Agrarian Relations in the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th Centuries

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE 15TH AND 16TH CENTURIES

Vera

P.

MDutaTchieva

EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, BOULDER DISTRIBUTED BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW YORK

1988

EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, NO. CCLl

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Copyright 1988 by Vera P. I"loutafchieva ISBN 0-88033-148-8 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 88-80386 Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS

Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v

1.

The Timar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

2.

Mulk and Vakif. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

3.

Rural Land Ownership and the Feudal Rent . . . . . . . ..

139

Notes .................. .r.

• • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • ••

198

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

242

PREFACE

The feudal means of production in Eastern societies is a matter that has been unjustly neglected by bourgeois historiography, which regarded feudalism as something to be found only in countries that had arisen from the ruins of the Roman Empire; that is, only in Western Europe. A sublect of long and detailed study, the institutions of Western feudalism, in this way, achieved the privilege of being regarded as "classical" feudal institutions. This situation, as far as the study of socioeconomic institutions in the Middle Ages was concerned, was the factor that compelled even the classical Marxist writers to analize their principles of the feudal means of productionnamely through their observations regarding the breakdown of the Gennanic clan-based society and the development of feudalism in Western Europe. In spit~ of this, and in spite of the fact that specialized scientific research had not uncovered the framework of feudal institutions in Southeastern Europe, Asia Minor, Central Asia, and the Far East, Marx indicated the existence of important distinctions between Western and Eastern feudal institutions and the existence of an "Eastern Feudalism." Bourgeois historiography showed an interest in the history of the Asian peoples insofar as it affected the interests of the nations of Western Europe. It was for this reason, quite naturally, that the question of feudalism in Eastern societies has only been investigated scientifically by contemporary Marxist historiographers. The many works on feudalism in Central Asia, east of the Caucasus, Asia Minor, and the Arab countries that have been published in recent decades already make it possible to distinguish certain basic tendencies in the development of Eastern feudalism, and to explain the Eastern feudal institutions. These studies give rise to a number of questions, both theoretical and factual. v

~

vi

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Primarily, the study of Eastern feudalism proves yet again the existence of certain general principles underlying feudal society. Here, as in the West, it is characterized by certain "industrial relationships," which are the result of the incomplete ownership of the means of production by the immediate producer and of the extraction of the surplus product by means of noneconomic pressures. Briefly, the study of feudalism in Eastern societies has shown that all peoples have passed through this socioeconomic formation, and that Western European societies hold no monopoly of it. The study of feudalism in the Eastern nations, however, has revealed a number of purely individual features that do not coincide with the predetermined ideas about feudal institutions, as portrayed by bourgeois historians. These features, in fact, are the result of the most important distinguishing mark of Eastern feudalism, which was mentioned by Marx: namely, the possession by the state of the means of production-the land. In a significant part of contemporary Marxist literature, and more particularly in the literature concerning Ottoman feudalism, it is already customary to speak of the "peculiarities" and "specifics" of this feudalisin. Such a description of the characteristics of Eastern feudalism in practice means its subordination to Western European feudalism. In the final analysis, why should the features of feudalism in France not be considred just as "specific" as far as Eastern feudalism is concerned? And why are the features of Eastern feudalism, which appeared in history earlier than Western feudalism, covered a far wider area, and lasted far longer, always evaluated in comparison with Western feudalism? If this had been justified at a time when Eastern feudal institutions had been studied insufficiently for the general laws governing feudalism to be observed, at the present stage of research it is quite unnecessary to give Western feudal institutions priority over Eastern ones. And if, in accordance with the general laws, each feudal society has created its own feudal institutions, each one should be defined by its features, and not by its "peculiarities. " The main feature of Eastern, and more particularly Ottoman, feudalism is the presence of a strong centralized power. As far as agrarian relations are concerned, this feature is expressed in the power to extract revenue from the land. It can be boldly stated that the salient characteristics of Ottoman feudalism arise from this principle. This fact has its own explanation. The Eastern feudal societies had been exposed to the invasions of nomadic tribes and were forced to engage in a constant struggle for existence. The role of these invasions was a dual one. On the one hand, it showed yet again the importance of

PREFACE

vii

a strong centralized power and, on the other, insofar as these tribes succeeded in penetrating the already formed Eastern feudal states, it had a "rejuvenating" effect on them and imposed upon them certain early feudal institutions. Apart from this, the study of feudalism in Asia Minor and Central Asia brings to the fore yet another of its characteristics: the almost ubiquitous presence of two basic forms of feudal land ownershipofficial (usually military) and unofficial. In other words, there was conditional and unconditional feudal land ownership. Although the periodization of feudalism in many Asian societies has not yet been finally determined, we cannot but observe that conditional feudal landownership is usually strengthened by the arrival of new, seminomadic masses, and that it inevitably accompanies the establishment of the power of new conquerors while, at the same time, the relative share of unconditional landownership is considerably reduced. With the further development of feudalism in the same societies, unofficial land ownership (which expands at the expense of official-usually military-land ownerhsip, and aims to make it subordinate) becomes ever more significant. In the certain sense, a similar phenomenon in Western European feudalism is the transition from benefice to feod. This was an isolated phenomenon, just as the barbarian invasion of Western Europe was an isolated event. One of the main questions that comes up in the study of Ottoman feudal institutions is that of the role of local tradition. Ottoman feudalism, which is fully representative of Eastern feudalism, was established on territories where highly developed feudal relationships already reigned supreme. However inadequately the history of the Kayl tribe-at the time when it played a part in the frontier system of the Seldjuk state and the first century of the by-then Ottoman state formation-may have been studied, it must be noted that the conquerors of Asia Minor and the Balkans were at a much lower level of socioeconomic development. The institutions created by the new state were formed naturally under the influence of local feudal institutions; but the role of that influence should not be overestimated. The forms of Ottoman feudalism were, above all, the result of the development of Ottoman society itself. In the final analysis, all feudal institutions have a good deal in common. This is because they are feudal. For this reason, Ottoman feudalism should not be viewed as a mere mechanical continuation of the development of feudalism in the Seldjuk state, Byzantium, or the Balkan states. In this situation, it is particularly unwise to construct theses regarding transition in feudal institutions proceeding from terminological and formal analogies in

viii

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

general. In this repect, the content of a given institution should be kept in mind. On the other hand, however, Ottoman feudalism cannot be viewed separately from the general development of socioeconomic relations in Asia Minor and Southeastern Europe. The very fact that the Ottomans took possession of the forces of production in these lands does not now permit us to draw a definite boundary between the development of Ottoman society and the societies it conquered. In these circumstances, which should always be borne in mind, Ottoman society was built to the detriment of human resources, which were drawn from the local populations in the process of their consistent and continuing muslimization .. The possession of the forces of production is, in fact, what should be understood by the phrase "conquest of the local population." The feudal institutions of Ottoman society, however, cannot be said to be adopted or imported. If the reverse were true, it would be difficult to explain why, in the conquered territories, where mature feudal relations with some initial signs of breakdown had existed,· feudalism continued to thrive for centuries. Agrarian relations in the Ottoman empire are a matter that has been the subject of considerable study. A few decidedly outdated studies by nineteenth-century European bourgeois historians (Hammer, Belin, Tischendorf) were devoted to the history of the Turkish state, and to its agrarian institutions, but many years passed before any further work was done. The second state in the study of Ottoman agrarian institutions took place in the 1930s and 1940s, during which mainly Turkish bourgeois historiographers (Koprulu, Barkan, Uzun~ar§ili and others) published a number of works dedicated to or touching upon certain aspects of agrarian relations in the empire. The third stage in the study of this matter began after World War II. At this stage, we can point to several research centers at which Ottoman feudalism in general and agrarian relations in the empireto a limited extent-were studied. There is already quite a sizeable group of scholars, mainly in the Soviet Union, (Miller, Novichev, Tveritinova, Dostyan, Djikiya, Ibragimov, and others) who have published many studies on the socioeconomic development of the Ottoman state. There are also many Yugoslav hiStorians who have studied Turkish feudalism (Hadzibegic, DrurdZev, Filipovic, Kresevljakovic, Sokolovski, Sopova-Bozanic, Stoyanovski, Kaleski, Mehmedovski, and others). After World War II Sofia also became a center of active research into Ottoman history.

PREFACE

ix

The many special research projects already carried out, which either discuss or mention the matter of agrarian relations in the empire are undoubtedly on a different level as far as scholarship is concerned. The work carried out by the pioneers in this field in the nineteenth century is indeed far even from the standard required by modem bourgeois methodology. The characteristic feature of their studies is an uncritical attitude toward their sources, a fonnal juridical approach, and the complete absence of historicism. In spite of this, the works of Hammer, Belin, and Tischendorf are still widely read because no new studies of many Ottoman agrarian institutions have been carried out. For example, as far as the timar is concerned, with the exception of J. Deny's article in the Encyclopeadia of Islam (which, methodologically speaking, is not much more contemporary, and which rests almost entirely on the studies already mentioned), there is no subsequent special research available other than that carried out by Tischendorf (1872). . Turkish bourgeois historians who should have carried out the most work as far as research into Ottoman feudal institutions is concerned, fall short of our expectations. As far as methodology is concerned, many of them lag far behind the contemporary bourgeois historians, and have produced works that are, from every viewpoint, rudimentary (Uzun~ar§ili, Karamursal, iI!an), which have completely ignored the actual Ottoman source material (Koprulu), and some have put forward unfounded and controversial theses (akdag). The research carried out by that productive scholar of Turkey's economic history, O. L. Barkan, is worthy of special attention. He is, above all, a contemporary Turkish bourgeois historian who makes use of the most significant original Ottoman material, much of which he includes in their entirety in his studies. In this way, Barkan puts into general circulation materials that were previously not accessible to non-Turkish historians. However, the theoretical interpretation of these sources is not always on a scientific level. Barkan's ideas regarding the very same questions frequently contradict one another, are entirely tendentious, and are of a reactionary, idealistic nature. However, his many works are an undoubted step forward in Turkish historiography, as they are devoted to the actual socioeconomic problems of Ottoman history. There are only two important Turkish historians whose work is completely up to the standards required by contemporary bourgeois historiography- H. ina1cik and M. T. Gokbilgin. In their works, we find a typically bourgeois objectivism (of which, in fact, Turkish scholars can rarely be found guilty), together with a critical and precise interpretation of the sources. The many sources mentioned in Inalcik

x

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

and Gokbilgin' s works are of exceptional importance to the study of agrarian relationtions in the Ottoman empire. Typically, if we exclude contemporary Turkish historiography, it is almost exclusively the historians of the Soviet Union and the Balkan countries who are, at present, engaged in the study of Ottoman feudal institutions. The particular interest shown in the history of Turkey by nineteenth-century Western European historians, which was dictated by the political aspirations of Britain, France, and Germany in Eastern Europe and the Near East, has waned completely. The new inpulse in these studies carne from the Marxist historians. Soviet scholars of socioeconomic relationships in the Ottoman empire concentrate mainly on the resistance by the mass of the people to Turkish feudalism (Tveritinova, Novichev, Dostyan, Thragimov). Valuable hypotheses regarding the position of the dependant population are contained in many of their works, in spite of the limited source material on which they are based, and that in certain cases, lead them to biased conclusions. In the final analysis, the contributions of Soviet scholarship to the study of Ottoman feudal reality determine the course of further studies in this field. Yugoslav historiography, represented mainly by the Sarajevo and Skopje Ottomanists, is known mainly for its valuable publications of new Turkish sources, and for its factual contributions. However, the generalized studies of some Yugoslav historians are still rather empirical (Sokolovski, A vdo) or are full of unsupported and not always methodologically sound theses (Dzurdzev, F ilipovic). In Bulgaria, the study of agrarian relations in the Ottoman Empire has only been put on a true scientific basis fairly recently-during the past fifteen years. In spite of this, a great deal of work has been carried out in this field, notably by such eminent historians as D. Kossev, A. Bourmov, H. Hristov, H. Gandev and J. Natan, who, although they do not make direct use of Ottoman material, offer valuable hypothetheses or have carried out separate investigations on the subject of Ottoman agrarian institutions, mainly during the later period of Ottoman rule. Apart from this, the small group of Ottoman historians from the Institute of History has already produced over thirty special studies in this field, based either on little-known or already well-known Ottoman sources. The undoubted advantage-namely the existence of copious archive material-possessed by Bulgarian Ottomanists has provided favorable conditions for the development of Turkish historical studies in this country.

PREFACE

xi

No matter how recently it has been put on a proper scientific footing, the question of agrarian relations in the Ottoman empire, with particular reference to this country when it was under Turkish rule has been considerably researched in many of its aspects. When it comes to an all around study of the matter, however, there are a number of circumstances that should be taken into account. It would be difficult to explain agrarian relations in any feudal society in isolation, as they are but a part of the complex socioeconomic and political reality of that society. In other words, the matter being examined cannot be isolated from the general historical background of Ottoman life at that time. For this reason, the first obstacle to be encountered is the fact that the history of the Ottoman state as a whole has not yet been studied from the Marxist point of view. Any relevant studies in this sphere are completely out of date. The second difficulty that confronts the scholar of agrarian relations in the empire is the huge volume of original material concerning the latter. Also, when we exclude the actual Turkish historians, the bulk of this material is inaccessible to scholars from other countries. Access is only possible through the publications of Turkish historiographers, which are themselves not particularly copious. In all cases, it should be borne in mind that the publication of this inaccessible but existing source material, when it becomes more generally known, will neccessitate a reexamination of many firm conclusions based on the incompl~te data now available to scholars. The third obstacle encountered in the investigation of agrarian relationships is the circumstance that, in spite of the many studies that have recently been devoted to this subject, at the present stage, a biased view of the matter has been given. The question of the position of the direct producer (land ownership, feudal rent, the categories of dependent population) is considered to be central. As far as the institutions of feudal land ownership are concerned, the most-studied are the later ones, (farms, for example, researched by H. Gandev, H. Hristov, and S. Dimitrov in Bulgaria). Very little attention has so far been paid to the early Ottoman feudal agrarian categories. The timar, in its,initial and early stages of development, has not been studied at all. The question of early unoffical land ownership, etc. has not been examined either. Such a state of affairs has also determined the character of this book. The most obvious point is that in one of its main areas, feudal land ownership, that is (represented on the one hand by the timar, and, on the other, by the mulk and the valdf) , the author has been able to rely to some extent on studies previously carried out. Consequently,

c

xii

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

that part of the book, too, is of an analytical nature. This particularly applies to the study of the mulk and the vakiJ, which have not been examined in Marxist literature. As far as rural land ownership and feudal rents are concerned, the author partially relies on established theories that are the result of research carried out by Soviet and Bulgarian historians and on her own research. Consequently, this section of the book is distinguished from the others by the fact that it does not dwell in detail upon the presentation of certain matters that have been explored in the author's earlier works. It should be noted that no examination has been made of the question of landownership in the sultan's has (Translator's note: has-a fief of an annual value of over 10,000 akqe). This omission is due entirely to the lack of accessible material in this field dealing with the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. However ample the information may be concerning his land ownership during the later period, it is considered that it would be erroneous to apply it to the earlier period. Furthermore, in the territories owned by the sultan, the forms of land ownership and exploitation were unequivocal, and not subject to general juridical requirements. This can be seen from the regime in the has lands from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. For this reason, the study of landownership in crown territories has had to be postponed until actual source material is found. Another feature of this book, which is dictated by the existing state of affairs, is the study of the history of certain agrarian institutions. Because, in the majority of the existing studies, the peculiarities of these institutions as a whole have been shown, it is necessary to trace their origins, gra~ual establishment, and fmally their imposition in order to demonstrate the changes in their characteristics. Naturally, such a presentation of the matter also requires a brief study of certain socioeconomic and political tendencies in the life of the empire, which have dictated the formation of the institutions in question, or upon which they were based. Finally, it should be stressed that, at the present stage of research, the question of agrarian relationships in the Ottoman Empire cannot be considered to have been studied exhaustively. This book confines itself to the study of separate institutions of these relations, which have been studied on the basis of an ample, but not exhaustive, source material. This material also defmes the geographical borders covered by this study, that is, almost the whole of the Ottoman administrative, military, and territorial units of Rumelia and Anatolia, with priority being given to information regarding the European territories of the

PREFACE

xiii

empire. As it was in those provinces that the agrarian regime was typical of the Ottoman feudal system, it is considered that the fact that land institutions in other parts of the empire have not been studied in no way significantly affects the conclusions arrived at in this study.

Chapter 1

THE TIMAR

The principal fonn of feudal land ownership in the Ottoman Empire in the period under review, the fonn in which we find elements of the tradition of certain Moslem feudal fonnations, and of the conquered non-Turkish states, but which, at the same time, is typically Ottoman in the fonn in which it was dominant in the empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is undoubedly the timar. It was the principal fonn of landownership, not so much because of the fact that its relative share in the agrarian system was the largest (this statement, according to some data, is open to dispute), but because, within the framework of the centuries in question, it was an institution imposed by the new state. At that time, the still immature feudal class in the ranks of the conquerors, and the existence of a strong central power did not allow the newcomers to wholly adopt the feudal institutions of those who were already settled in Asia Minor or the Balkan states. In one way or another, these institutions were the fruit of the stable and mature development of the feudal relations that had reached, in the Turkish principalities of Asia Minor, a stage of development far beyond that of the Ottomans. It was for this reason that, during the first decades of their expansion, during which the Ottomans retained some fonn of land ownership already established in the Turkish principalities, and even strengthened them (i.e., the mulk, the vakif, and the malikane-divanl eStates, of which I shall have more to say at a later stage), the first agrarian feudal institutions imposed and codified by the new empire was the timar. The extremely arbitrary, limited character of this land ownership, its close dependence on the state, and the timar-holder's obligations to the sultan are features that betrayed the 'more primitive stage of development of the new society in comparison with those already established on its territories. They bore witness to the lack of a firmly based and c

2

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

economically mature feudal class that would not be satisfied with the many conditions attached to the timar. They also demonstrate the still unchallenged might of the state, which was able to enforce such a conditional form of land ownership. This was a- period in which the timar was the most widely practiced form of land ownership, the period in which the emir, and later the sultan as well, relied on his troops, and they upon him. The barbarians who invaded Asia Minor and Southeastern Europe during the fourteenth century did not, however, settle in lands in which the slaveowning society was breaking down and feudalism becoming established. The relationships represented by the Ottomans were in no way new. They had been experienced, some centuries before, by the peoples whose lands they occupied. For this reason, the Ottoman invasions did not play the progressive role that was played by the barbarian invasions of the early Middle Ages. It was essentially a significant step backward in the historical progress of the nations they had conquered. The invaders inflicted their early feudal institutions upon the developed forces of production, which had reached an advanced stage of feudal relations in those countries. It was this aspect of the Ottoman invasion that was the most reactionary. However ruinous the Turkish conquest of the lands of Asia Minor and the Balkans might have been, it dealt a blow to the forces of production, which did not, however, destroy them. And it was the level of development of these forces of production, once established, and in spite of the cruel exploitation inflicted upon the enslaved producers that did not permit the discrepency between their production relations and the institutions that belonged to early feudal society to continue for any length of time. It was for~this reason that the timar, the foundation of land ownership imposed by the invaders, rapidly underwent changes and soon resembled unconditional feudal land ownership and breached the rules laid down for it by the early Ottoman sultans. The formation of the Ottoman feudal class as a separate group, which had been in progress since the first days of the conquest, went in step with and acted as a catalyst to this process, a process that changed the essence of the timar, or ushered in its decline, as some sources say. So, in the fmal analysis, the development of Ottoman feudal land ownership was the result of interaction between the level of development of the forces of production in the conquered lands and the formation of the Ottoman feudal class as a separate group on the one hand, and, on the other, of the aspirations of central government to keep the feudal agrarian institutions within the framework it had already laid down, and to hinder the expansion of feudal

CHAPTER ONE

3

landowners' powers. This particular aspiration was a short-lived one. Initially, it expressed the interests of the large lower stratum of the feudal land-owning class-the sipahi estate. The state, supported by this stratum, opposed to a certain extent the growing economic power and influence of the big feudal land owners. Soo, however, the latter had succeeded in occupying key positions within the administration and turned it into their weapon against the sipahi landowners. The victory of the feudal ruling class in practice meant a victory over the timar in its classic form, the form in which it was established during the fifteenth century. The features of the timar of that time are, however, of considerable interest to the study of Ottoman society; it was the institution that in spite of tradition, inheritance, and adaptations, remained typical of the feudal landownership imposed by the invaders.

The

Miri Lands

(Crown Lands)

The timar, as a form of feudal land ownership, was to be found only within the min lands. This,' according to Ottoman §eriat (religious) tradition, meant the conquered lands in Europe and Asia, with the exclusion of those comparatively small territories that had received a defmite classification during the time of the early Arab caliphate, the so called a§ar (tenth or tithe), and harac (tax paid by non-Muslims in lieu of military service) lands. If, to the aforementioned categories the mulk is also added, i.e., the real estate in centers of population, we have before us the forms of land ownership according to Islamic tradition. Bourgeois historiography accepts uncritically the scheme drawn up by the Islamic law experts, in spite of the obviously unscientific criterion upon which it rests. 1 In recent years, some Soviet, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav historians have suggested new categories for the lands in the empire, aiming at a clarification of the essence of this still unsolved question, not merely its formal outlines. 2 In their research, however, they do not refer back to the origin of the §eriat scheme, but only to the fetva (decisions on matters of canon law) of Abusuud in the sixteenth century. 3 In this connection, in order to achieve clarity , it is necessary to go even further back, to the epoch of the Arab caliphate, whence the §eriat categorization of the lands originates. Discussion of this division can be found in the works of the Arab legal expert, Abu Yusuf Yakub. 4 According to Abu Yusufs treatise, the territories that were populated by Arabs who had adopted Islam before their actual conquest

4

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

by the Moslems were subject only to a religious tithe (zekaJ) , and were left in the hands of their owners. 5 It was namely these that were the tithe lands. Abu Yusuf regards the harae lands as those whose inhabitants had not adopted Islam before they were conquered by the "righteous." [Translator's Note: zekat-alms prescribed by Islam (one-fortieth of one's income): tax for the relief of the poor.] In return for the right to live within the estates of the caliphate, they paid a poll tax (harae) and, in order not to be deprived of their lands, a harae on the land and what it yielded-land and proportional harae. 6 Typically, in the early caliphate, there were no ikta (fiefs) in these categories. Fiefs were only created on waste lands that were entirely unpopulated which shows that the ikta at that time was not yet of a feudal nature. 7 The tithe and harae lands were maintained in the Ottoman Empire within the exact limits laid down during the early caliphate-namely the first in Hejaz and Basra, and the second in Sevad and Iraq. 8 The literature does not, however, mention the reason for the creation of the miriye (or memleket) lands in the later Islamic formations, particularly in that of the Ottomans. Why, in fact, were the territories conquered by the Ottomans not granted harae status, that is, of lands whose inhabitants had not adopted Islam before being conquered by the believers? They, in fact, fulfilled all the requirements fonnulated for harae lands. Also, as A. S. Tveritinova justly points out, in the miriye lands as well the Ottomans enforced revenue collections (poll tax, land tax, and proportional harae, which were typical of the harae lands).9 In the Ottoman feudal state, the categories of land in question were enforced only because of the conservatism dictated by religious dogma. The interests of the emerging feudal classes in some of the Islamic societies did not permit the vast lands they controlled to be embraced by the statutes mentioned in early Islamic religious and legal tradition. According to the ~eriat, the tithe and harae lands in their initial fonn should have remained the property of the direct producers, as nonns were being created for them in the epoch when the clan structure among the Arabs were already declining. 10 Although these nonns were not observed in the Arab caliphate when it was at the height of its power, and feudal estates (fiefs) were being created in the harae lands, the actual situation did not change the essence of the nonn itself. The determination of the fonnal status of the tithe and harae lands reflected, in fact, the degree of socioeconomic growth in the later Islamic societies, in some of which a third category of land-the miriye or memleket-belonging to the treasury or the state had been created.

CHAPTER ONE

5

This was the fund that the central government had set aside for the maintenance of the ruling class as a whole, and which it kept at its sole disposal. In the Ottoman Empire, for example, the timar system was only widespread on the miriye lands, but the other types of fief were granted. Although the Ottoman state did not destroy the feudal forms of land ownership that had established themselves on a part of the harac lands before their conquest by the Ottomans, it did not impose there its own feudal agrarian institutions, and maintained the already existing forms. Because of the circumstances already mentioned, the tithe and harac lands should be excluded from the categories of land that were typical of Ottoman life, as they were an expression of artificially conserved, already outmoded socioeconomic institutions. The miriye and mulk lands were those,whose status corresponded to the relationships that were characteristic of the empire during the period under examination. The mulk or "true" mulk estates were those within the boundaries of settlements, or in their immediate vicinity. The direct producers ~ had full proprietorial rights over them, and could sell, make a gift or a vakiJ, or leave them to their heirs according to the laws of the ~eriat. II In this context, as I. P. Petrushevski also points out, the mulk could also have represented a prefeudal land category. 12 In the Ottoman Empire and, more precisely, in the Bulgarian lands under Turkish rule the strict distinction between the mulk and the miriye was rather blurred. Although this was supposedly a form of unrestricted ownership, or at least conferred ownership rights and that had been compulsorily required without feudal limitations, in our sources we find information regarding the issue of title deeds for house-building plots (ev yer tapusu) , 13 or even for houses (ev tapusu). 14 In addition, as will be seen below, the mulk lands too-orchards, vegetable gardens, melon fields, etc., which were within the boundaries of the settlement-were frequently subject to the kind of feudal taxation that was typical of the miriye lands. 15 These facts (the possession with deeds of houses and house-building plots, the payment of a tithe on the lands owned within the boundaries of the settlement) show beyond doubt that the predominant feudal relationships had blurred the distinction between the miriye and the mulk categories and that a tendency to equalize the status of the various lands existed at that time. The aim of this equalization was to ensure that as little land as possible remained beyond the control of the feudal land-owning class and that maximum revenue be extracted from the land owned by the producer. The estates that were referred to as "false" mulk, which without \

6

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

exception passed into hereditary or real valdfs (pious foundations), were created on the basis of the sultan's authority over the miriye lands. Their characteristics will be discussed at a later stage. It is merely noted that they should be viewed as a form of feudal land ownership with ownership rights over land that is, in essence, miriye. The miriye lands were, therefore, the principal category in the Ottoman feudal-agrarian system. They were not only predominant as far as quantity was concerned in the land fund of the empire, but most fully corresponded, as far as status was concerned, to the predominant feudal relationships within the empire. According to Ottoman ~eriat tradition, the rakabe-the ultimate authority over the miriye lands l6 -belonged to the treasury, that is, to the central government. 17 Although some authors, in their study of agrarian relationships in other Islamic feudal formations consider such a postulate to be pure fiction, it would be difficult to argue that in the Ottoman empire the supreme ownership of the state over the land was something which did not exist. IS In one way or another, in its capacity as supreme owner, the central government kept at its disposal a significant share of the feudal revenue extracted from the population of these lands; in other words, it required a defmite service from its tenants in return for the land it made available to them. It took away the possessions of feudal lords who did not fulfil their obligations; it exploited, through its own agents, vacant land parcels. It fixed the forms and extent of feudal exploitation. In fact, according to the famous postulate of Marx, state ownership of the land in many Asian countries was a reality}9 The central government, as owner, relinquished some of the legal rights it held over the miriye lands to various representatives of the feudal land-owning class. 20 The nature of the rights relinquished by the state in favor of feudal land owners varied according to the differing status of the latter. The conditions under which these rights were granted also differed. It would, in any case, be difficult to establish in what kind of feudal land ownership during the period in question central government fully relinquished its rights. Even with "true" valdfs, the form in which the state legally had no power of intervention, it fixed the norms for the exploitation of the raiyye, and frequently, only on the strength of one ferman, put an end to the valdfs existence. 21 It should immediately be pointed out, however, that when we speak of the Ottoman Empire, it cannot be regarded as a classless apparatus that administered the lives and property of its subjects with equal force, be they raiyye, sipahi, or pa~a. This theory is advanced, with varying degrees of emphasis, by contemporary Turkish bourgeois

CHAPTER ONE

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historiographers. The Ottoman state was an apparatus of the feudal land-owning class that acted in the interests of that class, and frequently in the interests of one particular stratum. If, at a given moment, it affected the interests of a particular feudal landowner, that would have been in the interest of the feudal land-owning class as a whole, or of the stratum that was in power at that time. This circumstance should always be borne in mind, as the not infrequent opposition by groups of feudal landowners to the state, and vice versa, could lead to inaccurate conclusions as to the nature and role of the Ottoman central power.

The Origin of the Timar The question of the origin of the Ottoman timar, or rather, of that which was the ~astern feudal agrarian institution whose features are most similar to those of the timar, has still not been resolved. Auth0rities on the timar have, in their researches into its origin, come to widely differing conclusions. From Hammer, who traces the origins of land tenancy by the military back to sixth-century Sassanid Persia22 , to Deny, who is inclined to accept Byzantine influence on this Ottoman institution as the decisive factor, one could also mention many other opinions that have been supported by argument to a greater or lesser extent. 23 For example, M. Belin considers that the first military tenancies in the Islamic formations were granted by Nizam-al Mulk, the vezir of the Seldjuk Sultan Ali Arslan. 24 That eminent scholar of the Seldjuk state, V. A. Gordlevski, points out, however, that the Mongols, who in their tum had been under the influence of Chinese institutions, had had a defmite influence on its military-feudal regime. 25 Tischendorf regards the timar system as an institution established by the first caliphs, or, more precisely, by Osman, 26 although he saw data to support the existance of such a form in the Sassanid state. 27 Contemporary Turkish historiographers 27 give particular significance to the Turkic tradition, represented by the western Mongolic peoples (the state of the ~lhans in thifteenth- and fourteenth-century Iran),28 the Seldjuks in Central Asia and Asia Minor, 29 the state formations of Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu beyond the Caucasus and eastern Asia Minor in the fourteenth- and fifteenth-centuries,30 and finally by the many feudal principalities that arose during the decline of the Seldjuk sultanate in Asia Minor (the Anatolian beyliks).31 Without making it one of our aims to clarify the complex question of the origin of the timar, we cannot but emphasize that the formations

8

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

mentioned were not at the same stage of socioeconomic development. For example, while the states of Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu were, to a certain extent, seminomadic formations with a tribal armed force,32 in the Anatolian beyliks feudal relationships were mature, and unconditional land ownership was predominant there. 33 Consequently, as far as they are concerned, one cannot speak of military land ownership, which is characterized by its conditional nature. In fact, whatever the elements assumed by the timar in the form in which it was imposed in the Ottoman Empire might have been, it was an Ottoman institution, the result of the actual historical conditions created in Asia Minor and Eastern Europe by the influx of barbarian masses into lands where mature feudal relationships had been dominant. In this sense, the timar, as a basic agrarian institution of the conquerors, could be neither "as found" nor "introduced" because it met the requirements of a definite set of historical circumstances. Analogous features in the characteristics of the timar and official land ownerships in certain formations in Central Asia and Asia Minor on the eve of the Ottoman expansion could not but exist, for it cannot be completely separated from the institutions of the conquered feudal states either. But the Ottoman timar, as an institutional system, remains the perfected form of Eastern military feudal landownership (military fiefs). 34

The Military Organization of the Ottomans in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries However abundant the special literature of theses and hypotheses regarding the origin of the timar, and the influences under which it came to be, that containing data and conclusions about the stages of its establishment and the imposition of the timar system in the Ottoman Empire is, in inverse proportion, scarce. This gap is not a question of mere coincidence: it is a consequence of the scarcity of input about the matter in question. Moreover, it is the development of the timar from its initial stages up to its establishment as the dominant system of land ownership that would outline, to a great extent, the forces active in Ottoman society until the mid-fifteenth century and their changing balance and structure. As the function of the timar in the period under review was the maintenance of the feudal landowner's cavalry, it is closely tied to the military organization of the Ottoman state. This is why a brief review of the development of Ottoman military organization would also cast light on the beginnings of the timar.

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9

A part of the Oguz Turkmen Kayi tribe, led by Ertogrul, which played a part in the Seldjuk military border system during the thirteenth century, was known as ue. It was through the latter that the Sultanate of Ikoneum organized the Turkmen nomadic tribes that had migrated toward its borders, driven by the Mongols. The sultanate directed this nomadic population to its eastern and western borders, setting it the task of defending the border regions. The leaders of the tribes that were included in the ue system were known as ue beyler, and each of them had several ue emirs. These tribal leaders were given tied estates (officially owned ·land) by the central government, but because of the unsettled way of life of these tribes, which would frequently carry out attacks on neighboring lands on their own initiative and were a constant source of headaches to the sultan, the central government preferred to keep their leaders at court as hostages. At the end of the thirteenth century, in the already considerably declining Sultanate of Konya,a large nomad uprising of a religious-hereticaJ. character took place. 35 Thus, it was that part of the Kayi tribe that later, having already mixed with other ethnic elements, became known as Ottoman. It represented part of the "ue" system, that is, the organization of the tribal border troops of the Turkmen nomads in the Seldjuk state. 36 It should be noted that the ue was still present in the Ottoman state a whole century after its creation. As Babinger points out, at the end of the fourteenth century in the Balkan lands of the Turkish military leaders- ue beyler-Iarge hereditary estates were granted, which passed from generation to generation over the centuries. 37 These were the so-called gazi mulkler. The accuracy of Babinger' s assertion is also proved by the fact that some chroniclers, for example Ne~ri, mention Ottoman military leaders bearing the title ue bey. Such, for example, was the famous Eurenos Bey, Pa~a Yigit, and others. 38 Furthermore, the districts that were considered to be border regions (until the beginning of a new campaign), were obviously considered as ue. 39 Again from Ne~ri, we discover that in 1385, Eurenos Bey was granted Seres as an ue estate. 40 A Jerman issued by Murat I in 1386 corroborates Ne~ri's infonnation. In itythe sultcn allowed Eurenos to create a vakif from any part of that land he considered fit, namely, from Seres Komotini (Gumurcine) to Bitolya, Biglishte and Hroupishte. 41 Although the Jerman does not make clear the status of that estate, it was, in all probability, an ue, granted to Eurenos the previous year. The name ue was also given to the part of Serbia that was conquered by the Ottomans toward the end of the fourteenth century (Laz ueu). 42 Consequently, the ue system, which was brought by the Ottomans

10

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

to our lands from the Konya sultanate, was not abolished until the end of the fourteenth century. In all probability, it disappeared during the period of strife between the sons of Beyazit I, as no reference to it can be found in the fifteenth century. Another form of military organization, this time not originating in the Seldjuk state, but created and formed in the Ottoman state were the yaya or p iya de , and m"Usellem or e§kinci bodies. This was the first step in the transition from the tribal irregular troops that composed the military might of Osman I, which were maintained exclusively by pillage, to a regular army. 43 Alaeddin, brother of Orhan and grand vizier of the new state, has been credited with its creation. In time of war, participants in both bodies received a regular wage of one akqe per day. 44 In time of peace, the yaya and m"Usellem cultivated their tax-free lands (farms), which had been granted by the government in exchange for their service. 45 In fact, the bodies in question were still an organization of troops along tribal lines, composed of free peasants, and not of feudal land owners and their serfs. The fact that it was not' 'inherited," but created at the dawn of the empire is very typical. It bears witness to the fact that, during the first half of the fifteenth century, Ottoman society was still not fully feudalized, and had reached the stage of military democracy. The yaya and musellem retained their position of power in the empire's military forces for almost a century. It was known that Saruca Pa§a, as yaya bQ§i of Rumelia, distributed many m"Usellem farms in the Maritsa valley in 1387. 46 In 1421, Mustafa Bey, governor of Rumelia, carried out a restructuring of both bodies. 47 In all probability, although we know nothing of the essence of these reforms, they would have meant the transformation of the yaya and musellem from a primary military force into auxiliary forces-which they were, according to the legislation in force at the time of Selim 1. 48 A basis for such a supposition is provided by A§ikpa§azade, according to whom, during the period of strife between the sons of Beyazit I, the m"Usellem were on the side of Musa, while Mehmet I was supported by the sipahi. 49 The victory of Mehmet consequently meant the victory of the feudal cavalry of the free peasants, and the above-mentioned reform, dating from the first year of the reign of Murat II, in all probability sanctioned that victory. To the military organization of the Ottomans created before the end of the fourteenth century, we should also add the janissaries. This body was also formed at the initiative of Alaeddin during Orhan' s reign (1328), but was only formed as an order of the fighting dervishes under Murat 1. 50 It would appear that, up to the period following

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

11

the strife between the sons of Beyazit, the janissaries were picked at random because it was not until 1438 that Murat IT commenced a systematic recruitment of Christian children to be trained as janissaries. 51 This army, which in the course of time loomed ever larger, in fact played an important part in the military organization of the empire up to the en,d of the sixteenth century. Even after that time, though, the janissaries played a not insignificant part in the political life of the Ottoman state at home, and had become a serious threat both to the central government and to the civilian population. 52 In all events, from the beginning of its formation until its dissolution, the corps of janissaries could be considered neither a tribal nor a feudal armed force, as it was a paid body of guards attached to the sultan's court, which was typical of the Middle Ages. This, in general outline, suffices to describe the military organization of the empire in the first decades of its existance after the emergence of the Ottomans into the historical arena.

The Creation and Early Development of the Timar The origins of the timar are traditionally linked with the name of the first Ottoman sultan-Osman I (1299-1326). Osman himself, before ridding himself of his dependence on the Sultan of Konya, had been his tenant, and had been granted lands around Kara Hisar as an ikta. 53 Hammer, Belin, and Tischendorf, referring to data given by Ne~ri and Saadeddin, are of the opinion that it was Osman who distributed the first timars. To his son Orhan, he gave his estates around Kara Hisar; to his brother Gunduz, a part of those estates, to his father-in-law Ede Bali, Bilecik; and, to Konu~ Alp and Turgut Alp, his military leaders, Yar Hisar and Aynegol. The lands around Bursa and Tapanili were given to his knights. 54 Regarding the conditions under which timars were granted to knights in the Ottoman army, the aforementioned authors merely indicate that these knights had to carry out military service, that their timars were never taken away from them without a reason, that their sons had to take over both their tenancies and their military service, and, if the tenant died while his son was still' a minor, a substitute for the latter would have to be found until he came of age. 55 These are the data that are quoted in the specialized bourgeois literature of the nineteenth century. Contemporary bourgeois historiography is more cautious, ouUing the features of the military tenancies that were granted in Osman's time. Koprulu merely points out that, according to tradition, it was Osman who first distributed estates,56 and the acknowledged expert

12

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

on the timar, J. Deny, adds that nothing definite can be said about the essence of these estates. 57 This caution in qualifying the estates under discussion was fully justified. Thus, for example, in the newly published seventeenth-century chronicle of Koca Huseyin which, in the opinion of its publisher, is based on earlier Ottoman chronicles, the same people who were granted land by Osman are mentioned. That event, which took place in the second year of Osman's reign, is described in the section headed "Distribution of the Villages and Towns." The estates themselves that were granted at that distribution were given the common name of ikta, and, several lines later, they were referred to as mulk ve mal. 57a It is, however, quite obvious that, in Osman's time, the tenn to be used for these lands distributed among members of the ruling family had still not been arrived at; neither was the content of the estates in question stated exactly. Of course, it is difficult to accept that the lands handed out by Osman, even if they did bear the name timar, were like the Ottoman military tenancies granted during the time of Mehmet II, for example. Ottoman society, which had only just commenced the process of feudalization, had yet to create its own feudal institutions. Moreover, if even in Osman's time the central government had got as far as organizing feudal armies, why would the heirs of that sultan have taken a step backward, fonning a tribal army from free peasants? As has already been stated, the yaya and m"itsellem corps were created under Murat I, and they did not relinquish their dominant position until the end of the reign of Beyazit 1. Up until that time, the uc system, which was typical of the nomadic way of life, had also flourished in the new state. Consequently, the idea that the timar was founded in the first years of the Ottoman state is unacceptable. It is more probable that Osman also shared the administration of the previously conquered land in Asia Minor with his relatives, a practice widespread among the Anatolian beyliks, where each member of the ruling family administered his own district and led his own troops into battle. 58 Data relating to the condition of the timar in the time of Orhan I (1326-1359) are even harder to come by. Only Hammer notes that this sutlan, too, granted timars and zeamets, without indicating the reasons for such a statement. 59 However, the fact that it was not until the reign of Murat I that the tenn zeamet was introduced is sufficient reason for this statement to be rejected. 60 The worries of Orhan I concerning the organization of the Ottoman anny are made sufficiently clear by the fact that he created three entire military corps (of infantry and cavalry from free peasants and janissaries). For this reason, it

CHAPTER ONE

13

is difficult to believe that he would not have devoted tirrie to the organization of the tenants' cavalry, if such had already been in the early stages of creation. Another fact neglected by specialized literature should be emphasized here. Some estates granted to the kadi and other state employees date from the time of Orhan. However, these estates were not timars, but tied valdfs. They were passed from person to person on the basis of service to the state. 61 Estates of this type were granted by the state even in the time of Mehmet II, at which time they were not only connected with service of a religious nature. Persons entrusted with the repair of bridges,62 shipbuilding,63 etc. were granted such valdfs. The fact that such estates were not granted after the reign of Mehmet, that is, after the firm establishment of the timar system, bears sufficient witness to the as yet secondary role of the timar in official (tied) land ownership until the middle of the fifteenth cen~ry. In any case, the use of the valdJfor the remuneration of state employees, (hizmeti mukabilesinde mutasarriJ, "possesses ·it in return for his services' '), at which time three non feudal military corps were created, proves that Orhan I did not engage in the organization of official (tied) land ownership as represented by the timar.64 Information regarding the timar from the reign of Murat I (1359-138~), is far more concrete. It is not only the first major victories in the Balkans that are connected with the reign of this sultan. He is rightly considered to· be the empire's first legislator. Toward 1375, with the aid of the beylerbey of Rumelia, Timurta§ Pa§a, Murat issued a law that, among other things, arranged the division of the military fiefs into timars and zeamets and stated that they should, without exception, be granted by the beylerbeys. 65 In all probability, these initiatives of Murat I followed others connected with the name of Hayrettin Kara Halil uld disprove her argument. 297. H. Inalcik, op. cit., pp. 1-6. 298. Ibid., pp. 33-34. 299. Ibid., pp. 55-56. 300. Oriental Section, Sign. Defteri, no. 331. 301. Oriental Section, Sign. CL 7/2. 302. TH 31110, p. 13. 303. Ibid., Sign. OAK 45/29: inv. 1/1959; OAK 45/30: .OAK 52/59; Seres-local admi?istration, population, XVI century; Istanbul, Defterhane, TImars. Istanbul-Defterhane. Lands under feudal exploitation, XVI century, istanbul-Defterhane, XVI century, istanbul. Defterhane, Timars, 1480, inv. 647/1954. 304. Br. Djurdjev, op. cit., p. 49 onward. 305. Oriental Section, inv. 647/1954. 306. For forced labor (angarya), see Chapter 3. 307. H. Hadjibegic, p. 318; Kanunlar, pp. 9, 30, 283; J. von Hammer, p. 194. 308. H. Hadjibegic, ibid. 309. Kanunlar, pp. 9, 30, 283. 310. Ibid., p. 399. 311. Kanunlar, p. 90 onward. 312. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 128 onward. 313. Br. Djurdjev, p. 49 onward. 314. Oriental Section, inv. 647/1954.

212

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE Notes to Chapter 2

1. In the present study, we accept the term "land mulk" (toprak mulku), introduced by O. L. Barkan, Mulk topraklar ve sultanlarin temlik fulkki, " istanbul Universitesi iktisat faliUltesi mecmuasi, C. vn, S.l, p. 164 onward, as the term used in our historiography (gazi mUtk) (B. Tsvetkova, "Pozemlenite otnosheniya v bulgarskite zemi pod osmansko vladichesko do sredata na XVIT vek, Istoricheski pregled, Year VIT, Book 2, p. 165) only partially expresses the meaning of the concept. 2. ~anunlar, pp. 296-297: MTM, I, 1, pp. 49-50. 3. O. L. Barkan, ibid., p. 157. 4. 1. P. Petrushevski, Ocherki po istoriifeodal'nykh otnoshenii v Azerbaidjanye i Armenii v XVI-nacfullye XIX w. (Leningrad, 1949), p. 222 ... 5. O. L. Barkan, op. cit., pp. 165-168. 6. i. H. Uzun~ar§ili, Osmanli devleti te~kilatina methal, pp. 125-126. 7. Ibid., p. 125. 8. 1. P. Petrushevski, op. cit., pp. 224-226. 9. The malikane-divani system has been studied in detail by O. L. Barkan. "Malikane-divani sistemi," Turk hukuk ve iktisat tarihi mecmua~i, C. IT, 1939. 10. 1. H. Uzun~ar§ili, op. cit., p. 166; compare with Kanunlar, pp. 182, 110. 11. Kanunlar, p. 83. 12. We have dwelt upon malikane-divani to the extent that it can serve as a basis for anaology with the malikimeler that appeared toward the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries. See S. Avdo, "Malikana dozivotni zakup drzavniv dobara u osmanskoj drzavi," Prilozi za orijentalno filologiju i istoriju jugoslavenskih naroda pod turetskom vladivinom, vol. XVill-XIX, 1958-1959, which are not an object of the present study. 13. i. H. Uzun~ar§ili, op. cit., pp. 164-166. 14. Temlik-a mulk estate. 15. O. Hilmi, Ahkam-iil evkafistanbul, 1307), 130 fetva, p. 55, quotation according to O. L. Barkan, "Mulk top rakla r, p. 160. 16. O. L. Barkan, "Mulk topraklar ... ," p. 158. 17. O. L. Barkan, "Mulk topraklar ... ," p. 160. 18. The author of the translation has adopted the term "absolute property" for the Turkish "miilkiyet." 19. H. Hadjibegic, "Rasprava Ali Causa iz Sofiya 0 timarskoj organizaciji XVIT stolecu," Glasnik Zemaljskog Muzeja u Sarajevu, Nova serija, Sv.IT, 1947, p. 153. The official Ottoman documents

NOTES

213

themselves define the powers of the mulk sahibi as follows: M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., p. 414. 20. G. Elezovic, Turski spomenitsi, I., p. 681; H. inalcik, Fatih devri uzerinde tetkikler ve vesikalar, I (Ankara, 1954), p. 219. 21. Ibid., p. 108. 22. D. Ihchiev, "Akt ze zaveshtaniye na Karlovskiya tev liyet, napisan na I den ot M. Shaban 801g ot Egira (8 April 1399), " /zvestiya na Istoricheskoto droumestvo, n.m (1911), p. 209 onward; M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 184 onward; G. Elezovic, op. cit., p. 678 onward. Oriental Section F I, ed. 15110, L. 5-4. 23. Ibid. 24. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 188-189, 193,234,282; G. Elezovic, p. 1089. 25. Ibid., p. 449. 26. M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 241, 330,408,44, 187, ~75, 33, 403, 437. 27. Information concerning the transformation of mUlks into vakifs is more readily available from the first and, even more so, the second generation of mulk owners (Ibid., pp. 424, 407,392,507,443, 417,381,329,450,128,408,341,412,397: Oriental Section, "istanbul defterhanesi," Vakiflar, 890.). 28. We discover the value of the ducat-(thirty akc;e) from Z. Karamursal, Osmanli mali tarihi hakkinda tetkikler (Ankara, 1940), p.4. 29. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 89,408,282,289, 173,; Oriental Section, Sign. istanbul-Defterhane, Vakijlar: M. T. Gokbilgin, op. cit., pp. 321, 329,297,230,407,406,392, 118,235,243; G. Elezovic, op. cit., p. 713; M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 507,494,443,438,429,435, 418,417,381; G. Elezovic, pp. 127-144; M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 444, 450,443. 30. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 407. 31. G. Elezovic, Turski spomenitsi, p. 93 onward. 32. Ibid., pp. 127-141. 33. Hr. Hristov, "Nyakoi problemi na prehoda ot feodalizma kum kapitalizma v istoriyata na Bulgariya," Istonsheski pregled, Year XVll, Book 3, p. 86 onward. 34. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 508. 35. Ibid., p. 287. 36. Ibid., p. 411. 37. We fmd anaological information in another vakifname for the Debur area (H. Kaleshki and M. Mehmedovski, Tn vakufnami na Kachanikli Mehmet pasha (Skopje, 1958), pp. 72-73.

214

AGRARIAN RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

38. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 318, 319, 321, 380-382,498-502. 39. Ibid., pp. 238,417,426,448, 506, 515, 518. 40. H. Hadjibegic, Kanun-nama sultana Sulejmana zakonodavtsa, pp. 320-321. 41. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 242, 248, 253, 334,417,429,403, 432, 435, 456, 502, 504, 506, 508, 391, 409, 417, 435. 42. Ibid., pp. 238, 242. 43. Ibid., pp. 261,417,436,440,448, etc. 44. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 241, 329. 45. V. N. Gordelevskii, p. 218. 46. M. T. Gokbilgin, p. 89. 47. B. Tsvetkova, "Pozemlenite otnosheniya v bulgarskite zemi pod osmansko vladichesko," p. 165. 48. G. Elezovic, p. 7 onward; M. T. Gokbilgin, aforementioned work, p. 201; O. L. Barkan, "Toprak i~~iliginin ... " IT, 412; D. Thchiev, "Akt za zaveshtaniye na Karlovskiye tevliyet, napisan na l-ya den na M. shaban 801 ot Egira," IBID, Book Sh. (1911), pp. 208-216. Gokbilgin wrongly assumes this mulk to belong to the reign of Beyazit IT (op. cit., p. 349). 49. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 438, 390, 515,426,435-436,224,437, 414,331,332,415,323,324,488,489. Midks belonging to the "supporters" of a given ruler can also be found. (Ibid., pp. 118, 236.) 50. Ibid., pp. 417, 289, 502. 51. M. T. Gokbilgin, pp. 198, 199,266-295,325,390,455-456, and so on. 52. i. H. Uzun~ar~ili, "Evrenos," islam ansiklopedisi, C. IV, p.414. 53. Ibid.,