Africa Yearbook. Vol. 5, Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2008

AFRICA YEARBOOK

AFRICA YEARBOOK Volume 5

Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2008

EDITED BY

ANDREAS MEHLER HENNING MELBER KLAAS VAN WALRAVEN SUB-EDITOR

ROLF HOFMEIER

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2009

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

ISSN 1871-2525 ISBN 978 90 04 17811 3 Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

Contents

i. Preface ........................................................................................................... ii. List of Abbreviations ...................................................................................... iii. Factual Overview ...........................................................................................

vii ix xiii

I. Sub-Saharan Africa (Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber & Klaas van Walraven) .......................................................................................................

1

II. United Nations and Sub-Saharan Africa (Linnea Bergholm) .........................

19

III. African-European Relations (Sven Grimm) ...................................................

33

IV. West Africa (Klaas van Walraven) ................................................................. Benin (Laurens Nijzink) ................................................................................. Burkina Faso (Alexander Stroh) ..................................................................... Cape Verde (Gerhard Seibert) ........................................................................ Côte d’Ivoire (Bruno Losch) .......................................................................... Gambia (Abdoulaye Saine) ............................................................................ Ghana (Paul Nugent) ..................................................................................... Guinea (Mike McGovern) .............................................................................. Guinea-Bissau (Christoph Kohl) .................................................................... Liberia (Lansana Gberie) .............................................................................. Mali (Martin van Vliet) .................................................................................. Mauritania (Claes Olsson & Helena Olsson) ................................................. Niger (Klaas van Walraven) ........................................................................... Nigeria (Heinrich Bergstresser) ..................................................................... Senegal (Vincent Foucher) ............................................................................. Sierra Leone (Krijn Peters) ............................................................................ Togo (Dirk Kohnert) ......................................................................................

43 57 65 73 79 87 93 103 111 117 123 131 137 145 161 169 177

V. Central Africa (Andreas Mehler) ................................................................... Cameroon (Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle & Fanny Pigeaud) .................. Central African Republic (Andreas Mehler) ..................................................

185 193 203

vi • Contents Chad (Han van Dijk) ..................................................................................... Congo (Rémy Bazenguissa-Ganga) .............................................................. Democratic Republic of Congo (Denis M. Tull) ........................................... Equatorial Guinea (Cord Jakobeit) ............................................................... Gabon (Douglas Yates) ................................................................................. São Tomé and Príncipe (Gerhard Seibert) ....................................................

211 219 227 241 247 253

VI. Eastern Africa (Rolf Hofmeier) ..................................................................... Burundi (Stef Vandeginste) ........................................................................... Comoros (Rolf Hofmeier) ............................................................................. Djibouti (Rolf Hofmeier) ............................................................................... Eritrea (Nicole Hirt) ...................................................................................... Ethiopia (Jon Abbink) ................................................................................... Kenya (Nic Cheeseman) ............................................................................... Rwanda (Susan M. Thomson) ....................................................................... Seychelles (Rolf Hofmeier) ........................................................................... Somalia (Jon Abbink) .................................................................................... Sudan (Peter Woodward) .............................................................................. Tanzania (Kurt Hirschler & Rolf Hofmeier) ................................................. Uganda (Volker Weyel) ..................................................................................

259 275 285 293 299 309 321 333 345 351 361 375 387

VII. Southern Africa (Henning Melber) ............................................................... Angola (Jon Schubert) .................................................................................. Botswana (Matthias Basedau & Christian von Soest) .................................. Lesotho (Roger Southall) .............................................................................. Madagascar (Richard R. Marcus) ................................................................. Malawi (Lewis B. Dzimbiri) .......................................................................... Mauritius (Klaus-Peter Treydte) ................................................................... Mozambique (Joseph Hanlon) ..................................................................... Namibia (Henning Melber) ........................................................................... South Africa (Ineke van Kessel) .................................................................... Swaziland (John Daniel & Marisha Ramdeen) ............................................ Zambia (Gero Erdmann) ............................................................................... Zimbabwe (Amin Y. Kamete) ........................................................................

399 409 421 427 433 441 449 455 465 473 489 495 505

List of Authors .......................................................................................................

517

Preface

In May 2003, the Africa-Europe Group of Interdisciplinary Studies (AEGIS) encouraged some of its member institutions to publish an Africa Yearbook with a wider international appeal. The African Studies Centre in Leiden (ASC), the Institute of African Affairs in Hamburg (IAA) and the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala (NAI) – all very active AEGIS centres sharing similar profiles – accepted this challenge and their joint efforts first bore fruit in the initial volume of the series in 2004. In 2007 the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in Uppsala (DHF) became the fourth institutional partner in this international project. For this issue, Rolf Hofmeier joined the three editors as sub-editor for the Eastern Africa section. The country-specific articles cover domestic politics, foreign affairs and socioeconomic developments in the states of sub-Saharan Africa during the calendar year under review. While we recognise the impossibility of finding fully objective indicators for the relative importance of each of these states, the length of the country-specific articles aims to reflect the approximate weight of each country. The four sub-regions are also introduced by means of an overview article. Further overviews summarise general continental developments, European-African relations and the United Nations and Africa. The Yearbook is based on scholarly work, but oriented towards a wider target readership, including students, politicians, diplomats, administrators, journalists, teachers, practitioners in the sphere of development cooperation as well as business people. Thanks to the support of the four partner institutions, the volume can be offered at a price attractive to this broad readership. Without forcing the individual contributions too much into a straitjacket, the volume is primarily concerned with providing factual (though not necessarily neutral) information. Each issue, in focusing almost exclusively on developments during the particular calendar year, provides a completely fresh annual overview of events and thereby adds to the cumulative record of ongoing developments. We wish to express our gratitude to all the contributors for their collaboration in this endeavour; to the partner institutions in AEGIS for encouraging us to embark on this ambitious project; to Peter Colenbrander for his meticulous language editing; to Sylvia Steege for her unfailing coordinating assistance; to Brill Publishers for taking such professional care of publishing matters; and last but not least to our four institutions for providing the necessary support and opportunities to allow us to turn this idea into reality.

viii • Preface Finally, we acknowledge with sorrow the passing in March 2009 of Prof. Gerti Hesseling. She was not only the author of the chapter on Senegal in previous volumes of the Africa Yearbook, but also, as the then director of ASC, fully supported the establishment of this new publication. We dedicate this Yearbook to her memory. The Editors (Hamburg, Leiden and Uppsala, June 2009)

List of Abbreviations

ABN ACP ADF AfDB AFD AGOA AI APRM AU BCEAO BEAC CAR CBLT CEEAC CEMAC CEN-SAD CEPGL CFAfr COMESA CPLP DAC DDR DFID DRC EAC ECA ECCAS ECOWAS ECOMOG EDF

Autorité du Bassin du Niger (Niamey) African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of Countries (Lomé/Cotonou Agreement) African Development Fund (Abidjan) African Development Bank (Tunis) Agence Française de Développement (Paris) African Growth and Opportunity Act Amnesty International African Peer Review Mechanism African Union (Addis Ababa) Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (Dakar) Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (Yaoundé) Central African Republic Commission du Bassin du Lac Tchad (N’Djaména) Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (Libreville) = ECCAS Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale Community of Sahel-Saharan States (Tripoli) Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (Gisenyi/Rwanda) Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine (BCEAO; BEAC) Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Lusaka) Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa Development Assistance Committee (Paris) Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Department for International Development (London) Democratic Republic of the Congo East African Community Economic Commission for Africa (United Nations; Addis Ababa) Economic Community of Central African States (Libreville) Economic Community of West African States (Abuja) ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group European Development Fund (Brussels)

x • List of Abbreviations EIB EPA ESAF EU FAO FTA GDP HIPC HRW ICC ICG IDA IDP IFAD IFC IGAD ILO IMF IOC IORARC MDGs MDRI MRU NEPAD NGO OECD OIC OIF OPEC PALOP PRGF PRSC PRSP PTA SACU SADC SAF SDR TI

European Investment Bank (Luxemburg) Economic Partnership Agreement Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (IMF) European Union (Brussels) Food and Agricultural Organisation (Rome) Free Trade Area Gross Domestic Product Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Human Rights Watch International Criminal Court International Crisis Group International Development Association (Washington) Internally Displaced Person International Fund for Agricultural Development (Rome) International Finance Corporation (Washington) Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Djibouti) International Labour Organisation (Geneva) International Monetary Fund (Washington) Indian Ocean Commission (Quatre Bornes) Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (Port Louis) Millennium Development Goals Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative Mano River Union (Freetown) New Partnership for Africa’s Development Non-Governmental Organisation Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Paris) Organisation of the Islamic Conference (Jeddah) L’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Vienna) Países Africanos de Lingua Oficial Portugesa Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Poverty Reduction Support Credit Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Preferential Trade for Eastern and Southern African States (now COMESA) Southern African Customs Union (Pretoria) Southern African Development Community (Gaborone) Structural Adjustment Facility (IMF) Special Drawing Right (IMF) Transparency International

List of Abbreviations • xi UAE UEMOA UMA UN UNCTAD UNDP UNEP UNESCO UNHCR UNICEF USAID WFP WHO WTO

United Arab Emirates Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine (Ouagadougou) Union du Maghreb Arabe United Nations (New York) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Geneva) United Nations Development Programme (New York) United Nations Environment Programme (Nairobi) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Paris) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) United Nations Children’s Fund (New York) United States Agency for International Development (Washington) World Food Programme (Rome) World Health Organisation (Geneva) World Trade Organisation (Geneva)

Factual Overview (as of 31 December 2008)

West Africa Country Benin Burkina Faso

Area Population (in sq km) (in m)

Currency

HDI

Head of State Boni Yayi Blaise Compaoré Pedro Pires

112,622 274,122

9 13.7

CFA Franc CFA Franc

0.459 0.372

4,033

0.5

0.705

322,462

18.9

Cape Verdean Escudo CFA Franc

0.431

Laurent Gbagbo

Gambia

11,295

1.6

Dalasi

0.471

Ghana

238,500

23.5

Cedi

0.553

Guinea

245,857

9.4

Guinean Franc

0.423

36,125

1.7

CFA Franc

0.383

111,370

3.6

Liberian Dollar

0.364

Mali

1,240,000

14.3

CFA Franc

0.391

Mauritania

1,030,700

3.1

Ouguiya

0.557

Niger

1,267,000

13.7

CFA Franc

0.370

Nigeria

923,768

143.3

Naira

0.499

Senegal

197,192

12.4

CFA Franc

0.502

Yahya Jammeh John Agyekum Kufuor Moussa Dadis Camara João Bernardo Vieira Ellen JohnsonSirleaf Amadou Toumani Touré Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz Mamadou Tandja Umaru Yar’Adua Abdoulaye Wade

Sierra Leone

71,740

5.7

Leone

0.329

Togo

56,785

6.6

CFA Franc

0.479

Cape Verde

Côte d’Ivoire

Guinea-Bissau

Liberia

Ernest Bai Koroma Faure Gnassingbé

Prime Minister Tertius Zongo José Maria Pereira Neves Guillaume Kigbafori Soro

Kabiné Komara Carlos Gomes

Modibo Sidibé Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf Seyni Oumarou

Cheikh Hadjibou Soumaré

Gilbert Fossoun Houngbo

xiv • Factual Overview Central Africa Country

Area Population (in sq km) (in m)

Currency

HDI

Head of State

Cameroon

475,442

18.5

CFA Franc

0.514

Paul Biya

Central African Republic Chad

622,984

4.3

CFA Franc

0.352

François Bozizé

1,284,000

10.8

CFA Franc

0.389

Idriss Déby

342,000

3.8

CFA Franc

0.619

DR Congo

2,344,855

62.6

0.361

Equatorial Guinea

28,051

0.5

Congolese Franc CFA Franc

267,667

1.3

CFA Franc

0.729

1,001

0.1

Dobra

0.643

Denis SassouNguesso Joseph Kabila Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo El-Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba Fradique de Menezes

Congo

Gabon

São Tomé and Príncipe

0.717

Prime Minister Ephraim Inoni Faustin Archange Touadéra Youssouf Saleh Abbas Isidore Mvouaba Adolphe Muzito Ignacio Milam Tang

Jean Eyeghé Ndong Joaquim Rafael Branco

Factual Overview • xv Eastern Africa Country

Area Population (in sq km) (in m)

Currency

HDI

Burundi Franc Comoran Franc Djiboutian Franc

0.382

Pierre Nkurunziza 0.572 Abdallah Sambi 0.513 Ismail Omar Guelleh

Nakfa

0.442 Isaias Afewerki 0.389 Girma Wolde-Giorgis 0.532 Emilio Mwai Kibaki 0.435 Paul Kagame

Burundi

26,338

8.2

Comoros

1,862

0.8

Djibouti

23,200

0.9

124,320

4.7

1,121,900

81.0

Birr

569,259

38.6

26,338

9.2

455

0.1

637,600

8.5

Kenyan Shilling Rwandan Franc Seychelles Rupee Somali Shilling

2,505,805

38.6

Sudanese Pound

Tanzania

945,087

40.3

Uganda

197,000

30.9

Tanzanian Shilling New Ugandan Shilling

Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Rwanda Seychelles Somalia

Sudan

Head of State

James Michel n.d. Sheikh Aden Madobe (acting) (Somaliland: Dahir Riyale Kahin) 0.526 Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir 0.503 Jakaya Kikwete 0.493 Yoweri Kaguta Museveni

Prime Minister

Dileita Mohamed Dileita

Meles Zenawi Raila Odinga Bernard Makuza

0.836

Nur Hassan Hussein

Mizengo Pinda Apollo Nsibambi

xvi • Factual Overview Southern Africa Country

Area Population (in sq km) (in m)

Currency

HDI

Head of State

1,246,700

17

Kwanza

0.484

Botswana Lesotho

581,730 30,344

1.9 1.9

Pula Loti

0.664 0.496

José Eduardo dos Santos Ian Khama King Letsie III

Madagascar

592,000

19.7

Ariary

0.533

Marc Ravalomanana

Malawi

118,484

13.6

Kwacha

0.457

2,040

1.3

0.802

Mozambique

799,380

21

Mauritius Rupee Métical

Namibia

824,269

2.1

Namibian Dollar

0.634

South Africa 1,219,090

48.7

Rand

0.670

Bingu wa Mutharika Sir Anerood Jugnauth Armando Guebuzo Hifikepunye Lucas Pohamba Kgalema Motlanthe King Mswati III. Rupiah Banda Robert Gabriel Mugabe

Angola

Mauritius

0.366

Swaziland

17,364

1.1

Lilangeni

0.542

Zambia Zimbabwe

752,614 390,580

11.7 13.2

Kwacha Zimbabwe Dollar

0.453 n.d.

Prime Minister Paulo Kassoma Bethuel Pakalitha Mosisili Charles Rabemananjara

Navinchandra Ramgoolan Luisa Dias Diogo Nahas Angula

Sibusiso Dlamini

I. Sub-Saharan Africa

Initially, the exceptional growth rates persisted, in particular for the resource-rich economies. So did the competition among external actors to secure and maintain access to African markets, especially to local natural resources. Only towards the end of the year did the emerging financial collapse in mainly the industrialised economies exert its effect on the world market and result in a rapid decline in demand for primary goods produced and exported by African economies. This had a negative impact on economic growth rates. It was also further evidence of the African continent’s dependence on external markets and led to more sober assessments of future socioeconomic trends. New political and security hot spots and conflicts demanding a collective African response included the failed secessionist attempts in Anjouan from the Comoran federation, the coup in Mauritania and the military takeover in Guinea. In addition, the aftermath of the Kenyan elections, as well as the two rounds of elections and the subsequent power-sharing negotiations in Zimbabwe, added new dimensions to the search for conflict resolution on the continent. In the latter two cases, governments of national unity seemed to emerge as a new tool to keep ousted regimes at least partly in power. Internationally acknowledged indicators of local crises were the spectacular pirate activities off the Somalian coast, which attracted the attention of and prompted military initiatives by external actors, although mainly to protect their own interests. An increase in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea as a result of the contested situation in the Niger delta and increased operations by Nigerian groups signalled more trouble on the opposite side of the continent.

Africa in the Global Economy Global trends, including the downturn from the middle of the year induced by the Western credit crunch, had different impacts. During the first part of 2008, oil, food and commodity prices continued their climb begun in previous years. Oil prices peaked at almost $ 150 a barrel in July before crashing to $ 40 at year’s end. In October, the IMF forecast a growth rate for sub-Saharan oil producers of 8.1%. Sub-Saharan Africa’s overall GDP growth for 2008 was estimated at 5.9%, pulled down by the lower rates for oil importing countries (4.8%). Still, the latter’s overall GDP indicated some resilience, with growth mainly founded on internal factors and banks largely unaffected by the financial crisis in the West.

2 • Sub-Saharan Africa Nevertheless, many countries were hit by the rise in fuel and food prices. With Africa’s urban population estimated to reach 367 m in 2010 and a dependence on food imports greater than on any other continent, sub-Saharan Africa was seriously affected. According to WFP, the costs of staple foods in some sub-regions rose by 40% or more in half a year. Food riots leading to several deaths and injuries rocked many urban centres during the first part of the year, including Mozambique, Cameroon, the Sahelian countries, Gabon, Somalia and Nigeria. Governments responded by instituting price controls, thereby also significantly raising budget expenditure. The FAO predicted a rise in cereal import costs for Africa’s poor countries of 47% as compared to the previous year. Although continental cereal production was forecast to rise to 154.5 m tonnes, this would not be enough to meet demand. The rise in food prices should have benefited rural areas, but increasing transport and fertiliser costs limited this effect. According to the AfDB, some 40% of annual farm output is lost due to poor infrastructure. WFP expanded food aid operations in the Western sub-region, among others, to feed those hardest hit by the rises in the cost of staples. Its work also grew in importance in the drought-sensitive Horn and Zimbabwe. Commodity prices continued to rise during the first part of the year. Bauxite rose 30% and the benchmark commodities index, the Jeffries-Reuters CRB spot index, witnessed the sharpest increase during the first part of the year since 1957. Many agricultural commodities shared in this, though not all. Cocoa and coffee soared, but growers of the former were not expected to gain in view of the increase in fertiliser costs. Cotton continued to be problematic because of US subsidies to American growers and the undercapitalisation of African smallholders. Tea suffered as a result of rising Asian production. By July, prices of metals began to come down, with even gold and platinum falling. Mining projects in countries such as Botswana, Burkina Faso, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia (to mention only some) got into difficulty. Global prices for maize and wheat also began to decline, suggesting some improvement in African purchasing power in the medium term. As the credit crisis took hold, the World Bank’s IFC planned a $ 3 bn fund to assist banks in poor (including African) countries to withstand its repercussions. On the whole, African banks were not as touched since they had invested little in the assets creating havoc in Western economies. Nevertheless, fears were expressed about the medium-term effect on remittances, in many countries a means of survival. An AfDB study published in January showed that remittances represented 19% of Senegal’s GDP and 218% of its public development aid. For Mali, the corresponding figures were 11% and 79% respectively. Against such a background, migration to Europe continued, and continued to take its toll in terms of human suffering. Across Europe, but also in transit countries like Mauritania and Libya, violence against African migrants increased as did their mass deportation. In June, African migrants in South Africa fell victim to waves of xenophobic attacks. The EU opened an office in Mali’s capital Bamako to advise (if not warn off) potential migrants. While debt relief did not have the high priority of previous years, there was concern about ‘vulture funds’, private Western companies buying up old government debts due

Sub-Saharan Africa • 3 to be written off and suing for full repayment and accumulated interest. The practices of these companies, many of which were registered in the British Virgin and Cayman Islands, threatened to derail the HIPC debt relief programme. As in previous years, much of the economic growth was linked to the activities of Asian countries, with Sino-Indian competition playing an increasingly important role. A Chinese industrial company set up a special economic zone on Mauritius to become the headquarters for companies operating on the mainland. So far, Mauritius has been the mainstay of India’s push into African markets, buttressed by the Indian settler population. The Indian government was also concerned about Chinese interest in the Seychelles, with which India has had a defence accord since 2003, allowing it to patrol Seychelles waters. On 8–9 April, New Delhi hosted the first ever Indian-African summit. Fourteen African countries participated and were offered $ 500 m in grants, $ 5.4 bn in credit and hundreds of millions of dollars in aid. Of Delhi’s oil imports, 11% now came from Nigeria, and India was also trying to make up for ground lost in Angola to its Chinese competitors. Indian-South African trade was calculated to have reached $ 5 bn in 2007. However, in South Africa too Indians faced competition from China, as well as Singapore, whose South African trade reached a value of $ 1.6 bn in 2007. Indian mobile operators appeared prepared to take on the Chinese in the telecommunications sector. By 2008, China had supplied $ 3 bn worth of telecommunications equipment to African countries. Delhi planned a project linking 53 African countries with India in a satellite and fibre-optic network to be handed over to the AU. Figures showed that China ranked as the biggest investor in and lender for Africa’s infrastructure and that overall Chinese trade with the continent for 2008 could reach $ 117 bn (from $ 50 bn in 2006 and $ 55 bn in 2007), making it Africa’s second biggest bilateral trading partner and overtaking France. A report by Britain’s DFID, using Chinese government figures, suggested that Sino-African trade was expected to pass the $ 100 bn mark by year’s end. Almost two-thirds of this was made up of oil and gas imports. US trade with Africa was still larger than that of China, thanks to increased oil and gas imports from the western coastal regions. On 28–30 May, Japan hosted the Tokyo international conference on African development, a four-yearly meeting held since 1993. Some 40 African countries participated and were promised a doubling of aid by 2012 to a level of $ 3.4 bn. It was emphasised that this aid, like China’s, was not conditional. This initiative could not disguise the fact that Japan’s aid budget has dropped by 40% since 1998, making it only the world’s fifth largest aid donor. The spring meetings of the World Bank and IMF saw a proposal by Western shareholders to increase African voting rights. African countries, however, were unimpressed and demanded parity. Even the proposal on quota shares for the IMF, which would have led to a tripling of basic votes and an executive director for large African countries, was deemed insufficient. The World Bank nevertheless announced a bailout package for developing countries hit by the credit crisis to a value of $ 100 bn, plus another $ 30 bn in lending to poor countries.

4 • Sub-Saharan Africa The G8 summit in Japan on 7–8 July was preceded by outreach sessions with leaders from Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania. While South Africa called for greater cooperation between the G8 and the five emerging economies in the south (China, Brazil, Mexico, India as well as South Africa itself), the US rejected a French proposal to widen the G8 to 14 or 15 countries. The summit reconfirmed spending of $ 60 bn on fighting disease, setting a timeframe of five years to make good on this old promise. It also set a goal of providing 100 m insecticide-treated mosquito nets to fight malaria by the end of 2010, while again reconfirming the boost in aid promised at Gleneagles by that year. African and G8 countries fell out with one another over Zimbabwe, the G8 deciding on more punitive measures. Efforts to resuscitate the WTO’s Doha round collapsed in Geneva in July when the US failed to resolve a dispute with India and China over protection of poor farmers in developing countries against food imports. This led to a moratorium on US and EU concessions to open markets to farm produce from Africa, Asia and Latin America in exchange for freer export of Western manufactures. Later in the year, the G20 group of developed and developing countries (which includes South Africa) made an attempt to restart the talks. With non-reciprocal trade preferences between the EU and ACP countries having expired in January, negotiations on the controversial EPAs supposed to replace them continued. On 3 October, ACP nations criticised EU pressures, complaining that bilateral negotiations had led to divisions within ACP ranks.

African Union The year began and ended with principled action on unconstitutional changes of government. The sanctions imposed on Anjouan, which had continued to defy the authority of the elected government of the Comoran federation, were extended for another month in January, involving a travel ban for 145 Anjouan officials and the freezing of funds and assets. When an attempted mediated settlement failed, on 20 February the Peace and Security Council (PSC) approved military action to restore Anjouan to Comoran authority. The assembly of heads of state and government at the first of its two summits, held in Addis Ababa from 25 January to 2 February, had already called on members to provide the Comoran authorities the necessary support. Libya, Senegal and Sudan pledged assistance and took part in the PSC meeting along with Tanzania, whose president, Jakaya Kikwete, was elected AU chair at the Addis summit. While South Africa’s President Mbeki opposed military intervention, a last attempt at mediation came to naught and opened the way for an invasion. Preceded by Comoran government troops, soldiers from Tanzania and Sudan landed by sea and air with logistical support from France and Libya (25 March). The AU-approved operation, named ‘Democracy in the Comoros’, ended in the flight of rebel leader Mohamed Bacar to the isle of Mayotte, a French possession, whence he was flown to Réunion to face trial for illegal entry into French territory. South Africa deplored

Sub-Saharan Africa • 5 the AU’s move. In August, the AU suspended Mauritania’s membership after President Abdellahi was toppled in a coup, the second in three years. The military in Guinea, who took over on the death of President Lansana Conté on 22 December, faced similar measures. At the AU’s second summit, which took place from 24 June–1 July in Sharm el Sheikh in Egypt, the AU demonstrated that the proof of the democratic pudding was not in the eating of such small fry as Anjouan or weak West African states. The summit took place at the time of the run-off in Zimbabwe’s presidential election, which confirmed Robert Mugabe’s hold on power. Many members resented Western calls for Mugabe to be excluded from the summit and were determined to show that AU policy would not be dictated by outsiders. As Zimbabwe’s opposition leader and presidential contender Morgan Tsvangirai had taken refuge in the Dutch embassy in Harare and Zambia’s President Mwanawasa, an outspoken Mugabe opponent, had suffered a stroke just hours before the summit’s start, the way was open for a triumphal welcome for Mugabe. Still, at least six countries dared to confront him. Botswana, supported by the presidents of Liberia and Sierra Leone, demanded Zimbabwe’s exclusion for violating national constitutional provisions. When President Museveni of Uganda wondered why Tsvangirai had not participated in the run-off and not taken refuge in the embassy of an African state, Senegal’s President Wade argued he had advised Tsvangirai not to stand and his colleague from Gambia noted that Mugabe could not deny the legitimacy of a party that had won a majority in Zimbabwe’s parliament. President Jammeh called for a power-sharing arrangement, a position inspired by the events earlier in the year in Kenya and supported by Gabon and South Africa, whose President Mbeki remained silent during the debate. When a Nigerian diplomat asserted that the run-off had not reflected the will of the Zimbabwean people, Mugabe pointed out that the elections had caused fewer victims than the 2007 election year in Nigeria. This was probably true – President Yar’Adua wisely left before the debate on Zimbabwe’s elections began – and the debate showed the difficulty of upholding democratic commitments in continental politics. A resolution was voted on calling for an extension of SADC’s mediation mandate and dialogue between Zimbabwe’s political leaders. Consequently, the demand to the UN Security Council one month later to block President al-Bashir’s indictment by the ICC’s prosecutor for war crimes in Darfur on the grounds that this could destabilise the situation in Sudan, was more than symbolic. Against this, other AU initiatives continued to work for greater commitment to democratic values. The first permanent general assembly of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) in September saw the appointment of prominent Cameroonian civil society activist Akere Muna, president of the Pan-African Lawyers Union and vice-chairman of Transparency International, as the council’s new head, taking over from Wangari Maathai, Kenya’s Nobel peace prize laureate. Although only half the member states have so far taken part in the organ’s activities, with NGOs with more than 50% foreign funding banned from participating (so as to limit donor influence, although most depend on such funding), it was

6 • Sub-Saharan Africa hoped that ECOSOCC’s trade union representatives, women’s groups, NGOs and human rights activists will increase the popular voice in AU policies. The Addis summit saw some important institutional decisions. After the failure the previous year to agree on a successor to embittered Commission President Konaré, the Assembly elected Jean Ping, a career diplomat from Gabon and hitherto foreign minister and confidant of President Bongo. Symbolic of the times, Ping is the son of a Gabonese mother and a Chinese trader. His election was seen as a sign that the post would not become the preserve of marginalised former heads of state. It was also noteworthy for the selection of a second Francophone in succession and the implicit preference for a pragmatic diplomat over a more Pan-Africanist inspired intellectual like Konaré. The summit also appointed ten new countries to serve on the PSC for the next five years: Chad, Burundi, Tunisia, Uganda, Rwanda, Swaziland, Zambia, Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali. Discussion of an audit report on the organisation’s functioning, pleading for greater powers for the Commission president was deferred. Several states defaulting on their contributions remained under sanction: Cape Verde, DR Congo, Eritrea, São Tomé and Príncipe and the Seychelles. A MoU signed with the World Bank on 20 September aimed at deepening collaboration between the bank and the AU on regional integration, relations with the diaspora and combating disease. The AU Commission was granted observer status at World Bank meetings, and the bank provided funding to reinforce the AU African diaspora programme by enhancing the capacity of the AU mission in Washington DC. The mission is charged with maintaining relations with representatives of the diaspora, officially considered as Africa’s sixth sub-region. While the Addis summit’s official theme was industrial development, proceedings were dominated by (post-)electoral violence in Kenya and the news that only French intervention had prevented Sudanese-backed rebels from taking Chad’s capital N’Djaména and toppling its President Déby. With the hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force UNAMID (United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur) taking over from the AU’s peacekeepers (AMIS, AU Mission in Sudan) on 31 December 2007, most of the peacekeeping responsibility shifted to the world body. However, Commission President Ping travelled in May to Chad and Sudan to mediate after Sudanese rebel forces had attacked Omdurman, sister city of Sudan’s capital Khartoum. Sudan accused Chadian President Déby of aiding the rebels while Chad alleged Sudan had helped the rebels that attacked N’Djaména. Sudan severed ties with Chad, after which Ping began his mission to de-escalate tension. Far from resolving the problems in the region, Nigerian peacekeepers in Darfur were ambushed on 21 May and were robbed of arms and cash. Several peacekeepers were killed in various incidents. Likewise, AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) peacekeepers in Somalia could not resolve the intractable conflict there. AU Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit visited Mogadishu on 23 January, calling Somalia Africa’s biggest security challenge and expressing frustration at the lack of international support for the mission, still significantly below the maximum authorised strength of 8,000. Several of

Sub-Saharan Africa • 7 the predominantly Burundian and Ugandan peacekeepers were the target of attacks in the course of the year, leaving a number dead or wounded.

Governance On 25 March, a symposium on ECA support to NEPAD and the AU was held at ECA headquarters in Addis Ababa. The resulting document illustrated the sobering lack of results so far in institutional collaboration. It acknowledged that collaboration between NEPAD and ECA “has not been effectively implemented” and that the ten year capacity building programme as the framework for institutional support to the AU “is a huge shopping list” that required “a clear definition of ownership and roles”. Not surprisingly, NEPAD once again produced few meaningful results during the year and continued to fall short of the original expectations. APRM remained the flagship of NEPAD and presented African countries as more accountable and accessible than hitherto. The APRM report on Benin was discussed during the year’s first AU summit in Addis Ababa and was officially published on 5 June as the sixth country report to date. Benin established its body for the implementation of the National Programme of Action (NPOA) on 23 October. The ninth summit of the APRM forum was held on 29 June in Sharm el Sheikh and was attended by 13 heads of state and government. By then, a total of 29 states had signed up to the APRM with Togo joining at that event as the most recent member. The forum conducted the peer review of Uganda as the seventh country. An advance mission to Cameroon led by Graça Machel took place between 3 and 5 June. Mali submitted its self-assessment report to the APR secretariat on 23 July, while Mozambique had done so in April, with its NPOA following in August. President Koroma launched the APRM for Sierra Leone on 15 September. Nigeria’s peer review was initiated at the ninth ordinary APRM summit in June and completed at the first extraordinary summit of the APRM forum in Cotonou on 25 October. Burkina Faso was peer reviewed at the same summit. Mali presented its Country Self Assessment Report (CSAR) on 23 July and a first field mission was undertaken between 5 and 22 December. The relative flurry of activity suggested major advancements. But a reality check, which also included the setbacks in countries like Kenya, revealed a different picture. In a critical assessment of the APRM recommendations in six final reports (on Algeria, Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa) two authors affiliated with the South African Institute for International Affairs observed that “the recommendations leave a lot to be desired” and that “no real policy guidance is provided”. This leads to second thoughts as to the extent to which the APRM is more than mere tokenism. Similarly problematic was the (lack of) performance by NEPAD. The Regional Consultation Mechanism, whose work is coordinated by the ECA and which was established so that UN organisations could coordinate their activities in support of NEPAD, held its ninth meeting on 21–22 October in Addis Ababa. The executive secretary of the ECA and

8 • Sub-Saharan Africa UN Under-Secretary General Abdoulie Janneh appealed for strengthened implementation of NEPAD’s Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) as a response to the food crisis. CAADP emerged as the main focus of NEPAD’s socioeconomic activities, along with investment in the use of electronic tools and communications. Measured against the original expectations, NEPAD has clearly not yielded the anticipated results. At the sixth African development forum in Addis Ababa (19–21 November), gender equality was a strong theme. The adopted plan of action proposed reinforcing global efforts in line with the UN secretary general’s campaign to end violence against women. It endorsed the latter in a comprehensive and urgent Africa-wide ‘Addis Ababa Plan of Action for Ending Violence against Women and Girls, Achieving Gender Equality and Empowering Women’ to eliminate violence against women and girls. The plan of action included costed and supported national plans to implement Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (passed unanimously on 31 October 2000).

Elections Most national elections held in 2008 undermined rather than confirmed national democratic standards, with one major exception (Ghana) and two controversial but positive cases (Zambia and Guinea-Bissau). Given prevailing circumstances, including the pronounced personalisation of politics, competition in most African countries for the highest office was invariably a crucial moment in political life. Presidential elections were held only in Zimbabwe, Ghana and Zambia. In the first two cases, these coincided with legislative elections. Both were observed with a mixture of hope and anxiety in light of the escalation of violence surrounding last year’s elections in Kenya that extended well into 2008. Zambia’s presidential elections (30 October) were necessitated by the death of incumbent head of state Levy Mwanawasa on 19 August. Rupiah Banda, of the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), succeeded in narrowly defeating the main opposition challenger Michael Sata by 40.1% against 38.1% of the vote. Sata’s party refused to accept the outcome and demanded a recount in 78 of the 180 constituencies. Election observers considered the elections free and fair although a number of technical shortcomings were evident and a small number of local riots were reported. Banda was constitutionally entitled to serve only for the remainder of Mwanawasa’s five year term. A major shift in popular support was recorded in the parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe held on 19 March. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was the winner of the legislative elections with the official results giving the Morgan Tsvangirai wing of the MDC 99 seats, the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) 97 seats and the Arthur Mutambara wing of the MDC ten seats. This was the precursor of the political crisis that resulted from the concurrent presidential elections. Official results gave Tsvangirai 47.9% of the vote compared to 43.2% for Robert Mugabe.

Sub-Saharan Africa • 9 This result necessitated a run-off between both candidates. The MDC’s own calculations were different and gave Tsvangirai more than 50% of the vote in the first round. As a consequence, the party believed it had won an outright victory. Violence and massive repression had occurred during the pre-election period, but state-sponsored violence became even worse after the elections. Tsvangirai himself was repeatedly arrested during the campaign for the second round of the presidential election. On 22 June, he announced it would not be possible to contest the second round. Mugabe easily won the run-off a few days later (27 June), but all observer missions judged the elections illegitimate. In July, the political rivals signed a MoU that their parties would hold talks on a power-sharing government. The negotiation process lasted until the end of the year, with Tsvangirai as prime minister and Mugabe as president as the only constant ingredients in an agreement. A close outcome was expected in Ghana’s general elections on 7 December. In the presidential race, Nana Akufo-Addo from the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) faced John Atta Mills, National Democratic Congress (NDC), and one other candidate, since incumbent John Kufuor was constitutionally excluded from standing for a third term. Security concerns increased in the month prior to the elections and widespread nervousness set in. In the first round of the elections, Akufo-Addo secured a narrow lead, but could not meet the 50% threshold. In the run-off on 28 December, Atta Mills obtained 50.2% against 49.8% for Akufo-Addo. Despite those close results, Akufo-Addo quickly accepted defeat. NDC also won the parliamentary election with 114 of the 230 seats, against 107 for the NPP, with three of the remaining seats being won by two smaller parties and four by independents, while one seat had still to be filled. Djibouti’s legislative elections held on 8 February reminded observers of the era of one-party rule, as only one list, from the ‘Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle’ (UMP), was presented to voters. This alliance of parties was dominated by President Omar Guelleh’s ‘Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès’ (RPP). The opposition ‘Union pour l’Alternance Démocratique’ (UAD) alliance boycotted the elections after persistent calls for electoral reform had been rejected. Opposition rallies were banned during the first weeks of the year and several leaders were imprisoned or put under house arrest as they prepared for a rally a week ahead of the polling date. The official turnout of 72.3% in a practically meaningless election was contested by opposition politicians. Equally meaningless were legislative elections on 4 May in Equatorial Guinea. The ruling ‘Partido Democrático de Guinea Ecuatorial’ (PDGE) in an alliance with nine smaller parties obtained 99 of 100 seats in the National Assembly. The main opposition party, ‘Convergencia para la Democracia Social’ (CPDS) found its representation in parliament reduced from two seats to one. The symbolic presence of two Spanish election observers, who recorded no irregularities, did not alter the image of an electoral masquerade in what remained a dictatorial regime. Slightly better was the performance of opposition candidates in legislative elections in Angola on 5–6 September. However, the ruling ‘Movimento Popular de Libertação de

10 • Sub-Saharan Africa Angola’ (MPLA) gained 81.8% of the votes, the ‘União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola’ (UNITA) a disastrous 10.4%, representing a major loss in parliamentary representation. With over 190 seats in the 220-strong National Assembly, MPLA has more than the two-thirds majority needed to change the constitution, thus making it possible for President dos Santos to extend his presidential term. UNITA complained of intimidation and unfair media coverage in the campaign. This was confirmed by human rights organisations. An extraordinarily high percentage of ballots were spoiled or disputed. In Rwanda, another landslide victory was won by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) and its allies in legislative elections held on 15 September: it received 42 seats (plus two), the ‘Parti Social Démocrate’ (PSD) saw no change at seven seats and the ‘Parti Libéral’ (PL) lost two seats and preserved four (only 53 of the 80 seats are filled in direct elections). However, even PSD and PL were considered supporters of President Kagame and are represented in government. There were reports that the results for both moderate opposition parties had been inflated to give the election a more acceptable appearance. The EU elections observation mission found a number of “fundamental shortcomings regarding the international and regional standards for democratic elections.” Doubts as to the credibility of the official turnout rate of 98.8% were also expressed. In Guinea-Bissau, the former ruling party ‘Partido Africano da Independência da Guinea e Cabo Verde’ (PAIGC) more than doubled its representation from 31 to 67 seats (out of 100) in the 16 November elections. Its main rival, the ‘Partido para a Renovação Social’ (PRS) lost 7 seats for a total of 28. Even more catastrophic was the downward trend for the ‘Partido Unido Social-Democrata’ (PUSD). It had scored the third-best result in the previous elections, but was now no longer represented in parliament. The remaining seats were taken by smaller parties. Given the small size of the country, a comparatively large number of foreign electoral observers (150) was deployed. They judged the election to be free, fair and transparent, while the PRS cried foul. Two days after the announcement of the results the presidential palace was attacked and a number of soldiers were arrested: it was unclear whether this was an attempted coup d’etat. Finally, on 19 September indirect elections were held in Swaziland, a monarchy in which nearly absolute power is vested in the king. Political parties remained banned. Many trade union members were arrested in demonstrations preceding the consultation that had little in common with free elections. In a first step, up to three candidates were selected by local councils or chiefdoms. The second step was when these could be voted on by registered voters. Only 15 of the 55 outgoing MPs were re-elected, while ten additional MPs were nominated by the king.

Peace and War All in all, this was a slightly better year than 2007 with regard to peace and war, despite the fact that the number of violent conflicts did not change. A downward trend in violence

Sub-Saharan Africa • 11 was discernible in Chad and Central African Republic (CAR), although Chadian rebels at one point came close to a military take-over of the capital N’Djaména. Combat intensified again in Darfur (Sudan), Somalia and eastern DR Congo. A number of peace agreements were signed, but most of them were vague or did not include important parties to the conflict and did not therefore promise any true new beginning. On 18 December, the United Nations emergency relief coordinator launched a global campaign to raise awareness of the plight of IDPs. With nearly 4.6 m IDPs according to the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Sudan was the country with most IDPs on earth (followed by Iraq with 2.5 m IDPs, DR Congo with 1.4 m and Somalia with 1.3 m). As in the preceding year, the larger Horn of Africa area, including Sudan, was the subregion most affected by war. The deployment of UN peacekeepers to replace the preceding AU mission in Sudan’s Darfur province did not stabilise the situation. In March, Chad and Sudan agreed not to support each other’s armed opponents, but to little effect. Heavy fighting was reported during the entire year. In particular, rebels of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and state security forces engaged in fierce battles. In May, a spectacular attack on Khartoum was stopped in Omdurman, on the opposite riverbank from the capital. It showed JEM’s logistical capacities, but the assailants were defeated by government forces within two days. In October, the government launched a so-called Sudan People’s Forum with the participation of numerous organisations, including from Darfur, but without major armed movements. One faction of the Sudanese Liberation Army signed a MoU on political and military coordination with the government on 13 October. President al-Bashir unilaterally declared a cessation of hostilities on 12 November. However, aerial bombardments by government forces resumed later that month. The humanitarian situation further deteriorated. Moreover, the foundations of the so-called Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the central government and Southern Sudan were heavily rocked when heavy fighting between government and southern troops paralysed the oil-rich Abyei province in June. Somalia remained a humanitarian and security nightmare. After July, the security situation in south-central Somalia deteriorated dramatically. An important gathering of Somali and international actors in Djibouti in September was followed by an agreement on the cessation of armed confrontation signed on 26 October. Already at the end of May, Ethiopia had agreed to withdraw its troops. Parties to the agreement also expressed their intention to establish a government of national unity, but there was not much hope of a quick settlement to the complex conflict situation. Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia had indeed turned into a disaster and its support for the transitional government had proven extremely unpopular. By the end of the year, Addis Ababa began to withdraw its troops. Militias from the jihadist ‘al-Shabaab’ or the different wings of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (some operating with overt Eritrean sympathy) reorganised and steadily expanded their influence to cover most parts of the territory by the end of the year. It is estimated that more than 2,000 people were killed during the year. The operations of the AU peacekeeping mission,

12 • Sub-Saharan Africa comprising 3,450 troops (two Burundian battalions, one Ugandan) instead of the envisaged 8,000, were limited to the airport, the seaport and a strategic road junction in the capital. It was evident that the force was completely overburdened by the task of providing security even to Mogadishu. In Chad, an alliance of rebel forces attacked the capital on 2–5 February, partially controlling the city, and was close to taking power militarily in N’Djaména. The tide turned when government forces, with decisive French help, gained the upper hand. The EU deployed a peacekeeping force, mostly aimed at securing refugee camps, to both Chad and the northeastern CAR after several months delay. The peace process in CAR had its ups and downs, but took a positive turn with the signing of a so-called global peace accord in June and the holding of an inclusive political dialogue in December. The setback in Burundi’s peace process in the preceding year at first continued, with fierce combat between the army and the remaining ‘Forces Nationales de Libération’ (FNL) rebels leaving about 100 people dead in April-May alone. Intense diplomatic activity led to a restart of the peace process. On 30 May, FNL leader Agathon Rwasa returned from exile after the signing of a ceasefire agreement, but later accused the security forces of plotting to kill him. The demobilisation process made good progress. Finally, on 6 December, government and FNL signed a peace agreement at a ceremony presided over by Uganda’s President Museveni. Not all the problems were resolved by the end of the year, as the rebels were asking peace mediators to ensure they had more time to complete the change from rebel group to political party. In late January, an important peace conference in Goma reinforced hopes in the peace process in eastern DR Congo. Additionally, the pact on security, stability and development in the Great Lakes region entered into force on 21 June. However, this formal progress was deceptive. In North Kivu province, the DR Congo’s armed forces (FARDC) and the ‘Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple’ (CNDP), led by renegade General Laurent Nkunda, clashed frequently from the end of August. The UN peacekeeping mission MONUC supported the efforts of the armed forces, but failed to make any difference. FARDC troops abandoned positions held jointly with MONUC and rogue elements terrorised the population. Furthermore, a resurgence of armed groups in Ituri was noted and the dreaded Ugandan rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) committed atrocities in northeastern DR Congo. By the end of the year, peace appeared no more than an elusive hope for the entire zone. Last year’s Tuareg rebellion in Niger continued and led to the killing of several dozen people. In neighbouring Mali, government and rebels signed a ceasefire agreement on 3 March and later a peace agreement. It was unclear whether this would be sustainable, with the rebels splitting into opposing factions. In Nigeria, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) continued to attack police stations and oil pipelines.

Sub-Saharan Africa • 13

Coup Attempts, the Struggle against Terrorism, Piracy West Africa was the scene of a series of coups and coup attempts, while terrorist and counter-terrorist activities were concentrated in the Horn sub-region and the Sahara. Pirate activities increased along the shores of Somalia, but also in the Gulf of Guinea. In Mauritania, President Abdallahi, only elected the preceding year as the culmination of the transition from long-term military to civilian rule, had lost popularity in the course of an ongoing economic crisis. Relations with parliament and the still powerful military hierarchy were already strained when the president dismissed the head of the presidential guard, Gen. Abdel Aziz, on 6 August. The immediate reaction on the same day was a non-violent military coup. Abdallahi was deposed and replaced by a military junta under leadership of Gen. Aziz. The official justification for the coup included the classical accusation of corruption, but also questioned the civil administration’s ability to secure the country against attacks by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The military junta quickly secured the allegiance of a strong majority of the political elite, with some observers interpreting this as a sign of a deep-rooted preference for military rule over democracy. About two-thirds of MPs and senators were considered to be supporters of the coup. In reaction, Mauritania was suspended from the AU. Western nonhumanitarian aid programmes were frozen and the US government imposed personal sanctions on the regime’s elite. In Guinea, a military junta took control within hours of the announcement of the death in office of President Lansana Conté on 22 December after a long illness. Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, a largely unknown officer who had nevertheless played a role in the numerous mutinies in preceding months and years, announced the suspension of the constitution and the dissolution of the government. Prime Minister Souaré surrendered and stepped down on 25 December. The junta of 32 members justified the coup by – again – referring to widespread corruption and the economic downturn. It promised to make elections possible within two years. The international reaction to the coup was similar to the Mauritanian case: the AU suspended Guinea from membership on 29 December; the US government stopped all non-humanitarian aid programmes; while Libya’s leader Kadhafi and Senegal’s President Wade called for recognition of the new rulers. The reaction of immediate neighbours was somewhat similar and showed a degree of consent for military take-overs. At least in the cases of Mali and Senegal, both rather advanced in the democratisation process, this was rather surprising. One explanation of the tolerant reactions was that both coups had not led to immediate bloodshed, while at least for Guinea worse had been expected. Guinea-Bissau experienced a series of suspicious army moves and coup attempts before and after elections. On 25 March, seven heavily armed men were arrested in GuineaBissau. It was not clear whether they had connections to the rebel movement in neighbouring Senegal’s Casamance province or whether they were preparing a coup attempt.

14 • Sub-Saharan Africa This eventually happened on 31 July, shortly after the dissolution of parliament, but failed. On 6 August, the navy’s chief of staff, José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, was arrested in this connection, but he later managed to escape to Gambia, only to be arrested again. Shortly after the elections, another coup attempt was foiled on 23 November when assailants attacked the presidential palace. This time a non-commissioned officer, also from the navy, was named as ringleader. Sergeant Alexandre N’Tchama Yala also managed to cross the border and was arrested in Gambia. These events proved the extreme fragility of the political situation and the limited loyalty of the armed forces. Several bombings in Somalia’s troubled Puntland and particularly Somaliland regions were recorded throughout the year, including attacks on the UNDP compound, the presidential palace and the Ethiopian consulate. In February, two grenades planted in a building exploded in Bossaso. More than 100 people were injured and more than 20 were killed. Most of the victims were Ethiopian immigrants. The US launched at least one missile on 3 March into southern Somalia, targeting an al-Qaida leader, but the strike failed. Several other air strikes occurred throughout the year. The US also started to rebuild and expand an air base in Bossaso. On 8 April, a suicide bomber killed one AU peacekeeper from Burundi. In both cases ‘al-Shabaab’ militias claimed responsibility. On 1 May, the US launched an air strike in Somalia’s Galgaduud region, killing the military commander of the radical jihadist ‘al-Shabaab’ movement. ‘Al-Shabaab’ issued threats of revenge and began to interrogate aid workers suspected of being spies for the US. On 29 October, a series of suicide bombings in Hargeisa and Bossaso killed more than 25 people. Those attacks were not attributed to a particular organisation. While the US blamed al-Qaida, Somaliland accused the ‘al-Shabaab’ militias. AQIM increased its activity in West Africa in 2008. In January, its activists were involved in a shooting near the Israeli embassy in Mauritania, leaving three foreigners wounded. AQIM particularly stepped up its activity in the aftermath of the coup in order to strengthen its position and influence. The nature of the relationship between AQIM and diverse Tuareg movements in the region was not entirely clear as ideologically both were distinct. On 20 March, Tuareg rebels ambushed a military convoy near the Malian town of Tin-Zaouatene and took 33 soldiers hostage. On 22 June, four French experts working for the French nuclear company Areva were kidnapped by Tuareg rebels in Niger. Those hostages were released a few days later. Ahamadou Ahalawey, a member of parliament and vice president of Niger’s national human rights commission, was kidnapped by Tuareg rebels on 14 May. Rebels released him on 24 May. The most mysterious move was the kidnapping of UN special envoy Robert Fowler, Canadian diplomat Louis Guay and their local driver about 25 miles from the capital Niamey during their visit to the gold mining region of Samira on 14 December. No organisation claimed responsibility.

Sub-Saharan Africa • 15 The US Africa Command (AFRICOM), established the preceding year, was formally activated on 1 October and remained provisionally located in Stuttgart, Germany. The fact that the US government was not able to find an appropriate base in Africa could be interpreted in different ways, but it was certainly evident that the general image of the US administration on the continent remained rather poor – at least before Barack Obama’s victory as the first black American president-elect, an event celebrated all over the continent. AFRICOM was now responsible for the coordination of US military operations in Africa, including military-to-military relationships, as well coordinating humanitarian-military operations. This meant that AFRICOM also coordinated the continuing operations to counter terrorism, such as ‘Operation Enduring Freedom: Horn of Africa’ (OEF-HOA) and Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) as well as the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) and the Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Within CJTFHOA, established in 2002, the US continued to assist several sub-Saharan countries with military training and civil-military operations. Apparently related to Nigeria’s Niger delta problem was the upsurge of pirate activities along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, particularly affecting Cameroon, which witnessed one spectacular attack, including bank robberies, on the port city of Limbe. Throughout the year, militants and gunmen from different Nigerian armed movements attacked oil company vessels. On 13 May, a vessel belonging to the US company Chevron was hijacked and 11 people kidnapped. They were released after the payment of a ransom. Similar incidents occurred in August, September and November. Piracy also continued along the shores of Somalia with 69 unsuccessful attacks and 46 successful hijackings being reported. Piratical activities went up particularly in September and December. Among the most spectacular cases were the capture of a large Saudi-Arabian oil tanker (‘Sirius Star’) and of ‘Faina’, a Ukrainian ship transporting tanks and other arms to Mombasa (Kenya). Risks, insurance costs and protective measures significantly increased for merchant ships transiting through the Suez Canal and Red Sea from Europe to Asia or Southern Africa. The social acceptability of piracy among Somalia’s population apparently increased as the pirates largely redistributed the ransom money. A US-inspired multinational naval operation called Combined Task Force 150 (CTF150) supported OEF-HOA in fighting piracy in the Horn of Africa region. In September 2008, the EU Council decided to establish EU’s first multinational maritime operation to prevent and repress piracy in the region. The EU NAVFOR mission (‘Operation Atalanta’) was planned to last 12 months and involved approximately 1,200 personnel. It officially started on 8 December. Besides Atalanta, individual countries combated piracy, among them India and Malaysia. In one incident, the Indian navy destroyed a hijacked Thai fishing vessel mistaking it for a pirate mother ship. In a second incident, it was successful in arresting pirates and freeing Yemeni hostages.

16 • Sub-Saharan Africa

Epidemics and Disasters Droughts and floods as natural – or often man-made – phenomena remained among the main contributing factors to hunger and displacement. Floods affected the mainly rural population in large parts of Southern Africa early in the year. Cyclones hit Madagascar in February and Mozambique in March. Early and extensive rains in many parts of subSaharan Africa once again proved more of a threat than a blessing. West and Central Africa were particularly hit by floodwaters during the second half of the year and thousands of people in Togo, Ghana, Niger, Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso and Senegal were left homeless. In East Africa, Kenya suffered from flooding in October, while the Great Lakes region was shaken by an earthquake in February. These natural catastrophes not only destroyed homes and left people without shelter, but also damaged public infrastructure and posed risks of widespread contamination and infectious diseases. On 30 December, the UN announced that 1,608 people had died as a result of a rapid outbreak of cholera in Zimbabwe. UN agencies such as WHO struggled to collaborate with the regime to tackle the epidemic. The government claimed there was no need for humanitarian assistance and that the cholera epidemic was the result of the deliberate spread of the disease as a biological weapon by imperialists to erode stability. Malaria remained among the single biggest health risks and causes of death. In a press statement on 30 September, Médecins sans Frontières said that although effective medication to diagnose and treat malaria existed, only 3% of children in need of effective treatment received the anti-malaria artemisin-based combination therapy (ACT). The highest number of malaria deaths occurred among young children in rural areas with poor access to health services. Every 30 seconds an African child dies of malaria. HIV/AIDS continued to be among the main causes of death. According to the 2008 report by UNAIDS, 67% of all people with HIV lived in sub-Saharan Africa, which accounted for 72% of all AIDS deaths. Almost 90% of the estimated two million infected children below the age of 15 were from the sub-region (2007 figures). Most countries in Southern Africa again ranked highest on the infection scale, with more than 15% adult prevalence registered, while most national epidemics had stabilised or even declined. Compared with other more seriously affected parts of the world, international disaster relief to Africa remained low. A summary of contributions compiled by OCHA estimated the share of funds allocated during the year to relief measures in sub-Saharan Africa at roughly $ 76 m (about 6%) out of $ 1.25 bn. In total, OCHA had issued 15 humanitarian appeals during the year. These were (in chronological order) for Kenya, Southern Africa, Madagascar, Liberia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, West Africa, Uganda, Sudan, Somalia, DR Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, CAR and Djibouti. Furthermore, the rise in global food prices threatened food security and nutrition across the region. A dramatic drop in cereal production aggravated the situation. Food aid became a major challenge to the international community and the UN system. At the opening of the

Sub-Saharan Africa • 17 ninth regional consultation mechanism meeting of UN agencies and organisations working in Africa on 21 October in Addis Ababa, UN Deputy Secretary General Asha-Rose Migiro said climate change and food security issues compelled the global community to address the vulnerability of Africa’s peoples. The meeting focused on a coordinated multisectoral response to the food crisis. Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber & Klaas van Walraven

II. United Nations and Sub-Saharan Africa

Even closer cooperation between the UN system and the AU marked the year. African leaders sought and enjoyed high-levels of attention on development needs and capacity for peacekeeping operations. There was a convergence around the idea that African actors should assume more ownership of and responsibility for the interconnected issues of development and security. UN representatives argued that this is necessary, given that the organisation focused about 60% of its time and most of its peace operations on Africa. On 16 April, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon observed that in his first 15 months on the job, he had spent more time on African issues than on those of any other continent. The UN therefore remained keen to build African capacities. Meanwhile, AU officials advocated self-reliance. The AU sought to build its role as a forum to harmonise divergent African national or sub-regional perspectives to enable Africa as a whole to have greater influence in international affairs. However, in many respects the scope and substance of the UN’s engagement remained unclear.

Peace and Security The situation in Zimbabwe led to divisive debates between sub-Saharan African states and other members of the UN. The AU supported the African mediation initiative led by SADC. The AU summit in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt (30 June–1 July) resulted in a resolution on Zimbabwe expressing tepid concern but merely encouraging the Zimbabwean leaders to engage in dialogue. The summit was controversial on account of the acceptance of Robert Mugabe’s presence. Many vocal critics, such as Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, criticised Mugabe’s participation on the grounds that his victory in the 27 June presidential run-off elections had been found to be unfair by African monitoring bodies (the AU, the Pan-African Parliament and SADC). On 29 June, Archbishop Desmond Tutu went so far as to say that there was “a very good argument” for sending an international peace force to Zimbabwe. In the UN, the US led a group of states pushing for more assertive action against Mugabe’s regime. However, the African position prevailed, since the US-drafted resolution that would have imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions against 14 top Zimbabwean politicians was blocked on 11 July by Russia’s and China’s vetoes. South Africa voted against the resolution on the grounds that sanctions might harm

20 • United Nations and Sub-Saharan Africa Thabo Mbeki’s efforts as SADC mediator on Zimbabwe. On 15 September, Mbeki and the UN special envoy Haile Menkerios, assistant secretary general for political affairs, oversaw the signing of a power-sharing agreement between Robert Mugabe and opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. On 16 April, following a well-attended high-level debate on peace and security in Africa, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1809, which expressed the council’s determination to strengthen its cooperation with regional organisations to prevent conflict. This was the day before the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council held their second joint meeting, the first such meeting having occurred in June 2007. The Security Council adopted many of the secretary general’s suggestions in his 7 April report on the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the AU, in the maintenance of international peace and security. Most importantly, the Council called on the UN secretariat to consult with the AU Commission on ways to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing the AU when it undertakes UN-mandated peacekeeping operations. It endorsed the proposal to set up a joint AU-UN panel to make suggestions on financing modalities for AU-led peacekeeping missions. This decision indicated the Security Council was ramping up its consideration of the issue of financing responsibilities in relation to chapter VIII arrangements. It also indicated some acknowledgment of the African position that when the AU authorises peace and security interventions, this is on behalf of the wider international community. The Security Council stressed on 14 January that better joint AU-UN strategies for conflict prevention were necessary. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA), within the framework of the ‘Declaration on Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union’, held a firstever ‘desk- to-desk’ consultation with the AU Commission. The DPA-AU consultative meeting on prevention and management of conflicts, held on 26 and 27 July 2008 in Bahar Dar, Ethiopia, brought together staff from the DPA and the AU Commission. It was modelled on similar arrangements with other regional partner organisations, such as the EU. The two offices came up with practical ideas on increased cooperation and agreed to hold a second DPA-AU consultation in early 2009 in New York. Moreover, the DPA mediation support unit supported the joint effort to broker peace in Darfur. As requested by the AU, this unit was also involved in the ongoing development of an operational plan for the AU Panel of the Wise, including the establishment of its secretariat. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) led seven missions to Africa during the 60th anniversary of UN peacekeeping. The UN Mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad (MINURCAT), comprising 863 personnel at year’s end, worked to help create conditions conducive to the voluntary, secure and sustainable return of around half a million refugees and IDPs clustered in the two countries’ volatile border regions with Sudan. MINURCAT’s standing police capacity assisted Chadian law enforcement agencies in establishing and training a

United Nations and Sub-Saharan Africa • 21 Chadian police element, and by December more than 400 such officers had been trained. UN police and military liaison officers worked with EUFOR, the existing EU military force, to enhance stability and support human rights and the rule of law. It was anticipated that EUFOR would transfer its authority to MINURCAT in March 2009. DPKO described the UN-AU hybrid mission to Darfur (UNAMID) as one of the most complex operations in the UN’s history. During the year, the mission slowly increased its strength, supported for the first time by an integrated AU-UN operational team at DPKO (entrusted with integrated deployment and the integrated special envoy system). At the end of June, the secretary general and the AU chairperson appointed the former foreign minister of Burkina Faso, Djibril Yipènè Bassolé, as the new joint AU-UN chief mediator for Darfur, to be based in El Fasher, north Darfur. By the end of the year, 15,444 personnel had been deployed out of the total authorised 26,000. Troops struggled to establish themselves amid continued fighting and insecurity, and were forced to operate without key assets, including transport, military aircraft and even basic accommodation. The operational environment became even more complicated in July with the decision by the ICC’s chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to charge Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir with war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. During the year, 21 UNAMID personnel died on mission, 13 of them in attacks. The Security Council repeatedly condemned aerial bombing in Darfur by the government of Sudan. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), based in Khartoum and Juba in Southern Sudan, continued to support the north-south peace process under 2005 comprehensive peace agreement. The approximately 10,000 peacekeepers prepared the ground for the upcoming national, Southern Sudan and state elections (2009) and for a referendum on the future of the country (2011). The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), comprising almost 20,000 peacekeepers, was severely tested when renewed violence flared up in August in the volatile eastern region of the DR Congo along the border with Rwanda. The situation worsened in late October when the rebel ‘Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple’ (CNDP) led by Laurent Nkunda mounted a major offensive that threatened Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu. Nkunda’s forces overwhelmed the government’s ‘Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo’ (FARDC) and displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians. UN peacekeepers protected civilians where they could, but local civilians showed their frustration by, for example, stoning the UN’s Goma headquarters. The secretary general appointed Olusegun Obasanjo, the former president of Nigeria, as his special envoy for the Great Lakes region on 3 November. Obasanjo liaised with his AU counterpart, former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa. The Security Council authorised an additional 3,100 troops and police and on 22 December the council voted to extend MONUC’s mandate by one year and called on MONUC to make protection of civilians a priority. The UN’s special advisor on

22 • United Nations and Sub-Saharan Africa the prevention of genocide, Francis Deng, reported that the violence in the North Kivu region was grave enough to warrant investigating whether the situation fell under the 1948 genocide convention. In July, peacekeepers withdrew from Eritrea and Ethiopia, where the UN peacekeeping operation in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) had monitored the tense border between the two countries for seven-and-a-half years. The Security Council voted unanimously to terminate UNMEE after restrictions placed on it by Eritrea undermined its ability to carry out its mandate. In Côte d’Ivoire, the UN-supported peace process passed a significant milestone with the launching of the identification and registration of voters on 15 September. However, the postponement of presidential elections until spring 2009 was a worrying development and the Security Council decided to review the role of the UN peacekeeping mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), which had been supporting the peace process, demobilisation and reconciliation. Concerned about the delay in the electoral process and continued human rights violations, the Security Council renewed the embargo against Côte d’Ivoire as well as the sanctions against individuals. Freedom of movement between the north and south was achieved with the closing in July of the last UNOCI observation post in the former zone of confidence that had divided Côte d’Ivoire since 2002. The peacekeeping mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the integrated UN effort continued in support of the government in reconciliation, recovery and development. The peacekeeping operation is expected to be downsized in 2009. The last chapter of the UN’s peacekeeping presence in Sierra Leone came to an end with the expiration of the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) on 30 September. In October, the Security Council created a new, smaller, integrated peace building office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) to continue the UN’s assistance to the country’s new government with peace consolidation and economic recovery. The calls for the UN to deploy a robust force to protect civilians in Somalia grew louder over the year. Following a peace agreement between the Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia in Djibouti on 19 August, the Security Council requested the secretary general to put forward a proposal for a multinational force to replace the 3,400 strong AU force (AMISOM) and to hand over to a UN peacekeeping operation once the security situation permitted. However, no such force materialised and in December the secretary general warned that the situation in Somalia was not yet ripe for UN peacekeepers. In stark contrast, Western NATO members summoned the necessary resolve towards the end of the year to counter the pirates off the country’s coast. The political mission led by UN special envoy Joaquim Chissano maintained its presence in Uganda and continued to lead efforts to secure a final peace agreement between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the government of Uganda. Moreover, the UN’s integrated office in Burundi was extended until 31 December 2009. The post-

United Nations and Sub-Saharan Africa • 23 electoral violence in Kenya quickly attracted high-level attention from both the UN and several African states. On 28 January, Francis Deng called for an immediate halt to the violent attacks. He urged political and community leaders to meet their responsibility to protect civilians, adding that they might otherwise be held accountable for violations of international law committed at their instigation. The Security Council working group on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa met on 1 December to discuss the responsibility to protect (R2P), chaired by South Africa’s permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Dumisani S. Kumalo. American Edward Luck, who was appointed special advisor on the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity on 21 February, stressed that prevention and support for states were the most important components of the R2P framework. He cautioned against a situation in which a focus by the UN Security Council on this framework would encourage militarism and interventionism. The AU’s permanent observer to the UN, Ambassador Lila Hanitra Ratsifandrihamanana, stressed the need of a non-military approach. She commended the UN’s R2P approach in Kenya, which involved neither the UN Security Council nor the General Assembly. The pact on security, stability and development in the Great Lakes region, dating from December 2006, entered into force in June after securing the necessary number of ratifications, eight of the 11 core countries of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).

Economic Performance and Development On 28 May, at the fourth Tokyo international conference on African development, G8 leaders declared their resolve to work towards fulfilling the commitments made at Gleneagles. This included an annual increase of $ 25 bn in overseas development aid (ODA) to Africa by 2010 as compared to 2004. The conference was co-organised by the Japanese government, the UN office of the special advisor on Africa, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. UNDP and Japan agreed to provide $ 92 m for an initiative to help governments bring their current anti-poverty strategies into line with the potential effects on development of climate change. In December, it was announced that 21 African countries stood to benefit from the programme. The top priorities during this year’s 63rd General Assembly, which opened on 22 September, were climate change, UN reform and the global food crisis. The most important meeting for sub-Saharan Africa was the high-level meeting on the achievement of MDGs and on the special development needs of Africa on 22 September. The guiding document for this meeting was the secretary general’s report ‘Africa’s Development Needs: State of Implementation of Various Commitments, Challenges and the Way Forward’. This document called on African countries to intensify the ongoing integration of NEPAD into the structures of the AU Commission. Additionally, it called for African countries

24 • United Nations and Sub-Saharan Africa to begin a peer-review exercise to review their progress in achieving the MDGs and to improve their economic and political governance and deepen their regional integration. It called on world leaders to support the African green revolution within the framework of the comprehensive Africa agricultural development programme and to invest in critical infrastructure, health systems, family planning services, national water supply and sanitation strategies. Additionally, the June report of the MDG Africa steering group (set up in 2007, chaired by the secretary general), ‘Achieving the Millennium Development Goals in Africa’, urged external actors to comply with existing EU and G8 commitments and to accelerate ODA flows to Africa. African leaders highlighted the current and potential impact of the global financial, food and energy crises for Africa. They pushed for debt relief for Africa’s least developed countries and expressed concern that the goal of doubling aid to Africa by 2010 would not be reached. Also, they called for the fulfilment of all official ODA commitments, including those by developed countries to increase their share to 0.7% of gross national income by 2015 and other commitments (such as those entailed in the Millennium Declaration; the 2002 Monterrey consensus on development financing; and the 2002 Johannesburg declaration on sustainable development). They called for Africa’s share of international trade to be increased through regional integration, greater integration into the global economy and fulfilment of the pledge to create an open and non-discriminatory trading system. African officials also captured the African ambitions for self-reliance. Jean Ping, chairman of the AU Commission, said, “It is for us as Africans to be primarily responsible for Africa.” President Kikwete of Tanzania, chairperson of the AU, noted that all Africa needed was help to complement its own efforts. World leaders declared that eradicating poverty in Africa was the greatest global challenge as they pledged themselves to reinvigorating a ‘global partnership of equals’ to end poverty, hunger and underdevelopment in Africa. However, to the disappointment of African leaders, the meetings led only to a rededication to previous commitments and a determination to mobilise resources. No new pledges were included in the adopted political declaration, ‘Africa’s Development Needs: State of Implementation of Various Commitments, Challenges and the Way Forward’. This was especially disappointing since, as the secretary general had argued, the $ 72 bn per year in external financing needed to achieve the MDGs in Africa by 2015 was entirely affordable, considering that in 2007 the OECD countries spent $ 267 bn on agricultural subsidies. At the end of the year, the General Assembly endorsed the document from the follow-up international conference in Doha, Qatar (29 November–2 December) on the financing of development to review the implementation of the Monterrey consensus, including the call for the UN to hold a high-level conference to examine the impact of world financial and economic turmoil on development. The document repeated the call for countries to meet existing aid commitments to poor nations, even during the current economic slowdown.

United Nations and Sub-Saharan Africa • 25 At the high-level conference on world food security and the challenges of climate change and bioenergy (3–5 June) in Rome, the WFP announced a $ 1.2 bn cash package for 62 countries hit by high food prices. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the WFP entered into a partnership with the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) to boost food production in Africa’s breadbasket regions and to support smallholder farmers. In August, WFP announced an additional $ 214 m to help people in 16 countries affected by high food and fuel prices, including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia and Uganda. On 24 September, a WFP purchase for progress initiative was launched, which may lead to changes in WFP policies that enable long-term contracts with farmers to purchase food in developing countries. Belgium, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Howard G. Buffett Foundation committed $ 76 m to fund 21 pilot projects across the developing world, including in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan. It is hoped the initiative will increase income security by allowing farmers to purchase the inputs such as fertilisers, seeds and equipment needed to boost harvests. Paul Kagame, president of Rwanda, outlined the potential structural impact of the initiative. It might, he said, enable farmers to take advantage of rising food prices by creating incentives to increase production. A joint UN-AU meeting took place on 25 August in Addis Ababa to discuss gender equality and the advancement of women, including the development of an AU gender policy. Twenty-five ministers and three deputy ministers attended this meeting, organised by the women, gender and development directorate of the AU Commission and the ECA’s African centre for gender and social development. The importance of gender equality to durable and inclusive development was also stressed at the sixth African development forum (19–21 November). Asha-Rose Migiro, a deputy secretary general, called on government leaders to act decisively to include women in all levels of decision making and to develop policies and legislation promoting women’s land and property rights. The forum adopted a plan of action to end violence against women and endorsed the secretary general’s initiative to designate 2008–15 for the campaign, ‘Unite to End Violence against Women and Girls’. Following from the AU Sharm el Sheikh summit’s declaration and commitments on water and sanitation in June, this issue received renewed levels of attention. The executive committee of the African Ministers’ Council on Water (AMCOW) met from 24–28 November in Nairobi to agree on ways to carry this declaration forward. In midDecember, ministers at the water for energy and agriculture in Africa meeting in Sirte, Libya, backed a proposal to secure billion dollar commitments for critical hydropower and agricultural irrigation systems across the continent. The conference was organised by FAO in collaboration with Libya, the AU, AMCOW, the AfDB and ECA. The FAO committed to push for a $ 65 bn, 20-year blue revolution water management programme to exploit natural resources by providing investment in water control at village level,

26 • United Nations and Sub-Saharan Africa extensive irrigation systems and developing major river basins for agriculture and hydroenergy generation.

Governance In closing of the General Assembly’s debate on 29 September, a South African representative said it remained a travesty of justice that Africa, which gave rise to so much of the Security Council’s work, was not permanently represented on that body. During the year, South Africa continued to be a leading African advocate of the AU’s proposal for Security Council reform, namely to increase the council’s membership to 26 and with six new permanent seats with veto privileges. On 14 July, ICCs chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo presented evidence against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide allegedly perpetrated by him though members of the state apparatus, the army and the Janjaweed militia in the Darfur region. The AU, with support from the NonAligned Movement and the Arab League, opposed this development. The AU Peace and Security Council condemned all acts of violence in Darfur and stressed the need to bring the perpetrators to justice, but the AU nevertheless urged the Security Council to defer the ICC process on the grounds that any attempt to arrest the Sudanese president would derail efforts at lasting peace. An AU Assembly decision expressed the sentiment among African leaders that certain (Western) states had abused the principle of universal jurisdiction to indict African leaders and that a right of diplomatic protection might be more appropriate in cases concerning nationals of the states concerned. The Assembly decision lamented the number of foreign indictments of Rwandan leaders. In his capacity as special advisor on African affairs, Under Secretary General Cheick Sidi Diarra of Mali co-organised a side event on the governance challenge in Africa at the high-level meeting on Africa’s development needs (22 September). The keynote speaker was James C. Jonah, former UN under secretary general of political affairs and Sierra Leone’s former minister of finance. Speakers upheld the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the APRM as positive examples of governance initiatives in Africa. It was noted that implementation of the APRM had been mixed and that many remained sceptical about the outcome of the process. However, they recognised the benefits of making possible political dialogue in Africa. Setbacks related to the process included the slow pace of implementation, mainly due to inadequate capacity. It should be added that although the AU adopted the African Charter in January 2007, it had been ratified by Mauritania only at year’s end. To take effect, the Charter needs a minimum of 15 ratifications. While the office of the secretary general’s special advisor on Africa was merged with the office of the Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS) last year, Cheick Sidi Diarra’s con-

United Nations and Sub-Saharan Africa • 27 tinued role as Africa advisor as well as head of the UN-OHRLLS may have lessened fears that the merger would lead to less attention on African affairs at the UN.

Humanitarian Assistance The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) established an AU liaison office in Addis Ababa in September to enhance OCHA’s strategic partnerships on the continent in which 70% of its operations are undertaken. John Holmes, the UN under secretary general for humanitarian affairs, was present at the inauguration of the office, which is anticipated to facilitate support for the AU in the areas of humanitarian policy development, protection of civilians, response coordination for complex and natural disasters, advocacy and resource mobilisation. Throughout the year, WFP was increasingly affected by the pirate activities off the coast of Somalia. The year saw the largest number of pirate attacks in the region ever, topping 100. Towards the end of the year, both the EU and NATO provided naval protection for ships carrying food aid and this helped WFP to reach people in need, above all in Somalia. The WFP sent 60 shipments with over one-quarter of a million tonnes of food to the region, enough to feed 1.3 m people for a year. The number of IDPs in Somalia rose from 450,000 to approximately 1.1 m between January 2007 and June. At the end of the year, the UN estimated that some 3.2 m people, or 40% of Somalia’s population, were in need of assistance, and that one in six children under the age of five in southern and central Somalia were acutely malnourished. The global food and fuel crises complicated ongoing humanitarian operations. On 16 July, the UN announced that, after revising their appeals in the mid-year review, UN agencies, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and 239 NGOs needed an extra $ 3.4 bn to respond to the world’s most severe crises for the rest of the year. The year’s overall humanitarian funding requirements for the 34 countries covered rose from $ 5.4 bn at the start of the year to $ 6.5 bn by mid-year. The biggest increases were in African countries: Somalia (up $ 235 m to $ 641 m), the DR Congo (up $ 161 m to $ 736 m), West Africa (up $ 104 m to $ 416 m), Sudan (up $ 81 m to $ 1.95 bn) and also Zimbabwe (up $ 78 m to $ 394 m). Donors had given $ 2.6 bn, equal to 46% of funding requirements, an improvement over mid-year levels in the past two years. In September, UN agencies such as OCHA, WFP and UNDP expanded their relief efforts across West Africa. Rising floodwaters displaced hundreds of thousands of people in Togo, Ghana, Niger, Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso and Senegal. The floods also damaged major infrastructure and gave rise to concerns about the widespread outbreak of infectious diseases. Furthermore, the rise in global food prices threatened food security and nutrition across the sub-region. A dramatic drop in cereal production aggravated the situation. In total, the region hosted some 200,000 refugees, the majority of whom come from Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Togo and Mauritania.

28 • United Nations and Sub-Saharan Africa During the second half of the year, WFP lacked critical funding to provide sufficient food aid to countries such as Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. In September, the agency appealed for $ 460 m to feed for the next six months 9.6 m people affected by drought and high food prices in Ethiopia. John Holmes warned that the Horn of Africa was facing a humanitarian crisis, with as many as 17 m people, including 3 m children, in urgent need of food and other critical assistance over the coming months. At year’s end, WFP was forced to cut rations because of a serious funding crisis in the provision of life-saving aid to over 4 m people in Zimbabwe suffering the effects of a disastrous harvest.

Refugees An African-led task force, including AU member states as well as AU partners such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was making the preparations for the special summit of heads of state and government on refugees, returnees and IDPs planned for April 2009 in Kampala, Uganda. The UNHCR expressed joy that a historic draft AU convention on the protection and assistance for IDPs in Africa was adopted by African ministers in charge of forced displacement matters on 11 November. If endorsed at the special summit in April, it will become the world’s first legally binding instrument for the protection of IDPs. In related activities, the UNHCR helped disseminate the AU policy on post-conflict reconstruction and development and the policy on post-primary education for refugees. At the beginning of the year, African nations hosted some 10.5 m of the people of concern to the UNHCR, a third of the worldwide total of refugees, IDPs and people otherwise in need of UNHCR assistance. The majority of these were IDPs. The agency applauded the generosity of the African states that offered local integration programmes, for example in Central, West and Southern Africa. The conflicts in Chad, the DR Congo, Kenya, Somalia and Darfur and the crisis in Zimbabwe produced large new displacements. Sudan remained the most complex humanitarian operation in Africa, involving both the largest IDP crisis and refugee repatriation operation. At the beginning of the year, Kenya had up to 500,000 displaced persons around the country due to the outbreak of post-electoral violence. The impact was felt throughout East and Central Africa, as disruptions of transport routes halted the flow of humanitarian goods and trade. During the course of the year, the situation stabilised, with many IDPs returning home. In addition to the conflict-induced displacements, Kenya faced multifaceted emergency conditions. Several factors affected livelihoods and food security throughout the country: uneven distribution of the rains, rising food and commodity prices, reduced cereal production and livestock disease. An estimated 1.4 m people received food assistance. An influx of refugees from Somalia added to a refugee population that already far exceeded the capacity of existing camps. In Darfur, an estimated 280,000 people were displaced during the first nine months of the year. There was a sharp increase in the number of attacks on humanitarian aid

United Nations and Sub-Saharan Africa • 29 workers. By December, 11 humanitarian workers had been killed in Darfur; there had been 172 attacks on humanitarian premises; 261 vehicles had been hijacked; 35 convoys had been ambushed; and nearly 190 staff had been temporarily abducted. In August, John Holmes expressed concern after two attacks on the staff and premises of ‘Médecins sans Frontières’. He warned that hundreds of thousands of people relied on the aid organisations, some of which curtailed vital aid operations to protect aid workers. The UN and its partners continued the majority of their operations, delivering aid to an estimated 4.7 m people. In May, fighting in Abyei (central Sudan) between the Sudanese armed forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army destroyed the town and uprooted up to 60,000 people. There was widespread frustration at the lack of progress on the Abyei protocol intended to resolve the territory’s disputed status. A rapid humanitarian response limited the extent of suffering among the displaced and host communities, but most of those displaced did not return home. In CAR, the most remarkable achievement was the return of almost half of the country’s IDPs. Some 85,000 people returned to their villages in the hope of re-establishing their livelihoods and starting new lives. Another 209,000 displaced in different parts of the country and in neighbouring Chad, Cameroon and Sudan felt unable to return home. Forced displacement remained worryingly high in the northwest CAR, where banditry, incursions by foreign armed groups and renewed fighting forced people to flee their villages on numerous occasions. In the southeast, attacks by the Ugandan rebel group LRA on several villages forced some 5,000 people to flee their homes.

Human Rights Two proposed resolutions condemning widespread human rights abuses in Sudan and Zimbabwe failed to pass the General Assembly’s third committee after becoming mired in debate between African and Western nations. The proposed resolutions were blocked by the adoption of so-called ‘no-action motions’ introduced by South Africa on behalf of the African group. This group protested against passing country-specific resolutions within the UN remit because such resolutions were not felt to engender the much-needed cooperation of the country concerned. The third committee adopted two texts on racism and racial discrimination. The resolution on the elimination of racism and follow-up to the Durban declaration and programme of action was adopted by a recorded vote of 109 to 13, with 35 abstentions. The other text, on the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, was adopted without vote. However, the references to the Durban declaration caused considerable commotion before the third committee could approve the human rights programme for 2010–11, which is the general guideline for the work of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). In one paragraph, the OHCHR was

30 • United Nations and Sub-Saharan Africa tasked with focusing on the follow-up to the Durban declaration and programme of action, and this formulation saw the US and Israel voting against the approval. The Israeli and US representatives expressed support for OHCHR, but had reservations or concerns about the Durban conference. The representative of Mauritius, on behalf of the African group, reminded delegates that the Durban declaration was a cornerstone in the fight against racial discrimination. South Africa’s representative added that it would have been “inconceivable” to adopt a text that did not mention the Durban conference and its follow-up, since an upcoming Durban review conference was planned. On 19 June, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) elected Martin Ihoeghian Uhomoibhi of Nigeria to a one-year term as president. At year’s end, the HRC’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism had reviewed ten countries: South Africa, Gabon, Ghana, Benin, Zambia, Mali, Botswana, Burundi, Burkina Faso and Cape Verde. The representatives for Sudan, Nigeria and Zimbabwe expressed strong support for the HRC and the UPR in response to the US representative’s concerns that the HRC had repeatedly failed to address some of the most pressing human rights situations in Sudan, Zimbabwe and Cuba. The Zimbabwean representative said that the American “obsession” with her country indicated its patronising and disrespectful disregard for regional processes. She also called for the US to become a member of the HRC, so that it could be submitted for review. On 12 December, the secretary general lent support to this view when he suggested that it was necessary and desirable that the US become a member of the HRC. His remarks were made at the HRC special session to mark the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The OHCHR human rights programme for Africa 2008–09 focused on assisting local, national and regional institutions to understand and respond to human rights concerns, increase the integration of human rights standards and principles into national legislation and policies, ensure the implementation of voluntary pledges by new HRC members and build on visits and recommendations by special procedures mandate-holders. The office maintained a presence in Togo and Uganda as well as regional presence in East Africa (Addis Ababa), West Africa (Dakar) and Southern Africa (Pretoria), together with the regional centre for human rights and democracy for Central Africa in Yaoundé, Cameroon. The country office in Angola closed at the request of the Angolan government. In September, the HRC extended the mandate of the special rapporteur on human rights in the Sudan until June 2009, a proposal made by both the African group and the EU. The rapporteur’s work on human rights in Sudan throughout the year detailed a grim human rights situation, and Darfur continued to be of particular concern. The rapporteur reiterated the need for government forces to immediately cease their land and air attacks on civilians in Darfur and that the government of national unity and the government of Southern Sudan do their utmost to address the widespread impunity. The high commissioner on human rights expressed particular concern about the attacks on villages in west Darfur, breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law by armed militias

United Nations and Sub-Saharan Africa • 31 and the Sudanese armed forces and the arbitrary arrest and detention of Sudanese individuals by security services, military and police.

Environment On 16–18 April, the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and AU international conference on renewable energy in Dakar resulted in a declaration on scaling up renewable energy in Africa. The meeting recognised that renewable energy would help reduce the impact of current high oil costs and address the power crises evident in most African countries. The declaration set out the need to work towards an Africa regional energy policy and to establish a common continental target for governments, with the support of development partners, for scaling up investment in renewable energy. It also called on African governments, international partners, NGOs and the private sector to support implementation of this action plan with adequate resources. On 12 February, Chungong Ayafor spoke on behalf of the African group at a General Assembly thematic debate on climate change. He stressed that adaptation to the impacts of climate change was key to poverty eradication and sustainable development. Such adaptation would require more international financial support for Africa, which was an obligation under the UN framework convention on climate change and the Kyoto protocol. Another priority for the African group was more equitable distribution of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. African environmental ministers called on the AU to adopt a common position on climate change at its 13th summit ahead of the Copenhagen climate change summit in December 2009. Climate change was a key topic at the meeting of UNEP and the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) in June. In the resulting decision, AMCEN ministers identified as key areas disaster reduction and risk management, sectoral planning and implementation and diversification of economies for building economic and social resilience. UNEP and UNCTAD published findings indicating that smallholder farmers in Africa were better off after switching from intensive to organic, or near organic, agriculture. The analysis of 114 projects in 24 African countries found that yields had more than doubled where organic or near-organic practices had been used. Farmers also spent less on fertilisers, pesticides and fuel. Linnea Bergholm

III. African-European Relations

The first half of the year was marked by a focus on translating the previous year’s highlevel commitments into practice, making for a feeling of ‘business as usual,’ and planning for stock-taking events on international commitments such as the conference on financing for development in Doha in November. International attention, however, shifted substantially in the second half of the year, with the focus on the US presidential elections and the rapid unfolding of and early attempts to contain the financial and economic crisis in autumn, all of which have potential implications for African-European relations. During the G8 summit in the Japanese town of Toyako, Hokkaido (7–9 July), the financial crisis was already looming, but heads of state still expressed optimism about addressing the global rise in food and oil prices. Africa featured fairly prominently on the agenda, yet few tangible results could be reported other than increased activity by donors in programmes for rural development, a sector ‘rediscovered’ after years of declining donor funding to it. The use of genetically manipulated crops as a possible answer to the global food crisis remained controversial. Later in 2008, the content and urgency of discussions among industrialised nations changed dramatically. With growing awareness that a global crisis was in the making, debates shifted from the G8 towards inclusion of other big developing economies in a G20 format. This forum was considered as key to global governance, and met as a World Economic Summit in Washington (15–16 November). The G20 represents the 20 biggest industrialised and emerging economies in the world, but since 1999 had met only as a gathering of finance ministers, whereas the summit in Washington was the first meeting of heads of state and government. The only African state in this round was South Africa, an emerging economy that is distinct from all other states of the continent. The new AU Commission chairperson, Jean Ping, explicitly stated that “South Africa does not speak for Africa” and advocated for continental representation of Africa in global governance forums like the G20. Ultimately, the then chair of NEPAD, Ethiopia’s President Meles Zenawi, was also invited (‘G20+’ format), along with others such as the president of the EU Commission, who is also a regular participant in G8 meetings. The unfolding world economic crisis was expected to hit Africa hard after a decade of average annual growth rates of around 6%. Declining finances in Western, including European countries will most likely reduce foreign direct investment in what are often considered high risk regions with poor ratings. Furthermore, remittances were likely to

34 • African-European Relations decline with the economic crisis affecting the labour market in the EU. And public money could become scarcer, as Western countries are expected to be more inclined to invest in their home markets. Furthermore, the risk of increased trade protectionism – harmful to development – was rising in this time of crisis.

Bilateral Relations between Africa and European States In 2008, bilateral European relations with African states were not much in the limelight and the financial crisis absorbed much of the European leaders’ attention. Developing countries might be suffering the most from the crisis, but this aspect was not key in European debates on the subject. France might have been expected to be the most exposed to African affairs in 2008, as it held the EU presidency in the second half of the year. However, little official interaction beyond business-as-usual happened, as other crises took centre-stage. France appeared to have been kept busy with crisis management during its EU presidency. French foreign policy apparently had shifted its focus beyond Africa. French President Nicolas Sarkozy visited South Africa in early 2008 (28–29 February). During the visit, he spoke before the South African parliament in Cape Town. In an apparent broadside against past French Africa policy, Sarkozy spoke of the possibility of France and South Africa having “relations which are exemplary, balanced, transparent and . . . rid of all hang-ups.” This was regarded as an attempt to become proactive in Africa policy again, after last year’s mission to Chad and CAR, which was often interpreted as a reversion to traditional patterns of French policy. In his second speech as French president on African soil, Sarkozy pointed out that there was nothing automatic in having French troops stationed in Africa, thereby again attempting to distance himself from traditional visions of a special linkage between France and Africa (‘Francafrique’). Sarkozy also chose South Africa to announce an increase in French bilateral aid to Africa by an additional € 10 bn over the next five years. Yet, little more interaction took place at the highest level besides French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner’s visit to the AU in his capacity as head of the EU troika in autumn (20–21 November). Germany’s Federal President Horst Köhler somewhat kept Africa on the German agenda with a state visit to Uganda and Rwanda (3–8 February) and the continuation of his Partnership with Africa initiative in Abuja, Nigeria (7–9 November). The visit to Rwanda was the first ever state visit by a German president and was acknowledgment of the reconstruction efforts of the country after the genocide 14 years ago. The Partnership with Africa forum was the fourth of its kind, co-hosted by Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, and was attended by the presidents of Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, the Ghanaian vice president and around 30 participants from parliaments, corporations, academia and the media. The discussion round called for better representation of Africa in global governance, not least in endeavours to tackle the global economic crisis. The forum was

African-European Relations • 35 followed by a three-day state visit by President Köhler to Nigeria. Germany’s foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, used the granting of an additional € 5.6 m budget for cultural activities in Africa by Germany as the occasion to visit three West African countries, Ghana, Togo and Burkina Faso. The German foreign office oversees the German cultural institute (Goethe Institute), which has suffered severe financial shortfalls in recent years and has closed a number of its branches around the globe, e.g., in 1998 in Dar es Salaam, in spite of many protests. Despite a continuing commitment to a high profile Africa policy in official speeches and public policies, the UK government under Gordon Brown was less visible in Africa. Brown had shown strong interest in Africa in his previous position as Chancellor of the Exchequer. The prime minister attended the AU summit in Egypt (30 June), urging more pressure on Robert Mugabe to step down in Zimbabwe. The UK’s relations with Zimbabwe were particularly strained and Zimbabwe was publicly criticised in the UK, its former coloniser. The first half of the year saw the somewhat shaky UK government busily trying to avoid a referendum on the EU treaty in the face of strong momentum of favour of the numerous EU critics in the country. In the second half of the year, UK politics were caught up in the financial crisis. The UK was one of the countries in Europe soonest and worst affected by the international credit crunch. The British pound depreciated rapidly, from an already low of € 1.25 in April almost to parity with the euro in late December (€ 1.02). Depreciation of the pound also effectively cut the value of the UK’s international aid, which weakened the credibility of Brown’s strong pledges to honour aid commitments made previously, while also addressing and urging more action on climate change. Europe saw state visits by inter alia Ghana’s President John A. Kufour, who was welcomed in Berlin by German Chancellor Angela Merkel (27 August). Kufuor also visited the Netherlands for a three-day state visit on 21–24 October, where he was welcomed by Queen Beatrix. Criticism arose over Kufuor’s absence from a dinner with the Ghanaian diaspora in Amsterdam, to which the Ghanaian embassy had invited. Berlin was also the host of an international conference on Liberia (26–27 June) at which the post-conflict West African country officially presented its poverty reduction strategy to donors. Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Chancellor Merkel signed a debt relief agreement worth € 268 m (26 June).

Institutional Development in the Regions – EU and AU The institutional development of both continental organisations resulted in internal changes and challenges. The AU saw a change at the helm of its Commission. It faced challenges of constitutional rule, unrest in Kenya and political tensions in Zimbabwe, which tested its principles. Reactions by and successes of the AU were mixed at best. The EU was confronted with a ‘no’ vote on its new treaty in Ireland and struggled with how to overcome the resulting deadlock. In parallel, Europe became increasingly aware that the

36 • African-European Relations financial crisis that became evident in the second half of the year might well become the worst economic crisis in over six decades. Against the backdrop of these political challenges for both entities, interaction between both continents operated mostly at a lower level. At the beginning of the year, the AU voted on its new Commission (1 February). Jean Ping officially succeeded Alpha Oumar Konaré as president of the AU Commission (28 April). The long-serving foreign minister of Gabon was initially backed by West, Central and Eastern African states and also gained most of North Africa’s backing after the Libyan candidate was persuaded not to run. Ping is the son of a Chinese businessman and a Gabonese mother, which commentators saw as a sign of the times. Nevertheless, European countries expected more pragmatism from Ping and the end of Konaré’s term was greeted with some relief. The AU was actively involved in preventive diplomacy (e.g., in Kenya) and abided by its rules suspending Mauritania and Guinea after the coups in those countries. In other cases, however, application of AU principles was tilted in favour of incumbents in power, thereby undermining the credibility of the NEPAD declaration on democracy, political, economic and corporate governance of 2002, dear to the hearts of many actors in the EU. The AU was unable to address the root causes of conflict in the cases of post-electoral violence in Kenya and violent oppression of the opposition in Zimbabwe. The EU, for its part, experienced a severe institutional and constitutional setback when the ratification of a new EU treaty was blocked by a ‘no’ vote in a referendum in Ireland (12 June). Before the Irish referendum, 18 member states had already ratified the treaty. The treaty needs unanimous ratification by all member states to come into force. In Ireland, ratification was rejected by 53% of voters, with a voter turnout of around 45%. The so-called Lisbon Treaty was meant to replace the failed European constitution, and aspired to reform the internal structure of the EU. The reforms were felt to be necessary by many after the EU grew to 25, now 27 member states, with decision-making being slowed down in many areas where unanimity is required. The Lisbon Treaty particularly aimed at reforming the EU’s external relations, suggesting a stronger role for the EU high representative for foreign and security policy (a sort of EU foreign minister) in order to make Europe’s voice more audible in international affairs, including in relations with Africa. Slovenia’s EU presidency in the first half of the year meant that an ex-Yugoslav republic and new EU member state from central Europe would be in charge of many dossiers on international relations. As expected, it gave low priority to Africa. Slovenia had only recently started to develop an Africa policy, a continent where it has no diplomatic representation. The small Slovenian aid budget was spent in Slovenia’s immediate vicinity in the Balkans. The issue of child soldiers was the one central item on the Slovenian agenda with regard to development cooperation that had relevance for Africa. Key topics for Slovenia were the Lisbon Treaty ratification process, economic reforms within Europe (the so-called Lisbon agenda), climate change and focusing EU attention on the western

African-European Relations • 37 Balkans as well as cultural dialogue in the Mediterranean region. It was expected that Africa would feature higher on the agenda once France took over the EU presidency in the second half of the year, particularly given the French president’s announcement that pushing European foreign policy forward would be one of the three priorities during France’s stint at the EU helm. The initial programme, however, was soon overtaken by events beyond French control. France’s presidency was ultimately marked by crisis management (war in Georgia and the financial meltdown) with little attention being given to African issues, despite the remarkable international presence of French President Sarkozy. The French EU presidency was generally regarded as successful. With the slide in attention on the international agenda, emerging actors could further increase their impact on and standing in Africa. The more business-as-usual relationship that had been evident since the signing of the joint Africa-EU strategy in 2007 was expressed in more regular high-level meetings between actors in Europe and Africa. During 2008, much focus was on establishing the institutions for implementing and monitoring the joint strategy. The strategy is meant to operate alongside and complement existing frameworks such as the Cotonou agreement and the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa, not to replace them. It comprised eight areas of activity: (i) peace and security (ii) governance (iii) trade, regional integration and infrastructure (iv) the MDGs (v) energy (vi) climate change (vii) migration and (viii) science, information society and space. In the fourth regular meeting between the European and the AU commissions (1 October), the European Commission emphasised progress in Africa – fewer conflicts and better governance, in EU Commission President Barroso’s words – but pointed to too little progress towards the MDGs in Africa. The regular troika meeting between the EU and the AU took place in autumn in Addis Ababa (20–21 November) and for the first time took stock of the joint Africa-EU strategy, focusing particularly on peace and security.

Conflict and Security In the realm of security policy, a number of conflicts familiar from previous years remained on the international agenda. These included Darfur and its effects on neighbouring Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), which closely involved the EU. Likewise, piracy off the Somali coast was a European concern. Other conflicts, like those in the Comoros, Kenya and Zimbabwe were rather a test of African continental structures and their reaction and mediation capacity and only indirectly involved Europe. The EU military mission (EUFOR) to Chad and CAR decided on in October 2007 achieved initial operating capability in March (15 March). In May, around 2,700 EUFOR soldiers were in place in eastern Chad and, to a much lesser extent, in Birao in northeastern CAR, along the border of the Sudanese province of Darfur. Most of EUFOR’s troops were French (around 1,550 soldiers). The mission attracted much criticism. In March,

38 • African-European Relations rebel forces advanced on N’Djaména and caught an EU advance party by surprise. Thousands of refugees fled across the Cameroonian border and the EU delayed its mission. The neutrality of EUFOR was persistently questioned, as the Chadian regime was clearly supported by France, which – separately from EUFOR – had a permanent military presence in Chad of 1,100 soldiers. EUFOR was meant as a bridging mission for a later UN mission. The AU intervened militarily in the Comoros to prevent secession by the island of Anjouan (25 March). The AU imposed travel bans on Anjouan’s government officials, froze their foreign assets and called for fresh elections on the island. Additionally, a naval blockade of the island had been implemented in late 2007. In March, government troops began assembling on Moheli, the Comoros island nearest to Anjouan. Around 1,500 AU soldiers supported the seizure of Anjouan. AU soldiers came predominantly from Sudan and Tanzania, while France and Libya offered logistical support for the operation. France took the secessionist island leader Mohamed Bacar into custody after he had fled to Mayotte (asking for political asylum). French authorities transported Bacar from the last Comoran island under French control to Réunion, a French overseas department in the Indian Ocean. Comoran authorities asked for the extradition of Bacar. The whole event shed some light on the very specific postcolonial relations France has in Africa. The conflict in Zimbabwe was mediated by South African President Thabo Mbeki, who had been mandated by the SADC. Mbeki was increasingly accused of bias in favour of Robert Mugabe. To the anger of the opposition, Mbeki appeared in Harare cordially holding hands with incumbent Robert Mugabe in front of cameras, asking the international community for patience with the situation (11 April). Mbeki’s inaction on Zimbabwe was heavily criticised by some African and European leaders. In Africa, a rift between political leaders became obvious, with strong criticism of Mugabe’s regime expressed by Kenya’s Prime Minister Raila Odinga, and the presidents of Senegal, Zambia and Botswana. However, the statement issued during the AU summit in Sharm el Sheikh (1 July) merely called on both sides to seek a solution. In Europe, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown was the most vocal. The power-sharing agreement for Zimbabwe, signed on 11 September, did not come into operation in 2008 due to the obvious politicking of the incumbent regime. Europeans adopted a wait-and-see attitude towards the agreed settlement in Zimbabwe. Along the shores of the Horn of Africa, the international security implications of the largely defunct state of Somalia became obvious. Piracy off Somalia’s coast became an international problem on one of the world’s key shipping routes towards the Suez Canal. Not a new phenomenon in international shipping, the hijacking of ships had increasingly affected European vessels, e.g., the Spanish ‘Playa del Bakio’ (20 April) or the French yacht ‘Ponant’ (4 April), which were only freed after payment of ransom. The ships were forced to lie in the roads before Somalia and the key to the problem was to be found in the anarchy in Somalia, which cannot police its territories. By the end of the year, the EU reported 71 attacks on ships off the Somali coast, with 17 ships hijacked and 200 people held hostage. This was also said to have negatively impacted the delivery of humanitarian

African-European Relations • 39 assistance to Somalia through the WFP. As a reaction to the increasing number of incidents (and strong media attention), European foreign ministers decided on an EU antipiracy mission off the coast of Somalia (9 December) called ‘Atalanta’. Participating states in this first joint EU maritime operation were, inter alia, Germany, Greece, France, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. The operation took place within 500 miles of the coast of Somalia and was mandated until December 2009.

EU Development Cooperation Probably the most important high level event in international development took place in Accra (2–4 September) with the 3rd high level forum on aid effectiveness. The meeting in Accra took stock of reforms in the international aid system agreed upon in Paris in 2005. The EU took the opportunity to present its own reforms and push the international agenda. Most visibly, the European aspiration for a better division of labour in development cooperation among actors in the EU system was taken to the international level and was put on the agenda. Secondly, the role of ‘emerging donors’ such as China, India, Brazil and others was a key discussion point in Accra: to what degree should these new or emerging donors adopt the principles enshrined in the Paris declaration of 2005 in their cooperation with other developing countries. In addition to Chinese engagement, India, Turkey and Iran held their own summits with African leaders in 2008, all of them linked to promises of aid and trade relations, mostly combined in package deals with African states or regions. The EU pushed for further international agreement on standards. The outcome was a rather soft clause that “invites” emerging donors to operate according to the Paris standards. Another article of the resulting Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), however, defined South-South cooperation as distinct from traditional aid relations. Aid standards enshrined in the Paris declaration are for the reduction of parallel structures in aid delivery, better harmonisation among donors and the reduction of uncoordinated country missions, etc. At the end of the year, the financing for development conference in Doha was meant to review the progress made on aid pledges in Monterrey in 2002. Doha took place at the high point of the financial crisis (29 November–2 December). It could therefore be regarded as a success that the Monterrey goals of 0.7% official development aid (measured against the gross national income) of developed countries was confirmed and thus the political momentum to deliver was not lost. According to OECD figures, aid volumes provided by EU member states increased by around 8% in 2008, despite the financial crisis. Following a decrease in 2007, EU aid figures for 2008 increased to more than € 49 bn. This, however, fell short of the increase necessary to keep to the EU timetable of reaching 0.56% of gross national income as official development assistance by 2010 and 0.7% by 2015. OECD aid figures also included debt relief, which is a finite way of increasing aid volumes. Once written off, the sum disappears from the statistics. If increases are made

40 • African-European Relations predominantly by debt relief, maintaining aid levels – let alone increasing them – would require an even steeper increase in real transfers further down the line. Thus, a credibility problem was only postponed and was potentially building up for a number of donors. And because of the financial crisis, prospects for aid volumes were far from rosy for 2009. The need for additional aid was likely to increase sharply during the crisis due to falling raw material prices and the increasing shortage of financing in developing countries, while developed countries also faced reduced financial leeway and were likely to spend more money closer to home on their own ailing economies. The 10th EDF for 2008–13 was finally ratified in June and came into force (1 July) half a year after the envisaged date. In order for the EDF to come into force, all EU members as well as two-thirds of the ACP countries had to ratify it. With the subsequent enlargement of the EU and the ACP group, the ratification process had become ever more time-consuming. The 10th EDF remained outside the EU budget, beyond the say of the European parliament. It is a key source of funding for EU relations with the ACP states. Around 40% of the 10th EDF is meant as budget support to ACP countries, and large parts of the overall fund are meant for the implementation of EPAs (see below). Also beefed up were the regional strategies, for which € 1.6 bn was earmarked, almost double the amount for regional activities in the 9th EDF. The EU donor atlas for 2008, the second version of which was meant as a tool to increase transparency and facilitate coordination among EU donors, also adopted a more regional approach. The Commission signed cooperation documents with ACP regions in Africa, namely SADC, ECOWAS, UEMOA, COMESA, EAC and IGAD. It is noteworthy that the organisations are not clear-cut regional entities and partly overlap. As an improvement in procedures in light of reforming the aid system, from the beginning of the year the EDF contained a co-funding provision that allowed the Commission to provide aid through other donors and to manage other donors’ funding. This was a response to the demands in the Paris declaration for more delegated cooperation, in order to reduce the administrative burden on partner countries, ideally without reducing the level of funding they receive. Shortly before the end of the year (4 December), the EU managed to strike a deal on € 1 bn for emergency food aid, meant as relief for food-importing states and poor consumers from high food prices throughout the year. The high world market prices led to a shortage of food in some African countries. Most of the money for food aid came from the EU’s financial instrument for stability and emergency aid reserves (€ 760 m), while € 240 m came from the redeployment of funds that were not earmarked. Originally, the Commission had proposed to allocate € 1 bn from unused EU agricultural funds for this specific purpose. The plans were, however, strongly opposed by several EU member states, which argued that the surplus should be returned to the member states, not least because of the shortage of funding in their national budgets due to the financial crisis.

African-European Relations • 41 The third European Development Days (EDD) took place in Strasbourg (15–17 November) and chose the topic of decentralised cooperation. The EDD happened to take place in parallel with the Washington G20 summit. EU Commission President Barroso sent a video message to the EDD from Washington, emphasising the EU’s willingness to deliver on its promises to developing countries in general and Africa in particular. The high-level participation included Morgan Tsvangirai (leader of the Zimbabwean opposition, and new prime minister in the waiting), Jean Ping (head of the AU Commission), the presidents of Benin (Thomas Yaya Boni), Madagascar (Marc Ravalomanana), Mali (Amadou Toumani Touré) and Burkina Faso (Blaise Compaoré), the French foreign minister (Bernard Kouchner), the EU development commissioner (Louis Michel), Nobel Peace Laureate Wangari Maathai from Kenya, the head of the AfDB (Donald Kaberuka), the German and Swedish development ministers (Heidemarie Wieczoreck-Zeul and Gunilla Carlsson) as well as various others. Under the French EU presidency, the EDD established themselves as a key high-level forum for public debate on EU development cooperation – and hence largely on EU relations with African states and institutions.

Trade and Development Still a key point on the trade and development agenda in Africa-EU relations were EPAs, meant to be a trade agreement for development purposes. The negotiations on the initiative, however, were very slow. Originally, it was envisaged that EPAs would come into force by 1 January. However, by mid-2008 there were only interim agreements with the EAC and a few individual ACP countries. The only full-fledged EPA was signed between the EU and the Caribbean. The agreements, in accordance to the WTO rules, were intended as a move towards reciprocal trade preference, in other words, mutual market opening instead of the previous unilateral preferential market access for ACP products to the EU market. Many technical details, however, had hampered the effectiveness of the previous non-reciprocal EU trade regime. Among the barriers were relatively strict rules of origin, i.e., definitions of when a product qualified as being from an ACP country and could enjoy the preferences. Furthermore, non-tariff barriers, such as sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards, have negatively affected trade opportunities for ACP countries. From the outset, incentives to move towards EPAs were not equally applicable to the ACP, as most ACP countries qualify for the EU’s ‘Everything-But-Arms’ (EBA) regime that grants tariff- and quota-free market access to all least developed countries (LDCs). While LDCs thus mostly faced low risks from changes to the trade regime with the EU, non-LDCs (e.g., Ghana, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Mauritius) by 2008 found themselves having to quickly reach an interim agreement on trade with the EU in order not to lose out on tariff preferences overnight. The loss of trade preferences for them could not be covered by the EPA regime, thereby potentially threatening the existence of small, but in some cases important export industries in these countries.

42 • African-European Relations On 26 November, Côte d’Ivoire signed an interim EPA with the EU. Besides Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana also had an interim EPA with the EU, whereas the West Africa region had not been able (or willing) to sign such an agreement. Nigeria had opted not to pursue the EPA avenue. Nigerian trade to the EU was now under the less beneficial EU general system of preferences. This hardly affected Nigeria, however, as 95% of its exports to the EU consisted of oil, on which there were no tariffs. Individual interim EPAs were also signed between the EU and Cameroon, as well as with Congo-Brazzaville and some members of the SADC, namely Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and Namibia. This somewhat defeated one of the declared purposes of EPAs, namely fostering regional integration. Interim agreements usually contained commitments to continue negotiating a full EPA, which was done with limited progress throughout the year. Difficult issues were offers for mutual market access, i.e., which items to exclude from free trade. Reciprocal preference required the inclusion of “virtually all trade” (as the WTO stipulates). According to the EU’s interpretation of WTO rules, this would require 90% of trade, e.g., 100% market opening of the EU and 80% of the ACP. With SADC, for instance, a tricky issue to be resolved was how to include South Africa, for which a separate agreement is in force. Throughout the year, four negotiation rounds took place with SADC. Further issues under discussion were investments and the inclusion of services in EPAs. Open questions remained on the support for adjustment costs related to implementing an EPA, e.g., through the so-called aid for trade initiative. While discussions of an EU-Africa trade regime were slow and tedious, China has gained further ground in trade with Africa. At the China-Africa summit in Beijing in 2006, China had declared the goal of an annual trade with Africa of $ 100 bn by 2010. What seemed ambitious then was reached prematurely in 2008, making China the second most important trade partner for the whole of Africa. Some commentators appeared to interpret this as a zero-sum game between the EU and China, that is, what China gained automatically meant a loss to the EU. Most African governments, however, seemed to hope for further stimulus from outside. This was even more necessary now, as the financial crisis also affected demand for raw materials, which, in turn, affected world market prices for many of Africa’s prime export articles. Chinese investment was thus regarded as a necessary substitute for reduced European business interests. For European cooperation policy, the Chinese factor was arguably one element in the set of drivers for further European reform to become more effective. There was, however, also the risk of EU member states interpreting Chinese competition as an indication of the need to turn more towards bilateral arrangements that further combine aid with trade (self-)interests. Sven Grimm

IV. West Africa

The sub-region witnessed contradictory developments in the political sphere. Another coup d’etat in Mauritania, a mutiny and army takeover in Guinea in the wake of President Conté’s death and a foiled coup in Guinea-Bissau as well as an attack on the country’s presidential residence, contrasted with events in Ghana, where the opposition took over in properly managed elections, making this the second peaceful leadership change in a decade. While the southwestern forest zone, including Gambia, remained unstable, the Tuareg rebellions in the Sahelian zone continued at a low level of intensity. As always, violence was rife in Nigeria, leading to many deaths but no repercussions for the subregion. Little progress was made with presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire, though the country remained fairly quiet, in spite of unrest among government troops and rebel militias over the payment of allowances. Social protests, spurred on by food and fuel prices,

44 • West Africa raged across the sub-region. Growth rates went down over the course of the year and inflation rose as the effects of the global economic crisis began to bite. Many mining projects, nevertheless, went ahead. West Africa’s pivotal role in the international cocaine trade continued to grow. The US called off plans to establish the headquarters of its new Africa Command (AFRICOM) in the sub-region.

Coups and Electoral Politics In two countries coups d’etat took place, while an attempted takeover in Guinea-Bissau failed. On 6 August, the presidential guard in Nouakchott toppled the president of Mauritania, Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, who was arrested along with his prime minister. This was the second coup since 2005, when the military overthrew the regime of President Ould Taya (also in August) and commenced a transition towards democratic rule that was only concluded with presidential elections in 2007. As in 2005, the takeover got approval from certain political groupings and pointed to the structural instability of the political system. Just as in the wake of the previous takeover, the military immediately announced their commitment to a transition process leading to renewed civilian rule, but this did not prevent the country’s suspension by the AU and condemnation of the coup by ECOWAS and Nigeria. The events in August confirmed that the military continued to be the power behind the throne, acting against the president when he tried to dismiss the commanders of the presidential guard, army and police. Also on 6 August, the authorities in Guinea-Bissau forestalled a coup by arresting the followers of the naval chief of staff, who fled the country when high ranking officers refused to participate in the alleged takeover. A successful coup occurred in neighbouring Guinea, where the death of ailing President Conté on 22 December created a power vacuum that middle-ranking officers filled to prevent a takeover by the top ranks. In doing so, they also preempted the rise to power of Conté’s temporary constitutional successor, the chairman of the National Assembly, which together with the supreme court was suspended. Activities by unions, political parties and civil society were banned while the legislative elections scheduled for December had already been deferred before Conté’s death. Although by year’s end only 30% of the population had been freshly registered to vote, the new junta promised an elected government by 2010. Like Mauritania, Guinea was suspended by the AU, but Libya and neighbouring Senegal expressed support for the military and Sierra Leone and Liberia kept a low profile, fearing regional repercussions from possible domestic violence. This also made the US and France adopt a more lenient line. If these coups showed that electoral politics had still not consolidated themselves in the whole of the sub-region, Guinea-Bissau at least went through the process of parliamentary elections, financed by the international community and held on 16 November. Peaceful and marked by a high turnout, they returned the country’s largest party to power after

West Africa • 45 it had withdrawn from a government of national unity in July in protest at the dismissal of some of its cabinet members. In sharp contrast to some of these developments, Ghana organised another successful round of parliamentary and presidential polls – the third since the new millennium and contributing further to the entrenchment of a two-party system. The opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) not only won the greatest number of seats in parliament, but its presidential candidate also forced a run-off against his rival from the ruling party (President Kufuour was constitutionally barred to stand for a third term). The latter was ahead after the first round but then suffered from a decisive swing to the NDC’s John Atta Mills, who assumed office as Ghana’s new head of state. The international community lauded Ghana’s electoral record, which contrasted with several other countries in the subregion. Presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire, which had theoretically been expected to take place not later than October, were again postponed when preparations got bogged down over the ever contentious issue of identification and registration of voters, one of the key problems in the 2002–07 civil war fought over immigrants’ disenfranchisement and the marginalisation of the country’s northern region. The rescheduling pushed polling day out beyond year’s end. In several countries, domestic politics were marked by a post-electoral wind-down, including in Benin, where, however, relations between the government and opposition descended into political deadlock, and Burkina Faso and Gambia, after legislative elections the previous year. In Nigeria, this was typically characterised by prolonged battles in the courts over petitions and annulments related to the messy elections of 2007. With numerous politicians coming out as winners or losers from these proceedings, a more structural solution was pursued with the formation of an electoral reforms committee. Some of its recommendations, however, would require amendment to the constitution and since this hurdle is almost insurmountable in the framework of the Nigerian federation, the supreme court remained the definitive arbiter in electoral battles. Similarly in Mali, the 2007 elections were followed by the start of a three-year reform process. A commission of inquiry called for the revision of the constitution and the electoral management structure and towards the end of the year the president mandated a follow-up commission to draft the necessary legislation. Meanwhile, voters were registered for local elections scheduled for 2009, and while the electoral register remained a bone of contention, measures were announced to modernise registration. In Togo, the government submitted a new electoral code to parliament reducing the independent electoral commission in size. More importantly, the government and EU agreed to a comprehensive population census as a prelude to redelineating constituency boundaries gerrymandered in favour of the regime’s northern strongholds. Senegal and Sierra Leone also entered a post-electoral phase, the former marked by bitter struggles within the ruling party and renewed dynamism in the opposition after its near-total boycott of the 2007 parliamentary polls. In an attempt at gerrymandering, the

46 • West Africa National Assembly created new electoral districts, but local elections due in May were deferred to March 2009. Tensions between the two leading parties also dominated politics in Sierra Leone but local elections passed off successfully and with a turnout lower than 40%. There were also municipal elections in Benin and in Cape Verde, where the turnout was 80.6% and the opposition gained the upper hand over the government party, prompting a cabinet reshuffle.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law The human rights record varied across the sub-region. Gambia, Mauritania and Niger were among the poorer performers. In Gambia, the alleged deaths of several people claimed to have been involved in a coup attempt in 2006 were left unexamined. The disappearances of an opposition supporter, Kanyiba Kanyi, and journalist Ebrima Manneh in 2006 remained unresolved. The government denied responsibility but also refused to appear before the ECOWAS court of justice, where the Media Foundation for West Africa began proceedings on behalf of Manneh. Gambia was ordered to release him and pay damages, but the government did not respond. A British mining engineer arrested for and charged with theft and economic crimes spent considerable time in detention and house arrest before being able to escape. Similarly, a Scottish missionary couple was sentenced to one year plus hard labour on sedition charges. AI in December published evidence of maltreatment of prisoners in Mauritania, notably of people who protested against the coup d’etat. The organisation also published a report on army brutality against civilians in the course of the Tuareg rebellion in northern Niger. The government denied accusations of torture, killings and abductions. According to a national human rights forum, slavery continued in Mauritania despite being banned the previous year, with the issue of land rights for freed slaves unresolved. Niger’s government was sentenced by the ECOWAS court of justice in an epoch-making case involving a woman who was sold at the age of 12 and lived in slavery for a decade. She was freed two years after the criminalisation of slavery in 2003 (involving heavy penalties). A British NGO filed proceedings on her behalf against the government, which was found guilty of not protecting the woman though not of legitimising slavery by upholding customary law. Vainly arguing that the case be thrown out as the woman had not exhausted the national appeals process, the government was ordered to pay € 15,000 in compensation and, in sharp contrast to the Gambian government, abided by the ruling. Other ECOWAS member states in the Sahelian zone where these dogged practices persisted were now under notice. Mauritania, however, is not a member of ECOWAS. In GuineaBissau, a number of child traffickers were arrested. The country’s human rights league criticised two Muslim leaders who defended female genital mutilation and ‘taliban’ child labour, a reference to children forced to work abroad for their masters.

West Africa • 47 In Togo, where the human rights situation improved somewhat, a bill was tabled for the abolition of the death penalty. The UN welcomed the initiative although extra-judicial killings, persecution by government agents and their impunity remained the country’s key problems. In Mali, a similar initiative launched by the president the previous year was still not brought to fruition in the face of public opposition to abolition. The Nigerian press agency published news that six men were awaiting death by stoning, while several dozens in some of the northern states faced amputations. The federal authorities, however, had so far prevented the carrying out of the stoning verdicts and most amputations. AI published a report on Nigeria claiming that more than 700 people were on death row, with hundreds having waited for a decade or more for their execution by hanging. The legal position of women in Nigeria improved slightly as procedures to obtain passports were eased, enabling them to acquire such papers without the explicit consent of husbands. Legislation to improve women’s rights and the position of children in Mali remained at an impasse in the face of traditionally and religiously inspired objections that also halted the abolition of the death penalty. In Senegal, homosexuals were confronted by renewed repression by the government, egged on by ambitious politicians and an Islamist group. The special court for Sierra Leone concluded its case against leaders of the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF), its judgment expected in February 2009. Other cases related to crimes against humanity committed during the civil war went through the appeals phase, with many convictions upheld or sentences increased and only some overturned. The case against former Liberian President Charles Taylor, accused of aiding the RUF, continued. Held at the ICC premises in The Hague for security reasons and experiencing procedural delays, it still contrasted with the case against the former president of Chad, Hissène Habré, exiled in Senegal. Pressed by donors, the Senegalese authorities moved slowly, with the National Assembly amending the constitution to lift the statutory limitations on the prosecution of crimes against humanity. The government, however, asserted that it required € 28 m in aid to carry on with the case. Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) began hearings and, amid accusations of incompetence, in December published an initial rather poor report on the events of the civil war. While Taylor had refused to testify, incumbent President JohnsonSirleaf in the end did so, admitting that she had contributed financially to Taylor’s war effort at the end of the 1980s, before withdrawing support when his intentions became clear. Togo, too, began the process towards a TRC, with the president starting consultations that led to agreement to investigate cases extending back to 1958. It remained unclear, however, how strong the TRC’s mandate would be, as the president was said to favour a model that would leave guilt undetermined, while many civilians interviewed by UNHCR on this issue pleaded for robust powers so the role played by the army and security services could be tackled. In similar vein, in Guinea-Bissau a bill was tabled

48 • West Africa introducing a general amnesty for the perpetrators of political crimes in the period from independence in 1974 to 2006. Human rights activists criticised the move. The media experienced harassment in various countries. In Gambia, a Nigerian editor was sentenced for sedition and spreading false information on malnutrition among children who were forced to scavenge for food in rubbish heaps. In Guinea-Bissau, a journalist was questioned about a report on an incident between the police and army staff. Similarly, in Mali a journalist was briefly detained when photographing policemen taking bribes from bus passengers. Generally, however, press freedom in the country was greater than elsewhere in West Africa. Private outlets, nevertheless, continued to operate under stringent media laws, which were debated at a conference in December by journalists from across the sub-region. In neighbouring Mauritania, the situation was worse. ‘Reporters sans Frontières’ and the Media Foundation for West Africa expressed concern about the prosecution of journalists under criminal statute rather than the press laws, and in October journalists faced violent attacks for covering protests against the coup d’etat. In similar vein, in Niger the government used the Tuareg rebellion to defer introduction of press laws decriminalising defamation. In August, a TV-radio group was banned for one month because it reported the suppression of demonstrations to protest the imprisonment of Hama Amadou, a former prime minister fallen from grace and charged with embezzlement. Two European journalists and a Nigérien colleague had been released earlier, after being detained for reporting on the rebellion. However, star reporter Moussa Kaka, working for ‘Radio France Internationale’ (RFI) and charged with similar offences, continued in detention until October, and was released only after prolonged court battles and outside pressure. RFI was banned twice within a year and it was feared that self-censorship would threaten media freedom. In neighbouring Nigeria, security services overreacted to reports on the president’s health, interrogating journalists who were sued for libel by the head of state but managed to obtain bail. Standards of reporting, however, declined. Senegal’s government banned TV footage of police repression of a demonstration while followers of the ruling party ransacked the offices of newspapers critical of the president. This, at any rate, led to the resignation of the minister responsible. One of the newspapers involved, following presidential attacks on the press, published an unsubstantiated report on presidential money-laundering, leading to a three-year jail sentence for one of its managers for libel. The media watchdog in Benin became involved in a dispute with the government over the silencing of a private radio station. While an APRM panel praised Burkina Faso for its press freedom, it highlighted the extent of corruption. Graft and the fight against it, whether or not politically motivated, was part of the political landscape in several countries. In one of the lesser scandals, Cape Verde’s opposition leader challenged the prime minister to publish his links with a bank involved in illicit operations, accusing the government of allowing money-laundering. However, the prime minister won a motion of confidence and ordered investigation into possible prosecution for defamation. In Côte d’Ivoire, road rackets by security personnel

West Africa • 49 were calculated to bring in up to € 150–230 m, contributing further to inflation. A purge took place in the cocoa industry, formerly a funder of President’s Gbagbo’s power base and, because of its corrupted state, a stumbling block to good relations with donors. The president’s position improved with this action, which intimidated opponents. Similarly, in Niger the arrest of former Prime Minister Hama Amadou, accused of misappropriation of funds, was more linked to the latter’s rivalry with President Tandja than the fight against corruption. In Guinea-Bissau, a major theft at the financial ministry led to the arrest of the treasurer and two accomplices. Mali’s auditor general reported that the state had foregone income totalling more than CFAfr 100 bn as a result of corruption and mismanagement. Around CFAfr 30 bn was successfully reclaimed, and in another development the minister for mines, energy and water was forced to resign after he was accused of conflict of interest involving an investment bank. On the TI index, Mali climbed from 118 to 99. Corruption scandals rocked circles close to President Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia and the appointment of a friend as the head of a new anti-corruption commission did not inspire confidence. In Sierra Leone, the fight against graft moved forward slightly with legislation to fast-track the prosecution of corruption, while in Nigeria the economic and financial crimes commission still failed to secure the conviction of many ex governors, ministers and chairpersons of parastatals. A corruption scandal rocked a governmental agency helping entrepreneurs in Benin.

Conflict, Instability and Violence Nigeria continued to be West Africa’s most violent country, though with few repercussions at the sub-regional level. Fighting between government troops and armed militias continued in the Niger Delta, the country’s most violent area, followed by the Middle Belt, where communal and sectarian clashes strained the political fabric, notably in the city of Jos, where a wave of violence left more than 400 people dead and thousands homeless. Attacks on offshore oil and gas stations in the Niger Delta continued, as did kidnappings for ransom, spectacular (bank) robberies and political contract killings. Despite the slow progress on DDR and the organisation of elections, Côte d’Ivoire remained relatively quiet, though government troops and former rebel fighters got involved in protests over the payment of allowances, the latter seizing vehicles and looting shops. UN peacekeeping troops remained in place, while French troops were reduced somewhat. Other violence in Côte d’Ivoire erupted during social protests against high food prices. Such demonstrations also took place in Benin, Senegal, Burkina Faso – where numerous towns, including the capital, were hit by rioting – and impoverished Guinea, where youths in October and November protested against fuel prices and the lack of utilities. Consensus Prime Minister Kouaté, appointed in 2007 after earlier protests, had already been fired at the start of the year, when his popularity had plummeted to such an extent that his dismissal triggered no mass response.This, added to the mutinies by army soldiers and

50 • West Africa non-commissioned officers in the spring, made Guinea one of the more unstable countries of the sub-region. It was this level in the armed forces that took power after the death of President Conté. In neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, the presidential residence came under attack on 23 November from soldiers trying to seize an arms depot. The government spoke of a coup attempt – the second, following on the alleged takeover attempt on 6 August. An ally of former President Kumba Yala was arrested. The coup on 6 August in Mauritania followed on political tensions during the summer, when the National Assembly passed a noconfidence vote against the cabinet, and the president retaliated by threatening to dissolve parliament and mandating the old prime minister to form a new government. This led to the mass resignation of MPs from a pro-government coalition, leaving the president without a majority in the Assembly and culminating in the army takeover. The separatist conflict in Senegal’s Casamance region continued at a low level, as the guerrillas experienced splits that opposed moderates to hardliners. The government redeployed troops and received new military hardware, including attack helicopters. In both Mali and Niger, hostilities between government troops and Tuareg rebels continued at a low level of intensity. These exchanges led the government in Mali to discontinue a policy of dialogue and to counter-attack. Negotiations between the Malian government and the Tuaregs took place under Algerian auspices, but at year’s end another rebel attack took place. The Malians decided to intensify security cooperation with Niger, whose government persisted with its uncompromising stand. Apart from leading to army brutality in the north, this approach yielded equally few results, as the rebels, despite suffering splits, continued attacks, involving the laying of landmines and abduction of civilians. Casualties since the start of the rebellion in Niger, more violent than in Mali, amounted to 70 deaths among government soldiers and reportedly at least 200 among the rebels.

Socioeconomic Developments Galloping price rises were the most significant development, putting many staple foods and fuel beyond the reach of all but the more well-to-do among West Africa’s urban dwellers, while peasants benefited minimally due to the rise in fertiliser costs. Rice, a staple for urban people, had risen 74% in price in Burkina since the end of 2007 and cooking oil by 100%. Other countries were similarly hit. An Oxfam study showed that in Mali food prices had increased over 80% between 2005 and 2008. This included locally produced cereal staples, although these were less affected than Asian rice imports. Most governments took measures to subsidise food prices, slash import duties or exempt products from taxation. In Ghana, fertilisers were again subsidised. The success in keeping food and fuel costs within bounds was limited and these measures were often unsustainable, such as in Senegal. Generally, food insecurity and malnutrition increased, forcing governments, such as those in Mauritania and Niger, to hand out cereals or seeds.

West Africa • 51 Inflation consequently soared. During the second half of the year, however, prices began to come down as a result of the onset of the credit crunch. Generally, it took some time before falling fuel prices began to make themselves felt and ease conditions for the population. Overall GDP growth rates were, as a result, lower than the previous year. The IMF calculated Nigeria’s 2008 real GDP growth at 5.3%, in large part made up by the country’s oil sector, which by mid-2008 had delivered record foreign reserves, although this bonanza tapered off as a result of the collapse of the oil price during the second half of the year. Senegal’s growth fell back to 3.9% (the IMF later lowered this estimate to 2.5% real GDP growth), Togo achieved a mere 0.8% (reassessed by the IMF to 1.1%), Guinea a mere 1.8% (thus turning negative in per capita terms, although IMF figures later put it at 4%) and Côte d’Ivoire 2.5%–2.8%. Some of these figures roughly reflected the state of the (post-)conflict cycles or the political instability in these countries, with the Ivorian economy clearly regaining some of its form after the minimal or negative GDP growth figures of previous years. Ghana and Cape Verde were the star performers with 7.2% and 6.5% respectively. Thus, taken as a whole, the sub-region still showed some resilience, reflecting the fact that banks were largely unaffected by the financial crisis in the West, although the effects of the global recession were still awaited. These figures said little about the distribution of wealth. While rising food and fuel costs most affected the (urban) poor, overall poverty levels remained a structural problem. In Côte d’Ivoire, a household survey showed that nearly half the population now lived below the poverty datum line and on less than CFAfr 660 a day – as compared to 10% of the population in 1985. In rural areas, the figure rose to more than 60%, in the north to 80% and in southern cities to almost 30%. In Gambia, too, poverty was said to affect 70% of the population. In better off Cape Verde, however, a survey showed that poverty had decreased, although rural areas and older people were still the most affected. Yet, cereal harvests in the Sahelian zone, a crucial indicator for medium-term wellbeing, were on the whole satisfactory thanks to abundant rains, although in the short term WFP increased its West African operations to feed an additional 1.4 m people affected by high food prices. Rains also led to flooding, affecting up to 130,000 people across the sub-region. Ghana, Togo and areas in Niger were particularly hit, as well as southern Mauritania, Burkina and Mali. The floods, however, were not as serious as in 2007. The ABN conference held in June in Niger’s capital Niamey endorsed a plan to rescue the Niger river, the source of livelihood for more than 110 m people in West Africa, but threatened by drought and silting. One of the plans included the construction of a dam in northwestern Niger to regularise water flows for irrigation and the generation of power. Mali, among others, focused on improving access to drinking water. Some epidemics struck the sub-region, such as an outbreak of polio in Nigeria (endemic in the north), where lawsuits against a pharmaceutical company for damages arising from a flawed drugs test in 1996 were still not concluded. In Mali, efforts were made to vaccinate

52 • West Africa against the disease (together with yellow fever) in a joint campaign with Niger and Burkina Faso. There was a major cholera outbreak in Guinea-Bissau (and a small one in Benin), leading to 200 deaths and more than 12,000 cases of illness. Exploitation of natural resources initially followed the trend of previous years, but was hit by the first effects of the global crisis towards the end of the year. In Ghana, production and exploration of offshore oil reserves continued, as it did in Nigeria, though militia attacks now included targets on the high seas. Gas production facilities, boosted by a new liquefied gas plant, could not prevent chronic blackouts. The China National Petroleum Corporation signed an agreement with Niger for the development of the Agadem oil reserves and the building of a pipeline link to the Chad-Cameroon pipeline. French nuclear giant Areva got definitive approval for development of the Imouraren uranium mine, expected to make Niger the world’s number two producer, the country having fallen back to fifth position in 2007. Indian steel producer Arcelor Mittal during the spring announced investment plans for iron ore mining in Liberia and Mauritania. However, with the IMF warning that mining contracts in Guinea were biased in favour of mining conglomerates, the Guinean government revoked the iron ore exploration rights of Rio Tinto. Renegotiation of bauxite contracts was expected. In Burkina, Ghana and Mali, gold production continued to grow. In Guinea, gold mining firms became the target of popular protest as the payment of local development royalties delivered few results, forcing one company to arrange the electrification of a town to appease protesters. Diamond production, however, experienced problems as a result of the onset of the economic crisis, affecting earnings in Ghana, while diamond-derived income in Liberia was boosted by the (sometimes incorrect) issue of Kimberley Process certificates. In Sierra Leone, De Beers announced that it would limit buying as the credit crunch began to make itself felt. Six countries (Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Senegal) created a committee to harmonise fisheries policies in an effort to improve surveillance and prevent overfishing by foreign trawlers. The EU agreed to pay € 300 m for fishing rights in Mauritania. Cape Verde’s fish processing industry experienced the destruction of freezing facilities as a result of fire. The cotton sector suffered from declining world prices and rising fertiliser costs. One sector that seemed hardly affected by the credit crunch was the drugs trade. Since 2003, 99% of continental drug seizures have taken place in the sub-region. Twenty-five percent of cocaine consumed in Western Europe is traded through West Africa, with a local wholesale price of $ 1.8 bn. Figures published this year by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicated that 50 tonnes of cocaine now transited through the subregion annually, against 46 tonnes in 2005. While global seizures account for some 45% of trafficking, in West Africa these represent the tip of the iceberg. Benefiting from weak states and poor monitoring, Latin American traders work with West African traffickers. Reports released in 2007 pointed out that of all Africans arrested for drugs trafficking, 90% were West Africans and 44% Nigerians.

West Africa • 53 Fears about cocaine’s corrupting effect on sub-regional governance consequently increased, also because the trade had begun to affect countries marked by better government. The UNODC report singled out Ghana, in addition to Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania, as the current key location for the shipping of drugs. To some extent, this was part of the continual shifting of trade patterns in the cat-and-mouse game between Western authorities and drugs dealers. This year, seizures were reported notably on commercial flights from Senegal, Nigeria, Guinea and Mali. However, monitoring agencies suspected that small-scale production, not just transit trade, of both cocaine and heroin was now under way in Ghana, with the necessary chemicals flown in from South Africa. Heroine from South Asia was also increasingly finding its way to Europe via West Africa, notably through Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria. Benin and Cape Verde were also listed in the transit trade. Cannabis grown in the sub-region, especially in Benin, Togo, Ghana and Nigeria, continued to be transported to Europe as well. Police in Togo dismantled a Colombian cocaine network and Sierra Leone saw rising cocaine seizures. In both countries, as in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, government officials were involved in the trade. The US Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA) and UNODC visited Ghana to discuss cooperation. However, Guinea-Bissau remained the sub-regional hub for Latin American producers. Both the UN and EU continued their engagement with the GuineaBissau government.

Sub-regional Organisations: Cooperation and Conflict ECOWAS summits were held on 18 January in Burkina’s capital Ouagadougou, on 23 June in Abuja and on 19 December, again in the Nigerian capital. The first meeting, re-electing Burkina’s President Compaoré as chairman of the authority of heads of state and government, discussed the issue of migration, adopting a joint approach and calling for the removal of obstacles to cross-border movement. The December summit was dominated by the fall-out from the global economic crisis. Confronted by the slowdown in growth, leaders called for greater African input into global initiatives to tackle the monetary and financial challenges. They also pleaded for investment in sub-regional infrastructure. With regard to EPAs, they urged that negotiations lead to a comprehensive accord by June 2009. Nigeria’s President Yar’Adua succeeded Compaoré as ECOWAS chair for the coming year. The summit also discussed food security, energy problems and drugs trafficking, adopting a plan of action. A two-day meeting, organised in partnership with UNODC, took place in Cape Verde at the end of October to discuss the sub-region’s role in the cocaine trade. Common security and defence issues included a plan for a summit to discuss the subregional implications of the Tuareg rebellions in northern Mali and Niger, a five-day exercise in Mali in June (codenamed ‘Operation Jigui’ – meaning ‘hope’ in Bambara) involving 150 military personnel for the development of the 6,500 strong ECOWAS Standby Force

54 • West Africa (ESF), and the contentious US plan to establish a headquarters for AFRICOM. While Liberia had been willing to host the structure, meant to help fight Islamist groups, defend oil interests and train African armed forces, simmering resistance to the establishment of the headquarters on West African soil finally led to a US decision to keep the headquarters in Germany. However, the US in the past had already negotiated base access agreements with several countries (including Mali and Senegal, as well as Algeria, which provided the use of a base in the southern desert city of Tamanrasset), giving the Americans the right to use military bases for operations or transit traffic. Since 2007, the US navy has had a permanent presence in the Gulf of Guinea. Resistance to the AFRICOM headquarters thus had more to do with public sensitivities than the military reality on the ground. The preparations for the building up of the ESF force have also benefited from Western funding. In February, a member states’ meeting in Guinea agreed to establish an ECOWAS network of electoral commissions to encourage impartial elections and their monitoring. This network, together with an ECOWAS election handbook, should help to improve electoral laws and the exchange of best practices. An ECOWAS meeting in early December discussed electoral issues, expressing satisfaction with the elections organised in Benin, Guinea-Bissau (observed by 45 ECOWAS monitors) and Sierra Leone. At the time, the Ghanaian elections were just under way, to which a monitoring team of ECOWAS MPs, ambassadors and representatives of electoral commissions was dispatched. In January the mediation and security council of ECOWAS discussed a framework for conflict prevention. West African ministers continued to monitor events in unstable Guinea-Bissau, together with EU and CPLP countries. ECOWAS chiefs of defence staff planned a follow-up mission in August, in the wake of the alleged failed coup attempt. The attack on the presidential residence on 23 November met with swift condemnation and triggered another visit by an ECOWAS delegation, headed by Commission Chairman Mohamed Chambas. Similarly, ECOWAS Chairman Compaoré on 30 May conferred with other West African leaders on the volatile situation in Guinea, rocked by army mutinies. On 7–8 July, Chambas visited Conakry for talks with political leaders. He expressed concern about the lack of human security. A joint UN-ECOWAS fact-finding mission was dispatched to Gambia to investigate the deaths of several Ghanaian nationals in 2005. ECOWAS condemned the coup d’état in non-member state Mauritania. The issue of free circulation of goods and persons continued to bedevil ECOWAS cooperation. Chambas conferred with civil society representatives on the issue, and the ECOWAS council of ministers on 18 May called on members to ratify a protocol relating to the free movement of persons and the right of residence and establishment. In addition, the ministers called for the resolution of outstanding differences relating to the establishment of the common external tariff. Notwithstanding these gestures, it has often been member states themselves that are the biggest stumbling blocks on the road to sub-regional integration. In June, experts endorsed a plan for the erection of joint border posts, ostensibly to facilitate crossings.

West Africa • 55 High food prices triggered an extraordinary meeting of ministers of trade and industry in Abuja on 19 May. Ministers in Bissau on 30 August exchanged views on the subregion’s energy needs, discussing plans prepared within the institutional frameworks of ECOWAS and UEMOA. One of these initiatives, the West Africa Power Pool, an ECOWAS project for stable and reliable energy, saw the signing earlier in the year of a memorandum of understanding for cooperation with a Chinese firm to improve electricity supply and cope with chronic blackouts. The West African transport and transit facilitation project gained an IDA credit to improve access from landlocked Mali and Burkina to harbours in Ghana. Six years after liquidation of Air Afrique, a new Pan-African airline called ASKY (Africa Sky) was launched in January, co-funded by the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development. ECOWAS member states were called upon on 26 April to grant air traffic rights. Representatives of ECOWAS, UEMOA and ECCAS met on 6–7 November to discuss liberalisation of access to air transport markets. The West African Health Organisation donated CFAfr 180 m to Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger for the fight against meningitis, which is often spread across the Sahel by the Harmattan wind during winter. This followed on the Bissau declaration of November 2007, which aimed to accelerate vaccination as part of better sub-regional health control. The West African museums programme at a meeting in Dakar on 22–23 September launched an appeal for better protection of the sub-region’s cultural heritage, endangered by conflicts and the smuggling of art objects. Klaas van Walraven

Benin

President Yayi Boni’s policy of ‘change’ encountered serious resistance. He faced growing opposition in the National Assembly, in which his coalition lost its majority when members of parliament joined opposing factions. The results of the local elections showed the declining popularity of Yayi and his coalition. Yayi’s government was accused of violating democratic rules and frustrating the proper functioning of national bodies such as the ‘Commission Electorale Nationale Autonome’ (CENA) and the ‘Haute Autorité de l’Audiovisuel et de la Communication’ (HAAC). The politicking between opposition and government paralysed the functioning of the National Assembly. The country’s foreign affairs were marked by a visit by US President Bush, the first visit ever by an American head of state. Benin also hosted the CEN-SAD summit and an APRM meeting. Socioeconomic developments were dominated by the high food and fuel prices, which led to some demonstrations in Cotonou. Cotton exports increased.

Domestic Politics The municipal and communal elections due to be held on 8 January were postponed twice, to 17 February and finally to 20 April. The first postponement was because the National Assembly had not yet appointed representatives for the senate and CENA, and

58 • West Africa the second postponement was in compliance with the statutory waiting period of 60 days between the installation of CENA and the elections. CENA members took office on 19 January. About four million people were eligible to vote at the more than 5,000 polling stations for the 1,435 communal and municipal councillors as well as 26,000 village and neighbourhood representatives. This was the first time that municipal and communal elections were held concurrently. Two thousand observers monitored the voting, including from abroad. The election was far from flawless. Although the ECOWAS observer mission gave its seal of approval, the polls were marred by poor preparation. In some localities, polling booths opened late or not at all and in some instances ballot papers and other materials were lacking. However, the mission commended the high level of civic consciousness and the calm and proper conduct of the electorate. In accordance with the recommendations of the ECOWAS mission, the election was re-run in six districts or ‘arrondissements’ where voters had been unable to cast their ballots (1 May). After some delay, the official final results were published on 20 May. If these elections are seen as a test of the popularity of the ruling coalition, the ‘Forces Cauris pour un Bénin Emergent’ (FCBE), its position deteriorated slightly, as it did not gain a majority among the mayors or the councillors. Cotonou went to the opposition, the ‘Renaissance du Benin’ (RB) led by former President Nicéphore Soglo (who thereby became mayor of Cotonou), and Porto-Novo, the second centre of power, to the ‘Parti du Renouveau Démocratique’ (PRD). The third city of the country, Parakou, went to the FCBE. The functioning of CENA was widely criticised, especially its flawed preparations for, and organisation of the elections. One measure to avoid problems during future elections was the proposed institution of a ‘Liste Electorale Permanente Informatisée’. President Yayi Boni invited Benin’s development partners to contribute to such a system of computerised voter registration, which would require an estimated CFAfr 10 bn to set up. The government was prepared to contribute 30% of the costs, and was seeking the balance from donors. Yayi Boni’s government encountered serious resistance within and outside parliament. On 12 March, on the eve of the municipal and communal elections, four important opposition parties issued a joint statement expressing concern about the multiple crises between the government and various national bodies. The so-called G4, consisting of the RB, PRD, the ‘Mouvement Africain pour la Développement et le Progrès’ (MADEP) and the ‘Parti Social Démocrate’, stated it wanted to put a stop to bad governance and threats to democracy. A week later, Nicéphore Soglo polarised the situation even further by accusing Yayi Boni of curtailing press freedom and taking the former dictator of Togo Gnassingbé Eyadéma as his example in national politics. The threat to press freedom arose from a dispute between the minister of communication and the independent HAAC, a media watchdog. On 26 March, the minister silenced

Benin • 59 a private radio station even though it had HAAC’s permission to start broadcasting. In a press statement, HAAC asserted that it had the constitutional prerogative to authorise or prevent broadcasts by private radio and television stations. The statement accused the government of violating constitutional law and the democratic principle of the separation of powers. On 2 April, the constitutional court ruled against HAAC by asserting that it should reconsider broadcast permits for private radio stations. On 12 August, tensions in the National Assembly became physical. During a debate on a letter from the president concerning a law making it possible to change radio and television frequencies, a member of parliament Djibril Débourou from the ruling coalition punched Sacca Fikara, an opposition MP. Only after intervention by some military, was order restored. Some time after the local elections, President Yayi Boni announced a cabinet reshuffle (22 October). Fifteen ministers left, eight kept their posts, three were moved and 19 new ministers were invited to join this new government. The total number of ministers increased from 26 to 30. Yayi invited four ministers from opposition parties in order to enlarge his support in the National Assembly, two from MADEP and two from G13, a group of MPs who had left the ruling coalition about a year earlier. G13 withdrew their ministerial candidates the following day, stating the group had not been officially consulted. On 28–29 November, the opposition parties – G13, G4 and ‘Force Clé’ – held a political seminar to express their disapproval of the way public affairs had been run under Yayi Boni and to provide a political alternative. However, the ruling FCBE rejected the measures proposed and dismissed them as a way out of political deadlock. On 7 June, seven new members of the constitutional court were sworn in for a period of five years. The government appointed three members, the four others being nominated by the National Assembly. On 15 December, the assembly elected its six representatives among the 13 judges who sit on the high court of justice. However, disagreement ensued between the ruling coalition and the opposition on the voting procedure. After an almost week-long deadlock, the assembly finally elected its representatives on 20 December. The opposition took all six seats, ignoring the call for consensus by the ruling FCBE, which boycotted the vote, declaring it unconstitutional. Despite these political tensions, on 30 December all 72 members of the National Assembly voted for the government budget for 2009, amounting to about CFAfr 1,238 bn, a 6% increase on the previous year. The president of the opposition RB, Mme Rosine Soglo, played a decisive role in the lead-up to this vote.

Foreign Affairs Benin hosted two international summits and welcomed US President Bush on 16 February, the first time an American president had visited the country. The two presidents spoke

60 • West Africa with each other in private and there was an extended working meeting with staff. At the ensuing news conference, Yayi Boni acknowledged US support in the field of education, health and the fight against corruption, especially within the framework of the Millennium Challenge Account. Bush applauded Benin’s efforts in these fields and Yayi Boni’s belief in the market economy. Bush further mentioned that they had spoken about mutual interests on the basis of a shared “belief in certain truths and certain values”. The American president’s visit was perceived as a diplomatic triumph for Yayi and his staff. Afterwards, however, some press commentators expressed criticism of the limited results of the Bush stopover. On 5 May, President Boni visited Libya’s leader Kadhafi to discuss preparations for the 10th meeting of CEN-SAD, which took place in Cotonou on 14–18 June. For this event, construction work was undertaken, including the building of a village of 105 villas close to the airport to lodge member state representatives. The airport, the city’s main roads and the conference buildings were rehabilitated. Estimated expenses were CFAfr 60 bn. Thirteen heads of states attended the summit to discuss a range of matters, from food security, high food and fuel prices to peace and security problems. However, while the food crisis and the high prices of food, mineral resources, oil and oil derivates such as fuel and plastics featured prominently on the agenda, one of the most tangible results was the abolition of visas for CEN-SAD members. The final declaration stated that “visas [were] abolished for businessmen, researchers, sportspeople and well-known artists.” Other pronouncements made it clear that member states would promote agricultural development and cooperation between oil-importing and oil-exporting countries to help people cope with food and fuel inflation. Benin hosted the first extraordinary APRM summit on 25–26 October. The summit was poorly attended: of the expected 28 head of states, only six showed up in addition to the host. The meeting completed the peer review discussion of Nigeria, which had been cut short during the previous meeting in June, and Burkina Faso s report was also presented. France’s immigration minister, Brice Hortefeux, arrived for a working visit on 17 September. President Yayi Boni and Minister of Foreign Affairs Moussa Okanla received Hortefeux and signed accords on the management of migration and development. Minister of Health Kessilé Tchala entered into an agreement for medical aid worth CFAfr 2 bn. Soulé Mana Lawani, minister of economics and finance, signed a deal with the French minister for a CFAfr 5 bn support programme for the electrification of rural areas, to be executed by European partners (EU, the Netherlands and Germany) and the Beninese electricity company. Benin renewed its military cooperation with its most important partner in this field, Belgium. From 28 May–1 June Belgian Minister of Defence Pieter de Crem visited the country to meet his Beninese counterpart, Kogui N’Douro. De Crem’s visit was preceded by a preparatory mission by the head of the Belgian army, General August van Daele. On 24 June, South African Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota and N’Douro signed a memo-

Benin • 61 randum of understanding on defence cooperation with Pretoria. The agreement focused on joint training of military personnel through the exchange of trainers, instructors and observers. Louis Michel, EU commissioner for development and humanitarian aid, visited Benin on 5 October. In expressing concern about the difficult relations between government and opposition, he remarked that “the international community [was] closely following the political situation in Benin.” He spoke with Pascal Irénée Koupaki, minister in charge of the economy, economic forecasting, development and evaluation of public action, economics and finance minister Soulé Mana Lawani and former president and current opposition leader and mayor of Cotonou, Nicéphore Soglo. President Boni expressed criticism of the ICC’s indictment of Sudan’s President alBashir, stating that it could damage efforts to bring peace to Sudan and that he had the feeling “that this court [was] chasing Africa”. About a month later, at the APRM conference on 25 October, the Beninese president attacked the world’s richest nations and largest emerging economies for excluding the poorest countries from the G20 summit. From 27 May to 10 June, President Yayi Boni embarked on a foreign tour that took him to Japan for the Tokyo international conference on African development, France (1–3 June), Italy (for the FAO summit on food security), Tunisia (for an AfDB meeting) and Kuwait, with which agreements were signed on technical, economic and educational cooperation. Yayi Boni also attended the conference on financing for development in Doha, Qatar, which lasted from 19 November to 2 December.

Socioeconomic Developments At the beginning of the year, Yayi Boni predicted real GDP growth of 7%. However, the negative shocks of food and fuel price increases and the global financial crisis reduced this to 5%, still the highest since 2001 thanks to strong agricultural production, construction and trading activity. Inflation rose to about 8%, a result of the government’s policy to let domestic prices fully adjust to high international food and fuel prices. Transport and telecommunications grew by an estimated 6.1%, spurred by increased activity at the port of Cotonou and high demand for mobile phones. The IMF visited the country twice (3–7 March and 10–24 September) to conduct the fourth and fifth reviews under Benin’s PRGF arrangement. In June, after completing the fourth review, the IMF announced it was increasing its financial assistance by 150% and that Benin would receive $ 16.4 m to enable the government to mitigate the impact of high fuel and food prices. IMF officials commended Benin’s overall fiscal performance, especially efforts to “improve governance in the revenue agencies and to strengthen tax and customs administration.” However, Benin was urged to continue structural reforms in key economic sectors to reduce its vulnerability.

62 • West Africa As a net importer of fuel and food, Benin suffered from the global increase in fuel and food prices. For some products, prices were twice as high as in the corresponding period the previous year. To diminish price increases, on 1 May the government suspended taxes on corn, flour and other staples. These measures, and the subsidies on fuel and other petroleum products, drained the government’s accounts of some CFAfr 85 bn. However, at least two large demonstrations took place in Cotonou in July and September to protest the increasing living costs. The farm-gate purchase price for first choice cotton was raised to CFAfr 210 per kg, up from CFAfr 180 the previous season. The price per kg of second choice cotton was fixed at CFAfr 160. Yayi Boni announced the government would also pay subsidies for fertiliser and insecticide inputs to offset higher production costs. The production of cotton, the country’s main export, increased during the season, with exports up by 11.6% to 268,628 tonnes. Rice production increased by 65% and millet production by 44%. Several countries and institutions provided donor aid to alleviate the effects of rising food and fuel prices. France and the Netherlands donated about CFAfr 1 bn to strengthen food security; Libya sent 38 tonnes of rice and medicines; and the World Bank provided $ 8.7 m in emergency support for expanded fertiliser use and to set in place a mechanism for the sustainable delivery of agricultural inputs in the medium-term. On 29 July, President Boni decreed the start of a project to protect Benin’s coastline, threatened by erosion, after the relevant € 50 m plan, partly funded by donors, went on hold as a result of the impasse between government and opposition. Other substantial projects at risk of being cancelled were programmes within the framework of the Millennium Challenge Account. China provided CFAfr 520 m in agricultural equipment to help mechanise the agricultural sector. At year’s end, Benin and China signed an agreement worth $ 6 m for a road construction project in Cotonou. On 3 June, the AfDB signed an agreement for a loan of $ 28.2 m to finance the Beninese section of an electrical power line connecting neighbouring Togo with Ghana. The project, part of the West African Power Pool programme, involves the construction of a power connection that will increase transmission capacity between Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana. On the public health front, the government disclosed figures showing a lower prevalence rate for HIV/AIDS. On the basis of the 2006 census, it was estimated that 1.2% of the population had HIV/AIDS, a reduction from 4.1% in 2001. Cotonou was faced with a cholera outbreak, which resulted in one death and more than 150 people falling ill. From October on, caesarean section operations were available free of charge. This measure was adopted to address mother and child mortality. Twenty specialists were trained to carry out the procedure and the government supplied equipment and materials worth CFAfr 30 m. Cardinal Bernadin Gantin, a leading Roman Catholic prelate, died on 13 May at the age of 86 in Paris. Gantin was formerly dean of the Vatican’s college of cardinals. A minister from Benin travelled to Paris to accompany the remains back home. The international airport of Cotonou was renamed in Gantin’s honour.

Benin • 63 In March, a corruption scandal concerning the ‘Project d’Appui au Developpement des Micro-Entreprises’ (PADME), a government organisation to support entrepreneurs, became public. According to the inspection commission, PADME’s director had claimed far too many expenses on his too frequent journeys. An estimated CFAfr 1.5 bn had disappeared in 2006 in the form of fictitious credit and other irregularities. Laurens Nijzink

Burkina Faso

External economic shocks that boosted the rising costs of living led to public unrest. The government, in which President Blaise Compaoré remained the most powerful figure, reacted with short-term accommodation measures, while political parties struggled more with internal strife than with policy proposals. The channelling of political claims was primarily organised by civil society. Meanwhile, President Compaoré consolidated his sub-regional diplomatic standing, particularly with his mediation in Côte d’Ivoire.

Domestic Politics Thousands of citizens demonstrated over rising costs of living several times throughout the year. Only after violent riots had occurred in all the major towns did political organisations seriously begin to take up the issue, which had been seething for years. Between 20 and 28 February, riots hit Bobo-Dioulasso, Ouahigouya, Banfora, Fada-N’Gourma, Koudougou and the capital Ouagadougou. According to the mayor of Bobo-Dioulasso, the estimated damage in Burkina’s second largest town amounted to CFAfr 500 m (approx. € 0.76 m). Some demonstrators were injured in clashes with the police, while 153 and 184 people were arrested in Bobo-Dioulasso and Ouagadougou respectively. Trials were held within days leading to 29 sentences in Bobo-Dioulasso and 44 sentences in the

66 • West Africa capital. Most sentences for looting and destruction of property did not exceed one year of imprisonment, whereas Thibaut Nana, a protest leader and the young chairman of a small opposition party, was sentenced to 36 months. All the others were immediately released. Alarmed by the violence and the prospect of escalation, a new coalition of civil society organisations was formed on 12 March in Ouagadougou. This ‘Coalition nationale de lutte contre la vie chère, la corruption, la fraude, l’impunité et pour les libertés’ (CCVC) issued a list of 15 demands. Civil society took advantage of the prevailing situation to renew longstanding political demands in addition to the debate on the cost of living, which remained the principal concern. The 15 points included free education and basic healthcare, the struggle against corruption, non-privatisation of strategic state enterprises (e.g., water supply, electricity, petroleum), resumption of proceedings in the case of the murder of journalist Norbert Zongo on 13 December 1998 as well as demands for price controls and higher salaries. When trade unions called for more demonstrations on 15 March, protests reverted to more organised and peaceful form. A group of parties dubbed ‘Groupe du 14 Février’ (G14), created ten years earlier, remobilised itself and released several joint press statements. For the most part, G14 demanded state-controlled prices, although it also frequently proclaimed its distrust of the current state administration and particularly deplored widespread corruption. This raised questions about how the opposition would implement price controls. Civil society was more effective. CCVC’s call for a general strike on 8 and 9 April met with a widespread response. When prices continued to rise, trade unions organised another strike on 13–15 May. The government reacted to the growing pressure with more price subsidies, mainly in the form of a temporary suspension of taxes and tariffs on staple products such as rice, milk, flour and salt. However, unrest continued. In June, Ouagadougou university students clashed with security forces on the central campus. Thirty-four students and 14 gendarmes were injured. Students were mainly mobilised by the ‘Association Nationale des Étudiants Burkinabè’ (ANEB), a student union known for its critical stance towards the government, its ability to paralyse the university and its readiness to confront the security forces. The students also deplored inadequate financial support and teaching facilities, restrictions on opportunities to repeat failed courses and the creation of a university security service. These special units – viewed as an indication of state suspicion – had already caused protests the previous year leading to massive delays in the academic calendar. As a consequence of the latest unrest, the University of Ouagadougou was closed from 27 June to 1 September and exams were again delayed. The university reopened after authorities made concessions on teaching facilities, dormitories and repeating failed courses. Later in the year, a strike by lecturers over salaries and working conditions once more brought education to a halt. Meanwhile, internal strife afflicted both the political camp supporting President Compaoré and the so-called ‘radical opposition’. The ruling ‘Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès’ (CDP) faced two major challenges. First, several former leaders of the ‘Conven-

Burkina Faso • 67 tion Nationale des Patriotes Progressistes’ (CNPP) – a political party that had merged with the then ruling ‘Organisation pour la Démocratie Populaire/Mouvement du Travail’ (ODP/ MT) to form the CDP in 1996 – continued their quarrel with the party’s executive committee. These disagreements began in the wake of the 2007 legislative elections. Members of the CNPP faction felt marginalised due to their unfavourable positioning on CDP’s electoral lists. As a result, none of the former CNPP leaders got into parliament. In April and May, the CNPP faction made its grievances public and complained about the CDP’s internal functioning. This step incurred the great displeasure of CDP President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. On 13 June, the national executive committee decided to suspend six major representatives of the CNPP faction “from all bodies, instances and structures of the party” on account of their “notorious indiscipline, factionalism and anti-party spirit.” Among those suspended was a former ambassador to Ghana and vice president of the National Assembly, Marc Oubriki Yao. Only the party congress scheduled for late 2009 could formally decide on a final expulsion. Second, the ‘Fédération Associative pour la Paix et le Progrès avec Blaise Compaoré’ (FEDAP/BC) was established in April following the merger of several associations that described themselves as civil society organisations favouring Compaoré’s development policy. Though downplayed by the CDP leadership and FEDAP/BC officials, the creation of this federation led to political speculation. Predecessor associations such as ‘Amis de Blaise Compaoré’ (ABC) and ‘Tantis pour Blaise Compaoré’ (TBC) had demonstrated their political power during the presidential campaign of 2005, when they had effectively mobilised numerous voters. Political observers, including many CDP politicians, thus, perceived the new federation as a potential threat to the ruling party’s dominance. This perception was nourished by the fact that the president’s younger brother François Compaoré was said to be the main figure backing the federation. Hence, rumour had it, Blaise Compaoré could use FEDAP/BC to promote his brother as successor to the office of the president. François Compaoré had been an economic advisor to the president for 20 years and had close family ties with the country’s richest business circles. Two further events fuelled these speculations. There was uncertainty about President Compaoré’s health. Observers presumed he could refrain from standing a fourth time as presidential candidate in the elections in 2010. However, Compaoré was able to dispel medical concerns when he announced in December that he had just undergone an operation on his eyes. Second, he dismissed Salif Diallo in a cabinet reshuffle on 23 March. Diallo, a close Compaoré ally, lost his position as minister of state for agriculture and fisheries as a result of rivalry with Prime Minister Tertius Zongo. Observers also pointed to Diallo’s alleged conflicts with François Compaoré and CDP chairman Kaboré. However, he remained a vice president of CDP and led an influential faction that was said to be the main internal rival to Kaboré’s group. The fact that Diallo was quickly sent as ambassador to Austria confirmed his marginalisation. Another cabinet reshuffle on 3 September included the removal of the ministers of finance and security, responsible for price

68 • West Africa policies and dealing with the student insurrection respectively. A minor post was allocated to Toussaint Abel Coulibaly, head of the third largest party in parliament and part of the presidential majority. The opposition again failed to unite. The late Joseph Ki-Zerbo’s ‘Parti pour la Démocratie et le Progrès/Parti Socialiste’ (PDP/PS) lost the support of its two remaining MPs as a result of internal strife. The election of François Kaboré at the fourth party congress on 22–23 November led to discontent with the faction of former leaders of the PS, a party that had merged with the much larger PDP in 2001. Others, particularly MP Etienne Traoré and former secretary general Alain Zougba, resigned from the party earlier in the year. The long-awaited reconciliation between the so-called ‘Sankarist’ parties also failed to materialise. Their alliance for the 2007 legislative elections called ‘Union des Partis Sankaristes’ (UPS) should have been transformed into a single party structure on 1–2 March but one of the party presidents, Norbert Tiendrébéogo, resenting his defeat in the election for party presidency, quit the alliance. The government used these developments to reject the UPS’s registration as a political party. In December, however, the largest Sankarist party, ‘Union pour la Renaissance/Mouvement Sankarist’ (UNIR/MS), announced a fresh attempt to unite this political camp under its own leadership. UNIR/MS had not participated in the abortive UPS project. On 13 December, opposition forces and government critics commemorated the 20th anniversary of the murder of Norbert Zongo, a leading figure in independent journalism in Burkina Faso. The anniversary contributed to the revival of the ‘Collectif des Organisations Démocratiques de Masse et de Partis Politiques’ (CODMPP), which collected 100,000 signatures for a petition demanding the reopening of judicial inquiries into the Zongo case and suspected the involvement of government officials in the murder. Two days later, police questioned four top representatives of the CODMPP (Chrysogone Zougmoré, Tolé Sanou, Jean-Claude Méda, Bénéwendé S. Sankara) because demonstrators had renamed a major road in Ouagadougou ‘Avenue Norbert Zongo’ by pasting over the official road signs. Officials spoke of damage to public property, critics interpreted their actions as an attempt at intimidation.

Foreign Affairs President Compaoré further increased his international standing, especially with his mediation in the sub-region’s conflicts. Ouagadougou remained involved in the political process in Togo, and Compaoré also held numerous talks and meetings on the Ivorian crisis, including two meetings of the monitoring and evaluation committee (14 January and 21 March) established in terms of the Ouagadougou Agreement. Moreover, Compaoré took part in the third conference of the ‘Cadre permanent de concertation’ (9 May), which dealt with Côte d’Ivoire’s planned presidential election. In preparing for this larger conference, the president met three times with the chairman of the Ivorian independent elec-

Burkina Faso • 69 toral commission (5 February, 18 March and 25 April). However, at year’s end the election was indefinitely postponed. Compaoré also held talks on Côte d’Ivoire with UN officials (UN secretary general on 31 January and 22 April, the deputy secretary general on 11 May, UN special representative on 20 March, 11 April and 9 July, the commander of the peacekeeping force on 19 March, 5 July and 2 August) and foreign dignitaries (e.g., French President Sarkozy on 7 March). Burkina’s prestige was also enhanced by its election as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council as of 1 January. On 30 June, the UN and AU appointed Djibril Bassolé as chief mediator for Darfur. Prior to his appointment, Bassolé – a former chief of staff of the gendarmerie, then minister of security – headed the ministry of foreign affairs. Bassolé had mediated in conflicts in neighbouring countries on Compaoré’s behalf, including in Togo and the Tuareg rebellion in Niger in the 1990s. While France remained the most important bilateral donor, Ouagadougou was able to diversify its support base by strengthening ties with Washington, which was mainly interested in military cooperation within the framework of counter-terrorism. Compaoré was received by President Bush at the White House during his visit to the US (14–16 July). In the course of this visit a convention was signed between Burkina Faso and the US Millennium Challenge Corporation on US development aid worth $ 480.9 m over five years for projects in agriculture, infrastructure and road construction as well as girls’ education. US special forces were allowed to operate in the north of Burkina, while 60 officers from Burkina’s air force, gendarmerie and presidential guard received training from American specialists in Ouagadougou from 18 to 23 August. The training aimed to build capacity for future peace building missions and counter-terrorism measures. Relations between Ouagadougou and Washington could only improve after the easing of diplomatic relations between the US and Libya, a long-time ally of Compaoré. An expert panel of the African Peer Review Mechanism expressed concern at Burkina’s authoritarian political system. During a press conference on 7 March in Ouagadougou after visiting 12 of Burkina’s 13 administrative regions, the chief of mission Marie-Angélique Savané, a sociologist from Senegal, highlighted the lack of dialogue between local populations and state representatives. While praising the country’s relative stability and press freedom, she called for improvements in the electoral system (currently favouring the ruling CDP), the decentralisation process (with CDP politicians proving reluctant to hand over power), civilian-military relations and the fight against corruption. In the second half of the year, former Liberian warlord turned Liberian senator, Prince Johnson, declared that he and later President Charles Taylor of Liberia had helped Compaoré overthrow President Thomas Sankara in 1987. In return, Compaoré had supported Taylor’s coup against then Liberian President Samuel Doe in 1990. Johnson thereby revived a long-standing allegation that Compaoré was involved in his predecessor’s murder. Burkina government spokesman denied the accusations. Compaoré himself even denied knowing Johnson personally.

70 • West Africa

Socioeconomic Developments The rising cost of living was the main concern. Although Burkina benefited from uninterrupted growth of approximately 5%, inflation soared to an estimated annual 9.5%, peaking in May when prices rose by 4.5% compared to the previous month. In October, the weekly news journal ‘Jeune Afrique’ published examples of real market price developments for essential imports. These showed an increase in prices for sugar of 27%, for rice of 74% and for cooking oil of 100% since the end of 2007. This trend was mainly the result of the economy’s high external vulnerability. A reduction in import taxes was of no avail. Burkina’s economy also suffered a double shock in the cotton sector, the country’s principal cash earner and rural employer. According to data from the US Foreign Agricultural Service, cotton production dropped by 47.7% from an all time high in the 2006–07 season and was projected to recover slowly by 25% during the 2008–09 season. This would still be only two-thirds the production in 2006–07. Simultaneously, the world market price for cotton continued to decline, further affecting earnings. The IMF was not satisfied with the reforms to date and urged greater privatisation and efficiency. The fastest growing sector was mining. Industrial gold production gained further momentum and new sites were explored across the country. Gold exports were expected to reach approximately three-quarters of the value of cotton exports. Six months after industrial mining started at Taparko, two further sites began production in March: the Yonga mine located 200 km south of Ouagadougou and the Mana mine, expected to produce about 3.6 tonnes a year and located in the northwest. All three mines were operated by Canadian companies (High River Gold in Taparko, Etruscan Resources in Yonga, Semafo in Mana). In October, UK’s Cluff Mining began to exploit a fourth site, Kalsaka mine in northwestern Yatenga province. In late February, a fourth Canadian investor, Orezone Resources, obtained rights to develop and exploit the Essakane gold mine in the northeast and secured $ 330 m in financing from German and South African banks. The same company successfully explored other sites, discovering a new gold vein in Bambore southeast of Ouagadougou. Norway’s Wiga Mining bought 93% of a company that was exploring the Inata site in the north. Meanwhile, 34 people perished in an accident at an artisanal mining site in August. There was also growing interest in other minerals. While a zinc project was suspended as a result of insufficient finance, manganese exploration intensified. Poor road safety led to the death of 70 people in a major accident in Boromo in November. President Compaoré was criticised for not returning from a visit to Europe after the accident. Following the protests over the rising cost of living, the country’s main employers’ association, ‘Conseil National du Patronat Burkinabè’ (CNPB), reached agreement with

Burkina Faso • 71 major trade unions to increase private sector wages. From 1 October workers received an 8% increase and middle-level and upper-level employees an increase of 6% and 4%. Negotiations between trade unions and government led to a 4% increase in public sector wages effective 1 January 2009. By and large, poor human development persisted and social inequality grew. UNDP reported in September that Burkina Faso needed to make urgent policy changes in order to have any chance of achieving five of the eight MDGs. With regard to two goals, including MDG 1 (eradication of extreme poverty and hunger) there was insufficient information for an evaluation. The country was not on target to reduce child mortality and remained highly dependent on multilateral and bilateral donors. As early as January, the IMF approved an SDR 9 m increase to help address the impact of external shocks. Alexander Stroh

Cape Verde

In the municipal elections in May, the opposition ‘Movimento para a Democracia’ (MpD) defeated the ruling ‘Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde’ (PAICV). The defeat prompted Prime Minister José Maria Neves to reshuffle his government to give it a new image. At the end of the year, after being affected by rising fuel and food prices, the country experienced the first consequences of the global economic crisis.

Domestic Politics On 18 May, MpD won the municipal elections, securing a majority of votes in 11 of the 22 municipalities, including the three largest ones, Praia, Santa Catarina (both on Santiago) and São Vicente. In Praia, Úlisses Correia e Silva, the MpD vice president, defeated the incumbent, Felisberto Vieira (PAICV), by a small margin of 559 votes. In São Vicente, where it did not win an absolute majority, MpD formed a coalition with the small ‘União Caboverdianas Independente e Democrática’ (UCID) opposition party. The leader of MpD, Jorge Santos, claimed that three-quarters of the population lived in places controlled by his party. PAICV secured ten municipalities, while the ‘Grupo Independente para Modernizar Sal’ (GIMS), a civic group allied with the MpD, won the municipality of Sal. Voter turnout was 80.6%, by international standards a high figure for local elections.

74 • West Africa Campaign issues focused on increasing food prices and rising crime rates in the urban centres. Since the last municipal elections in 2004, the number of municipalities had been increased from 17 to 22. Following the defeat in the local elections, Prime Minister José Maria Neves carried out a cabinet reshuffle on 30 June. Fátima Fialho was appointed new minister of economy, growth and competitiveness. The former economy minister, José Brito, replaced Víctor Borges as foreign minister, while Madalena Neves moved from environment to labour to replace Sidónio Monteiro, who shifted to youth and sports. Vera Duarte replaced Filomena Martins as minister of education and Marisa Morais took the justice portfolio, previously held by José Manuel Andrade. The new government included eight women. During the inauguration of the new ministers, Prime Minister José Maria Neves promised tax cuts to protect purchasing power in times of increasing food prices and to address the power crisis and rising crime rate. On 3 August, UCID, the country’s third largest party with two seats in parliament, split into two opposing factions when the party’s Santiago section held an extraordinary party congress and elected the businessman Mário Moniz as new leader. However, the incumbent António Monteiro dismissed the congress as illegal, did not recognise the vote and took the case to the supreme court. In an attempt to capitalise on the financial scandal involving the ‘Banco Insular de Cabo Verde’ (BICV) (see below), on 24 November Jorge Santos, the leader of MpD, accused the government of allowing money laundering in the country and asked Prime Minister Neves to make public his ties with BICV and its Portuguese owners. The prime minister denied any link and called on the attorney-general to investigate the possible prosecution of the opposition leader for defamation. The allegations led Neves to introduce a motion of confidence in the National Assembly, which was approved by the 41 deputies of PAICV on 5 December. The 23 MpD deputies and the two from UCID voted against the motion. After the vote, Libéria Brito, a PAICV deputy, claimed that it had been proved that the prime minister had always been telling the truth.

Foreign Affairs On 5 June, the EU and Cape Verde signed a two-year mobility partnership agreement aimed at jointly managing migration between the two parties. The objective of the programme, scheduled to start in January 2009, was to increase legal immigration to EU countries while reducing illegal immigration. Under the agreement, a joint migration centre is to be established in Praia to handle applications for short-term visas. Another aim was to prevent a permanent brain drain by encouraging circular migration: skilled Cape Verdians residing in the EU would be able to work on the archipelago without risking their right of return.

Cape Verde • 75 On 24 November in Paris, Minister of the Interior Lívio Lopes and the French minister of immigration and integration, Brice Hortefeux, signed a bilateral agreement on mobility. This would permit 700 legal Cape Verdian immigrants access to the French labour market annually, including 100 students wishing to obtain professional experience in France. Under the agreement, France would also finance development projects in the archipelago submitted by Cape Verdian immigrant associations. The agreement was also aimed at combating illegal immigration. According to Brice Hortefeux, a total of 10,000 Cape Verdian immigrants lived in France, with a further 30,000 holding dual nationality. In July, Cape Verde became the 153rd member of the WTO and the first African country to succeed in joining the organisation since its creation in 1995. The negotiations for the country’s membership took nine years, since several reforms related to industrial and intellectual property rights had to be introduced. Cape Verde was allowed until 2018 to meet all the WTO requirements. The government identified as priorities the elaboration and application of new legislation on health, commerce, customs and copyright regulations. WTO membership was expected by the country to result in increased levels of foreign direct investment to secure ongoing economic growth. As a result of reduced import duties, WTO membership was also expected to affect customs duties, which represented approximately 20% of domestic revenue. However, the government hoped that increased duties on agricultural imports and rising value-added tax revenues deriving from the expected increase in imports of goods would compensate for this loss. In Praia on 17 December, the director general of defence, Lieutenant Colonel Pedro de Reis Brito, and China’s ambassador, Wu Yuanshan, signed a protocol on military aid worth € 572,000 for the Cape Verdian armed forces. During the ceremony, Ambassador Wu Yuanshan stressed the long history of successful cooperation between the two countries and announced the signing of future cooperation agreements with Cape Verde, including on the construction of a national stadium, a hospital and schools. In addition, on 26 December Minister of Finance Cristina Duarte and Ambassador Wu Tuanshan signed three further agreements involving a donation of € 5.7 m, a concessional loan of € 10 m and an interest-free loan of € 2.3 m. The loans were for the financing of various projects, including the purchase of scanners for containers for the ports of Praia, São Vicente and Sal. On 19 December, Prime Minister Neves participated in the 34th summit of ECOWAS heads of state and government in Abuja, Nigeria. At the summit, Praia was chosen to host the headquarters of a West African institute for regional integration that would come into operation in 2010. The research institute would have financial and scientific autonomy and be financed by ECOWAS, Ecobank, UNESCO and other interested entities. Another summit decision was the immediate implementation of the Centre of Renewable Energies and Energy Efficiency that would also be located in Cape Verde.

76 • West Africa

Socioeconomic Developments From January to September, the IMF completed the three reviews of the three-year policy support instrument signed with the government in 2006. The IMF praised the country’s strong economic and policy performance, but criticised government for not regularly adjusting fuel prices in line with rising international prices, since this increased fiscal risks. Real growth in 2008 sustained by tourism revenues and inflows of foreign direct investment was estimated at 6.5%. Due to reduced current spending, especially on public sector wages, and improved tax collection, the IMF programme’s objective of reducing domestic debt to less than 20% of GDP was met two years ahead of target. The IMF stressed the importance of diversifying the economy to reduce the consequences of shocks and of monitoring the economy for adverse effects of the global crisis on domestic growth and the balance of payments. In March, Transport Minister Manuel Inocêncio Sousa announced that the China (Overseas) Fisheries Co. (CNFC) would take a stake in the local shipyard, Estaleiros Naveis de Cabo Verde (Cabnave), in São Vicente. CNFC intended to establish a service centre for the island’s fishing fleet of 245 ships. On 9 September, the fish processing sector suffered a major blow when fire destroyed most of the freezing facilities and the offices of Interbase in Mindelo, São Vicente. The company provides services for the island’s fishing fleet and storage facilities for more than 30 local food-processing enterprises, which lost 300 tonnes of inventory in the blaze. The government promised to invest € 14 m in the construction of new facilities, to be completed by the end of the year. Additionally, the executive guaranteed the payment of Interbase personnel as well as the supply of basic foodstuffs to São Vicente. To mitigate the local impact of rising food prices on international markets, on 26 May the National Assembly approved legislation to reduce the import duty on wheat from 20% to 10% and to exempt temporarily maize, wheat, dairy products and vegetable oils from value-added tax. In addition, in order to support the purchasing power of the country’s 23,000 pensioners, the government increased the basic state pension by 8% to CVEsc 3,500 (€ 32) per month. In response to rising international oil prices, in March the price regulating agency ‘Agência de Regulação Económica’ (ARE) increased the price of diesel by 12.8%, butane gas by 6.7%, petrol by 2.3% and electricity tariffs by 10%. In the same month, government introduced a new road tax of CVEsc 7 per litre of diesel or petrol to finance an autonomous road fund, ‘Fundo Autónomo de Manutenção Rodoviária’, set up in 2005 to improve maintenance of the road network. Government expected the fund to generate CVEsc 4.2 m (€ 2.7 m) in the first year. On 21 October, following a fall in international fuel prices, ARE reduced the price of diesel by 5.2%, while the price of butane gas were reduced by 8.4% on 23 December.

Cape Verde • 77 On 1 October, ‘Agência Nacional de Comunicação’ awarded concessions to two internet service providers MB Investimentos and TELMAX for internet services and VoIP services. MB Investimentos was owned by Cape Verdian stakeholders, while TELMAX was owned by Canarian and local investors. Three other internet providers, CV Multimédia, CVWiFi and CABOCOM, were already operating in the country. On 1 November, government approved a new anti-money laundering law to replace previous money laundering legislation approved in 2002. Concerns about the involvement of increasingly sophisticated criminal networks in the trafficking of drugs, people and arms in the West African sub-region lay behind the new legal provisions. The new legislation, elaborated according to international regulations, obliged all lawyers, solicitors, auditors and accountants to report illegal activities. In the same month, a money-laundering scandal erupted in Cape Verde. Following the forced nationalisation in early November of the Porto-based ‘Banco Português de Negócios’ (BPN) by the Portuguese government due to losses exceeding € 700 m, the bank’s illicit operations through its Cape Verdian subsidiary ‘Banco Insular de Cabo Verde’ (BICV) came to light and embarrassed the archipelago’s authorities. An investigation by the Portuguese central bank revealed that BICV had sustained more than € 320 m of the losses, without the subsidiary’s operations appearing on the balance sheet. Only in June had the central banks of Portugal and Cape Verde become aware that BPN and BICV were owned by the same Portuguese company, ‘Sociedade Lusa de Negócios’ (SLN), through stakes in a Gibraltar-registered offshore company. According to the revelations, from 2004 to 2007 BPN secretly transmitted more than € 300 m through BICV to Brazilian bank accounts, predominantly held by SLN-owned enterprises, transfers that apparently violated regulations on insider lending. On 26 November, the National Assembly approved the 2009 budget that aimed at mitigating the impact of the international financial crisis through fiscal incentives for the economy. Measures to increase domestic demand, including tax reductions, were expected to offset an anticipated decrease in migrant remittances and foreign direct investment. Owing to the increase in capital expenditure from 11.8% of GDP in 2008 to 15% in 2009, overall expenditure was projected to rise by 17% to CVEsc 52.2 bn (€ 450.6 m). Public investment concentrated on port expansion and the energy and water sectors with the aim of supporting development of the private sector. Increased spending on justice and security was to address the rising crime rate. Due to improved tax collection and ongoing foreign aid, the budget projected a total revenue increase by 10.2% from CVEsc 41.2 bn (€ 369.2 m) in 2008 to CVEsc 45.4 bn (€ 408.2 m) in 2009. The total budget deficit was expected to rise from CVEsc 3.4 bn (€ 30.5 m), 2.8% of GDP, in 2008 to CVEsc 6.8 bn (€ 61.2 m), 4.8% of GDP in 2009. On 10 December, the ‘Instituto Nacional de Estatistica’ released the results of a national poverty survey conducted in late 2007. According to the survey, the percentage of the population living in poverty decreased from 27.1% in 2006 to 26.7% in 2007. Poverty

78 • West Africa affected more women (33%) than men (21.3%), while the population over 60 years was the hardest hit. Moreover, in 2007 72% of the poor lived in rural areas, particularly in the interior of Santiago and Santo Antão. Gerhard Seibert

Côte d’Ivoire

This was the third year in the long awaited presidential elections. Finally planned for 30 November, they never happened, stumbling again over the recurring and unresolved issues of disarmament and voter registration. According to opposition supporters, ‘Radio Treichville’ (street gossip) as well as international observers, the repeated postponements stemmed from Laurent Gbagbo’s wish to stay in power indefinitely. However, many others considered the stalemate beneficial for all the actors in the six year crisis: not only the president, but also the leaders of the ‘Forces Nouvelles’ (FN), still in effect in charge of the north of the country and exploiting its resources and people; the ex-rebel soldiers and militiamen trying to avoid disarmament and using their guns for road-racketeering; and all those involved in the ‘crisis business’ (such as UN local employees, identification and registration teams, representatives of and delegates to the many crisis committees, businessmen avoiding taxes by smuggling through the north, etc.).

Domestic Politics The main presidential contenders remained unchanged: Laurent Gbagbo for the ‘Front Populaire Ivoirien’ (FPI); Henri Konan Bedié, former president, for the ‘Parti Démocratique

80 • West Africa de Côte d’Ivoire’ (PDCI); and Alassane Ouattara for the ‘Rassemblement des Républicains’ (RDR). Constitutional provisions prevented Guillaume Soro, the new FN prime minister, from running for presidential office as he was too young. The year started, however, with some confusion after a supposed coup attempt in Bouaké during the last days of 2007, following the outbreak of fighting between opposed factions within FN, which had been fully engaged in the peace process since the Ouagadougou Peace Accord (OPA) of 4 March 2007 and the appointment of its leader, Guillaume Soro, as prime minister a few weeks later, on 26 March. The attack, supposed to torpedo the peace process, was apparently launched by supporters of Ibrahim Coulibaly (‘IB’), one of the main leaders of the 2002 attempt to overthrow Gbagbo’s regime. Consequently, a case against IB, exiled in Benin, was opened on 8 January by Côte d’Ivoire’s top military prosecutor, Colonel Ange Kessi, and the Abidjan military tribunal issued an international arrest warrant on 31 January. On 15 January, UN Security Council once again voted unanimously to extend the mandates of UN and French forces until 30 July, using the recurring justification that the force was needed to help organise the “free, open, fair and transparent elections” awaited since the end of President Gbagbo’s mandate in October 2005. The OPA had settled on January 2008 for the organisation of these elections, the prerequisites being the disarmament of FN and pro-government militias and voter identification and registration. The slowness of these processes had led to successive adjustments and postponements in 2007. However, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon pointed out on 9 January, in recommending the extension of the UN mission, that security conditions had improved and that the political environment was now positive thanks to the efforts to implement the OPA. But he also remarked that the gains were fragile and renewed efforts were needed. The ‘Cadre Permanent de Concertation’ (CPC), in charge of following-up on the OPA, met in Abidjan on 14 February to seek ways of raising funds to accelerate the peace process by completing disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration as well as the electoral process. Three disarmament facilities under UN control in the country’s northern region were transferred to the national government on 19 March. During a ceremony in Ferkessédougou to mark the event, 118 former rebel fighters surrendered their weapons – very slight progress given government estimates of about 45,000 combatants in the country, including 33,000 former rebels and 12,000 pro-government militias. Even though a June deadline for elections had been mentioned several times since January, the government announced on 14 April that the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) had chosen 30 November as the new official date for the first round of the presidential elections. This progress was welcomed by the Security Council and the UN secretary general, who visited the country a few days later on 25 April. Ban Ki-moon participated in the signing ceremony for the code of good electoral conduct and stated that his envoy, Y.I.

Côte d’Ivoire • 81 Choi, would certify every step in the process, while an optimistic Gbagbo proclaimed the elections “[would] mark Ivorian rebirth”. As a result of this progress, the UN special representative for Côte d’Ivoire announced on 9 May that international donors would provide CFAfr 115 bn ($ 282 m) to support the peace process. Slight progress was marked on 5 May with a ceremony to disarm 1,000 ex-rebel fighters. The DDR programme includes three monthly payments of $ 200, participation in training programmes to facilitate return to civilian life and the option of joining the new national army or the ‘civil service’ programme. On the other hand, there was no progress at all in voter identification and registration. A UN Security Council delegation visited Côte d’Ivoire on 9 June to participate in a round of meetings and establish how the UN could assist in the presidential elections. It met with President Gbagbo, government officials, political leaders and the head of CEI, and insisted that the code of good electoral conduct be respected. Demonstrations occurred in mid-June in the rebel stronghold of Bouaké, demonstrating again the challenges of the disarmament process. Former fighters, demanding payment of their demobilisation allowances, seized vehicles and looted shops. FN strongly condemned the riots. However, further violent demonstrations, also sparked off by demands for demobilisation allowances, took place in Vavoua and Seguela in the northwest on 28 and 29 June, highlighting the continuing instability in the ex-rebel region and the threats to the peace process. Social tensions increased throughout the second quarter due to rising food prices. The street protests began in April. In this regard, Gbagbo encouraged rumours about a possible government reshuffle. He also decided to demonstrate his integrity and sternness in mid-June by undertaking a major clean-up of the corrupt cocoa industry, jailing its main leaders, including those very close to his own party. On 10 July, the innermost circle of Gbagbo confidants became caught up in the Kieffer affair, Kieffer being the French-Canadian journalist who had disappeared in April 2004. Simone Gbagbo, Côte d’Ivoire’s first lady, and the former finance minister, Paul-Antoine Bohoun Bouabre, now minister of state in charge of planning, were summoned by French Judge Patrick Ramael to testify before an investigating committee, which they declined to do. Guy-André Kieffer, a specialist in raw commodities and the Ivorian cocoa industry, was supposedly kidnapped while heading for a meeting with Michel Legré, Simone Gbagbo’s brother-in-law. The first lady’s and Bouabre’s names had come up several times during the investigations. On 17 July, UN Special Representative Choi met with the Ivorian president and called for the prompt launching of the identification operation in order to keep the electoral process on track. He reaffirmed UN support for the conduct of the elections. Faced with the government’s tardiness, the UN exerted increased pressure to ensure preparations for the elections moved ahead. In mid-August, UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) engaged more directly: it handed over 150 electoral kits to the government to be used for voter identification and registration and announced it would assist in recruiting and training

82 • West Africa identification agents and in rehabilitating about 70 identification centres across the country. At a meeting in Guinea-Bissau of the chiefs of UN peacekeeping missions in West Africa on 25–26 August, the UN stressed again the importance of launching the identification and registration processes as soon as possible and voiced concern over the delays. Voter identification was finally initiated on 15 September in Yamoussoukro by President Gbagbo, only 10 weeks before the official election date, although observers were sceptical that the daunting task of identifying up to 12 m people and registering around 9 m of them as potential voters would be completed in time. Many expressed concern that the slow progress in meeting the OPA’s terms threatened the elusive stability of the country. Even if some state officials had begun to be deployed in the north, the national territory remained divided and tens of thousands of IDPs continued to live away from home. Above all, there was concern about the continuing hostility towards foreign-born Ivorians still expressed by some people in power. Meanwhile, on 30 August the president’s party ‘Front Populaire Ivoirien’ chose Laurent Gbagbo as its nominee for the 30 November presidential contest. Yet tensions remained tangible, particularly in the army. On 26 September, Soldiers of FANCI (the government’s ‘Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire’) organised protest marches in Yamoussoukro, the capital, and Daoukro (centre-east) to demand the payment of war allowances. The chief of staff reacted strongly: the main instigators were arrested on 28 September and transferred to Abidjan to face a military tribunal and 91 soldiers were discharged from the army the day after the protests. On 14 October, new talks between the signatories of the OPA began under the aegis of the CPC in Ouagadougou. They were presided over by Burkina’s President Compaoré, mediator of the peace deal. With the election schedule increasingly uncertain, postponement was unofficially raised. However, UN Special Representative Choi decided to inject some optimism by strongly reaffirming, during a meeting with President Gbagbo on 14 October, the remarkable and irreversible progress made to date. Choi adopted the same positive tone in a speech to the Security Council on 27 October, in spite of the temporary suspension of voter registration a few days earlier as a result of confusion over the type of ID documents permissible for identification. The special representative admitted that the delays preoccupied him but that they would “remain manageable as long as the momentum (was) kept alive”. On 29 October, Prime Minister Soro finally announced that the presidential election could be delayed to allow for proper preparation of the electoral rolls. The postponement was confirmed on 10 November at a CPC meeting in Ouagadougou chaired by Compaoré and attended by Gbagbo, Soro, Ouattara and Bedié. Leaders asked the CEI to set a new date by 31 December (which was not done), together with a revised timetable for the preparations for the elections. They also called on government for quick disbursement of the funds needed to support and speed up the process. This rescheduling raised concern both locally and internationally. UNOCI urged government to complete the identification

Côte d’Ivoire • 83 process by the end of January 2009 so that the election could be held by June 2009 at the latest. Revitalised goodwill translated into acceleration of election preparations. In the north, ex-rebels officially launched the electoral census on 20 November (275 centres were opened in Bouaké) while Abidjan decided to establish 774 centres to this purpose.

Foreign Affairs The ‘normalisation’ of conditions since the OPA translated into lighter international pressure, particularly at the Security Council. Only three UN resolutions on the country were adopted in 2008 (of a total of 65), far fewer than on Somalia (10), the Middle East (7) and DR Congo (6). Resolution 1795 on 15 January and Resolution 1826 on 20 July dealt with the six-month extensions of the mandate of UNOCI and the French ‘Licorne’ force supporting it, as determined in Resolution 1739 (2007). At the end of the year, the UN could muster 9,100 uniformed personnel, while French forces were progressively reduced from 2,400 to 1,800 (from a maximum of 5,200 in 2004). Resolution 1842, adopted on 29 October, renewed for one year the arms, financial and travel measures imposed by Resolution 1572 (2004) and the measures preventing importation of rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire imposed by Resolution 1643 (2005). The October resolution expressed the international community’s concerns regarding the risks arising from slippage in the peace process and affirmed the need for renewed control of some actors in the crisis. This concern had been strongly expressed Deputy UN Human Rights High Commissioner Kyung-wha Kang during an official visit on 29 May to revise the controversial amnesty law promulgated in April 2007. It was also echoed by Human Rights Watch and the ICG, which released reports in April and May highlighting the risks associated the impunity enjoyed by actors in the civil war. President Gbagbo visited New York in mid-April. He pushed for reform of the UN, calling for greater involvement by regional organisations in conflict resolution. He also met with the head of the Africa committee of the US senate. Côte d’Ivoire hosted the third conference of AU ministers of integration (Abidjan) on 23–24 May and the G77 + China meeting in Yamoussoukro on 13 June. At the latter, Gbagbo called for increased SouthSouth cooperation. The president also participated in the 11th AU summit at Sharm el Sheikh. Premier Soro, along with Amadou Gon Coulibaly, the RDR minister of agriculture, attended the high-level conference on world food security hosted by the FAO in Rome on 3–5 June. Relations with France continued to improve, with the French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, visiting in mid-June. This was the first official visit since January 2003, when his predecessor, Dominique de Villepin, was confronted by demonstrators in front of a passive Laurent Gbagbo. The riots that followed a confrontation between protesters and French forces in November 2004 had led to around 8,000 French nationals fleeing the country. Kouchner visited the French high school, destroyed during the 2004 riots and

84 • West Africa rebuilt by the Ivorian government. He declared that France would fully back election results validated by the UN. For his part, Gbagbo recalled and supported what he called the “revolutionary speech” made by Nicolas Sarkozy in Capetown in February, when the French president announced that France would revise all its defence agreements with African states. Gbagbo stated that all foreign troops would leave the country after the elections, which included the ‘42ème BIMA’, the French battalion based in Abidjan since independence. In the aftermath of Kouchner’s visit, the office of the French development agency (closed down after the November 2004 clashes) reopened in Abidjan in early July. On the regional scene, tension increased in June on the Liberian border and Liberia denounced growing cross-border farming and hunting in Tuobo district by people from Côte d’Ivoire. This tension continued into August and the Liberian government deployed additional immigration personnel. Apart from the peace process itself restarted in Ouagadougou one year before, President Gbagbo officially visited Burkina on 27 July. In setting aside old grievances, he declared that “ties between Côte d’Ivoire and neighbouring Burkina Faso should be the backbone of West Africa”. President Yayi Boni of Benin and Faure Gnassingbé of Togo visited Côte d’Ivoire on 7 November. At the end of the year, the president recommenced his international travels. He participated in the UN finance for development conference in Doha (28 November–1 December), where he met with Robert Mugabe, and in the 35th ECOWAS summit in Abuja in December.

Socioeconomic Developments The contrasts in Côte d’Ivoire’s socioeconomic circumstances were more marked than ever. On the one hand, the abundance of new projects demonstrated reengagement by foreign, particularly French, investors, and allowed Gbagbo’s regime to proclaim its efficient management. On the other hand, and more darkly, the Ivorian people continued to suffer under increasing poverty, the consequence of the recession and the weak growth of previous years. ‘Big business’ landed on Abidjan on 3 April with a short visit by Vincent Bolloré, one of the most prominent French businessmen, who with President Gbagbo inaugurated the new Abidjan-Vridi container terminal aimed at restoring Abidjan’s position in West Africa and enabling it to compete with Dakar, where the harbour concession had been allocated to Dubai Ports World. The Bolloré group (owner of Sitarail, Côte d’Ivoire’s railways) had won the management of Abidjan’s harbour in 2006 following a controversial selection process. A few days later, Olivier Bouygues of the Bouygues conglomerate visited the country, where this company had earlier renewed a 15-year concession to manage the national power and water providers CIE and Sodeci. Bouygues discussed the construction of a new power station to be fed from the Foxtrot gas field. Bouygues holds 25% of Foxtrot and manages the two existing gas power stations.

Côte d’Ivoire • 85 Gbagbo continued to move ahead with his infrastructure programme (‘grands travaux’). On 11 June, he, along with Pierre Fakhoury initiated the construction of the new Laurent Gbagbo bridge over Abidjan’s lagoon and a new harbour on Boulay island. Fakhoury, former President Houphouët-Boigny’s favourite architect and master builder of Yamoussoukro’s basilica, had emerged as a ubiquitous local businessman during the preceding decade, becoming active in oil and public works, including the new presidential palace, senate and National Assembly in Yamoussoukro and the renovation of Abidjan’s once-glamorous Hotel Ivoire. Close to certain top French politicians, he had long benefited from Gbagbo’s largesse, including the allocation of a licence for an offshore oil field to his oil company, Yam’s Petroleum. The deal allowed direct financing of extra-budgetary operations and was thus a way for the president to circumvent budgetary constraints and controls. It also confirmed the similarities in the resource management of oil and cocoa, the two main money-spinners in the Ivorian economy. The macroeconomic situation continued to improve with the slight recovery of GDP. Growth in real terms was expected to be between 2.5% and 2.8% against 1.5% in 2007 and –0.3% in 2006. In that context, relations with donors improved. In early March, the IMF reiterated its support for the country by commencing negotiations for a threeyear PRGF and helping to ensure the country obtained debt relief. In parallel, relations with the World Bank improved with the completion in April of the process commenced in 2007 of arrears reimbursement. This step fully restored the country’s eligibility for new disbursements. To show his commitment to good economic governance, Gbagbo decided to purge the cocoa industry, one of the main stumbling blocks with donors. On 13 June, 23 ‘big guys’ of the ‘filière’ were charged, including the seemingly untouchable Henri Amouzou of the ‘Fonds de développement et de promotion des activités des producteurs de café et de cacao’ and Lucien Tapé Doh of the ‘Bourse du café et du cacao’. Both men were longstanding supporters of the regime. All 23 were thrown in jail and by this move Gbagbo achieved several objectives simultaneously: he showed his goodwill towards international partners and his commitment to fighting corruption and discomfited members of the political class, both his opponents and those in his own camp, all of whom now began to fear witch-hunts. On 3 November, the president made another goodwill gesture when he decreed the reincorporation into the budget of extra-budgetary expenditures on infrastructure in response to strong criticism by the World Bank and IMF of the financing of various ‘grands travaux’. These efforts were rewarded on 24 December when the IMF and World Bank announced they would grant eligibility for assistance under the HIPC initiative. Even if the road towards completion of this initiative (expected to be achieved in 2010– 2011) is long and budget expenditure will need careful management, this announcement represented a significant success for the regime.

86 • West Africa Observers noted that the priority given to external debt and international donors compromised economic recovery, because of an increasing domestic debt estimated at CFAfr 250 bn. These arrears had forced many local businesses into bankruptcy. As the president of the chamber of commerce and CEO of SIFCA, the major national private group, JeanLouis Billon noted, macroeconomic improvements obscured the bad conditions in the private sector, from which nearly 50% of small and medium enterprises had disappeared over the past five years along with a similar loss of formal jobs. Similarly, wage arrears had increased in the public sector and had led to strikes by teachers and customs officers. On 27 November, the national statistics institute released its household poverty survey, which showed that nearly half the population lived below the absolute poverty threshold and on less than CFAfr 660 a day, as compared with 38.4% in 2002, 33.6% in 1998 and 10% in 1985. The poverty rate was 62.4% in rural areas, 29.4% in cities and 80% in the north, showing growing disparities across the country, while 70% of Ivorians struggled to obtain sufficient food. Malnutrition levels were alarming. Nearly 20% of children in the north were acutely malnourished. In addition, Ivorians faced rising prices. Violent protests over rising food costs occurred in the main cities, mainly led by women. One person was killed and ten others injured on 1 April when police dispersed protesters in Abidjan. Gbagbo announced the cancellation of custom duties and taxes on basic household products. Protests erupted again during the summer. Strike action by taxi and other commuter services and ‘ghost town’ campaigns paralysed major towns between 12 and 21 July, following a 44% increase in the price of diesel and a 29% increase for petrol. The organisers met with Gbagbo, and Prime Minister Soro announced the government would halve the salaries of ministers as well as of managers of state-owned companies to help reduce the price of fuel. The north continued to live off smuggling, notably of coffee and cocoa exported to neighbouring countries (the latter estimated at 70,000–80,000 tonnes). Many former rebels were involved, as they were in illegal logging. The huge parallel economy benefiting politicians, rebels and businessmen contributed to the undermining of the normalisation process. A World Bank study released on 8 July estimated that road rackets organised by security forces delivered up to CFAfr 100 bn to 150 bn (€ 150 m and 230 m). This war chest was equivalent to 35%-55% of the entire investment budget of the Ivorian state in 2007 and contributed to inflation, which primarily hurt the poor. Bruno Losch

Gambia

President Yahya Jammeh and his ruling Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) continued to dominate the domestic political scene. The year witnessed a thorough cabinet reshuffle. Twenty months after President Jammeh claimed to have discovered a cure for AIDS, antiretroviral treatment was on the increase with fewer people participating in the president’s programme. The trial of military officers and civilians accused of participation in the March 2007 alleged foiled coup attempt continued in the courts amid wide concerns of arbitrary judicial procedures. Most of the alleged coup plotters testified in court that they had been tortured and forced to sign statements implicating them in the coup by the state’s repressive arm, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). Foreign relations with the West remained lukewarm, while President Jammeh continued to court and benefit from the friendship and assistance of Iran, Cuba, Venezuela and especially Taiwan.

Domestic Politics Growing political and economic instability and President Yahya Jammeh’s own paranoia led to a major cabinet reshuffle. On 19 March, three cabinet ministers were dismissed,

88 • West Africa including Abdoulie Sallah, minister of higher education, Neneh Macdouall Gaye, minister of information and technology and Angella Colley, minister of tourism. In a frenzied and dizzying set of changes, Omar Touray, an official working at the AU, replaced Crispin Grey-Johnson as foreign secretary. Grey-Johnson was then moved to the higher education ministry where he had served before his elevation as foreign affairs minister. Nancy Njie became Gambia’s new minister of tourism while Fatim Mbenga-Badjie, daughter to Dembo Badjie, Gambia’s ambassador to Sierra Leone, replaced Neneh Macdouall Gaye. Susan Waffa Ogoo, erstwhile minister of tourism, was appointed Gambia’s new ambassador to India and Neneh Macdouall Gaye was appointed as but never assumed the post of Gambia’s ambassador to the UN in New York. Angella Colley became Gambia’s new high commissioner to Nigeria and the sacked minister of higher education Abdoulie Sallah was appointed secretary to the cabinet, a position he had held in the pre-coup years under the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) regime of Sir Dawda Jawara. Meanwhile, Teneng Jaiteh rose to the post of secretary general, office of the president. The secretary general in the president’s office is head of the country’s civil service. President Jammeh also sacked the entire senior management of the tourism authority. In another set of presidential directives, Jammeh on 22 April appointed Susan Waffa Ogoo as permanent representative to the UN in New York and Tamsir Jallow was named ambassador to the US. The opposition suffered a major blow in May when National Alliance for Democracy and Development (NADD) coalition member Lamin Waa Juwara, leader of the National Democratic Action Movement (NDAM), joined the ruling APRC. For several months preceding his decision, Waa Juwara had staunchly denied online newspaper reports that he planned to defect to the ruling party. Juwara subsequently justified his defection by referring to alleged failures by the opposition parties. He called on ‘patriotic’ citizens to rally behind President Jammeh in his ‘nation-building’ efforts. Juwara’s withdrawal from the coalition was the second major setback for the opposition over the previous two years. Despite constitutional guarantees and ratification of key human rights treaties and instruments, including the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, arbitrary arrests and detentions, spurious charges against perceived opponents of the state, disappearances and other human rights abuses continued. On 18 August, after a trial that dragged on for more than 16 months, the US-based freelance journalist Fatou Jaw Manneh was found guilty ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ on four counts of sedition and sentenced to four years in prison with hard labour, or a D (dalasi) 250,000 (approx. $ 12,000) fine, payable the same day. Manneh was able to raise the funds to pay the fine from the Gambia Press Union and her family, thus avoiding imprisonment. At year’s end, the alleged deaths of former presidential right-hand man and NIA Director General Daba Marena and four other alleged March 2006 coup plotters – Lieut. Ebou

Gambia • 89 Lowe, 2nd Lieut. Alieu Ceesay, Sgt.Maj. Alpha Bah and Staff Sgt. Manlafi Corr – had not been resolved or investigated. The whereabouts of journalist Chief Ebrima Manneh, who was arrested by agents of the NIA in July 2006, also remained unknown. Following the filing of a case on behalf of Manneh by the Ghana-based Media Foundation for West Africa in June, the government refused to appear before the ECOWAS court to answer charges over his disappearance. It further refused to appear on three subsequent sittings of the court in January, March and June. In the last sitting, the government was ordered in absentia to immediately release Manneh and pay him up to $ 100,000 in damages. By year’s end, the government had not reacted to the ruling. The whereabouts of opposition United Democratic Party (UDP) supporter Kanyiba Kanyi, arrested by police on 18 September 2006, also remained unknown. Kanyi, a former employee of the Christian Children’s Fund, was arrested at a ruling party political rally in the countryside. No reasons were ever given for his arrest and no family members have seen him since his detention. The government denied that either Manneh or Kanyi were in their custody, a statement that led to speculations that both men had been summarily executed. The doors of ‘The Independent’ newspaper, shut down in the immediate aftermath of the 2006 alleged coup attempt, remained locked and boarded despite widespread international appeals for it to resume publication. The closure meant that with the exception of ‘Foroyaa’, the organ of the People’s Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS), no paper critical of the government remained in operation. In this repressive political environment, foreign nationals were not spared either. In February, 48-year old Charlie Northfield, an employee of Carnegie Minerals, was arrested and charged on one count of theft and three counts of committing economic crimes. The British mining engineer managed to slip through the police net and escaped to Britain after a long period of incarceration and house arrest. On 16 August, Abdulhamid Adiamoh, a Nigerian national and editor of a new publication, the ‘Today’ newspaper, was arrested on sedition charges and for allegedly spreading false information that threatened the country’s integrity. His paper was temporarily closed for reporting that Gambian children were sighted rummaging through rubbish heaps for scraps of food. Increasing poverty and rising food prices have severely affected many Gambian families. On 18 September, Adiamoh was convicted on all charges. He was fined $ 5,000. He was subsequently released and his paper allowed to resume publication with severe warnings to avoid publishing stories detrimental to the country’s image. On 29 November, David and Fiona Fulton, a Scottish missionary couple doing charity work, were arrested and charged with sedition against the government. The couple initially pleaded not guilty but changed their plea to guilty, probably hoping to be deported if they did. In December, both were found guilty, fined about $ 12,000 and sentenced to a mandatory one-year jail term with hard labour.

90 • West Africa

Foreign Affairs The Northfield and Fulton incidents, in which the British Foreign Office was involved, predictably strained Gambia-UK relations. A dispute over a planeload of Gambian deportees from Spain caused a diplomatic row between Banjul and Madrid when Gambian authorities refused to let the deportees disembark from a Spanish flight in August. In 2006, Gambia and Spain had signed an extradition protocol as part of a Spanish government campaign to stem the massive tide of West African illegal immigrants. The government’s explanation for refusing the deportees permission to disembark was that they had not been given adequate notice to prepare for their arrival. After sitting for eight hours on the runway at Banjul international airport, the plane was forced to fly back to the Canary Islands with the immigrants still on board. Weeks of diplomatic negotiations followed before Spanish planes were finally allowed to drop off the deportees. Relations with other Western countries, especially the US, continued to be lukewarm. President Jammeh, who habitually dresses in flowing white Muslim robes and carries around a string of Muslim prayer beads and a copy of the Holy Quran, presented himself as a great African nationalist and defender of the Muslim faith. At every possible opportunity, he accused Western governments, especially that of the US, of being terrorists who trampled on the rights of weaker nations and were bent on colonising the world. Meanwhile, relations with Gambia’s traditional friends in Latin America and the Middle East continued to blossom. Taiwan continued to pour financial and technical aid into Gambia and offered Gambian students scholarships to study in Taiwanese universities. Gambia also continued to maintain excellent diplomatic relations with Libya, Iran, Cuba and Venezuela, and reached out to the latter three largely because they were staunch critics of the US. Relations with next door neighbour Senegal remained uneasy as the separatist conflict in southern Senegal (Casamance) continued to fester. On at least one occasion, the northern border between the two countries was closed.

Socioeconomic Developments Poverty rose to affect over 70% of the population. The prices of basic commodities such as bread and especially rice reached alarming levels. By year’s end, the price of a 100kilogram bag of rice, the country’s staple food, was above D 800 (about $ 35), well beyond the means of the average family. Unbudgeted expenditure, especially by the president himself, falling political and financial accountability, lack of capacity in the civil service, increasing government encroachment on private businesses and a growing culture of human rights abuses and general insecurity contributed to poor economic performance. Spreading news of unexplained disappearances and the random arrests of foreign nationals, especially European

Gambia • 91 visitors and expatriates, adversely affected the tourism industry, the country’s major source of foreign exchange. The global economic downturn and especially the recession in the US meant that remittances, a key source of foreign exchange, fell sharply. In 2007, private remittances were an approximate $ 75 m, a figure much higher than the combined inflow of foreign direct investment and foreign aid. With the massive layoff of workers in the US, which has a high concentration of Gambian immigrants, remittances this year plunged to below $ 70 m. Real GDP growth fell from 6.3% in 2007 to 5.5% in 2008. Average consumer price inflation rose from 5.4% in 2007 to 6% in 2008, while public finances, which enjoyed a surplus of 0.2% in 2007, experienced a deficit of 4% and domestic debt stock rose 5.7% to 27% of GDP by the end of September. Meanwhile, ‘Vision 2020’, President Jammeh’s proclaimed neoliberal economic strategy, remained mired in obscurity and lacked focus. While the president seized every opportunity to declare that he would make the country a superpower by 2020, analysts failed to see any tangible progress towards such a utopian goal. Abdoulaye Saine

Ghana

The focal point of the year was the election of a new president and parliament. Although the polls were scheduled for December and in both cases won by the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC), the greater part of 2008 was spent campaigning, given that the principal candidates had been selected at the end of 2007. Football briefly took centre stage in January when Ghana hosted the African Nations Cup, but failure to reach the finals meant that popular attention reverted to politics. In the first nine months, high oil prices and rising food prices squeezed consumers, but ironically the unfolding global economic crisis at the close of the year brought some relief.

Domestic Politics In his New Year speech, President Kufuor noted that “Ghana’s elections [had] become the benchmark for others on the continent” and promised that the government would do its part to ensure a repetition of this achievement. On 13 January, Nana Addo Dankwa AkufoAddo of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) held a rally in Koforidua at which, flanked by 14 of the candidates who had contested the nomination, he indicated that the party was reunited following the controversy surrounding the congress in December 2007.

94 • West Africa However, a clear indication of ongoing splits came on 18 April when Alan Kyerematen announced his resignation, citing harassment of his supporters. Kufuor convened a meeting with Kyerematen and Akufo-Addo, following which the former rescinded his decision on 1 May. But the NDC was quick to point out that the affair cast doubt on NPP claims to be the paragon of democratic virtue, adding that Akufo-Addo had made similar complaints when he failed in his leadership bid against Kufuor in 1998. Another delicate matter was the selection of a running mate. There was active lobbying for a northern candidate, with the name of Boniface Saddique (MP for Salaga) being touted. On 14 August, Akufo-Addo decided on a party outsider, Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia. The youthful deputy governor of the Bank of Ghana lacked the baggage of some of the more established candidates. Meanwhile, Kufuor was forced to deal with some rebelliousness in government ranks. On 11 January, he sacked his national security minister, Francis Poku, because of rumoured corruption and his inability to see eye to eye with service chiefs. A vigorous public debate ensued over whether or not Poku had been placed under house arrest. On 24 May, Kufuor dismissed Kwamena Bartels as minister of interior, replacing him with his brother, Dr. Kwame Addo-Kufuor. The NDC encountered some difficulties of its own. The NPP press published rumours that party leader John Atta-Mills was very ill and therefore incapable of running the country. One NDC MP urged a rethink of the choice of candidate before being forced to retract. On 4 February, Mills issued a statement from South Africa stating that the medical issue was nothing more serious than treatment for cataracts and sinus problems. But doubts over his vigour made it imperative that Mills find a young, dynamic running mate who was preferably also a northerner. Despite Jerry and Nana Konadu Rawlings favouring Betty Mould-Iddrisu, and despite demands in Tamale that Alhaji Mumuni be re-selected, Mills eventually opted for John Mahama. The latter was a northern MP, but also a member of the Assemblies of God church. Although being a non-Muslim counted against him in some quarters, Mahama was quick to point out that his mother was Muslim. Most commentators considered him an excellent choice and the disappointed candidates fell dutifully into line. It was fortunate for the tenor of the subsequent campaign that Mahama and Bawumia considered each other friends, a relationship built on the close personal ties between their fathers. However, this did not prevent a certain amount of mudslinging. The pro-NDC press repeated allegations by the maverick politician, Kofi Wayo, that Akufo-Addo was addicted to hard drugs. This was damaging because it was known that the US was particularly concerned about Ghana as an emerging centre in the narcotics trade. On 4 February, Akufo-Addo’s lawyers felt compelled to issue a statement denying that he had ever been apprehended in the US for being in possession of cocaine and denying categorically that he had a drugs problem.

Ghana • 95 On 22 February, the Electoral Commission (EC) removed a potential source of controversy when it announced that the diaspora vote, which had been fiercely opposed by the NDC, would not be operative in the coming elections. However, the accuracy of the voters’ register remained a serious bone of contention. Before the reopening of the register, there were complaints that the figures for 13 Ashanti constituencies were massively inflated. On 11 April, the EC set up an independent committee to investigate. On 30 April, the EC chairman, Dr. Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, seemed to confirm the anomaly, although he cautioned against conspiracy theories. But on 10 June, he announced that the incorrect figures, which were the result of a printing error, only existed in hard copy and were not replicated in the EC’s own database. On 14 March, the EC began the process of allowing those who had lost their voter ID cards to replace them. On 31 July, the limited voter registration exercise (11 days) began, to allow those who had reached the age of 18 to register. There were clashes in the north between NDC and NPP supporters over alleged attempts to register minors. The NDC also complained that there was a deliberate shortage of registration materials. The EC conceded that there had been unforeseen logistical problems and extended registration by a further two days. The credibility of the exercise was placed in doubt, however, when the EC revealed on 10 September that whereas it had been expecting up to one million new names, it had actually ended up with almost two million additions to the register. The tally of 12,822,474 registered voters was 16.7% higher than the figures for 2006, with the Upper East and Ashanti regions recording the highest percentage increases. Between 5 and 11 October, the register was exhibited at all polling stations in an effort to ‘cleanse’ it. The EC was able to excise 500,000 names, mostly a consequence of double-registration, which went some way towards allaying fears. The choice of parliamentary candidates proved more of a problem for the NPP than the NDC. In Amansie-West, the incumbent MP was re-selected by a single vote on 11 May. When rival supporters demonstrated, the police cracked down in a heavy-handed manner. In many constituencies, aggrieved supporters of losing candidates threatened to vote ‘skirt and blouse’: that is, to vote for Akufo-Addo, but for a different parliamentary candidate. On 18 June, Kufuor, Akufo-Addo and NPP executives met to discuss the turmoil in the constituencies. However, any direct intervention was bound to prompt accusations of favouritism. On 14 March, a breakaway party, the Reformed Patriotic Democrats, was launched, and there were concerns that it would take crucial votes from the NPP. The creation of new districts and the choice of their capitals was also mired in controversy, and raised the possibility of a backlash. The campaign was dominated by NDC and NPP allegations about each other’s record in office. Akufo-Addo explicitly insisted that the two Kufuor administrations accomplished more than what was done during the entire 18-year period under Rawlings. The NDC disputed the figures and alleged that the Kufuor regime had been wasteful and corrupt. The perception of declining standards of probity was one that harmed the NPP. The government did not help its cause by reappointing Dr. Richard Anane as minister for

96 • West Africa transportation in March after the case against him by the commission on human rights and administrative justice was overturned by the courts on a technicality in 2007. On 8 January, Kufuor thanked India for the completion of the new presidential palace, but the NDC maintained that it was actually a waste of Ghanaian public money. In March, a public row erupted over plans to buy a presidential jet. Minister of Defence Albert Kan Dapaah explained that each presidential visit to Europe cost Ghana about € 250,000 and that money would be saved. On 19 March, parliament also voted to approve a loan agreement for the purchase of two executive jets from China. As in previous elections, the smaller parties struggled to find a public voice. On 30 January, Dr. Edward Mahama of the People’s National Convention appeared to welcome an alliance with the NDC. This was followed by a rumour in May that Mahama was willing to team up with the Convention People’s Party (CPP) as the running mate to Dr. Paa Kwesi Nduom. Mahama was slow to respond, but on 22 May he rejected such an alliance blaming Nduom for having gone public before an agreement had been sealed. Mahama became the only candidate to field a female running mate, Petra Amegashie. Meanwhile, Nduom, who chose a northern running mate, sought to inject renewed vigour into the CPP. However, the veteran MP for Ellembelle, Freddie Blay, endorsed AkufoAddo. Nduom supporters demanded his expulsion, but the reality was that Nduom had done precisely the same thing to the CPP candidate in 2004. On 9 October, a fast track court ruled against the party’s attempts to disqualify Blay as a parliamentary candidate. As his term wound down, the president sought to remove possible excuses for an NDC administration to seek revenge. On 25 May, he pardoned Dan Abodakpi, who had been jailed in 2007 for causing financial loss to the state. But any goodwill evaporated when Tsatsu Tsikata, the former head of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), was sentenced to an 18-year term of imprisonment. Kufuor surprised everyone when he announced on 24 May that he was conferring a national honour on Mills. After some delay, Mills turned the offer down. Kufuor compounded the embarrassment by honouring himself with a new award, complete with a solid gold medal. On 14 March, the coalition of domestic election observers despatched its first local observers nine months in advance of the polls. Meanwhile, the NDC and the NPP trained a total of 270,000 polling agents between them, covering all of the 22,000 polling stations in the 230 constituencies. On 5 May, nine political parties signed up to a joint communiqué committing themselves to free and peaceful elections. However, as the campaign heated up, there were a number of incidents. On 2 June, a man was killed as he entered the compound of the Volta regional minister, Kofi Dzamesi, with the alleged intention of assassinating him. Dzamesi claimed it was part of a plot to destabilise the region. On 31 August and 1 September, there were fatal clashes between NPP and NDC supporters in Tamale, where Bawumia’s convoy was attacked, and in Gushiegu, prompting concern amongst election observers. On 21 September, there were further clashes at Berekum in

Ghana • 97 Brong-Ahafo. The greatest potential powder keg was Bawku in the Upper East, where there was sporadic ethnic violence between Mamprusis and Kusasis. On 1 January, Interior Minister Bartels declared a curfew after fighting that led to numerous deaths, and this was renewed right through the elections. On 4 May and on 22 June, there were renewed outbreaks of violence and a significant number of mortalities. MPs from the north complained that Kufuor had done little to mediate in Bawku, whereas he was active in conflict situations abroad. In the closing stages of the campaign, the candidates toured the regions. Akufo-Addo made a special appeal to northern voters, promising a $ 1 bn northern development fund. Kufuor announced on 11 September that a draft bill would be expedited to make this a reality. The NDC responded with campaign promises to create a savannah development fund. In the south, Akufo-Addo promised a pension scheme for cocoa farmers. Everywhere, Akufo-Addo pledged an increased level of public spending, especially on health and education. He promised a university and factory for every region, which the NDC derided as reckless. Rawlings popped up repeatedly on the NDC campaign trail, attacking corruption and alleging NPP intentions to rig. On 17 September, the national security council announced a ban on seven former service commanders from entering all military and police installations “in the interests of national security” after they had met with Rawlings. On 2 December, service personnel with election duties cast their special ballots. The main poll followed on 7 December. The parliamentary results were a blow to the NPP, whose representation fell from 128 to 107 seats, whereas the NDC increased its tally from 94 to 114 seats and won a majority in seven of the ten regions. With two constituencies needing to be re-run, the NDC was well placed to command an overall majority. Among the shock defeats were those of Blay (CPP) and Saddique (NPP). Samia Nkrumah, the daughter of Kwame Nkrumah, won the only seat for the CPP. In the presidential race, Akufo-Addo topped the poll, but because he only gained 49.13% there needed to be a presidential run-off on 28 December. Nduom (1.34%), Mahama (0.87%) and four other candidates were eliminated. In the run-off, there was a swing to Mills, but the EC chairman, Afari-Gyan, accepted that the Tain constituency, where there had been no polling, would have to vote because there was a statistical possibility of Akufo-Addo winning. Bizarrely, the NPP boycotted, making the final result a foregone conclusion. The EC figures revealed Mills had secured eight regions and 50.23% of the vote. Although the successful outcome was lauded by the international community, the official turnout in a number of constituencies in Ashanti stretched credibility.

Foreign Affairs Kufuor maintained a punishing schedule of foreign visits. The year began with the postelection crisis in Kenya, in which Kufuor, in his capacity as chairman of the AU, sought

98 • West Africa to mediate. Some embarrassment was caused when the Kenyan incumbents indicated that his services were not needed. On 8 January, Kufuor arrived at the invitation of Mwai Kibaki, but the authorities insisted that this was merely a fact-finding mission. When Kufuor departed two days later, he explained that his intention had been to encourage Kibaki and Raila Odinga to agree to a cessation of hostilities and to engage in dialogue under the aegis of a group of eminent Africans. He announced that Kofi Annan had accepted the assignment of leading a team. Kufuor continued to invest time in ECOWAS. On 18 January, he flew to Ouagadougou to attend an ECOWAS summit of heads of state. On 27 February, he received a joint UN/ ECOWAS mission to discuss ways of bringing stability to the north of Mali, Niger and Mauritania where rebel activity posed renewed problems. On 19 December, Kufuor attended the 35th ordinary session of ECOWAS heads of state in Abuja, his last as president. On 28 January, Kufuor travelled to Addis Ababa for the 10th ordinary session of the AU, at which a new chairman was elected, taking over from the Ghanaian president. From there, Kufuor continued to Rome to attend the annual general meeting of the WFP. On 12 March, he visited Nigeria for talks with President Umaru Yar’Adua, and then on 19 March he flew to Paris for the launch of The Alliance for Africa Foundation. On 3 April, he passed through London to attend a progressive governance summit, and then continued to India to participate in the first Africa-India summit. Kufuor stated that African countries had much to learn from India, especially with respect to information and communication technologies. On 4 May, Kufuor travelled back to London to attend a conference on private/public sector partnership in attaining MDGs. On 24 May, he flew to Japan for the Tokyo international conference on African development and then on to the World Economic Forum in Cape Town. Between 30 June and 1 July, Kufuor attended the 11th ordinary session of the AU Assembly in Egypt. On 5 July, he left once more for Japan to attend the G8 summit, which began with a day devoted to Africa. At the start of August, Kufuor spent a further two weeks abroad, first visiting Trinidad and Tobago before proceeding to the opening of the Olympic games in Beijing. As his term of office wound down, Kufuor received many official invitations. On 25 August, he paid a three-day state visit to Germany, where he was awarded the highest state honour. Between 21 and 24 October, Kufuor was the guest of the Netherlands. His next stop was London, where he received the Chatham House prize in a ceremony presided over by the Duke of Edinburgh for his contribution to conflict mediation. President George W. Bush went further than anyone to acknowledge the role played by Kufuor. On 19 February, Bush arrived in Ghana as part of a five-country African tour. The visit prompted opposition speculation that the Americans were seeking a military base, but this was vigorously denied by Foreign Minister Akwasi Osei-Adjei. Much of the attention during the visit was focused on development cooperation, with Bush announcing a $ 350 m fund to fight neglected tropical diseases. Laura Bush launched a malaria initiative for

Ghana • 99 Ghana worth $ 17 m. In 2008, an estimated $ 75 m was to be spent in 23 districts on education, water, sanitation and electrification with money derived from the Millennium Challenge Account. On 11 September, President Bush returned the favour when Kufuor was invited to Washington for a farewell state visit that included a lavish banquet at the White House. Kufuor was praised for his international contribution and record as two-term president. From Washington, Kufuor continued to New York, where he used his final appearance at the UN General Assembly to highlight the achievements under his stewardship and to renew Ghana’s commitment to the MDGs. Ghana hosted three major international conferences. Between 18 and 25 April, it hosted a meeting of UNCTAD on the opportunities and challenges presented by globalisation. Escalating world food prices were a key item on the agenda. The meeting was attended by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, President Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone and President Lula da Silva of Brazil, who also used the occasion to sign four bilateral agreements covering energy, health, biodiversity and HIV/AIDS. From 2–4 September, Ghana hosted the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectivenes (HLF3), which was attended by a number of heads of state and closed by Kufuor. International and Ghanaian NGOs were critical of the lack of substance in the Accra agenda for action that promised greater harmonisation of effort and ownership by recipient countries. Between 30 September and 3 October, Ghana hosted the 6th biennial summit of the ACP countries. The summit was as controversial as HLF3, because the EU was seeking reciprocal trade concessions with ACP countries through EPAs. Ghana had already signed interim EPAs, whereas other West African states regarded the latter as the thin end of the wedge. President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, who had been indicted by the ICC in July, made his scheduled speech, which condemned the ICC action, and departed early. The meeting requested the ICC to suspend the indictment. Kufuor also engaged in some bilateral diplomacy. On 4 February, President Teodoro Obiam Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea visited to discuss cooperation in the oil sector. On 17 February, President Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia stopped in Accra en route to Gambia. On 2 September, following Mwanawasa’s sudden death, Kufuor attended the funeral. Between 17 and 19 April, Malian President Amadou Toumane Toure paid a state visit during which he was hosted by the Asantehene and awarded the country’s highest state honour. In the first week of November, the president of Trinidad and Tobago, George Richards, paid a return state visit to Ghana. On 22 November, Kufuor travelled to Liberia for a twoday official visit. In 2007, goods worth an estimated $ 200 m were imported from China, while statistics from the Ghana investment promotion centre indicated that China had become the largest foreign investor. On 18 January, a Chinese chamber of commerce meeting opened in Accra. On 18 April, Kufuor inaugurated work on the 560 MW Sunon Asogli Kpone thermal power plant, a private sector initiative involving the Shenzen Energy Group and the China-Africa Development Fund. The paramount chief of Asogli, Togbe Afede XIV, was

100 • West Africa credited with having brought the idea to fruition. The inauguration provided an occasion for Shenzen businessmen to visit. At the end of May, the first phase in the creation of a fibre optic network to sustain broadband connectivity, which was financed with a Chinese concessionary loan, was completed. On 2 September, an agreement was signed with the Sino Hydro Corporation for the construction of four dams in the western and central regions that were expected to generate 230 MW of electricity within three years. On 4 December, a new Chinese-built complex for the ministry of defence was commissioned.

Socioeconomic Developments On 14 February, President Kufour delivered his final state of the nation address. This provided him with the occasion to document the achievements since 2001. In the educational sector, he claimed that the Ghana school feeding programme had been held up as a model for developing countries, while he highlighted disease prevention as the cornerstone of health policy. He proudly announced that Ghana had launched a Euro-Bond on the London Stock Exchange to raise $ 750 m for infrastructural development and to withstand the shocks associated with rising oil prices. He also noted the successful redenomination of the cedi, which was completed in the first days of January. Kufuor looked to oil to remove important structural constraints on development and reduce donor dependency. The NDC observed that action against corruption did not receive much emphasis, which was surprising given the potential for oil revenues to introduce unprecedented temptations. However, on 22 February Kufuor formally acknowledged the need for mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency in the use of oil revenues. The first half of the year was dominated by soaring prices for imported petroleum and foodstuffs. On 28 January, Dr. Paul Acquah, governor of the central bank, announced that inflation had risen to 12.7%, in December. By July, it had peaked at 18.4%, but it fell back to 17.3% in October as food prices began to recede. Acquah also stated that the public debt of $ 7.1 bn had fallen from 50.9% of GDP in 2006 to 48.4% in 2007. On 28 October, Acquah noted that the crisis in the global financial markets and the subsequent contraction of the global economy had not had an immediate effect on Ghana. Indeed, the first half of the year witnessed a seven-fold increase in foreign direct investment, led by China and India. On 19 May, the government signed a second multi-donor budget support framework memorandum, revising an agreement signed in 2003. The total disbursement in budgetary support was expected to be $ 350 m over the course of the year. The conference on aid effectiveness (HLF3) provided the occasion for Ghana and the British government to sign a £ 250 m aid agreement covering 2008–10, mostly for budgetary support. At the same time, Ghana signed two agreements with Switzerland, worth $ 13 m, and an agreement with the EU to curb illegal timber exports. In order to alleviate some of the pressure on consumers, the government reduced excise duties on petroleum products on 22 May. It followed up on 13 June with the removal of

Ghana • 101 duties on imported rice, yellow maize and vegetables. The customs, excise and preventive service observed that the net effect would be a significant revenue shortfall. On 14 July, the government announced the reintroduction of subsidies on fertilisers. The poorer parts of the country were considered to be severely affected and WFP allocated $ 3.4 m to supporting families in the three northern regions. In his New Year’s speech, Kufuor confirmed that the West African gas pipeline project was complete. On 3 January, a nuclear power committee reported its findings on how to provide a nuclear energy alternative by 2018. On 18 April, Akufo-Addo lent guarded support to the idea in a statement on energy. GNPC expected that oil production capacity towards the end of 2009 would be 60,000 bpd. The two main exploration companies, Tullow and Kosmos Energy, were confident that output would be double that by 2010 after announcing further promising finds. On 26 February, a Norwegian delegation promised to make its expertise available to Ghana. On 3 June, a Russian oil company, Lukoil, indicated that it would begin onshore oil exploration in the second half of the year. On 20 June, the government bought the remaining 10% of shares in the Volta Aluminium Company (VALCO). On 7 November, parliament ratified the re-sale of 70% of the shares, as part of a plan to create an integrated aluminium industry. However, it turned out that the Brazilian and Norwegian investors were lukewarm about the acquisition. On 22 September, the government announced it was cancelling debts of $ 58 m owed by the Volta River Authority (VRA), the Electricity Company of Ghana and the Ghana Water Company Limited. The VRA was also one of the beneficiaries of the Eurobond issue. The gold sector performed well in the first half of the year, due to a combination of higher prices and an expansion of output by 3%. By contrast, earnings from the diamond mining sector contracted by 22% over the same period. Tourism was the fourth largest foreign exchange earner in 2008. Having grown by 13% since 2007, it was worth $ 1.3 bn. On 28 January, Cadbury announced the creation of a development fund to help improve cocoa yields and raise the income of farmers. On 29 January, the ministry of finance and the cocoa board signed a memorandum of understanding with 32 contractors vested with responsibility for completion of the first phase of the cocoa roads implementation project. This would improve 205 km of roads in the cocoa-producing regions. On 5 September, the government announced an early start to the cocoa season and increased the producer price by 36% in an attempt to reduce smuggling. The minister of finance, Kwadwo BaahWiredu, estimated that at least 50,000 tonnes had been smuggled, mostly to Côte d’Ivoire, that year. The minister also announced that the cocoa board would operate a stabilisation fund to hedge against price swings. On 1 October, Kufuor announced that Ghana expected to be able to process around half of the annual crop locally by the middle of 2010. Mobile phone coverage was expected to reach 50% by 2010. On 3 January, the government indicated that it had reopened the search for a majority stakeholder for Ghana Telecom, having rejected the existing bids. At the end of June, news leaked that the government planned to sell 70% of its stake to Vodafone UK. The sale was opposed by the

102 • West Africa NDC and the CPP. Although the enabling legislation failed to pass before the recess on 19 July, parliament was recalled and it was approved on 14 August. However, the government was forced to issue a bond to cover the outstanding debts. At the start of 2008, the doctor to patient ratio stood at 1:9,090 and the nurse to patient ratio at 1:1,538. On 7 March, Minister of Health Courage Quashigah announced that each new district capital would receive its own hospital. The keystone of government health policy remained the national health insurance scheme that was partly financed by a 2.5% levy on goods and services and partly by subscriptions. Whereas government aimed at covering 30% of the population by 2010, on 20 April officials estimated that coverage was already around 48%. Despite presidential praise for the school feeding programme, the chairman was sacked on 24 April following opposition allegations of misuse of funds and concerns expressed by the auditors. The University of Ghana marked its 60th anniversary, with the celebrations reaching their climax in July. On 2 October, the University of Cape Coast made Ghanaian history when it appointed the first woman vice chancellor in the shape of Naana Opoku-Agyeman. Ghana’s reputation for adherence to international norms was somewhat tarnished after the deportation of 16 Liberian refugees following a sit-in demonstration at Buduburam camp on 19 February. The deportations were publicly criticised by UNHCR, but Minister of the Interior Bartels insisted that circumstances in Liberia no longer posed an obstacle to return and that the refugees had refused to integrate. Some 500 Togolese were repatriated from the Volta region in March and April with the cooperation of UNHCR. On 24 January, Bartels admitted in parliament that Ghana had become a significant node in the drugs trade. He also accepted that there had been some infiltration of the security agencies by narcotics interests. On 16 June, an official of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) visited to discuss modalities for a pilot scheme to monitor shipping containers at Tema harbour. Three days later, Dr. Addo-Kufuor met officials of the US Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA) and highlighted Ghanaian initiatives, including the introduction of new X-ray facilities at Kotoka airport and the introduction of coastal speedboat patrols. On 22 October, President Kufuor announced that the DEA would open an office in Ghana. Paul Nugent

Guinea

The decrepit Conté regime slid further towards chaos until the president died in December. The military immediately took power, and though the head of the junta was an unknown junior officer, the takeover was much as observers had expected it to be. The leaders of the December putsch were also involved in a major army mutiny that took place the previous May and June, during which non-commissioned and junior officers revolted against their superiors, and soldiers continued their practice of abusing civilians. On 2 October, the country celebrated the 50th anniversary of its independence, but the ceremonies at that time were desultory and organised at the last minute. Funds contributed by other African heads of state for the celebrations went missing, and this became a source of recrimination and popular discontent in the months that followed.

Domestic Politics Guinean politics were oriented towards domestic affairs, as ordinary Guineans remained preoccupied with the difficulties of day-to-day survival and elites continued to jockey for position in the ‘fin de règne’ dynamics that finally resulted in the coup d’etat. The most important changes took place in the army, with the May–June mutiny presaging the December coup in both structures and personnel.

104 • West Africa The year began with the authority of consensus Prime Minister Lansana Kouyaté being directly challenged by President Lansana Conté. Kouyaté’s Minister of Communication Justin Morel Junior was fired by presidential decree on 3 January. This move followed from several decrees issued by the president’s office in December 2007, which specified the attachment of the country’s central bank to the presidency and reinforced the powers of Sam Mamadi Soumah, the secretary general of the ‘présidence’. Conté’s sacking of the minister was in direct contravention of the accords signed to end the bloody general strike and demonstrations of January–February 2007. When Kouyaté made no public reaction to this abrogation of the agreement that brought him to power, many Guineans began to criticise him for being too weak to stand up to the president. As the year progressed, it became clear that Kouyaté had little control of the true levers of power and he appeared to retire from the political scene. When the prime minister was sacked by Conté on 21 May and replaced with one of Conté’s former ministers of mines and a close associate, there was little public outcry. Indeed, many Guineans expressed relief that Kouyaté was gone. Some accused him of having promoted a pro-Malinke ethnic politics, others accused him of weakness and corruption, but few felt that he had lived up to the ideals of the 2007 uprisings that had put him in power. Even though Conté’s unilateral sacking of Kouyaté meant he reneged on all of his promises from one year earlier, Guineans were mostly resigned to the situation. Throughout this period, Guinea was preparing for upcoming legislative elections. The UNDP supported the electoral commission in its attempts to redo the voters’ list, but the process moved slowly, causing legislative elections to be postponed from December 2007 to June or July 2008, and later to December 2008. As that date approached, the elections were postponed once again. By the end of the year, an estimated 30% of the population had been newly registered to vote, but the process bogged down around November with lack of ink for the printers that printed the registration sheets being identified as the major logistical problem. Shortly after the prime minister’s sacking, rank-and-file soldiers and non-commissioned officers revolted in the main Alpha Yaya Diallo military camp in Conakry. The 23 May–3 June mutiny was led by Claude ‘Coplan’ Pivi, a non-commissioned officer who had gained renown as a karate champion and had often appeared on television on the 3 April anniversary of the army’s 1984 seizure of power to demonstrate his hand-to-hand fighting prowess. In addition, Pivi, originally from Macenta Préfecture in the country’s forest region, was reputed to possess powerful bulletproofing and other mystical war amulets. The mutiny led to the deaths of eight civilians, most of them killed by stray bullets, although several, including one Pakistani businessman, were deliberately killed by uncontrolled elements from the military. The soldiers pillaged the houses of several officers, including that of army chief of staff, Bailo Diallo. During the May mutiny, the army’s number two officer, General Mamadou Sampil, was taken hostage for five days. His bodyguard was killed. The mutineers called for Army

Guinea • 105 Chief of Staff General Bailo Diallo to be sacked, and also demanded back pay and raises that had been promised to them but which they claimed had been stolen by ranking officers. The sacking of Diallo, added to the earlier deaths of Generals Kerfalla Camara and Arafane Camara, meant that the upper echelon of officers of President Conté’s generation had suddenly dwindled. Demands for promotions from within the ranks were also acted upon, and a group of colonels thus moved up the hierarchy to become generals. Pivi’s fame grew during this period, as he demanded that all officers be stripped of their insignia before entering the military camp, a major symbolic breach of military protocol. He also reportedly personally gave the go-ahead in determining whether officers were allowed to enter the camp at any time. The armoury of the Alpha Yaya camp, the largest in the country, had reportedly been emptied at the time of the January 2007 general strike and uprisings, and once again rank-and-file soldiers controlled the camp’s weapons. As they did not control the weapons or the men, the military hierarchy was in an exceptionally weak position, and effectively had to accede to all demands. From this point onward, it was clear that the army’s formerly strong command and control structures had almost completely broken down. One instance of this occurred on 16–17 June, when the police followed the example of the army and mutinied for higher pay. At this time, a group of soldiers allegedly led by Pivi attacked the paramilitary police training camp in the Cameroon neighbourhood of Conakry. At least three policemen were said to have been killed, and some versions claimed there were dozens. While Pivi stated publicly that he could not tolerate such indiscipline among the police, many reports indicated that the attack had more to do with the fact that the police’s anti-narcotics investigation squad was based in the Cameroun base. All the computers used by this unit were destroyed, and according to some versions, a large quantity of cocaine the unit had confiscated was taken by the soldiers. Guinea’s emergence as a major trans-shipment point in the international drugs trade probably went back to at least 2007, as increasing attention was paid to Guinea-Bissau’s role in the trade and Latin American cocaine cartels moved further down the coast. Both countries had become important stopping-off points for Latin American cocaine destined for Europe, with ships, planes and even submarines involved in delivering the product to West Africa, and continuing on in small boats, planes and even across the Sahara desert. For many Guineans, 2008 was the year that the trade became an open secret. Both Nigerians and Latin Americans occupied villas in neighbourhoods like Kipe, and occasionally engaged in gun battles. Guineans increasingly complained that all the foreign drug dealers were accompanied by members of the elite red beret soldiers from the army, and President Conté’s son, Ousmane, was often cited as one of the kingpins in the Guinean drug economy. In August, a plane carrying a load of cocaine from Guinea-Bissau landed in the coastal town of Boké in the middle of the night. As a result, the town’s mayor, the police chief and the provincial governor were arrested. The interior town of Faranah was also

106 • West Africa said to be a major entry point, perhaps because it has a large airstrip built during the socialist period. October saw the celebration of the 50th anniversary of Guinea’s independence. Unlike Ghana, which had celebrated its 50th anniversary in pomp and style, the Guinean ceremonies were desultory and poorly attended. Local newspapers gave a clear indication of the sour mood that gripped the Guinean public with headlines like ‘Guinea Celebrates Fifty Years of Misery: The Country Sinks Deeper and Deeper into the Abyss’, ‘Fiftieth Anniversary of Independence: The Organisers’ Deals’, ‘Fifty Years of Independence: Guinea is Still Poor’. Almost as soon as the independence celebrations had ended, accusations began regarding the theft of large sums donated by cellular telephone companies and neighbouring heads of state to fund them. October and early November also saw a rising number of violent uprisings against the government. Most exploded out of protests over high fuel prices, or the lack of running water and electricity in Conakry and also towns such as Boké, Mambia and Siguiri. Two demonstrators were killed by the security forces in Mambia and Boké. In the week prior to President Conté’s death on 22 December, rumours circulated that he was close to demise. Although there was real concern that the country could turn to chaos, this same rumour had circulated so many times over the past five years that Guineans were not sure how seriously to take it. Conté’s death was announced late that night, and before dawn a group of middle-ranking officers had burst into the national radio and television station, announcing that they had taken power. In doing so, they evidently preempted the older, ranking officers, who had planned to take power after President Conté’s funeral, which would take place three days later. The voice of the putsch was Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, a university graduate from the country’s forest region. Camara immediately announced that the National Assembly and supreme court were suspended, along with the constitution, and that all political party, trade union and other civil society activities were banned. Although he had dissolved all of the institutions of the republic, he had himself introduced as the ‘Président de la République’ later that day. By the next afternoon, he travelled into central Conakry in a large military convoy, accompanied by Lt.Col. Sékouba Konaté and the erstwhile mutineer Claude Pivi. Reports began to emerge suggesting that Camara and Konaté, both members of the elite airborne unit, had been two of the leaders of the May–June mutiny, directing Pivi from behind the scenes. During the first days of the coup, constitutional successor Aboubacar Somparé and former Prime Minister Tidiane Souaré stated that the coup was unconstitutional, illegitimate and not supported by most Guineans. Deeply unpopular themselves, they found few allies and turned themselves in within 48 hours, accepting the soldiers as the country’s new leaders. Over the next days, Dadis Camara and his brothers in arms began to consolidate power, first drawing the other elite forces of the army together under the unified control of Pivi.

Guinea • 107 On 30 December, the junta named banker Kabiné Komara as the country’s new prime minister. Although little known in Guinea, Komara had been on the list of five candidates presented to President Conté in February 2007 as potential consensus prime ministers. As a result, civil society leaders welcomed the nomination as a kind of indirect victory, though they had not been consulted in the junta’s selection. Although Komara was supposed to be empowered to name his own civilian government, Camara had already named several ministers, including the feared and minimally educated Pivi, before he had arrived in the country from Cairo, where he had been living. The junta promised to turn power over to an elected government by the end of 2010, but various international actors insisted that elections take place sooner.

Foreign Affairs The government was not focused on foreign affairs. President Conté did not venture outside the country and only a few foreign dignitaries visited Guinea. By the end of the year the AU had suspended Guinea and ECOWAS looked poised to do the same. Guinea’s poor, even contemptuous relations with its neighbouring countries were exemplified by the debacle of the 50th anniversary of independence. President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal reportedly gave a check for CFAfr 500,000,000 (about $ 1 m), President Jammeh of the Gambia $ 500,000, and President Nguema of Equatorial Guinea a check for € 500,000 to help underwrite the independence celebrations. Not only did most or all of the money go unaccounted for, the heads of state were only invited to Conakry about ten days before the celebration, at the UN General Assembly. Diplomats in Conakry only received their invitations the day before the fête. Once they arrived, they found that the grandstand was in disarray, without enough seats for all the visiting heads of state and without Guinea’s sick president even bothering to attend. The situation in the contested territory around the village of Yenga remained unresolved, with Guinean troops still occupying Sierra Leonean territory they claimed after entering Sierra Leone in 2001 to push back Revolutionary United Front rebels who had been involved in cross-border attacks into Guinea. Given the dramatic nature of events in Guinea, this dispute attracted less international attention than it had in previous years. Guinea continued to pin its hopes on foreign direct investment, especially from China, but almost as soon as the coup took place, reports surfaced of exactions against Chinese nationals living in Conakry. There were many reports of them being robbed of their cars, cash, cellphones and being threatened with imprisonment by the very elite red beret troops who had seized power. Lebanese and other expatriates also came in for similar rough treatment, throwing into question whether Guinea would be considered a welcoming place for foreigners or their capital under the new administration. France continued its attempts to increase its influence in Guinea. For the most part, Guineans looked upon such attempts with great scepticism, given the perception that

108 • West Africa France had worked to ensure the country’s failure after independence in 1958. Finishing its turn as chair of the EU at the time of the coup, France found itself constrained to condemn the illegal seizure of power in unambiguous terms, but before the year was out more ambiguous statements from President Sarkozy and from the spokesman of the Quai d’Orsay indicated that France was likely to treat the putsch more leniently than its EU counterparts. At the end of the year, France’s secretary of state for cooperation and the Francophonie prepared to visit Conakry, which would make him the first European official to meet with, and implicitly recognise, the junta. The United States immediately condemned the coup, but it, too, had business and diplomatic interests in Guinea, and it was not clear how much pressure the Americans would actually bring to bear on the new military leaders. Like the European and African countries that followed the situation in Guinea, they seemed preoccupied with the threat of internal violence and its possible regional ramifications. In this light, it was not surprising that Guinea’s smaller neighbours, Liberia and Sierra Leone, said little about the coup. By contrast, Senegal’s Wade and Libya’s Kadhafi weighed in immediately with praise for the junta. Wade, who was never friendly with Conté, seemed to praise the soldiers as if to spite his now-deceased rival. Kadhafi, who was to visit Sierra Leone at the beginning of the new year, planned a stop in Conakry to meet Dadis Camara and pledge his support for the new government.

Socioeconomic Developments The economic situation continued to deteriorate, with provision of water, electricity and medical and educational services all continuing to slide. One bright spot was that telecommunications improved significantly, making telephone calls both inside and outside the country much more feasible than they had been over the prior decade. Foreign investment faltered as questions emerged about President Conté’s health and several mining contracts were put in question. The continuing failure to provide basic services – electricity, water, education, health – led to social unrest throughout the year, both in the form of the May–June mutiny, which was largely motivated by economic demands, and in the youth protests of October and November. The failure of the Kouyaté government to make a meaningful difference in these most basic state functions had soured many Guineans on the idea of pursuing socioeconomic change through a change of leadership. At the same time, the general strikes of 2006 and 2007 had introduced a new note of solidarity and organisation to the demands that Guineans were ready to make of their government. Inflation, which ran at about 30% for 2008, created a drag on Guineans’ ability to survive on often meagre salaries. The percentage of Guineans living on less than $ 1 a day rose to 53%. Spikes in fuel and food prices were especially onerous for Guineans, particularly those in cities. The price of a 50 kg sack of rice hovered around Guinean francs (FG)

Guinea • 109 220,000 for most of the year. The Guinean franc traded at 4,300 to the dollar in January, and rose steadily to 5,200 at year’s end. GDP growth was estimated at 1.8% for the year, making for negative GDP per capita growth. Falling fuel prices in the second half of the year took some time to result in lower fuel costs. Petrol reached a high of FG 7,800 per litre, but was lowered to FG 5,500 when the junta took power. The mining sector was in disarray for most of the year, though the Kouyaté government seemed to have made some attemps to regularise the country’s dealings with mining companies. Many observers noted that when former minister of mines and Conté confidant Souaré replaced Kouyaté, these attempts ceased. The major mining interests were in bauxite on the coast, in gold in the Upper Guinea savannah region and in iron in the country’s southeastern forest region. Bauxite has been produced in Guinea since the late 1950s, but has failed to bring as much prosperity as it might. While bauxite revenues accounted for 60% of government income in 1993, by 2005 this figure had dropped to 20%, a situation compounded by the fact that only 4% of the ore (which makes aluminium) is processed in the country. In August, an industrial accident at the Kamsar base of ‘Compagnie de Bauxite de Guinée’ (CBG) left toxic mazout on a broad swathe of shoreline. Gold mining companies were the targets of some of the major popular uprisings that occurred during the year. The companies pay a development royalty that is meant to contribute to local infrastructure and development. Local citizens, seeing few if any benefits but informed that there should be some, targeted the companies rather than the state. In Siguiri, this led to the rapid electrification of the town by the local mining company, something the state had failed to do. The iron ore sector had yet to take off, partly because there was still no way of bringing the ore out of the isolated southeastern part of the country. In addition, the exploration rights of Rio Tinto to the entire Simandou Mountain region were challenged by the government, which revoked half of the territory, saying that Rio Tinto had not made sufficient progress towards active exploitation of the mining area. The revoked lands were quickly attributed to Simfer SA, a company linked to the Beny Steinmetz Resource Group, an Israeli-based company that has done business in Sierra Leone and the DR Congo. The IMF observed that many of Guinea’s mining contracts were unfavourable to the country and suggested that they be revisited. Taxation of the mining sector, for instance, was not regularised, with the IMF estimating that Russian-owned ‘Compagnie de Bauxite de Kindia’ (CBK) was taxed at less than half the rate of Canadian-American-Guinean CBG consortium. Upon taking power, the military junta claimed that renegotiating these contracts was one of its key foci. Both the junta and ordinary Guineans perceived corruption as a major impediment to the country’s development and the provision of services to its citizens. Transparency International ranked Guinea 173rd of 180 countries, with only Somalia receiving a lower

110 • West Africa score in Africa. The perception of rampant corruption has affected every facet of Guinean life, from school exams, whose results are widely believed to be bought, to the mining and construction sectors, to the provision of security, where security forces were often accused of committing armed robbery and other exactions both before and after the coup. There were moves to address prior abuses by security forces and others and to promote reconciliation. Prime Minister Kouyaté had supported the formation of a commission of inquiry into the massacres and other abuses allegedly committed by security forces during the 2006 and 2007 general strikes. However, the proposed commission was never funded and did not become operational. The Souaré government that replaced Kouyaté’s introduced a ministry for national reconciliation, solidarity and relations with institutions, though this ministry did not survive the December change of government. Broad discussions of the legacy of the 1958–84 socialist government, of the 1984–2008 Conté government, and of the various abuses committed by both became central points of debate around the time of the 50th anniversary of independence. Perhaps the greatest challenge to Guinea is the prevalence of youth unemployment. With 44% of the population under 15 and more than 60% under 25, Guinea’s economy presented few prospects for young people, regardless of the level of education they had achieved. The arrival of lower-ranking officers at the head of state power was applauded by many youths simply because it represented a generational changing of the guard. However, it was not clear that the ‘Conseil National de la Démocratie et du Developpement’ would be able to resolve the massive problems caused by the lack of prospects for young men and women in the country. Mike McGovern

Guinea-Bissau

The political situation remained unstable and was highlighted by an alleged coup attempt in August and an attack on the president in November. The security sector continued to be characterised by inefficiency and disorder. This was reflected in the country’s ongoing involvement in international drug-trafficking. After years in preparation, an internationally backed reform plan for the security sector was finally implemented. Parliamentary elections in November took place in an orderly fashion. Consumers were hit by rising food and fuel prices. Social resentment was further accentuated by the country’s continuing weak economic performance, omnipresent corruption and the scarcity of drinking water and electricity as well as unpaid salaries in the overstaffed public sector.

Domestic Politics At the top of the political agenda was reform of the security sector, which was characterised by lack of capacity and resources and overstaffing. Of the annual budget, 30% was earmarked for this sector, according to International Crisis Group estimates. On 3 January, the coordinator of the mainly EU-financed ‘Comité Técnico de Pilotagem’ for the armed forces reform programme announced that a census of the various security units was to be undertaken from 23 January onwards. The preparatory phase of the EU mission in support

112 • West Africa of security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau commenced in June and aimed at implementing the national security sector reform strategy endorsed by Guinea-Bissau and international donors in 2006. Endowed with € 5.65 m, the mission was for an initial period of 12 months and consisted of 15 military and civilian advisors. The programme was planned to continue until 2013 under the tenth EDF. The mission leader, Esteban Verastegui, announced plans on 20 May that the army’s estimated 7,000–9,000 soldiers would be reduced to 2,000–2,500. Only 4,800 soldiers were officially registered, a significant number of them officers of high rank. The legal framework and security sector structures were to be restructured. Bilateral military-technical cooperation with Portugal was intensified in an agreement signed on 26 February. The need for reform became even more obvious on 13 April when 20 members of a special police force invaded the building of the crime investigation police, ransacked the offices and killed one officer. The victim had been previously detained for having accidentally shot two people, one of them a member of the special police force. Naval Chief of Staff Rear Admiral José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto fled the country after 100 of his followers were arrested on 6 August on charges of planning to overthrow President Vieira. The coup attempt failed when high ranking officers refused to participate. Na Tchuto was arrested in Gambia a few days later. On 15 August, President Vieira accused an unnamed political leader of being behind the coup. The presidential residence came under attack on 23 November from a group of soldiers attempting to seize an arms depot. One individual was killed and another wounded in the ensuing gunfire. The government and international observers characterised the attack as another coup attempt. Against this background, Alfredo Malu, the former head of the secret service and close ally of the leader of the ‘Partido da Renovação Social’ (PRS) Kumba Yala, was arrested on 2 December. He was released three days later. Sergeant Alexandre N’Tchama Yala, a nephew of Kumba Yala, was eventually identified as the mastermind behind the coup. He was interrogated by Senegalese authorities in Dakar in mid-December. Given all these challenges, the UN Security Council on 11 December welcomed the creation of the national commission on human rights. Human rights activists criticised a general amnesty law aimed at the perpetrators of political crimes committed between 1974 and 2006. By November, the bill had still failed to muster parliamentary approval. The leader of the opposition ‘Movimento Democrático Guineense’ (MDG), Silvestre Alves, on 29 January criticised the frequency of President João Bernardo ‘Nino’ Vieira’s foreign tours, accusing him and his wife of misusing state funds. Consequently, on 18 February Alves was summoned by the attorney-general. This incident shed light on the intimidating political atmosphere in the country. At the same time, Vieira’s repeated bouts of medical treatment in France reinforced speculation about his health. The re-election on 26 January of the president of the high court of justice, Maria do Céu Monteiro, for a further four-year term was criticised by the defeated candidate, Emí-

Guinea-Bissau • 113 lio Kaft Costa, the country’s only judge with a doctoral degree in law. He viewed the election as illegal since, he argued, all judges in the country were to elect the president of the high court, whereas only the high court’s nine judges had been allowed to do so. Prime Minister Martinho N’Dafa Cabi made changes to his government on 13 January. On 29 February, tensions between him and the chairman of ‘Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde’ (PAIGC), Carlos Gomes jnr., became clearly apparent. Gomes withdrew his confidence in N’Dafa Cabi as prime minister, citing indiscipline and lack of respect for the party. Following criticism by PAIGC’s central committee, Gomes reversed his decision on 10 March, thus enabling N’Dafa Cabi to remain in office. On 22 February, the ‘Liga Guineense dos Direitos Humanos’ condemned the radicalism of two Muslim leaders. Two days previously, the two had accused politicians and civil society of affronting Islam. They defended the practice of female genital mutilation and ‘taliban’ child labour. This took place on the eve of the 28 February debate in parliament on a bill drafted by the ‘Instituto da Mulher e Criança’ (IMC) to ban female genital mutilation. According to the IMC, more than 4,000 girls had fallen victim to this practice in 2007. The leader of the Ahmadiyya movement on 16 March welcomed the parliamentary initiative. ‘Taliban’ children are forced to work abroad for their religious masters. The NGO ‘SOS Criança Talibé’ on 8 January accused the government of a lack of activity in this field. However, growing numbers of these children were repatriated by NGOs and the International Organisation for Migration from Senegal to the eastern parts of GuineaBissau, a Muslim stronghold, and a number of child traffickers were arrested. In October, ‘SOS Criança Talibé’ reported a 45% drop in cases since 2007, although this figure was dispusted. The situation for the media remained difficult. On 12 March, a journalist was interrogated by the secret service for reporting the disarmament of a special police unit by the chief of general staff. The owner of ‘Rádio Pindjiguiti’ closed the station on 27 April, accusing his employees of intolerance and of disrespecting state institutions. The station had repeatedly broadcast debates heavily critical of the government. Generally, the media lack funds and equipment. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections in November, public radio and television were accused of partisan reporting. The UN supported the media with a grant of € 40,000. In late March, it became known that € 114,000 had been stolen from the ministry of finance. The treasurer and two accomplices were arrested. In a surprise move, President Vieira dismissed Attorney-General Fernando Jorge Ribeiro on 11 April and replaced him with Luís Manuel Cabral. On 27 July, PAIGC withdrew from the government of national unity, in which PRS and PUSD (‘Partido Unido Social-Democrata’) were the other partners, after Prime Minister N’Dafa Cabi sacked a number of PAIGC government members without informing the party. On 5 August, President Vieira dissolved parliament. Prior to this, the high court of

114 • West Africa justice had declared unconstitutional the extension on 1 August of the parliamentary mandate. Because its current mandate had expired on 21 April, parliament had voted in favour of a highly contentious extension until the elections scheduled for November. On 9 August, a new government took power, headed by the political veteran Carlos Correia (PAIGC) as prime minister. His all-party government was predominantly made up of people close to the president, representing PAIGC, PRS, PUSD, PRID (‘Partido Republicano da Independência para o Desenvolvimento) and APU (‘Aliança Popular Unida’). Parliamentary elections, financed by the international community, were held on 16 November. Both the campaign and the election itself were peaceful and orderly. Observers from the EU, UN, ECOWAS and the ‘Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa’ (CPLP) generally praised the exercise, although they also noted some vote buying and aggressive behaviour. Turnout was high (82% of 594,000 registered voters). PAIGC won the elections with 67 seats, while PRS took 28, PRID (led by PAIGC renegade and Vieira ally and former prime minister Aristides Gomes) three, and AD (‘Aliança Democrático’) and PND (‘Partido da Nova Democracia’) one each. PRS leader Kumba Yala, who had converted to Islam, on 17 November denounced the polls and only accepted the results on 18 December after the high court dismissed all objections. On 30 December, President Vieira nominated PAIGC leader Carlos Gomes jnr. as the new prime minister.

Foreign Affairs As in previous years, drug-trafficking remained one of the country’s major challenges. The international community increased its efforts to counter the problem. Following the international conference on drug-trafficking of 19 December 2007 in Lisbon, the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) organised a follow-up meeting on 22 January. It was attended by members of the government, international partners and staff of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Agreement was reached to develop an efficient strategic framework. The Lisbon conference had promised € 4.6 m for 2008 but the amount was not released until July. The operational programme against drugtrafficking developed by UNODC and Guinea-Bissau had a total budget of $ 19.1 m for the period up to 2010. The UN International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau also addressed the issue in Cape Verde on 5 May. The UN Secretary General was requested to make recommendations on transforming UNOGBIS into an integrated office. In December, the mandate of UNOGBIS was extended until June 2009. An EU mission visited Bissau in June to prepare concrete action against trafficking within the framework of the government’s ‘Plano Nacional de Luta Contra o Tráfico de Droga’, which is to run from 2009 to 2011. Bilateral cooperation on this issue between Guinea-Bissau and Portugal continued.

Guinea-Bissau • 115 On 28 July, the chief state prosecutor denounced ‘occult forces’, among them sections of the police, for trying to intimidate him into abandoning inquiries into two Venezuelan airplanes grounded at Bissau’s airport on 17 July on suspicion of transporting drugs. Minister of Justice Carmelita Pires also received threats. Five suspects, three Venezuelans and two airport employees, were arrested. A judge was suspended on 25 August for ordering the release on bail of four of them on 19 August. One Venezuelan wanted by Interpol fled the country the same day but was arrested in Mali a week later. On 21 September, police at the airport arrested two passengers en route to Lisbon, each carrying two kilograms of cocaine. Shortly after, four border patrol officers and a policeman were arrested for attempting to share the cocaine among themselves. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in a report of 29 September described Guinea-Bissau as “a major market place in the drug trade”. On 10 December, the minister of justice admitted that no one had been convicted of drug-trafficking to date. Security cooperation with other West African countries continued. Two Mauritanians suspected of murdering tourists and of having links to al-Qaida were arrested in Bissau on 10 January and handed over to Mauritania. One suspect managed to escape but was recaptured in Bissau in April. Cooperation with Senegal was strengthened on 10 October by an agreement aimed at cooperation in security matters and the struggle against illegal immigration. Cooperation with Morocco regarding professional training, security and Islam continued. China signed an agreement on 21 February for the construction of a new government building, worth $ 21 m, to house the prime minister’s office. On 13 and 14 March, President Vieira took part in the International Islamic Conference summit in Dakar. On 14 December, Cape Verdean President Pedro Pires visited Bissau. Relations between the two countries had deteriorated following a coup in Guinea-Bissau in 1980. The deputy military junta leader of Guinea (Conakry), General Mamadou Camará, visited Bissau on 30 December. Spain intensified its fight against illegal immigration and to this purpose signed an agreement with Guinea-Bissau on 25 January.

Socioeconomic Developments On 1 January, the IMF cancelled $ 180 m of a total of $ 830 m in Paris Club debts. The restructuring followed a new PRGF concluded on 21 December 2007. On 29 January, the IMF approved $ 2.8 m in emergency post-conflict assistance. This amount, to support the government’s economic programme, was disbursed on 28 July. On 20 February, Prime Minister N’Dafa Cabi participated in a meeting convened by the UN Peacebuilding Commission to identify priority areas for assistance from the commission to stabilise the country. Guinea-Bissau had joined the commission in December 2007. Portugal granted $ 2 m budget aid on 29 February and announced plans to support GuineaBissau’s financial administration. As a result, the ‘Programa Indicativo de Cooperação’,

116 • West Africa worth € 35 m and covering the period 2008 to 2010, was signed by the two countries on 6 March. On 14 March, parliament approved a law introducing a ‘tax for democracy and development’ amounting to CFAfr 2,000 annually (€ 3) to be paid by all employed citizens of between 18 and 60 years of age. For more than a decade, citizens had not been required to pay taxes. While the export of cashews had increased only slightly to 117,000 tonnes in 2007 on account of lack of capacity and rainfall, in 2008 a good harvest was expected. Prices rose to $ 0.70 per kg ($ 0.15 in 2007). Guinea-Bissau ranked as the world’s fifth producer of cashew kernels. The new fishing agreement concluded with the EU at the end of 2007 came into effect. In June it became known that an Angolan group planned to invest $ 500 m in bauxite mining. The government and the Nigeria-led Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) concluded an agreement early in the year on water and power facilities, their rehabilitation to be undertaken by an AFC subsidiary and a Chinese partner company. In February it was revealed that the Organisation for the Development of the Gambia River had raised $ 795 m (67% of the overall costs) to construct hydroelectric dams in Senegal and Guinea. Guinea-Bissau, as one of the four member countries, was allocated 8% of the energy produced. ECOWAS ministers of energy met in Bissau on 30 August to discuss the sub-regional energy crisis, which had been aggravated by the steep rise in global fuel and food prices. In April, May and June, the country was confronted with fuel shortages because the maximum price fixed by government did not meet suppliers’ costs. The government announced new prices on 21 June. From 9 May, government suspended the import tax on rice, a staple, resulting in tax losses of about € 3 m. The price of rice had risen by 70% in a year. On 12 May, government announced its intention to take over the administration of Guiné Telecom and Guinétel. These public operators were previously co-administered by Guinea-Bissau and Portugal, but controversy had erupted over debts and investments. As in previous years, the country was repeatedly shaken by strikes, which affected public schools, the ministry of finance, the office of the attorney-general and the health sector. In October, the ‘União Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Guiné-Bissau’ (UNTG) declared a three day general strike in the public sector, which was joined by taxi and lorry drivers. Salary arrears of several months, the increased cost of living and the bribes routinely demanded by the transport police were among the immediate causes. The bulk of revenues already went to meet salary payments, leaving little money for investment. In early 2008, it was revealed that 6% of the country’s GDP stemmed from remittances, making Guinea-Bissau one of the most important countries in this category. Guinea-Bissau was again affected by a cholera epidemic. It started in May and continued until October, when the rainy season ended. Some 12,500 individuals fell ill, of whom 200 died. Christoph Kohl

Liberia

In view of economic growth rates of at least 7% in the preceding two years, the country was reckoned to be the fastest improving nation in Africa, symbolised by rapid enhancements to physical infrastructure, such as roads (rebuilt by the Chinese), buildings and power restored in a limited way to the capital Monrovia. However, stability and growth continued to be fragile. Unemployment stood at 85% and even now few Liberians had access to electricity and clean water. Trials of former military officers for treason demonstrated threats to regime security, as did the seizure of arms at the border with Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire. Personal security was even more at risk, with the government introducing the death penalty for convicted armed robbers. There were some massacres, including the killing of 15 workers over a land dispute. A special emergency response unit was created with a total of 139 police officers to deal with these problems in and around Monrovia. The UN Security Council at year’s end approved the deployment of two additional police units. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) still had over 11,000 troops (down from 16,000 over the previous two years) and a police force of 1,074 and 471 international civilian staff – in total costing $ 603.8 m, more than three times the Liberian national budget.

118 • West Africa

Domestic Politics Tasked with creating ‘a clear picture of the past’ in order to facilitate reconciliation, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) began public hearings in January, coinciding with the opening of the trial in The Hague of former President Charles Taylor, charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity. Taylor continued to an extent to cast a shadow over the country’s politics: his refusal to testify to the TRC was widely commented on by the country’s media and the appearance of his former vice president, Moses Blah, as a prosecution witness caused a stir and heightened previously muted public interest in the trial, centring on the crimes Taylor allegedly committed in Sierra Leone. While the TRC was successful in collecting close to 20,000 statements, the process overall continued to be wobbly. Notorious former warlords like Prince Johnson (now a senior senator) appeared at the public hearings blustering, and none of them acknowledged the destructive roles they had played during the war, let alone apologised for them. The TRC itself as an institution was criticised by many: commissioners appeared incompetent and unfocused, and their effort so far dilatory. After spending about $ 7 m and two years, they had to be pressured to (very hastily) submit an initial report in December. Entitled Final Report Volume 1: Findings and Determinations: Summary of Preliminary Findings, Determinations and Recommendations, the 107-page report was badly written and fundamentally covered operational issues. No more than ten or 11 of the 107 pages appeared to address findings, determinations and recommendations, and these were rather vague. It was initially published on the commission’s website, but outrage from observers caused the commission to quietly remove it. At that late stage, President Ellen JohnsonSirleaf, who had initially vowed not to appear before the commission, did so in-camera, where she accepted that she had contributed $ 10,000 to Charles Taylor during the initial stages of the war, but withdrew her support after Taylor’s murderous intentions were exposed. The commission was due to fold up its activities in June 2009, by which time it should have produced a more acceptable report. Concerns over corruption rose sharply after a number of embarrassing disclosures involving people close to President Johnson-Sirleaf. In September, newspapers published stories relating to possible graft involving the office of the president, as well other even more serious cases of official corruption. It started after the email account of Willis Knuckles, a former minister of public works and a close confidant of Johnson-Sirleaf, was apparently hacked and its contents made public. Graft schemes were revealed, involving kickbacks and bribes probably amounting in all to $ 1 m or more, raising serious questions about the president’s anti-graft posture. It was not the first time that Knuckles, part of the small but very influential Americo-Liberian elite, had disgraced the presidential office. In 2007, his picture – showing him in a nude act with two women – circulated in newspapers and on the internet, and he was forced to resign.

Liberia • 119 Also in September, a scheme was uncovered at the finance ministry through which millions of dollars written up as ‘domestic debt payment’ disappeared via bogus companies and fake vendors. The previous month, a consultant for the Governance Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) at the ministry of finance stumbled upon what seemed to him suspicious payment to a bogus vendor, which he stopped. The matter was immediately reported to the cash management committee. A former finance ministry official had bypassed officially established GEMAP guidelines and paid the bogus vendor millions of dollars. One of the vendors fled the country a day after he was paid by the finance official under the domestic debt scheme. The government in October passed a law setting up an anti-corruption commission. Headed by Frances Johnson-Morris, a close friend of the president, the commission did not inspire great confidence. Johnson-Morris, as director of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission and subsequently chief electoral commissioner (presiding over the election of the current president), was a respected civil society activist. She was later appointed – controversially – to head the ministry of justice and then later still minister of commerce. Concerns about security remained, with rampant armed robbery being just one issue. There were also widespread incidents of rape, the government becoming so alarmed that it set up a special court to fast-track the trial of rape cases. Police records at the end of the year showed that the problem was far from effectively curbed and that Liberia was among the countries with the highest teenage pregnancy rates. A potentially far more destabilising pattern suggested itself on 11 June when 19 mutilated bodies were discovered close to the borders of Montserrado/Margibi counties, not far from Monrovia. Some of the victims had been shot and others hacked to death with machetes. The site of the killings had been the scene of a land dispute involving Margibi county Senator Roland Kaine (formerly close to Charles Taylor), and director of price analysis at the ministry of commerce, Charles Bennie (a former member of the rival faction, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy – LURD). Both officials as well as over a dozen others were arrested and charged with murder. A month before (in May), two people were killed in Maryland county after a violent clash over disputed land. In April, three villages in Bong county were razed to the ground, one person killed and over half a dozen severely wounded in a land dispute. For most of the year, there were reports that ethnic Mandingoes (a minority group most Liberians consider foreigners) were expelled from several commercial areas in Nimba county, a volatile region. In fact, during the year the government received more than 1,307 land-related complaints, with only 38% of the cases resolved. A key trigger in the troubles over land may have been the return of more than 100,000 former refugees, some of whom found that their land had been occupied illegally. The weak law enforcement mechanism in the country has been too slow to respond to the growing crisis. A paper prepared by the governance commission – headed by former President Amos Sawyer – in March identified land disputes as the most important security issue facing

120 • West Africa postwar Liberia, a position endorsed by a study conducted by the TRC. However, a planned land commission was not set up and even key legislation failed to pass. Despite the many efforts and donor resources spent on security sector reform, the 3,000strong Liberia National Police (LNP), trained and equipped by UNMIL, continued to experience difficulties. Over 70 police personnel were summarily dismissed for alleged collusion in crimes, including armed robbery. During a number of TRC hearings, victims identified serving police officers as former militia fighters who had committed gross atrocities. Serious incidents concerning rights violations and use of excessive force by police were reported regularly, and instances of detention without charge and beatings of civilians commonplace. A report by the ICG, noting the LNP’s inadequacies, recommended the deployment of the police “over the entire national territory, imposing sanctions against officers who do not report for duty at appointed places and times; hold those within its hierarchy fully accountable for management deficiencies and infractions of law when adequate management structures are in place; dedicate money and morale-boosting attention to it and improve human resource management, including for recruitment.” It was, however, not expected that these basic tasks could be fulfilled in the medium term. In the rural areas, police remained absent, and the lack of basic equipment for police forces located outside the capital meant that UNMIL had to continue its policing duties. Worse, when UNMIL created a non-compliance unit and a professional standards unit in May to undertake internal oversight of the LNP, this was viewed by some as intrusive. The LNP chiefs summarily rejected 12 of 38 recent recommendations on the improvement of policing standards and enhancement of integrity. The process of creating a new army with the help of two American private security companies, Dyncorp and PAE, was also fraught with difficulties. DynCorp was tasked to “recruit and make soldiers”, and PAE to “mentor and develop them into an operational force”. By the end of the year, the maximum number of 2,000 soldiers had been trained, although it was a Nigerian officer who continued as acting chief of staff. Popular anxiety about future army behaviour remained high, however. Liberia conducted its first census since 1984 in March. The preliminary results put the overall population at 3,498,072 persons. The census cost $ 2.6 m, paid for mainly by the UN, the European Commission and other donors.

Foreign Affairs President Bush, a key backer of President Johnson-Sirleaf, visited the country on 21 February at the end of his last tour of Africa. However, the anticipated announcement by the US to set up AFRICOM – the Pentagon Africa Command aimed at coordinating “all US military and security interests throughout” the continent – was not made. President Johnson-Sirleaf had in 2007 warmly invited the Americans to set up the command in Liberia,

Liberia • 121 but a generally cool reception among other African leaders and probably the lack of basic infrastructure in Liberia prevented this from happening. The Chinese, who had cancelled Liberia’s debt worth $ 10 m early in the year, opened a large embassy in Monrovia and launched several road (re)construction projects. They also entertained huge investment plans in Liberia’s mineral resources, including timber. There were 558 Chinese soldiers with UNMIL, and China announced it was constructing a campus for the neglected University of Liberia at a cost of $ 20 m, and an army barracks to house 700 Liberian soldiers in Gbarnga, Bong county. The charismatic Johnson-Sirleaf continued to outshine other leaders in the region. She was chair of the Mano River Union and played host to leaders from the region many times during the year, maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring countries. When soldiers staged a coup in Guinea following the death of long-term dictator Lansana Conté, Johnson-Sirleaf, declaring that instability of its neighbour posed an immediate security threat to her country, invited some members of the Guinean junta to Monrovia for talks. She was instrumental in galvanising regional efforts towards focusing on the Guinea situation, making sure that the new junta was not entirely isolated – something that she thought would be unwise and potentially destabilising.

Socioeconomic Developments The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS) paper launched by Johnson-Sirleaf to guide the Liberia development partners’ forum (donor conference) in Washington DC in February 2007, guided Liberia’s development management process through to June 2008. On 26–27 June, a substantive PRS document was discussed between the Liberian government and donors in Berlin. It emphasised the need to consolidate peace by strengthening institutions of security and the rule of law, as well as making greater investments in the growth sectors. Donors promptly pledged support to Liberia of the order of $ 250–300 m for 2008–09, approximately $ 115 m through the Liberia Reconstruction Trust Fund, and a further $ 140 m from the World Bank and AfDB to support infrastructure financing over the next three years. Partners also announced increased budget support and contributed to financing for a cash buy-back of the country’s commercial debt. The AfDB and World Bank made commitments of $ 26 m in budget support over the next three years. By far the most important instrument governing international donor assistance was GEMAP, seen by the government as its “sustained commitment . . . to budgetary balance and to an improved macroeconomic framework.” Nevertheless, GEMAP continued to cause some resentment among Liberians, since under the programme expatriate (mainly American) personnel virtually run key government revenue-generating institutions. Some Liberians argued that it was not building sufficient local capacity fast enough. In a survey

122 • West Africa of national managers of GEMAP-assisted institutions earlier in the year, seven out of eight claimed it was making no difference even where corruption, not to mention mismanagement, was concerned, and that the excessive focus on revenue-generating institutions neglected other corruption-prone and vital national institutions, like social security. However, revenue collection and pre-inspection of imported goods, once so prone to predation and unrestrained graft at the Freeport, greatly improved. The central bank, another key area of GEMAP intervention, functioned better, as the monthly status report of the IMF-funded chief administrator had shown over the preceding four years, with improved reporting systems, greater transparency and the removal of many bottlenecks. The improvements at the Monrovia Freeport, where previously brokers had to bribe a long line of officials before they could clear their goods, were palpable. Three significant changes since GEMAP was introduced were worth noting: every official charge greater than $ 100 had to be paid into a government bank account instead of as previously, to evereager officials who were more likely than not to pocket the money for themselves; security increased significantly; and goods inspection had become far more efficient. Liberian officials and observers, however, still complained of a lack of synergy between the GEMAP programme and overall state institutions, undermining the effectiveness of the entire programme. International goodwill remained steady, though sometimes expressed uncritically. A key concern has remained the minerals sector, in particular diamonds. The ministry of lands and mines had issued 39 diamond broker licences and 21 diamond dealer licences by 29 April. Illicit mining continued in many areas, however, and a UN panel of experts was informed of many illicit activities in breach of Kimberley Process regulations. By 12 May, the government’s Diamond Office had issued a total of 43 Kimberley Process certificates, but four of them were quickly cancelled. In all, Liberia exported 45,600 carats of diamonds worth $ 9.6 m, earning the cash-strapped government approximately $ 200,000 in the form of a 3% export tax. In response to the widespread fears of food insecurity due to the global food crisis, the president signed a $ 30 m agreement with ADA Commercial Inc. with the goal of developing rice production capacity and achieving a production output of 75,000 metric tonnes of rice by 2013. Subsidies from the government kept the price of rice, the country’s staple, stable, but by the end of the year an influx of locusts destroyed food crops and threatened to undermine local production capacity. ‘Flags of convenience’ was a major earner for the government, as previously. Liberia has the second-largest maritime registry in the world (after Panama). There were 2,724 vessels totalling 83.3 m gross tonnes registered under its flag, earning some $ 16 m in maritime revenue for the government. Lansana Gberie

Mali

Two major issues dominated Malian society. First, constant attacks by Tuareg rebel groups on army posts and convoys in the northern regions provoked military responses, as opposed to the government’s usual policy of dialogue. Second, the worldwide food and fuel crises led to rising food prices (particularly rice). In addition to a number of shortterm policy measures (subsidies, tax cuts, export bans), the government set up an ambitious programme to become self-sufficient in cereal output and less dependent on the world market. International donors adapted their aid policies to assist the government in this respect. Parliamentary opposition became more vocal, thereby increasing political accountability in society. Numerous policy issues were hotly debated. In addition, a commission was established by President Touré and mandated to make recommendations to strengthen Malian democracy. The report presented in October provided the foundations for a constitutional review process to be implemented in the years to come.

Domestic Politics Following the 2007 general elections, during which incumbent President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) was re-elected, the year marked the start of a three year reform process

124 • West Africa aimed at further consolidating democracy. On 28 February, the president mandated a commission of inquiry to identify Mali’s main democratic challenges and elaborate proposals for improvement. The commission comprised representatives of political and civil society, the civil service and the legal branch. For almost eight months it consulted a wide range of stakeholders. On 13 October, the commission presented its report, which included 233 recommendations. The report called for a constitutional review process, revision of the electoral management structure and the electoral system and improved media regulations, among other matters. On 11 December, a follow-up commission was instituted by the president and mandated to prepare for a constitutional review process and to draft legislation based on the recommendations presented. The foundations for a process to further consolidate democracy were thus laid. Against the background of this broader democratic consolidation, preparations for the local elections (scheduled for 26 April 2009) were initiated in the second half of the year. Malian citizens could register as voters until November. Yet again, opposition parties expressed serious doubts about the reliability of the electoral register and emphasised the negative impact of this issue on the legitimacy of the upcoming elections. Malian bureaucracy has always struggled to keep the civil and electoral register up to date. On 25 October, President Touré initiated an extensive civilian registration programme ‘Recensement Administratif à Vocation d’Etat Civil’. This programme aimed at registering all Malian citizens before September 2009 and including biometric data such as photographs and digitised fingerprints. Mali’s Independent National Electoral Commission, composed of representatives of political parties (both opposition and from the ruling coalition) and civil society organisations was also set up and started its preparations for monitoring the upcoming elections. An issue dominating the political agenda throughout the year was the constant attacks by Tuareg rebels on army posts and convoys in the northern regions. Officially, the rebels claimed they were protesting against the socioeconomic deprivation of these regions and calling for increased regional autonomy. Many observers, however, linked the attacks to a strategy of defending cross-border smuggling routes for drugs and weapons. A law was passed in parliament labelling the rebels terrorists and, as if to confirm allegations, the army intercepted three four-wheel-drive vehicles smuggling cocaine with a street value of $ 45 m. At the start of the year, however, the situation seemed more promising. Over 20 soldiers who had been taken hostage in August 2007 were released by the Tuareg rebels on 7 March following mediation by the Libyan government. Shortly after, another 40 soldiers were released. But on 21 May, a military convoy of 40–60 soldiers was attacked by rebel forces. According to the minister of defence, 22 people were killed (including four soldiers of Tuareg origin) and army equipment stolen. On 3 June, another attack on a military supply convoy took place between Kidal and Tinzawete. This series of attacks prompted a change of policy by the government. During his annual press conference on 8 June, Presi-

Mali • 125 dent Touré indicated that his preferred focus on dialogue was no longer adequate. A military response could not be excluded and, indeed, on 12 June, the army attacked a rebel basis in Tin Essalak. Some weeks later, negotiations were reopened under the auspices of Algeria. In the months that followed, the rebels released several Malian and international hostages. Mali signed an agreement with the government of Niger to intensify cooperation on security matters and on 11 November the ministers of foreign affairs of Libya, Algeria, Chad, Niger and Mali met in Bamako to discuss a regional plan of action to address the cross-border rebellion. At that point, rebel leader Bahanga had already received a refugee permit from the Libyan government. Despite these diplomatic efforts, yet another rebel attack took place on 20 December, which resulted in the death of nine soldiers and ten rebels. Other issues that dominated the political agenda were the proposed legislation on improved female and children’s rights (the ‘Code de la Famille’), the proposed abolition of the death penalty, the privatisation of the national cotton industry and the rising prices of primary commodities in the context of the emerging food crisis. A revised ‘Code de la Famille’ had been drafted under former President Alpha Oumar Konaré but was never enacted. In 2007, female parliamentarians, NGOs and lawyers intensified their lobbying for adoption of the bill. Islamic organisations, however, challenged the proposed modifications as going against Malian and Islamic traditions. Early in the year, President Touré instituted a 19-member commission to formulate recommendations on ways to balance (religious) traditions with the universal principles outlined in the bill. When the commission released its report after months of deliberation, Islamic organisations viewed their input as having been minimised and organised street protests. A member of parliament justified continued parliamentary silence over the proposed legislation in the following terms: “In this atmosphere of misunderstanding it is difficult for MPs to vote for this code at the risk of provoking a mass-uprising.” A bill dealing with the formal abolition of the death penalty (which had not been used since 1979) went through a similar process. After years of delay, there was a breakthrough in the process of privatising the national cotton company, ‘Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des Fibres Textiles’ (CMDT). The cabinet decided on the matter on 28 May, but trade unions, civil society organisations and (opposition) MPs fiercely criticised the plan. Nevertheless, the bill was enacted on 1 August by a large majority. It envisaged initial separation of the company into four (regionally delineated) sections, which were to be privatised individually. The parliamentary coalition of the ‘Parti pour la Renaissance Nationale’ (PARENA) and ‘Solidarité Africaine pour la Démocratie et l’Indépendence’ (SADI) was especially vocal. When the government presented its annual budget for 2009, the spokesperson of the coalition’s parliamentary caucus, Konimba Sidibé, presented a paper highlighting ten arguments to vote against the budget. The budget was, however, approved by a large majority on 18 December. It envisaged a significant rise in spending on the education,

126 • West Africa health and legal sectors. The predicted expenditure in the entire budget was set at CFAfr 127 bn above income, slightly above the CFAfr 120 bn overspent in 2008. The government was able to increase its tax income by more than 10%. The introduction of an auditor general (‘Verificateur General’) in 2006 began to have some impact. In 2008, the office released its findings for the previous year. The income foregone by the state through corruption and mismanagement totalled more than CFAfr 100 bn (70% of total civil service salaries). However, the state successfully recovered over CFAfr 30 bn of missing income from previous years. While stringent legal follow-up on individuals accused of malpractice seemed to be more challenging, Mali climbed from 118 to 99 on Transparency International’s list of corrupt countries. Mali’s minister of mines, energy and water resigned in September following severe international pressure. He was accused of a conflict of interest when a European investment bank lost € 3.7 m to a company he was personally involved in. While the country enjoyed relatively generous press freedom, television continued to operate within stringent media laws that obstructed private initiatives. These regulations were the subject of debate, such as at a sub-regional conference on 18–20 December, which brought together journalists from West Africa to discuss the theme of ‘Medias, Paix et Démocratie’. One incident during the year concerned a journalist briefly imprisoned by the policemen he had tried to photograph while they were demanding bribes from bus passengers. Both the major political parties, ‘Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali-Parti Africain pour la Solidarité et la Justice’ (Adema-PASJ) and ‘Union pour la République et la Démocratie’ (URD), held national congresses. In the run-up to its congress on 25–26 April, URD survived internal quarrels started by the minister of health, who unsuccessfully ran for the party presidency. Adema held its fourth ordinary congress between 24 and 26 October and enlarged its national executive committee from 44 to 80 members to accommodate internal political factions. On 5 June, senior Malian party representatives jointly launched the ‘Centre Malien de Dialogue Inter-Partis et de la Démocratie’ (CMDID), which strives to improve the functioning of political parties, strengthen the accountability of politicians to citizens and improve the legal framework of Malian democracy.

Foreign Affairs Despite the fact that most Malian migrants trek within the sub-region, the political agenda was dominated by migration flows between Mali and Europe. On 6 October, President Touré opened a ‘Centre d’Information pour la Gestion des Migrations’ in the presence of the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Louis Michel and French Minister of Integration Brice Hortefeux. The centre aims to provide better infor-

Mali • 127 mation to potential migrants and assist those returning to Mali, although no significant budget was earmarked for the second objective. Discussions with the French government on a bilateral migration agreement continued. The Malian government refused to sign an agreement regulating, among others things, the access of Malian migrants to the French labour market. Mali has seen its demands for legal status for some of the Malian migrants illegally residing in France frustrated. A visit to Bamako by the secretary general of the French ministry of immigration failed to produce a deal. For the first time in a decade, remittances from Europe to West Africa decreased as a consequence of the European recession. The number of tourists visiting Mali continued to increase significantly. On 17–19 October, representatives of the Malian tourism sector and international tour operators discussed ways for the sector to contribute more substantially to pro-poor economic growth. As far as bilateral relations were concerned, during his visit to Ghana President Touré discussed policies that could reduce transport costs between the two countries, thereby improving trade. Malian trade has been severely affected by the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. With the situation in that country improving, the Malian government decided to open a warehouse in the port of Abidjan in July, expecting traffic to increase significantly. Mali and Mauritania ended a joint conference on security matters days before the Mauritanian government was overthrown by its army generals. President Touré received the new Guinean leaders shortly after the death of President Lansana Conté. President Touré participated in the 35th summit of ECOWAS on 19 December. Besides the global financial crisis and issues of sub-regional integration, discussion centred on ways to counter the circulation of small arms. Between 15–21 June, the ECOWAS command post undertook an exercise to assess the peacekeeping capacities of its regional standby force stationed in Bamako. On 26 September, Mali hosted an UEMOA ministerial conference to discuss strategies to mitigate the external shocks generated by the world credit crisis on the sub-regional economies. A number of important bilateral and multilateral development agreements were signed. On 28–30 May, Japan organised its fourth international development of Africa conference, which President Touré attended along with some 40 other African heads of state. Japan later provided an additional gift of CFAfr 2 bn to the Malian government to support rice production. During the Olympic Games, President Touré and a large delegation of cabinet ministers visited China and met with numerous economic actors considering investment in Mali. As a follow-up, the president received a delegation of the Import-Export Bank of China in Bamako on 26 November. China provided loans totalling CFAfr 74 bn aimed at expanding Mali’s sugar industry. Both Brazil and Libya increased their support to Mali, focusing on strengthening the ‘Office du Niger’, the agency managing the irrigation schemes in Mali’s most fertile areas.

128 • West Africa Despite the rise of non-Western donors and investors, development aid provided by Western governments and multilateral institutions was still the most important. Negotiations on the 10th EDF resulted in an envelope of € 559.3 m being made available for the upcoming five years. On 28 May, the government reached agreement with the IMF on a three-year PRGF worth $ 41.7 m. On 11 December, an initial review was conducted and the IMF showed some flexibility over the government’s non-compliance with some performance indicators as a result of policies adopted to address the rising food and energy prices. On 14 July, the World Bank provided additional funds, to be integrated within a broader government programmes and aimed at stimulating private initiatives through micro-credit. Canada and Denmark also contributed an additional $ 28 m in this area. Early in January, the government signed a joint agreement with various UN agencies worth $ 266 m. The US provided a subsidy of CFAfr 9.5 bn to enhance agricultural productivity, and was followed by a number of other Western donors.

Socioeconomic Developments The food and fuel crises and the subsequent increase in primary commodity prices were the dominant issues for much of the year. An Oxfam report revealed that food prices in the country had increased over 80% between 2005 and 2008. A study commissioned by UEMOA showed increased food prices of 14.2% between May 2007 and May 2008. When various Asian countries decided to limit their rice exports, the situation deteriorated further, as Mali is highly depended on the Asian market. The cost of rice rose by almost 30% in the first quarter of the year. The price of locally and regionally produced grains (millet, sorghum, fonio, cassava) was not as severely affected. A positive development was that the 2007–08 seasonal harvest proved to be good. Cereal crop production showed a 5% increase compared to the previous season and was 22% above the five-year average. The food and fuel crises raised awareness among politicians that too great a dependence on the international market endangered food security. The government adopted a midterm policy framework entitled ‘Investing in agriculture in order to realise sustainable growth between 2008–12’. Within this framework, it defined an ambitious plan to increase local cereal production in order to become self-sufficient. However, before such plan could be implemented, a number of short-term policy measures had to be taken in response to the crises. First, government tried to restrict the export of Malian cereals to prevent further price increases. Exports to Mauritania and Côte d’Ivoire declined, but enforcing the ban proved challenging as existing price differences across borders created trade incentives. In addition, government set up tax dispensations for primary commodities and subsidised the fuel and seeds to be used for the upcoming planting season. As for the mid-term policies, Mali announced its ambition to double its total cereal output by 2012. For the 2008–09 season, a 24% increase in output was envisaged compared to the 2007–08 season. A key component of this ambitious agricultural plan was the

Mali • 129 ‘Initiative Riz’ launched by the prime minister in April. Recognising the urgent need to reduce the country’s dependence on Asian rice imports, he indicated that rice production would have to increase by 50% in the 2008–09 season. Various international donors modified their support strategies and contributed to this initiative. On 20 November, the minister of agriculture announced that cereal production for the 2008–09 season was indeed going to achieve the objectives set out. Government was unable to enjoy its success for long as the subsequent marketing of crops encountered major difficulties. Traders from Mali and neighbouring countries bought large quantities of cereals, which were then exported or stored. The effects were immediate: whereas the price per kilogram of rice was between CFAfr 175–250 in early October, it went up to CFAfr 275–350 within a month and a half. The government projected gold production to reach between 45–50 tonnes annually. This year, production reached 48 tonnes, generating over CFAfr 600 bn. Mali is Africa’s third gold producer, after South Africa and Ghana. The government prepared legislation to further diversify earnings and revenues from different metals. Considerable progress was made with respect to infrastructure. Roads between Gao and Niger were improved, as were those between Kati-Kita and Bougouni-Yanfolila. At year’s end, the Kayes-Bafoulabe, Bougouni-Sikasso, Sevare-Douentza routes were also under reconstruction. A road tax was envisaged to enable better maintenance. Under the Millennium Challenge Agreement, preparations were under way to modernise the airport. Exploratory talks were undertaken by President Touré to investigate possibilities for developing a tram network in the capital. The government heavily subsidised energy costs: energy prices were frozen at their 2003 level. Preparations were undertaken to build an extra power plant in Sirakoro and Balingue. Mali also opened its first solar plant some 500 km south of Bamako and various programmes focusing on biofuel were initiated. The large-scale social housing programme initiated by President Touré during his previous mandate continued. The aim is to build at least 10,000 houses before 2012, with more than 5,400 being constructed this year. Improving access to drinking water was also an important priority. Mali has more than 30,000 water wells ensuring 80% national coverage. On 30 June, the 11th AU summit in Egypt addressed progress made towards achieving the MDG objective of providing access to drinking water. Mali continued its impressive progress in treating HIV-positive citizens. Of the 2,800 registered patients, 50% received good treatment in 2006, 60% in 2007 and 77% in 2008. The percentage of people infected decreased from 1.7% in 2001 to below 1% in 2008. More serious healthcare problems arose as a consequence of malaria. A report published in 2008 revealed that almost 70% of fever cases were incorrectly diagnosed as malaria. Around 80% of local clinics lacked adequate equipment. In April, a large-scale vaccination programme against yellow fever was undertaken targeting over 5.7 m citizens. That same month, Mali participated in a vaccination campaign against polio, together with Niger and Burkina Faso.

130 • West Africa The increase in spending on education was expected to continue. Whereas 31% of total expenditure went on education in 2008, this figure was expected to rise to 33% in 2009 and 35% in 2012. Challenges are, indeed, numerous. Yet again the sector was characterised by continuing strikes by teachers for higher wages. As a consequence, the academic year started only in January and in some faculties even later. Mali also witnessed a sevenmonth strike by secondary school teachers, some of whom refused to supervise student exams. Research undertaken in 2008 indicated that only 23% of boys and 10% of girls in fourth grade could read a simple sentence in French. Of all the Francophone African countries, only left Burkina Faso and Niger fared worse than Mali as regards level of education. On 30 October, President Touré opened a national forum on education during which all major stakeholders formulated recommendations to resolve the crisis that has affected Mali for decades. National coverage by the mobile telephone network improved from 21% to 26%, thanks to competition between the two main operators (Sotelma/Malitel and Orange Mali). The number of subscribers increased from 2.7 m in 2007 to 3.5 m at year’s end. In culture and sports, Mali celebrated a number of successes. Kanouté was awarded the African football player of the year 2007 trophy. During an official ceremony, he dedicated the award to the citizens of Mali. Amadou and Marian, the blind and internationally renowned couple from Mali, released their new CD ‘Welcome to Mali.’ A Malian documentary highlighting the risks of buying medicines on the streets won first prize at the ‘Festival Clap Ivoire 2008’. Finally, thanks to the personal involvement of then South African President Mbeki, construction and restoration work at the Ahmed Baba Centre in Tombouctou started with the aim of preserving over 30,000 manuscripts of great historical value. Martin van Vliet

Mauritania

The widespread expectation that the country’s first freely elected president, Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, would bring increased press freedom and a more tolerant political climate at first appeared well founded. Repatriation of Mauritanian refugees from Senegal started as agreed. Risk factors included the growing terrorist threat, drug networks and illegal immigration to Europe. Ethnic tensions between Afro-Mauritanians and ArabBerbers were also reported. Rising oil and food prices raised fears of more food riots, especially given the limited prospects for oil revenues. Political tension increased during the summer when President Abdallahi and his government were accused of corruption, bad governance and an inadequate response to the economic crisis. Although Abdallahi was supported by political parties united in the ‘Pacte National pour le Developpement et la Démocratie’ (PNDD), formed on 5 January, on 6 August a successful military coup took place. It was condemned by the international community although some Mauritanian politicians supported the takeover. By contrast, trade unions appealed for resistance to the military. As a consequence, aid intended to finance rural development, health, education, road construction and anti-terror training was suspended. However, most ongoing aid operations in the country continued, including those undertaken by UN agencies and NGOs.

132 • West Africa

Domestic Politics The first 102 refugees of around 35,000 black Mauritanians expelled to Senegal in 1989 returned home on 29 January. Returning refugees got adequate material support from UNCHR, WFP and ‘L’Agence d’Appui et d’Insertion des Refugiés en Mauritanie’, but the issue of compensation for farmland remained unresolved. Difficulties in reclaiming land were reported, particularly in the area of Trarza, one of the few productive agricultural zones in the south. Resettlement in other areas was proposed. By June, the returned refugees numbered approximately 4,000 of the total of 24,000 supposed to return. The August coup and practical problems discouraged many refugees from returning. At the end of the year, repatriated citizens were promised identity cards to enable them to leave the refugee camps and look for jobs. Following the December 2007 terrorist attacks in which four French tourists died, other attacks by extremists linked to al-Qaida took place in February 2008, leaving several people dead. The Paris-Dakar rally was cancelled. In an attack on the Israeli embassy on 1 February, three people were wounded. The attack was seen as a symptom of radicalisation. On 28 May, Mauritanian prosecutors announced their readiness to prosecute 23 suspected terrorists. Twelve Mauritanian soldiers were killed on 15 September in an ambush southeast of the iron-ore mining town of Zouerate, close to the Western Sahara, mounted by suspected members of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, previously known as the ‘Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat’ (GSPC). Islamists launched internet campaigns to denounce the secularisation of society. Abdallahi was credited with introducing a more religiously tolerant form of government and for allowing an Islamist party, ‘Le Rassemblement National pour la Réforme et le Développement’ (RNRD-Tawassoul). His first government, headed by Prime Minister Zeine Ould Zeidane and consisting mostly of technocrats, resigned on 6 May. On 11 May a new cabinet was announced with Yahya Ould Ahmed El-Waghef of the ruling PNDD as prime minister. PNDD members held almost two-thirds of the cabinet posts. The RNRD-Tawassoul and the left wing ‘Union des Forces du Progrès’ also joined the government. A looming political crisis escalated during the summer. On 3 July, the National Assembly passed a motion of no confidence in El-Waghef’s government. A special commission was appointed to investigate the government’s response to the rising cost of living and the financing of ‘La Fondation Khattou Mint El Boukhary’ (FKB). The latter was run by the president’s wife. Abdallahi threatened to dissolve parliament and mandated El-Waghef to form a new cabinet. On 4 August, 49 PNDD MPs resigned in protest at what they saw as Abdallahi’s subversion of the democratic process and misappropriation of public funds. This action destabilised the position of Abdallahi and the PNDD, which no longer had a majority in parliament. The controversy pointed to an unprecedented crisis of confidence among Mauritanian politicians and culminated in the 6 August coup d’etat, which took place after Abdallahi issued a decree dismissing the commanders of the presidential guard, the army and the police. Analysts pointed out that the military were in fact always the real power behind the

Mauritania • 133 throne, even to a certain extent after the 2007 presidential elections that were considered to be free and fair. Thus, the 6 August coup merely confirmed this situation. The coup was led by the commander of the presidential guard, General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. The military established a ‘Haut Conseil d’Etat’ (HCE), composed of 12 officers. Abdallahi and El-Waghef were arrested. The HCE announced that it was committed to organising free and transparent elections as soon as possible. On 14 August, Mauritania’s former EU ambassador Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf was appointed to lead the council. This was interpreted as an attempt to defuse international condemnation of the coup. On 19 August, the ‘Parti Mauritanien de l’Union et du Changement-HATEM’ declared its readiness to participate in the transitional government. Demonstrations in support of and against the coup took place in Nouakchott and in other towns. The PNDD formed an alliance, ‘Le Front National pour la Défense de la Démocratie’, with three other parties in opposition to the coup. On 7 October (World Day for Decent Work), the ‘Confédération Générale des Travailleurs de Mauritanie’ (CGTM) organised a demonstration and called for resistance to the military dictatorship. On 1 September, the military leaders created a 22-member transitional government from the parties that had rallied behind the coup. The following day, the National Assembly chose four MPs to sit as a high court to try Abdallahi on allegations of corruption and obstruction of parliament. He was released, however, on 21 December. A senate committee was established to investigate the FKB’s funds. On 10 November, the Assembly in its first regular session since the coup discussed the budget for 2009. Thirty MPs, including the president of the Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, boycotted the session. Two days later the budget was adopted, cutting government spending by 13%. A national consultative meeting began on 27 December to consider an election date. In the course of the year, problems arose with regard to press freedom. ‘Le Rassemblement de la Presse Mauritanienne’, ‘Reporters sans frontiers’ and the Media Foundation for West Africa expressed their concerns about this matter. Several incidents were reported involving journalists who were prosecuted under criminal statutes rather than the press laws. In October, several violent attacks took place on journalists who were covering protests against the coup. Abdallahi in January assured an AI delegation that the torture of detainees was no longer tolerated. However, on 2 December AI published a report of two research missions in February/March and July with evidence that security forces had adapted torture routines, with prisoners being subjected to dangerous forms of maltreatment. Many demonstrators against the coup were also ill-treated. The ‘Forum des Organisations Nationales de Défense des Droits de l’Homme’ said that slavery continued to exist, in spite of its banning the previous year. The issue of land rights for freed slaves remained unresolved. The advocacy group ‘SOS-Esclaves Mauritanie’ pressed the government to do more. Mauritania still ranked 111 out of 128 countries on the World Economic Forum’s gender gap index, although it advanced to 74th position out of 128 with regard to political

134 • West Africa empowerment, in view of efforts to boost women’s presence in government and a quota of 20% women for those elected or appointed to high office, including ambassadorships and governorships. The latter benchmark had not yet, however, been attained.

Foreign Affairs Contacts with countries participating in the Barcelona process were intensified during the first half of the year. On 23 May, interior ministers in the western Mediterranean region met in Nouakchott to discuss the fight against terrorism in North Africa. While the GSPC had only limited operations in Algeria, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb was unleashing attacks in the whole region. These operations were considered as a threat to the whole of North Africa, but potentially also to Niger and Mali. On 24 July, Spain and Mauritania signed a good neighbour, friendship and cooperation agreement in the fields of politics, economy and finance, defence, development cooperation, culture and education, justice, migration and the fight against terrorism and organised crime. Mauritania continued to be a priority for Spanish foreign policy and the Spanish development agency increased its aid to € 11 m. On 3 March, President Abdallahi paid a three-day visit to Tunisia to discuss trade. The two countries decided to work towards a Maghreb summit and the strengthening of the Arab Maghreb Union. On 6 June, Mauritanian officials said they were not shifting sides in favour of Morocco in the Western Sahara conflict, contradicting Moroccan media reports. The government confirmed that it would uphold its neutrality in the conflict and maintain its recognition of the exiled Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Mauritanian-Chinese relations remained important and Mauritania confirmed its commitment to the one-China principle and refused to have contact with Taiwan. International reaction to the August coup damaged the country’s diplomatic position. On 19 August, the UN Security Council condemned the military overthrow. The Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union sent representatives to Mauritania but the delegation was not allowed to meet the ousted president. On 21 August, the World Bank announced that it had suspended $ 175 m in aid. The AU suspended Mauritania’s membership. ECOWAS, South Africa and Nigeria also condemned the coup. AU Commission chairman Jean Ping and Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra visited Mauritania in order to try to resolve the crisis (25 August and 14 September). On 24 September, the AU threatened Mauritania with sanctions and a deadline was set for 6 October. On 22 October, Senegal’s President Abdoulaye Wade rejected the idea of sanctions and said these would affect only the people. The AU met on 21 November to discuss the issue, but no sanctions had been imposed by year’s end. The military junta dismissed the call for sanctions as an empty threat. Nevertheless, on 26 August ‘L’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie’ decided to suspend Mauritania until the constitutional order had been restored. Russia also condemned the coup. The US declared that it continued to recognise

Mauritania • 135 the ousted regime as the legitimate government and froze more than $ 22 m in aid, including $ 15 m in military-to-military aid, $ 4 m in peacekeeping training and $ 3 m in development assistance. On 16 October, the Americans imposed travel restrictions on members of the junta, while on 22 October the EU gave Mauritania a one month to restore constitutional rule. One month later, it began examining “appropriate measures” in accordance with articles 8 and 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, which could lead to the freezing of aid, excluding food and humanitarian aid.

Socioeconomic Developments Mauritania ranked 137th out of 177 countries on the Human Development Index (2007– 08), a clear improvement on its 153rd position in 2006. However, as a consequence of the terrorist attacks, the country faced financial fallout, with investors turning away and tourist numbers decreasing by half. Projections for oil revenues were lower than originally expected. The IMF estimated GDP growth for 2008 as considerably lower than 5%. The economy continued to be dominated by the mining and fishing sectors. With grain production covering only 24% of domestic needs and 70% of food having to be imported, the government had to resort to emergency measures to avoid a deeper food crisis. On 7 April, the Food Crisis Prevention Network reported that cereal prices continued to rise. Food riots were reported and it was expected that the country might face the highest ever level of hunger in 2008. Already in 2007 11.9% of the population was suffering from malnutrition. In June, more than 500 tonnes of seed were distributed to six regional capitals, marking the beginning of emergency measures under a FAO initiative. The country had started to implement the 2005 Paris declaration on aid effectiveness and worked on a joint action plan on aid harmonisation after the Accra high forum held in September. International aid activities were seriously affected in the aftermath of the military coup. Of Mauritania’s public service, 67% is financed by international donors, of which 20% is provided by Arab countries, 20% by the EU and 10% by the World Bank. The US, France and Japan are the biggest bilateral donors, in addition to the Islamic Development Bank. Consequently, the aid cuts affected the whole society. The country’s potential as a breeding ground for terrorism and drugs trafficking and as a transit route for illegal migration, however, could discourage further cuts to aid. The World Bank programmes were concentrated on agriculture and the environment (28%), roads and water (28%), human development (26%), energy (13%) and the public sector (5%). The bank’s president, Robert Zoellick, visited Mauritania in January and underlined the importance of coordination among donors, government and key stakeholders such as civil society and private sector representatives. The World Bank also appointed a new country director, Madani M. Tall. A business environment enhancement project was approved by the bank in May and intended to support financial and private sector development issues, increase non-oil investment and improve the efficiency of the financial system.

136 • West Africa The IMF supported reform efforts under the PRGF programme and on 19 May announced that the country’s performance over the three year period remained satisfactory, despite the steeper-than-expected decline in oil production. A new mining code was submitted to parliament, a list of oil production sharing contracts was published and the centralised taxpayer database covering the main cities Nouakchott and Nouadhibou and introduced in December 2007 was functional. On 10 March, it was reported that Mauritania was on track to reach the MDG to enrol all children in primary school, with enrolment standing at 72%. However, according to UNICEF the quality of schools had plummeted. Moreover, the country would not meet all MDGs by 2015. Maternal mortality particularly was expected to remain high, with 747 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births according to WHO and UNDP figures. Women’s health conditions improved as the government, along with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the French NGO ‘Equilibres et Population’, implemented a programme to treat women with fistula. UNFPA provides $ 250,000 annually to help combat fistula in the country. Bilateral aid remained important. On 23 January, the China Exim Bank agreed to finance the construction of a major railway line connecting Kaedi in the south to the capital. On 16 March, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development gave Mauritania $ 35 m to finance a project to provide drinking water to Nouakchott from the Senegal river. The project includes building a pumping station, a 200 km pipeline, a water treatment station, reserve tanks and a major distribution tank. The EU agreed to pay € 300 m for fishing rights in Mauritania’s waters starting on 31 August. After the coup, the EU’s development and humanitarian aid commissioner, Louis Michel, recommended that the agreement be completely frozen. In a letter to the European Commission in September, the Mauritanian government confirmed it would “strictly observe terms of the fisheries partnership agreement which was concluded just a few days before the coup.” EU Fisheries Commissioner Joe Borg confirmed that the funds would be transferred before the mid-October deadline, when Mauritania would have the right to cancel the entire agreement. The country faced a number of long-term environmental problems, among them one of Africa’s worst rates of deforestation and land degradation to a value of nearly $ 200 m, according to a UN study in October. Development of the Banc d’Arguin National Park continued, as did the establishment of a satellite system to control illegal fishing and overfishing. These projects were financed by Germany. In TI’s ranking of corruption, Mauritania was among those countries that improved, ranking 118th out of 180 countries, compared with 125th the previous year. The number of illegal migrants and refugees using Mauritania as a transit point on their way to Europe declined until the summer as a result of the cooperation agreements signed in 2006 and 2007 with Spain. However, after the summer migration flows again increased. Claes Olsson & Helena Olsson

Niger

The Tuareg rebellion continued, though at a low level of intensity. Casualties mounted among civilians, who fell victim to army brutality, landmines and rebel abductions. The rebels gained an important new supporter but also experienced their first split. At year’s end, the military situation was inconclusive. The simmering tension between President Tandja and former Prime Minister Hama Amadou developed into open hostility, with the latter being detained on embezzlement charges. Media suffered attacks and harassment, especially from the government, which also banned humanitarian operations by ‘Médecins Sans Frontières’ (MSF). Cereal harvests were fairly good, thanks to abundant rains. Social tension was limited, despite increasing food and fuel prices. Uranium prices were renegotiated, leading to higher state revenues. The government was ordered by the ECOWAS court of justice to pay compensation to a victim of slavery.

Domestic Politics The armed rebellion initiated in 2007 by the Tuareg-led ‘Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice’ (MJN) continued unabated. On 8 January, the director of a private radio station was killed after driving over a landmine planted in a suburb of the capital Niamey. The explosion occurred in the Yantala district, home to many army officers. The MJN denied

138 • West Africa responsibility, which came after similar explosions in other cities. Government officials spoke of “urban terrorism” and called for the formation of vigilante committees. The incident marked the extension of the rebellion from its strongholds in the northern desert regions to settled parts of the country and showed that the MJN had supporters in urban areas, probably among Tuaregs living there. On 22 January, rebels abducted 11 people in the city of Tanout in Niger’s east, including the local prefect and a security official. Seven soldiers were killed in the attack, according to the MJN. The government reported three deaths and five wounded. Three days later, five civilians were kidnapped near the uranium mining town of Arlit in the north, including a teacher (teachers in Niger are regarded as representatives of the state). The probable target was the deputy head of Niger’s human rights commission, who had been expected to travel to the area but had cancelled his visit. The kidnapping of civilians, like the indiscriminate planting of landmines, led to calls from AI to respect the Geneva conventions, which ban the taking of civilian hostages. Twenty-five of these, including the prefect of Tanout, were released on 10 March to mark the uprising’s first anniversary. In mid-March, rebels launched an attack on a military base at Bani Bangou near the Malian border. Three soldiers were reportedly killed and one captured. The government responded to the continued offensive, as it had the previous year, with a combination of denial as to the nature of the uprising and harsh retaliatory action, usually targeting civilians. Arguing that its opponents had no political objectives but were bandits and traffickers, the regime persisted in its refusal to negotiate. An AI report published on 3 April claimed that the army had killed, tortured and abducted several civilians in reprisal for the deaths of five soldiers during operations in the mountains around Agadez, the northern capital, at the end of March. Civilians were allegedly forced to drive ahead of a military convoy to detonate landmines. At least eight civilians were said to have been arbitrarily executed, while some were also tortured. On 30 March, four inhabitants of a village were detained by soldiers and subsequently disappeared. The government denied the assertions (as was its habit with most NGO reports), claiming it had killed ten bandit-smugglers in an offensive in which five of its own soldiers had been killed. On 19 April, the National Assembly adopted an anti-terror law targeting the possession of explosives, hostagetaking, attacks on transport and unlawful possession of radioactive materials. Renewed hostilities erupted at the end of May, when the government claimed it had killed 11 insurgents in the Agadez area, which the MJN asserted was an attack on a nomad camp near Iferouâne, the town further north where the uprising had started the previous year. The rebels claimed that there were seven casualties and that they were civilians. On 14 May, they succeeded in kidnapping the vice chairman of Niger’s human rights commission in Tanout, engaged in peace initiatives in the area, together with his nephew. They were released ten days later. The pattern repeated itself when on 22 June four French employees of an Areva-owned uranium mine were seized in Arlit, only to be released three days later. As with many of these attacks, this one was calculated to humiliate the

Niger • 139 government, which had pledged to provide protection to mining companies. Though at a low level of intensity, the hostilities led to mounting casualties. Around 30 government soldiers were missing (taken hostage) at the start of the year. By mid-year some 70 had reportedly been killed since the beginning of the uprising. Casualties on the MJN side were believed to be at least 200, one of whom was the movement’s deputy commander. This did not prevent a mortar attack on the city of Agadez on 10 July. The MJN’s position was potentially strengthened when on 31 January Rhissa Ag Boula announced his support for the rebel cause. Ag Boula, a Tuareg leader who had represented the rebels in the 1995 peace negotiations that ended a previous rebellion, had been sought out by President Mamadou Tandja in 2006 to persuade Tuareg leaders to preserve the 1995 accord. Earlier in 2004–05 he had been sacked as minister of tourism and jailed for complicity in the murder of a member of the government party, ‘Mouvement National pour la Société du Développement’ (MNSD). Ag Boula criticised the government for its refusal to engage in dialogue and for issuing licences for uranium prospecting and warned that the MJN would attack mining company operations. His defection to the rebels meant the loss of his moderating influence on the Tuareg community, while his international reputation made it harder to pretend that the MJN was nothing more than a bandit movement. In July, MJN chief Aghaly Ag Alambo demanded that government and mining firms set aside 20%–30% of uranium earnings for the benefit of the local population. This was actually a concession compared to previous demands. By that time, the MJN had suffered its first split – a recurrent feature of Tuareg movements. On 30 May, several leading MJN members formed a new group, the ‘Front des Forces de Redressement’ (FFR), accusing the MJN of lacking a political strategy and of being ineffective in the fight against government troops. The new group, which included the political itinerant Ag Boula, as well as the former MJN spokesperson, also condemned the MJN’s use of landmines. The potential weakening of the rebel cause was highlighted by government statements in June that around 500 combatants had laid down their arms. A statement to this effect was broadcast by the government in August, but the MJN claimed these were rebel allies in Mali, not those fighting the government in Niamey. Nevertheless, several MJN members did lay down their arms – some in a ceremony in Zinder in August during which a government official stepped on a landmine setting off a chain reaction that killed one and injured dozens of others. Two months of relative quiet came to an end with a renewed outbreak of violence in October. The Toubou-led ‘Front des Forces Armées Révolutionnaires du Sahara’ (FARS), which had also risen up against the Niamey government during the 1990s, had by then also become active again. In April, it joined forces with the MJN and claimed to have killed seven government soldiers and abducted six. The government, which confirmed the clashes, claimed two people had died, one on each side. At year’s end, the Canadian Robert Fowler, appointed as the UN secretary general’s special envoy to Niger, went missing.

140 • West Africa He was apparently kidnapped together with a fellow Canadian just 45 km outside Niamey (14 December). While UN officials said he was travelling on official business, the government claimed he was in Niger on a private visit, a claim that underscored the sensitive nature of his mission and mandate, since the Niamey authorities refuse any UN mediation. At first, spokesmen for the FFR claimed responsibility for the abduction but later retracted the claim, leaving Fowler’s whereabouts and the responsibility for his disappearance shrouded in mystery. The rivalry of previous years between President Tandja and ex-Prime Minister Hama Amadou, both MNSD stalwarts, came to a head in June. Replaced as prime minister in May 2007 for his response to a corruption scandal in which two of his former ministers were implicated, Amadou was now himself accused by the National Assembly of misappropriating funds to the value of € 152,500. Several MNSD members voted with the opposition to press charges, and although the affair was unrelated to the embezzlement scandal that rocked the education and health ministries in 2006, the former prime minister was imprisoned on 26 June. The ex-premier’s detention was politically explosive as Amadou had already announced his candidature for the next presidential elections. Since Amadou continued as MNSD chair and it had been rumoured for years that Tandja, though constitutionally barred from seeking re-election, might wish to stand for a third term, there was a clear political motive behind Amadou’s arrest. This was confirmed on 31 July by the dismissal of two of Amadou’s confidants, his former cabinet chief Amadou Sala and an advisor, Hamidou Tchiana. This was the climax of a purge in the preceding weeks during which a dozen of Amadou’s collaborators had been stripped of their positions. Amadou supporters demonstrating at the behest of their leader were dispersed by police. With the majority of MNSD members remaining loyal to him and accusing Tandja of a witch hunt, another demonstration took place on 20 October. Party sections in Tillabéri and Zinder reputedly tried to remove Amadou from the MNSD chairmanship. Consequently, the ruling party faced growing internal fissures. Suspicions proliferated that Tandja wished to prevent Hama Amadou from standing for president. It was speculated that Tandja would groom his inexperienced son Ousmane, trade attaché in Beijing, for the position. Earlier rumours that the president might attempt to change the constitution to enable him to stand for a third term also gathered momentum. On 31 October, his supporters staged a rally in Zinder calling for his continuance in office. Thus, the next presidential polls, scheduled for December 2009, not only cast a long shadow but also exposed the ferocity with which politicians treated each other, potentially jeopardising the long-term stability of the political system. This threat was also evident in the treatment of the media. The government in August imposed a one-month ban on the Dounia TV and radio group after it had covered the suppression of a pro-Amadou demonstration. Moussa Kaka, reporter of ‘Radio France Internationale’ (RFI) and chief of the Sarrounia private radio station continued to be held in detention. He had been arrested on 26 September 2007 after telephone conversations with MJN leaders and charged with

Niger • 141 conspiracy against state authority, and the regime’s refusal to back down in the case led to a battle of wills with the courts and international pressure groups. Kaka’s reporting of MJN attacks exposed the regime’s fragility, thereby humiliating the military and the president, himself a former soldier. In addition, as a RFI reporter Kaka’s case appeared to be tied up with the state of French-Nigérien relations, which had cooled the previous year over the renegotiation of the purchase price paid by French nuclear giant Areva for Niger’s ‘yellow cake’. On 12 February, the court of appeal in Niamey overturned an earlier court decision that phone tap evidence on Kaka was inadmissible. Later, RFI’s FM transmissions were suspended for three months, the second ban in a year. The government had already postponed the introduction of new press laws, decriminalising defamation or false news. On 23 June, a senior judge ordered Kaka’s release, dismissing charges of collaboration with MJN rebels. However, the public prosecutor appealed, to the fury of the union of private sector journalists, who accused the government of media harassment. In September, the court of appeal reduced the charges, releasing Kaka on 7 October. His release came after mediation by the French government as well as RFI, which, having resumed broadcasting, discontinued high profile reporting. As the courts had never accepted Kaka’s defence that his action was part of normal journalistic practice and his release was provisional with the case still pending, the outcome was unsatisfactory for media freedom, now threatened by self-censorship. The upcoming 2009 elections, however, may have encouraged the regime to temporarily curb its responses. In the meantime, two French journalists working for European TV station Arte and arrested on 17 December 2007 for filming MJN men in the northern region (banned to the public), had been released after the exertion of international pressure (18 January). Manzo Diallo of Aïr Info, in jail since 9 October 2007, was released conditionally in February. Relations with international humanitarian NGOs, bedevilled since 2005 by the publicity over the famine stalking the countryside that year, took a turn for the worse. On 18 July, MSF had to halt operations in the Maradi region, where it was providing treatment to children suffering from malnutrition. Though Maradi was nowhere near the conflict zone, Nigérien media broadcast the accusation that MSF was aiding the rebellion. As in 2005, the decision led to an undignified dispute about the reality of malnutrition, with the government claiming that MSF – which in the past had not always manoeuvred with tact – was exaggerating the problem. The decision apparently emanated from the highest level and an appeal to Tandja to reconsider the situation met with silence. An embarrassed health minister unconvincingly asserted that Niger could handle malnutrition itself. Though there was no famine in 2008, malnutrition is a fact of Sahelian life, notably during the lean months ahead of the autumn harvests. An estimated 14,000 children were said to be at risk and Maradi MPs pleaded that MSF be allowed to continue its relief work.

142 • West Africa

Foreign Affairs Relations with France, Niger’s principal bilateral trading partner and donor, improved after the previous year’s renegotiation of the uranium purchase price, which took place against the backdrop of accusations that Areva was aiding the rebellion and the expulsion of its local French director. The conduct of foreign affairs was principally affected by the repercussions of the rebellion. ECOWAS at the beginning of the year discussed the need for a conference on the sub-regional implications. The Tuareg uprising in neighbouring Mali became more intertwined with that of their brethren in Niger. In March, it was rumoured that Malian soldiers, abducted by rebels, had been taken to Niger, following an alliance six months earlier between the MJN and those fighting in northeastern Mali. With the common border running through desert and arid Sahelian zones, which form no barrier to nomads and rebels alike, Mali claimed MJN rebels were fighting alongside Malian Tuaregs. Security experts suspected that both groups cooperated informally. Mali signed an accord with Niamey on security cooperation and in November their foreign ministers met colleagues from Libya, Algeria and Chad in Bamako to discuss a plan of action. The conflict between the Tuaregs and Mali’s government became the subject of Algerian mediation, leading to a ceasefire and the release of hostages mid-year, and Tuareg delegates from Niger also travelled to Algiers for talks earlier on. Libya, however, was more active in dealing with the Niger dimension of the Tuareg rebellion. The release of hostages, including the prefect of Tanout, on 10 March was facilitated by the Libyans. President Kadhafi held talks with MJN leader Alambo in southern Libya in August and urged an end to the fighting in both Niger and Mali. All this occurred after some cooling of relations the previous year, when Niger accused Libya – which has a long-standing frontier dispute in Niger’s northeast, known to have possible oil reserves – of involvement on MJN’s side. On 2 May, however, the prime ministers of both countries met in Niamey to sign deals worth € 100 m for the building of a trans-Saharan highway, an irrigation project and Niger’s shoe and textile manufacturing, severely hit by cheap Chinese imports. Other accords dealt with trade and air links. The UN continued to limit its involvement in view of the government’s refusal to negotiate with the rebels. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour called on 23 May for the release of the vice chairman of Niger’s human rights commission, kidnapped by the MJN ten days earlier. Later in the year, the world body secured the appointment of Robert Fowler as the secretary general’s special envoy. The government could not prevent his abduction in December. President Tandja, in his capacity as chairman of the summit of the ‘Autorité du Bassin du Niger’, chaired a joined conference with CEN-SAD in Niamey on 30 April.

Niger • 143

Socioeconomic Developments In contrast with other sub-Saharan countries, there was little social unrest as a result of the rise in food and fuel prices. This was the result of the subsidised sale of staple foods and the temporary suspension of taxes and import duties on rice (a staple for the urban population) in March. Fuel prices were kept under control from the beginning of the year. Since government arrears in the payment of student grants and civil servants’ salaries – one of the factors in the widespread social unrest in 2005–06 – had been cleared, the quiet on the social front was more or less maintained. Nevertheless, by February cereal prices had risen more than 5% in one month, reaching a level some 12% higher than in the same period the previous year. Localised underproduction, trader speculation and falling imports from neighbouring countries played a role. By May, prices were more than 28% higher than a year before, although this also reflected the usual rises during the lean period. In June, when overall prices rose by 2.6% in a month, the year-on-year inflation rate reached more than 10%. In August, it had crept up to 15.4%, the highest in a decade. Predominantly pushed by food and fuel prices, inflation began to come down in the next couple of months with the crash in the oil price and abundant harvests. Yet average consumer price inflation was expected to reach at least 10% for 2008, as compared to 0.1% in 2007. GDP growth was nevertheless expected to hover around the 5–6% mark. This reflected the fact that 30% of GDP is made up by agriculture, which saw above average harvests as a result of abundant rains. Partly because of damaging floods, some areas in the south were threatened by moderate food insecurity, in contrast to the north, which, according to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, faced high food insecurity. After a donor conference in December 2007 came up with $ 236 m in funding, longstanding plans for the construction of the Kandadji dam on the Niger river northwest of Niamey, came closer to fruition. A round table of donors and representatives of ABN member states was held in Niamey on 23 June, delivering aid pledges of more than € 900 m. The dam aims to regulate water for irrigation and generate electricity to cope with increasing demand for power and supply problems in Nigeria – at 85%, Niger’s principal supplier of electricity. In addition, a deal was signed with China for the transfer of several electrical power units to cope with growing blackouts, caused by ageing infrastructure. The Chinese deal could increase power in the capital by 30%. France Télécom won a tender for a fixed, mobile and internet licence, thus increasing competition with the Chinese, who after the privatisation of the state telephone company SONITEL entered the Nigérien market, whose mobile penetration rate now stood at 5.5%. Uranium represented an estimated 43% of export value. This was due to rising world prices as well as a new contract between Niger and Areva, signed on 13 January. Under the deal, Niger could sell 900 tonnes on its own account in both 2008 and 2009, while the contract price for uranium produced at the two existing mines at Arlit was increased by

144 • West Africa 50%. Areva was given approval for the development of the Imouraren mine, whose production was supposed to begin in 2010 and in due course to rise to an annual 5,000 tonnes of uranium oxide. This € 1 bn investment dwarfed the Chinese deal to develop another uranium mine (Teguidan Tessoumt). Imouraren could provide employment for around 1,400 permanent staff, and it was hoped that this and other mines would make Niger the world’s number two uranium producer with an overall output of 9,000–10,000 tonnes a year. In reality, production fell by 8.2% in 2007 after it had increased 11% the year before, pushing Niger from fourth back to fifth place. The drop resulted from various factors, but Areva’s obligation to maintain a higher level of security can only have increased costs. Despite the fall in production in 2007, the value of uranium exports rose as a result of the steep rise in world prices. The downward price trend during the second half of 2008 did not deter Areva from pressing ahead with its new site at Imouraren. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) reached a deal in June for the development of oil reserves in the Agadem block, near the Chadian border. The CNPC’s bid was first turned down as the company did not wish to commit itself to rapid exploration and the building of a refinery and pipeline linking to the Chad-Cameroon pipeline (the proven reserves of 300 million barrels were deemed insufficient for this). Yet the Chinese backtracked, indicating they suspected reserves to be larger. The ECOWAS court of justice in April found the government guilty of failing to protect a child from slavery. Assisted by a British NGO, Hadjiatou Mani brought her case before the court, having been sold at the age of 12 and having been repeatedly raped and beaten by her master, whose children she bore. After ten years of slavery, which in Niger – as in other Sahelian countries – is akin to a kind of serfdom in a caste system, Mani was freed in 2005 following the criminalisation of slavery in 2003 (involving heavy fines and prison terms of up to 30 years). The government, which was found not guilty of legitimising slavery by enforcing customary law, vainly argued that the case be thrown out as the woman had not exhausted the national appeals process. It was ordered to pay compensation of CFAfr 10 m (€ 15,000) and accepted the ruling. While the ruling was a source of embarrassment, it did send out a signal about the unacceptable nature of the entrenched practices that also existed in other Sahelian countries, such as Mali (which as ECOWAS member was now on notice) and notably Mauritania. In Niger, the local anti-slavery society Timidria, claimed that 43,000 people were still living as slaves, a figure that was disputed. Klaas van Walraven

Nigeria

The legal aftermath of the 2007 general election dominated domestic politics for most of the year. While the supreme court finally endorsed the election victory of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua towards the end of the year, the court of appeal declared some gubernatorial results null and void and several other cases were still before the court at the year’s end. Over much of the year, the president enjoyed limited legitimacy and authority. This was compounded by his health situation, a contentious issue in the public perception and one that to an extent further undermined his leadership. It soon became apparent that Yar’Adua was on shaky political ground. However, he did everything possible to reinforce his position against his predecessor Olusegun Obasanjo, who saw himself as having the right to maintain influence. Against the background of this silent struggle, some long overdue socioeconomic projects and programmes, particular in the energy and power sector, lost momentum, thereby putting the economy almost on hold. The situation in the Niger Delta remained deadlocked.

Domestic Politics The two main rivals and runners-up in the presidential election, retired Maj.Gen. Muhammadu Buhari of the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) and Atiku Abubakar of the Action

146 • West Africa Congress (AC), had challenged the outcome of the election in 2007, won by Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. Notwithstanding serious allegations of widespread voter intimidation, procedural irregularities, seizure of ballot boxes, fraud and organised rigging, the presidential election petitions tribunal unanimously dismissed the petitions on 26 February. Other petitions were struck down on the grounds of alleged incompetence. Without delay, both defeated main rivals filed notice of appeal in the supreme court, which has the final say on presidential elections. On 12 December, the highest court of the land, in a narrowly split 4–3 decision, rejected Buhari’s final challenge to the presidential election. The majority of judges were convinced that the appellant had not proved that the non-serialisation of the ballot affected the outcome of the election. In Atiku’s case, the court ruled 6–1 in favour of the incumbent. More was to come because the tribunals and the courts had to deal with other petitions concerning almost all gubernatorial and several National Assembly election results, which in some cases led to a re-run. Senate president David Bonaventure Mark (People’s Democratic Party, PDP), a retired major general, was the most prominent figure in parliament to (almost) fall victim to this trend. His election had been voided on 23 February by the election petitions tribunal in Benue state , which ordered a partial re-run. However, on 15 July the court of appeal set aside the nullification, thereby upholding his election in April 2007. The same applied for retired Brig. John Nanzip Shagaya (Plateau state) on 15 December, when the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) had to issue him a certificate of return for the senate. Major Satty Gogwin’s defeat in the tribunal, however, was upheld by the court of appeal, but the AC-candidate for the Plateau central senatorial constituency eventually got back into the senate by winning the re-run on 26 July. There were comparable cases in other federal states, two of which in Anambra were noteworthy. On 11 July and 19 December respectively, the supreme court ordered two PDP members of the House of Representatives, Obinna Chidoka and Linda Ikpeazu, to surrender their seats and for Gozie Agbakoba and Charles Chinwendo Odeda to be sworn in in their place. According to the court, the latter two were denied their right to be validly nominated after the PDP primaries. It was only because this was a pre-election matter that the supreme court got involved. The fiercest legal battles, however, took place on the gubernatorial front where organised rigging, fraud and intimidation during the 2007 elections had been most obvious. Consequently, almost all the results were challenged in the tribunals and subsequently in the court of appeal. The tribunals had already annulled the elections of the governors of Adamawa, Kebbi and Kogi states the previous year and voided more results during 2008 (Abia, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Edo, Enugu, Ondo, Sokoto). In Edo and Ondo states, they even declared the runners-up Adams Oshiomhole (AC) and Rahman Olusegun Mimiko of the Labour Party duly elected. Notwithstanding these verdicts, the court of appeal overruled the nullifications in Enugu and Kebbi, thereby upholding the election of Sullivan

Nigeria • 147 Chime and Saidu Dakingari respectively. On 12 November, it confirmed the tribunal’s ruling and declared the AC-candidate and former president of the Nigeria Labour Congress Oshiomhole to be the governor of Edo state. The court had already upheld the other nullifications and ordered a re-run. As widely expected, Ibrahim Idris (Kogi) in March, retired Vice Adm. Murtala Nyako (Adamawa) in April, Timipre Sylva (Bayelsa) and Aliyu Wammako (Sokoto) in May, Liyel Imoke (Cross River) in August, all PDP-frontrunners who had already won the gubernatorial elections in 2007, reclaimed their respective governorships. While the court of appeal had confirmed the tribunals’ rulings in favour of almost half the elected governors, the petitions concerning Abia, Delta, Ekiti, Imo, Kaduna, Katsina, Kwara, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo states were still pending at year’s end. However, the court’s verdicts raised more questions than provided answers about Nigeria’s constitutional law. The supreme court in an important ruling the previous year on the power struggle in Anambra state, took the view that Governor Peter Obi’s four-year term of office began with the oath of office and the oath of allegiance in 2006 after he had won a protracted legal contest with then PDP Governor Chris Ngige over the outcome of the election in 2003. The gubernatorial election in Anambra state in 2007 therefore had to be nullified because the court maintained there was no vacancy at government house when INEC conducted the election. As a result of that case, governors whose elections had been null and void but had won the re-run elections had longer tenures than all the other duly elected incumbents. Indeed, these candidates could even benefit from a fraudulent election in which they might at least have been indirectly involved. Interestingly, though the legal wranglings and the political power struggles were very fierce, not a single actor, party or public institution involved dared to sue a rival or a candidate for committing a breach of the law in the run-up to and during the election. Shortly after the April 2007 elections and against the background of the ensuing political and legal wrangling, the electoral reforms committee under former Chief Justice Mohammed Uwais was inaugurated. On 11 December, the committee eventually submitted its report. Its most important recommendation was that the INEC chairperson and deputy should be of different gender and should be appointed by the national judicial council instead of the president. Chairman Uwais admitted that some recommendations would require constitutional amendment to ensure their implementation. Ever since the 1999 constitution came into force, it lacked full legitimacy, having been imposed by the outgoing military regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar on the eve of his handing over power to the newly elected president, retired General Olusegun Obasanjo. Efforts by the National Assembly to at least correct some of its deficiencies and contradictions had failed in the past, highlighting the extreme difficulty if not impossibility of amending the constitution under the current federal system. The obstacles are very considerable because in addition to the required two-thirds majority of all the members in both chambers of the National Assembly, any amendment has to be approved by not less than

148 • West Africa two-thirds of the state assemblies. In some cases even a four-fifths majority is required in the National Assembly to get a proposal approved. In this context, it is only the supreme court that is capable of amending and revising the constitutional order. Towards the end of March, the health minister, Adenike Grange, and her minister of state, Gabriel Aduku, were the first cabinet members to resign, after they were accused by the anti-corruption agency (the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission or EFCC) of embezzlement. That decision heralded the beginning of a massive reshuffle within the cabinet, the police and armed forces and a rather quieter restructuring within the presidency, indicating the ultimate goal of eliminating Obasanjo’s continuing political influence. On 2 June, the chief of staff to the president, retired Maj.Gen. Abullahi Mohammed, who had served the president’s predecessor, was forced to resign and on 18 August the office of chief of staff was formally scrapped. While another retired major general, Sarki Murktar, kept his position as national security advisor, on 8 September the president sacked Babagana Kingibe, secretary to the government of the federation, and immediately replaced him with then Minister of Defence Mahmud Yayale Ahmed. Shortly afterwards, Yar’Adua restructured several ministries and created the ministry of Niger Delta. In the end, the splitting of several portfolios increased their number from 19 to 28, manned by 42 ministers. The long-awaited cabinet reshuffle by President Yar’Adua took place on 29 October with the removal of 20 ministers, among them a dozen ministers of state. However, it took the leadership several weeks before the new appointments were announced and subsequently cleared by the senate, and it was only during the second half of December that the reshuffle could be completed. While retaining the ministers of justice (Michael Aondoakaa) and foreign affairs (Ojo Madueke), the president assigned other key portfolios such as finance (Mansur Mukhtar), petroleum (Rilwanu Lukman), defence (Shettima Mustapha) and Niger Delta (Ufot Ekaette) to well-known politicians and technocrats. While Ekaette had served as secretary to the government of the federation under the previous administration, Lukman had been secretary general of OPEC in the 1990s and Mustapha, a former minister, was the pioneer treasurer of the ruling party PDP. The latter appointments raised public concern over the ages of the appointees and, in the case of Lukman, even over his frail health. In addition to the cabinet reshuffle, the president had already assigned new personnel to various public institutions. Hamman Kajoli Ahmed replaced Jacob Gyang Buba as comptroller general of customs; Mrs. Ama Inyingiala Pepple took over from Mrs. Ebele Okeke as the new head of the federal civil service; and Oba Abdulraheem became chairman of the federal character commission, an executive body established to implement and enforce fairness and equity in the distribution of public posts and socioeconomic infrastructure. The sensitive position of chairperson of the anti-corruption agency EFCC was eventually assigned to Mrs. Farida Waziri, a retired assistant inspector-general of police, thereby finally confirming the contentious and in some ways dishonourable removal of EFCC

Nigeria • 149 chairman Nuhu Ribadu the previous year. On 8 March, Vincent Ogbulafor emerged as the new national PDP chairman at the party’s special national convention, while Usman Baraje was elected national secretary of the party. All in all, these appointments cautiously achieved a considerable power shift towards the far north, close to President Yar’Adua’s home area. For the second time under the new administration, the military experienced far-reaching shake-ups. On 20 August, only days after he had scrapped the office of chief of staff in the presidency, Yar’Adua appointed new service chiefs. Maj.Gen. Abdulrahman Dambazau, an indigene from Kano state, replaced Lt.Gen. Luka Yusuf as chief of army staff. Rear Adm. Ishaya Iko Ibrahim took over from Vice Adm. Ganiyu Adekeye as chief of navy staff, while Air Marshal Paul Dike was made chief of defence staff, replacing General Andrew Azazi. Air Vice Marshal Oluseyi Petinrin took over as chief of air staff. Shortly thereafter, all the appointees were promoted a rank and their predecessors retired. The real impact of the shake-ups, however, was caused by a wave of retirements and promotions, the more so because more than 40 top-echelon officers had to leave the service in July and August, most of them mandatorily, and more than 500 officers in all the services were promoted at the beginning and the end of the year. In January, 15 military men, amongst them six field officers, faced court martial over the disappearance of fairly significant quantities of arms and ammunition. The weapons were allegedly stolen from an armoury in the northern city of Kaduna and subsequently traced to militias in the Niger Delta. According to the court, the arms were sold through Sunny Bowei Okah, brother to Henry Okah, a leader of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) who was extradited from Angola in February and was standing trial in a federal high court for alleged gun running and treason. In November, the court-martial eventually sentenced six culprits to life imprisonment while two were demoted. This trial brought to mind the proceedings in 2005 against high-ranking officers who were convicted of oil theft in the Niger Delta. Both trials clearly indicated the existence nationwide of sophisticated criminal networks in respect of the unstable situation in the Niger Delta. As in previous years, the oil producing Niger Delta was the most volatile part of the country, with the number of attacks and counter attacks by militias and security forces definitely exceeding those in the previous year. While the crisis developed into open warfare on several occasions, it was also characterised by a sophisticated propaganda and counter-propaganda campaign, in which local and international media as well as improved communications methods were used. The most visible militia group MEND, which was behind the worst attacks on the oil and gas infrastructure and abductions, dubbed its campaign ‘Hurricane Barbarossa’, declaring war on the oil industry and announcing and calling off ceasefires. Government security forces called for all-out action against the militias, adopting labels such as ‘Operation Flush Out III’.

150 • West Africa Given the frequent unreliability of figures, it is difficult or impossible to verify facts, claims and counter-claims about the number of attacks, acts of sabotage, victims as well as fatalities on both sides. In the course of the year, however, more than 44 foreign oil and construction workers, engineers and businesspeople from at least a dozen countries in the Americas, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa were kidnapped by different militia groups in Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers state. All but two Britons, who had already been held captive for three months at year’s end, were released almost unharmed. As in previous years, however, Nigerians – including civilians, policemen and soldiers and even toddlers – were again the worst affected and fell victim to attackers and hijackers. When, for example, gunmen kidnapped a staff member of a German construction company in Port Harcourt on 4 March, the Nigerian driver and two soldiers escorting him were killed. The German was released several hours later. In another incident near the major oil city on 11 July, two other German staff were kidnapped and an armoured vehicle was blown off the road with dynamite, leaving one soldier in the convoy dead. The two Germans were released on 14 August. Njo Amadi, abducted in Port Harcourt on 24 February, was not so lucky, being killed by the kidnappers after they had collected a naira 2 m ransom. The list of Nigerian kidnap victims grew longer by the day and the cold-bloodedness of the hostage-takers increased significantly. In extorting money from the victims’ families, the criminals targeted their victims carefully, some of the best-known being Seinye Lulu-Briggs, wife of an oil magnate (6 February), Dorothy Otele, wife of a Bayelsa state assembly member (18 March), Margaret Idisi, wife of the manager of a drilling company (13 April), Norum Yobo, elder brother of Everton football player Joseph Yobo (5 July) and Paul Edemobi, younger brother of the then director general of the national agency for food and drug administration and control, Dora Akunyili, who shortly thereafter became minister of information (1 December). Apart from the numerous attacks, victims and deadly disputes over control of stolen oil between rival armed gangs, the major cause for concern for the federal government, its security forces and the oil companies was the fact that in June the militias proved for the first time that all facilities were within their reach, even offshore. These had previously been considered safe from attack. On 19 June, militants claiming to be members of MEND raided Shell’s flagship project, the Bonga installation with a capacity of 220,000 bpd and lying some 120 km off the coast. On their way back, they kidnapped a US worker from a separate vessel. Despite the arrest of some 200 militants in September and of Sabomabo Jackrich, a leading member of MEND, in Rivers state on 28 December, security forces could not prevent further offshore attacks. On 4 and 19 December, oil services ships were attacked by speedboats off the coast of Akwa Ibom state and at least two persons killed. The Soku gas plant in Rivers state, which provided the biggest liquefied gas plant (Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas or NLNG) in Bonny with some 40% of its requirements, was shut down on 27 November after militants attacked and damaged the pipeline several times.

Nigeria • 151 Given the current unlikelihood of resolving the Niger Delta issue, Shell entered into an arrangement with local communities called ‘Community and Shell Together’ (CAST). This approach was directed at local people in communities in which pipelines were laid in order to protect oil and gas facilities from vandalism. It clearly indicated that ultimately a sustainable solution is only possible with the local people, including most of the militias. Notwithstanding the dangerous increase in violence, raids and the blowing up of pipelines and flow stations, the federal government called for a Niger Delta summit under the contentious auspices of Ibrahim Gambari, a former minister, undersecretary general and special envoy of the UN. His appointment as chairman of the steering committee did not go down well with the targeted stakeholders in the Niger Delta, who pointed to his role as Nigeria’s representative in New York during the military dictatorship of Sani Abacha. In early July, the president backed down. Even the nomenclature for the proposed talks was changed from summit to dialogue, and the Niger Delta Technical Committee was inaugurated on 8 September with Ledum Mitee as chair. This was the umpteenth half-hearted initiative and from the very beginning there were strong indications it was meant to fail, feeding widespread suspicion that neither the federal nor state governments in the Niger Delta region were really interested in resolving the deep-rooted crisis at this time. The 40-person committee submitted its report to the president before the year’s end. The Middle Belt, where deep political, ethnic and religious division prevailed, was the second most volatile area. There were, in relative terms, minor incidents in the form of communal, sectarian and political clashes in Anambra, Taraba, Kano and Ogun state. However, Plateau state and its capital Jos once again experienced a wave of violence. More than 400 persons were left dead and several thousand homeless sought refuge in local mosques, churches and army and police barracks. On 27 November, local elections took place in all 17 local governments in the state. In these elections, control over a portion of Nigeria’s oil revenue, no matter how small, was at stake. Skirmishes between rival political gangs started late that night in Jos North local government, an area always hotly contested by the mostly Christian indigenous inhabitants and the predominant Muslim Hausa-Fulani settler communities. Supporters of the mostly Hausa-Fulani-backed ANPP allegedly became violent when rumours spread that their candidate was to be declared runner up, although in their opinion he was leading the mostly Christian-backed PDP candidate. The following day, more violence erupted and several persons were killed, forcing police to impose a dusk-to-dawn curfew and in some areas even a 24-hour curfew, and causing Governor Jonah Jang to issue a shoot-on-sight order. However, no sooner had the state election commission declared the mostly Christian-backed governing PDP the overall winner on 29 November than demonstrators of the Muslim faith and strong supporters of the ANPP took to the streets to protest the results. Within hours, the protest spread to other parts of the populous city, leading to mayhem and killing. Churches and mosques were torched as mobs from the Muslim Hausa-Fulani community as well as from mainly Christian ethnic groups went on the rampage. Police

152 • West Africa forces were overwhelmed and soldiers were eventually deployed to restore a measure of calm. In addition, some 500 people were arrested, among them allegedly some 50 nonindigenes dressed in military and police uniforms and armed with guns. The federal government set up a commission of inquiry on 24 December, chaired by retired Maj.Gen. Emmanuel Abisoye. This decision reminded the public of the bloody riots in 2001 and 2004 in which several thousand people died or were injured. The judicial commission of inquiry at that time under the chairmanship of the well-known Justice Niki Tobi produced a report, which was never released. The then government simply issued a white paper and eventually brought this tragic chapter to a close. This action now prompted speculation that the forthcoming inquiry would meet a similar fate. As in previous years, the southern parts of the country were particularly crime-ridden, but the number of assassinations and killings of policemen declined slightly. Even so, the number of civilians injured or killed mainly by bank robbers increased dramatically to more than 100, while at least 40 policemen lost their lives. Raids on banks and bullion vans were executed by well organised gangs using automatic rifles, modern cars and communication devices, indicating that former and active police and military must have taken some part in the raids. One of the most spectacular robberies took place in Lekki, Lagos state on 21 November, when criminals clad in police and military uniforms approached a bank in the lagoon area, killed two staff and made their getaway in a speed boat. The highest civilian casualties, however, were sustained in bank robberies in Ilesha, Osun state (11 February) and Abakaliki, Ebonyi state (12 February): at least ten people died in the first incident and 11 in the second, several others were wounded and some naira 15 m was taken. Several persons were killed along the Enugu-Port Harcourt expressway when a gang of about 30 in military camouflage attacked a bullion van on 11 June and got away with an unknown amount of money. Prior to this, six gunmen on motorcycles had overpowered the security personnel of another bullion van in Port Harcourt on 26 March and carted away about naira 60 m. This was one of the rare armed incidents in which no one was killed. On 15 December, a gang of 20 robbers laid siege to the ancient city of Ile-Ife, Osun state and simultaneously raided three banks and a micro-finance institution, killing more than half a dozen people and injuring 30 to 40. In Adamawa state, in the east of the country, 11 persons were shot and a huge amount of money stolen on 20 September at the Ganye cattle market, a hub for traders, including from neighbouring countries. Even places of worship, at least those considered to be wealthy, were targeted. One example was the Church of the Living God of God’s Kingdom Society in Warri, Delta state, which was raided on 28 November. For more than two hours thugs held the community hostage, killing two pastors and two laypersons and extorting money and valuables from residents and worshippers. However, at least 90 armed robbers lost their lives while perpetrating their crimes. According to the Ogun state commissioner of police, 66 died in this southwestern state alone.

Nigeria • 153 Vice President Jonathan Goodluck launched ‘Operation Yaki’, meaning ‘operation war’, on 26 March, an initiative mounted by the Kaduna state government in an effort to end political killings. The reality on the ground was different. For instance, Alih Ayegba, PDP chairman of Ankpa local government, Kogi state, was murdered at his residence in the presence of his wife on 23 March. In late June, three motorcyclists shot Lawrence Anosike, head of service of Ikwuano local government, Abia state. Salomon Azande, a senior staff member in the office of the federal accountant general, was gunned down in Abuja on 14 August. A member of the editorial board of the nationwide daily ‘This Day’, Paul Abayomi Ogundeji, was killed in Lagos on 17 August and Ephraim Audu, a colleague from the Nasarawa Broadcasting Service, was shot dead in Lafia on 17 October. Last but not least, the traditional ruler in Nkanu West local government, Enugu state, Igwe Uche Nwachime, was abducted from his hotel in Enugu on 29 November and his corpse was found at a refuse dump two days later. This list is incomplete. The fact that the security forces could not track down the culprits revealed once again the degree of incompetence on the part of the authorities, as well as their lack of human resources, money and political support. Against the background of the still poor security situation, the record on human and civil rights was again mixed. The US State Department in its report maintained that the overall human rights record was poor and that government officials at all levels continued to commit serious abuses. The American journalist and filmmaker Andrew Berends and his Nigerian escort Samuel George were arrested by the joint military taskforce on the Nembe waterfront in Rivers state on 31 August and handed over to the state security service for taking shots for a documentary on the Niger Delta. On 12 April, their US colleagues Sandy Cioffi, Tammi Sims, Cliff Worsham and Sean Porter, along with their Nigerian counterpart Joel Bisina, who had been working on the project for years, were taken into custody for several days. All of them had entered Nigeria legally in early April with permission to complete the film. However, the filmmakers were interrogated by Nigerian security forces for lengthy periods. No formal charges were brought and they were ultimately deported. On 16 September, the state security service shut down the fairly popular private station Channels TV and arrested managers and senior staff after it reported that President Yar’Adua would step down due to poor health. The broadcast was a hoax attributed to the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN), which denied putting out the report and maintained that a false e-mail address had been used. Nevertheless, more staff were arrested the following day and the suspension of its transmission announced by the national broadcasting commission. Sharp criticism from within the National Assembly, unions and civil society forced the commission to lift the suspension several days later (19 September) and the detained staff were released the same day.

154 • West Africa Ever since Yar’Adua took power, there has been widespread speculation about his health. Rumours gained further momentum when on 8 November the ‘Leadership’ newspaper, belonging to Leadership Newspapers Group, published a report on the president’s allegedly failing health. According to the paper, he had fallen critically ill and had been unable to attend a number of public functions. Hardly had the story been published than the police and state security service interrogated all senior editors, and in the subsequent edition the newspaper apologised for the offensive publication. However, the president sued Leadership Newspapers for libel and shortly afterwards the police charged the chairman and three staff members with defamation, injurious falsehood and the sale of material containing defamatory information. On 27 November, however, the Abuja magistrate court granted bail to the accused, who had already been out on police bail. Once again, security forces had overreacted corroborating claims that harassment of journalists and civil rights activists whenever the government saw fit was still part of its political agenda. At the same time the whole affair revealed an increasing and accelerating decline in professional journalism in both private and state media. In short, the Nigerian media, with its many publications and programmes, developed more and more into public relations agencies, predominantly serving dubious lobbyists as well as corporate and political interests. On 22 January, a mild drama was played out at the state police commissioner’s office in Owerri, Imo state, when the police declined to take Ralph Uwazuruike back into custody. The leader of the banned militia Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) had turned himself in after burying his late mother in October the previous year. In addition, the federal high court in Abuja turned down a request by the federal government to return him to prison (5 March) and in June granted him a further three months of bail for post-burial rites. The court case was still pending at year’s end. On the other hand, some 80 members detained in May were charged with treason in the Enugu federal high court. However, it transpired that as early as June a deep rift had opened up within the MASSOB leadership. In February, Nigeria’s official news agency NAN revealed that six men in the northern state of Bauchi were awaiting death by stoning, while 46 others were awaiting amputation. In Katsina, Kebbi and Sokoto state, shariah courts passed death sentences by stoning for adultery and pregnancy out of wedlock. So far, no stoning verdict has been carried out but on a few rare occasions convicted persons have been punished by amputation. In this context, the relationship between the religious marshals in Kano, known as ‘Hisbah’, and the Nigerian police force was still tense, the result of the unresolved and contentious legal issue of state recognition. Last but not least, according to AI, as of February 736 people were on death row. About 200 had been awaiting hanging for over 10 years and some for more than 20. Some progress was made towards achieving gender equality when the comptroller general of immigration announced in August that a letter of consent from husbands would

Nigeria • 155 no longer be a requirement for a wife’s passport. However, women were still required to submit copies of their marriage certificates. Despite TI’s view that Nigeria’s corruption perceptions ranking had improved significantly, the anti-corruption campaign in fact slowed. In most cases, the anti-corruption agency EFCC, mainly financed by Western donors, failed to secure conviction of charged ex-governors and former ministers and chairpersons of parastatals. Many of the trials had stalled. The disclosure by the new EFCC chairperson that a probe would commence into more than 550 local government chairmen accused of embezzling most of the statutory allocations for years, illustrated that corruption was rooted within all three tiers of government and that the prospect of alleviating or eradicating it were bleak. On occasion, one or the other defendant was arrested, only to be released on bail shortly after. The former Delta state Governor James Ibori, detained in December the previous year, was granted bail in February. He and his wife Theresa Nkoyo Ibori became prominent figures in a legal battle in British courts over assets and money laundering. However, while his wife had been re-arrested and granted bail in London in May, the court of appeal in Kaduna ordered the release of his passport in July. Eventually in December, the London court of appeal upheld Ibori’s stance against the EFCC that the legal material used against his wife and him by the London police had come out of Nigeria unlawfully. On 18 December, Lucky Igbinedion, ex-govenor of Edo state, became the only governor convicted so far. He paid a fine of $ 25,000 rather than spend six months in prison for the embezzlement of $ 21 m while in office. He also had to repay $ 3.5 m and forfeit three of his properties. The EFCC, however, filed an appeal against the verdict in the court of appeal, maintaining that such fines were no deterrent.

Foreign Affairs Despite the fact that most African countries, including Nigeria, had forced AFRICOM, the US-Africa command, to drop its plans to locate its military headquarters in Africa and to keep them in Germany, the close US-Nigeria relations were predominantly shaped by security issues. This was underlined by Todd J. Moss, US deputy assistant secretary of state, bureau for African affairs, who pointed out that Nigeria was a partner in the promotion of sub-regional security, democracy and economic growth (26 January). In this context, retired Brigadier Oluwole Rotimi was appointed ambassador to the US. On 25 March, US and British military and intelligence officers and Nigerian security chiefs met in Abuja as part of the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy, to which a small number of other European countries, Canada and major donor agencies such as USAID, DFID and UNDP also belonged. In February, a one-week joint Nigerian-US military exercise ‘Maritime Safari’ took place off the Lagos coast. On 16 July in Abuja, 225 military communications experts from 23 countries and representatives from the AU and ECOWAS took part in

156 • West Africa another one-week exercise, ‘Africa Endeavour 2008’, sponsored by the US European Command. On 3 December, the senate committee on defence and the army met a highranking US congress delegation led by Senator James Inhofe to explore new ways of strengthening defence relations between both countries. Earlier, the 3rd THISDAY Townhall meeting on financial and stock markets was held in Abuja and attended by Lawrence Summers, former US secretary of the treasury, and by Steve Forbes of ‘Forbes Magazine’ together with top managers from Nigeria’s financial institutions (3 October). Their presence complemented the US Eximbank’s decision in June to double its Nigerian bank facility to $ 1 bn due to rising demand for long-term financing for infrastructure and transport projects. The importance of security to relations with Britain was reflected in a joint offshore security seminar aboard HMS Albion in mid-June, but bilateral relations had a far wider political scope. On 17 May, an overwhelming majority of councillors elected the Nigerian-born Ezekiel Obasohan as mayor of the London borough of Barking and Dagenham’. He thus became the first African to hold such a position of responsibility. This election confirmed the increasing political relevance of the African and Nigerian diaspora for British domestic policy, a trend further underlined by the visit of the Lord Mayor of the City of London, David Lewis, at the head of a business delegation to Nigeria in May. President Yar’Adua paid a visit to Britain on 15–18 July, holding talks with Prime Minister Gordon Brown on how to tackle the fast growing criminal rackets and the large-scale theft of crude oil in the Niger Delta. They agreed to establish a security training force to help Nigeria suppress the lawlessness in the region. This approach was reaffirmed by Britain’s energy minister, Malcolm Wicks, who during his visit in late August offered additional assistance in restructuring the ailing energy and power sector. Over the years, Nigeria has been a focus for the activities of DFID. This year, it earmarked £ 100 m in favour of a new six-year HIV/AIDS project and £ 50 m for combating malaria. This support was underscored by the visits of Ivan Lewis, minister for international development (November) and Gillian Merron, parliamentary under-secretary of state for international development (July). The five-day official visit of the spiritual head of the Muslim community, the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Sa’ad Abubakar III, to Britain in March underlined the special relations between Britain and Nigeria, particularly the northern region. However, towards the end of the year, the British NGO Female Prisoner’s Welfare Project Hibiscus put the number of Nigerian women convicted in Britain of drug trafficking and other related offences and serving varying prison sentences at 165. While President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua visited China for four days (27 February– 1 March), PetroChina aborted its bid for an offshore oil block offered by Shell a few months after the China National Offshore Oil Corporation had withdrawn its bid for the block. Nevertheless, the Chinese government, through its export guarantee agency SINOSURE, offered President Yar’Adua export guarantee facilities of $ 40 bn to $ 50 bn to encourage investment in Nigeria as part of a clear strategy to woo Africa’s second biggest

Nigeria • 157 oil and gas producer. In addition, China opened its first Confucius Institute in Nigeria at the Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka on 7 March, the sixth in Africa, and financed the teaching of Mandarin in a private boarding school in Ota, Ogun state. In July, one of China’s top engineering firms, China Harbour Engineering Company, the major international operating division of China Communications Construction Company, signed a MoU with the African Finance Corporation, a private sector-led investment bank and development finance institution, to build a six-lane ring road worth some $ 1 bn around the volatile oil city of Port Harcourt. However, the Nigerian government in May rejected a $ 2.5 bn loan to finance high-speed rail lines from Lagos to other parts of the country. Nigeria’s suspension in November of a $ 8.3 bn contract, agreed in 2006, to modernise a north-south rail route, threatened to sour bilateral relations and compounded the situation faced by China Railway Construction Corporation, whose shares in Hong Kong had fallen 18% on 4 November. On 14 August, the chapter on the disputed Bakassi peninsula was finally closed when the Nigerian flag was lowered and that of Cameroon raised, thus implementing the Green Tree agreement of 2006. At short notice, the venue of the handover was changed due to serious security concerns and shifted from Abana on the peninsula to the Nigerian city of Calabar, where the solemn ceremony took place under the auspices of Nigeria’s justice minister, Aondoakaa, and Cameroon’s deputy prime minister, Ahmadu Ali. Troops from both countries were placed on high alert after the little-known, self-styled Nigerian group Niger Delta Defence and Security Council attacked Cameroonian gendarmes twice in June and July, killing several persons. On 31 October, the militants seized a French oil supply vessel, kidnapping 10 crew members. These French, Tunisian and Cameroonian nationals were, however, released unharmed on 11 November. Last but not least, three communities in Sardauna local government in Taraba state – Kan Iyaka, Tamiya and Dorofi – were ceded to Cameroon (14 December), in line with the International Court of Justice verdict on Bakassi and the common border. For the first time the government and National Assembly publicly acknowledged that Nigerian nationals living in South Africa had been victims of the violence, humiliation, crime, xenophobic attacks and extra-judicial killings directed against immigrants. There was no proof that Nigerians had lost their lives during the fast-spreading riots against foreigners in June, an issue which threatened to cool bilateral relations further. Yar’Adua’s first state visit to South Africa (2–4 June), which included addressing parliament and attending the Nigerian business forum, was therefore an exercise in mending fences, with the president reminding South Africans that Nigeria had been the biggest African donor in the fight against apartheid. Notwithstanding this, 450 Nigerians were deported between January and September and the consul general in Johannesburg admitted in October that about 40 Nigerians were being deported each month. Quite a few Nigerians were deported from other countries as well, a fact that highlighted the number of Nigerians living abroad and the number of them accused of

158 • West Africa committing crimes or violating immigration rules. Libya deported 150 in February and 163 in May. In August, 40 Nigerians suffered a similar fate in Saudi Arabia, while the US had already deported 95 and Canada 10 in January alone. On 26 June, two Nigerians convicted of drug smuggling were executed in Indonesia and in September the Indonesian supreme court confirmed the death sentences on ten others for similar offences. The situation in the EU was not very different, as indicated by the arrest in January of more than 60 Nigerians for human trafficking. The arrests were the result of close collaboration between European police and the National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other Related Matters in Nigeria. In April, Spanish police, in a coordinated operation with the FBI, arrested 87 Nigerians suspected of defrauding Europeans and US citizens of millions of euros in a postal and internet lottery scam. Poor health prevented President Yar’Adua from addressing the annual plenary debate of the UN in September and caused him to miss the formal commissioning of the Nigerian cultural centre in Salvador da Bahia in Brazil at the end of August. Instead, he spent almost three weeks in Saudi Arabia receiving medical treatment, which led to wild speculation back home. However, he attended the G8 summit in Japan in July and made an official visit to France (11–13 June), where he signed an accord promoting cooperation in developing civilian nuclear energy. He joined the AU summit in Egypt (30 June–1 July) and at the end of July received his Ghanaian counterpart John Kufuor and concluded arrangements to establish a Nigeria-Ghana chamber of commerce. On 7–9 November, German President Horst Köhler chaired the fourth German-Africa forum, which this time took place in the capital Abuja. During the 35th ordinary session of ECOWAS in Abuja, Yar’Adua was elected chairman for a one-year term (19 December). As part of the AU/UN hybrid operation UNAMID, Nigerian peacekeeping forces once again suffered casualties. While only two soldiers were killed in action, 45 soldiers who had just returned from Darfur were killed in a fatal road accident in Nigeria’s northeastern state of Borno (21 May). In recognition of Nigeria’s leading role in UN peacekeeping, Lieut.Gen. Chikadibia Isaac Obiakor, force commander of the UN mission in Liberia, was appointed by the UN secretary general as military advisor for peacekeeping operations (28 May). However, the military did not escape accusations of corruption. In September, five army officers were arrested and accused of illegally withholding the allowances of peacekeeping personnel who had openly protested in Akure, Ondo state, on 4 July. Unsurprisingly, quite a number of the latter were subsequently charged with mutiny.

Socioeconomic Developments The international oil and gas price reached new heights and Nigeria’s high quality crude rose from $ 90 a barrel at the start of the year to $ 147 in July before crashing to $ 40 in December. At mid-year, Nigeria had accumulated $ 62 bn in foreign reserves. However,

Nigeria • 159 the slump in prices, partly triggered by the meltdown on Wall Street and in other major financial markets from August, as well as by a shortfall in oil production of not less than 20%, quickly eroded the ample reserves, which stood at $ 52 bn at the end of the year. This trend continued while, at the same time, the naira began to depreciate against the dollar to 140:$ 1, with the central bank’s intervention on the interbank foreign exchange market in early December leading to another revival of the parallel market. After weeks and months of bickering over spending increases, the federal government and National Assembly agreed on the 2008 budget totalling naira 2.748 trillion ($ 20.8 bn), which Yar’Adua eventually signed into law on 14 April. The budget was based on a benchmark of $ 59 a barrel, above the $ 54 initially proposed by the government, and an exchange rate of 117:$ 1. A supplementary budget of naira 683 bn became law in November. At that time the bickering over the benchmark and the 2009 budget resumed. On 2 December, the president presented his budget proposal totalling naira 2.87 trillion while acknowledging the federal government’s inability to fully implement the current one. While the senate passed its increased version of naira 3.049 trillion (17 December), the House of Representatives deferred its deliberations to January 2009. For most of the year, Nigeria was a nation in darkness, since the average power supply dropped to an all-time low. On 19 February the president set up a task force for the accelerated expansion of the country’s power infrastructure, aimed at reviving the theoretically installed capacity of some 6,000 MW within 18 months. In spite of this, the output of the state-owned power holding company of Nigeria was far below 2,000 MW in May. In a televised address on 29 May, marking his first year in office, Yar’Adua acknowledged that Nigeria would not be able to generate the required electricity for its citizens until at least 2015. Before his election, however, the president had promised to take swift action on power. Against this background, in August the government admitted that even the midterm goal of 10,000 MW in 2010 was no longer feasible and for the umpteenth time the target date was shifted, this time to 2011. In this context, a preliminary agreement on a Nigerian-German energy partnership was signed in Abuja on 19 August, involving the German energy giants E.ON, EVONIK, Siemens and the KfW IPEX-Bank, to help boost the power supply in years to come. On 14 January, the sixth unit of the country’s biggest liquefied gas plant NLNG, estimated to have cost $ 1.6 bn, was inaugurated, lifting the annual shipment to 22 m tonnes. While Nigeria exported all its gas to customers abroad, three finished gas-fuelled power stations lay idle. As in previous years, this bleak situation, which swallowed billions of dollars due to the costly and often overpriced importation of generators and diesel, sharply contrasted with the sustained and almost explosive growth of the telecommunications sector. According to the Nigerian communication commission, this sector absorbed more than $ 11 bn in investment over the preceding six years and Nigeria had become one of the world’s fastest growing telecom markets with a penetration rate of 30%. The market leader, MTN from

160 • West Africa South Africa, alone had an annual turnover of about $ 3 bn and the Swedish mobile network manufacturer Ericsson announced on 18 December that it had signed a deal to provide a nationwide residential fibre-optic broadband network. However, the ambitious Nigerian satellite project suffered a serious setback when the NIGCOMSAT-1 satellite, built and launched into orbit the previous year by a Chinese company, was shut down in November due to solar power problems. According to telecom experts, the satellite project was a ‘white elephant in space’ and the whole exercise a debacle from the start. On 13 February, the IMF concluded Article IV consultations with Nigeria and commended it for its strong macroeconomic performance with a generally positive outlook. Shortly afterwards, its managing director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, during his trip to four African countries, paid a visit to Nigeria (27–28 February). In July, the World Bank approved two credits totalling $ 450 m to support the federal and state governments in the fight against poverty. Of this, $ 250 m was dedicated to the rural area project Fadama III, while the balance was assigned to community and social development projects. Meanwhile, the first of three projects to upgrade urban facilities in nine Lagos districts, approved by an IDA credit facility of $ 200 m in 2006, eventually took off in May. In June, Nigeria sold $ 411 m in five year and ten year bonds in a step to restructure its domestic debts, estimated at some $ 18 bn, and to fund part of its budget deficit. The spread of HIV/AIDS continued unabated while the fight against polio lost momentum. The number of polio cases increased sharply from 279 to more than 800 cases at the end of the year, revealing that Nigeria was the only African country battling a polio epidemic. Two lawsuits in Abuja and Kano, in which the federal and Kano state governments sued the international pharmaceutical company Pfizer for damages and compensation, dragged on in the courts. The lawsuits stemmed from an unregistered drug test in Kano state in 1996 in which several children had died, while others had developed mental and physical deformities. However, out-of-court settlement talks broke down in early July when the governments and representatives of the victims’ families turned down an offer of $ 10 m in compensation. Talks between plaintiffs and the respondent on an out-of-court settlement resumed in November, but at year’s end no agreement had been reached. During the Olympic games in Beijing, Nigeria’s flag was hoisted three times. The national football team was narrowly defeated 1–0 by Argentina in the final, thereby winning the silver medal, while the 4 × 100 m women’s relay team and the long-jumper Mrs. Blessing Okagbare won bronze. Much to the delight of Nigerians, the 2000 Olympic gold medal for the 4 × 400 m relay event was re-awarded to the country, after the executive board of the International Olympic Committee subsequently disqualified the US team for testing positive for drugs. Heinrich Bergstresser

Senegal

The increase in consumer prices complicated matters for both the Senegalese and their president, Abdoulaye Wade. Social unrest mounted significantly and the regime tried to check it by making full use of its budgetary room for manoeuvre. Subsidies on oil and foodstuffs were unfortunately not sustainable in the mid-term, and donors were putting increased pressure on Wade. To preserve access to aid and investments, Wade carried on his typical hyperactive diplomacy, mixing it with nationalist posturing. Despite Senegal’s increasingly varied diplomatic portfolio, France remained a key partner. Internally, Wade’s son Karim’s bid for succession appeared to gain momentum with the consolidation of his own political structure, but suffered as a result of extreme tensions within the ruling party. Meanwhile, the opposition built on the social unrest, launching a lively campaign to gain political breathing space, the so-called ‘Assises nationales’. The government made extensive use of institutional tinkering and limited coercion to try to keep the opposition in check.

Domestic Politics The bitterly disputed presidential and legislative elections of 2007, which had confirmed President Wade’s rule, did not put an end to political tension. The possibility of Abdoulaye

162 • West Africa Wade being succeeded by his son Karim stirred controversy within and outside the ruling ‘Parti Démocratique Sénégalais’ (PDS). While critics denounced Wade’s monarchical tendencies and some questioned his son’s legitimacy as a half-French rich boy with a notoriously bad command of Wolof, the Senegalese lingua franca, Karim Wade was busy building up his own support organisation, the ‘Génération du Concret’ (GC). His control of a number of well-budgeted state projects played no small part in this, and Abdoulaye Baldé, the secretary general of the presidency, confirmed his part as Karim Wade’s key associate. The GC is a crypto-party that supports President Wade and aims to gather select PDS figures and ministers of the younger generation and to launch a bid for the support of the mass of disgruntled activists who have not been able to emerge through the PDS. Internal PDS struggles grew intense with the approach of local elections, initially planned for May, and PDS factions did battle with one another on several occasions (February in Fatick, June in Dakar and July in Pikine), leading to several injuries. The longdelayed renewal of PDS party structures was finally launched in April, heightening tensions – an indication of Karim Wade’s ambitions. Major GC figures such as Mamadou Lamine Keïta and Awa Ndiaye were promoted to key positions within the new PDS structure. Modou Diagne Fada, a former figurehead of the PDS youth wing who had created his own party, ‘Waar wi’ (‘the plot of land’, in Wolof ), returned to the PDS fold. In the course of the year, judicial pressure on Idrissa Seck eased: Seck, another former key PDS figure, had fallen from grace, lost his position as Wade’s prime minister, spent time in jail and fought Wade in the 2007 presidential election. In 2008, Seck adopted to a prudent stance, considering himself a member of the PDS ‘family’ (though not formally a member) and keeping his distance from the opposition, hence securing a degree of leniency on the part of the regime. Another disgraced ex-prime minister, Macky Sall, also got into difficulty with the government. Sall continued his opposition to President Wade within the party. His 2007 decision to summon Karim Wade before the National Assembly to account for his management of the preparations for the OIC summit finally cost him his parliamentary chairmanship in November. Some of his closest associates (including National Assembly representatives Moustapha Cissé Lo from Touba and Mbaye Ndiaye from Parcelles Assainies) were purged from the PDS. Building from his hometown of Fatick, where he is popular, Sall went on to create his own party, the ‘Alliance pour la République Yaakaar’. At the end of March, a cabinet reshuffle took place. The ministry of trade went to Mamadou Diop Decroix from ‘And-Jëf’, a left-wing party with a long-standing alliance with Wade. Other key changes were at the ministry of justice, where Madické Niang took over from Cheikh Tidiane Sy, who took over the ministry of the interior from Ousmane Ngom, with the latter receiving the ministry of industry, mines and small and medium businesses. The demotion of Ngom, a major PDS figure and a potential contender for the presidency, was generally interpreted as a move to consolidate Karim Wade’s position. A clear sign of President Wade’s growing worries could be found in his self-serving institutional manoeuvring, an established feature of his rule. In February, in an open

Senegal • 163 attempt at gerrymandering, the National Assembly voted for the creation of three more administrative regions (Kaffrine, Sédhiou, Kédougou). New rural councils were carved out. In March, in a move to gain more time to deal with both the social crisis and the tensions within the PDS, the government delayed the local elections due in May 2008 until March 2009. A series of key opposition municipalities (such as Mbour, Kédougou and Thiès, whose mayor was no less a person than Idrissa Seck) were taken over by the administration in May, officially because of bad governance. And in July, a new ‘Conseil Economique et Social’ was created – a somewhat similar structure had been suppressed in 2007 to get rid of its president, Mbaye Jacques Diop, who had fallen from grace. More spectacularly still, the mandate of the president was prolonged from five to seven years. Wade thus reneged on a reform he himself had implemented upon his take-over in 2000. The regime kept up its pressure on the media. In March, police prevented Walf TV from broadcasting footage of police repression of a demonstration. Offices of two newspapers with strong anti-Wade lines were ransacked in August by PDS zealots. The scandal was so great that the suspected sponsor of the attack, Minister Farba Senghor, was forced to resign. He was never indicted, in contrast to El Malick Seck, the manager of one of these newspapers, ‘24 Heures Chrono’, who received a three-year jail sentence for libel in September. Although the newspaper had accused the Wades of laundering money stolen during a bank robbery in Côte d’Ivoire without providing any evidence, this incident came as part of a long series of attacks against the press. President Wade’s provocative comments about journalists, whom he described as “petty politicians” during a visit to the US in July, were not reassuring to Senegal’s media community. The regime’s nervousness was further accentuated by the dynamism of the opposition. Excluded from the National Assembly since their near-total boycott of the 2007 polls, the main opposition parties, grouped in the ‘Front Siggil Senegal’, strove to gain political space. On 1 June, under the direction of Amadou Mahtar Mbow, a veteran intellectual and politician and former head of UNESCO, dozens of opposition parties, civil society organisations and trade unions called for a ‘Assises Nationales’ – a kind of prolonged national conference to discuss Senegal’s political situation. Despite the pressure exerted by the government and the PDS, this forum functioned well and was prolonged by local ‘Assises’ organised in all ‘départements’ to connect with popular concerns. Beyond the actual content of the many reports prepared in the course of the ‘Assises’ and their impact on policy formulation, this movement put additional pressure on the government and was central to the uneasy consolidation of a coalition grouping of most opposition parties for the forthcoming local elections. These included the ‘Parti Socialiste’ (PS), ‘Alliance des Forces de Progrès’ (AFP), ‘Ligue Démocratique’ (LD), ‘Parti de l’Indépendance et du Travail’ (PIT), ‘Rassemblement National Démocratique’ (RND) and the ‘Parti des Verts’, but not the party of Idrissa Seck. In the south of the country, separatists of the ‘Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance’ (MFDC) remained subdued. In April, the moderate separatist guerrillas

164 • West Africa based along the border with Guinea-Bissau and led by César Badiate organised an unsuccessful pan-MFDC meeting to try to reunite the guerrillas. Tensions within Badiate’s command were rife, with some of his fighters contesting his moderate posture and connections with the Dakar authorities. In April and May, several incidents took place along the Gambian border, where MFDC hardliners under the command of Salif Sadio are based, but also along the Guinea-Bissau border. The guerrilla groups, while too weak to engage government troops militarily, held their ground, defending their control over profitable cashew orchards and engaging in highway robbery. The Senegalese army, which had reduced its presence in 2007, redeployed troops in some places and received new hardware, including combat helicopters. The peace process, whose credibility is contested because of Dakar’s control over it, stalled. Tensions between mediators, including Moustapha Bassène of the ‘Comité des Sages’ and Pierre Atépa Goudiaby of the ‘Collectif des Cadres Casamançais’, did not help. A national forum for peace in Casamance organised by the ‘Conseil des Organisations non Gouvernementales d’Appui au Développement’, an influential federation of NGOs, insisted in August that real dialogue was needed between the actors involved in the Casamance crisis, and that Dakar’s habit of handing out money to MFDC groups to calm matters down was not a long-term solution.

Foreign Affairs Senegal’s position as a privileged partner of Western countries (and particularly France) continued, although there was growing mutual impatience between Dakar and its traditional partners. Western donors and the Bretton Woods institutions repeatedly voiced their concern over economic governance, explicitly pointing out instances of excessive, unapproved and unaccounted spending. The French ambassador went so far as to liken the financing of the Senegalese state to “giving drugs to an addict”. Donors raised numerous issues, including the management of the ferry boat Aline Sitoé Diatta, the sale of the state’s profitable shares in the Sonatel telecommunications company and broader issues of political governance, such as the delay in the trial of the ex-Chadian President Hissène Habré and the deterioration of Senegal’s human rights record, as noted by a US state department report. Budget Minister Ibrahima Sarr was sacrificed to appease donors, and though some of them temporarily withdrew budget support, Senegal maintained its access to aid, obviously because Senegal was too important a country to let fail. In December, the IMF completed a favourable second review under the three-year policy support instrument adopted in 2007, and approved a $ 75.6 m exogenous shocks facility to help finance the impact of higher food and energy prices on the balance of payments. Resources were forthcoming from other partners, including Germany, which granted CFAFfr 18 bn as development aid; the US, which confirmed a $ 9.5 m programme; and the World Bank, which provided

Senegal • 165 CFAfr 40 bn for the energy sector. France confirmed its role as a key partner, with the ‘Agence Française de Développement’ increasing operations. Among other things, in December a CFAfr 20 bn loan was granted to Senelec, the national power company, and Alain Joyandet, France’s assistant minister for cooperation and Francophonie, visited Dakar to sign a special, non-concessional, loan of € 125 m to help the Senegalese state meet internal debts. Of course, in this and in other instances, French firms were prime beneficiaries. All this owed something to French lawyer Robert Bourgi, spiritual heir to De Gaulle’s Africa advisor Jacques Foccart, who hails from a powerful Lebanese family from Senegal and played a growing part in Sarkozy’s Africa policy. Karim Wade and his father visited Sarkozy on 26 August and 10 September respectively. This happened while Wade developed an increasingly critical line on certain issues visà-vis Europe and in particular France. Thus, the regime engineered protests against the EPAs the EU was negotiating, criticised international institutions such as the FAO for their handling of the food crisis and reacted strongly when in September a French judge indicted several key Senegalese officials over the 2002 shipwreck of the ferry boat Le Joola. Wade showed his hostility towards Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean and the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum. This did not prevent him, however, from signing various agreements with France and Spain on illegal immigration and opening negotiations for an update of Senegal’s defence agreement with France. Benefits accrued from this cooperation on illegal immigration, and on 16 November, Spain gave a plane and a helicopter to the Senegalese army. President Wade seemed to try and combine the internal benefits of nationalist posturing with preserving Senegal’s role as a favourite partner of the West. In a typical move, under pressure from European donors Senegal started to cave in on the issue of Habré’s trial and the National Assembly amended the constitution in April to lift statutory limitations on the prosecution of crimes against humanity. Still, Senegal dubiously made it known that it needed € 28 m in donor aid to carry on with the trial. Continuing its tradition of dynamic foreign policy, Dakar strengthened ties with traditional and not-so-traditional partners in the Arab world. The hosting of the OIC summit (7–14 March) was a high point for Senegalese diplomacy as well as for Karim Wade personally, in charge of organising the event. President Wade was working hard at his old Libyan connection, paying a visit to Kadhafi in October. He attended the India-Africa summit on 8–9 April, stopping on the way back in Iran, and on 28–30 May took part in the 4th Tokyo international conference on African development. Always an enterprising peace broker, President Wade took the opportunity provided by the OIC meeting to get Chad and Sudan to sign an agreement, and declared his intention to become involved in mediation over the conflicts in Israel-Palestine and Colombia. Dakar has also been strengthening ties with less usual partners such as South Korea, Israel and Iran. Senegal maintained its high profile in peacekeeping, contributing troops to UN operations in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia

166 • West Africa and Congo, as well as to the AU Mission in Sudan. Senegalese Lieut.Gen. Babacar Gaye was retained as MONUC’s force commander in DR Congo. On a sub-regional level, Senegal maintained close contacts with political and military circles in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, essentially in an attempt to curb Casamançais separatism. Relations with Gambia were more erratic, though apparently slightly less tense than in 2007. Gambian military chief of staff Lang Tombon Tamba paid a visit to Dakar on 4 February and Gambian troops took part in parades on Senegal’s national day on 4 April, but the ongoing build-up of the Gambian armed forces and Banjul’s connections with Salif Sadio, leader of a radical Casamançais separatist group based along the Gambian border, remained troubling. As for Mauritania, the relationship remained good, all the more so as Wade was one of the first heads of state to express his support for the junta of General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz after the 6 August coup in Nouakchott. The repatriation of black Mauritanian refugees established in Senegal since the troubles of 1989, which started in January, proceeded untroubled. By October, about 4,700 refugees had been resettled.

Socioeconomic Developments The economy had a rough ride, stirring social unrest. The government used its budgetary leverage to mitigate tensions, but the sustainability of this policy was called into question by donors. While the world financial crisis had little immediate impact, it was the earlier global increase in prices for oil and foodstuffs that affected many in view of Senegal’s dependence on imports. The provision of electric power remained a recurring problem. The oil bill increased to CFAfr 600 bn, from CFAfr 217 bn in 2003. Inflation reached 6.1%, a slight increase on 2007. Towards the end of the year, it seemed to slow down as a result of the slump in the world economy. Growth fell to 3.9%. The global economic crisis called into question major projects such as Arcelor Mittal’s iron ore mine in eastern Senegal, the development of an international free zone outside Dakar by Dubai’s Jafza company and oil exploration along Senegal’s coast. Nevertheless, Dubai Ports World started to run Dakar harbour from July. The Sudanese company Sudatel was due to develop a new mobile phone network and Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative invested $ 100 m to recapitalise and save the major phosphate-producing Senegalese company, ‘Industries Chimiques du Sénégal’ in exchange for an increased ownership share to the detriment of that owned by the state. ‘Ciments du Sahel’ raised CFAfr 130 bn in February to develop its capacity and SenIran, a Senegal-Iranian joint venture, inaugurated its car assembly factory in Thiès in December. Neither this nor Randgold’s announcement of a promising gold find in Massawa, eastern Senegal, in July sufficed to alleviate mounting anxiety. Despite Dakar’s pledge to take over the company, the situation of Air Sénégal International, from which Royal Air Maroc intended to withdraw, remained criti-

Senegal • 167 cal. In a similar vein, the state had to increase its share of ‘Société Africaine de Raffinage’ to 65%. Its debt amounted to several hundred billions of CFA francs. Negotiations began with Iranian and UAE interests to rescue the country’s sole refining capacity. Social unrest was rife. The usual protest groups were active, including pupils, students and employees of the bus company ‘Dakar dem Dikk’, protesting against working conditions. There were also demonstrations against inflation, the redrawing of administrative boundaries and the lack of state support after floods hit Dakar’s suburbs in September. Even in rural areas, tension mounted as protesters mobilised. In April, the consumer groups ‘Association des Consommateurs Sénégalais’ and ‘Union Nationale des Consommateurs du Sénégal’ organised a mass rally in the capital. As the event had not been authorised, their leaders were arrested and sentenced to short suspended prison terms. In December, it was the turn of the imams of Guédiawaye, a suburb of Dakar, to call for a protest against the increase in the price of electricity. That same month, in Kedougou, protesters led by students returning from Dakar denounced the lack of beneficial impact of the major mining and agricultural projects in their region. On 23 August, a Molotov cocktail was hurled at a police station in a Dakar suburb, with the ‘Mouvement pour le Respect du Sénégal’, a hitherto unknown group, claiming responsibility. It appeared to be an isolated incident. The authorities often responded to protests in a rather heavy-handed way. A number of demonstrations were simply banned, their organisers frequently arrested, and on several occasions riot police violently suppressed protests. On 23 December in Kedougou, one demonstrator was killed. Several incidents took place concerning homosexuality. Some tabloids and enterprising politicians such as Mbaye Niang, head of the ‘Mouvement de la Réforme pour le Développement Social’, and Massamba Diop, of the Islamic NGO ‘Jamra’, turned the issue into a struggle over religious and national identity and public morality, and an indirect indictment of the regime, supposedly soft on homosexuals. The government took the bait and increased repression of homosexuals. Fearing that the opposition would feed on social unrest, the government was also responsive to the issue of price rises. After every mass demonstration, it announced new price controls. As in 2007, it tried to impose maximum prices on certain staples, but with limited success. Various taxes totalling CFAfr 239 bn (4% of GDP) were scrapped or relaxed. Despite continued growth of the budget (from CFAfr 1,474 bn in 2007 to CFAfr 1,650 bn in 2008, with CFAfr 1,880 bn voted for 2009), subsidies were costly and their sustainability, impact and fairness to rural producers called into question by donors. While they helped to absorb and spread some of the price increases, the retail price per kilogram of rice went up progressively from CFAfr 269 in January to CFAfr 454 in December. Domestic debt rose significantly and the delays in payments to businesses in the private sector amounted to CFAfr 225 bn by the end of October, threatening economic activity. Thus, in October Chinese construction company Henan China, in charge of major

168 • West Africa works around the city of Touba, temporarily laid off its workers because of an unpaid debt of several billion CFA francs. Senegalese business leaders repeatedly called on the state to pay its debts. In June, the government’s failure to issue a CFAfr 100 bn bond issue on Abidjan’s ‘Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières’ (where Senegal’s name had lately been very good), came as a worrying sign. Under heavy donor pressure to reduce the deficit, the authorities cut some subsidies and pledged in December to pay back state debt, correct fiscal slippages and suppress subsidies the following year. Happily enough, the end of the year witnessed the beginning of a decrease in consumer prices. In April, President Wade had announced the launching of a ‘Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nourriture et l’Abondance’ against the increase in food prices. However, only a fraction of the planned CFAfr 350 bn in agricultural investment was made available. Largely because of excellent rainfall, expected crop harvests for the 2008–09 season were nevertheless outstanding (about 1.8 m tonnes of cereals and 730,000 tonnes of groundnuts, more than double the previous year’s yields). Vincent Foucher

Sierra Leone

President Koroma of the All Peoples Congress (APC) completed his first year in office without major challenges, but without bringing major changes and improvements to the country either. However, upon being elected in 2007 he stated he needed three years to bring development to the country, so he was still given time by the electorate. Improvements were sorely needed. The country was placed last in the UN Human Development Index and it took bottom-ranking position in UNICEF’s State of the World’s Children report. Sierra Leone also became more corrupt, according to Transparency International. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) entered its final phase with the conclusion of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) case, with only the case of former warlord-turnedpresident of Liberia Charles Taylor ongoing.

Domestic Politics President Koroma completed his first year in office after having won the run-offs in the 2007 presidential elections against his opponent, former Vice President Solomon Ekuma Berewa of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP). After the many promises during the election campaign, more than 15 months of APC rule brought little real change to the country. The reinstalled Cleaning Day – a widely appreciated initiative to clean the streets

170 • West Africa of increasing amounts of rubbish first launched by the military National Provisional Ruling Council regime more than 15 years previously – did seem to work until quarrels erupted over the cost of collecting the rubbish gathered by the city’s inhabitants. The promise to provide the capital with round-the-clock electricity – a yardstick widely used by the electorate to judge the ability of a new leader to bring genuine change – was partly fulfilled. Thanks to major funds provided by the international donor community – in January the UK provided £ 20 m to help the energy sector to meet its target to increase electricity availability tenfold – the government did indeed deliver (intermittent) electric power to Freetown. The long-term solution, putting the hydroelectric dam at Bumbuna in the north of the country to work and linking it to the capital, was again postponed. The new government now promised to do this by the end of 2009, but similar promises had been made since work started on the project more than 30 years earlier. In line with his aim to “run the country like a business”, Koroma indicated he planned to increase the dam’s capacity from 50 MW to 300 MW to stimulate upcountry industries. Halfway through the year, a political impasse began to emerge between APC and SLPP. The ruling party had only a small majority in parliament – 59 of the 112 popularly elected seats – and some level of SLPP collaboration was needed to ensure the implementation of the government’s policy in SLPP strongholds upcountry. Charles Mambu, executive director of the coalition of civil society and human rights activists in Sierra Leone, sought the support of former (SLPP) President Tejan Kabbah and Bishop George Beguzii of the diocese of Makeni to overcome the crisis. The former president and the bishop held talks with the defeated candidate Berewa to convince him to work with APC for the sake of stability and peace. However, tensions between APC and SLPP were unlikely to be completely resolved and there was constant fear of violent clashes. On 5 July, voters went to the polls for local council elections. At stake were 475 local government seats in the country’s 19 local councils. Most mayor and councillor positions were won by APC candidates. Voter turnout was below 40%. In order to fight the endemic corruption – another yardstick for measuring presidential performance – Koroma appointed Abdul Tejan-Cole, a much respected lawyer, as the new head of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in 2007. Cole suggested new regulations to bring corruption cases straight before a special division of the high court, but the suggested legislation was slow in passing parliament and only on 1 September was the president able to sign it into law. The UK, the country’s largest donor, showed willingness to fund special magistrates to fast-track corruption cases, but again this initiative seemed to be ‘slow-tracked’ by parliament. Nevertheless, the president remained committed. He became the first of Sierra Leone’s heads of state to declare his assets to the ACC following a new law demanding officials to declare their assets annually and upon leaving office. This, however, was not enough to prevent the annual Transparency International report from showing the further rise of Sierra Leone among the 25 most corrupt countries.

Sierra Leone • 171 The UN-backed SCSL, mandated to try those who bore the greatest responsibility for the civil war of 1991–2002, entered its final phase. On 7 January, the trial of the former Liberian warlord-turned-president Charles Taylor – accused of aiding the RUF – recommenced after a costly six-month delay. The trial was not held on the premises of the special court at New England Ville in Freetown, but abroad at the International Criminal Court in The Hague, resulting in skyrocketing costs. Five previously convicted war criminals learned that the appeals against their sentences were unsuccessful. On 22 February, SCSL, following the appeal by the defence, announced it was upholding the nearly half a century of sentences handed down in 2007 for the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council senior commanders Alex Tamba Brima, Santigie Borbor and Brima Bazzy Kamara. On 28 May, the appeals chamber announced that while it was overturning some of the convictions, it was also entering new ones, and increased the sentences for the former Civil Defence Forces (CDF) senior figures. Moinina Fofana (CDF’s former national director of war), who was sentenced by the trial chamber to concurrent sentences totalling six years, was sentenced to 15. The total sentence for Allieu Kondewa (CDF’s former high priest) was increased from eight to 20 years. On 25 June, nearly four years after the trial opened, the defence concluded their case in the trial of three former top commanders of the RUF. The trial of Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao had started in Freetown on 5 July 2004 and heard 86 witnesses for the prosecution and 85 witnesses called by the defence. On 5 August, the closing arguments were concluded. Judgment was expected in February 2009. Some of these trials took place under the supervision of Justice Renate Winter, who was elected president of the special court on 29 May for a one-year term. She succeeded Justice George Gelaga-King, who had served as president of the court since 2006. While the special court cost more than $ 200 m, the national legal system was operating on a fraction of this, causing serious delays in trials and sentencing. According to a report published in February by the human rights organisation Prison Watch, more than half of Sierra Leone’s inmates had not yet been sentenced, with some prisoners on remand and adjournment for four years. Limited capacity on the part of public prosecutors was partly to blame. The number of prosecution attorneys stood at less than 25% of what it was before the civil war. Some relief was brought to prisoners by a UK student, Alexander McClean, founder of the African Prisons Project (APP), which aimed at improving the lives of prisoners across Africa. APP initiated a farming scheme to supplement the prisoners’ diet at the Pademba Youth Detention Centre in Freetown, where children as young as eight were held in custody. Early in December, the high court overturned treason convictions for 11 men, 10 ex-AFRC and ex-RUF combatants and one civilian. The indicted were accused of attempting to overthrow the government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in 2003.

172 • West Africa

Foreign Affairs Much of the collaboration between Sierra Leone and its immediate neighbours – Liberia and Guinea – was channelled through the Mano River Union (MRU). A one-day summit was held on 15 May in Monrovia. It was attended by President Koroma, Guinea’s Prime Minister Lansana Kouyaté and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, president of Liberia, who served as chair and host. Laurent Dona Fologo, chair of the Economic and Social Council of Côte d’Ivoire and representing President Laurent Gbagbo, was also present. The MRU members formally welcomed Côte d’Ivoire into the union as a full member. Members of the union agreed to provide $ 125,000 each to the operating budget. Another MRU mini-summit of heads of state and government was held on 10 December with the presidents of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire and the prime minister and head of government of Guinea present. It mainly focused on economic issues, though national and regional security was also high on the agenda. It was agreed to fully establish joint border security and confidence-building units in all four MRU states as a matter of urgency; to strengthen military-to-military and paramilitary cooperation within the region and include the ministers of agriculture of the member states on the joint security committee. With this last decision, the members indicated that food security was a matter of national security. Upon the death of President Lansana Conté, the new military regime in Guinea – the ‘Conseil National pour la Démocratie et le Développement’ – quickly reassured its neighbours that it did not constitute a threat to them. A delegation led by the second in-command – General Mamadou Toto Camara – visited Sierra Leone to explain the takeover. On 26 December, President Koroma attended Conté’s state funeral organised by the new regime. Following the 2007 decision to downsize Sierra Leone’s armed forces, plans were announced in December to close down the operations of the third infantry brigade’s military headquarters. The brigade covered the entire eastern province – during the war a RUF stronghold – including Kenema, Kailahun and Kono districts. The plans were in line with the diversification of the role of the army: an increasing number of officers served in peacekeeping missions abroad and the army instituted Operation Restore Hope to protect the environment against deforestation. The British-led military advisory and training team promised to stay on in Sierra Leone until at least 2012, but as a much downsized presence. By the end of January, President Koroma visited former colonial power Britain and met with Prime Minister Gordon Brown and the Prince of Wales. The president was promised £ 36 m in aid. On 28 May, Koroma spoke at the Tokyo international conference on African development. In his speech he thanked Japan for the many development initiatives it had financed, pointing to the link between poverty and armed conflict. Efforts were made towards standardising the payment systems of Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone and creating a single West African currency, as ultimately envisaged by ECOWAS. To this end, the African Development Bank and the West African Monetary

Sierra Leone • 173 Institute signed a grant agreement of $ 23 m. The grant would be used to finance the West African monetary zone payment system project. The zone includes Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

Socioeconomic Developments West African coastal countries were increasingly used as drug smuggling routes from Latin America and Central and South Asia to Europe and North America. The year saw an increase in cocaine seizures. In July, 600 kilograms of cocaine – worth $ 200 m – was discovered on a plane at Lungi international airport. The plane – coming from Venezuela – bore a fake Red Cross emblem. Within days, police arrested 58 suspects, including Americans, Mexicans, Colombians, Venezuelans, Brazilians and nationals from GuineaBissau and Nigeria. Some police and airport officials were also arrested. Among the apprehended was Mohamed Sesay, brother of Transport and Aviation Minister Kemoh Sesay. On 4 August, the president relieved Sesay of his duties in order to facilitate the investigations. The 2008 Human Development Index again put Sierra Leone in last position, as the impact of the decade-long conflict was still noticeable in most areas measured. Sierra Leone also occupied bottom-rank in UNICEF’s annual State of the World’s Children report released this year, with an under-five mortality rate of 262 per 1,000 births. Yetto-be-confirmed figures for 2008 indicated that the rate dropped significantly to around 200 per 1,000 births. On 29 February, the president launched a five to ten year strategic plan to combat high maternal and child mortality rates. The strategy – backed by the UK Department for International Development – involved the decentralisation of health services, immunisation programmes as well as eradicating overlaps between and redundancies among the various government agencies involved in reproductive and child health. UNICEF – also involved in improving care for pregnant women and infants – named several cultural obstacles to achieving this, such as early marriage, female genital mutilation, poor nutrition and lack of breastfeeding. National experts, however, pointed to the lack of trained staff. The UN Population Fund calculated that there were just six obstetricians in Sierra Leone, of whom only one was stationed upcountry. The UN estimated that there were only 65 trained medical doctors for a country of five million people. According to Plan International – a non-governmental organisation – child suicide rates were the highest in the sub-region. Orphans were identified as being at particularly high risk, with less than 10% deemed to be not at risk, according to a study published in June. The increase in food prices that began in 2007 hampered the struggle against inflation, which rose to about 15%. In response to the high cost of food, the government lowered its taxes on sugar, flour and rice from 15% to 10%. Nevertheless, the rises left large segments of the population extremely vulnerable, especially because domestic cereal harvests only

174 • West Africa meet about two-thirds of consumption needs. More than 50% of the population continued to live on less than a dollar a day. Among the hardest hit were low-income urban households and smallholder farmers, who were unable to produce their rice consumption requirements. On 11 September, a major storm affected more than 10,000 slum dwellers in Kroo Bay, one of Freetown’s largest slums. Kroo Bay’s inhabitants were already plagued by numerous diseases, lowering average life expectancy to a meagre 35 years. Deforestation remained a major concern. Early in the year, the government reimposed its timber export ban. Foreign companies, and in particular Chinese, had already plundered large parts of the remaining forests, with few benefits for local communities. On 2 September, Deputy Finance Minister Richard Conteh announced the government’s non-governmental organisation reform initiative. A new law was drafted to tighten controls on the more than 300 local and international NGOs active in the country and to provide more clarity and transparency in their development activities. The mobile phone sector continued to flourish. Millicom International Cellular upped its guidance for capital spending for 2008 in African countries, including Sierra Leone, to $ 1 bn (from $ 800 m for 2007). Millicom chief executive Marc Beuls commented: “Some analysts believe that for many developing countries like Sierra Leone, having wireless phone services available is a key part of modernising economies.” Meanwhile, China confirmed assistance to Sierratel, the Sierra Leone-owned telecommunications company operating landlines. As part of the inter-governmental agreement, a concessional loan was made available to support a code-division multiple-access project for Sierratel, which would allow multiple users to be processed over the same channel. The mining sector remained the main contributor to the country’s exports, responsible for about 90% of export income. The government provided African Minerals Ltd. a 99-year lease for the Pepel deep-water port and Pepel-Marampa-Tonkolili railway. These leases were intended as part of a wider plan to restart mining in the Marampa and Tonkolili iron ore mines. The disused narrow-gauge railway was to be upgraded to standard gauge. The annual rental for the lease was agreed at $ 250,000 plus a 10% interest in the African Minerals subsidiary operating the port. In addition, African Minerals promised to provide a $ 3 m guarantee. To prevent future disputes – London Mining plc and African Minerals came into conflict with each other over which company exactly leased what area of the Marampa iron ore deposits – the government indicated in mid-September that it would review its mining policy. Vimetco NV paid $ 40 m to acquire Global Aluminium from Titanium Resources Group. Sierra Mineral Holdings 1, a wholly owned subsidiary of Global Aluminium, operated the country’s bauxite mine, producing 1.2 m tonnes annually, with an estimated 31 m tonnes of proven and probable reserves. Koroma in November announced plans to develop a diamond polishing industry. Most of the mining companies active in Sierra Leone welcomed the initiative, but they remained cautious and referred to the many hurdles to be overcome in establishing a successful polishing indus-

Sierra Leone • 175 try. De Beers indicated that, in light of falling demand for diamonds induced by the credit crisis, it would limit its buying activities. Despite the debt cancellation in 2006 that enabled government to spend an extra $ 35 m a year, Sierra Leone remained dependent on donor money. The UK again provided approximately £ 40 m in aid in 2008, a sum likely to go up further in light of the second poverty reduction strategy. Early in the year the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa granted $ 10 m to improve the Kenema-Pendembu section of the Kenema-Koindu road project in the east. At the end of March, the bank also announced it would help in debt relief to the value of $ 9.7 m under the HIPC initiative. In February, Italy donated $ 2 m to an agriculture, forestry and food security project. The project’s aim was to introduce a sustainable production, processing and marketing system. A grant of $ 5.1 m and a loan of $ 5.9 m – over 40 years with 10 years grace – were approved by the IDA for the rehabilitation of roads, the port of Freetown and Lungi international airport. On 22 December, the IMF approved a $ 16 m increase to strengthen the country’s foreign reserves. These had come under pressure as a result of the increase in world prices for food and fuel. The IMF also completed the third performance review under a four-year PRGF arrangement. Upon completion, a further $ 10.8 m would be disbursed. Krijn Peters

Togo

The international donor community welcomed and rewarded the formal legitimation of the democratic transition process, completed with the parliamentary elections of October 2007. Generous aid and debt relief helped the ailing economy to recover. The decisive presidential elections of 2010 already cast their shadow over domestic politics. Presidential candidates of both the ruling party and the opposition tried their best to create an image of being development oriented and of providing impartial political leadership.

Domestic Politics Rivalry within the ruling class continued to set ‘modernisers’ against the traditionalist hardliners. It was personified in the fraternal strife between the head of state Faure and his junior half-brother and former defence minister Kpatcha Gnassingbé, who had been dismissed from the cabinet formed in December 2007. When the president officially commemorated the third anniversary of the death of his father Eyadéma (5 February) in Kara, the major fief of the ruling clan in northern Togo, Faure was reproached by members of his family and the old ethno-military and political guard for sidelining their vested interests. Kpatcha, apparently absent from the ceremonies, did not renounce politics. He resumed his seat in parliament for the prefecture of Kozah (14 February), which he had abandoned

178 • West Africa the previous year because of incompatibility with his former government office. With this step he not only ensured his parliamentary immunity but also a secure base for future power struggles within the ruling party. High ranking international mediators such as the presidents of Gabon and Burkina Faso, as well as Libya’s head of state Kadhafi during his visit to Kara and Lomé in June (13–15 June), vainly tried to mediate behind the scenes. The president relied on a tactical low-key appeasement approach, assisted by Pascal Bodjona, minister of state for territorial administration, informally labelled Faure’s ‘minister for re-election 2010’. In addition, the head of state seized every opportunity to become the darling of the donor community, whose backing was considered decisive for the recovery of the economy. On 15 April, the president started consultations on the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC). This was in line with the comprehensive political agreement between the major political forces (‘Accord Politique Global’, APG) signed on 20 August 2006. Agreement was finally reached to extend the period under consideration from 1958 up to the bloody political persecutions of 2005, including the politically motivated murder of the first Togolese President Sylvanus Olympio, father of the present opposition leader, in 1963. The consultations lasted three months and included, in addition to political parties, a wide range of civil society organisations and even diaspora communities. UNHCR, the EU and the Organisation of French-speaking Countries (‘Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie’, OIF) supported the initiative, which was also welcomed and critically acclaimed by Amnesty International and the ‘Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme’ (FIDH) in Paris. Its chairperson, Souhayr Belhassen, who visited Lomé on 25 May, cautioned that the Moroccan TRC model apparently favoured by Faure Gnassingbé could leave many Togolese frustrated because it was meant neither to determine guilt nor end the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations. UNHCR, which coordinated the consultations, in July completed a representative nationwide opinion survey to which almost 23,000 people from all social strata in urban centres and the countryside responded. The results, published on 26 September, underlined the need for a robust mandate for the TRC, in view of the biased justice system and the prevailing impunity. At year’s end, the final structure of the commission was still unclear, as was its mandate, notably on how to approach the role of the army and the security services, responsible for most of the atrocities. In addition, the opposition continued to insist on revision of the electoral system. Two controversial issues were the electoral code and the geographical bias in the delimitation of constituency boundaries, which were considered to be a major reason for the defeat of the ‘Union des Forces du Changement’ (UFC) in the legislative elections of 2007. The existing delimitation favoured sparsely populated northern strongholds of the ruling ‘Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais’ (RPT), but the skewed distribution of constituencies would not affect presidential elections, in which each vote counts equally. However, the

Togo • 179 principal opponent of the incumbent president in the 2010 elections, veteran UFC leader Gilchrist Olympio (aged 72) lives in exile because of attempts on his life in the 1990s and could still be barred from standing. Unfair residence requirements, inscribed in the constitution in favour of the ruling bloc in 2002, prevented his participation in the 2003 and 2005 polls. Nevertheless, on 19 July UFC unanimously nominated him as candidate for the 2010 elections and demanded corresponding amendment of the constitution and electoral code. Yawovi Agboyibo, another veteran politician and president of the second largest opposition party ‘Comité d’Action pour le Renouveau’ (CAR) and interim prime minister until December 2007, resigned as party leader on 18 October during a regular party congress. He wanted to set an example for the political class and make way for the younger generation. Dodji Apévon (53), also a lawyer and hitherto vice president of his party, took over. However, it was open to question whether Agobyibo would not stand again as presidential candidate if CAR and UFC did not come to terms. In December, the government, without prior consultation with the major opposition parties, submitted a draft bill to parliament to modify the electoral code. Under the bill, membership of the independent electoral commission (‘Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante’, CENI) was to be reduced from 19 to 13, 9 elected by parliament, 2 by civic organisations and 2 nominated by the government. UFC and CAR complained that the consultation process (‘Cadre Permanent de Dialogue’) agreed to in the APG had been disregarded. They also rejected the additional discriminatory and exclusionary measures (e.g., the above-mentioned preconditions for candidacy for the presidency) and the government’s proposed interference in the electoral process, which could jeopardise CENI’s independence. Apart from this, the government and EU agreed on a comprehensive population census (16 December), aimed at establishing a reliable population database for a new delimitation of constituencies, 27 years after the last count in 1981. It would be financed by the 9th EDF and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), which would also be responsible for its execution. The government introduced several confidence-building measures to mollify the donor community. A new decree to regulate the informal sector (13 February) was aimed at stemming the drain on financial resources and integrating the activities of informal enterprises into the formal sector. A delegation was created for the purpose of restructuring the informal sector. However, it remained questionable whether this would have any effect in revitalizing the economy in view of similar failed efforts in the past. The increase in the minimum wage (15 August) to cushion the effects of soaring living costs could be interpreted in the same light, since 47% of households live below the poverty line. The guaranteed inter-professional minimum wage doubled from CFAfr 13,757 to 20,000 (€ 42) and agricultural minimum wages increased as well. The 35,300 public servants received an additional transport allowance of CFAfr 5,000 (€ 7.62) in December, in view of rising fuel prices (by up to 18%).

180 • West Africa Still other confidence-building measures were the release of 297 prisoners to mark independence celebrations in April, and a draft bill to abolish the death penalty (10 December) on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UN and human rights organisations welcomed the initiative and urged the government to continue its efforts by creating an impartial justice system, addressing impunity and renouncing all forms of violence, a diplomatic hint that the bill was mainly symbolic. In practice, legal executions had ceased 30 years ago. The thorny problem remained that most human rights violations committed or tolerated in Togo take the form of extra-judicial killings and persecution. The cabinet reshuffle of 7 September, notably the appointment of Gilbert Fossoun Houngbo (aged 47) as prime minister, was apparently also meant to please donors. A former accountant at Price & Waterhouse and since 2005 director of UNDP’s Africa office, Houngbo was little known to the population. He was deemed a technocrat, not affiliated with any party, and was already the fourth prime minister appointed by Faure Gnassingbé since the latter assumed power in 2005. Houngbo replaced Komlan Mally, a stalwart of the RPT originating from Atakpamé (the president’s home town), who resigned on 5 September after hardly a year on the job. He was moved to the health ministry. The new cabinet formed by the prime minister on 15 September offered few surprises. Most key ministries remained in the hands of RPT stalwarts, with the number of portfolios increasing from 21 to 27, and the opposition remaining largely absent from the cabinet. One exception was the leader of the ‘Convention Démocratique des Peuples Africains’ (CDPA), Léopold Messan Gnininvi, hitherto minister of foreign affairs, who went to the ministry of industry. The human rights situation improved further. As part of the cabinet reshuffle, the human rights ministry was awarded to the president of the independent ‘Ligue Togolaise des Droits de l’Homme’, Yakoubou Hamadou. Concerning press freedom, Togo improved its rating by ‘Reporters sans Frontiers’ to the best ever grading (10), thus surpassing even neighbouring Benin (15) and Burkina Faso (13). Togo’s status on the much quoted Freedom House index improved slightly too, from ‘not free’ to ‘partly free’, as a result of the 2007 legislative elections, which were judged to have been ‘genuinely free and fair’. However, the Economist Intelligence Unit index of democracy, introduced in 2006, was probably more realistic because it embodied a wider concept of democracy than multiparty rule. It ranked Togo as being still at the lower end of authoritarian regimes (overall score 151 as of September 2008, with North Korea at the bottom at 167). Almost 7,000 refugees who had fled the country in the aftermath of the violent clashes during the 2005 election still had not returned home.

Togo • 181

Foreign Affairs The EU, which resumed development cooperation in November 2007 after a 15 year suspension, acknowledged and rewarded the ‘modernising’ approach of the government. On top of € 80 m provided the preceding year, it granted CFAfr 80.7 bn (€ 123 m) within the framework of the 10th EDF for the period 2008–13, with the overall aim of improving governance, economic growth and poverty reduction. The government’s goodwill measures were approvingly noted by EU Development Commissioner Louis Michel. He went so far as to characterise the three-year rule of Faure Gnassingbé as a ‘good example’ to be followed by other African countries when he announced additional EU-budget aid to the tune of € 15 m (4 October). Apparently, overriding geopolitical concerns caused the EU to overlook the coup by the incumbent president and the rigged presidential elections of 2005, followed by bloody political persecution, that had consolidated the power of the Gnassingbé, clan. However, within the EU differences continued between Paris, which pursued partisan politics and displayed a barely disguised interest in maintaining Togo’s status quo, and Berlin, backed by the British government, which insisted on guarantees for a level political playing field. The IMF followed suit in resuming aid on 21 April. Bilateral development cooperation also came on stream. France announced in September the doubling of its budget aid (€ 5 m overall in 2008) to support the successful transition to democracy and offset the external shocks stemming from the global rise in food and oil prices as well as cope with the damage created by heavy flooding in July. The French secretary of state for cooperation, Alain Joyandet visited President Gnassingbé in early September when it became evident that France took a very positive view of the recent steps taken by the Lomé government. France accorded grant aid of about € 140 m for the period 2008–12. In February, joint military exercises such as ‘Zio 2008’ involving thousands of troops from Togo, Benin and France, underlined these strong relations. Thus, it came as a surprise when the president cancelled his plans to attend the 12th Francophone OIF summit in Quebec (17–19 October) and sent his prime minister, Gilbert Houngbo, instead. Probably this was only because Faure Gnassingbé, accompanied by a high ranking ministerial delegation, was due to meet Sarkozy at the Elysée and other members of the French cabinet on 20 November anyway. Germany, which resumed aid in December 2007, sent its vice chancellor and foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, for discussions with Faure and opposition leaders (11 February). He was accompanied by about 60 German businessmen and journalists and reopened the Goethe Institute, burnt down during the 2005 upheavals. This was the first high-ranking German visit since 1993. A delegation of German MPs followed in mid-November to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the German Development Service’s work in Togo. Faure Gnassingbé lauded the long-standing ties with China during a visit by a Chinese delegation on 16–18 February. China and Togo signed two economic and aid agreements

182 • West Africa to a value of some $ 6 m. A first meeting of the China-Togo Mixed Commission on Economy and Trade was held in Lomé on 24 February. At the AU summit in Egypt (1 July) Togo joined NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism as its 29th member. The newly established APRM centre of excellence in Ghana, supported by the World Bank, Canada and Germany to enhance good governance in the sub-region, agreed to share its expertise for the peer review exercise.

Socioeconomic Developments Past weak performance continued. GDP growth per head was negative in three out of the four preceding years, due in part to more recent external shocks. Bad weather and flooding at the end of July destroyed vital roads and bridges in the north as well as crops. Soaring global fuel and food prices also reduced growth. Real GDP grew by a mere 0.8%, while inflation was estimated at about 8%. The production of cotton, the major export crop, declined by 27% to 40,000 tonnes due to bad weather and rising fertiliser prices. The 2009 budget adopted on 19 December foresaw a rise in expenditure (mostly on infrastructure, social services and domestic debt arrears) of 13.8%, based on an estimated increase in revenue of 16.4%. The opposition criticised these unrealistic forecasts, which will probably increase the estimated deficit of 2.9% of GDP even further. Negotiations on EPAs with the EU languished. Togo was deemed to be among those countries likely to be hardest hit by the loss of revenue stemming from the trade liberalisation demanded by the EU. Consequently, the government gave close consideration to the preparation of an African EPA template to serve as a common AU negotiating platform by the end of January 2009. Fiscal initiatives by the government within the framework of the PRGF programme were accompanied by an IMF credit of $ 108.4 m over the next three years. This was meant to pave the way for future public debt relief to the tune of $ 2 bn under the HIPC and multilateral debt relief initiatives. Togo reached the HIPC completion point in November, thus allowing for interim debt relief. Of the debts, 41% were attributable to bilateral engagements with members of the Paris Club. In June, the latter approved the immediate cancellation of $ 347 m, and an additional $ 393 m to be restructured in accordance with Naples terms, i.e., repayment stretched over the next 40 years with a 16 year grace period. This initiative was the most important, as about 75% of the total external debt arrears of $ 689 m (in 2006 almost 30% of GDP) was with members of the Paris Club. The World Bank assisted by granting another $ 168 m, most of it assigned to the repayment of government arrears to the bank. China became Togo’s principal trading partner (representing 31% of Togo’s imports in 2006). The volume of external trade between both countries reached $ 570 m in 2005. About 70 small and medium Chinese enterprises (textiles, shoes, kitchenware, mechanic

Togo • 183 and electrical consumer goods, bikes, etc.) had already invested some $ 20 m in their Togolese facilities. In previous years, Togo had become an entry point for cocaine from Latin America. In November, police dismantled a Colombian network that used Lomé and the tiny airport of Niamtougou (450 km north of the capital) as a transit hub to European markets. The authorities suspected high-ranking police officers of being involved. To comply with the UN MDGs, which demanded 100% school enrolment by 2015, the government abolished primary school fees in October to reverse the downward trend in enrolment from 95% in the early 1990s to 76% in 2006. However, given that just 61% of school-age children completed primary school, Togo’s pledge to make education universal by 2015 was unrealistic. Enrolment did increase considerably during the year, but school fees had been relatively low anyway (on average $ 4 p.a. for males, and half that for females), and concerns mainly centred on neglected infrastructure. The ministry of education estimated at the end of the year that it needed an additional 3,000 teachers, 5,000 new classrooms, some 100,000 school benches and hundreds of thousands of new textbooks, not to speak of the necessary reforms and investment in secondary and tertiary education required to raise skills on a sustainable basis. UNICEF welcomed the initiative but held that the country was ill prepared in view of two decades of neglect of the education system. After three years of advocacy work, human rights organisations succeeded in convincing Togo’s vodun priests to denounce practices that violated the human rights of minors, e.g, baptism of young girls as novices of vodun (vaudoussi) and forcing them into the service of convents and into marriage. The decision was communicated by the head vodun priest, Maman Kponou of Togoville, at the end of May. In December, the supreme chief of the Ogboni fraternity of Benin instituted an official branch in Togo by enthroning a national Ogboni chief, Olori-Olouwo, in Lomé. The reformed Ogboni society is a powerful religious-political network originating in Yorubaland (Nigeria) and is present throughout West Africa. Among its aims is the combating of witchcraft. On 8 March, the Freemasons installed the new leader of the Togolese Grand Lodge at their temple of Djidjolé on the western outskirts of the capital. The lodge is affiliated to the French Lodge (‘Grand Orient de France’, the centre of the influential Franco-African Freemason networks) and is notorious for supporting the Eyadéma clan. Its new head, lawyer and exarmy officer Mbenewar Bataka, is a Kabyé as well and friend of former Defence Minister Kpatcha Gnassingbé. His halfbrother, the head of state, was said to be awaiting initiation by Gabonese President Omar Bongo, an important Freemason dignitary. Dirk Kohnert

V. Central Africa

After a spectacular attempt by a rebel coalition to capture Chad’s capital N’Djaména by force in February, there was a relative decrease of violent encounters in this country and in the neighbouring Central African Republic (CAR). However, the upsurge in violent combat between renegade General Nkunda and the official security forces in eastern DR Congo meant that this was not at all a peaceful year for the sub-region. Economically, 2008 was a reasonably good year at the macro-level for the whole of Central Africa, with only Chad lagging behind. Yet the cost of living increased dramatically in the first months practically everywhere. Politically, most countries experienced no major change: the long-term presidents in most countries adapted their strategies to hold on to power, as did the relative newcomers in CAR and DR Congo.

186 • Central Africa

Democracy and Elections The only country of the sub-region to hold nationwide elections was Equatorial Guinea, where, on 4 May, legislative elections took place. Unsurprisingly, the ‘Partido Democrático de Guinea Ecuatorial’ (PDGE) of President Obiang Nguema, in alliance with nine smaller parties, won a landslide victory, taking 99 of the 100 seats in the National Assembly. The ‘Convergencia para la Democracia Social’ (CPDS), the only noteworthy opposition party, lost one of the two seats it had won in the preceding elections. This election proved – if proof was necessary – that the country lacked even the façade of democracy. Partial senatorial elections were held in Congo, with the presidential alliance securing 33 of the 42 seats. Seven independent candidates were elected and only two seats went to a regular party, attesting to the weakness of Congolese opposition parties. In Cameroon, President Biya initiated a change to the constitution that allowed him to stand for another term in the elections scheduled for 2011 and rule for another five years. He had acceded to power in 1982 and was thus one of the longest-serving heads of state in Africa (eclipsed by only Omar Bongo and Obiang Nguema in neighbouring Gabon and Equatorial Guinea). With a safe majority in parliament to secure this fundamental change, Biya did not opt for a referendum. When the chairman of the foreign affairs committee in the National Assembly stood up against those constitutional amendments, he was intimidated and later resigned his post. The National Assembly speaker subsequently tried to curtail the rights of this member of parliament.

Human Rights Certain political killings stood out. In DR Congo, a leading politician from the ‘Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo’ (MLC), Daniel Boteti, was shot by elements of the presidential guard, while in Chad the leading opposition figure Ibni Oumar was believed to have been killed after he disappeared following his arrest and torture by security forces. Human rights took a turn for the worse in Cameroon. In January, the governor of Littoral province banned all public demonstrations until further notice. Spontaneous demonstrations in February in reaction to price hikes for essential goods, shortages of energy and water supplies as well as the planned constitutional change to allow Biya to stand again for re-election were met with the widespread use of physical violence by the government (40–100 deaths, 1,600 arrests). Popular singer Lapiro de Mbanga received a three year sentence, while others were pardoned by Biya. Prison guards killed at least 17 rioting prisoners in June at New Bell prison in Douala. Another spectacular case was the arrest of Paul Eric Kingué, mayor of Njombé-Penja and member of the ruling party. He had asked the local French-owned banana plantation company to pay the business tax it had evaded for the last 30 years and immediately got into trouble. When the wages of the plantation

Central Africa • 187 workers were not paid, the latter took their superiors hostage and Kinguè was arrested and held for five months before being charged with inciting revolt. The US state department noted deterioration in the government’s human rights record only in the case of Chad. Most of the human rights violations were committed in the context of the ongoing civil war between government and rebel forces. However, a separate incident also attracted attention. On 29 June, security forces used excessive force in response to a local conflict in Kouno during which supporters of Sheikh Ahmet Ismael Bichara had attacked them. Seventy-two persons were killed during the confrontation, an estimated 68 of them supporters of Bichara and the remaining four gendarmes. Bichara had earlier called for a ‘holy war’ against the government. International human rights NGOs continued to report on specific cases. Human Rights Watch issued two reports on DR Congo. The 100-page report on human rights abuses by the Kabila regime, entitled ‘We will crush you’, left no doubt that the elected government was guilty of the most serious human rights abuses. The second report focused on the UN peacekeeping mission’s inability to protect civilians in Kigwanja (North Kivu), where about 150 civilians were killed. AI also issued a report on North Kivu. A report by the ‘Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme’ (FIDH) argued that an amnesty law promulgated in DR Congo in October would send the wrong message and make it more difficult for victims of violence to obtain justice. Press freedom was severely restricted in most countries of the sub-region. Equatorial Guinea was ranked 186 of 195 countries in Freedom House’s global press freedom survey for 2008. DR Congo, Chad and Gabon also fell into the ‘not free’ category, while São Tomé and Príncipe (‘free’) as well as Congo (‘partly free’) were the highest rated countries of the sub-region. In mid-field, Cameroon continued to rank poorly (141, no change) while ‘Reporters sans Frontières’ noted a steep decline of press freedom for the country in 2008 (129 of 173 countries, ranked at 111 in 2007). CAR ranked 132 (still ‘not free’). In CAR, the director of ‘Les Collines de l’Oubangui’ was sentenced in January to six months imprisonment for inciting revolt and released from prison after one month. He had published an editorial alleging that two ministers had embezzled CFAfr 7 bn meant for civil service salaries. Similar restrictions on press freedom were recorded in Cameroon. The private Equinoxe TV station and two private radio stations were closed down for reporting on the severe repression of the urban riots in February, but officially because they had not fully paid their licence fees. One of the radio stations, ‘Magic FM’ could not resume broadcasting again after the lifting of the ban in July because its premises had been ransacked, and its seized equipment was not returned by the police. More generally, Cameroonian security services hindered journalists in reporting on protest actions. The Chadian government also suspended two newspapers after the rebel attack on N’Djaména. The ICC played an increasing role in the sub-region. On 1 August, CAR’s President Bozizé wrote to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon asking the UN Security Council to freeze the current ICC investigation in his country for the sake of peace. He argued

188 • Central Africa that the country’s own judiciary should deal with all crimes committed since 2005, while leaving the prosecution of crimes not covered by the amnesty law to the ICC. This was in stark contrast to earlier declarations by the country’s authorities that they would not be in a position to handle the crimes against humanity, mainly committed in 2002. Most spectacular was the arrest of Jean-Pierre Bemba, a senator in DR Congo and MLC chairman, on 24 May in Brussels. The ICC had issued an arrest warrant and his transfer to The Hague followed on 3 July. The charges did not relate to events in the DR Congo, but in neighbouring CAR. This was different from the case of militia leader Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, who was arrested on 6 February and brought before the ICC’s pre-trial chamber five days later. He and Germain Katanga (arrested in October 2007) were charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity in DR Congo. Both trials were scheduled to commence in September 2009. Additionally, a warrant for the arrest of Bosco Ntaganda was issued in April. He was a leading commander under militia leader Thomas Lubanga, arrested the previous year. Lubanga’s trial was suspended for procedural reasons after the prosecution withheld evidence from the defence and the judges on the grounds that they had to protect their witnesses. This was seen as a serious and more general problem in the kind of trials the ICC had to adjudicate. Unrelated were new developments in the case of former President Hissène Habré of Chad, sometimes nicknamed the ‘African Pinochet’. Senegal, where Habré lived, had begun to amend its constitution the preceding year and new laws were enacted in July to permit the prosecution of persons for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture no matter when and where the events occurred. On 16 September, 14 Chadian victims filed complaints with a Senegalese prosecutor accusing Habré of crimes against humanity and torture. The prosecutor was now expected to examine the victims’ complaints and decide whether to present formal charges against Habré to the team of investigating magistrates named to deal with the case.

Instability, War and Peace In Chad, an alliance of rebel forces attacked the capital in late January and early February, taking partial control of the city and coming close to seizing power in N’Djaména by military means. The tide turned in favour of government forces, who gained the upper hand with decisive French and Libyan help, and were probably also helped by internal rifts within the rebel alliance. The EU deployed a peacekeeping force to both Chad and the northeastern CAR after several months delay, with the main aim of securing refugee camps. The peace process in CAR had its ups and downs, but took a positive turn with the signing of the so-called global peace accord in June and the holding of an inclusive political dialogue in December. In late January, an important peace conference in Goma raised hopes for the peace process in eastern DR Congo. The conference culminated with the signing of a declara-

Central Africa • 189 tion by representatives of the government and the armed groups, including the main rebel movement of Laurent Nkunda. It included a ceasefire agreement and the creation of a follow-up committee plus an amnesty for members of armed groups for acts of insurrection, but not for war crimes. However, the accord remained just a piece of paper. The ceasefire was constantly violated and at the end of August hostilities resumed. Additionally, the pact on security, stability and development in the Great Lakes region came into force on 21 June. This formal progress was deceptive, however. In North Kivu province, the DR Congo’s armed forces (FARDC) and the ‘Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple’ (CNDP), led by renegade General Nkunda, clashed frequently. The UN peacekeeping ‘Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo’ (MONUC) supported the efforts of the armed forces, but failed to make much difference. FARDC troops abandoned positions held jointly with MONUC and rogue elements terrorised the population. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s special envoy to the Great Lakes region, Olusegun Obasanjo, travelled to the country and met with Nkunda for the first time on 16 November, but by year’s end no concrete results of this mediation effort were apparent. Furthermore, a resurgence of armed groups in Ituri was observed and the dreaded Ugandan rebel movement, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), committed atrocities in northeast DR Congo. By the end of the year, peace appeared to be no more than an elusive hope in this zone. The first months of the year saw attacks by the northern-based rebel movement ‘Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie’ (APRD) in the CAR and there were further skirmishes during the year. The sub-regional peacekeeping mission, comprising about 500 troops, passed from CEMAC to CEEAC control in the summer. Gabon’s President Bongo continued to be very active in managing political conflicts in the CAR. He was the main architect of the various peace agreements signed during the year and of the so-called inclusive political dialogue. This important elite gathering was presided over by the former Burundian president (and coup leader) Pierre Buyoya. Uganda’s LRA invaded CAR again in March, committing numerous atrocities.

Socioeconomic Developments According to the IMF, the countries of the sub-region again fared rather unevenly. Equatorial Guinea was still on the ‘El Dorado’ track with GDP growth rates of 11.3%, not far below the figure for the previous year. DR Congo (6.2%), São Tomé and Príncipe (5.8%) and Congo (5.6%) all recorded very good results, while the rather meagre growth rates for Cameroon (3.4%), CAR (2.2%) and Gabon (2.0%) were a source of concern. Chad even experienced a negative trend, –0.4%. Oil exporting countries in general benefited from high prices on the world market at the beginning of the year, but the perspective turned more problematic with the global financial crisis in the second half of 2008. However, the growth rates had to be set against rather strong inflationary tendencies in most countries.

190 • Central Africa São Tomé and Príncipe and DR Congo had the highest annual percentage changes for consumer prices, a staggering 26% and 18% respectively. The largest scale protest actions against the rising cost of merely surviving took place in Cameroon, even though inflation there (at 5.3%) was among the most moderate in the sub-region. The February riots were, therefore, more an indication of the growing dissatisfaction of the urban poor and youth in general, not least because the political situation offered no prospect of change. Poor ratings for the sub-region in TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index were no longer a surprise, being by now a familiar phenomenon. In fact, the score of all but two countries of the sub-region worsened. Chad’s ranking at 173 (of 180), jointly followed by Equatorial Guinea and DR Congo (both ranked 171) stood out. CAR improved 11 ranks to a still very poor 151 – and without any change of score. Congo at 158 (8 places worse) and Cameroon at 141 (–3) completed the list of very corrupt countries in the sub-region. Gabon, which always had the best rating in the sub-region, lost 12 ranks to end up in 96th position. São Tomé and Príncipe, rated for the second time, again received a medium-to-low rating and ranked 121 (–3), with no change of score. Several scandals involving corruption and the enrichment of national leaders again hit the news. Almost certainly, most media attention was again focused on the allegations against three national presidents – Bongo, Sassou Nguesso and Obiang Nguema – that they had acquired their important real estate holdings in France with embezzled money. In December, TI France, the international lawyers’ association Sherpa and a Gabonese individual filed a suit in Paris for embezzlement of public funds, money laundering and abuse against all three presidents. Cameroonian authorities arrested the former finance minister, Abah Abah, the former justice minister, Olanguena Awono and former secretary general of the presidency, Atangana Mebara on corruption charges in March and May. These were all former close associates of President Biya, reinforcing the impression that Biya was particularly nervous about potential challengers sharing his own ethno-regional background. In São Tomé and Príncipe, two former prime ministers and several high officials were arrested and tried on corruption charges for their alleged involvement in the disappearance of millions of dollars from the government’s foreign aid fund. Gabon (ranked 107) was again the best performing country of the sub-region on the UNDP’s Human Development Index. Together with Equatorial Guinea (ranked 115), São Tomé and Príncipe (128), Congo (130) and Cameroon (150), it shared the ‘medium human development’ classification, while Chad (170) and more particularly CAR (177) and DR Congo (178) were not only categorised as countries with ‘low human development’, but were rated better than only one other country on earth (Sierra Leone). Unsurpisingly, poverty remained dramatic throughout the sub-region: Chad was rated 133 out of 135 countries on the Human Poverty Index (HPI-1), better than only Afghanistan and Mali (if this was consolation), while CAR (126) and DR Congo (115) were also among the poorest nations on earth. Only São Tomé and Príncipe (59) achieved a relatively good status. The UN-sponsored MDG monitor painted an optimistic picture for Equato-

Central Africa • 191 rial Guinea and Gabon, both of which were considered on track for most of the eight goals. By contrast, CAR, Chad and DR Congo had not a single MDG on track. Cameroon, DR Congo and São Tomé and Príncipe were even considered clearly off track for three of the MDGs. Goal 5 (improved maternal health) was very unlikely to be achieved in four countries of the sub-region. For many MDGs, the available information was deemed insufficient to draw clear conclusions.

Sub-regional Organisations There was no ordinary CEEAC summit during the year, but heads of state met in Kinshasa for an extraordinary meeting on 10 March, mainly to focus on the situation in Chad. The CEEAC chairman, Kabila, took the initiative in calling the meeting, which was meant to bolster Déby’s position. The Kinshasa talks were also attended by presidents Nkurunziza of Burundi, Bozizé of CAR, Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, Sassou Nguesso of Congo and Fradique de Menezes of São Tomé and Príncipe. Déby reportedly refused to recognise that the attack on N’Djaména was the result of an internal crisis and not just masterminded by Khartoum. In the end, the summit expressed its “solidarity with the government and the people of Chad”. The final declaration urged the rapid deployment of the hybrid AU/UN peacekeeping mission to Darfur. Two important gatherings between CEEAC and EU officials took place. The first was held in Libreville (27 June–2 July) and prepared for the second, held in Brussels on 10 November. This meeting, officially called a troika meeting since representatives of four CEEAC member states (among them representatives of the out-going and actual presidency) and of the actual and future EU presidency (France and Czech Republic) were present, was jointly chaired by the DR Congo’s Cooperation Minister Raymond Tshibanda and the French secretary of state for development cooperation, Alain Joyandet. It included EU Development Commissioner Louis Michel and CEEAC’s secretary general, Louis-Sylvain Goma. Participants noted a great degree of harmony between positions on the main agenda items (cooperation, peace and security). Both European and Central African parties stressed it would be necessary to harmonise positions between CEMAC and CEEAC and ultimately merge both organisations into one. For this process, both parties recommended the elaboration of a roadmap. The annual CEMAC summit was held in Yaoundé, Cameroon on 24–25 June. It was attended by host President Biya and his peers Bozizé, Sassou Nguesso, Bongo, Obiang Nguema as well as Chadian Prime Minister Youssouf Saleh Abbass. Sao Tomé’s President Menezes and the DR Congo’s foreign affairs minister, Autipas Mbusa, as well as Louis-Sylvain Goma, secretary general of CEEAC, attended as observers. The situation in Chad was again among the most important topics on the agenda. Déby got a clearer indication of solidarity from his CEMAC peers than he had at the CEEAC summit in Kinshasa. The status of the community’s joint airline project remained unclear, as no major progress was made, and the CEMAC Commission was asked to negotiate transitional

192 • Central Africa regulations with existing air companies. The summit urged the Commission to speed up the work on a sub-regional economic programme, to be submitted by the end of the year. The Commission was also invited to prepare police and security forces through training seminars on the new policy on free movement of people within the community. The long-term project to issue a CEMAC passport was again postponed, this time to 2010. Symbolically, a ‘CEMAC day’ was instituted for all member countries: on 16 March each year member states are to make efforts to sensitise the population on community issues. Finally, the summit decided to hand over responsibility for sub-regional peacekeeping troops to CEEAC. On 12 July, the ‘Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique’ (Micopax) under CEEAC’s aegis replaced the ‘Forces Multinationales en Centrafrique’ (FOMUC), up to this date the responsibility of CEMAC. The latter curiously has no mandate for peacekeeping in its statutes, while CEEAC has for some time had formal institutions active in this area. Thus, it seemed logical to shift responsibility from one organisation to the other, not least because the move also meant that new troop providers could be called upon, since Angola and DR Congo could then be associated with peacekeeping initiatives in the subregion. In the second half of the year, Micopax consisted of 500 troops from Cameroon (also a new provider of troops), DR Congo, Gabon and Chad. The police component was provided by Angola and Chad. The mandate of Micopax was renewable every six months until 2013. Andreas Mehler

Cameroon

Violence erupted at the beginning of the year as a result of both economic and political grievances, rocking a country usually described as the most peaceful in Central Africa. After a bout of harsh repression and a number of economic measures meant to improve the purchasing power of Cameroonians, the National Assembly eventually approved the controversial constitutional amendment removing the two-term limit on the presidency. This move occurred during a year also marked by tense relations with some neighbouring countries. Attacks on Cameroonian troops, especially in the Bakassi peninsula, which was eventually transferred from Nigerian control, repeatedly threatened the country’s security.

Domestic Politics In November 2007, the 25th anniversary celebrations of the Biya regime triggered a large increase in the notorious ‘motions of support’ for the head of state. Officials of the ruling ‘Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais’ (RDPC), publicly announced their support for a constitutional amendment to remove the two-term limit on the presidency. In his nationwide end-of-the-year address on 31 December 2007, Paul Biya

194 • Central Africa himself argued that such constitutional limitation was inconsistent with the very idea of democratic choice. This statement set off a wave of protests led by the Social Democratic Front (SDF), the main opposition party. Public demonstrations against the constitutional amendment were held in Douala on 14 and 23 February, despite a ban imposed in midJanuary on public meetings and demonstrations in Littoral province. Both demonstrations were followed by violent repression. On 25 February, road hauliers went on strike against the increase in the prices of fuel and basic goods. Violence erupted in Douala and in other towns in the western provinces, where shops were closed and traffic halted. In the streets, people demonstrated against the loss of purchasing power and the proposed constitutional amendment, which was interpreted as a way for the president to remain in power after 2011. The strike ended after the price of fuel was reduced on 27 February, but violence continued in the major cities, where gangs of young men looted shops and fuel stations. In a TV address on this day, President Paul Biya implicitly accused opposition parties of manipulating the young rioters. There were a number of incidents reported in Yaoundé, especially at the university, following the deployment of armed forces. The riots abated at the end of this turbulent week. The president announced on 7 March a tariff reduction on imported basic goods. The government also promised to increase the salaries of civil servants by 15%. Later in the month, the price of electricity was also reduced. The number of casualties in the riots and the repression became a matter of debate. On one hand, the ‘Maison des Droits de l’Homme’, a human rights NGO based in Douala, stated that more than 100 people had been killed, while on the other, the government acknowledged that only 40 had died during the February riots. The suppression of these demonstrations and riots was accompanied by measures against the private press. In January, Equinoxe TV, a private channel, was closed, officially for non-payment of the registration tax, while a month later, Magic FM, a private radio station, had its equipment confiscated. Both measures against the media could be interpreted as being intended to prevent public criticism of the government’s handling of the crisis. This curtailment of freedom of expression and the ban on public demonstrations in Douala were lifted only in July. In the meantime, parliament voted in the controversial constitutional amendment by a large majority (157 in favour, 5 opposed and 15 abstentions). The opposition parties denounced the fact that the vote was brought forward without prior notice. The main constitutional amendment was the removal of the two-term limit on the presidential mandate. While less remarked upon, the amendment of article 53 was also important: a new clause in the constitution states that the activities of the president will enjoy immunity, which would continue beyond the end of his mandate. The SDF was vocal in condemning the constitutional amendment but, with only 15 representatives in the National Assembly, could not effectively oppose it. Moreover, John Fru Ndi, the chairman of the party, still faced charges of murdering a SDF member, but his trial was postponed twice during the year. About 20 other members of the SDF involved in the same case and detained without trial since 2006 were released in November.

Cameroon • 195 The SDF also opposed the nomination of the members of Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), the new institution responsible for organising and supervising elections. On 30 December, President Biya nominated its 12 members, 11 of whom were either members of the central committee or the political bureau of the RDPC or close allies of the executive. This new institution had been created by law in 2006 and its mandate was formerly jointly discharged by the interior ministry and the ‘Observatoire National des Elections’ (ONEL). The government continued with its anti-corruption campaign. Specifically, the ‘Epervier’ operation entered its second phase. In March, two prominent former ministers, Polycarpe Abah Abah, former minister of finance and Urbain Olanguena Awono, former minister of health, as well as several high-ranking officials in state agencies were arrested for the large-scale embezzlement of public funds. In April, Jean Marie Atangana Mebara, former secretary general of the presidency, was interrogated by police about the controversial purchase of a presidential aircraft and was arrested in August. Several other former ministers and heads of administration were dismissed, tried or arrested during the year on allegations of corruption. Some of the individuals arrested during the first phase of the anti-corruption campaign, which started in 2006, were sentenced to from 20 to 40 years of imprisonment. Accusations of corruption were particularly common in the forestry sector. In April, a retired forester published a report detailing the corrupt practices in the sector. According to donors, corruption in the forestry sector amounted to a yearly loss to the state budget of tens of millions of euros. Minister of Forests and Fauna Elvis Ngolle Ngolle acknowledged that persistent problems threatened the sector and withdrew the licences of a dozen small forestry firms. However, when the French branch of Friends of the Earth, an international NGO, issued a second report on the matter in June, Ngolle Ngolle claimed that the sector was now a “model of good governance”. Corruption was also stated to be rampant in the agricultural sector: the ‘Association Citoyenne de Défense des Intérêts Collectifs’ (ACDIC) published a report in December highlighting the embezzlement of foreign aid in this sector. According to ACDIC, in 2008 € 1.8 m was poured in to support the production of maize. However, 62% of the funding had been misappropriated by civil servants in the ministry of agriculture. The publicity surrounding the report led in December to the arrest of the chairman Bernard Njonga and several members of the NGO. Because of the political and social tensions, human rights in the country remained a matter of concern. As noted earlier, public demonstrations in Douala were restricted and the media was muzzled during the first half of the year. The repression of the riots was violent and about 1,600 persons were arrested on charges of public disorder and destruction of private and government property. The minister of justice claimed in April that 729 persons had been fined and/or given prison sentences of from three months to six years. Lawyers and human rights advocates in Cameroon expressed concern that the trials were unusually hasty and unfair. On the national holiday (20 May), Biya decreed a conditional amnesty for prisoners but several dozen prisoners remained in custody, either because

196 • Central Africa they had appealed their convictions and sentences or because they had been unable to pay the fines imposed by the courts. The famous singer Pierre Roger Lambo Sandjo, better known by his pseudonym Lapiro de Mbanga, was arrested in April for his alleged participation in the riots. In September, he was charged with looting and sentenced to three years imprisonment. Prison conditions were still harsh and characterised by inadequate food and medical care as well as overcrowding. At least 10 detainees died and as many as 78 sustained injuries after a fire broke out at New Bell prison (Douala) on 20 August. As revealed by a search conducted in August in the same prison after prison authorities were alerted to a massive escape plot, criminality appeared to be on the increase inside prisons, with convicts having easy access to weapons. Attempts at escape had already occurred earlier in the year, and the reaction was harsh: on the afternoon of 29 June, dozens of prisoners forced their way out of New Bell prison and 15 were reportedly shot dead by prison guards and other security forces in the ensuing manhunt. Two others were killed on 30 June. Domestic insecurity appeared to be on the increase, especially during the second part of the year. Ten persons were abducted in June by bandits in the Extreme-North province and were found dead some days later. Again in October, November and December, attacks by bandits were frequent in the northern provinces but also in the West and Central provinces. Bandits and armed forces were killed in the exchange of fire. The insecurity was also evidenced in the hold-up of three banks in Limbe on the night of 28 September. Heavily armed commando-style groups descended on Limbe by boat and took control of the town for several hours before disappearing. A continuing worry for the Biya regime was the determined struggle of the anglophone secessionist movement to establish an independent state in anglophone Cameroon, the former British trust territory of Southern Cameroons. On 6 October, the chairman and 22 members of the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) were detained for four days for holding an illegal meeting. Members of the SCNC are regularly arrested in early October each year when they celebrate the contested referendum that led to the incorporation of Southern Cameroons into the former French colony. In August, President Biya created a seventh public university, which will be established for the next academic year in the city of Maroua in the Extreme North province, one of the most heavily populated provinces in the country. This institution had been promised by him during the presidential campaigns of 1997 and 2004. It is supposed to relieve the overcrowding in the current university system: no work has ever been undertaken to increase the size of the universities of Yaoundé I and II, Buea (South West), Douala (Littoral), Dschang (West) and Ngadoundéré (North). As in previous years, students and professors continued to complain about their working conditions. For the first time, a student union, the ‘Association pour la Défense des Droits des Étudiants du Cameroun’ (ADDEC), supported by an NGO, decided in July to lodge a complaint against the director of the public university of journalism ‘l’Ecole supérieure des sciences et techniques

Cameroon • 197 de l’information et de la communication’ of Yaoundé for ‘misappropriation’: the students accused him of charging illegally high registration fees (CFAfr 600,000 instead of CFAfr 50,000). In November, the main higher education union, the ‘Syndicat National des Enseignants du Supérieur’, went on strike for five days demanding better salaries. It claimed that the gradual increases the government had promised in 2001 had not been implemented.

Foreign Affairs The potentially oil-rich Bakassi peninsula, bordering Nigeria, was the major concern during the second half of the year. Violence had already erupted in November 2007 with the attack by unidentified assailants on a Cameroonian military post and the death of 21 Cameroonian soldiers. On 9 June, according to Cameroonian authorities, an unidentified armed group kidnapped a divisional officer of Bakassi and five soldiers aboard a pirogue on the Akwa Yafé river bordering Nigeria. All of them were found dead among the Bakassi mangroves a week later. On 13 July, three soldiers were killed in the same area. A few days after, an unknown Nigerian group, the Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF), part of the shadowy Niger Delta Defence and Security Council (NDDSC), claimed responsibility for these armed incidents. It promised new attacks, requested talks with the Cameroonian government on the status of the peninsula and demanded compensation for the forthcoming transfer of the territory held by Nigeria to Cameroon. When the Cameroonian authorities did not respond, BFF killed two soldiers in a new assault on 24 July. Despite the violence and insecurity, Nigeria completely withdrew from the Bakassi peninsula on 14 August in accordance with the 2006 Greentree Agreement, bringing an end to the 15-year dispute over the zone. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon described the transfer as “a model for negotiated settlements of border disputes.” However, on 31 October, 10 of the 15 crew members on a French oil vessel were kidnapped off the coast of the Bakassi peninsula by BFF gunmen. The motives of the militia were again unclear. After 12 days of detention on Bakassi peninsula, probably on the Nigerian side, the 10 hostages (seven French nationals, one Tunisian and two Cameroonians) were finally exchanged against the release of 13 prisoners. As with the previous attacks, the authorities remained silent and gave no public explanation. The government merely announced that two high-ranking army officers in charge of security in the Bakassi maritime area had been dismissed. However, some military and government sources suggested BFF was involved in arms and ammunition trafficking with high-ranking Cameroonian army officers before the handover. After the hostage crisis, additional troops were sent to protect the Bakassi peninsula. As in 2007, Cameroon’s relations with Equatorial Guinea were under stress. In October, the media reported a major scandal involving two Cameroonian police officers and authorities in the neighbouring country. They were accused of having arranged the kidnapping in Yaoundé of an opponent of the regime of President Obiang of Equatorial

198 • Central Africa Guinea. The office of UNHCR protested to the Cameroonian authorities as the victim, Cipriano Nguema Mba, a former army officer who had been sentenced in 2005 to 30 years imprisonment for a coup attempt, had been granted refugee status in Cameroon. Reports from Equatorial Guinea a few days later indicated the former officer was now detained in the notorious Black Beach prison in Malabo. In November, the two Cameroonian policemen who kidnapped Mba for money and handed him over to the intelligence services of Equatorial Guinea, were arrested, dismissed from the police – a very uncommon occurrence in Cameroon – and charged with collusion with a foreign secret intelligence service by a military court in Cameroon. Cameroonian media reported that the ambassador of Equatorial Guinea had also been summoned to the Cameroonian ministry of foreign affairs, but no further details were disclosed. Cameroon had also to deal with the aftermath of the troubles of 2–3 February in Chad. About 20,000 people, according to humanitarian sources, fled to Cameroon after the failed rebel attack on N’Djaména. A large refugee camp had to be established by the UNHCR near Maltam, a city in the north of the country about 20 kms from the Chadian capital. In April, because of security threats to the refugees, the camp had to be relocated near Garoua, about 350 km to the south. A few weeks earlier, in March, Cameroon had welcomed the Chadian opposition leader Ngarlejy Yorongar for three days in Yaoundé before his departure to France. He had been secretly evacuated from Chad by UNHCR. However, Cameroonian authorities made no public statement about his presence in the country. In April, UNHCR also reported that dozens of refugees were arriving each month from the western region of the Central African Republic to escape bandits and to settle permanently in Cameroon (mostly in the eastern region). According to UNHCR, this flow had begun in 2005 and the number of people involved would soon exceed 50,000. In June, Cameroon hosted the annual summit of the sub-regional organisation, CEMAC. On that occasion, CEMAC heads of state condemned the persistent rebel attacks against Chad. In 2008, Cameroon was the only CEMAC member to agree to ratify the EPA with the EU, since the European Commission had failed to persuade other countries to sign. Consequently, the Cameroonian government was criticised by private companies and NGOs of the sub-region of breaking sub-regional solidarity. They also argued that Cameroon would lose important customs duties through the agreement. There was no real change in Cameroon’s relationships with Western countries, the major providers of debt relief and development aid. These remained fairly good despite President Biya’s failure to engage in national or democratic dialogue before the constitutional change of April, as suggested by France and the US. France, which remained Cameroon’s main trading partner and source of private investment and foreign aid, decided in October to resume its loans to Yaoundé. These had been suspended in 2001 at the beginning of the debt cancellation process. Prior to this announcement, the Biya regime had strengthened its relations with Paris with the visit in May by the French minister of immigration, national identity and development, Brice Hortefeux, long-time friend and

Cameroon • 199 close ally of President Sarkozy. He held talks in Yaoundé with President Biya, who had met with the French president in October 2007 in Paris. Relationships between Cameroon and the US were more strained. The US administration decided to apply Proclamation 7750 issued at the January 2004 Summit of the Americas in Monterrey, Mexico, to Cameroonian citizens. This document stiffened US immigration laws by mandating the denial of visas to “persons engaged in or benefiting from egregious official corruption.” Its extension to Cameroonians was decided “because official words and declarations have had little effect”, according to a diplomat at the US embassy. In September, President Biya attended the UN General Assembly in New York and the Francophonie Summit in Canada in October. What caught the Cameroonian media’s attention about these occasions was that the head of state spent 45 days abroad instead of caring about the country’s increasingly difficult situation. On 26 October, Pope Benedict XVI declared he would visit Yaoundé in March 2009 to attend the meeting of the Episcopal Conference of Africa. The last papal visit to Cameroon had been by John Paul II in 1995.

Socioeconomic Developments The 2008 budget was not very different from the previous one and stood at CFAfr 2,276 bn, an increase of 1.1% compared to 2007. Oil revenues were estimated to decrease from CFAfr 688 bn to CFAfr 593 bn. Despite policy changes by the government after the February riots, prices for commodities continued to increase throughout the year. Because of higher inflation (5.3% versus 1.1% in 2007), the 15% increase in salaries for civil servants had no major impact on consumers. Government expenditures had to be increased as a consequence of the price hikes. The IMF showed understanding for those measures and extended its PRGF arrangement by half a year to January 2009. The IMF continued to admonish the government to increase domestic fuel prices in line with international oil prices. Fuel subsidies to consumers had already cost the national budget CFAfr 144 bn by midyear. By the end of the year, the government owed CFAfr 142 bn to the national oil refinery SONARA. The business community expressed concern that the government could amass more domestic arrears, with a negative effect on already weak business confidence. After the riots in February, a major emergency programme to boost agricultural production was announced in April, but by the end of the year farmers said they had seen no evidence of this plan on the ground. In October, the government also announced that family agriculture would benefit from a three-year plan worth CFAfr 30 bn, thanks to the contract on debt relief and development (C2D) signed with France. Meanwhile, ACDIC reported in December that the maize crop, the main cereal consumed by Cameroonians, would not be sufficient in 2009 and warned of a shortfall of about 120,000 tonnes if nothing more was done to help farmers.

200 • Central Africa Private companies continued to complain of fiscal harassment and corruption. For 2008, the World Bank ranked Cameroon 164 out of 181 in terms of ease of doing business (152 out of 175 in 2007). In December, less than a quarter of state-owned companies had submitted financial statements for 2007, according to the ‘Chambre des Comptes de la Cour Supreme’, which has been in charge of auditing finances since 2006. Moreover, it reported that audited financial statements contained many irregularities. According to an international expert, Dutch Professor Michel van Hulten, who worked for the national anti-corruption programme Change Habits, Oppose Corruption (CHOC) launched by the main donors to the country and the government, “the so-called ‘political will’ to fight corruption in reality does not exist.” The employers’ federation ‘Groupement Interpatronal du Cameroun’ (Gicam) reported in October that the illegal trade in fuel between Nigeria and Cameroon was causing monthly losses of CFAfr 13 bn to the companies involved in fuel distribution. The report continued that the state was also losing several CFAfr billions of taxes and custom duties. Gicam underlined that some authorities were involved in the illegal traffic. Gicam also complained at the end of the year of the continuing lack of sound transportation infrastructure in the economic capital, Douala. The employers especially stressed the too-slow rehabilitation work on the only bridge connecting the city to the industrial area of Bonabéri. Some companies reported that the huge traffic jams caused by the work resulted in a 15% decrease in turnover. Cameroon’s timber industry, the second most important export sector in the country, suffered heavily as a consequence of the global financial crisis. The sector began to be affected in March. About 10% of orders by American, Asian and European clients were cancelled. By the end of the year, 800 people had been laid off and the major firms in the sector announced that a further 2,000 people would be dismissed in January 2009 because of lack of demand. Energy shortages continued to handicap private companies. No tangible progress was made during the year on major dam projects such as the Lom Pangar dam, which should substantially improve the power supply. Mining exploitation did not progress either. The ministry of mining noted, nevertheless, that 53 exploration permits were registered during the year, as against only two in 2003. For instance, Nu Energy Corporation Cameroon, part of the Canadian Mega Uranium company, began exploring for uranium at two sites in the north and south of the country. The only major investment of the year was in the cement industry, a strategic sector, since Cameroon supplies several countries of the sub-region. The main player, Cimencam, owned by the French company Lafarge and the state of Cameroon, invested CFAfr 26 bn in a new crusher that will increase cement production from 900,000 tonnes to 1.5 m tonnes. The government expects this investment to bring an end to the chronic shortage of cement. After a failed attempt at privatisation, the international carrier, Cameroon Airlines (Camair), placed in liquidation in 2005, discontinued its activities in March and was

Cameroon • 201 dissolved in May, at which time its 800 employees were dismissed. Camairco, the company created by President Biya in September 2006 to replace Camair, has still to be established. The company’s demise was seen as a crucial problem, since Camair had been the main transportation link connecting the northern and southern parts of the country. Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle & Fanny Pigeaud

Central African Republic

Formal progress in the peace process, leading to a ‘global peace agreement’ amid continued insecurity and culminating in the organisation of an important elite gathering, the ‘inclusive political dialogue’, characterised the calendar year. The sub-regional peacekeeping mission changed its organisational basis from CEMAC to CEEAC and a European military mission was deployed in the east.

Domestic Politics At the start of the year, President Bozizé came under increasing pressure as a result of continued strike action, which had already started in 2007, for the payment of salary arrears in the public sector. The mediator for the republic, veteran politician Abel Goumba, on 2 January asked the government to make a gesture of appeasement. Bozizé showed little sympathy and appealed to the security forces and “the vital forces of society” to resist the concerted strike actions by the trade unions. The absence of any visible solution ultimately prompted a no-confidence vote in the National Assembly by Bozizé’s own party, ‘Convention Kwa Na Kwa’. Prime Minister Elie Doté resigned on 18 January before the vote could take place, thereby precipitating the formation of a new government. The

204 • Central Africa vice-chancellor of the University of Bangui, Faustin Archange Touadéra, was nominated prime minister on 22 January and a new government was appointed by presidential decree six days later. Eleven new names joined the cabinet of 29 members. Two well-known supporters of Bozizé were among the newcomers: Jean Serge Wafio of the ‘Parti Démocratique Centrafricain’ (PDCA), as minister of reconstruction of public buildings and housing, and Cyriaque Gonda, ‘Parti National pour un Centrafrique Nouveau’ (PNCN) and hitherto spokesman for the presidency, as minister of communication, national dialogue and reconciliation. Gaston Mackouzangba, ‘Parti de l’Unité Nationale’ (PUN), was appointed minister of the civil service, labour and social security. Also noteworthy was the nomination of Bernadette Sayo as minister of tourism and crafts. She was chairwoman of the NGO ‘Organisation pour la compassion et le développement des familles en détresse’ (Ocodefad), an advocacy group working with victims of the various episodes of violence in 2002 and 2003. Charles Massi, minister of rural development and a retired army colonel who was among the most active political entrepreneurs of the last decade, was the most remarkable person to leave the government. Bernard Lala was shifted from health to education without prior consultation. He resigned in protest 24 hours after his nomination, and the ministry remained vacant for months. The trend towards family rule continued unabated with the ministry of Sylvain Ndoutingaï, a nephew of Bozizé, upgraded to ministry of state. Ndoutingaï continued to control the strategic mining department. Bozizé’s brothers-in-law Raymond Paul Ndougou and Emmanuel Bizot were rewarded with the ministries of public security and of finance respectively. Bozizé continued to keep the defence portfolio for himself, but appointed his son Francis as junior minister responsible for, inter alia, for disarmament and army restructuring. The volatile security situation continued to be a source of concern, although the peace process did make clear progress. In 2007, the government had concluded a peace agreement with Zacharia Damane, a rebel commander of the ‘Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement’ (UFDR) operating in the northeast. This agreement was generally observed by both sides. However, the ‘Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie’ (APRD) remained active in the north. The defence ministry accused the APRD of mounting four attacks on government positions around Bocaranga in April, an allegation the rebel leadership denied. Furthermore, the dreaded Ugandan rebel movement, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) had moved into southeastern CAR. In late March, about 200 LRA fighters attacked four villages, including Obo, whence they abducted 157 people. Several thousand residents fled their villages. The APRD and the government finally signed a ceasefire agreement on 9 May. This prepared the ground for a more inclusive peace agreement. Interestingly, some well-known politicians jumped on the bandwagon rather late in the process – or revealed their intimate connection with the rebellion. On 29 March, former defence minister Jean-Jacques Démafouth was declared coordinator

Central African Republic • 205 of the APRD. It had long been believed that he had close links with the rebellion. Démafouth had once been one of ex-President Patassé’s closest confidants, but was dismissed and arrested in 2001 following a failed coup attempt. The move to make Charles Massi political coordinator of the UFDR came as a surprise. He headed a small political party (FODEM, ‘Forum Démocratique pour la Modernité’) and had supported, then opposed the Patassé regime as well as that of Bozizé and had held several ministerial positions. Both Massi and Démafouth had participated in presidential elections in the past, without success. The lesson they appeared to draw from the experience was that they could never win elections without taking up arms first. This was exactly what had been demonstrated by the career of Bozizé himself, who, after a disappointing result in the 1993 elections, had gone on to become chief of staff under Patassé before revolting against him. After many false starts, a so-called ‘global’ peace agreement was signed in Libreville on 21 June on behalf of the government, the APRD (Démafouth) and UFDR (Damane). It was rejected by parts of the exiled UFDR leadership, however, and was not signed by the third most important grouping, the ‘Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain’ (FDPC). Fighting erupted anew after all three groups withdrew from the peace process over the thorny issue of an amnesty law. In August, the APRD and the government army engaged in battle on two occasions, leading to three army deaths. Up to November, seven more skirmishes occurred. Gabon’s President Bongo again invited the belligerent parties to Libreville. Finally, the National Assembly approved the amnesty law in late September with 72 votes in favour and one abstention. Thirty-one opposition members boycotted the vote. The new law granted amnesty to both government and rebel forces for crimes committed since January 1999. This was crucial for Démafouth, who had been charged with the murders of five people close to former President Kolingba back in 1999. The law specifically named Patassé, Demafouth and FDPC leader Miskine. This was presented as the only realistic option for peace but created a number of problems. Firstly, Patassé, in exile in Togo, had been sentenced in absentia in 2006 to 20 years of forced labour for economic crimes and was investigated by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity. The law specified that it excluded genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as well as all acts under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Jean-Pierre Bemba, once DR Congo’s vicepresident and before that rebel leader, had been arrested in May near Brussels precisely for his role in the crimes against humanity perpetrated by his troops in CAR when they fought alongside Patassé’s army in 2002–03. On 1 August, Bozizé wrote to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon requesting the UN Security Council to suspend the ICC’s investigation for the sake of peace. The country’s judiciary, he stated, should deal with all crimes committed since 1999, leaving prosecution of the crimes not covered by the amnesty law to the ICC. In December 2004, the government had asked the ICC to deal with all crimes within its jurisdiction committed since July 2002. Later, the CAR’s judiciary confirmed

206 • Central Africa it was unable on its own to carry out the complex investigation and prosecution of the alleged crimes. The dilemma of choosing between ending a culture of impunity and ending several rebellions by diplomatic means became ever more stark and problematic. Violence continued into the last month of the year. On 29 September, a breakaway wing of the UFDR, the ‘Forces pour l’Unification de la République Centrafricaine’ (FURCA), took temporary control of Am Dafok, close to the Sudanese border. Sam Ouandja, a town with a refugee population of 3,000, was attacked by unidentified forces on 8 November. Nine government soldiers plus the village chief of Nobanja (close to the Chadian border) and his wife were killed in a FDPC ambush on 11 November. One of the original UFDR components, the ‘Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice’ (MLCJ) of Abacar Sabone, which had left the UFDR, joined the Libreville peace agreement on 7 December. Benin’s authorities had released Sabone along with UFDR leader Michel Djotodia on 18 February. Both had been in detention in Cotonou since November 2006. This new signing on was followed by the start of the so-called ‘inclusive political dialogue’. The preparatory committee for the dialogue presented its final report to Bozizé on 25 April after two months of negotiations among government representatives and the three main rebel movements. The recommendations spelled out the composition of delegates and the venue, but it took several more months before concrete preparations began. In late October, the APRD, UFDR and the government held talks in Libreville that resulted in changes to the composition of the preparatory committee, with the opposition alliance ‘Union des Forces Vives de la Nation’ (UFVN), civil society organisations and the rebel groups securing more seats. This paved the way for the holding, at last, of this important gathering of about 200 participants from 8 to 20 December in Bangui, under the chairmanship of a former Burundian president (and coup leader), Pierre Buyoya. Patassé flew in from exile in Togo, his rival within the ‘Mouvement pour la Libération du Peuple Centrafricain’ (MLPC), Martin Ziguélé, attended as well, as did Démafouth, who had formed a political party in the meantime (‘Nouvelle Alliance pour le Progrès’, NAP). UFVN coordinator Henri Pouzère demanded on 10 December that Bozizé step down for multiple violations of the constitution, but the tide turned when Ziguélé, whose MLPC was part of the UFVN, explicitly acknowledged Bozizé as president four days later. Towards the end of the gathering, Patassé adopted the same position. Warlord Miskine, absent at the beginning, participated at least for the last day. In the end, the participants and, most importantly, Bozizé agreed to form an inclusive consensus government, hold free and transparent elections, install a follow-up committee and create a truth and reconciliation commission. The relative success of the peace process did not immediately translate into security. ‘Zaraguinas’ or highway robbers continued to attack towns and road links, forcing people to flee their villages in the north and form self-defence groups. One of the most dramatic events was on 26 February, when the mayor of the village of Koui was taken hostage along with four others. Despite the payment of ransom, only two were released, the three

Central African Republic • 207 others, including the mayor, being executed. In April, bandits burnt down the village of Bogali. Human rights again came under threat. On 15 January, Faustin Bambou, director of the biweekly ‘Les Collines de l’Oubangui’, was sentenced to a six month term for inciting revolt. He was released, however, after a month. Bambou had published an editorial alleging that Ndoutingaï and Foreign Minister Zoumara had embezzled CFAfr 7 bn intended for civil service salaries. The state prosecutor asserted that the editorial incited the country’s largest labour union to take strike action. The National Assembly adopted a controversial law on the reorganisation and functioning of the higher council of the judiciary despite fierce criticism from magistrates. Subsequently, it was declared unconstitutional by the constitutional court. Bozizé enacted an amended law on 23 October. Human rights violations and atrocities by official security forces and APRD rebels were becoming even worse, and included torture and summary execution.

Foreign Affairs The heightened international attention that had become evident the previous year led to few tangible results. In June 2008, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) placed the country on its agenda (joining Burundi, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone) following a request by the government. PBC representative Jan Grauls visited the country in July to devise a first working plan and returned in November. It was hoped that the PBC could bring in additional funds and improve donor coordination for peacebuilding activities. The UN Secretary General’s special representative Lonseny Fall was particularly active in getting the peace process on track again, visiting neighbouring countries and the APRD stronghold Paoua. However, Gabon’s Omar Bongo remained the single most influential mediator. The UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT by its French acronym) expanded only slowly and during the year had little impact on the security situation. A liaison office was established in Bangui and a single UN police officer was deployed to Birao to liaise with local authorities and law enforcement entities. In a report to the Security Council on 4 December, the UN Secretary General expressed a preference for only a small military detachment in the country – a liaison team of about 15 officers based in Chad – that would conduct routine visits to Birao once the European Forces (EUFOR) mission was terminated. The EUFOR Chad/CAR deployment itself started belatedly. The mission’s main objective was to protect Sudanese refugees from Darfur and, not surprisingly, EUFOR focused more on Chad than CAR. In fact, only about 200 soldiers were based in Birao in the east. And it was not an encouraging sign when, after the attack on Sam Ouandja, a major refugee camp, EUFOR contented itself with evacuating nine humanitarian workers to Birao rather than adopting more comprehensive protective measures. The EU foreign

208 • Central Africa policy chief Javier Solana paid a visit to Bangui in May and met with Bozizé to discuss security matters as well as economic and development issues. The EU signalled new assistance plans in June, including in the security sector and for developing secondary cities. On 12 July, the ‘Forces Multinationales en Centrafrique’ (FOMUC) were transformed into the ‘Mission de consolidation de la paix’ (MICOPAX). Gabonese General Bibaye Itandas handed over command to Congolese Vice-Admiral Hilaire Moko. This change in command was accompanied by a change in responsibility for this peacekeeping mission from CEMAC to CEEAC. Additionally, a (Gabonese) civilian was installed as special representative. New participants were invited to serve with the mission, while the original troop strength of 500 was maintained until December. In May, Cameroon sent its first contingent. A police component of 150 members from Angola and 20 gendarmes from Gabon were added. CEEAC approved the extension by six months of the mission, which is potentially renewable until 2013. The special relationship with France was at times difficult. In the framework of its military cooperation, France in January donated communication equipment plus 18 military vehicles worth more than € 800.000. In a BBC interview on 12 February, Mining and Energy Minister Ndoutingaï accused Paris of “unfortunately keeping a post-colonial attitude” towards the CAR, and claimed that French company Total had tried to use the French government in order to maintain a monopoly in the petroleum sector. The CAR government two days later distanced itself from Ndoutingaï and declared that it would solve all conflicts of interest in a consensual way.

Socioeconomic Developments Price hikes for major commodities hit Central Africans at the beginning of the year and for months fuel remained difficult for ordinary citizens to obtain. Flour, milk and cement were in short supply, resulting in an inflation rate of 5.1%. The government was pressed by members of parliament to suspend value added tax on all basic necessities. The ministry of commerce set up a committee to monitor prices. The 2008 budget was approved by the National Assembly only on 22 January. Total revenue was set to increase by 7.9% (CFAfr 135.1 bn). A 16% rise in domestic revenues was projected. The level of tax collection was among the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa, making this goal look rather optimistic. The budget was based on an assumption of real GDP growth of 4.8% in the calendar year. This was higher than any of the IMF’s projections and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s estimate of 3.5%. The IMF approved interim assistance under the HIPC initiative worth $ 5.5 m in January, in the expectation that the government would meet its debt-service payments to the IMF itself. The implementation of the current PRGF and the PRSP to the satisfaction of

Central African Republic • 209 donors for at least one year was considered essential to reaching the HIPC completion point. The IMF conducted its second and third review of the $ 58.4 m PRGF in June and December. A number of performance criteria were not met, including the implementation of a plan to repay domestic arrears, but the Fund nevertheless praised the government’s efforts to consolidate peace and security and improve economic policy for producing some results, notably in agriculture. According to the IMF, the authorities were “demonstrating a firm resolve to implement their PRGF arrangement, under difficult financial conditions and a challenging external environment.” The government continued to receive strong financial support from other sources, particularly the AfDB, which approved a $ 14.8 m grant to support the country’s economic reform programme. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) granted $ 2.5 m in emergency humanitarian assistance to an estimated 108,000 IDPs and 85,000 CAR citizens who had returned to their villages. Additionally, there were around 100,000 refugees in neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Sudan. The French nuclear company Areva signed an agreement with the government on the exploitation of the uranium site of Bakouma. Production is set to start in 2010 and produce state revenues of about $ 40 m during the first five years. The agreement was considered to have brought to an end a quarrel over the acquisition of the UraMin company by Areva in 2007, which Bangui had characterised as against the regulations. In October, Areva sold 49% of UraMin to China Guangdong Nuclear Power Company (CGNPC). Uranium from Bakouma should supply two third-generation nuclear reactors that China ordered from Areva in September. Aurafrique, a subsidiary of the Canadian mining company Axmin, was confronted with a decree modifying its mining rights in Bambari, namely by limiting its exploration rights to gold (and no longer silver, copper, nickel, lead, zinc and iron). The company, nevertheless, pursued negotiations over a further potential mining site. Bozizé launched a controversial investment project on his fifth anniversary in power. The construction project on an island in the Oubangui river should cost € 500 m and was described by the president as the biggest project in the history of the country. The proposed undertaking is to include a hotel, commercial centre and other cultural and tourist sites, which are to be connected by a bridge to Bangui. A consortium including investors from 25 Asian, Near East and European countries is expected to provide the necessary funds. Minister Wafio promised a just and fair compensation to several hundred inhabitants of the island. Andreas Mehler

Chad

The security situation remained precarious throughout the year, despite the efforts of the EU stabilisation force (EUFOR) and a UN mission to train Chadian police and army personnel (‘Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad’, MINURCAT). Relations with Sudan remained strained, with a major attack by Chadian rebels supported by Sudan on the capital N’Djaména on 1 February and an attack by Sudanese rebels of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on Omdurman with alleged support of Chad on 10 May. Economic growth slowed, despite higher oil prices. Relations with the World Bank were severed following Chad’s non-compliance with conditions regarding the spending of oil revenues and the contract was ended after Chad paid back the loan.

Domestic Politics The year was marked by the attack by three rebel groups on the capital N’Djaména and its aftermath. Hostilities started with Chadian air raids on rebel positions near the border with Sudan on 29 January. The next day, vehicles from the three rebel movements, the ‘Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement’ (UFDD) headed by former Minister of Defence Mahamat Nouri, the UFDD ‘Fondamentale’, an Arab-led splinter

212 • Central Africa group headed by Abdelwahid Aboud and Acheickh Ibn Oumar and the ‘Rassemblement des Forces pour le Changement’ (RFC), led by President Déby’s cousins Tom and Timane Erdimi and made up mainly of Zaghawa, the ethnic group to which President Déby belongs, moved forward and took the town of Oum Hadjer, several hundreds of kilometres into the interior of Chad. On 31 January, a rebel column of 300 vehicles passed Ati in central Chad and halted 250 kilometres from N’Djaména. The Chadian army retreated to form a defensive ring around the capital to halt the rebels, who split into smaller groups. On 1 February, heavy fighting broke out 50 kilometres northeast of the capital. The Chadian army failed to repel the rebels and the next day the latter moved into the capital itself, occupying most of the town and advancing on the presidential palace, to which President Déby had retreated. In the end, the attack failed, in part because there was discord among the various factions over who would become president. They also had problems with their long supply lines from Sudan. A third column of the rebel movement RFC, bringing supplies and ammunition, failed to arrive, and was probably intercepted by a column of the Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which came to the support of the regime of President Déby. The attackers retreated from N’Djaména on 3 February, officially to allow citizens to leave the zone of combat, and retreated into Sudan and the east of Chad. During the attack, many inhabitants of N’Djaména expressed support for the attackers and there were reports of the looting of ministries and of the property of Zaghawa related to the president. Some 30,000 of the capital’s inhabitants fled across the border to the neighbouring town of Kousseri in Cameroon. After the attacks, a wave of repression set in: security services arrested dozens of opponents of the regime, among them Lol Mahamat Choua, former president (in 1979), Ngarlejy Yorongar and Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh. After some time, the first two were released and granted political asylum in France. Ibni Oumar was never seen again. According to rumour, he was imprisoned in a secret detention centre and killed. Between 14 February and 15 March, a state of emergency was declared over the whole of Chad and from 7 February until 15 March there was a curfew in the east and centre of the country and the capital. In parts of N’Djaména, there were systematic house searches for hidden weapons and to recover property looted from the government and Zaghawa associated with the regime. The streets were not patrolled by the Chadian army but by JEM forces, which were even more brutal. More than 1,000 homes were destroyed in various parts of the town, reputedly because they were built on land owned by the government, which it claimed was needed for public utilities such as hospitals and schools. People were not paid any compensation for their destroyed property. To protect the city from further attack, a canal three metres wide and three metres deep was dug around the capital. To make way for this canal, more houses were demolished. One consequence was that the movements of the population could be tightly controlled. Control by the customs service was also increased at the few entrances to the town.

Chad • 213 On 20 February, the press law was altered by a decree that imposed new restrictions on freedom of speech and the press. Many journalists and intellectuals fled the country. The main opposition radio station, Radio Liberté FM, was closed on 27 January, only to be reopened on 25 May. Protesting students were shot on 23 April in the southern town of Moundou. Talks with the united political opposition platform ‘Coordination des Partis Politiques pour la Défense de la Constitution’ (CPDC) were ended The rebels regrouped and on 25 February announced a national alliance, headed by Mahamat Nouri of the UFDD, with Timan Erdimi of the RFC as his vice president. In secret, part of the RFC engaged in negotiations with the Chadian government for a peace settlement, the negotiations taking place in N’Djaména on 25 March and on 14 April in Tripoli. Already in March, the national alliance had resumed hit-and-run attacks in the east of the country. On occasion, when alliance forces threatened aid organisations and operations, they barely avoided engagement with EUFOR. There was a standoff with Dutch marines near Goz Beida and Irish peacekeepers exchanged fire with rebels in mid-June. In June, there were new incursions by the rebels in the east of Chad. Fighting broke out near Abéché on 12 June. On 13 June, the cities of Goz Beida and Biltine were attacked. The government claimed it killed 161 rebels and seized 61 vehicles near Am Zoer. The situation calmed down from 17 June onwards, because the rebels were held up by floods. Despite the decrease in organised fighting between the government and rebels and the presence of EUFOR, the security situation in the east and south of the country deteriorated further. Banditry increased dramatically and by November 160 armed raids on aid agencies had been reported, involving the theft of vehicles and supplies and the killing of personnel. In Dogdore and Adé, aid activities had to be suspended in November following attacks and the theft of crucial equipment such as water pumps, leaving tens of thousands of refugees and IDPs unattended. The training by MINURCAT of 850 Chadian police to deal with this security threat experienced serious delays. In November, only 100 of the newly trained police officers were in place. The judicial system broke down almost completely despite the appointment of 180 new magistrates, who were mainly posted in the east. The retreat of the Chadian army and police to the main towns also contributed to the climate of impunity. Accusations that rebels and government forces themselves were involved in the banditry were denied by both. Religious unrest also manifested itself. In June, a Wahabiya Quranic teacher Sheikh Ahmet Ismael Bichara declared a holy war against the government of Chad. During a battle with the Chadian army, 68 of his supporters and four military were killed. The sheikh was detained without charge. In a bid to appease the opposition, President Déby appointed a commission of inquiry to investigate the events between 27 January and 7 March. The report was filed on 5 August and made public on 3 September. According to the report, there were 977 fatalities, 1,758 wounded and 380 detained during the February attack. The commission

214 • Central Africa also investigated the fate of the political detainees but came to no conclusion regarding the whereabouts of opposition leader Ibni Oumar. A criminal court sentenced 11 rebel leaders to death on 25 August for their participation in the attack on the capital. Among the convicted were former President Hissène Habré, Mahamat Nouri, Tom and Timan Erdimi, Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane (a former ambassador to Washington who joined the UFDD) and Abdelwahid Aboud. There were several cabinet reshuffles. In January, Mahamat Ah Abdallah was appointed minister of defence. Youssouf Saleh Abbas, a former member of the rebel movement ‘Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad’ (MDJT) was appointed as prime minister on 15 April, replacing Nourradine Delwa Kassire. As a former rebel, he offered his services to initiate negotiations with the armed opposition. On 24 April, four members of the CPDC were appointed cabinet members. Former general and Prime Minister Wadel Abdelkader Kamougué became minister of defence. The ministry of justice was taken by Jean Bawouyue Alingué, planning, urban development and housing by Hamit Mahamat Dahalob and agriculture by Mbaïlaou Naïmbaye Lossimian. On 15 September, President Déby reappointed or reassigned the governors in all 22 regions and appointed new prefects and secretaries general in all 60 departments. On 9 October, he restructured the territorial administration, including the establishment of four new administrative regions. Limited progress was made with electoral reforms.

Foreign Affairs Tension between Chad and Sudan escalated again when Chadian aircraft attacked the positions of Chadian rebels on Sudanese territory on 6 January. Sudan lodged a protest with the UN Security Council. Chad accused Sudan of actively supporting the Chadian rebels. On 27 January, a mini-summit was organised in Tripoli by Kadhafi who sponsored an earlier peace deal between Chad and Sudan. This summit included Libya, Egypt, Chad and Sudan. It did not, however, ease the tensions. Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir accused Chad of not fulfilling its obligation to deploy joint border patrols to monitor incursions by rebels from both sides, while Chad accused Sudan of supporting Chadian rebels and ordering them to move into Chad. In a bid to ease the tensions, Minni Arko Zenawi, a former Darfur rebel leader and former ally of Chad’s President Idriss Déby Itno, planned to travel to N’Djaména on 31 January. However, several rebel groups had already staged an attack on the capital with alleged support from Sudan, causing a further deterioration in relations between Khartoum and N’Djaména. The AU summit in Addis Ababa (25 January–2 February) expressed deep concern over developments in Chad after the attack on N’Djaména. Chad’s foreign minister accused Sudan of masterminding the attack to prevent the deployment of EUFOR to protect refugees from Darfur and Chadian IDPs. France flew in 150 extra troops in addition to the

Chad • 215 1,300 present to protect French and other European citizens. Foreign embassies and the UN evacuated their citizens and personnel. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon also expressed deep concern about the situation in Chad and called for a ceasefire. After initial silence, France condemned the attacks, but announced that the French troops would not intervene in the conflict but would fulfil France’s commitments to Chad, which included logistical support and intelligence. There were rumours that France did not expect Déby to survive this attack, and even offered him a safe haven in France. In the end, Déby was helped with Libyan ammunition for the T-55 tanks posted around the presidential palace and transported by the French troops. The deployment of EUFOR to stabilise the security situation was delayed considerably by the attack and the lack of contributions from EU member countries. Finally, in January, sufficient troops, helicopters and a field hospital were pledged by mainly France (2,000 troops), Ireland (480 troops), Poland (400 troops), Belgium, The Netherlands, Sweden and Italy. There were concerns over the neutrality of the mission, commanded by Ireland’s Lieut.Gen. Pat Nash, as the backbone of the force was supplied by France, which already had a military mission in Chad under a treaty supporting the Déby regime. Chadian rebels threatened to treat the EUFOR mission as an inimical force. France declared that its troops despatched to EUFOR would remain neutral. In the end, the 3,700 EU troops deployed from March onwards in eastern Chad and northwestern Central African Republic (CAR) did little to improve the security situation. Their mandate was to secure the camps for refugees and IDPs and limit the spill-over of the conflict in Darfur and not to police the countryside and the cities. Sudan remained suspicious of the EUFOR mission. Two French soldiers belonging to EUFOR who strayed across the border inadvertently on 3 March were fired on at close range by Sudanese soldiers. One was killed and the other soldier sustained light burns. On 15 November, two Sudanese MI-24 helicopters fired on a EUFOR patrol near Birak, destroying two vehicles, but no casualties were reported. The rest of the year was marked by intense diplomatic activity. On 13 March, a nonaggression pact brokered by Senegal and Libya was signed in Dakar between Chad and Sudan. It was decided to deploy an African buffer force on the border, with troops coming from Senegal and Congo (Brazzaville) and with Libya providing logistical support. Relations with Sudan soured again following a direct attack on 10 May by the Darfuri rebel movement JEM on Omdurman, the twin city of Khartoum, with apparent Chadian and Libyan support. Sudan accused Chad of masterminding the attack and providing support to JEM. This attack proved that Chad was also capable of hitting the enemy at the centre of its power. Diplomatic ties between the countries were severed. From 11–15 October, an AU delegation visited N’Djaména to promote the peace process. Libya also remained very active in diplomacy, because it wanted to prevent too much outside influence in the region. It also supported Chad’s President Déby, because Tripoli wished to prevent rebel leader Mahamat Nouri, who is a Gorane from the north and opposed to

216 • Central Africa Libyan influence and close to Saudi Arabia, from taking power. During a tripartite meeting on 22–23 October, an agreement was reached to restore diplomatic ties between the two countries and on 9 November Chad and Sudan exchanged ambassadors. On 15 November, the Dakar agreement contact group approved an evaluation mission to establish a peace and security force along the Chad-Sudan border, consisting of observer posts as well as 1,000 troops from each country. Chad also agreed to accept a UN follow-on force after EUFOR’s withdrawal during a visit by the under-secretary general for peacekeeping operations, Alain le Roy (13–15 October). At the end of August, the World Bank made clear to the Chadian government that the arrangements that constituted the basis for its involvement in the Chadian oil project were not working properly and that it had decided to withdraw its support for the project. The Chadian government agreed to repay both the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s and the IDA’s components of the bank’s loan by 5 September: on 9 September, the World Bank’s involvement in the oil project officially ended. This marked the closing stage (and the failure) of one the most ambitious attempts at institutional reform through development aid. Events in CAR also affected Chad. Refugees continued to pour in over the year, bringing the total to 57,000. In January and February, Chadian troops intervened several times in CAR in support of nomadic Fulani in their disputes with local farmers over grazing and water resources. The Chadian government maintained a strong interest in protecting the regime of François Bozizé, not least in order to intervene directly, if necessary, to prevent Chadian rebels from settling and organising in the north of CAR and the south of Chad (i.e., near the valuable oil fields near Doba). Déby also wanted to bolster the at times shaky united front with CAR against Sudan.

Socioeconomic Developments The economic situation remained a cause for concern. GDP was expected to decline by 0.5% over 2008 in an already precarious economic situation. Non-oil GDP was expected to grow by 3.2%, which put Chad’s growth rates among the lowest in Africa. In 2008, oil accounted for 47% of GDP and oil revenues rose to 41% of GDP. GDP was estimated at close to CFAfr 3,000 bn. By June 2008, total revenues from the oil project amounted to $ 3.3 bn, of which $ 1.9 bn consisted of taxes and $ 1.2 bn of royalties. Slow growth rates can be attributed to the military unrest. At the beginning of 2008, inflation picked up sharply, mainly due to higher food prices. By November 2008, it reached 11.8% on a 12-month basis, driven by a 21% rise in food prices. This price rise was the result of a drop in food production, higher transportation costs because of higher oil prices and the extra demand for food aid from humanitarian organisations.

Chad • 217 In terms of government revenues, the situation was even more tilted towards oil. Total government revenue was estimated at CFAfr 1,040 bn, of which CFAfr 843 bn consisted of oil revenues (profit taxes CFAfr 583 bn, royalties CFAfr 207 bn and emissions fees CFAfr 53 bn). Non-oil government revenue was only CFAfr 198 bn. The government’s non-oil primary deficit increased to 28% of GDP. Government spending increased overall, but mainly on account of security spending following the February attack, and reached almost 14.5% of non-oil GDP in 2008 (CFAfr 293 bn, of which CFAfr 189 bn was branded as exceptional military spending). Real spending on security may have been much higher because a lot of money is unaccounted for and no audits or checks are made afterwards. The number of refugees from Sudan (290,000) and the CAR (57,000) and IDPs (180,000) remained unchanged. In addition, 700,000 people among the host communities were in dire need of similar assistance as their situation had deteriorated as a result of the security situation. Their plight was not likely to improve soon, because the security situation made it impossible for displaced people to return and for aid agencies to provide assistance. Grain availability was good throughout the country at the beginning of the year after a 72% higher than average harvest over the 2007–08 season. There were regional deficits because of low rainfall (Kanem) and a shortfall in cotton production in Moyen Chari and Logone. Due to high livestock prices, the conversion rate for sheep/millet was relatively high, which favoured the northern pastoral population. Over time, the situation in the eastern Sahel became more precarious because of the short rainy season, the security conditions and the plagues of locusts and grasshoppers, except for Salamat, where there was an exceptional harvest of flood-retreat sorghum. Because of the insecurity, the transport of food was hampered and surplus areas started stockpiling. The continuing inflow of refugees (Sudan, CAR) put additional pressure on food prices. Their food security remained contingent upon security conditions and supply by aid agencies. Prices rose continuously in the months February-June following the attack on the capital. Renewed fighting in June hampered food provision in the east and the return of IDPs to their land, as EUFOR was too late in arriving to ensure safety. Distribution of food to refugees fell below minimum requirements in June. During July–August, food insecurity increased to alarming levels in deficit areas and areas affected by floods, and even affected food access in cities. A drop in livestock prices made food less accessible for pastoral people. Flooding affected 30,000 people in the south. Food availability improved in September because of the early harvest, but prices continued to rise. After the harvest, prices dropped only in Abéché, where most of the aid effort was concentrated, whereas in other regions prices hit new records because of increasing military insecurity and remained structurally high. Cotton production remained in crisis. Production over the 2007–08 season was onethird lower than in previous years and was not expected to increase because of low world market prices, mismanagement by the state-owned cotton company and mistrust among

218 • Central Africa farmers because of the late payment of revenues. The cotton company Cotontchad accumulated losses of 1.5% of GDP. Public services remained in a dire state. Despite increased government income, the provision of electricity and piped water in the main cities remained a serious problem and did not improve. In addition, STEE’s (‘Société Tchadienne de l’Eau et de l’ Électricité’) finances deteriorated even further due to weak payment collection, rising fuel costs and technical problems. Subsidies to keep the company going reached 1.3% of GDP. The situation in the capital was further aggravated by a government ban at the end of the year on the use of charcoal, on which 99% of the Chadians depend for cooking. The ban was only on charcoal made from fresh wood, but in practice extended to charcoal from dead wood as well, causing enormous problems for the urban population and leading to civil unrest. The health situation left much to be desired. Despite investments in infrastructure, basic health care remained extremely poor, because of the lack of competent and motivated personnel. Crucial investments in the fight against HIV/AIDS were not made as most attention was on the political and military situation. Especially in the south, with its influx of refugees from the CAR, the HIV infection rate was on the rise and nearly 8% of the population was infected. The large number of military wounded in battle placed an additional burden on the already weak health system. The number of cases of polio rose over 2008, making it necessary to launch a vaccination campaign for 500,000 children. Han van Dijk

Congo

The year 2008 was marked by peace and calm, which was only disturbed by a riot by youths at the funeral of a prominent politician. This event highlighted the persistent gap between government and civil society. Congo became more engaged in peacekeeping operations. The socioeconomic situation of most of the population remained precarious. Paradoxically, the government showed some signs of strong commitment to transparency and good governance in the economic field.

Domestic Politics The political year began with the installation of the government of the RMP (‘Rassemblement pour la Majorité Présidentielle’) and MCDDI (‘Mouvement Congolais pour la Démocratie et le Développement Intégral’), appointed in December 2007. The formation of the government sealed the agreement between the presidential majority and the opposition party of Bernard Kolélas, which was one serious alternative force in politics. The RMP alliance around President Sassou Nguesso thereby confirmed its overwhelming dominance. The increasing control over the state took place despite the usual protests from the opposition, which lacked the means to act effectively. The political weight of RMP was demonstrated in various elections throughout the year.

220 • Central Africa Two types of ballots took place: local elections and partial elections for the senate. The ‘Commission Nationale des Élections’ (CONEL) delayed the local elections originally scheduled for 20 January, justifying its decision by arguing that the interests of all competing parties should be protected. According to CONEL, the delay would allow for better preparation, including a thorough update of the electoral register. The election finally took place only on 29 June. Various observers, including the ‘Observatoire de la Société Civile Africaine pour la Démocratie et l’Assistance Electorale’ (OSCADAE), a pan-African NGO based in Togo, confirmed that the ballot had been regular and transparent. Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation Raymond Zéphirin Mboulou made the results public only on 5 July. He highlighted the low participation rate, but did not provide total figures for the votes cast. This omission cast some doubt on the statements of the authorities and observers about the good conduct of the election. The opposition did not fail to emphasise this aspect. The results nevertheless represented an overwhelming victory for the RMP, which won 364 of the 668 seats in contention. On 10 July, only a few days after the announcement of the local election results, the minister set the date for the election of senators in seven departments, Kouilou, Niari, Lekoumou, Pool, Plateaux, Cuvette-Ouest and Likouala. This contest took place on 5 August and resulted in the election of 42 new members, 33 of whom were from the RMP. Seven independents were elected as were two members of the ‘Union Panafricaine pour le Développement Sociale’ (UPADS). Significantly, the ‘independent’ senators declared themselves to be associated with the RMP. The generational renewal in politics, already evident in previous years with the disappearance of the old elite, continued. The first change came with the death on 5 January in Brazzaville of Gatsono Yoka Iccoulah, the prefect of Cuvette. A member of the PCT (‘Parti Congolais du Travail,’ the former single party) and former travelling companion of the nomenklatura, he played an important role in the mobilisation of the so-called ‘Cobra’ troops in the clashes of May-October 1997. The military success of the Cobras had allowed Sassou to return as head of state. Gatsono Yoka Iccoulah had occupied this prefecture since that time. The regime organised a national funeral and buried him on 12 January at the Marien Ngouabi Mausoleum. Jean-Pierre Tchicaya was the second prominent person to die, on 20 June in Paris after a long illness. A leader of the first importance, he had been, among other things, minister, member of the PCT political bureau, mayor of Pointe-Noire, MP and chairman of the National Assembly. A very strong personality, he had dominated the region of Kouilou. On 5 July, authorities paid tribute to him in Brazzaville. However, on 7 July, a violent disturbance against the regime marred his burial ceremony at Pointe-Noire. This outbreak in this region, hitherto considered peaceful, came as a surprise. A large proportion of young people took part in this unrest, and, based upon public rumours of witchcraft, blamed the president of the republic for Tchicaya’s death. Along the route of the procession, the crowd chanted “Ya thithi is dead,

Congo • 221 Sassou will follow!” The presidential convoy was greeted with stones and insults. Back in the capital, the president accused local authorities of being unable to control popular despair. A few days after the burial, a delegation from Kouilou went to the presidential palace in Brazzaville to seek forgiveness. The third death of political note, that of Augustin Poignet, occurred on 26 June. Former secretary of state for defence, interim president in 1968 and former chairman of the senate (1992–97), he too died in Paris after a long illness. Authorities paid special tribute to him on 17 July in the house of parliament, to which his body had been brought. His burial took place without incident on 19 July at his private residence at Sibiti in Lekoumou. The year ended with mobilisation campaigns by prominent personalities and party leaders in support of Sassou’s candidacy for the upcoming presidential elections in July 2009. They committed their parties to support the head of state even before the campaign was officially launched.

Foreign Affairs The Republic of Congo took several steps to signify its commitment to the policies of ‘good governance’ and international security. The chairman of the board of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), Peter Eigen, visited Congo for four days in January. He praised the government for its progress in connection with the initiative, including the adoption of a detailed workplan. Eigen discussed with several Congolese authorities the issues of transparency in public finances, good governance and resource management in the oil sector. Congo was subsequently officially accepted as an EITI candidate country at EITI’s board meeting in Accra on 22 February. On 1 February, the National Assembly approved a financing agreement signed on 17 July 2007 between Congo and the IDA, part of the World Bank in Washington. The agreement, amounting to $ 15 m or CFAfr 8 bn, was to last for five years. It allocated funding for improving the governance, transparency and efficiency of public sector financial management. Congo itself contributed CFAfr 2 bn towards the implementation of this project. For the project, three components were envisaged: governance of the oil sector, governance capacity building and management and monitoring of the project. The first component addressed the completion of annual audits of SNPC (‘Société Nationale des Pétrole du Congo’) and certification of quarterly revenue to the treasury. This component was to receive CFAfr 1.6 bn in funding. The second, with a budget of CFAfr 7.6 bn, would focus on consolidating the fight against corruption. The third, with a CFAfr 0.8 bn budget, was to establish technical advisory services and for the equipment necessary to control the project. Congo became more active in peacemaking and peacekeeping. On 24 January, Sassou Nguesso was appointed by the AU to mediate in the military crisis between Chad and

222 • Central Africa Sudan. At the same time, Rodolphe Adada, former Congolese minister of foreign affairs, held the position of special representative of the UN secretary general at the head of the joint UN-AU mission in Darfur (Sudan). Some multilateral agreements were adopted. On 10 January, Congo signed the 10th EDF (2008–13), amounting to almost CFAfr 60 bn. With this agreement, EU intervention increased from CFAfr 28.6 bn awarded in terms of the 9th EDF for the period 2002–07 to more than CFAfr 58 bn for the period 2008–13. Of the EDF budgeted amount, 68%, amounting to CFAfr 37 bn, was earmarked for financing road and rail infrastructure. Even as bilateral agreements continued to be signed with France, Brazzaville diversified its partners. Thus, Congo and the UK reached an agreement on 22 January to assist British nationals in difficulty in situations of conflict in the sub-region. The agreement would allow London to place a military contingent in Congo to evacuate its nationals at risk in any country in Central Africa. The conflicts in DR Congo served to legitimise the agreement. On 17 May, the National Assembly adopted, an agreement on economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation with Brazil. This agreement should enable Brazil to finance development projects in areas such as oil, transport infrastructure, energy, forestry, education, mining, health, housing, research, rural water supply and agriculture. On the strength of this agreement, both countries pledged to intensify cooperation on oil through two corporations, PETROBRAS and SNPC. To strengthen its ties with China, Congo on 14 June offered financial assistance of $ 1 m to victims of the earthquake that struck the province of Sichuan. The earthquake caused the deaths of almost 70,000 people. Finally, there were also agreements with DR Congo. The two Congos elaborated a programme to boost cooperation at their 11th joint commission session held from 21 to 25 January in Kinshasa,. This programme extended to 18 areas of activity related to political, diplomatic, economic, social and cultural development.

Socioeconomic Developments The National Assembly adopted the budget on 9 February. It rose in terms of revenue and expenditure to CFAfr 1,922.1 bn from CFAfr 1,376.9 bn in 2007. The increase was due to the substantial increase in revenue. The budget earmarked CFAfr 858.5 bn for operating costs against CFAfr 813 bn in 2007, an increase of CFAfr 45.5 bn or 5.6%. For investment, parliamentarians approved CFAfr 471.8 bn against CFAfr 400 bn last year, an increase of 17.9%. The budgetary savings grew to CFAfr 612.5 bn against CFAfr 163.9 bn in 2007. Oil revenues were expected to rise by CFAfr 32.9 bn (from CFAfr 267.1 bn to CFAfr 300 bn). Expenditure on servicing the public debt was estimated to decrease (CFAfr 286.5 down from CFAfr 289.7 bn in 2007 or –1.1%). Personnel costs amounted to CFAfr 168.8

Congo • 223 bn against CFAfr 141 bn the previous year. Expenditures on goods and services reached CFAfr 153.7 against CFAfr 130.1 bn in 2007. Although these budget increases appeared to signify good economic health, the economic situation proved difficult for the average Congolese. Money did not necessarily reach the most precariously placed. Some contract civil service staff had not been regularly paid for several years. For example, the board of the ‘Collectif des Enseignants du Supérieur pour l’Emploi’ (CESE) on 4 February appealed directly to the president of the republic for his intervention. He was asked to instruct the treasury to release funds to pay temporary teachers at the Marien Ngouabi University. This group had been on indefinite strike since 21 January over non-payment of various of their benefits by the rectorate. These included CFAfr 160 bn for 1996–97 and CFAfr 150 m for 2000–01 and the outstanding hours for 2006–07, which had, however, been budgeted. These teachers also blamed the rectorate firstly for not recruiting them as full-time teachers and, secondly, for delaying publication of the lists of individual appointments for 2007–08. The situation of one other vulnerable group, the ex-combatants, deserves particular mention. On 24 January, the high commissioner for their reintegration, Michel Ngakala, called on staff to redouble their efforts to accelerate the activities of the ‘Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion’ (PNDDR) and to achieve certain basic goals, such as starting payment of subsidies to the 5,000 militiamen of the ‘Conseil National des Républicains’(CNR). The latter represents the interests of the sole remaining armed excombatant unit, which was entrenched in the Pool region. The effects of irregular payment of salaries and allowances worsened with soaring food prices and costs of living across the country. Thus, in Owando in the Cuvette region, for example, state services noted the following increases: a drum of palm oil cost CFAfr 12,500 instead of CFAfr 7,500 while the price of two staples, mackerel and meat rose significantly. These staples had previously sold at CFAfr 1,600 and CFAfr 2,000 per kilogram respectively, but rose to CFAfr 2,000 and CFAfr 2,400. Unlike in some African countries, no social movements occurred. The government took some steps to address this crisis. On 12 May, the cabinet decided, among other things, to reduce VAT from 18% to 5% on all goods, with the exception of rice, on which it abolished VAT altogether. The government appointed a monitoring committee to ensure that these reforms were properly implemented. In July, the minister of trade, consumption and supply, Jeanne Dambenzet acknowledged that the implementation of some of these measures was lagging. After a short lull, the market again began to spiral. In curbing the effects of this crisis, the Congo benefited from special grants from countries such as Japan, which released CFAfr 1.4 bn. The Congolese leaders, honouring more or less honestly commitments made to international financial organisations, undertook a number of steps for the establishment of good governance. The anti-corruption centre legally provided for since 2007 was finally established. The law mandated the centre to monitor and evaluate the measures against corruption initiated by the government. Indeed, government did establish a national commission

224 • Central Africa to fight against corruption and fraud. To the centre, government entrusted oversight of the audits in all sectors of public life, the implementation of the plan of action in the fight against corruption and the implementation of governance reforms. The centre consisted of nine members appointed for five years by the president of the republic based on the recommendations of the different organisations they represented. The following persons composed this forum: Robert Moutéké, magistrate; Fidèle Ngouaka, MP; André-Ikongo Logan, senator; Felix Andzono, inspector of state; Diandouanina Dominique, trade unionist; El Hadj Djibril Bopaka, trader; Mapakou Joseph, member of World Council of Churches, Ollita Ondongo Emmanuel, a representative of civil society and Christian Mounzeo, of the executive committee of the local EITI branch. They were sworn in on 5 February by the ‘Tribunal de Grande Instance de Brazzaville’. The government also intervened on an economic level to indicate symbolically its willingness to establish such good governance. On 20 February, Minister of Infrastructure and Public Works Florent Ntsiba filed complaints with the prosecutor to bring to justice those companies that had received payments from the state-sponsored road fund to rehabilitate and maintain roads but had not carried out the work. These included Company Eastern Kouilou; Alea Services Lekoumou; Cogebatp in the Pool; and Incofi Development, MAC and SPS in the regions of Plateaux, the Sangha and Likouala. Much of the financing for these projects was provided through multilateral agreements under the EDF, or through bilateral agreements, mainly with France. Congo sought to diversify its economic partners in key sectors. From the beginning of the year, competition intensified in the world of mobile telephony. On 10 January, Warid Congo SA officially launched its activities in the country. The advent of this company signalled the entry of entrepreneurs from the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, into the Congolese economy. Warid Congo’s arrival to a certain extent opened up the field of mobile telephones, in which for nearly eight years competition had been tightly restricted. Warid is the third mobile phone company in Congo alongside Celtel Congo, which commenced operation in 1998, and MTN, in 1999. The presence of the Chinese continued to grow. The National Assembly on 1 February approved the ‘Kayo’ production sharing contract research licence. This permit had initially been awarded by decree in April 2006 to Wing Wah Chinese Petrochemical Joint Stock Limited. This company then sold it on 17 June 2007 to its Congolese subsidiary, China Petrochemical Congo Wing Wah SA. In addition, on 25 July, an agreement on economic and technical cooperation was signed between Congo and China. It provided for grants worth about CFAfr 3 bn for the construction of a hospital in M’Filou (Brazzaville) and an information centre for agricultural technology. The donation format met the conditionalities of the Bretton Wood Institutions, which had recommended that, under the PRGF programme in place since December 2004, Congo should accept preferably donations or only those concessional loans with very favourable repayment terms. Yet, as in previous years,

Congo • 225 people complained of the presence of the Chinese in other economic areas. Thus, the population of Kouilou deplored the unorthodox fishing methods used by Chinese trawlers and the violation of maritime space. Chinese operators were dynamiting fish even only ten metres from the coast, ravaging the fry from Pointe Indienne to Conkouati and damaging the canoes of passing fishermen. Continuation of these methods would result in only a few years in the complete loss of the country’s fishery resources. South Korea was another economic partner. On 4 July, the government signed a contract for the construction of a cement plant at Madingou in Bouenza with ECO Cement Company, a subsidiary of Consortium Congo-Malaysia-Korea (CMKC). Rémy Bazenguissa-Ganga

Democratic Republic of Congo

The year was dominated by the escalation in North Kivu of violence between the rebel army of Laurent Nkunda and a disintegrating national army. The fighting, which sparked a huge humanitarian emergency, was the continuation of an armed conflict that had persisted on and off since the end of the 2006 election cycle. It dashed the hopes for a peaceful resolution of the conflicts in the Kivu provinces that had stirred in January, when a major peace conference took place in Goma. Shortly before the renewed fighting erupted, Prime Minister Gizenga handed in his resignation in September. He was replaced by Minister of Budget Adolphe Muzito. The little progress that had been made to jump-start the economy was wiped out when the effects of the global financial crisis took their toll on Congo’s mining sector.

Domestic Politics In the course of the year, the security situation in North Kivu deteriorated sharply, despite promising peace negotiations in January. Between 6 and 23 January, some 1,200 delegates from across the country and all sectors of public life attended the Conference on Peace, Security and Development in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu in Goma,

228 • Central Africa the capital of North Kivu. The government had been compelled to agree to the conference after successive defeats of the army by the rebels of Laurent Nkunda left it with few other choices. At the same time, the broad range of participants, including most armed groups active in the east (though excluding the Rwandan Hutu rebels of the ‘Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda’ – FDLR), allowed the government to save face. In other words, the structure of the conference was supposed to counter the impression that the military fiasco had forced the government into direct bilateral negotiations with Nkunda’s ‘Conseil National pour la Défense du Peuple’ (CNDP). The Goma conference ended with the signing of a ‘Acte d’Engagement’ by representatives of the government and the armed groups, including the CNDP. The agreement stipulated an immediate ceasefire and the creation of a follow-up committee, the Mixed Technical Commission on Peace and Security, that was expected to hammer out the details for peace implementation (the so-called Amani process). Most importantly, it was to determine the terms and arrangements under which all armed non-state groups in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu were to be demobilised or integrated into the national army. The Goma agreement also provided for an amnesty for members of armed groups for acts of insurrection, but not for war crimes. None of the parties seemed to be making efforts to implement the Goma agreement. On several occasions, signatories withdrew from the follow-up process, including the CNDP and its foes, the ‘Patriotes Résistants du Congo’ (PARECO), a Mai Mai group mostly consisting of Congolese Hutu. Some evidence suggested that there was collusion between PARECO, the Congolese army and FDLR, at least in certain locales and among certain commanders. Nkunda’s CNDP, which claimed that the defeat of the FDLR was its main objective, was thus given a reason to drag its feet. It also claimed that the government had done nothing to implement key provisions of the Goma agreeement, including security for the Tutsi community in North Kivu, the protection of CNDP soldiers undergoing demobilisation or integration into the army and the return of some 60,000 Tutsi refugees from Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. Between the signing of the Goma agreement and its eventual collapse in September, some 300 ceasefire violations were registered by MONUC, the UN mission in DR Congo, and an extra 100,000 people were driven from their homes. Meanwhile, the Congolese army pursued its military build-up around Goma, where it assembled some 25,000 soldiers to take on the CNDP and its estimated 5,000 fighters. MONUC, which had only 5,800 troops in North Kivu, tried to impose a buffer zone to keep the belligerents apart. Its resistance to pressure from the Congolese government to take sides in the fighting exposed it to fierce criticism from President Kabila. Full-scale fighting between the CNDP and the Congolese army resumed on 28 August around Rumangabo and Rugari (Rutshuru district), some 40 km north of Goma. MONUC was unable to confirm which side initiated the hostilities. However, because they erupted one day before the Mixed Technical Commission on Peace and Security

Democratic Republic of Congo • 229 was finally to resume its work, there was reason to believe that spoilers on both sides had no interest in achieving a peaceful solution. On 2 October, Laurent Nkunda issued a statement announcing that the CNDP was henceforth embracing an agenda of national liberation, based on the premise that the elected government had failed to reconstruct and reconcile the country. Nkunda also reiterated increasingly credible claims that the government continued to cooperate with the Rwandan FDLR rebels. Amid plausible rumours that the Rwandan army had entered Congolese territory, the CNDP launched a major offensive on 26 October designed to pressurise the government into direct negotiations. The Congolese army offered little resistance. Retreating elements of the army attacked MONUC soldiers and looted parts of Goma, killing some 30 civilians. The CNDP finally stopped its advance a few kilometres from Goma and declared a unilateral ceasefire (29 October). Fighting resumed on 4 November in Kiwanja, north of Rutshuru, between the CNDP and PARECO. Investigations by MONUC and human rights organisations suggested that the CNDP had killed scores of civilians in Kiwanja during and in the aftermath of the fighting. On 29 October, Congo’s national parliament adopted a comprehensive peace plan. Contrary to the stance of the bellicose hardliners in government, it called for negotiations with the CNDP. The plan did not resonate with President Kabila and further strained his relationship with Vital Kamerhe, the head of the National Assembly. In mid-November, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s special envoy to the Great Lakes region, Olusegun Obasanjo, travelled to North Kivu. On 16 November, he met Laurent Nkunda and secured his commitment to a ceasefire agreement. Once it became clear to the government that no outside intervention in North Kivu would take place in its favour (see below), President Kabila gave in to the inevitable and agreed to direct negotiations with the CNDP. The announcement was made after a meeting in Goma between the foreign ministers of the DR Congo and Rwanda (5 December). The negotiations, under the auspices of the UN special envoy Obasanjo and the AU, started on 8 December in Nairobi. Neither Nkunda nor Kabila attended the talks, which were to continue into 2009. Contrary to misplaced optimistic expectations, the Nairobi agreement that had been signed between Rwanda and the DR Congo in the previous year was not implemented. Under the accord, the Congolese government was to disarm the Rwandan rebels of the FDLR, while Rwanda had committed to refrain from supporting the CNDP rebels. Too weak militarily, the government embarked on several rounds of negotiations with the FDLR to convince them to disarm and to return to Rwanda. The exiled FDLR leadership under Ignace Murwanashyaka (who lives in Germany) rejected the Congolese proposals. It maintained its long-held claim that termination of the struggle was out of question unless the Rwandan government agreed to a political settlement. Similarly predictable was Kigali’s response. It reiterated that it would not negotiate with genocidal forces. Furthermore, the Rwandan government delayed the publication of a list of the FDLR members it sought on charges of genocide. When it finally unveiled the list, it contained the names of close to 7,000 FDLR members. This implicitly suggested that it considered

230 • Central Africa more or less the entire group as genocidal, with the full knowledge that this was an absurd claim, given that many of the FDLR fighters were too young to have taken part in the 1994 genocide. This attitude was not conducive to encouraging lesser members of the FDLR to defect from the group and to return peacefully to their homeland. At the end of the year, however, there were signs that Kigali and Kinshasa were willing to make a fresh start. After the Goma meeting between the foreign ministers of both countries on 5 December, it was announced that both sides had drawn up a plan for military operations against the FDLR, set to start early in 2009. Tacit operations by the national army, the ‘Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo’ (FARDC) against the FDLR occurred throughout the year, but the Congolese army was ill-prepared to take on the far superior enemy. FARDC had commited ten batallions to the east to fight the FDLR. With the outbreak of fully fledged warfare with the CNDP, these troops were redirected to battle the Nkunda rebels. Logistical support by MONUC for these operations was weak. MONUC commanders have stated for a long time that there can be no military solution to the FDLR problem. If anything, strong armed operations with the disorganised FARDC would only lead to tactical withdrawals of the FDLR and rebel retribution against the civilian population. Jean-Pierre Bemba, the exiled chairman of the ‘Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo’ (MLC), who had come second in the 2006 presidential elections, was the subject of heated debates in the senate. He had fled the country in 2007 after heavy fighting in Kinshasa between his militia and Kabila’s forces. In March, the senate announced that Bemba would lose his seat in the upper chamber if he did not return. The government refuted Bemba’s assertions that his security in Kinshasa was not assured. However, it was widely believed that Kabila had little interest in seeing the return of this rival, who commands significant popularity in the capital, unlike Kabila. The dispute was overtaken by events when Belgian police arrested Bemba in Brussels (24 May) and subsequently transferred him to The Hague (3 July). The Belgian authorities acted on an arrest warrant of the ICC, which sought Bemba for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The charges did not relate to events in the DR Congo, but in the neighbouring Central African Republic (CAR). In 2002–03, Bemba’s MLC had intervened militarily in the CAR to support the government of President Felix Patassé against insurgents. Bemba was the first person to be arrested in connection with the ICC investigation in the CAR. ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo claimed that Bemba had pursued a plan of terrorising and brutalising innocent civilians, in particular through a massive campaign of rape and looting. President Joseph Kabila strengthened his patronage power when he appointed new heads for 37 of Congo’s parastatal companies (12 January). Most of the new appointees were members of Kabila’s government coalition. They replaced personnel that had come into office during the transitional power-sharing period (2005–07), when all senior posts in government and parastatals had been distributed among the member factions of the

Democratic Republic of Congo • 231 government of national unity. The most noteworthy appointment was Eugène Serufuli, who became head of the electricity company ‘Société Nationale d’Electricité’. A former governor of North Kivu (2000–07), Serufuli had joined the Kabila camp during the 2006 election campaign. Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga resigned on 25 September, citing his advanced age (83). His government had come under intense criticism by parliament for its failure to tackle the country’s many problems. The resignation had been demanded by Kabila’s party, the ‘Parti du Peuple pour la Réconstruction et la Démocratie’ (PPRD), but it also came as a relief for many Congolese and foreign observers, who felt that the Gizenga government lacked the necessary energy to move the country out of the crisis. While such views were probably correct, they neglected the fact that Gizenga’s party, the ‘Parti des Lumumbistes Unifiés’ (PALU), was only a junior partner in the PPRD, and key ministries (interior and security; planning; economy) were not held by PALU. Some in Kinshasa argued that the resignation did not change the fundamental configuration of power. Due to the weakness of Gizenga and PALU, Kabila had worn a double hat as president and de facto prime minister. Gizenga’s resignation led to speculation that Kabila would take the office of prime minister away from PALU, as some within the PPRD deemed that PALU support for government was no longer crucial. These rumours were dispelled when Kabila named Adolphe Muzito (51), the budget minister and a PALU member, as the new prime minister. Muzito’s new cabinet was presented on 26 October. It had 53 members, including four women. Kabila’s PPRD retained one-third of the ministries and two of the three newly created offices of deputy prime minister. The new deputy prime ministers were Nzanga Mobutu, hitherto the minister of agriculture, now in charge of social affairs; Emile Bongeli, a PPRD member and previously minister of information, now in charge of reconstruction; and Mutombo Bakafwa Nsenda, the former minister of justice, who was appointed deputy prime minister for security and defence. As in the previous government, significant overlaps between government offices raised the question of competing responsibilities. In terms of personnel, there was more continuity than change, though there were two noteworthy changes. Minister of Foreign Affairs Mbusa Nyamwisi was replaced by Alexis Tambwe Mwamba, a former rebel who had entered Kabila’s camp in the past ten years. Nyamwisi, a Nande strongman from Beni (North Kivu), took over as minister of decentralisation. To the great relief of Congo’s foreign partners, the erratic minister of defence, Chikez Diemu, was removed from the cabinet. He was replaced by Charles Mwando, a long-established figure in Congolese politics who had been minister for rural development under Gizenga. Born in southern Katanga, Mwando (72) was first elected member of parliament in 1965 and served in various governments during the Mobutu years. Between 1980 and 1987, he was the governor of Kivu, then comprising North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema.

232 • Central Africa Although the stabilisation of Ituri district had made tangible progress over the years, thanks mainly to the dismantling of militia groups, the post-conflict peace process remained precarious. A report by ICG noted that the root causes of conflict persisted, including land disputes and the unfair sharing of revenues from the exploitation of natural resources (gold, timber). Furthermore, the climate of impunity was not tackled, resulting in a lack of reconciliation among local ethnic communities. Joint operations between MONUC and FARDC against local militias continued throughout the year and the Congolese army was credited with a much better performance than in North Kivu. On 6 February, Mathieu Ngudjolo, the former leader of the ‘Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes’ (FNI) was arrested by state authorities and flown to the ICC in The Hague where he faced charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Ngudjolo had given up the fight in 2006, when the government promised to integrate his forces into the army and appointed him as an FARDC officer. After Thomas Lubanga and Germain Katanga, Ngudjolo became the third militia leader from Ituri to appear before the ICC. On 26 September, the ICC confirmed the charges against him and gave notice that it intended to try Ngudjolo and Katanga at the same time. On 29 April, an arrest warrant against another former Ituri commander was issued. Bosco Ntaganda had been an officer in Lubanga’s ‘Front Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo’ who had since joined Nkunda’s rebellion in North Kivu. Nkunda gave no indication that he would hand over Ntaganda. The trial against Lubanga, the ICC’s first-ever, took an unexpected turn in July when the court suspended the proceedings. Because the prosecution had withheld evidence from the judges and the defence that was potentially favourable to Lubanga, the court argued that the accused was deprived of a fair trial. The prosecutors justified their stance on the grounds that withholding the evidence was necessary to protect witnesses in Ituri from whom it (and the UN) had gathered the incriminating evidence against Lubanga. The court lifted the suspension of the proceedings in November after the defence disclosed its evidence to the trial chamber. The trial was set to begin in January 2009. Beginning in September, the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) stepped up its activities in Congo’s northern Haut Uélé distric (Orientale province). Attacks on villages resulted in the killing of hundreds of civilians and the abduction of some 200 children. With the support of MONUC, FARDC conducted military operations against the LRA to contain the growing insecurity in the region. The LRA activities appeared to be linked to increased international pressure to force the group into a long-awaited peace agreement with the Ugandan government. However, LRA leader Joseph Kony failed several times to show up at agreed locales to sign a peace accord. The western province of Bas Congo remained restive, following several rounds of violent clashes in previous years. It was once again the theatre of violent protests against the central state, evidence that state authority in the Congo – and the entire state reconstruction project for that matter – remained shaky even in areas outside the conflict-prone eastern Congo. The confrontations were again spearheaded by ‘Bundu Dia Kongo’ (BDK),

Democratic Republic of Congo • 233 a politico-religious movement that claimed to represent the interests of the Kongo ethnic group against the political marginalisation and political exploitation of the Bas Congo province. The protests were also a response to the state’s ruthless repression of grievances in the previous year and the deep-seated local disenchantment with the state and postwar democratic politics. Following a number of violent encounters between state agents and BKD followers, the state reacted in a concerted manner to what Congo’s police chief, General Numbi, described as “organised resistance”. In late February and early March, hundreds of members of the ‘Police National Congolaise’ (PNC) and soldiers of the presidential guard were deployed to Bas Congo. They attacked BDK adherents throughout the province. Opening fire on them at their temples, in meeting halls and at roadblocks, they killed at least 100 people in cold blood. MONUC subsequently investigated these events and reported that “the size and composition of the PNC force deployed, the comprehensive geographical dimension of the operations, the type of weapons and ammunition used, the excessive use of force employed and the arbitrary executions that were carried out, the systematic destruction of BDK temples (zikwa) and houses and the large number of arbitrary arrests all suggest that the authorities may have intended to considerably reduce the operational capacity of the BDK movement.” Insisting that only 27 people had been killed, the government reacted angrily to the UN report and refuted it as “mendacious”. It banned the BDK following a cabinet meeting held in Matadi (22 March), the capital of the province. In late March, the National Assembly held a remarkable debate on the events in Bas Congo, and struck a more conciliatory tone. Among other things, it recommended that BDK youths be integrated into the police, that government should facilitate the return of the BDK members who had feld during the government crackdown and finally that a conference on peace and development for the province be organised, crafted on the model of the Kivu peace conference in Goma. However, the government continued with its heavy-handed approach. In May, several BDK members among the 150 or so arrested during the crackdown were sentenced to death or prison terms. The dismaying performance of FARDC against CNDP rebels reflected the overall disarray in the national army. The reform of the security sector made no progress. Inadequate logistical support, lack of command and control and political rivalries meant that the army was literally non-existent. Extortion and human rights abuses by soldiers were widespread. As worrying was the policy to tackle the underlying problems facing the army. For all intents and purposes, the government had no policy, nor was it willing to agree with donors on a roadmap for reforming the deeply compromised institution. A roundtable on security sector reform was finally held on 25 February 2008, bringing together national and international stakeholders. Minister of Defence Chikez presented a ‘master plan’ that outlined his vision for army reform. Its centrepiece was the formation of a rapid reaction force of 12 battalions that was to constitute the nucleus of the future army. Some donors, including Belgium, promised to support the formation of these units.

234 • Central Africa As a follow up, various working groups on army reform were established between the chief of staff of the army and various donors and reached agreement on a work plan. To the consternation of Congo’s foreign backers, this was shelved by the minister of defence. The little momentum for army reform that existed was lost once the crisis in North Kivu was in full swing. Progress of sorts was made with the completion of a biometric census of the Congolese army by the EU’s advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the DR Congo (EUSEC). It identified 122,000 active soldiers. A well-coordinated plan for security sector reform was also hampered by deteriorating relations between the Congolese government and the international community, particulary MONUC. While the mission criticised government for its lack of direction and cohesion, government resented interference in its domestic prerogatives. Relations with MONUC futher worsened when the mission refused to side with the army in North Kivu. The mission retorted that fighting the army’s war in eastern Congo was not part of its mandate. Government made conscientious efforts to mobilise public opinion against MONUC, which resulted in protests and attacks on MONUC in North Kivu. Security concerns were exacerbated by the tottering disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. The national DDR programme had been suspended in 2006 when donors had frozen funding because of concerns about mismanagement. Its formal resumption in July posed a significant challenge. According to the UN, at least 131,000 fighters and soldiers were still to go through DDR, but no one only really knew if these numbers were correct. The confusion increased in connection with the Goma conference, as dozens of hitherto unknown Mai Mai militias in North Kivu came forward and demanded involvement in DDR. Human and political rights in the country did not improve. As in previous years, government agents were responsible for serious human rights abuses throughout the Congolese territory. While some of these were linked to the sheer decay of state structures, there were also strong indications that government was pursuing a deliberate policy to intimidate and wipe out opposition forces. An extensive compilation of state abuses was produced by Human Rights Watch, a human rights group. In addition to the situation in North Kivu and Bas Congo, the report (entitled ‘We Will Crush You’) pointed to the targeting and murder of journalists and opposition figures. For example, Daniel Boteti, deputy chairman of Kinshasa’s provincial assembly and a member of the MLC, Congo’s main opposition party, was shot dead in his car in the capital on 6 July. The police arrested seven members of the Presidential Guard, one of whom claimed that a Kabila ally, Kinshasa Governor André Kimbuta, had ordered the murder. There was no verdict by the end of the year. Subsequent to the murder, the MLC briefly suspended its participation in the National Assembly.

Democratic Republic of Congo • 235

Foreign Affairs In January, the special representative of the UN secretary general (SRSG), William Swing, who had led peacekeeping operations in the country since 2003, left MONUC. His successor was Alan Doss, previously the SRSG in Liberia. His appointment rekindled hopes that the overstretched mission would be turned into a more effective peacekeeping force. However, the UN was again at the centre of an alleged scandal. A report by the BBC in April suggested that investigations by the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) into claims that MONUC troops from India and Pakistan had been involved in smuggling arms and minerals in collusion with rebels in eastern Congo, had been hampered by UN headquarters. In an article for the ‘International Herald Tribune’ (23 May), Matthias Basanisi, a former OIOS investigator, asserted that the investigations in 2006 had been taken away from his team after it had found credible evidence of wrongdoing by Pakistani peacekeepers. He described UN reporting on the behaviour of peacekeepers in Congo as “little short of a whitewash”. Although the UN and MONUC refuted the claims, the opacity of the investigation reinforced the widespread impression that these agencies had to cover up improper behaviour by their staff. Some observers suggested that UN headquarters was anxious not to alienate India and Pakistan, both of which are important troop-contributing countries to the UN in general and to MONUC in particular. Between them, they fielded 46% of MONUC’s military component. The mission had to contend with another public relations disaster in October when MONUC’s new force commander, Spanish General Vicente Diaz de Villegas, left the mission barely one month after joining it (27 October). Although personal reasons were cited, the media speculated that the general was frustrated at the lack of means available to MONUC to carry out its mandate. His predecessor, Lieut.Gen. Babacar Gaye (Senegal), was reappointed as the interim force commander. Overall, the year was widely perceived as a disaster for the UN mission. The focal point of criticism was its failure to protect civilians in eastern Congo. MONUC pointed out that its forces were stretched “beyond the limit”. As at 18 November, the mission had a military strength of 17,354 troops, 62% of whom were deployed in the Kivu provinces. However, this was insufficient to carry out its mandated tasks. In North Kivu, the theatre of conflict, MONUC had ten peacekeepers for every 100,000 civilians. In late October, the mission requested the UN Security Council to approve an additional 2,785 blue helmets to bolster its quick-response capacities. The Security Council agreed (Resolution 1843 of 22 November). By year’s end, no country had come forward to provide the troops. Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner of France flew to Kinshasa in late January, a visit that appeared to indicate renewed French engagement with the Congo. France announced the establishment of a consulate in Bukavu (South Kivu). Prior to that, the US, UK and to a lesser extent the EU had established a diplomatic presence in Goma (North Kivu). These measures suggested that Western states were willing to step up their involvement

236 • Central Africa in the DR Congo in the search for peace. This assumption was underpinned by the heavy presence of foreign diplomats at the Goma conference in January, where they reportedly exercised significant pressure on the participants to come to an agreement. While the international community fell back on a passive policy after the signing of the Goma agreement, the collapse of the latter ignited a new wave of international crisis diplomacy beginning in October. A string of foreign envoys from the UN, the US, France and the UK visited Congo and neighbouring countries. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon appointed former Nigerian head of state Olusegun Obasanjo as his special envoy to the Great Lakes region. Two emergency meetings took place, one in Nairobi (7 November) and the other in Johannesburg (9 November). The Nairobi summit, which was attended by Ban Ki-moon, was held under the auspices of the AU and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. The meeting resulted in the establishement of a mechanism to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the conflict. It was to be composed of Obasanjo, former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa and its chairman, Mwai Kibaki, president of Kenya. The extraordinary meeting of the SADC expressed tacit support for the DR Congo government. It also considered deployment of a regional intervention force to North Kivu. Kabila, who attended the summit, actively lobbied Angola, its key partner in the region, to intervene in North Kivu. Luanda’s reticence defused anxieties of a replay of the second Congo war, which had begun in August 1998 and had sucked in neighbouring countries, including Angola. In the aftermath of the summits, UN special envoy Obasanjo embarked on a round of regional shuttle diplomacy, travelling to Angola, Congo and Rwanda. At the height of the crisis in October, when the fall of Goma appeared imminent, the government also called on the international community to deploy a multilateral intervention force to North Kivu. Belgium actively supported the idea for the deployment of a EU intervention force, but most EU member states rejected the plan. Relations with Belgium, the former colonial power, hit rock bottom. Not for the first time, Belgian Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht was at the centre of the dispute. During a visit to Kinshasa in April, the outspoken Flemish liberal raised a number of concerns in meetings with Kabila, including the latter’s opposition to having a UN human rights rapporteur for the DR Congo, corruption, mining deals with China and concerns over the slow pace of political reforms. Kabila reacted angrily, stating that Belgium must decide whether it wanted normal ties or a “master-slave-relationship” with its former colony. The row took a turn for the worse when an unperturbed de Gucht took another swipe at the Congolese government a month later. During an interview with a Belgian television channel, he insisted that members of the Belgian government “not only have the right, but also the moral duty to say what we think about Congo and that the country is not going in the right direction.” The Congolese government recalled its Brussels-based ambassador. It also ordered the closure of the Belgian consulates in Lubumbashi and Bukavu. On 12 December, the UN-appointed group of experts released its final report (UN document S/2008/773) on the situation in the DR Congo, specifically the links between

Democratic Republic of Congo • 237 the war economy in eastern Congo and the financing of armed groups. With regard to the CNDP, it emphasised that the group had captured most of its weapons from the FARDC and that a significant percentage of its resources came from taxation in occupied areas, particularly at cross-border posts. However, it also provided evidence suggesting that the strength of the CNDP was partly derived from Rwandan support. It documented CNDP’s system of financing, which it described as a “sophisticated financial network of Congolese and Rwandans in the diaspora.” It further stated that Rwandan authorities “have been complicit in the recruitment of soldiers, including children, have facilitated the supply of military equipment, and have sent officers and units from the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF)” to the DR Congo in support of CNDP. In addition, it provided evidence that a Rwandan advisor to President Paul Kagame provided financial support to the rebels. In a symbolical but politically significant move, the Netherlands, followed by Sweden, suspended some of its aid to Rwanda. The panel of experts also presented evidence on collaboration between FARDC and FDLR in terms of the provision of arms to the Rwandan rebels and joint operations against the CNDP. Furthermore, it suggested that it was not in the interest of certain FARDC commanders to end the conflict in eastern Congo “as long as their units are able to deploy to, and profit from, mining areas.”

Socioeconomic Developments Given the ongoing violence in eastern Congo and the absence of public services in much of the country, the humanitarian crisis remained one of the worst worldwide. In January, the American NGO International Rescue Committee published its fifth major mortality survey, covering 2006–07. The survey found that 5.4 m people had died since 1998, thus surpassing every conflict since the Second World War. Equally disconcerting was the finding that the humanitarian crisis left as many as 45,000 people dead every month. The renewed fighting in North Kivu displaced over 300,000 people and brought the number of internally displaced persons in eastern Congo to 1.4 m. Sexual violence against women and girls continued unabated in eastern Congo. A report by a coalition of NGOs claimed that in June alone more than 2,200 cases of rape were recorded in North Kivu province, representing only a small proportion of the total. On 19 June, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1820, which called sexual violence “a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instil fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group.” Maj.Gen. Patrick Cammaert, formerly a MONUC commander, told the meeting that it “has probably become more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier in an armed conflict.” The economy fared reasonably well, but deteriorated sharply in the last quarter of the year. First, continued conflict in eastern Congo took a heavy toll on the fiscal situation. This was primarily due to increased military expenditure, although information on security spending

238 • Central Africa was not published by the government. Second, the onset of the international financial crisis sent a shockwave through the economy. The mining sector was particularly hard hit by the indirect effects of the global crisis. Between July and December, Congo’s main export commodities were in free fall. Copper lost 75% of its value, diamonds 40% and cobalt 20%. The sharp reduction of global demand for mining products forced numerous mining companies in the DR Congo to put a hold on investments. More importantly, they reduced or even stopped production, thus initiating a reversal of the positive trends achieved in the first half of the year when (officially recorded) mining production had surpassed the figures for 2007. According to official statistics, copper output was 216,000 tonnes until August, compared with 97,000 tonnes for the whole previous year. The increased production ushered in the rise in mining export revenues, following an increase in world demand for these products (10.4% for copper and 67.5% for cobalt between January and June 2008). However, the positive trend came to an end when mining operations collapsed in the last quarter of the year and the full extent of the crisis became clear. In Katanga, the main mining province, some 300,000 miners lost their jobs between July and December. The number was expected to increase further as the crisis continued. Given that an estimated 10 million of Congo’s population of 65 million depended directly or indirectly on mining for income, the crisis was having devastating socioeconomic effects. By year’s end, the central bank corrected its previous estimate on real GDP growth for 2008 from 10% down to 5.9%. Its growth forecast for 2009 was lowered to 4.4%. By December, year-on-year inflation stood at 27%. The depreciation of the Congolese franc (CF) was another worrying trend. It traded at CF 639 for $ 1 in December, compared to an average of CF 500 in 2007. This was the result of the infusions of newly printed money that the government undertook to finance its fiscal deficit, which increased sharply in the last quarter of the year. For example, monthly fiscal deficits rose from CF 5.4 bn in October to CF 55.4 bn in November, due to the military efforts in North Kivu and a steep decline in tax revenues from the mining sector. Consequently, foreign reserves hit a five-year low by the end of the year. The much touted investments by Chinese companies in the mining sector and planned infrastructure operations failed to materialise, partly due to the objections of the IMF. The government published the terms of the $ 9 bn deal in February. It consisted of a package under which China’s Export-Import (Exim) Bank was to provide loans worth $ 6.2 bn to fund a wide range of infrastructure programmes, while some $ 3 bn would be invested in Sicomines, a mining joint venture between Gécamines and Chinese investors. The IMF asserted that it would not agree to a PRGF over concerns that the Chinese loans, at an interest rate of 6.2%, were not sufficiently concessional. In view of the IMF, the ChineseCongolese contracts were public ventures guaranteed by the Congolese state – hence the IMF’s concern over debt sustainability. The completion of the Sicomines feasibility study was delayed and was not expected before mid-2009. The hard-nosed position of the IMF created a considerable dilemma for the Congolese government. Adopting the IMF recommendations could jeopardise or at least delay the deal with the Chinese companies,

Democratic Republic of Congo • 239 whereas the latter might reconsider their investments in light of falling copper prices. Ignoring the IMF criticism would threaten future financial support by Congo’s institutional donors. Nonetheless, the government seemed intent to reconcile these contradictory positions, although these efforts clearly implied that immediate progress on either front was unlikely. Even if the Sicomines feasibility study were to produce positive results that would also address the concerns of the IMF, the DR Congo would neither receive a new PRGF before the third quarter of 2009 nor be eligible for debt relief under the HIPC initiative before late 2009. Congo hopes that its external debt of $ 11.5 bn will be cancelled under the HIPC initiative. Members of the political opposition and civil society groups also objected to the China deal. They argued that the contracts were deeply unfavourable to the DR Congo inasmuch as the mineral production to secure the loan was worth far more than the investments the country would receive in return. However, this argument was based on the high prices for copper that collapsed in the course of the year. Partly as a result of the government reshuffle in September and October, the 2009 budget was unveiled only in November. With a total of $ 4.8 bn, it was substantially larger than in the previous fiscal year ($ 3.3 bn). However, it rested on extremely optimistic, if not outright unrealistic assumptions, including a growth rate of 9%. Given the downturn of the mining sector, projected domestic revenues were clearly out of line with reality. The same was true for development assistance flows, which were forecasted to contribute 30% to the budget, despite the absence of new agreements with the IMF. The government’s claim that the budget took into account the precarious economic environment was not shared by the IMF, which expected sharply declining government revenues in 2009. The Washington-based organisation also slashed its projections for 2009 for foreign direct investment in the DR Congo from the original $ 2.5 bn to $ 0.8 bn. As the adverse effects of the global economic crisis sunk in, the Congolese government adjusted its 2009 forecast for the mining sector, the backbone of the country’s economy. In late December, Deputy Mines Minister Victor Kasongo announced that government expected copper exports of 365,000 tonnes, up from projected 2008 exports of 289,169 tonnes but down from a precrash 2009 forecast of 410,000 tonnes. Projected cobalt exports were slashed by half to 32,000 tonnes. Still, it remained unclear when and how the government would revise its 2009 budget. During the course of the year the government pursued a review of logging and mining contracts to improve transparency and revenue flows and to enforce legal and environmental standards. In October, it published the review of the logging contracts that had been awarded since the 1990s. Of the 156 contracts examined, 110 were recommended for cancellation, including those with the three biggest foreign companies in the country, which held 15 m ha of the 22 m ha allocated for commercial logging. By the end of the year, it was unclear whether government would implement the proposal. This suggested that this review might eventually share the opacity of the mining review process. The latter review, which had begun in the previous year, was published in September. Of the

240 • Central Africa 61 contracts examined, only 14 were deemed satisfactory. The majority of contracts were expected to be renegotiated, either to increase the ownership share of Congo’s parastatal Gécamines or to enhance the royalties accruing to it as a partner in the joint ventures. The foreign companies affected by the review process were expected to table revised contracts that would offer the government better terms. On the whole, the review was subjected to considerable criticism. From the point of view of foreign companies, the drawn-out and opaque process tarnished Congo’s already poor reputation as a destination for foreign investment. Non-governmental organisations, on the other hand, claimed that the review had not improved ethical standards and its lack of transparency was not in the interest of Congolese population. Contrary to the agreements the central government and provinces had entered into in the previous year, fiscal decentralisation, as stipulated by the constitution, continued to be on hold. The 2008 budget did not foresee that the provinces would be allowed to retain 40% of the revenues they collect. Instead, provinces were to settle for 15% of their taxes, a position that caused significant anger, particularly in Katanga and Bas Congo. Government policy was in line with the IMF, which has taken a strong stance against budget transfers to the provinces, arguing that fiscal decentralisation threatened fiscal stability. In November, the governors complained that since July they had not received even the 15% the government had promised to transfer to them. In summary, decentralisation remained a contested reform that revealed considerable antagonism and distrust between central government and the governors. The dispute gained increasing importance in view of the local elections that the elections steering committee announced would be held before June 2009. The 2009 edition of ‘Doing Business’, a publication of the World Bank, ranked the DR Congo as the worst place to do business across 181 economies, the same assessment as in the preceding report. Citing numerous obstacles to trade and investment, the report noted, for example, that an entrepreneur had to pay an unlikely 229% of his profits if he/she paid all the taxes that Congolese law stipulated. The country scored equally badly in other regards. For instance, the costs that accumulated to enforce a contract represented as much as 150% of the claimed value of the contract. In the absence of a new PRGF agreement with the IMF, overall donor support remained well below Congolese expectations. Nevertheless, a number of donors pledged renewed assistance. On 30 October, the EU announced a five-year aid programme worth $ 670 m. This was less than the $ 600 m aid package which the UK agreed to provide for the period 2008–11. Together with the World Bank, the British also announced financial support for infrastructure rehabilitation worth $ 120 m. Denis M. Tull

Equatorial Guinea

The legislative and local elections in May reconfirmed the all-encompassing dominance of the pro-presidential camp. The opposition was reduced to one seat in the National Assembly and able to hold on to just a few seats on the municipal councils. Foreign affairs activities were mainly directed towards the sub-region. Tensions with Cameroon over the allegedly large number of illegal immigrants remained high, whereas the border dispute with Gabon moved closer to becoming a joint submission to the International Court of Justice. Economic development was overshadowed by the dramatic fall in oil prices, raising the prospect of negative growth rates for the first time in years.

Domestic Politics On 29 February, President Obiang dissolved the National Assembly and called legislative and municipal elections for 4 May. Although the legislative poll was only due before 2009, President Obiang decided to bring the polls forward along with the municipal elections in order to limit public spending on electoral campaigning. The new electoral census revealed a 75% increase in the number of voters compared to the register used in 2004. Meanwhile, several members of the opposition joined the ruling ‘Partido Democrático

242 • Central Africa de Representantes del Pueblo’ (PDGE), thereby reducing the opposition’s chances to increase its share of the polls. After a six-week campaign that began on 18 April, the legislative and local elections took place on 4 May as scheduled. The results confirmed the tight grip on power of the political forces centred on the president. They have dominated the political scene since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1991 and saw their share of the vote increase to close to 100%. The coalition comprising the ruling PDGE and nine small parties won 99 of 100 seats in the National Assembly, leaving the main opposition party, ‘Convergenzia para la Democracia Social’ (CPDS), with just one seat, down from two in the last legislative election in 2004. In addition, the pro-presidential coalition was able to increase the number of municipal council seats won from 200 in 2004 to 217 out of 230 in this year’s poll. The CPDS only obtained a significant number of votes in the capital, Malabo. The election day passed off without major incident. Security had been tightened weeks before the polls, with an increased military presence on the streets, closed borders since 22 April and the denial of visas to Spanish journalists wishing to cover the election. Opposition parties denounced intimidation tactics by the security forces, the lack of international observers and electoral irregularities. There were no EU observers, since the government had made the request for them only two weeks before the polls. Spain sent two observers, who reported that no irregularities were detected in their presence. However, doubts over the freedom and fairness of the electoral process remained and the results clearly showed that there were no checks and balances on the president’s extensive executive powers and on the near absolute dominance of his political camp. The combination of repression and an extensive patronage network financed by the oil wealth available to the regime sufficed to constrain the development of a viable opposition movement. Following the usual pattern after legislative elections, President Obiang dismissed the government on 7 July, stating that it was one of the worst-performing he had ever appointed. In the new cabinet nominated on 14 July, however, he retained all important ministers in their previous posts, including the minister of defence, the minister in charge of security and the minister of foreign affairs. Teodoro Nguema Obiang, the president’s eldest son, held on to his post as minister of agriculture. As with all previous governments since he came to power in 1979, President Obiang kept all important ministries, notably for the security and defence apparatus, tightly within the hands of his dominating Fang ethnic group from near Mongomo on the mainland. Some newcomers were given positions in junior ministries. Also in continuity with the last reshuffle, the prime minister was not from the minority Bubi ethnic group indigenous to the island part of the country. For many years, there was an unwritten rule that the prime minister had to be from the Bubi ethnic group. Ignacio Milam Tang, the new prime minister and a former ambassador to Spain, was also a member of the Fang ethnic group and had held several cabinet positions in the past. Unlike his predecessor, who was disliked by some of the old guard for his technocratic methods, the new prime minister was expected to follow a more consen-

Equatorial Guinea • 243 sual approach. In the new cabinet, the former finance minister, Marcelino Owono Edu, became the new minister for mines, industry and energy. His appointment signalled the president’s interest in tightening control over the country’s oil revenue and monitoring more closely the accounts of the national oil company. In late July, the ‘Demócrates por el Cambio’ (Decam), a platform of 13 political organisations operating in exile, announced it intended to participate in the presidential elections scheduled for the end of 2009. Decam was founded in Spain in 2005 as a united front against the regime. However, since the exiled opposition remained fragmented, there was a strong possibility that Decam would fail to put forward a common candidate in the poll, thereby implicitly adding legitimacy to the regime without posing a notable challenge to Obiang’s iron grip on power. With respect to the appalling human rights situation, the report of the UN’s special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment confirmed that torture was used systematically against prisoners, that detention centres were in a deplorable state, that corruption was endemic and that the justice system lacked independence and was dysfunctional. The report issued after the visit of the rapporteur in mid-November recommended complete overhaul of the penal and judicial system. Typical of the regime’s handling of such sweeping criticism from abroad, the government statement issued after the visit reported only improvements, while ignoring the report’s main findings and recommendations.

Foreign Affairs In foreign affairs, relations with the former colonial power Spain suffered over the conduct of the legislative elections. President Obiang cancelled a planned visit to Spain in late July. According to the Spanish newspaper ‘El Pais’, neither the Spanish king nor Prime Minister Zapatero had time to meet Obiang. The Spanish strategy to promote democratic change through active engagement, while increasing the presence of Spanish business interests, notably in the oil sector, had had very few tangible effects so far. In mid-February, President Obiang paid an official state visit to several countries in Latin America, including Argentina, Brazil and Cuba. The visit was intended to strengthen bilateral ties with these countries. The visit to Argentina turned out to be most controversial, with Argentina’s opposition parties and media openly criticising the poor human rights record and dubious democratic credentials of the visitor from Equatorial Guinea. Reacting to the supposedly deteriorating security situation after the spectacular robberies carried out with speed-boats in December 2007, President Obiang visited his counterpart from Nigeria in late January. Equatorial Guinea agreed to help finance security operations in the region directed at controlling the activities of a faction of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

244 • Central Africa Although the situation seemed to have improved over the last few years, with enhanced cooperation in the gas sector and attempts at regional integration, tensions with Cameroon resurfaced. In October, the exiled nephew of President Obiang was reportedly kidnapped by two Cameroonian policemen and handed over to security forces from Equatorial Guinea in exchange for an undisclosed amount of money. The allegedly large number of Cameroonian illegal immigrants resident in the country provided the background to another incident in December. A Cameroonian fisherman was killed by security forces from Equatorial Guinea in an operation to stop the inflow of immigrants. With a joint maritime border not yet demarcated in a mutually acceptable way, incidents at the border continued to raise the spectre of further escalation. With respect to the equally contested maritime border with Gabon, the secretary general of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, attended the opening ceremony of a new round of bilateral talks that began on 11 June. On 22 July, both countries announced they had made substantial progress in their talks focused on preparing key documents for a planned joint submission to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Ban Ki-moon appointed Nicolas Michel of Switzerland as the special advisor on and mediator in the border dispute on 17 September. Michel’s appointment suggested that the UN considered the issue mainly legal as opposed to the prelude to violent conflict. Referring the border dispute over three uninhabited small islands in the Bay of Corisco to the adjudication by the ICJ suggested that the two countries were committed to a peaceful solution, although a decision by the ICJ might take several years. In July, a five-year agreement with Angola came into force. The cooperation agreement covered the hydrocarbon sector and Equatorial Guinea hoped to benefit from Angola’s much better record in reaching more attractive production-sharing agreements with international oil companies. However, it is possible the agreement was a diplomatic formality without much substance.

Socioeconomic Developments Forecasts for economic development were pessimistic for the first time in years. With the coming on stream of two large oil and gas projects and the massive increase in public investment in infrastructure, real GDP growth was estimated at a robust 11.2% in 2008. Due to the dramatic fall in average oil prices in the second half of the year, however, a decline in growth seemed likely for 2009. While still in surplus at an estimated 7.1% of GDP in 2008, the current account was expected to record a deficit in 2009. The same effect was expected for the fiscal balance, estimated at 19.8% of GDP in 2008 but also forecast to go into deficit in 2009. Driven by government spending ahead of the legislative and presidential elections, inflation rose to an estimated 7.5% in 2008, up from 5.5% the previous year. With the decline in oil prices, inflationary pressures were expected to ease significantly towards year’s end. However, the government also admitted that the

Equatorial Guinea • 245 basket of goods used for the composite price index was outdated. The budget for 2009 approved by the National Assembly in October provided for an increase in public spending of 93%, reducing the budget surplus to CFAfr 106 bn from CFAfr 1,017 bn in 2008. Since details were not published, it remained unclear whether this huge increase in public spending was earmarked for the completion of large infrastructure projects ahead of the presidential elections or for the purchase of larger government shares in the country’s oil and gas projects. Oil and gas production rose to an estimated 428,000 bpd in 2008 up from 385,000 bpd in 2007. Since no new fields were scheduled to come on stream and production from older fields continued to decline, the overall decline in oil and gas prices also delayed investment in new production fields. Therefore, oil and gas production was expected to decline in 2009 and 2010. Since the start of the oil boom in the 1990s, Equatorial Guinea has received foreign direct investment inflows of $ 10.7 bn, making the country the fourthlargest recipient in sub-Saharan Africa. But with the government purchase of the assets of Devon Energy, a US oil company, for $ 2.2 bn in April, FDI inflows were expected to become negative for the first time in 2008. This purchase, financed by accumulated foreign-exchange reserves, was intended to increase the government’s control over the country’s key economic sector. Although there was growing speculation the government would press other oil companies to sell part of their stakes as well, no other deal was reported. In his traditional end-of-year speech, President Obiang failed to even mention the expected economic downturn and decline in oil prices, but instead hailed the new long-term National Economic Development Plan (Horizon 2020) designed to turn the country into an emerging economy by 2020, to accelerate poverty reduction and to guarantee basic social services for all within the next decade. The plan was approved in November and accompanied by the creation of a new economic agency, the ‘Agencia Nacional Guinea Ecuatorial 2020’ (ANGE), intended to bear overall responsibility for implementing the plan. On 23 December, Equatorial Guinea became a founding member of the Forum of Gas Exporting Countries (FGEC), a new permanent organisation of 15 producers created to stabilise gas prices and monitor markets. In addition, Equatorial Guinea LNG, the company responsible for the management of the liquefied natural gas plant located on Bioko, signed a cooperation agreement with Gazprom, the Russian national gas company. Although no details were disclosed, the agreement could pave the way for future cooperation in the construction of a second train at the LNG plant. On 5 January, the WTO announced the establishment of a working party to initiate accession negotiations with Equatorial Guinea following the country’s formal request to join the WTO in February 2007. However, this was only the first step along the supposedly long road to full membership in the organisation. Cord Jakobeit

Gabon

After 40 years of uninterrupted rule and following the resignation of Fidel Castro, Omar Bongo Ondimba became the longest-serving head of state in the world, a dubious political achievement. Unlike Cuba’s cigar-smoking president, whose fragile health resulted in his necessary departure from power, 73-year-old Bongo remained the dominant political figure in Gabon, giving no sign that his position was menaced by old age or sickness. Nor did he face any serious domestic challenge to his power, having systematically removed and/or co-opted all his rivals. Furthermore, with record-breaking commodity prices, support from the international community and billions of dollars of foreign direct investments in his country’s extractive industries, Bongo faced no external challenges from foreign states.

Domestic Politics Bongo’s ruling ‘Parti Démocratique Gabonais’ (PDG) maintained its overwhelming majority in the National Assembly, buttressed indirectly by several smaller parties that supported his presidential majority in the national parliament. A cabinet reshuffle in October moved the minister of finances (and Bongo’s son-in-law) Paul Toungi to the ministry of foreign affairs, replacing Bongo’s ex-son-in-law, Jean Ping, who is now serving as the

248 • Central Africa president of the AU Commission. Toungi was replaced in the finance ministry by Blaise Louembé, who had run the treasury since 2000 and was a long-time Bongo loyalist and close collaborator of Toungi. Louembé was replaced in the treasury by Fidèle Ntissi, a powerful insider who had served as a presidential advisor on Bongo’s staff. The finance minister and the treasurer were always key positions in Bongo’s elaborate patronage network, the main arena of what passes for politics in this neo-patrimonial rentier state. No presidential or legislative elections were held this year. Municipal elections originally scheduled for January were postponed due to challenges by the opposition regarding the country’s voter registration lists. They were finally held on 27 April. No fewer than 14,000 candidates presented themselves on 800 party lists. Turnout was low, with only a third of the 720,000 registered voters (out of a population of 1.3 m) participating in the ballot. Unsurprisingly, the ruling PDG returned 1,120 councillors to office, putting up a particularly strong performance in the rural areas, where it was often the only party represented. However, it did less well in the big cities. In Libreville, the capital, for instance, it won only three of six councils, and it failed to control the other main cities of Port-Gentil, Moanda and Owendo. Yet as the municipalities depend on the national government for all of their revenues, ultimate control remained with the ruling party. Also, Fang politician and former Prime Minister Jean-François Ntoutoume Emane of the PDG managed to become mayor of Libreville, despite the longstanding tradition that this post be held by an Mpongwe, the indigenous ethnicity of that locality. The opposition ‘Union Gabonaise pour la Démocratie et le Développement’ (UGDD), led by Zacharie Mbyoto, made significant gains, winning 160 seats, mainly in its stronghold in the southeast of the country. The ‘Union du Peuple Gabonais’ (UPG) returned only 80 councillors, probably due to Pierre Mamboundou, its leader, dropping his historical uncompromising stance towards the Bongo regime. Only in its bastion of Ngounié province did the UPG retain a majority. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Gabon was ranked as the 96th most corrupt country in the world, with a score of 3.1 (i.e., highly corrupt), but still in a much better position than all its neighbours. Wishing to manage the perception of corruption – if not its reality – President Bongo announced on 11 January that Gabonese ministers would no longer enjoy the privilege of government-purchased vehicles in order to reduce what he called their “useless and ostentatious expenses”. In his announcement, made during a cabinet meeting, Bongo said his ministers should deploy all their efforts towards ameliorating the conditions of the life of the Gabonese people. This followed a speech on the evening of his 40th anniversary in power in which he denounced the Gabonese ruling class for its lack of integrity and for having taken funds destined for development of the country. On 20 March, the government released its third report prepared under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), claiming significant improvement over the previous two reports in the declaration of oil revenues.

Gabon • 249

Foreign Affairs This year was marked by rising tensions between Gabon and France following comments by the French cooperation minister, Jean-Marie Bockel, about the need to end the corrupt neo-colonial practices and make relations between the two countries more transparent. Bockel, a socialist who had been named to Sarkozy’s conservative government, publicly called on the French president to bring “an end to Françafrique”, the network of personal relationships between decision-makers and intermediaries of French and African origin with tremendous political and economic influence in the region. Bockel’s comments were judged unacceptable by the regime in Libreville. “There are state secrets”, lamented President Bongo, “there are things between heads of state which should not be said except between heads of state.” Responding to these criticisms, President Sarkozy decided to replace Bockel with the more traditional Gaullist politician Alain Joyandet as part of a cabinet reshuffle on 18 March. On 13 April, Joyandet travelled to Libreville with the secretary general of the Elysée, Claude Guéant, to mend relations with Bongo, who announced that the matter was resolved to his satisfaction. But relations between the two countries had also been damaged on 2 March by a scandalous broadcast on France 2 television of a documentary that exposed President Bongo’s questionable real estate holdings in France. Following public statements by the president and his foreign ministry proclaiming their shock that the French government had not intervened to prevent the broadcast, the French ambassador in Libreville was issued a ‘note de protestation’ by the Gabonese government. The broadcast on French public television had focused on the expulsion in February of two Gabonese students who were escorted out of France for reasons of inadequate academic performance, resulting in a veritable diplomatic crisis. Gabon complained that this act violated an agreement signed in 2007 concerning the regularisation of immigration between the two countries. “Normally”, explained Interior Minister André Mba Obame, “there is a dialogue between the Gabonese and French services, but for some time now the French services have been arresting Gabonese citizens without consulting us and putting them on airplanes back to Gabon.” The Gabonese government threatened to retaliate by expelling French citizens, 5–10% of whom, according to Obame, were residing there in irregular situations. As the crisis became more serious, Pierre Boutin, a French national who has headed the mineral prospecting service ‘Bureau de Recherches Geologiques et Minières’ (BRGM) for the past 30 years, was issued a letter on 24 March informing him he was being removed from his functions and telling him to leave the country within 24 hours. The strong reaction of the Bongo regime should be placed in the context of its proFrench regional diplomacy. Gabon was an important intermediary in the political crises in Niger, Chad and Central African Republic (CAR), where civil war and attempted coups d’etat continued throughout the year. On 19 January, President Bongo intervened to secure the release of two French journalists in Niger arrested for reporting on the Touareg

250 • Central Africa rebellion in the north of the country. Then the presidents of Chad and Congo were invited to meet with Bongo in Libreville on 24 January in a mini-summit intended to prepare an AU resolution concerning the humanitarian crises unfolding along the borders of Chad, CAR and Sudan. At this meeting, Bongo notably orchestrated a common statement by the francophone African leaders in support of the deployment of a French-dominated European Union military force (EUFOR) in eastern Chad. On 6 February, some 500 French expatriates were evacuated from Chad to Gabon by French military forces when rebel forces marched on N’Djaména, out of a total 1,231 foreigners evacuated from the Chadian capital during two days of combat that followed a failed coup attempt by rebel forces. Bongo equally continued to play a crucial role in the peace process in CAR, hosting several rounds of peace negotiations in Libreville and helping to prepare a so-called inclusive political dialogue. France maintained a permanent military base in Camp Charles De Gaulle located next to the international airport just outside Libreville, part of the military cooperation agreements that have been the hallmark of Franco-Gabonese relations since independence was granted to the country in 1960. On 2 December, Transparency International (France) filed a complaint in French courts concerning the circumstances by which President Bongo had acquired his vast real estate holdings in France over the past four decades. The complaint also included the questionable realty holdings of Congolese President Denis Sassou Nguesso and Equatoguinean President Obiang Nguema. This legal action followed the leak to the media of a French police investigation which found that Bongo and his family owned 39 properties in France, including an $ 18.8 m villa acquired in 2008. That criminal investigation had commenced at the request of TI France but was dropped earlier in the year for lack of sufficient proof. Bongo reacted to the latest civil action through his lawyers, denying any wrongdoing and declaring his intention to sue the activists for defamation. But more troubling were the arrest and detention of Gabonese transparency activists Marc Ona Essangui of Publish What You Pay Gabon, Georges Mpaga of the Network of Independent Organisations for Good Governance, Alain Moupopa of Afrique Horizon and Gregory Ngbwa Mintsa, who had joined Transparency International’s civil action. On 31 December, the Libreville offices of Publish What You Pay were suddenly sacked and searched by Gabonese authorities, who seized the activists’ computers and files, thereby making it impossible for the accused to defend themselves against charges of defamation. Under Gabonese law, defamation of the president is a crime, rather than a civil tort, and is punishable by imprisonment.

Socioeconomic Developments With an economy essentially dominated by mineral-export revenues, Gabon benefited from record oil prices, as well as a modest increase in oil production from 243,000 to 247,000 bpd. Nominal GDP rose from an estimated $ 10,850 m in 2007 to $ 12,522 m

Gabon • 251 in 2008. After years of gradual decline in the country’s petroleum production, this year marked the first rebound in crude output, brought about by new investments in older fields and by draconian government measures to stop strikes by oil workers. Total Gabon, which is the country’s premier producer, on 28 February announced the launching of a $ 2 bn redevelopment plan to increase production from one of its major oilfields. The Anguille field, which was discovered in 1962, is located in the shallow waters 20 km off the oilcapital city of Port-Gentil. The company planned to use sub-surface injection and hydraulic fracturing, as well as drilling a dozen new wells, to increase the field’s output from the current 7,500 to 30,000 bpd by 2013–14. On 20 March oil workers from the ‘Organisation Nationale des Employés du Pétrole’ (ONEP) called a strike at the Gamba field and demanded the departure of Shell-Gabon’s general director, Hans Bakker, and the possibility of taking two months of vacation, which they had not enjoyed for the past two years. On 31 March, the government sent in troops, occupied the site and threatened to use violence against the strikers unless they returned to work. The strike briefly paralysed the production of 60,000 bpd at Gamba, and an additional 30,000 bpd produced by other companies using the Gamba terminal to export their crude. Windfall profits generated by higher oil prices and production allowed government to reduce its domestic and external debt by buying back a large portion of its bilateral obligations with $ 400 m in foreign-exchange reserves. Consequently, the country’s external debt was massively reduced from $ 4,896 m (or 45% of GDP) in 2007 to $ 3,137 m (or 25% of GDP) in 2008. Total public debt was reduced from 50.1% to 31.4% of GDP. More than any other policy, this reduction of national debt was the single wisest move by the government in recent years. Not only has it reduced the financial burden on future generations, but it has also allowed the present government to allocate more of its budget to domestic expenditures rather than wasting its revenues on debt-servicing to foreign lenders. Bongo’s sensible decision to take windfall oil revenues and repay the principle allowed his administration to reduce the potential burden of tens of millions of dollars in future interest payments, and more prudently, as oil prices fell to their previous $ 40 per barrel level by the end of the year, it may have indemnified his government from future arrears. Here the advantage of four decades in power was evidenced by Bongo’s previous experience of oil-price volatility and his ability to learn from past problems with the debt trap. Growth in non-oil minerals, praised by international financial institutions, was concentrated on the development of the country’s manganese and iron ore reserves. Manganese prices rose 58% in 2008 and Gabon is the second largest producer of manganese in the world, with plans to become the number one through the activities of the longstanding French mining conglomerate ‘Compagnie Minière de l’Ogooué’ (COMILOG). But it was the new exploitation of iron ore deposits in Belinga by the China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation (CEMEC) that raised hopes the country

252 • Central Africa might resolve its problem of what to do in the post-petroleum era. China has promised to purchase all the iron produced at Belinga once exploitation begins. Working with several Chinese forestry firms, including self-proclaimed Honest Timber Gabon, tropical rainforests in Belinga were finally being cleared around the future iron project, which the Chinese won from the Brazilians during an aggressive bidding process in 2006. After two years of regulatory delays, this was the first concrete activity on a multi-billion dollar project, an enormous complex of mines, ports, trains, and hydroelectric dams, which President Bongo has proclaimed to be the single greatest development in his country’s economy since the Transgabonais railway built in the 1970s and 1980s. The ministry of forestry and fisheries declared a closed season for commercial fishing in designated northern territorial waters from January to April. This moratorium was expected to be reimposed every year until the alarming decline in fish stocks subsides. The rise of distant water fishing, the increase in global trade in fish products and the use of fisheries subsidies have been responsible for overfishing throughout the Gulf of Guinea. Foreign commercial fishing boats were the primary culprits in this lamentable disappearance of Gabon’s marine biomass and the government moratorium did not apply to local artisan fishermen. Moreover, the ministry’s regulators lack effective capacity to survey the country’s 885 km of coastline and prevent illegal fishing within protected areas, resulting in poor implementation of this latest marine conservation effort. On 28 October, the Jane Goodall Institute France announced that it had decided to create a subsidiary in Gabon to develop new programmes of protection, research and aid to primate (both human and non-human) populations living in and around the country’s 13 national parks. This celebrated non-governmental organisation, which already runs similar programmes elsewhere in the Congo rainforest basin, noted that over the past two decades the region has lost over half of its great apes. Piloted from France, the new Jane Goodall Institute Gabon will conduct seminars for the protection of wild chimpanzees and initiatives to educate young people to respect biodiversity and preserve their country’s endangered flora and fauna. Gabon is home to the world’s largest population of western lowland gorillas, which recent DNA tests have revealed to be a different subspecies from its cousins, the eastern mountain gorillas. Primatologists have estimated that 40,000 lowland gorillas out of a world population of 94,000 were living in Gabon. For several decades these great apes have been threatened with extinction through loss of habitat, hunting and disease. Douglas Yates

São Tomé and Príncipe

The first half of the year was marked by considerable political instability provoked by the dismissal by parliament of two consecutive governments within three months. The main political parties quarrelled intensely, but also engaged in negotiations. Renewed instability was provoked by the departure in rapid succession of two natural resources ministers at the end of the year. There were virtually no developments in the oil sector, while some progress was made in the tourism and air transport sectors.

Domestic Politics The political elite displayed throughout the year – and not for the first time – a high degree of inter-personal and inter-party competitiveness resulting in considerable political instability. On 7 February, Prime Minister Tomé Vera Cruz (‘Movimento Democrático Força da Mudança’, MDFM) resigned a few days after withdrawing the national budget 2008 estimated at $ 90 m from parliament to avoid its expected defeat by the opposition ‘Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe/Partido Social Democrata’ (MLSTP/PSD) and ‘Acção Democrática Independente’ (ADI), which together held 31seats of a total of 55. The opposition had criticised the budget proposal for not including enough funding for the key sectors of agriculture, fishing and tourism.

254 • Central Africa On 13 February, the allied MDFM and ‘Partido de Convergência Democrática’ (PCD) signed a coalition agreement with ADI to last until 2014. The following day, Patrice Trovoada, son of ex-President Miguel Trovoada (1991–2001) and leader of the ADI (11 seats), was inaugurated as prime minister of a coalition government comprising the three parties and controlling 34 seats. Trovoada, a businessman, was expected to be able to raise foreign funds through his supposed international connections. On 7 April, the new government submitted to parliament a fresh national budget of $ 86 m, of which $ 52 m was destined for public investments and $ 34 m for current expenditures, including $ 17 m for civil service salaries. Agriculture, infrastructure and water and electricity represented 22%, 16% and 15% respectively of the investments, while education and health accounted for only 9% and 8% of the budget respectively. Even deputies in the newly formed ruling coalition criticised the budget proposal as being worse than its predecessor. Finally, the budget was approved with only 25 votes in favour and 28 abstentions. Following this embarrassing vote, the opposition party MLSTP/PSD brought forward a motion of no confidence in Prime Minister Trovoada, allegedly to ascertain the legitimacy of his government. On 20 May, the no confidence motion was approved by the 30 votes of the MLSTP/PSD and the deputies of PCD. The latter accused Trovoada of lack of transparency in government affairs. Subsequently, MDFM revoked the inter-party agreement with the PCD signed in 2002, making the opposition MLSTP/PSD the major party in parliament. On 30 May, President Menezes dismissed Prime Minister Trovoada and called on the four parties in parliament to negotiate a new coalition. Following talks, on 9 June the four parties agreed to ask President Menezes to entrust the leader of the MLSTP/PSD, Rafael Branco, with the formation of a new government. On 16 June, President Menezes formerly approached Branco to form an all-party government. The latter, however, refused, while ADI rejected the option of joining a coalition headed by the leader of the MLSTP/PSD. Finally, on 21 June, President Menezes, named Rafael Branco as prime minister at the head of a coalition government comprising MLSTP/PSD, PCD and MDFM, which combined held 43 seats in parliament. Before assuming the post, Branco had to renounce his second, Portuguese nationality. For the first time a woman, Elsa Pinto (MLSTP/PSD), was appointed defence minister. Moreover, neither the minister of foreign affairs nor of defence in the new government was a confidant(e) of President Menezes, as their predecessors had been. Prime Minister Branco declared Portugal, Angola and Brazil as key allies in the country’s development. On 2 July, the anti-money laundering legislation approved by parliament in April became effective. The government hoped the legislation would cause the removal of the country’s name from the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) list of countries lacking effective measures against money laundering and terrorist financing. However, on 17 October FATF declared that São Tomé and Príncipe still posed a risk in both respects.

São Tomé and Príncipe • 255 Later in the year, Prime Minister Branco’s government underwent renewed instability provoked by the departure within the space of a month of two successive ministers of natural resources. On 15 October, the then minister, Agostinho Rita (MDFM), was dismissed following accusations that he had authorised the ‘Empresa Nacional de Água e Electricidade’ (EMAE) to finance scholarships for three employees of the energy utility to study at a private accounting college owned by him. His successor, Carlos Fernandes Marques (MDFM), resigned on 31 October after only two weeks in office, citing health reasons. On 11 November, Branco appointed Cristina Dias, former economy minister in the government of Vera Cruz, as the new natural resources minister. The dismissal of Agostinho Rita provoked a bitter conflict in his own party. At the MDFM congress on 13 September, he had been elected secretary general, while Manuel Deus Lima, his predecessor as natural resources minister, was elected party president. Disputes within the party leadership over whether to continue in the government provoked a crisis that, on 23 November, resulted in an emergency meeting of the MDFM’s national council. President Menezes presided over the meeting, although the constitution prohibits the head of state from occupying any other public office. At the meeting, the two men were dismissed from their posts and an interim commission made up of Eugénio Tiny, João Costa Alegre and Frederico Ferreira was established to lead the party until the next congress. In October, a military court tried Wilson Quaresma and six other members of the rapid intervention police (PIR) on charges of crimes against state security and insubordination arising from their leadership in the occupation of the police headquarters in October 2007. On 21 November, the seven accused were sentenced to from 10 to 18 months in prison, suspended for two years.

Foreign Affairs As part of its military cooperation with the US, in January São Tomé and Príncipe became the first African country to install the US Navy’s Regional Maritime Awareness Capability surface surveillance system. This intelligence system allows local navies to access information on global maritime traffic through Maritime Safety and Security Information Systems. The local coast guard expected the system to enable it to detect illegal fishing in the country’s territorial waters. On 15 March, France cancelled bilateral debts of € 7.6 m as part of a Paris Club agreement. The following month, the French government promised € 16 m in development funds for the period 2009–12. On 15 July, Portugal wrote off bilateral debts of $ 35 m and promised development aid of € 50 m in the framework of a three-year aid agreement. Prime Minister Branco travelled to Luanda on 29 July for a two-day visit, and was accompanied by the ministers of foreign affairs, defence, public works and finance. Branco was received by Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos and Prime Minister Fernando da

256 • Central Africa Piedade dos Santos. The delegation held talks on oil exploration, air and maritime transport, trade, agriculture and public administration. During the visit the establishment of a strategic partnership agreement between the two countries was discussed. On 4 September, Branco departed for a one-week visit to Taiwan together with the ministers of foreign affairs and territorial administration. On his departure, Branco, whose MLSTP/PSD has always maintained bilateral relations with the Chinese Communist Party, stressed that he visited Taiwan as head of the government and not as party chairman. En route back from Taipei, the delegation paid an official visit to Portugal. President Menezes left on 24 November for a two-week tour that took him to Angola, South Africa, Qatar, Senegal and Portugal. The principal objective of these visits was to raise funds to finance his country’s 2009 budget.

Socioeconomic Developments Significant developments occurred in tourism and air transport, while the energy sector was plagued by major problems and the oil sector remained largely inactive. In January, the Dutch SCD Aviation, using an 18–seat plane, inaugurated regular flights between São Tomé, Príncipe, Libreville (Gabon), Port Gentil (Gabon) and Douala (Cameroon). On 19 May, the government and SCD Aviation, since 2007 the owner of Bom Bom Island Resort in Príncipe and Omali Lodge Luxury Hotel (formerly Marlin Beach Hotel), signed an € 5 m agreement to modernise and manage the airport on Príncipe for 15 years and maintain the air link to both islands. On 1 May, Pestana inaugurated its 5-star hotel in São Tomé. It had 115 rooms, a casino, discotheque, office centre and a condominium section with 54 units. On 9 June, EuroAtlantic Airways, owned by the Portuguese Pestana hotel group and the Metello family, initiated a weekly charter flight between Lisbon and São Tomé. By September, 2,500 tourists had been flown to the three Pestana hotels in the country. The new national airline, STP Airways, was formally initiated on 23 June. EuroAtlantic held a 37% stake in the line and assumed management of the company. The government retained 35%, while the local Banco Equador, owned by the Angolan groups Mombaka and António Mosquito and the ‘Grupo de Investimentos e de Apoio aos Serviços’ (GIAS), owner of Club Santana, each held 14% of the shares. On 18 August, STP Airways inaugurated a weekly flight operated with EuroAtlantic planes to Lisbon. In April, the Italian company Italbrevetti established a thermal power plant comprising three groups of generators with a capacity of 3 MW near the capital. In exchange for the € 4.2 m investment, the government granted the Italians a 20-year concession to operate and manage the Contador hydroelectric dam, which produced 1.6 MW. By as early as mid-July, two of the generators had broken down, resulting in constant power cuts in the country. Due to the ongoing energy crisis, on 29 August the government dismissed the management of EMAE headed by Júlio Silva (ADI) and announced its intention

São Tomé and Príncipe • 257 to restructure the state-owned company. EMAE produced only 9 MW, while demand was about 17 MW. A special commission was entrusted with analysing the company’s problems and presenting solutions for the energy crisis. On 1 October, the government announced the launching of a public tender for the construction of a 30 MW thermal power plant while on 19 November former Defence Minister Óscar Sousa (MDFM) was appointed director general of EMAE. In late November, Taiwan promised $ 15 m for the construction of a new thermal power plant to end the energy crisis. During a meeting of the Joint Ministerial Council (JMC) of the Nigeria-São Tomé and Príncipe Joint Development Zone (JDZ) in São Tomé in July, ministers of both countries agreed to put pressure on oil companies operating the Blocks 1–4 (Chevron, Sinopec, Anadarko and Addax Petroleum) to go ahead with exploration drillings. JMC also decided to set up a security commission for the JDZ and rejected the property claims made shortly before the meeting by Houston-based Nigerian ERHC for Blocks 5 and 6. In response, ERHC filed a lawsuit in Abuja against JDZ in an attempt to secure its 15% interest in each of the blocks. In addition, on 25 November ERHC asked the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) to rule that these interests should remain untouched. Earlier, in July, in an arbitration with Addax over a 9% portion of Block 4, the LCIA had awarded 7.2% to Addax Petroleum and 1.8% to ERHC. In December, Addax announced that initial plans to start exploration drilling in Block 4 in 2008 had been postponed to the second half of 2009. On 24 September, the Angolan Sonangol oil company increased its stake in the national fuel company ENCO from 40% to 78%, after a private shareholder sold his 3% and the government sold 35% of its 51% stake for $ 32 m. The state retained 16% and private investors 6% of ENCO. The government used $ 10 m of the proceeds to settle ENCO’s debt with Sonangol, while $ 22 m were earmarked to finance the 2009 budget. In November, Sonangol announced the establishment of a fuelling station in Neves in the north of São Tomé to supply maritime traffic in the Gulf of Guinea region. Construction of the $ 30 million project was expected to start in 2010. Other investments in infrastructure and telecommunications were envisaged. On 28 July, the government and Portugal Telecom signed an agreement allowing the ‘Companhia Santomense de Telecomunicação’ (CST), a joint venture between the state (49%) and Portugal Telecom (51%), to invest $ 15 m in the West African Festoon System (WAFS) international consortium that is constructing a fibre optic submarine cable link between Luanda and Accra. The undersea link is expected to provide the islands with improved international communications. On 1 August, the government and the French consortium Terminal Link, comprising ‘Compagnie Maritime d’Affrètement’ and ‘Compagnie Générale Maritime’, signed a € 260 m contract on the construction of a 80-ha deep sea port at Fernão Dias. This facility will have a container terminal, which will serve the Gulf of Guinea region. It was expected that the port will employ some 1,000 people directly and indirectly create another 3,000 jobs.

258 • Central Africa On 11 December, the National Assembly approved the substantially increased 2009 national budget of $ 150 m. The budget projected public expenditures totalling $ 100 m on health and education (25%), agriculture and fishing (20%), water and energy (16%) and infrastructure (15%). The budget included an increase in the minimum monthly wage from Dobra (Db) 650,000 (€ 30) to Db 1.2 m (€ 56) and an average 35% increase in public sector salaries. External donors were expected to finance about 80% of the budget. Gerhard Seibert

VI. Eastern Africa

Most external attention on the sub-region was again focused on the continuing armed conflicts in the Darfur region of Sudan and in Somalia, while early in the year the extraordinary post-election violence in Kenya was for some weeks very much in the international limelight. Other notorious conflict zones (Ethiopian-Eritrean border, northern Uganda, Burundi, Comoros) on the other hand enjoyed almost no international attention and remained a backwater of international concern. The Darfur and Uganda conflicts were also closely intertwined with neighbouring countries in the Central African sub-region (Chad, Central African Republic, DR Congo). There were only a few changes in the domestic political situation of the 12 countries in the sub-region. By far the most important was the creation of a power-sharing grand coalition in Kenya as a way to overcome the schism that had resulted from the disputed results

260 • Eastern Africa of the election at the end of 2007. Parliamentary elections in both Djibouti and Rwanda, in the absence of genuine electoral contests, simply confirmed the long-established political dispensation. In Comoros, the illegal semi-autonomous regime on Anjouan Island was overturned in a military invasion and new elections were held for the island presidency. The shaky and almost powerless transitional government of Somalia collapsed towards the end of the year with only uncertain hope of a new beginning. Long-running conflicts with internal rebel groups in both Burundi and Uganda appeared to be moving towards an end, but were still not finally resolved. The sub-region was generally spared major catastrophe, but some countries were again affected by drought and the population experienced steep food price rises and general inflation. A marked surge in piracy activities by Somalis in the Gulf of Aden and along the entire East African coast captured international attention and became a serious menace to shipping in the sub-region. Macroeconomic growth was very uneven: Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda were the best performers with growth rates above or close to 10%, while the GDP of Comoros, Eritrea and Seychelles grew by 1% or less. The longer-term effects of the onset of the global financial and economic crisis were difficult to assess. No substantial progress was made in the controversial negotiations with the EU over EPAs that had stalled in 2007. Seychelles was readmitted as a member of SADC, but otherwise there were no changes in the membership of sub-regional organisations. The first tripartite meeting of COMESA, EAC and SADC broached the possibility of an eventual merger of these partly overlapping organisations.

Political Developments The situation in the Sudan remained relatively unchanged and was again overshadowed by the massive human suffering resulting from the conflict in the country’s western Darfur provinces, now in its sixth year, and by uncertainties over the durability of the 2005 peace agreement that had ended the long civil war in the South and made possible the establishment of a semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). Despite these unresolved challenges, the central government in Khartoum, on the back of a continuing oil-driven economic boom and with at least some diplomatic support from sympathetic African and Arab governments against Western condemnations, felt sufficiently secure to persist in its confrontations with domestic adversaries and to obstruct international efforts to stop the fighting in Darfur. The largely ineffective AU peacekeeping mission evolved into a new larger hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping force, mandated by the UN Security Council in 2007. This force, UNAMID, faced many practical problems in its build-up and was still far short of its planned strength by year’s end. Its impact on the ground to end violence and protect civilians thus remained limited and unsatisfactory. Further international pressure on the Khartoum regime took the form of the announcement that the ICC was investigating a possible arrest warrant for Sudanese President al-Bashir for his role in

Eastern Africa • 261 the atrocities in Darfur. Various peace talks again proved fruitless and no political solution for the conflict was in sight. New strains also arose between Khartoum and GoSS in Juba over the control of oil-producing areas and the appropriate division of oil revenues in accordance with the 2005 peace agreement. Delays in announcing a new census, important for determining accurate population figures and the relative weighting of different parts of the country, created further tensions in advance of crucial national elections scheduled for 2009. There was no let-up in sight in respect of the long-entrenched political repression in Eritrea. The population suffered numerous human rights violations at the hands of the regime, and there was no avoiding the pervasive militarisation of society. Consequently, the flight of young Eritreans to neighbouring countries continued unabated. No elections were even contemplated and there was an absolute lack of transparency in political decision-making, which was fully concentrated in the hands of President Isaias Afewerki. Political rights and media freedom in Eritrea were ranked globally at the very bottom. External opposition groups remained weak, with no realistic chance of changing the situation. The military regime was internationally isolated and continued to focus primarily on its confrontation with Ethiopia. The domestic political situation in Ethiopia remained relatively unchanged with continuing confrontation between Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and his ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front and various political opposition groups. This situation stemmed from the highly controversial 2005 elections, and the ensuing persecution and imprisonment of many opposition leaders persisted. The regime maintained full control over the public sphere, and no reconciliation between the ruling elite and its opponents was in sight. Social and ethnic unrest continued in various parts of the country, particularly in the Ogaden and Somali regions. Opposition forces remained weak and fragmented, and the authoritarian regime showed no indication of moving towards gradual political liberalisation. The ruling multiparty alliance of President Guelleh in Djibouti remained in full control and automatically won the parliamentary elections in the absence of opponents, since the notoriously weak opposition parties had decided to boycott the elections. Because of the electoral system and based on their experience in the 2003 elections, they saw no chance of gaining even partial success. The overwhelming dominance of Guelleh and his regime over public affairs was thus further consolidated and remained virtually unchallenged. The mini-state continued to enjoy an influx of foreign investment and to benefit significantly from the presence of French and US military bases. The three distinct parts of Somalia again witnessed widely differing political developments during the year, and there was no indication they would again move closer in the foreseeable future. Somaliland remained generally stable and calm and had all the earmarks of a functioning state, despite the continuing lack of formal recognition by other states and international organisations. The authorities in Puntland maintained the

262 • Eastern Africa semi-autonomous status of this northeastern part of Somalia. By and large, they skirted the continuing turmoil elsewhere in the country and prepared to elect a new leadership in January 2009. Puntland attracted unprecedented international attention as the main base of the upsurge in Somali pirates menacing regional shipping routes. The situation in Southern Somalia saw no marked improvement and was again characterised by widespread insecurity, violence and indiscriminate fighting between competing groups. The factual authority of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was limited to certain territorial areas, while large tracts of land were effectively controlled by radical Islamist groups. Lengthy negotiations in Djibouti between the TFG and the majority moderate faction of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia and their eventual agreement to form a new national government, however, raised unexpected hopes for a new political constellation. The TFG president resigned in late December and all attention was focused on the selection of the new leadership in early 2009. The tiny island state of Seychelles was devoid of outstanding political events, being generally characterised by a fairly cordial coexistence between President Michel’s longdominant Seychelles People’s Progressive Front and one substantial opposition party. Both camps had after many years come round to accepting the underlying differences in Seychellois society and the need to avoid deep confrontation. All attention was focused on the socioeconomic implications of the drastic but unavoidable economic reforms the government was forced to undertake in view of the imminent financial near-collapse of the country’s economy. Although the relatively comfortable Seychellois standard of living was seriously threatened, the stringent measures were accepted without widespread social unrest. At the beginning of the year, the other small island state of Comoros witnessed a sharp confrontation between Union President Abdallah Sambi and the leader of the semi-autonomous island Anjouan over the latter’s lack of political legitimacy: he had in 2007 engineered his own re-election in the absence of any opponents and without the approval of the legal authorities. Fearing another de facto secession by Anjouan, Sambi had for some time been demanding support from the AU to remove the illegitimate Anjouan regime by force. In March, an invasion by AU-mandated troops finally removed the regime and new elections for the island presidency were held a few months later. Thus political legitimacy was restored, but the bickering between the Union and island authorities over their respective competencies continued unabated. Conflict arose over Sambi’s strong push to revise the delicately balanced 2001 constitution. Under the circumstances, the legislative elections that were due were quietly skipped without much debate. Kenya started the year in the middle of its most fundamental crisis since independence, resulting from the announcement of the highly disputed official results of the presidential and parliamentary elections on 27 December 2007. Suspecting deliberate fraud by incumbent President Mwai Kibaki’s camp, followers of the main opposition leader Raila

Eastern Africa • 263 Odinga immediately protested. The protests turned violent during the first weeks of the year and plunged the country into entirely unexpected turmoil that escalated into an orgy of violence, with a sharp accentuation of ethnic hostilities. There were serious fears that this post-election violence might lead to all-out civil war. Frantic international mediation efforts, however, eventually resulted in an accord between the main political actors and the creation of a power-sharing grand coalition government, with Kibaki as president and Odinga as prime minister. Thus the violence abated and the country returned to a semblance of normalcy. However, the underlying tensions between the major political camps resurfaced repeatedly during the year over various contentious issues. Despite recurring speculation about the imminent break-up of the coalition, the government held together until the end of the year and was able to agree on further compromises. In neighbouring Tanzania, the almost legendary political stability and the barely challenged dominance of the long-ruling former single party was never seriously threatened. However, there was clearly a growing groundswell of popular discontent with the performance of President Jakaya Kikwete’s government, whose lauded macroeconomic achievements had not led to marked improvement in the lives of the majority of the population. In the political arena, the main focus was on various cases of alleged high-level corruption, leading to the indictment of several prominent politicians and the unprecedented resignation of the prime minister, a close ally of the president. Despite earlier optimism for an end to the longstanding antagonism between the ruling party and the main opposition in semi-autonomous Zanzibar, reconciliation was again blocked by intransigent elements in the island’s power elite. Nonetheless, the political climate was generally calm and devoid of open confrontation. Uganda had a relatively uneventful political year, free of major upheaval in the longestablished political order. President Yoweri Museveni and his ruling National Resistance Movement remained absolutely dominant and held all the reins of power largely unchallenged, as had been the case since 1986. However, the opposition was relatively free to express public dissent and to play a notable role in parliament. An active, lively civil society contributed to a fairly open political climate and managed to expose various scandals involving the power elite. Some cracks began to appear within the ruling party amid early indications that Museveni would make another presidential bid in 2011. All hopes for a peace agreement with the rebels of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to end more than two decades of civil strife in the north were again dashed after more than two years of negotiations. In the meantime, the LRA had retreated into the neighbouring DR Congo and the northern parts of Uganda were slowly returning to normalcy. Parliamentary elections in Rwanda brought a clean sweep for President Paul Kagame and his ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front in the absence of any meaningful political opposition and in a generally well-controlled political environment that allowed hardly any space for dissent. Two minor parties were re-elected to parliament, but did not even view

264 • Eastern Africa themselves as genuine opposition forces. The country remained well administered, stable and without internal security problems, but was clearly ruled in an authoritarian fashion by a small inner circle of the elite. Neighbouring Burundi, after a shaky and tumultuous political year in 2007, with several months without a government majority in parliament, saw the renewed strengthening of the authority of President Pierre Nkurunziza and the ruling ‘Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie’ (CNDD-FDD). All members of a dissenting minority faction of the party lost their parliamentary seats on the basis of a controversial constitutional court ruling and were replaced by loyalists, thereby consolidating CNDD-FDD’s majority. In accordance with the power-sharing formula in the 2005 constitution (based on consociational democracy), the country’s two traditional major parties continued to hold ministerial positions, but otherwise behaved more like an opposition. All political forces started to position themselves well in advance of the next elections in 2010. After more than two years of difficult peace negotiations with the last active rebel group, ‘Forces Nationales pour la Libération’ (FNL), an agreement appeared imminent in December but remained to be formally concluded. In the entire Eastern Africa sub-region in 2008, there have been virtually no changes in Freedom House’s annual assessment of political rights and civil liberties. For the latter, all country ratings remained unchanged, whereas on the political rights index Comoros rose from 4 to 3 and Somaliland slipped from 4 to 5 (on a scale of 1 at the top to 7). While none of the 12 sub-regional countries (plus Somaliland as a separate entity) were rated in the top category as ‘free’, four countries (Eritrea, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan) remained in the ‘not free’ category. Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea were among the lowest rated countries worldwide (with scores of 7 for political rights), while Rwanda was only slightly better. The remaining eight countries (plus Somaliland) were all categorised as ‘partly free’ (with both political rights and civil liberties in the 3–5 point range). Among these, Seychelles was again judged the best, followed by Comoros and then Kenya and Tanzania (tied). TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2008 once again revealed wide discrepancies between countries of the sub-region. Among 180 countries listed, Seychelles again easily achieved top position with an overall ranking of 55 and a score of 4.8 points (out of 10), evidence of further improvement over the preceding year. By contrast, Somalia was rated as the worst country (ranking 180 and scoring 1.0 points), while Sudan was ranked 173 (1.6 points) and Burundi 158 (1.9 points). The remaining countries, as with most other African countries, ranged between 3.0 and 2.1 points in the following order: Djibouti, Rwanda and Tanzania (jointly ranked 102), Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda (all 126), Comoros (134) and Kenya (147). Similar divergences between countries were discernible in regard to press freedom, as expressed in the 2008 Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders. Of 173 listed countries, Eritrea for the second year took last position (score 97.5), behind even North Korea. Somalia (ranked 153), Rwanda (145), Ethiopia (142), Sudan (135) and Djibouti (134), with

Eastern Africa • 265 scores ranging from 58 to 42, were also judged to be general offenders against the principle of freedom of the media. The best marks for press freedom in the sub-region went to Tanzania (rank 70), Seychelles (74), Comoros (89), Burundi (94), Kenya (97) and Uganda (107). Freedom House’s similar Press Freedom Report 2009, covering all events in 2008, showed comparable results but with some notable variations for specific countries. Out of a total of 195 listed countries, five Eastern African countries appeared in the category ‘partly free’: Comoros and Tanzania (jointly ranked 101), Uganda (109), Seychelles (125) and Kenya (128). The press situation in the remaining countries of the sub-region was judged to be ‘not free’ with the countries ranking in the following order: Djibouti (160), Burundi (163), Ethiopia (165), Sudan (168), Somalia (180), Rwanda (181) and Eritrea (190). Based on regular reporting by AI, Human Rights Watch, other NGOs and the US State Department, the worst politically motivated offences against human rights occurred once again in Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. In varying degree, serious human rights violations were also reported in practically all the other sub-regional countries, but not on the same scale and often arising from deplorable prison conditions and uncontrolled actions by state security agents, not necessarily with a specific political agenda.

Transnational Relations and Conflict Configurations The precarious domestic political situation in Sudan continued to have important repercussions on relations with most neighbouring countries. This was particularly so in eastern Chad, where the Darfur conflict spilled over noticeably due to close ethnic linkages across the border and a continuing influx of refugees into the relative safety of camps on Chadian territory. Consequently, bilateral relations remained strained throughout the year. The northeastern parts of the Central African Republic (CAR) were also somewhat affected by cross-border refugee and rebel movements from Darfur. An EU military mission, EUFOR, proposed by France in 2007 to protect refugee camps in Chad and CAR, became operational after considerable delay and with only lukewarm support from other European countries. It was expected to hand over to a UN mission in early 2009. For most of the year, the government of Southern Sudan continued its efforts to facilitate a peace process in the protracted rebel war involving the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda. The peace negotiations again dragged on inconclusively, since LRA leader Joseph Kony remained elusive and did not allow his negotiating team to sign a peace deal. The remnant LRA rebels had already been chased out of Ugandan territory and been forced to retreat into remote areas of neighbouring CAR and DR Congo. Realising the futility of the peace talks, a joint military operation by Uganda, DR Congo and Southern Sudan, with US logistical support, was mounted against the LRA in December, but proved to be a total failure. Previously strained Sudanese relations with Eritrea had improved markedly since 2006 and remained stable throughout the year, thus making the activities of Sudan-based

266 • Eastern Africa Eritrean opposition groups considerably more difficult. Otherwise, the Eritrean leadership continued to be quite isolated and at loggerheads with all other governments in the sub-region. Again no progress was made towards a lasting solution of the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, but apart from a few minor skirmishes there were no military confrontations. Eritrean pressure led to the termination of the UN mission that had been monitoring the fragile ceasefire along the contested border. Eritrea’s IGAD membership remained in limbo following its unilateral declaration of suspension in 2007. Another border dispute that witnessed limited military confrontation was that which emerged between Eritrea and Djibouti. Eritrea repeatedly denied having occupied stretches of Djiboutian territory and stubbornly spurned outside attempts at reconciliation, including UN resolutions. All countries of the Horn of Africa continued to be significantly affected by the ongoing insecurity and political turmoil in Somalia. Lengthy negotiations in Djibouti among many Somali factions and groups over reconciliation and the formation of new transitional national institutions ended positively with an agreement, while other fundamentalist Islamist forces, actively supported by Eritrea, remained totally opposed to the deal and threatened to intensify their violent armed resistance to the fledgling transitional government in Mogadishu. Ethiopia withdrew its troops from Somalian territory after two years of providing security to the shaky transitional institutions, but remained very involved in the Somalia quagmire to protect its own national interests. An AU peacekeeping mission (AMISOM), with contingents from Burundi and Uganda, had little impact in restraining the violence. The Somaliland authorities proved largely successful in steering clear of the conflicts. Unexpected international attention was turned on Puntland as the home base for most of the Somali pirates that had become a major threat to international shipping in the Gulf of Aden and along the East African coast, particularly during the latter part of the year. Patrols by warships from different nations, including from the EU and under NATO command, had only a limited impact in curtailing the piracy, which became more frequent and more daring. The Great Lakes region, with wide-ranging ramifications across the national borders, again witnessed the complex interplay of many groups from different countries of the region and was directly affected by the continuing conflicts and prevailing insecurity in the eastern DR Congo. The November 2007 Nairobi agreement, formulated by the USfacilitated Tripartite Plus Joint Commission (Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda, Uganda) to demobilise all ‘negative forces’ in the region, was never implemented. A large conference in January in Goma assembled most Congolese belligerents and resulted in another agreement that raised new hopes of an eventual peaceful solution to the endless conflicts. However, the agreement collapsed in September, leading to renewed intensification of armed confrontation and of civilian suffering. A UN report released in December clearly identified close linkages between Rwanda and some of the key actors in the Congolese

Eastern Africa • 267 Kivu provinces, thereby again highlighting the Rwandese government’s long-pursued interference in these areas. These activities were largely rooted in concern over the continued presence of anti-government rebel movements (FDLR and others) on Congolese territory, but also resulted from economic interest in the exploitation of Congolese natural resources. In December, the protracted peace negotiations in Burundi between government and the last rebel movement, FNL, finally seemed to be close to an agreement to demobilise FNL fighters and eventually integrate FNL cadres into the country’s political arena. This outcome was largely the result of renewed pressure from concerned neighbouring countries, with South Africa as official mediator. The agreement also allowed Tanzania to insist on quicker repatriation of Burundian refugees from the camps on its territory and on completion of the exercise by mid-2009. The political crisis in Comoros, triggered by the dispute over the illegal 2007 elections on Anjouan island, was brought to an end by the unprecedented AU-mandated military invasion of Anjouan in March involving troops from Sudan and Tanzania. In continuance of a decade of involvement, Comoros thus remained a little-noticed test case of the AU’s ability and commitment to contribute to the resolution of (relatively minor) political conflict in a member country. UN peacekeeping initiatives to contain the worst violence in the many instances of intra- or inter-state confrontation in the sub-region again ran up against severe constraints. The continued presence in the Eastern Congo of the large UN Mission in the DR Congo (MONUC) had some effect in containing the overspill of rebel activities into neighbouring East African countries, but could not prevent this completely. The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) had to close altogether due to the non-compliance of the Eritrean authorities. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) continued to monitor the implementation of the precarious peace process in Southern Sudan against the backdrop of growing concern about the viability of the whole process. The slow build-up and the deficiencies of the new hybrid UN-AU Mission in Sudan (UNAMID) represented major problems. UNAMID was intended to build upon and enhance the earlier AU Mission to Sudan (AMIS), which had struggled even to mitigate the conflict situation in Darfur. Again, no UN peacekeeping role was even contemplated for the raging conflict in Somalia. In July, the chief prosecutor of the ICC formally sought an arrest warrant against Sudanese President al-Bashir in connection with his role in instigating the conflict in Darfur. This was an unprecedented move against a sitting state president and led to an outcry from most African governments. No final ICC ruling on the issue had been made by year’s end. In Uganda, the issuance in 2005 of ICC warrants against LRA leaders continued to be a major stumbling block in the peace negotiations between the government and the LRA, since no way could be found to circumvent the warrants.

268 • Eastern Africa

Socioeconomic Developments The macroeconomic performance of countries of the sub-region was again divergent but moderately satisfactory, although generally still not on a scale to overcome structural poverty and lay the foundations for dynamic and sustainable growth. The immediate impact of the global financial and economic crisis was in most cases rather limited, but serious concerns began to be expressed towards the end of the year. Only three countries achieved markedly higher GDP growth than the African average of 5.2% (according to preliminary IMF 2008 figures. Ethiopia had a fifth exceptional year in a row with 11.6% growth, and Rwanda (11.2%) and Uganda (9.5%) also surpassed their already robust 2007 results. At the other end of the scale, both Comoros and Eritrea (with 1% growth) continued to perform very poorly, in both cases largely the result of unfavourable political conditions and civil conflict. The small and highly vulnerable island economy of Seychelles was the hardest hit by the global financial crisis, but was also affected by the longer-term effects of its welfare-oriented policies. Its economy almost collapsed, ending up with zero growth for the year. Both Tanzania (7.5%) and Sudan (6.8%) continued relatively successfully on a growth pattern that had become fairly stable over a number of years, while Kenya (2%) experienced a sharp setback largely as a result of the post-election violence and political turmoil early in the year. Djibouti (5.8%) and Burundi (4.5%) both had moderate gains in growth, close to the all-African average. No reliable figures were available for Somalia. Most countries officially proclaimed the pursuance of cautious monetary policies and comparatively modest inflation targets, but almost everywhere on the continent average consumer prices increased strongly, largely because of the global surge in food prices and energy (oil) costs during the first half of the year. The estimated 2008 average African inflation rate was 10.1%, but several Eastern African countries surpassed this by far. Seychelles, as a consequence of its shock currency devaluation, ended up with 37% inflation for the year. Ethiopia (25.3%) again had exceptionally high inflation as a result of years of unrestrained growth, as was the case for Rwanda (15.4%) and Sudan (14.3%). Relatively slow growing economies like Burundi (24.4%), Kenya (13.1%), Djibouti (12%) and Eritrea (11%) were, however, not spared the inflationary surge. Comoros (4.8%), as usual, experienced the lowest inflation due to its firm institutional ties with the Franc zone. Uganda (7.3%) and Tanzania (10.3%) were relatively the most successful in containing inflation despite reasonable growth. All countries of the sub-region had a negative balance of payments on current accounts, in contrast to the practically balanced African average of 1% of GDP (due to substantial surpluses for major oil and mineral exporters that practically invalidate the average). The largest deficits were in Djibouti (-39.2% of GDP) and Seychelles (-32.1%), while Eritrea (-2.7%) and Uganda (-3.2%) had remarkably low deficits and the remaining countries had deficits ranging from -5.8% (Ethiopia) to -11.1% (Burundi).

Eastern Africa • 269 UNDP’s 2008 Human Development Index (based on 2006 data) clearly highlighted wide variations in the sub-region in respect of general socioeconomic development levels. Only Seychelles attained the high human development category (HDI value above 0.8) and ranked 54 out of 179 countries. Comoros (ranked 137), Kenya (144), Sudan (146), Djibouti (151) and Tanzania (152) appeared in the lower half of the medium human development category (HDI values above 0.5) with index values somewhat above the sub-Saharan average, while the other countries were in the low human development category (HDI value below 0.5): Uganda (156), Eritrea (164), Rwanda (165), Ethiopia (169) and Burundi near the bottom (172).

Sub-regional Cooperation and Sub-regional Organisations The enlarged five-member EAC made further progress in fully integrating its new members Burundi and Rwanda, who had on 1 July 2007 formally joined the three original anglophone core countries Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda with their long history of close cooperation and sense of common identity. In the lengthy adjustment process, there was need for gradual harmonisation of many procedures and legal provisions hitherto quite divergent as a result of differing cultural and linguistic traditions, often dating from colonial times. Rwanda thus switched its financial year (from calendar year to a July-June cycle) and decreed English (rather than French) as the second official language, whereas Burundi had yet to follow suit and remained a little more out-of-step. The 9th ordinary EAC summit was held on 26 June in Kigali and elected Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame as the rotating chairperson in succession to Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni. The summit appointed ten judges (two per state) to the two chambers of the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) and granted Burundi preferential treatment for its membership contributions for 2007–08 and 2008–09. Burundi was thus required to pay only $ 1 m per financial year, while the other four states shared the shortfall in the EAC budget. Parallel to the summit, Kigali hosted the first East African investment conference from 26–28 June. The 7th extraordinary EAC summit on 22 October in Kampala decided on a new political structure for the EAC secretariat in Arusha to achieve fair distribution of top positions among all five countries (one secretary general and four deputy secretaries general), but no immediate personnel changes were made and the appointment of representatives from Burundi and Rwanda was deferred until 2009. During the year, national consultations were conducted in both Burundi and Rwanda to gauge public support for fast-tracking the political federation of East Africa (similar to an earlier exercise in the other countries), with the results to be submitted to the summit in 2009. The new members from Burundi and Rwanda (nine each) of the second East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), constituted on 5 June 2007, were only sworn in on 13 May due to delays in ratifying the amendments to the EAC treaty necessitated by the change in membership. While Rwanda had already chosen its EALA members in 2007, the

270 • Eastern Africa nomination process in Burundi had been marred by disagreement and was only completed in early 2008. On 17 June, the EALA approved the EAC budget for 2008–09. It totalled $ 40.5 m (about 58% in form of partner state contributions and about 40% expected from donors). Almost 60% was intended for the EAC secretariat, the rest for EALA, EACJ, Lake Victoria Basin Commission, customs and trade and the defence liaison unit. Arrears in membership contributions continued to impede the smooth functioning of EAC institutions. This problem reached threatening proportions towards year’s end. The EAC Customs Union, in force since 2005, had settled into routine operations after the contentious debates before its start. Certain transitional safeguards for Tanzania and Uganda still applied (until 2009), while full removal of non-tariff barriers also remained to be achieved. New transitional arrangements were made to include Burundi and Rwanda into the customs union. Lengthy and difficult negotiations to move to the next integration level, an EAC Common Market, got under way from 14–22 April in Kigali during the first meeting of a High-Level Task Force (HLTF) that brought together about 150 government and business delegates from all five member countries. The original timetable set December as the deadline for agreement on a protocol to serve as the basis for launching the common market in January 2010. Rotating among member countries, further HLTF discussions were held in Nairobi (August), Bujumbura (September), Kampala (October), Zanzibar (November) and Rubavu in Rwanda (December). Following the structure of a model protocol, good but gradual progress was made on most points, but a time extension had to be agreed during the Zanzibar meeting to overcome an unresolved deadlock on three key issues. Tanzania remained opposed to the common positions of the other four governments on the use of national identity cards as travel documents, the granting of permanent residence to all citizens of member countries and unrestricted access to land. These issues remained a major stumbling block and raised doubts about the commitment of Tanzania to the EAC integration process, although such doubts were vehemently dismissed by the Tanzanian government. In the absence of compromise, more HLTF rounds were scheduled for 2009. No substantial progress was made on the controversial issue of concluding an EPA with the EU, after the EAC states signed an interim framework agreement in November 2007 that allowed for continuation of trade relations in accordance with WTO rules. More objections were raised by a number of politicians to the conclusion of a standard EPA as proposed by the EU, unless there was a much stronger focus on and more funding for development issues. The 13th COMESA summit had originally been scheduled for May in Zimbabwe, but was cancelled at the last minute because of ongoing post-election violence, thus inadvertently extending Kenya’s chairmanship. A new December meeting was again postponed into 2009 to allow further consultations on harmonisation of policies with two other AUacknowledged regional economic communities (RECs), EAC and SADC. The launch of a COMESA customs union remained on the agenda for the next summit of the 19 member

Eastern Africa • 271 states, as an evolution of the existing FTA, with its more limited membership of 13 states. The Eastern and Southern Africa Trade and Development Bank (PTA Bank), COMESA’s financial arm, remained in its Nairobi headquarters despite an earlier promise to relocate to Bujumbura (the original choice, which was never pursued due to the years of conflict in Burundi). The PTA Bank remained the largest financial institution in the region with 17 member states (China and Tanzania not belonging to COMESA). Seychelles was readmitted to SADC as its 15th member (after its earlier withdrawal in 2003). This step again underscored the continuing problem of overlapping memberships by countries in different regional economic communities. Seychelles joined Tanzania as the second Eastern African member of SADC, essentially a Southern African organisation. A first tripartite summit on 22 October in Kampala brought together top representatives from all COMESA, EAC and SADC member states (26 countries altogether) with a view to initiating steps towards the eventual merger of these organisations into a single REC and to fast-tracking the longer-term goal of an African Economic Community. The summit directed a task force from the three secretariats to develop a roadmap for the establishment of a single free trade area and for joint infrastructure programmes and to prepare a MoU on inter-regional cooperation and integration between the three regional economic communities. Similar tripartite summit or ministerial meetings were expected to be held every two years. The 12th IGAD summit from 9–12 June in Addis Ababa was dominated by discussion of a badly needed revitalisation of an organisation that had for long been widely perceived as ineffectual, both for reasons of internal structural weakness and of persistent political conflict in the Horn of Africa. The IGAD chairmanship passed for the next two-year period to Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, and Mahboub Maalim from Kenya was installed as new executive secretary. The status of Eritrea’s membership, after its notice of suspension in April 2007, remained unclear amid signs of possible rapprochement. A regional integration workshop from 3–5 November in Addis Ababa considered the draft minimum integration plan (MIP) as a blueprint for IGAD’s future strategy, with an emphasis on pragmatic forms of cooperation and the envisaged creation of a free trade area. Despite attempts to be invited, IGAD did not attend the October tripartite summit in Kampala, presumably on account of its lack of competency in the area of trade integration. An extraordinary IGAD summit on 29 October in Nairobi was exclusively devoted to supporting the promising prospect of a new political compromise in Somalia. The establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), one of five sub-regional components of the AU’s envisaged African Standby Force, made further progress. The goal was to have interim operating capacity in place by mid-2010, with an eventual military component of about 6,000 personnel plus a non-military force of up to 3,000. During the 6th council meeting of the defence ministers on 17 January in Moroni, Uganda handed over the chair to Comoros and Burundi was admitted as a new member. A subsequent extraordinary council meeting on 13–14 March in Kampala noted good overall

272 • Eastern Africa progress, including the formation of the military brigade headquarters in Addis Ababa and the setting-up of the EASBRIG Coordinating Mechanism (EASBRICOM) in Nairobi. Another round of policy organ meetings was held from 20–29 August in Kigali, followed by the first week-long command post exercise involving about 110 senior military staff in Nairobi from 24 November onwards. EASBRIG membership included 14 Eastern African and Indian Ocean countries. However, of these Madagascar and Tanzania decided to focus their activities on the SADC brigade. The Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) held its 24th ministerial council meeting on 27–28 March in Victoria with a focus on restructuring the organisation’s secretariat and reinforcing its activities. The rotating IOC presidency for the following year was handed to the foreign minister of Comoros and Callixte d’Offay from Seychelles was designated the new secretary general as of 1 July. The French secretary of state for development cooperation signed two new financing agreements with the IOC. Anxiety was again expressed about the uncertain consequences of the EPA discussions with the EU. The 8th council of ministers meeting of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) on 4 May in Tehran (Iran) was poorly attended and was confronted with an obvious lack of concrete achievement over its more than decadelong existence. Most of its 18 members from Africa, Asia and Oceania had lost interest in this rather disparate regional grouping based on economic integration, but without a political agenda or a strong vision. From Africa, only Mauritius as host to a minuscule secretariat still attached some importance to IOR-ARC, whereas this was no longer the case for South Africa, one of the original initiators. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) achieved formal institutional recognition on 21 June with the ratification of the underlying pact on peace, security, stability and development in the Great Lakes region by eight of its 11 member states. An important further step was taken on 10 September in Kigali with the signing of a trust instrument for the administration by the AfDB of the Special Fund for the Reconstruction and Development (SFRD) of the Great Lakes Region. The planned 3rd regular ICGLR summit in December in Kinshasa had to be postponed because of the new security crisis in the eastern DR Congo. A forum of parliaments from ICGLR member states was established from 2–5 December in Kigali. The small secretariat, based in Bujumbura, struggled to have a meaningful impact on the many interwoven conflicts in the region. Very little progress was made to revitalise concrete activities by the ‘Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs’ (CEPGL) after its official relaunch in April 2007. The Kinshasa government failed to fulfil its promised financial and staff contributions to the small secretariat in Gisenyi (Rwanda), thus leaving it entirely reliant on inputs from Burundi and Rwanda. Any renewed activities were dependent on expected external support from Belgium and the EU.

Eastern Africa • 273 Water ministers from all ten riparian states of the Nile basin (with Eritrea as observer) met on 21–22 July for their 16th council of ministers meeting as part of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in Kinshasa. Henriette Ndombe (DR Congo) was appointed the new executive director of the NBI secretariat in Entebbe (Uganda). Apart from deliberating on many technical cooperation issues, mostly executed with substantial donor support, considerable progress was noted towards concluding the cooperative framework agreement that would lead to the establishment of the long-envisaged permanent Nile River Basin Commission. Most of the text had been agreed in 2007, but Egypt and Sudan were holding out against one contentious article that referred to historical water rights (formulated in the colonial-era treaties from 1929 and 1959) that gave Egypt veto powers over upstream water use by other countries. Again no decision was taken by the heads of state and the deadlock thus persisted. Rolf Hofmeier

Burundi

The year was marked by initial deadlock followed by clear but slow progress in the peace process with the ‘Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu-Forces Nationales de Libération’ (Palipehutu-FNL) rebel movement. The rebel leadership returned to Bujumbura in May. To put an end to an institutional stalemate in the National Assembly, 22 dissident former ‘Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie’ (CNDD-FDD) MPs were expelled and replaced by party loyalists. The UN Security Council extended the mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) until 31 December 2009. GDP growth rose to 4.5%, while inflation peaked at around 22%. Donors and the IMF were moderately satisfied with the implementation of PRSP policies.

Domestic Politics The peace process between the government and the Palipehutu-FNL rebel movement was marked by significant ups and downs. In February, an action programme to promote early implementation of the September 2006 comprehensive ceasefire agreement was developed by the political directorate and the South African facilitator, Minister Charles Nqakula, and

276 • Eastern Africa endorsed by both government and Palipehutu-FNL. The programme envisaged completion of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, the return of the rebel leadership to Burundi and integration of senior FNL cadres into national institutions. However, continued distrust by the FNL leadership of the Burundian government – allegedly because of the shortcomings of the legislation granting provisional immunity to FNL members – almost derailed the entire peace process: on 17 April violent hostilities broke out between FNL and the ‘Force de Défense Nationale’ (FDN). Both forces exchanged mortar and machine-gun fire in the immediate vicinity of Bujumbura and in neighbouring provinces, as a result of which thousands of civilians were displaced. The fighting ended in early May, following strong condemnation by Burundi’s international partners. A new ceasefire was agreed and the return of FNL leader Agathon Rwasa from Tanzania to Bujumbura on 30 May, after 20 years of exile, gave further impetus to the peace process. In the months following Rwasa’s return, several issues gave rise to renewed tension between government and Palipehutu-FNL. The first of these was the release of FNL’s socalled political prisoners and prisoners of war. Others were FNL’s request for around half the senior civilian and military positions; the timing, sequencing and funding of the process to identify, disarm and demobilise FNL members; and the recognition and registration of Palipehutu-FNL as a political party without changing its name (despite constitutional and other legal obstacles to ethnic references in the names of political parties). An important step forward was taken on 4 December when a joint declaration was signed by President Pierre Nkurunziza, Rwasa and the heads of state and government participating in a regional summit in Bujumbura on the peace process. It was agreed, among other things, that Palipehutu-FNL would alter its name before being registered as a political party and that the government would offer 33 senior posts to the rebel movement. (These posts were later specified and included two ambassadorships, two provincial governorships, etc., but the detailed apportionment was not accepted by FNL). On 31 December, about 250 FNL prisoners, beneficiaries of the provisional immunity, were released by ministerial order. However, no significant progress was made in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of Palipehutu-FNL members. Palipehutu-FNL submitted a list of some 21,000 claimed members (including armed and unarmed combatants). The identification of FNL combatants and their relocation to assigned assembly areas started very slowly. By mid-December, some 2,150 Palipehutu-FNL elements had gathered at Rugazi assembly area. According to human rights groups, hundreds of children remained in the ranks of Palipehutu-FNL. The armed conflict aside, general insecurity remained problematic. According to UN figures, the number of reported incidents involving armed violence amounted to 1,503, with – apart from the above-mentioned renewal of political violence in April – an increasing number of incidents, casualties and injuries towards the end of the year. The provinces most affected were Bujumbura town, Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza, Cibitoke and Ngozi.

Burundi • 277 Firearms remained widespread among the population. In May, a new commission on civilian disarmament and combating the proliferation of small arms was established. In 2008, some 6,000 light weapons were collected and destroyed. Soon after the government reshuffle in November 2007, a new political crisis arose opposing Nkurunziza’s dominant ruling party CNDD-FDD and its so-called ‘coalition partners’, (which in practice were often considered to be the main opposition parties) ‘Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi’ (FRODEBU) and ‘Union pour le Progrès National’ (UPRONA). Sources of disagreement included the proposed establishment of a parliamentary commission to monitor the implementation of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement with Palipehutu-FNL. In addition, internal divisions within CNDD-FDD exacerbated the political stalemate. On 26 January at a CNDD-FDD congress, leading members were expelled from the party. On 28 February, 46 MPs from various parties wrote to the UN Secretary General to express concern about their personal safety. Ten days later, the residences of four signatories of the letter were damaged after coming under grenade attack. As a result, the National Assembly was – once again – unable to execute its legislative work for several months. The government applied controversial strong-arm tactics in June to break this impasse. At the request of CNDD-FDD’s chairman, Jérémie Ngendakumana, the president of the National Assembly, Pie Ntavyohanyuma, initiated legal proceedings in the constitutional court. On 6 June, the court ruled that the continued presence in the National Assembly of 22 MPs who were no longer CNDD-FDD members (some of them having sided with deposed party chairman Hussein Radjabu in 2007) was unconstitutional. The legality of this judgment was severely criticised and it was widely felt that the judgment had strongly undermined the court’s independent standing. The 22 MPs were quickly replaced by party loyalists, as a result of which the ruling party – together with FRODEBU dissidents who established a new party ‘FRODEBU Nyakuri’ (headed by former FRODEBU President Jean Minani and former Justice Minister Didace Kiganahe) – reestablished the two-thirds majority required under the constitution for any law to be adopted. Three of the 22 MPs were arrested and were still in prison at the end of 2008, while several others left the country. Some of them – most notably Pascaline Kampayano and Jean-Marie Ngendahayo – strongly criticised the government for corruption, bad governance and a deplorable human rights record. Legislative work resumed, however, and a substantial number of new laws were enacted by the end of the year. Despite the upheavals and marked tensions, the composition of the government remained unchanged in 2008. Both FRODEBU and UPRONA continued to be represented in the cabinet, but they increasingly behaved as opposition parties. The leadership of both parties felt hard done by for not being allowed to discard their own dissenting MPs, as had been the case for CNDD-FDD. A national dialogue framework (‘cadre de dialogue national’) failed to yield tangible results, but had the merit of serving as a continuous semi-informal

278 • Eastern Africa forum for dialogue and negotiation in which burning political issues could be addressed as they arose. On 4 April, almost a year after his arrest in 2007, former CNDD-FDD chairman Hussein Radjabu was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment by the supreme court for endangering the security of the state. Seven other suspects were sentenced at the same time. Despite his being held in Mpimba prison, his political relevance, most notably through the small but increasingly active ‘Union pour la Paix et le Développement’ (UPD) party formally led by Zedi Feruzi, brother of the former governor of Muyinga province, remained undeniable. Although new elections (presidential, legislative and local) were not due until mid-2010, political activity became increasingly dominated by the de facto launch of their electoral platforms by several political parties. A ministerial order was issued in October restricting the activities of political parties. But following strong protest, the order was soon amended. A second major source of political tension was the functioning and composition of the ‘Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante’ (CENI). A presidential decree on its establishment, mandate and functioning was promulgated on 18 June. Opposition parties feared that CENI would not be able to operate independently and requested amendment of the decree (which in fact was twice amended). In addition, CENI members proposed by Nkurunziza were strongly opposed by the opposition. Since the constitution requires a three-quarters parliamentary majority for the appointment of CENI members, FRODEBU and UPRONA continued to insist on negotiations and political dialogue on CENI’s functioning and composition. Also in view of the 2010 elections, several new political parties were established, including one by former Second Vice President Alice Nzomukunda, the ‘Alliance pour la Démocratie et le Renouveau’ (ADR). By the end of the year, 40 political parties had been officially registered. Apart from Palipehutu-FNL, a second political movement awaiting registration was the ‘Mouvement pour la Sécurité et la Démocratie’, later renamed ‘Mouvement pour la Solidarité et la Démocratie’ (MSD). Its leader, wellknown journalist Alexis Sinduhije, was arrested on 3 November for holding an illegal political meeting. Amnesty International and several other organisations campaigned for his release. Other human rights-related concerns continued to tarnish the government’s image. Some human rights abuses were clearly linked to the general context of political violence and the increasing pre-electoral climate and inter-party competition. UPD repeatedly protested against intimidation and the arrest of several of party members. Other people with links to political parties were targeted. In early 2008, a number of local CNDD-FDD officials were killed, presumably by FNL-Palipehutu. Several individuals linked to FNL and FRODEBU were, according to eye-witness accounts, targeted by agents of the National Intelligence Service (SNR), local administration officials and members of CNDD-FDD youth divisions. The director of Net Press news agency, Jean-Claude Kavumbagu, was arrested on charges of defamation on 11 September. He had disclosed that Nkurunziza’s participation in the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in China had been exces-

Burundi • 279 sively expensive. Justice sector trade union leader Juvénal Rududura was arrested for allegedly falsely accusing government officials of corruption. Following years of international pressure, including by international human rights NGOs and the UN Human Rights Council independent expert on Burundi, the suspected perpetrators of a massacre of civilians in Muyinga province in August 2006 were brought to trial before a military court in October. The main accused (who had fled Burundi in December 2007), Colonel Vital Bangirimana, was sentenced to death in absentia, while 14 others received prison sentences. Three legislative developments were also noteworthy. First, with assistance from the Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, legislation was drafted to establish a national independent human rights commission in June. However, the new bill adopted by the cabinet in November considerably reduced the independence of the commission in terms of its mandate, powers and the appointment of its members, Second, the National Assembly and the senate adopted the Optional Protocol under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, allowing individual victims to submit their cases before the Human Rights Committee. However, the president refused to promulgate the law and asked parliament that it be brought forward for a second reading. Third, a new criminal code was tabled in the National Assembly. The bill was widely applauded for defining and addressing the crime of torture and for abolishing the death penalty. It was, however, strongly criticised for criminalising homosexual conduct, a provision inserted at the very last moment during discussion in the parliamentary committee on justice and human rights and at the request of the president’s office. The National Assembly adopted the new criminal code on 22 November, but it was expected the senate might want to amend certain provisions, as a result of which the bill would again be tabled for discussion in the National Assembly. Very little progress was made in regard to the transitional justice process. Following the signing of a framework agreement between the UN and the Burundi government in November 2007, a tripartite steering committee (including UN, government and civil society representatives) continued to prepare nationwide popular consultations on transitional justice. A technical follow-up committee elaborated more detailed workplans and national consultations were expected to start possibly in early 2009. While the transitional justice negotiations were initially led by the first vice presidency (Tutsi, UPRONA), Nkurunziza and his close advisors gradually took control. While CNDD-FDD did not formally call into question the agreed establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission and special tribunal, both of mixed national and international composition, it increasingly expressed preference for a transitional justice mechanism centred on truth, reconciliation, pardoning and (conditional) amnesty, rather than on truth-telling and accountability through criminal prosecution. Burundi continued to face the classic post-conflict challenge of resettling returnees and IDPs. According to UNHCR, some 95,000 Burundian refugees returned in 2008 (most from Tanzania, including more than 30,000 from old refugee settlements dating back to the

280 • Eastern Africa 1972 Hutu massacres). Over the past six years, more than 470,000 refugees had returned home. To deal with land disputes involving returnees, a special commission (‘Commission Nationale des Terres et Autres Biens’) had been established. It reported that by 1 November some 10,770 disputes had been brought to its attention, of which some 3,380 had been settled. Another significant challenge remained the demobilisation of the military, in combination with the need to achieve an ethnic balance within the various security forces (as stipulated in the constitution). In March, presidential advisors announced a plan to demobilise 3,480 military personnel by June, most of them Tutsi (including senior ranks). This prompted major concerns and almost caused serious unrest when 650 Tutsi soldiers openly refused to be demobilised. Although the plan’s implementation was revised at the request of Defence Minister Germain Niyoyankana, the challenge of demobilisation remained to be dealt with sooner or later. More generally, on several occasions throughout the year CNDD-FDD leaders expressed a desire to amend the constitution, including elements of its crucial consociational power-sharing mechanisms and its ethnic equilibrium provisions.

Foreign Affairs On 22 December, the UN Security Council extended the BINUB mandate until 31 December 2009 and encouraged leaders of the regional peace initiative, the South African facilitator, the AU and the political directorate to remain actively engaged in Burundi’s peace process and to assist in ensuring its sustainability. In principle, the mandates of both the South African facilitation process and the AU special task force were scheduled to expire on 31 December 2008. The World Bank’s Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), which provided funding for Burundi’s DDR programme, closed on 31 December. However, the World Bank proposed the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund for the DDR programme to which it pledged a $ 10 m grant, so as to avoid a funding gap between the closure of the MDRP and the start of the trust fund. The UN Peacebuilding Commission remained active in Burundi’s post-conflict reconstruction process, with specific focus on governance, the security sector, human rights and land issues. In June, a biannual review of progress in implementing the strategic framework for peacebuilding in Burundi was undertaken. A country-specific configuration meeting on Burundi took place on 12 December. New projects approved by the Peacebuilding Fund steering committee included a project to improve service delivery by local administrations and funding for the national consultations on transitional justice. In September, the UN Human Rights Council resolved to extend the mandate of the independent expert on human rights in Burundi and emphasised the establishment of an independent national human rights commission as a precondition for ending the mandate of the independent expert. In January, the UN committee on the elimination of violence

Burundi • 281 and discrimination against women noted considerable areas of concern and recommended reforms, including amendment of discriminatory legislation, elimination of discriminatory cultural practices and implementation of a national gender policy. In his report in August, the independent expert, Akich Okola, noted that the overall human rights situation had deteriorated. In December, Burundi was also considered at the third session of the universal periodic review working group of the UN Human Rights Council. At the 7th extraordinary summit of EAC in Uganda in October, Burundi was represented by Second Vice President Gabriel Ntisezerana. The summit considered the progress report on the comprehensive road map prepared by the EAC secretariat to facilitate effective integration of Rwanda and Burundi into EAC’s organisational system. Earlier in May, nine members representing Burundi in the East African legislative assembly were sworn in. Their selection had been the subject of considerable political disagreement among the parties represented in the government. In response to a Burundian request to the four other EAC member states, Rwanda made available around $ 1 m to assist Burundi in paying its annual contribution to the EAC budget. Relations with neighbouring Rwanda remained friendly. In his capacity as acting EAC chairman, Rwandan President Paul Kagame visited Burundi for three days in August. Much to the dissatisfaction of Burundian journalists, Burundian and Rwandan officials had agreed that certain bilateral issues would not be addressed during the closing press conference. These included publication by Rwanda of a list of 670 Burundians suspected of active involvement in the 1994 genocide, the investigation into the death of former Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira (who was on board Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana’s aircraft when it was shot down on 6 April 1994) and a border dispute. Renewed hostilities in the eastern DR Congo from September onwards had no significant political or security-related repercussions inside Burundi. However, in November, some 600 demobilised soldiers joined Laurent Nkunda’s ‘Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple’ (CNDP) rebellion. They probably did so with at least the knowledge and acquiescence of Burundi’s government and FDN leadership. Most were Tutsi, probably looking for a job. Eyewitnesses reported that these recruits were paid between $ 500 and $ 600. In October, Burundi deployed an extra 850 troops to Somalia as part of the AU military there. This contingent was in addition to the 850 soldiers sent in late 2007 and early 2008.

Socioeconomic Developments Burundi’s macroeconomic performance was marked by a small increase in GDP growth from 3.6% in 2007 to 4.5% in 2008, thanks in part to a good coffee harvest. Consumer price inflation peaked at around 22%, compared to 8.4% in 2007. Inflation was expected to fall in 2009 in line with falling international food and fuel prices. As in previous years,

282 • Eastern Africa Burundi’s currency remained relatively stable, probably due to the weakness of the US dollar and thanks to significant donor funds. The current account deficit rose to 14.5% of GDP. Higher coffee prices during 2007–08 boosted coffee exports (which accounted for about two-thirds of total exports).The ‘Office du Thé du Burundi’ (OTB) reported a 45% increase in earnings in the tea sector compared to 2007. However, falling prices on the international market for both tea and coffee towards the end of 2008 were likely to result in a fall in growers’ incomes in 2009. Despite major criticism, the budget for 2009 was adopted by parliament in early December. It projected an increase of 45% in revenues and 57% in expenditures, with a deficit exceeding $ 100 m. Burundi depended on foreign aid for some 50% of its 2009 budget. The biggest budget allocations were for defence and education. Several observers, including the auditor general and the non-governmental watchdog ‘Observatoire de Lutte contre la Corruption et les Malversations Économiques’ (OLUCOME) criticised the budget for being unrealistic, in particular in light of actual revenues and donor disbursements in 2008. Indeed, in August a supplementary budget for 2008 was approved by government, increasing planned expenditure by 14%. Major concern was expressed about the modest allocation for the agricultural sector (despite the fact that more than 90% of the population lives by agriculture), sharply contrasted with the allocation of $ 9.4 m to the president’s office, including $ 2 m which the president can spend in support of whatever he deems to be ‘good initiatives’. Also of major concern for OLUCOME and other observers was a provision in the new public finance law of 17 November. Originally, article 55 of the law placed the financial inspectorate of the state under the ministry of good governance, but this was subsequently brought directly under the president’s office, meaning that the president himself could decide which financial dossiers involving allegations of corruption or embezzlement of public funds would be made public and which kept secret. An annual PRSP progress report was published in November. It identified for each of the four priority PRSP axes the actions undertaken to realise agreed objectives, possible constraints and short-term programmes to be implemented. Overall results of the first year of PRSP implementation were considered encouraging. For the ‘improving governance and security’ strategic axis, performance indicators suggested that much work remained, including efforts to raise the percentage of judgments rendered relative to outstanding cases. In terms of the ‘promoting sustainable and fair growth’ axis, performance indicators suggested a mixed trend, with GDP growth well below projections. The third axis, ‘developing human capital’, was characterised by noteworthy progress in regard to the number of assisted vulnerable persons, appropriations for housing, the completion rate for primary schools, assisted deliveries and vaccine coverage. The fourth axis, the ‘fight against HIV/AIDS’, performed well, particular the number of care providers and affected persons receiving support.

Burundi • 283 In July, six months after the expiry of the first PRGF, the IMF approved a new threeyear PRGF to support the medium-term programme of promoting macroeconomic stabilisation, reducing poverty and enhancing structural reform and governance. The macroeconomic objectives of this PRGF-supported programme included 5% average GDP growth for the three years to come (compared to 3.6% for the 2004–07); reduction of inflation to around 6% by 2011; and stabilisation of gross official reserves to cover three months of imports. In October-November, an IMF mission working jointly with the government carried out the first review of the implementation of the programme during April-September. The mission was generally satisfied with Burundi’s progress towards the completion point under the HIPC process, allowing for possible substantial debt relief in 2009. Earlier, in May and August, the use of HIPC assistance had been the subject of two technical and financial audits. In the last quarter of 2008, a major drought affected the northern part of the country, in particular Kirundo province. Apart from causing food shortages for an estimated 15,000 households, the drought also impaired Burundi’s hydroelectric output. The government announced it would have to institute power rationing in Bujumbura, which consumes over 90% of the country’s electricity. Stef Vandeginste

Comoros

A military invasion, with assistance from the AU, toppled the illegal leadership of Anjouan island and political life returned to normalcy after new elections for the island presidency. The delicate politico-institutional set-up of the ‘Union des Comores’ remained, however, tense, with renewed quarrelling over the respective competencies of the Union authorities and the leaders of the three semi-autonomous islands and with attempts by President Sambi to bring about changes to the complex federal constitution. Mistrust among leading political figures thus remained high. There was no noticeable improvement in social conditions for the majority of the population and the general economic performance remained very poor.

Domestic Politics The year 2007 had ended with an unresolved stand-off between the Union authorities and Anjouan’s president, Mohamed Bacar, who had engineered his continuance in power in elections that had generally been regarded as illegal. A vicious conflict had arisen mainly between Bacar and Union President Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, while the leaders of the other two islands, Ngazidja (Grande Comore) and Mohéli, had remained somewhat aloof and

286 • Eastern Africa suspicious of Sambi’s ambitions. Despite AU sanctions and growing isolation, Bacar had stubbornly refused demands for new elections, while Sambi was determined to end Bacar’s illegal rule by any means, even including military invasion. Sambi’s new-year address consequently focused fully on Bacar’s rebellion and on the need to liberate Anjouan. During the following weeks, political activities, including public demonstrations, were geared up in support of an invasion, while Sambi actively solicited support from the AU in the form of troops from African countries to assist his own ‘Armée Nationale de Développement’ (AND), which was no match for the Anjouanese gendarmerie. Despite clear signs of a build-up to an imminent invasion, Bacar did not respond to a personal notification by the AU’s long-standing special representative Franceso Madeira on 27 February and the invasion became inevitable. On 25 March, a combined force of about 450 AND, 750 Tanzanian and 600 Sudanese soldiers under a Tanzanian commander landed on Anjouan from neighbouring Mohéli. They met little resistance from the 500strong gendarmerie and quickly seized control of the island, while Bacar and 22 close followers fled by boat to the nearby French-controlled island of Mayotte, whence they were quickly transferred to Réunion, a French overseas département. The French refusal to extradite Bacar to Comoros triggered recurring public protests and confirmed suspicions of secret French collusion with Bacar’s secessionist strategies. Bacar was in June sentenced to three months imprisonment, but his application for asylum in France was rejected and he was eventually given refuge in Benin on 19 July. On 31 March, the president of Anjouan’s appeal court was named as head of a provisional island executive until the holding of new elections. The same five candidates for the island presidency that had boycotted the illegal 2007 elections now presented themselves again, while Bacar’s attempt to run was invalidated by the constitutional court. The AU mission’s mandate had in the meantime been extended until October to enable the mission to supervise the elections and guarantee public security. On 15 June, Mohamed Djaanfari, a Union MP and Sambi’s rival in the 2006 elections, won 44.2% of the votes against 40.1% for little-known Moussa Toybou, who was strongly supported by Sambi. This result, based on a participation rate of only 42.8%, necessitated a second round of voting on 29 June. With 49% of the electorate participating, Toybou now emerged as winner with 52.4% of the vote. Djaanfari, who protested against Sambi’s undue support for Toybou, had himself been backed by the Ngazidja and Mohéli presidents. External observers, however, considered the elections to be generally satisfactory, with only minor irregularities. With the installation of Toybou as Anjouan president and of a new island cabinet, the long crisis had at last come to an end and the country returned to a condition of political normalcy. At the same time, Sambi had been provided with a loyal supporter from his own native Anjouan in the continuing complex inter-island rivalries – in sharp contrast with the previously prevailing situation. Legislative elections for both Union and island parliaments that were supposed to have been held in March/April (in accordance with a four-year cycle) were

Comoros • 287 silently skipped without any noticeable public discussion, obviously due to the preoccupation with solving the Anjouan crisis. A conflict over the composition of the constitutional court raised the political temperature in late June in the crucial period between the two rounds of the Anjouan election. Sambi insisted that the six-year mandate of the court’s president (and two other members) had lapsed on 12 June and went ahead with nominating a new president in the face of protests from many representatives of the political class. However, three new judges of the constitutional court (of a total of seven) were sworn in on 30 June and immediately had to approve the second round election result. Sambi on 11 July undertook his third cabinet reshuffle since assuming power in 2006, retaining the two vice presidents from Ngazidja and Mohéli and increasing the number of members by three to 15. This was reversed in the next reshuffle on 12 December, when the cabinet was drastically reduced to only two vice presidents and eight ministers, in line with an agreement with the IMF on the need for leaner state structures and a reduction in the bloated public sectors resulting from the parallel existence of four governments (union and three separate island administrations). According to the IMF agreement, the total number of ministers in the country was not to exceed 26, i.e., only five for each island. On 4 February, Ngazidja President Mohamed Abdoulwahab had formed a new stronger government amid signs of a more confrontational stance towards Sambi, with whom he had formerly collaborated closely. On 13 November, the Ngazidja cabinet was again reshuffled and its membership increased by two to nine. In late August, Mohéli President Mohamed Ali Said formed a new slightly changed island government, the third within a year. The political landscape in respect of formalised party structures remained extremely volatile, with a multitude of highly personalised small groups. The ‘Mouvement des Citoyens pour la Justice et le Progrès’ (MCJP) had been specifically formed in 2007 to support Sambi’s role as national leader, while his predecessor Azali Assoumani’s ‘Convention pour le Renouveau des Comores’ (CRC) attempted to regain strength and influence. Sharp controversy arose over an economic citizenship programme that was first mooted in July by Sambi with the intention of conferring Comorian citizenship on residents (but without full nationality) from Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and possibly other countries. This proposal was initially rejected, but on 27 November passed into law after a controversial second reading in parliament in the face of angry protests by dissenting MPs and many other politicians. Sambi had stressed the expectation of very lucrative advantages, including the prospect of investments of up to $ 200 m within two years, while opponents feared a potential sell-out of national interests. There were also widely held suspicions of a growing Shiite religious influence arising from Sambi’s close personal links with Iran (exemplified by his nickname Ayatollah), while Comorians are predominantly Sunni. The government’s popularity was further eroded by continuing severe economic and social problems, with little prospect of improvement, thus raising the spectre of social unrest.

288 • Eastern Africa Subsequent to the removal of Bacar’s illegal regime, national political life became increasingly overshadowed by the difficulties of and frustrations in abiding by the complex regulations in the federal constitution agreed to as a compromise in 2001. Sambi had on various notable occasions since 2007 severely criticised the weakness and high cost of the existing institutions and had continued to demand substantial and more workable revisions. This immediately raised fears among island leaders (especially from Ngazidja and Mohéli) that Sambi’s ambition was to centralise power in the Union government, substantially reduce costly public service structures and undertake much more far-reaching economic reform, including privatisation of state institutions and anti-corruption measures. This inevitably led to increasingly antagonistic posturing by Sambi on the one hand and by Abdoulwahab and Said on the other, despite the absence of the deep personal antipathies that had existed during Assoumani’s rule. During independence day celebrations on 6 July, as on other occasions, Sambi repeatedly insisted on the need for changes to the constitution, to be discussed in a new ‘inter-Comorian dialogue’ conference and to be confirmed by referendum. Protests against such plans were particularly strong on Mohéli, since (according to the rotating presidency principle of the constitution) the next president was expected to be elected in 2010 from that island. On 24 November, Sambi unilaterally announced the holding of a constitutional referendum (possibly in conjunction with legislative elections) probably in March 2009, thus leaving this fundamental issue unresolved at the end of the year.

Foreign Affairs The AU continued to play a crucial role as arbiter in the inter-Comorian conflict. In January, AU sanctions against Bacar’s Anjouan regime were extended by another 30 days, but the maritime blockade proved to be ineffective. While Sambi intensified his efforts to solicit support for a military invasion, he was frustrated by South African President Mbeki’s refusal and insistence on further diplomatic mediation with Bacar. On 20 February, the AU Peace and Security Council finally approved a military solution, with Libya, Tanzania, Senegal and Sudan offering troops for the exercise (with French logistical and transport assistance). For the AU, this was the culmination of its longstanding involvement in the Comorian problem, with the expectation of a successful result, in contrast with the failures of most other AU missions. Tanzania’s President Kikwete, the AU chairman, was determined to go ahead with the operation, even after an angry last-minute exchange with Mbeki. Tanzania and Sudan eventually contributed the bulk of the AU force for the March invasion, whereas the Senegalese contingent never arrived and Libya provided only minor logistical support. The last Tanzanian soldiers from the AU mission left Anjouan only at

Comoros • 289 the end of October. On 25 August, Sambi addressed the Tanzanian parliament and gave thanks for the support provided. Throughout the year, Sambi had a busy international travel schedule in pursuit of his goal to secure both diplomatic recognition and concrete socioeconomic assistance for his weak government. He thus personally attended both semi-annual AU summits, the 20th Arab League summit in Damascus in March, the 10th CEN-SAD summit in Cotonou in June, the UN General Assembly in late September and the 12th Francophonie summit in Quebec in October. In mid-June, Sambi visited Iran to further strengthen bilateral relations, despite the fears of his domestic opponents about the growth of Iranian influence. A visit on 20–21 July to Washington was mainly to lobby for renewed financial and economic support from the US, IMF and World Bank. On 9 January, US Undersecretary of State for Africa Jendayi Fraser had been in Moroni (on a brief extension of her intervention in Kenya) to discuss the then threatening Anjouan problem. Bilateral relations with France remained rather ambivalent and delicate, due to the long-simmering conflict over Mayotte. At the same time, care was taken not to jeopardise the crucial support of the former colonial power and major aid donor. Strong anti-French public protests arose over France’s refusal to hand Bacar over to Comorian authorities and over the harsh treatment meted out to illegal Comorian migrants (primarily from Anjouan), who continued to try to find refuge on Mayotte. In April, this led to a temporary diplomatic stand-off when the government categorically refused to readmit any such persons sent back from Mayotte, but this was soon rescinded in exchange for an easier procedure for Comorians to obtain French visas. New public demonstrations against France in September were in reaction to the announcement of a referendum to be held on Mayotte in March 2009 to decide on the status of a fully-fledged ‘Département d’Outre-Mer’, which had long been demanded by the majority of the island population. During national day celebrations on 12 November, the claim to Mayotte as an undisputably integral part of the Comorian nation was again reiterated and supported with demonstrations, but Sambi was nevertheless careful to state at the same time that France remained a privileged partner of the Comoros, thus underscoring the existing dilemma. On 15–16 May, two French junior ministers, in charge of cooperation and of overseas territories, visited Moroni to initiate a French-Comorian ‘Groupe de Travail de Haut Niveau’ (GTHN). This met several times during the year with the aim of making practical improvements (trade, travel regulations, etc.) and normalising bilateral relations and for the first time included representatives from Mayotte. The results of the 4th GTHN round from 10–12 December in Moroni were expected to lead to a bilateral accord in 2009 during a vaguely envisaged visit by French President Sarkozy, although uncertainties remained on account of the looming Mayotte referendum.

290 • Eastern Africa

Socioeconomic Developments In view of the continued political instability, no improvement in the generally poor economic performance was in sight and living conditions for the vast majority of the population remained extremely precarious, particularly on Anjouan after the isolation under the Bacar regime. GDP growth in both 2007 and 2008 was only minimal at 0.5%, thus leading to further decline in per capita income. The inflation rate of 9.6% had doubled in comparison to 2007. Imports of $ 161 m were matched by export receipts of just $ 10 m, and the negative current-account balance of $ 18.6 m (equivalent to 8.7% of GDP) was the highest in history. Comoros’s terms of trade had deteriorated by an average of 16% over the last three years. The accumulated total external debt was estimated at $ 296 m and was clearly unsustainable. Foreign reserves of around $ 100 m remained roughly the same as in 2007 and the currency (Franc Comorien) remained pegged to the euro due to membership in the franc zone. Remittances from the large Comorian diaspora remained essential for the national current account as well as for many individual families. Public finances were once again extremely precarious (partly due to the cost of the Anjouan invasion), and most public servants experienced seven months arrears in salary payments. The fiscal deficit continued to deteriorate to an estimated 2.7% of GDP, despite the introduction of various highly unpopular reform measures (such as increased fuel prices and power tariffs). An IMF mission visited Comoros in July/August for routine article IV consultations. It assessed the general economic situation with a view to preparing the way for renewed financial assistance to the government, although a full PRSP was not expected before spring 2009 and the country was still not eligible for complete debt cancellation under HIPC and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative terms. On 26 November, the government sent a letter of intent to the IMF outlining its further intended reform measures. This in turn resulted in IMF approval on 15 December of a $ 1.7 m loan in Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) and a $ 3.4 m disbursement under the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF). Some of this funding was immediately used to pay parts of the salary arrears. IMF approval was conditional on resumption of the old revenue-sharing formula among the union and island administrations (suspended by Sambi in February) and on promises of regular monthly monitoring of the budget situation. The IMF was moderately positive about the chances for gradual improvement in the overall financial and economic situation, provided a number of reforms were actually implemented. However, reform remained a fundamental bone of contention between Sambi and the island presidents. Whereas Sambi was pushing to reduce the overstaffed civil service and costly duplicate institutions, to privatise parastatal bodies and for fiscal reform, his adversaries remained highly sceptical about such moves. Widespread social unrest became evident during several months of severe fuel shortages and power cuts after the fuel supply contract between Total and ‘Société Comorienne de Hydrocarbures’ (SCH) expired in April and was replaced, but only after some delay, by

Comoros • 291 an arrangement with an Iranian firm. The next oil tanker arrived only in August, while the shortages had generally driven up food and other prices and hampered various productive activities. Not much visible progress was made with Sambi’s pet habitat programme to improve housing conditions. Despite various announcements of expected new business investments, mostly from Arab countries and Iran, nothing much actually materialised. In June, a second retail bank, Exim Bank Comoros (a subsidiary of Tanzanian Exim Bank), was launched as competitor to the French-controlled ‘Banque pour l’Industrie et le Commerce’ (BIC), previously the sole bank on the islands. Rolf Hofmeier

Djibouti

Single-list parliamentary elections without any genuine contest confirmed the undisputed control over all aspects of public life of President Ismail Omar Guelleh and his longruling ‘Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès’ (RPP). Weak opposition forces continued to be subjected to intimidation and harassment, and one party was dissolved by presidential decree. A border conflict with Eritrea escalated into open military confrontation, with several casualties, and remained unresolved by the end of the year. Despite renewed drought and severe food security problems for large segments of the population, the macroeconomic performance was relatively satisfactory and the investment boom continued. After years of IMF disapproval of the government’s fiscal policies, a new PRGF arrangement was agreed.

Domestic Politics The parliamentary election on 8 February for 65 seats in the National Assembly was held in the absence of any competition for the ruling electoral coalition ‘Union pour la Majorité Presidentielle’ (UMP), since the opposition bloc ‘Union pour une Alternance Démocratique’ (UAD) had condemned the elections as a charade and had opted to boycott

294 • Eastern Africa them. This was in reaction to the fact that in the last elections in 2003, UAD had not obtained a single seat despite having received 37% of the popular vote, due to an electoral system with unevenly sized multi-seat constituencies. UAD’s demands for proportional representation had been routinely quashed by Prime Minister Dileita Mohamed Dileita on the grounds that this would upset the delicate tribal balance, although he conceded that changes might be needed at some point in the future. Opposition spokespersons branded the existing electoral regime as effectively a one-party system. Both main ethnic groups, Afars and Somali Issas, had equal numbers of MPs. UMP filed its finely-balanced list of 65 candidates with the ‘Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante’ (CENI) on 10 January. More than a third of them were new and 14% were women. While RPP, generally perceived as representing the Issas, clearly had the lion’s share as senior coalition partner, the list also included representatives from the other coalition members: the moderate faction of the ‘Front pour la Restauration de l’Unité et de la Démocratie’ (FRUD), generally regarded as representing the Afars, as well as three minor parties ‘Parti National Démocratique’ (PND), ‘Parti Populaire Social Démocrate’ (PPSD) and ‘Union des Partisans de la Réforme’ (UPR). CENI barred the ‘Ligue Djiboutienne des Droits Humains’ (LDDH) from putting forward candidates. The campaign was officially scheduled between 25 January and 6 February, but was generally uninspiring since all candidates were unopposed. Several attempts by opposition groups to organise public rallies were, however, banned on the pretext that the groups concerned had not fielded any candidates for the election. Several of their leaders were intimidated, arrested for short periods or placed under house arrest, again confirming the opposition’s complaints about recurring governmental repression. According to the official election results, the turnout was 72.6%, but this seemingly high participation was somewhat misleading, since the registration rate had been fairly low. Of the ballots cast, 6% were spoilt and all 65 candidates were naturally declared elected by the constitutional council. Observers from the AU and the Arab League gave the election a positive assessment. On 27 March, in a spirit of continuity, Guelleh appointed a new 21-member cabinet with only minor changes. Prime Minister Dileita, holding his office since 2001 and the most influential Afar representative, was retained as well as all ministers responsible for key portfolios, but the appointment of two women was a novelty. In July, Guelleh created a new post of secretary general of government and entrusted it to an old friend, Ismail Houssain Tani. Throughout the year, the government remained in full control of all aspects of the public sphere and left practically no room for noticeable activity by the weak opposition groups, which lived under the threat of more severe repression. On 9 July, the ‘Mouvement pour le Renouveau Démocratique et le Développement’ (MRD), whose leader Daher Ahmed Farah lived in exile in Brussels, was deregistered and had all its assets seized for allegedly supporting Eritrea in the border dispute that had recently erupted anew. MRD had been one of the constituents of the UAD opposition camp, together with the relatively stronger

Djibouti • 295 ‘Alliance Républicaine pour la Démocratie’ (ARD) and the smaller ‘Union Djiboutienne pour la Démocratie et la Justice’ (UDJ). The government suspected Farah of having contact with the dissident FRUD faction that had not subscribed to the 2001 peace accord and was responsible for the occasional armed commando raids that still occurred in the northern zone inhabited by Afars. The death under obscure circumstances on 6 May of a former FRUD fighter now serving in the army hinted at the apparent fragility of FRUD’s integration into the army. While the isolated raids by the remaining FRUD rebels in the north had long been largely ignored by government, this attitude changed markedly with concerted attacks in the media against the incursions and accusations that Eritrea was supporting the rebels. There were also indications of an apparent reluctance by some army elements to fight against the Afar rebels, indicating possible tension and disagreement within the army over the legitimacy of this approach.

Foreign Affairs Much attention was devoted to a renewed border dispute and armed clashes with Eritrea, similar to earlier confrontations in 1996 and 1999. Initial reports on the armed skirmishes in the northern border area from 18–22 April between army units and alleged Afar rebels were unclear as to the degree of military support from the Eritrean side, but indicated renewed conflict in the border triangle with Ethiopia and on the strategically important Ras Doumeira promontory along the Red Sea. There were further skirmishes in May, followed on 10–12 June by direct confrontation between both armies, with intense close range fighting and a total of about 35–50 casualties. Djibouti then withdrew its troops some distance from the front line, whereas Eritrea categorically denied even the existence of a problem or having occupied Djiboutian territory. There were contradictory accounts of the events leading to the fighting, but apparently Eritrea had demanded the return of 30 deserters who had crossed the border to escape compulsory military service in Eritrea. While there were no further open clashes during the rest of the year, the problem remained unresolved as the Eritrean military did not withdraw from Djiboutian soil. Guelleh spoke of a war situation and attempted to solicit international support from various quarters, but to little avail. The UN Security Council on 24 June and again on 17 September strongly denounced Eritrea’s actions and demanded withdrawal of its troops. Similar positions were taken by the AU and Arab League as well as many national governments. Djibouti fully cooperated with several fact-finding missions, while Eritrea simply refused to meet with any potential mediators (such as Iran and Qatar, who offered their services on the grounds they were on good terms with both belligerent parties). On 26 August, Djibouti handed 26 Eritrean prisoners over to the Red Cross and gave out renewed conciliatory signals, but the stalemate persisted. In continuation of earlier largely failed initiatives, the Djiboutian government once again made strenuous efforts to mediate in the unresolved Somalia conflict and to host the months of inter-Somalian negotiations under UN auspices. Guelleh on 12 May decreed the

296 • Eastern Africa formation of a high-calibre government commission to ensure full support for this renewed attempt to reconcile Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) with most of its internal adversaries, especially the majority wing of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS). After almost four weeks of UN-sponsored talks, a consensus arrangement was reached on 9 June and was subsequently signed as the Djibouti Agreement on 18 August. Djibouti continued to facilitate further discussions on the peace process, and Guelleh went to great lengths to underscore his role as regional peacemaker. However, a major international gathering on Somalia that took place in Djibouti at the end of September proved inconclusive. Djibouti continued to be an important conduit for many Somali refugees and asylum seekers on their way to the Arabian peninsula and the Middle East. In October, a Somali business investment council was set up in Djibouti to serve as a base for possible business contacts in Somalia. Bilateral relations with France, the former colonial power, remained ambivalent, torn between France’s role as major aid donor and operator of a large and long-established military base and the tensions arising from an old judicial controversy over the alleged involvement of Guelleh in the murder (or suicide) of a French judge, Bernhard Borrel, in 1995. On 21 January, the International Court of Justice began its hearings into Djibouti’s complaint against France over the Borrel affair, based on the French authorities’ refusal to disclose witness statements and to quash the arrest warrants against two senior Djiboutian officials closely associated with Guelleh. On 4 June, the ICJ ruled that France had not violated the terms of a cooperation agreement in its handling of this case. In the meantime, on 27 March, a French court had sentenced the two officials in absentia to prison terms for bribing key witnesses to discredit testimony against Guelleh. In obvious retaliation, on 7 April Djibouti issued arrest warrants for alleged child abuse against five French nationals, including two diplomats, who had resided in the region in 1995. Guelleh was clearly frustrated that French President Sarkozy appeared to show no inclination to intervene in the case and bury the issue, unlike his predecessor Chirac. The strained relations improved markedly when France fully supported Djibouti in the border conflict with Eritrea and provided useful logistical and intelligence assistance to Djiboutian forces. Guelleh acknowledged this specifically by thanking France in his independence day address on 27 June. Doubts about the long-term future of the French military presence, estimated to bring about $ 150 m into the country annually, had arisen on 15 January when Sarkozy signed an agreement for a new military base in Abu Dhabi, considered by some as a potential alternative to Djibouti. In mid-October, Guelleh met with Sarkozy on the sidelines of the Francophonie summit in Quebec to seek a higher French profile in Djibouti, including in the business field to counterbalance increasingly dominant Dubai interests. The US military base signified the country’s continuing high geostrategic value for Western security interests in the Horn of Africa and over large parts of the Indian Ocean. This value was further underscored with the dramatic increase in piracy by Somalis along the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden. On 13 December, an agreement with the EU was

Djibouti • 297 signed making Djibouti the base for the UN-mandated EU anti-piracy task force comprising patrol ships from several countries. The threat of piracy also endangered ambitious Djiboutian plans to become a key commercial hub for the wider sub-region. Political Relations with Ethiopia were largely unproblematic and centred mainly on the practical aspects of Djibouti’s crucial role as transit point for its big neighbour’s trade with the rest of the world. Djibouti’s mediation role in the Somalia conflict was very favourably regarded by Ethiopia in view of its intention to withdraw its own troops from that country. The Djibouti-based IGAD secretariat continued to have little noticeable impact on the problems of the sub-region. On 28 December, Guelleh participated as an observer in the 6th summit of the Sanaa Cooperation Group (founded in 2002 by Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen) in Khartoum. The first national workshop to prepare for an APRM exercise was held in late December. A Djibouti-China friendship group was formed in parliament in June.

Socioeconomic Developments Despite a markedly improved macroeconomic performance, Djibouti was confronted with severe food insecurity for substantial sections of the population as an effect of prolonged drought. In mid-April, the government had to introduce emergency measures to contain the situation and on 29 May the World Bank approved a special $ 5 m grant to support the government’s programme to mitigate the impact of dramatically increased food prices on the poor. By July, there was near famine in pastoral areas and almost half the population was considered to be affected by food shortages or unaffordable food prices in varying degree, due to the country’s near-total dependence on food imports. Appeals for more international food aid met with limited response and the government’s emergency programmes proved largely inadequate to a problem of this scale. By the end of the year, there was only slight improvement in the situation. Despite several years of persistent criticism of government for its lax fiscal policies, on 29 March at the end of regular article IV consultations a visiting IMF mission announced IMF’s readiness to start negotiations with government for a new PRGF. This opened up new opportunities to obtain international support, since the IMF was satisfied that considerable progress had been made in implementing economic and financial policies, even though influential elements of the political elite still resisted a more reform-oriented course. Another IMF mission from 14–24 June further strengthened the newfound cooperation and acknowledged the obvious boom in the economy, but again insisted on stricter expenditure control by government. On 18 September, the IMF approved a three-year PRGF of $ 20 m in support of the government’s economic programme and its own version of a PRSP dubbed the ‘Initiative National pour le Développement Social’ (INDS), which had been launched in January 2007. An immediate initial disbursement of $ 6 m was expected to strengthen Djibouti’s position against food and oil price shocks. On 16 October, a debt

298 • Eastern Africa reduction agreement was signed with the Paris Club to reduce the country’s debt burden by up to 79%. The debt owing to Paris Club creditors was estimated in August to be nominally around $ 100 m, more than 60% of this in arrears. With the IMF and Paris Club agreements, new hopes were raised that determined implementation of the INDS could significantly address key structural bottlenecks in the Djiboutian economy. The likely impact of the global financial crisis on Djibouti was thought to be relatively limited. At the macro level, the economy performed strongly in 2008 with a GDP growth rate of 5.8% (5.3% in 2007), driven mainly by foreign direct investment and robust construction and maritime services. Inflation was 9.2% at year’s end following steep increases in food and oil prices earlier in the year. The currency remained pegged to the dollar under a currency board arrangement. The extremely skewed trade balance (imports $ 575 m, exports/ re-exports $ 75 m) clearly demonstrated the characteristic imbalance in the economy. The negative current account balance was estimated to be equivalent to 27% of GDP. In the World Bank’s annual “Doing Business” assessment, Djibouti was ranked fairly low at 153 (out of 181 listed), indicating persistence of many traditional weaknesses in international business competitiveness. This had also been underscored in March in a US report on the business climate that stressed the prevalence of corruption and lack of confidence in the judicial system. The ambition of turning Djibouti into a sub-regional services and logistics hub, imitating Dubai, remained elusive, although modest progress was made with the arrival of new foreign banks and more investment funds. The construction of the big new Doraleh container terminal was delayed and its inauguration postponed to 2009. No firm progress was made with the ambitious plan to construct a suspension bridge, at 27 km the world’s longest, across the Red Sea to Yemen. An agreement signed in April with Iceland envisaged construction of a geothermal power plant by 2012 to free the country of dependence on oil. Ethiopia repeatedly complained of congestion and delays at the port, and for months there was a simmering dispute over the increased port charges DP World, the port operator from Dubai, considered to be unavoidable. In August, Guelleh intervened personally at the last minute and demanded further discussions with Ethiopia, but on 1 December the tariffs were raised by 15%-25%. The sorely needed rehabilitation of the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway faced another setback when the contract signed with a Kuwait firm as new investor and operator collapsed in December. DP World also expressed an interest in the railway project, but a final decision had yet to be made. Rolf Hofmeier

Eritrea

The government continued its self-reliance strategy, based on a militarised command economy employing national service recruits in infrastructure projects and commercial agriculture. A poor harvest increased the threat of malnutrition and imported consumer goods reached price levels far exceeding average world market prices, partly due to increased contraband trade. There were no reforms in the political and judicial systems and the human rights record remained extremely poor. The mass exodus of young people continued. The UN Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) was terminated in July, with no solution of Eritrea’s conflict with its neighbour in sight. A border conflict with Djibouti led to armed clashes, while US-Eritrean relations continued to be poor.

Domestic Politics There were no structural changes in the political system and no intentions on the part of President Isaias Afewerki to introduce even modest democratic reforms. In May, he stated in an interview that ‘democracy’ means not political pluralism but equal opportunities and rights for the majority. The People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) remained the only permitted party and no elections were held or planned for the future.

300 • Eastern Africa The National Assembly has been defunct since 2002, with several of its members arrested since the crackdown on dissidents in 2001. There were no changes in the cabinet. Ministers seemed to play only a marginal role in the political decision-making process, which is dominated by the president, while the growing power and political influence of military commanders became obvious during the year. The judicial system was based on ‘special courts’ with military commanders acting as judges, on a poorly organised modern court system and on ‘community courts’ headed by laypersons who were supposed to apply customary law. None of the political dissidents (G15) and journalists arrested in 2001 were released or brought to court, while arbitrary arrests without any legal follow-up continued on a regular basis. In summer, about 40 religious and secular traditional elders, all members of the Saho ethnic group, were detained for unspecified reasons and remained in custody throughout the year. For the second year in a row, Eritrea was ranked last worldwide in the press freedom index of Reporters Without Borders. In January, this organisation released a report on the journalist Seyoum Tsehaye, arrested in September 2001, stating that he was being held in Eiraeiro prison camp, a remote place in the Northern Red Sea region. On 17 April, Ali Abdu, the acting minister of information, deplored the Western media’s monopoly of information, claiming that Western media lacked professionalism, ethics and morality and criticising them for their “hollow advocacy of press freedom”. He praised the coverage by Eritrean media of issues in neighbouring countries. Eritrean TV and radio broadcast propaganda against the Ethiopian government in several Ethiopian languages, while the Ethiopian state TV directed similar broadcasts against the Eritrean government for Eritrean viewers. In late January and early February, several people were killed in acts of sabotage carried out by opposition groups. In Tessenei, a city bordering Sudan, a time-bomb exploded, while near Shilalo, Gash-Barka region, a bus hit a mine. Two persons were killed and six seriously injured. Government media attributed these incidents to terrorists sponsored by the Ethiopian government, without providing any details. Possibly the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of the Kunama (DMLK) was involved in the mine incident, as the organisation was active in the border area inhabited by ethnic Kunama, who felt marginalised by the influx of settlers from the highlands and the introduction of commercial farming on their lands. On 2 July, the owner of the Omo detergent factory and chairman of the Eritrean Employers’ Federation (EEF) was found dead in his car near the Asmara to Massawa road. The circumstances of his death remained highly suspicious. The politically powerful military commanders showed growing dissatisfaction with the government’s policies, especially in regard to trade and economic activities in which the military were strongly involved. Meetings of the president and his cabinet were usually attended by the commanders of the four military operation zones, reflecting their growing political weight, since generals controlled part of the legal and contraband trade as well as commercial agriculture. Such meetings took place on 12 February and 12 December in Massawa, 28 August in Asmara and 22 September in Barentu. During the December

Eritrea • 301 meeting, there were reportedly heated arguments between the president and military commanders. Religious persecution of members of evangelical minority churches and of parts of the Muslim community continued. A large number of priests and deacons of the Orthodox Church up to the age of 50 were called up for military service, from which they had formerly been exempted. On 24 May, 25 evangelical Christians were arrested and held at the Wi’a military prison camp, while in early June 34 members of the “Berhane Hiwet” evangelical congregation were arrested in Keren. At the beginning of the academic year, officers at the Warsay-Yikealo school at the Sawa military centre burnt 1,500 bibles brought by new students and arrested eight of them who objected to the measure. It was forbidden to keep personal bibles and qurans at Sawa. About 3,000 Christian adherents of non-registered communities remained under arrest. On 19 December, 28 Muslims were detained at the mosque in the Mai Chehot neighbourhood in Asmara. Generally, Muslims suspected of being sympathetic towards the Wahabi sect were under threat of arrest. The warsay-yikealo development campaign, a military and national service programme obliging people of between 18 and 40 years (and sometimes up to 50) to work without salary, continued. Many recruits worked in infrastructure programmes directed by PFDJ-owned companies or on agricultural plantations managed by the military. In July, the 3rd national youth festival was held at Sawa camp. On this occasion, and throughout the year, officials called on the youth to live up to their country’s expectations and follow the example of the martyrs of the independence struggle. Despite these efforts to motivate the youth and shoot-to-kill orders along the borders in cases of non-compliance, the prolonged national service led to an increased exodus of thousands of young people into Ethiopia or Sudan. In Ethiopia, where at least 25,000 Eritrean refugees lived and 600 new arrivals were registered per month, two new camps had to be opened to house them. About 100 Eritreans arrived in Sudan weekly. In that country, 240,400 Eritreans were officially registered and 135,000 of them lived in refugee camps. Many of them tried to reach Europe by boat, mainly via Libya. Some 2,500 Eritreans arrived in Israel via Egypt. The Egyptian government deported 1,200 Eritreans to their home country in June. On 1 July, Eritrean media reported that 740 deportees had been received “with warm hospitality” and would later rejoin their respective families and return to their workplaces. In fact, most of them were taken to Wi’a military detention facility. Following this event, Egypt allowed the UNHCR to interview 174 Eritreans who had been granted refugee status. In December, Egyptian authorities again detained Eritrean migrants and 45 of them were deported. The Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA), an umbrella organisation of 13 opposition groups in exile, held its annual congress in Addis Ababa in early May. As usual, the meeting was hampered by conflicts between the leadership of the various organisations, especially the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the ELF-Revolutionary Council (ELF-RC). Under pressure from civil society members observing the congress, the groups elected a new common leadership after an initial impasse and adopted a common charter.

302 • Eastern Africa It was, however, doubtful whether the split in the alliance could be permanently healed. On 25 May, the Sudanese government ordered all Eritrean opposition parties to close their headquarters in Khartoum, desist from their political activities and return assets obtained from Sudan in 2004 to the authorities. As a result of the improved relations between the Eritrean and Sudanese governments, the opposition was forced to concentrate its activities on Ethiopian territory. From 23–27 July, ELF-RC held a congress and decided to restructure itself as a broad-based party. It changed its name to Eritrea People’s Party (EPP) in an attempt to attract younger members, who were disenchanted with the ongoing conflicts within the several ELF factions dating back to the 1980s. From August, EPP commenced steps to unify with the Eritrean Democratic Party (EDP), mainly consisting of disgruntled former members of the ruling PFDJ. On 11 February, UNMEE began to temporarily relocate its staff of 1,700 blue helmets in Eritrea to Ethiopia on account of the refusal by Eritrean authorities to supply the mission with diesel, thus paralysing its operations. The authorities delayed the relocation by not allowing UNMEE soldiers to cross the border. On 15 February, the UN Security Council appealed to the Eritrean government to stop its obstructionism, to which the government replied that the UN had failed to ensure the ending of Ethiopian occupation of Eritrean territories and was now “dwelling on peripheral matters”. At the end of February, more than 100 peacekeepers remained stranded in Eritrean territory and were finally relocated to Asmara and Assab, whence they were repatriated.

Foreign Affairs Eritrea’s conflict with Ethiopia remained unresolved and the UN peace mission was ended on 31 July. The Security Council had extended UNMEE’s mandate by six months on 30 January because of concerns about the tense security situation in the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) located on Eritrean territory. In resolution 1798 (2008) the Security Council called on both countries to take concrete steps to enable the demarcation of the boundary in accordance with the Algiers Peace Agreement of December 2000 – a demand the Ethiopian government continued to disregard – and to reduce their forces, numbering tens of thousands on both sides. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s preference had been to extend the mandate by just one month. The ministry of foreign affairs dismissed the UN resolution as being irrelevant because it violated the UN Charter and was adopted under US government pressure. The Eritrean press statement criticised the UN for not pressuring Ethiopia to leave occupied Eritrean territory and for creating the impression that the TSZ would be a permanently demilitarised area. On 19 April, President Isaias branded the continued presence of UNMEE forces in Eritrea as illegal, since the virtual demarcation of the border by the Eritrea Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) in November 2007 had removed its further legal justification. At that time, only a few of the mission’s personnel were still in the country. The official

Eritrea • 303 termination of UNMEE’s mandate by the Security Council thus came five months after its de facto disbandment. Although there had been no serious acts of violence while UNMEE monitored the border, the UN had been unable to implement the Algier’s agreement or the EEBC’s border decision. Eritrea’s border conflict with Djibouti, which had led to armed clashes in 1996 and had remained unresolved, again erupted. In April, Eritrean national service recruits started digging trenches near Ras Doumeira, a peninsula extending into the strategic Bab el Mandeb Strait, several hundred metres within Djiboutian territory, according to Djiboutian officials. They were built as defence lines against possible future attacks by Ethiopia via Djiboutian territory. French troops undertook a reconnaissance mission but were unable to confirm any Eritrean infringement. Nonetheless, these events led to a troop build-up on both sides. On 10 and 11 June, soldiers from Eritrea and Djibouti exchanged fire at the Ras Doumeira border point. Six Djiboutian soldiers were killed and 62 wounded, but there was no information about Eritrean casualties. The US, Ethiopia, the Arab League (of which Djibouti is a member), the AU and IGAD blamed Eritrea for the clashes. On 12 June, the UN Security Council urged both states, particularly Eritrea, to agree to a ceasefire and to pull back their troops to their previous positions. The Eritrean government issued no clear statement on the incident but stressed it would not engage in acts of hostility that could undermine good neighbourliness. The probable immediate cause of the clash was the desertion of about 30 Eritrean soldiers into Djiboutian territory and the subsequent refusal by the Djiboutian army to return them to their Eritrean commanders. On 16 June, the ‘Somaliland Times’ reported that 80 more Eritreans had defected to Djibouti after fighting had broken out. Some of the Eritrean troops surrendered after the clash, enabling Djibouti to regain lost territory. On 20 June, Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssef accused Eritrea of occupying Djiboutian territory after Djiboutian forces had withdrawn from the contested area. Four days earlier, Yemen’s President Ali Abdellah Saleh offered President Isaias his good offices as a mediator, but without success. Eritrea denied occupying Djiboutian territory or the existence of a territorial dispute. The ministry of foreign affairs stated on 9 July that Washington was behind the conflict, fomenting an artificial crisis while ignoring Ethiopia’s deployment of long-range offensive weapons on Eritrean and Djiboutian territory at Mount Musa Ali. On 27 June, Djibouti’s President Ismail Omar Guelleh said Djibouti would not be “dragged into war” by Eritrea and thanked France for its military support. In mid-September, the UN sent to the region a fact-finding mission, which was welcomed by Djibouti but denied permission to enter Eritrea, an act condemned by the Security Council on 17 September. Eritrea’s ambassador to the UN, Araya Desta, argued that the UN had condemned Eritrea immediately after the fighting took place in June without trying to ascertain the reasons behind it and, without giving details, claimed that Djibouti was the aggressor. On 4 November, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mottaki offered to mediate in the conflict. Given the highly strategic location of the contested border area near the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the military engagement of France, the US and Germany

304 • Eastern Africa in Djibouti, it was unlikely that Eritrea would gain support for its position of denying a dispute and refusing communication with international bodies. Apart from the border issue, differences between the Eritrean and Djiboutian governments related to their respective roles in the Somalia conflict. Eritrea continued to support the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) and the al-Shabab militias against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) backed by Ethiopia and the US. At the Asmara meeting of ARS on 8 April, there were indications of an imminent split when its chairman, Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmad, showed readiness to accept UN-sponsored mediation in Djibouti to reach agreement with the TFG. His less moderate rival in the ARS, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, opposed such negotiations. As a result, ARS split into an Asmara-based and a Djibouti-based branch in early May, when Sheikh Sharif entered into the talks that led on 18 August to the Djibouti Agreement between his ARS faction and the TFG. The Eritrean government opposed negotiations with the Ethiopian-backed TFG, as did Sheikh Hassan’s Asmara-based minority ARS faction and al-Shabab, even though the agreement called for the replacement of Ethiopian troops in Somalia by UN forces. From 14–15 August, Moses Wetangula and Deng Alor, respectively the foreign ministers of Kenya and Sudan, visited Asmara to discuss Eritrea’s eventual return to IGAD. The president expressed his view that IGAD needed restructuring, but reiterated his country’s “commitment to continue being engaged with IGAD”. At the end of the year, however, Isaias criticised the organisation for being paralysed and an agent of the US. The Eritrean government continued to view the conflicts with its neighbours in the framework of a US conspiracy against the country, and US-Eritrean relations remained extremely poor. In an interview with Al-Jazeera on 18 April, President Isaias accused the US of encouraging the Ethiopian government not to implement the EEBC border demarcation in order to protect its regional interests. He also stated that the UN was “dictated [to] by the US administration”. On 29 September, Eritrea’s foreign minister, Osman Saleh, told the UN General Assembly that the US played a role in initiating or perpetuating obstacles or blocking solutions to the conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the border clashes between Eritrea and Djibouti and troubles in Somalia and Sudan. The US state department listed Eritrea among the ten worst offenders against human rights and the three worst offenders against religious freedom, along with North Korea and Iran. On 6 October, the US banned arms sales to Eritrea, designating it “a country that is not fully cooperating with anti-terrorism efforts.” US threats to list Eritrea as a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ were never given concrete expression. The US administration’s reasons for the arms ban were Eritrea’s support for the Somali al-Shabab militia, considered a terrorist organisation by the US, and the hosting of the more radical ARS members, especially Sheikh Dahir Aweys. The foreign ministry responded with verbal counter-attacks. Eritrea’s relations with the Sudan remained cordial. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir visited Asmara on 9 April. Eritrea continued to play an active role in the contact group charged with implementing the Dakar Agreement between Sudan and Chad. Foreign

Eritrea • 305 Minister Osman visited Khartoum on 13 August, when his Sudanese counterpart Deng Alor stressed Eritrea’s positive role in the mediation process. The contact group (Congo, Eritrea, Gabon, Libya, Senegal plus Sudan and Chad) met in Asmara on 12 September to discuss the normalisation of bilateral relations. One month later, Isaias met the EU special representative for Sudan, Torben Brylle, in Asmara and argued against foreign intervention to solve internal Sudanese problems. Eritrea tried to further boost its relations with Iran. On 20 May, the president visited President Ahmadinejad in Teheran, where the latter stated there were no limits to the scope of cooperation between both countries. An Iranian government delegation visited Asmara on 28 July to discuss bilateral cooperation, trade and investment. In September, Iran announced it was ready to support Eritrea in agriculture, mining and the automotive sector. Eritrea granted Iranian ships access to its harbours and the Iranians agreed to renovate the defunct oil refinery at Assab. According to rumours first spread on opposition websites, Iran’s primary motive was to strengthen its control over the Bab el Mandeb Strait through the port of Assab. There were unconfirmed reports from unclear sources that Iran had deployed troops and weapons, including long-range missiles, at Assab. Eritrea also tried to intensify trade with China and Japan. President Isaias visited Tokyo on 29 May and on 6 August a Japanese delegation visited Massawa to inspect the capacities of the fish processing sector. Relations with Libya and Qatar remained close. The AU chairman, Jean Ping, visited Asmara in October and was told by President Isaias that he had witnessed no meaningful accomplishment by the AU. In August, Foreign Minister Osman was refused an entry visa by Canada because of that country’s ban on members of organisations “engaging in the subversion by force of a government”. Like the entire Eritrean government, Osman had been a member of the former Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) during the independence struggle. This decision had implications for the Eritrean diaspora in Canada, many of whom had been members of either the EPLF or the ELF.

Socioeconomic Developments The economic situation did not improve, with basic consumer goods remaining scarce and very high prices for imported goods such as edible oil, grain, rice, pasta and especially kerosene for cooking purposes, which was hardly obtainable. This dearth forced the population to use charcoal or even wood for cooking even in the capital, leading to further depletion of tree cover. Every person was entitled to a single bread roll a day. Owing to low rainfall, the harvest was relatively poor. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated it would reach 200,000 tonnes, less than half the previous harvest. All free trade in food commodities inside the country was banned, but there was a contraband trade in goods illegally imported from Sudan and Ethiopia. Official imports were almost exclusively handled by the party-owned Red Sea Corporation. Both the PFDJ

306 • Eastern Africa and the military used unpaid labour provided by the warsay-yikealo development campaign recruits, who had to work on infrastructure projects, road construction and in commercial agriculture. In November, military commanders forced private farmers and pastoralists to dump their cattle at bargain-basement prices and exported the animals to countries like Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Grain intended for subsistence purposes was also seized by the authorities. These measures were justified as being part of the government’s endeavours to achieve food security through self-reliance and by the need to distribute whatever was available equally. Subsidised food and other basic commodities were available through coupons in so-called community shops, but in insufficient quantity, while food bought on the black market was much more expensive. The president, in attempting to explain the necessity of food storage to achieve food security, stated, “We need to develop a culture of saving not just in storing food but also in every aspect of our lives. If a person is currently consuming 2,000–2,500 calories a day, then he/she should reduce it to 1,500– 1,200.” Malnutrition among children below five years stood at between 15% and 20%, while iron-deficiency anaemia affected 34%. The UN Central Emergency Response Fund pledged $ 2 m in emergency support, partly to provide households with seeds, fertilisers and tools. The UN Committee on Rights of the Child examined Eritrea’s periodic reports on the implementation of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, and acknowledged the progress made in the health sphere. Child mortality was reduced by more than 50% to 48 deaths per 1,000 live births. The committee demanded that more be done to combat female genital mutilation and general discrimination against girls and criticised the restrictions on international organisations and NGOs. The education system was not restructured and the 12th school year had to be taken at the Warsay-Yikealo School in Sawa under militarised conditions, while the only university remained closed. China donated Yuan 80 m (about $ 11 m) for the construction of the Adi Keyh College of Arts and Social Science, which, once completed, was supposed to offer six degree and two diploma courses. There were still no institutions offering internationally accepted degrees. The country faced a growing lack of qualified teachers, since many of them had fled across the borders, sometimes along with their students. The World Bank approved grants of $ 29.5 m for energy and early childhood development programmes. In Europe, there was growing criticism by human rights activists and parliamentarians of plans by the European Commission to provide € 115 m to Eritrea between 2008 and 2013 despite its poor human rights record, complete lack of transparency and refusal to work with civil society organisations and NGOs. The EU commissioner for development aid, Louis Michel, met President Isaias in Asmara in June, but neither party released any details related to his visit. No final decision on the funding was taken during the year. The availability and reliability of statistical data remained poor due to the lack of transparency and the control over the economy exerted by the ruling party and the military, neither of which submitted to any form of financial monitoring. Per capita GDP was

Eritrea • 307 estimated at $ 230 and GDP growth at 0.8%, while consumer price inflation was 18%. The current account balance remained negative at minus $ 226.2 m and foreign exchange reserves were $ 20.1 m. Eritrea’s HDI ranking was 164 out of 179. In the industrial sector, many government and private enterprises were inoperative, including Asmara brewery and the Coca Cola processing plant. On 5 August, a delegation of prospective Chinese investors visited cotton production sites. A banana and tomato processing plant was inaugurated at Alebu, Zoba Gash-Barka on 19 August. The plant, a joint-venture between the government and an Italian entrepreneur, was supposed to provide 170 jobs. A brick factory in Barentu, capital of Zoba Gash-Barka, was renovated. The enterprise was managed by an army lieutenant. The Bisha gold project, jointly owned by the government and the Canadian mining company Nevsun, did not start operations in 2008. The Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa was named the leading banker for the project and approved $ 89 m for the project of the required $ 250 m. In August, the fisheries minister, Ahmed Haj Ali, held talks with a Japanese delegation to enhance bilateral cooperation in the fishing sector. The export of fish had been hampered by poor infrastructure and logistics and, probably as a result, fish had been sold at reduced prices on local markets. Nicole Hirt

Ethiopia

Political life continued its slide towards autocracy, with the leading Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) monopolising political space in parliament and in government organs across the country. Disregarding opinions of the opposition and critiques by experts, commentators, the remaining independent press and donor countries, the government displayed a curious mixture of insecurity, authoritarianism and arrogance in its behaviour, which did not augur well for national politics. The ruling party’s intention to fight for survival and complete dominance at all costs was no longer hidden, while for the international community the overriding mantra was ‘economic growth’. The EPRDF was centred on Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the undisputed leader who took no risks and showed no interest in national compromise or inclusive politics. No observer could claim that Ethiopia was on the right political track, as respect for human rights, civil liberties and equity registered no significant progress. The popular opposition leader Birtukan Mideqsa, released in 2007, was again imprisoned on flimsy grounds, as part of further moves to undermine and fragment the legal opposition. The crucial problems of domestic political reconciliation and democratisation, settling the border issue with Eritrea, the Ogaden insurgency, and the quagmire in Somalia, where Ethiopian troops were engaged for a second year running, were thus not solved. One

310 • Eastern Africa exception was Ethiopia’s announcement of the withdrawal of its troops from Somalia by the end of the year, with in fact only a few thousand remaining on 31 December. While Ethiopia’s economy grew substantially and showed dynamism despite the government’s more restrictive policies, the food insecurity of millions of people, mass poverty, shaky health and education sectors, ecological decline and the fair distribution of the benefits of economic growth remained major challenges. Socioeconomic inequalities were still huge. Weather conditions varied, with relatively good harvests but with regional crises in food production again necessitating food aid. Donor countries again provided major financial support packages to Ethiopia, largely out of habit rather than based on a long-term programme and a critical appraisal of the facts or evaluation of the use and impact of the funds. Foreign relations with Sudan, where oil imports played an important role, grew closer (with Meles supporting the rejection of the ICC warrant against President Omar al-Bashir) and relations with Djibouti, Kenya and Somaliland remaining stable. The strained relations with Eritrea saw no improvement.

Domestic Politics Ethiopia, the most complex and important country in the Horn of Africa, took further predictable steps towards authoritarianism, with the closing down of much of the political space for democratic politics and the forceful reassertion of one-party control by the ruling EPRDF (with the Tigrai People’s Liberation Front/TPLF at its core). The government and the dominant EPRDF (the difference was often difficult to discern) were very good at the rhetoric of ‘democracy’ and ‘good governance’, but there was very little to show for it. Human rights, opposition party activities, civil society space and associational life were constantly under threat, and although limited possibilities still existed, the overall political picture was bleak and worrying. A growing number of voices from within the country, diaspora groups, rights organisations and among international analysts spoke of an emerging dictatorship, and the government indeed did little to disprove this lament. Prime Minister (and TPLF/EPRDF chief) Meles Zenawi entered his 17th year in power. Domestic or international criticism and appeals to the government to show responsibility and inclusive statesmanship were ignored, as was evident in highly symbolic acts such as the reincarceration of prominent opposition leader Ms. Birtukan Mideqsa on 29 December, based on an intentional misunderstanding of one of her statements, and the dubious conviction of popular singer Teddy Afro (Tewodros Kassahun) on 5 December on fallacious charges of ‘manslaughter’ (for allegedly accidentally killing a street vagrant with his car in 2006). No credible evidence had been produced in court in his case, and evidence disproving his guilt, such as clear testimony that on the said day he was nowhere near the scene, was ignored by the court. He was jailed for six years, presumably because of the great and unwelcome appeal of his songs to the Ethiopian public.

Ethiopia • 311 Opposition parties were also harassed, notably in the countryside, and civil society organisations obstructed. Opposition members or people critical of particular policies were often unjustly dismissed or forced out of their jobs. Labour union freedom was nonexistent, academic and university life was under worrying pressure and the independent media were pushed back further. Security services earned overtime in developing informant networks, surveillance and in reporting on opposition figures and other critical voices. There were also some suspected political disappearances and reportedly more than a dozen extrajudicial killings. All this was clearly contrary to the country’s 1994 constitution. Several thousand political prisoners, most of them Oromo, were reportedly still in prison. In March, the civil society activists Daniel Bekele and Netsannet Demissie, part of the large group of opposition figures arrested after the dramatic 2005 elections, were released, although only after being condemned for ‘incitement’ and under certain conditions. On 8 October, a bill was pushed through parliament that significantly enlarged the powers of the executive (the Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs, proclamation 471/2005). This gave the government all power to dismiss, dissolve or reorganise all federal organs and offices in the country, without scrutiny by parliament. The largest opposition parties, Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and United Ethiopian Democratic Front (UEDF), experienced further fragmentation, not least due to constant harassment by the government. Their irrelevance in parliament, where they were routinely ignored and bypassed by the ruling party and by government ministers, became glaring. They were also much under-reported in the state-controlled media. The opposition had no chance to introduce legislative proposals into parliament (which lacked the formal right to initiate legislation). Some former opposition leaders left the country (for instance, CUD leader and 2005 mayor-elect Berhanu Nega) while others attempted to create a new party from the remnants of CUD, the Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJP). The UEDF, a coalition of ethno-regionally based parties, also descended further into crisis on account of its heterogeneity, leadership squabbles and lack of visibility in parliament. Oromo Federal Democratic Movement (OFDM) leader, veteran economist Bulcha Demeqsa, was the most rhetorically energetic member of the opposition. Building an opposition party base in the rural areas was next to impossible, due to constant harassment, threats and arrests, invisible to the foreign diplomatic community indifferent to or blissfully ignorant of what happened outside Addis Ababa. In mid-September, the EPRDF held its 7th congress in Awassa and duly re-elected Meles Zenawi as chairman. Reports were made on the various party activities, including the massive membership drive that marked the transition of the EPRDF from a cadre party to a ‘popular’ party, although nothing changed in the leadership structure. Confirmation of the reassertion of dominant (TPLF/EPRDF) party rule was provided by local elections on 13 and 20 April for the ‘qebeles’ and ‘woredas’ (districts), and for 20 vacant parliamentary seats. The EPRDF fielded 3.6 m of the 4.5 m candidates (1 out of

312 • Eastern Africa 20 Ethiopians). As critics had predicted, it was a clean sweep for the EPRDF, which won a Soviet-style 99% of the vote and in the process forced all local officials and administration workers to become party members. In a majority of constituencies, opposition party candidates were not even able to run. This ‘organisational operation’, well-executed by thousands of party cadres, was partly triggered by earlier World Bank and donor country strategies developed after the 2005 election crisis to redirect donor development funds straight to local authorities instead of to the federal government. The government response was to ‘recapture’ the local authorities and coopt them fully into the national and ruling party structures. This wholesale politicisation of the countryside further diminished the trust between people and led to a silencing of critical voices. A climate of fear and avoidance in social and political life was noticeable in the country. During the year, there were several more mysterious bombings of taxis, buses, petrol stations, bars and hotels, killing about 40–50 people. As in previous years, hardly any perpetrator was caught, except in two cases: after a bus bombing near Humera (eight killed, 27 injured) people “in the pay of Eritrea” were arrested, and after a bombing in Jijiga on 20 September (four killed, 20 injured), when people “working for the insurgent Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)” were apprehended. Details of these cases remained unclear. The government also introduced a new draft NGO law severely restricting the range of activities in which local NGOs could participate and limiting their access to foreign funding (no more than 10% of the budget). Clearly, contrary to government claims about legally “regulating and strengthening the NGO sector”, the opposite was intended: amazingly NGOs were prohibited from taking part in domestic debates on or from contributing to advancing human and democratic rights; equality between peoples, sexes or religions; children’s rights and the rights of the disabled; conflict resolution and reconciliation; or criminal justice issues. The law was an unprecedented effort to restrict citizens’ rights to organise and to form grassroots organisations aimed at supporting people in the pursuit of their rights and a further step to consolidate the government’s/party’s monopoly on social and cultural activities, even internationally. The argument that “only the government should provide services” in these fields seemed weak, since government had no record of doing so and was unable to fill-in the gaps. The effect was thus another step in undermining independent civil society. The law was considered by many a regrettable and costly mistake, as it would significantly increase the misery of the Ethiopian people and preclude the inflow of millions of dollars to the country. By thus politicising the NGO sector, the government further confined the sociopolitical space for groups not adhering to the party line. Debate on the NGO law in parliament was stifled and a predictable majority vote was expected in January 2009. A major controversy, again showing that everything – including professional services and institutions – was politicised to a dangerous degree, arose over the 2007 census figures, of which a preliminary report by the central statistical authority became available in November. The data showed a curious mix of facts and fiction, making everybody unsure

Ethiopia • 313 about its exact value. The first point was the relatively low total population figure of 73.9 m in 2007. Most previous estimates (based on extrapolation) had expected 78–80 m at least. For instance, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs estimated Ethiopia’s 2007 population at 80.8 m. The lower population figure made the GDP growth figures look more favourable. However, the main bone of contention was the reduction of the population of Amhara region, credited with the lowest population growth rate (1.7%) of all regions. Its population was nearly 2 m less than regular projections on the basis of growth rates suggested. This was a puzzling decline in view of the national annual growth rate of about 2.6%, unless there was mass starvation or out-migration from Amhara region, which was not the case. Addis Ababa’s population was also estimated as being quite low, little different from the 1994 census figure, which was also puzzling in view of the substantial in-migration from rural areas. The legal system showed continued dependence on the government, and judges were not immune from pressure from above, notably in cases involving alleged political opponents. Lower civilian courts were able to operate independently, but suffered from a lack of manpower and facilities and were faced by a large backlog of cases. Bribery occurred frequently. Prison conditions were sub-standard, often appalling, and prisoners’ rights were not respected. Birtukan Mideqsa, the most prominent prisoner, was held in solitary confinement and was only allowed to see her four-year old daughter on a few occasions. Reform of the judicial system was nowhere visible and the enormous backlogs continued. In the long-running trial (since 1991) against 57 former ‘Derg’ top government members, the federal high court pronounced sentences on 11 January, ranging from 23 years to life imprisonment. On 26 May, in the appeal case involving some of these people, including former dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam, the sentence was changed by the court from life imprisonment to death in 18 cases. In the case of Mengistu, there was no chance he would be extradited from his exile in Zimbabwe to face his sentence. On 4 December, the new media law (adopted by parliament on 1 July) was gazetted, confirming severe restrictions on news gathering, publishing and broadcasting. In terms of the law, the government demanded certification, prohibited relevant government office information from being divulged to the independent press, determined what was considered transgression of the right to gather and publish critical news and on what subjects, and made it easier to apply the defamation clause. Journalists guilty of this and other infringements of national security and public order (to be determined by the government) could be criminally tried and imprisoned. The effect will probably be that journalists and editors will increase self-censorship. During the year, several of the few remaining independent journalists were harassed or arrested, including Alemayehu Mahtemework of the magazine ‘Enqu’ on 2 May, simply because he had a story on singer Teddy Afro. On 22 August, chief editor Amare Aregawi of the ‘Reporter’ was arrested, but was released after a week. But on 31 October he was violently attacked and beaten unconscious by unknown assailants while collecting his son from school.

314 • Eastern Africa Other newspaper editors were also arrested, held for some time, released on bail or fined, or had their licences revoked. Dozens of journalists remained in exile. Several papers continued to be banned or went out of business during the year, but about 20 new ones appeared, including party or government papers. Independent newspapers were not welldistributed outside the cities and hence the information deficit, notably among the rural population, remained substantial. During the year, the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC) continued as the sole internet service provider. Internet access was the lowest in Africa. Many websites, notably of the unreservedly critical Ethiopian diaspora, were blocked and e-mail traffic routinely checked with the help of Chinese technology and advisors. Internet speed was also very slow and the connections unreliable, except at the ECA offices and for other international organisations and at certain government colleges, such as the civil service college. The extension of internet through projects such as Schoolnet and ‘Woredanet’ nevertheless continued. Cellphone network coverage in the countryside (controlled exclusively by ETC) expanded significantly. Cellphone use also greatly increased. Frequent power cuts affected not only these services but also the economy in general. As part of the government’s rhetorical enactment of ‘national harmony’, the third Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Day was celebrated in Addis Ababa on 8 December, this time organised by the Oromiya region authorities, with cultural performances by the 76 official ethnic groups in Ethiopia. The speeches and performances were almost identical to those of the previous year. One of the speeches asserted that Ethiopia now was “a country in which justice and the rights and equality of its peoples are ensured and where development and progress hold out real hope”, words that provoked ripples of suppressed laughter through the crowd. Ethnic relations were not as harmonious as represented, as was evident in the frequent clashes between groups in rural areas throughout the year, reflecting persistent ethnic and regional tensions, for instance in southern and western Ethiopia. Clashes seemed endemic in the Ethiopian ethno-political system because it politicised the group identities of all ethnic/linguistic groups, pitting them against each other. A few examples: a clash between Guji and Sidama near Wondo-Guennet on 3 April left 18 people dead; another between Issa Somalis and Afars in the area of Mille and Adaytu village from 10–12 June saw 32 people killed and 26 wounded. The number of victims of subsequent Ethiopian army operations was not known. The background to the conflicts was persistent drought and the gradual encroachment of Issas on Afar land. Another conflict erupted between the agro-pastoralist Guji Oromos and the sedentary Burji people on 6 August and again on 17 September, killing at least five people, displacing many, with 17 homes razed and dozens of livestock taken. It also led to Burji vacating several villages or towns, including Soyoma and HagereMariam, in the face of the onslaught by heavily armed and well-organised Guji, who had been fighting with other ethnic groups as well over the past years. Government security forces acted only belatedly, after repeated requests by the Burji. In Gambela region, police

Ethiopia • 315 and militia fought local inhabitants resisting the relocation of their villages, resulting in 11 deaths and 29 injured. The Gauwwada ethno-linguistic group also engaged in a major fight with police and government forces in early February, after leaders had asked for a special district for the group: 33 people were killed, 49 injured. Somali and Oromo pastoralists also fought regularly, mostly competing for land and other resources around their ‘borders’. In general, pastoralists faced difficulty in the face of the persistent bias of the government towards settled agricultural peoples over pastoral livestock herders. Various ethno-regional insurgent movements continued their activities but did not threaten the national army, except perhaps the ONLF, which faced a major counter-offensive. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), active in parts of Oromiya region, and the small Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front (EPPF), in the Amhara region near the Sudan border, were a nuisance to the government but did not make a dent in the military situation. The domestic situation was further marred by the harsh government campaign to suppress the ONLF insurgency, which had challenged the government in 2007 with a disastrous terror attack on an oil field, unleashing a full-blown and ongoing offensive by the Ethiopian army. According to several international human rights groups and backed up by refugee interviews and aerial photographic evidence of scorched villages and fields, in this massive campaign serious and often avoidable human rights abuses were perpetrated against civilians. The campaign curbed the role of the ONLF, but precipitated local food security problems, huge social and economic damage and deep resentment among Ethiopian Somalis. Foreign NGOs were hindered in their work and due to this pressure ‘Médecins Sans Frontières’ terminated its operations on 26 August. While the ONLF was not an Islamist movement, the government – with its secularist leanings – became more aware of the dangers of Islamist radicalism due to the Front’s possible connections with Somali extremists, and it started reconsidering its previously fairly lenient policies towards the radical Muslims who were emerging in the country. Christian-Muslim tensions were a potentially dangerous issue, fuelled by foreign-educated radical Muslim leaders and activists. Especially worrying were the growing religious polemics, notably by Muslims against Christians and so-called ‘unbelievers’, and by some Christian groups responding in kind, in dozens of tracts, audio-CDs and DVDs. This trend further challenged the Ethiopian model of religious coexistence. Religious tensions thus remained just below the surface, with Wahhabi-Salafist groups as well as other Islamist revivalists building their strength through conversion programmes (‘da’wa’), religious education and training (much of it foreign-funded), and calls for dissociation from Christians and other non-Muslims. A violent incident occurred on 2 March when Muslim extremists in Nesebo (Arsi) attacked congregants at two Protestant churches with machetes, killing one man and seriously injuring 15 others. Despite their growing impact, ‘Salafist’ extremists were by no means universally popular among the Ethiopian Muslim population (35–40% of the total).

316 • Eastern Africa The Evangelical-Pentecostal churches expanded further at the expense of the Ethiopian Orthodox church. The latter, still the largest denomination, saw consolidation of religious renewal movements within it and both denominational streams also adopted a more selfconscious and at times polemical presentation of their interests and views vis-à-vis other religious communities. According to the 2007 census, Christian denominations formed about 62% of the population.

Foreign Affairs The three crucial foreign policy issues were: the war in Somalia, the tension with Eritrea and obtaining the accustomed number of donor loans and grants without provoking too much criticism of the political and human rights record. On the first issue, important changes did occur, none on the second, and on the third, business continued as usual, with a weak and inconsequential donor community babbling on about the deteriorating condition of democracy and human rights in the country. For the rest, the relations with neighbours Kenya, Sudan, Djibouti and Somaliland were stable and on the whole free of conflict. The war in Somalia between the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its Ethiopian supporters on the one hand and the radical Islamist insurgents (‘al-Shabaab’, ‘Hizb ul Islam’) backed by Eritrea and some Muslim countries on the other, remained bloody and chaotic, with the two parties matching each other on the battlefield. Many civilians died in the crossfire. The Ethiopian military, however, gradually withdrew from the fighting in order to force the TFG to take matters into its own hands. The financial and human costs may also have weighed too heavily on Ethiopia. After the accord reached between TFG and the Somali opposition (Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARSDjibouti) in June, Ethiopia announced it would withdraw its forces by December, and in fact largely did so (with the rest leaving in January 2009). Its military regrouped just across the border and continued to train Somali TFG units. On the Eritrea-Ethiopia border issue, the ideological and judicial stalemate continued: no talks were held. The Eritrea Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) closed its doors, but no delimitation of the border on the ground was made. The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) also folded, withdrawing after Eritrea sabotaged all supplies to it, including fuel, and withdrew its cooperation. Eritrean troops also reoccupied the temporary security zone along the border, and the area remained very tense, with troops vigilant on both sides. A solution was not likely under the two current regimes. Relations with the donor community and the EU proceeded predictably, with the usual sums of aid money forthcoming, disbursed with little critical evaluation. Britain especially was rather lenient, sending another $ 220 m on ODA to Ethiopia. In July, a report by a retired British colonel and consultant (M. Dewar) advised the government on modernising its internal security.

Ethiopia • 317 Meles Zenawi made several foreign visits, for instance to the India-Africa summit in New Delhi on 8–9 April, to South Africa on 18–19 June, to the 11th AU summit in Egypt on 29–30 June and to the G8 summit in Japan on 8–9 July. Among the foreign dignitaries visiting Ethiopia were the Finnish minister for foreign trade and development, the French secretary of state for foreign affairs and the Chinese assistant foreign minister. Ethiopia also remained pivotal in IGAD, but this regional organisation did not accomplish much during the year, except in showing its exasperation at the Somali TFG for its lack of success in achieving unity of purpose or extending its authority. Negotiations in November in Uganda on a new Nile River agreement to replace the 1929 and 1959 accords stalled following disagreement among member states of the Nile Basin Initiative. China remained a very important partner of Ethiopia in political and economic affairs. Chinese investments this year were estimated to be at least $ 350 m, up from only $ 10 m in 2003. Relations with the US in the last year of the Bush administration remained good, as the American perception of Ethiopia as a valuable regional ally in the global anti-terror campaign did not change, despite persistently critical voices in the US congress on Ethiopia’s domestic policies. The extent of material support by the US to Ethiopian war efforts in Somalia was not known but was probably significant (unconfirmed reports even claimed that the US gave Ethiopia about $ 80 m per month for this).

Socioeconomic Developments A famine threat continued to plague Ethiopia: 3.5–6.4 m people were variously estimated to be in need of emergency food aid, although 2008 was not a year of persistent nationwide drought. Failure of seasonal rains in several areas (Tigrai, Gedeo, Sidamo), but also recurring faulty government policies to foresee and plan for it were responsible. After a government call for $ 425 m, foreign donors, mostly the US, again supplied emergency food aid. This year’s harvests were not bad, but domestic food production saw no noticeable increase, certainly not on a per capita basis. All land remained state property, with peasants having usufruct rights, transferable to children under certain conditions. The export of coffee, oil seeds, hides and leather products and flowers brought in larger sums than in the previous year. For example, coffee sales rose 60–70%, although in some areas coffee production was affected by local droughts. Flower exports reportedly rose by about 130% and netted $ 185 m, lower than the projected $ 280 m, as sales dropped towards the end of the year due to the widening global economic crisis. The full extent of the global economic downturn had, however, not yet affected Ethiopia by December. Additional exports were horticultural products, gold and livestock. Exports remained competitive due to the low wage costs: on average a labourer earned $ 60–80 a month. Total export

318 • Eastern Africa earnings reached $ 1.3 bn, but offsetting the benefits of export growth was the strong increase in imports to about $ 6 bn. The Ethiopian economy remained heavily state- and party-dominated: the IMF estimated in a 2007 report that about 55% of all enterprises were public ones, and this figure did not decline in 2008. One example was the big EPRDF-party business conglomerate Guna (export of sesame seeds, natural gum, coffee, pulses and spices; and production, import and distribution of construction materials, industrial and agricultural inputs): figures released on 27 July revealed that it had netted a gross profit of $ 4 m during the past year, an increase of more than 200% on previous years. A new tack in government policy was the promotion of micro- and small-scale enterprises, stimulated by donor agencies. In mid-April the government launched a commodities exchange, with a centralised electronic price listing system for agricultural products. The intention was to improve domestic market efficiency and distribution. At the end of the year, the government also moved to take over coffee marketing, because it saw coffee traders hoarding to raise prices. Many trading licences were revoked. As macroeconomic figures differed markedly across institutions (IMF, government, UNESCO, UNDP, World Bank, Economist Intelligence Unit), they were considered only tentative. Undeniably there was continued substantial growth in Ethiopia. According to US figures, the country’s GDP reached $ 25 bn (with almost half generated by the agricultural sector and 13% by industry). The IMF (in April 2009) claimed a GDP growth rate of 11.6% for 2008, in continuance of the performance of the last five years. There remained, however, the paradox that despite this growth 3–4 m people were again on food aid, 44% lived in dismal poverty and more than 50% of people remained in the informal economy. The overall growth clearly did not lead to a more inclusive development pattern. Under the government’s current ‘agriculture-led industrial development’ model, the services, construction and infrastructure sectors expanded again, financed chiefly by World Bank and through donor country projects and coupled to poverty reduction programmes (e.g., Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty – PASDEP). Most of the work in these sectors was carried out by EPRDF-affiliated companies and non-party affiliated businesses continued to have difficulty in gaining access. The overall road network expanded 5%. On 10 September, a new 303-metre bridge across the Blue Nile near Dejen, on the Ethiopia-Sudan route, was opened, financed by Japan. In June, the World Bank initiated a new four-year Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), with first-year funding to the tune of $ 635 m. It was aimed at some familiar themes: enhancing governance, service delivery, poverty reduction and building food security. These goals were the same as in previous CAS documents. Controversy arose over emerging new projects to lease agricultural land to major foreign investors from China, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and even Djibouti (its president got 7,000 hectares). This new trend, also evident in other African countries, would see foreigners using the land to produce food for their own domestic markets. As all land is state

Ethiopia • 319 property, the government could easily appropriate it from local peasants and pastoralists and contract it out on lease, with a promise of financial benefits for the state. On 7 April, an embarrassing gold scandal came to light, when it appeared that the national bank had lost at least $ 17 m due to a fraud involving gold-plated steel bars – an incredible mistake probably due to corruption, and a serious blot on the government’s reputation. On 24 June, the acting auditor general, Assefa Desta, presented a critical report on excessive government borrowing in 2006, i.e., Birr 3.3 bn in excess of the amount approved by the legislature. He called the borrowing, with its important subsequent economic effects, ‘unlawful’. The report was unfavourably received by the finance minister and the stateappointed governor of the national bank, who disputed the audit, although the auditor general had worked on figures supplied by them. The facts appeared to be correct, because this extra borrowing, combined with at least a 16% increase in the money supply (i.e., printing extra banknotes), partly explained the accelerating inflation (15.8% in 2007 and 25.3% in 2008). Furthermore, IMF figures in a report of 31 July appeared to confirm the auditor general’s analysis. Later in 2008, it was reported that the money supply had been expanded by 40%, partly due to clients withdrawing money from their bank accounts and leading to a much reduced savings rate. Retrospectively, fiscal prudence appeared to have been abandoned after November 2005. On 1 July, a new auditor general was appointed. Inflation reached about 40% at year’s end, although food price inflation was considerably higher, causing further hardship to the masses of poor people, notably in the cities. In March, the government announced a package of measures to reduce inflation, including monetary intervention, more subsidies, more food imports and cutting import tariffs. All this further dented the already meagre foreign exchange reserves, and the effect was not immediately apparent. The scarcity of foreign exchange led to serious balance-of-payments problems. These were partly alleviated by a higher than usual inflow of remittances. While the local newspaper ‘Fortune’ estimated the sum for 2008 to have been in excess of $ 1 bn, it was more likely around $ 850 m, up 25% from 2007. Remittances were mainly spent on family support, housing construction and small-scale business investments. The government’s budget (the Ethiopian budget year starts on 7 July) reached Birr 54.2 bn ($ 5.7 bn), and this increase was partly based on an expected revenue increase of 20–25%. The budget deficit was estimated at 4.4% of GDP, but excluding donor grants was 8.4% of GDP. The current account deficit for 2008 was estimated to be about 7–8% of GDP. Foreign debt rose to $ 3.1 bn., despite debt relief. Foreign direct investment was about 2–3% of GDP. During the year, Ethiopia secured foreign aid packages of more than $ 1.3 bn, bringing the total sum of ‘development aid’ received by the country since 1991 to $ 24 bn. However, Ethiopia still ranked only 169 on UNDP’s Human Development Index (of a total of 179 countries), no improvement on last year. Remarkably, on TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index it was ranked 126 out of 180, higher than last year.

320 • Eastern Africa Persistent socioeconomic problems were unemployment, a low general level of education and skills in the face of rising education costs (the illiteracy rate was around 50%), a high number of IDPs fleeing conflict and natural calamities and a steadily shrinking agricultural resource base due to continuing high population growth. Any plea for population control was countered by religious authorities, both Muslim and Christian, locked in a competitive ‘demographic battle’. This issue too was highly politicised. The number of refugees in the country was estimated by UNHCR at 59,800. The most recent figure for registered IDPs was more than 200,000, still including tens of thousands in Tigray, a result of the Ethio-Eritrean border war of 1998–2000. There was also a steady outflow of thousands of labour migrants from Ethiopia to Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Middle Eastern states (many of them being trafficked women), often via Somaliland and Puntland ports. The health sector expanded in line with population growth but suffered from a lack of investment and bad facilities. The doctor-patient ratio rose to 1:37,000. Public health problems such as HIV/AIDS, infectious diseases, prostitution and maternal and infant mortality remained very serious. In the field of education, primary school expansion continued, with more pupils enrolled and more schools built in rural areas. The further construction of rural universities was announced, although the record of the existing ones built over the last eight years or so was pretty bleak, with bad facilities for teaching or research, bad living conditions for students, under-stocked libraries and a very weak academic culture. Experts commented that the aim appeared to be to produce people with certificates, rather than well-educated or competent people. Some observers spoke of frivolous, non-productive investments in make-believe education. The old top universities, like in Addis Ababa, were further weakened. In addition, the high production of BA and MA holders augmented the problem of massive unemployment among graduates. This problem was also widespread among high school leavers. Environmental problems remained serious, but while consciousness of these increased they were not seriously or comprehensively tackled, as was evident by the steady expansion of cropland at the expense of forest areas and pasture land, and by the failure to devise and enforce environmental laws on industrial waste, discarded batteries, plastic waste and sewage. In several agricultural areas, tree planting, terracing and irrigation schemes were implemented to reduce erosion. But the uncontrolled pollution by, for instance, the expanding flower industry persisted, blighting the local environment and raising fears among local people over the water supply and the long-term fertility of the land. Only one new flower farm, Fressia Ethiopia, boasted that its production was environmentally friendly. Prime examples of heavily degraded natural resource areas were Lake Koka and the Akaki River, both southeast of Addis Ababa. Jon Abbink

Kenya

Life in 2008 was dominated by the extraordinary political crisis that followed disputed presidential and parliamentary elections held in late 2007. International mediators led by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan ultimately brought a period of violent civil conflict and uncertainty to an end by persuading government and opposition leaders to sign-up to a government of national unity. However, the fallout from the violence threatened to undermine political stability, national unity and economic growth.

Domestic Politics The elections of 27 December 2007 represented the tightest presidential race since the return to multi-party politics. Opinion polls suggested that Raila Odinga, the candidate of the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), would narrowly defeat Mwai Kibaki, the incumbent and candidate of the Party of National Unity (PNU). A third candidate, Kalonzo Musyoka of the Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K), was not viewed as a serious contender. Although Kibaki enjoyed greater access to state resources, Odinga’s campaign was more energetic and better coordinated. Most notably, Odinga presented himself as first-among-equals within a ‘pentagon’ of ethno-regional leaders selected

322 • Eastern Africa for their capacity to deliver support across the country – Musalia Mudavadi (Western), William Ruto (Rift Valley), Joseph Nyagah (Eastern), Charity Ngilu (Eastern) and Najib Balala (Coast). Odinga’s ability to forge a ‘coalition of the disposed’ within ODM, combined with the distrust with which many PNU supporters viewed the ODM leadership, served to raise intercommunal tensions. In particular, the months leading up to polling day saw heated debates over a number of divisive issues, most notably the commitment of the opposition to introduce a form of regional government, which in Kenya is often associated with a redistribution of power and land away from historically advantaged ethnic groups. Although polling day passed without incident, the process of counting and announcing the results quickly descended into chaos. While the parliamentary election was far from flawless, the results proved to be less controversial than the presidential poll, with parties supporting the ODM winning just under 50% of the seats, while parties allied to the PNU secured just 37%. However, the presidential election quickly degenerated into farce, as ODM and PNU leaders and activists descended on the central counting venue to contest every announcement made by the chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), Samuel Kivuitu. Unfortunately, the commissioners’ actions directly contributed to the sense of chaos and the ECK failed to restore public confidence in the polls. Kivuitu himself publicly admitted to losing contact with many of his returning officers, openly voicing his concern that the results were being ‘cooked’. Following a two-day delay during which the ODM released a set of ‘independent’ results that suggested a significant victory for Odinga, on 30 December Kivuitu officially declared Kibaki to have won the presidency by 225,174 votes. Despite protests by rival candidates and election monitors that PNU leaders had used their influence over the ECK to rig the election, Kibaki was instantly sworn in as president and the government simultaneously announced a ban on live media broadcasts, triggering a wave of civil unrest. The violence intensified in the first two weeks of January as ODM sought to overturn the election result through mass protests, while the government flooded problematic areas with police and deployed security forces to maintain order in Nairobi. The dynamics of the unrest were not constant and took a number of different forms throughout the country. In Mombasa, Kisumu and Nairobi (Kibera), an initial wave of frustration at Odinga’s ‘defeat’ evolved into a series of running battles between opposition supporters and the police. In some cases, protests descended into looting and the intimidation of ethnic communities thought to have supported Kibaki, most obviously the Kikuyu. As the cycles of violence unfolded, pro-government militia under the catch-all banner of the notorious Mungiki gang appear to have been transported to these areas to mount revenge attacks on opposition supporters. In the Rift Valley, the scene of election violence in both 1992 and 1997, the conflict came closest to ethnic cleansing, as Kikuyu ‘settlers’ were forced to leave their homes in search of safety. On 1 January, a mob set fire to a church in Burnt Forest, killing around 30 women and children who had been seeking sanctuary.

Kenya • 323 The refusal of senior opposition leaders to condemn the atrocities led the government to accuse Odinga of supporting an all-out attack on the Kikuyu people. However, it was not clear to what extent the violence was spontaneous as opposed to planned, and inquiries into the post-election unrest suggested that the police were responsible for a significant number of the fatalities. The assassination of two ODM MPs in January contributed to the sense of disorder and demonstrated the extent to which violence had been integrated into the mainstream of Kenyan political life. Melitus Mugabe Were, just elected to parliament for the first time, was dragged out of his car and shot in his Embakasi constituency on 27 January. Shortly afterwards, on 31 January, David Kimutai Too, the MP for Ainamoi, was shot dead along with his girlfriend. Initially ODM supporters alleged that the killings were part of a wider plot to deny the opposition a majority in parliament, citing the involvement of a police officer in Too’s murder as evidence of a conspiracy. As news of the killings spread, civil unrest intensified. However, further police investigations suggested that neither death was directly related to national political struggles. Most obviously, it emerged that Too had been shot by a jealous love rival who had also been dating his girlfriend, while the exact events leading to Were’s murder were never fully explained. His assassination may have been more connected to local political battles than the national context: some candidates defeated by Were in the Embakasi election boasted well-publicised links to the violent Mungiki gang, which had a history of activity in the area. Despite the continuation of civil conflict, Kibaki signalled his determination to keep hold of the presidency by naming a new cabinet on 8 January. Hard-line ministerial figures including Martha Karua (justice and constitutional affairs) and George Saitoti (internal security and provincial administration) were retained, along with established Kikuyu leaders such as Uhuru Kenyatta (local government). However, Kibaki also moved to consolidate his parliamentary position and fragment the opposition by coopting ODMKenya, appointing its leader Musyoka as vice president. As a result, neither ‘government’ nor ‘opposition’ could claim a clear majority within the parliament. The refusal of hardliners on both sides of the political divide to compromise necessitated international mediation. ODM initially demanded a ‘forensic recount’ of the ballot, but it quickly became apparent that the poor security surrounding the storage of ballot papers at polling stations and the filing of election returns by the ECK, meant that a comprehensive and reliable recount was impossible. Consequently, the efforts of mediators focused on persuading all parties to enter into a government of national unity that would negate the need to work out – and reach agreement over – who really won the presidential election. After a series of failed attempts to bring the rival leaders to the negotiation table, Kofi Annan’s arrival on 22 January was welcomed by the opposition and tolerated by the government. However, the lack of trust between the main protagonists ensured that progress towards an agreement remained slow. The Kibaki delegation initially refused to offer

324 • Eastern Africa ODM important ministerial positions, while the Odinga delegation initially rejected the proposal that Kibaki be allowed to retain the presidency, with Odinga taking up the new secondary position of prime minister. However, a combination of international pressure, concern that the conflict might escalate further and mounting evidence of the economic cost of the political stalemate led to the signing of a power-sharing agreement on 28 February. The announcement of the deal curtailed the violence, which by then had taken the lives of over 1,000 Kenyans and resulted in the displacement of around 300,000 more. Under the power-sharing deal, PNU retained control of the most significant coordination posts, including vice president, ministers of home affairs, finance, foreign affairs, defence, justice and constitutional affairs as well as provincial administration and internal security. Although a post of prime minister was created for Odinga, on the whole former opposition leaders had to settle for less prestigious infrastructure ministries, such as lands, roads, agriculture and water. The lower profile of the posts given to ODM led to accusations from opposition supporters that the deal signed by Kibaki and Odinga was a power-sharing deal in name only. The need to incorporate all parties within the government and the reluctance of MPs to forgo the rewards of ministerial appointment resulted in the largest Kenyan cabinet ever. Reports that the 42 ministers and 52 assistant ministers would cost over Kenyan shillings (KSh) 10 bn in salaries and allowances over the course of the five-year parliamentary term reignited the debate over the remuneration of MPs. According to figures leaked by the ‘Nairobi Star’ newspaper in January 2009, the real cost of an MP during the tenth parliament (inclusive of salary, allowances and benefits) was KSh 1,435,846 a month. If correct, this would make Kenyan MPs some of the best paid legislators in the world. In an attempt to improve the public image of parliamentarians and to raise revenue for funding the ‘pro-poor’ budget announced on 12 June, Finance Minister Amos Kimunya proposed to tax MPs’ allowances. Previously, MPs had been taxed on only the first KSh 200,000 of their salaries, a tiny proportion of their take-home income. However, MPs rejected the proposals, prompting widespread condemnation and leaving a hole in the government’s spending plans for 2008–09. The final ‘unity’ agreement signed by Kibaki and Odinga was intended only as a stopgap solution, and included a four-part agenda intended to provide a road-map that would lead to a more sustainable resolution. The main goals of the agenda were to end the violence and restore fundamental rights and liberties, to address the humanitarian crisis and promote reconciliation, to institute a power-sharing mechanism to break the political deadlock and finally to tackle the long-term issues underpinning the violence, including constitutional reform, land rights and past instances of corruption and violence. All parties committed to dealing with the first three items within 15 days and the final item within the calendar year. While PNU and ODM did manage to negotiate the distribution of cabinet seats and the legislation required to create the new post of prime minister, ambiguities within the final agreement left many questions unanswered. The most notable areas of

Kenya • 325 uncertainty included whether the president enjoyed the right to sack the prime minister; whether Odinga would have to resign as prime minister in the case of an ODM split; and whether fresh elections would have to be called in the event that the coalition were to break down. As the government got down to business, the scope of the powers held by the prime minister came to be a major source of conflict between PNU and ODM MPs. ODM leaders claimed that Odinga had the right to coordinate government activity in the legislature. Against this, senior PNU leaders argued that the unity agreement had not changed Kenya’s status as a fundamentally presidential political system and that the post of prime minister should therefore be interpreted as an advisory role lacking executive power in its own right. The lack of foresight regarding how the new political system would actually function in practice was well illustrated by reports in the ‘Daily Nation’ newspaper on 25 January 2009 that Odinga had worked without a salary for a year because the issue had originally been overlooked. Thereafter, MPs had proved unable to settle the matter because of disagreement over whether the prime minister’s wages should match the president’s salary, implying equality between the two posts, or whether it would be more appropriately pegged to the vice president’s salary. Confusion inside and outside parliament over such basic issues contributed to an atmosphere of political instability throughout the year. Despite the creation of a unity government, the legislature remained divided along party lines. However, assessments of the parliamentary strength of PNU (43 seats) and ODM (99) were obscured by the large number of seats won by smaller parties and independents. Parties generally thought to be allied to PNU included Musyoka’s ODM-Kenya (16 seats), Kenya African National Union (14), Safina (5), National Rainbow Coalition-Kenya (4), Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-People (3), Democratic Party (2), Sisi Kwa Sisi (2) and New Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (2). Meanwhile, parties aligned to ODM included the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) (3), Kenya African Democratic Development Union (1), United Democratic Movement (1) and People’s Democratic Party (1). In total, some 23 parties were represented in parliament. Once the 12 nominated MPs were appointed (distributed according to the constituency results of parties) the PNU and ODM blocks proved to be roughly equal in size. Consequently, the balance of power lay in the hands of a small number of independent parties and their actual turnout for any given vote. As a result, the outcome of parliamentary debates retained an element of unpredictability throughout the year. ODM won an early victory when its candidate for speaker of the National Assembly, Kenneth Marende, defeated the PNU’s candidate, Francis ole Kaparo, on 15 January. The role of the speaker was significant in terms of the timetabling of parliamentary legislation and the conduct of legislative debates, and as a result the outcome of the vote was interpreted as a barometer of the likely behaviour and sympathies of the tenth parliament. Marende ultimately won 105 votes to Kaparo’s 101, suggesting in practice that ODM possessed a narrow parliamentary advantage early in the year.

326 • Eastern Africa As a result of the fine existing balance of power, five by-elections held on 11 June threatened to derail the unity government. The potential for these polls to shift the advantage from ODM to PNU dramatically raised the political temperature. Fears for the country’s political stability were heightened because the absence of effective electoral reform meant that the polls had to be conducted under the auspices of the ECK, which had clearly failed to manage the general elections. Furthermore, the importance for ODM was heightened just days before the polls when two ODM legislators, Roads Minister Kipkalya Kones and Home Affairs Assistant Minister Lorna Laboso, were killed in a plane crash while campaigning for an ODM colleague, reducing the number of ODM MPs pending additional by-elections. To make matters worse, all these elections were in highly volatile areas that had previously witnessed significant unrest. However, with the exception of Kilgoris, where moments before the results were announced 14 houses were burnt down and a car set ablaze, the elections were largely peaceful. Although PNU and ODM candidates engaged in heated battles, their respective leaders made concerted efforts not to inflame local passions. Significantly, many voters appeared uninterested in the polls, suggesting that the ‘Kenya crisis’ may have undermined faith in the formal political process. Commentators suggested that the decline in voter turnout also reflected the low value placed on the parliament by voters, the anger felt by many Kenyans towards the political class as a whole and fears over the possibility of election-related violence. A more united PNU campaign saw the party make gains in Embakasi and Kilgoris, while ODM retained the Ainamoi, Wajir North and Emahuya constituencies. Along with the deaths of Kones and Laboso, these results swung the parliamentary balance of power back in favour of Kibaki. However, as the parliament progressed, internal party splits and backroom political deals undermined the meaning of party identity. On 16 July, Odinga and Karua, bitter opponents during the violence of early 2008, shared a platform to criticise the government, in which they both served as senior ministers, for not doing enough to fight corruption. Odinga’s willingness to cultivate a new relationship with Karua stemmed from the emergence of deep divisions within ODM, which potentially threatened his position as leader. In addition to the general disappointment of ODM supporters that the presidency had been conceded, the main threat to Odinga’s leadership and to party unity more generally came from a faction of disgruntled MPs from the Rift Valley. In August, these members were reported to have threatened to end their support for Odinga unless they received assurances that Kalenjin MPs would receive a greater share of ministerial positions and that their supporters would not be evicted from the disputed Mau Forest area. The battle for Kibaki’s succession, the president being prevented by constitutional term-limits from standing in 2012, also resulted in deep divisions within PNU. In July, corruption allegations hit the front pages, with Finance Minister Kimunya being accused of benefiting personally from failing to follow standard procedures in the sale of the Grand Regency hotel to the Libyan Arab African Investment Company. Although the precise details of the deal remained shrouded in mystery, Kimunya was ultimately forced to resign after a number of his PNU

Kenya • 327 colleagues refused to offer him their support. The willingness of high-profile figures such as Justice Minister Karua to use the corruption scandal to remove potential rivals from within their own party effectively announced the onset of the succession battle within PNU, shattering the facade of party unity. As the political merry-go-round gathered momentum, new political alliances that appeared implausible just months earlier came to the fore. Most notably, towards the end of the year rumours circulated that senior PNU leaders were in talks with long-term rival William Ruto, who many Kikuyu voters blamed for orchestrating election-related violence in 1992, 1997 and 2007, to form a new electoral alliance ahead of the 2012 polls. Reports of such backroom political realignments further eroded public confidence in the political system, leading to widespread disillusionment. The combination of constant infighting within parliament and a general lack of political will was largely responsible for the absence of progress over the long-term issues relating to justice for past wrongs and constitutional reforms, which made up ‘agenda four’ of the unity agreement. Although commissions of inquiry into the ‘Kenya crisis’ were established and delivered damning verdicts, the high number of veto players within the government of national unity ensured that few reform efforts were carried through. The Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence, better known as the Waki Commission after its chairman, Philip Waki, a judge of Kenya’s court of appeal, was established in February. The commission was composed of George Kegoro, a high court advocate, who served as the secretary to the commission, and commissioners Gavin Alistair McFadyen, a former assistant police commissioner in New Zealand, and Pascal Kambale, a lawyer from the DR Congo. In a 529-page report delivered to Odinga and Kibaki on 15 October, the commission documented 3,561 injuries, 117,216 cases of property destruction and 1,133 deaths during the post-election violence. Significantly, 405 deaths were caused by gunshot wounds. As most opposition supporters did not have access to firearms, human rights activists claimed that this finding implicated the police and security forces in over a third of the fatalities. The Waki Report identified major failings within the security forces as well as implicating senior political figures in the organisation of the conflict. Unsure of how to proceed, the commissioners took the unusual step of placing the most high-profile names, thought to include six cabinet ministers, five MPs and a number of well-connected businessmen, into a sealed envelope, which it pledged to hand to the ICC in The Hague if the government failed to establish a credible national prosecution mechanism. Despite this threat, the presence in parliament of a number of MPs who feared that their own names, or those of their associates, were included in the envelope undermined efforts to build agreement on a suitable prosecution process. The findings of the Independent Review Commission into the flawed electoral process, popularly known as the Kriegler Commission after its South African chairman, Johann Kriegler, met with a similar fate. The commissioners sworn in on 20 March included a Tanzanian judge, Lucy Imani Daudi Aboud, an election-observation expert from Argentina, Horacio Boneo, a PNU representative, Professor Marangu M’Marete, and two ODM

328 • Eastern Africa representatives, Francis Angila Aywa and Catherine Muyeka Mumma. Although Justice Kriegler had considerable international experience and had led South Africa’s electoral commission following the end of apartheid, the Kriegler report disappointed many opposition supporters and civil society groups. Most notably, the report concluded that the endemic administrative incompetence displayed during the election made it impossible to decide who had really won. The report also failed to apportion blame for the bureaucratic failings among political actors, instead placing most responsibility for the chaotic counting process on personal and institutional failings within the ECK. In line with this finding, parliament disbanded the ECK in December. However, the absence of a concrete plan for what or who should replace the ECK left Kenya without a functioning electoral commission, undermining the overarching priority of building a more effective political system. Reform efforts also stalled with regard to the police, the constitution and the pressing problem of the high number of IDPs in the aftermath of the election-related violence. Although most IDP camps were closed down by the end of year, the government failed to implement effective schemes to reintegrate the displaced or to establish a credible nationbuilding project. In December, a controversial media bill was passed by parliament, raising fears of democratic backsliding. Critics alleged that the bill represented a further intrusion on media freedom following on from the temporary ban on live broadcasts implemented during the post-election violence, and would allow government to censor the media and set heavy punishments for perceived press offenders. Widespread opposition to the bill, combined with government’s failure to deal successfully with IDPs, rising food prices, corruption scandals and increasing unemployment fuelled popular discontent. Protests over the price of food first erupted on 31 May and Nairobi continued to suffer regular disturbances throughout the year. Criticism of MPs hit an all-time high following their refusal to pay tax on allowances at a time of rising food prices, and came to a head with the heckling during Kibaki’s independence day speech on 12 December, which had to be cut short as a result.

Foreign Affairs Kenya’s engagement with international actors was dominated by the negotiations surrounding the creation of the government of national unity. Relations between the Kibaki government and the EU grew frosty after EU election observers expressed grave doubts about the reliability of the election results. The US also openly criticised the government and responded to evidence that post-election violence had been organised by prominent individuals by issuing a travel ban on ten unnamed politicians and businessmen on 4 February. However, the US was less outspoken than the EU on the issue of electoral fraud and was quick to express support for the idea of a government of national unity that would allow Kibaki to remain president, a position that eased the pressure on the PNU at an important moment in the negotiations. Opposition leaders complained that America’s overriding priority was to remain on good terms with the Kibaki government due to Kenya’s

Kenya • 329 geostrategic significance with regard to Somalia and suspected al-Qaida terrorist networks in East Africa. Consequently, they alleged, the goal of promoting democracy was sacrificed on the altar of security. The role of foreign governments and NGOs in promoting democracy in Kenya was further complicated by the refusal of the International Republican Institute (IRI) to release an exit poll paid for by the US government. The poll found, in contrast to the official election results, that Odinga had won by around 6% of the vote. The IRI’s official explanation that the poll was withheld because technical flaws undermined its findings was disputed by a political scientist from the University of California, San Diego, and one of his doctoral students, who had both worked on the poll. As criticism of the IRI’s refusal to release the poll mounted, the IRI’s East Africa director gave interviews to the international media that implied the US government, because it favoured a Kibaki victory, had put pressure on the IRI to delay the release of the poll. He alleged that he had been personally present at meetings where the US ambassador, Michael E. Ranneberger, had attempted “to influence the perceptions of the Kenyan electorate, and thus the campaign.” Although the results of the exit poll eventually became widely known, the episode left a bitter taste in the mouths of opposition supporters. In July, Odinga was asked to endorse the conduct of the IRI, but refused. While his response stopped short of blaming the US government directly, he wrote that the 2007 experience “has cast some doubts among ordinary Kenyans” and concluded that “my supporters believe that had I.R.I. released those polls, they would have made a huge difference and even saved lives.” The IRI exit poll was not the only foreign intervention to receive a mixed response. Archbishop Desmond Tutu was the first foreign negotiator who attempted to reconcile the warring parties in a well-intentioned but poorly thought-out visit to Nairobi on 2 January. Critics alleged that his presence enabled the government to defer engaging with more credible negotiators, most notably the AU chairperson, Ghana’s President John Kufour, and former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Kufour managed to meet both parties on 9 January but failed to bring them together or to secure substantial agreement. Hopes of a stable deal rose only after the arrival of Annan and a team of negotiators that had the full support of the international community. Under Annan’s leadership, Kibaki and Odinga engaged in face-to-face talks but still struggled to find common ground. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Nairobi on 18 February to support Annan’s work to broker a power-sharing deal. Following reports that Annan had lost hope, Rice warned that Washington would take the “necessary steps” if a domestic solution could not be found, and continued to call throughout February for the creation of a coalition government. With time running out on Annan’s mediation, Tanzania’s President Jakaya Kikwete, as new AU chairperson, joined the negotiating team on 26 February, bringing a fresh approach to the mediation amid rumours that he had come to warn Kibaki and Odinga of mounting regional and international impatience with the political deadlock. When the government of national unity was finally formed on 28 February, the international mediators took the plaudits and Annan and Kikwete became hugely popular in Kenya as a result of their contribution to

330 • Eastern Africa the peace process. Kikwete was even invited back to Nairobi in December to receive an honorary university degree commemorating his role as “an icon of peace”. Following the signing of the unity agreement, international actors focused their efforts on encouraging the government to make progress with institutional reforms while supporting the process of reconciliation. Annan continued to head a Panel of Eminent African Personalities which had been tasked with monitoring the implementation of the unity agreement along with the recommendations of the Waki and Kriegler commissions. Because Annan held the ‘envelope’ containing the names of those implicated in the electoral violence, the panel maintained a central role in the ongoing debate. However, the complexity of the many choices facing the Kenyan government made it difficult for donors to engage with the reform process. As a result, foreign governments focused their efforts on supporting the reconciliation process. USAID committed a $ 100 m recovery package aimed at peace and reconciliation, support for reform and restoring the livelihoods of communities. Similarly, Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that the UK would disburse an additional £ 2 m of funding through the Department for International Development to “help bring lasting peace to the country”, in addition to the £ 50 m aid provided to Kenya during 2007–08. However, the government’s slow progress in bringing the perpetrators of the post-election violence to justice, combined with limited evidence of reform of key institutions such as the police, judiciary and electoral commission, began to harm relations with donors. On 13 December, the US ambassador criticised the proposed media bill, which he said could threaten the country’s hard-fought reputation for a free press. Regional relations were strained during the crisis when the impassability of Kenyan roads blocked the vital transit routes for neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda. Some commentators interpreted the timing of the ‘unity deal,’ which was signed just after Kikwete had joined the negotiating team, as evidence that the threat of regional intervention ultimately played an important role in forging a compromise. However, following the return of political order in Kenya, relations with Tanzania and Uganda quickly reverted to normal. Significantly, the momentum propelling the deepening and expansion of the EAC appears to have survived the Kenya crisis. On 30 December, the Kenyan government announced plans for a second railway line to connect the port at Mombasa to Uganda, although it remained unclear how the $ 3.5 bn project would be financed in the context of low economic growth and with donors facing increasingly difficult constraints.

Socioeconomic Developments The January violence caused major disruptions to key sectors of the economy. Agriculture typically contributes around 23% of GDP, with the service sector making up around 60% and the remaining 17% coming from industry. Tea and horticultural products provided 34.3% of total sales in 2007, making them the country’s most important exports. In 2006 and 2007, the expansion of the flower and tourist industries contributed to impressive economic growth rates of 6.4% and 7% respectively. However, the benefits of the renewed

Kenya • 331 economic growth were not widely shared, in part because the NARC government elected in 2002 initially rejected a pro-poor approach to economic development. Rather, the Kibaki administration preferred to pursue a ‘trickle-down’ approach that prioritised increasing economic growth through trade, based on the assumption that over time growth would lead to improvement in the living conditions of all Kenyans. Sadly, this expectation has yet to be fulfilled and Kenya remained an extremely unequal country. Although employment increased from 14.7 m in 2003 to 16.5 m in 2007, the impact of this rise was effectively wiped out by a population increase over the same period of 3.7 m. It was estimated that, despite the gains of recent years, the poorest 20% of the population continued to receive just 6% of the national income while 49% went to the richest 20%. Popular dissatisfaction stemming from the combination of media reports of national economic success and visible poverty and inequality became manifested in a widespread sense of injustice which was a contributory factor in the explosion of violence in early 2008. The crisis had a major impact on the economy through a number of different processes. The closure of many shops over the Christmas and 2007–08 new year period ensured that holiday takings were down on previous years, while a number of businesses had property damaged or burnt down. At the same time, the impassability of key roads during the violence made it impossible to move cargo through the port at Mombasa, which prevented the transport of an estimated 27 m bags of maize. More significantly for medium-term economic growth, the tourist sector was badly hit by the negative images carried in the international media. Many travellers cancelled their trips and the country saw a 38% fall in visitor numbers in the first half of 2008, with some hotels reporting an occupancy rate as low as 15–20% in peak season. Tourism is likely to take a number of years to return to 2007 levels. The cumulative impacts of the post-election violence and the global economic downturn were profound. The Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) estimated that the government lost $ 31 m in taxes over the first week of the violence alone. Shortages of food and fuel caused by the violence, along with high global prices, saw inflation rise to an abnormally high 25%. Prior to the crisis, economic growth had been expected to top 7% in 2008, but it ultimately stalled at 3.3%. Towards the end of the year the central bank governor revised growth estimates for 2009 down to just 3.6%, but independent estimates suggested that even this was optimistic. Despite this, the currency remained relatively stable in the second half of the year at around KSh 78–79 to $ 1. The crisis had a direct impact on investor confidence and the Nairobi Stock Exchange lost 279 points on the first day of trading in 2008, with shares losing $ 629 m in panic selling. Although the restoration of political order partially stabilised the market, it slumped again after June, and overall fell from 4,713 points in January to a low of 3,106 on 29 October. However, despite the downturn, some local investors retained confidence in the economy. Launched on 28 March, the initial public offering of Safaricom, the largest mobile phone provider and one of East Africa’s most successful companies, was oversubscribed by 532%. The revenue from the Safaricom privatisation enabled the government to plug a large budget shortfall left over from 2007.

332 • Eastern Africa Development spending under Kibaki was guided by Vision 2030, the government’s official development strategy. The plan focused on ‘key growth sectors’ with the intention of creating a more attractive climate for investors, with $ 25 bn earmarked for infrastructure, skills development and social services provision. Infrastructure priorities included improving energy security, extending the country’s road infrastructure and increasing the speed and reliability of telecommunications. The priorities of Vision 2030 and the need to respond to popular frustration over the high cost of essentials were the two main influencing factors on the budget, announced on 12 June. In stark contrast to previous budgets, Finance Minister Kimunya emphasised explicitly ‘pro-poor’ policies: VAT on maize, flour, milk and rice was zero rated, while import duty on wheat products was reduced from 35% to 10% for one year. At the same time, the government promised to tackle the issue of youth unemployment by promoting job creation schemes in urban areas. In line with its commitment to improve infrastructure and with priorities established at a July EAC meeting, the government set aside KSh 65 bn to make a network of urban, rural and national highways fully operational. The most significant infrastructure projects featured in the budget were the extension of the rural electrification programme at a cost of KSh 6.8 bn and the modernisation of the port of Mombasa in conjunction with the Japanese government. Other notable projects included KSh 900 m to establish a business process outsourcing park in Nairobi and KSh 700 m to fund the completion of an undersea cable intended to improve bandwidth quality and reduce the cost of communications. The budget proposed to fund these projects by raising an additional KSh 2 bn from a number of ‘sin’ taxes on cigarettes and malted beer, and by removing the tax exemption on MPs’ allowances. However, even with these tax increases, the budget showed a shortfall of KSh 127 bn in the national finances, of which only KSh 25.2 bn was expected to be covered by international donors, with the rest to be funded through an additional KSh 100 bn of government borrowing. Consequently, the current account deficit increased from 3.3% of GDP in 2007 to 6.1% in 2008. Although the KRA surpassed its revenue collection target by KSh 1.4 bn in the second quarter of the 2008–09 financial year, reflecting the authority’s increasing professionalisation and capacity, the refusal of MPs to pay tax on allowances undermined the government’s revenue projections. More significantly, the projected fall in economic growth was likely to delay increases in tax revenue in the short-term, putting further pressure on government spending plans. At the same time, efforts to fund infrastructure expenditure through further privatisation and the issuing of a $ 500 m sovereign bond were deferred indefinitely as a result of the inhospitable financial climate. As a result, the government suffered a cash-flow problem, which, along with poor budget planning and structures for execution, resulted in many of the proposed infrastructure projects remaining dormant at year’s end. Nic Cheeseman

Rwanda

The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), under the leadership of President Paul Kagame, retained political power. In September, it handily won parliamentary elections that the EU observer mission characterised as having fundamental shortcomings by international standards. The neo-traditional local ‘gacaca’ courts continued to hear evidence in over 80,000 cases across 10,000 jurisdictions. Domestic political violence was virtually non-existent. Relations with some members of the international donor community cooled towards the end of the year following the release of a UN report that identified Rwanda as a major player in the conflict in eastern DR Congo. Some donors cancelled their budget aid while others took a wait-and-see attitude following Rwanda’s vigorous denial of wrongdoing. Relations with France, which had thawed somewhat in early 2008, were again frosty following the arrest of a senior RPF member in November. Economic growth remained strong, despite higher-than-forecast inflation and donor concerns that Rwanda’s presumed presence in eastern Congo could damage its economic prospects. Urban poverty decreased, while in rural areas it remained widespread and chronic.

334 • Eastern Africa

Domestic Politics The RPF-dominated alliance won 42 of the 53 elected seats (of a total of 80) in parliamentary elections held on 15–18 September. The ‘Parti Social Démocrate’ (PSD) took seven seats while the ‘Parti Liberal’ (PL) won four. One independent candidate ran and received less than 1% of the vote. A total of nine political parties contested the election, with six joining in an alliance with the RPF. The ruling alliance obtained 78.8% of the votes (a gain of 5% over 2003), PSD 13.1% and PL 7.5% (a loss of 3.6%). Both the PSD and PL voted consistently with the RPF and were not to be regarded as opposition parties. The dominance of the RPF in parliament became apparent when special interest representation was taken into account. Of the 27 remaining seats, 24 went specifically to women, two to youth and one to disabled representatives. These seats were not voted on by the registered electorate: instead representatives belonging to the National Women’s Council, National Youth Council and the National Disabled Council elected representatives from among their peers. Each of these councils showed strong affinity with the RPF, having voted with the government throughout the last parliament (2003–08). It is likely that women, youth and disabled representatives will again closely align themselves with the government during the life of the new parliament, meaning there will be no opposition given this strong majority. No elections were due for the second chamber, the senate. The elections resulted in the highest proportion of women in parliament anywhere in the world. Kagame commended Rwandans for their sage decision to elect women. In total, 44 women were elected. Kagame praised the election results, saying that a female majority in parliament “emphasizes the fact that the country’s future is being shaped by women.” The polls were monitored by representatives from Rwandan civil society, the AU and the EU. The EU observer mission testified to the improvement in the conduct of the poll, but also pointed out fundamental shortcomings in the election process when judged by international standards. International human rights organisations and foreign journalists were more openly critical, noting that no candidates actually ran against the government and that those who tried to do so were intimidated, harassed and in some cases jailed without being charged. There were also charges of outright election fraud. The elections also highlighted the concentration of power in the executive. Rwanda’s parliament had limited influence. Political power remained heavily concentrated in the hands of Kagame and his close advisors. Parliamentarians – be they male or female – actually had little power to legislate on behalf of their constituents. They had little room to develop policy or even to debate openly and space for free and open political expression remains limited. The government maintained a tight rein on the media. Journalists who spoke out against the policies of the RPF were accused of ethnic divisionism or of preaching genocide ideology under the new genocide ideology law that was adopted in June. The punishments

Rwanda • 335 contained in the new law were draconian at best as it covered, according to Human Rights Watch, “a very wide range of speech that is unquestionably protected by international conventions.” The new law was most aptly characterised as a ‘tool of social intimidation’. For example, children as young as 12 years old could be criminally liable while individuals who held leadership positions could receive up to 25 years in prison along with fines up to Rwandan francs 5 m. The 2008 genocide ideology law “does not require that the perpetrator intends to assist or facilitate genocide, or be aware of any planned or actual acts of genocide” but only that the speaker has uttered statements that the government believes constitute ‘genocide ideology’. The genocide ideology law meant that only those media outlets that expressed views in line with the government were able to speak out: as a result, many practised self-censorship. Instances of journalism that criticised or challenged government policy were in turn followed by crackdowns on the media. For example, during celebrations in honour of World Press Freedom day on 2 May, the government ejected three Rwandan newspaper editors for their ‘revisionist writings’ and banned them from all future government activities. These editors, all of them with Kinyarwanda-language weekly newspapers, subsequently received death threats, as did some of their staff. The government also threatened the editor of a fourth Kinyarwanda-language paper after it reported on the alleged cronyism of Finance Minister James Musoni. International media were not spared. In August, Information Minister Louise Mushikiwabo told both Voice of America and BBC to “desist from non-factual reporting” or risk being banned. The minister was referring to interviews on both stations with members of the anti-government militia ‘Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda’ (FDLR) from their base in eastern DR Congo. The government cautioned both stations not to allow “genocide fugitives” to “spread their ideology of divisionism and hatred.” A new media law, passed on 7 May, put in place stringent penalties for journalists found guilty of spreading ‘divisionism’, highlighting the extent to which the government seeks to define the limits of acceptable discourse about ethnic identity. The government also maintained tight control over civil society organisations and other forms of associational life. Civil society did not represent an open space where individuals or groups could openly and publicly influence or challenge government policy. Instead, civil society organisations played an important role in filling the social void in the lives of many Rwandans in the aftermath of the genocide. Membership in civil society organisations remained open to Tutsi survivors and many Hutu ‘survivors’ marginally benefited from their membership in organisations that supported survivors, although specific privileges such as access to subsidised health care and the waiver of children’s school fees were available only to Tutsi women in their recognised status as ‘real survivors’ of the 1994 genocide. The government affirmed its position that Tutsi were the only ‘real survivors’ when it passed a constitutional amendment in May decreeing that the genocide be publicly referred to as the ‘genocide against Tutsi’. While it was true that Tutsi were

336 • Eastern Africa targeted by genocidal killers on the basis of their ethnicity, the decree effectively silenced any debate about the Hutu who were killed during the genocide (April to July 1994) and afterwards in acts of revenge by RPF-led forces in 1995 and 1996. Perhaps in implicit acknowledgment of the silent resentment that many ethnic Hutu had for government policy since the genocide, the government arrested several Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) officers for crimes against humanity they allegedly committed during the 1994 genocide. The arrest of four officers, a general, a major and two captains, marked the first time the government had acted against high-ranking military officials. The government had previously acknowledged that some war crimes were committed by undisciplined and rogue soldiers bent on revenge and that they have been tried and convicted in the military courts. Before these arrests in June, only 14 known trials of low-ranking RPF soldiers had taken place, resulting in light sentences of less than six years in camera before the military high court. In October, the court sentenced the two captains to eight years imprisonment for the murder of the archbishop of Kigali and two senior members of the Catholic church while the other two officers were acquitted. The government held up the trial of the officers as an example of its willingness to allow senior RDF members to be held accountable for their actions during the 1994 genocide. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) released a statement calling the case a victory for the rule of law in Rwanda. Domestic human rights organisations called the verdicts a mockery of justice and contrasted the sentences and acquittals with those being meted out at ‘gacaca’ trials. For example, in February an elderly Hutu woman received a sentence of 25 years in prison for giving food to the ‘Interahamwe’ militia during the genocide. The trials were also questioned by Human Rights Watch, which released a report in July pointing out the lack of judicial independence from the executive. The government rebuffed this criticism and held up the trials as proof that there was no impunity for members of the RDF. ‘Gacaca’ trials continued throughout 2008. The government had expected the trials to wrap up no later than December 2008. It now appeared that the trials will conclude in June 2009. The ‘gacaca’ courts were a central part of the government’s post-genocide national unity and reconciliation tool-kit and emphasised legal retribution over social reconciliation. Instituted in 2002, the courts were an open-air local-level retributive mechanism that the government instituted to prosecute individuals for crimes of genocide. For the government, ‘gacaca’ was a truth and reconciliation strategy to accomplish the following: 1) establish a truthful record of what really happened during the 1994 genocide; and, 2) accelerate the release of more than 120,000 individuals accused of acts of genocide so that they could return home and help rebuild Rwanda rather than just sit in jail. Participation was mandatory. Human rights organisations continued to criticise the ‘gacaca’ process for its lack of legal protections, notably the right to a fair trial. The main difficulty remained the government’s unwillingness to allow participants at ‘gacaca’ to speak about RPF war crimes committed before, during and after the genocide. Only Tutsi survivors were

Rwanda • 337 allowed to speak about crimes they witnessed while Hutu perpetrators were obliged to tell the truth about what they did. The government did not deny that RPF soldiers committed crimes during the genocide, but only that they were not on the same scale as the carefully planned genocide of Tutsi by Hutu. The 2007 Gacaca Law was further revised in March. The new law allowed category 1 suspects of genocide to be tried before the courts. Category 1 suspects were the so-called ‘big fish’, meaning the organisers and implementers of the 1994 genocide, and included most of the individuals awaiting trial at the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania. The law was criticised by human rights groups who claimed that it was politically motivated to allow Rwanda to try the ‘big fish’ in its national courts. The main concern was the lack of fair trial guarantees for category 1 suspects. The mandate of the ICTR was set to expire in December 2008 but was extended by the UN Security Council until the end of 2009. Management of the caseload was complicated by the decision not to transfer cases to Rwanda for trial. In March, it was anticipated that ICTR would transfer its outstanding balance of cases to the Rwandan domestic courts. International human rights organisations, led by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, were against any such transfer because of the presumption of government interference in the trials. By June, ICTR informed the government that it would not be transferring the remaining cases to Rwanda. In December, it handed down its most significant ruling since its inception by sentencing a permanent secretary in the ministry of defence, Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, and two other military officers to life imprisonment. Bagosora was widely believed to have been the chief architect of the 1994 genocide. The government praised the conviction while reiterating its wish to try the remaining suspects on Rwandan soil. Shaping the concerns of international human rights organisations was Rwanda’s continued poor record of protecting basic human rights. The ‘gacaca’ courts remained a site of insecurity as government officials openly interfered in numerous cases in efforts to determine the outcome. Unknown assailants killed at least 16 Tutsi survivors before their scheduled testimony. Living conditions in prisons and ‘cachots’ (local detention centres) for the estimated 59,000 mostly ethnic Hutu prisoners (of whom 34,141 were genocide prisoners and another 2,846 were genocide suspects) in 14 prisons did not drastically improve during 2008. Access to healthcare and adequate nutrition remained a problem for most of the prison population. Internal security was assured by the Rwanda National Police (RNP). Throughout 2008 there were numerous cases of arbitrary arrest, beatings, corruption and indiscipline within the national force. The government expressed concern about the levels of corruption among security personnel and instituted a toll-free number to encourage citizens to report cases of police excess and abuse. During the year, 305 officers received community training, which included seminars on the proper use of force and respect for human rights. Local security forces, known at Local Defence Forces (LDF) killed at least six Rwandans: none of the officers was charged. The LDF was made up of

338 • Eastern Africa ‘volunteers’ who were chosen from the communities they served. They were answerable to local officials, not to the RNP. Men above the age of 18 were required by law to ‘volunteer’ and some who tried to avoid LDF service were detained and beaten by members of the RNP on the instruction of local government officials. The government continued its tough stance on good governance and the fight against corruption. The RPF had instituted significant reforms designed to reduce public-sector corruption, and donors considered Rwanda to be the least corrupt country in Africa. However, enforcement of anti-corruption laws tended to occur in cycles. In 2008, several senior government officials, as well as more than 100 police officers and 27 district mayors, resigned or were removed from office for being corrupt. None of these individuals faced charges in court. TI, in its widely cited Corruption Perception Index, ranked Rwanda 102 out of 180 countries under review. It gave Rwanda a score of 3.0 out of 10, which indicated high levels of public corruption. Comparatively, Rwanda ranked on par with Tanzania and better than regional neighbours Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya and Uganda. In October, the ministry of justice released the report of the commission of inquiry into France’s role in the 1994 genocide. The 500-page report was the result of two years of inquiry led by senior Rwandan government officials. It accused former French President François Mitterrand and more than 30 senior French officials of facilitating the genocidal plan of then President Habyarimana. Rwanda launched the commission in response to a 2006 inquiry led by French judge Louis Bruguière, who accused Kagame and other senior members of the RPF of ordering the assassination of Habyarimana. The French government reacted strongly to the report, condemning it as politically motivated and based on unsubstantiated evidence. It also affirmed its commitment to the findings of the 1998 Quilès Commission, in which France investigated its role in the 1994 genocide. In further reaction to the indictment, the government amended the constitution in May to grant perpetual immunity from prosecution to former presidents. The amendment stipulated that former heads of state could not be prosecuted on charges for which they had not officially been put on trial during their period of office. The government also announced in October that French would no longer be one of Rwanda’s official languages, leaving English and Kinyarwanda as the only official languages. The social implications of this new policy remain to be seen. As written, it favours children of anglophone households and virtually excludes those of francophone families. It could potentially lead to the dismissal of many educators at both universities and secondary schools and may represent a move to weed out non-anglophone teachers surreptitiously.

Foreign Affairs In late 2007, Rwanda had signed an agreement, the Nairobi Accord, with the DR Congo concerning the presence of illegal armed groups in the DR Congo’s eastern Kivu provinces. The plan targeted the FDLR, a Hutu and anti-RPF militia based in both north and south

Rwanda • 339 Kivu. The RPF believed that FDLR was responsible for the 1994 genocide of Tutsi and were using the Kivu region as a base from which to attack Rwanda to finish the genocide. FDLR claimed it did not participate in the 1994 genocide and that its interest was to return to Rwanda to represent ordinary Hutu who were currently oppressed by the Tutsi-led RPF government. The accord contained four distinct phases, implementation of which continued throughout 2008. The first phase of ‘sensitising’ FDLR rebels was voluntarily disarmament, followed by cantonment, voluntary repatriation and then disarmament by force. The 45-day sensitisation period ended in March with limited success. The DR Congo’s foreign minister attempted to negotiate with the FDLR leadership, whose Germany-based leader Ignace Murwanashayaka refused to engage. Murwanashayaka cited the list of 7,000 FDLR fighters that the Rwandan government had prepared, saying that they were genocide suspects and would likely be arrested on their return to Rwanda. Murwanashayaka sought to meet with Rwanda’s Great Lakes envoy, Richard Sezibera, to secure an amnesty for his FDLR fighters, but the government refused. By May, only 300 FDLR fighters had been cantoned. Relations between the DR Congo and the FDLR, and between FDLR and Rwanda, soured considerably in March when the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1804 demanding that the FDLR stop fighting and its fighters present themselves for cantonment. In reaction, the FDLR re-engaged the rebel forces of Laurent Nkunda, whose ‘Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple’ (CNDP) was backed by the Rwandan government. Nkunda’s CNDP also engaged the Congolese army. The CNDP sought to gain control of eastern Congo, a resource-rich area. Both engagements resulted in massive population displacement and a resurgence of rape of Congolese women and girls. Rwanda intermittently closed its northwestern border throughout 2008 to prevent the flow of refugees and to reduce the possibility of overnight raids by the FDLR into Rwanda. In October, the DR Congo’s ambassador to the UN presented to the Security Council what he called firm proof that the Rwandan military (RDF) was present in northern Kivu, both to aid Nkunda’s CNDP and to eliminate the FDLR. The Rwandan government denied its military involvement, claiming that the DR Congo was only trying to cover up its inability to deal with the conflict. The UN, along with European foreign ministers, called for an urgent bilateral agreement between Rwanda and the DR Congo. It was unlikely that the RDF was present in DR Congo, but very likely that it was providing logistical support to the CNDP. Nkunda’s CNDP insurgency against the FDLR lessened the pressure on the RPF to enter into a settlement with the Hutu militia, whose demand to return to Rwanda in a power-sharing agreement had been repeatedly refused. In December, the Rwandan government was formally linked to the CNDP in a report issued by a UN panel of experts charged with investigating violations of the international sanctions regime against illegal armed groups in the DR Congo. The report provided considerable evidence of linkages between senior members of the RPF/RDF and the CNDP leadership. Rwanda vigorously denied the claim and denounced the report as the

340 • Eastern Africa handiwork of genocide deniers and others in the international community “who cling to dangerous inaccuracies and outright lies”. In perhaps implicit acknowledgement of the significant financial, military and logistical linkages between Rwanda and the CNDP, President Kagame promised to bring Nkunda to justice for “his excesses in eastern Congo”. Complicating the situation were reports of a split within the CNDP leadership. Specifically, Nkunda’s second-in-command, Jean-Bosco Ntaganda, sought to oust Nkunda. Whether or not this happened was unclear. Rwanda remained silent although there were reports that Kagame was deeply unhappy about Nkunda’s style of combat, notably his use of civilians as military targets. DR Congo issued an international warrant for Nkunda’s arrest in November, but he remained at large at the end of the year. Rwanda reiterated its commitment to disarming illegal armed groups in DR Congo in December in a statement issued by the Tripartite Plus Joint Commission (TPJC). It also called on the TPJC to endorse travel and financial sanctions against the FDLR. The joint verification mechanism (JVM) remained dormant. It was intended to be reactivated to monitor the conflict in the Kivu regions of eastern DR Congo following the 2007 agreement between the foreign ministers of Rwanda and DR Congo. In 2008, both the UN and the European parliament called on DR Congo and Rwanda to revive the JVM. Rwanda and DR Congo were in negotiations at the end of the year to resume diplomatic relations a decade after they were broken off, suggesting that the JVM may be revived in 2009. A factor in these delicate negotiations was the replacement of Richard Sezibera as Rwanda’s envoy to the Great Lakes region in October. Sezibera was known to be an intimidating figure who answered only to Kagame. The incoming envoy, Joseph Mutaboba, was a seasoned diplomat well versed in the complex and subtle relationships between the various actors in the region. Mutaboba’s appointment may have been a sign of Rwandese willingness to find a solution to the endless crisis in eastern Congo. Rwanda dispatched a senior envoy to Angola in mid-February to explore the possible restoration of diplomatic relations, which had been broken off in 1998 when Angola sent troops to support Congolese President Laurent Kabila against Rwandan forces. Relations had not, however, been restored by the end of year. Relations with regional neighbours Uganda and Burundi improved with the encouragement of the UK, while relations with France remained strained throughout the year, and deteriorated further in November when Kagame’s chief of protocol Rose Kabuye was arrested in Germany on an international arrest warrant that had been issued by France in 2006. Predictably, the Rwandan government reacted angrily, including stage-managed public demonstrations in Kigali, although there was evidence that it had orchestrated the arrest to gain access to the testament related to the indictments against Kagame and other senior RPF members. Speaking at an AU summit in June, Kagame hinted that indictments against foreign nationals alleged to have played a role in the 1994 genocide could soon be issued by Rwanda. Kagame sponsored a summit resolution that called for a meeting between the AU and EU to ensure that arrest

Rwanda • 341 warrants against Rwandan nationals issued by France (2006) and Spain be withdrawn since they infringed African national sovereignty. Kagame was reacting in part to the February indictment by a Spanish judge of 40 RPF members for killing hundreds of thousands of civilians, including nine Spanish nationals, in the post-genocide emergency (1995–99). In December, following the release of the UN report, the Netherlands and Sweden suspended their bilateral budget support aid. Some critics also called on the UK, Rwanda’s biggest donor, to do the same. The UK declined and instead praised Rwanda for its efforts to improve bilateral relations with the DR Congo. Donor relations remained generally positive throughout the year with the majority of international donors, including the US, offering continued praise for Rwanda’s commitment to good governance and marketoriented economic reforms. This was also the prevailing mood during the 8th annual donor meeting in late November in Kigali. In particular, the US government announced in May that it would give Rwanda $ 20 m to train its troops in Darfur as part of the $ 100 m package for the AU/UN peacekeeping mission there. Rwanda committed to provide 2,600 troops to the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia in May, but no deployment occurred during the year. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair visited in January and announced his volunteer position as a governance advisor to Kagame. US President George W. Bush visited in February as part of his five-country African tour and expressed support for the international sanctions against the FDLR. Other prominent international visitors were German President Horst Köhler and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. Business and religious leaders from the US visited throughout the year, including Howard Schulz of Starbucks and evangelist Rick Warren. Rwanda also sponsored several regional conferences as part of its continuing efforts to become a regional hub for services, trade and financial transactions. For example, in June, as part of its EAC membership, Rwanda hosted the first East African investment conference, which attracted investors from across eastern and southern Africa. Discussions included the investment proposal to build a rail link from Tanzania to Kigali. Kagame opened the Kigali stock exchange in January. Trading was limited to corporate and treasury bonds but will in future be open to foreign companies. The stock market was intended to bring foreign investment to Rwanda.

Socioeconomic Developments Government continued to promote social reconciliation among Rwandans through its policy of national unity and reconciliation. The policy made any discussion of ethnicity illegal. Rwandans were no longer Tutsi, Hutu or Twa but were now Rwandans. The policy was the basis of national peace and security and adherence by all government bodies was

342 • Eastern Africa paramount and was monitored by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. The main organisation representing Tutsi survivors of the 1994 genocide, IBUKA, continued to criticise the policy, noting that it silenced the truth of how Hutu killed Tutsi during the genocide. The government, whose senior leadership was largely comprised of anglophone Tutsi who had returned to Rwanda after the genocide, tolerated IBUKA’s criticism as it understood the political sensitivity of appearing to publicly marginalise one of its key constituents. In practice, however, survivors of the genocide, many of whom were either widows or child-headed households, remained among Rwanda’s most vulnerable citizens. The government also continued to implement its development and poverty reduction policy, Vision 2020, following the successful renegotiation of its economic development and poverty reduction strategy with the IMF and other donors. Implementation of Vision 2020 was mixed, with urban areas benefiting significantly through the creation of new roads, market centres and other infrastructure. Rural areas, particularly in the southwestern regions, have remained poorer since the genocide. Rural poverty was shaped by drought and other climatic shocks, rising oil costs and other costs related to trade arising from Rwanda’s landlocked position. More significant in shaping rural poverty was the government’s commitment to producing crops, notably tea and coffee, for foreign markets. Peasant Rwandans, accounting for 87% of the population and relying on subsistence agriculture, were forced to grow ‘productive crops’ such as coffee or tea rather than the crops they need to meet their basic nutritional needs. Peasants who resisted government directives could be fined or imprisoned. The FAO identified Rwanda as being particularly vulnerable to rising food prices and nutritional shortfalls for most of its population. The government continued to invest in coffee and tea production, including breaking ground on a new coffee-roasting and packing facility in Kigali in September. At the end of the year, the government was in negotiations with UAE-based Dubai World to buy two of the largest tea estates in the northwest of the country. In December, the government announced that it had accepted an offer to privatise the Gisovu tea factory in western Rwanda. Rwanda remained on track to meet select MDGs, notably in education, health and gender equity. For example, net enrolment at the primary school level for boys and girls was already 95%. There was also gender parity in both primary and secondary schooling. Of the total population, 60% lived within 5 km of a health centre. Spending on HIV/AIDS accounted for almost 25% of the health budget and the prevalence rate had fallen from 14% in 2000 to just 3% in 2007. Women had a 50% higher prevalence rate than men. However, it remained unlikely that the government would meet other targets. Almost 40% of the population lived on an income insufficient to meet basic food needs. Poverty levels had increased since the genocide: the UN found that at least 57% of the rural population lived in extreme poverty and that Rwanda’s Gini co-efficient had increased from 0.47 in 2000 to 0.51 in 2007.

Rwanda • 343 The government continued with its policy of home-grown solutions to Rwandan problems. The implementation of the administrative decentralisation policy continued with support from European donors. Appointed local-level officials remained responsible for overseeing the decentralisation process through local sensitisation efforts and the continued enforcement of the ‘imihigo’ (performance) contracts, instituted in late 2007 and signed between local government officials and the local population. Household heads were to “make vows of the achievements they will have attained in a period of one year before their local leaders and the entire population.” Households that failed to meet their performance targets were fined and could be imprisoned for non-payment at local detention centres known as ‘cachots’. An evaluation of these contracts started in December. The ministries of local government and internal security maintained tight control over the decentralisation process and evaluated the ‘imihigo’ process. In December, parliament approved a mini-budget covering the first six months of 2009 with the purpose of aligning Rwanda with the fiscal year of the EAC countries. Rwanda remained highly dependent on donor support: 43% of the mini-budget was to be financed by external grants, 5% from external loans and the balance from domestic revenue (which had been equivalent to 12% of GDP in 2008, exceeding the target by 20.4%). The country drew from its reserves to make up the $ 20 m shortfall resulting from the withdrawal of aid by Sweden and the Netherlands. The IMF completed the 5th review of the current PRGF and praised the budget as one that “will assist in achieving poverty-reducing growth if properly implemented.” It did express concern about Rwanda’s role in eastern DR Congo and cautioned government to consider the possibility of future aid cuts in subsequent budgets. The government committed to improve tax collection as the basis for economic growth, a move which could additionally burden the rural poor. Despite a weakening global economy, GDP growth remained robust at probably 8.5% or even more, meeting IMF expectations. Economic growth was grounded in healthy outputs in the agricultural, manufacturing and service (banking and telecommunications) sectors. Inflation peaked at 22.4% by the end of the year as a result of the rising cost of imports, while the average for 2008 was 15.4%. In September, the government released its budget framework paper for 2009–12. It forecast average annual GDP growth of 7.8% over the period. It also anticipated a significant rise in domestic tax revenue, with domestic funds covering 59% of budget expenditures by 2011–12. Susan M. Thomson

Seychelles

All attention was focused on the drastic adjustments to socioeconomic policies needed to save the country from complete collapse as a result of the double impact of the global financial crisis and the inherent structural weaknesses in the government’s long-pursued welfare-oriented approach. The country was forced to seek a stand-by arrangement with the IMF, triggering a shock that halved the value of the national currency. The high living standard to which the Seychellois population had become accustomed was thus seriously threatened. The political situation nevertheless remained relatively calm without significant social unrest and with the continuing undisputed dominance of the ruling Seychelles People’s Progressive Front (SPPF), in power since 1977.

Domestic Politics President James Michel, in his annual state-of-the-nation address before the National Assembly on 12 February, set the tone for the year when he dwelt at length on the increasingly apparent repercussions of a tougher international economic environment, but insisted that the country should remain realistic, resilient and responsible in dealing with these new realities. This theme was taken up again in his strong plea for the country’s unity on 18

346 • Eastern Africa June during national day celebrations commemorating the 15th anniversary of the adoption of the democratic and pluralistic constitution. Throughout the year, Michel and the SPPF leadership openly acknowledged the advent of new much more difficult challenges, but stressed their determination to preserve as much as possible of the country’s social cohesion and welfare-orientation for all groups in society. This was in continuation of the moderate reform course pursued since 2003, when the formerly strict socialist orientation had clearly reached its limits. The relationship between the ruling SPPF and the opposition Seychelles National Party (SNP) underwent several ups and downs during the year, but was generally less confrontational than in previous years. Both major political camps more or less accepted the status quo, with an obvious clear advantage for the SPPF. The political climate was relatively calm, since the next elections were not due before 2011 and 2012. A bipartisan approach usually prevailed when urgent remedial measures were needed towards the end of the year to safeguard the economy against complete collapse in the face of a threatening financial crisis. In this climate of uncertainty, the country’s first president and elder statesman, James Mancham, called on 9 December for the formation of a government of national unity, while some SNP politicians demanded early elections. This option was, however, not seriously considered and the political landscape remained relatively unperturbed. The year had begun with new and improved relations between SPPF and SNP and several rounds of personal meetings between Michel and SNP leader Wavel Ramkalawan, but new strains soon began to emerge. On 21 February, the government formally acknowledged liability for the injuries sustained by 13 SNP followers as a result of police brutality during protest demonstrations in October 2006, and the attorney-general was instructed to seek an out-of-court settlement. In March, a fresh row erupted in parliament over the approval of two ambassadors-at-large nominated by SPPF and SNP respectively: a wealthy naturalised Indian businessman, Chinnakannan Sivasankaran, and Mancham. The refusal to appoint the latter was suspected to have been due to behind the scenes intervention by France Albert René, the former president and still powerful SPPF chairman. On 22 March, the foundation stone was laid for a new parliament building to be built with a $ 2 m grant from China. Ramkalawan opposed this project as being incompatible with the country’s dignity, and he more generally wanted greater public transparency in his meetings with Michel. Subsequently, the dialogue between the two leaders came to a halt. In May, SNP pointedly voted against a supplementary budget of Seychelles rupees (SR) 68 m, partly intended for salary increases for MPs, even though it had originally approved the budget in December 2007. A by-election in the Mont Fleuri constituency on 19 July was precipitated by the resignation from parliament on 20 June of SNP MP Jean-François Ferrari in angry protest at the speaker’s refusal to let him speak on an anti-corruption bill. Ferrari hoped to stir up some political excitement, but little mobilisation was apparent. SPPF, fearing a backlash given

Seychelles • 347 the depressed economic situation, decided not to contest the seat and called for a boycott. Ferrari was thus handily reelected on the basis of a very low 26% turnout. His opponent, Frank Elizabeth of the Democratic Party (DP), secured only 12% of the votes, a clear indication of the DP’s loss of relevance. In the 2007 parliamentary elections, SNP and DP had formed an alliance, but it soon fell apart. In November, new discussions were initiated to reconstitute this alliance, but the issue remained controversial and undecided. On 5 August, Andrew Perera from Sri Lanka was appointed new chief justice, thus continuing the government’s practice of giving preference to foreigners over local legal professionals. The fact that most judicial posts were still held by foreigners gave rise to some criticism. In February, Michel announced a new constitutional review committee and a new Public Officers Ethics Bill to promote ethics in the public service. He was hinting at signs of corruption in the police and the judiciary and was alarmed at growing drug use. On 16 July, the supreme court ruled in favour of the government by approving the liquidation of one of the largest hotels, whose closure in January had stirred controversy and prompted rumours about hidden Arab investor interests. During the last quarter of the year, political attention was exclusively focused on the drastic rescue measures to stabilise the critical economic situation. This encouraged a new climate of closer cooperation between government and opposition, prompting government to make some conciliatory appointments of opposition and liberal business personalities to key positions in public institutions. SNP was confronted with a delicate political dilemma of having to support the far-reaching market-oriented economic reforms introduced by government that they had for years unsuccessfully demanded. This left SNP unable to vehemently oppose SPPF’s new direction. In the end, SNP abstained from voting on the 2009 budget.

Foreign Affairs President Michel continued his efforts to promote Seychelles on the international scene more actively than his predecessor had done, and in this endeavour he was also supported by the opposition. In particular, emphasis was given to presenting the common problems of the world’s small island states to various international forums and to forging closer cooperation among such states. One opportunity to do so was Michel’s speech during the UN General Assembly’s general debate in late September. In mid-August, he attended the annual SADC summit in South Africa to conclude the country’s readmission to this subregional organisation that had been pending since 2006. Readmission represented a reversal of the government’s unilateral withdrawal from SADC in 2003 over membership fees, which were considered far too high, having been based on the country’s elevated income level. In the meantime, government had reassessed the value of SADC membership, in parallel with continued membership in COMESA and IOC. Seychelles took over the annually

348 • Eastern Africa rotating IOC chairmanship in April 2007 and hosted the 24th council of ministers meeting on 27–28 March in Victoria, before handing over the chair to Comoros. Attempts were also made to strengthen bilateral links with China, India and several African countries, while at the same time maintaining close relations with Britain, France and the US. Michel visited China for the Olympic Games in August and signed a Yuan 20 m technical aid agreement on 13 November, when Wu Bangguo, standing committee chairman of the Chinese People’s Congress, visited Seychelles.

Socioeconomic Developments Seychelles was hit hard and fast by the global financial crisis and the ensuing credit crunch and was one of the first countries to seek and obtain stand-by support from the IMF. However, the country’s predicament was also the consequence of the long period of socialist welfare-orientation under René and of only half-hearted and much delayed reforms under Michel in recent years. The structural weaknesses in the economy and the unsustainable indebtedness now came brutally to the fore and necessitated a radical switch from continued gradualist reform to shock treatment, no matter how painful for most of the population. Discussions with the IMF about the necessary reform measures had, however, been long under way, thus facilitating the fast conclusion of an agreement. The first crunch came on 1 July with the failure to service principle and interest payments due on an un-rated $ 85 m private placement credit of the government. The Paris Club rebuffed pleas to reschedule outstanding debts without prior agreement with the IMF. On 7 August, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) subsequently downgraded its rating for Seychelles to ‘selective default’, thus documenting the severity of the financial dilemma. On 3 October, the government had to declare default on the six-monthly payment of $ 9 m due on a $ 200 m sovereign bond issued in September 2006. S&P rated the chances of bondholders to obtain repayment at only 30–50%. The country’s currency reserves were down to just $ 14 m, equivalent to one week of import cover. Total external debt at the end of August stood at $ 809 m, two-thirds of it to commercial creditors. This accumulated debt was almost equal to the GDP and was totally unsustainable. The government had to publicly admit the situation had dramatically deteriorated and that drastic remedial measures were inevitable. The most contentious issue had for years been the artificial overvaluation of the national currency in a welfare-motivated attempt to contain price levels in the almost completely import-dependent island economy. This policy had necessitated rigid currency controls (to suppress black market dealings) and led to constant foreign exchange shortages. Francis Chang-Leng, who had for seven years held key responsibility as Central Bank of Seychelles (CBS) governor, resigned on 31 October and was replaced by Pierre Laporte, a Seychellois with professional IMF experience.

Seychelles • 349 On 31 October, the government submitted a letter of intent to the IMF with a detailed outline of a whole range of future financial and economic reforms intended to restore macroeconomic balance with support of the IMF and the international community. On the same day, parliament unanimously approved two crucial laws regarding CBS’s role and the abandonment of all currency control regulations. On 14 November, the IMF approved a two-year stand-by facility for $ 26 m, with immediate disbursement of $ 9 m and the remainder to be paid in seven quarterly instalments. This first-ever IMF arrangement in Seychelles history committed government to a regime of tough reforms, such as reduction of the public sector, further privatisation and boosting the private sector, better fiscal governance, scrapping most subsidies and review of the tax regime, and, above all, allowing unrestricted convertibility of the currency. In the first two weeks of November, the rupee lost more than half its value, plunging from a previously controlled rate of SR 8 to $ 1 to about SR 17. Afterwards the exchange rate stabilised and even recovered slightly by the end of the year (with foreign reserves also recovering to $ 41 m), while interest rates were raised to almost 30%. The shock exercise achieved its short-term purpose of preventing the country’s complete financial collapse, but further debt rescheduling discussions with the Paris Club and other commercial lenders were expected in early 2009, while more time was needed to fully implement most of the other structural reforms. The IMF was, however, satisfied that its benchmarks for the year’s end had been met. Inevitably, the shock treatment had a sharply negative effect on the relatively comfortable average standard of living of the Seychellois population. This was most immediately felt in drastic price hikes for practically all commodities. While inflation had as early as June gone up to 32% (mostly for food and oil products), it shot up to more than 60% in November and December as an effect of the currency’s depreciation. The year’s average inflation rate was given as 37%. The CBS in its 2007 annual report produced considerably revised national accounts figures (in accordance with UN methodology) that were about 25% higher than those hitherto provided, showing for 2007 GDP of $ 912 m, per capita income of about $ 10,700 and a growth rate of 7.3% (average for 2005–07, 7.7%). Preliminary estimates for 2008 indicated a sharp slump to zero growth resulting from problems in all three mainstays of the economy (tourism, fisheries and financial services). Tourist arrivals for the year were down by 1.4% to 159,000, with a noticeable dip of 10% for the last quarter as a result of the global economic recession. Increased concerns over the surge in Somali piracy in parts of the Indian Ocean negatively affected the fisheries industry, with the result that many trawlers remained tied up in dock for longer periods. Exports (estimated at $ 475 m) covered little more than half of imports ($ 882 m), and the current account deficit of $ 275 m was equivalent to one-third of GDP. Foreign direct investment had been a record $ 248 m in 2007, mostly in hotels and the tourism industry, and held up well during the first

350 • Eastern Africa half of 2008. Based on IMF information, it was reported that Seychellois individuals and companies held total assets of $ 2.4 bn in overseas accounts, which was regarded as proof of the thriving offshore industry. The government’s budget performance again proved much less satisfactory than originally anticipated. The final budget figures for 2007 were far below target, with lower than expected revenues and higher expenditures. Nevertheless, there was a budget surplus of SR 65 m (1.1% of GDP as opposed to the original 7% target). Several reform measures (such as sharp increases in power tariffs and cuts to other subsidies) were introduced in the 2008 budget, which aimed at achieving a surplus of 5% of GDP. Finance Minister Danny Faure in his 2009 budget speech on 11 December claimed that the primary budget surplus for 2008 was forecast to reach as high as 7.1% despite all the economic problems encountered during the year, while the IMF subsequently estimated an overall budget deficit of about 2.3% of GDP. The new 2009 budget introduced a number of harsh fiscal measures in line with the reform agenda agreed with the IMF and aimed at achieving a primary surplus of 6.2% of GDP to enable government to gradually clear the huge domestic debt that had accrued over the years. The budget was approved on 19 December by the SPPF majority, with SNP abstaining and criticising the new measures as too austere and too rapid. One important element was the plan to reduce the public sector of 19,600 persons by about 2,000, which had practically been achieved by end of November through a voluntary retirement scheme. The official unemployment rate in December was given as only 1%, but was expected to rise in 2009. Further privatisation was envisaged as was a generally more conducive environment for the private sector. On the whole, the SPPF government had through the sheer impact of the financial crisis been forced to accept and introduce sharp revisions of the basic tenets of its long-espoused welfare-oriented policies and to prepare the population for much harsher times and a difficult 2009. Longer-term hopes rested on promising but still uncertain oil prospecting activities, while the immediate outlook for high-class tourism was depressed. Rolf Hofmeier

Somalia

Somalia continued to be marked by violent civil conflict and humanitarian disaster and saw only few changes towards the establishment of a central government. There were several developments on the political front, in the military situation and in international diplomacy, but no stability and no resolution of the tripartite division of the country between Somaliland, Puntland and the more disorganised South. None of the fundamental problems of social and political order was tackled. The exponential increase in Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the southern coasts became a major international concern. Authorities in Puntland and the South were not able to suppress these activities, and an international naval protection force was building up. A major change was the withdrawal of the Ethiopian army, which had invaded Somalia in December 2006 at the alleged request of the weak Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and had fought the militant-jihadist groups, mainly the ‘al-Shabaab’, that re-emerged after the defeat of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006 and aimed to topple the TFG. The war took a heavy toll on the civilian population and aggravated the humanitarian situation. In Southern Somalia the TFG held its ground but failed to extend its authority and institutional structures beyond the central areas. The presence of international NGOs and some UN agencies kept a check on the humanitarian problems and prevented mass starvation, but conditions remained extremely

352 • Eastern Africa precarious throughout the year. A new accord between the TFG and the moderate wing of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) offered some hope of new political alignments, but internal quarrels within the TFG led to the resignation of interim President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed at the end of the year.

Domestic Politics Throughout the year, Southern Somalia was marred by bitter conflict and enduring instability, coupled with massive humanitarian problems. The TFG dating from 2004 (the legitimate, internationally recognised but weak government based on a negotiated clan/family power-sharing agreement) could not further entrench its authority and was attacked constantly by Islamist militant groups as well as being criticised by a coalition of opposition forces that had emanated from the ICU, defeated in December 2006 by the TFG forces and the Ethiopians who had assisted them. Most of its leadership was in the meantime united in the ARS, which was initially based in Asmara (Eritrea). The animosity between the three Somalias was not resolved. Somaliland, the selfdeclared independent republic of 3.4 m people with its own constitution, maintained its stability but remained fragile economically and politically as a budding democracy, though with authoritarian traits. In October, preparations started for a general election scheduled for March 2009. The autonomous region of Puntland did not make much progress towards democratic government or administrative institutionalisation and was not successful either in stemming the tide of illegal immigrants and refugees trying to move to Yemen or in tackling the growing problem of piracy along its coasts. No moves towards unification of the three Somalias were in sight, and indeed in the case of Somaliland this prospect was no longer realistic, as the leadership and the population remained adamantly opposed to it. Puntland and Somaliland did not resolve their border dispute and their troops remained on stand-by in the frontier zone. The ongoing violence negatively impacted all sectors of society, undermined stability, threatened political progress, justice (violence was generally used with impunity), education, economic growth and the general recovery of the country. The violent insurgency was spearheaded by the ‘al-Shabaab’ militants, a collection of extremist Jihadist groups enjoying foreign support (including contingents of foreign fighters), originally part of the ICU as their central militia force but now distanced from it. They waged a brutal campaign of sabotage, attacks and terrorist acts throughout the year. Former ‘al-Ittihad al Islami’ member Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’ was one of the movement’s mentors, but he had fled to Eritrea to be part of the ARS opposition. Another leader, Mukhtar Robow ‘Abu Mansur’, told the media in September that his movement had much sympathy with al-Qaida, seeing it as an example for the mujahidin in Somalia. ‘Al-Shabaab’ categorically refused negotia-

Somalia • 353 tions and compromise with the TFG and also called for the unconditional removal of the troops of the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM). One of the most radical and violent military leaders of ‘al-Shabaab’ and a point man for al-Qaida in Somalia, Aden Hashi Farah ‘Ayro’, was killed in an US air strike on 1 May. He had long been on the US wanted list. A number of other commanders died with him. There was no follow-up on this elimination, and other radical leaders and even the two remaining terrorists involved in the Nairobi/Dar es Salaam terror attacks of 1998 and 2002 (Fazul Abdullah Mohamed and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan) remained at large. Ayro’s disappearance thus did little to stop the advance of the ‘al-Shabaab’. Suicide bombings continued and confirmed that Somali Islamist terrorism had become part of global jihadist campaigns, with the accompanying radical-violent discourse of power and ‘martyrdom’ in the name of ‘Islam’. While most Somalis saw these actions as against accepted modes of struggle, many young people and Islamist clerics embraced the discourse, thus illustrating the deep crisis in Somali society and its educational and social system. On 3 February, an Islamist terror attack in Bosaaso (Puntland) killed 21 Ethiopians, but these were would-be migrants not soldiers. On 30 September, an ‘al-Shabaab’ bomb killed six people and wounded 13 in the Baidoa market. On 29 October, simultaneous terror attacks were launched against a number of institutions, the UNDP office and the Ethiopian embassy in Hargeisa (Somaliland) and the Puntland interior ministry in Bosaaso, killing 31 people in all. This was a deliberate attempt by radical militants to draw these two regions into the violent turmoil of Southern Somalia. In various statements, ‘al-Shabaab’-related ideologues and spokesmen often proclaimed that democracy and human rights were ‘idolatrous’, ‘blasphemous’ or un-Islamic’. While there were radical Islamists inside Somaliland and Puntland as well, support for terror acts was not strong. Internal tensions and antagonistic relations between regional and clan-based groups continued, even occasionally within the ARS opposition. From the start, the ARS was united only in its rejection of the presence of Ethiopian troops supporting the TFG and in its propagating of the rule of shariah law, but was divided on other issues, such as on coalition formation with other groups/parties or even the TFG, and on the nature of the future Somali state and political system. In November, a new party emerged, the Islamic Party (‘Hizb ul-Islam’), uniting four smaller Islamist groups and initially opposed to the new TFG government. It was led by radical cleric Sheikh Omar Iman Abubakar. Throughout the year, heavy fighting occurred in major towns, especially Mogadishu. In February and April there were battles between TFG/Ethiopian forces and ‘al-Shabaab’ insurgents, which took the lives of several hundred civilians. In the conflict, massive human rights abuses were perpetrated by all the parties involved, but mostly by ‘al-Shabaab’, targeting civilians, TFG administrators, judges, movie-goers, journalists, NGO personnel, aid workers and anyone associated with the TFG or seen to be following an ‘un-Islamic’

354 • Eastern Africa agenda. The assailants often assassinated their ‘opponents’ when the latter were leaving mosques with relatives or friends. The country remained a danger zone for the population at large because of the incessant fighting and the indiscriminate shelling and shooting in the cities by both the ‘al-Shabaab’ groups and the TFG and Ethiopian forces. On 2 June, after several rounds of negotiations in Djibouti, a power-sharing agreement was reached between the TFG and the largest and more moderate ARS faction, ARSDjibouti (ARS-D) led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former ICU leader. The chief points of this accord, mediated by UN Special Representative in Somalia Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, were cessation of hostilities, joint security patrolling, disarming armed groups, stabilisation of the country, an enlarged parliament and especially the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. This significant agreement was signed in Djibouti on 26 October, and the Ethiopians prepared to withdraw. The ‘al-Shabaab’ and allied militias, however, rejected the agreement and wanted no part in the new government, choosing the road of continued violence and extremism. So did the other more fundamentalist ARS faction, ARS-Asmara (ARS-A) under Hassan Dahir Aweys (probably funded by Saudi Arabia). The incessant bickering between TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein as well as with the interim parliament over implementation of the accord finally led to a no-confidence vote against the president, followed by his resignation on 29 December. Yusuf ’s attempt on 14 December to sack the prime minister had thus backfired, since the move was rejected by parliament and Hussein was reinstated. The substantially enlarged parliament (now including members of the ARS-D) was poised to choose a successor in January 2009. ‘Al-Shabaab’ still drew youngsters and the unemployed (providing regular ‘salaries’ and other privileges) and drew support from a number of radical Islamic clerics and selfappointed sheikhs or imams. However, counter-movements emerged, for example a militia of the ‘Ahlu as-Sunna wal Jama’a’, a mainstream Muslim movement, which ejected ‘al-Shabaab’ from parts of Galguduud (Gur’eel and Dhusamareb towns, for instance) in December. According to Ethiopian intelligence and the UN monitoring group in Somalia, Eritrea continued to supply arms and training to Islamist fighting forces inside Somalia. ‘Al-Shabaab’ was also well-funded by jihadist circles from overseas (private and diaspora sources) as well as by some Middle Eastern states. In the wake of mounting insecurity and the absence of government, piracy along the southeastern Somali coast again notably increased, becoming a major international concern, because in addition to relief supply ships to Somalia regular commercial shipping was also threatened. Towards year’s end, 19 ships of a total of 40 captured were still in the hands of pirates, among them a large Saudi oil tanker (Sirius Star) and a ship carrying 32 battle tanks probably destined for Southern Sudan (MV Faina). International sea patrols were building up but could not prevent all piracy attacks. In August, one Filipino sailor died when his ship was seized by pirates. TFG and Puntland security forces were incapable

Somalia • 355 of suppressing the pirates, who succeeded in extracting an estimated $ 30–40 m in ransom money from various shipping companies. The role of the Somali diaspora in the conflict was ambiguous. On the one hand, large sums were given for the survival of relatives and as educational or economic investment, while on the other people in the diaspora resorted to the familiar inciting radical-political discourse. In March, it became known that a number of Somalis from Minneapolis had suddenly disappeared from their homes and been recruited for suicide terror attacks inside Somalia. Although Somaliland, with a dominant Isaaq clan-family majority, had many domestic problems, including crime, abuse of women and children, social disorder, clan rivalry and a weak economy with high unemployment and a lack of state funds, there was more stability and a budding democracy unthinkable to southern Somalis. Somaliland’s leadership, under President Dahir Riyale Kahin and his United Democratic National Party, governed in an authoritarian manner and opposition parties (Kulmiye and the Justice and Welfare Party) had a hard time. Somaliland was still not recognised internationally as an independent country and thus could not receive official bilateral development aid from donors. Puntland, the autonomous region in the northwest largely inhabited by the Darod clan-family, struggled unsuccessfully to develop a representative political system and faced economic problems and poverty, not to mention the intensifying piracy, although locally this brought in a lot of money. Some sources asserted that several leading figures in Puntland’s government as well as businessmen with international connections profited from the ransom money. Puntland had a small coast guard, which occasionally arrested pirates but was not equal to the massively increased scale of piracy. Bosaaso port remained a magnet for migrants and refugees trying to reach Yemen, a human flow ill-controlled by the authorities and leading to hundreds of drownings at sea. Somalia remained a very difficult country to work in for the international community – such as UN agencies, donor country missions and NGOs, and their staffs were regular targets of intimidation, threats, abductions and terror attacks, notably by Islamist militants (‘al-Shabaab’). By year’s end, 52 aid workers, journalists and NGO activists, including several expatriates, had been killed. Among them was the local head of UNDP, Osman Ali Ahmed, shot on 6 July. ‘Al-Shabaab’ militants also assassinated elders, women leaders and sheikhs who opposed their policies and their ban on NGOs and foreign aid work, some in drive-by killings and others by beheading. In some areas where ‘al-Shabaab’ took over the city administration (Kismayo in August, Merca in September), many NGOs were told to pack and leave or were allowed to operate only under strict conditions. AMISOM retained its presence in Mogadishu but was unable to increase its numbers to the projected level of 8,000 men. Nevertheless more Ugandan and Burundian soldiers arrived, reaching 3,300. Despite their good work and courageous stand in Mogadishu (protecting the port and airport for food aid shipments and as well guarding certain main

356 • Eastern Africa thoroughfares, the presidential palace and other institutions), AMISOM made little difference to the overall domestic military situation. The ‘al-Shabaab’ subjected AMISOM to vicious propaganda and to violent shell and mortar attacks. The ongoing armed conflicts took a heavy toll on the general population. While many young men were enlisted in the armies and the militant fronts, their relatives and clan members were exposed to violence, insecurity, abuse and malnutrition. An estimated 3,000–4,000 civilians were killed in crossfire during the year. About 1.1 m persons continued to be displaced, and Mogadishu saw the further exodus of 40–80,000 people trying to escape the clashes. About 3.4 m (40%) of the population, and up 70% from last year, were estimated by the UN to be dependent on international food aid for survival.

Foreign Affairs Somali foreign policy was not unified but conducted in limited form by the separate Somali entities, notably Somaliland, despite its not being recognised internationally. The TFG in Southern Somalia was the official government in the eyes of global institutions such as the UN and IGAD, and it made efforts to increase its visibility in the international arena, but was in a weak position and commanded few resources. Short of official recognition, Somaliland cultivated good economic and political relations with Ethiopia, Djibouti, some Middle Eastern countries and the EU. Border problems with Puntland were not resolved: the Sanag and Sool districts, including the town of Las ‘Anod, remained under Somaliland’s control. Puntland under President Adde Muse Hirsi also had fairly good relations with Ethiopia (economic and security cooperation) and with Yemen. The US was an active supporter of the TFG, funding about 30% of its budget, with the EU covering another 40–50%. In Puntland, Bosaaso airport was being upgraded with American assistance into a full-fledged airfield fit for any type of aircraft. Islamist groups and the ARS-A continued to enjoy the support of Eritrea and several Muslim countries (probably also Iran), as noted in reports of the UN monitoring group on Somalia. The proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia continued throughout the year. In December, Ethiopian troops, contrary to most expectations, left southern Somalia after being drawn down over the course of the year. Ethiopia’s policy had been to gradually reduce its fighting force in order to challenge TFG to build up its authority and its own army and police and achieve internal political unity, including reaching out to opponents. Gradually, the Ethiopians had lost patience with TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf. In addition, they had an insurgency of ethnic Somalis in their own Ogaden province on their hands. The last 3–4,000 Ethiopian soldiers were scheduled to leave Somalia in January 2009. Ethiopian forces, however, remained present in great numbers just across the border.

Somalia • 357 In the wake of the TFG-ARS-D June accord, the TFG made a request to the UN for peacekeepers, but in September the Security Council rejected this appeal.

Socioeconomic Developments As no official and reliable figures existed on government budgets, tax revenue, imports and exports, etc., all figures on the Somali economy were mostly guesswork. The UN had estimated per capita GDP at $ 283 in 2006. Agriculture and livestock accounted for some 40% of GDP and about 65% of export earnings. However, the country experienced poor rains in the ‘Gu’ rainy season, leading to crop shortages. Somalia’s main income consisted of overseas remittances from the Somali diaspora that reached an estimated $ 850 m. Many Somalis were dependent on these remittances for survival, investment, education, etc. The economic activities of most Somalis were predominantly informal and unregistered. Livestock sales were the main source of export earnings, followed by bananas and other tropical fruits, charcoal, hides and fish. The chief imports were khat, sugar, sorghum, corn, and machinery, including electronics. Apart from small-scale artisanal enterprises, some sugar refineries and textile businesses, industrial production was virtually non-existent. Somaliland showed overall stability and economic growth, largely stimulated by trade with Ethiopia, Djibouti and Saudi Arabia. The main local revenue was from livestock exports to Saudi Arabia and from Berbera port charges, but most private income derived from diaspora remittances. Somaliland’s state budget amounted to only about $ 51 m, most of it spent on public sector salaries, including those of ex-militia members. Most of the salaries went to security services, the army, police and the administration. The Irish Enex Energy Resources started oil exploration in the disputed Sanag region. Puntland’s budget was about $ 16 m, almost 50% less than the estimated value of piracy ransom money during the year. The budget was spent mainly on security and civil servants’ salaries. The general socioeconomic situation in Somalia was marked by dynamic activity in trade, import-export (retail), contraband, telecom and some agriculture and livestock raising, but the level of development and production was very low, and poverty was rampant and even elementary facilities, notably in the countryside and small towns, were lacking. The absence of a central bank contributed to the illegal printing of money and high inflation. Food scarcity and high food prices (a more than threefold increases for rice, for instance) complicated the situation further, and crime rates – theft, raiding, land grabs, rape, abduction, etc. – remained quite high. Corruption was an endemic trait of Somali economic and political life, but without it nothing could be accomplished. The Somali business environment was based on clan-network trust and not primarily on law, although in

358 • Eastern Africa some areas shariah was enforced. While customary Somali contract law (‘xeer’) between local or clan groups was also observed, mediated by elders and/or religious people, courts did not function well (except in Somaliland) and were few in number. The ‘al-Shabaab’, who controlled southwest Somalia, instituted shariah courts to the exclusion of other courts and strictly enforced their totalitarian version of Islamic law. On 28 October, for instance, a 23-year woman accused of adultery was stoned to death in Kismayo. The economy of Southern Somalia was generally fragmented and provided no reliable tax base, despite dynamic but informal entrepreneurial activities. Telecom, transport (several private air lines), arms sales, crime and contraband flourished. The markets were well stocked for people with money. Somalia’s large and internationally well-connected business elite was an important political player behind the scenes, with some members supporting the Islamists and others the TFG. This elite was considered crucial to any future political dispensation in Somalia. The telecommunications infrastructure in Southern Somalia continued to expand, with almost total coverage of the country through five networks, despite the problem that they were still not mutually compatible and did not interconnect. Islamist militant groups continued to dominate the telecom system. The environment suffered further as a result of the unregulated depletion of the natural habitat and of pollution. Except for game animals and forests (for charcoal burning), Somalia’s natural resources and mineral riches (natural gas, precious stones, possibly oil) were not exploited or even fully explored. Agriculture and pastoralism suffered as a result of drought, animal disease and shrinkage of usable land, already limited by the (semi-)arid conditions in much of the country. Health problems were quite dramatic, with a lack of hospitals, doctors, nurses and supplies and no investment due to the dismal security and humanitarian situation. As in previous years, understaffed, underfunded and underequipped hospitals worked overtime to treat the victims of the violence, as well as patients with common afflictions such as hepatitis, infections, malaria, HIV-AIDS, diarrhoea, typhoid and other diseases related to contamination of water and soil. In Somaliland, the health situation was somewhat better, but still far from satisfactory. Somalia’s last recorded ranking on the UNDP Human Development Index of 2001 had been 161 (out of 163). Foreign NGOs continued to assist the Somali health sector, but came more and more under threat, mainly from ‘al-Shabaab’ and related Islamist radicals opposed to any ‘foreigner’ or perceived ‘un-Islamic behaviour’. The foreign NGOs and UN agencies working in medical and emergency aid were also regularly subjected to extortion, intimidation and direct threat. UN agencies in 2008 spent more than $ 180 m on humanitarian and recovery programmes, serving an estimated 1.5 m people in need out of a total Somali population of about 9 million, with an annual growth rate of some 2.8–3%.

Somalia • 359 Educational structures remained very underdeveloped and were only kept running with large private input. Somaliland had primary schools serving more than 40,000 children and also had two private universities. In the South and in Puntland, many schools were run by Islamic charities with foreign or diaspora funding. Most children (approx. 70%) had no formal education or only went to Quranic schools, with a very biased and limited curriculum. The level of literacy, skills and general knowledge thus continued to decline. There was great interest in ‘universities’ or colleges, but they had very limited places and could not develop into real centres of learning and teaching, due to the lack of funds and academic culture, Islamist intimidation and the prevailing insecurity. Migration flows were related to pastoralist movements as well as to conflict patterns and went in several directions: Somalis moving into Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti to escape violent clashes, Ethiopians and southern Somalis moving to Bosaaso and entering Yemen or Saudi Arabia for work or asylum. This led to human trafficking and illegal migration in unseaworthy vessels under unreliable captains. Hundreds of people were again drowned in the Gulf of Aden in accidents or were forced overboard within sight of coast guards. The number of IDPs remained unchanged at an estimated 1.1 m at the end of the year. More people left Mogadishu to escape the fighting between TFG forces and its Ethiopian allies on the one hand and ‘al-Shabaab’ and related Islamist militias on the other. Despite Kenya’s closure of its border, 60–80,000 people fled illegally into that country and most ended up in the large Dadaab refugee camp. Another 30–40,000 Somalis fled to Ethiopia. In Somaliland, some 75,000 (unregistered) IDPs lived in a number of camps or with relatives, mainly in or near the capital Hargeisa. Jon Abbink

Sudan

At the beginning of 2008, Sudan was still struggling with unstable national politics and continuing regional problems, especially in Darfur, where the conflict that had started in 2003 remained unresolved. Following a fall-out between the partners in the Government of National Unity (GNU), the northern National Congress Party (NCP) and the southern Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM), the GNU was re-established at the end of 2007, but relations remained tense throughout 2008. In Darfur, international commitment to a new AU/UN peacekeeping force (UN-AU Mission in Sudan/UNAMID) remained slow to build while progress towards negotiations between the warring parties was also tardy. Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 made some progress but the timetable still lagged. These problems, and the lack of an observable peace dividend for much of the population, led to signs of popular disenchantment with the process that at its outset had been widely heralded both domestically and in the international community. With the downturn in the global economy in the second half of 2008, there were fears that Sudan’s recent oil-based growth would fade, leading to further social and political difficulties.

362 • Eastern Africa

Domestic Politics In national politics, the return of SPLM to the GNU at the start of 2008 did little to improve the integration of the government. SPLM’s temporary withdrawal late in 2007 had raised real doubts about the government’s future. NCP had been obliged to make concessions to bring SPLM back in, including the replacement of Lam Akol as foreign minister by the more solid SPLM figure of Deng Alor, but it was scarcely a strong rapprochement, with both the old adversaries apparently paying more attention to their own party concerns. These fragile relations were punctuated by occasional joint meetings that attempted to resolve outstanding issues to an extent that permitted GNU to survive in name if barely in practice. For the NCP, there was to be particular internal debate once the ICC chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, issued his charges against President Omar Hassan al-Bashir in July for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Darfur. In particular, the debate revolved around how to respond if, as was widely anticipated, he was indicted, though in fact the decision of the court’s judges had still not been handed down as the year drew to an end. Meanwhile, the first vice president and SPLM leader, Salva Kiir, spent most of his time in Southern Sudan, where he continued to serve as both head of the newly established Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and commander of the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA). With elections due in 2009, there was also considerable manoeuvring with regard to possible new political alliances, especially involving the ‘traditional’ political parties, notably the Umma Party, led by former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) under the patronage of Mohammed Osman Mirghani, leader of the Khatmia Islamic sect. The situation for both parties was complicated by internal factional rivalries, but at the same time they sought to improve their positions ahead of the elections. Meanwhile, with NCP seeking to strengthen its own position through possible alliances with one or both of its main northern rivals, there was much speculation and some activity during the course of the year. Sadiq al-Mahdi had long criticised the CPA for its exclusivity and sought instead some kind of national conference involving all major parties. In March, a pact, known as the National Compromise Agreement, was agreed between al-Mahdi and al-Bashir, with talk of a conference in the following two months. In the end, however, the conference failed to materialise and uncertainty about the Umma Party’s strategy for the elections persisted. Meanwhile, DUP’s patron Mirghani remained outside the country, with repeated speculation as to if and when he might return and whether or not the strategy would involve an agreement between him and al-Bashir. In the end, he did return in November, but ambiguity still surrounded DUP’s strategy. As Mirghani had at one time been head of an anti-NCP coalition of parties, including SPLM, Umma and the Sudan Communist Party (SCP), there were thoughts that this option might be revived in time for the elections. Meanwhile, all parties were training their cadres and raising funds ahead of the campaign.

Sudan • 363 In the south, the main issue was the development of SPLM’s sentiment with regard to the referendum in 2011 on independence. In May, it held its national convention on the 25th anniversary of its founding: this was also the first such convention since 1994. Salva Kiir was re-elected unopposed as SPLM chairman for a further five years, while the influential Pagan Amum was re-elected as secretary general. The convention also reaffirmed SPLM’s formal support for the unity of north and south in line with the late John Garang’s vision of the ‘New Sudan’, in which the ‘marginalised’ areas of the southwest and east would come together to establish a new relationship with the richer centre, which had hitherto been seen as both dominant and exploitative. This was in accordance with the commitment the two parties made when they signed the CPA that they would work to make unity attractive when the time for the referendum in the south arrived. In July, it was announced that Kiir would run for the presidency, but by the end of the year there was some doubt about this prospect. However, in spite of this uncertainty there were still many in the south who distrusted NCP, wanting nothing more to do with northern Sudanese politicians and appearing to favour eventual separation. There was also some embarrassment in September when Somali pirates hijacked a Ukrainian freighter and demanded a $ 20 m ransom. It transpired that its cargo included tanks and other arms, and though the end-user certificates indicated they were for Kenya, it was widely thought they were destined for the army being built up by GoSS out of the former SPLA rebel force. While arms procurement was not banned under the CPA, this incident created the impression that money was being spent on arms when few in the south were experiencing any peace dividend. The implementation of the CPA made some progress throughout the year, although it also encountered difficulties. Probably the worst of these related to Abyei, an oil-rich area currently producing about 13% of all oil exports and situated on the north-south border disputed by both NCP and SPLM. According to the CPA, there was to be an international commission that would make a binding pronouncement on Abyei, but when it reported in 2005 its findings were rejected by NCP. There were a number of minor clashes in 2007 and in March 2008 SPLM decided to send its own man, Edward Lino, known as a strong figure, to take over the administration of the area. This unilateral action caused resistance from NCP and in May heavy fighting broke out between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the forces of the northern-dominated national government, and the forces of the SPLA, which now effectively constituted the army of GoSS. The fighting was intense for several days and resulted in the evacuation of some 50,000 from the town of Abyei, which was largely destroyed. However, the crisis was damped down when the president and NCP leader, alBashir, and national first vice president and president of GoSS, Kiir, signed an agreement. A battalion of the Joint Integrated Units (JIU), a force formed under the CPA from the two armies, was to be deployed, as well as peacekeeping forces from the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). It was also agreed that in effect there would be a joint administration of the area; help would be given to the refugees to return; more of the oil revenues from Abyei would be spent locally; and there would be a new border arbitration tribunal, which in the event of

364 • Eastern Africa failure of the parties to agree would send the question to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. Clearly both sides were prepared to compromise rather than put the CPA at risk on this issue and subsequently the area became more settled, though still with some local land disputes between southern farmers and northern pastoralists. The CPA had also called for a definitive drawing of the whole of the north-south border, a matter of some historical and geographical dispute. A border commission was established, but progress proved slow and while the commission continued throughout 2008 its work had still not been completed by the end of the year. With multi-party elections due by July 2009 according to the CPA, there was concern that the electoral law was being delayed and was two and a half years late. Finally, in July, the law was passed by the National Assembly. In addition to a predominance of single member geographical constituency seats, the law confirmed that there would be an element of proportional representation based on party lists, while 25% of the seats would be reserved for women. These will be the most complex elections Sudan has held, and there will be simultaneous state elections for the country’s 26 federal states, as well as for GoSS. The CPA also required that an electoral commission be established, and that was also delayed. However, in August the commission was finally announced, with the distinguished veteran southern politician Abel Alier as chairman. It was perceived as being comprised essentially of technocrats rather than of those with party affiliations. The responsibilities of the commission included any decision to delay the holding of elections, an eventuality many were suggesting would be inevitable given the work needed before they could be held. Another requirement for the undertaking of the elections, not to mention the 2011 referendum for the south on independence, was the holding of a national census. Though there had been previous censuses, most were seen as politically tainted, and the census seen as most reliable was that of 1955, more than 50 years ago. Twice postponed, the latest census was due on 15 April and after further slight delay it finally went ahead. Even as the census was being conducted, it was clear that there were a number of problems. In parts of Darfur, the security situation was too poor for it to be held, while in the south there were logistical and security problems in some areas. Nevertheless, the head of the Southern Sudan census commission declared himself satisfied with the outcome. However, by the end of the year, and with the census results still not published though due in June 2008, Kiir expressed concern over the enumeration. With rumours suggesting that the figures for the south might be below those estimated (these figures being used for financial provisions to GoSS from the national treasury), Kiir announced that any figure less than 15 million would not be acceptable. This was far higher than any of the previous estimates for the region. The census figures were finally expected early in 2009 and could prove contentious, causing further problems for the elections and perhaps reinforcing the widespread expectation that they might be delayed beyond the scheduled date in July. Concern was also expressed on

Sudan • 365 the need for new media and national security laws before the elections to provide for a free atmosphere for their conduct. Darfur continued to be a crucial issue throughout the year. On 31 December 2007, it was announced that the AU monitoring force in Darfur, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), would be supplemented by a UN force, the joint operation to be known as UNAMID. It was announced that the force would rise from 6,000 to 26,000 during the course of 2008, though in fact it had not even reached 15,000 by the end of the year. Perhaps anticipating this enlargement, to which it had reluctantly agreed, SAF and its associated militias launched a fresh offensive on the rebel forces in January, and the level of violence seemed as high as at any time since the conflict first erupted in 2003. In May, there was a sudden new twist in the situation when one of the rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), launched a surprise attack on Omdurman, which forms part of the capital Khartoum. The attackers had driven over 1,000 km across the semi-desert from Darfur, but their assault was soon repulsed. However, the fact the attackers had managed to reach as far as Omdurman was still a source of considerable embarrassment to the government, especially to the intelligence and security agencies. The incident indicated that JEM had the capability to spread the conflict beyond Darfur itself, and there were fears that western Kordofan to the immediate east of Darfur might also become embroiled in the conflict. Following the attack, a number of people were arrested for alleged collusion with JEM. A further significant development was the announcement in July that ICC’s chief prosecutor, Moreno-Ocampo, had formally asked for an arrest warrant against President al-Bashir on charges of criminal responsibility for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur. The charge was swiftly rejected by the government, which itself went on a diplomatic offensive and also announced in August that it would itself appoint a special prosecutor to investigate crimes in Darfur since 2003. Meanwhile, it embarked in October on organising a ‘Sudan People’s Initiative’ aimed at demonstrating the president’s commitment to peace in Darfur. In the event, the initiative turned out to be a somewhat lengthy talking shop, with none of the rebel groups fighting in Darfur participating. After its conclusion, in November the president announced a unilateral ceasefire, but it was soon clear that fighting in Darfur persisted though with significantly lower intensity, while UNAMID was still proving slow to build up. There were hopes that negotiations with the major rebel groups, which had failed in Abuja (Nigeria) in 2006, might start once more. A new AU-UN mediator, Djibril Bassole, was appointed in October and met with rebel leaders as well as senior government officials, but progress proved difficult. There was a good deal of talk of a new round of negotiations taking place in Qatar but by the end of the year this had still not transpired. Two of the main faction leaders in particular seemed reluctant to become engaged: Khalil Ibrahim of JEM and Abdel Wahid, based in Paris, the leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), which is supported by the Fur, the largest ethnic group in the region. One difficulty in seeking peace has been the proliferation of armed

366 • Eastern Africa groups, with estimates suggesting 15–20 groups in the field. However, only a smaller number of the groups were thought to be politically significant, including (in addition to those of Khalil Ibrahim and Abdel Wahid) a JEM faction led by Idris Azraq, the SLM faction under Adam Ali Shoggar, Unity SLM led by Khamis Abdullah al-Bakr and United Resistance Front (URF). The one faction to sign the 2006 Abuja peace agreement, Minni Minawi’s SLM, appeared to be of declining significance, though Minni himself remained officially a ‘senior assistant’ to al-Bashir. There were also tensions between NCP and SPLM arising from the Darfur situation. SPLM continued with its own long-running links with the rebel factions in Darfur and appeared critical of the government’s use of the SAF at the beginning of the year. In September, the new SPLM Foreign Minister Deng Alor said that NCP was not serious in its efforts to resolve the Darfur crisis, and that it should cooperate with the ICC if an indictment was handed down against al-Bashir. Later, it was announced that the second vice president, Ali Osman Taha, would lead the Sudan delegation to the UN General Assembly rather than the foreign minister. In addition, SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum was removed from his post as minister of cabinet affairs, apparently because of his critical comments about the government.

Foreign Affairs Sudan’s external relations were increasingly dominated by its relations with the UN. At the start of 2008, this relationship had focused on Sudan’s reluctant acceptance of the formation of UNAMID, an initiative to which it gave the barest cooperation, thereby contributing to the slow progress in deploying the force. However, from July relations centred on the ICC prosecutor’s charges against al-Bashir. The government responded with defiant dismissal of the charges, attacking them as irresponsible and threatening that they would do broad, though unspecified, damage to the region. A number of opposition party leaders backed al-Bashir, thus easing domestic tensions, but predictably the rebel groups in Darfur sided with the ICC. Internationally, the government initiated discussions with members of the UN Security Council, especially China and Russia, with a view to getting the council to block the ICC from issuing an arrest warrant. The Security Council had the power to suspend an ICC prosecution for 12 months, and the suspension might then be renewed. However, there were also suggestions that in the event the Security Council considered such a resolution, it might be vetoed by the US, which had already described the situation in Darfur as genocide. Moreover, in America there was very active concern expressed by human rights groups. However, the ruling by the ICC judges, who were widely expected to agree with the prosecutor and issue an arrest warrant, had still not occurred by the end of the year and thus further developments involving the Security Council were postponed. Meanwhile, Sudan had pursued a regional diplomatic offensive and had obtained some support for al-Bashir’s rejection of the allegations against him. The three main international

Sudan • 367 organisations lobbied were the AU, the Arab League and the OIC, all of which gave their support to al-Bashir. All expressed the view that the issuing of an arrest warrant might have a destabilising effect, with some leaders perhaps concerned over the precedent of seeking to arrest a serving head of state. As well as regional organisations, a number of individual governments expressed their support for this view, including Egypt and South Africa. Such was the pressure that the Security Council recognised the concern over Sudan’s stability among member states when extending the UNAMID mandate in July. Privately there was speculation that if a warrant was issued, there would be threats to the UN operations inside Sudan. With a UN peacekeeping force of 10,000 in southern Sudan under the terms of the CPA, this could be a serious blow to the agreement itself, in addition to the impact it would have on UN operations in Darfur. Others thought that there might be a ‘palace coup’ in Khartoum leading to the handover of al-Bashir by his colleagues in the hope that it would defuse a difficult and embarrassing problem for Sudan’s international relations. But it was also pointed out that the full list handed by the UN to the ICC for investigation over atrocities in Darfur contained 56 names. It might thus be difficult to find a trusted NCP leader who was not on it and who might therefore finish up in the same position as al-Bashir if or when the latter was indicted. A further suggestion was that al-Bashir would effectively ignore the warrant and seek the support of the Sudanese people through the presidential elections scheduled for 2009. If successful, this approach would then allow him to present himself as a democratically elected leader who was effectively absolved by the support of his own people. Sudan also looked to its friends on the Security Council, especially China. From the start of the year, China showed its concern over the lack of progress regarding Darfur and the damage that this might do to China’s interests and image. Among these interests was oil, with a subsidiary of the Chinese state-owned oil company, Sinopec, reported to have opened talks in July with the government about undertaking prospecting work in Darfur with security to be provided by the SAF. China’s concern over image was connected with the Olympic Games held in Beijing in August. Some Western critics dubbed these the ‘genocide Olympics’ because of China’s links with Sudan, and called for a boycott. American film producer Steven Spielberg even resigned as choreographer of the opening ceremony over the issue. In February, China’s special representative for Africa and Darfur made a number of international calls before arriving in Khartoum. Though China always makes a point of disclaiming involvement in the internal affairs of other countries, he was reported to have urged the government to do more to address the issue. Some saw this as a factor in Sudan’s reluctant acceptance of UNAMID. In the Security Council itself, China remained cooperative as far as the Sudan government was concerned, with China supporting the proposal that there be a temporary halt to possible ICC prosecution of al-Bashir to facilitate talks between the contending parties in Darfur. A similar attitude in the Security Council towards Darfur was shown by Russia. Though not involved in Sudan’s oil development in the same way as China, Russia had growing

368 • Eastern Africa commercial links with the country, particularly with regard to arms supplies. Probably in order to improve its image, Russia in March offered to provide helicopters to UNAMID, a significant contribution in an area as large as Darfur, where logistics have long been a problem and the rest of the international community has been slow to give support. Relations with the US started the year on a frosty note. The Sudanese government was concerned about the activities of the new head of the US embassy and warned him against interfering in the country’s domestic affairs. After further exchanges, as well as the murder of a US diplomat in January, the new US special envoy to Sudan, Richard Williamson, decided to postpone his first visit to Khartoum. However, intelligence links between the two countries continued. The US was also keen to embrace GoSS and senior SPLM figures continued to be regular visitors to Washington, including the new GNU Foreign Minister Deng Alor. By April, relations appeared to be a little warmer and there were rumours that the CIA wanted further help from Sudan’s intelligence with the possible dropping of US sanctions as the quid pro quo. However, with the sound of Sudan’s American critics of Darfur ringing in its ears, the State Department made it clear eventually that the time was not yet ripe for full reconciliation. As the year progressed and Barack Obama became the Democratic Party’s candidate for the presidency, speculation arose that this would not mean an early change in relations. In particular, Obama’s advisor on international relations during his campaign, Susan Rice, a former assistant secretary of state for Africa during the Clinton administration, was known to be a strong critic of Sudan, especially over Darfur. Furthermore, Hillary Clinton’s nomination as secretary of state at the end of the year by President-elect Obama meant another Darfur critic in the new administration. Relations with neighbours are always significant for a conflict-prone state with porous borders and in 2008 this was particularly the case for Sudan’s relations with Chad. In February, Chadian rebels attacked the capital, N’Djaména, from the east and laid siege to the presidential palace. They were driven off, but officials accused Sudan of aiding them. While there was a long history of such support from Sudan, mainly conducted via Darfur (from where both Hissein Habré and then Idriss Déby had fought their way to power), it was unclear how much Sudanese involvement there was on this occasion. It was also suggested that the attack might have been timed to prevent an attempt by the EU to establish a peacekeeping mission of 3,700 men, to be known as the European Union Force (EUFOR), on the Chad-Sudan border to try to contain the Darfur crisis and protect refugees from it in eastern Chad. France had long had a particular concern over the situation in Chad and provided the leadership for the new force. Chadian rebels may have seen this as strengthening the control of N’Djaména in the east and thus acted before the force was in place. Concern over EUFOR was heightened in early March when a French soldier with the mission was killed and another injured by Sudanese forces when their vehicle crossed into Sudan. Some thought that Sudan was trying to ward off EUFOR, concerned that it might cooperate with UNAMID in Darfur, thereby restricting the freedom of operation of Sudanese forces.

Sudan • 369 The heightened tension was a cause of concern for the AU with its commitment to Darfur, and later in March in Senegal an agreement was signed between al-Bashir and Chad’s President Déby. However, within weeks each government was again accusing the other of supporting rebels, a situation apparently confirmed by the defection to Chad in April of a Sudanese army officer, who, it was claimed, was responsible for financing the Chad rebels. Shortly thereafter, the JEM attack on Omdurman took place, and immediately Sudan blamed Chad for supporting it. The JEM leader, Khalil Ibrahim, was from the same ethnic group, the Zaghawa, as Déby, though the two men have had their differences. Accusations continued to fly back and forth between Sudan and Chad for the remainder of the year, though nothing further occurred on the scale of the respective attacks on the two capital cities. Relations with other neighbours were less tense. Kenya and Uganda both saw consolidation of their growing commercial and political links with southern Sudan. With regard to Uganda, there was also the question of Sudan’s involvement in efforts to end the long-running internal Ugandan conflict between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Uganda’s support for SPLA in the southern Sudanese war had in the past been countered by backing from Khartoum’s Islamist regime for the LRA. Since the peace in the south, it was thought that the new GoSS would be in a good position to mediate between Uganda and the LRA and for much of 2008 GoSS Vice President Riek Machar endeavoured to do so. A point was reached where an agreement appeared possible, only for it to fail when LRA leader Joseph Kony sought to have his indictment by the ICC dropped as part of the deal. Following this setback, Uganda, supported by Sudan and the DR Congo, launched a fresh assault on the LRA in mid-December, but it was not clear by the end of the month that it had been as successful as Ugandan President Museveni was claiming. Meanwhile, the Sudan government was concerned to balance its relations with Eritrea and Ethiopia in the east. Their mutual animosity over their border dispute, and the problems both could cause for the fragile security in eastern Sudan, meant that Sudan had to be careful with regard to both. The rivalry between Eritrea and Ethiopia extended into Somalia, where Eritrea supported the Islamic Courts movement seeking to control the southern part of the country, while Ethiopia accused the movement of being a cover for radical Islamists who also posed a threat to Ethiopia itself, with its large Muslim population. Ethiopia instead supported the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and in 2007 Ethiopian forces backed by US air support had overthrown the Islamic Courts movement. During the course of 2008, Sudan supported efforts by Djibouti to reconcile the TFG and Islamic Courts leaders, though the efforts made little headway. With regard to Sudan’s Arab neighbours, Egypt remained concerned about the situation in southern Sudan, notably the possible implications of a vote for separation in 2011. In particular, it feared that separation would complicate the issue of the Nile waters by bringing another state into play on the question of the utilisation and development of a river so vital to Egypt’s existence. As a result, it tried to develop its relations with GoSS in the

370 • Eastern Africa hope of influencing the leadership. Egypt was also well aware that with rising populations and worsening environmental degradation, Sudan’s African neighbours in Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia were increasingly focusing their attention on both the White and Blue Niles. Sudan also remained in close contact with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which broadly supported Egypt’s concern about the possible separation of the south.

Socioeconomic Developments After several years of strong growth for Sudan’s economy, 2008 ended with uncertainties with regard to both production and income, especially with falling world oil prices. All had seemed bright at the start of the year: over the period 2003–07 the country had averaged 9% annual growth in GDP, and it was expected that a similar figure would be achieved in 2008. In addition, the economy appeared to be fairly stable. Inflation had been at around the 8% mark in 2007 and it appeared that a similar figure could be maintained. Although there had been slight increases in government spending that were greater than increases in revenues, the deficit was predicted as being manageable. In the event, inflation strongly exceeded expectations, rising to an 18% average for the first 11 months of 2008 before falling back with the economic downturn. However, the downturn had a negative effect on Sudan’s external trade, dominated by oil exports valued at an estimated $ 11,634 m in 2008. This had helped to reduce the current-account balance to $ 1.9 bn, though with exports down the balance was worsening by the end of the year. Monetary policy had also been stable and held the new currency, the Sudanese pound, close to its target of two pounds to the US dollar, though by the end of the year it had fallen by some 10%. For 2008, the authorities were hoping for a similarly stable situation, while trying to develop Sudan’s own money markets. It was also announced in January that, partly as a response to US President Bush signing into law the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Bill, which made transactions using US banks even more difficult than under existing sanctions, Sudan would now use the euro as the principle currency for banking transactions. The problem of Sudan’s longterm debt remained, with the figure still approximately $ 27 bn, but it was hoped to borrow from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the Islamic Development Bank, as well as drawing $ 295 m from China and $ 272 m from India. In addition, it was hoped by the end of the year that Sudan’s limited links with the West would make the country less vulnerable to the global credit crunch than some others. The unexpected economic downturn had a significant effect on budget forecasts of national revenues, which were expected to fall in 2009 by as much as 44%, from S£ 14.1 bn to 7.9 bn. Such figures were likely to make the budget passed in December quite unrealistic: at S£ 26.9 bn it was similar to the budget for 2008. Budgetary figures and the consequent distribution of revenues from the national government to GoSS were proving both a financial and political problem by the end of the year.

Sudan • 371 Industry, particularly the oil sector, now accounts for 31% of GDP and the growing oil sector has largely driven economic growth in recent years. On the production front, the output from Sudan’s oldest fields in blocks 1, 2 and 4 started to decline, falling from 265,000 bpd to 205,000 bpd. While this fall was to some extent compensated by expanded output in the later blocks, 3, 5, 6 and 7, the quality of this oil is poorer and it commands lower prices on world markets. Overall it was hoped that total oil output would rise to 600,000 bpd by the end of the year for an average for 2008 of 500,000 bpd. In July, it was reported that Sudan had opened talks with a subsidiary of the Chinese state-owned oil company Sinopec for help in exploiting possible oil reserves in Darfur. China was asked to carry out seismic evaluation of a large area in the north of the region, the first time such work has been carried out there since the conflict began in 2003. While it would take several years to bring any possible oil into production, this request was a further indication of the country’s possible continued growth as an oil supplier. However, in October nine Chinese oil workers were kidnapped in southern Kordofan, and four were killed in a botched rescue attempt. This was a warning to China about the problem of security in its oil operations. In other oil-related developments, an agreement was signed for the export of oil to Kenya, and there were fresh hopes for exploration in the far north and in the east near the Red Sea, though the Swedish Lundin oil company decided to pull out of southern Sudan after a series of failures. However, by the end of 2008 it was clear that global developments were bringing problems, especially given Sudan’s heavy reliance on oil as the major engine of economic growth. In income terms, there was a dramatic downturn from October onwards as world oil prices plummeted: revenues were down 40% in the October–November period alone. The consequence of the decline was that the budget forecast for oil revenues had to be cut by 44% from S£ 14.1 bn in 2008 to S£ 7.9 bn for 2009. In addition, with oil prices down dramatically the plan to build a new refinery at Port Sudan had to be put on hold as it was now too expensive. In response, the new minister of finance, Awad al-Jazz, formerly minister of oil and energy, who had swapped positions in January with another senior NCP politician, Zubeir Hassan Ahmed, called for discussions on diversifying the country’s economy. One new development was the announcement that a brewery was to be opened for lager beer by SAB Miller in February 2009. No brewery had existed since Sudan introduced Islamic law in 1983, but the regional government of the non-Islamic south hoped that this development would reduce reliance on imported beer from East Africa. In regard to other areas of industry, the new dam at Merowe in the north improved the electricity supply significantly. The 1,200 MW dam came on stream in November and was expected to be fully operational by the end of 2009. However, plans for a further new dam in the region now appeared uncertain. In addition, the Kuwait Fund for Economic Development agreed to give $ 212 m for heightening the Roseiries dam on the Blue Nile, a development which will enable Sudan to export electricity to neighbouring Ethiopia. Meanwhile,

372 • Eastern Africa power supplies in Darfur and the south remained particularly poor. There were plans for four hydroelectric schemes in the south, at Juba, Torit, Wau and Maridi, but by the end of the year only one was being seriously planned and no contract had yet been agreed. In mining, there was some expansion of gold exploration with licences being awarded to companies from Yemen and Morocco in the north, while South African and British companies were exploring in the south. Expectations of significant new finds were not high. Nevertheless, with gold prices rising in the global recession, even modest finds would be welcome. The telecommunications sector continued to grow as Arab and Chinese companies came into the market, and expectations were particularly high for the south, which had hitherto lagged behind developments in the north. Transport also grew in the first half of the year. In addition to the focus on road transport of recent years, there were moves to improve the neglected rail sector. The Chinese were significantly involved in developments in transport, though there was criticism that such developments continued to focus on the central areas of the country to the detriment of the more distant regions. One such project that opened in 2008 was a new bridge at Meroe in the north, close to the new dam. Partly to offset this, there were plans for all-weather roads to link the centre to Darfur in the west and to Juba in the south. The government’s programme of privatisation also affected the transport sector: the government embarked on the part-privatisation of the River Transport Corporation, river transport being another formerly neglected link the country’s overall system, although there has been some recent improvement in the fleet. The economic downturn also began to affect the country’s building boom, especially in central areas. Much of this was funded from the Gulf, both by Arab investors and the remittances of the many Sudanese expatriates working there. Both investment and remittances experienced contraction by the end of 2008. The service sector, accounting for 34% of GDP, also declined towards the end of the year. Much of it had been helped by funds from the Gulf, but the availability of these has fallen. There had been hopes in government circles that improvements in relations with the US might lead to a lifting of sanctions, which have had some affect on foreign direct investment for several years, but the issue of Darfur prevented significant progress even before the downturn. Agriculture remained the largest sector of the economy, accounting for approximately 35% of GDP. In March, the government announced plans for a new sugar cultivation scheme, the White Nile Sugar Project, to be run by the Kenana Sugar Company, already one of the largest sugar producers in the world and a significant exporter for the country. Cereal harvests were good across the country and there was talk in the first half of the year of new foreign investment in agricultural schemes, with particular interest being shown by Arab financiers. However, by autumn the global downturn suggested that there would be a slowdown in agricultural expansion.

Sudan • 373 By the end of the year, it was also clear that a number of deeper structural problems were emerging. Sudan had largely relied for its growth on Arab and Asian investment and as this slowed there were few signs of US or European alternatives emerging. US sanctions and divestment campaigns in the West more generally have restricted investment from this quarter, though there was American interest in the south, with which the US had long had significant ties. In addition, the lack of political progress on Darfur as well as the economic downturn were unlikely to change the situation with regard to the north. The growth of recent years had also shown up a shortage of trained and skilled labour in the country, with a number of new projects importing labour, especially from Asia. Corruption also remained a problem, with Transparency International reporting that Sudan was among the most corrupt countries in the world. There was also concern that the rapid development of central areas of the country had not been matched by developments in other regions. This, together with displacement due to conflict, largely accounted for the urban drift, especially towards the major cities of the central region. The extent of this shift may not be fully revealed until the results of the 2008 census are finally released. This question of population movement was especially sensitive in the south, where there were fears that it might be linked to attempts to reduce its share of the national budget. Against the background of an overall reduction in the budget, this concern was already causing political tensions between SPLM and NCP by the end of the year. The global economic recession that began during 2008 meant the prospect of even less being spent on social development than hitherto. In the budgets of both the GNU and GoSS, expenditure on the military dwarfed that on social services. At S£ 5.8 bn, the defence budget was six times the size of the allocations for health and education combined. Criticism of this was expressed by some members of the National Assembly, but the government’s inbuilt majority ensured the budget passed. There was, though, a meeting in May in Oslo of the Sudan Consortium involving international donors and the GNU in support of the CPA during which a further $ 4.9 bn was pledged for social and economic development between 2008 and 2011. In addition, the UN pledged a further $ 2.2 bn, mainly for humanitarian relief. Peter Woodward

Tanzania

Most political attention was focused on various high-level cases of alleged corruption, leading to the unprecedented resignation of the prime minister and of several ministers. No solution was found to the long-simmering political confrontation in Zanzibar, and new strains emerged in the union between Tanzania’s mainland and Zanzibar. Despite signs of the government’s growing unpopularity, the control of President Jakaya Kikwete and his long-ruling ‘Chama cha Mapinduzi’ (CCM, Party of the Revolution) was never seriously in dispute. As AU chairman for most of the year, Kikwete assumed an active role in panAfrican affairs. Macroeconomic performance continued to be fairly satisfactory, although the population enjoyed little direct improvement in its living standards.

Domestic Politics Continuing efforts to fight endemic corruption were a major political issue throughout the year. In early February, the country was shocked by the surprising resignation of Prime Minister Edward Lowassa and two ministers in connection with serious corruption allegations arising from the scandal popularly known as the ‘Richmond-Saga’. Richmond, a reputedly US-based power supply company, had in 2006 been contracted during an energy

376 • Eastern Africa crisis to deliver power generators, but failed to fulfil the contract. On 6 February, the report of a parliamentary commission, established in November 2007 and chaired by MP Harrison Mwakyembe, was presented to parliament. It stated that Richmond was registered neither in the US nor in Tanzania and appeared to have been a mere dummy company and that the whole bidding process had been marred by corruption and gross irregularities. Lowassa was openly accused of having personally selected Richmond among eight other bidders, and thus being responsible for what was called a “shameful act”. He was called on to face the consequences. The report also accused East African Cooperation Minister Ibrahim Msabaha, who had been energy and minerals minister when the Richmond deal was made, and his successor, Nazir Karamagi, of having been directly involved in the dubious affair. Edward Hosea, director of the Prevention and Combat of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), was accused of covering up the deal by publishing a whitewash report on the issue. Mwakyembe’s report also demanded the sacking of Attorney-General Johnson Mwanjika for failing to properly advise government on the various irregularities. The following day, Lowassa and the two ministers announced their resignations, but insisted on their innocence. Kikwete accepted the resignations and, as required by the constitution, dissolved the cabinet. Since the prime minister’s resignation was an unprecedented occurrence, Tanzania experienced its severest government crisis since the early 1980s. Public opinion, however, was positively disposed towards the resignations as a long awaited step forward in the effort to fight grand corruption instead of chasing only small fish. Kikwete was widely lauded for not having protected the prime minister, one of his closest political allies for many years. Not only were the resignations unprecedented, but also the frankness of the report and the fact that high-ranking persons had been named. This new approach was generally welcomed and favourably compared with the way in which allegations of grand corruption had been dealt with under Kikwete’s predecessor Benjamin Mkapa. Suggestions of reintroducing some form of ‘leadership code’ (reminiscent of the Nyerere-era) and of more clearly separating the political and business arenas were, however, not followed up. Some critics doubted whether Lowassa’s resignation was indeed a victory for the rule of law over the personal interests of high-ranking politicians. Since Kikwete’s and Lowassa’s presidential campaigns in 2005 had reportedly been extremely costly, it was argued the Richmond deal may have been finalised to obtain funds to enable not only Lowassa but even the president himself to repay the financiers who had underwritten the campaigns. In this reading, Lowassa’s resignation was the result of an agreement between both leaders and their friends to sacrifice one of them to allow the other to remain in office. This interpretation was fuelled by allegations made by another member of the Mwakyembe commission that Lowassa and Rostam Aziz were proprietors of the Richmond Company. Aziz, a businessman and influential MP, former CCM treasurer and close friend of Kikwete and Lowassa, had been the manager and a financier of Kikwete’s presidential campaign. Whereas the general public understood Lowassa’s resignation as a sign of Kikwete’s

Tanzania • 377 commitment and strength, some analysts viewed it as a clear indication of the weakened position of the president, who was facing strong opposition from factions within CCM. On 8 February, Kikwete nominated the little-known Minister of State for Regional Administration and Local Government Mizengo Peter Pinda as new prime minister. This surprising choice was widely welcomed in the media and 98.9% of parliamentarians voted Pinda into office. Pinda had been a long-serving civil servant and was known more as a quiet, hard-working technocrat than as a glamorous politician. On 13 February, the new cabinet was sworn in. The number of ministers was reduced from 29 to 26 and of deputy ministers from 31 to 21 (six ministries were merged into three). Since the dissolution of the previous cabinet had been required under the constitution and did not reflect a desire on the part of Kikwete to undertake a full-scale ministerial shake-up, the new cabinet strongly resembled its predecessor. Only four new ministers or deputy ministers were appointed and only eight ministers and seven deputy ministers were not reappointed, two of them stepping down voluntarily for reasons of age. A number of big names were, however, among those dropped, including Finance Minister Zakia Meghji, Industries and Trade Minister Basil Mramba, Public Safety and Security Minister Bakari Mwapachu and Livestock Development Minister Anthony Diallo. The president also used the opportunity to reshuffle portfolios and returned only four ministers to their previous positions. Of the new cabinet’s members, a quarter were female compared to 30% in the previous cabinet. Although the president was praised for his seemingly strong moves against corrupt leaders, questions began to arise by the end of the year in the absence of legal action against the suspects accused of having caused enormous damage to the country. Moreover, none of the suspects lost their prestigious party positions in the CCM. The speed of cabinet reshuffle was partly owing to the upcoming state visit of US President Bush (16–19 February), who praised Kikwete for his strong commitment to tackling corruption. Another major financial scandal involved the central bank, the Bank of Tanzania (BoT). In early January, Kikwete announced he had sacked BoT governor Daudi Balali after external audits revealed the bank had in 2006 paid more than TSh 130 bn from its External Payment Arrears (EPA) account to several companies on the basis of faked documents. Balali’s suspension as well as the appointment of Benno Ndulu, a respected economist and former BoT deputy governor, as new governor were widely welcomed. Balali reportedly died of leukaemia on 16 May in the US, where he had gone for medical treatment in late 2007. Public opinion and the media reacted impatiently when there were no signs of further action against the culprits and when Kikwete announced that those implicated in the scandal had until the end of October to repay the illegally obtained money. It was suspected that after returning the money, they would escape punishment. Kikwete’s announcement later appeared to have been a trap to restore confidence among the main suspects and encourage repayment of the money stolen from the account (75% of which was recovered). In early November, about 25 top business people and senior BoT officials were arrested and taken to court.

378 • Eastern Africa The anti-corruption campaign came to the fore again in mid-April over graft allegations involving another political heavy-weight. Andrew Chenge, infrastructure development minister and former attorney-general, stepped down following a story in a British newspaper alleging that he had deposited $ 1 m into an account on Jersey. Chenge was under suspicion of having been involved in the shady procurement in 2001 of an expensive traffic control system from the British defence and aerospace company BAE Systems, which transaction the British serious fraud office was investigating. The main suspect, a Tanzanian businessman, had been granted immunity in the UK in return for cooperation in the investigations into the case. Chenge’s resignation was followed by another cabinet reshuffle, albeit minor. In late November, two former cabinet ministers, Basil Mramba (finance) and Daniel Yona (minerals and energy) were charged with abuse of office and causing the loss of over TSh 11 bn to the government by agreeing to have a private company sign and execute gold production assaying agreements in contravention of the law and guaranteeing unjustified tax exemptions to the company. A few weeks later, Gray Mgonja, former permanent secretary in the finance ministry, was arrested on the same charge. Yona and Mramba had been senior ministers under Kikwete’s predecessor Mkapa and close allies of the former president. During his presidency, Mkapa was criticised for sparing influential politicians from prosecution. It was unclear whether the unprecedented prosecution of senior CCM politicians was the beginning of a new era in the fight against grand corruption or just a move to weaken Mkapa’s faction in the major power struggles within the party. The same uncertainty applied to the allegations against Mkapa himself, who was suspected by MPs and the media of involvement in several cases of corruption and misuse of power while in office. He was accused of having bought a coal mine (together with then Minerals and Energy Minister Yona) at a give-away price and of thereby using the government’s indigenisation scheme for personal enrichment. Pinda declared in parliament that Mkapa was among the government leaders being investigated for abuse of office. It was, however, not clear whether Mkapa as former president enjoyed immunity from prosecution. Mkapa denied all the allegations, declaring that they were part of a campaign by people whom he hadn’t favoured when he was in office. Corruption allegations also led to a prominently reported conflict in September in CCM’s youth wing, UVCCM, when its deputy chairman Nape Nnaye not only implicated the organisation’s leadership, but also pointed to links with Lowassa. Nnaye’s expulsion from CCM was only prevented through Kikwete’s personal intervention. During its midDecember congress, UVCCM elected a new chairman from Zanzibar, who promised that the party youth would be in the forefront of the fight against corruption. Media, parliament and opposition parties played an important role in the campaign against corruption and misuse of public office. These issues were discussed much more openly, aggressively and impatiently than in previous years. In addition to the abovementioned cases, a good number of serious corruption allegations were made against

Tanzania • 379 leading politicians and high-ranking civil servants. This development was described by many observers as a sign of growing political emancipation, but doubts remained as to whether corruption allegations were sometimes false and made for personal benefit or to discredit potential rivals as the selection process for candidates for the 2010 elections got under way. Also, citizens reacted less tolerantly towards allegedly corrupt public leaders. The already high level of discontent rose even further. In a number of cases, government members were booed or even faced stone-throwing when they appeared in public. Opinion polls revealed the unpopularity of the government and the state administration. A survey published in August by the well-regarded university project REDET (Research and Education for Democracy) concluded that although Kikwete was still more popular than the government, public confidence was at a very low level. According to the REDET poll, Kikwete was – halfway through his first presidential term – the most unpopular president in Tanzania’s history. This situation was all the more remarkable since he had only three years earlier entered State House on a wave of public sympathy and with high expectations for his presidency. Kikwete responded positively, stating that he took the public grievances seriously and promising to improve the performance of his administration. The openness with which people were able to air their discontent as well as the positive manner in which the government responded were a good indication of significant improvements regarding freedom of opinion and of the press. According to analysts, the deep public frustration mainly arose from the lack of perceived progress in three major areas that the president had during his electoral campaign promised to tackle: first, the continuing disclosure of corruption and theft by public leaders and the impression that the president was being inactive in addressing the issue; second, the persisting poverty of the majority of people and increasing hardship for the middle-class due to steep price increases; and third, the inability to resolve the Zanzibar crises. The long-standing crisis in Zanzibar was marked by two developments: continuing talks between the rival CCM and Civic United Front (CUF, the strongest opposition party) to find a political solution for the deadlock and new discussion of the character of the statehood of the semi-autonomous islands. The ‘muafaka’ talks (from the Swahili word for ‘agreement’) between the ruling CCM and CUF finally met with apparent success on 17 March, when CUF Secretary General Seif Shariff Hamad publicly announced that agreement had been reached between the two negotiating teams that envisioned a government of national unity. Hamad’s statement soon proved premature. During CCM’s party congress held in late March in Butiama, the village where Tanzania’s founding father Julius Nyerere was born, the party organs rejected immediate implementation of the agreement, arguing that a CCM-CUF coalition government was such an important step that the population of Zanzibar should decide by means of a referendum. There was general disappointment with this decision, even within CCM. There were doubts that the Zanzibar authorities would be able to organise a free and fair referendum since they had

380 • Eastern Africa never managed to organise general elections that were free of rigging and manipulation. It appeared that a small clique around Zanzibar’s President Amani Karume had blocked a solution supported by even a majority within CCM. The CUF leadership was disappointed but reasonable in its responses. Although some CUF leaders cautioned that prolonged deadlock would strengthen radical forces within the party, the leadership declared it would continue to favour peaceful means for achieving CUF’s aims. Leading CUF members suggested the UN should come and not only supervise but also organise the next elections in 2010 to guarantee a free and fair voting process and prevent violence. Although CCM invited CUF to return to the negotiations, CUF stated there was no sense in doing so since the accord already agreed had been rejected by CCM party organs. Apart from the problems this decision posed for Zanzibar, it also clearly indicated that Kikwete’s power as party chairman was constrained by strong politicians and rival groupings within CCM. He was known to favour a coalition government in Zanzibar, but was obviously not in a position to convince the party to follow this course. The Zanzibar wing of CCM and Karume in particular were assumed to have blocked the approval of the power-sharing agreement. CUF, however, increased pressure on Kikwete by stating they still counted on him to carry through with the implementation of the agreed coalition government. In his mid-term speech to parliament on 21 August, Kikwete announced that Vice President Ali Mohamed Shein, originating from Pemba, would play a stronger role in finding a solution to the Zanzibar problem. Since Karume’s two terms in office under the constitution would end in 2010, moderates in CCM might try to select a presidential candidate who would handle the political problems on the islands in a more collaborative way. The need to break the longstanding deadlock was underscored in mid-May when elders from Pemba demanded the separation of their island from Unguja in a letter to the UN representative in Tanzania. The seven initiators of the letter, said to be CUF members, were arrested on charges of treason. It appeared that the demand for separation was to draw public attention to the perceived marginalisation of Pemba Island by Zanzibari authorities. It seemed unlikely that the arrests were in any way helpful and they may have been another overreaction by the police. The ‘Legal and Human Rights Centre’, a reputable NGO, stated that the arrests had violated the right of freedom of expression guaranteed by the Tanzanian constitution. In early July, a heated debate on the character of Zanzibar’s statehood erupted. It was provoked by Pinda, who stated in the union parliament that Zanzibar was not a state (nchi in Swahili) and thus could not join the OIC. Reactions from Zanzibar were harsh. Some Zanzibari leaders within both CCM and the opposition insisted that Zanzibar was a genuine state, albeit within the union. Much of the debate stemmed from different understandings of the meaning of statehood, but the debate also exposed deep-rooted differences in the concepts of the union as well as the prevailing mistrust between both its parts. The debate continued for some weeks and Kikwete was called on to intervene. He initially

Tanzania • 381 declined the request on the grounds that such essential discussions should be allowed in a democratic society, but finally ended the debate by stating that Zanzibar had ceased to be a sovereign state with the creation of the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964. Demands by Zanzibar to be allowed to join the OIC were again rebuffed. Foreign Minister Bernard Membe, however, promised that the union government would examine the possibility of Tanzania’s joining the OIC. This option had, however, been promised for over 15 years with no action being taken. On 24 October, the Christian Council of Tanzania called for Membe’s resignation for allegedly violating the country’s secular constitution by considering membership in a faith-based international organisation. Despite the major internal conflicts within CCM and the high level of public frustration, the opposition was unable to benefit significantly from the situation. CUF focused its attention almost exclusively on developments in Zanzibar, while the other smaller opposition parties watched the developments apprehensively, fearing that close cooperation between CCM and CUF would further marginalise them. CHADEMA (Party for Democracy and Progress) had spearheaded the anti-corruption crusade in 2007. However, after the government and particularly Kikwete took the leading role, it became difficult for CHADEMA to maintain its image as the brave and honest David fighting Goliath in the form of the corrupt ruling party. CHADEMA mourned the loss of Chacha Wangwe, MP for Tarime and the party’s vice chairman, who died in a car accident on 28 July. Members of his family and residents of his home region doubted the official version and rumours spread that he was the victim of political assassination. The tensions abated when his family confirmed the official version following an independent investigation. The by-election on 12 October to fill his seat was extremely fiercely fought by the main contenders from CCM and CHADEMA. Violent clashes between supporters of both parties and also involving security forces prompted observers to fear the worst for polling day. However, the day itself passed peacefully, presumably due to a strong police presence. CHADEMA won and CCM immediately accepted unconditional defeat. Although much of the violence resulted from poor and politically one-sided ‘escalation management’ by local security forces, the Tarime by-election suggested that Tanzania’s record of peaceful elections could be jeopardised during the next elections in 2010. The director and a leading journalist of ‘MwanaHalisi’, a weekly newspaper known for strongly denouncing corrupt practices, were victims of a violent attack in early January. State authorities were praised by media organisations for condemning the assault and commencing immediate investigations. Five people were arrested. On 13 October, ‘MwanaHalisi’ was banned for three months after publishing a story about an alleged plot to oust the president allegedly spearheaded by certain senior CCM leaders and Kikwete’s own son. The ban was strongly criticised by Western embassies and by media organisations and newspaper editors.

382 • Eastern Africa An increase in killings of albinos gave rise to negative international publicity for Tanzania. The belief that using body parts of albinistic people in rituals or potions would enhance the user’s prosperity resulted in numerous killings of albinos or the hacking off of parts of their bodies Most of these crimes were committed in regions bordering Lake Victoria where superstition was prevalent and ‘witch-hunts’ and the killing of elderly people had been reported for years. Numerous suspects were arrested and the president announced efforts to register and control traditional healers, who were thought to be the driving force behind the phenomenon. As a symbolic gesture, Kikwete appointed a woman from Zanzibar as the first albino MP. The voluntary repatriation of refugees continued and almost 100,000 refugees from Burundi (who had come in the 1990s) returned home. Thus, the overall number of refugees was reduced to about 46,000 Burundians and 80,000 Congolese. In a separate repatriation exercise, launched in March, another 30,000 people returned from among the earlier wave of over 200,000 Burundians who had arrived in 1972. Tanzania offered full local integration, including naturalisation and citizenship, to those long-term Burundian refugees who wished to remain in the country. In 2008, 165,000 refugees submitted their citizenship applications.

Foreign Affairs Excellent relations were maintained with all major international players. Kikwete’s energetic response to corruption allegations pleased Western donors who had become increasingly impatient with the slow pace of cracking down on this problem. There were only minor instances of criticism by Western donors of the government, such as when it banned ‘MwanaHalisi’. Tanzania’s good reputation and growing international prestige earned some appreciation: on 31 January Kikwete was elected AU chairman for a oneyear-term, and in early February Tanzania was one of five African states visited by US President Bush, who spent four out of six days (16–19 February) in Tanzania and signed the Millennium Challenge Corporation compact, a grant worth $ 698 m over five years. In early June, the 8th Leo Sullivan Conference for African-Americans interested in African business ventures was held in Arusha and attracted 4,000 participants. On 13 April, Tanzania was the first sub-Saharan African country to become part of the Olympic torch relay route, an obvious recognition of the friendly Tanzanian-Chinese relations dating back to the 1960s. As in previous years, Tanzania played an active role in the management of violent political conflicts in Africa. The post-election violence in neighbouring Kenya early in the year was viewed with great concern, but the inflow of refugees from Kenya was unexpectedly low. The government declared itself neutral and refrained from acknowledging either of the two Kenyan rivals. A coalition of four opposition parties planned to hold a demonstration in Dar es Salaam on 5 January in support of Raila Odinga, but was banned from

Tanzania • 383 doing so by the police. In mid-January, ex-President Mkapa joined Kofi Annan’s team of African mediators to find a solution to the Kenyan deadlock. On 28 February, Kikwete also became involved as AU chairman and contributed to the two parties’ acceptance of a power-sharing arrangement. Although Kikwete earned international respect, the local press challenged him to not only resolve foreign conflicts but also to make the same effort to resolve the difficulties with Zanzibar. Tanzania took the lead in the AU-mandated invasion of Anjouan Island in the Comoros on 25 March and contributed almost half of about 1,500 soldiers. The invasion was backed by the US and France and generally understood to be a legitimate move. There was no major national or international opposition to the invasion except from South Africa’s President Mbeki, who tried to halt the invasion in a last-minute appeal to the AU. Tanzania and South Africa also followed different approaches in regard to Zimbabwe. While Mbeki, SADC’s mediator, was extremely reluctant to criticise Zimbabwean President Mugabe, Kikwete was one of the first African presidents to change his position and sharply condemned Mugabe. On 21 April, more than 100 African bar associations, human rights groups and other independent organisations met in Dar es Salaam and demanded that the AU become involved in Zimbabwe’s crisis, saying that SADC was not doing enough. In contrast to the strong condemnation of Mugabe, Tanzania rejected ICC efforts to indict Sudan’s President al-Bashir for genocide. The threatened indictment was viewed as untimely and as complicating efforts to implement a peace accord. Tanzania continued its somewhat hesitant approach to EAC integration. During the third round of negotiations on the EAC common market protocol in Bujumbura in October, Tanzania finally appeared to be willing to lift restrictions on the right of residency for nationals of EAC member countries. This step would remove the need for work permits, a major hindrance to the free movement of labour within EAC. Tanzania, however, maintained its hard line on provisions in the draft protocol allowing nationals of other partner states to acquire land, stating that it was still too early to fully open its lands to other East Africans. Tanzania’s clear reluctance on these issues antagonised the other four member states.

Socioeconomic Developments Judged on the basis of most macroeconomic indicators, the economy continued to perform relatively well, as it had since the beginning of the decade, and this was positively acknowledged by the multitude of international donors active in the country. GDP growth was robust at 7.5% (7.1% in 2007), helped by favourable weather conditions and particularly good results in manufacturing, trade, construction and mining. The global financial and economic crisis did not have much of an impact, but projections for 2009 envisaged a limited slowdown. Inflation accelerated markedly, with an average of 10.3% for the year and a peak of 13.5% in December, while the food price index surged to 18.6% by year’s end. The

384 • Eastern Africa agricultural sector grew by only 4.8%, and towards the end of the year some northern parts of the country experienced food shortages and threats of partial famine, but the national food reserve was sufficient to handle the situation. The exchange rate experienced normal fluctuations throughout the year, but on balance remained quite stable. The (preliminary) trade deficit widened further with imports growing substantially by 32% to $ 2,608 m and exports slightly less (by 29%) to $ 6,328 m. Thus, only about 40% of Tanzania’s import bill was covered by exports. Apart from gold (benefiting from high prices), there was a sharp rise in exports of manufactured goods (mainly to African markets), which had become more valuable than the traditional range of agricultural exports. The (provisional) current account deficit of about $ 2.8 bn (equivalent to 14.2% of GDP) was a new record, but in the overall balance of payments was largely offset by inflows of foreign direct investment and aid. Gross foreign reserves decreased only slightly to $ 2.7 bn by the end of September, equivalent to 4.4 months of import coverage. While the external debt had in previous years, through debt cancellations, been substantially reduced, standing at $ 4.4 bn at the end of 2007, it surged again to $ 5.4 bn at year’s end. Despite almost a decade of fairly solid GDP growth, the reduction of the conspicuous poverty in the country was disappointingly modest. This became very evident in December with the release of the results of a new national household budget survey undertaken in 2007. The proportion of the population living below the national poverty line had only dropped from 35.7% in 2001 to 33.3%. Economic decision-makers were shocked that the effect of overall GDP growth on poverty reduction had been so marginal. The distribution of economic benefits had obviously remained highly uneven, with the lower strata of the population and most inhabitants of rural areas experiencing no improvement in their living conditions. The urban-rural gap was widening. It was evident that Tanzania would not be able to achieve the MDGs by 2015. Despite all the macroeconomic successes and positive acclaim by the international donor community, Tanzania remained one of the poorest countries in Africa. In UNDP’s 2007–08 Human Development Index, Tanzania was ranked 159 (out of 177), near the top of the low human development category. The 2005 GDP per capita was only $ 316 and in PPP terms ($ 744) only three other countries had a lower average income. Despite these shortcomings, Tanzania continued to be regarded by practically all international aid agencies as among the most successful and consistent reform-oriented countries and to be fully supported with aid resources. IMF missions in February–March and in September undertook reviews of the Policy Support Instrument (PSI) that had been in effect since February 2007 as a new form of monitoring government’s financial and economic policies aimed at sustaining broad-based growth and accelerating poverty reduction. The IMF’s generally positive assessment of the policies pursued was a key element in maintaining the confidence of all 35 members of the Tanzania Development Partners Group. In both reviews, the IMF affirmed that the mutually agreed financial and other core targets (especially tax and customs administration reforms; local government, legal

Tanzania • 385 sector and public sector reforms) had by and large been met and that the PSI programmes were broadly on track. At the end of a visit on 29 February, the IMF managing director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, also expressed himself very satisfied with Tanzania’s strong macroeconomic performance and structural reforms and pledged continued full support. The government in a letter of intent to the IMF on 3 December reiterated its adherence to the agreed reform goals. The World Bank on 21 October approved its sixth PRSC for Tanzania to the value of $ 160 m. Finance Minister Mustafa Mkulo on 12 June introduced the new budget in parliament, providing a confident outlook for the government’s budgetary operations based on the successful fiscal performance of the previous financial year. Only minor changes to fiscal policies were announced in the budget speech. Preliminary assessment of budget performance for 2007–08 showed that consolidated targets in regard to revenue collection and expenditures had been very nearly met, thus indicating further improvement over previous years, particularly in respect of the government’s capacity to implement planned projects. The strategy of decentralisation by devolution had been gradually extended and by and large brought positive results. The budget for financial year 2008–09 foresaw an ambitious rise in expenditures of 19% to TSh 7.2 trn (about $ 6.1 bn). In accordance with the National Development Vision 2025 and the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (Swahili acronym: MKUKUTA), Tanzania’s version of a second-generation PRSP, the six main priority areas (education, roads, health, agriculture, water, energy) were allocated 64% of the total budget. The overall thrust was positively received by the general public and the budget was acclaimed as a ‘people’s budget’, although some critics felt that too little attention was still being given to the agricultural sector. Of the envisaged budget, 66% was expected to be raised from domestic sources, based on an enhanced tax ratio target of 18.5% of GDP (compared to 16.7% in 2007–08). All recurrent expenditures were to be entirely funded from domestic revenues, without recourse to domestic borrowing. Despite continuing efforts to substantially raise domestic revenue collection, it was clear that most development expenditures in the budget were still dependent on external funding. The share of foreign funding for the budget was expected to decline to 34% (compared to 42% in 2007–08). Most donor activities were more closely coordinated than in the past in the context of the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) established with the government in 2006. Almost 40% of all external aid was expected to be provided as general budget support, i.e., no longer in traditional project or programme form. The Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) that had since 1992 been in charge of privatisation of the roughly 400 state-owned enterprises or institutions was wound up in December 2007. Responsibility for finalising outstanding divestitures until 2011 was given to a reconstituted Consolidated Holding Corporation (CHC), but during its first year little further progress was made and only TSh 1.9 bn was collected from sales. The highly unsatisfactory performance of several semi-public corporations responsible for essential

386 • Eastern Africa infrastructural services (ports, railways, airways, power) continued to create political problems and generate public anger. The management of Tanzania Railways (TRL) had only in 2007 been granted under a 25-year concession to RITES of India. Air Tanzania was still in deep trouble and in need of a new structure after the earlier 49% participation by South African Airways was reversed in 2007. Dar es Salaam’s port management deteriorated considerably and became a burden on many economic sectors. The same was true of the Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO), which was still unable to guarantee a reliable power supply, although some improvements and expansion projects were under way. In April, an unusually heated debate erupted in parliament over the rationale for partial privatisation of TANESCO. Zanzibar was for months without regular electricity after the power cable from the mainland was damaged. Several months of controversy over petrol prices culminated in December, when government decreed a price limit after petrol companies refused to pass lower world market prices on to consumers. This led to the temporary unavailability of petrol on the market. Effective 1 January, government raised the minimum wage significantly to TSh 150,000 (about $ 120) per month in the private sector and TSh 120,000 in the public sector. Following protests by employers, a compromise, immediately implemented by some, was negotiated that allowed private companies to lower the minimum wage under certain circumstances to TSh 80,000. This resulted in strikes in various sectors, such as transport services and the textile industry. In the public sector, a growing number expressed dismay at the economic hardships resulting from rising inflation and began to protest, particularly at the six-month delay in the higher wages promised in January. While most trade unions were too weak and ineffectual to mount mass action, the powerful Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU) with over 150,000 members was different. A general strike by teachers on 15 October was called off at the last moment due to government intervention, but the threat was at least successful in securing outstanding wages, but not further wage increases. University students also went on strike in November to protest the cost-sharing burden and insufficiency of bursaries, but the authorities did not budge and suspended the students for the remainder of the year. Conflicts in the mining sector between small artisanal miners and large international mining companies continued to be sensitive but remained low-intensity. The presidential mining contracts review committee, chaired by a former attorney-general, Mark Bomani, submitted its report to parliament in early July. The committee suggested a number of measures to allow government to obtain a greater share of the benefits from the mining sector. Contracts between previous Tanzanian governments and mining companies had been widely criticised for strongly favouring companies to the detriment of the interests of the state, small-scale miners and communities living in the mining areas. Kurt Hirschler & Rolf Hofmeier

Uganda

In Kampala, Uganda’s election to a two-year term on the body entrusted with the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”, the UN Security Council, was welcomed as a token of worldwide esteem. In the African realm, the government held aloof from the Libyan leader’s fast-track approach to continental unity, and received good marks coupled with a number of warnings from its peers in the continent’s self-evaluation procedure. In general, the country was on good terms with its neighbours, and relations with even the DR Congo improved. The economy was doing fairly well though food and fuel prices rose sharply, leading to inflation figures not seen in quite some time. In the domestic field, the row between the president and the traditionalist elite of Buganda, the country’s central region, continued. The president also quietly laid the groundwork for yet another re-election bid in 2011. Government’s image was tarnished by corruption scandals involving politicians from the inner circle of power. Peace in the north was no longer disturbed by the notorious Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Negotiations with the LRA continued in Juba, but to no avail. The year ended with a largely unsuccessful military offensive against this group in its hide-out in the DR Congo, followed by gruesome atrocities perpetrated by the LRA against Congolese civilians.

388 • Eastern Africa

Domestic Politics On the political scene, it was President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni who continued to draw the major lines and, at times, also spell out the minor details in his determination to retain his hold over the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) and the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Contradictions within NRM became apparent with the Temangalo scandal involving senior members of government. Security Minister Amama Mbabazi, at the same time NRM secretary general, sold 414 acres of land near Kampala owned by him and a business partner to the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), which intended to use it for a housing scheme. The plots were sold at USh (Shillings) 11 bn (about $ 6.5 m). There was suspicion that this price exceeded the market value and that Finance Minister Ezra Suruma, the overseer of the pension fund, unduly influenced the purchase. Parliament set up a committee of inquiry, which at the end of October presented two conflicting documents. The majority report found evidence of influence peddling in the transaction, whereas the minority paper detected no fault with the two ministers. In the NRM, the critics of Mbabazi, who was believed to consider himself Museveni’s future successor, were led by Local Government Minister Kahinda Otafiire, like Mbabazi, a NRM ‘historical’. First Lady and MP Janet Museveni, in the NRM caucus meeting on 3 November, did not follow her husband’s line in protecting Mbabazi, but instead asked the minister to take back the land and return the money. The president accepted the view the ministers had done no wrong and kept them in the cabinet. Notwithstanding the earlier majority report, parliament cleared the two ministers. The consequences were felt in other places, with NSSF director David Chandi Jamwa being sacked at the beginning of December by Minister Suruma, whom Jamwa had criticised for intervening in the sale. Donor concern over corruption was demonstrated by the UK high commissioner in a ceremony on 8 December. He symbolically handed over a USh 117 m ($ 60,000) cheque to the inspector-general of government, this being the refund for a bribe a presidential aide had received from a British company. A former assistant to Minister of State Caleb Akandwanaho (aka Salim Saleh, Museveni’s younger brother) was convicted in the UK for trafficking cocaine and in the House of Commons the reliability of Ugandan diplomatic passports was questioned. An anti-corruption division of Uganda’s high court started operation on 1 July. Another major strain for the president was the relationship with Buganda, whose traditionalists had never been reconciled to the purely cultural role Museveni had assigned to their king, the Kabaka, after the restoration of the monarchies in 1993. There were various facets of the dispute, one being the proposed amendments to the Land Act. According to the president, these would stop illegal evictions of tenants, whereas landowners saw the plans as a scheme to expropriate land in order to allow access to it by large investors or other non-Baganda. During the year, the bill was the subject of discussion but was not enacted into law. Protests led to the arrest for a week of three prominent royalists, the

Uganda • 389 ‘Mengo Three’, in July. To counter the influence of ‘Mengo’, the seat of the kingdom, government responded favourably to the aspirations of smaller groups living on Buganda’s soil but always denied their own traditions and identity. To reassert his claims over the Baruli in the northern part of Buganda – who had installed their own ruler, the Ssabaruli, in 2004 – Kabaka Ronald Muwenda Mutebi intended to visit the area in October but was blocked by government, the police expecting disturbances as a result of this provocation. In December, the president backed the installation of the Ssabanyala as the cultural head of the Banyala, who are close to the Baruli. Conservative Baganda also voiced opposition to the presence in their region of increasing numbers of ‘Balaalo’, itinerant herdsmen (the expression also being used to point to the Bahima, the president’s ethnic group). In Busoga, geographically and culturally quite close to Buganda, the Kyabazinga, Henry Wako Muloki, died at the age of 87 on 31 August. Feuds over the succession of the traditional head ensued. The opposition political parties, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), the main force, as well as the traditional actors Democratic Party (DP) and Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), played a less significant role than in the year before. However, they scored a legal success on 27 May when the constitutional court struck down a provision in the Police Act requiring police permission for the holding of a public rally. To celebrate the court decision (against which government appealed), the DP held a rally in the capital only to have the police disperse the crowd and shut down the DP office for about four weeks. FDC together with UPC and the minor Conservative Party (CP) and Justice Forum (JEEMA) formed the Inter-party Cooperation on 5 August with a view to pooling their strength before the 2011 elections. This development was at least partly driven by Western political foundations that were assisting the opposition parties. The DP had taken part in the preparations for this development, but did not join. The People’s Progressive Party (PPP) led by former Minister Jaberi Bidandi-Ssali, who had in 1980 been a co-founder of the Uganda Patriotic Movement, NRM’s predecessor, held its first delegates’ conference from 11–14 June in Kampala. A new branch of the army was established, the Special Forces (a title previously used by a security unit of ill repute in Obote’s time), which were placed under the command of Lt. Col. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Museveni’s son. In June, he had graduated from a tenmonth course at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Prominent among the duties of the Special Forces, which include marines and paratroopers, will be protection of the oil-producing sites in western Uganda. A year after the death of Brigadier Noble Mayombo (who was known to be in poor health and to take anti-retroviral drugs), State House disclosed that the inquiry commissioned in 2007 had established that he had died of natural causes, though the report itself was not released. Soldiers were given a pay rise, a private receiving USh 200,000 (about $ 104 by the end of the year) instead of USh 180,000. This is equivalent to a primary school teacher’s salary, while a police constable receives USh 160,000 a month.

390 • Eastern Africa The number of crimes reported during the year decreased. Cases of fraud, however, rose considerably and were frequently related to pyramid schemes. Mobile phones accounted for roughly half of all reported thefts. The public became alarmed at the incidence of ritual murders believed to have been perpetrated to secure human limbs for witchcraft purposes: 25 cases were reported against three in 2007. A wave of arson hit boarding schools, starting with a fire in the dormitory of a junior school forming part of prestigious King’s College Budo near Kampala on 14 April, killing 20 girls. The media, including private FM stations (objectivity and responsibility not always being their trademark), were occasionally harassed. The off-Kampala printing house of ‘Red Pepper’, a gossip paper leaning strongly towards pornography, was stormed by unknown gunmen on 28 June and set on fire. Uganda, among the first countries acceding to the APRM created in 2003, underwent the various stages of this evaluation process from 2004 onwards. The country support mission had been conducted in February 2005 and was headed by Nigerian Professor Adebayo Adedeji, former executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). The 665-page country self-assessment report, in the compilation of which numerous stakeholders, including civil society organisations, had been involved and partly based on a national sample survey, was handed over to Museveni on 19 January. Among “the problem areas that are still undermining democracy and good governance” identified were “corruption and ineffective public institutions”. It was noted that “many of the effects of misrule from the 1970s and early 1980s remain in the national psyche.” The “widespread and deeply entrenched corruption tendencies and practices and growing citizen apathy which severely hamper citizen demand for better accountability from public servants” were depicted as one such effect. The visit of the country review mission, again led by Adedeji, took place from 3–24 February. The 14-member team held discussions with various state actors and groups from different walks of life. Talks were also held with representatives of the districts. In accordance with APRM practice, the mission made its draft report available to government for its comments. Its response, together with a programme of action, was appended to the mission’s report and presented to the APR forum consisting of the heads of state and government participating in the APRM. Their review took place on 29 June in Sharm el Sheikh in Egypt, on the eve of the AU summit. The mission had identified a number of key challenges, which included high population growth. Among the best practices worth emulating by other countries were the macroeconomic management, the handling of the AIDS pandemic and the manner in which the judiciary dealt with election petitions. In addressing his peers, Museveni took strong exception to some of the report’s criticisms. He did “not share the alarmism over the high rate of population growth”: instead “the high population will be used as a dividend through increased production and productivity of the population to realise economic transformation.” Neither did the reference to “the danger of the return of ‘neo-patrimonial politics’ . . . make sense” to him in view of “our vast democratic

Uganda • 391 structures” recognised by the mission. The final country review report was supposed to be made public before the end of the year, but this was not the case. Uganda was the seventh country to complete the procedure. Peace negotiations with the LRA, facilitated by the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), continued in Juba. In January, GoSS Vice President Riek Machar was informed by LRA leader Joseph Kony that his deputy, Vincent Otti, was dead. It emerged that he had been killed in October 2007 on Kony’s orders over the handling of the peace process, Otti having taken a more constructive approach. While Kony remained in hiding in the Garamba National Park in the northeastern corner of the DR Congo, a delegation with somewhat doubtful credentials negotiated on his behalf in Juba. In January, Kony dismissed his chief negotiator and three others, reproaching them for “making money from the peace talks”. The agenda items in the Juba talks were (i) cessation of hostilities, (ii) comprehensive solutions, (iii) reconciliation and accountability, (iv) permanent ceasefire and (v) disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). An annexure to the agreement of 29 June 2007 on accountability and reconciliation between the Ugandan government and the LRA laid down details for the implementation of the principal agreement, including a provision to establish a special division of the high court “to try individuals who are alleged to have committed serious crimes during the conflict.” Furthermore, an agreement on implementation and monitoring mechanisms was signed on 29 February by Internal Affairs Minister Ruhakana Rugunda on behalf of the government and by the head of the LRA delegation. Witnesses included Machar, Joaquim Chissano, special envoy of the UN secretary general for the LRA-affected areas and former President of Mozambique, plus representatives of the DR Congo, Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa as well as from the EU, Canada and the US, thus demonstrating African and international concern. By the end of March, both sides had reached accord on all the items on their agenda. Signed or initialled were eight substantive agreements intended to constitute in sum the final peace agreement. As reported by Machar, a short text which was to be ceremonially signed by Kony and Museveni was initialled. Arrangements were made for Kony to put his signature on the covering agreement on 10 April in Ri-Kwangba, the agreed assembly point in Southern Sudan for the LRA fighters, but he did not turn up. A month later, Acholi community leaders travelled there to meet him but he shunned them. His fears persisted that he might not get away with some traditional conciliatory procedures once he returned home, since the ICC arrest warrant remained in force and the possibility of facing a Ugandan court of law was not seen as attractive either. Other attempts at meeting in July, August and September failed. Efforts to have Kony sign the agreed documents continued, but in vain. Internal disagreements within LRA over the future line of action seem to have persisted. In accordance with the agreements, a war crimes division of the Ugandan high court was set up on 23 May, the imposition of the death penalty not being envisaged.

392 • Eastern Africa Early in June, the LRA attacked a Southern Sudanese army camp in Nabanga, quite near the Ri-Kwangba assembly point. Fourteen soldiers, six women and six children were killed. In the DR Congo, a first wave of LRA attacks on civilians took place in September. To swell LRA ranks, children were abducted even from the Central African Republic. In November, Kony met in Garamba with elders from northern Uganda, only to set new preconditions for his signature. The deadline was 29 November, and for the seventh time he skipped the appointment, while LRA attacks on civilians in the DR Congo and South Sudan persisted. This course of events prompted joint military action by Ugandan, Southern Sudanese and Congolese forces, codenamed ‘Lightning Thunder’, which was strongly, if tacitly, supported by the US. The operation in Garamba started on 14 December and was aimed at killing or capturing Kony and fellow LRA leaders. In this respect, the action was a failure, the main trophies being a wig and a guitar supposedly belonging to Kony (plus some state-of-the-art communication equipment). The operation did, however, weaken the LRA by destroying its main camps and freeing a number of child soldiers, including the last ‘Aboke girls’ abducted in 1996. Special envoy Chissano, who before had briefed UN Security Council members on 20 June in private informal consultations, met the council on 17 December in a closed meeting. This led on 22 December to a statement by the council’s president agreeing “with his recommendation that the peace efforts should continue” while recalling the ICC’s “arrest warrants for certain LRA leaders” and reaffirming “that ending impunity is essential”. The statement commended states in the region for their increased cooperation and welcomed their joint attempts to address the security threat posed by the LRA. At the same time, the Ugandan government was encouraged “to honour its commitment to accelerate reconciliation, recovery and development . . . through rapid implementation of its Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP).” The return of IDPs to their homesteads made headway. In Acholiland by November, 459,000 people were back in their villages of origin, with 329,000 living in transit sites – satellite camps half-way home – and 437,000 still in IDP camps. An obstacle to moving back was the lack of basic infrastructure in home villages. The LRA demonstrated its continued existence by perpetrating the ‘Christmas massacres’ near Duruma, Faradje and a number of other places along the northeastern border of the DR Congo. Killings also took place in Southern Sudan. The number of civilian victims in the DR Congo during the days from 24 December onwards was estimated at more than 400 and tens of thousands fled their homes. The situation in Karamoja eased further. Food security, however, sank to a low as the area experienced its third successive poor harvest. In addition, half the goat population fell victim to disease. The 2005 Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP), which had not had much impact, was relaunched by Prime Minister Apolo Nsibambi on 18 April in Moroto as a three-year programme to the tune of USh 445

Uganda • 393 bn (then $ 267 m). In the process of collecting weapons from local warriors, UPDF did commit human rights violations but on a lesser scale than before. In October, four soldiers were court-martialled and sentenced to 12-year terms for killing a village chief.

Foreign Affairs The year 2007 had concluded with congratulations being extended by Museveni to his Kenyan counterpart Mwai Kibaki on his reelection. Since the Ugandan public was well aware of the peculiarities of Kibaki’s electoral success, this response drew criticism. Museveni then pointed out that the message was merely a formality related to his role as current chairman of the five-member EAC, a post he retained until the 9th ordinary summit in Kigali on 26 June. He also continued as chairperson-in-office of the Commonwealth, meeting its head, Queen Elizabeth II, in London on Commonwealth Day in March. Using the opportunity provided in September by the UN General Assembly, he again met with US President George W. Bush. Museveni also kept up his multi-faceted relationship with Muammar Kadhafi (which may earlier have helped in the rapprochement between Kadhafi and the US). The Libyan leader visited in March to close an Afro-Arab youth conference (partly sponsored by him) and to open the national mosque on Old Kampala hill (largely financed by him). During his visit, Kadhafi upset Christians by alluding to the Bible as a forgery, Muslims by suggesting that non-Muslims should visit the Caaba in Mecca and government by attempting to bypass protocol to make direct contact with the Buganda kingdom. This last was in line with his attempts to gain the support of traditional leaders in his pursuit of African unity (in spite of the fact that he had deposed Libya’s King Idris in 1969). Scuffles between his bodyguards and Ugandan security operatives were a widely reported feature of the visit. In contrast to the Libyan leader’s aspiration to achieve the proposed Union Government for Africa at full tilt, the AU summit meeting in Sharm el Sheikh from 30 June to 1 July saw Museveni among those favouring a gradual approach. Uganda offered to host the July 2010 AU summit. The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was still largely dependent on Uganda’s 1,700-man contingent, with only Burundi providing further troops. Maj.Gen. Francis Okello succeeded Maj.Gen. Levi Karuhanga as force commander. Three UPDF soldiers were killed by Somali insurgents. In Uganda in October, police issued a terror alert, believed to be prompted by threats from the al-Qaida network over Uganda’s role in Somalia. The annual foreign ministers’ meeting of the OIC took place in Kampala from 18–20 June. Uganda assumed the chairmanship of the OIC council of foreign ministers (for reasons of political expediency the country kept up its OIC membership entered into 1974 during the rule of Amin). The meeting had been preceded by the first OIC business forum from 16–18 June, aimed at attracting the private sector in wealthy OIC member states to African

394 • Eastern Africa markets. Another first-time event was the Tripartite Summit bringing together the three regional economic communities EAC, COMESA and SADC. During this Kampala meeting (21–22 October), the heads of state and government present – among them Presidents Kgalema Motlanthe (South Africa) and Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe) – agreed on a future free trade area and customs union spanning 26 countries from South Africa to Egypt. Another tripartite endeavour of different character and composition continued, although somewhat cumbrously. This was the security cooperation – including meetings of the chiefs of defence staff – in the form of the Tripartite Plus Joint Commission, consisting of Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda and facilitated by the US. The foreign ministers of the four countries met on 10 December in Kigali, just ahead of the commencement of Operation Lightning Thunder. In general, the states in the Great Lakes Region worked more closely together. The DR Congo and Uganda realised the added value of peaceful cooperation, especially in view of their common economic interest in the oil and natural gas deposits in the Albertine Basin. Disputes arose over fishing rights in Lake Edward and over a few square miles on the boundary between DR Congo and Uganda’s West Nile region. Both countries agreed to re-demarcate the common border. Unrest in eastern DR Congo led to waves of refugees crossing into Uganda. Relations with Southern Sudan – Uganda along with Kenya provides the main avenue for its trade and is also a major supplier of foodstuffs and building materials – were close, though at the end of June Machar raised the question of the continued presence of the UPDF on its territory. About 47,000 Southern Sudanese refugees were assisted by UNHCR to return. Relations with fellow EAC members on the whole continued smoothly, though the year began with a spill-over of Kenya’s post-electoral crisis in the form of an influx of refugees and brief disruption of the main transport route for landlocked Uganda. Uganda’s international standing and the scope of its foreign relations were illustrated by the state visit of German Federal President Horst Köhler in February and by the presence of Museveni at the first-ever India-Africa Forum summit in New Delhi in April and at Israel’s 60th anniversary celebrations in Jerusalem in May. On 17 October, the UN General Assembly elected Uganda one of the five non-permanent members of the UN Security Council for 2009 and 2010. Receiving the votes of 181 of the 192 member states, it came second to Mexico’s 185 ballots, whereas Austria, with 133 votes, just met the two-thirds requirement. Usually, regional groups in the General Assembly agree beforehand on candidates they present to the plenary, but until mid-year both Uganda and Madagascar were contenders for the African seat. In Sharm el Sheik, the AU executive council endorsed Uganda’s candidature. The last time the country had served on the Security Council was in 1981 and 1982, while in 1966 it had been a member for a one-year term. Museveni decided to entrust widely respected Internal Affairs Minister Rugunda with the post of permanent representative in New York. Like his US counterpart, he holds cabinet rank while serving as ambassador to the UN.

Uganda • 395 On 21 November, the assembly of state parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC in The Hague decided to hold the review conference of the Rome Statute in Kampala during the first half of 2010. The Church of Uganda, one of the largest provinces in the Anglican communion, refused along with other mainly African churches to attend the regular ten-yearly Lambeth Conference. In their view, the Anglican fellowship of bishops had been broken by the toleration of the consecration as a bishop of a man living in same-sex relationship in the US in 2003. Instead, they convened the Global Anglican Future Conference (GAFCON). Meeting from 22–29 June in Jerusalem, GAFCON acknowledged God’s creation of humankind as male and female and described as an “unchangeable standard of Christian marriage” that it takes place “between one man and one woman”.

Socioeconomic Developments The third review under a three-year Policy Support Instrument (PSI) approved at the end of 2006 was carried out by the IMF in March, followed by a fourth combined with Article IV bilateral discussions in October. The IMF noted that “on a foundation of two decades of sound policies, Uganda achieved an impressive economic performance” leading to its economy being counted as among the fastest-growing in sub-Saharan Africa. This growth, however, had not resulted in “significant structural transformation of the economy”. During the year, the country was buffeted by two major shocks: global increases in food and fuel prices giving rise to an inflation rate exceeding 15%, and the worldwide economic downturn likely to dampen demand for Ugandan exports as well as curtail financial resources for investment projects. In October, the Shilling depreciated by one fifth against the dollar, whereas before there had been pressure on the currency to appreciate. The hopes of 2007 for organic cotton production faded when the crop was affected by vermin and disease. This led to a 12% fall in output. The Cotton Development Organisation supported the return to conventional strains. Power shortages did not completely disappear but the situation eased further after emergency thermal power plants came on stream. Hopes for a durable solution to the energy crisis lay in the future exploitation of the oil and natural gas deposits of the west – possibly greater than initially expected – and in the new hydroelectric plants under construction. Work on the Bujagali dam was ahead of schedule. However, an inspection by the World Bank belatedly revealed not only the environmental risks of the project but also the weak position of government in relation to the investors it had called in. The budget for the 2008–09 financial year was presented in parliament by Finance Minister Suruma on 12 June. Its motto was again prosperity for all (‘bonna bagaggawale’), with the focus this time being on setting strategic priorities to accelerate the escape from poverty. As in the year before, transportation and energy infrastructure headed the priority

396 • Eastern Africa list. Industrial and human development, along with security and governance followed. The total amount came to about $ 3.8 bn (2007, $ 3 bn). Total budget and project support from donors was to cover 30% of expenditure (for the 2007–08 financial year the projected rate of donor support had been 38.7%). Looking back over the 2007–08 financial year, Suruma gave 8.9% as the estimate for real GDP growth, the economy having grown “substantially faster” than anticipated. During the first half of 2008, food and commodity prices rose and Ugandan agricultural products and other commodities were in high demand on the domestic and particularly regional market. He indicated an average rate of underlying inflation (which excludes food crops) of 8.6% for 2007–08 and figured total export earnings for both goods and services at about $ 2.3 bn, an increase of 15%. Private investment in 2007–08 grew again and reached 21% of GDP (2006–07, 17.9%). The micro-finance infrastructure was extended: within a year the number of sub-county Savings, Credit and Cooperative Organisations (SACCOs) had doubled. Remittances by migrants, increasingly a major source of foreign exchange earnings, amounted to almost $ 1.4 bn in 2007–08. Incentives were announced for new agro-processors. No major changes in taxation were proposed. Among the soft targets smokers bore the brunt, at the same time as drinkers gained: while excise duty on cigarettes was increased, duty on beer made from local raw materials fell from 30 to 20%. As a result of the 2007 tax amnesty, the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) was able to realise USh 41 bn. Moreover, according to the minister, “the policy brought a number of new taxpayers on the tax register that URA would never have accessed.” The remittances the minister mentioned came in part from Ugandans working for security contractors in Iraq: their number increased as their average salary decreased. Government in May spoke of about 6,000 guards, each earning at least $ 700 a month. A quarter of a year later the figure was 8,000, the official minimum salary now being $ 600 because of competition from other countries. Graduated tax, formerly the major source of revenue for local governments, had been abolished in 2005. The local service tax and a local hotels tax to replace it could not be enacted in 2007, but were finally approved by parliament in April. The service tax was levied on people in gainful employment or business, while peasants, petty vendors, the unemployed and the poor did not have to pay. Members of the armed forces, police and prison service were also exempt. TI’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, published in September, placed Uganda at 126, a further deterioration (2007, rank 111; 2006, 105). Still it fared better than EAC partners Kenya (147) and Burundi (158) or neighbours DR Congo (171) and Sudan (173). In fighting AIDS, warnings were sounded that complacency might lead to HIV infection rates again rising. Prevention messages in the past were largely addressed to young people,

Uganda • 397 yet at present it is mainly married couples who are at risk. In October, a five-year strategic plan was launched aimed at lowering the rate of new infections by 40%. Volker Weyel

VII. Southern Africa

In several countries, the year was dominated by elections, which differed in terms of their legitimacy. Due to the death of Zambian President Mwanawasa in office and the subsequent ousting of South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki, SADC had three different chairpersons during the year. The sub-regional body, which welcomed back the Seychelles as its 15th member state during its annual summit, was kept busy with a number of meetings in the reluctant search for a political solution in Zimbabwe, but failed to contribute in a meaningful way to a lasting improvement there. The country remained mired in violence and conflict, while the situation for the majority of the population deteriorated further. The general stability of SADC and cooperation among its member states was tested by the differences in view over the handling of the Zimbabwe crisis, but the sub-regional bloc avoided a split over these political matters. Swaziland and Angola, next to Zimbabwe,

400 • Southern Africa remained among the worst performers with regard to democracy and human rights, while elections in all three countries testified further to the authoritarian nature of the dominant political culture. Intra-regional economic integration went ahead with the implementation of a FTA, though multiple affinities among member states with different preferential trade organisations, and the differences over the interim EPAs remained a challenge. The general economic performance declined considerably towards the end of the year as a result of the global economic crisis, and rising food prices had severe impacts on many people, forcing governments to take relief measures for the poorest.

Elections, Democracy and Human Rights This was a rather turbulent year in terms of elections and political life, though as in previous years few lives were lost, with the notable exception of Zimbabwe, where politically motivated violence seemed to remain chronic. During the year, three new heads of state took office, only one of these transfers being planned and anticipated: on 1 April Ian Khama took over the presidency of Botswana from Festus Mogae. Due to an amazingly rapid loss of support and confidence within his own party, South African President Thabo Mbeki was forced to resign at the end of September and Kgalema Mothlane took over as interim president for the balance of the year and beyond. In Zambia, the death of President Levy Mwanawasa on 19 August led to presidential elections within 90 days, as required by the constitution. From these the former vice president, Rupiah Banda, emerged as a close and somewhat unexpected winner. President Robert Mugabe managed once again to stay in office against all the odds, though this time round it was a difficult exercise, testing his abilities as a plotter to the fullest, while also suggesting that others in the internal power circle representing the military might already have taken over the decisive role on policy issues. Scheduled parliamentary elections took place in Angola on 5 and 6 September and in Swaziland on 19 September, while parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Zimbabwe on 29 March, with a second round of presidential elections on 27 June. While Zimbabwe’s parliament as a result had a new majority composed of the two factions of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the battle over the presidency raged on with strong suggestions of foul play. The second round of the presidential election (after a highly dubious and much delayed result from the first round denying Tsvangirai the absolute majority of votes that many believed he had actually secured) turned into a farce after Tsvangirai opted out as a result of the systematic use of state terror against supporters of his MDC party. Parliamentary elections in Swaziland were also a mockery of the meaning of the term, as no political parties were allowed to register and campaign. King Mswati III ruled almost as a feudal monarch. Consequently, it was hardly any surprise that Zimbabwe and Swaziland remained among the pariah states for their political restrictions, repression and lack of civil liberties. Ongoing disputes over contested parli-

Southern Africa • 401 amentary election results required a SADC mission headed by Botswana’s former president, Sir Ketumile Masire, to go to Lesotho on 8 February. Local elections provided significant political evidence of continuity and/or change in two other countries. Madagascar entered a stormy political era in the aftermath of communal elections in December 2007, which documented the rise of a formidable challenger to President Marc Ravalomanana in the form of the newly elected mayor of the capital Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina. Local elections in Mozambique, by contrast, consolidated the overwhelming dominance of Frelimo and the continued decline of influence of Renamo, which had originally been created and operated as a rebel organisation fighting an ugly war against the former liberation movement. Along similar lines, parliamentary elections in Angola documented the further decline of the ‘União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola’ (UNITA). The long-standing opponent of the ruling ‘Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola’ (MPLA) had, like Renamo, earlier fought a long and bitter war of destruction, before campaigning peacefully for votes. Like Frelimo in Mozambique, the other former Portuguese colony in the sub-region, MPLA could base its consolidated hegemonic rule on the monopolistic control of the state apparatus and the media. The overwhelming victory was achieved in hardly fair conditions and left the ruling party almost unchallenged. It also left the longserving President dos Santos (longer in office than Robert Mugabe and who would only step down from further elections for health reasons) confident in his prospects for the presidential elections scheduled for 2009. In Zambia, the constitutionally required presidential election necessitated by the death of President Mwanawasa in office was by contrast a close and tough competition, both in terms of the nomination of the presidential candidate by the late president’s party, Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD), as well as in the direct confrontation with the main opposition party’s candidate Michael Sata. The former vice president and acting president, Rupiah Banda, managed to win both the internal nomination for the MMD as well as the election on 30 October without any major violence erupting, despite the narrow margin of victory. He represented the old political generation with his roots in the former state party, United National Independence Party (UNIP), and close ties to Zambia’s former leader Kenneth Kaunda. The parliamentary elections in Swaziland resulted – in the absence of political parties – in a selection of staunch royalists rather than representatives of the people, and the procedure lacked any democratic credibility. This monarchy closely resembles a totalitarian state, in which citizens are denied even basic human rights while the living conditions for the majority of people continue to deteriorate further. Similarly, the parliamentary and in particular the presidential elections in Zimbabwe made a mockery of democracy and were an unashamed display of the arrogance of power before a world watching almost in disbelief. Due to a tolerant sub-regional policy (see the details on SADC’s role below), the incumbent president, Mugabe, managed to steal

402 • Southern Africa victory from his rival Tsvangirai in an uncontested second round of presidential elections. The two MDC parties were ultimately forced to accept a compromise government of national unity, while fundamental human rights were systematically violated by the repressive machinery of the state under the control of securocrats within the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). In the absence of any bigger electoral tests, the political climate in Namibia became tougher as a result of the activities of a newly established opposition party, the Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP). This party represented a number of dissenting voices from among the ranks of the former liberation movement and in the eyes of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) posed a challenge to its hegemonic role, especially in the northern home base of the organisation. While first local election results provided no evidence of this challenge, the political rhetoric escalated and politically motivated acts of violence erupted among followers of the parties. This increased concerns over the possible escalation of violence during the campaign for the parliamentary and presidential elections in late 2009. In a parallel development, the establishment of a new political party also largely recruited from among disappointed members of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa added to the tensions over the claims as to who represented the real liberation movement in the true spirit of post-apartheid nation building. In both South Africa and Namibia, the former liberation movements, ANC and SWAPO, cultivated closer links with each other and the other three anti-colonial movements in the sub-region, MPLA, ZANU-PF and Frelimo, all of whom had assumed political power in a sovereign state and had since then not surrendered political control over their countries. The newly elected ANC president, Jacob Zuma, took visible initiatives to forge renewed closer bonds between the former liberation movements by visiting neighbouring countries and entering into new friendship pacts and alliances seeking to protect the hegemonic status of the organizations concerned. The parliamentary deadlock in Malawi continued. The unresolved differences over the legality of the massive floor crossing by MPs and the abuse of this practice by the ruling party to maintain its majority led to further delay in adopting the country’s annual budget. Internal strife kept most of the parties busy in the lead-up to the general elections in 2009. Political dissent over the election result of the previous year and the subsequent allocation of parliamentary seats continued in Lesotho, which as a result was visited by former President Masire of Botswana as SADC envoy on 8 February to seek a solution to the impasse. The government continued throughout the year to obstruct any form of opposition. By contrast, Botswana managed to execute the long-prepared and smooth transition from President Festus Mogae to the new head of state Ian Khama (who is appointed directly by the governing party, not by direct election by voters). The governing party kept the opposition at bay by means of keeping its own party in-fights ahead of next year’s general elections largely under control. In contrast, the erstwhile major opposition party

Southern Africa • 403 was largely preoccupied with and paralysed by its internal rivalries. Indeed, during the year another party emerged as the most serious challenger to the governing party, which has been in political power since independence. The sub-region’s relative political stability combined with authoritarian structures and rigid concepts of political rule, can to some extent be discerned in the very durability of the governments. In half of the 12 countries (if one adds Zimbabwe to Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa) the party voted into power at independence (or in the South African case in the first democratic elections) has not since been replaced . If one adds the absolutist monarchy of Swaziland, fewer than half of the sub-region’s states have since independence undergone a change of government. Concerning the overall state of democracy and civil liberties in the sub-region, the 2008 ranking by the Freedom House Index allowed some comparison between states, despite the doubts as to the reliability of such assessments. On a scale of between 1 (free) to 7 (not free) the states of the sub-region were again among the best and worst African performers in the combined average ratings for political rights and civil liberties. Mauritius (1/2), Botswana (2/2), Namibia (2/2), South Africa (2/2) and Lesotho (2/3) qualified as ‘free’; Mozambique (3/3), Madagascar (4/3), Zambia (3/4) and Malawi (4/4) as ‘partly free’; and, not surprisingly, Angola (6/5), Swaziland (7/5) and Zimbabwe (7/6) trailed behind as ‘not free’.

Socioeconomic Developments A SADC international consultative conference on poverty and development was held in Mauritius from 18–20 April with high level participation by the 14 member states. This was pursuant to the body’s implementation of the long-term Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and was considered a milestone towards poverty eradication in the sub-region with the aim of accelerating implementation of the MDGs. For the first time in the sub-region, civil society, business, donors and governments alike participated in a single conference with this thematic focus. As is so often the case with high calibre diplomatic events, few if any results were recorded over the rest of the year that indicated the ambitious agenda was any closer to realisation. For several years the power supply situation has been among the biggest problems facing the sub-region’s economies and people. It also highlighted the dependence of this sector on the South African energy utility Eskom, which supplied energy to other countries in the sub-region and was forced to cut supplies due to shortages. Frequent power failures restricted industrial production, the wholesale and trading sector as well as affecting public and social services and ordinary citizens in their households (to the extent that the latter benefited from any electrical power supply at all, since many still had no access to these services). A SADC ministerial task force on the implementation of power sector projects was held in Gaborone on 21 February. On the basis of the understanding that the SADC

404 • Southern Africa region is experiencing a power emergency, the ministerial task force adopted a roadmap to accelerate the sub-region’s recovery from this shortage by ensuring effective connectivity, as well as supply side and demand side management initiatives. The new buzzword was energy trading as a new means for SADC states to secure adequate power supplies for business and residential electricity in Southern Africa through a more coordinated Southern African power pool. Interconnector projects between Zambia and Tanzania and Zambia and the DR Congo were part of this as well as new agreements between Zimbabwe and Namibia to revamp and jointly utilise the Hwange power station. Eskom and the government of Mozambique signed an agreement in early April for an additional supply of 250 MW from the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric power station. This raised the total South African imports of power from this supplier alone to 1,500 MW. Towards the end of the year, after a series of drought and flood stricken years, local producers entered the rainy season, which, according to SADC’s food security early warning system in a bulletin issued in November, promised good conditions for local food production in most of the countries. The annual ordinary SADC summit in mid-August reviewed the progress report of the ministerial task force on food security and adopted various measures to enhance regional food security, including increased investment in and budgetary allocations for food production and the establishment of a regional food reserve facility. Problems of access to inputs were most serious in Lesotho and Zimbabwe. The latter is in continued need of massive food aid to ease the hunger of the majority of its population. An estimated 7 m people were at the end of the year in need of food aid. Prices of fertiliser more than doubled in most countries during the 2008–09 crop season compared to the previous season. The stresses brought about through external pressures, which resulted in markedly higher food prices for local consumers, were partly offset by more positive trends in local food production. However, the price hikes for both food and petrol contributed significantly to the general increase in inflation rates in most countries and added to the pressure on ordinary people in their struggle to make ends meet. The rapid and drastic decline in world market prices for certain base metals and other primary (mining) goods, marking an end to the previous resource boom, was a major contributing factor to the downward economic spiral in some of the countries. Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia suffered in different but complementary ways from the low prices for copper and the lack of demand for diamonds (which in the case of Angola was offset by the high prices for crude oil). In the case of Botswana and Namibia, the decline in diamond sales had a major impact on state revenue towards the end of the year and heralded a bleak period of recession (which in the case of Namibia could be cushioned through expanded production of uranium yellow cake, which is much in demand). In South Africa, the manufacturing sector also suffered to a considerable extent and unemployment increased sharply. While the aggregated scores in international rankings for good governance are of doubtful reliability, they continue to serve as an indicator that allows countries to posi-

Southern Africa • 405 tion themselves within overall scales and influence the perceptions of potential investors. As in previous years, Southern African states were among the best and worst performers on the continent. The Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International for 2008 ranked 180 countries on a scale of 10 points, 10 being the maximum score (corruption free). On this index, the countries of the sub-region appeared in the following order (rank and points in brackets): Botswana (36/5.8), Mauritius (41/5.5), South Africa (54/4.9), Namibia (61/4.5), Swaziland (72/3.6), Madagascar (85/3.4), Lesotho (92/3.2), Malawi and Zambia (115/2.8), Mozambique (126/2.6), Angola (158/1.9) and Zimbabwe (166/1.8). Floods in parts of the sub-region during January and the destruction caused by Cyclone Ivan in Madagascar (February) and Cyclone Jokwe in Mozambique (March) prompted ad hoc emergency funding for humanitarian relief by the international community through the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The overall funding allocated remained, however, small in comparison to relief measures elsewhere. A major challenge during the year was a cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe, with almost 24,000 confirmed cases. According to UN figures, the outbreak claimed close to 1,200 lives between August and the end of the year. This meant that about 5% of cholera cases in this period were fatal, well above the international norm of 1%. The latest available figures presented during the year by UNAIDS showed that in 2007 the sub-region remained the epicentre in terms of global HIV/AIDS prevalence. Nine of the countries in the sub-region (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) accounted for 35% of all HIV infections and 38% of all AIDS-related deaths in the world. Swaziland had the world’s highest adult HIV prevalence (26%), while South Africa had the highest absolute number of people living with HIV (estimated at 5.7 m). The epidemic continued to grow in Mozambique but measurable reductions were recorded in Zimbabwe and Botswana.

Sub-regional Organisations The 28th ordinary SADC summit of heads of state and government was hosted by South Africa as the new SADC chair in Johannesburg and ended on 17 August. It officially launched a FTA (see below) and readmitted the Seychelles as a 15th member state. The small island state had withdrawn from the community five years earlier allegedly for financial reasons and rejoined after a ‘more realistic membership fee’ had been negotiated. The summit created expectations that decisive action would be taken to solve the impasse in Zimbabwe, but failed to broker a final deal. Hopes that it would have served as the arena for the signing of a power-sharing pact between rivals Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai were dashed. Hence, the summit resulted in even more disappointment and frustration among those sub-regional players (not least within civil society agencies and local and international advocacy groups), who wanted to see a strong sub-regional

406 • Southern Africa body that went beyond grand-sounding programmatic declarations and also oversaw their implementation and sought to enforce fundamental norms among member states. South African President Thabo Mbeki, who at the summit succeeded the late Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa as SADC chair, had originally sounded optimistic about an agreement between ZANU-PF and MDC. He stressed that he spoke as SADC chairperson and not as mediator in the Zimbabwe talks and called for political unity and cohesion in the subregion. As he said, “we have had numerous challenges that have tested the very cohesion that acted as a potent weapon against those forces that have an interest in our perpetual weakness and marginalisation.” Negotiations to solve the crisis in Zimbabwe kept SADC leaders busy throughout the year. Following the elections on 29 March and the crisis resulting from the regime’s reluctance to accept the vote of the people, Zambia’s president and SADC chairperson Levy Mwanawasa summoned the SADC heads of state for an extraordinary summit on 13 April in Lusaka. Eight heads of state attended. According to the official communiqué, it was held “in line with SADC objectives to promote common political values and systems transmitted through institutions that are democratic, legitimate and effective to facilitate the consolidation of democracy, peace, security and stability.” The soft approach and tone during its deliberations and in its concluding statement was a disappointment to those who had expected more. The fact that SADC negotiator and South African President Thabo Mbeki had stopped over in Harare on his way to Lusaka for a separate meeting with President Mugabe was considered another disappointment. According to an observer from the Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust, an organisation promoting voter rights, the lack of progress meant “back to the drawing board because the regional leaders failed to address fundamental issues.” The continued delay in announcing the results of the presidential election and the evidence of state-organised systematic violence against opposition members by the Mugabe government was in serious breach of both AU and SADC electoral laws. This situation, in combination with the shuttle diplomacy of MDC opposition leader Tsvangirai, meant that SADC was forced to remain focused on the matter. A ministerial troika of political, defence and security organs within SADC, comprising the foreign ministers from Angola and Swaziland and the Tanzanian deputy minister of defence as well as the SADC Executive Secretary Tomaz Salomao, held another round of crisis talks in Harare with Mugabe, Tsvangirai and the Zimbabwe electoral commission in early May. At the end of June, the troika on defence and security held an emergency meeting in Mbabane, with King Mswati III, Tanzania’s President Kikwete and a representative of the Angolan president in attendance. Thabo Mbeki claimed that he had not been invited (which was denied by the SADC executive secretary) but had a direct conversation with the Swazi king the night before the meeting. The change in the South African presidency at the end of September did not impact Mbeki’s continued role as chief mediator for SADC for the remainder of the year. He

Southern Africa • 407 was credited with the power-sharing agreement signed between Mugabe and opposition leaders in Harare on 15 September, with other SADC heads of state in attendance. According to Mbeki’s successor, newly appointed South African President Kgalema Mothlane, his government had “full confidence in Mr. Mbeki’s ability to build on the historic successes already made in the power-sharing negotiations under his mediation”, although implementation of the signed deal remained doubtful, with Mugabe attempting to do it his way. In response to another emerging impasse, Mbeki visited Harare for further negotiations on the power-sharing deal in mid-October in an attempt to break the deadlock. A SADC crisis meeting held on 20 October in Swaziland dealt with issues related to the situation in the eastern part of the DR Congo and the political situation in Lesotho. The Zimbabwe issue, which was expected to be the main topic on the agenda, was postponed to 27 October in Harare to allow Tsvangirai to attend, after he had been refused a passport and could not travel. It made no progress in resolving the impasse over the allocation of ministries in the government of national unity. A subsequent SADC emergency summit in Johannesburg on 10 November endorsed a compromise in terms of allocating or sharing responsibility for relevant ministries. Based on the partial progress in forming a government based on a power-sharing formula, the strongest supporters of the Mugabe regime (in particular Namibia and Angola) demanded that selective and targeted sanctions by the international community be lifted and aid be provided to allow for a recovery of the ailing economy. Other SADC member states (in particular Tanzania and even more so Botswana, whose new President Ian Khama was a staunch critic of Mugabe’s autocratic rule) continued to raise concerns over the violation of the word and spirit of the agreement signed with the ZANU-PF regime. At the end of the year, the chances taken by Mugabe during the negotiations undermined trust in the new government and impacted sub-regional support to Zimbabwe. South African president and SADC chairperson Motlanthe announced at a news conference on 17 December that an aid package of Rand 300 m for agricultural inputs – released on condition of the formation of a power-sharing government – had been repackaged as part of SADC’s emergency relief programme. As a presidential spokesperson stated, SADC “cannot be sure if [the aid] would be distributed in a manner to reach the intended recipients” if the sum were transferred to the Zimbabwean government. The funds were therefore administered by SADC’s Zimbabwe Humanitarian and Development Assistance Framework instead of being handed over directly to Zimbabwe’s state authorities. While progress in terms of supporting democracy by the sub-regional organ was barely discernible, the advocates of a more gender sensitive normative framework had reason to celebrate. At the ordinary SADC summit, 11 member states finally signed the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development after three years of negotiations and a postponement the year before to allow for further national consultations. Four member countries (Botswana, Mauritius, Madagascar and Malawi) did not sign for various reasons, including constitutional implications. Legal and gender experts who participated in the Southern

408 • Southern Africa African protocol alliance meeting held in parallel with the SADC summit, described the protocol “as the most far reaching of any sub-regional instrument for achieving gender equality.” The protocol included specific time-bound goals and targets to ensure accountability in addressing: inequalities in constitutional and legal rights; governance, education and training measures; productive resources and employment; gender-based violence; health and HIV and AIDS; peace building and conflict resolution and media information and communication. It included legislation to prevent trafficking in women and girls in the sub-region by 2015. This proposal arose from the fact that no member state had specific legislation to effectively protect victims and prosecute offenders. On the economic front, steps were taken towards more intra-regional coherence and exchanges. Among member states with markedly outward-oriented economies and a trade balance mainly benefiting from the export of natural resources and primary goods to industrial countries, this was no easy task. In April, a SADC internal tariff phase-down became effective while the SADC FTA was officially launched in August at the ordinary annual summit. The regional bloc had since 2000 implemented the SADC trade protocol, which provided the framework for deeper economic integration. The SACU countries were the core group in its formation (South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland), and were joined by Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Madagascar. Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia brought the total number of SADC FTA members during the year to 12. Angola, the DR Congo and the Seychelles, however, have not yet applied the trade protocol. In terms of the agreed schedule for the tariff phase-down, 85% of all product lines were to trade as zero tariffs in 2008. The remaining 15%, considered to be sensitive products, were to have tariff barriers removed between 2008 and 2012. On 21 October, the roadmap for creating Africa’s largest trading bloc was finalised when the chief executives of SADC, COMESA and the EAC signed an agreement in Kampala. It committed the parties to creating a FTA with a total population of 527 m people (57% of the continent’s population) and a combined GDP of $ 624 bn. The tripartite summit prepared the next steps for the harmonisation of trade and investment regulations in the three trading blocs as well as the free movement of persons. Almost two-thirds of the 26 states hold multiple customs union memberships and the overlap is a major challenge, requiring mitigation. The extent to which this initiative intersects with the differences among SADC countries over entering into an interim EPA with the EU remains to be seen. Henning Melber

Angola

The first regular elections in 16 years were the most momentous political event of the year and brought about a massive win for the party in power, the MPLA (‘Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola’). Since the end of the civil war in 2002, President José Eduardo dos Santos and his entourage have tightened their grip on power and the resources of the country, with very little improvement in the living conditions of the majority of the people. The confirmation of his rule through democratic elections is thus only the last step in the consolidation process of Angola’s singular power structure, centred on the presidency and the dominant party, which aims to improve the government’s international standing. The Angolan government made significant investments in infrastructure and is redeveloping sectors of the economy other than the oil industry. Buoyed by high oil prices and drawing on the efficient services of Chinese construction companies, a rapid transformation of the country is taking place, raising the hope that these changes will eventually benefit a larger segment of the population. Prestige construction projects, as well as some high profile visits by foreign dignitaries, underlined Angola’s aspirations to become a significant player in Africa, challenging the economic and political dominance of South Africa and Nigeria.

410 • Southern Africa

Domestic Politics After repeated postponements since the end of the war, President dos Santos announced in January that the parliamentary elections would take place on 5 and 6 September. These resulted in a resounding victory for the ruling MPLA party, which ended up taking 191 of the 220 seats in the National Assembly, and a total of 81.6% of votes. UNITA (‘União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola’), the MPLA’s old war-time enemy and major contestant, clearly failed to convert itself into a political party capable of becoming a credible alternative to the MPLA, and won only 16 seats. The rest were divided among PRS (‘Partido de Renovação Social’, 8 seats), FNLA (‘Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola’, 3 seats) and the ‘Nova Democracia’ coalition (2 seats). EU and SADC observer missions characterised the elections as generally “credible and transparent”, with several technical problems, mainly in Luanda, and some reported irregularities in the exclave province of Cabinda. With a huge number of small arms unaccounted for throughout the country, there was widespread fear of repetition of the violence of 1992. In that sense, the peacefulness of the process, as well as the eagerness of Angolans to participate in the elections (with a reported voter turnout of 87.4% of about 8 m registered voters) was arguably its most remarkable aspect. Despite chaotic circumstances in Luanda, where numerous polling stations could not open on time because of technical problems, staff shortages or lack of voting materials, electoral observers in the provinces praised the discipline of voters, the eagerness of polling station staff and the general feeling of calm and security during the voting. Despite this achievement, conditions for free and fair elections were lacking. The MPLA took full advantage of the power of incumbency and its access to limitless state resources to gain advantage over its competitors. Throughout the voter registration process since 2006, the boundaries between state, government and party have become increasingly blurred and electoral education programmes often resembled electioneering campaigns for the party in power. Traditional authorities were systematically coopted by the party. Furthermore, the MPLA employed its firm control over state media to present itself in a favourable light. In an expensive PR campaign, President dos Santos was successfully portrayed as the architect of peace and guarantor of stability. Throughout the year, he was often seen inaugurating new schools or hospitals, not necessarily in his capacity as head of state, but more as head of the party. The government also increased public spending on high visibility projects prior to the election and made ambitious promises of more investment in infrastructure and service delivery. Immediately after the elections, UNITA demanded a fresh ballot because of the alleged irregularities, claiming it was “not possible to say that the elections were free and fair”, specifically because of the unscheduled extension of the voting to two days. Two days after the election, however, Isaias Samakuva, the president of UNITA graciously conceded defeat and wished the newly elected government all the best, hoping it would “govern in the interest of all Angolans”. It remains to be

Angola • 411 seen whether and how UNITA will reformulate a political agenda and expand its support base while playing a constructive role as opposition party. In a cabinet reshuffle on 26 September, António Paulo Kassoma was appointed as the new prime minister, but in Angola’s peculiar ‘semi’-presidential system the president remains the head of government in fact. Former Prime Minister Fernando da Piedade dos Santos ‘Nandó’ became the new president of the National Assembly. On 17 October, the National Assembly formally dissolved the not very functional wartime ‘Governo de União e Reconciliação Nacional’ (GURN), which had been established by the 1994 Lusaka Protocol and had allocated several posts to UNITA members. The president subsequently removed from office the remaining UNITA ministers and increased the total number of ministers to 33. Especially noteworthy was the establishment of a new ministry of economy to oversee the old ministry of finance and planning, which apparently in the eyes of the president had become too independent. In December, dos Santos announced that the long-overdue constitutional reform would take place prior to the presidential elections scheduled for September 2009. In all probability, the change would allow for the election of the president by the National Assembly instead of by popular vote. This move is likely to delay the holding of presidential elections to 2010. In any event, unless his alleged ill health prevents him from running for office, dos Santos’s re-election as head of state seems to be guaranteed. The only likely threat to the stability of the Angolan dominant-party system might come from internal factions, which, in the event of his death, would compete to replace him. Rumours, however, have it that some of dos Santos’s children are already being groomed to take their father’s place. With the parliamentary opposition reduced to all but irrelevancy, the MPLA is able to change the constitution without any form of meaningful political debate. Civil society activists see a return to the times of the single-party state, where the only possible opposition to the party in power comes from civil society and the churches, and must take place outside the parliamentary system. Critical Angolan activists describe the Angolan state as a monarchy, where the president rules by decree and through powerful patronage networks comprising a small clique of relatives, ministers and generals, with little or no accountability to parliament, the judiciary or the populace. This outcome might hardly indicate the advancement of democracy in Angola, yet one cannot simply dismiss the fact that an overwhelming majority of the people chose to participate in the electoral process, voting for peace, stability and the hope of economic participation. The renewal of the parliament through a democratic vote may well encourage the population to hold their government accountable in the next elections for its promises and the services delivered. Civil society organisations and the influential reformed and Catholic churches were to a degree able to expand their activities into civic education prior to the elections. However, the government kept tight control over such activities, repeatedly menacing NGOs with closure if their actions became too independent. One prominent Angolan advocacy

412 • Southern Africa NGO, AJPD (‘Associação Justiça, Paz e Democracia’), was threatened with closure in September. The association successfully referred the case to the supreme court, where it was pending at year’s end. Numerous other representatives of civil society were intimidated, silenced or simply bought off by the government when they became too critical. In parallel, the government created various pseudo-independent NGOs or charitable foundations, whose apparent main function was to whitewash the image of the president and his government by delivering aid in his name. Probably the best-known example is the president’s foundation, the FESA (‘Fundação Eduardo dos Santos’), which funds hospitals, schools, cultural activities, etc. and delivers services that would usually be provided by government. The foundation receives generous support from international oil companies, which are encouraged to donate as a sign of ‘gratitude’ for newly granted drilling concessions. The party’s encroachment into all spheres of civil society and any public or economic activity is typical of the nature of power in Angola. The unrest in the oil-rich, northern exclave of Cabinda continued. During the civil war in the rest of the country, the rebellion in Cabinda was always simmering at a low level of intensity. Since the end of the war, however, the conflict has flared up again. The government deployed troops to Cabinda with the intention of routing the secessionist FLEC guerrillas (‘Frente para a Libertação da Exclave de Cabinda’). The MoU for greater autonomy and a larger share of oil revenues signed in 2006 with the Bembe faction of FLEC and the ‘Forum Cabindês para o Dialogo’, a loose coalition of Bembe and churches and human rights activists, was rejected by the other FLEC factions. The interventions by the Angolan armed forces (‘Forças Armadas Angolanas’, FAA) were accompanied by violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including, according to Human Rights Watch, extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture and other mistreatment, sexual violence and denial of civilians’ freedom of movement. This repression continued. The arbitrary detention and reported torture of at least 15 civilians for “crimes against the security of the state” since September 2007 has so far resulted in only one trial: on 16 September, a military court in Cabinda sentenced former Voice of America correspondent Fernando Lelo and four soldiers to 12 years in prison for “state security crimes”. On the night of 25 September, one of FLEC’s military leaders, Comandante Maymona, was detained by the Congolese (Brazzaville) authorities in Pointe Noire at Angola’s request. Upon his transfer from hospital to prison, he was executed by a FAA commando. Repression in turn led to increased FLEC activity, including the kidnapping of foreign oil workers, and a lasting peace in Cabinda is still far off. The human rights situation in Angola remains critical and the run-up to the elections saw a further deterioration in human rights standards. On 1 April, the government closed the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights after only four years of operation in the country. Yet serious human rights violations persist, especially in Cabinda and in the Lundas. In addition, Human Rights Watch reported repeated evictions of inhabitants of informal settlements in Luanda. Equally, press freedom is still under threat. The

Angola • 413 state-controlled National Television of Angola is the only non-satellite television station. Likewise, ‘Radio Nacional de Angola’ remains the only station covering the entire territory of Angola, since the few smaller commercial radios are allowed to broadcast only in their home provinces. The sole really independent radio, the Catholic church’s ‘Radio Ecclésia’, has so far been denied a licence to broadcast nationally. On 10 July, another private radio station in Luanda, ‘Radio Despertar’ was suspended from broadcasting for 180 days on the grounds that its effective range, 400 km, exceeded the 50 km accorded by its licence. The only daily newspaper, ‘Jornal de Angola’, is state controlled, while the few independent weeklies have a low circulation and are under constant pressure, which leads to widespread self-censorship. Several journalists were indicted for seditious activities, including the abovementioned Fernando Lelo, accused of fomenting rebellion in Cabinda. Finally, the increasing number of private security companies is worrisome. Most of them are at least partly owned by senior military and government officials and have lucrative contracts with parastatal companies, such as Sonangol or Endiama. The lack of effective legal control over them makes activities in the grey zone of lawlessness likelier.

Foreign Affairs Since the end of the civil war, Angola’s efforts to return to the international stage have been largely successful. Already during the 1990s, international opinion shifted in favour of the MPLA, and, driven mainly by their commercial interest in the oil reserves, the US and European states started to woo the Angolan government. Attempts to improve the oft-criticised lack of financial transparency, as well as the affirmation of the government in democratic elections will only improve the country’s international standing. The emergence of China as a new player in Africa has considerably influenced the dynamics of Angola’s foreign policy. Regionally, Angola’s foreign policy is marked by a desire for stability and influence and recognition of the country’s status as a strong military power, its economic prosperity and its hegemonic aspirations to rival with the dominant subregional power South Africa. Angola’s six-month chairmanship of OPEC, which started in January, was a largely ceremonial role and was discharged by the oil minister, José Maria Botelho de Vasconcelos. During Thabo Mbeki’s terms of office, bilateral relations with South Africa were somewhat tense, not only as a result of the personal animosity between the two presidents, but also because of Angola’s military interventions in DR Congo in 1998–2003 and its opposition to South African economic influence. The election of Jacob Zuma as new president of the ANC, however, heralded a change in this often difficult relationship: in April, Zuma made a four-day visit to Angola, pleading for closer bilateral relations. Over the elections crisis in Zimbabwe, relations warmed further. Dos Santos, a long-time ally of Robert Mugabe, had earlier offered political and military support to the Zimbabwean government for the elections and could thus benefit from privileged access to the regime in negotiations.

414 • Southern Africa The waning influence of Thabo Mbeki in the mediation process, as well as Angola’s chairmanship of SADC’s security committee, allowed Angola to step in and, together with Tanzania and Swaziland, form a troika of interested parties to facilitate a parallel political dialogue between ZANU-PF and MDC (Movement for Democratic Change), which was then integrated into Mbeki’s efforts. In November, there were allegations that Angola had sent troops to the DR Congo to support Joseph Kabila’s government against the rebel forces of Laurent Nkunda in the east. On 15 November, Angolan foreign affairs spokesman Abreu Breganha denied reports that Angolan troops had been flown to North Kivu to defend the provincial capital, Goma. To stifle further rumours of military intervention, President dos Santos met the UN special representative, Olusegun Obasanjo, on the same day and offered his services as a mediator in the conflict. This offer was not pursued, but dos Santos mentioned the possibility of future Angolan participation in a possible SADC peacekeeping mission in the region. Angola’s influence in the DR Congo remained strong, as evidenced on 23 November by Kabila’s second visit to Luanda since his re-election. China became a key partner, mainly thanks to the provision of oil-backed credit lines without political conditionalities. Since 2006, Angola has overtaken Saudi Arabia as China’s main crude oil supplier and bilateral trade reached an estimated value of $ 25.3 bn per annum, mainly the result of high prices for crude oil. In return for credits and loans, Chinese food products and consumer goods were imported into Angola, and Chinese companies played a major part in the ongoing infrastructural reconstruction and development activities. On 18 December, in the face of the global financial crisis, dos Santos met with Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in Ziguangge, China, to increase the mutually beneficial cooperation and to build on the already excellent bilateral relations. However, the Angolan government has declared it does not want to become too dependent on China and is striving to find other revenue sources, including from its wartime patron Russia, but also from Israel and India. Driven by geostrategic and oil interests, the US sought to further improve relations with Angola. The US is still Angola’s main trading partner, and commercial exchanges between the two countries are bound to increase as the US strives to diversify its petroleum supplies. Angola has also for some time been seen as potential host country for the US Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) headquarters. While AFRICOM’s future is still unclear, Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, chief of US naval forces in Europe and Africa, visited Luanda for talks with the government and the military in November. Following the encounter, Admiral Fitzgerald announced the signing of a MoU for 2009 that will focus on maritime security and surveillance. This is in line with US aims to safeguard the oil reserves of the Gulf of Guinea and to improve relationships with the Angolan government. Given Angola’s shared history with, and the lusophone ties with Portugal and Brazil, relations with these countries are traditionally strong. Both countries invested extensively in Angola, particularly in the construction and banking sector, and many among the Ango-

Angola • 415 lan elite held substantial shares in Portuguese and Brazilian companies. Migration flows to Portugal were significant, as the entry requirements for Angolans are lower than in the rest of the EU. Furthermore, Portugal often acts as Angola’s advocate in international relations. Relations with France have been frosty in the last few years. President Nicolas Sarkozy’s one-day visit to Luanda in May – the first by a French president since 1998 – was to plead for improved bilateral relations. However, the beginning of the Angolagate trial in Paris in October led to renewed tensions. In this case, involving the payment of kickbacks in connection with arms smuggling in the late 1990s, the main accused were a group of French businessmen, most prominently Pierre Falcone, Arcady Gaydamak, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand (son of the former French president), along with high-ranking civil servants in the Mitterrand and Chirac administrations. French Defence Minister Hervé Morin, however, wrote to the judges that Falcone’s actions did not infringe French law, as the arms shipments had not transited through French territory. This was viewed as an attempt to save face for dos Santos and to protect the extensive business interests of French multinationals in Angola, including Total (oil), Areva (uranium), SoGen (banking) and Thales (telecom). Although no Angolans were officially charged in this action and allegations of corruption against dos Santos are unlikely to be made to the court, the tensions will probably persist for some time, as the first sentences are expected only in October 2009. As for the $ 790 m assets frozen in Switzerland in connection with this case, the Angolan government has finally reached an understanding with the Swiss that some of the money will be restored, on the condition that the funds be deployed for humanitarian de-mining.

Socioeconomic Developments Fuelled by the oil industry, Angola again experienced tremendous economic growth and was the fastest growing economy in sub-Saharan Africa, with the GDP growth rate topping 13.2% and the inflation rate at a record low of 12.1% (down from 12.2% in 2007). According to the IMF, GDP reached $ 83.4 bn, with an annual per capita income of $ 5,708. This stunning upturn has attracted billions of dollars in foreign investment, which allowed for continuing investments in infrastructure and properties. An unprecedented construction boom transformed the face of the capital in record time. Still, the economy was almost completely dependent on oil, with few linkages to the rest of the national economy and little diversification. The financial crisis and subsequent drop in crude oil prices prompted concerns that state revenues from oil could collapse in 2009. Consequently, the MPLA promised to diversify the economy and rebalance the national budget prior to the elections. As a further indication of the adverse financial circumstances, foreign currency reserves, according to Amadeu Mauricio, the governor of the National Bank of Angola, dropped to $ 18.9 bn in November, after reaching a record high of $ 19.8 bn in October. This would indicate the bank’s increasing difficulty in maintaining

416 • Southern Africa its unofficial ‘hard Kwanza policy’, which had preserved a stable exchange rate of Kz 75 to $ 1 since mid-2007 as a central part of the government’s efforts to contain the cost of imports and fight inflation. The oil industry made up 60% of GNP and 95% of exports, with production averaging two million bpd. Early in the year, Angola overtook Nigeria as the major oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa. In December, the Angolan government announced the largest ever single investment in Angolan history, up to $ 5 bn, for the construction of a liquid natural gas plant in the northern town of Soyo with the participation of Sonangol, Chevron, BP, ENI (Italy) and Total. This gas is largely earmarked for the US market, with the first deliveries expected in 2012. However, the oil industry relies mainly on foreign capital and expertise and employs only about 0.2% of Angola’s active labour force. In October, the government published a new law that obliged oil companies to meet their staffing needs with Angolan personnel. As long as there are few skilled personnel, however, companies are allowed to recruit foreign staff with the authorisation of the oil ministry. Thanks to ‘no strings attached’ oil-backed credits from China, the government could again announce a positive balance of trade ($ 17.2 bn), notwithstanding the murkier inconsistencies of the state budget. A recurring issue with Angola’s oil revenue is its highly opaque nature, with oil revenues being siphoned into the notorious ‘Bermuda Triangle’ of the oil parastatal Sonangol, BNA (‘Banco Nacional de Angola’) parastatal and the treasury. A report by the US NGO International Budget Project (IBP) compared 85 countries according to the openness of their budgetary processes. Angola emerged as one of the countries with the least transparent budget processes of all, scoring 3 out of 100 points on the Open Budget Index 2008 (down from 4 points in 2006). Equally, TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2008 placed Angola on the lower rungs of the ladder (158th of 180). Despite mounting pressure by international advocacy groups, Angola has refused to subscribe to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and much of the money remains unaccounted for. In fact, those few Western oil companies that, in the interests of transparency, tried to disclose some of their payments to the Angolan government were swiftly threatened with legal action. Corruption, both grand and petty, remains a major problem in Angola. Generally, the business climate favoured those with strong ties to the presidency, and ministers and other officials openly owned shares in companies doing business with the state, as there are no laws or regulations on conflict of interest. Because of a long-standing feud with the IMF and given its relative financial independence thanks to oil revenues, Angola has only a national economic programme and does not adhere to any programme agreed with the Bretton Woods institutions. However, Angola repaid two-thirds of its debts to the Club of Paris during the year, and due to the drop in crude oil prices fiscal pressure has increased and new negotiations for international credit lines are likelier. In similar vein, the government announced it would raise future funds by issuing state bonds and no longer through oil-backed loans.

Angola • 417 Since the end of the war in 2004 and especially prior to the elections, the government increasingly invested its revenues in infrastructural development. Most investments were geared to improving the long-neglected transport infrastructure. Again, China played a central role in these investments, as the road and railway network is not only built with Chinese labour and money, but will also ensure cost-effective access to soughtafter mineral resources in the hinterland. According to the credit agreements, 70% of all projects financed by Chinese loans are to be carried out by Chinese companies and an estimated 100,000 Chinese workers (officially 40,000) are rebuilding railways, roads, ports, schools and hospitals. The main projects include rehabilitation of the legendary Benguela railway, the Luanda-Malange line, the Moçâmedes line from Namibe to Menongue, as well as linking these lines to the Zambian and Namibian networks. All three lines are due for completion by 2011. A feasibility study is under way for a railway line from the southernmost port of Namibe to the city of Cabinda, linking the exclave to the mainland by a 20 km bridge over the Congo River to be built by the China Road and Bridge Corporation at a projected cost of $ 2.6 bn. While the rehabilitation of infrastructure benefits the population, this development causes some concern, since the flows of money were largely unaccounted for and the unregulated influx of Chinese workers into areas where Angolans could work might increase resentment among the population. There is a downside to this oil-driven boom. The widening gap between rich and poor has resulted in little improvement in the living conditions for the majority of the population: the trickle-down effect remains to be felt. Due to the massive influx of foreign capital, Luanda has become one of the most expensive cities in the world, with oil companies and their subsidiaries willing and able to pay astronomical rents for inner city properties, and where upscale restaurants, clubs and supermarkets cater to the desires of a small Angolan and foreign elite. Meanwhile, most of the population fends for a living mainly in the informal economy. Luanda is crippled by daily traffic congestion, with road infrastructure nowhere near sufficient for the population. Furthermore, water and power cuts are almost as frequent as during the war, and basic sanitation is lacking in a majority of the ‘musseques’ (shantytowns). Naturally, throughout the country the civilian population has experienced some improvement in their situation since the end of the armed conflict. Free circulation of people and goods has resumed and the security situation has improved demonstrably. Still, the ‘peace dividend’ expected after the end of the armed conflict has not yet benefited the population. Outside major cities there is little socioeconomic development. Diamonds are another of Angola’s major sources of income, and early in the year Endiama, the state diamond mining company, predicted expansion of production to ten million carats. Alluvial diamonds are mined artisanally in the northeastern provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. Despite this wealth, these provinces are generally viewed as being exploited and underdeveloped, and were described by their inhabitants as “the land of diamonds, without

418 • Southern Africa electricity, water, schools or roads.” A report released in July by prominent Angolan activist and journalist Rafael Marques in collaboration with a network of local activists denounced land seizures by the Sociedade Mineira do Cuango (SMC), a joint venture involving the British company ITM Mining, the Angolan state enterprise Endiama and the private company Lumanhe, owned by Angolan army generals. Compensation for seized lands is seldom paid or is inadequate, with farmers being paid a mere $ 0.25 for each square metre of seized land. SMC appeared to enjoy impunity for its illegal actions, and human rights abuses in the provinces were frequent. The arbitrary practices of the mining companies left the population hungry and denied of their full rights as citizens. Angola continues to host the African Association of Diamond Producing Countries (ADPA) and announced the awarding of mining concessions in other provinces, where deeper diamond deposits are suspected. Such deposits require investment in industrial mining, and already major mining companies such as De Beers, Anglo American and BHP Billiton have announced their willingness to partner with Endiama in the exploitation of these concessions. Other mining resources such as iron ore, copper and gold exploited during colonial times have only now started to attract renewed interest by foreign investors. With the financial crisis and the high initial investments required, it is unclear how soon this sector might be developed. The manufacturing and industrial sector remained marginal, operating far below its potential due to the unfavourable business environment, characterised by high costs, rampant corruption, Byzantine legislation, an overvalued currency and poor infrastructure. Nonetheless, some industries experienced increasing success, mainly those producing beverages and cement. The main gains were, however, to be made in construction and subsidiary services for the oil industry and government (import-export of food and beverages, luxury items, cars, etc.). Angola’s other major resource, its abundance of rich arable land, remained underdeveloped and the agricultural sector accounted for only about 6% of GDP. The years of war had left large swaths of land mined and uncultivable. Despite an increase of 17% in cultivated acreage over 2008, only 4.8% of the potentially arable surface was planted and the cultivation of the pre-independence export crops coffee, sugar and tobacco has declined into insignificance. Attempts to revive the coffee sector have been unsuccessful, largely due to the overvaluation of the currency, which made Angolan produce uncompetitive on world markets. Prior to the elections, the MPLA stated its intention to make Angola self-supporting in milk and vegetables. In February, the ‘Banco de Desenvolvimento de Angola’ announced the financing of structural projects to promote manioc production, as well as the breeding of cattle, poultry and goats to increase domestic production. In July, it also announced a five-year plan to expand the current Aldeia Nova agroindustrial project by $ 400 m. Compared to 2007, food security slightly improved overall. Due to insufficient rains during the planting season, however, the FAO forecast a drop in cereal yields by 14.5%, and the country’s estimated cereals deficit of

Angola • 419 500,000 tonnes has not significantly improved. According to WFP, an average of 1.12 m people per month continued to depend on food aid, compared to 1.4 m in 2007. Prior to the elections, the government made ambitious promises of more investment in infrastructure and service delivery, such as the creation of 12,000 new jobs and the construction of a million homes. Yet physical reconstruction of the country has yet to translate into social and human development for the majority of the population. The IMF estimated population growth at 2.1%, with 43% of the 17 m inhabitants under the age of 15. However, exact figures are not known, since the last census dated from 1970. Of the originally estimated 4.5 m IDPs, about 100,000 had yet to return to their places of origin. Furthermore, around 48,000 refugees remained in Zambia, and up to 193,000 in DR Congo, most of whom are not expected to return to Angola anytime soon. The 2008 HDI ranked Angola at 162 of 177, with a majority of the population still living close to the poverty line. The last government poverty survey from 2001 stated that 68% of the population lived in poverty and 26% in extreme poverty. A new survey is in the making. Only 20% of the population have access to electricity and 49% remain without access to a source of clean water. According to the HDI, the adult literacy rate stood at about 67.4%, with a combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio of 25.6%. However, consistent with an ambitious ten-year plan from 2006 to increase the adult literacy rate to 91%, the government increased spending on education, which now stood at 7.9% of budgeted expenditure. Where basic infrastructure is weak, health services are seldom much better. The adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is officially at 2.1% (3.7% according to the last HDI), but is likely to be under-reported. Other diseases, namely malaria, TB, cholera and typhoid are widespread, and life expectancy at birth is an average of 38.2 years. The bulk of health work is still carried out by NGOs, as is the development of infrastructure in Luanda’s sprawling ‘musseques’. The Luanda Urban Poverty Programme (LUPP), for example, largely financed by DfID and implemented by a coalition of local and international NGOs in conjunction with the government, has set out to create communal management systems for improved water, sanitation, and rubbish collection services and has funded crèches and micro-credit programmes for Luanda’s poorest. Jon Schubert

Botswana

Despite a transfer of power to a new head of government, Botswana continued to enjoy political stability. The handing over of the presidency from President Mogae to Ian Khama went smoothly, while the opposition remained divided. Unlike his predecessor, Khama showed little patience with the turmoil in Zimbabwe. While diamond production remained the engine of economic growth, HIV/AIDS continued to threaten socioeconomic development.

Domestic Politics The long expected handover of power from President Festus Mogae to his Vice President Ian Khama, both of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), proceeded without hitch. At the beginning of the year, President Festus Mogae began to travel the country to make his farewells and mark the end of his presidency. On 1 April, Khama, the son of the country’s founding president Seretse Khama, was inaugurated as the fourth president of Botswana. Typical of the modest style of politics in the country, the ceremony lasted only one hour and no foreign dignitaries were present. In his inauguration speech, Khama identified “democracy, development, dignity and discipline” as the guiding principles of his presidency. He particularly stressed the developmental challenges facing the country, such as

422 • Southern Africa diversification of the economy, the fight against HIV/AIDS and promotion of education. Khama also announced that special attention would be paid to the “lack of discipline”, such as alcohol abuse, reckless driving, disrespect for elders, abusive language in public discourse as well as slander and false statements in the media. Especially the latter alarmed some of his critics, who feared an autocratic leadership style. However, Khama tried to reassure his critics by pledging his firm commitment to democracy and by stating that a change in leadership style would not mean a change in substance. On the day of his inauguration, the new head of state announced a cabinet reshuffle, in which around one-fifth of the ministers and deputy ministers were replaced. As expected, former Foreign Secretary Mompati Merafhe became vice president and Pandu Skelemani took over foreign affairs, but the appointment of newcomers such as Christiaan De Graaf (agriculture) and Nonofo Molefhi (land and housing) raised eyebrows on account of their low profile and limited political experience. The dismissal of Charles Tibone (labour and home affairs) came as no surprise but meant that the business lobby had lost a prominent figure in cabinet. However, key portfolios such as finance and development (Baledzi Gaolathe) and education (Jacob Nkate) saw no changes and Khama also retained prominent BDP veterans and the representatives of important BDP factions, such as Ponatshego Kedikilwe (minerals, energy and water affairs) and Daniel Kwelagobe (presidential affairs and public administration). Although Khama, as BDP party president, had succeeded in accommodating the different factions, some infighting inevitably flared up in the wake of the primaries for the upcoming general elections in 2009. Since some parliamentary seats are ‘safe’ BDP strongholds, the contests during party primaries are more active than the legislative elections themselves. In a primary for a by-election in Palapye, (then) Health Minister Sheila Tlou, after being defeated by her opponent by six votes only, was finally beaten on 16 February after the BDP leadership ordered a rerun of the primary. The two main rounds of BDP primaries were on 26 July (18 constituencies) and 30 August (25 constituencies). In total, eight sitting MPs, including an assistant minister, Olifant Mpho, failed to secure re-election, though all of Ian Khama’s allies were successful. The party leadership indicated its satisfaction with the conduct of the primaries, and despite a total of 703 complaints on this matter, the whole exercise was clearly conducted in a much more orderly fashion than primaries in earlier years. In this respect, the BDP also fared well compared to the major opposition party, the Botswana National Front (BNF). The rift within the BNF between supporters and opponents of the party’s president, Otsweletse Moupo, over his personal integrity and leadership style became more marked. After Moupo lost the party primary contest for the Gaborone West North constituency on 9 February to a virtually unknown candidate (which may prevent Moupo from securing a parliamentary seat in 2009), the youth and women’s league urged him to resign. However, at the party conference held from 18 July to 20 July, Moupo ignored calls to step down.

Botswana • 423 Instead, on 23 September the party began a purge of dissidents, expelling Nehemiah Modubule, MP, and Elmon Tafa, a leading activist. In addition, the BNF leadership decided to terminate the group membership of Modubule’s party, the United Socialist Party (PUSO). In November, BNF’s fortunes further declined as more dissidents left or were expelled. Modubule and Tafa signalled they intended to contest the 2009 election, probably as independents. Moreover, three senior BNF members – Keeta Masogo, John Disele and James Mathokgwane – decided to leave of their own accord. Former BNF general secretary Akanyang Magama, who had been dropped as BNF parliamentary candidate for Gaborone South for the 2009 general election, went to court and on 18 December the high court ruled in his favour. Moupo further undermined his credibility by being seen at the front of the congregation in a televised religious service in Nigeria, appearing to be seeking help from a popular ‘prophet’. In contrast, the Botswana Congress Party (BCP) looked increasingly self-confident and capable of challenging the BNF at the polls and becoming the main opposition party. In April, the BCP used the tenth anniversary of its formation for a publicity campaign that highlighted its strengths. The BCP, currently with only one representative in parliament, continued its preparations for the 2009 elections and increased its list of ‘priority’ constituencies, which the party targets to win, to 21. A renewed attempt at unity talks with BNF in June proved shortlived and the BCP seemed to rely more on its alliance with the Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM) and other smaller parties. In fact, BCP increased its vote share in by-elections throughout the year, while BNF obviously suffered as a result of its poor public image. In the by-elections for Palapye on 15 March, BNF suffered a major setback coming in only third after BDP (1,942 votes) and BCP (1,456) with just 125 votes (down from 724 in 2004). The BCP had refrained from fielding a candidate in Kgalagadi North and urged its supporters to vote for the BNF, which had previously held the seat by a small margin over the BDP. Nevertheless, BNF lost the seat to the BDP (3,121 to 2,071). In the by-election for Serowe North West on 21 June, the former constituency of President Khama, Tshekedi Khama, younger brother of the president, won by a large margin, which came as no surprise since Serowe is the traditional capital of the Bamangwato tribe, of which Ian Khama is paramount chief. The seat had been vacated by Ian Khama when he had become state president in April. With a voter turnout of 32%, Tshekedi Khama won by 1,896 votes to 119 for his sole opponent from the BNF. Meanwhile, the president had completed the first 100 days of his presidency. While he enjoyed massive popularity among the population, the local press remained wary of him, raising concerns that he may be intolerant of dissidents and looking to repress the media. They were alarmed by the publication in June of a draft media practitioners’ bill, which they portrayed as repressive, particularly because it allowed cabinet ministers to appoint a media complaints committee. In August, parliamentary debate over the controversial bill was postponed until November to enable more consultation with the media to take place

424 • Southern Africa and reflecting the widespread opposition to the legislation. However, on 10 December, parliament passed the controversial bill without further extensive discussion and the Botswana Press Council intended to challenge it in the high court. In his first state of the nation address on 3 November, State President Khama emphasised again that he fully supports democracy but that discipline and combating anti-social behaviour is needed to prevent its erosion. This comment was in defence of the alcohol levy of 30% introduced on 1 November to combat heavy drinking, which is one of Khama’s special concerns. He also briefly commented on the Basarwa issue. The government wanted to integrate the Basarwa into modern life and this policy included relocation from traditional settlements. This has been portrayed as discriminatory by local and international human rights groups. After hopes for a consensus-based solution to the problem had risen when Khama reportedly met Basarwa leaders in mid-June, his observation that the hunter and gatherer lifestyle of the Basarwa was an “archaic fantasy” made it clear that the government was sticking to its existing approach.

Foreign Affairs Botswana continued to enjoy amicable relations with most of its neighbours and global partners. The 20 October announcement that former President Mogae, who had stepped down at the end of March, had won the Ibrahim Award for Achievement in African Leadership attested the popularity of the country on the international stage. The award aims to reward African leaders who show a commitment to promoting good governance and consists of $ 5 m over ten years and $ 200,000 per year for life thereafter. The government has traditionally focused on economic development in Southern Africa and again took a leadership role in the SADC. Consequently, Botswana also became one of the 11 member states of the SADC FTA, which was launched on 1 August. It removed trade barriers on 85% of imports from SADC countries. The most controversial challenge in the region was how to deal with the crisis in Zimbabwe. Botswana took a strong and public stance against President Mugabe, a clear deviation from the country’s more cautious approach in the preceding years. This was due to the new President Ian Khama, who has a more outspoken leadership style than his predecessor. On 6 July, Vice President Merafhe argued at the AU summit in Egypt for the exclusion of Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe from AU and SADC meetings. However, this proposal was – at least publicly – backed by only Kenya’s Prime Minister Raila Odinga. Botswana’s new president also boycotted a SADC summit held on 16–17 August in Sandton (South Africa), demonstrating that he did not recognise Zimbabwean President Mugabe’s re-election on 27 June. As a response to the enduring political crisis, which continued after the signing of a power-sharing agreement on 15 September in Zimbabwe, President Khama proposed to the presidents of the SADC and the AU and the UN secre-

Botswana • 425 tary general that new elections be called in the neighbouring country. On 5 November, an extraordinary meeting of the SADC inter-state defence and security committee was held in Maputo. At this meeting, the Zimbabwean government alleged that Botswana sought to interfere in its internal affairs and had since 2002 provided military training to youths from the opposition Movement for Democratic Change with the aim of destabilising Zimbabwe. This claim was strongly rejected by Botswana’s government and Zimbabwe was unable to provide documented evidence in support of its allegations. According to Botswana, there had been 25 annual meetings of the bilateral BotswanaZimbabwe joint permanent commission on defence and security, during which no such allegations had ever been made. Botswana’s good international standing was underscored in June when the British high commission announced the UK’s decision that all Botswana citizens visiting the UK for less than six months would no longer need visas to enter the country. On the other hand, the public controversy persisted with Survival International (SI), the British-based NGO that has led the international campaign against the controversial relocation by government of Basarwa from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR). In December 2006, the high court had ruled this relocation unconstitutional. SI denounced the Ibrahim Leadership Award for former President Mogae as “making a mockery of good governance” immediately after the announcement of the award on 20 October. On 20 April, the group had also criticised government for refusing to allow Basarwa who had returned to the CKGR to access boreholes in the reserve. The government stated it was under no obligation to provide water. Meanwhile, a private lodge operator was granted permission to set up and drill boreholes inside the CKGR. Furthermore, SI alleged that exploratory boreholes had been sunk in preparation for a diamond mine in the reserve.

Socioeconomic Developments Since 2003, the ninth National Development Plan (NDP9) was the principal macroeconomic framework for guiding financial and economic policy. The tenth National Development Plan (NDP10), from April 2009 to March 2016, was prepared over the year. Like the preceding document, the plan concentrated on economic diversification, employment creation, poverty alleviation, combating HIV/AIDS and improving service delivery and development project implementation. Botswana was again given favorable credit status by rating agencies (for the ninth year an A grade rating by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s). With a score of 4.2, Botswana ranked 56th worldwide on the 2008–09 World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). According to the Index, it has the second-most competitive macroeconomic framework in sub-Saharan Africa, outperformed only by South Africa. Furthermore, the budget for the 2007–08 financial year showed a substantial surplus of P (pula) 3.81 bn,

426 • Southern Africa which was due to a combination of greater than anticipated revenue and under-spending as a result of lack of capacity. Yet macroeconomic as well as social challenges remained. The annual inflation rate increased to 12.6% compared to 7.1% in 2007. This was largely due to high petrol prices up to August. The Bank of Botswana’s target inflation corridor of 4–7% was abandoned during the year. The diversification of Botswana’s economy experienced serious setbacks. Due to rapidly increasing building costs, the development of two prominent projects, Tati Nickel (a nickel-refinery using Activox technology) and Mmamabula (two thermal power stations to export energy to neighbouring countries) was deferred. In addition, there was a shortfall in energy supply, as the South African Eskom utility reduced power supplies by 60 MW to provide its home market. The diamond sector continued to drive the economy. In March, De Beers moved its Diamond Trading Company (DTC) to Botswana and opened a ‘diamond park’ outside the capital Gaborone to concentrate all the country’s diamond-processing operations in one place. By the end of 2008, more than 3,000 individuals were employed in the diamond manufacturing sector. During the first six months of the year, Botswana exported rough diamonds worth P 11.5 bn, compared to P 9.9 bn in the same period in 2007. However, in the last quarter of the year, the global financial crisis led to a sharp decline in commodity prices and less revenue was generated from selling diamonds than anticipated. The telecommunication sector is seen as one of the prime means of economic diversification. The construction of the Botswana Innovation Hub, a centre for information and communication technology near the Sir Seretse Khama international airport in Gaborone, started and is planned to be completed in 2010. The state-owned Botswana Telecommunications Corporation (BTC) is to be transferred to private ownership. The BTC Transition Bill was approved by parliament in November. Privatisation was also foreseen for the state-owned airline Air Botswana, an endeavour that has proved unsuccessful in recent years. The government continued to invest in social and education infrastructure. In June, construction began on a new school of medicine at the University of Botswana. In addition, building commenced on the Botswana International University of Science and Technology (BIUST), the country’s second university. Based in the city of Palapye and to be opened in March 2010, the institution will have a technical focus. Other goals in the social sector were hard to achieve. The aim of NDP9 was to raise the transition rate from junior to senior secondary schools to 83% by the end of March 2009. In 2008, it stood at 67%, well below the rate envisaged. The HIV/AIDS prevalence rate, one of the highest in the world, has only slowly started to decrease. In 2007, the most recent year for which data were published, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS among pregnant women aged 15–49 years was 33.7%, down from 37.4% in 2003. Matthias Basedau & Christian von Soest

Lesotho

The 2007 election had seen the return to power of a government led by the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). The ruling party had overcome the challenge presented to it by the departure from its ranks of sitting members of parliament to a new party, the All Basotho Convention (ABC), yet it had only done this through the formation of a strategic alliance with the small National Independence Party (NIP) that enabled it to exploit the loopholes in the Mixed Member Proportionality (MMP) electoral system. Fortified by an overall LCD-NIP 37 seat majority in the National Assembly, business in this small country continued much as usual, not least because of disarray within the ranks of the government’s defeated opponents. Nonetheless, while political battles continued to attract much attention, the fundamental factors determining the fate of the Basotho – notably economic dependence upon South Africa – were pointing towards a more worrying future.

Domestic Politics The election results were a disappointment to the ABC, which had contested them with high hopes of defeating the LCD. But it was the tiny pro-monarchist Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) that contested the election results in court. This was not wholly surprising because, ironically, it had been the ABC that had initiated the processes of electoral

428 • Southern Africa alliance by linking up with the smaller Lesotho Workers’ Party (LWP). This was facilitated by exploiting a loophole which undermined the spirit of the MMP electoral system: allied parties could increase their joint representation in parliament through a combination of the stronger party competing under its own name in the first-past-the-post constituency election, whose outcomes tend to over-represent larger winning parties, while teaming up with its ally under the latter’s name in the national list proportional representation segment of the poll. This strategy had served the LCD-NIP well, but it had come at the expense of the country’s minor parties. In particular, the MFP had a singular axe to grind, for its leader, who had represented the party in parliament after 2002, had failed to secure re-election. Consequently, it now challenged the legality of the distribution of the PR seats. However, its bid to overturn the results was dismissed by a judgment in the high court, delivered by Justice Semapo Peete, one of a bench of three judges hearing the case. His ruling, delivered on 3 July, was that in terms of the constitution, such an action could be brought only by a person who was an elector and not by a political party, and that in any case, the decision of the independent electoral commission on the allocation of seats was final. The failure of the case on a technicality, rather than on the substance of undermining the spirit of MMP by the major political parties, left the electoral process in uncertainty. When visiting Maseru on 8 February, the former president of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, as head of a SADC mission to resolve the political impasse, had indicated that he would attempt to source funds to provide for the visit to the country of Professor Jorgen Elklit, the Norwegian electoral expert who had been the major architect of the particular system of MMP. However, nothing came of this presumably because the LCD (which had only reluctantly embraced MMP anyway) had no interest in facilitating the proposed visit. On the same day that Masire was calling for conflict resolution, the government suffered a rebuff with the rejection by the senate of a controversial amendment to the constitution. This would have enabled applications related to the validity of the election of members to the National Assembly heard by the high court to be appealed to the court of appeal. The government wished this because in the lead up to the election, the legality of the LCD’s electoral alliance with the NIP had been rejected by the high court (on the grounds that the leader of the NIP – who was at odds with its membership – had not been consulted), only for this judgment to be overturned by the appeal court. However, the senate, composed of 33 nominated members (24 of whom are chiefs) and wherein the opposition has relatively more influence, exercised its power to reject the amendment (which requires a two-thirds majority in both houses or a simple majority in both houses and majority support in a referendum). Against this, prospects for a more accountable politics were not improved by signs of official intolerance of opposition. Macaefa Billy, leader of the LWP and an MP, found

Lesotho • 429 himself in the high court on 25 April charged with sedition and subversion arising from words he had uttered at an ABC party rally on 8 April 2007. The key evidence was provided by the police in the form of a videotape of the speech. However, because the police were forced to admit that the videotape was not the original version, which had been lost, the case was dismissed. Nonetheless, the director of public prosecutions, Leaba Thetsane, gave notice of intention to appeal. Meanwhile, on 11 April, the court of appeal had overturned a high court judgment under which the Rev. Pholoana Adam Lekhoaba, host of a lively talk show, ‘Rise and Shine’, who was highly critical of the LCD and backed the ABC, had successfully rebuffed an attempt by authorities to deport him. Lehoaba’s problem was that, although born in Lesotho and having attempted to renounce his South African nationality, he had failed to obtain citizenship of Lesotho and remained a South African. Nonetheless, concerned about the plight of many Basotho who, despite legal restrictions to the contrary, retain passports of both Lesotho and South Africa, the court recommended to the government that dual citizenship be allowed for persons born in Lesotho. Subsequently, the radio station Harvest FM, for which Lekhoaba had worked (and whose owner he had married), was closed down on 24 July for broadcasting what the Lesotho Communications Authority termed “inaccurate, malicious and defamatory” information on ‘Rise and Shine’. This was the first time that a radio station had been forced to shut down. Meanwhile, the National Assembly had passed a Lesotho Communications Authority (Amendment) Bill which, if finally enacted, would give the minister of communications the power to overrule the broadcasting regulator and to refuse a licence to, or actually shut down, a radio station without prior notice. Within this context, the political opposition remained in disarray. At the annual conference of the NIP on 23 April its founding leader, the veteran politician Anthony Manyeli, who had opposed the coalition with the NIP, lost the leadership to Dominic Motikoe, a sitting MP. Meanwhile, the ABC had become increasingly divided since the previous election, its internal disputes made public by the departure from the party of Moeketsi Tsatsanyane, one of its best-known figures, in reaction to what he deemed the dictatorial leadership of Tom Thabane. Shortly afterwards, on 3 June, his house was raked by bullets late at night. Neither Tsatsanyane nor his family was injured, but he alleged the attack was politically motivated. More positive news was the implementation of the APRM, already under way, announced in the Government Gazette on 20 June. The APRM was designed to assess acceding countries according to procedures and content of democratic, economic and corporate governance, as well as evaluating socioeconomic development. In Lesotho, the review was to be overseen by a national governing council of 14 members drawn from diverse sectors of society, six of whom were to form an executive committee. The council was tasked with holding workshops and consultations throughout the country with a view to encouraging widespread participation in the process.

430 • Southern Africa

Foreign Affairs Much attention was given in the media to the connections with Lesotho of Prince Harry, third in line to the British throne. These involve his work for various charities in the country, and on 17 July, his presence in Lesotho to celebrate the birthday of King Letsie III. However, Lesotho’s remaining connections with Britain, the former colonial power, are becoming increasingly marginal. Indeed, Lesotho was given warning in August that the UK was considering implementing visa conditions for Basotho visiting Britain following terrorist and criminal activities committed by individuals holding Lesotho passports. It was decided that the British would work closely with Lesotho to curb the corrupt production and issuance of Lesotho passports, and to review the situation within six months. Lesotho is increasingly becoming a de facto dependency of South Africa, which surrounds it, and various international agencies. This was brought home during the first months of the year in the rudest possible way by Lesotho’s subjection to regular ‘load shedding’ by the South African electricity commission, Eskom, during South Africa’s power crisis (brought on by inadequate investment in power generation since 1994). In response, Minister of Natural Resources Monyane Moleleki announced to the 30th meeting of the Southern African Power Pool management meeting in Maseru on 27 February that Lesotho would embark on power saving programmes to cut consumption by 12%, mentioning the possibility of developing wind farms at Letseng-la-Terae and other areas. However, the very real possibility is that Lesotho will become more, rather than less, dependent upon electricity supplied from South Africa. Meanwhile, with Lesotho’s links with Britain diminishing, those with the East are increasing. China is building a new parliament building (which is badly needed, because, with the increased number of MPs since 2002, the existing colonial-era building is hopelessly overcrowded), and announced its funding of two new secondary schools (to be built by a Chinese contractor). The Chinese ambassador also hosted a farewell for 12 Basotho offered scholarships to study in China. Meanwhile, Japan is funding seven new secondary schools in seven of Lesotho’s ten districts. Trade ministers from 36 of the 49 Least Developed Countries met in Maseru on 20 February to formulate a common policy ahead of the forthcoming WTO Geneva round of negotiations scheduled for March/April. The meeting was also attended by EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, who handed over € 500,000 to the Apparel Lesotho Alliance to Fight AIDS. While indicating that this money was part of normal development assistance, he added that it was linked to the opening up of possibilities for duty-free and quota-free exports of textiles to the EU under the EPA agreed between the EU and eight SADC countries at the end of 2007.

Lesotho • 431

Socioeconomic Developments Minister of Finance Timothy Thahane presented a budget on 13 February of Maluti (M) 9.1 bn. Of this, the recurrent budget would account for M 6.1 bn and the capital budget M 2.16 bn. The budget would be financed through revenue of M 8 bn, development partner grants of M 690 m and external loans of M 355 m, leaving a budget deficit which was announced as M 399 m (although there is a discrepancy in the figures of some M 45 m). The minister reported that, following a growth rate of 7.2% in 2006, expectations were that this would have been around 5.1% in 2007 and 7.0% in 2008. However, he warned of difficulties ahead for the clothing and textile industry from aggressive competition from China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Bangladesh and India; overdependence upon SACU revenues; and electricity shortages because of ‘load shedding’. Major reforms were heralded regarding the introduction of three-year medium-term expenditure framework and a contributory pensions scheme for public sector employees aged 40 and below. According to figures available from the annual report of the Lesotho Electricity Corporation (LEC) for 2006 (the last year before it was privatised), Lesotho drew 91% of its supply from the Muela power station, using water that passes through the Katse resorvoir before dropping via the Lesotho Highlands Water Project transfer tunnel to the Muela reservoir. Only 8% of Lesotho’s power was imported from Eskom in 2006. However, with plans afoot to expand the benefits of electrification from the current rate of 12% to 35% of the population by 2015, this may mean importing up to 50% from Eskom. Although a Lesotho Renewable Energy-based Rural Electrification Project (funded by the UN Global Environmental Facility) is focused upon harnessing solar energy, the failure of Lesotho to maintain its existing small run-of-river hydroelectric plants suggests that good intentions may be trumped by incapacity for implementation. Despite Lesotho’s increasing dependence on South Africa, Pretoria seems little concerned with its economic welfare. There are already far reaching concerns among the smaller members of the SACU that they have effectively been abandoned by South Africa, which dominates the Union, by its unilateral signing of a Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement with the EU in April 2004. This forced Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland to accept a de facto free trade agreement, about which they had been inadequately consulted and which would severely reduce their customs revenues from SACU. Roger Southall

Madagascar

The year marked a sea change in governance that had a pervasive effect on domestic politics, foreign affairs and the socioeconomic direction. President Marc Ravalomanana had been criticised for his centralising approach to governance but his new efforts drew even stronger accusations that he was conflating public policy and political processes. His private sector role, through his umbrella corporation, The Tiko Group, served as a critical network for his political position even as his political position ensured the growth of The Tiko Group at the expense of private sector rivals. Fuelling the confrontation was the rapid rise of the mining and oil sector. President Ravalomanana planned to use this revenue to pay for his ambitious Madagascar Action Plan (MAP). The populace showed increasing impatience with the limited impact of economic growth on poverty. Nearly every viable institutional path available to opposition in both the private and public arena was routed through legal but heavy-handed channels. President Ravalomana did alter the law and its processes to suit his needs. Andry Rajoelina was the only seated opposition leader of note. Throughout the year, President Ravalomanana worked to isolate Rajoelina, while altering the system to his advantage. His credibility in much of the country, and particularly in his Antananarivo powerbase, was waning. By year’s end even the long-faithful international community began to criticise President Ravalomanana actively for poor governance decisions.

434 • Southern Africa

Domestic Politics The beginning of 2008 saw the new mayors elected around the country in local elections on 13 December 2007 take office. Out of the capital region of Antananarivo’s 302 communes, 204 were won by President Marc Ravalomanana’s TIM (Tiako i Madagasikara) Party. Another 93 were won by independents, most of whom were aligned with the president and often against a TIM member the president sought to marginalise. Of the five positions going to the opposition, however, one was the most important, the mayor of Antananarivo. The capital city is the economic and political engine of the country and the mayor is one of the country’s most powerful offices. Indeed, President Ravalomanana himself served as mayor of Antananarivo for only two years before launching his presidential bid. The win by Andry Rajoelina was the only significant chink in TIM’s armour. Rajoelina is much like Ravalomanana was: charismatic, young (33 years old), of merina ethnicity and a successful entrepreneur. His company Injet was the foundation of a successful printing and media conglomerate that expanded into radio and TV (called ‘Viva’). Rajoelina’s networks were not as deep as Ravalomanana’s but he did represent an eclectic disenfranchised former political coterie and a business class that complained Ravalomanana used his political position to the advantages on his Tiko companies. In his first speech, Rajoelina called for, “fomba fijery vaoavao,tena hafa tsotra izao” (a new vision, completely another). This was a reaction to a growing perception of presidential domination. Presidential loyalists dominated the National Assembly, the senate and much of the judiciary. The former system of autonomous provinces had given way to a system of regional leaders appointed by the executive. The most local level of governance, the 17,500 ‘fokontany’, were run by presidents who were newly answerable to the appointed ‘chefs de region’. The only locally elected leadership in the new system were the mayors. The president’s party controlled 997 of the country’s 1,546 communes and independent loyalists many of the rest. With the former mayor of the port city of Tamatave, Roland Ratsiraka, imprisoned, even that opposition stronghold was under TIM control. The Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau (BIANCO) pursued 1,167 legitimated complaints against officials, but even this was seen by many as a centralising activity as BIANCO was under the office of the president, placing the executive above review. In December, opposition leaders accused it of becoming a political police force and there was a movement within the administration itself towards auditing BIANCO. The rise of Rajoelina in Antananarivo provided the only institutional avenue for opposition. Rajoelina thus garnered support. This included Roland Ratsiraka and the former speaker of the National Assembly, Jean Lahiniriko, but also members of the business elite who believed themselves marginalised by economic nationalism. For instance, Andre Ramaroson, CEO of Savonnerie Tropicale, was critical of what he called Magro’s (a Tiko company) unfair practices in the soap sector. Edgard Razafindravahy of the Prey Group was critical of what he termed tax harassment in the flour sector and the use of

Madagascar • 435 state television for private gain. Razafindravahy had discreetly supported Rajoelina but he, Ramaroson, and others now showed more overt support for the new mayor against the president. Monja Roindefo, son of the once powerful National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar (MONIMA) party leader Monja Jaona, left politics after a poor showing in the 2006 presidential elections and became general manager of the mining company Subsoil Exploration. In September, he formed Equivenst to manage private investment portfolios. Like Razafindravahy and Ramoroson, he argued against the president’s dominance in the private sector, particularly mining, and began demonstrating support for Rajoelina. The mayor paid the price for challenging the president. He found his water and electricity bills constantly challenged and services disrupted; there were disputes over the bus depot in Ampasampito; and the debts of the municipality were constantly being questioned. There was a general challenge by the state to the municipal apparatus. This only intensified the enmity between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina. For his part, President Ravalomanana gave his official new year message on 4 January. He began with a warning to those who would oppose him: “Mind what you say that may offend us and oblige me to close the door on you. What happens to you individually is unimportant; what is essential is the will to develop the nation.” He then laid out three primary objectives: 1) to achieve an 8% growth rate by reinforcing public-private partnerships, investing in the private sector, further facilitating global investment, and creating a Malagasy Bank for Construction and Development; 2) to increase rural production by doubling food production, improving irrigation, fertiliser use, and training; and 3) to reduce poverty by increasing civic and personal responsibility, collaboration with churches and non-government organisations, and training initiated at the region level. All this, he argued, should be accomplished by following the MAP. The MAP was a platform of the TIM party that became an approach to state-centred national development. In 2007, elements of it were enshrined in the constitution, leading many to argue that the president was conflating political process and public policy. This approach was thus not well received by all. Throughout the year it led to a growing view among the populace, particularly in the capital, that the president’s focus was to build the economy through macro-development and large international investment but at the expense of poverty reduction and the average citizen. By 21 October, a group of moderate opposition leaders, including Manasse Esoavelomandroso and Alain Rakotomavo (Leader-Fanilo Party), Gabriel Rabearimanana (Monima Party), Evariste Marson (Rally for Socialism and Democracy – RPSD Party), Reboza Julien (Socialist and Democratic Party for the Unity of Madagascar – PSDUM Party), Beza Sseramila (Tambatra Party) and Pierre Andrianantenaina, began organising a common voice against the president. However, they could not agree on whether to include more radical opposition members, such as Zafy Albert (Committee for National Reconcilliation – CRN ), and they lacked an institutional avenue of expression and organisation.

436 • Southern Africa Civil society saw reason to challenge the presidency. The Malagasy Council of Christian Churches (FFKM) split in its support. The Protestant Church of Jesus Christ in Madagasar (FJKM) re-elected President Ravalomanana lay vice president in October. But on 6 July, Cardinal Armand Gaetan Razafindratandra informed the president for the first time that as a Protestant he would no longer be allowed to accept communion. This came after heightened conflict with the Catholic church over the hurry-up approach to the April 2007 constitutional referendum. In October, the Catholic Church of Madagasar (EKTR) had also expressed deep concern over President Ravalomanana’s programme to Malgachise education in rural areas, leading to a personal battle over state support for education in the rural sector. In October, the president also came under heavy criticism for what quickly became known as the Daewoo affair. Daewoo Logistics, subsidiary of the Korean Daewoo conglomerate, provided key logistical support to the Canadian company Sherritt in mining nickel in Tamatave. Daewoo Logistics was in the initial stages of an agreement for a 99 year lease on 1.3 m hectares (13,000 sq km) of mostly arable land to grow biofuels. That is a significant area in a country totalling 592,000 sq, about 5% of it arable. This was a far from transparent transaction conducted in a short period. The popular perception was that the president and the mining sector benefited and everyone else lost. This significantly damaged President Ravalomanana’s credibility in delivering the benefits of the MAP. Ravalomanana’s authority was further eroded when he ordered a $ 60 m plane. This was popularly viewed as an undue extravagance in a country with such high poverty. Perhaps one of the most critical shifts was in the media sector. Since Ravalomanana became president, the number of media outlets has proliferated. In May, Mamy Ravatomangao, the CEO of the Sodiat Group, launched ‘La Verite’. At the same time, restrictions on media content increased. The culminating event came on 13 December when the president shut down the Viva TV station of Andry Rajoelina, sparking calls for protest from the mayor. On 17 December, Serge Radert (who for most of the year worked with Andry Rajoelina) and Serge Zafimahova presented the results of a report commissioned by the president on reforming the law on party politics. In solidarity with Rajoelina, most of the opposition boycotted this meeting. The report was fairly balanced, even technocratic, but the lack of ensuing debate made it clear that the implementation of party reform would be contentious and the president would be accused of advocating a new law that would make it more difficult and expensive to register parties.

Foreign Affairs Madagascar set about enhancingits stature as a regional actor. Yet even while the international community continued significant support for the president both in the public and private sector, signs of concern began to emerge.

Madagascar • 437 USAID initiated various programmes: ‘Governing Justly and Democratically’, ‘Investing in People: Health’, ‘Investing in People: Education’ and ‘Economic Growth’. These efforts were in concert with the MAP. Other major efforts included, in November, new financing for rural development, a new compact on 15 October with BIANCO and an October presentation of results of a land-titling project. The World Bank’s support for Madagascar grew to almost $ 1.2 m. Programmes included rural development, microfinance, governance, energy, finance, health, private and social services, nutrition and transportation. In June, the World Bank completed an HIV/AIDS prevention project, while the second phase of a sustainable health development project was launched in July. Poverty reduction support credits were renewed. There was new spending on integrated growth pole projects to integrate regional government, and social accountability efforts were supported. The mining sector saw direct support, particular in the southern Anosy region, and communes saw support for budgets in response to legal reforms calling for a distribution of mining benefits between the national and local governments. On 31 January, the IMF released a new disbursement, bringing the total under the PRGF to $ 49.9 m. The IMF mission of 26 March to 4 April was the fourth to review the PRGF. The mission concluded that “Madagascar’s economy continues to perform well”, the “outlook for 2008 remains positive”, and it moved forward towards a new PRGF. Another review for 11 to 24 September ended with similarly positive reviews. A 12 December summary report concluded that “the authorities have implemented sound fiscal and monetary policies, which have contributed to good macroeconomic outcomes” and listed areas in which it intends to continue to support economic reforms. However, also at the end of the year the World Bank and the EU froze budgetary aid to the president over governance concerns. There was also a growing outward projection of what had been an inner dialogue. For instance, in the second week of November the outgoing IMF representative, Pierre Van Den Boogaerde, told a semi-private forum that Ravalomanana’s educational reforms create “a machine to manufacture idiots”. He went on to say, in contrast to what was written in mission statements, that he didn’t think the MAP approach would reduce poverty. One of President Ravalomanana’s great successes was an expansion of regional influence. Madagascar was selected to host the AU summit in July 2009 and there appeared to be support from Alain Joyandet, the French state secretary in charge of cooperation and Francophonie, for Madagascar to host the 2010 Francophonie despite cooler relations with France. On 14 July, the French ambassador, Gildas Le Lidec, left Madagascar at the request of President Ravalomanana and there was no immediate replacement. For its part, France expressed concern over the Daewoo affair. Madagascar also continued its diversified trade approach. Ravalomanana has spent much of his presidency moving away from a virtually exclusive relationship with the former colonial power of France to include China, Korea, the UK, the US, Australia and other countries. This is particularly true of

438 • Southern Africa the burgeoning mining and energy sector, where anglophone companies such as Sherritt on the east coast and Rio Tinto in the south have played an increasingly dominant role.

Socioeconomic Developments Poverty is both broad and deep. According to a 2005 household demographic study, 78.3% of subsistence farmers live in poverty with an intensity rating of 31.4%. In all, some 68.7% of Malagasy live in poverty, 52% of the urban population and 73.5% of the rural population. The IMF estimated real GDP as having grown only 2.1%, significantly lower than the 2007 estimate of 6.4% and lower than the average of 7.3% during Ravalomanana’s years in office. This was due largely to external shifts in the world economy. Inflation was down to 9.4 %, the lowest since Ravalomanana took office and well below the average for the decade of 10.6% and the average for the 1990s of16.4%. By the end of 2008, the IMF forecast 7.5% growth in 2009 and an inflation rate of 8.8%. Marc Ravalomanana’s plan for addressing poverty lay in the MAP. Translated into Malagasy policy, this included raising Madagascar’s HDI ranking from 146 out of 177 to 100; decreasing the poverty rate from 85.1% to 50%; reducing the fertility rate from 5.4% to 3%; increasing life expectancy from 55.5 to 61 years; increasing literacy from 63% to 80%; increasing the number of students completing primary school from 19% to 56% and secondary school from 7% to 40%; increasing the GDP growth rate from 4.6% to 19%; increasing the GDP from $ 5 bn to $ 12 bn; increasing the GDP per capita from $ 309 to $ 476; increasing foreign direct investment from $ 94 m to $ 500 m; improving the World Bank business climate ranking from 131 to 80 and TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index from 2.8 to 5.2; and, increasing the households with land title from 10% to 75%. The most controversial part of this effort is the land titling. The approach, largely funded through a US Millennium Challenge Account, is for the modernisation of land tenure services and computerisation of land tenure and topographic archives in Antananarivo and the zones and decentralisation of land tenure management to the commune level. In agrarian societies, land titling reform by the central government often runs foul of ethnically embedded, community-based land tenure arrangements. The allocation and designation of purpose of land also came into question at times, as in the Daewoo affair. The other objectives of the MAP were not challenged on their merit but rather for their approach and implementation. Throughout 2008, there was a growing concern among the population and regional leaders that the MAP was continuing economic growth but not reducing poverty. This was an indicator that the benefits of the growth, particularly in mining and oil exploration, were not being well distributed. UN statistics seem to support this, for even as the economy expanded 7.26%, annual spending declined 6.8%. This sentiment, manifest in a growing yet disparate opposition voice, was perhaps best summed up by Andrianjaka Rajaonah of the civic group OTRIKAFO in a 14 January article in the

Madagascar • 439 opposition ‘Madagascar Tribune’: “[Reactionaries] shamelessly reflect their own advantages in the development of Madagascar, to expect the poor to bear their poverty, even death, so that development continues, their development.” Richard R. Marcus

Malawi

Malawian politics did not change much in 2008, especially the controversial battle involving the national budget and section 65, which created enormous political tensions and influenced the economic and social lives of the citizenry. Because this issue had not been resolved in 2007, the relationship between the opposition parties – in the main, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) – and the ruling Democratic People’s Party (DPP) was characterised by ‘hide-and-seek’, mostly over parliamentary business. Government had a difficult time in moving ahead with its budget and President Bingu wa Mutharika was again accused of dictatorial tendencies and flouting the rule of law when he tried to bulldoze matters through in the face of a strong opposition. The economic and social situation, in particular food security, was generally good though not unaffected by the controversies that spilled over from the political environment. On the international scene, Mutharika initiated diplomatic relations with certain countries, maintained cordial relations with existing bilateral partners and received a number of international awards for good governance and sound economic management.

442 • Southern Africa

Domestic Politics The 2008–09 budget was a focal point and gave rise to a lot of tension and uncertainty. Opposition parliamentarians threw their weight behind section 65 of the constitution, an issue that had not been resolved following the landmark supreme court ruling of 2007, which gave the speaker the mandate to declare vacant the seats of parliamentarians who crossed the floor. The government prioritised the national budget while the opposition camp, as in 2007, was keen to debate the ruling, which would see large numbers of MPs, mostly in the government camp, losing their seats if the speaker used his powers. Affected parliamentarians on the government side did not withdraw earlier high court injunctions to stop the speaker of the National Assembly from declaring their seats vacant. This meant the speaker’s hands were tied, as he could do nothing about matters that were in court. The opposition camp was bitter because in 2007, soon after the budget had been passed, the president had prorogued parliament indefinitely, fearing that section 65 would be resuscitated. This greatly complicated any attempts to reach a compromise on section 65 and the budget. The need to pass the Malawi kwacha (MK) 229 bn budget first and address section 65 later received overwhelming support from religious and civil society organisations, chiefs, the rural masses and university students. Not only was the budget instrumental to health, education and social service delivery, it also provided enhanced wages for public servants and chiefs, who looked forward to higher purchasing power on the commodity market. Furthermore, it provided for the development of social and economic infrastructure, subsidised fertiliser and the 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections. In the wake of the major deadlock, the leader of opposition in the house, MCP President John Tembo, challenged Mutharika to move towards compromise in the mediation talks and hinted that the opposition would not change its stance on section 65 as they did not want to be cheated again. On the other hand, UDF leader Bakili Muluzi had earlier asked his supporters in the three regions to unite to remove Bingu wa Mutharika from power in May 2009. Bingu wa Mutharika accused the opposition of trying to sabotage the budget in a bid to force the speaker to act on section 65 and create chaos in the political and administrative governance of the country. He threatened to close parliament and freeze allowances for MPs should they continue to procrastinate over the passing of the 2008–09 budget. The deadlock that followed culminated in a war of words. Various threats to close parliament or to run the affairs of the country without parliamentary involvement characterised Mutharika’s public rallies. The president had to ask the clergy to intervene through a mediation process, which they executed effectively. This mediation took place against the backdrop of the mounting criticism of the opposition by many sectors of Malawian society, including demonstrating University of Malawi students and other members of society who were pro-budget now and section 65 later.

Malawi • 443 This signalled the need for the opposition camps to rethink their strategy as they were becoming very unpopular among their own constituents. As in the previous year, in order to make progress on the budget the government pledged to proceed with section 65 after the budget was passed. Specifically, government promised to withdraw section 65-related injunctions, call a meeting on 29 September for the speaker to remove MPs who had abandoned their parties and thirdly, remove the clerk of parliament, Matilda Katopola as demanded by opposition MPs, for alleged abuse of office by using her company to provide stationery to parliament. When the budget, which was presented on 23 May, was finally passed on 29 August (two months after the 30 June deadline), the government remained silent and never called the promised 29 September meeting. Instead, it accused the opposition of being irresponsible and wasting taxpayers’ money. The government announced there would be no section 65 debates until after the May 2009 general elections, a proposition which the opposition had to accept for want of a better option. Thus, ultimately, the future of section 65 remained unclear during the year in the hope that the May 2009 presidential and parliamentary elections would resolve the dilemma. Seven members of the electoral commission appointed by Mutharika in the face of opposition protests and challenges because of lack of consultation and alleged regional bias were sworn in on 17 January after the high court upheld the decision of the president to appoint them. This set the stage for the preparations for the general elections in May 2009. The Malawi electoral commission released the poll calendar in March, stressing that the registration process would be in six phases staggered from 2 June to September, although the timetable was subsequently extended to 5 November because of logistical and equipment challenges. All the major parties, the MCP, the UDF and DPP held their party conventions between April and December to elect their presidential candidates, with Tembo, Muluzi and Mutharika emerging as the respective winners. Various political parties also conducted primary elections for the parliamentary candidates, amid reports of chaos, protests and allegations of rigging and unfair political practices. By the end of the first phase of registration in August, one million eligible voters had registered, though the process was marred by equipment shortages and the malfunctioning of cameras as well as by voter apathy. By the end of the year, close to six million Malawians had registered and the Malawi electoral commission had finalised the strategy for civic and voter education to ensure free and fair elections. Although there were nine constituencies that were vacant due to deaths or the removal of incumbents on criminal grounds, the electoral body ignored the need to conduct by-elections and concentrated on the 2009 general elections. Throughout the year, there were attempts by smaller parties to strengthen their positions by seeking alliance partners. In July, UDF, Maravi People’s Party (MPP), Congress for Democrats (CODE) MDU (Malawi Democratic Union), MDP (Malawi Democratic Party) and NRP (New Republican Party) were putting their heads together to field one presidential candidate, Bakili Muluzi.

444 • Southern Africa Muluzi had announced in 2007 his intention to stand as the UDF presidential candidate in the 2009 elections, and his ambitions became increasingly apparent during 2008. Not only did he start campaigning and making whistle stops in various towns in the country, but he was also officially endorsed as UDF presidential candidate at a highly controversial convention in Blantyre, at which other equally powerful contenders such as Cassim Chilumpha (who was answering charges of treason and conspiracy to murder President Mutharika) went home highly frustrated owing to deliberate machinations to prevent them from competing effectively. The rift between Muluzi and his UDF vice president had emerged early in the year when each of them expressed open interest in being the UDF’s presidential candidate. Muluzi’s eligibility to stand after serving two terms as president was not resolved during the year. He strongly criticised members of the public affairs committee when they indicated they would oppose his bid to return to power. James Phiri brought a case before the high court to rule on Muluzi’s eligibility, but in July the court declined to do so. Vice President Cassim Chilumpha’s treason case remained in limbo throughout the year. In his New Year message, Mutharika accused the judiciary and lawyers of delay in the case while the lawyers accused government of withholding evidence vital to the defence of their client. However, Chilumpha has been relatively free during the year, able to attend public functions and Muslim Id prayers. Mutharika expressed surprise at the permissiveness of the legal regime in the country, claiming that a treason suspect would not enjoy so much liberty anywhere else in the world. In a dramatic turn out of events in August, Chilumpha presented his nomination papers and MK 50,000 in fees for a parliamentary position under the ruling DPP in his Nkhotakota South constituency. In November, he surprised both opposition and ruling party supporters when he drummed up support for the DPP government in Nkhotakota. Tembo’s MCP, by far the major opposition party in parliament, remained quite strong throughout the year in spite of some defections to the ruling DPP. The departure of the party’s Vice President Nicholas Dausi in 2007 was followed by Bitony Kutsaira and Ted Kalebe. In February, Tembo accused the ruling DPP of luring his party MPs with cabinet posts. This created much animosity between the MCP president, who happens to be leader of opposition in parliament, and the DPP leadership. It might also have contributed significantly to Tembo’s behaviour in the National Assembly. Although UDF was mobilising for the 2009 election and although its sponsor Bakili Muluzi exerted considerable influence, the party developed significant cracks during the year.As noted above, the relationship with the Vice President Cassim Chilumpha deteriorated when he expressed interest in the running for the presidency. Muluzi’s electoral ambitions created dissatisfaction among others in the UDF political elite who were eyeing the post. Some, including Sam Mpasu, openly disapproved of Muluzi’s intended comeback. Since its founding president Chakufwa Tom Chihana’s death in 2006, AFORD (Alliance for Democracy) has been on the brink of collapse and in 2008 its only MP abandoned

Malawi • 445 the party to form her own party, Rainbow Coalition, in time for the May 2009 general elections. Some of the leading executive members of the party joined Mutharika’s DPP. However, some reorganisation of AFORD was undertaken in readiness for the general election. In May, the nation was taken by surprise by news of an alleged coup plot involving former army commander Joseph Chimbayo and a former inspector general of police, Joseph Airon, and other high ranking members of the police, army and UDF. All were arrested for allegedly plotting to overthrow President Mutharika. Muluzi, who was on his way from London, was alleged to be the mastermind behind the plot with the aim of taking over the government as the next president. The suspects were released on bail and the year ended before the case was heard.

Foreign Affairs Like many other developing countries, Malawi’s relationship with international donor agencies and donor countries determines aid flows, which are crucial to her economic and social development. Donor satisfaction over budgetary discipline and expenditure targets and the government’s performance in implementing the PRGF, as well as the earlier cancellation of debts by the IMF and the World Bank (in 2006), signalled growing donor confidence in the Bingu administration and support for Malawi. The country enjoyed good relations with fellow SADC member states. During the year, SADC leaders met in Uganda, Zambia and South Africa to consider issues of common concern, including the deteriorating political and economic situation in Zimbabwe. Malawi remained an active member of various international organisations including, in addition to SADC, COMESA, AU, the Commonwealth and the UN. During the first two months of the year, Malawi opened diplomatic relations with China (after dropping Taiwan) and the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (formerly Western Sahara). The relationship with China had immediate benefits for Malawi, but also triggered many changes: a Taiwanese firm abandoned the Chitipa-Karonga road project, and its embassy reclaimed 10 Land Cruisers earmarked for the Malawi army from Toyota Malawi. In April, Bingu went to open the embassy in China and came back with the news that China would give MK 40 bn in aid. A Chinese medical team arrived in the country to fill the staffing gap left buy the departing Taiwanese at Mzuzu hospital. The Chinese government also pledged to complete the Chitipa-Karonga road and the parliament building in Lilongwe, also formerly supported by Taiwan. A DPP delegation went to China for a five-day visit soon after the president’s return, further cementing the nascent diplomatic relationship. During the year, Bingu travelled abroad for official engagements, including the AU meeting in Egypt, and the burial ceremony on 2 September of the late President Levi

446 • Southern Africa Mwanawasa of Zambia. He travelled to Norway on 29 August to the African Green Revolution conference to receive the MDG3 Champion Torch award for his efforts at promoting gender issues in Malawi. In September, he flew to New York to attend the UN General Assembly and addressed several round-table discussions with top political and corporate leaders on progress on MDGs, food security and production, poverty and hunger. In New York, Mutharika received the Louis Blouin Foundation global creative leadership award for consistently addressing national issues with the goal of developing practicable solutions and new partnerships for Malawi. The third award he received (on 4 September) was the food security award from the Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Network for reviving the fertiliser subsidy programme. He also attended the Tokyo international conference on African development in Japan and the World Economic Forum for Africa in South Africa in June.

Socioeconomic Developments Malawi’s economy depends on agriculture, which accounted for more than one-third of GDP, over 90% of export earnings, employed nearly half of those in formal employment and supported over 80% of Malawi’s population. Tobacco is by far Malawi’s largest export, followed by tea, cotton and sugar. Maize is the main staple and rice, millet, cassava and potatoes supplement maize as sources of starch for Malawians. Over the year, the economy continued to depend on donor support, more especially from the IMF, the World Bank and individual donor governments. President wa Mutharika has continued to be popular among donors for his sound economic management which, in addition to international awards, has earned him national recognition during the year. Ngoni chiefs bestowed on him one of their highest accolades, the title of Ngwazi, similar to that given to the first president of Malawi, Ngwazi Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda. While the subsidised fertiliser programme has led to increased food production, the programme, which was allocated MK 19.4 bn, up from MK 11.5 bn in 2007, continued to experience challenges. These variously included abuse, corruption, favouritism, theft and politicisation by politicians, chiefs, extension staff, police, salesmen and drivers. The registration process for the subsidised fertiliser coupons targeted 1.7 m poor smallholder families and started in earnest on 5 September, soon after the national budget was passed. However, as in previous years, there were numerous fake coupons being sold on the market, allegations of inflated prices at fertiliser selling points and demands for bribes by Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) officials at market depots. Drivers were arrested for delivering truckloads of subsidised fertiliser to the wrong places. Wealthy people used their financial muscle to buy coupons, bribe ADMARC officials and gain access to many bags of subsidised fertiliser. Allegations were rife in the press that ruling party political elites in some districts of the country ‘directed’ district commission-

Malawi • 447 ers not to provide coupons to opposition members and that ministers were distributing fertiliser coupons to their supporters. In the previous year, chiefs had been mandated to register and distribute coupons to their people, but in 2008 it was the extension staff in the ministry of agriculture who registered and distributed subsidised farm inputs. Both approaches have been marred by many problems and challenges. The president addressed the subject of corruption in almost every forum. At the national Anti-Corruption Day in Mzuzu in February, he warned against inflated invoices in government transactions and cautioned civil society organisations to account for donor money. The president also attacked the private sector for cutting corners in doing business. The former minister of education in the UDF administration was sentenced to six years of imprisonment with hard labour on April 8 for abuse of office in the procurement of learning materials meant to be provided free to primary schools. Several bureaucrats and members of the political elite were briefly detained and others questioned by the antigraft body in connection with various corruption allegations. One corruption case that regularly hit the headlines, owing to the frequent court postponements, injunctions and counter-injunctions, was that involving former President Bakili Muluzi, who was alleged to have deposited MK 1.4 bn of donor money in his personal account. The anti-corruption campaign championed by President Mutharika since 2005 has helped to win donor confidence and an increased inflow of donor support for various development projects. Like most other countries in the sub-region, the government faces challenges in ensuring economic growth as well as economic development. While GDP is increasing, there are questions about how much this is benefiting the rural citizen in terms of improved access to health services, education, clean water, good housing and other infrastructure and services. Cholera was reported in parts of the country, particularly in December, when rains often give rise to waterborne diseases. However, HIV/AIDS-related deaths reportedly dropped by 75% due to free anti-retroviral treatment and improved civic education at various levels, including participation by people living with HIV/AIDS in many initiatives. In September, Malawi’s HIV prevalence rate was 12%, among the lowest in the SADC region. Malawi’s economic performance has been strong in recent years. Economic growth has been robust, inflation has been moderate and debt sustainability has substantially improved. High oil and fertiliser prices earlier in the year increased inflationary pressures and put pressure on foreign exchange reserves. The IMF approved $ 77.1 m to help counter food and fuel price shocks. Consumer prices increased by 9.3% in the 12 months to September, mostly because of a 25% increase in fuel prices in June. Food price inflation continued to be moderate although domestic maize prices increased sharply in some areas in the first half of the year. Malawi’s real terms of trade deteriorated significantly despite solid increases in tobacco export prices and the easing of world prices of oil, fertiliser and other imported goods. The decline in the fuel price did not trickle-down to the citizens,

448 • Southern Africa because most of the stock of fertiliser and fuel was contracted by government at an earlier higher price. Although international reserves were buttressed by the seasonal inflow of tobacco revenues in April-September, these were only $ 175 m, enough to cover just 1.1 months of imports. The World Bank increased its funding for economic growth from $ 300 m to $ 450 m while the AfDB more than doubled its soft loan from $ 80 m to $ 188 m in September. Later, in November, AfDB gave another MK 8 bn in aid for water projects in different parts of the country. Inflation has been dropping since Mutharika took over the leadership of Malawi, declining from 10.5% in 2006 to 7.2% in 2007. However, owing to fuel and staple food price increases, inflation rose to 7.9% in 2008. To control the price of maize, which has been rising, government was forced to issue a directive to ensure that the government-controlled ADMARC is the sole buyer at a price of MK 45 per kg and also a seller of maize at MK 52 per kg. Apart from poor harvests in some parts of the country, the shortage of maize was created by other factors, including hoarding by local businessmen to ensure a higher sale price, the donation of maize to countries such as Lesotho and Swaziland and sales of the same to Zimbabwe. For the ruling DPP, the hoarding of the maize stocks by ‘politically’ motivated businessmen was an attempt to create an artificial shortage, which could undermine the government’s image at the international level. The main export earner, tobacco had bumper sales, although there were price disagreements between buyers and sellers on the Limbe, Lilongwe and Mzuzu auction floors. Prices ranged from $ 1 per kg to $ 3.50 per kg. As of August, the tobacco industry earned $ 400 m. By 2 October, the value had risen to $ 472 m from 194.8 million kg of tobacco sold compared to 111 m in the previous year. The exchange rate for the Malawi kwacha appreciated against all major currencies except the US dollar, which remained relatively stable. Although macroeconomic indicators show declining inflation and falling interest rates, for most rural and urban people consumer prices skyrocketed: petrol prices, for instance, hit record levels by the end of the year. Salaries and wages remained low and several organisations (Likoma Hospital, Likuni Hospital, University of Malawi, Mzuzu University, Malawi Telecommunications Limited and G4 Security Company) experienced strikes and sit-ins over salaries and allowances. Investment doubled during the year, with the Malawi Investment Promotion Agency approving 54 new companies in the first half of the year amounting to $ 111.7 m compared to $ 92 m in 2007. In August, the SADC secretariat rated Malawi among the best-performing countries in the region, having recorded a good performance in economic and social development. Lewis B. Dzimbiri

Mauritius

Mauritius celebrated its economic, social and political successes on the occasion of its 40th anniversary of independence on 12 March. Economic growth, sector diversification, expansion in tourism and consolidation of social achievements were the catchwords. However, a more sombre mood emerged when shadows were cast by the financial crisis in the US and subsequently the world over the island’s economy, which is intrinsically linked to the outside in several sectors. In overall terms, Mauritius ranked first in Africa in the Mo Ibrahim Foundation Governance Index.

Domestic Politics The year started with social unease and unrest in the Port Louis suburbs of Ste.-Croix, la Vallée-des-Prêtres and Plaine-Verte, where violence and robbery occurred in plain daylight to such an extent that citizens had already begun to respond with self-administered justice and counter-violence. Even systematic vehicle checks and a regular presence on the streets and corners by ordinary police in combination with elements of the Special Supporting Unit (SSU) did not improve the situation. It was only after intensive negotiations involving social workers that the tension abated.

450 • Southern Africa Given the relative strength of the political parties, which could only govern through changing alliances and coalitions, domestic policy issues and statements by politicians were widely discussed. In January and February, opposition leader Paul Bérenger, chairman of the Mauritius Militant Movement (MMM) stated that the alliance consisting of the Labour Party, Mauritius Party of Xavier-Luc Duval, the Greens and the Republican Movement was politically burnt out. To survive until the next election, Labour needed, according to Bérenger, a new partner in the form of MMM. The secretary general of the Labour Party, Deva Virahsawmy, rejected this claim and asserted that Labour was in a stable alliance and would not seek early elections. On the contrary, Labour was enraged by Bérenger’s move to name Dinesh Ramjuttun, a former advisor to Prime Minister Ramgoolam and open critic of Finance Minister Sithanen’s economic policy, as a possible prime minister in the case of victory by MMM. On the eve of independence day, the ‘Financial Times’ dedicated a ten-page supplement to the celebrations. In this supplement, Bérenger stated that while daily domestic policy issues gave rise to controversy and argument between government and opposition, there was no ideological fracture between the three major political blocs, Labour Party, MSM (Militant Socialist Movement) and MMM. Ramgoolam, for his part, observed that, given the globalised environment, Mauritius would have to accept the principle of a liberal world economy. He went on to indicate he would at the same time focus on the poor, this not being for him a question of principle but a technical matter of finding the appropriate threshold for poverty alleviation. He also defended the concept of Mauritius as an entry point for Asian economic actors in view of the growth of the African market. The daily ‘L’Express’ dedicated a special issue on 2 March to 40 years of independence, tracing the economic, social and political developments against all odds and despite the initial opinion of experts on the country’s Malthusian prospects. In his address to the nation on this occasion, the prime minister suggested reform to the electoral system in order to achieve in parliament and in the political parties real representation of Mauritian society as a whole, not just fair representation of its composites. This initiative, according to Ramgoolam, would have to be matched by a comprehensive integrative social policy. He used the opening of the World Bank’s new premises in Port Louis on 12 February as an opportunity to steer the domestic debate in a more social direction. Ramgoolam thanked the World Bank for its service to the nation in a “meander world of global economy”, at the same time criticising the economist’s perspective as the sole ideological compass and asserting an “agenda of local development” as his personal political conviction. He thus fixed the point of departure for the second half of his mandate. He wanted to see more and more immediate social benefits from the supposed economic growth in order to bring his term of office safely through to 2010. MMM experienced a setback in parliament when Ajay Gunness, MP for constituency 10, had to withdraw as chief whip of the opposition when the Independent Commission

Mauritius • 451 Against Corruption (ICAC) mounted a public inquiry into allegations of undue influence against him. A second case of alleged bribery was brought by ICAC against the president of the Mauritius Port Authority, Siddick Chaddy, who at the same time was a director of Blockbusters video company. He was alleged to have received $ 25,000 from the Dutch dredging company Boskalis in return for a contract with Port Louis harbour worth Mauritius rupees (MR) 380 m. In August, in another episode relating to governance, there were suggestions that Minister of Justice and Attorney-General Rama Valayden (chairman of the Republican Movement, junior partner in the alliance) had influenced the police in favour of a supposed drug smuggler. On 16 March, Minister for Foreign Affairs Madan Dulloo (Mauritius Militant Socialist Movement, a junior partner in the government alliance) resigned over ‘lack of communication’ with the prime minister. He was replaced on 13 September by Arvin Boolell (Labour) in a government reshuffle. Although the personality of the incumbent president had given rise to domestic dissension in the past, Sir Anerood Jugnauth was unanimously re-elected to the position by parliament for a second five-year term on 19 September. The question of national identity was partly related, to the question of slavery and indentured labour. Parliament established a Justice and Truth Commission. While the prime minister insisted the commission find the unbiased truth about the past, the question of compensation or reparation for target groups was avoided in the parliamentary debates in August. The issue of national identity was reinforced by UNESCO’s decision to designate Le Morne mountain a world heritage site and by the holding of a national Creole cultural festival, with international participation, at the end of the year.

Foreign Affairs One international question of central importance was the negotiation of the EPAs between the EU and ACP countries that have special relationships with the EU in terms of the Treaty of Cotonou signed in 2000. Mauritius, as one of the middle income countries in this group, needed to become part of a regional partnership arrangement in order to gain virtually free access for its exports to the European market against a reciprocal formula that allowed duty free-entry into Mauritius for a determined percentage of imports. The Mauritius government had signed an interim agreement in mid-December 2007 in order to continue exporting to the EU. In terms of this interim arrangement, Mauritius must liberalise 24.5% of its imports from the EU, this percentage rising to 53% in 2017 and finally reaching 95.6% in 2022. The interim arrangement would serve as a bridge to ensure uninterrupted commerce between Mauritius and the EU, and was essential to the textile industry and tuna exports until a comprehensive EPA could be signed. Another continuing issue was the rights and destiny of the Chagos refugees who had been evicted from the Chagos islands in 1971 when the US took over the British Indian

452 • Southern Africa Ocean Territory in order to establish the Diego Garcia airbase. To expedite resolution of this issue, Bérenger proposed in January to file a suit for crimes against humanity against the UK in the ICC on the grounds that the expulsion of the Chagos people could be seriously considered as such. Against all expectations, the hopes of the Chagos people and of the Mauritius government were abruptly dashed when the UK’s highest judicial authority, the Law Lords, decided on 22 October against the Chagos people after three favourable decisions in lower British courts over the last eight years. Commenting on the verdict, observers noted that the latest decision was due to pressure from the US government. With respect to regional cooperation, Mauritius continued to play an active role in SADC, but since the country had no particular leadership role in the grouping, its actions and the responses to them were low profile. Relations with Mozambique improved, although more in terms of cultural exchange than of economic projects. After the start of the sugar cane cooperation project in Maarameu, development stagnated in spite of the potential in agriculture, tourism and fisheries. This was the same with relations with Madagascar. Given the potential of production and marketing prospects between the two countries, actual developments remained modest. Mauritius joined the Seychelles in declaring on 11 December before the UN that they would jointly exploit 387,000 sq km of the continental shelf below the Indian Ocean. There was some suspicion that Mauritius nationals were implicated in the Bombay terrorist attack on 26 November. The director general of the state bank of Mauritius, Chaitlall Gunness, was found dead in the hotel attacked by the terrorists. Ramgoolam declared in parliament on 3 December that the Mauritian credit cards found on the hotel premises did not establish any link to a presumed terrorist of Mauritian nationality.

Socioeconomic Developments Economic growth responded to structural reform efforts initiated by the Labour government from 2005 onward under the leadership of the Minister of Finance Rama Sithanen. Tax reform, together with improvements in the business environment and investment initiatives, spurred foreign investment to unprecedented levels and accelerated growth. Growth, projected at 6.5%-7% for the 2007–08 fiscal year (ending June), was broadly based but especially strong in tourism, banking/offshore financial institutions, construction and services. Rising fiscal receipts and expenditure containment reduced the budget deficit, and public sector debt continued to decline (overall budget deficit of 3%; primary budget surplus of 1.7% and accumulated public debt at 59% of GDP). The external current account deficit was reduced but remained high on investmentdriven import growth. The exchange rate appreciated 17% in real terms in the 12 months ending February from a depreciated level in 2005–06. However, the economy faced rising labour costs, weak infrastructure and other bottlenecks, as well as strong pressures from

Mauritius • 453 international commodity price rises. Although appreciation in the exchange rate had dampened some inflationary pressures, inflation remained a concern. The central bank (Bank of Mauritius) accumulated reserves that were projected to cover 6.5 months of imports. In April, the bank introduced a special deposit facility (bills) and widened the discount interest rate in an attempt to absorb liquidity. The banking sector and financial system remained relatively sound and vulnerability indicators improved. At this stage, according to the IMF, “assuming no major negative shocks”, the banking system was well capitalised and the public debt should be sustainable. The authorities continued their efforts to liberalise international trade and secure market access. A free trade agreement with Pakistan was signed and a cooperation agreement with India was under discussion. With the growing importance of services in the world economy, particularly in the Asian region, an appropriate strategy for a small island economy would be to attract the growing monetary and financial markets in Asia with innovative new financial products and services. This, however, carries significant risks in the form of possible illegal money laundering and financial terrorism, and scrutiny by not only the OECD and IMF but also by national authorities, such as India’s serious fraud investigation office and criminal investigation department through the Mauritius-India Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA). In keeping with the festivities surrounding the 40th anniversary of independence, the 2008–09 budget presented on 6 June in parliament was dubbed an ‘AMIGO’ budget: building an Attractive, Modern, Inclusive, Green and Open Mauritius. In view of the improved macroeconomic performance, the alliance government sought to address major economic and social concerns by granting a MR 5.2 bn increase to public sector employees. Many economic and social issues were taken into account: income, inflation, education, food and energy security, infrastructural bottlenecks and poverty alleviation. In order to increase the disposable incomes of households and provide some relief from high inflation, the income tax exemption thresholds were raised to MR 25,000. However, government resisted demands to reduce the value-added tax, which applied to a large basket of goods and services. Instead, Sithanen opted to decrease to the value of MR 1.8 bn customs duties on many imported food items and other articles commonly used by households. The budget also contained several social measures to alleviate the pressures on lower income groups. These included an increase in food aid, old age pensions and other social benefits, scholarships to students from poor families and the writing off of non-performing Development Bank of Mauritius (DBM) loans. These measures came on top of existing subsidies on basic staples such as rice, flour and cooking gas. The budget laid particular emphasis on raising the educational levels of human resources to support the development of an increasingly service-oriented, knowledge-based economy. Government set a target of doubling tertiary enrolment by 2015 and measures were considered for improving access to higher education, including the creation of a Human Resource Development

454 • Southern Africa Knowledge and Arts Fund of some MR 1 bn for financing the upgrading and building of physical infrastructure for tertiary education, student loan schemes and scholarships as well as specific training and skills projects. Food and energy security have become important priorities for government in the face of the global food crisis and rising prices for petroleum products. The mobilisation of resources to boost local and regional production of food as well as promote sustainable development through initiatives aimed at increasing the use of renewable energy, encouraging energy efficiency and recycling were also supported and financed. Numerous projects, valued at around MR 42 bn, were announced in the budget to reduce traffic congestion and modernise road networks, port and airport facilities, the water supply and sanitation infrastructure. Given the changing age structure in Mauritius, the budget took account of the increase in the retirement age from 60 to 65 years. It announced reforms to the pension system to allow portability of pensions after two years of service with a view to promoting labour mobility. The tourism sector (total arrivals: 930,000), where growth of 8% had been projected, grew by 2.6% below expectations. Tourism experienced the first shock from the economic crisis in November, when arrivals of tourists from European markets dropped massively (Britain –16%; Sweden –18%; Netherlands –17%; Spain and Austria –11%), but overall figures dropped only slightly by 2.4% in November in comparison with the same period in 2007. Cooperation with China reached new heights with the Tianli complex in Riche-Terre north of Port Louis. The industrial area and compound designed by Artech (Taipei), financed and operated by the Tianli Group from mainland China, will employ 34,000 people directly (of whom about half are expected to be migrant Chinese workers) and 8,000 indirectly. It has a construction value of MR 20 bn, will cover two sq km. and will take five years to complete. Fifteen companies will produce and distribute a variety of products: pharmaceuticals, agro-industrial, seafood, electronic devices such as mobile telephones, kitchen lines and consumer products for the SADC and COMESA market. This project is considered to be the cornerstone in Mauritius’s strategy to develop the island economy into a second Singapore-type production and distribution hub. By African regional standards, Mauritius continued to be considered a showcase of development, again ranking top in the Mo Ibrahim Foundation Governance Index, with best scores in the categories rule of law, safety and security, participation by civil society and respect for human rights, sustainable economic development and opportunities, as well as human development. Klaus-Peter Treydte

Mozambique

Frelimo’s sweeping victory in local elections cemented its position as the predominant party. Renamo became increasingly insignificant. A cabinet reshuffle showed no fundamental political changes. The corruption crackdown netted some high profile arrests. Xenophobia in South Africa and the crisis in Zimbabwe were the most important subregional external factors impacting on foreign relations, while the negotiations with donors remained essential both in foreign affairs as well as socioeconomic developments. Economic growth continued, but worsening poverty triggered sporadic violence.

Domestic Politics The ruling Frelimo party overwhelmed an ever-weaker opposition in local elections on 19 November, winning a majority in the municipal assembly and mayoral office in 42 of 43 municipalities. Renamo, the former guerrilla movement and now the main opposition, had won control of five of the then 33 municipalities in 2003, but lost them all. Blame was largely laid at the door of Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama, and Renamo was expected to do badly in national elections due in late 2009. Frelimo was the single liberation movement that won independence in 1975, then ruled the one party state, and has won all multi-party elections since the end of the civil war in 1992. It has always had an exten-

456 • Southern Africa sive and responsive party structure reaching down to the smallest village, and under President Armando Guebuza this was strengthened and revitalised. Indeed, there were growing complaints that civil servants and those applying for government loans and licences were now expected to have party cards. The party machine has become increasingly effective in two ways. First, it transmits grassroots concerns to the top, as has been shown by Guebuza’s increasing emphasis on job creation, which is a major local preoccupation. Second, it has been highly effective in encouraging its supporters to vote. Turnout in the local elections was 46%, compared to 28% in the 2003 municipal elections and 43% in the 2004 national elections. By contrast, Dhlakama, who has led Renamo since it was a South African-backed guerrilla movement in the 1980s, has retained tightly centralised control and has failed to convert Renamo into an effective political party. Fearing challenges to his leadership, he expelled or marginalised people with political and organising skills. The reason for the devastating defeat in local elections was largely due to the lack of a party machine to support local candidates and mobilise sympathisers and ensure they voted. Beira, Mozambique’s third largest city, could prove to be Dhlakama’s downfall. Since colonial times, Beira has always opposed the government in the capital and it has become a Renamo stronghold. Daviz Simango was elected mayor in 2003 and proved to be highly effective and popular and it was assumed he would stand again for re-election. Just days before candidates’ lists were to be submitted, Dhlakama announced that the unpopular Renamo party head in the province, Manuel Pereira, would be the candidate. Simango supporters were outraged and in three days organised enough signatures to allow him to stand as an independent. Simango won 62% of the vote, compared to 34% for the Frelimo candidate and a derisory 3% for Pereira. Dhlakama expelled Simango from the party, but many in Renamo, especially younger activists but also parliamentary leaders, support Simango as the person with the charisma and organising skills to revitalise the party. At the end of the year, Dhlakama was tenaciously retaining control of a party in increasing disarray. The next test will be national elections in 2009 – for president, national parliament and, for the first time, for new provincial parliaments. Provincial parliaments were included in the 2002 constitution at the insistence of Dhlakama, who believed Renamo would win majorities in at least half the provinces – a now highly dubious assumption. Provincial elections had been scheduled for 2007, but were postponed to correspond with national elections in 2009. A new electoral register was drawn up during three registration periods in 2007 and 2008. More than 8.9 m people registered to vote, 88% of the voting age population of 10.2 m. Mozambique has two local government systems: in rural areas district administrators are appointed by central government, but urban areas are municipalities with elected governments and substantial devolved powers, including for economic development. The number of municipalities was increased from 33 to 43 and they cover 31% of the national population.

Mozambique • 457 Meanwhile, Frelimo is combining moves to both centralise and decentralise, with an understanding that these are not incompatible. Party membership and obedience to both government policy and party leaders are increasingly demanded, with instructions often passed down the line by mobile telephone, but within that system power has been substantially decentralised and creativity is encouraged in the carrying out of policy. The mayor of Maputo, Eneas Comiche, had proved to be highly effective, but Frelimo did not choose him to stand again because he was seen as too independent of party leadership. Unlike Renamo, the decision caused some local anger but no defections. The new Maputo mayor is David Simango. The two Simangos are unrelated, but the two big city mayors with names that differ by only one letter caused immense confusion in the foreign media and donor communities. The biggest example of centralisation mixed with decentralisation is the district development fund created by the Guebuza government. More than $ 300,000 per year is given to each district and rules were tightened in 2008 so that money could only go for projects that create jobs or increase food production, and that can repay the loan. Decisions are made by local district and village development committees, which must have at least 30% women and be genuinely representative of local interest groups. Informally, most members are Frelimo. But within those rules, the local development committees have almost total discretion to decide on loans and monitor the projects, which means for the first time literally tens of thousands of people are making decisions about how development money is to be spent. The funds also show the degree of communication between top and bottom. Initially, some of the money could be spent on small infrastructure, but central government decided this was already in the state budget and should not be allowed. Development committees objected, saying they wanted the ability to commission locally essential small projects such as drainage, bridges and classrooms that were not in provincial and national plans, and in 2008 this was agreed and a second grant of $ 100,000 per district was given for locally determined infrastructure. In addition to these grants, communities earned $ 1.4 m in 2007 from local management of forestry, wildlife and other resources, up more than 50% from 2006. Permanent secretary in the agriculture ministry, Daniel Clemente, said that 68 community management projects were being implemented, 70% being supervised by foreign donors and the remainder by national organisations. A government reshuffle, which began in December 2007 with the sacking of the agriculture minister and the appointment of former trade union leader and former provincial governor Soares Nhaca as his replacement continued in March. The defence, foreign affairs, justice, transport and environment ministers, all considered weak, were sacked. Oldemiro Baloi, a respected former industry minister and deputy cooperation minister who had become a banker, was named foreign minister. The new justice minister, Benvinda Levy, is a judge; the new transport minister Paulo Zucula had won praise as head of the National Disasters Institute (INGC). Frelimo political commission member Alcinda

458 • Southern Africa Abreu was demoted from foreign affairs to environment minister. Dismissed defence minister Tobias Dai is President Armando Guebuza’s brother-in-law. Filipe Nhussi, a former businessman, is the first defence minister not to have been in the liberation war, but the link is retained because he is a Makonde from the north of the country and his parents fought in the liberation war. The army’s chief of staff and deputy chief of staff, who had held the posts since the end of the war 14 years ago, finally retired in March. Like their predecessors, the new chief of staff is Frelimo and the deputy is Renamo and all four were commanders in the 1982–92 war. Corruption remained a central issue, both with government and donors. Budget support was not increased and money going to projects and programmes was not being converted into budget support, due to “serious disquiet about performance in the area of governance, particularly the lack of substantive indications of progress in the fight against corruption,” said Irish ambassador Frank Sheridan, head of the G19 donor budget support group, on 22 May. “Concerns about governance have been growing in recent years, and could have a long term influence if we do not find ways together of making tangible progress,” he added. A touchstone for donors has been the failure to bring prosecutions over the looting of Banco Austral by people high in Frelimo in the late 1990s and the assassination in 2001 of Bank of Mozambique head of banking supervision Antonio SibaSiba Macuacua, who had introduced a vigorous loan recovery programme. Under donor pressure, the government ordered a forensic audit of Austral by an international law firm. Although that audit was completed in 2006, nothing has happened. The results of the audit have not been made public and nobody has been arrested for fraud or malfeasance. “The lack of progress in criminal investigations following up the forensic audit of Banco Austral remains a recurrent preoccupation of the partners,” said the Norwegian ambassador and 2007–08 G19 head, Thorbjørn Gaustadsaether, on 30 April. Corruption was also of concern to Mozambicans, and after a relative silence in the first half of the year the government announced a whole series of corruption-related actions. On 22 September, Almerino Manhenje, who had been interior minister from 1996 to 2005 and who was seen as close to former President Joaquim Chissano, was arrested and charged with involvement in the case of $ 9 m missing from the interior ministry. He was not granted bail and remained in detention in early 2009. Eight others were also arrested, including the financial directors of the interior ministry and the riot police. Arrested separately on 22 September was Albino Mussana, former director of the national social security institute. He had been dismissed in February and in June Labour Minister Helena Taipo said that $ 8 m had been stolen from the social security fund between 2002 and 2008. Former Transport Minister Antonio Munguambe and Diodino Cambaze, head of the Mozambique Airports Company, were arrested in December and October respectively and charged with corruption relating to airport company funds. A former administrator of Banco Austral, Benigno Parent Junior, and two security guards were arrested on 8 December and charged with the murder of Antonio Siba-Siba Macuacua. Three senior officials

Mozambique • 459 of the bank at that time had been interviewed by the police in July. Despite prima facie evidence of the violation of banking and company laws, no one has been charged with plundering the bank and senior Frelimo officials suspected of involvement still retain high level protection. Government spokesman and Deputy Education Minister Luis Covane reported that 468 public servants were dismissed or expelled from the state apparatus, compared to 461 in 2007. These sanctions were imposed for such offences as theft of state funds, forgery of documents and signatures, breaches of professional secrecy, absence from work without authorisation, poor attendance to the public and drunkenness at work. The ‘Universidade Pedagogica’ (teacher training university) expelled 238 students for falsifying the certificates that showed they had completed the 12th class of secondary school. Two Pakistani citizens were caught trying to smuggle over $ 2.5 m in bank notes out of Mozambique. They were stopped by the customs service at Machipanda, on the border with Zimbabwe. However, high-level corruption remained an issue. On 7 December, three notorious murderers were allowed to escape from cells in the Maputo city police command. They were Anibal dos Santos Junior (‘Anibalzinho’), the man who led the death squad that murdered the country’s foremost investigative journalist, Carlos Cardoso, in November 2000. He has twice before been allowed to escape by high interior ministry officials. Escaping with Anibalzinho were Custodio Luis de Jesus (‘Todinho’), charged with the murder of the director of the Maputo central prison, and Samuel Chavangueza (‘Samito’), accused of a string of bank robberies and murders of police officers. They were alleged to be closely linked to police and interior ministry staff who were directly involved in organised crime, and those who released them may have been anxious to prevent them testifying in upcoming court cases. Todinho was shot and killed in Maputo in mid-January 2009 in very unclear circumstances, while Samito was arrested again. A fire was set in a building of the finance ministry on 22 October, according to the deputy prosecutor, Taibo Mucobora. The building housed the budget and accounts sections. The fire was extinguished relatively quickly and did not damage any key documents. An article in the government daily ‘Noticias’ (16 October) claimed that police who had stopped overweight vehicles on the toll road from Maputo to South Africa received mobile telephone calls from ‘influential individuals’ telling them to release the lorry. Drivers simply used their mobile phone to contact these ‘influential individuals’ if they were stopped. The problem was so common that it made controlling heavy vehicles very difficult. More than one-third of lorries weighed during the year had been overweight, according to the company that runs the toll road.

Foreign Affairs Mozambique was one of the first countries to participate in the APRM. It prepared its selfappraisal and the first AU team visited. The xenophobic violence that erupted in May in

460 • Southern Africa South Africa dominated foreign affairs. At least 30 Mozambicans were killed and 37,000 Mozambicans fled. The other major issue was the crisis in Zimbabwe and the question of how to deal with President Robert Mugabe. This had a direct effect on Mozambique, with many impoverished Zimbabweans crossing the border into Mozambique in search of work and a sharp drop in traffic passing through the port of Beira. Despite this, most of Mozambique’s leadership tended to support Mugabe, both because they feel a debt for Mugabe’s support during the destabilisation war in the 1980s and because they feared that if Mugabe fell, donors would force the reversal of land reform. But Graça Machel, widow of first President Samora Machel and wife of South Africa’s former President Nelson Mandela, called for increased regional pressure on Mugabe to step down. When the Cahora Bassa dam passed into Mozambican ownership, the new management immediately cut electricity supplies to Zimbabwe until some of the large back debt was paid 12 days later. Donor relations remained largely good, despite concerns about the failure to deal with corruption. But in a 30 April report, donors admitted that they were failing to keep their promises and failing to reduce the workload for the government. For example, the budget support donors sent 191 missions to Mozambique in 2007 – meaning one arrived nearly every working day – and totally failed to keep their pledge to reduce missions to 140. They also failed to cooperate more on technical assistance. In an unusually angry comment, Mozambique’s Planning and Development Minister Aiuba Cuereneia on 30 April said, “we must mention, as we have in every joint review, the need to reduce the administrative burden of foreign aid, including the duration of joint and semi-annual reviews, which continue to be very long and complex, absorbing too much work time of senior members of the government and partners.” Foreign aid remained essential. Finance Minister Manuel Chang said aid would cover 56% of government expenditure. Roughly half of aid is direct budget support. The policy dialogue with government has been dominated by the group of 19 donors. They gave money directly to the state budget, in part because they collectively negotiated conditionality with the government and the size of budget support gave them huge power. The World Bank was a member of the G19. The US and Japan wanted to maintain tighter detailed control over how their aid was dispersed and refused to give aid as budget support. As major donors, they objected to having so little influence and being excluded from the policy dialogue. Thus, towards the end of the year, there were informal discussions about how to create a joint policy forum. After four years of negotiations, the US finally began to dispense funds from a $ 507 m Millennium Challenge Account grant. Both Sweden and Switzerland reduced their budget support, as the World Bank and Denmark had done a year before. In an action that won public praise from both critics and supporters, the government finally stood up to the donors in mid-August, when President Armando Guebuza and Development Minister Aiuba Cuereneia said that government would use its own revenues to fill the gap.

Mozambique • 461

Socioeconomic Developments Economic growth was estimated at 6.8%, not far short of the target of 7%, Prime Minister Luisa Diogo said on 27 December. The capital Maputo displayed major new construction and traffic jams of new cars. However, there was growing recognition that the majority of Mozambicans were not benefiting from economic growth. The joint AfDB, OECD and ECA report “African Economic Outlook” warned that growth was largely driven by aid and by “mega-projects” such as the Mozal aluminium smelter, which generated little in terms of employment or tax revenue. “Although the tendency for poverty reduction continues, there are also perceptions and clear indications of an ever growing gulf between the privileged and the poorest”, Norwegian ambassador Thorbjørn Gaustadsaether said at the closing ceremony of the joint review on 30 April. He added that various factors, notably the lack of jobs, meant that “the least favoured members of society have not benefited from the country’s economic growth.” The 2008–9 G19 chair, Irish ambassador Frank Sheridan, said “it seems to me that many of the poorest are struggling just to maintain their present standard of living, or are even falling back, while the most prosperous are benefiting disproportionately.” He warned that failure to deal with problems of inequality could lead to “social tension and subsequent political failure”, and thus he wanted to see “greater stress on economic growth that benefits the poorest.” Even the IMF agreed. Age Bakker, head of an IMF mission to Mozambique, in a press conference at the end of February said that “most people do not feel the economic growth that has been registered in Mozambique. There must be more emphasis on an equitable distribution of wealth in the country.” Bakker stressed the need to create jobs and to expand the financial sector to support agriculture. Child malnutrition is rising, according to former Health Minister Helder Martins. Under-five malnutrition has risen from 36% in 1997 to 46% in 2006, he said on 19 June. Meanwhile, the government admitted it will not meet the MDGs for reducing maternal and child mortality rates. The rates were improving, but only slowly, according to National Director of Health Mouzinho Saide. For every 1,000 live births, 4 mothers die and 125 babies do not reach their fifth birthday, which remained extremely high. Cholera is now endemic in most of Mozambique and between October 2007 and the end of 2008 there were 15,000 cases and 170 deaths, a credibly low mortality rate of 1.1%, which reflects rapid response by health workers. More than 130,000 HIV-positive people were receiving anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs by the end of 2008, which is close to meeting the demand. The problem remained that many more people than that could benefit but refused to be tested, according to Health Minister Ivo Garrido. Sporadic violence in response to growing poverty was an increasing issue. In demonstrations in Maputo on 5 February and four other towns on subsequent days against the high cost of living, at least five people were killed and more than 100 injured, many shot by the police. The demonstrations were typically organised by mobile telephone text

462 • Southern Africa message by young people, many in the ‘informal sector’, who built barriers and blocked the roads. Rogerio Sitoe, editor-in-chief of the government-owned daily ‘Noticias’ responded on 15 February in a remarkable column. He argued that the root cause of the riots was “the religious way we applaud and accept the prescriptions of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund,” when these were really “poison prescriptions”. They destroyed jobs and failed to promote agricultural development, which had “contributed greatly to the impoverishment of the countryside and forced a migration to the cities, particularly of the youth.” The government needed instead its own development policy and to stop treating World Bank and IMF statements as if they were “bible verses”. Lynchings increased, with more than 50 people accused of being thieves being killed by communities during the year, and a similar number only saved by the police. The lynchings tend to be in very poor urban neighbourhoods, of people accused of stealing food from gardens or of breaking into houses at night in areas with no light or police protection. In poor rural areas in central Mozambique, several people were attacked and at least one killed when better-off farmers were accused of stealing the rain from their neighbours. In Cabo Delgado district in the north, local people burned down tents set up as cholera treatment units and attacked treatment teams, accusing them of spreading the disease. An earlier study by Carlos Serra and a team from Universidade Eduardo Mondlane of attacks on cholera teams showed the poor people believed strongly that the rich and powerful wanted to kill them and thus they could not accept that teams putting chlorine in wells were acting for their benefit. Floods in January and February displaced more than 100,000 people in central Mozambique, mainly in the Zambezi river valley but also along the Save, Buzi and Pungoe rivers. At least 20 people died. In late January the Zambezi river at Tete rose by three metres in just two days. Flooding is a regular occurrence, and Mozambican preparations continue to improve, through the INGC. In September 2007, the regional meteorological forum SARCOF had predicted above average rainfall, so the INGC stepped up preparations. Evacuation committees were established in riverside villages and INGC organised boats and helicopters. As flooding became worse, it moved its headquarters to Caia on the Zambezi river to be closer to the action. INGC works with several aid agencies permanently based in Mozambique and they can increase their assistance during floods, but no special emergency appeal was issued. In mid-January, INGC head Paulo Zucula (appointed transport minister later in the year) held a press conference to criticise “organisations which live off of emergencies” and which were exaggerating the flood in order to raise money. On 18 February, all the Oxfams working collectively in Mozambique publicly apologised for a 4 January statement in which they claimed Mozambique had made a formal appeal for help. In South Africa, 416 Mozambican miners died in 2007, according to figures released in 2008. Thirty-five died in accidents in the mines and the rest from other causes, mainly

Mozambique • 463 AIDS. In 2007, South African mines had recruited 45,000 Mozambicans, who remitted $ 93 m to Mozambique in 2008. In the six years 2002–07, 2,917 Mozambican miners had died and another 769 who were gravely ill were repatriated. New minimum wages were announced on 5 May. Previously there had been three minimum wages: $ 46 per month for agricultural workers, $ 59 for soldiers and $ 67 for other workers. The rates for other workers have now been split into nine categories, and the new minimum wages were: agricultural $ 54, soldiers $ 65, and others $ 75 to $ 97. South Africa’s electric power crisis affected Mozambique. In the first half of the year, the Mozal aluminium smelter (which imports electricity from South Africa rather than directly from Mozambique’s Cahora Bassa dam) had to cut production by 10%. Two biofuel projects, both producing ethanol from sugar cane, were started during the period of high oil prices. One was in Dombe, Manica province, and will involve 18,000 hectares of sugar cane. The other is a $ 510 m project in Massingir district, Gaza province, with 30,000 hectares of sugar cane, to produce 120 m litres of ethanol a year. But this project is dependent on water from the Massingir dam, and a floodgate was seriously damaged on 22 May. The dam was built at the end of the colonial era and has never functioned properly. The central Mozambique railway line linking Tete coal mines and Zambezi valley sugar mills to the port of Beira was destroyed by Renamo in the mid-1980s during the war of destabilisation, but it is now being rebuilt. The line to the Marromeu sugar mill opened in 2008 and the line to Tete is due to open in 2010. Macao-based billionaire Stanley Ho has set up a bank, MozaBanco, chaired by former Bank of Mozambique governor Prakash Ratlal. Cashew production hit 95,000 tonnes in the 2007–08 harvest, above the target of 85,000 tonnes. Of this, about one third was exported raw, mainly to India, one third was processed by the rapidly expanding group of local factories and the remaining third was processed by the informal sector. The average export prices for unprocessed nuts was $ 750 per tonne, up more than 50% on 2007, according to the director of the government’s Cashew Promotion Institute (INCAJU), Filomena Maiopue. This, in turn, pushed up the price paid to peasants to over $ 0.5 per kg. The revival of the cashew sector started in 2001 when Mozambique quietly rejected the World Bank-imposed free market policy, which had destroyed the sector, and instead began supporting peasant producers, marketing associations and private factories. Mozambique’s foreign debt is $ 3.3 bn, according to Finance Minister Manuel Chang. At its peak in 1998, foreign debt was $ 6 bn. Mozambique benefited from debt cancellation under the HIPC and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative programmes: the World Bank cancelled $ 1.3 bn, AfDB $ 500 m and the IMF $ 154 m, Chang said. Chang also pointed to the rapid increase in the government’s domestic debt, which more than doubled between 2005 and 2008.

464 • Southern Africa Mozambique failed to meet its target under the Ottawa treaty to demine the country by the end of 2008. Mines were planted during three different wars, and the national demining institute estimates that it will take six more years to clear them. However, there were only three land mine accidents, with seven victims, compared to 11 accidents and 24 victims the year before. Joseph Hanlon

Namibia

The year was dominated by growing polarisation between the governing South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and the newly established political opposition, Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP). Politically motivated acts of violence and an increasingly radicalised rhetoric cast their shadow over the democratic image of the country. Foreign relations remained unspectacular, but Namibia continued to seek closer ties with countries from beyond the Western hemisphere. Food prices and inflation rose markedly and the socioeconomic situation deteriorated towards the end of the year as a result of the global financial and economic crisis. Namibia remained a lower middle-income country with some shocking discrepancies in the distribution of wealth.

Domestic Politics President Pohamba announced a cabinet reshuffle on 8 April, the first since he assumed office three years earlier. While several ministries changed hands and state secretaries were rotated on a large scale, the same old guard was recycled. Former Prime Minister Hage Geingob, who was ousted from office by Pohamba’s predecessor Sam Nujoma and subsequently resigned after being demoted to a less prominent portfolio, returned to government after six years as the new minister of trade and industry. His political comeback

466 • Southern Africa had been foreshadowed in November 2007 when he was elected deputy president of SWAPO at the party’s congress. Divisions in SWAPO remained visible throughout the year, with the SWAPO Youth League, the Women’s League and other branches expressing radical views that contrasted with the gentler approach of President Pohamba. The head of state and party leader, considered to have a conciliatory character, came under repeated internal attack by hardliners for passivity, caution and softness. During politburo and central committee meetings in August, he faced unusually sharp personal attacks and was accused of not consulting with the party before taking decisions in office. These ongoing quarrels fuelled suspicion that influential factions inside the party were seeking to replace Pohamba as the SWAPO candidate for the presidential elections at the end of 2009. Repeated reports in the local media (including the state-owned newspaper) were dismissed as mere speculation, but the ongoing internal differences indicated that power struggles remained the order of the day. The situation was made more complex by the presence of a new party, RDP, itself the result of an internal SWAPO power struggle over the succession to the founding president, Sam Nujoma. Established in late 2007 mainly by former members of the exiled leadership of the liberation movement, it was considered to be the first serious challenge to SWAPO’s total dominance. With a leadership home base in the region where the liberation movement originated, RDP claimed to be able to make inroads into the main SWAPO stronghold. These predictions were not confirmed in the first contests, the local elections in the region, where SWAPO maintained its unchallenged dominance, although with a comparatively low voter turnout. Leaders of the Namibian Lutheran churches responded to the growing polarisation by means of a pastoral letter read out during services on 23 March. The four bishops of the three churches expressed the fear that the country was moving backwards in terms of freedom and democracy. The bishops’ letter identified “intolerance, verbal and physical attacks and counter attacks” and warned that “failure to redress this situation now can lead to mass loss of lives country wide.” The bishops noted that “political opponents are not enemies, but participants in a democratic set-up.” This was the first time since independence that the church had commented on politics in such dramatic terms. The political rivalries were radicalised during further contests. On 10 May, SWAPO activists prevented the RDP from holding a political rally, properly registered in compliance with existing laws, in a part of Windhoek’s former township Katutura. In condemning this violation of its constitutionally enshrined rights, the RDP released an open letter to President Pohamba, in which it compared this intervention with Hitler’s methods and blamed “neo-fascist elements” in SWAPO. The minister of education, in his role as highranking SWAPO official, publicly declared shortly thereafter that there would be “no-go areas” for other political parties, since these zones were owned by SWAPO. The RDP responded with a statement branding this as a “fascist inclination”. Not surprisingly in

Namibia • 467 light of the year’s political escalation, the UN’s annual report on 20 August on the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), recommended that Namibia review its laws in order to prevent, combat and punish hate speech. In its findings, the committee expressed concern that hate speech, mostly by politicians, continued at an unacceptable level and must be stopped. The showdown between SWAPO and the RDP was illustrated by parallel events on 18 October in different parts of Katutura. Some 150 SWAPO supporters tried to prevent a RDP rally at an informal settlement. They refused to follow police orders and were finally dispersed with teargas, while several persons were arrested. The RDP rally was called off. In a political rally held by the SWAPO Party Youth League the same day close by, the Youth League’s president demanded that all higher ranking positions in the state apparatus and state-owned enterprises be filled with only reliable SWAPO members and stated, “We have a political religion called SWAPO and the political heaven is SWAPO, and the political hell is where all the other political parties are.” As a special guest, the leader of a delegation from the South African ANC Youth League said of the opposition parties: “Destroy these political cockroaches, they are in your kitchen.” There was no reaction from the government to this incident. In response to the escalation, all but one smaller opposition party withdrew from the local by-election held on 31 October and called for a boycott. Of over 24,000 registered voters, less than 6,000 turned up (22.2%). In earlier elections in this constituency, the number of votes cast exceeded 10,000. In an unprecedented initiative, founding SWAPO member Andimba Toivo ya Toivo – who was incarcerated for almost 20 years as a political prisoner on Robben Island and later served as a minister in three cabinets until his retirement in 2005 – on 21 November published an open appeal for tolerance and respect in the state-owned daily newspaper ‘New Era’. He wrote: “We are living in new times that require new ways of conducting political struggle. The formation of new parties and the exchange of differing opinions in the political arena is a normal occurrence in the life of a democracy. The flourishing of new ideas can only contribute to the vitality and development of our nation. The present should be a battle of ideas and not of swords, and the battle should be conducted with respect for our fellow human beings.” His was a rare voice of reason within the party establishment. On 22 November, RDP and SWAPO supporters engaged in violent clashes in the north. SWAPO activists again tried to prevent a registered RDP rally, and in the fracas 12 RDP members were reported injured. A deputy minister claimed in a ‘New Era’ article on 5 December the right of self-defence in response to attacks by political enemies and concluded: “The SWAPO Party shall prevail against the onslaught and all tactics designed by the perpetrators of various methods of violent political abuse … against our party and its leadership. We the people of Namibia shall win this war, the SWAPO Party shall win this war, and Namibia shall forever remain peaceful.”

468 • Southern Africa The new opposition party claimed a small symbolic victory when it secured a high court ruling on the same day (5 December), which granted its urgent application to use the Windhoek College of Education as a venue for the first full RDP party congress. The advance booking for the venue had been withdrawn at short notice on the instruction of the permanent secretary of the education ministry. The former foreign minister and SWAPO heavyweight Hidipo Hamutenya was elected unopposed as the party’s president. The position of vice president was also filled with a former SWAPO member while Jesaya Nyamu, a former minister expelled from SWAPO as a result of the earlier power struggle over the Nujoma succession, was elected secretary general. Consequently, in the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for the end of 2009 SWAPO will have to compete mainly with former comrades for the electors’ votes.

Foreign Affairs Namibia remained a loyal supporter of the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe and fully backed the South African line on negotiations with the regime under siege. Army commander General Martin Shali visited Zimbabwe mid-year for scheduled talks with the military. When this was questioned by some local independent media, the official response was that the visit had been planned long ago and had nothing to do with the political situation. In a rare intervention by local civil society actors, five NGOs on 5 June sent a petition to the head of state urging him to encourage respect for human rights in the neighbouring country. By contrast, an extraordinarily strongly worded editorial in the state owned ‘New Era’ dismissed what it styled “Botswana’s Macho Politics on Zim” and criticised its neighbour’s call to close the border as “a declaration of war by other means”. On several occasions during the year, the government and president demanded the lifting of sanctions and recognition of the new government, in which ZANU-PF would play a legitimate role and with Mugabe as head of state. This underlined the Namibian commitment to a firm alliance among erstwhile liberation movements in the sub-region, formalised earlier by an internal agreement among MPLA, ZANU-PF, Frelimo, ANC and SWAPO. Due to these shared views on sub-regional issues, links with South Africa became closer. On 5 August, South African President Thabo Mbeki attended the South AfricanNamibian heads of state economic bilateral commission. Jointly with President Pohamba he inaugurated the first (and South African supported) cardiac unit at the Windhoek central hospital. More importantly, ANC President Jacob Zuma twice visited Namibia to cultivate closer ties between the two organisations. After an initial visit on 11/12 August he returned on 8 December to meet with President Pohamba and former President Sam Nujoma. A joint communiqué released by the ANC on 9 December in Windhoek stated “that there is a recurring reactionary debate around the need to reduce the dominance of former liberation movements on the African continent. In this regard the emergence of counter revolutionary forces to reverse the social, political and economical gains that have

Namibia • 469 been made under the leadership of our liberation movements was discussed.” In his letter from the president published upon his return in the weekly electronic circular ‘ANC Today’, Zuma summed up the deliberations thus: “Political analysts and all who claim to know Africans better than they know themselves tell us that it is good for Africa and democracy if the majority of former liberation movements was reduced. How do we as former liberation movements ensure that we do not steer away from our mandate of serving the poor and all our people, in the current climate of counter-revolution?” Fraternal links were also cultivated with North Korea, whose parliamentary chief and political number two Kim Yong Nam paid a state visit on 20–22 March. He attended the independence day celebrations (21 March) and the official inauguration of the new state house. A North Korean construction company had been building the grandiose complex since 2002. The administrative block cost taxpayers over N$ 400 m alone, while the notyet- completed presidential residence was financed with a N$ 33 m grant from the Chinese government. Another state visit was paid on 13–15 July by the President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. She addressed parliament and stressed the African bonds of friendship, but made it clear that she considered the Mugabe government an embarrassment. Relations with the US showed some discord. In a letter dated 21 November, 26 of the 50 members of the American house committee on foreign affairs of the US Congress referred to a State Department report showing that in 2007 the US and Namibia had voted in the same way in the UN General Assembly only 7.2% of the time. The committee asked specifically for a policy change on Israel and criticised Namibia as being biased in favour of Palestine. The US embassy declined comment. The prime minister, who acknowledged receipt of the faxed letter but refused to confirm its authenticity, stated that Namibia’s policy would remain unchanged. Just a few weeks earlier a dispute had erupted within SWAPO over a motion adopted in parliament to enter into an agreement with the US administration for a $ 305 m Millennium Challenge Account grant for education and tourism projects. It was feared the deal would include preferential access for US investors wishing to establish tourist lodges in the Etosha game reserve and other national parks, to the detriment of local interests in the industry. While the US embassy dismissed the claims, execution of the agreement was put on hold. Thanks to a proactive and smart ambassador to the United Nations, Namibia managed to achieve a high profile and high visibility in General Assembly-related activities. Kaire Mbuende, a former SADC executive secretary and deputy foreign minister, was a near ubiquitous representative who participated in several initiatives.

Socioeconomic Developments In terms of financial indicators, this was a bumpy year for the Namibian economy and consumers. Increased food and fuel prices considerably affected the import-dependent market and resulted in a sharp increase in the inflation rate, which stood at year’s end at

470 • Southern Africa 10.9% (compared with 7% a year before). With its currency pegged to the South African rand, the Namibian dollar weakened markedly especially after August and at year’s end had depreciated against the US dollar by 26% (N$ 9.3 to $ 1). While the earlier economic bonanza enjoyed by the export-oriented economy persisted into the first part of the year, the latter part witnessed the effects of the global financial crisis. According to estimates, real GDP growth declined to around 3% (4.1% in 2007). Deteriorating terms of trade contributed to a large reduction in the current account surplus. A much higher fiscal deficit than originally anticipated was expected at the end of the financial year (March/April 2009). On 5 March, Finance Minister Saara Kuugongelwa-Amadhila presented her annual budget for 2008–09. She projected average GDP growth of 5.1% until 2010, which as a result of the global economic crisis proved to be unrealistic. Based on this assumption, state expenditure was increased to a whopping N$ 22.6 bn, a 26% increase on the N$ 17.8 bn of the previous fiscal year. At 37.7% of GDP, it exceeded the target of 30% considerably and in light of the subsequent economic slowdown could create serious fiscal difficulties. State tax and other revenues were estimated at N$ 20.7 bn, a figure that will probably also require downward adjustment, thereby adding to the difficulty of holding the deficit close to the set ceiling, namely 3% of GDP. Defence spending, unproductive in the context of Namibia’s economy, became the third biggest item, at 10.5% of total spending (N$ 4.8 bn). According to an analysis by the local Institute for Public Policy Research, Namibia’s military expenditure – allegedly mainly for infrastructure – amounted to “a far higher proportion than any Western democracy, higher than even the US.” The mining sector, the backbone of the economy, experienced a very mixed year. Rollercoaster commodity prices most affected diamond production and cutting, which had reached an all-time peak at the beginning of the year only to undergo its biggest collapse in history by year’s end. Diamond production by the joint venture Namdeb (owned by the Namibian state and de Beers) and De Beers Marine (in charge of the offshore mining) for the first time exceeded 2 m carats. However, lack of sales meant many people had to be laid off or given early retirement. These developments also affected the diamond cutting and polishing industry established a decade earlier to add value before export, leaving parts of the workforce unemployed. The coastal diamond mining town of Oranjemund, situated in a closed zone to which there is strictly controlled access (the diamond ‘Sperrgebiet’), faced a bleak future and increasingly resembled a ghost town. Likewise, the copper mine and smelter in the town of Tsumeb closed in December in response to the rapid decline in world prices, which plunged over the year by 65%, from $ 8,000 to $ 3,000 per tonne, and made further production unprofitable. The closure of the mine, which was only a few years earlier celebrated as a success story when it was taken over by the Anglo-Australian multinational Weatherly, left some 600 miners out of work. Total investment in mining was, at N$ 12.7 bn, greater than in any other sector. A German company made the single biggest investment, N$ 2.5 bn in a new cement plant.

Namibia • 471 Despite the mixed results, mining continued to contribute N$ 7.6 bn to the economy, amounting to 12.4% of GDP and over 60% of the total export volume, more than any other sector. Revenue income from mining amounted during the year to N$ 1.6 bn. For the first time since independence, uranium contributed more than diamonds to this result. Producing 5,000 tonnes of uranium oxide, Namibia emerged as the fourth biggest producer in the world (after Canada, Kazakhstan and Australia). More open pit mines were licensed and will add to the output, despite growing concerns among environmental groups, who continued in vain to demand more careful environmental impact assessments (the mines, for example, are major consumers of scarce water resources) and better protection from the potentially dangerous activities. The Navachab gold mine near Karibib benefited from the shift by investors to gold as a hedge and the subsequent price of $ 800 per ounce, which contributed to a profitable bottom-line. A further blow to the economy, adding to the high unemployment rate (estimated at well over 40%), was the final closure of Ramatex. The last operational unit of the Malaysian textile company shut down in early March with the immediate retrenchment of 3,000 workers followed by tense negotiations over compensation, which the company, in violation of Namibian labour law, originally refused to offer. The company also left behind a polluted environment. Ramatex had started production in 2001 mainly for the US market under AGOA after negotiating an attractive investment deal at the expense of the Namibian taxpayer. On balance, almost the only beneficiary of the short-lived bonanza was the foreign company. A new church and trade union-affiliated initiative was launched for a Basic Income Grant (BIG) in the form of a monthly N$ 100 payment by the state to every resident below the age of 60 (when people become eligible for a monthly pension). A pilot project was started in January in an impoverished rural community 100 km east of the capital Windhoek. The initial results were presented by the BIG coalition in September as evidence of success. They were questioned in early November by an economist of a local thinktank, leading to heated controversy, while the government gave no indication it would be willing to consider BIG. Instead, President Pohamba announced before Christmas that political office bearers would receive a 24% salary increase to be implemented in two tranches of 12% during the two consecutive financial years. Floods in the north (the former Ovamboland) in February caused the displacement of growing numbers of people, estimated in March at over 70,000. 41 people drowned, 11,000 homes were destroyed, as were roads, other infrastructure and large parts of the harvest. The independent National Society for Human Rights, critical of SWAPO, concluded the year on 17 December by presenting a damning human rights report in which it stated that overall human security had deteriorated markedly in all spheres (economic, food, health, environmental, personal and political as well as community security). The official review of poverty and inequality in Namibia, published by the Central Bureau of Statistics in October, stated that on the basis of the data from the 2003–04 Namibia

472 • Southern Africa household and expenditure survey, the wealthiest 10% of the country’s population (no longer exclusively white) has consumption levels 50 times higher than the poorest 10%. With a Gini coefficient of 0.63 (a tool to measure inequality in income distribution among people of a national economy), inequality is said to have declined but remained among the highest in the world. As the official report observed, “in addition to being among the most unequal societies in the world, Namibia is also among the most polarised.” As if this were not bad enough, the two economists who were the main contributors to the official report stated in their individual capacities in a separate article that the qualitative data point to deteriorating living conditions. Henning Melber

South Africa

The long wrangle between State President Thabo Mbeki and ANC President Jacob Zuma culminated in September in Mbeki’s inglorious resignation. ANC Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe took over as caretaker president, in anticipation of Zuma’s presidency after the general elections in April 2009. In October, disaffected members left the ANC to form a new party, the Congress of the People (COPE). In the second half of the year, the South African economy began to feel the impact of the global financial crisis. After four years of growth averaging 5% per year, the annual estimated GDP growth was only 3.1%. However, Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel insisted that South Africa was not heading for a recession.

Domestic Politics A tumultuous year saw the ousting of President Thabo Mbeki in September and the first major split in the ANC since it came to power in 1994. After the bitterly contested election for the leadership of the party at the ANC conference in Polokwane in December 2007, the National Executive Committee (NEC) was dominated by Zuma supporters. In Polokwane, Kgalema Motlanthe, who served for many years as secretary general of the ANC, was elected deputy president of the party. He commanded respect among Zuma

474 • Southern Africa and Mbeki followers, but after Polokwane he was seen as belonging to Zuma’s camp. On 12 July, Motlanthe was elevated to the cabinet to prepare him for executive office in case Zuma was incapacitated by his corruption trial (see below). This appointment was also seen as a move to enable Motlanthe to gain experience in government and to ensure a smooth transition from the Mbeki presidency to a Zuma presidency after the 2009 elections. As cabinet ministers are supposed to be selected from among the members of parliament, Motlanthe was given the seat of the former COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) president, John Gomomo, who died in January. After the Polokwane conference, Mbeki’s hold on the government became increasingly tenuous. In May, he was widely criticised for his inertia when South Africa became engulfed by a wave of xenophobic violence. After the ANC NEC on 20 September announced its decision to oust Mbeki, South Africa experienced a nervous week. On 23 September, news came that Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel had resigned along with a third of the 28-minister cabinet. It was not immediately clear whether this was a technical step to enable the new president to form his own team, or a resignation in protest. The rand fell and recovered immediately after Manuel, who was attending an IMF meeting in Washington, stated that he was available to be appointed to the new cabinet. The decline of the rand by more than 3% against the dollar served as a reminder of the vulnerability of the economy in the event of signs of instability or drastic policy changes. On 25 September, the National Assembly elected Motlanthe as president by 269 votes to 50 votes for the candidate from the Democratic Alliance, Joe Seremane. On the same day, Motlanthe announced his new cabinet, stressing continuity in government. Motlanthe, one of the ANC’s intellectuals, is known for his quiet, self-effacing style and negotiating skills. He served ten years on Robben Island for recruiting young people into the then banned ANC and its military wing ‘Umkhonto we Sizwe’. After his release in 1987, he worked for the National Union of Mineworkers. Immediately after he was sworn in as president, rumours started circulating that he might be the perfect compromise candidate to remain in the office after the 2009 elections, but Zuma’s supporters were adamant that Motlanthe was only acting as caretaker. Ever since Mbeki fired Zuma as deputy president in 2005 to face corruption charges, Zuma had been fighting for a come-back. A majority in the ANC hierarchy, including Zuma, seemed willing to let Mbeki serve his second term until the elections in April 2009, but the tables were turned on Mbeki after Judge Chris Nicholson of the Pietermaritzburg high court found on 12 September that there had been interference by the executive in the decision to prosecute Zuma. Nicholson did not pronounce on the substance of the charges against Zuma, but pointed to procedural irregularities. After the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) announced its intention to resubmit charges against Zuma, a majority in the ANC NEC decided to end Mbeki’s term. It was suggested that their ultimate goal was to stop the prosecution, thus clearing the way for a Zuma presidency. Until then, Zuma had told his comrades that they

South Africa • 475 should not waste their time on a “dead snake”. After his resignation, Mbeki lodged an appeal with the constitutional court, stating that Nicholson’s verdict was unfair because he had not been given the opportunity to defend his position. Zuma supporters now took the position that a fair trial would no longer be possible because of a pattern of interference in the course of justice. Some of Mbeki’s close allies did not return in Motlanthe’s cabinet: Aziz Pahad (deputy foreign minister); his brother Essop Pahad (minister in the presidency); Sydney Mufamadi (provincial and local government); Alec Erwin (public enterprises) and Ronnie Kasrils (intelligence). Applause greeted the announcement that discredited Minister of Health Manto Shabalala-Msimang was to be replaced by Barbara Hogan. Shabalala-Msimang, notorious for her resistance to the provision of antiretrovirals to HIV-positive patients, became minister in the presidency. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), an alliance of organisations campaigning for the rights of HIV-positive people, welcomed Hogan’s appointment. The new minister of defence was Charles Nqakulu, whose performance as minister of safety and security had been lacklustre. The speaker of parliament, Baleka Mbete, was elected as the new deputy president. Brigitte Mabandla was moved from justice to public enterprises. Other new faces in the cabinet included Enver Surty as minister of justice and constitutional development, Nathi Mthethwa at safety and security, Geoff Doidge at public works, Siyabonga Cwele at intelligence, Sicelo Shiceka at provincial and local government and Richard Baloyi at public service and administration. In February, COSATU fired its president Willie Madisha, a Mbeki supporter, after a commission of inquiry found that trust between him and other office bearers had broken down. Madisha was also a former president of the South African Democratic Teachers Union and a former member of the politburo of the South African Communist Party (SACP). He had spoken out against Zuma and had also exposed a transaction in which the SACP general secretary, Blade Nzimande, was alleged to have received an undeclared R 500,000 donation from a businessman. Madisha announced his intention to build a rival trade union movement. For this reason, he did not become prominent in the leadership of COPE. In the wake of Mbeki’s dismissal, a number of prominent ANC politicians began consultations about the formation of a new party. Initially nicknamed Shikota, combining the surnames of the two initiators Shilowa and Lekota, the new party adopted the name Congress of the People (COPE). This indicated that COPE wanted to portray itself as the true guardian of the principles and goals of the ANC, as stated in the Freedom Charter, adopted by the Congress of the People in 1955 in Kliptown. At its inaugural conference on 16 December in Bloemfontein, COPE leaders stressed that one of the main differences between the ANC and the new party was the latter’s insistence on a democratic participative organisational culture in the party, in contrast with the authoritarian and centralist mode of operation that had come to characterise the ANC. COPE tried to claim the moral high ground, with promises of clean government, free of corruption. Lekota stressed that

476 • Southern Africa COPE wanted to remain committed to the non-racial principles of the ANC. However, when he made a statement mildly critical of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), pointing at the flight of skilled whites and the enrichment of a black elite, he faced a barrage of criticism. BEE tends to be very popular among Africans but very unpopular among Coloured, Indian and White South Africans. Particularly in the Western Cape, BEE is one of the factors that has alienated Coloured voters from the ANC. In its first electoral test, a series of municipal by-elections in the Western Cape, COPE won 10 out of 27 seats. Estimates of COPE’s electoral strength varied wildly, from up to 20% of the vote to at best 5% or 6%. The newsletter ‘SouthScan’ reported in December that COPE boasted a paid-up membership of over 400,000, around two-thirds of the ANC’s total. That would correspond with the balance of power at the Polokwane conference, where delegates were divided 60–40% between the Zuma camp and the Mbeki camp. Different motives existed for leaving the ANC to join COPE. For Mbeki supporters who felt increasingly marginalised in the ANC, joining COPE may have been perceived as a better career option. Some, such as Allen Boesak, joined COPE because they believed that the ANC had betrayed the principles of non-racialism. Others felt uncomfortable with the attacks from the Zuma camp on the judiciary. The SACP openly rejoiced at the ANC’s falling apart, which was perceived as an opportunity to move the ANC to the left now that the right wing had split off. The SACP held the right wing responsible for the controversial neoliberal GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) programme instituted in 1996. However, some COPE luminaries, notably Shilowa, Madisha and Philip Dexter, are former SACP cadres. The SACP fired Dexter, its former treasurer, for opposing Zuma’s bid for the presidency. Mbeki’s fall also had consequences in the provincial power structures. The premiers of the Eastern Cape and Gauteng, Nosimo Balindlela and Mbhazima Shilowa, were sacked. In the Western Cape, Premier Ebrahim Rasool, also a Mbeki supporter, had already been replaced in July. The new premier, Lynne Brown, was a long time local activist who had been effective in building bridges. The ANC in the Western Cape was in disarray after the disputed election in October of a new provincial executive, headed by provincial secretary Mcebisi Skwatsha. Important ANC districts representing tens of thousands of members refused to recognise the new executive. The Africanist tendency in the ANC Western Cape had alienated many Coloured voters, who already felt bypassed by Africans because of BEE and affirmative action. COPE’s support base looked very heterogeneous, not unlike the ANC’s constituency. Although COPE has the image of a middle class party and was branded as elitist by COSATU and the SACP, it also attracted support from the left. Mosiuoa ‘Terror’ Lekota was a founding member of the United Democratic Front in 1983, as well as premier of the Free State in 1994–96, chair of the National Council of Provinces, national chairman of the ANC and had been minister of defence since 2004. His standing in the ANC declined at the Polokwane conference, where he failed to calm a booing crowd of Zuma supporters. Lekota has criticised Zuma for his militarist posturing with his trademark song ‘Bring

South Africa • 477 Me My Machine Gun’ and for introducing tribalism into internal ANC politics by using his Zulu identity to mobilise support among Zulus. Former Deputy Minister of Defence Mluleki George from the Eastern Cape also had a history in the UDF. He was known as Mbeki’s main fixer ahead of the Polokwane conference. Shilowa made a career in the trade union movement, but his wife Wendy Luhabe is a prominent businesswoman who is seen as one of the financial powerhouses behind COPE. Other prominent business persons in COPE include Lynda Odendaal, Hilda Ndude from the Western Cape and Saki Macozoma. Helen Zille, leader of the biggest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, welcomed the formation of COPE and said that it would open the way for a party system that would not be racially defined. Most political parties, including COPE and the ANC, published their electoral manifestoes only in January 2009. The ANC’s presidential candidate, Zuma faced the challenge of squaring a circle. On the one hand, he cultivated his image as a man of the people, who at long last would bring improvements to the lives of millions of poor and unemployed. On the other, Zuma assured business leaders they need not fear his administration and that sound economic policies would continue. He also addressed the concerns of white commercial farmers and of the predominantly Afrikaner workers organised in the Solidarity trade union. In announcing his version of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), Zuma stressed that it is time for others to benefit: “Those who have opportunities can’t be coming back all the time.” The shift of power from the Mbeki to the Zuma wing was already noticeable in large empowerment deals, with known Mbeki supporters being squeezed out. Some massive transactions were put on hold pending the outcome of the Polokwane conference. Earlier, Motlanthe, then deputy president of the ANC, hinted at a gradual phasing out of BEE schemes in a meeting with Afrikaner business and agricultural leaders in Stellenbosch. BEE has also come under fire for exacerbating the skills crisis: further economic expansion is hampered by a shortage of qualified labour. ANC treasurer Mathews Phosa called the purging of whites – mainly Afrikaners – from the civil service a mistake as it had led to a skills vacuum in certain areas. In August, the Solidarity trade union held talks with Zuma and Motlanthe about a change in the rules for affirmative action. The union argued for an end to affirmative action appointments in critical positions and in favour of those with scarce skills, and proposed that young whites be exempted from racial quotas since they did not themselves benefit directly from apartheid. However, BEE remained hugely popular among the black middle class, which owed its rapid rise to it. In a report to the December 2007 Polokwane conference, ANC former treasurer general Mendi Msimang made it clear that ANC cadres who were ‘deployed’ to big business were expected to pay a ‘compulsory levy’ to the ANC. According to Msimang’s financial report, the fortunes of the ANC had experienced a remarkable turn-around, from a deficit of R 76 m in 2002 to a surplus of R 67 m in 2007. He acknowledged that the ANC used the Chancellor House investment company as its business front. ANC assets had increased to about R 7 bn, largely thanks to the successes of Chancellor House.

478 • Southern Africa The Chancellor House group of companies, formed in 2003, has acquired empowerment stakes in a great variety of businesses. According to ‘SouthScan’, nearly a third of the members of the ANC NEC are directors of BEE companies. The NEC includes 28 individuals with interests in 69 companies. As a corollary of the court proceedings against Jacob Zuma, the independence of the judiciary risked falling victim to the political wrangles. In January, retired Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson and a prominent anti-apartheid lawyer, George Bizos, warned against views expressed by Zuma supporters that “our judiciary as a whole lacks the independence and integrity to ensure that Mr. Zuma will receive a fair trial.” As the battles in the courts continued, Zuma loyalists intensified their campaign to have charges withdrawn because of an alleged ‘anti-Zuma bias’ in the judiciary. A task team formed after the Polokwane conference was charged with working out a strategy to get Zuma off the hook. Another legal team sought a general amnesty relating to the arms deal, to stop all investigations and prosecutions “in the interest of political stability”. In 2005, Zuma had been charged with racketeering, four charges of corruption, money laundering and 12 charges of fraud related to the multi-billion arms deal concluded in 1999. The case was struck from the role in 2006. However, shortly after the Polokwane conference, the National Prosecuting Authority resubmitted the charges against Zuma. As the Zuma trial dragged on, the prosecution and the defence in turn had reasons to celebrate. On 31 July, the constitutional court in a majority ruling dismissed an attempt by Zuma to prevent evidence from searches at his premises from being used in the court case against him. Zuma and the French arms company Thint had contested the lawfulness of the searches. All but one of the constitutional court’s 11 justices dismissed his challenge of the warrants issued in August 2005. At stake was the use of the massive documentation seized during these raids, which allegedly proved that Zuma received more than R 4 m in gifts and payments from his former financial adviser Schabir Shaik in return for services for Thint (formerly named Thomson CSF and now Thales) in the competition for the arms deal. In the majority verdict, the court also indicated that the use of pre-trial litigation by Zuma’s lawyers to prevent his case from coming to court should be discouraged. The team used dozens of applications to have the prosecution declared invalid. Before the verdict, the constitutional court had taken unprecedented action against the judge president of the Cape, John Hlophe. All members of the constitutional court were in agreement in accusing Hlophe of attempting to improperly influence two of the judges to rule in favour of Zuma. On 20 May, the judges of the constitutional court stated that the court would “not yield to or tolerate unconstitutional, illegal and inappropriate attempts to undermine their independence or impartiality.” Pending a decision by the Judicial Services Commission, Hlophe was granted special leave. In September, Zuma’s legal team scored a victory in the Pietermaritzburg high court. In his verdict, Judge Nicholson dismissed charges against Zuma because of procedural irregularities and stated that he had been the victim of interference by the presidency. Thousands of jubilant Zuma supporters

South Africa • 479 danced in the streets of Pietermaritzburg. However, at the beginning of 2009, the supreme court of appeal reinstated the case against Zuma. While the ANC reaffirmed its support for the rule of law, ANC Youth League (ANCYL) President Julius Malema suggested that “dark forces” were at work and that the NPA should agree to a permanent stay of execution in the Zuma case. Earlier, Malema said at a Youth Day rally that “we are prepared to die for Zuma. We are prepared to take up arms and kill for Zuma.” In October, Malema criticised the Mbeki presidency because under his rule “the resources of the country were distributed to certain individuals and a certain tribe.” The implication of ethnic favouritism is particularly sensitive. In mid-June, the office of the public prosecutor in Düsseldorf, Germany, shelved its investigations into bribery connected with the multibillion rand sale of four corvettes as part of the arms deal. It had been alleged that President Thabo Mbeki and other senior ANC officials had received massive bribes. The German magazine ‘Der Spiegel’ reported in 2006 that the steel and arms manufacturer Thyssen-Krupp was guilty of bribery in the deal for the corvettes in the late 1990s, as well as in another intended deal with the Angolan navy. Prosecutor Arno Neukirchen confirmed on 18 June that he had evidence of crimes on the part of former Thyssen-Krupp employees against the company itself, but this was unrelated to the corvettes. He said that South Africa had not provided the information needed to finalise the case. In May, a wave of xenophobic violence against foreign Africans claimed at least 56 lives and left over 500 people injured. Some 30,000 immigrants were forced to leave their homes. Mozambique and Malawi sent buses to take their traumatised nationals home. Thousands of foreigners fled South Africa. The attacks began in Alexandra, a densely populated township in northern Johannesburg. On 18 May, at least two foreigners were burned alive. In the next days, xenophobic riots flared up in downtown Johannesburg and surrounding townships and squatter areas, targeting immigrants from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi and other African states. In a number of cases, neighbours came to the rescue, but in many instances onlookers cheered the mobs as they clubbed, stoned or burned their victims. In many cases, looters exploited the mayhem to steal from houses and shacks of immigrants. Some who returned to their homes weeks later found them occupied by others. At times, the violence also turned against certain South African ethnicities, notably from Limpopo and Mpumalanga, who could not speak the proper Zulu words when questioned. In several instances, police were seen as complicit in the attacks on foreigners. In Diepsloot, a crowd destroyed the shacks of some 30 Zimbabwean migrants. When the police eventually arrived, they arrested 20 Zimbabweans as illegal migrants while arresting none of the South African attackers. On 22 May, the violence spread to the Cape Town area where police said that 500 people had fled their homes after gangs looted foreign-owned shops. In Khayalitsha near Cape Town, rioters targeted Somali shopkeepers. According to official statistics, South Africa has 1.1 m immigrants, but estimates of the real number hover around five million. As a consequence of the deepening crisis in

480 • Southern Africa Zimbabwe, Zimbabweans make up the largest number, with some estimates as high as two million. Only about 20% of Zimbabweans had refugee status, the rest being classified as economic migrants. Many were well educated and were sought after by employers, who regard them as better trained and more reliable than South African workers. In addition to the Zimbabweans, there are substantial numbers of migrants from Mozambique, Malawi, the DR Congo, Somalia and Burundi. After the attacks, places of refuge were created, with churches and NGOs delivering emergency relief amid much criticism of the inadequate response by the government. Around Cape Town, Islamic NGOs were particularly active in bringing relief to refugee sites. It was days before President Thabo Mbeki took charge of a rapidly deteriorating situation by bringing in the army to support the police. On 23 May, the government decided to deploy troops on the streets. Since the ANC came to power in 1994, the military had never been used to quell riots. The army trade union SANDU expressed concern, stating that soldiers were trained in conventional warfare and not in law enforcement. In a television speech on 26 May, Mbeki condemned the attacks as an “absolute disgrace” and called for an end to the “cold-blooded acts of murder, brutal assault and looting”. The government was apparently taken by surprise by these events, although protests and tensions in townships had been escalating over the years. Much of this protest consisted of localised demonstrations against poor service delivery. In recent years, South Africa counted an average of 10,000 demonstrations a year, a doubling of the number over five years. Amid reports of inadequate maintenance of sanitation and water treatment plants, complaints about unsafe water were proliferating. In the Eastern Cape, nearly 80 children died in April due to unsafe tap water. In Soweto and Limpopo province, individual cases of cholera were reported. Rising food and fuel prices have aggravated a sense of grievance. Foreigners, particularly from Africa, are seen as rivals for scarce goods such as jobs and houses. Government officials blamed the violence on the ‘Third Force’, a term reminiscent of the early 1990s when rightwing whites and Zulu traditionalists joined forces to derail the process towards democratic elections. Manala Manzini, chief of the national intelligence agency, stated that there was definitely a “third hand” involved in the orchestration of violence. Minister of Intelligence Ronnie Kasrils also made vague references to strings being pulled behind the scene. As in the early 1990s, references to a third force implicated Zulu migrants. The riots inflicted huge damage on South Africa’s reputation. Articles in many African media reminded the public how African states had offered hospitality during the struggle against apartheid. The Dakar-based Pan African human rights organisation RADDHO (‘Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme’) stated that the attacks had damaged South Africa’s leadership: “It is difficult to understand how the country which amply enjoyed the support of all African peoples in its fight against apartheid and which hosted the World Conference against Racism and Xenophobia in 2001 can be the place where such events are taking place.” On 23 May, churches and trade unions organised

South Africa • 481 a march to show solidarity with the victims. A study conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council recommended that a national summit be held on foreign nationals and immigrants. Other recommendations included the formation of local community forums on migration, an audit of housing policies, more efficient border control and measures against corrupt practices prevailing in the department of home affairs, in local government and in the South African Police Service (SAPS). According to a report by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), local government was a crucial factor: in poor communities with strong and effective local administration, officials managed to contain the violence. After the Gauteng provincial government announced that all temporary shelters would be closed on 15 August, the constitutional court ruled that temporary accommodation should remain open till the end of September. According to the province, only some 2,000 foreign nationals remained in the six camps, while 15,000 people had returned to their homes or their countries of origin. The riots affected the tourist industry, which accounted for 8% of GDP and provided a living to nearly a million South Africans. Germany, one of the main sources of tourists, issued a travel alert. The violence and the incapacity of the police to deal with the riots also raised scepticism about South Africa’s ability to provide a safe and welcoming environment for the 2010 World Cup. South Africa expects some 150,000 tourists from Africa for the World Cup. In November, the Scorpions detective unit was disbanded as an autonomous unit operating under the NPA and merged with SAPS, in line with a resolution at the ANC’s Polokwane conference. The Directorate of Special Operations, as the Scorpions were officially known, was established to fight high profile corruption cases and had a record of successful investigations. Their two most high profile cases involved Jacob Zuma and the head of police, Jackie Selebi. The police chief was accused of having close links with organised crime syndicates. On 1 February, Selebi was charged in a Randburg court on three counts of corruption and one of defeating the ends of justice. In September, Mbeki suspended the National Director of Public Prosecutions Vusi Pikoli, who also served as head of the Scorpions, in a move widely seen as political interference to protect Selebi. Mbeki appointed a commission of inquiry headed by the former speaker of parliament, Frene Ginwala, to investigate whether Pikoli was ‘fit for his office’. The commission reported that Pikoli’s integrity was beyond reproach but that he lacked sensitivity on matters of national security as well as presidential privilege. Although the Ginwala Commission recommended his reinstatement, Pikoli was fired on 8 December by President Motlanthe. The ANCYL had been in the forefront of the campaign against the Scorpions. Scorpion detectives had been investigating deals made by the ANCYL investment arm Lembede Investments, which had been generously funded by murdered mining magnate Brett Kebble. In the Communist magazine ‘Umsebenzi’, SACP general secretary Blade Nzimande branded the Scorpions as a “counter-revolutionary” organisation that had to be disbanded.

482 • Southern Africa Discussion continued about reforming the electoral system in order to make parliamentarians accountable to their constituencies rather than to the party. Electoral reform is also a plank in COPE’s platform. The current party list system makes candidates dependent on the favours of the party rather than accountable to their constituency. Changing the electoral system requires an amendment to the constitution, which can only be done with a two-thirds majority in parliament. Nelson Mandela’s 90th birthday was celebrated on 18 July with a huge rock concert at Hyde Park in London. On 10 November, Miriam Makeba, the first black singer from South Africa to gain international fame, died of a heart attack at the age of 76. Makeba spent 31 years in exile, mostly in the US and in Guinea. In recent years, she was a goodwill ambassador for South Africa as well as for the FAO. In March 2008, she highlighted the plight of women victims of sexual violence during a visit to the DR Congo.

Foreign Affairs President Mbeki’s seemingly futile efforts at mediation in the crisis in Zimbabwe seemed at long last to be crowned with success when President Robert Mugabe and opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai signed a power-sharing deal on 15 September. Mbeki had been trying to broker a deal since 2007. After the Zimbabwean general elections, when Mugabe refused to accept the MDC’s electoral victory, Mbeki denied there was a crisis in Zimbabwe. His mediation had long been dismissed as ineffective. MDC leader Tsvangirai pressed for Mbeki’s replacement as mediator as he was seen as being partisan to Mugabe. When this bid failed, he pressed successfully for more extensive engagement by other African countries. In parallel with Mbeki’s efforts, the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) of SADC became involved in mediation. Angola in particular, a long time ally of Mugabe, began playing an active role. After the signing of the power-sharing deal, South Africa pledged R 300 m in agricultural aid for Zimbabwe in the form of seeds, fertiliser and other farming inputs. However, when the deal was not implemented, South Africa announced that it would withhold aid until a government of national unity was in place. COSATU was openly critical of Mbeki’s handling of the Zimbabwean crisis. In April, dockworkers in Durban refused to unload weapons destined for Zimbabwe from the Chinese ship ‘An Yue Jiang.’ COSATU’s calls for solidarity by other African trade unions were successful. The ‘An Yue Jiang’ was allowed to dock in Luanda but not to unload arms for Zimbabwe. The saga of the Chinese arms shipment focused attention on the negligent reporting by the National Conventional Arms Control Co-ordinating Committee (NCACC), which is supposed to vet all arms sales and transits. NCACC has standing instructions forbidding arms delivery and arms transits to countries in conflict. Although it is required to submit a quarterly report to parliament, for the past three years no reports have been made. During this period, South African arms have been sold to the Central African Republic and

South Africa • 483 Chad, both plagued by armed conflict. South African-made Eland armoured vehicles were used in early 2008 by the Chadian army in their battles with Sudanese-backed rebels. The 82 Eland armoured vehicles were delivered to Chad via French and Belgian intermediaries, in contravention of the EU code of conduct as well as South Africa’s own NCACC guidelines. Under a Zuma presidency, relations with Angola are expected to improve. Angola’s rapidly growing economy and military strength have made it a rival power in the region. In March, Zuma received a high level welcome on a visit to Angola to commemorate the historic battle of Cuito Cuanavale. In a meeting with President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Zuma proposed regular consultations so as to improve cooperation in political and economic matters. Under the Mbeki presidency, the ruling MPLA felt that the ANC did not adequately acknowledge its contribution to the struggle against apartheid. In 1997, Pretoria objected to Angola’s armed invasion of Congo-Brazzaville in support of Denis Sassou Nguesso, and a year later South Africa criticised Angola’s military adventures in the DR Congo. South Africa and China resolved in January to strengthen their relations by holding annual high level talks on issues of long term strategic importance. Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma made the announcement while hosting the Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, in Pretoria on his first official visit to Africa. China’s presence has been growing steadily, with the Chinese community in South Africa now numbering some 250,000 people. In February, then Minister of Defence Mosiuoa Lekota announced a review of the 1998 white paper on peacekeeping operations in Africa. South Africa has military contingents in the DR Congo, Burundi, Rwanda and Sudan. If South Africa is to continue and even expand its peacekeeping operations, the army will need to be equipped accordingly. In 2008, the defence department was allocated R 904 m, or 3% of its budget, for peacekeeping, up from R 860 m. National treasury officials estimated that allocations for peacekeeping will increase to over R 1 bn by 2010–11. The total defence budget increased from R 26.1 bn to R 28.2 bn, personnel costs being by far the largest expenditure. With payments for the 1999 arms deal diminishing, more money became available for training, salaries and infrastructure. The last payments are expected in 2009. Most of the equipment has arrived, although the promised ‘offset’ investments to deliver massive numbers of jobs have not materialised. Most equipment was destined for modernisation of the navy and the air force, not for the army, which bears the brunt of peacekeeping operations. South Africa spends 1.3% of its GDP on defence, which is very modest for a middle power that has taken on an ambitious role on the African continent. In September, Lekota cancelled the purchase of a military spy satellite from Russia, which would have cost between R 2.2 bn and R 2.4 bn. The reasons for the cancellation are not clear, as the transaction was shrouded in secrecy. In retaliation, the Russian civilian

484 • Southern Africa space agency Roskosmos delayed the launching of SumbandilaSat, South Africa’s flagship project in civilian research and earth observation. ‘Noseweek’ reported in November that South Africa had at long last found a use for its prestigious Rooivalk helicopter gunship. From early 2009, Rooivalks will be deployed in covert operations in the eastern Congo and Darfur. Twelve Rooivalks have been sold to the South African air force, but arms manufacturer Denel has failed to sell any on the international market. The development of the Rooivalk has cost over R 8 bn. Relations with the DR Congo continued to expand, with the nine provinces of South Africa offering assistance with the process of moving towards a federated state. The DR Congo has increased its number of provinces from 11 to 26. The South African provincial administrations assisted with capacity building and programmes in health, environment, sanitation and education, as well as possible cooperation in sectors such as mining, oil exploitation and tourism. Some Congolese provinces have twinning arrangements with provinces in South Africa. South Africa continued to differ with its regional partners in SADC and SACU about signing an EPA. As a manufacturing country, South Africa is banking on beneficiation as a key to further industrialisation. Concerned that liberalisation of services and elimination of export taxes would impede industrial progress, South Africa wanted to protect its own market. This concern was not shared by countries such as Botswana, which expected benefits from free market access. Botswana’s minister of trade and industry stated his country would no longer tolerate South Africa’s Big Brother behaviour. The issue has become divisive within SACU, with other members refusing to follow South Africa’s lead. Apart from South Africa, all SACU member states have signed an interim EPA. In August, a SADC summit agreed on a new FTA agreement intended to promote regional integration. South Africa had been promoting a new FTA as it would open a regional market valued at $ 360 bn, with a total population of around 170 m people. Critics doubted whether an agreement on the elimination of tariffs would indeed make much difference as long as development of the physical transport infrastructure lags. South Africa offered to help Uganda with boat patrols on Lake Albert. Since the discovery of oil in 2006, tensions between the DR Congo and Uganda over the disputed border have increased. South African companies have already invested in the region. SacOil (South Africa Congo Oil), largely owned by the Maponya family and the Moseneke family with strong ANC credentials, have a production-sharing agreement for a block on the south of Lake Albert on the Ugandan border. Tokyo Sexwale’s New African Global Energy company is seeking a concession, while state-owned PetraSA also has a stake in the oil exploitation in the Albertine basin. From 23–24 April, Mbeki visited Swaziland, ostensibly for discussions about joint water projects as well as tourism schemes. Political repression may also have figured on the agenda. The deputy president of Swaziland’s banned opposition Peoples United

South Africa • 485 Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) was shot dead in the South African town of Nelspruit on 1 April. The murder of Gabriel Mkhumane, a medical doctor, remained unresolved. At the first ever India-Africa summit in New Delhi on 8–9 April, South Africa pressed India to move some of its diamond cutting industry to southern Africa. India has been trying to bypass the Antwerp diamond cartel and source rough stones directly for its large cutting and polishing industry. Southern Africa accounts for more than 40% of the world diamond output. The diamond industry in Gujerat is the world’s largest importer of rough stones and exporter of polished diamonds. A visit by President Nicholas Sarkozy in February signalled an improvement in relations with France, which had cooled after Jacques Chirac had criticised Mbeki’s mediation efforts in Côte d’Ivoire. The agenda included economic cooperation as well as security issues. The South African electricity company Eskom signed a € 1.4 bn deal with the French company Alstom, which has been chosen to supply turbines for a new coal-fired power station in Mpumalanga.

Socioeconomic Developments In the first months of the year, the economy suffered severe electricity shortages, as Eskom proved unable to keep up with rising demand. In January, diamond, gold and platinum mines in South Africa and in neighbouring countries were forced to close. Mining houses announced losses of R 300 m a day. In the first quarter, mining production in South Africa was 11.4% lower than in 2007. The electricity supplies to three aluminium smelters were also discontinued. Particularly hard hit was Mozambique, with the rationing of electricity from South Africa to Mozal, the giant aluminium refinery. Economists warned that the energy crisis would have a long-term impact on the government’s goal of halving unemployment and poverty by 2014. The economy needed to grow by at least 6% per annum to maintain the current unemployment level at the official 25%, or 40%, the definition used if people who no longer actively seek a job are included. The power outages may undermine investor confidence. The government declared an emergency and announced a package of measures, including rationing, price hikes and a renewed push for alternative energy sources. From July, the consumer price of electricity went up by 14.2%. The shortages were explained as a consequence of successful economic policies to boost growth and the electrification of nearly 3.5 m houses since 1994. Opposition leaders noted that warnings about impending power shortages had been given since the late 1990s. In his February budget, Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel announced an amount of R 10 bn over the year for Eskom and a further R 50 bn over the next five years as a loan to support Eskom’s capital spending programme. Eskom’s expansion plans will bring relief only by 2012. The utility has apparently opted for investment in nuclear power

486 • Southern Africa at the expense of its commitment to regional energy projects. It identified five possible sites for a conventional nuclear power station with a capacity of 20,000 MW. Eskom’s current capacity is around 40,000 MW in total. Energy analysts anticipate that by 2030, some 30% of South Africa’s energy mix will be nuclear. Currently, South Africa’s energy needs are largely met by coal-fired plants, making it one of the world’s worst offenders per capita in the emission of greenhouse gases. In June, the South African government finalised its nuclear energy policy, which outlined an extensive programme to develop all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle: conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication and the reprocessing of used fuel. The government also renewed its commitment to the African nuclear weapons-free zone treaty. South Africa stopped enrichment of uranium in 1990 when it also dropped its nuclear weapons programme. The decision to opt for nuclear energy was not only inspired by the electricity shortages, but also by the belief that long-term reliance on hydroelectric energy was unwise in a region prone to increasing droughts and persistent instability. The nuclear option means that the Inga dam on the Congo River will get less priority. In August, a deal worth $ 242 m was announced for the construction of a demonstration Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) at Koeberg, the site of an existing nuclear power plant in the Western Cape. Consortium partners for the development of the PBMR included Eskom, the South African government, the Industrial Development Corporation as well as USbased Westinghouse Electric. The budget, presented by Trevor Manuel on 20 February, accommodated many of the ANC’s demands for expansion of social welfare and education, while keeping a tight rein on inflation as well as a budget surplus of 0.6%. With a global financial crisis looming, Manuel resisted pressure from the left to ease the fight against inflation and spend the budget surplus. Investment in public sector infrastructure, both social and economic, was projected to grow 19% over the next three years. The social security network, which currently reaches about a quarter of the population, will be further extended. The child support allowance was raised from R 200 to R 220 a month and extended to children up to the age of 15. Old age pensions will be raised from R 870 a month to R 940, while the qualifying age for pension grants for men will be lowered from 65 to 60 over the next three years. Women already qualify at the age of 60. Social grant beneficiaries have increased from fewer than three million in 1997 to an expected 12.4 m by April. Manuel also announced an easing of foreign exchange controls. In his mid-term budget proposals presented on 21 October, Manuel noted an “almost unprecedented increase” in the price of food and fuel. Partly as a result, inflation increased, reaching a peak of 13.6% in August. Manuel announced that over the three year mediumterm expenditure period ahead, R 171 bn would be added to the budget tabled in February, taking total proposed spending, including the social security funds over the next three years, to R 2.4 trn. As a net effect of higher spending and lower revenue growth, the budget balance would shift to a moderate deficit of 1.6% of GDP in 2009. Manuel also

South Africa • 487 announced an additional R 51.3 bn for the provinces, earmarked for education, health, agricultural extension services and infrastructural investment. The existing labour intensive public works programme, which currently provides 145,000 full time equivalent jobs, was to grow to over 300,000 jobs and apprenticeships a year. On 6 August, strikes and demonstrations organised by COSATU brought major sectors of the economy to a standstill. Marches were held in Pretoria and in Cape Town. COSATU’s general secretary, Vavi, stated that wages were lagging behind price increases. In October, the ANC held a summit with its alliance partners COSATU and SACP, announcing an industrial policy that would focus on job creation. The summit concluded that decisive action was required to transform patterns of wealth production and distribution. More equitable development was to be achieved by further expanding welfare and by a ‘social endowment’, ensuring free basic water, electricity, sanitation, basic education and subsidised housing as well as facilitating access to existing benefits and a mandatory social insurance scheme, as well as a national health insurance. In the same month, Zuma told the Corporate Council on Africa in Washington that there was no question of changing the independence of the reserve bank. He also met Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and other high officials to assure them that South Africa’s political and economic stability was not at stake. At the same time, Gwede Mantashe, secretary general of the ANC as well as chairman of the SACP, criticised Zuma for assuring investors that economic policies would not change. In September, the government decided to shelve a bill on expropriation, devised to give the state more powers to speed up the stalled land reform process. A parliamentary committee explained that the bill could not be debated because of inadequate preparation and would be reintroduced at some later date. Analysts speculated that the government wanted to move more cautiously to prevent a crisis of confidence in the agricultural sector. Amid reports of rising food prices in much of Africa, food security has risen higher on the political agenda. Maize harvests, however, were good, reaching more than 11 m tonnes. A long-term concern, however, was that much agricultural land, notably grazing land, was taken out of production and converted into game parks. The government aims to redistribute about one-third of white-owned farmland to blacks by 2014, but the scheme was lagging far behind schedule. Briefing the media, Director General for Land Affairs Thozi Gwanya noted that land prices had increased in recent years and that an extra injection of R 75 bn was needed to reach the target of 30% by 2014. By 31 July, the department had redistributed 4.8 m hectares of land against a target of 24.6 m hectares by 2014. Critics noted that there is enough state-owned land and land voluntarily put up for sale available to satisfy the land hunger of aspiring black farmers, but land transfers were stifled by bureaucratic bottlenecks. The land commission on the restitution of land rights has settled 95% of claims, some dating back to the 1913 Land Act. The outstanding 4,900 claims were complex rural claims in different phases of settlement. Currently, the major part of budget allocations for

488 • Southern Africa land reform is spent on restitution, but with the restitution programme expected to wind down by 2010–11, more money will become available to buy white farmland for redistribution to black farmers. The Consumer Debt Report, published in November by the debt counselling agency Credit Matters, revealed that, contrary to widespread perceptions, white South Africans were more heavily indebted than all other race groups combined. Whites, who make up 9.2% of the population, owe R 680 bn in household debt, compared with R 310 bn for blacks, R 82 bn for Coloureds and R 65 bn owed by Indians. According to the National Credit Regulator (NCR), household debt has quadrupled to more than R 1.1 trn in the past five years. Mortgages accounted for more than half of household debt. Close to 100,000 homeowners have defaulted on their bonds, with 25,000 in danger of losing their homes. Roger Brown, chief executive of Credit Matters, said that whites owed the most because they were traditionally defined as a lower-risk group and offered more credit. More and more South Africans struggled to service their debts because of high interest rates, rising food and fuel prices and tightening access to credit. The 2.6 million-strong black middle class is not immune to the credit crisis: at least 10% had items repossessed in the past year and a half. Every month, 6,000 vehicles and 2,000 homes were being repossessed. Research by the Bureau of Market Research at the University of South Africa showed that income disparities have widened in the past two years, largely as a consequence of the rise of a very wealthy black elite. South Africa’s Gini coefficient widened to 0.65 in 2008 from 0.63 in 2006, considerably more uneven than in other emerging economies such as Brazil or Malaysia. When the ANC came to power in 1994, the Gini coefficient was estimated at 0.57. Income inequality is rising more rapidly among black South Africans. In June, a high court ruled that South Africa’s 10,000 strong community of Chinese South Africans ought to be included in the definition of ‘black people’, with the consequence that they qualify for black empowerment deals. Under apartheid, Chinese were classified as Coloured. In early March, the government reached agreement with mining giant Anglo American on a mining charter aimed at spreading the benefits of coal, copper and platinum mines to local businesses and communities. The deal involved the ownership transfer of 26% of shares in the companies to create partnerships with local firms and communities. However, prices for platinum and base metals plummeted from $ 2,300 per ounce in March to $ 720 an ounce in late October. Over December, statistics showed a contraction of 7% in manufacturing, South Africa’s second largest sector. Consumer demand was also depressed, partly due to high interest rates maintained by the reserve bank in order to contain inflation. Ineke van Kessel

Swaziland

By every socioeconomic indicator, life in Swaziland continued its grim downward spiral. Economic growth slid to below 1%, a crippling drought continued unabated, the HIV/ AIDS infection rate, one of the highest in the world, showed no signs of slowing, while the government enacted and implemented draconian anti-terror legislation that violated even provisions of Swaziland’s own constitution. King Mswati III turned 40 as the country celebrated its 40th year of independence from Britain. Dubbed the 40/40 celebrations, the two events were celebrated on a scale of lavishness quite out of proportion to Swaziland’s economic ills.

Domestic Politics On 19 September, parliamentary elections were again held on a no-political-party basis. The 2006 constitution is ambiguous on the issue of the legality of political parties. While it guarantees freedom of association, it fails to comment specifically on the question of political parties, which were banned in 1973 when the late King Sobhuza declared a state of emergency. Sobhuza argued that political parties were divisive, instruments of foreign elements and inconsistent with Swazi custom. By the time of the elections, the high court had failed to rule on an application to register political parties brought in terms of the 2006

490 • Southern Africa constitution. In any event, a dozen political groupings and civic associations decided in January to boycott the elections on the grounds of the alleged illegitimacy of the monarchical state. The result was the election of a largely pliant body of staunch royalists. A Commonwealth expert team observing the elections issued a critical report, describing them as not democratic or free or fair, and stated, “we cannot conclude that the entire process was credible”. Probably the most significant outcome of the poll was the king’s appointment on 16 October of Barnabus Dlamini, a hard line conservative, to the position of premier. Dlamini had previously served a seven-year term as prime minister between 1996–2003, a period characterised by a crackdown on opposition and trade union groups. He had also during that time introduced a 60-day detention-without-trial provision. Less than a month after Dlamini took office, on 15 November, the king promulgated the Suppression of Terrorism Act and within days declared four longstanding opposition groups to be ‘terrorist’ in terms of the legislation. They were the Peoples United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO), the Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO), the Swaziland Solidarity Network (SSN) and a lesser-known group called Umbane. Two days later, police arrested PUDEMO’s leader, Mario Masuku, and charged him with terrorism. At year’s end he remained in police custody. The provisions of the Terrorism Act have been widely condemned. The London-based anti-censorship organisation, Article 19, criticised the act as an assault on the right to free expression, while Amnesty International and the International Bar Association in a joint statement expressed concern at the wide-ranging, vague and imprecise definition of terrorism and called for the act’s repeal or amendment. The two bodies expressed concern “that key provisions in this anti-terrorism law are inherently repressive, breach Swaziland’s obligations under international and regional human rights law and are already leading to the violation of the right to freedom of expression, association and assembly.” They also strongly criticised the “provision for up to seven days incommunicado detention without charge or trial, with the attendant risks of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, or enforced disappearances.” Throughout the year there were a series of protests, mainly in the form of marches to demand democratic reforms. These were orchestrated by the major opposition groups, which included PUDEMO, the Swaziland Coalition of Concerned Civic Organisations (SCCCO), SWAYOCO and the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU). Many of these marches were either banned by the police or broken up violently. On 6 March, police used teargas against public transport workers who were showing solidarity with textile workers protesting against low wages. In the course of the strike, some 40 textile workers were hospitalised after skirmishes with the police. On 31 July, a PUDEMO rally was banned and brutally dispersed by the police. Concurrent with the elections being held in September, several marches were staged in various parts of the country calling for multiparty democracy. On 3 September, 10,000 pro-democracy activists crowded the streets of Manzini in one of the largest demonstrations in Swazi history.

Swaziland • 491 In response to the wave of protests, the Swazi government arrested several opposition leaders, including Jan Sithole, the secretary general of the SFTU, and Armstrong Robinson, the national organiser of PUDEMO. In a more serious incident, the deputy president of PUDEMO, Gabriel Mkhumane, was shot dead in Nelspruit, South Africa on 1 April. Rumours circulated that he had been assassinated by Swazi government operatives. He had been attending a meeting to discuss a planned border blockade of goods going in and out of Swaziland. Its staging was abandoned as a result of his death. The blockade was finally attempted in October at the Oshoek border post between Swaziland and South Africa, but attracted little support and had even less impact on cross-border traffic. Further bomb attacks were reported. In the most notable of these, two alleged saboteurs were killed when their car exploded under the Lozitha bridge. A widely reported presumption was that the explosives detonated prematurely. The two deceased were named as Jack Govender, an Indian South African from Durban and former member of the ANC’s underground army Umkhonto we Sizwe, as well as a founding member of the SSN, and a Swazi citizen, Musa ‘MJ’ Dlamini. A third unnamed suspect who survived the blast was taken into detention, where it is alleged he was severely tortured. Much controversy and secrecy surrounds this incident. No charges have been brought against the alleged survivor but the incident was used to justify the enactment in October of the anti-terrorism legislation. Govender was buried in Swaziland at a funeral attended by about 1,000 mourners. The media continued to be harassed. At a border blockade, a journalist had his camera confiscated and prints deleted. In October, Swazi journalists were ejected from a meeting in which the newly elected and appointed MPs discussed their salaries. Prior to the election, the electoral boundaries commission set up to run the election banned reporters from its public meetings because it did not like the way they reported events. Corruption remained rampant. It was reported that an unnamed cabinet member was being investigated by the state’s anti-corruption unit on how he/she had amassed an amount in the region of Rand (R) 30 m. The identity of the suspect has never been revealed and no charges have been laid. In a related theme, several press reports noted that Swazis were being forced to pay cash to receive food aid that had been donated free of charge by international agencies. In 2007, attempts were made by junior members of the Swazi police and prisons services to unionise. In the face of opposition from senior police, including the chief of police, Edgar Hillary, registration of the Swaziland Police and Correctional Services Union was denied in terms of the Industrial Relations Act. The issue was appealed to the courts by the union and on 23 May a full bench of the high court dismissed their application. The court found that police and prison officials performed essential services or, as they put it, were members of the “disciplined forces” and, as such, did not have the right to organise collectively.

492 • Southern Africa

Foreign Affairs After years as a low-profile player in regional politics, Swaziland assumed a more prominent role in June when King Mswati became chair of the SADC Organ of Politics, Defence and Security. Charged with the promotion and maintenance of regional peace and stability in the 14-member bloc, Mswati was involved in several meetings on the crisis in Zimbabwe. None produced any discernible progress. At the start of the year, bilateral relations were established with Bangladesh. Hope was expressed that the people of Swaziland would benefit from access to cheaper Bangladeshi products such as pharmaceuticals, melamine and jute goods. Swaziland also signed two bilateral agreements with the Philippines. These focused on economic infrastructure and educational development. Swaziland reaffirmed as its commitment to maintaining diplomatic ties to Taiwan, and is the only SADC member to do so: its textile industry is dominated by garment-making factories owned by Taiwanese entrepreneurs. Swaziland, together with other SACU members bar South Africa (and in the face of strenuous opposition from that country) signed an interim EPA with the EU. This action created considerable tension within SACU, which seemed on occasion to be on the brink of dissolution. Despite several closed-door meetings, tension over the issue continued. In the course of the year, the EU allocated € 63 m to Swaziland for projects focusing on human development, water supply, sanitation and irrigation. Throughout the year, various South African groups, most notably the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), expressed opposition to the Swazi government and solidarity with Swazi opposition groups. On 6 March, COSATU organised a protest march on the Swazi embassy in Pretoria, while in August COSATU, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, as well as SFTU, met at a conference to mobilise solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe and Swaziland in their struggles for democracy and human rights. COSATU also organised a border blockade in October at the Oshoek border gate, and announced a plan to boycott goods destined for Swaziland and Zimbabwe. The ANC Youth League also spoke out against the Swazi monarchy, while the Creative Workers Union of South Africa supported a call to boycott the 40/40 celebrations. The World Federation of Trade Unions expressed support and solidarity with the people of Swaziland and its labour movement, while it did not go unnoticed that then President Thabo Mbeki did not make an appearance at the 40/40 celebrations. Earlier in the year, however, he had held talks with King Mswati in Swaziland, reportedly to strengthen political and economic ties, including water and tourism development projects.

Socioeconomic Developments The Swazi economy continued its poor performance. For the first time in nearly 30 years the annual growth rate fell below 1% to 0.7%. Unemployment continued to rise. Local

Swaziland • 493 economists estimate that an annual growth rate of 3.6% was required just to keep up with population growth. This level of growth has not been attained since the late 1970s. Contributing to its worsening economic condition was the fact that Swaziland experienced its sixth consecutive year of severe drought and heat waves, which withered up to 80% of crops in some areas. Aid agencies estimated that up to 40% of the population was dependent on some form of food assistance. Income inequalities intensified, with the World Bank estimating that 80% of the nation’s wealth was in the hands of 20% of the population, while the EU ambassador described Swaziland as having “one of the world’s most skewed income distributions”. In its one attempt to deal with rising levels of poverty, government doubled the monthly pension paid to the elderly from about $ 15 to $ 30. Swaziland continued to suffer from one of the highest, if not the highest, HIV/AIDS infection rate in the world. Life expectancy was said in some circles to have dropped from nearly 60 years in the 1990s to just over 30 years. In contrast, Amnesty International put the figure at 40.9 years. The country’s under-five infant mortality rate was estimated to be in the region of 126 to 144 per 1,000 or a rate of over 12%. Many health experts regarded this figure as conservative. As a result of the high HIV/AIDS rate, 30% of Swazi children are said to have lost either one or both parents. This has increased the number of orphaned and vulnerable children in the country. Another crisis facing these children is that funds for a government subsidy to schools to meet the costs of these orphans were said to be exhausted. Concurrent with the high rate of HIV/AIDS, the incidence of TB was also on the rise. These facts notwithstanding, the king continued his extravagant lifestyle. In celebration of the 40/40 year, he splurged even more than usual on the occasion. The celebration was estimated to have cost R 100 m. In addition, a fleet of new German-made cars was ordered for the monarch, his 14 wives and other senior royal family members. Eight of the queens undertook an international shopping spree in Dubai, said to have cost about $ 4 m. This sparked a nationwide outcry in a country in which the average Swazi lives on around $ 0.50 per day and a rare protest march by women’s rights activists. To add insult to injury, the king invited the nation to submit gifts and donations to the royal family in what he alleged was consistent with the traditional customs of the Swazi nation. Women continued to suffer discrimination and abuse. The new constitution notwithstanding, women do not have the same access to justice as Swazi men and are not equally protected by the law. This is because there is no legislative framework that condemns acts of rape and abuse. In response to the march by women’s groups, Jim Gama, the governor of the Swazi royal capital, described the march as “unSwazi”, as a woman needs the permission of her husband to register her disagreement with what is happening and she cannot march. John Daniel & Marisha Ramdeen

Zambia

The president’s death and the opposition leader’s poor health overshadowed domestic politics, which were also marked by a surprisingly clear nomination result for the presidential aspirant for the ruling party to replace the late President Mwanawasa and a very close competition for the presidency won by former Vice President Rupiah Banda. Foreign policy activities were partly stalled by the succession problem, but remained basically unchanged, with an outspoken stance against Robert Mugabe’s politics in Zimbabwe and closer ties with Asian powers. Although the economy had continued to grow over the last six years by an average of more than 5% (in 2008 by 5.8%), the world’s financial crisis heralded a serious economic slowdown, with the drastic slump in copper prices starting mid year.

Domestic Politics The succession debate, which had begun during the previous year – the constitution allows for two terms only and President Mwanawasa had started his second in 2006 – took a new turn in January, when the country’s first lady, Maureen Kakubo Mwanawasa, was publicly discussed as a possibly candidate. She was supported by a faction within the ruling party, the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD), but was criticised by other

496 • Southern Africa party members, who pointed out that the Zambian republic was not a ‘dynasty’. Critics also suspected that President Mwanawasa was, through his wife, aiming at a third term. Although she officially denied all ambitions for the presidential office, the rumour resurfaced when her husband was hospitalised. On 29 June, President Mwanawasa suffered a stroke while attending the AU summit in Egypt. He was taken to France for intensive care, but died in a Paris clinic on 19 August. According to the constitution, the new president is to be elected within 90 days of the office holder’s death (or removal). Until the presidential election, as stipulated by the constitution Vice President Rupiah Banda became the acting president. Mwanawasa’s death sparked off a highly competitive nomination race within MMD. In the end, there were 20 aspirants to become the MMD’s presidential candidate, among them the acting president, Finance Minister Ng’andu Magande and the party secretary, Katele Kalumba. What appeared to be a very ‘bitter’ election campaign, including all sorts of mud-slinging, which some observers viewed as heralding a major split in the ruling party, resulted in a surprisingly clear-cut victory. On 5 September, the national executive committee of the MMD nominated Rupiah Banda, with 43 votes, as the party’s candidate against 11 votes for his closest contender Magande, who was publicly endorsed by Maureen Mwanawasa as her husband’s favourite, and trailed by two other aspirants with one vote each. Contrary to many expectations, all the losers accepted defeat, none left the party and no split weakened the MMD. Before the formal nomination process, seven of the nine provincial MMD organisations had declared their support for Banda. Banda’s nomination appeared to be surprising, because when he was appointed vice president by Mwanawasa in 2006 he had already retired from politics and it was unclear when he had left the former state party, United National Independence Party (UNIP). The available information is a source of contention: according to one source he joined MMD in 2002, while another rumour is that he left UNIP only shortly before the 2006 elections. Under these circumstances, he was hardly expected to have a personal support base within MMD. However, he was apparently able to use his short time as acting president to his advantage. At the same time, he was probably the lowest common denominator for the various factions within MMD, which blocked each other’s candidates, and had not been much involved in the party’s ongoing factional strife. Coming from Eastern Province, he had no affiliation with any of the major ethnic groups in the country, which made him an ideal candidate for forging a grand ethnic coalition in order to win the elections. In this situation, his age of 71 years may also have made him attractive to the ambitious younger generation of MMD leaders counting on another early succession. Unlike many of his rivals, Banda was not implicated in a major corruption case, and he was seen as an experienced politician who had served not only as foreign minister and as minister of mines during the one-party era, but also as ambassador to different countries and in various managerial functions in corporations and on parastatal boards. After his clear nomination, Banda also got broad support from outside MMD. Leaders of some smaller political

Zambia • 497 parties such as the United Liberal Party (ULP), Forum for Development and Democracy (FDD) and UNIP publicly supported his candidacy, among them Kenneth Kaunda, the first president of the country and leader of the former state party UNIP. At the same time, the major opposition party, Michael Sata’s Patriotic Front (PF), continued to be plagued by a deep internal rift. In fact, the party was split into two factions that were involved in a continuing power struggle. The major bone of contention was the participation of the party’s MPs in the National Constitutional Conference (NCC), and more generally Sata’s authoritarian leadership style. Having followed a zig-zag policy over participation in the NCC, Sata had directed that the process be boycotted. However, in December 2007, 27 of the party’s 42 MPs defied Sata and became members of the NCC. When Sata threatened to expel them from the party, which meant they would lose their seats in parliament, they took the issue to court. In January, a court order blocked Sata from expelling the MPs, a move that was supported by a decision of the Lusaka high court only a month later. Sata’s position that PF was a kind of private ‘club’ and therefore no court had jurisdiction to decide on internal disputes was rejected. The wider implication of this case was that internal disputes within political parties were not private but public matters and therefore an issue for public jurisdiction. The rift between the two factions deepened in March, when the central committee presided over by Sata formally expelled five of the 27 dissenting MPs from the party on the grounds that they had allegedly stopped paying their dues to the party and had withdrawn their membership. The five filed an action against their expulsion, again in the Lusaka high court, denying all the allegations. Some of the renegades had publicly denounced Sata’s dictatorial leadership style early in 2007. On 25 April, the feud among the two factions abated temporarily when Sata suffered a heart attack and was taken into emergency care in a South African hospital with the assistance and at the expense of the Zambian government. When Sata recovered and returned home, Zambians witnessed a new round of surprising U-turns. First, as the major leader of the opposition, he was publicly reconciled with the president after many years of bitter political disagreement and rivalry dating back to the early 1990s. The reason for this change was that he felt deeply grateful to Mwanawasa for providing unconditional government support in a personal emergency to one of his most vociferous critics. Second, after Mwanawasa’s death he completely changed his campaign tactics for the presidency. In contrast to his anti-China rhetoric of the 2006 election campaign, he not only toned down his criticism of the Chinese presence in the country, but announced he would protect ‘Chinese investment’. And, in a gesture towards all international observers, he declared he would also respect all legal contracts signed by the MMD government. However, his main campaign target remained the urban voters, and he appealed to them by promising to reduce taxes and the number of cabinet ministers in order to curb government expenditure. At the same time, the opposition to Sata culminated in the declaration by some of the rebel MPs that they would challenge Sata’s leadership at the next party convention

498 • Southern Africa and, secondly, in the public announcement by a few dissidents that they would support MMD’s candidate Banda in the presidential race instead of Sata. Finally, one of the rebels filed a legal action against the nomination of Sata as PF’s presidential candidate, arguing that he had been denied the chance to compete for the nomination himself because there was no proper nomination process in the party. Although the Lusaka high court upheld Sata’s nomination, the fact remained that the party had never held a convention, ‘general conference’ or any proper leadership election since its formation in 2000. According to the party’s constitution, a general conference was to take place every five years and was the only avenue for electing the party’s leader. However, the PF constitution is silent on the nomination of a presidential candidate, and gives the party’s president wide-ranging powers to make appointments to party positions. Another about-face in PF policy occurred in December, when the party announced demonstrations against the salary increases of about 15% for constitutional office holders, which PF Vice President Guy Scott and his legislators had supported in parliament. While Mwanawasa was hospitalised in August, his cabinet had passed the bill for tabling in parliament. The Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) described PF’s move as “immoral” and accused it of double standards. The presidential election, held on 30 October and giving rise to considerable tension, was won by Rupiah Banda by a very close margin of only 35,209 votes. In total, Banda (MMD) won 718,359 votes, or 40.1% of the overall vote, while Sata (PF) got 683,150 (38.1%) and Hakainde Hichilema (United Party for National Development, UPND) 353,018 votes (19.7%) trailed by Godfrey Miyanda (Heritage Party, HP) with only 13,683 votes (0.8%). The result had similarities with the result in 2006. Sata and his PF gained most of the votes in urban areas, while the MMD won in rural regions: the MMD candidate was strongest in Eastern, Central, Western and Northwestern Province, while Sata won majorities in Lusaka, Copperbelt and Luapula provinces. Hichilema secured only Southern Province. The result underlined the fact that Sata’s PF had emerged as the major opposition party and had superseded UPND as the major challenger to the ruling MMD. Despite the slim margin of victory, disgruntled PF supporters did not resort to major violence of the sort that had erupted in several towns after the 2006 elections. The heavy security presence prevented a repetition. However, the election was tainted by a degree of apathy. The low turnout of 45.4% of registered voters could partly be attributed to the fact that in the available 90 days the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) was unable to organise a fresh voter registration drive. All election observers – from SADC or from FODEP – were generally satisfied with the conduct of the election and could find no evidence of rigging. The Zambia Centre for Inter-party Dialogue (ZCID) even commended the ECZ for performing much better than in the general elections of 2006. Despite this general satisfaction, the losing candidate Sata rejected the result by citing a host of alleged irregularities. He even accused the ECZ of rigging the election in Banda’s favour, and finally filed a petition demanding a recount of votes cast in all constituencies.

Zambia • 499 Banda was sworn in on 2 November in the presence of the new South African president and new SADC chairman, Kgalema Motlanthe, and Robert Mugabe. President Banda will hold office until the constitutionally stipulated next elections in 2011. The new cabinet (14 November) was the result of a wide-ranging reshuffle. Only six ministers who supported Banda during the nomination process kept their positions. However, many members used to be close allies of Mwanawasa. Insofar as the new cabinet implied no major change in policy orientation or in the factions supporting the president, it required no new patronage network. A major loser was former Finance Minister Ng’andu Magande, who had competed with Banda for the MMD’s presidential nomination. He was replaced by Situmbeko Musokotwane, the former economic advisor to the president. Local government and housing minister, Sylvia Masebo, was replaced by her deputy minister, Bennie Tetamashimba, who was Banda’s election agent and MMD spokesperson. The ministry of foreign affairs was taken over by Kapinga Pande, while Justice Minister George Kunda was retained in office but also appointed as vice president. In April, the constitutional review process was able to make some progress on certain contentious issues, especially the crucial 50%-plus-one vote for the election of the president. Both the ruling party and opposition parties agreed on the formula for the National Constitutional Conference (NCC), a formula that was brokered by ZCID, in which major political parties participate and sponsored by donors. The 50% clause was first included in the constitution that facilitated the transition to multi-party democracy in 1990, but later abandoned by the former President Chiluba in 1996 in order to secure his re-election by a simple majority. Since then, some of the presidents have had limited legitimacy: for example, President Mwanawasa won with only 29% of the vote in 2001. In November, the new vice president confirmed to the public that the NCC would be able to finalise its work by the end of 2009 and that the 2011 elections could be held under the new constitution. However, quite a few Zambian observers were sceptical about whether the government would stick to that timetable and whether the 50% clause would survive the whole constitutional process: the NCC will only provide a draft report on the new constitution, which parliament with a MMD majority will have to adopt. Mwanawasa’s anti-corruption policy of ‘zero tolerance’ remained controversial. Most donors stopped funding the Task Force on Corruption (TFC), formed to investigate crimes under the Chiluba government, for lack of substantial results. Many corruption cases had dragged on for years without conviction, and a number of corruption charges against well known politicians were dropped without adequate explanation. Nevertheless, on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Zambia’s position improved slightly by 0.2 to 2.8 points (out of 10). Zambia was thus ahead of 26 countries in Africa but performed worse than 17 other African countries.

500 • Southern Africa

Foreign Affairs After several years of rather low-profile foreign policy, especially in 2006 when the president was ill and faced an election campaign, Mwanawasa made a remarkable return to the international stage. However, the year started with a disappointment for Zambian diplomacy when the country’s candidate for the AU Commission chair, Zambia’s ambassador to the US, Inonge Mbikusita-Lewanika, failed to be elected during the 10th ordinary session of the AU assembly of heads of state and government in Addis Ababa on 1 February. Before the elections, the Zambian government made a major effort to enlist support, particularly among SADC members. Mbikusita-Lewanika was only one of five candidates from countries such as Burundi, Sierra Leone, Mauritius and Swaziland. Ultimately, Jean Ping from Gabon was elected by a two-thirds majority behind closed doors. At the same summit, Zambia and nine other countries were elected as members of the AU peace and security council for the next five years. In April, however, Mwanawasa took centre stage in African politics when, as chairman of SADC, he called an extraordinary summit on Zimbabwe in Lusaka on 12 April to discuss the ongoing crisis in that country after the controversial elections of 29 March. Mwanawasa’s call worsened the already strained relationship between the two governments. How much the government worried about the deteriorating situation in the neighbouring country became obvious when Zambian security forces were put on high alert along the borders with Zimbabwe on 4 April, while Zimbabweans and the international community were anxiously awaiting the delayed announcement of the election results. According to the ministry of defence, this was a precautionary measure in case of an eruption of violence and a possible influx of refugees from Zimbabwe. Zambian border posts stepped up security also to “avoid abuse of asylum facilities”, while the ministry of home affairs granted refugee status to at least 12 supporters of Zimbabwe’s MDC. While Mugabe boycotted the extraordinary meeting, three ministers did represent Zimbabwe, one of them denouncing the summit as being sponsored by the British government. Mwanawasa was at pains to refute this kind of allegation, and he had already been critical of Mugabe’s policy and the fruitless quite diplomacy the year before. With reference to Western demands for a stronger stance against Mugabe, Mwanawasa declared that the impasse in Zimbabwe could only be peacefully resolved within SADC. When the campaign for the presidential run-off elections in Zimbabwe scheduled for 27 June turned steadily violent, Mwanawasa, again as SADC chair, called for postponement on the grounds that the situation in the neighbouring country did not comply with “SADC principles and the charter and conventions of the African Union.” His call was supported by various civil society organisations and the Mineworkers Union of Zambia. The Zimbabwean government dismissed the SADC chairman’s demand as a unilateral move that was not in line with SADC rules and that would further divide the regional bloc. Earlier, spokesmen for Zimbabwe’s ruling party had accused Mwanawasa of siding

Zambia • 501 with the opposition party. In his last statement (read on his behalf), Mwanawasa criticised the circumstances surrounding the presidential run-off election as a “serious blot on the culture of democracy in our sub-region”. Earlier, he had called Mugabe’s politics an “embarrassment” to the region and continent. In a later development on 11 December, the Zambian government officially dismissed as “political hogwash” allegations apparently coming from Zimbabwe that Zambia and Botswana were planning to invade Zimbabwe in order to remove President Mugabe from power by force. Of his various state visits to other African countries, Mwanawasa’s visit to neighbouring Angola on 17–19 March was the most important. It was described as the beginning of a new era after many years of strained relations as a result of the Angolan civil war. The first step to improve mutual ties was taken in 2005 during Mwanawasa’s first visit to Luanda. Apart from the agreement to cooperate in various political, economic and security fields, the major issue was the reopening of the Lobito railway corridor. Before the Angolan civil war, the corridor used to link the Zambian Copperbelt via the Benguela railway line to the Atlantic Ocean. The rehabilitation of the railway link, at a projected cost of $ 2 bn, is expected to give Zambia access to a deep sea port, thereby allowing it to move its exports faster and at lower cost. On his trip to Asia, Mwanawasa first attended the fourth Tokyo international conference on African development in Yokohama, 28–30 May, entitled ‘Towards a Vibrant Africa: Continent of Hope and Opportunity’. The size of his ministerial entourage signalled the relevance of the meeting: it comprised the ministers of foreign affairs; finance and planning; commerce, trade and industry; and agriculture and cooperatives. The conference, which takes place every five years, was attended by 45 other African leaders. The president used the conference for talks with the Japanese prime minister, and he also chaired a meeting of the SADC heads of state behind closed doors on 30 May. At the invitation of President Hu Jintao, Mwanawasa spent the following week in China for what was officially called a private visit. Earlier in the year, Mwanawasa had reacted to anti-Chinese sentiment in Zambia by urging Chinese investors to improve their communications skills in order to avoid misunderstanding with Zambians. On his visit to Zambia in February, the Chinese commerce vice minister tried to placate critics by promising that the majority of new jobs created at the Chinese-owned Chamibishi Copper Smelter (CCS) would be given to local Zambians. On this occasion, the Zambian government strove to give the assurance that the property rights of Chinese investors would be protected. All this was a belated response to Sata’s anti-Chinese political agitation in previous years as well as to recurrent complaints about working conditions in Chinese-owned companies. However, in early March striking workers at the CCS site destroyed some of the property and assaulted the Chinese manager. The government not only condemned the incident and the workers involved but also urged foreign investors to comply with Zambian legal regulations.

502 • Southern Africa The planned voluntary repatriation of the remaining 51,000 Congolese civil war refugees in Zambia – in total, Zambia hosts about 87,000 refugees from neighbouring countries – was abandoned due to the recurrence of fighting in the eastern DR Congo in October. New refugees from the country were expected, but Zambia closed its borders to DR Congo. This measure was explained by the incidence of “mysterious diseases” in the Congo, meaning the Arena and Ebola viruses. In November, the minister of defence reiterated that Zambian policy was not to get involved in the DR Congo’s civil war. He also explained that Zambia would not be able to contribute peacekeepers to a UN mission to the country because the defence forces were already overstretched and because in this critical situation border security with the DR Congo had priority. Zambia had peacekeepers in the Sudan, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Eritrea and also troops with the SADC standby brigade.

Socioeconomic Developments For the sixth year in a row, the country achieved relative macroeconomic stability and substantial economic growth. The average growth rate over that period was in excess of 5%, and the rate for 2008 was 5.8%. The annual budget had projected a rate of 6.3%. The budget presented under the promise of unlocking resources for economic empowerment and wealth creation was delivered on 25 January by Finance Minister Ng’andu Magande. The shortfall in growth was attributed mainly to the poor performance of the agricultural and construction sector. The Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR), comprising 140 organisations, as well as church organisations approved of some of the measures taken by the government and commented positively on the overall economic growth, but were highly critical of government spending. According to the CSPR, the budget gave no indication of the resources being ‘unlocked’ for poverty reduction. The increases in social spending were still insufficient to address the problems of the rural population, who made up 68% of the total and of whom 80% lived below the poverty line. Unlike in urban areas, the incidence of absolute poverty in rural areas has gone up (by 2%). At the same time, the government reduced spending on agriculture by 3%, from 8.8% (2007) to 5.8% (Zambian Kwacha 1,064 bn to ZK 800 bn). While government spending on the social sector was to increase from 36% to 39%, the nominal increases in the health and education budget of 0.8% and 0.4% were denounced as insufficient to meet the multiple challenges in these two sectors. The CSPR also demanded an increase in agriculture expenditure to more than 10% of the national budget and called for more spending on environmental protection. In fact, only 68% of essential drugs were available at health centres. Although the government employed an additional 1,658 frontline medical staff, the available 15,349 personnel were still considered to be far below the requirement for adequate health service

Zambia • 503 delivery. Nevertheless, improvements in some health indicators were recorded compared to 2002: under-five mortality declined from 168 to 119 per 1,000 live births; maternal mortality fell from 729 to 449 per 100,000 births; the prevalence of HIV declined from 15.6% to 14.3% (age group 15–49) and malaria infections dropped from 89.5% to 75.0%. The government also revealed some improvements in the education sector. The recruitment of 5,000 new teachers reduced the pupil-teacher ratio by about 2.8 on average, and with the completion of 1,527 new classrooms 137,000 additional school places were created. The government continued to change the tax policy, the changes becoming effective on 1 April. The increase in the minimum non-taxable monthly threshold from ZK 500,000 to ZK 600,000 was viewed by CSPR as inadequate, because that amount just covered the average cost in December 2007 of basic food in Lusaka. Consumers were also supposed to benefit from reduction in value added tax (VAT) from 17.5% to 16%. To cash in on the booming copper mining industry, the government introduced a new fiscal regime for this sector that would earn expected additional revenue of $ 415 m. For copper, the windfall tax was increased to 25% (at a price of $ 2.50 per pound) and up to 75% (for a price above $ 3.50 per pound). The financial and economic performance over the year against the budget was mixed, with some targets being met, others not. The budget deficit remained at 2.7% of GDP, below the targeted 3%. However, in addition to the lower than projected overall economic growth rate, the inflation rate of 16.6% was significantly higher than the projected 7%. This was largely due to external influences, specifically high international fuel and food prices. Food prices increased by more than 20%, compared to 6% the year before, with serious negative effects for the vast majority of the population. The kwacha performed poorly against other currencies, depreciating 27.3% against the US dollar on average, but much less against the UK pound or the South African rand. In line with this, the current account deficit widened due to increased imports and inflated import prices: overall this deficit was up to 9.1% of GDP compared with only 2.4% in 2007. The revenue collection system performed positively partly based on the new tax regime. Tax revenue, which amounted to almost 95% of domestic revenue, was 2.4% above target, while non-tax revenues were 18.4% below target. However, due to administrative problems, collection of the new mining tax remained 65% below the expected target. A disturbing fact was the doubling of new debt within the last two years. Despite the chequered budget performance over the year, in June the IMF attested to significant progress towards macroeconomic stability, and reached agreement with the government on a new PRGF, basically on the same lines as its predecessor completed in September 2007. The new three-year PRGF was for SDR 48.9 m ($ 79.2 m), and enhanced the country’s international and bilateral creditworthiness.

504 • Southern Africa The overall growth of the economy was mainly driven by transport, storage and communication as well as by manufacturing and mining. The decline in the agricultural sector (–4%) was attributed to poor weather conditions, which led in some areas to flooding that destroyed crops. However, the government also acknowledged some structural constraints as contributing to the withholding of private investments: lack of access to credit, input and extension services; inadequate infrastructure; poor livestock management and the weaknesses in fertiliser support programmes. While the mining sector again recorded a positive growth rate (4.9%), the sharp dive in copper prices in the second half of the year heralded the first negative effects of the deepening world financial and economic crisis. International copper prices fell from a record of more than $ 8,900 per tonne in April to less than $ 3,500 per tonne in December, but well above the low of $ 1,200 in 2000. Copper revenue accounted for 80% of foreign earnings and for the last six years has been the main driving force behind economic growth. In response to the price drop, mining companies declared that job cuts would become unavoidable. In reaction, the president called for dialogue between mining companies and trade unions to avoid mass dismissals and asked his ministers to act as mediators. By mid-December, the first retrenchment of almost 5,000 mineworkers was imminent, and Luanshya Copper Mine, jointly owned by a Swiss and an Israeli company, laid off 1,700 workers. Gero Erdmann

Zimbabwe

Landmark elections, a political stalemate, the resurgence of political violence, the absence of a proper government, SADC-mediated talks and a damaging cholera outbreak joined the deteriorating economy at the top of the domestic political and socioeconomic agenda. In foreign affairs, Zimbabwe’s relations with the West remained frosty. Some voices from within Africa broke ranks with most of the continent and publicly condemned the ZANUPF government.

Domestic Politics In an extraordinary government gazette on 24 January, President Robert Mugabe announced that presidential, general and local elections would be held on 29 March. Parliament would be dissolved on 28 March. The announcement was criticised by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and civil society, and MDC would have preferred the elections to be held under a new constitution. The announcement was a setback to the interparty talks mediated by South African President Thabo Mbeki, whose apparent efforts to have the elections postponed failed. On 5 February, a former finance minister, Simba Makoni, who had defected from ZANU-PF, announced his candidacy for the presidency. There was widespread speculation that Makoni had the backing of the

506 • Southern Africa vice president, Joice Mujuru, and her husband, retired General Solomon Mujuru. On 12 January, Dumiso Dabengwa, a senior member of ZANU-PF and former cabinet minister, announced that he would support Makoni’s presidential bid. Cyril Ndebele, the former speaker of parliament, also backed Makoni. While predicting that Makoni’s candidacy would split the ZANU-PF vote, analysts also indicated that this would dilute the opposition vote. This was confirmed when the smaller MDC faction (MDC-Mutambara) publicly announced that it would back Makoni. The party would, however, separately contest the parliamentary, local government and senate elections. On 10 January, the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) already began to expose the election problems that would seriously compromise the results. In addition to violence, there were problems with voter education and registration. Despite some changes to the media and security laws and regulations in the run-up to the elections and as part of the interparty talks, President Mugabe and his ZANU-PF were accused of controlling all aspects of the electoral process. In particular, the registrar general, appointed by Mugabe, was accused of trying to rig the elections in ZANU-PF’s favour by, among other things, manipulating the voters’ roll. In February, President Mugabe launched his election campaign. In his rallies across the country he blamed the West, particularly the UK, for Zimbabwe’s economic problems. He promised to end those problems when elected. Election results changed internal matters considerably. The opposition won control of parliament. Of the 206 contested seats, ZANU-PF won 96, MDC-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) 99, and MDC-M 10. One seat was won by Jonathan Moyo, the former information minister, who had contested as an independent candidate. In the senate elections, ZANU-PF garnered 30 seats, MDC-T 24, and MDC-M 6. Crucially, the opposition won seats in ZANU-PF’s rural strongholds. There were speculations that Morgan Tsvangirai had won the presidential poll: the MDC-T confirmed these by claiming that Tsvangirai had won 50.3% of the vote. Citing logistical problems and the need for a recount, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) did not immediately release the presidential results, notwithstanding the fact that they were public knowledge thanks to the constitutional changes that stipulated that election results had to be displayed outside polling stations. The army relocated the vote-counting centre to a secret place and barred opposition and independent monitoring groups from witnessing the recount. Meanwhile, as the recount dragged on, there were allegations of harassment, violence and intimidation against the opposition and civil society. On 25 April, 250 policeman raided the MDC-T headquarters. ZESN offices were also raided. In the raid on the MDC-T headquarters some 300 people were arrested for allegedly engaging in post-election violence. On 2 May, ZEC finally announced the results of the presidential election. Tsvangirai got 47.9%, Mugabe 43.7%, Makoni 8.3%, and independent candidate Langton Towungana 0.6%. MDC-T dismissed the result as “scandalous daylight robbery”. Since none

Zimbabwe • 507 of the candidates had won an absolute majority, a second round run-off was to be held within three weeks of the announcement of the results. However, ZEC controversially announced that the run-off would take place on 27 June. This was interpreted as a ploy by ZANU-PF to allow Mugabe to gain the advantage through violence or rigging. The results of the parliamentary elections were thrown into turmoil as the two biggest parties (ZANU-PF and MDC-T) challenged many of the results. ZANU-PF claimed the MDC-T had bribed ZEC officials to rig the election in its favour. At least 100 officials and polling officers were arrested. Rumours were rife that Mugabe had lost the election and the tight circle of securocrats in the Joint Operations Command (JOC) had advised him not to concede defeat. The JOC was made up of Constantine Chiwenga, commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF); Perence Shiri, commander of the air force of Zimbabwe; Augustine Chihuri, commissioner-general of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP); Paradzai Zimondi, head of the Zimbabwe prison services; Happyton Bonyongwe, director-general of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO); and Philip Sibanda, commander of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). Emmerson Mnangagwa – back in Mugabe’s favour after being sidelined since late 2004 – headed the JOC. Dubbed a ‘military junta’ by critics, the JOC was believed to be effectively running the country. The period leading up to the presidential run-off was characterised by widespread state violence against and repression of suspected opposition supporters, especially in rural areas. Some 200 people were reportedly murdered, many were tortured and more than 200,000 displaced. Even after the election, violence continued. On 2 July, some 220 Zimbabweans sought refuge at the US embassy in Harare. Morgan Tsvangirai himself was repeatedly detained by police in what was seen as an attempt by ZANU-PF to restrict his ability to campaign. Furthermore, the government banned food aid. This meant that many people would have to depend on the government, and by extension ZANU-PF, for food. Many top civil society activists, election observers and members of the MDC leadership were reportedly arrested and/or assaulted. On 1 June, Arthur Mutambara, leader of the MDC-M was arrested in connection with an article he had written in ‘The Standard’ in April. According to the police, the article included falsehoods and was in contempt of court. On 3 June, police arrested three South Africans working for Sky News for illegal possession of broadcasting equipment. They were tried, convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment. On 5 June, the government banned all international non-governmental organisations. On 9 June, Deputy Attorney-General Johannes Tomana announced that anyone arrested for involvement in political violence would not be granted bail. On 12 June, Tendai Biti, the MDC-T secretary general, was arrested at Harare international airport. He was charged with treason on the basis of a widely discredited MDC-T document about changing the government. The document had been confirmed as a forgery and was thought to be the work of ZANU-PF.

508 • Southern Africa On 22 June, citing escalating violence, Tsvangirai withdrew from the run-off election. On the same day he sought refuge at the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Harare. The MDC formally submitted Tsvangirai’s withdrawal to ZEC on 24 June. The government and ZEC did not recognise the withdrawal, insisting that legally he was still a candidate. The June 27 election went ahead and Mugabe won a ‘resounding’ victory with 85.5% of the vote against Tsvangirai’s 9.3%. The MDC-T, unsurprisingly, did not recognise the election or the results. An hour after the announcement of the results, Mugabe was sworn in as president. Immediately afterwards, he called for “serious dialogue” with the opposition. On 1 July, MDC-T ruled out any possibility of a power-sharing deal with ZANU-PF. On 5 July, Mbeki’s diplomacy continued when he met with Mugabe together with the MDC-M leadership. MDC-T declined an invitation to attend. Following exploratory talks on 10 July, ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations, under the auspices of SADC and supported and endorsed by the AU, signed a MoU. It set out the agenda of the negotiations under four broad issues: economic, political, security and communication According to the MoU, the “dialogue [would] be completed within a period of two weeks from the date of signing of [the] MOU.” The parties agreed to “refrain from negotiating through the media”. Tsvangirai, Mugabe and Mutambara met in Harare on 22 July. They expressed support for a negotiated political settlement. The negotiations, mediated by President Mbeki, officially began in Pretoria on 25 July. Even as the talks got under way, there was disagreement regarding their status, with the MDC-T claiming that they were no more than “talks about whether to have talks”. On 25 July, it was reported that the ZANU-PF Politburo had resolved not to accept a power-sharing deal that failed to recognise Mugabe’s re-election or sought to reverse the land reform programme. There was a lot of contradictory information coming from the parties during the talks. For example, on 28 July, MDC-T said that the dialogue had stalled owing to disagreement on the leadership of the government. On 29 July, Mbeki claimed the talks were going very well. On 30 July, Mugabe said that the talks were going well and that the negotiators were working towards compromise. Significantly, in a joint statement on 6 August, the parties called for an end to violence. The SADC called for a summit in Johannesburg on 16 August. On 14 August, Tsvangirai’s emergency travel documents were briefly confiscated by CIO operatives at Harare international airport. He was on his way to the SADC summit. The documents were quickly returned and he was able to travel. The summit ended on 17 August with no agreement. In a communiqué, the participating SADC leaders called on the parties to “conclude the negotiations as a matter of urgency to restore political stability in Zimbabwe”. On 19 August, five months after the elections, government announced that parliament would convene the following week. On 20 August, MDC-T declared that the convening of parliament was unacceptable, referring to it as “a clear repudiation of the Memorandum of Understanding”. On 24 August, Mugabe unilaterally appointed eight resident ministers and governors as well as three non-constituency senators. The MDC-T denounced

Zimbabwe • 509 the appointments as a violation of the MoU. Members of parliament were sworn in on 25 August. In the election for the speaker of parliament, MDC-T candidate Lovemore Moyo emerged as the winner, defeating MDC-M’s Paul Themba Nyathi, who was also backed by ZANU-PF. Evidence indicated that some MDC-M members voted for the MDC-T candidate. In another controversial move, on 26 November Mugabe reappointed Gideon Gono to another five-year term as governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). Analysts predicted that the reappointment would deepen the country’s economic crisis. On 3 September, it was reported that Mugabe had threatened to form a cabinet if a power-sharing deal was not signed by 4 September. On 8 September, MDC-M stated that they would not be part of a government that excluded MDC-T. Mugabe reportedly backed down from his threat. On 11 September, Tsvangirai said that a deal had been reached. Confirming this, Mbeki announced that “an agreement has been reached on all items on the agenda”, pointing out that the deal would be signed in Harare on 15 September in the presence of other African leaders. On 15 September, SADC leaders witnessed the signing of the deal. According to the Global Political Agreement (GPA), the Government of National Unity (GNU) would consist of a president, two vice presidents, a prime minister and two deputy prime ministers. Mugabe would be president with executive powers. He would chair cabinet and the National Security Council (NSC). Tsvangirai would be prime minister with executive powers. He would chair the council of ministers and run the day-to-day business of government. He would be a member of the NSC. Mutambara would be one of the deputy prime ministers. There would be 31 ministries: ZANU-PF 15, MDC-T 13 and MDC-M 3. The specific details on the allocation of the ministries would be worked out between the parties. Other items in the GPA included a commitment to end violence, to uphold basic freedoms, to carry out a land audit and to ensure non-partisanship in state institutions. On 17 September, speaking to the ZANU-PF central committee, Mugabe described the agreement as a “humiliation”, blaming it on the party’s losses in the 29 March elections. The central committee approved the agreement. On 18 September, the three parties deliberated on the distribution of ministries but no agreement was reached and the case was referred to the negotiators, who met on 19 September. Again, no agreement was reached. On 4 October, the three party leaders met in Harare do discuss the issue: once more, they failed to agree. According to ZANU-PF, the disagreement centred on two ministries, home affairs and finance. Disputing this, on 5 October the MDC insisted that there were disagreement on all of the cabinet portfolios. On 9 October, Tsvangirai declared a deadlock and asked Mbeki to intervene. Mugabe, Tsvangirai and Mutambara met on 10 October and agreed to bring in Mbeki to mediate. However, on 11 October, the government mouthpiece, ‘The Herald’, surprisingly published an ‘official’ list showing the cabinet. The key ministries of defence, home affairs, justice, foreign affairs and local government were allotted to ZANU-PF. The MDC-T was allotted, among others, constitutional and

510 • Southern Africa parliamentary affairs, economic planning and investment promotion, labour and social welfare. MDC-M got education, regional integration and international cooperation, and industry and commerce. According to ‘The Herald’, only the finance ministry remained in dispute. The MDC-T denounced the publication of the list as “unilateral, contemptuous and outrageous”. MDC-M also rejected the list dismissing it as “hallucination on the part of ZANU-PF”. On 13 October, Joseph Msika and Joice Mujuru were sworn in as vice presidents, signalling that Mugabe was on the way to forming a cabinet. Protracted interparty talks between 16 and 17 October produced no agreement. The case was referred to the SADC. On 20 October, the SADC met in Swaziland. Tsvangirai did not attend, citing the refusal of the government to issue him a proper passport. Another SADC meeting in Harare on 27 October was unsuccessful. At an emergency SADC summit in Johannesburg on 10 November, the leaders endorsed the immediate formation of a cabinet with shared control of the ministry of home affairs. In a significant compromise by Mugabe, the finance ministry was allocated to the MDC-T. On 12 November, the MDC-T said it would not join the government unless the outstanding issues – among them “the issue of governors, equity and allocation of key ministries” – were resolved. Interparty talks resumed in South Africa on 25 November with Mbeki as mediator. In the next few days, there were accusations and counteraccusation between Mbeki and the MDC-T with the latter calling on Mbeki to step down as mediator. On 13 December, the draft Constitutional Amendment Bill (Number 19) was published in the government gazette. In December, Tsvangirai turned down an invitation from Mugabe to be sworn in as prime minister on the basis that there were outstanding issues concerning power sharing. As the negotiations dragged on, there was an upsurge in state-sponsored violence. On 13 November, the MDC-T reported that government had launched another wave of attacks on the party and human rights activists. There were increasing incidents of abductions by state security agents. The most notable case was that of Jestina Mukoko, the director of the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), which documents cases of human rights violations. A former newsreader at the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, she was abducted from her home in Norton on 3 December. For three weeks, the police claimed they did not know where she was and were treating her case as a kidnapping. One week later the high court ordered the police to look for Mukoko. Two other ZPP employees, Broderick Takawira and Pascal Gonzo, were abducted from their offices in Harare on 8 December. On 24 December, the three and other abducted activists appeared briefly in court. High court Justice Yunus Omerjee ordered the release of a number of abductees, including Pascal Gonzo. The judge also ordered Mukoko and Takawira to be released immediately to Avenues Clinic under police guard, to be given full access to their legal practitioners and relatives and to remain there until 29 December, when they were due to appear in the magistrate’s court. Police disregarded the order. On 29 December, lawyers

Zimbabwe • 511 were advised that Mukoko and eight others were to be charged with allegedly recruiting or attempting to recruit individuals for training in banditry, insurgency, sabotage or terrorism. Allegedly, the abductees were severely tortured. The year ended with the individuals still incarcerated in solitary confinement at Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison. There were many reported abductions in the period between October and December in various areas, particularly Mashonaland West, Manicaland, Masvingo and the Midlands provinces. In the town of Banket, on 30 October, a two year-old was abducted together with his parents and nine other MDC-T activists. At the end of the year, he remained in custody with his mother at Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison. By year’s end, there were still 12 ‘missing’ MDC officials and supporters who had reportedly been abducted. Significantly, the year witnessed some disturbances by soldiers. Soldiers rioted on 28 November and 1 December allegedly in frustration over their inability to withdraw adequate amounts of their pay from the banks. On 1 December, police and rioting soldiers from the presidential guard engaged in running battles in Harare. On 16 December, the government reported that the air force chief, Air Marshal Perence Shiri, was shot on 13 December in a terrorist plot designed to destabilise the country. There was widespread speculation that the attempted assassination was a result of the feud in ZANU-PF. There was little action on the legislative front. On 7 March, government gazetted the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act. It had been passed by the previous parliament and President Mugabe had assented to it. The act stipulates that black Zimbabweans must own at least 51% of the shares of every public company and all other businesses. On 28 November, the SADC tribunal ruled that 78 white Zimbabweans could keep their farms because Zimbabwe’s land reform programme discriminated against them. However, seizures of the properties of the commercial farmers reportedly increased, as government indicated that it would disregard the ruling.

Foreign Affairs While as a body the SADC maintained its support for Mugabe, even to the point of supporting him against Tsvangirai’s demands, there was some discord in the regional body. The Botswana parliament unanimously adopted a motion condemning the situation in Zimbabwe. Tsvangirai, who was concerned about his security, was allowed to establish his operational base in Botswana. Reportedly, it was Ian Khama, the Botswana president, who initiated the 28 April Lusaka extraordinary SADC summit called by SADC chairman, Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa, to discuss post-election political developments in Zimbabwe. Botswana maintained its critical stance throughout the year. Significantly, Khama boycotted the 16–17 August SADC emergency summit in Johannesburg because he did not recognise Mugabe’s controversial re-election. On 4 November, Zimbabwe described Botswana’s calls for a fresh presidential election to solve the political crisis as

512 • Southern Africa “extreme” provocation. In December, Botswana’s foreign minister, Phandu Skelemani, said that if neighbouring countries closed their borders with Zimbabwe, Mugabe’s rule would end in a week. On 15 December, Zimbabwe’s Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa told ‘The Herald’ that Zimbabwe had evidence Botswana was giving military training to members of MDC-T as part of a plot to remove Mugabe. Botswana dismissed Zimbabwe’s accusation as nothing more than “distorted” and “concocted facts”. On 17 December, Zimbabwe’s case against Botswana was dealt a major blow when the SADC chairman, South African President Kgalema Motlanthe, disclosed that the regional bloc did not believe Zimbabwe’s accusations. Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga was another consistent critic. Speaking at the World Economic Forum on Africa in Cape Town on 5 June, he said, “What happens in Zimbabwe is a big embarrassment for the whole continent. We cannot condone what is happening there.” On 24 June, he again called the situation in Zimbabwe “a big embarrassment”. On 30 June he urged the AU to “suspend [Mugabe] and send peace forces to Zimbabwe to ensure free and fair elections.” In response, the Zimbabwean government said Odinga was not qualified to speak on Zimbabwe as his hands “drip of blood”. On 4 December, Odinga said power-sharing in Zimbabwe was dead and it was time for African governments to oust Mugabe. Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa also broke ranks with African leaders. On 22 June, he stated that the political situation in Zimbabwe was an embarrassment to the whole SADC region and Africa. He also stated that it was “scandalous for the SADC to remain silent in the light of what is happening.” Other critical remarks came from Rwandan President Paul Kagame. On 18 June, he said that the African continent had failed the people of Zimbabwe by failing to help resolve the political crisis in that country. Referring to Zimbabwe, on 14 December Kagame said that leaders should not do wrong under the pretext of the good things they did for their countries in the past. More critical remarks came from respected Africans. Speaking in London on 25 June, Nelson Mandela accused President Mugabe of a “tragic failure of leadership”. Also on 25 June, Desmond Tutu, another consistent critic of the Zimbabwean government, labelled Mugabe a “Frankenstein” and called on other countries to intervene before the country descended into bloodshed. On 24 December, Tutu said that the international community must use the threat of force to oust Mugabe from office. Significantly, the SADC observer mission concluded that the results of the run-off election “did not reflect the will of the Zimbabwean people” and judged the election as not having been carried out according to SADC standards. In July, Zimbabwe was at the top of the agenda at the 11th summit of the AU in Egypt. The meeting, attended by Mugabe, approved a resolution calling for him to negotiate with Tsvangirai. In December, the government allegedly barred ‘The Elders’, a group comprising former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, former US President Jimmy Carter and women’s and children’s rights advocate Graça Machel, from entering Zimbabwe. The three

Zimbabwe • 513 were due to arrive on 22 November to assess the humanitarian crisis. In a statement on that date, ‘The Elders’ said that the government had “refused to cooperate in any way to make the visit possible”. In an open letter on 13 June, 39 prominent figures in Africa, including Kofi Annan, former heads of state, and civic leaders, called for a free and fair election, stressing that this was “crucial for the interests of both Zimbabwe and Africa”. On 18 June, ANC President Jacob Zuma said he was worried that Zimbabwe’s presidential run-off election would not be free and fair, given the violence and and the intimidation of the opposition. Chairman of the AU Commission Jean Ping described the events as “a matter of grave concern”. On 25 June, the SADC called for the election to be postponed and for “meaningful talks” to take place between ZANU-PF and the MDC, stating that “the people of Zimbabwe can solve their own problems”. Relations with the West continued to be strained. The EU, US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand maintained, renewed or strengthened targeted sanctions against Mugabe and senior ZANU-PF and government officials. The US, Britain, Australia and Sweden were among the most vocal critics of the Zimbabwean government. For its part, Zimbabwe continued to blame its problems on the West’s “illegal sanctions”. On April 24, Jendayi Frazer, the US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, noted that Tsvangirai had won the 29 March presidential elections and urged Mugabe to step down. On 30 June, Italy recalled its ambassador to Zimbabwe for consultations following the re-election of Mugabe. On 5 June, police and military officers detained and harassed US and British diplomats and local embassy staff who were investigating political violence in Mashonaland Central. The US described the attack as “absolutely outrageous”. Britain summoned the Zimbabwean ambassador for an explanation. On 9 July, Gordon Brown described the Zimbabwean government as a “criminal cabal”. He expressed doubts about the possibility of a free and fair election. Zimbabwe continued its ‘Look East’ policy. On 23 February, ‘The Herald’ reported that China was to lend Zimbabwe $ 42 m to buy farm equipment. The agreement was signed by Gideon Gono and the Chinese deputy commerce minister, Gao Hucheng, during a visit to Harare. Chinese firms would supply much of the equipment. Mugabe hailed China for supporting his government. On 17 April, the South African government confirmed that a Chinese cargo ship believed to be carrying 77 tonnes of small arms, including more than three million rounds of ammunition, AK47 assault rifles, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades, had docked in Durban. On 18 April, South Africa’s high court ruled the cargo could be offloaded in Durban, but could not pass over South Africa’s roads to get to Zimbabwe. Durban’s dockworkers said they would not handle the cargo, fearing the arms would be used against the people. The ship then headed to the port of Luanda, Angola. It remained unclear what happened to the weapons thereafter. On 24 June, in its first statement publicly condemning the conduct of Zimbabwe’s presidential election, the UN Security Council unanimously blamed the Zimbabwean government for violence, intimidation and the denial of free campaigning. On 29 April,

514 • Southern Africa the Security Council held a session on the situation in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean government denounced the session as “sinister, racist and colonial”, dismissing it as “a sign of desperation by the British and their MDC puppets”. South Africa, which then held the Security Council presidency, was reluctant to take up the issue of Zimbabwe. On 5 June, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon met Mugabe in Rome and announced that Mugabe had accepted a suggestion to send UN Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs Haile Menkerios to Zimbabwe to discuss how the UN could assist in the electoral process. Ban also stressed to Mugabe “the need to stop the violence and to deploy neutral international observers”. On 17 June, Menkerios met Mugabe in Harare “to discuss the technical requirements for holding the election, to see what the UN can do to help build capacity for a free and fair election.” On 18 June, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour announced that a member of her staff had been expelled from Zimbabwe on 17 June after spending only two days in the country. Also on that day Ban Ki-moon expressed alarm at conditions in the period leading up to the election and that, if the situation did not improve, “the legitimacy of the election outcomes would be in question”. On 23 June, following Tsvangarai’s withdrawal from the election, Ban Ki-moon said that the election should be postponed, pointing out that Tsvangirai’s decision to withdraw was understandable given the violence against his supporters. On 12 July, Russia and China vetoed a Security Council resolution imposing UN sanctions on President Mugabe and his inner circle. The resolution, supported by the West, would have imposed an arms embargo on Zimbabwe and a worldwide asset freeze and travel ban on Mugabe and 13 senior government and party officials accused of orchestrating abuses in the run-off vote. On 3 November, Global Fund executive director Michel Kazatchkine announced that the donor group had ordered that funds under its administration in Zimbabwe be placed under the Additional Safeguards Policy (ASP), which aims to ensure that funding is used for its intended purpose and not to benefit the government. This came after $ 6.5 m meant for the country’s anti-malaria campaign mysteriously disappeared. The money was part of a $ 103 m grant from the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria, $ 28.5 m of which was allocated to the health ministry for prevention and treatment of malaria. Civic groups suggested that the funds were spent by the bank to fund ZANU-PF’s political activities, particularly in the run-up to the March and June elections. Zimbabwe later paid back the money. Apart from travelling to the SADC and AU summits on Zimbabwe, Mugabe also travelled to Rome for the UN food summit (3 June). British and Australian ministers described his presence there as “obscene”. On 19 September, with the situation still unresolved, Mugabe travelled to New York for the 63rd UN General Assembly, where he again blamed the West for Zimbabwe’s problems.

Zimbabwe • 515

Socioeconomic Developments Economic indicators did not improve. According to official figures, year-on-year inflation surpassed 100,000% in January. By July it was 231 million per cent. Economics Intelligence Unit estimates put the GDP at $ 1.5 bn, down from $ 1.7 bn. The decline in the real GDP accelerated to –12.6%, from –5.5%. Agriculture declined by 17.5%, industry by 13% and services by 11%. The current accounts balance deteriorated from – $ 500 m to – $ 655 m, while international reserves fell from $ 120 m to $ 100 m. The total external debt rose from $ 4.9 bn to $ 5.3 bn. RBZ figures revealed that domestic debt was Z$ 790.6 quadrillion. On 1 August, the RBZ redenominated the currency and removed ten zeroes. The official year-end exchange rate (using the redenominated currency) was $ 1 to Z$ 200,000. In April, government devalued the Zimbabwe dollar from Z$ 250 to the US dollar to Z$ 15,000 to the US dollar. No budget was presented during the year. By the governor’s own admission, the RBZ funded government and ZANU-PF operations by printing money. In late November, the stock market fell sharply following monetary policy measures introduced by the RBZ to curb fraudulent speculative behaviour by investors who were ‘buying’ and ‘selling’ shares that were not backed by actual credit balances in their bank accounts. The government introduced a statutory requirement that from the end of November insurance firms and pension funds would have to invest between 30% and 35% of their assets in prescribed government assets. Failure to comply would result in “very serious remedial measures”. In January, government announced that it would open ‘people’s shops’ countrywide to provide basic commodities at affordable prices. In line with the new monetary policy, on 25 September government licensed 600 shops to sell goods in foreign currency. This was part of efforts to battle a flourishing black market trade and scarce supplies of basic commodities. This led to an increasing dollarisation of the economy, as even businesses that were not licensed began trading in foreign currency. Analysts argued this would do little to alleviate the plight of millions of Zimbabweans in the absence of radical political and economic reforms. The educational and health sectors remained paralysed for most of the year due to frequent and prolonged industrial action by teachers and health personnel over salaries and working conditions. The educational and health delivery system continued to experience problems of staffing, equipment and funding. Health and educational personnel made up a substantial part of the brain drain to countries such as Australia, the UK and South Africa. According to the Human Development Report (2007–08), Zimbabwe had an HDI score of 0.513 and was ranked 151st. The HIV prevalence among adults (15–49 years) was 15.6%. The proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day was 56.1%. On 19 November, the UN Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) put out a $ 550 m consolidated

516 • Southern Africa appeal for Zimbabwe for 2009, citing the “the alarming degradation of Zimbabwe’s economy and rise in social vulnerability [that] continued in 2008.” Another failed agricultural season further increased dependence on food as well as non-food assistance and gave rise to projections that 5.1 m people would depend on food aid by the first quarter of 2009. The country’s food needs were met through imports. Government reportedly paid Malawi $ 94 m for 400,000 tonnes of maize. Power blackouts worsened, with some domestic and industrial areas receiving no electricity for a day or more. Zimbabwe was unable to generate all the electricity it needed and had to import power from the DR Congo, South Africa and Mozambique. The problem was compounded by the decision of Cahora Bassa (Mozambique), the main supplier, to frequently cut off supplies over unpaid debts. Water shortages persisted in urban areas. Power cuts and lack of foreign currency to pay for treatment chemicals were cited as the major causes. Many people, even within government and ZANU-PF circles, blamed the state-controlled Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) for incompetence and bungling. Migration and displacement continued, with many Zimbabweans leaving the country as political or economic refugees. According to CAP, the most evident dimension of the migration phenomenon in Zimbabwe has been the irregular migration of youths to neighbouring countries, primarily South Africa and Botswana. Because they were undocumented, the majority of Zimbabwean migrant youths were apprehended and deported back to Zimbabwe. A cholera outbreak that began in Chitungwiza on 27 August spread to Harare and then to most of the country. The outbreak was blamed on the failure by ZINWA to provide uninterrupted water supplies and to collect refuse. On 30 November, government announced that cholera had killed more than 425 people and infected more than 11,000. Charging that government was trying to minimise the real death toll, the independent Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights put the death toll at 1,000. In December, the WHO said cholera cases could balloon to 60,000 before the rainy season ended. On 8 December, the government declared the epidemic a national emergency. Government appealed for help for its hospitals, which the health minister admitted were “literally not functioning”. On 11 December, Mugabe claimed that Zimbabwean doctors, with the help of “others”, had “arrested” the epidemic. The statement was met with widespread ridicule and disbelief and government vigorously tried to deny that Mugabe meant that there was no more cholera in Zimbabwe. By the end of the year, the epidemic was still spreading. Amin Y. Kamete

List of Authors

Jon Abbink, Researcher, African Studies Centre, Leiden, Professor of Anthropology at the Free University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, [email protected] Matthias Basedau, Senior Researcher, Institute of African Affairs, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany, [email protected] Rémy Bazenguissa-Ganga, Lecturer, University of Lille, France, [email protected] Linnea Bergholm, Research Candidate, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Department of International Politics, UK, [email protected] Heinrich Bergstresser, Media Consultant, Freelance Research Associate of the Institute of African Affairs in Hamburg, of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation and of InWent, Germany, [email protected] Nic Cheeseman, Lecturer in African Politics and Hugh Price Fellow of Jesus College, University of Oxford, UK, [email protected] John Daniel, Academic Coordinator of the School for International Training’s programme in Reconciliation and Development in Durban, South Africa, [email protected] Lewis B. Dzimbiri, Senior Lecturer in Public Administration, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana, [email protected] Gero Erdmann, Senior Researcher, Institute of African Affairs, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany, [email protected] Vincent Foucher, Researcher at the Centre d’Etudes d’Afrique Noire, Bordeaux, France, [email protected] Lansana Gberie, Senior Associate, International Center for Transitional Justice, Monrovia, Liberia, [email protected] Sven Grimm, Research Fellow, German Development Institute, Bonn, Germany, Sven. [email protected]

518 • List of Authors Joseph Hanlon, Senior Lecturer, Development Policy and Practice, Open University, Milton Keynes, UK, [email protected] Kurt Hirschler, Freelance Political Scientist, Hamburg, Germany, kurt_hirschler@web .de Nicole Hirt, Freelance Research Associate, Institute of African Affairs, German Institute of Global and Area Studies and Senior Consultant at HACOS – “Horn of Africa Consultancy Service”, Hamburg, Germany, [email protected] Rolf Hofmeier, Former Director, Institute of African Affairs, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany, [email protected] Cord Jakobeit, Professor of International Relations, University of Hamburg, Germany, [email protected] Amin Y. Kamete, Lecturer, University Bangor, Wales, UK, [email protected] Christoph Kohl, Ph.D. Candidate at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany, [email protected] Dirk Kohnert, Deputy Director, Institute of African Affairs, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany, [email protected] Bruno Losch, Senior Economist, Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement, Montpellier, France, [email protected] Richard R. Marcus, Director and Assistant Professor, International Studies Program, California State University, Long Beach, USA, [email protected] Mike McGovern, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Yale University, USA, michael. [email protected] Andreas Mehler, Director, Institute of African Affairs, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany, [email protected] Henning Melber, Executive Director, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, [email protected] Laurens Nijzink, Researcher, African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands, LNijzink @ascleiden.nl Paul Nugent, Professor of Comparative African History and Director of the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, UK, [email protected]

List of Authors • 519 Claes Olsson, Political Scientist and Editor at Global Publications Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, [email protected] Helena Olsson, Communication Officer on a project ‘Swedish Workplace HIV/Aids Programme (SHWAP)’, Stockholm, Sweden, [email protected] Krijn Peters, Lecturer, Centre for Development Studies, University of Wales, Swansea, UK, [email protected] Fanny Pigeaud, Journalist, Agence France-Presse, France, [email protected] Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle, Assistant Professor in Political Science, University of the Antilles and Guyane, France, [email protected] Marisha Ramdeen, Research Intern at the Human Sciences Research Council and MA student in political science at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, [email protected] Abdoulaye Saine, Associate Professor in Political Science, Miami University of Ohio, Oxford, USA, [email protected] Jon Schubert, MA (Basel), freelance consultant, Ph.D. Candidate at SOAS, London, UK, [email protected] Gerhard Seibert, Researcher at the African Studies Centre (CEA), ISCTE, Lisbon, Portugal, [email protected] Roger Southall, Honorary Research Professor, Sociology of Work Unit, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, [email protected] Alexander Stroh, Research Fellow, Institute of African Affairs, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany, [email protected] Susan M. Thomson, Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Ottawa, Canada, susanm. [email protected] Klaus-Peter Treydte, Economist, Freelance writer and Consultant, Former (2000–2004) country representative Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation Madagascar and Mauritius, kp3t@ gmx.net Denis M. Tull, Senior Research Fellow, German Institute for International Affairs, Berlin, Germany, [email protected] Stef Vandeginste, Researcher, University of Antwerp, Belgium, Stef.vandeginste@ua .ac.be

520 • List of Authors Han van Dijk, Researcher, African Studies Centre, Leiden and Professor of Law and Governance in Africa, chair Law and Governance group, Dept of Social Sciences, Wageningen University and Research Centre, The Netherlands, [email protected] Ineke van Kessel, Researcher, African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands, Kessel@ ascleiden.nl Klaas van Walraven, Researcher, African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands, [email protected] Martin van Vliet, Institute of Multiparty Democracy at The Hague, The Netherlands, [email protected] Christian von Soest, Research Fellow, Institute of African Affairs, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany, [email protected] Peter Woodward, Professor, School of Politics and International Relation, University of Reading, UK, [email protected] Volker Weyel, Former Editor-in-chief ‘Vereinte Nationen’ (1977–2004), specialised journalist and consultant, Bonn, Germany, [email protected] Douglas Yates, Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Department of International Affairs, The American University of Paris, France, [email protected]