Academic Staff in Europe: Changing Contexts and Conditions (Greenwood Studies in Higher Education)

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ACADEMIC STAFF IN EUROPE: Changing Contexts and Conditions

Jürgen Enders

GREENWOOD PRESS

ACADEMIC STAFF IN EUROPE

ACADEMIC STAFF IN EUROPE Changing Contexts and Conditions EDITED BY

Ju¨rgen Enders

Greenwood Studies in Higher Education PHILIP G. ALTBACH, Series Editor

GREENWOOD PRESS Westport, Connecticut • London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Academic staff in Europe : changing contexts and conditions / edited by Ju¨rgen Enders. p. cm.—(Greenwood studies in higher education, ISSN 1531–8087) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–313–31828–X (alk. paper) 1. College teachers—Europe. 2. College personnel management—Europe. 3. Universities and colleges—Europe—Administration. I. Enders, Ju¨rgen. II. Series. LB2331.74.E85A33 2001 378.1'2'094—dc21 00–049079 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright 2001 by Ju¨rgen Enders All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 00–049079 ISBN: 0–313–31828–X ISSN: 1531–8087 First published in 2001 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.greenwood.com Printed in the United States of America TM

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Published in cooperation with the Center for International Higher Education and the Program in Higher Education, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts.

Contents

Series Foreword by Philip G. Altbach

vii

Preface

ix

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Between State Control and Academic Capitalism: A Comparative Perspective on Academic Staff in Europe Ju¨rgen Enders

1

The Academic Profession in the Two Communities of Belgium Karel Tavernier

25

Academic Staff in Denmark: The Consequences of Massification in a Small Country John E. Andersen

49

The Changing Nature of Academic Employment in Finnish Higher Education Jussi Va¨limaa

67

Professional Diversity in a Centralized System: Academic Staff in France Thierry Chevaillier

91

Unsolved Problems and Inadequate Solutions: The Situation of Academic Staff in German Higher Education Uwe Schimank

115

The Academic Profession in Greece: Current State and Conditions of Employment Dimitrios G. Tsaoussis

137

vi

8.

9.

Contents

Academic Staff in Ireland: The Right of Tenure Enacted and Endorsed Maureen Killeavy and Marie Coleman

153

A Guild in Transition: The Italian Case Roberto Moscati

173

10.

The End of Public Employment in Dutch Higher Education? Egbert de Weert

195

11.

Expansion, Reorganization, and Discontent among Academic Staff: The Norwegian Case Svein Kyvik, Ole-Jacob Skodvin, Jens-Christian Smeby, and Susanne Lehmann Sundnes

12.

The Academic Profession in a Massifying System: The Portuguese Case Virgı´lio A. Meira Soares

217

233

13.

Adapting to Change: The Academic Profession in Spain Jose´-Gine´s Mora

14.

The Academic Profession in Sweden: Diversity and Change in an Egalitarian System Berit Askling

277

Profession or Proletariat: Academic Staff in the United Kingdom after Two Decades of Change Oliver Fulton and Chris Holland

301

15.

255

Index

323

About the Contributors

329

Series Foreword

Greenwood Studies in Higher Education publishes current research and analysis on higher and postsecondary education. Higher education in the twenty-first century is a multifaceted phenomenon, combining a variety of institutions and systems, an increasing diversity of students, and a range of purposes and functions. The challenges of expansion, technology, accountability, and research, among others, require careful analysis. This series combines research-based monographs, analysis, and reference books related to all aspects of higher education. It is concerned with policy and practice in a global perspective. Greenwood Studies in Higher Education is dedicated to illuminating the reality of higher and postsecondary education in contemporary society. Higher education is a central enterprise of the twenty-first century and a key part of the knowledge-based economy. Universities are the most important source of basic research, and are therefore key to the development of technology. They are also the repositories of the wisdom of society— their libraries and other facilities are in many ways the institutional memory of civilization. University faculty provide not only education and training, but are involved in the creation and interpretation of knowledge. Universities are central to the civil society. Higher education is a key to the social mobility and progress of large numbers of people. Universities and other postsecondary institutions are increasingly complex. They are large and multifaceted. Academe is also diverse, with a wider range of institutions, a less homogenous student population, and a mixture of public and private support. This series is dedicated to illuminating these complexities. It is also committed to the improvement of one of the most important parts of society—postsecondary education. Philip G. Altbach

Preface

There is an ongoing debate on the “crisis” of the academic profession, as well as on future expectations regarding its role and functioning in higher education and modern societies. Rising enrollments, difficult financial circumstances, new technologies, and movements toward accountability and assessment are having a profound impact on the academic profession. The relationship between academic staff and the nation-state is changing, and the profession seems on its way to losing some of its traditional guild powers. The role of the institutions and their management within the playing field of higher education is strengthened. Watchwords in this ongoing process of reengineering the staffing of the academic profession are performance and quality, competition and flexibility, and efficiency and accountability. Academic staff are higher education’s most important asset and most costly resource. Employment and working conditions of academic staff are therefore not only influenced by these developments but seen as important tools for adaptation to the new circumstances higher education systems are facing. Thus, it is of interest not only to demonstrate and compare variations across and within countries but also to analyze the outcomes of the changing academic environment on the academic labor market and the conditions of working life. We observe growing changes regarding the staff structure and career perspectives of younger academics, traditional concepts of job security and tenure tend to be questioned, heterogeneity among academic staff is growing, the remuneration and workload of academic staff constitute a moving target of reorganization, and last but not least, the entire work setting of academics in teaching and research is on the agenda. It is our purpose to understand the nature of these challenges in different national settings, with a special emphasis on analyzing current trends in the terms and conditions of academic employment and work.

x

Preface

This volume derives from a project on Employment and Working Conditions of Academic Staff in Higher Education: A Comparative Study in the European Community. The study was initiated in 1998 by the Center for Research on Higher Education and Work in Kassel, Germany. Experts from 14 countries—Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom—were invited to write country chapters to highlight the developments of the last two decades and the “state of the art” of the academic profession, mainly in universities in their national context. The completion of this volume would not have been possible without the expertise, knowledge, commitment, and time of these country experts. I want to take this opportunity to thank my colleagues for responding favorably to my invitation to join the study and for all their efforts undertaken. As both scholars and objects of reorganization, they have brought their professional expertise and knowledge, their academic background, and their experience to this study. They have adopted an analytical and critical approach in analyzing and interpreting the recent developments in the context and conditions of academic work and how academics perceive these changes in their national setting. My own comparative work in this context would not have been possible without their vital support. The comparative results of the study presented in this volume are, however, entirely the author’s responsibility. Furthermore, I want to express my gratitude to the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, the German Trade Union for Education and Science, and the Hans-Bo¨ckler-Foundation for supporting the study and the conference. My thanks are also due to the staff and students of our Center in Kassel for their patience and support during the preparation of this book.

ACADEMIC STAFF IN EUROPE

Chapter 1

Between State Control and Academic Capitalism: A Comparative Perspective on Academic Staff in Europe Ju¨rgen Enders

AN UNCERTAIN PROFESSION When observing the sectors of production and service in our modern societies and the institutions in charge, we see that the higher education and research sector has several specific features. They include a relatively open set of goals; a loose mechanism of coercion, control, and steering from above; a high degree of fragmentation; and—last but not least—the academic profession’s strong influence on the determination of goals, the management and administration of its institutions, and the daily routine in the respective sectors. In addition, if we look at the interrelationships between the different sectors of production and services, the academic profession could be considered one of the most influential in shaping other sectors, as Harold Perkin (1969) stressed when he called it the “key profession.” In public debates and reflections, there are complaints that the concept of a single academic profession may be an illusion, that it can hardly cope with the tensions it has to live with, and that it is endangered. For some two decades it has been widely assumed that it seems to feel increasingly entrenched. The literature (cf. the overview in Altbach 1991; Clark 1987; Morey 1992) suggests that the sense of crisis has grown. Decline, erosion, and deprofessionalization are frequently used when asking if the academic profession could be losing its characteristic features. This concern is obviously linked to the massification of higher education and the secular trend toward a “knowledge” society, a “highly qualified” society, a “lifelong learning” society, or an “information” society. Whatever the term, the transition of higher education and the changing nature

2

Academic Staff in Europe

and role of knowledge seem to be accompanied by changes in higher education and its interrelationship with society that are a mixed blessing for universities, their status, function, and role (Teichler, Daniel, and Enders 1998). RECENT PRESSURES For about two decades, the winds for higher education and its academic staff have been changing. Rising enrollments, financial constraints, and moves toward accountability and assessment and new technologies are having a deep effect on the academic profession. Four closely interrelated issues are often quoted in this context (Altbach 1996; Enders and Teichler 1997; Farnham 1999; Karpen and Hanske 1994; Kogan, Moses and ElKhawas 1994). First, in many countries, the academic profession seems to be facing a more rapid loss of status than in the past. Relative losses of income are reported, and junior positions have become more risky and less well paid. The idea that the members of an expanding profession with growing importance for society may consider themselves as losers has grown in the last two decades. Second, the resources of higher education institutions are becoming tighter. In many industrial countries, the student/academic staff ratio has increased and the basic funding of research has declined. Certain developments could be called “efficiency gains,” yet the feeling of impoverishment is widespread. Third, the academic profession may be losing its academic guild powers. We note a rise of managerial powers in higher education, as well as growing control of academics’ performances. Fourth, the academic profession is being blamed for not providing the services expected to society. The critiques range from a claim that it is not ensuring the quality expected to the widespread accusation that what graduates learn is inappropriate and that research does not sufficiently address the most pressing problems of our times. Furthermore, one fears a decline in faculty morale, disillusionment their mission, seeing themselves as academic workers who are merely doing a routine job and who are no longer strongly committed to the traditional norms and values of the profession. From this perspective, a decline of the traditional professoriate and a decrease in number who answer the academic calling (Clark 1997) are reasonable visions of a possible future in which the academic profession is seen as an institutional resource that provides more or less effective services. Hence, our study is most timely. All the countries involved have seen changes in actors and procedures. The relationship between academic staff and the nation-state is changing dra-

A Comparative Perspective on Academic Staff in Europe

3

matically. The role of the institutions and their management within the playing field of higher education are strengthened. Academic staff are higher education’s most important asset and most costly resource. Therefore, not only are their employment and working conditions influenced by these developments, but they are viewed as important tools to adapt to the new circumstances. Thus, it is of interest not only to describe and compare variations across and within countries but also to analyze the outcomes of the changing environment for the academic labor market and working conditions. Our aim is to understand the nature of these challenges in different national settings. REGULATING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP: A CHANGED PLAYING FIELD Unlike the liberal professions, academics are not self-employed but work as members of staff for public or private institutions governed by legal rules. In the public sector, they usually have the status of civil servants (e.g., the German Beamte or French fonctionnaires) or of public employees. It is quite different from working under an employment contract, even if the contract or part of it is determined through bargaining between employers’ and employees’ representatives. Whether the employer is a private institution or a public, nongovernmental one, academics usually have the status of employees, regulated by contracts under private law. The higher education systems in our study are predominantly public, even though some countries, such as Portugal, have growing private higher education sectors and some are debating the establishment of private universities. The overwhelming majority of academics are civil servants or civil employees. While academics’ power, privileges, and conditions of employment in continental Europe are protected by constitutional or administrative law, academics in the United Kingdom have employment contracts that are rooted in the principles of common law. Traditionally, they form a profession that is relatively unitary and is unmatched in mainland Europe. There are three basic ways of regulating academic staff’s employment: by state law, by collective bargaining between employers’ and employees’ representatives, or by employer regulations of the higher education institution. Furthermore, various higher education systems have traditional mechanisms of individual bargaining between a member of academic staff and representatives of the employer (state authorities or institutional leaders). The regulations and rules can therefore be laid down in legal decrees, government decisions, collective agreements, institutional documents, or employment contracts, depending on whether they have been determined unilaterally by state law or employer regulations or bilaterally by national, local, or individual bargaining or a composite mix of both. Typically, they

4


cover salary and work load, job security and tenure, recruitment and promotion procedures, fringe benefits, sabbaticals, and pensions. In the last two centuries, the basic philosophy that regulates the higher education systems and the employment and working conditions of their academic staff has changed. Although the dynamics and areas of change may differ according to country, at least three major trends can be identified. Heterogenization A remarkable trend in a number of countries can be analyzed as reaction and withdrawal from the former philosophy of the legal homogeneity of higher education institutions. The underlying assumption is that this logic placed severe limitations on their capacity to adapt to a changing environment. In this context, diversification provides a tool to enforce the division of labor between and within higher education institutions and their academic staff. Decentralization The higher education environment has become so diverse, complex, and changeable that a nationwide bureaucratic system with ex ante regulations, tight process control, and line-item budgeting is no longer appropriate. Governments, therefore, must switch toward a system of distant steering or state supervision. They set broad missions, framework conditions, and finances in which each institution is given a higher degree of autonomy. Marketization As regards financial resources, manpower, and quality and quantity of products, efforts are being made to create a more competitive environment, for example, government policies to build up a marketlike resource allocation system and developing competition between and within higher education institutions. In effect, control of higher education institutions is shifting away from what Burton Clark (1983) called the academic oligarchy toward more market and state control. Government remains the most important actor, but it tends to withdraw into distant steering, setting the legal and financial boundaries and using instruments of quality control. The distribution of power within the triangle of state, market, and academic oligarchy tends to be reorganized and other actors have appeared in the playing field (see Figure 1.1). The reforms of the 1970s legally established nonprofessorial staff and students as a fourth power in universities. Recent debates and restructur-


5

Figure 1.1 The New Complexity of Actors

ations of steering and financing have brought into play the stakeholders as a fifth power. Last but not least, efforts to consolidate institutional capacities for self-regulation supported the establishment of the “managerial class” as an important actor in universities. Hence, we observe a rather complex constellation of actors and powers that directly or indirectly influence the public and private life of higher education and the academic staff. These developments are based on the assumption that they will allow for a more flexible responsiveness in steering higher education and its staff. One hopes to improve the quality of work processes and outcomes of basic units and individual academics by reorganizing the staff structure and doctoral training, staff development, and appraisal; making the workload, especially teaching, more flexible; and introducing salary-bonus systems and partly performance-related pay scales. Furthermore, it is argued that a better functioning of higher education as modern institutions will be supported by greater self-steering capacities of institutions and their managerial power. There are different forms of managerialism. They could be called soft and hard, but the crucial question for the academic staff is whether institutional management will bring growing support or control. At least four concepts of the Homo academicus and his institutional leadership can be observed in recent debates (see Figure 1.2). First, trust in the self-steering capacities of academics as long-standing

6


Figure 1.2 The Homo Academicus and the Institutional Leadership

and socialized professionals who are best let alone and symbolically represented by institutional leadership is diminishing. Trust in the professional and discipline-based self-steering mechanism is declining, and institutional leadership is becoming a visible force of its own. Second, in some countries public debate tends to draw a caricature of the Homo academicus as the “lazy professor” who needs incentives and visible sanctions. Academics are seen as spoiled and narcissistic employees who must be cut down to size and as a guildlike anachronistic workforce that must adapt to the realities of corporate capitalism in higher education. Third, the academic tends to be seen as a Homo oeconomicus who can be steered by cost-centered management, that is, locally shaping rules, regulations, and instruments for efficient work and output. The underlying assumption is that people go where the money is and that steering by the invisible hand of the market will lead to the expected outcomes. Fourth, a more sophisticated concept emphasizes the internal differentiation of academic staff and the role of institutional leadership as soft supervisors who aim to design academics’ status and tasks according to their strengths and weaknesses. This is close to the approach of staff development through human resource management. Modernization of Employment Relationships: Convergence or Varied Solutions? Although there has been a fairly widespread new philosophy of selfsteering and a common drive to make higher education systems in Europe


7

more efficient and cost-effective in recent years, the changes must be placed in their context. As far as state financing is concerned, new models of output-based funding, lump-sum funding, and assessment-based research funding have been introduced. In the area of staffing, there have been attempts to make higher education institutions and their staff more accountable, to increase academic productivity and output, to reduce staffing costs, and to create more flexibility in the academic workforce. Attempts have also been made to shift the responsibility for some aspects of employment and working conditions from central governments or national bargaining to institutional management or local or individual bargaining. In the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, elements of neocorporatism have been consolidated by these developments. Finland and Sweden, where membership and representation of academic staff in trade unions are high, are moving toward two-tier bargaining structures that reinforce local regulations on pay scales, teaching load, and terms of recruitment and appointment. Here national collective bargaining sets frameworks, whereas local bargaining between institutions and local branches of trade unions regulates further details of employment conditions. In Sweden, a unitary system of higher education is supplemented by individual bargaining on salaries and teaching loads. In Finland, universities can appoint professors and establish or discontinue chairs for the first time in their history. The Norwegian higher education system, which comprises four universities and a number of state colleges and private colleges, underwent a wave of expansion in the 1990s. Measures for result-oriented planning were introduced, and the influence of university and college administration in academic matters was strengthened. At the same time, the number of administrative officers and managers increased considerably. Academic membership in trade unions is relatively high, and employment conditions are determined by a composite mix of unilateral and bilateral regulations. Negotiations on salaries were recently supplemented by local bargaining on pay raise, which is partly based on staff performance in teaching and research. In the early 1990s, reforms were also introduced in Denmark. In 1992, an Anglo-American structure was adopted with the introduction of bachelor’s and Ph.D. degrees. In 1993, a new research program came into force in the universities. The funding of teaching was to be based on the principle of a fixed rate for each type of education, which was related to an estimated number of students set by the Ministry of Education. In 1992, a Danish Centre for Quality Assurance and Evaluation of Higher Education was created as a result of the new University Act that gave the institutions more autonomy. The influence and responsibilities of collegiate bodies were reduced and to some extent transferred to university administrators and rectors. In order to cope with the massification of higher education, the

8


Netherlands and the Flemish-speaking community of Belgium created binary systems. Interestingly, the Netherlands—where membership in trade unions is lower than in the northern European countries—have also introduced a two-tier bargaining structure where pay scales are regulated at the national level and other conditions at the local level. As with Sweden, the individualization of employment conditions is supported by individual bargaining on salaries. In the Flemish-speaking community of Belgium—with its tradition of “clerical universities,” which enjoy a relatively high degree of autonomy—decision making on salaries, teaching load, or the recruitment and appointment of academic staff has shifted toward employer regulations. Labor unions and professional associations are relatively weak and spread over a range of organizations, whereas the elected rectors, deans, and heads of departments play a significant role in representing their profession at the local and intermediate levels. In the United Kingdom, with its high degree of institutional autonomy and professional collegiality, a series of reforms and initiatives has put the traditional distribution of power under strain. Recent developments can be interpreted as a threat to traditional patterns of institutional autonomy and bargaining. Here we observe a move toward a hybrid system with a growing impact of marketlike forces and greater governmental influence. The abolishment of the binary line in 1992, with the inclusion of former polytechnics and colleges in the university sector and the sharp increase in student numbers and sharp decrease in government funding for teaching, has changed the picture. Major amendments in the resource allocation have led to a mix of block grant teaching funding and assessment-based research funding. Various measures were introduced to increase institutional responsibility and managerial power. Furthermore, localization and individualization in the determination of conditions have developed in order to increase discretion as regards salaries, teaching loads, or recruitment/appointment procedures. Hence, threats to national bargaining and trade union influence are perceived. Ireland, with its high participation rate in universities and technical colleges, provides an interesting example of a country with a tradition of a relatively large degree of institutional autonomy and a high representation of academic staff in trade unions. While salaries are negotiated at the national level, the teaching load and the recruitment/appointment of academic staff are traditionally negotiated at the local level. Ireland has recently introduced a unit-cost system of funding and elements for strategic planning and quality assurance. Tenure is by state decree, and it is unlikely that the relatively stable and homogenous status of the academic staff will change. In most central and southern European countries, academic staff’s terms of work and employment have traditionally been regulated by the state authority, supplemented by national bargaining or consultations with pub-


9

lic service trade unions. In France, Greece, and Italy, they are mainly regulated by the central government. In Germany, responsibility for higher education and its academic staff is shared between the central government and the 16 federal states that have considerable autonomy. Labor unions have only limited influence in these countries. In national bargaining, academic staff are represented by public sector trade unions. The national power of academic trade unions may be diluted because membership is relatively low and is spread over a number of organizations. Moreover, professional associations are split into those that cover the professoriate and higher senior ranks and those that cover the assistant academic staff or, as in Germany, the professoriate only. In these countries, the tradition of a strong academic oligarchy was characterized by close links with the state and a gap between professorial and subprofessorial positions. In the 1980s and early 1990s, higher education systems saw several waves of reform. In Greece, many laws regulated the academic staff structure, the terms of employment and the pay scales, and new laws are currently being discussed to overcome the shortcomings of the last reforms. In Italy, the Ruberti laws offered greater autonomy from central government, but they were largely ignored by the academic community. In Germany, attempts have been made to reorganize the staff structure and junior staff positions, but the situation of younger academics is still a matter of concern. Because of the rather mixed performances of legal state reforms in staff structure, a new distribution of power between the state, the academic oligarchy, the market, and the emerging managerial class in higher education institutions has been sought. In Germany and Italy, discussions and initiatives have been taking place to rearrange the playing field in higher education. According to the Federal German Higher Education Act of 1998, the central authority withdraws in certain areas in order to encourage ongoing regional and local attempts to strengthen institutional autonomy in staffing and financing matters and the new federal state systems for financing and outcome-oriented planning. Moreover, the introduction of performance-based salary components for the professoriate and the establishment of assistant professorships in order to bridge the gap between junior and senior staff are being discussed. In Italy, a system of lump-sum funding has been introduced, and intermediary bodies, such as the Italian Rectors Conference and a national evaluation agency for higher education, have been established. Following the regulatory changes in the mid-1980s, the legal framework for academic staff in France now seems stable. There are no debates on recruitment procedures nor on the system of tenure. The main change was the introduction of salary bonus systems to create performance incentives and to obtain a more balanced recognition of various tasks in teaching and research, service, and administration. Since the period of growth has come

10


to an end, there is concern about the career prospects of research students and junior staff and about the increase in the number of teaching-only staff recruited among secondary school teachers. In Portugal and Spain, academic staff in public higher education have, until recently, benefited from the expansion of the system as regards their employment and working conditions. Portugal is moving from an elite to a mass higher education system, and the private sector is growing. It now enrolls approximately one-third of all students. Even though the private institutions are run under public law, the conditions of academic staff as employees in the private sector differ significantly from those of their colleagues in the public sector. Spain moved to a mass system in the early 1980s and has now reached a participation rate of around 45 percent. In the 1980s, attempts were made to move away from highly centralized control of higher education by giving greater responsibility to regional governments and increasing the autonomy of the institutions. Staff structure moved from a traditional chair system to a department model, and new categories of staff were introduced. In the early 1990s, a salary system with productivity bonuses and continuous individual evaluation of academic staff were introduced. Yet among the major continental and southern European countries, the changes contrast with a growing discontent among policymakers and some analysts of these higher education systems. They see the deeply rooted rigidities of state control and the civil service status of academic staff as serious obstacles to adjustments to the more momentous changes the systems are experiencing. The present debates could therefore be the first noise that precedes the coming winds of change. The European Dimension “Internationalization” is not new. It has had a growing impact on staffing in at least two respects. Policymakers and those responsible for higher education have become more aware of international cooperation and competition between higher education systems that are now expected to contribute to the national economy and welfare in a global environment and to maintain their performance in a competitive international teaching and research environment. Interest in international developments and trends and mutual observation of higher education systems have developed. Furthermore, the watchwords of international competition serve as a legitimization of national policies in this area. It is widely held that higher education in highly industrialized societies serves similar functional needs and that it can improve its performance through reforms that take into account comparative experiences. Respect for the variety of higher education systems is seen as a principle that must be observed in the European Union in any activity that promotes European cooperation and a European


11

Figure 1.3 The Conditions of Academic Life: A Moving Target under Debate

dimension. The European programs in the area of higher education and research have created new possibilities for exchange and participation in international networks and for supporting training for teaching and research in the national and international contexts. How far this European dimension becomes visible within national systems may differ according to the size of the system, the degree of traditional international orientations, and other factors. Countries such as Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, or Spain report a very visible and welcome influence of the European Union programs. Academic labor markets in Europe, however, are far from international. Our knowledge and available data on international staff exchanges and mobility are still very limited. While temporary mobility, a certain brain drain to the United States, and two-way academic mobility between industrialized and developing countries were frequent in the past, mobility within Europe is becoming important, but it is accompanied by many barriers and traps. We found little evidence that the higher education systems under observation would attract large numbers of academics from other countries or suffer serious brain drain problems. CONDITIONS OF WORKING LIFE This section will study the conditions of working life, the staff structure, job security and tenure, remuneration, and workload and academics’ work in teaching and research (see Figure 1.3). The wide variations across and within countries show that the outcomes of new actor constellations and regulations of the academic labor market could be less uniform than expected.

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Staff Structure and the Issue of Tenure Traditionally, we can differentiate between two ideal types of staff structure: the chair model and the department-college model (cf. Neave and Rhoades 1987). The first—in its Humboldtian and Napoleonic variations— was characterized by a relatively sharp contrast between the traditional professorial core who hold tenured positions as chairholders and the largely untenured class of junior staff that aim to obtain professorial positions after two or three career stages and qualification periods. Here appointment to a professoriate is seen as a great increase in status and prestige, independence, and resources. In contrast, the second structure traditionally forms a more collegialbased organization of the basic units of academe. Academic staff from lower ranks to (full) professor basically have the same functions, and their status is dependent upon publicly acknowledged qualifications and expertise. The probationary period of nontenured staff is shorter, admission to tenured positions comes earlier, and further career steps within academe are more regularly organized, for example, the tenure model of U.S. universities or the tradition of (senior) lecturers, readers, and professors in the Oxbridge model (cf. Halsey 1992). These career systems—contract, regular employee, tenure—represented highly structured, uniform tracks characterized by differentiated ranks and a strict schedule for the positioning of various groups of academics and their move up the career ladder. Today, this evolution of academic roles and careers may well be at a critical turning point. One of the reasons for this is the reinterpretation of regular staff structures. While, for example, the staff structure in Germany could still be defined in terms of the chair-contract model (cf. Enders and Teichler 1997), attempts are being made to consolidate the positioning and independence of postdoctoral junior staff according to the U.S. tenure model. Staff structures in Ireland and the United Kingdom, and to some extent in Norway, are still following the department-college model of a more regular career ladder. In the United Kingdom, it seems that middle-rank staff’s expectations of a professoriate are growing and that nonpromotion tends to be regarded as a failure. In France and Italy, the many untenured assistants have started to obtain permanent contracts. Greece has recently abolished the chair system and moved toward a kind of “tenure” model with assistant, associate, and full professors as the core of the academic staff. Spain has formally introduced a department structure, although the chair system remains the basic working unit. In Belgium, Finland, and Sweden, which were influenced by the chair model, professorial and assistantlike positions are supplemented by stable teaching positions. However, Sweden remains a special case because of the relatively sharp distinction between research positions and teaching-only staff. The staff structure in Portugal could be


13

described as a mix of apprenticelike assistantships leading to a “tenure” model that starts with untenured assistant professors. Finally, the staff structure in Dutch universities developed a hierarchy of three professorial ranks, as well as permanent positions for academic employees who assist the professoriate in its teaching and research duties. Yet a growing number of academic staff are excluded from regular staff structures—whatever their character. Expansion and a policy reorganization of resources and personnel changed nonprofessorial posts. The rise of a class of nonprofessorial teachers in response to the growing student numbers and the growth of externally financed contracted research staff is an international phenomenon. Continuous and satisfying employment and personal development and encouragement for a “regular” academic career have become rarer for a growing number of staff. In short, these appointments are likely to be dead ends. An increase in temporary research staff is observed in the Flemishspeaking community of Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Spain and Portugal are facing the problematic outcomes of a remarkable growth of higher education. There is a saturation of the system as regards newcomers to the academic profession. The meanings of tenure are changing. Traditionally, it guaranteed job security and autonomy for senior academic staff and was a social sign of status and prestige. In the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, “tenure” meant that permanent academic staff could only be dismissed in very rare cases. Now they can be dismissed in case of redundancy (e.g., if their department or institute is closed down). So far, this seems to have had little impact, but it is a significant symbolic loss for the academic profession in the respective countries. Finland has introduced temporary positions for professors, and in Germany, positions for professors under contract have become an issue. In other countries, debates about the future role of tenure now focus on a reduction of tenured positions, the introduction of untenured positions alongside the traditional tenured ones, and the increasingly common practice of voluntary redundancy and early retirement. In contrast, in Greece, Ireland, and Italy, the status of academics as tenured or permanent staff has been emphasized. All in all, there are few signs in the countries in this study that the traditional privilege of great job stability for the core of the profession is being undermined. It is the high degree of job autonomy of senior academic staff that is debated in order to bring them under stricter control of institutional leadership and ministries. The design of staff structures, the size of fixed-termed staff, and the inclusion or exclusion of doctoral candidates as members of academic staff must be taken into consideration when looking at the proportion of permanent academic staff in the countries in our study. The proportion of permanent staff in universities (i.e., those holding a tenured position or a

14


permanent contract as employee) varies significantly according to country: It is lowest in Portugal, with less than 40 percent, and in Finland and Germany, with between 40 percent and 50 percent. In the Flemish-speaking community of Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain, between 50 percent and 60 percent of university staff hold permanent positions. We can estimate that in the French-speaking community of Belgium and the United Kingdom they represent between 60 percent and 70 percent of university staff. The highest share is reported in Ireland and France with some 80 percent and in Italy with some 90 percent. The proportion of academics holding professorial positions in universities also differs significantly. This is clearly a more selective group in all countries and represents between 10 and 30 percent of academic staff. Tenure or permanent contracts are more common in the nonuniversity sector. In Belgium and Finland, some two-thirds of academic staff in nonuniversity institutions have a permanent contract; in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway, the proportion is close to 90 percent. Women in the Academic Profession In all the countries, the share of women in the academic profession has grown in the last two decades. In Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, this development was helped by policies or programs to support their careers. But staffing policies in most of the 15 countries have given little attention to this issue. The share of women has mainly grown in the junior staff positions and lower ranks of academic staff. The academic profession is still clearly male dominated, and women are much more underrepresented at the level of the professoriate or other senior ranks: About a quarter of academic staff in universities in Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands are women. In the other countries of our study, they represent about one-third of the university staff. The share of women academics in the professorial ranks is clearly lower in all countries: In Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, it is less than 10 percent. It is only somewhat higher in the other countries, with Finland and France having the highest participation rate (about 15 percent). A look at the participation of women in nonuniversity institutions provides a mixed picture: Higher shares in these institutions compared to the respective university sector are reported in Belgium, Finland, and Norway; the proportion of women academics in universities and nonuniversity institutions is almost the same in the Netherlands and Portugal. In contrast, it is lower in German Fachhochschulen than in universities. Academic Salaries and Fringe Benefits The academic profession has often been characterized by its high degree of job satisfaction, and academic staff were considered well paid. Even


15

though they were not as well remunerated as comparable employees outside higher education, the intrinsic rewards of the job (i.e., a high degree of autonomy in the use of their time, a low degree of job prescription and control, and the possibility to do challenging and initiative work) could be more important than status and pay. In a number of countries, however, there seems to have been a gradual erosion of remunerations, especially in disciplines like business studies, computer sciences, and engineering where higher education faces great competition with the private labor market. Prestige and academic freedom therefore compensate less for the financial handicap when youngsters consider an academic career. Other factors that could have an impact in the near future are flexibility and the widening of pay scales. More autonomous institutions may well be able to pay very different salaries and performance rewards to their academic staff. Looking at current pay scales in the higher education systems under study, we note considerable differences. In absolute terms (i.e., without taking relative costs of living into account), we can estimate that the highest salaries for the professoriate are paid in Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands, followed by France, Germany, and Ireland. Lowest top salaries for the professoriate are found in Finland, Portugal, and Spain. Salaries in Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are considered relatively low and/or declining. In these countries, there is clear dissatisfaction among academic staff. Professors’ salaries also differ significantly within countries. This is, of course, influenced by factors such as the degree of internal differentiation of positions within the professoriate and the impact of seniority and family status on income. The greatest differences are reported in France, Germany, and Ireland, where the lowest starting salaries for professors are around half the highest-end salaries. In contrast, differences are relatively flat in Finland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, where the lowest starting salaries for professors represent about three-quarters of the highest-end salaries. We observe little variation across countries if we compare full-time staff at the beginning of their academic career or those employed in the lowest ranks and those who have reached top professorial positions. Starting salaries for lower ranks are somewhere around a third of top salaries. But differences could be greater than this crude estimation suggests if we take into account the variations in part-time employment in the lowest ranks according to country. More important for the overall standing of the academic profession is the trend toward flexible pay scales through the introduction of pay-bonus systems in several countries. In 10 countries analyzed in this book, there is some form of additional payment. In Belgium, there are special payments for additional lectures and teaching loads and salaries for research contracts. In Sweden, there are additional payments for posts of responsibility. In France and Spain, there is a mix of teaching, research,

16


and administrative bonus systems. In the United Kingdom, there are discretionary points in salary increase. In most systems, flexible and partly performance-related income has become an incentive for performance and competition. In contrast, the various systems of fringe benefits for academic staff—in most countries rooted in respective regulations for the public service—have not been a real issue. In this area, we still find a high degree of homogeneity, at least among the core of the academic profession, while the situation is different for those who are employed at the periphery of fixed-term and part-time contracts. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEACHING AND RESEARCH AND WORK LIFE For universities, the transition from elite to mass higher education and the increasing demand for more socioeconomic “relevance” were fundamental challenges to their traditional mission, functions, and selfunderstanding. In addition, they were confronted with contradictory demands. On the one hand, they were required to teach large numbers of students and give more room to teaching modes that were oriented toward the needs of industry and the labor market. On the other, research was expected to make a greater contribution to economic innovation and societal problem solving. Pressures to improve performance in these areas also increased in a postindustrial society where education and knowledge have become important assets in the competition for power, prosperity, and prestige. Universities were conceived as central elements of “national innovation systems,” providing the highly qualified manpower and the knowledge on which a science-based economy and society rest. With mass higher education, the model of theory-oriented and researchbased teaching as the standard mode was increasingly questioned. First, the large number of students rendered research studies that require close interaction between professors and students and access to research opportunities impossible tasks for the bulk of the students. Second, industry and government were mainly interested in students who had been trained on a scientific basis but with a focus on professional education. Hence, transparent and more schoollike curricula patterns that are oriented toward the learning and application of knowledge and skills that are relevant for professional practice are seen as more appropriate than the traditional university courses that emphasize research. Third, this corresponded to the interests of a considerable share of students seeking a professional qualification for employment outside academia. Fourth, the organization that is adequate for research and teaching differs. While the former requires specialization and flexibility to follow new developments, the latter requires synthesis and more stable structures. Diversification of income for teaching or research,


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the competition for external research funds, and reliance on conditional and contract support play a significant role in this process. Hence, many institutions are engaging in priority-setting exercises and are challenged by competing goods. The emergence of evaluation and quality assessment exercises also contributes to a significant reshaping and restructuring of the teaching-research relationship. Academics have, of course, been using traditional measures of research output for many years. One could, however, argue that they are infected by a bias of research excellence as a contribution to the production of new knowledge, whereas other research functions that are more closely related to teaching, such as research as the application and transfer of knowledge, research as training for academic teaching, or research as a playground for the training of junior academics, have been neglected. More comprehensive measures could become more important when distinctions between various functions of university research are disappearing—for example, when the time between invention and application and the turnaround time for new products is shrinking. In these conditions, teaching and research could, at best, be competitive partners in financial resources, performance measures, time budgets, and qualifications and academic staff’s career intentions. The recent structural changes in policies concerning the most prominent tasks of teaching and research are difficult to assess and by no means uniform. Countries that traditionally followed the Napeolonic model of separating a public research system from a more teaching-oriented one are seeking closer links between these sectors in order to strengthen the research function and the teaching-research nexus. On the one hand, the infrastructure, academic staff, and pool of new talent that are available to the higher education sector must be more systematically and effectively used to expand and strengthen the research base as the key element of economic and social modernization. On the other, the separation of training for research and execution of research is increasingly perceived as dysfunctional, leading to deficiencies and weaknesses in the production of professional researchers. Efforts are being made to integrate research institutes and their staff in universities and teaching tasks, to rearrange research money flows between the sectors, and to stimulate staff mobility between research and higher education institutions. Some countries that traditionally followed the Humboldtian model of a close teaching-research nexus are, in contrast, facing the problems of a system-wide fairly homogeneous integration of both tasks in the financing of universities, their institutional mission, and the job roles of academics. Here it is widely felt that both teaching and research functions tend increasingly to suffer under these conditions. Efforts are therefore being made to separate resource flows between teaching and research, to separate vocational-oriented undergraduate from research-oriented graduate edu-

18


cation, or to separate the departmental responsibility for teaching and research through specialized teaching or research management. In contrast, in countries where the differentiation between teaching and research was traditionally at the level of job roles, with some academics being primarily or even exclusively teachers, while others were predominantly researchers, efforts are being made to counterforce this division of labor and to reinforce the teaching-research nexus for all groups of academic staff. We thus observe a rather composite mix of movements between pre-Humboldtian, Humboldtian, and post-Humboldtian approaches in search of a new balance between teaching and research. The impact of massification and financial constraints on growing student/ staff ratios differs greatly across European countries. Academic staff in all the countries of our study must shoulder an additional teaching workload. Even in countries where service statutes oblige university teachers to devote some of their resources and working time to research, this varies considerably according to their teaching load, resources, and interests. Although there are growing complaints about heavier workloads and diminishing resources and external interference and internal bureaucracy, the overall satisfaction of the university professoriate seems relatively high. Yet it is surprising to note that a relatively stable use of working time is reported in some countries (Germany, Norway, Sweden) where reliable data on the workload and time budget of academics over time are available. There are obviously counterforces that enable academic staff to reserve a considerable amount of their time for research, even when student/staff ratios are increasing. In many countries, support for and control of teaching quality is explicitly given more importance. Not only is quality control a new legal obligation, but university administrations are also taking up this new task of setting up control mechanisms and rewarding teaching more explicitly in their promotion criteria. In this context, several countries have modified the allocation of the teaching load of their academic staff. Finland, for example, has recently moved from the traditional system of setting a minimum number of weekly lecturing hours to an annual total number of hours. Spain has recently changed to a modular system of teaching credits. In Sweden, an annual maximum teaching load has been fixed. Italy has introduced a minimum teaching load per year. Fairly flexible frameworks for the teaching load that must be determined by negotiations at the local level are reported in Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Concentration and diversification of income for research raise the question of how far research and research excellence are becoming areas not only of growing competition but of growing polarization between the “haves” and “have-nots.” This polarization not only occurs between institutions but within the same institution, thus creating a degree of hetero-


19

Figure 1.4 Staffing in Higher Education: A Changing Arena

geneity that was unknown in the past. The most obvious impact of a further shift toward research funds from separately budgeted funds and external sources is the growing size of “research or project staff.” But we could ask how far the marketization of higher education and the changes in the resource allocation affect prestige and power within academe. Following the resource dependence theory, we would assume that external market and government pressures provide incentives for faculty and managers to change the mix of research from a discipline-inspired one to a market-driven one. Recent studies, mainly inspired by organizational theory, show that institutions tend to go where the money is. But do academics? Any serious answer to these questions would be beyond the scope of our study, and it would be naive to underestimate the ongoing changes that some assert are a revolution in academic work (see Slaughter and Leslie 1997). But our study provides some evidence that any scenario of an almost inevitable transfer of control from the disciplines and academics to groups external to the academic communities would also be misleading. This underestimates the more dynamic role of academics and their influence on the environment and tends to be culturally blind to the variety of national traditions and characteristics that must be taken into account. THE WINDS OF CHANGE: PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS Higher education systems and their academics live in interesting times of change. These changes are occurring in the area of actors and procedures that are relevant for staffing and in the area of regulations concerning employment and working conditions (see Figure 1.4). What is less clear is the outcomes of these developments. Different sociopolitical options as well as our hopes for and fears of the future come into play when we look at different scenarios concerning the long-term changes in the academic profession. Furthermore, it should be taken into account that we might em-

20


phasize continuity or rupture, evolutionary or revolutionary developments, depending on our vision of higher education. The roles and rules for the actors in the playing field of higher education have been mixed up. While the speed and depth of these changes might differ, all higher education systems in our study have experienced and/or are currently experiencing similar trends. Although the dynamics and areas of change may differ according to country, at least three major trends can be identified: Heterogenization as a reaction to the philosophy of legal homogeneity in higher education institutions; decentralization as a switch toward a system of distant steering by the government or state supervision in which each institution is given a higher degree of autonomy; marketization as an effort to build up a marketlike resource allocation system and develop competition between and within higher education institutions. In effect, the control of higher education institutions shifts to some extent away from academic oligarchy toward, paradoxically enough, more market and more state control. There are obvious signs that market and marketlike behavior characterized by competitiveness, a strong emphasis on productivity, the search for ever-expanding and new income streams, drastic cost cutting, and the academics’ growing insecurity have a growing impact on higher education. But it would be misleading to see the rise of academic capitalism as an undisputed global trend that is taking over higher education and destroying traditional patterns of rules and regulations. In the continental European context, many of the affiliations between academic staff and the state and the traditional resource distribution that allow tenure to continue and governance to influence higher education have remained. The government remains the most important actor. In some countries where welfare economy, trade unionism, and collective bargaining have had a strong tradition, the marketization of higher education is counterbalanced by new corporatism approaches. In several countries, there are signs of a growing decentralization of the employment and working conditions of academics. There are various shifts of responsibility and decision making toward the academic workplace according to country: intermediatization as a shift of responsibility from the central government to intermediate bodies; regionalization as a shift of responsibility from central to regional state authorities; localization as a shift of responsibility to the local level of employer regulations and local collective bargaining; and individualization as a shift toward individual bargaining between academics and institutional representatives. Salaries, teaching loads, and other elements of time and resource allocation tend to become more flexible and are reorganized according to institutional and individual circumstances. It seems premature to assess the outcomes of these developments, but they contribute to a growing loss of communality within the academic profession.


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All in all, the institutional level is gaining importance in staffing issues. But it would be misleading to speak of a uniform trend of new public management. Rather, it is shifting between hard and soft versions, between strong institutional control, a cost-centered management, and a staff development–oriented soft supervision. The problem of the trend toward distant steering by the state and growing institutional responsibility could be called “rebureaucratization.” Actors and procedures may differ from country to country, but there are signs that the new freedom of universities could produce rigidities. Decentralization is often accompanied by new bureaucratic rules to be accepted by the federal state or agencies. The intention to leave more room for strategic judgment within the institutions is accompanied by more detailed performance evaluation and internal process regulations. In effect, external formalism could be translated into internal or internalized formalism. Many measures have been taken to preserve or improve the quality of teaching and learning, of research and service under conditions of tighter financial control, and in many cases, of rising student/staff ratios. They include: restructuring the higher education system to set different quality objectives and different resources for various sectors, institutions, or subunits in higher education; better training of the academic staff; restructuring of junior academic careers and career criteria; greater assessment and evaluation of academic staff performance and linking evaluations to rewards and sanctions; and restructuring the management of higher education institutions and increasing the potential to steer academic staff. In other words, we can identify typical methods used by any product or service company to improve quantity and/or quality of output without additional resources or additional staff. In this context, it is interesting to note how the concept of “staff” has entered the field of higher education. Universities are no longer only the home of scientists and educators or the breeding ground of the elite. They are also organizations that must offer an efficient service and therefore have to oversee the activities of their academic staff. The obvious and serious danger of this approach is that it could threaten central elements of the academic profession—that is, the collegiality of decision making, individual autonomy in teaching and research, the pride of intellectual leadership and social prestige, and the stability of economic and intrinsic rewards. There are persuasive elements in the theory of deprofessionalization and proletarization: Salaries tend to be broken up into different components and seem to decline; the status of tenure has become an issue in many countries; teaching and research are monitored and inspected; and a casual workforce of part-time and fixed-term staff is growing at the periphery of the professional core. Last but not least, in some continental European countries we see a change in the academic staff’s status from civil servant status to contract relationship status. This thesis, however, tends to take the new rhet-

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oric of output and product orientation, consumerism and flexibility, market and managerialism as reality. It tends to overestimate the impact of external actors and conditions on the life of higher education and to underestimate the idiosyncratic elements in different national contexts, as well as the flexibility, inertia, resistance, and variety of academics’ responses. Our study shows that the oft-claimed trend of a general erosion of academic staff’s employment and working conditions is less strong, less consistent, and less universal than previously believed. But having said this, one cannot overlook the fact that the academic profession is now in a rather defensive position. While academics succeeded for a long time in accommodating changing environments to their aims and needs, they are now blamed more and more for the shortcomings of higher education and its problems in defining a new place in the emerging knowledge society. It is therefore important that the academics themselves find a third way beyond erosion and traditionalism and seek active strategies of involvement in the ongoing process of change. So far, the traditional character of the academic profession has not been counteracted by advocacy of a new modern model. It is left to ongoing changes to eventually lead to a new professionalism of the academic profession or various academic subprofessions.

REFERENCES Altbach, P. G. 1991. “The Academic Profession.” In P. G. Altbach (ed.), International Higher Education: An Encyclopedia. New York and London: Garland, pp. 23–45. Altbach, P. G. (ed.). 1996. The International Academic Profession: Portraits of Fourteen Countries. Princeton, NJ: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Clark, B. R. 1983. The Higher Education Systems. Berkeley: University of California Press. Clark, B. R. (ed.). 1987. The Academic Profession: National, Disciplinary, and Institutional Settings. Berkeley: University of California Press. Clark, B. R. 1997. “Small Worlds, Different Worlds: The Uniqueness and Troubles of American Academic Professions.” Daedalus 126(4), pp. 21–42. Clark, S. M., and Lewis, D. 1988. “Faculty Vitality: Context, Concerns, and Prospects.” In J. C. Smart (ed.), Higher Education: Handbook of Theory and Research. Vol. 4. New York: Agathon, pp. 282–318. Enders, J. 1997. The Academic Profession in Europe: A View from the Status Perspective. Edinburgh: Center for Economic Reform and Transformation, Discussion Paper 18. Enders, J., and Teichler, U. 1995. Der Hochschullehrerberuf im internationalen Vergleich. Bonn: Bundesministerium fu¨r Bildung, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie. Enders, J., and Teichler, U. 1997. “A Victim of Their Own Success? Employment


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and Working Conditions of Academic Staff in Comparative Conditions.” Higher Education Policy 1, pp. 347–372. Farnham, D. (ed.). 1999. Managing Academic Staff in Changing University Systems: International Trends and Comparisons. Buckingham: Society for Research in Higher Education and Open University Press. Halsey, A. 1992. Decline of the Donnish Dominion. Oxford: Clarendon. Karpen, U., and Hanske, P. 1994. Status und Besoldung von Hochschullehrern im internationalen Vergleich. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Kogan, M.; Moses, I.; and El-Khawas, E. 1994. Staffing Higher Education: Meeting New Challenges. London and Bristol: J. Kingsley. Morey, A. 1992. “Introduction: Faculty and Students: Teaching, Learning and Research.” In B. R. Clark and G. Neave (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Higher Education. Oxford: Pergamon Press, pp. 1515–1535. Neave, G., and Rhoades, G. 1987. “The Academic Estate in Western Europe.” In B. R. Clark (ed.), The Academic Profession: National, Disciplinary, and Institutional Settings. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 211–270. Perkin, H. 1969. Key Profession. The History of the Association of University Teachers. New York: A. M. Kelley Publishers. Slaughter, S., and Leslie, L. L. 1997. Academic Capitalism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Teichler, U. 1996. “The Conditions of the Academic Profession: An International, Comparative Analysis of the Academic Profession in Western Europe, Japan and the USA.” In P.A.M. Maassen and Frans A. van Vught (eds.), Inside Academia: New Challenges for the Academic Profession. Utrecht: De Tijdstroom, pp. 15–68. Teichler, U.; Daniel, H.-D.; and Enders, J. (eds.). 1998. Brennpunkt Hochschule: Neuere Analysen zu Hochschule, Beruf und Gesellschaft. Frankfurt/M. and New York: Campus.

Chapter 2

The Academic Profession in the Two Communities of Belgium Karel Tavernier

INTRODUCTION It is not easy to give a global overview for Belgium of the academic profession, its legal embedding, and the way it is perceived by the different stakeholders. Recently, great differences between the university sector and the nonuniversity higher education sector (Hogescholen, or HOBU) have developed between the Flemish and French-speaking communities and within each community. Also, legal reforms are under way in all sectors of tertiary education. Since in this change process Flemish university legislation is the most advanced, this sector will serve as the backbone for this text.

THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION Main Characteristics In Belgium, there are 17 universities or university institutes and 68 institutions of nonuniversity higher education. Together they enroll some 300,000 students who are working toward a basic diploma. Nonuniversity higher education accounts for 56 percent of tertiary education in Belgium and is somewhat more developed in the Flemish community. Since Belgium became a federal state in 1988, it has had two separate systems of higher education, each with its own higher education bill, its own minister for education, and its own administration. Since the Flemish university bill of June 12, 1991, they have been slowly growing apart. Yet having started from the same traditions and the same regulatory framework, both systems

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still have much in common. From an international perspective, they are still similar enough to be treated as one. Both the Flemish and the French communities have maintained a binary system. The university sector stresses research, whereas the Hogescholen, a flourishing and qualitatively advanced “nonuniversity sector for higher education,” is more vocational and application oriented. In addition to fully fledged four-year vocational programs (HOLT), this sector also offers a broad range of short-cycle diplomas (HOKT). In some disciplines, such as applied economics, universities and Hogescholen are rather close. Unlike in many other countries, Belgian universities have enjoyed a rather high degree of institutional autonomy, since private or “free” schools by far outnumber the “official” or state schools. Historically, the Catholic organizations have developed an extensive network of schools from kindergarten, primary, and secondary schools to institutions for higher learning. In 1997, the Catholic secondary schools still enrolled about 70 percent of all pupils. In the university sector, the free institutions account for 62 percent, of whom 44 percent are in Catholic-inspired institutions and 18 percent in the two main Brussels universities, which have a Freemason origin. Of course, now this has more to do with traditions in governance than with the ideological conviction of the students. The political power that comes with these numbers has resulted in a funding of these free institutions on an equal basis with the state universities. Belgium shares with Holland this rather unique situation. Extremely important for Belgium is the quasi absence of public or semipublic research institutes such as the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) in France or the Max Planck Institute in Germany. The Belgian Research Foundations are, to a large extent, funding mechanisms for research within the universities. Even when foundations have scientists on their payroll, they work in the university laboratories and are firmly embedded in the research structure of the university.1 In the Flemish as in the French-speaking community, there is a great difference in size, with about 27,000 students at K. U. Leuven, 800 in the K. U. Brussels, and about 900 at the agricultural faculty of Gembloux. Undoubtedly, this has to do with the political movement of the 1960s, which aimed at the democratization of universities by lowering the threshold to higher studies. At that time, it was believed that participation could be drastically increased by a regional redistribution of first-cycle universities. As a result, the Belgian university system now consists of six more or less complete universities and a range of smaller university colleges that offer a two-year “candidature” program in a few fields. Antwerp should be mentioned independently, as it is a confederation of three university institutes growing toward one single university.

The Academic Profession in the Two Communities of Belgium

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The Legal Framework for Universities Very soon after having acquired its new legislative powers in matters of education, the Flemish government put higher education on the political agenda. After an informal but intense concertation of the minister of education with the rectorates of the Flemish universities, and inspired by the Dutch reforms, the new university bill was approved by the Flemish Parliament on June 12, 1991, soon followed by a similar law for nonuniversity higher education (July 13, 1994). Change is also under way in the French community, but so far, most features of the old legislation still prevail. The basic philosophy of the new university system can be described as follows. In a knowledge society, the university environment has grown so diverse, so complex, and so changeable that a nationwide bureaucratic system with detailed ex ante regulations, tight process control, and line-item budgeting is no longer valid. The government must therefore move to a system of distant steering whereby each university is given a high degree of institutional autonomy. The government only sets broad missions. For universities, these consist in teaching, research, and community service, basic research being stressed to distinguish it from the nonuniversity sector where teaching prevails. The latter’s research activity is limited and more oriented to applications and product developments. In both sectors, each school is assigned a number of fields in which they may operate. Also, permanent education is made an explicit task. Distant steering, of course, does not mean that the government is completely absent. But its control is shifted from ex ante process regulations and work procedures to product-quality and extensive financial accountability toward the government and other stakeholders. The funding system for universities is extremely simple. Whether private or public, each university receives a “block grant” for its functioning. It consists of two parts. The first is a historically determined and invariable lump sum. The second depends on the number of students each university is able to attract. In the larger universities, the basic subsidy represents hardly 50 to 60 percent of their total annual budget. The remaining part comes from the second and third income streams, which, to a large extent, are obtained from competitive project funding. Universities decide about their staff according to their priorities and strategies. This extensive freedom is not absolute, as a limited number of official regulations have been maintained. A first series concerns the rule of “decent management.” This concept is taken from government administration and points to (1) the obligation of extensive and explicit motivation for all decisions; (2) the principle of equal chances for all persons involved; and (3) the existence of transparent criteria and procedures. A government commissioner acts as an observer in

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all decision-making bodies. He can propose a veto by the minister of education when formal rules are not respected. Second, a set of rules were introduced to protect the long-run financial equilibrium of each institution and its ability to honor its salary liabilities toward its tenured staff. The (Flemish) law states that the salary share of the basic subsidy should never exceed 80 percent (temporarily stretching to 85 percent). Also, for years, the university had to maintain a minimum of 36 percent of academic staff numbers for nontenured assistants on 3 ⫻ 2 years contracts. This had a double objective: that of an in-built financial flexibility for harsh times and that of preserving access to the academic profession for each new generation of graduates. In addition, to help the university administration shield itself from pressures for too excessive and too-fast promotions, the (Flemish) law provided that a maximum of 25 percent of all academic staff should be a professional chairholder; this norm becomes 35 percent when professors are included and a maximum of 64 percent for the four ranks of tenured staff taken together. Recently, these norms have met growing opposition: The argument is put forward that there are now so many temporary nontenured staff on the second and third income stream that work supervision by experienced staff has become unsatisfactory. So why not loosen these norms, since universities remain financially responsible? Very recently, a law extension has indeed abolished the 25 and 35 percent norms in Flanders (Decreet X, July 20, 1999). The Legal Framework for the Nonuniversity Sector (Hogescholen) The Flemish university law of June 12, 1991, should lead to other reforms in the nonuniversity higher education sector. Both in Flanders and in the French community, new legislation has been introduced and approved by the respective Parliaments. The impact of these reforms has been greater than for the university sector for the simple reason that until then the former had been subjected to a centralistic government rule without much real power for school directions. Even the number of teaching staff in the different disciplines and schools was strictly proportional to the number of students via a legally defined formula. Moreover, it was government administration that paid the salaries. What was left as decisional power did not really go to the school directions. Very often, through the system of labor negotiations, it went to the staff itself or to its representatives, either locally or nationally. In such a system, cost-saving policies or rationalizations are lacking, the dominant driving force being maximal protection of existing employment, whether needed or not. The guiding principles for the reform of the nonuniversity sector can be


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found in the Flemish university law of June 2, 1991: Through more institutional autonomy, envelope funding, financial incentives for bigger schools and quality control, drastic changes are under way. The nonuniversity sector at present has two main subdivisions: the HOKT and the HOLT. The one-cycle, or short-type (HOKT), programs require three years. The HOLT, with two cycles (four to five years), is intended to be of academic level but with a vocational and application bias; industrial engineers, interpreters, and licentiates in commercial sciences are its typical graduates. In addition to the titles of lector and work-leader, which do not require a doctorate, staff can, in principle, hold the same titles as in universities. However, only the last grant the title of professor ordinarius. In practice, the nonuniversity sector comprises a majority of lectors and experts with external expertise. Once the reform is completed, the number of institutions will be drastically reduced. In 1991, Flanders had 123 one-cycle institutions with no more than 140 students on average, and 29 two-cycle schools with 765 students on average (Nonneman 1993–1994). In Flanders only 28 Hogescholen are left now. In the meantime, the French community has reduced this number from 110 to 40. The Educational Program Structure Although there is a separate law for universities and HOBU, the real cleavage is not between university and HOBU but between the universities and the two-cycle schools (HOLT), on the one hand and the one-cycle schools (HOKT), on the other. In an effort to upgrade the HOLT, and also under political pressure from the opponents of the binary system, the HOLT legislation copies the university law in many respects. • Universities and HOLT schools organize their study curriculum in three cycles: The first leads to the diploma of candidate, which is normally obtained after two years of study. In universities, the second cycle leads to a final diploma, which again takes two years, except in civil engineering, bioengineering, commercial engineering, dentistry, pharmacy, law, and psychology, which require three years’ study. As is the case in many countries, medicine requires seven years for the basic degree of medical doctor and up to five additional years for further specialization. In the HOLT sector, the second cycle also leads to the diploma of licentiate or industrial engineer after two years. The universities offer 18 different fields of study; the HOBU, 11. • HOKT has only one single cycle of three years; typical diplomas are graduate in nursing, in informatics, in accountancy; laborant and teacher for the primary schools and lower levels of secondary education. • Next to their normal programs, most universities and HOBU offer third-cycle programs. As in France, two tracks can be distinguished: a specialization track

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leading to the certificate of specialized studies (GGS diploma) and a track leading to a certificate of supplementary studies (GAS diploma). • In universities, the highest degree is the doctorate. It is obtained after a formal training program and a doctoral thesis. Only universities can grant doctorates; but some bridge programs make it possible to switch from HOBU to university.

Each track is organized according to a rather rigid grid of study years. A student must pass the examination over the full-year program before he or she can enter the following year. Exams are organized in June, with a second chance in September. Compared to most other countries, the Belgian examination system puts great stress on students and teachers, especially as the old tradition of oral examinations has not yet been completely abandoned. However, the system has proved to be efficient, since students obtain their final degree in a shorter time than elsewhere. Critics say that this examination approach has an in-built bias toward pure reproduction of formal knowledge and does not lay stress on creativity, critical questioning, contextual thinking, and problem solving, which should be the basic characteristics of a university education. Recently, the Federation of Industry has strongly condemned this approach. Universities complain that because of insufficient indexation and fastraising costs, the basic subsidy falls short of meeting student growth. They point at the increasing student/teachers ratio and the unavoidable tendency to switch from more expensive professors to cheaper assistants. Undoubtedly this is true for the first cycle. But as one moves to the second and third cycles, especially in the exact sciences, the picture changes drastically. In many university faculties—though less in humanities—in seminars, work sessions, and dissertation work, students are brought into a real research environment through seminars, work sessions, and dissertation work. They meet their senior colleagues very often and work together on the same large projects. Because research is concentrated in universities, the increasing number of young researchers on contracts and fellowships has improved the ratio of students to academic staff (see Table 2.1 later in this chapter). Of course, the basic weakness remains the low ratio between senior tenured staff and the younger, inexperienced academic personnel. THE NEW STAKEHOLDERS AND THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION The Relevant Actors During the last decades, universities have been forced out of their ivory tower. Because of the importance of knowledge for society, universities and their academic staff have become central actors in the socioeconomic development of their communities. Because the composition of the university


31

income streams has changed drastically, it is clear that their tasks have been broadened from teaching and research to transfer of technology, to application-based activities, to permanent education, and even to community service. Academic staff sit on advisory boards and expert committees. A growing number of new stakeholders keep a critical watch on what happens in higher education. Students know that they must rely on the quality of their training to succeed in the labor market; industry has realized that its survival depends on a permanent supply of highly skilled labor and on the availability of a strong national research infrastructure that is necessary for a rapid integration of new knowledge into their processes and products; for the social partners and for public administration, modern life has become so complex that they also need university knowledge and higher education training to achieve their ambitions in building a new society. The general impression, however, is that the stakeholders’ influence on decisionmaking in higher education is indirect. In Belgium, the question arises whether their participation in the decision-making bodies goes beyond a symbolic and powerless representation. An indirect influence cannot be denied: Higher education does not leave the public indifferent. In the public debate, the new societal demands attract great attention. Looking at the interplay of the two traditional stakeholders, the state and the university, much has changed. As in most countries, the government remains a very important actor, but it tends to withdraw from operational interventions and apply distant steering, using the instruments of quality control and the setting of legal boundaries. A direct and probably very important consequence of this is that internally the oligarchy of senior tenured professors has lost much of its dominance in deciding what to teach and how to pursue their scholarly activities. In addition to the external pressure of public opinion and the quality control of their individual performance, they now must face a more alert student body and a more outspoken and emancipated group of junior assistants and researchers, who each try to defend their own interests through specific organizations and coalitions. But above all, there is the greater strength of university governance. The central university administration, or the rectorate, has gained much power because of the institutional autonomy bestowed on them by government. Moreover, in most institutions the rector and his team have reached their position through a representative vote by the entire university community, which again increases their authority. Belgian universities enjoy an almost American-like institutional autonomy. To find out who the most relevant decision makers are, it is worth analyzing how the new (Flemish) legislation has come into being. With many stakeholders, it is remarkable how the process of university lawmaking has almost exclusively been dominated by a strong coalition between the regional minister of education and the rectors of the eight Flemish universities. In an informal but intense concertation—probably only possible

32


in small countries—a modern university system was rapidly conceived and enforced. Subsequently, to upgrade nonuniversity education, university law served as the model. Pressure Groups, Professional Associations, and Labor Unions The minister of education and the rectors are the strategic players. It is evident, however, that they are under permanent pressure from other lobbying groups. The rectors meet regularly and negotiate their policy issues in rectors’ conferences: the VLIR (Vlaamse Interuniversitaire Road) in Flanders and the CIUF (Conseil Interuniversitaire des Universite´s Francophones) in the French-speaking community. Within their institutions, they must obtain the support of their respective university boards and more especially their academic councils. All academic councils have students and assistants among their members, but they are a minority. University boards that have the ultimate “formal” power differ greatly from university to university and sometimes have representatives of labor unions and regional politicians as members. In most universities, though, academic staff dominate. In some universities, such as Ghent and Brussels, the “association of professors” holds some of the seats. In others such as K. U. Leuven there is a tradition that academic representation is only done by the powerful group of the deans. In the Flemish university environment there are a wide range of professional organizations. But they only have a limited influence. They are organized within the university and therefore often lack an active national covering and coordination. Within the universities, there may be two rival organizations: One includes the assistant academic personnel; the other is only open to the higher ranks of the tenured staff. Official labor unions exist and include christian democrats, socialists, and conservatives. Moreover, within each sociopolitical orientation an additional distinction is often made between unions for the private and unions for the public sector. All these organizations lobby the academic authorities and the policymakers but with relatively little impact. One main reason for the limited role and influence of these entities is probably the system of elected deans, elected department heads, and elected rectors. Being elected, very often by a wide majority and for a limited time, the university community considers them as the real representatives of their profession. In many academic councils there is no other independent and strong representation next to the deans, except for the nontenured assistants. This has not always been the case. In 1968, when major issues were at stake, academics proved to be able to mobilize a wide and powerful movement very rapidly.


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Table 2.1 Academic Staff, Administrative Staff, and Students in the Flemish (1998–1999) and French (1997–1998) Community and Belgium (absolute numbers in FTE,1 in percent)

FSR ⫽ Foundations for Scientific Research. 1 Full-time equivalent. 2 Tenured scientific personnel included. 3 Temporary contracts, fellowships, and indefinite labor contracts. 4 Contract research with ministries and official agencies not included. 5 1998. Sources: Verstraete (1999); CIUF (1999).

STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE ACADEMIC STAFF Table 2.1 gives an overview of the university staff for both communities and for all income sources. Using these figures, in Table 2.2 the most important student and staff ratios are calculated. In Belgium with 51 percent and especially in its Flemish part with 55 percent, the relative size of the academic staff on the second and third income flow is astonishingly high. These figures illustrate that basic and applied research are still very much a university business. The predominance of small-and medium-sized firms, the quasi absence of independent research institutes, a stagnant basic subsidy, and for Flanders, the recent

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Table 2.2 Student/Staff Ratios and Staff Ratios for the Flemish (1998–1999) and French (1997–1998) Communities

Source: Calculated from Table 2.1.

government effort to increase university research are cited as the main reasons. For the regular tenured staff paid on the basic subsidy, it means much greater supervision of junior scientists, which in 1999 reaches on average 3.8 persons per tenured academic in Flanders and 2.8 in the French community. When the administration is taken into consideration, the ratios run up to 5.5 and 4.2. Central administration is included in these last figures. The relatively high ratio of students to regular academic staff is 16.4 for Belgium. It improves considerably when the second and third income streams are included. With a ratio of 8.1 for Belgium and 7.0 and 9.3 for the Flemish and French communities, students at Belgian universities, especially in their later years, study in a real research environment. Staff Structure in Universities If one looks behind the global figures, Belgian teaching and academic staff cover a wide range of very diverse statutes and career tracks. They differ from community to community and within each community, whether in universities or in the nonuniversity sector. For the efficient and effective functioning of the university, most attention should be given to the different ranks of the tenured staff on the basic subsidy. It is this group that constitutes its backbone. K. U. Leuven de-


35

scribes their job content as follows: It can be expected that a lecturer (docent) will deliver acceptable research and teaching; a senior lecturer (hoofddocent) has proven that he is able to deliver acceptable research and teaching; a professor has developed into a more-than-average creative and productive researcher—he is a teacher with didactic qualities and with broad teaching experience; a professor ordinarius is an excellent researcher who is recognized in his discipline—he is a teacher with didactic qualities and great teaching experience and endowed with leadership qualities. Concerning the staff on the basic subsidy, there is one important difference between the two communities: For to the tenured ranks, the Frenchspeaking universities have maintained the category of tenured scientific personnel, which works under the direction of a professor. Their postdoctoral career starts with the rank of “first assistants,” then moves up to “work-leader,” and finally to “faculty aggregate.” Financially, this career ends at the level of professor. In 1991, Flanders decided to abolish this category and to integrate most of its members in the tenured academic staff. At the same time, the additional rank of lecturer was added on the route to ordinarius. The move toward a unique academic career system is important because it gives more people a chance for independent scientific work and promotion. Yet it remains true that a majority of the tenured scientific personnel may stay in the lowest two ranks. The second income stream for both communities is dominated by the Foundations for Scientific Research (FSR). Their fellowships constitute an important support for the research activity of the universities. Aspirants on the payroll of the FSR are doctoral fellows who work toward a doctorate in university teams under the guidance of a professor. They are supposed to obtain it within a maximum of four years. Their assisting teaching duties are limited to a few hours a week. Their “net” remuneration is comparable to that of an assistant. Postdoctoral research mandates are granted on a competitive basis for three years. Temporary prolongations are possible but are limited to a maximum of nine years. The rationale of this postdoctoral employment on FSR budgets (also possible on university funds) is based on the fact that the immediate postdoctoral period has proven to be extremely fruitful for the valorization of the know-how acquired during the doctoral period. It is an ideal situation for publishing. At the same time, it serves as a professional orientation period for the candidate, and for the university, it is a welcome opportunity to test future tenured candidates. This is also the case, but on another level, for the tenure ranks of the research foundations. The holder of such a position is affiliated with a particular university, and in most cases, he or she will also have a parttime academic appointment on the payroll of the same university. The salary of a “research leader” corresponds to that of a lecturer (docent). A “research director” has the same remuneration as a senior lecturer (hoofddocent). Each university, however, can upgrade these researchers to the

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Table 2.3 Academic Staff in Belgian Universities on Basic Subsidy in 1996 (in FTE,1 in percent)

1

Full-time equivalent. Source: Studie en Planning, K. U. Leuven (internal document, 1998).

ranks of professor or ordinarius. In that case, the additional cost falls on the university and not on the FSR. In 1998, an important decision was taken by the Flemish Foundation for Scientific Research. It aims at the full integration of the tenured FSR researchers into the academic ranks of the university to which they are affiliated. This officializes and simplifies an existing situation by bringing all tenured academics under the direct jurisdiction of each university. In Table 2.3 the full-time equivalents (FTEs) who are financed on the basic subsidy are given for Flanders and for the French-speaking community. As universities have great spending freedom, the personnel structure can also differ enormously from university to university and hence from community to community. Flanders retains a large share of its basic funding for temporary assistants, but once they are in a tenured position, promotion seems somewhat quicker. A somewhat easier budgetary situation for the Flemish than for the French community also plays a role. Over the years the increase of the subsidy has been insufficient to keep up with the evolution of costs. Unlike the HOBU where, until the recent reforms, the paymaster was the government administration, for their basic activities universities must operate within a given envelope. Therefore, they have been obliged to reduce their permanent staff in favor of less expensive temporary assistants to meet their financial obligations. If all the personnel on the basic subsidy are taken together, in 1999, universities were working with 8.3 percent, less than in 1982 (VLIR 1999) In evaluating these figures, a serious caveat is necessary. As is apparent from Table 2.1, the picture is


37

incomplete because the real staff expansion in universities occurred through the second and third income streams. For the second income stream, the Flemish government has made remarkable efforts to enhance the research capacity of its community. Structure of and Staff Composition in Nonuniversity Higher Education Here again, the personnel structure differs greatly between Flanders and the French-speaking community. Since the 1994 law, it is possible for all nonuniversity institutions in Flanders to appoint academic staff in the same four tenure positions as in universities. In practice, however, very little use is made of this. The one-cycle institutes (HOKT) hardly ever do so. In many HOKT schools, even senior lecturers are uncommon. The assistant positions are only open to schools with two-cycle programs. Typical for the nonuniversity sector are the ranks of vocational and senior vocational lector. Table 2.4 shows a clear distinction between the pre- and postreform periods. A stricter government budget and school mergers have had a direct effect on the total FTEs. In the same period, student numbers rose from 83,028 to 92,770. The student/teacher ratio has therefore increased from a comfortable 10.2 to 12.5. The latter figure comes closer to that of universities and could jeopardize the labor-intensive teaching concept that is typical of Belgian nonuniversity higher education. The reform has allowed for school mergers and rationalization that should make this drastic reduction more bearable. EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF ACADEMICS IN UNIVERSITIES The University Decides In Belgium, and more especially in Flanders, many of the operational and strategic decisions concerning the academic staff’s employment and working conditions are taken by the university governance. Within its financial means and subject to a limited number of legal requirements, it is the university or the HOBU institution that decides as to the size and composition of its staff and how it is distributed among the faculties. This is the case not only for the “special academic staff” on research contracts with industry, European Union, or research foundations but also for staff members who are financed on the basic subsidy. The university decides on full-time or part-time positions, the ratio between administrative and academic staff, the relative importance of tenured staff, and within the tenured staff, their share in each of the four tenure ranks. It is the university that opens vacancies and selects, recruits, appoints, and promotes candidates.

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Table 2.4 Academic and Administrative Staff in Nonuniversity Higher Education in Flanders, 1992–1993 through 1998–1999 (absolute numbers, in percent)

Source: Hogescholen in Vlaanderen (1997), 37.

A limitation is the obligation to use the official salary scales, but the university has great freedom as to starting salaries and speed of promotion through the four ranks of the academic hierarchy. Legally, each member of the academic staff has a work contract with his or her institution. Tenured staff retire at 65. Normally, staff members are assigned to a department. Their task is defined by the university governance and comprises teaching, research, and sometimes community service. A tenured member of staff can be allowed by the university governance to do private consultancy for a maximum of one working day a week without losing his fulltime statute. A guest professor can be invited for a total period of a maximum of 6 years. As the university receives its basic subsidy as a block grant, it is its responsibility to pay its staff on a regular basis throughout its whole career. At retirement, however, the pension for tenured staff (on basic subsidy) is the responsibility of the federal government. Salary Scales in Universities As the financial burden of pensions is taken up by the federal state, the government has chosen to fix the salary scales for each academic rank by law. They are adjusted every year for inflation. Through a system of triennials, within each scale, salaries rise from a minimum level to a maximum level of about 50 percent more. Salaries in universities compare favorably with those of the average civil servant. The position of ordinarius is equal to that of a secretary general of a ministry. They are, however, considerably lower than in the private sector. Moreover, seen over a longer period, there has been a gradual erosion. Especially for civil engineers informaticians, economists, and lawyers, the academic profession has become less attractive. Prestige and academic freedom compensate less and less for this financial handicap when young people consider an academic career.


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Table 2.5 Academic Salaries in Belgian Universities in 1998 (monthly gross income in euro)1

1

Exchange rate based on “The Irrevocably Fixed Conversion Rates between the Euro and the Currencies of the Member States,” Official Journal of the European Communities 41 (December 31, 1998), L359, p. 3. Source: K. U. Leuven (internal document, 1998).

Table 2.5 gives the official salary scales for the four tenure ranks. Using the data of K. U. Leuven, the “real” starting salary is given, as well as the average age of entry into that rank. It is remarkable that the age of entry is the same for an ordinarius as for a professor. It shows that promotions are not dominated by seniority but to a large extent by the curriculum. Brilliant scholars with a solid—up to now—mainly research curriculum move faster. They can even skip a rank. Lesser performers are delayed in their career and may only become professor, senior lecturer, or exceptionally, lecturer. The figures in Table 2.5 refer to gross income before tax reductions and contributions for social security. For a family with three persons, take-home pay is about 44 percent less. As civil servants, professors receive an annual vacation allowance and an annual bonus, which again are much less than in the private sector. In judging the attractiveness of a university career, additional comments should be made. First, with the greater autonomy, regulations for academic remuneration have recently been considerably reduced. The Flemish university law allows universities to use up to 1 percent of the total salary amount for temporary salary supplements for those whose academic performance is excellent. So far, however, the difficulty of interdisciplinary comparisons has deterred most universities from doing so. Second, a special legal arrangement allows universities to grant 50 percent of the net surplus on industrial research contracts to the responsible professors and their staff. This surplus is paid out as a temporary salary supplement. Here also one sees that many professors prefer to add much of these supplements to their badly needed working credits, travel money

40


for conferences, and visits to foreign universities. High marginal taxes are undoubtedly an additional reason for this. Third, personnel on tenure can be given permission by the university governance to engage in private consulting. Only when this activity exceeds 20 percent of their normal working time are they obliged to switch to a part-time statute. For 6 years they have the right to full reintegration as long as they are under 60. Looking at other official or internal requirements, in Belgium, and more especially in Flanders, there are very few regulations. On average 5 to 6 hours a week of teaching is common. However, it can go from less than 1 hour to more than 10. In such an approach, the evaluation of an academic’s work is shifted from process rules to ex post quality control. Also, social control by peers in the faculty and the systematic evaluations at each of the six steps in the promotion ladder should not be neglected. Career Development: Internal Procedures It remains true that, even with growing autonomy, Belgian universities remain within the tradition of public administration. The rule of “decent administration” requires that each university formulates its procedures and criteria in a transparent way. Putting aside the regrettable pressure from some government agencies to use this obligation to replace the previous bureaucratic and cumbersome government rules by similar internal ones, it must be said that in many universities this has increased administrative coherence. The freedom to set one’s own rules has resulted in Human Resource Management (HRM) divergences from one university to the other. However, because of interuniversity discussions in the rectors’ conference, these differences have remained limited. The general pattern of the yearly employment procedures could be characterized by the procedures at K. U. Leuven. Within each faculty, a kind of Permanent Teaching Commission analyzes all vacancies and program changes that are introduced by departments, sections, and divisions. It has a large and active representation of students. Screened by the faculty that is responsible for overall program coherence and funding possibilities, the proposals reach the academic authorities, where fiat is given or refused. A rather influential evaluation committee is set up for each vacancy or series of vacancies. It is mainly or exclusively composed of ordinarii, sometimes with the support of external experts. It ranks candidates and submits this ranking to the “special academic council” (only deans, vice-rectors and rector). It is this body that, informally, takes the decisions. Formally, it is the university board that decides. It is possible to appeal these decisions. Each rank can be a final one. It is again the evaluation committee that gives the first evaluation, but all promotions in a faculty must fit into the faculty budget. At present, in


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many universities a bottleneck seems to develop at the level of senior lecturer where promotion is much slower. Career Development: Staff Appraisal and Staff Development In Flemish university law, quality control is very important. It is the responsibility of each university. The law requires universities to set up a system of quality control for study program, curriculum, development, teaching quality, and teaching infrastructure. According to the law, the government controls whether universities take their evaluation job seriously. It can intervene when it judges the work of a university to be deficient. In Belgium, evaluation of individual academic staff has existed for many years. Their recruitment and promotion largely depend on their previous research performance, which is measured by international publications and citation indices. In this evaluation, it is only recently that attention has been given to teaching qualities. Now, in many universities, candidates for promotion submit a “teaching dossier” in addition to their research profile. A teaching dossier contains the results of student evaluations, their monitoring effort, the teacher training certificates, or any other teaching award or teaching innovation. Sanctions for malfunctioning of senior tenured academic staff are not very great. But even for them, the greater attention given to teaching quality and research performance as well as the published or nonpublished evaluations constitute a moral pressure that should not be underestimated. In their evaluation effort, Flemish universities collaborate within the rectors’ conference (VLIR). They also use external visitations, often in collaboration with Dutch universities. Here it is the Dutch model of self-study reports and visitation committees that prevails. Teacher training courses in many universities are professionally organized. Often they are supplemented by individual monitoring by teaching specialists. Individual Career Prospects in the University Individual career prospects depend on talent, the willingness to work, other personal characteristics, and a certain degree of luck. It also depends on the age structure and staff composition at the university where one wants to build a career. In a university such as Gent, student numbers have been growing steadily, allowing for more academic positions. Moreover, an earlier retirement program has created an additional need for replacement. In such a university, chances for promotion will be higher than in some nonuniversity institutes that struggle with stagnating enrollment and too many permanent positions. In universities, a normal career would start with taking up a vacant assistantship. The law allows assistants to work up to 50 percent of their

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time toward a doctorate. This temporary contract of three times two years should allow them to follow the doctoral course and to carry out their doctoral research. In the exact and biomedical sciences, this research would normally be done as part of a larger project in one of the research centers. In human sciences, the relationship between professor and doctoral students in most universities is more personalized. More and more assistantships take the form of fellowships instead of normal work contracts. Though the net income is about the same, these contracts have more attractive social security provisions. Fellowships, however, require fewer teaching duties and focus more on the doctorate. In Flanders, of the total nontenured academic staff, 13 percent have some kind of fellowship; in the French community, 7 percent. After the doctorate, one can obtain a three-year postdoctoral fellowship, mainly for research. A tenured appointment refers either to a scientific profile or to a set of courses. It is either full-time or part-time. Once in a tenured rank, promotion from one rank to the other very much depends on the excellence of the research curriculum, the teaching task, and more recently, the teaching dossier. Candidates will face competition from external candidates and from fellows of the scientific research foundations. In many universities, the latter have proven to be a fast career lane. Male-Female Distribution Both in the Flemish and French-speaking universities, there are very few women in tenured positions. The figure hardly exceeds 10 percent. In the higher ranks, the situation is even worse. This is due to the lower student participation rate of women. But even when one takes the lowest academic rank of lecturer, figures only reach 22 percent for the Flemish universities and 27 percent for the French-speaking ones. Behind these figures lies the sociological fact that in the crucial years of an academic career women must combine their motherhood duties and the time-consuming task of writing a doctorate and publishing in scientific journals. In most universities, a movement is under way to reverse this situation without neglecting quality. There is no positive discrimination, but considerations such as family duties and pregnancies are beginning to appear in the recruitment and promotion criteria. In most universities, efforts are made to provide for child care and extended employment after pregnancy. This male-female picture contrasts with that of the nonuniversity sector, where, in 1994, the percentages were 45 percent for the Flemish and 47 percent for the French-speaking community. Here, the higher percentage of women reflects not only the absence of doctoral and research requirements but also the fact that many career-minded males do not find these positions sufficiently remunerated.


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Table 2.6 Academic Salaries in the Belgian Nonuniversity Sector in 1998 (monthly gross income in euro,1 range2)

1

Exchange rate based on “The Irrevocably Fixed Conversion Rates between the Euro and the Currencies of the Member States,” Official Journal of the European Communities 41 (December 31, 1998), L359, p. 3. 2 Starting salary and ending salary after 25 years. Source: K. U. Leuven (internal document, 1998).

EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE NONUNIVERSITY SECTOR Adapting to a New Law Until the 1994 law, nonuniversity institutions were subjected to a strictly regulated system. This law modeled nonuniversity higher education on universities with more institutional autonomy, envelope funding, and quality control. Financial responsibility was shifted to each institution. Many institutions are still trying to adapt to the new situation. For most schools, the introduction of norms concerning the maximum percentage of permanent staff has obliged them to accept new staff only on a temporary basis. Also new evaluation procedures bring additional work to a reduced permanent staff and that in a situation of growing student population. Salary Scales in the Nonuniversity Sector In general, salary scales could be somewhat lower in the nonuniversity sector. In comparing, different promotion criteria should be taken into account (see Table 2.6).

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Career Pattern in the Nonuniversity Sector Taking into account the vocational character of the HOBU and its subdivision into one-cycle and two-cycle programs, career paths start from very different levels of schooling. First, with a one-cycle diploma, access is open to a permanent or temporary position in the ranks of “vocational” or “practice” lector (praktijklector). Depending on seniority and professional experience, a position of senior vocational lector (hoofd praktijklector) is a possible promotion. Second, with a university degree or a diploma from a two-cycle school, one can have a permanent or temporary position as an assistant and work-leader. Third, a doctorate gives access to one of the same four tenure ranks as in universities. Relatively little use is made of this. Since the new law, the distinction between temporary and permanent positions is due to a greater extent to the rule that in each school permanent positions should never exceed 64 percent of the FTE. As most schools do not reach that norm, it is difficult for newcomers to obtain a tenure position. Finally, because of the vocational character, in evaluations much less attention is given to publications and research performance than to seniority and teaching quality. The Growing Importance of the Teaching Duty In Belgium, academic prestige is gained by research performance. This might change in favor of teaching excellence in the future. Indeed, a wide range of factors are working in that direction. First, in the new legislation, control of teaching quality has become important. University administrations have taken up this new task fairly eagerly. They have set up control mechanisms and have included teaching in their promotion criteria because teaching quality has become more and more important for student recruitment. Nowadays, universities face a much less faithful student population than before. Students shop around not only in the different universities of their own community but also across the frontiers of Europe. In previous generations, the university of their parents or the ideological inspiration used to be more important than teaching quality. Second, another powerful factor is that basic research has become so expensive that a polarization of research excellence seems unavoidable. This polarization occurs not only among universities but also within universities. The long-run implication is that a larger and larger group of academics might have to look elsewhere for their professional fulfillment. In his book Scholarship Reconsidered, E. Boyer of the Carnegie Foundation calls this a move toward renewed scholarship that he describes as making new syntheses, opening new lanes, and “saying and writing it well.” Here, teaching quality is a natural outcome.


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The influence of the European Union is more important than one would expect. Up to now, academics gained their international esteem through participation in international research networks. The successful Erasmus programs, founded by the EU, are changing this by offering the possibility to participate in international teaching networks. Finally, the growing importance of permanent education and the new possibilities of multimedia and telecommunications should also be mentioned. Bureaucratization? With their legislative initiatives, especially in Flanders, the regional governments have clearly indicated their intention to make institutions of higher learning more independent. Conceptually, the blueprint is clear and attractive: distant steering but with expost quality control and accountability. However, this legal construct is included in a sociological and institutional reality that makes a clear-cut application very difficult. The “Federal State Council” and its agencies that watch over Belgian constitutional correctness are not always on the same wavelength in the change process toward liberalization and more room for judgment at the decentralized level. The pitiful result is that the regional government and its agencies have been forced to formulate new and bureaucratic rules to create an often complicated interpretation that can be accepted as constitutionally correct by the federal agencies. Even the intention to leave more room for strategic judgment within the institutions is hindered by the obligation to formulate detailed and bureaucratic internal regulation as to how universities will use their freedom. Hence, external formalism is replaced by an internal one. For academics, this presents the danger of internal rules replacing the legal ones.2 Less Academic Freedom for the Individual Academic As the government withdraws from the university scene, more power goes to the university governance. Being closer to the professorate, this power is more direct and personal, especially as it is the university administration that formulates and interprets the performance criteria. Moreover, because of the economies of scale and the costs of research, research is done more in collaboration with colleagues of a research unit and in common projects. Hence, not all research lanes and not all methodologies are equally open. Also, stressing the quality of teaching programs requires coordination and avoidance of overlaps, which again reduces individual academic freedom.

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A Broader Salary Structure for Academics It has been argued that in Europe a hierarchization of institutions is developing. Connected with this is the expectation that university income streams will be very different and very unequal. Hence, universities will be able to pay very different salaries and performance-linked salary supplements. Also, it is expected that the trend toward fellowships instead of work contracts for junior staff will continue. Tenure under Siege? Growing competition among universities will increase performance pressure from the university governance. Already discussions are being held about reducing tenured positions. A working group of the Flemish Rectors’ Conference in a preliminary report in 1998 suggests limiting tenured positions to the ranks of ordinarius and professor. Other academics, whatever their income source, should then be offered a negotiated work contract of the same type as is customary in the private sector. Because so far academic pensions were paid by the federal government, this proposition is far from being accepted. But it illustrates what certain circles think about tenure and academic work contracts. Academic Drift in the Nonuniversity Sector The new law on the two-cycle programs of nonuniversity higher education (HOLT) stresses that the higher academic ranks should hold a doctorate. As a result, the new teachers tend to come immediately out of university laboratories and often lack work experience in industry. This is a very serious drawback for their previous vocational focus. Unavoidably, there is an academic drift that brings HOLT even closer to university teaching but without the previous vocational specificity of their mission. NOTES 1. Notable exceptions are the Royal Library, the Royal Meterologic Institute, the Africa Museum, and more recently, Interuniversity Micro-electronic Center (IMEC) and Vlaams Institute voor Biotechnologic (VIB). These last two are funded by the Flemish community but operate in close collaboration with and on the campuses of universities. 2. Article 17 states that all “important matters” concerning education must be regulated by law. The contestation is about what is important.


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REFERENCES Boyer, E. 1990. Scholarship Reconsidered. Princeton, NJ: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. CIUF. 1999. Statistiques universitaires, anneé academique 1997–1998. Brussels: CIUF. Communaute´ Française de Belgique. 1990. L’enseignement superieur et la recherche scientifique. Brussels: Communaute´ Française de Belgique. Het Onderwijs in Belgie. 1996. Onderwijs in de Europese universiteiten; eenheid in verscheidenheid. Open universiteit: Garant, Leuven, Apeldoorn. Hogescholen in Vlaanderen. 1997. Verslag van de commissaris-coo¨rdinator over het jaar 1997. Brussels: Ministerie van de Vlaamsegemeenschap. Hoornaert J. 2000. “Toelatingsvoorwaarden en selectie in Frankrijk, Nederland, Duitsland en Vlaanderen.” Thema 2000, no. 4, pp. 21–29. K. U. Leuven. 1993. Reglement van het academisch personeel. Leuven: K. U. Leuven. Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, Departement Onderwijs. 1994. Het Vlaams onderwijs, enkele internationale blikvangers. Brussels: Ministerie van de Vlaamsegemeenschap. Nonneman, W. 1993–1994. “De kosten van instellingen van hoger onderwijs buiten de universiteit en de kost van de kleinschaligheid.” Tijdschrift voor Onderwijs, Recht en Onderwijsbeleid 3, pp. 137–144. OECD. 1991. Examens des politiques nationales d’e´ducation. Vol. 3. Brussels: OECD. Tavernier, K. 1993. “An Organizational Framework for Staffing Policies in Universities.” Higher Education Management 2, pp. 151–160. Tavernier, K. 1995. “Human Resource Management in Universities.” In J. De Groof (ed.), Personeelsbeleid aan de Vlaamse universiteit, Cahiers voor onderwijsrecht en onderwijsbeleid. Deurne: Kluwer, Rechtswetenschappen, Belqie¨, pp. 53–62. Van de Meulebroeke, L.; De Munter, A.; and Gadeynee, J. M. 1998. “Vrouwen in het academisch corps.” Leuvense perspectieven: Onze Alma Mater 1, pp. 7– 29. Verhoeven, J. C., and Beuselinck, I. 1998. “Belgium: Diverging Professions in Twin Communities.” In D. Farnham (ed.), Managing Academic Staff in Changing University Systems: International Trends and Comparisons. Buckingham: Open University Press, pp. 35–57. Verstraete, L. 1999. Het personeelsbestand aan de Vlaamse universiteiten op 1 februari 1999. Brussels: VLIR. Vlaamse Gemeenschap. 1991. Decreet van 12 juni 1991 betreffende de universiteiten. Vlaamse Gemeenschap. 1994. Decreet van 13 juli 1994 betreffende de hogescholen. Vlaamse Gemeenschap. 1999. Decreet X van 20 Juli 1999. VLIR. 1998. Statistische gegevens betreffende de studentenbevolking aan de Vlaamse universiteiten, academiejaar ’96–’97. Brussels: VLIR. VLIR. 1999. Het personeelsbestand aan Vlaamse universiteiten op 1 februari 1998 en in zijn evolutie. Universiteit en Beleid 4, p. 10.

Chapter 3

Academic Staff in Denmark: The Consequences of Massification in a Small Country John E. Andersen

INTRODUCTION As in most Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (and other) countries, higher education in Denmark has undergone profound changes in the last three decades. The development from a relatively small and very elite system to a mass system was based on a number of reforms, especially in the last decade. Many were inspired by structures and changes in other countries. The adaptation of an Anglo-American structure in 1992 with bachelor’s, master’s, and Ph.D. degrees is an example. The ongoing attempt to reduce the number of institutions and concentrate their activities in bigger colleges and universities will put an end to a specific Danish institutional structure. Higher education has become a target for political debate and actions; the employment conditions of academic staff and the institutional structure of higher education have been discussed at length. In the ongoing debate on performance contracts between universities and the government, “benchmarking” has been a key issue. The universities have been urged to construct standards, comparing themselves to the most excellent institutions in their fields and setting their goals accordingly. Although some have tested benchmarking procedures, they are not much used, and there is no official ranking of the institutions.

THE HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM Denmark is a special case when it comes to the higher education system and the division of labor. Institutions are much smaller than in most other European countries. The average number of students is 800, compared to

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5,000 to 6,000 in Sweden. In Denmark, there is one higher education institution for every 26,000 inhabitants, compared to every 258,000 in Sweden. Institutions can be divided into two sectors: the college sector and the university sector. The college sector comprises relatively small colleges that offer short-term (one to three years) and medium-term (three to four years) courses. Generally, the short-cycle programs are provided by vocational colleges and the medium-cycle programs prepare students for a profession. This chapter is concerned mainly with the university sector that offers longterm higher education, including doctorates. The sector comprises five traditional universities, which offer the full range of academic disciplines, and six more specialized institutions, which offer programs in specific professional fields: a technical university and schools of veterinary science and agriculture, pharmacy, education, as well as two business schools. They have university status. It is only at the university level that teaching is research based. The aim of controlling the development of the universities and other higher education institutions led to the creation of the Department of Higher and Further Education at the Ministry of Education in 1974. It established tight control over the number of students and the budget of the universities. The budget structure was reformed in the early 1980s. This reform was based on a separation of funding of teaching and of research. The funding of teaching was based on a student/teacher ratio, and as the Ministry had total control over the number of students and defined the ratio, this led to a very tight regulation of the funding of teaching activities. Attempts were made to introduce a similar model for the funding of research, but the Ministry never succeeded in finding a useful model. Hence, the government put more and more of the financial resources for research in what is called “Cigar-boxes.” In other words, it switched from basic funding to project funding. The funding of university activities is based on the following principles: (1) Funding of teaching is based on examination success–related grants. This means that each student who passes an exam equivalent to one year’s study will release a fixed amount of money. If the student fails the exam, no money is released (in Denmark this is called the taximeter-principle); (2) funding of research is allocated to each institution independently of the funding of teaching; (3) in the funding of buildings, rent is separated from these two elements; and (4) a basic funding of 1 million DKr (Danish Krone) is granted to each university, irrespective of the size of the institution. (At the time of writing a totally new funding model was being is discussed. The institutions want freehold under their conditions, but other principles for ownership and tenancy need to be identified.) In 1994, the new University Act granted universities more financial autonomy. Since then, funding has been allocated as a lump sum to the universities, and the Senate allocates the funds to the faculties. The faculty

Academic Staff in Denmark: The Consequences of Massification

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Table 3.1 Funding of Teaching in Danish Universities in 1998 (taximeter per student, in euro)1

1

Exchange rate based on European Central Bank (ECB) daily euro foreign exchange reference rates on February 1, 2000: 1 DK ⫽ 0.1343508 euro. 2 Mathematics. 3 Veterinary. Source: State Budget (1998).

council must then distribute the funds between the institutes. Before 1994, it was the Ministry of Education that decided on the distribution of the funds at faculty level. There is therefore no longer a separate budget for salaries. The Ministry of Education has given professional and financial autonomy to the institutions, but it defines the goals according to the “taximeter” system. Funding of teaching is related to productivity, but since 1994, the funds have not been given according to an estimated number of students set by the Ministry but as a fixed rate per active student—that is, if they pass their examinations. Therefore, today, the financing of the universities is in the hands of the Danish Parliament and forms part of the national budget where the size of the taximeter is decided. Table 3.1 gives examples of the size of the taximeter. The amount is given annually if students succeed in their respective fields of study. The funding of university research is allocated as a basic public expenditure and amounts to 20 to 40 percent of the total amount of funding of teaching and research. Total expenditure on research has increased from 1.24 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1985 (or some 10 billion DKr in fixed 1995 prices) to 1.91 percent in 1995 (or 18.5 billion DKr in 1995 prices). The expenditure on research in the public sector represented 0.81 percent of the GDP in 1995 and was above the average of the European Union (EU) countries for the first time. Today, more public grants are given for research—but they are earmarked. The government decides on the area for extra investment—until recently, the hightechnology sector. These external funds rose from a total of 20 percent in 1985 to 35 percent in 1995. For the university sector, the figures are 19 percent in 1985 and 33 percent in 1995.

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Table 3.2 Funding of Research and Development in Danish Universities, 1985–1995 (in million euro,1 in percent)

1

Exchange rate based on European Central Bank (ECB) daily euro foreign exchange reference rates on February 1, 2000: 1 DK ⫽ 0.1343508 euro. Source: Ministry of Research and Information Technology (1997).

As mentioned before, Danish universities are public property and are therefore still mainly funded by the state. But the growing influence of other sources of funding for research activities can be seen in Table 3.2. Public funding still prevails, but funding from industry has grown by a factor of almost four between 1985 and 1995. Funding from foreign sources— mainly the EU—has increased even more. This change from internal to external funding affects the working conditions of the university teachers. An increasing number are part-timers, and there is only a slight increase in new permanent staff. As the external funding of public research has increased, this also means that a growing share of employment at the universities is temporary. At the same time, employment of administrative and technical staff (secretaries, laboratory workers, etc.) has decreased in relation to the academic staff, giving more work to university teachers (see Table 3.3). Structure of Study Programs and Admission The aim to raise “efficiency” also led to a reform of the study structure. It became closer to the Anglo-Saxon system of bachelor’s, master’s and Ph.D. instead of the traditional structure, which was closer to the Humboldt tradition. The bachelor’s degree was introduced in 1988. The minister of education decided that students could leave the university with a bachelor’s degree after three years. There was no attempt in the beginning to


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Table 3.3 Research Staff and Administrative/Technical Staff in Danish Universities, 1985– 1995 (in percent)

Source: Ministry of Research and Information Technology (1997).

create a formal three-year program with well-defined competencies. This resulted in one of the highest unemployment rates among bachelors ever seen in the Danish labor market. In the early 1990s, a formal 3-5-8 study structure was introduced. A university course normally consists of a threeyear bachelor’s degree course, followed by a two-year course leading to a master’s degree (Candidatus degree). The Ph.D. course (normally) lasts for three years following upon a master’s degree and culminates in the public defense of a thesis. Very few students leave with a bachelor’s degree, and only 5 to 8 percent obtain a Ph.D. degree. The introduction of the bachelor’s and Ph.D. degrees has led to considerable commotion in the university sector, not least because it was implemented within a very short period of time and because it was introduced during a period of budget cuts and an increase in the number of students. These factors have changed the working conditions of university teachers. In Denmark, tuition is free, and in principle, students with the appropriate entrance qualifications are admitted. Since 1994, the universities can decide on the intake of students within an overall framework, except in subjects with expensive programs such as medicine and dentistry. Here, the Ministry of Education determines the intake, as is the case with teacher education colleges. For the latter, the arguments are based on the demands for practical training places and graduates. Free intake is not the same as free admission, which means that all students who leave secondary education are entitled to be admitted to the courses and institution of their choice. Free intake means that it is the universities that decide how many and which students they will admit. Between 1992 and 1996, the total number of study places (41,000) and the total expenditure for each of the years were determined in a pluriannual agreement. Since then, more students have been admitted because of an increase in the number of applicants (31,050 applied in 1985, compared to 60,228 in 1997). In each of the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, some 2,000 applicants were rejected because they did not have the required

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qualifications. The rest were rejected because they had applied for a subject where all the study places had been allocated. It is more especially in teacher education colleges, pedagogical colleges, and humanities at the universities that there are too many applicants and therefore many rejects. At the universities, there has been a drop in applicants in natural sciences and technical sciences. In recent years, we observe in some European countries a declining interest of young school leavers to apply for natural and technical sciences. STAFFING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: MAIN ACTORS AND PROCEDURES The Relevant Players With very few exceptions, institutions of higher education are state run, and all staff members are state employees. Since 1997, each university has referred to two different ministries. Matters concerning research and economy fall under the Ministry of Research, whereas teaching and continuous education fall under the Ministry of Education. The obvious problem with the universities is that they are unique in combining teaching and research. In order to avoid controversies about competence between the two Ministries, the Danish prime minister heads a standing commission that mediates between the two! Generally speaking, the state negotiates the general agreement with the unions that represent the university teachers. As from 1999, this will be a three-year agreement that stipulates the economic (budgetary/financial) framework within which all agreed improvements will be financed. The state will allocate resources to the institutions accordingly. The overall budget for each institution is generated through the annual state budget. In cases where the government wishes to impose general budget cuts, which has been the case in recent years, it might be difficult for the institutions to see how their budgetary frame was increased to meet the general agreement. Some adjustments to the budget might arise because of the number of students admitted or politically wanted at each institution. Since the University Act of 1994, the rector receives the total funding, and further allocations of funds are the result of local decisions and negotiations. In some full-size universities the deans are urging for a return to the old system of earmarking the funds for each faculty. The universities can transfer funds within the budget, for example, from salaries to operations, and vice versa. Except for full permanent professorships, the institutions can establish all academic positions. Since the decentralized procedure of budgeting was inaugurated in the early 1990s, the state has found other ways of controlling the universities and the outcome of teaching and research, mainly


55

through evaluations and accountability. As from 1994, strategy plans have been mandatory. The Danish Rectors’ Conference functions as an intermediate coordinating body that mainly cooperates with the Ministry of Research. It can initiate projects and participates in many international organizations, including the Confederation of European Union Rectors’ Conferences and the Association of European Universities (CRE). Nordic cooperation was not weakened when most Nordic countries joined the EU. It is maintained in the Association of Nordic University Rectors’ Conference. Although not an official body, the Rectors’ Conference and its executive committee are heard before any new government initiative within the sector is taken. The Danish universities coordinate their policy toward the various EU cooperation programs through the Committee for International Relations under the Rectors’ Conference. There is a similar organization for university administrators, the Committee of Administrators. University staff members are organized mainly by occupation or educational background. Eighty to 85 percent belong to a number of unions. The largest, with over 3,000 university teachers, is the Danish Association of Masters and Ph.D.s, Dansk Magisterforening (DM). Lawyers and social scientists are members of the Dansk Jurist og Økonomforbund (DJØF), and engineers are members of the Ingeniørforbundet i Danmark (IDA). These three unions cooperate and publish a monthly magazine for researchers in higher education. The central organization for professionals with a university or college education is the Danish Confederation of Professional Associations (AC), with some 12 member organizations, including those just mentioned. The unions that represent the university teachers are bargaining agents. Through their umbrella organization, they engage in general bargaining every second year; from 1999, every third year. The agreement that we know today has two chapters. The first is for ordinary positions, which, as a general rule, include an obligation to conduct research and teaching. The other contains supplementary positions as either time-limited positions as full-time researchers or part-time positions, primarily in teaching. Local bargaining at the institutions is becoming much more important, especially after the new salary scheme of 1998, whereby any increment or salary bonus can be bargained at least once a year. RECENT CHANGES IN THE GOVERNANCE OF UNIVERSITIES In 1970, an act on governance of universities was passed. Students and younger teachers became part of the governing bodies of the universities. In 1973, the act was replaced by another that also gave access to technical

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and administrative staff. The ratio between university teachers, technicaladministrative staff, and students was 2:1:1 in most governing bodies (the senate and faculty councils) and 1:1 between teachers and students in bodies that were responsible for studies and exams. At the time, it was claimed to be the most “democratic” law of university governance in the world. Although there were some small—but in some cases, rather substantial— changes over the years, this law was not replaced until 1993. The new law introduced a far more hierarchical structure with more responsibility for individual leaders. These were still elected among the permanent university teachers, and the collegial bodies had far less influence. With this law, some of the authority was transferred from the Ministry to the institutions. The number of governing bodies was reduced, and external representation was introduced in the institutions’ chief governing bodies: the senate and faculty council. The management was changed to a more hierarchical structure consisting of individual leaders. It was claimed that this meant empowerment through delegation of the vice-chancellor who is responsible for the activities of the institution, both internally and externally. Educational management is placed with the director of studies, who is in charge of the staff-student committee (maximum of 10 members, equal representation of teachers and students). This director of studies is responsible for the educational resources of the department, organizes teaching within the subject area that the staff-student committee covers, deals with complaints about the standard of teaching and solves conflicts regarding the execution of teaching in his or her subject area. The management of research lies with the head of the department, who is in charge of the department’s research resources and of the planning of its research activities. The head of the department also has both the right and the duty to allocate work to the staff. This law caused great changes in the rights concerning research. In the former law, university teachers had explicit freedom of research. With this law, they only have freedom of methodology, but there have been very few examples of management executing their right to decide the researcher’s subject of research. So there is still a very high degree of self-determination. The daily management at department level is divided between a head of department and a director of studies. This can lead to a conflict of interests. In 1996 there was a major discussion that involved the minister of education who, at the time, was responsible for the universities (they are now under the minister of research). The conflict was about whether or not a director of studies should have financial resources of his own to buy alternative courses outside the university if he wasn’t satisfied with the teachers allocated to him by the head of department. The conclusion was that the director of studies only has a “drawing right” of the department’s human resources and therefore does not have his own budget to buy teaching. The


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opposite would have been a disaster for university teachers because it would have meant that a director of studies could take over half of the university teachers’ duties and therefore half of the salary to buy alternative teaching outside. THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION: BASIC CHARACTERISTICS AND STAFF STRUCTURE Most university teaching and research staff hold permanent positions. Each state employee can, however, be dismissed if the employer has a reason that is accepted by the union. If the union cannot accept the reason, there is an agreed bargaining process starting with the local management, then with the Ministry of Finance, and ending up in a special court if a solution cannot be found. There are specific rules concerning the period of notice. Furthermore, there has been a trend toward more part-time work (mainly in teaching) and fixed-term contracts (mainly in research). The following overview of the negotiated staff structure and career ladder is therefore not entirely fair in reflecting the career movements of Danish university teachers. The structure for academic staff mainly comprises three groups: the ordinary academic staff, the supplementary research staff, and the supplementary teaching staff. Ordinary staff must hold a Ph.D. or its equivalent. The first appointment, adjunkt (assistant professor), is limited to a period of three years. This is the only position where the division of time between research and other duties—teaching and administration—is stipulated. The adjunkt must reserve half of the three years for research and participate in pedagogical training and courses in university teaching. After three years the appointment stops, but the university must announce a position as lektor. This is the permanent position for academics who hold the qualifications one can obtain during the appointment as adjunkt, that is, Ph.D. level plus a year and a half of full-time research combined with pedagogical qualifications. The applicants will mainly be judged on their qualifications as researchers. The appointment as lektor (associate professor) is a full-time, permanent position, with a duty to conduct research and teach at all levels from bachelor to Ph.D. There is no stipulation regarding the specific proportions time to be devoted to research and teaching duties. This means that the lektor may, in theory, be required to teach full-time for a long period. But in fact, this never happens because he must also participate in the research carried out by the institute. The top position is “professor” (full professor), which is also a full-time, permanent position with teaching and research duties, but it requires a higher level of qualifications than lektor. Since there are not enough posi-

58


tions as professor available to offer all lektors who possess the necessary qualifications the opportunity to apply, this is a substantial obstacle to a career as a top-qualified university teacher. As a result of the renegotiation of the general agreement on positions in universities in 1999, 200 new professorates are expected to be released. These positions will be restricted to eight years and will mainly be awarded to younger researchers with internationally recognition for excellence in their fields. They will be less highly paid than the ordinary professorates. The positions for full-time researchers are divided according to levels of qualifications, like the positions in the ordinary structure. The categories are mostly used for research projects financed from external sources. This gives the following categories: research assistant, which is a position for non-Ph.D.s and is limited to a maximum period of two years; research adjunkt, which is the position for researchers with qualifications at the Ph.D. level. The maximum length of appointment is five years, and it cannot be prolonged at the same university. A research lektor must hold qualifications that are similar to those of the ordinary lektor. This position is also limited to a maximum period of five years, but holders can be appointed for more than one period. Research professor is also limited to a period of five years, and the qualifications are the same as for an ordinary professor. The supplementary structure also covers part-timers, primarily for teaching purposes. It includes the amanuensis, who is employed for up to two years; the external lecturer (Ekstern lektor), who is appointed part-time for a period up to three years, and the teaching assistant (Undervisningsassistent), who is appointed part-time for one semester. These are the “lowest” and most insecure positions. EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF ACADEMIC STAFF The distribution of the research staff, that is, the ordinary staff and the supplementary research staff, is shown in Table 3.4. It should be borne in mind that in the ordinary structure university teachers have both teaching and research duties. Externally financed personnel are far more common in engineering and in the sciences than in the humanities. The reason for this is the large number of externally financed contracts and collaboration with industry. External funds for the sciences have been almost four times larger than for the humanities. Recent developments are, however, quite different. While the external funds for the sciences increased 2.5 times in fixed prices between 1985 and 1995, in the humanities they increased 4.8 times. The number of staff in each area is quite the opposite if we analyze the number of part-timers involved in teaching activities. Here the vast majority


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Table 3.4 Academic and Administrative/Technical Staff and Proportion of Female Staff in Danish Universities in 1995 (absolute numbers, in percent)

Percentages do not total 100 due to rounding. 1 Only directly related to research activities. Source: Ministry of Research and Information Technology (1997).

are in the humanities, and there are almost none in the technical and science faculties. As regards women academic staff, very few hold full professorships, and there are a growing number in the lower categories (Andersen 1998). This picture has been rather constant, although there has been a development in recent years: Recent research shows that the development toward more women researchers continues slowly but persistently. Between 1993 and 1997, the proportion of women in academic positions rose from 16 to 20 percent. In more than half of all the vacancies the commissions received, however, there were no applications from women researchers (Sta˚hle 1999). To overcome this lack, we need to analyze, then remove, the barriers to women’s applications. Teaching-Related Staff In 1997, the Danish Association of Masters and Ph.D.s carried out a survey of the number of temporary teachers and researchers in the universities. It revealed that temporary employment was high. In Denmark all teaching is—in principle—research based at the university level, but the survey showed that this was not always the case. The survey covers the period 1995–1996 and shows that part-timers in teaching (who are not engaged in research) are to be found mostly in the social sciences (41.3 percent) and humanities (38.4 percent). Table 3.5

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Table 3.5 Permanent and Part-time Teaching Staff in Danish Universities, 1995–1996, by Field (absolute numbers in FTE,1 in percent)

1 Full-time equivalent. Source: Dansk Magisterforening (1997).

shows the distribution of part-timers versus permanent academic staff employed in the different faculties. Again, one must bear in mind that the permanent staff have both teaching and research duties, whereas the part-timers in this survey only teach. Hence, it is difficult to maintain that all teaching in universities is research based when almost half is in the hands of part-timers who do not carry out research connected to their teaching. This does not mean that they are not qualified as researchers. On the contrary, many are very well qualified, with a Ph.D. degree, but they are doing their research without being paid for it, and therefore their teaching is not registered as being based on research. Only permanent staff can deliver research-based teaching. Time Allocation Recent surveys (Jacobsen 1990) have shown that the average workload for university teachers is 50 hours a week (see Table 3.6). The time devoted to teaching, research and administration is on average 50 percent, 40 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. It is not unusual to devote only 20 to 30 percent of working hours to research and between 0 percent and 60 percent to teaching. The main consequence is that the increase in the number of students in many cases results in more teaching (and administrative) obligations within normal working hours and that research is conducted in the time that is left after teaching. University teachers are expected to have both the time and the economic resources to improve their qualifications. However, it is made clear to researchers with a teaching obligation that their most important qualification is their ability to conduct research. This gives the university teacher some security against being required to teach full-time.


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Table 3.6 Working Hours per Week of Danish University Teachers, by Field (in percent)

Source: Jacobsen (1990).

ACADEMIC SALARIES The vast majority of university teachers are in permanent positions, financed by the public funding of universities. From a social point of view, they are relatively well paid. But if we compare their earnings with the qualifications and workload demanded, the salary is not impressive. University teachers are covered by the general bargained agreement in the state sector that includes rules concerning payment, dismissal, normal work hours, a pension scheme, maternity leave, and so on. The monthly salary consists of a scale of eight steps, where holders of a bachelor start at step 1 and end at step 5. Holders of a master start at step 2 and end at step 8. The agreement also includes general wage increments in addition to the general scale for each category of appointments. At each university there is also a possibility of local bargaining between the unions and the management on further individual increments. All academics and professionals are covered by a general pension scheme that is agreed in the general agreement. The employee pays 5 percent of the scale salary (and of some high increments), and the employer, 10 percent more. The payment for pension is to a pensions fund that is controlled by the union. A very small number of employees are covered by special rules that give them a pension directly from the state. They are therefore not members of the pensions fund. Recruitment and Selection of Academic Staff In 1998, the Ministry of Education issued a circular on recruitment and selection of academic tenured staff. The appointment boards used to prioritize between qualified applicants, leaving only the formal decision to the faculty boards and the deans. Following the new circular, the appointment boards only decide whether or not the applicants are qualified. After counseling with the department or after an interview, the deans will choose

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between the accepted candidates. This new procedure has been met with great protest from university teachers. It is meant to be more efficient and less time-consuming (it was not unusual for the appointment boards to work for more than one year just for one position). It also places the final decision with the deans, who, in this respect, are becoming more powerful. Although the Ministry of Research has emphasized that research qualifications are still important, other qualifications such as pedagogical ones must be taken into account more seriously. At present, there is an ongoing process developing objective ways to present and assess these other qualifications. Promotion of Academic Staff The career structure of 1993 prescribes the possibilities of promotion in the Danish university system. As a result of the general bargaining in 1999 the unions and the Ministry of Education are negotiating ways to improve the promotion possibilities for adjunkts and lektors. Often—especially in science—an adjunkt will not obtain the announced position of lektor in his field because other external (foreign) applicants have more international experience and research qualifications. Lektors can only be promoted if a professor position is opened in their field. In many other countries, promotion is possible after an evaluation but without an open announcement of a professor position. The Danish Ministry of Research has rejected any suggestion to create a similar system in Denmark. Instead, a new professor category has been announced but is only to be acquired after announcement and application. Depending on the budgetary situation, a pay rise may be given individually to compensate for the lack of promotion possibilities. Despite the pronounced intention of the state to individualize payment in the sector, this option is not generally used in Denmark. All staff members in one category are usually paid the same salary. Although some special programs for the promotion of women have been launched with great success, the proportions of men and women in the sector are far from equal. But the number of women is growing significantly in many fields. Since 1995, all university teachers must pass a pedagogical test before they can obtain a permanent position at a Danish university. They are accordingly offered pedagogical training and supervision by more experienced colleagues. This is the only formalized staff development procedure for Danish university teachers.


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RECENT TRENDS AND DEBATES: PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS In the early 1990s, a series of reforms were introduced, and the current debate still focuses very much on the following aspects. In 1992, the government entered an agreement for higher education for the years 1992–1996 with a majority of the Danish Parliament (Pluriannual Agreement). With this agreement the previous continuous cuts in the funding of higher education came to an end, and an Anglo-American structure was adopted with the introduction of the bachelor’s and Ph.D. degrees in a 3-5-8-structure. In 1993, a new research program came into force at the universities. It builds on the master’s programs and is completed by the award of the Ph.D. degree. The introduction of the program was a consequence of the 3-5-8 educational structure at the universities. Before, a Ph.D. degree was regarded as the first postgraduate degree, and students were given full employment while taking the courses. Now it is a program at the highest level, and students are given free grants while taking the courses. Another key element was that the funding of teaching in higher education was to be based on the principle of a fixed rate for each type of education (taximeter). It was related to an estimated number of students set by the Ministry of Education. In 1992, the Danish government set up a Danish Center for Quality Assurance and Evaluation of Higher Education. The government argued that evaluations were needed as a steering mechanism as a consequence of the new University Act, which gave the institutions more autonomy. In 1993, a new University Act came into force introducing “stronger management” by reducing the influence and responsibilities of collegiate bodies. These responsibilities were transferred to university administrators and a more traditional hierarchy of leaders. In 1993, a new agreement on staff structure in universities came into force. The intention was to create a formal structure that gave a centrally agreed overview of all the possible positions as a university teacher negotiated by the university teachers’ unions (previously it was based on decisions taken by the full professors who governed the departments). The ordinary positions at the universities are assistant professor, associate professor, and full professor. A new element was that an assistant professor had to obtain pedagogical qualifications during employment. (An assistant professor is temporarily employed for a maximum of three years and thereafter has the possibility to be appointed as associate professor, if judged qualified and if an associate professorship is available.) It was also new that temporary categories of employment became part of the agreement about job structure. The conditions were set in a supplementary employment category. The political agreement in 1992—the Pluri-annual Agreement—for

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higher education was made in Parliament to cover the 1992–1996 period. The conditions for universities were so bad at the time that the politicians realized that if the sector was to survive and fulfill its responsibility of providing education at the highest academic level, it needed more grants. In 1993, Denmark changed government, and in 1994 the government introduced the “Universities in Growth” plan, allocating more funding for higher education and research. In return, the universities had to formulate detailed plans of action on a yearly basis and regularly report on results. But no strings were attached to the funds injected into the higher education sector. This was the last time Danish politicians transferred resources without any precondition. In the meantime, the political debate on higher education has been very intense. The players in the sector (university management, the academic staff, and their unions) have argued for more resources and have drawn public attention to the fact that the new mass university is underfunded and suffers from a lack of time for research. Recent research has documented a 40 percent growth rate of students between 1985 and 1995, whereas the growth in the number of teachers only increased marginally (Sta˚hle 1999). Still, most politicians are reluctant to supply more funding and criticize the universities for not providing the expected services to society. The current debate focuses on university governance through more powerful centralized top management, that is, rectors. To a certain degree, the unions and the democratic election procedures are seen as obstacles to development and cost-effectiveness. The Ministry of Research and the Ministry of Education have created new specialized institutions of higher education (e.g., an Information Technology University) with appointed rectors and a board of governors with a majority of external members. This seems to be the next hot issue in the university debate: whether elected rectors should be replaced by recruited top managers. In a somewhat erratic course, budget decentralization and self-regulation seem to be matched by more central decisions, formalized systems of quality control, and earmarked funds administered by ministries according to more or less clearly defined criteria. The implementation of the Performance Contract in 1999 can be seen as a step in the direction of rebureaucratization (Ministry of Research and Information Technology 2000). At the beginning, these contracts were seen as stipulating expectations between two partners, producing results and providing funding. In autumn 1999, it became obvious that the Development Contracts were rather void documents and mere declarations of intention from the universities that were not matched by any obligations from the ministries. For the academic profession, they have brought no clarification concerning working conditions and workloads. Several surveys that are mainly based on interviews with university teach-


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ers show a greater workload for academic staff. The unions have tried to raise this problem in collective bargaining, but the government has repeatedly refused to acknowledge the concept of overtime, arguing that an academic position with time for research is not controllable. In other words, the price Danish researchers pay for great freedom in organizing their work is that they are not paid for any extra workload. This is somewhat contrary to the introduction of a new salary scheme with individualized payment. Individualized salary bonuses can be given without any limit for qualifications, functions, and results. The system has been introduced at all public workplaces and makes more local bargaining necessary. Since each university that benefits from budget autonomy will have to find funds for bonuses within the existing budget, distinctive differences in payment have emerged only to a limited extent. The reorganization of the structure of higher education has led to another public debate. In order to increase the percentage of the cohort in higher education to 50 percent in the next few years, the government has launched a plan to transform the very many small institutions of higher education that are now outside the university sector into fewer, bigger ones. In 1999, a small number of bigger centers for higher education (CVU [Center for viderega˚ende uddannelse]) were created. Although this will be a collegelike university sector that only offers partly research-based teaching, the CVU institutions will be allowed to award a professional bachelor degree. Finally, Danish universities and their academic staff will face a problem in 2005. It is very often stressed in the debate that the massive expansion in the early 1970s caused a too-sudden recruitment of university teachers. These teachers and a very substantial part of all university teachers who are active now will gradually retire by 2005. This can be perceived as a relief in times of ongoing budget reductions, but, on the other hand, it is not compatible with the innovative management of universities that is so much in demand. The retirement age cannot be the decisive factor for development, especially when Danish universities have just declared their aims and challenging visions for the twenty-first century in performance contracts.

REFERENCES Andersen, H. 1998. Koen og karriereforhold i dansk forskning. Sociologisk Rapportserie nr. 10 Koebenhavn: Sociologisk Institut Koebenhavns Universitet. Dansk Magisterforening. 1997. Rapport LUF-dag. Koebenhavn: Dansk Magisterforening. Finansloven (State Budget). 1998. Økonomistyrelsen. Koebenhavn: Finansloven, p. 1352. Jacobsen, B 1990. Universitetsforsker i Danmark. Koebenhavn: Nyt fra Samfundsvidenskaberne.

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Ministry of Research and Information Technology. 1997. Research and Development in the Public Sector. Koebenhavn: Ministry of Research and Information Technology. Ministry of Research and Information Technology. 2000. University Performance Contracts—The Danish Model. Koebenhavn: Ministry of Research and Information Technology. Sta˚hle, B. 1999. Alder, koen og rekruttering i Dansk Universitetsforskning. Koebenhavn: UNI-C.

Chapter 4

The Changing Nature of Academic Employment in Finnish Higher Education Jussi Va¨limaa

INTRODUCTION This chapter analyzes the employment and working conditions of the academic staff in Finnish higher education. It focuses on the university sector because higher vocational education was only established in the 1990s. There are, therefore, no longitudinal data on the employment and working conditions of the academic staff in this sector (AMK institutions, ammattikorkeakoulu). The study is based on statistical data published by Statistics Finland (1993, 2; 1998, 12), the Ministry of Education (in KOTA database, which contains data describing university performance since 1981), and academic trade unions (Rantala 1998). It is supported by academic research related to the topic and by personal experiences gained as a university teacher, administrator, and researcher at the University of Jyva¨skyla¨ as from 1984. The scope, however, is limited in one respect. The term academic staff is used in a rather general sense. Clearly, the employment profiles of individual academics may vary between disciplines (Becher 1989) and institutions (Clark 1987) and according to academic status (Ruscio 1987) and gender (Va¨limaa 1998). We will provide a general overview.

HIGHER EDUCATION IN FINLAND The Traditions of Finnish Higher Education The history of Finnish higher education began with the establishment of a Royal Academy in A˚bo (Turku) in 1640, when Finland was under Swed-

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ish rule (from the twelfth century to 1809). The foundation of a university was related to a policy aiming to train civil servants for the king and clergy for the Lutheran Church. These aims remained under the Russian rule (1809–1917) when Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy. The Imperial Alexander University, renamed when it was moved to Helsinki in 1827, continued its social functions of training Lutheran clergy and civil servants for the tsar. University structures were redesigned according to the Humboldtian ideas that emphasize the unity of teaching and research and the autonomy of universities and professors (Lehrfreiheit) and students (Lernfreiheit) (Klinge et al. 1987, 1989). Following the Swedish tradition, the Russian tsar appointed professors from among the persons suggested by the university board, which mainly consisted of professors. The Imperial Alexander University was very important for the development of Finland as a cultural, political, and economic entity. In fact, it was at the core of the nation-making process, establishing the necessary foundations for the emerging nation-state. The Republic of Finland was founded in 1917 (Alapuro 1988; Va¨limaa 1996). Between the two world wars, Finnish higher education continued to be an elite system. In addition to the University of Helsinki (formerly Imperial Alexander University), two universities (A˚bo Akademi and Turun yliopisto) were established in 1920. The professors were appointed according to the procedure introduced under Swedish and Russian rule, with the exception that the president of the Republic replaced the tsar. Professors belonged to the highest level of society, and between the 1920s and the 1940s, many served as ministers (Klinge 1992). In a survey of social status hierarchies carried out in the late 1970s, professors were placed just below the prime minister and the bishops (Va¨limaa 1996). In the 1990s, they still retained their high social status and the universities their prestige. The transition of Finnish higher education toward a mass higher education system began in the late 1950s. It has been estimated that massification began in the 1970s (Ahola 1993; Trow 1974) when more than 15 percent of the age cohort entered higher education. One of the consequences of massification was the introduction of the numerus clausus in the 1960s. Creating equal educational opportunities for education—including higher education—became one of the most important objectives of the welfare state. The expansion of higher education was supported by a regional policy with the result that all major provinces were allowed to establish their universities in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The higher education development law of 1986 introduced a new strategy described by Van Vught as a strategy of self-regulation. The act and the government decision connected to it secured the basic resources and a 10 percent annual growth of appropriations. At the end of the 1980s, this was exceptional in western Europe. The situation changed rapidly in the early 1990s. Because of severe ec-

Academic Employment in Finnish Higher Education

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onomic difficulties, the higher education budget was reduced between 1991 and 1994 (Va¨limaa 1994). In 1995, the new government drew up guidelines for higher education up to the year 2000. Education and research were and are seen as crucial for Finland’s strategy for the future. Higher education institutions are seen as a part of the national innovation and development strategy that help the national economy on the world market (HE Policy 1998). In 1999, there were 20 higher education institutions located in all the regions of Finland (10 multifaculty institutions, 3 technical universities, 3 schools of economics, and 4 art academies). Universities grant professional degrees, bachelor’s degrees, master’s degrees, licentiate degrees and doctor’s degrees. They are all public in the sense of the traditional continental model (Clark 1983) and autonomous institutions, but they are subordinated to the Ministry of Education. The AMK institutions are local institutions operated by a local authority, municipal federation, or a registered Finnish foundation or association. All AMK degrees are, however, approved by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry regulates the functioning of the higher education system through national legislation and the power of the purse linked to national steering instruments. In 1997, universities admitted 18,660 students, and AMK institutions, 22,809. A comparison with the size of the relevant age cohort (on average 65,000 persons aged 17–21) shows that 64 percent of the cohort is offered a first-year place in higher education. This is, however, not the real percentage because the entrants belong to different age cohorts. We may estimate that the real percentage lies between 50 and 60 percent. If we only include university students, the percentage varies between 20 percent and 28 percent. The trend of the 1990s was a growing teacher/student ratio because the number of students was increasing, whereas the number of university teachers remained the same or even decreased. In 1985, there were 12.7 students per teacher in the universities. In 1990 the ratio was 14.2, and in 1997, it was already 18.5 (KOTA). Universities are administered by representatives who are elected for a three- to five-year period. Decisions are made by administrative bodies, which comprise many members representing the professors, the other teachers and researchers, the other staff, and the students. The representation of any single group must be less than half of the total membership of the given body (HE Policy 1998). The highest decision-making body in the Finnish universities is the senate, which is chaired by the rector. Faculties are administrative units consisting of several academic departments. A dean who is elected among the professors heads faculties as well as faculty councils. Faculties have traditionally conferred degrees and appointed short-term academic staff. At the departmental level, one of the senior academics (normally a professor or a lecturer) is elected the head of the department for three to five years.

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Two Traditions of Social Relations in the Academic Departments Following the Humboldtian ideas and the structure of the German universities, Finnish professors have always been both autonomous chair holders and state officials. This has created the basis for the development of the chair system in the Finnish universities. The German tradition encourages hierarchical social relationships between professors and assistants or other junior academics, because the latter depend on the professors’ material and/ or mental support at the beginning of their career. In addition to German traditions, one aspect of the expansion of the Finnish higher education system is the emergence of the department organization based on AngloAmerican ideals that emphasize collegial relationships among university teachers (Perkin 1984). Departments range from establishments with a professor, an assistant, and a secretary to large institutions with many professors, lecturers, and assistants. The idea of a department based on collegiality is supported by a staff structure where both professors and lecturers have permanent positions. This tradition may conflict with the German one even though normally these two traditions are interconnected with the “tacit knowledge” (Gerholm 1985) that junior academics need to learn in order to survive in the academic world. THE REFORMS AND CHANGES IN THE 1990s The Reform of Vocational Higher Education The major reform in the Finnish higher education system was the implementation of a nonuniversity sector in the 1990s. From the perspective of governmental steering, the aim of the AMK institutions reform was to change the educational structure to meet the needs of society (students and the labor market), expanding and developing higher education to meet the needs of international economic competition and European integration, and enhancing educational provision and flexibility through more effective cooperation between institutions. In addition, students are given greater opportunities to make personal choices. Therefore, it was assumed that the binary system is more responsive to the needs of working life and society (Ahola 1993). The government started this experiment in 1991 by giving permission to set up 22 temporary vocational higher education institutions. Each consisted of one to eight former vocational institutions. The experimental institutions were located in all parts of Finland and represented practically all types of institutions and fields (Ahola 1993). The same structure has become the rule in most of the new AMK institutions when the reform was expanded into a systemwide practice in 1996. Since autumn 1997, there


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are 30 AMK institutions: 16 established as permanent institutions and 14 with a temporary license to operate. In the next few years they will be evaluated and (normally) given the status of permanent AMK institutions. The government’s plan foresees the creation of a total of some 30 AMK institutions, all of them multifaculty institutions (HE Policy 1998). The Reform of Doctoral Training The main problems with traditional Finnish doctoral training have been the lack of systematic support and its funding. Most doctoral students have studied on a voluntary basis outside universities (and outside their normal working hours) without any economic support. In the mass higher education system, the supervision of their studies has been rather sporadic. The main aim of the graduate education reform was to make doctoral training more efficient by creating a systematic structure that could be implemented in all disciplines. The reform was implemented very rapidly in 1994, with the first graduate schools starting to operate in early 1995. The Ministry of Education granted funding for 93 graduate schools with 949 students, but the total number of doctoral students funded through this system was between 2,000 and 2,500 persons because universities must fund an equal number of doctoral training posts. The student population was, and is, academically very heterogeneous, because the posts were filled by researchers who were at different stages of their academic careers. Some were finishing their dissertation, whereas others had just completed their master’s degree. However, students are expected to take their doctoral degree in four years. During their studies, they are paid a monthly salary (FIM8,000– FIM10,900; FIM ⫽ Finnish mark). The Free Allocation of Teaching Resources Reform One of the major reforms that has influenced the nature of academic work (and its division of tasks and duties) was the reform concerning free allocation of teaching resources. The principles were agreed upon by the Ministry of Education and the academic trade unions. It was first launched at the University of Jyva¨skyla¨ and at the Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration in 1988–1989. The reform was a politically hot issue until it was extended to all universities in 1998. The AMK institutions adopted the same model of allocating teachers’ working time at the beginning of 1999. The reform aims to make the allocation of the teachers’ time between academic tasks and duties more flexible. Flexibility was achieved by discontinuing all previous regulations and statutes concerning the lecture hours of university teachers. Before the reform, a professor was required to lecture 140 hours per academic year (4 hours a week); an associate

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professor, 186 (6 hours a week); a senior lecturer, 392; a lecturer, 448; and a full-time teacher, 420 (Statistics Finland 1993). A separate decree allowed part of the teaching load to be substituted by seminar instruction, where 2 hours corresponded to 1 hour’s lecture. Assistants and senior assistants observed the civil service working time (approximately 37 hours a week) and were expected to do research for 12 to 24 hours a week, part of which involved teaching (Va¨limaa 1993). Teachers’ work now consists of some 1,600 hours a year. This does not, however, mean that they are not allowed to work more than that (in fact, most do), but it means that 1,600 hours is the basis for their salary. (Note: A Finnish mark is equivalent to 0.17 euro [1 euro ⫽ 5.95 FIM]. The current exchange rate [January 2001] of 1 euro is 0.91 U.S.$.) Financing Higher Education in the 1990s Education, science, and culture accounted for 13 to 14 percent of the Finnish state budget in the 1990s. In real terms, the funds spent every year on education, science, and culture varied between FIM25,000 and FIM26,000 million in the 1990s. Higher education (20 universities, 32 AMK institutions, and the Academy of Finland) was allocated a third (32.4 percent) of the budget of the Ministry of Education. This was about 4.5 percent of the total state budget (KOTA). There were two simultaneous trends in the 1990s. First, an economic recession hit Finland in the early 1990s, resulting in high unemployment rates (about 20 percent in 1993), a growing national debt, and budget cuts in the public sector. Being part of the public sector, all higher education institutions suffered reduced budgets (Va¨limaa 1994). Hence, state expenditure on higher education (universities) fell by 4.9 percent between 1991 and 1994. It then rose again, reaching the level of the 1991 budget in 1998. Simultaneously, however, the structure of the financing changed. The share of public funding by the Ministry of Education decreased by 8 percent between 1991 and 1997 (from 77 percent to 69 percent), while external funding from both private and public sources almost doubled. In terms of real income, between 1991 and 1997, the total income from chargeable services and other external funding (European Social Fund, The Academy of Finland, other public and private sources) grew by FIM1,260 million, whereas the funding from the Ministry of Education remained about the same (4,100 million marks) (KOTA). This change also affected the working conditions of the academic staff because short-term contract researchers are normally funded from the external funding sources. It is natural that the proportion of external funding is highest in the technical universities, but it has also become an important funding source in multidisciplinary universities. For example, at the University of Jyva¨skyla¨, 36 percent of the university budget was based on outside funding in


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1997. In practice, this means that part of the basic tasks—including permanent staff’s salaries—were covered by external funding sources. This is one of the pressures put on Finnish universities to increase external funding. Changes in National Steering Instruments and the New Universities Act According to the official picture given by the Ministry of Education, the university administration and decision-making systems have been “streamlined by reducing the number of levels and by delegating authority” during the 1990s (HE Policy 1996). The trend of the 1990s was to increase the power of the rectors, deans, and heads of departments at the expense of the collegial bodies. In addition, the dynamics of the higher education system changed with the introduction of new steering instruments called “management by result” in the 1990s. These include budgeting by result, lump-sum budgeting, and result agreements between the Ministry of Education and the universities. The goal of management by result is to reward performance and effectiveness (HE Policy 1996, 1998). The new steering instruments prepared the ground for the new Universities Act by gradually increasing institutional autonomy both in economic and in legal matters. The context for the implementation of the new Universities Act is also strongly influenced by the “marketization” of higher education in the sense that Bargh, Scott, and Smith (1996) describe it. In the new Universities Act (Yliopistolaki 1997), which was implemented in August 1998, universities were granted internal autonomy in all important matters. These include the right to allocate their internal resources independently of the Ministry of Education, the right to establish their institutional decrees and decision-making procedures, and the right to appoint professors and other academic staff. These are significant changes in a public higher education system rooted in the traditions of the continental model because now universities have the opportunity to implement institutional policymaking. These changes also affect the working conditions and contractual situation of the academic staff. STAFFING IN HIGHER EDUCATION The academic staff and nonacademic staff who work in the Finnish universities are regarded as civil servants. The nature of their contract with the state as represented by each university involves either a public office (virka), which is a permanent position, or a civil service relationship (virkasuhde), which is a temporary public office. “Tenured track” or “tenured position” do not exist as social categories in Finnish education in the American sense of the concept. Therefore, I shall use the categories of permanent and temporary positions to describe different civil service relationships.

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The rights and duties of employer and employee as well as the conditions of recruitment and dismissal are regulated by the State Civil Servants’ Act (valtion virkamieslaki 19.8.1994/750). The implementation of the Universities Act has provided universities with the right to nominate professors in addition to their previous rights to recruit other academic and nonacademic staff. Universities may also establish or abolish public offices, civil service relationships, and academic chairs within the limits defined in the State Civil Servants’ Act. The working conditions of the academic staff are agreed upon through collective bargaining, which is normally characterized as a tripartite system because it includes the labor unions, the employers’ organizations, and the state (the public sector). The system is a statutory one and was introduced in the early 1970s. There are three central labor organizations in Finland: the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK), the Confederation of Salaried Employee Organizations (STTK), and the Confederation of Unions for Academic Professionals (AKAVA), which has 32 affiliates and a total membership of 347,000. The largest union is the Trade Union of Education in Finland (105,000 members), whereas the unions of academics working in the universities are among the smaller trade unions: the Finnish Union of University Researchers and Teachers (FUURT, 5,500 members), the Union of Finnish Professors (UFUP, 1,700 members), and the Association of Finnish University Lecturers (UFUL, 1,700 members) in 1998. Normally the national labor organizations bargain with the nationallevel representatives of private and public sector employers’ organizations every two to three years. These negotiations lead to a national-level agreement, which defines the general framework (percentage of salary rise, working conditions, etc.) for the collective bargaining between individual trade unions and employers’ organizations. Academic trade unions represented by AKAVA’s Public-Sector Negotiating Commission bargain with the representatives of the public sector. As regards the university teaching staff, the agreements are nationally binding: All employers and employees in the field must follow them. Other academic staff (mainly researchers), represented by their local associations, negotiate with the respective university. Hence, researchers’ working conditions and salaries are not necessarily comparable. However, individual researchers or university teachers do not need to enter into negotiations with their employers, because a general framework has already been constructed in the national- or institutionallevel contracts and agreements. The benefits of the national agreements are obvious: They bring stability and predictability to labor markets. The problems are also obvious: The system is rather inflexible because all agreements are made either at the national or the trade union level. As a result, there is not much room for


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flexibility or sensitivity to local conditions. Hence, employers have criticized the collective bargaining system, demanding more flexible contracts and more power to bargain at the level of enterprises. In the context of the economic problems, greater flexibility was one of the employers’ main objectives in the 1990s. Labor organizations have admitted that more flexibility is needed and that local-level negotiations should be given more weight. Therefore, flexibility was increased and more rewarding salary policies were also introduced in the public sector in the 1990s. As for the universities, the same problems have been felt and the same arguments repeated. One way of increasing flexibility was the introduction of the free allocation of teaching resources. The Organization of Trade Unions The organization of the various academic trade unions is fairly similar. Each one has member unions or associations consisting of local unions in the different universities. The highest authority is the general meeting where members elect their union’s executive board. Some 80 percent of the professors belong to their trade union, and that is the lowest rate. The Finnish academic trade unions are not political organizations in the southern European sense of the word because they are not connected to a single political party or ideology but maintain ties with many parties. The members of the Union of Finnish Professors are mainly holders of permanent positions, even though the number of temporary chairs increased in the 1990s. The Finnish Union of Professors emphasizes the social importance of research in society and the role of professors in maintaining a high quality of research. The Association of Finnish University Lecturers belongs to the Trade Union of Education in Finland, a union dominated by schoolteachers. This indicates two things. First, the professional identity of university lecturers has been oriented more toward teaching than toward research. Second, in issues related to working conditions and salary, they may be in a stronger position because they are affiliated with a powerful trade union. The present situation may, however, weaken their professional identity as members of academic communities in universities. FUURT has a different role because it protects the academic staff whose working conditions and employment are the most uncertain of all: Only 21 percent of their members hold permanent positions. Therefore FUURT is a traditional trade union that safeguards its members’ legal and social rights at the workplace and provides assistance in work-related matters. Members also benefit from the Teacher’s Unemployment Benefit Society. These services are supported by a system of appointed representatives (luottamusmies) maintained by the AKAVA through its negotiation organ. Ap-

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pointed representatives are responsible for local negotiations between the employee and the employer (Acatiimi 1998). In Finland, the system of appointed representatives is an essential instrument in defending union members’ rights because it provides a link through which to negotiate on matters relating to individual and collective conditions of employment contracts. All three labor organizations have their appointed representatives in the higher education institutions. Recruitment Processes There are three main procedures to recruit academic staff in universities. First, appointment to a chair is usually a public process. When the chair (or public office) is declared open, candidates send their applications to the respective faculty council or department. In the case of professors, faculty councils nominate two or three experts to evaluate the academic production of each candidate. Then the faculty councils place the three best candidates on a ranking list and send it to the university board. Normally, the university board appoints the first-ranking candidate. The procedure is similar for lecturers, senior assistants, and senior researchers. Faculty councils appoint assistants and short-term personnel (with contracts of less than seven months), following the suggestion made by the respective department, which, in practice, means the head of the department. A second recruitment procedure, which is new, is based on invitations. This is normally used to appoint someone for a fixed-term professorship. One or two experts evaluate the academic quality of the invited person. If the evaluation is positive, the candidate is appointed to a post that normally lasts five years. A third procedure is applied to recruit research staff for projects. The head of the project or the department concerned appoints someone for a fixed period of time. Candidates may be asked to send their applications, but this is not always the case. ACADEMIC STAFF IN FINNISH HIGHER EDUCATION Researchers and Assisting Staff The academic staff in Finnish universities may be divided into university teachers, researchers, and assisting staff. The number of university teachers has not increased in the 1990s, whereas the number of other staff has grown rapidly. This increase has been mainly funded from external sources. According to the KOTA database, the growth has been most rapid among the other staff funded from external sources (see Table 4.1). They consist of researchers, assisting and administrative personnel, and university teachers.


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Table 4.1 University Teachers and Other Staff in Finnish Universities, 1985–1997 (absolute numbers, in percent)

1

Professors, associate professors, lecturers, senior assistants, assistants. Researchers (14%) and other, mainly administrative personnel (86%). 3 Project researchers, administrative, and assisting personnel. Source: KOTA database (1998). 2

The category of assisting personnel is more statistical because it covers those who cannot be included in the other two categories. Assisting staff may work either as librarians or laboratory engineers, or their title may be research amanuensis or amanuensis in departments. In the latter case, their work consists of various departmental duties or research-related andassisting tasks. Researchers are persons who are funded either by the Academy of Finland, a university, a ministry or from other private or public funding sources. They are often called “project researchers” (projektitutkija). Normally, they are provided with facilities by a university or a research institute, and they hold the title of researcher (tutkija) or senior researcher (erikoistutkija). Senior researchers normally have a licentiate or a Ph.D. degree and have longer contracts than researchers. The reform of doctoral training has contributed to the increase in the number of contract-based research staff in the Finnish universities. The position of doctoral students resembles that of contract researchers because they are also paid a salary during their studies, normally for a four-year period (Aittola & Maä¨tta¨ 1998). University Teachers There are three categories of university teachers: professors, lecturers, and assistants. All are regarded as civil servants. In addition to these categories there has remained a historical remnant called docent (dosentti). It is not a public office but requires permission to teach at the university concerned. Docents are paid according to their lecturing hours.

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Professors are responsible for teaching and research and often for the administration of their departments. The category of professors (professori) consisted of professors and associate professors until July 31, 1998. Since then associate professor has been discontinued as a title, even though it continues to exist as a salary grade (A26). Traditionally, professors and associate professors were given a permanent position and the title of professor echoed the prestige of the German professors. Things began to change in the 1990s when universities started to appoint people to fixedterm chairs (maä¨raäikainen professuuri). In 1998, as many as 33 percent of the new professors were appointed as fixed-term “temporary professors.” Professors have been—and still are—the most prestigious group of academics, even though their social status has been challenged by fixedterm professors and by the invitation procedure described above. In the 1990s, this once homogeneous category comprised four types of professors: research professors (tutkimusprofessori) (salary grade A28–30) appointed by the Academy of Finland for a five-year period, the previous “full” professors (salary grade A28), the new “ex-associate” professors (salary grade A26), and fixed-term professors (salary grade A26–28). Lecturers (lehtori) are university teachers who do not carry out research. Traditionally, their work was defined in terms of lecturing hours during the academic year (12 to 14 hours a week), even though this definition has been challenged by the free allocation of teaching resources: Now lecturers can do research (Va¨limaa 1993). They normally hold a permanent position and consist of lecturers, senior lecturers (lehtori yp.), and junior lecturers (lehtori, ap.). In all these categories, the possession of postgraduate degrees and teaching experience lead to an increase in salary. Originally, an assistant’s post (assistentti) was a doctoral training position offered to junior academics. However, because of the growth of Finnish higher education, the shortage of university teaching staff led to a situation where assistants found themselves with a heavy teaching load and many departmental duties. Furthermore, when the rapid expansion of Finnish universities slowed down in the 1970s and ceased in the 1980s, there emerged a “Ph.D. jam.” Young Ph.D.s who did not have access to chairs occupied assistants’ posts, blocking the way for the younger generations. The position of senior assistant (yliassistentti) was created to solve the problem in the 1980s. Senior assistants must hold a postgraduate degree, whereas assistants normally hold an M.A. degree. This policy seems to work quite well because 72 percent of the senior assistants had either a Ph.D. or a licentiate degree, whereas 67 percent of the assistants held an M.A. degree in the early 1990s (Statistics Finland 1993). Both assistants and senior assistants are appointed for a fixed term, normally five years. The lowest category of university teachers is the full-time teachers (paä¨toiminen tuntiopettaja). They have the lowest salary and the heaviest teaching load. Before the free allocation of teaching resources, it consisted of 14


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Table 4.2 University Teachers in Finnish Universities, 1983–1992 (absolute numbers, change in percent)

Source: Statistics Finland (1993).

hours of lecturing a week. The number of full-time teachers has dropped by almost 40 percent, mainly because of the budget cuts in the 1990s. The newest category of university teaching staff is the university teacher (yliopiston opettaja), or university lecturer (yliopistonlehtori). They combine the work of lecturers and full-time teachers and have a contract with the university. The Number and Structure of the Teaching Staff With the expansion of higher education, the number of university teachers grew steadily until the 1980s and stagnated at the turn of the decade. Since then, there has been little change. The 1980s saw a growth in the number of all types of university teachers except assistants and full-time teachers (see Table 4.2). These trends can be seen in all statistical publications, even though there are differences between exact numbers due to different criteria used. The KOTA database indicates the quantity of human resource but not necessarily the number of persons hired, whereas Statistics Finland (1993) gathered data on actual situations (excluding art academies because they are not traditional universities). The drop in the number of assistants is due to conversions of assistantships into senior assistantships. The posts of full-time teachers have decreased because of economic problems: They are often based on shortterm contracts and therefore are the easiest to abolish. The Structure of the Teaching Staff According to Statistics Finland (1993), the median age of university teachers was 42 years in 1992. It rose by 4 years between 1983 and 1992,

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from 38 to 42 years, indicating the end of expansion of Finnish higher education. Median age was highest in permanent positions (professors, associate professors, senior lecturers, amanuensis) and lowest in temporary positions (assistants and senior assistants). The percentage of women teachers increased by 5 percent in the 1980s. On average, 35 percent of university teachers were women in 1992. The percentage varied, however, between academic positions. The proportion of women chair holders increased as the academic status decreased. This trend has been noted in other countries (Kyvik 1991). Hence, only 10 percent of the professors but 60 percent of the full-time teachers were women. There are, however, differences between disciplines: Almost 60 percent of teachers and researchers in the humanities were women, whereas in technical fields, the percentage was 12 percent (Statistics Finland 1993). There are differences in the gender structure mainly due to disciplinary differences. The technical universities have more male staff than the universities with strong faculties of humanities and social sciences (Universities of Jyva¨skyla¨, Joensuu, Tampere, Helsinki). Equality of salary and working conditions for both sexes is part of the national labor policy. Hence, there are no special programs to promote the recruitment of women. However, there does not seem to have been severe recruitment problems, since the number of women teachers and researchers increased steadily in the 1980s. The Mobility of University Teachers Staff mobility is rather low in the Finnish universities: 76 percent of the teachers work in the university where they obtained their last degree (deviation: 71 percent–90 percent). The professors were the most mobile group, since less than two-thirds (59 percent) obtained their degree in the institution where they hold their chairs, whereas lecturers (67 percent), associate professors (70 percent), senior assistants (84 percent), and assistants (91 percent) mainly work at their alma mater (Statistics Finland 1993). The large universities (especially the University of Helsinki) have trained a greater proportion of university teachers and researchers than their size would suggest. This is partly due to the expansion of Finnish higher education in the 1960s and 1970s when new universities mainly recruited their professors from the University of Helsinki. On the basis of these figures, it becomes quite clear why the international mobility of academics is not an issue in Finland: Most of the academic staff were recruited from their own institution. This is reinforced by the isolation created by the Finnish language. The Structure of the Teaching Staff in AMK Institutions There are both permanent and temporary AMK institutions in Finland with no significant differences in the structure of the teaching staff between


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Table 4.3 Teaching Staff in Finnish AMK Institutions, by Gender and Degree, in 1997 (absolute numbers, in percent)

Source: AMKOTA database (1998).

the two. Permanent AMK institutions employed 2,159 full-time teachers (53 percent women) and 1,265 part-time teachers (40 percent women). Temporary AMK institutions employed 2,400 full-time teachers (45 percent women) and 436 part-time teachers (45 percent female) (AMKOTA 1998). However, the composition and structure of their teaching staff differ significantly from that of the universities because there are neither professorships nor assistantships nor research posts. This is due to their tradition and mission of high-quality vocational education. The most prestigious category of AMK teachers is senior teachers (yliopettaja), who are responsible for developing and leading their departments or professional fields. AMK institutions aim to recruit Ph.D.s or licentiate degree holders to these positions. AMK lecturers’ job profiles resemble those of traditional university lecturers, since neither are expected to do research. Most teachers in AMK institutions hold either an M.A. degree (63 percent) or a professional degree (20 percent ⫽ other). Senior teachers, lecturers, and full-time teachers have a permanent position, unlike part-time teachers. The high proportion of women teachers may be explained by the orientation of AMK institutions. In social work, health care, culture, and tourism, they are the majority (see Table 4.3).

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Table 4.4 Proportion of Working Hours Spent on Major Functions in Finnish Universities in 1992, by Field (mean percentage of respondents)

Source: Statistics Finland (1993).

WORK AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE UNIVERSITIES The Division of Work: Teaching, Research, Other Duties In universities, academic work is divided into teaching, research, and other tasks (mainly services and administrative duties). According to a timebudget study carried out by Statistics Finland (1993), the academic staff spend 44 percent of their time on teaching, 44 percent on research, and 16 percent on other duties. The proportions vary, however, according to discipline, as can be seen in Table 4.4. According to Statistics Finland (1993), significant differences can be found in the amount of time spent on teaching in different institutions, even in the same field, indicating differences between institutional resources. In the humanities, the variation was 14 percent, and in the social sciences, it was 12 percent. In science the difference was 10 percent, followed by 9 percent in forestry and agronomy, 7 percent in technical sciences, and 6 percent in medicine. As for research, the differences were similar: 12 percent in humanities, 12 percent in social sciences, 10 percent in science, 3 percent in forestry and agronomy, 10 percent in technical sciences, and 9 percent in medicine. The structure of academic work is also linked to academic position and gender. In all academic positions, male teachers have more time for research, whereas women teachers devote more time to teaching. There are, however, variations according to academic positions: Male professors teach more than women professors, whereas women senior assistants teach more than their male colleagues. As for researchers, women teach more but have fewer other duties than their male colleagues. It is quite natural that professors and associate professors have more other duties than the rest of the academic staff since they are often responsible for their departments.


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The Work of Researchers and the Junior Teaching Staff According to a national survey carried out by the Finnish Union of University Researchers and Teachers, 27 percent of the respondents worked as university teachers, whereas 38 percent were researchers. The percentage of permanent officeholders was 21 percent: They worked mostly in libraries. Most respondents (79 percent) had a short-term contract or worked on a scholarship. As for researchers, 91 percent were in a fixed-term position. The length of project researchers’ contracts and researchers’ tasks and funding sources vary considerably. According to the survey, the majority of their contracts (60 percent) are for a maximum of one year. Unemployment is also a threat: 22 percent of the respondents had been out of work during the two years preceding the survey, and 6 percent were unemployed at the time of the survey (Rantala 1998). Unemployment rates of H.E. graduates are lower compared to non-graduates. As an illustration of typical working conditions, we shall describe the career path of a woman project researcher in the field of social studies. Let us call her Sofia. Sofia graduated in 1992. After graduation, she was recruited by her professor to work as a research amanuensis for 1 month, followed by a 2-week contract as a researcher. This was followed by another 2-month contract as a researcher, which was later extended by 11 months. After these contracts, Sofia was unemployed for 8 weeks. She was recruited again in December 1993 for a 2-week period, after which she was granted a 3-month scholarship. After this, Sofia continued as a researcher until the end of 1994 (three contracts). She then obtained a university scholarship for 18 months. After this period, during which she finished her licentiate thesis, she was a lecturer in the academic year 1996–1997. Sofia then continued as a research assistant until the end of 1998. Sofia worked all the time in the same department. Between 1992 and 1998 she had 18 contracts with the same university, lasting from 2 weeks to 12 months. She was funded by two ministries, a public health care organization, a foundation, a city council, and two different scholarships granted by her alma mater. Typical in her career is the constant uncertainty as to whether she will obtain another contract after the current one expires and for how long.

This describes the reality of the junior staff in Finnish universities: Their career paths may and do consist of various types of work (teaching and research) that last for varying periods, with a possibility of periods of unemployment. This group is the most dependent on the increase of external funding because their contracts are those that are the easiest to discontinue. Salaries and Social Security The salaries of university teachers are paid according to the contracts concluded through collective bargaining, whereas researchers’ salaries and

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Table 4.5 Salaries of Academic Staff in Finnish Universities in 1997 (gross income per month in euro)1

1

Exchange rate based on “The Irrevocably Fixed Conversion Rates between the Euro and the Currencies of the Member States,” Official Journal of the European Communities 41 (December 31, 1998), L359, p. 3. Source: Statistics Finland (1998).

working conditions are negotiated at the institutional level. In both cases, however, they consist of a basic salary, seniority increments (paid for 3, 5, 8, 11, 15, and 18 years of service), and personal bonuses on the basis of performance either in research (researchers and the junior teaching staff) or in research and postgraduate training (professors). The personal bonuses and the principles according to which they are granted are based on collective bargaining, but the persons concerned and the sums are decided by the institutions. For research, it is difficult to analyze the impact of these policies because personal bonuses are confidential: There are no available statistics. As for professors, it has been agreed that 57 percent will be paid personal bonuses on a yearly basis. The differences within groups of university teachers need to be explained. One is the teacher’s years of public service. Compared to the basic salary, the difference can be over FIM6,000 a month, and in the lowest salary grades, it is over FIM2,000 a month. The second difference, especially in the lower academic positions, is extra teaching hours. According to the FUURT survey, 32 percent of the respondents earned about FIM1,070 a month and 14 percent an average of FIM2,020 a month through extra teaching. The third difference is personal bonuses. Professors may have either one (about FIM2,300 a month) or two (FIM4,600 a month) personal bonuses on the basis of their performance in doctoral training or research. These are also paid to other teachers and researchers. Table 4.5 lists salaries of academic staff in Finnish universities in 1997. The academic staff benefit from a health care system that is paid for by


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the employer. It includes the free services of doctors and nurses. In case of unemployment, academic trade unions pay a certain proportion of the former salary (up to 50 percent), even though the main funding comes from the state budget. Both the employer and the employee pay a proportion of the salary into pension funds. These service do not cover project researchers working on a scholarship. ACADEMIC CAREER FIELDS AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT In principle, the structure of an academic career is that of a career ladder that is supported by national legislation and university practices. The normal prerequisite for all lower academic positions (researchers, assistants, and lecturers) is an M.A. degree. For higher teaching and research posts (senior researcher, senior assistant, professor) a Ph.D. degree is normally required. In practice, however, the structure of career development is difficult to describe as a career ladder. Rather, it consists of various paths leading from one position to another. According to Enders (1996), the question concerning the structuring of an academic career in German higher education is: How does one become a professor? In Finland, the relevant question for a junior academic is how to find funding for the next project. There are three reasons that account for the present situation in Finland. First, the economies of scale. Now that higher education is no longer expanding, the system offers university teachers and researchers a limited market. As a result, there are few open posts available to junior academics. This is, in turn, related to the funding structure. Most of the funding for junior academics comes from external sources, which have created a market for shortterm research contracts. A third factor can be described with the help of the “Ph.D. overproduction” concept. The reform of doctoral education doubled the annual production of Ph.D.s in the 1990s. According to Aittola and Maä¨tta¨ (1998), only 41 percent of doctoral students aim to work in universities or research institutes after having defended their dissertation. There are, of course, disciplinary differences: In technical fields, they are more interested in private enterprises than in the humanities or social sciences, where 52 percent are oriented to universities. These high percentages can be explained by the uncertainties inherent to academic career expectations based on the short-term contracts available for young academics— including Ph.D.s. We shall describe the structure of Finnish career paths with the help of two different academic career fields that are linked: the field of permanent positions and the field of temporary positions. Field is used here as a metaphor derived from arcade and computer games: One must gain a certain

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number of credits to move from a lower to an upper level. In this case, one needs research credits to advance from the field of temporary academic positions to that of permanent positions. The teaching and research tracks are closely interconnected because in both cases the assessment criteria are dominated by publications. In the “temporary field,” the essential question is how to find one’s first job and make it last. The first job also depends on one’s personal networks because project researchers (the most probable first job) are appointed by a project manager or a professor without the involvement of a collegial body. It is assumed that after a few years of active research one will be better qualified to apply for a better-paid or even a permanent position. As in the case of Sofia, there are many kinds of temporary and short-term contracts and positions available. Yet one may only remain a project researcher, especially if one does not obtain a doctoral degree. The field of permanent positions follows a different logic. Here one may speak about an academic career. The development of one’s career greatly depends on research activities. Hence, it is harder for lecturers to become professors because they have less time for research than their colleagues who are funded by the Academy of Finland or some other external source. Building a career depends less on one’s personal networks than on one’s reputation, even though both are linked. Multimember decision-making bodies normally appoint academics to permanent positions. There were some 11,200 posts in the field of temporary positions (including 686 senior assistants’ posts, 1721 assistant’s posts, and 330 fulltime teacher’s posts) in 1997. Most, however, are filled by project researchers and assisting personnel. In principle, most “temporary” academics aim at a permanent position. In the field of permanent positions there are 11,900 posts (KOTA). However, only 4,200 are academic posts, the rest being administrative posts (7,740). This means that there are at least 2.7 “temporary” people applying for each permanent position. In practice, however, the figure is much higher because holders of permanent positions may also apply for these posts. In short, it is very difficult to advance from the temporary field to the permanent field. Normally this requires publications and a relevant academic degree. It will not, however, be enough because both the social dynamics and the role of the gatekeepers vary according to the field. In the temporary field, the gatekeepers are individuals, whereas in the permanent field they are collegial decision-making bodies. One can also choose the administrative track. But it is very difficult to return to the academic field after having been part of the higher education administration. It is also possible to leave both these academic career fields and start working in “the real world.”


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The Personalization Process The Finnish higher education system is in transition. Recent reforms of higher vocational education, doctoral training, and the allocation of teaching resources, together with new legislation, have created a new playing field for the employment and working conditions of the academic staff. The functioning of higher education was regulated by the Ministry of Education through budget allocations and national regulations until the 1980s. The situation changed rapidly with the economic difficulties that Finland faced in the 1990s. The new national policy emphasizing the autonomy of higher education institutions began in the 1980s. However, the decrease in public funding has strengthened managerial development in the universities, and steering through “management by results” has given the universities new fiscal possibilities to allocate their resources independently of the central authorities. The new Universities Act institutionalized these developments. An interesting development seems to be taking place in the universities. It could be called the “personalization of a permanent position.” The universities (at least the University of Jyva¨skyla¨) easily discontinue a permanent position or a chair when its holder retires or leaves the post. In this case, the university’s central administration may wish to reallocate its institutional resources. In practice, this means that permanent positions are becoming tied to a person rather than to an academic discipline or chair. It seems that the nature of academic employment is changing both in the permanent and temporary fields in Finnish higher education. REFERENCES Acatiimi. 1998. “Finnish Union of University Researchers and Teachers, FUURT (Tieteentekijoïden liitto).” Acatiimi 9, pp. 26–27. Ahola, S. 1993. “Diversification and the Mass Higher Education System in Finland. Martin Trow revisited.” In H. Jalkanen and L. Lestinen (eds.), Korkeakoulutuksen kriisi (Higher education in a crisis?) Jyva¨skyla¨: Institute for Educational Research. Aittola, H., and Maä¨tta¨, P. 1998. Tohtoriksi tutkijakoulusta. Doctoral Training in Finnish Graduate Schools: Reforming Doctoral Studies in Finland. Institute for Educational Research. Research Reports 3. Jyva¨skyla¨: University of Jyva¨skyla¨. Alapuro, R. 1988. State and Revolution in Finland. Berkeley: University of California Press. AMKOTA. Database maintained by the Ministry of Education. http://www.csc.fi/ amkota.html. Bargh, C.; Scott, P.; and Smith, D. 1996. Governing Universities. Changing the Culture? Bury St. Edmunds: SRHE & Open University Press. Becher, T. 1989. Academic Tribes and Territories. The Intellectual Enquiry and

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the Cultures of Disciplines. Bury St. Edmunds: SRHE & Open University Press. Clark, B. R. 1983. The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in CrossNational Perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press. Clark, B. R. (ed.). 1987. The Academic Profession: National, Disciplinary, and Institutional Settings. Berkeley: University of California Press. Enders, J. 1996. Die wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter: Ausbildung, Bescha¨ftigung und Karriere der Nachwuchswissenschaftler und Mittelbauangeho¨rigen an den Universita¨ten. Frankfurt/M.: Campus. Gerholm, T. 1985. “On Tacit Knowledge in Academia.” In L. Gustavson (ed.), On Communication. Linko¨ping: University of Linko¨ping, Department of Communication Studies. HE Policy. 1996. Higher Education Policy in Finland. Helsinki: Ministry of Education. HE Policy. 1998. Higher Education Policy in Finland. Helsinki: Ministry of Education. Klinge, M. 1992. “Intellectual Tradition in Finland.” In N. Kauppi and P. Sulkunen (eds.), Vanguards of Modernity. Jyva¨skyla¨: Publications of the Research Unit for Contemporary Culture 32, pp. 33–42. Klinge, M., et al. 1987. Kuninkaallinen Turun Akatemia 1640–1808. The Royal Academy of A˚bo. Helsingin yliopisto I. Helsinki: Otava. Klinge, M., et al. 1989. Keisarillinen Aleksanterin yliopisto 1808–1917. The Imperial Alexander University. Helsingin yliopisto II. Helsinki: Otava. KOTA. Database maintained by the Ministry of Education. http://www.csc.fi/kota/ facts.html. Kyvik, S. 1991. Productivity in Academia. Scientific Publishing at Norwegian Universities. Trogstad: Universitetsforlaget. Ministry of Education. 1995. Education, Training and Research in the Information Society: A National Strategy. Helsinki: Ministry of Education. National Board of Education. 1996. The Development of Education 1994–96: National Report of Finland. Helsinki: National Board of Education. Perkin, H. 1984. “The Historical Perspective.” In B. R. Clark (ed.), Perspectives on Higher Education—Eight Disciplinary and Comparative Views. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 17–55. Rantala, E. 1998. “Tieteentekijoïden liiton ja¨senkyselyn tuloksia” (analyzing the data collected by The Finnish Union of University Researchers Teachers). Acatiimi 9, pp. 8–15. Ruscio, K. 1987. “Many Sectors, Many Professions.” In B. R. Clark (ed.) The Academic Profession: National, Disciplinary, and Institutional Settings. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 331–368. Statistics Finland. 1993. Statistics Finland: Science and Technology 2. Helsinki. Statistics Finland. 1998. Statistics Finland: Wages and Salaries 12. Helsinki. Trow, M. 1974. Problems in the Transition from Elite to Mass Higher Education. Policies for Higher Education: Conference on Future Structures of PostSecondary Education, Paris. Va¨limaa, J. (ed.). 1993. Action or Therapy? Free Allocation of Teaching Resources—Experimentation in Finnish Higher Education. Institute for Edu-


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cational Research. Publication Series B. 81. Jyva¨skyla¨: University of Jyva¨skyla¨. Va¨limaa, J. 1994. “A Trying Game: Experiments and Reforms in Finnish Higher Education.” European Journal of Education 2, pp. 149–163. Va¨limaa, J. 1996. “Private and Public Intellectuals in Finland.” In K. Kempner and W. G. Tierney (eds.), The Social Role of Higher Education: Comparative Perspectives. New York: Garland, pp. 185–207. Va¨limaa, J. 1998. “Culture and Identity in Higher Education.” Higher Education 36, pp. 119–138.

Chapter 5

Professional Diversity in a Centralized System: Academic Staff in France Thierry Chevaillier

INTRODUCTION The French definition of higher education is broad: It comprises every program for which access requirement is the baccalaureate, the secondary school leaving diploma that entitles its holder to enter universities and other higher education institutions. The higher education system is mostly public. Private institutions offer programs in specific fields such as engineering and business studies; they are often under the responsibility of semipublic bodies such as local Chambers of Commerce. Various public authorities, ministries, and local authorities are responsible for public higher education institutions. The Ministry of Higher Education controls and funds only part of the state public higher education institutions. Other ministries control and fund institutions, some of which are among the most prestigious: Ecole Polytechnique, the most famous engineering school, is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense and staffed by both military and civilian personnel. Schools of Art and of Architecture fall under the responsibility of and are funded by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, and several Schools of Agronomy and Veterinary Medicine, by the Ministry of Agriculture. In public institutions, most permanent staff are tenured and enjoy the status of public employees. Within the general framework of the Public Employee Statute (Statut geńe´ral de la fonction publique), they belong to a wide array of categories of public employees, each category (corps) having its own recruitment and promotion procedures and its own job definition and workload.

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Employment in the higher education system is not uniform: Different sectors have different employment conditions. Within one sector, there are often several categories of employees with different employment conditions, although they often perform exactly the same tasks. THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION Higher education institutions offer both short vocationally oriented and more general and longer programs. It comprises: • Eighty-seven public universities, including 3 National Polytechnic Institutes and 3 Technology Universities. They differ widely in size, enrollment ranging from 1,000 to 40,000 students, with an average of 15,000. Altogether, they enroll some 1.4 million students (in 1998). • Twenty-eight Teacher Training University Institutes (Instituts Universitaires de Formation des Maıˆtres [IUFM]), formally independent but linked to universities, with a total enrollment of over 80,000 students. • A small number of private (mostly Catholic) universities (5) and colleges (14), enrolling less than 1 percent of the students (about 22, 000). • About 500 Grandes Ecoles, which can be private or public or enjoy a mixed status, like those operated by local Chambers of Commerce. They tend to specialize in engineering, agriculture, business administration, or architecture. They are much smaller than universities. • Fine and applied art schools are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs and operated by the state or by local authorities. • Independent institutions offering shorter programs in health and social services (training of nurses, midwives, social workers, special education staff, etc.). Most of these schools are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. • Programs that are organized and taught in both public and private upper secondary schools are also included in higher education: Special preparatory programs for the Grandes Ecoles, which are usually very selective (Classes Pre´paratoires aux Grandes Ecoles [CPGE]). They constitute the traditional first stage of study toward engineering or business schools, the elite track of French higher education. They enroll some 80,000 students. Short vocational programs, similar to Institutes of Technology (IUTs), called STS (Sections de Techniciens Supe´rieurs) lead to a Higher Technician Diploma with enrollments of about 230,000 students.

Most publicly funded research used to be organized outside the universities or the Grandes Ecoles by specialized research agencies or public research corporations. The most famous, the CNRS (National Center for Scientific Research), employs about 20,000 people, as compared to 80,000 employed by universities. The CNRS used to and still partly continues to

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run its own laboratories, but it is increasingly associated with universities: It funds some university laboratories and operates mixed research units. Eighty percent of its research units are in universities. Other research agencies are smaller and more specialized. They basically operate in the same way as the CNRS. Higher education is organized in three “cycles.” In universities, the first two years of study (first cycle) lead to an intermediate degree, Diploˆme d’Etudes Universitaires Geńe´rales (DEUG). CPGEs prepare students for the competitive entrance examination to the various Grandes Ecoles in two years. Short-term vocational programs also last for two years. The next two years of university studies are referred to as second cycle, as are the three years of study in engineering or business schools. Third-cycle programs consist of one-year DEAs, DESS, and Maste`res. They select their students from the Grandes Ecoles or university graduates. DEAs (Diploˆme d’e´tudes approfondies), which are oriented toward research, and DESS (Diploˆmes d’e´tudes supe´rieures spećialiseés), which are more vocational or professional, are offered by universities, and Maste`res are offered by the Grandes Ecoles. This structure is being reexamined in order to harmonize the structure of programs between the various sectors of higher education in France but also between the different European higher education systems. In 1997, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), some 50 percent of the 18- to 21-year-olds were enrolled in higher education. More than 60 percent of an age cohort passed the Baccalaureát. A vast majority of baccalaureate holders enter higher education institutions (mainly universities, where many drop out in the first years). Traditionally, teaching at universities is based on lectures (cours magistral). All French universities are equipped with many lecture theaters that can accommodate up to several hundred students. Here, there is almost no interaction between students and academic staff. There are also teaching periods in smaller groups called travaux dirige´s and experimental work in science laboratories called travaux pratiques. It is not unusual for universities to enroll several hundred students in one program, the group being subdivided into two or three lecture groups and more than 20 smaller groups of travaux dirige´s. The teaching methods hardly change when, owing to attrition, the size of the groups diminishes as students get nearer to graduation. STAFFING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: MAIN ACTORS AND PROCEDURES In France, three categories of permanent staff work in higher education institutions: teaching staff (personnel enseignant), research staff (cher-

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cheurs), and administrative and technical staff (Ingeńieurs et personnels administratif, technique, ouvrier, de service et de sante´ [IATOSS]). Each category is divided into several groups, each group (corps) being defined by a common set of rules concerning recruitment, promotion, pay, work conditions, and duties. As moves from one group to another in the same category are considered a promotion, moves between categories are not common. Teaching staff are either teachers with higher education status, who take part in both teaching and research (Enseignants-Chercheurs) or teachers with secondary education status who are considered as “teaching only” academic staff. Full-time research staff are usually employed by national research agencies, such as the National Center for Scientific Research, even when they work in university laboratories or institutes. Full-time tenured researchers may take part in teaching on a voluntary and part-time basis, but teaching is not a statutory duty, and they therefore receive financial compensation. They also supervise research students who work in the research laboratories (without any compensation). They may be seconded (de´tache´s) to universities for several years, in which case they are subjected to the regulations of tenured teachers. Among the administrative and technical staff, some are very close to research or teaching staff in that they perform tasks that are similar. Although top-grade technical staff often take part in teaching and research, they are not considered to be academic staff. Graduate students also contribute to teaching: Some Ph.D. students may supplement their “research grant” by teaching in the first-cycle programs, either on an hourly basis (vacataires) or on a teaching assistant or instructor (Moniteur) contract. Universities can also employ on an hourly basis (vacataires) people whose principal employment is in administrations, business firms, or other organizations (including research agencies). Actors in Staffing Tenured staff are state employees under the “general public employee statute.” Hence, they are “recruited on a national basis,” which means that they are appointed by a state official (the minister of education or the president of the Republic for the full professors) at the end of a precisely defined procedure called concours in which applicants are “screened” by a national body, acting as jury. The National Council of Universities (Conseil National des Universite´s, [CNU]) examines individual applications to tenured positions and proposes, together with the institutions, candidates for nomination by the minister or the president. Members of this council are partly elected by academics and partly appointed by the minister. It is divided into groups and sections, each section being in charge of a specific


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field (there are 72 different sections, some of which are divided into subsections). A typical section comprises 48 members, of which 16 are appointed and 32 are elected. Appointment proposal, which is generally endorsed by the minister, is a joint decision of the institution and the National Council of Universities. The recent reforms of the procedure focused on who takes precedence in this joint decision. Either the institution could shortlist applicants among whom the CNU would select the qualified candidates, or the institution would choose its favorite candidate on a national list of applicants previously screened by the CNU. The real issue is that in one case the CNU could make proposals that disregard the needs of an institution, and in the other, the institution could favor less qualified local candidates. There is no employer organization in the public sector, since the state is the only employer. Among private and semiprivate institutions there is no specific organization. For the fairly large number of schools that are under the responsibility of the local Chambers of Commerce, the National Federation of Chambers of Commerce is the relevant organization. A specific collective agreement that would regulate the teaching staff of these schools is being discussed. There are four main unions for academic staff, affiliated to different general federations or linked to other teacher unions. Their role is, on the one hand, to discuss pay and working conditions with the employer, the minister of education, and the minister of public employment (Ministe`re de la Fonction Publique). Since academic staff are public employees, most of the discussions on their pay are held at the level of the public administration. On the other hand, unions present or support candidates to the various elected bodies involved in recruitment: National Council of Universities, university boards, recruitment committees. Hence, their influence is not negligible. Procedures and Regulation The minister of education may allocate new positions to universities within the limits of the number and types of positions approved every year by Parliament. Existing positions may become vacant through retirement, promotion, or transfer of staff to another institution. Every year, universities inform the Ministry of the type of staff they need, in which discipline, and whether they would like to keep positions vacant for future recruitment (in which case, they receive funding to employ part-time staff). The number of positions they apply for greatly exceeds the number of positions available. The minister takes his decision and publishes a list of positions for which concours will be organized (in the official publications of the government and on the Internet sites of the Ministry of Education).

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Teaching Positions with Higher Education Status The present regulation gives the last say to the institution. Candidates to a teaching position in a higher education institution apply to the CNU for qualification. Every spring, a list of qualified candidates is published in every academic discipline by the appropriate section of the CNU. Qualification is valid for a limited period: If qualified candidates are not recruited during the four years following the CNU’s decision, they must reapply for qualification. Only qualified candidates can apply to vacant positions advertised in the early spring. They apply for a specific position in a specific institution. Applications are processed by institutions in the late spring. Every institution operates statutory recruitment standing committees (commissions de spećialistes) organized on the basis of the 70-odd disciplines defined by the CNU. In small institutions, one committee may be set up for several related academic disciplines. Each committee is made up of elected members drawn from the institutions’ faculty and of members coopted in other institutions or in other disciplines of the same institution. The number of members varies from 10 to 20. These committees, in which professors and lecturers sit in equal number, are elected for four years and meet as often as is necessary to deliberate on staff recruitment and promotion. Teaching Staff with Secondary Education Status Traditionally, in some disciplines, academic staff were recruited among secondary education staff (in humanities, in some of the social sciences, and in the natural sciences). The typical career of academics in those disciplines was the following: baccalaureate, preparatory classes in top secondary schools (lyceés), Ecole Normale Supe´rieure (elite teacher training institution), Agre´gation (competitive exam for recruitment to secondary education), several years in a tenured teaching position in a secondary school, secondment to a university as an assistant, and finally recruitment to a tenured position in a university. This pattern has changed over the last decades: Many secondary school teachers are now seconded to universities without any change in their status: They keep the same teaching load and the same career structure. They are considered as “teachers only,” as opposed to staff with university status. Their recruitment is treated as a secondment, and there is no particular procedure for it. Universities, on being informed by the Ministry that they are allocated secondary teacher positions, advertise their needs and process the applications as they see fit. Some institutions refer the applications to a standing recruitment committee. Others set up “ad hoc” committees for


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each specific recruitment. The university president then officially asks the minister to second the selected candidate to his institution. Secondary teachers seconded to higher education institutions may ask to return to secondary schools when they wish. Some of them attempt to change status by applying to lecturer positions after obtaining a Ph.D. Some people, recruited as secondary school teachers, actually never teach in secondary schools, entering a Ph.D. program with a specific grant straight after their recruitment. They are rapidly offered temporary research and teaching positions, which are considered to be the first stages of an academic career in higher education institutions (most have studied at one of the Ecoles Normales Supe´rieures). Tenured Research Positions Public research staff are employed by the state in tenured positions allocated by Parliament and the Ministry to the various national research agencies. Although tenured research staff are recruited outside higher education institutions, it is worth mentioning some features of their conditions of employment for two reasons: First, a career in research is the main alternative to a career in higher education for most Ph.D. graduates. Second, the number of transfers between research and teaching positions is not negligible. Career paths are similar in public higher education and in public research. Prerequisites for recruitment and pay structures are very similar. For this reason and also because most research units of these agencies work in close cooperation with university laboratories (indeed, more and more units are joint units of agencies and universities), it is fairly easy to transfer from the one to the other. In 1995, 1 in 20 newly recruited lecturers and 1 in 10 professors came from research agencies. There have been recurrent government plans to merge the two types of institutions and to end this situation, which is specific to French research, but they have failed regularly. Appointment of Temporary and Nontenured Staff Procedures for recruiting temporary staff working on an hourly basis (vacataires) are much less involved. Decisions are taken at the institutional level or at the departmental level in institutions upon approval by the appropriate recruitment standing committee. Employment conditions of teaching staff on contract (i.e., nontenured), working part-time or full-time, are more strictly regulated. As they are employed by a state corporation, they must sign a specific type of labor contract (contrat de droit public) that is different from ordinary labor contracts.

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THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION: BASIC CHARACTERISTICS, SIZE, AND STRUCTURE Legal and Social Status Academic staff, like most state employees, are granted tenure (they become agent titulaire) after a short probation period of one to two years during which they are stagiaires. Once they are granted tenure (titularisation), they enjoy a common statute (Statut geńe´ral de la fonction publique) that guarantees them continued employment, sets their rights and duties, and organizes their career and compensation. Litigation on employment matters is dealt with by a specific judicial system designed to handle the disputes between the state and private bodies or persons: administrative courts (Tribunaux Adminstratifs). They are considered—and most of them consider themselves—as top public servants, with a career structure that can be compared to that of army officers or magistrates. The end of tenure is not currently considered in the various political platforms. Yet there are some marginal issues, such as the demands of nontenured staff to obtain tenure without having to submit to the formal recruitment procedure in a process called inte´gration. This happened in the past when nontenured assistants were given tenure en masse in the 1970s. Since then, by stating explicitly that nontenured positions are short-term positions that will never lead directly to tenured positions, the Ministry has made it clear that this will not happen again. Occupational Grading Structure Full-time Tenured Staff with University Status (Enseignants chercheurs) This category, like all full-time public employees, is organized in statutory groups (corps), each being divided into classes and each class into stages (ećhelons). For each stage of a given class of a given group there is a level of compensation. Promotion between stages, classes, and groups is based on different procedures. • Professors (professeurs des universite´s). There are three classes in this group: second, first, and exceptionnelle, accounting at present for, respectively, 53 percent, 37 percent, and 10 percent of the group. The proportion in the top class is limited to 10 percent at the national level. • Lecturers (maıˆtres de confe´rences). There are three classes in this group: second, first, and hors-classe, accounting at present for, respectively, 46 percent, 54 percent, and 8 percent of the group. The proportion in the top class is limited to 10 percent. • Assistants. They used to be a third category of full-time staff with university


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status. Although they were initially appointed for a limited term, they fought for tenure in the 1970s and succeeded in obtaining it in the early 1980s. The 1984 higher education staff statute provided for the phasing out of this category. No new position has been opened since 1984, and vacant positions are closed. Tenured assistants can access the group of lecturers through specific concours. Their number has dwindled from about 15,000 in the late 1970s to less than 2,000 today. Although this group is bound to disappear, its career structure was improved in 1999.

Full-time Tenured Staff with Secondary Education Status They were first employed by universities when Technology Institutes were created in 1966, and until the late 1980s, their number remained small (around 2,000). As from 1986, their number grew steadily to the present figure of over 12,000. The same career principles prevail for this type of staff who is also part of the public employment sector. Professeurs agre´ge´s are the elite of secondary education teachers. They mostly teach in upper secondary schools and in classes supe´rieures, which are higher education programs organized in secondary schools. Of a total of 47,500, about 8,000 (17 percent) teach in higher education programs (of whom 6,000 are in higher education institutions). Only 5,500 professeurs certifie´s (out of 233,500) teach in higher education institutions. Nontenured Full-time or Part-time Staff on Contract • Associate or visiting professor (professeur associe´ ou invite´). Universities can use vacant positions (either of professor or of lecturer) to recruit full-time or parttime temporary staff on contracts. Associate professors or lecturers are mainly recruited among professionals, business executives, or research officers. Visiting professors are usually foreign academics who are invited for a few months by universities. Associate and visiting professors have the same duties and rights as tenured staff. • Temporary assistant (Attache´ temporaire d’enseignement et de recherche.) [ATER]. After the decision to discontinue the recruitment of assistants in 1984, a new category of nontenured staff was created in 1988. Strict conditions were defined in order to avoid recreating the situation that had led to the assistants dispute of the 1970s. The ATER are recruited (half-time or full-time) for one year (renewable twice and exceptionally a fourth year) among advanced students who are nearing completion of their Ph.D. or who have just completed it. This position is conceived as a way of bridging the time gap between the termination of the Ph.D. grant and recruitment in a tenured position. • Instructor (moniteur) Among graduate students with a research grant (Allocation de recherche), institutions appoint instructors who will be given a supplementary compensation in exchange for a limited amount of teaching. Their teaching is restricted to first and second year students. Out of some 10,000 Allocataires (an annual flow of 3,500), 4,000 are moniteurs.

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• Foreign language assistant (lecteur et maıˆtre de langues e´trange`res). Appointments are for a period ranging between one and six years (when they are recruited under a formal agreement between countries or institutions). Foreign language assistants should be native speakers and hold a degree equivalent to a Maitrise for lecteurs and a postgraduate degree for Maitres de langues. • University hospital staff (Practiciens hospitaliers universitaires, chefs de clinique des universite´s assistants des hoˆpitaux, assistants hospitaliers universitaires). These are staff jointly recruited on contracts by the head of the medical school and the university hospital.

Part-time Staff Employed on an Hourly Basis Universities and the Grandes Ecoles employ teaching staff paid by the hour. They are called charge´s d’enseignement vacataires and attache´s temporaires vacataires. They are appointed by the head of the institution or of the medical school for a given number of hours, after agreement by the standing disciplinary recruitment committees. Charge´s d’enseignement vacataires should be employed full-time outside the university. (Retired and unemployed persons are not eligible.) Attache´s temporaires vacataires are doctoral students who are not older than 26. They are recruited for one year. Together with university staff who are paid overtime, they account for a sizable share of teaching. Institutions receive some of their recurrent funding for such part-time employment when the permanent staff allocated to them do not cover their teaching needs. In some disciplines, since the number of permanent staff is kept low for various reasons, or in newly created or rapidly expanding institutions, great use is made of part-time staff: In many universities, more than half the recurrent funding for instruction is spent on them. There are widely diverging estimates of the full-time equivalent of this sort of employment. A teacher union recently quoted a figure of 40,000 full-time equivalent staff, roughly half the total number of full-time staff in higher education. In recent years, as the number of students decreased and new staff was recruited, the teaching needs of the institutions have fallen, and they, have resorted less to part-time and overtime teaching. Research Staff Full-time public research staff are almost exclusively employed by research agencies, even though they work on university premises where many institutes and laboratories of these agencies are located. Out of the 26,000 staff employed by the CNRS, over 11,000 are “researchers”; the remaining 15,000 being either “technical” or “administrative” staff. There are two ranks for researchers: Charge´ de recherche (Research fellow) and directeur de recherche (research director), broadly equivalent to the two grades of lecturers and professors in higher education institutions. The top categories of technical staff, “research engineers,” can be compared to researchers as


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far as salary and careers are concerned. In some fields, their tasks are very similar, and they also take part in research and publish. The same category of research engineers exists in universities, where they are either associated with research centers or employed in highly qualified technical positions in the management of the institutions. Qualifications of Academic Staff Qualification requirements are clearly stated in the regulations that govern recruitment. Full-time permanent staff are required to hold a Ph.D. There are exceptions, which can be explained by history: Before 1984, the “State Doctorate” (Doctorat d’Etat) was required for professorial positions. The requirements for lecturer positions varied according to discipline: In some disciplines, lecturers were recruited among secondary school teachers, and the formal recruitment requirement was the agre´gation, the national secondary education teachers recruitment competitive examination. Since the new 1984 law, newly recruited lecturers and all professors must hold a Ph.D., except for associate faculty. Since 1984, professors must also sit for the habilitation a` diriger les recherches (somewhat similar to the German Habilitation), which is obtained after submission and discussion of a thesis or a collection of research papers or books. Qualifications required for secondary education staff seconded to higher education institutions are the Licence for professeurs certifie´s and the Maitrise for professeurs agre´ge´s. They are initially recruited through a competitive state examination. Some secondary school teachers seconded to universities hold a Ph.D. or prepare one, which allows them to apply to vacant lecturer positions. Contractual staff, moniteurs, attache´s temporaires, and attache´s temporaires vacataires, are recruited among doctoral students, which means that they have obtained at least a DEA. Lecteurs and Maıˆtres de Langues should be native speakers and hold, respectively, a degree or a postgraduate degree. No formal qualification is required for staff employed on an hourly basis (Charge´s d’enseignement vacataires). No record is kept of the level of qualification of staff. There are many staff of secondary school status and associate staff who hold a Ph.D. The qualification of staff on hourly contracts, although their number is very large, is totally unknown at the aggregate level and rarely surveyed at the institutional level. Distribution by Type of Institution, Discipline, Status Tenured staff account for nearly 80 percent of teaching staff, of which 16 percent are secondary education staff, considered as “teaching only” staff. The share of nontenured staff is higher in universities (about 20 per-

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Table 5.1 Student/Staff Ratio and Teaching/Nonteaching Staff Ratio in French Higher Education, 1985–1998

Source: MEN, DPD (various years).

cent) than in other institutions (6 to 9 percent). It is especially high in medical schools (32 percent). Tenured secondary education staff, who make up 10 percent of the total teaching staff of universities, represent 40 percent in IUTs and 25 percent in the humanities sector of universities. Teaching staff is unevenly distributed among the three cycles of higher education: Full professors tend to teach in degree year or postgraduate programs. Junior or part-time lecturers and teachers with secondary school status usually teach in first-cycle programs and more especially first-year programs. In 1989, the minister reached an agreement with unions on ratios for different categories of staff: 60/40 for lecturers/professors, 50/40/10 for second class/first class/special class professors, and 28/72/8 for second class/ first class/special class lecturers. The present proportions are 68/32, 53/37/ 10, and 42/51/7. Student/teacher ratios vary according to discipline and institution. In 1996, the average ratio was 49.2 for the law sector, 35.9 for the humanities sector, 17.2 for the sciences, and 11.6 for medical studies. In universities, the distribution of ratios for all disciplines ranged from 50 at Paris II (mainly law) to 9.4 at the Toulouse National Polytechnic Institute. In comprehensive universities, ratios vary between 20 for old institutions and 40 for the young overseas universities. When the university funding procedure was altered in the mid-1990s, the equalization of these ratios among universities, if not among disciplines, became one of the criteria used to allocate resources to institutions (see Table 5.1). Social Characteristics and Gender Issues Little is known of the social background of academic staff since Homo academicus, the study carried out by Bourdieu in 1984 on university full professors in 1968. It is now outdated, although some of the cultural features are still valid. Age and gender distribution are better documented: Among tenured staff, women accounted for 13.7 percent of professors (against 9.1 percent in


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1987) and 35.5 percent of lecturers (30.8 percent in 87) in 1997. The gender distribution varies by discipline and age, with a different pattern for the two categories of staff (see Table 5.2). As there are at present more women than men among students of French universities, their share in academic staff will continue to increase. Interestingly, in medicine and law, which used to be considered as “male disciplines,” more women graduate than men. Table 5.2 shows that the percentage of women professors is low but increasing in law and health sciences, low but stable in natural sciences, and high and possibly decreasing in the humanities. Among lecturers, it is higher (particularly in health sciences) and increasing everywhere. This reflects the general trend that the proportion of women is unevenly distributed among disciplines (more in the humanities, fewer in the sciences) and increasing everywhere (especially in the health sector). Although the gender distribution is still in favor of men, there is little debate on gender issues. As a rule, more men are found in higher academic positions. But the situation is changing fast, and the gender distribution of teaching staff tends to conform with that of students: The share of women is still low in the sciences, but this is the sector where women students are in a minority. Career Prospects for Junior Academic Staff The number of tenured positions opened each year depends on the creation of new positions by the state budget and turnover on existing positions (see Table 5.3). Policy shifts were frequent in the last decades; as a result, there has been a wide fluctuation in the number of academic positions created. But the current slowdown in student enrollments is bound to lead to a decrease in the number of new positions that are opened. This decrease will be offset until about 2005 by a higher turnout, the large number of academics recruited in the 1970s reaching the age of retirement. At the disciplinary level, the distribution is governed partly by shifts in student enrollments and partly by the age structure of the faculty. In some disciplines, prospective demands for Ph.D. holders should also include public and private research job openings. Private demand is highly volatile and depends on the state of the economy. Recruitment in public research (which was an important issue in the 1970s) has been low recently and is likely to remain so (CEREQ 1998). The number of researchers in National Research Agencies, after a period of growth in the late 1980s, is now stable. The administration of the CNRS is trying to induce researchers into applying to university positions, thus increasing competition for younger research students.

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Table 5.2 Proportion of Female Academic Staff in French Higher Education, by Field (in percent)

1

35–39 years. 30–34 years. Source: MENRT (1998b). 2

EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF ACADEMIC STAFF Recruitment and Selection As stated previously, the usual recruitment procedures for tenured staff involves two levels of selection, local and national. Only in the so-called law sector (law, administration, economics, and business) and partly in pharmacy is the procedure different for professors (there is only a nationallevel selection). For nontenured positions, selection is at the local level. Appointments are made nationally by the president of the Republic for professors and by the minister for lecturers. They are made locally for most other nontenured staff, either by the president of the university or by the Recteur, the local representative of the minister. At the national level, the National Council of Universities is in charge of selection and of part of the promotions. Representatives of lecturers and professors have the same number of seats, but according to the principle of peer judgment, only professors take part in the selection of professors. At the local level, institutions must set up disciplinary standing committees according to detailed regulation: The commissions de spećialistes are elected for four years. They are made up of an equal number of lecturers and professors, most of them elected, some of them (10 to 30 percent) coopted by elected members. When the number of professors is too small in one discipline, academic staff from other disciplines in the same insti-


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Table 5.3 Tenured Academic Staff in French Higher Education, 1985–1998, by Status (absolute numbers, in percent)

Source: MEN, DPD, Note d’Information (various issues).

tution or from the same discipline in other institutions can be appointed or committees can be set up for two or more related disciplines. These recruitment committees examine applications and interview candidates. The candidates are ranked, and a list of up to five selected candidates is established and sent to the board of the university. A select committee, made up of the academic members of the board (conseil restreint), discusses the lists adopted by the various recruitment committees of the institution for all the vacant positions and makes the final appointment proposals to the minister of education. There is one exception: For the recruitment of professors in law, administration, economics, and business studies, there is a national concours: All applications are examined at the national level by a panel appointed by the minister of education. The selected candidates can choose the university to which they will be appointed, and the institution has no say in the recruitment procedure. Promotion Procedures Procedures leading to a change in status differ according to whether they concern promotion from one statutory group (corps) to the other, within one statutory group, or within a class (classe) of a statutory group. Promotion should be distinguished from election or appointment to academic functions such as head of department or dean, or even director or president. Even though these functions attract supplementary compensation, they are not considered a promotion because they are temporary (the term for heads of department, deans, and president is between three and five years). In the public tenure system, all promotions are acquired permanently. Within a statutory group, a change of class is a promotion. This pro-

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motion is granted according to two different procedures. Every year, a number of promotion opportunities (depending on budgetary appropriations, rate of turnover, etc.) are available to the Ministry, which allocates them to the universities and to the CNU. Academic staff members who meet national and local criteria apply for promotion with their institution. If they are not promoted, their application is forwarded to the CNU, where they obtain a second chance. This duality of procedure has been justified by the fact that institutions tend to promote those who are involved locally in research, teaching, or administration, whereas the CNU tends to promote on the basis of quality, usually associated with research quality. Within a single class, there is also promotion through an increase in salary. This promotion is awarded automatically after given periods of time that are prescribed by the regulations of the group. About every two or three years, tenured academics progress on a pay scale and get a pay rise. For secondary education–type academic staff, promotion partly depends on evaluation by heads of departments. For this category of staff, every promotion is decided in Paris for both higher education institutions and secondary schools. Although one usually speaks of promotion when someone transfers from one statutory group to another, is better paid, or is better considered, this is not technically a promotion but a recruitment, since it involves an open competition. Some recruitment procedures are specific to candidates from one given statutory group (e.g., for lecturers to become professors) but one can enter a statutory group (corps) only by concours. Staff Appraisal and Staff Development Secondary education teachers are assessed (note´s) by their headmaster and by the national education inspectorate. In higher education, there is no systematic evaluation of staff performances either in teaching or in research. The screening of application for promotion nevertheless amounts to an evaluation by the institution or the CNU. Staff development is on a voluntary individual basis. There are training programs for which staff may apply and obtain some funding. Staff can also ask for a “sabbatical leave” to switch to a new research field or get acquainted with a new technique. The only systematic training of higher education teachers is organized for young nontenured staff (moniteurs): They are assigned an experienced staff member of their department as tutor and must attend special courses organized in 14 Regional Higher Education Teacher Training Centers, (CIES; Centres d’Initiation a` l’Enseignement Supe´rieur), created in 1989. Duties and Prescribed Tasks Legally, teaching duties are defined as time spent in the presence of students. According to the type of interaction with students and the size of


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the audience, teaching time carries a different weight in the calculation of teaching time. There are three types of teaching periods: • Lecture (cours magistral [CM]) where the teacher addresses an audience that can be quite large (up to several hundred students), with usually very little interaction. It is weighted more than the other types. • Discussion groups (travaux dirige´s [TD]) in smaller groups with more interaction. They usually supplement lectures and are often taught by junior staff. • Laboratory work (travaux pratiques [TP]) in the experimental disciplines or in languages, where students work in small groups under the supervision of an instructor.

The type of teaching is taken into account in the definition of teaching duties. One hour of CM is equivalent to 1.5 hours of TD and to 2 hours of TP. Student assessment and participation in the institutions’ administration are considered as part of the duties of academic staff. There is no extra compensation for these tasks. Organizing and supervising exams in their departments, marking papers, holding office hours for students, sitting on university examination boards (including the baccalaureate), and advising students are seen as part of the teaching duties of the permanent staff. The teaching duties of professors, lecturers, and similar contract staff (attache´s) are defined as 192 TD hours a year or its equivalent, using the conversion ratios: 128 CM hours or 256 TP hours or any combination of the three. According to the length of terms, which varies between 24 and 32 weeks per year, this amounts to an average weekly load of 6 to 8 hours. The teaching load of staff of secondary education status amounts to 384 hours of TD-equivalent teaching (a weekly load of 12 to 16 hours, which compares with a load of 14 to 18 hours a week in secondary schools). If teaching is conducted only in the shape of lectures (CM), which is not uncommon for most professors and many lecturers, the teaching load is lighter (5 hours a week). It is heavier for those who teach only TP. Language assistants (lecteurs) must teach 300 TP hours. Instructors (moniteurs) who are working toward their Ph.D. have a lighter load of 64 TD hours a year (2 to 3 hours a week). Time Budgets of Academic Staff The time budget of academic staff has only recently aroused interest among the decision makers. The typical attitude used to be: If the statute states that professors teach half time and engage in research half time, there is no reason why this should change. The diversity of the teaching profession has been recognized as far as financial compensation is concerned: More teaching, more research activity, or more administration is rewarded with bonuses. It is also quite common to deplore the fact that recruitment

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and promotion procedures and practices do not take this sufficiently into account. When an “Observatory of Higher Education Costs” was created by the Ministry in the early 1990s to measure the teaching costs of universities, the matter started to be investigated seriously. Evidence drawn from several institutions gives a better idea of time budgets (Observatoire 1992–1997): Academic staff were surveyed on time spent in (or for) the institution on research, teaching, and administration: • In most disciplines, professors spend more time on administration than other academic staff. • Nontenured junior staff (Attache´s, moniteurs) spend more time on research than on teaching and more time on research than most other categories of staff.

Pay Scale and Current Earnings Academic staff income is made up of three parts: basic compensation, including general bonuses and allowances; supplementary compensation, including overtime and specific bonuses; and outside income from various activities (patents and copyrights, consulting, lectures and teaching outside their institution, second jobs, etc.). Basic Compensation Basic compensation is based on a gross salary from which social contributions are deducted and to which bonuses and allowances are added. Gross salary is calculated by multiplying an index, which is specific to each position, by a monetary amount. This amount, the value of the index point, is the same for all public employees and can be managed by the government to adjust the total salary bill of the public sector. It is at present valued at about FF28 per month. For an index of 1,000 attached to a given position with a given seniority, the gross salary will be FF28,000 per month. (Note: A French franc is equivalent to 0.15 euro [1 euro ⫽ 6.56 FRF]. The current exchange rate [January 2001] of 1 euro is 0.91 U.S.$.) Tables 5.4 and 5.5 give the range of net salary for the various types of academic staff. Promotion that takes place at different times of careers brings an increase in the salary of staff. In the medical and dental sector, most senior academic staff are paid two salaries, one as teaching staff and one as hospital staff. Bonuses and allowances that are paid to all staff in a given category are usually included in basic compensation. They are the “residence allowance” (indemnite´ de re´sidence) and the higher education bonus (prime d’enseignement supe´rieur or prime de recherche et d’enseignement supe´rieur). General bonuses are commonly used in France to discriminate between public employees working in different sectors: Two public servants


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Table 5.4 Salary Scales in French Higher Education, 1998 (annual net income in euro)1

1

Basic compensation, overtime, and specific bonuses included; before income tax.

with the same salary may receive a different basic compensation owing to such bonuses. The Ministry of Finance is famous for the high level of bonuses paid to its staff. Bonuses and allowances are taxable, but they do not enter into the calculation of public servants’ pensions. Higher education bonuses (prime d’enseignement supe´rieur or prime de recherche et d’enseignement supe´rieur, respectively, for teaching only staff and for research and teaching staff) are quite modest (at present, slightly over FF7,000 a year, i.e., less than 3 percent of the average basic salary). Residence allowances vary from one geographical area to another to compensate the extra cost of living in large towns (up to 3 percent of basic salary). Supplementary Compensation A survey conducted in 1989 throws light on the income discrepancies among staff whose basic compensation is similar. Academic income is made up of all payments made to staff as a result of their activity in the institution. The difference with basic income is explained by overtime teaching and other supplementary compensation (e.g., exam fees or night duties in hospitals) and specific bonuses or allowances for responsibilities and functions that are temporarily held by certain staff.

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Table 5.5 Basic Academic Salaries in French Higher Education (annual salary, net of social security contributions before taxation), by Rank, 1988 (in euro)

1 Secondary education staff. Source: Ponthieux and Berthelot (1992), 10.

Overtime Paid overtime is fairly common. In 1989, 49 percent of academic staff outside the health sector worked approximately 30 hours a year overtime, with an annual supplementary compensation of about FF8,000. However, in recent years, the decrease in student number translated into a fall in overtime. The distribution of overtime is skewed: It is less common among professors and more common among junior staff (moniteurs are not allowed to work overtime) and more frequent in the law sector (where the student/staff ratio is higher) than in the humanities or the sciences (there is no overtime in the health sector, where most tenured staff are paid a double salary). Overtime teaching is paid by the hour at a flat rate, whatever the status. This rate (at present, FF360 per hour for a lecture—there are different rates for TD and TP, tutorials, and laboratory instruction) is much lower than the cost of one “statutory” hour of permanent staff (the annual basic salary divided by the statutory teaching load), which ranges from about FF500 for junior “teaching only” staff to FF2,000 for a senior professor. Specific Bonuses There are three types, awarded on an individual basis to academic staff who accept an “extra activity” for a given period: Research supervision bonus (prime d’encadrement doctoral et de recherche), teaching bonus (prime pe´dagogique), and administration bonus (prime administrative, prime de charges administratives). Outside Income Although academics are required to ask their employer for permission to undertake outside activities and to declare their outside income, there is very little information on this matter, except for the 1988 survey quoted above. It indicates that outside income is very unevenly distributed across positions, disciplines, and regions. Broadly speaking, Paris and the south of France account for half the number of academic staff and more than 70 percent of total outside income.


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In most disciplines, except law and medicine, lecturers and professors have similar outside income. Law, economics, and business studies are sectors in which it is higher and concerns a small number of people, while medicine is where it is the most evenly distributed. The largest share comes from copyrights (20 percent of professors—46 percent in law—get some income from copyrights), but income from self-employment is not negligible, especially in law where professors are allowed to run a private lawyer practice. Social Security and Social Benefits Academic staff, whether tenured or not, are covered by the national social security system for public employees. Basic health insurance is similar to that of other workers, but it is managed by a special corporation called Mutuelle (MGEN), which also offers optional supplementary insurance. Family insurance is, unlike for private sector employees, directly operated by the Ministry of Education. Staff get the same basic allowances and benefits as other employees, but there are supplementary allowances that are specific to public employees. Retirement pensions are funded by the state out of its ordinary budget. Employees’ pensions are higher in the public sector than in the private sector. The basic pension after 37 years and 6 months of employment is equivalent to 75 percent of the last salary before retirement. There are taxdeductible supplementary pension funds for public employees, but they are not widely utilized. CONCLUSION After the changes of the mid-1980s, the statutory framework of academic staff now seems stable. Neither recruitment procedures nor the system of tenure were being discussed in the late 1990s. Working conditions have been affected by the growing number of students and by constraints on resources. Until the end of the 1980s, problem areas were quality of teaching and the availability of laboratory and office space. In the early 1990s, a vast building program (University 2000), jointly financed by the state and the regions, was launched. The situation improved greatly in many institutions, except in the Paris area, where a new program (“university of the third millennium”) will soon be launched to catch up with the rest of France in a few years. Working conditions are also affected by the number and qualification of support staff. The ratio of nonteaching to teaching staff has steadily deteriorated in the last decades. Although the number of academic staff has grown over the period at the same pace as the number of students, admin-

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istrative and technical staff are lagging. Academics complain of spending more and more time on tasks that could be performed by qualified clerical or scientific staff. The qualification structure of administrative staff is inappropriate: The greater autonomy of institutions and departments has created needs for more qualified administrators that have not been matched by new positions of higher status. The main change in the financial conditions of academic staff was the introduction of bonuses in order to create incentives and recognize the various tasks performed by academic staff. Although limited in their amount, they were quite effective. The Ministry is directing its efforts toward inducing academics to innovate in teaching and research. This could involve a transformation of the present incentive structure (possibly limiting the amount of overtime teaching by permanent staff and transforming the bonus system to link it with involvement in teaching). University heads have insisted that teaching performance and research should be taken into account in the recruitment and promotion processes. The growing concern over falling teaching standards led to the introduction of new schemes for the evaluation of teaching. As from 1997, institutions have been required to introduce evaluation of teaching by students. The development of evaluation of the various activities at the institutional level is perhaps the change that is perceived as the most momentous by academic staff who were accustomed to great individual autonomy and to distant checks and controls. As the period of rapid growth has come to an end, there is also a concern over the career prospects of research students and junior academic staff. It is difficult to forecast the needs for Ph.D. graduates because of possible shifts in students’ choice of subjects and uncertain future education and research policies. The increase in the number of teaching-only staff in higher education is another source of concern. In the last 15 years, the number of secondary school teachers seconded to higher education institutions has been multiplied by four. Teaching-only staff now represent nearly 20 percent of tenured academic staff. This was partly the outcome of a short-term education policy: Excess staff from secondary education where enrollments were falling were transferred to higher education, which was still growing. Yet there are fears that this also indicates an evolution of higher education away from the tradition of teaching based on research under the pressure of the market. REFERENCES Bourdieu P. 1984. Homo academicus. Paris: Editions de Minuit. Centre d’ Etudes et de Recherches sur les Qualifications (CEREQ). 1998. Emploi public, emploi prive´. La difficile conversion des titulaires de the`se. Bref n146. Marseille: CEREQ.


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Comite´ National d’E´valuation. 1993. Les enseignants du supe´rieur. Paris: CNE. Durry G. 1998. Rapport sur la condition des personnels enseignants de l’enseignement supe´rieur. Paris: MENRT. MEN, Note d’Information, Direction de la Programmation et du De´veloppement. 1999. “Les personnels de l’enseignement supe´rieur.” Paris: MEN, no. 25 and various older issues. MENRT (Direction de l’Administration et du Personnel). 1997. Concepts et re`gles applicables a` la gestion et au contoˆle des emplois. Paris: MENRT. MENRT (Direction de l’information et de la communication). 1991. Enseigner a` l’universite´. Paris: MENRT. MENRT (Direction de l’information et de la communication). 1994. Les me´tiers de l’enseignement supe´rieur et de la recherche. Paris: MENRT. MENRT (Direction de la programmation et du de´veloppement). 1998a. “Le personnel de l’e´ducation nationale et de l’enseignement supe´rieur.” Tableaux statistiques, n6551. MENRT (Direction de la programmation et du de´veloppement). 1998b. “Les personnels enseignants de l’enseignement supe´rieur—1996–1997.” Note d’information, n98.33. MENRT (Direction geńe´rale des enseignements supe´rieurs). 1998c. Annuaire des e´tablissements d’enseignement supe´rieur, 1996–1997. Paris: MENRT. MENRT (Direction geńe´rale des finances, bureau du budget de l’enseignement supe´rieur). 1998d. Informations sur le financement et les effectifs de l’enseignement supe´rieur. Paris: MENRT. Ministe`re de l’Education Nationale. 1995 and 1999. “Financements et effetifs de l’enseignement supe´rieur.” Paris: MEN, pp. 32 and 49. Observatoire des couˆts des e´tablissements d’enseignement supe´rieur. Various reports, 1992–1997. Grenoble: Presses universitaires. Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development (OECD). 1997. Education at a Glance. Paris: OECD. Ponthieux, S., and Berthelot, J. M. 1992. “Les enseignants-chercheurs de l’enseignement supe´rieur: Revenus professionnels et conditions d’activite´.” Documents du CERC, n105. Quenet, M. 1994. “Rapport sur la condition des personnels enseignants de l’enseignement supe´rieur.” Ministe`re de l’enseignement supe´rieur, May 1994.

Chapter 6

Unsolved Problems and Inadequate Solutions: The Situation of Academic Staff in German Higher Education Uwe Schimank

INTRODUCTION German higher education is greatly criticized today, both from within and from outside. This criticism has been growing for a long time, not least because it has not had any significant effects. Academic staff’s employment and working conditions are part of the long-debated reform issues. This chapter presents the present staff structure of higher education institutions and focuses on the major deficiencies and current attempts at reform, or at least on the debates as to which reforms are necessary.

THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION The basic structures of German higher education were established by the Humboldtian university reforms of the nineteenth century, especially the “unity of teaching and research” as the double task of German universities, the prominent role of the professors, and the public status of universities (Ben-David 1971, 108–138). After World War II, the system grew rapidly between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s when the number of students and staff increased, and several new universities were established. Since then, the number of students increased from 781,107 (1975) to 1,438,524 (1990) to 1,809,797 (1995). Established posts for academic staff in German higher education stagnated for many years with 63,248 (1975) and 63,368 (1990) and afterward grew to 82,519 (1995), mainly as an effect of the integration of a number of higher education institutions of the former German Democratic Republic in the early 1990s (Wissenschaftsrat 1995, 33)1 (see Figure 6.1). To maintain the student/staff ratio of 1975, which

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Figure 6.1 Posts for Academic Staff in German Higher Education, 1975–1995 (absolute numbers)

Source: Wissenschaftsrat (1995), 33.

already was not satisfactory, more than 140,000 established posts would have been necessary in 1995. At present, German higher education comprises over 300 institutions. Only about one-third are universities, including technical universities and comprehensive universities (Gesamthochschulen). The Fachhochschulen, which are former professional schools, were integrated into the system of higher education in the early 1970s. They now call themselves “universities of applied sciences” and outnumber universities. About 140 exist today. However, in terms of staff, finance, and students, universities still dominate German higher education. There are eight times as many academic staff in universities as in Fachhochschulen; and nearly three-quarters of the students study at universities, compared to one-quarter at Fachhochschulen. Universities and Fachhochschulen are part of the public sector. In this respect, it is important to know that the major political responsibility for German higher education rests not with the central government (Bund) but with the 16 La¨nder. Central government is an important provider of funds for higher education, especially for building expenses and for separately budgeted funds for research projects. In addition, it is responsible for the enactment of the framework law on higher education that formulates the

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rules concerning the functions, organization, and staff structure of higher education institutions. But much more important are the La¨nder, which provide for the largest part of the universities’ institutional funding and whose Ministries of Education and Research are the government authorities that control and guide the higher education system. This federalist structure exerted a competitive pressure on higher education policy and universities in the last century and was a crucial factor in the worldwide superiority of German universities of the time. Since World War II, however, the La¨nder have avoided competition with each other. Instead, they coordinate their higher education policies in the Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK). Hence, most institutional structures are identical in all 16 La¨nder. The innovative character of federalism with respect to the institutional development of higher education has been mainly replaced by an institutional and political standstill. Concerning the situation of academic staff in universities and Fachhochschulen, it will be seen how it is shaped by the interplay between government actors, higher education institutions, and staff members, the latter partly as individuals, partly collectively. STAFFING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: MAIN ACTORS AND PROCEDURES With the exception of those scientific collaborators who are financed by separately budgeted funds, there must be an established post for each staff member of a higher education institution in the organizational budget plan. Every year, the university or Fachhochschule formulates its budget plan and applies for it at the Ministry of Education of its Land. The Ministry then takes decisions concerning this plan and may revise it. The budget plan includes an enumeration of all established posts and a description of each post with respect to its organizational function. Hence, a higher education institution cannot decide on its own how much it spends on personnel and how much it spends on other expenses. Furthermore, it cannot decide autonomously, for example, to reduce the number of professors in favor of a growth in the number of scientific assistants, or to transfer a professorship from the biology to the physics department, or to change a professorship from “sociological theory” to “sociological methods.” All these specifications of established posts by category, department, and task are subject to approval by the Ministry. Thus, the government intervenes closely in the staff structure of the higher education system. To be sure, it often simply approves the applications of higher education institutions. But it may veto an application, and the anticipation of this possibility shapes the applications. In addition, government regulates the staff structure of higher education according to the laws of the public service. Higher education staff is not a

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special category of the public service. Higher education institutions have to accept for their personnel the same regulations that apply to all kinds of public administrations, even if it is obvious that a regulation that is adequate for, say, a ministry or a local housing administration cannot apply to a university. These are two of the four major ways in which government intervenes in staffing at higher education institutions—the other two will be dealt with later. Within universities, decisions about the budget plan and the staff structure are the result of a complicated interplay of mechanisms of university “self-government” (Selbstverwaltung). Each department sets its own budget plan by a collective decision. The decision-making body consists of representatives of professors, nonprofessorial academic staff, nonacademic staff, and students. Then all these plans are decided upon by a central decision-making body of the university where these four “status groups” are represented. Without going into detail about the complicated mechanisms and dynamics of “self-government,” it can be said that the status quo prevails (Schimank 1995, 222–258). At most, incremental changes can be made from one year to another, so that far-reaching changes of established posts and the resources attached to them are almost impossible. Furthermore, most established posts of nonprofessorial academic staff are assigned to a professor as part of his employment contract with the Ministry—which is the third major governmental influence on a university’s staff structure. These assignments cannot then be changed by the university or the Ministry against the will of the professor. The same holds true for his post. A professor cannot be forced to change the description of his professorship with respect to teaching. The role of trade unions is rather insignificant. Since higher education staff is only a part of the public service, there are no special trade unions for higher education; instead, this sector is divided up between a trade ¨ ffentliche Dienste, union for the public sector as a whole (Gewerkschaft O ¨ Transport und Verkehr, or OTV) and a trade union for education in general (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft, or GEW), which mainly ¨ TV does not pay particular attention to represents teachers. Thus, the O higher education; nor is the higher education staff the most important group for the GEW. The influence of both unions in higher education is also rather limited because professors—the most powerful “status group”— traditionally do not participate in union activities. They mainly join the Deutsche Hochschulverband (DHV), which is a pressure group for their interests. Thus, the general interests of higher education and the interests of nonprofessorial staff are not well represented politically. Concerning salaries and other general working and employment conditions, however, academic staff in higher education profits from the fact that there is one collective bargaining for the whole public sector. Finally, with regard to the recruitment of academic staff, again the gov-


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ernment intervenes in the selection of professors. When a university, in complicated legal proceedings of “self-government,” has decided upon a rank-ordered list of usually three candidates for a professorship, this list is sent as a proposal to the Ministry. The Ministry can accept the proposal and invite the number-one candidate to begin bargaining about an employment contract. This is the most frequent case. The Ministry can also change the rank ordering and start bargaining with the number-two or even number-three candidate. It can even reject the proposal altogether. It cannot, however, choose someone who is not on the list. But it can force the university to start the recruitment process again. In brief, in matters of staff structure, German higher education institutions are subject to considerable government intervention, but institutional “self-government” protects the interests of individual professors. These are the two dominant forces that often conflict with each other. Other forces, especially institutional leadership and trade unions, are much weaker. ACADEMIC STAFF IN HIGHER EDUCATION: BASIC INFORMATION One has to distinguish between two groups of academic staff: professors and nonprofessors. This distinction is very marked in German higher education. The social gap between professors and the nonprofessorial academic staff is much greater than in many other countries (Enders 1996, 23). Professors are divided into three subgroups: C2-, C3-, and C4-professors. These are administrative categories of remuneration that express their status hierarchy. C4-professors enjoy the highest status, traditionally called Ordinarius or Lehrstuhlinhaber (chair holder). Their chair typically consists of a number of subordinate academic staff on established posts, student assistants, and a secretary. C4-professorships only exist in universities and are the majority there (see Table 6.1). C3-professors have fewer, sometimes no, academic staff at their disposal. C2-posts at universities are “junior professorships,” usually without tenure, for those who have just obtained their habilitation and are seeking a C3- or C4-professorship. At the Fachhochschulen, there are no C4-professorships but a considerable number of permanent C2-posts. All three kinds of professorships, with the exception noted, have tenure from the outset. The teaching duties of the different professorships consist of 8 hours teaching per week for a professor at a university and 16 hours for a professor at a Fachhochschule. There is almost no nonprofessorial academic staff at the Fachhochschulen. This shows that these institutions are not supposed to train and qualify younger academics. They do not have the right to award doctorates and the degree of Privatdozent. Dissertations and habilitations are the monopoly of the universities.

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Table 6.1 Posts for Academic and Nonacademic Staff in German Higher Education, 1997, by Type of Institution (in percent)

Source: Wissenschaftsrat (1998b), 226–229.

At the universities, in contrast, there are about three times as many nonprofessors as professors. The majority of this nonprofessorial academic staff must teach and carry out research, as well as qualify for these tasks. They work on their doctoral thesis or their habilitation and for the chair to which they belong. There are six categories of nonprofessorial academic staff in universities (Enders 1996, 112–116; Perschel 1996; Reich 1996). First, there are scientific helpers (wissenschaftliche Hilfskraft). This is the lowest-status group. They only have a service function for the professors and other academic staff and no formal rights to further qualification. The maximum time someone can remain in such a post is four years. Scientific helpers are not allowed to work more than 19 hours a week. Many prepare their dissertation after work. Second, there are scientific collaborators (wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter) on established posts with temporary contracts. Their main function is also service for a chair; but this includes independent teaching. The teaching duty is usually four hours a week. Furthermore, they can use part of their working time to write their dissertation thesis. However, if they stay on as scientific collaborators after their doctorate, they have no formal rights to further qualification. The maximum time they can remain in such a post is seven years. Part-time and full-time contracts are available. The third group is scientific collaborators on established posts with permanent contracts. They often obtain their post after their doctoral degree. Their function is service for a chair or for a department. This includes independent teaching. Sometimes, when teaching is the main reason for a permanent contract, their teaching duties are longer than the four hours a week—in some cases, longer than for professors.2


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Scientific collaborators who are financed by separately budgeted funds make up the fourth group. Their function is to collaborate on research projects for which a professor, sometimes also a scientific collaborator on an established post, has obtained funds. Research is their main function, but only within the framework of the project. They are supervised by the project leader. The length of their contract varies between one year, sometimes even less, and four years. In principle, they can work indefinitely on this contractual basis—but no longer than seven years at the same university. Scientific collaborators often work on a part-time contract; thus, many do their dissertation or habilitation after work. They have no teaching duties. The fifth group consists of doctoral students or researchers who are working on their habilitation and are financed by a stipend. The vast majority of stipends go to doctoral students. Sources for stipends are as varied as those for separately budgeted funds. Usually stipends last for two or three years. During this period, the person has no other obligation than to carry out research for his degree. Finally, the sixth group is scientific assistants (Assistenten). They must hold a doctorate and not be older than 32.3 Then they obtain a 6-year contract (two times three years) to do service work for a chair, on the one hand, and their habilitation, on the other. The service work mainly consists of independent teaching. The teaching duty is usually four hours a week. In 1997, there were 318,079 established posts, of which 110,989 were for academic staff.4 Of these, 40,426 were professors—that is, one-third of total academic staff or one out of nine of total staff. The other two-thirds were nonprofessors. If one adds scientific collaborators in research projects financed by separately budgeted funds and scientific helpers, the share of professors decreases to about a quarter of the total academic staff. At the universities,5 of 143,342 established posts for total staff, 68,368 were for academic staff. Thus, academic staff made up almost half of total staff; 22,387 were professors. Hence, about one out of six established posts at universities was for a professor and two were for nonprofessors.6 Of the professors, 12,056 had a C4-professorship. At the Fachhochschulen, of the 27,871 established posts, 14,480 were for academic staff. This relation is similar to the figures at universities. But 13,489 were professors. As already mentioned, there is almost no nonprofessorial academic staff at Fachhochschulen. Of the professors, 7,990 had a C3-professorship, and 5,499, a C2professorship. With regard to gender, it comes as no surprise that women are still a minority among academic staff (Wissenschaftsrat 1998a, 16–27). Whereas in 1997 they represented 43.4 percent of all students and 40 percent of all students who passed their final examinations, they only represented 30 percent of those who obtained their doctorate, and only between 11 percent and 14 percent of those who obtained their habilitation in recent years. In

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1995, the share of women scientific collaborators and scientific assistants was about 25 percent; of C2-professors, about 10 percent; of C3professors, about 9 percent; and among C4-professors, about 4 percent. Thus, fewer and fewer women can be found at the top of the academic qualifications and careers ladder. EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF ACADEMIC STAFF Having described the general staff structure of German higher education, we shall now study an individual staff member’s employment and working conditions and how these are experienced. Recruitment, salary, tenure, work autonomy, and career prospects are the key words. The prevalent situation in the 1990s will be described, first for the professors and second for nonprofessorial academic staff. Special attention is then given to the relation between teaching and research. Last, recent developments and debates about desirable future changes will be discussed for both groups of academic staff. Professors On average, someone is about 42 years old when he obtains his first professorship. Acquiring a professorship means—most often for the first time in one’s academic career—obtaining a permanent position, or tenure. Even more important, one becomes a public servant who cannot be dismissed. This unlimited job security is usually legitimized as a precondition of the independence of teaching and research from any extrascientific pressures, especially from the state, which—without a significant private sector of higher education—has in effect the monopoly to offer or withhold professorships. The earnings of professors are good, although in similar positions in private business salaries are considerably higher. In the first half of the 1990s, university professors’ annual income was between DM80,000 and DM99,999 for 26 percent, between DM100,000 and DM119,999 for 32 percent, between DM120,000 and DM139,999 for 16 percent, and over DM139,999 for 18 percent. (Note: A German mark is equivalent to 0.51 euro [euro ⫽ 1.96 DEM]. The current exchange rate [January 2001] of 1 Euro is 0.91 U.S.$.) At the Fachhochschulen, professors’ annual income was less than DM80,000 for 18 percent, between DM80,000 and DM99,999 for 35 percent, between DM100,000 and DM119,999 for 34 percent, and over DM119,999 for 14 percent (Enders and Teichler 1995, 80–82). Professors enjoy extraordinary autonomy in their work (Scheven 1996). They have no superior within their institution. Deans or rectors are primi inter pari and cannot intervene directly in the core activities of teaching


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and research. The only formal superior of a professor is the respective Ministry—which is far away and does not monitor his day-to-day activities. In addition, the role of the Ministry as a superior is very restricted. The autonomy of teaching and research that is granted constitutionally to every professor does not allow the Ministry any strict control over his activities. He can only be required to give lectures and seminars according to his prescribed teaching load. Unlike professors at a Fachhochschule, university professors are expected to carry out research. But how much research a professor actually does, on which topics, and how long he needs to complete his research work are beyond anybody’s control. In addition to teaching and research, professors must legally take part in their institution’s self-government by participating in various commissions and standing committees or by being dean for one period of office. But if they want to avoid these duties, they often find ways to do so—for instance, by building up an image as a notoriously quarrelsome person. In Fachhochschulen, one must have a record of at least five years’ employment outside higher education to become a professor. Its purpose is to have practical experience in the field one teaches—example, in industry for an engineer. Usually professors at Fachhochschulen hold a doctorate but seldom a habilitation. If someone becomes a C2-professor at a Fachhochschule, he may then try to acquire a C3-professorship; but if someone immediately becomes a C3-professor, he is already at the top of the career ladder in this kind of institution. University professors must not only hold a doctorate but usually also a habilitation.7 An important criterion in the recruitment for a professorship is the candidate’s reputation as an innovative and engaged researcher. This is still, though not formally, much more important than his teaching abilities. Professors who head the recruitment commissions usually prefer research to teaching competencies. Other “status groups,” especially students, cannot convey their divergent priorities to professors. Sometimes the Ministry intervenes in favor of teaching. Recently, the government also encouraged a positive discrimination in favor of women. C3-professors at universities often apply for C4-professorships. If they are successful, they increase their salary and their resources for teaching and research. A C4-professorship is the final step of the academic career ladder. However, C4-professors can apply for professorships at other universities. For each offer of a C4-professorship there is an automatic increase in salary of about DM1,000 per month before taxes—if the professor accepts the offer, on his new professorship, if not, on his old one. In addition, he can bargain for more resources—for instance, another established post for a scientific collaborator or expensive laboratory equipment. Still, after an offer, a C4-professor can only apply for another professorship after three years. Thus, there are not many opportunities to increase one’s salary and one’s resources. Very few C4-professors get more than two or three

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offers during their career. Many—perhaps the majority—do not get any further offer at all. Nonprofessorial Academic Staff To put it in a nutshell, professors have tenure, a good salary, and great autonomy, whereas the nonprofessorial academic staff member usually has no permanent position, is often employed on a part-time basis with a rather low salary, and is formally and informally greatly dependent on the professors. Nonprofessorial academic positions are very often filled by people whom the professor to whose chair the position belongs knows personally. Perhaps they were his students or his student assistants. Apart from the obligation to conform with legal regulations and the political pressure to discriminate in favor of women, no one intervenes in these decisions. This means that, in contrast to the formalized multilevel decision making for the recruitment of a professor, with considerable veto power of the Ministry, the recruitment of nonprofessorial academic staff is very fragmented. Personal idiosyncrasies of the professors shape the decision criteria. The vast majority of nonprofessorial academic staff, with the exception of some scientific collaborators, have temporary work contracts and stipends. In 1991, less than one out of five had a permanent contract (Enders 1996, 108), a share that has gradually declined since the 1970s and is still continuing to decline. The work contracts of scientific helpers must be renewed every six months, which means they can be dismissed without reason. For the other groups of academic staff, contracts range from about one year to seven years. They must be renewed every two or three years. Thus, the large majority of nonprofessorial academic staff are subject to job insecurity. It must be taken into account that a significant number of scientific collaborators are working on part-time contracts. Professors often split full established posts into two half-time posts, and sometimes even into three or four part-time posts. On the one hand, professors justify this by pointing out that more younger academics have a chance of earning extra money while working on their dissertation. On the other, this often leads to hidden or even open exploitation because, as for other academic staff on part-time contracts, it is often implicitly expected by the professors that these scientific collaborators work more for the chair than can be formally requested—sometimes to the extent that they cannot but neglect their qualification work. In the early 1990s, the annual income before taxes of nonprofessorial staff on full-time contracts was less than DM60,000 for 23 percent, between DM60,000 and DM79,000 for 54 percent, and over DM79,999 for 18 percent. Of nonprofessorial academic staff on part-time contracts, only


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14 percent have an annual income of over DM40,000 (Enders and Teichler 1995, 83). Thus, there is a huge income gap between professors and most of the nonprofessorial academic staff. All the categories of nonprofessorial academic staff are extremely dependent on their professors with respect to daily work as well as with regard to qualification. Formal and informal aspects can be distinguished. Formally, a professor is the supervisor of those scientific helpers, scientific collaborators, and scientific assistants who belong to his professorship. He may order his academic staff to assist him and cooperate with him in teaching, research, and administrative work. This implies that he can prescribe to his academic staff members the topics of their seminars. Thus, the independence of teaching of nonprofessorial academic staff only means that they do it without direct supervision by the professor and that they gradually obtain the right to examine students. With respect to research, autonomy does not extend to topics, especially if this work leads to a dissertation or habilitation. A member of the nonprofessorial academic staff usually chooses his professor as the main supervisor of this work. Therefore, a consensus between both must be reached about the topic of this work. This gives the professor formal power to veto topics he does not want. Informally, a professor’s power over his academic staff is much greater because he can decide almost alone whether to renew their work contracts and how he supports and assesses their dissertation or habilitation.8 Moreover, his recommendations are often crucial for their career opportunities. Taking a closer look at nonprofessorial academic staff’s careers, the simultaneity of work and qualification reveals in-built tensions. On the one hand, the university and the professors are highly dependent upon the teaching and research performance of these staff members; on the other, they must be given enough autonomy and time for their qualification. Priorities often differ. For a professor, his staff members’ teaching and research work come first and the qualification second, whereas it is the opposite for the staff members. This must be seen against the background of two possible career paths for nonprofessorial academic staff: in higher education, on the one hand, and outside higher education (e.g., in business, the health care sector, or public administration), on the other. In higher education, qualification stages lead almost invariably to a professorship. Hence, it must be asked, How does one become a professor (Enders 1996, 112–116)? First, one has to obtain one’s doctorate. Here, there are several alternative paths: a part-time job as a scientific helper or as a scientific collaborator, either in a research project or on an established post; or on the job as a full-time scientific collaborator or by a stipend. Afterward, there is only one formal path: becoming a scientific assistant. On this established post one has six years to obtain one’s habilitation, which, in most cases, is

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the prerequisite to apply for a professorship. Other paths are taken by all those for whom no established post as a scientific assistant is available. The most important is working as one of the three kinds of scientific collaborator; often this implies that someone changes from one kind of scientific collaborator to another until he finally obtains his habilitation. It is not unusual—as is also the case for the doctorate—that there are periods of unemployment in between—for instance, if someone can no longer be employed on an established post as a scientific collaborator and a proposal for a research project where the person could work as a scientific collaborator has not yet been accepted by the funding agency. Here one of the most serious problems concerning staff structure emerges. As already mentioned, the nonprofessorial academic staff strongly outnumber professors. Only very few of those who work as scientific helpers, collaborators, or even assistants have a chance of becoming a professor. To make just a rough calculation: During the 25 years during which someone is a professor, 4 persons occupy a post of scientific assistant, at least 2 or 3 persons a post of scientific collaborator on a temporary basis, about 12 persons a post of scientific collaborator in a research project, and about 7 persons a post of scientific helper. And on average, there is more than one post of these categories of academic staff per professor. Not all the nonprofessors, to be sure, want to become professors and many have satisfying careers outside higher education. This, of course, greatly depends on the discipline. Still, there is a huge discrepancy between the number of those who start with the ambition of obtaining a professorship and those who finally succeed. Thus, there is an overproduction of applicants for professorships, and they add up over the years because those who are not successful try for several years before they finally give up. Most have no other chance because there are no adequate positions outside higher education for them. They are usually overqualified, too specialized, and too old for business, industry, or public administration. Since World War II, two parallel developments—common to many countries—have reinforced this built-in frustration. First, an increasing teaching load, especially since the late 1960s, and greater personnel demands of research have led to a disproportionate growth of nonprofessorial academic staff at universities. Second, a doctorate has become more and more important for many careers outside academia. Therefore, work opportunities for doctoral students had to be created in many disciplines. But often young academics become attracted to academia during their doctorate. Both developments result in a clash between high academic aspirations and very limited opportunities. Since most members of the nonprofessorial academic staff are employed on a temporary contract, this is not just an identity problem but a serious economic problem of earning one’s own and often one’s family’s living. It is estimated that about four-fifths of the research capacity of the higher


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education system and about two-thirds of its teaching capacity are provided by nonprofessorial academic staff (Enders 1996, 34). And the system greatly benefits from a permanent turnover of young academics who challenge their professors with new ideas. However, such an arrangement rests on certain conditions that are often not fulfilled. First, these young academics should not become addicted to a career in higher education, with all its insecurities and frustrations. Yet they should be committed to academic research as long as they remain in higher education because otherwise their research work would not be what most professors and disciplines need. But these are conflicting demands. A temporary but authentic commitment to academia is almost impossible. So the usual, mostly unconscious, strategy of professors is to attract their academic staff into academia, educating them in the spirit of the university and breeding in them hopes for a career in higher education in order to make them good research workers. As supervisors with a feeling of responsibility, professors then do their best to provide their academic staff with established posts, positions in research projects, or at least stipends, for as long as possible. Paradoxically, the more responsibility a professor feels and the more successful he is in these activities, the more likely he is to produce academics who stay too long in higher education to have a realistic chance of a good career outside higher education when they are thrown out by the scarcity of posts, positions, and stipends. Professors who serve young academics best are those who do not encourage them to become a professor, who change each member of their academic staff after three years at most, and who declare this policy unequivocally before someone decides to join their academic staff. But they will always have to deal with relatively inexperienced researchers and teachers in their academic staff, giving them leave, even if they could keep them, just when they become most valuable to them. This is the basic dilemma underlying many of the tensions and conflicts, failures and frustrations, of the academic staff in German higher education. On the one hand, professors need more and more support in teaching and research from academic staff. Otherwise, many more professorships will have to be created, and this is far too expensive for the government. On the other hand, only a small number of the nonprofessorial academic staff can become professors. The present staff structure was originally designed to solve this dilemma by a differentiation of nonprofessorial academic staff. Scientific collaborators, as the majority in nonprofessorial academic staff, were supposed to aspire for a doctorate but not for a habilitation; this step should only be taken by the small number of scientific assistants. But it proved impossible to channel ambitions and careers in this way. Therefore, a highly unsatisfactory situation for everybody involved—including professors, who have to endure much misery among their academic staff and many silent or loud accusations from it—reproduces itself with each new generation of academics in many scientific fields.

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Teaching and Research Despite all these conflicts of interest, professors and nonprofessorial academic staff at universities share the common problem of balancing teaching and research duties. Following the Humboldtian principle of unity of teaching and research, both tasks formally constitute equal parts of the work of university academic staff. However, there are strong built-in tensions between teaching and research. They compete for resources and for the working time of academic staff; and whereas research activities are carried out and evaluated within a “cosmopolitan” context that extends far beyond the particular university where they are undertaken, teaching takes place in this “local” context. Since those who become professors are mainly selected on the basis of their research work and its “cosmopolitan” reputation, it can be assumed that the majority of professors give priority to research; and since they are the most important role model for nonprofessorial academic staff, this orientation can also be attributed to most members of this group. However, since the mid-1970s, student overload has caused a growing demand for teaching, which, in turn, has created pressure on university research. For professors, this has resulted in a tremendous problem of work satisfaction and professional identity. Most enjoy doing research much more than teaching and are therefore frustrated by having to do too much of the latter. In addition, without research, they lose their cherished “cosmopolitan” reputation and have to make do with a “local” reputation. Even more serious are the consequences of worse research opportunities for the nonprofessorial academic staff. It has become more and more difficult for them to finish their dissertation or habilitation, as the age of completion of these qualifications shows—not to mention the cases of failure. It can be suspected that professors frequently use their formal and informal power to delegate teaching duties to their academic staff so that they can maintain their time share for research.9 Still, the majority of all categories of nonprofessorial academic staff devote more of their working time to research, mainly to their dissertation or habilitation, than to teaching (Enders 1996, 149–161, 190–202)—whereas for professors it is the opposite. The growing gap between student and staff numbers at German universities is one of the consequences of a massive scarcity of finances that originates in the enduring fiscal crisis of the German State. Another consequence of this lack of resources is that research must be financed more and more by separately budgeted funds from all kinds of sources. The competition for this project money has greatly increased. To be able to do any significant research, professors have had to invest more and more time and energy into writing elaborate grant proposals and engaging in more and more activities of social networking with potentially influential people.


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Even if they are successful, professors are usually granted a smaller amount of money for a shorter period of time than before. They lament the fact that they have become “professional application agents” to secure the jobs and research opportunities of their academic staff, with no time to do any research. And research is conducted more and more by largely unsupervised, relatively inexperienced academic staff. Essential opportunities for younger academic staff to learn from their professors by collaborating with them on a piece of research have disappeared. Thus, not only the quality of present but also of future research suffers. Recent Developments and Debates There have been two major policy developments with respect to academic staff in German higher education since the mid-1970s. Both have become more visible recently. With respect to professors, it is attempted to bring them under a stricter control of university leadership and the respective Ministry, although there has been much resistance. They are predominantly seen as spoiled, narcissistic, and lazy employees who need to be cut down to size. Concerning nonprofessorial academic staff, there is sympathy for their harsh conditions. Thus, they are seen as the “good guys in trouble” who need help. Changes in employment and working conditions of professors must be seen in the context of recent debates and reform initiatives concerning the overall governance structure of German higher education (Schimank, Kehm, and Enders 1999). To put it in a nutshell, the traditional combination of political regulation by state authorities and an oligarchic academic self-government dominated by professors will be shifted toward an institutional arrangement in which performance-oriented competition for resources and customers and hierarchical self-guidance gain importance. In the traditional arrangement, professors enjoyed great autonomy of work and a relatively standardized high level of salary and tenure. All these features are scrutinized now to increase competitive pressure and hierarchical control over professors. First, the positions of deans and rectors will be strengthened in many respects, including their formal authority vis a` vis the professors of their department or institution. Deans and rectors will have greater responsibility in monitoring the teaching and research performance of professors; university leadership at both levels will be able to give orders to professors with respect to certain aspects of their work where they now take decisions on their own; and rectors and deans will be given new instruments to sanction performance deficiencies and disobedience, as well as outstanding performance and loyalty. As can be seen from these proposals, one of the aims of stronger hierarchical guidance is to increase competitive pressure on professors. Unlike

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in some other countries such as Great Britain, in Germany there are no clear conceptions of how evaluation measures will be institutionalized and of their consequences. What has already been eliminated is the permanent allocation of resources to a professorship, which, from now on, will be for only five to seven years and will be renewed according to the results of a performance evaluation. This means that someone whose performance has deteriorated will have to do without, say, one established post for a scientific collaborator in future. The Kultusministerkonferenz, the standing committee of the ministers of all La¨nder responsible for higher education, reached an agreement about this recently. Another measure that could increase competitive pressure on professors in the future is a further shift of resources for research to separately budgeted funds. Whether more project money increases the quality of university research can be questioned, bearing in mind the impression that, even now, many professors feel they are reduced to being “professional application writers.” Other measures concern professors’ employment conditions. The most radical proposal came recently from the Hochschulrektorenkonferenz (HRK), the association of university rectors (HRK 1998). It recommends that in the future all professors’ basic salaries should be at the level of a C3-professorship. Additions would be dependent on performance and would be only temporary. The KMK and the central government welcomed this suggestion and will probably implement a new salary scheme of this kind. This would result in a reduction and considerable uncertainty for all professorships that are now at the C4 level. The HRK further suggests that the government should make more use of the possibility it already has to employ professors as white-collar employees and no longer as public servants.10 Besides certain additional financial advantages this would represent for the government, some restrictions to mobility from higher education to industry and back again would be removed. An important obstacle to the mobility of professors in higher education was already eliminated recently by the KMK. Because of old-age pensions, until now, a professor who was over 52 years of age could not apply for a professorship in a different Land from the one where he had his professorship. This implied that the most important way to obtain a salary increase was blocked. Taken together, these measures open up new opportunities for successful competition among professors. The danger of these and other measures is a creeping reduction of academic freedom. Nobody would deny that there are lazy and irresponsible professors who should be sanctioned either by university leadership or by competitive pressure. The problem is that most measures concerning monitoring, punishing, and directing these professors require great efforts and also affect professors who perform well. An almost inevitable harmful effect would be an increase in the number of commissions and red tape interfering in teaching and research.


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The very real danger of a silent drop in professors’ commitment to their work should also be taken into account. Of course, if the huge majority were bad performers, it would not matter much if the few good ones were also discouraged. But who knows the distribution of bad and good performers in the total population? Professors’ bashing is now fashionable, especially among politicians and Ministry officials who want to divert attention from their mistakes of the past and their problems in financing higher education. Examples of professors who totally disregard their duties can always be found. But for a more accurate picture, one should remember that each professor is in charge of far more students than 20 years ago and that there are no valid indications that students who complete their studies now are less well educated and trained than their predecessors. Thus, German professors have shouldered quite a lot of additional teaching work, without disregarding research. It could be rather difficult to identify similar increases in productivity in industry or business, not to speak of public administration. German professors on average work 60 hours a week (Enders and Teichler 1995, 52–53; Schimank 1995, 103–104).11 This is in contrast with the reduction of working hours in most other occupations; and top managers in industry earn much more for a comparable amount of work. Obviously, professors still enjoy their work, especially in research. This precarious mixture of motivations upon which—with regard to professors—the still quite good performance of German higher education rests could easily be destroyed by overregulation, too-strict hierarchical control, ruinous competition for separately budgeted funds, badly designed evaluations whose results are felt to be unjust, lower salaries, and other effects of the measures currently debated or implemented. Thus, with respect to professors, it must be feared that political measures might work as “selffulfilling prophecies” in the long run, producing exactly those unmotivated and uncreative “go slow” employees that they wrongly diagnosed at the beginning. Turning to the nonprofessorial academic staff, the situation seems better at first sight. The highly problematic situation of this “status group” is recognized by many observers, and a number of measures have been discussed and implemented to alleviate its lot. Some attempt to improve the situation of doctoral students, whereas others support postdocs who want to become professors. With respect to the doctorate, in the late 1980s, the Science Council designed and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) created a new structure for doctoral work: the Graduiertenkollegs (Lange 1998; Wissenschaftsrat 1997). In 1996, 261 were established at German universities, and about 10 percent of all doctoral students were enrolled in them. A Graduiertenkolleg is located in a university. It consists of 10 to 20 doctoral students who work within a loose thematic framework that was formulated by a small number of professors. In some, the topic is confined to one

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discipline, whereas in others topics are transdisciplinary. Professors at a Graduiertenkolleg specify the topics for dissertations and select doctoral students who agree to work on one of these topics. These receive a threeyear stipend and have neither teaching obligations nor other work to do for their professor. They must attend seminars at an advanced level that deal with topics of general interest and have to present their work to the other students and to all the professors on a regular basis. Graduiertenkollegs are therefore meant as a step in the direction toward a differentiation between graduate and undergraduate studies, as it is known in American higher education. It is important that they are not permanent structures but limited to a period of six to eight years. The research projects are collective, and entry is on a competitive basis. Graduiertenkollegs have received great praise. Since even several hundred Graduiertenkollegs can only include a small number of those who want to write a dissertation, they were explicitly conceived by the DFG as a support for very carefully selected highly gifted doctoral students. However, although those who participate in a Graduiertenkolleg prefer this way of doing their dissertation work to an individual stipend, most would prefer to work as a scientific collaborator on an established post or in a research project. Their integration into the professor’s work would be greater, and they would earn more money if they had a full-time contract. Thus, de facto the Graduiertenkollegs do not serve as an instrument of support for an elite but as another second-best alternative for obtaining one’s doctorate. In this respect, they function well and are very necessary; but the aim to substantially transform the situation of top doctoral students has not been achieved. Concerning postdocs, one of their two major problems is the same as for doctoral students. German postdocs who aspire for a habilitation need too long to obtain it. On average, they are about 40 when they finally become Privatdozenten looking for a professorship (Wissenschaftsrat 1996, 28–31, 105). The second problem is their great dependence on their professor. What is mainly functional for doctoral students who still have to learn many teaching and research skills becomes a serious dysfunctionality for postdocs. They cannot choose autonomously the topics of their research work and their teaching but need the consent of their professors. To apply for separately budgeted funds, postdocs also often need formal support from their professors; and even if this is not the case, it is a handicap if a research proposal comes from a nonprofessor. Thus, academics in an often highly creative and energetic phase are too closely bound by their formal and informal subordination to professors. Measures to speed up the academic career of postdocs and reduce their dependency on professors have been discussed recently. Recommendations by the Wissenschaftsrat have focused on this debate (Wissenschaftsrat 1996). It is agreed that opportunities for postdocs to acquire separately


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budgeted funds and to manage research projects independently of their professor should be increased. A more radical proposal is to do away with the habilitation. The HRK suggests that temporary “qualification professorships” should be created whereby postdocs can learn how to handle a professorship and the university can see how well they work as a professor (HRK 1998, 9–10). However, there are still many defenders of the habilitation, especially in the humanities, social sciences, and medicine. In contrast, many natural sciences will probably substitute the habilitation very soon by other criteria to assess qualifications for a professorship. With respect to research, publications in refereed journals and the successful acquisition of separately budgeted funds will be taken into account. Thus, the future might bring a diversification of postdoc careers to a professorship by disciplines. Nonprofessorial women academic staff have enjoyed special support in the last 10 years (Wissenschaftsrat 1998a). Many programs and measures have been implemented, and even more radical ones are proposed.12 There are a number of special programs to promote women’s academic careers. The Ministries have enforced a rule whereby women applicants for a position in higher education, as in other sectors of the public service, must be preferred to male applicants if they are equally qualified. These measures will be extended. The Wissenschaftsrat proposes that established posts for scientific collaborators who do not hold a doctorate will be divided among male and female younger academics according to the proportion of male and female university graduates in the respective discipline; and established posts for postdocs, especially for scientific assistants, will also be divided according to the share of both sexes among those who obtain their doctorate (Wissenschaftsrat 1998a, 12). The new higher education laws of many La¨nder reinforce these suggested legal restrictions by financial incentives. It is planned that the proportion of women academic staff of a university or department will be a criterion for the allocation of institutional funds. Also, part-time contracts for professors are seen as an important precondition for more female professors. Small successes of deliberate policies to support women’s careers can already be seen. Their share is slowly increasing at all levels (Wissenschaftsrat 1998a, 16–27). One out of six professorships is now given to a woman. A summary appraisal of all that is debated and done on behalf of nonprofessorial academic staff cannot but be pessimistic. The basic dilemma described above is not really dealt with. That German higher education lives from a chronic overproduction of postdocs and Privatdozenten in all disciplines where no significant labor market exists outside higher education cannot be denied; and up to now, no one has found a solution to this problem, which manifests itself in countless personal “patchwork biographies” that sometimes end in real tragedies.

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CONCLUSION The overall situation of academic staff in German higher education is not very positive. There are many problems, most of them originating from basic structural principles that have resisted change for many years. No solutions that promise genuine improvements have been conceived or implemented. On the contrary, with respect to professors, initiated and intended measures might correct one problem by creating another, even greater one; and what is done for the nonprofessorial academic staff is more “symbolic politics” than a substantial change for the better. Thus, most problems remain unsolved, and solutions are often inadequate. NOTES 1. The number of established posts is just a rough indicator of the persons employed—but without great additional effort, no better data can be made available. The number of persons is considerably higher than the number of posts. However, none of the additional categories of personnel teach regularly. 2. When student numbers and the teaching load increased at the end of the 1960s, a new category of nonprofessorial academic staff with a permanent contract that was specialized in teaching was created to relieve professors: the “Akademische Rat.” In the 1980s, this category was abandoned once more, but there are still a number of persons on such a post. 3. Exceptions to this age limit are made for a number of reasons such as pregnancy and family responsibility and scientific excellence. 4. The following data are from Wissenschaftsrat (1998b, 226–229). Figures are considerably higher than those mentioned earlier. The difference is mainly explained by the fact that here all posts for academic staff at university hospitals are included. 5. Including Gesamthochschulen but excluding university hospitals. 6. The quantitative relation between professors and nonprofessors varies considerably according to scientific field (Enders 1996, 73). In the humanities and social sciences, the share of professors of the total academic staff is much higher than in the natural sciences, engineering, or medicine. 7. With respect to the latter, there are exceptions, especially in engineering; and when many new professorships were created at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, a habilitation was often not required because there was a far greater demand for professors than available Privatdozenten. 8. It is true that a member of the nonprofessorial academic staff may decide to choose another professor as supervisor for his dissertation or habilitation. But to do so would be a strong symbolic offense against his professor, who might counter by not renewing his contract. In addition, it would not be easy to find another professor as supervisor because he might fear indirectly offending a colleague. 9. As empirical data show, the share of research in the professors’ time budget has not decreased, as one would have thought, but has even slightly increased between the mid-1970s and the 1990s (Enders and Teichler 1995, 45–66; Schimank 1995, 98–109, 115–123). Delegating teaching to nonprofessorial academic staff is not the only possible strategy, but it is an important one.


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10. For a critical discussion, see Hartmer (1998). 11. This massive extension of working hours beyond what is normal in most jobs does not apply to the nonprofessorial academic staff (Enders 1996, 156). 12. A comparison with France where anonymous concours decide the fate of younger academics shows that there is less discrimination against women than in Germany, an indication that latent prejudices still dominate decision making concerning academic careers.

REFERENCES Ben-David, J. 1971. The Scientist’s Role in Society. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Enders, J. 1996. Die wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter: Ausbildung, Bescha¨ftigung und Karriere der Nachwuchswissenschaftler und Mittelbauangeho¨rigen an den Universita¨ten. Frankfurt/M.: Campus. Enders, J., and Teichler, U. 1995. Berufsbild der Lehrenden und Forschenden an Hochschulen: Ergebnisse einer Befragung des wissenschaftlichen Personals an westdeutschen Hochschulen. Bonn: Bundesministerium fu¨r Bildung und Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie. Hartmer, M. 1998. “Der beamtete Hochschullehrer—Selbstversta¨ndlichkeit oder Anachronismus?” Wissenschaftsrecht 31, pp. 152–169. HRK (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz). 1998. Empfehlungen zum Dienst-und Tarif-, Besoldungs-und Vergu¨tungsrecht sowie zur Personalstruktur in den Hochschulen. Bonn: HRK. Lange, J. 1998. “Doktorandenausbildung in den Universita¨ten.” Beitra¨ge zur Hochschulforschung 3, pp. 175–187. Perschel, W. 1996. “Wissenschaftliche Assistenten, sonstiger wissenschaftlicher Nachwuchs.” In C. Fla¨mig et al. (eds.), Handbuch des Wissenschaftsrechts. Berlin: Springer, pp. 373–407. Reich, A. 1996. “Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter, akademische Lehrkra¨fte.” In C. Fla¨mig et al. (eds.), Handbuch des Wissenschaftsrechts. Berlin: Springer, pp. 409–428. Scheven, D. 1996. “Professoren und andere Hochschullehrer.” In C. Fla¨mig et al. (eds.), Handbuch des Wissenschaftsrechts. Berlin: Springer, pp. 326–371. Schimank, U. 1995. Hochschulforschung im Schatten der Lehre. Frankfurt/M.: Campus. Schimank, U.; Kehm, B.; and Enders, J. 1999. “Institutional Mechanisms of Problem Processing of the German University System—Status Quo and New Developments.” In D. Braun and F. Merrien (eds.), Towards a New Model of Governance for Universities? A Comparative View. London: Jessica Kingsley, pp. 179–194. Wissenschaftsrat. 1995. Personalstellen der Hochschulen 1995. Ko¨ln: Wissenschaftsrat. Wissenschaftsrat. 1996. Empfehlungen zur Fo¨rderung des Hochschullehrernachwuchses. Magdeburg: Wissenschaftsrat. Wissenschaftsrat. 1997. “Stellungnahme des Wissenschaftsrates zur Weiterfu¨hrung des Graduiertenkolleg-Programms.” In Wissenschaftsrat, Empfehlungen zur

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Doktorandenausbildung und zur Fo¨rderung des Hochschullehrernachwuchses. Ko¨ln: Wissenschaftsrat, pp. 7–34. Wissenschaftsrat. 1998a. Empfehlungen zur Chancengleichheit von Frauen in Wissenschaft und Forschung. Ko¨ln: Wissenschaftsrat. Wissenschaftsrat. 1998b. Personalstellen der Hochschulen 1996. Ko¨ln: Wissenschaftsrat.

Chapter 7

The Academic Profession in Greece: Current State and Conditions of Employment Dimitrios G. Tsaoussis

THE GREEK UNIVERSITY SYSTEM The University System The present status and terms of employment of Greek academics can better be understood if examined against the background of the changes that have occurred during the last 25 years. The years 1975, 1982, and 1983 constitute landmarks in a long process that gave the system of Greek higher education its present shape. In 1998 the Ministry of Education announced an extensive educational reform both in the upper secondary and tertiary sectors. However, as the new measures and structures affecting the universities have not yet taken their final shape, they are not examined here. Reference is made to them when appropriate in order to indicate directions of eventual future developments. Since 1844 all Greek Constitutions have made reference to education. The Constitution of 1952 was the first to make explicit reference to higher education, providing that institutions of higher education are self-governed under the supervision of the state, and their professors are civil servants. The 1975 Constitution, voted after the fall of the military dictatorship (1967–1973), introduced a number of important provisions relating to universities. It established intellectual freedom; it established a binary system of tertiary education distinguishing between an upper (academic) and a lower (professional) level of higher education; it decreed that professional education could not exceed a period of three years; it established for all the right of free state education, at all levels (including higher education); it provided that (upper) higher education is offered exclusively by fully self-

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governed state and prohibited the establishment of private institutions of (upper) higher education; finally, it raised the status of university professors from civil servants to public functionaries and accorded them tenure similar to that of senior judges. The terms (upper) higher education (Anotati Ekpaidefsi) and institutions of (upper) higher education (Anotata Ekpaideftika Idrymata—AEIs) used by the 1975 Constitution reflect a layer of higher education that included two different types of institutions: the universities (Panepistimia) of the Humboltian type and the unidisciplinary graduate schools (Anotates Scholes), which corresponded to the French Grandes Ecoles. In 1964 the entire sector of upper higher education was unified. Graduate schools became public, and studies were extended to four years. Since 1990 all graduate schools have been renamed universities and have acquired a pluridepartmental structure. This means that the entire upper higher education layer has practically become a purely university sector. In 1982, Law 1268/82, known also as the Law Framework for the structure and function of the institutions of upper higher education, introduced radical reforms, giving the system its present shape.1 Article 1 of this law made clear the fundamental orientation and principles of the reformation introduced by giving for the first time an explicit and legally binding description of the mission of the university. According to this article the mission of the university is: (2.)i. to produce and to transmit knowledge through research and teaching and to cultivate the arts; ii. to contribute to the formation of responsible persons with scientific, social, cultural and political awareness and to provide them with the means necessary to secure their adequate training for a scientific and professional career; iii. to contribute in answering the social, cultural and developmental needs of the country.(3). In the framework of their mission Universities must contribute towards meeting the needs of the people for continuous education and lifelong learning.

The reform of 1982 was followed by another reform in 1983 that introduced the technological educational institutions (TEIs). This law unified the until-then practically amorphous system of the lower layer of higher education and brought it within the public sector. Following this development the Greek terms corresponding to the distinct layers of upper and lower higher education (Anotati kai Anotera Ekpaidefsi) were gradually abolished. The term tertiary education (Tritovathmia Ekpaidefsi) was introduced in their stead as a collective indication of the two layers of the binary system provided by the Constitution. University Structure and Organization The law from 1982 underscored the public character of the universities and had significant practical implications. All formal decisions concerning

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the universities’ organs (including the validity of examinations) are administrative actions of a public organ and are therefore liable to annulment by the Supreme Court of Administrative Justice. The supervision of the Ministry of Education refers to the legality of the administrative acts of the university and, more particularly, the election of the academic staff. The Ministry sets the framework for the operation of the university by means of legislative action. As this kind of state intervention is frequent, supervision amounts practically to strict control with virtually no concern for academic issues. With the exception of the two recently founded universities (The Greek Open University and the International University of Greek Studies), which have a special status, all universities have the same structure and organization. A university is composed of schools, schools are composed of departments, and departments are composed of divisions. The organization that applies to all levels is identical: one person vested with supervisory, executive, and administrative authority; one small collective executive and administrative body; and a large collective body with substantial deciding authority. The one-person organs and their deputies (rector and vice-rector, deans, chairperson and alternate chairperson of department, director of division) are elected from the tenured academic staff of the two upper ranks. The large collective organs (senate, general assemblies at all levels) include academic staff members from all ranks. The senate and the general assembly of the department are the most important collective organs. The senate is composed of the rector, the two vice-rectors, the deans of schools (if any), the chairpersons of the departments, members of the academic staff appointed by the departments and selected in such a way that all ranks below that of professor are equally represented, and representatives of the undergraduate and postgraduate students and auxiliary teaching staff. The second most important unit is the department and its general assembly, which are composed of all the members of the academic staff if they are less than 30. If they are more than 40, it is composed of the chairperson and his or her deputy, the directors of divisions, and up to 30 members of the academic staff, elected annually by secret vote and so that all ranks and divisions are equally represented. The university system has expanded not only because of the establishment of new universities but also because of the increase in the number of departments in each institution. The total number of departments is 188 (1999), as against 182 in 1994–1995, 120 in 1986–1987, and 82 in 1983– 1984.2 This is partly due to the universities’ initiative and mainly to government policy. As regards universities, the main reasons for the growth of their departments seem to be organization and expediency. The renaming of the graduate schools as “universities” led to departments that include specialization

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and branches that were previously underrepresented. In other cases, the growth of some departments led to their being split. But one of the fundamental causes is related to the fact that departments are degree-granting units. The growth of the departments in a single university can also be attributed to a concern for a corresponding increase of professional outlets for their graduates. This is expected to affect their image positively. The role of the government is primarily linked to its educational policy. The creation of the new universities after 1982 led to a growth in the number of departments by direct governmental action. The same goes for the decision to abolish teachers academies and academies of physical education and to establish corresponding teacher training and physical education university departments. According to recent plans of the Ministry of Education, university departments will be increased by 70 and academic staff by about 470 by the year 2004. The growth in the number of university departments did not lead to any substantial increase in student numbers, which remained practically constant between 1986–1987 (27,294) and 1994–1995 (25,261), with an annual average of 26,250.3 This is because the total number of students entering universities and unidisciplinary graduate schools did not change following the division of these institutions into departments. One must remember that the Ministry of Education makes the final decision concerning the total annual intake of students and their distribution per university and department. The Ministry has recently decided to gradually increase the number of students entering the university and to abolish the numerus clausus as of the academic year 2000–2001. Resources and Management An important aspect of university self-government is the independent management of its economic affairs. Universities’ operations and development are financed from four main sources: the state, income derived from their own resources, income derived from projects carried out with the financial support of the European Community (mainly through the Community Support Framework), and income derived from research and other activities of the university and/or its academic staff. There are three main channels through which a university manages its economic affairs. First, its financial service that administers its regular annual budget covered by state funds in accordance with the general rules for public accountancy and auditing, duly adapted to the needs of the university for speedier action and greater flexibility. A second channel is the special bodies universities can set up to manage and administer their property; by September 1996, all universities but four had set up such bodies (Kladis and Panoussis 1996, 25). The third is the special fund set up in 1985 to enable universities to overcome red tape and taxation difficulties in han-


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Figure 7.1 Structure of Academic Staff in Greece

dling research funds payable to third parties by academic staff responsible for research projects. Initial legislation and regulations concerning the fund were later amended by ministerial decision in order to facilitate the transfer of Community Support Framework funds from the Ministry of Education and other sources, such as the Ministry of Labor, to the universities. RANKS OF ACADEMIC STAFF Law 1268/82 marks a clear departure from the old academic structure, which, following the Humboltian pattern, was organized around the chair and the ordinary professor. The new law introduced the American academic structure. Yet the system as it stands today is more complex, since it had to incorporate both preexisting categories of mainly auxiliary academic staff and new categories of teaching staff created to meet urgent needs arising from the establishment of new universities and/or departments. As shown in Figure 7.1, there are two major categories of academic staff. The first, designated by the law as “Teaching and Research Personnel” (Didaktiko-Erevnitiko Prosopiko), corresponds to the regular aca-

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demic staff. The second category, the supplementary teaching personnel, is divided into two subcategories: external instructors and auxiliary teaching staff. Each of these categories and subcategories operates within its own legal framework, created by subsequent ad hoc amendments and regulations. The regular academic staff are divided into four hierarchical ranks: (full) professor (Kathigitis), associate professor (Anaplirotis Kathigitis), assistant professor (Epikouros Kathigitis), and lecturer (Lektoras). Professor and associate professor hold tenured positions; assistant professors and lecturers hold term positions. Yet by special ad hoc legal provisions, assistant professors and lecturers may, under certain conditions, hold permanent positions. The category “external instructors” includes both academic and nonacademic staff who are external to the university and hold temporary teaching assignments. They are appointed on an annual basis, and their contract cannot (in principle but not in practice) be renewed or extended for more than two consecutive years. External instructors and scientific assistants occupy a peripheral position. The latter constitute a residual category. Yet the former, and especially the adjuncts, play a considerable role by sharing a substantial part of the teaching burden of the academic staff without, however, having any responsibilities for running the university. Adjuncts may be employed full-time or part-time. Depending on their qualifications, their remuneration is equal to that of the corresponding rank of a full- or part-time member of the academic staff. Adjuncts are appointed for up to one year’s term. The total period of the renewal of their appointment is three years. In practice, universities have used this position to provisionally fill vacancies by appointing nonacademic teaching staff at a lower cost, since adjuncts were not entitled to most of the benefits, allowances, and subsidies of regular academic staff. Since, for financial reasons, the state has proved to be very reluctant to meet the immediate needs of the universities to fill their vacancies, the universities were in turn reluctantly led to appointing adjuncts to cover the pressing needs of their programs. This is a structural problem because it tends to postpone almost indefinitely the election and appointment of regular academic personnel and thus to perpetuate the period of uncertainty that new universities and departments go through before reaching maturity and independence. It is a functional problem because these instructors share no responsibility for the operation of the department and for the structure and functioning of its study program. This increases the burden of the members of the regular academic personnel, especially those of the upper ranks. In essence, adjuncts are a marginal category who are totally unassimilated and unsupervised. The subcategory “auxiliary academic staff” includes special teaching personnel, special administrative-technical personnel, and scientific assistants and aids. They all have two characteristics in common: They offer auxiliary


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teaching services and do not need to hold a Ph.D. degree. The special teaching personnel carry out autonomous teaching functions. The other two perform functions that are subsidiary to those of the academic staff. STATUS AND EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS OF THE ACADEMIC STAFF Academic Freedom Both the status and the duties of the regular academic personnel are directly linked to, and dependent on, academic freedom. Academic freedom is acknowledged, secured, and safeguarded by provisions of the Constitution (1975) and the Law (1982) at two distinct but complementary levels: that of the university and that of the academic staff. At the institutional level of the university, these provisions seem to be the first explicit legal regulation of the university asylum, tacitly recognized by long-standing tradition but not always respected. It is interesting to note that in order to secure enforcement of these provisions imprisonment is foreseen for the transgressors of the asylum. The move toward legal sanction of the university asylum was made because of the strongly felt need to condemn and prevent repetition of forceful intrusions like the military intervention in the National Technical University on November 17, 1973, to put an end to student uprising against the military junta. At the individual level, the Constitution safeguards the independence and academic freedom of university full professors by raising their status to that of public functionaries, as against that of civil servants accorded to them by the 1952 Constitution, and regulating their position in ways similar to that of senior judges. The difference between the two statuses is that whereas civil servants occupy an executive and subordinate position, public functionaries occupy a totally independent public position. Law 1268/82 accorded the status of public functionary to all the members of the academic staff, irrespective of their rank. Terms of Employment of the Regular Academic Personnel The terms of employment of academic staff is one of the four major issues that have come to plague the Greek university system from the 1982 reform to the present day. The other three are the deterioration of remuneration; the inability of the state to provide the funds to fill academic staff vacancies; and the inability of the government to resist pressures to give tenure to academic personnel holding office for terms. The terms of employment of the academic staff are set by law. The first arrangements under the new regime were introduced by Law 1268/82. Article 17 para. 1a specifies that the members of the academic staff Teaching-

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Research Personnel (DEP) have the obligation to render their services to the university at which they have been appointed on a full-time basis and during all working days. The details of this provision were to be regulated by the charter of each university. Three years later, Law 1566/85 was passed, which clarifies that full-time employment is understood as the obligatory presence of members of the academic staff in their respective university for at least 20 hours a week as well as their participation in the collective organs. Two notes are pertinent here. First, to that date (1982) very few universities were able to establish their own charter and thus decide on how the law would be applied by their institution. This was primarily due to the long transitory period universities were undergoing since the introduction of the new regime. Older universities had to go through a process of organizational and administrative adjustment. The second point is that a number of personnel issues originally regulated by the law in 1982 or left to be regulated by the university charters were regulated by successive laws, presidential decrees, and ministerial decisions. This clearly showed the degree of dependence of the university and its staff on the state and acted as a countermotive for universities to arrange their affairs independently and according to their particular needs. Special reference should be made to the possibility for members of the academic staff to hold a second salaried position or to pursue a parallel free profession, as was traditionally the case with lawyers, medical doctors, engineers, and so on. Law 2083/92 was the first attempt to strike a balance between second employment and fair remuneration of academic staff who are fully employed in the university. It introduced three major categories of academic staff—fully and exclusively employed, full-time, and part-time members—and described the status of each category academics could opt for. It proved to be an abortive attempt to solve the problem. For lack of clear regulation of the matter practically all members of the academic staff opted for full and exclusive employment, irrespective of their holding a second salaried position or a free profession. The final result was a general increase of 35 percent of their total remuneration for all members of the academic staff. Law 2530/97 abolished the category of full and exclusive employment and retained only the distinction between full- and part-time members of the academic staff. Full-time members must reside in the prefecture where the department in which they are appointed is established. They must perform their teaching duties for at least 6 hours a week and must be present on the premises of the university for at least another 14 hours and for at least three days a week in order to perform their scientific research and administrative tasks. Part-time members of the academic staff are those who do not belong to the category of full-time members and do not fall


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under the conditions prescribed as incompatible to, or leading to suspension of, the status of the member of the academic staff. REMUNERATION OF THE ACADEMIC STAFF Salaries, Subsidies, Allowances, Benefits The total monthly remuneration of the academic staff is paid directly by the state. As is the case with any person employed in the public sector, the salary constitutes only part of the total monthly remuneration, which includes subsidies, allowances, and/or benefits paid either as salary increments or as lump sums. The salary forms a basis for calculation of monthly payments and pensions, since the latter are calculated as a percentage of the salary. There are two types of salary: the basic salary and what could be called the real salary. The basic salary is fixed by law and remains constant over a rather long period of time. The real salary consists of the basic salary, the subsidy for previous service, and the annual increments added to adjust the salary to inflation and cost of living. Both the basic salary and the allowances and benefits that make up the monthly income have changed repeatedly over the years. The most recent change was implemented by Law 2530/97, which foresees the following subsidies, allowances, and benefits (art. 12 para. 2): • Subsidy of previous public service: It is an increment of the basic salary equal to 4 percent for the first year, increased thereafter by 4 percentile units (i.e., to 8 percent) every two additional years of public service for 14 biennial periods and up to 60 percent of the basic salary. • Postgraduate studies subsidy: Dr10,000 (Dr ⫽ drachma) for those holding a master’s degree and Dr18,000 for those holding a Ph.D. (Note: A Greek drachma is equivalent to 0.003 euro [1 euro ⫽ 332 GRD]. The current exchange rate [January 2001] of 1 euro is 0.91 U.S.$.) • Allowance for teaching preparation and extra-teaching university employment on the premises of the university. • Regular monthly indemnity for library creation and development and for participation in conferences. • Special research allowance for conducting postdoctoral research and for speedier and more effective forwarding of research projects. • Family benefit as foreseen for all civil servants. • Extra monthly emoluments for the rector, the vice-rectors, and the deans or department chairs.

The law states explicitly that “after the present law enters into force no other monthly payment granted to members of the Academic Staff, besides

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the allowances and indemnities foreseen by the present article, is justified, whatever its name and source.” The same law provides that besides these regular payments full-time members of the academic staff may be remunerated for research funded through the university’s special fund, for teaching at the University Center for Education and Training (KEK), and so on. Part-time members are excluded from this provision. Payments to full-time members made through the university’s special fund are subject to the following deductions in favor of the fund: up to 15 percent from honoraria received for funded research, 20 percent for any other work performed, and 30 percent for any honorarium received from the exercise of a free profession. In 1982 the basic salaries of the three lower ranks were calculated as increments of the basic salary of the professor, which was set at 120,000 GRD. Associate professors received a basic salary equal to 85 percent of the professors basic salary; assistant professor, 70 percent; and lecturers, 60 percent. In 1992, the year that saw the tripartite categorization of the academic staff, members of the category of full and exclusive employment were to receive a 35 percent increase, and members of the part-time category were to suffer a 35 percent reduction. As we saw, the measure led finally to a generalized increase of 35 percent for all members of the academic staff. The last change was introduced in 1997 when the order of percentage differences per rank was reversed. The basic salary of the lecturer, set at Dr250,000, was taken as the starting point. It was multiplied by 1.10 for the assistant professors, by 1.30 for the associate professors, and 1.50 for professors. Part-time members received the third of the total salary and allowances of full-time members in their rank. PLANNING, RECRUITMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC STAFF Manpower Forecasts and Planning Law 1268/82 introduced two novel institutions: the National Academy of Arts and Sciences (Ethniki Akademia Grammaton kai Epistimon [EAGE]) and the National Council of University Education (Ethniko Symvoulio Anotatis Paideias [ESAP]). The EAGE was conceived as the central consultative agency of the universities for teaching, postgraduate studies, and procedures of evaluation and assessment of the academic staff. It was also meant to play the role of government consultant on matters of university education. EAGE, which was conceived as an organ external to the universities, has never functioned to this date. The ESAP was a consultative organ for policy development. It was renamed the Council of University Education (SAP) and was finally replaced


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by the National Council of Education (ESYP), a more complex organ conceived as an independent administrative authority under the supervision of the minister of education. ESYP is meant to consult the government on the creation of personnel posts in the universities. Both ESAP/SAP and ESYP consult the minister of education on planning, development, and distribution of the academic staff and other university teaching personnel. This opinion constitutes the last phase of a planning procedure that was initially introduced in 1992 and subsequently amended in 1994 and 1995. The procedure started at the level of departments where needs for academic staff positions were assessed by the divisions, initially on a four-year basis and subsequently on an annual basis. Departments submitted their proposals to the senate, which then submitted to the Ministry the university’s needs for academic staff by rank and subject. The final decision rests always with the minister, who decides on the basis of the policy pursued in relation to the funds provided for this purpose by the national budget and other sources (e.g., the Community Support Framework). The planning procedure introduced by this legislation has not led to a well-developed and consistently followed practice. Qualifications of the Academic Staff To be elected, members of the academic staff must hold a Ph.D. degree and must compete in three fields: (1) teaching experience or research or acknowledged professional performance, (2) original publications, (3) ability for advancement and/or peer acknowledgment. The first group of qualifications is considered either independently or in relation to each other. Publications may be in the form of books, articles, contributions to collective works, or papers presented at conferences and published in their reports. They may be individual or collective. In the latter case, the candidate’s contribution must be clearly assessed. Advancement, contribution to science, and acknowledgment by peers are assessed on the basis of the candidate’s performance. The law introduces gradations of these qualifications by rank. In the case of promotion from the rank of assistant or associate professor, electors must take into consideration the students’ evaluation of the candidates’ teaching performance. Law 1268/82 provides: A Presidential Decree to be issued following the opinion of the National Academy of Arts and Sciences (Ethniki Academia Grammaton kai Epistimon—EAGE) shall determine the conditions and procedure of evaluation of teaching ability, the form of the questionnaire to be completed by the students and the way in which the answers to this questionnaire will be elaborated. The questions refer to the organization of the teaching material, the way teaching and exercises are related to each other and the degree of cooperation.

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To this date such a Presidential Decree has not been issued, with the result that no teaching evaluation is in reality possible, since there is no legally established way of assessing its objectivity and credibility, if legally contested. Recruitment and Promotion Procedures To allow an easy and swift transition from the old to the new regime, Law 1268/82 provided that all those who held the rank of professor and occupied a chair became professors. All those who held the title of extraordinary professors without occupying a chair became associate professors. Those who held the position of assistant professor became permanent assistant professors. Those who held the title of Yfigitis, which corresponded to the German title Dozent, and had already completed at least a year’s teaching assignment were to be assessed in order to become permanent assistant professors. Finally, those who held positions of auxiliary teaching personnel and a Ph.D. degree automatically became lecturers. The latter provision was annulled by the Conseil d’Etat since the persons concerned were originally appointed and not assessed and elected by the academic staff. The Court considered that this procedure ran counter to the constitutionally established freedom and independence of the university. A special procedure was then introduced whereby auxiliary teaching personnel who had automatically become lecturers were given several opportunities to be assessed by ad hoc electoral bodies in order to ratify their initial appointment and their status as a permanent member of the academic staff. If they failed in these assessments, they could be transferred as permanent civil servants to other public positions. Auxiliary teaching staff who did not hold a doctoral degree were given several opportunities to obtain it or to be transferred to other public positions as permanent civil servants. This possibility was offered once again in 1997 and resulted in the creation of ad personam permanent positions of auxiliary teaching personnel for those who remained in the university without obtaining their Ph.D. Law 1268/82, except for these transitory arrangements, provides that the academic staff is recruited and/or promoted by formal and competitive selection procedures. Following the Ministry’s approval to fill a certain number of vacancies, announcements and call for candidacies are published in the Government’s Official Gazette and the daily press and are communicated to the Greek embassies abroad. Candidacies may also be submitted by five members of the department’s general assembly. Electoral assemblies are formed in the departments; they appoint special recommendation committees that study the candidate’s files and make recommendations to the electoral assembly, which takes the final decision. The electoral bodies are composed of members of the department’s academic staff who hold a rank that is superior or equal to that of the vacancy to be filled.


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To provide as much transparency as possible, the law foresees, first, that the electoral assembly is convened in joint session with the department’s general assembly, which comprises nonvoting members; second, that the electors must justify their vote; and third, that the department must publish the minutes of the electoral session every year. The law also provides that the candidates must submit files that include a curriculum vitae, an analytic presentation of their work, and copies of their publications for each of the electors. This is considered of major importance. The recommendation committee must submit to the electoral assembly a fully justified report that includes (1) an analytic presentation and assessment of the work and personality of each candidate and a judgment on their contribution to the advancement of science, (2) an opinion on the degree of correspondence of each candidate to the qualifications foreseen, and (3) a classification of candidates by order of their relative assessment. Candidates can comment on the committees’ recommendations. Electors can ask candidates to provide supplementary information. The minutes of the electoral session are checked by the rector for their legitimacy. The rector forwards to the minister of education for publication in the Government’s Official Gazette the minutes and the act of appointment of the candidate elected and communicates the minutes to all the candidates. In 1997 a new form of quasi recruitment was introduced by allowing members of the academic staff to move from one department to another and from one university to another, provided such mobility takes place between peripheral universities. Its rationale seems to be to facilitate a more equitable distribution of teaching personnel between peripheral universities, especially when redundant young personnel would have a better chance for promotion. The promotion procedure is identical to the selection procedure. Originally, promotion from the rank of lecturer to assistant professor and from the latter to the rank of associate professor was open. Those who were being assessed had to compete with external candidates for the same position, while promotion from the rank of associate to that of full professor was closed. Law 2527/97 provided that associate professors as well must be promoted by open procedures to the rank of professor. It also introduced a procedure of indirect promotion by providing that members of the academic staff in service may be candidates in open elections for any position of whatever rank in the same or another university. This sanctions an old practice whereby members of lower ranks were seeking promotion without waiting for the term foreseen by the law to be completed. All categories of auxiliary teaching personnel and special scientists, with the exception of adjuncts, are recruited with procedures following the general pattern of academic staff recruitment. Adjuncts, however, are appointed without previous assessment of their candidacy. This irregular

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situation may have the advantage of giving departments a chance to test, for a limited period, the abilities of prospective members of the academic staff. In fact, it tends to give a strong advantage to their subsequent election to the rank of assistant professor (because of the prerequisite of at least two years of previous independent teaching) to persons who are recruited in indirect ways, without any competition, with no transparency, and no ability to check their qualifications and the legitimacy of the decision for their appointment. CONCLUDING REMARKS The changes introduced by the 1975 Constitution are still in application. The state still holds the monopoly on university education. The establishment of private universities continues to be prohibited. The binary system is still firmly in place. Academic freedom is acknowledged, and academics enjoy a legal status similar to that of senior judges. The university remains at the top of the educational pyramid, and the regular academic personnel occupy a distinct position, both in the educational and in the wider social context. The 1975 Constitution therefore helped to raise the social prestige of academics. Law 1268/82 consolidated and extended these changes by formally acknowledging and regulating the university asylum and by granting the status of university professor to all members of the regular teaching personnel. Yet the radical changes that were introduced led to a rather unexpected result: the virtual bureaucratization of the academic profession. These changes affected in a negative way both its social image and its status. There are many reasons for this. The following could be considered the most important: the growth in the number of academic staff. The old regime considered the ordinary professor as the central academic figure in the university. The introduction of the new system of academic ranks with provision for serial promotion transformed the professorial rank into a culminating point of an academic career. The introduction of a system where the two upper ranks were tenured positions and the two lower term positions continued to give a certain prestige to the ranks of professors and associate professors. All the more so since these had a certain power in both the academic and administrative spheres. The subsequent legal regulations concerning permanence and changes in academic staff election procedure led to a gradual drop in the social status and prestige of the academic profession. The creation of collective university organs with significant responsibility for running the university made the university administration more democratic. Yet it ended up creating a heavy administrative load, especially for the tenured staff. It also created new dynamics in the operation of university academic and bureaucratic affairs because of the new power structure and


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the tensions and alliances between groups of academic staff members, irrespective of their ranks. Closer links between the university and society and the national economy led to unprecedented professional involvement of academic staff in both the private and public sectors. This situation, together with the gradual deterioration of the salaries of the regular teaching personnel, ended up creating a marked distinction between those who retained their professional academic status despite the gradual loss of its social prestige and those who used their professional status to acquire more status, prestige, power, and/ or income outside the university. The issue of full-time and part-time employment and the great variety of subsidies and allowances bestowed on academics to increase their remuneration, but not their claim for higher pensions after retirement, reflect the situation that has developed in the last 15 years or so. The introduction and extensive use of adjuncts are a lasting anomaly in the structure of the university and the academic profession. They were introduced to meet the urgent teaching needs of newly founded universities. Adjuncts have become a widely used source for easy and quick recruitment of cheap teaching personnel in a university that is subject to strong social and political pressure to give priority to its teaching role. Yet this one-sided function does not correspond either to the mission of the university, as explicitly described by the law, or to the role the university had conceived for itself. And it definitely is not the appropriate role in the highly transitional, and therefore uncertain, times in which we are living. The status and prestige of the university and the academic staff are preconditions for them to play the leading role society and the economy expect of them. The creation and maintenance of a temporary and marginal category of teaching personnel tend to reinforce the bureaucratic character that universities seem to be acquiring. A final point concerns the self-government of the university. This is a prerogative established both by the Constitution and by laws. Yet it still remains a desideratum. The state holds a very strong grip on university affairs. The fact that in the 16 years following the introduction of Law 1268/82 no less than 32 laws have been enacted is strong evidence of this. But even Law 1268/82 is by itself a good example of the state’s strong control in matters regarding university education. The creation of institutions like EAGE and ESAP/SAP/ESYP are cases in point. Their aim was to act as wider policy consultants to the Ministry and to bring the university under greater state and social control. Universities do not have many opportunities to formulate their mission independently, and hence their orientation, their policies, or the framework for their educational, research, and wider operational plans. They have become massive degree-granting bureaucratic structures that operate as a point of reference to establish the level and correspondence of extrauniversity institutions that provide formal

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or nonformal education. It is evident that this does not enhance the prestige of the university and its teaching staff, nor does it lead to satisfactory employment conditions. NOTES 1. Law 1268/82 and all subsequent legislation concerning universities are published codified and annotated in D. Kladis and J. Panoussis, The Law Framework for the Institutions of (Upper) Higher Education (Athens: Sakkoulas, Vol. I, 1984, Vol. II, 1986) (in Greek), and subsequent updated editions of 1989, 1993, 1996, and 1998. For the jurisprudence of the Conseil d’Etat on university legislation and its application, and for information concerning salaries, subsidies, and so on, see A. Tsitos, Greek Universities—Structure and Function (Athens: Telethrion, 1996) (in Greek). 2. Ministry of Education, Unpublished official information. 3. Ibid.

REFERENCE Kladis, D., and Panoussis, J. 1996. The Law Framework for the Institutions of (Upper) Higher Education. Athens: Sakkoulas (in Greek).

Chapter 8

Academic Staff in Ireland: The Right of Tenure Enacted and Endorsed Maureen Killeavy and Marie Coleman

INTRODUCTION The impetus for the major developments in higher education in Ireland during the last 30 years derived from two studies: Investment in Education (Government of Ireland 1966) and The Report of the Commission on Higher Education (Government of Ireland 1967). The picture of third-level education painted by these studies is one of a system characterized by a lack of planning, low standards of entry, and inadequate accommodation, resources, and research facilities. Although the Commission noted with concern the increasing number of students availing of third-level education in the 1960s, Investment in Education reported that only 4 percent of students progressed from postprimary school to university at this time, and over 85 percent of those students were from the top three occupational categories in the population (Government of Ireland 1966, 172–176). The range and scope of third-level education in this decade had a rather narrow and traditional academic focus, and it was not availed by the vast majority of young Irish people. In 1964, just 356 years ago, over 78.2 percent of students in third-level education were attending university, 9.5 percent were in teacher training institutions, and a further 10.6 percent were being educated in nonaided religious institutions. During the following 30 years, major policy initiatives brought about expansion and fundamental changes in the system. Two separate statutory bodies were set up by the government: the Higher Education Authority (HEA) in 1968, with major responsibilities for the university sector, and the National Council for Education Awards (NCEA) in 1971, with academic responsibility for the nonuniversity third-level sector (Government

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of Ireland 1971). These two bodies had a very significant influence on the development of higher education, and the dual nature of the areas of their operation emphasized the strong binary nature of the developments in the decades that followed. While there was a continued and marked expansion within the traditional universities both in number of student places and in the range and variety of courses on offer, this was matched by major new developments in the nonuniversity sector. Several Regional Technical Colleges (RTCs) were established nationwide, as well as the Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT), which was followed by the creation of similar institutions in other locations in the country, and two National Institutes of Higher Education in Dublin and Limerick (Higher Education Authority 1998). The National Institute of Higher Education, Dublin, became Dublin City University (DCU) and the National Institute of Higher Education, Limerick, became the University of Limerick (UL) in 1989 (Higher Education Authority 1998). This removed the role of the NCEA in validating their degrees and aligned the two newly designated institutions, Dublin City University and the University of Limerick, with the older institutions within the university sector. This study is, however, concerned primarily with matters concerning staff in the seven universities, including the two larger colleges of education that are, in effect, part of these institutions.1 THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION Financing of Higher Education in Ireland The principal source of funding for all levels of education in Ireland is the exchequer (Government of Ireland 1995). The share of the education budget to be allocated to third-level institutions is distributed among these institutions by the Department of Education and Science (DES) via the HEA. Under the terms of the 1997 Universities Act, the Higher Education Authority determines the amount of money to be allocated to each institution on the basis of a statement of proposed expenditure submitted annually by the universities. This money, along with whatever additional income the university expects to receive, constitutes the annual budget of the university (Government of Ireland 1997b). Undergraduate tuition fees, which formerly accounted for a significant part of the income of universities, were abolished by the government in 1995. Currently, students are only liable for a capitation fee. However, they must still find the necessary finance from private sources to cover their living expenses, unless they are in receipt of a grant. The figures for the funding of higher education for the financial year ended December 31, 1996, were as follows: current expenditure on thirdlevel and further education—IR£478,740,000; grants through HEA to universities, and so on—IR£238,437,000; grants to Vocational Education

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Committees for regional and technical colleges—IR£150,675,000; and capital expenditure—IR£46,929,000 (Higher Education Authority 1998, 14). (Note: An Irish pound is equivalent to 1.27 euro [1 euro ⫽ 0.79 IEP]. The current exchange rate [January 2001] of 1 euro is 0.91 U.S.$.) According to figures produced by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), expenditure on higher education amounts to 24 percent of the total expenditure on education (OECD 1995). In its White Paper on Education produced in 1995, the Department of Education proposed that a system of funding known as the unit-cost system be implemented by the Higher Education Authority, in consultation with the institutions of higher education (Government of Ireland 1995). Various government initiatives in higher education throughout the 1990s have indicated that the role of research is beginning to achieve greater legitimacy in the eyes of Irish education planners and financiers. In particular, the White Paper on Education, published in 1995, established a separate budget to provide additional research funding. A proposal in an earlier prelegislative document, the 1993 Green Paper on Education, to separate funding for teaching and research was opposed by academics. It was feared that the traditional and essential links between teaching and research would be broken and that such a separation in the role of academics would have a detrimental impact on the quality of third-level education (Irish Federation of University Teachers 1993). The overwhelming bias in research funding favoring the sciences at the expense of the arts and humanities has been an ongoing problem in Irish education. The first targeted measure to deal with the situation was taken in 1998 with the setting up of a separate dedicated research fund by the minister for education and science.2 This represented a first step toward the more equitable funding of research across the higher education sector. It seems likely that the proposed Humanities and Social Science Research Council, which is currently under consideration, will further help with the provision of funding for research in these areas (Bric 1999). The Types of Higher Education Institutions The Irish higher education system is based on a rigid binary model, with a clear distinction between the university and nonuniversity sectors, the latter being composed largely of colleges that provide technological education. Government legislative initiatives during the 1990s have all reinforced this binary structure, in spite of pressure from the nonuniversity sector for a more comprehensive policy, which would upgrade their status in the higher education system (Coolahan 1998; Cosgrave 1998). The two largest universities, Trinity College and University College Dublin and National University of Ireland, Dublin, are based in Dublin city, as is Dublin City University. The National University of Ireland, Maynooth (formerly

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Saint Patrick’s College) college and the pontifical university at Maynooth are located at a short distance from Dublin city. That leaves only three universities outside the Dublin hinterland, in Galway, Cork, and Limerick. Therefore, the diversity of university institutions is biased in favor of the capital city. In contrast, there is a much greater diversity of institutes of technology. While these institutes are also based in the main urban centers such as Cork, Galway, and Limerick, they are also to be found in smaller urban centers. During the academic year 1996–1997, there were 100,204 full-time and 22,795 part-time students enrolled in third-level colleges in Ireland (Government of Ireland 1998, 120). To put these figures into context, the total population of the Republic of Ireland, recorded in the 1996 census, is 3,626,087, of which 484,505 are receiving full-time education (Government of Ireland 1998, 13, 217). In a report prepared by the Higher Education Authority in 1995, it was estimated that by the academic year 2000– 2001 there would be a total of 110,600 students in higher education; 62,300 in the university sector and 48,300 in the institutes of technology. Looking further into the future, the projected figures for 2007–2008 are 119,000, 67,000, and 52,100, respectively (Higher Education Authority 1995, 14). STAFFING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: MAIN ACTORS AND PROCEDURES The State The state controls Irish education through the Department of Education and Science (formerly the Department of Education), which was established in 1924 under the auspices of the Ministers and Secretaries Act of that year. The mission of the Department of Education is, according to the 1995 government White Paper on Education, “to ensure the provision of a comprehensive, cost-effective and accessible education system of the highest quality, as measured by international standards, which will enable individuals to achieve their full potential as persons and to participate fully as citizens in society and contribute to social and economic developments” (Government of Ireland 1995, 193). The core functions of the Department in achieving this mission include: “strategic planning and policy formulation . . . ; determination of national curricula; promotion of equality . . . ; resource allocation and appropriate monitoring; evaluation of performance and outcomes; determination of overall personnel policies . . . ; [and] certain executive activities” (Government of Ireland 1995, 194). Intermediary Bodies Much of the administration of third-level education is conducted by the Department of Education through the Higher Education Authority. It was


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envisaged that the HEA would devise strategies for the restructuring of higher education to help the system in coping with a significant increase in demand for access to higher education that was projected for future years. It was also provided for the HEA to perform such duties as advising the minister for education on the establishment of new institutions of higher education; continually reviewing the demand for higher education; and making recommendations on the provision and distribution of places for students in the national system of higher education (Government of Ireland 1995, Sections 3–7). As one of the principal functions of the HEA is the distribution of government funding to third-level education, the act also gives the authority the power to demand financial statements from institutes of higher education. Its new functions will also eventually apply to all publicly funded third-level institutions, including the institutes of technology. Previously, the nonuniversity sector was the responsibility of the National Council for Educational Awards (Coolahan, 1998, 192– 199). Outside the university sector a newly created intermediary body of much importance is TEASTAS, a national certification authority, set up initially on an interim basis in September 1995, whose responsibilities include “the development, implementation, regulation and supervision of all nonuniversity third-level programmes, and all further and continuation education and training programmes” (Coolahan 1998, 198). Higher Education Institutions Although publicly funded and regulated by government legislation, the Irish universities are private institutions, each of which is governed by a body known as the governing authority. These authorities, established by statute, are composed of the president and chief officers of the university, members elected to represent both academic and nonacademic staff, student representatives, graduates of the college, government nominees, and local authority representatives. The role of higher education institutions in Ireland is to provide professional training and education. As such, these institutions, in particular the universities, are very influential. The universities are responsible for educating professionals in fields such as medicine, law, and engineering, and as such, their ethos has a significant influence on professional careers. Likewise, the colleges of education have traditionally exerted a major influence on Irish society, as they are responsible for the training of teachers for primary education, a level of education attained by the vast majority of the population. Representative Organizations of Employers Bodies such as the Irish Business Employers Confederation (IBEC) are gaining an increasingly loud voice in the planning of Irish higher education.

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This body was invited to make submissions in response to government initiatives on higher education during the 1990s, such as the National Education Convention and the 1993 Green Paper on Education. Employers’ organizations have also been given seats on the governing authorities of some higher education institutions. The involvement of these organizations in planning the future of higher education is aimed at ensuring that, particularly in the technological and scientific sectors, university and college graduates are adequately equipped to supply Irish industry with the type of trained professionals that are required. However, it is felt in some academic circles that such bodies are becoming too influential, leading to courses in colleges and universities becoming “demand driven,” that is, being dictated by the needs of employers. Representative Organizations of Academic Staff The principal body representing academic staff in universities in the Republic of Ireland is the Irish Federation of University Teachers (IFUT). As its name suggests, the membership of this organization is drawn from members of the academic staff in the five older universities. The Federation is both a professional organization and a trade union, and it is affiliated with the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. It developed during the 1960s, at which point the academic staff associations in each of the universities became the local branches of the Federation. The academic staff in the two newer universities, DCU and UL, which began their existence as institutes of higher education, do not have specific teacher union representation. Rather, they may become members of the general union, which represents all employees in the institution.3 Third-level teachers who do not come from the university sector and who wish to join a union may become members of the Teachers Union of Ireland (TUI), a more general union that represents teachers at the second and third levels of education. IFUT is the only union that caters solely to university teachers. Its total membership at the end of 1999 was approximately 1,400. The principal aims of IFUT, which was founded in 1963, are the advancement of higher education and research; the promotion and protection of academic freedom; the protection of the terms and conditions of employment of its members; and the safeguarding of their professional interests. Its chief activities in the area of industrial relations include negotiating salaries on behalf of its members and representing members who have been dismissed or are threatened with dismissal from their posts (Coleman 2000). As a professional organization IFUT is involved in issues relating to policy formation and implementation both in Ireland and internationally.


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ACADEMIC STAFF IN HIGHER EDUCATION: BASIC INFORMATION AND DATA Legal and Social Status of Academic Staff and the Issue of Tenure The tenured nature of academic employment involves in effect a fixedterm contract on appointment as an academic extending to retirement, with dismissal only being possible on grounds of incompetence, disability, or outrageous conduct (IFUT 1998a, 1). Prior to the enactment of the universities legislation in 1997, the notion of tenure for academic and related staffs was enshrined in the statutes of the universities, and this right was never challenged in the courts of the state. In a situation of redundancy, compensation equivalent to at least the salary outstanding to retirement age was considered to be the right of academic staff. In the case of the closure of an institution, as established with staff in Carysfort College, reasonable redeployment was considered an alternative to compensation (IFUT 1998b). The 1997 Universities Act provides an explicit legislative guarantee of tenure in that it stipulates that a permanent, full-time member of the academic staff of the university is designated an officer of the institution (Government of Ireland 1997b, Subsection 3/1). Further, it stipulates that there must be a statute of the university that shall provide for tenure. This provision places tenure on a firmer footing than was the case pursuant to the 1908 Act, which regulated the operation of the institutions of the National University of Ireland prior to the recent legislation. The Irish universities have broadly similar procedures governing both the probation/assessment period prior to the award of tenure and the conditions for promotion. First appointments to an academic position in an Irish university are usually at the assistant lecturer or lecturer level, depending on candidates’ qualifications and prior experience. It is necessary to point out, however, that in some universities these two positions have been amalgamated into a single scale. The regulations in operation at University College Dublin stipulate that on appointment as an assistant lecturer there should be an initial probationary period of six months. If the employment is continued beyond this preliminary period, the full probationary period shall be three years from the date of appointment (University College Dublin 1983, 1). The Assessment Board involved in the selection of candidates may recommend certain alternatives to the full probationary period, and it is usual for all or part of the three years’ probation to be dispensed with for more mature candidates. On appointment as lecturer (formerly termed college lecturer in the NUI colleges), the normal probationary period is one year. This period may be extended for a further year on the recommendation of the head of department with the approval of the Promotions Committee. However, this latter

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arrangement is rare in most institutions. The Promotions Committee is made up of the senior officers of the university and four elected academic staff representatives. The guidelines used in deciding on the award of tenure or the promotion to lecturer include satisfactory performance of lecturing and other duties; evidence of interest in the pursuit of research and scholarship; evidence of interest in and contribution to the affairs of the department; and the college and academic achievement. The award of a doctoral degree or equivalent constitutes adequate evidence of academic achievement. On completion of a satisfactory probation, the lecturer is deemed to have tenure. Occupational Grading Structure of Academic Staff Academic staff positions in most Irish universities are categorized in five main grade levels, although in some institutions, such as Trinity College Dublin, there are four main academic staff grades. Recent statistics show that 57.5 percent of full-time academic staff in Irish universities are at one of the two recruitment grades of lecturer or assistant lecturer, 23.8 percent are senior lecturers, 6.7 percent are associate professors, and another 12 percent are (full) professors. The ratio of junior to senior staff has been a matter of disagreement between college authorities and staff associations for many years. In 1985, a claim by IFUT for an increased allocation of senior positions at University College Dublin was countered by the institution’s claim that 60:40 was an appropriate ratio of junior to senior staff. The full extent of the situation only becomes evident when the data examined include part-time staff. These data, which indicate that over 65 percent of academics are employed at a junior grade, present a more accurate picture. Furthermore, it is noted that these figures exclude teaching assistants, demonstrators, and other positions that are more junior than the lowest grade level included in the data. It is, however, not possible to identify accurately the number of academic staff in tenured employment, as the figures available from the HEA do not differentiate between tenured and nontenured staff in full-time employment. However, all academics at the lecturer level who have completed one year on the staff of the university and whose performance has been judged satisfactory are granted tenure. Hence, it is possible to deduce that close to 80 percent of the 3,137 academic staff in the seven universities have been granted tenure. This number represents the full-time staff as a percentage of the total staff of the institutions in question. An analysis of the full-time/part-time status of staff in the seven Irish universities is presented in Table 8.1, which is based on recent statistics from the Higher Education Authority. The data presented indicate that the vast majority of senior positions in the university sector are full-time ap-


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Table 8.1 Academic Staff in Irish Higher Education by Full-time/Part-time Status (absolute numbers, in percent)

Source: HEA (1998).

pointments, with over 95 percent of staff in full-time positions. It is necessary to point out in this regard that part-time positions at the professorial levels are usually held by medical and dental consultants who occupy chairs in specific and narrow fields of study where a full-time appointment would be inappropriate. There are considerably more part-time appointments at the junior level in the seven Irish universities, with approximately one-fifth of appointments at lecturer, assistant lecturer, teaching assistant, and demonstrator being part-time positions. Part-time appointments at the lecturer grade are typically in the professional areas such as teacher education and include practicing professionals who are otherwise employed in their own fields. A considerable number of the demonstrators who are employed either on a full-time or a part-time basis are postgraduate research students. Usually, they are involved in doctoral research in science. Table 8.2 presents the number of full-time and part-time students, the number of full-time academic staff, and the ratio of staff both to full-time and to the entire student cohort for each of the four preceding years.

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Table 8.2 Students, Academic Staff, and Student/Staff Ratios in Seven Irish Universities, 1994–1998 (absolute numbers)

Source: HEA (1998).

The figures presented here are in broad agreement with the data in OECD’s Education at a Glance (1998), which indicate that in 1996 the ratio of students to teaching staff in Irish universities was 21.6, while for the nonuniversity higher education sector, it was 12.2. It should be pointed out that Irish universities have the third-highest student/staff ratio, which is 5.1 points higher than the average of the 29 OECD countries (OECD 1998). An examination of Table 8.2 shows a sustained increase in the number of students attending university both on a full-time and on a part-time basis in recent years. The number of full-time students rose from 51,645 in 1994 to 58,466 in 1998, an increase of almost 10 percent, whereas the increase of 1,929 in part-time students during the same period represents an increase of 27.5 percent. These were not matched by the increases in staff numbers, which amounted to approximately 10 percent during these four years. The worsening staff/student ratio during this period, which is outlined in columns rows six and seven, indicates that staff numbers did not keep pace with the increases in overall student numbers, particularly part-time student enrollment during the period in question.

Education and Qualifications of Academic Staff Currently, almost all full-time teaching positions in the university sector in Ireland require an honors primary degree and a postgraduate degree, usually at the master’s level. In addition, an appropriate professional qualification and postqualification experience are typically required for appointment to areas of professional studies. Initial appointment is usually at assistant lecturer or lecturer grade, and new members of the academic staff are expected to complete doctoral studies before being made permanent


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and granted tenure. Research competence, teaching experience at university level, and a creditable publication record are major factors in the allocation of all academic teaching posts, but particularly positions at the level of associate professor and professor. In the case of appointment to the headship of a department within the university, candidates are usually expected to have administrative ability (HEA 1998, 17). In general, in the nonuniversity institutions in third-level education, a recognized degree or an equivalent professional qualification is required for all teaching appointments. In the institutes of technology the minimum requirements for appointment to the post of college teacher are a primary degree or equivalent qualification and a minimum of two years’ approved postqualification teaching experience. For appointment to the post of college lecturer in such subjects as architecture or engineering, candidates must have a degree or degree equivalent or a relevant professional qualification obtained through examination. Similar qualifications are required for the position of college lecturer in such areas as art and design, music, and business studies. In addition, candidates for these positions must be proficient in spoken Irish (HEA 1998). EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF ACADEMIC STAFF Legal Status and Contractual Situation The legal status of a full-time permanent member of the academic staff in one of the seven Irish universities is that of an officer with tenure. Lecturers’ duties are assigned by the head of the department and may include, lectures, tutorials, seminars, practical classes, student consultations, supervision of research, and examining (University College Dublin 1987). The conditions of appointment document in which these duties are specified also include details of pension arrangements, the grounds for termination of employment, and other related matters. The academic staff who are not protected by tenure are those who, for the most part, are in part-time or temporary employment or are employed on a short-term contract basis. Recently, there has been a marked increase in the number of academics who have been employed in such nonpermanent positions. This change in recruitment patterns in universities has become a major concern, and because of its recent nature, it is not yet possible to quantify the extent of its occurrence. Staff employed in contract positions, which are usually for a period of three years or less, are protected by unfair dismissal legislation to a certain extent. However, the transient nature of their employment is an insecure foundation for establishing an academic career.

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Table 8.3 Academic Salaries in Irish Universities (annual income in euro,1 range)

1

Exchange rate based on “The Irrevocably Fixed Conversion Rates between the Euro and the Currencies of the Member States,” Official Journal of the European Communities 41 (December 31, 1998), L359, p. 3. 2 The lower initial salary for lecturers in Trinity College is due to the incorporation of a lower scale with the lecturer scale. Source: Irish Federation of University Teachers (1998a).

Pay Scales and Current Earnings In recent decades, collective pay bargaining between the social partners and the government has been a major feature of industrial relations in the state. The most recent, Partnership 2000 (P2000), involved increases in salaries for civil service grades with which almost all academic grades have established “relativities.” Salary increases for academic staff based on relativities may be contested and have to be negotiated because of a lack of direct comparability between the civil service and the university contexts. However, such relativities are adhered to as a general rule. The salary scales in operation in Irish universities are broadly comparable. An overview of typical academic earnings with respect to the four main salary grades is presented in Table 8.3. The differences between the various institutions are mainly due to variation both in initial salary for different grade levels and in the number of incremental points on the various salary scales. Social Security and Benefits The pensions of the majority of those in academic employment in the older universities are funded by their institution, whereas a system of contributory pensions operates in the colleges of education and the two new universities. As a general rule, those who have reached pensionable age are


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entitled to an annual pension of one-eightieth of salary at retirement for each year of pensionable service. A retirement gratuity, usually of 1.5 year’s salary on completion of 40 years’ service or a pro rata benefit, is also payable at the retirement age of 65. The attainment of a permanent pensionable position has tended to occur at a later age in recent years, and consequently many academics cannot attain full pensionable service by the age of 65. It is usual for them to opt to contribute to a private scheme to insure full benefit when they reach pensionable age. More frequently than before, most academics today are older at the point when they are appointed to a full-time permanent post. Greater competition for academic positions and, more important, the fact that many young academics spend considerable time in temporary or contract employment mean that individuals are unlikely to have sufficient service for entitlement to a full pension. Most of the pensions in the seven Irish universities require that members have completed 40 years of accredited permanent full-time employment prior to reaching the age of 65. It is usual for those who will not be entitled to a full pension on retirement to take part in an Additional Voluntary Contribution (AVC) Scheme. This allows them to “top up” or allocate a portion of income prior to tax to make up the deficit in their pension provision. Working Time and Work Tasks The duties of individual staff members are assigned by the head of department, and these may include lectures, tutorials, seminars, practical classes, student consultations, supervision of research, and examining (University College Dublin 1987). Junior staff are usually more involved in grading papers, whereas more senior staff act as assistant examiners of the university and sit on examination boards (HEA 1998, 17). Apart from these contractual assignments, members of staff are expected to take part in research activities. The conditions of appointment stipulate that “as far as is compatible with the other duties of the post, the staff member shall devote himself/herself to research and the advancement of knowledge” (University College Dublin 1987, 1). The apportionment of staff time between teaching, research, and administrative duties is decided by the head of department and varies considerably between different areas of academic life. Various factors tend to influence this. They include the academic and research interests of individual members of staff, the distribution of the teaching workload of the department, and the time commitments to other associated academic duties. However, the opportunities for involvement in research activities are of major importance to the career advancement of university staff. In common with colleagues in other countries, the promotional prospects of Irish academics are primarily dependent on their record of research publications.

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It is not possible to know the exact proportion of academics’ time that is devoted to research activities. The Higher Education Authority in its profile of the national higher education system estimates that while there are substantial variations by grade and subject area, approximately 20 percent of academic time is spent on research (HEA 1998, 17). ACADEMIC TRAINING AND CAREER The initial recruitment of academic staff in Ireland is by public competition, and typically positions are advertised in the national press and in appropriate international educational publications. The selection procedure is based on an appraisal of the applicants’ qualifications and on an interview. Recently, the authorities in the universities have tended to involve the existing academic staff in a preselected consultative process to ascertain departmental needs prior to filling a chair. It is also usual for candidates who are preselected for such a senior post to make a presentation to the staff of the department in question. The HEA (1998) in its recent profile of the higher education system in Ireland reports that while staff members may apply for higher-level posts within their institution, no posts should be reserved exclusively for the existing staff members. Academic promotion is decided on the basis of competition, and successful candidates are chosen by a promotions committee in each of the institutions. Usually, this committee includes the president, the registrar, and the deans of the faculties of the university, together with a number of elected members of staff. The criteria for the award of tenure comprise satisfactory performance of lecturing and other duties, evidence of interest in the pursuit of research and scholarship, contribution to the affairs of both the department and the institution, and academic achievement (University College Dublin 1983). In practice, the award of a doctoral degree or its equivalent is taken to constitute evidence of academic achievement. The criteria for promotion to senior lecturer are similar, but a proven research record is an essential prerequisite. Special Programs and Regulations for the Promotion of Women in Higher Education The promotional profile of women academics in Irish universities has been a cause of grave concern in recent years. While women have been appointed to junior academic and nonpermanent positions in much greater numbers than in the past, their career progress has been stunted in comparison to that of their male colleagues. Further, they seem to remain for the most part at the recruitment grade within their institution. Table 8.4 presents a broad outline of the gender balance in academic staff at six grade levels in the seven Irish universities. It shows the lack of


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Table 8.4 Academic Staff in Seven Irish Universities, by Rank and Gender, 1997 (in percent)

Source: HEA (1998).

balance in gender representation at each of the promotional academic staff grades. One of the most important guarantees of the Universities Act (1997) in relation to fair employment practice is cited under the “Objects of the University,” namely, to promote gender balance and equality of opportunity among students and employees of the university. It states that the governing authority “shall require the chief officer to prepare a statement of the policies of the university in respect of gender equality and the university shall implement the position as set out in this statement” (Government of Ireland 1997b, Section 36.3, 29). This provision is important because it is legally binding on the authorities to rectify the very serious anomalies and the discrimination suffered by women staff that is apparent in the promotional profiles of women and male academics. While there are slight differences between the various universities in this regard, the general trend is depressingly similar. The recent university legislation clearly articulates the appropriate course of action that the governing authority in each institution must undertake to redress gender imbalance within the universities. In response to the universities legislation of 1997, an equal opportunities policy document has, for example, recently been adopted by the Governing Authority of the National University of Ireland, Dublin. It states that the university will work to eliminate unfair discrimination, will redress imbalances and foster an ethos of equality, and will continue to develop guidelines and codes of practice that will underline its commitment to the principle of equality. It is hoped that these aspirations will serve to pave the way for progress in the area of equal opportunities in employment in higher education. Staff Appraisal and Staff Development Procedures Irish universities have traditionally used two main methods to monitor standards and evaluating procedures. It has been customary for depart-

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ments to utilize external examiners both locally and from the United Kingdom, Europe, and the United States to monitor standards for the award of degrees, postgraduate degrees, and doctorates. Further, professional departments such as Architecture and Engineering have their degrees accredited by the appropriate professional bodies. In the government’s Charting Our Education Future: White Paper on Education, published in 1995, it was suggested that a restructured Higher Education Authority be responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of quality audit systems within the various institutions (Government of Ireland 1995). This was followed by a recommendation in 1996 that such a system should be based on cyclical evaluation of departments and faculties by national and international peers, preceded by an internal evaluation (HEA 1995). The university legislation of 1997 incorporated new accountability procedures and charged the governing authority of each institution with the preparation of strategic development plans. Further, the president (or chief officer) of each institution was given the task of establishing procedures for evaluating the quality of the teaching and research carried out by the institution. The HEA was given an overseeing role in relation to the proposals for strategic planning and quality assurance procedures. The act stipulates that the evaluation should provide “national and international comparisons on the quality of the teaching and research and the provision of other services at university level” (Government of Ireland 1997b, Section 35(2)a). In effect, quality assurance procedures had been initiated on a trial basis in 1995, prior to the universities legislation. The Committee of Heads of Irish Universities (CHIU) and the HEA had, after consultation with staff and international experts in the field, developed programs that were put into operation on a pilot basis in departments that had volunteered to take part in the program. The major thrust was that appraisal should focus on the departmental unit rather than on individual members of staff in the university. It was considered important that the initiative in the Irish universities should benefit from the international experience in this area and that the major problems associated with punitive and unproductive programs of staff assessment should be avoided. An unpublished internal study carried out on behalf of the Irish Federation of University Teachers found that the members were supportive of such an initiative and would cooperate with programs designed to improve the quality of teaching, research, and administration within their academic department. RECENT TRENDS IN THE AREA OF ACADEMIC STAFF One of the most striking characteristics of the Irish higher education system since the 1960s has been the sustained increase in the number of students proceeding to third-level education. This trend increased during the 1990s, leading to fears within the academic community that such mas-


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sification would have a detrimental effect on the quality of education if adequate finance and resources were not made available to colleges and universities. This increase in participation in higher education is due in part to the encouragement from government and from higher education institutions to improve access to education to all classes of society. In order to achieve greater participation, new initiatives such as modularization, “semesterization,” and distance education programs have been introduced. The increase in public expenditure on higher education, which has been necessitated by the expansion of student numbers, has led to a stronger focus on the ways in which public funds are used by higher education institutions. The concept of “quality assurance,” or value for money, is now an established part of government policy in regard to Irish higher education. The Universities Act of 1997 made quality assurance a statutory obligation for universities. A central aspect is the assessment of teaching staff in order to improve the quality of teaching, and staff development programs have already been put in place in many colleges and universities. A significant achievement in the working conditions for academic staff has been the legal recognition of “tenure,” which may be defined as a fixedterm contract to the age of 65. In 1986, when the government decided to close a college of education in Dublin, the union representing the staff in that college, the Irish Federation of University Teachers, forced the government to recognize the fact that its members had tenure. The impact of this was that the government could not simply make the academic staff in the defunct college redundant. Instead, it had to seek to redeploy them to suitable posts elsewhere. In the Universities Act of 1997, this concept of tenure was given statutory recognition. Against that, the career prospects of junior staff in Irish universities are a matter of growing concern. The situation is aggravated by changes in recruitment patterns in third-level institutions. Recently, the increase in the number of contract positions in the various colleges has had a significant impact on the career prospects of junior staff. These positions are usually for a period of three years or less, and while the members of staff involved are protected by unfair dismissal legislation, the transient nature of their employment is an increasingly important trend. NOTES 1. St Patrick’s College, Drumcondra, and Mary Imaculate College, Limerick, are colleges of the DCU and the UL, respectively. 2. In 1998, the minister for education and science set up a body to deal with targeted research funding in the humanities under the chairmanship of Dr. Maurice Bric.

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3. In DCU the union representing staff is the Services Industrial Professional Technical Union (SIPTU), and in UL, employees are represented by the Manufacturing Science Finance Union (MSF).

REFERENCES Bric, M. 1999. The Humanities and the Social Sciences: The Case for a Research Council. Dublin: DES. Coleman, M. 2000. IFUT: A History of the Irish Federation of University Teachers. Dublin: IFUT. Coolahan, J. 1998. “Third-Level Education in Ireland: Change and Development.” In F. O’Muircheartaigh (ed.), Ireland in the Coming Times: Essays to Celebrate T. K. Whitaker’s 80 Years. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration (IPA). Cosgrave, A. 1998. Address of the President of the National University of Ireland, Dublin, to the joint Conference AUT and IFUT conference at Malahide, 1998. Deloitte and Touche. 1997. Study on Governance and Management Structures of Irish Universities. Dublin: Commissioned Report. Farry, M. 1996. Education and the Constitution. Dublin: Round Hall Sweet and Maxwell. Government of Ireland. 1966. Investment in Education. Dublin: Stationery Office. Government of Ireland. 1967. The Report of the Commission on Higher Education. Dublin: Stationery Office. Government of Ireland. 1971. Higher Education Authority Act. Dublin: Stationery Office. Government of Ireland. 1993. Education for a Changing World: Green Paper on Education. Dublin: Stationery Office. Government of Ireland. 1995. Charting Our Education Future: White Paper on Education. Dublin: Stationery Office. Government of Ireland. 1997a. Statistical Report of the Department of Education and Science, 1996/97. Dublin: Stationery Office. Government of Ireland. 1997b. Universities Act. Dublin: Stationery Office. Government of Ireland. 1998. Central Statistics Office, Statistical Abstract, 1997. Dublin: Stationery Office. Higher Education Authority. (HEA) 1995. Report of the Steering Committee on the Future Development of Higher Education (Based on a Study of Needs to the Year 2015). Dublin: HEA. Higher Education Authority. (HEA) 1998. Ireland: Profile of the National Higher Education System. Dublin: HEA. Irish Federation of University Teachers. 1993. IFUT News. Vol. XVI. Dublin: IFUT. Irish Federation of University Teachers. 1995. IFUT ’95. Dublin: IFUT. Irish Federation of University Teachers. 1998a. IFUT ’98. Dublin: IFUT. Irish Federation of University Teachers. 1998b. IFUT Triumphs. Dublin: IFUT. The Labour Court. 1987. Industrial Relations Acts, 1946 to 1976. Recommendation No. LCR 11100. Document signed on behalf of the Labour Court by John M. Horgan, Deputy Chairman, April 6, 1987.


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Mulcahy, D. G., and O’Sullivan, D. (eds.). 1989. Irish Education Policy: Process and Substance. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. National Education Convention Secretariat. 1994. Report of the National Education Convention. Dublin: NEC Secretariat. O’Buachalla, S. 1988. Education Policy in Twentieth Century Ireland. Dublin: Wolfhound Press. OECD. 1995. Education at a Glance. Paris: OECD. OECD. 1998. Education at a Glance. Paris: OECD. University College Dublin. 1983. “Procedures to Govern Probation/Assessment Period, Award of Tenure and Promotion from Assistant Lecturer to College Lecturer.” Unpublished document approved by the Governing Body, December 20, 1983. University College Dublin. 1987. “Conditions of Appointment of Assistant Lecturer/College Lecturer Appointed to the Age of 65 Years.” Unpublished document, December 18, 1987.

Chapter 9

A Guild in Transition: The Italian Case Roberto Moscati

INTRODUCTION From the outset, the Italian system of higher education, just like the public administration of the nation, has been very centralized. To understand the rationale of this tradition, it is important to bear in mind that the nationstate found its origin in 1861 in the unification of a number of political and administrative entities of a very different nature. Education has been always conceived as one of the most important tools to unify, both socially and culturally, populations with very specific and differing backgrounds. Hence, the education system has been kept public and centralized. From the beginning, the new nation had to face two contradictory problems. On the one hand, the need to keep up with the economic development of the other European countries required a further qualification of the labor force. On the other hand, in a large part of the country (the south—“the Mezzogiorno”—that covers one-third of the nation) the entire labor force could not be employed. People from all social strata (but particularly from the growing petty bourgeoisie) used education and professional training to avoid unemployment and improve their social position, thus creating a surplus of degree holders in the labor market. As a result, the higher education system had the alternative of either being too open—in order to accommodate the demand for education and thus create highly qualified unemployment—or too tight and devoted to elite reproduction (thus preventing social mobility through education). Changes in access to higher education have always been introduced for political reasons, but never as a consequence of policies that tried to match

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demand and supply in the labor market and to plan the education output accordingly. Unlike most industrialized countries, for decades the Italian system of higher education offered a single type of training and conferred a single title (the Laurea) both for those who wished to devote themselves to research and for those who intended to exercise a profession. Until very recently (1990s), the universities had their own juridical status and administrative, teaching, and disciplinary independence, although under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. In practice, they made very little use of their independence. Finally, all the universities benefited from a capital grant from the state (including the few private ones, although to a lesser degree) (Barbagli 1982; Clark 1977). With the creation of a Ministry of the University and Scientific Research (1989) a period of reforms began. Three basic issues became intertwined in the debate: (1) the autonomy of universities; (2) the curricula reform; and (3) the introduction of the evaluation of research and teaching. The Autonomy of Universities Universities’ independence and right of self-government have never been implemented, although these are expressly included in the Italian Constitution. All organizational aspects were traditionally established by the central authority, not only by means of law and regulations but also via circulars and replies to requests through which the Ministry of Education made known its interpretation of the laws in force. In 1993, through an attachment to the state’s financial law, this procedure partly changed, as the Ministry of the University and Scientific Research was entitled to give an annual lump sum to each university according to established parameters. This measure, which has never been debated since, represented the first real step toward university autonomy. Following this, other measures went in the same direction: from the introduction of a compensatory financial aid given to the universities according to their productivity to the new law regulating the recruitment of academic staff. The latter, which was introduced in 1998, replaced the national competition subdivided by disciplines (organized by the Ministry) by local competitions (organized by each university). The Curricula Reform The reform of the university curricula was conceived as a measure to “modernize” university production and to reduce the rate of dropouts and of students who were unable to complete their studies within a set time limit. In addition, vocational short cycles were created, and there was an attempt to reshape course contents. The first measure (new short cycles) has been rather successful; the second is still under discussion and is a

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critical point, affecting the cultural and scientific background of all disciplines and the distribution of academic power. The recent agreement between the four European governments (France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy) to work toward a homogenization of higher education systems, based on a three-year first level, creates even more serious problems, which are far from being solved (Moscati 1996). The Introduction of Evaluation of Research and Teaching The improvement of university productivity was one of the basic reasons for the introduction of evaluation and quality control programs. This measure, established by law both as internal (self-) evaluation of each university through compulsory structures (nuclei di valutazione) and as external (system) evaluation through a national Evaluation Observatory, represents a revolution in the tradition based on ex ante assessment of regulations that characterize the Italian public administrations (including the higher education system). This has led to resistance on the part of academic and nonacademic staff. THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION The Italian system of higher education has always been centralized and mostly public, with a single study cycle leading to a degree and a steady increase in the number of universities in which students are very unevenly distributed. It has a very low level of productivity (exemplified by a high rate of dropouts and by the time taken by most students to graduate). With the unification of the country in 1861, Italy adopted the administrative system of the Piedmont, which was strongly influenced by the French (Napoleonic) one. The education system followed and was structured to provide homogeneity of supply in all parts of the kingdom. For the same reason it was conceived as public. All academic and nonacademic staff were therefore public officers (Clark 1977; Neave and Rhoades 1987). At present, higher university education is provided in 65 institutes, of which 45 are state universities. Nonuniversity higher education is offered by various types of institutions, each of which has its own structure, regulations, and organization. It is neither part of secondary education nor of higher education. A reform of some of these nonuniversity higher education institutions is under way to transform them into university-level institutions. There are also university-level private higher education institutions, including specialized schools. Law no. 243 of 1991 acknowledges the fact that private universities have existed in Italy for a long time. They are independent but agree to conform with the curricula of state universities so that the certificates they award can be legally recognized. They also agree that the Ministry of the University and Scientific Research should supervise

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the management and organization of their courses to make sure they are in compliance with the norms currently adopted in similar state institutions. The state can allocate funds to the private universities and institutes of higher education that have obtained the authorization to issue legally recognized certificates. They are decided on the basis of the number of students enrolled, the degree courses, the number of teachers and members of the technical-administrative staff, and financial conditions.

Study Structures The Italian university system has changed over the years, partly in accordance with the trend to study for vocational qualifications. It is now divided into three levels: the “short cycle” or university diploma courses (lauree brevi or diplomi universitari); the degree courses (corsi di laurea); and research doctorates and specialist diploma courses (dottorati di ricerca and scuole di specializzazione). The universities award university the diploma (diploma universitario); university degrees (diploma di laurea); diploma of specialization (diploma di specializzazione); research doctorates (dottorato di ricerca); and certificates of finishing courses (attestato di perfezionamento). The doctorate courses were created in 1980 and are of variable duration but not less than three years. Their number is determined annually by the Ministry because students who are admitted receive a fellowship from the Ministry (except foreign students), which varies from 176,000,000 lira (about 91,000 euro) to 205,000,000 lira (105,900 euro). (Note: An Italian lira is equivalent to 0.0005 euro [1 euro ⫽ 1936.27 ITL]. The current exchange rate [January 2001] of 1 euro is 0.91 U.S.$.) The title of “research doctor,” conferred by the national disciplinary commission, is an academic title that can only be evaluated in the sphere of research. Holders are supposed to find a place in academia or in research institutes. At the end of 1997, after eight cycles of the doctoral program, 23,729 fellowships were granted by the Ministry, and 17,359 doctoral titles were awarded (73 percent of the fellowships), but only 29 percent of the degree holders entered academia (mostly in computer science, earth science, physics, and chemistry). Third-level university studies have been revised recently, and a special law has been passed (in 1998) that goes in the direction of greater university autonomy. Under this new law, each university can establish the number of doctorate places, the prerequisites for admission, and the number of fellowships conferred. In addition, doctorates will have greater value and will not only be related to academia. Emphasis will be laid on experiences in foreign institutions during the training period.


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Table 9.1 Students in Italian Higher Education (degree and diploma courses), 1970–1971 through 1995–1996 (absolute numbers, in percent)

Sources: ISTAT (1998a, 1998b).

Access to Higher Education The number of universities has increased rapidly since the 1970s, and there has been a parallel increase in the number of students and, to a lesser extent, of teaching staff. The student population is concentrated in a small number of universities in the major cities (Rome, Milan, Naples, Bologna, Turin, and Padua). Some 55 percent are concentrated in nine large universities with an average of over 60,000 students (the highest number is 160,000, at Rome’s “La Sapienza” University), while the other universities have an average of some 11,000 students. At present, the Ministry of the University and Scientific Research is studying the splitting of the “megauniversities,” which can only offer services and accommodation to a very limited number of students. The number of new entrants has steadily risen since the beginning of the 1960s (see Tables 9.1 and 9.2). The open door policy introduced in 1969 obviously increased the social demand for higher education, particularly for the more traditional degree courses leading to the laurea. But the demand for the short cycles (offered in very limited numbers until very recently) increased much more slowly. In 1969–1970, there were 169,777 students registered in first-year “long” courses and 3,412 in first-year short cycles (the registration rate of the 19-year-olds was 25.4 percent and 0.4 percent, respectively). In 1995–1996, there were 311,665 new entrants for the long cycles and 23,683 for the short ones (40.2 percent and 3.1 percent of the 19-year-olds, respectively). The average age of graduates is currently over 27. Although students enter higher education at the age of 19, and some degree courses last for 5 (engineering and architecture) or 6 years (medicine), students take an average of 7.5 years to graduate, and the percentage of students who are unable to complete their studies in the standard period is over 30 percent. The most negative aspect is that the percentage is increasing steadily, since it was 20.8 percent in 1969–1970 and 33.8 percent in 1995–1996.

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Table 9.2 Indicators of Higher Education in Italy

1

State universities only. University students on schedule with their studies (without overrun) per 100 youngsters of the same age group (19–24 years). 3 Degree holders (excluding short cycles) by 100 enrolled five years before. 4 First-year students enrolled in short and long cycles by 100 19-year-olds. Source: Censis (1998), 167. 2

The number of dropouts has increased since the 1960s. The figure varies from one faculty to another but averages around 28 percent in the first year alone. If we compare dropouts with those enrolled in the first year, we can see that in 1969–1970 there were 73,364 against 169,777 new entrants (43.2 percent); in 1979–1980 their number rose to 157,170 out of 233,873 newly enrolled (67.2 percent), and in 1994–1995, there were 208,027 dropouts and 311,665 students enrolled in the first year (66.7 percent). Some 30 percent of undergraduates obtain a degree. The percentage seems to have increased recently after reaching an all-time low in the 1980s. Again, the level of productivity seems to be declining, since out of 616,898 students enrolled in 1970 there were 56,414 graduates (9.1 percent of the student population), but in 1980 total enrollment was 1,035,876 with 74,118 graduates (7.1 percent); in 1985, their number dropped to 72,427 (out of 1,106,582 enrolled), equal to 6.5 percent; and in 1995, their number grew to 112,388 (6.8 percent of the 1,660,747 enrolled). The number of academic staff grew rapidly in the early 1980s as a result of legislation concerning career reorganization (Law no. 382 of 1980). In 1970, their total number was 12,307 (for 682,000 students, a ratio of 1: 55); 10 years later the figure was 34,073 (for 1,048,000 students, i.e., a ratio of 1:31), and by 1993–1994 it had risen to 54,962 (for a total of 1,629,000 students, i.e., a ratio of 1:30). However, the increase has slowed down considerably recently, and its distribution between the various disciplines is highly diversified. For example, the average number of students per lecturer ranges between 5 in medicine and 101 in law. Moreover, the statistics do not indicate the distribution of the ratio within courses; the number of students attending the basic first- and second-year courses is


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disproportionately high, with peaks of 600 to 800 students per class. In many universities, especially in the big cities, the most crowded courses are taught in cinemas that universities are obliged to hire. On average, the number of students per lecture room has risen to 224, and there are 0.53 lecture room places and 0.04 library places per student.

Higher Education Public Expenditure University budgets consist almost entirely of government funds. Since 1994, the government has granted a standard sum to each university, calculated on the basis of the 1993 expenditure and adjusted in relation to the number of students and teaching staff. This amount is awarded as a lump sum to each university, with few constraints as to its distribution between personnel, structures, and research. But expenditure on personnel (teaching and technical/administrative staff) must not exceed 90 percent of the total. This represents a considerable innovation compared with the far more rigid forms of Ministry control previously imposed. The total sum transferred to universities tends to increase slightly, especially as regards expenditure on scientific research, which was seriously penalized by previous public expenditure cuts. Income from student fees is becoming increasingly important. Fees have increased considerably recently. They tend to be based on the student’s family income and account for 10 to 35 percent of the total university budget (the average is around 15 percent and seems to be growing rapidly). The total annual average cost per student has been estimated at 7.8 million lira (4,029 euro); the average cost for each degree holder represents 104 million lira (54,000 euro): of the latter amount, the state contribution represents 88 million lira (45,454 euro).

STAFFING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: MAIN ACTORS AND PROCEDURES The Relevant Actors The Role of the State The state is the main source of financial support for universities, since the private universities also receive a substantial contribution from central public resources. Until 1998, the Ministry fixed (following a specific law) the call for the national contests for promotion, since all teaching and nonteaching staff members are public servants. The number of places opened in each competition has been always established by the Ministry according to the financial resources available. The total amount of the state budget

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for education (and for higher education) has remained rather stable for many years and is now slowly increasing. Intermediary Bodies The professoriate has some autonomy, exemplified by structures of selforganization. The main one is the University National Council (Consiglio nazionale universitario—CUN), which represents all university staff through members elected by rectors, professors, technical and administrative staff, and students. It functions as an advisory committee to the minister of the university and scientific research on recruiting policy, distribution of financial resources for research activities, three-year planning of the university system, and curricula reform. CUN also acts as a court for administrative sanctions. Another intermediary body is the Permanent Conference of the Italian Rectors (CRUI), which was created by the rectors for the cooperation of independent universities. It has recently been recognized as a consulting body by the Ministry of the University and Scientific Research and is developing its own policy, which may compete with that of the Ministry and some roles played by CUN. Another new structure is the Observatory on the Evaluation of the Universities (Osservatorio sulla valutazione delle universita`), which was created to coordinate the self-evaluation carried out in each university by the internal Evaluation Groups (Nuclei di valutazione). The new policy of evaluation, conceived to support the growing autonomy of the universities, has been encouraged by the government as a way of introducing some check on the universities’ performances, replacing the former administrative control by the Ministry of the University and Scientific Research. The Observatory coordinates the university groups of evaluation in order to make individual evaluations compatible and to compare them. It was created by the Ministry of the University and can suggest procedures of evaluation. More especially, it establishes the indicators for the redistribution of a percentage of the ministerial financial resources according to universities’ performances. These three buffers may create conflicts that seem to be on the verge of exploding. Procedures and Regulations Employment and working conditions of academic staff are determined by Law n.382, which was passed in 1980. It restructured their career and recruitment procedures and defined their basic rights and duties. Standards for salary and other benefits are also established by law. There is no formal negotiation between representatives of the academic staff and the government. Everything depends on the will of the political forces in Parliament,


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as unions and others representative organizations are not supported by academics. Interests of the category are not really represented by the academics who are members of the Parliament either. Hence, there is no pressure by any interest group that can do some lobbying. The hiring of an academic staff member by a university (as his career) is regulated by national competitions, and individual bargaining is very limited. All this changed with Law n.210, passed in July 1998, under which each university is able to create an opening for a place, provided that it has the financial resources to pay the related salary. In this case, an evaluation committee made up of five professors (one nominated by the university and four elected among those available in the related field) is nominated by the Ministry. It evaluates the candidates and indicates the winner and two other candidates who are “eligible” to be invited to fill a similar place in other universities. This measure was introduced to speed up career procedures and recruitment. How thoroughly these targets will be achieved remains to be seen. ACADEMIC STAFF IN HIGHER EDUCATION: BASIC INFORMATION AND DATA Legal and Social Status Academic staff members are public servants and therefore depend on the central public administration. Hence, they cannot be fired, except in rare cases related to behavior. The basic historical reason for this can be found in the protection of state officials from political pressure inside and outside public administration (Neave 1995). Academic staff members benefit from the social welfare for public employees for insurance and pensions. Normally, retirement is at 72 (or at 67; see below), with the possibility of staying on for three more years and sometimes becoming “emeritus,” depending on the university’s evaluation of academic performance. Researchers, associate professors, and full professors enjoy stable positions. At each stage, entrants must prove their quality during a period of three years, after which they are evaluated by an ad hoc national committee. In case of positive evaluation, they are confirmed in their position. In case of negative evaluation, they have two more years to submit their production to a different national committee to obtain confirmation. In case of a second negative evaluation, they are invited to ask to be assigned to secondary schools or another public administration branch. This hardly ever happens. Occupational Structure Academic staff members are subdivided into five categories: Full professors, who have teaching, research, and administrative duties, head and co-

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ordinate a number of university structures such as departments, institutes, and research centers. They can only become rectors. Associate professors have similar teaching and research duties to those of the full professors but have less responsibility for university structures. Researchers contribute to the research activities and collaborate on teaching duties. According to the law (n.382) passed in 1980, the ricercatori, who replace the former assistant professors (assistenti), do not have to take full teaching responsibility so that they have time to complete their training. The law limited the number of hours per year they could devote to teaching to avoid their being spoiled by their “masters” (the baroni described by Burton R. Clark (Clark 1977). Through the years, researchers have obtained the right to teach, since they are now at the same level as the other two categories in this respect. There are still limits to their becoming head of a research group and coordinating academic structures when there are academics of higher ranks. Contracted professors (professori a contratto) are recruited for special courses on an annual basis from outside the university or from a foreign country. They have a temporary status, and their salary and working conditions are established on a case-by-case basis by each university. Their number is limited by public universities’ budget problems, with some exceptions in the few private ones. Lecturers (lettori) in foreign languages can be recruited by each university according to the number of students (one for every 150 students in each language). They help professors in their teaching activities. Their position has been debated for a long time, since they very often act as full teachers but are paid much less and do not enjoy tenure. Education and Qualifications of the Academic Staff The educational background of Italian academics largely reproduces the structure of the national higher education system, which was based on a single track leading to the laurea. Postdegree specializations are very popular in fields such as medicine (86.2 percent) but less so in others such as engineering (27.9 percent) or natural sciences (32.9 percent). The absence of a post-laurea level of study incited many young scholars to go abroad to obtain a specialization in their field. The number of “cosmopolitans” (Gouldner 1957, 1958) is still lower than expected: Only 2.6 percent obtained a specialization abroad, 4.0 percent hold a master’s degree (10.0 percent in engineering and 11.7 percent in economics and social sciences), and 2.7 percent a Ph.D. (6.8 percent in natural sciences, 6.3 percent in economics and social sciences). The main reason for this limited experience in a foreign system is probably the fear of losing contact with prominent figures in the field, who represent the basic resource for an academic career, according to the rules of the guild system (Clark 1977).


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Table 9.3 Full Professors, Associate Professors, and Researchers in Italian Higher Education, 1985–1997 (absolute numbers, change in percent)

Source: Fiegna/Figa` Talamanca (1998), 153–196.

Staff Structure Since 1980, academic staff has been subdivided into three categories: full professors (professori ordinari), associate professors (professori associati), and assistant professors or lecturers (ricercatori). In 1995–1996, there were 13,288 full professors, 906 retired professors but who were still carrying out some professional activity (professori fuori ruolo), 6,816 professors with a temporary teaching load (professori a contratto o incaricati), 16,285 associate professors, 19,832 between researchers and assistant professors (this last category is a remnant of the situation before Law 382/80 and will progressively disappear), and 1,590 lecturers in foreign languages, for a total of 58,717 academic staff members. As we can see in Table 9.3, between 1985 and 1997, there has been a global increase in the number of researchers and a drop in the number of associate professors, many of whom have been promoted to full professors. Among researchers, the greatest increase was in engineering and agricultural science. Humanities registered the lowest increase. The number of associate professors has dropped, especially in law, medicine, and the humanities, as the number of full professors increased in all sectors, but more especially in agricultural sciences, economics and statistics, and natural sciences. It is crucial to compare the variation in the number of academic staff members and the change in students enrolled in each discipline. As far as tenure/nontenure is concerned, researchers, associate professors, and full professors enjoy stability when, having passed a national competition, they obtain confirmation of their position after three years. Temporary positions for young scholars with a four-year postdoctoral fellowship or for “contracted professors” involve a minority.

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The full-time/part-time alternative has a rather peculiar impact on academia. The law defines certain professional activities that are external to the university and are not compatible with a full-time status. They are limited to continuous professional activities in a private or public company and to entrepreneurial and commercial activities. All other professional activities are permitted, including liberal professions such as lawyer, as well as external cooperation with companies, consulting activities, and so on. There are no time limits. In fact, this rule, if combined with the one that fixes the minimum of all teaching activities (internal and external to classes) to 350 hours per academic year, allows academics to involve themselves in a large range of external professional activities compatible with a full-time status. It must also be remembered that the culture of evaluation is in its early days, and consequently the concept of “individual freedom” is developing. As a result, a minority of academic staff members choose to work part-time (34.4 percent of the sample, with differences ranging from 48.3 percent in medicine to 12.3 percent in natural sciences), thus accepting a 40 percent reduction in their salary. The situation described in our research carried out in the early 1990s has recently changed in a very interesting way. A few years ago, a new rule restricted the area of consultancy that was compatible with full-time employment. As a result, the number of academics who chose to work part-time decreased substantially. At present, the percentage is as follows: full professors, 8.2 percent; associate professors, 7.0 percent; researchers, 7.2 percent. The most reasonable explanation is that those who are involved in such consulting activities have decided to choose full-time employment. But the question is: Did they stop doing consultancy? There are no data available, but some doubts can be raised since there is a lack of control of these activities. The Sociodemographic Profile of Academic Staff Women make up about one-third of the professoriate. In 1997–1998, there were 1,506 women out of 13,153 full professors (11.4 percent), 4,600 out of 17,517 associate professors (26.3 percent), and 7,711 out of 16,905 researchers (45.6 percent). They are mostly to be found in the humanities and less in natural sciences, economics, law, and social sciences. In one empirical research1 carried out in the early 1990s, the situation seemed slightly better, since full professors represented 10.4 percent versus 32.9 percent of men, whereas there were 35.1 percent women associate professors versus 37.6 percent men, and more women researchers (54.6 percent) than men (28.4 percent). The reasons for the discrepancy between the official national data and those of the empirical research can be linked to the different percentages of respondents in the disciplines, women being more present in the humanities and social sciences than in engineering, architecture, and medicine. But the important difference is related to the pace and


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length of academic careers. It is well known that women have more difficult, slower and shorter academic careers than men, probably because of the male-oriented attitude of academia and the self-restraint of women academics, who are more inclined/compelled to combine academic duties with other outside (private) roles (Facchini 1997). The average age of the academic staff is rather high because national competitions to enter academia and pursue a career were organized in a very bureaucratic way. This prevented them from being held every two years as the law requires. Hence, the average age for researchers is 49, for associate professors, 52, and for full professors, 58. The age of retirement has been established by subdividing academic staff members enrolled before and after 1980, with the former having to retire at 72 and the latter at 67 (plus three years with no teaching duties but still on the university payroll for both categories). It is therefore foreseen that 39 percent of full professors, 27 percent of associate professors, and 6.1 percent of researchers will retire between 1998 and 2010. Obviously, this calls for a quicker recruitment process at the lower level, which, at the moment, still remains to be implemented. Traditionally, the academic career was considered as appropriate for the social elite. This is related to high social prestige, which has progressively been declining through the years (although it is still relevant for liberal professions—lawyers, physicians—or in some small towns and peripheral universities). The social origins of academics confirm the popular image: The highest social strata are well represented in terms of the main indicators. Academic staff members have fathers who belong to the upper classes (public and private managers, members of liberal professions, entrepreneurs): 49.4 percent in the early 1990s (data from the research mentioned above), but 55.0 percent in 1958 and 52.0 percent in the early 1970s.2 But academics with working-class fathers represented 5.7 percent in the 1990s, compared to 11.0 percent in the 1970s and 6.0 percent in 1958. Most mothers belong to the non-professional category. If we consider academics’ grandfathers in the 1990s, there is a sort of social mobility, since membership in the upper strata (same combination of professions as for the fathers) drops from 49.4 percent to 37.9 percent. The small bourgeoisie predominates with 32.6 percent, and the working class represents 10 percent. Looking at parents’ educational level (Bourdieu’s “cultural capital”), there is a very high percentage of fathers with a university degree (71.8 percent, which is extremely high compared to the national level of education—of the total labor force in 1997, 10.9 percent had a university degree). As for the mothers, their level of education is lower, but 49.0 percent held either a university degree or an upper secondary school diploma (Bour-

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dieu 1984). Indicators of profession and education suggest a higher social level of academics in medicine and engineering than in natural sciences and humanities. EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF ACADEMIC STAFF Prerequisites There is no prerequisite to enter the academic career. But, in practice, it is crucial to take part in competitions for placement as a researcher when it is created by a university. The procedures were structured in 1980 (Law n.382) with competition at the local level for researchers (the lower level of the career) and national competition for associate and full professors. The law of July 1998 put emphasis on the local level, in line with the new autonomy of universities. Young scholars who hold a doctorate have an advantage in the competition. Having had a postdoctoral research fellowship has some importance, as academic experience (mostly as a member of a research group) in the university that creates the opening remains a relevant variable. Contracts and Salaries Earnings of the academic and nonacademic staff are regulated by an entry salary and automatic increases every two years, following different percentages established by law and revised through negotiations between government and trade unions for the technical and administrative staff members. Part of their salary is related to full-time/part-time employment (40 percent difference). The progression of full and associate professors’ salary is divided into eight two-year steps with an increase of 8 percent of the basic salary. The salary of associate professors reaches on average 74 percent of full professors’, and the salary of researchers is about 70 percent of that of associate professors’. With recent increases, the gross average salary (including insurance, pension fund, and the like, for about 40 percent) of full professors choosing the full-time status is 175,350,000 lira per year (90,573 euro); for associate professors, it is 129,117,000 lira (66,693 euro); and for researchers, it is 90,434,000 lira (46,711 euro). The career progression of technical and administrative staff is divided into 11 levels plus that of “inspector” and some part-time positions. The earning at the entering level (always evaluated at gross level, to which about 35 percent must be subtracted to get the net salary) is 36,015,000 lira (18,603 euro). Very few employees are at this level, as the majority can be found at level five, earning 50,025,000 lira (25,839 euro), and at the top level with a salary of 153,374,000 lira (79,0222 euro): These top managers


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represent only 184 out of 56,387 nonacademic staff members in the university system as a whole. Working Hours and Tasks The working hours for academic staff members was established by the Law 382/80, which defined minimum standards for teaching activities of full professors and associate professors, except researchers. The teaching hours were established at not less than 250 per year for full-time professors (plus 100 hours for administrative and organizational duties), and not less than 250 for part-timers (who were freed from organizational duties). Researchers devote a maximum of 250 hours per year to teaching activities. In practice, there is great confusion concerning the interpretation of “teaching activities,” which include organization and preparation of courses, exams, students’ orientation, and all other involvement of academics in university activities, except research. The other practical problem is linked to the lack of control of the work of the academic staff. Hence, at the end of each academic year, every member of academia fills out a summary of his activities, and everything is left to the honesty of the professoriate. Workload and Time Budget How academic staff members operate can be seen from their selfevaluation. The field research mentioned above shows that at least onethird of those interviewed spend no more than 30 percent of their time doing research, more than half (53 percent) spend from 30 percent to 60 percent, and only 15 percent more than 60 percent. There are differences in the time devoted to research by full professors (only 8 percent devoted more than 60 percent) and researchers (28.5 percent devoted more than 60 percent of their time). Substantial differences can be found according to discipline: Those in the natural sciences devote more time to research than those in humanities, in economics, and in social sciences, followed by those in law, engineering, and medicine. As far as teaching is concerned, it is interesting to note that more than half of those interviewed devote less than 30 percent of their working time to it, and only 4.5 percent do 60 percent or more. More precisely, associate professors devote more time to teaching than their other colleagues, and interestingly enough, some 20 percent of researchers devote more than 50 percent of their time to teaching, which, in principle, was (at the time of the research) strictly limited by law. It is possible to infer that full professors are more involved in research and are in a position to be partially replaced in their teaching duties by researchers. Organizational and administrative activities are more often attributed to full professors (although the percentage of time spent in this domain does not seem particularly great),

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whereas professional activities that are internal to the university are very rare (except in medicine). Activities outside the university must be taken into consideration in the global time budget of the academic staff. In the sample, 33 percent said they spent some time on outside activities, particularly associate professors (40 percent), those in large universities (70 percent), and those in the north of the country (38 percent). Of these, 41 percent had chosen full-time employment, and most said they worked between 8 to 11 hours per working day. Interestingly enough, 64 percent were dissatisfied with their salary, and this is one (but not the only) reason why they carry out external activities. Academic staff have at least four kinds of activities: • Professional activities strictu sensu. They must be enrolled on a professional list— for example, lawyers, engineers, architects, dentists, physicians; 87 percent of academics in medicine are enrolled on such lists. They are very dissatisfied with their university salary. Of these, 57 percent have chosen full-time employment, and a case-by-case inquiry should be conducted to see whether they are entitled to do so. It depends largely on whether their external activities are occasional. In this respect, the position of physicians has been under discussion for many years. • Consulting is more compatible with full-time employment. It is more widespread among engineers and physicians in the north, which is economically more developed. • External research activities include applied research for the market and pure research in public or private research institutes. Full professors in economics or social sciences from large universities in the north of the country are often found in this category. • Teaching outside the university is very often carried out by the same kind of academics who are involved in external research activities.

There are several reasons for external activities, and they affect the disciplines in different ways. Economic reasons exert a rather strong pressure where comparisons with other professionals in the same field penalize academics (in medicine or law). Better possibilities to do external research can also be mentioned. The decline of academic prestige and the absence of a real individual university (or department or institute) policy can also be explanations. ACADEMIC TRAINING AND CAREER Recruitment and Selection of Academic Staff Recruitment normally begins with a competition for a place in a university. Actually, it begins earlier with a choice between a young scholar who


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decides to try to enter a doctoral program and a full professor who is prominent in his field at the local level (and sometimes at the national level as well). If the young scholar is encouraged to try to obtain a fellowship for a doctoral program, it means that he will not be left alone in the following stages of his training. Obviously, not all those who are encouraged to follow this path will always be protected by an academic. But if he has the intellectual and moral qualities, it is likely that this will be the case. The number of places with a fellowship in the doctoral programs are relatively few. Doctoral programs are conceived in relation to the academic world, and many full professors tend or need to have a group of young assistants to help them with their research and teaching. After the three-year doctoral program, young scholars can obtain a fouryear postdoc fellowship. This represents a first step in the academic career. Selection for a researcher’s position is very keen, due to financial constraints. At present, the law prevents universities that receive an annual lump sum from the state from spending more than 90 percent for their teaching and nonteaching staff. The lack of other private resources puts severe limits on the recruitment policy, hence, the progressive aging of the professoriate. Promotion Procedures Promotions are also affected by financial constraints. With the legislation on national competitions for positions of associate and full professors (which will soon be replaced by competitions at the local level), there has been confrontation in each discipline between different interest groups, sometimes related to “schools of thought” (which now only exist on paper) or alleged ideological differences (e.g., the lay versus the Catholic groups in social sciences). These disputes cover a number of individual vested interests and represent an updated version of the battle among baroni evoked by Clark (Clark 1977). Recently, a measure extends to the just promoted and not yet confirmed researchers the right to teach and represents an attempt to reduce the teaching load of the full professors. But the academic world is strongly resisting the idea of including teaching activities in the career evaluation and promotion procedures. The new law on recruitment and career should hasten academic career mobility, but there is no real perception of the aging of the entire professional category, and no measures are being taken to recruit young scholars and researchers. Here economic constraints seem to be a good excuse to cover the vertical format of academic power. The right to recruit a few young scholars as personal assistants prevents any department from having a recruiting policy and could lower the number and quality of those entering the academic career. In this framework, there is no room for special programs for the promotion of women. Scholars and academic staff members are supposed to

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be equal from the gender point of view; only seldom do we hear proposals that favor the introduction of quota regulation in the career recruitment and promotion, of women but there is little support inside the academic world. In fact, there are no gender differences in terms of salary, and possible discrimination in career evolution is not easily found. MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN THE LAST DECADES Major Formal Transformations The most important reform of the status of university professors remains Law n.382 of 1980. On paper, it represented a change in the professoriate condition in a general transformation of the system of higher education. The entire career of the academic staff was restructured into three levels (researchers, associate professors, and full professors) who were all guaranteed stable positions. Behind this rather rigid framework there was an attempt to abolish certain unstable positions (at lower level) upon which academic figures exerted an undue pressure through the vertical organization of the academic power of the heads of institutes (the baroni). This new policy was a parallel attempt of both the state and academia to regain more comprehensive control over the academic staff members’ careers and over the academic world in general through a very rigid structure of the profession and a firm centralization of any decisions related to its evolution. Previously, many members of academia—for example, contracted assistant professors, fellowship holders, and charge´s de cours—were recruited on a temporary basis by the universities, which were not responsible for their salaries (they were left to the Ministry of Finances). This was the last example of an attempt by the two leading powers the central public administration and the professoriate to reinforce the Napoleonic model (Moscati 1991). The first part of Law 382 on career organization was initially implemented very strictly (establishing the total number of members in the three levels, fixed at a maximum of 15,000 each). For many years this rigidity prevented the recruitment of “new blood” and caused an upturn of the existing professoriate, since candidates sat for exams to enter one of three levels. The 1980 law was very contradictory in its purposes and effects, since it marked the end of an old way of conceiving higher education and the equilibrium between the academic forces representing tradition and innovation (Martinotti and Moscati 1982). A second law that affected the academic staff was passed in 1990 (Law n.341). In the decade between the two, a separate Ministry of the University and Scientific Research was created. At first, the minister was very much


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in favor of a realignment of Italian higher education with the main European models. As for the academic staff, the main change was the extension to the researchers of the possibility to teach an official course: This modification of the previous law (Law 382/80) was in line with the attempt to reduce the student/teacher ratio, which was considered unmanageable in most of the first-year courses. By the same token, universities were to split courses with more than 250 students. University autonomy received strong support in 1993 through the law that granted universities an annual lump sum to be subdivided by each university according to its policy with only few limits (90 percent of budget as the highest limit to be devoted to staff costs). There was also a “fund for the re-equilibrium,” intended as an extra to be related to indicators of a university’s efficiency and that concerns a growing percentage of the budget (now at 7 percent). The case in point seems to confirm the need to introduce framework-rules that support the “virtuous behaviors” that are not sufficiently appealing per se and are not always convincing if left only to individual ethics—that is, the moral duty to follow the law (Cherych and Sabatier, 1987). Current Trends and Issues at Stake Autonomy has been “the name of the game” in recent years. As from 1996, the Ministry of the University has introduced a number of measures in this direction, giving more power to each individual university, while trying to change the functioning of the entire system of higher education. The combination of autonomy and evaluation was a new way of considering the system as a collection of independent entities coordinated by a center that should not be the Ministry but a “buffer” created by the Ministry with academic staff members: the Evaluation Observatory whose task is to link in a network the Centers of Evaluation in each university. Another coordination center is the Conference of the Italian Rectors (Conferenza dei Rettori Italiani), which has taken on the role of intermediary body between the universities and the state. So far, the reaction of the professoriate has been contradictory. On the one hand, some academic staff members have reacted positively, especially in disciplines that are more affected by international relations (natural sciences, engineering, economics). On the other, groups of consolidated interests are opposing this innovative trend, particularly where the pure (guild type) academic perspective prevails (as in law or medicine). In general, it seems that the resistance is less strong than before, perhaps also thanks to the policy adopted by the Ministry whereby the new proposals were the result of the work of ministerial committees made up of academics from different universities and disciplines. As far as the academic

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staff is concerned, two aspects are under discussion at present. One, the recruiting procedures, has already been regulated by law; the other, the academics’ legal status, has been under discussion in Parliament for several years. The main innovation of the 1998 law on recruitment is related to the possibility for each university to create an opening and to call for a national competition according to its needs and possibilities. A commission for the evaluation of the demands, made up of one member who is internal to the university and four from other universities, will then be nominated. After evaluation of the candidates’ scientific production and, in the case of associate professors or researchers, an oral didactical examination, it will present three names assessed by quality, among whom the university will choose the winner. As for the academics’ legal status, the proposals under discussion are trying to innovate on Law 382/80, particularly concerning teaching duties (the minimum limit of 350 hours seems senseless, and there is a proposal that each academic should have responsibility for two courses per year, plus duties related to better-defined tutoring and administrative activities). On this topic there is a confrontation between a rather normative position (represented by the trade unions) and another that aims at creating a better attitude toward duties and participation in collective activities among the academics. NOTES 1. Because of a lack of qualitative data on the Italian professoriate, all these and the following are derived from a sample research carried out by a research group coordinated by the author of this article. The research was conducted at the national level between 1989 and 1992 with a mail questionnaire (5,754 answers out of 25,000 questionnaires sent) plus a number of qualitative semistructured interviews. The results were published in Moscati (1997). 2. Data from the 1950s and 1970s are taken from empirical research conducted 25 years ago (see Giglioli 1979).

REFERENCES Avveduto, S., and Moscati, R. 1992. Oltre la laurea: Nuove possibilita` educative nel sistema formativo che cambia. Milano: Angeli. Barbagli, M. 1982. Educating for Unemployment: Politics, Labor Market and the School System—Italy, 1959–1973. New York: Columbia University Press. Bourdieu, P. 1984. Homo academicus. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit. Censis. 1998. Rapporto sulla situazione sociale del paese. Roma: Angeli. Cherych, L. and Sabatier, P. 1987. Great Expectations and Mixed Performances: The Implementation of Higher Education Reforms in Europe. Stoke-onTrent: Trentham Books.


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Clark, B. R. 1977. Academic Power in Italy: Bureaucracy and Oligarchy in a National University System. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Facchini, C. 1997. “Uomini e donne nell’Universita` italiana.” In R. Moscati (ed.), Chi governa l’universita`? Il mondo accademico italiano tra conservazione e mutamento. Napoli: Liguori, pp. 213–244. Fiegna, G., and Talamanca, F. 1998. “Il reclutamento dei docenti universitari dal 1960 al 1997.” In Accademia nazionale dei lincei, L’Universita` in Italia: Appunti per un convegno. Roma, pp. 153–196. Giglioli, P. P. 1979. Baroni e Burocrati: Il ceto accademico italiano. Bologna: il Mulino. Gouldner, A. W. 1957. “Cosmopolitans and Locals: Towards an Analysis of Latent Social Roles I.” Administrative Science Quarterly 2, pp. 281–306. Gouldner, A. W. 1958. “Cosmopolitans and Locals: Towards an Analysis of Latent Social Roles II.” Administrative Science Quarterly 2, pp. 444–480. ISTAT. 1998a. University Education Statistics (1987/88–1995/96). Roma: Poligrafico dello Stato. ISTAT. 1998b. Education Statistics Yearbooks (1970/71–1995/96). Roma: Poligrafico dello Stato. Martinotti, G., and Moscati, R. (eds.). 1982. Lavorare nell’Universita` oggi: Esperienze di didattica nella crisi dell’istruzione superiore. Milano: Angeli. Moscati, R. 1991. “Italy.” In G. Neave, and F. van Vught (eds.), Prometheus Bound: The Changing Relationship between Government and Higher Education in Western Europe. Oxford: Pergamon Press, pp. 91–108. Moscati, R. 1996. “The Changing Policy of Education in Italy.” Journal of Modern Italian Studies 3, pp. 55–72. Moscati, R. 1997. Chi governa l’Universita`? Il mondo accademico italiano tra conservazione e mutamento. Napoli: Liguori. Neave, G. 1995. “On Living in Interesting Times: Higher Education in Western Europe 1985–1995.” European Journal of Education 4, pp. 377–393. Neave, G., and Rhoades, G. 1987. “The Academic Estate in Western Europe.” In B. R. Clark (ed.), The Academic Profession: National, Disciplinary & Institutional Settings. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 211–270.

Chapter 10

The End of Public Employment in Dutch Higher Education? Egbert de Weert

INTRODUCTION The whole process of determining terms and conditions of employment of academic staff in the Netherlands is currently undergoing deep transformations. The position of the different actors has changed considerably, and they must develop their new roles further in the new constellation. This affects both the traditional characteristics of the academic profession and its public status. The developments in employment relationships cannot be considered in isolation. They are part of a much broader development of Dutch higher education. Greater autonomy and emphasis on accountability and quality, the changing internal governance structure of institutions, rigorous funding allocation mechanisms, pressures to contribute to economic development, and greater diversity of the student population—all these have brought about changes in the work practices and aspirations of academic staff and the conditions in which they have to perform their tasks.

THE DUTCH SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION Higher education consists of two sectors, the university sector and the sector of higher vocational education (Hoger Beroepsonderwijs, or HBO). There are 13 Dutch universities, 9 of which provide teaching and conduct research in a wide range of disciplines in arts and sciences. Three are specialized in science and engineering and one in agricultural sciences. Their size varies greatly according to their age and the range of arts and science disciplines they teach. Despite the claims of individual universities and de-

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spite attempts to rank universities, the differences in terms of status and academic standing are negligible, and it is generally believed that they can be compared on equal terms as far as their academic quality is concerned. The HBO sector was established in the 1960s when colleges for higher vocational training were upgraded. Major reforms in this sector led to amalgamations of more than 400 smaller institutions oriented toward specific professional fields into large institutions, providing a wide range of vocationally oriented courses with a standard period of study of four years. Today, there are some 60 HBO institutions whose main task is to provide theoretical and practical training with a clear vocational orientation. Their size and course provision differ substantially. The relationship between universities and HBOs has been a subject of continuous debate. Although there is some overlap between them, and in principle, their courses are of the same duration and the tuition fees are the same, the government maintains a basic distinction between the two as a guarantee of institutional differentiation. The main difference is the status of research being an essential task for universities. HBOs can only carry out applied research in the context of teaching tasks. In universities, however, there has been a tendency to separate teaching and research. This is due to the policy of concentrating much of the research in research schools and research institutes. The research schools are considered as independent organizational units with responsibilities for budgets and for the employment of academic and administrative personnel. The other difference is between academic and vocational education. HBOs are supposed to develop close links with their respective professional fields. But the boundaries between academic and professional thrusts are not clearly demarcated, which provokes much debate on the respective tasks and functions of the two subsystems. The “equal but different” philosophy has not prevented the government from incorporating the twin sectors into a single Act on Higher Education and Scientific Research, which has been operational since 1993. The total number of students in Dutch higher education amounts to 450,000 in 1998, of which 160,000 are in the university sector and 290,000 in the HBO, thus 36 percent and 64 percent, respectively. Enrollments in the HBOs have increased steadily over the years, whereas the growth in the university sector stagnated in the 1990s and slightly declined thereafter. Universities and HBOs differ in course organization and teaching practices. In universities, staff teach a certain discipline. For most courses, an active involvement in research is necessary, and the professionalism of staff has been derived from scientific performance. Students have great freedom in their choices. The educational concept at the HBOs, on the other hand, is a closed curriculum that has to be attended by all students. It is teacher oriented, and teaching is based on a routine. This classical distinction between universities and HBOs is gradually changing, and

The End of Public Employment in Dutch Higher Education?

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the academic staff at HBOs are searching for a new professional identity (Mertens 1999). The model that underlies the public funding of higher education has undergone several changes. Basic in the current model is that universities should no longer be dependent on the number of students but that government funding per university will be determined beforehand for a longer period of time. “The aim is to offer the institutions a stable funds perspective which will enable them to counterbalance the declining intake” (Koelman 1998, 136). In this system, the teaching capacity is degree dependent and less sensitive to student enrollments. A method of funding that is fully student independent may seem quite attractive at a time when the number of students is declining. On the other hand, capacity funding on the basis of expected output and quality assessments may bring uncertain factors back in. Money allocated on the basis of the number of graduates means that the more diplomas an institution delivers, the more money it will receive. But institutions will be penalized in the case of dropouts. It has been calculated that under this model only 13 percent of the funds will be allocated on the basis of new entrants. In the HBO sector, a similar funding model based on numbers of graduates has become effective. However, the budget has not kept pace with the increase in enrollments in this sector. The funding of research is quite independent of student data. Academic staff positions will increasingly be financed on the basis of research assessments. In addition to this direct research funding, the Dutch research council allocates funds for scientific research. Finally, institutions increasingly attract research funds from external sources. This amounts to about 18 percent of the total research budget of the universities. The educational provision by both universities and HBOs at the level of postinitial higher education, which has developed enormously, is more self-supporting. STAFFING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: MAIN ACTORS AND PROCEDURES Changing Position of the Relevant Actors In the last decade the balance between the main actors who determine terms and conditions of employment has changed quite considerably. Decision-making powers have gradually been decentralized from the government to higher education (HE) institutions in three major phases: Sectoralization Until 1989 the central government through the Ministry of Internal Affairs determined basic salaries and working conditions for all those employed in the public sector. In 1989 the determination of working conditions was transformed into a bargaining process between two more

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or less equal parties, and the responsibility for those employed in the public sector was shifted away from the minister of internal affairs to the respective sectors, such as municipalities, provinces, police, trade, and education. Thus, since 1989 the minister of education determines the salary and working conditions of academic staff after bargaining with the unions. Exceptions are the pensions and social security rights, which remain within the remit of the minister of internal affairs. Decentralization of Conditions of Service In the 1990s decentralization has taken a further step by transferring decision-making powers on personnel matters to higher education institutions. The earlier adage that terms and conditions of staff were determined by the minister, “unless stated otherwise,” has been reversed in the amendment of the Higher Education Law of 1994. The point of departure is that universities and HBOs are legally able to determine employment conditions of their personnel, with the exception of certain defined matters that still come under the Ministry. These are the primary or “protocol” issues that include the system of job evaluation and salary scales, redundancy entitlements and other social security issues, and standard working hours. This phase has resulted in a codification of all conditions of service, which until then were rather fragmented, into a central labor agreement. Decentralization of All Terms and Conditions of Staff In the 1990s, universities and HBOs expressed the desire to take responsibility for all terms and conditions including salary negotiations. This has resulted in a collective agreement that encompasses all terms and conditions of service. In the university sector, a covenant was signed by government, universities, and trade unions in which further procedures of this decentralization have been agreed. The covenant prescribes that negotiations at the national level include salaries, function appraisal schemes, working hours, social security, and “all that employers and unions decide among themselves.” The delegation of legal powers from the government to the institutions has changed the position of the actors at the bargaining table. Whereas in the earlier phase government played a central role in determining the salaries after negotiation with the trade unions, as from 1999 the trade unions and higher education institutions are negotiating about all terms and conditions of service (with the exception of pensions and some general social security regulations regarding unemployment and illness). Universities and HBOs act as the legal employers of all staff members, and both sectors have their own intermediary bodies to defend the collective interests of the member institutions. For the universities it is the Association of Dutch Universities (VSNU) and for HBOs the HBO-Council. These bodies, which were founded under private law and are funded by the participating insti-


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tutions, are recognized by all universities and HBOs as the official employers’ associations that represent them in negotiations with the unions. There are four trade unions active in the higher education sector. Organized in a federative structure, the unions act as collective bargaining agencies that negotiate on behalf of a variety of professional associations. In addition to the determination of salary and working conditions at the national level, negotiations take place between the local branches of the trade unions and the governing bodies of the individual institutions. Issues include the collective agreement as well as various topics that have to be agreed upon between employer and employee, fringe benefits, and so forth. It is important to note that institutions can legally determine some of the conditions of employment of academic staff locally and can develop their own personnel policies. In this context, they meet the local branches of unions as well as those responsible for the main decision-making structures that have been developed within the institutions and in which various staff categories are represented. For example, the employee council established at most institutions has formally been acknowledged as an actor in personnel policies and represents the interests of all personnel. Thus, the determination of terms and conditions takes place at two levels—first, at the central level between the trade unions and the intermediary bodies; second, between the trade unions and the individual institutions at the local level. The balance between these levels is far from stable, and the question of what should be determined nationally and what should be determined locally is subject to discussion. In the new constellation the role of the government has been limited. This corresponds to the overall policy in the last decade of increasing the autonomy of institutions. However, the government determines the total budget for the new labor agreement. Hence, the government still exerts considerable influence over the salary demands of academic staff. In addition, government regularly attempts to influence the outcome of the negotiations by calling on all social partners to mitigate the demands, especially when economic growth is expected to stagnate. Procedures and Regulations The institutional arrangements for bargaining between the actors are clearly outlined. Prior to the expiration date of the collective agreement, the actors begin by consulting their members. For example, the respective trade unions consult their local branches and formulate on that basis the demands and issues. In the “Organized Consultation” (Georganiseerd Overleg), all the unions at the federative level formulate their plan on the basis of which they jointly start negotiations with the employers’ organizations (VSNU and HBO-Council). Important subjects are the general wage development for all staff in the coming period, as well as general working

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conditions, such as (reduction of) working hours, redundancy entitlements, and workload. These negotiations, which can take several months, aim to arrive at a collective (national) labor agreement (the CAO). When the actors have come to an agreement, they request the minister to declare the terms as being legally binding on all institutions and on all their employees. In addition to these national agreements, there are institutional arrangements at the local level regarding the further details of the collective agreements. At the central level, different views on salaries are a continuous obstacle for an agreement. A crucial argument used by the unions is that the wages in the educational sector have not kept up with those in other public sectors and in the market sector. There is evidence that the employment conditions of those in the public sector have deteriorated in the last decade (Wilke and Dragt 1996). The government has denied that salaries in the educational sector are lagging behind those in other public sectors and the market and argues that, for example, the social security benefits for those employed in the public service are favorable compared to those in the private sector. The unions argue that social security benefits are no longer as attractive. This continuous squabbling shows that there is a growing need to compare the employment conditions of those working in the educational sector with those in other employment sectors. In such a comparison the total package should be taken into account, including all secondary benefits and pensions. In the HBO, the first collective agreement came about in 1993 and consists of two parts. One covers collective rights such as employment issues, flexible labor contracts, redundancy schemes, and rights of appeal. The other covers individual rights, such as the obligations of employers and employees, working hours, holidays, maternity leave, and performance assessments. For the universities and separately for the research organizations the first collective agreement became operative in 1997. An agreement usually lasts for about one year, after which new negotiations start. Impacts on the Positioning of the Academic Staff The question as to what impact these developments have on the positioning of academic staff depends on the way the actors take on their respective roles. If the national agreement includes as many issues as possible and if these are binding across the board on all institutions, not much may change. If, on the other hand, collective agreements are considered as framework agreements that allow for individual, institutional, subject, or market differences, the changes may be considerable. The employers are in favor of framework agreements that provide the greatest institutional flexibility. A further decentralization will lead to a point where more will be left to the discretion of the institutions. According to the VSNU, national collective bargaining is only justified if economies of scale are involved. The


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trade unions, on the other hand, take the line that all bargaining should be determined centrally and binding on all institutions in order to ensure legal security and equality of rights among academic staff and to achieve uniformity at the national level. In the bargaining process resulting in the collective agreement of 1999, the flexibility requested by employers with regard to staff management became a dominant issue. This flexibility includes the liberalization of the rules governing the recruitment and selection of staff, personal contracts of service, new reward systems, and more casual employment (temporary contracts). According to the employees, such flexibility requires the abolition of the civil service status for academic staff. In the collective agreement of 1999 these aspects have not been settled satisfactory for all actors. In addition to matters regarding salaries, number of working hours, entitlements, appraisal schemes, and grievance procedures, the agreements for the different sectors contain the following new elements: • Extra facilities for maternity leave • Education and training facilities for staff and career development • A minimum of two years for temporary appointments with a maximum of two subsequent extensions; the fourth appointment is automatically on a permanent basis • Better salaries for research trainees • Extension of the possibilities for dismissal when functions are discontinued or personnel made redundant.

Several of these aspects will be discussed further in the next two sections. THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION: BASIC CHARACTERISTICS, SIZE, AND STRUCTURE Main Features of Academic Staff and Social Status As in many other countries in mainland Europe, the academic staff were traditionally considered as part of the public service. This implied that all staff in the higher ranks were appointed by the Crown. Once appointed, the loyalty regarding the state was guaranteed through a large amount of professional autonomy, the guarantee of a lifetime contract, a high salary, and favorable pension rights. Academic staff do not constitute a profession in the strict sense, but as Neave and Rhoades (1987, 213) have put it, “academia is an estate, whose power, privileges, and conditions of employment are protected by constitutional or administrative law.” The developments described above have changed this traditional feature of academic staff quite considerably. The appointment of professors by the

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Crown was abolished in 1987, and since then, all academic staff are employees and the institutions are their legal employers. Although most academic positions are on a permanent basis, staff no longer have the solid position they used to have. If a position becomes obsolete or is no longer wanted, individual members of staff cannot claim another post. Similarly, due to shortfalls in student enrollments in some departments, budget cuts, or restructuring of departments, institutions have the right to dismiss tenured staff because of redundancy. For example, the large-scale reorganizations in the 1980s led to a decrease of over 30 percent (in full-time equivalents [FTEs]) in traditional academic staff positions between 1983 and 1989. Since then, reorganizations have been carried out in both universities and HBOs that have been accompanied by large-scale dismissals. It is no longer unusual to oblige academic staff to resign. Even professors no longer have a lifetime job, although their dismissal entails a lengthy, time-consuming, and expensive procedure. Legal Status An important issue during the last bargaining process was the proposal by employers to abolish the civil service status of university personnel and to replace it by employment contracts under private law. The HBO sector is predominantly private and is regulated by private law. The three denominational universities are also privately owned. All the other universities are public institutions. However, it is no longer clear whether employees of public institutions are by definition public servants. This question has become a concern for jurists. Recently, the legal status of academic staff became a subject of the debate on the “further privatization of the universities” in the Dutch Parliament. The Akkermans’ Committee advocates the privatization of universities whereby academic staff are employed by universities as the legal employers, rather than by the state, like the private institutions (Akkermans 1995). The Dutch Parliament, however, has not adopted this view and has put the concept of privatization in the context of its application. This means that privatization is not a goal as such whereby parts of higher education are left to the market and the government retreats. The debate on privatization does not broach the question as to whether public universities should become private corporations. The starting point is the public function of universities. Here, public and private institutions are the same. The juridical status of the institution in this context is not decisive, as the private institutions also perform this public function and receive governmental funds. Public universities are not considered part of the central government but are established by law, which gives them their legal status (Ministry of Education, Culture and Science 1998; Noordzij 1998). This conception of “privatization” implies that academic staff are no longer considered as civil


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servants but are employed by the universities as their legal employer. Hence, there is a contractual relationship between the staff and the institution in which the rights and duties are laid down. According to this view, public and private institutions do not differ, and the same legal regulations regarding personnel matters apply to both universities and HBOs. Although the abolition of the public status seems a logical outcome of the decentralization process, there remains much disagreement between the actors involved about interpretation and implication of such a move. Occupational Grading Structure of Academic Staff In the university sector there are three main academic ranks: • Professor (hoogleraar) • University main lecturer (universitair hoofddocent [UHD]) • University lecturer (universitair docent [UD])

The title professor is a general one, and although there are some specifications, such as ecclesiastical and endowed professors, these are considered part of the professorship. The three ranks stand in hierarchical relation to each other and form a typical employee career ladder. In the past it was more common to promote a staff member on the basis of seniority, but this has disappeared and promotion is based on individual assessments. All staff in these ranks have both teaching and research duties (traditionally 40 percent teaching, 40 percent research, and 20 percent administration). Recently, the freedom of institutions to determine the weight of these task components for each individual staff member has been extended. In addition to these main positions, there are also other categories, namely, “other academic staff,” which consist of research and teaching associates who are employed at universities and the affiliated research institutes, the research trainees, and student assistants. The function of research trainee dates back to 1991 and concerns young academics who carry out academic tasks. Their position is for a temporary four-year period and normally leads to a doctorate; they are employed by the university. They have a master-apprentice relationship with their supervisor. The composition of the university staff categories has remained fairly stable over the years. In 1998 there were 21,943 academic staff (absolute numbers in FTEs) employed, of which 11 percent (2,474) were professor; 12 percent (2,623), university main lecturer; 27 percent (5,930), university lecturer; 28 percent (6,147), other academic staff; 19 percent (4,101), research trainee; and 3 percent (668), student assistant (VSNU 1999). One remarkable fact is that compared to previous years there is a great drop in the category of research trainees since 1994. One explanation is that the employment conditions are considered as less favorable compared

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to other employment sectors, and therefore fewer young people are interested in pursuing a research career. Another reason is that some universities have introduced a new category, namely, scholarships, instead of research traineeships. Although the holders of scholarships do the same kind of work as research trainees and are also working for their doctorate, they are not considered formal employees of the university. Universities are not charged for their redundancy payment when they leave the institution. Another factor explaining the drop in research trainees is that in order to compete on the graduate labor market, some universities have started to pay research trainees better and have put them in the category “other academic staff.” These changes have resulted in a greater diversity in academic positions, especially in the lower ranks. In the HBO sector, the occupational grading structure has changed considerably over the years. Until 1993, there were two main grades, teacher (docent) A and B. Since then, several new positions have been created. At present, the following positions can be distinguished: • Teacher A (docent A [doc A]) • Teacher B (docent B [doc B]) • College teacher (hogeschooldocent [hsdoc]) • College teacher B (hogeschooldocent B [hsdoc B]) • College teacher C (hogeschooldocent C [hsdoc C]) • Senior lecturer (hogeschoolhoofddocent [hshdoc]) • Lector

These titles can be placed in a ranking order from teacher A as the lowest rank to lector as the highest, requiring higher levels of qualifications regarding the link between theory and professional practice. The top two positions, senior lecturer and lector, were created very recently and require higher academic qualifications. Despite this functional differentiation, to date there are two main positions, namely, teacher A and college teacher. Especially the last rank has developed considerably. In 1998 there were about 13,300 academic staff employed at HBOs, 51 percent of which were teacher A and 40 percent of which were college teacher (i.e., hogeschooldocent). The other ranks remain negligibly small (HBO-Council 1998). There is some pressure from the HBO sector to increase governmental funds in order to be able to appoint more staff in the upper two ranks (senior lecturer and lecturer). Characteristics of Academic Staff Two characteristics of academic staff in particular deserve attention, namely, the low number of women in the higher academic ranks and the


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aging staff population. In Dutch higher education women are underrepresented among academic staff, although a general growth can be seen. In the HBOs, the percentage of women in academic staff functions has increased from 24.6 percent in 1990 to 28.5 percent in 1998. In universities a similar pattern occurs: The percentages of women in academic staff were 16.8 percent in 1990 and 24.1 percent in 1997. However, a breakdown regarding different staff categories shows that women are particularly underrepresented in the higher academic ranks. In HBOs women are hardly represented in the top academic staff positions. In universities 5 percent of all professors are women, 7.5 percent are UHDs, and 19.6 percent are UDs. The corresponding percentages in 1990 were 2.6 percent, 6 percent, and 15.7 percent, respectively, indicating that there is a proportional increase. In lower positions, women are better represented: 40 percent of other academic staff and 38 percent of research trainees in 1998. It may be expected that according to the metaphor of the pipeline, more women in these lower positions may move on to the higher academic ranks. However, as figures of the ETAN Working group on Women and Science (European Commission 2000) show, there is a clear decline of women at the time that solid academic careers start. In every next step in the career, the pipeline shows leaks that become manifest at each next career step. In this regard, the Netherlands is at the bottom of the list among six western European countries. The report notes the astonishing influence of gender on the outcome of academic careers. “To ignore these patterns is to accept discrimination in the sciences” (European Commission 2000, 13). As regards the age structure of academic staff, we observe that the number of staff under 50 years of age in the HBOs has decreased over the years, whereas the number of those aged 50 and more has more than doubled, from 2,281 in 1990 to 4,742 in 1997. In universities a similar pattern can be found, where the number of those who are 50 years of age and above is gradually increasing. The proportion of this last category of the total staff population rose from 20.5 percent in 1990 to 32.9 percent in 1997. The decline of the 30 and younger age group is mainly due to the growth in the number of research trainees, although most of them will not stay in the system. Given these figures, it is not surprising that the length of service among academic staff is quite high and institutional mobility very low. For the higher academic ranks, the mean length of service is over 20 years. The Carnegie Project on the academic profession finds that about half of the respondents have never had a job outside the university. The researchers conclude that academic careers are made inside the university system (Geurts, Maassen, and van Vught 1996).

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EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF ACADEMIC STAFF Growing Importance of Human Resources Management The devolution of the responsibilities for staffing issues from government to institutions has led to greater attention being given to personnel management at the institutional level. Traditionally, personnel management at the local level is concerned with administering personnel matters, such as appointments and salaries. This has a bureaucratic character, ensuring that institutions meet their legal obligations. This attitude is gradually changing, and institutions are increasingly seeking to integrate personnel issues into their overall strategic management. There is growing awareness that the recruitment, deployment, retention, and reward systems should require strategic thinking at all management levels. Perceived problems like the aging staff population, the low proportion of women in higher ranks, the lack of staff mobility, the increasing uncertainty regarding budgetary issues all require proactive human resource management. This need has been reinforced by the new governance structure for universities established in 1995 (Ministry of Education, Culture and Science 1995). The purpose of this bill was to invest the university executive board and the deans with clear managerial responsibilities and to integrate managerial and administrative processes into a single system. Issues regarding financial, personnel, and quality matters must no longer be handled separately but should be brought together in an integrated management model. The basic thrust is that collegial management, traditionally embedded in democratically chosen representative bodies, has been replaced by more managerial structures, both at the central university level and at the faculty level, with deans as professional, full-time managers. The departmental unit has ceased to exist as an organizational entity. Instead, the dean has a central role with executive powers in research, teaching, finance, and management issues. It is expected that the new deans will play a central role in all important staffing issues such as recruitment, retention, and dismissals (Cohen 1996; Weert 1999). One much debated issue concerns the system of permanent employment linked to the civil service status (more or less comparable to tenure). The employers wish to abolish this status in order to increase the freedom of institutions to establish modern employment relationships in which there is more room for flexibility, mobility, and employability. Several institutions are experimenting with new types of employment, such as the socalled flexible professor. It is important to note, however, that the current collective agreement limits the possibilities for temporary appointments. The collective agree-


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Table 10.1 Salary Scales of Academic Staff in Dutch Universities, 1998 (monthly gross income in euro)1

Percentages do not total 100 due to rounding 1 Exchange rate based on “The Irrevocably Fixed Conversion Rates between the Euro and the Currencies of the Member States,” Official Journal of the European Communities 41 (December 31, 1998), L359, p. 3. Source: VSNU (1999).

ment for universities fixes a minimum of two years for temporary appointments, with a maximum of two subsequent extensions. Apart from the research trainees who virtually all have a temporary contract, this regulation applies to the category “other academic staff,” 90 percent of which have a temporary employment contract. They are mostly employed for the duration of a specific research project. Their status is uncertain, and their prospects of pursuing an academic career are not favorable. In comparison to this, the proportion of professors, UHDs, and UDs all together that hold a nontenured position is quite low, namely, 6.4 percent. Concerning the HBOs, the collective agreement prescribes that the number of temporary contracts should be limited to a maximum of 10 percent of all those employed. This is also seen in the statistics: In 1990, 21 percent of all academic staff still had a temporary contract, whereas in 1997 this percentage had dropped to 9.6 percent. Pay Scales and Current Earnings The salary structures of academic staff are based on a job evaluation that assigns every post to one of the 18 grades in the public sector’s salary grades. Table 10.1 presents the distribution of the academic staff categories for universities over the different grades. Each grade has fixed salary scales,

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Table 10.2 Salary Scales of Academic Staff in Dutch HBOs, 1998 (monthly gross income in euro)1

1

Exchange rate based on “The Irrevocably Fixed Conversion Rates between the Euro and the Currencies of the Member States,” Official Journal of the European Communities 41 (December 31, 1998), L359, p. 3. 2 This concerns not FTEs but total number of persons. Source: HBO-Council (1998).

with 9 to 12 annual increments. The table only mentions the bottom and top amounts within each grade. Salary increments are provided to most staff automatically, although institutions are legally entitled to withhold them for poor performers. The salary of research trainees concerns a percentage of scale 10, which increases over the years, albeit some universities have abolished this reduction and pay the trainees more. As can be seen in the table, there is some overlapping between the grades; for example, increment number 7 of grade 11 equals the first increment of grade 12. Staff members who are in two different grades may have equivalent salaries, but those in higher grades will have a higher salary in the long run. The table shows that university staff cover a rather broad range of grades. Table 10.2 shows that the majority of staff in HBOs belongs to scales 11 and 12. HBOs seem quite reluctant to implement salary differentials. If the figures of the distribution of staff over the grades are made in a time perspective, over the last five years there has been a gradual shift toward grade 12. An automatic promotion from one scale to another is no longer the rule. A candidate who has reached the top salary of scale 11 may be promoted to scale 12, but this is only possible on the basis of an assessment of individual performance during all stages of the academic career. Seniority plays a much less important role. It is becoming increasingly difficult for individual staff to move from one grade to another. Working Hours, Work Tasks, and Workload Working hours are formally 38 hours a week, but this will be reduced to 36. It is generally acknowledged that this reduction in working hours


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does not result in a reduction of the workload, and many staff work more hours. The formal prescriptions of the work tasks are no longer centrally determined. According to previous schemes, all major categories of academic staff at universities had the same functions: research, teaching, and administrative duties (respectively 40 percent, 40 percent, and 20 percent). Now, universities can determine the range of work tasks in the context of career planning. An example is the model introduced at Utrecht University that aims to create more possibilities for a differentiated career formation in teaching and/or research (Rules and Regulations on Functions, Careers and Rating: WP-FLOW). The idea is that teaching and research tasks are equivalent for the attainment of the institutional objectives and that these task components feature in different proportions in the functions of academic staff and the workload of a single staff member. In another vein, Lemmers and van Rixte (1998) argue how the classical role of professors is gradually changing toward an executive and managerial role with less emphasis on doing research. In the HBOs, functional differentiation has been broadened. This can be seen in the various categories of academic staff and the corresponding formal prescriptions of work tasks. Although there is a ranking order in terms of academic qualifications, teaching tasks are no longer equally distributed among academic staff. Staff may take on different assigned tasks, such as instructor of practical education and research or tasks concerning curriculum innovation or development. With respect to the workload and time budget, it is generally heard that academic staff have to work in an environment that comprises stringent conditions and time schedules. Slootman (1991) finds in a survey of university academic staff that the actual working time by far exceeds the formal working time. There is dissatisfaction over the lack of time and means to do good work. Most problems occur in the field of research where 60 percent indicate that work has been hindered due to lack of time. More especially, the economy measures and reorganizations by the government have had negative effects. According to more than 80 percent, the situation has deteriorated because of governmental measures. Similar conclusions concerning the heavy workload are found in the Carnegie Project (Geurts Maassen, and van Vught 1996, 506). It appears from the international comparison in the Carnegie study that Dutch university professors reported the highest working hours per week and spent a relatively high share of their working time on teaching-related activities (Enders and Teichler 1997). Fruytier and Timmerhuis (1995) support the view that changes in the research and teaching environment have resulted in an accentuation of the conditions under which research and teaching have to be carried out. Time, money, and societal benefits have become important assessment criteria besides the existing criteria of scientific quality and creativity. Also, the

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teaching process requires more intensive work patterns. In both the HBOs and the universities new educational approaches such as learning in working groups, problem-based learning, and practical work require much study counseling and time investment of staff. As far as time allocation is concerned, it is interesting to add that in the past academic staff were autonomous in dividing the time spent on research and teaching. Now, research has more often been organized in research schools and research institutes, which facilitate to establish independent budgets for teaching and research. Situation and Career Prospects of Intermediate-Rank and Junior Staff Junior staff are mainly in nontenured positions for a limited contract period. The most important category is research trainee, who is generally believed to have a relatively weak position as far as pay level and career prospects in academia are concerned. Recently, the number of vacancies has exceeded the number of candidates, particularly in science and engineering subjects. In order to attract more candidates, the technical universities have increased the salaries for trainees or offer them allowances and fringe benefits, such as computer and research facilities. Evidently, these extra facilities cannot compete with the salaries that are currently offered in the private sector, but they may be attractive to those who are motivated to do research and aim to pursue a career in science. Apart from the financial situation of research trainees, their career chances within academia are uncertain after they have completed their traineeship. The present academic structure is top-heavy: The contraction in numbers of higher academic ranks leaves limited room for career development, especially for younger staff. New types of appointments have been introduced at the bottom of the job hierarchy, such as postdoctoral positions for promising young academics who are considered to have the potential to pursue an academic career. However, these are temporary posts with no long-term prospects. Since 1998, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science has made funds available for universities to appoint young scholars as professors in subjects with an aging professorship (chemistry, humanities, psychology, biology, and mechanical engineering). This temporary double staff aims to prevent a shortage of suitable candidates when the “old” professor retires. Moreover, it aims to retain young talent at the university. Another recent policy is to reduce the working hours of staff who are over 55 with attractive salary conditions and use the hours available to attract young staff on more permanent positions. This policy has the advantage that the experience of older staff will not disappear, and a reju-


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venation of the academic staff can be stimulated. The decision by those concerned is on a voluntary basis, but they are obliged to retire when they are 61 years old. Promotion of Women As indicated above, the proportion of women who move up to the higher positions in universities or HBOs is relatively low. In temporary positions, women and men are more equally distributed. Explanations for these gender disparities are sought in role theories or theoretical notions where echoes can be heard of in Georg Simmel (German philosopher and sociologist) of how women are either treated or act as strangers in science. Other reasons why women have trouble in attaining higher positions pertain to organizational factors. According to Portegijs (1998), universities are not sensitive to part-time work and do not acknowledge that jobs may be carried out only on a full-time basis. This attitude is reinforced in the present ranking system on the basis of the number of publications. For women, who are more often in part-time jobs, it is difficult to compete quantitatively with men. Other research has concentrated on the organization of academic work, gender bias in research assessments and peer review in the awards of grants, and generally aspects of university culture that are not favorable to women (see, for an overview of research, Wetenschapspersoneelsbeleid, 2000). In 1997, in order to increase the number of women, the government enacted a bill on proportional representation (Wet Evenredige Vertegenwoordiging), forcing institutions to draw up an emancipation plan every four years that should contain target figures on the number of women in higher ranks. At the same time institutions have to indicate strategies as to how to achieve these targets. Another initiative concerns the so-called Aspasia-program, which provides funds to enable women to transfer to higher academic ranks. Critics of these governmental initiatives have argued that these are not sufficient. Regarding the bill on proportional representation, there are no purse strings attached to it, and some critics advocate some form of contract compliance. The Aspasia-program is only applicable to a small number of women— and therefore just a drop in the ocean. Although a substantial increase in financial means seems necessary to have more women represented in higher ranks, the program may boost the academic career of women. Recruitment and Staff Development It is common practice to recruit academic staff mainly on the basis of their research capabilities, their publications, and contacts in the research world. The possession of a doctorate is a typical prerequisite for UHDs and professors. It is assumed that those who are good at research are good

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at teaching. Increasingly, however, universities have begun to require specific qualifications regarding teaching skills and teaching experience as part of the selection criteria. Other qualifications, especially for senior university staff, include managerial abilities and capacity to attract external research funding. Contacts with the world of professional practice are also given more importance. In advertisements for the recruitment of professors, abilities to operate in the world outside higher education are increasingly mentioned. In HBOs, the prerequisites for academic staff have a more divergent character. Many teaching staff have a university degree in their field, but other educational qualifications are also accepted. Normally, candidates should have obtained practical experience in the professional field, preferably for a minimum of five years. At the same time, staff are expected to have relevant professional networks, which they are supposed to maintain. The current collective agreements for the HBOs and universities prescribe regular assessments and procedures concerning the performance of all staff. The discussion about the general functioning of staff members usually takes place on an annual basis. It considers the positive and negative aspects of the contexts in which staff have to carry out their assigned tasks with the aim of improving general performance. Staff appraisal schemes are increasingly being introduced, and some universities have begun to subject the professoriate to regular quality assessments, a practice that some professors consider as alien to their academic status and privileges. It is only in the last few years that efforts have been made to implement staff development. Staff development aims to create optimal possibilities for staff to develop themselves both within and outside the institution. This concerns horizontal and vertical mobility, career planning, and additional schooling facilities. The mobility of staff, however, is limited, given the possibilities the institution can offer. A brilliant academic does not necessarily have management capacities, and many staff members are not qualified for higher positions. Staff development schemes have been developed for elder staff members that take account of their current abilities. Schooling facilities may have various forms. Most notable are training facilities that are offered to staff in order to improve their teaching. Although this is mostly on a voluntary basis, it is increasingly becoming a part of staff development. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT There is no doubt that the changing role of the government in Dutch higher education impacts on the position and working conditions of academic staff in universities and HBOs. A key element is the devolution of decision-making powers from the government to the institutions, making


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them more responsible for personnel matters. The Netherlands is an example of a shift of types of employment relationships from the civil or public type to the private type. In the former type, terms and conditions are settled unilaterally by the government, whereas in the private, or contractual, type the obligations of the staff are settled bilaterally between employers and employees and their representative organizations (Farnham 1999). The VSNU and HBO-Council as the employers’ organizations and the unions are the central actors who determine the collective agreements that are binding on all parties. These agreements, however, tend to become more framework agreements that need to be adapted to suit particular circumstances at the local level. This development assumes more freedom of action and responsiveness to labor market and related circumstances by institutional authorities. Due to these developments, institutions have become more responsible for staffing issues. They can no longer limit their activities to administering staff appointment systems and other mainstream personnel activities and to ensuring that institutions meet their legal obligation. Now institutions must develop personnel policies at the institutional level and integrate them into their overall management strategies. Integral management has been made easier through the new governance structure for universities, which focuses on the integration of management and administrative processes in a single system. The basic thrust of this structure is that collegial management is to be replaced by more managerial structures where deans act as professional, full-time managers with executive powers in research, teaching, and personnel management issues. In the current debate the following elements receive much attention: • The development of systems a` la carte whereby individual staff can choose from a variety of conditions such as sabbatical leave, pay bonuses, and extra holidays. • The introduction of different rewards and benefits for individual staff, based on staff appraisals and performance assessments. • Greater mobility and flexibility, which aim to enhance the employability of academic staff in a broad range of functions, tasks, and locations within institutions, as well as in the external labor market. • A greater flexibility in labor contracts away from the public service status.

These issues vary in the extent to which they are implemented within institutions. Flexibility and mobility have become the central issues, termed as modernization of employment relationships. In order to achieve the flexibility regarding the rules governing staff recruitment and selection, employers feel that the civil servant status should be abolished. The abolition of this status may seem a logical step since academic staff are entering a contractual relationship with the institutions as the employer as in the pri-

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vate sector. This would lead to the end of public employment in Dutch higher education. What are the implications of these changes for the working conditions of academic staff? Will the traditional concept of “academic community” and collegiality prevail, or are we moving toward another interpretation of the academic profession? Although it is too early to draw conclusions, a first evaluation of the implementation of the new governance structure indicates that the shift from collegial governance toward a more managerial model may put pressure on the institution as a professional work community. Too much emphasis on decisive governance will result in lack of support for and little acceptation of new administrative relationships (Klankbordgroep 1998). Professors from different universities have repeatedly published pamphlets in which they have expressed their disapproval of the current management structure. In the HBOs, the power balance between management and staff is also changing. Blokhuizen and Montfort (1998) have pointed out in a major study how the demands from management have increased considerably: higher outputs, better quality and productivity, and a division of tasks. Teaching staff experience the greater formalization of procedures and the strengthening of managerial top-down approaches as pressures on the workload and as a curtailment of their professional autonomy. An executive management structure may create tensions between managers and academic staff, as there are different views on how academic work must be organized, conducted, and assessed. The continuous pressure to submit evaluation schemes is felt as strenuous and time-consuming. The framing of imperatives set by management may affect the working conditions of academic staff at all levels, leading to a loss of control over tasks and the working environment and lesser thrust in management. These experiences point to the challenging question of how to find principles by which institutions might balance management imperatives with academic values, moving beyond sterile dichotomies of managerialism and collegiality and developing genuine academic leadership. In a world where talent runs free, it becomes increasingly important for higher education to ensure that it can recruit and retain its staff. There is growing awareness that much of the quality of education and research depends on the capabilities of the academic staff. As illustrated before, institutions are experiencing an aging staff population and a low representation of women, features that require active human resource management. A report commissioned by the Ministry of Education argues that academic recruitment— especially in science—is in danger due to poor career prospects at the earlier career stage. Many young, promising researchers are leaving the university and others are not attracted to an academic career. The report suggests enabling institutions to employ more staff on the basis of a broader range of contractual employment arrangements, a financial boost from govern-


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ment, and new career perspectives for young promising scholars (Wetenschapspersoneelsbeleid 2000). At the same time, institutions are exploring new ways of managing human resources with emphasis on the quality of academic staff. One example is “competence management” where a direct link is being established between the strategic goals of the institution or unit and the competencies that are required to achieve them. This may be well received, as it may result in a staff plan containing career planning and training advice for each employee. But it may also provoke greater dissatisfaction, as it can be more threatening for some staff members. The developments analyzed here may imply a loss of traditional privileges for the professoriate and a less solid position under private law. But it may also create new possibilities of appointing more staff who, at present, are on a temporary contract. As has been shown, there is a strong segmentation between a group of permanently employed, relatively well-paid academic staff and peripheral groups of casually employed, insecure, and poorly paid staff. Human resource management that focuses on reducing this segmentation may be less favorable for the existing staff. For others, especially intermediate-rank and junior staff and women employed on a part-time basis, the attractiveness in pursuing an academic career may increase. Considered in this way, the changing working conditions of staff also have positive aspects.

REFERENCES Akkermans, P. 1995. Relatie overheid-universiteiten. Utrecht: VSNU. Blokhuizen, C., and van Montfort, F. 1998. Ingenieurs, Scholing en Onderwijscultuur. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press. Cohen, M. J. 1996. “Human Resource Management in Universities.” Tijdschrift voor Management en Organisatie (M&O) 5, pp. 499–510. Enders, J., and Teichler, U. 1997. “A Victim of Their Own Success? Employment and Working Conditions of Academic Staff in Comparative Perspective.” Higher Education 34, pp. 347–372. European Commission (ETAN Working Group). 2000. Science Policies in the European Union: Promoting Excellence through Mainstreaming Gender Equality. Brussels: European Commission. Farnham, D. (ed.). 1999. Managing Academic Staff in Changing University Systems. Buckingham: Open University Press. Fruytier, B., and Timmerhuis, V. 1995. Mensen in onderzoek: Het mobiliseren van human resources in wetenschapsorganisaties. Assen: Van Gorcum. Geurts, P. A.; Maassen, P.A.M.; and van Vught, F. A. 1996. “The Dutch Professoriate.” In P. G. Altbach (ed.), The International Academic Profession. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, pp. 493–529. Gordijn, C.M.N., and Potters, L. 1998. “Vergrijzing in het hoger beroepsonderwijs.” Kwartaalschrift Onderwijsstatistieken. Voorburg: CBS, pp. 14–17.

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HBO-Council. 1998. Kengetallen HBO. Den Haag: HBO-Raad. Klankbordgroep Invoering MUB. 1998. De Kanteling in het Universitair Bestuur. The Haag: SDU. Koelman, J.B.J. 1998. “The Funding of Universities in the Netherlands: Developments and Trends.” Higher Education 35, pp. 127–141. Lemmers, A., and van Rixte, M. 1998. “Leidinggeven aan onderwijs en onderzoek: De veranderende rol van de hoogleraar.” Thema 3, pp. 44–49. Mertens, F.J.H. 1999. “Kwaliteitsbewaking in het Nederlandse Hoger Onderwijs.” Tijdschrift voor Hoger Onderwijs 1(17), pp. 40–55. Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. 1995. Wetsvoorstel Modernisering Universitaire Bestuursstructuur (MUB). Zoetermeer: Ministry of OC&W. Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. 1998. Hoger Onderwijs en Onderzoek Plan (HOOP). The Haag: SDU. Neave, G., and Rhoades, G. 1987. “The Academic Estate in Western Europe.” In B. R. Clark (ed.), The Academic Profession: National, Disciplinary, and Institutional Settings. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 211–271. Noordzij, C. J. 1998. Naar een nieuw arbeidsrechtelijk regiem voor de Nederlandse un iversiteiten. Utrecht: VSNU. Portegijs, W. 1998. Eerdaags evenredig? Leiden: Universiteit Leiden, Vakgroep Vrouwenstudies. Slootman, A. W. 1991. Arbeidsbeleving van universitair wetenschappelijk personeel. Utrecht: Lemma. VSNU. 1999. Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs Personeelsinformatie (WOPI). Utrecht: VSNU. Weert, E. de. 1999. “The Netherlands: Reshaping the Employment Relationship.” In D. Farnham (ed.), Managing Academic Staff in Changing University Systems. Buckinham: Open University Press, pp. 158–174. Wetenschapspersoneelsbeleid. 2000. Talent voor de Toekomst, Toekomst voor Talent. Plan van aanpak voor het Wetenschapspersoneelsbeleid. Zoetermeer: Ministerie van OC&W. Wilke, M. L., and Dragt, Th. H. 1996. Zijn arbeidsverhoudingen bij de overheid marktconform? The Hague: Centrum voor Arbeidsverhoudingen Overheidspersoneel.

Chapter 11

Expansion, Reorganization, and Discontent among Academic Staff: The Norwegian Case Svein Kyvik, Ole-Jacob Skodvin, Jens-Christian Smeby, and Susanne Lehmann Sundnes

INTRODUCTION The higher education system in Norway developed considerably in the 1990s. To meet the large rise in student numbers, funds were greatly increased and the number of administrative staff grew. Still, the increase in staff numbers has not fully compensated for student growth. From 1988 to 1997, expenditure per student in the university sector dropped by 6 percent and in the college sector by 4 percent. The rise in student numbers has particularly affected student/staff ratios in the humanities and the social sciences. Growth in the higher education system combined with tighter budgets have led to general discontent among academic staff. In addition, wage increases have been relatively smaller in this sector than in the private one. For example, the gap in salaries between academic staff and industrial workers has decreased by some 20 percent in the last two decades. Traditionally, being a professor in Norway was a sign of social recognition. According to an opinion poll ranking Norwegian occupations in 1985, full professors ranked sixth out of 66 various occupations, surpassed only by prime minister, supreme court president, president of Parliament, ambassador, and head surgeon, but ahead of Member of Parliament, bishop, and bank manager (Økonomisk Rapport 1985). There are, however, clear indications of a decreasing status. In fields that have an alternative job market in the private sector, the universities have increasing problems in keeping talented doctoral graduates and in finding competent applicants for full professorships. Other reasons for the general discontent among academic staff are the state’s efforts to make the institutions more accountable. Since 1990, all state institutions, including universities and

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colleges, have been instructed to introduce result-oriented planning (Larsen and Gornitzka 1995). This includes greater emphasis on objectives and results as governing criteria at every organizational level. The condition for the implementation of these objectives was that the governance and management system in higher education institutions be strengthened, giving university and college administrations more influence in academic matters (Dimmen and Kyvik 1998). Although these reforms do not seem to have greatly changed academic culture, regular complaints about the bureaucratization of university life have increased the frustration of the academic staff. THE HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM In 1999, higher education was provided by four universities (75,000 students), six specialized university colleges (7,000 students), 26 state colleges (75,000 students), and 26 private colleges (15,000 students), mainly with religious affiliations, as well as colleges of business administration. A total of 13,500 persons are employed in academic positions in the public higher education sector, 8,500 of whom have tenure, 2,000 are externally funded researchers, and 3,000 are doctoral students in temporary positions. The state colleges were established in 1994 through the amalgamation of 98 specialized colleges of education, engineering, health education, and others into multipurpose institutions. The aim was to raise the academic standards of nonuniversity higher education, to break down the barriers between courses, and to make better use of available resources in the various regions. The state colleges offer two- to four-year vocationally oriented courses, as well as a range of programs that correspond to university subjects for lower degrees. A few subjects for higher degrees are offered at almost half of these colleges, mostly in cooperation with the universities. All institutions of higher education are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, Research and Church Affairs. In the public sector, education is free of charge at universities, university colleges, and state colleges. The budgets are not divided between teaching and research, and the number of students has been decisive for the allocations. About 4 percent of general university funds are allocated on the basis of results in terms of student credits earned and higher degrees awarded. Expenditure for research amounts to some 50 percent of the total expenditures at the universities. While teaching is almost entirely financed by general university funds, R&D (research and development) is partly financed by external sources (the Research Council of Norway, the public sector, the business enterprise sector, private funds, etc.). The government expects the institutions to generate external funding amounting to at least 10 percent of their total budget. More than 30 percent of the R&D at universities is now funded by such sources.

Expansion, Reorganization, and Discontent: The Norwegian Case

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The private colleges are regulated by law and may only receive state funding for recognized study programs, but they are not automatically entitled to such support. In 1997, 19 private higher education institutions received state funding for part of their activities. The variation in the public share of the budget is considerable, from almost 90 percent to approximately 15 percent. Since 1996, all universities, university colleges, and state colleges are governed by the Act on Universities and Colleges, which offers a common framework for their organization and governance. Furthermore, it links the institutions through “Network Norway.” This concept presupposes that the higher education institutions will be further developed within a national integrated system. Network Norway will require closer cooperation and a better division of labor in teaching courses and research between the various institutions. Further expansion should go together with specialization so that every institution can set national standards for its fields in at least one program. The universities and the university colleges will be responsible for the major part of basic research, whereas the state colleges will have main responsibility for a wide array of professionally and vocationally oriented programs and will also take on some of the university programs for basic and undergraduate education. In fields where the universities do not offer similar programs, the colleges should offer graduate education. Concurrently, the colleges should do research and development work, preferably linked to practice in specific fields or to problems that are particularly relevant to their regions. Highly competent research environments could also play a role in graduate and postgraduate education in collaboration with a university or university college. STAFFING IN HIGHER EDUCATION1 The Negotiation System As a rule, each academic position is linked to a certain level of income that is the result of annual negotiations between trade unions and central authorities. Every second year the agreement that regulates working conditions besides salaries is negotiated in connection with these central negotiations. It regulates the general pay rise and the sum to be bargained in “adjustment negotiations” and in “local negotiations.” The adjustment negotiations may lead to changes in salary scales or other adjustments concerning the salary system, or to pay rises for special groups of employees. They are held at central level. Local negotiations take place at each institution. They were introduced in the universities and the university colleges in 1991 and in the state colleges in 1996 and are an important tool for decision making concerning salaries at the institutional level. The institutions must have their own salary policy to be able to conduct local nego-

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tiations between the institutions’ management and the local trade unions representing their employees. Local bargaining may include increases in pay for groups of employees and/or individuals. A person can claim a salary rise for achievements in research and teaching or for significant changes in workload or in the position’s content. Hence, the institutions can implement a more flexible and differentiated salary policy. Some disciplines are declared problem fields by the authorities when it comes to recruiting and keeping qualified personnel at the institution when higher salaries are offered in other sectors of society. This has led to central earmarking of an amount of money for local negotiations in disciplines such as law, medicine, and information technology. Trade Unions The Norwegian Association of Research Workers (Forskerforbundet) is the largest trade union for academic and administrative employees in research and higher education. It has approximately 10,000 members, which is about 65 percent of the total academic staff in the universities, university colleges, state colleges, research institutes, research foundations, research councils, and museums. It is affiliated to the Federation of Norwegian Professional Associations (Akademikerne), which has some 110,000 members and mainly includes employees with a master’s degree. The main objective of the Norwegian Association of Research Workers is to improve the working conditions in research and higher education and to represent its members’ economic and professional interests. It aims to promote higher salaries for both academic and administrative employees. The Association works toward improving possibilities for research and a rising the level of competence among academic employees in universities and colleges. Since there is a close connection with society’s views on research and employment opportunities for research workers, the Association is also actively involved in the research and education policy debate. THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION Academic Positions In 1995, a common appointment structure at universities, university colleges, and state colleges was implemented. The permanent academic positions are now professor, college reader, associate professor, senior lecturer, university/college lecturer, and college teacher. However, as the occupational titles indicate, some are reserved for universities and university colleges and some for state colleges. Universities now only have two kinds of permanent positions, the full


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professor and the associate professor. The requirement for obtaining tenure is a doctoral degree, which automatically qualifies for an associate professorship. In addition to these permanent positions, there are four types of temporary positions that are used by all institutions but mainly by universities: • Research scholar. This is a research position, with a normal duration of four years and requires admittance to a doctoral program. The requirement is a master’s degree. • Research assistant. Primarily used for short-term assistance on research projects. Since 1986, most of these positions have been transformed to research scholar positions according to new regulations by the Ministry of Education, Research and Church Affairs. A master’s degree may be required. • Postdoc. A new position created in 1997–1998. The requirement is a doctoral degree. • Researcher. This position is financed externally and is linked to concrete research projects. Its requirements vary from a master’s degree to professorial competence.

Number of Academic Staff In 1997, over 13,000 persons were employed in academic positions at universities, university colleges, and state colleges (see Table 11.1). Slightly more than 50 percent of the total academic staff are employed at the four universities. State colleges and university colleges employ, respectively, 40 percent and 10 percent of the academic staff. On average, 36 percent are women, but this proportion varies considerably according to position and type of institution. At the state colleges, two-thirds of the academic staff are college lecturers and college teachers. At the universities and university colleges, the distribution of positions reflects their role as research and research training institutions. In general, the distribution of positions at university colleges is very similar to that of the universities. Almost half of the academic staff in the universities and university colleges are nontenured personnel, compared to only 3 percent in the state colleges. Academic Training and Recruitment Traditionally, a doctoral degree was not viewed as a formal part of the educational system. New research recruits received research training as part of their higher degree and additional training in positions as fellows or research assistants. The doctoral degree (dr.philos.) was traditionally taken rather late. In the last two decades, new doctoral degrees have been established to give a better structure to research training (Kyvik and Tvede 1998). The Norwegian Institute of Technology took the lead in 1974 by

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Table 11.1 Academic Staff in Norwegian Higher Education, 1997, by Type of Institution (absolute numbers, in percent)

Source: Norsk institutt for studier av forskning og utdanning (NIFU).

introducing the “dr.ing.” degree. In 1977, the four universities established corresponding degrees in the natural sciences (dr.scient.). In the 1980s, new doctoral degrees were introduced in most disciplines: in the humanities (dr.art.), in the social sciences (dr.polit.), and so on. They are based on formal research training with structured courses. A degree corresponding to the Ph.D. at a recognized—preferably American—university is the objective. Today, Norway has two types of doctoral degrees: the traditional dr.philos. degree, which is kept as an alternative for those who do not follow doctoral training programs, and the new formalized doctoral degrees. There are no formal differences in the status of the two degrees. In 1993, joint national regulations with a prescribed length of study were introduced for all the new formalized doctoral degrees. The norm is three years of research on a full-time basis, including at least six months’


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course work, preferably over four years, with 25 percent of additional duties. Joint national contracts have also been established, that is, admission and supervision contracts for the institutions, as well as contracts between doctoral degree–granting institutions and external research institutes. The purpose is to ensure that candidates are given good working conditions and qualified supervision and that they complete their studies within a prescribed time limit. These regulations pertain to all fields. Organized research training is mostly financed by a research fellowship, paid for through either the institution’s budget or the Research Council of Norway. Most doctoral degree candidates have such fellowships with regular salaries that, to a certain degree, are competitive with the salary level in the public sector. A doctoral degree is now a mandatory requirement to obtain tenure at the universities. But the recruitment of staff in the state college sector is also based on other criteria. The amalgamation of different cultures and traditions makes it difficult to follow one common principle for the recruitment and selection of academic staff. The former regional colleges placed more emphasis on research, whereas colleges of education, health care, and engineering gave more weight to practice and pedagogical qualifications. If people are to do high-quality research, research competence is a premise. But it is argued that, in training for a profession, experience from practical professional activities may be more important. Because of different competence profiles at the new colleges, the issue of recruitment criteria is difficult to solve. With the introduction of the title “professor” in the state college sector and the distinction between two types of lectureship positions, one mainly for teaching and the other for teaching and research, we see two different career paths where only research competence will lead to top positions and where research is given greater status (Kyvik and Skodvin 1998). Special Programs and Regulations for the Promotion of Women Several initiatives have been taken to promote women in academic positions (Lie and Teigen 1994). Some are of a more general character, and some are directed toward specific fields where women’s participation is particularly low. In the 1980s, the Norwegian Parliament obliged the Ministry to enhance gender equality in the institutions of higher education. Some of the initiatives proposed were to give women applicants for academic positions preference over male applicants with the same qualifications (gender quotas) and to earmark funds for recruitment programs in disciplines with low female participation. During the same period, the Research Council of Norway introduced earmarked fellowships for women students and quotas for women recruit-

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ment positions. For women with research fellowships, the employment period was prolonged by six months for maternity. In medicine, women were to be given priority with regard to technical assistance for research projects. According to the Equal Status Act of 1979 and the Act on Universities and Colleges of 1995, minimum participation in councils, boards, and committees should be 40 percent. However, this aim has not been achieved in all institutions. A mapping of the measures to increase women’s participation in research and higher education shows that most of the initiatives came from the Research Council of Norway, not from the higher education sector. It further shows that many initiatives have been taken to promote women in higher education but that these have not been extensive (Pedersen 1997). The proportion of women academic staff increased from about 20 percent to more than 30 percent between 1987 and 1997 (see Table 11.2). It is not possible to estimate the effect of the special promotion programs for women here. The general increase in women’s participation at all levels in society and the large increase in women who obtain higher education degrees are probably more important. EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS Pertaining to employment conditions, the higher education institutions are subject to regulations from central authorities. These include appointments, salaries, and general working conditions for academic staff. Appointments Norwegian law is very strict when it comes to temporary contracts. The only positions that are not tenured are research scholars, research assistants, postdocs, externally funded researchers, and lecturers and teaching assistants in part-time positions. Temporary appointments to permanent positions are legal until the limit of three and a half years if no qualified applicants are available. All applicants for tenured positions in the university and in the college sector are now assessed by “ad hoc committees” and appointed by the institutions. Applicants’ teaching competence should be assessed for all positions, but in practice, it is given limited attention for associate professorships and full professorships. Until 1987, full professors were senior government officials. Promotion to the rank of full professor has traditionally been dependent on vacant positions and competition with other applicants. However, as from 1993, faculty in both the university and college sectors could be promoted to full professorships if they were found competent by national committees. This had, to some extent, also existed on an ad hoc basis in previous years, and between 1987 and 1997, some 700 people were promoted to full profes-


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Table 11.2 Proportion of Female Academic Staff in Norwegian Higher Education, 1997, by Type of Institution (in percent)

Source: Norsk institutt for studier av forskning og utdanning (NIFU).

sorships. In comparison, about half as many such new positions were established in the same period (Forskerforbundet 1997). The proportion of full professors among tenured faculty members in universities rose from 40 percent in 1987 to 47 percent in 1997. The main argument for this reform was that many faculty members had a position and salary below their “true level” of qualification and that this was unfair. Furthermore, the reform would make it easier for academic staff to plan their career without depending on vacant professorships. In addition, it would give the higher education institutions better opportunities to offer faculty positions that equaled competence level. But it has been claimed that the reform would lead to less mobility. Someone in an academic position who has professorial competence no longer needs to apply for a vacant professorship at another institution but may be promoted to full professor at his or her institution. Pay Scales and Earnings Salaries are generally low compared to those of higher education graduates in the business enterprise sector. This leads to competition between the higher education sector and other sectors for skilled personnel. This is particularly true for medicine, law, and engineering. Assistant professors, lecturers, and college teachers are paid according to

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Table 11.3 Academic Salaries in Norwegian Higher Education, 1998 (annual gross income in euro,1 range)

1

Exchange rate based on European Central Bank daily euro foreign exchange reference rates on February 1, 2000: 1 NOK ⫽ 0.1238696 euro. Source: Forskerforbundet (1997).

seniority. For the other positions, salaries increase after negotiation. Most salaries for these latter positions tend to be at the lowest level (see Table 11.3). The research assistant position is divided into three levels according to qualifications. Qualifications for the upper level are similar to those of research scholars. At each level, research assistants are paid according to seniority. The salary structure in Norway is quite flat compared to other countries. In 1997, an industrial worker earned on average NOK217,600 a year, and the salary gap between academic staff and industrial workers has also decreased by some 20 percent in the last 15 to 20 years. (Note: A Norwegian krone is equivalent to 0.12 euro [1 euro ⫽ 8.07 NOK]. The current exchange rate [January 2001] of 1 euro is 0.91 U.S.$.) General Employment Conditions Faculty members are subject to the same regulations as other state employees. This includes the right to salary during sickness, maternity leave, and occupational injury. The general retirement age is 67, but employees in the state sector can retire from the age of 62 and must retire by the age of 70. The official working week for academic staff is 37.5 hours, the same as for all public employees. This amounts to 45.8 working weeks per year and a total of 1,717.5 working hours. Staff members must be present at the institution during regular working hours unless they are attending conferences, traveling, doing research outside the institution, and so on. Formal Prescriptions of Tasks In the university sector, the number of teaching hours is decided by the institutions within frameworks set by the Ministry of Education, Research


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and Church Affairs. Traditionally, full professors teach 5 hours a week (supervision not included). When assistant professorships were established in the 1960s, these professors were expected to teach up to 12 hours a week, but over time, their teaching load has been reduced, and in most institutions it is identical to that of a full professor. The general guidelines of the Ministry indicate that academic staff employed on a yearly basis may devote as much time to research as to teaching. But local agreements should be reached to ensure a certain flexibility and to plan the institution’s own use of resources. At universities and most university colleges, tenured faculty may apply for a sabbatical year after six years’ duty or for six months after three years (in some institutions they may apply for a sabbatical year after five years). Those who have been rector, dean, or department head may apply for a sabbatical year after their term of office (usually three years). In the college sector, the former regional colleges developed rules that were similar to those of universities. The other former institutions in this sector had also to some extent decided upon the number of teaching hours, but on the basis of general guidelines negotiated between the Ministry and the trade unions and traditions in the particular type of institution. Their primary task was teaching, but gradually some colleges developed extensive research activities. The state colleges have no general regulations for sabbaticals, but faculty members may apply for leave of absence to develop their professional competence, to complete a doctorate, or to work on a research project. Obtaining a sabbatical year is, in general, much more difficult than in the university sector. The new Act on Universities and Colleges states that all teaching at higher education institutions should be research based. But there is great uncertainty as to what this actually means. The Ministry has emphasized that research is neither an individual duty nor a right for academic staff at the state colleges. However, the Norwegian Association of Research Workers has a different view on this issue. It claims that, on the basis of previous norms about the use of time for R&D in the college sector, at least 25 percent of the working time should be devoted to such activities. Academic staff with research competencies and the motivation to conduct R&D should be allowed to spend a larger share of their total working time on such activities. There is also disagreement within the state colleges on this issue (Kyvik and Skodvin 1998). Some argue that since the Act on Universities and Colleges states that teaching should be research based, a logical implication would be that all academic staff should conduct R&D. Others claim that instead of individual research duties, state colleges should allow differentiation among their academic staff. It is claimed that an individual research obligation would be a waste of resources because some teachers are neither motivated nor competent to conduct research. Instead, they should have

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Table 11.4 Proportion of Working Hours Spent on Major Functions in Norwegian Universities (1991) and State Colleges (1997), by Rank (mean percentage of respondents)

1

Including college teacher. Including senior lecturer. 3 Including university/college lecturer. Sources: Kyvik and Enoksen (1992); Kyvik and Skodvin (1998). 2

the possibility to do research, while others should concentrate on keeping up to date with the development of relevant vocational fields. The Ministry’s guidelines concerning academic staff’s working duties underline that local employers must provide satisfactory documentation on working duties, including research. Working duties must be fulfilled in accordance with individual working plans. If the research obligation of an academic staff member is not fulfilled, a larger share of his or her working time should be devoted to other relevant activities, preferably teaching. Use of Working Time The latest data on the actual use of faculty time are drawn from surveys among all tenured academic staff at universities in 1992 and at state colleges in 1998 (Kyvik and Enoksen 1992; Kyvik and Skodvin 1998). Faculty were asked to estimate the approximate allocation of their working time between various tasks during the previous year (January 1 to December 31). They were also asked to estimate the approximate number of hours they worked in an average week. The response rates were 69 percent versus 71 percent. The distribution of working time between different activities is given in Table 11.4. First of all, the table illustrates the great differences


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between universities and state colleges pertaining to the time devoted to teaching, supervision of graduate students, and R&D. While tenured university faculty used about 30 percent of their total working time for teaching, college staff spent twice as much on this activity. However, university faculty devoted more time to the supervision of graduate students (13 percent) than college faculty (1 percent), more time to research and development (32 percent versus 20 percent), and more time to external and professional activities outside their own institution (9 percent versus 5 percent). There were, however, no differences between universities and colleges with regard to the percentage of time spent on administrative work (16 percent–17 percent). Second, the table indicates clear differences between faculty in various academic positions. In both types of institution, the percentage of time devoted to teaching increases in the lower positions, whereas the percentage of time devoted to the supervision of graduate students decreases. Differences in teaching time between academic positions are, however, much greater at state colleges than at universities. With respect to R&D, there are no differences between full professors, associate professors, and assistant professors at universities but great differences between these groups at state colleges. The faculties were also asked to estimate the approximate number of hours they worked in an average week. Tenured university faculty worked for an average of 50 hours a week in 1991, and tenured state college faculty 43 hours in 1997, including the time for activities that are paid for beyond their ordinary salaries as faculty members, “external activities” and “professional activities.” According to the definition of these categories in the surveys, teaching at other universities, editorial work for journals, consultancy work for external institutions, practice as a physician or lawyer, and so on, are additional activities. If we exclude the time devoted to external and professional activities, the average working week is 45 hours for university faculty and 41 hours for state college faculty, compared to 37.5 hours for state employees. It should, however, be noted that external and professional activities are tasks that faculty members are expected to do, even though this work is paid for, or rewarded by, institutions other than their own universities. Doctoral Candidates and the Labor Market The traditional objective of research training was to prepare candidates for an academic career. A main goal of the new doctoral degrees is that research training will have a broader purpose and be directed toward other sectors where research skills are required, for example, industry and the public sector. The general labor market prospects for doctoral graduates seem good, although many do not always obtain their first choice (i.e.,

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work in universities and colleges). A survey of three cohorts of graduates showed that between 40 percent and 50 percent remain in the higher education sector, between 5 percent and 10 percent obtain research positions in the institute sector, as many go into industrial R&D, and the rest find other work in the private or public sectors. There are, however, clear differences between fields. In the social sciences and humanities, 70 to 80 percent remain in the university and college sector. This is the case for some 50 percent in the medical and natural sciences and only 20 percent in technology (Tvede, Skodvin, and Sarpebakken 1997). In the years to come, there will be a great demand for new academic staff at universities and colleges due to the skewed age structure of the present faculty. In many disciplines there could be problems finding qualified applicants for vacant academic positions (Tvede and Sarpebakken 1998). CONCLUSION Student numbers increased considerably in the 1990s. This led to general discontent among academic staff with regard to working conditions. The student teacher ratio was much higher in the 1990s than in the previous decade, and university faculty say their personal time for research is under pressure. The growing number of graduate students has led to more time being devoted to supervision. It is, however, not clear to what extent working conditions have actually deteriorated. The most significant growth in the student faculty ratio in the universities took place between 1987 and 1991 when the ratio increased from 15:1 to 22:1. In the 1990s, growth in student numbers was accompanied by an increase in the number of faculty members. In 1997, the student faculty ratio was 20:1 (Smeby and Kristensen 1997). In the college sector, faculty members’ research conditions improved in the 1990s, especially in vocational fields such as engineering, nursing, and other health professions. In the former regional colleges and colleges of education, however, no significant changes have taken place in faculty members’ use of time for various activities (Kyvik and Skodvin 1998). Still, academics complain that there are fewer resources for teaching, and there seems to be general discontent (Kyvik 1999). In addition, many claim that the higher education institutions have become bureaucratized. The relationship between academic and administrative staff has changed considerably. From 1987 to 1995, the total administrative staff in universities, (i.e., clerical positions and administrative officers and managers) increased by 58 percent, whereas permanent academic positions rose by 48 percent (Gornitzka, Kyvik, and Larsen 1998). Many also claim that academic staff spend too much time on administrative matters. This discontent seems to have prevailed in the last


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two decades. Some 75 percent of tenured academic staff are members of boards, councils, and committees at their universities and colleges (Gornitzka, Kyvik, and Larsen 1998; Kyvik 1999). A decrease in income level and more detailed state regulations concerning academic life add to the frustration about working conditions. But it has become easier to be promoted to the rank of full professor. The 1993 reform, which gave associate professors the possibility to be promoted on a personal basis, has resulted in a large number of new professors and hence a rise in salary level. Furthermore, the 1995 reform that introduced a common staff structure for all academic personnel in higher education has considerably improved employment conditions for state college faculty. It was considered advantageous to have an equal structure of positions and equal regulations for employment and promotions at all public institutions in the higher education sector. The new structure will, in time, lead to the disappearance of assistant professorships as a consequence of no new appointments, but present holders of these positions may keep their titles. The fact that faculty in regular academic positions normally have tenure and that there have been no great efforts to change things show that academics have relatively good employment conditions. The overall conclusion of this chapter is therefore mixed. While jobs are safe and employment conditions have improved in the last decade, working conditions seem to have somewhat deteriorated for many academic staff members. NOTE 1. We will concentrate on academic staff in the public higher education institutions, which, in student numbers, account for more than 90 percent of higher education in Norway.

REFERENCES Dimmen, A˚., and Kyvik, S. 1998. “Recent Changes in the Governance of Higher Education Institutions in Norway.” Higher Education Policy 11, pp. 217– 228. Forskerforbundet. 1997. Opprykk til professor etter kompetanse—en vurdering. Oslo: Forskerforbundet. (Forskerforbundets skriftserie 5/97). Gornitzka, A˚.; Kyvik, S.; and Larsen, I. M. 1998. “The Bureaucratisation of Universities.” Minerva 36, pp. 21–47. Kyvik, S. (ed.) 1999. Evaluering av høgskolereformen. Sluttrapport. Oslo: Norges forskningsra˚d. Kyvik, S., and Enoksen, J. A. 1992. Universitetspersonalets tidsbruk. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Studies in Research and Higher Education (Rapport 10/ 92). Kyvik, S., and Skodvin, O. J. 1998. FoU ved statlige høgskoler. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Studies in Research and Higher Education (Rapport 10/98).

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Kyvik, S., and Tvede, O. 1998. “The Doctorate in the Nordic Countries.” Comparative Education 34(1), pp. 9–25. Larsen, I. M., and Gornitzka, A˚. 1995. “New Management Systems in Norwegian Universities: The Interface between Reform and Institutional Understanding.” European Journal of Education 30, pp. 347–361. Lie, S., and Teigen, M. 1994. “Higher Education in Norway: A Nirvana of Equality for Women?” In Word Yearbook of Education 1994. London: Kogan Page. Økonomisk Rapport. 1985. Toppene i samfunnet sta˚r i statskalenderen 17, pp. 46– 51. Pedersen, K. R. 1997. Rekruttering av kvinnelige forskere: Endringer og karriereveier de siste 20 a˚r. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Studies in Research and Higher Education (Skriftserie 21/97). Smeby, J. C., and Kristensen, K. A. 1997. Student-og stipendiatvekstens betydning for forskningsomfanget ved universitetene. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Studies in Research and Higher Education (Skriftserie 32/97). Tvede, O., and Sarpebakken, B. 1998. Rekruttering til norsk forskning: Status og behovsanslag mot a˚r 2015. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Studies in Research and Higher Education (Rapport 13/98). Tvede, O.; Skodvin, O. J.; and Sarpebakken, B. 1997. Stipendiater og doktorgradsgjennomføring i en overgangstid. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Studies in Research and Higher Education (Rapport 15/97).

Chapter 12

The Academic Profession in a Massifying System: The Portuguese Case Virgı´lio A. Meira Soares

THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION Basic Information The Portuguese higher education system comprises both universities and polytechnic institutes. In 1996, the number of staff in public higher education was 15,900, and the number of students in both public and private sectors was about 334,000. The public higher education sector consists of 16 universities, and 1 nonintegrated university institute, 15 public polytechnic institutes, and 1 nonintegrated polytechnic school. Thirty-nine public higher education institutions depend both on the Ministry of Education and on another Ministry (e.g., Health Schools, Military Schools and Police Academy). The private higher education sector is made up of 14 recognized university institutions and 98 nonintegrated polytechnic schools.1 After the 1974 revolution, the number of candidates for higher education increased sharply, and the “traditional” public institutions were unable to accept them all. Social tensions were felt by the governments. A numerus clausus was introduced. Meanwhile, the private sector prepared itself to take its share in the new “market.” The results were both positive and disastrous. A Framework Law on Portuguese Education was published,2 although it did not greatly change the organization of higher education. Universities were given more autonomy (at least in the law),3 and private institutions, which were formerly regulated by a tough legislation,4 were allowed to operate under very loose norms. Access to higher education became too easy, allowing students with

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very low-level performances to become candidates. The budgets of the public higher education institutions did not take into account the changes the system was undergoing. Later, a new legislation for private higher education institutions was approved5 but not always applied rigorously. It was only in the 1990s that the situation began to change. Access to higher education became more demanding. Polytechnic institutes, once regarded as second-class higher education institutions, began to be better considered by society. Public universities (through the Portuguese Rectors’ Conference) were able to convince the government that the financing system was inappropriate, and a new funding formula was applied to all public higher education institutions. In the meantime, private institutions went their own way, often illegally using professors of the public sector with the complacency of the State Authorities. The situation was finally “solved” by legislation that was supposed to bring some “moral” grounds to the whole issue.6 The approval of the funding formula was accompanied by a decision of the Portuguese Rectors’ Conference (composed of rectors of public universities and the rector of the Portuguese Catholic University) to begin a nationwide evaluation of the study programes. It was later to become the basis for the Portuguese Law on Evaluation of the Higher Education Institutions,7 which is applicable to all the sectors of higher education, but it has only been applied to public institutions so far. The state control model has a long tradition in Portugal. Although the Autonomy Law of (Public) Universities gave them a great deal of autonomy, the governments were reluctant to give up their powers, especially in matters related to the financial management and patrimony of the institutions. The transition to a state supervision model only took place recently.8 Public polytechnic institutions were also given more autonomy,9 although to a lesser extent than universities. Their pedagogical autonomy is partly controlled by the Ministry of Education. The private sector is ruled by specific legislation that mainly concerns academic, pedagogical, and scientific issues, leaving it free to manage human resources and financial issues. This was accompanied by a sharp rise in the number of students which can be seen in Table 12.1. It is interesting to note that the percentage of the 20- to 24-year-old age group has greatly increased since the academic year 1990–1991. Since the early 1990s, the private sector has developed. This is mainly due to the loosening of the access prerequisites and the increase in the number of private institutions. Study, Teaching, and Research Universities and university institutes are entitled to award four degrees: doctor (doutor), master of sciences/arts (mestre), master (licenciado), and

A Massifying System: The Portuguese Case

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Table 12.1 Number of Students and Percentage of Age Cohort Studying in Portuguese Higher Education, 1980–1981 through 1996–1997 (absolute numbers, in percent)

Source: Higher Education Department of the Ministry of Education (1998).

bachelor (bacharel). Polytechnic institutes and nonintegrated polytechnic schools can award masters and bachelors.10 The bachelor degree consists of two- to three-year courses, students being entitled to continue their studies for two to three additional years to obtain the degree of master. But this degree is more commonly obtained in four- to six-year programs and was until recently only awarded by universities and university institutes. Public universities and university institutes are free to create and organize their study programs. This is not the case with the polytechnics or the private institutions: The minister of education must approve the creation of the programs. In most cases, they are organized in semesters, the typical student workload (contact hours) being between 25 and 30 hours a week. The M.Sc./M.A. degree is obtained after two years. There are formal courses, and students must submit a final thesis that is publicly discussed before an academic court.11 Public universities and university institutes are free to define the fields in which they award the degree and to determine the organization and the contents of the courses. Private universities must have the fields and programs approved by the minister of education. The highest academic degree is doctor. No formal courses are offered, although candidates may be obliged to attend specific courses that are defined by the scientific board of the institution. They will normally have a supervisor. He or she is responsible for the orientation of their research work, which should lead to the writing of a doctoral thesis that is presented and discussed during a public examination. Universities also award the title of agregado.12 This is not an academic degree but an academic title. Anyone who holds the degree of doctor can apply to obtain it. The approval of a candidate is based on his or her

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scientific and pedagogical merits. Only those who hold this title can be candidates to the highest rank of the university career. STAFFING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: MAIN ACTORS AND PROCEDURES The Relevant Actors Parliament and the government represent the state in all matters regarding higher education policies. Parliament usually approves framework laws either by taking the initiative or by approving proposals or by changing the decree laws of the government. Very seldom does it take decisions concerning the daily management of the system. Thus, the government has the main role regarding higher education issues. It approves or proposes to Parliament legislation regarding budget, financial, and human resources management, careers and employment conditions, pedagogical matters, and any others that are not assigned to the institutions. It also oversees the functioning of the public institutions, mainly as far as management is concerned, gives them authorization for large investments, fixes the number of places of academic and nonacademic staff, and determines the number of students to be admitted to higher education institutions every year. One could say that the state supervision model is not completely understood by the Central Administration, since the institutions still feel a lot of interference. In that sense, the recent legislation, which gives public universities greater flexibility to manage their budget, private income, human resources, and property, was a welcome step. According to the law,13 the Rectors’ Conference (CRUP) and Polytechnics Presidents’ Council (CCISP) are legal partners in all discussions concerning higher education policies. Their role can go beyond what is prescribed in the law, and CRUP has been proactive in proposing specific legislation (e.g., funding formula, legislation regarding flexibility in the management of the universities, the evaluation law for study programs). The Portuguese Association of Private Higher Education (APESP) represents private institutions and is considered as a partner of the Ministry of Education in matters of interest to its associates or in matters related to higher education policies involving these institutions. Another partner is the Rectors’ Conference of the Private Universities (CRUPP), which was created recently. Despite what was said above, public higher education institutions have a great deal of autonomy in their management (both financial and of human resources). Providing they follow the general rules and annual quotas defined by the government, they are free to recruit academic and nonacademic staff, promote them, use the available funds according to their needs and to the national law, and carry over the funds that were not spent during


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a particular year. They can also contract with other partners, and universities can create or hold shares in private companies, have more flexibility in their management, and own the buildings and premises they use. In scientific and pedagogical aspects, they are free to organize themselves without any external interference. Research funding is not freely divided inside the institutions, which is a great constraint to their autonomy. However, it is their decision to accept the existing research groups. Moreover, higher education institutions are free to define their internal structure and their governance bodies under the broad limits of the law. The same principles apply to private higher education institutions but with the necessary adaptations. Trade unions are the government’s key partners in discussing teachers’ careers, employment conditions, and any other matters that may be of interest to their working conditions. According to the law,14 they must be consulted about any new legislation concerning these matters. There are seven unions or federations of unions representing the academic staff.15 Membership is free, but many academic staff members are not registered with any union. As a result, the labor movement is weak, and about five years ago, some of these unions decided to act together in collective bargaining without losing their identity. Each union keeps in contact with the heads of the institutions to deal with specific matters of the staff of institutions that do not involve the competence of the government. In Portugal, as in many other countries, medical doctors, dentists, lawyers, architects, veterinary doctors, and engineers with a degree do not have the right to exercise their profession. The certification to exercise was delegated by the state to a professional association, known as an Ordem. Thus, an Ordem can say to a higher education institution that a program does not entitle the students to exercise the profession they intend to follow. Procedures and Regulations Academic staff in public higher education institutions are civil servants. Therefore, all matters regarding careers and working conditions are primarily discussed between the government and the unions. According to the law, the government cannot publish legislation regarding any aspect of the academic career, including increases in salaries, without previous negotiations with the unions. In particular, collective bargaining involves discussions between the government and the unions. Yet when the main issue is not strictly related to salaries, any agreement or decision must be submitted to the representatives of the institutions—CRUP and CCISP. Consultation of the individual institutions is not predicted by the law and depends on the judgment of the rectors of the universities and the presidents of the polytechnic institutes. But many heads of these institutions decide to consult their staff when major issues, such as careers, are being negotiated.

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Unions, naturally, are interested in the interests and needs of their associates (or prospective associates). Hence, they seek a permanent dialogue with CRUP and CCISP. There has been a permanent contact between representatives of CRUP in the recent past, mainly to exchange ideas and to discuss some particular problems concerning working conditions and legal aspects of the academic profession that are common to all institutions. Some contacts are also established between the unions and the institutions at different levels (faculties, departments) when there are particular problems. Usually, they are related to violations of the laws regarding the rights of the staff. Such problems are usually solved by the institutions. Collective bargaining is not common in private higher education institutions. Some exceptions exist, but it is only now that the unions are trying to create contacts to change this. ACADEMIC STAFF IN HIGHER EDUCATION: BASIC INFORMATION Legal and Social Status Teachers who work in public higher education institutions are civil servants. Yet special laws that give them specific rights and duties regulate their careers. Their salaries are higher than the average salary of almost all other civil servants. Their status is considered as special, and they are regarded inside the institutions as having more power than others. Since they deal with the production and transmission of knowledge and teach the future leaders of the country, they are considered intellectually above the average citizen and therefore as part of the higher ranks of society. In social terms, the same is true about teachers in private higher education institutions. But their legal status is different. Their contracts follow the national work laws for the private sector. Occupational Grading Structure of Academic Staff There are two different careers in public higher education institutions: one for university teachers and another for polytechnic teachers. There is no intercommunication between the two. In both cases, two situations can be found: teachers whose main occupation lies in their professorial activities and those whose main activity lies (or is supposed to lie) somewhere else. The laws make a difference between the two sets of teachers. Those who belong to the former have their place in the grading structure of academic staff, whereas those who belong to the latter are considered as temporary teachers whose contract can come to an end when the institutions do not need them anymore. However, while they are serving the institutions, their rights and duties are the same as


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those who follow the academic career in terms of teaching duties. We will only refer to the academic career rank of the first set of teachers. As for the second, we will refer to those teachers as “specially contracted personnel,” following the terms used in the laws. In universities, there are the following positions:16 1. Junior Assistant (Assistente Estagia´rio) 2. Assistant (Assistente) 3. Assistant Professor (Professor Auxiliar) 4. Associate Professor (Professor Associado) 5. Full Professor (Professor Catedra´tico)

Teaching activities can also be assigned to “specially contracted personnel.” These should be persons who, due to their special skills, may be invited (convidado) to perform those tasks. They are called “invited” teachers, and their positions are Assistente Convidado, Professor Auxiliar Convidado, Professor Associado Convidado, or Professor Catedra´tico Convidado. Their functions and salaries are the same as those of a teacher in the equivalent position in the career. Foreign professors may also be appointed to teach in Portuguese universities on a temporary basis. They are called Visiting Professors (Professores Visitantes). To teach foreign languages the universities can also recruit Leitor(es), who are also included in the “specially contracted personnel.” Other experienced professionals with the adequate higher education degree and students registered in the last two years of a course may be invited to assist in the teaching activities (never formal lectures), but they cannot teach alone. They are called Monitor(es). In the polytechnic institutes, there are the following positions: 1. Assistant (Assistente) 2. Assistant Professor (Professor-adjunto) 3. Professor (Professor-coordenador)

Teaching activities can also be assigned to specially contracted personnel. These should be persons who, due to their special skills, may have a contract. According to the contract, they are called Equiparado a Assistente, Equiparado a Professor-adjunto, and Equiparado a Professor-coordenador. Their functions are the same as those of a teacher in the equivalent position in the career. If the institution feels the need, those who hold an adequate higher education degree may be recruited to supervise and take responsibility for laboratory activities and other work such as fieldwork. They are called Encarregados de trabalhos.

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Table 12.2 Degrees of Academic Staff in Portuguese Public Higher Education, by Type of Institution (absolute numbers, in percent)


There are no career regulations in the private sector, although the government must publish legislation regarding this. Thus, it is impossible to give details about academic careers. Education and Qualifications of Academic Staff Academic staff in public higher education institutions must have specific qualifications (See Table 12.2). However, sometimes a degree is not enough. The Public University Sector To become an Assistente Estagia´rio one must hold a master’s degree or its legal equivalent. To become an Assistente one must hold the M.Sc./M.A. degree or its legal equivalent, except if candidates are already Assistente Estagia´rio. In this case, the M.Sc./M.A. degree can be replaced by a public examination that evaluates the scientific and pedagogical qualities of the candidate. Those who wish to become Professor Auxiliar must possess the degree of doctor, irrespective of their past academic professional experience. However, academic professional experience is a fundamental requirement to reach the higher ranks of the career. To become a Professor Associado or a Professor Catedra´tico, academic experience is required. The degree of doctor is required for the former and the title of Agregado for the latter. “Specially contracted personnel” follow other rules. Since they mainly come from the private sector (e.g., industry), they must have professional experience. If they are invited as Assistentes Convidados they must hold a master’s degree or its legal equivalent. But if they are invited as Professores


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(Auxiliares, Associados, or Catedra´ticos) Convidados, their professional experience and scientific background are enough, and they do not need to hold a degree. The Public Polytechnic Sector To become an Assistente one must hold an “adequate” degree (master or bachelor). A candidate who wishes to be a Professor-adjunto must hold the M.Sc./M.A. degree or a Diploma de Estudos Graduados17 or, because of the professional character of this sector, have a technical or professional curriculum that is relevant for the institution and an adequate degree (master or bachelor). To become Professor-coordenador one must hold the degree of doctor or have academic professional experience as Professor-adjunto or Equiparado a Professor-adjunto or Equiparado a Professor-coordenador and hold an adequate academic degree. Specially contracted personnel follow different rules. Someone with special scientific, pedagogical, professional, or technical skills can be invited to be Equiparado a Assistente, Equiparado a Professor-adjunto, or Equiparado a Professor-coordenador. The degree he or she holds is only legally necessary if he or she wishes to be a candidate to any position in the career. The differences between the two sectors are clearer when one looks at the laws that regulate the careers than when one reads the framework laws on education. The education and qualifications of academic staff are very different. Whereas in the university sector degrees and the title of Agregado are considered of utmost importance for promotion (not neglecting professional experience), in the polytechnic sector more emphasis is laid on professional experience (not neglecting the importance of the degrees). Distribution of Academic Staff In universities, Professor Associado and Professor Catedra´tico are the only permanent positions. Each institution distributes the positions according to its internal pedagogical and academic organization. A certain number of permanent positions are available for each discipline, or group of disciplines and they are defined by the institution. The total number is defined according to student/staff ratios and is fixed by the minister of education. The positions of Professor Auxiliar, Assistente, and Assistente Estagia´rio are not permanent, and the number of places in each of the positions changes according to the needs and legal prescriptions. One must remember that an Assistente can be promoted to Professor Auxiliar once he or she obtains the degree of doctor, and an Assistente Estagia´rio can be promoted to Assistente if he or she fulfills the prescribed conditions. Teachers who occupy one of the positions mentioned above must work on a full-time basis (35 hours a week). But under certain conditions, they

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Table 12.3 Contractual Regime of Portuguese Academic Staff, by Type of Institution (absolute numbers, in percent)


can work in another institution once they have obtained the rector’s permission. However, teachers may also decide to work exclusively in the university. In that case, besides the salary, they may only be paid for certain external activities such as giving conferences, writing books, participating in work groups appointed by the minister of education if they have the consent of the institution or take part in work that results from a contract between the university and another entity. Salaries are different in both cases: Someone who does not work exclusively for the institution earns two-thirds of the full salary. Invited (convidados) teachers may have part-time or full-time contracts, the percentage being fixed according to the working hours (usually teaching hours determine the percentage). They may also decide to work exclusively for the university, but their contract always has a time limit defined by the law. The number of Professores Convidados can never represent more than one-third of the total number of permanent positions. Professores Visitantes are full-time employees and can also work exclusively for the university. Despite general complaints about the salary level and the research and teaching conditions, the number of teachers who work exclusively in the universities is high, as can be seen in Table 12.3. What was said about university teachers may be applied, with the necessary adaptations, to the teachers of the polytechnic institutes. The positions of Professor-coordenador and Professor-adjunto are the only permanent positions. The distribution is made among disciplines or groups of disciplines according to the proposals of the institutions, which are made according to their internal pedagogical and academic organization. The ministers of education, finance and public administration approve


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the total number, and the minister of education approves the final distribution. The position of Assistente is not permanent, and the number of positions is defined according to needs and the legal prescriptions. Any teacher occupying a position must work on a full-time basis. Specially contracted personnel and Encarregados de trabalhos are also supposed to work on a full-time basis. However, they may also have a part-time contract (20–80 percent) if they also have jobs outside the institution that are incompatible with a full-time position. Exclusive dedication to the institution is also possible for Assistentes, Professores-adjuntos, and Professores-coordenadores if they participate in research projects or in research, technical, or educational development projects. In addition to their salary, they can only be paid for certain external activities such as conferences, short courses, and writing books. Their salaries are higher than those of teachers who work only on a full-time basis. Someone who does not work exclusively for the institution earns two-thirds of the full salary. The regional and vocational nature of the polytechnic institutes enables them to recruit locally the teachers they need, at least as “specially contracted personnel,” since there is no limit to their number. Yet the number of teachers who work exclusively for the institutions in the polytechnic career is higher than might be expected, given the professional and vocational nature of these institutes. In Table 12.3, we show the distribution according to the contractual regime in 1996. There are no available data on the gender distribution of teachers in the 1970s. It can only be guessed that the number of women teachers in higher education institutions was very low. The same happened with students to a lesser extent. The situation has improved, but as far as higher education careers are concerned, the distribution is still far from the national average gender distribution of the population (approximately 48 percent are male). Both in the university career and in the polytechnic career the percentage of women was 36 percent in 1996. But registered female students represented 56 percent the same year, which is higher than the national value for the population. But what is more noticeable is that in the same year the percentage of women graduates was 65 percent of the total number of graduates. There are no programs to increase women’s participation in higher education careers As was already said, it is very difficult to reach the top positions in the university career. There are many requirements regarding qualifications. But massification led to a sharp increase in staff numbers. Despite all the difficulties, the percentage of teachers in higher ranks has increased during the last decade. In Table 12.4 we show the evolution of the total number of staff in the different ranks for all universities.18 It is interesting to note that the percentage of Assistentes Estagia´rios

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Table 12.4 Academic Staff in Portuguese Public Universities and Polytechnics, 1987–1997 (absolute numbers, in percent)


greatly decreased, whereas the corresponding figures for the higher ranks increased, especially at the level of Professor Auxiliar, showing a clear improvement of the level of the university staff. The lower ranks (Assistente Estagia´rio and Assistente) seem to be disappearing. The polytechnic sector was re-created in 1979,19 and some postsecondary schools that were already professionally and vocationally oriented were integrated into the new system. Hence, the teachers of those schools were also integrated into the new system. But the positions they occupied were not to be filled once they left or retired. New schools would follow the new


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legislation when they needed to contract new teachers. Thus the evolution of the number of staff in Table 12.4 must be regarded with care because under the item “others” are included the teachers of the existing schools in 1979. It is clear from the figures that as the number of Assistentes increases, the number of “others” decreases. This corresponds to a “stabilization” of the sector that can also be confirmed by the increase in the number of professors, in particular, Professores-adjuntos. EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF ACADEMIC STAFF Tenure When we talk about tenure it must be clear that a general discussion is only applicable to public higher education institutions since the private ones do not have a clearly defined career and may use the general law according to their interests. Teachers in Portuguese higher education institutions have a long and difficult career path before they reach the highest ranks. But someone with a degree of doctor can be appointed as a university professor for life after five years of full-time practice as professor by the competent scientific board of the institution.20 Someone who is Professor-adjunto in a polytechnic institute can be appointed for life after three years of full-time practice in that rank by the competent scientific board of the institution.21 In both cases, the decision must take into account the scientific and pedagogic performance of the candidate. But if the teacher is promoted or moves to another institution of the same sector, he or she cannot be denied this right. This means that once someone has tenure, he or she never loses it except on his or her request or as a result of disciplinary action. Thus, the issue of tenure is only discussed when institutions are faced with poor performances of teachers or in the case of mobility in higher education. A poor or bad performance never leads to the dismissal of a tenured teacher. Mobility is not favored when no incentives are given to seek a place in another institution. This may lead to inbreeding. Having tenure is like having a life insurance policy. Some attempts to change the laws and the mentalities were never accepted by the unions, and the governments seem to hesitate in taking such difficult decisions. Pay Scales and Legal Status of Academic Staff Owing to the limited number of permanent positions, the promotions of Professores Auxiliares and Professores Associados are becoming more and more difficult to obtain. But many seek to obtain the title of Agregado.

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We have already seen that the title of Agregado is a prerequisite for the position of Professor Catedra´tico. Those who hold the title of Agregado have higher salaries. Therefore, the ranks in the pay scale do not correspond directly to the ranks of the career, as we can see in Table 12.5.22 In each rank of the pay scale there are different indexes that correspond to a raise in salary after three years in that rank. For the Assistente Estagia´rio it is two years. The salaries are fixed on the basis of the index 100. Once this index is fixed, all the salaries are known automatically. The figure for index 100 was fixed as from October 1st, 1998, and represents 247,692 Portuguese Escudox. Although teachers in higher education institutions are civil servants, the contracts differ between holders of permanent positions and the others. Holders of permanent positions are appointed through a public competition, whereas the others have temporary contracts with the institutions. Teachers who occupy permanent positions have a job for life, even when tenure is denied. If this is the case, they are transferred to another position in the Public Administration. Paradoxically, a Professor Auxiliar has a contract (he or she is not appointed) but is treated as though he or she occupies a permanent position. Social Security and Benefits Irrespective of the nature of the employment, all workers in the country must pay not only the normal taxes but also a percentage of their salary for social security. For civil servants this represents as much as 1 percent for health benefits and 10 percent for the retirement fund. Health benefits give them the right to be reimbursed for any medical service (either private or public) up to a fixed amount and to use the National Health Service under the same conditions as any other worker. The amount that is not reimbursed is taken into account in the calculation of the taxes that they must pay every year. Teachers usually retire when they are 60 and have paid 36 years to the retirement fund, but they can work until the age of 70. The salary after retirement (pensaõ de aposentaçaõ) corresponds to the salary earned during the last year in active life. These rules do not apply to part-time teachers. Their social benefits are those of their main jobs. Working Hours and Tasks The University Sector The teaching workload is 6 to 9 hours a week (25 to 30 weeks a year). Professores Catedra´ticos coordinate graduate and postgraduate courses or


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Table 12.5 Academic Salaries in Portuguese Public Higher Education, by Type of Institution (gross income per month in euro, range)

Sources: Decree-Laws 408/89 and 277/98.

seminars and lecture the theoretical part of those courses or seminars. They must orient but not teach in the practical part of the courses (e.g., laboratory or fieldwork). They must also coordinate the other teachers of the courses of their fields and lead and carry out research. Professores Associados have almost the same tasks as Professores Catedra´ticos. But under certain circumstances they may teach the practical part of graduate and postgraduates courses and collaborate in the research policy defined by the Professores Catedra´ticos of the department. They only have the responsibility of coordinating a course when there are no Professores Catedra´ticos in the department. A Professor Auxiliar has virtually the same tasks as a Professor Associado as far as teaching is concerned but must teach the practical part of graduate and postgraduate courses. Assistentes teach the practical part of graduate and postgraduate courses and, if necessary, the theoretical parts of graduate courses. Assistentes Estagia´rios teach the practical part of graduate courses. The functions of “specially contracted personnel” are the same as those that correspond to the rank in which they were contracted. Leitores teach modern languages, but, if they agree, they can teach in other graduate courses. All teachers are supposed to be involved in research work. Those in the senior ranks are responsible for the supervision of those in the junior ranks.

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The Polytechnic Sector The teaching workload is 6 to 12 hours a week (25 to 30 weeks a year). A Professor-coordenador coordinates and teaches courses, orients traineeships and seminars, and supervises the pedagogic and technical activities of the other staff. He or she is also responsible for scientific research and technical development activities in his or her field. Professores-adjuntos have virtually the same tasks as Professorescoordenadores but must act according to their directives. Assistentes work under the supervision of a professor and must teach the practical part of the courses. But if they fulfill the requirements for a position of Professoradjunto, they can be assigned the functions that correspond to that rank if the competent scientific board of the institution so decides. In both careers, there are no formal prescriptions as to the time to devote to the different activities (except teaching). But the teachers of both sectors must use part of their time to support the students, to do research and to perform administrative tasks. Usually R&D (research and development) activities take up most of that time, and administrative tasks are mainly attributed to professors who are also responsible for the supervision of Assistentes and Assistentes Estagia´rios. In both sectors, every teaching hour is equivalent to 1.5 hours after 8:00 P.M.

Staff Appraisal and Staff Development Procedures Except for promotion procedures, staff appraisal is not common practice in higher education institutions. The law prescribes that professors with tenure must present to the institution a report of their activity every five years. The report must be published, but there are no direct consequences. The laws and regulations do not reward good teachers, nor do they penalize the bad ones. The requirements for promotion cannot be considered as part of an appraisal. Moreover, despite what is prescribed in the law, promotions mainly take into account the academic activity of the candidate, not the pedagogical activities. Staff development procedures are the responsibility of the institution, and there are provisions in the law to develop certain programs. In universities, an Assistente Estagia´rio or Assistente must have a working plan to develop under the supervision of a professor. The approval of this plan by the competent scientific board means that the institution provides the necessary means for its success. In addition, an Assistente can be released from all his or her duties for a maximum period of three years to prepare the doctoral thesis. If release time is denied during the time of the contract, the Assistente’s contract will be extended for one year with the possibility of renewal for two years to complete his or her doctoral work.23


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In polytechnic institutes, Assistentes must have a supervisor appointed by the competent scientific board until the end of the first contract (three years). They can also be released from their teaching duties for a maximum period of two years to obtain the academic degrees needed for promotion. In both sectors, professors have a right to sabbatical leave (six months every three years or one year every six years in universities, and six months every three years in polytechnic institutes). Situation and Career Prospects of Junior Staff in Higher Education The data on the number of staff in public universities since 1987 show that the percentage of Assistentes Estagia´rios (considered here as junior academic staff) decreased continuously until the end of 1996, from 19.9 percent to 8.5 percent. In absolute terms, their number was lower in 1996 than in 1987. During the same period, the percentage of Assistentes remained stable, whereas the number of Professores Auxiliares increased by a factor of around 3, and its percentage increased by a factor of around 2.5. These observations do not leave much hope for young staff regarding their career prospects in universities. Although the number of students in public higher education institutions is likely to increase, there are limits to the number of staff to be admitted because of the fixed staff/student ratios. Effects that can be expected from retirements will only be felt gradually. Polytechnic institutes will have a tendency to increase their capacity (in 1996–1997, the number of students in this sector was approximately 28 percent of the total number of students in the public sector). One must also recall that as of 1998 polytechnic institutes were allowed to award the degree of master. They are therefore competing with the other sectors, but mainly with the private sector. This may open possibilities for young people’s future career prospects. Other career prospects may only be opened if in the near future the careers of private institutions are regulated in such a way that they are obliged to have their own academic staff with the same requirements as the public ones. We hardly mentioned the the situation of women in academic careers. This is no longer an issue. Although the top positions are still occupied by men, there are more women reaching top positions without introducing special measures in the recruitment and promotions procedures. In fact, there are departments, schools, or faculties where the number of women in all ranks is already higher than that of men.

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Table 12.6 Academic Staff, Students, and Student/Staff Ratios in Portuguese Public Universities, 1990–1991 through 1996–1997 (absolute numbers)

1

Full-time equivalent. Source: Higher Education Department of the Ministry of Education (1998).

CONCLUSION Quantitative Developments in the Higher Education System The increase in the number of students both in public and in private higher education institutions in the last two decades leaves no doubt that the number of staff should also have increased—and indeed it did. The question that may be asked is: To what extent is there a relation between these two facts? Polytechnic institutes did not exist two decades ago and were not in a stable situation in 1988. Some were beginning to enroll students, and others did not have students in all the courses. New polytechnic schools were created in the meantime. The available data on private institutions are scarce. Hence, it is impossible to make a quantitative analysis. It is therefore advisable to turn to the evolution of the number of students and staff in the public universities. In table 12.6, we show the evolution of the student/staff ratio between 1990– 1991 and 1996–1997. The funding formula is based on the number of students and on ratios defined as a function of the fields of the different courses. Thus, it is possible to calculate the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) teachers that a university “should” have. As some universities had a greater number of FTE teachers, they were obliged to adapt in subsequent years. This may explain the recent continuous increase of the ratio. Polytechnic institutes had very low student/staff ratios 10 years ago (approximately 6.5:1), and it is only since 1993 that these have begun to be more “reasonable” (approximately 13:1). In the academic year 1995–1996, there were 15,903 teachers and 198,775 students in the public higher education institutions, the student/ staff ratio being 12.5. This is the result of the recent developments described above. But it also corresponds to a different view of public higher education. Until 1993, the annual budgets of the institutions were calculated on the basis of the budget of the previous year. This has changed, as we have


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seen. Yet these trends do not mean that a particular institution cannot benefit from special treatment. When an institution has budgetary problems as a result of its structure it can contract additional funding with the Ministry of Education. But institutions must propose a restructuration plan and negotiate it with the government. Finally, we think it is now clear why career prospects are limited: The number of staff is fixed according to a formula that is transparent, but it does not favor new contracts unless there is an increase in the number of students. Reforms in the Academic Career Structure Until 1980, the academic career was mainly determined by the university career, which was regulated by legislation passed in 1970.24 This legislation was, at the time, very important for the universities: Academic degrees were the most important factor. But that legislation proved to be outdated after the 1974 revolution. Salaries were low, staff development was not stressed enough, and it was difficult to obtain tenure. The national situation was more demanding: Salaries should increase, tenure was at stake, and staff development was necessary in an institution that had to improve its performance. Before the revolution, many people were sent abroad to obtain a doctoral degree, and just after the revolution, many qualified people came from the former colonies. In place were conditions to improve the career situation and to bring the best teachers to higher education institutions, leading to the legislation that still rules the university career. The emergence of the polytechnic institutes created a new situation that was addressed by specific legislation. Many years have passed since those two important documents were published, and the situation has changed. The M.Sc./M.A. degree was created in 1980.25 Its creation led to an increase in the number of postgraduate students who now occupy positions in the universities and polytechnic institutes. The academic drift of polytechnic institutes and a certain professional drift of the universities led to discussions about the intercommunication between careers in the universities and the polytechnic institutes. The decreasing numbers of Assistentes Estagia´rios have prompted an examination of the existence of that rank in the staff career of the universities. Even the existence of the rank of Assistente is not ensured. The presence of young researchers who can teach and are paid by the European Union’s programs is a source of disagreement among the different actors. They build a new group of temporary researchers who might stand in competition with the regular junior staff holding assistantship positions. Mobility is discussed when questions about tenure arise. The impossibility of inviting an internationally recognized scientist to fill a permanent position without being submitted to a public competition is also a

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matter of discussion. In the meantime, salaries are increasing at a reasonable pace according to the cost of living conditions.26 New laws concerning the careers of higher education academic staff are being prepared and discussed with the different partners (trade unions, universities, polytechnic institutes). This is not a simple process because although trade unions have the main role in the discussion, the consequences will be mainly felt at the institutional level. Recruitment procedures and promotions are sometimes in conflict with the already established interests the unions defend. Thus, the negotiations must take into account both the legitimate demands of the teachers’ representatives and the scientific and pedagogic demands of the institutions. Joint meetings (including Ministry of Education, trade unions, and institutions) have already taken place to try and find possible agreements. But the risk of having laws that do not meet the demands of the parties is great. It is enough to recall that it is likely that the more conservative academic partners will never be in agreement with the more liberal ones. But the government has its own ideas and these do not satisfy both institutions and unions. It will be the political agenda to determine if and when those laws will be approved. Changes in Working Conditions Portugal joined the European Community in 1986. Since then, much money has been used to build new infrastructures and improve old ones (PRODEP program—Projecto de Desenvolvimento Educativo para Portugal) in the higher education institutions. Two programs devoted to development (first Cieˆncia and then Praxis) were approved, and infrastructures were also built. At the same time, these two programs financed higher education institutions to train young people. Scholarships were granted to many young people to obtain a postgraduate degree. There was a sharp increase in the number of “youngsters” who obtained the degrees of M.Sc./ M.A. and doctor. And the national budget for science has increased considerably in the last three years, introducing better working conditions. These developments have changed some of the traditional working conditions of the academic staff. The creation of new infrastructures forced some of them to create artificial research teams involving people from different universities. However, they later used them to train young people who obtained scholarships. Finally, the contribution of these students to the teaching courses was helpful but not very well accepted. They were not staff members—continuity was not assured! They had little chance of becoming staff members. Conditions for development exist and have proved to be efficient. How this will affect employment conditions is not easy to predict, and some uneasiness can be felt among the different actors. But it has indeed con-


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tributed to a more dynamic attitude in the higher education institutions and to producing more qualified people. NOTES 1. Higher Education Department, Ministry of Education. Given on October 8, 1998. 2. Law 46/86, published on October 14, 1986. 3. Law 108/88, published on September 24, 1988 4. Decree-law 100-B/85, published on April 8, 1985. 5. Decree-law 271/89, published on August 19, 1989; and Decree-law 16/94; published on January 22, 1994. 6. Decree-law 15/96, published on March 6, 1996. 7. Law 37/94, published on November 11, 1994. 8. Decree-law 252/97, published on September 26, 1997. 9. Law 54/90, published on September 5, 1990. 10. Law 115/97, published on September 19, 1997. 11. Decree-law 216/92, published on October 13, 1992. 12. Decree-law 301/72, published on August 14, 1972. 13. Decree-law 344/93, published on October 1, 1993. 14. Decree-law 45-A/84, published on February 3, 1984; and Law 23/98, published on May 26, 1998. 15. FENPROF, FNE, SNESUP, SINDEP, SINAPE, ASPPO, and SNPL. 16. From now on, we will refer to positions in Portuguese. 17. Although this diploma is mentioned in the legislation, it was never regulated and therefore we may say it does not exist! 18. No difference is made here between full-time and part-time teachers. 19. Decree-law 513-T/79, published on December 26, 1979; and Law 29/80, published on July 28, 1980. 20. Decree-law 448/79, published on November 13, 1979, and amended by Law 19/80, published on July 16, 1980. (This legislation is the main source of information about the career paths of university teachers. Some changes were introduced later, and we will refer to them when necessary.) 21. Decree-law 185/81, published on July 1, 1981. (This legislation is the main source of information about the career paths of polytechnic institute of teachers. Some changes were introduced later, and we will refer to them when necessary.) 22. Decree-law 408/89, published on November 18, 1989. 23. Decree-law 245/86, published on August 21, 1986. 24. Decree-law 132/70, published on March 30, 1970. 25. Decree-law 263/80, published on August 7, 1980. 26. Decree-Law 277/98, published on September 11, 1998.

Chapter 13

Adapting to Change: The Academic Profession in Spain Jose´-Gine´s Mora

INTRODUCTION This chapter presents and analyzes the situation of academic staff in Spain, which has changed considerably with the legal reforms that began 15 years ago and the remarkable growth of the higher education system in recent decades. It is likely to change again if current discussions on new reforms are implemented in the near future. Hence, the picture given here is only a snapshot of a very dynamic situation. We can summarize the results of our analysis by stating that the working conditions of tenured staff can be considered reasonable. Generally speaking, tenured academic staff, who are civil servants, feel comfortable in their positions. But the same is not true of nontenured academic staff. In the past, since nontenured positions were considered temporary, no conflicts arose. But as the system is becoming more saturated, their situation is becoming more problematic. How to solve their current situation is now the subject of an important debate.

THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION The Legal Framework The current structure of higher education in Spain was established in 1983 by the University Reform Act (Ley de Reforma Universitaria, [LRU]). The LRU developed article 27 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, which recognizes the autonomy of universities. It brought great changes to the legal framework of Spanish universities, which, until then, had been regu-

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lated by the central Ministry of Education (Garcıá-Garrido 1992; Mora 1997b; Sanchez-Ferrer 1997). The main changes were: (1) Universities became autonomous entities; (2) direct responsibility for universities was transferred from the central government to the 17 autonomous regions; (3) private universities could be established; and (4) power over the universities is shared by the central government, the regional governments, and the universities. The central government is responsible for general and legal issues concerning staff, basic legal rules for governing universities, general guidelines on the organization of academic programs, and financing of national research programs. Regional governments are responsible for financing public universities and planning higher education in their region. Universities take decisions on internal organization, programs, curricula and syllabi, policies for tenured staff (restricted by the general rules for civil servants) and nontenured staff, the organization of teaching and research, and internal budgeting. Decision making was transferred to collegiate bodies, which include a considerable number of nonacademic staff and students. Organizational Aspects Higher education in Spain consists almost exclusively of universities. There are 46 public universities and 16 private institutions. There is also a new vocational postsecondary education system outside the university system. Most students enroll in public universities, although the growing number of private universities accounts for roughly 5 percent of higher education students. There are three basic types of university programs: short-cycle programs, which are more vocationally oriented and last for three years; long-cycle programs, which last for four, five, or six years; and third-cycle programs (doctoral programs), which add two years of course work and require the preparation of a research-oriented thesis after a longcycle degree. Students who are interested in an academic career pursue doctoral programs. There is an increasing number of postgraduate courses of varying duration and with different objectives, but they are not considered “standard” programs (Mora and Vidal 2000). In Spain, universities carry out most of the research activities. But there is a national research institute (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientı´ficas [CSIC]) with different branches and centers, which are in some cases linked to universities. This chapter does not consider staff in the CSIC, although their structure and working conditions are very similar to those of university staff, the only exception being that they do not have teaching duties. Before the LRU, the central government financed universities. In the current financial model, regional governments grant funds to universities as a lump sum for current expenditure, which they freely allocate internally.

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However, universities do not have full control over the main items of the expenditure budget (staff salaries are fixed by the central government), and the income budget (appropriations and tuition fees) is fixed by the regional governments. Not only did the financial system change, but total funds for universities increased enormously after the LRU. The total higher education expenditure in Spain reached 1.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1996 (OECD 1998). This is still below the average for developed countries, but it is considerably higher than the same figure in Spain 10 years before: In 1985, it was only 0.54 percent of GDP (Mora and Garcıá-Aracil 1999). Higher Education Students There has been considerable growth in the number of higher education students in recent decades. Since the 1960s, growth has almost doubled each decade. But it has slowed down in recent years, and the trend has begun to change over the last year because of the reduction in the size of the cohorts reaching higher education age. In recent decades, the Spanish higher education system has become a mass system. The gross enrollment quota for 18- to 23-years-olds (the typical age group for higher education) was 41 percent in 1998 (Mora, GarcıáMontalvo, and Garcıá-Aracil, 2000). But access to higher education is reasonably fair. If we analyze students’ socioeconomic backgrounds, we find a fair representation of children from middle- and upper-class groups. Children from lower socioeconomic groups also have reasonable access, although they are still underrepresented (Mora, 1997a). The proportion of female students exceeds that of men. In 1970, their share was 26 percent, and by 1980, it had reached 44 percent. In 1986, it reached 50 percent and has continued to increase, currently representing 54 percent of the higher education population. Academic Staff before and after the LRU Before the LRU, tenured academic staff were members of national bodies. Members of the national body of Catedra´ticos, for instance, changed from one university to another, depending on the vacancies available. Vacancies in universities were filled on a competitive basis limited to members of the national body of Catedra´ticos. Seniority was the main reason for being selected. When nobody from the national body applied, an open competition was held. The new Catedra´tico was placed at the bottom of the national list of Catedra´ticos. From here, in most cases, started a long pilgrimage from a small university to another considered more important. The internal organization of universities was extremely hierarchical. Departments did not exist, and the basic unit was the chair occupied by a

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Catedra´tico who headed it for all teaching and research issues and was in charge of all those working in the chair. A second category of tenured staff (adjunct professors) developed a dependent function in the chairs. Although the legal status of nontenured staff was not very different from the current one, their direct dependence on the chair, instead of on the department, made their career position too closely linked to their personal relations with the chair. In the 1970s, when the number of students increased dramatically, the number of academic staff should have increased at a similar pace. However, this was not possible for two reasons: (1) financial resources did not increase sufficiently fast; and (2) availability of personnel with the basic qualifications for teaching in universities was scarce. During this period, a very large number of young people became university teachers, with very low salaries but with reasonable prospects for promotion. They founded a strong political union movement, the PNN (Profesores No Numerarios— Non-Tenured Teachers) at the end of the Franco dictatorship. Reasons for conflict were obvious: a growing system, very scarce financial resources, and the impetus of a massive group of young, dynamic academic staff. Hence, the first educational law passed by the democratic government concerned the university system, since it was considered the area that most needed reform. The LRU changed the situation of academic staff. The main changes were the following: (1) departments, where several professors work together and share teaching and research activities, replaced the former chairs; (2) professors became members of each university instead of members of national bodies and could only move to other institutions through competition in open trials; (3) rules for the selection of professors changed, giving a significant role to the university that has the vacancy; (4) a new structure of professorships and nontenured personnel was established. At the same time, a substantial increase in resources allowed for successive and massive calls for tenured positions in universities. Most of the PNN group found a stable position in the 1980s; and (5) reasonable increases in academic staff salaries, made an academic career more competitive from an economic point of view.

MAIN ACTORS AND PROCEDURES The working conditions of academic staff in Spanish universities depend on two main actors: The central government establishes the salaries, status, general duties, and rights of academic and nonacademic and tenured and nontenured staff, as well as the working conditions for tenured academics, who are civil servants. Universities determine the number and type of positions in each department and specific rules for the access of new entrants and for the promotion of staff (limited by general rules established by the


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central government). They also establish the working conditions of nonacademic staff and regulate those of nontenured academic staff. Although the regional governments do not play a formal role in the working conditions of academic staff, they play an extremely important part in defining staff policy in universities. Because they finance universities, the staff policy carried out by universities is strongly dependent on financial deals with regional governments that indirectly must cover the payroll. But regional governments, as is being currently discussed in several regions, could establish salary increases for the staff employed in universities under their patronage. These would have to be paid as bonuses and not as increases in basic salary, which, by law, must be homogeneous. Moreover, universities, with the agreement of the Social Council, can establish salary bonuses for academic staff, based on individual merit. In the few universities that make use of this possibility, bonuses are based on research performance. Unions have a marginal role in defining the working conditions of academic staff. Their main influence is at the central level, where public sector unions discuss the working conditions of the civil servants with the central government on the Negotiating Board of Civil Servants. Obviously, the specific case of academics is not a big issue in these negotiations, where the interests of 2 million civil servants are discussed. There is also a Negotiation Board of University Staff, which discusses the specific situation of university workers with the Ministry of Education. It does not discuss the salaries of civil servants. However, it does discuss the specific working conditions of academic staff and the salaries of non– civil servant staff. These criteria are valid for public universities. In the case of private universities, there are no specific regulations, with the exception of the general rules for labor relations. Yet legal norms compel private universities to employ a minimum of 30 percent of academic staff with a doctorate for first-cycle courses, and 70 percent in the case of second-cycle courses. Moreover, at least 60 percent of academics must be full-time. The objective is to protect quality standards in teaching and to guarantee that the academic staff have a reasonable level of academic training and commitment to the institution. ACADEMIC STAFF IN HIGHER EDUCATION: BASIC INFORMATION AND DATA Legal and Social Status of Academic Staff Tenured staff have the status of civil servants. Nontenured staff have an administrative contract with each university that establishes a special type of relationship between employees and the public administration. It is less

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restrictive for the employer (i.e., fewer rights for the worker) than the standard labor contract. Thus, the distinction between “civil servant staff” and “labor staff” is very relevant in Spanish universities, affecting not only the tenured position but also academic and social status, salaries, additional benefits, and so on. With the exception of a few professionals who have part-time positions in universities as teachers in specific fields, a nontenured staff position is considered as a temporary situation for those who are starting their academic career. Obviously, the objective of most nontenured academic staff is to obtain a tenured position.

Academic Staff Categories Tenured Staff There are three categories of tenured staff. They can have full- or parttime posts. But regulations discourage people from holding part-time positions. Hence, only a small proportion work part-time. The three categories of academic tenured staff are the following: C-Professor (Profesor Titular de Escuela Universitaria). A long-cycle degree is the only requirement for this position. Formally, C-Professors can only teach in first-cycle programs traditionally taught in escuelas universitarias. They have full autonomy for organizing their teaching duties, establishing the content of courses, and giving them. No previous experience is required, although most have previously held nontenured positions. This position is only available in departments with short-cycle programs. This is a common situation in engineering, business, and education departments but is rarer in other areas. B-Professor (Profesor Titular de Universidad and Catedra´tico de Escuela Universitaria). This is the most standard professorship for tenured academic staff. As a doctorate is required, this is the “natural way” to reach tenured positions for academics working in research-oriented fields. No previous working experience in academia is formally required, though it is rare to find B-Professors who have no previous experience in another university or a research institute. They have full autonomy for teaching or developing research programs, and they can reach any academic position except rector. A-Professor (Catedra´tico). This is the most prestigious from an academic and social point of view. A-Professors must have held a position as BProfessor for at least three years. Their rights and duties are similar to BProfessors, although only they are eligible to be rectors. Although C-Professors do not necessarily have a doctorate, many of them are preparing their doctoral thesis or developing research in order to be promoted to B-Professor status. This happens frequently when they fulfill this requirement. It is rather more difficult to be promoted from B-Professor


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to A-Professor. Promotion is basically a question of available positions at the top level. There is a thumb rule (that in some universities is even included in the internal norms) that the B-Professors/A-Professors ratio should be 3:1. There is no formal hierarchical structure in departments. Hence, all professors with civil servant status are free to develop their teaching duties. But only A- and B-Professors are also free to develop their research projects. In spite of this, there are often informal hierarchic relationships among the different ranks of professors. Nontenured Staff There are four types of positions of nontenured academic staff: positions for beginners on the academic ladder, positions for experts who wish to collaborate in teaching, positions for ad interim professors, and extraordinary positions for visiting or emeritus professors. They can be broken down as follows: Interns (Becarios). They are not members of the university staff because they have no labor status. From a legal point of view, they are graduate students with a grant. Central or regional governments provide these grants as part of their plans for developing research. This position is increasingly becoming the first step on the university ladder. Interns must have completed a long-cycle program, and most are enrolled in doctoral programs. They collaborate on research teams, prepare their thesis, and may help in laboratory work or in practical lectures. Interns stay in this position even when they become doctors in fields that are more saturated or have fewer opportunities for jobs outside the academic world (e.g., natural science or humanities). Assistant (Profesor Ayudante). This is a position (with several subcategories) for recent graduates of a long-cycle degree who are starting their academic career. They have some teaching responsibilities and give a few lectures or help in laboratories. This category was designed by the LRU to train future professors or researchers. Hence, this is a full-time position, and the main goal is to collaborate on research projects. But because they are “nonefficient teaching personnel” (considering their reduced teaching duties), universities consider assistants to be “too expensive” and are reluctant to develop this type of position. The number of assistants has decreased dramatically, and in some universities, they have completely disappeared. Associate (Profesor Asociado). This category was established by the LRU as a way of incorporating experts and specialists from the nonacademic world into university teaching. Obviously, the doctorate is not required. To hold a long-cycle degree is the only requirement. The post was basically designed to be a part-time position that was compatible with another job outside the university, although the possibility of a full-time post was also

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considered by the LRU. This category is legally limited to 20 percent of the academic staff. Associates only have teaching duties, giving lectures from three to nine hours a week, depending on the contract. Because they do not have any other extra duties, their salaries are relatively low. Regrettably, this has denaturalized the laudable goals of this type of staff. Several years ago, universities launched a policy of recruiting as associates young people with no expertise at all. This was a way of having “cheap labor” to cope with the increasing number of students. Since many “false associates” (i.e., not the experienced professionals that they are supposed to be) are interested in an academic career, they are doing research and working on their doctoral thesis. In fact, they are acting as assistants at a lower cost for the institutions and have greater teaching duties. The number of fulltime associates (a status that should be exceptional) has increased remarkably to over 40 percent of the total number of associates. Legally, they cannot have another job. It is impossible to know the exact proportion of “real associates” (not interested in an academic career) and “false associates” (people preparing or having finished their doctorate). But of the 29,000 associates, 8,143 hold full-time positions, and 7,908 have a doctorate. It is likely that those in full-time positions are “false associates.” There are also differences by field. In professional fields such as medicine, engineering, and law, the proportion of “real associates” is higher than in more academic fields, where most associates are “false associates.” Interim Professor. People that fulfill the legal requirements for the position of professors (A-, B-, and C-) but do not have tenure can provisionally occupy this position. Interim positions last from the moment the professorship is endowed until the vacancy is occupied by a tenured professor. The number of these positions is dropping as the system becomes more stable. Visiting Professor. This modality allows universities to bring academics from other Spanish or foreign universities on a temporary basis. They can be given a different status according to their academic background. These positions are more frequent in Language Departments. Emeritus Professor. These are former professors who wish to stay in touch with academic life, especially by heading research and seminars or by giving special courses. Their number is limited to 3 percent of the academic staff, and their salary is compatible with their retirement pension. Data on Academic Staff Table 13.1 presents data on academic staff in the Spanish higher education system in 1998. Data are broken down into the categories mentioned above. Associates, the most heterogeneous group, represent 37.2 percent of the academic staff. Although the LRU fixed a maximum of 20 percent for this category, there is an informal agreement between universities and gov-


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Table 13.1 Academic Staff in Spanish Higher Education (absolute numbers, in percent)

1 Estimations. Source: Consejo de Universidades (1999).

ernments to allow for a higher percentage. Associates are, without doubt, the most problematic group, and a solution is currently being discussed in governmental circles. Positions that require a doctorate (A-, B-, and emeritus professors) make up 41.4 percent of the total academic staff. In the rest of the positions, there are also people who hold this degree. As regards the doctorate, the situation of C-Professors is very dynamic because many are preparing their doctoral thesis or are expecting promotion after completing their doctorate. We have roughly estimated that about 30 percent of these have a doctorate. Some 7,908 associates and 1,860 assistants are doctors. More than 13,000 people are in positions where a doctorate is not required, most of them expecting promotion, or at least a more stable position. Thus, if both groups are added together, some 58 percent of the academic staff in Spanish universities have a doctorate. Table 13.2 shows the development of the number of academic staff in Spanish universities by field of study and gender in a decade of rapid growth. In just 10 years, it increased by 63 percent (90 percent in the social sciences). Obviously, this generated tensions in human resources management and in the quality of teaching. The trend has slowed down in recent years, and the main problem now is how to offer stable working conditions

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Table 13.2 Academic Staff in Spanish Higher Education in 1982 and 1992, by Field (absolute numbers, in percent, change in percent)

1982 percentages do not total 100 due to rounding. Source: Consejo de Universidades (1996).

to a massive group of young staff that, in the meantime, have considerably improved their academic qualifications. Despite the dramatic increase of academic staff in recent years, the student/teacher ratio has become worse, especially in the social sciences, natural sciences, and engineering, the fields with the most rapid growth in the number of students. The opposite is true for humanities and health sciences, where, although the number of students has not decreased, the number of academic staff has remained stable. This raises doubts about the rationality of the increase in academic staff, which, in many cases, is related to power structures within institutions rather than to real needs. Table 13.3 shows the proportion of women. They account for about onethird of the academic staff in universities, and their number has risen from 24 to 31 percent in one decade, an increase of 111 percent in the total number of women. They are greatly underrepresented in engineering, but it is precisely in this field where the increase (281 percent) has been most dramatic in the decade under study. There are no positive discrimination policies for women, probably because the increase in the number of women who have joined academia seems reasonable. Table 13.3 also shows the distribution of academic staff by age groups. These data come from a survey carried out in 1990. Obviously, since then the academic population has aged slightly. We can observe that academic staff, including tenured staff, are relatively young. This is a consequence of


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Table 13.3 Age Groups of Spanish Academic Staff, by Gender and Status, 1990 (in percent)

Source: Elaborated from INE (1991).

the rapid expansion of the 1980s. It creates a lack of opportunities for the younger groups and will still be an important issue for many years to come. It can be seen in the table that, on average, women academic staff are younger than males. EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF ACADEMIC STAFF Formal Regulations of Working Hours and Workload The central government regulates the working hours of academic staff. They comprise 220 working hours a year, that is, about 8 hours a week for A- and B-Professors. Although legal norms establish 330 teaching hours a year for C-Professors (with no formal research duties), most universities only require the same number of hours from them as from A-and BProfessors. There are several types of contracts for associates, from fulltime to only a few hours. In summary, associates have a minimum teaching load of 80 hours a year (i.e., about 3 hours a week), and they are not required to do research. But if they want to be promoted, they must carry out research. The teaching load for academic staff therefore ranges from 80 to 330 hours a year. The figures concerning teaching hours only include lectures given in the classroom. For other teaching activities, such as laboratory work, a multiplication index is applied to the number of hours. Because standard courses have between three and nine credits (i.e., between 30 and 90 hours of teaching a year), most teachers must give about three different courses to complete their teaching duties. But in fields with lower demand, or in universities with a higher number of academic staff, the teaching load is less. In some universities, there is an alleviation in the number of teaching

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hours that depends on individual research performance. It must be pointed out that all the academic staff in Spanish universities formally have a teaching load. Research positions with no teaching duties do not exist. Departments monitor the fulfillment of teaching duties, including tutorials. There are no complaints in general, although academics’ commitment to tutorials is more erratic, probably because of the lack of interest of the students. Although teaching duties are reasonably well fulfilled, the commitment of academic staff to improving teaching techniques or to introducing pedagogical innovations is not as great as would be desirable. A- and B-Professors must devote part of their working time to research. Assistants must help in research activities while they are preparing their thesis. The other categories (C-Professors and associates) do not formally have research duties. Whereas teaching activities are strictly controlled, research is more independent. In the case of the lower categories, research is the mechanism for promotion. In the case of A- and B-Professors, commitment to research may vary from great dedication to none at all. But surveys show a reasonable research productivity among tenured academic staff. Academic staff do not have other formal duties. However, those who are elected or appointed to a representative or executive position (cargo acade´mico) have additional tasks. There are a myriad of these positions in all levels of the university structure: from coordinator of a Teaching Unit (a group of similar courses) to rector. Most people in these positions benefit from an alleviation in teaching hours and a salary increase. A-, B-, and C-Professors may have a part-time position with fewer working hours, a light teaching load, and a lower salary. But we have not included them in Table 13.5 because it only affects about 5 percent of the professors. The proportion of part-time professors is only slightly higher in some professional fields such as law and medicine. In 1990, a national survey was carried out on how academics share their working hours (INE 1991). Table 13.4 presents the main results for tenured and nontenured staff. They show that academics spent almost half of their time (46.2 percent) on teaching activities, while the percentage is slightly higher in the case of nontenured staff. But both tenured and nontenured spent about 40 percent of their working time on research. Finally, academics devoted the rest of their time (13.5 percent) to management or other academic activities, although tenured staff are more overloaded with these types of activities (16.6 percent of their time). Academic Staff Earnings The central government establishes academic staff earnings. They are made up of five elements: basic salary, seniority bonuses, productivity bonuses, reward for university office (for those with an executive position),


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Table 13.4 Proportion of Working Hours Spent on Major Functions by Tenured and Nontenured Academic Staff, 1990 (mean percentage of respondents)

Source: INE (1991).

and participation in contracts (for those who have research or consulting contracts). Basic Salary Basic salary depends exclusively on rank. The basic salary is composed of several parts, some of which are common to the rest of the civil service. Civil servants in Spain are ranked in 30 levels. Educational requirements for each position are important criteria to establish these ranks. Hence, academics rank very high (from 26 to 29), at the same level as high state officials. To avoid paying higher salaries to the large number of academics (and to the rest of teachers), the basic salary for civil servants is composed of two parts. One is similar for those with the same rank. The second is lower for teachers than for the rest of similarly ranked civil servants. A claim of teachers has been the elimination of this difference. Seniority Bonuses Civil servants receive a bonus (trienios) for each three years of service, whether in different positions or departments. The increases are not con-

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siderable (430 euro per year) but do reach a significant amount for the older staff. (Note: The current exchange rate [January 2001] of 1 euro is 0.91 U.S.$.) Productivity Bonuses At the beginning of the 1990s, the central government established a system to reward productivity so as to encourage tenured academic staff’s commitment to teaching and research. Additionally, some regional governments are currently discussing the possibility of establishing additional incentives based on the same concept. There are two types of productivity incentives: Teaching Productivity. Professors’ teaching activity is assessed every five years. For each positive evaluation, professors receive a permanent increase in their salaries. Because all professors (with extremely rare exceptions) are positively assessed, this has become an additional way of rewarding seniority. The number of positive evaluations is limited to five. Hence, after 25 years of teaching, no additional increases are awarded. The value of each bonus depends on rank: 1,500 euro per year for A-Professors, 1,350 euro for B-Professors, and 1,200 euro for C-Professors. Research Productivity. Professors receive a permanent research productivity bonus after a positive evaluation of each six years of research activity. This is also limited to five positive evaluations. The economic value of these bonuses is the same as in the case of teaching activities. But because assessment criteria are more rigorous, they are considerably less frequent. Using data from a group of universities, we have estimated that, on average, A-Professors have less than two research bonuses, B-Professors less than one, and very few C-Professors have one bonus. Rewards for University Office Academics elected and/or appointed to managerial or academic positions in universities receive an extra amount of money, and their teaching duties are reduced. The monetary compensations are not high, but bearing in mind the large participation of academics in the management of universities, they affect a considerable number of academics, mostly A- and BProfessors. Participation in Contracts The LRU established that academic staff can negotiate with public or private institutions for special services such as giving special courses (with a limit of hours); consulting; and applied research contracts. The university signs these contracts, receives the funds, retains a part as overheads, pays for the costs, and pays the academics involved in the contracts as agreed. Departments must approve these contracts (refusal is exceptional) and receive a small overhead. These extra earnings mainly affect academics who


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Table 13.5 Academic Salaries in Spanish Higher Education, 1998 (annual gross income in euro)

1 Estimations (earnings from research contracts and university office are not included). Sources: Data provided by universities and State Official Bulletin.

are working in market-oriented fields, where the more dynamic can double their earnings. But there are no data to evaluate the average incidence on academics’ earnings. Table 13.5 presents a summary of academic staff earnings. We have not included earnings from rewards for university office and participation in contracts because they only affect part of the academic staff and are irregular. Figures are in gross salaries. It is important to point out that income taxes in Spain are lower that in other European Union (EU) countries. Obviously, it depends on personal and family situations, but a standard professor may have to pay around 25 percent income tax. In the last column, we present a rough estimation of the average salary of professors. We have based these calculations on data from only five universities, yet they are representative enough. Hence, this average is a reasonable approximation of the average earnings of Spanish professors, if earnings from other activities (contracts or university office) are not considered. In the second part of Table 13.5, earnings of nontenured staff are presented. Salaries for associates and emeritus professors vary, depending on the type of contract and teaching duties. There are also several categories of assistants, with small differences in salaries. The salaries of emeritus

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professors are not very high, but they are paid in addition to their retirement pension. As we can see, salary differences between tenured and nontenured staff are significant. The hypothesis that nontenured positions are provisional has traditionally justified these differences. Differences have been easily accepted, while the rapid growth in the number of students also allowed an increase in the number of available tenured positions. But in the current situation of stability, the status of nontenured staff and the growing number of “false associates” with few opportunities for promotion are becoming a serious problem.

Entry to an Academic Career In a period of rapid growth and changes in the university system, access to an academic career has changed and continues to change considerably. On the one hand, current access is extremely different from 10 years ago. On the other, there are enormous differences, depending on the field or the university. The procedures for entry and promotion depend far too much on time and place. Hence, the following paragraphs can only be considered as a general picture of the main traits and most common norms and practices for training and promotion in Spanish universities. Starting an Academic Career There are three standard ways to start an academic career: 1. Interns are recruited by professors as auxiliary staff for research projects (paid by the funds available during the duration of the project), or they can receive a public grant (for a limited period). They do not have teaching duties, and the amount of their grants (they are not salaries, strictu sensu) is relatively low (about 8,000 euro a year). This is becoming the most common way for individuals to start an academic career while they try to obtain better positions as an assistant or associate. 2. An assistant position is the most desirable path to start an academic career. Assistants have a small teaching load with practical lectures or laboratory work and a reasonable salary. Their main goal is to work on research projects and complete their doctoral thesis. After finishing their dissertation, normally after at least five years as assistants and one year in another university, they are eligible for a tenured position if there are vacancies. Yet in the present saturated context, many remain assistants several years after finishing their doctorate. It is becoming common to find assistants with excellent scholarly records, which only a few years ago would have ensured rapid promotion to a tenured position. 3. The position of associate was established to attract experienced professionals to teach in universities. But economic reasons have perverted the aims of this type of position, and associates are becoming a cheaper alternative to assistants, with the same objectives mentioned above, but with greater teaching duties.


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When a department has a vacancy for an assistant or associate, it is announced publicly and published in the national newspapers. Candidates present their resumes to the department. A commission, composed of academic staff, ranks the proposals according to the rules established by the university. The Council of the Department makes the proposal to the Governing Board of the University for the definitive appointment. As experience is important in the rules established by universities, being an intern or having been selected before for a temporary post is the standard way into an academic career. After being taken on in a department as an assistant or associate, there is no formal process for assessing performance or capacities. The Doctoral Thesis Obtaining a doctorate is the main objective of those who are starting an academic career. This degree makes one eligible for the highest ranks in academia. Doctoral students (many of them interns, assistants, and associates) must enroll for at least two years and pass a number of courses. At the end of the courses, they must present a dissertation (not the doctorate dissertation) that must be approved by a committee of three doctors. After obtaining the research sufficiency, they can start original research work under the direction of a doctor, which should lead to the presentation of a doctoral thesis. The duration of this period can vary tremendously depending on the commitment of the candidate and the director. The thesis is presented to a committee composed of five doctors who must be experts on the subject of the thesis. At least two must come from other universities. Although it is unusual to reject a thesis, this is not just a formal act. Theses are sometimes informally rejected in previous discussions, and candidates are asked to make improvements. The presentation of the thesis is followed by a public discussion, that is considered as the candidate’s first academic act that, in some ways, marks his academic life, including possibilities of promotion. Promotion of Nontenured Staff There are no formal rules. Interns are normally promoted to assistant or associate when positions are available. When there is a vacancy in a tenured position, it can be filled ad interim by a nontenured academic who fulfills the requirements for this position. Departments appoint the candidate who is best situated in the internal (and informal) ranking of the department. But to occupy the position permanently, candidates must pass a public trial. This provisional appointment is the way in which the department makes known its favorite candidate. Promotion to a Tenured Position The basic system for promotion to a tenured position is similar for the three categories of professors. When there is a vacancy, or the university

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decides to create a new position, this is announced. Normally, universities create new positions following departmental requests. In most cases, departments only make this request when they have a suitable internal candidate who has a reasonable chance of obtaining the position. It is an open call, and anyone who satisfies the academic requirements for each position can be a candidate. A committee composed of five members is appointed to select the best candidate. The university, following the recommendation of the department, appoints two members. The Council of Universities appoints the other three professors in a random process where only professors of other public universities are eligible. The committee holds a public session where candidates present their qualifications (with specificities for the three levels). After secret discussions, the committee recommends the appointment of one or none of the candidates. So far, trials for professorships (especially in the case of B- and CProfessors) have not been strongly disputed. Few candidates from other universities participated because the local candidate has better chances, with two out of five votes, if there are no internal disputes (the proverbial reluctance of Spaniards to move to other cities is a factor that should also be considered). The local candidate, and in many cases the only one, who had occupied ad interim positions was the winner. But this situation is changing, and strong disputes over these positions are becoming normal as the number of candidates for each post are increasing. In the case of C-Professors, candidates must present their merits, the contents of their courses, and their thoughts on how to give courses and organize their teaching duties to the committee (composed of A-, B-, and C-Professors). In addition, they must demonstrate their teaching abilities by giving a lecture in front of the committee. Formally, only teaching skills are considered. The system for selecting a B-Professor is similar to that for a C-Professor. The committee is composed of A- and B-Professors. Candidates must present their teaching abilities (as in the case of C-Professors) and their research merits. Although, research skills are considered, trials focus more on teaching. In order to be promoted to an A-Professor, candidates must have been B-Professors for at least three years. This means they are civil servants working in a university who have passed a public trial where they have show their teaching capacities. The trial process is similar to the former cases. Candidates present their merits and their research abilities to the committee composed of five A-Professors. The selection is mainly based on the candidates’ research merits. Trials to fill this type of position are becoming increasingly fierce, and there are often many candidates.


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Academic Staff Assessment In Spanish universities, academics’ individual activity is evaluated in several ways (Mora and Vidal 1998). Two are related to their teaching activities: 1. Every five years, tenured professors are evaluated by their universities. Because of the lack of reliable standards, all professors (with very rare exceptions) are assessed positively. This system has become a formality and an additional way of rewarding seniority, since professors receive a permanent increase in their salaries for each positive assessment. 2. In most universities, students carry out an annual survey on each teacher and each course. The overall results are published, but only the assessed teacher and the university have access to individual data. This survey has two positive effects: Universities detect problematic cases of teachers’ lack of pedagogical abilities and conflict between students and teachers; and it stimulates the fulfillment of basic teaching duties and affects how teachers handle them.

Universities have a department that helps academics in their teaching activities. Courses on teaching techniques are frequent in universities, but attendance is low. In a survey carried out in one university, most academics complained about the lack of institutional help to train them in teaching abilities. In another question in the same survey, academics considered that they did not need special training in pedagogical issues. This contradiction probably represents typical behavior of academics everywhere. Individual research activities are evaluated through a twofold system. On the one hand, proposals for research projects requesting public funds are evaluated ex ante and ex post, and only those that reach certain standards of quality are financed. The second type of evaluation only affects professors (nontenured academic staff are evaluated, formally and informally, during the promotion process). National committees composed of experts for each group of disciplines are responsible for the assessment of individual research activity. For each period of six years, professors can present their most relevant publications to the corresponding committee in the hope of obtaining a positive assessment. But this evaluation is relatively strict, and “research periods” are often evaluated negatively. Hence, positive assessment has become a symbol of prestige and a prerequisite for promotion to higher positions. Retirement Sixty-five is the standard age for retirement in Spain. But civil servants may stay on the job until they are 70 if they so wish. In addition, professors may have a position as emeritus for a further 4 years. An important fact is that the reduction in earnings for civil servants when

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they retire is greater than for others. Pensions are made up of the part of the basic salary that is common to the rest of the civil servants and bonuses for seniority. The remaining rewards are not considered. This means a drastic reduction in earnings. Foreseeable Changes The growing number of young people in nontenured positions, many of whom have excellent qualifications in national and foreign universities, is becoming a potential source of conflict and tension in universities. But the mechanism for selecting professors, which is greatly influenced by the university itself, has favored local candidates. Blunt public discussions on university endogamy (a pejorative term often used as an equivalent to corruption) have even reached editorials in national newspapers. But although this problem is not the central problem of Spanish universities, as many people seem to think, it is something that should be corrected by developing a more open system of selection. This has compelled the new government elected in the spring of 2000 to propose a reform of the LRU, which is currently being prepared. Two aspects are central in the new reform: first, a change in the committees for the selection of professors and, second, a proposal for the establishment of a new academic career with tenured positions but non–civil servant status. These reforms seemed reasonable, especially concerning the tenured positions. This may enable nontenured academic staff to be promoted through a non–civil servant channel, besides the traditional civil servant one. This will allow many individuals to improve their work situation without requiring universities having to create professorships with the lack of flexibility that these positions have due to their civil servant status. CONCLUSION As from the early 1980s, Spanish universities have enjoyed a situation that can be considered as very positive both for the quality of the system and for the working conditions of academic staff. But new conflicts have recently appeared. Those who govern universities and academic staff are accustomed to a situation where growth was the norm and more academic positions were available or foreseen. This has changed dramatically with the stability in the number of students, and the landscape of higher education institutions is changing very quickly. At present, more positions are not necessary if academic staff policies do not change, abandoning the general rule that closely relates academic staff numbers to the number of lectures delivered. On the other hand, a relatively young population occupies most of the professorships, and vacancies due to retirement are very scarce. The consequence is the existence of a growing group of young people, with


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very high qualifications, who cannot opt for tenured positions if the current structure of academic personnel is not changed. This is becoming a great problem, and it is a source for concern among experts and governmental circles, who are currently discussing legal reform in this area. REFERENCES Consejo de Universidades. 1996. Anuario Estadistico. Madrid: Consejo de Universidades. Consejo de Universidades. 1999. Profesorado de las Universidades Pu´blicas en 1999. Informe 1/1999. Madrid: Consejo de Universidades. Garcıá-Garrido, J. L. 1992. “Spain.” In B. R. Clark and G. Neave (eds.), Encyclopedia of Higher Education. Vol. 1. Oxford: Pergamon Press. INE. 1991. Encuesta sobre empleo del tiempo del profesorado universitario. Madrid: INE. Mora, J. G. 1997a. “Equity in Spanish Higher Education.” Higher Education 3, pp. 233–249. Mora, J. G. 1997b. “Market Trends in Spanish Higher Education.” Higher Education Policy 3–4, pp. 187–198. Mora, J. G., and Garcıá-Aracil, A. 1999. “Private Cost of Higher Education in Spain.” European Journal of Education 2, pp. 95–110. Mora, J. G.; Garcıá-Montalvo, J.; and Garcıá-Aracil, A. 2000. “Higher Education and Graduate Employment in Spain.” European Journal of Education 2, pp. 229–237. Mora, J. G., and Vidal. J. 1998. “Introducing Quality Assurance in the Spanish University.” In G. H. Gaither (ed.), Quality Assurance in Higher Education: An International Perspective. New Directions on Institutional Research No. 99. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, pp. 29–38. Mora, J. G., and Vidal, J. 2000. “Lifelong Learning in Spanish Universities: The Market inside a Public System.” European Journal of Education 35(3), pp. 317–327. OECD. 1998. Education at a Glance. Paris: OECD. Sanchez-Ferrer, L. 1997. “From Bureaucratic Centralism to Self-regulation: The Reforms of Higher Education in Spain.” West European Politics 3, pp. 166– 184.

Chapter 14

The Academic Profession in Sweden: Diversity and Change in an Egalitarian System Berit Askling

INTRODUCTION In Sweden, as in many other Western countries, new patterns of social demands and international competition challenge traditional functions and structures of the higher education system. In this process of overall system transformation, Swedish academic staff are currently faced with changes in two respects: • Due to the radical deregulation in the beginning of the 1990s and the sharp growth in student numbers during the same period, the working environment and the working profiles of academics are getting more varied. • The entire regulative and legal framework for academic appointments, activities, and promotion has recently been reformed (January 1, 1999). The new framework opens for an individual variation in working conditions and duties, incentives, and career patterns among staff members.

The move away from national uniformity and collective agreements to a system characterized by local diversity and individual contracts stands out as a predominant feature when current employment and working conditions for academic staff are to be described and analyzed (Askling 1998b). THE SWEDISH HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM Some System Characteristics In recent years, the higher education system has been thoroughly reorganized by two comprehensive reforms, one in 1977 and the other in 1993.

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The reform in 1977 was a late response to the unforeseen expansion in the 1960s, whereas one of the purposes of the reform in 1993 was to facilitate a further expansion. In 1977, the state was the main actor as an agent of change, and the reform included a strong element of national planning and regulation. In 1993, the state encouraged the higher education institutions and their academics to take the role as the main agents of change. Although different in character, both reforms imposed substantial changes in working conditions for the academic staff. In conjunction with the reform in 1977, practically all post-uppersecondary education (i.e., all university-type education as well as nonacademic colleges for different kinds of vocational education and training) was brought together under the overall concept of higher education (ho¨gskola) and incorporated into one system. This meant that two very divergent types of institutions, universities and colleges, were subordinated to the same law and ordinance and treated as equal, although they differed enormously with regard to access to permanent research resources, academic qualifications, and study and teaching traditions, that is, in “academic capital.” In 1993, a new Higher Education Act came into force. This time the reformation aimed at reducing the detailed influence from the state (government and intermediary bodies) and supporting flexibility for internal renewal and responsiveness to external demands. The reform implied a shift from state governance through regulation and input control to state governance through control of outcomes. Despite the overall impression of deregulation and loosening of the central structure, some typical characteristics of the Swedish system ought to be pointed out. Admission is still centralized and follows the numerus clausus principle. Student loans and grants are also centrally administered, and the payment is made directly to the students and, thus, separated from the state funds to the institution. Many degrees from vocationally oriented programs are still expected to adhere to a national standard. The allocation of resources to the institutions is still divided into two parts, one for undergraduate education and the other one for research and graduate education.1 Evaluation and assessment have received less emphasis in Swedish higher education than in many other countries. As entry is selective and centrally directed, market signals from the students are still weak. Attempts to compare or rank courses, programs, or institutions are discouraged. All courses are subject to continuous examination, written and/or oral. There are no final examinations that cover an entire three- to five-year program. Most students are examined by their own teachers. There are no external examiners and no national assessments of the students’ achievements. (The former uniformity of the program structure was codified in national study plans, which were looked upon as a guarantee for national equivalence of

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standard.) Professional evaluation is also poorly developed. Although peer review as a means is used in appointments, its use in other contexts is limited. Another characteristic feature of Swedish higher education policy is the standpoint that research ought to be located at universities and specialized institutions within the higher education system (and thus also connected to undergraduate education) and not located to separate research institutes. Toward Homogeneity and Diversity in Structure From the early 1990s onward, two distinct development trends can be identified in the higher education sector, which both affect working conditions for faculty staff (Askling 1998a; Bauer et al. 1999). The first trend presents us with a picture of many simultaneous but various processes of development and renewal in programs and courses. The entire system is moving toward increased variation between institutions and also between faculties and departments in what concerns students, programs, teaching tasks, research activities, additional assignments, and sources of funding. Every institution can profile itself and offer something that is different from what the other institutions offer—however, not to such an extent that the notion of national equivalence in degrees will be questioned. This qualitative and quantitative development in overall structure has brought about more diversified and, at the same time, less stable and predictable working conditions for the academic staff. The other trend presents us with a picture of many simultaneous processes of homogenization. Ever since the late 1970s (following from the 1977 reform) it has been the explicit policy of both the government and the academics’ trade union that all undergraduate education ought to be linked (in one way or another) to research. Nowadays, a university college can apply for the right to offer a doctor’s degree and establish research within one or another field of research. The National Agency for Higher Education has to approve their qualifications and give a recommendation to the government, who takes the formal decision. Today, many university colleges prepare strategic plans for their own future development and are also active in raising external funding for research. These colleges are, more or less explicitly, aspiring to be turned into universities or, at least, receive substantial increased state funding for research. Such aspirations have been positively met by the government. (At the same time there is a heated debate in which the risk of splitting limited research resources, and thus suboptimizing the national resources that are at hand for research and graduate education, is vigorously claimed, mainly by established researchers at the universities.)

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Figure 14.1 Number of Students in Swedish Higher Education, 1940–1996

Sources: Ho¨gskoleverket (1996a); SCB (1996).

Types and Number of Higher Education Institutions The majority of higher education institutions are run by the state. A small number of institutions are run by regional authorities and private interests; however, they all receive substantial resources from the state. Not until the end of the 1980s did Sweden follow the track of most other European countries and increase the number of study places for higher education. This was the start of an almost linear expansion of student numbers. The relative increase in number of students in the last years is almost of the same magnitude as the increase during the 1960s (see Figure 14.1). All institutions have grown considerably during the last 10 years. Today, higher education enrolls more than one-third of the cohorts of young people aged around 20. Apart from students coming straight from upper secondary school, the student population includes a relatively large proportion of mature students, that is, students who have previously acquired various amounts of working experience. The expansion is a deliberate attempt by the government to cope with the high unemployment rate and to increase the number of graduates in the workforce (still at a lower level than in many other developed countries).


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Financing of Higher Education Since the 1970s, there have been three basic types of state resources for higher education: a state grant for undergraduate education, a state grant for research and graduate education, and a varying amount from national research councils for research projects. In the 1993 reform, a new resource allocation system for undergraduate education was introduced. The former input-based system (based on national fixed price tags per program and number of students) was replaced by an output-based system (based on estimated examination rates), in which the institutions were given an educational assignment before the commencement of each three-year period. The estimations of examination rates are made by the institutions (formally by the university boards) and allow for a certain amount of risk-taking by the institutions. Resources are based on number of students and their performance but are not, as was initially intended by the government, also linked to quality assessment and dependent on national quality indicators (i.e., the performance of the institutions). Institutions get a lump sum, based on the contracts, but how this is allocated within each institution is mainly a local decision, as are the content and curricula of programs. Until 1999, the funding of research and graduate education at the universities and the specialized institutions was earmarked to each faculty area, which means that the government exerted influence on the relative proportions of research funding to the faculties and, thus, also the volume of graduate education. However, from 1999, the funding for research and graduate education is allocated just to four larger areas of science. Research councils and a number of foundations for strategic research are also important sources for state-funded research. In 1994, the total amount of state funding for research was considerably raised, when the Conservative government after having dismantled the large wage earners’ funds established so-called strategic foundations. At the same time, state funding for research directly to the institutions was reduced. The institutions also rely on external funding of their research from private companies. This kind of funding for commissioned education and for applied research and commissioned investigations has increased considerably during the last years. Universities and specialized institutions nowadays face a situation where the permanent funding for research has been reduced and where they (through their researchers and research groups) have to compete on the national and international funding markets. The individual researcher is nowadays more dependent on his or her success in the application for funding. The dependency on external resources also creates differences in working conditions for “rich” departments and faculties, which bring money to their institutions, and “poor” ones, which are dependent on their institution and the regular state funding for their own survival. Some departments in the faculties of Natural Sciences, Medicine and Technology receive more

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than 80 percent of their total funding from external sources. Thus, the large universities are exposed to internal centrifugal forces, which tend to develop a climate of protection and mistrust between the faculties. Another trend is also evident at the large universities. In order to facilitate interdisciplinary research, special research centers are established. They try to establish themselves as centers of excellence. Number of Students and Number of Academic and Nonacademic Staff Over a 10-years period there is about a 50 percent increase in student numbers and about a 20 percent increase in total staff. In the same period of time the proportion of professors has been fairly constant at about 11 percent of all academic staff and about 5 percent of total staff. There is also a reduction in administrative support staff, mainly due to reductions in technical assistants and people doing relief work but also reflecting a general strive to reduce the costs for administration. Universities and specialized university institutions have about 10 full-time equivalent students per teaching and research personnel (academic staff) and 7 students per employee (all staff). Small- and medium-sized university colleges have in general 19 students per teaching and research personnel (academic staff). The difference between research and nonresearch institutions reflects the larger amount of researchers at institutions with permanent research resources (Ho¨gskoleverket 1998; SCB 1998). Study, Teaching, and Research In a recent investigation, commissioned by the Ministry of Education and Science (Utbildningsdepartementet 1998) aiming at examining students’ view on participation in decision making and influence on study matters, the quality of undergraduate teaching was also brought to the fore. The investigators found that the students were rather unsatisfied with their influence on teaching matters and also on the quality of teaching.2 The investigators came to the same conclusion as their predecessors in two earlier governmental investigations, the one undertaken in the 1960s (Universitetspedagogiska utredningen [UPU]) and the other in the late 1980s (Ho¨gskoleutredningen, Grundbulten) (SOU 1992, 1). The low status of teaching compared to research makes it not rewarding for teachers to engage in teaching and to spend their energy on improving teaching. The entire reward structure for academic staff members is still mainly based on qualifications in research. In this respect, the new regulations for appointment and promotion from 1999 are intended to imply a break.


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STAFFING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: MAIN ACTORS AND PROCEDURES The State-Institution Relationship Swedish universities and colleges have never had a legally autonomous status like those of Anglo-Saxon universities (Lane 1992). Since the fifteenth century, when the first Swedish university was founded in Uppsala, universities have been responsible for training almost all kinds of higher civil servants, and the academic corps was closely allied with the state administration (So¨rlin 1996). From the close relation to the state apparatus follows another characteristic feature of the Swedish higher education system, which now in the 1990s has been challenged: its uniformity in structure, organization, and regulation. Following the reform intentions of 1977, aims and curricula for each undergraduate program were established by the state. The volumes and locations of most study programs, as well as the organizational structure of the institutions, were regulated by the government and/or by intermediary bodies. As an example, Parliament decided the number of student places to be allocated to every general study program and institution and allocated funding according to national price tags for each program.3 Thus, the academic autonomy of both institutions and individuals was restricted in a way that has few corresponding examples. On the other hand, as was mentioned earlier, the individual academic teacher examined his or her own students without being monitored or assessed by neither peer nor external stakeholders. The “Swedish model” of deregulation strongly emphasizes institutional responsibility for developing their internal strategies and procedures for monitoring quality as a way of supporting the shift toward a self-regulating model of institutional governance (Ho¨gskoleverket 1996b). Since 1993, the National Agency for Higher Education (Ho¨gskoleverket) has been responsible for exerting ex post facto control on institutions by using national assessments and audits. However, the implementation of its evaluation program has been slow (Askling and Bauer 1997). Thus, the formal autonomy of the higher education institutions has been more pronounced than before. Employer(s) and Employees Although the state is the paymaster, institutions themselves now have a more independent role as employers than previously. The right to establish lectureships was given in the 1960s, and since 1993, each university is even entitled to establish permanent professorships. Over the years, local negotiations has also increased with regard to such issues as establishing posts, appointing staff, and setting salaries. Viewed in this perspective, one can say that there are now as many employers in the higher education system

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as there are institutions (although all institutions operate within the framework of the state’s employer’s responsibility). In central wage negotiations the state is represented by the National Swedish Agency for Government Employers (Statens Arbetsgivarverk). In local wage negotiations, the employer is represented by the university rector. In Sweden, staff is organized in unions mainly by occupation and/or educational background. Sweden has three main confederations of trade unions. The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), which is the largest, charters mainly for blue-collar workers. The central organization of professional employees (Swedish Central Organization of Salaried Employees [TCO]) covers mainly white-collar workers. The third confederation is the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO), whose members are professionals with university or college education. SACO members are employed by state, county, municipal, or private employers. In all, about 80 to 85 percent of academic staff are associated with one (or in some cases, more than one) of the SACO associations. The majority of the remaining academic staff are represented by the TCO. Within SACO, there are unions for teachers, engineers, doctors, dentists, lawyers, and so on. The Swedish Association of University Teachers (SULF) is one of them. SULF is a union for professors, lecturers, researchers, and postgraduate students within Swedish universities and colleges. SULF also has members from the Swedish national research councils. SULF, like SACO, has no political affiliations. SULF has local bodies at all the universities and major colleges. At some of these, SULF also employs a local ombudsman. Some of the SULF members are also affiliated to another SACO union on favorable financial terms. Thus a professor of medicine may be a member both of SULF and of the Swedish Medical Association, whereas a senior lecturer at a technical faculty may be a member of SULF as well as the Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers. Procedures and Regulations In successive steps since the 1960s, the professors’ collegial influence has been reduced, mainly in congruence with the growth of corporatism in Sweden (Ruin 1979, 1991). In the 1977 reform, the formal influence of the professors was radically reduced in all decision-making bodies to the advantage of other categories of academic and nonacademic staff, students, and representatives of society in general and vocational fields. In 1993, academic staff members regained some of their earlier influence in institutional decision-making bodies, with one significant exception: On university boards, the external representatives make up the majority of the board and are appointed by the government.4 In all other decision-making bodies the academics are in majority. (The students are also represented in all decision-making bodies of the institutions.)


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Teachers’ organizations and other employees’ organizations are entitled under the Codetermination Act of 1976 to receive information and influence managerial decisions within their institutions. Representatives from these organizations are also entitled to attend and express their opinions at university and faculty boards. Since 1998 a Cooperation Agreement has also been in action. This agreement aims at supporting a more thorough cooperation on such issues as leadership, competence development, and working conditions. Academic and Institutional Leadership In 1993, the autonomy of the institutions was strengthened. A strong leadership was emphasized by the government on all levels within the organization, and a more managementlike style of institutional governance was expected, which at least partly was to replace the traditional collegial model of leadership (peer level decision making according to a primus inter pares model of leadership). The new situation gives the leaders of various levels a changed role, which is difficult to integrate with the other pronounced principle of leadership at universities and colleges, namely, the traditional, collegial model of decision making (Gov. Prop. 1993–1994, 177, p. 38). Now, a few years later and in a context of further expansion, budget restrictions, and dependency on external funding, the internal power structure has evidently changed. At some universities and specialized institutions, the expectation for strong institutional leadership has been met by the formation of advisory groups and/or by appointment of vicerectors. At most institutions an internal delegation of responsibilities to the faculties and then further down to the departments has taken place. At the departments, the full responsibility for financial matters and the need for staff management have turned the head position into an almost full-time administrative job as executive manager. The total distribution of workload is to be agreed upon in local contracts. By such an arrangement, the head of the department will be the provider of individual opportunities for professional benefit and promotion. Consequently, the post is too complex and diversified to be run by professors acting as a combination of chair holders and laymen administrators. It is a waste of competence, it is argued, when a professor is a head. Such statements are examples of how the traditional collegial based primus inter pares model of academic leadership is abandoned in favor of a more functionalistic view of qualifications for leading positions. Bauer et al. (1999) observed the total absence of references to the corpus of professors (the chair holders) when the internal power structure was described. At the basic level of the institutions, among academic staff, the present attempts to strengthen the institutional leadership are con-

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Table 14.1 Academic Staff in Swedish Higher Education, 1997 (absolute numbers in FTE,1 in percent)

1 Full-time equivalent. Source: Ho¨gskoleverket (1998), 97.

sidered a paradoxical consequence of the Higher Education Commission’s report “Freedom, Responsibility and Competence.”5 For individual faculty members and for students, decentralization and deregulation have led to curtailed freedom in the sense that the rules have become less clear, that rights and obligations have become less clearly defined, that these individuals are now at the mercy of ad hoc decision making in matters crucial to themselves (Dahl 1998). ACADEMIC STAFF IN HIGHER EDUCATION: BASIC INFORMATION AND DATA Categories of Academic Staff Since 1986, there have been four main categories of academic staff: professors, senior lecturers (universitetslektor), research assistants (forskarassistent), and junior lecturers (adjunkt). In recent years a fifth category has been more frequent: Due to new regulations of graduate education, the doctoral scholarship position (doktorandtja¨nst) has been more frequent than before (see Table 14.1). Professors are essentially regarded as research workers. The professorial tradition comes originally from Germany where the distinction between the holders of chairs and other academic staff was—and still is—much sharper than in the Anglo-American tradition (Scott 1991). This historical predisposition to regard professors as mainly attached to science and scholarship and at a distance from undergraduate education was reinforced during the 1960s and 1970s when the number of students in undergraduate education increased and, at the same time, the funding for research increased. The


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function of professors was seen as managing research groups and supervising graduate students. The proportion of professors among academic staff is still low (see Table 14.1). From 1999 on, promotion from senior lecturer to professor will be based on individual competence development and not on the availability of vacant posts. By such a procedure, the number of professors will be doubled within a few years. In a survey undertaken by Blomqvist, Jalling, and Lundequist (1996) in the Swedish part of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, an obvious pattern in the allocation of working hours of teachers between undergraduate and graduate programs was identified. The number of professors who spend all their time in undergraduate programs is negligible, contrasted with the one-third of senior lecturers who do so. More than 20 percent of professors teach only at the graduate level. With the exception of those holding research appointments, only a few teachers have no teaching or supervision duties at all (543). Due to several reasons (such as an uneven expansion of undergraduate education and an uneven allocation of external resources for research), there are today great variations between the faculties with regard to the proportion of professors in their academic staff (Ho¨gskoleverket 1998; Utbildningsdepartementet 1994). Most distinctive in the sciences is the rise of large-scale research endeavor. Large scientific groups, complex instrumentation, and lengthy periods of time to assemble and process extensive data have become necessities of research in many subject areas and have also changed the work situation of many professor. (Askling and El-Khawas 1997). The university lecturer position (universitetslektor) was established in 1959. At that time, several measures were taken for increasing the efficiency of the growing mass education and in particular, to shortening the total time students spend on studying. “Throughput” became a buzzword. The lecturer had his or her main teaching duties in undergraduate education, thus allowing the professors to do research and take part in graduate education. (Another measure to improve efficiency was to organize all undergraduate education into lines and to divide the one- or two-terms-long discipline-bound study courses into small study units expressed in points, where one point represented one week’s study.) The university lecturer position introduced an uneven and unfamiliar specialization of duties within the academic university–based profession with the stipulations on teaching tasks (although the formal requirements to the lecturer positions focused primarily on research qualifications). Since then, this split in the academic profession has caused problems and discussions about how to overcome the separation of duties on the two senior academic positions. Another long-lasting consequence of the introduction of the lecturer position was that, during the expansion, the number of professors was kept on an almost

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constant (low) level, thus preserving the tradition of professor as the chair holder of his or her discipline. The junior lecturer position (universitetsadjunkt) is an old position. In its present shape as a pure teaching post with no formal requirement of doctor’s degree, it was reintroduced in the mid-1970s, when the university colleges and a number of educational programs that had previously been outside the university system were brought into the extended higher education system. By these senior and junior lecturer positions a new career track was introduced for lecturers (university teachers with few opportunities for research work) parallel to the one for researchers (with just a few obligations in teaching). The junior lecturers constitute nearly one-third of the teachers at undergraduate level, within the faculties of humanities, natural sciences, and social sciences in the universities, and as much as 68 percent of the total teacher corps in the colleges. The whole issue of the junior lecturer position is something of an anomaly (Blomqvist, Jalling, and Lundequist 1996). Some of the junior lecturers entered higher education in the 1970s, when their non-university institutions were being amalgamated into the unified “Ho¨gskola.” Others are former graduate students who have stayed in the system without completing their degrees. A number of new appointments as junior lecturers have also been made, the majority of them in areas where it is still difficult to recruit teachers with a doctor’s degree. Besides, it is tempting for an institution to make such appointments, as the junior posts are cheaper (lower salary and higher teaching duties). Qualifications For professors, senior lecturers, and research assistants a doctoral degree is required. For the junior lecturers (adjunkt) position, a doctoral degree is not essential. On average, 51 percent of teachers have a doctoral degree. We observe great differences between universities and research institutions, on the one hand, and university colleges, on the other hand, with regard to staff qualifications. At universities and research institutions, 67 percent of academic staff members hold a doctorate; at the university colleges the corresponding proportion is 28 percent. In small- and medium-sized university colleges, there are, in general, no professors. The colleges have a large proportion of junior lecturers without doctor’s degree, and the main workload is teaching. There is also a substantial variation among faculties regarding the qualifications of the academic staff members. In the faculty of social sciences (including teacher education), less than 50 percent hold a doctor’s degree among the staff members; in natural sciences, pharmacy, and medicine, more than 80 percent do.


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Gender and Age In 1994, 29 percent of teachers in higher education were women and 71 percent were men. The proportion of women in appointments requiring a doctor’s degree was low. Among senior lecturers 22 percent were women, and among postdoctoral fellows, 26 percent. The pattern is similar in all faculties and sectors, with the proportion of women in junior posts being higher than those in senior posts. In 1994, women held only 7 percent of professorships (Ho¨gskoleverket 1996a). However, a leveling out is apparently taking place. In the most recent years, women have increased their proportion among professors—from 5 to 10 percent—and among senior lecturers from 17 to 25 percent. The proportion of women in graduate training has risen significantly. The proportion of men and women in leading academic positions gives a similar picture of the gender dimension: Eighty-eight percent of heads of departments, 90 percent of deans, 80 percent of pro-deans, 80 percent of rectors, and most registrars are men. Only a few women are engaged in executive management and leadership of institutions. As regards the age structure among staff members at Swedish universities and university colleges, the earlier rapid expansion of higher education in the 1960s entailed massive new recruitment of young teachers and researchers. Since then the rate of recruitment has fallen, which has led to the current situation of an aging faculty. Most senior and junior lecturers were born in the 1940s. In the next coming 10 years, almost half of the present professors will retire, and their positions have to be refilled. Staff Mobility Geographical mobility is low in the Swedish higher education system (mobility is low in the labor market as a whole). There is little correspondence with the Anglo-Saxon system of “mobile” career ladders for academics, where the reputations of institutions encourage some individuals to move from one institution to another during their professional work lives. Few Swedish academics apply for positions outside their institutions once they have secured a top position within them; thus also very seldom in their academic careers are they publicly scrutinized and reviewed by peers. The majority of professors and senior lecturers are appointed to the university where they took their doctorate. Several reasons for this low mobility have been suggested (So¨rlin 1996): The notion of uniformity and equivalence between institutions and programs as standard has also implied a similar notion of equality in prestige and working conditions. The former regulated system of salaries also created a lack of incentives to moving. The expansion during the 1960s of undergraduate students at the universities gave

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the young and newly appointed academic staff opportunities for making progress in their career at their home university. EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF ACADEMIC STAFF A New Appointment and Promotion System As was mentioned earlier, in 1999 a new agreement on hours of work and new regulations for appointment and promotion came into force. The institutions have more latitude for taking their own measures concerning staff-related issues. They are also expected to prepare a staff management policy of their own. One important reason for a new system relates to the earlier mentioned decentralization policy. Despite the extensive stepwise deregulation since the mid-1980s, manifested in the 1993 Higher Education Reform, appointments and promotions of the academic staff were still mainly centrally regulated. The devolution of authority to the institutions in 1993 created a strange combination of local responsibility of internal matters and remaining state prescriptions for one of the most strategic of internal matters, staffing. Another reason for the government to take an initiative in these matters had its roots in the long-standing discontent with the division between researching and teaching tasks. Teaching was the only aspect of the duties that was regulated in detail, but research qualifications played (and still play) a predominant role for appointments to academic positions. Lecturers who wanted to make an academic career must “buy” themselves free from at least part of their teaching load to ensure time to do research. This condition tended to consolidate a negative attitude toward teaching: “free” from teaching for doing research. A further reason relates to the age structure of the academic staff. The present wave of expansion, in combination with the predictable need for replacements in a few years, makes it necessary for the institutions to prepare a policy for their own staff recruitment. Such a policy must also, it is argued, be sensitive to the current efforts to support promotions of female academics. Payments All appointments entitle a pension. This means that there is no need for a formal tenure application in order to get a guaranteed pension. Besides, there is no correspondence to the rank structure in U.S. universities. Around 90 percent of professors and most senior lecturers have permanent tenured posts, as opposed to categories of researchers, who, because of current regulations, can hold their posts for a limited period of time. From 1999,


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professors are no longer irredeemable—hitherto a major (at least symbolic) feature of academic freedom. From 1999 on, professors will have the same employment security as other employers. A feature of higher education in Sweden since the beginning of the 1990s (and in sharp contrast to earlier conditions) is the widening range of personal or individual agreements on salaries and conditions of employment for academic staff. This variation in working conditions is to be found not only between faculties and departments but also within departments and other basic units. By the new agreements from 1999, this variation might be even more outspoken in the future. Each institution has to formulate its own policy for salaries and conditions of employment, within the overall framework laid down in the general collective agreements between the state, represented by the National Swedish Agency for Government Employers, and staff associations and unions. Prescriptions of Working Time and Work Tasks In the new regulations of 1999 the total working load of university teachers is 1,700 hours for teachers who have a holiday of 35 working days, 1,732 hours for teachers with holiday of 31 working days, and 1,756 hours for teachers with 28 working days for holiday. The distribution of working hours on tasks of various kinds has to be regulated in local agreements. The working duty is no longer defined in number of lessons up to a ceiling but in hours. Normally, one lecture is equivalent to 4 working hours. Doctoral students holding scholarships are required to do some teaching. These new regulations replace the former ones from 1986, in which a maximum teaching load (but no minimum teaching load) was specified for each category of staff within the overall working year of 1,757 hours. In a survey undertaken by SULF (the federation of academics), university teachers estimated their workload at 51.2 hours a week (SULF 1998). However, there were great variations in tasks and working conditions for staff, depending on their individual competencies, in addition to variations that are bound to formal position and institutional and faculty affiliation. The working hours up to the maximum of 1,757 hours could be used in various ways. The proportion of research activities varies considerably between institutions and faculties. At some of the faculties, the influx of additional funding for research allows the lecturers to “buy” themselves free from teaching tasks to do research. The duties of professors vary widely depending upon the faculty and the type of institution in which they work. Although the teaching-research division has caused a lot of frustration, the impression is that Swedish academics, in general, are satisfied with their work. After having completed the Swedish part of the Carnegie study, Blomqvist and colleagues find Swedish academics, in general, rather contented with the opportunities for

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combining teaching and research (Blomqvist, Jalling, and Lundequist 1996). Promotion In short, the new appointment and promotion system from 1999 includes the following elements: A new career ladder is introduced from junior lecturer to senior lecturer and from senior lecturer to professor. Qualifications in research and teaching will, after application, allow for promotion from one post to another. This means that a single carrier track is established in which promotion will be based on successive assessment of the individual teacher’s/researcher’s competence and not just concentrated to situations when regular posts are to be replaced or new posts are established. A more even distribution of duties between the categories of academic staff is also intended, allowing teachers and researchers to be engaged in both teaching and research. In appointment and promotion, more attention is to be paid to pedagogical qualifications. All staff members must be offered opportunities and incentives for individual competence development. They are also expected to contribute to the development of their department and their institution. The new regulations demand a more systematic approach to staff management issues. In particular, the right to time for individual competence development is defined. For the professors this might imply a reduction in the right to time off for individual competence development. By tradition, professors have had a right to sabbatical leave lasting a semester, normally every five years. Earlier, this right was explicitly stipulated in the regulations, but in 1999, this right was replaced by the general right for all staff members to seek competence development and time for research. As the individual academic is guaranteed a right to competence development, there is, accordingly, an obligation for the institution to offer it and also an obligation for the individual staff member to take part in it. This will make it easier for academics to be promoted, but on the other hand, it will make them more dependent on the staff-related and promotion policy of their own institution and department. Annually, each employee and the head of department will set up a plan for competence development and duties delineation. ACADEMIC TRAINING AND CAREER Recruitment and Selection of Academic Staff Special appointment boards, subordinate to the faculty boards, handle the appointments of professors and senior lecturers. The whole procedure aims at keeping a high level of quality control and, in addition, allowing


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for fair and objective treatment of all candidates. The reciprocal independence of the state and the autonomous professors, a characteristic heritage from the oldest Swedish universities, has been protected through a highly formalized and rigorous referee system. All documents are public. However, the cost in terms of time in the referee procedure is fairly high. From advertising a post to appointment, the time span might be as long as a couple of years. The procedure also tends to give priority to traditional academic criteria, as defined by members of the appointment board and the referees. Several steps have to be taken in order to reduce the timeconsuming rigidity of this procedure. The slow appointment procedure has also inhibited the institutions from matching the expansion in study places with new academic appointments and therefore put a heavy teaching burden on the already employed staff. Many faculty boards and departments nowadays try to take a more active part in recruiting new professors by encouraging possible candidates to apply, thus exerting a kind of “headhunting procedure” before the formal appointment procedure takes place. Procedures for Promoting Academic Staff Besides payment, academics can be rewarded in other ways. An example of academic rewards is a reduction in teaching loads for doing development and quality work. A further kind of promotion leads away from teaching to administration, and to posts as director of studies, vice rector, and so on. As such tasks are often very time-consuming and therefore hard to combine with research work, this kind of promotion is sometimes perceived more as a form of “temporary compulsory service” to the academic community than as a valuable promotion. According to the principle of individually determined arrangements, factors such as the individuals’ portfolio of skills, their performance, and professional contributions will play a more significant role in determining personal salaries than they have thus far. A few years ago, the new title “associate professor” (almost full professor) was introduced as a promotion for senior lecturers with solid all-round academic reputation. The university teacher union SULF also argues that talented junior lecturers ought to be promoted to senior lecturers without having the formal requirements (doctor’s degree). Special Programs and Regulations for the Promotion of Women in Higher Education As is evident from Table 14.2, there are big differences in the distribution of women and men among teachers and research staff on almost all posts in the higher education system. A few years ago, the government established 32 particular professorships, 73 research assistants, and a large number of doctoral scholarships with a

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Table 14.2 Proportion of Women in Swedish Universities and Colleges, 1986–1987 and 1996–1997 (in percent)

Source: Ho¨gskoleverket (1998), 99.

view to promoting gender equality. (Efforts to increase the proportion of male students in women-dominated programs are also made, however, with little success.) Each institution is responsible for preparing its own strategic plan to recruit more women to posts as professors. Challenged by the government, most institutions have prepared equal opportunity plans to even out the gender imbalance. These plans include such measures as information drives and programs to make better use of women’s experiences. In their annual reports, the institutions also have to report on what measures they have taken and to what extent they have reached their goals. During the next decade, many professors and senior lecturers will be recruited from among persons who have held the position of research assistant. It is therefore relevant to compare the distribution of women in this group with the present distribution of women professors to see likely future trends (Blomqvist, Jalling, and Lundequist 1996). When comparing the figures for 1986–1987 and 1996–1997, one can see that the proportions of men and women have become more equal, most of all in the recruitment posts. Staff Appraisal and Staff Development Procedures At the end of the 1980s, the government called upon a commission to scrutinize the state of the art of teaching in undergraduate education and to suggest measures for improvements. In its final report (SOU 1992, 1) the commission recommended pedagogical/methodological training for teachers, experiments with new kinds of examinations, course evaluations, and use of external examiners. As proposed by the commission, a National Council for Undergraduate Education was established by the government, aiming at supporting teach-


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ers engaged in improving their own teaching. Pedagogical qualifications as formal criteria in promoting staff will also give institutions incentives to fix on the importance of pedagogical issues. Many institutions have established support centers for teaching and learning, for evaluations, and for staff management. However, budgets for these units are generally tight. Most institutions have established monetary awards, often in the form of travel scholarships, for excellent teaching.

Career Perspectives of Junior Staff In 1995, the government decided to make significant savings in higher education for financial reasons. These savings did not fully affect the finances of the institutions until the fiscal year 1997. In particular, the universities and specialized professional institutions were affected by substantial cuts. Thus, a reduction in staff has taken place in these institutions and has negatively affected the career opportunities for junior staff. Small- and medium-sized institutions, on the other hand, have received increased appropriations. Several attempts have been made to estimate the needs of the higher education institutions for their own internal recruitment, however, with varying results (SOU 1998, 128). Although there is a consensus of the need for a further expansion, divergent opinions about the direction of the prospective development of higher education with regard to areas of science have been heard. The overall figures of the age structure indicate a large number of replacements, due to retirements, in the next 10-year period of time. Many junior lecturers without doctoral degrees have been encouraged to apply for internal or external financial support (leave on full or partial pay) to follow graduate programs and obtain doctoral qualifications. For doctoral students, who hold a doctoral scholarship, a smaller proportion of teaching can be included in their duties. Courses in pedagogic and didactics are also often included in the program for the doctor’s exam as a preparation for a future career within the higher education system.

THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION IN TRANSITION This chapter was written in a period of rapid structural and contextual development. Before one can say what new practices have been established, new staff regulations have to be “translated” into institutional staff management policy and into departmental action plans. The combination of sharp growth in student number, devolution of authority from the state to the institutions (in many cases, also followed by a corresponding devolution within the institutions to the faculty boards and the departments), and dependency on external funding has brought about a complexity in func-

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tions and activities for all categories of academic staff members, and it has changed the internal power structure. The Humboldt Ideal For the academic profession of today the separation of teaching and research, laid down during the first period of expansion (in the 1960s and 1970s) by the establishment of senior lecturer positions, is still a reality. As was mentioned earlier, the majority of undergraduate teaching is done by junior and senior lecturers, and professors concentrate on research, on graduate instruction, and (not the least) on research administration. At the same time, the ideal of integration of the two aspects of the profession is strongly argued for by both the government and the university teachers’ union SULF. In an interview study with 77 Swedish university teachers in 1995, Bauer et al. (1999) found that the respondents strongly supported academic values within the Humboldtian tradition. Whether primarily teachers or researchers, a large majority say they prefer a combination of teaching and research in their personal mix of professional activities. Different arguments are mentioned: They like both tasks; they consider them to be mutually inspiring and enriching; higher education has to have vital contacts with research and the research front; they appreciate the contact with students as well as the ability to temporarily leave one task for the other; and so on. The long struggle of university lecturers to spend part of their time on research has led to a kind of official opinion about the necessity of a teaching-research connection and to protection of Humboldtian ideals. Therefore, contemporary professional identity among academics in Swedish higher education implies a balanced combination of teaching and research. However, perhaps the ideal of the researching teacher and the teaching researcher and the autonomous academic scholar is a “romantic” ideal, created in the unusual time of economic growth and welfare development in the 1960s. Many of the academic staff members entered the academic profession at about the same time as the expansion started, in the mid1960s. They have formed their norms and values within a framework of social and economic conditions that are no longer at hand now. The expansion of undergraduate students has moved higher education almost toward the conditions and context of an upper secondary school, whereas the new (and economically strong) demands for sophisticated knowledge production have had a tremendous impact on how research is carried out (with a sensitivity to the demands of industry). Compared to the situation in some other countries with a trend toward differentiation of academic roles (e.g., Bauer and Henkel 1996; El-Khawas 1995; Fulton 1996), in Sweden there appears to prevail an even stronger


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resistance against such a separation and a tendency in the opposite direction—that is, a striving for strengthened integration. However, Bauer et al. published their study before the full effects of the new budget restrictions were set into effect by the government. Institutional and Individual Autonomy In the official argument at the beginning of the 1990s for a move from an ex ante model of governance to an ex post model of governance, references were made to decentralization, freedom, autonomy, and selfregulation (Askling and Almeń 1997). The possible tension between institutional autonomy, on the one hand, and collegial and individual academic autonomy, on the other hand, was not paid attention to, and the duality in the self-regulative model of governance between strong executive leadership and a collective consciousness was not brought to the fore. On the contrary, the often used concept of “the Learning University” seemed to imply a harmonious development for both individuals and organization. According to two Swedish researchers, Dahllo¨f (1997) and Rolf (1997), Swedish academics seem to lack an awareness of the systemic dimensions of the higher education context. Perhaps the research-teaching divorce (evident in many higher education systems although manifested in various ways) has blocked a clear view regarding how expectations and preconditions of higher education institutions have changed over the years and how these changes in framework have brought about the complexity of the profession. The devolving of authority and the radical reduction of state regulations, in combination with a stronger dependency on external markets for additional funding, have released strong centrifugal forces at the universities and called for strong institutional leadership. (This has been an often-repeated remark by the National Agency’s audit teams.) However, such demands on more pronounced academic leadership challenge ingrained notions of academic collegial—and more procedural—leadership (Askling 1998c; Askling, Bauer, and Marton 1998). In short, what we have is a powerful transformation process, which might bring about a shift in both the “rationale” and “rationality” of higher education and the academic profession (or professions). The working conditions for Swedish academics are changing to such an extent that the academic profession itself may be changing. NOTES 1. From January 1, 1999, funding for research and graduate education is destined to four broad areas of science. 2. However, as basic information for international comparisons, such statements have to be interpreted carefully. Many Swedish students who have taken part in

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the international exchange programs witness, after their return home, that the climate in Sweden is much more informal and open than in the country they visited. 3. Earlier, the National Board of Universities and Colleges had a moderating role between the government and the institutions. 4. Since January 1998, the rector is no longer the chairman of the university board. The chairman is now one of the external representatives. 5. Title of the Higher Education Commission’s report, which paved the way for the reform (SOU 1992, 1).

REFERENCES Askling, B. 1998a. Institutional Governance and Management in a Context of Policy and System Change. Report from the Department of Education and Educational Research. No. 1998:2. Go¨teborg: Go¨teborg University. Askling, B. 1998b. “Sweden: Professional Diversity in an Egalitarian System.” In D. Farmham (ed)., Managing Academic Staff in a Changing University System. Buckingham: Open University Press, pp. 191–208. Askling, B. 1998c. Quality Work in Swedish Universities in a Period of Transformation. Report from the Department of Education. No. 1998:04. Go¨teborg: Go¨teborg University. Askling, B., and Almeń, E. 1997. “From Participation to Competition: Changes in the Notion of Decentralisation in Swedish Higher Education Policy.” Tertiary Education and Management 3, pp. 199–210. Askling, B., and Bauer, M. 1997. “The Role, Functions and Impact of a National Agency in the Evaluation of a Decentralised Higher Education System.” Paper presented at the CHER Conference in Alicante, September 19–20, 1997. Askling, B.; Bauer, M.; and Marton, S. 1998. “Swedish Universities towards Selfregulation—A New Look at Institutional Autonomy.” Paper presented at the 20th EAIR Forum, September 9–12, 1998. Askling, B., and El-Khawas, E. 1997. “The Academic Profession: Evolving Roles in Diverse Contexts.” Paper presented at the ASHE Annual Conference, November 5–9, 1997. Bauer, M., and Henkel, M. 1996. “Responses of Academics to Quality Reforms in Higher Education—A Comparative Study of England and Sweden.” Paper presented at the 18th Annual EAIR Forum, August 1996. Bauer, M.; Askling, B.; Gerard-Marton, S.; and Marton, F. 1999. Transforming Universities: Patterns of Governance, Structure and Learning in Swedish Higher Education at the Millennial Turn. London: Jessica Kingsley. Blomqvist, G.; Jalling, H.; and Lundequist, K. 1996. “The Academic Profession in Sweden.” In P. G. Altbach (ed.), The International Academic Profession: Portraits of Fourteen Countries. Princeton, NJ: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Dahl, S. 1998. University Autonomy and Academic Freedom—A Swedish Perspective. SULF-skrift. Stockholm: SULF. Dahllo¨f, U. 1997. “Utva¨rdering och uppfo¨ljning i kvalitets—och fo¨rba¨ttringsarbete.” In Kvalitet—och fo¨rba¨ttringsarbete vid universitet och ho¨gskolor. Stockholm: Ho¨gskoleverkets skriftserie. El-Khawas, E. 1995. “One Professoriate, or Many? Assessing Aspects of Differen-


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tiation among Academics.” Paper presented at the 17th Annual EAIR Forum, 1995. Fulton, O. 1996. “Which Academic Profession Are You In?” In R. Cuthbert (ed.), Working in Higher Education. London: Open University Press. Governmental Proposal 1993/94:177. Utbildning och forskning: Kvalitet och konkurrenskraft. Stockholm: Allma¨nna fo¨rlaget. Ho¨gskoleverket. 1996a. A˚rsrapport fo¨r universitet och ho¨gskolor 1994/95. Tabellbilaga. Stockholm: Ho¨gskoleverkets rapportserie 1996: 8R. Ho¨gskoleverket. 1996b. The National Quality Audit of Higher Education in Sweden. Stockholm: Ho¨gskoleverkets rapportserie 1996: 10R. Ho¨gskoleverket 1998. A˚rsrapport fo¨r universitet och ho¨gskolor 1997. Stockholm: Ho¨gskoleverket. Lane, S.-E. 1992. “Sweden.” In B. R. Clark and G. Neave (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Higher Education. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Rolf, B. 1997. “Kvalitet i ho¨gskolans grundutbildning.” In Ho¨gskoleverket (ed.), Kvalitet—och fo¨rba¨ttringsarbete vid universitet och ho¨gskolor. Fo¨redrag vid en konferens i Uppsala, January 9–10, 1997. Stockholm: Ho¨gskoleverkets skriftserie. Ruin, O. 1979. Studentmakt och statsmakt. Stockholm: Publica. Ruin, O. 1991. “Bending with the Breeze. Political Preferences and Institutional Reforms in the Modern University System—A Case Study.” In M. Trow and T. Nybom (eds.), University and Society: Essays on the Social Role of Research and Higher Education. London: Jessica Kingsely. Scott, P. 1991. Higher Education in Sweden—A Look from the Outside. Stockholm: Universitets- och ho¨gskolea¨mbetet. So¨rlin, S. 1996. Universiteten som drivkrafter: Globalisering, kunskapspolitik och den nya intellektuella geografin. Stockholm: SNS Fo¨rlag. Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU). 1992. Frihet, Ansvar, Kompetens: Grundutbildningens villkor i ho¨gskolan. Beta¨nkande av ho¨gskoleutredningen. Stockholm: Allma¨nna Fo¨rlaget. Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU). 1996. La¨rare fo¨r ho¨gskola i utveckling. Stockholm: Fritzes Fo¨rlag. Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU). 1998. Forskningspolitiken: Forskning a˚r 2000. Stockholm: Fritzes Fo¨rlag. Statistiska Centralbyra˚n (SCB). 1996. Universitet och ho¨gskolor. Grundutbildning: Nybo¨rjare, registrerade och examina 1994/95. U20 SM 9601. Stockholm: SCB. Statistiska Centralbyra˚n (SCB) 1998. Universitet och ho¨gskolor. Personal vid universitet och ho¨gskolor 1997. SCB U23 SM 9801. Stockolm: SCB. SULF (Sveriges Universitetsla¨rarfo¨rbund). 1998. Seniora la¨rare. Tillga˚ng eller belastning? SULFs skriftserie Nr 17/98. Stockholm: SULF. Sveriges akademikers centralorganisation (SACO). 1994. Akademikernas lo¨ner i Sverige och Europa: En analys av sju akademiska yrken i sju la¨nder. Akademikerfakta Nr 5. Stockholm: SACO. Utbildningsdepartementet. 1994. La¨rarka˚ren vid universitet och ho¨gskolor under 1990-talet. Ds 1994:79. Stockholm: Fritzes Fo¨rlag. Utbildningsdepartementet. 1998. Studentinflytande i ho¨gskolan. Ds 1998:51. Stockholm: Fritzes Fo¨rlag.

Chapter 15

Profession or Proletariat: Academic Staff in the United Kingdom after Two Decades of Change Oliver Fulton and Chris Holland

INTRODUCTION: KEY THEMES OF THE UK CASE The UK higher education system has undergone a number of major structural changes in recent years, whose consequences are still rippling through the working life and employment conditions of the academic profession. Notable among these changes are: • Sharp growth in student numbers, especially in the period from 1989 to 1995 • Sharp decline in government funding for teaching on a percapita basis • Major changes in resource allocation methods: quasi-market mechanisms, allocations based on assessed quality, and the removal of the entitlement of all universities to resources for research • Heightened inspection and accountability, widely interpreted as a loss of trust in professional self-regulation • Increasing use of information technology for teaching/learning and for management • The merger (1992) of the former polytechnic and college system into a single university sector, with a common planning and funding system • The gradual devolution of aspects of UK government and administrative structures, including elements of higher education policy and management, to the four constituent countries of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland—and potentially in the future to subregions of England

For those working within the UK system, perhaps especially the frontline academic staff, these changes are claimed to have disrupted institutional cultures and practices on a dramatic scale: Few aspects of academic

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work have been left undisturbed. At the extreme, some critics have described the effects on the academic profession as amounting to a process of “deprofessionalization” or “proletarianization.” This chapter will review the current situation of the academic profession in the light of changes in employment and working conditions. THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION Structure of the System British higher education is provided through institutions of four different types. Universities were and are autonomous, self-governing bodies with powers to award their own degrees. They fall into two types. The “pre1992” universities derive their authority and independence from a “royal charter” awarded by the Crown at their foundation. The second type are the 1992 universities, most of which were formerly polytechnics created during the late 1960s, which became independent corporations in 1989 and gained university status in 1992. Historically, only the pre-1992 universities were funded for research, whereas the polytechnics concentrated on undergraduate and even subdegree teaching, vocational rather than academic courses, part-time study, and a local orientation. However, some of these differences gradually eroded, and in many formal respects, the universities now form a single sector that is funded and regulated through a common system. However, differences still remain, both in their typical institutional mission and—notably for the purposes of this chapter—in some important aspects of staff employment and conditions. Third, there are both general and specialist higher education colleges that became independent corporations in 1989. And fourth, there are the further education (FE) colleges— neighborhood colleges whose central mission is vocational training at subdegree level. This chapter will, however, concentrate mainly on university staff. Formally, the private sector in the United Kingdom is insignificant. There is one small private university—the University of Buckingham—which receives no direct block funding from the state, though its staff can bid for state-funded research grants and students are eligible for government financial support. However, it could be argued that the university sector, especially the pre-1992 universities, has, by European standards, many of the characteristics of private institutions. In particular, some of the most successful and longest-established universities—notably, but not only, Oxford and Cambridge—have very large endowments and reserves and derive a high proportion of their income from non–block grant sources. With complex internal governance structures and effective high-level political connections, the ancient universities have become adept at distancing themselves from aspects of central government regulation and control. Among

Profession or Proletariat: Academic Staff in the United Kingdom

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Table 15.1 Higher Education Institutions1 and Students in the United Kingdom 1998–1999, by Type of Institution (absolute numbers, in percent)

HE ⫽ higher education. FE ⫽ further education. 1 All institutions in receipt of direct block grant funding for higher education teaching. 2 Includes major colleges of the Universities of London and pre-1992 colleges of the University of Wales. 3 FE A: Total number in receipt of direct block grant funding for higher education teaching. 4 FE B: Number with substantial funding for higher education teaching (⬎ £1 million allocated for 1999–2000). Sources: (Institutions) Funding Councils for England, Wales, Scotland; Department of Education, Nothern Ireland; (Students) Dearing (1997).

their forms of distinctiveness, staff employment conditions at Oxford and Cambridge do not conform to the norms for other pre-1992 universities that will be described below. In an article published in 1996, the present author argued (Fulton 1996b) that one of the striking effects of the 1992 removal of the binary division between universities and polytechnics in the United Kingdom was to undermine the legitimate pursuit of diversity in favor of a virtually onedimensional hierarchy of “quality.” The characteristics of the leading research-oriented universities have come to define the apex of this reputational hierarchy, even though the Funding Councils are now making efforts—at the margins—to reward institutions that score differently on different tasks and missions. Table 15.1 shows the distribution of institutions and student numbers in the United Kingdom. It will be seen that the pre-1992 universities are still the largest sector in terms of student enrollments. However, the 1992 universities, most of which have expanded extremely rapidly in the last 10 to 15 years, encompass many of the largest institutions and also enroll the largest number of undergraduates. Financing of Higher Education Higher education institutions receive recurrent funding from a number of different sources. The predominant source for all but a small minority

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of institutions is block grant funding from government. This is transferred via an allocation from the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), or its equivalent for the three other countries. The allocation methodology is formula driven and is intended to be fully transparent: Institutions can read off, or infer, how their allocations have been derived, down to the level of “earnings” by individual academic departments. However, the block grant is allocated on the assumption of institutional autonomy: Institutions are not required to disburse resources internally according to the formula. In broad outline, the HEFC funding has three components. “T,” or teaching, funding is allocated on the basis of weighted student numbers. Since 1995, institutions’ total enrollment of UK- and EU (European Union)-based undergraduates has been “capped,” preventing them from earning extra income by enrolling larger numbers. Institutions also earn student fees, formerly paid on students’ behalf but since 1998–1999 paid directly by students (but means-tested). In 1996–1997 and 1997– 1998, fees constituted between 25 and 30 percent of most universities’ total teaching-related income: But in effect, T allocations plus fees may be taken as a single student-related income stream, with the value per capita controlled by government. In recent years, “efficiency gains” (i.e., percentage reductions in percapita payment) have been imposed on this stream by government. From the late 1980s up to 1995 these “gains” could be offset by increased enrollments—resulting in net increases in income, though generally at the cost of worsening staff/student ratios. But between 1995 and 1998, most institutions experienced net reductions in teaching income. Any failure to fill student quotas reduces funding allocations to the institution, and these reductions may well be passed on to the departments directly affected. The second component of Funding Council allocations is “R,” or research-related, funding, which was to constitute 20 percent of HEFCE funding in 1999–2000 (THES 1999). This is intended to provide the necessary base of academic staff time and resources to support a university’s research efforts. Whereas T calculations are primarily cost and recruitment related, R has for some years been based on a formula combining “quality,” as measured in periodic “Research Assessment Exercises,” and the “volume” of research. Because of the competitive nature of R funding, its distribution is highly uneven. This unevenness is all the more striking in that, before the 1980s, all of the then-existing universities were funded under the assumption that all permanent academic staff were active in research, and those in the same discipline should be funded on the same basis, regardless of location or quality. The Research Assessment Exercise (RAE), conducted approximately every four to five years, involves scrutiny of each “unit(s)’ ” (i.e., department[s]’) research performance by a disciplinary peer review panel. Submissions to the panel include quantitative and qualitative indicators,


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including a list of four publications by each member of staff included. Staff are thus under considerable peer pressure to “perform” at a level no lower than their colleagues and may be excluded from a submission if their work is thought likely to jeopardize the unit’s collective grade. The Funding Councils also allocate resources (10 percent of the total 1999–2000 allocation) for “special [policy] initiatives,” mainly by competitive bidding. In addition to general governmental (block grant) funds and home/EU student fees, institutions’ other main sources of income include the following. “Overseas” (i.e., non-EU) students pay fees directly to the institution, and these are intended to cover at least the full cost of tuition. Government grants through the Research Councils are intended to cover the additional costs of undertaking a specific piece of research, including employment of research staff contracted for the project and associated overhead costs. Consultancy income, depending on institutional and disciplinary custom and practice, may be covered by private contracts between academic staff and clients or by departmental or institutional contracts. For some staff, it can be a substantial source of additional income. The funding methodology has important consequences for the working conditions of individual staff. Any failure to achieve student recruitment quotas or target RAE grades has financial consequences that can be unequivocally attributed to the departments concerned. In the current very constrained financial situation of most UK institutions, their management may well be tempted to pass the responsibility for coping with shortfalls directly to those departments—and substantial shortfalls can only be met by reducing staff numbers or by generating external income. STAFFING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: MAIN ACTORS AND PROCEDURES Historically, the state was quite heavily involved in some aspects of the employment and working conditions of academic staff: Despite their charters, the pre-1992 universities were treated in certain respects as if their employees were civil servants. On the one hand, academic freedom, as understood in the United Kingdom, meant not only that the exercise of academic judgment was protected from state intervention but that all matters relating to the individual employee—appointment, promotion, work allocation—were a matter for the institution. On the other hand, the state insisted on a national salary scale and took a direct hand in setting the salary levels of university staff in return for undertaking to meet the salary costs. The annual collective bargaining round took place through a threestage process involving trade unions, vice-chancellors (the heads of universities), the University Grants Committee, the Department of Education and Science (education ministry) and the Treasury (finance ministry). At times of dispute or discontent with salaries and promotion prospects, it was gen-

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erally believed that the process was entirely political, and the unions made sure that they drew in members of both Houses of Parliament in support of their claim. Employees in the polytechnics and colleges, on the other hand, had been consistently treated as local government employees, subject to the same conditions as schoolteachers and with their salaries subsumed in the same negotiating processes. By 1992, when the polytechnics and colleges formally joined the university sector, the government had sharply changed position on university pay. In the 1980s, its primary concern had been to hold down costs directly. It took part in the annual salary negotiations. It legislated to eliminate academic tenure in the pre-1992 universities, enabling the universities (in theory) to reduce their salary costs through redundancy procedures. It also imposed conditions on the annual salary settlements—first, that all staff must undergo individual appraisal and, second, that a (small) percentage of the annual cost-of-living increase in pay must be awarded on a shortterm, reviewable basis through assessment of performance, thus attempting to get “better value for money” from the academic salary bill. Over the next three or four years, however, the Conservative government reached its final position of a full commitment to “marketization.” Universities, old and new, were to be set in competition against each other for funding: They were invited to bid to the Funding Councils for greater student numbers at marginal cost and to enter the marketplace for new students wherever they could find them. Logically, therefore, government should— and did—withdraw from the salary process: Its job was simply to allocate the total state resource to be spent on the universities. From then on, the national salary scales were simply negotiated between the institutions as employers and the trade unions. However, for many years, one of the unions (the Association of University Teachers [AUT]) has campaigned not only for higher salaries but also for an independent “statutory” pay review body such as already exists in the United Kingdom for state-funded professions such as medicine and schoolteaching. Both the Conservative governments of 1979–1997 and the succeeding Labour government have consistently refused to set up such a body on an official basis. Universities and colleges, therefore, must simply manage within their own means. As far as government is concerned, so ministers’ rhetoric goes, it is up to them whether they choose, for example, to pay their staff more. If they do so, the inescapable implication is that they must earn more resources in external markets or—perhaps more likely—employ fewer staff. The current intermediary bodies, the country-based Higher Education Funding Councils—are responsible for disbursing government funding but have very limited power to affect the internal affairs of institutions. Under the post-1992 Conservative government, indeed, which put them in place, they were firmly instructed that they were in no sense to act as planning


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or management agencies. Although this, too, is increasingly something of a collective fiction, it is true that they take relatively little interest in the pay and conditions of academic staff. Employers’ organizations are of two types: general representative bodies of university and college leaders, and a specialist agency set up to handle employment issues, including collective bargaining. There are two general representative bodies: the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP), of which all universities are corporate members, and the Standing Conference of Principals [of Colleges] (SCOP). These two bodies and their predecessors were directly involved in salary negotiations up to 1994 and still include general policy issues of pay and conditions in their remit. However, operational issues were handed over in 1994 to a single specialist organization, the Universities’ and Colleges’ Employers’ Association (UCEA). UCEA negotiates pay and conditions for all groups of academic and nonacademic staff with a wide range of trade unions and associations. The settlements that are reached are taken as guidance by individual institutions, but (subject to collective bargaining) there is no requirement for all of them to pay the agreed rate—indeed, there have been well-publicized cases of institutions paying both above and below the national settlement levels. Despite the continued existence of collectively negotiated national pay scales, individual higher education institutions play significant roles in determining pay and conditions for their staff. They draw up their own standard employment contracts. They determine their own criteria for appointment and promotion, and they also determine the balance between different ranks and how they wish to handle fixed-term appointments. Equal opportunities policies, policies for staff development and training, and staff appraisal policies are other areas of local discretion. Policies for staff disengagement, whether individual dismissal for misconduct, redundancy, or premature retirement, are also determined at institution level. Most such areas are the subject of local employer-union negotiation. In addition, as market-oriented and semiprivate institutions, universities and colleges are technically free to set their own salaries. If this freedom were generally used, the national salary scales would disappear, and the result would presumably be differentials not only between institutions of different prestige and financial strength but also potentially between academic disciplines. However, this opportunity has been received unenthusiastically, not only—unsurprisingly—by the unions but also by the university authorities who, with few exceptions, have seen the prospect of local or even individual negotiation as time-consuming, divisive, and inflationary. It was this prospect that led the universities and colleges to set up UCEA in 1994 to conduct collective national negotiations on their behalf. However, because of the wide range of financial strength and market position of its members, it is not always easy for UCEA to achieve a salary

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settlement that satisfies its full membership. Every year, following the latest national agreement, there have been threats by prominent vice-chancellors to leave UCEA and/or not to abide by—and hence undermine—its proposals. A number of trade unions and professional associations operate in UK higher education. The AUT is the recognized representative of the pre-1992 universities, UK-wide. Although the AUT originally defined itself as a strictly professional body, its membership voted in 1971 to affiliate to the national Trades Union Congress, and since then it has been regarded, and regarded itself, as a quasi-industrial trade union. Halsey (1992) sees this vote as a defining stage in the move from the “guild” model of professional self-government toward what was ultimately to become, in his words, a “proletarianized” occupation. Since the 1970s, the AUT has arguably suffered from an ongoing conflict of identity, endeavoring to maintain its professional status as the possessor of academic authority and prestige, while at the same time engaging from time to time (but not always with great conviction) in industrial action (but never a full strike) in pursuit of its pay claims. Another symbol of its ambivalence is its willingness to accept all university administrators and managers (even vice-chancellors) as full members. Its total membership in 1998 stands at approximately 43,000 (figure supplied by AUT), but this includes “academic-related” staff as well as teachers and researchers. The other main union for academic staff is the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE). As its name implies, NATFHE was founded for teaching staff in further education in the days when higher education in polytechnics and colleges was still known by the somewhat confusing name of “advanced further education.” It is still the main union in England and Wales for staff in FE colleges as well as in polytechnics and higher education colleges. However, as the polytechnics and colleges have increasingly diverged in tasks, pay, and conditions and indeed in management style from further education colleges, the combination of these different membership groups has come under strain. Since 1992, AUT and NATFHE have from time to time discussed the desirability of a merger into a single union. But such discussions have foundered, partly on mutual suspicion and competing interests but perhaps mainly on the AUT’s pre-1992 university membership’s fear of status and professional dilution and of the downgrading of specific higher education issues, if forced into a merger with the large number of staff in FE colleges. NATFHE’s total membership in higher education institutions in 1998 is 18,000 (figure supplied by NATFHE), but this is not directly comparable with AUT since its membership criteria are drawn more narrowly and restricted to teaching staff and exclude Scotland.


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ACADEMIC STAFF: BASIC INFORMATION AND DATA Social Status of Academic Staff Halsey (1992) analyzes at length what he sees as the declining social status of academic staff in the United Kingdom. In economic terms, he documents a steady long-term decline in academic salaries relative to average earnings in manufacturing industries. He describes the profession as having shifted from the small, nineteenth-century “status group” of Oxbridge dons with gentlemanly/collegiate characteristics, dependent essentially on private patronage, to the enlarged and less well-rewarded “professional bureaucracy” of the 1970s. Beyond this point, he suggests that a number of real and perceived influences have led to something close to proletarianization: expansion of staff numbers; losses of autonomy of working conditions, of job security, and of promotion prospects; deterioration in working conditions, including increased student/staff ratios and growing “public squalor” of university buildings. All of these, he suggests, have led not only to discontent within the profession and a subjective sense that its status has declined but to lowered attributions of prestige both in the public at large and in the British political elite in particular. There are unfortunately no reliable data other than salary information that would enable us to judge the validity of these observations. However, it has been argued (Trowler 1998) that Halsey’s analysis seriously overstates both the nature of changes in working conditions and the subjective sense of loss that this has created. One might add here Harold Perkin’s (1989) account of the rise and fall of publicly employed professionals as a whole in British society and observe with Perkin that the Thatcher-Major governments of 1979–1997 included not only academics but schoolteachers, doctors, lawyers, and other “public” professional groups in their attacks on professional privilege and expertise. Legal Status and Tenure Since 1989, all academic staff in higher education institutions (HEIs) have been employees of the institution in which they work. Their appointment is not subject to state approval or regulation. Their institution as employer is solely responsible for conforming to prevailing national and European employment law. Employees of the 1992 universities and colleges have never had tenure: They are appointed either to fixed-term contracts or to indefinite contracts with an agreed period of notice, subject to the retirement age in force at the time they reach it. In the pre-1992 universities, until 1987 all staff on normal “lecturing” (i.e., teaching and research) contracts were awarded tenure following a short period of probation, normally

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three years. At that time, fixed-term contracts were virtually only used for staff employed on finite funding. The precise legal implication of tenure is said to have varied from one university to another, depending on the terms of its charter and statutes, but the general interpretation was that individuals were guaranteed a job for their whole working life by the institution as a whole, even if their department were to be closed. The then-Conservative government passed legislation to eliminate tenure from all university charters. From the date at which the government first announced its intentions, universities were forbidden to issue new contracts, either for appointment or promotion, that embodied tenure. Nevertheless, even when faced with severe financial difficulties as some have been, nearly all universities and colleges have adopted a policy of “no (enforced) redundancy” for academic (and in most cases, also nonacademic) staff. They have chosen instead to shed staff where necessary through compensation for voluntary redundancy or premature retirement—often at generous levels but sometimes also backed up with the threat of compulsory redundancy if all else fails. Thus, while legal tenure is formally fading away, many of its attributes still exist in practice. Occupational Grading Structure Table 15.2 shows the distribution of academic ranks across the sectors, from (1) the Carnegie 1992 survey and (2) the Dearing survey of 1997. Despite the ending of the binary system, there are still differences dating from the binary era between the pre-1992 universities and the 1992 universities and colleges, both in the nomenclature used for the ranks and in procedures for promotion. In the pre-1992 universities all new “lecturing” staff are appointed to the grade of lecturer.1 In the mid-1980s, the lecturer scale, which was extremely long (containing some 14 points for annual progression), was split into two halves, and promotion from lecturer A to lecturer B requires a positive decision by the institution following a review of performance. Although there is no prohibition on remaining indefinitely as lecturer A, failure to achieve promotion implies not only a relatively low salary (the top of the lecturer B scale is often taken as the benchmark in salary negotiations) but also that the staff member has been exceptionally singled out as unworthy of routine progress: Very few staff are not promoted. Universities might now expect this humiliation to induce the staff member to leave, and many would encourage them to go. The grades of senior lecturer and reader are first-level promotions to identical salary scales: In all universities, a readership denotes achievements specifically in research, whereas senior lectureships may denote research, teaching, or any other achievement, usually in combination. However, the precise criteria depend on variable institutional policy. Professor is the final promotion, almost always for staff already occupying the grade of senior lecturer or


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Table 15.2 Academic Rank, by Type of Institution, 1992 and 1997 (in percent)

Numbers do not total 100 due to rounding. Sources: Fulton (1996a), table 10.5; Dearing (1997), Report 3, table 5b.

reader. In the pre-1992 universities it is highly unusual, though not quite unheard of, to be promoted to professor without a distinctive research reputation. In most pre-1992 universities the proportion of “senior” posts (i.e., beyond lecturer grade) has grown substantially since government restrictions were removed in the early 1980s, and in many cases so too has the proportion of professors. Whether as cause or consequence, the United Kingdom’s “old” universities appear to be moving from the residue of a “chair” system, with a single professor permanently heading a department assisted by one or two senior lecturers/readers while most staff remain lecturers throughout their career (a pattern that could still be found quite commonly in the 1970s), toward an American-style collegial pattern, in which staff would normally expect to move through the three grades: seriously disappointed if they failed to reach senior lecturer/reader and certainly hoping to become one of at least five or six full professors in due course. The latter pattern can now be found quite widely. As Table 15.2 shows, the proportion of lecturers only just outweighed that of senior grades in 1992. In almost all pre-1992 universities, moreover, the post of head of department is held on a short-term basis, elected by all lecturing staff from those in any senior position.

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In the 1992 universities and colleges lecturer is again the entry grade, but senior lecturer is a minimum career expectation. The lowest “senior” rank, roughly corresponding to a pre-1992 senior lectureship, is principal lecturer. Here promotions tend not to be made simply on the basis of personal achievement but to a designated “post of responsibility,” carrying extra administrative or managerial duties, which may be advertised and competed for internally or even externally. Beyond this point, grade promotion with a higher salary is generally to a management post, such as permanent head of department or dean. In some institutions, holders of such posts are given the honorary title of professor. In others, the titles of professor and reader are awarded on the basis of individual achievement, as in the pre-1992 universities, but carry no extra salary. In addition, the table shows clearly how the 1992 universities contain much smaller proportions of staff in senior ranks. These institutions’ commitment to a fixed structure and task-based promotion gives them much less flexibility than the pre-1992 universities to increase the proportion of senior posts. Women in the Academic Profession The national figures for 1996–1997 show that the proportion of women in the academic profession as a whole has now reached 33 percent but that the proportions decline steadily, so that at the top only 8 percent of professors are women. Analysis of these figures shows wide differences by former sector, with the 1992 universities having higher proportions of women staff at all levels including the most senior; but also surprisingly wide differences, especially in the proportion of professors who are women, by institution within the former sectors as well. A more recent sample survey carried out for the Times Higher Education Supplement (1999) suggests that the recruitment and promotion of women appear to have accelerated somewhat recently. But it is still very much the case that women are underrepresented at all higher levels and are also disproportionately likely to be employed on fixed-term contracts. Beyond the requirements of British and European employment law, there are no special procedures or regulations governing the appointment or promotion of women academics. Individual institutions, especially the 1992 universities, have a variety of policies. These quite commonly include a requirement to short-list at least one woman for every advertised post and including women wherever possible as members of interviewing panels. National bodies including the trade unions have run campaigns or even sustained ongoing pressure groups in favor of greater fairness to women staff.


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The Changing Role of the Doctorate Unlike many other national systems, there is no absolute requirement of specific prior qualifications for entry to the academic profession in the United Kingdom. The Ph.D. came relatively late to the United Kingdom, but there is a general belief that it is now the standard expectation of new recruits to the pre-1992 universities The available data, however, are somewhat contradictory. Halsey (1992, 139) reported figures from the Universities Statistical Return that showed remarkably little change up to that time in the proportion of pre-1992 university staff with doctorates: The percentages fluctuated between 42.3 percent and 43.3 percent between 1975 and 1989. However, Williams, Blackstone, and Metcalf (1974, 44) reported on the basis of their survey of university academics in 1969–1970 that 51 percent then had doctorates; and the Carnegie survey (Fulton 1996a) found that no less than 70 percent of its sample of pre-1992 English university staff held a doctorate, with another 6 percent working toward one. Part of the explanation for these discrepancies must be Halsey’s finding that very low proportions of research staff (yet) held doctorates. If this is the case, it can indeed be said that in the pre-1992 universities the Ph.D. has now virtually become the norm for “lecturing” staff. However, this is not the case for the 1992 universities. In 1992, the Carnegie survey found that 34 percent of polytechnic staff held doctorates and 12 percent were working for one, and the comparable figures for the colleges were 23 percent (16 percent). In theory, the increasing use of the Ph.D. as the standard entry qualification combined with the relatively short UK doctorate should mean a relatively painless entry to the profession at an early age compared with most other European (and North American) systems—and it is the case that a few staff can still be found in permanent lecturing posts as young as 24 or 25. However, in the United Kingdom, as elsewhere, excesses of supply over demand tend to mean that, in practice, in most fields entry to a tenure-track post only occurs after a period in a fixed-term research or teaching post or in a postdoctoral fellowship. EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS The Tenure Debate Although the abolition of tenure in the pre-1992 universities was greeted with outrage when first proposed, it is hard now to see many practical differences as a consequence. As explained earlier, very few staff in these institutions have been made compulsorily redundant—tenure or no, compulsory redundancy is likely to provoke serious industrial disputes and will be avoided by university management for that reason alone. A larger num-

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Table 15.3 Annual Salaries for Academic Staff, by Type of Institution and Rank (in Pounds Sterling, euro)

1 AUT estimate. Disc ⫽ discretionary points that are awarded to a minority of staff. Sources: http://www.aut.org.uk/campaigns/pay/scales-main.html (pre-1992 universities); http: //www.natfhe.org.uk/hied/payscale.html (1992 universities and colleges).

ber of staff have been induced to leave, and no doubt the cost to the institution of buying out their contract expectations through voluntary redundancy or premature retirement has been reduced now that tenure has been removed. But voluntary departures were certainly not unheard of in the days of universal tenure. The knowledge of their somewhat greater insecurity may be a factor in the relatively low morale of British academics—but this is arguably attributable much more directly to underfunding and the general insecurity this brings than to their formal contractual status. Pay Scales and Current Earnings Table 15.3 suggests that although salary structures—and promotion procedures, as described earlier—differ between the two former sectors, levels of pay are broadly comparable. However, surveys also show that, taken as a whole, staff in the pre-1992 universities have considerably higher average earnings. In 1992, for example, the Carnegie survey found that 21 percent of university staff earned over £31,400 (roughly the minimum professorial salary at that time) compared with 9 percent of polytechnic and 6 percent of college staff. (Note: A Pound Sterling is equivalent to 1.67 euro [1 Euro ⫽ 0.60 GBP]. The current exchange rate [January 2001] of 1 euro is 0.91 U.S.$.) Since salary scales are broadly similar, this differential is evidently


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largely attributable to the considerably higher proportion of senior staff in the pre-1992 universities. In the strict sense, there is little or no performance-related pay in the United Kingdom. Except perhaps for a few people, mainly in the 1992 universities, with substantial management responsibilities, academic staff are not employed on contracts that specify performance targets and their corresponding rewards. However, following the salary negotiations of the late 1980s referred to earlier, 1 percent of the total salary bill was set aside for the then-universities to use on an individual basis in order to “reward, motivate and/or retain” staff. The comparability of academic pay with that of other professionals has already been referred to. Most surveys of academic pay have concentrated either on average earnings or on the salary levels of fixed points on the scales such as the final point on the lecturer B scale or the professorial minimum, in the case of the pre-1992 universities. Different authors have come to sharply different conclusions, in large part because of their choice of starting points and benchmarks. The Carnegie survey showed that in the early 1990s English academics were considerably more discontented with their salary level than were staff in most of the other countries included. A number of different surveys since then have also revealed high levels of subjective discontent. Much more recently, the Bett Committee, an independent committee set up with the support of the universities and colleges as employers and of the higher education staff trade unions, has declared that salary levels are indeed too low, especially starting salaries for new entrants to the profession, which are seen as inadequate to attract high-quality recruits, and the salaries of professors, which are seen as uncompetitive in a global market. Working Time and Work Tasks As described earlier, there are no formal national prescriptions for any category of staff in the pre-1992 university sector: Prescriptions or proposals are negotiated at local institutional or subinstitutional level. As was described earlier, before 1992 there were sharp differences both in the mission of the universities and the then-polytechnics and in the funding that they received for research. Although the 1992 universities are now eligible to compete for research funding of all kinds and there are pockets of very successful research effort, their basic assumption for workloads purposes is still that teaching is the core activity of staff and that eligibility for research time cannot be automatic. In the pre-1992 universities, on the other hand, increasing competition and greater financial differentiation between high and low scorers on the RAE have meant that, where once all staff were assumed to be devoting a fixed percentage of their time to research, there are now sharp variations in funding for research between

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Table 15.4 Working Hours Spent on Major Functions during Teaching Terms and Vacation, 1992, by Type of Institution (median hours)

Source: Fulton (1996a).

universities and also between departments within them—and indeed, if a department so chooses, between individuals. Thus increasingly in both types of university—but possibly with more resistance in the old universities where it represents a distinct loss of autonomy—teaching load and research time are a matter for management prescription or individual negotiation and can vary widely even between individuals within the same department. The consequences in practice can be seen in Table 15.4, from which a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, and not surprisingly, there are sharp differences between undergraduate teaching terms and vacations in the amount of time that academic staff spend on teaching. Second, and also predictably, teaching loads were higher in the then-polytechnic sector than in the pre-1992 universities. But third, time spent on research increased much more sharply during vacations in the (then) university sector than in the polytechnics and colleges: In other words, even in 1992, polytechnic and college staff on average substantially reduced their total working hours during vacations: Staff of the pre-1992 universities did not. The Position of Junior Staff Until recently the United Kingdom has been less likely than many other countries to define junior status as problematic. The time needed to obtain a doctorate is quite short, and indeed it can be waived, or imposed as a later condition, if the appointing committee so wishes. Probation arrangements have been developed to the point where they can be seen as supporting individuals, protecting the institution’s legitimate interests, and unlikely to impede the career progression of normally achieving junior staff. In both 1992 and pre-1992 universities, junior lecturing staff are normally placed on the lower points of a reasonably long career grade. Thus, formerly, anyone appointed to a “permanent” lecturer post could look forward with reasonable confidence to a long period in which to build up a


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successful career. Difficulties arose from time to time with the fluctuations of the recruitment market: Periods of rapid staff increase have alternated for many years with periods when there were very few vacancies. This has created difficulties for new Ph.D.s and to some extent promotion bottlenecks for staff in midcareer. However, in recent years a huge increase in the use of fixed-term (and part-time) contracts for teaching staff and a very sharp rise in the numbers of research staff have created difficulties and conflicts of expectation. Research posts, in particular, traditionally served as an alternative first step toward a lecturing career. But the number of research staff now precludes this. Thus there are concerns about the “revolving door” of short-term recruitment after a Ph.D. It is certainly no longer the case, as it was in the 1980s, that a brief period on a short-term contract for research or teaching would earn a permanent job when one came up. The Dearing survey showed that it is mainly research staff who are employed on fixed-term contracts, with no less than 86 percent in this position. At the other extreme, the proportion of professors, or of those aged 50 and over, who hold fixed-term contracts is quite small. Perhaps contrary to general perceptions, it is mainly the pre-1992 universities that resort to fixed-term contracts, even for their “lecturing,” that is, non–research specialist staff. The Dearing survey found furthermore that half (49 percent) of all academics had been employed on a fixed-term contract at some time. There were sharp differences by age: The older the respondent, the less likely to have experienced fixed-term academic employment. The authors comment that it is unclear whether the difference is due to change in the use of fixedterm contracts over time or to the loss to the profession of large numbers of staff (presumably mainly research staff) early in their careers. The AUT has run a campaign for some years to support contract research staff and improve their conditions of employment. In 1997, the CVCP and its companion bodies signed a “Concordat” with the Research Councils that are responsible for funding a large proportion of contract research staff. Under this agreement, the parties agreed to develop active personnel policies for research staff, including in particular improvements to their long-term career prospects through longer-term training, guidance, supervision, and support, improved contractual arrangements, and attempts to provide funding beyond the life of single projects. Among other things, there is increasing interest in the possibility of long-term research-only careers, which had previously been very much the exception. Staff Appraisal The requirement to undertake regular staff appraisal was introduced as a condition of a salary settlement in the late 1980s. The precise form of

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appraisal and the cycle on which it was to take place were left to institutions to decide: They, in turn, might choose to delegate responsibility to subunits. In the early years, appraisal schemes took on a fairly high profile, with debates about appropriate methods, trade union anxieties, national and institutional training schemes, and external evaluation. Little is now heard of them, and it seems likely that the process has largely become routinized. In the early years it was also clear that a variety of models were being adopted. These ranged from clear, top-down managerial models, in which staff at each level are appraised by their seniors, to collegial models where appraisees choose appraisers from a pool of eligible people, including those working at their own grade. Equally critically, appraisal methods appear to have ranged widely from more inquisitorial approaches involving performance targets for monitoring with agreed consequences to supportive or quasi-therapeutic models in which the content of the interview is confidential to appraiser and appraisee. It is perhaps another measure of the limit of state powers of influence or intervention that government should have felt that it had the right to insist on the existence of appraisal schemes but no right to prescribe what these should consist of. Staff Training If appraisal has become routinized, staff training is now by contrast at the center of a national debate. Most universities have set up induction schemes for new academic staff, primarily oriented to teaching on the grounds that the Ph.D. or other postgraduate qualifications provide adequate training in research. However, as with appraisal, a variety of models have been on offer, ranging from instructional models in which “experts” train “novices” to self-development or portfolio-based models in which new staff essentially acquire and demonstrate their acquisition of the necessary skills with the aid of a support tutor or mentor. Originally, most such schemes were voluntary and uncertificated: Increasingly, however, universities have begun to require their new staff to undergo some form of training program and in return to offer them a certificate that may even carry some public transfer value. In its 1997 report, however, the Dearing Committee took the argument one stage further by recommending that all staff, whatever their experience, should be able to demonstrate that they were fully trained and qualified to teach. Subsequently—and under pressure from government—a joint employer-union committee has examined these proposals more closely, and the CVCP has set up a new Institute for Learning and Teaching (ILT) in Higher Education, which is to manage the emergent national framework for training and certification. Its first proposals (including proposals for


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certifying and registering already experienced staff) were recently sent out for consultation and met with rather mixed responses. Although the ILT is university owned and controlled, it has already identified itself strongly with government concerns, justifying this with the threat of direct government intervention if its own proposals are not accepted. A revised scheme has just been issued at the time of writing, which, among other things, appears to be achievable for experienced staff with considerably less difficulty than the first proposals. It remains to be seen whether such a national scheme will achieve its aims of recruiting institutions and individuals in viable quantities, as well as identifying, certifying, and enhancing the quality of professional practice of higher education teachers. DEVELOPMENTS AND CURRENT TRENDS Many of the key developments have already been described in earlier sections. However, three themes deserve further discussion and reflection. Student/Staff Ratios and Work Intensification This is the fundamental change in the material circumstances of higher education institutions. There has been huge growth in student numbers, especially between 1988–1989 and 1994–1995. Although the figures are not fully comparable, it is safe to say that the total number of students has more than doubled in the last two decades and that most of that growth took place during the six years just referred to. At the same time, per capita funding has been very sharply reduced. Dearing (1997, 45) uses official figures to show a decline of 40 percent in unit funding since 1976, with the sharpest fall again occurring in the same recent years. Although the level of reduction has now slowed, it has not ceased. Trends in student/ staff ratios are virtually impossible to calculate with full credibility, but it is clear that unit cost reductions on this scale must have impacted severely on the ratios. The AUT suggests that there was a decline of 40 percent in the ratio in the 10 years from 1985–1986 to 1995–1996. It is also clear that—no doubt under the pressure of the Research Assessment Exercise— the research productivity of academic staff, as measured by numbers of publications or external grants per capita, has been increasing steadily. Even if staff are not working harder (and surveys suggest that most of them believe that they are), their output has been increasing very fast. The extent to which these trends can legitimately be described as constituting work intensification is of course debatable. Some institutions, and/ or some units within them, appear to have attempted to maintain traditional teaching and assessment methods against the odds. In the case of Oxford and Cambridge, where intensive tutorial methods arguably con-

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stitute a “unique selling point,” private funds have been raised to enable these traditions to be maintained; elsewhere this has not been so easy, and there are plenty of complaints that not only class sizes but, especially, assessment loads have increased. The latter have been exacerbated by national moves towards “modularized” teaching and assessment, resulting in more frequent demands on staff time for marking. However, institutions have also attempted to compensate for these trends in unit costs by changing their methods, with larger classes, more prepackaged “resource-based” and information technology-based teaching, and the encouragement of greater student autonomy. In his analysis of life in a 1992 university with a determinedly “mass” higher education mission, Trowler (1998) indicates that the increased student load has been handled in a variety of ways institutionally and that individuals have developed personal ways of coping that range from despair through tokenism to enthusiasm. Selectivity and Differentiation, Managerialism, and Surveillance For academic staff who are old enough to recall employment conditions in the 1970s, there is little doubt that external pressures have increased sharply. The “quality” of their unit’s research and teaching is now assessed on a five- or six-year basis and—especially with respect to research—their individual contribution is clearly identified. The research assessment has direct financial consequences, and the teaching assessment, indirect consequences. Thus, from a managerial viewpoint—and in a context of declining resources—it is essential that staff contributions are actively and continuously monitored and managed: Teaching loads, expectations of grant earning and publications, and outside income generation are all elements that are now available for individual negotiation and of course individual differentiation. Selective decisions—to support individuals with extra time and resources or to load them with administration or less-demanding areas of teaching—can well be justified by the new financial imperatives. There are strong temptations (and encouragement from government and other external actors) to adopt an industrial model of line-management procedures. However, observation suggests that many units and their heads remain deeply committed to collegial and supportive methods of decision making and to methods of resource allocation that are more egalitarian or driven more by internal academic judgment than external assessment or earning power. As was suggested earlier, limited evidence also suggests that individual staff may adopt a variety of coping strategies, from enthusiasm through compliance to tokenism and resistance. Yet there can be little doubt that whatever the active or passive forms of resistance there is plenty of change in the external conditions that bear upon working life.


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Deprofessionalization, Commodification, Proletarianization? Some analysts of employment conditions in higher education take an explicitly labor process approach (see, e.g., Winter et al. in Smyth 1995). The extreme form of this critique argues that in the emergent conditions of mass higher education in the United Kingdom, including sharply declining rates of state investment, we can see higher education institutions being subjected to a set of Taylorist reforms in which both students’ and staff’s experience are fragmented and commodified. Teaching components are broken down, prepackaged, monitored, and inspected in ways that reduce or negate the holistic quality of professional judgment that formerly constituted the core of academic work. Salary and status have declined and are declining in parallel. And an army of casual “proletarian” laborers (part-time, fixed-term, without the traditional right to the unity of teaching and research activity) is being recruited to support or, as often, substitute for declining numbers of “traditional” academics. There have recently been attempts by UCEA, partially but not wholly endorsed by the Bett Committee, to remove the distinctive employment status of “academic” staff and develop “generic” grades, salary scales, and recruitment and promotion procedures that would apply indiscriminately to all staff. Such attempts can quite easily be interpreted as supporting this thesis. While there are clearly persuasive elements in this interpretation—and it is to some extent shared both by long-standing scholars of higher education such as Halsey (1992) and by New Right advocates of wholesale reform through marketization and the destruction of professional privilege—we lack evidence to support it in any depth. Taken literally, it undoubtedly overestimates the determinism of material circumstances, and/or the determination of external actors, and equally underestimates the inertia, resistance, and sheer variety of responses of academic workers. The linked studies of Henkel (2000), and Kogan and Hanney (1999) suggest that it is in the area of academic disciplinary practice, and not in labor processes, that the biggest changes may be taking place. It is, of course, arguable that the language of commodification, consumerism, markets, and managerialism are in themselves bringing about the construction of a new academic identity. But, again, the fragmentary evidence suggests that any such sweeping conclusion would be premature. NOTE 1. The term lecturing staff normally denotes career staff of all ranks from lecturer to professor with standard contracts that require them to undertake all three roles of teaching, research, and administration.

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REFERENCES Bett, M. 1999. “Independent Review of Higher Education Pay and Condition.” Report of a Committee Chaired by Sir Michael Bett. London: The Stationery Office. [Dearing] National Committee of Enquiry into Higher Education. 1997. Higher Education in the Learning Society. Main Report, Appendices and Reports. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Department for Education (DfE). 1993. Higher Education Statistics. London: DfE. Fulton, O. 1996a. “The Academic Profession in England on the Eve of Structural Reform.” In P. G. Altbach (ed.), The International Academic Profession: Portraits of Fourteen Countries. Princeton, NJ: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Fulton, O. 1996b. “Differentiation and Diversity in a Newly Unitary System: The Case of the UK.” In V. L. Meek, L. Goedegebuure, O. Kivinen, and R. Rinne (eds.), The Mockers and Mocked: Comparative Perspectives on Differentiation, Convergence and Diversity in Higher Education. Oxford: Pergamon/ IAU Press. Halsey, A. H. 1992. Decline of Donnish Dominion: The British Academic Professions in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Henkel, M. 2000. Academic Identities and Policy Change. London: Jessica Kingsley. Kogan, M., and Hanney, S. 1999. Reforming Higher Education. London: Jessica Kingsley. Perkin, H. 1989. The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880. London: Routledge. Smyth, J. (ed.). 1995. Academic Work. Buckingham: Open University Press and Society for Research into Higher Education. Times Higher Education Supplement (THES). 1999 [March 3]. “Elite Trumped in Access Stakes,” p. 1, and “English Funding Allocations,” pp. 11–14. Trowler, P. 1998. Academics Responding to Change. Buckingham: Open University Press and Society for Research into Higher Education. Williams, G.; Blackstone, T.; and Metcalf, D. 1974. The Academic Labour Market: Economic and Social Aspects of a Profession. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Index

Academic capitalism, 1, 20 Academic councils, 33, 40, 51, 56, 69, 76, 83, 131, 218, 220, 223–224, 231, 281, 284, 294, 305, 317 Academic freedom, 15, 27, 38, 45, 56, 65, 130, 137, 143, 148, 150, 158, 286, 290, 297, 305. See also Autonomy Academic professional organizations, 31, 33, 70, 94, 158, 284–285 Academic staff unions, 95, 100, 158, 169, 284, 291, 293, 296, 308 Access to higher education, 28, 44, 91, 156–157, 169, 173, 177, 233–234, 257–258, 270 Accountability, 2, 27, 45, 168, 301 Accreditation, 165, 168 Administrative bodies, 69, 91, 95, 98, 140, 148, 153–154, 156–158, 180, 191, 237, 278, 283–284, 306–307 Age of academic staff, 39, 41, 79–80, 102–103, 185, 230, 264, 289–290, 295 Appointment procedures, 8, 35, 37, 42, 76, 94–95, 97, 99–100, 104– 105, 142, 148–150, 159, 161–163, 165, 220, 224, 231, 239, 242, 245– 246, 249, 271–272, 284–285, 288–

290, 292–293, 307, 309–310, 312, 316 Appraisal, 5, 41, 106, 133, 166–168, 248, 294, 306–307, 317–318 Assessment, 2, 17, 21, 86, 106–107, 125, 133, 146–149, 159, 168–169, 175, 224, 268, 271, 273, 278, 281, 283, 292, 301, 304, 306, 319–320. See also Evaluation; Quality assessment Autonomy, 4, 7–10, 13, 15, 20–21, 39– 40, 68, 73, 112, 124–125, 174, 177, 180, 186, 191, 233–235, 237, 255, 260, 283, 297, 309, 316, 320; academic, 283, 297; administrative, 236; financial, 9, 234, 236; institutional, 7–10, 26–27, 29, 31, 43, 73, 87, 112, 285, 297, 304; professional, 122, 129; in research and teaching, 21, 68, 123, 235, 260. See also Academic freedom Bargaining, 3, 7–9, 20, 74, 119, 123; collective, 3, 7, 20, 74–75, 83–84, 118, 164, 237–238, 305, 307; individual, 3, 7–8, 20, 181; local, 3, 7, 20, 220 Boards: academic, 31, 159, 165; ap-

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Index

pointment, 105, 107, 292–293; faculty, 285, 292–293, 295; university/ college, 33, 40, 68, 76, 95, 105, 224, 231, 235, 245, 248–249, 259, 271, 281, 284 Careers, 10–15, 21, 34–35, 38–42, 44, 70–71, 83, 85–86, 96–99, 101, 103, 108, 112, 122–127, 132–133, 138, 150, 157, 163, 165–166, 169, 178, 180–182, 185–186, 188–190, 223, 225, 229, 236–241, 243–246, 248– 249, 251–252, 256, 258, 260–262, 270–271, 274, 277, 288–290, 292, 295, 311–312, 316–317. See also Promotion Categories of staff, 10, 35, 73, 77–79, 81, 91–94, 98–103, 106, 108, 120, 125–126, 128, 141–142, 144, 146, 149, 151, 160, 181–183, 185, 189, 260–262, 269, 271, 284, 286, 290– 292, 296, 315 Centralization, 91, 173, 175, 190. See also Decentralization Civil servant status, 3, 10, 21, 38–39, 68, 73–74, 77, 98, 108–109, 122, 130, 137–138, 143, 145, 148, 164, 179, 181, 237–238, 246, 255–256, 258–261, 267, 272–274, 283, 305 Collective bargaining. See Bargaining, collective; Trade unions Collegiality, 7, 8, 15, 25, 56, 63, 70, 73, 86, 206, 213–214, 256, 284– 285, 297, 309, 311, 318, 320 Conditions: of employment, 3–4, 7–8, 10, 19–20, 22, 37, 43, 67, 74–76, 80, 87, 92, 95, 97, 104, 112, 115, 118, 122, 129–130, 137, 143, 152, 158, 163, 180, 182, 186, 224, 226, 231, 236–238, 245, 252, 265, 277, 290–291, 301–303, 305, 313, 317, 320–321; of work, 3, 4, 7, 10–11, 19–20, 22, 37, 43, 67, 72–75, 80, 82–84, 87, 94–95, 104, 111, 115, 118, 122, 129, 163, 169, 180, 182, 186, 219–220, 223–224, 230–231, 237–238, 245, 252, 255–256, 258– 259, 263, 265, 274, 277–279, 281,

285, 289–291, 297, 302–303, 305, 309, 313 Contracts, 3, 12–17, 30, 37, 39, 42, 46, 73–74, 76, 79, 83, 94, 97, 99– 101, 107, 118–120, 124–125, 132, 142, 163, 165, 169, 186, 223, 237– 243, 245, 247–248, 251, 260, 262, 265, 267–269, 277, 281, 285, 305, 307, 310, 314–315, 317; fixed-term, temporary, 16, 28, 72, 76–77, 79, 83, 85–86, 120–121, 124, 126, 159, 163, 169, 224, 238, 246, 249, 309– 310, 312, 317; flexible, 75; parttime, 16, 99, 121, 124, 133, 242– 243, 317; permanent, 12–14, 73, 120, 124, 246, 309. See also Tenure Control, 1–2, 4, 5, 10–11, 13, 15, 18– 21, 27, 29, 31, 40–41, 43–45, 91, 112, 117, 123, 129, 131, 139, 151, 175, 179–180, 184, 187, 190, 235, 257, 266, 278, 283, 292, 302, 304, 319. See also State control Decentralization, 4, 20–21, 286, 290, 297. See also Centralization Decision making, 8, 20–21, 28, 31, 69, 73, 86, 107, 118, 124, 219, 256, 282, 284–286, 320 Dependency on the state, 87, 122, 144, 148, 233, 258–259, 293, 302 Deprofessionalization, 1, 21, 302, 321 Deregulation, 277–278, 283, 286, 290 Differentiation, 6, 15, 18, 127, 132, 227, 296, 315, 320 Doctorates, 29–30, 35, 42, 44, 46, 101, 119–121, 123, 125–127, 131– 133, 168, 176–177, 259–263, 270– 271, 288–289, 313, 316 Employers’ organizations, 8, 74–76, 95, 157–158, 181, 284–285, 307 Equal opportunities, 27, 68, 156, 167, 190, 223, 289, 294, 307 Evaluation, 7, 9–10, 17, 21, 76, 106, 112, 130–131, 146–148, 156, 168, 174–175, 180–181, 184, 187, 189, 191–192, 234, 236, 268, 273, 278–

Index 279, 283, 294–295, 318. See also Monitoring; Quality assessment Federal states, 9, 21, 117 Fees, 109, 154, 179, 257, 304–305 Flexibility, 3–5, 7, 15–16, 20, 22, 28, 70–71, 75, 140, 220, 227, 236–237, 274, 278, 312 Framework Act for Higher Education, 9, 27–28, 74, 91, 111, 116, 138– 139, 157, 164, 189–190, 219, 226, 233, 236, 241, 255, 277 Funding, 7–9, 19, 26–27, 29, 36, 40, 43, 50–52, 58, 61–65, 71–72, 77, 83, 85–86, 91, 95, 100, 106, 111, 117, 121, 126, 128, 131–133, 143, 146–147, 154, 186, 191, 217–218, 223–224, 236, 251, 257, 268, 270, 283, 285, 295, 297, 302–306, 310, 314–315, 317, 319, 320; mechanisms, 8–9, 26, 52, 61, 102, 155, 234, 250, 301, 305; public, 8, 52, 61, 72, 77, 87, 91, 116, 140, 157, 169, 176, 179, 219, 256, 273, 278– 279, 281, 301, 304, 306; research, 2, 7–8, 17, 19, 50, 92–93, 116, 130, 141, 146, 155, 218, 237, 279, 281, 286, 302, 304, 315; sources, 19, 52, 72–73, 76–77, 83, 86, 154, 279, 282, 303 Governance, 20, 26, 31, 37–38, 40, 45– 46, 129, 218–219, 237, 278, 283, 285, 297, 302 Governing bodies, 20, 86, 157–158, 167–168, 180, 284, 302 Government control, 4, 41, 117, 123, 129, 179–180 Graduate schools, 71, 138–140 Heads of departments, 8, 33, 69, 73, 76, 100, 105–106, 159, 163, 165, 190, 227, 258, 285, 289, 292, 311– 312 Heterogenization, 4, 18–20 Human resources development/management, 6, 235–236, 263

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Individualization, 8, 20 Institutional leaders and leadership, 3, 5–6, 13, 119, 129–130, 285, 289, 297, 307 Institutions, types of, 70, 97, 101, 138, 155, 175, 221, 227, 229, 278, 280, 291, 302, 316 Job satisfaction, 14, 126–128, 131, 152, 188, 291 Job security and insecurity, 4, 11, 13, 20, 122, 124, 127, 129, 163, 291, 309, 314 Junior staff, 9–10, 12, 14, 17, 21, 31, 34, 46, 70, 78, 83–85, 102–103, 107–108, 110, 112, 119, 160–161, 165–166, 169, 239, 247, 249, 286, 288–289, 292–293, 295–296, 316 Management, 6, 21, 27, 140, 176, 218, 234, 236–237, 266, 301, 307– 308, 312, 315–316; institutional, 1, 3, 5, 7, 18, 21, 101, 220, 285, 305, 313; models of, 73, 87, 320; participation in, 268, 289; personnel, 285, 290, 292, 295 Managerialism, 5, 22, 87, 285, 312, 318, 320–321 Marketization, 4, 19–20, 73, 306, 321 Massification, 1, 7, 18, 68, 168, 233, 243 Ministries (in charge of higher education), 7, 13, 67, 69, 71–73, 77, 83, 87, 91–92, 95–98, 106, 108–109, 111–112, 117–119, 123–124, 129, 131, 133, 137, 139–141, 147–148, 151, 174–177, 179–181, 190–191, 218, 221, 223, 226–228, 233, 235– 236, 251, 256, 259, 282, 305 Mobility, 11, 17, 80, 130, 150, 173, 185, 189, 205–206, 212–213, 225, 245, 251, 289 Monitoring, 21, 41, 129–130, 156, 167–168, 266, 283, 318, 320–321. See also Evaluation Neocorporatism, 7, 20, 284 Nonuniversity higher education, 14, 25–

326

Index

29, 32, 34, 37, 41–44, 46, 70, 153– 155, 157, 162–163, 175, 218, 288 Output measurement, 7, 17, 21 Pay, 7, 15, 38–39, 46, 85, 94–95, 109, 164, 181, 219–220, 259, 268–269, 278, 290, 293, 295, 304–308, 314– 315 (see also Salary); scales, 5, 7–9, 11, 15, 97, 106, 108, 164, 225, 245– 246. See also Salary, scales Performance, 2–3, 10, 16, 20–21, 31, 39, 41, 44, 46, 67, 73, 106, 112, 125, 129–131, 147, 160, 166, 180, 234, 245, 266, 281, 293, 304, 310, 315, 318; assessment, 21, 156, 181, 245, 251, 271, 306; indicators, 304; -related pay, 5, 7, 9, 15–16, 46, 84, 259, 315 Private sector (in higher education), 3, 10, 26–27, 33, 38–39, 46, 91–92, 95, 103, 111, 122, 138, 150–151, 174–176, 179, 182, 188, 217–219, 230, 233–238, 240, 245–246, 249– 250, 256, 259, 268, 302, 307 Productivity, 7, 10, 20, 131, 174–175, 178, 266, 268, 319 Professionalism, 19, 22, 302 Professoriate, 2, 9, 12–15, 18, 180, 184, 187, 189, 190–191, 212, 215 Professors, 6, 12–13, 15–16, 30–31, 38–39, 42, 46, 68–70, 75–76, 78, 80, 83–86, 94, 96–97, 101, 104– 106, 110–111, 115, 117–134, 137– 139, 143, 146, 150, 180, 188–192, 217, 223, 225, 234, 238, 241–249, 258, 261–262, 266, 268–274, 282, 284–294, 269, 312, 314–315, 317; age, 122, 130; appointment procedures, 7, 68, 73–74, 94, 123, 239– 241, 245, 260, 272, 292; duties, 35, 82, 107, 119–120, 128, 131, 181– 182, 189, 260–262, 266, 269, 287, 291; female, 80, 82, 103, 122, 133, 289, 294, 312; and promotion, 39, 149, 189, 224, 261, 265, 272, 287,

311; ranks of, 12–14, 28–29, 36, 71– 72, 77–78, 80, 85, 98–102, 119, 121, 141–142, 148–150, 160–161, 163, 181–186, 220, 229, 231, 239– 248, 258, 260–263, 265–266, 268, 271–272, 286, 292; working hours, 71–72, 82, 108, 110, 128–129, 131, 187–188, 227, 248, 266 Professorships, 76, 81, 117–119, 121– 123, 125–127, 130, 132–133, 217, 221, 224–225, 227, 231, 258, 260, 262, 272, 274, 283, 289, 293 Proletarianization, 21, 302, 308–309, 321 Promotion, 4, 18, 28, 35–36, 38–44, 91, 94–96, 98, 104–106, 108, 112, 147–150, 159–160, 165–166, 179, 189–190, 223–224, 241, 245, 248– 249, 252, 258, 261, 263, 266, 270– 271, 273, 277, 282, 285, 287, 290, 292–293, 305, 307, 309–310, 312, 314, 317, 321. See also Careers Public expenditure (for higher education), 72, 154–155, 169, 179, 217– 218, 256–257 Qualification (of academic staff), 12, 16–17, 86, 119–120, 122, 124–126, 128, 133, 142, 147, 149–150, 159, 162–163, 166, 182, 223, 225–226, 240–241, 243, 258, 264, 274–275, 282, 285, 287–288, 290, 292, 295, 313, 318 Quality assessment, 17, 106, 181, 192, 273, 281, 283, 292, 301, 304, 320. See also Evaluation; Monitoring Quality assurance, 2, 8, 168–169, 259 Ranks of staff, 9, 12–15, 28, 33–40, 42, 44, 46, 100, 139, 141–142, 146, 149–151, 160, 182, 236, 239–240, 243–249, 251, 261, 267–268, 271, 290, 310, 312. See also Categories of staff Recruitment, 4, 7–10, 41–42, 44, 74, 76, 80, 91, 94–101, 103–107, 111–

Index 112, 118–119, 122–124, 146, 148– 149, 151, 160, 163, 166, 169, 174, 180–182, 185, 188–190, 192, 220– 221, 223, 236, 239, 243, 249, 252, 262, 270, 288–290, 292–295, 304– 305, 312–313, 315 Redundancy, 13, 149, 159, 169, 306– 307, 310, 313–314 Research: and career, 17, 41–42, 44, 84, 86, 97, 120, 262, 266, 272, 317; funding, 2, 7–8, 17, 19, 26, 35–37, 42, 50, 92–93, 116, 121, 128, 130, 141, 146, 155, 218, 237, 279, 281, 286, 302, 304, 315; and teaching, 7, 9–11, 13, 15–18, 21, 27, 31, 35, 38, 68–69, 72, 75, 78, 81–84, 86, 94, 97, 106–108, 112, 115, 117, 122– 123, 125, 127–130, 138, 141, 155, 165, 168, 174–175, 181–182, 189, 218–220, 223, 227, 235, 242, 256, 258, 262, 268, 282, 288, 290–293, 296–297, 308–310, 316–317, 320 Research staff, 10, 12–13, 17, 19, 35, 76–77, 93–94, 97, 100, 109, 220– 221, 224, 226, 282, 293, 305, 313, 317 Researchers, 17–18, 30–31, 35–36, 69, 71–72, 74–77, 80, 82–86, 94, 100, 103, 121, 123, 127, 176, 181–187, 189–192, 218, 221, 251, 261, 281– 282, 284, 288–290, 292, 297, 308 Retirement, 13, 38, 41, 87, 95, 100, 103, 111, 151, 159, 165, 181, 183, 185, 226, 244, 246, 249, 262, 270, 273–274, 289, 295, 307, 309–310, 314

Sabbatical leave, 4, 106, 227, 249, 292 Salary, 4, 16, 28, 35, 39, 46, 71–72, 74–75, 77–78, 80, 85, 101, 106, 108–111, 122–124, 129–130, 145– 146, 159, 164–165, 181–182, 184, 186, 188, 190, 219–220, 223, 225– 226, 231, 238, 242–243, 246, 259, 262, 266–267, 269–270, 274, 257, 288, 305–307, 309–310, 312; scales,

327

38–39, 43, 78, 84, 164, 219, 305– 307, 314, 321; systems, 5, 9–10, 46, 84, 130, 145, 180, 219, 226, 314. See also Pay Staff: age structure of, 30, 41, 185, 264–265, 289–290, 313; female, 42, 80, 102–103, 121, 133, 166–167, 189, 224, 264–265, 293–294, 312; numbers, 13, 28, 38, 43, 76–78, 100, 102, 111–112, 115, 150, 160– 162, 178, 183, 233, 236, 243, 245, 249–251, 256, 258, 263–265, 274, 282, 305, 308–309, 317; support, 111, 127, 133, 282. See also Categories of staff; Professors Staff development, 5–6, 21, 106, 129, 146–147, 167, 169, 248, 251, 258, 263, 294, 307 State control, 1, 4, 10, 20, 156, 190, 234, 278, 283, 302, 304 State regulation, 129, 141–142, 144, 150, 302, 309 Status, 12, 15, 67, 80, 94, 96, 102, 106, 112, 118–120, 123, 131, 137, 143, 145, 151, 190, 283, 314, 316, 321; legal, 3, 8, 10, 13, 21, 91, 97– 99, 101, 106–107, 138, 143–144, 148, 150, 159, 163, 174, 181–182, 192, 309, 321 (see also Civil servant status); social, 2, 6, 12–13, 68, 78, 98, 150, 159, 181, 309 Student/staff ratios, 2, 18, 21, 30, 33– 34, 69, 100, 102, 110, 115, 128, 162, 178–179, 191, 217, 230, 241, 249–250, 264, 282, 304, 309, 319 Students, 4, 10, 16, 68, 70–71, 77, 85, 93–94, 99–101, 103, 106–107, 112, 116, 118, 121, 123–126, 128, 131– 132, 139, 143, 147, 175–177, 179– 180, 187, 229–230, 233, 235, 237, 239, 243, 248, 252, 256–257, 261, 266, 271, 273, 278–280, 282, 284, 286–287, 289, 291, 295–296, 302, 304–306, 320–321; female, 103, 167, 223, 243, 294; male, 103, 164, 294; numbers, 7–8, 10, 13, 16, 69,

328

Index

71, 92, 100, 110–111, 115, 140, 153–154, 156, 161, 162, 168–169, 176–179, 182–183, 191, 217–218, 230, 233, 235–236, 249–251, 256, 258, 262, 264, 270, 274, 277, 280– 283, 295, 301, 303–304, 306, 319 Teaching: funding, 7–8, 50–51, 63, 71– 72, 108, 142, 155, 218, 230, 301, 304; hours, 7–8, 15, 18, 20, 35, 40, 71–72, 77–79, 84, 96, 99, 107–108, 110, 119, 121, 144, 165, 183–185, 187, 189, 192, 226–227, 229, 242, 246, 248, 262, 265–266, 270, 290– 291, 293, 316, 320. See also Working hours; Workloads Tenure, 4, 8–9, 11–14, 20–21, 28, 30– 31, 33–42, 44, 46, 73, 91, 94, 96– 99, 101–106, 108, 110–112, 119, 122, 124, 129, 138–139, 142–143,

150, 153, 159–160, 163, 166, 169, 182–183, 218, 221, 223–225, 227– 229, 231, 245–246, 248, 251, 290, 306, 309–310, 313–314 Terms of employment, 8–9, 137, 143, 158, 163. See also Conditions of employment Trade unions, 7–9, 20, 67, 71, 74–75, 85, 102, 158, 186, 192, 219–220, 227, 237, 252, 279, 284, 305–308, 312, 318. See also Academic staff unions Working hours, 71, 120, 131, 144, 165, 187–188, 226, 229, 241–242, 246, 265–266, 287, 291, 315–316. See also Teaching hours; Workloads Workloads, 18, 91, 165, 187, 220, 235, 246, 248, 265, 285, 288, 291, 315. See also Teaching hours; Working hours


JOHN E. ANDERSEN is Director of International Affairs, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. BERIT ASKLING is Professor of Education and Vice Rector, Go¨teborg University, Sweden. THIERRY CHEVAILLIER is Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of Bourgogne, and Member of the Institute for Research on the Economics of Education (IREDU), Dijon, France. MARIE COLEMAN is Senior Researcher with the Royal Irish Academy’s Dictionary of Irish Biography. JU¨RGEN ENDERS is Senior Researcher, Center for Research on Higher Education and Work, University of Kassel, Germany. OLIVER FULTON is Professor of Higher Education, Center for the Study of Education and Training (CSET), Lancaster University, United Kingdom. CHRIS HOLLAND is Research Fellow, Center for the Study of Education and Training (CSET), Lancaster University, United Kingdom. MAUREEN KILLEAVY is Senior Lecturer in the Education Department, University College Dublin, Ireland.

330


SVEIN KYVIK is Director of Research at the Institute for Studies in Research and Higher Education (NIFU), Oslo, Norway. JOSE´-GINE´S MORA is Professor of Economics, University of Valencia, Spain. ROBERTO MOSCATI is Professor of Sociology, University of Milan, Italy. UWE SCHIMANK is Professor of Sociology, University of Hagen, Germany. OLE-JACOB SKODVIN is Researcher at the Institute for Studies in Research and Higher Education (NIFU), Oslo, Norway. JENS-CHRISTIAN SMEBY is Researcher at the Institute for Studies in Research and Higher Education (NIFU), Oslo, Norway. VIRGI´LIO A. MEIRA SOARES is Professor in the Science Department, University of Lisbon, Portugal. SUSANNE LEHMANN SUNDNES is Researcher at the Institute for Studies in Research and Higher Education (NIFU), Oslo, Norway. KAREL TAVERNIER is Professor in the Economics Department, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium. DIMITRIOS G. TSAOUSSIS is Professor and Director of the Center for Social Morphology and Social Policy (KEKMOKOP), Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece. JUSSI VA¨LIMAA is Senior Researcher and Head of the Higher Education Research Team, Institute for Educational Research, University of Jyva¨skyla¨, Finland. EGBERT DE WEERT is Senior Researcher at the Center for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS), University of Twente, the Netherlands.

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