Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey Towards Integration and Accession

Albania and the European Union Albania and the European Union The Tumultuous Journey towards Integration and Accessio...

Author: Mirela Bogdani | John Loughlin

180 downloads 1724 Views 835KB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

Albania and the European Union

Albania and the European Union The Tumultuous Journey towards Integration and Accession

MIRELA BOGDANI and JOHN LOUGHLIN

Published in 2007 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com In the United States of America and Canada distributed by Palgrave Macmillan a division of St. Martin's Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 Copyright © Mirela Bogdani and John Loughlin The right of Mirela Bogdani and John Loughlin to be identified as the authors of this work has been asserted by the authors in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Library of European Studies 4 ISBN: 978 1 84511 308 7 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall From camera-ready copy edited and supplied by the authors

CONTENTS List of Tables Acknowledgements Acronyms

ix xi xii

1. European integration and the transformation of the democratic state: Theoretical and contextual issues 1.1. The nation-state and the development of the European Union 1.2. Theories of European integration 1.3. The Europeanization approach: theoretical issues

1 1 14 19

2. Albania in 1990: At the crossroads between communism and democracy 2.1. The democratic movement for the overthrow of communism 2.2. Political, historical, economic and cultural legacies of the past: the Ottoman and communist legacies 2.3. To what extent is Albania 'European'? 3. The transition period: Political and socio-economic situation of Albania. How far is Albania from meeting the Copenhagen criteria? 3.1. Democratic transformation in Albania 3.2. Political situation Elections Public administration The rule of law Judicial system Human and Minority Rights. The Cham issue Media Approximation of domestic legislation to EU Laws 3.3. Economic situation Post-communist economic transformations Economic indicators and the situation in specific sectors Other market-related areas

21 21 22 31 36 36 40 40 47 49 51 53 55 57 60 60 61 71

vi 3.4.

3.5. 3.6. 3.7.


Social situation From egalitarianism to polarization and 'jungle capitalism' The situation in specific areas Demographic situation Environmental situation Religious situation Advantages of Albania as an independent nation-state How far is Albania from meeting the criteria?

4. EU membership prospective for the countries of Western Balkans and Albania 4.1. The EU's eastern enlargements: the Western Balkans and the completion of the EU map 4.2. The importance of European accession and integration for the Western Balkans and Albania 4.3. The future of the Kosovo issue 4.4. The Balkans back into the European mainstream? 4.5. The Accession Process and EU membership criteria (Copenhagen criteria) 4.6. The principle of conditionality, the Stability Pact for SouthEastern Europe and the Thessalonica Summit 4.7. Western Balkans - passengers on the same train 4.8. History of Albanian's European integration efforts: on the way towards the EU destination 4.9. The other priority: Membership in NATO 4.10. The future of Western Balkans and Albania lies with the EU 5. The political system: Albanian political parties and their attitude towards the EU 5.1. The political structure 5.2. Political situation from 1992-97: The 'reign and fall' of the Democratic Party A good beginning which turned into a new 'dictatorship' The failure of the Constitution and the farce of the 1996 elections Pyramid schemes and the following popular uprising 5.3. Political situation after 1997 Socialists back in power Commitment to restore the country and restart the reforms Another eight years of governance failure

73 73 76 79 79 80 84 85

87 87 92 96 100 102 107 111 115 119 120

122 122 123 123 126 127 129 129 130 131

5.4. 5.5. 5.6. 5.7. 5.8. 5.9. 5.10. 5.11. 5.12. 5.13.

Contents

vii

Polarization of the political system The opposition Small parties Party coalitions Partitocrazia Internal party democracy Ideological/political identity Funding of parties Organizational structure The rhetoric of EU membership

132 133 134 136 137 138 141 144 145 146

6. Clientelism, corruption and organized crime: Serious barriers to EU membership 6.1. The 'importing' of illegal activities from the Balkans a challenge for the EU 6.2. Clientelism 6.3. Corruption and bribery 6.4. Organized crime 6.5. Connections between the mafia and politics

148 148 149 151 155 160

7. Policy making in Albania 7.1. Components of policy-making 7.2. What type of policy-making has Albania?

163 163 166

8. The role of the elite and the domestic actors 8.1 The elite and middle class under communism 8.2. The birth of the new elite 8.3. The domestic actors The political elite and state actors a. The role of political leaders b. Government c. Parliament d. President The bureaucratic elite (Civil servants) The knowledge elite a. The 'Brain drain' Civil society The media elite The masses and public opinion a. The politics of domestic collective identity - Italian case

170 170 172 173 173 174 177 179 181 182 183 184 187 189 190 193

viii


9. Local government and decentralization 9.1. Territorial governance under communism 9.2. The current Albanian system of local government 9.3. The functions of Albanian local government The communes and municipalities Functions of the regions Local finances 9.4. The functioning of local government 9.5. Future challenges 10. EU economic aid, assistance and programmes: How have they contributed to domestic reforms and development? 10.1. EU aid and assistance in various areas in the past and in the present 10.2. Evolution of EU assistance to Albania and its complementarity with other donors 10.3. The CARDS programme 10.4. The future instruments of EU financial assistance

195 195 197 199 199 200 201 202 206

209 209 213 215 217

11. The impact of external factors on Albanian politics and policies 11.1. The impact of the EU and Europeanization 11.2. Globalization 11.3. The influence of the CEE countries 11.4. The role of the International Community in Albania 11.5. Regional cooperation and Albania's attitude to geo-politics and the war against terrorism 11.6. 'Greater Albania' in the light of the future accession of Albania and Kosovo into the EU 11.7. The Albanian diaspora and its role in domestic politics. 11.8. When will Albania join the EU?

219 220 221 223 224

Conclusions Endnotes Bibliography Index

239 249 259 269

226 229 233 236

LIST OF TABLES 1. The 35 negotiation chapters of the acquis communautaire 2. The process of accession of the Western Balkan countries

59 114

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We are greatly indebted to Bejtullah Destani, Director of Albanian Studies Centre in London (UK), and Arch. Silva Kashifi (Italy), for their great help. We would also like to give special thanks to Dr. Albert Rakipi, Director of 'Albanian Institute for International Studies' and Blendi Kajsiu from the 'Albanian School of Politics', for their help in providing literature and expertise, in particular on Albanian political parties, local government etc. We also owe a debt to a number of people who provided useful ideas, data and critiques. Mirela wants to acknowledge the assistance of many friends and colleagues, such as Ilir Loka, Christine Dando, Edi Hasho, Suzannah Lux, Dorjan Hysi, Ada Mio and Muhamet Veliu. Her gratitude extends to Enkelejda Tahiraj (University College London, UK), Gary Kokalari (USA) and Sokol Bushati (Canada) for their valuable suggestions and comments. John would like to thank the Warden and Fellows of Merton College, Oxford, in particular Professor Robert Gildea, for offering him a Visiting Fellowship during Michaelmas Term, 2004, which provided a congenial environment for writing up sections of this book. John also thanks the Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Arts and Sciences for offering him a Fellowship in 2005, which allowed him to continue this writing up. We are grateful to Mr. Ian Thompson, Director of European Documentation Centre at Cardiff University, for advice about the relevant literature. We would also like to record our thanks to Prof. Bruce Haddock (at Cardiff School of European Studies) for sharing his expertise in transition studies in Eastern European countries. John would like to thank his daughter Niamh Baker-Loughlin for her patience and support. Mirela owes particular thanks to Dr. Paul Langmaid for his enormous moral and material help and support, her parents and sister Doris, and finally to her wonderful daughter Cindy for her patience and love.

Authors

ACRONYMS Acquis communautaire CARDS programme CEE countries CoE CAP ECHO EHCR CSP DP EU EC EMU EMS ESI EIB EBRD FDI FTA GDP IMF ICG ILO NATO NGO OECD OSCE ODIHR

EU legislation Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratization and Stabilization Central and Eastern European countries Council of Europe Common Agricultural Policy European Community Humanitarian Aid Office European Convention on Human Rights Country Strategy Paper Democratic Party (of Albania) European Union European Community European Monetary Union European Monetary System European Stability Initiative European Investment Bank European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Foreign Direct Investment Free Trade Agreement Gross Domestic Product International Monetary Fund International Crisis Group International Labour Organization North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Governmental Organization Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Organization for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Acronyms

PHARE PL QMV SAP SAA SEA SEM SEECP SME SP TEU UN UNDP US Aid WB WTO WHO

xiii

Pologne-Hongrie Assistance à la Restructuration des Économies Party of Labour (of Albania) Qualified Majority Voting Stabilization and Association Process Stabilization and Association Agreement Single European Act Single European Market South Eastern European Cooperation Process Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises Socialist Party (of Albania) Treaty of European Union United Nations United Nations Development Programme United States Aid World Bank World Trade Organization World Health Organization

1 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE: THEORETICAL AND CONTEXTUAL ISSUES ‘One clear thread is visible in the post-communist puzzle of success and failure: only nation-states have succeeded in the European integration project’. Ivan Krastev (2003)

1.1. The nation-state and the development of the European Union Modern European history is very largely the story of the emergence of the nation-state as the dominant form of political organization. Possible rivals to the nation-state historically were the Holy Roman Empire, the papacy, the leagues of city-states such as the Hanseatic League, the Italian cities such as Venice and Florence, or the myriad dukedoms, bishoprics and abbeys, such as existed in the German-speaking lands at the time of the French Revolution. For a variety of reasons, mainly connected to the appropriate political forms associated with the rise of capitalism, these rivals succumbed to the nation-state system. The nation-state, however, is ambiguous. On the one hand, it has been associated with modernity, with industrial capitalism and with liberal representative democracy. On the other hand, it also gave rise to imperialism, tensions in international relations and, indeed, world war as well as Fascism and Nazism. It is not necessarily democratic as the experience of a small nation-state, which was also a communist dictatorship, such as Enver Hoxha’s Albania, illustrates. Nevertheless, perhaps its strongest association has been with liberal democracy and the various freedoms associated with that form of political organization. In any case, during the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, it was the model to which all newly formed states aspired. Nationalism, the ideology associated with nation-state building, broke up the

2


British, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, was behind the formation of new states such as Germany and Italy, and was the impulse behind the transformation of the colonial states of Latin America, Asia and Africa into independent entities. The strength of nationalism and national identity was evident with the collapse of the Soviet Empire in the 1990s and the emergence of new independent states from the debris of communism. This is evident from the phenomenal growth of international organizations, such as the United Nations or the Council of Europe (CoE), whose membership is based on the nation-state principle. In 1989, the Council of Europe had around twenty members. Today, 2006, it has forty-six members with the addition of many states from the former communist bloc, including Albania. The success of the nation-state has made it and the democratic forms of organization associated with it, seem almost to be the ‘natural’ form of politics. In fact, the nation-state emerged only comparatively recently in historical terms and can be dated from the French Revolution in 1789. Before that there were states of various kinds and ‘nations’. But nations originally meant simply the place where a group was born (from the Latin ‘natus’), as in the nations such as the Flemish, Occitans, English, etc., who formed the units of the Crusaders’ armies. By the eighteenth century, however, in England and France, the term took on its modern meaning as ‘an imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983), that is, an association of individuals with a common identity based on religion or language, whose members could not meet one another directly, but with whom they identified through their imaginations. The first ‘modern’ nation, in this sense, was England, following the Protestant Reformation, which was soon emulated by Catholic France and then by Germany, Russia and the United States. Greenfeld (1992) describes these as the ‘five paths to modernity’. On the other hand, it was Hegel who formulated the concept of the ‘modern state’, in which the state was an abstract entity standing over and above ‘civil society’ and, in some sense, superior to it. In opposition to the AngloAmerican tradition, which speaks about ‘government’ rather than ‘state’, the continental European tradition has adopted this notion of the ‘state’ as a juridical entity in its own right (Dyson, 1980; Loughlin and Peters, 1997). It was only at the French Revolution, which began in 1789, that ‘nation’ and ‘state’ joined to form a normative ‘couple’: nations ought to have states and states ought to be co-terminus with nations. During the Revolutionary period, there was a debate concerning whether the new French Republic should be a centralized or decentralized unitary state or, indeed, a federation. The Girondin faction (so-called because many of their members came from the Gironde area in south-west France) of the National

European Integration and the Transformations of the Democratic State

3

Assembly, while supporting the Revolution and the Republic, were in favour of a decentralized model and some also supported federalism. The Jacobin faction in the Assembly, led by extremists such as Robespierre and Danton, favoured a centralist approach, which was, in fact, in continuity with the absolutizing trends of the monarchy. It was the Jacobin tendency which predominated and their emphasis on the ‘unity and indivisibility’ of the Republican nation-state led to the formulation of the term Jacobinism. Napoleon I consolidated this trend with the creation of the prefects during the period of the First Empire1. Those who opposed this centralization were mainly on the political right, such as monarchists, the Catholic hierarchy, regionalists, but also some on the left such as anarchists like JeanPierre Proudhon. France became the archetypical example of the nationstate and became a model for many nationalist movements aspiring to independent state-hood, including Ireland, Greece, Italy, Finland and Poland, to name just a few. The French state and its imitators adopted the unitary state form of organization (Loughlin, 2007). But, importantly for the object of study of this book, Albania and other communist states, ‘Jacobinism’ became a hallmark of Marxism-Leninism. Marx and Engels welcomed the French Revolution as a breakthrough in human progress and strongly identified with the extremist Jacobin faction. Lenin saw himself as a ‘Russian Robespierre’ and the Bolsheviks consciously adopted Jacobinism as the model of the new Soviet states after 1917. ‘Democratic centralism’ was the Leninist reformulation of Jacobinism. Albania, too, during the communist period, followed this doctrine and this was reflected in the highly centralized and authoritarian form of state organization it adopted during the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha. The importance of this doctrine will become clear when we examine issues such as regional and local democracy in Albania and the territorial question in general. But the nation-state idea also influenced states that were federations, such as the United States, Canada and Germany. The federal level represented the ‘nation’ and shared state sovereignty with the federal units, whatever they were called – provinces, states, or Länder. The principle of national unity was kept intact. An interesting example of a quasi-federal state is Spain, the first article of whose Constitution, promulgated in 1978, after the death of Franco, proclaims that Spain is a ‘one and indivisible nation’, and also that there are within Spain ‘nationalities and regions’. The Spanish example illustrates the ambiguity of the term ‘nation’: does it refer to Spain as a whole or may it also be applied to what the constitution calls ‘nationalities’, such as the Basque Country or Catalonia? Spanish Jacobins refuse the latter designation, while Basque and Catalan nationalists do not

4


see themselves as part of the Spanish nation2. The United Kingdom is an example of a state with some ‘pre-modern’ features, in that it is, officially, a multi-national state created through the unions of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland with the dominant nation England, while at the same time it is clearly a modern state. But here too there is an ambiguity: is the United Kingdom itself a nation which is British, with four constituent nations, or are the latter the real nations? English people tend to see themselves primarily as British (and secondarily as English), while Scots and Welsh identify themselves primarily with their own nations and only secondarily with Britain. In Northern Ireland, the majority of Catholics refuse any British identity and see themselves as Irish, while the majority of Protestants identify strongly with Britain (more so than most English people do) and only very weakly with Ireland. All of this has relevance to Albania. Albania is a small nation which broke off from the Ottoman Empire and became independent in 1912. Many ethnic Albanians are also found outside its borders, especially in parts of the former Yugoslavia, such as Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia. There are also Albanian communities in Greece. Besides these territorially-based communities, there is the large diaspora to be found mainly in the United States, but also in some European countries such as Italy, France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. During the period of communism, Enver Hoxha’s aim was to consolidate the independence of the existing state of Albania and not to question the current borders. Despite some evidence of discrimination against Albanian communities outside these borders, especially in Kosovo, Hoxha, after the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, had little choice but to abandon any plans to incorporate Kosovo and Albanian-inhabited western Macedonia into what Tito believed would become a Balkan Federation including Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The principle of national independence sought by Hoxha, in its turn degenerated into a complete isolationism, as Albania courted bigger powers and then broke off relations with them: first with Yugoslavia, then with the USSR and finally with China. But the national question came to the fore again with the collapse of the Soviet Union and especially with the disintegration of Yugoslavia into civil war during the 1990s. Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia were heavily involved in this conflict and there was great pressure on the first transition governments in Albania to intervene. Although sympathetic noises were made particularly by the Democratic Party towards the Albanian minorities, governments of whatever political complexion trod a careful path to maintain Albanian independence during this period. Thus, Albania can be regarded as a uni-


5

tary nation-state following the French model of unity and indivisibility, but with important minorities outside its borders who have an influence on its politics. Although there are some linguistic and ethnic minorities, particularly Greeks, within its borders, it is overwhelmingly homogeneous. The nation-state, in its liberal-democratic manifestation, had provided the framework for the exercise of political citizenship and human rights. Then, in the second half of the 20th century, it reached its culmination with the arrival of the Welfare State, in which the concept of political citizenship was further developed to include social rights alongside the more traditional political rights of liberal democracy. The Beveridgian3/Keynesian4 Welfare State was built during the period that the French call Les Trente Glorieuses (the Thirty Glorious Years between 1945 and 1975) when western economies, helped by the United States Marshall Fund reconstructed their economies in a long economic boom. The Welfare State was characterized by a continual expansion of citizens’ rights (including rights to a wide range of social policies) and of the policy programmes necessary to meet these new and ever increasing demands. This meant, of course, more bureaucracy to administer the programmes, but also a state which was uniform, standardized and symmetrical in order to fulfil the principles of equity and equalization which underlay the Welfare State. This was true also of territorial organization. The trend toward centralization noted in the French concept of the nation-state was exacerbated and regional and local authorities were reduced to being the instruments of the delivery of social welfare services on behalf of the central state, rather than being expressions of regional and local democracy as they were meant to be. Regional policy, as devised during the period of the Trente Glorieuses had little to do with regionalism, in the sense of giving power to regional authorities, but rather was an expression of national social policy applied at a territorial level (Loughlin, 1997). It all came to an abrupt halt with the first oil crisis of 1973 and, later, with the elections of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in 1981, the Beveridgian/Keynesian Welfare State was called into question by the theory that later became known as ‘neo-liberalism’. The indivisibility and unity of nationhood also underlies modern political concepts, such as sovereignty and the ‘rational’ forms of public administration defined by Max Weber5. It also underlies the ‘realist’ theory of international relations. This is conceived as relations between discrete political entities, somewhat like the balls of a billiard table, which relate to one another as equals, whatever the disparities between them in terms of size, population or socio-economic strength. Thus, Luxembourg is a sovereign entity alongside the United States. Of course, in reality such a con-

6


ception is absurd and international relations follow patterns of symmetry and asymmetry precisely because of these particular characteristics. Nevertheless, even taking this into account, international law is based on respect for the sovereignty of nation-states over their own territories. Infringement of this principle by one state against another is correctly regarded as an act of war and aggression. There is also an international convention that one state does not interfere in the internal affairs of another, except to prevent extreme violations of human rights, as in the case of Kosovo or Iraq, and even then this exception depends on the regime in question and on the configuration of international politics. It is clear that in a region such as the Balkans with its mosaic of overlapping ethnic, linguistic and religious groups, this principle of national self-determination and non-interference has been very difficult to achieve. The old Yugoslav Federation constructed by Tito and his associates was an attempt to devise a political system in which these different groups could live in harmony but, in the end, it served mainly as a pretext for Serbian nationalist domination and broke down with the collapse of the communist system. Albania has, by and large, respected the principle although there is evidence that, during the Hoxha dictatorship, it was providing assistance to revolutionary MarxistLeninist groups around the world (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997). The primacy of the nation-state as the key form of political organization has, however, been challenged from a number of sources, of which two are relevant to this book. First, it has been challenged by the European federalist movement, which regarded nationalism and the nation-state system as the origin of many of the ills of the modern world, including the major European civil wars between France and Germany, but involving most other European states, of the 19th and 20th centuries. The founding fathers of Europe, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Altiero de Gasperi and Konrad Adenauer, were in favour of a federalist Europe, in which the nation-state would be by-passed and neutralized, albeit not eliminated. The more extreme federalists of the European Federalist Movement, such as Alexandre Marc or Altiero Spinelli, wished to see the nation-state disappear completely. Some federalists spoke of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ (De Rougemont 1996), or a ‘Europe des Ethnies’ (Héraud, 1974), in which the existing ‘artificial’ nation-states would be replaced by the more ‘natural’ regions or ethnic communities. Although the more extreme federalist formulations remained at the level of wishful thinking, federalist ideas did influence the initial design of the early European institutions and the federalist ideal was to reappear at key moments in the history of European integration. As European integration accelerated at these moments, the


7

absolute position of the nation-state would be relativized and its relationship with other states and with its own constituent parts made more complex. Second, the Soviet empire of communist states, dominated by Moscow, severely limited the autonomy of nation-states, which existed only on paper. The federal system of the Soviet Union was largely a sham and hid the real domination by Russia and the Communist Party, just as the Yugoslav Federation masked the predominance of Serbia within the Federation. At the same time, as events such as the crushing of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 or the Czech revolt in 1968 by Soviet tanks illustrate, the autonomy of the client states of the Soviet Union did indeed have important limits. It was the paranoid fear of invasion by outsiders that these examples provided, that drove Enver Hoxha and his party to adopt the highly isolationist policy that characterized the Albanian communist system. The bunker mentality of Albanian communism is aptly symbolized by the tens of thousands of concrete bunkers built in the 1960s, which still deface the Albanian countryside and towns. Despite its anti-nationalist origins, however, for a long time, roughly from the mid-1950s to the late 1970s, the European Community did not seriously challenge the dominance of the nation-states which made up its members. One author, in fact, has described this period as the ‘European rescue of the nation-state’ (Milward, 2000). The principle of national interest was paramount and the Community, during this period, was little more than a strong international regime. The arrival to power in France of General De Gaulle, who detested the very idea of a European federation, ensured that this was the case. It should also be remembered that this was the period of the Trente Glorieuses during which the nation-state was consolidating itself as a system. The nation-state was then at the height of its powers and did not need to supplement these with European policies. The European Community was useful as a mechanism for strengthening the market, as well as providing a conduit for the arrival of funding through the US Marshall Fund. It was also useful politically and supported by the US as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, whose armies now occupied a large part of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The federalist ideal of the founding fathers tended to fade into the background in this situation while the nation-state successfully reasserted itself. This did not mean that the Community was nothing but an international regime. Integration did continue, but at a slower pace than European federalists would have wished and the more ambitious dreams of the latter were put on hold. With regard to the Soviet Union, this had little influence on Western Europe, except through the western communist parties and in the developing

8


world, where the Soviets supported national liberation movements, as in Angola, Mozambique or Vietnam, who employed a Marxist rhetoric, but who fundamentally were nation-state nationalists. It is all the more remarkable, then, given the dominance and resilience of the nation-state, that in the 1980s and 1990s, the future of the nationstate and its very survival should become a topic of journalistic comment as well as academic research, spawning a considerable academic literature6. In effect, the 1980s witnessed something of a revival of the European idea with the relaunch of the Community and especially the Single Market programme, devised by the European Commission under the Presidency of Jacques Delors. The context of this series of developments was the preceding crisis of the Welfare State and, indeed, of a certain mode of industrial capitalism, which began in the 1970s. This crisis has been attributed to various factors: the 1973 oil crisis was undoubtedly a triggering factor, but even before this, in the late 1960s, the system was in difficulties with fiscal overload (the state simply could not afford the vast financial outlay that the Welfare State was costing) and the economic difficulties caused by Keynesian approaches to economic policy. Thus, the two basic approaches based on the theories of Beveridge and Keynes called into question the Welfare State model. The Welfare State already had its critics on both the left and right of the political spectrum. The left, or rather the ‘New Left’, was represented by groups such as the Frankfurt School of neo-Marxists, which included such thinkers as Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse. These authors combined Marxist political and sociological analysis with Freudian psychoanalysis to critique the overpowering bureaucracy of the Welfare State, which they claimed both stultified the individual (for example, sexually) and represented a counter-revolutionary compromise with capitalism, instead of socialist revolution. The New Left had an important impact culturally by contributing to the critique and transformation of traditional value systems in the west. Marcuse’s writings, for example, became key texts during the student rebellions of the 1960s7. But on the level of practical politics it was perhaps the ‘New Right’, composed of economists such as Milton Friedman (1962), sociologists such as William Niskanen (1971) and philosophers like Robert Nozick (1974), who laid the intellectual foundations for the neo-liberal revolution of Margaret Thatcher, elected to power in Britain in 1979, and Ronald Reagan, elected US President in 1981. In effect, these thinkers provided the intellectual tools for a critique of the state as such, and called for a reduction of its intervention in both society and the economy. Needless to say, such ideas were music to the ears of young right-wing radicals in the for-


9

mer Soviet states of Central and Eastern Europe, but also in Albania, who had suffered for so many years under the burden of the totalitarian state. This crisis of the Beveridgian/Keynesian model of the state and economic development led to a reinvention of capitalism both through new technological developments and a series of policy approaches which involved privatization, deregulation and the introduction of market procedures in public administration and public policy programmes, based on Thatcher’s and Reagan’s neo-liberal agenda. The collapse of the BrettonWoods Agreement in the mid-1970s and the opening up of world trade combined with these reforms to produce what we now call globalization, although this is a vast and complex phenomenon which comprises many different dimensions. The initial beneficiaries of these new developments were, in fact, not the global economy, but the US and Japan, which became powerful economic blocs, threatening to marginalize and leave behind the weakened and demoralized European states. European political, business and administrative elites, aware of this challenge, reasoned that European states, as individual states, would not be capable of responding to it. Rather, they could only mount an effective response by coming together. It was this reasoning, formulated by the European Round Table of Industrialists at the beginning of the 1980s, that was one of the immediate factors that led to the relaunch of Europe outlined above. The results of these developments have been quite spectacular. First, the ‘European Community’ itself has been transformed into the ‘European Union’ by the successful completion of the single market in 1992, as well as by the successive reforms of the Treaties at Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, culminating in the recent formulation of a single constitutional treaty for the Union by the Convention on the Future of Europe, presided over by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. These reforms have profoundly affected the nature of the Union itself. As remarked above, the EC was little more than a strong international regime right up to the 1970s. Today, it seems to have rediscovered, at least partially, its federal vision of a ‘United States of Europe’, even if it is not yet quite a federation. It is rather, a hybrid type of organization, with some intergovernmentalist features (which recognize the primacy of the national interests of the member states) and with some supranational or federal-type features (which emphasize the primacy of the EU common interest over and above national interests). In fact, many of the elements of a true federation are now in place: a single currency, a central bank, a European administration (the Commission), a European Parliament, a European Court of Justice, many common policies (CAP, monetary policy etc), as well as embryonic policies of defence, justice and

10


home affairs, and foreign affairs. Furthermore, the successive treaty revisions have strengthened the supranational elements over and above the intergovernmentalist ones. For example, decision-making by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), rather than unanimity in the Council of Ministers, is now used for an increasing number of issues, thus lessening the importance of national vetoes. The European Parliament is also more closely involved in decision-making through the co-decision procedure. Thus, we might describe the European Union as a unique system of governance with strong state-like and federal-type features. These developments predated, but became intertwined with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. This is one of the most remarkable periods of modern history, as what had seemed from the outside to be a powerful and impregnable system suddenly collapsed like a pack of cards, revealing a system of great weakness and inner decay. The Berlin Wall fell just when the EU was preparing itself for the single market and, eventually, political and monetary union. The almost spontaneous response of Western Europeans was to welcome the newly liberated countries of Central and Eastern Europe and some of the countries of the former Soviet Union into the Community. The liberated countries, for their part, saw this as a desirable goal and, once the old communist regimes had fallen, began almost immediately to prepare for it. Already, East Germany was reunited with West Germany, thanks to the efforts of the then Chancellor Helmut Kohl. However, there was something of a paradox here. The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and of the Baltic and Balkan regions had either regained, or won for the first time, national independence as nation-states. They thus followed the pattern outlined at the beginning of this chapter in adopting what had become the dominant form of political organization. They correctly perceived that this was the path to liberal democracy and social and economic well-being. Indeed, Czechoslovakia, in a peaceful divorce settlement, split in two and became two separate nation-states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The Baltic States followed a similar pattern while, in the Balkans, Yugoslavia disintegrated, as each element of the old federation began to assert its national rights, beginning with the largest, Serbia and Croatia, and the most prosperous, Slovenia. But the principle of national self-determination also affected the more composite parts, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. The federation quickly descended into a violent conflagration, as Serbs battled all the other groups and eventually the massacres led to UN intervention. In a sense, Albania was fortunate in already possessing an ‘old’

European Integration and the Transformations of the Democratic State 11

nation-state and clear boundaries, although it was threatened by spill-overs from the Yugoslav conflicts. But those countries which did successfully negotiate the path to national independence, including Slovenia, now wished to abandon their newfound freedom by surrendering parts of their national sovereignty to a fledgling neo-federation, the European Union. This is all the more paradoxical in that the federal idea itself was suspect, having been corrupted by the paper federation of the old Soviet Union. The disintegration of the Yugoslav federation and even the ‘velvet divorce’ of Czechoslovakia further damaged the idea of a federal union. Nevertheless, ‘Europe’ clearly represented an ideal of democracy, prosperity and well-being for the former Soviet bloc countries that was well-nigh irresistible. In fact, the dream of integration into the EU was realized for eight of these countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Estonia Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia), along with Cyprus and Malta in May 2004. Romania and Bulgaria are scheduled to join in 2007 if certain conditions are fulfilled. Even Croatia is now a contender for entry. Do this drive towards European integration and the wider phenomenon of globalization mean the ‘end of the nation-state’? By no means! The nation-state is not disappearing but is, rather, being transformed, so that its internal configuration and its relations with other states are significantly different today as a result of these transformations than they were even twenty years ago. Internally, the heyday of the Welfare State paradigm has now passed. With the crisis of the Welfare State and the advent of neo-liberal hegemony in the 1980s and 1990s, the state itself, in the majority of Western countries, has redefined its role less as ‘directing’ and ‘controlling’ in a top-down, hierarchical manner, and more as ‘steering’ and ‘animating’ a variety of interests in civil society. Arguments about the advent of the ‘hollow’ or ‘invisible’ state were probably exaggerated, but certainly the relationship between the state and civil society and the state and the economy did change to one better described as ‘partnership’, rather than as intervention and direction. The state and governmental actors retained, nevertheless, key positions in these relationships and it is now recognized that governmental actors bring to the relationships a set of resources deriving from their legitimacy and the sheer size of public bureaucracy that are rarely possessed by private sector actors, unless these are huge multinational corporations, such as Microsoft. Relations among states also changed and the whole notion of international relations has undergone a transformation during this period. What were once defined as ‘international’ and ‘diplomatic’ issues are increasing-

12


ly seen as ‘domestic’, as borders have opened up and trade and financial exchanges have been deregulated. Furthermore, international relations no longer concern simply national governments and departments of foreign affairs but, increasingly, other actors such as cities and regions, who have developed a truly ‘para-diplomatic’ set of activities. Besides these, there are supranational organizations such as the EU, and international organizations such as the Council of Europe, the World Trade Organization and the various agencies of the United Nations, all of which are involved in what were once purely domestic affairs internal to the nation-state. These tendencies of blurring the domestic and the international are nowhere more evident than within the European Union itself, where ‘European Affairs’ in most member states is no longer the preserve of the Departments of Foreign Affairs, but involves all other government departments. Having said this, ‘European issues’ also remain, in some respects, ‘international’. The point we are making is that there is at least an ambiguity and ‘international relations’ is less clear-cut than in the past. We might therefore say that the traditional nation-state has been transformed in these respects, while it has obviously retained many of its classical features in particular with regard to the organization of the political and administrative features of democracy. This means a plurality of parties, free elections, governments and executives accountable to elected assemblies, a rational-Weberian type of public administration and subnational government. There are also the various freedoms associated with liberal democracy: freedom of thought and opinion, freedom of assembly, a free press, etc. These basic democratic principles have found a variety of expressions in western states, which are federal or unitary, and among the latter, may be centralized, decentralized or ragionalized. They have a variety of electoral and party systems and distinct traditions of public administration and policy style. The transformation of the state outlined above has, however, posed new challenges to the classical liberal-democratic nationstate. The most serious challenge is that, particularly within the European Union, national governments are no longer capable of delivering the range of benefits that is associated with the Welfare State, but are constrained by vaster forces which they no longer control: international finance, globalized economic processes and new technologies. What this means is that the centres of real power have shifted from the national locus to centres outside the nation-state. As democratic politics is, to some extent, about the exercise and control of power, this poses a challenge for the current national organization of democratic life. This is clearly evident within the EU itself, where over 60 per cent of legislative decisions are made by the EU institutions and


are simply adopted into national legislation by the representative assemblies of the member states. The recent attempts at reforming the Union have not yet succeeded in solving the problem of this democratic deficit. These, then, are the political realities that the new democracies of the former communist bloc wish to join. Not only are they asked to abandon at least some of their hard-won national independence, but also they have to adapt their internal state systems to cope with the transformations that have characterized the Western European states, as well as the EU system of governance. This is, to say the least, a daunting prospect and entails much greater demands than those experienced by states in earlier enlargements. At least these states, with the exception of Spain, Portugal and Greece, had been functioning liberal democracies for long periods of time. However, there are also a number of differences among the new democracies, which means that the preparations to meet the conditions for entry will be variable. First, there are divisions among the new states themselves. Some, the so-called Visegrád8 states, do share some of the history of Western Europe and went through experiences such as the Reformation, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, 19th century urbanization and nationalism and may even have had some limited experiences of democracy. They therefore adapted more easily to the standards of western democracies. The transition for these countries, as Kaplan argues (2004) ‘was relatively easy, because the countries boasted high literacy rates, exposure to the Enlightenment under Prussian and Hapsburg emperors, strong industrial bases and middle classes prior to WWII and the cold war’. Others have not had this experience, having been part of the Russian or the Ottoman Empires before being ruled by extreme-right regimes in the period between the two world wars or being annexed by the Soviet empire. Therefore the idea that western-style democracy could be developed further south in the Balkans, has proved more challenging and problematic. It is the first group of countries that have been able to draw on these historical affinities to adapt themselves to the political, economic and social conditions necessary for joining the Union, as specified by the Copenhagen criteria. Second, the experience of communist rule for forty years or more left all the countries in a dire state politically and economically, although, again, there were differences among them, with Hungary, for example, having initiated economic reforms already during the communist period, or Poland, where the Catholic Church provided a strong counter culture to the ruling Communist Party. Third, the accession of the new states came just at the moment when the existing EU member states were themselves undergoing the significant reforms outlined above, when

14


EU integration was accelerating and when the global international scene was changing beyond recognition. The new states thus had to embark on a very ambitious and difficult programme of reform which involved throwing off the communist yoke and renewing their political, administrative and economic elites, building from scratch a capitalist economic system, devizing new democratic institutions at national, regional and local levels and preparing themselves to adopt the acquis communataire of 80000 or so provisions, which the existing member states had adopted over much longer periods of time. Meanwhile, within the EU itself, two problems emerged. First, the initial enthusiasm in the West that had greeted the collapse of communism and the possible expansion of the Union was wearing off, as both politicians and citizens became aware of the great difficulties (and costs) of unification. The unification of Germany was an example of the difficulties that might arise, as West Germany incurred huge economic and financial costs as a result of reunification. Second, the EU was finding great difficulty in preparing itself for enlargement. The institutions of the EU were originally designed for six states and, despite the reforms that followed the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, they have not been sufficiently reorganized to cope with a much greater number of members – even then 15, never mind a possible 25-30 states. It is generally recognized that the attempted revisions at Nice and Amsterdam, which were meant to make the necessary institutional adjustments for enlargement, failed miserably to do so. The recent Convention on the Future of Europe, which was set up to produce a draft Constitutional Treaty, has produced a document but, at the time of writing (2006), this remains to be ratified by all the states and several obstacles remain. Foremost is the problem of eurosceptic states, such as the UK, where opinion polls suggest there would be a negative result in the event of a referendum. The failure of the referendums held in 2005 on the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands are further symptoms of this erosion of support and this gave the UK government the excuse of postponing its own referendum. Furthermore, in countries like France and Austria, a problem has arisen with the opening of negotiations for EU membership with Turkey, whose entry is deeply unpopular. 1.2. Theories of European integration The problem here is usually identified as a tension between ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ the Union. In the dynamics of European integration, ‘deepening’


is seen as a prerequisite for ‘widening’ and involves strengthening the supranational rather than intergovernmentalist nature of the institutions. Many existing member states, however, such as the UK and the Scandinavians, are opposed to this. However, what has become clear in all these negotiations is that national interest, which varies depending on factors such as size and population and a range of domestic factors, still has the capacity to block progress towards the necessary reforms. Smaller states such as the Benelux countries, Ireland, and now Malta, tend to favour supranationalism (although euroscepticism has also been growing in countries such as the Netherlands and Ireland, traditionally ‘euro-enthusiasts’), because they do not have as much influence as the larger member states, and thus exercise an influence out of all proportion to their size. The larger states in general, such as Britain, France and now Poland, are more in favour of intergovernmentalist arrangements. These preferences of the states or politicians may be related to three theories, which attempt to explain and describe what kind of political entity the EU is, or what it should be: Federalism, as is clear from our earlier discussion, is both a theory and a political ideology, which sees the EU as at least an incipient federation and interprets many of its present features as having federal characteristics. The aim of committed European federalists is to transform the EU into a fullyfledged federation. Some would argue that a number of ‘federal elements’ are already in place: the European Court of Justice, the common market, the common currency (the Euro), and a growing number of common European policies such as agricultural policy (CAP), structural and cohesion policy, monetary policy and others. Furthermore, there is currently a process of constitutionalization, by which the various Treaties, which established the EU and have been reformed at various points, will be gathered together into what is known as a ‘Constitutional Treaty’ (that is, something rather less than a national Constitution and somewhat more than a Treaty between sovereign states). If ratified by the member states, it will also be a step towards a federation by giving the EU a president, a foreign affairs minister, and a common defence entity. There are different models of a possible European federation, such as the ‘United States of Europe’, where the existing member states become analogous to the US states, or the model of German co-operative federalism, whereby the Länder are intertwined with the Federal Government in decision-making and administration, or the notion of a ‘Europe of the Regions’, in which the existing member states will disappear in favour of regions of various kinds. However, the new European federation will not be a copy of any of these models, but possibly a hybrid of features drawn from them all, as well as having some features of a traditional international regime.

16


Neo-functionalism explains European integration as a process whereby the sharing of ‘functions’ (originally coal and steel production, but it might also include agricultural policy, training programmes, etc.) ‘spill-overs’ into institutional and, eventually, political developments. It shares with federalism the aim of transcending the primacy of the nation-state and national governments, but differs from it in placing economic factors above the political. For example, it has always been sceptical about constitutionbuilding, whereas this is primary in a federalist approach. Academically popular in the 1960s, when authors such as Ernst Haas (1964) analysed the ‘spill-over’ from the ‘European Coal and Steel Communities’ and ‘Euratom’ to the setting up the High Authority (the forerunner to the European Commission) and the other early EC institutions, neo-functionalism suffered a decline in the 1970s and early 1980s, as it seemed that the course of European integration during that period did not bear out its predictions. It made a comeback, however, in the 1980s with the (somewhat unexpected) success of the Single Market programme of Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission. Contemporary neo-functionalists point to the spill-over from the Single Market programme to the accelerated institutional and policy developments, elaborated in the revisions of the Treaties at Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989). These included more powers and a co-decision role for the European Parliament, more Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of Ministers (thus reducing the influence of the national veto), as well as the creation of the Euro and the setting up of the European Central Bank. Intergovernmentalism is a theoretical approach, which explicitly opposes both federalism and neo-functionalism, arguing that it is the member state governments who are the key actors in the EU. This is seen in the key role of the European Council, comprizing Heads of State and Government, the highest decision-making body in the EU, and the Council of Ministers, which groups together government ministers with responsibility for a particular portfolio and is the ultimate decision-making body in these areas. The European Commission, on the other hand, does make policy but simply proposes it. The slogan which summarizes relations between the two bodies is ‘the Commission proposes and the Council disposes’. The leading contemporary proponent of intergovernmentalism is Andrew Moravcsik (Moravcsik, 1999), but also many politicians, such as Margaret Thatcher and General De Gaulle, were in favour of intergovernmentalism. Intergovernmentalists emphasize the centrality of national executives, that the states remain the primary actors in the functioning of the EU,


whereas neo-functionalists point to supranational institutions (such as the European Commission or the European Parliament) as well as transnational interest organizations. There is a resemblance between neo-functionalism and federalism. Intergovernmentalists on one side, and federalists and neo-functionalists on the other, tend to pose two diametrically opposed scenarios for the European future: the EU as an intergovernmental institution – an international regime - versus the EU as a supranational ‘system of governance’ with state-like and quasi-federal features. Is European integration an economic or political phenomenon? If it is economic, what levels of interdependence need to be achieved among a group of national economies for them to be described as ‘integrated’? Achievement of a free trade area, customs, common market or monetary union? Does economic integration imply political integration or vice versa? Does integration consist of the replacement of traditional structures of governance with new types of institutions and new forms of authority? Should integration be understood as a process or as an outcome? One of the most satisfactory answers to these questions is given by Rosamond (2000) who describes European integration as ‘a deepening and widening, never-ending process of political, economic and security cooperation between nations, with the overall goal of the preservation of peace’. The European Union has turned out to be attractive for most states9of the former communist bloc for several reasons. First, the EU has been a powerful core of states at the heart of Europe with levels of prosperity, stability and well-being that were the envy of all these countries. The seemingly inexorable drive towards economic and political integration has been a magnet not only for them, but also for the more economically advanced states of Europe, such as Austria, Finland and Sweden and at least the elites of Norway and Switzerland. Even these last two countries, which chose in popular referendums not to join the Union, are deeply affected by its policies and developments. Second, the countries of the EU have been important models of democracy and, already in the cases of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1980s, Europeanization and democratization were seen as complementary processes. Although the European Union itself, as a political system, has a serious democratic deficit, it proved to be an important factor in encouraging democracy in these countries. The other important organization to encourage democratization has been the Council of Europe, a much more broadly-based body with 46 members, including all the existing member states of the European Union, those countries aspiring to join the EU and others such as Russia, Moldova and the Ukraine.. Its primary purpose is to promote democracy and human

18


rights and it has worked closely with the European institutions to do so in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. There has been a division of labour here: while the Council of Europe has concentrated on the installation of political democracy and has defined, through its various charters and conventions, what this means in practice, the EU institutions have been more concerned with the economic and administrative aspects of the transition. However, the end result aimed at is the same: the installation of liberal democracy and the capitalist economic system. The third reason why Central and East Europeans have been attracted to Europe is that the European Union, as a zone of political stability and economic prosperity for the past fifty years contrasts so much with the turmoil of the Balkans region and other parts of the former communist bloc which accompanied the disintegration of the Soviet system. It is largely thanks to the umbrella of the European Union that the West European states have experienced the most prolonged period of peace since the Second World War. This, in fact, is probably the Union’s most important accomplishment. The incentive to join this ‘club’ made the ten new states succeed in meeting the stringent conditions of the Copenhagen criteria and to become members of the Union on 1 May 2004. These states were also involved in the proceedings of the Convention on the Future of Europe and some of them, such as the largest of the new members, Poland, demonstrated a capacity to influence the proceedings and their outcome. The Balkan states, with the exception of Slovenia (which prefers not to belong to the ‘wild Balkans’), have remained on the margins of this process of enlargement. Albania is on the margin of the margins. Nevertheless, the recent enlargement has changed considerably the parameters within which these states now find themselves. Their geo-political situation has changed, as both the borders of both the EU and NATO now touch the Balkans, as well as Belarus, the Ukraine and Moldova. This is both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge is to avoid a hardening of the divisions within the former communist states, especially between the more advanced states such as the Visegrád countries, as well as Romania and Bulgaria, and those states which have less successfully made the transition: Belarus, the Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkan countries. Albania finds itself squarely within the latter group. The opportunity is that the new borders may actually assist the weaker states to accelerate and intensify their reforms to catch up with their immediate neighbours. As the new member states become more integrated into the EU system which may lead to virtuous cycles of economic and social development and reinforcing democratic practice, then this may have a knock-on effect on the outsiders.


1.3. The Europeanization approach: theoretical issues The general process of adaptation of countries to these processes has been termed ‘Europeanization’. This may be understood in two senses. First, there is a broad meaning which refers to the transition of countries from a particular regime, such as the Spanish, Portuguese and Greek dictatorships, or the former communist regimes of the Soviet bloc, to a regime of liberal democracy and market capitalism. A wide range of organizations could be involved in this, alongside the European Union, such as the Council of Europe, whose work has been mentioned above, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), etc. Individual embassies, particularly those of the UK, Germany and France, might also be involved in this work of transition. This broader process of Europeanization is a pre-condition for Europeanization in the narrow sense, that is, a preparation for the integration of countries into the European Union. This implies the fulfilment of a number of conditions, as laid out in the Copenhagen criteria (see Chapter 4). A considerable academic literature has developed seeking to analyse the processes of Europeanization in this narrow sense of the word, as well as to explain the reasons for its successes or failures10. Börzel and Risse emphasize that mediating factors may enable or prohibit domestic change in processes of Europeanization. They distinguish two different approaches, based on rationalist or sociological institutionalisms, which explain this. Rationalist institutionalism emphasizes the absence of multiple veto points and the presence of supporting institutions, as the main factors facilitating change. Sociological institutionalism points to the socialization of domestic actors, who become ‘norm entrepreneurs’ and ‘change agents’. A cooperative political culture will also facilitate adaptation. Another useful distinction drawn from the literature on ‘new institutionalism’, as developed by March and Olsen (1998), is that between the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (LoA) and the ‘logic of consequences’ (LoC). The LoA refers to the assimilation of norms by domestic actors, because it is the right thing to do (and therefore appropriate). The LoC refers to the assimilation of norms by these actors, because they are aware that failure to do so will have adverse consequences for them, that is, there is no true assimilation. Combining this distinction with the concepts formulated by Börzel and Risse, we can see the importance of the nature of the domestic political actors and the domestic political culture for facilitating or hindering processes of

20


Europeanization. The central argument of this book is that in the Albanian case, there exist multiple veto points to the adaptation of European norms, domestic actors are driven by a logic of consequences rather than a logic of appropriateness, mainly found in the corrupt political class and their criminal connections, and that there is a political culture of conflict and division, rather than of cooperation. In the next chapter we will outline some of the historical reasons for this situation.

2 ALBANIA IN 1990: AT THE CROSSROADS BETWEEN COMMUNISM AND DEMOCRACY ‘The Albanian road to democracy was strewn with land mines in the form of the cumulative political, economic and social legacies of Hoxha’s communist dictatorship, which made genuine democratization seem almost impossible’ Elez Biberaj (1998: 71)

2.1. The democratic movement for the overthrow of communism The collapse of communism established a New World Order and dramatically changed the geo-political landscape of Europe and more specifically that of Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasian region and the Balkans. By the end of the 1980s, unlike other countries of the eastern communist block where the ‘velvet revolutions’ had started their irreversible way towards democracy, Albania seemed to slumber in a long lethargic sleep unawakened by the events sparked off by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. This slumber was, in part, a result of the determination of the old Albanian communist caste to prolong the regime as long as they could. They sought to prevent Albania from following the path towards democratic reforms adopted by the CEE countries. It was also because of Albania’s terrible isolation, which meant an almost complete lack of information about what was going on in the rest of Europe (most Albanians did not even know that the Berlin Wall had fallen). The first signs of Albanians wakening from their slumber were the anti-communist demonstrations, the first in 50 years, in Kavaja and Shkodra in spring 1990. These reflected the widespread discontent of people with the regime which had been present beneath the surface. In the summer of that year, thousands of people invaded the foreign embassies in Tirana, asking for asylum. However, the development which really shattered the communist regime was what

22


became known as ‘the students’ movement’, which lasted from December 1990 until April 1991 (Rama: 2005). This started with protests and demonstrations and culminated with the historic hunger strike in February 1991 and the toppling of Enver Hoxha’s monument in the main square of Tirana. Following the students’ movement were mass street demonstrations and protests in Tirana and other cities and, in 1991, a nation-wide strike of workers. Those who initiated the overthrow of communism in Albania were, therefore, not established and well-known intellectuals as in the other CEE countries, but students and the young, who were the first to ask for political pluralism and the removal of communist symbols, and later on workers and the trade unions, all of whom appeared brave enough for an open confrontation with the government. The intellectuals, however, were reluctant to challenge the system and unwilling to openly confront the regime, fearing persecution in the aftermath. This is important as the lack of a democratic liberal elite and dissident intellectual groups as initiators and leaders of the democratic movement is one of the features distinguishing Albania from other CEE countries (see Chapter 8). These demonstrations and protests occurred with little violence and the transition in Albania, like in most of the other countries of the eastern communist bloc, came as a result of a ‘velvet revolution’, avoiding bloodshed such as occurred in Tiananmen Square in China or in Romania. The end of communism in Albania, the last bastion of Stalinism, took place in three historic moments: the collapse of communism in 1990; the end of the hegemonic one-party system with the election of the first coalition government in 1991; and the official end of communism with the first democratic election in 1992. Some argue that the official date of the fall of Albanian communism is 4th June 1991, with the resignation of the last communist government headed by Fatos Nano when the democratic movement brought to an end forty-seven years of communist rule in Albania, an era that had brought so much misery to the Albanian nation. This opened the way for the processes of democratization and political and socio-economic transformations. 2.2. Political, historical, economic and cultural legacies of the past: the Ottoman and communist legacies According to Pridham (2000:16) democratization is the whole process of regime change from totalitarian rule to the setting up of a new liberal democracy. It is a multi-stage and multi-dimensional process, which involves:

Albania in 1990: At the Crossroads between Communism and Democracy 23

authoritarian regime collapse, pre-transition liberalization, democratic transition, democratic consolidation and, finally, the entrenchment of liberal democracy. It is clear that Albania, while it has embarked on the early phases of transition, is having difficulties in reaching the final stages. This is as a result of certain historical, political, economical and socio-cultural legacies.

Political legacy Albania may be considered a ‘special case’ and an ‘exception’, even within the communist bloc. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the country had suffered under one of the toughest dictatorship regimes within the entire communist block and was considered Europe’s most Stalinist country. As one author puts it, ‘Albania’s dictator, Enver Hoxha, was a fan of the more extreme forms of communism, first embracing Soviet Stalinism until Khrushchev started introducing reforms, and then Maoism, until China began liberalizing its economy’ (Hollingham 2005). Albania described itself as ‘the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat’, and was one of the most repressive communist regimes the world has ever seen. Like other Stalinist countries, it was a one-party state run by the Party of Labour of Albania (PLA) as the communist party was known. Elections to the parliament were purely cosmetic and the parliament met just twice a year to approve decisions already made by the party leadership. In fact, it was the Politburo of the PLA which was the real decision-making body of the state. It is sometimes argued that there is no such thing as a ‘totalitarian’ regime, in the sense that it is not possible for a state to control every single aspect of the lives of individuals and society. Albania, however, came close to such a state with the widespread and brutal repression and violation of basic human and political rights. Freedom of expression and independence of thought were completely crushed, and ‘class struggle’ was invoked in a paranoid manner to justify the merciless political persecution of ‘people and class enemies’ and their families (thousands of people vanished in prisons and internal exile, or were executed). Political and civic pluralism and democratic institutions were forbidden. Albania went even further than China in abolishing all forms of private sector activity and private property, and forbade all religious institutions or even beliefs. The Albanian version of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and subsequently other bizarre Chinese-inspired policies brought more repression, devastation and poverty to the country.

24


Secondly, because of the country’s infamous self-imposed international isolation, which left a legacy of political passivity and backwardness, Albanians had no points of reference apart from those given by the regime. It is true that during the Cold War all communist countries operated in isolation, with the exception of Yugoslavia. However, the lonely ‘fortress Albania’ with its sealed borders was even more isolated than its communist sister-states which made it possibly the most isolated country in the world, never mind Europe. Albania was forced to cut links with Yugoslavia in the late 1940s, with the Soviet Union in the 1960s and with China in the 1970s ‘on the grounds that these countries were not truly communist’ and then claimed it was the world’s only true communist country11. After each breakup with its close allies, observers hoped Albania would move toward a rapprochement with the West. But instead of opening the country in this direction and outwards, Enver Hoxha moved it further inwards and, at the end, after 1978 cut it off almost entirely from the rest of the world (maintaining semi-formal relationships only with some hopeless Latin-American and African Marxist-Leninist countries like itself). Isolation thus became the keynote of its foreign policy. Albania, thus cut off from any kind of economic, political and cultural links with the outside world, was turned into a ‘gigantic prison’, with its people locked inside barbed wire fences. Anyone caught trying to escape from this ‘prison’ was considered guilty of ‘high treason of the homeland’ and severely punished by long terms of imprisonment, executed or shot by border guards12. This pathological isolation imposed by a xenophobic communist dictatorship prohibited the free movement of people and information (media, literature and art) and no international organizations were allowed in the country before 1991. There was a stifling atmosphere of paranoia created by the regime’s claim that the country was surrounded by ‘external enemies’ and this was used to justify isolation and economic hardships. It also led to littering the country with tens of thousands of concrete bunkers (around 400.000), as the country prepared for ‘attack from abroad’, mainly from its ‘two biggest enemies – Soviet revisionism and American imperialism’. The bunkers, built into the earth like the cement-domed heads of R2D2 structures from ‘Star Wars’, were grey eyesores planted into the country’s fields, beaches and mountains, creating a siege mentality in an imaginary ‘Don Quixote’ war of defence. Albania was thus something like a surreal maverick country. When the curtains fell, however, the self-proclaimed ‘light-house of Europe’ was revealed as nothing more than a dark hell. For their part, the Western governments totally ignored this strange country and the foreign intelligence agencies ‘wiped’ Albania from their


plans of cold war, keeping a total indifference towards it, as if the country did not exist at all. Ordinary Europeans, if they noticed Albania at all, viewed ‘the country of eagles’ as one of mystery and curiosity. For them, Albania was one of the most unfamiliar parts of Europe, a blind hole in the knowledge of the average educated westerner13, a bizarre country of some 3.5 million people who even spoke a language unrelated to any other European tongue. This brings to mind the brilliant movie ‘Wag the Dog’, in which the US President seeks to draw attention away from a presidential sex scandal. One of his advisers (Robert De Niro) and a Hollywood producer (Dustin Hoffmann) create a fictional US war with Albania. ‘Why Albania?’ asks Dustin Hoffmann. ‘Because nobody knows anything about Albania’, replies De Niro. This is how Andrew Mueller (2003) describes communist Albania: ‘Albania’s fearsome reputation is the product of a modern history best described as tragi-comic: tragic if you had to live there, comic if you did not. Under the fabulously insane dictator Enver Hoxha, who ruled from 1944 until his death in 1985, Albania was so insular and paranoid that it fell out with every other batty communist state. Hoxha left the Warsaw Pact when the USSR invaded Czechoslovakia, and stopped talking to China when they started speaking to the USA (‘Revisionists!’ snorted Hoxha). Convinced that the whole world coveted his loopy Ruritanian fiefdom, Hoxha gaoled or killed thousands of opponents, banned religion and foreign travel, and built hundreds of thousands of semi-circular concrete bunkers all over Albania, facing in every direction. The whole world, whose true feelings towards Albania were bemusement and indifference, let him get on with it.’ It is obvious that such a society is not a fertile breeding ground for political democracy and the creation of a vigorous civil society. However, even before the communist period, Albania had never developed a genuine democracy or experienced political pluralism in any significant way. After the First World War, a rudimentary pluralistic party system appeared with the conservative Progressive Party led by Ahmet Zogu14(which attracted the support of some northern clan chiefs and some Muslim tribal leaders from the south), the Popular Party, led by Xhafer Ypi and the People’s

26


Party led by Fan S. Noli15 who had been educated at Harvard and wished to develop western ideas. There were, however, high levels of governmental instability during this time illustrated by the fact that, between July and December 1921, the government changed hands no fewer than five times. Both Ypi and Noli served as Prime Ministers of governments led by the Popular Party, but it must be said the experiment of multi-party democracy was not a great success and it soon degenerated into armed struggle between the different factions for control of the state. By 1924, Ahmed Zogu finally defeated his enemies (including the more progressive elements, such as Fan Noli) and smothered the fledgling democracy. Zogu came to power mainly with the support of Yugoslavia. However, after his victory, he in turn began making claims on territory settled by Albanians in Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, Benito Mussolini had come to power in Italy in 1922 and the Italian state had its eyes on Albania as a foothold for the creation of a new Italian empire in the region. Zogu turned to the Italians for support against Yugoslavia and, in 1925, the Italian-backed ‘Society for the Economic Development of Albania’ was created. Italy and Albania also signed a mutual defence agreement. In 1928, Zogu convinced the Albanian parliament to agree its own dissolution and to proclaim him as ‘King Zog’. By this point, Albania and King Zog were, in effect, puppets of the Italian Fascist State and Albania was turned into a semi-protectorate of Italy. The friendly relationship ended in 1939 when Italian forces invaded Albania and Zog fled with his family to Greece. Italians controlled Albania during most of the Second World War until November 1944, when the communist partisans led by Enver Hoxha took over the country.

Economic legacy Albania had a very low socio-economic starting point in the 1990s, with a background as the poorest country in Europe, considered by some as the ‘Somalia of Europe’. Its extreme poverty was a consequence of the communist regime’s centrally planned and collectivist economy, the full collectivization of agriculture, state ownership over everything and regulation of business, abolishment of private property, all of which were a recipe for economic failure by their stifling of private initiative and an independent economic sector. This was the case with most of the other countries of the communist bloc and was one of the principal reasons for the collapse of the communist system in the 1990s. However, these problems associated with Soviet-style economic approaches were compounded in the Albanian


case by Enver Hoxha’s paranoid adoption of the principle of national selfreliance. This principle became the main element of the country’s economic policy, especially after the split with China in 1978. Before that, Albania had achieved a relative economic success, receiving substantial assistance from its ‘big brothers’: first from Yugoslavia (1945-1948), then from the Soviet Union (1948-1960) and later from China (1961-1978), with whom it developed a series of client relationships. But after the split from China, until 1990, Albania refused all foreign aid or investment. The strict implementation of the self-reliance policy was clearly demonstrated in the crazy and egotistical slogan ‘we Albanians would prefer to eat grass, than to sell our principles’. The economy was characterized by fixed prices and salaries, low rates of trade and a very low standard of living. The economy and society in general depended on a Spartan egalitarianism (emphasized especially after the Albanian version of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the 1960s), in which the majority of the population lived, in stark contrast with the ‘royal’ nomenklatura class, who used to enjoy enormous privileges and live a good life in a special guarded area in Tirana, known as the infamous ‘Blloku’ (the block)16.

Socio-cultural legacy The establishment of communism found Albania a very backward country, largely agrarian with a great mass of peasantry, and a Muslim and semifeudal society, which was very traditional, conservative and patriarchal. At the very onset of the communist system, in an attempt to overcome the backwardness of this society, Marxism-Leninism was declared to be the official and sole ideology. Everything was to be in conformity with this dogmatic ideology, which internationally preached ‘the triumph of the proletarian revolution’, and domestically had to protect the people from ‘dangerous, alien, bourgeoisie-revisionist’ influences from abroad. The determination to continue ‘our own way’ was expressed in the saying of that time ‘Let the dogs (enemies of Albania) bark as much as they can, while the Albanian caravan will always march forward’. Even some achievements of communism had unfortunate social consequences: illiteracy was eradicated, but literacy and education became tools to brainwash the masses; a wide network of professional and vocational schools was created, but education was strongly centralized and ideologically driven; the communist regime succeeded in the electrification of the whole country, but this became a means to broadcast communist propaganda; the economy was

28


industrialized, but this process was a way of creating the ‘new socialist man’, indoctrinated with the communist mentality. ‘The new socialist man’ was considered the ‘highest social achievement’ of communism. This ‘creature’ was expected to acquire appropriate communist traits, morality and atheistic ideas, as well as to be free of any remnants of the past and ‘bourgeois culture’. As a result of this, the amorphous mass of peasantry was ‘promoted’ to the level of the ‘working class’ and pseudo-intelligentsia, who all were obedient creatures of the communist leadership. The Albanian communist ‘revolution’ resembled the Russian and Chinese Revolutions in so far as it attempted to ‘skip’ a stage of Marx’s model of historical dialectic in which feudalism gave way to bourgeois industrial capitalism (including liberal democracy), which would be in turn replaced by communist socialism. Albania, like Russia and China, attempted to pass from a rural peasant society to a socialist industrialized one without passing through the intermediate stage of bourgeois capitalism. It therefore lacked a well-developed middle-class imbued with democratic ideas and principles. The communist regime aimed to create a national community and construct a socialist society ‘blessed with social and economic equality’. And by not allowing tolerance for diverse viewpoints (critics and alternative ideas were a total heresy), and by long and brutal repression, communism managed to develop mass brainwashing, conformism and apathy. In the end, Albania retained some of the worst aspects of the traditional and peasant tribal society of the past without developing the positive features of industrialization. Albanian society also retained many of the features of what may be described as the Balkan-Mediterranean culture and mentality. This culture is marked by hostility between individuals and the state and urban/rural conflicts. Society is dominated by ‘clan’ interests, that is, the interests of patriarchal extended families who operate a system of informal networking and clientelism. ‘Gifts’ and bribes are exchanged as a way of attenuating the excesses of exploitation and repression. In the same way as in Mediterranean societies such as Sicily, southern Italy, Greece and Corsica (Loughlin, 1987 and 1992) Albanian society is based on the notion of the ‘honour’ of the family, which leads to the violence of the vendetta if this ‘honour’ is violated. This means that there is a sub-culture of violence subverting any attempt to create a civil society based on the rule of law, which is one of the prerequisites of a democratic system. Furthermore, again like in other societies of this region, this culture perverts formal political and administrative institutions by transforming them into instruments of cronyism, nepotism and clientelism.


Historical legacy The most immediate and powerful historical legacy is firstly that of being under communist rule for almost 50 years. There was, however, an important longer-term historical dimension, as suggested above in the distinction made in Chapter One between the Visegrád countries and those that had been within the Russian or Ottoman Empires. The Visegrád countries had, for the most part, shared a number of the historical experiences of west European states, such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and 19th industrialization and urbanization. Furthermore, in these countries private property had not been totally abolished, religion was not completely forbidden, and political and social pluralism were tolerated to some extent even if under more restricted conditions than in the west. They even had ties with, and membership in, a number of international organizations. In this way they never entirely broke their ties with the west. Albania, on the contrary, was first part of the Byzantine Empire and then, for 500 years, part of the Ottoman Empire, with its sultanate imperial system and legacy of patrimonial and personalistic rule. From this it inherited under-developed state-society relationships, weak institutional capacity and structures and a fragmented civil society. Albania then became an authoritarian monarchy until the outbreak of the Second World War (under King Zog’s rule, however, Albania was a much freer society compared to the communist period). Even in terms of Marxist ideology, these conditions were unpropitious for the development of a modern socialist society and economy, which presupposes an already developed urban and industrial system, with bourgeois elites capable of carrying through the revolutionary transformation. Instead, the four decades of communist rule, mostly under the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha, who turned the state into something like a family enterprise, reinforced socioeconomic and political backwardness. The years after Second World War came to be called ‘the time of liberation’, but they turned out to be just the opposite for Albanians. For 50 years this grotesque and paranoid regime created political, economic and social asymmetries between Albania and the rest of Europe. Albania’s historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, as well as communism, has been important factors in hindering its successful transition to a modern liberal democracy. Albania, therefore, did not have traditions of capitalism and democracy, unlike some of the other transition countries which embarked on the ‘era of changes’ with varying potential levels of these traditions. Albania was experiencing democracy for the first time in its history and was clearly

30


the country with the longest journey to travel from a rigid Stalinism to democracy. ‘Of all the former communist countries, Albania appeared least prepared for the painful transition from dictatorship to a pluralist democracy and a market economy – argues Biberaj (1998:149) - The historical legacies of centralized, authoritarian rule and economic underdevelopment placed serious impediments in the way of rapid and smooth democratization of the Albanian polity’. Albania’s task of overcoming this legacy and ‘catching up’ with the West was therefore immense, even compared to other former communist states.

Post-1990 legacies Pridham (2000:30) argues ‘Democracy is not born of an immaculate conception, but inherits a variety of past legacies that may complicate the regime change’. We have already outlined the most important legacies from both the communist and pre-communist past. However, the political and economic system of Albania established after the onset of democracy has also been faulty and problematic. Indeed, it is hard to see how it could have been otherwise given the previous conditions. Furthermore, these unpropitious conditions have been exacerbated by events after 1991, such as the unrest of 1997 caused by the failure of pyramid schemes (which led to the collapse of institutional order – see chapter 5), as well as the Kosovo crisis in 1999 (which provoked a huge flow of refugees into Albania), which have caused serious setbacks. Besides these longer- and medium-term factors, however, it is poor, incompetent and irresponsible political leadership which has been the principal factor that has prevented Albania achieving good results in its attempted reforms. These have failed to live up to the ideal of being the ‘norm entrepreneurs’, described in Chapter 1, capable of adopting a ‘logic of appropriateness’ in the assimilation of the new norms. This is not surprising given that many of the political elites, such as the Socialist leader Fatos Nano and the ‘reformist’ Democratic Party leader Sali Berisha and their followers, were themselves products of the communist regime and had been party members. This is not to say that the picture is entirely bleak and without redeeming features. It can even be argued that Albania, compared to some other states, has had some advantages on its road to democratization and integration. There is, for example, the fact that it has been a state (for 80 years), unlike other countries (such as Slovakia) or the former entities of the Russian and Yugoslav Federations which, after 1990, had to create new


states as a result of the disintegration of their federations. Furthermore, in the Balkans, some of its neighbouring states have not sorted out their constitutional and territorial status as well as their borders (as in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and even Macedonia) and some of them are still experiencing a provisional situation under the general guidance and oversight of the international community. Albania, on the contrary, has a strong advantage of having been, for almost a century, an independent state (even if too independent). Secondly, Albania, despite its location in a region of Europe that is a mosaic of overlapping ethnic and religious communities, has itself no major domestic inter-ethnic problems. The reason for this is that it is almost entirely ethnically homogeneous (Albanians account for 98 per cent of the total population while the biggest ethnic minority in the country, the Greeks, is estimated at about 70000), unlike other countries in the region which are multiethnic, having a mixed population, such as Serbia (Serbians and Albanians), Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnians and Serbs), Macedonia (Macedonian and Albanians) and Montenegro (Montenegrins, Serbs and Albanians) and where minorities account for up to 10-25 per cent of the population. Thirdly, Albania is also remarkable in that it has experienced little if any of the religious conflict between Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims, that has been an important factor in the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, even though all three religious groups are present in the country (see below Chapter 3). The reason for this, besides the intense ‘atheization’ of the country during the Hoxha regime, is that all Albanians identify first with the Albanian nation, and only secondarily with their religion, if they have one. That is, they are first Albanians, then Muslim, Catholic or Orthodox or atheist. The mutual harmony of the religions in Albania is thus a factor of stability in an ethnically and religiously divided region17. 2.3. To what extent is Albania ‘European’? In the light of the discussion surrounding Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership and because a majority of Albanian inhabitants are, at least nominally, Muslim, it is legitimate to ask to what extent is Albania ‘European’. That it is in fact European is an implicit assumption in its drive for membership of the European Union. From a geographical point of view, Albania is certainly European, as it has always been part of the European continent. Geography provides the physical framework, but fundamentally it is values that make the borders of

32


Europe. From the historical and political perspectives, however, Albania, like the other Western Balkan countries, has been ‘detached’ from Europe twice: first, six centuries ago by the Turkish Empire, which turned it into an Ottoman possession for 500 years, and second, after the Second World War by the Soviet Union, when it became part of the communist bloc for 45 years (despite Enver Hoxha’s isolationism, Albania still remained part of the communist bloc of Europe). These separations from Western Europe have had a deep impact on the nature of the political and administrative of the country. Even a country such as Greece, which gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire almost 100 years before Albania and has been part of Western Europe since the end of Second World War and part of the EU for almost 30 years, still shares to some extent this Turkish past and it, too, still suffers as a result of the Ottoman administrative heritage. How much stronger then is that inheritance in Albania! Socially and culturally, then, does Albania have a European cultural identity, traditions and values? It is clear that, even though Albania shares a common linguistic ancestry (Albanian is an Indo-European language)18with Western European states, there are different social norms, mentality and culture, deriving from the ‘Balkan’ culture, but also from Albania’s Muslim inheritance, although the ‘Balkan’ dimension is probably the more important. Some convergence of cultural identity is considered to be essential to integration and more difficult to achieve, compared to political (liberal democracy) and economic (market economy) convergence. However, this cultural gap is narrowing as a result of opening up to the world and being exposed to the different aspects of globalization (economic, social, cultural, and technological). Furthermore, Albania shares a number of common cultural features with other parts of the Balkan/Mediterranean region such as Greece, Corsica, southern Italy, Spain and Portugal. These areas have been integrated more or less successfully into the European Union and it is difficult to see why Albania could not follow them in this regard. From the religious point of view, is Albania ‘eligible’ to join the club? Although secularist countries such as the UK, France and the Scandinavian members play it down, the EU is still in some sense a ‘Christian club’. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who chaired the Convention on the Future of Europe, which drew up the European Constitutional Treaty, commented in a French newspaper that Europe ‘had three sources of identity: GrecoRoman philosophy and law, Enlightenment Humanism and …JudaeoChristian religion’. The Christian Church, which succeeded the Roman Empire as the unifying institution in European society, bequeathed to


European common values, mentalities and attitudes are shared at a continental level. This was true even after the schism between the western Latin and eastern Byzantine Christian traditions in the 11th century and the 16th century Protestant Reformation. Even the secularist humanism deriving from the 18th century Enlightenment is rooted in the values of the Christian gospel, albeit in a secularized form. The populations (if not always the political and intellectual elites) of certain countries of this ‘Christian club’, including France, Britain, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, are very resistant to the Turkish accession mainly because it is Muslim. The attitudes of some member states towards even starting negotiations with Turkey over EU membership show clearly that they want to keep Turkey out, mainly because of its religion and because it is thought that it could not be easily integrated into western culture. Opposition to Turkey joining the EU was one of the key reasons voters rejected the EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands. A French poll said 35 per cent of those who voted ‘no’ did so to oppose Turkey’s entry into the EU (Meixler 2005). Romania, on the other hand, which is economically more backward than Turkey and is plagued by corruption, has been given the green light by the EU. Some, such as Hourican (2004), argue that ‘until all the Balkan countries with sizeable Muslim populations: Bosnia Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia – together with Turkey get into the EU, until that is we “enlarge to the Muslim world”, religion will continue to be an issue and we will continue asking these faintly embarrassing questions’. Although the EU has also given the green light to negotiations with Turkey, it is unlikely that it will become a full member even in 20 years time for the simple reason that countries such as France and Austria will insist on holding referendums on membership, which will undoubtedly decide on rejection. But what about Albania? First of all, is it really a Muslim country? Officially, the answer is that is majority Muslim, and with BosniaHerzegovina, has one of the two largest and oldest Muslim communities in Europe. However, the official figures for Albania are not accurate as they are based on an out-dated poll conducted in 1929, according to which 70 per cent of the population were Muslim, 20 per cent Greek Orthodox and 10 per cent Roman Catholic. Even if these figures are accurate, the absolute number of Muslims in Albania is quite small, since the total population of the country is only 3 million. This means that the total Muslim population in Albania would be around 2.4 million compared to France with about 5.98 million Muslims (about 10 per cent of the population) or Germany with about 3.06 million (about 3.7 per cent). Of course, the existence of these large Muslim populations does not mean that France and

34


Germany are becoming Muslim societies, whatever the alarmist predictions of some right-wing commentators, or that law in these countries will be influenced by the sharia. Other examples would include the fact that the most regularly practised religion in England is now Islam, and Wales has more Muslims than Methodists. Turkey, while having a secular state, is a profoundly Muslim society. This leads us to the second aspect of Albanian Islam. Albania, unlike Turkey, is both a secular state and secular society. Albanian Islam has never been a strict and traditional form. The majority of Albanian Muslims are Sunnis, the branch which, in contrast to the Shi’ites, is most open to western influences such as in dress and social habits. The other Muslim tradition in Albania is Bektashism, a form of Shi’ite Islam close to the Sufis (best known for the practice of the ’whirling dervishes’). The Bektashis are one of the least dogmatic expressions of Islam and open to collaboration with other faiths. In any case, most Muslim Albanians have a long secularist tradition, being very moderate and liberal (in the sense of marrying someone of another religion, drinking alcohol or eating pork, etc). The long period of official state atheism also had the effect of damping down religious fervour on the part of Muslims. After the collapse of communism the religious revival has tended to favour conversions to Christianity rather than Islam, reinforced by the wish of Albanians to join the European family, which is viewed as a ‘Christian club’. In Albania there is little evidence of Islamic fundamentalism, or even Islamization. Most young Albanians today conform to the more hedonistic and secularist life-styles of their young western counterparts. The situation in Albania is unlike Kosovo or Macedonia where religion has been an important element of their national identity for the ethnic Albanian populations. Another specific feature is that Albania historically did not have a single national church, powerful and influential, as had its neighbouring countries Greece and Serbia. Thirdly, Albania poses fewer security concerns for the EU as its borders do not touch the Middle East, including Islamic regimes such as Syria and Iran, and problematic countries whose names end with ‘..istan’, which would be an overstretch for the EU’s security. On the contrary, two of Albania’s neighbours, Italy in the west and Greece in the south, are already EU member states. This makes the entry of Albania into the EU much less problematic from a geo-strategic point of view than a country such as Turkey. Albania, therefore, cannot be written off in the same terms with which Commissioner Franz Fischler dismissed Turkey as ‘oriental’. In summary, from the religious aspect, even though it is viewed by the West as a Muslim country, Albania is not under European suspicion19, as is the case with Turkey


(for more about this issue, see the ‘Religious Situation’ in Chapter 3). Furthermore, Albania can give a good example to Europe as a country with one of the most moderate Muslim populations in the world and a country of inter-religious understanding and tolerance, within a secular state. This is especially important today when Europe is trying to encouage moderate expressions of Islam within its boundaries to confront the threat of Islamic terrorism. However, geographical, historic, cultural and religious factors are not enough for a country to be ‘eligible’ to be part of this respectable club called the EU. As the new Pope, Benedict XVI, has remarked ‘European integration cannot only be geographic or economic, but must above all be based on the fundamental values of the dignity of the human being…In the process of the European Union’s expansion it is of capital importance to remember that it will lack substance if it is reduced to merely geographic and economic dimensions…Rather, the union must consist above all of an agreement about values which find expression in its law and in its life…This rightly demands of each state a proper ordering of society that creatively reclaims the soul of Europe, affirming the transcendent dignity of the human person and the values of reason, freedom, democracy and the constitutional state.’ (Zenit News Agency, 2005). Albanian history can reach back to the period before the Ottoman conquest and Islamization, to when it shared this common Greco-Roman and Christian culture with Western Europe and which gave birth to the values to which Pope Benedict XVI is referring. It is significant that the first significant literary work written in the Albanian language was written by a Catholic bishop, the namesake of one of the authors, Pjetër Bogdani (1630-1689)20. Despite its long detachment from Western Europe, Albanians now wish to recover what they regard as this ‘lost’ European identity, and most importantly to rejoin Europe and to be part of it, not just geographically, but as part of the political and economic union. The slogan leading the demonstrations of 1990 for overthrowing the communist regime was ‘We want Albania with the rest of Europe’. ‘Return to Europe’ was synonymous with the rejection of communism and ‘Europe’ signified ‘democracy’. Now Albanians have made their choice. Their wish for a ‘European destination’ showed the desire of the people to open up and reintegrate with the ‘big family of Europe’, after half a century of isolation. As a journalist once said ‘Albania has been Europe’s unreachable child. It was the last, after five centuries, to push away Ottoman rule. It was the last to grow out of Stalinism. For much of its modern history, xenophobic, it has sulked’. It did not join the 20th century until 1990. Now, the ‘Land of the Eagles’, about which everyone knew so little has re-appeared on the European political map.

3 THE TRANSITION PERIOD: POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION OF ALBANIA HOW FAR IS ALBANIA FROM MEETING THE COPENHAGEN CRITERIA? ‘Albania’s rapid transition from Europe’s most isolated dictatorship to its wildest market economy has been as bumpy as the country’s pot-holed roads’. Leyla Boulton (2005)

3.1. Democratic transformation in Albania As we noted in the first chapter of this book, liberal democracy is the form of governance typically associated with the modern nation-state, even if it is possible to have a nation-state, such as Fascist Italy or Francoist Spain, which is not democratic and may even be authoritarian. This was the case with Albania, which achieved independent statehood in 1912, but has only recently achieved democratic status. ‘Democratization’ is the whole process of regime change from authoritarian or totalitarian rule to the setting up of a new liberal democracy (Pridham, 2000:16). In the long run, democratization understood as regime change involves a fundamental transformation of political, economic and social structures. It progresses through a number of stages from the early transition stage to consolidation. Democratic consolidation is lengthier than democratic transition and can last several decades. It involves the inculcation of democratic values at elite and mass levels and the legitimization and full institutionalization of a new democracy. The democratization process ends with the completion of consolidation. At the same time, even in advanced democratic societies such as are found in Western Europe and North America, democratization is never wholly complete in the sense that the quality of democratic practice can always be improved and it demands a continual effort to maintain at a high level21. ‘Democracy’ is therefore an ideal towards which all countries have to continually strive and should never be taken for granted.

The Transition Period: Political and Socio-Economic Situation of Albania 37

The post-communist transformation of the CEE countries, which includes both destructive elements (elimination of the communist system) and creative ones (building a new capitalist society), has gone through three distinctive stages: The first phase is the ‘euphoria’ of the immediate transition period, which followed the ‘velvet revolutions’ or other changes of 1989-1990. In Albania, as in most other CEE countries (except for Romania), the collapse of communism was not accompanied by bloodshed. The huge mass protests and demonstrations led by the democratic forces brought down the communist leadership by peaceful means. Albanians, like the other peoples in Eastern Europe were nearly all very happy at the collapse of communism, enthusiastic about the regime change, and full of hopes for the near future of the country. At the same time, in the other part of the continent, Western Europe, there was a high tide of optimism about the removal of the world threat of communism and the likelihood of the political unification of Europe. The second phase, is the ‘disillusionment’ which results from a decline in living standards for a large part of the population and from high unemployment, which usually accompanied the transition. In some countries this led to the ‘second wave’ of revolutions that started after 1996. In Albania this happened in 1997, and resulted in civil unrest, chaos and violence. In other countries, a series of such revolutions overthrew the corrupt regimes established after ‘the velvet revolutions’ of the 1990s. More recently, three former Soviet republics went through this stage, following fraudulent elections and bringing into power progressive forces: the ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia in 2004, the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine and the (unexpected revolution) in Kyrgyzstan, both in 2005. The third stage is the ‘nostalgia syndrome’, which comes as a result of political, social and economic chaos. The high costs of transformation and the challenges of adapting to new unknown realities provoke a craving for the ‘good old days’. Those involved in political transformation tend to underestimate the costs involved and the difficulties of adaptation. In the euphoria of the moment, utopia seems possible especially since many of those at the forefront of change are young students for whom the world is a paradise to be conquered. Those who are older, however, tend to remember the past as a period of settled security and they therefore hanker after this in the new unsettling situation. The young, on the other hand, become impatient with the slow pace of change and with the difficulties they confront. The lesson from Albania is that it is not easy to build a democratic system from scratch as has been attempted in this country. Democracy here is young, not yet rooted and stabilized, and, therefore, fragile and unstable.

38


The country is following an evolutionary path from an isolated authoritarian political system to its current system of ‘partial’ democracy towards the consolidation of a fully-fledged system of liberal democracy. Describing this system, Biberaj (1998:355) argues that ‘Albania still remains a partially developed democracy or a “proto-democracy”, a system that meets certain procedural democratic criteria, but is only a partially developed substantive democracy. The difference between ‘procedural’ democracy and ‘substantive’ democracy is that the former follows democratic forms, e.g. multi-party electoral systems and an elected parliament, but may lack a democratic culture of obedience to the rule of law, political responsibility on the part of politicians and citizens, and accountability. A ‘substantive’ democracy must be ‘procedural’, but the latter may exist without the former. Some analysts, such as Lubonja (2004) argue that ‘more than a democracy, the current system in Albania has features of a regime…it can be compared only with the tough capitalism of the 19th century in the west, the polarized capitalism of Latin America or that of Africa’. By ‘regime’ the author means something that is not yet a fully-fledged democracy, although this is not the usual meaning of the word in political science, where it refers to a type of political system (e.g. monarchy, republic, dictatorship, etc.). According to Held (1999: 46), ‘the system of liberal democracy is the dominant political form of a modern nation-state, where the decisions affecting a community are taken by a group of representatives who have been chosen to govern within the framework of the rule of law’. Liberal democracy is distinguished by the presence of a cluster of rules and institutions, which are: the constitutional entrenchment of control over government policy in elected representatives; the establishment of mechanisms for the choice and peaceful removal of elected representatives in frequent, fair and free elections; the right to vote for all adults in such elections and the right to run for public office; an effective right for each citizen to freedom of expression, including to criticize the conduct of government and the socio-economic system in which it is embedded; accessible sources of information and an established right to form and join independent associations. Newell (2001:180) adds that, in addition to effective accountability of the executive to the legislature, ‘the decentralized forms of government to ensure government must be sufficiently close to the people that the influence of each citizen is maximized’. He is here referring to the principle of regional and local democracy, which may be thought of as complementing national democracy (Loughlin, 2004a). It is the Council of Europe which has most developed this idea, especially in its ‘European Charter of Local Self-government’ to which might be added in the near


future a ‘European Charter of Regional Self-government’. These Charters define the practical organization of democracy at the sub-national level. Thus, the principal elements of liberal democracy are: political and civic pluralism and freedom, executive accountability (both vertically to the electorate and horizontally to the legislature), the absence of reserved domains of power, sub-national government, and, above all, the rule of law. Albania (and the whole Balkans) adopted liberal democracy at a late stage of modern history. Like the other former communist nations of Eurasia, Albania thus found itself having to build a system of democratic governance from scratch. In the beginning of the 1990s, it started the socalled ‘dual transformation’, which according to Pridham (2000: 181), combines political democratization and economic transformation. Albania initiated significant institutional and legislative transformations aiming to establish a new political order. The initial phase of transition saw speedy and surprising progress, which won Albania a place among the most advanced former communist countries in terms of the rate and intensity of the reforms. Within a few years, democratic institutions were set up and a democratic legal framework was introduced. Albania was accepted as a member of international political and financial institutions such as the Council of Europe, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Its foreign policy was oriented towards integration into the EU and NorthAtlantic structures. Good results were also seen in the economy, as it started to move quickly from the ruins of a centrally-planned economy towards a market economy. Albania had the fastest pace of privatization in comparison with other economies in the region: over a three-year period, about 70 per cent of the economy was privatized, prices and trade were almost entirely liberalized and tight monetary and fiscal policies led to an admirable macro-economic stability. In 1995, inflation was 7 per cent against 231 per cent in 1991 and the budget deficit was 10 per cent of the GDP compared to 50 per cent for the same years (Ruli and Belortaja 2002:24). The economy had a boost in mid-1995 with the signing of an agreement with a consortium of 41 western banks to resolve the $500 million foreign debt Albania had inherited from the communist period. By 1996, the average monthly wage had risen to around $100. Price liberalization had achieved its goals: shortages were more or less eliminated, shops were well stocked with better product quality and more variety than ever before and private markets were thriving in many cities (Biberaj 1998:196). The newly emerging private sector proved to be highly dynamic, making the greatest contribution to overall economic growth. During 1993-96,

40


Albania experienced an annual growth rate of 9.5 per cent. During this period, progress was also made in establishing a legal and regulatory framework for a market economy. This positive and strong economic performance caused Albania to be seen by many mainstream commentators in the West as a model for post-communist economic development. The analysis made by foreign experts and institutions during this period considered Albania a special case of successful transition (Zeneli 2003). Sadly, the results of the progress achieved were destroyed in 1997 with the unrest caused by the collapse of pyramid schemes when many Albanians lost their savings. The picture then was of a complete freezing of state institutions, an absence of public order, social anarchy and a collective hysteria with acts of violence and destruction, followed by political disruption and economic decline. The country had to start from ‘ground zero’. Albania managed to recover, but the progress of reforms slowed down (for more about pyramid schemes, see Chapter 5). 3.2. Political situation Olsen (2002: 927) points out that the ‘criterion of access of candidate countries to the EU is liberal democracy, implying that the Union will admit countries that reliably adhere to some universal and impartial criteria in their domestic and international conduct’. The Copenhagen criteria require that the countries wishing to join the EU should first guarantee democracy through the stability of institutions and the rule of law. How does the current political situation in Albania measure up to these criteria? As remarked above, Albania has made good progress in installing procedural democracy. Political democratization at the level of substantive democracy, on the other hand, is progressing very slowly. The responsibility for this lies mainly with an unstable and immature political climate, which has continued to be characterized by political conflicts and crises. This can be seen through an examination of the functioning of the different institutions of liberal democracy. 3.2.1. Elections Substantive democracy can function successfully only if there is a strong multi-party system and those in power are held accountable through regular and competitive elections. These are the only legitimate means through


which power should change hands. Therefore, free and fair elections are considered the corner stone of a liberal democracy. As mentioned in the first chapter, Albania had a brief history of multiparty elections in the 1920s, from 1921 until to 1928 until Zog, then Prime Minister, pressured the parliament to dissolve itself and declare Albania a kingdom with himself as king. During the communist period, elections were a façade and people were forced to vote for the only existing party, the PLA. The first multi-party elections after the fall of communism were held on 31 January 1991. Albania was the last of the CEE countries to hold such elections. Eleven political parties and associations fielded candidates for the (then) 250 seats of the parliament. In addition to the Party of Labour of Albania (still a communist party), there were the Democratic Party (the first democratic party) and four other small parties (Republican Party, the Ecology Party, the Agrarian Party and Omonia, a party representing the Greek minority). The elections were considered peaceful and the turnout was very high at 98.92 per cent. The Party of Labour won over two-thirds of the vote and, although the Democratic Party lost, the result was, in a sense, a victory for the main opposition party, given that it had been only recently created, was without financial means, with poor infrastructure around the country and no access to state radio and television. These elections can therefore be considered a victory for democracy and marked an end to the one-party system. At the same time, they should be seen more as a step towards the establishment of democracy than fully democratic, given the control exercised by the ruling party over the electoral process and the handicaps under which the opposition had to operate. The second elections, which, in fact, were the first truly democratic elections in Albania, were held only a year later, in March 1992. Eleven political parties participated in them and the turnout was again high, at 90.35 per cent. This time the opposition Democratic Party won 62 per cent of the votes. Sadly, the 1992 elections may also be the last fully democratic elections, at least until 2005, as all elections since then have been highly contested, characterized by both technical and political problems, a large number of irregularities, electoral bribery and volatility. As Vickers (2003) points out ‘elections are one of the ever-present obstacles to normality in post-communist Albania’. In all these controversial elections, incumbents have used the advantages of being in office, while losers have contested the results. In other words, each side contests the legitimacy of the electoral process itself depending on the result, thus undermining that legitimacy. In a series of reports made by international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the

42


Organization for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which have monitored and observed the elections, Albania has been criticized for not conducting free and fair elections. According to Albanian analysts ‘A political culture is being developed in which manipulation of the elections has become the norm, and as such the unwritten law of the Albanian electoral system. Under these circumstances it can no longer be claimed that election fraud is a transition phenomenon, since now it has created a tradition of its own that is likely to continue, in one way or another, in the future’ (Kajsiu, Bumçi, Rakipi 2002:5). If election fraud has become part of the Albanian electoral process then the resulting fraudulent elections undermine the legitimacy of Albanian governments and of the democratic system itself. Pre-election periods have been characterized by a very tense political atmosphere and increased polarization and intolerance. A worrying phenomenon is the buying of voters, especially those living in poor and deprived areas. The election campaigns, which resemble battles, have been filled with inflammatory and empty rhetoric and ruthless personal attacks. Candidates’ posters, billboards and banners fill the streets. The climax of the election takes place during the last month before election day, with tours across the country by party leaders and their entourage, who try to get their messages across public speeches in front of massive gatherings and meetings with their supporters and militants. These populist gatherings, sometimes accompanied with open and free stage concerts featuring prominent singers, musicians and artists, have become very fashionable since the 1996 election campaigns. In the last parliamentary elections, a new positive development took place. This was an exit poll before the elections, the first-ever held in Albania. More serious is that on election day itself, there are often many problems, such as ballot-box stuffing, forged voter registrations, incidents at polling stations and police interference, as well as intimidation and harassment of voters, candidates and party supporters and activists. These were witnessed most notably in the elections of 1996 and 1997. Other incidents and problems, such as the refusal of complete disclosure of campaign expenditures, unexplained delays in the publication of final results, incitement of violence or hatred, were noticed right after the elections. Following each election, almost all the losing parties or coalitions refuse to recognize the results and proceed with boycotts of parliament or other local decision-making bodies. This was the case with the first elections of 1991 and subsequently in 1996, 1997, 2000 and 2001. In addition to boycotts, the losing parties waste much time and energy in contesting the elec-


toral results and complaining to international organizations, instead of focusing on becoming constructive opposition forces and carrying out internal reforms inside their own parties. Besides electoral shortcomings, another worrying feature of Albanian elections (with the exception of the first two) has been the low turnout. Even though this is a feature of elections in other European countries, including established democracies, it is more worrying in a country like Albania, where the democratic system is still struggling to establish itself. Another disturbing issue is the quality of the candidates and the process of candidate selection (explained further in Chapter 5). Those who run for office are not always the most honest, decent and successful people. They are not representative of positive values and integrity and do not necessarily enjoy the respect of their community. In most cases, they are not selected through a fair and open competition process. The party chairmen ignore (not that they do not understand) the fact that good candidates improve the image of the party as a whole in the eyes of the public at large and its credibility towards the electorate. The process of selection of candidates is controlled and monopolized by ‘party bosses’, mostly without taking into account the opinions of the grassroots party members, local party structures and the electorate. Most candidates are not resident in their electoral constituencies, which is one of the reasons for the later weak relationship of the MPs with their electorate (further analysed in Chapter 8, ‘Parliament’ section). A very disturbing phenomenon is that the selection of candidates is degenerating into a ‘dirty business’ between the candidates and party chairmen. Money seems to be the most significant factor and criterion in choosing the candidates. Those who can fund their own campaign are given priority, although they might not be the most eligible and suitable candidates. A recent trend, therefore, is the increasing number of individuals with suspicious economic and morally dubious pasts who come forward to run in elections, instead of people with integrity who can properly represent the electorate and work for it in a responsible manner. The victory in the elections of such candidates (especially the representatives of business oligarchs and mafia types) has two negative consequences: firstly, organized crime can become part of the parliamentary majority, and secondly it can be institutionalized within the state leadership. This will favour the conditions for Albania to produce and export much more crime. The European future of the country would become less attainable and the existence of such a problematic country would have negative implications for regional stability as well. In addition to the negative role played by the political parties, another obstacle is the attitude of the Albanian citizens themselves. In essence, an

44


essential element of democracy is the free participation of the citizens themselves, mainly through the ballot box. Are citizens ‘free’ in Albania? It is here that mere procedural democracy is dependent on a number of conditions of freedom in order to become also substantive democracy. Individual freedom depends on factors such as: the levels of poverty and economic security, public order and safety, the level of understanding of the voting process, involvement in criminal activities, etc. In circumstances where these conditions are not met, as is the case in many parts of Albania, there can be a corruption of the democratic process and the establishment of substantive democracy is delayed. The vote of a poor person can be easily bought, the vote of a criminal goes to the corrupt politician, an ignorant person can be easily misled by the propaganda machine, and so on. In this context, democracy in Albania ends up in a combination of manipulation of the masses by the elites in power and of blackmail of these elites by criminal organizations. As a result, mere elections are insufficient and can hardly resolve anything. What is also needed, above all, is the strengthening of the ‘rule of law’, which includes ensuring fair and free elections. The present electoral system in Albania is a combination of a majority voting in constituencies, or a SMDS one (Single Member District System), with a proportional system (proportional representation from national lists). The first provides 100 seats and the second 40 seats in the parliament, so the electoral system is primarily a majority one. One argument in favour of the majoritarian system (which is that used in the United Kingdom and Anglo-Saxon countries generally, but without a proportional element) is that it produces majority governments and therefore reduces the need for coalition governments which are often unstable. In Albania, the majoritarian element has tended to perpetuate the alternation in power of the two major political parties (the Socialist Party and the Democratic Party). The disadvantage is that it does not create room for political alternatives to gain meaningful representation. Furthermore, the Albanian political system resembles the old Italian system (before the reforms of the 1990s) in that it is a kind of partitocrazia (rule by parties) where people tend to vote for the parties and not for the individuals, and parties dominate all aspects of the system. This has meant that candidates from the smaller parties, even if they are individuals of excellent quality and values, do not get elected. Party affiliation of the candidates rather than their qualifications still remains the most important factor. Therefore, as part of electoral reform, the proportional element of the electoral system could be strengthened in the future, making it more representative and, in this way, promoting compromise and conciliation, which is so necessary for the fragile democracy in Albania.


In order to ensure free and fair elections, the government party and the opposition established a bi-partisan committee and, with the assistance of the OSCE in Tirana, worked for two years to prepare and adopt a new Electoral Code on a consensual basis and to revise the electoral law. Although this was a step in the right direction, many issues, such as redrawing of the constituency boundaries and updating the electoral register and the voter lists, still remain unsolved. The high levels of internal mobility and migration to the cities and towns mean that many of these lists need to be updated22. In the last local elections in 2004, Albania did not meet OSCE and international standards for free elections. Several other international bodies and governments warned Albania to clean up its act in time for the 2005 parliamentary elections. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe approved a resolution in April 2004, which warned Albania of the danger of losing its membership in the CoE if the forthcoming elections were not fair and free23. High-ranking officials of the US State Department have also declared that these elections would be the last test for Albania and a decisive condition for its membership of NATO. The US President George Bush reminded Tirana in April 2005 that the July general elections were an important moment and that they should be held according to democratic standards (Kosovo Report 2005). The representatives of the EU Commission in Tirana and Brussels have demanded a balanced Central Electoral Commission and accurate voters’ lists and considered the elections as a trial and precondition for Albania signing the SAA and for the integration of the country into the EU. ‘If the coming legislative elections will not be held in accordance with international and European norms, the EU will freeze the negotiations over the accord of stabilization and association with Albania’ said Lutz Salzmann, head of the EU office in Tirana, in a interview 24. Because of these warnings from the EU and the international community, the Albanian government and the political forces from both majority and opposition camps tried to show more responsibility and took the 2005 parliamentary elections more seriously than in previous years. There was a good precedent in the last parliamentary elections in Kosovo, held in 2004. In Kosovo, which is not yet a proper state, the elections (the third free and fair elections overall and the first held under local control), were conducted in a peaceful and transparent manner and demonstrated the maturity and determination of the Kosovar people and leadership to build a democratic society. Despite these difficulties, the July 2005 Albanian parliamentary elections were, as the European Commission noted (2005:10), conducted in a funda-

46


mentally sound manner, in line with the newly revised Electoral Code. They adhered to fundamental democratic principles, which led to a smooth transfer of power. However, although voting was generally calm and conducted in a peaceful atmosphere, the elections were not without problems: one election official was shot dead in the capital Tirana, polling stations in parts of the country remained open for an additional three hours, and monitors25 reported a series of irregularities, such as violations of voting procedures, voting centres not opening in time and violence and intimidation. Moreover, the lengthy count following the elections became a real nonsense. The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, in its final report, indicated a number of positive developments of the election process, but stressed that a number of issues would still have to be addressed. Twenty-two political parties organized into different coalitions took part. The elections resulted in the victory of a coalition led by the Democratic Party, which won a total of 80 seats, coming to power after eight years in opposition. The Socialist Party-led coalition was defeated, gaining only 60 seats. Although the 2005 elections themselves were overall free and fair, the weakness of the current electoral system, that is, the lack of representativeness noted above, was evident in the results. The final report of the OSCE/ODIHR mission notes this and states that ‘the provisions of the election code detailing the election system do not guarantee the accomplishment of the constitutional objective to achieve proportionality “to the closest possible extent” between the votes received by party lists and the overall composition of the Parliament. This system allowed many contestants to adopt electoral strategies, which challenged the limits of the law and blurred distinctions between political parties. After the experience of the 2001 legislative elections, the 2005 election process confirms that the current election system will remain prone to abuse until it is reformed. The Albanian political actors need to initiate a constructive debate to improve the electoral system, in order to ensure the just representation of the Albanian citizens in the parliament’. Small parties won (mainly through the proportional lists) a much higher representation in the new parliament, compared to their membership and electorate (this is further analysed below in Chapter 8). Fair and unproblematic elections seem to be still an objective difficult to achieve for Albania. As Yzeiri argues (2005), ‘[there] does not seem to have been created yet in Albania the embryo that feeds a normal democracy, which is the peaceful alternation of power through the vote…this embryo is unlikely to be developed as long as a system which is a combination of communist remnants with a Mafiosi capitalism continues to exist in Albania’.


3.2.2. Public administration The public administration inherited from the communist period lacked a managerial class, qualified decision-makers and competent civil servants, who would be able to manage the challenges of the transition period. Even 15 years after the fall of communism, the Albanian bureaucracy still preserves its Byzantine character and has never developed into a Weberiantype ‘rational’ administration, nor does it resemble ‘a new public management’ type of public administration. Long-standing issues of corruption, political interference, chronic lack of adequate human resources, high turnover and insufficient implementation of the legal framework of administration continue to hamper the consolidation of a professional and independent civil service. The politicization of the public administration institutions has been one of the major problems throughout the transition period. One of the worst developments has been that every political party that comes to power replaces previous employees (not only political directors, but also civil servants, technical experts, and even lower level administrators) with its own loyal members or supporters. It could be argued that it is normal practice, even in established democratic countries, for an incoming government to replace the top executives of central administration, but in Albania these ‘stormy’ cyclical cleansing campaigns in the institutions of public administration are politically motivated and affect all the ranks of the civil service. These purges fuel social tensions among people and create panics of job insecurity, which become worse in the context where state employment is for many people the only source of income. Because of these ‘Jacobin’ methods, public administration employees, especially before the elections, are more concerned about how to preserve their jobs, rather than to perform their tasks in a competent and detached manner. More importantly, this phenomenon has damaged the institutional memory, thus weakening the stability and continuity of the institutions, and undermining the legitimacy and the efficiency of the institutions of public administration. The government which came to power in September 2005, despite its pre-electoral promises, soon after taking office, and under the slogan of ‘the small state’ and ‘restructuring’ of administration, started ‘cleansing campaigns’ in state institutions. The entire administration has been under change: junior staff are sacked because ‘there are too many civil servants for the modern and cost-effective administration’ the new government has in mind, and the senior staff are asked to resign only to be replaced with friends and allies. Lots of dismissals (often even without giving any reasons)

48


and replacements based on a purely political basis have been carried out, even at the expense of highly qualified professional and educated people26. The bureaucracy is large, inefficient and lacking a culture of efficient administration. Equipment and infrastructures have improved over the years, but are still insufficient to carry out the tasks required. The main problem, however, is the quality of human resources. Personnel are not competent and properly trained and are subject to a high turnover. The lack of capable administrators at all levels of public administration is a serious drawback. ‘Political bureaucrats’ prevail over the ‘rational’ administrators. This is confirmed by international organizations: ‘Even after ten years of supposedly moving towards the democratic process, most appointments in high administration are made on the basis of politics rather than professional qualifications…Many senior officials in central institutions have little appropriate experience or bureaucratic sophistication’ (ICG 2003:3). The Civil Service Law has been an important achievement, but it still remains to be effectively implemented, mainly with regard to fair and professional selection procedures, transparent and competitive examinations and interviews, which have rarely been respected and carried out. The real criteria for hiring are often nepotism, clientelism, bribery and political militantism, rather than meritocracy or career development. These criteria play the determining role not just in hiring, but also in the promotion of civil servants, especially to key posts. Even though some modest efforts have been made from the Department of Public Administration to make the recruitment process for civil servants more meritocratic and transparent and to reduce political interference, ‘merit and competence’ remain ‘alien’ concepts, and political criteria still prevail over technocratic. Civil servants are considered by some observers as a ‘predatory elite’ thriving on capture of the state, instead of governing in the public interest. Again, this has been confirmed by international observers: ‘The Albanian civil service remains hindered by a pervasive lack of understanding of the real separation between the political and administrative levels. Political appointments, down to Director level in most central ministries, are still a norm’ (European Commission 2005:12). The fair selection procedure is a problematic issue not only in central public administration, but also at other levels of administration. Subjective and political nominations even here are far too frequent. The turnover in some ‘profitable’ institutions, such as customs and fiscal services, is very high. Therefore, the improvement and implementation of clear guidelines for the recruitment, transfer and dismissal of all civil servants, as well as for their long term-appointments, is defined as one of the short-term priorities in the European Partnership with Albania.


Career prospects in the civil service remain poor. Very few people manage to achieve top positions as a result of climbing the career ladder, many of those at the top are there because of political or nepotistic connections. This leads to de-motivation on the part of many honest, hardworking, well-educated and qualified civil servants. Salaries and other forms of benefits and rewards of civil servants are relatively low. The situation gets worse when it comes to comparing their salaries with those in the top positions, such as ministers and deputy-ministers, general secretaries and directors. Besides the big difference in salaries, these are favoured with other benefits and privileges, such as cars, chauffeurs, secretaries and even the right to obtain (with better conditions compared to ordinary citizens) mortgages from the bank for buying houses (not to forget that housing is one of the most problematic issues in Albania). They can also import a personal car without the usual customs clearance! All this emphasizes the elitist and corrupt character of Albanian public administration and makes the ordinary civil servants feel more demotivated and de-personalized (analysed below in Chapter 8). An increasing number of civil servants have been trained by the Training Institute of Public Administration (TIPA). However, as the European Commission notes ‘training for civil servants nonetheless remains predominantly supply-driven’ (2005:12). A positive development has been the recent joint initiative of this institution with the Department of Public Administration and Ministry of European Integration to provide training relating to EU issues. Therefore, as noted in the last report of the European Commission (2005:11), ‘considerable efforts remain necessary to restrict political appointments to the appropriate levels, improve salaries and career structures, and introduce performance management to raise the effectiveness of the public administration’. In summary, Albanian public administration is, in most cases, not yet ready to carry out its role of formulating and implementing government policies and moreover is not yet in a position to ensure adequate implementation of instruments of the SAA. 3.2.3. The rule of law The rule of law is a basic element of liberal democracy and therefore a fundamental value of the EU, essential for democratic stability and a necessary pre-condition to improving the socio-economic context. In Albania, the

50


European Commission notes (2003:6), ‘respect for and implementation of the rule of law remains deficient, which is notably due to weak law enforcement institutions, limited administrative capacity and widespread corruption and organized crime’. The index of the rule of law in Albania is 0.17, against 0.60 in Mongolia and 0.34 in Burkina Faso27. The attitude of many Albanians is that the law and its enforcement are something negotiable, rather than obligatory. The ‘rule of law’ is perceived as an ‘alien’ force, which limits ‘individual freeedom’. A culture of rights and duties has not yet developed. Public order and criminality remain unresolved problems (even though not as problematic as during the period of social chaos of 1991-92, or in the time of civil unrest of 1997, during which was witnessed the almost total breakdown of state authority). Self imposed justice, ‘vendetta’, and blood feuds (in the north of Albania) prevail over institutional justice. Many of the criminal groups are eliminated in internal fights, rather than as a result of the rule of law. Citizens do not feel safe, secure and protected from either ordinary or organized crime. As Mueller (2003) describes Albania: ‘this pint-sized, sunny slice of the Adriatic coast has been ground down for years by blood vendettas, armed robberies, assaults, mobster assassinations, bombings, car-jacking and street crime’. These phenomena which started only after the collapse of communism were new in a society which had been notably crime-free28. The escalation of crimes was raised especially after the abolition of the death penalty in 1998, in the context of ratification of the ‘European Convention on Human Rights’. Many Albanians think that this was not a right decision in a country where the crime rate is high, where both ordinary and organized crime have reached worrying levels, and where the criminals can do whatever they wish with impunity. As a lot of people say, Albanian Parliament has abolished the death penalty for the criminals, but has sealed it for hundreds and thousands of innocent people. Some argue that, if the death penalty were back in force, it would help in re-establishing state authority and strengthening rule of law. A re-emerging problematic phenomenon is the old Albanian custom of ‘hakmarrja’ or the blood feud, a custom of revenge killing found in northern Albania, which was quiescent during the period of communism, but after its collapse has emerged again. Its origin goes back to the 15th century, during the Ottoman period, when the population in the northern highlands did not accept the Ottoman state administration and control, and established its own system of self-administration. This had laws and customs, which contain the organizing moral, social and religious principles of northern Albanian society known as the Kanun of Lek Dukagjini29. Over the cen-


turies, kanun has run through generations of families, resulting in the deaths of countless (mainly young) people. During the last decade, in the context of the absence of the rule of law, this primitive constitution has returned to destroy many people’s lives (mainly because of disputes about land). ‘If Albania ever wants to realize its dream of European integration, the rule of law must prevail as more than just a concept, and no one, absolutely no one, can stand above the law …the rule of law must be enforced from the lawless mountains of Northern Albania, to the gangsters dominating the port of Vlora, where pimps behave as overlords, but most importantly in Tirana, where senior politicians and government officials masquerading as leaders have violated the public trust with their corrupt practices’ (Kokalari 2002). Unfortunately, the twisting and breaking of the rule of law in Albania often starts with the politicians and statesmen themselves. The politicians think and act as if they are above the law. Newell (2001:182) argues ‘if politicians and parties tolerate illegality, then individual citizens will begin to find that their own interests are in fact best served by acting illegally themselves’. Therefore, a culture should be developed that all are equal before the law. The rule of law needs a long time of maturation until it becomes a permanent feature of the civic and political landscape of the country. In Albania, this is not that promising, and, from the point of view of EU accession, worryingly, given that the state of the rule of law is one of the major criteria for evaluating the progress of Albania’s journey towards the EU. The rule of law includes: • The functioning of the judicial system; • The fight against organized crime and corruption (this is analysed in Chapter 6). 3.2.4. Judicial system Albania’s judicial system and structures30 have undergone deep transformations and reforms over the last 15 years, in order to be adapted to that of a liberal-democratic system. The country has made progress towards improving the organization and functioning of its judicial system. However, ‘despite some positive developments the overall effective functioning of the judicial system remains a matter of concern’ (European Commission 2004:5). The Council of Europe, in its 2004 resolution, makes a similar judgement: ‘The judiciary system, which should play the most critical role in the fight against corruption and organized crime, is weak and ineffective. Its personnel are poorly paid and trained and seem to be at least partially

52


corrupt. This affects also the enforcement of the new laws, in particular with regard to serious crimes.’ (Council of Europe: 2004). The limited prosecution of serious crimes is a matter of concern and there is weak cooperation between prosecutors and police. Again, the words of the Council of Europe are pertinent: ‘The inability of the Albanian police, prosecutors and judges to successfully find, arrest, prosecute and convict serious offenders, and in particular members of organized crime syndicates, fundamentally undermines democracy and the rule of law in the country. Impunity and freedom of operation for organized crime, which benefits from weak governance and the judiciary’s failure to operate efficiently, is a threat not only to public order but to the economic prospects and the political stability of the country’ (Council of Europe: 2004). Corruption encompasses almost all actors of the judicial system. ‘The impoverished Balkan country became a key smuggling route for drugs, people and guns into Western Europe after the fall of communism and its weak and corrupt judiciary is often accused of letting criminals go free’ (Reuters: 2003). Improper professional behaviour within the judicial system continues to constitute a serious problem. As a consequence, there is a fundamental lack of trust by the Albanian population in the delivery of justice and in the judicial institutions. The Albanian State Police does not properly fulfil its functions to contribute to the general development of, and respect for, the rule of law. It is weak, badly trained, and ill-equipped to carry out its duties, notably in regard to the fight against ordinary and organized crime. The police are underpaid and this is often the reason for their involvement in smuggling, bribe-taking, or, even worse, cooperation with organized crime. Political interference is frequent and corruption is widespread at all levels of the police hierarchy. After the launch in early 2004 of the initiative ‘Order within Order’, however, some progress has been made in the fight against corruption within the police force. The challenges are to increase the capacity and improve the functioning of the judiciary, to increase the independence of the judicial system from politics and organized crime, and to ensure the proper prosecution of serious crimes. Cooperation between all law enforcement bodies continues to require substantial improvement (on the assistance of the EU in the Albanian judicial area, (see Chapter 10).


3.2.5. Human and Minority Rights. The Cham issue By ‘human rights’ is understood civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Human rights and fundamental freedoms are guaranteed by Albanian law and Albania has ratified a number of UN and European conventions including the European Convention on Human Rights (EHCR) in 1996. Despite adhering to these conventions, however, trafficking in human beings, serious allegations of mistreatment by the police and interference by political and financial lobbies in the media are still far too frequent for a country aspiring to become an EU Member State. Violence and discrimination against women and children are also serious problems. The 2004 Resolution of the Council of Europe made a number of recommendations with regard to the improvement of the human rights situation in Albania.31 Also included in human rights are intellectual, commercial and property rights. Although the issue of property rights is now high on Albania’s political agenda, the current situation remains dominated by a lack of clarity over property ownership, which is a serious impediment to the creation of a functioning property market, discourages investment, holds back the development of agriculture and tourism and fuels social tension. Generally, minorities’ rights in Albania are respected and there are no serious inter-ethnic problems. There is no credible evidence that the Greek minority, which constitute the biggest ethnic minority (estimated at about 70000), has been repressed or treated badly by the Albanian governments; on the contrary, Albanians have always been in a good relationship with ethnic Greeks in the south and the latter have been promoted to high official and political posts during both communism and democracy. The Greek minority has its own political party, ‘Union for Human Rights’, with elected members of parliament, which has been in the government coalition since 1997 (with the Socialists and now with the Democrats in the current 2005 government), as well as its cultural association ‘Omonia’. Albania has made considerable efforts to protect minorities, including in the field of education and the provision of schools (European Commission 2005:21). However, section iii of the 2004 Council of Europe resolution suggests that there still may be some problems and recommends that Albania sign and ratify without further delay the ‘European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages’. One example of such problems was the manifestation of nationalist tensions of ethnic Greeks in the south of the country (Himara) during the last local elections. While Albania has respected and protected the rights of its Greek minority, the Albanian minority in Greece32 has faced serious problems of

54


discrimination and other violations of minority rights. One of the outstanding national problems affecting Albania’s relations with Greece is the Cham issue. The Cham (Çam) minority is one of the two long-established groups of Albanian descent (the other is the Arvanites) living in Greece. They are an Albanian-speaking minority, with both Christians and Muslims, that inhabits the Thesprotia region in north-western Greece and the south-western tip of Albania. Most of their region, Chameria (Çamëria), following the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors in London in 1913, was detached from Albania and incorporated into Greece (only the northern part with seven villages was left within the borders of the motherland)33. Since then, Greek governments have pursued discriminatory politics towards Chams. They issued laws according to which Chams were prohibited to buy, sell or transfer their real properties. Although the Treaty of Lausanne and related instruments excluded the Chams from the compulsory exchange of population, the Greek government succeeded in identifying as Turks a significant number of the Cham Muslim population and during 1921-26 deported them to Turkey. Subsequently it confiscated lands belonging to Chams and gave them to Greeks who had been deported from Asia Minor during Ataturk’s revolution. A similar process occurred in 1944 - 45 when about 30000 Muslim Chams, including many of the elderly, women and children, were forcibly expelled from Greece to Albania by Napoleon Zervas34 allegedly because of their collaboration with the Nazis. On these grounds, the Greek authorities approved a discriminatory law, sanctioning the expropriation of properties and lands of Chams. Subsequently the confiscated Cham properties were sold or given free to Greeks. This law still remains in force today. As Greece and Albania improved their relations after 1987, the Cham refugees in Albania have constantly and peacefully demanded their human rights, based upon European standards and the Greek Constitution. As an Albanian academic and lawyer, Agron Alibali (2004), points out, ‘They have asked for a speedy return to their homes in Greece and their rights to reclaim their properties back. They do not advocate violence or any change of borders and Albania does not have territorial ambitions against Greece’. The Greek government, however, has thus far ignored their demands. Perhaps, however, the most shameful aspect of this affair is the attitude of Albanian governments after 1990, who have not placed the Cham issue on the political agenda and no one has tried to resolve this injustice done to an entire Albanian community. Therefore, as the ICG recommends (2004), ‘it would be advisable for the Albanian and Greek governments to try and settle the long-standing issue of the Chams dis-


placed from Greece in 1945 before it gets hijacked and exploited by extreme nationalists, and the Chams, legitimate grievances get lost in the struggle to further other national causes’. 3.2.6. Media In democratic countries the media are sometimes considered to be ‘the fourth power’ of the state (with its three other branches: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary). Over the past few centuries35, newspapers have played an important role in shaping culture, influencing politics and government policies, as well as in business, and have affected the daily lives of millions. Today, television and radio are probably even more important. The media, both written and electronic, inform the public of important affairs, provide information on which many readers form opinions, affect people’s attitudes, their conduct and even their fundamental values. For good or bad, the media can be a mighty power to reckon with. In Albania, during the first decade of the transition, the media has played an important role and has been very influential in a positive way in the process of democratization. The emergence of an opposition press at the beginning of the 1990s was a historic development for a country with a total lack of freedom of expression and the press. The first opposition publication was the newspaper ‘Rilindja Demokratike’ (Democratic Reawakening), which appeared on 5 January 1991. The pluralist press was highly appreciated, especially at the beginning of the transition, as a forum for open free thought and debates. Despite these positive achievements, a professional independent media is not yet fully developed in Albania. In general, it lacks a proper sense of responsibility, which is manifested in scant respect for codes of ethics, human rights and other liberal-democratic values, which are still not embedded in the journalists’ work. The credibility of the media has been often harmed by irresponsible and biased reporting, partisan tones of editorial articles, the high degree of manipulation and disinformation, and the absence of a balanced presentation of views and facts36. They have showen a tendency to focus on personalities and political leaders rather than on issues and concerns of citizens. The media are also generally characterized by a low level of professionalism, especially in the first years of the transition, as most journalists had no proper education or qualifications (the School of Journalism was established only in recent years), and mainly coming from odd educational backgrounds (even from the Academy of Fine Arts!)

56


There are a big number of so-called independent media outlets, but because of financial difficulties, most of them are affiliated with or financed by different political parties, or powerful businesses and oligarchs (even socalled independent papers), which has harmed the development of a truly independent TV and press. Some of the owners of the most important newspapers or TV channels possess at the same time powerful businesses which may be legal (mainly in construction) or illegal. Another problem is that the party in power does not allow equitable access to the state TV and radio for all political forces, especially for those in opposition. From a legal point of view, the press in Albania is free, so that freedom of expression seems to be generally respected, but this freedom is often abused. There have been cases of harassment and intervention by the government in certain media outlets to influence reporting, posing a threat to their independence and objectivity. ‘Recently state authorities have taken revenge on newspapers or TV stations, which criticize the state politicians and especially the Prime Minister for their wrongdoings, by sending in financial inspectors, and interfering with media freedom’ (ICG 2003:3). There have been persistent complaints that government officials use financial and fiscal pressures through tax authorities and control over major advertisers to censor the publishers of Albanian newspapers and other media. As a result of this pressure, most of the print and electronic media have become openly pro-government in their reports, since media owners do not like to jeopardize the future of their publications and profits by attacking or criticizing the government. One of the last flagrant cases was the action directed at the daily paper ‘Koha Jone’ and its owner, Nikolle Lesi (MP) in spring 2005. In response to critics and publishing of original documents about corruption involving the then Prime Minister Fatos Nano and the illegal businesses of his wife, the latter took revenge on Lesi, firstly by using financial and fiscal pressures and sending financial officials to inspect the newspaper accounts, and then by asking the parliament for the removal of Lesi’s parliamentary immunity. The parliament voted against it, but this case showed again the government’s efforts to threaten and intimidate the free press. Such actions ignore the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and expression and constitute a direct affront to democracy. The Albanian media have still a long way to go to attain the standards of professionalism, independence and ethical codes of Western journalism. Therefore, foreign organizations such as ‘Human Rights Watch’ have urged the EU to include the issue of media freedom in its association talks with Albania. One of the priorities in the European Partnership is to


encourage investigative journalism in Albania and to take measures to support the independence and professionalism of journalists (European Commission 2004:7). 3.2.7. Approximation of domestic legislation to EU Laws A very important EU requirement is incorporating the acquis communautaire into national legislation and also ensuring its effective application, i.e. increasing implementation and enforcement capacities through appropriate administrative and judicial structures. The acquis, which is the body of laws and regulations developed from the European Treaties, is composed of 35 chapters (with around 80000 clauses!), each of which focuses on a specific sector or issue area (see Table 2). The negotiations with the EU focus on the terms under which applicant countries have to adopt, implement and enforce the acquis. Therefore a three-phase process of adopting, implementing and enforcing the acquis is a requirement for every country wishing to join. In respect of that, Albania has two challenges to face: firstly, to ensure the approximation of its legislation to EU laws, and secondly to apply them effectively. Albanian structures fall short of the level required for achieving the goal of legislative approximation to the acquis (Bianku 2003). Even though, in a lot of areas, Albania has developed a new and contemporary legal framework, the problem lies in the implementation and enforcement of laws. The photocopying of European legislation is not enough, the laws must be understood and put into effect. Therefore, there is a need to move on from the formal adoption of legislation to the development of the capacity to implement it. The Resolution of the Council of Europe (para. 15) makes reference to the problem of Albania’s legislative capacity37. Undoubtedly, if these measures are carried out, there will be a vast improvement in the country’s capacity to adopt the acquis communautaire. The establishment, in 1999, of the Directorate for Approximation of Albanian Legislation with the acquis communautaire, in the Ministry of State for Legislative and Institutional Reform (which in 2000 moved to the Ministry of Justice and then in 2001 to the Ministry of European Integration), was an important step forward in the process of approximation. Albania has been included in TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office), a programme of the European Commission, which aims to provide technical assistance in adaptation and implementation of the legislation. It points out the importance that the

58


European Commission is giving to the implementation of the SAA through the adoption of community norms into internal law. The Albanian Government has completed the ‘National Programme for the Approximation of Legislation with the Community Legislations and Implementation of the SAA’, an initiative supported by EU technical assistance38.


Table 1: The 35 negotiation chapters of acquis communautaire

1. Free movement of goods 2. Freedom of movement of workers 3. Freedom to provide services 4. Free movement of capital 5. Public procurement 6. Company law 7. Intellectual property 8. Competition policy 9. Financial services 10. Information society and media 11. Agriculture and rural development 12. Food safety 13. Fisheries 14. Transport 15. Energy 16. Taxation 17. Economic and monetary union 18. Statistics 19. Social policy and employment 20. Enterprise and industrial policy 21. Trans-European networks 22. Regional policy and structural funds 23. Judiciary and fundamental rights 24. Justice, freedom and security 25. Science and research 26. Education and culture 27. Environment 28. Consumer and health protection 29. Customs union 30. External relations 31. Foreign, security, defence policy 32. Financial control 33. Financial and budgetary provisions 34. Institutions 35. Other issues

60


3.3. Economic situation 3.3.1. Post-communist economic transformations Political analysts have argued that the prospects for effective democracy depend on social development and economic well-being. The second Copenhagen criterion is related to the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union. Albania embarked on the path of economic reforms in the wake of the catastrophic collapse of the economy, which occurred in 1991. To build a market economy in such conditions and in the ruins of a totalitarian state economy was a daunting challenge for the country and its inexperienced leadership. The ambitious goal ahead was to develop a functioning market system, as well as the auxiliary institutions and policies necessary to support it. Economic transformation from a centrally planned to a market economy is a huge and multi-dimensional task, which requires the incorporation of the principles of market liberalism: free and open markets, liberalization, privatization, deregulation, free competition, labour market flexibility and minimal state intervention. Geiger (1998:196) argues that ‘price and macro-economic stabilization are by themselves insufficient to achieve the transition to a market economy…to transform the system governments will have to attach more importance to privatization and trade liberalization’. Therefore, even when left-wing governments have been in power in Albania, they have been obliged to pursue economic policies which are in essence Thatcherite, neo-liberal policies of market liberalism. These, along with a limited intervention of the state in the economy and limited policy autonomy, are in line with economic policy recommendations from international financial organizations such as the IMF and WB. The conditionality of both EU and IMF loans holds Albania to the liberal market economy model. Thus, the policy choice for Albania is more a Western model of capitalist economy rather than a ‘mixed mode’, such as market socialism. This is challenging and difficult, however, in a country with a strong tradition of state centralism and interventionism. Official reports confirm that Albania has made important progress in economic stabilization and in its macro-economic system (in the context of the IMF programme), inflation and budget deficit figures have reached levels comparable with the EU. Macro-economic stability, a prerequisite for sustainable economic growth, however, is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a successful market economy. Moreover, the basis of growth


is not assured, the grey economy still represents a high percentage of GDP, the budget depends greatly on external financing, the private sector is weak and foreign direct investment is pretty low. Economic development is very uneven, and is concentrated mainly in Tirana. The market institutions have not yet been sufficiently established and are non-functional and corrupt. The weak functioning of market mechanisms has led to the prevalence of an ultra-free market economy (similar to anarchy), known as anarcho-capitalism, which is far from being a functional market economy. A significant proportion of the Albanian economy is the informal economy. Its size is large, about 40-50 per cent, whose main outputs are criminal activity (human trafficking, drugs and smuggling) and massive tax evasion (most of the businesses do not declare their real profit because of taxation) (Ruli and Belortaja 2002:31). This large cash economy has led to difficulties for the state in executing basic tasks and obligations, including fulfilment of the obligations and implementation of the future SAA. Activating market mechanisms and institutions and the reduction of the informal sector are the current economic challenges. ‘The new strategies should be developed to transform the business from trade into production, and to shift the priority from macro-economic indicators to those of the real economy’, argues Feti Zeneli (2003). One of the features of the economy which has developed during these transition years in Albania is ‘cronyism’, which implies the possession and control of the national wealth and the economic activity by a privileged minority mainly through their political power (the new oligarchs of Albanian ‘democracy’ try to justify this as ‘a normal product of the business culture’), while the majority of the population has a tiny proportion or even none of this wealth and is excluded from the right to economic activity. The economy is highly monopolized and the majority of the monopoles are linked with the politics, and thus ‘crony capitalism’ is far from a true market economy. In some respects, this is a legacy of the domination of the old economy by the communist party and its supporters. 3.3.2. Economic indicators and the situation in specific sectors

Growth rate - GDP The growth rate of the economy has been high since 1990. In 2004, it was estimated at 6 per cent (European Commission 2005:25). The major economic sectors contributing to the increase of GDP are construction, trans-

62


portation, the service sectors, agriculture and trade. Important contributions, however, come firstly from remittances, which have been EUR 650700 million per year or 14 per cent of GDP in 2005. The problem is that remittances are not ‘injected’ into the Albanian economy, but mainly into the ‘stomachs’ of Albanians, as a means of easing their poverty. Remittances are likely to decrease in the future for several reasons, such as the integration of expatriates, re-union with their families, and investments in the host countries. The second source of growth is from money laundering. The International Crisis Group (ICG 2003:5) claims that, ‘50 per cent of GDP is generated from illegal activities, such as trafficking and smuggling’. Therefore the question is not how fast the economy is growing, but in what direction and on what basis. GDP per capita has increased slightly to the level of EUR 1600 a year, but remains one of the lowest in Europe (European Commission 2004:13).

Fiscal policy Responsible fiscal policy is a main pillar of contemporary EU economic policies. According to the IMF, Albania has relatively average tax rates: top income is 25 per cent, corporate tax rate is 23 per cent and VAT is 20 per cent. The new government has promised a reduction of small business taxes by 50 per cent, which was expected to come into force by the end of 2005, which is a very positive development, as it will help to boost private sector activity39. The administrative capacity of the tax administration has improved and the collection of revenues has increased over the years. The collection and control capacity, however, remains weak. Tax revenues represented 21 per cent of GDP in 2004, which is amongst the lowest in Europe (European Commission 2005:28). Albania collects less in tax revenue and social security contributions per capita compared to other countries in the region, even though its value added tax and contribution rates are among the highest. Tax evasion and tax avoidance are a matter of concern. In the household sector, it is estimated to be 52 per cent of GDP. Corruption (the hiding of tax revenues) amongst tax officials at tax offices is still problematic. Therefore the Commission stresses that ‘a strengthening of the tax administration, as well as the fight against fiscal evasion and fraud, remain at the core of the fiscal strategy’ (European Commission 2004:17).


Monetary policy Monetary policy has been in line with the requirements of the IMF. Inflation stood at 2.9 per cent in 2004 (European Commission 2005:25). The relatively low and stable level of inflation is a reflection of continued lek (Albanian currency) appreciation against the euro and the dollar. The exchange rate has remained fairly stable. The Albanian budget, however, depends largely on foreign financing (18 per cent in 2003), which is expected to increase in the coming years. Government expenditures have been very high. In 2004, the budget deficit was limited to 5 per cent of GDP (European Commission 2005:26), thanks, to a certain extent, to a slight rise in tourism and increased exports of textiles, footwear and vegetables. Foreign debt is projected to decrease to 19.9 per cent of GDP (on account of debt forgiveness) and total public debt to about 61 per cent of GDP (European Commission, 2004:14). The Commission recommends that expenditure controls have to be strengthened and public spending should give priority to investments. Albania is having difficulties in establishing a modern financial system. The economy remains dependent on external financial factors, such as foreign assistance and aid remittances from emigrants (which will go towards its decrease in the future), and foreign investments. Albania’s banking sector is rudimentary and remains on the periphery of an economy which has a large unregistered sector. The Albanian economy remains largely cash-driven and the majority of transfers, transactions and payments are still carried out outside the banking system (basic services such as ATMs and credit cards are just beginning). The level of bank lending generally, as well as credit level in the private sector, are still relatively low. Bank credit to the private sector is still the lowest in the Balkans region, and last year it was only 8.5 per cent of GDP. Small businesses rely on loans arranged under international donor programmes. According to the US Department of State ‘banks do not yet play a central role in the Albanian economy, as most business cannot rely on banks for financing’ (Heritage Foundation 2003). The Albanian banking sector currently consists of 16 privately-owned banks (all foreign-owned). Privatization recently of the largest bank of the country, the ‘Albanian Savings Bank’, by Austria’s Raiffeisen group, as well as the steps to privatise the main Albanian insurance company, INSIG, represent progress towards the development of the financial sector.

64


Customs The customs service remains a sensitive sector given the country’s high level of imports and border trade, as well as the considerably high rates of smuggling. However, it has not played the role it should in fighting organized crime, drugs and smuggling. Cooperation between the customs service and the police has improved, resulting in a number of large-scale seizures of drugs, as well as smuggled goods such as cigarettes, narcotics etc, but there is a lot more to do in this direction. Corruption of custom officials remains a big problem, which affects also the amount of revenue collection. A disciplinary Commission, which has been operational since 1999, has tried to address this and some limited results have been achieved. Another problem in this sector remains the high turnover of personnel. When the new government came to power in September 2005, it made a large number of replacements and dismissals among customs staff (150 custom officers were dismissed accused of participating and supporting the electoral campaign of the SP). In terms of revenue collection, progress was made in 2004 by collecting 98 per cent of the planned revenue, which was an increase of 11 per cent compared to 2003 (European Commission 2005:40). The EU has assisted Albania in formulating customs legislation, developing its customs code, and in its implementation. The EU Customs Assistance Mission, called CAM–A (established just after the 1997 crisis), and a programme operated by USAID have been helping customs officials to modernize procedures, meet revenue and collection targets, improve training, and reduce opportunity for fraud and corruption within the customs administration. A computerized custom declaration and processing system, developed by the UN, has brought substantial progress.

Privatization Privatization is a very important element of reform, because, as the World Bank notes, ‘the essence of the transition itself has not to do with increasing production, [but] rather with completing the transfer of state production to private hands’ (WB 2000). Even though privatization involves political costs, especially in increasing the army of unemployed people, the transfer of assets to private hands may result in the longer run in significant benefits for the economy and therefore for the people. In Albania, agriculture, transportation, retail trade and housing were almost totally privatized by 1996. The process of privatizing state industrial and commercial enter-


prises was considered completed by the end of 1999, and later this process was extended to those economic sectors of particular importance to the Albanian economy: the so-called strategic sectors, such as the telecommunications, banking, energy sectors, and mining. The privatization of all SMEs has been also completed. At the Thessalonica Summit, Albania committed itself to the ‘European Charter for Small Enterprises’, which aims to improve the environment for small business, considered the backbone of the economy (European Commission 2003), but its implementation is going slowly. Unlike small and medium enterprises, the privatization of large state-owned enterprises has proved to be difficult and slow, because of a lack of domestic capital, corruption, a lack of foreign investment and the high costs of their restructuring. As the Commission points out: ‘large-scale privatization has suffered delays’ and is not completed, since strategic utilities in the energy (KESH), telecommunications (Albtelecom), sectors and large enterprises remain to be privatized (European Commission 2005:26). Political uncertainty and a low level of interest from strategic investors have contributed to these delays. However, in the last year, two high-profile privatization deals took place: the acquisition of the country’s biggest bank, ‘Albanian Savings Bank’, mentioned above; and a 20-year concession agreement for modernizing and managing ‘Tirana International Airport’ with an international consortium led by Hochtief of Germany. The privatization process is continuing in the oil and gas sectors. Privatization in Albania in many cases is characterized by a lack of fairness and openness. Since it started at the beginning of the 1990s, there have been persistent allegations that the governments have abused the privatization procedures assets, and of corrupt practices in the privatization of stateowned enterprises, including privatizing the assets at less than their real value, and that income generated from privatization has been mismanaged or even acquired by the political class. The first post-communist Socialist government was described by the DP as ‘the nomenklatura was enriching itself under capitalism’ (Biberaj 1998:191), i.e. they were profiting from the privatization, using their old network of party bosses and apparatchiks. Later the Socialists, when in opposition, accused the ruling Democrats of allowing politically influential DP members to benefit disproportionally from privatization at the expense of the general public. In the last eight years of Socialist government, before they were defeated in 2005, there were many accusations from the opposition, public opinion and international organizations, about speculation and profiting from the privatization of large enterprises (for example, of the telecom sector). Privatization, therefore,

66


has not proved to be entirely fair in terms of safeguarding the interests of the average citizen; the real beneficiary has been the political class.

Private Sector Boulton (2004) points out that, ‘Private sector business in Albania is just over a decade old, having sprung from the collapse of a draconian collectivism which prohibited Albanians from keeping even a privately-owned hen’. The new private sector and the number of small and medium-sized businesses have been continuously growing since the beginning of the transition, operating particularly in the services sector (hotels, catering, transport and travel), manufacturing and wholesaling. The private sector accounted for 75 per cent of GDP with up to 60 per cent of the labour force in 2004, making its contribution very significant. In 2005, the main sectors of activity of SMEs were trade (50 per cent), services, transport and industry. Within the private sector, however, informal activity is larger than the formal, and tax evasion is deeply ingrained. Business companies consistently underreport their real income and levels of employment. In regard to taxation barriers for small businesses, there has been some progress, particularly with the decision of the new government in 2005 to cut taxes by up to 50 per cent. The business environment is difficult. Persistent deficiencies in the Albanian judiciary and business-related administrative barriers, corruption and bribe-taking, the unresolved issue of land ownership, weak infrastructure, energy shortages, and especially the high fiscal burden, have created an atmosphere unsupportive of private business. The lengthy, complex and costly procedures in registration of new businesses, obtaining of licences and permits, not only open the way to bribery and corruption, but, most importantly, hinder the development of the private sector and the economy as a whole. All these barriers and deficiencies have prevented a serious boost in investment, especially Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and have affected the normal operation of a free market economy. Moreover, the relations of the state with business have been often characterized by conflicts and arbitrariness. The successful businesses have the back-up and the support of the politicians. Meksi (2003:20) has summarized the main aspects that help or hinder the development of the private sector in Albania: ‘the developing culture of private business, the lack of an efficient business structure, the irregular functioning of the free market mechanisms (competition, licensing etc), the lack of public-private partnerships in investments, the lack of a developed


and active banking system, regarding the business credit, the lack of longterm stability in the countries of the region’. International organizations stress that impediments to private sector development threaten the prospects for growth and poverty alleviation. Promotion and support of domestic business is very important for the Albanian economy.

Trade An open trade environment is an important pillar of EU economic policies. Albania’s trade regime has been modernized and liberalized. Since 2000, Albania is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and as such, has continued to fulfil its commitments and its trade liberalization. Albania has made progress in trade relations with the EU and, as a matter of fact, this area is the most institutionalized aspect of relations between Albania and the EU. It started with the 1992 Cooperation of Trade and Agreement, which, as mentioned above, was a trade-based agreement. In 1999, the country benefited from Autonomous Trade Preferences with the EU, by extending generalized tariff preferences to Albania (Albania benefits from unilateral trade concessions under the EU’s autonomous trade measures – ATMs). In 2000, an extension of duty-free access to the EU market was also established for products from Albania. The EU is Albania’s main commercial partner, representing about 74 per cent of Albania’s total imports and around 85 per cent of the total export, (European Commission 2005:5), making Albania one of the highest EU trade-dependent countries. The EU imports mainly manufactured products from Albania: textiles (28 per cent) and agricultural products (8 per cent). The EU member states are also important trading partners of Albania: Italy is the most important Albanian partner in terms of trade and FDI, and Greece is the second. Trade remains a cornerstone of the EU’s policy in South Eastern Europe (European Commission 2003). For this reason, the establishment of a network of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between the countries of the region under the auspices of the Stability Pacts on trade liberalization represents a major achievement. Albania has signed the agreements of an FTA with Croatia, Macedonia and Kosovo. Albania’s conditions for the movement of goods, services and capital, are relatively open and non-discriminatory. However, the lack of sufficient administrative capacity and widespread corruption continue to have an

68


adverse impact on the implementation of these freedoms and make trade hazardous. Regarding the movements of people,, Albanian migratory flows towards Europe and North America remain high. Albania has a large trade deficit (21.5 per cent of GDP in 2004), to which increased imports and limited exports have contributed. The Albanian market has been flooded by imported consumer goods, to which have contributed the low performance of industry and the poor quality of goods produced in the country.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) The Albanian legal framework already provides for protection of foreign companies and investments. However, Albania has a low level of FDI (including investment in tourism), which accounts for 4.5 per cent of GDP in 2004 (European Commission 2005:26), and the smallest percentage of FDI in the Balkans: only 0.2 per cent (Zeneli 2003). A recent report40 of the Financial Management Network (FMN) states that Albania has a potential for absorbing 3.3 billion dollars in FDI, while until the end of 2003, it absorbed just one billion (not including the privatization of strategic enterprises). In the report are listed all the countries of Eastern and South East Europe, 14 in total, and Albania lies behind only Bosnia Herzegovina and Moldova. The investments can be defined geographically and by sector. Areas with a higher rate of foreign investments are tourism, light industry (shoes, textiles), construction and agriculture. Most foreign investments are concentrated in the main cities, especially in Tirana. The majority of foreign companies and joint-ventures are Italian and Greek. There are very few multinational corporations (MNCs), such as Coca-Cola. The rate of FDI was high between 1993-1996, but the civic unrest of 1997 seriously harmed it, contributing to its decrease. Johnson (2001) considers ‘the private transfers, in the form of remittances from the 15 per cent of Albanians who live and earn abroad, as vital injections into the Albanian economy and dwarf FDI’. The low level of FDI currently can be explained by several factors which include: political instability, high taxes, corruption in the public administration and judiciary, complex administrative procedures, poor infrastructure electricity shortages and the issue of land ownership. Attracting FDI is an important prerequisite for the country’s economic development, but investors will only be attracted to countries which are politically stable, where property rights are clear, contracts are honest and the judicial system is fully functioning.


Industry and energy sector Economic transition has triggered a dramatic collapse of the previous socialist industries. Industrial decline or the so-called process of de-industrialization is serious in Albania. Ruined plants and factories and high unemployment symbolize the end of Albania as an industrialized country. Albanian industry is outdated, obsolete, and unable to compete with European industry. ‘Industrial production’s contribution to the GDP growth in 2004 was only 9.9 per cent’ (European Commission 2005:47). The energy situation remains a matter of serious concern. The ongoing energy crisis continues to provoke discontent amongst the population and to threaten Albania’s economic stability, growth and development. In Albania, 98 per cent of energy is generated from hydroelectric sources existing from the communist period and in the last years no new or alternative sources of energy generation have been built. The main reasons which have contributed to this crisis are: the growth of the economy, the domestic use of electricity for heating and other needs, electricity theft and losses, outdated energy infrastructure, high prices and the unsafe nature of alternative fuels like gas and petroleum. Energy crisis was one of the main challenges that the new government faced in its first months in power, because long hours of power cuts every day in the middle of winter ‘fuelled’ anger and frustration on the part of both households and companies. An important step taken recently was the ‘Energy Community Treaty’ which Albania signed, along with other countries of South East Europe, with the EU. In practical terms, this treaty means that the countries in SEE will be able to trade electricity and gas among one another and with any EU member states under the rules of the acquis communautaire41

Agriculture Over the last years, almost 98 per cent of agricultural land has been distributed to smallholders. This has transformed the land and agriculture from being for fifty years a collectivist and centralized structure to a fully private sector with families farming small and fragmented fields for their own consumption and very local markets. Half of the population still make their living from agriculture, which represents around 24 per cent of the country’s GDP (European Commission 2005:32), helping to reduce poverty and unemployment. Albanian agriculture, however, remains underdeveloped and inefficient, physical infrastructure is poor and not yet able to

70


respond adequately to the internal needs of the country. Land and entire state farms have been abandoned and are being left uncultivated, because most of the younger labour force is moving away from agriculture. Therefore, despite its rich agricultural land and optimal climate, Albania imports most of its food, including fresh fruits and vegetables, from neighbouring countries. Serious efforts are necessary if Albania wants to develop an efficient agricultural sector, to apply more modern production technologies and to improve productivity and production quality substantially, in order to promote exports and use the opportunities given by EU trade preferences. These efforts are necessary not only to satisfy the internal market, but also to compete in EU markets.

Transport and Telecommunications Albanian physical infrastructure was already poor and outdated, but it became worse after 1992 with a big influx of private cars and other vehicles. During communism, Albania was the only country in Europe where cars were banned (it was illegal to own a car), except for communist party and high government officials. There were only 600 cars in the country and the main personal transportation was bicycles and carts. Today there are thousands of cars, some 90 per cent of which are Mercedes Benz, which do not always arrive in the most legitimate way. The transport infrastructure is poor, most of the roads are narrow and in some parts extremely hazardous, pot-holed and without road signs or signposts. The incidence of road accidents is high, not just because of lack of road safety conditions, but mostly because of the carelessness and inexperience of drivers and poor roadside police inspection (here there is also very flagrant corruption). Traffic, especially in Tirana, is chaotic, because although the roads are more or less those of thirty years ago, the number of cars has hugely increased. Despite the completion of some roads, highways and rail projects, transport infrastructure overall is primitive (only 12.4 per cent of Albanian roads are paved). Railway transport, which used to be one of the main means of transportation during the communist period, has deteriorated in infrastructure, service and quality of trains, and as a result few people use it now. Transport infrastructure needs to be substantially improved, which is even more imperative if the country wants to attract foreign investors. One of the specific objectives of the SAP is the integration of the Western Balkan countries into pan-European networks, in order both to open mar-


kets and to develop interconnected infrastructures. The main priorities in this area are the completion of two corridors: the East-West or Corridor VIII (Durrës-Varna, via Tirana and Sophia) and North-South axis (connecting Greece with Montenegro). Another priority is the axis DurrësKukes-Morine, linking Kosovo with the Adriatic. The Memorandum of Understanding on the Pan-European Corridor VIII, the most important road link in the Balkans (linking Italy with Turkey via routes through Albania and other countries) is of critical importance not just for Albania but for the whole region. In the area of telecommunications, Albania has achieved, since January 2005, the full liberalization of this sector. There are three licensed mobile phone operators in the country. Despite the overall poverty of population and the high rate of mobile phone services (prices are even higher than the EU average), the number of mobile phones users has continued to increase. Currently 80 per cent of Albania’s territory, corresponding to 90 per cent of its total population, is covered by the service (European Commission 2005:32). This is in sharp contrast with the landline telephone system, which stands at 7 per cent. The privatization of Albtelecom, the major Albanian telecommunications company, is in process. 3.3.3. Other market-related areas Other challenges that require special attention are internal market-related areas, such as public procurement, competition and state aids, standards and certification, accreditation, metrology and calibration, consumer protection, intellectual property and property rights. Albania has taken important legislative and administrative steps (a new competition law was adopted in 2003, and a Law on State Aid in 2005) in establishing structures to regulate competition and state aid. The presence of the large grey economy, however, continues to prevent fair competition between companies belonging to the formal economy, as well as affecting negatively those foreign companies willing to invest and operate legally in Albania. After 50 years of a system and society where competition was a heresy, there is a great need to develop a competition culture, which is still in its infancy, in order for people to understand the benefits of competition as a useful mechanism that brings more efficiency and productivity, more choice, and cheaper prices. It should be noted that the application of conditions with regard to competition has been a difficult task even for the CEE countries in general, let alone for Albania. According to EU regulations, competition

72


should be applied within five years after the SAA is in place. In the field of standards and certification, by mid-1995 Albania had adopted 57 per cent of European standards (European Commission 2005:36). Public procurement in Albania is problematic, mainly because of fraud and corruption. The number of cases of irregularities identified during public procurement procedures is very high. Tenders and procurements in the public sector (including central public administration/ministries) are considered and have eventually become important sources of illegal profits for senior officials and ministers. The lack of free competition, transparency, equal treatment and non-discrimination in tenders and procurement have left room for a high level of corruption and have damaged efficiency and best value for money. Frauds related to public procurement involving politicians and high-level officials are frequently objects of articles in the press, but investigation and prosecution of these cases remains limited and ineffective. ‘In awarding public contracts, - as the European Commission (2005:43) notes, - procuring entities award tenders solely on the basis of lowest price, rather than using the criterion of the economically most advantageous tender…There is insufficient investigation and criminal prosecution of procurement-related offences and political influence and corruption remain significant factors’. EU efforts are, therefore, focused on strengthening public procurement structures, ensuring strict implementation of tendering procedures and promoting a public procurement culture, based on the principles of transparency and fair competition. Considering the transparency of public funds a step towards European integration, the EU recently launched a new initiative, the SPPS project (‘Support to the Public Procurement System’), under the slogan ‘Public money, your money’. It aims to improve efficiency and transparency of the Albanian public procurement system in order to bring it into line with EU standards and best international practice. The reform of the public procurement system is important not only for the economy of the country and for further liberalizing the internal market, but also from a future SAA perspective, when Albania would need to ensure fair access of EU companies to public procurement markets and operation. The issue of land and property ownership, one of the main pillars of a market economy, is yet unsolved. This key and sensitive issue is one of the most persistent and unfortunate legacies of communism. The return of the settlements of former owners, whose land and property had been confiscated after the communists came to power in 1945, has been a very difficult task to resolve. It has been not just difficult, but sometimes impossible, given the social and demographic changes that have happened during


more than 50 years. This issue has fuelled a great deal of tension between owners who want their land and properties back and governments. The adoption of the ‘Law on the Restitution and Compensation of Property’ and the establishment of the relevant committee have been important steps, but are as yet without practical results. Much of the property in urban and coastal areas where the land market has the biggest economic potential is still unregistered. To make things worse, there have been allegations of the unlawful privatization of land and properties where the restitution/compensation process has not yet been implemented. The unresolved issue of land property has become one of the obstacles of the development of business, tourism and foreign investments in the country. In conclusion, we concur with Boulton (2004) who states that ‘Albania’s rapid transition from Europe’s most isolated dictatorship to its wildest market economy has been as bumpy as the country’s pot-holed roads’. Albania remains a poor country, but it is no longer the poorest in Europe, being the second poorest after Moldova. ‘When I hear this from Albanians - says Nordlinger (2005) – I’m reminded of the old story in the US that Alabamians are grateful for Mississipi’. 3.4. Social situation 3.4.1. From egalitarianism to polarization and ‘jungle capitalism’ Many observers and scholars have argued that the capitalism which started to develop in Albania right after 1990 was a ‘Latin-American’ type, with high social polarization and wide inequalities in income, wealth and power. In this ‘banana republic’ type of country, resources are concentrated in a few hands (half of the new wealth is controlled by one-fifth of the population). On the other hand, the fact should not be denied that the living standards of the population as a whole have risen considerably and a degree of prosperity has been achieved compared with the period of communism, but they are still very low when compared to the standard of living of Western Europe which Albania wishes to achieve. Therefore, Albanians are experiencing two kinds of difference: the first between the egalitarian socialist system of the past (equal income) and ‘a jungle capitalism’ system of today (high degree of polarization), and the second one between the capitalism in Albania and the western model. The transition from a poor, but equal society, in a state which guaranteed for all citizens ‘cradle-to-grave’ work and welfare benefits, to a tough market

74


economy where wages are low compared with the western world, but where prices for most of the same products are comparable with the west, is hard going for Albanians. In some goods, prices in Albania have reached European and have even overtaken American levels, while the level of poverty (standard of living) is closer to Africa. Albanians were unprepared for the replacement of the elaborate social welfare system, which communism created, that assured them everything: job security, price stability, few wage differences, free medical care and education, housing, with the current ‘law of the jungle’, or the survival of the fittest. Social benefits have decreased over the last 10 years, mainly to keep the budget under control.

Mentality and culture Significant changes have occurred in the value system and in people’s mentality. At the beginning of the transition there was large-scale disorientation and social chaos, caused by the breakdown of the rigid communist system of social and moral values. This went along with the rejection of the ‘new socialist man’ – ‘a product of the communist regime, defined by his stable Albanian identity and communist consciousness’ (Vickers and Petiffer 1998:3). The poor and mediocre cultural life, fanatically based on conservationism and traditional domestic folklore and filled with communist ideological propaganda and dogma, was very quickly replaced with all forms of modern arts and a rush to imitate mechanically the culture of the west. Dissolution of traditional values of social solidarity, the strong sense of community, and large, tightly-knit families are being replaced very quickly with ‘western’ and contemporary global social and cultural life-styles and the rise of individualism. Although individualism is a typical feature of western societies, in post-communist Albania it went to extremes as a reaction to an imposed collective past and the negation of individualism during the totalitarian regime. Opening up to the world was also accompanied with a decline in national pride and civic moral values. On a more positive note, Albanian social life has become more open, interesting and vibrant.

The revival of regionalism Besides the revival of religion (see below) and ethnicity, there has been a reemergence of regionalism (all of which had been latent during communism). Albanians in Albania (like all ethnic Albanians in the Balkans) are divided into distinct groups, who have different social and moral values, as


well as different dialects. The population in the north of Albania, as well as ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo, Montenegro, Southern Serbia and part of Macedonia, are known as Ghegs. Those in the south (below the Shkumbini River) and in the Albanian region in the northern part of Greece, Chameria, are Tosks. The most distinguishing feature between the two groups is the difference in dialect (the official standard modern Albanian language, called ‘unified literary Albanian’ is based on the Tosk dialect, viewed by many in the north as one more thing imposed by the Tosk communists upon the Ghegs). ‘The traditional social organization of the Ghegs was tribal, based upon a tightly-knit clan system connecting various isolated homesteads and thus more fragmented’ (ICG 2004). From the religious point of view, the majority within both groups were Muslim, with the Ghegs being 10 per cent Catholic, and the Tosks 20 per cent Orthodox. During the communist period, because most of nomenklatura and political leadership came from the south (including Enver Hoxha, who was from Gjirokastra), Tosks were in a more favourable position in Albania. This factor and the inherited backwardness of the northerners, created a big gap between the two regions in terms of economic, social and cultural development. Rivalries between the two groups, which were less noticeable during communism, started to re-emerge during the transition to democracy.

The middle class The middle class, which should be the most progressive element of society and provides the biggest income to the state budget, is suffocating under current economic conditions. In Albania, there is a middle class in terms of its education and professional qualifications, but not of its income (in this respect the middle class is poorer than the other much less educated strata of society). It is sometimes remarked that ‘Albania built socialism without workers and today is building capitalism without the bourgeoisie’.

The women’s issue One Western perception of backwardness for Albania, among others, has been related to the marginalization of women in society. Gender equality is not yet sufficiently enshrined in Albanian society. Even though the communist regime put a lot of emphasis on improving and raising the status of women, both in the work force and in education (by the end of the 1980s women represented 47 per cent of the labour force, 30 per cent of PL

76


members, 30 per cent of MPs and over 50 per cent of university students), in essence Albanian society was very masculine. Even today, while access of women to political, social and economic posts is possible, the tradition of a male-dominated society and a Balkan-macho mentality remains predominant, particularly in rural areas. The new ‘Law on Gender Equality’ approved recently will hopefully give impetus to an increase of women participation in politics and decision-making structures, in particular in parliament and government, which is currently very low (there is only one woman minister in the newly appointed government, while the representation of women in the new parliament is only 8 per cent, compared to the average female representation in parliaments in Southeast Europe, where 17 per cent of parliamentarians are women). 3.4.2. The situation in specific areas

Poverty and regional inequalities The blind action of market forces without social protection has led to an increasing polarization in society. As Wood (2003) observes, ‘there has arisen a vast gulf between a minority with extreme wealth on one side (mainly generated through “suspicious” activities) and the majority living in extreme poverty on the other’. Thus, poverty is one of the key social problems, especially in rural areas. As the European Commission (2003:12) notes ‘currently 25 per cent of the Albanian population is living below the poverty level, on less than 1.2 Euro per day’, and 5 per cent in extreme poverty. This is the same as in many African countries. The remittances from abroad have eased this poverty by helping elderly or unemployed family and relatives. They have also been an important source of income to improve housing conditions. Wages, especially in the public sector, are in many cases below poverty levels. Regional inequalities, which already existed during communism, are widening, with the centre and the south being much better off than the poorer north, which continues to remain a marginalized and peripheral region. The gulf between rich metropolitan Tirana and the rest of the country is very obvious. The situation is worst in the north and especially northeast, with a lack of infrastructure and investment. The living conditions of most of the population in small cities and villages are very poor and the people in these areas have little or no access to basic public services.


Even though the overall macro-economic indicators are positive, governments have failed to ensure basic and adequate supplies of daily essentials for the population. Water shortages and power cuts are a feature of daily life. The main electoral-campaign priorities in the last elections, even in large urban areas, in a European country in the 21st century (!), were water and electricity. Public services and infrastructure are inefficient, unreliable, scarce and of low quality. ‘Weak and deteriorating infrastructure and services throughout the country have left 40 per cent of households without access to necessities, such as basic education, water, sanitation and heating’ (Cameron 2003:67).

Unemployment Unemployment, which officially used to be non-existent during communism (‘being unemployed’ had a stigma attached to it), has been a massive and growing problem in the transition years. This is a result of three factors: privatization, liberalization and de-industrialization. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), the level of unemployment in the country is about 38 per cent (European Commission 1994: 14). The high level of unemployment is one of the main reasons for the massive emigration of Albanians abroad. The structure of employment has changed, with a significant shift from industry to services and trade

Urbanization A dominant trend of the last decade has been urbanization. During communism, the ratio between the rural and urban populations was 60 to 40 per cent respectively. An ‘original’ feature of that period was internal migration, which was strictly controlled and limited. Population movement from one city to another, especially from rural areas and in particular to the capital, happened only within stringent regulations and conditions. The first signs of urbanization started right in the beginning of the 1990s after the lifting of these measures. Urbanization has, however, been rapid, uncontrolled and unregulated. Thousands of people from rural areas, especially in the north, have abandoned their homes because of poverty and unemployment and migrated to Tirana and other main cities in the hope of finding jobs and improving their living standards (as a result of this the population of Tirana has grown from 320.000 in 1992 to around a million today). This ‘gravitation’ towards the capital and administrative centres

78


has caused overpopulation of cities and many problems, from social exclusion to environmental problems. It has also increased pressure on infrastructures, sanitation, housing, transportation and communications. As a result of the rapid rates of urbanization, the above ratio is now probably around 50/50.

Health and Education Albania used to have acceptable standards of education and health during the period of communism. Health care and education were totally free, accessible, available and universal. Since 1990, the education level of the population has fallen significantly, school enrolment rates have declined significantly (38 per cent in 2002 versus 79 per cent in 1990) and the quality of education has deteriorated (the decline of the VET - Vocational Education Training area, has also been dramatic). Problems in the health system include poor quality of public health services, low accessibility and affordability of health care, debilitated physical infrastructure of hospitals and health centres, as well as the widespread practice of informal payments and bribery to health personnel (patients are ‘forced’ to pay for almost every kind of medical treatment). The issue of corruption and bribery is very problematic in the education system as well, especially in universities, with students having to pay their teachers to pass their exams42. The salaries and general motivation of teachers and doctors are low. Health centres’ infrastructure and teaching facilities are poor. Public spending on education has decreased from 5 per cent of GDP in 1991 to 2.8 per cent in 2003 (European Commission 2005:31). Even though there have been positive developments, such as the opening of new universities in five larger cities and the depoliticizing of the educational system (developing a contemporary and non-ideological curriculum), rehabilitation of a number of school facilities (mainly by donors), the education system, and in particular higher education, has poor standards. Education is a key factor in successful democratization, and therefore should be promoted and developed at all levels. In conclusion, Albania has many of the features of transitional societies. As Mocnik (2003) argues, ‘increase of poverty and inequality, rise of unemployment (as well as youth unemployment), the decline in the standard of living and the emergence of social groups at risk such as youth, unemployed, the poor and pensioners are common features of all postsocialist countries’.


3.4.3. Demographic situation The population in Albania is 3.3 million (which is smaller than the total number of Albanians living in Albanian ethnic territories in the region, estimated at seven million). However, the population has declined since 1990, mainly because of emigration over the transition period. This has been a major demographic upset, leading to the departure of 15 per cent of the total population and 40 per cent of the young population, going to North America and the EU, mostly permanently (European Commission 2001:12). Emigration seems to be the only ‘escape’ for the young and unemployed and as long as the economic and political problems persist, this phenomenon will continue. Albania has a high rate of population growth (8.1 in 2004), owing to both high birth rates: 3.02 children per female (the highest in Europe), and relatively low mortality rates. The proportion of young people is high (46 per cent), which puts pressure on the demand for educational expenditures and employment opportunities. However, because of high youth emigration, this rich human potential is lost to the country. 3.4.4. Environmental situation Over the last decade, Albania has suffered increasing environmental problems and currently is confronting an environmental crisis: air and water pollution, forestry destruction, toxic hotspots and radioactive waste products etc. Its urban areas have high levels of air pollution due to uncontrolled development. Experts in the country say that Albania is facing a humanitarian catastrophe due to growing pollution caused by poisonous gases that are 10 times above the tolerance level set by the World Health Organization (AFP). Tirana, which has tripled in size since 1992, is estimated to be one of the most polluted cities in the world (behind New Delhi and Beijing, but more polluted than Athens, Budapest, Bucharest or Madrid). Levels of air pollutants from vehicles are very high, as most people use second-hand cars and use poor quality petrol that spreads pollution. Water supplies remain highly polluted, notably in urban areas, due to outdated sewage and sanitation systems, and water treatment infrastructures. In regard to waste management, Albania’s 3 million people don’t have a single waste-water treatment plant, toxic-waste disposal facility, or sanitary landfill. Some unplanned construction work along the seaside has spoiled beautiful beaches. However, some of the environmental ‘hotspots’

80


have started to be addressed. In addition, Albania is experiencing soil erosion due to overgrazing and illegal logging. Peasants continue cutting down forests to heat their homes, while construction companies haphazardly mine gravel from riverbeds, disrupting aquatic life and furthering an already critical nationwide erosion problem (SBB 2005). Citizens in general remain largely ignorant of the importance of environment to the socioeconomic development of the country, and to environmental health risks, and the environmentally friendly culture is extremely limited. Strengthening of environmental institutions, enforcing of environmental laws and public awareness of environmental protection, are challenges that need to be addressed. Albania ratified the Kyoto Protocol in December 2004, but mere ratification is useless without effective implementation of the measures signed up to. 3.5. Religious situation The revival of religion has been another important aspect of the transition in Albania. Freedom of religious belief was sanctioned in the new provisional Constitution in 1991, which lifted the ban imposed in 1967 on any kind of religion. After the abolition of all religions, Albania proclaimed itself the ‘first atheist state in the world’. The atheist motto of Albanian society for almost 50 years was ‘the religion of Albanians is Albanianism’43. Even before that, forced by certain historic circumstances, Albanians have shifted from one religion to another. Originally, Albania was a Christian country (Illyrians, the predecessors of Albanians, converted to Christianity while under the Roman Empire) and, after the Great Schism between Rome and Constantinople in 1054, it was split into a Roman Catholic north and an Orthodox south. After the Ottoman invasion, Albanians started their conversion from Christians into Muslims. Thus the biggest religious shift happened during Ottoman rule and, by the end of 17th century, the majority of Albanians were Muslims. Unlike most of their neighbours, who remained Christian, Albanians easily abandoned their religion and massively embraced the new one. This happened for a number of practical or survival reasons. The most important among them was the fact that Muslims enjoyed the highest social status and a lot of other privileges, such as paying less taxes or getting better jobs or administrative positions. Albanians who managed to escape this conversion and remained Roman Catholics were mainly those living in inaccessible highlands of the northern and north-eastern regions, as well as those in the south on the


border with Greece, who were under the Byzantine influence of Orthodoxy. Another aspect of this period was the existence of ‘cryptoChristians’, who were Muslims by day and Christians at night (and in their hearts). An interesting feature is that the Muslim religion has been more important among Kosovar Albanians, probably because of their being neighbours with Orthodox Serbia. This was later emphasized when Kosovo became part of Yugoslavia, and the religious issue became a very important component of their national identity. In the newly independent state of Albania, created in 1912, even though proclaimed secular, the society remained predominantly Muslim. No official state religion was known in the inter-war period. Still, the relations among all different religious groups remained friendly, as it has been historically, which was helped by the co-existence and inter-marriage between Muslims with Catholics and Orthodox. The religious landscape of Albania was composed of 70 per cent Muslim (mainly Sunni and 15 per cent Bektashis, a sect derived from the Shia branch of Islam), 20 per cent Greek Orthodox (mainly in the south) and 10 per cent Roman Catholics (in the north). When the communists came to power in 1945, they confiscated all the properties and land of the religious institutions. Gradually, they became less and less tolerant of religion and, finally, the worst came in the 1960s, when the Albanian communist leadership, inspired by the Chinese model of the Cultural Revolution, decided to abolish all religion. Under the Marxist slogan ‘religion is the opium of the people’, which later became a motto to brainwash them, all religious practices were banned and many priests and imams were imprisoned. Nobody was allowed even to have a copy of the Bible or Koran and even the very thought of belief in God could not be expressed openly. Churches and mosques were either destroyed, or turned into culture youth centres, warehouses or cinemas. Communists not only physically destroyed religious institutions, but also indirectly the social basis of religion, which resided in the traditional social structures. As Vickers and Petiffer (1997:231) point out, ‘Enver Hoxha succeeded where the Ottomans had failed, by replacing the authority of both clan and religion with communism’. It is true that there were anti-religious campaigns in other states, such as the Ukraine and Russia, where many churches and monasteries were destroyed and many priests and nuns massacred. But Albania was different in the sense that it was the world’s first officially atheist state, even the USSR or Poland did not outlaw religion as such. It is ironic, therefore, that Mother Teresa was herself Albanian44 (born in Skopje), so that the two best-known Albanians before the fall of communism were she and Enver Hoxha!

82


In 1991, in addition to other freedoms, Albanians were at last free to practise any kind of religion they wished, but because of the long period of atheist propaganda, they were lacking the most basic religious awareness and knowledge. However, there has been a modest religious revival as in other post-communist states. This has some interesting features. Firstly, Albanians of Muslim roots (especially those of the younger generation), have shown little desire to embrace the religion of their grandparents, and are more attracted to Christianity. This is probably for two reasons: they view Christianity as associated with Europe and western values and therefore as connected to the process of Europeanization (joining the EU); and they consider Islam to be a backward religion, not civilized and restricted in regard to human rights, in particular to women’s rights. Not many educated and young people are seen frequenting the mosques or embracing the Muslim religion (not even the Bektashis, which is a moderate form of Islam45). Therefore, there has been little revival of traditional Muslim ways, creeds, and rites even among those who identify themselves as such. At the beginning of the 1990s, there were efforts from the Muslim world to re-establish more radical forms of Islam among the Muslim population: Islamic groups and delegations started to visit Albania, aid schemes flowed from Turkey, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, and there were different projects for restoring old or building new mosques and Islamic schools. There were also schemes to set up and improve ordinary schools and health centres, to invest in all kinds of industry, and to give scholarships for young Albanians to study Islamic theology (in the last 15 years hundreds of youngsters have attended religious schools or courses in different Islamic countries). The Albanian government of that time gave permission for agreements with a lot of these projects (such as with the Islamic Development Bank). This was more for pragmatic reasons to benefit from economic aid in such a desperately poor economic situation and also because of the lack of European and American investment and aid to Albania. Therefore the membership of Albania in the ‘Organization of the Islamic Conference’ (OIC) in 1992, which provoked a wave of alarm and criticism among western and Albanian people, was motivated more for economic than for religious motives. It was more a logical and practical move in response to the EU and the US not investing in Albania, rather than an attempt to turn Albania into a part of the Islamic world. The second feature in religious revival was an urge to embrace the Orthodox religion, mainly from the southern population. This was also to a great extent for pragmatic reasons. As Vickers and Pettifer (1998:113) describe it, ‘during this time hundreds of Albanians agreed to be baptized


into the Orthodox faith in order not only to receive the precious aid parcels, but also to become eligible for a visa to work in Greece…The dispute between the Albanian and Greek governments over the number, status and rights of the ethnic Greek minority in southern Albania has inevitably made the resurrection of the Orthodox faith in Albania more controversial than that of the other principal religions’. The fact that Athens historically has tried to consider Albanian Orthodox ethnic Greeks has made the revival of Orthodox religion a more sensitive issue compared with the others. Another feature is the embracing of Protestantism, mainly for two reasons: firstly the influence of the ‘missionary crusades’ of several Christian groups (mostly Americans) such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons etc. They showed a real determination and devotion in their mission of introducing the ‘new faith’ and to eradicate atheism among Albanians. A second reason is that a lot of young Albanians, especially in urban areas and Tirana, joined or worked with missionaries because of the language, as it was a very good and free way to learn English. In conclusion, we can say that Albania remains a country of a great religious tolerance where the three main religious communities have lived in peace and harmony for centuries and still do. It is not unusual to come across mixed marriages whose members belong to different religions, one to Islam, one to Christianity. In Albania the important feast days of all the three religions are official holidays. Almost two generations of Albanians, born or brought up as atheists during the communist period, have not inherited a religious culture, only their grandparents’ religious identity, which in most cases is fragile and easily changeable for the reasons mentioned above. ‘Nowadays most Albanians identify with a religious group, but do not practise their faith devoutly’ (Koleka 2005). It would be very useful and interesting, however, to conduct a new census for defining the true religious composition of the Albanian population. The findings of the new census should then be incorporated in all official documents and world encyclopaedias to reflect realistically the religious division of the population in Albania. The figure of 1929 that 70 per cent are Muslim is not only outdated, but also inaccurate and unreal, given the recent history of the 30 years of imposed atheism, two generations who grew up without any religious faith whatsoever, and then the religious revival after 1990 when lots of people have been embracing various religions sometimes totally different from that of their roots. However, despite the religious revival, the Albanian population as a whole remains secular. Unlike elsewhere in the Balkan countries and societies, where politics, religion and

84


ethnicity are three key elements of identity (and conflict), in Albania and for Albanians only the first has much importance. 3.6. Advantages of Albania as an independent nation-state Albania possesses a number of advantages as well as challenges. In addition to the political advantages of being a state for almost a century (compared to other new states created recently) and not having major inter-ethnic problems (like some other neighbours such as Serbia, BosniaHerzegovina and Macedonia), Albania has also a very good geo-strategic position as an important bridge between Western and Eastern Europe and the Middle East, since it is simultaneously a Balkan, Mediterranean and European country. The attractive geographical location by the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, the spectacular Alps in the north and its natural beauty offer many opportunities for the tourist industry. Albania has a rugged, wild and wonderful beauty, which ranges from jagged mountains in the north to long and white sandy beaches in the south, in particular the magnificent south-western coastal strip, known as the Albanian Riviera. The country’s 500-kilometre long coastline along the Adriatic and Ionian Seas represents superb prospects for tourism development, through which it could generate much-needed national income (as her neighbouring countries, Greece and Croatia, which have the same coastline, have done). Added to this natural beauty, there is a very attractive warm climate, delicious food and the friendliness of the Albanian people, which all heighten the chances for successful tourism. Albanians are warm and hospitable, lively and expressive, quick learners who passionately express their emotions and opinions with animated gestures. However, the problems of political instability, the weak rule of law and public order, the unsolved question of property, poor infrastructure, corruption etc., have seriously compromised these great national riches. Governments so far have not been able or willing to formulate a positive policy on tourism development, losing in this way one of the most important sources that could generate high income for the poor state budget and the country’s GDP. This is how a journalist describes Albania in the ‘Vancouver Sun’: ‘There is still a long way for this beautiful country to travel, if it seriously hopes to corner some much-needed tourist dollars. It has the natural beauty and more local charm than anywhere I’ve seen in Europe. But it lacks the professionalism, experience and infrastructure


needed to give places like Greece a run for their souvlakis. But with the incredible landscape, the warmth of the people, the sheer affordability and the absence of a full-scale tourist invasion, third world travel has thus far proved to be the most rewarding of all’. Albania is also relatively rich in mineral resources. With its plentiful hydroelectric and oil resources, it offers good opportunities in the energy sector. Another advantage is related to social-demographic factors. Albania has a small population (only 3 million), which makes it easier and better manageable in terms of development, infrastructure and public services. It has one of the highest birth rates in Europe (3.02), a high percentage of young population (46 per cent) and a large proportion of the population economically active (58.4 per cent), which are all in stark contrast to the ageing and low-birth rate populations in most of the EU countries. This, together with a well-educated working force, can offer a range of benefits to foreign investors in regard to a labour force which can adapt quickly and efficiently. 3.7. How far is Albania from meeting the criteria? Analysing the political situation, it is clear that Albania is far from a fully democratic system. There are still big challenges in terms of political and government stability, good governance, reinforcing democracy and ensuring free and fair elections, respecting and enforcing the rule of law, upholding human rights, developing a sound judicial system and public administration and an independent media. In the next chapters we will analyse two other phenomena, which are very problematic in Albania’s way towards accession: corruption and organized crime. Economically, Albania has come out of a centralized planned economy and is striving towards developing a market economy. However, the current picture resembles more an ultra-free market economy (which is still far from being a functional market economy) with two sides to it: a ‘miracle’ macro-economy with a high growth rate, low inflation, a low budget deficit, and on the other side a micro-economy with high rates of unemployment, high taxes and largescale fiscal evasion and high prices. Thus, while its macro-economic indicators are good, the real economy is in crisis, because economic growth is mainly the result of remittances and criminal activities. With the accelerating richness of a handful of individuals, families and clans, and the equally galloping poverty of the rest of the population, the country is a typical ‘Balkan republic’.

86


In the 2005 annual report of the European Commission (2005:63), the conclusion in almost all areas, is that ‘Albania has achieved some progress, but this progress has mainly consisted of adoption of new legislation, in formulation of action plans and the establishment of new institutions’. On the other hand, it is emphasized that this legal and institutional framework ‘should be followed up by rigorous implementation leading to concrete achievements and results’ (2005:68), and the main reason for this not having been done is that ‘implementation has been hampered by a difficulty in making available resources combined with a lack of political will’ (2005:66). Judging from the current political, economic and social situation, it is evident that Albania is still far from fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, especially in regard to political democratization, and this is serious in a country that aspires to become part of the EU. The next chapters analyse the reasons and factors that are acting as obstacles for Albania’s journey towards progress, democratisation, and joining the European family.

4 EU MEMBERSHIP PROSPECTIVE FOR THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN BALKANS AND ALBANIA ‘The future of the Balkans is within the European Union’ Declaration of the European Council at Thessalonica (June 2003)

4.1. The EU’s eastern enlargements: the Western Balkans and the completion of the EU map The accelerated integration of the European Union is reshaping the Westphalian46 state order in Europe, that is, a Europe of independent and sovereign nation-states. This is a process of immense historical dimensions. Even though he stresses the importance of the national interest principle in European affairs, Moravcsik (1999:1) states, ‘The EU is an extraordinary achievement in modern world politics’. Like many mighty creatures, however, Europe has an Achilles’ heel, a vulnerable point. This is the Western Balkans, which, as Glenny (2003:1) argues, ‘seem like a hopeless case, doomed to a perpetual cycle of war and underdevelopment’. The Western Balkans (some call it ‘Adriatic Europe’) is the name given to a new geo-political region comprising the former communist countries, encapsulated more precisely in the equation ‘Yugoslavia, minus Slovenia, plus Albania’ (Alibali 2003). This region and, in fact, the whole Balkan Peninsula has been historically stigmatized and denied the ‘honour’ of being called ‘European’. On the other hand, Glenny’s pessimistic assessment does not tell the whole story since Slovenia is now a member of the EU and Croatia is making enormous strides in preparing itself to join. Furthermore, the cycle of wars and ethnic cleansing which accompanied the collapse of the old Yugoslav federation has now largely

88


ended thanks to NATO and US intervention and the imposed settlements in the late 1990s (Batt, 2004). Until 1999, the EU did not have a clear strategy for this region, but the conclusions of the European Council meeting in April of that year recommended the launching of a new association process. Since then, the EU has been committed to change the negative image of the Balkans, which is seen by the outside world as ‘an island of instability in the heart of Europe, exporting migrants and importing peacekeepers’ (ESI 2003:17). Many of the key political and administrative elites of the EU have declared that the Balkans is an integral part of Europe and the unification of Europe will not be complete until it includes its south-eastern part. As the International Commission on the Balkans (2005:3, 28) points out, their task is ‘to help transform the proverbially chaotic, bloody and unpredictable Balkans of the past into a stable, peaceful and dependable South-Eastern Europe of the future’. What explains this new-found coherence of EU strategy towards the Balkans? Firstly, the European enlargement process itself, which is aiming to close the artificial gap between the east and west of the continent. In fact it could be argued that the enlargement of the EU towards the rest of Europe is not an enlargement as such, but a re-unification of the two parts, which have the same values, traditions and principles (at least among the key national elites), but have been separated for many decades by the historical tragedy of communism, a wrong that had to be righted. No wonder the enlargement policy of the EU is considered by many to be one of the great achievements of the post-Cold War world, a political miracle and its most impressive foreign policy venture. Secondly, the expansion of the EU towards the Balkan Peninsula is beneficial for Europe. As the International Commission on the Balkans (ICB) puts it, ‘for so long dismissed as Europe’s powder keg, if the Balkans were successfully absorbed into the EU, it would finally banish the possibility of a revival of the type of conflict which so plagued the continent’s 19th and 20th century history, and defusing the powder keg would be a landmark achievement for Europe’. Leaving the Balkans out of the EU could seriously harm the European project itself. As Glenn Kessler (2005) says, ‘there cannot be a stable Europe if the Balkans are on fire’. The EU is better off putting its efforts and spending its money on helping to develop democracy in these troubled countries, rather than spending it on stabilization strategies, such as military, policing and peacekeeping missions. This is no doubt ‘a far better and ultimately cheaper alternative than watching the region slip back into political instability’ (ESI, 2005). Besides security reasons, the EU sees Eastern Europe and the Balkans bringing economic

EU Membership Prospective for the Countries of WB and Albania

89

benefits, as potential markets for goods, services and cheap labour, for their high quality professionals and qualified migrant workers, as well as for sorting out the twin problem of Western Europe’s labour shortage and the Balkans’ surplus working-age population. Therefore, the development of this ‘marginalized and troubled ghetto’ in the midst of Europe is important not just for the region, but also for the EU itself. Thirdly, it must be remembered that when the region descended into civil war in 1991, there was very little knowledge of the Balkans in the foreign affairs departments of EU member states or in the European institutions themselves. European countries were divided on the approach to take and fell back on traditional and historical reflexes. Germany and Austria supported Slovenia and Croatia in their drive for independence against Serbian domination, while Greece, Russia and France supported Serbia. In the end, EU incoherence was incapable of dealing with the problem and had to rely on the intervention of the US to bring about a solution (Lehne, 2004). It is significant that the peace accords of 1995 were signed in Dayton, Ohio, and not in a Western European city. By the late 1990s, however, this had changed. US preoccupations had moved elsewhere in the world, while for the EU it was becoming clear that ‘it has to bring its own house in order’, because, as the second ICB report states, ‘turning a blind eye on the Balkans is no less a recipe for disaster’. Thus, by the end of the 1990s, NATO forces were being replaced by EU military and then police forces to provide security for the region. The Balkans, with its history of hostility, rivalry and wars calls to mind Europe after the Second World War. One of the most important achievements of European integration was building peace between the European nations. The EU was most importantly a major peace project, therefore in building and strengthening the problematic Balkan countries, the EU should follow the model of peace, on the basis of which the Community itself was designed and became united. Furthermore, the EU could also draw on the expertise of the transition process in CEE, which, by 2000, was almost a decade old. Thus, by the turn of the millennium, there was a new-found consensus which allowed the development of a coherent strategy. This is summed up in the approach entitled ‘Stabilization and Association’, that is, first develop stability (lack of violent conflict) and then build up association with a view to complete integration. One key difference with the CEE transition process, however, is that, whereas the CEE countries were handled on an individual and bilateral basis without being conditional on regional stability, the Western Balkans began to be treated as a whole. This was recognition of the

90


mutual links between the different countries of the region and individual progress was largely based on progress of the entire region towards stability. The enlargement of May 2004 was the fifth enlargement of the EU. When the process started in the beginning of the 1990s, misperceptions flourished, that enlargement was a reward to the new member states for the overthrow of communism, or was an act of charity. On the contrary, facts have shown that this enlargement has been both in the interests of the EU and the new member states, for the prosperity, peace, stability and security of the EU as a whole. In just one decade the prospect of being members of the EU was a driving force in achieving and strengthening democratic and market reforms, and transforming societies in the eight CEE countries (three of them, Estonia, Lithuania and Estonia, had even been part of the former Soviet Union). However, it was not just the end of a long chapter; it is also the beginning of a new one, or to change the metaphor, as Timothy Garton Ash (2004) has called it ‘an unfinished symphony’. The present EU borders do not represent Europe’s natural borders (Rakipi 2003: 155). Because of this enlargement, the EU has become much larger and more diverse. Europe looks different since the newcomers are bringing changes and injecting a new dynamism into the European integration process. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his speech to the US Congress in July 2003, noted, ‘their [the CEE countries] scars are recent, their memories strong and their relationship with freedom is still a passion’ (Blair 2003). Although this enlargement did not include the Western Balkans, it did bring the European Union to their doorstep (The Economist has dubbed the new border regions ‘the crystal curtain’ of Europe). After the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the Western Balkans will be bordered by EU member states. A fresh positive development came in November 2004 when the new European Commission, headed by José Manuel Barroso, moved the Western Balkans (SAP) countries from DG External Relations to DG Enlargement, an important act of support, interest, and attention that the EU is paying to these countries. The last enlargement is having a significant impact on the countries of the Western Balkans. By sharing something of the same past, as well as their own experiences of transition and integration, CEE countries could provide valuable assistance to the countries of the Western Balkans. It can contribute to making their own perspective real and visible, and reinforce the message that hard work, and the sometimes painful reforms and adjustments required, will pay off, even if we need to adapt this experience to the rather different realities of the Balkans. With sufficient political will and


91

the ability to reform and endorse the core values and principles of the European Union, the countries of the Western Balkans, among them Albania, will be next in line. What does seem certain is that the longerterm political, economic and social developmental perspectives of the Western Balkans are intimately connected to the deepening of their relationship with the European Union and to fulfilling the conditions for entry that the EU lays down. It is now a widespread belief that the prospect of EU membership, by serving as a strong incentive for CEE countries, will do the same for the Western Balkans. The European perspective may make miracles in the Balkans and thus transform Balkan societies. On the other hand, the immediate accession of ten countries in May 2004 has created new difficulties, since this is the biggest enlargement in EU history and involved bringing in countries, which are relatively poorer than their predecessors in previous enlargements. Many EU officials concede that the body is suffering from ‘enlargement fatigue’ after two successive waves of expansion that have increased the EU from 12 member states in 1994 to 25 today. As Wolf (2002) argues, ‘the EU is caught between the lure of the desirable and fear of the unworkable…further enlargements offer big benefits and huge challenges…making it work will exhaust the energies of Europe for decades’. Therefore, at the Thessalonica Summit, it was decided that the EU should slow down further enlargements in order first to cope with the scale of that of 2004 (EU Press Release: 2003). Critics of the pace of EU expansion also argue that the Union needs a modernized budget, reduced spending on farm subsidies and a focus on economic growth, before it admits poor new agrarian countries. In response to this, Mr. Rehn in an interview (Financial Times, 2006) said that Europe ‘cannot take a sabbatical’ from the enlargement process, while it sorts out its internal rules and future financing. Another issue which is increasingly discussed is the question of the Union’s absorption capacity, which should be taken into account in the pace of enlargement, to deal with the institutional questions (this is why the European Parliament has said that further enlargement of the European Union after Romania and Bulgaria will not be possible under the Treaty of Nice and after the accession of these two countries no further enlargements are foreseen until the end of the decade, starting probably with Croatia). Another argument is related to the negative results of the referendums on the proposed European Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands, which many analysts and commentators believe are going to affect further expansion. At issue is whether the European Union is now willing to expand its borders further east and allow in even poorer and more problematic countries in the Balkans, as well as

92


Turkey (many Western Europeans think that Turkey is ‘too big, too poor and too different’). According to the results of a poll, ‘Eurobarometer 63’, carried out by the European Commission in July 200547, ‘One in two citizens are in favour of Croatia and Bulgaria joining the European Union. Opinions, however, seem to be divided as regards the second accession country, Romania, while a majority of respondents are clearly against Albania and Turkey being granted membership (respectively 50 per cent and 52 per cent against)’. Therefore, the prospect of further enlargement is increasingly called into question, both on the streets and among the elites. Wolfgang Schüssel, Austria’s chancellor and holder of the rotating EU presidency in the first half of 2006 said that Western Europe has a ‘psychological problem’ with enlarging the club into the Balkans (Financial Times, 2006). In this context, anxiety over future enlargement is very obvious in the internal politics of the EU member states. This may affect the chances of Albania and other Western Balkans joining soon. The EU has made this commitment and despite these difficulties, further enlargements seem inescapable, because, among other positive factors, as Jose Manuel Barroso has said, ‘Enlargements have not been a brake on integration, but a “motor” for it’. ‘It is a cliché to say that enlargement is our greatest success story - Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy said to the ‘Sound of Europe’ conference in Salzburg in January this year - but throughout history, in the entire field of international relations, I do not think there is another strategy more valuesdriven, more original in its methodology and more successful in terms of results48’. 4.2. The importance of European accession and integration for the Western Balkans and Albania As we said, from 2007, after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the Western Balkans will be bordered by EU member states. Therefore, as the ICB (2005) recommends, moving the region as a whole from the stage of protectorates and weak states to the stage of EU accession would appear to be the only solution to prevent the Western Balkans from turning into a ‘black hole’ on Europe’s periphery. Otherwise it will become an isolated island in the heart of an integrating continent, behind a wall of visa restrictions blocking a desperate population from seeking a better life and work elsewhere. The Schengen ‘wall’ is the ‘imaginary’ and last wall that separates the Balkans from Europe. The ICB goes on to say that ‘the real


93

choice the EU is facing in the Balkans is: Enlargement or Empire. If the EU does not devise a bold strategy for accession that could encompass all Balkan countries as new members within the next decade, then it will become mired instead as a neo-colonial power in places like Kosovo, Bosnia and even Macedonia’. This is not to say that the conditions in the Western Balkans are now propitious for EU accession. There remain many problems, in particular two principal sets of obstacles. The first comes from the approach adopted by the EU itself.. The second concerns the internal conditions of the Western Balkans. The EU has essentially adopted a strategy towards the region similar to that adopted toward the CEE: first transition, then stabilization, and finally integration.. Although in the CEE, these phases did, to some extent, overlap, they largely followed one another in a logical sequence. In the Western Balkans, according to Batt, the sequence must be different in that integration must precede stabilization and is a condition of the latter. She bases this conclusion on a number of key differences between the Western Balkans and the CEE. First, there is a difference in political culture largely derived from the fact the Western Balkans were part of the Ottoman Empire, as we have already pointed out above. Furthermore, although almost every group and society in the Western Balkans declares its wish to ‘join Europe’, there is much less self-confidence in this prospect than was the case in the CEE, where elites and masses could draw on historical experiences that were already European. Many in the Balkans are also sceptical about the extent to which the EU wishes to accept them, as is illustrated by its use of the term ‘potential candidates’ rather than simply candidates. The second difference is the question of nation-statehood. Western Balkan countries are composed of weak and dysfunctional states or quasiprotectorates (such as Bosnia and Kosovo), and most of them have not yet resolved the issue of their territories and borders. Thus, Kosovo’s status is still undecided, the future of Serbia and Montenegro is unclear and even the future of Macedonia is uncertain. But not only are the Balkans composed of weak states and protectorates, they also suffer from a failed nation-building legacy. It is striking, as the quote from Ivan Krastev at the beginning of Chapter 1 shows, that it is those countries who have succeeded in becoming nation-states which have entered the EU: the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the Baltic states, and even Slovenia. The lack of nation-state status may, therefore, be an obstacle to the entry of the Balkan states. The exception here, though, is Albania. As we have already pointed out, state-hood can be seen as one of Albania’s strengths, even if the

94


quality of its institutions more resembles the other Balkan states than west European states. But the other states of the Western Balkans are all weak states cobbled together with weak legitimacy and fragile political and administrative institutions. These give them a high level of instability, which does not enhance their status as candidates for EU accession. Finally, there is the legacy of war. The CEE managed their transition to nation-statehood without the violence of civil war and ethnic cleansing that characterized the Balkans. Even Czechoslovakia split in an ‘amicable’ divorce. Although there are problems with minorities in almost all the CEE states, these were mostly dealt with in non-violent ways. Again, Albania is closer in this regard to the CEE than to the rest of the Balkans. However, the legacy of war has crippled and set back the economic and social conditions of the rest of the region and will take some time to eradicate. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to avoid historical determinism, which would imply a fatalistic acceptance of the impossibility of change in this region. The example of Croatia springs to mind as it has transformed itself, despite its involvement in the region’s civil wars and despite the return to power of some of the more hard-line parties in the conflict. This does not mean that all problems have been solved and that the region is completely stable and on the road to liberal democracy. The stability of the region still rests on weak feet. The legacy of war and conflict has spawned a number of problems, which make both stability and democracy fragile. The region’s profile is bleak, a mixture of weak states and international protectorates, where Europe has stationed almost half of its deployable forces. Economic growth in these territories is low or non-existent; unemployment is high, corruption is pervasive, and the public are pessimistic and distrustful towards its nascent democratic institutions (ICB 2005:7). In countries such as Serbia and Albania, there has been a worrying and massive growth of organized crime and links between the former (and even current) political class and criminal groups. Corruption is widespread and prevents the full functioning of political, judicial and administrative institutions. As Bugajski (2003:112) argues, ‘The future of the Western Balkans presents a fundamental challenge not only for post-communist democratic development and for post-communist reconstruction, but also for the success of US and EU policy and the effectiveness of the trans-Atlantic relationship’. Another crucial problem is to resolve the final statuses of Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Macedonia, even though perceived by some as a vulnerable country in the Balkans, is considered a ‘success story’ in its road towards European acces-


95

sion. Its progress is related to the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. This agreement, which ended a short, but bloody civil war in 2001 between the Slav majority and Albanian minority, mandated fundamental changes to the Macedonian constitution, establishing inclusive, fair and democratic interethnic governance, increasing the rights of Albanians to influence the legislation and their representation in decision-making institutions. It has focused on achieving a peaceful co-existence between Macedonians and Albanians within the Macedonian state and increasing decentralization. The principle of multi-ethnicity, embedded in this constitution, is now being implemented throughout the country. As Barroso in his trip in Skopje said ‘Diversity had become a guarantee of the unity of the country and in this respect, you are a model for other countries in the region49’. Bosnia, ten years after Dayton50 (which created a joint multi-ethnic state comprised of two entities: the Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb-led ‘Republika Srpska’), is still an international protectorate. Bosnia and Herzegovina and its people must now choose whether to maintain the current constitution with its functional limitations and international dependence, or to opt for constitutional changes necessary to become a stable and functional country, ready to progress towards the EU. However, it is widely believed that the prospect of EU accession will provide the necessary incentive for the strengthening of the federal structures of the Bosnian state. Montenegro’s aspirations for statehood and breaking free from Serbia were finally fulfilled on 21 May 2006, when a referendum was held on the question of its status within the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Montenegrins turned out in record numbers (87%) to decide whether to stay in their troubled union with Serbia, or to become independent and write the final chapter in the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. 55.4 per cent of voters opted for independence for their small Balkan republic, one point above the threshold that the European Union said was needed to make secession valid. They thus achieved their 88-year quest for independence (after World War I, Montenegro had been merged into the newly formed Yugoslavia and was thus erased from the map of Europe), peacefully and democratically through ‘a velvet divorce’, unlike the violent break-downs of the other former republics, such as Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina51. After the break from Serbia, Montenegro is likely to continue talks on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement and to conclude it, perhaps by the end of 2006. After the seeming resolution of the Montenegro problem, that of the status of Kosovo represents the last remaining piece of the Yugoslav puzzle, so

96


that there will be no further border changes in the region, the framework of the Dayton agreement in Bosnia will be respected by all, and there will be a serious and concentrated effort to bring all the countries of the Balkans into the EU. This is not an easy task, but only making the Balkans a part the EU will ensure that the Balkan wars are a thing of the past (Grigorev 2005). 4.3. The future of the Kosovo issue The 1913 London Conference of ambassadors of Balkan states recognized, among others, the newly independent state of Albania, but left whole regions inhabited almost entirely by ethnic Albanians, Kosovo among them, outside Albania’s state borders. Kosovo became as a result a province of Serbia (1913 - 1918), part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918 - 1929), later to become the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929 - 1944), and an autonomous province of Serbia within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945 - 1991). It remained a province of Serbia and Montenegro (a ‘leftover state’ of the former Yugoslavia) until 1999, when the war for independence broke out. A 78-day NATO bombing campaign forced Serbia to halt ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Albanians and since then Kosovo has been administered by the United Nations52. Under UN guidance, it is already a separate state in all but name. The province has an elected national assembly and its own institutions of government, police and customs services, monetary system and postal code. In 2004, Kosovo held parliamentary elections that were judged free and fair by international observers, and it established a coalition government that is cooperating fully with its U.N. partners. However, Kosovo has been in a legal limbo for six years. The province has a Serb minority, but its 90 per cent Albanian population demands independence. Relations between the ethnic groups are unstable and the different groups do not accept full legitimacy in the eyes of the others, and continue to regard one another with suspicion. Ethnic tensions have been rising in Kosovo and sporadic violence has erupted between the majority Albanian and minority Serbian populations, culminating in the March 2004 clashes which led to 19 dead, 730 homes and 39 religious buildings destroyed and 4000 people displaced (Lehne 2004:116). If the issue of Kosovo’s status is not resolved in the near future, it is feared that violence could flare again. Uncertainty has helped drive Kosovo’s economy into the ground and unemployment runs at about 60 per cent. Because of its uncer-


97

tain future, neither the World Bank nor the International Monetary Fund can offer assistance. Despite all this, the EU until recently has been reluctant to grant ‘independence’ to Kosovo for fear of destabilizing the whole region. Their concern is that this might have a domino-effect in the region, with a breakdown in Macedonia where around 25 per cent of population is Albanian53, a strengthening of those who seek the creation of a ‘Greater Albania’ in the region, and even provoking a disintegration of Bosnia. The EU also fears it might set a precedent for other secessionist movements in countries such as Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Therefore, until recently, it has seemed more interested in preserving Kosovo’s status quo as part of Serbia, under the UN protectorate. Serbia and Greece are strongly against granting independence to Kosovo, as they regard with hostility the creation of a second Albanian state in the region, as they fear this might lead to the establishment of a large Albanian state in the Balkans (see ‘Greater Albania’ in Chapter 11). Serbia insists Kosovo can only have autonomy, but now Western governments believe Serbia has already lost Kosovo. As Robinson (2005) points out, ‘The problem is getting Serbs to face up to reality’. The US administration, in contrast to the EU, seems more determined on finalizing Kosovo’s status (as it was in sorting out the situation there in 1999) by designing a new strategy to finally settle its status (Kessler 2005). Recently the Bush administration gave a push toward resolving this thorny problem by putting forward a road map towards resolution, by urging that improvement of standards could take place alongside the talks, rather than waiting until a successful outcome of the tasks54. The events of March 2004 tragically illustrated that stability and harmony between ethnic groups is an illusion and if the region’s status continues to remain in limbo, or the situation to be frozen for a couple more years, it is likely to become ‘a pressure cooker’. If the situation explodes, at it may at any moment, it will have negative effects in the whole region. The status quo is the problem and not the solution for Kosovo. The same is true of the other proposed solutions, such as partition, or a greater autonomy under Serbia. The only solution for Kosovo is independence. ‘Saving Kosovo was a necessary step in 1999, so is setting it free today’ – as was commented in the ‘Christian Science Monitor’ (2005). The ICB argues that the unresolved status of Kosovo is among the major obstacles for the Europeanization of the Balkans, which can be solved only if it is moved away from a ‘standards before status’ policy and towards a ‘standards and status’ policy and by granting independence to Kosovo through a four stage process55. The best way forward is for Pristina

98


and Belgrade to begin negotiations, under international supervision, with the goal of Kosovo becoming independent, as did Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia (if it gains independence, Kosovo will be the first newly independent state since East Timor in 2002). Recently the UN Security Council gave the green light to start final-status negotiations, to discuss the fate of what UN special representative Soren Jessen-Peterson describes as the ‘last piece of the puzzle in the Balkans’56. The aim of these talks, which is involving Europe, the US, and both sides in the conflict57, is to achieve a negotiated agreement before the end of 2006 on a Kosovo status settlement that promotes a multi-ethnic society. Quite possibly it will be a form of ‘conditional independence’, which includes no union with Albania, respect for minority Serbs and code for full independence after a transitional period (The Economist, 2005). Full sovereignty might be offered when democratic standards are achieved and only as Serbia and the states of the Western Balkans join the EU over the course of the next decade. The ICG, which has advocated the form of ‘conditional independence’ for Kosovo since 2004, highlights the importance of Kosovo’s independence for the whole region and argues, ‘Independence would effectively neutralize the more extremist tendencies of ethnic Albanian insurgent groups and the diaspora. The two Albanian states, Kosovo and Albania, would then be able to concentrate on building political and civic institutions to prepare for eventual integration into European structures’ (ICG 2004:14). The negotiations were due to start at the end of January 2006 in Vienna, but this was postponed because of the death of Kosovo President, Ibrahim Rugova, nicknamed the ‘Gandhi of the Balkans’, for his efforts to achieve Kosovo’s independence through peaceful means. Sadness at his death was formally recorded by the EU’s General Affairs and External Relations Council in January. The Council said ‘Kosovo has lost, in this time of important decisions for the future of Kosovo, a historic leader who devoted his life to promoting peacefully the rights of his people’. UN-sponsored talks between Belgrade and Pristina on the future status of Kosovo started in Vienna on February 20, 2006. As Grigorev (2005) points out, ‘At present, working out a solution acceptable to both Belgrade and Pristina seems nearly “mission impossible”: Pristina says it will accept nothing short of independence, and Belgrade asserts that the solution must lie within its newly created formula of “more than autonomy but less than independence”. Thus emerges the eternal dilemma of international relations: the right of self-determination versus the inviolability of borders’. Negotiations, therefore, are anticipated


99

to be difficult, mainly because Serbia does not want to let Kosovo go. As the ICG points out in its latest report on Kosovo (2006), ‘it is extremely unlikely that any Serbian government will voluntarily acquiesce to the kind of independence, conditional or limited, though it may be, which is necessary for a stable long-term solution’. It is interesting to note the positions of the great powers: while the US and the UK are pushing for Serbia to accept that Kosovo will become independent (in an interview in March 2006, Jack Straw, the UK foreign secretary, said, ‘Kosovo’s independence is almost inevitable’), France has adopted its traditional attitude to wars in the Balkans and Philippe Douste-Blazy, French Foreign Minister, stuck closer to the European Union’s official line by saying that ‘negotiations should not be prejudged’ (Dinmore and Dombey 2006). The Germans seem neutral since their interest in former Yugoslavia has in fact been exhausted in Slovenia and Croatia. Another great power involved in the negotiations talks, Russia, apparently will back Serbia. This is not only because Russia has been its historic ally, but also because Kosovo independence may establish an international precedent for other post-Soviet conflict areas, such as Chechnya, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and NagornoKarabakh (they speak already of a ‘Kosovo model’, for using the Kosovo precedent and applying its solution, in the event that Kosovo becomes independent). The prospect of international recognition of Kosovo’s independence has caused some unnecessary nervousness even in Tbilisi (it fears that if Kosovo was granted independence it would cause a surge of unrest in the breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia provinces), in Baku, Chisinau, Bucharest, and even Kiev (because of the Crimea), all of which have taken the speculations on a ‘Kosovo precedent’ unduly seriously. They are also on record as stating that any solution in Kosovo, irrespective of its form, is not to be interpreted as setting a precedent or model in international law or practice. On 19th January 2006, the GUAM group of countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) made a joint statement to the OSCE to the same effect (Interfax, January 19). Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine lack the means, singly or collectively, to tilt the outcome in Kosovo toward autonomy as against a ‘precedent-setting’ recognition of Kosovo’s independence. China, too, is worried that this solution for Kosovo would set a precedent for the Chinese-claimed territories of Taiwan and Tibet (the Bush administration, however, is trying to persuade Moscow and Beijing that independence for Kosovo is ‘unique’ and would not set a precedent for Chechnya, Taiwan and Tibet). An independent Kosovo would not set a

100


political precedent, but would follow the precedent created in the early 1990s when neighbouring Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia - all former Yugoslav republics - gained independence. Therefore, as Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, said to the European Parliament on February 2006, when discussing the prospects for a Kosovo settlement, ‘We should not delude ourselves. This is going to be a difficult process’58 The resolution of the final status of settlement in Kosovo will be at the heart of the political process in the near future, which should be placed within a broader context of the EU accession process for the whole region, with an independent Kosovo as a future member of the EU. 4.4. The Balkans back into the European mainstream? These are reminders of the inherently unstable nature of Balkans politics and inter-ethnic relations and illustrate the dangers that exist there. However, almost ten years after the Dayton agreement and five years after the fall of the Milosevic regime, the Western Balkans have been more stable than in the early 1990s, when it was devastated by ethnic cleansing and civil war. It is hoped that the new-found EU commitment to the region will enhance this. An essential ingredient in this package is the prospect that these countries will one day be able to join the EU, despite the handicaps under which they now labour, and it is this incentive that may provide a stimulus to the political elites who at least employ the rhetoric of proEuropean sentiments. This is why Croatia has become such an important role model for the other Balkan states, including Albania. Rakipi (2003:158) argues that the ‘integration process of the Western Balkans is three- sided: firstly, the countries of the region are themselves developing an integration process that is related to the modernization of society, state and economy, the creation of integrated markets and the creation of functioning states…The second process is regional integration, which in essence means the creation of a common, functioning market and the setting up of functioning human and economic infrastructures of development…And the third process is the advance of each country and the region as a whole towards the EU’. The last report of the ICB (2005:6) emphasizes the EU’s imperative of helping to overcome past legacies in the Balkans and to include Western Balkan states in the European mainstream:


101

‘It was in Sarajevo in the summer of 1914 that Europe entered the century of madness and selfdestruction. The founding fathers of the European Union, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, were respectively 28 and 26 years old. But their dream of a united Europe, founded on shared values and institutional interdependence, can easily be traced back to that summer day in Sarajevo. Eighty years later, in the early days of the siege of Sarajevo in the mid-1990s, a photo of a half-ruined post office with three items of graffiti written on its wall captured the imagination of the world. The first graffito read, “This is Serbia”, the second stated “This is Bosnia”. And someone had scrawled underneath “No, you idiots, it’s a post office!”. But a European historian of the present added a line of his own “This is Europe”. Because all of the destruction in the Yugoslav wars has been done by Europeans to other Europeans in Europe, the line “This is Europe” embodies the EU’s moral imperative when it comes to overcoming the legacies of war and destruction in the Balkans. There is also a security imperative. Political instability in the Balkans threatens Europe with the prospects of never-ending military conflicts, constant flows of immigrants, flourishing of Balkanbased criminal networks and the erosion of the EU’s credibility in the world. It is in Sarajevo in the summer of 2014 that Europe should demonstrate that a new European century has arrived’. ‘The European Union is serious about the Western Balkans, and committed to welcoming it back into the European mainstream’ - this was the consistent message delivered by European Commission President José Manuel Barroso and European Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn on their three-day tour through the region in mid-February 2006 (Zagreb, Belgrade, Pristina, Skopje, Sarajevo and Tirana). ‘The background for our visit was scepticism [felt by many of those who live] in the region about the credibility of their European perspective. Our purpose was to make clear that their EU perspective is concrete and tangible. Our message was one of encouragement and reassurance - the countries have a medium to long-

102


term perspective of membership, once the required criteria are met’, said Commissioner Rehn on his return59. Ultimately, the only long-term solution to the situation is the integration of the Western Balkan countries to the Euro-Atlantic structures. Pope Benedict XVI also advocated the integration of the Balkan countries into the big European family. ‘Europe needs the Balkan nations, and they need Europe! Entry into the European Community should not, however, be understood merely as a panacea to overcome economic adversity’, the Holy Father said in reference to developing other values, such as respect for the dignity of the person (Zenith News Agency: 2005). 4.5. The Accession Process and EU membership criteria (Copenhagen criteria) The accession process is the whole process of joining the EU. This is an intergovernmental process, a matter for the governments of applicant countries and the member governments in the European Council, acting in consultation with the European Commission and the European Parliament (Cini 2003: 215). It is important to remember that the new member states ask to join the EU rather than being requested to do so by the Union. This means that the relationship is asymmetrical in the sense that it is the EU which defines the conditions of accession. As Olsen (2002:927) states, ‘The EU has turned out to be attractive for most European states and the list of applicant countries is long…following the routine application of criteria for entry. If an applicant country meets the criteria of membership, it is admitted, if not, then the door is closed’. Judy Batt (2002:9) points out ‘that the “return to Europe” has progressed from a utopian vision to a practical and vastly ambitious project…but to get there, countries that wish to join the EU and become its members, have to follow a certain path, which for some countries is long, difficult and requires a lot of hard work’. This ‘path’ to accession is a formal process which involves countries negotiating individually with the European Commission under Article O of the TEU. It includes the following steps: • The Formal Application: submitted to the European Council; • The Opinion (avis): the Council requests an Opinion from the European Commission (the Opinion is a detailed document which explains the economic and political situation of the applicant country and evaluates its ability to cope with membership);


103

• The Accession Conference: the Council convenes a conference with representatives of the applicant countries, the Council and the European Commission; • The negotiations: Each of the 35 chapters of the acquis comunautaire is examined, negotiated and upon agreement, provisionally finalized; • The Agreement: upon the finalization of all the chapters, the European Commission makes recommendations to the Council on enlargement; • Approval by the European Parliament (absolute majority required); • Ratification: by all member and applicant states’ parliaments and by referendum (in some cases). This used to be the ‘scheme’ of the enlargement process before the CEE enlargement. When we examine past enlargements60, we can see that they were guided by an easier set of rules and principles of joining for adjusting to European policies. The reason was that until the 2004 enlargement, most of them had been Western European countries with established liberal-democratic regimes, with the exceptions of Spain and Portugal, and, to some extent, Greece (which has a long history of democracy, but had also experienced the ‘Regime of the Colonels’, a military dictatorship, between 1967 and 1975). However, even though these three Mediterranean countries were not always liberal democracies (and therefore would not have met the political Copenhagen criteria), they had market economies in place, being right-wing regimes which had adopted the free market system (thus complying with the economic criteria). For the new democracies of Eastern Europe the EU did not apply the classical method of accession. The new countries had to go through transformation of their political and economic systems after a long period of communism (hence had to fulfil both political and economic criteria). The EU, therefore, came up with a new set of criteria for EU membership, which have come to be known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’. They have been used to frame the accession process for the CEE countries and for Southern European countries (Malta, Cyprus and Turkey), as well as for future enlargements. The criteria for EU membership, the so-called Copenhagen criteria, were established by the European Council in 1993 and laid down in Articles 6 (1) and 49 of the EU Treaty. They require that the candidate countries ensure:

104


1. Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the respect for and protection of minorities (the political criteria)61; 2. The existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union (the economic criteria); 3. Ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (the administrative-technical criteria). An additional criterion, which has been highlighted at subsequent European Councils, is: 4. The importance of not only incorporating the acquis communautaire into national legislation, but also ensuring its effective application through appropriate administrative and judicial structures (the legal criteria). At the Copenhagen Summit of 1993, it was emphasized that it is necessary ‘not only to subscribe to the principles of democracy and the rule of law, but to put them into practice in daily life’ (European Council, 1993). Therefore, accession is not merely a legal process that involves the approximatization of legislation, but a process changing the legal framework in which society and the economy operate. The longer implementation period of complying with the Copenhagen criteria was also a new component, which did not exist in the previous enlargements and was added as a requirement for the CEE countries. The communist legacy of almost fifty years of a lack of political pluralism and a centralized economy could not be overcome overnight. The case of East Germany was the most typical one, which despite getting huge economic assistance from West Germany and sharing its language, nationality, traditions and culture, struggled to meet the criteria and still, 15 years after unification, has much lower standards compared with its West German confrères. The accession of the eight CEE countries, plus Cyprus and Malta, was subject to a process called ‘The Europe Agreements’. In less than 10 years after they applied (Poland and Hungary were first in 1994) they successfully joined the EU in May 2004. The accession of these ten countries followed three main steps: • The Pre-Accession Process: this involves trade, cooperation, economic aid and association agreements. A pre-accession strategy, which aimed to assist applicant countries as they prepared for mem-


105

bership, was adopted at the European Council at Essen in 1994. The country in this phase has an ‘applicant / potential candidate’ status. • The Accession Process: this involves the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria. ‘Agenda 2000’, a document of the European Commission published in 1997, opened the door for starting negotiations with the CEE countries. The country in this phase is given a ‘candidate / accession’ status. • EU Membership: application and then joining. The country in this phase wins ‘member’ status. The Western Balkans are also following these steps. Like the CEE accession countries, the Western Balkans have made great strides in overcoming the legacy of half a century of communism and introducing wideranging reforms. However, for them, the prospect of accession seems more challenging and longer, having had (besides the other handicaps outlined in previous chapters) a recent history of instability, wars and ethnic conflicts and divisions, representing in this way a bigger challenge for both themselves and the EU. Therefore, for the accession of the Western Balkans, the EU came up with a new formula, which is a new strategy with a regional dimension, called the ‘Stabilization and Association Process’ (SAP) (European Commission 2001:4). This approach was finalized at the Zagreb Summit of November 2000. SAP consists of two components: • The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) - A contractual relationship. • Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) – An assistance programme. The SAA itself has four main phases: • Preparation for the SAA; • Negotiation of the SAA (opening and then signing of the agreement); • Ratification by EU member states and entry into force; • Implementation of the SAA. Therefore the new step added to the accession process of the Western Balkans, compared to CEE countries, or even to the Eastern Balkans (Romania and Bulgaria), is the SAA. The SAA is the new ‘original’ element, which will make their process longer and more demanding than in the other CEE countries, because during its implementation countries have to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. The SAA is a successor of ‘The Europe Agreement’, which was applied to the CEE countries (however, the ‘Europe Agreement’ contains only the ‘association’ element, the SAA

106


contains two other elements: ‘stabilization’ and ‘association’). If the period of implementation of the SAA is successful (in terms of fulfilling all conditions and satisfying the Copenhagen criteria), it leads to the final phases: • Application for EU membership; • Accession talks, the process of negotiating the 35 chapters of the acquis comunautaire (including opening and signing the negotiations); • Signing of the Accession Treaty; • Date of Accession and joining the EU. Therefore, a country’s satisfactory track-record in implementing its SAA obligations will be an essential element for the EU to consider any membership application. Following a membership application, and on the basis of the Commission’s Opinion, the EU may decide to grant an applicant country candidate status and political recognition of a closer relationship with a country on its way towards membership, and is a necessary precondition for opening accession negotiations. Before these negotiations can be opened, however, a country needs to reach a sufficient degree of general compliance with the EU’s Copenhagen criteria: political (including full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia/ICTY, where relevant), economic, and legal. Candidates must adopt all the EU’s laws and policies. The first step consists of a check on how far the candidates’ legislation corresponds to the EU, a technical process known as ‘screening’. The European Council decides whether and when negotiations can be opened, based on a recommendation from the Commission. Fulfilment of the criteria in the Stabilization and Association Process and implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement must then continue right up to accession. SAP is a long-term policy for moving gradually from stabilization and reconstruction to association and sustainable development in a flexible and dynamic process. By introducing European values, principles and standards to the transition countries, it aims to help with their reforms, bringing them closer to EU membership (European Commission 2003:2). As Olsen (2002:928) points out, ‘the enlargement process appeals to democratic identities and values and is portrayed as consistent with liberal-democratic principles’. The main element of the SAP, the SAA, represents in itself a contractual relation between an advanced model such as the EU and a country in transition. As Landsman (2003:27) describes SAA: ‘It is not an old-fashioned bilateral treaty, or a 19th century dynastic marriage. It is not something which can be concluded and agreed in private deals between political


107

leaders based on personal friendships and opaque give and take. It is not on sale for a couple of lucrative contracts. It is not a tool in a Cold War style strategic balance. Nor is it, crucially, an agreement whose terms can be determined in isolation from the rest of the region and the rest of Europe’. Rather, the SAA is a transparent contract, which strengthens the political and economic links between countries in preparation for the country’s admission as a member of the EU. It focuses on respect for key democratic principles and the development of a market economy with the integration of the country into the EU single market. The other component of the SAP, CARDS, provides technical and financial aid to achieve these aims, which, for the period 2000-2006, was worth €4.6 billion. It has four principal aims62: • Reconstruction, democratic stabilization, reconciliation and the return of refugees; • Institutional and legislative development, including harmonization with European Union norms and approaches, to underpin democracy and the rule of law, human rights, civil society and the media, and the operation of a free market economy; • Sustainable economic and social development, including structural reform; • Promotion of closer relations and regional cooperation among countries and between them, the EU and the candidate countries of central Europe. These are, in effect, a summary of the conditions necessary to meet the Copenhagen criteria (CARDS is more fully described in Chapter 10). 4.6. The principle of conditionality, the Stability Pact for South–Eastern Europe and the Thessalonica Summit Since 1993, the principle of conditionality, associated with the Copenhagen criteria, has become central to the enlargement process. This principle was defined by the European Council in 1997. The ‘Royaumont Process and Regional Approach’ established political and economic conditionality for the relations of the EU with South-Eastern Europe. It implies a relationship in which one partner has leverage over the other through an ability to withhold a desired benefit (in this case EU member-

108


ship). Since membership is conditional on meeting the Copenhagen criteria, applicant countries modify their domestic policies and institutions to bring them into line with EU requirements. It set a series of objectives to be achieved within certain deadlines to make the country’s legal framework and policies fully compatible with those of the EU. These objectives comply with EU conditionality and are enshrined in the acquis communautaire, in the ‘Accession Partnerships’63and in the Commission’s annual reports. Democratic conditionality is achieved by specifying pre-conditions for support, involving the promise of either material aid or political opportunities. Conditionality has been like a balance between progress and meeting conditions, imposing rigorous checks on the process, but providing appropriate assistance and due rewards for progress. Besides that related to general political, economic, legal and institutional reforms, EU conditionality is applied to other specific unresolved issues in different countries of the region, such as the compliance with the Hague Tribunal (for Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina), implementation of the Ohrid Agreement (for Macedonia), or the resolution of final status of Kosovo (for Serbia and Kosovo). Therefore, conditionality has become the principal mechanism by which the EU exercises its influence on applicant countries and as a consequence the EU has become the main external focal point for domestic reforms in the applicant countries. To monitor the progress in implementing the priorities and carrying out the reforms, the EU has developed a screening mechanism by taking ‘X rays’ of every political, economic and legal aspect of the country. One of the monitoring tools to check the country’s progress, which is done regularly by the Commission and reflects ‘transparency’, is the SAP Annual Report. The Annual Reports, published since 2002 by the European Commission, follow the structure of the Copenhagen criteria, assess progress made and identify areas where the country needs to increase its efforts. Therefore, they are the basis of the assessment made by the EU on the readiness of applicant countries for joining the Union. Although the SAP is a ‘regional’ policy, that is, applied to all the countries in the region, this does not mean that all the Western Balkan countries will join the EU at the same time and that Europe will open its ‘gates’ only when all these countries are ready to enter. On the contrary, it will depend on the progress of each country in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and the pace of reforms. Therefore EU officials and politicians prefer not to discuss timetables for accession, which means that each country progresses through the accession process at its own pace and will be accessed on its own merits. Every agreement, therefore, is ‘tailor-made’, meaning it


109

takes into consideration the specific situation of each country and evaluates countries on the basis of their individual performances. The SAP has been complemented by another project, which is also an EU initiative, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. It was initially conceptualized as a ‘Marshall Plan’ for the Balkans. Initiated in 1999 by Germany, it was supported not just by EU countries, but also by the wider international community: other G-8 countries (USA, Japan, and Canada) and international organizations (OSCE, CoE, NATO, UN, and the World Bank). The Stability Pact aimed to foster the conditions set out in the ‘Royaumont Process and Regional Approach’. The Stability Pact focused on democratization and human rights, economic reconstruction and development and security issues, with the aim of accelerating the transition of the countries towards stable democracies, market economies and open pluralist societies. It would help to stimulate regional cooperation and expedite integration into European and transAtlantic structures. To benefit, countries had to cooperate and work on tensions and crises in the region, develop good regional relationships, create free trade areas, and fight against organized crime, corruption and all forms of criminal activities (World Bank 2000). The Pact’s secretariat, located in Brussels, is organized into three units: • Working Table I, dealing with issues of democratization and human rights. • Working Table II, dealing with economic reconstruction, cooperation and development matters. • Working Table III dealing with security issues. The Pact is also important in that it has increased the interest and the attention of the international community towards the Balkans. It is interesting to note the role of the international community, who seem to have developed a division of labour to assist in the transition. The EU has the task of preparing the accession countries in their economic and administrative structures. The Council of Europe has the role of promoting political democracy and human rights and provides the legal and constitutional frameworks for this, for example, through its various charters, such as the ‘European Charter on Local Self-government’ or the ‘European Convention on Human Rights’. The Council of Europe also provided direct legal assistance to the new countries in helping to write their constitutions in which were incorporated several of the Council’s charters and conventions. The ‘Venice Commission’ also known as the ‘Commission on Democracy through Law’ had an important role in these

110


processes. The OSCE, in which the US has a strong presence, is involved with wider security issues, as well as elections in this very volatile region. Besides the SAP (which was confirmed by the Thessalonica Summit of June 2003 as the overall policy framework),, the European Commission approved on 30 March 2004 the first ever ‘European Partnerships for the Western Balkans’, inspired by the ‘Accession Partnerships’, which had helped prepare countries for eventual EU membership in the past. The Partnerships are based on the third Annual Reports on these countries. They identify short- and medium-term priorities for countries’ preparation for further integration with the EU (identified in the Commission’s Annual Reports) and serve as checklists against to which to measure progress. Currently ‘Accession Partnerships’ are presented for Croatia and Turkey and ‘European Partnerships’ are presented for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo. The preparation of the Balkan countries for integration into European structures is today a major priority of the EU. As is stressed by the European Commission, however, it cannot realize this task single-handed, but has to be accompanied by a strong commitment by the countries themselves to political and economic reforms, and the adherence to the core values and principles of the Union (European Commission 2003:3). In this way, it has to be a shared agenda for European integration. As the ICB (2005:4) notes, ‘the governments and the citizens of the region are responsible for the future of their own societies and should bring their own houses in order’. The Summit of Thessalonica in June 2003 was a milestone in the relations of the EU with the Western Balkans. It assured the countries of the Western Balkans that they share ‘a common European destination’. Ahead of the summit, Commissioner Chris Patten said (EU Press Release, 2003: 1) ‘Thessalonica will send two important messages to the Western Balkans: the prospect of EU membership is real and we will not regard the map of the Union as complete until you have joined us. Nevertheless, membership must be earned. It will take hard work and the political will of those in power in the region. How far you proceed along the road towards European integration and how fast, will be up to you’. The Summit sent a strong political message along these lines to the countries and peoples of the Western Balkans: their future lies in integration into EU structures, the EU is committed to the European future of all Balkan countries, and Europe will be fully re-unified only after this region has become an integral part of it. The rate of progress of this integration, however, will depend on the performance of the countries themselves and on a wide range of reforms. While ‘dangling this carrot’ before the Balkans, the EU also


111

hedged its bets as to when this might happen since a further message was that there was no timetable for eventual membership. However, despite the prospect of raising funds, the Thessalonica Summit did not offer the Balkan countries the ‘candidate status’ as they had hoped, probably because of the complications and challenges of the last enlargement. After the Thessalonica Summit, however, there has arisen a strong belief, uniting and convincing the people and governments of the Balkans, that the region cannot achieve stability and prosperity outside the process of European integration. Instead of remaining ‘a marginalized ghetto’ in the midst of Europe, the Western Balkans have chosen to become part of the EU and to follow the path of European integration. 4. 7. Western Balkans – passengers on the same train The integration of the Balkan countries into the EU orbit has gone through several historic periods and has been performed with different approaches. In this process we distinguish four periods: The first Balkan country to join the EU was Greece, in 1981 (the second enlargement of the Union). Despite being geographically in the Balkans, ‘spoiled by fate’ Greece was able to ‘escape’ being dominated by communism (thanks to the generosity of the UK and Churchill) and became ‘politically’ part of Western Europe after WWII. As such, the country established a liberal-democratic system (except for the period of the Colonels’ dictatorship 1967-1974) and a market economy, unlike the other Balkan countries, which were all under communist rule. However, even though Greece did not fulfil many of the economic criteria needed to join the club (its economy and economic indicators were far behind other Western European countries), the EC decided to accept Greece, for political and historic reasons, being nostalgic of her ancient values, as Greece was considered the ‘European cradle of civilization’. The second country of the region which joined the EU was Slovenia (even though Slovenia refuses to consider itself as Balkan), as part of the fifth enlargement in 2004, together with other CEE countries. Slovenia was amongst the most politically and economically progressive even within this group64. The third is expected to see the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the so-called ‘Eastern Balkans’. They hope to be the next newcomers on the block, aspiring to join the EU on 1 January 2007. They are both now accession countries after signing the Accession Treaty on 25 April 2005. Their Accession Treaties are currently under ratification by the Member States65.

112


The Commission, however, continued to monitor their preparations closely and reviewed the situation in April/May 200666 and on the basis of May 16 monitoring report was then decided to review their progress by early October 2006 at the latest. It will then consider whether the 2007 accession date can be maintained and, if so, whether any safeguards or other remedial measures may be needed upon accession. This provides for accession to be postponed until 2008 for either of the countries if preparations are manifestly incomplete in important areas. In both countries, especially in Bulgaria, important issues remain, such as the judicial reform process, the fight against corruption (including at ‘high level’) and the fight against organized crime and trafficking. However, looking back at the past two years since the new member states joined in 2004, Rehn said67, ‘We have every reason to be satisfied and proud, even though there was no lack of doomsday scenarios. Yet the Cassandras were proven wrong. We can succeed equally well in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania’ The fourth, also still to come, will be the accession of the Western Balkans. With the inclusion of this group, the Balkan region will be completely part of the EU. Currently the countries within this group are at different stages along their path towards the EU. Two countries from this group, Croatia and Macedonia, have already negotiated the SAA. Macedonia was the first country among the Western Balkans to sign the SAA in April 2001, which came into force on 1 April 2004, taking the country another step forward on the road of European integration. It was followed by Croatia which signed the SAA in October 2001, after opening negotiations in 2000. Albania opened negotiations in January 2003 (i.e. three years behind them) and finally signed the SAA in June 2006 (i.e. five years behind Croatia and Macedonia). Among these five countries, Croatia is the most advanced. It is fairly prosperous even by Central European standards and certainly when compared to the ‘East Balkan’ countries of Romania and Bulgaria, with a stable political system, one of the richest parts of the former Yugoslavia and high standards of living. However, even though it had achieved most of the conditions necessary to move on to the accession phase, the talks were kept on hold for some time because of the issue of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal (the Croatian authorities were asked to deliver to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY] in the Hague the war crime suspect General Ante Gatovina68), until 3 October 2005, when the accession negotiations with Croatia were formally opened. The accession negotiation process with Croatia (together with Turkey) moved into a new phase in early February 2006, with the Council of


113

Ministers starting to examine the first screening reports from the European Commission and then in June the first accession conference with Croatia was held in Luxembourg. The Prime Minister Ivo Sanader and his committed government has set itself the ambitious target of accession in time to participate in the European elections of 200969. Macedonia has advanced considerably in its path towards membership. On 22 March 2004 it submitted an application for EU membership and on 17 May 2004 the European Council asked the European Commission to present an Opinion on this application, which is still in preparation. The European Commission ‘enlargement package’ adopted in November included a recommendation to grant candidate status to Macedonia, on the grounds of the country’s progress as a ‘success story’: a stable democracy and a functioning multi-ethnic state just four years after being on the brink of civil war. This recommendation was approved by the European Council in Brussels in December 2005, which decided to grant ‘candidate’ status to the country. The other Western Balkan countries, Serbia-Montenegro, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina are further behind. Despite not being able to fulfil the criteria for political and economic reform, another reason for delay in opening negotiations has been the lack of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal to hand over former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his military commander, Ratko Mladic. These two were sought for atrocities committed throughout Bosnia during the war (in particular for the Srebrenica massacre, when nearly 8000 people were killed). In this way, the EU, by expressing compliance with ICTY, has put the issue of bringing the people allegedly responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law to justice as an element of conditionality for opening the accession negotiations with these countries. However, Serbia and Montenegro finally opened negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) on 10 October 2005. The process is forecast to be tricky, firstly because of level of cooperation with the ICTY and secondly because the difficult political issue on the status of Kosovo, which, as noted above, represents a challenge for the entire region and for the international community. ‘The real prize is a stronger and closer relationship with the EU, and other issues should not distract your attention from this goal’, said Olli Rehn, European Commissioner for Enlargement, at the opening ceremony in Belgrade. The negotiations on the SAA were progressing well and the initial goal was to conclude the negotiations by the end of 2006. But, on May 3, the European Commission halted negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro, because the fugitive Serb general, Ratko Mladi, has not been delivered to the ICTY.


114

Table 2: The process of accession of Western Balkan countries

SAA Western Balkan

Accession

Entry

Application

Talks

into

(opening)

EU

Negotiations

31.01.2003

12.06.2006

Macedonia

2000

April 2001

21.04.04

22.03.2004

Croatia

2000

Oct. 2001

01.02.05

21.02.2003

Serbia & Montenegro (Kosovo)

10.10.2005

Albania

Bosnia & Herzegovina

25.11.2005

Entry into

Membership Signing of SAA

Countries

Opening of

force

03.10.2005 2009 ?


115

The decision was taken after the Commission received a detailed update from the Tribunal’s Chief Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, on the lack of cooperation of Serbia and Montenegro. However, as mentioned earlier, after becoming an independent state, Montenegro will continue talks on a SAA and hopes to sign it in 2006. Bosnia-Herzegovina was the last one in the group to open the negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement, on 25 November 2005. The first Official Round of negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Bosnia and Herzegovina took place on 25 January 2006. The country is now striving to go from peace building to state building and then member state building. While Croatia has opened the accession talks and Macedonia is very close to them, Albania has only recently signed its SAA. Croatia hopes to join the EU in 2009 and Macedonia perhaps in 2012, while Albania is unlikely to join the EU before 2018, if its present situation continues, and also because the period of implementation of the SAA for Albania has been set at ten years. In terms of their current status70, Croatia, the leader of the region, is now an official candidate country (together with Turkey), since 2004. Macedonia also won candidate status in December 2005. Albania, along with Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina are potential candidates, as defined by the Thessalonica Summit (see Table 1). The achievements of both Croatia and Macedonia in overcoming their problems and crises and their determination to achieve EU accession should have a powerful inspiring effect everywhere in the region, including Albania. ‘The Western Balkans – as Meksi (2003:21) notes - are passengers on the same train. Even though they have taken the train at different stations, they have a common destination with a different ticket price’. 4.8. History of Albanian’s European integration efforts: on the way towards the EU destination As we saw in the first chapter, one of the elements of the isolationist policy of Albania during the communist period was the lack of participation in international relations, reflected in the non-presence of international organizations in the country until 1990. After 1975, Albania withdrew completely from the international system and all organizations of which it was a member (even from development organizations such as WHO). The only organization of which it remained a member was the UN.

116


Therefore, one of the first challenges when Albania started to open up to the world was establishing its ties with political, economic and military international organizations and institutions and becoming integrated into their networks. Orienting its domestic developments and external relations towards the EU was one of the first and most important priorities. Since 1991, successive Albanian governments have placed European integration at the top of their political agendas. Relations between Albania and the (then) European Community (as the European Union was called before the Maastricht Treaty in 1992) started in 1991, and in 1992 a ‘Cooperation and Trade Agreement’ was signed between Albania and the (newly-named) EU (Albania was the first South-Eastern European country to conclude such an agreement). The ‘Cooperation and Trade Agreement’ was established mainly to encourage trade and democratization with Albania, but it was also a response to the humanitarian crisis of 1991. As Johnson points out (2001) ‘the Cooperation Agreements parallels the Europe Agreements process of the most advanced CEECs starting in 1991, and the Partnership Agreements offered to all countries of the former USSR signed in 19941995, with one key difference: no guarantee of eventual EU membership’. The 1992 ‘Trade, Commercial and Economic Cooperation Agreement’71 is still the current contractual relations between the EU and Albania, until the conditions for SAA conclusions are met. At the beginning of 1995, Albania officially asked for the opening of negotiations for an accession agreement with the EU. An evaluation undertaken by the Commission on the possibilities of free marketing of goods, services and capital in Albania, concluded that a ‘classic’ Agreement like those that most countries have with the EU about their membership would be a premature step for Albania (Meksi 2003:13). In January 1996, the EU Council of Ministers asked the Commission to compile a proposal for a new agreement that would strengthen Albania-EU relations (even though this was not on the level of a European Agreement). Unfortunately, the events that followed that year with the disastrous parliamentary elections in May and a year later after the collapse of pyramid schemes put a serious question-mark over Albanian democracy and the readiness of the country to progress towards integration, leaving this issue in stagnation. Only two years later, in 1999, a very important step was undertaken by the EU: the European Commission proposed a SAP for five Balkans countries, including Albania (European Commission 2003:1). This was endorsed by the Fiera Council in 2000, which confirmed that the EU’s goal was the fullest possible integration of all Western Balkan countries into the


117

economic and political mainstream of Europe and recognized them as potential candidates for EU membership (European Commission 2001:5). The 2000 Zagreb Summit was an important step in the commitment of the EU to the Western Balkans. It was there that the SAP was established by gaining from all countries of the region an agreement to a set of conditions for accession to the EU. The summit set up an ‘EU/Albania High Level Steering Group’ with the objective of stepping up cooperation and identifying and supporting the reforms to be carried out by the country in preparation for the negotiation of a SAA. After the Zagreb Summit, Albania made considerable progress in fulfilling the commitments for opening negotiations, which was reflected in the report prepared by the Steering Group. The report was presented at the European Council Meeting in Gothenburg in June 2001, on the basis of which the European Commission concluded that it was appropriate to proceed with the negotiation of a SAA with Albania. Draft negotiating directives were submitted to the Council in December 2001, and an EU-Albania Consultative Task Force (CTF) was set up with the objective of assisting Albania to prepare for the negotiation of a SAA. In November 2001, the President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, declared in Tirana that the opening of negotiations would be in March 2002, but the political stability of the country was made a condition for these to start. This, unfortunately, did not happen, because of a severe internal crisis within the Socialist Party in power during the second half of the year, which had negative implications for the reform process and the country’s political stability (Milo 2002:298). Nevertheless, the Council adopted the directives for opening the negotiation of a SAA with Albania at its meeting in Luxembourg in October 2002. The negotiations were officially launched on 31 January 2003. Since beginning in March 2004, the negotiation meetings are held every six weeks, with the pattern of one political round followed by two technical rounds. Up to date there have been 16 negotiation rounds, of which six were political rounds and ten technical. In the 7th official round of negotiations, which took place in Tirana on 8 February 2006, the SAA was finally initialled at technical level, signalling the agreement of the chief negotiators on the Commission and the Albanian side to the text which had been negotiated. Three years of negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU were brought to a formal conclusion on the 18 February 2006, while Commission President Barroso and Enlargement Commissioner Rehn were in Albania, with the initialling of the agreement. ‘It is an important step forward on the road to Europe. We now plan to take Albania’s relationship with the European Union to the next level’, said

118


Barroso72. The Stabilization and Association Agreement with Albania was signed on the margins of the June 12 General Affairs and External Relations Council in Luxembourg. The next step that needs to be taken is the ratification of the SAA by all the Member States. When the agreement comes into force, Albania has to establish a track-record in implementing it in order to move closer to the EU. The SAA establishes a comprehensive framework for reform progress and is an important step on Albania’s path towards the EU. It focuses on political dialogue, enhanced regional co-operation (including the perspective of establishing free trade areas between the countries of the region), the establishment of a free-trade area between the EU and Albania within ten years, and a gradual approximation of the Albanian legislation to the EU acquis.. Following the Thessalonica Agenda, which proposed the European Partnership document, as a necessary mechanism to take forward the European integration of the Western Balkans, the Albanian government prepared the ‘Action Plan for the Implementation of the European Partnership priorities’73. Through the European Partnership, the EU provides guidance to the Albanian authorities on reform priorities. The Government has recently prepared the ‘National Programme for the Approximation of Legislation with the Community Legislation and Implementation of the SAA’ (even though the negotiations for the signing of the SAA are still under process). It contains the main mechanisms for the programming, prioritizing and monitoring of the European integration process. From 1999, when the prospect of accession started to become a reality, relevant institutional mechanisms have been created to facilitate the preaccession and integration process and to foster the Albania-EU relationship. The importance and priority given to this process is reflected in the evolution of structures in charge of European integration, from a General Directorate of Euro-Atlantic integration at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Secretary of State for European Integration, and finally to the establishment of a fully-fledged institution, the Ministry of European Integration. Created in 2004, it is currently the body with the central role in the European integration process of Albania, whose mission is the technical direction and coordination of the integration process of the Republic of Albania with the European Union, through the approximation of domestic legislation with that of the EU, formulation of integration policies, coordination of financial aids and information of the public about this process74. The most important joint structure with the EU remains the EUAlbania Joint Consultative Task Force (CTF), set up at the Gothenburg Summit. The CTF EU-Albania, in addition to the official negotiations, has


119

been an important instrument of dialogue between the EU and Albania and for the implementation of the proper reforms that are necessary in the European integration process. The CTF, composed of working groups and joint committees, has held 12 meetings so far. These meetings monitor the progress of Albania in all the sectoral reforms based on the first three Copenhagen criteria. Another institutional structure is the Parliamentary Committee for Integration, a bi-partisan committee, which was set up in 2002. The SAP represents a historical turning point because, for the first time, a concrete path was offered to Albania in its rapprochement with the EU. The SAA offers stronger incentives for pushing ahead with the reform process, but also creates more demanding political and economic conditions on the country. But, rather than pressures, they should be considered more as opportunities that Albania can take or leave. Albania was eager to conclude the SAA negotiations, because this would imply recognition of reform progress and administrative capacity, but the talks dragged on for more than three years without any substantial progress being made in crucial areas such as corruption, organized crime, and the judicial system. Even though the Albanian government wanted to sign it since in 2004, this did not happen, as many obligations had not been fulfilled. Therefore, when asked in January 2004 by Albanian officials if a date could be agreed for signing the agreement, Romano Prodi said ‘We didn’t work for a date, we are working to perform’ (Reuters), implying that the accession is performance-related. The same message was given by Chris Patten (2004) in a speech in the German Parliament, when he said ‘I see no prospect of concluding these negotiations this year, so the coming year is crucial for Albania to demonstrate to us that it really is serious about its European policy. The choice is Tirana’s. It can work with us and move forward or it can ignore our clear messages, in which case I can only foresee stagnation in the European integration process’. Thus, EU officials have always stressed that there will no short cut to membership. 4.9. The other priority: Membership in NATO NATO membership is the other priority of Western Balkan countries. NATO is viewed as the most important security force in the region, mostly because of its efficient interventions and resolutions in various Yugoslav conflicts and wars during the 1990s, such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Membership of NATO is thought to contribute to regional stabil-

120


ity, improve the security of Western Balkan countries and to support them in reforming their security sector. Besides that, NATO membership is, ironically, the most important instrument for demilitarizing this very militarized part of Europe. It also played an important role in facilitating European integration for the CEE countries and it could do the same for the Western Balkan countries. The EU and NATO accession processes are separate, but they feature some parallels. Accession to both are meritdriven processes. Both the EU and NATO share the common goal of a free and secure Europe. Full membership of NATO has been the second most important pillar of Albania’s foreign policy, along with EU membership. In December 1992, Albania became the first former country of the Warsaw Pact (from which it withdrew in 1968, just after the USSR’s invasion of Czechoslovakia) to request membership in NATO. Albania played an important role during NATO involvement in the Yugoslav conflict, by putting at NATO’s disposal its port and air facilities. In June 2000, Albania hosted a NATO exercise, called ‘Co-operative Dragoon 2000’. The country has also expanded bilateral military ties with NATO members such as the US, Germany and Turkey and has signed military cooperation agreements with a number of states in Europe and within the region. It also joined NATO’s ‘Partnership for Peace Initiative’ in February 2004, one of the first countries in the region to do so. Together with Croatia and Macedonia, Albania is a member of the ‘US - Adriatic Charter of Partnership’, (signed in Tirana in 2003). The US has given strong support to Albania’s application for NATO membership. However, the United States cautions against further NATO expansion before 2008 and has told NATO allies any further expansion of the alliance should wait until at least 2008. The decision was a disappointment for Albania, as well as Croatia and Macedonia, which had hoped to join the alliance earlier. ‘We don’t think that the candidates that are interested in that are ready yet’ said Kurt Volker, the US principal deputy assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs75. 4.10. The future of Western Balkans and Albania lies with the EU The Balkan Wars of the 1990s caught the international community and particularly the countries of Western Europe by surprise. As Yugoslavia descended into civil war and inter-ethnic conflict, the EU, mostly ignorant of the realities in this region, fell back on outdated historical reflexes, which


121

exacerbated rather than calmed the conflict. In the end, it was the US, under the guise of NATO, which had to step in to impose a solution. These wars left behind a legacy of economic and social disruption that marks the region out as different from the CEE, whose transition to democracy and capitalism has been much smoother. Although not a former member of the Yugoslav Federation, Albania has been affected by the Balkan Wars, because of the large numbers of Albanians that were living in the Federation and with having to cope with huge numbers of refugees from Kosovo who ended up on Albanian soil, on the edge of the Serbian aggression. It has also suffered negative consequences as a result of the growth of organized crime and corruption which can be seen as side-effects of the Wars. Although it tends to be forgotten or marginalized in studies of the Western Balkans, which have concentrated on the former Yugoslavia, Albania is nevertheless at the centre of this region. In fact, it is one of the countries that are recognized as part of the region by EU programmes such as CARDS, and it is part of the SAP. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage is that Albania is eligible for these assistance programmes and has as good a chance of EU accession as any other of the Balkan states. In this it stands in contrast to Turkey (even though both countries are, at least nominally, Muslim), which has had much greater difficulty in even being recognized as a candidate because of its huge size and more ‘exotic’ nature for most west Europeans. The disadvantage is that it suffers from many of the same disadvantages of these countries, despite having successfully avoided being involved in the Yugoslav conflict. One positive feature that emerges from the analysis presented here is that the Balkans conflict has forced the EU to adopt a much more unified strategy towards the region and this, in turn, has strengthened both its foreign and its defence policy areas. This can only be to the benefit, not just of the EU as an emerging polity, but of the Balkans region itself, as the countries of this region prepare themselves for entry. For a small, impoverished and backward country such as Albania, this can only be good news. Having situated Albania in the wider Balkan context and the EU approaches to this region, we shall now turn to a more detailed analysis of Albania’s efforts to shake off its communist past and become a democratic state.

5 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: ALBANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EU ‘The orientation of the Albanian political elite towards Europe is not because they are idealistic or philosophically motivated, but, by playing the card of “integration into the EU” their sole aim is to legitimize and prolong their power’ Ardian Vehbiu (2003).

5. 1. The political structure Political parties play a crucial role in organizing and promoting political participation, formulating programme and policy alternatives, and articulating the interests of their electorate. As we saw in the first chapter about its political legacy, Albania did not inherit a tradition of democratic life and political pluralism. The first Albanian political parties, in the western meaning of the word, appeared in the early 1920s, the most prominent being: the Progressive Party led by Ahmet Zogu, the People’s Party led by Fan Noli, and the Popular Party led by Xhafer Ypi. The experiment with political pluralism, however, was short-lived and ended in 1928 when, as noted earlier, Ahmet Zogu persuaded the parliament to establish the monarchy with himself as King Zog. The communists established a singleparty state when they came to power after WWII and a multi-party system was introduced only in December 1990 in response to students’ demands for political pluralism. After 50 years in a single party state, the first opposition party was established and the regime authorized political pluralism. The transition from a single-party system to political pluralism in Albania was accompanied by the emergence and flourishing of a large number of parties. For 46 years the ruling communist party, the Party of Labour of Albania, ruled over a ‘party state’, banning all other political parties and organizations. Therefore, the eagerness and curiosity of Albanians

The Political System

123

for this new kind of freedom was reflected in the establishment by the year 2005 of around 57 parties76, a huge number for a small population of three million inhabitants. Despite the large number of political parties, however, the political system can be described as being in practice a two-party system with the Socialist Party (SP), the largest party on the left and the Democratic Party (DP), the largest one on the right. The SP is the offspring of the former communist party being established at the Tenth Congress of the Party of Labour in June 1991, after the latter had gone through several structural and ideological transformations. It revitalized its image by changing its name to the Socialist Party of Albania and by adopting west European social-democratic ideas, thus reforming the ideology of the party. Its new manifesto assumed that the SP would be a modern, progressive party and committed to democracy, social justice and economic reforms. The main element of the economic programme of the SP was the adoption of a market economy. Many believe, however, that the SP was little more than a ‘genetic mutation’ of the former communist party. It inherited and preserved from the Party of Labour its internal structure, organizational resources and nationwide network. For these reasons, it remains the best-organized party in the country. The SP was the party in power from 1997 after the unrest of pyramid schemes until it was defeated in the 2005 June elections. Its principal rival was the Democratic Party, which is described in greater detail in the next section. The post-communist political life of Albania has been dominated by a bi-polar format with these two parties of the left and right and with the centre not occupied by any large party. There are two main reasons for that. Firstly, the other political parties do not have a strong electoral following and are therefore less significant in political life. The second reason is related to the electoral formula that is primarily majoritarian (already mentioned above in the section on ‘elections’ - Chapter 3). 5.2. Political situation from 1992-1997: The ‘reign and fall’ of the Democratic Party 5.2.1. A good beginning which turned into a new ‘dictatorship’ The DP was the first opposition party to be created (it was established in December 1990). It started as a student movement against the communist regime, but soon after it became a ‘catch-all party’, with a broad base of sup-

124


port that went across all segments of society. Around the DP were gathered the prominent and best-known figures of the intelligentsia, young people, people who had suffered during the communist regime (such as former political prisoners), those who had been unsympathetic to the regime, workers and trade unions. At the same time, however, some of its founding fathers and most prominent leaders, including Sali Berisha, had been members of the communist party and to some extent inherited this communist past. Upon its creation, the DP committed itself to a multi-party system, the introduction of a free market and a European future for Albania. The campaign posters of the DP in the elections of 1992 displayed symbols of the European Community. The projection of ‘Europe’ as the immediate answer to the problems the country was facing just after communism, however, may have been more a result of the immaturity and inexperience of the political class of that time, than of a sophisticated political analysis. In the first truly free elections of 1992, the DP, led by Berisha, won an overwhelming majority of votes, confirming its steady movement away from communism. The DP initiated economic reforms (by applying radical free market ‘shock therapy’ policies), moved the country out of isolation by developing links with western countries and international organizations and committed itself to democratic change. But while being credited with the ‘economic miracle’ (already described above in chapter 3), as well as with bringing the country to order by ending the social chaos, in the political sphere things started to look different. Once in power, the DP began to abandon the programme of political pluralism and to use undemocratic methods of ruling. The erosion of democratic principles first started within the party itself and the symptoms of the lack of internal democracy soon became evident: dialogue and debate were increasingly disregarded, a climate of intolerance developed and factions banned, and the ‘cult of the individual’ in its leadership was rapidly developing. From a party with a broad support of all segments of society, the DP began to distance itself from former political prisoners, who initially were its strong supporters, for refusing to follow strong rightwing nationalist policies. The progress of democracy was endangered by an obsessive desire for power. Many individuals and groups (including some of its ‘founding fathers’) were either expelled from the party or left disillusioned with the lack of internal democracy and autocratic leadership style of Berisha. Many of them subsequently went on to create new parties (see below): in 1992, Gramoz Pashko (former Deputy Prime Minister), Arben Imami, Neritan Ceka and Prec Zogaj; in 1994, Petrit Kalakula and Abdi Baleta; in 1997, Dashamir Shehi, Bashkim Kopliku (both former Deputy


125

Prime Ministers) and Genc Ruli77 (former Finance Minister); in 1999, Genc Pollo (former Deputy Chairman), Tritan Shehu (former Party Chairman and Deputy Prime Minister), as well as a number of high profile individuals, such as the party chairman Eduard Selami. The most prominent negative feature of this ‘new rulership’ was the establishment of a highly centralized presidential system and a heavy concentration of power on the then president (Berisha). The President was central to almost all decision-making processes and power was taken away from parliament and the executive (the parliamentary opposition had ceased to exist as an effective political force). As a result, the country was more like an executive presidency than a parliamentary democracy, which it was supposed to be according to the existing Constitution. The level of politicization and nepotism in public administration, judiciary and all other state institutions was alarming: they were filled with DP members, militants, loyalists and those from northern Albania. Many accused the president of giving northerners senior positions, reflecting the regional divisions in Albanian society between north and south. Authoritarian tendencies also started to appear in the media, which focused on the messages of the exclusive powers of the President. State control of television and radio and censorship started to be evident in the media and press. The reppression of political opposition became problematic and the opposition was rejected. Opposition leaders and journalists were labelled ‘communists’, ‘criminals’ or ‘enemies of democracy’ and were intimidated, arrested or jailed (among those imprisoned was Fatos Nano, the leader of the Socialist Party and later Prime Minister). The political rallies of opposition parties were banned everywhere. Another feature was the increasing reliance on the security services, with the revival of a sigurimi78 style apparatus. The DP’s HQ looked more like a sultanate, surrounded by bodyguards and northerners from the Tropoja region. The mafia proliferated and started to flourish in this climate. There were persistent allegations of corruption and nepotism by high DP politicians and officials and even that Albania’s government had been involved in organized crime, including drug trading and embargo-busting, especially in violation of UN sanctions towards Yugoslavia from 1992-95. Even though the party tried to launch a campaign to fight corruption, the anticorruption drive did not reach the senior politicians and government officials, because Berisha seemed to be unwilling to address corruption at the top (even though he himself was perceived as incorruptible). As a result of the monopolization of political power, Albania, under the DP, came to resemble the ‘one-party state’ of the communist regime

126


before it. Critics alleged that what had changed was a new type of nomenklatura and the ruling political elite. At the end of its rule, the Berisha regime, instead of constructing a state based on the rule of law, constructed a police state; instead of developing a market economy, it developed an economy of cheating firms; instead of building a democracy, it built an autocracy. Many critics felt that Albanian political life had returned to a new kind of dictatorship. As Duffy (2000:84) expresses it, ‘After decades of authoritarianism, the people felt threatened by Hoxha’s reincarnation’. 5.2.2. The failure of the Constitution and the farce of the 1996 elections It is clear nevertheless that, in this early period, there was a major retreat from a real and functioning parliamentary democracy. The EU and other international organizations were aware of reports coming from Albania about the lack of democracy, undemocratic ruling methods and the rise of organized crime. The DP was increasingly viewed not just by the opposition, but also by a large part of the population as a source of repression, corruption and criminality. These perceptions damaged the reputation of the DP and as a result, public confidence in government and the popularity of the DP declined considerably, even among those who, a couple of years earlier, had been its sympathizers. This alienation became increasingly worse and one of the first signs of widespread disappointment was the failure of the referendum in 1994 on the first post-communist constitution, which was designed to create a strong centralized presidency along the lines of that already established by Berisha. Therefore, the defeat of the referendum was more a sign of discontent with the Berisha regime than with the constitution itself. As such, it shattered the powerful DP establishment and gave the first sign of the big cataclysm that was to come. This failure was followed by the 1996 elections, in which history seemed to turn back: the DP, with its economic and organizational supremacy (like the Party of Labour only five years before), ran a high-profile and vigorous campaign with huge funds, and control of the media, while the opposition SP had a severe lack of funding and was not even allowed to present its campaign on TV or to hold rallies. The result was one of the most shameless vote-stealing and manipulative elections ever. The aim of the DP was not just to win the elections, but also to mark a deep victory with spectacular results: the DP won 122 out of 140 seats (or 87 per cent), while the SP won only five, which meant a parliament controlled by a single party. All these showed clearly the resilience of the com-


127

munist legacy/heritage, as well as an obsessive desire to remain in power. Elections were followed by widespread criticisms from the international community: OCSE, the EU, CoE and the US State Department, all of whom contested and asked for the elections to be repeated (even though the EU and European countries did not sustain their criticism, while Washington was the most outspoken critic). But the DP ignored their requests and went on of proclaiming its deep and ‘deserved’ victory. The political cost of this stubbornness started to show its first signs: the US who, at first, simply requested the repeat of elections only in some zones where irregularities were higher, two months later called for completely new elections. Just after the elections, the international community started to reevaluate its attitude to the DP. The EU halted further cooperation agreements other than those already agreed. However, the tone of criticism of the EU and European countries, in particular the two neighbours, Italy and Greece, was much lower, being concerned that the political instability in the country would lead to new waves of emigrants. The US, on the other hand, did not recognize the results and started to review its relationship with Albania (including its assistance programmes). From being the strongest and most supportive international ally, the US turned into the biggest critic of the DP after the elections and could not wait to get Berisha out of power. The loss of international support, especially of the Americans, and the contesting of the legitimacy of the elections, seriously damaged the future of the DP. The DP paid heavily for this failure to respond to criticism from international organizations, especially the USA, when, only a year later, armed revolt broke out.79 5.2.3. Pyramid schemes and the following popular uprising The event that gave the final kick to the DP’s rule was the failure of the ‘pyramid schemes’. These were financial conglomerates, linked to organized crime, which had been present in Albania since 1992, but flourished especially during 1995-96, a period in which thousands of Albanians invested (and then lost) their savings in them. In contrast to other East European countries and Russia where these get-rich-quick schemes also mushroomed, in Albania they had two original features: firstly, they operated for a longer period and secondly, they involved a larger number of people. Other contributing factors were a poor understanding on the part of the population about the market economy and a lack of knowledge about financial institutions and investment operations. Albania also lacked

128


a functioning banking system and legal investment opportunities. The circulation of this large amount of money artificially increased the living standards of the population and, on the other hand, encouraged laziness: they offered such high returns (some of them interest rates of up to 50 per cent a month) that many people gave up their jobs or were no longer interested in seeking employment, because of the flow of money received without the need for work. These high returns could be explained only by their connection with the money laundering operations of the Albanian and Italian mafias, as well as other crime organizations who were laundering their profits from weapon trafficking, drugs, smuggling, and other criminal activities. What was worse, the schemes were not only permitted, but were also even supported and promoted by the Democratic Party government, which maintained close links with some of the companies. Even in the summer of 1996, when the operation of pyramids came to a climax, the DP did not take any action against them such as closing them down, fearing this would provoke a huge popular backlash and subsequently lead to a loss of power. Not only the party in power, but the opposition parties and media as well, were all supportive of the schemes. There were even allegations that senior government officials and politicians (from both the DP and SP) had themselves been involved in some of these suspicious activities and had close ties with the schemes. Even the international financial organizations, such as FMI and WB, did not intervene in time, only giving the alarm at a late stage. By 1996, there were around nine companies operating as pyramid schemes, some of which (most notably Vefa Holding) had or claimed to have legitimate businesses. These ‘Pozzi’ schemes made the banks irrelevant and dried up capital for investments. At the end (by January 1997), they were estimated to have accumulated $2 billion and a big proportion of the national capital. Thousands of people had invested all their household finances in them, some having sold everything they had - properties, houses, farms and belongings. No wonder their failure, at the beginning of 1997, produced such widespread unrest and brought the country to the brink of civil war. Violent protests broke out in most of the cities, especially in the south, giving way to an armed revolt. Hundreds of people robbed army depots, warehouses and military bases (left abandoned by police and military forces) and took large amounts of weapons and ammunition (almost one million Kalashnikovs fell into the hands of civilians). The picture followed was one of total anarchy (many government buildings, state institutions, industries and shops were attacked and looted), especially after the involvement of


129

criminal gangs (particularly in Vlora) in the armed revolt, a breakdown of state authority and serious political disorder. Thousands of people were killed and many more wounded. Berisha’s rule collapsed. Many believed that Berisha and the DP betrayed the ideals Albanians had fought for in 1990. Paradoxically the DP had started with the aspiration of bringing democracy to Albania, but had degenerated into a very authoritarian and undemocratic party. 5.3. Political situation after 1997 5.3.1. Socialists back in power The uprising was followed by fresh elections, which were held in 1997. The election campaign was one of the most violent and least democratic observed in post-communist countries. However, the elections were considered by the international community as acceptable given the specific circumstances. The SP won these elections with an overwhelming majority, (especially in the south), capturing 101 out of 140 seats in the parliament. However, it should be stressed that these elections were only a formality, because it was the mass uprising that brought the Socialists to power. The elections were considered more a defeat for the Democrats than a victory for the Socialists. The SP did not represent the best alternative and it had not reformed itself sufficiently to be accepted by the Albanian people and by the international community, therefore its victory was more an expression of anger of the people about the pyramid schemes and bad governance by the DP, rather than sincere votes for the Socialists. Moreover, it was widely believed that the SP was behind the armed revolt, by welcoming and orchestrating it, and had used it as a long-awaited opportunity to come finally to power. In his speech of resignation in July, Berisha accused the Socialists of taking advantage of the situation created by the collapse of the pyramid schemes to organize a ‘communist’ armed rebellion. The SP for their part did make every effort to take advantage of the situation, some of the opposition leaders even collaborating with the rebels, which later created the conditions for political influence of mafia and criminal individuals. A broad-based coalition was created, which would lead the country to its economic and political recovery. Politically, right after assuming power, the Socialist government, just as the DP had done five years before, started cleansing Democrats from public administration, foreign service, academia, judiciary, state-controlled media, police, customs, taxation, and put-

130


ting their own people into the key positions. Interestingly, many of those in positions of power and in senior posts were the sons and daughters of the old nomenklatura (who had been in power in the communist era). During Nano’s imprisonment which lasted three years (on charges of misappropriation of foreign aid), the SP created the image of a united leadership (unlike the DP). But right after the disastrous elections in 1996, conflicts within the leadership of the SP started to emerge. In its first governing years, the SP seemed to be more tolerant and moderate than the DP and generally internal democracy was much better. Its leader Nano seemed to be open-minded, refined and cultured, offering a more moderate and tolerant approach, a more relaxed atmosphere and greater political pluralism within his party and in politics generally. Although factions were evident, no one was expelled from the party, despite the increasing divisions between the traditional Marxist conservatives on one side (represented by the deputy chairman Servet Pellumbi) and, on the other, Nano and the young generation calling themselves ‘Euro-Socialists Youth Forum’, who wanted the party to get rid of its past ideological inheritance and advocated a more modern party identity. The Socialists, unlike the Democrats, shifted power from the president (Rexhep Mejdani) to the Prime Minister Nano. Realizing the crucial role of the international community, the new government immediately started to modify their attitude towards it and to soften their anti-American rhetoric. 5.3.2. Commitment to restore the country and restart the reforms After coming to power, the SP, under the leadership of Fatos Nano, committed itself to restoring public order in Albania and to restarting the political and economic reforms. The reappropriation of weapons from the armed civilians and the restoration of law and order were the most immediate tasks for the new government. The country was still in a state of anarchy. The safety and security of ordinary citizens were still not guaranteed, given that armed and violent bandits together with convicted criminals (who had escaped from prison) were still shooting, looting and terrorizing the population. The devastating unrest destroyed much of the economic progress that had been accomplished since the transition from communism. From being a star economic performer, Albania was transformed overnight into economic paralysis, followed by economic hardship, increased poverty, unemployment, inflation all of which led to reluctance on the part of foreign


131

investors to invest (most of them withdrew during the unrest). Therefore, the revival of the economy and putting the country’s finances back in order were among the daunting tasks of the new government. The Socialists realized they did not have much choice but to continue following the liberal free market economic approach initiated by the DP (such as privatization, etc), which they had criticized while in opposition. As soon as Albania started to recover from the disaster of the pyramid schemes, another political crisis happened in the autumn of 1998. A key DP leader from the northern district of Tropoja, Azem Hajdari, was assassinated. His assassination was interpreted by the DP as politically motivated and orchestrated by the Socialists, but it was later proved that it was carried out by rival criminal groups for control of weapon trafficking on the eve of the conflict in Kosovo. Hajdari, with strong Kosovo connections, was apparently killed as a result of his involvement in the selling of arms to Kosovo factions during the summer of 1998 (ICG 2003:4). This event, however, was enough to mobilize a new wave of violent protests organized by the DP, which brought the capital into anarchy once more. Nano fled the country and the government was paralysed. The international community condemned the uprising and accused the DP of trying to get power back through an illegitimate coup. The other crisis, which was not domestic but regional, came in 1999, when the conflict broke out in Kosovo. It was estimated that a huge influx of 500000 refugees (equal to 16 per cent of Albania’s population) came to Albania in the wake of Serb aggression. The Albanian population showed a strong sense of brotherhood and hospitality, hosting refugees in their homes, even though they were extremely poor themselves. The Albanian government, led by Pandeli Majko (who replaced Nano after his resignation), handled the situation and showed a high sense of responsibility domestically and in the region by providing a safe haven both for refugees and for NATO military forces. This fact, and the willingness of Albania to host a huge number of refugees, despite its own poverty and difficult economic situation, were highly praised by the international community. 5.3.3. Another eight years of governance failure The Socialist government, mostly under the leadership of Fatos Nano, in the years that followed has been characterized as poor, ineffective and irresponsible. This is evident from the current political and socio-economic situation of Albania we described above in Chapter 3. Corruption and

132


organized crime became much worse than during the reign of the Democrats and strong ties between Socialist politicians and officials with criminal elements were strengthened. Nano’s government was infamous in its last years for its irresponsible and arrogant leadership and corruption. Nano’s proximity to other corrupt leaders, most notably Italians, such as with Craxi in the beginning of the 1990s and currently with Berlusconi, is notorious. He was widely alleged to be under strong Greek influence, which is shown in his preferential treatment to the Greek companies. The SP, unlike the DP, did not experience any splits and the setting up of break-away parties for quite a long time. But in 2004, after continuous disputes, power struggles and vicious rows between Nano and Meta, the latter, who had battled unsuccessfully to replace Nano as party leader, finally broke with the SP and together with other Socialists created a new party, called the ‘Socialist Movement for Integration’, which claimed to be reformist. This was the only faction to split from the SP since its creation in 1991. 5. 4. Polarization of the political system The Albanian political scene is marked by deep polarization. There is a remarkable lack of tangible policy issues in the party political programmes, instead the political debate turns on the personalities of the leaders of the two main political parties, Berisha and Nano (now replaced as SP leader by Edi Rama, the mayor of Tirana). The political style is characterized by harsh political confrontation and uncivilized political behaviour, especially during election campaigns (which are full of ruthless and militant rhetoric) and public debates, and by a lack of political dialogue and a spirit of cooperation. The political atmosphere has been volatile and conflictual and the political scene is completely dominated by power struggles not just between the political parties but also within them. This is true of all political systems and, indeed, politics is the non-violent resolution of political conflicts. However, democratic politics implies a respect for the ‘rules of the game’ and of the legitimacy of political opponents. In the highly-charged and volatile atmosphere of Albanian politics, opponents are considered more as ‘enemies’ than as legitimate political opponents. The worst example of this conflict was given by the two main political leaders, Berisha and Nano, whose relations were characterized by a constant fierce personal rivalry. The Berisha-Nano rivalry is now replaced by the Berisha-Rama rivalry, which appears to be no less virulent. The reasons for these savage relations within the political elite are


133

because parties lack a tradition of consensual and democratic culture and the political process is archaic. More importantly, the political programmes of the parties have not been challenged by realistic alternatives and by clear policies, and their rule has been accompanied by a systematic abuse of power. This has led to very poor and ineffective governance and the failure to implement the promised reforms. 5. 5. The opposition In a functioning democratic state, the Opposition should be part of the legitimate ‘governance’ of the country, even if not forming the government. They are part of its successes as much as its failures. In Albania, during the years of pluralist democracy, the political parties in power have tried to exclude the opposition parties from the policy process. This is partly explained by the fact that during communism there were no political opposition or dissident groups such as existed in other CEE countries. In the early years after the communists came to power and afterwards, any attempts to oppose the Party of Labour and the cult of Enver Hoxha were brutally suppressed, with the political dissidents ending up in political prisons or being deported or executed. This mentality and approach remained even after the establishment of political pluralism. This has meant that the opposition has been weak and excluded from the political process and has never developed a constructive and coherent opposition, capable of competing for power. The attitude of the opposition, of whatever political hue, has been the purely negative one that ‘the duty of the opposition is simply to oppose’ rather than to offer clear, convincing and better sets of alternative policies. The favourite weapons of the opposition have been simply to boycott, or to hold street protests and meetings, which are sometimes violent. ‘The goal of every opposition’s efforts has been only to replace people, not to improve the situation’, points out Lubonja (2004). Alternation in power demonstrates balanced party competition and is an indicator of a healthy and functioning democracy, it stimulates leadership renewal and policy innovation. Cole (1998:35) points out that ‘democratic alternation is a key measurement of any liberal democracy’. In Albania, on the contrary, removal from power is perceived as a catastrophe for the party, because the politicians and state officials lose the ‘paradise’ of privileges, luxurious lifestyles and their high social status, which they only have from being in power. ‘The institution of resignation’ as a democratic institution, often crucial for the resolution of political crises, is

134


not considered as an option and has been rarely applied in the political life of Albania, even when it was desirable and necessary (after total failures of governance), or even in cases when politicians or officials have been involved in numerous scandals. 5. 6. Small parties The political spectrum in Albania has become increasingly very ‘colourful’: various parties with all kinds of names and programmes have been created, though most of them are ‘phantom’ political parties, without a largescale popular following and electorate, and with limited grassroots and small membership. As Biberaj (1998:275) points out, ‘with the exception of the Democratic and Socialist Parties, few looked like real national parties, most did not develop deep-rooted group loyalties or much popular support, they had no clear social basis and minimal institutionalization…most parties are still loose agglomerations of disparate groups rather than genuine parties linked to articulate constituencies’. The most important among the small parties have been: the Republican Party (founded in January 1991) as the second opposition party, further to the right than the DP and focused in its programme on the thorny property issue; the Social Democratic Party, centre-left (founded in April 1991); and Union for the Protection of Human Rights (created in February 1992), which started as Omonia, representing the Greek minority and then expanded to all the ethnic groups. Even though it claims to represent all ethnic groups, in reality its stronghold is in the ethnic Greek areas in the south of the country. There are also two historical parties, established during WWII: the Legality Movement (Legaliteti) which advocated King Zog’s return, and the National Front (Balli Kombetar), an anti-communist resistance movement which aimed at the establishment of a democratic republic and re-unification of all ethnic Albanian territories. Being abolished in the country during communism, they continued their activity in the diaspora, mainly in the US. They both had a revival when political pluralism was established and their social base was former political prisoners and former landowners. As right–wing parties, they promoted the property issue, as well as nationalist issues, by supporting the idea of the unification of Albania with other Albanian-inhabited territories in the Balkans. The Legality Movement campaigns for a constitutional monarchy under King Leka, but the idea of monarchy has not been supported by young people or professional elites.


135

The defeat of the referendum on monarchy in 1996 showed this clearly (even though the campaign was led by Leka Zogu himself, who then alleged that the result had been manipulated by the SP). There are no significant parties of the extreme left or extreme right. The new Communist Party (on the left) and the Party of National Unity (on the right) have had a very weak electorate backing. There are two parties of a religious nature: the Christian Democratic Party (a parliamentary party with its electorate base mainly among the Catholic population in the north) and the newly established Islamic Party. As a result of party fragmentation, internal fissures and sometimes an intolerant atmosphere within the big parties, over the years new groups of factions broke off from both the DP and SP and went on to create new parties. It needs to be stressed though that these splits have been driven mainly by personal rivalries and internal fights for power, rather than over political beliefs and principles. The first party to be created (in September 1992), as a result of a split from the DP, was the Democratic Alliance Party, a centre-right party, from a group of the DP ‘founding fathers’, after they were expelled from the DP. They offered a more moderate and centrist alternative and claimed to represent the intellectual, middle-class and urban stratum. Next the Democratic Party of the Right split from the DP in 1994; the Movement for Democracy Party split from the DP in 1997; the Reformed Democratic Party was another group which split from the DP in 1999; the Socialist Movement for Integration split from the SP in 2004; and the Social Democratic Union and the Social Democracy Party were two groups which split from Social Democratic Party respectively in 1994 and in 2001. There have been also other minor break-ups, from the previous break-aways, of big parties, such as in the Reformed Democratic Party in 2001 and in Democratic Alliance Party in 2002. Even though presenting more moderate and progressive alternatives and having prominent intellectuals within them, these new parties unfortunately have not played any significant role in political life, not just because of their size, but because of their inability to gain electoral support. Instead of strengthening and increasing their influence and credibility with the Albanian population, they have been marginalized and have ended up as ‘coffee-talk parties’, dividing into other smaller parties. Great hopes for any of them to become a new influential political force to challenge either the DP or SP, so desirable for the political life of Albania, vanished soon after their creation. Among them, the Reformed Democratic Party, led by Genc Pollo, is the most modern and progressive party, where the internal democracy and other fair democratic rules are very much respected.

136


5.7. Party coalitions Since the political scene has been continuously dominated by two parties, pluralism is something of an empty phrase. As mentioned above in Chapter 2, one of the reasons for this is the current electoral law, which favours the big parties. The minimal national average percentage of the vote a political party has to receive in order to gain a place in parliament is just 2.5 per centl80. But although this threshold is very low, only a few political parties manage to achieve it and, of those who do, barely any of them manage to receive more than 4 per cent of the vote during national elections. Even though there are currently 14 political parties represented in parliament, only two of them (besides the SP and DP) the Social Democratic Party and Reformed Democratic Party, won them through the majoritarian vote. The rest won the seats through proportional representation as ‘gifts’ given from DP or SP in exchange of their support. Thus the total percentage of seats by smaller parties does not reflect their real electoral strength. The survival of small parties depends to a large extent on their ability to ally with either of the main political parties. Thus they enter into alliances with either of the two main political parties, creating coalitions, by being more like satellites around them. Party coalitions were also a new phenomenon in Albanian political life (for 50 years the PL ruled alone). The first governmental coalition was formed in 1991 while the SP was in power. From 1992 until 1994, the DP was in coalition with the Republican and Social Democratic Parties (the latter have been with the Socialists between 1997 and 2005). The government which resulted from the 1996 elections was the only one without any coalition, and the DP governed alone until it lost power in 1997. After 1997, the SP governed with a broad-based coalition, composed of its left-wing allies (mainly with the Social Democratic Party) and with some centre-right parties (such as the Democratic Alliance and Union for Human Rights). The DP and SP have had only two short-lived transitional governmental coalitions together (national unity or technical government), forced by the highly dramatic domestic situation: in 1991 after the first multi-party elections when the country was in an economic crisis, and in 1997 when the armed revolt began after the collapse of pyramid schemes. The opposition parties in their turn have tried to create coalitions under various labels and slogans, which most of the time have been very loose and short-lived, such as the coalition of right-wing political forces in 1995 called the Albanian Right League, or pre-electoral alliances such as another right-wing coalition called the United Albanian Right (E Djathta e Bashkuar) in 1997 and


137

Unity for Victory (Bashkimi per Fitore) created by the DP in 2001. Some odd coalitions have been observed in Albanian political life such as the alliance of the Monarchists with the Republicans (the Legality Movement with the Republican Party within the opposition coalition Unity for Victory), the coalition of the DP (a right-wing party) with the Union for Human Rights (which represents the minorities’ rights). Therefore the main reason for small parties not being important and influential in the political life of the country is not so much the electoral law, but the parties themselves. They have not yet managed to transform themselves into powerful and influential political forces. Their efforts have been more concentrated in getting a few seats in parliament or the odd ministerial post for their presidents or chairmen. The coalitions have not been real alliances, just bargains between the chairmen for their selfish and materialistic benefits. 5.8. Partitocrazia Partitocrazia is ‘rule by parties’ in their own interests, rather than in the general interest of society and the country. Political parties in Albania, especially the two main ones, the SP and the DP, play an important role not just in political life, but also in the overall life of the country. That influence is so big that often it is difficult to tell where the state ends and the parties begin, a system similar to the old Italian partitocrazia before the Italian constitutional reforms of the 1990s. This in fact was related to the communist legacy, since during communism the party was the state and also dominated every aspect of society. Even though the DP, since in its first election platform (in 1992), had called explicitly for the separation of the state from the party, in reality it was not respected and the phenomenon of the partitocrazia became highly evident. Over the last decade there has been a harsh struggle by the political parties for the control of the state and its institutions, which have been subordinate to and used by political parties. They were even used to support and consolidate the rule of the political party in power. This identification of the state with the political party in power has been a prevailing feature of the Albanian political scene. One of its unfortunate consequences, as Kajsiu et al. (2002:6) argue, ‘has been the collapse of the state along with that of the political party in power’.

138


5.9. Internal party democracy The issue of internal party democracy is very important for Albanian political parties, so important that it is probably the main challenge parties are facing. There are some indicators or components to evaluate the degree of democracy within a party such as: internal electoral processes, the existence or co-existence of party factions, the degree of internal debate and discussions, the degree of decentralization, and the leadership style. The present shortcomings related to internal democracy in all Albanian parties can be explained firstly by their historical background. The SP derived from the former communist party, inheriting much of the organizational structures and tradition of its predecessor the Party of Labour, while the DP, even though established as an opposition to communism, has not been able to develop into a real internally democratic party. Secondly, a large number of members and leaders in both parties used to be PL members, and therefore inherited an intolerant and ‘unitarist’ mentality and the same old methods. Thirdly, there is the lack of democratic tradition and political experience, as well as the previous political system’s legacy. All these traits are reflected in deficiencies and undemocratic practices and attitudes inside Albanian parties (although in some parties more than others): the lack of tolerance and dialogue; the banning of factions and alternative ideas or critics within the party; the lack of courage to speak up for fear of being dismissed from the party or being considered as ‘traitors’; the lack of transparency with decisions not being taken openly or by consensus (it is more a case of decision-imposing than consensus-seeking); authoritarian leadership practices; little room for discussion and debate, especially when it come to opinions and views that differ with those of the leadership or the chairman of the party; and the style of command rather than bargaining. Parties, therefore, are marked by a personalistic style of leadership. It is a known fact that the DP has been more autocratic than the SP and its leader, Berisha, has a greater authority over his party. Factions are not permitted at all and when they are exposed they have been ‘kicked out’ of the party or left of their own volition. All the dissidents have failed in their efforts to challenge the establishment of the party, ending up marginalized or being forced to create new parties. Within the SP there has been a much greater freedom for internal debates and discussions. Factions are often visible in this party. The diversity of factions and views within them is also very evident in the Reformed Democratic Party. Another phenomenon is party capture, which is the domination of the party by an individual (usually the president), a group of people (the presi-


139

dent and his supporters), or a clan. Political parties remain to a great extent vehicles and ‘properties’ of their leaders. Therefore, they are identified by their presidents (the so-called party of ‘president + seal’), ‘who rule the parties in an autocratic manner’ (Shkupi 2003). The mentality and behaviour of the parties’ leadership in general and of their presidents in particular, is that they are the party bosses and behave as if they ‘own’ the parties. Another component of internal party democracy is the internal electoral process. Usually there are two kinds of election within the party: firstly, the selection of candidates for the national elections, and secondly, the election of individuals to the highest decision-making positions of the party (chairman, executive, etc.). Technically, the electoral process refers to different procedures, such as the way the voting process takes place, if the voting process is open or secret, and the way the votes are counted. Politically, it is related to the degree and the way in which the leadership of the party uses its power and influence to affect the outcome, in order to select the candidates they are interested in. The selection of candidates who are not popular with or desirable to the membership or electorate is an indicator of a lack of internal democracy. Unfortunately, the evidence over the years of transition has shown that all the internal electoral processes in Albanian political parties are characterized as problematic and the competition within the party structures is not free and fair. Let’s start with the first one: the selection of the candidates who will stand for the national elections. The names are usually decided within a very limited group of people, e.g. the ‘party oligarchs’ at the centre (the president and his immediate circle) and then only formally approved in the decision-making bodies such as the National Assembly, Steering Committee National Councils or National Committees. Therefore, the process of selection of candidates by their political parties does not create the conditions for the grassroots membership of the party to select people who can best represent the interests of the electorate. On the other hand, local party structures and local authorities have little or no impact at all on the selection. Therefore, there is a need to democratize the nominating process by empowering ordinary party members at the base and the local party structures. The second one: election to the highest decision-making body or other leading structures of the party. In all the political parties the leader and leadership are elected through decision-making forums that bring together candidates from all the local branches. These decision-making forums, such as the Congress of the party (the highest forum), usually meet every four years. What happens is that the party leadership makes every effort to ensure that the delegates chosen to participate in the Congress are their

140


supporters and will vote for them. The delegates are usually the loyal people or those who owe favours to the party’s leaders. They are carefully selected by the branch chairmen who are in most cases loyal supporters of the party president. Sometimes participants do not even know most of the names they vote for. Therefore, as Kajsiu argues (2004:15) ‘the legitimacy of the delegates to these forums, and thus the legitimacy of the forum itself is at best questionable and at worst absent…the leaders use these forums simply to perpetuate their power, as indicated by the fact that neither political party has had a leadership change since the fall of communism’. This was true at least until 2005 when Edi Rama replaced Fatos Nano as leader of the SP following their election defeat in June of that year. The same thing happens for selection of the members to the leading structures (National Assembly, Steering Committee, National Council, National Committee) the party leaders, in particular the president, use all kind of methods such as buying votes, promising executive posts or money, threatening to take away people’s existing jobs or posts (especially in the case of the party in power). The phenomenon of vote-trafficking has become very common, especially in the SP, being practised widely by its former leader Nano (not only within his party, but also in parliament with other opposition MPs). Thirdly, the election of the president and leadership: political parties over these 14 years have produced leadership castes, who take important decisions without taking into consideration the interests and aspirations of their membership and their electorate. This has brought about the detachment of the parties both from their electorate and membership. These castes have been dominated either by one individual (such as the case of the DP) or have been a struggle between two or three main leaders (as in the SP). The castes are usually elected from the delegates of the party congress, who are paid off by the leadership by posts in return for votes. In this way, the pyramidal structure of the parties creates the possibility of ‘vote traffic’. Therefore the Albanian parties are not ‘electoral parties’, in the sense that neither the selection of candidates for elections, nor those for the leading structures of the party, are made directly by the members according to the principle of ‘one member, one vote’ (Zaloshnja 2004). By introducing the new approach of ‘one member, one vote’, the president, the leadership and the national assembly of the party would be elected directly by the entire membership of the party, avoiding abusive practices such as the current mode of selection of delegates to the congress. In this way they would be more representative of and accountable to the membership that has elected them, and on the other hand would give the opportunity for every member to be part of the decision-making processes within the party. This would


141

also minimize the ‘party capture’ phenomenon. These measures, along with a more genuine representation in national decision-making forums, would have two positive effects: they would create both more space for competition as well as a higher quality of party candidates. The Reformed Democratic Party is the first party which approved the principle of ‘one member, one vote’ in its National Council in July 2004. At the beginning of 2005, the SP (under the influence of National Democratic Institute/NDI) also signed the memorandum for the application of this principle. Unfortunately this approach, which could decentralize and improve the voting process, needs time to be put into practice, firstly because those who are in the leadership of the party are not interested in changing things for the better, and secondly it requires better party financing since such electoral processes are quite costly, as well as a better information management system for party membership (currently none of the parties has computerized lists or any other records such as a data base for their membership). Another way of improving internal democracy is through decentralization of the political system itself (see Chapter 9), which would improve the centre–base relationship. In effect, the highly centralized political and administrative system inherited from the communist regime means that parties themselves reflect the system, and the base is under the direct control of the centre. With weak local government with scant resources, there is little incentive to produce strong local leaders, and this allows the party hierarchy to dominate the party and use the local level to consolidate its own grip. This is one of the features of a partitocrazia system. With political and administrative decentralization and the development of regional and local democracy, there is a stronger likelihood that local and regional leaders will emerge and thus modify the grip of the central echelons over the party. In this context, the need for increased democratization within political party structures has been emphasized as a first and important step towards greater democratization in Albania in general (Kajsiu 2004:14). Greater democratization within the parties, building the capacities of the political parties, structural reforms, improving the parties’ efficiency and democratic culture are needed. 5.10. Ideological / political identity At the onset of political pluralism, the two major political groupings were positioned clearly on the left and right of the political spectrum. The SP, after its ideological transformation, positioned itself programmatically

142


along the lines of a democratic socialist party, following the tradition of the West European left and identified with the principles of European social democratic parties. The main supporters of the Socialist Party came from those social groups that had been sympathetic to the communist regime. Its new members were often the offspring of the former communists but having more moderate and open attitudes than their parents. The Democratic Party, created in opposition to the communist regime, positioned itself as a right-wing party. It would draw, at least in its initial phases, from those segments of the population that either had been persecuted during communism, or from those who were unsympathetic to the regime. These were mostly young people, students, as well as educated people and intellectuals. The anti-communist propaganda, which initially made the DP very popular, by the late 1990s had become anachronistic and irrelevant. Therefore, the glue which brought together all these different groups of people when the DP was created in the 1990s, to bring down communism, by 2000 had come apart and as a result neither the DP as a ‘catch-all party’, nor the anti-communist rhetoric, (rather than economic factors), were shaping their ideological and partisan preferences. Later developments started to blur these divisions between the two big parties and their immediate allies. The political class, although they declared themselves to be on the right or the left, did not in fact develop clear and differentiated political identities. On the contrary, each of them has tended to represent sections of the whole electorate and society. Despite what is written in their manifestos, in party statutes and rules of procedures, in reality it is hard to tell which of the two main parties, SP and DP, is on the right and which is on the left. The difference is mostly semantic and a matter of terminology. This is clear from the fact that they have taken paradoxical stands on many issues, which contradict their proclaimed ideologies The SP and other smaller left-wing parties support, and are supported by, (big) business and created monopolies during their governance, while the PD and other right-wing parties articulate social policies which favour the vulnerable strata of society. The economic policies of the SP are neo-liberal and not based on a social market approach. On a number of occasions the DP has acted like a centre-left party, while the SP is increasingly behaving as a centre-right one. Sometimes, the DP positions, on many issues, run parallel with those of the SP and vice versa. Right- and left-wing principles, liberal and conservative, nationalistic and internationalist, are mixed in a mish-mash without form and shape. The outcome of such developments, as Kajsiu (2004:22) argues, has been that both political parties are suffering from acute identity crises.


143

There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, there is the lack of a real multi-party system tradition and the legacy of the one-party state. During the Enver Hoxha period, ideology was a mix of the extreme-left ideology of internationalism and socialism, and a paranoid and xenophobic nationalism, more typical of an extreme-right ideology. The only party in power during the communist regime, the communist party, did not have the characteristics of the typical left parties of the period after the Second World War, which went through a process of adaptation to contemporary changes in Europe. On the contrary, it remained ‘frozen’ in the Stalinist orthodoxy. Secondly, after the collapse of communism, it was thought that the remedy (and the only choice) for the terrible effects of the 50 year leftwing dictatorship was a right-wing neo-liberal therapy, and this was embraced by all parties (left and right). Thirdly, despite this embrace of neo-liberal ideology, a large number of individuals in both parties have inherited a communist mindset when it comes to political and ideological leadership. However, the main reason for the lack of any ideological identity in all the political parties and politicians is the prevailing philosophy of ‘money and power’. As long as they have money and power, they care little about political beliefs and convictions. Therefore, the parties and especially their leaders are not coherent in their programmatic convictions (or more precisely perhaps they do not have political convictions at all), but instead tend to follow a very pragmatic approach which suits their materialistic and careerist purposes. An interesting fact is that even the masses in Albania are very politicized and ideologized, which is another reflection of a strong communist inheritance. It is not a surprise to see unemployed people who cheer and vote for the DP, or oligarchs supporting the SP. The concept of a ‘right’ or ‘left’ wing party is understood in an ‘original’ Albanian way, making it difficult to define parties’ ideological stands in terms of a traditional left-right continuum, as it is in the European or American context, or in the classic meaning of this concept. The blurring of ideological divisions, however, is also a feature of contemporary politics in western democracies where political differences are often based on cosmetic and photogenic differences between party leaders. Mrs. Thatcher was an exception in that she was a ‘conviction’ politician adhering rigidly to ideological positions. But the general tendency everywhere has been for parties to converge. Indeed, this tendency has been reinforced by the collapse of communism and the crisis of western Marxism which resulted from this. In Albania, however, the lack of ideological differences is important, as the country needs to develop programmatic alternatives, whereas in the west

144


these alternatives have been tried and the ideological conflict is less important. Ideological differences between parties are important because they define different issues in various policy areas, such as in economic policies (e.g. the degree of state intervention in economy), labour policies (the level of corporatism), social policies (the issue of income distribution). In postcommunist Albania there is a need firstly for a better knowledge, culture and principles of both left and right ideologies. The need for developing right or left identities is a challenge for the political class. The anti-communist identity of the DP and its satellite parties and the pro-liberal agenda of the SP bring confusion to the electorate. The political class should properly not just design, but also apply political programmes that better address and represent the interests of certain groups of society, manifestos with better articulation of policies based on ideological and principled divisions. In this way political parties would be able to recover their identity and stand for concrete ideas, rather than simply compete for power. This would imply greater partisanship based on ideological differences. 5.11. Funding of parties Even though the state is obliged to aid a political party financially, in practice the share of the budget allocated to political parties does not suffice for them to conduct their activities (especially for non-parliamentary parties). Funds are distributed equally amongst all parties that run for office, and after that, they are distributed in proportion to the seats won in parliament. A negative effect of this practice is that it tends to favour the ruling party. This is the first reason why the ruling parties possess more funds. Secondly, it has at its disposal a great deal of state resources. Thirdly, the party in power attracts wealthy people and organizations (business as well as mafia), since, for obvious reasons, most businessmen are inclined to finance the political party in power. This is because, besides the financial aid from the state budget, the parties are entitled by law to any wealth they have acquired through legal means, which includes donations from political organizations abroad as well as local private persons and companies. This entire situation primarily favours the ruling party. Through these three means the party in power can have enormous funds, compared to the other parties, especially those in opposition. Electoral campaigns in Albania are becoming more and more expensive. The last two parliamentary elections campaigns in particular, have been far too expensive and the fact is that the funds used by political par-


145

ties in these campaigns were several times more than their legitimate sources of financing. The existence of the law mentioned above, lack of transparency and accountability, limited funds from the state and a lack of democratic traditions of fund-raising activities through local party associations, have created the possibility for dirty money to enter political campaigns. Unlike in most west European democracies (except for some countries like Italy) where the funds are generated from the party associations, in Albania they are provided either by mafia or powerful business interests. The businessmen are willing to fund the campaigns for two reasons: to be subsequently privileged in receiving government contracts, or to avoid taxes by financing the ruling party officials. As Jano (2006) points out, ‘In Albania nobody really knows through which financial sources the political parties sustain themselves since the contributions are not disclosed’. However, the most worrying thing is financing of the parties and their election campaign by the mafia and organized crime. Sometimes, for certain reasons, the latter prefer to ‘sponsor’ individual candidates rather than the political party. This has given the opportunity for organized crime to finance political campaigns of individual politicians, even when the money has not entered the coffers of political parties. It is sometimes claimed that behind a successful candidate is a mafia connection. Therefore the issue of the transparency of party finances, contributions and expenditures, is very important in freeing political parties from the influence of dubious interest groups and organized crime. Unfortunately, in Albania at this time, in effect there is no real accountability and control over parties’ financing. In terms of funding, regrettably, little attention has been paid to political parties by the international community (Kajsiu 2004). Instead, they have poured lots of funding and effort into building up civil society. Taking into consideration the fact that the political parties are the most important domestic actors and the crucial role that they play in the process of democratization, it is of the utmost importance that more attention be devoted to them especially in terms of expertise, research and training. 5.12. Organizational structure It is probably clear from the above that Albanian political parties are hierarchical structures that have little to do with democracy. This is more or less the same in all the parties. The SP, however, has a more collegial decision-making structure, compared with the DP, which has a more vertical and centralized structure. The highest decision-making bodies have differ-

146


ent names in different parties (National Assembly, Congress, Steering Committee, etc.). Parties also usually have a youth and a women’s forum. The tendency and aim in both main parties is to have large and expanded memberships (even though in most cases this is a ‘fictional membership’), instead of seeking to ensure quality as well as quantity. Currently the number of members in each of the parties is more or less the same, but since the party in power is also a source of employment, as well as of other benefits, it tends attracts somewhat more members than the opposition party. As ideology and policy programmes have become less salient features of the internal life of parties, this has led to a gradual decline in the numbers of ideologically committed members and an increase of ‘pragmatic’ ones. Personal, material interests and benefits prevail over values, beliefs and political convictions. Another shortcoming is the under-representation of women in politics. Albanian politics is a male-dominated bastion and women are poorly represented in political parties, as well as in positions of power (in parliament this representation is minimal, and at 5 per cent the lowest in Europe). This is related to several historic, economic and social factors, which would need another book to explain. We already mentioned the social base of the two main political parties at the beginning of their establishment. After 15 years, however, the ‘social map’ of both parties has changed, but especially of the DP, which has lost many of its intellectuals and many young people. DP members and sympathizers, however, are still younger than those of the SP. Geographically, the SP tends to have its electoral base in the southern part of the country, while that of the DP is more in the north. The DP is stronger in cities than in villages, and from the social point of view, it has more support among intellectuals and educated people. 5.13. The rhetoric of EU membership A positive feature, however, is that in Albania, EU membership is accepted as a priority by all parties, from the left to the right of the political spectrum. The problem is that this statement of priority often seems to be more rhetorical than realistic and little more than a mantra in the political struggle. The rhetoric of Albanian accession to the EU is being used by the political class in power to gain credit for itself and to seek electoral support, to score political points in the name of democracy and Europe. Their slogans may be pro-Europe, but their actions are often opposed to the prin-


147

ciples of European democracy. Furthermore, the rhetoric of EU membership is being used as an ‘analgesic’ to calm down the pains caused by frequent crises. ‘The orientation of the Albanian political elite towards Europe is not because they are idealistic or philosophically motivated, but, by playing the card of integration into the EU, their sole aim is to legitimize and prolong their power’, argues Ardian Vehbiu (2003). One of the main reasons for this gap between rhetoric and reality is the fact that the political class is under pressure from the structures of organized crime that are interested in keeping Albania out of European Union control. ‘There is a question mark over whether the political elite actually wants to join the EU: the opposition would see any success in this direction as a victory of the party in power, and the mafia definitely does not want Albania to join’, points out Ismail Kadare (2003), the great Albanian writer. Another reason for the political elite to use this rhetoric is to please the international community, especially the EU and the USA. Glamorous labels which governmental coalitions pin on themselves, such as ‘The Alliance for Integration’ do not bring Europe closer, they are just expressions of demagogy. What is needed to get closer to Europe are hard work, responsibility and commitment. Achievement of the Copenhagen criteria requires concrete steps to be taken and reforms completed, but the Albanian political class does not yet seem ready to fulfil this mission. The perceived lack of quality of party members and specifically of its leadership, accounts in part for the negative public perceptions about the political parties. Politics in general and political parties in particular are highly unpopular with the Albanian people and electorate. The attitude of most of the population towards them is indifferent and even hostile, and a certain part of the electorate does not like either of the two big political parties, DP or SP, viewing them as inefficient, corrupt and irresponsible. Many people see political parties as a means for incompetent people to achieve undeserved positions of importance and enrich themselves (Kajsiu 2004:21). The parties in Albania conform to a large extent to the description of Bull and Rhodes of Italian parties (1997:11), ‘agents of paralysis and instability rather than unambiguous forces for change’. Albanian politics, as the Albanian Human Rights Group (2004) observes, ‘is still characterized by its conflictual and abusive character which can in no way be accepted if we are to talk seriously about a fast and worthy integration into the larger European family’.

6 CLIENTELISM, CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED CRIME: SERIOUS BARRIERS TO EU MEMBERSHIP ‘It is going to take much more than press releases and empty speeches to covince the world that Albania is taking effective action to put an end to these phenomena’. European Commission (2004)

6.1. The ‘importing’ of illegal activities from the Balkans – a challenge for the EU At the end of the 20th century the dream of a ‘borderless Europe’ finally came true, at least for a certain number of countries which are members of the EU. In the eyes of many EU citizens it certainly represented a crucial milestone of the European integration project. In 1999 the Schengen Agreement was put in place, removing all controls at the EU internal borders for those countries, the majority of EU member states, which had signed up to it81. The initial enthusiasm and joy that Western Europeans expressed towards the extraordinary events that followed the fall of the Berlin wall were soon replaced, however, by feelings of fear and panic at new threats coming from Eastern Europe and Russia: uncontrolled flows of migrants and asylum seekers and trafficking by the mafia in drugs, prostitutes and weapons into Western European societies. In this way, ‘Borderless Europe’ started to seem more like a ‘Fortress Europe’: the EU assumes the functions of the traditional nation-state to defend its citizens against the threats of criminality and terrorism, to protect them against competition on the labour markets and to secure their social rights. The Shengen acquis is now not simply about abolishing internal borders within the EU, but also and most importantly about tightening controls at the external frontiers of the Union. In effect, this is creating a new ‘iron curtain’ around the EU.

Clientelism, Corruption and Organized Crime

149

The increase of immigration and the export of organized crime from the former communist states after the collapse of the Soviet Union has been a major concern for the EU, which is addressed in its third pillar82, ‘Freedom, Security and Justice’ (previously called ‘Justice and Home Affairs’). Top priorities for the EU are now not only tight control of EU external borders and visa regimes, but also the fight against organized crime, trafficking in drugs and human beings and money laundering. Some argue, however, that the existence of the criminal activities in Eastern Europe in general, and the Western Balkans in particular, is explained by the needs and demands generated in Western European countries. The appetite in Western European societies for drugs, prostitutes and smuggled goods (such as cigarettes) is one of the factors which sustain the illegal mafia activities in the Eastern Europe and Balkans. However, if this explains the demand, it is the poverty and corruption left behind by the collapse of communism which explains the supply, especially in the area of prostitution. The fall of communism in 1990 opened Albania’s borders bringing an unprecedented influx of trafficking and organized crime to the EU, which was large-scale during the 1990s. There are several reasons for this: firstly, because Albania was one of the poorest countries in the region and therefore could supply many recruits to criminal gangs, who, in turn, exploited young women seeking a better life in the west. Secondly, it is geographically situated at a cross-roads where much trafficking passes through. This constitutes one of the major obstacles to Albania obtaining the democratic credentials necessary for joining the EU. Many reports by international organizations have pointed out that corruption and organized crime are endemic, negatively affecting institutional and economic development and seriously threatening the stability and progress of the country. Therefore, we will analyse in depth the reasons why these phenomena have plagued every aspect of daily life in Albania, starting with the problem of ‘clientelism’. 6.2. Clientelism This has been extensively studied by scholars in connection with Italy and it will be useful to examine the results of this research since Albania has a number of features, such as its party system and its rambling and incompetent bureaucracy, that are similar to the Italian case. According to Furlong (1994:3), an expert on Italy, clientelism refers to the use of state resources of various kinds to develop personal electoral support. It is a certain mode of managing power relations and manipulation of state institutions in the

150


interest of the people in power, structuring the system around informal networks of personal relationships based on exchanges of favours, in the way of ‘you scratch my back, I scratch yours’. Clientelism is encouraged by specific economic, political and social circumstances: poverty, unemployment, new and weak democratic state institutions, suspicion and mistrust that make collective action difficult. Clientelism is related to the phenomenon, already referred in this book, of ‘partitocrazia’, which Newell (2001:45) defines as ‘the penetration of vast areas of the state and society and the “colonization” by the parties of numerous sectors of the state’. By occupying a wide range of public sector institutions, the parties, especially those in government, are able to tap a rich seam of public resources and to use them in a continuous flow of exchanges. Based on a weak state, allowing for considerable overlap between the personnel of the parties on one hand, and interest groups and administrative positions on the other, it makes it difficult to draw clear boundaries between these entities and to know in what capacity individuals are acting (Newell 2001:48). In this way, elected politicians control access to the principal sources of wealth, the awarding of public contracts, and the granting or withholding of licences to do certain types of business. Clientelistic distribution of resources is also a significant means of voter mobilization. Politicians seek to manage public resources, because that is an effective means of maintaining their own power. Another aspect of clientelism is the provision of employment and the appointment of party workers and members, especially to public institutions. This phenomenon, called by the Italian scholars ‘lottizazione’, is the system through which the major political parties share out posts in public bodies and companies. In Albania, clientelism existed and was very strong during communism (unlike the other two phenomena: corruption and especially organized crime). The system of favours, exchanges and support from a ‘friend’ (known as the concept of ‘miku’), or any relative in getting jobs or getting things done (especially in services, health care and education) was very widespread. During the transition, however, it has worsened. There are many reasons for this: the absence of a brake on the political class and a weak state and administration, the current state of the Albanian economy, where private economic activity is limited and public funds are very important, the absence of properly functioning market institutions, and employment opportunities. Another reason is that, in a country like Albania where unemployment is high, the ability to influence ‘hiring’ in a clientelistic way is a source of great power. The scope for patronage is enormous given the current state of the economy. Other reasons are related to the


151

Albanian culture and mentality (see below). Abuses of responsibility and power include appointments to public positions, exchanges and share of bribes for public work contracts and provision of illegal benefits. ‘Party bosses’ at the centre and the local level help supporters to secure government benefits and services, favour new businessmen and entrepreneurs to obtain licences and contracts, and hold a strong grasp over the distribution of public sector and administration jobs to party officials and supporters. There have been allegations of politicians and statesmen extensively abusing public office to advance their personal interests and seeing it as an opportunity to enrich themselves. Unfortunately, they refuse to realize that public office, in addition to being an honour, is first of all a responsibility to the people who voted for them, a responsibility for their country and a responsibility to democracy. 6.3. Corruption and bribery Corruption refers to the arbitrary exercise of power and the supply of goods and services not sanctioned by law. The high and regular incidence of corruption and other abuses of power might slow down and have serious effects on the process of democratization. As Newell (2001:45) argues, ‘partitocrazia and the clientelistic management of power relations provide one of the bases for, and facilitate the spread of political corruption’. During communism, there was little evidence of the blatant and largescale corruption found elsewhere in Eastern Europe, even though the communist leaders of nomenklatura used to enjoy certain obvious privileges (which were ‘super luxurious’ compared to the austere and egalitarian life-style imposed on the rest of population), such as villas in resort areas, fancy cars, hunting reservations, special shops, private beaches, study abroad, travel and medical treatment in the west. But the culture of both corruption and clientelism in Albania go back even further than communism and have their roots in the Ottoman Empire, where clientelistic relations were the basis of the state administration (which is also the case for example of Greece)83. They can also be related to features of Albanian culture (or more widely, the MediterraneanBalkan culture) such as mistrust of others, the clan mentality, absence of mutual respect between citizens and the state, social isolation and a lack of civic awareness, and a mentality which considers official and key public posts as sources of profit. The weak tradition of the rule of law, the low level of respect for the law, a weak state or a state that does not function,

152


and an undeveloped civil society, as described in the previous chapters of this book, create fertile ground for corruption to flourish. Besides these historical, social and cultural factors, the more immediate causes are economic: underdevelopment and poverty, and the eagerness to get-rich-quick. At present, high unemployment, lack of security and the lack of investment needed to create new jobs, high living costs, low salaries in public jobs, a lack of accountability and transparency, and the absence of political stability have also contributed to the increased levels of corruption in Albania. In Albania, bribery, even though defined by the country’s penal code as a crime, is widespread, existing at all levels of the state administration, in public services, customs, taxation agencies, judicial, health care and education system and especially in the agencies that issue licences for private businesses. It is found among doctors who demand that patients pay for medical treatments, teachers and professors who ask money from students for passing exams, civil servants who demand small bribes (all of whom are trying to compensate for their low wages), and among big businessmen who pay off cabinet ministers for major favours or for winning tenders. Citizens and businesses are forced to pay bribes at all levels of the administration in order to save time and to get things done. Bribery has become a part of people’s every day normality. The process of application and approval for licences and other important permits is very long, bureaucratic and thus leaves room for corruption practices. Therefore, as Hope (2005) comments, ‘Bribes are paid to register companies, obtain permits and licences and to avoid harassment by the tax authorities’. According to an international survey which included data from the World Bank, 77 per cent of Albanian companies bribe officials. Bribes are also paid in order to avoid penalties. Another phenomenon, which has become a standard practice, concerns cases when, to get public jobs, especially in customs or fiscal services, people pay big sums of money (much larger than their yearly income), in order to be placed at times in positions within these structures. Such a practice, as Kajsiu (Forthcoming: 37) argues, ‘has a direct impact in lowering the work ethic and morale in all the levels of society, and thus makes the fight against corruption extremely inefficient’. In Albania, corruption has become so systemic and routine, that it is almost impossible to do anything without it. It has become like a contagious disease, spreading its virus into every facet of life. The ‘cancer’ of corruption is not in its initial stages, but in the phase of metastasis. It has spread everywhere, contaminating every sphere of society and public institutions, making the fight against it very difficult and complicated. Once corruption has emerged, it tends to spread. As it snowballs, it becomes


153

increasingly more acceptable, transforms itself into a necessity and finally ends up as a common way of life (Jano: 2006). In this way, corruption in Albania has become an accepted fact, a moral norm, something you do not have to be ashamed of. The attitude of people towards corrupt behaviour is that since everyone, especially statesmen and politicians, do it, why not them, since it seems to be normal practice. Even though cases of corruption are exposed everyday in the media and people know about them, the corrupt individuals are rarely investigated, or condemned. Nobody has been prosecuted for corruption so far, so there is a widespread attitude of ‘why not, it’s worth risking!’ Newell (2001:53) argues that corruption is selfgenerating: the further it spreads, the less willing people are to report it to the authorities and the fewer the risks it involves, the less likely it is that the anticipated costs will outweigh the benefits. In Albania, the abuse of public office is a widespread phenomenon, as more and more individuals are caught in a mania and greed for quick profits and are drawn into networks of corrupt exchanges. It is therefore very difficult to eliminate the phenomenon. The moral and material costs of corruption are lowered, which make corruption spread still further. Those who are supposed to be leading the fight against it, senior politicians and statesmen, are the very ones who practise it and, as a result, as the Albanian saying goes ‘The fish starts to smell from the head’. Corruption by politicians, government officials and MPs varies from ‘gifts’, such as cars or apartments (donated by businessmen or mafia people), to corrupt affairs which lead to large deposits of money in foreign banks. Worse, senior politicians and officials are so shameless that they do not even try to hide their corrupt affairs. One political analyst, Andrea Stefani (2004), considers this blatant corruption of the politicians as ‘spectacular and one of the forms of the arrogance of those in power’. The paradox in Albania goes further in that during the period of Socialist government, 1997-2005, corrupt politicians, the government and the Prime Minister were almost routinely filing legal charges against publishers, journalists and civic groups who had accused them of corruption (Veliaj 2004). There were dozen of lawsuits and prosecutions against journalists, but there was not one single lawsuit against a politician. ‘Albania has become a kleptocracy – pointed out one of the Albanian diaspora activists, Gary Kokalari (2004) - where the [former] Prime Minister [Nano] and his cronies are free to pillage’. Corruption has now become incorporated within the Albanian political and state institutions. Corruption badly affects domestic business. The system is so well developed in Albania that an entrepreneur who cannot afford to accede to it by

154


paying bribes risks failure. Public contracts go to those who pay more, rather than those who are best qualified, so it becomes ‘an infernal mechanism’ as Della Porta (1993:236) describes it. As a result, there is little free and honest competition, since entrepreneurs have to adapt to these practices in order to ensure the survival of their businesses. A massive network of mutually beneficial linkages is created between the political parties and powerful economic groups, involving politicians and businessmen of the very highest rank. Corruption is obviously closely related to organized crime. This comes firstly because of the need for funding. In Albania, as we saw above, state funds for parties are very limited, while the electoral campaigns have become more and more expensive. Therefore the sources of funding for parties and politicians often come from people engaged in all sorts of dubious activities. Thus, individual politicians and parties, taking advantage of the lack of transparency in their parties’ financing, have become dependent on illegal and corrupt forms of funding. Another reason that makes corruption difficult to fight in Albania is the weak judicial system, as the Council of Europe statement quoted above makes clear. It is not just weak and lacking in independence, but is itself plagued by corruption. As such, it cannot act as a problem-solver. A weak judiciary is also the result of a weak state, which means that ‘troublesome’ judges and prosecutors, without any protection from the state, can easily become targets for defamation or even assassination by criminals. In this context, it is unlikely that Albania will see in the near future an anti-corruption crusade of the ‘Tangentopoli’ type, which happened in Italy in 1992, as a result of which one third of all MPs ended up under judicial investigation, including four former prime ministers, five former party leaders and seven members of the Amato government (Newell 2001:56). Another reason is related to institutional mechanisms. Certain institutions which can contribute in this issue have not been effective, such as the Attorney General of Albania, the Department of Internal Auditing (which investigates economic crime, corruption and abusive financial practices) and the High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Control of Assets. Therefore, institutions and mechanisms to fight corruption have been either not efficient, non-existent, or even worse, its instrument. The inefficiency of the justice system is reflected in the number of officials that have been dismissed on allegations of corruption. According to the last report of the European Commission (2005:16), the number of public officials prosecuted for corruption has increased: 171 in 2004 compared to 76 in 2003, but still these numbers are in stark contrast to the fact that Albania in the same period has been listed as one of the countries with


155

the highest corruption levels in Europe. Furthermore, the net has not yet been able to catch the ‘big fish’ - the people at the top. From reports and findings of international organizations, corruption has been identified as the plague that is preventing Albania’s development and the main impediment to foreign investment. The European Commission in one of its latest reports points out that corruption is affecting every facet of life and public services, ‘but in key areas such as the judicial system, customs, police, and public administration remain a matter of deep concern’ (European Commission 2003:2). According to the ‘2005 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index’, Albania has a score of 2.4 out of 10 (where 10 is the least and 0 is the most corrupt), ranking 126 out of 158 countries84. Albania has failed to fight this phenomenon and that the anti-corruption mechanisms employed so far have been ineffective. ‘Yet there has been no attempt to curb the rampant and institutionalized corruption and bribery that pervades every aspect of the lives of ordinary Albanians’ (Vickers 2003). Even though several conventions on corruption are signed and ratified by the Albanian governments, a permanent body under the Council of Ministers (ACMG) whose responsibility is reporting and monitoring anti-corruption measures has been established, a ‘Law on the Prevention of Conflicts of Interests’ and ‘Law on Declaration of Assets’ exist, and even an elaborate ‘Action Plan on the Prevention of and Fight against Corruption’ has been compiled, in practice little is done and the commitment of governments to tackle corruption has not been sufficiently translated into concrete measures. Since corruption has become a threatening phenomenon not only for the economy, but also for the stability of the country, the challenges for the government are to take effective measures to ensure increased institutional capacity to investigate and prosecute corruption, measures against bribery of public officials, and the adoption and enforcement of a new law on the declaration of assets of politicians and officials. The new government that came to power in September 2005 led by Sali Berisha under the electoral slogan ‘Reform and Clean Hands’ has put the fight against corruption as its first priority. It is still early to see how it is working on this objective, but the first signs do not look very promising. 6.4. Organized crime The break-up of the old communist states and the economic and social upheaval that followed in the 1990s created fertile ground for the rapid rise

156


of sophisticated, ruthless organized crime groups, which operate all types of criminal activity including drugs, weapons and human trafficking, smuggling, money laundering, kidnapping, extortion, murder, and fraud. These phenomena are new in a society which was virtually crime-free, but now ‘a steady criminalization or ‘Mafiaization’ of society has been developing in Albania’ (Pettifer 1997). ‘Organized crime is a dreadful problem in Albania, a problem which is exported to many member states of the EU’, confirms Chris Patten. Individuals and groups involved in drugs and prostitution scattered around the Albanian diaspora has been the reason for the bad image and reputation of Albanians in the world, derogatorily stereotyping them as ‘homo albanicus’85. We have already outlined above the reasons for the widespread nature and the depth of organized crime in Albania: the absence of the rule of law, the absence of an effective police force and a functioning judiciary system. Other reasons are related to the endemic poverty and the eagerness and temptations of getting rich quick and sometimes easily. Scarcity of jobs and the lack of opportunities to make an honest living make certain segments of the population and society turn to different forms of organized crime as the sources of income. Another specific reason (which makes Albanian criminal gangs ‘successful’ in the mafia-world) is that they are based on strong family and local connections.

Trafficking Albania moved from being a very isolated and conservative society under communism to one which threw off moral and ethical constraints, but also one where extreme poverty forced certain people into new avenues of material gain. This is the context in which trafficking developed, a new phenomenon that started after the 1990. It includes: • Trafficking of human beings: - Women (prostitution); - Refugees (illegal immigration); - Children. • Trafficking of arms and weapons. Albania became the main country in the region in the trafficking of human beings, both as the main source and the main transit point. Thus, in the Report of the Task Force of the Stability Pact (2003), Albania ranks


157

first, with 46 per cent of all human trafficking from South-Eastern Europe, the region which accounts for 92 per cent of all trafficking in the whole of Europe, followed by Moldova with 23 per cent. Most of those trafficked are young women destined to become prostitutes and sometimes to live as virtual ‘sex slaves’ in the richer countries of Western Europe. According to the 2002 UNICEF report ‘Trafficking in human beings in Southeastern Europe’, over the past ten years, some 100.000 Albanian women and girls were the victims of human trafficking. Trafficking also includes children, as part of a mafia network that makes profit out of transplant organs and street children. According to UNICEF86, thousands of children a year are trafficked from Albania. The other aspect of human trafficking is illegal immigration into the EU. In 2003, an anti-trafficking strategy was formulated, the implementation of which has produced some results in reducing the numbers of people trafficked across the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. Illegal immigration still remains a serious problem, however, as tragically demonstrated in the Karaburun incident of January 2004, when over 20 people died when their rubber boat collapsed and sank a few miles off the Italian coast. Fifty years of ‘hermetic’ communist isolation (ordinary Albanians citizens were prohibited from having a passport, let alone travelling abroad) has been followed by a tough visa regime that still preserves walls between Albania and the rest of Europe. This, besides the lack of rights to free movement for living, studying and working abroad, has contributed to a deterioration in the social psychology of Albanians, not only because it brings back unhappy memories of past travel restrictions of the communist period, but also it makes them feel like third class citizens. The visa regime was established under the rationale that countries of the Balkan region represent a ‘security threat’ to Europe and the risk of importing organized crime and terrorism. However, some experts argue that ‘this visa regime is hardly an effective instrument for these purposes’ (Batt 2003:140). In Albania (placed on the ‘visa black list’ of the EU, along with other Western Balkan countries), this strong visa regime has ‘promoted’ the flourishing of human trafficking activities by the mafia. Borders create smugglers and criminals fly their own planes. Therefore, the only people who have profited from this ‘second isolation’ of Albania have been the traffickers, mainly the criminals gangs in Vlora and Durrës, who have become wealthy with the money of poor people, who, because of the lack of employment opportunities at home, try to escape abroad in search of a better life. The paradox is that mafia gangsters are equipped with all kinds of visas for themselves, while the honest citizens, even those who want to go abroad to visit their fami-

158


lies, are denied this basic right and obliged to experience the greatest difficulties for obtaining a visa in foreign embassies. These involve lengthy, complex, costly and often humiliating procedures and treatment of Albanian citizens by embassy personnel, making the idea of getting a visa a nerve-racking and frustrating experience. Often applicants have to travel a considerable distance to Tirana, stand for several hours in queues (sometimes even outside), provide a large number of documents, and even though they pay the charges, in the end, are sometimes not able to obtain the visa. There have been allegations that certain officials and diplomats in foreign embassies in Albania are taking advantage of the harsh visa regime to make a profit. For these reasons, especially after the Karaburun tragedy (but even before that), the Albanian authorities requested the European Parliament to soften the visa regime for Albanians, but this was rejected because of the fear of waves of immigrants and the Union’s internal security. On the contrary, an EU ‘smart visa policy’ for Albanians favouring honest citizens, young people and businessmen, while closing the doors for criminals, would be an effective alternative. This was demonstrated in the cases of other Balkan countries, where visa restrictions with the EU were lifted, such as with Bulgaria (2001), Romania (2002) and Croatia, and the citizens of these countries enjoy visa-free access to the EU. As the ICG 2005 report ‘EU visas and the Western Balkans’ points out, ‘the EU’s present visa regime with the countries of the Western Balkans is fostering resentment, inhibiting progress on trade, business, education and more open civil societies and as a result contributing negatively in regional instability…Indeed, strict visa regimes can be counter productive: the more difficult the process, the higher the value of “paying for an alternative service” to receive the visa, with a series of opportunities for bribery and forging of documents’. It goes on to recommend ‘selective liberalization for certain identified groups and visa facilitation for all applicants, involving a simplified, speedier, less painful process’. A ‘smart visa policy’ also helps to create a sense of optimism and a positive psychological effect among ordinary citizens that the EU has something concrete to offer them. Trafficking of arms and weapons has also been a problem. It reached exceptional proportions during the Kosovo crises in 1999, and later on during the conflicts in Macedonia.


159

Drugs Albania is primarily a transit country and a major route for illicit drugs from East to West, making available to this kind of traffic its human resources and its political power. About 70 per cent of the drugs produced in Afghanistan are shipped to the west via the country. Albania has also become also a place for drug production. In the south, particularly on the Adriatic coast, where a particularly favourable environment exists for the cultivation of cannabis, lots of plantations can be found. According to the UN Anti-Drug Department87, Albania holds first place for the production of marijuana and the country is the main route in Europe for trafficking in heroine and cocaine. Drug consumption within the country is also increasing88. The narcotics income in Albania is estimated to be over $2 billion per year. Thus Albanians have become powerful traders in drugs rivalling prominent groups from other countries, and it was alleged that they control a considerable share of the European market (ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia also hold a share of drug markets in many west European states and almost exclusively supply the Swiss market). Even though an adequate legislation on drug trafficking (which lays down tough prison sentences) is in force as well as an approved National Anti-Drug Strategy and related action plan, and there have been some actions against drug cultivation and trafficking through seizures and crop destruction, the situation is still a problem. Prosecution and conviction of traffickers is difficult since they cooperate sometimes in collusion with politicians, the police and the judiciary, the very institutions that are supposed to be in the front line of fighting this phenomenon.

Smuggling Smuggling of consumer products, including cars and pharmaceuticals, is common (Heritage Foundation 2003:3). A very important issue in the fight against organized crime, especially regarding trafficking, drugs and smuggling, is border management. Therefore, the customs service, besides revenue collection, has a big responsibility in this area. Cooperation between the Customs Service and the Border Police has improved, resulting in a number of large-scale seizures of drugs, as well as of smuggled goods such as cigarettes, narcotics etc, but a lot more still needs to be done in this regard. Both programmes established by the EU (CAM –A) and USAID have helped to improve the work of customs in regard to smuggling. An

160


important aspect is the cooperation with border services of neighbouring countries, which has also recently improved.

Money laundering Although a ‘Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering’ has been in force since 2003, not much has been done by Albanian governments to fight this and it remains a matter of concern. Individuals involved in organized crime activities have used the income generated from trafficking and smuggling for private investment, primarily in construction and tourism. The problem is that money laundering in a mainly cash driven economy like Albania is very difficult to combat. The large size of the informal economy with its high levels of cash transactions, the poor quality of the banking system and the high level of corruption allow money laundering to flourish. Structures to fight it are still too weak and have not led to concrete results. To date, there have been only a few convictions. Therefore, more enforcement of anti-money laundering legislation is necessary towards confiscations, seizures and freezing of assets, and more importantly the prosecution and conviction of the individuals involved. Challenges for government remain prevention and prosecution for this crime, not only within the banking and financial sectors, but also in other economic sectors, for example in construction and tourism, where it is frequently found, as well as seizing assets and investments resulting from criminal activities. 6.5. Connections between the mafia and politics Unfortunately, the actions taken so far by the Albanian government to combat organized crime and mafia activities have barely scratched the surface of the problem. A tough legislation against organized crime, approved in parliament in 1996, which included heavy punishments for drugs and weapons traffickers and fixed prison terms, was abrogated in 1998, shortly after the Socialists came to power. The harsh punishments for drug trafficking were discontinued and a legislative vacuum in this area followed. In September 2004, an ‘anti-mafia package’ was introduced, consisting of a law on fighting organized crime, a law against the financing of terrorism and a law on the protection of witnesses. Therefore, as all in the other areas, progress has consisted only in adoption of new legislation and formulation of action plans. This must be followed by rigorous implementation, if concrete results are to be achieved.


161

Several of the factors underlying this situation have already been mentioned. The main reason, however, is to be found in the connections between organized crime and the mafia and politics. As Kerin Hopes (2005) points out in his report in the Financial Times, ‘trafficking in people and smuggling of narcotics and weapons are problems that plague all the west Balkan countries, but these issues have a higher profile in Albania, because members of the political elite are allegedly involved in criminal activities’. Therefore, the major factor that sustains and promotes organized crime in Albania is the political class (both in power and in opposition). As the ICG (2003:7) observes, ‘While the authorities accept the existence of organized crime, they do not acknowledge its links with individuals in top state offices, the police and politics…In many areas traffickers work in collaboration with the police and customs officials and enjoy the protection of high-ranking politicians’. Enormous revenues from prostitution, drugs and other criminal activities are not only invested in the economy, but also go into the pockets of these high ranking state officials and politicians. There are allegations that some government officials and politicians are on the payroll of criminal organizations. ‘Quite often members of the Albanian political elite, including members of the parliament, ministers and premiers have publicly supported and interacted with individuals that later on were found to be heads of the economic mafia, trafficking and organized crime in Albania’, points out Kajsiu (2002: 40). At the beginning of 2005, a scandal burst into the open after the disclosure made in parliament by MP Nikolle Lesi of the transcript of a conversation between then Prime Minister Nano and the former Constitutional Court chairman, Fehmi Abdiu, in which they had talked about parliament abolishing the existing law on drugs, arms and human trafficking, which would facilitate organized crime activities. Even though this was not proved later, the fact is, as mentioned above, that parliament, once the Socialists came to power, abrogated the above-mentioned legislation against organized crime. Because of this connection with the political elite, the rule of law has not been effectively applied, either against the criminals (during the four years before 2001 only nine individuals were sentenced for human trafficking, and even fewer for drugs and prostitution trafficking89), or against the politicians or senior officials. None of the latter has ever been convicted for trafficking, although the above-mentioned reports indicate that certain politicians and senior government officials are the ‘drug barons’. In the absence of a strong state and strong institutions and under the protection of politicians, Albania has become ‘a safe haven’ for criminals and mafia where they could comfortably perform their criminal activities.

162


Organized crime has penetrated not only politics, but the world of business as well. As Biberaj (1998: 201) notes ‘in addition to protection, the forces of organized crime have succeeded in penetrating and taking over legitimate private businesses through alliances with corrupt government officials...many businesses have been reportedly owned by criminal groups involved in drug trafficking, money laundering and smuggling’. Another source through which organized crime sustains itself in Albania is through the connections it has established with similar criminal networks in the world and from neighbouring countries, such as from Russia, the former Yugoslav countries, Turkey, Bulgaria, etc., and especially with the mafia groups in southern Italy. ‘Organized crime has grown, consolidating links with the Albanian diaspora and the wider criminal world’ (ICG 2003:7). What is needed is firstly to strengthen the law enforcement institutions, and secondly to break the ties between crime and politics. Regarding the first, the cooperation between the judiciary, police and intelligence agencies in Albania, as well as with their counterparts in the neighbouring countries and with other international agencies concerned with these crimes, is essential. The EU has warned that the Albanian government must seriously intensify its efforts to combat organized crime in order to qualify for membership. Even though the Commission has identified huge crises in the energy, transport, water and agricultural sectors, the CARDS budget concentrates mainly on fighting organized crime, fraud and corruption (ESI 2003:12). The Summit in Thessalonica in June 2003 was an opportunity for the Western Balkan countries to give evidence of their commitment to concrete achievements in the fight against organized crime and corruption. However, it is going to take much more than press releases and empty speeches to convince the world that Albania is taking effective action to put an end to these phenomena.

7 POLICY MAKING IN ALBANIA ‘Most of the governments in power in Albania never had the “luxury” of applying long-term development policies. This happened for two reasons: firstly, the continuing political and social crisis in the country and secondly, the need torebuild before going into a stable development phase’. Ermelinda Meksi (2003:16)

We have so far described the political and administrative institutions, as well as the socio-economic situation of Albania. These, however, only describe, in a rather ‘static’ fashion the context of political life. A more ‘dynamic’ analysis is still needed and this may be done through an analysis of the country’s policy-making system. Peter John (1998) argues that policy-making is a process with multiple determinants: ideas, interests, beliefs, ideologies, institutions, actors, resources, and is influenced by domestic and international factors and developments. Policy analysis, as a branch of the social sciences, is concerned with how and why governments act as they do. To simplify what is, in effect, a vast literature, we can see policy-making as consisting of four main components: content, context, process and actors. 7.1. Components of policy-making

1.The content is the substance of the policy, i.e. ideas, goals, objectives, and the action plan of how to get to the outcomes. The Albanian government adopted its policy agenda in 2001: the ‘Policy Agenda for SocioEconomic Development’ (European Commission 2001:7). It takes into account the conditionality requirements of the SAP, IMF and WB and focuses on four main priority areas: • Governance and institutional development (civil service and public administration reform, local government and decentralization, legal reform, public order and the fight against corruption)

164


• Human resources and social services (education, health, labour markets and social security); •Private sector development (privatization, banking, agriculture, trade and tourism); • Public infrastructure (energy and transport); • Environment (sustainable development).

2. The context is the political, economic and socio-demographic situation (background), in which policy-making takes place (explained in previous chapters). 3. The process involves a long transformation from initial goals to final outcomes and includes three main stages: policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. Policy formulation What is needed to design a policy are ideas, as proposals, alternatives or solutions to problems or situations. It has two phases, agenda-setting and decision-making. Agenda-setting has to do with which issues gain prominence, while decision-making is a choice from a set of alternatives. From this ‘policy primeval soup’, as Kingdon calls it (1984), policy-makers choose those alternatives, as Simon states, ‘which are conducive to the achievement of goals or objectives and maximize the decision-makers’ values’ (Hill 1997:99). Effective decision-making requires an open and consensual process across a broad range of social and political forces (which, as we have seen in our analysis of Albanian political parties, is unfortunately not the case for Albanian decision-making). It is an interactive process involving individuals, often with conflicting interests and ideas. It therefore requires bargaining and negotiations.

Policy implementation Implementation is the process of translating policy into action, converting policy intentions into programmes, or putting policy into effect (Barret and Fudge 1981:4). Successful policies have clear objectives, performance standards, costs and timing, appropriate scheduling and monitoring. The reasons for policy failure, according to Hogwood and Gunn (1984:197), are: bad execution (ineffectively implemented by those responsible), bad policy (based on inadequate information, defective reasoning or unrealistic

Policy Making in Albania

165

assumptions), or bad luck (when external circumstances are not favourable or cut off resources). Even though the policy agenda of the Albanian government is ambitious, the main challenge it faces is to convert objectives into action. The country has developed in many fields a modern legal framework, but the problem lies in the implementation and enforcement of the law (as is clear from the analysis presented above). The problem, therefore, is not the absence of strategies and legislation, but deficiencies in their implementation and enforcement. EU integration is a priority goal in both foreign and domestic policy. Good intentions, however, are not sufficient to ensure proper reform. The barriers to implementation in Albania are a weak bureaucracy and insufficient resources. Another factor that has impeded the success of implementation is political instability and interference. The success of a policy depends on the participant actors. The lack of responsibility, willingness and commitment to get things done from key decision-makers or politicians is the major negative factor in implementation in Albania.

Policy evaluation This is about the assessment of policy outcomes by indicators and performance measures. This is an important aspect of policy-making that has developed over the last twenty to thirty years, particularly in the United States, but now increasingly in European countries as well. It is an attempt to assess the success or failure of a particular policy programme in whether or not it has achieved its goals and what the wider effects of the policy might be. Evaluation helps to determine whether the policy should be continued or terminated and, if continued, whether there should be modifications made to it. Clearly, this is a sensitive issue as there are many interests involved in a policy programme: politicians, administrators and the recipients (groups or individuals) of the policy programme. The inbuilt bias is to continue the programme in operation. It is all the more important, then, that evaluation should be strictly objective and the evaluators independent of these different interests. In the United States, the tendency has been for evaluation to be carried out by organizations or private firms, outside the governmental system. In countries such as France, it is governmental agencies that have tried to evaluate themselves. In Albania, it is unlikely that the public sector could evaluate itself with any degree of objectivity and therefore evaluation would have to be carried out by private organizations, including, at least at the beginning, from outside the country.

166


4.. The actors include participants (the ‘stakeholders’) involved in the whole policy-making process. What is important is the kind of relations they have and how they interact with one another. The policy-making process in Albania is monopolized by a limited set of actors (mainly the political class), rather than involving the participation of a wide range of people or groups. Secondly, the most powerful collective actor is the political elite. Thirdly, policy-making is a process of bargaining between the political elite and the economic interest groups (mainly the business elite). Fourthly, the knowledge elite (intellectuals and educated people), which should have been a very influential factor, has been seriously reduced as a result of the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon (see next chapter). Some include as another component of policy–making the institutions. They affect the efficiency and effectiveness of policies, policy design and implementation. The process of reform in post-communist Albania started in the conditions of an institutional vacuum. Building and strengthening of democratic institutions represents a big challenge since this is more difficult than building roads or industrial complexes. ‘In a weak state like Albania - Rakipi (2003:170) argues – despite the fact that formally the state is composed of institutions, the real structure of power does not comprise institutions, but a structure of individuals, starting from the simple employees to the high ranks. This structure of individuals is a pyramid, at the top of which stands the chief of power, president or prime minister. Frequently the individuals have direct access to the top of the pyramid. Such organization of state bureaucracy may lead to the collapse of state structures and failure of state institutions in two different ways: when the superman on top of the pyramid falls, the whole structure of individuals beneath collapses as well, or if they sense that the boss is about to fall short, they abandon him and start the search for the future boss’. 7.2. What type of policy-making has Albania? What type of policy-making has Albania? Rational or incremental? Corporatist or pluralist? The model of ‘rational policy-making’ developed by Herbert Simon consists in ‘setting out objectives and then subsequently finding options or means to fulfil these objectives, after identifying firstly all existing problems and opportunities, secondly all options or alternatives, thirdly all cost and benefits and finally the values related to consequences’ (Hogwood and Gunn 1984:45). However, policy-making in real life rarely proceeds in


167

such a logical, comprehensive and purposive manner. This ‘rational comprehensive’ approach is centralized, technocratic, and planned, and therefore sometimes it is sometimes seen as a feature of totalitarian or communist societies, although its origins are really in the centralized Welfare State systems of the 1950s and 1960s. Limitations to rationality are related to the complexity of the real world and the impact of unexpected internal and external factors, lack of knowledge, skills and resource limitations (time, energy and money). The second model, developed by Charles Lindblom (1958), argues that policy-making tends to be incremental (Hogwood and Gunn 1984: 52), i.e. small adjustments rather than sweeping changes, moving cautiously rather than taking giant steps. In this way, problems are not solved once and for all, but instead, policy-making is serial. As Hill (1997:102) argues, ‘by testing the water, the decision-maker can assess the wisdom of the moves and can decide whether to make further progress or to change direction’. Policy-making is regarded as a process of bargaining, negotiations and compromises among the actors, what Lindblom has called ‘partisan mutual adjustment’, and might include ‘consensus seeking’, an approach characteristic of most pluralist liberal democracies. Lindblom argues that incrementalism is the best way in which policies could and should be made such societies. Another group of authors argue against both rational comprehensive and incrementalist approaches that there is no one ‘best way’ of policymaking and advocate a combination of both models. This is because some issues require a highly political, pluralist, bargaining and incrementalist approach, while others need a more planned or analytical approach. With this in mind, Etzioni has argued for what he calls a ‘mixing scanning’ approach which combines both fundamental decisions and incremental ones where ‘fundamental decisions are important because they provide the context for incremental decisions’ (quoted in Hill 1997:106). Is the policy process in Albania one of rational comprehensiveness or incrementalist? During communism, policy-making followed what might be called the ‘rationalist’ model, reflected in the centralized and planned approach (e.g. five-year economic plans). Of course, as in all the countries of the communist system, this ‘rationalism’ existed mainly on the surface of things, and underneath, was hidden a deep-seated and almost insane irrationality, which was finally revealed when the pack of cards fell down. This was so because communism refused to treat people as human beings and autonomous persons endowed with freedom and dignity, but instead saw them as cogs in the industrial machine. This was deeply depersonaliz-

168


ing and people robbed of their dignity and freedom end by becoming incapable of creativity and, as a result, productivity suffers. The freedom of the individual person is taken over by the overpowering state which can maintain its legitimacy only by violence and fear. The ‘new man’ of Marxism is, in fact, a pipe-dream and ends in complete servitude of the masses to the system, which is increasingly run by self-serving and self-satisfied party elites. The ‘rationality’ of the machine is far removed from the more profound ‘rationality’ of the human person and finally can only grind to a halt. On the other hand, the excessive individualism and ‘freedom’ of a complete market-type approach is equally injurious to the human person since the latter also exists in society and needs the concept of the ‘common good’ as the necessary context in which his freedom is exercised. In the first decade of the transition, there was a reaction to the excessive interventionism of the communist period, with a perhaps excessive reliance on market-type approaches to policy. Major policy decisions were not a result of setting clear goals and objectives, or made on the basis of a serious commitment to achieve and implement them. Rather they were reactive and incoherent policies that did little to enhance the government’s ability to deal with and solve domestic problems, but which served sectional political and economic interests. On the other hand, as Meksi argues (2003:16), ‘most of the governments in power never had the “luxury” of applying long-term development policies. This happened for two reasons: firstly, the continuing political and social crisis in the country and secondly, the need to rebuild before going into a stable development phase’. The picture somewhat changed, however, with the new commitments to EU membership. To some extent, it could be argued that policy-making is rational, because there is a government policy agenda with a well-defined goal, which is the EU accession of Albania, as well as objectives in specific areas and strategies about how to achieve them. On the other hand, it can hardly be a technocratic and ‘politics and pressure-free model’ of decisionmaking, immune from politics. Rather, it is more what Lindblom (1958) called a process of ‘muddling through’. Policy-making has been to a great extent a political process, not a technocratic one, a partisan rather than administrative one. A political process, as Hill (1997:98) argues, ‘particularly in a democratic context, is one in which some actors have a more legitimate policy-making role than others…hence there is a potential conflict amongst actors, particularly the politicians, to have exclusive rights to make policy’. The discourse of the EU about market liberalization, fiscal restraint and meeting certain criteria, presented as the only feasible choice for the economic policy of a country,


169

‘requires policy-making to become more technical, i.e. immune from certain political and economic interests, and structures more independent of direct political control’ (Della Sala 1997:18). Another feature is the role of party ideological programmes. Some policies are efforts to enforce changes compatible with a specific ideological goal. In Albania, of course, as noted above in our analysis of Albanian political parties, ideology in policy-making is becoming less important, because the personal self-interests of the actors play the most important role. Another way of understanding the policy ‘style’ is to ask whether policy-making is pluralist, corporatist or elitist. This has to do with which actors are involved, the power relations among them, and how these power relations affect how they interact with one another. Thus we have: • Pluralism: when policy is the result of the participation of a wide range of actors. • Corporatism: when there is a so-called ‘iron triangle’: government, plus the two social partners (business and labour). • Elitism: when it is made with the participation of just a few key elite groups. We believe that policy-making in Albania is characterized in most aspects as elitist, in the sense that the key decisions are made by the political elite in power, who seem to be the main actors, and partly as corporatist, as often it is the key business elites who are also influential actors (although these ‘business elites’ may also be involved in organized crime). Labour, the third side of the iron triangle, along with other segments of civil society (NGOs, professional associations), knowledge elites and the political opposition, are excluded from, or not active in, policy-making. The lack of participation by a broad range of actors means that the policy process in Albania is hardly pluralist and open and there is a need for more compromise and consensus. The policy-making system in Albania demonstrates many of the characteristics of what Della Sala (1997:19) describes as a ‘weak state’, in the sense that ‘these states lack the ability to provide strong direction in steering the nation-state through troubled waters’. The acceptance of the Copenhagen criteria and efforts to achieve them hopefully will be an incentive for Albanian governments to improve the decision-making capacities within the state. As the Council of Europe (2004) assessment of the Albanian state shows, however, there is still a long way to go.

8 THE ROLE OF THE ELITE AND THE DOMESTIC ACTORS ‘Albania has been caught in the vicious circle of weak institutions that produce authoritarian leaders, who in turn sustain and promote instittional weakness’. Blendi Kajsiu (2002:19).

In this chapter we shall identify who are the actors involved in the policy process, what are the relationships between them and what are their attitudes, role and contribution to the main policy goal of Albania, that of European integration. Hill (1997:109) states ‘policy-making is a process which involves elected politicians, civil servants and representatives of pressure groups’. He further distinguishes between ‘the elected’ and ‘the appointed’ as ‘insiders’ within the state, and the rest as ‘outsiders’. The prospect of EU membership creates a powerful incentive for fundamental domestic reforms, but the ultimate responsibility for carrying these out lies with the various domestic actors, both the political and administrative elites, as well as the wider forces of civil society. This is what is known as taking ‘ownership of the process’. 8.1. The elite and middle classes under communism Unlike the Visegrad countries, which were part of the Habsburg Empire, and developed an efficient administration and taxation system and where the conditions were created for the formation of a middle class, Albania came out of the communist period without this key group. An embryonic middle class appeared in Albania after independence in 1912, but this was crushed during communism. The first period after the communists came to power (1945–48), witnessed an attack on the political and knowledge elites formed before the war and on the bourgeoisie, by confiscating all

The Role of the Elite and the Domestic Actors

171

their properties. This elite, who had been almost entirely educated in the west, was gradually replaced by a new intellectual elite, prepared uniformly in the communist camp according to the Russian recipe. During the second phase (1949–61), the attack continued on the fragile stratum of bourgeoisie (composed mainly of small entrepreneurs), which was considered by the communists to be a reactionary social class. The destruction of this class and continuous persecution of their family members was accompanied by the complete abolition of private property. In this way, the precommunist upper and middle classes and elites were eliminated. During 1962-73, at the time of the ‘cultural revolution’ and under Chinese influence, the communists started the experiment of the creation of a new species, known as ‘the new socialist man’. As in China, this social experiment led only to the destruction of the social basis of a healthy society and, in fact, led to the degradation of the human person and a deep cynicism on the part of the political class. This would have grave consequences for the transition from communism as some of the essential elements of a democratic society – what Robert Putnam calls ‘social capital’ – were missing. This intellectually stifling environment and the consequent series of ‘witch-hunts’ of intellectuals resulted in the end in the prevalence of an ‘intelligentsia’, which was, to a large extent, brainwashed, mediocre and passive (intellectuals and academics used to assume a low profile in order to survive the communist regime), but also blindly loyal to, and closely integrated into, the Party of Labour. As Vickers and Pettifer (1998:39) describe it, ‘the political culture of the Tirana elite under communism was of a peculiar narrowness, extremely provincial, often extraordinarily selfsatisfied in view of how modest Albania’s achievements were in many fields, and full of internal contradictions’. The artistic elite was conformist and ideologically indoctrinated and forced to produce the so-called ‘art of socialist realism’, while every other form of art was condemned and punished as ‘foreign bourgeois-revisionist ideology’90. The intelligentsia were almost entirely located in Tirana. Because intellectuals enjoyed a privileged social position compared to other strata of society (the working class and the so-called ‘cooperativist peasantry’), their attitude was extremely elitist (especially among Tirana intellectuals who had an almost ‘aristocratic’ mentality) and in reality the differentiation among (the new) social classes was very evident, despite the communist propaganda about the superiority of the ‘working class’ which denied that such social discrepancies existed. As a result of these purges and the mediocrity of communist intellectuals, therefore, Albania did not have a long-established culture of dissident

172


intellectuals and there was no equivalent of the liberal political elites and dissident groups which emerged in Central European communist countries in the late 1970s or early 1980s. It was these groups who made the biggest contribution to overthrowing communism in Hungary, Poland and other CEE countries. On the contrary, as Kajsiu (2002: 14) points out, ‘the early 1990s found Albania without an experienced liberal elite to lead transition processes’. The people who filled the gap and who formed the new political class in the 1990s, were, ironically, mostly individuals who had been members of the Party of Labour or had links with the former communist establishment. Some of them, overnight and without a real metamorphosis, ‘re-discovered’ themselves as democrats, or opponents of communism. Few of the post-communist political elites can claim to have had a ‘dissident’ status under communism. The development of an independent and efficient elite (in particular a political elite) in post-communist Albania was, therefore, a real challenge. 8.2. The birth of the new elite In the early years of transition, Albanian decision-makers were either ‘policy virgins’, catapulted fresh into positions of power, starting to learn how to govern in unfamiliar settings, or those from the communist regime, who had to unlearn old policy ways and learn new ones. In most cases they were not equipped with the relevant professional education. During communism, formal academic education in political science and international relations was almost completely absent, or it was very basic, distorted and politicized in the form of ‘Marxist-Leninist’ philosophy and jurisprudence. What is striking is that, during the transition period, there has been a partial reproduction of the communist nomenklatura in the political, administrative and economic realms. Who is the national elite and what is its role? According to Pridham (2000:143), ‘National elites are top post-holders in the largest political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications and cultural organizations…who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially’. Although the term ‘elite’ has a pejorative connotation in western societies today, it may also have a more positive meaning, in the sense of a group of people who provide the necessary leadership in a society that is undergoing significant changes. In order to be considered an elite in this positive sense of the word, the group


173

of people who lead and govern a nation or a state should have one or more of these features: knowledge, nobility, wealth or power. Thus, elites are composed of educated people with wide knowledge, who are in power but have a sense of service towards the people, who may have wealth, but use it for good things. The role of the elite is particularly important in times of system change or during transition periods, because with their knowledge, professional expertise, and sense of commitment and sacrifice, it can take its people towards progress, or on the contrary, to go backwards (examples of the first are the elites of the CEE countries who took their people and their countries towards democratization and accession to the EU). Unfortunately, this is not the case in Albania. An Albanian political analyst, Shinasi Rama (2004), described it in this way: ‘The current Albanian elite is, in every sense, the most monstrous that has ever existed in the history of the Albanian nation, it does not fulfil any of the criteria of an elite, but on the contrary, it has become a cancer of the nation and the Albanian state. The elite of Tirana has started a mad race to become artificially noble, forgetting that nobility can only be gained by and expressed through service and sacrifice towards the people. This so-called elite, which governs the Albanian state today, lacks every feature of nobility. The most powerful and influential elite group in Albania, the political elite, is composed to a considerable extent of people with no integrity and without enough education, coming from peasant, provincial and poor backgrounds. As for their wealth, it has been won in a gangster-like, corrupt, mafia and criminal way, using the state power’. In this analysis, he refers mainly to the political elite or politicians, whom he calls ‘political hyenas’ from the fact they use their positions of power given by the state to scavenge the country and people’s resources in order to rule over Albanians. This power gives these people, in an anarchic environment like the Albanian transition, enormous material privileges and a high social status and, as a consequence, after a short period they find themselves artificially converted into an elite in the negative sense of the word. 8.3. The domestic actors 8.3.1. The political elite and state actors The political elite is a powerful collective actor, which seeks to dominate the process of democratization. Pridham (2000:155) argues that ‘during transition, the political elite faces three challenges: alternation in power,

174


party alliances and role of opposition, forms of interaction between political elite and mass pressures’.

a. The role of political leaders The role of leaders in society and history cannot be denied, and in processes of political change, as in the transition from communism to democracy, good leadership is a key factor of success. Badly-trained and incompetent leaders, on the other hand, will hinder progress and even make a society go backwards. This is the lesson of history to be learned from Latin America to Asia and to Europe. Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin, although undoubtedly powerful and charismatic leaders, were catastrophic for the countries which they led. Winston Churchill and John F Kennedy, on the other hand, led their nations forward in situations of great danger during the Second World War and the Cold War respectively. The difference between the two sets of leaders is not in their charismatic qualities, which they all shared, but in the values that underlay their leadership. In the first group, there was a deep cynicism about human nature and the human person, whom they regarded as mere instruments to achieve their ends, political and personal power, and could then be discarded. In the second group, there was an adherence to values of respect for the person and, deriving from this, an acceptance of democracy and human rights. One of the reasons that Albania has not been successful as a nation-state throughout its history is that it did not have such qualities of leadership or had them only for a short period of time (Skanderbeg, Ismail Qemali, Fan S. Noli etc). During communism, Albania’s leaders, and its dictator, Enver Hoxha, chose as their role models Stalin and Mao Tse Tung! To some extent, given that, during the transition period, Albania’s leaders came to a large extent from the old communist elites, it is not surprising that the quality of leadership has been low. Instead, as an Albanian political analyst, Mustafa Nano (2003) argues, ‘It has been governed by political leaders inexperienced in the procedures of democratic life, known for their incompetence and irresponsibility’. The first reason for that is the prevalence of communist mentality in most of the current leaders and politicians, as they have lived most of their live under that system and many of them have been previously members of the Party of Labour. As Nordlinger (2005) points out, ‘Post-Communists aren’t so “post”. They still think like communists and act like communists. They have not developed democratic ways of living, dealing and governing’. That explains the


175

lack of essential political skills such as tolerance, cooperation, compromise or negotiation. Another reason for displaying such a level of irresponsibility and incompetence is that most of the individuals who entered politics, as the well-known critic Rexhep Qosja notes, ‘do not have any notable academic or professional backgrounds and have hardly been successful in their previous professions, or are people without integrity and high values’. There are few people of real ability and responsibility among the political elite, capable of conducting political business competently and with decency. The third reason is related to the fact that politics in Albania has become the most ‘profitable’ get-rich-quick profession. Politicians enjoy the highest living standards in the country because of the massive wealth they have acquired. Just a few months after coming to office, politicians and high officials have luxurious houses and expensive cars. It is not surprising, therefore, that everybody wants to enter politics, or to become a politician, or to obtain an ‘armchair post’. Politics in Albania is a ‘zero-sum game’, in which the winner takes all and the loser gets nothing. Therefore, as long as they live in this ‘paradise of power’, their main aim is to fill their pockets, to accumulate wealth for themselves and their families, to use their positions to help their relatives and cronies, to send their children to study at the best universities abroad, but on the other hand not to make any contribution to their country and its citizens. Placing their own selfish interests above those of the nation and its citizens is one typical feature of many of the Albanian leaders. Thomas Carothers characterizes this Albanian democracy as ‘feckless’, pointing out that ‘the Albanian political elite from all major parties are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, dishonest and not serious about working for their country’ (ESI 2003:13), which has contributed to the discontent of Albanians towards their ‘leaders’. Edi Rama, the Mayor of Tirana, who recently succeeded Fatos Nano as the Chairman of the Socialist Party, is one of the few exceptions to this. His success in transforming the Albanian capital into a more vibrant city has turned him into Albania’s most popular politician91. The political elite is deeply involved in economic activity, including the black market economy and the monopolies. A special category, who are increasingly dominating the political scene are the so-called ‘business politicians’, or the infamous oligarchs, who have virtually no ideological or programmatic convictions, and who have built their career through a skilful combination of corruption and clientelistic practices. Albania needs to get to the point where it is more like Western countries, where, although it is sometimes claimed that big business has an undue influence on poli-

176


tics, politicians run the country, while businessmen largely stick to running their businesses. When a country fails to create a political system based on stable institutions, it relies on personalities and the result is that there is a dominance of individuals over institutions. ‘Albania has been caught in the vicious circle of weak institutions that produce authoritarian leaders who in turn sustain and promote institutional weakness’, observes Kajsiu (2002:19). The archaic cult of the two ‘dinosaurs’ in Albanian politics, Nano and Berisha, is the best example of that. Unfortunately, Albanians, especially the younger generation, do not have good role models in domestic politics. Writing during the period when Fatos Nano was Prime minster and Sali Berisha was leader of the opposition, one British author notes that ‘the names of both main leaders are synonymous with what many Albanians feel is the root cause of the paralysis in Albanian politics and the prevalence of a communist mentality in the political leadership’ (Vickers 2003). In its 2004 report, the European Commission accused Albania’s leaders of lacking the political will to meet preconditions for concluding a SAA. The irresponsible and cynical comment the then Prime Minister, Fatos Nano, made about this statement, in an interview with the Financial Times, was ‘What is “political will”? Does it walk, does it sing?’ (Boulton 2004). Albanians are understandably fed up with this arrogance and irresponsibility and agree their political leaders are to blame. ‘The political class that has put itself above the people is a very concrete obstacle to the country’s progress’, says Kadare (2003). The political scene, over the transition period of 16 years, has been dominated by the same political actors. ‘There are still the same actors – the President of the Delegation of South East Europe in the European Parliament, Doris Pack, said in an interview – and the same people cannot change things. They are old in their thinking and cannot be changed. Here lies the problem’ (Baku 2004). The dominance for a long time of the same individuals in Albanian politics is related firstly to a feudalistic mentality, since such people see themselves as irreplaceable and their power as eternal, and secondly to an obsession to retain that power forever, by any means (this because of the reasons explained above: politics as a ‘paradise of privileges’). There are also a lot of ‘quick-change acrobat’ politicians, who jump from one party to another, even to a completely opposite political side, driven by the obsession to stay always in politics and in power. These ‘chameleons’, colourless or spineless individuals, are very common in Albanian politics. Many Albanians believe that as long as the current leaders and political class continue to dominate, there is unlikely to be much improvement in


177

politics and in the country’s situation in general. What Albania needs, they think, especially in its politics, are more idealistic, patriotic and intelligent newcomers, people with integrity, strong willingness and a high sense of commitment and responsibility.

b. Government During the first decade of transition, the governments in Albania, ‘simply have survived without in fact governing’ (there is an analogy to be found in Di Palma‘s characterization of the Italian system of 30 years ago (Di Palma, 1977). This ‘survival without governance’ includes a mixture of political stasis and policy paralysis. Mere political survival has been a systemic feature of Albanian politics, reflected in weak executives. Despite offering attractive packages of policies and promises, the executive has been unable to implement them. Personalistic, rather than programmatic commitments on public issues, low levels of policy alternatives and the failure to keep election promises, have resulted in unaccountable governments and ineffective policy-making, called by Furlong (1994:4) ‘the ungovernability syndrome’. Accountability (both for executive and parliamentary branches of the state) remains an alien concept. Government in Albania has also suffered from the phenomenon known as ‘state capture’ with state structures and institutions captured by a broad range of political and economic interests. What is worse, ‘capture’ by organized crime seems to be on the rise and it is a development of great concern (Freedom House, 2004:16). ‘Government is viewed as a means of distributing jobs and largesse to one’s supporters’, observes Boulton (2004). The post of a ‘minister’ has risen to a cult, because in Albania this is a post which gives power to do everything, to sign and decide, to hire and fire, to give or take favours, a post which puts you in charge of profitable tenders and procurements, a post which provides an official car, bodyguards, free trips abroad and a lot of other privileges, which makes you feel very important and the centre of attention, giving therefore a power par excellence. What is worse, some members of the government and the civil service control and monopolize a number of key sectors of the economy. Many cabinet members have direct conflicts of interest with the private businesses they run on the side. State institutions are weak and politicized. What is more disturbing, state institutions have quite often become instruments of political struggle. All these lead the Albanian state to suffer from low levels of legitimacy and

178


difficulty in asserting its authority against power centres organized on a clientelistic basis around the political elite. While state institutions are weak, state and political actors, oligarchs and mafia individuals, taking advantage of the faulty transition period, have become powerful and influential and for the most part escape scrutiny. As a result of the victory of the DP and its allies, after eight years in opposition, a new government coalition took office in September 2005. The task facing it is to build a stable and legitimate state, which the citizens seek to strengthen and not to destroy, a state that can be accepted in the future by the EU as a full member. It is perhaps a positive sign that the new government has reduced the number of ministries from 17 to 14, as this may reduce the number of opportunities for political patronage (since there are fewer posts to distribute). The new government, among other priorities, pledged to fight corruption, reduce poverty and raise the standard of living for Albanians. A public opinion poll organized by the MJAFT! Movement in January 2006 on the evaluation of the first 100 days of the new government (Mjaft: 2006), showed that Albanian citizens, on a scale from 4-10 (where 4=fail and 10=success) have given the new government a grade of 6.3. When asked how the change of government has affected their lives, work, family, relatives and community, 81.1 per cent of the respondents do not feel any visible change, followed by a proportion of respondents (9.2 per cent) who feel that the government has negatively influenced their life, followed by a smaller proportion who feel it has positively influenced their lives (8.6 per cent). The majority of the respondents, when asked to evaluate the progress of a series of issues over recent months, compared to the period before the general elections, believed that the progress was about the same as before, for almost every issue. Similar results were obtained from another poll, organized by Globic Polls (Chapel Hill, NC, USA: 2005) on the evaluation of the government’s first 100 days. This poll, conducted in the two largest Albanian cities, Tirana and Durrës, showed that for a government which has been in power in its first months, the evaluation of public opinion is pretty low and worrying. Forty two per cent of the respondents think that things are heading in the wrong direction, compared with 41 per cent who think the opposite. Those interviewed feel that the government has not done much in improving their daily basic needs, such as water, electricity and roads, reduction of unemployment and poverty, and the public order. The grade the respondents have given to the new government is 6.4, very similar to that of the other study.


179

It seems the Berisha government has a lot of challenges ahead to make the necessary reforms to improve the lives of its citizens, which subsequently may change their perceptions of that government.

c. Parliament The Albanian unicameral parliament, called the ‘People’s Assembly’, became pluralist for the first time in 1991 (after 45 years), with the participation of elected representatives from many political parties. In recent years, the internal organization and parliamentary structures have improved, as the Council of Europe (2004) has stated, but the functioning of parliament and parliamentary bodies is still being hampered by the slow pace of reform, inefficient procedures, an endemic shortage of experience and technical expertise and by a tendency to politicize parliamentary administration. The Albanian parliament has not yet achieved a high degree of institutional credibility; it looks more like a ‘talk-shop’ and debating club, where a confrontational political atmosphere still dominates, rather than a law-making body. Indeed it has served as ‘a rubber stamp’ to approve decisions already made in the HQ of the party in power, instead of becoming an arena for national decision-making and conflict resolution. Most MPs lack skills of compromise and negotiation and find it difficult to take a constructive bipartisan approach on important pieces of legislation91. The Albanian parliament has been characterized as a ‘foot-dragging parliament’ (ICG 2003:10) with low levels of accountability to the electorate. ‘There is too little communication and feedback between Albanian elected officials and voters – points out Biberaj (1998:169) - and the influence of the broader public on the legislature is negligible…lawmakers in general maintain very loose ties with their constituencies’. Most of the MPs, once elected, forget about the people who voted for them and the obligations and promises they made, mainly pursuing their personal interests. Besides the lack of responsibility and commitment from the MPs themselves, two other factors have contributed to the poor contact of the MPs with the voters or to low levels of accountability to the electorate: the nature of the electoral system, being partly proportional (which means a number of them are not elected directly, therefore not known by their electorate), as well as the fact that most MPs are not permanent residents of their constituency areas. Many Albanians seek to become MPs because of the privileges and lifestyle that this post offers, which are in such stark contrast to the rest of the

180


population. The salary of an MP is $1500 per month (compared to the salaries of even the professionals, such as a doctor’s or a teacher’s in the public sector, which average only $200 per month), plus extra payments if he is a member of a parliamentary commission. Every MP is provided with a car and a driver92, and there are 140 of them (including all extra expenses for petrol and car maintenance, as well as the salary of the driver), and with $80 expenses per month for mobile phones. The total annual cost of an MP is $55000. Other privileges include: the right to get a mortgage from the bank for buying a house with much easier and better conditions compared to ordinary citizens (not to forget that housing is one of the most problematic issues in Albania), to import a personal car without customs duty, not to pay border taxes, and to have a diplomatic passport, for the MP and for his/her spouse. MPs, unlike others, have the right to retire at 55. The pension for an MP who has been in parliament for a four-year term is $450 per month, or three times more than the salary of a primary school teacher. Another issue has to do with the political, professional and academic background and achievements, as well as the moral values of individuals who become MPs. This is a known shortcoming of the Albanian Parliament, where there is a lack of political professionals or lawyers. What is worse, as mentioned in Chapter 3, is the election of individuals with suspicious business, oligarch and mafia connections. This means that firstly, organized crime can influence parlamentary activity, and secondly it can even be found in the state leadership. Talking about the new 2005 parliament, analyst Mustafa Nano (2005) states that, ‘over 50 per cent of the MPs of the new parliament are individuals who have made neither any political contribution, nor any other contribution to other areas of human activity outside of politics, as much as the profession of a fortune-teller has to do with that of a scientist. MP candidates from small parties, such as the Republican Party, Social Democratic Party, Agrarian Party, Democratic Alliance Party, and even a number of candidates from big parties such as SP, DP or Socialist Movement for Integration, have been completely anonymous previously. The MPs experienced in political and public life, with political and professional achievements and expertise, are in the minority. This is, therefore, the parliament with the least dignity and professionalism of the whole post-communist period in Albania. This is, in fact, one of the most significant indicators of the degeneration of the Albanian political class, who are incapable of attracting the electorate and winning votes with good governing programmes, policies and alternatives, and who turn for help to wealthy and suspicious tough guys. The institution of parliament, which is one of the most important and respected in the truly democratic world, has


181

degenerated so badly in Albania’. Because the MPs are protected with a strong immunity, this is another reason why the mafia and their associates want to become MPs. Therefore, the current Albanian Parliament is far from being a decent and elite institution, as it is supposed to be. The Albanian civic movement Mjaft has criticized the lack of representativeness of the parliament elected on 3 July, as there is a discrepancy between the real support in the electorate for the political parties and the number of votes the parties received. Even though there are 12 parties in the current parliament, only three of them (DP, SP, and the Socialist Movement for Integration which obtained only one seat) won seats with the majoritarian vote94. The seats of the remaining nine parties were won only through the proportional vote. The most striking example was the Republican Party, which obtained 20 per cent of the proportional votes (eight percent of the total number of seats), which does not reflect its real electorate. The Albanian Parliament can and must play a central role in Albania’s political life and during the country’s journey towards the EU. Unfortunately so far it has not played this role successfully.

d. President Albania is a parliamentary republic and the president is elected by two-thirds of the votes cast in the parliament. He has not much power, and has to choose either to make a significant impact on his country and its citizens, or to keep a low political profile by just occupying a ceremonial and honorary post. The recent presidential elections were considered a major success, because Albanian political parties took into account the opinions of the EU and international community and, with a wide consensus among them, agreed to choose the first ‘non-political’ president. He has therefore been called ‘the consensual president’. President Alfred Moisiu has been given the opportunity to be an important reformer, a national leader above politics and president of all the people, but to fulfil this role he will have to take courageous and decisive action and stand up to the negative forces within the country. That such a development is possible can be seen from the example of Mary Robinson, who became President of Ireland in the 1980s. The Irish Presidency, like the Albanian, was hitherto largely ceremonial and occupied by retired academics or politicians at the end of their careers. Mrs Robinson changed this with a high profile support for various social reforms that were part of Ireland’s ‘modernization’ programme, and was one of the elements which led it to develop into the ‘Celtic Tiger’.

182


8.3.2. The bureaucratic elite (Civil servants) ‘The purer form of rational policy-making considers civil servants to be dominant in policy-making’ (Hill 1997:109). This is because they engage twice during the policy process: in the stage of policy formulation by providing ideas and at the implementation stage by executing the tasks. Parson (1995:269) argues that ‘decision-making is increasingly framed by technical and expert opinion and this in a modern state involves the analysis of a problem and the implementation of solutions’. The undermining of the role of civil servants in Albania comes from the lack of a Weberian-type rational administrative culture. Instead of a bureaucracy of professional and administrative values, Albania has developed a politicized bureaucracy, where the attitudes of civil servants are shaped by political affiliation or the preferences of their ministers, as described by Hall (1993: 275), ‘where they stand depends on where they sit’. Of course, in western states such as France and Germany, the very senior civil servants are also political appointees and can adopt partisan attitudes, but the administrations as a whole do follow Weberian-type bureaucratic approaches, while in the United Kingdom even the very top civil servants, the permanent secretaries and their immediate subordinates, do not have partisan connections. Albanian civil servants, especially those in key positions, do not have the necessary professional expertise and knowledge, or the administrative and managerial skills, and their appointments are generally short-term (which harms the corporate institutional memory). Sometimes, ministers and high officials put their energies into influencing (and subsequently profiting from) tenders and improper public procurements, rather than into strategic reform. This results in ineffectiveness, lack of productivity and failure to carry out reforms. As Vickers notes, ‘the government is composed mostly of mediocre officials and their patronage networks threaten to keep many reforms at a superficial level’. Civil servants are important actors in the process of democratization, they are directly involved in, and to a certain extent responsible for, Albania’s integration into EU structures. Developing a strong public administration and a professional, depoliticized and meritocratic civil service is, therefore, very important. Despite its shortcomings, the positive thing is that the bureaucratic elite is in favour of European integration. In a poll conducted by the Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS) in 2002 to measure the attitude and understanding of the population to EU integration, public administration officials showed high support of EU membership and


183

a good understanding of the EU and the integration process. This is a good sign and, along with increasing professionalism and depoliticization, will perhaps help it to implement the central instruments of the SAP and to cope in the future with European policies, which are increasing in their scope and complexity and are becoming more technical and sophisticated. 8.3.3. The knowledge elite Parson (1995:265) argues that ‘the rise of technical knowledge can lead to a meritocratic system in which the most highly educated will form the main social elite’. Knowledge is vital to understanding the modern world and to coping with the challenges of globalization, high technology and competition. As Bell argues, ‘in the society of the future, the scientist, the professional, the technician and the technocrat will play a predominant role’ (quoted in Parson 1995:267). Albania is not currently a society where ‘knowledge’ is sufficiently appreciated or considered important, but if the country is to succeed on the road of convergence on which it has embarked, ideological or political forms of decision-making will have to gradually be complemented by a more technocratic approach [decisionmaking must be political, but it should have a technocratic base]. The knowledge elite generally includes: • Intellectuals; • Academics and researchers; • The cultural elite (writers and artists); • The media elite (analysts and journalists); • ‘Epistemic’ and ‘policy communities’. The knowledge elite is probably the most important actor for ensuring progress and the success of the democratization process. As a result of the importance given to education during communism (Albanians have always appreciated education) and the respected social status intellectuals used to enjoy, by the end of the 1980s the knowledge elite constituted a large group in quantity, though not necessarily in quality in all fields. The establishment of a market economy and the new changes in the 1990s started to denigrate both the status and the income of these intellectuals, so many abandoned or shifted from their professions to more profitable ones (sometimes of a lower status), even becoming business entrepreneurs. For this and other reasons related to the phenomenon of the ‘brain drain’, the knowledge elite in Albania has been much reduced in size. There are fewer academics in universities and other higher educational institutions,

184


including the ‘Academy of Sciences’ and their quality has decreased. Fewer people engage in scientific research. One positive feature, however, has been the growth in the number of think-tanks and research institutes, as these are fora for experts and researchers to generate new ideas. In Albania, there are no ‘epistemic communities’ like those described by Haas (1992:2): ‘networks of knowledge-based experts or professionals with recognized expertise in a particular domain, who share a set of beliefs, who help…policy-makers by proposing policy alternatives and giving scientific and technical advice and expertise’. These communities are channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments, as well as from country to country. In the other EU countries, there are identifiable epistemic communities, composed of intellectuals, academics, political and economic elites, who have been supportive of European integration, despite changes of government. This cognitive dimension of policy-making is also present in the concept of ‘advocacy coalitions’, who, according to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993:25), are ‘people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief system, which is a set of basic values and problem perceptions’. Such groups are present in Albania only in a very rudimentary form.

a. The ‘Brain drain’ Albania has experienced high emigration over the last decade, mainly as the result of the difficult political and socio-economic situation in the country and the lack of opportunities that it can offer and lack of hope for a better future. Today, approximately 25 per cent of the total Albanian population (born in Albania), or over 35 per cent of the labour force, has emigrated (Barjaba 2004). Albania’s migration flow has, since the early 1990s, been five times higher than the average migration flow in developing countries. This has had a twofold effect: on the one hand, it has been beneficial for the Albanian economy, because of remittances, (which in 2005 exceeded €750 million or one-fifth of the country’s GDP); on the other hand, it has been harmful, because it has led to a loss of human capital, which can badly affect a country’s potential for development and can have serious consequences for socio-economic life. Much more harmful than emigration in general, however, is the emigration of educated people, professionals and intellectuals, known as the phenomenon of the ‘brain drain’. This is because the intelligentsia are a key section of the political, knowledge and cultural elites of a country and,


185

more importantly, play a crucial part in establishing and consolidating liberal democracy. Whilst the emigration of the working class is seen more as beneficial, the exodus of intellectuals and professionals has almost entirely negative consequences: socially, because the country loses the ‘brains’ and talents; politically, because it loses the educated middle class, from which can come potential leaders; economically, because the most educated people integrate quickly into their new homeland and seem less likely to send money back; fiscally, because tax-payers have paid to educate many of those who leave, who in most cases end up working in jobs below the level of their qualifications at home. This phenomenon, known as the ‘brain waste’, means that educated and qualified people are obliged to do menial jobs in a foreign country as emigrants, instead of using their intellectual abilities, capacities and skills. According to The Economist (2002), Albania has lost one-third of its qualified people over the last decade and many find themselves immigrating into countries which have ‘points’ systems to attract educated and highly-skilled migrants, the opposite phenomenon, that of ‘brain gain’. The deterioration in quality of Albanian schools and universities and the lack of educational and professional opportunities and hopes for the future have drained another population cohort: the youth. Albanians hold education in high regard and appreciate a good education, so a large number of Albanian students, through various scholarships or individual applications, have been pursuing their studies abroad and many have graduated from good western universities (westerners are impressed by the high results in education and Albanians capacity to speak several foreign languages). After graduation, however, they face the dilemma of whether to stay abroad or to return to their home country. The education they have received in western universities would be a great help in advancing the country. Most of them, however, prefer not to come back and this is not because of the low salaries in their own country, but because of the lack of opportunities for well-educated people in Albania’s mediocre political and administrative system. ‘Failed politics have killed many hopes, visions and dreams of young people abroad, who aspire to return back to their country and contribute with the education they have received in the West’, says Erion Veliaj (2004). According to a study conducted by the Open Society Institute, 60 per cent of Albanians who study on scholarship abroad do not wish to return home94. Those who return – as Jerina Zaloshnja (2005) points out – ‘prefer to work for international organizations and research centres in Tirana in exchange for much better pay than the government institutions offer’, as well as for not being under stress of quick turnovers and political interference.

186


Albania has been experiencing a devastating brain drain over these 15 years of transition. During the period 1990-2003, approximately 45 per cent of academics (university professors and researchers) left the country, as did thousands of university graduates. It is a pity to see that the country’s best and brightest, most educated and talented, had fled abroad, mostly never to come back. The paradox, however, is that wealthy nations use various schemes to ‘absorb the brains’, while poor countries like Albania make little effort to stop these young people, the bright future of the country, from leaving or to attract them back home. The reality is that Albanian leaders seem more comfortable governing a country from which the smartest, most educated, civilized and skilled citizens leave every day, rather than implementing strategies and finding ways to make the country a better place to live and to work. They are not interested in encouraging the brightest to return home, on the contrary they use all means to de-motivate and discourage them. A country like Albania, where advancement and progress depends on political affiliation rather than meritocracy, will lose bright people to societies and countries where talent and ‘brain’ is appreciated. The Albanian government has approved a ‘Strategy for Migration’ in order to enable Albanian Diaspora to contribute to the country’s development. However, an elaborate strategy is not enough to make talented people to return home, because, as the European Commission (2005:38) rightly points out, ‘it is clear that tangible progress will occur only with an overall improvement in the social and economic conditions and in political confidence’. Recently (2006) the UNDP office in Tirana has undertaken a ‘Brain Gain’ initiative, which is assisting the Government of Albania in the effort of utilizing expatriate Albanian expertise for the country’s socio-economic development95. Not only students who have graduated, but also many Albanian emigrés, recent and longstanding, wish to contribute to the development of their homeland with their skills and resources. Their skills, gained in the most developed countries, would be highly valuable to the Albanian environment that requires new inputs as it moves towards greater integration with the EU. In addition to contributing to increasing Albania’s economic capital in terms of financial resources and remittances, Albanian emigrés also have the potential to contribute to develop the country’s social capital through their extensive networks which could stimulate business development and investment. The prospect of European membership has proved elsewhere to decrease this exodus and to make people return, by improving ‘things at home’. Ireland, once a land of emigrants, has become a country of net immigration. This is also happening with the CEE accession countries,


187

where the levels of emigration have fallen considerably. Given opportunities and political stability, good leadership and the rule of law, many of those who might think of leaving Albania would prefer to stay home and those who have left might decide to return. 8.3.4. Civil society According to Larry Diamond, the functions of civil society include ‘limiting state power, promoting a modern type of citizenship and democracybuilding and creating channels for the articulation of interests and opportunities for participation and influence’ (quoted in Pridham 2000:233). Albania did not inherit a ‘civil society’, because there was no separation between the state and society during the communist period, as the state and the communist party had absolute control and penetrated every aspect of society and life. Even before that, Albania lacked civic traditions and independent social organizations and associations. These historical and communist legacies have been and still are among the major obstacles to the construction of a powerful civil society in Albania. Another reason has been the fact that during the transition the efforts by government to support its development have been scarce and there has been little dialogue and interaction between civil society and government. The political elite has neither encouraged, nor has been willing to accept the contribution from civil society. Another barrier has been its lack of real autonomy from the state and especially the political parties. NGOs, think-tanks and different associations and organizations are often not free from and are usually very dependent on political influence or control. Therefore, civil society has not yet become the source of alternative views and approaches to the challenges Albania faces and which could greatly influence the decision-makers. It has not made enough efforts to explore citizens’ concerns and needs, let alone to articulate and channel them sufficiently. Most of the structures of civil society - NGOs, trade unions, business and professional associations - do exist in Albania but are still underdeveloped. Unlike the industrialized countries where the role of the social partners is crucial and where they actively participate in policy-making (especially economic and labour policies), corporatism in Albania is almost non-existent. Trade unions are weak organizationally and have limited affiliations as a result of de-industrialization and high unemployment. Business, on the contrary, has developed as the result of the emergence and flourishing of the private sector. A new business elite has emerged, a

188


part of which has a powerful role not only in the economic life of the country, but also in political life. A part of this elite, known as the ‘oligarchs’, exercises considerable control over the media and politics. The informal connections between the business and political elites is what often counts in decision-making processes. Professional organizations, think-tanks, civic and grass-root associations, however, are limited and lack the organizational experience, financial resources and advocacy skills necessary to influence decision-making. Furthermore, many intellectuals with potential knowledge and experience to lead civic associations, movements and organizations, have instead become attached to the political parties, mostly because politics has become a very ‘profitable’ profession. NGOs are more numerous and exist in great variety. They promote public interest issues, such as human and minority rights, women’s and children’s rights, environmental protection and the media. Generally speaking, however, they have been unable either to speak on behalf of the general public, or to bring substantial pressure to bear on government policies. ‘Most of the Albanian NGOs are not representatives of indigenous social movements, but rather closed circles of elites that conduct a one way dialogue and try to milk international donors, as well as the government96’. The international donors, in order to bridge the gap between the public and politics, have put a lot of effort into strengthening Albanian civil society mainly through funding the NGOs. Assistance has come from the EU through the PHARE programme and other international and private organizations. The NGO sector has been dependent on foreign funding, ‘a dependency relationship that is very disturbing since there is a tendency on part of civil society organizations to accommodate in their projects the objectives of the donors rather than the priorities and needs of the country97’. However, the picture is not completely bleak and some positive developments have been made. Some civil society organizations have been involved in the drafting of national strategies in relation to important social areas, such as poverty reduction, corruption, organized crime, and the prevention of trafficking of women and children. Public campaigns organized by civic movements, such as Mjaft!’ (Enough!) addressing society and citizens’ concerns and needs, have achieved a certain degree of success. Although apathy and demoralization are wide-spread, these movements and other NGOs have shown they can mount effective civic protests to voice the anger of people at poverty, corruption and mismanagement by seemingly indifferent and irresponsible politicians, and to bring them to task.


189

In conclusion, then, it might be said that, even though it is not the main domestic actor and still not very strong, civil society in Albania is much more advanced than the political class. 8.3.5. The media elite A key pillar of any democratic society is an open and free press. The media play a prominent role in the democratic process, because, as Hall (1993:288) argues, ‘the press is both a mirror of public opinion and a magnifying glass of the issues that it takes up’. In Albania, the media seem to have a very powerful and influential role and journalists are important actors. From being just propagandists during communism, over the democratic transition journalists have changed their role into being social advocates and critics. Even though a big number of journalists still lack professionalism and a real understanding of democratic politics and market economics, in recent years, a number of prominent journalists, columnists, editorials and analysts (such as Fatos Lubonja, Mustafa Nano, Andrea Stefani, Plator Nesturi, Adrian Klosi, Feti Zeneli etc.) have emerged. These have made important, outspoken and courageous contributions to raising the awareness of Albanians to democratic values and processes, by criticizing the wrongdoings of governments and politicians and by revealing domestic political and social problems, as well as possible solutions. The number of written and electronic media (newspapers, magazines, TV and radio stations) has been growing. Media, however, remains to a large extent dependent on the various power centres (government, political parties, and economic interests), as instruments to serve their interests, and has close ties with the political elites and business and thus has ceded part of its independence in exchange for financial gains. This was also mentioned by the Council of Europe in its report (2004). The media have tried to play a significant role in informing public opinion about European processes and issues. Taking into consideration that Albania’s public perceptions are highly influenced by the media, it is very important for this information to be realistic and accurate. Media coverage on the relations between Albania and the EU continues to increase and is fairly comprehensive and there is an effort to analyse and disseminate the most important EU events, even if there is no Albanian connection. However, the current limitations of the Albanian media (a certain lack of professionalism and independence, limited knowledge of the EU institutions and policies), together with the temptations to ‘politicize’ EU-related

190


events, still lead to distortions and misunderstandings. In order to play a better role in the democratization process, journalists, need to become more professional, ethical, and independent (politically and financially) to provide balanced, responsible and objective reporting. 8.3.6. The masses and public opinion The 1990 slogan ‘We want Albania with the rest of Europe, expressed the wish of Albanians for a European destination and their desire to open up and reintegrate into the ‘big family of Europe’, after half a century of isolation. ‘Even after 13 years, the rapprochement with Europe remains a fundamental aspiration of the Albanian people’ (European Commission 2000:1). Batt (2002:4) argues that ‘the aspirations and the concept to “return to Europe” is multifaceted: it operates at the psychological level of asserting a European character in the national identity; at the level of domestic politics, it means establishing the social, political and economic frameworks for a way of life similar to that enjoyed in Western European countries; at the international level, it means acquiring the benefits associated with membership of international bodies such as CoE, OSCE, and above all, the EU and NATO’. According to a public opinion survey conducted by the International Commission on the Balkans in 2004, Albanians are the most proEuropean people of this region. Albanians were 72 per cent in favour of the EU with only 2 per cent against it, followed by Kosovo 71 per cent in favour and 5 per cent against, while the least pro-European country in the region was Serbia, with 49 per cent in favour and 13 per cent against. The reasons for the high levels of Albanian public support for EU membership are explained, firstly, by a high political motivation linked to the historic symbolism of ‘returning to Europe’, which is a return to Western civilization, and the EU being identified with liberal democracy, democratic stabilization and security guarantees. Secondly, it is related to the economic and financial benefits, because the people hope that EU funds will improve their socio-economic position and lead to a rise in their standard of living. Thirdly, and for a majority of people an important and touchy issue, it is hoped that EU membership will include their country in the ‘Schengen acquis’, allowing the free movement of people, and the right to move and work wherever they wish in the EU, a right that was denied to Albanians for almost 50 years.


191

During the first decade of transition the affection of the Albanian population was mainly directed towards the USA (Vehbiu 2003). The welcome that Albanians gave in June 1991 to the then US Secretary of State, James Baker, was spectacular. Albania was (and still is) famously, some might say notoriously, pro-American. According to a survey carried out by the ‘Gallup International Association’, Albania was the country which registered the highest percentage of support for the US with 95 per cent, followed by Kosovo with 89 per cent and Israel with 84 per cent99. The above-mentioned survey conducted by the ICB revealed similar proAmerican feelings on the part of Albanians: 85 per cent pro and 3 per cent against, with Serbians as the most anti-American, with 17 per cent pro and 28 against. The high affection of Albanians towards the US has its roots in the historic gratefulness towards the American President, Woodrow Wilson, who is credited with preserving Albania’s independence (at the Paris Peace Conference100). In the first years after the collapse of communism, the United States also seemed to play a more active role in Albania, in the face of relative indifference from the European Community. Another reason is related to more recent events, and the strong support of the USA in the Balkans in favour of ethnic Albanians, particularly in the conflict of Kosovo in 1999. During this crisis, the US appeared again as the traditional great power ally of Albanians: while Russia and other certain European states such as Greece were giving support to Serbia, the US was supporting the Albanians. The last reason, of course, has to do with American leadership and supremacy in the international arena. The myth of America has fitted the mentality of Albanians through the traditional concept of the ‘promised land’ and because of American materialistic and pragmatic attitudes, rather than aristocratic, aesthetic, and cultured Europe. The affection of Albanians for America has meant Albania is considered by some the ‘Israel of the Balkans’ (Nordlinger 2002). However, being actually in Europe geographically, the country’s historical ties and the movement towards a ‘united Europe’, are changing the orientation of Albanians. As Chris Patten (AIIS 2003:3) said, ‘Two steps forward, one step back – the great idea of European Integration is gaining increasing popular legitimacy’. The aspirations of the Albanian people to reintegrate into mainstream Europe and the ‘bottom up’ pressure that results may be used to promote reforms. Support for the reform process and the realistic expectations of what it will deliver, depend firstly on an understanding of the EU, its policies and what the SAP is. The results of the poll conducted by AIIS in 2002 to measure the attitude and understanding of the population to

192


European integration and accession showed that 98.3 per cent of Albanians were in favour of joining. It also showed a number of interesting elements such as: most Albanians expect Albania to join the EU within 5-10 years; a considerable number think that the EU should admit Albania even if it is not ready for accession because this would favour real reforms. The poll revealed that the level of support for EU integration was much higher than the level of knowledge about this process, because it confirmed a number of misconceptions about what the EU really is, and what Albania has to do to become an EU Member State and why. Sometimes hopes and expectations about the capacity of the EU to help Albania solve its internal problems, especially political ones, are exaggerated. Albanian politicians, particularly those in power, often send overly optimistic messages to the population. The role of educational institutions is vital in informing young people about the European integration process and in creating a future generation able to understand and benefit from integration into the European family. A strategy for improving the understanding of the European Union and what it can offer the Western Balkans has been elaborated by the European Commission, but as it notes, ‘this should be a shared task…the Albanian authorities and the media should further enhance their efforts to provide Albanian society with precise information on the values, principles, objectives, activities and overall functioning of the EU’ (European Commission 2003:16). Much of the EU’s efforts and the expected future gains are invisible to the population, while shortterm and painful reforms are recognized immediately. 16 years ago Albanians knew where they wanted to go, but they were not conscious of the time and costs needed to get there. Albanians, therefore, may want to reflect on the words of Bette Davis’s character (in the film ‘All about Eve’) where she declares, ‘Fasten your seatbelts, it’s going to be a bumpy ride’. One of the difficulties that make it difficult for the public to be educated about the EU is the gap which divides the public from the political elite, a growing public mistrust towards democratic institutions and ‘a growing disenchantment of citizens with governments which are unresponsive to their concerns and unable to reverse the social and economic decline’ (ESI 2003:3). The Albanian public is seriously disappointed with politics. As Kadare (2003) puts it, ‘domestic opinion, either populist or elitist, is that the current politics has no morals, even though politics should be moralistic’. The state appears distant, alien and largely irrelevant to the concerns of everyday life of Albanian citizens. One result of this has been a growing abstentionism reflected in the drastic decrease in voter turnout with each successive election, from 98.92 per cent in the 1991 first multi-party parliamentary elections


193

to 90.35 per cent in the 1992 elections, down to 55.59 per cent in 2001, but with a slight increase to around 56 per cent in 2005101. ‘The 52 per cent voter-turnout in the last local elections illustrated once again the electorate’s disillusionment with their leadership’s inability to provide them with basic necessities, such as water and electricity’ (Vickers 2003). What is worse is that there is little hope that in the near future that any government will reverse this trend. For this reason and because of the loss of confidence and patience in the political class, Albanians see their hope as coming from outside, some even thinking Albania should be governed and monitored as an international protectorate of the UN, the US, or the EU.

a. The politics of domestic collective identity – Italian case The aspiration of ‘catching up with Europe’ might be a strong incentive for the so-called politics of domestic collective identity. There is a parallel with the Italian case that adopted a national macro-economic policy in compliance with the ‘convergence criteria’102, established by the Maastricht Treaty of European Union (TEU) in 1992 for countries wishing to join the Eurozone. Efforts to achieve this goal motivated drastic domestic changes and reforms not only in economic policy, but also for political (executive) stability. In the early 1990s the economic indicators of Italy provided evidence of a difficult economic situation. The unstable political system and governments of short duration had lacked the political and institutional capacity to deal with and solve domestic economic problems. Thus, Italian governments and policy-makers were faced with a tough dilemma: to meet the criteria and join the Eurozone or to stay out of it. It was not easy with such economic indicators, but they chose the former. ‘The path to convergence’ lasted from 1992-98, during which the governments of Amato, Ciampi, Dini and Prodi carried out economic reforms in order to meet the criteria, undertaking serious efforts, which led to the formidable adjustment of Italian macro-economic policy. The determination and high sense of responsibility of Prime minister Prodi played a significant role. Having a strong pro-European attitude, he considered meeting the EMU targets a priority for his government and was determined ‘to get to the EMU appointment on time’, declaring, ‘either Italy is within the EMU, or I shall resign’ (Corriere della Sera, 1996). He introduced a new plan to reduce the budget deficit to 3 per cent, by cutting spending and raising taxes, and especially by introducing hard economic choices, such as a special tax on incomes, called the ‘Euro-tax’. In 1998

194


Italy achieved the ‘mission impossible’ (Radaelli 2002:225), joining the Eurozone with the ‘first wave’ of countries. In this way, ‘the Italian political elite seized on the SEA and TEU to leverage economic reforms that would set the country’s house in order, a goal that had eluded governments for decades’ (Della Sala 1997). Italy was able to join the Eurozone thanks to a combination of several factors: the external requirements, the determination of its leaders, the commitment of governments and the support of the elites and the Italian people. The domestic discourse, the support of public opinion, driven by national identity, the pride of Italians and their Europeanism, were all very important. Even though Italy had been part of the EC since the start, support had more to do with the humiliation of Italians if left out of Europe, rather than the advantages of Eurozone membership. As Radaelli (2002:225) points out, ‘the “tax for Europe” in a state with a high potential for tax revolts went down surprisingly well: it became a symbol of willingness not to be excluded from Europe’. Prodi, with other politicians and policy-makers, succeeded in persuading the masses. The propaganda ‘the price for the last ticket to Europe’ raised a wave of enthusiasm and the awareness of the people, turning the path to EMU into a manifestation of the politics of collective identity. There are clearly lessons here for Albania, which shares so many similarities with Italy in its political and administrative system although, of course, it lacks the strong economic bases of northern and central Italy or its long traditions of civic life. Similar radical reforms occurred in Ireland in the 1980s, not in relation to the Euro, but in relation to painful reforms necessary for economic success. These were carried out through a process of ‘social concertation’ between the government, business and the trade unions and with the approval of the Catholic Church (then influential in Irish politics). Thus, the conditions were laid for the ‘Celtic Tiger’ phenomenon, which has catapulted Ireland (a nation similar in size if not in climate to Albania), to the league of rich nations...

9 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND DECENTRALIZATION103 ‘With the demise of Communism, there was initially some relaxation of central control. However, it was evident that central government [following the transition to democracy] was seeking to inhibit local autonomy …’. Douglas Saltmarshe (2001:126)

9.1. Territorial governance under communism Albania, although a physically small country and overall ethnically homogeneous, possesses significant geographical and cultural differences between the north and south of the country. ‘The North of Albania was largely organized along tribal lines whereas the more fertile south was a predominantly feudal society dominated by rich beys’ (Saltmarshe, 2001:113). The cultural differences relate to different dialects of the Albanian language but also, to some extent, to religious differences. In the mountainous north is found the Gheg dialect and the population is Muslim, but with a concentration of the Roman Catholics. In the south are found those who speak the Tosk dialect, which is also the official language of Albania and the population is also mainly Muslim with some Greek Orthodox populations (who are ‘Greek’ in the sense of adhering to Orthodoxy rather than being ethnically Greek). Despite these differences, Albania is traditionally a highly centralized state, having made the transition to democracy in 1991 without ever having experienced any form of local democratic government. Until independence in 1912, Albania was part of the Ottoman Empire, which did not encourage decentralization or local autonomy. Similarly, during the period of the Zog monarchy (192839) and the Italian occupation (1939-1943), local government was nonexistent. After the Second World War, the communist regime made a determined effort to consolidate national independence by emphasizing

196


the centralization of the state. It is clear from what we have written so far in this book that the Albanian communist regime was one of the most authoritarian of the entire communist world and local administration was a means by which the central government and the Albanian Labour Party controlled civil society. Local government was administered by People’s Councils who administered the affairs of the district (rreth), the city (qytet), the locality (lokalitet) and the village (fshat) (Saltmarshe, 2001:115). However, the People’s Councils were in turn controlled by the ALP and were thus a bogus form of democratic organization. Centralized control by the Party was reinforced by a vast system of spies and informers, backed up by imprisonment and concentration camps which resulted in the systematic destruction of values, such as trust and solidarity, necessary for the functioning of a democratic civil society especially at the local level. One of the key tasks of the democratization process was, therefore, to create, almost ab nihilo, a new system of genuine local government rather than simple local administration and control. This was also an aspect of the preparation for Albania to enter into the European Union, as the European Commission also insisted on efficient and effective local government and at least regional administration. In this regard, there is a difference in emphasis in the Commission’s approach, compared with the Council of Europe. The Commission is more concerned with the administrative aspects of decentralization and regionalization because it wishes to see the funds it provides administered in the best way possible, while the Council of Europe, and its Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, is concerned more with the political aspects, that is, strong regional and local democracy104. In 1992, the first Democratic Party government embarked on an important administrative reform, including a reorganization of local government. Law no. 7570 (1992) on ‘The Organization and Functioning of Local Governments’ established decentralization as one of the basic goals and principles of local governance in Albania. In 1994, the DP proposed a new Constitution, which enshrined the principle of local self-government, to replace that of 1976, but this was rejected by the electorate, not because of the section on local government, but because they thought it placed too much power in the hands of the president of the Republic. Following the crisis brought on by the collapse of the pyramid schemes, and the change of government which resulted, the new Socialist government also produced a new Constitution, which, this time, was accepted by the parliament and ratified by the electorate in a referendum. The 1998 Constitution (Article 108) followed the 1994 version by also accepting the

Local Government and Decentralization

197

principle of local self-government. In 1999, the Albanian government signed and ratified the ‘European Charter of Local Self-Government’. In 2000, the government adopted a ‘National Strategy for Decentralization and Local Autonomy’. Also in 2000, the Parliament passed Law no. 8652 ‘On the Organization and Functioning of Local Government’. This, along with a number of other subsequent laws105, completed the legislative process of establishing democratic local government in Albania. Although the constitutional and legislative bases of Albanian local government now conform to a great extent to the norms established by the Council of Europe and to best practice in Western Europe, the actual practice of local democracy is beset with difficulties (Albanian Institute for International Studies, 2003). Furthermore, there was a lack of harmonization of previous laws which were in contradiction with the 2000 law in that they permitted central government to infringe local autonomy106. The failure to implement fully these laws and norms follows the general pattern already described in this book. It arises partly because of the weak nature of Albanian civil society as a result of the years of communist dictatorship, but more contemporary factors include the bitterly divided political party system, the weak economic situation of the country, and the endemic corruption of the political and administrative systems. Furthermore, the central government and central departments have been reluctant to devolve real political and financial powers to local authorities. To some extent, this is understandable given the lack of expertise and the poor human and financial resources within the local authorities. It is also, however, a hangover from the previous highly centralized system that existed under communism. The installation of a prefectoral system, whereby the prefect controls appointments at local government level, is also in continuity with the past and is reminiscent of the old communist nomenklatura (nomination) system. Despite this, recent surveys have shown that Albanians feel closer to and trust local government more than national government. All the political parties and the most important interest groups in society, as well as international organizations, agree that the process towards political decentralization must continue and, indeed, be strengthened. 9.2. The current Albanian system of local government The 2000 ‘Law on the Organization and Functioning of Local Governments’ states in Article 3 the basic purpose of the legislation:

198


• Recognition of the existence of different identities and values of the communities in Albania; • Respect and enforcement of the fundamental rights of citizens provided in the Constitution and other laws in those communities; • Opportunity for communities to make choices between different kinds of local public facilities and services; • Efficient and effective exercise of the functions, competencies and duties of various bodies of local government; • Delivery of appropriate services; • Promotion of effective participation of local residents in local government. Albanian local government is in two tiers: the first level consists of 373 administrative divisions divided between 65 municipalities (bashkia) in urban areas, which may be divided into ‘quarters’ (lagje), and 308 communes (komuna) in rural areas, which may be further sub-divided into ‘villages’; the second level consists of 12 regions (qarku) (Hodaj, no date). The municipalities and communes have representative councils, which are directly elected by the population. The mayors and heads of communes are also directly elected by the population. The regional councils are indirectly elected and are composed of representatives of the municipal and communal councils in proportion to the populations of the municipalities and communes, although there must be at least one representative from each. The mayors and heads of communes are members ex officio of the regional council. Tirana, the capital of Albania, has a special status defined in Law no. 8684 of 31 July 2000, which sub-divides the city into eleven municipal units, of which the heads are directly elected by the residents. The municipal units are under the authority of the mayor of Tirana. Local authorities have the right to create their own forms of local administrative organization and to employ personnel to carry out administrative tasks. Alongside the system of local representative government there also exists the local administration of the state. The office of prefect (see above) was created in 1992 by the then President and current Prime minister Sali Berisha. There are twelve prefectures, which correspond to the boundaries of the twelve regions. The prefect is appointed by, and directly responsible to, the prime minister. He or she is responsible for ensuring that the implementation of decisions made by local governments is in conformity with national laws. In reality, the prefect exists to ensure that the will of the central government is followed at the local level. It has been criticized because of the politically partisan bias this may imply at the local level. The prefect employs a number of staff that monitors the social, eco-


199

nomic and political affairs of the region. All policy documents and budgets are passed to the prefect who can hold them for ten days to assess their legality. The prefect may also appoint and dismiss regional employees, most importantly the council secretaries. In effect, these are opportunities for the central government to exercise a direct control over the local authorities in order to ensure that they follow the policy approaches of the central government. 9.3. The functions of Albanian local government The 2000 Law ‘On the Organization and Functioning of Local Government’ defines a typology of functions of local government, which applies to both first and second levels. These may be exclusive, shared or delegated. 9.3.1. The communes and municipalities

Exclusive functions of the communes and municipalities There are four main categories of functions which are exclusive: a. Infrastructure and public services: Water supply; Sewage, drainage systems and flood protections channels in residential areas; Construction, renewal and maintenance of local roads, pavements and squares; Public lighting; Public transportation; Cemeteries and funeral services; City/village decoration; Parks and public spaces; Waste management; Urban planning, land management and housing in accordance with the law. b. Local economic development: Preparation of programmes for local economic development; Regulation and functioning of public markets and trade networks; Small business development and promotional activities;

200


Services to support local economic development; Veterinary services; Protection and development of local forests, pastures and natural resources of local character. c. Social, cultural and recreational functions: Preservation and promotion of local historical and cultural assets; Organization of recreational activities; Social services, including orphanages, day care, homes for the elderly, etc. d. Civil security: Public order; Civil security. e. Shared functions (from January 2002): Pre-school and pre-university education; Preventive health care and public health protection; Social assistance and poverty reduction; Public order and civil protection; Environmental protection; Other shared functions as described by law. f. Delegated functions: These are functions of the central government or administration which, by law or by a contractual agreement, are assigned to the local government. The central government guarantees the necessary financial support for the exercise of these functions, but the local government may commit its own financial resources to the task in order to attain a higher level of service. Delegated functions may be mandatory or non-mandatory. 9.3.2. Functions of the regions The regions, like the municipalities and communes, also have exclusive, shared and delegated functions. Their main exclusive function consists in developing and implementing regional policies and of harmonizing these with national policies at the regional level. The region may also adopt functions delegated to it by the communes and municipalities within the region or by the central government. In the latter case, the central government must guarantee financial support for the carrying out of the function. Central government delegated functions must be on the basis of a law or mutual agreement.


201

Compared to the municipalities and communes, the regions are weak in terms of the functions they have been assigned. However, it is argued that they are of much more recent creation and will take time to grow into their role. One important function assigned to them is responsibility for rural roads. 9.3.3. Local finances

Municipalities and communes There are two main sources of local revenues: own revenues (local taxes and fees) and conditional and unconditional transfers from central government. The weak level of local fiscal autonomy of Albanian local government can be seen from the fact that transfers constitute almost the entire source of revenue: 96.22 per cent in 1996, 98.28 per cent in 1997, 97.24 per cent in 1998 and 96.30 per cent in 1999! Furthermore, in 1999, 86.6 per cent of all revenue was in the form of conditional transfers, that is, where local government has little or no discretion in their use. In 1999, only 3.7 per cent of local revenue was raised from own sources, mainly fees (2.49 per cent). The main reason given for the huge disparities between transfers and own resources are that the biggest budget items of Albanian local government are on education and health, seen as important elements in the struggle against the great poverty and deprivation that exists in the country. It is this very poverty and deprivation that deprives the local authorities of a sufficient financial base in the form of local taxation. Nevertheless, increasing local fiscal autonomy was an important element of local democracy and, in 2002, a new fiscal package was put into law (Schroeder, 2004). Under this law, local authorities can now set the tax rates on local property, small businesses107 and infrastructure impact tax on new construction. Attempts were also made to improve the administration of local taxation. The new local fiscal package has had a profound impact on the level and composition of locally raised revenues available to municipalities and communes. In 2000, own-source revenues amounted to 2.3 billion lek of which around 40 per cent came from local taxes while in 2003, they were 9.2 billion lek of which 75 per cent were from local taxes. There has also been an increase in the proportion of unconditional compared to conditional transfers. In 2003, local authorities controlled the allocation of around one-third of spending on local public services, compared to about 7 per cent in 2000. According to one outside expert, ‘The

202


combination of the unconditional transfer mechanism with the new set of shared and local taxes does, therefore, appear to be generally well-structured and should be given some time to operate so as to allow the results to be evaluated’ (Schroeder, 2004).

Regional finances Regional revenues derive from basically the same sources as those of the communes and municipalities but, in addition, they obtain fees from the services they provide. Officials in the Ministry of Finance agree that although the financial own-resources of local governments in general were increasing, the resources which go to the regions are small. In 2001, 76 per cent of local authority resources were transfers from the central state while today 36 per cent comes from the state and 64 per cent from local revenues. The regions receive 4 per cent of this 64 per cent. With regard to central government transfers, the municipalities and communes receive 91 per cent of unconditional grants, with 9 per cent going to the regions. 9.4. The functioning of local government All groups in the political parties whether of the government or the oppsition and all the key actors of the administration and of civil society are unanimous in agreeing that decentralization and the creation of an effective system of local government are of the highest priority. However, there have been some differences with regard to the setting up of regional councils. This was an idea of the Socialist government and opposed by the DP opposition. Now they are more or less accepted by both parties, but the two main parties disagree on how they are functioning, with the Socialists (when in power) claiming that they were a success and the Democrats being more critical. However, even the Socialists recognized that they had deficiencies which could be rectified by more intensive training from international organization, such as the UN and the Council of Europe. The Socialists also thought that there should be direct elections to the regional councils as a way of strengthening their legitimacy. The new regional bodies began functioning only in 2001 and there was initially some antagonism between them and the ‘first level’ local authorities. The regions are still being established and need to develop administrative structures but, already, in 2005, new competencies had been assigned to them.


203

Mr. Sali Berisha, when leader of the opposition, agreed that the law on local government was a good thing, but that it still needs to be fully implemented. He commented that the budget of local authorities was too small, that there was a lack of transparency in local government, that competencies still needed to be transferred to the local authorities, and there was still a need for capacity building. The DP in opposition wished the regions to receive 25 per cent of the total budget, as well as having their own tax resources, in addition to a percentage of national taxes. They should also be given more competences such as infrastructure. He also felt that the system of prefects was not necessary. A new law on local government was needed. Mr. Berisha feels that a reform of the regions is necessary as they are not really ‘regions’ and lack funds and authority. It remains to be seen how sincere Mr. Berisha’s intentions were. One problem which has arisen is the conflict between central and local government where different parties are in power. This has surfaced again when the new right-wing government has found it very difficult to work especially in the municipality of Tirana, which is a Socialist bastion. To compound matters, the popular mayor of the capital, Edi Rama, as mentioned above, is now the leader of the Socialist Party after the defeat of Fatos Nano in the last party’s election. A big crisis erupted at the beginning of 2006 with the commencement of building works on the underpass at the end of the motorway from Durrës to the outskirts of Tirana, called ‘Zogu i Zi’. The municipality considered this work to be essential to ease the traffic congestion in the city, but this was opposed by the central government. The latter ordered the closing down of the worksite and the demolition of work already done, claiming that there were irregularities in the bidding process for the contract and the procedures used. In reality, the argument seems to have been a purely political one between two political rivals, Prime Minister Berisha and Mayor Rama of Tirana. The dispute became so bitter that, in January 2006, a delegation from the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, headed by its president, Giovanni Di Stasi, arrived in Tirana for a fact finding mission on the argument between the city’s government and central government108. The visit took place at the request of Mayor Rama, who reported the Albanian national government to the Council of Europe for actions against the ‘European Charter of Local Self-Government’. Mr. Di Stasi criticized the use of the construction police to prevent the continuation of the work and Mr Rama complained that this police had not been used against other local authorities sympathetic to the Democratic Party.

204


Despite requests by the Council of Europe and the EU, which made the process of administrative decentralization a precondition to the signature of the SAA, progress has been slow, even though governments of both left and right officially declare that they are favourable to this. Some commentators fear that the new Berisha government will pass laws that aim to shift all decision-making powers back to central government. It is at present (March 2006) too early to make a judgement on this. Whatever about the disagreements between the two main parties at the national level, there is a certain amount of agreement on the part of the different political actors involved at the local level (with the exception anyway of the stand-off between Tirana and the central government109). At least to some extent, this common position is held by the two main parties, the DP and the SP. The Association of Regions, which is composed of the presidents of the regional councils, has a PS chairman and a DP vice-chairman and it seems that there is good cooperation among the different political groups. The Association has had good relations with the central government in the past and participated in the drawing up of draft laws on local government. There was also some improvement in their financial situation, as funds not used in one year could be reserved for use the following year, rather than being returned to the central treasury. Nevertheless, the Association feels there is room for improving the position of the regional councils and the need to: • Clarify their functions; • Give them an input in drafting policy on health and education; • Give them greater financial autonomy; • Increase the mandate of councillor to four years or a maximum of five, instead of the current three year term which is considered too short; • Provide them with offices and increase the number of administrative staff. Some members of the Association criticize the prefectoral system which they feel is not necessary, although others thought that the prefects did not interfere too much in the affairs of the regions. It was generally felt that the regional administration and the prefectoral administration should be kept apart. With regard to the method of election of the regional council, one suggestion was that the indirect election of the council should continue as at present, but that the council president should be directly elected. Some members of the association queried whether the number of regions (12) was appropriate, given the size of Albania and whether this should be


205

reduced. There is now a widespread opinion that 12 is too many and a smaller number around 5 or 6 would be more appropriate. Tirana, as the capital of the country, as well as its political, cultural and economic centre, is in a category of its own and its status is determined by a special law, which places it outside the other levels of local government. Because of its size, the municipal authorities decided that it should not be part of the regional council of Tirana. Officials in the municipality argue that the regional council is more appropriate as an umbrella organization for those municipalities which are too small to function by themselves. The regional council can then play a coordinating role. For this reason, Tirana municipal council does not see the need to participate in the Tirana regional council. Some officials also argue that the regional councils lack political legitimacy and are in favour of directly elected councils with more clearly defined functions. The mayor Edi Rama, is in favour of reducing the number of communes and the number of regions. The evaluation of the functioning of regional and local government in Albania by the national and local politicians and administrators might be described as cautiously positive. Decentralization was in place and, although there were still serious problems, progress had been made. The regional councils were functioning although still quite weak and capable of improvement. The evaluation by some of the international organizations in Albania was somewhat harsher. The OSCE pointed to the problem of endemic corruption at all levels of government and society as one of the great obstacles to building democracy. The OSCE, however, also thought that decentralization might be a good thing and that strong local government could be a way of combating corruption. They felt that it might be better to consolidate what already existed rather than trying to go further. USAID (the US Agency for International Development), which had been advising the Albanian government on decentralization strategy thought that the regional councils were still trying to find their role. They were still not fulfilling their functions and there were divisions within the government as to what this role and these functions should be. One problem they identified was that of administrative capacity, as many local governments simply did not collect all the fees they were due. They also agree that there is corruption at every level and that the best way to avoid this was to have an active and informed citizenry and to overcome the fatalistic character of the Albanian population.

206


9.5. Future challenges The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe delegation to Albania in 2005 felt that considerable progress had been made in Albania with regard to building the constitutional and legislative framework for the implementation of the ‘European Charter on Local Self-Government’. It also recognized, however, that because of the poor social and economic conditions of the country, the provisions of the Charter were not fully implemented. In particular, there were problems of bitter partisan rivalry, as well as endemic corruption at all levels. Despite the difficulties of implementation, the delegation felt that decentralization was one of the best remedies to overcome these problems and welcomed the willingness of all the political parties to pursue this strategy. This is in line with the drive towards preparation for entry into the European Union, even if, as pointed out above, sometimes the European Commission is less concerned with the political dimension of decentralization and regionalization. There is the possibility to improve the situation by a serious reform of the regions, which are quite new bodies and have existed only for a short time. The delegation felt that mistakes had been made in the initial design of the regions and in the definition of their role and functions in the political and administrative system. This is unfortunate as it is easier to build a new model rather than modify an existing one. There was a consensus among the political and administrative class that the regions were a positive development but that, at present, they did not function well. Their functions are not clearly defined, they lack financial and administrative resources and they are too many of them. There is also excessive interference on the part of the prefects who act as an instrument of central government control, rather than as an administrative support. The regions also lack political legitimacy and are not well known to the general public. For these reasons the delegation felt there was need for a new law devoted to the regions which might contain the following elements: • In conformity with the ‘Council of Europe’s Helsinki Declaration on Regional Government’, there should be directly elected regional councils; • There should be a more effective organization of regional councils, which should be fewer in number and whose boundaries are determined on the basis of socio-economic space; • There should be a separation of the regional assembly and the executive with the latter either directly or indirectly elected;


207

• There should be a clear definition of the region's competences which should include (in line with regional competences exercised elsewhere in Europe): - the environment - public transport - training - cultural affairs • There should be a greater percentage of local revenue from own resources, including regional taxes and fees. There should be a clearer definition of central government grants with the emphasis on unconditional, rather than conditional grants; • The electoral system should be PR and the mandate of elected councillors should be for a minimum of four years; • The institutional capacity of the region should be strengthened; • The respective roles of the prefect and the regional council should be clarified in order to avoid overlap. The role of the prefect should be confined to a posteriori control of legality and the prefect should not intervene in a political sense in the workings of the regional council. There should be a clear separation of the regional and prefectoral administrations. Besides these comments, which reflect the views of the Council of Europe and are based on the principles of the ‘European Charter of Local Self-Government’ and various declarations concerning regions made by the Council, should point out that alternative views exist among Albanian scholars and policymakers on the issue. Mr. Agron Alibali, an Albanian expert on this issue, believes that the approach taken by the Council could be well suited to large countries such as Germany, Italy, Spain or Great Britain, but in a small country like Albania it is misplaced and the country should have retained an improved version of the pre-existing structure of local government based upon districts, communes and municipalities, which was more suited to its society, legal traditions, economic structure and history. Mr. Alibali argues that the creation of ‘regions’ and other changes in the local government structure and its powers made in the Constitution were externally imposed without a proper and inclusive debate within the country; that the opposition Democratic Party firmly and publicly rejected those dramatic changes; and that the Constitutional referendum results showed, in fact, that the majority of Albanians did not support them. Alibali further argues that regionalism as promoted by the Council of Europe has had dramatic social effects in Albania. District cap-

208


ital cities were historically the centre for economic, commercial, legal, and social life of the entire district. They were the natural contact point between the city and the village in the lower plain or in the remote mountain. According to Alibali, the new regional structure is dysfunctional, undemocratic, costly and time-consuming; it has simply increased the distance between the citizen and the local government. It has further promoted a massive depopulation of the countryside and the mountainous regions and increased the pressure for massive population movements or drifts towards the cities and the neighbouring countries. Mr. Alibali points out also that transplanting a foreign model based upon a large-country regionalism to a small country like Albania is a failed experiment and that the European principles on self-government would be much better served in Albania through the re-constitution of the local government structure that existed in the country before 1998. Whatever about this, we would simply remark that it is now too late to turn the clock back and the acquis démocratique which the Council of Europe promotes was adopted by Albania in the early years of the transition. What could be changed now are the method of election to the regional level, the number of regions and the system of local financing. Furthermore, it is also probably the case that a fully functioning system of local government in Albania will come about only when there is a radical overhaul of some of the problems associated with the wider system of government and society, which we have consistently pointed out in this book: the partitocrazia, the endemic corruption, the weak nature of political and administrative institutions and, not least, the terrible economic backwardness and poverty of the country which aggravate all these ills.

10 EU ECONOMIC AID, ASSISTANCE AND PROGRAMMES: HOW HAVE THEY CONTRIBUTED TO DOMESTIC REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT? ‘All of these diverse programmes aim to rebuild both the “hardware” (infrastructure and utilities) and the “institutional software” (functioning and accountable institutions and an independent judiciary) of Albania’. European Commission (quoted in Johnson 2001:183)

10.1. EU aid and assistance in various areas in the past and in the present The EU is a large and rich political system and economic market, and a source of investment, technology and aid. It has initiated several programmes of economic assistance to help applicant countries prepare for membership, such as PHARE, SAPAD and ISPA. The aid and assistance given through these programmes has aimed to close the gap between the economies of the EU member states and that of applicant countries. To ensure a positive impact from these assistance programmes, the EU has developed some operational principles to guide its interventions (ESI 2003:6), which also underline the main EU prescriptions for regional policy: • Additionality: EU funds are added to domestically financed public investments, i.e. EU funds must be co-financed from national sources. • Development planning: all projects supported by the EU must be embedded in long-term development programmes developed by the country to increase spill-over effects. • Partnership: the EU requires close partnership between the Commission and national/regional governments, to work closely together to design, implement and evaluate programmes. This

210


reflects the EU principle of subsidiarity, which states that decisions should be taken as close to the citizen as possible. In practice, this means involving regional and local levels of government and administration. • Conditionality: is used to encourage fiscal discipline, sound macroeconomic policy and responsible economic policies, which lead to EU convergence strategies. International assistance in general and the EU’s in particular, have contributed a great deal in upgrading the economy, and promoting democracy and the rule of law in Albania during the transition years. The aim has been to improve the living conditions of the population, promote civic values and consolidate democratic institutions. A very significant part of its contribution has been through the financial support and assistance for stabilization of the economy of the country. The EU has had a presence in Albania since the early days of transition. It started in 1991 with the humanitarian aid mission led by Italy, known as ‘Operation Pelikan’ (which continued until 1993), but planned and financed by the European Community (2 million ECU of EU aid), which prevented mass starvation and widespread malnutrition. The EU has been the main provider of multilateral assistance to the country, representing 54.7 per cent of total multilateral aid, followed by the World Bank with 26 per cent (European Commission 2000:21). Over the period 1991-2004 Community assistance to Albania has totalled about €1.2 billion (European Commission 2005:6), making the EU the biggest aid donor. It is to be emphasized that the EU assistance has concentrated on aid, rather than investment. It has, however, contributed in strengthening the domestic institutions that support investment. The breadth of EU involvement in Albanian reconstruction can be measured by the broad scope of policy areas in which it cooperates with Albanian authorities (Johnson 2001). In 1991-2000, Community assistance was given through two humanitarian programmes: PHARE and ECHO. The PHARE programme, which was launched by the EC in 1989, to apply only to Hungary and Poland and aiming to coordinate pre-accession aids, extended to other CEE countries, including Albania, in 1992. PHARE projects in Albania have been in different areas, such as in development of the financial and banking sector, SMEs, agriculture and the fight against drugs. Through the PHARE programme, the Community offered to Albania €635 million (European Commission 2005:6). In 1993, the PHARE Partnership Programme (PPP), which aimed to strengthen NGOs in civil society, was developed.

EU Economic Aid, Assistance and Programmes

211

The second programme, ECHO, was founded in 1992 and Albania was included in the same year. Its main operation was during the 1997 crisis when an office was opened in Tirana to help in public health problems and sanitation. The aid amounted to €17 million and consisted of food and medicine supplies. EU involvement in the provision of aid and financial assistance has been mediated by various institutions, some of which had been created to help the political, economic and social reconstruction of former communist countries of Eastern Europe. The most important were the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), founded in 1991 and which began assistance to Albania in 1992, and the European Investment Bank (EIB) founded in 1958. Both banks have provided some investment financing. During this period, Albania benefited from €1020.6 million assistance from the Community, of which €85 million were loans from the EIB (European Commission 2001:18). One of the most recent EBRD projects is to support the rehabilitation and upgrading of a certain section of the road from Fier to Tepelene, part of Albania’s north-south axis, with a €35 million sovereign loan110. The EU has also financed some sections of the Pan-European Corridor VIII and rehabilitation in the main ports. Besides humanitarian and financial aid, the most successful area of cooperation between Albania and the EU, as highlighted above, is trade relations. Firstly, this is the most institutionalized aspect of the relation between Albania and the EU with a very well developed institutional structure. As Johnson argues (2001), ‘trade cooperation between Albania and the EU has formed the basis of their formal relationship and will continue to dominate their partnership’. Secondly, the EU is the main commercial partner of Albania. The 1992 Cooperation of Trade and Agreement, which was the first contractual agreement between the EU and Albania, was a trade-based agreement. The EU also assisted Albania’s application for membership to the WTO by providing technical assistance, especially in terms of helping Albania to ensure compliance of its legislation with WTO standards. The assistance of the Union in the judicial arena has consisted of assistance provided to the Ministry of Justice, training programmes in the School of Magistrates, and in improving the court facilities. In June 2005, a consortium consisting of the Ministries of Justice of Austria, Germany and Italy started the implementation of the CARDS project ‘European Assistance Mission to the Albanian Justice System’, a two-year external action of the EU. The wider objective of this project is to facilitate, through strengthening capacities within the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary, the

212


development of a more independent, impartial, efficient, professional, transparent and modern justice system in Albania, therefore contributing to restoring people’s confidence in their institutions and to the consolidation of democracy and rule of law in the country, as required by the Stabilization and Association process with the EU. The European Commission through TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office), of DG Enlargement is giving technical assistance in adaptation and implementation of domestic legislation. The EU has assisted Albania in the area of customs by developing its customs code, in formulating the country’s customs legislation and in its implementation. The EU Customs Assistance Mission (CAM–A) established right after the 1997 crisis, has contributed in many aspects to the customs operation, such as in improving revenue collection, prevention of smuggling, and preventing corruption within the customs administration. Other EU programmes have included ‘Tempus’, focused on higher education and up-grading the performance of Albanian academics and exchanges for university students, in which Albania was included in 1992, the ‘Copernican 2 Programme’ on research and development, the ‘LIFE III Country Programme’ a project on environmental cooperation, the ‘DAPHNE’ Programme to combat violence against women and children and the ‘IRENE’ initiative against women trafficking. The EU also has its local community development programme in Albania, through which provides funding for hundreds of projects at local community level. Another aspect of EU assistance has been in the area of security and defence, even though here it has had a lower-profile. The EU has not been able to provide military assistance during times of crisis, but only afterwards, as defined under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU’s second pillar111. The most important intervention was ‘Operation Alba’ after the events which followed the failure of the pyramid schemes (April-August 1997). Even though it did not contribute directly in restoring security and public order in the country, it helped in escorting humanitarian convoys, defending government and military buildings and protecting the personnel of international organizations. It was chiefly important in the positive psychological effect it had on the Albanian population, traumatized by the terror of what almost became a civil war. Another mission in the security area was ‘MAPE’ (Multinational Advisory Policy Element), created by the Western European Union (WEU) to re-establish and retrain Albanian police forces. The mandate of MAPE in Albania was extended twice by the WEU Council. In 1999, in order to oversee the shelter and feeding of the ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo to


213

Albania, another humanitarian and military group was created by the EU: ‘AFOR’ (Albanian Force for Humanitarian Assistance). Besides this main objective it had other positive effects for the Albanian economy and infrastructure (in rebuilding roads and airfields). As the European Commission points out ‘All of these diverse programmes aim to rebuild both the “hardware” (infrastructure and utilities) and the “institutional software” (functioning and accountable institutions and an independent judiciary) of Albania (Johnson 2001:183). Besides financial aid, the EU has provided technical advice and assistance, based on the secondment of officials from member states. This mechanism, known as ‘twinning’ and aimed at strengthening the administrative and judicial capacity of the country, was used during previous enlargements and is now being applied to the Western Balkans, including Albania. The secondments of long-term civil servants and experts was, however, interpreted differently by some Albanian economists and experts, who claimed that a considerable part of international aid went towards paying the high salaries and generous benefits of the foreign technical advisers and experts, or for the services of consulting firms and contractors, most of whom had no prior experience in Albania and none even in the region. 10.2. Evolution of EU assistance to Albania and its complementarity with other donors There have been three phases in EU assistance towards Albania: The first phase (1991-1993) was a response to the crisis situation, focused on emergency operations and reconstruction, and therefore the assistance was provided as emergency and food aid. The second phase (1994-2000) was a move to greater support for political, institutional and economic transition. From 1994-96, PHARE provided grants to support economic reform. After the 1997 crisis, EU support was concentrated on the re-establishment of the rule of law and the development of basic infrastructures. During the 1999 Kosovo crisis, it focused on aid to refugees. Between 1998 and 2000, the general focus of Community assistance was on democratic stabilization. During the third phase (from 2001 onwards) the emphasis has been on preparing for and implementing the association process. The assistance allocated to ‘Justice and Home Affairs and Administrative Capacity Building’ increased steadily, reflecting the SAP’s emphasis on strengthening the administration’s implementation capacity.

214


Thus, from the initial phase of physical reconstruction and rehabilitation, the Community’s focus has shifted to state institution-building, socioeconomic development and on sectors affected by the impact of the enlargement process, with the aim of assisting the reform processes and preparing the country for a closer relationship with the EU. Implementation of Community programmes in Albania has had mixed results. According to European Commission reports, Albania has lacked the administrative capacity to manage properly the implementation of financial assistance programmes. It has also had difficulties in correctly implementing European Commission procurement and contracting procedures, which has led to frequent repetition of procurement exercises and resulted in serious delays. Because of the lack of proper and timely implementation, in 2002 the Commission decided to cancel a total of 20 programmes amounting to €13.7 million. ‘Albania should take a lead from Serbia and Montenegro where the rate of implementation of assistance is the highest in the region: about 98 per cent of allocated funds have been contracted and 77 per cent of these paid’ (EU Press release: 2). Another issue, which has often provoked a sensitive debate (especially in western political circles), is that of (in)effective absorption and domestic (mis)management of foreign aid. Many donors have complained that Albania has been unable to absorb foreign assistance successfully or has spent the money inappropriately. It was observed that much of the humanitarian aid in the form of food, medical supplies, and clothes, or items intended for hospitals, orphanages, or schools, disappears before reaching the intended recipients or is stolen and then re-sold in the black market. One reason for this is related to the lack of institutional infrastructure to absorb aid effectively. However, the main factor is related to corruption. The fact is that lots of financial assistance given to Albania through various projects has ended up in the pockets of politicians or administrative officials. Another important contribution of the EU has been in coordination of aid from other international donors. For instance, donations from G-24 countries are channelled through the PHARE projects. Complementarity between the EU and member states’ assistance, as well as other donors, has made it possible to achieve good results through cooperation. Since 1993, the Commission has been implementing joint programmes with the Council of Europe in legal system reform and human rights. The EU has cooperated with the IFM and WB to fund the ‘Joint Recovery Programme for Albania’. It chairs, together with the OSCE, the group ‘Friends of Albania’, which has been created to raise donors’ awareness about Albanian issues.


215

On a bilateral level, since 1992, some EU member states (Greece, UK and Sweden), have provided aid, grants and loans for humanitarian aid, rehabilitation of infrastructure, transport, communications, human rights protection, judicial, police, health and education reforms, institutional capacity building and civil society. Italy (34 per cent) and Germany (18 per cent) are the largest state donors. Two neighbouring countries, Italy and Greece, interested in preventing and stopping the flood of refugees pouring out of Albania towards them, have provided lots of humanitarian aid and have often coordinated EU projects (as we already mentioned at ‘Operation Pelikan’). The EU member states have also been the primary source of investment in Albania (even though investment represents only about a third of what arrives in the form of aid). However, the interest of member states has been generally low and closely related to their individual political interests. Other international organizations and donors have contributed in various areas. Thus, the OSCE, after 1997, contributed in areas such as elections, the parliament, property etc. The Council of Europe has contributed in legal system reform and the development of human rights legislation. Support of the transition to democracy and a market economy has also come from international financial institutions, mainly the IMF and WB, as well as from bilateral donors such as US Aid, Swiss Cooperation, and individual countries (Norway and Kuwait). In order to manage and coordinate the donor assistance better, the Albanian Council of Ministers launched recently the ‘Integrated Planning System’ (IPS) - a single assistance management strategy with a single point of contact with donors. 10.3. The CARDS Programme Since 2001, the ‘Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization’ (CARDS) programme has been the main EU financial instrument of cooperation for the Balkan countries. Anastasakis and Bechev (2003) argue that CARDS contains both bottom-up and top-down approaches to boost democratization and institution building. Bottom-up strategies refer to the strengthening of civil society and the structures of local governance, while the top-down approach is associated with institution-building at the central level and various segments of the executive branch of government. This programme, which covers the period 2000-2006 and supports the SAP, has replaced all the previous assistance programmes. As is clearly defined in its name, CARDS focused initially on reconstruction, using ad

216


hoc structures such as the ‘European Agency for Reconstruction’ (EAR). It then shifted to institution building and administrative reform. The financial allocation for CARDS assistance for Albania for the period 2002-04 was €145.5 million under the National Programme and €20 million under the Regional Programme (European Commission 2004:6). The first annual programme under CARDS was adopted by the Commission at the end of 2001 (€37.5 million). In July 2002, the Commission adopted the second annual programme (€44.9 million). The overall amount allocated for Albania for the 2001-2006 period amounts to €278,4 million. For 2005 alone, the amount was €44.2 million (European Commission 2005:6). However, the EU’s assistance under the SAP is conditional on further progress in satisfying the Copenhagen political criteria and progress in meeting the specific priorities of the European Partnership with Albania. Failure to respect these conditions could lead the Council to take appropriate measures to suspend its financial assistance. The main priorities for financing under the CARDS programme are outlined in the Albanian ‘Country Strategy Paper’ (CSP), which was issued in 2001. This strategy provides a strategic framework in which EU assistance will be provided in the period 2000-06. The CSP is accompanied by a ‘National Indicative Programme’, which describes the sectors and interventions towards which EU assistance for Albania for the period 2002-04 was directed. The assistance was focused on five key areas (European Commission 2001:4), which were: Democratic Stabilization (about 5 per cent) was focused on strengthening civil society and the media in Alban. Good Governance and Institution Building (Justice and Home Affairs) (about 40 per cent of funding), was intended to support the reform in the judiciary and police by enhancing public order, improving border management, and fighting organized crime, fraud and corruption, and controlling asylum and migration; to support the ongoing Police Assistance Mission of the European Commission to Albania (PAMECA); and to improve customs and taxation. Administrative Capacity Building (about 20 per cent) addressed two issues: firstly, enhancing the overall administrative capacity through the development and improvement of Albanian public administration and its key bodies, and, secondly, increasing the administrative capacity in specific areas: public procurement, competition and state aid, customs and taxation. Economic and Social Development (about 35 per cent) was directed to key areas such as investment, trade, infrastructure, education and local community development.


217

Environment and Natural Resources included improvement of monitoring of pollution indicators, reduction of pollution, improvement of hazardous waste management, strengthening of the system of environmental monitoring, efficient management of waste and better urban and regional planning. Opening of Community Programmes: A Framework Agreement between the EU and Albania on participation in Community Programmes was signed in November 2004, then ratified by both in 2005. In addition to CARDS assistance, Albania is a priority country for the ‘European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights’, and benefits from the ‘LIFE environmental programme’, as well as from the 6th ‘Framework Programme for Research and Development’. 10.4. The future instruments of EU financial assistance The European Commission has proposed the creation of a new financing instrument for funding cooperation, including cross-border projects, called the ‘Instrument for Pre-accession’ (IPA), which will become available to the Western Balkans between 2007-2013. This programme will cover both the candidate and potential candidate countries, including Albania. This new financial instrument will, henceforth, replace the CARDS Programme. Albania (and the other Western Balkan countries), however, will not have access to the full package of pre-accession assistance for at least another five years. The planned assistance for Albania during this period is planned to be €485 million (ESI 2005). Pre-accession assistance is based on a vision of economic and social convergence with the EU. It involves intensive engagement by the Commission in assisting candidates to develop their institutions, policies and procedures to conform to those of the EU. Not only that, but the previous experience of providing the pre-accession assistance to other candidate countries (for example with Turkey or Bulgaria) has shown that this process of domestic institutional and policy changes accelerates and helps the candidate countries towards their EU membership. It is still too soon to tell whether these all these will improve Albania’s preparation for entry into the EU. Given the poor state of its public administration and the high levels of organized crime and corruption in the country, it is likely that Albania will follow the pattern of southern Italy or Greece, where there has been great difficulty in absorbing the funds that have been poured into the country. The better scenario would be that of Ireland, which combined an intelligent and rational use of the funds with

218


significant political and administrative reforms to become the ‘Celtic Tiger’. This does not mean that the EU should desist providing these financial and other aids to Albania. It means simply that they must be made conditional on significant reforms happening within the country.

11 THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL FACTORS ON ALBANIAN POLITICS AND POLICIES ‘I would say that Kosovo, Albania, and the Balkans, all still need European supervision. I would not consider this as something that endangers the sovereignty, dignity and authority of these countries, but on the contrary, helps them’. Ismail Kadare (2004)

Transnationalist theories emphasize the role of international factors (states, organizations, developments, events), which are presumed to influence domestic change (Pridham 2000:8). The 1990s have witnessed a growing influence of external factors on national states and governments. Most notable among these forces are: • Europeanization: accelerating European Union integration and its effects on member states and states within its orbit. • Globalization (mainly economic and technological dimensions): economic interdependence, financial markets, international competition and technological development. • International organizations (NATO, CoE, OECD, IFM, WB, etc.). Globalization and European integration, with their challenges, pressures and requirements, are becoming drivers for change in domestic systems. The influence of external factors on national states and governments is growing, posing choices and fundamental challenges to domestic structures and policies, and sometimes imposing painful reforms. External actors influence the processes of institutional reform, not only by setting the conditions for accession to membership or allocation of funds, as with the EU, but also by functioning as the legitimate repositories of knowledge about the democratic state and the domestic system of governance, as with the Council of Europe.

220


Nowadays, no single state, even the most powerful, can stay outside the frame of international relations and not be affected by the impact of these forces. Multilateral linkages (membership of international or regional organizations), or bilateral linkages with other states, have intensified this impact. 11.1. The impact of the EU and Europeanization The EU is the dominant external actor encouraging democratization, for two main reasons: the attraction of the EU model (which represents a wealthy, stable and democratic group of countries) and the conditionality, applied in the framework of prospective membership. The EU leverage is exercised through three ways: political conditionality, financial aid and sanctions. European integration has become a driving force with an influential impact on states and a source of domestic change and transformation. It has been a deepening, widening and continuing process, whose role has increased after SEA and TEU. ‘Europeanization’ explains the impact of the EU upon the individual states, on domestic institutions, structures, policies and practices. It refers to the extent to which EU requirements have affected the states’ policy agendas and to what degree the EU practices, procedures and values have been embedded in administrative practices of member states. It is a process leading towards closer integration, policy convergence and homogenization. The impact of ‘Europeanization’ has been most notable through three aspects: the Single European Market (SEM), EU legislation, and EU policies. The SEM has been a source of great pressure towards deregulation and liberalization in domestic markets, privatization of national monopolies, and restrictions on public ownership and state aid. Market liberalization, in promoting productivity and competitiveness, requires a limited intervention of the state in the economy, primacy of market principles and forces, and limited national policy autonomy. A whole range of policy areas and competences has shifted to the EU. The policy areas which have become most Europeanized are those related to the operation of the single market, such as competition policy, trade, the common agriculture policy (CAP), and monetary policy. EU legislation and its conversion into domestic law include transposition, implementation and reinforcement of EU regulations, directives and recommendations. The goal of accession to the EU is serving as a motor for reforms, development and progress in Albania. Three events show that when Albanian governments have taken into consideration the recommenda-

The Impact of External Factors on Albanian Politics and Policies

221

tions of the EU, the domestic political atmosphere has improved. First, the outcome of the last presidential elections, when Albanian political parties took into account the opinions expressed by the EU (which made it a requirement for opening the negotiations for the SAA) and the international community, leading to the election of the president with a broad consensus. Second, after the EU made it clear that it had had enough of the opposition’s constant boycotting, the opposition DP ended its boycott and joined local government institutions. Third, in spring 2002, a more constructive atmosphere between the main political parties allowed for the establishment of a number of bi-partisan (ruling party and opposition) parliamentary commissions on elections, property-related issues and EuroAtlantic integration. Fourth, the agreement in June 2002 between the two main political leaders brought calm to the political scene. 11.2. Globalization Globalization is an ambiguous and contested concept with some authors (such as Hirst and Thompson, 1996) claiming that there is nothing specifically new about since it was already present in the form of international trade flows as early as the end of the 19th century. Most commentators today, however, see contemporary processes of globalization as quite different from the increased trade flows that existed before. It is a multifaceted phenomenon that includes a global economy, international trade, foreign investment and global financial markets, but also global exchanges of ideas, people, capital, services and cultures. It is analytically useful to distinguish three main dimensions of globalization: the economic, where it has weakened national economies; the political, since this has resulted in weakening of national states; and, finally, cultural in that there has been a globalization, or rather Americanization, of national cultures and traditional values have been weakened. Cohen (1996) sums it up thus: ‘Under conditions of capital mobility and a high degree of market integration based on economic openness, states face a number of pressures for convergence of their economic policy choices and their financial and economic systems with those of the dominant financial centres’. This accelerated the decline of state authority, since it becomes difficult for individual states to sustain and develop specific kinds of policies, and for national governments to formulate their own domestic policies, mainly in the macro-economic area.

222


On the other hand, globalization can be seen to be a positive force, by having a significant impact in improving the economies and states fiscal and economic policies. International capital mobility creates strong pressures for fiscal adjustment and for monetary policies, and for governments to reduce budget deficits. ‘The financial markets make daily judgements on the policies of government, which are no longer able to protect themselves from external pressures by regulating the flow of capital’ (Della Cananea 1988: 382). In the European Union, these effects are mediated through the common monetary policy of the Eurozone controlled by the European Central Bank, which has instigated a regime of fiscal orthodoxy, that has been beneficial overall to the economies of European states. Even countries outside the Eurozone, such as the UK and Sweden, and countries outside the EU itself, such as Norway and Switzerland, are obliged to adapt to these measures of fiscal orthodoxy. Although globalization and EU economic convergence have benefited many countries that are either highly developed or on the way to development, they make it difficult for very weak countries, whose condition may even worsen. This is the situation in Albania. Her current political and especially economic conditions make it very difficult for her to cope with the high levels of global competitiveness and development. The only way Albania can face it is by integrating herself into the European market and all other structures of the EU. Therefore integration of Albania into the European system is a necessity for being able to compete globally. However, to compete successfully in a European and global economy, Albania needs to develop high standards in production and services, and this can be realized only through modern technology and good management. The powerful fiscal orthodoxy, mentioned above, is pitiless in its treatment of states that stray from it, whether these are large or small. It is policed by international bodies such as the IFM and WB, as well as the European Commission, who have been putting pressure on national governments, calling for the pursuit of neo-liberal reforms in market liberalization, privatization and deregulation. The very developed area of trade relations with the EU is contributing to Albania’s interaction with the global market as is also her contacts with international financial organizations such as the IMF and World Bank.


223

11.3. The influence of the CEE countries The idea of ‘returning to Europe’ has been central to the transformation of post-communist CEE states. They have made strenuous efforts to gain recognition as rightful members of the ‘European family’ and eight of them joined in May 2004. As Batt (2002:9) argues, ‘the domestic transformation in CEE countries is accompanied by a deeper penetration of Europe into the domestic sphere, both as an idea mobilized in domestic political discourse by national leaders to legitimize proposals for change and reform, as well as a practical actor chiefly in the form of European Commission, exhorting and advising applicant governments, monitoring reforms, offering financial assistance and conducting accession negotiations’. Political actors in these countries used the understanding of what being or becoming ‘European’ meant for the purpose of state transformation. The success of the CEE countries in satisfying the criteria for EU accession is giving inspiration and encouragement to Western Balkan countries which share the same aspirations. The CEE and Western Balkan countries are not the first poor and ‘problematic’ countries helped by the EU. One of the founding members, Italy, was hugely underdeveloped in the south of the country. Also, the European Community, as it then was, assisted the integration of societies emerging from isolation and dictatorship, such as Spain, Greece and Portugal, and this has been among its greatest historical achievements. The EU has a remarkable record of triggering economic success by helping poor countries or regions. Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal have experienced remarkable transformations in economic and social development over the last 20 years. Ireland is the most outstanding success story of European cohesion policy. The impact of Europeanization has also been striking in the Mediterranean countries, Spain, Greece and Portugal, where the GDP has risen from 68 per cent of the EU average to 79 per cent between 1989 and 1999 (ESI 2003:5). This has been the result of following a triple policy prescription: integration into a larger market, sound macro-economic and fiscal policies, and a major injection of EU structural assistance. The two other Balkan countries, Bulgaria and Romania, which constitute the ‘Eastern Balkans’, aspire to join the EU on 1 January 2007. They are both accession countries by having signed, on 25 March 2005, the Accession Treaty. Romania is an example of the extraordinary impact that the concrete prospect of EU membership can have on the perception of South-Eastern European societies and economies. Six years ago, the stock

224


of FDI in Romania stood at $1 billion. Once accepted as a candidate country, it began to rise, reaching $9 billion last year (Glenny 2003:2). Despite the pain involved, the Romanians have worked hard to meet the Copenhagen criteria. A similar pattern is visible in Bulgaria, which also has undertaken major political and economic reforms. Bulgaria signed the ‘Europe Agreement’ (precursor of SAA) in 1993, but because of successive unstable and uncommitted governments, and a turbulent political and poor economic situation, no real progress was made immediately after. The elections of 1997 marked the turning point in Bulgaria’s post-communist transition. They brought to power an efficient and responsible government that promised to commit to democratic reforms and to achieve EU membership in 10 years. In the context of the current political and economic situation of that time, this goal seemed very unrealistic. The fact is, however, that Bulgaria has started to make good progress towards its goal: it achieved ‘candidate’ status in 1997, opened negotiations in 2000 and concluded them four years later. It is expected to join the EU in 2007, exactly 10 years later. This again is a clear example which shows how important good political leadership is. However, as Bugajski (2003:113) points out, ‘if Romania and Bulgaria, with all their imperfections, have achieved commendable levels for participation and integration, then there is no valid reason why the rest of the Balkans cannot follow suit’. All these examples are beneficial for Albania as they demonstrate that, whatever the starting point, success is possible when you have an efficient and responsible political leadership. 11.4. The role of the International Community in Albania Since 1991, when Albania opened up to the world, the international dimension has been very crucial in Albania’s transition. The lack of legitimacy and the unreliability of political parties and other domestic actors, governments and state institutions, have increasingly amplified the importance of this dimension. The international community in Albania has been trying to fulfil the role of honest broker and facilitator that the state institutions have proved unable to perform. Some international organizations, especially the OSCE Presence Mission, the EU delegation, CoE, WB, UNDP, as well as certain foreign embassies, in particular the US Embassy, have been important players on the Albanian political scene. Some other international institutes such as the ‘US International Republican Institute’ (IRI), and the ‘US National Democratic Institute’ (NDI), have contributed greatly in fostering


225

political dialogue and mediating the discussions among political parties. The inability of the local actors to deal with domestic challenges and cooperate with one another, the crisis of the electoral processes and other unsolved political and economic problems, have ‘promoted’ the international community and given it another role, from mediator to arbitrator. Especially after the 1997 crises, Albanian politics have grown even more dependent on international mediation and arbitration. Its judgement has been brought to bear on very important domestic issues (such as the election of the President), as the local actors seem increasingly incapable of finding common ground. Therefore there is no doubt that legitimacy in Albania now lies with the international community and its verdict tends to be considered as final. Albanian politicians have become increasingly prone to rely on international interventions, rather than sit down and negotiate with one another. They devote more time and effort to winning the sympathy of these international actors. As Kajsiu (2002: 7) argues, ‘it has created a vicious circle of dependency culture – both economic and political – in which the local actors have become increasingly dependent on the international community and thus the latter has become increasingly involved in Albanian domestic politics’. The public opinion poll mentioned before on the first 100 days of the new government (Mjaft: 2006), also showed that Albanian citizens keep on believing more in international than national institutions: NATO (67 per cent trust them), EU (65 per cent) and OSCE (62 per cent). Among national institutions the most credible ones were the media (56 per cent) and the President of the Republic (53 per cent). The least credible institutions were the government (41 per cent), the prosecution service (35 per cent) and the judiciary (32 per cent). There is a widespread perception by the general public that most of the important decisions about Albanian politics (even the ‘decision’ which political force will win the elections) are taken with the ‘blessing’ of the international community. The omnipresence of foreign diplomats in government and political activities is one of the factors that has fuelled such perceptions. The pattern of patronage in Albania remains successful, as it has always been a distinguishable feature of Balkan politics in general.

226


11.5. Regional cooperation and Albania’s attitude to geo-politics and the war against terrorism Regional cooperation is a cornerstone of the EU’s policy. As the European Commission notes, ‘it is also a part of the preparation for integration into European structures’ (European Commission 2003:6). The volatile region has finally put a period of conflict behind it hopefully for good. An increased improvement of inter-regional relations has been noticed especially after the fall of Milosevic’s regime. Much progress has been made, particularly in the fields of energy, trade and transport. Free Trade Agreement among the Western Balkans countries is a way of boosting trade, investment, economic development and jobs. A single agreement is thought best to replace the current web of 31 bilateral trade agreements, which have already contributed to a substantial increase in mutual trade in the region, but which have not seen intra-regional trade reach its full potential. This idea was received positively across the region, but ran into early trouble. In Croatia some critics misinterpreted the move as an attempt to force the country back into a regional ghetto, or even to recreate the former Yugoslavia, instead of bringing it closer to the EU112. However, this single regional trade agreement, besides contributions within the region, will also complement the ongoing integration into the EU market. ‘In no way does it replace the European perspective - Commissioner Rehn113said in a meeting in April this year to define a future single free trade agreement for the region - but rather it complements it by preparing the countries for closer economic integration with the EU’. A significant step forward towards creating a common energy market between the EU and SEE and the integration of the regional energy sector, a key building block for the region’s economic development and renewal, was made on 25 October 2005, by the signing in Athens of the ‘Energy Community Treaty’, the first ever multilateral treaty in South East Europe. It creates the legal framework for an integrated energy market between the European Union and nine partners of South East Europe – Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria and UNMIK on behalf of Kosovo114. The projects on infrastructure have recently become the focus of regional cooperation. Progress has also been made in the areas of police and judicial cooperation, with support from the CARDS programme (European Commission 2003:13). The inter-relation and inter-dependence of Balkan countries is very vital for their future, compared to other parts of Europe. This is because they are small and relatively unattractive markets, therefore their economic develop-


227

ment and sustainability depends on the creation of a common trade and economic area in the region. A free trade and a free movement space, and a common labour market, facilitated by a functional infrastructure and travel policies, will accelerate the economic integration of the region. This will be a major factor for attracting foreign investors too, which is very important for the region. Therefore, regional cooperation is a necessary precondition for economic development of the Western Balkan countries. Albania has maintained a constructive attitude in connection with its regional relationships, strengthening political, economic and commercial links with its neighbours. It is involved in many of the multi-lateral regional initiatives currently taking place in the region, such as the ‘Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’ and SEECP, the South Eastern European Initiative (SEEI), as well as anti-crime initiatives such as the ‘Adriatic and Ionian Initiative’ in 2000 and Border Security Initiative. It has also made significant progress in concluding and now implementing FTAs with eight countries in the region. Albania has been recognized as an important actor in its foreign and in regional geo-politics, playing a very good role in promoting regional stability. It has followed a balanced and constructive policy, which has been acknowledged not only for the stabilization of the region, reduction of tension and conflicts in the Balkans, but also in the general interests of peace and security in Europe. Romano Prodi (2003) pointed out that ‘Albania has played and is continuing to play a vital role in mediating and supporting regional stabilization with a great sense of responsibility’. Biberaj (1998:263) also notes, ‘While most other countries in the region have been swept by a dangerous wave of nationalism, Albania has pursued a policy of constructive engagement with its neighbours, becoming a strong advocate of Balkan cooperation…In a region prone to crisis, miscalculation and tragedy, Albania emerged as a responsible player and a key factor for the stability of the region’. Albania has also – as the European Commission (2005:22) states – continued a policy of non-interference and conciliation as regards domestic issues concerning Albanian minorities in neighbouring countries. It has maintained a constructive policy towards Kosovo, supporting the settlement of Kosovo’s final status (independence) within the framework of its integration into the EU. The degree of western involvement in the Balkans has been proportional to the destabilizing potentials of the region. The unresolved Kosovo question and the fragile stability in Macedonia have tied the international community to a regional stability approach. By the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, it has been increasingly evident that

228


Albanians are becoming important in the Balkans and no important decision can be taken without them on issues of ‘reconstructing’ the region. Returning to the international political scene, Albania is appearing with a new authority and in this context Tirana is viewed as an important actor in Balkan politics. Albania matters more to the international community in the post-communist era than it did before. Their concern is that turbulence in Albania is, firstly, likely to fuel regional instability, and, secondly, to generate successive waves of refugees to neighbouring countries and to Europe. Although, in principle, the international community views democratization and security as interrelated and interdependent, their short-run policies have given precedence to stability over democratization. This means that as long as the Albanian government plays ‘a constructive role in the region’, other deficiencies, such as undemocratic practices, corruption and trafficking, are overlooked so long as they do not threaten regional stability. Given the security threats in the region, quite often the democratic procedures, standards, and governance have been sacrificed to stability considerations. However, governance in Albania should not be appraised in terms of its destabilizing potential in the region and developments within Albania should be judged not on merit of the so called ‘stability considerations’, but against democratization processes. The same thing was noticed in the attitude of the US towards the Albanian government, in regard to the new agenda of the fight against terrorism. Albania has supported the war against terrorism, by following the international resolutions and conventions, by expelling suspected supporters of terrorism from the country, and by sending its own soldiers to Afghanistan and Iraq and by being one of the US’s allies in the war against terrorism. This unconditional support by Albania of the US, which comes from the strong pro-American sentiments of Albanians (as explained earlier), is, however, being used by Albanian governments to get credit for itself and to ensure the support of the US administration, in the hope that this relationship will help maintain its grip on power. The US administration, for its part, seems to be more interested in the stability of the region and having an ally in the war against terrorism, than in the quality of democracy within the country. US officials point to Albania’s stability as a justification for accepting the political status quo. However, temporary stability in a country has a higher price than that of true democracy, and in addition, Albania cannot be an effective partner in the war on terrorism if it loses its democratic values. Support for a just cause against terrorism should not be reciprocated with support of a group in power, who do not work hard to improve its democratic life. The Albanian government and its leaders


229

should not take advantage of the good will Albanians have for America and should not abuse this relationship for selfish purposes. Instead of claiming to be involved in a meaningful contribution to the war on terror, the Albanian government should focus its attention on ending high-level political corruption and fighting organized crime, because it is known that criminality and terrorism run in concentric circles. The US and other leading democratic countries should not turn a blind eye to Albania’s criminality and political corruption or tolerate corrupt leaders and governments, in exchange for regional stability or other strategic motives, or in the interest of the so-called realpolitik. 11.6. ‘Greater Albania’ in the light of the future accession of Albania and Kosovo into the EU With the collapse of communism in both Yugoslavia and Albania, the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the new political changes in Albania, what is called the ‘Albanian National Question’ has taken on a new importance. It originates from an unjust decision made more than a century ago, which divided the Albanian territories among neighbouring countries and left more than half of the Albanian territory and population outside the new Albanian state. The borders of Albania and the whole region were drawn and redrawn in a series of historical events. The first was the Treaty of San Stefano (signed after the Russo-Turkish War), which assigned Albanianpopulated lands to Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia and divided Albanian lands among several states. In the Congress of Berlin (1877-78), the Great Powers overturned that decision, turning the Albanian inhabited territories to Ottoman rather than Slavic control. It was in this Congress that Bismarck made the infamous quote ‘Albania is a geographical concept, an anomaly of history and there is no such thing as an Albanian nation’. The second event was the Conference of Ambassadors in London in 1913 following the Balkan Wars, where the Great Powers recognized the independent Albanian state. However, demographics were ignored and half of the territories inhabited by Albanians (Kosovo, Çhameria and others) were divided between Montenegro, Serbia and Greece. The third was the Paris Peace Conference in 1918 right after WWI. Albania’s independence was preserved thanks to the support from US President, Woodrow Wilson, who strongly supported it. The borders were re-defined again in 1921, once more to Albania’s disadvantage. Thus, even though Albania became an independent state following the collapse of Ottoman Empire, it lost two-

230


thirds of its national territory, and half of its population ended up as ‘minorities’ in neihbouring countries such as Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Macedonia. A century of re-drawing borders left ethnic Albanians scattered across the Balkans. Currently, ethnic Albanians constitute 90 per cent of Kosovo’s two million population, in Macedonia about a quarter of the country’s population (around 500000), in Montenegro 6.5 per cent of population (60000) and slightly more in Southern Serbia (Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja115). The idea of a ‘Greater Albania’ developed in response to these unjust decisions with the aim of recovering the lost territories. ‘Greater Albania’, or as it is known by other names ‘Ethnic Albania’ or ‘Pan-Albanianism’, represents in this way the project of the unification of a divided country, the ultimate goal of a unitary state of all Albanians. This unitary state would include present-day Albania and all areas of Albanian inhabited territories in the Balkan region: Kosovo and other territories in Southern Serbia and Montenegro, (western) Macedonia and the region of Çhameria in northern Greece. The project of ‘Greater Albania’ was first supported by Italy during WWII, as part of the general strategy of Rome to destabilize the (then) Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. A version of ‘Greater Albania’ (as a unitary state with Kosovo and western Macedonia) even became a reality and existed for four years during the Axis occupation. Chronicles of that time say that in 1941, after Yugoslavia was defeated by Italo-German forces, the young Kosovars took to the street to celebrate the long-dreamed unification with motherland Albania. In 1945 Kosovo became again part of Serbia. In 1948, when Tito broke up with Stalin, and Albania took the side of the Soviet Union, the borders with Yugoslavia were sealed and the two Albanian populations living on each side of the border were forced to cut relations with each other until 1990. Historically, ‘Greater Albania’ is viewed with a great deal of hostility by the neighbouring countries, mainly Serbia and Greece, who both fear a large and strong Albanian state, and see the increase of influence of Albanians in the region as a threat. Nor has it been supported by the present ‘great powers’ of Europe, who are concerned that a ‘Greater Albania’ would destabilize the whole region. To the majority of Albanians living in territories outside Albania, especially those of Kosovo, being for decades under severe oppression, frustration and humiliation under Serbian rule, the idea of unification has always been a dream, that they hope will one day come true. Decades of persistent discrimination and harsh policies from Belgrade towards ethnic


231

Albanians have intensified this aspiration. Especially under Rankovic and during the Milosevic regime (known as the ‘butcher of the Balkans’), Albanians were discriminated against in terms of language, religion, employment and education opportunities, and were subjected to ethnic cleansing. Therefore the independence of Kosovo, and subsequently the unification of all Albanian territories in one nation-state, have been two ideals of all Kosovars and ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, which have fuelled conflicts and wars not just in ex-Yugoslavia, but also with a risk of spill-over effect in the whole Balkans. Support for the idea of ‘Pan-Albanianism’ exists also among the longestablished Albanian diaspora from former Yugoslavia, especially in Germany, Switzerland and the US. In contrast to ethnic Albanians in the region or in the diaspora, ‘Greater Albania’ has not been so appealing to the Albanians living inside the Albanian nation-state. Throughout its history, Albania has never played the role of a mother country. A weak, poor and vulnerable state, it has always been preoccupied with its own survival. During communism, Albania, even though a sovereign state, never showed any interest or took any action to press for the rights of Albanians in territories in the region. Furthermore, the isolation, poverty and the repressive communist regime weakened the nationalistic feelings among Albanians. As Biberaj (1998:153) argues ‘the regime had manipulated the issue of national unity to such an extent that in the post-communist period any interpretation of patriotism was considered by many, particularly the youth, as objectionable, anachronistic or primitive’. Even after democracy was established in Albania and the country came out of isolation, as the ICG (2004) points out, ‘Poverty and internal political conflict have eclipsed any aspirations towards expanding the state’s boundaries’. ‘Greater Albania’ has not been in the programme or rhetoric of any of the main political parties. Decades of separation have deepened the economic, psychological, religious and social differences between Albanians within the country and those on the other side of the border (Kosovars, especially in the beginning of the 1990s, considered Albanians poor and highly educated, while the latter consider Kosovars economically prosperous, but backward). Especially in the south, where the Tosk population has not much in common with Albanians in Kosovo (historically, culturally and socially), support for unification is weaker. With different lifestyles, mentalities, interests and living standards, to many Albanians living in Albania, the concept of ‘Greater Albania’ is a myth, rather than a possible reality. Moreover, this myth is not

232


a factor in the internal dynamics of the country, where the priorities lie with domestic challenges, such as basic services, corruption and trafficking. What are the prospects for a ‘Greater Albania’ so far? Kosovo, as analysed before, is heading towards its independence, but apparently a ‘conditional’ one, in return for an assurance from all Albanians in the Balkans that the present borders of South-Eastern Europe will remain unchanged. For ethnic Albanians living in Macedonia and those in southern Serbia (Presevo Valley), independence or subsequent unification with the motherland, since 2001, does not seem very promising: the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia and the Covic Plan in Southern Serbia seem to have wiped out these dreams. As for the Republic of Albania, because of the feeling of the Albanian population described above and its own domestic problems and priorities, the Albanian governments and politicians have been keener on developing cultural and economic ties with Kosovo and among ethnic Albanians in the region, while maintaining its separate statehood and the existing borders. Therefore, Albania remains highly unlikely to lead any movement for political unification and is committed to regional stability. As the ICG (2004:2) argues, ‘Pan-Albanianism remains more mythical than practical for most Albanians, who recognize that such an aspiration is utterly inconsistent with the reality of contemporary geopolitics’. Currently both Albania and Kosovo are in the same regional perspective for joining the EU, and, therefore, even if Kosovo gains her independence, or even if both countries will one day unite with each other, the final goal for both of them is to be part of the EU. Even though a larger Albanian state would mean greater political weight, the goal of ‘Greater Albania’ or the unification seems unrealistic in the light of the processes of European integration and convergence, on which both countries have embarked, which will eventually lead to the abolition of border controls, convergence of economic and other policies under a common political umbrella of the EU and the perspective of a gradually unifying Europe. As the Albanian academic and politician, Paskal Milo (2001:45) notes, ‘The future goal of all Albanians is to create an Albanian zone comprising all Albanian-inhabited regions of South-Eastern Europe being integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures’. It is interesting to compare this situation with that of Northern Ireland, where Catholics resemble the Kosovars to some extent in their aspiration to unite with the southern part of the island. For many years, the violent conflict seemed to be irreconcilable until the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998. What made this possible was the membership of both the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom of the European Union.


233

This allowed a redefinition of concepts such as national sovereignty and ‘borders’ in such a way that what had been a non-negotiable conflict between Ireland and Britain and between Catholic and Protestant became negotiable as ‘sovereignty’ itself was redefined to become less absolute (Loughlin, 2001). It is not inconceivable that the EU would have a similar effect on the patchwork of minority groups and their relations with different states, including Albania, in the Western Balkans. The final goal for all the countries in the region is to be part of the EU, not ‘Greater Albania’, ‘Greater Serbia’ (known as ‘Nacertanie’), ‘Greater Croatia’, ‘Great Greece’ (Megali-Idea), or other sentimental tales prepared in the nationalistic kitchens of the Balkans. The EU perspective will bring an end to the paradox of seven capitals in five countries. When the countries of the Western Balkans join the EU all Albanians in the region will be part of the same political unit for the first time since 1912. Instead of ‘Greater Albania’, it will be the ‘great European Albanians’. 11.7. The Albanian diaspora and its role in domestic politics The Albanian diaspora is large and the number of Albanians currently living outside Albanian nation-state borders is greater than those living inside. The successive invasions of Albania over centuries from various foreign empires and states, the separation of Albanian territories, the establishment of communism with its political oppression and subsequently the difficult economic conditions, and finally the collapse of communism, triggered different waves of emigration of Albanians from their country or Albanian territories to the rest of the world. The first huge emigration was to the south of Italy in the 15th century after Ottomans occupied Albania (after the death in 1468 of Skanderbeg – today’s Albanian national hero). Large Albanian communities of their descendants, called Arberesh, can be found today in Calabria and Sicily. Other waves of emigration took place in the 19th and early 20th centuries to Egypt, Lebanon, US, and Turkey among other countries. The number of Albanians in Turkey is estimated at more than one million (even though most of them have been assimilated). The next big wave was after the establishment of communism, when many people fled for political reasons. Emigration stopped completely during the communist regime and fleeing the country was severely punished and considered a shameless act of ‘betrayal against the homeland’.

234


The most radical change came with the ending of the communist isolation which triggered a new wave (the largest ever) of emigration, which still continues after 15 years. Albanians living in Yugoslavia also experienced several waves of immigration. The early one was before 1941 when thousands of Albanians were forced to emigrate to Turkey and USA, due to loss of their land. Some thousands more escaped in the 1960s because of persecution by Rankovic’s secret police. Two other waves happened in 1881 and 1989 during demonstrations and riots in Kosovo and to escape the Milosevic regime. So unlike Albanians in Albania, who remained extremely isolated, Kosovars were able to emigrate, both for political or economic reasons. Economic emigration was made possible thanks to the liberal policies of Tito and Albanians, as all the other nationals within the federation, were allowed to work and live abroad. Thus many of them went to the west, especially to Germany and Switzerland, in the 1960s and 1970s, as ‘guest workers’, which explains the large number of Albanian communities from former Yugoslavia in these countries today. The last big wave of Kosovars happened after the outbreak of the conflict in Kosovo in 1998-99. As a result of all these waves of emigration, Albanian communities today can be found in almost every corner of the world. The most favoured destinations for Albanians from Albania have been the two neighbouring countries, Greece (where there are around 600000 legal and illegal emigrants) and Italy (around 300000). Other countries with significant populations are: Germany (120000), Switzerland (100.000), France, UK (50000), Canada and especially the US (Barjaba 2004)116. This emigration after 1990 has formed the ‘new diaspora’. The Albanian diaspora until 1990 was more an émigré community than a fully-fledged diaspora. The biggest community of Albanians is currently in the US. It is composed of groups from three main waves of emigration. The first are the descendants of emigrants who went to the US at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century (mainly from the Korça and Himara regions). The second are those who fled after the WWII to escape the communist regime. The third, which is increasingly growing, are those who went to the US after the collapse of communism (a big number by winning the ‘green card’ lottery). Greece has also a big Albanian community, which is composed of three main groups, two of them long-standing. The first, Arvanites, are the descendants of the Tosk, who moved to Greece during the 13th and 14th centuries. They live mainly in Attica, the Peloponnese, Hydra, Salamina and other Aegean islands. Even though they have been to a large extent


235

assimilated, in many of their villages they have preserved their language, customs and traditions. Most of the leaders of the Greek National Revolution were of Arvanites origin. Unlike the Arberesh of Italy, the Arvanites of Greece are not recognized as a minority. The second group are the Chams, who live in north-western Greece (see Chapter 3). The third group are the recent immigrants who moved to Greece after the fall of communism in Albania (their number is estimated to 600000). It is interesting to see the degree and speed of integration into the host society and the process of social, religious and linguistic homogenization. This is much higher among Albanians from Albania compared to those from former Yugoslavia. For the latter, the process of adjustment to the new environment and modification of their set of values and lifestyle has proved to be more challenging and difficult. The better-educated professionals tend to be more integrated into the host society and prefer not to have strong ties with their original community. The process of assimilation is more obvious in children (especially in those of the second or third generation of settled immigrants), who seem to irreversibly accustomed to ‘Western ways’. Social, economic, cultural and emotional integration into the new society and keeping both cultures are important parts of the Albanian emigrants’ identity. The entry of the diaspora factor into Albanian domestic politics was revitalized when Albania opened towards democracy. It was marked in the first multi-party elections in 1991 when large funds were raised among Albanians in the US and other countries (such as Switzerland) and sent to assist the opposition campaign. Most of the diaspora has a right-wing orientation which explained their willingness to support the DP. The large Kosovo Albanian diaspora communities living in the USA, Switzerland and Germany, have played and still continue to play a significant role in contributing to the economic, political and social development of Kosovo. Great help and support was seen during the Kosovo conflict, where much material, financial and moral support was given to the country, the people and the Kosovo Liberation Army. Albanians from the diaspora help in any way they can, such as with political support and investments, and they keep a sharp eye on the rights of Albanians outside Albania. A network of political, social and cultural organizations and associations can be found everywhere in countries with big Albanian communities. The Albanian community in the US, concentrated mainly in the northeast of the country, is the best organized, compared to other countries. It has developed into an Albanian lobby, well-organized and financed. With its ideas, programmes, financial aids, clubs, newspapers, associations and

236


organizations, it has contributed to the Albanian national question and more recently to domestic politics. There are different organizations, most prominent and influential among which are the ‘National Albanian American Council’ (NAAC) and the ‘Albanian American Civic League’ (AACL). Initially created with the purpose of bringing together the various influential groups of Albanian-Americans to campaign on behalf of Albanians in Yugoslavia and to bring Kosovo to the attention of the US Congress (ICG 2004:26), they have subsequently expanded their focus of activity and have been very active in lobbying, financing and debating different Albanian issues. A most recent initiative has come from ‘The new Albanian generation’ in the US to mobilize and encourage young people (mostly students) to return home. The number of Albanian intellectuals living and working overseas has increased and over the last years an interest for keeping contact among expatriates has been growing. The Albanians like other diasporas turned to the internet as a forum of communication with one another and with the homeland. There have been a growing number of virtual networks that link Albanian expatriate professionals, students, researchers, scientists, artists, businessmen etc., in exchanging information and news, as well as for discussing issues of various interests. 11.8. When will Albania join the EU? Kadare (2003) said, ‘I would say that Kosovo, Albania, and the Balkans, all still need European supervision. I would not consider this as something that endangers the sovereignty, dignity and authority of these countries, but on the contrary, helps them. The old concept has changed when this used to be called colonialist influence or invasion. European countries now demand the European influence themselves. People of the Balkans and we Albanians, must understand that this is a great chance, which has two important implications: the strengthening of the relations with the EU and improving and strengthening of relations among neighbouring countries’. Today, the Albanian isolation of former years is impossible. Even the largest and most powerful states are part of a world of interdependent states and are buffeted and challenged by phenomena such as globalization and continental groupings of states such as the EU. The lesson that emerges from recent years is that states may confront these challenges most successfully in collaboration with other states and that regional integration is the way forward. In Europe, it is the EU which is the powerful


237

core that attracts all the states around it and which is absorbing those which are ready into itself. Albania recognizes this and most of its population and national elites are in favour of joining. It is interesting, too, that the very prospect of joining the EU has positive spin-off benefits for all the countries of the region and even forces them to put aside their historical conflicts and antagonisms to cooperate with one another. It took 10-15 years for the CEE countries to become part of the European family. How long will Albania’s journey be? The first important thing to say is that Albania has started this journey. The second positive thing is that the EU is willing and committed to help Albania on this journey. However, there are two barriers which makes the journey rather ‘bumpy’: one domestic and the other external. The first is the Albanian political class and leadership, which do not always display the necessary responsibility and commitment to carry out the reforms necessary to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. And, as EU officials have stressed, this should be a ‘mutual task’. Romano Prodi, in his speech to the Albanian Parliament on the day of opening the SAA negotiations, remarked, ‘The answer to that question (when will Albania join the EU) lies in your hands, in your determination and commitment to completing the catalogue of reforms we have drawn up together: ownership and responsibility are the key words…there are no short-cuts, all the other countries have travelled down this road’. The second one is more a historic disadvantage than a barrier. It has to do with a more hesitant and even to some extent more ‘hostile’ political environment in the west with regard to further expansion. This has come because of three reasons: firstly, the west is not as enthusiastic as 16 years ago when communism collapsed and it was eager to embrace the ‘easterners’. Thus, the CEE countries were not only more advanced than the Balkans, but more ‘lucky’ in that their applications to join came at an opportune moment of western good-will. Secondly, this last enlargement has to some extent exhausted the EU and has led many to call for it to slow down in its expansion to the east, especially to the south-east. The issue of the Union’s absorption capacity and the outstanding institutional questions, mentioned earlier, are other problems which EU officials seem to be worried about. Thirdly, the rejection of the Constitution by two countries so far (ironically two of the founding members, including France, one of the initial ‘architect’ of the European Community) have put in question the future of the EU itself. One of the reasons for that rejection was connected with future enlargements, especially that of Turkey. Two EU member states, France and Austria, have declared they will hold referendums when

238


the time comes for Turkey to join, which they may also do for other Balkan countries and Albania. However, most EU leaders agree that absorption capacity must not become an additional criterion to stop further EU enlargement and the constitutional deadlock should be not an obstacle for the prospect of membership held out to the Balkans. Despite all these setbacks, the EU seems very determined and committed to its promise to include the Western Balkans with the rest of the ‘European family’. Different analysts, politicians, officials and organizations ‘forecast’ various dates for the accession of the Western Balkans, including Albania. The ‘International Commission for the Balkans’ (2005) in its last report believes that the countries of the Western Balkans, Albania included, will achieve membership by 2014. According to the ‘European Stability Initiative’ (ESI:2005), Albania, along with Bosnia-Herzegovina, SerbiaMontenegro and Kosovo, will achieve candidate status around 2010 and membership around 2020, far later than the expectations of the countries of the region themselves. The ‘International Crisis Group’ (2003:15) notes, ‘Albania’s EU membership will be a long and difficult process, requiring perhaps another generation’. Paskal Milo, an Albanian politician and a scholar on Balkan issues, said in an interview, however, that Albania is likely to join by 2018. So when will Albania join? Much depends on its domestic actors, and especially its political class. If Albania gives itself a new, more serious, competent and responsible political class and leadership, it will join much earlier than all the above forecasts, exactly like other two Western Balkan countries, Croatia and Macedonia, which started the SAP at the same time and are now quite far advanced. However, one thing is for sure: the progress of Albania in its democratization and transformation is undoubtedly linked to the prospect of joining the EU. It is of course this entity, as well as the general European environment, that, if anything, allows optimism about the future and hope that Albania will be able ‘to catch the fast train of Europeanization’ and join the other European countries, in order to build a common future together.

CONCLUSIONS ‘I personally believe that Albanian people and their institutions will meet this challenge [of preparing for entry into the EU] successfully and will bring European standards to their country’. Romano Prodi (2003)

What ‘bilan’ might we draw up for Albania’s situation more than a decade after the collapse of communism? The overall analysis of this book suggests that the balance sheet is more negative than positive, but there are some positive features as well. Historical, political, economical and social legacies, as well as a faulty transition process have been among some of the factors responsible for the current situation. Even 15 years after the collapse of communism, according to Vickers and Pettifer (1997: 288), ‘as Hoxha’s bunkers became gradually covered over by grass and foliage, it was clear that his political heritage would be less easy to erase’. Albania is still going through its transition period, a transition which has been faulty, as Albania has made changes, but without a real and profound transformation. Drastic changes have occurred and much has been achieved, but they have been changes of the façade, and progress has been mainly ‘cosmetic’. The analysis of the current political and socio-economic situation shows that Albania faces enormous problems and every facet of society needs reform, but reforms progress at a slow pace (they are passive reforms since they gain momentum only after Brussels criticizes or Washington interferes). Policy-making in Albania is mainly elitist, but the elites are not always capable of carrying through the reforms, which are fine on paper, but are not implemented sufficiently. Since 1991, all Albanian governments have considered European integration a priority at the top of the political agenda. The prospect of EU membership for Albania and other Western Balkan countries became concrete and possible through a special regional policy, the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). From 2000, Albania committed itself to the goal of EU accession, but to achieve this it has to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria.

240


Unfortunately it is still far from meeting them. There remain big challenges such as: ensuring and preserving political and government stability, developing good governance, reinforcing democracy and ensuring free and fair elections, respecting and enforcing the rule of law, developing civil society, upholding human rights, and intensifying the fight against organized crime, trafficking, fraud and corruption. Other important challenges include improving public administration and other structures involved in the implementation of the SAA, as well as ensuring the approximation of legislation to EU laws. Thus, the country is far from having a system of ‘substantial’ democratic institutions, a fair and free electoral process, responsive political parties, an independent media and a vibrant civil society. With regard to the Albanian economy, there are two sides to it: a ‘miracle’ macro-economy with a high growth rate, low inflation, a relatively low budget deficit, and on the other hand, a low-performing micro-economy with high rates of unemployment, high taxes, fiscal evasion and high prices. While its macro-economic indicators are therefore good, the real economy is in crisis, because economic growth is mainly the result of remittances and money laundering. The ‘grey’ economy represents a high percentage of GDP, the budget depends greatly on external financing, the private sector is weak, the fiscal burden is high and FDI is low. Market mechanisms are still weak and market institutions have not yet been fully established. Therefore it resembles more an anarchic market economy, which is far from being a functional market economy and which needs strong institutional mechanisms in order to function correctly. There are still huge social problems, with polarization and large inequalities, high levels of poverty and unemployment, deterioration of education and health systems, high emigration, uncontrolled urbanization and severe environmental problems. However, the most crucial problem lies with the country’s political class, whose primary objective seems to be its own self-interest and selfpreservation. ‘What has not changed over these years is the mindset of Albania’s political class, which has shown a chronic lack of responsibility, willingness, professionalism and commitment to tackle the country’s major domestic problems’, points out the ICG (2003:15). The political class represents the most powerful and influential actor in Albania, but it is not reliable and responsible in the process of democratization and EU accession. As the 2004 report of the European Commission (2004:19) points out, ‘the political commitment and determination which are necessary to address the many pending issues have not been sufficiently present’. Even though the political class is in favour of EU membership, this can be seen

Conclusions

241

more as rhetoric than a true aspiration. Taking into consideration the high levels of corruption and the connection between a number of politicians and organized crime, it could be argued that this is a goal these politicians are not interested in achieving, for the simple reason that democracy and EU membership would mean the end of using the country’s and people’s resources for personal benefit, and no more dirty money in their pockets. ‘There are some very important people at the top of Albanian government, who are simply not interested in getting Albania closer to Europe…A nan iabp ol liticians should understand that it’s up to them and only to them to ensure integration of their country into Europe’, said Doris Pack in an interview (Baku 2004). Some analysts argue that Albanian democratization could have had a different trajectory without the presence of the EU pushing for and directing reforms. If it were not for the role of the EU and the fact that all CEE countries sooner or later will be part of a ‘united Europe’, Albania would continue to be a ‘Balkan Banana Republic’, left in the hands of irresponsible, incapable and egocentric politicians and governments, where corruption and organized crime would flourish, with the mafia, criminals and politicians, the country’s ‘nouveaux riches’, enjoying privileges, wealthy and luxurious lifestyles on the one hand, and the majority of the population living in poverty on the other. Another negative factor is that the knowledge elites (intellectuals, talented and educated people), who are a very influential factor in the progress and democratization of a country, have mostly vanished, as a result of the phenomenon of the ‘brain drain’. On a more positive note, it is important that all segments of society are in favour of joining the EU. A high percentage of the Albanian population is in favour and identifies the EU with democratic values and civilization, economic benefits, and the inclusion of the country in the ‘European acquis’, which will bring the free movement of people, a right denied to Albanians for 50 years under communism and still continuing today. Therefore, the EU remains the primary locus of Albania’s efforts in managing the difficult period of transition and its goal for the future. The EU seems to be the best guarantee of democratization and progress in Albania. This is because, firstly, the prospect of EU membership is a credible prospect in its political horizon, a strong incentive and a powerful driving force for carrying out domestic reforms. The Copenhagen criteria, which provide fundamental principles relating to democratic governance and the rule of law, as well as setting the ‘objective’ technical standards for the development of a market economy, serve as motivating factors for the domestic actors to undertake changes and push the reforms ahead.

242


Secondly, the EU is committed to helping Albania and to bringing her closer to the Community, reflected in the concrete process of SAP and SAA, which are Albania’s first steps towards EU membership. Thirdly, the EU is the main provider of multilateral assistance to Albania, which operates under democratic conditionality. This financial and technical support has covered a large number of sectors, including humanitarian aid, trade, macro-financial assistance, political stability, public order, public administration reform, judiciary and law enforcement, infrastructure, agriculture, health and education, and fighting organized crime, fraud and corruption. The current financial programme, CARDS, is a very important component of the SAP. It is a positive fact that the EU is the only element of consensus that unites all political parties and all social groups. This leads us to believe that the two types of pressure: the external one from the EU and from other international organizations, on the one hand, and internal pressure from the various domestic actors and the public who are interested in progress and EU membership, on the other, will probably help Albania eventually to achieve the goal of accession. The help and support of external actors is important and necessary, but the reforms and all the steps of a successful integration process should, in the first instance, be the responsibility of the domestic actors, in particular the politicians. We would like to be as optimistic as Prodi (2003) when he said, ‘I personally believe that Albanian people and their institutions will meet this challenge successfully and will bring European standards to their country, but, judging by the evidence, without a significant renewal of the existing political class, EU integration and accession may be a never-ending process, and lacking in benefits. Putnam (1993:3) argues that ‘the quality of democracy depends on the quality of its citizens, so that every people gets the government they deserve’, but Albanians do not deserve to be labelled continuously as ‘a people UNDONE’ and to be the last ‘catching the train to Europe’. In conclusion, the prospect of accession of Albania into the EU relies to a great extent on the political class of the country, since this is the most powerful and influential of all the domestic actors. However, since the political class has so far not lived up to its responsibilities, it needs to be renewed. There are two ways to do that: either from inside the country or from outside it. From inside there are three possible means of change: violent civil unrest, free and democratic elections, and the maturation of civil society. Violent demonstrations and protests to bring down the elites in power are non-democratic, as well as being unacceptable to the international

Conclusions

243

community. It is believed that to use violence would hold back the transition to democracy. However, the events of recent years in some former communist countries, specifically in Georgia in 2004, in Ukraine in 2005 and recently in Kyrgyzstan (all three former Soviet republics), following fraudulent elections, showed the contrary of this argument and proved that uprising of masses can achieve what elections can not. The ‘rose revolution’ in Georgia, followed by the ‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine, overthrew the corrupt regimes established there after the ‘velvet revolutions’ of the 1990s, which brought the end of communism. A ‘Georgian or Ukrainian scenario’ was apparently what the opposition forces were aspiring to for Albania, if the recent parliamentary elections in 2005 had not been free and fair and they had lost the elections. It should be emphasized, however, that the revolutions in the three former Soviet states were led by very prominent, progressive and decent new leaders, such as Victor Yushchenko and Mikhail Saakashvili, who are determined to lead their countries towards real progress and democratization. Unfortunately this is not yet the case in Albania. The full support given to these revolutions by the EU and the US was also a very important factor in their victory. US President George Bush said, ‘Georgia is one of the countries that best illustrate US central foreign policy theme “the need to spread freedom and democracy”…Georgia’s revolution inspired others around the world, by blazing a trail followed by Iraq, Ukraine and Lebanon’. It is highly unlikely that either the EU or the US would lend its support to such a revolution in Albania, given its past history of instability and the volatile nature of the Balkans region. On the contrary, the EU and the US would have done everything possible to prevent such a scenario. This is also important in that the three former Soviet states were internally divided between those who were pro-Russian and those who were pro-Western and the West naturally encouraged the latter. No such division exists in Albania, where the links with the Soviet Union were broken as far back as the 1960s. Instead, all Albanians are, at least at the level of rhetoric, in many cases, genuinely pro-European. The other way that change will come about is through pressure from civil society, which is a long-term solution, even though civil society in Albania is much more advanced than its political class. It is clear from the analysis presented in this book, however, that communism inflicted a great deal of damage on Albanian civil society and it will take a long time for it to develop the culture, values and institutions, necessary to hold government to account in a democratic manner. In the meantime, the temptation is that the political class, or, rather, the political parties, will continue to dominate civil society rather than the other way around.

244


Regarding the electoral path, elections in Albania have not always been entirely free and fair, for the simple reason that the political party in power has tended to manipulate and use every means to retain its power and together with it, the ‘paradise of privileges’. The recent parliamentary elections of 2005, however, show that some improvements have occurred in this area in that the losing party, the Socialists, accepted the defeat and did not follow with protests and boycotts, which is a sign of progress in a country where election results traditionally have been bitterly contested. These parliamentary elections were a very important step in the process of democratization reforms and getting closer to Europe. The election campaign turned into a real race to win from both camps. The Socialists were hoping for a third straight victory (under the slogan ‘Continuity and Progress’), while the Democrats, after eight years in opposition campaigned on the slogan ‘Reform and Clean Hands’ (which calls to mind the Italian ‘mani pulite’ reforms of the 1990s). The Socialists, as Kerin Hope pointed out (2005), ‘were facing a mounting “fed-up” factor’. There were palpable signs of popular discontent with the government’s bad governance, corruption, mismanagement of the economy and the continuation of poverty. On the other hand, the DP had not shown itself to be a constructive opposition and a better alternative for Albanians. In the months leading up to the elections, the DP, however, began to develop a progressive strategy of opening up the party to new people and ideas. The first was the ‘injection’ of new blood and the creation of a ‘Policy Committee’, known as the KOP, in charge of drafting the programme for the future government. New figures from civil society and academia, mainly young and educated-abroad individuals, and not previously involved in politics, were asked by the leadership of DP to join this new forum. The second was the return of some of DP’s ‘founding fathers’, who had either been expelled or left the party. The third was the creation of a broad right-wing coalition, even though the parties, other than the DP, were small and insignificant (this coalition presented common candidates for every electoral zone, which avoided competition between the parties of the same coalition in contrast to the left-wing coalition). And finally was the management of the electoral campaign by an American firm. It remains to be seen, however, whether these were more ‘cosmetic’ and image changes, rather than a real deep reform, since the old party leadership remains in control. Besides the two main parties two new political forces appeared on the political scene: the ‘Socialist Movement for Integration’ (LSI) on the left, and the ‘Movement for National Progress’ (LZHK), a coalition on the right. For many voters, already disappointed with the DP and SP and eager

Conclusions

245

for a third alternative, this was a good sign, but unfortunately neither of these forces represented a powerful alternative, as was later demonstrated in the election results, where the first won only 6 seats and the latter did not even manage to enter parliament. These elections, therefore, as has been the case for the last 15 years, were a race between the SP and DP. The election battle was tough, but, surprisingly, the Democrats won. However, as many analysts agree, this was not so much a vote for the Democrats, because they represented the best choice and had the best policies, but a combination of three main factors. Firstly, there was the governance failure of the Socialists and the rejection of the corrupt and irresponsible Nano government by the people of Albania. Secondly, the big split within the SP, followed by the drain from the party with the creation of LSI. Thirdly, Berisha’s perseverance, combined with a new winning formula: unity, plus opening up the party, on the way to rehabilitate itself. Another reason was the necessity for an alteration of power, because, after eight years, people were longing for new ‘faces’. Therefore again in these elections, the question for Albanians was not ‘Which party coalition is the best?’, but ‘Which one is the least bad?’. Berisha became the prime minister of the country, even though only 42 per cent of the population voted for the right-wing coalition. In other words, ‘Berisha won, because Nano lost’. In the final analysis, three individuals share responsibility for the new changes: Sali Berisha, for a well run campaign, Ilir Meta, for acting as the ‘spoiler’ by drawing votes from the Socialists and last, and, mainly, Fatos Nano, for his irresponsible political behaviour and giving a majority of Albanian voters a major reason to vote for change. The return of Berisha to the leadership of the country, after his abject departure eight years ago, has been a surprise for both Albanians and the international community. History is giving Berisha, ‘a power-hungry’ individual (as many analysts describe him), a second chance, and the fact is that in the democratic world a politician with Berisha’s biography is rarely given such a chance. And this presents Berisha with the opportunity to be remembered as a leader who led his country out of the swamp of crime and corruption and into a society guided by the rule of law, placing the country well on the path toward integration with the West. As a matter of fact, the main promise of his electoral campaign was to start the fight against corruption, develop tourism development through FDI, and to further the integration of the country into the EU and NATO structures. Will he and his government be able to fulfil this mission successfully? First of all, the new government has a lot of challenges to tackle, enormous problems to solve, true reforms to conduct and finish, all necessary for democ-

246


ratization of the country and for bringing it closer to Europe. The list is long, as we saw in the early chapters of this book. Secondly, with their accumulated wealth, the Socialists will present a formidable opposition and will undoubtedly make every attempt to undermine the Berisha government. Powerful financial forces, including organized crime, will try to protect their respective turfs by exerting influence by whatever means possible. A new positive development for the Socialists is a change in the SP leadership: replacement of Fatos Nano with Edi Rama, the energetic, efficient and moderate Mayor of Tirana. Therefore, Berisha’s job will not be easy. And most importantly, has he learned from his mistakes? The first signs are not encouraging. Firstly, the composition of the new government: the leadership of the DP did not seem to have made a real effort to bring together in the newly appointed government the finest and best individuals from the public administration, academia, and research institutes, inside and outside the country. On the contrary, most of the ministers of Berisha’s cabinet are anonymous and inexperienced, even in their professional life, never mind in politics, very young (somebody called it ‘the government of diapers’) and for most of them their weak academic and professional background and expertise do not match their ministerial posts. And Berisha must be vigilant to assure that the old corrupted individuals of the Nano government are not replaced by a new breed of thieves. In terms of reforms and policies, Berisha has promised that he will take swift and aggressive action to right the many wrongs that plague Albania, particularly corruption and organized crime. He has pledged to complete privatization of the banking sector, then to focus on selling off utilities and industry. He also aims to overhaul the tax and customs systems and double health-care and education spending. All this remains to be seen. However, the most important thing is for Berisha to respect the internal party democracy and not to return to his autocratic rule which threw him out of power back in 1997. As Erion Veliaj pointed out in a speech (2006), ‘We do not want the regime of corruption to be replaced with a regime of autocracy. We need a governance which is not only responsible and not corrupted, but also respects the basic human rights and the independence of institutions’. Unfortunately, Berisha’s actions towards individuals who dare to object him seem to be more of the same, as was shown in the case of the dismissal, in April 2006, of Spartak Ngjela MP, one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the DP and the Chairman of Commission of Laws in the parliament. The other way is from the outside: the international community and international organizations, such as the EU, are showing real determination to get Albania on the right track. It is obvious that the political leader-

Conclusions

247

ship has become a barrier for the progress of Albania and many believe that Europe could help Albanians to change it (as they did in Ukraine). Both EU and US policies, as the ICB (2005) points out, can help Albania and the whole region to get on, get in, and catch up with the rest of Europe. These positive driving forces from outside (which give both a purpose and a direction), along with a new generation of elites, leaders and intellectuals (mainly those educated abroad) are essential for Albania to progress on the road to democratization, European integration and accession. They bring hope for turning this vision, which still seems utopian, into a reality. They bring hope that the European future of Albania is not a ‘mission impossible’. What will make Albania’s journey shorter and less bumpy and what it really needs is a new political class, a new generation of leaders, reformers and visionaries, free from the communist mentality, equipped with real democratic principles and values of integrity, decency and honesty, committed and willing to sacrifice and make a difference for the country and its citizens, for a country and a nation which deserves more and which has lost a lot of time. These will bring new ideas and energy for transforming and reforming the country along western democratic lines, making it part of the ‘great European family’. Let us hope that Albania and the Albanians will not have to wait too long!

ENDNOTES

1 A model followed by contemporary Albania (see chapter 9). 2 Both Socialist and Popular Party governments have refused in the past to acknowledge that the three nationalities are, in fact, nations, but, in 2006, a law was passed in the Cortes, which recognized the ‘national chatactei of Catalonia. 3 William Beveridge, a British senior civil servant and Fabian Socialist, was the first to lay down the principles of the Welfare State, with his book ‘Unemployment, a problem of industry’, published in 1909, and then in 1942 with the ‘Beveridge Report’. He argued that all people working, as well as their employers, should contribute to a national insurance scheme, so that in times of need (sickness, old age, temporary unemployment and childhood) benefits could be provided, ensuring in this way security ‘from the cradle to the grave’. 4 John Maynard Keynes, a British economist, presented his ideas about economic management in his book ‘General theory of Employment, Interest and Money’ (1936). Against the theory of neo-classical economics which argued that the state should not interfere with the mechanisms of the market, he put forward the position that the state should intervene to control factors such as money supply, to stimulate demand in order to create conditions of full employment. ‘Keynesianism’, as a mode of economic management, became widespread in western industrialized countries in the post-war period and was closely associated with the Welfare State. 5 Max Weber, a German scholar writing at the beginning of the twentieth century and considered to be one of the founders of modern sociology, was one of the first to outline the nature of modern bureaucracy in several of his writings. Weber defined bureaucracy as impersonal, rational, meritocratic, achievement-oriented and universalistic. According to his views the public administration of the modern state should be technocratic rather than 'political', that is, it should not be determined by party political or personalistic interests (see Weber: 'Political Writings, Cambridge Texts in the History of

250

6 7

8

9

10 11

12 13

14 15

16

17

Albania and the European Union Political Thought', edited by Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs, Cambridge University Press, 1994). Among the more important works are: Habermas (2001), Held (1995), Horsman and Marshall (1994), and Hirst and Thompson (1996). For example, see his ‘Eros and civilisation: A philosophical inquiry into Freud’, London: Allen Lane, 1969 and ‘One dimensional man: studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society’, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964. The Visegrád group was created in February 1991 by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and now consists of four countries after the division into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. There are exceptions: Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, for example, are divided between sections of their populations which have a strong west European orientation, and others who are more attracted to Moscow. See, for example, the works by Cowles, Caporaso, Risse and Risse-Kappen (2001); Börzel and Risse (2000), Radaelli (2000) and Olsen (2002). As a matter of fact, these countries cut ties with Albania, which found itself a pawn in these powers’ rivalries. Yugoslavia severed relations with Albania following the Tito-Stalin split and Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in June 1948. After Stalin died in 1953, Enver Hoxha lost his protector, as Khrushchev began a rapprochement with Tito. This forced Hoxha into the arms of China, but when the Chinese began their rapprochement with the United States, Hoxha was forced reluctantly to choose a path of isolationism. During Hoxha’s time it is believed at least 100000 were imprisoned for political reasons or simply for a word uttered and 5000 were executed. A French friend of one of the authors says she hoped that a question on Albania would come up in her school geography exam as there were was nothing to write about the country! Ahmet Zogu was a northern chieftain who in 1924 became Prime Minister and then in 1928 proclaimed himself ‘King Zog of the Albanians’. Fan S. Noli was a Harvard-educated and highly intellectual person, who served shortly as Prime Minister in 1924 and then, when Zogu returned to power, fled the country and spent the rest of his life in the US. The Block District, once the quartier of the party nomenclatura and prohibited for the masses, is now a fashionable area, where the villas of the ruling elite, including Hoxha’s, are turned into trendy bars, cafés, restaurants and shops. There is also a great deal of intermarriage between groups and children will often be given Christian or Muslim first names whatever the religious origins of their parents.

Endnotes

251

18 Although there are many theories about the origin of Albanians, most historians agree that Albanians and their language descend from the ancient Illyrians, whose culture, according to The Encyclopaedia Britannica, dates back to 2000 BC. 19 The suspicion of west Europeans is more likely to focus on issues such as crime and corruption than on religion. 20 His “Cuneus Prophetarum” (The Band of the Prophets), published in 1685, was written originally in Albanian and subsequently translated into Latin and Italian. 21 In advanced capitalist states, democracy is fragile and, in recent decades, there has been a switching off from politics and politicians by many citizens with one consequence being declining electoral turnouts. 22 There exist in the larger towns and cities what are known as ‘informal zones’ which are districts, whose streets have no names and where the houses have no numbers. The residents are simply unknown as there is no record of the houses being built or of who moved into them. 23 www.assembly.coe.int 24 AFP: 06 August 2004 25 The vote was monitored by about 500 international observers from the OSCE, the Council of Europe and a European network of non-governmental organizations. About 4000 local monitors also took part. 26 Some examples are: Directors of the National Museum, the National Library, the National Opera, and the Director-General of the National Audit Department, were either dismissed or asked to resign. 27 www.cgdev.org/docs/MCAdataMrr04forWeb.xls 28 Free, that is, of ‘ordinary’ crime. Of course, the communist state was guilty of the most enormous ‘political’ crimes such as execution, torture, and false imprisonment. 29 The Kanun was framed in the 15th century by Leke Dukagjini, a prominent Albanian northern chieftain, and was codified (collected and published) by Shtjefen Gjeçovi, a Franciscan scholar in the 1930s. 30 Judicial structures include a Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court, 6 civilian appeal courts and 29 district courts. 31 2004 Resolution of the Council of Europe recommended that Albania: i. puts in place procedures for mandatory investigation of all complaints of mistreatment or torture by the police, speedily enforces the recommendation contained in the Report by the European Committee on the Prevention of Torture, continues and expands human rights training of police and effectively completes the transfer of competence for detention centres to the Ministry of Justice; ii. investigates all reports and punishes all incidents of abuse of homosexuals; iii. speedily implements all recommendations contained in the 2002 Opinion of theAdvisory Committee of the Framework Convention

252

32

33

34

35

36

37

Albania and the European Union for the Protection of National Minorities, through an open dialogue with the minority groups concerned; iv. repeals or substantially reviews the criminal defamation laws and reforms civil defamation laws in order to prevent their abusive application; v. improves the regulation on ownership and financing of media outlets in order to improve transparency and prevent abuse and improper influence on the media and through the media by those who financially control them; vi. completes the transition of the Albania RTV from a state television service to a neutral public service broadcaster. Greece is among the very few countries in Europe which has signed, but not ratified the Council of Europe’s ‘Framework Convention of National Minorities’. 38 out of 46 member states have both signed and ratified the Convention. Until December 1912 there were 90000 people living in Çamëria, 50000 Muslims and 40000 Christians, of which 18000 spoke Greek and 72000 Albanian. In 1947, Zervas himself was forced to resign from his position as Minister of Interior as evidence emerged at the Nuremberg Trials of his own collaboration with the Nazis. The first daily bulletin, called Acta Diurna, appeared in the Roman Empire. In the 7th century, the Chinese produced the world’s first printed newspaper (called Dibao). In the 17th century, in 1605, Germany became the birthplace of the first newspaper in Europe with the regular publication of Relation in Strasbourg. The first daily newspaper in Europe was also a German newspaper, Einkommende Zeitungen, which appeared in Leipzig in 1650. The same criticisms might be made of much of the western press as, for example, the English ‘gutter’ tabloid press but this is balanced by the existence of highly professional ‘quality’ newspapers, such as the Daily Telegraph, the Guardian, The Times in the UK, Le Monde and Le Figaro in France, and the Volkskrant in the Netherlands even if these newspapers show a political orientation towards the Left or the Right. The BBC also has a reasonably high standard of objectivity in reporting political affairs. With regard to the functioning of democratic institutions, the Assembly asks the Albanian authorities to: i. carry out a review of recently adopted legislation and, where this has not yet been done, secure budgetary means and adopt all other administrative measures necessary for its speedy and meaningful implementation;

Endnotes

38 39 40 41 42

43

44

45

46 47 48 49 50 51

253

ii. revise the Rules of Procedure of the Albanian parliament in order to reinforce its scrutiny of government action, notably when it comes to the preparation and implementation of legislative acts; iii. create, without any further delay and before the next parliamentary elections, a reliable civil register which should serve as the basis for a new voters’ list. In addition to the reform of the electoral law carried out in 2003 with the help of the international community, it is also necessary to review the present election administration in order to limit the excessive role of the main political parties in election procedures and remove all other reasons for the persisting failure to carry out properly conducted elections in line with international standards. http://www.mie.gov.al Although this reduction has been challenged by the local authorities which are the main beneficiaries of the tax. Shekulli, June 23, 2005. http://www.stabilitypact.org/pages/press/detail.asp?y=2005&p=161 A poll conducted by Albanian Student Government showed that 22 per cent of students in all Albanian universities have had more than one experience where they had paid to pass an exam or to get a good mark (Kolami 2005). In a way, this ‘quasi-religious’ nature of nationalism was a common feature of 19th and early 20th century nationalisms but, in Albania, it took the added form of an explicit atheism. Today, Albanians are very proud of Mother Teresa, as illustrated by her name being given to the international airport and to the main university hospital in Tirana. Currently, the Bektashi leadership is facing pressure from radical elements within the Albanian Sunni community to amalgamate the two groups under the umbrella of an ‘Islamic Council’. This is a worrying development as more young men are returning to Albania from radical religious schooling in countries such as Pakistan and Yemen and are questioning the values of Bektashi tolerance. The Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648 marked the birth of modern Europe as a continent of sovereign states. http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_en.htm http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly.htm#a1 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly.htm#a1 In November 1995 the Dayton Peace Accords brought an end to a threeyear war, which left 250000 dead and over two million people homeless. From 1944 - 87 Yugoslavia was a federal state consisting of six republics: Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and BosniaHerzegovina, as well as two autonomous provinces: Kosovo and Vojvodina. By the end of 1999, only two republics, Serbia and Montenegro, remained within the federation. The disintegration of Yugoslavia, which took place

254

52

53 54

55

56

57

58 59 60

Albania and the European Union over the last decade of the 20th century and was very bloody, started in June 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. Then in September 1991, Macedonia declared its independence and four years later Bosnia-Herzegovina won its independence under the Dayton Agreement The United Nations took control of Kosovo in 1999 after NATO bombing drove out Serb forces, accused of killing 10 000 Albanians during 1998-99. KFOR keeps the peace while UMNIK runs the civil administration, gradually devolving departments to President Ibrahim Rugova and the elected national assembly. The Kosovars see them as a self-perpetuating bureaucracy, which must be resisted as an occupying force, even if a benign one. The European Union is responsible for most of the reconstruction and redevelopment, while a six-nation Contact Group, the US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, guides overall policy. This is the official figure given by Macedonian authorities, while Albanians claim to compose 45 per cent of the total population. In recent years the West has used a formula to keep the troubled province under control, known as ‘Standards before Status’. Through this approach the USA and European states thought that Kosovo should first develop stable democratic institutions under UMNIK administration before being capable of being an independent state. This strategy proved unsuccessful. Stage 1: Separation of Kosovo from Serbia: sovereignty should develop from the status quo as defined by Resolution 1244. Stage 2: Independence without full sovereignty. Stage 3: Guided sovereignty: allowing for reserved powers for the internation al community in the fields of human rights and minority protection. Stage 4: Full and shared sovereignty inside the EU. The process of settling Kosovo’s status began in November 15, with the appointment of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, as the U.N. Secretary General’s Special Envoy for Future Status Process for Kosovo. The status negotiations are guided by a contact group of six nations: the United States, Britain, Russia, France, Germany, and Italy, as well as the European Commissioner for Enlargement, the NATO Secretary-General and UN representatives. http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly.htm#a1 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly.htm#a1 The first enlargement was in 1973 when Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined; the second in 1981 with the entry of Greece; the third in 1986 when Spain and Portugal joined; the fourth in 1995 when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined (Norwegians, even though they have applied twice, voted twice in referendums against joining). In 1990, although not a formal enlargement, the former communist East Germany was assimilated by uniting with West Germany.

Endnotes

255

61 In addition to these, other political conditions are of respect for international obligations, such as peace agreements and cooperation with the ICTY. 62 http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/cards/foreword_en.htm 63 European Partnerships for the countries of the Western Balkans were adopted in their updated form by the General Affairs and External Relations Council on January 30-31, 2006. The partnerships are updated regularly to identify new priorities for action on the basis of European Commission findings on the countries’ preparations for further integration with the EU. 64 Slovenia is sometimes called the ‘Catalonia’ of the Balkans. 65 Until May 2006, the process has been completed by 17 Member States. 66 Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and European Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn presented, in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, the Commission’s conclusions on Bulgaria and Romania on May 16, 2006. 67 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly.htm 68 Ante Gatovina was finally captured in Spain on 8 December 2005, clearing away a very important obstacle to furthering the negotiations between the EU and Croatia. 69 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly.htm 70 Accession countries: Bulgaria and Romania Candidate countries: Turkey, Croatia and MacedoniaPotential candidates: Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina 71 A joint committee oversees the proper functioning of the agreement, meeting annually and most recently in May 2005. Five sectoral Working Parties meet annually to monitor developments and reforms in their respective fields and then report to the Joint Committee. 72 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly.htm#a1 73 The document was approved by the Council of Ministers on 13.05.05. 74 Ministry of European Integration: http://www.mie.gov.al 75 Brussels, Belgium (AP), 09 July 2005. 76 It is doubtful whether most of these groups were parties in the usual sense of the word and were often a small group of individuals around a leader. 77 Pashko, Imami, Ruli and Zogaj returned to Berisha again in 2005 on the eve of the parliamentary elections and were subsequently given high posts in the new 2005 government. 78 The Albanian secret service under the communist regime. 79 It was even alleged by some opponents that the revolt was the result of a conspiracy organized by foreign intelligence services and the Greek lobby in the USA! 80 The Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania. 81 The Shengen Agreement originally concluded in 1985 as inter-governmental, was incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, becoming in


256

82 83 84 85

86 87 88

89 90

91

92

93

94 95 96

this way part of the acquis communitaire. The only member states which are not part of the Shengen Agreement are: the UK, Ireland and Denmark. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht organized the EU into three pillars: Economic Community (EC); Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). See Loughlin, 2001, chapter 12 on Greece. http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781359.html). After the fall of Communism in 1991 and onwards, images promoted by the media, especially in the neighbouring countries, Greece and Italy, where there are high numbers of Albanian emigrants, have contributed to constructing an image of Albanians as being cruel, violent, riddled by criminality, and uncultured. Of course, like all stereotypes, there is some element of truth in this, but only as it applies to the criminal types. The average Albanian is, in fact, the opposite of the stereotype. http://www.unicef.org/albania/ www.unodc.org/unodc/world_drug_report.html This is a phenomenon that could also be observed in Italy in the 1970s and 1980s when the southern-based mafia organizations spread the drugs culture to young people in the Centre and North of the country thus expanding their profits enormously. Ministry of Justice, Yearly Bulletin 2001. This conformism was typical of the old communist states but, in the west too, there is another kind of conformism by intellectuals and artists, which is known as ‘political correctness’, an absurd approach to moral, ethical and political issues, which seems to be based on exaggerated respect for small, but influential minorities. Even though Edi Rama is a very popular figure amongst the population and the media, there have been allegations by his political rivals about his corrupt practices, and criticism of his arbitrary and arrogant style. These features are also true of most western parliaments, including Westminster in the UK, as power has tended to ‘migrate’ from the assembly to the government, and, within the cabinet, to the Prime Minister. However, although this is a common trend, it does not mean it is good for parliamentary democracy. Recently there has been a new initiative, initiated by the Albanian civic movement Mjaft, to reduce the expenses of parliamentarians, mainly towards the cars and drivers. http://www.parlament.al/dep-kry.html The Open Society Foundation for Albania: www.soros.org/natfound/albania This initiative follows two previous schemes: the OSFA Fellowship Scheme that supported a number of fellows who returned to Albania and were employed in the civil service, and the one by Albanian NGOs (Mjaft

Endnotes

97 98 99 100

101 102

103

104

105

106

257

Foundation and Albstudent) which offered internships to Albanian students living abroad with Albanian institutions and private companies. IRI National Youth Survey. January – February 2003. Human Development Report for Albania, UNDP 2000, p. 71. http://extranet.gallup-international.com/uploads/internet/VOP2004_USper cent20release.doc At the Paris Peace Conference held in 1919, British, French and Greek negotiators decided to divide Albania among Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia. This decision was vetoed by the American President W. Wilson. Central Elections Commission: www.kqz.org The Convergence Criteria are: i. Inflation: the average rate of inflation must be inferior or equal to 1.5per cent points, based on the average of three member states that have the best behaviour in price matters. ii. Types of interest: the countries that attempt to accede to the Euro will have to have an average rate of nominal interest in the long term, inferior or equal to two points on the long term average rate of the three member states of lowest inflation. iii. Public deficit: budget deficit will not be able to exceed 3per cent of GDP at market prices. vi Public debt: the aspiring countries must adjust their public debt so that it will not be superior to 60per cent of their GDPs. v. Exchange rates: the different currencies of the countries that adopt the Euro will have to remain during a minimum period of 2 years within the normal fluctuation bands of the EMS, before their “examination”. This chapter draws heavily on a report on ‘Regional Democracy in Albania’ drawn up in 2005 by John Loughlin in his capacity as expert of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. Of course, it does not represent the official position of the CoE and engages only the authors of this book. There have been complaints from representatives of regional and local authorities of the CEE that the Commission has supported their central governments in hindering effective political decentralization and regionalization. This was aired at a conference in Brussels organized by the Council of Europe and the Committee of the Regions held in Brussels in 2003. Law no. 8744 of 22 February 2001, on ‘The Transfer of Immovable State Properties to Local Governments’, Law no. 8982, 12 December 2002 on ‘The System of Local Taxes’, Law no. 8978 of 12 December 2002 on ‘Local Small Business Tax’, and Law no. 8979 of 12 December 2002 on ‘Amendments to the Law on Personal Income Tax’. An example is a law which set up what is know as the ‘Construction Police’, an armed police force which, on instructions from the Prime Minister, may

258

107 108 109

110 111 112 113 114 115

116

Albania and the European Union intervene to prevent or even demolish constructions which do not have the correct paper-work. The new Berisha government, however, has reduced this tax by 50 per cent, thus depriving the local authorities of valuable revenues. AGI, Tirana, January 16, 2006. Another delegation of the Congress visited Tirana to examine the issue in April 2006. Tirana, as the largest municipality and economic power-house of the country, sees itself as apart, also from the other municipalities, and refused to join the regional council of Tirana. http://www.ebrd.com/new/index.htm According to the ‘Petersberg Declaration’ of 1992 the WEU will engage only in humanitarian, peacekeeping, rescue and crisis management tasks. http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly.htm#a1 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly.htm#a1 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly.htm#a1 These three municipalities were separated from Kosovo in 1946 and were placed under Serbia, with a decision by the Yugoslav government. A conflict broke out in 2001 as Albanians wanted to remove Serbian control and integrate the Presevo Valley with Kosovo. However, the Covic Plan, an international peace agreement, signed in 2001, left these three municipalities under Serbia. These figures include only the Albanians from Albania.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AFP (2004) “Albania at risk of disaster from heightened pollution levels”. 25 May. Ahtisaari, M. (2003) “Give Balkan nations their proper place in Europe”. Herald Tribune, 21 July. AIIS - Albanian Institute for International Studies (2002) Albania and EU: Perceptions and realities. Tirana. AIIS (2003) Democratic Governance at the Local Level: the Case of Albania. Tirana. Albanian Daily News (ADN) (2003) http://www.albaniannews.com/main.asp Albanian Human Rights Group (2004) “Declaration: Violent protests, a product of Albanian Politics’ incapability”. Tirana, 2 July. Alibali, A. (2003) “Ballkani Perëndimor apo Europa Adriatike“. Korrieri, Tirana, 21 August. Alibali, A. (2004) “Essay” in World Encyclopedia of Minorities. Routledge. Alibali, A. (Forthcoming) Kushtetuta, Europa dhe Minoriteti Cam. Tirana: Onufri. Alison, S. (2004) “EU’s Prodi downbeat on Albania reform progress”. Reuters, 20 January. Anastasakis, O. and Bechev, D. (2003) “EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the Process” in European Studies Papers, St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/areastudies/southeasteur.shtml Anderson, B. (1983), Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London: Verso. Ash, T.G. (2004) “EU enlargement: Unfinished Symphony”. SEESP Newsletter No 2, July. Avery, G. and Cameron, F. (1998) The Enlargement of the European Union. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press. Baku, E. (2004) “Intervistë me Doris Pack”. Koha Jonë, Tirana, 2 August. Barjaba, K. (2004) “Albania looking beyond the borders” in Migration Information Source, August.

260


Barret, S. and Fudge, C. (eds) (1981) Policy and Action: Essays on the implementation of public policy. London and New York: Methuen. Batt, J. and Wolczuk, K. (eds) (2002) Region, State and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Frank Cass. Batt, J. (2003) “The enlarged EU’s external borders – the regional dimension” in Debating Integration, AIIS. Batt, J. (ed.), (2004) The Western Balkans: moving on. Chaillot Paper No. 70, Paris: Institute for Security Studies. Bianku, L. (2003) “Approximating Albanian legislation to EU legislation - a crucial process affecting steps to future integration” in Monitoring Albania’s path to European Integration. Tirana: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Biberaj, E. (1998) Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy. Westview Press. Blair, T. (2003) “Prime Minister’s speech to US Congress”. 17 July. Bogdani, M. and Loughlin, J. (2004) Albania and the EU: European Integration and the Prospect of Accession. Tirana: Dajti 2000. Börzel, T. and Risse, T. (2000) “When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change” in European Integration online Papers (EIoP). Vol. 4, No. 15, 29 November. Boulton, L. (2004) “Albania, political discord slows EU march”. Financial Times, 18 May. Bugajski, J. (2003) “The Balkans as global model: Three dimensions of security” in Debating Integration, AIIS. Bull, M. and Rhodes, M. (1997) “Between crisis and transition: Italian Politics in the 1990s” in M. Bull, and Rhodes, M. (eds), Crisis and Transition in Italian Politics. London: Frank Cass. Cameron, F. (2003) “Albania – The challenge of the EU Integration” in Debating Integration, AIIS. Çili, H (2002) “Nano bid to silence press”. Press Release: Centre for Press freedom at the Research Institute for Democracy and Development. 28 November. Cini, M. (2003) European Union Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cohen, B. (1996) “Phoenix rising: the resurrection of global finance” in World Politics. Vol. 48. Cole A, (1998) French politics and society, pp.35. Corriere della Sera, (1996) in Radaelli, C. (2002) The Italian state and the Euro. Oxford University Press. Council of Europe (1997) “Recommendation 28 on the state of local and regional democracy in Albania”. Strasbourg : Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. Council of Europe (2004) “Honouring of obligations and commitments by Albania”, Resolution 1377 of the Parliamentary Assembly, Strasbourg.

Bibliography

261

Council of Europe, Ministry of Justice and European Centre Albania (2001) “Report on the study of approximation of Albanian Legislation with the European Convention of Human rights”. Tirana: Flesh. Cowles, M., Caporaso, J., Risse, T., and Risse-Kappen, T. (2001) Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. Cornell Studies in Political Economy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. De Rougement, D. (1966) The idea of Europe. New York: Macmillan. Della Cananea, G. (1997) “The reform of finance and administration in Italy” in Donovan M. (ed.) Italy. Dartmouth: Ashgate. pp. 369-84.. Della Porta, D. (1996) “Actors in corruption: Business Politicians in Italy” in International Social Science Journal, Vol. 149, pp. 349-364. Della Sala, V. (1997) “Hollowing and hardening the state: European Integration and the Italian economy”, in Rhodes M., and Bull, M. (eds), Crisis and transition in Italian politics. London: Frank Cass, pp. 19-31. Di Palma, G. (1977) Surviving without Governing: The Italian parties in Parliament. Berkeley: University of California Press. Dinmore, G. and Dombey, D. (2006) “Russia and China pledge not to block new Kosovo”. Financial Times, 14 March. Duffy, T. (2000) “Albania: Beyond the Hoxha Legacy”, in Kostecki, W., Zukrowska, Z., and Goralczyk, B., (eds), Transformations of PostCommunist States. London: Macmillan Press. Dyson, K.(1980) The State Tradition in Western Europe: a study of an idea and an institution. Oxford: Martin Robertson. European Commission (1999) “Commission Communication to the Council and European Parliament on the Stabilization and Association process for countries of South Eastern Europe”. Brussels, 26 May. European Commission (2001) “Albania: Country strategy paper 2002-2006”. External Relations Directorate General. Brussels, 30 November. European Commission (2003) “Albania: Stabilization and Association Report 2003”. Second Annual Report. Brussels, 26 March. http://europa.eu.int/external_relations/see/sap/rep2/com03_339.htm. European Commission (2003) “The Stabilization and Association Process for South East Europe”. Second Annual Report. Brussels, 26 March. http://europa.eu.int/external_relations/see/sap/rep2/com03_341.htm European Commission (2003) “Thessalonica summit: Western Balkan countries to endorse European Charter for small enterprises”. Brussels, 20 June. http://europa.eu.int/external_relations/see/sap/sum_06_03/ip03_872.htm. European Commission (2004) “Albania: Stabilization and Association Report 2004”. Third Annual Report. Brussels, 30 March. http://europa.eu.int/external_relations/see/sap/rep3/index.htm. European Commission (2004) “Western Balkans: launch of first European Partnerships. - Annual Report: Albania”, Brussels: 30 March.

262


European Commission (2005) “The Western Balkans and European integration”. Brussels, 21 May. European Commission (2005) “Albania: 2005 Progress Report”. Fourth Annual Report. Brussels, 9 November. European Commission (2005) “2005 Enlargement Package”. 9 November. European Commission (2005) “Communication from the Commission: 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper”. 9 November. European Commission (2005) “Eurobarometer 63: Public Opinion in the European Union” July. http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion?archives/eb/eb63/eb63_en.htm. European Commission (2005-06) “Enlargement Newsletter”, Monthly Electronic Newsletter. European Commission Delegation in Albania (2000) “Albania, a future with Europe”. European Commission “The EU’s relations with Albania - Milestones in the relations between the EU and Albania”. http://europa.eu.int/external_relations/see/albania.htm. European Council (1993) “Presidency conclusions”. Copenhagen, 21-22 June. http://europarl.eu.int/summits/copenhagen/co_eu.pdf. ESI - European Stability Initiative (2003) “Western Balkans 2004: Assistance, cohesion and the new boundaries of Europe - A call for policy reform”. http://www.esiweb.org/weternbalkans/showdocument.php?document_ID=37. ESI (2005) “Initiative “Breaking out of the Balkan Ghetto: Why IPA should be changed”. 1 June. European Union (2003) “Press Release: Thessalonica Summit: EU relations with Balkans”. 19 June. http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/WO0306/S00292.htm. Freedom House, (2004) Nations in transit 2004: Albania, http://www.freedomhouse.org. Friedman, M. (1962) Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2003) Monitoring Albanian’s path to European Integration. Tirana: Flesh. Furlong, P. (1994) Modern Italy: Representation and reform. London and New York: Routledge. Geiger, T. (1998) “Believing in the miracle cure: the economic transition process in Germany and East-Central Europe”, in Larres, K. (ed.), Germany since unification: the Development of the Berlin Republic. Basingstoke: Macmillan. pp. 174-202. Glenny, M. and Knaus, G. (2003) “Thessalonica and beyond: Europe’s challenge in the Western Balkans” in European Stability Initiative. Greenfeld, L. (1992) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge. Mass: Harvard University Press.Grigorev, A. (2006) “Debalkanizing the Balkans”.The Wall Street Journal Europe, 10 January.

Bibliography

263

Haas, E. (1964) Beyond the nation-state: functionalism and international organization. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Haas, P. (1992) “Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination” in International Organization. Vol. 46, No. 1, pp.1-35. Habermas, J. (2001) The postnational constellation: political essays. London: Polity Press. Hall, P. (1993) “Policy paradigms, social learning and the state: the case of economic policy-making in Britain” in Comparative Politics. Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 275-296. Held, D. (1995) Democracy and the global order: From the modern state to cosmopolitan governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. Held, D. et al. (1999) Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press. Héraud, G. (1974) L’Europe des ethnies. 2ième éd., (préf. d’Alexandre Marc). Paris: Presses d’Europe. Heritage Foundation (2003) “Albania - the 2003 Index of Economic Freedom”. The Wall Street Journal. http://www.heritage.org/index/country.cfm?ID=1.0. Hill, M. (1997) The policy process in the modern state. 3rd edition, New York: Prentice Hall. Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. (1996) Globalization in question: the international economy and the possibilities of governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hix, S. and Klaus H. Goetz (2000) “Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems”, in Goetz K. and Hix S. (eds) Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems. London: Frank Cass. pp. 1–26. Hodaj, F. (no date) “Local Democratic Governance”. Instituti i Studimeve Urbane, roneotype. Hogwood, B.W. and Gunn, L.A. (1984) Policy analysis for the real world. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hollingham, R. (2005) “Albania’s struggle with privatization”. BBC News, 19 May. Hope, K. (2005) “Albania, a bright future around the corner”. Special Report, Financial Times, 12 April. Horsman, M. and Marshall, A. (1994) After the nation-state: citizens, tribalism and the new world disorder. London: Harper and Collins. Hourican, B. (2004) “Bosnians do not want Islam to be a bar to EU entry”. Irish Times, 6 October. Hughes, J. and Sasse, G. (2001) “Ethnicity and territory in Former Soviet Union: Regions in conflict” in Regional and Federal Studies. Vol. 11, No. 3. pp. 1-14. Hughes, O. (1998) Public Management and Administration. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Ilirjani, A. (2005) Vlersimi i opinionit publik per 100 ditet e para te Qeverise se Partise Demokratike. Chapel Hill, NC: Globic Polls, December.

264


Info-Balkans E-letter (2005) “Transparency of public funds, a step towards European integration”. Press Release, 16 May. ICB - International Commission on the Balkans (2005) The Balkans in Europe’s Future. http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf ICG - International Crisis Group (2003) Albania: State of the Nation 2003. Balkans Report No.140, Tirana/Brussels. http://www.crisis.web.org/projects/showreport.cfm. ICG (2004) Pan-Albanianism – How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability. Europe Report No. 153, 25 February. ICG (2005) EU Visas and the Western Balkans. Europe Report No. 168, 29 November. ICG (2006) Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition. Europe Report N°170. 17 February. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1243&l=1. IMF - International Monetary Fund (2002) Article IV Consultation with Albania. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2003/pn0327.htm. Jano, D. (2006) “What cases corruption? The Albanian case”. Presentation in BASEES Annual Conference, Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK. 1-3 April. John, P. (2001) Analysing public policy. London: Continuum. Johnson, A. (2001) “Albania’s relations with the EU: On the road to Europe?” in Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 3, No.2, pp. 171 - 192. Kadare, I. (2003) “Shqiptarët, model i kulturës së re në Ballkan”. Koha Jonë, Tirana, 11 June. Kajsiu, B., Bumçi, A., and Rakipi, A. (2002) Albania – A Weak Democracy, a Weak State, Report on the State of Democracy in Albania. Albanian Institute for International Studies. http://www.aiis-albania.org Kajsiu, B. Albanian Political Parties – Amidst Dilemmas and Challenges: A Country Report. Forthcoming: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Tirana. Kaplan, R. (2004) “Barren Ground for Democracy”. The New York Times, 15 November. Kessler, G. (2005) “Bush has plan to act on the status of Kosovo”. The Washington Post, 17 May. Kokalari, G. (2002) “Time for a square deal?”. Tema, Tirana, 29 October. Kolami, O. (2005) “Korrupsioni edhe ne arsim”. Gazeta Shqiptare, Tirana, 14 December. Koleka, B. (2005)“Albania wary of extremist inroads”. The Washington Post, 2 April. Kosovo Report (2005) “Bush thanks Albania for increasing troops numbers in Iraq”. 8 April.Krastev, I. (2003) “Bringing the State back up”. Conference paper. September 2003. http://www.suedosteuropa-gesellschaft.com Landsman, D. (2003) “EU and Albania: Euromyths and Eurorealities”, in Debating Integration, AIIS.

Bibliography

265

Lehne, S. (2004) “Has the ‘Hour of Europe’ come at last? The EU’s strategy for the Balkans”, in Batt. J. (ed.), The Western Balkans: moving on. Chaillot Paper no. 70, Paris: Institute for Strategic Studies. Lindblom, C. (1959) “The science of muddling through” in Public Administration Review, Vol.29 (2). Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-communist Europe Baltimore. John Hopkins University Press. Loughlin, J. (1989) Regionalism and Ethnic Nationalism in Corsica: a Case-Study of Corsica. Florence: European University Institute. Loughlin, J. (1992) “Les Iles de la Méditerranée”. La Revue d’Economie Régionale et Urbaine. No. 4, pp. 619-628, December. Loughlin, J. (1997) “Regional Policy in the European Union”, in S. Stavridis et al. (eds), New Challenges to the European Union: Policies and Policy-making. Aldershot: Dartmouth. Loughlin, J. (2001) “La Dimension Européenne de la Dévolution en GrandeBretagne”, Pouvoirs locaux, Vol. 49, No. 11, pp. 115- 120, June. Loughlin, J. (2004) “The ‘Transformation’ of Governance: New Directions in Policy and Politics” in Australian Journal of Politics and History. Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 8-22, March. Loughlin, J. Subnational Government: the French experience. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Loughlin, J. and Peters, B. Guy (1997) “State Traditions, Administrative Reform and Regionalization”, in M. Keating and J. Loughlin, (eds), The Political Economy of Regionalism, pp. 41–62. Loughlin, J. et al., (2004) Subnational Democracy in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lubonja, F. (2004) “Gëzuar regjimin”. Korrieri, Tirana, 9 January. Lubonja, F. (2004) “Ndryshimi i sistemit apo i njerëzve”. Korrieri, Tirana, 12 February. Mansfield, P. (2006) “Albania steps in from the cold”. The Observer, 9 April. Meixler, L. (2005) “Turkey’s future in question after EU vote”. Associated Press Writer, 2 June. Meksi, E. (2003) “The Albanian dimension of integration” in Debating Integration, AIIS. Milo, P. (2001) Greater Albania – Between Fiction and Reality. Tirana: Albpaper. Milo, P. (2002) Bashkimi Europian”. pp.277-99. Tirana: Albpaper. Milward, A. (2000) The European rescue of the nation-state. 2nd edition London: Routledge. Ministry of European Integration of Albania’s web-site: http://www.mie.gov.al Mjaft, (2006) “The Public Opinion Poll over the first 100 days of the Government”, commissioned by the MJAFT! Movement and carried out by Index Albania company. January.

266


Mocnik, R. (2003) “Social change in the Balkans”. Eurozine, 26 June. Morava, F. (2004)“Mes Brukselit dhe Bosforit”. Klan, Tirana, 1 February. Moravcsik, A. (1999) The choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to Mastricht. London: UCL Press. Mueller, A. (2003) “Tirana’s true colours”. The Independent, 13 July. Nano, M. (2003) “Zgjedhje pa zgjidhje”. Shekulli, Tirana, 28 October. Nano, M. (2005) “Parlamenti i deputeteve furacake”. Korrieri, 15 August. Newell, J. (2000) Parties and Democracy in Italy. Dartmouth: Ashgate. Niskanen, W. (1971) Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine. Nordlinger, J. (2002) “The Israel of the Balkans - A Report from Greece and Albania”. The National Review Magazine, 10 November. Nordlinger, J. (2005) “In Albania…”. The National Review Magazine, July 11. Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, state and utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. Nugent, N. (1999) The Government and Politics of the European Union. 4th edition, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Olsen, J. (2002) “The many faces of Europeanization”, Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 40, No.5, pp.927-939. Parker, G. and Condon, C. (2006) “Some Balkan states may find EU’s door closed”. Financial Times, 7 April. Parsons, D. W. (1995) Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Patten, C. (2004) “The Western Balkan: The Road to Europe”. Speech to German Bundestag, European Affairs Committee. Berlin, 28 April. Pettifer, J. (1997) “The Albanian upheaval: Kleptocracy and the Post-Communist State”, Labour Focus on Eastern Europe. No.57. Pinder, J (1991) European Community: The building of a union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pridham, G. (2000) The Dynamics of Democratization: A comparative approach London and NY: Continuum. Prodi, R. (2003) “Albania’s European destiny”. Speech in Albanian Parliament. Associated Press, Tirana, 4 February. Putnam, R.D. et al. (1993) Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Qosja, R. (2003) “Demokracia dhe Dorëheqjet”. Prishtina, 11 December. Radaelli, C. (2000) “Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change” in European Integration Online Papers. Vol. 4, No. 7, July. Radaelli, C. (2002) “The Italian state and the Euro: institutions, discourse and policy regimes”, in Dyson, K. (ed.) European states and the Euro:Europeanization, Variation and Convergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rakipi, A. (2003) “I leave to Europe tomorrow” in Debating Integration, AIIS. Rama, Sh. (2005) “Pjesemarresit ne Levizjen Studentore jane te gjithe fitimtare”. Gazeta Politika, Tirana, 8 December.

Bibliography

267

Rama, Sh. (2004) “Handraku elitar: Përsiatje mbi Parinë e Tiranës”. Koha Jone, Tirana, 23 May. Reuters Report (2003) “U.S. urges Albania to keep pressure on crime lords”. 27 October. Robinson, M. (2005) “Kosovo destined for independence, but on probation”. Reuters, October 12. Rosamond, B. (2000) Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Ruli, G. and Belortaja, S. (2003) “Albania - the difficult road towards lasting growth” in Monitoring Albanian’s path to European Integration, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (eds) (1993) Policy change and learning: An advocacy coalition approach. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press. Saltmarshe, D. (2001), “Developments in Albanian Local Government” in Local Government Studies. Vol. 27, pp. 111-129. Summer. Sandholtz, W. and Zysman, J. (1989) “1992: Recasting the European Bargain” in World Politics. Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 95-128. Schroeder, L. (2004) Albania: Fiscal Decentralization Policy Study. The Urban Institute, Washington DC. Shkupi, S. (2003) “Programi apo Partia?”. Shekulli, Tirana, 8 January. South European Society and Politics. Vol.5 (2) 2000 & 6(2) 2001. A Frank Cass Journal. SBB - Steel Business Briefing (2005) “Albania: Clean-Up Problem Puts Albania in the Spotlight”. 4 May. http//: www.seeurope.net. Stefani, A. (2004) “Demokracia mes dy kucedrave”. Panorama, Tirana, 10 February. The Christian Science Monitor (2005) “Europe’s Next Independent State”. 20 May. The Economist (2002) “Do developing countries gain or lose when brightest talents go abroad?”. 26 September. The Economist (2005) “Kosovo’s future”. 19 January. UNICEF (2002) Trafficking in human beings in Southeastern Europe. Report. Vancouver Sun (2005) “Milking cows in Albania”. 25 July. Vehbiu, A. (2003) “Dëshira për Europë”. Bota Shqiptare, Rome, October. Veliaj, E. (2004) “Albanian Independent Press Squeezed by the Government”. BCR. No.502, 10 June. Veliaj, E. (2006) “Fjalim ne 3-vjetorin e themelimit te Mjaft”. March. Vickers, M. (2003) “Testing Albania’s stability”. ICG, 29 October. Vickers, M. and Pettifer, J. (1997) Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity. London: Hurst and Co. Wolf, M. (2002) “Europe risks destruction to widen peace and prosperity”. Financial Times, 11 December. Wood, N. (2003) “Economic boom in Alban widens gulf between rich and poor”. New York Times, 23 August.

268


World Bank Europe and Central Asia Region (2000) The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South Eastern Europe - A regional Strategy Paper. Yzeiri, I. (2005) “Kush do t’i fitoje keto zgjedhje?”. Koha Jone, Tirana, 10 April. Zaloshnja, E. (2004) “Drejt Partive Elektorale”. Panorama, Tirana, 8 October. Zaloshnja, J. (2005) “Albania-EU Relations: Who negotiates on behalf of Albania”. Tirana Times, Tirana, October.Zeneli, F. (2003) “Sektorët prioritarë të ekonomisë dhe investimet e huaja”. Shekulli, Tirana, 4 October. Zenit News Agency (2005) “Pope Says Values, Not Geography, Unite Europe: Advocates Inclusion of Balkans in EU”. Vatican City, 19 May.

INDEX

acquis communautaire 57, 59, 104, 108 Albanian diaspora 153, 156, 162, 186, 231, 233, 234, 235 Albanian Government 45, 58, 82, 118, 119, 131, 160, 162, 163, 165, 186, 197, 205, 228, 229, 241 Albanian Parliament 26, 50, 179, 180, 181, 237 Albanian Riviera 84 Alibali, Agron 54, 87, 207, 208 Amsterdam Treaty 9, 14, 16 Balkans 6, 10, 13, 18, 21, 31, 39, 63, 68, 71, 74, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 105, 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 134, 148, 149, 158, 190, 191, 192, 213, 217, 219, 223, 224, 226, 227, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 236, 237, 238, 243 Barroso, José Manuel 90, 92, 95, 101, 117 Berisha, Sali 30, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 132, 138, 155, 176, 179, 198, 203, 204, 245, 246 Beveridge, William 8 Biberaj, Elez 21, 30, 38, 39, 65, 134, 162, 179, 227, 231 Blair, Tony 90

Bosnia-Herzegovina 10, 31, 33, 84, 94, 98, 108, 113, 115, 119, 238 Britain 4, 8, 15, 33, 207, 233 Brussels 45, 109, 113, 239 Bulgaria 4, 11, 18, 90, 91, 92, 105, 111, 112, 158, 162, 217, 223, 224, 226, 229, 230 Bush, George 45, 97, 99, 243 CARDS 10, 63, 105, 107, 121, 162, 167, 211, 215, 216, 217, 226, 242 CEE countries 21, 22, 37, 41, 71, 89, 90, 91, 103, 104, 105, 111, 120, 133, 172, 173, 210, 223, 237, 241 Chameria (Çhameria) 54, 75 Chams 54, 55, 235 China 4, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 99, 171 Christian Church 32 Cold War 10, 13, 24, 25, 88, 107, 174 Communist Party 7, 13, 23, 41, 61, 70, 122, 123, 124, 135, 138, 143, 187 Constitutional Treaty 9, 14, 15, 32, 91 Copenhagen criteria 13, 18, 19, 36, 40, 86, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 119, 147, 169, 224, 237, 239, 241 Council of Europe 2, 12, 17, 18, 19, 38, 39, 45, 51, 52, 53, 57, 109, 154, 169, 179, 189, 196, 197, 202, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 214, 215, 219

270


Croatia 10, 11, 67, 84, 87, 89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 98, 99, 100, 108, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 120, 158, 226, 233, 238 Delors, Jacques 8, 16 Democratic Party 4, 30, 41, 44, 46, 123, 128, 134, 135, 136, 138, 141, 142, 180, 196, 203, 207 Di Stasi, Giovanni 203 Eastern Balkans 105, 111, 223 Eastern Europe 7, 9, 10, 18, 21, 37, 67, 84, 88, 103, 107, 109, 148, 149, 151, 157, 211, 227, 232 EBRD 39, 211 Europe Agreement 105, 224 European Commission 8, 16, 17, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 57, 58, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 86, 90, 92, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 108, 110, 113, 116, 117, 148, 154, 155, 163, 176, 186, 190, 192, 196, 206, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 222, 223, 226, 227, 240 European Community 7, 9, 102, 116, 124, 191, 210, 223, 237 European Council 16, 87, 88, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 113, 117 European Parliament 9, 10, 16, 17, 91, 100, 102, 103, 158, 176 European Partnership 48, 56, 118, 216 European Union (EU) 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 31, 32, 35, 87, 90, 91, 92, 95, 99, 101, 107, 116, 117, 118, 147, 192, 193, 196, 206, 212, 219, 222, 226, 232 Eurozone 193, 194, 222 Fan, S. Noli 26, 122, 174 Georgia 37, 97, 99, 243 Ghegs 75, 195

Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry 9, 32 Greece 3, 4, 13, 17, 26, 28, 32, 34, 54, 55, 67, 71, 75, 81, 83, 84, 85, 89, 97, 103, 111, 127, 151, 191, 215, 217, 223, 229, 230, 233, 234, 235 Haas, Ernst 16, 184 Hoxha, Enver 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 75, 81, 126, 133, 143, 174, 239 Instrument for Pre-accession (IPA) 217 International Commission on the Balkans (ICB) 88, 89, 92, 94, 97, 100, 110, 190, 191, 247 International Crisis Group (ICG) 48, 54, 56, 62, 75, 98, 99, 131, 158, 161, 162, 179, 231, 232, 236, 238, 240 Iraq 6, 228, 243 Italy 1, 3, 4, 26, 28, 32, 34, 36, 67, 71, 127, 145, 149, 154, 162, 193, 194, 207, 210, 211, 215, 217, 223, 230, 233, 234, 235 Kadare, Ismail 147, 176, 192, 219, 236 Keynes, John Maynard 8 KOP 244 Kosovo 4, 6, 10, 30, 31, 34, 45, 67, 71, 75, 81, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 108, 110, 113, 114, 115, 119, 121, 131, 158, 159, 190, 191, 212, 213, 219, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 234, 235, 236, 238 Lindblom, Charles 167, 168 Maastricht Treaty (TEU) 14, 116, 193 Macedonia 4, 10, 31, 33, 34, 67, 75, 84, 93, 94, 97, 98, 100, 108, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 120, 158, 159, 226, 227, 230, 231, 232, 238 Majko, Pandeli 131

Index Meta, Ilir 132, 245 Milo, Paskal 117, 232, 238 Mjaft 178, 181, 188, 225 Moisiu, Alfred 181 Monnet, Jean 6, 101 Montenegro 4, 31, 71, 75, 93, 94, 95, 96, 110, 113, 114, 115, 214, 226, 229, 230, 238 Moravcsik, Andrew 16, 87 Muslim world 33, 82 Nano, Fatos 22, 30, 56, 125, 130, 131, 132, 140, 153, 161, 174, 175, 176, 180, 189, 203, 245, 246 NATO 18, 45, 88, 89, 96, 109, 119, 120, 121, 131, 190, 219, 225, 245 Nomenklatura 27, 65, 75, 126, 130, 151, 172, 197 Ohrid Agreement 95, 108, 232 OSCE 19, 45, 46, 99, 109, 110, 190, 205, 214, 215, 224, 225 Ottoman Empire 4, 29, 32, 93, 151, 195, 229 Pack, Doris 10, 167, 176, 241 Party of Labour of Albania 23, 41, 122 Patten, Chris 110, 119, 156, 191 Petiffer, James 74, 81 PHARE 188, 209, 210, 213, 214 Pope Benedict XVI 35, 102 Pridham, Geoffrey 22, 30, 36, 39, 172, 173, 187, 219 Pristina 97, 98, 101 Prodi, Romano 117, 119, 193, 194, 227, 237, 239, 242 Qosja, Rexhep 175 Rama, Edi 22, 132, 140, 173, 175, 203, 205, 246 Rama, Shinasi 173 Rehn, Olli 91, 101, 102, 112, 113, 117

271

Romania 11, 18, 22, 33, 37, 90, 91, 92, 99, 105, 111, 112, 158, 223, 224, 226 Rugova, Ibrahim 98 Russia 2, 7, 17, 28, 81, 89, 99, 127, 148, 162, 191 Saakashvili, Mikhail 243 Schengen area 92, 148, 190 Schuman, Robert 6, 101 Serbia 7, 10, 31, 34, 75, 81, 84, 89, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 108, 110, 113, 114, 115, 190, 191, 214, 226, 229, 230, 232, 233, 238 Shkodra 21 Single European Act (SEA) 14 Slovenia 10, 11, 18, 87, 89, 93, 98, 99, 100, 111 Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI) 132, 135, 180, 181, 244 Socialist Party 44, 46, 117, 123, 125, 142, 175, 203 Solana, Javier 92, 100 South-Eastern Europe 88, 107, 109, 157, 232 Soviet Union 4, 7, 10, 11, 21, 24, 27, 32, 90, 149, 230, 243 Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 109 Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) 105, 106, 113, 115, 117, 118 Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) 105, 106, 212, 239 Thatcher, Margaret 5, 8, 9, 16, 143 Thessalonica Summit 65, 91, 107, 110, 111, 115 Tirana 21, 22, 27, 45, 46, 51, 61, 65, 68, 70, 71, 76, 77, 79, 83, 101, 117, 119, 120, 132, 158, 171,173, 175, 178, 185, 186, 198, 203, 204, 205, 211, 228, 246

272


Tosks 75, 195, 231, 234 Treaty of Nice 91 Turkey 14, 31, 33, 34, 54, 71, 82, 92, 103, 110, 112, 115, 120, 121, 162, 217, 233, 234, 237, 238 Ukraine 17, 18, 37, 81, 99, 243, 247 United Kingdom (UK) 3, 4, 44, 182, 232 United Nations 2, 12 United States of America (USA) 2, 36, 38, 68, 79, 174, 191, 229 US State Department 45, 127 Veliaj, Erion 153, 185, 246 Vickers, Miranda 6, 41, 74, 81, 82, 155, 171, 176, 182, 193, 239 Visegrad countries 170 Vlora 51, 129, 157

Washington 127, 239 Weber Max 5, 8 Western Balkans (WB) 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 98, 100, 101, 105, 110, 111, 112, 115, 117, 118, 120, 121, 149, 158, 192, 213, 217, 226, 233, 238 Wilson, Woodrow 191, 229 World Bank 19, 39, 64, 97, 109, 152, 210, 222 Yugoslavia 4, 10, 24, 26, 27, 81, 87, 95, 96, 99, 106, 112, 120, 121, 125, 226, 229, 230, 231, 234, 235, 236 Yushchenko, Victor 243 Zagreb Summit 105, 117 Zogu, Ahmet 26, 122, 135, 203

Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey Towards Integration and Accession

Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey Towards Integration and Accession (Library of European Studies)

Opportunities and Risks in Central European Finances (European Union Accession)

Opportunities and Risks in Central European Finances (European Union Accession)

European Union Law And Defence Integration

Legitimacy and the European Union

The Central and Eastern European Countries and the European Union

The European Union and Turkish Accession: Human Rights and the Kurds

The European Union and the Nordic Countries

The European Union and the Third World

Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues (Europe and the Nation State)

The European Union and Turkish Accession: Human Rights and the Kurds

The European Union and the People

The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-2008: A History of European Integration

The European Union Decides

The European Union Decides

The European Union

European Union: The Basics

The European Union

The European Parliament, the National Parliaments, and European Integration

The European Union

The European Union and National Defence Policy (State and the European Union)

Uneasy Neighbors: Israel and the European Union

The European Union and International Organizations

The European Union and E-Voting

Drug Policy Harmonization and the European Union

The European Union: Economics and Policies

Treaty Conflict and the European Union

Treaty Conflict and the European Union

Political Parties and the European Union

Integration, Growth, and Cohesion in an Enlarged European Union

Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey Towards Integration and Accession