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AFRICA AND FORTRESS EUROPE

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Africa and Fortress Europe Threats and Opportunities

Edited by BELACHEW GEBREWOLD University of Innsbruck, Austria

© Belachew Gebrewold 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Belachew Gebrewold has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editor of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England

Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA

Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Africa and fortress Europe : threats and opportunities 1. National security - European Union countries 2. National security - Africa 3. European Union countries - Foreign relations - Africa 4. Africa - Foreign relations - European Union countries 5. European Union countries - Emigration and immigration 6. Africa - Emigration and immigration I. Gebrewold, Belachew 327.4'06 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Africa and Fortress Europe : threats and opportunities / [edited] by Belachew Gebrewold. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-0-7546-7204-3 1. Africa--Emigration and immigration. 2. Europe--Emigration and immigration . 3. Europe--Emigration and immigration--Government policy. 4. Political stability--Africa. 5. Internal security--Europe. 6. National security--Europe. 7. Terrorism--Europe-Prevention. I. Gebrewold-Tochalo, Belachew, 1968JV8790.A47 2007 363.325'17--dc22 2007020226 ISBN 978-0-7546-7204-3

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

Contents List of Figures and Tables About the Authors Acknowledgments List of Acronyms and Abbreviations Introduction Migration as a Transcontinental Challenge Belachew Gebrewold

vii ix xi xiii

1

PART 1 THREATS FROM AFRICA 1

2

3

4

5

6

Crisis Region Eastern Africa: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development in an Environment of Latent Conflict Dustin Dehéz

21

Crisis Region Western Africa: The Cradle of African Migration to Europe Dirk Kohnert

37

Crisis Region Southern Africa: The Southern Africa Development Community and Human Security in the Region Cheryl Hendricks

55

Peace and Security Policy of the African Union and the Regional Security Mechanisms Stephan Klingebiel

71

Migration Theories and African Migration to Europe Belachew Gebrewold

85

Migration from Africa to Europe in the Age of Globalization: Historical and Economic Perspectives Andreas Exenberger

107

PART 2 THE RESPONSES OF THE EU 7

Frontex and African Illegal Migration to Europe Ilkka Laitinen

127

vi

8

Africa and Fortress Europe

European Migration Policy Heinrich Neisser

139

The EU’s Peace and Security Strategy in the DRC Birgit Loeser

159

Conclusion – Securitization of Migration and the Civilizing Process Belachew Gebrewold

173

Index

183

9

List of Figures and Tables List of Figures Breakdown of major Sub-Saharan African diasporas in the EU

51

Financial inflows of ODA, FDI, and official remittances (average of the years 1980 to 1999; source: IOM 2003: 228, World Bank data of 2001)

52

Figure 2.3

Migration-routes from Africa to Europe

53

Figure 6.1

Gross annual emigration rates of selected countries (per thousand of population), 1850s to 1900s

122

Refugee populations, 1994–2003

123

Figure 2.1

Figure 2.2

Figure 6.2 List of Tables Table 2.1

Table 4.1

Table 6.1

Table 6.2

Immigration rate and level of skill of Africans in OECD-countries (25+ years; in percentage of local work force)

53

Overview of the components of APSA and stages of implementation

83

Migrant stock (in percent) and its growth (in millions), selected countries, 1980–2000

124

Average emigration rates from African regions to OECD countries

124


About the Authors Dustin Dehéz is Director for North-Eastern African Studies at the Düsseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy (DIAS) and Member of the Young Foreign Policy Experts of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS), Germany. His research focuses on African security, state failure and the military in Africa Dr Andreas Exenberger is Assistant Professor at the School of Economics and Statistics at the University of Innsbruck in the field of economic history. His research focus is on the history of globalization. Dr Belachew Gebrewold is Assistant Professor of African politics at the university of Innsbruck, Austria. His key research areas are peace, conflicts and violence and contemporary Euro-African relations. Dr Cheryl Hendricks is currently the Programme Head of the Southern African Human Security Programme at the Institute of Security Studies in Tshwane, South Africa. Dr Stephan Klingebiel is Political Scientist and Head of the German Development Institute, Department for Governance, Statehood, Security. His main research areas are development, security policy, crisis prevention and conflict management instruments. Dr Dirk Kohnert is an Economist, and is Deputy Director of the Institute of African Affairs (IAA), at GIGA, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg/ Germany. He has been Managing Editor of the scholarly journal Afrika Spectrum since 1991. Mr Brigadier General Ilkka Laitinen is the Executive Director of Frontex, the EU agency responsible for operational cooperation of border guard services of the Member States of the European Union. Birgit Loeser is Principal Administrator at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union – DGE IX Civilian Crisis Management, Brussels. Professor Heinrich Neisser is Professor of Politics of the European Integration at the Department of Political Science of the University of Innsbruck. His key research areas are the Political System of the European Union and the Single European Act.


Acknowledgments The steadily rising illegal migration from Africa to Europe is the main reason for our attempt to discuss the Euro-African relations in the context of migration and security. It would be weird to thank these tragic events, which have been happening on the Mediterranean Sea and on the Atlantic Ocean, but these events are, ironically, decisive for the material and immaterial support to complete this book successfully. These sad events made the book project interesting and they even helped to get financial support for the project. Shall I thank these crises for this success? Anyway, I would like to thank the Department of Political Science of the School of Political Science and Sociology of the University of Innsbruck for all the facilities provided in order to conduct and complete this book. The Leopold Franzens University of Innsbruck/Austria was kind enough to support the project financially. Furthermore, the Foreign Office of the Tyrolean Government acknowledged the relevance of this book and decided to grant some financial support towards the technical completion. Research assistant Elisabeth Haun was a great help during the whole process of the emergence and accomplishment of the book. Without the considerable help of Professor Heinrich Neisser, this book would never have been successful. His immense knowledge of the European Union, his openness, cooperation and his financial support have been decisive for this project. He has realised how various developments in Africa have been significant for the European Union and he encouraged me continuously to invest time and energy in the completion of this book. I have had many discussions with David Francis, Director of the African Studies Centre at Bradford University, UK, who I would like to thank. His comments and suggestions to refine the book project were very important. Finally, I would like to thank the contributors for their patience and conscientiousness while revising their chapters upon my comments and suggestions. Belachew Gebrewold


List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACCORD ACP AHSI AMIB AMU APSA APF APFO ASF AU CADSP CEMAC CEN-SAD CEWARN CEWERUs CEWS CFA CFSP CIAT CIRAM COMESA CNO CPO-Kinshasa DDR DDRR DFID DRC EASBRIG EC ECCAS ECOWAS EDF EPA EPN ESDP ESS EU EUPOL EURODAC

African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific countries African Human Security Initiative African Mission in Burundi Arab Maghreb Union African Peace and Security Architecture African Peace Facility African Peace Forum African Standby Force African Union Common African Defence and Security Policy Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale Community of Sahel and Saharan States Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units Continental Early Warning System Communauté financière d’Afrique Common Foreign and Security Policy Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Centre national des operations de la PNC Centre provincial des operations de Kinshasa Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Resettlement The Department for International Development Democratic Republic of Congo Eastern African Standby Brigade European Community Economic Community of Central African States Economic Community of West African States European Development Fund Economic Partnership Agreements European Patrols Network European Security and Defence Policy European Security Strategy European Union EU Police Mission European Dactyloscopy

xiv

EUSEC DR EUSR FDI FJSTs FOMUC FRONTEX FYROM GDP GMI ICC IDPs IEMF IGAD IGASOM IOM IPU ISPDC ISS LDC LLDC LRA MDGs MONUC NEPAD NATO NGO OAU ODI OECD OPDS PIR PNC PSC RABITs RAC RECs SADC SG/HR SIS SPLM/A SSA SSR TEC TEU TFG


CongoEU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo European Union Special Representative Foreign Direct Investment Frontex Joint Support Teams Force multinationale en Centrafrique Front Extérieure Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Gross Domestic Product Groupe d’Intervention Rapide Islamic Courts Council Internally Displaced Persons Interim Emergency Multinational Force Intergovernmental Authority on Development IGAD peacekeeping force in Somalia International Organization on Migration Integrated Police Unit Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee Institute for Security Studies Development Country Least Developed Country Lord’s Resistance Army Millennium Development Goals Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo New Partnership for Africa’s Development North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Governmental Organization Organisation of African Unity Overseas Development Institute, London Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Police d’Intervention Rapide Police Nationale Congolaise Political and Security Council Rapid Border Intervention Teams Risk Analysis Centre Regional Economic Communities Southern African Development Community Secretary-General/High Representative Schengen Information System Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement Sub-Saharan Africa Security Sector Reform Treaty of the European Community Treaty of the European Union Transitional Federal Government

List of Acronymns and Abbreviations

UN UNDP UNHCR UNITA UNSC WANEP WHO WTO

United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees National Union for Total Independence of Angola United Nations Security Council West African Network for Peace World Health Organisation World Trade Organisation

xv


Introduction Migration as a Transcontinental Challenge Belachew Gebrewold

The causes and consequences of migration, and the implications of the migration policy of the European Union, determine the intercontinental and interstate relations between Europe and Africa. The migration policy of the EU and its foreign policy are being increasingly interconnected. These EU policies are being affected by the political instabilities, institutional weaknesses and ongoing conflicts in other parts of the world, such as in Africa. The migration policy of the EU is increasingly becoming part of the development cooperation policy. This phenomenon shows that there are no more separate policy areas. This is a political paradigm shift. This paradigm shift is mainly caused by the 9/11 attacks and the bombings of Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005. Since those terrorist attacks, a key European security strategy is to secure Europe not only internally, but also from the outside. One important component of this security strategy is the mechanism to address migration as transcontinental challenge. This book is not a ‘migration reader’; instead, it is an analysis of Euro-African relations within the context of the increasing African migration to Europe. Migration from Africa, as well as other parts of the world, is being increasingly considered as one of the key threats to European political and social security. Many European citizens do not approve of the US policy towards the Middle East; its invasion of Iraq, and its military bases in various countries in Europe, etc. The protest by Italians on 17 February 2007 against the planned military base in Vicenza, Italy is just one of the many examples. Even if some Europeans sympathize with many Arab countries, regarding US invasions and interventions in the region since the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, and London, they are increasingly feeling an unease with Islam. The growing anti-Islamism in Europe and increasing Islamist terrorist attacks have engulfed the migration issue. Young people from Eastern and Northern Africa with Islamist backgrounds were involved in the ten coordinated terrorist attacks, the worst ever seen in Spain, on 11 March 2004, which saw 191 people killed in Madrid. In the same way, four coordinated suicide bombers struck in central London on 7 July 2005, killing 52 people and injuring more than 770. Such terrorist attacks have become one of the EU’s most urgent security concerns, forcing it to make migration policy a security policy. After the March 11 bombings, many Spanish Moroccans and other Muslims in Spain feared a racist and anti-Islamic backlash against immigrants. Nearly 376,000 Moroccans have legal residence and work permits and about 200,000 live

2


undocumented in Spain; and, since the bombings, Islamophobia and racist reactions have begun to worry both the government and non-governmental organizations.1 Similarly, in October 2006, election campaigns in Austria saw far-right parties attracting a considerable number of voters by raising the issues of immigration and Islam. Not only far-right parties but also a considerable number within the European population are blaming Muslims in particular, and foreigners in general, as threats to the security of Europe. This is leading to the securitization of migration.2 Already, by 2003 and 2004, there were moves in Europe to address illegal migration and Islamist terrorism as interrelated issues. In May 2003, the five ‘core’states of Europe (GB, France, Italy, Spain and Germany) created a new alliance; the G-5, in order collectively to fight illegal migration and terrorism. The French Internal Affairs Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy suggested the creation of a ‘security zone’ on the western Mediterranean Sea. To stop the illegal migration from North Africa to Europe the so-called ‘3 plus 3’ project was suggested, which includes three European states (Spain, France and Italy) and the three North African states (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) from where most of the illegal migrants come to Europe.3 Besides fighting illegal migration and terror threats from Africa there is another important factor for the increasing involvement of the Europeans, as well as the US, in securing the Mediterranean Sea: Libyan and Algerian oil. Petroleum interests are vital and vulnerable. Libya (after Russia) is the second largest source of oil for Germany, who is, in turn, the second largest exporter (after Italy) of arms to Libya. Tony Blair visited Libya on 24 March 2004 in order to protect oil interests. Libya possesses what are probably the eighth largest oil reserves in the world. The Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, visited Libya on 7 October 2004, for the fourth time in the same year, to inaugurate the pipeline ‘Greenstream’. The ‘West Libyan Gas Project’ is built and run by Italian energy company ENI; the main foreign investor in Libya. Otto Schilly, the former Home Affairs Minister of Germany, suggested the creation of ‘reception camps’ for African refugees in North African states. The idea was welcomed by some European politicians including Tony Blair.4 The growing number of African migrants to Europe has increased resentment against legal or illegal migrants. In Europe, implicitly or explicitly, African migrants are increasingly being considered as Islamic fundamentalists, potential terrorists, drug dealers or criminals. The number of African migrants attempting to enter Europe has increased during the past few years, whereas African intercontinental migration, until quite recently, has been modest. However, especially following the last couple of years, some in Europe believe and fear that this has changed and the migration pressure from Africa is increasing.5 In 2005, 22,939 illegal migrants were registered on the Italian island of Lampedusa, and between January and August 2006, 14,567 newcomers arrived there. Similarly, in 2005, 11,781 African illegal migrants 1 2 3 4 5

Human Rights Watch (2005, p. 12). Zucconi (2004); Tirman (2004, p. 7). Dietrich (2005). Dietrich (2005). Hatton & Williamson (2005, p. 247).

Introduction

3

arrived at the Spanish Canary islands, and between January and July 2006, 17,058 new arrivals were registered. According to Spanish authorities, up until the end of 2006, more than 31,000 migrants arrived at the Canary Islands, and about 6,000 died or went missing in the Mediterranean and Atlantic in the same year. On the Maltese side there were 1,822 illegal migrants in 2005, and 1,502 between January and August 2006. After hundreds of African migrants managed to climb the border fences into the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa in September 2005, Spain has doubled the height of the fences (from 3 to 6 metres) that separate these enclaves from Morocco. In order to address this challenge Spain has been equipping itself with a new radar system, day/night vision cameras, tear gas diffusion system and detection wires.6 Patrol boats, planes and helicopters from various European countries are operating off the shores of Mauritania, Senegal and Cape Verde coordinated by Frontex (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union). The EU considers these measures as a preventative operation to locate and identify any illegal boat and to immediately return it, if found, to African waters. In addition, some European states have already been arming North African states such as Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Libya, bilaterally, to reinforce their coast defence capacities and prevent the influx of African migrants. By establishing Regional Protection Programmes for refugees close to the regions of origin, Europe aims to ward off migration flow towards Europe. Violence and poverty are usually considered as the main patterns of African crisis or the push factors of the African migrants to Europe. These conflicts and poverty vary from region to region in Africa. State collapse, failure and weakness in states such as Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Chad, Central African Republic, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Guinea etc have regional as well as transcontinental implications. Although to varying extents, all these and other African states are affected by violence and poverty. Conflicts based on the politics of identity and marginalization of non-Arab and non-Muslim Africans in Sudan have been devastating the southern and western parts of the country.7 So far there are no solutions for the Darfur conflict in western Sudan. Civil militia and state violence8 has killed at least 200,000, displaced 2.5 million people and sent another 200,000 as refugees into Chad. The government of Sudan systematically supports this violence.9 The Sudanese government has been exploiting local resources, especially in southern Sudan, and imposing its religious and cultural beliefs on the non-Arab populations. It has been adding fuel to conflicts between various ethnic groups in the southern part of Sudan, and since the beginning of 2003, also in the west – in Darfur. This had served at various times as a tactic but,

6 7 8 9

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4319828.stm Idris (2005). Tar (2005). Flint & de Waal (2005).

4


in the long-run, the problem has remained and armed opposition against the central government has not decreased. The UN Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1564 (2004) gave the green light for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to operate in Darfur. In 2004 the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) deployed around 150 troops. In March 2005, more than two years after the beginning of the war, the AU had less than 2000 of its authorised 3320 personnel on the ground. The humanitarian, security and political situation deteriorated directly after the war began. Atrocities continued and malnutrition, disease and famine were devastating the entire Darfur region. The situation is still deteriorating because attacks on civilians continue and the Sudanese government is not willing to stop arming its militia. Not only the fighting between the rebels and the Sudanese government, but also the escalating proxy war between Sudan and Chad, has begun to destabilize the whole region including the Central African Republic (CAR). With the aid of the Sudanese government, rebels in the northern part of CAR are trying to overthrow the government of François Bozize, whereas Chad and CAR are supporting the Darfur rebels. In order to address the catastrophic situation in Darfur the UN Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006) attempted to extend to Darfur the mandate of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which presently has 10,000 personnel monitoring the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This agreement was signed in January 2005 to end the second Sudanese civil war, which began in 1983. The UN proposed to deploy 22,500 troops to replace the 7000 AU peacekeeping troops in Darfur. However, the UN was not in the position to force the Sudanese government to accept the deployment of the UN peacekeeping troops and instead, it ‘invited’ Sudan to consent to the deployment proposal. This weak position of the UN partly reflects the fact that the members of the UN Security Council do not agree on robust resolution; China is interested in Sudanese oil and Russian weapons are used to kill the Darfurians. Another problem zone in Africa is Nigeria. Within four years of Olusegun Obasnjo taking office in 1999 more than 10,000 people were killed in inter-communal conflicts. Sometime the violence has pitched Muslims against Christians, but it has not always been on a religious level. There are some 250 different ethnic groups and the religious geography is such that there is no clear division between the Christian South and Islamic north. There are Christians in the North as well as Muslims in the South. Another major factor that contributes to the ongoing conflicts in Nigeria is that of wealth distribution. Hostage-taking of mainly foreign oil company workers has become an attractive business in the Delta region. In spite of the oil exploration in the Delta region, communities feel aggrieved at the lack of development and high unemployment. Although Nigeria’s population has grown rapidly (as is the case in all African countries), and despite the country’s vast oil wealth, the pace of the economy is disappointing.10 Those who have access to the source of power become rich, and the poor and powerless want it all the more. At the beginning of 2006 the overall oil production went down 220,000 barrels a day, which is almost 10% of Nigeria’s average output 10 Hunt (2006).

Introduction

5

of 2.6 million barrels. In early October 2006, after a wave of attacks, several oil facilities were shut down, which resulted in a 25% drop in Nigeria’s oil output. This economic injustice and corruption has caused the Delta region to become awash with weapons. The militants called the ‘Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta’ (MEND), from the ethnic Ijaws – Nigeria’s fourth largest ethnic group who live primarily in the Delta – are violently fighting against national and international exploitation.11 High levels of poverty and a struggle for access to scarce resources, such as land and jobs, have simultaneously turned Nigeria into a land of poverty and plenty.12 In spite of its $400 billion in oil revenue since the early 1970s, crude oil output of 2.6 million barrels per day and about 184 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, Nigeria is one of the highest ‘migrant producers’ in Africa. This is caused by such factors as $35 billion foreign debts, 60% of its population living below the poverty line, and life expectancy of 47 years. Since independence in 1960 more than $380 billion has either been stolen or wasted by Nigerian governments and the culture of corruption.13 It is estimated that corruption costs Africa $148 billion per year. This corruption in Africa increases the costs of goods by up to 20%, deters investment and impedes growth by 0.5%.14 Corruption and undemocratic institutions in most African states have resulted in the continent’s current indebtedness by $300 billion. The Democratic Republic of Congo boasts huge reserves of gold, some 30% of the world’s diamond reserves, more than 70% of the world’s valuable coltan mineral and vast deposits of cobalt, copper and bauxite yet the civil war between 1998–2002 killed at least 4 million. Various rebel groups, militias from Congo and neighbouring states and the active military involvement of neighbouring states operating in the eastern part of the country have created the tragedy.15 This has been happening in spite of the presence of more than 17,000 UN peacekeepers, with an annual budget of $1 billion. More than 1000 people are dying every day from war-related causes, including disease, hunger and violence. Regional as well as global actors are responsible for the Congolese tragedy.16 One thousand people die every day as a result of the ongoing conflicts, and it is they who are paying the price for the atrocities caused by King Leopold II of Belgium, who paved the way for the exploitation of the Congolese natural resources and the brutalities against the population since the second half of the 1880s.17 The scramble for Africa started thereafter, and the Europeans divided the continent like a piece of cloth. The Belgians, who took the Congo from King Leopold II in 1908, carried on the brutality and exploitation of Congo’s natural resources – such as uranium,

11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Adetoun (2005). Akinwumi (2004). Smith (2006). Lockwood (2006, p. 66). Munene (2005). Clark (2002). Meredith (2005, p. 96).

6


cooper and diamonds – especially in the mineral rich areas of Katanga.18 The Belgian interests in Katanga contributed substantially to the civil war that emerged in the early 1960s. President Mobutu had been supported by various countries in spite of the fact that he depleted the country politically and economically. When Laurent Kabila, who ousted Mobutu on 16 May 1997, was assassinated on 16 January 2001, his son Joseph succeeded him as President of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Contrary to his father, Joseph Kabila swiftly agreed to the deployment of a United Nations military observer force, which was expected to disarm the militant forces associated with the Rwandan genocide of 1994. These forces were residing in the Democratic Republic of Congo after the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front took control of the power from the Hutu militias, who then fled from Rwanda. This spill-over effect of the Rwandan genocide has dramatically contributed to the devastating war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The presence of the Ugandan armed groups fighting the government in their home country also added fuel to the war. These armed groups from Rwanda and Uganda provided a rationale for the governments of these countries to conduct the counterinsurgency operations within the Congolese territory. Besides Uganda and Rwanda, out of economic interests and/ or to fight rebels operating from there, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Burundi occupied Congolese territories. In spite of various ceasefire and peace agreements, such as Lusaka 1999, Sun City 2002, Pretoria 2002 and Luanda 2002 heavy fighting continued in Eastern Congo, particularly in the Kivu and Ituri Provinces. Local, national and regional shareholders in the Congolese conflict made these provinces the main theatres for direct and proxy confrontation. The transitional government was sworn in on 30 June 2003 and was supported by the troops of the European Union and peacekeepers of the United Nations. One of the key objectives of the transitional government was to prepare elections for 2005 but belligerent leaders, corruption and mismanagement had been threatening the population throughout the transition period. Ongoing conflicts and institutional weaknesses caused the postponement of national elections from June 2005 until March 2006. In spite of the final presidential elections that took place at the end of October of 2006, the armies of the defeated presidential candidate Jean Pierre Bemba were not willing to lay down their weapons and be integrated into the national army. In the second half of March 2007 up to 600 people may have died in the clashes in Kinshasa between the hundreds of bodyguards of Jean Pierre Bemba and the national army. The Ivory Coast was once West Africa’s richest country. A rebel group called ‘New Forces’ took control of the north in September 2002 and although its objectives were political, its composition suggests that ethnic issues undeniably play an important role. The rebels, who attempted a coup against President Gbagbo in September 2002, complain that they are politically and culturally discriminated against. It was hoped that the ceasefire and Linas-Marcoussis Accord of January 2003 would bring a lasting peaceful solution, especially since July 2003 when both parties declared an ‘end to war’ and declared their willingness to disarm and reintegrate the armed

18 Meredith (2005, p. 97); Schraeder (2006).

Introduction

7

groups with the political objectives of a power-sharing government and creation of a ‘zone of confidence’ between north and south. However, that did not happen. After the conflict divided the country into north and south, a buffer zone between the two sides was created and it is currently patrolled by 3500 French and 7853 UN troops. It is hoped that a major step forward has been taken when, on 27 March 2007, the two sides agreed to appoint the prominent rebel leader, Guillaume Soro, to the position of prime minister. On 30 July 2007 they declared the end of the war. As the history of this conflict and list of deals show us however, Ivorian politicians are famous for breaking the accords they have signed and this might happen again. The Horn of Africa is probably the most troubled region in Africa. The state of Somali collapsed in 1991 after President Siad Barre was ousted from office.19 After the collapse, three major things happened: first, Somaliland (the former British Somaliland) became independent; second, the interclan-based civil war of Somalia began; and third, the international military intervention took place in 1992.20 Neither the US military intervention nor the UN involvement could pacify the country. Instead, the US and the UN left the country, humiliated by the warlords of Somalia.21 Although the former British Somaliland became relatively peaceful and is progressing economically, the economic infrastructure and political institutions have been completely destroyed. Since the collapse of the Somali state there have been a number of peace negotiations, peace accords, ceasefire agreements and peace conferences. Towards the end of 2004, the Transitional Federal Government was created with support from the regional and global players, yet since the transitional government failed to move to Mogadishu from Baidoa or establish political and economic institutions, the Islamic Courts Union filled the gap. Somalia is awash with weapons that have flooded in since the collapse of the state. The UN arms embargo could not help to stop the further influx of arms, primarily because regional states such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and many other Middle East countries are supporting various factions not only financially but also with weapons. Furthermore, various terrorist elements are increasingly using Somalia as a breeding ground for radical Islamists. The Islamic Courts Union took power in June 2006 and stabilized at least Mogadishu until December of the same year. Then, with the help of Ethiopia and the USA, the transitional federal government expelled the Islamists from Mogadishu. The involvement of Ethiopia and Eritrea has exacerbated the situation. Whereas Ethiopia supports the Transitional Federal Government, Eritrea supports the Islamic Courts Union. Ironically, Eritrea is an extremely secular state. Eritrea’s objective of supporting the Islamic Courts Union is primarily to weaken Ethiopia, which is not only intervening militarily in Somalia, but is also the arch-enemy of Eritrea. This means that the war between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the Islamic Courts Union is a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Islamic Courts Union controlled Mogadishu between June and December 2006 and 19 Gebrewold (2005). 20 Library of Congress (2004). 21 Lewis, 2004

8


pacified it. However, ironically, for Ethiopia and the US (and probably for others as well) the peace brought by the Islamic Courts Union was not peace. They believe that Islamists cannot bring genuine peace. In Mogadishu it was only between June and December 2006 that people could move relatively freely, and buy and sell their goods, for the first time in the past 16 years. People of Mogadishu began to ‘enjoy’ the order brought by the Islamists. However, the objective of the anti-Islamists is not necessarily peace for the Somalis, instead it is simply the fight against the Islamists. Ethiopia, the US and the Transitional Federal Government expelled the Islamic Courts Union from Mogadishu in December 2006, since then, Mogadishu has turned back into what it used to be before power was taken by the Islamic Courts Union in June 2006. The consequences are displacement, killing and migration. Due to the conflicts and destruction, many Somalis head to Europe, primarily through Greece. Zimbabwe, once one of the flourishing economies in Africa, is devastated by political (suppression of opposition and denial of freedom of speech) and economic chaos. Mugabe was celebrated as one of the big African personalities in fighting apartheid and leading the Zimbabweans in their struggle for independence in 1980. However, little by little, Mugabe turned into a dictator. Since 1999, the Movement for Democratic Change has attempted to oust Mr Mugabe but has so far failed to achieve that goal. Even though he has been in power for 27 years and has contributed to the catastrophic political and economic situation, President Robert Mugabe says he wants to contest elections due next year. With unemployment at 80%, inflation about 7,600% (around mid-May 2007), more than 80% of the population living below the poverty line, and a life expectancy of 35 years, Zimbabwe is the worst performing country in the world. opposition activists are beaten in policy custody, more than 700,000 Zimbabweans were made homeless in the campaign of the government to destroy slums yet human rights demands and economic pressure from the western world has had little effect so far. Mugabe has got enough support from the eastern world (in particular China) and the Africans. Even though the current Chair of the African Union and Ghanaian President, John Kufour, has described the situation in Zimbabwe as ‘embarrassing’, African leaders are not willing to condemn Mugabe.22 The ‘big player’ South Africa does not want to isolate the once anti-apartheid hero, Mugabe. One of the consequences of this political and economic chaos is highly increasing migration flow from Zimbabwe. More than one million Zimbabweans are estimated to be in South Africa, and at least 3 million Zimbabweans have left their country to work in South Africa or to head to Europe and elsewhere. Critics of Mugabe from Zimbabwe and from outside hoped for a lot from the SADC Summit of 30 March 2007. But the only outcome of the summit was the appointment of President Mbeki of South Africa to mediate between Mr Mugabe and the opposition. Again Mugabe is the winner. The spill-over effect of the devastating civil war in Liberia and Sierra Leone from the late 1980s until 2002 has crippled Guinea. The incursions by rebels in Guinea’s border regions with Liberia and Sierra Leone since September 2000 have claimed more than 1000 lives and caused the displacement of thousands of the 22 Dowden (2007, p. 15).

Introduction

9

population. In late 2001 President Conte proposed extending his presidential term, which contributed to further escalation of the conflict. Even though the agreement in March 2002 between Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, on measures to secure mutual borders and to tackle insurgency, eased the relations between these neighbouring countries, the detainment and suppression of oppositions within Guinea has remained an unresolved internal problem. Elections boycotted by the opposition parties in 2003, assassination attempts against the president in 2005, crippling general strikes since 2006, and the declaration of a state of emergency on 13 February 2007 have made Guinea one of the most out of control states in Africa. Senegal used to be one of the stable countries in Africa, however the tumultuous elections of February 2007 have shown that this could change. The tradition of democracy in African Senegal has been a rare model, but fights between supporters of President Abdoulaye Wade and those of his former prime minister-turned-rival, Idrissa Seck, before the elections on 25 February 2007 overshadowed the Senegalese democratic record of remaining stable despite its religious and ethnic heterogeneities. In the weeks before polling for the February elections, police used teargas to disperse protesting oppositions, critics of Wade received death threats, and votes were rigged. High unemployment and the rising level of political consciousness of the young generation could change the situation of Senegal dramatically. Unemployment at 50% among young men and increasing levels of corruption23 are not only causing internal conflicts but also forcing many young men to leave their country in search for a ‘better’ future in Europe. The countries covered above are not the only ones affected by conflicts, bad governance and economic hardships. Unfortunately most of the African countries are affected, although to lesser extents. States such as Kenya, Angola, and Chad are also affected by the high level of corruption in Africa. In March 2007, an armed conflict between the rebels ‘Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement’ (UFDR) and the French backed regular army in north-eastern Central African Republic (CAR) caused a dramatic humanitarian crisis. Around 20,000 people have sought refuge in Cameroon, 50,000 in Chad, and an estimated 212,000 are displaced within CAR. The mutual destabilization process between Sudan and Chad has displaced at least 140,000 Chadians and 235,000 Sudanese refugees and exposed them to the deserts in eastern Chad. Economic hardships in states such Mali and Niger; interethnic conflicts, increasing suppression of the opposition and recurrent drought in Ethiopia;24 an incredibly authoritarian rule and brutal regime in Eritrea, all are causing many Africans to migrate to Europe or elsewhere. All Eritreans hoped that after independence in 1993, their country would become one of the most democratic and prosperous countries in Africa. However, Eritrean politics are completely militarized, the economy is destroyed and the country is becoming increasingly isolated both regionally and internationally. It is estimated that every month between 400 and 600 Eritreans flee poverty and conscription through the dangerous Sudanese deserts.25 23 Thompson (2007, p. 23). 24 Jalata (2005). 25 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6492961.stm

10


These and similar institutional weaknesses and unbearable political and economic situations play a considerable role in African migration towards Europe. In the political atmosphere of the western world there is an increasing feeling that potential Islamic terrorists are infiltrating the West under the cover of refugees. Increasing Islamic fundamentalism is expected not only from the North African states, such as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia or Egypt, but also from Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria. Various studies argue that poverty- and conflict-driven migrants and Islamic fundamentalists from collapsed, failed and weak African states are heading for Europe. The EU’s response regarding migration and security is three-pronged: common asylum and migration policy, cooperation with third countries and tight border controls. Based on the 1999 Tampere Programme guidelines for EU migration policy from 1999 to 2004, the EU has envisaged the harmonisation of the migration policy and the establishment of minimum standards of protection, reception, procedures, and recognition of asylum status, whereas a common immigration and asylum policy for the EU are determined by the 2004 Hague Programme for the period of 2005 to 2010. As regards control of the maritime borders, the EU Commission’s communication to the Council on 30 November 2006 has suggested plans to adopt a two-pronged approach: first, fighting illegal immigration, protecting refugees and reinforcing control and surveillance of the external maritime border; second, pursuing and strengthening cooperation with third countries in the context of the Association Agreements and European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans with North African states as well as, in the context of the Cotonou Agreement with Sub-Saharan states, to address the patterns of African crises and illegal migration. Tight border controls also mean cooperation to increase external border controls in terms of increasing the effectiveness of member state border controls as measured by decreases in migration.26 The ‘other’, ‘stranger’, ‘migrant’ is a source of threat, and causes ‘mass fear’ or terrorism; it poses threats to ‘our’ jobs, housing, borders, cultural identity and national sovereignty. Since September 11, 2001, this perception of threat has reinforced the security-migration nexus, resulting in securitization of migration.27 There are real as well as perceived threats regarding the migration-security nexus. The bombings of Madrid and London highlighted the real threats, but these real threats create further perceived threats especially if migration becomes more and more securitized. These perceived threats can result in ethically questionable policies which, in turn, might result in fortress building. This can be seen as an ethical threat that undermines human rights, values, equality, justice and rule of law. According to liberal tradition theory, the increasingly restrictive European migration policy threatens its continental cultural values. From a liberal point of view Carens28 argues that there is little justification for keeping migrants out because Europe is committed to respect all human beings as free and equal moral beings, the equal moral worth of individuals, and because of the priority of the individual 26 Koslowski (2006, p. 573). 27 Faist (2006, pp. 609, 612, 613). 28 Carens (2006, p. 619)

Introduction

11

to the community. According to this liberal position, it is unfair to maintain that ‘it is our country, we can let in or keep out whomever we want’, because there is no basis for drawing fundamental distinctions between citizens and aliens who seek to become citizens. Furthermore, Carens argues that the hypothetical possibility of threat (which might be caused by migrants) to public order is not enough to justify any level of restriction. From this liberal perspective Carens rejects even the braindrain argument. For him it is against liberal tradition to try to keep people from emigrating because they represent a valuable resource to their country of origin.29 Boswell30 tries to reconcile the communitarian-nationalist tradition on the one hand and the liberal universalism on the other. For the liberal universalism ‘states have ethical obligations to admit and assist all individuals in need of protection without discriminating on what are considered to be grounds of nationality, ethnicity, religion, and so on’31. The welfare nationalism, such as left-wings and trade unions, tries to justify its anti-liberal restriction on the grounds that unrestricted immigration would undermine wages and threaten job security. Further, ethnocentric nationalism, such as far-right, centre-right and Christian Democratic Parties, restricts migration in order to preserve the cultural identity (culture, language and norms) of national communities. Boswell argues that liberal universalist refugee law is politically unacceptable and irrelevant, and he tries to combine the universalist and communitarian-nationalist views. The local societies in which the migrants arrive should not feel that liberal universalist responses to refugees are imposed upon them. ‘By articulating a commitment to these liberal goals, communities can also celebrate and reinforce their shared norms. A generous attitude toward helping outsiders can reaffirm group identities’.32 Could the various forms of African crises be an opportunity for the Europeans to reaffirm their European identity and their traditions of human rights values by helping the Africans, especially the African migrants who stand in front of their doors? Are there any shared European norms to address this problem? How could the African problems be solved, and by whom? These questions have been playing an important role in various Euro-African cooperation initiatives for decades. Within the context of the Cotonou Agreement with the Sub-Saharan states, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy with the Northern African states, the EU attempts to support the African initiatives in two ways: first, by supporting the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU) by helping incorporate programmes and strategies for self-reliant development, economic integration and cooperation of the African regional economic communities (REC); second, by supporting the consolidation of African regional security mechanisms (RSM) such as IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development in the Horn of Africa), SADC (Southern African Development Community), and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). These two EU measures to support the African initiatives are influenced 29 30 31 32

Carens (2006, p. 628). Boswell (2006). Boswell (2006, p. 667). Boswell (2006, p. 676).

12


more and more by the increasing problems of African migration towards Europe. The Euro-African Partnership for Migration and Development aims at setting up cooperation programmes for the management of legal migration, and reinforcement of the national border control capacity of countries of transit and departure through maritime, terrestrial and aerial cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination within the framework of the Comprehensive Security Strategy of the EU according to the European Security Strategy Paper of December 2003. The Declarations of the Euro-African conferences on Migration and Development, of Tripoli in November 2006 and of Rabat in July 2006, designed measures on how to manage African migration to Europe. According to the declarations migration management depends on partnership with countries of origin, transit and destination. Since poverty and conflicts are believed to be the causes of migration, various strategies are outlined to address this problem. Good and effective governance, sustainable environmental policy, integrating Africa into global trade, peace, and coherent international policies of development cooperation are some of the key issues in intercontinental cooperation. These policy areas are augmented by further measures to address the transcontinental challenges such as facilitating legal migration and integrating legal migrants, protecting them through rule of law; fighting illegal migration; controlling borders of origin and transit; fighting human trafficking through strengthened police and judicial cooperation; setting up efficient re-admission systems; setting up appropriate financing mechanisms; creating coherent plans of action; and developing partnership between scientific and technical institutions. These strategies are meant to deal with the systemic crisis in Africa: underdevelopment, especially in rural areas, political conflicts, HIV/AIDS and other similar diseases, and unchecked population growth. The EU–Africa vision is therefore to meet the United Nations Millennium Development Goals by 2015 and improve EU–Africa relations based on an ‘equality-partnership-ownership’ principle. Peace and security (conflict prevention, development, peace-keeping, peace-building, security sector reform and disarmament) are the key strategies of the intercontinental cooperation. This intercontinental crisis is seen, on the other hand, as an opportunity to strengthen multi-level cooperation between Europe and Africa. First, what is the impact of the geopolitical dynamics on Africa? This means, how do the external actors, for example China, Japan, India and the USA, play a role addressing the African socio-political crises? Moreover, a lot will be expected from the regional stabilization capacity of the militarily and economically strong African states or anchor countries such as South Africa and Nigeria. But this depends on how South Africa recovers from the Apartheid legacy, and how Nigeria overcomes its culture of corruption.33 It is also important to take into account how fragile states can destabilize not only themselves but also their neighbouring states. From a geo-economic point of view in Africa there are resource-rich countries, agricultural or commodity dependent countries and landlocked countries that could have positive or negative effects on other states. This geo-economic dynamic also includes investment climate, intraregional trade, and interconnection (trade and integration). Another factor is the geo33 Smith (2006).

Introduction

13

social dynamic regarding progress, inequality, education, the health system, etc. The geo-environmental dynamic is one of the crucial aspects in Africa where the majority is dependent upon a subsistence agricultural economy. The common opportunity for Africa and Europe is, therefore, to address collectively the common intercontinental security threats. According to the Euro-African plans, creating positive economic development (macroeconomic stability, integrated regional markets, global market access and trade, private sector development, and food security), an interconnected Africa (trans-African networks, energy infrastructure, and a bridged digital divide) would keep African migrants at home. For all that to happen, increased EU-financial help for Africa is believed to be crucial. According to the Millennium Development Goals, the aid targets – which the EU supports – are to allocate 0.56% of the rich countries’ GDP until 2010, and 0.7% until 2015, to the development of poor countries of the world, particularly Africa. Eastern Africa is politically and economically the main vulnerable region in Africa. State collapse in Somalia, which has not had any significant government since 1991; devastating wars in Sudan; hunger, famine, conflicts and rising Islamism in the whole region, have transcontinental implications. The European Union has been trying directly or indirectly to help solve the Somali and Sudanese peace talks at various times. For example, the EU has supplied financial support to the African Union Mission in the Darfur region. In Chapter 1, Dehéz analyses the conflict dynamic in the region and its transcontinental implications. In Chapter 2, Kohnert discusses migration from West Africa to Europe. He maintains that there are several myths about international migration, remittances and development. Whereas the point of departure, according to Hendricks and Dehez, is the regional security mechanisms (SADC and IGAD respectively), Kohnert focuses not on ECOWAS as an institution, but instead, on the whole Western African region. He provides more facts and clarifies why there are debates on this issue. One important aspect of the chapter is the effect of the African emigration on African economies. Finally, he analyses the impact of the European economic (trade) policy on the increasing African migration to Europe, and how Europe reacts to the illegal migration. In Chapter 3, Hendricks discusses the political situation of the southern African region. After the end of Apartheid, this region was thought to be the source of stability for the whole of Africa but the economic and political crises in Zimbabwe and the conflicts in DR Congo in particular and the Great Lakes Region in general, have dashed those initial hopes. Hendricks focuses on how the regional security mechanism (Southern African Development Community – SADC) tries to stabilize the region militarily and economically. The European Union is interested in stabilizing this region to cooperate economically, especially with South Africa, and to stabilize this region, which is one of the high senders of migrants and is affected by high rates of HIV/AIDS, both seen as security threats to Europe. The ‘EU Strategy for Africa’ of 2005 and the Euro-African Rabat Declaration of July 2006 and Tripoli Declaration of November 2006 on Migration and Development consider peace and development as pillars of European and African security. The European Union tries, on the one hand, to support the Regional Security Mechanisms (discussed by Dehez, Kohnert and Hendricks in this volume), whilst, on the other

14


hand, it increasingly supports the peace, security and development initiatives of the African Union. In Chapter 4, Klingebiel clarifies the security related objectives and ambitions of the African Union. The European Union believes that this institution will play a significant role in the EU’s ‘external dimension’ of migration policy. All these measures and strategies show that there seem to be clear visions about how to address or manage transcontinental migration. However, an important question is: are the patterns of the current African migration to Europe similar to others in history, or is there any peculiarity? Hatton & Williamson maintain, in their book about globalization and migration, that the ebb and flow of cross-border migration in Africa can be explained by the same variables that operate today and in earlier centuries.34 Furthermore, according to them, economic growth in Africa would sharply reduce net emigration, which is consistent with the notion that successful development attracts foreign immigrants across borders and keeps more potential native immigrants at home.35 This assertion sounds logical, but that is not always the case. In Chapter 5, on migration theories, I argue that, although they certainly play a role, it is not only poverty and conflicts that push people to other richer countries. At different times there are different factors that cause people to migrate; modern media and globalization play as important a role as poverty and conflicts do. I discuss various migration theories and finally attempt to point out the role of ‘modernization’ and cultural globalization in pushing young Africans towards Europe. In various migration theories the economic aspect is a key part of migration analysis. In the push as well as pull factors analysis risk minimization or/and profit maximization is the centrepiece of migration research. In Chapter 6, Exenberger analyses, from an economic perspective, why people move and what are the consequences of their movement. Departing from the historical perspectives it discusses ‘slave trade’ as economically forced migration from Africa. Following that it discusses the political economy of migration, its reasons and some of its effects. In an attempt to stop the increasing flow of African illegal migration to Europe, boats, planes and helicopters are patrolling the shores of Senegal and Mauritania, the main routes to the Canary Islands. This is an operation of the European Union’s border control agency, called Frontex, for the management of the operational cooperation at the external borders of the Member states of the European Union. Frontex, established by the Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 aims to be a trustworthy, operational community coordinator and contributor in the field of external border management on the Mediterranean and Atlantic. The main tasks of Frontex are coordinating operational cooperation between Member States in the field of management of external borders; developing a common integrated risk assessment model; helping Member States train their national border guards; developing research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders; assisting them technically and operationally at external borders; and supporting them in organizing joint return operations.36 This border control of Frontex and the 34 Hatton & Williamson (2005, p. 250). 35 Hatton & Williamson (2005, p. 251). 36 EC (2004, Chapter II, Art. 2).

Introduction

15

Spanish fence project in Ceuta and Melilla are usually criticized as ‘fortress Europe’ projects. However, Brigadier General Laitinen argues, in Chapter 7, that the EU does not have any intention of fortress building. In Chapter 8, Neisser discusses the migration policy of the European Union. His analysis includes the migration-related policy developments beginning from the Schengen Agreements of the 1980s until the Hague Programme of 2004. The chapter deals with the significance of the European migration policy and analyses why the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs are increasingly integrated. Neisser assesses the migration policy of the European Union against the backdrop of the European ‘community values’ of freedom, rule of law and fundamental rights. According to Neisser, although the EU is on the right track in its attempt to address the wave of African migration to Europe it has still a lot to do to make its migration policy more humanitarian. One of the key aspects of the Hague Programme is the ‘external dimension’ of the migration policy of the European Union. The European Union believes that it is better to find lasting solutions for the causes of African illegal migration to Europe. Poverty and conflicts in Africa are considered to be the main push factors, therefore securing Africa, politically and economically, is the core of the ‘external dimension’ of the Hague Programme. In Chapter 9, Loeser discusses the military intervention of the EU to secure and stabilize the Democratic Republic of Congo, including security sector reform and police training. Even though the EU does not explicitly express it that way, it intervenes in Congo, at least partially, so that those from the crisis region do not leave their countries of origin and head for Europe. Löser says that it is not easy to find documents that confirm this intention, but various sources confirm that Europe is trying to secure itself outside of its territory by taking long-term measures that prevent the flow of immigrants from African crises regions. The reason why the three regions (eastern, western and southern Africa, including Congo) are selected is that they are currently the most affected regions by ongoing conflicts. In Northern Africa there are indeed institutional weaknesses and the region is a leading sender of migrants to Europe, but, currently there are no acute violent conflicts comparable to the conflicts of the three aforementioned African regions. However, this does not mean that there are no factors that could lead to emigration from North African regions. Instead, the main focus of this book is to discuss migration from the background of conflict as a push factor. This is also one of the key reasons why Europe sent its intervention troops into the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 and 2006. This means that the African crises are the push factors for the EU to consolidate and harmonize its migration policy to protect itself from the spill-over effects of the African crises. Hence, the African crises have direct and decisive impacts on the European migration and foreign policy. The three regions discussed in this book are more affected by these crises than Northern Africa. From this background, some key research questions raised by this book are the following. How and to what extent is the European Union threatened by the patterns of African crises? Are these threats real? How does the EU tackle these threats? What are the implications of the EU’s strategy to tackle these threats? The chapters that constitute this book try to answer the above questions. Within the context of the challenges facing African migrants to Europe, this book analyses Africa’s peace, security and

16


development initiatives by assessing the capacities and challenges of the AU and its Regional Security Mechanisms to find lasting solutions for Africa’s crises and their transcontinental implications. The following aspects distinguish this book: first, this book project is an interdisciplinary study; the first of its kind about the current African migration to Europe and the EU’s attempts to protect itself through virtual or real fortress building. Second, it pays special attention to the current poverty- and conflictdriven African migration towards Europe, which is a new phenomenon challenging the intercontinental relations. Finally, the EU’s policy measure of interconnecting migration, security and development is a new intercontinental strategy that has not yet been discussed adequately on an academic level. This book gives an overview of the threats and opportunities of the current and coming migration policy of the EU towards Africa. References , accessed 13 February 2007. Adetoun, B.A. (2005) The role and function of research in a divided society: a case study of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, in: E. Porter (ed.) Researching Conflict in Africa: Insights and Experiences (Tokyo: United Nations University Press). Akinwumi, O. (2004) Crises and Conflicts in Nigeria: A Political History Since 1960 (Münster: Lit-Verlag). Boswell, C. (2006) The liberal dilemma in the Ethics of refugee policy, in: A. Messina & G. Lahav (Eds) The Migration Reader: Politics and Policies, pp. 664–682 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Carens, J.H. (2006) Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders, in: A. Messina & G. Lahav (Eds) The Migration Reader: Politics and Policies, pp. 619–638 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Clark, J.F. (Ed.) (2002) The African stakes of the Congo War (New York: Palgrave). Dietrich, H. (2005) Das Mittelmeer als neuer Raum der Abschreckung, in: http:// www.ffm-berlin.de/mittelmeer.html, accessed 13 March 2007. Dowden, R. (2007) Endgame in Zimbabwe, Time, 169(14), p. 15. European Council Regulation Number 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004, establishing a European agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of the member states of the European Union. Faist, T (2006) Extension du domaine de la lutte: international migration and security before and after 11 September 2001, in: A. Messina & G. Lahav (Eds) The Migration Reader: Politics and Policies, pp. 609–615 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Flint, J. & de Waal, A. (2005) Darfur: A Short History of a Long War (Cape Town: Zed Books). Gebrewold, B. (2005) Civil militias and militarization of society in the Horn of Africa, in: D.J. Francis (Ed.) Civil Militia: Africa’s Intractable Security Menace? pp. 187–212 (Aldershot: Ashgate). Hatton, T.J & Williamson, J.G. (2005) Global Migration and the World Economy:

Introduction

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Two Centuries of Policy and Performance (Cambridge: MIT). Human Rights Watch (2005) Setting an example? Counter-terrorism measures in Spain, January, Vol.17, No.1 (D). Hunt, J.T. (2006) The Politics of Bones (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart). Idris, A.H. (2005) Conflict and Politics of Identity in Sudan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Jalata, A. (2005): Oromia and Ethiopia: State Formation and Ethnonational Conflict, 1868–2004 (Trenton: Red Sea Press). Koslowski, R. (2006) The mobility money can buy: human smuggling and border control in the European Union, in: A. Messina & G. Lahav (Eds) The Migration Reader: Politics and Policies, pp. 571–587 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Lewis, I.M. (2002) A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (Oxford: James Currey). Library of Congress Federal Research Division (2004) Somalia: a Country Study (Washington, DC: Kessinger Publications). Lockwood, M. (2006) The State they are in: an Agenda for International Action on poverty in Africa (Bourton on Dunsmore: Practical Action Publishing). Menkhaus, K.J. (2005) Somalia and Somaliland: terrorism, political Islam, and state collapse, in: R.I. Rotberg (Ed.) Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, pp. 23– 47 (Cambridge: World Peace Foundation). Meredith, M. (2005) The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair; A History of Fifty Years of Independence (New York: Public Affairs). Munene, M. (2005) Mayi Mayi and Interahamwe militias: threats to peace and security in the Great Lakes Region, in: D.J. Francis (Ed.) Civil Militia: Africa’s Intractable Security Menace? pp. 231–250 (Aldershot: Ashgate). Schraeder, P.J. (2006) Belgium, France and the United States, in: G.M. Khadiagala (Ed.) Security Dynamics in Africa’s Great Lakes Region (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Smith, D.J. (2006) A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Tar, U. (2005) Counter-insurgents or ethnic vanguards? Civil militia and state violence in the Darfur region, western Sudan, in: D.J. Francis (Ed.) Civil Militia: Africa’s Intractable Security Menace? pp. 131–160 (Aldershot: Ashgate). Thompson, C. (2007) Senegal’s President has won another term, but the youth are getting restless, Time, 169(14), p. 23. Tirman, J. (2004) The movement of people and the security of the states, in: J. Tirman (Ed.) The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration after 9/11, pp. 1–16 (New York: The New Press). Zucconi, M. (2004) Migration and security as an issue in U.S.-European relations, in: J. Tirman (Ed.) The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration after 9/11, pp. 142–154 (New York: The New Press).


PART 1 Threats from Africa


Chapter 1

Crisis Region Eastern Africa: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development in an Environment of Latent Conflict Dustin Dehéz

Introduction The history of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) differs substantially from other African regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). IGAD was founded late in 1986 by a minimal consensus among member states and was initially established as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD). This organisation confined itself to humanitarian emergencies and to food security, since drought and malnutrition was widespread in the Horn of Africa region. At the end of the Cold War, a military coup in Sudan brought to power an Islamist regime that seemed determined to destabilise its neighbours where a generation of ‘new leaders’ had just gained power. Along with state collapse and a failed United Nations intervention in Somalia, political elites realised that security was of tremendous importance to foster sustainable economic development. Thus, IGADD was renamed in 1996 to IGAD to underline its focus on regional security. But early enthusiasm proved to be short-lived. The organisation remained weakly institutionalised because its legal framework was provided by an agreement signed by the participating governments. A binding treaty that is set to the standards of international law would have provided a stronger structure. Unlike countries in comparable African regions, the governments of the Horn of Africa were not moving closer in the aftermath of the Cold War. On the contrary, tensions were rising soon after the IGAD agreement was signed in 1996. After Eritrea and Ethiopia split peacefully in 1993, the two countries were expected to cooperate intensively. However, the relationship was soon strained, especially after Eritrea introduced its own currency in 1997. Meanwhile, the conflict in Southern Sudan remained unresolved. Along with the impasse in the peace process in Sudan, the conflict in Northern Uganda continued to claim the lives of innocent Ugandans. Meanwhile, the regime in Khartoum continued to support the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Southern

22


Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) received support from the Ugandan government. Hence, the proxy war between the two countries lingered even at the beginning of the 21st century. Civil war in Somalia continued and was prolonged when Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war over the small border enclave of Badme. Thus, a proxy war began in Somalia. The fragile situation in Somalia led to general concerns over potential disasters. In 2006, the conflict turned into a full-blown war between the Ethiopian army and Islamists that took control of Southern Somalia. The security situation is further aggravated by the massive influx of small arms into the Horn of Africa and the large number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) living in the region, many of them intending to get to Europe, where they often seek sanctuary; as a result, the security situation in the Horn has direct consequences for Europe and its security policy. Dual memberships are another problematic issue in regional cooperation – Kenya and Uganda are additionally members of the East African Community (EAC), a more coherent regional bloc as all EAC-members share a common colonial legacy.1 Meanwhile, the secretariat of IGAD remained understaffed and member states were regularly falling behind their fees, when paying at all. When the 1990s drew to a close, IGAD made the Sudan and Somalia peace processes a priority. However, it had already become apparent that member states gave the organisation a low priority and that the organisation was acting increasingly independent from regional governments. By September 2006, the Somalia peace process was facing collapse. Although the situation in Sudan seemed to look more promising, IGAD seemed unable to break the sophisticated conflict dynamics prevalent in the Horn of Africa. In its 20th year of existence it seems as if the organisation is at a crossroads.2 Hence, it is worthwhile to ask what IGAD has achieved so far and, more importantly, where it has failed to reach its objectives. So far, scholarly research has predominantly focused on IGAD’s role in the peace processes in Somalia and Sudan. Its structures and history have not attracted the same amount of attention, as have IGAD’s structural shortcomings. Since the region is located close to Europe, failure to enhance regional security will ultimately lead to more refugees migrating to the European Union. This article tries to fill the existing desiderata in analysing the conflicts in the region, IGAD’s reactions to major conflicts, its structures and implications of its work for Europe. Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: Regional Cooperation and a History of Mutual Interference The Horn of Africa is by all standards a conflict-prone region.3 Various international conflicts in the past had direct or indirect consequences for the Horn of Africa and its adjacent areas. Cultures of mutual interference and mutual intervention have 1 Franke (2007, pp. 21–39). 2 The body of scientific literature on IGAD is still relatively weak, important work has been undertaken by Juma (2003, pp. 225–252); Nyuot Yoh (2003, pp. 89–93); Mwaûra & Schmeidl (2002) and Ackermann (2003). 3 Matthies (2005).

Crisis Region Eastern Africa

23

amplified nearly all conflicts in the region even if they originally had internal causes.4 Conflicts on the global level, for instance, contributed to regional insecurity during the Cold War: in the beginning, Ethiopia closely cooperated with United States, while Somalia was a strong Soviet ally, but when in 1974 a coup d’état brought the Ethiopian empire to an end and Mengistu Haile Mariam seized power, Addis Ababa switched sides and joined the Soviet coalition. Following the devastating Ogadenwar with Ethiopia, Somalia also changed sides and became an ally of the US after the Soviet Union opted openly to support the new regime in Addis during the war.5 Although it was widely expected that this political pattern would change in the wake of a New World Order, as then US president George H.W. Bush called it, to date it has not. In fact, until today there is no culture of mutual understanding between the regional governments. Most political leaders in the region acquired power through military means, so did Issais Afewerki in Eritrea, Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia – both had fought against the Dergue regime, the military governing council Mengistu formed to rule the country – Yoweri Museveni in Uganda and Omar Al-Bashir in Sudan.6 Moreover, all these political leaders seized power in the early stages after the end of the Cold War, and the West was all too willing to embrace them as Africa’s ‘new leaders’, citing their commitment to democracy and the principles of good governance. More than ten years onwards this enthusiasm has given way to a more pragmatic approach: the foreign policy agenda of the United States and its allies is dominated by the war on terror and foreign policy decision-makers are trying to contain the problem of radical Islamism in the Horn of Africa region, a problem coming to fore when Islamists of the Islamic Courts Union defeated an alliance of US-backed warlords in Mogadishu in June 2006, and subsequently gained a foothold in Southern Somalia in what ultimately motivated the Ethiopian government to intervene militarily, with US backing, in December 2006; again realpolitik determines the international environment that directly affects the security in the region.7 Hence, conflicts in the region have developed a sophisticated conflict dynamic of mutual interdependence and have so far rendered the isolated conflict resolution efforts of IGAD fruitless. On the local level conflicts in Uganda, Sudan, and Somalia were initially of internal origins, but all these conflicts quickly gained regional dimensions when neighbouring countries sided with the government or one of the guerrilla forces. The Sudanese government has, over a long period, supported the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda and the Ugandan government has in turn supported the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM/A) of John Garang in Southern Sudan. Both conflicts originally had internal causes, the oppression of Christians in Southern Sudan by various Sudanese governments and the lack of representation of the Northern Ugandan Acholi people in the government of Yoweri Museveni after he seized power in 1986. But mutual intervention through proxies made conditions for

4 5 6 7

Ghebremeskel (2002, pp. 9–29). Westad (2005, pp. 251–287). Cliffe & White (2002, p. 58). Dehéz (2007, pp. 221–228).

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conflict resolution on a national level problematic, while the international community was reluctant to engage in more than one conflict at the time. The colonial legacy added to the conflicts in the Horn. When the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) decided in 1963 that colonial borders were to be maintained, it did so knowing that many of these borders were not demarcated and that, in the Horn of Africa, many pastoralist societies crossed borders regularly. Unresolved and potential conflicts often involve actors that are not members of IGAD but who openly play a role in regional politics. The conflict over the Nile waters is of increasing importance in the long-run and is likely to have repercussions for the peace processes IGAD is trying to initiate. All water of the Nile passes through Sudan and Ethiopia before finally streaming through Egypt. Cairo has repeatedly shown its determination to stop other riparian states from making use of the Nile water and has even threatened to go to war if such an attempt were to be made by Ethiopia. The latent rivalry over control of the Nile water has brought Egypt continuously into meddling with IGAD affairs, Cairo is opposed to one of the key provisions in the Southern Sudan peace agreement, the referendum on national independence to be held in 2011. If Southern Sudan were to opt for independence, the Nile Waters Agreement of 1959, regulating the distribution of the Nile water, would have to be renegotiated, something the Egyptian government wants to avoid at all cost as it has so far been disproportionately favoured by the agreement. The same motives were at play when Egypt started to get involved in the Somalia peace process; in 2000, Djibouti led an initiative to foster national reconciliation; supported by Egypt, the so-called Arta Conference ended in the establishment of a Transitional National Government (TNG) that soon collapsed after Ethiopia felt its interests underrepresented and subsequently withdrew from the entire process.8 A bloody border war between Addis Ababa and Asmara from 1998 to 2000 further fuelled the conflict; concurring interests were no longer at play and the peace process collapsed. Regional Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Intervention The border war of 1998 in which Eritrea and Ethiopia went to war over the small border enclave of Badme caught IGAD off guard, and although it initially tried to facilitate peace talks, its efforts remained without any success.9 On the contrary, the war paralysed the whole organisation; the Executive Secretary of IGAD was of Eritrean origin and when tensions between Eritrea and Djibouti – where the IGAD secretariat is located – were rising following the outbreak of hostilities between Asmara and Addis Ababa he was denied readmission to Djibouti.10 Nearly all operations of IGAD came to a standstill and could only be resumed after the Executive Secretary had been replaced. Since IGAD has only seven member states, disagreements between only two states can end any progress within the organisation immediately. In fact, the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia has polarised the 8 de Waal & Salam (2004a, p. 248). 9 Berman & Sams (2003, p. 76); On the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in general, see Reid (2004), Dehéz (2006) and Lata (2003). 10 Lata (2003, p. 168) and Negash & Tronvoll (2000, p. 70).


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whole region and is still blocking progress in the Somalia peace process. Various opposition groups in the region continue to rely on foreign sponsoring, among them the Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda and various factions in Somalia. However, it remains debatable if one of these groups can continue its fight against governments in the region when neighbouring states withdraw their support entirely. In fact, the culture of mutual interference by supporting proxies and opposition groups has not ceased at all albeit the formation of IGAD. Furthermore, the inability to provide peacekeeping capacities is not without problems for IGAD’s general aim of fostering regional security. When peaceprocesses enter a decisive stage, regional organisations have to deploy peacekeeping troops. For example, the failure of IGAD to deploy peacekeeping troops to Somalia has created the impression among conflict parties that in the decisive stage (when the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was to relocate to Somalia), IGAD would back away. Although IGAD later regretted the inability to deploy troops to Somalia, this move saved it from a military disaster. Neighbouring countries would also have been involved in any IGAD peacekeeping contingent. For instance, Ethiopia openly stated that it wanted to contribute. However, the participation of neighbouring countries in a peacekeeping force is likely to exacerbate violence. When member states are neighbouring the theatre of operations, their own policy agenda is usually going beyond that of the regional body. These member states are frequently becoming conflicting parties. Nonetheless, they are expected to contribute to the re-establishment of security. This is an issue the former secretary general of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), Salim A. Salim, was very well aware of. Salim stated, ‘At any rate, a regional approach is most effective when the participation of neighbors sharing borders is managed properly and is best when these are excluded from certain conflict-management situations affecting each other.’11 Intrastate and interstate conflicts are a regular challenge for regional organisations, in Africa and Europe alike. When the European Union had to deal with the break-up of Yugoslavia during the Cold War, it failed tremendously. Nonetheless, the Yugoslavia crisis is instructive in illuminating the basic principles of conflict mediation by regional organisations. In their history, regional organisations have established a record of being a stabilising influence, and when conflict does arise, it is usually isolated and in their backyard. In the case of conflict, the international community is expecting that the stability that regional organisations achieved can be extended to adjacent areas. The situation is entirely different in the Horn of Africa region where IGAD has to deal with conflicts not adjacent to its area but with various conflicts in the region itself, and within and between its member states. One conflict within the region would be a serious challenge to any regional organisation, be it European or African, but in the case of IGAD the number of conflicts exceeds the number of member states. Addressing the difficult interdependence of conflicts in the Horn is of utmost importance for any regional conflict resolution or prevention programme, but in recent history no regional organisation had to encounter such conflict levels

11

Adibe (2003, p. 87).

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within its own borders; unsurprisingly though, IGAD has so far failed to cover the sophisticated nature of the connections between the various conflicts. The Peace Process in Somalia Somalia is an outstanding example of the conflict patterns that are prevalent in the Horn of Africa region. Ever since Siad Barre had been ousted from power in 1991 by a loose coalition of various armed factions, Somalia has largely been identified with state failure and state collapse.12 However, the present situation in Somalia is highly heterogeneous. The north-western part of the former British colony of British Somaliland declared its independence again in May 1991 following the breakdown of Somali central order. It has since managed an impressive transition to democracy, reaching a preliminary climax with parliamentary elections in September 2005. These elections were considered free and fair by international observers. Since Hargeysa is short of international recognition, western governments, especially the US and the UK have encouraged the government of Hargeysa to continue its efforts in consolidation of statehood. In the north-eastern province of Puntland, a more informal administration has emerged in 1998 under the leadership of Abdullahi Yusuf and declared itself to be an autonomous state within Somalia. Yusuf heads the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was formed during a peace conference in Nairobi and Eldoret, Kenya, held between 2002 and 2004 under the auspices of IGAD. The TFG was relocated to Somalia in July 2005, first to the city of Jowhar, later to Baidoa, where it was located until Ethiopian troops seized Mogadishu from Islamist forces around December 2006. The TFG is still in place and internationally recognised but has only been able to extend its authority beyond the borders of Baidoa due to Ethiopian military support; it has not been able to foster national reconciliation. Its looming failure became apparent in June 2006 when Islamists belonging to the Islamic Courts Council (ICC) of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Hassan Dahir Aweys seized control of Mogadishu and large parts of Southern Somalia. Afterwards, they briefly encircled the TFG in its stronghold of Baidoa. After the ICC threatened to expand the war into the Ethiopian Ogaden region (which is mainly inhabited by Somalis), the government of Meles Zenawi took firm action and defeated the Islamists in a short and highly successful campaign. Realising that conflicts in Somalia and Sudan were already endemic, the IGAD decided to engage in active diplomatic conflict resolution in both countries. Various other initiatives for peace in Somalia had already failed when the peace talks began in Kenya in 2002. In 2002, Kenya acted on behalf of IGAD and sponsored another peace process, convening in Nairobi and Eldoret, Kenya, and this time the process has had a somewhat better take-off than its predecessors, all regional governments were cooperating closely to ensure concurring interests. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, some regional actors changed their foreign policy agendas; Egypt, Sudan and the Gulf States played a less aggressive role in the affairs of the Horn afterwards as they were being watched more closely by the United States, and 12

On the conflict in Somalia in general see Bakonyi & Stuvøy (2005).


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Ethiopia and Kenya soon came to dominate the renewed efforts for the restoration of Somali statehood. In late 2004 a new Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed headed by Abdullahi Yusuf, former president of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland, the north-eastern province of Somalia and long-term ally of the Ethiopian government. The peace agreement concluded in Nairobi was nonetheless rather a power sharing agreement between various Somali factions and warlords.13 However, the TFG was not able to relocate from Kenya to Somalia for nearly a year. But by staying in exile the transitional institutions were not able to draw up any legitimacy in Somalia itself and when IGAD and member states were pressuring the government of Yusuf to return to Somalia it called for an additional deployment of a 20,000 international peacekeeping force to guarantee its safety. On 31 January 2005, the regional organisation decided to deploy a peacekeeping force to Somalia (IGASOM) alongside the relocation of the Transitional Federal Government. The TFG was relocated to Somalia in July 2005, but IGASOM has not been deployed despite the repeatedly proclaimed willingness by IGAD to do so.14 Facing the breakdown of yet another peace process, it may be illuminating to ask whether IGAD has met all preconditions for a successful peace-process in Somalia. In fact it has not dealt effectively with the complexity of the political situation, it has not been able to bridge all dividing regional interests, nor has it dealt with the future of Somaliland properly. First, the situation was not analysed in all its complexity before starting the process in 2002. Regarding Somalia as a failed state it was believed that national reconciliation could be achieved with enough patience and diplomatic pressure and the international community lent its support to the renewed peace process as it believed that any efforts for the restoration of statehood would be endorsed by Somalis.15 However, the term ‘state failure’ does not adequately describe the situation in Somalia today. The situation is far less coherent than the term implies. In fact, the political landscape is highly fragmented with various forms of social order or nonorder, ranging from de facto statehood in Somaliland to forms of different order by clan legislation, Sharia courts or forms of formal non-order in regions where warlords still hold all the means of coercion. When the Somali peace process was revived under a new IGAD envoy, Kenyan Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, he noted that the initiative was no more than a power sharing agreement between non-representative warlords in which central issues were left untouched. By again concentrating on warlords who were perceived as the real power-holders – a mistake the United Nations also made during their intervention in the early 1990s when clan elders still commanded more influence than today – traditional forms of order were again encompassed, in what finally guaranteed less legitimacy for the initiative among

13 Menkhaus (2005). 14 By the time of writing this chapter, Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana and Burundi declared that they were willing to commit troops to the mission, as the US pledged massive financial and logistical support to the mission, and the first troops were scheduled to arrive by the end of February 2007. 15 Little (2003, pp. 2 and 164).

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Africa and Fortress Europe 16

ordinary Somalis. Clan elders or religious leaders were not involved adequately in the peace process; hence the TFG had no legitimacy in the eyes of many Somalis, and was in fact regarded as an Ethiopian puppet regime. Secondly, IGAD has also failed in giving a clear indication in which way it wanted to deal with de facto independent Somaliland; a failure that created the impression among some southern Somali faction leaders that national unification was still in reach. Fifteen years after independence was proclaimed by the breakaway state, there are no viable alternatives to full recognition of Somaliland left. In fact, Hargeysa has managed an impressive transition towards democracy and, as Jeremy Wells put it, its struggle for consolidation of statehood is ‘in a sense complete’.17 The organisation’s unwillingness to address the issue of Somaliland has had two consequences. First, when the government of Hargeysa wanted to foster its international recognition it decided to seek membership in the African Union, it did not apply for membership in IGAD. Second, the inability to address the case of Somaliland has undermined the new attitude towards security that is now less based on the belief that guaranteed borders provide security but that human security should be at the centre of security issues and that human security would lead to more development.18 The Peace Process in the Sudan The Sudanese conflict has perhaps been one of the longest lasting and most complex in post-independence Africa.19 In Somalia, local, regional, and global conflicts have accelerated the conflict. Meanwhile, progress has been made in the Southern Sudanese conflict when regional and global interests were concurring on what accelerated the conflict in other parts of the country, notably Darfur. The United Nations has regarded the Sudan conflict rather passively. Although the conflict in Southern Sudan has been one of the longest lasting wars on the continent, the United Nations Security Council did not adopt a single resolution on the matter until 2005. Again, in the absence of international engagement, regional peace efforts were necessary should the conflict be brought to an end. IGAD stepped into the arena in 1993 with the establishment of the Standing Committee of Foreign Ministers. This committee comprised Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya. In May 1994, it managed to reach a Declaration of Principles signed in Nairobi between the warring groups. Nonetheless, the Declaration proved to be less than promising and more substantial efforts were subsequently needed as violence continued. Only in 1999 did the organisation establish a secretariat for the peace process, located in Nairobi to accelerate efforts for reaching a settlement. Following 11 September 2001, the Sudanese government realised that a more active US foreign policy in the Horn of Africa region was to be expected and it needed to seriously adjust its agenda to the rapidly changing international environment when it wanted to avoid 16 On traditional forms of Somali social order see Lewis (2002). 17 Wells (2003, p. 1). 18 Spears (2004). 19 On Sudan in general see Adar (2000), O’Fahey (1995), De Waal & Salam (2004a), and Shay (2005, pp. 3–60).


29

20

becoming the White House’s next target. With the Support of the IGAD partners’ forum and the United States, the Machakos Protocol was reached in July 2002. Subsequently, The Memorandum of Understanding was created in October the same year; a real breakthrough as the Sudanese government for the first time lived up to its commitments. Although some crucial problems were left untouched, the cessation of hostilities worked for the first time since the onset of the conflict and thus bolstered IGAD’s reputation as a conflict mediator. Although many basic principles of a lasting peace agreement between the South and the government in Khartoum were at that point envisaged, final adjustments on core questions were necessary that included the separation of religion and state politics and the question of autonomy of the Southern provinces. Three areas remain only partly solved or entirely untouched and although progress was made on the problems it is by no means certain that these issues might not spoil the peace process altogether at a later state. First, the question of imposition of Sharia law is perhaps the most contentious issue in the peace process.21 Introduced in 1983 as the so-called September laws by then Sudanese president Al-Numayri, it had immediately fostered hostilities in the South. The September laws established Sharia punishments for offences such as theft and drinking of wine, although many Southern Sudanese were Christians. In June 1989, Brigadier Omar Al-Bashir staged a coup d’état and ousted then Prime Minister Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi. He declared Sudan an Islamic Republic, Sharia law was expanded to the South of the country in 1991 and jihad was declared on Non-Muslims in the South; the politics of Islamisation reached a climax in the period from 1992 to 1996, a period in which fighting between the government forces and Southern SPLM/A forces was intense.22 Although the politics of Islamisation eased since 1999, the war against Africans in the Darfur region shows the ongoing radical stance of the government in Khartoum. In fact, progress in the resolution of the war in Darfur has stalled as western governments were working carefully not to exert too much pressure on the government of Al-Bashir, since they fear that such pressure could lead to further setbacks in the implementation of the Southern Sudanese peace agreement. Against the background of the ongoing genocide in Darfur the isolated peace-process in the South might prove questionable as no one really knows whether Khartoum has been cooperative to avoid more pressure in the Darfur question and whether cooperation will cease if the United Nations takes a tougher stance on Darfur. Secondly, it remains to be seen whether or not Khartoum will accept a vote in favour of independence in the South in 2011. In addition, some regional governments are opposed to a potentially independent Southern Sudan; in particular, Egypt wants to avoid such a referendum as the Nile water agreements would have to be renegotiated. 20 Morrison (2002). 21 O’Fahey (1995, p. 32). 22 The politics of Islamisation were heavily influenced by Hassan Al-Turabi, who, as Alex de Waal and A. H. Abdel Salam put it, can be considered an ‘Islamist Lenin’. However, Al-Turabi’s influence and subsequently the politics of Islamisation eased when Al-Turabi was de facto stripped off his offices in 1999. It was on Al-Turabi’s initiative that Osama bin-Laden was invited to Sudan in the early 1990s (De Waal & Salam, 2004a, p. 83).

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Moreover, international actors are opposed as the potential independence could be quoted as a precedent by other movements seeking secession in Africa. So far, IGAD has made sure that a referendum is envisaged, but what is lacking is a clear roadmap on how to deal with statehood in the region. Given that Somaliland is also seeking independence and is far more advanced in its consolidation of statehood it will prove to be problematic to offer international recognition to Southern Sudan and not to Somaliland, especially when keeping in mind that Somaliland had been a single British protectorate in the colonial period and its case is hence a quest for the restoration of colonial borders, something that cannot be said about Southern Sudan. Thirdly, although being closely interdependent, the Southern Sudanese peace process left the issue of the Northern Ugandan insurgency by Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) completely untouched. When Omar Al-Bashir seized power in a coup d’état in 1989, he stepped up his support for the LRA and hence aggravated violence in the neighbouring country.23 The resolution of the Southern Sudanese war has been a major setback for the LRA since it could not use Southern Sudan as a safe haven any longer and as the government in Khartoum has stopped its support for Kony’s ransom insurgency. However, the Southern Sudanese peace process might have held a window of opportunity for the resolution of the Northern Ugandan conflict, an opportunity certainly missed, as parts of the LRA still able to continue their fight have meanwhile relocated to the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, dragging Uganda deeper into the Congo-conflict. Again, by totally neglecting the Ugandan conflict and by focusing on national reconciliation without addressing the regional conflict dynamics, IGAD has failed to take the opportunity for a broader peace process. CEWARN and EASBRIG – Escaping the Conflict Trap Although the Cold War had ended, conflicts in Africa continued and human sufferings reached new heights, African governments began to realise that African solutions to African problems would include a substantial overhaul of its regional mechanisms. In 1993, a first effort was made when the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) – a mere paper tiger – agreed upon a Continental Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. But despite these efforts, the OAU’s policy of noninterference and its obsession with national sovereignty prevailed and rendered the organisation totally ineffective. Hence, in July 2002, African governments took a decisive step and replaced the OAU with the African Union (AU). To act effectively the African Union established a Peace and Security Council (PSC) and in order to enable the PSC to react quickly to serious crises the AU decided to request five African regional organisations to set up regional standby brigades. Together, these brigades and an additional brigade based in Addis Ababa would build the African Standby Force (ASF), a 15,000 force that should be deployable within 30 days and able to sustain its military presence for at least 180 days and should be in service no 23

Prunier (2004, p. 365).


31

later than 2010. A coherent political framework was also envisaged with a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) that is currently being developed by the AU.24 The first regional brigade to report readiness is the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) put together by IGAD, Rwanda, Comoros, the Seychelles, and Madagascar. Originally it was scheduled to be completed by mid-2006; the deadline has been postponed since. The troops were to remain in their respective countries until deployment, the regional headquarters will be based in Addis Ababa and its secretariat will be located in Nairobi.25 IGAD’s conflict prevention programme, Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System (CEWARN), experienced a somewhat better take-off, although the goals have been far less ambitious. It is accompanied by a continent-wide initiative to establish an AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS): on a national level, Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units, so called CEWERUs, gather information continuously and are requested to share information – something considerably new given that many governments in the region did not share any information at all previously. Thus, by collecting all available information IGAD tries to anticipate potential crises. However, the information CEWERUs are to obtain must be publicly accessible; in a region where governments do not control their entire territory this restriction could prove to be problematic. On the other hand, CEWERUs are urged to cooperate with civil society organisations to attract grassroots support and work more effectively. The idea seems to be attractive at first glance, but in a region where some governments again act more autocratic, cooperation between civil society groups and Early Warning Units creates an impression of wishful thinking and not one of inspiring conceptualism. Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia were the first countries to establish CEWERUs, but these countries are also the most committed to regional peace and security. However, only if all countries follow their path will CEWARN function, until now they have not. It remains a fundamental weakness of the African Union’s peace efforts that the most inexperienced regional body with the most strained interstate relations is scheduled to be the first organisation to set up one of the regional brigades, while regional organisations with much more experience in peace operations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are still acting independently. Nonetheless, IGAD’s focus on conflict prevention and the failure actually to establish a peacekeeping force has contributed to the overall impression of its inability to address peacekeeping concerns: ‘IGAD’s potential to contribute to regional peacekeeping is negligible. For the foreseeable future, its efforts to resolve and manage will be confined to the realm of diplomacy.’26 The European Union and its Support for IGAD From the very foundation of IGAD, the European Union had a strong interest in supporting the organisation’s performance. While, during the second half of the 24 25 26

Alusala (2004). Neethling (2005). Berman & Sams (2003, p. 65).

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1980s, the European Union was particularly worried about the influx of refugees from the region, and although this is still driving the EU’s policy in the region, the focus has shifted to containing the spread of Islamism in the region. Here, the EU’s interests are identical with the foreign policy objectives of the United States. Although terrorists act on a global scale, the issue of illegal migration to Europe is closely linked to the problem of international terrorism. Porous borders are making it easy for terrorists to cross into neighbouring states in what ultimately increases the danger of potential spill-overs following state failure. The United States, for instance, were hunting al-Qaeda operative Mohammed Fazul Abdullah in Southern Somalia near the Kenyan border after the Ethiopians ousted the Islamists from power in early January 2007. Meanwhile, refugees are also crossing borders regularly, as do pastoralist societies. Promoting border security is therefore one of the key policy objectives of the European Union and the United States alike. In the end, it is hoped, this may also lead to a decline in refugee numbers from the Horn of Africa region to Europe. It is, however, problematic that more and more states in the region have left their courses on implementing good governance and democracy. Eritrea now perceives the United States as their arch enemy and the parliamentary elections in Ethiopia in 2005 ended with a crackdown on journalists and a more autocratic rule of Meles Zenawi. So far the European Union has failed to promote soft security issues like good governance and democracy and, in doing so, has also failed to reduce the number of overall refugees. In promoting the work of IGAD, the European Union took the lead in creating a so-called IGAD Partners Forum. To offer financial and diplomatic advice to the young organisation, the former colonial European powers Italy and the United Kingdom were showing a special interest. When fostering the peace processes in Sudan and Somalia, European states and the EU itself were frontrunners in creating special working groups to assist in these processes; although these groups were soon hijacked by old rivalries between the former colonial powers, their mere creation showed the continuing interest of Europe in the region’s security, although the EU failed to add to the region’s security. Conclusion: Against all Odds Given the sophisticated conflict dynamics within the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa, the current level of economic development, the heterogeneous political structures in the different countries, and the so far unbroken culture of mutual interference and intervention, the present state of the regional organisation is unsurprisingly weak. In fact, it can be described as a huge step forward that IGAD exists after all. It is, however, promising to note that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development is more committed to regional security than the ECOWAS or the SADC, although it lacks the means to enforce its commitments. Furthermore, commitments of governments differ widely. While Uganda and Kenya are among the front-runners to increase regional security, Eritrea and Sudan are still standing aside, following their own agendas often in contradiction to those of IGAD. By deciding to establish a Standby Brigade in Eastern Africa, IGAD again showed its


33

willingness to contribute to regional security in a constructive manner, reiterating what donor countries have stated repeatedly: that progress on the African Standby Force is considered crucial for more economic development in the region.27 It will furthermore be vital to break with the currently persisting pattern that IGAD moves independently from member states; resolution of the Eritrean–Ethiopian conflict will especially be of importance to put the organisation back on track. Only then will the number of refugees to Europe from the region be reduced and the European Union might very well contribute to the security in the region by bolstering IGAD more directly, rather than relying heavily on bilateral relations with some countries in the region, such as Ethiopia. Additional and dual memberships will remain among the most problematic issues in developing African regional organisations. The dual membership of Kenya and Uganda, both in IGAD and the East African Community (EAC) will affect IGAD’s ability to move to closer economic cooperation. EAC member states are all former British colonies and share some common legacy and if regional cooperation among EAC member states is going to increase and the envisaged monetary union is to come,28 IGAD will face the decision either to limit its ambitions to a mere security organisation or to invite Tanzania into IGAD. In either case, Ethiopia, the by far most important player in the Horn’s political arena, will be weakened. The fact that most IGAD members are parties in the conflicts affecting the region led IGAD to rely heavily on additional but semiautonomous structures. It will be crucial for the success of IGAD as an organisation to offer conflict resolution within its own structures. Otherwise, the international community might look to more isolated conflict resolution processes again. References Ackermann, A. (2003) The idea and practice of conflict prevention, Journal of Peace Research, 40(3), pp. 339–347. Adar, K.G. (2000) Conflict resolution in a turbulent region: the case of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Sudan, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 1(2), pp. 39–66. Adibe, C.E. (2003) Do regional organisations matter? Comparing the conflict management mechanisms in West Africa and the Great Lakes Region, in: J. Boulden (Ed.) Dealing With Conflict in Africa. The United Nations and Regional Organisations, pp. 79–108 (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Alusala, N. (2004) African standby force. East Africa moves on, African Security Review, 13(2), pp. 113–121. Bakonyi, J. & Stuvøy, K. (2005) Violence & social order beyond the state: Somalia & Angola, Review of African Political Economy, 5(104), pp. 359–382. Baregu, M. & Landsberg, C. (Eds) (2003) From Cape to Congo. Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges (London: Lynne Rienner).

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Berman, E.G. & Sams, K.E. (2003) The peacekeeping potential of African regional organisations, in: J. Boulden (Ed.) Dealing With Conflict in Africa. The United Nations and Regional Organisations, pp. 35–77 (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Boulden, J. (Ed.) (2003) Dealing With Conflict in Africa. The United Nations and Regional Organisations (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Cliffe, L. & White, P. (2002) Conflict management and resolution in the Horn of Africa, in: C. Mwaûra & S. Schmeidl (Eds) Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa, pp. 43–67 (Asmara: The Red Sea Press). Dehéz, D. (2005) Somalia vor der Rückkehr der Übergangsregierung. Eine Anleitung zum Scheitern äußerer Intervention, DIAS-Analyse, 18, 2005. Dehéz, D. (2006) Kein Frieden am Horn von Afrika, Verhärtete Fronten zwischen Äthiopien und Eritrea machen ein Scheitern der UNMEE immer wahrscheinlicher, Vereinte Nationen, 54(3), pp. 98–103. Dehéz, D. (2007) Stellvertreterkrieg in Somalia, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 2, pp. 221–228. De Waal, A. (Ed.) (2004) Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (Indianapolis: C. Hurst). De Waal, A. & Salam, A. (2004a) Islamism, state power and Jihad in Sudan, in: A. de Waal (Ed.) Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (Indianapolis: C. Hurst). De Waal, A. & Salam, A. (2004b) Africa, Islamism and America’s ‘War on Terrorism’ after September 11’, in: A. de Waal (Ed.) Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, pp. 213–257 (Indianapolis: C. Hurst). Ford, N. (2005) Doubts over East African integration, African Business, 312/8/9. Franke, B. (2007) Africa’s competing regionalisms and their impact on the continent’s emerging security architecture, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 25(1), pp. 21–39. G8 Summit (2006) G8 Progress Report by the Africa Personal Representatives on Implementation of the Africa Action Plan (Gleneagles). Ghebremeskel, A. (2002) Regional approach to conflict management revisited: the Somali experience, The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 4, pp. 9–29. Hansen, H.B. & Twaddle, M. (Eds) (1995) Religion & Politics in East Africa. The Period since Independence (London: James Currey). Jacquin-Berdal, D. & Plaut, M. (Eds) (2004) Unfinished Business. Ethiopia and Eritrea at War (Asmara: The Red Sea Press). Juma, M.K. (2003) The Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the East African Community, in: M. Baregu & C. Landsberg (Eds) From Cape to Congo. Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges, pp. 225–252 (London: Lynne Rienner). Lata, L. (2003) The Ethiopia–Eritrea war, in: J. Boulden (Ed.) Dealing With Conflict in Africa. The United Nations and Regional Organisations, pp. 153–184 (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Lewis, I.M. (2002) A Modern History of the Somali. Revised, Updated & Expanded (Oxford: Oxford University Press).


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Little, P.D. (2003) Somalia. Economy Without State (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Marchal, R. (2004) Islamic political dynamics in the Somali Civil War, 114-145, in: A. de Waal (Ed.) Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (Indianapolis: C. Hurst). Matthies, V. (2005) Kriege am Horn von Afrika. Historischer Befund und friedenswissenschaftliche Analyse (Berlin: Köster). Menkhaus, K. (2005) Somalia and Somaliland. Terrorism, political Islam, and state collapse, 23-47, in: R.I. Rotberg (Ed.) Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Morrison, J.S. (2002) Somalia’s and Sudan’s race to the force in Africa, The Washington Quarterly, 25(2), pp. 191–205. Mwaûra, C. & Schmeidl, S. (Eds) (2002) Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa (Asmara: The Red Sea Press). Neethling, T. (2005) Realizing the African standby force as a pan-African ideal: progress, prospects and challenges, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 8(1), pp. 1–25. Negash, T. & Tronvoll, K. (2000) Brothers at War. Making Sense of the EritreanEthiopian War (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Nyuot Yoh, J.G. (2003) Peace processes and conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa, African Security Review, 12(3), pp. 89–93 O’Fahey, R.S. (1995) The past in the present. The issue of Sharia in Sudan, in: H.B. Hansen & M. Twaddle (Eds) Religion & Politics in East Africa. The Period since Independence, pp. 32–44 (London: James Currey). Prunier, G. (2004) Rebel movements and proxy warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986-99), African Affairs, 103(412), pp. 359–383. Reid, R. (2004) Ethiopians believe in God, Sha’abiya believe in mountains: the EPLF and the 1998-2000 war in historical perspective, in: D. Jacquin-Berdal & M. Plaut (Eds) Unfinished Business. Ethiopia and Eritrea at War, pp. 23–35 (Asmara: The Red Sea Press). Rotberg, R.I. (Ed.) (2005) Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Shay, S. (2005) The Red Sea Terror Triangle. Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Islamic Terror, pp. 3–60 (London and New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers). Spears, I.S. (2004) Debating secession and the recognition of new states in Africa, African Security Review, 13(2), pp. 35–48. Wells, J. (2003) Cabinda & Somaliland: A Comparative Study for Statehood & Independence (African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific). Westad, O.A. (2005) The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).


Chapter 2

Crisis Region Western Africa: The Cradle of African Migration to Europe Dirk Kohnert1

Introduction Africa’s economic history is a history of large population movements driven by a variety of reasons: notably, slave-trade and colonialism, violent conflicts, poverty, ecological degradation, population pressure and a certain cultural propensity of some ethnic groups for outward orientation.2 Even today, most of the 680 million Africans live under conditions of extreme poverty and insecurity. Although the incidence of trans-national migration has remained about the same on a global scale since the 19th century, its structure and direction has changed significantly.3 Whereas Europe was known as a source of waves of large scale out-migration until the early 20th century, trends were reversed after the Second World War. The rate of immigration in highly industrialized Western European countries has accelerated significantly in the past decades. It is mostly undocumented Africans who constitute a growing proportion of these immigrants. There are well founded reasons to believe that this tendency will accelerate, as Sub-Saharan Africa probably has a higher potential for immigration into the EU than any other region in the World. All of the 20 least developed countries (LDCs) are African, and more than half of them belong to crisis-torn Western Africa, which in the 1990s gained the reputation of degenerating into the Pandora’s box of the continent,4 while being situated relatively close to West European borders. Some experts even believe that population movements from Africa could evolve into the single biggest migration wave in world history in the medium and long run.5 Therefore, politicians of all sides are well advised to take this development more seriously than in the past. However, experts and politicians alike are deeply divided over the best concepts for analysing and solving the problem. Even in scholarly literature, several myths about

1 GIGA – Institute of African Affairs, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. An abridged German version has been published as GIGA-Focus Afrika, No. 12. 2006. 2 Cf. Adepoju (2003); Bilger & Kraler (2005); Baker &Aina (1995); De Bruijn et al. (2001). 3 Cf. Haas (2005a, p. 1270). 4 Cf. Kaplan (1994). 5 Cf. Sandell (2005, p. 1); UN (2006, p. 1).

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international migration, remittances and developments still persist.6 The following is meant to provide more facts and to clarify some of the controversies of the current debate. Incidence of West African Migration to Europe Migration from Africa is a reflection of its socio-economic dynamics over time.7 Over the past few decades, the number of refugees from conflict regions in Africa has increased dramatically. Between 1993 and 2002, 27 out of 53 African states suffered from violent conflicts. At the end of 2005, some 18% of all African migrants were refugees. This proportion is far above the global average, and African refugees constitute about one third of the global refugee population. This may explain, why nearly half (47%) of the 16.7 million cross-border migrants in Africa in 2005 were women and children.8 The above figures explicitly disregard some 13 million additional internally displaced people, as well as a considerable number of seasonal migrants, who would have accentuated the problem even more. Most of the trans-national migrants, however, remain in neighbouring African countries, overwhelmingly (42%) in Western Africa. Apart from push factors, like violent conflicts, gross human rights violations, population pressure, degradation of natural resources and poverty, the major part of current migration is due to external pull factors. Young people, threatened by unemployment and lack of perspectives in their home countries, are eager to try their luck in what may appear to them at first sight as their El Dorado, i.e. Western Europe. Many of them struggle to reach it, in utter disregard of the involved risks, by any means, mostly illegally. But let there be no misunderstanding, the extreme African poor do not even have of this alternative, as migration to overseas destinations involves considerable costs, which can be covered in many cases only with contributions by the extended family (e.g. €800 to €1200 per person for the passage from the Senegalese coast to the Canary Islands), good health, a minimum amount of risk tolerance, and embeddedness in viable transnational social networks. Most African migrants with overseas destinations go in Europe. According to 2005 estimates of the International Organization on Migration (IOM), there are about 4.6 million recorded Africans living in the EU, compared with 890,000 in the USA. The major reasons for this unequal distribution are the comparative advantages in relation to transfer cost and the established cultural and socio-economic links of African diasporas to the former colonial powers such as England, France, Portugal, Spain, Germany and Italy. According to IOM-census figures, about two-thirds of Africans in Europe are from Northern Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). A smaller, but steadily increasing part has arrived from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The latter overwhelmingly stay in France (274,538) and England (249,720), and, on

6 7 8

Cf. Haas (2005a). Cf. IOM (2003, p. 220). Cf. IOM (2005, p. 33).

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Crisis Region Western Africa 9

a smaller scale, in Germany (154,564) and Italy (137,780). However, these figures are probably grossly underestimated, as they do not take account of the majority of unauthorized Africans living in the EU. According to estimates of the Migration Policy Institute, there are between seven and eight million irregular African immigrants living in the EU, mostly in its Southern parts. Current figures fluctuate in accordance with the regularization programmes of member states, notably of France, and more recently of Italy and Spain. However, many of the officially recognized migrants fall back into illegality when their limited visas expire or if they fail to meet other conditions for recognizing their legal status.10 West Africans constitute by far the largest share of SSA-migrants in Europe. They mostly come from Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal.11 In general, Francophone Africans are more likely to migrate to France because of its special socio-cultural post-colonial relations with its former colonies and due to the language, whereas Anglophone Africans, notably Ghanaians and Nigerians, show more flexibility in selecting their destinations.12 Figure 1 shows the major SSA diasporas in the EU. However, the attraction of the EU for SSA migrants increases from year to year. According to IOM estimates, between 65,000 and 80,000 migrants crossed the Sahara annually in their strive for unrecorded entry into the EU13 in the past five years. One of their major transit countries was Morocco, which recorded a tenfold increase of SSA migrants between 2000 and 2005.14 Subsequently, the authorities in Rabat, assisted by the EU, have reinforced their borders surrounding the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta, as well as along the Atlantic coast, which contributed to the recent reorientation of the flow of migration.15 Ambiguous Impact of Migration on African Economies Migration is not necessarily a zero-sum game, where one side loses to the benefit of others; this holds for Africa too. In the ideal case, if migration were to be properly managed in the overall interest, all parties involved could gain: the migrants, their extended families at home, the countries of origin and the receiving countries.16 Unfortunately, the selfish interests of major players involved in this game, both on an individual and state level, have hitherto prevented such an optimal solution. Deterrence and zero-migration policies on the part of fortress Europe, for example, encourage irregular immigration, smuggling, marginalization and exploitation of migrants on different levels and stages of their journey to Europe.17 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Cf. IOM (2005, p. 26). Cf. Papademetriou (2005). Cf. Figure 1. Cf. UN (2006, p. 6). Cf. IOM (2005, p. 42). Cf. Reuters, November 10, 2005. Cf. below. Cf. UN (2006, p. 1). Cf. below.

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As usual, the better educated have most to gain, and because of their resource endowment, they are more prone than others to benefit from the pull factors, such as better living and economic conditions in their host countries. This is one of the reasons for a considerable ‘brain drain’ over the past 30 years, which has resulted in the loss of about one third of the African academic workforce to highly industrialized countries. Between 33% and 55% of Africans with higher education left Angola, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Tanzania in search of a better life and employment in OECD countries. For example, about 20,000 Nigerian and 12,000 South-African doctors migrated overseas, whereas only 33,000 remained in South Africa, according to recent WHO statistics. Even the 926 Ghanaian doctors practising nowadays in OECD countries would be urgently needed at home, where they would represent 29% of all doctors employed.18 Again, Western Africa has been the most important source of this brain drain, due to the economic and/or political crisis in Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone since the 1980s (see Table 2.1).19 The drain of human capital is mostly reflected in the employment sector for highly qualified personnel.20 Island economies, such as Cape Verde (69%), the Seychelles (59%), Mauritius (48%), Madagascar (36%), but also countries suffering from civil war, such as Somalia (59%), Sierra Leone (41%) or Liberia (37%), have been affected21. Another remarkable trend is the ‘feminization’ of the brain drain in recent years, caused by the growing number of highly skilled African women looking for employment abroad.22 In addition, the migration of highly qualified personnel is a considerable financial burden to the state budget of the countries concerned. According to UNCTAD estimates, the loss of one qualified academic costs on average US$184,000. Last, but not least, the brain drain delays the growth of an African middle class and the development of sustainable structures of the civil society, which may exert a negative impact on the political and economic stability of the countries of origin. However, there are also positive – although often neglected – socio-structural effects of the brain drain, beyond the question of remittances (which will be discussed further below). This counteracting ‘brain gain’ relates to the transfer of knowledge, of innovations and the consolidation or extension of foreign trade relations. New value systems, political and spiritual orientations, acquired by migrants in Europe, and imported into their home countries often contributed significantly to the development of Africa.23 For example, migrants among the African political elite, mostly educated at European universities, played a decisive role in many liberation movements. Heroes of African independence, such as Léopold Sédar Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, Amilcar Cabral, Frantz Fanon, or the many exiled politicians

18 19 20 21 22 23

ECA (2006, p. xvi). IOM (2003, p. 216); cf. Table 1. 26.7% in West Africa in 2000, cf. Table 1. ECA (2006, p. 30). Cf. IOM (2003, p. 215). Cf. Haas (2005a, pp. 1272–1273).

Crisis Region Western Africa

41

of the ANC, which contributed to the end of apartheid in South Africa, are vivid examples. In addition, remittances of African migrants can contribute considerably not just to the wellbeing of their families at home, but to poverty reduction and development at the regional and even at the national levels in general.24 Case studies from Burkina Faso, for example, have revealed that remittances of migrants reduced the rate of households living below the poverty line by 7.2%.25 Although average individual remittances from Africans are relatively low (US$200–300), compared with the global average, its overall annual total almost doubled from US$4.9 billion to US$8.1 billion between 2000 and 2005, according to estimates of the World Bank and ECA. All officially recorded money transfers of migrants from Africa amounted to US$14 billion in 2004. Depending on the respective country, this translated into shares of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 3% (Nigeria, Kenya), 7% (Ethiopia, Senegal, Sudan), 11% (Ghana), 23% (Cape Verde), and of up to 40% in Lesotho.26 Remittances via official channels accounted for over 200 billion CFA (€300 million) for Senegal only.27 However, these official figures only reflect an incomplete image of the reality. Many Africans prefer informal channels for remittances transactions in view of the lack of performance of the African banking system, notably if they are unauthorized guests in their receiving country. These informal transfers double and sometimes triple the share of officially recorded remittances, according to estimates of the IOM. In some LLDCs they surpass even private foreign direct investments (FDI) or development aid.28 Therefore, it has been recognized that remittances (mostly from Europe) constitute the second largest source of external private finance in African developing countries, besides FDI. Up to now they are an underutilized and badly managed source of national development in the countries of origin.29 However, the EU member countries bear their share of responsibility too: high entry barriers and the criminalization of irregular immigrants result in social seclusion and the formation of ghettos of migrants in European capitals, which discourage remittances because the concerned prefer to care for their own immediate needs in a hostile social and political environment (see Figure 2.2).30 Migration Routes from Africa to Europe In the last two decades Northern Africa has developed into a transit region for SubSaharan migrants. The new migration pattern, its policy response by the Maghreb24 1278). 25 26 27 28 29 30

OECD (2006, pp. 142–143); Gubert (2005); Sall (2005); Haas (2005a, pp. 1274– Cf. ECA (2006). OECD (2006, pp. 142–143); cf. ECA (2006, pp. 75–76). UN (2006, p. 19). Cf. Figure 2. Cf. Ionescu (2006); Adams & Page (2005, p. 1645). Cf. Haas (2005a, p. 1278).

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and European states, as well as its negative ‘side effects’ on the migrants concerned, have been analysed in detail by Baldwin-Edwards (2006) and others.31 The actual number of Sub-Saharan migrants living ‘in transit’ in Northern Africa is difficult to estimate. Most of them are irregulars, ‘without papers’, mostly living as outcasts under miserable conditions in an Arabic xenophobic social environment. A case study of irregular African migrants living in Algiers has revealed that about two thirds of the interviewed migrants consider themselves treated as ‘slaves’, ‘poor wretches’, or subhuman beings.32 According to well-informed estimates, there are at least 100,000 living in Algeria and Mauritania, more than a million in Libya, and some 10,000 in Morocco. They are certainly not welcomed by the local population and the authorities. Between January 2000 and March 2006 about 35,000 unauthorised SubSaharan migrants were forcibly expulsed by Algerian authorities. Because of the more rigid migration controls of EU member states, the sealing of the EU’s southern borders along with the costal line between Morocco and Mauritania against the increasing influx of irregular migrants, migration routes have increasingly shifted to sea-born alternatives, notably from Senegal, Gambia and Guinea to the Spanish Canary Islands (see Figure 3).33 The latter registered over 31,000 African refugees in 2006, a sixfold increase compared with 2005, and almost four times as many as in the previous four years combined.34 An additional 5000 were intercepted by the islands’ coastguards, and 6000 migrants died or went missing under appalling conditions on the perilous 1000 km sea journey, according to estimates of Spanish border authorities in Tenerife.35 Another 16,000 African migrants arrived on the tiny Italian island of Lampedusa (south of Malta) from the Libyan coast in the same year. As for the Atlantic sea routes, migrants pay the smugglers the equivalent of US$800 to US$1250 for a one-way passage from Senegal to the Canary Islands in small wooden fishing boats, called lothios, or ‘pirogues of death’ in the local dialect.36 Because of the rapid growing demand, boat-builders and carpenters in Gambia started to construct bigger pirogues, designated especially for the transport of 60 to 100 migrants, which cost about 100,000 dalasi (US$3539). They are equipped with two outboard engines, GPS, and a minimum of petrol and other supplies for the 8 to 12 day journey, depending on the sea conditions. The transfer in the crowded boats under the open sun is life threatening. Local agents openly admit that the chances the boat will be detected by border patrols before arrival is 50:50, otherwise the people on the boat simply perish.37 No wonder then that experienced pilots of these pirogues are in high demand. One renowned ‘pirogier’ was the ‘Baron’ from Saint-Louis, who

31 Cf. Boubakri (2004, Fall); Haas (2005b); Hamood (2006); Futo & Jandl (2004); Marfaing (2004). 32 Cf. Simon (2006). 33 Cf. Parkes (2006); Figure 3. 34 Cf. BBC-news Africa: Canaries migrant death toll soars. December 28, 2006. 35 Cf. below in more detail. 36 Cayucos, in Spanish. 37 Cf. Fleming: Gambia – new front in migrant trade (BBC-Africa news, 10 October 2006).


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escaped prosecution in Senegal in September 2006 by fleeing to Mauritania. He was said to have successfully transported over 1000 migrants to Tenerife.38 Concerning the risk evaluation of such journeys, the long distance over the open Atlantic is not the only problem. Senegalese fishermen had already been forced to travel along the West African coast up to the Golf of Guinea in search of valuable catches, because their local fishing grounds had been depleted by foreign (mostly EU) fishing armadas.39 The new GPS technique facilitates orientation.40 Besides irresponsible neglect of basic security precautions on the side of the smugglers, the major cause for imminent danger lies in the special framework conditions for these transports, i.e. clandestine refugee-transfers in overcrowded boats on the high sea, enforced by the close surveillance of the multinational Frontex sea- and airborn forces,41 patrolling along the West African coast, and organized by the EU and concerned African states. This was demonstrated by the sad fate of a tiny rickety yacht which started in late December 2005 with 37 Senegalese migrants on board, towed by a bigger smuggling vessel with a destination of the Canaries. On the way, the smugglers severed the towing line, possibly because they feared detection by the coastguard planes, and the yacht drifted into the open Atlantic. On 30 April 2006, fishermen from Barbados, rescued the boat, which had been driven by the trade winds over the Atlantic, but nobody had survived the ordeal; they found on board only 11 mummified corpses and some evidence of their origin and fate.42 Notwithstanding these imminent hazards, the desperate migrants see no alternative. Apparently, even Asian smugglers have joined the lucrative business. They transport migrants from Pakistan, India or Bangladesh by air to West African harbours where they are loaded on board of unseaworthy ships meant to reach the Canaries. In September 2006, a rusty fishing trawler with 160 Pakistani and Indians on board was intercepted by the Spanish coastguard before the Canaries. In February 2007 a fishing trawler, overloaded with some 400 migrants from Kashmir and different African origins, set sail from Guinea to the Canary Islands and broke down in international waters off the Mauritanian coast. It was towed – after one week of wrangling over the responsibility for the rescue mission – to the Mauritian port of Nouadhibou for the repatriation of the migrants.43 Most of the irregular migrants whose nationality could be identified were repatriated to their home countries. Thus, 38 Cf. Belleret: Chronique des clandestins (12) – On n’arrêt pas la mer avec les bras (Le Monde, 22 October 2006). 39 Cf. below. 40 Belleret: Chronique des clandestins (10) – L’irrésistible appel du large. (Le Monde, 20 October 2006). 41 ‘Frontex’, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, was established in 2004. In 2006 it prevented some 4000 African migrants reaching the Canary Islands (cf. BBC-news Africa, 26 January 2007). 42 Cf. Nation News, Barbados, 7 May 2006. Connotations with the deplorable conditions of the Atlantic slave trade are not too far fetched. 43 Cf. dpa, 15 September 2006; UN (2006, p. 12); BBC-news Africa: ‘Mauritania to let migrants land’, 10 February 2007; UN-news Service: ‘West Africa: UN refugee agency calls for 400 people adrift to be allowed to disembark’, 9 February 2007.

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on the base of a bilateral agreement between the Spanish and Senegalese immigration authorities 4400 migrants interned in refugee camps on the Canary Islands were repatriated by plane to Saint Louis (Northern Senegal) between 9 September and 26 October 2006. Unfair EU Foreign Trade Policy Reinforces Migration Pressure in Africa The enduring desolate economic situation and bleak perspectives of most households in African LLDCs account for one of the major reasons for African trans-national migration. This has also been recognized by the member states of the EU. At the joint EU–AU migration summit in Tripoli (22 to 23 November 2006) they promised to stem the growing flow of migrants by a significant increase in development aid to the most affected West- and North African countries, specifically targeted on potential migrant populations. In total, the EU promised to allocate some €40 million to boost job creation in Africa.44 However, aid and development do not necessarily lead to a reduction of migration. On the contrary, different studies suggest that at least the kind of economic growth promoted by the highly industrialized Western countries and by the WTO, based on a neo-liberal approach of trade liberalization, would stimulate migration from Sub-Saharan Africa in the medium and long run.45 This applies the more if the donor countries obstruct sustainable growth of African LDCs by non-tariff barriers to trade, unfair subsidies and dumping prices, which undercut the comparative advantages of these countries for labour intensive agricultural products on the world market.46 Thus, studies published by the World Bank, international NGOs, and others have repeatedly blamed the EU in this respect, proving that the EU foreign trade policy contributes to a significant extent to reduce the income-earning possibilities of West African producers, in pursuit of the commercial interest of the EU member states, and to the detriment of development in Sub-Saharan Africa.47 In addition, this selfish foreign trade policy of the EU and its member states counteracted its own pro-poor development cooperation with African states, which it has tried to implement for decades. The most blatant examples are the EU fisheries and agricultural policies, the negative effects of which have been discussed in more detail elsewhere.48 Just the elimination of unfair cotton subsidies paid by the USA, China and the EU to their farmers would increase the income of West African cotton producers by US$250 million per annum. According to ODI estimates, EU cotton subsidies account for up to 38% of income losses to cotton farmers in West- and Central Africa; the elimination of these subsidies would increase the cotton export earnings of Benin and the Chad Republic by US$9 million and US$12 million, respectively.49 The EU has already 44 Cf. BBC-news Africa: ‘EU unveils new immigration plans’, 30 November 2006. 45 Haas (2006a); Martin & Taylor (1996). 46 Cf. Haas (2005a, pp. 1271–1272). 47 Cf. Anderson et al. (2005); Baffes (2005); Borrmann et al. (2005); Hinkle & Schiff (2004); Oxfam (2006). 48 Cf. Kohnert (2006). 49 Cf. Gillson et al. (2004).


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recognized the necessity of a better coherence between its fisheries- and development policy concerning the ACP member countries in 2002; but to date it has not put corresponding measures into practice. Even high ranking representatives of EU member states, like the German minister for Economic Development Cooperation, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, and the German President Horst Köhler, criticised the double talk and the lack of coherence of EU trade and development policies during the WTO conference in Cancun (Mexico, 2003) and the Africa Forum summit in Accra (Ghana, January 2007), but again, apparently without great success. Contested EU Measures to Prevent Irregular African Migration to Europe The prevailing perspective of the EU concerning African immigration is still focused mainly on security and prevention, neglecting the chances for development linked to it for all sides concerned.50 During the joint Migration and Development Conference at Rabat (Morocco, 10 to 11 July 2006), attended by ministers of over 30 African and European states, the African partners accepted in principle the demand of their European colleagues for a more active involvement in the close supervision and prevention of irregular migration (‘Action Plan of Rabat’). However, it was agreed upon that stepping up border controls both at land and at sea would not suffice. New ways to open up legal ways of temporary or ‘circular’ migration and development of employment opportunities in the transit countries and countries of origin were considered to be a necessary supplement. At the Tripoli summit in November 2006 the EU vice president Franco Frattini recommended once more a quota system of legal immigration, adapted to the specific needs of each EU member country. But whether more draconic proposals to seal off ‘fortress Europe’ had been discarded all together was not certain. This concerns the construction of concentration or ‘reception’ camps for ‘boat people’ and other irregular migrants and refugees outside the EU borders in Northern Africa, proposed among others by the then British Premier Tony Blair in 2003 and the German and Italian ministers of the interior Otto Schily and Giuseppe Pisanu in 2004, but fiercely contested by other governments of EU member states and by human rights groups. In 2004, the EU proposed to set up five ‘reception centres’ in Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia at a later date. On 5 November 2004, the leaders of the 25 EU governments agreed on the approval of common asylum rules for the EU until 2010, whereby it should be examined if there is a possibility to process asylum claims outside the territory of the EU.51 At least one camp was built in Libya with the assistance of the Berlusconi government in 2004. Another camp was constructed with Spanish assistance in Nouadhibou, Mauritania, where up to 4000 undocumented migrants were interned in 2006, mostly from Senegal and Mali.52 50 Cf. Baldwin-Edwards (2006); Parkes (2006). 51 Cf. Gnusser (2004). 52 Cf. ‘Mauritanie: L’Espagne prépare un camp d’accueil pour les émigrants clandestins à Nouhadibou’ (Paris: AFP, 24 March 2006); ‘Mauretanien: Transitland für MigrantInnen oder Hilfspolizist der EU? 25.01.2007 .

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In the meantime, the implementation of other more subtle proposals of the European Commission’s ‘Global Approach on Migration’ was accelerated, like the creation of job-recruiting centres for temporary African migrants in their home countries, co-financed by the EU and interested member states. In February 2007, an EU-pilot project in Mali was under construction, and similar centres were planned for Senegal, Ghana and Mauritania. Their aim was to match the European demand for cheap labour, notably in Spain, Italy and France, in sectors such as agriculture, building or cleaning, to the corresponding offer of suitable African job seekers.53 Initially the job centres will be restricted to the capital, but regional offices in outlying towns or villages, where most migrants start their journey, are also envisaged. However, these plans were strongly opposed by right-wing EU politicians, notably in Poland and other East-European member states, such as Slovakia and Lithuania – as well as Romania and Bulgaria, which recently joined the EU. They argued that it would be difficult to understand for millions of their voters – who would be happy to have low-skilled jobs in agriculture and other sectors within the EU – why they could not work freely in all EU member states, whereas millions of euros would be spend on African immigrants. As similar populist views opposed to African immigration are increasingly fashionable all over Europe, policy makers were at pains to propagate ‘modern’ concepts of ‘circular migration’.54 On the basis of recent research findings, they underlined the positive aspects of migration if managed properly, like the development potential of remittances55 or the tapping of other African diaspora resources for development.56 Although the new concepts are certainly more than a simple re-vitalization of old models of temporary migration, as employed by the German ‘Gastarbeiter’ system in the 1960s and 1970s, they share some common shortcomings, notably with respect to negative social effects in sending and receiving countries.57 The social costs in the receiving countries are related to the highly asymmetric distribution of cost and benefit of immigration. Whereas certain sectors of the economy, as well as the middle and upper class, who employ the labour or services of immigrants, can gain considerable profits, notably if employed under precarious black market conditions, the lower strata of the society, especially unqualified labour, will be exposed to cut-throat competition both on the labour market and in the social services. Increasingly violent social conflicts between disillusioned migrants and their neighbourhoods, as the former are insufficiently integrated into the society and often living as outcasts in suburban ghettos, as in Cachan (Paris) and other French cities in 2005, are foreseeable in other European countries, probably reinforced by related ultra-right-wing excesses. The envisaged immigration quota systems for temporary migration, already practised in the veiled form of periodical 53 Cf. BBC-news: 9 February 2007: ‘European Union development commissioner, Louis Michel, is in Mali for talks to set up the EU’ s first job centre for African migrants’. 54 Cf. Vertovec (2007, p. 7). 55 Cf. above. 56 Cf. Haas (2006b); Ionescu (2006). 57 Cf. Castles (2006).


47

‘regularization’ of hundreds of thousands unauthorized immigrants in Spain, Italy and France in the past ten years, might solve short-term problems on national labour markets. But in the medium and long run they are likely to increase the social and political tensions caused by baldy managed immigration policies. An adequate and sustainable integration concept for immigrants would be viable only if it comprised a significant improvement of the labour market conditions for domestic citizens living under precarious economic and social conditions. And last, but not least, the unfair EU foreign trade policy mentioned above should be replaced as soon as possible by Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) between the EU and ACP countries on equal footing,58 supplemented by sustainable reintegration and development programmes. Conclusion African migration is a reflection of its socio-economic dynamics since the times of the slave trade. In the last few decades the number of refugees from conflict regions in Africa has increased dramatically. The conflict ridden and poverty stricken region of Western Africa became the cradle of migration from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, where most African migrants with overseas destinations live. They flee from their desolate economic situation, violent conflicts or political persecution. The drain of human capital from Africa is most pronounced in the employment sector for highly qualified personnel. Another remarkable trend is the ‘feminization’ of the brain drain in recent years, caused by the growing number of highly skilled African women looking for employment abroad. However, migration is not necessarily a zero-sum game, where one side loses to the benefit of others. There are also positive – although often neglected – economic and socio-cultural effects of the brain drain. Remittances of African migrants contribute considerably not just to the wellbeing of their extended families at home, but to poverty reduction and development on a national scale in general. They constitute the second largest source of external private finance, apart from foreign direct investment. In addition, a counteracting ‘brain gain’, i.e. new value systems, political and spiritual orientations, acquired by migrants in Europe, results in a transfer of knowledge and of innovations. The European Union and its member states share a heavy dual responsibility for the continuing migration pressure: first, because they fostered over decades corrupt and autocratic regimes like that of Eyadéma’s Togo,59 or successive Nigerian military dictatorships, with dire disregard to principles of ‘good governance’. The aftermath of these regimes is still to be felt today, and constitutes one of the underlying factors for politically motivated migration. Second, the EU contributed to Africa’s growing economic misery, due to the damaging effects of selfish European external trade policy. Nevertheless, the prevailing perspective of the EU concerning African immigration remains to be focused on security, the foreclosure of its external borders and prevention. Even current EU programmes to combat African migration

58 59

Cf. Borrmann et al. (2005). Cf. Kohnert (2005).

48


‘at the roots’ with increased development aid to West African countries concerned may be based on illusions. The available evidence and literature points to the fact that this policy of ‘development instead of migration’ is bound to fail because of the peculiar overall structure of economic growth in West Africa, promoted by the highly industrialized Western countries and the WTO. Their neo-liberal approach to development, based on global trade liberalization, will rather stimulate migration from Sub-Saharan Africa in the medium and long run. The European–African migration summits in Rabat and Tripoli in July and November 2006 even strengthened the policy of exclusion. But even Germany and France meanwhile hesitantly accept the fact that they are immigration countries. The EU commission endorses a limited and temporarily restricted immigration of Africans. However, two fundamental problems remain unsolved. The cost and benefit of immigration are distributed asymmetrically between EU member countries and between social classes within the EU. Both will aggravate the imminent danger of violent conflicts and of right-wing extremism in the immigration regions. The revitalization of old concepts of ‘selective’, ‘temporary’ migration under the heading of the modern approach of ‘circular migration’ is unlikely to solve the problem either. Yet well-adapted immigration regulations could serve the interest of all parties involved. Last, but not least, it could contribute to protect the over-aged population of European member states in the long run against threatening economic decline. References Adams, R.H. Jr. & Page, J. (2005) Do international migration and remittances reduce poverty in developing countries? World Development, 33(10), pp. 1645–1669. Adepoju, A. (2003) Migration in West Africa, Development, 46(3), pp. 37–41. Anderson, K., Martin, W. & Mensbrugghe, D. v. d. (2005) Would multilateral trade reform benefit sub-Saharan Africans? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, Nr. 3616, June 2005, Washington, DC. Baffes, J. (2005) The cotton problem. World Bank Research Observer, 20(1), 109– 144. Baker, J. & Aina, T.A. (Eds) (1995) The Migration Experience in Africa (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute). Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2006) Between a rock and a hard place: North Africa as a region of emigration, immigration and transit migration, Review of African Political Economy, 33(108), pp. 311–324. Bilger, V. & Kraler, A. (Eds) (2005) African migrations – historical perspectives and contemporary dynamics, Stichproben (Vienna; special issue), 5(8), pp. 1–328. Borrmann, A., Busse, M. & Neuhaus, S. (2005) EU/ACP economic partnership agreements – impact, options and prerequisites, Intereconomics, 40(3), pp. 169– 176. Boubakri, H. (2004) Transit Migration between Tunisia, Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa. (Paper, MG-RCONF (2004) 6e, Strasbourg: Council of Europe). Castles, S. (2006), Back to the Future? Can Europe meet its Labour Needs through Temporary Migration? IMI Working papers 2006, No. 2 (Oxford: International


49

Migration Institute, University of Oxford). De Bruijn, M., Van Dijk, R. & Foeken, D. (Eds) (2001) Mobile Africa: Changing Patterns of Movement in Africa and Beyond (Leiden: Brill). Docquier, F. & Marfouk, A. (2004) Measuring the International Mobility of Skilled Workers (1990–2000) (Washington, DC: The World Bank, Policy-Research Working Paper Series No. WPS3381). ECA (2006) International Migration and Development – Implications for Africa (New York: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, ECA) [website], (updated 8 February 2007) <www.uneca.org>. Fall, P.D. (2004) État-nation et migrations en Afrique de l’Ouest: le défi de la mondialisation (Paris: UNESCO) [website], (updated 8 February 2007) http:// unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001391/139144f.pdf. Futo, P. & Jandl, M. (Eds) (2005) 2004 Yearbook on Illegal Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Central and Eastern Europe (Vienna: International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD)). Gillson, I., Poulton, C., Balcombe, K. & Page, S. (2004) Understanding the Impact of Cotton Subsidies on Developing Countries (London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Working Paper). Gnusser, C. (2004) The European war against refugees, in: Analyse und Kritik, [website], (updated 8 February 2007) . Gubert, F. (2005) Migrant remittances and their impact on development in the home economies: the case of Africa, in: OECD, Migration, Remittances and Development (Paris: OECD). Haas, H. de (2005a) International migration, remittances and development: myths and facts, Third World Quarterly, 26(8), pp. 1269–1284. Haas, H. de (2005b) Morocco: from emigration country to Africa’s migration passage to Europe, Migration Information Source [website], (updated 8 February 2007) www.migrationinformation.org. Haas, H. de (2006a) Turning the tide? Why ‘development instead of migration’ policies are bound to fail. IMI Working papers 2006, No. 2 (Oxford: International Migration Institute, University of Oxford). Haas, H. de (2006b), Engaging Diasporas – How Governments and Development Agencies can Support Diaspora Involvement in the Development of Origin Countries. IMI, in cooperation with Oxfam-Novib (Oxford: International Migration Institute, University of Oxford). Hamood, S. (2006) African Transit Migration through Libya to Europe: The Human Cost (Cairo: The American University in Cairo). Hinkle, L.E. & Schiff, M. (2004) Economic partnership agreements between SubSaharan Africa and the EU: a development perspective, The World Economy, 27(9), pp. 1321–1333. Ionescu, D. (2006) Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners for Home and Destination Countries: Challenges for Policymakers (Geneva: IOM, Migration Research Series, MRS, No 26). IOM (2003) World Migration 2003: Managing Migration – Challenges and Responses for People on the Move. (Geneva: International Organization on Migration, IOM)

50


[website], (updated 8 February 2007) <www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/cache/bypass/ pid/8?entryId=4992>. IOM (2005) World Migration 2005: Cost and Benefits of International Migration. (Geneva, International Organisation for Migration), [website], (updated 8 February 2007) <www.iom.int>. Kaplan, R.D. (1994) The coming anarchy – how scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet, The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, [website], (updated 8 February 2007) . Kohnert, D. (2005) Togo – Ein Lehrstück fehlgeschlagener Demokratisierung, Afrika im Blickpunkt (AIB), No. 1 (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, Hamburg). Kohnert, D. (2006) Afrikanische Migranten vor der ‘Festung Europa’, GIGA Focus Afrika, No. 12 (Hamburg: GIGA – German Institute of Global and Area Studies). Marfaing, L. & Wippel, S. (2004) Les relations transsahariennes à l’époque contemporaine – un espace en constante mutation (Paris: Karthala). Martin, P.L. & Taylor, J.E. (1996) The anatomy of a migration hump, in: J.E. Taylor (Ed.) Development Strategy, Employment, and Migration: Insights from Models, pp. 43–62 (Paris: OECD). OECD (2006) International Migration Outlook 2006 (Paris: OECD). Oxfam (2006) Unequal Partners: How EU–ACP Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) could Harm the Development Prospects of Many of the World’s Poorest Countries (London: Oxfam Briefing Note, September 2006). Papademetriou, D.G. (2005) The Global Struggle with Illegal Migration: No End in Sight (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute) [website], (updated 8 February 2007) www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=336. Parkes, R. (2006) Joint Patrols at the EU’s Southern Border: Security and Development in the Control of African Migration (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP). Sall, B. (2005) Migration, remittances and economic initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa, in: OECD, Migration, Remittances and Development (Paris: OECD). Sandell, R. (2005) Were they Pushed or Did they Jump? The Rise of Sub-Saharan Immigration (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, [website], (updated 4 Dec. 2006) <www.realinstitutoelcano.org/ analisis/835/Sandell835.pdf> Simon, C. (2006) Le Maghreb, espace d’immigration. Le Monde, December 15, 2006. UN (2006a), Organized crime and irregular migration from Africa to Europe. (New York: United Nations (UN), Office on drugs and Crime, July 2006) Vertovec, S. (2007), Circular migration: the way forward in global policy? IMI Working papers 2007, No. 4 (Oxford: International Migration Institute, Univ. of Oxford)

51


6RPDOLD8. &DSH9HUGH3RUWXJDO 1LJHULD8. $OORWKHUV

*KDQD8. *KDQD,WDO\ 6HQHJDO,WDO\ 6HQHJDO)UDQFH 0DOL)UDQFH *KDQD*HUPDQ\

Figure 2.1 Breakdown of major Sub-Saharan African diasporas in the EU Source: UN (2006, p. 6); IOM (2003, p. 219). Available data on migration stock mostly date from 2000 and 2001 and do not necessarily include unauthorized migrants; therefore, they may not represent the current reality.

52

Figure 2.2

7RJR &DPHURRQ6HQHJDO

0DOL

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1LJHULD

&DSH

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)',


Financial inflows of ODA, FDI, and official remittances (average of the years 1980 to 1999; source: IOM 2003: 228, World Bank data of 2001)

53


Figure 2.3 Migration-routes from Africa to Europe Source: © UN (2006, p. 12)

Table 2.1

Western Africa Eastern Africa Central Africa Northern Africa Southern Africa

Immigration rate and level of skill of Africans in OECD-countries (25+ years; in percentage of local work force) 1990 2000 Level of skill Level of skill Low Medium High All Low Medium High All 0.3 1.1 20.7 0.5 0.3 2.8 26.7 0.8 0.2

1.0

15.5

0.4

0.2

1.6

18.4

0.6

0.5

1.0

9.8

0.6

0.4

1.3

13.3

0.8

2.2

1.8

6.8

2.4

2.3

1.5

6.2

2.5

0.1

0.5

6.9

0.5

0.3

0.5

5.3

0.9

Low skilled = primary education 0-8 years of schooling Medium skilled = secondary education 9-12 years of schooling High skilled = tertiary education 13+ years of schooling Source: ECA (2006, p. 29); Docquier & Marfouk (2004).


Chapter 3

Crisis Region Southern Africa: The Southern Africa Development Community and Human Security in the Region Cheryl Hendricks

Introduction Peace, security and development, viewed as intrinsically intertwined, have been at the top of the African continental and regional agendas for more than a decade. The conceptualisation of peace and security has also undergone a fundamental paradigm shift from a narrow state-centric perspective to that which places the security of individuals, democratisation and a respect for human rights as central referents and markers of security. This perspective has become known as Human Security.1 The African Union (AU) has adopted a Human Security approach that is enunciated in, among others, its Common African Defence and Security Policy. The policy notes: The causes of intra-state conflict necessitate a new emphasis on human security, based not only on political values but on social and economic imperatives as well. This newer, multi-dimensional notion of security thus embraces such issues as human rights; the right to participate fully in the process of governance; the right to equal development as well as the right to have resources and the basic necessities of life; the right to protection against poverty; the right to conducive education and health conditions; the right to protection against marginalization on the basis of gender; protection against natural disasters, as well as ecological and environmental degradation. At the national level the aim would be to safeguard the security of individuals, families, communities and the state/national life, in the economic political and social dimensions.2

Regional economic communities are seen as the ‘building blocks’ of the AU’s peace and security architecture. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), established in 1992, is one of the regional organisations in Africa tasked

1 The Human Security Perspective was articulated in the United Nations Development Programme (1993), in the United Nations Development Programme (1994) and in the United Nations Commission on Human Security Report (2003). 2 African Union (2004).

56


with creating Human Security.3 In 1996, SADC created an Organ on Politics Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDS/Organ) to deal with peace and security issues in the region. Southern Africa today is a far cry from the embattled conflict zone of the 1980s and 1990s. However, its constitutive states are still at various stages in the conflict cycle: Swaziland is an emerging conflict area; Zimbabwe is embroiled in political conflict; the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is transiting to the post-conflict phase, although the state is fragile and there are still high levels of violence in the East; Angola and Mozambique are engaged in post-conflict reconstruction; and while South Africa’s transition period has brought relative stability to the country, it has high levels of crime and unemployment. Although Lesotho, Madagascar and Zambia are considered stable, they have all experienced attempted coups in the last decade. Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, and Tanzania are peaceful but, similarly to all the other countries in the region, are beset with high levels of poverty and inequality. The region also has to deal with new destabilising conditions, such as, food and water shortages, environmental degradation, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, terrorism, organised crime, gender-based violence, and the continued proliferation of small arms and light weapons. These concerns make it imperative that peace and security is broadened to include non-military threats and that both the security of the individual and the security of the state are necessary to engender growth and development. Peace, Security and Development in Africa are also key concerns for the European Community (EU) and consequently Aid to the continent has been channelled to these sectors. Although Aid has always been rationalised on a humanitarian basis, the ground has begun to shift with clear linkages being made between the lack of human security in Africa and the possibilities for the Caliban to disrupt socio-political relations in ex-colonial powers. Scores of Southern Africans landing at Heathrow Airport with the intention of staying may not as yet be as visibly threatening as those from the Sahel risking their lives in search of the better life that Europe portends but blocks access to; however, they form part of a larger perceived problem of an influx of migrants from Africa. The lack of peace, security and development are viewed as ‘migratory pressures’ and hence the need to address these factors to stem the tide. It is therefore in the EU’s interest to ensure that Southern African countries are politically and economically stable and that structures such as SADC and its OPDS function successfully. The EU therefore maintains strong political and economic relations with SADC and its member states, and remains its biggest donor. This chapter provides an overview of the development of the SADC OPDS and the way it functions with regard to creating human security. In the face of a multitude of challenges what should the priorities of the Organ be? What role has the international community, especially the European Community, played in assisting SADC to reach its objectives? What are the underlying pressures and challenges of their interventions? 3 This community presently consists of 14 states: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Seychelles has observer status.

Crisis Region Southern Africa

57

The chapter argues that SADC, and the OPDS in particular, have recognised the need for, and codified through their policy framework, a human security approach. However, there is still a wide gap between the policies formulated and the ethos, practices and programmes implemented to provide concrete expression of their ideal. This is partly a result of the historical development of the organisation, regional power relations that manifest in the politics of the organisation, internal capacity challenges, and external (to the organisation and the region) power relations exerted on it. SADC countries face differing challenges and are at varied levels of attaining human security. They therefore represent different levels of threat to ‘Fortress Europe.’ Background The formation of SADC, from a loose grouping of states that cooperated through the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) into a more centralised regional economic community, is well documented.4 This chapter only elaborates on this history in relation to the collaborative security institutions that emerged. The decolonisation process in Southern Africa was uneven with respect to timing and methods and these factors shaped the form of collective security that was predominantly informal and primarily concerned with the liberation of countries in the region. While the majority of the Southern African countries obtained their independence in the 1960s, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe’s liberation was delayed, and only later achieved via an armed struggle. The adoption of a ‘Lusaka Manifesto’, in 1969, and a series of informal meetings by the Mulungushi Club were some of the first expressions to create collaborative security mechanisms between decolonised states in the Southern and East African region. 5 In the mid-1970s, the Front Line States (FLS) regional security structure emerged: an informal structure concentrating on achieving majority rule in Southern African states and confronting the onslaught by South Africa. This pre-occupation meant that the FLS focused on military and political issues, i.e. a focus on regime security. In 1975, the FLS created a ministerial body, the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), specifically to deal with perceived security threats. The political culture of this institution has impacted upon the functioning of the regional security institutions in Southern Africa. The ISDSC had to deal with issues considered to be ‘sensitive’ and was engaged with liberation movement structures that were operating ‘underground’. These factors shaped the way in which the ISDSC operated; that is, on the basis of secrecy and personal trust among its members rather than binding rules and regulations. The proposal by South Africa in 1979 for the formation of a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, and the 4 See Lee (2003), Oosthuizen (2006), Mandaza (1996) and Ngoma (2005). 5 There were a number of collective security agreements by white colonial regimes dating to the 1940s and intensifying in the 1960s. See Ngoma (2005, pp. 79–83).

58


adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), in the same year, informed the formation of SADCC. A declaration, ‘Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation’ was adopted at the FLS’s 1980 Summit in Lusaka, giving birth to SADCC. SADCC’s raison d’être was primarily economic. The member countries had, at the time of its formation, barely enjoyed sovereignty for ten years or less and had adopted differing development paths, political norms and values. They were therefore reluctant to cede power to any supra-national organisation. SADCC was structured as a decentralised organisation; for example, it placed each of its member states in charge of a specific development sector. SADCC also functioned ‘without a legal framework, treaty or protocol’.6 The FLS and its sub-structure, the ISDSC, continued to exist, operating largely outside of SADCC, entrenching a separation between development, politics and security, a lack of transparency and unaccountability, and a militaristic and state-centric perspective on peace and security issues. Although the FLS and SADCC generated a sense of regional solidarity, and arguably regional identity too, they were less successful in effecting peace and security (beyond support for liberation movements), economic development and/or lessening their dependence on South Africa. By the 1990s there was a growing international consensus on the route to political and economic development, i.e. that democracy and markets were the cornerstone to sustainable development. A new challenge for development at national, regional and global levels was that of creating the environment for the promotion of democratic governance and market driven economies. Moreover, Namibia had gained independence in 1990 and the region’s erstwhile security threat, South Africa, was metamorphosing from its pariah status. These international and regional events provided the impetus for SADCC to transform its institutions, norms and priorities. SADCC TO SADC: Old Wine in New Bottles? SADCC Heads of State took a decision in 1989 to formalise the organisation into a body whose decisions are legally binding and which may enter into contract with states and other regional and international organisations.7 In 1992, at a meeting in Windhoek, the Heads of States signed a treaty that ushered in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC’s objectives, as outlined in the Treaty, showed an immediate shift towards closer cooperation, establishing common norms and values, and creating the basis for addressing ‘the region’s deep-seated political, economic, and military challenges’.8 These objectives are: • Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration; • evolve common political values, systems and institutions; 6 7 8

Malan (1998, p. 2). Oosthuizen (2006, p. 120). Baregu & Landsberg (2003, p. 2).


• • • • • •

59

promote and defend peace and security; promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective- and selfreliance, and the interdependence of member states; achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes; promote and maximise productive employment of the utilisation of resources of the region; achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment; strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the region.9

Some of the admission criteria for SADC are: commonality of political, economic, social and cultural systems; observance of the principles of democracy, human rights, good governance and the rule of law; ability to honour its obligations and to participate effectively and efficiently in the SADC programme of Action; and should ‘not be at war and should not be involved or engaged in subversive and destabilisation activities, and have territorial ambitions against SADC, any of its member states or any member state of the African Union’.10 SADC has not been strict on compliance with these criteria, as it has accepted all countries in the region, irrespective of whether or not they conform to the admission criteria, as members. For example, Zimbabwe and Swaziland do not meet the good governance criteria, and the DRC, due to instability in the country, has not been able to participate ‘fully and effectively’ in the organisation. The goal, as per the treaty, should then be to have these countries move in this direction. SADC, however, has been reluctant to take a stand on and/or intervene in countries that do not adhere to its good governance criteria, leading to a growing lack of organisational credibility in the region. For example, the international community and the citizens of SADC expected a far more interventionist approach by the organisation on the conflict in Zimbabwe. The conflict erupted in 2000 with the land invasions by war veterans and the government’s attempts to suppress the rise of the opposition movement (Movement for Multiparty Democracy). Although not marred by the same levels of violence seen in other African conflicts, Zimbabwe has steadily declined into a state characterised by repressive rule and economic collapse. SADC’s principle of non-intervention in internal matters as well as its guiding compass of solidarity has framed its approach towards resolving the Zimbabwe question. It sought to use ‘quiet diplomacy’ to try and bridge the impasse that had developed between the ruling and opposition parties but this has not led to much success. SADC countries are also at different levels of socio-economic development. Southern Africa has some of the poorest countries in the world, e.g. Malawi and Mozambique. South Africa, by contrast, has a gross domestic product (GDP) ‘four times that of its southern African neighbours and comprising around 25% of the

9 Southern African Development Community (1992). 10 Cited in Oosthuizen (2006, pp. 135–136).

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entire continent’s GDP.’ South Africa’s economic resources and moral capital12 has positioned it as a major actor within SADC. South Africa has been instrumental in restructuring the organisation, especially in the spheres of norm and agenda setting, and it has provided implementation capacity for the organisation. Zimbabwe and Angola, however, have a longer history with the institution and thus retain a strong influence. There is therefore a division in SADC between those countries more supportive of Zimbabwe and those closer aligned to South Africa. This division came sharply to the fore in the discussions around the formation of the Organ13 and, though presently subdued, remains a potential fault line within the organisation and part of the reason for the tardy response to the crises in Zimbabwe and Swaziland. The SADC Secretariat also remains weak and this has led to numerous accusations that there is little political will for the realisation of a strong successful SADC.14 The SADC Organ: Stillborn or the Harbinger of Greater Human Security? A key objective of SADC, as stipulated in its treaty, is the promotion and defence of peace and security and cooperation in this regard. The Treaty did not fully elaborate on the institutional mechanisms that would be responsible for achieving this objective. This was to be outlined in a Protocol. Given SADC’s history, the differing political cultures and threats facing countries in the region, reaching agreement on the structure of such an institution, and the conceptualisation of security that should inform it, was bound to be fraught with tension. Agostinho Zacarias notes that ‘soon after the signing of the SADC treaty, recurrent statements by regional leaders called for a new security agenda that would favour peaceful resolution of conflicts, prefer conflict prevention to conflict resolution, and be based on concrete problem-solving methods’.15 The FLS was dissolved in 1994, but there was no agreement on what to replace it with. Some states argued that security was a sensitive issue that should not be ‘subordinated to the debate on economic development and handled by bureaucrats at the SADC secretariat or the SADC summit …’ while others argued the need for a new peace and security structure that would be inclusive of all member states, incorporated as a substructure of SADC, and would report to the Summit.16 Two years later a compromise position was reached, with the recommendation to summit that an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) be established. Zimbabwe was elected as its first chairperson but the operationalisation of the Organ remained dormant until 1999. Between 1996 and 1999 the region experienced an attempted coup in Lesotho, the return to civil war in Angola and an escalation of conflict in the DRC. In 1997, 11 Southafrica.inforeporter 12 Which it acquired through its negotiated resolution of conflict and its institutionalisation of democratic rights. 13 Baregu & Landsberg (2003, p. 7). 14 Tjonneland et al. (2005, pp. v–vi). 15 Zacarias (2003, p. 36). 16 Zacarias (2003, p. 37).


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Laurent Kabila, with the backing of Rwanda and Uganda overthrew the notoriously corrupt Mobutu regime in the DRC. However, Kabila’s rule was soon embroiled in conflict as rebels, backed by his former allies, began to seize control in the East. In 1998, after a plea by Kabila for SADC’s assistance, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia sent troops to the DRC. They argued that ‘their intervention had been based on the SADC Treaty, Article 4, read in conjunction with the objectives of the SADC OPDS, in response to hostile action by foreign states that required a defensive response by SADC.’17 The intervention by these three countries sparked many a criticism in the region and indeed there were question marks around whether or not this was an intervention sanctioned by SADC. When Thabo Mbeki became president of South Africa in mid-1999 he was able to hold a meeting with all regional leaders, brokering a peace-deal, known as the Lusaka Accord. Since then, South Africa, on behalf of SADC, has been key in attempts to bring peace and stability to the DRC. In 2003 it was estimated that 3.3 million people had died in the DRC, largely because of the conflict.18 The way in which the conflict in the DRC was dealt with by SADC highlighted some of the tensions that were brewing in the organisation and which were affecting the progress of the Organ. Key here, as pointed out by Baregu & Landsberg, were the issues around the autonomy of the OPDS, the lack of a legal framework and the hegemonic power struggles between South Africa and Zimbabwe.19 The formation of the OPDS must be viewed against these background tensions. The legal framework for the OPDS, ‘The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation’, was set out in 2000 and adopted by the Heads of State in 2001. It entered into force in 2004 when the required nine signatures of member states were obtained. Angola, the current incoming chair of the Organ, has yet to sign the Protocol. To assist with continuity, a Troika governs the Organ, i.e. an incoming chair, the chair and the outgoing chair. The ISDSC was incorporated into the Organ and an Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) was also established, thus separating politics from defence. The objectives and strategies for implementation of the SADC Organ reflect a broader approach to security, but the directorate charged with implementing these tasks has little capacity. Adebajo, in a comparison between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and SADC noted that there were about 40 full time staff working on security issues in ECOWAS and only two in SADC.20 There are currently four people in the directorate and it thus remains ‘a hub without spokes’.21 The Strategic Indicative plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO) is designed as a framework to operationalise the Protocol. In

17 18 19 20 21

Institute for Security Studies (2004). Shah (2003). Baregu & Landsberg (2003, p. 7). Adebajo (2005, p. 26). Fisher & Ngoma (2005, p. 7).

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total, SIPO lists 28 objectives and 147 activities, many of which are overlapping.22 The objectives include establishing mechanisms to avert aggression, improving defence capability, improving information collection and analysis, promoting civil– military relations, promoting demilitarisation, demobilisation and reintegration, combating HIV/AIDS, harmonising structures, improving the state judicial systems, coordinating peace-keeping arrangements, and so forth. SIPO also makes provision for the inclusion of NGOs in accomplishing its objectives. The security agenda therefore includes political-military and non-military threats and allows for diverse actors to be involved in its resolution. However, there is no clear prioritisation in this plan, or sufficient detail on how to accomplish set objectives or time frames attached, making it more of a wish list of things to be accomplished. Achievements and Limitations on the Peace and Security Front Although there has been a barrage of critique on the non-functioning of the Organ, in fairness, given its relatively recent institutionalisation and its capacity constraints, there has been some progress. On the whole, the SADC region is more peaceful and the majority of its states, if using the yardstick of multi-party elections, are considered to be democratic. The civil war in Angola has been resolved (largely because of the death of the rebel leader Jonas Savimbi), the DRC has had its first democratic multi-party election in 40 years, which South Africa played a major role in seeing to fruition, and DDR programs are being pursued. SADC, however; still faces many challenges: ‘Inequality between and within states is widening; poverty is increasing in most countries and food shortages abound; the incidence of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis continues to be on the increase; the widespread use of small arms and organised crime and money laundering persists; refugees and internally displaced people still present major problems; violence against women and children and human trafficking is on the increase; human rights abuses and electoral irregularities are still common’,23 as are the issues associated with post-conflict reconstruction and statebuilding. A Human Security approach demands that these challenges be addressed. In its attempts to address peace and security concerns, SADC adopted a Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other related matters in 2001, a Mutual Defence Pact in 2003, and a Stand-by Brigade has been formed, although its launch has been delayed until 2007. In addition, joint training exercises of peace keepers have taken place and an early warning system is in place. SADC also adopted a Declaration on Gender and Development (calling for 30% representation of women in parliaments) in 1997 with a later addendum on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence Against Women, a Protocol against Corruption in 2001, the Protocol on the Free Movement of Peoples in 2005, a set of ‘Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections and Election Observer Missions’, and the Organ held a meeting in Windhoek in 2006 to coordinate donor assistance.

22 See SADC ‘Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation’ adopted in 2004. 23 Hendricks (2006, p. 6).


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SADC has therefore made great strides in setting the legal framework in place to address security and development concerns. The domestication and/or monitoring of the implementation of these frameworks have yet to take place. Countries appear to sign the protocols, but then do not take the next step of placing them for approval before their parliaments in order to accede to them. If SADC does not develop the capacity to monitor the implementation of the protocols these become merely pieces of paper with good intent. The Organ has not been able to effectively deal with human rights abuses in the region or find appropriate ways of including civil society organisations in its policy formulation and implementation. It has preferred the path of ‘diplomatic solidarity with authoritarian states’.24 Zimbabwe has been a test case for the Organ’s new human security approach, and its lack of concrete steps to address the problem has produced a sense of déjà vu and consequent lack of trust in the ability of the current (which in effect remains the old) guard to implement stated objectives. The lack of civil society participation is also seen as limiting the capability of SADC’s early warning system, an argument that can be extended to the functioning of the entire Organ. Cilliers has argued that the early warning system operates like an intelligence gathering system rather than being based on open sources.25 Abie Dithlake, secretary general of the SADC Council of Non Governmental Organisations, has also critiqued the lack of civil society involvement, claiming that ‘both the pursuit of democratic governance and regional integration has been overly state-centric and elite driven’.26 Southern Africa has the strongest concentration of civil society organisations on the continent. Much of the capacity for research and implementation can be harnessed from these institutions. The Organ, driven as it is by securocrats, has yet to make full use of this resource and begin to see them as allies rather than as foes. Moreover, civil society itself should claim the space provided for it under the SADC Treaty, which stipulates, ‘SADC shall seek to involve fully, the people of the region and non-governmental institutions in the process of regional integration’.27 One of the key questions on the adoption of the Mutual Defence Pact is the rationale for its existence, that is, who are SADC members protecting themselves against and/or where are the threats deemed to be emanating from? The threats to SADC countries have been primarily internal. It is therefore noteworthy that the pact places emphasis on state sovereignty. Ngoma states that the ‘pact clearly advocates the protection of the state (as would be expected of a security community), but at the possible exclusion of the people who are ultimately the very motivation for a more secure environment’.28 The SADC Organ has been relatively good at implementing traditional security mechanisms. Discussions on the formation of a SADC Brigade, as part of the African 24 Raftopolous (2006, p. 81). 25 Cilliers (2005). 26 Dithlake (2006). 27 Article 21 of the ‘Declaration and Treaty of SADC’ 1992. A point also made by Dithlake. 28 Ngoma (2004, pp. 414–415).

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Union’s African Standby Force, began in May 2004. A policy framework document known as the ‘Modality Report on the Establishment of the SADC Standby Force Brigade’ was then drafted and countries have since made their contributing pledges. This brigade will be launched in 2007, three years ahead of the AU schedule for the establishment of a standby force. Draper et al. contend, SADC continues to focus far more on the traditional definition of security – a reflection of the perspective of its member states. Consensus is far easier in this field than it is in the area of interventions in the face of domestic instability. In those areas there is a notable absence of political will to ensure members comply with protocols and related agreements. Notwithstanding the policy design and protocols, SADC is still quite far from being regarded as a security community. Its members hold divergent views on the broad principles and values, such as good governance, democracy and accountability. The very different levels of political and economic development of SADC members compound this. 29

For the Organ to act as a security community and implement a human security paradigm it must first get broad-based understanding amongst its members on what human security means and what it implies for the changed nature of its operations. At the moment it is more of a matter of wearing the cloak of human security but conducting business as usual. This modus operandi will inevitably limit the opportunity that is before SADC to transform itself into the community it seeks to be. SADC, and the Organ in particular, appears to be a captive of its past and there is little pressure from its citizens to transform the institution. Relations between SADC and the European Union Europe has a deep historical relationship with Africa and with Southern Africa in particular. These relations date to the colonial era in which the economies of Southern African states were inextricably tied to those of their colonisers. Southern African states continue to trade more with Europe than between themselves. The Lomé Convention of 1975 and, replacing it, the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 (revised in 2005) have governed the trade and political relations between African states and the EU. The OAU/AU and SADC have, to a large extent, modelled themselves on the EU. These organisations have been donor dependent and the European Community has been a major donor in this regard. Tjonneland indicates that ‘foreign donors provide nearly 60% of SADC’s current budget’.30 The Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme between SADC and the EC, for the period 2002– 2007, ‘which is to provide a comprehensive framework for EU – Southern Africa co-operation’ earmarked €101 million for the period to the organisation for pursuing regional integration and trade and transport and communications.31 In May 2006, 29 Draper et al. (2006, p. 7). 30 Tjonneland (2006, p. 1). 31 Cited in ‘Trade Briefs’ under Economic Partnership Agreements on the Trade and Law Centre website, www.epa.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=4610


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the EU signed an agreement for €18 million for the modernisation of the SADC customs in preparation for a SADC customs Union by 2010. The Department for International Development (DFID) has placed its financial support into institutional reform, regional trade and HIV/AIDS.32 In 1994, the Berlin Initiative was entered into between SADC and the EU. This initiative proposed that SADC and the EU enter into consultations every six months ‘on a range of economic, development, human rights, democracy, governance and security issues’.33 The EU has therefore been in close cooperation with SADC. Both the EU and SADC have emphasised the need for African ownership in the development of their economic and security agendas and the need for African selfreliance. This emphasis has changed the nature of donor relations, with a stress on partnerships rather than recipients. The EU Strategy for Africa, proposed in 2005, is ‘to work in partnership with the nations of Africa to promote peace and prosperity for all their citizens’.34 This strategy seeks to achieve the Millennium Development Goals under the guiding principles of ‘equality, partnership and ownership’. The emphasis is on assisting with peace and security, and good governance as essential prerequisites for development. In relation to peace and security the EU commits to working with the AU and regional organisations and in particular to: •

• • • • •

Develop a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention – here it seeks to address the root causes of conflict and promote dialogue, participation and reconciliation and support regional organisations’ efforts to strengthen governance/institutional capacity building Cooperate in addressing common security threats Support African peace support operations – notably through the Peace facility for Africa Disarm to break the conflict cycle – support DDRR Sustain peace in post-conflict situations Tackle conflict resources35

It is within the context of this African Strategy that the EU will channel support to SADC peace, security and development initiatives. It is of course not all benevolence that accounts for the EU strategy. Conflict, the lack of development and regional integration, and poor border control mechanisms in Africa are seen as security threats to Europe: push and opportunity factors that account for the perceived rising tide of refugees and legal and illegal immigrants. Channelling assistance in this regard is then also aimed at preventing these forms of migratory patterns. Conflicts in the DRC, Angola and Zimbabwe have increased the number of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and illegal immigrants from, and in, Southern Africa. In

32 33 34 35

Tjonneland (2006, p. 10). International Peace Academy (2000). Commission on European Communities (2005 ). Commission on European Communities (2005).

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addition, the Human Development Index for 2006 ranked the DRC at 167, Angola at 161 and Zimbabwe at 151 out of a total of 177 ranked countries.36 The UNHCR report indicates that at the end of 2005 the DRC accounted for 430,625 refugees and 55,962 asylum seekers, Angola for 215,777 refugees and 8,352 asylum seekers and Zimbabwe for 10,793 refugees and 17,326 asylum seekers of concern to the UNHCR.37 But the main countries of asylum for refugees from Africa have always been other African countries and this remains the trend. For example, Tanzania, Zambia, Congo, Rwanda and Uganda were the main hosts to refugees from the DRC. Poverty levels in Zimbabwe have induced what is referred to as a ‘brain drain’ effect. As in the case of IDP’s, there are no reliable statistics. However, in 2003 it was estimated that 479,348 skilled Zimbabweans were in the diaspora, with an estimated 36% of these located in the United Kingdom, 34.5% in Botswana and only 4.6% in South Africa.38 These figures have however been disputed, with claims that the majority of the Zimbabwean diaspora are located in South Africa but are there as illegal migrants.39 Nevertheless, the daunting pictures of masses of Africans landing on the shores of Europe have created tensions within Europe and it is therefore in the EU’s political interests to assist Africa, inclusive of the Southern African region, to begin to create peace and security in the region. However, it is perhaps more challenging for the EU, and other donors to work with SADC, and the Organ in particular, than with other regional organisations. The Organ, though donor dependent, still vigorously asserts its independence. It also has little of what, in donor speak, is referred to as ‘absorptive capacity’ making donors reluctant to invest in the institution. Tjonneland notes that from 2001 ‘direct support to the SADC Organ activities has been limited to some funding from the UNDP’s peacebuilding programme in Africa. In addition general DFID funding to the Secretariat facilitated the printing of SIPO … Since early 2005, GTZ has seconded a technical advisor providing assistance to the Organ directorate’.40 Donors have preferred to provide money to subsidiary SADC organisations such as the Parliamentary and Police Forums. They have also preferred to channel their money via NGOs working in the area of peace and security. This has placed the Organ and NGOs in the region in a perceived competition for funding and partly explains the Organ’s resistance to cooperate with NGOs in the area of peace and security. Another problem that manifests itself is the attempt by donors to insist that Zimbabwe be excluded from initiatives funded with their money. SADC, in a measure of solidarity, then also decided to reject funding under those conditions. Donors, inclusive of the EU, are now flocking back to SADC: the re-entrance of China on the playing field poses an economic threat; they retain a vested interest in promoting good governance and intra-regional mobility, and the strengthening of institutions such as the SADC brigade will relieve pressures for international 36 37 38 39 40

United Nations Development Programme (2006). United Nations High Commission for Refugees (2005). United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian affairs (2003). United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian affairs (2003). Tjonneland (2006, p. 14).


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peacekeepers. The EU strategy for Africa and its accompanying Global Approach to Migration are the frameworks through which socio-political and economic relations will be conducted with Africa. Conclusion SADC has to once again take the initiative and assess what its key priorities are (short, medium and long term), what programmes it needs to implement to meet those priorities, what capacity exists where in the region that it can draw on, and what it needs to bring in from external actors to deliver on its programme. It needs to scale down on its current list of priorities and choose a few that will have maximum impact and implement it well – it is only through this exercise that it will begin to be seen as an agency that can do more than draft protocols. Moreover, it must make the mental shift, which has practical organisational implications, to human security so that it tackles those issues that cause the greatest threats to individuals, and delivers on the objectives of peace, security and development. It has to do this, not because it is now has the added responsibility of acting as the gatekeeper for ‘Fortress Europe’, but because it is the very rationale for its existence. Creating human security is first and foremost in the interest of the citizens of the region, and they would prefer it to remain as just that. References Adebajo, A. (2005) ECOWAS and the SADC: a tale of two invalids? City Press, 22 May 2005. African Union (2004) Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy. Adopted at the Second Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (Sirte, Libya). Baregu, M. & Landsberg C. (Eds) (2003) From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges (London: Lynne Rienner). Cilliers, J. (2005) Towards a continental early warning system for Africa, Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper, 102. Commission on European Communities (2005) Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee: EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s development’, COM (2005) Brussels 12.10.2005. Dithlake, A. (2006) Strengthening civil society engagement with SADC: challenges and opportunities. Paper presented at a workshop in Pretoria hosted by the ISS on Civil Society and Governance in Southern Africa, 14–15 September 2006. Fisher, L.M. & Ngoma, N. (2005) The SADC organ: challenges in the new millennium, Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper, 114. Hendricks, C. (2006) Introduction, in: C. Hendricks (Ed.) From State Security to Human Security in Southern Africa: Policy Research and Capacity Building Challenges, Institute for Security Studies Monograph Series, 112 (Pretoria). International Peace Academy (2000) Southern Africa’s evolving security architecture:

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problems and prospects. Report of a seminar in Gaberone, Botswana, 11–13 December 2000. Lee, M. (2003) The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa (University of Cape Town). Malan, M. (1998) SADC and sub-regional security: Unde Venis et Qua Vadis?, Institute for Security Studies Monograph, 19. Mandaza, I. (Ed.) (1996) Peace and Security in Southern Africa (Harare: Southern Africa Political Economy Series). Ngoma, N. (2004) SADC’s mutual defence pact: a final move to a security community? The Round Table, 93/375. Ngoma, N. (2005) Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa: An Analysis of Regional Security in the Southern African Development Community (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies). Oosthuizen, G.H. (2006) The Southern African Development Community: The Organization, its Policies and Prospects (Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue). Raftopolous, B. (2006) Prospects for national dialogue in Zimbabwe, in: C. Hendricks (Ed.) From State Security to Human Security in Southern Africa: Policy Research and Capacity Building Challenges, Institute for Security Studies Monograph Series, 112 (Pretoria). Tjonneland, E., Isaksen, J. & le Pere, G. (2005) SADC’s Restructuring and Emerging Policies: Options for Norwegian Support. Report Commissioned by the Norwegian Embassy (Harare). Tjonneland, E.N. (2006) SADC and donors – ideals and practices: from Gaberone to Paris and back, FOPRISA, Report No.1 (Botswana). United Nations Commission on Human Security (2003) Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People (New York: UNCHS). United Nations Development Programme (1993) Human Development Report (UNDP). United Nations Development Programme (1994) Human Development Report (UNDP). United Nations Development Programme (2006) Human Development Report (UNDP). Zacarias, A. (2003) Redefining security, in: M. Baregu & C. Landsberg (Eds) From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges (London: Lynne Rienner). Internet Based References Draper, P., Sidirpolous, E., Jakobeit, C. & Maier, M. (2006) Trade, economic cooperation and conflict prevention, management and reduction in Africa. Paper 7 of the Joint Project of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and the Centre for International Cooperation and Security, available at: http://www.upi-fiia.fi/ eng/events/past_events_2006. Institute for Security Studies (2004) Hawks, doves or penguins? A critical review of the SADC military intervention in the DRC. Occasional Paper, 88, available at:


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http://www.issafrica.org. Shah, A. (2003) The Democratic Republic of Congo. Last update: 31 October 2003, available at: www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Africa/DRC. Southern African Development Community (1992) Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community. Adopted in Windhoek, Namibia on 17 August 1992, available at: http://www.sadc.int. Southern African Development Community (2001) Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. Adopted in Blantyre, Malawi on 14 August 2001, available at: http://www.sadc.int. Southern African Development Community (2004) Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Co-operation (SIPO). Adopted on 5 August 2004, available at: http://www.sadc.int. Southafrica.inforeporter. South Africa: economy overview. http://www.southafrica. info/doing_business/economy/econoverview.htm United Nations High Commission for Refugees (2005) 2005 Global Refugee Trends (Geneva), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/statistics. United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2003) Zimbabwe: Focus on the extent of the brain drain. 23 July 2003, available at: www.irinnews.org


Chapter 4

Peace and Security Policy of the African Union and the Regional Security Mechanisms Stephan Klingebiel

Introduction: the Beginnings of a New Peace and Security Agenda in Africa? Compared with previous decades, peace and security have not ranked as high on Africa’s agenda as they have at the beginning of the Millennium. While peace and security have been recognized in the past as one of the most urgent challenges facing the continent, they have not had so clear a profile. Both peace and security are now a political priority for practical policy approaches and efforts both in and outside Africa.1 The basic parameters involved have shifted in the direction of greater visibility and a heightened a political will to act. The African Union (AU), created in 2002, is well known for promoting this new direction. However, the new peace and security plans face a number of challenges. The AU’s ownership approach to peace and security contrasts sharply with African funding and implementation capacities. The dynamics that Africa has developed on its own and the dynamics currently involved in external assistance of Africa largely relate to military capabilities. In fact, there have been many examples of mechanisms put in place by African institutions themselves (e.g. the Organization of African Unity) or by the international community (e.g. the United Nations, key states). These institutions were unwilling or unable to intervene militarily in extreme emergency situations to protect civilian populations. Furthermore, numerous critical doubts have been expressed about the raison d’être of military actions by Africa and the motives informing initiatives and military actions by external actors in Africa. The creation of the AU can be seen as a crucially important step towards the development of a new peace and security architecture. In structural terms, the AU offers a set of entirely new proactive conditions. On the other hand, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), AU’s predecessor, had a largely unsatisfactory record in the field of peace and security. These problems were due to inhibiting principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in the affairs of member states. As a result of various positive developments at regional level and the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development) initiative, the AU is now seen as constituting a realistic

1 For an overview see Cilliers & Sturman (2004); Powell (2005); Francis (2006); Klingebiel et al. (2006).

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‘African reform programme’ designed to set new African political accents. At the same time, it is consciously seeking support from abroad. The dynamics developed by African reform efforts have been accompanied by an altered outside perception of Africa’s growing significance in international politics. Today, more attention is being paid to Africa’s role in international relations than in the late 1980s during the end of the Cold War. This greater measure of attention is associated only in part with ongoing efforts to reduce poverty and redress structural deficits, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, it has far more to do with new political priorities in international relations linked to a changed security environment. In this environment, there are new threats to peace and stability such as international terrorism, proliferation of arms of mass destruction, and vast illegal migration. Thus, in the context of the new international security agenda, Africa has come to be seen as a continent that is highly relevant in terms of security policy.2 As a report by the US Council on Foreign Affairs rightly notes, ‘Africa affects the G8’s global interests in security’.3 The issue of peace and security in Africa is also on the agenda of the European Union (EU). Both the Commissioner for Development (Louis Michel) and the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) for Common Foreign and Security Policy (Javier Solana) are showing considerable interest in the subject. The European Security Strategy (ESS) is meant to deal with these challenges.4 In December 2005, the EU Council adopted a strategy entitled The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership,5 which considers peace and security to be one of the main areas for cooperation. Considering the EU’s geographical proximity to Africa, this growing preoccupation with security issues arising from the African continent results, in the first place, from masses of illegal immigrants trying to enter the EU.6 As violent conflict and economic reasons are the main motivational factors for migration, approaches towards a more efficient APSA seem quite reasonable. The new international security agenda has numerous implications. One factor is that more cross-cutting approaches are combining elements of foreign security and development policy. Interfaces and overlaps between the civil and military spheres have grown at a striking pace in recent years.7 Approaches that cut across policies have come to be a challenge for donors; especially with respect to sub-Saharan Africa. In the Sub-Saharan area, the EU is one of the most important protagonists. Against this background, this chapter wants to answer two questions. First, what are the components of the new African Peace and Security Architecture and how can 2 See, for example, Richard N. Haass (in: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006, p. xiii). He states: ‘Africa is of growing international importance.’ 3 Atwood et al. (2004, p. 2).

4 5 6

Council of the EU (2003). Council of the EU (2005). The African Studies Centre et al. (2003, p. 15).

7 The relationship between development and security is not a fundamentally new conceptual issue. Earlier debates, however, saw this relationship primarily as abstract interdependence. In contrast, the current debates, which began in the early 2000s, focus far more directly on convergence in conceptual and practical policy terms. For an overview see Klingebiel & Roehder (2004) and Klingebiel (2006).

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this approach be evaluated? Second, what role does the EU and other international donors play in establishing a new African peace and security agenda? This chapter analyses the main pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture. In the following, the approaches of external actors (especially the European Union) are discussed. Finally, the chapter draws conclusions concerning the ongoing African efforts and the increasing interest of the international donor community in the subject. Main Pillars of the new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) A few years after the AU was founded, the reform of the continent’s peace and security architecture began to develop a pronounced and visible dynamic. The OAU was never able to assume a genuine role as a force for continental change. Rather, it was Africa’s regional structures – to the extent that they proved workable in the first place – that played this role in some regions in the past. In addition, this is true of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and, to a lesser extent, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The establishment of the AU has entailed a fundamental shift. This shift has involved raising the issue of peace and security to a continental level, but without depriving regional institutions and arrangements of their important tasks. What, in practical terms, are the fundamental differences that would seem to justify a relatively positive appraisal of the AU only a few years after it was founded? In all, eight important pillars on which the new APSA rests can – with some reservations – be identified (see Table 2). First, the AU’s basic structure is geared to constructively addressing challenges that arise in the field of peace and security. While the OAU was predicated on noninterference and non-intervention, the AU envisions for itself a role of responsibility and has been moving away from a policy of indifference. For this issue, the AU’s founding document, the Constitutive Act, states (Article 4) that the Union must function in accordance with the following principles: (h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; … (j) the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security. This altered self-conception has far-reaching implications for the AU’s tasks and duties. Second, there is, in the context of both the AU and NEPAD, a new consensus on the close relationship between security and development. Generally, security is acknowledged as being the main precondition for development. In some quarters the security dimension is given priority, or armed conflict is expressly seen as one of the main obstacles to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals

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(MDGs) in Africa. This implies that the continent must be prepared to assume a greater degree of responsibility for progress in its development. Third, the AU has explicitly formulated an emancipated peace and security policy in which Africa itself takes responsibility. The AU has, on numerous occasions, pointed to its paramount responsibility for ensuring peace and security in the African continent in keeping with arrangements at UN level (‘African solutions to African problems’). This way, it will be clear that the involvement of other countries in this area is welcome only on condition that they are prepared to cooperate within the framework of AU approaches and that they are invited to do so. A contradictory aspect would be the continent’s material and financial reliance on the external resources it needs to build the appropriate infrastructure and to conduct possible military missions (e.g. Darfur/Sudan). Moreover, at its Second Extraordinary Assembly held in Libya in February 2004, the AU adopted a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). The CADSP relies on the concept of ‘human security’ rather than a narrowly defined security concept geared to military action. Fourth, the AU has built up a comprehensive array of organizational capacities and structures. The AU’s central organ in this respect is its Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC has been operational since December 2003 (its first session was 16 March 2004). At this time, the relevant protocol entered into force. The PSC is composed of 15 rotating members (five members elected for a three-year term, ten for a two-year term), who represent Africa’s five regions. Interestingly, every member of the PSC is required to meet certain conditions relating to contributions to peace missions, ‘respect for constitutional governance, as well as the rule of law and human rights’. However, not all PSC members can be considered to have met these conditions. Since its establishment, the Council has considered a number of crisis and conflict situations, including Burundi, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Fifth, the AU has decided to form an African Standby Force (ASF) by the year 2010. It is proposed that the ASF will have a force level of 15,000 troops and be made up of five regional standby brigades. An effective security policy must include several military options and it must be seen as a particularly ambitious undertaking in view of the highly divergent conditions prevailing in the five regions. Thus far, efforts in this direction have made most headway in West and East Africa. Further difficulties that may arise are funding and structural problems, especially when it comes to deciding what regional institutions should develop the standby brigades. This is an issue of some importance because many AU countries also belong to other organizations and divisions of responsibilities among regional institutions are unclear. At present, it is realistic to assume that military capabilities are very weak at both continental and – above all – at the regional level. Sixth, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are vital for the functioning of the APSA. According to the Peace and Security Protocol, the Regional Conflict Mechanisms are ‘part of the overall security structure’ of the AU and therefore play an important part in promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. While the AU coordinates, monitors, adopts policies and acts at a political level, the RECs are meant to implement at regional level decisions made at continental level. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is supporting a process that involves the signing


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by the AU Commission and eight RECs of a Memorandum of Understanding that also covers peace and security issues. The eight RECs are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-Governmental Agency for Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESSA) and the East African Community (EAC). However, this process clashes with the AU’s rationalization programme, which seeks to persuade countries to join only one of the five RECs representing the regions of the AU. The five RECs hosting the workshops on the development of the ASF and preparing to provide ASF contingents are: ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, ECCAS, and the northern region. The last of these is not yet represented by a unified body, but consists rather of a conglomeration of countries interested in playing a role in the APSA (mainly Algeria, Egypt and Libya). Seventh, as the AU has benefited from recognizably constructive leaders in its initial phase, it can be said to have begun in relatively propitious circumstances. In its Commission Chairperson, Alpha Oumar Konaré, and its Commissioner for Peace and Security, Said Djinnit, the AU has two leading personalities who are respected throughout Africa and the world. The political weight of the former AU Chairperson, Olusegun Obasanjo (until January 2006), and the personal engagement of South African President Thabo Mbeki (in the ongoing conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, for example) are visible signs of the AU’s commitment in this regard. Eighth, in the presentation of an overall picture of a functionally effective and legitimized peace and security architecture, it is essential to bear in mind the role played by African think tanks and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Such bodies as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), SaferAfrica, the Centre for Conflict Resolution, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) (all based in South Africa), the African Peace Forum (APFO, Kenya) and the West African Network for Peace (WANEP, Ghana), and such transborder networks as the African Human Security Initiative (AHSI) are playing a major part in developing analytical capacities and broadening the debate on the continent. However, this know-how is concentrated in a limited number of countries (chief among them perhaps being South Africa).8 African Peace Missions in Practice The African Union and the regional mechanisms have already been active in a number of situations – not least in the Darfur/Sudan crisis – with external support playing a major role in implementation: •

With its first African mission, the AU took a substantial step to enhance its

8 Concerning the debate on South Africa’s role as a regional power and anchor states, see for example Landsberg (2005) and Draper et al. (2006).

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•

•

•

operational effectiveness. The aim of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was to help stabilize the country. Under AMIB troops were deployed for peacekeeping tasks in the absence of a comprehensive ceasefire. It lacked civilian functions that usually form part of such complex operations. The mission was supported financially by the US (United States), the UK (United Kingdom), France, and the EU. In 2004, the AMIB’s task was taken over by a UN peacekeeping mission. The decision to embark on an African Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), which is set to reach a force level of almost 7000 troops, is a milestone for the AU’s operational effectiveness. The mission, initially projected to last for one year, is expected to cost some $466 million in one year (July 2005 – June 2006). Originally, AMIS was mandated to monitor an agreed ceasefire and to protect the monitors. In a second phase, AMIS was given a stronger role. The mandate is to improve the security situation throughout Darfur, to ensure a safe environment for humanitarian assistance and to protect civilians. AMIS is supported mainly by the EU and the US. The mere fact that the African Union sent troops into the crisis area is in itself a success. In a critical situation the AU had the courage to take action, while the international community was still looking on. To uphold its commitment, AMIS helped to stabilize the situation in Darfur. One of its goals was to create stability, others were to take care of internally displaced persons and to install administrative structures. Although the deployment of an African force and the temporary improvements in Darfur are admirable achievements, the situation there is still intolerable. At the end of 2005, discussions therefore began with the aim of the mission being handed over by the AU to the UN.9 The AU and the UN agreed in principle to effect this transfer. However, the Sudanese regime has proved itself capable of preventing the handover. Apart from continental peace missions, there have been regional missions, above all those carried out by ECOWAS.10 They include the ECOWAS peace mission to Liberia, which was supported mainly by the US, with some help from the EU. ECOWAS undertook several initiatives aimed at a peaceful settlement of the civil war in Liberia which started in 1989. Part of these efforts was, in 1990, the establishment of an observer force.

In at least one other crisis the African Union wanted to dispatch a further peace mission. However, as the international community showed no willingness to support a mission to Somalia (probably for several reasons, including the preoccupation with AMIS, and the strong interests of neighbouring countries), the AU was unable to act.11 9

For the debate on co-deployment and similar issues see Francis et al. (2005).

10 Current peacekeeping experiences differ highly among the Regional Economic Communities. Whereas ECOWAS can already draw on an operational stand-by force, others have not even established the structures for deployments (Klingebiel et al., 2006, pp. 24–28). 11 Klingebiel et al. (2006).


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Approaches of the European Union and other External Supporters External actors are showing considerable interest in the APSA. This growing interest has also been accompanied by changes in the policies pursued by external actors. These changes can be observed at three levels. First, Africa is coming to play a more perceptible role in the international security agenda and in the ongoing (re)definition of geostrategic interests (interest in Africa’s oil and other resources).12 Second, a certain degree of change is to be seen in the willingness of external actors to commit themselves militarily and/or to dispatch peace missions to Africa. This, of course, has largely been achieved at the cost of their direct participation in UN peace operations in Africa, especially in the aftermath of the Somalia debacle in 1993 and of the Rwanda genocide in 1994. Third, of the concrete political options available, there appears to be a growing tendency to adopt joint foreign, security and development policy approaches with a view to building and supporting the new African peace and security architecture. Since the early 2000s Africa has played a significantly more perceptible part in the security and geostrategic considerations of outside actors than it did in the 1990s. The debate in the US over Africa’s new strategic significance is – despite its USspecific features – exemplary in this regard. The (US) Africa Policy Advisory Panel (2004, 2) argues as follows: First, and arguably most profound, Africa has assumed a new, strategic place in U.S. foreign policy and in the definition of vital U.S. national interests. This shift moves the United States away from the past habit of treating Africa as a humanitarian afterthought and begins to reverse a decade-long decline in the United States’ presence and engagement in Africa.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the EU Council in December 2003 is of similar importance in this connection. Viewed against the background of new threat scenarios,13 in the face of which the classic concepts of self-defence have lost much or their meaning, sub-Saharan Africa’s crisis vulnerability is coming to play an increasingly important role here. The ESS points in particular to the interdependence of the problems involved:

Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict.14

12 See, for example, the report ‘More than humanitarianism: A strategic U.S. approach toward Africa’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 2006) for the ongoing debate in the United States. In Germany, the debate indicates a clear increase in the attention paid by overall German policy to Africa. Newly defined security parameters form one of the leitmotivs of the German debate (Klingebiel 2006). 13 The ESS discusses five key threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. 14 Council of the EU (2003).

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Other relevant strategies of the EU underline the importance of the subject. The EU Africa Strategy, 15 which is a cross-policy approach, has as its primary aims ‘the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the promotion of sustainable development, security, and good governance in Africa’. The first partnership cluster is Peace and Security: ‘Without peace there can be no lasting development. Without African leadership to end African conflicts there can be no lasting peace’. To define the EU’s response to the emerging APSA more precisely, the Council’s Secretariat and the Commission presented in June 2006 a ‘European Union Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflict’. One important feature of the support provided to enhance African capacities in the field of peace and security must be seen in joint cross-policy approaches by external actors and the contributions made by development policy.16 These new approaches include not only strategies embracing different policies (such as the EU Africa Strategy), but also interfaces with other, more operational and practical areas; e.g. ‘integrated missions’, and the pooling of financial resources for a goal shared by different policies (e.g. the UK’s Africa Conflict Prevention Pool). These new interfaces between development policy, defence policy and foreign policy have given rise to a lively academic and policy-oriented debate on the possible benefits (e.g. greater effectiveness of conflict management capacities) and the possible risks. The main risk as the critics see it is the ‘securitization’ of development policy, with development policy subordinated to a security agenda dominated by military interests. Against this background, one possible danger is the use of development aid resources for security objectives. The EU’s Peace Facility for Africa has a major role to play in this context. Based on a proposal by former EU Commissioner Poul Nielson, it was requested by the AU and has been available since May 2004. Initially, the African Peace Facility (APF) was endowed with €250 million from the Ninth European Development Fund (EDF). Its purpose is to fund peacekeeping operations in Africa that are carried out and manned by Africans. The main share of the amount (€212 million) was used for the AU Mission in Darfur (AMIS). Resources were also used to support the operation in the Central African Republic (Force multinationale en Centrafrique – FOMUC) led by CEMAC (Communauté économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale, which is a regional economic community of central African states) and a short-term mission to the Comoros during the election period in the spring of 2006. Although the Council initially decided to use EDF money for the APF on only one occasion, it agreed in April 2006 to provide short-term funding of €50 million and to further strengthen the APF with substantial, long-term funding of €300 million from the 10th EDF for an initial three-year period (2008–2010).17 Besides the APF, EU assistance was provided to support the APSA in other areas. As regards the African Stand-by Force, the EU, one of the ‘lead partners’, arranged a series of workshops. The EU is also working on the provision of assistance for 15 Council of the EU (2005). 16 Klingebiel (2006). 17 EU (2006).


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the AU’s counter-terrorism centre (African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism).18 All in all, in terms of the volume and predictability of funding, the European Union is one of the most important supporters of the AU peace and security agenda. It is demand-oriented, since the AU is in constant need of funds to sustain peacekeeping operations and the EU can be relied on to meet that need. The EU also plays an important coordinating role for donors, both in terms of general support for the AU and support for AMIS. Besides support measures for the APSA itself, the international community is conducting peace missions in Africa, which has become the focus of UN peacekeeping missions since the low ebb of the 1990s. And the EU’s first out-of-area operation – a mission with a narrow timeframe (from June to September 2003) – was carried out in Africa (Operation Artemis). The mission, conducted in the civil-war-stricken region of Bunia in the east of the DR Congo, centred on the protection of the local civilian population against attacks by warring militias. At the UN’s request, the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en RD Congo (MONUC) received military support from an EU-led multinational rapid-response force, whose task it was to stabilize the security situation and to improve the population’s humanitarian situation. The main aim of Operation Artemis was not to improve the security situation of the region in the long term, but to gain initial experience with an out-of-area operation. In 2006, the EU has again led an operation, this time with the goal of achieving stability during the period leading up to the presidential elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Conclusions On the whole, a positive view must be taken of the ongoing African efforts and measures to implement a new African Peace and Security Architecture. A comparison with the approach adopted by the former OAU reveals three areas of improvement: •

•

•

The AU is showing the political will to act. The Constitutive Act in particular makes it clear that the AU will not continue to pursue a policy of noninterference. As regards the military capability of the AU and its RECs, the establishment of an African Stand-by Force is a major step in increasing the APSA’s ability to act. Most important in terms of visibility are interventions that have been led by the AU or the RECs. The AU is taking action not only, but most importantly, in Darfur. The impact is somewhat limited, but the AU is at least able to decide to launch peace missions.

18 EU (2006).

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Despite this important progress compared with the pre-African Union situation, a number of crucial limitations are important in any assessment of the APSA: •

•

•

•

The APSA’s capability to act is still very limited. This challenge applies equally to the political efforts and military capacities. It is, for example, quite unrealistic to assume that all five sub-regions will be able to establish an ASF by 2010. In addition, the AU and the RECs do not have the autonomous power to carry out a peace mission, there being structural constraints in the areas of logistics and air-transport facilities, for example. Overall, despite the political will to act (in some cases), the APSA does not have the resources to take action. Neither the AU’s programme budget nor its operational fund is sufficiently well endowed by its member states for an adequate structure to be put in place or for even a small peace mission to be conducted. As there is a serious need for peace missions on the African continent, the focus is clearly on peace and security issues in a narrower sense. However, the African Union is not only a collective self-defence and security organization, but has a broad mandate to address continental tasks and challenges. Owing to the pressing day-to-day crisis and conflict management obligations, less attention is paid to other tasks and non-military approaches to peace and security. One indicator of the donors’ focus is the spending of around 90% of donor support on the AU’s Peace and Security Directorate (Klingebiel et al., 2006). The area of AU post-conflict reconstruction approaches, for example, is in reality non-existent. In general, there is an unbalanced relationship between the AU’s civil and military tasks and approaches. Finally, the political integrity of any single AU member state is not always secure. The debate during the Khartoum Summit on who was to chair the African Union in January 2006 showed that, even though the Sudanese government was responsible for the conflict situation in Darfur, Sudan could still have been chosen to chair the AU.

The European Union is a major partner of the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities as they set about establishing the new APSA. Europe has developed a fairly strong engagement in African peace and security issues motivated by its own vital interests in meeting the challenge of new security risks and migration problems. All in all, it plays a constructive and visible role. Different types of EU member states, with different Africa agendas, are keen to see the EU playing this role. The UK and France, for example, are interested in the question of burden-sharing. On the other hand, such countries as Germany want to see a European approach rather than a strong bilateral agenda in this field. In general, a positive view must be taken of the ongoing African efforts and measures to install a new peace and security architecture. However, there are still a number of structural deficiencies that must be overcome if a truly effective peace and security architecture is to be installed. External support from cross-policy and development-policy approaches may make a positive contribution to these efforts.


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References African Union (2005) The common African position on the proposed reform of the united Nation: ‘The Ezulwini Consens’, AU, Executive Council, Ext / EX.Cl/2 (VII), Addis Ababa. Africa Policy Advisory Panel (2004) Rising U.S. Stakes in Africa, Seven Proposals to Strengthen U.S.–Africa Policy (Washington, DC: Africa Policy Advisory Panel). African Studies Centre, Leiden, Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, Center of Social Studies, Coimbra University & Peace Research Center, Madrid (2003) Failed and collapsed states in the international system. Alusala, N. (2004) African Standby Force, West Africa moves on, African Security Review 13(2), pp. 113–121. Aning, E.K., Addo, P., Birikorang, E. & Sowatey, E. (2004) African commitments to conflict prevention and peacekeeping: a review of eight NEPAD countries, African Human Security Initiative (AHSI), AHSI Paper 5. Atwood, J.B., Browne, R.S. & Lyman, P.N. (2004) Freedom, Prosperity and Security. The G8 Partnership with Africa: Sea Island 2004 and Beyond, A Council of Foreign Relations Special Report (New York). Bayart, J. (2004) Commentary: towards a new start for Africa and Europe, African Affairs, 103(412), pp. 453–458. Cilliers, J. & Sturman, K. (2004) Challenges facing the AU’s Peace and Security Council, African Security Review, 13(2), 97–104. Commission for Africa (2005) Our common interest, Report of the Commission for Africa (London: Commission for Africa). Council of the EU (European Union) (2003) A secure Europe in a better world, European Security Strategy (Brussels: Council of the EU). Council of the EU (2005) The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership (Brussels: Council of the EU). Council on Foreign Relations (2006) More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach toward Africa (New York: Council on Foreign Relations). DFID (Department for International Development) (2004) Evaluation of the conflict prevention pools’, EVSUM EV647 (London: Department for International Development). Draper, P., Wheeler, T. & Alves, P. (2006) The role of South Africa in global structural policy, German Development Institute, Discussion Paper 7/2006, Bonn. EU (European Union) (2004a) Declaration on European military capabilities, Military Commitment Conference, 22 November 2004 (Brussels: EU). EU (European Union) (2004b) Securing peace and stability for Africa, The EUFunded African Peace Facility (Brussels: EU). EU (European Union) (2006) Joint progress report by the European Commission and General Secretariat of the Council to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on the implementation of the EU Strategy for Africa (Brussels: EU). Francis, D.J. (2006) Uniting Africa, Building Regional Peace and Security Systems (Aldershot: Ashgate). Francis, D.J., Faal, M., Kabia, J. & Ramsbotham, A. (2005) Dangers of Co-

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deployment, UN Co-operative Peacekeeping in Africa (Aldershot: Ashgate). Herbst, J. & Lyman, P.N. (2004) Crisis diplomacy and peace operations, Africa Policy Advisory Panel, pp. 119–135. Herbst, J. & Mills, G. (2003) The future of Africa: a new order in sight? Adelphi Paper 361 (Oxford, New York). Klingebiel, S. (Ed.) (2006) New interfaces between security and development, changing concepts and approaches, DIE Studies, No 13, Bonn. Klingebiel, S. & Roehder, K. (2004) Development–military interfaces: new challenges in crises and post-conflict situations, GDI-DIE, Bonn. Klingebiel, S., Blohm, T.M., Eckle, R., Grunow, K., Heidenreich, F., Mashele, P. & Thermann, A. (2006) Donor Contributions to Strengthening the African Peace and Security Architecture (forthcoming). Landsberg, C. (2005) Towards a developmental foreign policy? Challenges for South Africa’s diplomacy in the second decade of liberation, Social Research, 72(3), pp. 723–756. Powell, K. (2005) Opportunities and challenges for delivering on the responsibility to protect the African Union’s emerging peace and security, ISS Monograph 199; Pretoria. Secretary General (2004) Implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary General on the causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, Progress Report of SecretaryGeneral (UN-Doc.: A/59/285). UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (2005) Peace Consolidation in Africa, Challenges and Opportunities (New York: UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa). UN Panel (2004) A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the Highlevel Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (New York: UN Panel).


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Table 4.1 Overview of the components of APSA and stages of implementation Components of APSA

Stages of implementation

Peace and Security Council

• • •

Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)

• • • •

Panel of the Wise African Standby Force

• • • • •

Military Staff Committee

• • •

African Union Commission

• • • •

Directorate for Peace and Security

• • •

Regional Economic Communities

• •

Operational at all levels (Ambassadors, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Heads of State), i.e. regular meetings at all levels Second elections of two-year members (10 countries) in 2006, three-year members due to be newly elected in 2007 Deployment of political and military missions (e.g. Sudan, Burundi, Comoros, Central African Republic and Côte d’Ivoire) Not yet operational, no protocols yet relating to establishment Roadmap in process of development (March 2006) Situation Room has eight staff, analyses conflicts on the continent and advises the AU Not yet fulfilling intended function – inter alia because only ECOWAS and IGAD in process of establishing early warning systems Not yet operational, no protocols yet relating to establishment Roadmap in process of development (March 2006) To be established by 2010 Not yet operational, but Concept and Roadmap for Operationalization available Workshops in 2006 creating basis for terms and conditions of future ASF deployment (payment, training, command and control, etc) and harmonizing RECs Planning elements to be established at regional and AU level Operational, but does not yet have its own offices in Addis Ababa Meets on ad hoc basis to prepare PSC meetings, insofar as they have military component Operational but weak Chairperson of the Commission plays central role Commissioner for Peace and Security plays central role Not coordinating and managing donor interaction with the Directorate of Peace and Security as it should Operational but weak Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) developing ASF, but management of AMIS lies with separate unit outside the PSOD Conflict Management Centre weak, few personnel and as yet no roadmap for CEWS and post-conflict reconstruction Relationship between AU and RECs necessary for functioning of APSA, e.g. CEWS, ASF Not yet fully established – Memorandum of Understanding between AU and RECs at draft stage

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Political Affairs Department

• •

ECOSOCC (Economic, Social and Cultural Council)

• • •

Source: Klingebiel et al. (2006)

Operational but weak Although responsible for aspects of early warning and postconflict reconstruction, no significant influence on peace and security architecture and agenda ECOSOCC launched in 2005 as the main civil society body of the AU; not yet fully operational One of ten sectoral cluster committees is peace and security Role in APSA remains to be seen, depending on whether civil society will be invited to take part in PSC, AU and other meetings relevant to peace and security in the future

Chapter 5

Migration Theories and African Migration to Europe Belachew Gebrewold

Introduction Defining and theorizing migration is a challenging academic field. Since the second half of the 19th century, various academic disciplines such as demography, geography, economy, sociology, psychology and political science began to discuss the phenomenon of migration. The research works of E.G. Ravenstein in 1885 discovered that people migrate in order to improve living standards. However, various studies show us that theories and definitions of migration affect economic, political, cultural, philosophical, technological, and other aspects of human life. Various theories have tried to analyse the causes of migration: however, developing a migration theory or various migration theories presupposes terminological clarifications. Anthony Messina and Gallya Lahav have pointed out some important concepts that would better help us understand and develop migration theories. They define concepts such as international migration, immigration, emigration, immigrant and migrant workers, seasonal migrants, family reunification, illegal or irregular migrants, overstayer, undocumented worker, undocumented immigrant, forced or involuntary migration, refugee, asylum seeker and non-refoulement. These definitions affect not only academic theorization, but also political decisionmaking calculations. Departing from their theoretical definitions of these concepts Messina & Lahav specified four major components of migration: labour migration (permanent and temporary), family reunification, humanitarian or forced migration (asylum seekers and refugees), and illegal migration.1 As Messina & Lahav correctly point out, the boundaries of one stream of migration can easily blur and intersect with other streams.2 On the one hand, this is an advantage because it would help show interdependence of various theories, on the other hand it signifies that it is not easy to agree on a comprehensive migration theory.3 The phenomenon ‘migration’ can be approached from different perspectives: motivational (the reasons for leaving), spatial (geographic distance and its impact on migrants’ decision-making), temporal (the duration of leaving the home country),

1 2 3

Messina & Lahav (2006a, pp. 9–11). Messina & Lahav (2006a, p. 12). Massey et al. (2006, pp. 35, 39).

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and socio-cultural (new environment, language and culture).4 However, one aspect that has not been given due consideration in migration theory in general and African migration to the West in particular, is the role of media and cultural globalization. When discussing the causes of migration there are usually two categories of analysis: push and pull factors. The most common push factors are economic or demographic (poverty, unemployment, low wages, high fertility rates, lack of basic health and education); political (conflict, insecurity, violence, poor governance, corruption and human rights abuses); social and cultural (discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, religion, gender or caste); and environmental (harvest failure, resource depletion, and natural and/or man–made disasters).5 Pull factors are economic opportunities (spread by global media) such as jobs, an increase in living standards, and personal opportunities such as family reunification.6 The objective of this chapter is to discuss to what extent current migration theories explain the cause of African illegal migration to Europe. The key question is therefore: is the increasing African legal and illegal migration a new phenomenon or does it follow the same procedures of migration in history? Do the two main categories of migration theories (conflicts and profit maximization or risk minimization) serve as sufficient push and pull factors in the context of African illegal migration to Europe? In this chapter, I argue that the various theories are very important in discussing and understanding the issue of migration from Africa to Europe, but one important aspect is missing in all those theories. This is the impact of cultural globalization and modern media on the decision of migrants to leave countries of origin searching for a better future. Whereas the overall economic situation and political stability proceeds with a very low pace, modern media and ‘modern culture’ are expanding very quickly in Africa. Unfortunately, I cannot give any reliable statistical data on media in Africa; instead I rely on my own observations from my native Ethiopia, and I do not believe it to be different in other African countries. The dissemination of modern media such as mobile phones, televisions and computers is growing disproportionately compared with poverty and hunger reduction or qualitative education policies and measures. Increasing economic investment and tight security policy cooperation are on the top of the EU agenda as well as in its cooperation with African states. In my view this does not help much if the issues of local cultural consciousness, the impact of cultural globalization and the dissemination of mass media are not given due consideration in academic discussion as well as on a policy level. This chapter discusses various migration theories and at the end it comes back to the issue of media and cultural globalization. Unfortunately the mutual impacts of media, globalization and migration are not well-researched. Therefore, it is not easy to find relevant literature in this area. My objective in this chapter is, therefore, to point out this important but neglected aspect in migration research.

4 5 6

Han (2000, 8ff) in Afane (2002, p. 22). International Development Committee (2004, pp. 18–19). International Development Committee (2004, 18–19).

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Sociological Theories From a sociological point of view, migration is concomitant to cultural and intellectual evolution. Migrants are advanced in economic culture, intelligence and geographical knowledge and, because they are conscious of a true destination, the movement is planned, purposeful, and deliberate.7 A general sociological theory maintains that migration is caused by an imbalance in the ‘standard of living’ (the level the population desires) and the actual ‘scale of living’ within a society. The consequence of a higher standard than scale is population pressure (directly proportional to the imbalance) which leads to mechanisms to reduce population pressure.8 This line of argument may be used to explain the context of emigration by using the imbalance as a push factor. However, it does not really say a lot about the immigration context except that a higher scale of living may be seen as a pull factor.9 Saunders defines migration as human spatial movements whereby people, individually or collectively, change their place of abode.10 Samuel N. Eisenstadt’s theory, written in 1954, is one of the rare trials to apply general sociological theories to migration. He tried to examine the determinants of migration, the social structure of the migration process and the absorption of migration by using Talcott Parsons’ ‘Theory of Action’.11 Talcott Parsons’ General Theory of Action deals with the establishment of a general theory in the social sciences that should have three functions: first, codification of our existing concrete knowledge by providing a generalized hypothesis for the systematic reformulation of existing facts and insights; second, it shall serve as research guidance, i.e. by codification it enables us to locate and define more precisely the boundaries of our knowledge and of our ignorance; thirdly, it shall facilitate the control of the biases of observation and interpretation which are at present fostered by the departmentalization of education and research in the social sciences.12 The point of reference is the action of an individual actor or of a collectivity. The theory is interested in the actor’s orientation to a situation. When the terms refer to a collectivity as the acting unit, it is understood that it does not refer to all of the actions of the individuals who are its members, but only to the actions which they perform in their capacity as members.13 Based on this theoretical background, Eisenstadt defines migration as the physical transition of an individual or a group from one society to another.14 It is a ‘physical transition’ in the sense of changing the living place, hence moving from a familiar world to an unfamiliar world. It consists of three phases: first, formation of the motivation of the migrant after having considered the advantages and disadvantages of migration. Second is the migration phase, i.e. leaving the country of origin and arriving in a new environment. It is not the changing of the domicile that counts here, 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Fairchild (1964, p. 193) in Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, pp. 51–52). Saunders (1956, p. 220) in Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, p. 86). Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, p. 86). Saunders (1956, p. 221) in Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, p.52). Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, pp. 91–92). Parsons & Shils (1951, p. 3). Parsons & Shils (1951, p. 4) Eisenstadt (1954, p. 1) in Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, p. 52).

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but the process of ‘de-socialisation’ – the movement from a life based on known social roles to a life without structures and orientation (new forms of interaction and participation). Third is the ‘Process of absorption’: insertion of migrants in the new society. The success of absorption is dependent upon three sub-processes (institutionalisation of role expectations and behaviour in everyday life, the migrants’ adjustment to host society and institutional participation). When former identity is given up and replaced by identification with the host society and when emotional forms of expression and symbols are integrated it is called full absorption. Such a full absorption can only be achieved if participation in institutions such as economy, politics and culture is possible.15 However, this theory focuses only, as HoffmannNowotny criticizes correctly, on migration caused by incapability of a society to fulfil the expectations of its members.16 The migration theory analysis of Hartmut Esser focuses on the integration process of migrants through re-socialisation and reorganisation. This process entails three further aspects (acculturation, integration and assimilation): first, acculturation: adaptation of behaviour, orientation pattern and characteristics of host society as a learning process; second, consequence: integration which is only possible as a consequence of a learning processes. Esser differentiates between the personal, social and systemic integration. Third, assimilation which happens in four forms: cognitive assimilation (knowledge), social assimilation (interaction), structural assimilation (institutions), and identificative assimilation (values).17 Based on the theory of Ravenstein, Everett S. Lee18 defines migration as a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence. The general scheme of Lee’s analysis contains four factors: first, factors associated with the home country; second, factors associated with the potential host country; third, intervening obstacles; and finally, personal factors. However, according to Lee, the number of factors is as infinite as the methods of individual estimation and therefore it is not possible to understand them precisely. It is generally possible to set forth a few (factors) which seem of special importance and note the general and average reaction of a considerable group. Based on the most important factors, Lee deduces 19 hypotheses (six concerning the scope of migration, six concerning migration streams and counter streams and seven concerning the characteristics of migrants).19 Lee differentiates within those factors between hard (humanitarian crisis, armed conflict, environmental catastrophes) and soft (poverty, social exclusion, unemployment). The favourable pull factors at destination tend to attract migrants who are positively selected in terms of human capital or motivation, whereas this might not be the case, when the unfavourable push factors at origin play a crucial role in instigating the migration process.20

15 16 17 18 19 20

Han (2000, 46ff) in Afane (2002, 24ff). Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, p. 93). Han (2000, 58ff) in (Afane 2002, 28ff). Lee (1966). Lee (1966, p. 50) in Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, pp. 88–89). Lee (1966) in Bijak (2006, p. 6).


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The economic situation in the receiving countries is one of the decisive factors for migrants’ decisions. Various studies maintain that a high unemployment rate and strict asylum and migration policies of a country have strong impact on the decision of the migrants while choosing country of destination. For the migrants, however, historical ties and networks in the destination countries are of paramount significance while taking those migratory decisions. Those decisions are further influenced by the GDP of the receiving country and its overseas development aid. The latter is usually called ‘liberalness factor’. Not in all cases but in most cases migrants try to inform themselves about the human rights standards, the asylum policy, asylum integration measures, the tradition of naturalization of the destination country.21. According to Thielemann, the development aid payments and strict or deterring asylum policies have higher impacts than the GDP factor. Strict asylum policy deters the migrants from attempting to choose that deterring country as the destination country. It restricts access to that country and to its social system. These discouraging policies include difficulties in integration, above average rejection rates, limited movement possibilities and prohibition to work. Politicians who pursue a deterring migration policy securitize migration on the grounds that refugee migration would destabilize the receiving states, or an uncontrolled migrants influx is not in the interests of receiving societies.22 Further, the politicians of these deterring countries suggest moving the asylum seekers to the so-called safe third countries23 within the regions around the original countries of the asylum seekers. According to Thielemann, two very significant aspects in the deterrence factor are, namely the prohibition from work and the above-average rejection rate. Further, for him the most significant pull factors are a low unemployment rate and a large number of foreigners belonging to a certain community, hence existing historical ties and networks.24 The argument of Thielemann concerning existing historical ties and networks is viable and convincing. However, the ‘liberalness factor’ has a weak aspect. Many migrants from Africa do not have any knowledge about their destination countries, the political systems and traditions. Many come to know only upon their arrival, smuggled by human traffickers, that such a country, to where they are brought, exists. So the GDP or liberalness factor is true in the case of the welleducated migrants. Many migrants belong unfortunately not to this category. J.E. Taylor emphasises the importance of personal migrant networks in the envisaged host country as pull factors. The effect of such networks decreases monetary, psychological and other similar costs and migration risks.25 As Heisler says, these networks create a kind of ethnic enterprise through ‘reactive solidarity’. This ad hoc solidarity is a solidarity that did not exist before immigration but which becomes a resource for members of the group after immigration. Technological revolution

21 22 23 24 25

Thielemann (2003, p. 16). Hollifield (2000, pp. 155, 165–166). Thielemann (2003, p. 17). Thielemann (2003, pp. 25–30) Taylor (1986) in Bijak (2006, p. 6).

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such as easier and faster global transportation systems facilitate transnational and transcontinental networks of the migrants.26 As discussed above, Thielemann examined push and pull factors related to migrant networks based on historical ties. For Taylor as well as Thielemann colonial relations play a big role in historical ties. These colonially-based historical ties because of linguistic, economic and cultural ties and relations cause migrants move to the industrialized countries of former colonizers. The more the relatives and friends move there, the more ties and networks emerge in the receiving countries and the more migrants follow. A good example is the case of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the United Kingdom (UK). The cultural, education and linguistic system will be very much influenced by the former colonial power. This helps the Bangladeshis or Pakistanis easily integrate. As the large number of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the UK shows, that was an attractive factor. Taylor’s assumption was empirically confirmed since the outcome of the examination is that historical ties (hence personal migrant networks) are a very important pull factor with a high positive correlation to the number of asylum seekers in a country. Whereas historical ties and networks are relevant in relations to push and pull factors, historical ties do not necessarily lead to easier integration of migrants. The knowledge of language is not enough for an easier integration. Very often the colonized reject the culture and political system and history of the colonizer. They argue that the economic misery or conflicts pushing the migrants to the former colonizer country is caused by the colonial past. So colonial ties do not necessarily serve as positive integrative factor. The economic factor is the leading factor in the analysis of migration theories. Accordingly, even the politically persecuted asylum seekers or refugees take into account the economic dimension while taking decisions for migration. Based on the economic aspect, asylum seekers prefer to apply for asylum in richer countries, not always in safer countries. What they look for is not only political security, but also economic gain such as job opportunities in the host countries, income maximization and risk minimization. This depends further on the GDP of the refugees’ destination country and unemployment rate there. According to this risk minimization and profit maximization approach, the ‘relative number of asylum applications in a country will be positively correlated with its GDP, and negatively with its unemployment rate’.27 The ‘Decision Theory of Migration’ maintains that migration is caused by a variety of individual decisions that aim at benefit maximization. As a consequence, we would be able to predict the scope of migration if we were able to know when the benefits of migration are deemed higher than those of staying.28 That means that the accuracy of prediction is dependent upon the ability of science to predict individual decisions. Besher assumes that the ‘mode of orientation’ is very important for decisions. He differentiates between the ‘purposive-rational’ type of orientation (long term perspective concerning the evaluation of action possibilities and its alternatives; decision mostly dependent on information), the ‘traditional’ type of 26 Heisler (2000, pp. 81, 87); Brettell (2000, pp. 106–118). 27 Thielemann (2003, p. 19) 28 Besher (1967, p. 75) in Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, p. 93).


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orientation (decision depends on traditions), and the ‘short-run hedonistic’ type of orientation (decision depends on short-term emotional aspects). Finally, he categorized persons on the basis of their profession, their age and the duration of their education. On the basis of this categorization, it is possible to predict that in certain groups the probability for migration is higher than in others.29 Nevertheless, it is not possible to predict the scope of migration.30 Economic Theories From an economic perspective, migration is a process that contributes to a redistribution of labour. Hence, migrants are equal to workers.31 Economic theories usually focus on labour migration, which represents an important indicator of economic development.32 The Neoclassical macroeconomic migration theory explains this as follows: Given wage differentials between two capitalist economies, one characterised by a surplus of labour (unemployment) and the other by a surplus of capital, migration and capital movements occur. The flows of both production factors in opposite directions, and the related convergence of wage levels, are a way of return to the economic equilibrium … It is worth noting that in the whole neoclassical approach, migration is a disequilibrium phenomenon. … Nevertheless, the presented approach is very simplistic and does not explain for example the phenomenon of return migration, or population flows in the absence of wage differentials. … there exists an alternative Keynesian view on migrationinduced labour market adjustments towards the economic equilibrium, through the elimination of differences in unemployment, not in wages.33

For example, there are two countries: A and B. A has a shortage of capital but an abundance of labour, hence the supply of labour is higher than the supply of capital with the consequence that the market wage decreases. In country B the situation is the opposite (more capital than labour supply, market wages increase); the wage differences lead to migration: workers from A migrate to B where the demand for labour is high. Due to this migration, the demand and supply of labour is changing. Hence, the market wage decreases in country B and increases in country A to the point where the demand curve cuts the supply curve. This point represents the equilibrium. According to the dual labour markets theory, migration is the product of permanent demand for migrant labour at the destination countries whose economy depends upon the migrant workers.34 An important aspect in this theory is that wages are not only the price of labour, but also a proxy measure of the employee’s position in the occupational and social hierarchy. This social behaviour determines the employment 29 30 31 32 33 34

Besher (1967, pp. 134–135) in Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, p. 94) Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, p. 94). Lebhart (2002, p. 7). Han (2006, p. 174). Bijak (2006, pp. 8–9). Piore (1979) in Bijak (2006, p. 10); Massey et al. (2006, p. 36); Todaro (1976).

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behaviour. With increasing economic development the labour shortages at the bottom of the hierarchy increase. This causes entrepreneurs to search for immigrant workers who lack aspirations to a higher social status. This economic behaviour of the employer is more profitable than to raise wages in order to attract a local labour force. For the employer, increasing wages to preserve the local labour force is economically irrational. The economic and social hierarchization segments labour markets – the local population moves to more attractive capital-intensive professions, while immigrants take up the labour-intensive ‘3D’ (dirty, dangerous and difficult) jobs. Whereas the immigrant workforce is a more flexible production factor, the local workforce is protected by institutions such as trade unions and regulations of working conditions. This factor petrifies the labour market dualism.35 According to the world systems theory36 international migration is associated with the advances of the capitalist system and global markets in the globalized world of today. Economic actors from the industrialized world are increasingly searching for land, raw materials, labour, and new consumer markets in poorer countries,37 whereas labour flows in the opposite direction. Because of the increasing demand for low-skilled labour in the industrialized world, the jobs in the manufacturing sector become less and less desirable for the local population, following the shift towards a service-based economy. At the same time, the modernization of agricultural production in the peripheries caused by capital flows, leads to an increase in productivity. This modernization process results in a reduction of demand for local labour. The structural consequence of this globalization and modernization is the surplus of agricultural workers who migrate and search for either formal or informal job opportunities in the low-paid segments of the manufacturing and service sectors in the industrialized world.38 Hence, migration is a natural product of disruptions and dislocations as a consequence of capitalist development. 39 Like other theories we have seen so far, the world systems theory acknowledges that not only economic, but also historical, cultural, linguistic and factors determine the decision of migrants choosing countries of destination. These elements are the reason why the whole theory cannot be simply classified as ‘macroeconomic’, but rather offers another cross-cutting perspective combining economic and sociological explanations. Whereas Lebhart40 and Bijak41 include the world systems theory in economic theories, Han42 maintains it as a system theory. Another economic approach to migration theories which comes very close to Besher’s decision theory is the neoclassical macroeconomic theory of migration. According to the neoclassical macroeconomic theory, migration is the result of a

35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

Massey et al. (1993, pp. 441–443). Wallerstein (1974) in Bijak (2006, p. 10). Massey et al. (1993, p. 445). Zlotnik (1998, pp. 7–8). Massey et al. (2006, p. 42). Lebhardt (2002). Bijak (2006). Han (2006).

Migration Theories and African Migration to Europe 43

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decision depending on a cost-benefit-analysis. Migrants calculate migration benefits as a sum of net income over a certain period of time. Net income means expected income in the receiver state minus expected income in the sender state; whereas expected income means that the potential income needs to be multiplied by the probability of work. Migration costs are important when taking decisions. Migration costs mean direct costs such as travel expenses and indirect costs such as those that emerge when looking for a new job or while adapting to a new environment. This is an investment in travelling, learning a new language and culture, adapting to a new market, cutting old ties and forging new ones.44 A quantitative evaluation of costs such as adaptation costs is of course difficult. Finally, the cost-benefit analysis calculates migration benefits minus migration costs. In the case of a positive result, migration brings benefits and will be realized.45 An important aspect of this theory is the incorporation of unemployment rates. The decision is not only dependant on wage differences, but also on unemployment rates. The fact that incomes are multiplied by probabilities demonstrates that it is possible a job might not be found/secured, which evidently depends, among other things, on the unemployment rate. This connection is also proven in the examination of Thielemann. Thielemann demonstrates that there is a significant negative correlation between the unemployment rate of a destination country and the number of asylum seekers heading towards it. However, the model was criticized because it was never part of a comprehensive examination and it is not clear if it explains international migration. Nevertheless, it is accepted that wage differentials are necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisites for migration.46 According to the so-called new economic theory of migration, migration-related decisions are made not only by individuals who migrate but also by households. This can be described as a family project of migration. According to this theoretical approach, migration is a strategy to diversify the economies of households as an instrument to manage risk at the household level, and not necessarily to maximise benefits. According to this theory, ‘wage differentials between origin and destination countries are not a prerequisite for migration.’47 It is households that take migration decisions, as individuals are usually embedded within families/households. As a consequence, the migration decision is based not only upon maximising the expected income (as in the neoclassical macroeconomic theory), but also upon minimizing risks. Such risks are, in developing countries, for example unemployment or poor harvest. Based on this idea, households send members of their family to other countries where working conditions are independent from local conditions. As a consequence, the risk is dispersed (hence minimized) by diversifying the family income. Even if the harvest is very poor in the region, the family member who is working in another country may send money which is, in practice, very often done. This money is commonly used for investments in productive activities (which 43 44 45 46 47

Massey et al. (2006, p. 37). Massey et al. (2006, p. 37); Todaro (1976). Sjaastad (1962) in Lebhart (2002, pp. 8–9). Lebhart (2002, p. 9) Stark &Bloom (1985), Stark (1991) in Bijak (2006, p. 12).

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should lead to additional income). However, the theory emphasizes that the migration decision is not only related to the increase in absolute income, but also to the increase in relative income (in comparison to another group).48 This theory is very helpful in explaining the relation between international migration and development. It shows that migration might be used to reduce the risk and hence does not need to be dependent upon wage differentials. As a consequence, migration is seen as an instrument that helps to overcome the constraints (capital and risks) concerning investments in local activities. Moreover, the theory explains that – even if economic development increases – the motivation for migration may increase if the population does not profit from economic development proportionally. As mentioned above, migration is not only used to increase the absolute income, but also the relative income.49 Institutional theory of migration maintains that the imbalance between a large number of people who would like to enter a developed country and the strict visa policies of these countries, facilitates the emergence of entrepreneurs (‘immigration black market’) and institutions that promote international movement of people. Voluntary humanitarian organizations also arise to address the exploitation and victimization of migrants, and to enforce the rights and improve the treatment of legal or illegal migrants.50 According to cumulative causation theory,51 ‘each act of migration alters the social context within which subsequent migration decisions are made, typically in ways that make additional movement more likely’. One component of this cumulative causation is the distribution of income: ‘as a household’s sense of relative deprivation increases, so does the motivation to migrate’. The migration of some from a village or neighbourhood, first results in an increase of income for those who have moved and for their families. The consequence of this migration is income difference and further migration of the other members of the community. The second component of cumulative causation is distribution of land. According to this theory, migrants living abroad purchase land in the areas of origin, but let it lie fallow since wage labour is more lucrative than local agrarian production. This results in lower demand for local farm labour, increased out-migration, more access to funds to buy land, more uncultivated land and more out-migration. The third component of this cumulative causation is the impact of out-migration on the organization of agrarian production: the money the families of migrants invest in capital-intensive methods of agriculture decreases the labour-intensive agriculture. This means, the ‘more migration, the greater the capitalization of agriculture and the greater the displacement of agrarian labour, leading to still greater migration’. The fourth component of cumulative causation is that a taste for consumer goods and styles of life that are difficult to attain through local labour creates a new culture of migration. The fifth component of the cumulative causation is that, from the point of view of regional distribution of human capital, raising educational levels in peripheral areas increases the 48 49 50 51

Stark (1991) in Lebhart (2002, 10–12). Lebhart (2002, p. 11). Massey et al. (2006, p. 45). Myrdal (1957).


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potential returns to migration and attracts more and more educated people to urban areas abroad or at home. Finally, immigration produces ‘immigrants’ jobs’: ‘once immigrants have been recruited into particular occupations in significant numbers, those jobs become culturally labelled as “immigrants’ jobs” and native workers are reluctant to fill them, reinforcing the structural demand for immigrants’.52 Whereas these theories are viable and interesting, the second and third components of the cumulative causation theory seem to be too hypothetical, and do not apply to most African cases. Due to population density, most African societies cannot afford to let land lie fallow; secondly, people in many African cases do not out-migrate because of a decreasing labour force demand in the agriculture sector, but because it is either not profitable as a means of subsistence economy or because they are attracted by ‘modernization’, which is believed to be found only in urban areas or in the western world. Other Migration Theories According to Ravenstein, the decision to migrate is negatively correlated to geographical distance. Similarly, Samuel A. Stouffer focuses on aspects of geographical distance based on the question ‘how many people migrate a certain distance?’. The outcome of the analysis is ‘the number of persons going a given distance is directly proportional to the number of opportunities at that distance and inversely proportional to the number of intervening opportunities’.53 Similarly, Thielemann examines the ‘geographic factor’ for asylum seekers, and he maintains that: even if geographic proximity may be less important because of technological developments, facilitating longer journeys, it is assumed that they still have an impact on the relative burden. Especially by recognising that asylum seekers do not have the necessary finances at their disposal to undertake long-distance travel, a positive correlation of geographic proximity with the dependent variable is assumed.54

The geographical theory of ‘mobility transition’ is based on the theory of demographic transition (from high to low mortality and later from high to low fertility). An important aspect of the theory is that it assumes different types of migration. It includes international migration; migration in parts of the country that have not been accessed before; migration from rural to urban areas; migration from cities to cities or within cities and other types of short time mobility called ‘circulation’.55 Hence, the aim of migration is connecting different forms of regional mobility to the society’s stage on its way to modernization.56 This means social modernization causes an increase and a continuous diversification of human mobility patterns.57 One 52 53 54 55 56 57

Massey et al. (2006, pp. 46–49). Stouffer (1962, pp. 69–91) in Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, p. 76). Haun (2007, p. 26). Zelinsky (1971) in Lebhart (2002, p. 22). Zelinsky (1971) in Lebhart (2002, p. 22). Zelinsky (1971) in Bijak (2006, p. 14).

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problematic aspect of this theory is that it would mean that societies are constantly heading towards higher levels of wealth.58 According to the unified migration systems theory, similar migratory patterns and continuous interplay of historical, economic, cultural and political linkages between sending and receiving countries determine migration systems. ‘The presence of feedback effects makes population flows both a cause, as well as an outcome of the other interactions.’59 Lebhart describes this theory as the first step towards the use of the system approach for international migration. This approach is based upon the following premise: migration leads to a unified space that contains home and host countries and although distance plays a role, it is not decisive.60 To understand migration and its consequences it is important to consider this unified space. Although migration is one process that connects the home and host countries, there are various other networks. Therefore, migration is mainly between those regions that are already connected culturally, historically, politically or economically. The processes that connect the home and host countries themselves influence the conditions in the countries so that, for example, migration is meant to be changing in terms of its scope and characteristics. The state plays an important role, since it may influence international migration directly by certain political measures, but also indirectly by forcing economic, strategic or political connections to other states. These processes on the macro level finally influence the decision on the micro level. This is, for example, the case concerning existing ethnic networks that facilitate migration of individuals. A similar aspect was discussed regarding historical ties and networks that facilitate further migration. Some researchers have created various typologies of migration or classification frames for migration. Ravenstein classifies migration based on distance: ‘local migrant’ (within a community or a district); ‘short-journey migrant’ (to a neighbouring community of a neighbouring district); ‘long-journey migrants’ (distance greater than to neighbouring community/district); ‘migration by stages’ (greater distances over a longer period of time, but in small ‘migration steps’), and ‘temporary migrants’.61 According to Fairchild, there are four types of migration based on the cultural level of the involved societies and on the peaceful or warlike migration: from deep to high cultural level through warlike invasion; from high to deep cultural level through warlike conquest; from high to deep cultural level through peaceful colonisation; and on the same cultural level through peaceful immigration.62 However, as HoffmannNowotny correctly criticizes, it is problematic to determine the colonisation as a peaceful process and to use the term ‘cultural level’.63

58 Skeldon (1997) in Lebhart (2002, pp. 22–23).

59 Kritz et al. (1992) in Bijak (2006, p. 15); Mabogunje (1970); Zlotnik (1998, pp. 12–13). 60 61 62 63

Massey et al. (2006, p. 49). Ravenstein (1885, pp. 181–184) in Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, pp. 55–56). Fairchild (1925) in Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, pp. 56–57). Hoffmann-Nowotny (1970, p. 57).


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Reason for Migration other than Poverty and Conflicts The Impact of ‘Third-World-Tourism’ Third-world tourism was always highly criticised because of its negative impact on the host countries’ societies.64 Many criticise that the negative impact of tourism does not only affect socio-economic questions, but the whole culture of a society. Tourism regions usually adapt their lifestyle and offers to the demands of the tourists. As a consequence, an independent development is a lot harder to attain. Usually, such changes are difficult for the local population because they often become hosts involuntarily.65 Krippendorf describes the impact of tourism to countries of the south to be mainly negative, for example, tourists often have alternative ways of behaviour and consumption than the host society. As a consequence, the local population wants to imitate the culture of the tourists or they react with discontent and resignation or it tries to adapt local traditions based on the commercialization within the tourism region.66 The Impact of Media on Emigration So far we have seen various theories that have tried to explain the issue of migration. One important aspect, which is not given due consideration in migration theories, is the role of media. The modern de-territorialized media makes available all information to peoples at all corners of the earth. 67 In modern complex societies, there are eight large groups of socializing agents: family, peer groups, work groups, churches, legal agencies, schools, organizations (such as trade unions), and mass media. The knowledge, norms, and skills mediated by the mass media cover the whole range of culture – from concrete, specific, implicit, lived culture to abstract, general, explicit and formalized culture. The mass media of modern society are thus able to take over large parts of the socialization carried out both in informal groups (for instance, peer and work groups) and formal organizations (such as schools and trade unions). A number of scholars have observed that the mass media have indeed taken over socialization functions formerly fulfilled by the family, the churches, and the schools. There is interaction not only between individual and socializing agents, then, but also among the socializing agents themselves. It is within the parameters of such double interactions that we are all being continuously socialized, and that the media functions as linkages in the social fabric.68 The media has a large impact on the development of the individual and plays an important role in society. Hinterleitner defines the media’s impact on countries in the

64 65 66 67 68

Hinterleitner (1996, p. 39). May (1988) in Hinterleitner (1996, p. 42). Krippendorf (1988) in Hinterleitner (1996, pp. 42–43). Pietraß (2006). Rosengren (1988, p. 91).

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southern part of the world as negative.69 The main direction of the information flow is from the north to the south, which has a variety of consequences on the countries in the south such as an increasing cultural heteronomy. Since most Africans get knowledge about other cultures via the media, there is certainly a problem that the information dispersed by the media does not correspond to reality. As a consequence, the media has a positive impact on the African migration decision only because it gives a distorted image of western reality. Moreover, the media’s messages might be interpreted in very different ways depending on one’s environment and social background. How the audiences are active, in various ways, as they select from and reinterpret, for their own purposes, the media materials that they consume is influential in their decision to migrate. The interpretation of the media’s messages might not have anything to do with reality but, as mentioned before, it still has an impact on the migration decision. This is problematic in the case that the migration decision would be different if the individual doing the deciding had not had the information via the media. As a consequence, the media (and its way of showing the living style of other countries) could lead to migration. In the 1990s, a high number of Albanians crossed the sea to emigrate to Italy. Lured by images of success provided by the world of television, Albanians flocked to the country that could fuel their hopes and desires.70 However, even though watching Italian television was forbidden until 1985 and was punishable by a sentence of up to 7 years in jail, the majority of Albanians watched it during the night. The fascination of Italian TV was, according to the interviewed Albanians, its colours, beauty, and entertainment, in contrast to the ‘dark and uniformly grey cultural landscape offered by Albanian television’.71 ‘What Albanian people appreciated most in Italian television was a cultural landscape of pleasure and beauty which both responded to and surpassed their most audacious fantasy’.72 But in terms of ‘perceived prosperity’, Albanians would rank a variety of countries, such as the USA, France, Germany, Australia and Canada, more highly than Italy. Nevertheless, Italian television was permanently present, ‘within everyday family life, Italy was the imagined space onto which Albanians first projected their hopes and desires; Italy enjoyed the status of the country most likely to provide an “answer” to local needs’.73 The desire of the current young Albanian generation is drawn towards the reality offered on television – they ‘want to have fun, to live free sexual lives, to study and to work, to go on holiday and travel’ just like the Italians. But this lifestyle is very far removed from that of their parents and hence, hard to realise. So if young Albanians compare their lives with those of other European youngsters as presented in foreign television programmes, it is obvious that they

69 Hinterleitner (1996, p. 26). 70 Barjaba et al. (1996, pp. 32–35) and Vehbiu & Devole (1996, pp. 29–30) in Mai (2001, p. 95). 71 Mai (2001, p. 100). 72 Mai (2001, p. 101). 73 Mai (2001, pp. 101–102).


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feel at the margin of the so-called global culture in relation to which they seem to have developed a sort of inferiority complex. Everything that connotes quality, beauty, prestige and glamour is necessarily foreign to Albanian young people; everything that is Albanian denotes backwardness, unfashionableness and shoddiness. Albanian young people seem left without nothing more than a purely affective and emotional attachment to their country, which they often describe as ‘the country of my family’, rather than their own.74

However, the fascination with Italy decreased once contact was made with the reality on Italian soil and not with the ‘reality’ as portrayed on Italian television. Those Albanian migrants who were interviewed were broadly disillusioned by being in Italy. They did not expect the luxury goods, which they had seen broadcast on television, to be so expensive, that they would have to work for so little money, that they would have to work so much, or that it would be so hard to find a job even when they had university diplomas.75 These disillusioned migrants play an important role in the transmission of information about reality in Italy (that contradicts the broadcasted Italian reality). Or, as the author puts it, the new generation of Albanian youth are benefiting from the experience of the many friends and relatives who have returned from Italy and from the information they convey about the actual possibilities available in Italy and about the social discrimination and stigmatisation migrants are likely to encounter there.76

As we have seen, the arguments of Myrdal’s cumulative causation theory the modern life style is one of the important push factors for migrants. It is not only economic factors such as wage jobs, profit maximization or risk minimization that pushes migrants to take decisions to migrate, but also the ‘exciting’ urban life that attracts young migrants in general, and young men in particular, to the urban areas at home or abroad. Improved modes of transportation, modern telecommunication, television, e-mails and the internet not only make transnational, transcontinental, transcultural communications easier, but they also contribute to the increasing fascination for the modern life style in the industrialized world.77 Pushed not only by poverty and conflicts, but also fascinated by modernity and cultural globalization versus ‘backwardness’ (as many Africans designate their situation) and tradition, many young Africans have been trying to overcome the actual and virtual fences of Europe. For many African migrants the main routes of migration to Europe have been Libya and Morocco (to Ceuta and Melilla). Many young Africans, from across the Sub-Saharan region, go to countries such as Tunisia and Libya as transit countries as well as final destinations. In Libya as well as Tunisia those migrants are seen as a threat to public security.78 The EU policy-makers do not find it easy to reach a decision on how to deal with the surge of African illegal migrants. During the summer of 2006, at a meeting 74 75 76 77 78

Mai (2001, p. 103). Mai (2001, p. 104). Mai (2001, p. 104). Brettell (2000, pp. 102–104). Human Rights Watch (2006, p. 17).

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in Tampere/Finland, Austria and Germany accused Spain of granting amnesty to about 500,000 undocumented foreigners. The French Interior Minister; Nicolas Sarkozy, said Spain had granted amnesty to 600,000 illegal migrants and had sent out the wrong signal. Increased investments in Africa, re-admission agreements with countries such as Senegal, border surveillance, and, as Nicolas Sarkozy demands, common tough standards in dealing with illegal migration, are the main migration policy measures. Although its reliability is questionable, as of 2005 Libya estimated that 600,000 ‘legal’ foreign workers and 1 to 1.2 million ‘illegal’ migrants resided in the country, and that between 70,000 and 100,000 foreigners of both varieties enter the country every year. Al-Qadhafi’s policy of increasing pan-Africanism and facilitating the free movement of individuals and his original intention to welcome immigrants of African origin79 have been encouraging many Africans to head for Europe through Libya. Countries of origin and migration routes are well discussed in the chapter by Kohnert in this volume. According to Frontex sources (see the chapter on Frontex in this volume) the number of illegal migrants arriving by sea from Africa has increased considerably. Between January and August 2006, 14,567 Africans arrived in Italy, through Sicily, including Lampedusa island, whereas the total in 2005 was 22,939. Between January and July 2006, 17,058 Africans arrived in Spain through the Canary Islands, whereas in 2005, as a whole, 11,781 arrived. Between January and September 2006, 1,502 arrived in Malta whereas in 2005 it was a total of 1,822.80 674 migrants reached the shores of the Canary Islands in the space of 24 hours during the first week of September 2006, and almost 6,000 the month before. The European Union is trying to address the problem by increasing economic aid and investment, and by releasing special grants totalling €3.28 million to Italy, Spain and Malta to stem the influx of African illegal immigrants by stepping up sea surveillance patrols and to improve the so-called reception centres. The migrants come from most of the African countries but mainly from Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Republic of Congo, Gambia, Guinea Conakry, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Benin, Liberia, Sudan, Niger, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.81 The return policy and re-admission agreements are very often questionable from the point of view of human rights and the risk that migrants are going to face if they are returned without their consent. It is also questionable that they would ever return voluntarily after having spent so much money, energy and time with the hope of getting into Europe. For example, Libya returned 47,991 people in 2005, and claims that 35,627 (74%) returned willingly. Libya deported the remainder ‘after consulting with their countries’ authorities’. In addition, according to the EU, Libya deported 54,000 in 2004, and 43,000 in 2003. How many returned voluntarily is not stated.82 The risky attempts made by many young Africans trying to get into Fortress Europe cannot be attributed solely to economic factors: profit maximization or 79 80 81 82

Human Rights Watch (2006, pp. 13–14). http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDLEGAL/456efd8f2.pdf. Amnesty International (2005). Human Rights Watch (2006, p. 52).


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risk minimization, or hard or soft pull and push factors, which we have seen in various migration theories above. As the Albanian case shows us, the media has two important impacts, particularly on the decisions of young Africans: advertisements on television for goods coming from outside or advertisements for goods produced within that country to be consumed by rich Africans. Conclusion The poor (majority) of Africans are fascinated by these tantalizing goods being advertised. The outcome is a psychological mixture of resignation, disappointment and determination to be part of this ‘beautiful’ world that television presents. Provided there is an electricity supply, televisions can nowadays be found in all corners of Africa. Even where there is no electricity, car batteries are purchased to provide a power supply for televisions. During various international football matches, such as the World or European Championships, many Africans receive images not only of the stadiums but also of the ‘glittering’ cities of the West. These fascinate not only unemployed or uneducated young Africans, but also the educated, the employed or entrepreneurs. However, this phenomenon should not be seen just from an economic point of view. The decision of many young Africans to migrate to the West has to do, to a considerable extent, with cultural globalization. Here, the Cultural Globalization I refer to is the so-called modernization. Many young Africans feel they are caught between two incomparable cultures: that of their parents and the culture that is dominating the world nowadays (the western system of knowledge, culture of consumption, individual liberty and independence from traditionally binding institutions, and so on). It is interesting to observe in various media in African countries how the highly educated as well as less educated and governmental as well as non-governmental organizations describe their cultural backgrounds when they refer to political and economic hardships: we have to struggle to free ourselves from backwardness. Many people believe that they are backward. Modernization for them, not only means economic development, but also means being part of the global culture, western economic prosperity, cultural progress and civilization. It would be interesting to study the economic and educational background of many African migrants attempting to get into Europe. However, since most migrants do not reveal their true country of origin, it remains difficult to make a sound study of their backgrounds. In order to avoid a misunderstanding of my point, I would like emphasize that I am not denying that there are illegal or legal African migrants attempting to get into Europe (economically needy, politically persecuted). I believe this to be self-evident. I, myself am an immigrant to Europe from Ethiopia. My point here is that the attempts of the European Union and of the African Union to stop African illegal migrants through increasing economic aid and investment is a utopian project. If it were merely a matter of economic development it would only be necessary to make the level of African economic development equal to that of the West. However, whether this is feasible or desirable is questionable. Since I believe

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that the issue of African migration is caused considerably by the phenomenon of cultural globalization, focusing only on the economic aspect is missing the point. Therefore, I consider it very important to address the issue of an increasing cultural inferiority complex and the gradual eradication of the local cultural values on a political level as well as on the level of the local educational institutions in Africa. References Amnesty International (2005) The southern border; the state turns its back on the human rights of refugees and migrants’, Amnesty International, 41/008/2005, 20 June. Afane, U. (2002) Das Phänomen der Migration unter dem besonderen Aspekt der irregulären Zuwanderung in Deutschland, Diplomarbeit, Universität Erfurt. Ball-Rokeach, S. & Cantor, M.G. (1988) Media, Audience, And Social Structure, third printing (California: Sage). Barjaba, K., Lapassade, G. & Perrone, L. (1996) Naufragi Albanesi (Rome: Sensibilialle Foglie). Besher, J.M. (1967) Population Processes in Social Systems (New York, London: The Free Press). Bijak, J. (2006) Forecasting international migration: selected theories, models and methods, Central European Forum for Migration Research, working paper 4/2006, available at: http://www.cefmr.pan.pl/docs/cefmr_wp_2006-04.pdf, accessed: 20 December 2006. Brettel, C.B. (2000) Theorizing migration in anthropology: the social construction of networks, identities, communities, and globalscapes, in: C.B. Brettell & J.F. Hollifield (Eds) Migration Theory: Taking across Disciplines, pp. 97–135 (London: Routledge). Curran, J. & Morley, D. (Eds) (2006) Media and Cultural Theory (Routledge: London). Eisenstadt, S.N. (1954) The Absorption of Immigrants (London: Routledge Kegan Paul). Fairchild, H.P. (1925) Immigration: A World Movement and its American Significance (New York: Paterson). Fairchild, H.P. (1964) Dictionary of Sociology (New Jersey: Paterson). Han, P. (2000) Soziologie der Migration (Stuttgart: UTB). Han, P. (2006) Theorien zur internationalen Migration (Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius). Haun, E. (2007) The Externalisation of Asylum Procedures. An Adequate EU Refugee Burden Sharing System? (Frankfurt: Peter Lang). Heisler, B.S. (2000) The sociology of immigration: from assimilation to segmented integration, from the American experience to the global arena, in: C.B. Brettell & J.F. Hollifield (Eds) Migration Theory: Taking across Disciplines, pp. 77–96 (London: Routledge). Hinterleitner, E.M. (1996) Bildung durch Reisen. Eine entwicklungspolitische Stuienreise Erwachsener nach Burkina Faso: ein interkulturelles Lernfeld?


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(Universitätsverlag Rudolf Trauner: Linz). Hoffmann-Nowotny, H. (1970) Migration. Ein Beitrag zu einer soziologischen Erklärung (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag). Hollifield, J.F. (2000) The politics of international migration: how can we ‘bring the sate back in’, in: C.B. Brettell & J.F. Hollifield (Eds) Migration Theory: Taking across Disciplines, pp. 137–186 (London: Routledge). Human Rights Watch (2006) Stemming the flow: abuses against migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, Human Right Watch, 18, 5 September. International Development Committee (2004) Migration and development. How to make migration work for poverty reduction. Sixth report of session 2003-04, Volume 1, House of Commons, available at: http://www.publications.parliament. uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmintdev/79/79.pdf, accessed: 20 December 2006. Jäckel, M. (Ed.) (2005) Mediensoziologie. Grundfragen und Forschungsfelder (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften). Kasasa, A. (2001) Dossier migration, The ACP-EU Courier No. 187, pp. 28–32, July–August 2001. King, R. & Wood, N. (Eds) (2001) Media and Migration. Constructions of Mobility and Difference (London, New York: Routledge). Krippendorf, J. (1988) Für einen anderen Tourismus. Probleme-PerspektivenRatschläge (Frankfurt: Fischer RB), in: E.M. Hinterleitner, Bildung durch Reisen. Eine entwicklungspolitische Stuienreise Erwachsener nach Burkina Faso: ein interkulturelles Lernfeld? (Universitätsverlag Rudolf Trauner: Linz). Kritz, M., Lim, L.L. & Zlotnik, H. (Eds) (1992) International Migration Systems: A Global Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Lebhart, G. (2002) Internationale Migration. Hypothesen, Perspektiven und Theorien, Demographie aktuell, 19, Berlin. Lee, E.S. (1966) A theory of migration, Demography, 3(1), pp. 47–57. Mabogunje, A.L. (1970) Systems approach to a theory of rural–urban migration. Geographical Analysis, 291), pp. 1–18. Mai, N. (2001) Italy is beautiful. The role of Italian television in Albanian migration to Italy, in: R. King & N. Wood (Eds) Media and Migration. Constructions of Mobility and Difference (London, New York: Routledge). Massey, D.S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A. and Taylor, E. (1993) Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal, Population and Development Review, 19, pp. 431–466. Massey, D.S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A. and Taylor, E. (2006) Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal, in: A. Messina & G. Lahav (Eds) The Migration Reader: Politics and Policies, pp. 34–62 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). May, S. (1988) Tourismus in der dritten Welt - von der Freizeit zur Freiheit (Zürich), in: E.M. Hinterleitner, Bildung durch Reisen. Eine entwicklungspolitische Stuienreise Erwachsener nach Burkina Faso: ein interkulturelles Lernfeld? (Universitätsverlag Rudolf Trauner: Linz). Messina, A & Lahav, G. (2006a) Concepts and trends, in: A. Messina & G. Lahav, (Eds) The Migration Reader: Politics and Policies, pp. 9–14 (Boulder, CO: Lynne

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Rienner). Messina, A. & Lahav, G. (Eds) (2006b) The Migration Reader: Politics and Policies (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Morley, D. (2006) Globalisation and cultural imperialism reconsidered, in: J. Curran & D. Morley (Eds) Media and Cultural Theory (Routledge: London). Myrdal, G. (1957) Rich Lands and Poor (New York: Harper and Row). Parsons, T. & Shils, E. (Eds) (1951) Toward a General Theory of Action. Theoretical Foundations for the Social Sciences (New York: Harper & Row). Pietraß, M. (2006) Mediale Erfahrungswelt und die Bildung Erwachsener (Bielefeld: Bertelsmann Verlag). Piore, M. J. (1979) Birds of Passage: Migrant Labour in Industrial Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Ravenstein, E.G. (1885) The laws of migration, Journal of Statistical Society, LII, June, pp. 241–301. Rosengren, K.E. (1988) Linking culture and other societal systems, in: S. BallRokeach & M.G. Cantor Media, Audience, And Social Structure, third printing (California: Sage). Saunders, H.W. (1956) Human migration and social equilibrium, in: J.J. Spengler & O.D. Duncan (Eds) Population Theory and Policy (Glencoe). Sjaastad, L.A. (1962) The costs and returns of human migration, Journal of Political Economy, 70(5), pp. 80–93. Skeldon, R. (1997) A Global Perspective. Migration and Development (Harlow, UK: Addison Wesley Longman). Spengler, J.J. & Duncan, O.D. (Eds) (1956) Population Theory and Policy, pp. 219– 229 (Glencoe). Stark, O. (Ed.) (1986) Research in Human Capital and Development, Vol. 4: Migration, Human Capital, and Development (Greenwich: JAI Press). Stark, O. (1991) The Migration of Labor (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell). Stark, O. & Bloom, D.E. (1985) The new economics of labour migration, American Economic Review, 75(2), pp. 173–178. Stouffer, S.A. (1962) Social Research to Test Ideas (Glencoe). Taylor, J. E. (1986) Differential migration, networks, information and risk, in: O. Stark (Ed.) Research in Human Capital and Development, Vol. 4: Migration, Human Capital, and Development (Greenwich: JAI Press). Todaro, M.P. (1976) Internal Migration in Developing Countries (Geneva: International Labour Office). Thielemann, E. (2003) Does policy matter? On governments’ attempts to control unwanted migration, European Institute Working Paper, May 2003, available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/europeaninstitute/pdfs/Eiworkingpaper200302.pdf [accessed 05 May 2005]. Vehbiu, A. & Devole, R. (1996) La Scoperta dell’Allbania. Gli Albanesi secondo i Mass-Media (Milan: Paoline). Wallerstein, I. (1974) The Modern World-System, Vol. I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press). Zelinsky, W. (1971) The hypothesis of the mobility transition, Geographical Review,


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61(2), pp. 219–249. Zlotnik, H. (1998) The Theories of International Migration. Paper for the Conference on International migration: Challenges for European Populations, Bari, Italy, 25– 27 June.


Chapter 6

Migration from Africa to Europe in the Age of Globalization: Historical and Economic Perspectives Andreas Exenberger

Introduction In 1990, the British director David Wheatley and the writer William Nicholson produced, for the international campaign ‘One World’, a fictional movie centred on mass migration from Africa to Europe. The movie, entitled ‘The March’, was about hundreds of people fleeing hunger, poverty, and war in the Darfur region (which is more than a historical coincidence). They marched across the Sahara to the Strait of Gibraltar and on their way their numbers multiplied to hundreds of thousands. Not surprisingly, this mass threatened Europe. Once they crossed the Strait, they were observed by an international media and received by a hastily created but well armed European force. Consequentially, the Africans remained trapped in the dead end of a tourist beach. Europe, it was stated in the movie, was not yet ready for the immigrants and did not want to ‘watch them die’.1 Although the movie was strictly fictional, it was inspired by incidents familiar to contemporary Europeans. Throughout recent years, African migrants have arrived (either dead or alive) in large numbers by sea in Spain and Italy. In 2007, reported migration occurred mainly in overseas territories like the Canary Islands, Ceuta, Melilla and Lampedusa. Hence, while a globalizing world is said to be constantly and fundamentally changing over the last two decades, the stability of this migration pattern is astonishing. So, this chapter asks – from an economic perspective – why people generally move and what are the consequences of their migration. Before these questions are discussed, some clarification about migration and globalization is necessary, while ‘Africa’ and ‘Europe’ are understood in simple geographical terms throughout the text. Migration is differentiated from ‘travelling’ by its economical background and its restriction to permanent, or at least long-term, movements of people and their centres of interests. The primary idea of migration is to look for a living abroad; usually to be derived from a compensation for work, no matter what level of qualification. In this sense, migration is something lasting, 1 ‘Watch us die’ was the slogan guiding the march. It symbolizes the hope that the world would act if death were to happen, not far away and hidden, but well observed and right in the centre of the West.

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while the phenomena of ‘return’ or ‘repeat’ migration are not addressed here.2 Furthermore, in the context of African migration to Europe, migration obviously has to be international (while empirically the vast majority of migration flow is intranational). To sum up in economic terms, migration is the permanent ‘movement’ of the production ‘factor’, labour, across borders. The context of this kind of movement to ‘globalization’ is rather direct, no matter how narrow or broad it may be understood3. For economists, globalization is ‘the ongoing process of growing economic interdependence between countries’4 or – more useful for this paper – the ‘integration of national economies into the international’ by flows of goods, money, people and technology.5 Generally, as an ‘integration of labour markets’ migration is an important ingredient of most of the more specific economic definitions of globalisation.6 On the other hand it is also an important force contributing to integration (as a cause or as a consequence), and market integration finally results in price convergence (or even equalization), which may be the most narrow understanding of globalization. In perfectly integrated markets, labour should be paid all over the world with a price equal to its marginal productivity. As long as there are international differences in the compensation for certain skills, people will move to places where the wage is higher, which finally equalizes wages. This chapter describes the economic and historical perspectives of migration. It starts with the physically forced migration from Africa, called the ‘slave trade,’ and continues with the economically forced migration from Europe during the nineteenth century. It reveals patterns of movement that take place during cycles of globalization and hence provides the historical parallels of recent developments. The political economy of migration is then discussed: its economic sense as ‘factor movement,’ the policy reactions to it (particularly in the light of the ‘brain drain’ debate), economical pressures and historical path-dependence as well as the future of African migration to Europe. Concluding remarks will close the chapter. Historical Perspective To some extent, Homo sapiens have clearly always been a Homo movens. However, although migration seems to be a constant of human history ever since the beginning of time,7 it is also historically clear that migration has been a second best to settlement in the last millennia. People usually want to remain where they are as long as their situation is acceptable. In fact, only a small portion of the population is actively 2 Thus, ‘commuters’ – no matter if daily, weekly or seasonal – are not migrants, because migration means to stay where you have moved to, at least for some years. On the other hand, it does not matter if the movement is intended or not. 3 Exenberger & Cian (2006, pp. 25–44); Exenberger (2006, pp. 2–6); Held & McGrew (2001). 4 Fischer (2003, p. 3). 5 Bhagwati (2004, p. 3). 6 Bordo et al. (2003). 7 Robertson (2003, pp. 54–60).

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willing to move abroad in the light of potential benefits (i.e. access to income, or religious, economical, or political freedom). Economically speaking, people are ‘migration-averse’. The elasticity of migration is rather low, because its opportunity cost is regarded as high and expected benefits must by far exceed an existing wage (or more generally wealth) gap. Besides continuous migration on the Eurasian and African continent, there are two historical incidents of mass migration that are strongly related to recent African migration. The first was the violence-driven migration to the Americas, so influential in the early days of globalization (sixteenth to eighteenth centuries) and the second is the poverty driven mass migration from Europe during the nineteenth century. This migration from Europe (re-)populated the United States, and also Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Australia and some smaller countries, with settlers and workers from Europe. These two historical movements show interesting parallels to recent trends. Both movements are strongly considered to be affected by globalization forces. Also, both events primarily affected young males; the most economically active part of the population. While there are also superficial differences (the slave trade was connected with direct violence, and European immigration originated in Europe), even on this level, parallels predominate: the first example is about African outward migration and the second example is about economically forced migration, i.e. structural violence, which together constitute today’s African emigration. The Slave Trade The regular slave trade from tropical Africa to the Islamic world had already started in the seventh century AD, but the numbers were comparatively small.8 They grew to thousands per year, when Portuguese traders started the direct trade between Europe and Africa in the mid-fifteenth century. These traders utilized the existing pattern of warfare in Western Africa by which captured populations were available, and tried – successfully – to redirect trade routes from the inland to the sea. Another boost came with the emergence of the plantation complex in the Americas, which demanded a constant inflow of labour.9 Overall, estimates of the demographic impact of the slave trade on Africa vary to a high degree: the smallest numbers account for around 10 million in four centuries (people who, in the end, actually worked in the Americas, at least for some months), the biggest exceed 100 million (a large part of the difference can be explained by the death toll during capture, land and sea transport). However, according to population estimates by Angus Maddison, Africa had 46.6 million inhabitants in 1500, 53.3 million in 1600, 61.1 million in 1700 and 74.2 million in 1820,10 hence the impact may account for more than a sixth of the overall population.11 If Africa simply had 8 Curtin (1997, p. 69). 9 The numbers increased to a maximum of 80,000 people annually (Curtin, 1997, p. 75; Eltis, 1997; Inikori, 1998; Klein, 1999; Thomas, 1997). 10 Maddison 2002 11 If life expectancy is estimated at 33 years, total population for 1500-1820 amounts for 577 million.

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the same population growth as the rest of the world, there would have been 41.4 million inhabitants more in 1820, i.e. 56% more. Clearly, this does not mean that the slave trade was the only reason for that gap, but it definitely does account for a considerable part of it. Although all these calculations are subject to unavoidable data inaccuracy, the economic impact of a gap like this is easy to imagine, particularly because the slave trade was targeted at the economically most active population. However, slavery (slowly) lost its significance during the nineteenth century and African slaves where replaced by Chinese and Indian indentured servants and low-wage workers as globalized cheap labour.12 To sum up, in the words of Phillip Curtin: The early phases [of the slave trade] clearly belong to the pre-industrial world, whereas the eighteenth-century trade was somehow a build-up toward the industrial age that was to come. By the nineteenth century, the industrial age was under way, and the African slave trade was phased out of existence. In its place came new global patterns of migration.13

The High Tide of European Emigration In intensity, other flows of people were clearly outnumbered by European outward migration, particularly between the 1840s and the 1900s (Figure 4). This migration was mainly to North America. It was no longer an elite or marginal phenomenon as in earlier centuries, but due to improvements of transport technology,14 particularly those associated with steam power, a mass phenomenon accounting for a movement of around 60 million people during these decades (i.e. almost 3% of the entire world population), peaking to far more than a million annually in the 1900s.15 Immigration rates were between 5 and 10 per thousand annually in the United States or Canada (or exceeded 10 per thousand in Argentina or Australia),16 and small countries sometimes exceeded it by far, such as for example New Zealand in the 1880s, when the initial population was increased by more than half due to immigration.17 While most emigrants, in and around 1800, were ‘settlers’, the vast majority of migrants around 1900 came from urban areas and non-agricultural occupations and most of them were between 15 and 35 years old, hence migrants ‘carried a very high labour participation rate to the New World’.18 The same more or less holds today, as the number of Maghrebi nationals in Europe shows.19 An important question, which has been studied using nineteenth century European emigration data, is the contribution of certain factors to emigration flows. They were positively related to the natural population growth at home (an effect 12 However, in the late nineteenth century Africans were enslaved again within colonial empires, but usually not traded any more and even brutally kept from migrating. 13 Curtin (1997, pp. 76–77). 14 O’Rourke & Williamson (1999, pp. 29–55). 15 Chiswick & Hatton (2003, p. 69). 16 Hatton & Williamson (1998, 10). 17 Baldwin & Martin (1999, p. 19). 18 Hatton & Williamson (1998, pp. 10–11). 19 Sutcliffe (2006, pp. 137–138).


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that increased for six decades before decreasing), the linearly increasing effects of industrialization at home, the emigrant stock abroad and – of course negatively – the wage gap between home and abroad.20 Hence, demographic pressure, domestic industrialization, network effects and wage benefits combined to cause European emigration a century ago. As a consequence of migration, factor price dispersion between the sending Old World and the receiving New World decreased throughout the second half of the nineteenth century until the First World War, because of a relative increase of the prices of factors becoming scarcer and a relative decrease of the prices of factors becoming more abundant. Furthermore, data for the nineteenth century suggests that Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin were right in stressing the direct relationship between commodity market integration and factor price convergence.21 As well as the owners of the moving factors, the left-behind workers in particular profited in emigration countries, whereas the owners of land and capital profited in immigration countries. Migration Policies in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries Immigration policy clearly contributed to these developments, although even in the nineteenth century capital moved easier than people, but incomparable to today’s gap between the speed of hot money and the slowness of boat people. However, opposing tendencies emerged from the late nineteenth century onwards22 and the overall cycle of migration policies is well described by Andrés Solimano: They were, in general, relatively liberal, though with ethnic discrimination in the mid nineteenth century (particularly in Australia, United States and Canada); then gradually those policies became more restrictive in receiving countries with a severe tightening of immigration in the inter-war period of 1914–1950. In the late twentieth century, like before, immigration policies in industrial countries have become significantly influenced by business cycle and unemployment considerations.23

Global migration slowly regained strength after the two World Wars, the Great Depression and extremely isolationist policies. But accompanying decolonization after 1945 and in addition to immigration into the United States, a lot of people from former colonies immigrated into the former imperial centres, particularly France, but also Britain, the Netherlands and Belgium. While this led to some immigration from Africa to Europe, the bigger numbers there came from adjacent regions in the SouthEast. When the extraordinary post-Second World War growth in Europe resulted in a ‘tight’ labour market (low unemployment, high wages, employers finding it difficult to get workers), European economies became increasingly labour-demanding and ‘invited’ labour power from abroad, particularly from neighbouring regions. The first so-called ‘oil shock’ symbolizes the end of this boom, and growth decreased while unemployment increased (which strangely enough is not called a ‘tight’ situation 20 21 22 23

Hatton & Williamson (1998, pp. 39, 51). O’Rourke & Williamson (1999). O’Rourke & Williamson (1999, pp. 185–206). Solimano (2001, p. 22).

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although in this case many more people suffered). Economically speaking, before 1973 there was high demand for immigration in Europe, from 1973 on there was high supply (i.e. demand decreased sharply while supply even grew). Economic Perspective Why Do People Move? John Hicks, Nobel Prize laureate in Economics in 1972, proclaimed in the 1930s the economic wisdom that ‘differences in net economic advantages, chiefly differences in wages, are the main causes of migration’.24 Or almost as simply speaking: ‘Migration is a function of inequality, since the fastest way for a poor person to get richer is to move from a poor country to a rich country’.25 Jeffrey Williamson, one of the leading economic historians engaged in migration research, describes the reasons for migration as follows: Across-border migrations can be viewed as reflecting excess factor supply in the sending region and excess factor demand in the receiving region. … Most mass migrations are driven by economic events, in particular by real wage and living standard gaps between regions. Labour markets matter, and since young adults have the most to gain and the least to lose by moving, migration is very selective by age (and sometimes by gender).26

Andrés Solimano extends this picture: Most of the time, people migrate abroad in search for better economic opportunities for the migrants and their families offered by foreign countries compared with the economic opportunities found at home. In fact, unemployment, low wages, meager career prospects for highly educated people, significant country risk for national investors in the home country are all factors that propel people to emigrate abroad. In addition, there are noneconomic reasons to emigrate such as war, ethnic discrimination, political persecution at home, etc. … In addition, the choice of the country of immigration is often dictated by the existence of a network of family, friends and connections that have previously migrated to that specific country.27

With respect to Africa, Aderanti Adepoju ‘considers the determinants of emigration to be categorizable under the headings of labour force growth, economic decline and debt, ethnopolitical conflict and ecological deterioration. In this context, emigration should be seen as a survival strategy by individuals and families’.28 Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson have also calculated – although with rather poor migration data – the influence of certain factors on migration between 1977 and 1995 (comparing 21 countries) and they came up with typical results: the wage gap between sending and receiving regions, the share of population aged 24 25 26 27 28

Hicks (1932, p. 76). Wade (2004, p. 583). Williamson (2004, p. 121). Solimano (2001, p. 7). Baldwin-Edwards (2006, p. 5); see also Adepoju (2004).


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from 15 to 29, and the flow of refugees are strictly positively related to migration, while GDP per capita growth is strictly negative.29 In a more sophisticated setting, however, there is a migration cycle of low, high and again low emigration levels. The reason is mainly due to diminishing financial migration constraints, which may as well result in an increase of emigration even if the wage gap actually decreases30. To sum up, in the words of Jeffrey Williamson: Demographic events mattered in Africa’s recent past and they will matter even more in its future. There are three reasons for this. First, population growth puts pressure on land and other resources, lowering the marginal product of labour and living standards at home, encouraging emigration as real wage gaps between home and abroad widen … Second, the underlying economic growth of the African economies has been very dismal over the last two decades, and most analysts project more of the same over the next two decades … Third, the projected demographic changes are big.31 And they would be much bigger in the absence of the disastrous impact of HIV in many African countries.

Migration as Substitute or Complement to Trade A second Nobel price laureate, Robert Mundell, who received the prize in 1999, introduced another basic idea into the economics of migration in the 1950s: in a world free of distortions, countries may choose to ‘trade’ either goods or factors of production. The equalization of prices (and of wages), which removes any incentives to trade (or to migrate) further, is possible in two ways: either by trading goods another country cannot produce as efficiently (in this case, no migration happens), or by moving factors of production another country lacks (in this case, no trade will take place). However, if distortions are considered, conclusions change dramatically and migration can even become a complement to trade.32 Lopez and Schiff for example added labour mobility between countries, differences in skill levels and costs of, and constraints in, financing migration to the standard trade model.33 By that they showed extensively that trade and migration can be complementary. Their analysis is applicable for countries with roughly stable populations (transition economies) as well as for countries with increasing populations (developing economies) and they showed furthermore that trade liberalization will in any case result in a more skilled labour force (resulting in additional benefits), while protectionism will particularly increase skilled emigration (resulting in additional losses). Hence, while trade liberalization, aid and investment may reduce migration pressure from the already developed East of Europe, it may fail to do so in the case of Africa, and may even worsen the skill composition, because empirically the higher migration costs, the

29 30 31 32 33

Hatton & Williamson (2003, p. 475). Williamson (2004, pp. 125–126). Williamson (2004, p. 128); see also Hatton & Williamson (2002, 2003). Schiff (1996). Lopez & Schiff (1995).

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tighter migration constraints and the lower the average skill and income of migrants, the more likely trade and migration are complements.34 Trade liberalization will most probably not considerably reduce migration pressures on the EU from Africa or on the US from Latin America. The historical records are completely clear: ‘The historical bottom line is this: When we look at the long swings embedded in the time-series data, we find that trade and capital flows were rarely substitutes and often complements. The same was true for trade and migration. … Trade and migration were never substitutes … (and) it appears that policy makers never acted as if they viewed trade and migration as substitutes either’.35 Migration Benefits in Theory and Practise George Borjas, one of the leading labour market economists, states at the beginning of his textbook, in the chapter about ‘labour mobility’, something rather typical of the way of thinking of economists about the labour market: A competitive labour market equilibrium allocates workers to firms so as to maximize the value of labour’s product. Workers are continually searching for better jobs (that is, jobs where they are more productive and earn higher wages), while firms are searching for better workers. As a result of these search activities, the value of marginal product of labour is equated across firms and across labour markets (for workers of given skills). The equilibrium allocation of workers and firms, therefore, is efficient. No other allocation can increase the value of labour’s contribution to national income.36

The statement claims validity in a hypothetical world free of distortions. In a world like this, the skill composition of immigrants is usually complementary to the skill composition of the native workforce: if the skill level is higher in the sender than in the receiver country, mainly low qualified workers will move; if the rate is lower, mainly high qualified workers will. In this stylized setting, the welfare analysis of migration also comes to clear conclusions: immigration leads to an overall welfare gain (‘immigration surplus’) in the receiving country, but wages decrease. While workers as a group lose (an increasing labour supply leads to decreasing wages), capital owners as a group gain more than workers lose (mainly because otherwise unemployed capital can now also be used productively) and hence the economy as a whole gains. The problem here is that the distributional effect is much larger than the overall welfare effect, i.e. comparatively large compensation would be necessary.37 In the sending country, without considering brain-drain or remittances, the opposite happens.

34 Schiff (1996, p. 44). 35 Collins et al. (1997, p. 25). 36 Borjas (1996, p. 279). Quite openly, the text continues with: ‘Needless to say, actual labour markets are not quite as neat …’ 37 Borjas (1994).


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38

If group effects or externalities are considered, there may be a greater gain, but an overall welfare loss through migration also becomes possible. While in the presence of human capital externalities (positive spill-over effects of human capital congestion), sending countries will lose and receiving countries accumulate skill and hence gain. If social capital effects are considered (positive network effects) the result worsens. If in this case immigrant and native populations differ significantly, migration leads to a loss of social capital in all groups, even in the immigrant population, because earlier networks lose coherence. The receiving country can avoid this by successful integration policy, the sending country by successful internalization of these effects – two strategies that unfortunately contradict each other to a certain extent. How the latter can be done, is for example shown by Martin Baldwin-Edwards with reference to Philippe Fargues: ‘Morocco maintained its policy stance of promoting emigration, opposition to the integration of Moroccans abroad, and great emphasis on the remittances received from the Moroccan diaspora’.39 This active promotion resulted in a relatively large diaspora of three million Moroccans abroad by 2004, mainly in France, Spain and Italy, which is more than 10% of the population at home.40 Generally however it is easy to make a case for a connection between migration and economic growth:41 immigration may relax a labour constraint for growth in labour-scarce economies, it may sustain high profitability of investments (by moderating the growth of wages) and hence also support savings, it may foster growth by increasing the average skill level of a labour force, and – while these effects usually will be accompanied by opposite effects in sending countries – in a distortion-free world it will lead to an increase in world output. There are also arguments for a contribution of migration to reduce inequality, although these are rather ambiguous. On the contrary, a force clearly reducing inequality is the transfer of remittances from receiving countries, in certain regions these payments can even be the most important contributions to development.42 In North Africa and West Asia, this development started three decades ago: As oil prices increased in the late 1970s, and the economies of the Persian Gulf boomed, poor people from Egypt and Jordan began seeking high-paying jobs in a variety of labourintensive fields in Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, poor people from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia began seeking labour-intensive jobs in Western Europe. While no comprehensive figures have ever been collected on the number of migrants involved, the amount of money sent home by migrants from these countries was substantial. 43

38 Schiff (1996). 39 Baldwin-Edwards (2006, p. 2). 40 This number is a conservative estimate. The overall number of Maghrebi immigrants in Europe in 2002 has also been estimated by Pierre Vermeren to be as high as 10 to 15 million (Sutcliffe, 2006, pp. 124). 41 Solimano (2001, pp. 15–18). 42 Baldwin-Edwards (2006, p. 6). 43 Adams & Page (2003, p. 2030).

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The lowest benchmark for these flows of money, the numbers officially reported, amounted for between 2 and 6% relative to GDP in Maghreb countries (NorthWest Africa), and was even higher in Mashreq countries (the so called ‘Middle East’).44 For Sub-Saharan Africa it was just 0.6%, but informal numbers are in any case definitely higher, estimated between 2% in Senegal and 20% in Eritrea, a considerable source of external development funding.45 However, even official remittances amount to considerable sums in Northern African countries. In the case of Egypt, for example, US$4.8 billion and US$3.9 billion was the annual average in the 1980s and 1990s, in the case of Morocco it was between US$1.6 billion and US$2 billion.46 Not surprisingly, econometric results show that remittances do reduce the poverty headcount on the 1$-a-day level, even in the generally not too poor North African and West Asian countries, as shown by Richard Adams and John Page, but the results for remittances are much weaker than for high GDP per capita or equal distribution of wealth (low Gini coefficient), and the same also holds for government employment. Nevertheless, an increase of 10% of the share of remittances in GDP reduces the poverty headcount by 5.7%.47 Some Numbers and the Problem of Data A serious problem for the estimation of the economic effects of migration, particularly from Africa, is the high degree of illegal or illicit migration. Hence, accurate numbers of migration are simply not available, and the official numbers underestimate the overall flow of labour. ‘Across-border movements of migrants or long-term visitors are at best unsystematically recorded in Africa and, typically, not recorded at all’.48 According to World Bank figures (see Table 3), from 1980 to 2000 not only has the number of immigrants in the United States increased from 14.3 million to 35.9 million, but also in the (15) countries of the EU (from 14.4 million to 26.4 million). Hence, they almost doubled. Few of these flows are associated with Africa, because much of African migration remains within the continent and, generally, most African migration is still refugee migration within Africa (Figure 5).49 However, the ideas of millions of people waiting on African shores for a boat to cross to Europe are clearly exaggerated. Official records of illegal immigrants in Spain and Italy account for 10 to 20,000 people annually for each of them.50 Most of these people come from the Mediterranean itself, and only a quarter from Sub-Saharan Africa, but their share has strongly increased in the last few years.

44 Adams & Page (2003, p. 2030). 45 Baldwin-Edwards (2006, pp. 6–7); Sutcliffe (2006, pp. 146–153); Adams & Page (2003, p. 2042). 46 Adams & Page (2003, p. 2042). 47 Adams & Page (2003, pp. 2033, 2043). 48 Hatton & Williamson (2003, pp. 470–472); see also Sutcliffe (2006, pp. 124–133). 49 Hatton & Williamson (2003, pp. 478, 470–472). 50 Because officially recorded illegal immigrants are a contradiction in itself, effective numbers are for sure higher, but not extraordinarily; Baldwin-Edwards (2006, p. 9).


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Migration Losses: The Brain-Drain Debate As with migration in general, there is a serious data problem associated with the brain-drain debate. ‘Due to the poor quality of international data, assessing the economic impact of the brain drain is a challenging issue’.51 Hence, estimates vary to a large degree. Rupa Chanda, for example, has reported that 60,000 Indian doctors work in Britain alone, which is 12% of all Indian doctors and 30% of all doctors registered in the United Kingdom.52 More specifically, as estimated by Peter Stalker in the early 1990s, Sub-Saharan Africa lost a third of its intellectual potential in the three decades after decolonization, only surpassed by the Caribbean in relative numbers.53 More numbers on emigration from Africa to OECD countries are calculated by Frederic Docquier and Abdeslam Marfouk – from the records of OECD countries – and they show a considerable brain-drain in 1990 as well as in 2000. The emigration rate of tertiary educated people is in all parts of Africa higher than the average rate (and most often extremely higher), as shown in Table 4. Besides, for Northern and Southern Africa, where the numbers are relatively low and the brain drain is even decreasing (in Southern Africa also because of the end of Apartheid in 1994), the levels and trends are clear: in 2000, Africa lost almost a fifth of its well-educated population, and the situation was clearly worsening during the 1990s.54 Although, as discussed above, distortion-free economic analysis suggests that there is no negative effect of migration, even if not skill-neutral, in the case of small proportions, in the case of Africa these numbers are much too high to be regarded as ‘small’, and furthermore a distortion-free analysis neglects positive externalities emerging from high-skilled populations on the development (economic as well as other forms of development) of a country. Considering more effects, the theoretical as well as empirical evidence becomes even more confused: (W)hile there is clearly a possibility that the brain drain is beneficial to the residents left behind in the home countries … (i)t is not even certain that there is an overall globalwelfare gain from the brain drain, although given the apparently large private benefits of the migrants themselves and their higher productivity in their new locations, it seems highly likely.55

51 Docquier & Marfouk (2004, p. 34). 52 Commander et al. (2004, p. 241). 53 Schiff (1996, pp. 25–26); Stalker (1994). 54 The most extreme cases in 2000 may be of interest: Cape Verde, 69%; Gambia, 65%; Somalia, 59%; Seychelles, 59%; and Mauritius, 48%; and from the big countries Ghana, 43%; Nigeria, 36%; and Angola, 26%; almost all of these numbers increased during the 1990s (Docquier & Marfouk, 2004, pp. 18–19). 55 Commander et al. (2004, p. 266).

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Concluding Remarks Recently, there has been a fundamental historical shift, which has not been fully recognized so far, as debates in several European countries show, but, ‘In the decades following the end of World War II, Western Europe became what it had not been for a thousand years: a region of immigration.’56 Nevertheless, one also has to keep in mind that the vast majority of migration flows occurs within and not between adjacent regions, usually even within countries. Hence, globally the biggest migration flows are within the United States, to a much lesser extend within the European Union, and recently also within China. This general statement also holds for Africa as a world region. Generally, there are currently two counteracting forces. These forces affect migration very differently: While demand for low skilled labour is growing in advanced countries due the increase of unqualified service jobs and the unwillingness of the natives to perform these tasks, on the other hand demand for low skilled labour in developing countries is also increasing due to outsourcing. The former supports cross-border migration, the latter restrains it. And in the light of the ‘old’ forces at work, particularly the share of young adults in population,57 Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson have calculated the ‘emigration pressure’ from Africa as already exceeding 1 per thousand of population annually and rising further in the future, resulting in a potential annual outward migration from Africa up to 2.5 million people in 2025.58 This holds even more if there is slow development in Africa, dashing hopes, but also enabling more and more people to afford the move. And the more people move, the more network effects become effective.59 This chapter has provided some answers to some basic questions about migration from an economic point of view. Why do people migrate? Broadly speaking, people move because of better opportunities abroad and potential benefits, which (far) exceed the costs, monetary as well as non-monetary. How many people move? Notwithstanding the poor quality of the data, it is millions of people. Overall, the immigration stock amounts for 3% of the world population, a large number, although this is relatively less than it had been in 1914. Who gains from migration? Economists would answer that all gain – at least potentially. If labour markets are liberalized and distortions are removed, labour finds its most productive utilization anywhere in the world, which leads to an overall welfare gain. The problem is distribution. Migration also results in immediate losses for certain groups, which they have to be compensated for. And what will the future bring? Most certainly, the future will bring a further increase in cross-border migration, official as well as illegal. This migration

56 Demeny (2003, p. 27). 57 Population projections by the United Nations show that until 2050 populations in the South will far exceed those in the North, with a big difference: while in the South there is still an age pyramid, in the North the age distribution looks more like a champagne glass (Demeny, 2003, pp. 6, 10). 58 Hatton & Williamson (2003, p. 480). 59 Hatton & Williamson (2002, pp. 565–566).


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will occur from all parts of the world because the old forces remain at work and new ones (market and technology effects, for example) add to the pressure. Finally, what will be the policy responses to these developments? There is some hope that there will be more creative ones. Current immigration policies, particularly in Europe, are – almost exclusively – driven by security considerations, and not by economic or humanitarian. Also the debate about ‘useful’ immigration in the light of an aging problem is not very helpful, because the numbers necessary to solve this problem would by far exaggerate what is regarded as socially acceptable. In addition, the debate about ‘useful’ immigration of high skilled workers producing spill-over effects fails to address the access demand for labour in advanced countries, which is for low-skilled or unskilled. Consequently, it would be more important first to recognise the fundamental historical change that made Europe an immigration region and to regard this immigration not only as positive, but even as necessary; second, to understand the effects of immigration on local labour markets and to prevent the most adverse effects for the domestic population; and third, to shift migration policy from prohibition to integration to utilize social capital effects and assure stability. Today, immigration policy, particularly in the European Union, is to a large degree a policy of threat. The debate is about ‘economic refugees’, which denies people the right and even the chance to quest for a better life, but the term is never adopted, for example, to European academics looking for better employment opportunities in the United States. In the words of Bob Sutcliffe: Many of those who go missing in the Strait [of Gibraltar] or off the north-west African coast are never accounted for in figures and the total number of those who die annually must be substantially more than those reported. The deaths, though not directly willed by the authorities, are an inescapable and necessary part of the policy of deterrence of illegal immigrants. Well publicised shipwrecks, arrests and drownings are, like the fence [of Ceuta], part of the policy of demonstrating that the frontier, open to millions of people, is firmly closed to those who have not been selected.60

Here we arrived where we departed, at the Pillars of Hercules. Hence, the final question should be raised about the historical path-dependency of this restrictive policy. This question is about a collective unconscious, buried in almost 1300 years of a history, which may be called ‘European’. It was in AD 712, when Europe was ‘invaded’ by people of a different faith from the South before defeating Germanic Christians. So, is the buried reminiscence of Gibril Tarik and his 7000 warriors crossing the Strait – which later became named after him – part of the problem? Or is it the Ottomans, besieging Vienna in 1683? This question will be left for further thoughts, as will many issues connected with migration which this chapter was only able to address far too briefly.

60

Sutcliffe (2006, pp. 165–166).

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References Adams, R.H. & Page, J. (2003) Poverty, inequality and growth in selected Middle East and North Africa Countries, 1980–2000, World Development, 31(12), pp. 2027–2048. Adepojou, A. (2004) Trends in international migration in and from Africa, in: D. Massey & J.E. Taylor (Eds) (2006) International Migration: Prospects and Policies in a Global Market, pp. 59–77 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Baldwin, R.E. & Martin, P. (1999) Two waves of Globalization: superficial similarities, fundamental differences, in: H. Siebert (Ed.) Globalization and Labour, pp. 3–58 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck). Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2006) Between a rock and a hard place: North Africa as a region of emigration, immigration and transit migration, Working Paper (Mediterranean Migration Observatory, UEHR, Panteion University, Athens) online at http://aei.pitt.edu/6365/Between_a_rock_FINAL.pdf (published in Review of African Political Economy, 33(108), pp. 311–324). Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defense of Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press). Bordo, M., Taylor, A.M., & Williamson, J.G. (Eds) (2003) Globalization in Historical Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Borjas, G.J. (1994) The economics of immigration, Journal of Economic Literature, 32(4), pp. 1667–1717. Borjas, G.J. (1996) Labour Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill). Borjas, G.J. (1999) Economic research on the determinants of immigration: lessons for the European Union, World Bank Technical Paper No. 438 (Washington: The World Bank). Chiswick, B.R. & Hatton, T.J. (2003) International migration and the integration of labour markets, in M. Bordo et al. Globalization in Historical Perspective, pp. 65–117 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Collins, W.J., O’Rourke, K. & Williamson, J.G. (1997) Where trade and factor mobility substitutes in history? National Bureau of Economic Research Working paper No. 6059 (Cambridge, MA: NBER). Commander, S., Kangasniemi, M. & Winters, L.A. (2004) The Brain Drain: curse or boon? A survey of the literature, in: R.E. Baldwin & L.A. Winters (Eds) Challenges to Globalization. Analyzing the Economics, pp. 235–272 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Curtin, P.D. (1997) Africa and global patterns of migration, in: G. Wang (Ed.) Global History and Migration, pp. 63–94 (Boulder: Westview Press). Demeny, P. (2003) Population policy dilemmas in Europe at the dawn of the twentyfirst century, Population and Development Review, 29(1), pp. 1–28. Docquier, F. & Marfouk, A. (2004) Measuring the international mobility of skilled workers (1990–2000): release 1.0, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3381 (Washington: The World Bank). Eltis, D. (Ed.) (1997) Routes to Slavery: Direction, Ethnicity and Mortality in the Transatlantic Slave Trade (London: Cass). Exenberger, A. (2006) Poverty and globalization: problem and solution, or two sides


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of the same medal? International Trade and Finance Association Working Papers 14 (Berkeley: Berkeley Electronic Press). Exenberger, A. & Cian, C. (2006) Der weite Horizont. Globalisierung durch Kaufleute (Innsbruck: Studienverlag). Fischer, S. (2003) Globalization and its challenges, American Economic Review, 93(2), pp. 1–30. Hatton, T.J. & Williamson, J.G. (1998) The Age of Mass Migration. Causes and Economic Impact (New York: Oxford University Press). Hatton, T.J. & Williamson, J.G. (2002) Out of Africa? Using the past to project African emigration pressure in the future, Review of International Economics, 10(3), pp. 556–573. Hatton, T.J. & Williamson, J.G. (2003) Demographic and economic pressure on emigration out of Africa, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 105(3), pp. 465–486. Held, D. & McGrew, A. (Eds) (2001) The Global Transformations Reader. An Introduction to the Globalization Debate (Cambridge/UK: Polity Press). Hicks, J.R. (1932) The Theory of Wages (London: Macmillan). Inikori, J.E. (Ed.) (1998) The Atlantic Slave Trade: Effects on Economies, Societies, and Peoples in Africa, the Americas, and Europe (Durham: Duke University Press). Klein, H.S. (1999) The Atlantic Slave Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Lopez, R. & Schiff, M. (1995) Migration and the skill composition of the labour force: the impact of trade liberalization in developing countries, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1493 (Washington: The World Bank). Maddison, A. (2001) The World Economy. A Millennial Perspective (Paris: OECD). O’Rourke, K. & Williamson, J.G. (1999) Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-century Atlantic Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Robertson, R. (2003) The Three Waves of Globalization. A History of a Developing Global Consciousness (London: Zed Books). Schiff, M. (1996) South-north migration and trade: a survey, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1696 (Washington: The World Bank). Solimano, A. (2001) International migration and the global economic order: an overview, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2720 (Washington: The World Bank). Stalker, P. (1994) The Work of Strangers: A Survey of International Labour Migration (Geneva: ILO Publications). Sutcliffe, B. (2006) The path of the sea: human migration across the western Mediterranean, Revista de Economia Mundial, 14, pp. 121–169. Thomas, H. (1997) The Slave Trade: The History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1440– 1870 (New York: Simon & Schuster). Wade, R.H. (2004) Is globalization reducing poverty and inequality? World Development 32(4), pp. 567–589. Williamson, J.G. (2004) The Inaugural Noel Butlin Lecture: world factor migrations and demographic transitions, Australian Economic History Review, 44(2), pp. 118–141.

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Gross annual emigration rates of selected countries (per thousand of population), 1850s to 1900s

V

Source: derived from Hatton & Williamson (1998, p. 33)

,WDO\

,UHODQG

V

V

*UHDW%ULWDLQ

V

6ZHGHQ

V

V

*HUPDQ\

Figure 6.1


123


Source: derived form World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005

:RUOGWRWDO

LQ$IULFD

Figure 6.2 Refugee populations, 1994–2003

124

Table 6.1


Migrant stock (in percent) and its growth (in millions), selected countries, 1980–2000 1980

WORLD

Migrant stock 1990

2000

Growth in millions 1980–2000

2.3

2.9

2.9

78.10

Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Switzerland United Kingdom

3.7 8.8 10.9 5.1 2.0 3.5 0.6 16.6 6.2

6.1 9.0 10.4 6.6 2.4 8.0 2.0 20.5 6.5

9.4 8.6 10.7 8.9 2.8 9.9 3.1 25.1 6.8

0.48 0.14 0.39 3.39 0.52 1.09 1.02 0.75 0.56

Australia Canada Saudi Arabia United States

21.0 15.5 19.3 6.3

23.3 15.5 26.7 9.3

24.5 18.9 25.4 12.4

1.62 2.02 3.45 20.74

Source: derived from World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005

Table 6.2 Average emigration rates from African regions to OECD countries Region Northern Africa Central Africa Western Africa Eastern Africa Southern Africa

No. of countries 6 9 16 17 5

ER educ. 1990 6.8 9.8 20.7 15.5 6.9

ER all 1990 2.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5

ER educ. 2000 6.2 13.3 26.7 18.4 5.3

ER all 2000 2.5 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.9

Notes: ER educ. = emigration rate of tertiary educated people; ER all = overall emigration rate Source: derived from Docquier & Marfouk (2004, pp. 18–19)

PART 2 The Responses of the EU


Chapter 7

Frontex and African Illegal Migration to Europe Ilkka Laitinen

Introduction In order to talk clearly about the influence Frontex1 may have on illegal migration flows from Africa, it is necessary first to provide some information on Frontex. Initially we will describe the purpose of Frontex and its mission, including a brief introduction of the European model of Integrated Border Management, as Frontex is a key player in its implementation. The status of Frontex as an independent body of the European Union will then be defined followed by a look at the beginnings of Frontex’s existence, where we will name the important milestones as well as mention the legal basis of its establishment. In the following text, the tasks of Frontex will be introduced and their performance described. In doing so, we will mention the types of risk analyses produced by Frontex and the role these play as the basis of all Frontex activities. Later, the operational principle will be dealt with and Frontex operations will be illustrated by several examples. These examples include operations at land, sea and air borders, both with deployment of Member States experts as well as with the use of technical equipment. This section will be concluded with brief descriptions of three new initiatives; the European Surveillance System, Rapid Border Intervention Teams and Frontex Joint Support Teams, and the centralised record of technical equipment for border control and surveillance. Frontex tasks, in the areas of training border guards and following up the development of research, will follow. The concluding part will deal with the role that Frontex has in dealing with illegal migration flows, with particular focus on illegal migration flows from Africa. One aspect of the implementation of free movement of people, promised to European citizens in the Treaty of Rome, was the abolishment of border checks between Member States. In order to ensure internal security in this new environment, it was necessary to take a more effective joint approach and enhancing cooperation of law enforcement bodies across Europe was one aspect of this. European security architecture has been gradually developed through everyday Schengen cooperation based on the abolition of internal border controls, legal acts such as the Amsterdam Treaty, and political guidelines from the Conclusions of European Council meetings 1 Frontex stands for the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. The abbreviation probably comes from the French frontiers exterieuers – external borders.

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in Tampere in 1999, in Laeken in 2001,3 Seville in 20024 and Thessaloniki in 2003.5 Since November 2004 when the Hague Programme6 was accepted by the European Council, the area of Freedom, Security and Justice was being created in the European Union through strengthening cooperation between Member States, Schengen Associated Countries and other partners. While guaranteeing respect for fundamental freedoms and rights, a new approach needed to be formulated in order to tackle effectively such phenomena as illegal migration, the trafficking and smuggling of human beings, terrorism and organised crime, as well as the prevention thereof. One important aspect of the protection of the area of Freedom, Security and Justice is the control of the external border. This has undergone an evolution. At the beginning of this evolution nationally focused systems were solely within the sovereignty of each state. However, the change in situation caused by the abolition of internal border controls meant that the controls at, and surveillance of, the external borders of the European Union needed to be strengthened. This was only possible through increased solidarity and sharing of responsibility, as well as through strengthened cooperation and greater coordination of Member States’ activities. Thus, a specialised body to complement national border security systems was created in the form of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex). Its establishment was carried out particularly in view of the necessity to integrate national border security systems of Member States against all kinds of threats that could arise on or through the external border of the European Union. Frontex: Purpose and Mission The purpose of Frontex is coordination of intelligence driven-operational cooperation at EU level to strengthen security at external borders. The mission of Frontex is to strengthen the freedom and the security of the citizens of the EU by complementing the national border management systems of the Member States. The prerequisite for this is the fact that Frontex is a trustworthy operational European coordinator and contributor that is fully respected and supported by the Member States and external partners. Frontex actively promotes the cooperation among border related law enforcement bodies responsible for the internal security at EU level. Frontex operational activities are intelligence driven and Frontex remains a key player in the implementation of the concept of EU Integrated Border Management.

2 European Council (1999). 3 European Council (2001). 4 European Council (2002). 5 European Council (2003). 6 16054/04 JAI 559 – The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union.

Frontex and African Illegal Migration to Europe

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As newly defined by the Conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of December 2006,7 the European model of Integrated Border Management consists not only of border controls but also of other important elements. Effective protection of a border does not start at that border and nor does it end there. Apart from border control, i.e. checks and surveillance, as defined in the Schengen Borders Code,8 including relevant risk analysis and crime intelligence; the system also includes detection and investigation of cross-border crime in coordination with all competent law enforcement authorities. One further component is the four-tier access control model (measures in third countries, cooperation with neighbouring countries, border control, control measures within the area of free movement, including return). Inter-agency cooperation for border management (border guards, customs, police, national security and other relevant authorities) and international cooperation as well as coordination and coherence of the activities of Member States and institutions and other bodies of the Community and the Union are also indispensable elements of the model. Frontex Status Frontex was established by Council Regulation (EC) 2007/20049 as a community body having legal personality as well as operational and budgetary autonomy. It is governed by its Management Board, which consists of operational heads of national border guard services of all Member States of the European Union and Schengen Associated Countries and two representatives of the European Commission. This Board is entrusted with the necessary powers to establish the budget, verify its execution, adopt the appropriate financial rules, establish transparent working procedures for decision making by the Agency and to appoint the Executive Director and his Deputy. In line with the Article 25 of the Regulation 2007/200410 the Executive Director is independent in the performance of his/her duties. This fact provides evidence for the aforementioned necessary operational autonomy of Frontex. As far as the budget of Frontex is concerned, the greatest portion of its revenue comes from the subsidy from the Community entered in the general budget of the European Union (Commission section) (as stipulated in Article 2 of the Regulation

7 Conclusions of 2768th Council Meeting Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels, 4–5 December 2006 as published in 15801/06 (Presse 341). 8 OJ L105 of 13.4.2006 – Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code). 9 OJ L349 of 25.11.2004 – Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 10 OJ L349 of 25.11.2004 – Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.

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2007/2004 ). Besides this, further revenue comes from contributions from the countries associated with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis; from fees for services provided and any voluntary contributions from the Member States. The expenditure of Frontex includes expenses for staff, administration, infrastructure and operations. It is an important guiding principle of Frontex that the minimum of 50% of the Agency’s expenses is spent on operational activities. Looking at Frontex’s first years of existence, the budget developed from €6.2 million in 2005 via €19.2 million in 2006 to €35 million in 2007. This substantial increase in budget shows that Frontex’s budgetary authorities – namely the Council and the European Parliament – have both been supporting its growing role. Beginning of Existence, Legal Basis There are several important milestones in the starting period of Frontex. On 26 October 2004, the Council Regulation 2007/200412 was adopted, by which Frontex was established. On 26 April 2005, the Council Decision 2005/358/EC13 was adopted, by which the seat of Frontex was designated to be in Warsaw, Poland. The first meeting of the Frontex Management Board took place in Warsaw as early as 25 May 2005 and it was during this meeting that the Frontex Executive Director was appointed. The above-mentioned steps were the necessary prerequisites and Frontex very quickly became operational in its seat in Warsaw on 3 October 2005. In December 2005 Frontex coordinated its first joint operation at the eastern land border of the Member States of the European Union. Frontex Tasks and their Performance Tasks in Brief The coordination of intelligence-driven operational cooperation between Member States in the field of management of external borders is at the top of the list of Frontex tasks. The Agency provides assistance to Member States in the training of national border guards including the establishment of common training standards, and carries out risk analyses. Another task is following up the development of research relevant for the control of external borders. In addition to this, Frontex 11 OJ L349 of 25.11.2004 – Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 12 OJ L349 of 25.11.2004 – Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 13 OJ L114 of 4.5.2005 – Council Decision of 26 April 2005 designating the seat of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (2005/358/EC).


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also assists the Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders and provides Member States with the necessary support in organising joint return operations. Risk Analysis The core principle of all Frontex activities is the fact that they are intelligence driven. In practice, the basis of all Frontex activities is the risk analysis. The risk analysis carried out by the Agency identifies a need for performance of joint operations or pilot projects as well as a need to develop and implement training tools for border guards or to perform activities in the area of research and development. In general, there are two types of risk analysis; periodical and tailored. The periodical risk analyses, carried out annually, cover a whole area, i.e. the whole length of the external border of the Member States of the European Union in a given period, while the tailored risk analyses concentrate on a particular phenomenon at an external border, e.g. a specific flow of illegal migration targeting one or more Member States. While carrying out risk analyses Frontex applies the so-called ‘Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model’ (CIRAM). The Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model was developed by a European Council Expert Group in 2002. The implementation of CIRAM in the Member States was the responsibility of the former Common Unit. A Risk Analysis Centre (RAC) was set up in Helsinki in 2003 to compile the joint risk assessment on a European level. Following the establishment of Frontex the task of compiling joint risk assessments was transferred across from the RAC, which closed on 1 May 2005. In the course of its work Frontex has revised the CIRAM to correspond to current analytical requirements. Coordination of Operational Cooperation Coordination of operational cooperation between Member Sates in the field of management of external borders is the key task of Frontex. All Frontex activities are carried out with the aim of strengthening border security by ensuring coordination of Member States’ actions in the implementation of Community measures relating to the management of the external borders. On a day to day basis, this coordination takes different forms, such as the coordination of joint operations, the initiation of pilot projects, and the development of training tools etc. Frontex Operational Circle As with other Frontex activities, a risk analysis always needs to be carried out to identify the need for a joint operation. It is based upon this risk analysis that joint operations to be carried out at the external borders are initiated by Frontex. However, there is also a possibility of a request from a Member State for its support in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external

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borders (Article 8 of Regulation 2007/200414). Nevertheless, a risk analysis is also carried out in such a circumstance. The next step is the drafting of an operational initiative by Frontex based on the risk analysis and after consultation with the Member State(s) whose territory is affected by the particular phenomenon to be tackled. It is very important to stress at this point that Frontex is a coordinator and contributor. This means that the Agency does not have its own technical or human resources to be deployed in the actual course of operations. Due to this fact, as the next step of the operational circle, Frontex addresses other Member States with a request for participation in the operation by offering their means. The received offers are then evaluated against the background of the needs of that particular operation and a decision of the use of concrete assets is taken. Following that, the operational plan is finalised with all actors involved. A special type of joint operation is ‘joint return operations’. Compared with other tasks, the role of Frontex in this regard is rather limited as the Agency’s mandate is only to provide Member States with the necessary support in organising these operations. Besides, Frontex, together with the experts from the Member States, is identifying best practices on the acquisition of travel documents and the removal of illegal third country nationals. Examples of Joint Operations The first joint operation to include Frontex was carried out in December 2005 – January 2006 at the eastern land border of the European Union/Schengen area. A risk analysis prepared by Frontex highlighted that the phenomenon of returning third country nationals who reside, overstay or work illegally in Schengen Member States while travelling towards the EU external land border on their way back to their home countries, was of significant importance. Therefore, a joint operation took place in two phases. The first phase concentrated on third country nationals leaving the Schengen area/European Union. The main focus was on detecting third country nationals who stayed longer then authorised as well as on forgeries of travel documents and border stamps. In the second phase the priority was given to entry control. The experience gathered during this operation has clearly proven that such joint endeavours are a useful instrument in temporarily strengthening border checks and border surveillance in areas of identified threat or risk. This operation can serve as an example of one type of joint operation, the core of which lies in strengthened border control at a particular part of the border, with concentration on a particular phenomenon, being conducted jointly by border guard officers of several Member States. Apart from increased effectiveness, another crucial aspect of such operations is the fact that border guard officers can work together on a particular issue and are able to share expertise and experience on the spot within their daily work. Such joint operations have not only been conducted at the land border but are also of great importance at the air border. An example can be seen in 14 OJ L349 of 25.11.2004 – Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.


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a joint operation conducted at several major European airports in November 2006 and in February – March 2007. The focus of this operation was South American nationals trying to enter the European Union illegally via air. Experts from several Member States were deployed to these airports in order jointly to conduct checks of passengers. In addition to the focus on detection of cases of illegal migration, the operation also had an important expertise sharing aspect. This was provided by the experts to colleagues from other Member States and also by the use of a training tool on false and falsified documents developed under the coordination of Frontex. For each operation a coordination centre is set up to continuously gather, evaluate and disseminate information. In this way, for example, alerts on detected modi operandi can be shared among all involved participants in real time. Such information sharing was also the key aspect of two other operations mentioned here as further examples, these being Frontex coordinated joint operations during the Winter Olympic Games in Torino, Italy and during the FIFA World Cup Football Championship in Germany. These operations were conducted in view of expected attempts to use major sporting events such as these by organisers of illegal migration trying to smuggle people into the European Union upon the pretence of attending these events. Expertise sharing and expert support are also an important part of sea operations. As an example, we can name two operations coordinated by Frontex in the summer and autumn of 2006 in Malta and on the Canary Islands. Within these operations, experts from several Member States were deployed to support the authorities of Malta and Spain respectively in the interviewing of illegal migrants who arrived at their territories by sea. The purpose of these interviews was to establish the country of origin of these migrants to enable their return, while guaranteeing access to international protection to those in need of it. Besides this, another aim was to reveal information regarding the extent to which the illegal border crossings were organized and how. Indeed, it was thanks to the information gathered by the experts that the arrest of several facilitators was made possible. Another example of joint operations coordinated by Frontex is deployment of technical assets of several Member States to tackle a particular illegal migration flow. This model for example, was used to target the central Mediterranean migration flow towards Malta and Italy and the migration flow towards the Canary Islands. In both of these cases, several Member States reacted to the request formulated by Frontex on the basis of the draft operational plan and offered their technical resources, in the form of vessels and aircraft, to be deployed in the operational area. New Initiatives To conclude the section on joint operations we would like to mention three new initiatives currently under/in development. Based on the Presidency Conclusions from the European Council of 15/16 December 2005,15 Frontex carried out two feasibility studies dealing with institutional and technical possibilities of the surveillance of the southern maritime border of the European Union. Apart from monitoring the current 15

European Council 2006.

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situation, the studies proposed possible solutions for the area. From the point of view of organisational structure and the way to exchange information a network of national contact points connected with Frontex has been suggested. From a technical point of view, the studies present the structure of a surveillance system covering the southern maritime borders as well as the open sea. The proposed system is based on existing surveillance activities and the updating of these to form the European Surveillance System. Once in place, the system will play an essential role in saving lives at sea and tackling illegal immigration. While there are many steps to be taken by the Member States on the way to the proposed solution, Frontex is currently starting to implement one part of the structure, namely the European Patrols Network (EPN), at the southern maritime borders of the EU as a cooperation model for the open sea. The establishment of the EPN is based on Member States’ existing patrolling activities covering the Mediterranean Sea and a part of the Atlantic Ocean and the planning together of a permanent joint operation. The second new initiative worth mentioning here is Frontex’s proposal of socalled FJSTs (Frontex Joint Support Teams) and the draft amendment of Regulation 2007/200416 establishing the RABITs (Rapid Border Intervention Teams). Both these proposals foresee the establishment of a pool of experts from the Member States, trained by Frontex, which could be deployed in joint operations. This pool would be composed of experts and expert teams skilled in individual aspects of border control and with specific geographically related knowledge. Once composed, the pool would enhance the execution of joint operations in the sense that the composition of the teams for each operation would be easier. With regard to the RABITs, which will be deployed in urgent and exceptional situations, the crucial aspect of the pool will be the fact that it will enable fast deployment of the teams. The third initiative currently emerging is the so-called centralised record of technical equipment. This record, being created by Frontex, will include equipment for control and surveillance of external borders belonging to Member States, which they, on a voluntary basis and upon request from another Member State, are willing to put at the disposal of that Member State for a temporary period, as foreseen in Article 7 of Regulation 2007/2004.17 Having been created, the technical records will again enhance Frontex coordinated joint operations, as they will reduce the necessity of ad hoc requests for technical assets. Assistance to Member States in the Training of National Border Guards The next issue for Frontex is the assistance to Member States in the training of national border guards, including the establishment of common training standards. 16 OJ L349 of 25.11.2004 – Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 17 OJ L349 of 25.11.2004 – Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.


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Frontex contributes to the improvement of professionalism of Member States’ border guards, thereby substantially enhancing the implementation of the Integrated Border Management. Training activities conducted by Frontex are based on three principles. The first principle is the legal basis provided by Council Regulation 2007/2004,18 Article 5, which gives Frontex general tasks in the field of training, as well as some other documents, such as the Conclusions of Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting 27–28 April 2006,19 in which Frontex was invited to develop and implement specific training in the area of return. The second principle is direct cooperation with Member States. Based on this principle, the Member States are involved in the development of Frontex training initiatives, curricula and training-materials. Besides this, temporary sub-project leaders from the Member States are deployed under the lead of Frontex. Finally, the third principle concerns the implementation of the training tools in the Member States. This is done by the transfer of common training modules into national ones. As far as concrete training tools are concerned, on the basic level of training there is the so-called ‘Common Core Curriculum’. This new curriculum is the first common curriculum including common skills and competencies (as a standard) for the basic training of border guards in the European Union. Parallel to this, a Mid Level Course has been developed as advanced training. These two models focus on the principles of the Bologna20 and Copenhagen21 Processes, namely higher vocational education. Several specialised training tools have also been created, such as the training tool on detection of false documents, including the harmonisation of English terminology, helicopter pilots training, training tools for third countries, training on stolen car detection and training on joint-flight returns. Besides this, Frontex has set up a network of Training Coordinators in all Member States and is developing a network of Partnership Academies certified in specific training tasks. Following up the Development of Research Following up the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders is the subsequent task of Frontex. By doing this, the Agency strengthens the border control capabilities of relevant national bodies by informing them of the availability of modern technology and products as well as by ensuring that specific interests of border guard authorities are properly taken into account in security research.

18 OJ L349 of 25.11.2004 – Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 19 Conclusions of 2725th Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg, 27–28 April as published in 20068402/06 (Presse 106). 20 CRE (2000). 21 European Commission (2002).

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Frontex and African Migration Flows Given its mandate, Frontex is clearly one of the main players in the European Union’s response to migration flows from Africa. Looking at migration flows in general, we need to bear in mind that it is a very complex issue composed of several elements. The starting point is obviously the situation in the countries of origin, which provides the motivation for people to migrate. Besides this, there is also the situation in the countries of destination. Their policy and practice towards migrants is clearly a contributory factor. The next step is the actual migration, composed of the departure from the country of origin, possibly continued by transit via other countries and followed by the actual crossing of the external border of the European Union. The last, but not least important component, is the reception in the country of arrival, encompassing possibilities of the return of illegal migrants. In the particular case of Africa, we can talk about three main routes. The Western African route leads from the Maghreb countries, especially from and via Morocco to the Spanish mainland and from Sub Saharan countries towards the Spanish Canary Islands. The Central Mediterranean route goes from Libyan and Tunisian ports towards the Italian islands of Lampedusa, Panteleria and Sicily, and also towards Malta. Finally, the Eastern Mediterranean route leads from the Mid East via Turkey and Egyptian ports towards Greece (Crete) but also Italy. The overall migration policy of the European Union, meaning the overall EU approach to migration flows in all their components, is in the hands of the European Commission and the Justice and Home Affairs Council. These are the platforms where policy framework is formulated and adopted and Frontex is one of the actors working within this framework. As for the above-defined components of the migration flows, we can see that the role of Frontex is clearly in the actual crossing of the external border and the journey preceding it, with a limited role in returns. As we have mentioned in the section on the status of Frontex, the Agency is a key player in the implementation of the European model of Integrated Border Management. This model encompasses all aspects that need to go hand in hand. Frontex is a coordinator of national border guards so the joint operations to enhance the control of the border are one of the steps the Agency takes. These operations are based on risk analysis of the situation and the information and intelligence gathered in these operations is evaluated in view of detection and investigation of cross border crime. In this regard, the inter-agency cooperation is a key issue and Frontex is, within its mandate, concentrated on cooperation with other actors at the EU level, such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Maritime Safety Agency and the European Satellite Centre. As we are talking about the external border, cooperation with neighbouring countries as well as other third countries is also of crucial importance. Conclusion Management of the external borders is one of the aspects of the European Union’s security policy. When we look at the key threats we can see that they all have a clear border related aspect. No matter if we talk about terrorism, proliferation of weapons


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of mass destruction, regional conflicts or organised crime, effective management of the borders always plays a role. Looking more concretely at illegal migration, we need to clearly see the character of this phenomenon. Illegal migration is a crime. Organisation of illegal migration is also a crime. Moreover, the latter is often connected with other very serious forms of organised crime, such as the trafficking of human beings and it is also linked with a substantial danger of the loss of human lives. Effective Integrated Border Management can substantially contribute to the reduction of the above-mentioned phenomena and Frontex is a key player in this regard. To conclude, we would like to stress that from our point of view there is no ‘Fortress Europe’. There is a European Union developing towards more integration and more freedom within its borders. This increases the necessity of more effective control of these borders to ensure security of the citizens. Besides, many factors make the European Union attractive for people from other parts of the world, such as Africa. There are many steps that can be taken by various actors in several areas such as improvement of the situation in the countries of origin or possibilities in the countries of destination. From the point of view of our mandate, we in Frontex can clearly see that people migrating illegally from Africa are taking the most dangerous of all ways – the often very long journey across the sea. By enhancing the control of the situation at the external border we hope to contribute substantially to the reduction of human lives lost on this journey. References CRE (2000) The Bologna Declaration, February 1999, available at: http://ec.europa. eu/education/policies/educ/bologna/bologna.pdf European Commission (2002) The Copenhagen Declaration, November 2002, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/education/copenhagen/copenahagen_declaration_ en.pdf European Council (1999) Presidency Conclusions, available at: http://www. consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm European Council (2001) Presidency Conclusions, available at: http://www. consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf European Council (2002) Presidency Conclusions, available at: http://www. consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72638.pdf European Council (2003) Presidency Conclusions, available at: http://www. consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/76279.pdf European Council (2006), Presidency Conclusions, 15914/1/05 REV 1 CONCL 3 of 30 January 2006, Brussels European Council, 15/16 December 2005.


Chapter 8

European Migration Policy Heinrich Neisser

Introduction: Migration Challenge of the European Union Migration has become a key theme in national, regional and international debates.1 The shape of the migration policy is politically sensitive. Europe is now a multiethnic continent. By the mid 1990s, almost 6% of EU-residents were racial, ethnic or religious minorities. By 2000, more than 6% of EU-residents had been born in a different country from the one in which they were residing. Many European countries, such as France and UK, have significant minority populations. Germany has welcomed generations of guest workers (mostly from Turkey).2 Since 1990, as a result of the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Member States of the European Union were facing with a dramatic increase in numbers of asylum seekers from Eastern and Central European States. At the same time, the number of asylum seekers from developing countries has also increased. There was a coincidence between this development and the final implementation of a Single European Market. The implementation was done by the Single European Act. In the 2000 edition of the UNHCR publication The State of the World’s Refugees it is pointed out that: The wish to remove obstacles to trade and other flows within the EU went in parallel with the desire to maintain control over the movement of people of non-member countries. At the same time governments feared that freedom of movement within the EU would create numerous new problems in the immigration and asylum arena.3

Since 1990, domestic policy on immigration and asylum has increasingly been shaped by EU-institutions. The EU authorities are facing various challenges. Governments of the Member States are unwilling to lead an open debate on migration solution, for fear of provoking public hostility. It entails a lack of information of the real situation. Another problem is the rise of populist parties of the right in Europe. They have played a very large part in the tightening of immigration rules and the treatment of asylum seekers within the country.4 The populist parties organize largely, sometimes exclusively, around the issues of race, immigration, citizenship and cultural 1 Harvey (1999, pp. 23–34). 2 Hix (2005, p. 360). 3 See UNHCR website, available online http://www.unher.ch/pubs/sowr2000/ch07. pdf (chapter 7, p. 162). 4 Lloyd (2003, pp. 88–99).

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assimilation. Answering those problems public policy must seek to internationalize the problem – at the level of the European Union but also at a global level. Another perspective seems to be essential. Immigration and asylum are tightly intertwined with other issues, such as housing, welfare, security, labour market, health, education. That means that migration and asylum policy must present complex solutions to a complex problem. Within the European Union, measures in different fields of policy must be coherent. Coherence is a prerequisite of effectiveness. This chapter discusses the historical developments of the European migration policy. Because of the increasing influence of populist and far-right wing parties in the various countries of the European Union, asylum and migration policies are getting very strict. In the same way, at the EU level, demands for tight migration and asylum policy are increasing. Even if the overall migration policy of the European Union is on the right track, ‘fortress Europe’ looks increasingly possible, which could be dangerous for the European humanitarian tradition and values of human rights. While acknowledging the threats of various waves of migration to Europe this chapter pleads for serious humanitarian values. The Legal Framework of the Union’s Migration Policy The legal System of migration is a complex and differentiated one. It comprises different types of rules. The migration and asylum acquis consists of treaties, conventions, agreements, regulations, Directives, communications – placed on different levels of the Union’s legal system. The main basis is primary law laid down in the treaties especially the treaty of the European Union and the treaty of the European Community. These treaties are implemented by regulations and Directives, the so-called secondary law. The following overview gives brief information about the essential parts of migration and asylum acquis.5 Primary Law The Treaty of Amsterdam brought immigration and asylum into the EC treaty and into the spectrum of EC policies. Title IV (Art 61-69) concerns ‘Visa, asylum, immigration and other policies referring to the free movement of persons’. It commits the Council to adopt common politics in the following areas:6 • • •

5 6

Standards and procedures for checking on persons crossing the EU’s external borders. Rules on visas for stays of longer than three months, including a single list of countries whose citizens require visas to visit the EU. The conditions under which third country-nationals shall have freedom to travel in the EU for up to three months.

Van Krieken (2004). Hix (2005, p. 354).

European Migration Policy

•

• • •

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Standards and procedures for granting and withdrawing asylum and refugee status, including minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers and refugees. Minimum standards for the temporary protection of displaced persons (de facto refugees rather than asylum seekers). Measures on immigration policy, including common conditions of entry and residence and common rules on illegal immigration and repatriation. Measures defining the rights and conditions under which third-country nationals can work and reside anywhere in the EU.

Secondary Law Among the five kinds of ‘secondary’ legislative and executive acts (see Article 249 TEC) are significantly important regulations and Directives. Regulations have general application and are binding on both the EU and the member States. Directives are addressed to any number of Member States, are binding in terms of the result to be achieved and must be transposed into law by the national authorities. Frequently, in the field of migration and asylum policy, Directives are applied as the legal instrument. Directives are an instrument for harmonizing national law but they also give to the member states the possibility to adopt their own rules within the framework of the Directives. The following gives brief information about the legal framework, which is relevant for migration and asylum issues. (a) •

•

•

•

Migration: the existing Directives concern the scope of legal immigration: Family reunification – The Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification entered into force on 3 October 2003. Member States’ legislation had to comply with this Directive not later than 3 October 2005. EU long-term resident status – The Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 on a long-term resident status for third country nationals who have legally resided for five years in the territory of a Member State entered into force on 23 January 2004. Member States legislation had to comply with this Directive by 23 January 2006 at the latest. Students – A Directive on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service was adopted by the Council on 13 December 2004 (Directive 2004/114). It entered into force on 12 January 2005. Member States’ legislation must comply with the Directive by 12 January 2007. Researchers – A Directive for the facilitation of the admission of researchers into the EU was adopted by the Council on 12 October 2005 (Directive 2005/71). Its provisions will have to be implemented by Member States by 12 October 2007.

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(b) Asylum: the following regulation and Directives are described as the ‘four main legal instruments on asylum’. In the field of responsibility, reception, procedures and qualification the prerequisites for a Common EU Asylum System are already given in the shape of harmonized minimum standards. •

The Dublin Regulation (2003)7 • In general, each Member State has the duty to enable asylum applications for third country nationals within their territory, but it is only one Member State that is responsible (Art. 3). The latter is, in general, that Member State where the application for asylum was lodged for the first time (Art. 13). Nevertheless, Chapter III of the Dublin Regulation defines some exceptions valid in the given order (Art. 5) in turn. The Member State is responsible (even if the first asylum application was not lodged in this respective Member State) in the case that:

• • • • •

family members of unaccompanied minors are legally residing in it (Art. 6), family members of the asylum seeker are residing in it as refugees and that the lodging of an application in this state is wanted (Art. 7), the asylum seeker is provided with a valid residence document or a valid visa of it (Art. 9), a third country national enters the respective Member State and does not need an entry visa for it (Art. 11), the application is lodged in the international transit area of an airport situated on its territory (Art. 12).

Finally, a humanitarian clause is incorporated into Chapter IV, Art. 15 of the Dublin Regulation: ‘Any Member State, even where it is not responsible under the criteria set out in this Regulation, may bring together family members, as well as other dependent relatives, on humanitarian grounds based in particular on family or cultural considerations.’ The latter might be dependency in case of pregnancy, a new-born child, serious illness, severe handicap or old age.

• •

•

7 8

The Reception Conditions Directive (2003)8 This Directive contains guaranteed access to information within 15 days after the asylum application (Art. 5), to a refugee status document within 3 days after the application (Art. 6), to medical screening (Art. 9), to emergency care and essential treatment of illness (Art. 15), to the education system in the case of minors (Art. 10), to vocational training (Art. 12) and to material reception conditions (Art. 13). Furthermore, free movement within a defined area that allows ‘sufficient

Council regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003. Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003.


•

•

•

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scope for guaranteeing access to all benefits under this Directive’ must be guaranteed (Art. 7). The Member State defines the duration for no access to the labour market. This period of time may not be longer than one year in the case that the first instance decision has not been taken and ‘this delay cannot be attributed to the applicant’ (Art. 11). Moreover, the Directive regulates the possibilities for the Member States to reduce or withdraw reception conditions. This is possible if the asylum seeker leaves the assigned accommodation, refuses reporting and does not appear for personal interviews (Art. 16). Finally, the Directive provides minimum standards for minors (Art. 18), unaccompanied minors (Art. 19) and victims of torture and violence (Art. 20).

•

The Qualification Directive (2004)9 • Chapter III regulates the prerequisites that need to be fulfilled to be qualified as a refugee. The refugee status granted in case of certain kinds of persecution (physical/mental violence, etc) that needs to ‘be sufficiently serious … as to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights’ (Art. 9). • Furthermore, the Directive defines the conditions for cessation of the refugee status (Art. 11), for exclusion (Art. 12) and for the refusal to renew refugee status (Art. 14).

•

The Asylum Procedures Directive (2005)10 • Guaranteed access to asylum procedures for all adults that have legal capacity and that apply in person at a designated place (Art. 6), to asylum decisions in a written form (Art. 9), to information in an appropriate language and a translation service (Art. 10), to a personal interview (Art. 12) and to legal assistance at their own costs (Art. 15). Furthermore, Article 17 provides specific guarantees for unaccompanied minors (as does the Council Directive on minimum standards for reception). • The asylum seekers must not be detained for the only reason of seeking asylum (Art. 18). • The UNHCR has the right to contact with the applicants, to information concerning the applications and to announce its opinion (Art. 21). • Chapter III regulates the examination procedures, while the procedures to appeal are defined in Chapter V. • Chapter IV regulates the procedures to withdraw the refugee status.

9 10

Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004. Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005.

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Programmes Programmes are political documents adopted by the institutions. They contain an orientation for the further migration and asylum policy. They formulate goals and activities and describe the political way on the single field of policies. As far the migration and asylum policy is concerned two programmes are an essential platform. The European Council in Tampere (1999) had agreed an ambitious programme in order to create an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’. The Finnish Presidency stressed that the European Union’s common rights should be guaranteed to its own citizens but at the same time must ‘offer guarantees to those who seek protection in or access to the European Union’. An open and secure European Union has to be ‘fully committed to the obligations of the Geneva Convention on Refugees and other relevant human rights instruments, and able to respond to humanitarian needs on the basis of solidarity’. This programme was the basis for several measures. In November 2004, the European Council in Brussels adopted a new programme for Justice and Home Affairs. This so-called ‘Hague Programme’ – nickname ‘the vague programme’ – is less ambitious than the Tampere Programme.11 It sets the political terms of reference for Immigration issues for the next five years. Communications of the Commission The Commission has the right to make legislative proposals on its own institutions (Article TEC). Apart from this monopoly of the right of initiative, the Commission has other possibilities to present ideas, programmes and perspectives of the future. The Commission has also a unique obligation to print ‘the way to the goal ahead’. The Commission can generate ideas. As far as the migration and asylum policy is concerned the Commission’s Communications play an essential role. They contain an analysis of the status quo and give many incentives for the further development of the process of harmonization in the field of migration and asylum policy. The following examples show:

•

• • • •

11

Communication towards a common asylum procedure and a uniform status, valid throughout the Union, for persons granted asylum, COM (2000) 755 final. Communication on the common asylum policy, introducing an open coordination method, COM (2001) 710, 28 November 2001. Communication: integrating migration issues in the European Union’s relations with third countries, COM (2002) 703 3 December 2002. Communication towards a more accessible, equitable and managed asylum system, COM (2003) 215. Communication towards a more efficient Common European Asylum System: The Single Procedure as the next step. SEC (2004) 937. Bendel (2005, pp. 20–31).


•

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Communication: the Global Approach to Migration one year on: towards a comprehensive European migration policy, COM (2006) 735 final.

The Communications issued by the Commission are documents influencing the process of migration and asylum policy. Some of them contain a report about the status quo, others give an analysis of possible developments and contain recommendations for further measures. Schengen Acquis The free movement of persons was, from the very outset of the European integration process, a fundamental objective. In the concept of the European Economic Community, this principle applied only to cross-border economic activity. The treaty of Maastricht established a Union’s citizenship guaranteeing the free movement of persons between the EU member states in general. The free movement of persons ranges now from work and residency rights to the removal of border controls between the member States. It is the central right of citizenship of the Union. The White Paper about the completion of the Internal market elaborated by the Commission 1985 made the removal of physical barriers to the free movement of goods and persons a subject of discussion. The Commission suggested the complete elimination of internal frontier controls and borders by 31 December 1992. But the Council adopted only some measures to remove controls on the free movement of goods. Many member states were reluctant to remove these internal controls without harmonized rules on the crossing of the EU’s external borders, such as common visa requirements and asylum policy.12 In 1985, France, Germany and the Benelux countries adopted an intergovernmental agreement, outside the EU treaty. This Schengen Accord eliminated the border controls between the signatory states. A further Convention was signed on 19 June 1990. This Convention came into effect in 1995. It abolished the internal borders of the signatory states and created a single external border. Common rules regarding visas, asylum rights and checks at external borders were adopted. This convention was accompanied by so-called compensatory measures. This concerned a better coordination between the police, customs and measures to consult problems such as terrorism and organized crime. To that end a complex information system, the so-called Schengen Information System (SIS) was set up. Among the main measures of the Schengen systems are: • • • • •

12

the removal of checks at a common border, replacing them with external border controls, coordination between administrations on the surveillance of borders, defining the role of carriers in the fight against illegal immigration, the drawing up of rules for asylum seekers, and a common definition of the rules for crossing external borders.

Hix (2005, p. 348).

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The Schengen acquis has been brought by a protocol attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam into the European Union framework. The Schengen area is now within the legal and institutional framework of the EU, which means it is now under parliamentary and judicial security. On the Road towards an European Migration Policy Treaty of Maastricht – Third Pillar: Cooperation on the Field of Justice and Home Affairs The Maastricht Treaty established the third pillar – Justice and Home Affairs – as part of the new European Union in order to increase intergovernmental cooperation on these issues. The new form of cooperation covered nine areas considered to be of common interest: asylum policy; the crossing of external borders; immigration; combating drug addiction; combating international fraud; judicial cooperation in civil matters; judicial cooperation in criminal matters; customs cooperation; and police cooperation. The main responsibility in the decision-making process had the Council of Justice and Home Affairs supported by a coordinating committee set up under Article K 4 of the TEU, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, steering Committees and specific working parties. But this decision-making process quickly created problems, owing to a blurred distinction between the provisions contained in the Treaty of Rome and EU Treaty.13 The essential question was whether asylum, immigration and external frontiers should be dealt within the context of freedom of movement of persons, in a Community framework. Cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs put more weight on the member states and limited the power of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice. The commission does not have the exclusive right of initiative, sharing this role with the member states. The problem of the treaty of Maastricht was a limited role for the institutions and a lack of control over decisions taken by the member states. Migration Policy as a Community Task. Moving from the Third Pillar to the First Pillar Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, the subjects of asylum and migration were moved from the Third Pillar to the First Pillar. The Treaty created a distinction between the free movement of persons and the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice. Policies on visas, asylum, immigration and judicial cooperative in criminal matters have been made Community matters, which means the Community has the possibility to use instruments like regulations, Directives, decisions and recommendations. Both subjects – asylum and migration –have formally been transferred from the TEU to the TEC. 13

Leonard (2005, p. 221).


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Article 63 TEC lays down goals and measures for a transition period of five years: The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 67,14 shall, within a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam15, adopt: 1. measures on asylum, in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and other relevant treaties within the following areas: a) criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an application of a third country in one of the Member States, b) minimum standards on the reception of asylum seekers in Member States, c) minimum standards with respect to the qualification of nationals of third countries as refugees, d) minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting or withdrawing refugee status. 2. Measures on refugees and displaced persons within the following areas: e) minimum standards for giving temporary protection to displaced persons from third countries who cannot return to their country of origin and for persons who otherwise need international protection, f) promoting a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons. 3. Measures on immigration policy within the following areas: a) Conditions of entry and residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by Member-States of lag-term visas and residence permits, including those for the purpose of family reunion, b) Illegal immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of illegal residents. 4. Measures defining the rights and conditions under which nationals of third countries who are legally residing in a Member State may resident in other Member States. Measures adopted by the Council pursuant to points 3 and 4 shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing in the areas concerned national provisions which are compatible with the Treaty and with international agreements. 14 Article 67 contains the decision-making procedures especially the transition from unanimous decisions to a qualified majority System. 15 The Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on 1 May 1999.

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The decision-making process for the transitional period and the time afterwards was differentiated. During the transitional period of five years following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (this was the period from 1 May 1999 to 1 May 2004) the Council decided on a proposal of the Commission or on the initiative of a Member State and after consulting the European Parliament. The Council acted unanimously (Art 67 par 1 TEC). After this period of five years: •

•

the Council shall act on proposals from the Commission; the Commission shall examine any request made by a Member State that it submits a proposal to the Council, the Council acting unanimously after consulting the European Parliament shall take a decision with a view to providing for all or parts of the areas covered by this title of the TEC to be governed by the procedure referred to in Article 251 (= co-decision procedures) and adapting the provisions relating to the powers of the court of Justice.

This means that 1 May 2004 had an impact on the initiative ‘rather than on the actual decision making process’.16 The Role of the Member States The first step to establish a clearer responsibility was made in the mid 1980s. In 1986, the member states’ governments set up an ‘ad hoc Working Group on Immigration’. This intergovernmental body, consisting of officials from interior ministries outside the EU institutional structure, implemented informal cooperation between governments. The output of this cooperation has been two conventions on immigration policy: The Dublin Convention or Asylum in 1990 and the External Frontiers Convention in 1991.17 The Dublin Convention aimed to prevent multiple asylum applications: all states’ asylum regulations are mutually recognized and it was ensured that asylum applications would only be processed by member state in which the asylum seeker first arrived in the EU. The External Frontiers Convention provided for the mutual recognition of visas for non EU-nationals. Third-country nationals residing legally in one member state do not need a visa to travel to another EU State for a period of less than three months. But some countries refused to ratify the Dublin Convention as well the External Frontiers Convention.18 The United Kingdom and Spain refused to sign the External Frontiers Convention due to their ongoing disagreement over Gibraltar. Since the treaty of Maastricht, Justice and Home Affairs ministers have met each other on a regular basis and have adopted more common policies. But their decisions have been yet more resolutions and recommendations rather than directly effective joint actions. The few joint actions of importance covered the easing of travel 16 17 18

Van Krieken (2004, p. 10). Hix (2005, p. 353). Hix (2005, p. 353).


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restrictions on third-country nationals studying in the European Union, common transit visas in all member states, a uniform format for residence permits and burdensharing with regard to the admission and residence of refugees.19 However some member states did not accept to be bound by joint actions. All these circumstances made it difficult to establish a real common policy. The Role of the Commission The Commission plays within the so-called institutional triangle – Commission, Council of Ministers, European Parliament – the role of an ‘initiator’ in a broader sense. Its responsibilities are manifold. They have been summarized as being those of • initiative, • implementation and • supervision. The treaty of the European Community gives to the Commission a specific right to put proposals for the legislative process (Art. 211). Normally the Council can only take decisions when the Commission has made a proposal (regulations, Directives). Apart this legislative initiative, the Commission can formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in the treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers it necessary. As an ‘engine’ of the integration process the Commission operates on a broad spectrum of substantial proposals: white books, green books, papers, communications and so on. The latter are, as I previously illustrated, particularly important in the field of migration and asylum policy. Within the commission’s portfolios there is a special responsibility for the area of Freedom, Justice and Security. This scope also covers immigration, asylum, visa and border issues. In the current personal composition of the Commission (2004–2009) the competent Commissioner is Francesco Frattini, a former minister of the Italian Government. He is also one of the Vice Presidents of the Commission. Frattini is supported by a Directorate-General. This Directorate-General exists since October 1999. The Director-General is Jonathan Faull. Under his administrative responsibility 320 officials are working in four directorates decentralized in 17 policy units.20 Let me stress again the role of the Commission on the field of migration and asylum policy. The relation between the Commission and the Council of Ministers can be characterised by different goals. The Commission has to represent the Community’s interests, whilst the Council of Ministers represents the interests of those of the Member States. In reality, this means that: the more the Council is hesitating to fulfil the goals of the treaties, the more the Commission has to push the realization of these goals. This assessment is adequate to the current situation of migration and asylum policy. This fact creates a special role of the Commission. It is the Commission that has to give impetus to a progressive process of harmonization and implementations 19 20

Hix (2005, p. 354). See http:\\ec.europa.eu\dgs\justice.home\index_eu.html.

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of the migration and asylum acquis. Therefore, all the initiatives and documents elaborated by the Commission are important and necessary. Programmes The Tampere Programme (1999–2004) More or less one can say that the European Council in Tampere from 15–16 October 1999 started the period of the establishment of a Common European Asylum and Migration policy. In Chapter 17 of the Presidency Conclusions four elements are defined: •

•

•

•

Partnership with Countries of origin (A I): the approach of the EU includes activities in the regions of origin, such as combating poverty and conflict, improving living standards, increasing job opportunities. Common European Asylum System (A II): This includes some basic principles, such as nobody should be sent back to persecution. Some key elements constitute the system: a clear and workable determination of the State responsible for the examination of an asylum application; common standards for a fair and efficient asylum procedure; common minimum conditions of reception of asylum seekers; the approximation of rules on the recognition and content of the refugee status; temporary protection of third country nationals;21 and finalization of the EURODAC identification System of asylum seekers.22 Fair treatment of third country nationals (A III): people who are legally residing within the EU shall grant rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens. Further, this requires efficient management of migration flows; closer cooperation between the Member States concerning border control; combating of illegal immigration including the involved criminal network. While taking all necessary measures to address migration-related criminality and manage migration flows, the rights of the victims shall be guaranteed. Management of migration flows, which includes information campaigns on the actual possibilities for legal immigration and prevention of all forms of trafficking in human beings; tackling illegal immigration at its sources; closer cooperation and mutual technical assistance between the Member States border control services; and effective control of the Union’s future external borders by specialised trained professionals.

The Hague Programme The Brussels European Council 4–5 November 2004 made an important step for the Union’s Migration and Asylum Policy. At this summit, the European Union

21 22

Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001. See EURODAC Regulation 2000.


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discussed an area of Freedom, Security and Justice, especially the Hague Programme. Five years after the European Council’s meeting in Tampere, the European Union adopted a new multi-annual programme for the next five years. This programme dealt with all aspects of policies relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, which means – among other things – asylum and migration, border management, integration. The European Council will review progress on the Hague Programme by entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty (1 November 2006). As far as asylum, migration and border policy is concerned the programme started: ‘International migration will continue. A comprehensive approach involving all stages of migration, with respect to the root courses of migration, entry and admission policies and integration and return policies is needed’ (1.2). Its aim is that the European Council urges the Council, the Member States and the commission to pursue coordinated, strong and effective working relations between those responsible for migration and asylum policies and those responsible for other policy fields relevant to these areas. The Hague programme comprises the following activities: •

•

•

•

A common European Asylum System with a common procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum or subsidiary protection. The ongoing development of European asylum and migration policy should be based on a common analysis of migratory phenomenon in all their aspects (first phase). In its second phase, the Common European Asylum system should be based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention and other relevant treaties, and be built on a thorough and complete evaluation of the legal instruments that have been adopted in the first phase. This evaluation should be concluded 2007, the second-phase instruments and measures should be submitted to the Council and the European Parliament ‘with a view to their adoption’ before the end of 2010. Integration of third country nationals: the European Council calls for equal opportunities to participate fully in society. Obstacles to integration need to be actively eliminated. A coherent European framework of integration should be established. It comprises following aspects: Integration • is a continuous, two way process involving both legally third-country nationals and the host society; • includes, but goes beyond, anti-discrimination policy; • implies respect for the basic values of the European Union and fundamental human rights; • requires basic skills for participation in society; • relies on a frequent interaction and intercultural dialogue between all members of society within common forums and activities in order to improve material understanding; • extends to a variety of policy areas, including employment and education. Partnership with third countries to improve the capacity for migration management and refugee protection, prevent and combat illegal immigration, inform on legal channels for migration, resolve refugee situations by providing

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• • •

•

•

•

•


better access to durable solutions, build border-control capacity, enhance document security and tackle the problem of return. Partnership with countries and region of origin developing EU-Regional Protection Programmes in close consultation and cooperation with UNHCR. Partnership with countries and regions of transit. An effective removal and repatriation policy against illegal immigrants. This policy must be based ‘on common standards for persons to be returned in a human manner and with full respect for their human rights and dignity’. A better management of migration flows, i.e. border checks and the fight against illegal immigration. It needs solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities including its financial implications between the Member States. The Schengen Information System (SIS II) has to become operational in 2007. It concerns a database of people who have been issued with arrest warrants and of stolen objects. The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (established on 1 May 2005) should be evaluated before the end of 2007. Common visa rules – introduction of biometrics in the visa information system.

The Hague programme offers a very important orientation on the field of freedom, security and justice. It sets out the ten priorities for the Union. Recently, the elaboration of a post-Hague programme was envisaged by the informal Council of Ministers in January 2007 in Dresden. The German Presidency considered establishing a high-level advisory group discussing a post-Hague programme and presenting a report in autumn 2008. This report could be the basis for discussion between the Commission and the Council in 2009. The African Wave of Refugees The steadily increasing migration pressure from Africa brings a major challenge to the European Union. Three Member states of the European Union are particularly involved in that process: Italy, Spain and Malta. Tackling this problem, the European Union must provide a dialogue between the African countries and the Union and an intense cooperation between the EU and the African Union. In 2006, there were two successful and important events: a ministerial conference was held in July 2006 in Rabat as a joint initiative between Morocco, Spain and France. This conference brought together West, Central and North African states with EU Member States to discuss common responses to migratory flows along the West African route. States committed themselves to developing a close partnership ‘to work together, in the framework of a global, balanced, pragmatic and operational approach, with respect for the fundamental rights and dignity of migrants and refugees, on the phenomenon of migratory routes’. This framework should involve countries of origin, transit and destination, this partnership is focusing on the fight against poverty and the promotion of substantial development in African states.


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An Action Plan has to be elaborated. A second, follow up ministerial conference in two years is planned. Another event in 2006 was an EU–Africa Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, held in Tripoli on 22–23 November. The EU and the whole of Africa came together for the first time to make a political commitment to working together on migration. An Action Plan and Declaration on human trafficking, legal and illegal migration and economic development have been adopted. At the same time, the European Union strengthened its will to work in partnership with African Union, African countries and regional organizations, such as ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD. Another perspective is a dialogue on the basis of Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement, covering a broad range of issues from institution and capacity building and effective integration of legal migrants to return and the effective implementation of readmission obligations, in order to establish a mutually beneficial cooperation in this field. On the basis of Article 13 of the Cotonou-Agreement, a dialogue has been initiated with some Sub-Saharan African states. Migration is currently being incorporated into the programming exercise for the Tenth European Development Fund. On the basis of Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement, a bilateral dialogue on migration was developed between the EU and Senegal, Mali, Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Mauritania and Niger. This has so far proceeded with Mauritania, Senegal and Mali. Three other countries had to be removed from the list due to varying political circumstance while other countries are proposed to be added the list, such as Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia (COM 735 final (2006)). Conclusion and Future Perspectives This chapter has tried to show that the migration policy of the European Union is politically very sensitive. Generally viewed, one can say the EU is on the right track. To establish migration policy in a broad sense as a Community task is the right way. However, there is no doubt that the ongoing EU cooperation will be confronted with many obstacles. The national migration policies alone can no longer meet the migration challenges, faced by the Member States of the European Union. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to speed up the process of the Europeanization of migration policy. But there are a lot of obstacles in the path of a comprehensive EU strategy. Obstacle and tensions have slowed the progress of the ambitious programmes of the EU. Five areas must be highlighted: •

•

The process, which started with the programme of Tampere and was followed by the Hague programme, must continue aiming to complete the concept of harmonization and guaranteeing minimum standards. The decision-making process of the Council must be focused on a qualified majority decision. The main principle for migration and asylum policy has to be the protection of human rights, particularly human dignity. The Human rights charter of the European Union recognizes the right of asylum. Article 18 of the Charter

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•


stipulates: ‘The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community’. The European Union needs a better developed system for sharing the burden of refugees. To distribute people among the EU Member States is not the human way. A system of financial compensation should be preferred in which countries that receive a disproportionate number of immigrants would receive money from a central EU fund.23

The Commission proposed a framework programme on ‘Solidarity and the management of migration flows’. This programme gives adequate support to an area of freedom, security and justice under financial perspectives 2007– 2013. This financial support is for the following funds:24 • European Refugee Fund: €699 million • External Borders Fund (concerning controls on external borders): €1820 million • European Fund for the Integration of Third-country nationals: €825 million • European Return Fund €676 million (Total: €4020 million) • To foster integration and the intercultural dialogue. Migration and integration are highly linked. As the Commission in the Communication of 30 November 200625 pointed out, a wider participation of the different stakeholders, including migrants themselves, is necessary for promoting an effective integration strategy. Three measures are mentioned: • The establishment of an integration platform where relevant partners can exchange views on a regular basis. • The consolidation of the role played by local authorities building on the successful ‘Integrating cities: European policies, local practice’, a conference held in Rotterdam. • The creation of an Integration website and new editions of the Integration Handbook and the Annual Report on Migration and Integration. • In October 2005, Heads of State or Government discussed migration as one of the main challenges of globalization and agreed on the urgent need to step up action. Two months later, the European Council adopted the Global Approach to Migration: Priority actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean. The Global Approach intends coherent policies and action on migration, and brings together various relevant policy areas including external relations, 23 Moraes (2001, p. 130). 24 Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008–2013 as part of the General Programme. Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows (SEC (2005) 435) COM/2005 0123 final – COD 2005/0046. 25 The Global Approach to Migration one year on: towards a comprehensive European Migration Policy.


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development, employment and justice, freedom and security. The European Union gave, in a first phase of the Global Approach, priority actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean. Now it must find ways to make the European Union’s approach truly comprehensive. Finally I have to stress that migration and asylum policy mirrors not only the attitude of politicians but also the spirit of societies. The European Union likes to describe itself as a Community of values. Migration and asylum issues are an essential test case for the willingness to accept and to establish an open and multicultural Community. Multiculturalism as ‘the seeking of equal rights and recognition for ethnic, racial, religious or sexually defined groups is on of the most pervasive and controversial intellectual and political movement in contemporary western democracies’.26 I would like to add not only in western democracies but especially in all the ‘Member States of the European Union’. Looking to the reality of migration and asylum policy we can say this area shifted in terms of Maastricht from pillar 3 to pillar 1, but the political behaviour of Member States’ governments is determined by a commitment to sovereignty and remained rather intergovernmental. I will finish by addressing a fundamental perspective. The current asylum controversy throws forth a number of ethical questions, which are essential for shaping migration and asylum policy. Gibney is dealing with these questions in his well-differentiated publication and gives some examples: • • •

Are states justified in privileging the claims of their own citizens over the claims of refugees, asylum seekers on other immigrants in need? Do states have an obligation to admit for entry any outsider at all and, if so, from what does this obligation derive? What is the correct criteria by which to decide where anyone is entitled to reside in the contemporary world (birth? need? citizenship? preference? contribution to the maximisation of total global utility?) 27

For the single states it is difficult to find an adequate answer. States have different views and different answers. In a political community of states, which is on the side an Association of sovereign states (intergovernmental cooperation) and on the other side a supranational community, Member States must agree on common ethical principles. Gibney is pleading for humanitarianism as a desirable principle in shaping migration and asylum policy.28 And Walzer, a well-known communitarian, argues that while states are generally free to construct entrance policies according to their own criteria, in dealing with refugees they are bound by the requirements of

26 Solomos & Schuster (2000, p. 76). 27 Gibney (2004, p. 18). 28 Gibney (2004, p. 233).

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humanitarianism. Further, these requirements are based on the principles of mutual aid and benefits.29 The idea to consider humanitarianism as a principle applied on migration and asylum policy is not without problems. Some perspectives are not clear. But the approach could bring a new direction in the debate. The dialogue about migration and asylum policy would become a value orientated debate. May that bring a new dimension against the growing populism. References Bendel, P. (2005) Immigration policy in the European Union; still bringing up the walls for fortress Europe? Migration Letters, 2(1), pp. 20–31. COM 735 final (2006) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – the Global Approach to Migration one year on: Towards a comprehensive European migration policy. Brussels, 30 November 2006. EURODAC Regulation Dec (2000) Automatic Fingerprint Identification System. Gibney, M.J. (2004) The Ethics and Politics of Asylum. Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Harvey, C.J. (1999) Immigration and asylum law: new covenants and familiar challenges, Public Law, pp. 23–34. Hix, S. (2005) The Political System of the European Union, 2nd edn (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Koopmans, R. & Statham, P. (Eds) (2000) Challenging Immigration and Ethic Relations Politics. Comparative European Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Leonard, D. (2005) Guide to the European Union. The Definitive Guide to all Aspects of the EU, 9th edn (London: The Economist). Lloyd, J. (2003) The closing of the European gates? The new populist parties of Europe, in: S. Spencer, S. (Ed.) (2003) The Politics of Migration. Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change, pp. 88–99 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing). Moraes, C. (2003) The politics of European Union Migration Policy, in: S. Spencer, S. (Ed.) The Politics of Migration. Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change, pp. 116–131 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing). Solomos, S.J. & Schuster, L.K. (2000) Citizenship, multiculturalism and the policies of identity. Contemporary dilemmas and policy agendas, in: R. Koopmans & P. Statham (Eds) Challenging Immigration and Ethic Relations Politics. Comparative European Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Spencer, S. (Ed.) (2003) The Politics of Migration. Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing). Van Krieken, P.J. (2004) The Consolidated Asylum and Migration Acquis. The EU Directives in an Expanded Europe (The Hague: TMC Assei Press). Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres of Justice. A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford:

29

Walzer (1983).


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Robertson Martin). Internet-based References Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing in the consequences thereof. Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers; available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2003/I_031/I_03120030206en00180025.pdf,accessed: 20 January 2007. Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted; available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=CELEX:320004L0083:EN:HTML, accessed 20 January 2007. Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugees; available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LEXUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/I_326/I_ 32620051213en00130034.pdf, accessed: 20 January 2007. Council regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national; available at: http://eur-lex.europa./LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2003/I_050/ I_05020030225en00010010pdf, accessed: 20 January 2007.


Chapter 9

The EU’s Peace and Security Strategy in the DRC Birgit Loeser

Introduction It was a bit of a surprise, back in spring 2003, in the shadow of the second US-led Iraq campaign, when the European Union (EU) announced it was to get militarily engaged in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This was to be known as ‘Operation Artemis’, the EU’s second military operation conducted within the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, more specifically, under the terms of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).1 It was also its first operation outside of Europe. Much has happened since, for example with regard to the continued stabilization process of the DRC: a constitution for the DRC was finally adopted late in 2005 and agreed through a referendum, which paved the way for the elections that took place in 2006. In addition, progress has been made within the ESDP: the EU has not only adopted an overarching ‘European Security Strategy’2 (2003), but also a ‘Strategy for Africa’3 (2005) and is now engaged in the DRC through three parallel ESDP operations, which is unprecedented; it is also engaged in Sudan. And, finally, Africa’s own ambitious plans to take on responsibility for conflict prevention and conflict management have moved forward: the African Union is on its way to seriously developing similar crisis management instruments through its African Peace and Security Agenda (APSA) which also has an impact on the way the International Community is dealing with peace and security in Africa. The post-election phase will provide new opportunities for the DRC government, for African regional organisations as well as for the International Community, including the EU, to pursue with the further stabilization of the country. A comprehensive Security Sector Reform (SSR) will be the key for its success and will have an effect on the stabilization of the whole Central African Region. This 1 The CFSP was established in 1993 as the second pillar of the EU. Its aims include safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the EU, to strengthen EU’s security as well as international security and to preserve peace. Within this framework, ESDP provides the EU with the operational capability to conduct crisis management operations both with civilian and military instruments. The High Representative for CFSP, since 1999 Javier Solana, plays a key role in this. 2 EU Council (2005d). 3 EU Council (2003).

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chapter examines the ESDP’s evolving role in this process. It looks back at the EU’s first military engagement in 2003 and analyses the aims and effects of its engagement thereafter. Based on an analysis of the present situation, prospects for a new chapter of this engagement in the post-election period can be identified. The key underlying question is that of the shaping of an interrelationship between EU and DRC interests. The Importance of Operation Artemis Since the late 1990s, the government of the DRC has gradually lost control over large territories in the east of the country. Shifting alliances between local as well as Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces have been responsible for continued unrest and atrocities against the local population. A large number of people have had to flee their homes. The UN force MONUC was put in place in 1999 in order to help stabilize the region. After the disorderly withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the Ituri Province early in 2003, the power struggle resumed with renewed attacks on the population. A quickly re-deployed Uruguayan battalion needed to be reinforced, which was not within the UN’s immediate capacity. Although the threats in the East of the DRC in Spring 2003 were real, with risks of another genocide looming in Bunia, Ituri Province, there can be no doubt that Operation Artemis, the EU-led temporary reinforcement for MONUC, also had some internal motivation: as a matter of fact, the EU, only weeks before, had launched its first ever ESDP military operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), based on the so-called ‘Berlin Plus arrangements’ – painfully negotiated with NATO over the last couple of years. Then, at least some of its Member States were keen to demonstrate to the world (or to the US?) that the EU was also capable of undertaking so-called ‘autonomous’ military operations, i.e. without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. A respective engagement in the DRC urged by the UN Secretary-General at the time seemed perfect. Taking aside the EU’s original motivation, the real effect and thus the real importance of Operation Artemis for both the DRC and the EU was to be the fact that the ESDP henceforth got – and remains – heavily engaged in the overall stabilization process of the DRC, gradually intensifying its focus towards the reform of the overall security sector and gradually developing a proper strategy. From the very first day, this ESDP engagement launched in 2003 was to complement Community activities still going on and largely dwarfing this commitment4 in terms of money spent and numbers of projects undertaken. But with the political pressure of 25 Member States behind any ESDP action, the dynamics and effects of it can at times make a big difference. Operation Artemis was thus a success, although it was very limited in scale and scope in terms of its duration, number of tasks and regional coverage; its aims and purposes, mainly the stabilization of the security conditions, the improvement of the humanitarian situation and the protection of refugees, were fully met.5 So the EU brought, at least partial peace to a difficult conflict and proved 4 The Ninth European Development Fund alone provides for ca. €475 million for the DRC as a whole over a period of five years. 5 United Nations (2004).

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to itself and the world its autonomous crisis management capacities as well as its readiness to engage outside Europe, if need be. But there is more: Operation Artemis has also proved that the UN, the NGO community and other international organizations can usefully coexist with an ESDP engagement in one single country. There has been no duplication of effort but added value through a well-defined and focused additional EU effort. This aspect is not to be underestimated given the often inter-blocking rather than interlocking effect such multiple international activities can create, such as unnecessary concurrence and ineffectiveness. The fact that the 2003 Operation Artemis was able to contribute such additional value undoubtedly motivated the EU to remain engaged in the DRC with its ESDP instruments. It also made it acceptable to other international actors as well as to DRC authorities. Finally, this new EU engagement in the DRC has also opened up a new role for the EU’s Special Representative (EUSR) for the Great Lakes Region, Aldo Ajello, who has been active in the DRC and the wider Great Lakes Region since 1996.6 From then on, he was to give political guidance to ESDP missions in the DRC and facilitate their contacts with other EU actors on the ground as well as with local authorities.7 But prior to the launching of more ESDP missions after 2003, the EU was to work on its strategic positioning in a changing international environment, which is described in the following section. The EU Takes on a More Strategic Approach, Including Towards Africa At the end of the same year that Operation Artemis was successfully launched and concluded, the EU adopted its first ever Security Strategy.8 This strategy describes the security challenges facing the EU in the new, post-Cold War and post-September11 international environment, calling for ‘a more active, more coherent and more capable’ international role for the EU. Amongst others, ‘state failure’ is mentioned in the strategy as a ‘key threat’ to the EU. The DRC is only indirectly listed as an example when saying that ‘the EU and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including ... in the DRC’. Regional conflicts, too, are considered to be a ‘key threat’. Emphasis is placed on the fact that ‘violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our border, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructure; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights’. The Great Lakes Region conflict is explicitly mentioned in this context. One relevant major objective of the European Security Strategy is the promulgation of an ‘international order based on effective multilateralism’ through 6 Representing, for example, the EU in the ‘Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition’ (CIAT) (International Committee accompanying the Transition), alongside the European Commission. 7 EU Council (2006a) for his latest mandate. 8 EU Council (2003).

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the promotion of international law, the reinforcement of international, including regional organisations and an increased cooperation amongst them. Security sector reform and good governance are key policy aims since ‘the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states’. Only one month after the adoption of the European Security Strategy in January 2004, the EU Council adopted a so-called ‘Common Position’9 concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa.10 According to this Common Position, the EU will inter alia mainstream conflict prevention strategies in its development policy. Furthermore, the EU makes a long-term commitment to support the enhancement of African peace support operations capabilities at regional, subregional and bilateral levels. The Common Position also underlines the importance of actions to ensure long-term stability such as security sector reform. In order to underpin these policy aims, the EU set up the ‘African Peace Facility’ (APF) in April 2004, an allocation of funding from the European Development Fund, worth €250 million to support African peace support operations and capabilities. Almost all of the funding was to be spent within only a year to help finance the AU’s first peace support operation in Sudan, AMIS I and AMIS II, covering mainly the personnel costs.11 This heavy financial support was complemented by political and personnel support to the Abuja peace talks12 and to the Ceasefire Commission. Finally, through ESDP, a team of around 100 military and 50 police officers provided equipment and assets, planning and technical assistance, military observers, training of African troops and civilian police officers as well as strategic transportation.13 This effort to support AMIS was the first demonstration of the EU’s capability to put policy aims into practice (that were defined in the January 2004 ‘Common Position’) and by making best use of a tool that had only been created shortly before (the APF). Later on in the same year, in November 2004, an ESDP Action Plan was approved by the EU Council in response to the evolving African Peace and Security Agenda (APSA), emanating from the AU Durban Protocol of 2002. This ESDP Action Plan mainly focused on actions towards African PSO capacity building, planning support, Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) and SSR. Possible actions included, for example, technical advice, exchange of best practice and the appointment of EU liaison officers.

9 Within CFSP, a Common Position defines common policy objectives, aims and principles, as appropriate, which are binding for EU Member States. 10 EU Council (2004a) and EU Council (2005a). 11 At the end of 2005, this financial aid amounted to €212 million. 12 The AU-led Inter-Sudanese peace talks on the Darfur conflict were held in the capital of Nigeria from August 2004 until May 2006. The Darfur Peace Agreement, which includes a ceasefire and humanitarian measures, was signed in Abuja on 5 May 2006 by the Parties (the Government of Sudan, the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement), witnessed by representatives from the International Community who had previously helped facilitate the talks, such as the UN, the EU, the Arab League, the US, the UK, France etc. 13 EU Council (2005c).


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The year after, 2005, was then declared by the UK, in its double capacity as G8 and EU Presidency, the ‘Year of Africa’. And, indeed, 2005 was to coincide with two other important events relevant for Africa: (i) the UN Millennium Summit in September and (ii) the UK-initiated international ‘Commission for Africa’, which presented its final report in March 2005.14 It is against this background that the July 2005 EU Council conclusions called for a long-term EU strategy for Africa. Based on a European Parliament report on a Development Strategy for Africa, a written contribution by the SG/HR Javier Solana as well as a Commission Communication on an EU Strategy for Africa, the EU Council finally approved its first-ever regional strategy, the EU Africa Strategy, in December 2005. In the field of peace and security, the EU commits inter alia to ‘work with the AU, sub-regional organisations and African countries to predict, prevent and mediate conflict ... (to) provide direct support to the AU, sub-regional or UN efforts to promote peace and security through CFSP and ESDP activities, … (and to) enhance … support for post conflict reconstruction in Africa...’. At the last EU–Africa Ministerial meeting held in Brazzaville in October 2006, a consultation process for the development of a joint strategy was agreed, which should be presented for adoption at the EU–Africa Summit in late 2007. Finally, in addition to the measures mentioned-above on Africa-related strategic work, two concepts were developed by the EU late in 2005 that were important for the practical implementation of the EU’s further peace and security-related engagement in the DRC: one is the EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning, a concept that aims at more effectively combining all of the EU’s crisis management tools at its disposal, be it civilian, including police, or military, as called for in the European Security Strategy. The second is the EU Concept for ESDP support to SSR, which defines an EU approach to SSR in so-called partner countries. In this concept, SSR is defined as a contribution to an accountable, effective and efficient security system, operating under civilian control consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance, transparency and the rule of law, and acting according to international standards and respecting human rights, which can be a force for peace and stability, fostering democracy and promoting local and regional stability. Both concepts are important reference documents for the current and future ESDP engagement in SSR in the DRC. All of these strategic and conceptual developments since 2003, the year of Operation Artemis, have set the scene for the ever-increasing ESDP engagement in the DRC, as will be shown in the following sections. They lay the ground for a more systematic engagement, with defined EU strategic aims and objectives. EUPOL Kinshasa Comes Into Play The ‘Global all-inclusive Agreement on the transition in the DRC’, signed in Pretoria on 17 December 2002, and the ‘Memorandum on Security and the Army’ of 29 June 2003 provided for the establishment of an Integrated Police Unit (IPU), a 14

See for the full report http://www.commissionforafrica.org.

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specialized unit of the DRC National Police (PNC) created in 2002 under Congolese command. The IPU was composed of 1008 police officers from around the country, representing all political movements. Its tasks were to ensure the protection of the State institutions and Transitional government authorities as well as to contribute to the maintenance of law and order in case of serious unrest. If successful, the interfactional IPU was meant to serve as a model in the future restructuring of the PNC. On 28 July 2003, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1493, encouraging donors to support the establishment of the IPU and approving the provision by MONUC of additional assistance that the IPU might need in the field of training. In a Joint EU-UN Declaration on Co-operation in Crisis Management of 24 September 2003, the UN Secretary-General and the EU Presidency considered ways to assist in the establishment of the IPU in Kinshasa and to provide security to the transitional government and its institutions. Finally, in October 2003, the government of the DRC made an official request to the EU SG/HR in this respect. In December 2003, the Political and Security Committee of the EU (PSC) agreed that the EU should follow up this request in a three-fold approach: (i) through the rehabilitation and refurbishment of a training centre and the provision of basic equipment; (ii) through training of the IPU, and (iii) through a follow-up, monitoring and mentoring of the implementation of the IPU mandate following the initial training phase. In April 2004, the European Commission thus adopted a financing decision under the European Development Fund (EDF) for a project including technical assistance, rehabilitation of a training centre, provision of equipment and adequate training for the IPU by February 2005.15 For its part, the EU Council adopted a Joint Action in May 2004, in which the EU commits to ‘support the process of the consolidation of internal security in the DRC which is an essential factor for the peace process and the development of the country, through assistance to the setting up of an IPU in Kinshasa’,16 including the provision of equipment. In October 2004, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1565 (2004) by which the mandate of MONUC was extended until 31 March 2005 and expanded to support the Government of National Unity and Transition ‘to contribute to arrangements taken for the security of the institutions and the protection of officials of the Transition in Kinshasa until the IPU would be ready to take on this responsibility and assist the Congolese authorities in the maintenance of order in other strategic areas’. This left time for the EU to carefully plan its contribution to this effort, which was to materialize into a parallel track: first the European Commission efforts already mentioned, and secondly, the launching of the initially 31-strong ESDP police mission called ‘EUPOL Kinshasa’ on 12 April 2005. According to the Joint Action adopted in December 2004,17 EUPOL Kinshasa’s mandate is to monitor, mentor and advise the setting up and the initial running of the IPU in order to ensure that the IPU acts in accordance with the training received in the Academy Centre and according to international best practices in this field. These actions should be focused on the IPU chain of command to enhance the management 15 16 17

€10 million were set aside for this. EU Council (2004b). EU Council (2004c).


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capability of the IPU and to monitor, mentor and advise the operational Units in the execution of its tasks. Originally, the mission was to be concluded by 31 December 2005. Portuguese Superintendent Adilio Custodio was nominated Head of Mission and the mission itself was composed of police officers from Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Canada and Turkey. Following the example of the ESDP police mission in FYROM called ‘Proxima’, the main concept of the mission consists of co-locating experts at each level of the Congolese IPU chain of command. These experts provide targeted advice and help coordinate any other assistance needed. During its first term, EUPOL Kinshasa, in close liaison with MONUC, contributed inter alia to (i) the identification and training of IPU members, (ii) the inspection and verification of equipment and assistance in managing it, (iii) the definition of organizational and functional standards and (iv) the drafting of relevant rules and regulations for the IPU. The IPU was declared operational in June 2005. With the continued EUPOL Kinshasa advice and assistance, including subsequent operational matters, the IPU has grown since into a well respected and effective, but also a rather privileged police unit that works alongside other units such as the ‘Police d’Intervention Rapide’ (PIR – units trained and equipped by France and Angola) or the ‘Groupe d’Intervention Mobile’ (GMI – a unit trained and equipped by South Africa). The IPU’s effectiveness has been tested several times, for example in June/ July 2005 when major demonstrations occurred in the context of discussions over the extension, or not, of the transition. Its professionalism and performance were widely commended each time. Based on this success, and considering that continued EU mentoring and advice were needed for two aspects – the security of the upcoming elections and the completion of more comprehensive police reform plans – President Kabila addressed a letter to the EU SG/HR in October 2005, inviting the EU to extend EUPOL Kinshasa. On 22 November 2005, the EU Council approved this request by extending the current mandate for another year, namely until 31 December 2006. Six staff members were added and the mandate was henceforth to include ‘increased advice on other issues complementary to the effective conduct of policing in DRC’. Against this background, EUPOL Kinshasa was, alongside MONUC, Angola, South Africa, France and the UK, invited to take part in the ‘Groupe Mixte sur la Réforme et la Réorganisation de la PNC’ (Mixed Group on the Reform and Reorganisation of the Congolese National Police) in January 2006, an initiative of the Minister for the Interior. The final report of this Group decisively backed by EUPOL Kinshasa was published in June 2006 and will form the basis for the entire police reform to be taken forward by the new Government. To summarize, it appears that the success of Operation Artemis has paved the way for a continued ESDP engagement in the DRC. EUPOL Kinshasa was clearly operating in the interest of DRC authorities, not only because of the need to satisfy UN concerns, but mainly in view of the tremendous task of bringing order to its police forces. Due to its experiences in the Balkans, the EU knew that relatively small civilian crisis management missions could add value and have a real impact. The parallel CFSP/ESDP strategic development and focus on Africa has helped make a continued ESDP engagement in the DRC acceptable to EU Member States

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and the EU public. By the end of 2005, confidence in the expertise provided by EUPOL Kinshasa made a prolongation of the mission to be self-evident, particularly in view of the challenging months ahead. But policing is just one part of the security sector. In order to be really effective and comprehensive, ESDP assistance had to be broadened. The Work of EUSEC R.D. Congo In June 2005, another civilian ESDP mission for the DRC was launched, code-named EUSEC R.D.C. With its establishment based on UN Security Council Resolution 1592 (2005) adopted on 30 March 2005, the Transitional Government of the DRC was urged to pursue a comprehensive reform of the security sector. In response to this, DRC authorities addressed a letter to the EU SG/HR on 26 April 2005, asking for a dedicated team of EU experts for relevant advice and assistance. In the subsequent EU Council decision, the EU reaffirmed its interest in this new ESDP mission by saying the following: ‘The current security situation in the DRC may deteriorate, with potentially serious repercussions for the process of strengthening democracy, the rule of law and international and regional security. A continued commitment of EU political effort and resources will help to embed stability’.18 Accordingly, EUSEC R.D. Congo was tasked to ‘provide practical support for the integration of the Congolese Army and good governance in the field of security, including identifying and contributing to the development of various projects and options that the EU and/or its Member States may decide to support in this area’. French General Pierre Michel Joana was appointed Head of Mission, leading a team of 8 experts. Its mandate was to expire in May 2007. As one of its first projects, following a specific request by the DRC authorities of July 2005, the EU Council decided that EUSEC R.D. Congo should provide technical and logistical support in view of the modernization of the chain of payment of the DRC Armed Forces.19 The absence of the regular payment of army salaries is indeed one of the main reasons for their lack of discipline and professionalism. Whilst soldiers are called upon to protect the people, they can turn into enemies by repeatedly ravaging for food supplies and other goods. Within the framework of these mandates, EUSEC R.D. Congo, to date is successfully advising the DRC army in a variety of aspects, as in the field of financial administration. Each expert is co-located at different levels of the army chain of command, from the Cabinet of the Defence Minister downwards. Through the presence of an additional 41 EUSEC R.D. Congo personnel at those integrated military brigades that already received training (or ‘brassage’ as it is often referred to), the effective separation of the chain of payment from the chain of command is being supervised. This has helped to ensure that soldiers are now being paid on a regular basis.

18 19

EU Council (2005b). EU Council (2005e).


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ESDP Support During the 2006 Elections These two relatively small, but highly effective ESDP actions that followed Operation Artemis and complemented the continuously heavy European Commission engagement in the DRC, have helped the EU as a whole to be seen by DRC authorities and other International Community actors as a credible and serious actor in peace and security matters. The EU, its institutions and Member States, are today in effect the biggest actor in this country, and Aldo Ajello, the EUSR, is a highly visible and respected face and voice, representing the EU on a permanent basis in the country and the region. It is his continued intensive engagement with all parties within the political scene in the DRC and with the relevant international and regional actors that helped facilitate the opening of yet another chapter of ESDP engagement in the DRC in the context of the current elections: one is the temporary reinforcement of EUPOL Kinshasa to support the coordination of Congolese crowd control units in Kinshasa during the elections, and the second is the establishment of EUFOR R.D. Congo, a temporary military mission to support MONUC. Both follow on a UN request of December 2005 addressed to the EU and are based on UNSC Resolution 1671 (2006). As regards the first, it has to be noted that EUPOL Kinshasa was a full member of the ‘Groupe Technique sur la Securisation des Elections’ (Technical Group on Securing the Elections) from the beginning. In this capacity, EUPOL Kinshasa has been intimately involved in the Congolese detailed planning for securing the elections. EUPOL Kinshasa has in effect helped conceive the concept of the dedicated ‘Centre national des operations de la PNC (CNO)’ and the ‘Centre provincial des operations de Kinshasa (CPO-Kinshasa)’. These are composed of different police units and aim at coordinating all police actions where unrest around crucial election dates are to be expected. Already back in 2005, there was the unanimous view held by DRC representatives and other participants in this Group that these Centres would benefit from external advice and mentoring based on the model of the IPU as well as similar efforts undertaken by Angola, South Africa and France, as was already mentioned (PIR and GMI). EUPOL Kinshasa was naturally to lead in the further refinement of this international assistance. The result was the EU decision to temporarily (maximum five months) reinforce EUPOL Kinshasa with an additional 38 police officers who, together with the already existing 25 EUPOL police officers, were to be co-located in the above mentioned Congolese police operational centres. Their task was to help ensure an enhanced and coordinated response of the Congolese crowd control units in Kinshasa in the case of disturbances during the elections.20 In this context, a key factor has been the EU decision to invite Angola and South Africa to formally take part in this temporarily expanded EUPOL Kinshasa mission. This is against the background of their training and equipment of the PNC. In addition, other African countries were also invited.21 20 EU Council (2006b). 21 Those invited were: Angola, South Africa, Cape Verde, Morocco, Mali and Senegal.

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This African participation is a novelty, at least for civilian ESDP missions, and makes the case for the EU’s key interest in African ownership in peace and security matters. Whilst this renewed ESDP police action in the crucial field of crowd control was built on and around the already existing EUPOL Kinshasa mission, the temporary (four months) EU military effort had to be set up and planned from scratch. In line with the mandate provided by UNSC Resolution 1671, EUFOR R.D. Congo was tasked (a) to support MONUC to stabilize a situation in case MONUC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing capabilities; (b) to contribute to the protection of civilians under the imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo; (c) to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa; (d) to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel as well as the protection of the installations of EUFOR R.D. Congo; and (e) to execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger.22 Its main purpose, however, was that of deterrence. Hence, in addition to its main element of 400–450 soldiers in the city of Kinshasa, a rapid deployment element in neighbouring Gabon was established, deployable to the DRC within a day. EUFOR R.D. Congo also had recourse to a so-called ‘over-the-horizon reserve force’ which could be deployed from Europe within a few days. Both these temporary ESDP missions in support of a peaceful Congolese electoral process were terminated on time and with great success. Both have made a decisive contribution to helping the Congolese authorities as well as the UN in securing the elections to the extent possible. The events around some tense days in August were a particular test to the Congolese security forces in Kinshasa and were managed fairly effectively, also with the discrete help of the two ESDP missions. MONUC was thus able to concentrate its efforts on stabilizing the eastern part of the country with its remaining large number of internally displaced persons and the continued presence of armed militia. The fact that both ESDP missions were made possible, again, by the positive example set by previous ESDP missions in the country is of interest to the main question posed in this article. This was particularly relevant from a DRC perspective that needed to be able to rely on effective and trustworthy international assistance. From an EU perspective, the scope and purpose of this new ESDP engagement was determined by the need to ensure that the achievements of the two previous ESDP missions as well as the heavy overall EU political and financial investments in the DRC stabilization process were not to be lost should the electoral process derail. Much in the same way as the local knowledge acquired by EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC R.D. Congo has helped EUPOL Kinshasa’s temporary reinforcement team and EUFOR R.D. Congo, their combined, yet increased local knowledge, will be crucial for the next post-election phase.

22

UNSCR 1671 (2006) and EU Council (2006c).


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What Comes Next? First, what should come next is a democratically elected DRC government that assumes the task of further reforming the DRC’s security sector. This task is huge since much remains to be done in all sectors despite all best efforts of the Transitional government to ‘overcome decades of entrenched bad government’23 and the immense assistance provided by the International Community: military, police, judiciary as well as cross-cutting sectors such as parliamentary oversight and financial control. DRC authorities are fully aware that this task requires the continued engagement of the International Community. The International Community, for its part, is aware that no single international actor can provide the comprehensive assistance needed. This is an effort that is best shared amongst all stakeholders in a coordinated manner. With its huge political, economic and diplomatic power, but even more so with its large operational footstep in the DRC and the extent of its practical experience, the EU is very well placed to assume a leading role in this. Such a role does correspond with its own strategic view on Africa as a whole and the DRC more specifically. It does also match with the interests of the DRC, which continues to be in need of a reliable partner. Accordingly, the EU Council on 15 September 2006 concluded as follows: following the conclusion of the electoral process, it is of crucial importance that the Congolese authorities show strong commitment to good governance and remain committed to strengthening the rule of law as well as security and stability in the DRC. The Council underlines the importance of the DRC authorities continuing the reforms in the security sector. In this context, the Council underlines the role played by EUSEC R.D. Congo, EUPOL Kinshasa as well as the EC and Member States activities. The EU will pursue its ongoing efforts in order to support the Congolese authorities in this field, building on its experience and that of its Member States. In view of the need for a comprehensive approach combining the different initiatives underway, the EU would be ready to assume a coordinating role in international efforts in the security sector, in close cooperation with the United Nations, to support the Congolese authorities in this field. The first few months of 2007 will be crucial in defining the feasibility of such a coordinating role for the EU, which will have to take account, inter alia, of the review of the mandate of MONUC, which is due in September 2006. The DRC Contact Group, which brings together the main international stakeholders such as the UN, the EU, France, Belgium and the United Kingdom, will be the main forum to sort this out. Internally, the EU will have to sort out how best to coordinate the variety of instruments at its disposal. There is, for example, a case for combining the existing two ESDP missions, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC R.D. Congo into a single ESDP SSR mission that would also be complemented by a Rule of Law dimension in order to be in line with the EU’s agreed conceptual approach to comprehensive SSR. Whatever the outcome of this debate, an EU lead role in the international assistance to SSR in the DRC would be the culmination of a process that started 23

UN Security Council (2004, §50).

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with a rather spontaneous, ad-hoc ESDP military engagement in unknown territory, and progressed all the way to a more deliberate and thus more meaningful approach – which is as it should be. Action that is built on a clearly defined policy, vision and strategy is, as a matter of fact, always more credible since policy aims are made transparent and can be measured by the actions taken. That way we can also see whether the EU is acting like a ‘fortress’ vis-à-vis the DRC, as suggested by the title of this book, or like a responsible ‘global actor’ as claimed in the European Security Strategy. References EU Council Official Documents at http://www.consilium.europa.eu EU Council (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Security Strategy, Brussels 12 December 2003. EU Council (2004a) Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004. EU Council (2004b) Joint Action 2004/494/CFSP of 17 May 2004. EU Council (2004c) Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004. EU Council (2005a) Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, 2005/304/CFSP of 12 April 2005. EU Council (2005b) Joint Action 2005/355/PESC of 2 May 2005. EU Council (2005c) Joint Action 2005/507/CFSP of 18 July 2005. EU Council (2005d) Council conclusions on an EU Strategy for Africa, 22 November 2005. EU Council (2005e) Joint Action 868/2005/PESC of 1 December 2005. EU Council (2006a) Joint Action 2001/122/CFSP of 21 February 2006. EU Council (2006b) Joint Action 2006/300/CFSP of 21 April 2006. EU Council (2006c) Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP of 27 April 2006. UN Official Documents at http://www.un.org: United Nations (2004) Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit Military Division, October 2004. UN Security Council (2004) Third Special Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, Document S/2004/650 of 13 August 2004. UNSCR 1671 (2006). Commission for Africa http://www.commissionforafrica.org

Conclusion Securitization of Migration and the Civilizing Process Belachew Gebrewold

Peacekeeping, security sector reform, elections preparation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, etc, have intrastate, regional and global security significance. The EU is starting to act in Africa as a global military power. One important reason for the EU’s increasing military presence is to prevent or resolve conflicts so that people from the African crisis regions do not leave their areas and potentially head for Europe as a result of such conflicts. This strategy is a kind of trans-location of the EU borders from southern Europe to Northern, Eastern, Western and Southern Africa through military surveillance or long-term strategies of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post conflict reconstruction and economic development. Africa is still the most challenging region of the world. For some it would have been better for Africa, as well as for the world, if the colonial powers had stayed longer to ‘civilize’ the African political culture and economic institutions. Accordingly, not only the colonization, but also the hasty decolonization has contributed to the current African crisis, with global implications. During the 1970s and 1980s, Africa was discussed, on a political as well as an economic level, as being a forgotten continent. Whereas almost all other parts of the world were progressing economically and politically, most African countries’ political institutions and economic performances were deteriorating. However, many western analysts, academics, and Africans themselves hoped that the 1990s would be the decade of Africa. In this decade Apartheid was defeated; Namibia became independent and communist-oriented leaders such as Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia were deposed, and even in former Zaire a small step towards democratization was initiated. The situation in Angola and Mozambique also began to get better. The Bicesse Accord was reached, in 1991, between the warring Angolan parties, and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola won the elections in 1992. This was a good sign for national and regional security. However, since the results were not accepted by the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, localized fighting resumed in 1995, and in spite of the fact that a national unity government was installed in April 1997, serious fighting resumed in late 1998 and continued until Savimbi was killed in 2002. But the situation in Mozambique after the end of the fighting in 1992 and free elections in 1994 continued steadily in a positive way.

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The new leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia (Isaias Afewerki and Meles Zenawi respectively) were especially considered as rising stars of African politics. It was hoped that they would rebuild not only their own destroyed political and economic institutions, but also contain the Islamist regime of Sudan and save the collapsed Somali state. With the exception of Mozambique almost all of them returned to similar or other types of crises. The hopes that emerged in the early 1990s diminished. Many Africa countries submerged once more into conflicts and economic destruction, as various chapters have shown us in this volume. Africa, once again, became the ‘lost continent’. It is a failed continent challenging the international community. It is a scar on the conscience of the world, as Tony Blair put it.1 However, the lost continent was not lost altogether. Its crises have global implications and it has become clear in Europe that an African crisis is an intercontinental crisis. Africa was rediscovered in a different way. African crises and migration challenges have become new opportunities for intercontinental cooperation between Europe and Africa and for discovering global responsibility for these African crises. The success of the opportunities as well as of the intercontinental cooperation depend however, on the extent of the inclusion of the peoples affected by poverty and conflicts into this intercontinental project. Not only economic development but also peace and security are doomed to failure if they are not projects and products of all those who are expected to benefit from them. Human security can happen only if all humanity is its architect. Creating human security is first and foremost in the interest of the citizens (Africans as well as Europeans). The greatest threat to humanity is the civilizing project or process which does not take this into account. The real or virtual ‘Fortress Europe’ emerges because of the misled and elitist civilizing process. Europe has been developing strong peace and security ties with Africa motivated by its own vital interests, particularly to meet the migration challenges. Its immigration policy has become a policy of threat. This means that threats and migration are interchangeable. To address threats means not only to address migration but also to civilize the political, cultural and economic situations of relevant geographic areas. The EU, with its huge political, economic and diplomatic power, has been intervening in Congo not only out of humanitarian reasons to address the appalling humanitarian situation, but also to secure Europe by acting as political and economic civilizer in Congo, and thereby nipping migration in the bud. As Laitinen argues for Frontex in this volume, there is no policy of ‘Fortress Europe’ on the EU level. However, the EU’s principles and the real politics of the EU do not always match. Regarding migration, the EU argues that its policy objectives are security for its citizens, freedom for those who live in Europe and justice for legal or illegal migrants. This happens through effective control of its borders to ensure citizens’ security. Through tight external border control Frontex hopes to substantially contribute to the reduction of human lives lost on the migration journey. The objective of this book is not to deny migration-related terror or other security-related threats. Of course there are threats to European security as a result of the spill-over effects of the political and economic crisis in Africa. The point here, 1

Ferguson (2006, p. 2).

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therefore, is not to deny the existence of threats. Various authors have shown that there are real migration-related threats in Africa that could have security implications for Europe. But at the same time it is important to distinguish between perceived and real threats. Confusing perceived with real threats can lead into flagrant human rights violations and create panic in European society. Because of the so-called mass migration, many innocent people including women and children are being kept in detention camps in southern Europe or northern Africa. The threats are not always real; they are sometimes perceived and fabricated. The African crises and the EU’s policies to tackle them should not undermine the human rights tradition of the EU by building a real or virtual fortress to isolate Europe. A critical study on migration policy of the EU does not plead for neglecting the concerns of European security. Instead, its purpose is to increase awareness of the humanitarian dangers of migration policy that focuses primarily on European security while reinforcing the management of the European Union’s Southern Maritime Borders. It is a political and academic necessity to acknowledge that migration is not a new phenomenon of our time. Even its extent cannot be described as something extraordinary. The extent of migration is a sign of the times and corresponds to the political, cultural and economic justice or injustice of any given period in history. It is a historical human reality. Migration is not only a positive, but also a necessary and inevitable human phenomenon. It is neither enough nor desirable to react to migration by just raising economic aid or military intervention. The African crises require fundamental changes to the traditional political and economic concepts in Africa as well as in Europe. African crises are not caused by policy implementation mistakes, or instead by conceptual mistakes. They are caused by the cultural inferiority complex of the African political and intellectual class and superiority complex of the western world. The former wanted to civilize itself by denying the local reality and immaterial resources and by imitating materially and immaterially the western world; whereas the latter attempted to civilize the African by imposing its political and economic concepts. In the clash of these complexities, the poorest Africans are the victims. The failure of this resulted in securitization of migration. Securitization of migration means two things: first, migration is a threat; and second, migration is a security issue. These global implications have led to the securitization of migration. Furthermore, the areas of securitization of migration are cultural, economic and political. After the events of 9/11 in New York and Washington, DC, and the March 2004 and July 2005 bombings of Madrid and London, respectively, this issue became even more pressing. Since these events, the ‘Other’, the ‘stranger’ is warded off not only at the southern borders of the European Union, but also within the European Union. Muslims in Christian countries, blacks or dark-skinned people in the countries of the white-skinned are perceived as primary sources of cultural and political security. They are feared as potential sources of threats and cultural alienization. It is not only violent men who are feared as security threats, but also women and children who could undermine the social system of the European welfare states. Not only bodily security, but also the native European moral values, collective identities and cultural homogeneity are feared to be threatened by

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the influx of migration from Africa or elsewhere to Europe.2 Securitization means control and survival: control or elimination of the threat in order to survive. This is a process of elevating migration to a meta-issue. Migration is a meta- or overarching issue because security-related political, social, economic and cultural threats arrive alongside the influx of strangers.3 These strangers have become ‘challenges’ to natives’ jobs, to cultural identity and to crime control.4 The European Union attempts, in its comprehensive security strategy, to address the political, social, economic and cultural challenges threatening security. Not only the Council’s paper of December 2003 ‘Secure Europe in a better world’, but also the EU’s Strategy for Africa of 2005 envisage finding lasting solutions for Africa and other parts of the world from where threats to the EU might come. In both strategy papers migration is a component. The Hague Programme, discussed in detail by Heinrich Neisser, entails one aspect of the securitization of migration: the ‘external dimension’ contained in the Hague Programme intends to politically, economically, socially and culturally secure, for example, Africa so that Europe is in turn politically, economically, socially and culturally secure. Accordingly, it is not enough to address the problems of migration here in Europe, but also the causes of migration in Africa. The Rabat Plan of Action and the Declaration of Tripoli (both in 2006) are interesting measures that take this into account. Key aspects of the conferences under the category of ‘promotion of development’ include: improving economic cooperation, the development of trade, socio-economic development, and conflict prevention in order to promote economic prosperity in the countries concerned and thereby respond to the root causes of irregular migratory flows.5 This means that since, in the policy of securitization of migration, mere ‘fortress building’ does not offer lasting solutions, the Hague Programme as well as the outcomes of the Rabat and Tripoli Declarations try to go a step further. This step I would call the ‘civilizing process’. In other words, the other side of the securitization of migration is the ‘civilizing’ project. The Civilizing project is the attempt to make Africa learn the political and economic cultures of Europe. The security strategies, the economic policies and the long term visions of the EU for Africa are direct or indirect civilizing processes and it is African as well as European politicians who are striving for this transcontinental civilizing project. The EU military interventions in Congo in 2003 and 2006 were part of the civilizing process and it is the political and economic situation in various parts of Africa that make this civilizing process inevitable. In Eastern Africa the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the remaking of the collapsed state of Somalia, and the brutal civil war in Sudan, especially in the Darfur region, have intrastate, regional and global security implications. Conflict resolution in this region could yield positive results in reducing the number of refugees from this region heading for Europe. The European Union might very well contribute to the security in the

2 3 4 5

Faist (2006, pp. 609, 612, 613). Faist (2006, p. 613). Tirman (2004, p. 7). Rabat and Tripoli Declarations of 2006.

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region by bolstering IGAD to civilize the political and economic institutions of the states in this region. However, various European states, in their long history of relations with Africa, have contributed to the undermining of the very civilizing process, which now they are striving for. This has led first to migration and then to securitization of migration. For decades corrupt and autocratic regimes (from Togo, Nigeria, DR Congo etc), which disregarded the principles of ‘good governance’, have been supported by the European states. Current migration, caused by political and economic push factors, is not a phenomenon that emerged suddenly. Instead it is the product of a long process. This means that the civilizing process should not focus only on the conflict and poverty-ridden African countries, but also on the behaviour of Europe towards Africa, politically, culturally and economically. Securitization and foreclosure of European external borders and the prevention of African immigrants would undermine the European self-civilizing process. Even the current EU civilizing project of increased development aid to African countries could be illusory because it happens on an intellectual level. According to the transcontinental intellectuals, the urgency of the African political and economic situations does not allow for the inclusion, in the civilization project, of those affected by political conflicts, economic destruction and injustice who would be the main beneficiaries. As various economics experts argue, the neo-liberal approach to development, based on global trade liberalization, will rather stimulate African migration. As already discussed, the intercontinental migratory challenge has resulted in intercontinental cooperation. This is one of the key aspects of the Hague Programme: cooperation with the countries of origin and transit. As the history of international cooperation shows us, intercontinental or international cooperation has not been always constructive. On the contrary, international or intercontinental cooperation has contributed to the escalation of conflicts, exploitation of natural resources, and the undermining of democratic processes. Depending on political and ideological alliances, mainly based on cultural and historic ties, various despots, dictators and corrupt regimes have been supported by western allies. Eyadema of Togo, Mobutu of Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo), and Idi Amin of Uganda were all good friends of some western allies in spite of their appalling democracy records. Current conflicts and crises of Africa have grown, partly due to the messy politics of those western allies. This means that intercontinental cooperation to address African crises and migration related challenges could be a threat to lasting peace for Africa and Europe if they are not handled responsibly. The US, especially since 9/11, has not only built bases in different parts of Africa, but some of the African states have been named ‘anchor states’ for its global war on terror. Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa are, for the US, the most important anchor states, at least in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, Meles Zenawi, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, is one of the key allies of the US and the UK in the fight against global terrorism. Whereas from within Ethiopia there is growing protest against the Ethiopian government, which was especially evident in the May elections of 2005, international actors – such as the US or the UK – cherish their friendship with the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. These global actors are rather more interested in an ally for their war on terror; therefore, they do not

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take seriously the protests of the Ethiopian opposition against the government. International cooperation is unfortunately dominated by national interests. Development aid is thought to be an important long-term consideration in intercontinental cooperation. However, development aid or global security policy cooperation can paradoxically lead to more undemocratic policies and the establishment of power bases of the stakeholders in Africa. In the name of fighting terrorism many African politicians are branding their political opposition as terrorists. The Rabat Plan of Action and Tripoli Declaration underline good governance and democracy as indispensable components of political structures that could stop African migration to Europe. But this intercontinental strategy is meaningless as long as influential European actors like the UK or France support their traditional African allies regardless of the governance records. Besides economic aid and increased investment in Africa, military intervention in the form of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacemaking are key components of the intercontinental cooperation. The European Union intervened in the Democratic Republic Congo in 2003 and 2006. The United Nations’ troops are present in conflict countries such as Sudan, Congo, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Burundi, Western Sahara and in the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Most of the time, all those military operations are made irrelevant by rivalling global interests. In spite of the UN peacekeepers or EU military operations, the influx of various arms and the exploitation of natural resources by regional and global actors have been killing 1000 Congolese everyday, and Russian weapons and Chinese oil interests are killing the Sudanese. Germany wanted to appear as a global actor in Africa when it led the EU military intervention in Congo in 2006 because it is fed up with always being overshadowed by France and the UK in African politics. All military interventions are challenged by complex local realities that cannot be easily understood and solved. As Helmut Willke asserts, the more complex a system, the more difficult it is to intervene.6 These complexities are not peculiar to Africa. All societies have their own complexities, but in Africa the involvement of many national, regional and global material and immaterial interests make the African case even more complex. Military interventions can make the understanding of these complexities even more difficult. An alternative political understanding is needed in Africa to understand these complexities. Devastated by the slave trade, colonialism, subjugation, exploitation, and mistreatment Africa has acquired another element of complexity: resignation. Poverty on the one hand, and ongoing conflicts on the other hand, have made many Africans doubt their capacity to solve these problems, besides the fact that these problems are exacerbated by foreign intervention. As I have discussed in the introduction to this volume there is no continent in the world performing so poorly as Africa. All this bad news has a psychological impact on well-educated as well as less-educated Africans. It is an illusion to believe that African Union solves African problems. The African Union and the African regional security mechanisms are too weak to solve the problems and too alien to the local problems. A functioning African Union or a regional security mechanism needs functioning states; and a functioning state 6

Willke (2005).

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needs local capacities and knowledge systems. But this is unfortunately not the case in Africa. Instead, the civilizing process from above tries to lead Africans into the civilized world. The civilizing process maintains that the world is full of dangers, therefore a mega organization, e.g. the African Union or European Union, or supra-national institutions will be required to guarantee security, unity and stability. The civilizing process’s point of departure is that unity is an indispensable prerequisite for progress. The belief is that unity in the modern state form and, in the larger context, in the form of globalization, creates a new world of lesser conflicts and increased prosperity. Whether we wish it or not, the general tendency of the global civilizing process is that there is one culture, one language, one technique, and one knowledge system alone. African autocrats like Mugabe argue that ‘Africa has a different culture’. This is true, but the reason they argue in this way is in order to justify their own failure by underlining that Africa is different and the Europeans have to stay away. In his 2005 election campaign, Mugabe designated the opposition groups fighting for more democracy and human rights as ’men of black skins with white blood’. He considers himself as ‘Africanity’ personified; he discards outside appeals for human rights and democracy as a perennial desire of the Europeans to colonize and universalize their values, although he himself propagates that he and his ZANU-PF party are for democracy and human rights. He hates democracy and human rights when they are demanded from outside and by the Zimbabwean opposition, but he professes that he is pursuing democracy and human rights. This is not a mere contradiction between words and deeds, rather the product of colonization, which has engraved in the colonized mind the ambivalence between an inferiority complex (isolating the Self in the name of Africanity) on the one hand, and receptivity of the universal (colonial?) values in the civilizing process on the other. Bad roads, poor health care, crumbling buildings, impoverished livelihoods, lack of superhighways, skyscrapers, consumer conveniences constitute lack of modernity. An inferiority complex comes from this ‘lack of modernity’7 and lack of ‘civilization’. Many Africans, intellectuals and politicians, for their part are attempting more and more to civilize themselves by following the footsteps of the European Union. The African Union was created as part of this civilizing process. As we have seen in the first three chapters of this volume, Africans have created various regional security mechanisms to strengthen regional, political and economic cooperation. However, the reality on the ground shows that the African regional security mechanisms as well as the African Union have followed a questionable civilizing process. These huge regional and continental institutions divert attention from the compelling task at ground level. Much more time, energy, and knowledge, new visions and money have to be invested in basic issues rather than in large institutions. It is not because of a lack of big institutions in Africa that there are ongoing conflicts and devastating poverty. It is rather because Africans have pursued the wrong civilizing process. The African Union and ‘Africanity’ (continental African identity) has, in some cases, ironically contributed to the designation of Africa as a continent of non7

Ferguson (2006, pp. 32–33).

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stop problems. One good example of this is how the Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, has been defended by African leaders in spite of flagrant human rights violations and repression of the opposition. The catastrophic governance of Mugabe has intrastate, regional and global implications. The civilizing process of universalism based on a single and objective truth is culturally more detrimental than beneficial. The development concepts and strategies of the educated and westernized African intellectuals will keep on undermining the cultural contexts of peacemaking and dealing with conflicts, as well as political understanding. If peace in Africa is considered as the foundation for development and stability, the cultural ‘contextuality’ and sustainability of peace has to be taken seriously. The integration process in Africa, today in the form of the African Union, could bring forth more disintegration and violence rather than the peace and development hoped for. The African political and intellectual class is searching for big projects and institutions like the African Union or regional security mechanism. Instead of creating and consolidating such institutions so that they can solve small-scale local problems, it would be better first to solve these local problems so that these institutions might then emerge in the future when the time is ripe. Unfortunately, African politics is developing the other way around. The existence of the AU, IGAD, SADC or ECOWAS does not help much if the basic needs of the population suffering in remote and neglected areas in the countryside are not addressed. The poor are not only suffering economically and political, but are also neglected culturally and socially. The civilizing process is the utmost cultural violence against the African poor, marginalized, displaced, persecuted, raped and killed; and it is done by transcontinental intellectualism. Both civilizing processes and fortress building are by-products of the international political, cultural and economic systems. And both projects will certainly fail unless the international systems change in favour of the African poor; impoverished, exploited and abandoned, by transcontinental intellectualism. As a consequence of the centuries long exploitation, degradation and oppression, many Africans have internalized the inferiority complex that has become a new African culture. Many migrate not only to flee from poverty, but also to be part of the ‘superior’ western culture, which can be lived and enjoyed in the western world far from the ‘backward’ Africa. This inferiority complex is partly caused by globalization of the western culture and is done first by the African intellectuals and political class themselves. The partial integration of Africa into the global system, culturally and economically, is the main driving force. Whereas the majority of Africans live in poverty and are uneducated, the globalized Africans are consuming material and immaterial western or eastern goods. Sheraton hotels and slums, presidential palaces and beggars lying on the streets, face each other. Airports and highways are being built for those who have the money to fly or have cars, whereas the majority rides donkeys. Mobile phones and televisions penetrate the hidden corners of Africa and goods produced in Africa or abroad are being advertised on the streets or on television for the minority of Africans. Those ‘beautiful’ things are tantalisingly coming closer and closer to the African villages; however, they are still out of reach. Virtually, Europe is coming nearer to Africa, while in reality, staying far away.

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It is not only those suffering from hunger, displaced by conflicts or the unemployed who leave Africa, but also those fascinated by the western and eastern worlds. The material goods coming from there, the increasing admiration for knowledge systems, cultural values, freedom and alike are increasingly important push factors. However, this does not mean that conflicts and poverty do not play any role in African migration to Europe. They are very important push factors. However, unless African educational and political institutions address seriously the cultural globalization phenomenon, facilitated by rapidly expanding modern media, even billions of euros will not solve the problem of migration. The consequence is an illconceived civilizing process and the securitization of migration. References EU-Africa Action Plan, Rabat 10-11 July 2006, in http://www.maec.gov.ma/ migration/Doc/PA%20final%20EN.pdf, accessed 05 April 2007. Faist, T (2006) Extension du domaine de la lutte: international migration and security before and after 11 September 2001, in: A. Messina & G. Lahav (Eds) The Migration Reader: Politics and Policies, pp. 609–615 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Ferguson, J. (2006) Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (Durham, NC: Duke University Press). Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development Tripoli, 22–23 November 2006. Tirman, J. (2004) The movement of people and the security of the states, in: J. Tirman (Ed.) The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration after 9/11, pp. 1–16 (New York: The New Press). Willke, H. (2005) Systemtheorie II: Interventionstheorie: Grundzüge einer Theorie der Intervention in komplexe Systeme (Stuttgart: Lucius und Lucius).


Index

Abdullah, Fazul, 32 Abuja Peace Talks, 162 Acculturation, 88 Addis Ababa, 23, 24, 30, 31, 81, 83 Afewerki, Isaias, 23, 174 African Migration Flow, see Migration African Peace and Security Architecture, 72, 73, 77, 79, 82 African Peace Facility, 78, 79, 82, 162 African Stand-by Force, 79 African Union, 4, 8, 11, 13, 14, 28, 30, 31, 55, 59, 64, 67, 71, 75, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 101, 152, 153, 159, 178, 179, 180 African Union Mission, 75, 76 Ahmed, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh, 26 Ajello, Aldo, 161, 167 Albania, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104 Al-Bashir, Omar, 23, 29, 30 Algeria, 2, 3, 10, 38, 42, 45, 75, 116 Al-Mahdi, Al-Sadiq, 29 Al-Numayri, Ja‘afar, 29 AMIB, 76 Amilcar Cabral, 40 AMIS I, 76, 162 AMIS II, 162 AMU, 75 ANC, 41 Angola, 6, 9, 34, 40, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 66, 117, 165, 167, 168, 173 Apartheid, 8, 12, 13, 41, 117, 173 Arta-Conference, 24 Asmara, 24, 34, 35 Assimilation, 88, 102, 140 Aweys, Hassan Dahir, 26 Backwardness, 99, 101 Badme, 22, 24 Baidoa, 7, 26 Benin, 44, 52, 100 Berlin plus Arrangements, 160 Berlusconi, Silvio, 2, 45

Blair, Tony, 2, 45, 174 Bologna and Copenhagen Process, 135 Borjas, George, 114, 115, 120 Boswell, Christina, 11, 16 Botswana, 56, 66, 68 Bozize, François, 4 Brain drain, 11, 40, 47, 66, 69, 108, 115, 117, 118, 120 Brain gain, 40, 47 Brazzaville, 163 Burundi, 6, 27, 40, 74, 76, 83, 178 CADSP, 31, 74 Cairo, 24, 49 Cameroon, 9, 52, 153 Canary Islands, 3, 14, 38, 42, 43, 44, 100, 107, 133, 136 Cape Verde, 3, 40, 41, 51, 117, 168 Carens, 11, 16 CEMAC, 78 CEN-SAD, 75 Ceuta, 3, 15, 39, 99, 107, 119 CEWARN, 30, 31 CEWERUS, 31 CEWS, 31, 83 Chad, 3, 4, 9, 44 China, 4, 8, 12, 44, 67, 118 CIRAM, 131 Circular migration, see Migration Civilizing process, 173, 174, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181 Colonialism, 22, 24, 26, 30, 32, 33, 37, 38, 39, 56, 57, 64, 90, 96, 110, 111, 173, 178, 179 COMESSA, 75 Commission for Africa, 49, 81, 163, 171 Common African Defence and Security Policy, 31, 55, 67, 74 Common Core Curriculum, 135 Common European Asylum System, 144, 150, 151

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Conflict prevention, 12, 24, 30, 31, 33, 60, 65, 68, 78, 81, 159, 162, 170, 173, 176, 178 Conflict resolution, 23, 24, 25, 26, 33, 34, 35, 60, 75, 173, 176, 178 Congolese National Police, 165 Constitutive Act, 73, 79 Conte, Lansana, 9 Cotonou Agreement, 10, 11, 64, 153 Crisis Management, 159, 161, 163, 164, 166 Cross border migrants, see Migrants Cultural globalization, 14, 86, 99, 101, 102, 181 Custodio, Adilio, 165 Dada, Idi Amin, 177 Darfur, 3, 4, 13, 16, 17, 28, 29, 74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 107, 162, 176 Darfur Peace Agreement, 162 DDR, 62, 162 Dehéz, Dustin, 13, 14, 21, 23, 24, 34 Democratic Republic of Congo, 3, 5, 6, 15, 56, 69, 79, 100, 159, 168, 177 Dergue, 23 De-socialisation, 88 Diaspora, 38, 39, 46, 49, 51, 66, 115 Djibouti, 24 DRC, 56, 59, 61, 62, 66, 69, 159, 160, 161, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170 DRC Contact Group, 169 Dublin Convention, 148 Durban Protocol, 162 EASBRIG, 30, 31 East African Community (EAC), 22, 33, 34, 75 Eastern Africa, 13, 21, 31, 32, 33, 53, 124, 176 ECA, 40, 41, 49, 53 ECCAS, 75 Egypt, 3, 10, 24, 26, 29, 52, 75, 116, 136 Eisenstadt, Samuel N., 87, 102 Eldoret, 26 England, 38 EPA, 47, 65 Eritrea, 7, 9, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 32, 33, 34, 35, 74, 100, 116, 153, 174, 176, 178

Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement, 25 Esser, Hartmut, 88 Ethiopia, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 74, 86, 100, 101, 153, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178 EU Africa Strategy, 78, 163 EU Strategy for Africa, 14, 65, 67, 82, 163, 170 EUFOR R.D. Congo, 167, 168, 169 EUPOL-Kinshasa, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170 Euro-African conferences, 12 Euro-African plans, 13 Eurojust, 136 European Development Fund, 78, 153, 160, 162, 164 European emigration, 110, 111 European Maritime Safety Agency, 136 European Neighbourhood Policy, 10, 11 European Patrols Network, 134 European satellite Centre, 136 European Security Strategy, 1, 12, 72, 77, 81, 159, 162, 163, 170 European Union, 1, 3, 6, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 25, 32, 33, 43, 46, 47, 64, 72, 73, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 100, 101, 118, 119, 120, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 144, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 159, 175, 176, 178, 179 EUROPOL, 136 EUSEC R.D. Congo, 166, 167, 169, 170 EUSR, 161, 167 Exenberger, Andreas, 14, 107, 108, 121 External borders, 3, 10, 14, 15, 16, 43, 48, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 140, 145, 146, 150, 152, 154, 174, 177 External dimension, 14, 15, 176 External Frontiers Convention, 148 Externalities, 115, 117 Eyadema, Gnassingbé, 47, 177 Failed state, 27, 161 Fanon, Frantz, 40 FDI, 41, 52 FJSTs, 134

Index Forced migration, see Migration Foreign trade policy, 44, 47 Fortress Europe, 15, 39, 45, 57, 67, 100, 137, 140, 156, 174 France, 2, 17, 38, 39, 46, 47, 48, 51, 76, 80, 98, 111, 115, 124, 139, 145, 149, 152, 162, 165, 167, 170, 178 Freedom, Security and Justice, 128, 144, 146, 151, 152, 154 Front Line States, 57 Frontex, 3, 14, 15, 43, 100, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 174 Frontex Joint Support, 127, 134 G8, 33, 34, 72, 81, 163 Gabon, 168 Gambia, 40, 42, 100, 117 Garang, John, 23 Gbagbo, Laurent, 6 Gebrewold, Belachew, 1, 7, 17, 85, 173 Geneva Convention, 147, 151, 154 Geneva Refugee Convention, 144 Genocide, 6, 29, 73, 160 Germany, 2, 37, 38, 39, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51, 77, 80, 81, 98, 100, 124, 133, 139, 145, 152, 178 Ghana, 8, 27, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 51, 75, 100, 117, 153 Gibney, Matthew J., 155, 156 Globalization, 14, 86, 92, 101, 104, 107, 108, 109, 120, 121, 154, 179, 180 Good governance, 23, 32, 47, 59, 64, 65, 67, 78, 162, 163, 166, 169, 177, 178 Great Lakes Region, 13, 17, 33, 161 Greece, 8, 136 Guinea, 3, 8, 9, 42, 43, 100 Haile Mariam, Mengistu, 23, 173 Hargeysa, 26, 28 Hatton, Timothy, 2, 14, 17, 110, 111, 113, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122 Hendricks, Cheryl, 13, 14, 55, 62, 67, 68 Hierarchization, 92 HIV/AIDS, 12, 13, 56, 62, 65, 113 Hoffmann-Nowotny, Hans-Joachim, 87, 88, 90, 91, 95, 96, 103 Homo movens, 108

183

Horn of Africa, 7, 12, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 32, 34, 35 Human rights, 2, 8, 10, 11, 17, 38, 45, 55, 59, 62, 63, 65, 74, 86, 89, 99, 100, 102, 103, 140, 143, 144, 151, 152, 153, 161, 163, 175, 179, 180 Human Security, 28, 55, 56, 57, 60, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 74, 75, 81, 174 Humanitarianism, 77, 81, 155, 156 IDPs, 22, 66 IGASOM, 27 Illegal migration, see Migration Integrated Border Management, 127, 128, 129, 135, 136, 137 Integrated missions, 78 Intercontinental cooperation, 12, 174, 177, 178 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 73, 75, 83, 153, 177, 180 Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD), 21 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), 22, 66, 76, 168 International migration, 13, 16, 38, 48, 49, 50, 85, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 102, 103, 105, 120, 121, 151, 181 Interstate Defence and Security Committee, 57 IOM, 38, 39, 40, 41, 49, 50, 51, 52 IPU, 164, 165, 167 Iran, 7 Irregular migrants, see Migrants Islamic Courts Council, 26 Islamic Courts Union, 7, 8, 23 Islamic fundamentalists, 2, 10 Islamisation, 29 Islamism, 1, 2, 7, 8, 13, 21, 22, 23, 26, 29, 32, 34, 35, 174 Italy, 1, 2, 32, 38, 39, 42, 45, 46, 47, 51, 98, 99, 100, 103, 105, 107, 115, 117, 124, 133, 136, 149, 152, 165 Ituri, 6, 160 Ivory Coast, 3, 6, 178 Joint Operations, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136

184


Kabila, Joseph, 6 Kabila, Laurent, 6, 61 Katanga, 6 Kenya, 9, 10, 22, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 40, 41, 75, 177 Khartoum, 21, 29, 30, 80 King Leopold II, 5 Kiplagat, Bethuel, 27 Kivu, 6 Klingebiel, Stephan, 14, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78, 80, 82, 84 Kohnert, Dirk, 13, 14, 37, 44, 47, 50, 100 Kony, Joseph, 30 Labour migration, see Migration Laeken, 128 Laitinen, Ilkka, 15, 127, 174 Lampedusa, 2, 42, 100, 107, 136 LDCs, 37, 44 Lee, Everett S., 57, 68, 88, 103 Lesotho, 41, 56, 61 Liberalness factor, 89 Liberia, 3, 8, 9, 40, 76, 100, 178 Libya, 2, 3, 42, 45, 48, 49, 67, 74, 75, 99, 100, 136 Linas-Marcoussis, 6 LLDCs, 41, 44 London, 1, 10, 34, 35, 49, 50, 67, 68, 81, 102, 103, 104, 121, 156, 175 Lord’s Resistance Army, 21, 23, 25, 30 Löser, Birgit, 15 Lusaka, 6, 57, 58, 61 Machakos Protocol, 29 Madagascar, 31, 40, 56 Madrid, 1, 10, 50, 81, 175 Malawi, 56, 60, 69 Mali, 9, 45, 46, 51, 52, 100, 153, 168 Malta, 3, 42, 100, 133, 136, 152 Mauritania, 3, 14, 42, 43, 45, 46, 153 Mauritius, 40, 43, 56, 117 Mbeki, Thabo, 8, 61, 75 Media, 14, 86, 97, 98, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 181 Melilla, 3, 15, 39, 99, 107 Migrants Cross border migrants, 38 Irregular migrants, 42, 43, 45, 85 Trans-national migrants, 38

Migration African Migration Flow, 136 Circular migration, 45, 46, 48, 50 Forced migration, 14, 85, 108, 109 Illegal migration, 2, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 32, 49, 50, 72, 85, 86, 100, 127, 128, 131, 133, 137, 153 Labour migration, 85, 91, 104, 121 Migration and Development, 12, 14, 45, 49, 103, 104, 153, 181 Migration flows, 118, 127, 136, 150, 152, 154 Migration policies, 1, 10, 14, 15, 16, 39, 49, 50, 89, 100, 111, 119, 136, 139, 140, 141, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 153, 154, 156, 174, 175 Migration routes, 41, 42, 53, 100 Migration theories, 14, 85, 86, 88, 90, 91, 92, 95, 97, 101, 102, 103, 105 Millennium Development Goals, 12, 13, 65, 73, 78 Mobutu, Joseph Desiré, 6, 61, 177 Modernization, 14, 65, 92, 95, 101, 166 Mogadishu, 7, 8, 23, 26 MONUC, 79, 160, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 171 Morocco, 1, 2, 3, 10, 38, 39, 42, 45, 49, 52, 99, 115, 116, 136, 152, 168 Movement for Democratic Change, 8 Mozambique, 40, 56, 57, 60, 173, 174 Mugabe, Robert, 8, 179, 180 Museveni, Yoweri, 23 Nairobi, 26, 27, 28, 31 Namibia, 6, 56, 57, 58, 61, 69, 173 NATO, 160 Neisser, Heinrich, 15, 139, 176 NEPAD, 11, 71, 73, 81 New York, 1, 16, 17, 33, 34, 35, 49, 50, 68, 81, 82, 102, 103, 104, 120, 121, 156, 175, 181 Nielson, Poul, 78 Niger, 5, 9, 16, 100, 153 Nigeria, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 16, 17, 27, 39, 40, 41, 47, 51, 52, 100, 117, 153, 162, 177 Nile, 24, 30 Nkrumah, Kwame, 40

Index Obasanjo, Olusegun, 4, 75 Ogaden, 23, 26 Ogaden War, 23 Operation Artemis, 79, 159, 160, 161, 163, 166, 167, 170 Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, 56, 60, 62, 69 Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 24, 25, 30, 58, 64, 71, 73, 79 Pan Africanism, 100 Panteleria, 136 Parsons, Talcott, 87, 104 Partnership Academies, 135 Peace and Security Council, 30, 74, 81, 83 Peacekeeping, 4, 5, 6, 25, 27, 31, 34, 67, 76, 78, 79, 81, 82, 170, 173, 178 Pisanu, Giuseppe, 45 Police d’Intervention Rapide, 165 Police reform, 165 Political and Security Committee, 164 Portugal, 38, 51, 109, 165 Primary Law, 140 Profit maximization, 14, 86, 90, 99, 100 Proxy war, 4, 7, 22, 35 Puntland, 26, 27 Push factors, 3, 15, 38, 86, 87, 88, 99, 101, 177, 181 Rabat, 12, 14, 39, 45, 48, 152, 176, 178, 181 RABITs, 134 RAC, 131 Rapid Border Intervention Teams, 127, 134 Ravenstein, Ernest George, 85, 88, 95, 96, 104 Re-admission Agreements, 100 Reception camps, 2, 45 Regional economic communities, 11, 55, 57, 74, 76, 78, 80, 83 Regional Protection Programmes, 3, 152 Regional security mechanisms, 12, 13, 14, 16, 71, 178, 179 Remittances, 13, 38, 40, 41, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 115, 116 Re-socialisation, 88 Return operations, 15, 131, 132 Risk analysis, 129, 131, 132, 136 Risk minimization, 14, 86, 90, 99, 101

185

Rule of Law, 10, 12, 15, 59, 74, 163, 166, 169, 170 Russia, 2, 4, 178 Rwanda, 6, 31, 61, 66, 77, 160 Rwanda genocide, 77 SADC, 8, 12, 13, 21, 32, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 75, 153, 180 SADCC, 57, 58 Salim, A. Salim, 25 Sarkozy, Nicholas, 2, 100 Saudi Arabia, 7, 116, 124 Schengen acquis, 130, 145, 146 Schengen Borders Code, 129 Schengen Information System, 145, 152 Schilly, Otto, 2, 45 Seck, Idrissa, 9 Secondary Law, 140, 141 Securitization of migration, 2, 10, 173, 175, 176, 177, 181 Security Sector Reform, 12, 15, 159, 162, 173 Senegal, 3, 9, 14, 17, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 100, 116, 153, 168 Senghor, Sédar Senghor, 40 Seville, 128, 176 Seychelles, 31, 40, 56, 117 Siad Barre, Mohamed, 7, 26 Sicily, 100, 136 Sierra Leone, 3, 8, 9, 40, 100 Single European Act, 139 Skill composition, 114, 121 Slave trade, 14, 37, 43, 47, 108, 109, 110, 121, 178 Solana, Javier, 72, 159, 163 Somalia, 3, 7, 8, 10, 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 34, 35, 40, 76, 77, 117, 153, 176 Somaliland, 7, 17, 26, 27, 28, 30, 35 South Africa, 8, 12, 13, 40, 41, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 66, 69, 75, 81, 82, 165, 167, 168, 177 Southern Africa, 12, 13, 15, 21, 34, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 75, 117, 124, 173 Southern Sudan, 3, 21, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30 Soviet Union, 23

186


Spain, 1, 2, 3, 15, 17, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 100, 107, 115, 117, 124, 133, 136, 148, 152 SSR, 159, 162, 163, 170 Stand-by Brigade, 30, 31, 33, 62, 74 Stand-by Force, 30, 33, 35, 64, 74, 76, 79, 81, 83 State collapse, 3, 13, 17, 21, 26, 35 Strategic partnership, 72, 81 Sub-Sahara, 10, 11, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 72, 77, 78, 99, 116, 117, 136, 153, 177 Sudan, 3, 4, 9, 10, 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 74, 75, 76, 80, 83, 100, 153, 159, 162, 174, 176, 178 Sudanese People‘s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM/A), 22, 23, 29 Swaziland, 56, 59, 60 Syria, 7 Tampere, 10, 100, 128, 144, 150, 151, 153 Tanzania, 33, 40, 56, 66 Television, 86, 98, 99, 101, 103, 180 Terrorism, 1, 2, 7, 10, 17, 23, 26, 32, 34, 35, 56, 72, 77, 79, 128, 136, 145, 174, 177, 178 The Hague Programme, 10, 15, 128, 144, 150, 151, 152, 153, 176, 177 Thessaloniki, 128 Thielemann, Eiko, 89, 90, 93, 95, 104 Trade policy, 13, 44, 47 Transitional Federal Government, 7, 8, 25, 26, 27 Trans-national migrants, see Migrants Treaty of Amsterdam, 140, 146, 147, 148 Treaty of Maastricht, 145, 146, 148 Treaty of Rome, 127, 146 Tripoli, 12, 14, 44, 45, 48, 153, 176, 178, 181 Tunisia, 2, 3, 10, 38, 45, 48, 52, 99, 116, 136

Turkey, 136, 139, 165 UFDR, 9 Uganda, 6, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 35, 40, 61, 66, 177 UN Security Council, 4, 164, 166, 169, 170 Undocumented Africans, 37 UNHCR, 66, 69, 100, 139, 143, 152 United Kingdom, 3, 10, 16, 26, 32, 51, 66, 76, 78, 80, 90, 103, 104, 117, 121, 124, 139, 148, 162, 163, 165, 170, 177, 178 United States, 7, 12, 17, 23, 26, 29, 32, 38, 44, 76, 77, 98, 109, 110, 111, 116, 118, 119, 124 Visa, 39, 94, 140, 142, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 152 Wade, Abdoulaye, 9, 112, 121 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 92, 104 Walzer, Michael, 155, 156 Warsaw, 130 Welfare gain, 114, 118, 119 Welfare loss, 115 West Africa, 6, 12, 13, 21, 31, 33, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 48, 61, 73, 75, 81, 116, 119, 152 Williamson, Jeffrey, 2, 14, 17, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122 World Bank, 41, 44, 48, 49, 52, 116, 120, 121, 123, 124 WTO, 44, 45, 48 Yemen, 7, 35 Yusuf, Abdullahi, 26, 27 Zambia, 56, 66 Zenawi, Meles, 23, 26, 32, 174, 177 Zimbabwe, 3, 6, 8, 13, 16, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 66, 68, 69, 100, 179, 180

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