1949±1980', American Political Science Review, December 1984. Thomas Risse-Kappen, `Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies', World Politics, 43, July 1991, pp. 479±512. Peter W. Rodman, Ìs the Cold War Over?', Wilson Quarterly, 13:1, Winter 1989, pp. 39±42. James N. Rosenau, `Foreign Policy as Adaptive Behavior. Some Theoretical Notes for a Theoretical Model', Comparative Politics, 2:3, 1970, pp. 365±87. Bruce Russett and Michael W. Doyle, `The Democratic Peace', International Security, Spring 1995, pp. 164±84. Michael J. Shapiro, G. Matthew Bonham and Daniel Heradstveit, À Discursive Practices Approach to Collective Decision-Making', International Studies Quarterly, 32:4, December 1998, pp. 397±419. Graham Shepherd, `Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1969±1984: a Second Test of Interpersonal Generation Theory', International Studies Quarterly, 32, 1988, pp. 91±123. Dennis Simon and Charles Ostrom, `The Politics of Prestige: Popular Support and the Modern Presidency', Presidential Studies Quarterly, 18:4, Fall 1988, pp. 742±55. John A. Thompson, `The Problem for United States Foreign Policy', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 2: 3, November 1990, pp. 65±80. Robert C. Tucker, `Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political ``Realism'' ', American Political Science Review, XLVI:1, March 1952. William Earl Weeks, `Historiography: New Directions in the Study of Early American Foreign Relations', Diplomatic History, 17:1, Winter 1993, pp. 73±96. Deborah Welch Larson, `Problems of Content Analysis in Foreign Policy Research: Notes from the Study of the Origins of the Cold War Belief Systems', International Studies Quarterly, 32, 1988, pp. 241±55. Ronald F. Wendt and Gail T. Fairhurst, `Looking for ``The Vision Thing'': the Rhetoric of Leadership in the 1992 Presidential Election', Communication Quarterly, 42:2, Spring 1994, pp. 186±94. Ìs History Over?', National Review, 41:16, September 1, 1989, pp. 14±16.

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238 Bibliography Arjun Appadurai, `Patriotism and its Futures', Public Culture 5:3, Spring 1993, pp. 411±29, reprinted in Manfred B. Steger and Nancy S. Lind, Violence and its Alternatives: an Interdisciplinary Reader (New York: St. Martins, 1999). Richard K. Ashley, `The Achievements of Post-Structuralism', International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 240±53. Enrico Augelli and Craig N. Murphy, `Consciousness, Myth and Collective Action: Gramsci, Sorel and the Ethical State', in Stephen Gill and James H. Mittleman (eds), Innovation and Transformation in International Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy. Revolution, War and Peace, 1989±1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1995). James David Barber, Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1985). Alicia Barcena, `The Role of Civil Society in Twenty-First-Century Diplomacy', in James P. Muldoon Jr, JoAnn Fagot Aviel, Richard Reitano and Earl Sullivan (eds), Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations Today (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), pp. 190±200. Ryan Barilleaux, The Post-Modern Presidency: the Office after Reagan (New York: Praeger, 1988). R.J. Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947). Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman (eds), Post-Realism: the Rhetorical Turn in International Relations, (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1996). Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology. On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960). Robert Bellah, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985). Thomas Bender, `The Cultures of Intellectual Life: the City and the Professions', in John Higham and Paul K. Conkin (eds), New Directions in American Intellectual History (London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1979). Susan Porter Benson, Stephen Brier, and Roy Rosenwieg, Presenting the Past. Essays on History and the Public (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1986). Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: the Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (New York: Little, Brown, 1993). Rebecca Bjork, The Strategic Defense Initiative. Symbolic Containment of the Nuclear Threat (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992). Daniel H. Borus (ed.), These United States. Portraits of America from the 1920s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). Denise M. Bostdorff, The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994). Mike Bowker and Phil Williams, Superpower DeÂtente: a Reappraisal (London: SAGE/ RIAA, 1988). John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and Everett Walters (eds), Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century America (Cincinnati, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964). David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision. Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (London: Free Press of Glencoe/Macmillan, 1963). Thomas L. Brewer and Lorne Teitelbaum, American Foreign Policy (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1997).

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240 Bibliography Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, Marching in Place: the Status Quo Presidency of George Bush (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992). John Dumbrell (with a chapter by David M. Barrett), The Making of US Foreign Policy, second edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997). Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (New York: The Free Press, 1965). ÐÐ , The Rules of Sociological Method, eighth edn, trans. Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller, George E.G. Catlin (ed.) (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1950). ÐÐ , Sociology and Philosophy, trans. D.F. Pocock (London: Cohen & West, 1953). Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). George C. Edwards III, The Public Presidency (New York: St. Martins Press, 1983). George C. Edwards III, `Presidential Rhetoric: What Difference Does it Make?', in Martin J. Medhurst (ed.), Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996). Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx: the Character of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Vintage, 1998). Jean Bethke Elshtain, Real Politics: at the Center of Everyday Life (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). James Fallows, More Like US. Making America Great Again (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989). Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: the Onset of the Cold War, 1945±1950 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970). Robert Ferrell, America as a World Power, 1872±1945 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1971). ÐÐ , America in a Divided World, 1945±1972 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1975). Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957). Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1996). Marlin Fitzwater, Call the Briefing! Reagan and Bush, Sam and Helen (New York: Random House, 1995). Joseph Frankel, National Interest (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970). George M. Fredrickson, The Inner Civil War. Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993). Robert V. Friedenberg (ed.), Rhetorical Studies of National Political Debates, 1960±1988 (New York: Praeger, 1990). George Friedman and Meredith Le Bard, The Coming War With Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991). Gil Friedman and Harvey Starr, Agency, Structure, and International Politics. From Ontology to Empirical Inquiry (London & New York: Routledge, 1997). Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). Graham E. Fuller, The Perils of the Post-Cold War World (New York: Dutton, 1992). John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War. Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Steve Garber and Phil Williams, `Defense Policy', in Dilys M. Hill and Phil Williams, The Bush Presidency. Triumphs and Adversities (London: Macmillan, 1994). Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion. Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941±1949 (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970).

Bibliography 241 Lloyd C. Gardner, Arthur Schlesinger Jr, and Hans J. Morgenthau (eds), The Origins of the Cold War (Waltham, MA: Ginn Blaisdell, 1971). Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture; Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973). Marc A. Genest, Conflict and Cooperation. Evolving Theories of International Relations (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1996). James William Gibson, The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam (Boston/New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986). Betty Glad, `Figuring out Saddam Hussein', in Marcia Lynn Whicker, James P. Pfiffner and Raymond A. Moore (eds), The Presidency and the Gulf War (Westport, Conn./ London: Praeger, 1993). Allen E. Goodman and Bruce D. Berkowitz, The Need to Know. Task Force Report on Covert Action (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Background Paper, 1994). Philip Goulding, Confirm or Deny. Informing the People on National Security (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). James R. Grossman (ed.), The Frontier in American Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990). Maurice Halbwach, La memoire collective (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968). Louis Halle, The Cold War as History (New York: Harper and Row, 1967). Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War (London: Verso, 1983). Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974). John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe. Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Roderick P. Hart, The Sound of Leadership. Presidential Communication in the Modern Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). John Higham and Paul K. Conkin (eds), New Directions in American Intellectual History (London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1997). Dilys M. Hill and Phil Williams (eds), The Bush Presidency. Triumphs and Adversities (London: Macmillan, 1994). Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: the Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday, 1967). Barbara Hinckley, The Symbolic Presidency. How Presidents Portray Themselves (London: Routledge, 1990). Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr, The Cold War as Rhetoric: the Beginnings, 1945±1950 (New York: Praeger, 1991). Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver's Troubles or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968). ÐÐ , Primacy or World Order. American Foreign Policy since the Cold War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). Michael Hogan (ed.), The End of the Cold War. Meanings and Implications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). John Hohenberg, The Bill Clinton Story. Winning the Presidency (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994).

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246 Bibliography W.W. Rostow, The Delusion of Power: an Essay in Recent History (New York: Macmillan, 1972). Robert I. Rotberg and Thomas G. Weiss (eds), From Massacres to Genocide: the Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises (Washington, DC and Cambridge, MA: Brookings Institution & The World Peace Foundation, 1996). John Gerald Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (London: Routledge, 1998). Arthur Schlesinger Jr, `Leninist Ideology and Stalinist Paranoia', in Thomas G. Paterson (ed.), The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1970), pp. 96±106. ÐÐ , The Cycles of American History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986). Steven Schlossstein (sic), The End of the American Century (Chicago: Congdon & Weed Inc, 1989). Wilbur Schramm and Donald F. Roberts (eds), The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, revised edn (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972). Michael Schudson, Watergate in American Memory: How We Remember, Forget and Reconstruct the Past (New York: HarperCollins, 1992). ÐÐ , `Ronald Reagan Misremembered', in David Middleton and Derek Edwards (eds), Collective Remembering (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 108±19. Barry Schwartz, `The Reconstruction of Abraham Lincoln', in David Middleton and Derek Edwards (eds), Collective Remembering (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 82±107. James M. Scott and A. Lane Crothers, Òut of the Cold: the Post-Cold War Context of US Foreign Policy', in James M. Scott (ed.), After the End: Making US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998). Robert Sklar (ed.), Ìntroduction', The Plastic Age. 1917±1930 (New York: George Braziller, 1970). Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: the Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992). Craig Allen Smith, `The Jeremiadic Logic of Bill Clinton's Policy Speeches', in Stephen A. Smith (ed.), Bill Clinton on Stump, State, and Stage: the Rhetorical Road to the White House (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1994). Jean Edward Smith, George Bush's War (New York: Henry Holt, 1992). Larry D. Smith, `The New York Convention. Bill Clinton and `À Place Called Hope''', in Stephen A. Smith (ed.), Bill Clinton on Stump, State, and Stage: the Rhetorical Road to the White House (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1994), pp. 201±22. Sam Smith, Shadows of Hope: a Freethinker's Guide to Politics in the Time of Clinton (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). Stephen A. Smith (ed.), Bill Clinton on Stump, State, and Stage: the Rhetorical Road to the White House (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1994). Steve Smith and Richard Little (eds), Belief Systems and International Relations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). Tony Smith, America's Mission: the United States and Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Twentieth Century Fund and Princeton University Press, 1994). George Sorel, Reflections on Violence, trans. T.E. Hulme and J. Roth (London: Collier, 1962). Ithiel de Sola Pool (ed.), Trends in Content Analysis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959). Jill Steans, Gender and International Relations (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998). Ronald Steele, Pax Americana (New York: Viking Press, 1967).

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Monographs The American Enterprise, Public Opinion and Demographic Report, 5:5, September/October 1994. The Carnegie Endowment National Commission on America and the New World, Changing Our Ways: America and the New World (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992). Terry Eagleton, Talking Liberties (Channel Four Broadcasting Support Services: 1992). Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. Vol. VI ± Eastern Europe: the Soviet Union (US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1969), pp. 697±709. The Heritage Foundation, Making the World Safe for America: a US Foreign Policy Blueprint (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, April 1992).

Video sources The Gulf War, BBC 1 Television, January 16, 1996. Investigative Reports, A & E Television (US), July 23, 1995. Panorama, BBC 1 Television, March 25, 1995. The War Room, Pennebaker Associates and McEttinger Films, directed by Chris Hegedus and D.A. Pennebaker (Vidmark:1993) VM5894.

Index Acheson, Dean, 11, 50, 122 Afghanistan conflict, 105 agenda-setting, see foreign policy models aid to Eastern Europe and USSR, 62, 75, 107, 115±16, 133±5 Ailes, Roger, 77 Albert Einstein Peace Prize, 68 Allison, Graham, foreign policy models of, 18, 170, fn 89 America as ideology, 24 Àmerica First' campaign, 35 American dream, theme of, 23, 100, 128, 129, 147, 158, 201 fn 57 American Civil War, analogy, use of, 56±61, 109±10, 126, 129±30, 148 American Enterprise Institute, 39 American exceptionalism, and African Americans, 94 Bush public diplomacy, summary of uses in, 146±51 and Carter, 30±1 Clinton public diplomacy, summary of uses in, 151±4 and Cold War origins, 27±9 defined, 23±4, 166 fn 20, 143 and elite legitimacy, 144±64 and end of the Cold War, 32±45, 143±6 erosion of, 29±30 fluidity and transgenerational dynamics of, 4, 23, 28±9, 43±5, 156±64 history and origins of, 23±32 and `manifest destiny', 25, 32±5, 150±1 and nation building, 6, 43±5, 159±61 and presidential campaign of 1992, 108±14 and Persian Gulf War, 77, 84±8, 149±50, 156±7 and Reagan, 31, 147 and related concepts, 23 and rhetoric of `self-flagellation', 30±1, 36±9, 148±50, 153±4 tensions within, 24, 31, 162±4

and Transatlantic exceptionalism, 7, 29±30, 51±2, 150±1 as a value-strategy syncretization, 5, 21, 23, 43±5, 143, 157 see also para-ideology American Revolution, in passim 21; analogy of, 109±10 Andreotti, Guilio, 103 Arab±Israeli relations, see Middle East peace process Aspen Institute, 46, 72 Atlantic Council of the United States, 40 Atlantic Monthly, 40 Baker, James, 46, 48, 50, 51±5, 57, 61, 74, 78±9, 85, 99, 104, 105, 106, 146, 148, 149, 150, 155, 181±2 fn 62 Barilleaux, Ryan, 13 Bartholomew, Reginald, 116 Baumgartner, Frank R., 16 Begala, Paul, 153 Bell, Daniel, 30 Berlin airlift, 107 Berlin, Isaiah, 123 Beschloss, Michael, 78, 97, 105, 117 Bessmertnyk, Alexander, 75, 98 Beveridge, Albert, J., 148, 151 Boorstin, Daniel, 30 Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power (Nye), 35 Brookings Institution, 36 Brown, Jerry, 120 Brussels Summit (1989), 58 Buchanan, Patrick, 35 Buckley, William, F., 38 Burke, Kenneth, 8 Bush, George Herbert Walker (and Bush Administration), 17, 21±2, 32±3, 37, 39, 45, 46±118, 146±61 and agenda-setting, 62±3, 66±7, 93, 75±6, 89±98, 115±16 and American exceptionalism, 146±51 and Baltic states, 97

249

250 Index Bush, George Herbert Walker, continued on Cold War, 46, 48±53, 56, 74, 99±101, 161; as the `long peace', 51 comparison of self with Lincoln, 57±61; Gorbachev as Lincoln, 109±10 compared to Clinton, 118±23, 138±42, 152±3, 157±9, 161 conservatism of, 65, 67±8, 157±9 and core values of US, 54, 61±2, 150 crisis management style of, 92±3, 103 domestic pressures on, 47, 67, 108 and ènd of history' idea, 55, 146, 151 and Gorbachev, 68, 97±106, 114±15; normalization, 46±118; on resignation of, 107±8, 109, 155 influences on worldview, 157±9 and `moving beyond containment' motif, 49±51, 54, 65 and organizational processes, 65±6, 88 prizes awarded to, 68 rhetoric on domestic problems, 63, 86±7, 111±13 rhetorical contradictions of, 55, 95, 112±13 threats perceived by, 49, 52, 180 fn25, 112, 149 visit to the Soviet Union (1991), 99, 100±1, 114; `Chicken Kiev' speech, 21, 100±1, 112, 115; relations with former Soviet republics, 108 and World War Two analogies, use of, 40, 50, 61, 64, 72, 75±6, 77±81, 84, 96, 107, 114, 158 see also Malta Summit; Persian Gulf War; Soviet Coup; Vietnam War Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 31 Carter, James (Jimmy), 17, 30, 31 rehabilitation of, 39±40 Carville, James, 153 Catholic University, 58, 62 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 32±3 Cheney, Richard, 47, 62, 73, 76 `Chicken Kiev' speech, 21, 100±1, 112, 115 Chilton, Paul A., 5, 20 China, 36 Christopher, Warren, 131 Citizens Democracy Corps, 63±4

city on a hill, 24, 29, 31, 35±6, 146±7, 152 Clinton, Hillary, 42 Clinton, William Jefferson (and Clinton Administration), 21±2, 32, 42, 45, 88, 94, 119±42, 143±4, 151±4, 156, 157±9, 161, 162 and American exceptionalism, 136±8, 151±4 on the Cold War, 121±2, 123, 124, 125±6, 132±3, 134±5, 161; as the `long peace', 122 comparison of self with Truman, 122, 124, 153; with Roosevelt, 124±5, 129, 141, 153; with Kennedy, 130, 139, 140 compared to Bush, 118±23, 138±42, 152±3, 157±9, 161; to Eastern European revolutionaries/Russians in 1989, 153; to Reagan, 140 and ènd of history', 154 and foreign aid, 133±4, 135 inauguration of, 13; Inaugural Address, 152 influences on, 158±9 and Iraq, 137 Jeremiad role, 118, 123±8, 136, 152±3; `new covenant' speeches, 120 media approach of, 14±15; and the Internet, 159 and NAFTA, 126±7 and National Economic Council (NEC), 131±2 and NATO, 127 and normalization with the Soviet Union, 133±6 and organizational process model, 122 on the peacefulness of democracies, 126±7 and `Renaissance weekends', 132 recurring rhetorical themes used by: `change' motif, 130, 139; crisis and post-war reconstruction, 128±36; domestic disorder, 123±8, 153; US Civil War analogies, 126, 129±30; World War One analogies, 125, 126±7, 129; World War Two analogies, 124±5, 158 and Ross Perot, 128, 141 sex scandal, 31 Somalia policy, 123, 136±7

Index 251 `War Room' of, 114, 128 and former Yugoslavia, 113±14, 137±8, 140; as `quagmire', 138 see also `quagmire rhetoric' Coalition for America at Risk, 83 Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, 33 Cobb, Roger W., 16, 93 Cohn, Carol, 9 Cold War, 12±13, 26±32, 37; declared over, 49, 56, 74 see also end of the Cold War; long peace; Bush; Clinton collective memory, 43, 60, 64, 91, 161 Committee on the Present Danger, 39 Committee to Save the ABM Treaty, 33 Common Sense (Paine), 26 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 52±3, 55 Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), 38 constructivism, 4, 166 fn 13, 20 containment, 49±50 in domestic politics, `containing disagreement', 62, 66, 69 `moving beyond containment', 49±51, 54, 65 revived, 102; in relation to former Yugoslavia, 114, 137±8 Coolidge, Calvin, 10 Council of Economic Intervention, 36 Cox, Michael, 131 creative responsibility sharing, 52 Cuban Missile Crisis, in passim, 18 Danforth, Samuel, 24 decline (US), debate about, 35±9, 62 and public pessimism, 41 see also end of the Cold War Defense Advanced Research Products Agency (DARPA), 129 defense restructuring, 72±3, 129, 131 Democratic Party, 34 Democratic Review (1845), 25 Depression, The, 17, 125, 126, 129 see also Roosevelt; World War One deÂtente, 48, 50, 56, 58 de Toqueville, Alexis, 24 Dole, Robert, 99, 101 Drew, Elizabeth, 128, 132

Dulles, John Foster, 26, 140 Durkheim, Emile, 4, 159±61 Eagleburger, Lawrence, 47, 50, 52±3, 61, 103, 110, 114, 146, 149 Eagleton, Terry, 65 Edelman, Murray, 9, 141 Eisenhower, Dwight, 17, 122 Elder, Charles, D., 16, 93 elites, kinds of, 9, 167 fns 30, 31 Elshtain, Jean Bethke, 20 end of the Cold War, 1, 32±70 and cognitive dissonance/a paradigm shift, 4, 6, 32±9, 64±70, 114, 145±6, 160 and ènd of history' debate, 41±3 and government agencies, responses of, 32±3 and Hollywood, 35 and media, 32±43, 63 and interest groups, responses of, 33±4 and national self-examination, 35±9 official explanations of, see Bush policy legacy of, 161±4 and political parties, impact on, 34, 38±9 `post-superpower stress syndrome', 37 and public opinion, 40±1 as `pyrrhic victory', 40 and rehabilitation of Carter and Nixon, 39±40 and school curricula, 32, 39 and threats posed by, 32±5, 61, see also Bush as US victory, 109 see also Cold War; decline; Bush; Clinton ènd of history' debate, 32, 41±3, 66, 178 fn 127 described as an `X article', 42±3 post-Cold War significance of, 43, 145±6 and Bush Administration, 55, 146, 151 and Clinton Administration, 154 The End of History and the Last Man (Fukuyama), 41 epistemic communities, 20 Ermarth, Fritz, 109 European Community, 36, 52±3, 55, 103

252 Index exceptionalism, see American exceptionalism Federalist Papers, 36, 148 Festinger, Leon, 145 Fitzwater, Marlin, 69 Flynn, Raymond, L., 87±8 foreign policy models, 13±21 agenda-setting, 15±16, 66, 89±93; and Bush, 62±3, 66±7, 73, 75±6, 89±98, 115±16; and Clinton, 114, 119±42 bureaucratic politics, 14 incrementalism, 14±15, 65, 88±9 organizational processes, 15, 66, 88, 122 personality/psychology, 17±18, 89 rational actor, 18±19; and selfdeception, 9, 19 recurring themes, 19±21 role of rhetoric in models compared, 13, 18±19, 20 Foreign Relations of the United States, 37 Fourteen Points, 26 fragmentation in US politics, 34 Franklin Delano Roosevelt Freedom Medal, 68 Freeze Voter, 33 frontier thesis, 25 Fukuyama, Francis, 32, 41±3, 55, 89±90, 145±6 Gaddis, John Lewis, 51 Garber, Steve, 144 Gardner, Lloyd, 27 Gates, Robert, 90±1, 103, 111 Geertz, Clifford, 4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 154 generational differences (Bush and Clinton), 158±9 Genscher, Hans Deitrich, 107 Gingrich, Newt, 38 Germany and Gorbachev, 59 resurgence of, 37 reunification, 41, 74, 107 glasnost and perestroika, in passim, 37, 38, 46, 151 Gonzalez Marquez, Felipe, 103

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 33±4, 54±5, 59, 60, 68±9, 75, 96±108, 115 charisma compared to Bush, 68±9 domestic pressures on, 96±7, 98, 115 and German reunification, 59 peace prizes awarded to, 68 resignation, 104, 107; Bush's speech on the occasion, 107±8 US investment in, 96±106 Great Migration, 24 Greenberg, Stanley, 153 Grunwald, Mandy, 153 Guam, 25 Hadley, Stephen J., 116 Halliday, Fred, 48 Hart, Roderick, P., 122 Havel, Vaclav, 103 Hawaiian Islands, 25 Healy, George, 58 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 43 Helms, Jesse, 38 Helsinki summit, 74 Hendrickson, David, C., 90 Heritage Foundation, 34, 39 Hill, Kent, 37 Hill & Knowlton, 79±80 Hinckley, Barbara, 122 Hitchens, Christopher, 42 Hitler, Adolph, 21, 79, 89±90 Hoffman, Stanley, 29, 162 Hofstadter, Richard, 24 Hofstra University, 39 Holloway, Rachel, 139 House Armed Services Committee, 47 House Foreign Affairs Committee, 62, 80 House Human Rights Caucus, 79 House Intelligence Committee, 33 Houston Economic Summit (1990), 68, 69 Hudson Institute, 34 Hunt, Michael, 20 Huntington, Samuel, 145, 156 ideology, 24, see also para-ideology incrementalism, see foreign policy models India, 36 Institute on Religion and Democracy, 37 International Security, 40 Iran, 31

Index 253 isolationism, 26, 109 Jackson±Vanik amendment, 75 Japan, 35±6, 52 Jefferson, Thomas, 24±5, 152 Jervis, Robert, 9 Jones, Bryan, D., 16 Jones, Joseph, M., 11 Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 17 Kaifu, Toshiki, 104 Kennan, George, 26±8, 96±7 Kennan Prize, 68, 74 Kennedy, John F., 13, 29, 129, 130, 139, 140 Kennedy, Paul, 35 Kerr, Richard, J., 103 Kerry, John, 87 Kimmit, Robert, 50, 52, 61 Kohl, Helmut, 103 Kojeve, Alexandre, 43 Kolt, George, 109 Kirkpatrick, Jeanne, 38 Kissinger, Henry, 9, 141 Kosovo, 2; Kosovo Liberation Army, 2 Kristol, Irving, 38 Kuklick, Bruce, 122 Kurds, 85, 91 Lake, Anthony, 163 Larsen, Henrik, 19 Larson, Deborah, 8 Lasswell, Harold, 9, 44 Leffler, Melvyn, 12 Lehman, Ronald, F., 103 Lenczowski, John, 38 Leuchtenberg, William, 4, 141 Lewis, Flora, 41 Lincoln, Abraham, 21, 31, 56±8, 109±10 London Declaration, 51, 69 long peace, 40, 51, 122, 123 long telegram, 26, 27 Los Angeles Riots, 113 Lubbers, Rud, 103 Luce, Henry, 26 MacArthur, General Douglas, 26 Major, John, 103 Malta summit, 13, 56±61, 74

`man of history' award, 68 Manheim, Jarol B., 2, 30 Marshall, George, C., 11, 50, 122 Marshall plan, 107 Martin Luther King Jr International Peace Award, 68 Martin Luther King Jr Non-Violence Peace Prize, 68 Marx, Karl, 43 Matlock, Jack, 99, 102 Maxim Gorky, 56 May, Ernest, 19 Mead, Walter Russell, 35 Mearsheimer, John, 40, 123 Medhurst, Martin, 9 Middle East peace process, 77, 98, 100, 106, 107 151, 154 Miller, Perry, 30 Mitchell, George, 99 Mitterand, FrancËois, 103 Monroe doctrine, 25 Moore, Raymond, 117 Morgenthau, Hans J., 27±8 Morgenthau Prize, 68 Mortal Splendor: the American Empire in Transition (Mead), 35 Mueller, Claus, 5 Mulroney, Brian, 103 Myth of America's Decline. Leading the World Economy in the 1990s, The (Nau), 35 Nation, The, 39 National Economic Council (NEC), 131±2 National Interest, The, 41 National Mobilization for Survival, 33 National Security Agency, 33 National Security Strategy Report (1991), 102, 108, 147 Nau, Henry, 35 Newsweek, 35 new world order, 39, 54, 74±6, 80, 85, 94, 101, 116, 150 New York Times, 36, 38, 79 Nicaragua, 31, 59 nine-plus-one agreement, 101 Nixon, Richard, 17, 78, 99, 102, 110 memorandum (1991), 110 rehabilitation of, 39±40

254 Index normalization, see Bush North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 38±9, 48±53, 55, 150, 162 Northern Ireland, 162±4 NSC 68, 26±7 Nuclear Freeze Advisory Board, 34 Nunn, Sam, 116 Nye, Joseph, 35, 163 Operation Desert Shield, see Persian Gulf War Operation Desert Storm, see Persian Gulf War Operation Provide Hope, 107 organizational process model, 15, 66, 88, 122 Ostpolitik, 30 O'Sullivan, John L., 25 Ozal, Turgut, 103 Paine, Thomas, 26, 31 para-ideology, 5±6, 20, 23, 66, 69±70 Peace Corps, 129 Peacemakers, The (George Healy), 58 Peet, Richard, 42 Pentagon, defense planning document (1990), 33 position on the Soviet Union, 47 perestroika, see glasnost Perot, Ross, 128, 141 Persian Gulf War, 17, 58, 71±95, 109, 147±50, 160 and American exceptionalism, 77, 84±8, 149±50, 156±7 and community building, 73±8, 81; rallying for future contingencies, 156; Bush's communications with foreign leaders, 92; venues for speeches, 92±3; see also sympathetic public ecologies and decline predictions, 35, 86 and domestic renewal (rhetoric of ), 84±8, 109, 111±14 Hussein compared with Hitler, 79, 89±90 and ìncubator babies', 79±80 and Islamic pilgrimage season, 88±9 and Israel/Palestine, 77, 98, 100; see also Middle East peace process

and new world order, 74±6, 80, 85, 94, 150; see also new world order and nuclear fears, 80, 90 opposition to, 76 and Saudi Arabia, 72, 73, 88 and the Soviet Union, 73±5, 81, 97±9, 100, 101 and US public opinion, 76, 80, 92, 93±5 and US rationales for, 72, 73, 81 and Vietnam, 78, 81±4, 90±1; `Vietnam syndrome' exorcised, 83±4, 91, 149±50 and World War One analogies, 90 and World War Two analogies, 72, 77±81, 84 Pfaff, William, 36 Philippines, 25 Politics Among Nations (Morgenthau), 28 Popadiuk, Roman, 104 Popov, Gavril, 100, 102 Powell, Colin, 47, 89, 103 presidents, see under individual names presidential campaign of 1992, 108±14, 139±40, 141 Presidential Decision Directive, 25, 163 presidents' roles in speechwriting, 10, 17±18 Primakov, Yvegeni, 75 Progressive, The, 39 public diplomacy/rhetoric, 1±22, 142±57 crisis management role of, 4, 6, 89, 91±2, 97±8, 102±4, 154±6 defined, 2±4; targets of, 3±4; routine and crisis forms of, 3±4, 9±13 domestic consensus-building role of, 3, 7, 15±16, 110±11, 155±6; and legitimacy politics, 144±6, 159±64; and nation-building, 159; and sympathetic public ecologies, 4, 6, 44, 71±2, 89, 91±2, 142, 143, 156±7 and elections, 9±10 and evolution of the mass media, 10 and `hunting license' speeches, 14 and globalization, 163 as `guerrilla warfare', 14, 158 and models of foreign policy analysis, 13±19, 65±6; see also foreign policy models and `new directions' speeches, 14

Index 255 and policy, 1±6, 8±21, 65±70, 88±95, 114±18, 142±57; and deception, 9 and presidential legacies, 10, 17, 21 and recurring themes, 19±21 and soft power, 6; defined, 167 fn 23, 142; and soft hegemony, 143±4 and traditional diplomacy, 2, 6, 162±4 and trial balloons, 14 and Truman Doctrine, 10±12 public opinion polls: on exceptionalism, 31; on end of Cold War, 40±1; on Persian Gulf War, 76, 80, 92, 93±5, 150; on Soviet Union, 97; on nuclear weapons cuts, 116±17; on foreign aid, 116; on 1992 presidential candidates, 117; on voter concerns in 1992, 120 Puerto Rico, 25 Puritans, 20, 24, 30 `quagmire' rhetoric, 90±1, 150, 156±7 racism, 82, 151, 156±7 Radio Free Europe, 33 Rand Corporation, 34 Reagan, Ronald, 13, 31, 34, 50 Republican Party, 38, 47 rhetoric, see public diplomacy Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, The (Kennedy), 35 Rivlin, Alice, 36 Robson, John E., 103 Romania, 59 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 124, 125, 129, 141, 153 Roper Poll (1983), 31 Rubin, Robert E., 131±2 Ryan, Halford, Ross, 139 Safire, William, 36, 101 Samoa, 25 Saudi Arabia, 72, 73, 88 Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr, 139 Schwarzkopf, Norman, 80, 91 Scowcroft, Brent, 47, 76, 99, 101, 103, 107, 109 Seitz, Raymond, 50, 54, 61, 74 Senate Finance Committee, 54 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 61 Senate Intelligence Committee, 33

Shapiro, Michael, J., 17 Sherman, Martin, 34 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 59, 74±5, 102 Simpsons, The, 117 Single European Act (SEA), 52 Slava, 56 Smith, Craig Allen, 152 Smith, Larry, 140 social function of myth, 4 soft power, 6,167 fn 23, 142, 162±4; and soft hegemony, 143±4, 162±4 Solarz, Stephen, J., 76 Somalia, 123, 136±7 Southern Baptist Convention, 85 Soviet coup, 93, 115; and Bush, 102±8, 155; and Yeltsin, 103±4, 150 Soviet Union, 27, 36±8, 40, 75, 90 Pentagon views of, 33 republics declare independence, 104 US financial aid to, 107, 115±16, 133±5 see also Gorbachev; Yeltsin; Bush; Clinton; Soviet Coup Space Watch, 33 speeches, kinds of, see public diplomacy speechwriters, 10, 14, 17 Stanford University, 6 START Treaties, 100, 105±6, 117, 155 State of the Union Addresses, 98, 105, 109 Steele, Ronald, 29 Steinbruner, John, 76 Sununu, John, 103 sympathetic public ecologies, 4, 6, 44, 71±2, 89, 91±2, 142, 143, 156±7 see also public diplomacy Talbott, Strobe, 42, 78, 97, 105, 117 Tannenbaum, Frank, 28 Tehranian, Majid, 2 textbooks, 32, 39 textiles legislation, 75±6 think-tanks, 34 Third World, 39, 43, 48 Truman, Harry, 10±12, 50, 110, 122, 124, 153 Truman doctrine, 10±12 Tsongas, Paul, 120 Tucker, Robert W., 90 Tufts University, 34

256 Index Tulis, Jeffrey, 10 Turner, Frederick Jackson, 25 Ukraine, 100±1 United Nations, 151±2 peacekeeping, 163 USS Bellknap, 56 USS Forrestal, 57 Vance, Cyrus, 31 Vandenburg, Arthur, 11, 50, 77, 122 Varg, Paul, A., 24 Vietnam War, 17, 30, 37, 81±4, 90±1, 113, 158 domestic political legacy, 63, 82 see also Persian Gulf war Voice of America, 33, 63 Walesa, Lech, 103 Waltons, The, 117 Wander, Philip, 122, 140 War Resisters League, 33 War Room, The, 114, 128 Washington, George, 109 Washington Post, 35, 36, 37, 79 Washington Summit (1990), 68 Weber, Max, 43 Webster, William, 47 Western European Union (WEU), 53

White House Office of Communication, 13 Eli Wiesel Foundation Humanitarian Award, 68 Will, George, F., 34, 38 Williams, Phil, 144 Williams, William Appleman, 29 Wilson, Woodrow, 26, 72 Winthrop, John, 24 Winthrop, Robert, C., 25 Woerner, Manfred, 52 Woodward, Bob, 76 World Trade Organization (WTO), in passim, 162 World War One, 26, 125, 126±7, 129 World War Two, 17, 26, 40, 50, 61, 64, 72, 75±6, 77±81, 84, 96, 107, 114, 124±5, 158 Wyoming Ministerial, 182 fn74 `X' article (Kennan), 26 compared with Fukuyama's ènd of history', 42±3 Yeltsin, Boris, 97, 99, 103±4, 105, 106, 107, 115, 133, 150 Yugoslavia (former), 43, 96, 113±14, 126, 137±8, 150, 162 Zhirinovksy, Vladimir, 133

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