A Vital Rationalist: Selected Writings of Georges Canguilhem

A Vital Rationalist Selected Writings from Georges C;J n g u i I hem

v

Edited by Fran10ois Delaporte Translated by Arthur Goldhammer \\'ith an introduction by Paul Rabinow and

a critical bibliography by Camille Limoges

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BOOKS·

1994

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YORK

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Contents

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107

and

108

of

Editor's Note b_v Fran(ois Delaporte

the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public

pres~)

9

Introduction: A Vital Rationalist

without written permission from

~V

the Publisher.

Paul Rabinow

11

Sources for the excerpts are listeJ on pp. 480~81. PART ONE

METHODOLOGY

Printed in the United States of America. Distributed by The MIT Press,

II

Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England

Ill

The Historv of Science 25 The Various Models 41 The History of the History of Science

l.ibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Canguilhem, Georges,

1904-

PART

Two

EPtSTI::MOLOGY

A vital rationalist; selected writings fi·om Georges Canguilhcm /edited by Franc;:ois De laporte; translated by Arthur Goldhammer with an introduction by Paul

IV V

Rabinow and a critical bibliography by Camille Limoges.

p.

A Baroque Phvsiologv

em.

1.

Delaporte, franc;:ois,

Q12~.C34

~oo-dc2o

2.

Phvsiologv

Science-Philosophy.

1941-

11.

103

The Major Problems of lVineteenth-Century

ISBN 0-942 299-72-8

Science-History.

91

An Experimental Science

Includes bibliographical reference5. 1.

Epistemology of Biology 67 Epistemology of Physiology

VI

Title.

115

Epistemology of Medicine

The Limits of Healing

1993

9]-86q CJP

129

The Nea· Situation of .+!edicinc A ,tfedical Remlution

145

133

49

PAHl THIHE

VII VIII IX PAHT

FouH. X

XI XII PAHT FIVE

HISTORY

Cell Theory 161 The Concept of Reflex Biological Objects 203

179

INTERPRETATIONS Dc~cartes

219

Auguste Comtc

237

Claude Bernard

261

Rene_

Translator's Note

PHOHI I .I\1S

The texts collected here are translated from the French for the

XIII

XIV

Knowledge and the Living

first time, but for t\vo exceptions: I have included passages from

Science and Life

my translation of Georges Canguilhcm 's Ideology and Rationali~v

287

The Concept of l.ije 303 The Normal and the Pathological lnrrodtJction to the Problem

The Identity of the Two States

321

Normality and Normativity

Books, 1989 ).

327

Implications and Counterpositions XV

337

351

Critical Rlbliography by Camille Limoges Notes

(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988) and from Carolyn Fawcett\ translation of The Normal and the Pathological (Ne:w York: Zone

321

385

455

7

Editor's Note Franmcrgence of three disciplines: biology. physiology and medicine. Depending on the sub-

ject of study. Canguilhem will sometime_~ provide a histor)' of

Introduction: A Vital Rationalist

theorv sometimes a historv of concepts and sometimes a historv •

•

J

•

of biological objecte Henri IV, he entered the mnst elite educational institution in France, the Ecole Normale Sup(Tieure, in 1024. Among his promotion, his cohort, vvcre Jean-Paul Sartrc, Raymond Aron and Paul Ni:~an; lv1aurice Me-rleau·Ponty t'ntered the Ecole a year later. Already at this time, Canguilhcm vvas interested in themes that he would return to and develop rhroughout his intellectual life: in particular, a p.1per on Auguste Comte's theory of order and progress, which Canguilhem submitted f()r a diploma, display~ the beginnings of this persistl'nt interest in the relation of reason and 'locicty - an interest he shared with his other distinguislwd classmates but which Canguilhem developed in a highly original manner. The philosopher Alain's judgment ofCanguilhem

10

II

A

\i

fAl

RATIONALIST

in 1924 as "lively, resolute and content" still captures the man's spirit almost three-quarters of a century latcr. 1 Once he became agrC.qi in philosophy in 1927, the young Canguilhem began his teaching tour of provincial lycc.~es, as wrmation of an important resistance group to which he made available his skills. All in all, a life in the century. as the French say: like so many of his compatriots, Canguilhem 's life was shaped by the conjuncture of France's enduring institutions and the contingent events of his time. In 1943, Canguilhem defended his medical thesis, "Essais sur quelques probiCmcs concernant le normal et le pathologique." The continued timeliness and exceptional durability of this work is attested to by the fact that he updated it twenty years later with significant nc\v reflections, and that it \vas translated into English decades later as The Normal and the PathologicaJ.l After the war, he resumed his post at the University of Strasbourg (in Strasbourg), where he remained until 1948. After first refusing the important administr to establish .. the order of conceptual prog-

"the historicity of scientific discourse, in ~o much as that his-

ress that is Yisibil' only .d"tn the fact and of \vhich the present

tory effectuates a project guided by its own internal norms but

notion of scientific truth h the provisional point of culmination."6

traversed by accidents interrupted l-ry cri-;e past \\\ls no longer judge of the present, it was, in the full ~cnse of the word, witness to a movement that transcended it, that dethroned the past in favor of the present. As Fontenelle wa~ well aware, before the Moderns could speak about the Ancients, even to praise them, they had to take their distance. [Etudes, p. 55] [ 3 J According to Descartes, however, knowledge has no his-

r

tory. It took Newton, and the rdUtation of Cartesian cosmology, f()f history- that is, the ingratitude inherent in the claim to begin anew in repudiation of all origins - to appear as a dimension of science .I The history of science is the explicit, theoretical recognition of the fact that the sciences are critical, progressive discourses fOr determining what aspects of experience must be taken as real. 'The object of the history of science is therefore a nongiven, an object whose incompleteness is essential. In no \vay can the history of science be the natural history of a cultural object. All too often, however, it is practiced as though it were a form of natural history, contlating science with scientists and scientists with their civil and academic biographies, or else conflating science with its results <md results with the fOrm in which they happen to be expressed fOr p(·dagogical purposes at a particular point in time. [Etudes, pp. 17-18]

The Constitution of Historical Discourse [4 J The historian of science has no choice but to define his object. It is his decision alone that determines the interest and importance of his subject matter. This is essentially always the case, even when the historian's decision reflects nothing more than an uncritical reo;pect for tradition. Take, for example, the application of probability to nineteenth-century biology and social science. 4 The subject does not fall within the boundaries of any nf the nineteenth century's

THE

HISTORY

OF

SL:IENCE

mature sciences; it corresponds to no natural object, hence its study cannot fall back on mere description or reproduction. The historian himself must create his subject matter, starting from the current state of the biological and social sciences at a given point in time, a state that is neither the logical consequence nor the historical culmination of any prior srate of a developed science not of the mathematics of Pierre-Simon Laplace or the biology of Charles Darwin, the psychophysics of Gustav Fechner, the ethnology of Frederick Taylor or the sociology of Emile Durkheim. Note, moreover, that Adolphe Quetelet, Sir Francis Galton, James McKeon Catell and Alfred Binet could develop biometrics and psychometrics only after various nonscientific practices had provided raw material suitable fOr mathematical treatment. Quetelet, fOr example, studied data about human sit.t:>; tht:' collection of such data presupposes a certain type of intury of science I am, of course, drawing on the

JO

JI

METHODOLOGY

TH!=

HISTORY

OF

SCIENCE

inspirational teachings of Gaston Bachelard. 6 The fundamental

approach. By observing th~..·~c rules he will avoid the error of, for

concepts of Bachelarrl's epistemology arc by now well known, so

instance, seeing Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis as a premature

well known, perhaps, that they have been disseminated and dis-

transfOrmist or geneticist. 4 [fdcologv and Rationali~r. pp. 10-12 J

cussed, especially outside France, in a vulgarized, not to say sanitized, fom1, devoid of the polemical fOrce ofthe original. Among

[6] When Bache lard speaks of a nonn or value, it is because in thinking of his favorite science, mathematical physics, he identi-

them are the notions of new scientific spirit, epistemological

fies theory vvith mathematics. II is rationalism is built on a frame-

[rupture], and obsolete or ''offi-

work of mathematism. In mathematics one speaks not of the

cial" science .... To my mind, the best summary of Bache lard's research and

"normal" but of the "norrned." In contrast to orthodox logical

teaching can be found in the concluding pages of his last episte-

cal content, whether actual or potential. and that progress in

obstacle, epistemological break

positivists, Bachelard holds that mathematics has epistemologi-

mological work, Le Matirialisme rationne/.7 Here the notion of

mathematics adds to that content. On this point he agrees with

epistemological discontinuity in scientific progress is supported

Jean Cavaill&s. whose critique of logical pmitivism has lost noth-

by arguments based on the history and teaching of science in

ing of its vigor or rigor. Cavaii!Cs reh1tes Rudolph C1rnap by shov.'-

the twentieth century. Bachelard concludl's with this statement:

ing that "mathematical reasoning is internallv coherent in a \vav

''Contemporary science is based on the search for true [ ~iritable]

that cannot be rushed. It is by nature nature of this progn~ss, he conclude~.

facts and the synthesis of truthful [ veridique] laws." Bv "truth-

progr~ssin:'."!Il

As to

th~·

ful" Bachdard docs not mean that scientific la\vs simply tell a truth permanently inscribed in objects or intellect. Truth is sim-

One of the fundamental problems with the doctrine of science is

ply what o;;cience .;;peaks. How, then, do we recogni1e that a state-

precisely that progress is in no way comparable to increasing a given

ment is scientific? By the fact that scientific truth never springs

,·o!umc by adding a small additional .\mount to what i_~ ,1fready there,

fully blown from the head of its creator. A science is a discourse

the old subsisting with the new. Rather, it i'> perpetual revision, in

governed by critical correction. ff this discourse has a history

which some thing an effort to discover in what respects the discredited past remains the past of an activity that still deserves to be called scientific. It is as important to understand what the past taught dS it is to find out why we no longer he!ieYc in its lf'sson_'t. [ Etudn,

Emile Meyerson's than to Bachelard\, and more keenly attuned to the continuity of the rational function than to the dialectics of rationalist activity. Yet it was because he recognized the role of epistemology in doing history of science that he cast his Etudes aalilfennes and The Astronomical Revolution in the form that he did.

[ 13 J It is easy to distinguish between what Bache lard calls "normalitv"B and what Thomas Kuhn calls "normal science.".l 4 The

h the dating

44

4\

pp. ll-14]

Empiricist Lonicism

METHODOLOGY

the continuity of scientific research. Both stress the discontinuous nature of progress. Nevertheless, while the fundamental concepts share a 1;1mily resemblance, they do not really belong to the same brJ.nch. This has been noted by Father Franc;:ois Russo, who, despite reservations about the claims of superiority to which epistemological historians are sometimes prone, argues that Kuhn is mistaken about the nature of scientific rationality as such.25 Though ostensibly concerned to preserve Karl Popper's emphasis on the necessity of theory and its priority over experiment, Kuhn is unable to shake off the legacv of logical positivism and join the rationalist camp, where his key concepts of"paradigm" and "normal science" would seem to place him. These concepts premppose intentionality and regulation, and as such they imply the possibility of a break with established rules and procedures. Kuhn would have them play this role without granting them the means to do so, for he regards them as simple cultural facts. For him, a paradigm is the result of a choice by its users. Normal science is defined by the practice in a given period of a group of specialists in a university research setting. Instead of concepts of philosophical critique, we are dealing 'vith mere social psychology. This accounts for the embarrassment evident in the appendix to the second edition of the Structure of Scientific Revolutions when it comes to answering the question of how the truth of a theory is to be understood. [!deologr and Rationalitv, pp. 12-13]

lnternalism and Externalism [ 14 J How does one do the history of science, and how should one do it? This question raises another: what is the history of science a history of? ~ny authors apparently take the answer to this second question for granted, to judge by the fact that they never explicitly ask it. Take, for example, the debates between what English-speaking writers call internalists and externalists.26 Exter-

THE

VARIOUS

MODELS

nalism is a \vay of writing the history of science by describing a set of events, which are called 1'scientific" fOr reasons having more to do with tradition than with critical analysis, in terms of their relation to economic and social interests, technological needs and practices, and religious or political ideologies. In short, this is an attenuated or, rather, impoverished vt:>rsion of ~·1arxism, one rather common today in the world's more prosperous mcietics.n 'Internalism (which externalists characterize as "idealism") is the view that there is no history of science unless one places oneself within the scientific endeavor itself in order to analyze the procedures by which it seeks to satisfy the specific norms that allow it to be defined as science rather than as technology or ideology. In this perspective, the historian of science is supposed to adopt a theoretical attitude toward his specimen theories; he therdOn.· has as much right to formulate models and hypotheses as scientists themselves. Clearly. both tht> internalist and externalist positions conOate the object oftht~ history of science vvith the object of a science. The externalist sees the history of science as a matter of explaining cultural phenomena in terms of the cultural milieu; he therefore confuses the history of science \Vith the naturali':!t sociology of institutions and fails to interpret the truth claims intrinsic to scil'ntific discourse. The internalist sees tht· facts of the history of Kience, such as instances of simultaneous discovery {of modern calculus, fOr example, or the law of conservation of energy), as facts whose history cannot be written vvithout a theory. Thus, a fact in the histor:y of science is treated as a fact of science, ,1 procedure perfectly compatible with an epistemology according to which theory rightfully takes priority over empirical data. [Etudes, pp. 14-1 S]

47

CJ-L\PTrR

THHEE

The History of the History of Science

A History of Precursors [ 15 J Every theory is rightly expected to provide proofs of practical efficacy. \\!hat, then, is the practical effect fOr the historian of science of a theory wh05e effect is to make his discipline the place \vhnc the theoretical questions raised by scientific practice are studied in an cs~entially autonomous manner? One important practical effect is the elimination of what J.T. Clark has called "the precursor virus."-JX Strictly speaking, if precursors existed, the history of science \\'otdd lose all meaning, since science itself would merely appear to have a historical dimension.

'

Consider the work of Alexandre KoyrC. Koyre contrasted, on epistemological grounds, the "closed vmrld" of antiquity with the "infinite universe" of modern times. If it had been possible for some ancient precursor to have conceived of "the infinite universe" before its time, then Koyre's whole approach to the history of science and ideas would make no sense.)';) A precursor,

Wl'

are told, is a thinker or researcher who pro-

ceeded some distance along a path later explored all the way to its end by someone else. To look for, find and celebrate precursors is a 'lign of complacency and an unmistakable symptom of 49

METHODOLOGY

THE

HISTORY

OF

THE

HISTORY

OF

SCIENCE

incompctcncl' f()r epistemological criticism. Tvm itineraries can-

Ferchault de RCaumur and Maupertuis as precursors of Mendel

not be compared unless the paths followed are truly the same.

without noticing that the problem that Mendel set himself was

In a coherent system of thought, every concept is related to

every other concept. Just because Aristarchus ofSamos advanced

of his own devising, or that he solved it by inventing an unprecedented concept. the independent hereditary character. 32

the hypothesis of a heliocentric universe, it does not follow that

So long as texts and other works yoked together by the heu-

he was a precursor of Copernicus, even if Copernicus invoked his

ristic compression of time have not been subjected to critical

authority. To change the center of reference of celestial motions

analysis for the purpose of explicitly demonstrating that two

is to relativize high and low, to change the dimensions of the uni-

researchers sought to answer identical questions for identical

verse- in short, to constitute a

SY'~tl·m.

But Copernicus criticized

reasons, using identical guiding concepts, defined by identical

,11l astronomical theori(·s prior to his own on the grounds that they

systems, then, insof:1r as an authentic history of science is con-

were not rational systems. 30 A precursor, it is said, belongs to

cerned, it is completely artificial, arbitrary and unsatisfactory to

more than one age: he is, of course, a man of his own time, but

say that one man finished what the other started or anticipated

he is simultaneously a contemporary oflater investigators credited

what the other achieved. By substituting the logical time of truth

with completing his unfinished project. A precursor, therefore, is

relations for the historical time of these relations' invention, one

a thinker whom the hi~torian believes can be extracted from his

treats the history of science as though it Wt~n.-· a copy of science

cultural milieu and inserted into others. This procedure asmmes

and its object a copy of the object of science. The result is the

that concepts, discourses. speculations and experiments can be

creation of an artifact, a counterfeit historical object -the pre-

shifted tTom one intellectual environment to another. Such adapt-

cursor. In Koyre's words:

ability, of course, is o~ned at the cost of neglecting the "historicity" of the object under sturly. Hmv many historians, for

The notion of a ''lim,. runner" is

,1

very dangerous one for the histo-

example, have looked l(H precursors of Darwinian transf()rmbm

rian. It is no doubt trut' that ideas have

among eighteenth-century naturalists, philosophers and even journalists?-~1 The list is long.

opment, that is to say. they are born in one mind, and reach maturity

Louis Dutens's Recherches sur l'ori,qine des diwuvertes attribuies

their solutions can bt' traced. It is equally true that the historical

,1

quasi independent devel-

to bear fruit in another; consequently, the history of problems and

aux modernes ( 1776) may be taken as an (admittedly extreme) case

importance of a doctrine is measured by its fruitfulness, and that later

in point. \\'hen Dutens writes that Hippocrates knev..· about the

generations are not concerned with those that precede them except

circulation of the blood, and that the Ancients possessed the sys-

in so fM as they

tem of Copernicus, we smile: he has fOrgotten all that \Villiam

quit~

~ee

in them their "ancestors" or "forerunners." It is

obvious (or should be) that no-one h.ls ever regarded himselt

Harvey mvcd to Renaissance anatomy and mechanical models, and

as the "fOrerunner" of someone else, nor been able to do 'lo. Conse-

he fails to credit Copernicus's originality in exploring the math-

quently. to regard anyone in

ematical possibility of the earth's mo\'ement. \Ve ought to smile

oneself from understanding

thi~

light is tht' best way of preventing

him.~)

just as much at the more recent writers who hail Rene- Antoine

\I

METHODOLOGY

THE

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OF

THE

HISTORY

Of-

SCit'~CEo

A precursor is a man of science 'vho, one knows only much later,

from De _functionibus systematis nervosi, and concluded that the

ran ahead of all his contemporaries but before the person whom

entire theory of the reflex action inhere-nt in the spinal cord \vas

one takes to be the \vinner of the race. To ignore the fact that he

there "preformed and preestablished" (priiformirt und priiswbilirt ).

is the creature of a certain history of science, and not an agent of

Although not interested in investigating whether Hall and MUller,

scientific progress, is to accept as real the condition of his possi-

who may not have knov·m Prochaska's \vork directly. might have

bility, namely, the imaginary simultaneity of"bef()re" and "after"

been influenced by vvord of it filtered through "the scientific

in a sort of logical space.

milieu of his contemporaries and epigones" (in die fJieichzciti,qc und

In making this critique of a false historical object, I have

epigonische wisscnscha_ftliche 11Clt transpirirte), Jeitteles asks hmv this

sought to justify by counterexample the conc':pt I have proposed

work could have been ignored for so long. His answer, \vhich

according to \vhich the history of scicncl' defines its object in

seems judicious to me, is that Albrecht von Haller's authority is

its own intrinsic terms. The history of science is not a science,

a sufficient explanation. The theory of irritability, of a strength

and its object is not a sci~tific object. To do history of science

inherent in the muscle, diverted attention from the intrinsic func-

(in the most operative sen~- of the verb "to do") is one of the

tions of the spinal cord. This only makes Prochaska's merit all the

functions (and not the easiest) of philosophical epistemology.

more apparent: rather than rehearse the ideas of the period, his

[Etudes, pp. 20-2 3]

\vork contradicted them. The final lines of the article arc an appeal to some generous historian to revive the great Prochaska

A History in the Service of Politics

as a model for future generations. Jeitteles thought that the man

[16] It was in 1858 that a new oolemic, initiated this time by

to do this was the current occupant of Prochaska's chair at the

George Prochaska's growing renov.:n, resulted in Descartes\ name

venerable and celebrated University of Prague, the "illustrious

being brought into the history of the reflex fOr the first time. The

forerunner of all German universities." That man was the distin-

occasion was an article by A.L. Jeitteles, a professor of medicine

guished physiologist Jan Purkinje (1787-1869).

at Olmiitz, entitled Who Is the Founder of the Theon of Reflex

The impetuosity of this plea, which naturally and pathetically

A1ovement?l 4 Jeittcles summarized Marshall Hall's first paper, said

combines a claim for the originality of a scholar with an affirma-

a few words about Hall's priority over Johannes MUller, ackno\i\'1-

tion of the cultural values of an oppressed nationality, is equaled

edgcd the great value of both men's work, yet claimed that the

only by the brutality and insolence of the reply it received from an

impetus for research into reflex action came from else,vherc,

oflicial representative, not to say high priest, of German physiol-

ffom an earlier time, and ffom another source. "It was none other

ogy. Emile Du Bois-Reymond (1818-1896), Muller's student and

than our eminent, and today insufliciently honored, compatriot,

successor in the chair of physiology at the University of Rcrlin-

George Prochaska, who richly deserves to be preservl'd in the

who became a member of the Re-rlin Academy of Sciences in 1851

eternally gratefUl memory of our Czech fatherland, so rich in supe-

and \vho was already celebrated not only fOr his work in neuro-

rior men of every kind." Jcittelcs asserted that Prochaska \vas the

muscular electrophysiology but also for his numerous professions

true founder of the theory of reflex movement, quoted excerpts

of philosophical faith in the universal validitv of mechanistic

METHODOLOGY

determinism and the inanity of metaphysical questions 35 - summarily dismissed Prochaska and gave Descartes credit for ha\'ing had the genius to anticipate both the word and the idea of "reflex." In a commemorative address delivered at the time of Muller's dt•ath in 1858, ~Bois-Reymond stated that he had found ( wic ich gcjunden habe) that Descartes. roughly a century and a half before Prochaska, had correctly described reflex rnovement ( erstens beschrieb ... Descartes ... die Rcflexbewegungcn vO!lig

richtig); he had used the same analogy (with reflection) to de-

scribe the phenomenon; and he also deserved credit for the law

of peripheral manifestation ·of sense impressions. '16 The passages that precede and follow these lines on Descartes give a clear indication of Du Bois-Reymond's intention. It \vas, first of all, to protect Miiller's "copyright," as it were: MUller may not have known about Descartes, but Prochaska \vas another matter. If Prochaska was not the father of the notion of reflex, then he himself fell under the shadow of the judgment proposed in his name against his successors. Furthennore, Descartes was. according to DuBoisRcymond, a self-conscious mechanist physiologist, a theorist of the animal-machine, and therefore descrYing of the same admiration extended to Julien Offray de La Mcttrie, the theorist of the man-machine. 37 By contrast, Prochaska was a vague and inconsistent thinker in whose mind the notion of reflex was associated "',..ith that of consensus nervorum, an anatomical myth of animist inspiration. lX Indeed, if Prochaska had formulated the principle of the reflection of sense impressions in 1784, he failed to mention it in his Physiolosic oder Lehre von der Natur des .Henschen in

1820. I<J Firh1ily, Prochaska did not know \\'hat he wa-; doing the

f

THE

HISTORV

OF

THE

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OF

SCIENCE

in diminishing Prochaska, Du Bois-Reymond was really trying to

discredit a group of biologists manifestly guilty in his eyes of the sin of metaphysics, n 1 1'1 hope," 59

MCTHODOI OGY

THE=

HIS lORY

OF

THE

HISTORY

Ot

SCICNCE

Cuvicr says, "to have proven that this system is false,"5J alluding

ending finally with man, proclaimed to be the "master" of all that

to \Vhat he knmvs he has demonstrated through comparative anat-

\vent before. Now, it so happPns that there is a \Vestnn philoso-

omy and paleontology, namely, that there is no unity of organic

pher of Greek antiquity \vho \vas able to read that order, which

gradation, no unity of structural plan, no unity of composition

\vas unknmvn to Eastern mythology: that philosopher was Aristotle, "who understood that there is in nature a collection of

and no unity of type. Nmv, if Blainville, for his part, acknovvledges five distinct types

groups, and that each group fOrms a veritable series \vhose degrees

of creation, he nevertheless argues that they are arranged in a

pass imperceptibly ffom one to the other, from the most imper-

series, each one being the distinct expression of a general plan

fect to the one in \vhich life achieved its highest perfection.''' 6

whose progressive or regressive order, if one looks at the level of

.. ~ristotle's goal, clearly, was to achieve knowledge of man regard-

the species for gradations and degradations that ought to apply

ing all those aspects that make him superior to the animals, a

only to genera, does not proceed without apparent hiatus. If the

being possessing a touch of the divine. '>7

numerous papers, reports and dissertations published by Blainville

This key to reading the forms of life gives us the key to reading

can be seen as the a posteriori of his Yoological system, then the

Hlainville and Maupied's Histoirc. That key is the notion of "mea-

a priori is described in his Histoirc des sciences de !'organisation as

sure," an absolute term of reference and comparison. "J\-1easure"

an a priori not of rational intuition but of divine revelation. This

is a word that recurs frequently in the l/istoirc. The measure of

affirmation can bl' read in the Introduction, signed by Blainville

organized beings in their serial disposition is man. 51\ And it was

himself: "I conceived and carried out my I listoire de !'organisation

because Aristotle made man the measure of animality that Aris-

as a possible foundation fOr philosophy, while at the same time

totle himself is the measure of truth for the series of investiga-

demonstrating that philosophy is one and the same thing as the

tions that took animals as their object. Through the ccnturil's

Christian religion, \vhich is so to speak only an a priori, revealed

Aristotle is the measure of the sciences of organization. [ ... J

to man by God himself \vhen the state of society required it.''Sl

Nmv that \Ve possess the key to the Histoire des sciences de

And further: "Science in general is knowledge a posteriori of the existence of God through his works."54

cluded in the book while others were excluded. Unlike eclec-

How, then, does knowledge proceed? Through reading. The

tics such as Cuvier (who was frequently characterized as such,

preliminary analysis of zoological notions at the beginning of vol-

cover- that is, to read in the structures and functions of living

both scientifically and politicaJiy5 9 ), lllainville based his choices on an explicit criterion: "In this history a number of eminent men

lifr in terms of concepts and laws ba, the author of a Ci..'ld)rated dictionary of tht.· French

move; and the reasonable or thinking soul, the faculty of human-

guage, and Charles Robi~ proff.~sor of histology at Paris's Faculte

ity. In this context, it matters little whether Aristotle thought of

de Mcdccine. [ ... J

these three souls as distinct entities or as merely hierarchical lev-

The Dictionnairc

IMl-

de mL;dccine in question was a r(Tasting of the

els, the lesser of which could exist without the greater, whereas

1855 revised edition of Pierre Hubert Ny:-.ten's Dictionnairc (181-t),

the greater could neither exist nor function \Vithout the lesser.

itself the revised and (~xpanded successor of Joseph Capuron's

The important thing is to remember that fOr the Greeks the word

Dictionnairc de mt!decinc ( 1806). The editors were keen to point

psrche meant cool breath. The Jews, moreover, had ideas of life

out the difference

and the soul quite similar to those of the Greeks: "And the Lord

cused of championing Mld the positivi')t doctrine they professed

bet\\"l"f'll

the materialist ideaummary of it~ contents

priest of German materialism at thC' time. In De la Philosophic dite

given in the fifth part of the 1637 Discourse on At/ethod as a mani-

positive dans scs rapports m'ec Ia mCdecine, ChaufiJrd cekbrated "the

festo supporting an animal physiology purified of all references

indissoluble marriage of medicine and philosophy" and yearned

to a principle of aninlJtion of any kind, it was bccJu.;;e \Villiam

to f()und "the notion of the real and living being" on "human rea-

Harvey's discovery nfthc circulation of the blood and publication

son a\\'are of itself as cause and force." Two yearo,; later, Claude

of the Exercitatio anowmiw de motu cordis et mn,quini~ in animalihm

BenBrd wrote, "For the experimentJ.I physiologht, there can be

( 1628) had, in the mcantinw, presented

no such thing a:>. :>.pi ritualism or matcri.1lism .... The physiologist

nation of Ll life function -an explanation that nuny phy~iciam.

.:t

hydrodynamic expla-

and the physician should not think that their role is to discover

particularly in Italy and Cermany, had tried to imitJ.te, offering

the cause of Iife or the essence of diseases." 11 ["Vie," Encyclopae-

a variety of artifici.:tl models to explain such other functions as

dia, pp. 76 7a-6 7b J

muscular contraction or the t.'quilibrium of fish in \\·,1ter. In fact, 77

EPISTEMOLOGY

EPISTEMOI OGY

OF

BIQI_OGY

Galileo's students and disciples at the Accademia del Cimento, Giovanni Alfonso Borelli (De motu onimalium, 1680-81 ), Francesco Rcdi and Marcello Malpighi, had actually tried to apply Galilco's teaching in mechanics and hydraulics to physiology; Descartes, though, was satisfied to set forth a heuristic program that \vas more intentional than operational. One vvay of explaining how organs like the eye or organ systems like the heart and vessels work is to build what \Ve would now call organs the organist and the air that causes

said that plants too have organs, although of an extremely simple

them to play are one and the same thing. by which I mean that

kind, and people did wonder ,1bout the organi1ation of the plant

the soul is extremeh· ~imilar to the air or to brearh."lx

kingdom. f..licroscopk examination of plant preparations led to

The concept of organism developed in the eighteenth century.

gen~.·re

organ~.

rhar concourse being .;,uch

that thcq· .Ktions constitute, lw their order of harmony or ~ucce~­

sir•n. tl1l' intrinsic form of a function of health or of a gt>nu.;, of 11

disea~t·.-

OF

81'JLClGY

tably turned attention toward the problem of integrating t'lementary indi\'idualitics and partial life forms into the totali;ring individuality of an organism in its general life l()rm. Such problems of general physiology would increasingly claim the attention of Claude Bernard over the course of his career as a researcher and professor. For proof one need only consult the-

Comte, of course, imported the concept of consensus into the

ninth of his Le(Ofl'l mr les phCnomCnes de Ia ric communs aw: animau'

theory of the social organism, and he later revised and gener,tliJf'd

et au.r vc!gitau\. The organism is a society

it in hi.'l work on social static.-,. "Consensus" then bccaml' synon-

organi::.ms, at once , an invariant, but he failed to note that in any real nll'chanical

o,;ystem involving fl-iction, this quantity does not remain constant, due to the generation and loss of heat. The eighteenth century faikd to formulate the notion of conservation of cm·rgy ...\t the beginning of the nineteenth century, two feh in 1826, Jacob Augustus Lockhart Clarke in 1850, Brown-Si,quard in 1850 and Friedrich Goll in 1860. Rased initially on experiments involving section and excitation of nerve fibers, this work prPceded Friedrich \1\ralter\ discovcry of spinal

the molluo;k hut from ohserntion of the di.;;tinctive, sequential

degPncration in 1850.

mechanical nature always aroused the fewest objections was the neuromuscular. Mechanistic theorie~ first arose not from the

lncomotion of vcts a detected

nature\ presumed powu to correct disorders on its own. Nature

deviation. Thh activity, however, b not the product of inrMte

the physician \Vas respected by a therapeutics of watchfulness

knmvledge: "Nature finds its own ways and means, but not bv

and support. By contrast, modern medic in~.: was activist in its ori-

tongu~

entation. Bacon expressed the hope that it would learn from

are another, and so are other actions of this sort. Nature does what

chemistry. and Descartes that it would learn from mechanic'j. Yet

is appropriate without instruction and without knowledge."

bet ween the Greeks and the Moderns, for all that they were sepa-

intelligence: blinking is one such, the various offices of the

ThC' an,1logy betweC'n nature as healer and the rnedic.1! art

rated by the Copernican re\'olution and it"i critic.1l comt:'']Ul'JlCes,

throvrs the light of nature on the art, but not vice versa. The

the difference remained philosophical, without perceptible im-

medical art must observe, must listen to nature; to observe and

pact on the health of mankind. The shan.'d project of Bacon and

to listen in this context is to obey. Galen, who attributed to

Descartes, to preserve health and to avoid or at least delay the

Hippocrates conc('pts that one can only call Hippocratic, adopted

decline of old age- in o;;hort. to prolong life- resulted in no not-

them in hio; own right and taught that nature is the primary con-

able achien·mento;;. Although Nicolas de i\-Lllebranche and latrr

sen·ator of health because it is tht:' principal siMper of the organ-

Ed me Mariotte spoke of "experimental ml·dicine," the phra~c

ism. llowever, no Hippocratic text goes so far as to portray nature

remained a signifier in search of a signified. Eighteenth-century

as infallible or omnipotent. The medical art originated, developed

medicine remained a symptomatology and nosology, that is, a sys-

and \Vas perfected as a gauge of the power of nature. Depending

tem of classification explicitly based on that of the naturalists.

nn \
animals rather than on men; and instead of Galenic principles it

rable: d-ory and progress. Experimental medicine is progressive,

ust'd rxtracts isolated by pharmaceutical chemistry, fOr example,

he argt~t·:, because it elaborates theories and because those the-

repl.King opium with morphine and quinquina "vith quinine.

ories art -hem selves progressive, that is, open. Bernard\ \'it:"w is

01 thesc thrl'l' differences, the second wa~ initiall~· greeted with

summcc LIP in twn obiter dhta: "An experimc,ntalist never out-

thl' greatest incomprehension and critici~m. J\lagcndie's vivisec-

lives hi• vork. lie is always at the level of progrcs of his rese.uch as Magendie's successor. For he had discovered

symptoms, was "placed in parentheses." A sign could sometimes reveal ,ln illness before a symptom led to its being ~uspected. In

the influence of the sympathetic nervous sy">tem on animal heat

Section 86, Laennec gives the example of a pectoriloquy as the

( 185 2 ); had generated, in the course of research on glycogenesis, a ca~c of diabt>tes by a lesion of the pneumogastric nerve at the level of the fourth ventricle ( 1849-51 ); and had demonstrated the selective action of curarC' on the motor nerves. As a result, Bemard conceived an idea that he never n·pudiated, namely, that all mor-

sign of a symptomless pulmonary phthisis. 44 This was the beginaccidents and anomalies, a practice that would gradually expand

bid disorders arc controlled by the nervous system;-1-2 that diseases

oscopt· to the most modern magnetic re~onance imaging equip-

are poisonings, and that infectious viruses are agents of fermen-

ment, from the X-ray to the computerized tomographic scanner

tation that alter the internal environment in which cells live.43

and ultrasound instrument, the scientific side of nwdical prac-

Although thc..~sc propositions vvere later adapted to quite different

tice is mo~t strikingly symbolized by the shift from the medical

experimental situations, none can be said to have been directly

office to the testing laboratory. At the same time, the scale on

responsible for a positiYe therapeutic application. What is more,

which pathological phenomena are repre,ented ha"> been reduct·d

Bernard's stubborn views on the subject of pathogeny prevented

ffom the organ to the cell and from the cell to the molecule.

him from seeing the practical implications of the work of ccr-

ning of the use of man-m.1de instrument~ to detect alteration~. with the addition of new testing and measuring equipment and the elaboration of subtle test protocols. From the ancient steth-

The task of the physician, however, is to interpret information

EPISTEMOLOGY

EPISTEMOLOGY

Ot

MFD•C•NE

derived from a multiplicity of source:-,. Though medicine may set

tJbk father of the numerical method." It may be of ... onw inter-

aside the individuality of the patient, its go,\[ r(_•mains the con-

est to recall a litrlc-knO\nl judgment concerning him. llenry

quest of disease. VVithout diagnosis, prognosis and treatment,

l)ucrotay de Rlainvillc said this in his Histoire des sncnces de

there is no medicine. Here we find an object suitable for study

l'org.:wisation of 1845:

in terms of logical and epistemological analysis of the construcappl~·ing

tion and testing of hypotheses. \Ve also find ourselves at the dawn

A m.Hhematician, Pinel began by

of medical matht•matics. Doctor.~ were jusr beginning to become

mcch.111ics: a philmopher, he carried on with an in-depth 5tucly of

mathem,ltics to animal

a\vare of an epistemological limitation already recogni7l~d in cos-

nwntal illne'>s; a naturalist and obst"rver. ht.· made

mology and physics: no serious prediction i~ possible without

ing the natural method to medicine; ,md tmvard the end he l.1psed

progn·cd ~tatistical meth-

[53] l oui'i used stati-.tics in a different spirit h-om Pinel. lli'i" main

ods to study the relation between certain dbcascs and changes

goals w~.:re to substitute a quantitative indt·x for the clinician's per-

in the weather. I Jt. also introduced statistical considerations in

son.:d judgment, to count the number of \veil-defined signs pres-

the revised edition of his TraitC midico-philosophique sur l'aliination

ent or absent in the examination of a patient and to compare the

menta/c. Edwin Heinr Ackcrknecht says that Pim:l was "the veri-

results of om~ period with those obtain~·d by other phy and Charles Robin, both positivists, declared their hostility to "numerics)\ in the article they published under that rubric in the thirteenth edi~ tion of their Dictionnaire de midecine, chirurgie et pharmacie ( 1873 ). In their view, calculations could never replace "anatomical and ph:vsiological knowledge, which alone makes it possible to weigh the value of symptoms." Furthermore, the effect of using the numerical method is that "patients are observed in a sense pas~ r,;ively." As with the case of Laennec, this \vas a method that set

Bacteriolooy

aside the distinctive features of the patient seeking individual

[54 J The discoveries of Louis Pasteur, Hcnnann Robert Koch and

attention for his or her p administered in dispensaries, bar~ racks and schoolhouses. The object of medicine was no longer so much disease as health. This gave new impetus to a medical discipline that had enjoyed prominence in England and France -,;ince the end of the eighteenth century - public health or hy~ giene. Through public health, which M'quired institutional status in Europe in the final third of the nineteenth century, epidcmi~ ology took medicine into the realm of tht:> social sciences and

144

145

eco~

F f' IS T E f-1Ll LClGY

FPISTEMOL(](~·;

OF-

MEOICLNF

nomics. It became impossible to look upon medicine solely as

The German School

a science of organic anomalies or changes. The effects of the

[55] Yet it was an extension of microscopic techniques for the

patient's social and economic situation on the conditions of his

study of cell preparations and the use of synthetic aniline stain~

or her life now numbned among the f~1ctors that the physician

(manufactured in Germany after 1870) that led, fi)r the first time

had to tJke into account. The political pr imagine

past that it now constitutes a distinct genre, to which additional contributions may be added as they arise, even without system-

ogy, their thinking has bt:>en dominated

atic intention. Biology classt;>s have familiarized all of us with what

li\'ing things growing out of a primary -;ubstance that io;; continuous and plastic; others think of organisms as compoo;itt·s of dis-

is now a fairly standard image nf the cell: schematically, epithelial tissue resembles J honeycomb. -1 The \vord "cell" calls to mind

crete parts, of"nrganic atoms" or "seeds oflifC.." Continuity versus

not the prisonn or the monk but the bee. Ernst Heinrich Haeckel

discontinuity, continuum vasus particle: the mind imposes its

pointed out that cl'lls of wax filled with honey are in C\'ery way analngou~ to cdb of plants filled with sap.4 I do not think that

torm., in biology just as it does in optic'i. The term "protoplasm" now refers to ration and association lurk more or less discreetly in the background of the developing cell theory.

Dujardin had suggested the term "sarcode" fOr the -;amt.: thing, Theodor Schwann, the man regarded as the founder of cell theory, \vas influenced by both images: he believed that a structure-

!62

i6J

namely, a living jelly capable of subst:>qucnt organization. Even

less substancl' (the cytoblasteme) gives rise to thC' nuclei around which cells form. In tissues, cells form wherever the nutrient

CELL

HISTORY

liquid penctrilte,. This theoretical ambivalence on the part of the

Tf-'EOPY

"anillll\ls and plantories a~sumcd that heredity i-, uni-

parts is the nnl:· one, BuHt">n argues. capable of avoiding thP

path - h~· which one theory leads to another. Auguste Comte

lateral: ovists, following Regner de Craaf, claimed that it was

shrewdly called attention to thi-, relation oft henry to theory wht>n

maternal, whcreJ'\ animalculists, f(->llowing Anthonie \Jn Leeuwen-

he remarked that since an t..·mpirical ob':lcrvation prcsuppos, in any assemblage

it is compmt>d is one of pmximity. Just a.~ ox~gen Jnd hydrogen di\-

of thPSt' pMtS.

,lppcar in \\"JlL'r, ju~r .1s nH·rcur) and \ulfur di~appt·.u in cinnabar,

what tahs place here i'> a true interpenetration, an inlertwining and

[Connaissancc, pp. 52-56]

unification oL1ll the animJicu[c'i. hom that m!lment on, they haw

Lorenz Oken, or the Continuous lmaoination

i'lrll

no life of tht·ir on n. ;\II arc p!Jced .Jt the ~ervicc of a higher organ.md \nll-1.. toward a unique and cnrnmon function, m perform that

[AO) Charles Singer and Marc Klein, as well as Emile Guyl~not,

lllflction in pur~uing thc.__·ir

though to a lesser dcgn,~c, did not fail to note the credit dut· to

all .1re

Oken fr the formulation of cell theorv. Oken belonged to the Romantic school of nature philosopher'> founded by Schelling.ln

~aniticcd.

O\\·n

ends. lien--, no indiYidua[ i\ -;pan•d;

But the language is mi\leading., for the combina-

tion of indi\·idu.llitic" timns anntht·r indidduJiit_\. The former arc the lattt·r appt'.lrs (lnly a~ a result (lth.u dc ... trucrion. 11

dc.\tro~cd. and

The speculations of this school had as much intlucncc on earlyninctr-

Rut ,,-hat is the point of saying that protein viruses are simple liv-

~nn cnmpnscd nfmany ct'lk Tht· indi\·idua!it~ of the pn~un

in turn he cHaced in a society of individu.1ls h~



tho-;c a\rending ~nics of Jnu!tiplcs of the cell. can also be found in

of research intended to shed light on that relation as n_·vealing

cellul.:n ~;uhmultiplcs: the parts of tht.· cell in turn possess a certain

some ultimate truth. l Connoissancc, pp. 69-71 J

dcgrcL· of indi\·iduality p.1rtially ~uh,umcd by the higher and more powerful individu.1lity of the cell. Individualit~ cxi of individualized

regard, there is no reason to confine the pown of individualitv

cellular building blocks. given the rulv of -.uch essential systems

1]2

l7J

j.,

H

CELL

STORY

in a general way that ,1!! the procett-'d. The other involve\ 179

HI5T()RV

IHE

biology in particular: it is widely bt~lieved that, in this .-,cience,

CO\iCEFT

l'S

it in a different cqntext or with

J

to ex plain the class of phenomena that he had explained in his

rliflncnt meaning. it don not follow that the l"'mcept as tJ_'>ed in

own fdshion. Mv ovrn vie"· is that, in the historv of !-.cience, logic per se

the original theory is nothing but a nw .minglcss word. Some concept':!, such as the ret1ection and refraction of light, are theoreti-

ough; to take precedence over the

cally polyvalent, rhat is, cJpable of being incorporated into both

lo~k

of history. Before we

relate theories in terms of logical content and origin, \Ve must

particle theory and H'J\'e theory. furthermore, the fact that

ask how contcmpor.uit~~ interpreted the concepts of which those

cept plays a o;trong role in a certain theoretical domain is by no

theories were composed- f{x if we do not in.,ist on internal con-

means sufficient grounds for limiting research into the origins of

sistency. we ri\k falling into the paradox that logic is ubiquitous

that concept to similarly con-.rituted domains.

J

con-

except in scientific thought. There may he a logic, moreover, in

By adhering to thc'ic methodological prcccpt'i, I carne not

the succession of doctrines in themselves illogical. Even if one

discover Thomas \Villi~- for -.rlmt· nin('tl'enth-cenrury physiolo-

holds that the principk of noncontradiction h obsolete, and even

gists aware of the history of the reflex concept hod mentioned

,j!J

to

filS TORY

THE

CONCEPT

OF

REFl [;.,

his name- but to confirm his legitimate right to a title that had

they are inserted." Morphologically, this tells us little, but that

pre,·iously been open to doubt or challenge. [Formation du nijlexe,

little suffices for Descartes's physiology of movement. Every nerve is a bundle of fibers contained vvithin a tube, a marrow cnmi'\ting

PP· 3-6]

of fine threads extending from the cerebral marrow and rather

Rene Descartes Did Not Formulate the Reflex Concept

loosely sheathed in an arterylike tubular skin.22 One might say,

[ 65 J When Descartes proposed his general theory of involun-

borrmving an image from modern technology, that Descartes

tary movement, he, like many others before him, associated such

envisioned the nerve as a sort of electrical cable run through a conduit. As a bundle of wires, the nerve served as a sensory

movements with phenomena that we today refer to as reflexes. Does it follmv, then, that he belongs among the naturalists and

organ,n while as a conduit it served as a motor organ. 1 -1 Thus Descartes, unlike Galen and his followers, did not distinguish sen-

physicians who helped to delineate and define the concept of reflex? The answer to this historical and epistemological ques-

sory nerves from motor nerves. Every nerve was both sensory and

tion mu~t. I think, be deferred until detailed, critical study of

motor, but by virtue of different aspects of its structure and by

the Cartesian anatomy and physiology of the nerve and muscle ena-

way of different mechanisms. IS The centripetal St'nsnry excitation \vas not something that propagated along the nerve but,

bles us to decide whether or not Descartes could have anticipated, ho\vevl'r confusedly, the essential elements of the concept.

rather, an immediate and integral traction of the nervous fiber.

Descartes, of course, believed that all physiological functions could be expla.ined in purely mechanical terms. Hence, he saw

\Vhen the animal sees, feels. touches, hl·ars or taste~. the surLKt' nf its body shakes the hrain hy \VJ)"" of the nent:" fiber. The cen-

only a limited number of possible interactions among an organism's parts: contact, impulse, pressure and traction. The impor-

trifuga.l motor reaction, on the other hand, is a propagation, a

tance of this fact cannot be overemphasized. Descartes's vvhole

transport. The spirits flow out through the pores of the brain, opened up in response to th(' pulling on th(' fihers, and into thl' empty space between the fibers and the conduit through which they run. If pressed, they press; if pushed, they push. Ht>nce the

conception of animal movement derives from this principle together with what he considered a sutTicicnt set of anatomical observations. [Formation du ref/etc, p. 30]

muscle s\vells, that is, contracts.~ 6 Involuntary movement is thus

[66 J In Article 10 of The Passions of the Soul, Descartes claims that the animal spirits, born in the heart20 and initially carried

different from action in all of its elements and phases. [Formation du n!flcxc, pp. 34-35]

by the blood, build up in the brain as pressure builds in an air chamber. When released by the brain, these spirits are transmit-

[6 7] Basically, the conc('pt of reflex consists of morl' than just a rudimentary mechanical explanation of muscular movement. It

ted through the nerves to the muscles (other than the heart),

also contains the idea that some kind of stimulus stemming from the periphery of the organism is transmitted to the center and

where they determine the animal's movements. Descartes says that muscles .ue balloons filled with spirits, 'vhich, as a result of their transversal expansion, contract longitudinally, thus moving the articulated bone structures or organs such as the eye in which 182

then reflected back to the periphery. What distinguishes retlex motion is the fact that it does not proceed directly from .1 center or central repository of immaterial pmver of any kind. Therein

HISTORl

~ ,,

THE

CONCE~T

CF

RE~IIo'-

lies, within the genu~, "mtwement," the specific difference be-

the heart retained its heat, and traces of blood remaining in it

tween involuntary and voluntar;'. Now, according to C,1rtesian

could vaporit.e and cause it to e.xpand.~r.: Hut fnr those \\.·hn held

theory, movement that mJ.nifests itself at the periphery, in the

that the heart was a muscle. it became diHicult to argue that the

muscles or visc~._·ra, originJ.tes in a center, the center of all organic

brain was the essential centr,'tl controller of all organ movements.

centers, namely, the cJ.rdiJ.c vessel. This is a material center of

Thus, it became necessary to look to place-<E

H'STORY

panied hy a representation, stemming from the rdlcction of an

CONCEPf

r_)~

RE~LEX

Whytt, rather, he argued that medullary rdlectinn of nervous

external sense impression, is \vhat takes place, fOr example, when

imp..re~sions was governed by a biologicalla'v of the conse-rvation

a decapitated frog jumps in response to a pinch of its digit."42

of living things. The examples cited by Prochaska were the s~me­

Unzer's originality should now be apparent: he refu'>cd to iden·

ones that Descartes and Astruc had described: occlusion of the

rif~,

eve! ids and snec1ing. ProchasL1 defined the relation of reflex

anti mechanism wirh animism, ,wei he decentrali:t.ed the phe·

nome non of reflection of stimuli, which \Viii is and Astruc had

~otion

been able to conceive only in terms of a cerebral seat.

cxolicitlv distinguished the aspect of obligatory automatism from

George Prochaska, professor of anatomy and ophthalmology

th:·

to

consciou~ness

better than any of his predecessors: he

aspe~t of optional. intermittent unconsciousm~ss, and he sup-

at Prague and Vienna, would succeed in combining \Vhytt's obser·

ported this distinction vvith .1rgunwnts f[om comparative anat-

vat ions on the functions of the spinal cord with Unzcr's hypoth·

omy. As one ascends from lower to higher animals, a brain is adJed

eses about extending the reflex function outside the brain. In De

to ;he sensorium commune. In man, soul and body have been joined

functionibu~

svstematis nenosi commentatio (1784), Prochaska argued

by God. Nevertheless. the soul "produce!'. absolutely no action

that the physiology of the nt.·ryous system had confined itself too

that depends wholly and uniquely on it. All ir~ actions are pro-

narrowly ro the brain, ignored comparative anatomy, and there·

duced, rather, through the instrumt.~nt of the m·rvous system."

fOre, until Unz-~r, failed to recognize that the vis nenosa, or

m'T·

Thus Prochaska end~ ,vhcre Descartes began: in the case of invul~

vnus force (no more talk of animal spirits), requin·d only one

untarY motions, thl' soul uses an apparatus that can also function

thing: an int.Kt connection of the nerve fiber to the sensorium com·

''"ithf~ut its cooperation and permission. But the anatomo~phyervations of associated movements in narcotized

cord by the sensory nerve, which then might or might not con-

animals and general reflex convulsions led him to two simulta-

tinue on to the common sensorium and, thus, might or might not

neous conclusion:~: reflex movements can involve the entire body

become conscious. Reflex movement \Vas therefore one species

in response to the most insignificant local sensation, and the more

within a genus comprising all movements conditioned on the

extensive a reflex movement is, the less it is synchronized.

action of the sensory nerves. I fall, on the other hand, felt that

Mi.iller's concept of reflex, which maintained a connection 197

HISTORY

with sensation- that is, with the brain- as well as the possibility that a local sensation might produce reflected effects throughout the organism, sidestepped most of the objections that had been raised against llall's ideas. Hall had scandalized many physiologists by attributing to the spinal cord a power to regulate movement still \Videly believed to be an exclusive province of the brain.[ ... J It was in 1853, four years before Hall's death, that Eduard Pflilger published Die scnsorischen Functionen des Riickenmarks der rJ',rheltiere. The \veil-known lav.rs of reflex activity (homolateral conduction, symmetry, medullary and cerebral irradiation, generalization) C'sscntially recast, in apparently more experimental fOrm, "-hiller's notion of the association of movements and the radiation of sensations. In fact, PflUger followed Miiller in using the reflex concept to l'xplain so-called sympathetic or consensual phenonll'na, whose interpretation had previously divided proponents of the principlt' oLmastomosis of the peripheral nerves (Thomas Willis, Raymond Vieussens, Paul-Joseph Barthcz) from believn~ in the principle of a confluence of impressions in the 1·ensorium commune (Jean Astruc, Robert Whytt, Johann August Un1.er, George Prochaska). According to Prochaska, the reflex xt that made it meaningful was as old as Prochaska would have been. had he not died in 1820. In fact, PflUger did not succeed in 1853 in finding a strictly physiological o;,olution to a problem that Hall, rather than really facing, had sidestepped by attributing what he called "excitomntor powers" tu nerve fihers. The problem lay in the terms '\ensat ion" or '\emibility" as lhey wnc used in the earliest definition~ of the reflex. \Vii lis had said that "rdlex motions immediateh, fOllow sensation" (motus rejlexus est qui a sensionc prae1·ia imme· diatus depcndens, illico retorquetur), whereas Prochaska had sneration, h~._·nce

\Yith Ari•aotle but also the history of vvhat was long called "nat-

with the problem of the mutability of -;pecic~. On this point,

ural history," including the classification of living things, their

Huffon was never able to achieve certainty. lie did not regard the

orderl;.' arrangement in a table of -;imilaritics and diffrrences.

idea of dcrivatin· species as absurd on its face, but he believed or

study of their kinship through morphological comparison and,

professed to b...:lieve that ob:-,crvation confirmed the teachings of

finally, study of the compatibility of different modt>s of e:..istcnce.

the Bible. S'>

Natural hbtory ntury. the status of species \vas the foremo~t problem of the naturalio;ts, as can be seen most clearly of

k1rth

famous dictum, "I think, therefOre I am." The radical distinc-

and will are not subject to the same limitations as intelligence,

tion betvvcen soul and body, thought and extension, implies tht'

not only in the human mind but also in God. For Descartes, tech-

substantial unity of matter, whatever its fOrm, and thought, \Yhat-

nology \vas ahvays to some degree a synthetic and, as such, un-

cver its function.l Since judgment is the soul's only function,

analyzable fOrm of action, but I do not believe that he vie\ved it

there is no reason to believe in the existence of an "animal soul,"

consequently as unimportant; rather, he saw it as a f(xm of crea-

since animals, bereft of language and invention, show no sign of

tion, though admittedly an inferior one. If the foregoing analysio.; is correct, one question remains un-

being capable ofjudgment. 4 The denial that animals possess souls (or the faculty of rca-

answned: Why is there no theory of creation in Descartes's phi-

son) does not imply they arc devoid of life (defined as warmth in

losophy? Or, to put it another \vay, why is there no aesthetics?

the heart) or sensibility (insofar as the sensory faculties depend

Of COUrSe, it is difficult to draw any COnclusion \VhatSOl'Vt'r ft·om an absence- but there are grounds fOr asking whether Deo:.;cartco:.;

on the djsposition ofthe organs).r; The same letter I cited above reveals one of the moral under-

might not havl' felt an obscure sense that admitting the possibil-

pinnings of the theory of the animal-machine. Dc'icartc..; doe' lOr

ity of a general aesthetics might have contradicted his general

animals what Aristotle did fOr slaves: he devalue' them in order

thc()ry. for Dcsc:trtl's, the intelligibility of reJlity deriYed from

to

mcchanin and math(:matical physics. For him, movement, along

cruel to animals than it i~ overly rious trm·.ud rncn, freed from

jtL.;,tif~

using them as instruments. ".l\1y opinion is no more

with extension and number, was a fundamenttoriE:

ONS

DESCARTES

ect, \Nere to be explained exclusively in terms of material la,vs.

to tell the time than it is for a tree which grew from this or that

Gueroult is correct, then, \Vhen he says that Descartes began with

-;ced to produce the appropriate fruit." 25 But may we not reverse

a conception of medicine as pure physics which he later rejected,

the order of this relation and say that what('ver is natural. that is,

and, furthc·r. that "one of his chief reasons fOr confessing the fail-

mechanical, in the animal organism is also artifici;·!l, giwn that

un· of his medical project was his growing conviction that me-

animal-machines are automatons constructed, as it wert', by Cod?

chanical concepts alone would never suffice to create a medical

And in constructing these machines, did God not pnwidc for

science bccau~c the human body is not pun· t'xtcn":~iun but in part a ppccial casc of man. there is no \\'ay to avoid recourse to

2]4

INTERPRETATIONS

"God's transcendent purpose, namely, that the la\\'S of mechanism

CHAPTFH

ELEVEN

alont: should suffice to engender and preserve machines whose parts are arranged so as to fulfill the requisite conditions for a

Auguste Comte

union of bodv and soul, that is, a relation of means to end"28does this not imply, then, as Gueroult suggests, that if we assume that machines lack this Hsame organization and interdependence of parts and \vhole,"29 we must accept an "incomprehensible clivi~ sion" bet'vveen men and animals? Indeed, without such interdepcndenct:, which allows a mechanical relation of structure to be transformed into a teleological relation of fitness for purpose, the indivisible functional unity of the organism becomes inconceiv~ able. The incomprehensible division is tolerable only when pre~ sen ted as an "unfathomable mystery" that situates man in relation to God's wisdom.JO

The Montpe/lier School [87] After being banished to Montpellier for his role in the closing of the Ecole Polytechnique, Auguste Comte took courses at the

In short, only a metaphysician could have set forth the prin-

faculty of Medicine, where Paul~Joseph Barthez had taught until

ciples of a mechanistic biology without falling at once into con-

his death ten years prior to Comte's arrival. Tht: man who actually

tradiction (contradiction that must in any case emerge in the end).

introduced the father of positivism to biology was Henry Ducrotay

Few historians of biology have noticed this, and even fewer histori-

de Blainvillc, a former professor at the Museum and the Sorbonne.

cally minded biologists. It is more regrettable that philosophers

J laving met him at Claude Henri de Saint-Simon's, Comtc at-

have made the same mistake. [Formation du rijlcte, pp. 54-56]

tended Blainville's course in general and comparative physiology

from 1829 to 1832. He admired his teacher's encyclopedic knowledge and systematic mind. The Cours de philosophic positi~'C was in fact dedicated to Blainville and Charles fourier, and its forti~ eth lesson is full of praise for Comte's erst\vhile teacher. [ ... ] In portraying the eras that preceded the advent of the positive

spirit in philosophy, Comte liked to sketch the. history of biology in broad strokes, dra\.ving on a keen awareness of the interrelatedness of biological discoveries that he took from Blainville's lectures. A striking example can be found in the Fifty~sixth lesson of the Cours, \Vhich concerns the naturalists of the eighteenth century.1 1 Comte excelled at giving summary descriptions of the contributions of various scientists and at \Veighing their relative 2]6

2J7

11\.TEof.!PRETAT'O"JS

AUGU'31E

COMTE

importance. Among those whom he singled out as precursors of

metaphysical state of physiology," maintained that Barthez's "vital

positivism were Hippocrates, Barthez, Bichat, Johann Friedrich

principle" pointed to "a mctaphysical state of physiology farther

Meckel, Lamarck and, of course, Claude Bernard. The range of

removed from the theological state than the IOnnulation used by

the citations proves that Comte was genuinely learned in the sub-

Stahl assumed." Unlike so many of his own contemporaries and so

ject, whence the easc with lvhich he attained a lofty vantage fi·om

many of Barthu's, Comte refused to be misled by a mere change

which he was able to conceive of the history of science a') a critical

0

history, that is, a history not only oriented toward the present but

stituted a new name fi)r what Stahl had called "the soul." On this

judged against the norms of the present. Thus, in the forty-third

point, he made a profound ,md pertinent remark: "For so chimer-

fterminology. He did not believe that Barthez had merely sub-

lesson Comte's account of the controversy between mechanists

ical an order of ideas, such a change in terminology alwayo, indi-

and vitalists was planned to reveal the "obviously progressive

cates an authentic modification of the central idea."

intent" of the Montpellier vitalists, especially Barthez and Bichat,

Barthez's invaluable historian, his friend Jacques Lordat, points

whose work was so unjustly decried at the time in Paris. [Ftudes,

out that Albrecht von Haller was primarily responsible for the

pp. 62-6 3]

mi,;interpretation that Comte avoided. It was von Haller who

f88] In a note in the twenty-eighth lesson of the Coun, Comte hailed the illustrious Rarthez as "a far more influential philoso-

wrote in the second volume of his Anatomicol Ubra~v that Barthez

pher" than ConJillac, and in his preface to the j~1 om'eaux rilriments

source of the lift-_ fOrce.

de !a science de !'hom me he praised it as a text "of eminent philo-

copy of his 1772 inaugural address to the Montpellier Faculty of

sophical power" and an "excellent logical theory," far superior

i\·1cdicine, "De Principio vitali hominis," von Haller indicated

believed that what he called the "vital principle" was the ultimate P

But in thanking Barthel fOr sending a

to the "metaphysician" Condillac's Traiti des .~vstc'mes. In the fOrty-

that he himself was not so bold as to "accept a principle of a novel

third lesson, Barthez is praised fOr having established "the essen-

and unknown nature.''

tial characteristics of sound philosophical method, after having

Note, moreO\Tr, that while Rarthez's \vork was certainly one

so triumphantly demonstrated the inanity of any attempt to dis-

'iource of Comtc's philosophy, it i~ at least plausible that Barthe1\

cover the primordial causes and intimate nature of phenomena

Fxposition de Ia doctrine mridicole, which Lordat published in 1!-~18,

of any order, as well as having reduced all true sciencc to the dis-

influenced Comte's judgment of that work. Jacques Lordat was a

cover;' of the actual laws governing phenomena." There can be

professor of anatomy and physiology at Montpellicr when Comte,

no doubt that it was from a medical treatise published in 1778

who was banished to Montpellier in 1816, attended courses there.

that Comtc took the fundamental tenets of his positive philoso-

When Comte characterit.ed Barthez's cxpression "vital principle"

phy, which he believed were confirmed by Pierre-Simon Laplace's

as a mere "formula," he wa') actually using the same term that

1796 Exposition du systCme du monde and Fourier's 1822 Thiorie ana~l'tique de lo chaleur.

Lordat had used in critici1.ing von llallcr's C1ilurc to understand

It should now be clear why Comte, who characterized Georg Ernst Stahl's doctrine as "the most scientific f()rmulation of the

that the phrase implied no belief in a special substance or entity distinct from body and soul. Comte encountered the teachings of the Montpellier School in iVlnntpellier itself, and that, coupled

I"'TERPRETATIONS

AUGUSTE

with his outspoh·n animosity tmvard certain leading figures of the Paris School, may have had something to Jo with the admiration that enabled him to form a clear picture of Montpellier's doctrine. [Etudes, pp. 7 5-77] [89] Comte was able to perceive the direct, authentic insight into biological realities that lay hidden behind the abstract concept of the vital principle. From Barthez as well as Bichat, he learned of the intimate relations among the concepts of organization, life and consensus. This debt to BarthE'Z may explain Comte's tl'ndency to present him as the sole representative of the Montpellier School. He overlooked, or pretended to overlook, ThCophile de Rordeu. The idea that the life of an organism is .1 synthesis of elementary lives, an idea that delighted Diderot in D'Alembert's Dream, would no doubt have seemed as unsatisfactory to Comte as did the theory of organic molecules- and he woulc! have raised against it the same objl·ctions that he leveled. in the k)rty-first ksson of the Cours, at th~, first formulations of cell theory. If Bichat dissuaded Comte from f()Jiowing Lorenz Oken, Banhez overshadowed de Bordeu in his mind. The concept of complex living things composed of organic molecules or animalcules suggested a misleading analogy between chemistry and biology. Life is necessarily a property of the whole organism: "The elementary animalcules \vould obviously be even more incomprehensible than the composite animal. even apart from the insoluble difficulty thJ.t one would thereby gratuitously create concerning the effective mode of so monstrous an association." Very much in the spirit of Barthez, Comte held that "every organism is by its very nature an indivisible whole, which we divide into component parts by mere intellectual artifice only in order to learn more about it and always with the intention of subsequently reconstituting the whole." The statement reveals as manv taboos as it does ,crupks. [Etudes, pp. n-79] c

-

COMTE

Bioloyical Philosophy [90] The invention of the term "biology" reflected a growing awareness on the part of physicians and physiologists that their subject matter was fundamentally different from that of the physical sciences. The coining of the word suggests an assertion of the discipline's autonomy, if not ofits indept'ndence. Comte's biological philosophy provided systematic justification fOr that assertion: it connoted full acceptance of, as well as a need to consolidate, "the great scientific revolution \vhich, under Bichat's leadership. transferred overall priority in natural philosophy h·om astronomy to biology."n Comte was not entirely wrong to see the disappointments he had suffered in his career as consequences of the fact that he, a mathematician, had taken up cudgels on behalf of the biological school in the struggle to maintain, "against the irrational ascendancy of the mathematical school, the independencl' and dignity of organic studies."H Comte's conception of thl' milieu ju~tified his belief that biology could not be a separate science. And his conception of the organism justified his belief that biology must be an autonomous science. The originality and fOrce of his position lies in the correlation- or, some \vould say, dialectical relation- between these two concept~. Comte took the Aristotelian term "milieu" from Lamarck via Blainville. Although it "''as in common use in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century nwchanio and thl' physics of iluids, it was Comte who, by reverting to the word's primary sense, transf(xmed it into a comprehensive, synthetic concept that would prove useful to later biologists and philosophers. When he suggested, in the forty-third lesson of his Cours in 1Rl7, that the first duty of biology is to provide a general theory of milieus, Comte, who may not have known thl' \vork ofVVilliam Edwards (1824) or Etienne Geoffroy Saint-llilairc (1831) in this area, thought he was pro-

1'-jTERPRETATIONS

claiming Lamarck's superiority over Bichat. Hichat's distaste for

AUGUST tO

COMTE

to whom he alludes, enabled him to see, in the earliest formula-

the methods of the eighteenth-century iatromathematicians had

tions of cell theorv, the first glimmerings of a theory of"degrces

led him to insist not only that the distinction between living and

of individuality." For Comte, the very concept of the cell implied

inert was legitimate but also that the living and the inert were

a misleading analogy bct\vccn organic bodies and inorganic com-

fundamentally antagonistic. Against this, Comte argued that "if

pounds composed of indivisible molecules. l7 [Etudes, pp. 6 3-66] [91] Clearly, the idea underlying all ofComte's positions on biology was the necessary duality of life and matter. In biological philosophy, the eighteenth century bequeathed two temptations to the ninctct·-nth: materialism and hylozoism, that i~. the doctrine that matter is animated or that matter and life are inseparable. Comte, like Descartes, battled on two fronts, and his tactics were, if nothing else, Cartesian. The matter/life dualism was the positivi ':it equivalent of the Cartesian metaphysical dualism of extension and thought. For Comte, dualism was a prerequisite of univcrs,1l progress, which to him meant nothing other than the subjugation and control of inerl matter by the universe of the living under the guidance of humankind. "\Vc are, al bottom, even less capable of conceiving of all bodies as living," wrote Comtc,

all that surrounds living bodies really tended to destroy them, their exbtence would be fundamentally unintelligible."l'i Comte's successive judgments of Lamarck are revealing, however, of the deeper meaning of his biological views.[ ... ] Beyond the first consequence of the Lamarckian theory of the milieunamely, the variability of species and the gradual inception of ne\v varieties - Comte perceived a possibly monist, and ultimately mechanist, tendency. If the organism is conceived of as being passively shaped by the pressure of the environment, if the living thing is denied all intrinsic spontaneity, then there is no reason not to hope that the organic might someday be explained in terrns of the inert. But here the spirit of Bichat rose up in Comte against the threat of "cosmological usurpation," 36 against the shouldering aside of Larmarck 's insights in favor of an uncompromising mathematical approach.

than as inert, because the mert' notion of life implie~ the exi'itcnce

Similarly, Comtc held, like Bichat and following his lead, that the tissue was the lowest possible level of anatomical analysis; he therefore denied that the cell, . .vhich he called the "organic monad," could be the basic component of all complex organisms. It was not simply that he was suspicious of microscopy, whose technique-, were still relatiYely primitive; Comte's opposition to cell theory was primarily logical. For him, an organism was an indivisible structure of individual parts. Actual living things were not "individuals" in any simple sense. Neither his superficial knowledge of German nature philosophy, especially that ofOkcn, nor his reading of Henri Dutrochet (at around the time he \vas preparing the Cours), nor even his reading ofTheodor Schwann,

of thing~ not endowed with it .... Ultimately, living being-, can c:-.ist only in inert mili(·us, which provide tlwm with both a 'iubstrate ,md a direct or indirt•ct source of nourishment. ... If everything were alive, no natural law would be ros~iblc, for the variability that is ah,·ays inhert'nt in vital spontaneity is really limited only by the preponderance of the irwrt milieu. ~x

Even in beings where the only manif(·-,tation oflifc is vegetative, one finds a "radical contrast between life and death." Hetween plants and animals there is simply a "real distinction," whereas between plants and inert substances there is a "radical st>paration." The traditional division of nature into three kingdoms

AUGUSTE

INTERPRETATIONS

COMTE

(animal, mineral, vegetable) allowed one to imagine a gradual

Lamarck's doctrine. Gall provided Comte vvith an argument in

transition from one species to another along a chain of being;

favor of innate aptitudes and, more generally, of innate func-

Comte therefore proposed replacing that tripartite scheme with

tions - an argument that Comte elaborated into a guarantee of

a new one consisting of two "empires" (living and inert). He was

continued progress through development of a preexisting order. Comtc claimed to have achieved comprehensive, critical in-

convinced that "vital science cannot exist without this irreduc-

sight into the biology of his time. If I have correctly identified

ible dualism."l9 In essence, Comte saw, between Lamarck and Descartes, a par-

the grounds of his self-confidence, it should now be possible to

allel that no one would think of disputing today. Perhaps more

state his most important conclusions in a systematic fashion. First,

perspicacious with respect to the fUture than accurate in his per-

Comte believed that he, following Georges Cuvier, had eliminated

ception of the present, Comte anticipated the consequences of

teleology from biology: the "conditions of existence" replaced

the idea that animals can be conditioned by their environments-

the dogma of final causes, and the only relation assumed to exist

that is, he fOresa\v the possibility of behaviorism. The assumption

between an organism and its environment, or betvveen an organ

of a direct muscular reaction to external impressions is incom-

and its functions, was one of compatibility or fitness, implying

patible, Comte argued, with the idea of "animal spontaneity, which at the very least implies that inner motives are decisive." 40

nothing more than viability. "Within certain limits," Comte states

This would lead to a "restoration of Cartesian automatism, which,

existence is possible." 42 The harmony between fUnction and organ

though incompatible with the facts, continues in one fOrm or

"does not go beyond what actual life requires."·B Since, moreover,

another to mar our leading zoological theories."4l

organisms depend on their environments, living things arc sub-

in the Cours, "everything is necessarily arranged in such a \vay that

Nm"· we can sec why Comtc ascribed such importance to the

ject to cosmic influences. Biology is therefOre related to cosmol-

theories of Franz Joseph Gall, who argued that the fundamental

ogy; hence, the principle that nature's laws are invariable, first

inclinations and drives of human and animal behavior arc innate.

h.lrmulated in astronomy and eventually extended to chemistry,

His cranioscopic method, so easy- all too easy - to celebrate or

could now be extended to biology, thereby invalidating the helief

ridicule, actually stemmed from his principled hostility to sen-

that variability and instability are essential to organic processes.

sualism. If it could be shown that certain areas of the brain were

Finally, generalizing a principle borrowed from Franyois Joseph

by their very nature associated with certain psychic faculties, then

Victor Broussais, Comte held that all pathological phenomena

one must ascribe primordial existence to those faculties. Hence,

coold be explained by the laws of physiology. Thus, he argued that

nothing could have been more alien to Gall's (or Comte's) think-

the difference betv.veen health and disease was a matter of degree

ing than the Lamarckian idea that the biological functions are

rather than of kind - hence medicine should base its actions on

independent of the organs that embody them (and may even influ-

the analytic la\vs of anatomophysiology.

ence the development of those organs). True, Gall did map cere-

Yet, as even the Cours made clear, the very organic structure

bral topography by studying the mental functions of his patients,

of living things constituted an obstacle to further progress in

but in doing so his intention was to refUte, not to corroborate,

~·

'•

positive, experimental physiology. An organism, Comte argued,

r~

AUGUSTE

1 ERPRETATIOI\.S

CO'-.IITE

is a consensus of orgam and functions. The harmony that e-'ists

and that of Kurt Goldstein, to find in the former a phcnomcno-

among the functions of' the organism is "intimate in a ver} dif-

louiccll hiolngv amnt Ia lcttre and in the l.utcr a hitherto-ne~lected t--

ferent sense from the harmon} that exists between the organism

positivi~t inspiration. In fact, Comte had an idea, albeit a con-

and the milieu."H An organism, Comte maintained, is a uni-

fu-;ed one, of where he was going. The intellectual function was

fied whole; to dissect it, to divide it into component parts, was

the distinguishing feature of animal lite. To interpret all life as a

"mere intellectual

artifice." 4 '>

~-

~

The biologist, then, must \vork

series devolving from man, the perfect embodiment of that hmc-

from the general to the specific, from the whole to the parts:

tion, was to trt:>at biology as subordinate to sociology, fl:lr the true

"How can anyone conceive of the 'vholc in term-; of its parts once

theory of intelligence was to be found, Comtc believed, in soci-

cooperation attains the point of strict indivisibility?" 4 b Between Immanuel Kant and CLwdf Hernard, Comte oncl' again made

olog\' and not in psvchology. [Etude\ biological philo'iophy, that cdiHcc of erudi-

finality, in the guise of totality, an essential element of the defi-

tion and learning, hid an intuitive conviction whose implication-; were. far-reaching. The impetus behind that conviction no doubt

nition of an organism. This was not the only place \\'here the positivist method vio-

stemmed from the fact that a utopian spirit breathed life not only

lated the principle of working from the simple to the complex

into the bold assertions of a brand-new science but al-;o into the

and the known to the unknown. In celebrating the promotion of

time-tested truths of a philosophy almost a-; old as life itself. Sim-

anatomy to the quasi-philosophical dignity of compar.HiYe anat-

ply put, this was the conviction that life takt·s place but does not

omy. a system that providl'd a basis f(x cla .. -.if~·ing the multitude

origin,ue in the ,,-orJd of the inert, wht:"re it abandons to dc,uh

of spl'cific forms, Comtc \vas led to reject Cuder's fond notion

individual organisms that stem from elsc,dH.TC. "The collection

that the animal kingdom consists of a number of distinct branches

of natural bodies does not fl:lrm an absolute whole-" This bel it-t',

and to accept instead Lamarck's and Blainville's th . .~ory of a unique

combined with the i(ka of a continuous, linear series of living

series. Once again, his grounds for making this choice involved a

things culminating, logically as well as tt.•lcologically, in man, was

subordination of the simple to the complex, of the bl'ginning to

eventually transformt>d into the idea of Biocracy as tht· necessary

the end: "The study of man must always dominate the complete

condition of Sociocracy. This was the positivi 'it equivalent of tht·

old metaphvsical itka of a Kealm of Fntk rFtudes, p. 7 3 J

system of biological science, either as point of departure or as

;_,'/I

goal."- 1' This is became the general notion of man is "tlw only

p

immediate" datum we haw.-+:-: Comte thus claimed to be keeping

~~.

Positive Politics

faith with his general program, "which consists in ,1lways reason-

) 'i

[93] The superiority of positive politic~ "rl·~ults ffom the fact

ing from the better known to the lesser known," even though he

"

,_.,

',,';'il

,,

that it discon.'rs what others im·ent." The di~covnv that the inven-

insisted on arranging the animal series in order of decreasing com-

tor of positive politics claimed as his own was that "the natural

plexity - this in order to read the series as "revealing a devolu-

laws that govern the march of civili1.ation" are derived ffom the

tion ffom man rather than

J

perfection ffom the sponge." It \vould

strain credulity to draw a p.-uallt:>l between Comte's approach here

I

laws of human nrganintion. To the extent that "the state of -;ocial organization is essentially dependent IJn the ~tate of civilization,"

c. 1J

INTFRPRETATIONS

social organization is nothing other or more than an aspect of human organization "not subject to major change" (so far as we can see). \Vhat we know of human organization, moreover, is the result of a methodological decision "to envisage man as a term in rhe animal series, indeed, from a still more general point of view, a') one of a collection of organi1.ed bodies or substances." St.•erningly faithfUl to Claude Henri de Saint-Simon's terminology, Comte gave the name "physiology" to the "general science of organized bodies." But a difference between his me of the term and Saint-Simon's is already evident. For Comte, physiology was not just a discipline recently instituted for the study of man as living being, one whose method could serve as a model for the study of m.m in society; more than that, the content of physiology was to become the nucleus of a new science. Physiology owed its content to medicine, and medicine taught this lesson: "Long having hoped that he might learn to repair any disturbance to his organi1atinn and cwn to resist any destructive force, [man J fina1ly n.·al i1ed that his efforts \verc futile as long as they did not cooperate with tho~c of his organization, and still more fUtile when the two were opposed." And further: ''The fact that many illnesses were cured in spite of defective treatments taught physicians that every living body spontaneously takes powerful steps to repair accidental disturbances to its organization." Hence, politics is like medicine in that both are disciplines in \vhich perfection requires observation. And just as there were f\.\'0 schools of medical thought, so, too, were there two ?ngth to the presence of

COMTE

perfect themsclve~. Hy interpreting this capacity as an inherent

resistance. From this I venture to conclude that well before he

property of the nature of org.ani1.atinn, he was able to k~·ep l~tith

added Anthelme Kicherand's E/Cments de physiologic and Barthez's

\\·ith the precepts of positivism.

.'iom·eaux ClCments de Ia science de /'homme to the annals of posi~

On December 25, 1824, Comte wrote Jacques-Pierre fanny

tivbm, Comte had read what both authors had to say about ani-

Valat: "The state in which we find society today is a long way

n'lal movement. l-ticherand wrote of "l.igzag moveml·nt in the

from normal. ... It is. rather,

space between two parallel lines." And Barthcz, in his Nouvelle

he viewed organization as a normative property of organisms, he

,1

very violent state of crisis.'' Because

mCcanique des mouvements de l'homme et des animaux, discussed

could on three difll>rent occasions ch.uactt·rile political projects

waves and reciprocating motions. Comtc also used the word osci\A

or practiu·-; as ''monstrusitic.," or "monstrous" 1nd on fqur

w the

two young phy.,icians, Dr. LouisAAuguste Segond and Dr. Charles

Hippocratic condul He described his allegiance to po'~ In what respects, moreover, did Franyois-Joseph-Victor Brous· sais influence LittrC (either directly or through Comte)? Surely, Littn:'· inherited Broussais's stubbornness in defending the theories of physiological medicine, which were based on a belief in the identity of the normal and the pathological. as well as on a rdU. experience of such military phyicians as Villerme, \vho had served as surgeon-major in Napoleon's army. This medical subspt·cialty had no doubt lent credence to the notion of milieu, fir~t put fonvard in the works ofBlainville and l_amarck. I Iygiene, according to Littn?, is the science of actions and reaction~ bet..veen milieus <md organisms. humam included. :\-..for milieu, Littn~ noted in IRSR that the term had a tt:'chnical meaning, and h(' g.an~ a detailed definition in many respect'\ rrminiscent of the t.-tble of phy~ical agent~ that Blaim·ille hJd called "external modifiers." The scientific elaboration of the word "milieu" in the nineteenth century require-d the participation of a number of sciences that had achieved the stage of "positivity"- physics, chemistry and biology. The term also served in part as an ideological substitute for the notion of"climat

-

,'IS

attentive readers of Bernard already knmY, he

become so complex, industries cannot do without the oversight

tility i-, expres-;ed openly at the end of Rerna.rd's most widely read

of a highn agency that appreciates the dangers, preserves the envi-

·work, the Introduction

ronm delivered at the

of expcrimentJ.Iism." There can be no doubt that he meant this

Colkge de France in hi'i la . . t appt:>arance there ,1s f\1agendic\ 'iub-

rnJ.xim to apply to himself. An c.:xplanation c.1n he t~1und in his

stitute. In rhat lecture, he reviewed tht.• cxperimt'nt'\ .1nd the con-

note boob: "Everyone t()llows his own path. Some undergo lengthy

clmion, pp. 144-46]

The Implications of a Paradoxical Discovery [101 J The importance, then and now, of the Le,ons sur les pMnomCnes de Ia ric communs au• animaux et aux t'i8itaux stems first

INT!-Rf-'RETATIONS

CL AUDC

E3ERNARD

tion in terms, an impossibility as unthinkable as a square circle.

philosophical, or, to usc a term less suspect to the scientific mind,

Second, and more important, Hernarcl understood that he had

meta physiological. That idea can be summed up in a sentence first

hit upon an argument capable of exploding a theory firmly estab-

written in 1878: "There is but one \Vay of life, one physiology,

lished in the minds of contemporary chemists. Whatever misgiv-

ways to live, there was probably only one way to die a natural

for all living things." ["Claude Bernard," Dialogue, pp. 560-62] [103] In the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant argued that the conditions under which physical science was possible \vere the transcendental conditions of knowledge in general. Later, in Part Two of the Critique of Practical Reason, entitled "The Critique of Teleological Judgment," he modified this vie\v, acknowledging that organisms were totalities \vhose analytic decompo~ition and causal explanation were subordinate to an idea of finality, the governing principle of all biological research. According to Kant, there could be no "Newton of a blade of grass." In other \\'ords, the scientific statu~ of biology in the encyclopedia of knov,:lcdge could never compare with that of physics. BefOre Claude Bernard, biologist'i were forced to choose bet ween identif). ing biology with physics, in the manner of the materialists and mechanish, or radically distinguishing between the tvm, in the manner ofthe french naturalists and German nature philosophers. The Newton of the living organism was Claude Bernard, in the sense that it

death. In 185 3, Claude Bernard proved that there was no division

\Yas he who realized that living things provide the key to deci-

of labor among living things: plants

not essential as suppli-

phering their own structures and functions. Rejecting both mech-

ers of the glucose without which animals cannot live. The t\\'O

anism and vitalism, Bernard was able to develop techniques of

kingdoms do not form a hierarchy, and there is no teleological

biological experimentation suited to the specific nature of the

subordination of one to the other. This discovery paved the \vay

object of study. It i~ impo~sihle not to be struck by the contrast,

fOr a general physiology, a science of the life functions, and this

probably unwitting, between the lOllowing two passages. In l.erons

ings one may have about illustrative comparisons, a comparison here is irresistible. \Vhen Galileo observed spots on the sun, he ddivcrcd a decisive blmv to the old Aristotelian distinction between the sublunary world, supposedly susceptible to generation and corruption, and the supralunary \vorld, supposl'dly etl'fnal and incorruptible. He taught mankind to sel' analogous things in analogous ways. Similarly, when Claudl' Bl'fnard discovcrl'd the glycogenic function of the liver, he delivered a decisive blmY to the old distinction between the plant and animal kingdoms, according to which plants can and animals cannot synthesize simple organic compounds, in particular hydrocarbons. lie taught the human eye to see life in a new way, without distinction bl't\vecn plant and animal.

.,

In the fOrtil'th lesson of the Coors de philosophic positive, Auguste Comte had written in 1838 that while there were hundreds of

\Vl'fl'

discipline immediately gained a place in the academy alongside comparative physiology. From Bernard's doctoral thesis to the last

."i'

mr fcs phCnomCncs ph_rsiqucs de la vic (Leo;~ons of December 28 and ~0.

1836), franc,·ois Magendie wrote, "I see the lung as a bellows,

courses he gave as professor of general physiology at the Musl·um

the trachea as an air tube, and the glottis as a vibrating reed ....

(published in 1878 as Le(ons sur lcs phCnomCncs de la vie commons

We have ,m optical apparatus f(n our eyes, a musical instrument

aox animaux ct aux vCaCtau.\ ), his work was all aimed at proving

for our voice'l, a living retort lOr our stomachs." Bernard, on the

the validity of a single guiding principle, \vhich might be called

other hand, in his Cahicr de notes, wrote, "The larynx is a larynx,

266

,1-JTERPRETATIONS

and the lens of the eye is the lens of the.' t'yc: in other words, the mechanical and physical conditions necessary for their existence are satisfied only \Vi thin the living organism." Thus, while Bernard took from Lavoisier and Laplace by way of Magendic what he himself called the idea of "detcrminism," he was the sole inventor of the biologica:J concept of the "internal environment," the concept that finally enabled physiology to become a deterministic science on a par with physics but without succumbing to fa5cination with the physical model. [Etudes, 148-49]

The Theoretical Foundations of the Method

[l04] The unusual, and at the time paradoxical, nature of what Bernard had "inadvertently" discovered was what enabled him to conceptualize his early results in such a way as to determine the course of all his fUture re,C'arch. Without thl· concept of the inner environment, it is impossible to understand Bernard's stubborn advocacy of a technique that he did not inn·nt but to which he lent nl·w impetus: the technique of vivisection, vvhich he was obliged to defend against both emotional outrage and the protests of Romantic philosophy. "Ancient science was able to conceive only of the external environment, but in order to place biological science on an expnimental fiJoting one must also imagine an internal environment. I believe that I was the first to express this idea clearly and to stress its importance in understanding the need for experimentation on living things." Note that the concept of the internal environment is given here as the theoretical underpinning of the technique of physiological experimentation. In 1857. Bernard wrote, "The blood is made for the organs. That much is true. But it cannot be repeated too often that it is also made by the organs." What allowed Bernard to propose this radical revision of hematology was the concept of internal secretions, which he had fOrmulated two years earlier. After all, there is a consid-

C LA U 0 E

8 ERN AR ll

cra.ble c !Terence between the blood's rci.ltion to the lungs and its relat m to the liver. In the lungs, the organism interacts with the inor;anic world through the blood, whereas in the liver the organisrr interacts with itself. The point is important enough that it bears ·epeating: without the idea of internal secretions, rhne could bt no idea of an internal environment. and without the idea of an in·~rnal environment, there could be no autonomous science of:hysiology. [Etudes, pp. 147-48] [lOS: The concept of the internal environment thus depended on the vi or formulation of the concept of internal secretions; it also der,·nded on cell theory, whose essential contribution Bernard acepted even as he grew increasingly skeptical of the theory of d·: fOrmative blntal medicine declared

thm, identified physical nature '""ith disorder, and that he r~:garded

war on tht' Hippocratic trJdition. To do ~·sscs but does not touch disease ....

r1 _ . . rates J aband.·:1ed pure expectation to administer n ~ l-hv· . . remt:d' l~ alwavs to f··,:ourage natures own tcndenctcs, to " IC~s. il''' "' "Rl . hast I.. through its ,,,ular phases. Bernard apphed the en C (ISeC' . des. 1•gnat, •ton ··lippocratic" :.'any modern doctor vvho failed to mak . , s patient his :.1p priority, and who was concerned e cullrtn' 1 abo ve, a II 1 to· 'l dnc and class:··. diseasc5 - who chose diagnosis and ro , . . treatment. · 'l'Se were the nusologists: Thomas P gnos._ 15 ()ll Sydcnh, -,mc;:ois Boissi:· de Sauvages d that had passed since his first cour-.e.'ll He was

scntientibw; ct irritabilibus ( 17 52), M. Tissot \\Tote, "If pathology's

progress had been made: "I am the founder of experimental med-

dependence on physiology were better known. there would be

icine." Magendie had blazed a trail, according to Bernard, but he

no need to belabor the influence that the new discovery ought

had neither set a destination nor dt:"veloped a method. Nor could

SUIT

that

to have on the art of healing. But unfOrtunately we lack a work

he have, bccau are actually one. Is not man's invention and use of machines, his technological activity in general, what Hegel calls the "r!Jse of reason" in Section 209 of his Logic? This ruse consists in accomplishing one's own ends by means of intermediate objects acting upon one another in conformity with their own natures. The essence of a machine is to be a mediation or, as mechanics say, a link. A mechanism creates nothing, and therein lies its inertia (incrs), yet it is a ruse whoc;e construction necessarily involves art. As a scientific method and philosophy, mechanism is therefore an implicit postulate in any use of machines. The success of this human ruse depends on the lack of any similar ruse in Nature. Nature can be conquered by art only if she herself is nor art: only a man named Ulysses (No-Man) is capable of devising a scheme to get the wooden horse insidt• the gates of Troy, and he succeeds only because his enemies are fOrces of nature rather than clever engineers. The ruses by which animals avoid traps are often adduced .1s objections to the Cartesian theory of the animal-machine. In the foreword to the ]\/cw Essays, Leibniz offers tht' case with which animals are trapped as evidence for Descartes's contention that they are capable only of responding to immediate sensations (what we would today call "conditioned reflexes"). Conversely, Descartes's hypothetical description in the Meditations of a deceptive God or evil geniu.vith the demiu_!:~ of

arc intelligible, because the intelligible is in the world.

the Timaem. Ont:' of the most a'ltonishing propositions of Aris-

relation between knowledgl:' and being, in particular between

totle's philosoph~· of bio\ogy is that it makes not the arti~Ml but the art responsible for \vhat is produced. Vv·'hat cures the patient

intelligence and life. If one treats intelligence as a function of con-

is not the physician but health. It is because the form "health" is

A first major difficulty in Aristotle's philosophy concerns the

templation and reproduction, if one gives it a p!J.ce among the

present in medical activity that medicine is, in ~~1Ct, the c.1use of

forms, however eminent, onl' thereby situates (that is, limits) the

the cure. By art, Aristotle means the unrd1ecti\'e purpose of a nat- I

thought of order at a particular place in the universal order. But

ural logos. 1\"ieditating on the example of the physician who heals

how can knowledge be at once mirror and object, refll:'ctor and

not because he i.'> a physician but because he is inhabited and ani-

rel1ection! If the df'finition of man as

or reasoning

mated by the frmn "health." one might say that the presence of

animal, io;; a naturalist's definition (in the same sense that Carolus

the concept in thought, in the form of an end represented as

Linnaeus defines the wolf as canis lupus or the maritime pine

a model. is an epiphenomenon. Aristotle's anti-Platonism was

as pinus maritima). then science, and in particular the scil'nce of

rdlected in his depreciation of mathematics: mathematics was

[wov AoyJKOV,

life, is an activity of life itsel[ One is then fl:lfced to ask what

denied access to the immanent actidty of life, which is God's

the organ of that activity is. And it fOllows that the Aristotelian

essential attribute. and it was only through knowledge (dut is,

theory of the acthe intellect, a pure form without organic basis,

imitation) oF that immanent ,\Ctivit~ that man could hope to form

has the dfect of separating intelligence from life; it lets some-

an idea ofGmL [Etudes, pp, l 36-38]

thing from outside (8upaEkv, in Aristotk's terms) enter the human embryo, as through

t\

doon\·a~. namely, the extranatural or tran-

scendent power to make sense of the essential forms that individual beings embody. The theory thus makes tlw conception of

Nominalism [122] A further difficulty of Aristotelianism concerns the ontological and gnoseological st,ltus of indi\'iduality in a science of life

PROBLEMS

KNOWLEDGE

based on concepts. If the individual is an ontological reality and not simply an imperfection in the rea1ization of a concept, what

AND

THE

LI\ING

served as a model for nineteenth-century physicians in developing their nosologies. "The rationality of what threatens life," he \\'rote, "is identical to" the rationality of life itself." But there is

is the significance of the order of beings represented in the classification by genus and species? If the concept of a living being ontologically presides over its conception, what mode of knowl-

rationality and rationality. The matter of universals was, of course, an important issue

edge is the individual capable of? A system of living forms, if grounded in being, has the ineffable individual as its correlatej but an ontological plurality of individuals, if such a thing exists, has a concept, a fiction, as its correlate. There are two possibilities. Is it the universal that makes the individual a living thing as well as this particular living thing? If so, singularity is to life as the exception is to the rule. The exception confirms the rule, in the sense of revealing its existence and content, fOr the rule, thl;:': violation of the rule, is \vhat makes the singularity apparent, indeed glaring. Or is it the individual that lends its color, weight and flesh to that ghostly abstraction, the universal? Without such a gift, "universal" would ha\·e no meaning in "life," and would he an empty word. The conflict between the individual and the universal as to their respective claims on "being" bears on life in all its forms: the vegetable as wdl as the animal, function as \veil as form. illneo;s a-. well as "temperament." All approaches to life must be homogeneou'i. If living species exist, then the diseases of living thing the pro jeer of naturali:ting knowledge of nature. [Etudes, pp. 339-42]

be unfaithful to the lessons of experience. Nevertheless, he argues that similarity of ideas guides the imagination toward certain habits, or unif(xmitie~. in dealing with the environment. llabit tele-

scopes together a whole host of individual cxperie11CCS. If any one of these experiences is evoked by a name, the individual idea of that experience conjures up others, and we yield to the illusion of generality. {t

is easy to see that thne can be no comfortturn

to concede at least that there is uniformity among humans, even

to nominalism, nor do they constitute an attempt to justi(\ con-

though l Iume held that human nature \vas inventive and, more

cepts on the basis ofrheir pragmatic value in achieving economv

t~

~pecifically, capable of adopting deliberate conventions. VVhat

(:fthought. Reason itself prescribes such economy, according

does this accomplish? It introduces a cleavage in the system of

Kant, and in m doing pmscribes the idea of nature according ro

living beings. because the nature of one of those being') is defined

which there is no such thing as similarity, f()r in that case the logical law uf species as wt.·ll as the underst(lnding itOR-V1!\L

AND

fHE:

PATHO

OGICAL

lower limits of variation proper to each phenomenon of the normal organism, without ever being able to produce really new phenom-

alway~

designed to uncover the la\VS by

ena which would have to a certain degree any purely phy"iiological analogues. 25

which each determining or modifYing influence of a phenomenon affects its performance, and it generally consists in introducing a

Consequently every conception of pathology must be based on

clear-cut change into each designated condition in order to mea-

prior kntnvledge of the corresponding normal state, but con-

sure directly the corresponding variation of the phenome-non itselP 4

versely the scientific study of pathological cases becomes an indispemablc phase in the overall search for thE' laws of the normal

Now, in biology the variation imposed on one or several of a phe-

state. The observation of pathological cases offers numerous, gen-

nomenon's conditions of existence cannot be random but must

uine advantages f(Jr actual experimental investigation. The tran-

be contained 'vi thin certain limits compatible with the phenom-

sition from the normal to the abnormal is slovver and more natural

enon's existence. Furthermore, the fact of functional comensus

in the case of illness, and the return to normal, when it take.-.

proper to the organism precludes monitoring the relation, which

place, .-.pontancously furnishes a vcrif)'ing counterproof. In addi-

links a determined disturbance to its suppmedly exclusive effects,

tion, as far as man is concerned, pathological investigation is more

with 5ufficicnt analytical precision. But, thinks Comte, if we

fruitfld than the necessarily limited experimental exploration. The

readily admit that the essence of experimentation lies not in the

-;tudv" of morbid states is essentially .scientific . valid for all organ'

researcher's artificial intervention in the system of a phenome-

ism.-., even plant life, and is particularly suited to the most com-

non which he intentionally tends to disturb, but rather in the

plex and therefore the most delicate and fragile phe-nomena which

comparison between a control phenomenon and one altered vvith

direct experimentation, being too brusque a disturbance, would

respect to any one of its conditiom of existence, it follows that

tend to distort. Here Comtc was thinking of vital phenomena

diseases must be able to function for the scientists as spontane-

related to the higher animals and m,1n, of the nervous and psy-

ous experiment-; which allow a comparison to be made between

chic functions. Finally, the study of anomalies and monstrosities

an organism's various abnormal states and its normal state.

conceived as both older and less curable illnes~es than the functional disturbances of various plant or neuromotor apparatuses

Accorrling to the eminently philosophical principle which will serve

completes the study of diseases: the "teratological approach" (the

from nrw.: on as a direct, general basis f(>r positive pathology and

study of monsters) is added to the "pathological approach" in bio-

who~e

definitive

e~tablishment

we owe to the bold ,mel persevering

genius of our famoupending on what causes it." 27

mal organism." But in the end it must be recognized that the

Second, it should be pointed out that despite the reciprocal nature of the clarification achieved through the comparison of the

terms U':>cd here, although only vaguely and loosdy quantitative,

still ha,·e a qualitative ring to them. [NP, pp. 19-21]

norn1al with the pathological anc-1 the assimiliation of the pathosity of determining the normal and its true limits of variation

Claude Bernard and Experimental Pathology [129] ln Bernard's work, the real identity- should one say in

first, before methodically investigating pathological ca~es. Strictly

mechanisms or symptoms or both?- and continuity of pathologi-

logical and the normal, Comte insists repeatedly on the neces-

speaking, knowledge of normal phenomena, based solely on ob-

cal phenomena and the corresponding physiological phenomena

servation, is both possible and necessary without knowledge of

are more a monotonous repetition than a theme. This assertion

disease, particularly based on experimentation. But we are pre-

is to lw fOund in the Le(om de physioloHic expirimcntale appliquee

st:>nted with a .;;erious g.1p in that Comtc provides no criterion

aIa mt?decine ( 185 5 ), especially in the second and twenty-second

\\'hich would allow us to knmv \vhat a normal phenomenon is.

lectures of Volume Two, and in the Le(ons sur Ia chaleur ani male

We are left to concludt· that on this point he is referring to the usual corresponding concept, given the fact that he u'iies the

(1876). We prekr to choosl' the le\ons sur le diabcte et Ia glrcoBenCse onimale ( 1877) as the basic tt'xt, which, of all Bernard\

notions of normal state, physiological state and natural state

works, can be con~idered the one especially devoted to illustrat-

intL'rchangeably.n Better still, when it comes to defining the

ing the theory, the one where clinical and experimental facts are

limits of pathological or experimental disturbance~ c·ompati.ble

pre~ent('d at least as muc·h for tht' "moral" of a methodological

with the existence of organisms, Comte identifies these limits with those of" a "harmony of distinct influenCl'S, those exterior

and philosophical order which can be drawn from it as for their intrinsic physiological meaning.

lJO

ll'

f lf-'Eo

PROBLEMS

NORMAL

AND

-1 HF

PATf'OLOG

CAl

Bernard considered medicine as the 5cience of diseases, phys-

plant world through its feeding; that blood normally contains

iology as the science of life. In the sciences it is theory \vhich

sugar, and that urinary sugar is a product generally eliminated h~/

illuminates and dominates practice. Rational therapeutics can be

the kidneys when the rate of glycemia reacht:"s a certain thresh-

sustained only by a scientific pathology, and a scientific pathol-

old. In other words, glycemia is a constant phenomenon inde-

ogy must be based on physiological science. Diabetes is one dis-

pendent of fOod intake to such an extent that it is the absence of

case vvhich poses problems whose solution proves the preceding

blood sugar that is abnormal, and glycosuria is the consequence

thesis. "Common 'lcnse shows that if \ve are thoroughly acquainted

of glycemia which has risen above a certain quantity, serving as a

with a physiological phenomenon, we should be in a position to

threshold. In a diabetic, glycemia is not in itself a pathological phe-

JLTnunt fOr all the disturbances to which it is susceptible in the

nomenon- it is so only in terms of its quantity; in itself; glycemi,1

pathological state: physiology and pathology are intermingled and

is a "normal and constant phenomenon in a healthy organism."n

are essentially one and the same thing."~O Diabetes is a disease that consists solely and entirely in the disorder of a normal function.

There is only one glycemia, it i'l constant, penn.uwnt, both dt~ring

"Fvny disease has a corresponding normal function of which it

diabetes and outside that morbid -;tate. Onl~- it has dt·grcK: glyCL·-

is only the dbturbed. exaggerated, diminished or obliterated

mia bdnw 3 to 4 percent docs not lead to glycosuria; hur aho\'l' that

expression. If we are unable to explain all manifcstatiom of dis-

k\'cl ~J_,cosuria results .... It is impossible to pt·rceivL· the tr,1thition

today. it is because physiology is not yet sufficiently advanced

lnm1 the nnrmJI tn tht:' pathological state, .1nd no problem dHJW~ IH'r-

l'olSl"

and therL" arL" still many normal hmctions unknown to us."'~ 1 In

tn th.m diabetl'~ tht' intimate fusion ol rhy~;iology .:md pathology. q

this, Rnnard was oppo~L·d to many physiologists of his day, acimpo-.ed on the organism. The study of diabetes no longer allowed

[NP, pp. 30-32] [130] Claude Bernard, unlike Broussais and

such .1n opinion.

hi-. gem·ral principle of pathology with verifiable ,1fgumcnts,

xi~t,

SJ.\T fOr their inten-

is claimed that disease is the exaggerated or diminished expres-

sity, which varie~ in the normal state and in the diseased state. 32

sion of a normal function. Or at least we have the means to know

Briefly, we know that Bernard's genius lies in the fact that he

sion, his thought is not entirely free fi·om ambiguity.

it, for in spitt:' of Bernard's undeniable progrc..;s in logical precishowed that the 'lugar fOund in an animal organism is a product of

First of all, with Bernard as with Hie hat, Broussais and Comte,

this same organism and not just something introduced from the

there is a deceptive mingling of quantitative and qualitative conlll

THE

PROE3LEMS

NORMAL

AND

THE

F'ATHOL OGiCAL

cepts in the given definition of pathological phenomena. Some-

that it learns nothing in disease and through it? The science of

times the pathological stare is "the disturbance of a normal

opposites is one, said Aristotle. Mu~t it be concluded from this

mechanism consisting in a quantitative variation, an exaggera-

that opposites are not opposites? That the science of life should

sometimes the

tal-e so-called normal and so-called pathological phenomena as

diseased state is made up of "the exaggeration, disproportion,

objects of the same theoretical importance, susceptible of recip-

tion or attenuation of normal phenomena, H

35

discordance of normal phenomena."3 6 Who doesn't see that the

roecll clarification in order to make itself fit to meet the totality

tenn "exagger.ltion" has a distinctly quantitative sense in thC' first

ol the vicissitude.s ot' lite in all its aspects, is more urgent than

definition and a rather qthllitative one in the second. Did Bernard

legitimate. This does not mean that pathology is nothing other

believe that he was eradicating the qualitative value of the term

than physiology, and still less that disease, as it relates to the nor-

"pathological" by substituting for it the terms disturbance, dis-

mal state, represents only an increase or a reduction. It is under-

proportion, discordance?

~tood that medicine needs an objective pathology, but research

This ambiguity is cntainly instructivt· in that it revt'als that the

\vhich causes its object to vani~h is nor objective. One can deny

problem itself persists at the heart of tht: solution presumably

that di'iease is a kind of violation of the organism and conr.;ider it

given to it. And the problem is the following: Is the concept of

as an event that the organism creates through some trick of its

disease a concept of an objective reality accessible to quantitative

permanent functions, without denying that the trick is new. An

scientific knmvledge? Is the difference in value, which the living

organism's behavior can be in continuity "'.:ith previous behaviors

being e~tabli.shcs between hi_~ normal life and his pathological life,

and still be another behavior. The progrt•ssiveness of an advent

an illusor)' appearance that the . }K

failed to recognize. [ ... ] 1Jere again, we owe to the chance of bibliographical resenrch the intell:·crual pleamre of stating once mon· thnt the most appnrently paradoxical thc..,cs also have their tradition which un-

abn·s~

wa-; found in the anterior part

ever~ dn abon·. To the resenations that I felt obliged to set forth at that time, let me add this. In e...rablishing the science of movement on the principle of inertia, modern mechanics in effect made the distinction betwt:>en natur,ll and violent movenx·nts absurd, as int:>rtia is precisely an indifference with respect to directions and variatiom. in mmernent. Life is far removed from such an indifft_.rence to the conditions \vhich are made for it; life is polarity. The simpk~t biological nutritive ~y~tem of assimilation and excretion expresses a polarity. When the wastes of digestion are no longer excreted by tht· organism and congest or poison the internal environment. this is all indeed according to law (physical, chemical and so on), but none of this follmvs the norm, which is the activity of the organbm itself. This i~ the simple fact that I want to point out \vhen we speak of biological normativity. [NP. pp. 127-28]

The Normal and the Patholonical as Qualitative Contrast [138] Finally, as a result of the determinist postulate, it is the reduction of quality to quantity \vhich is implied by the essential 147

T PRQBLE:\IIS

THEe

'\JURMAL

AND

fHE

PATHOLOCICAL

identity of physiology and pathology. Tn reducr the difference

ha'> no \'ita! quality, it cannot be called healthy or normJI or phys-

betv;Ci...'n rencc

iological. Normal and pathologic.1l han· no meaning on a scale

of thl' amount of' glucose within thl' body, to delegate the task

\Yhere the biological ohject is reduced to colloidal equilihria and

of distinguishing one ·who is diabetic from one who is not to a

ionized solutions. In studying a state that he describes as physio-

renal threshold conceived "Simply as a quantitative difference of

logical, the physiologist C)Ualifies it Js such, even unconsciously;

level, means oheying the spirit of the physical scil'nces which. in

he considers this state as positively qualified by and h>r the liv-

buttressing phl·nomena with law:,, can explain them only in teml-'i

ing lwing. Now this qualified physiological state is not, as ~uch,

of their reduction to a common measure. [n order to introduce

what is extended, identically to itself, to another sr of

forms may prove ro he mort: advantagt'nus, hence more riable. An

conception. f fealth becomes perceptible only in relation to dis-

environment is normal .when it allows a species to multiply and

ease, which revcals its cssencC" by suggesting a possible transition

. as to tolerate, if necessary, changes

to new norms. A person who cannot survive at high altitudl's

diYersif\". in it in such a

\\'ay

because uf hypoten:-.ion may be able to live normally at altitudes

in the environment. If the relation between the environment and the living thing

up to fifteen hundred feet. No one is obliged to live at ,1ltitudes

b ~uch that neither can \'ary without compromising the viahility

abon· thn.·r thousand feet, but anyone may sorneven-

that the methodological implications of Piaget's research wnl'

teenth-centurv French hM1 basically rhc Sdtnt.' idt..'d. Descartes

initially tht· .sJ.me as rhose of Lt?vy-Bruhf: Piagct compared the

spoke of childish credulity and nursery tales in much the same

thought of the child to that of a contemporary cultivated adult,

l\Y

PROBLEMS

an adult \Vhost: culture was of the sort that Piaget regarded as normative fOr his time, that is, for which scientific and rationalist \'alucs stood at the top of the hierarchy. Compared with the rational mentality, children's thinking could be characterized by adjectives beginning with the prefix a-, indicating some sort of lack or absence. Note, however, that Piagct's adult is what Max Weber and Karl Jaspers call an "ideal type." To be sure, it can he argued that this norm..1l type is not only normative but average and characteristic of the majority. But the "mentality" of an age is a social fact, determined by education. If, in fact, in surveys, the ideal type turns out to reflect the average, it is because compulsory education has established certain norm.;;. Here again, man engenders man, and if the norms imposed on many generations of children included a systematic devaluation of childhood, it should come as no surprise that, in comparing today'.s children to today's adults, it turns out that children lack many of the traits inculcated in adults. The problem of mentalities is inextricably interwined with that of education, and the problem of education is inextricably intntwined with that of generations. At any givt·n point in time, those who happen to be adults are fOrmer children who were raised by other adults. It takes a generation to test the Yalidity of educational ideas. And it takes fifty to sixty years (two generations) for philosophical values to become rooted as habits. Piaget's adults more or less unwittingly hetray superficial tokens of respect for the positivist values of the period 1860-90, which gained favor with the educational reformers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. [MS I.e Normal et le problemc des menta litis, II, f. lr, 2r, 3r] [146] There is a characteristic gap between a child's desires and his means of realizing those desires. The child therefore creates a world of representations in which desires have the ability immediately to create objects presumed capable of satisfying

NORMALITY

AN[)

NORMA'iiVITY

them. The child can experienn· pleasure only with permission or by delegation. lie is strictly dependent on adults to meet its Yital needs. Thus, to obey is to live. At first, thc..~rc is no difference between social obligation and physical necessity. Adults. then, ar(' both compensation lOr and incKapable rcmiJl(krs of the child's helplessness. Freudian p~ychology had the great merit of revealing the true essence of the child's thought. The child live.;; in illusion because he lives in desire, and because he feels desire long before gratification is physically possible. So long as it i to the '\Jme thing), h(m·· tn act on things and men. The cuntcnt of the child's thought is his ignorance of the biological reai1ty of childhood. That ignorance last as long ,\s the child rcmaim un,1warc of copulation as his inception and fate, and so long as he is forbidden, whether by organic immatu~ rity or social taboo, to engage in coplllation himself. In fairy tales and f:1ntasies, the child seeks to satisf~· a need for pleasure and to as"crt a po\\'l'r for '':hich he still lacks the means. The \Vcalth of imagination compensates fOr the poverty of rcalintion. \Vh,H vve Moderns call "adult" in man is his awareness of the gap between desire and rcality. The adult does not rely on myth for the gratification of desire. In the adult, responsibility lOr the gratification of desires that present-day rtality places out of reach can he delegated instead to play or art, that is, to illuions con'i

PROBLEMS

'\JORMALITY

A'\JD

NORMAl

V' I Y

of philosophy to see llegelian philosophy as the culmination of

was really arguing was that primitive thought was not prelogical

the arduous advent of the Idea and the German bourgeois state

but heterogeneous, and sensing. too, that champions would soon

as the normal fOrm of all society. And in England, Spencer's evo-

come fonvard to defend the merits of forms of thought "differ-

lutionism, taking up ,.vhere Mill's positivism left off, further

ent" from modern science, sought to restore continuity: the prim-

accentuated the philosophical belief that superiority and poste-

itive, they argued, \vas not as alien to our logic as some claimed,

riority are one and the same. Anterior, less complex and inferior

nor was modern thought as fully logical as some believed. The

became synonymous.

transition from one form of mr.:ntality to another involved a cer-

Little by little a difftJse dogma took shape: namely, that the

tain loss of content (modern thought is not as rich as primitive

intellectually primitive and the intellectually puerile arc t\\'0

thought) as \veil as the consolidation of a certain disposition

fOrms of a single infirmity. At around the same time, moreover,

(modern thought is more methodical). We can easily understand

research in embryology sho\\red that certain anatomical anomalies

,vhat the primitive is: it is what we become when we abandon the

were the result of arrested development. A club fOot, a harelip, a

critical spirit, the precious prize of an always vulnerable conquest

testicular ectopia- each of these conditions is the perpetuation

(thesis of Belot and Parodi, discussion at the SociCtl~ Franyaio;c

after birth of a state through which every fetus or embryo passes

de Philosophie after publication of Uvy-Bruhl's books).

\vhile still in the uterus. What is abnormal is the halting of devel-

Nevertheless, both groups of philosophers preserved the essen-

opment at an intermediate stage. What is normal at one moment

tial rationalist and positivist norms: reason is superior to mysti-

in time becomes abnormal later. \Vhen Lucien LCvy-Hruhl published Fonclions mentales dans les

cism; noncontradiction is superior to participation; science is

sociCtCs infCrieurcs in 1910, his initial usc of the term "prelogical"

is superior to the progress of faith. [MS J.e ,'r>../ormal ct lc problimc

to characteriH' the "primitive" mode of thought suggested an

de1 mentalitcs, I, f. 2r, 3r]

implicit depreciation. Philosophical opinion \vas divided. Some

o;uperior to myth; industry is superior to magic; faith in progress

[149l Rationalism and positivism thus depreciated mythical

philosophers were delighted to discover that the theory of men-

thinking. Despite the rationalist attitudes implicit in Christianity,

tali tis provided arguments to justif)' a normative conception of the history of thought. At last, there were criteria for choosing sides in philosophical combat, for distinguishing bet\Yeen fruitful new ideas and survivals of the past, for separating the backv,. . anllooking from the fon.Yard-looking. Leon Hrunschvicg, for ex-

moreover, the theologians recognized that this depreciation of myth was all-encompassing. Phenomenological theologians therefore decided that only one reaction was possible: all mythological and religious systems would have to be rescued en bloc. ivtodern mythology portray~ it~elf a~ restoring the value of

ample, used both LCvy-Bruhl and Piaget to argue in favor of his

myth in the face of rationalist depreciation. To grant recognition

mvn doctrine concerning the Ages oflntelligence and to disparage

to other value systems is tantamount to restricting the value of

Aristotle's philosophy on the grounds that it remained confined

rationalism. In the end, normative tolerance provf's to lw a depre-

within the mental framework of a primitive or a child of six.

ciation of the positivist depreciation of myth. It is impossiblf' to

J\'1eanwhile, other philosophers, sensing that what l_f:vy-Bruhl

save the content of any religion without saving the content of all

NORMALiT'{

PRO E3 L fo.l\.1 S

A~JD

rJORMAliVIT'1

religions .... In order to saY~:" a religion that had, admittedly, aban-

that ha•.:e brought thosl' values to consciousness are n()rmative, and

doned the Inquisition and the stake, it was necessary to save other

a normative direction is normally worth pursuing. [~15 I.e ,1>.•./or-

religions with their whirling dervishes and human sacrifices: tOr

mal et /e probliime des menta lite'. ~5

be the unity of a uniqut:" thought. A bureaucratic .md tt:"chnocratic

J lans Kelsen maintains that the ,·alidity of a juridical norm depends

myth, the Plan is the modern dress of the idc.1 of Providence. As

(_)Jl

its insertion in a coherent system, an order of hierarchi1ed

it is very cll·ar that a meeting of dcleg.Hes and a gathering of

norms, drawing their binding power from their direct or indirect

machines are hard put to achieve a unity of thought, it must be

reference to a fundanh.·ntal norm. But there arc diff('rent juridical

admitted that we vmuld hesitate to say of the Plan '"'hat La Fontaine

orders because there then discoYer that no society is

arr inclined to think nf philosophy a'\ utopian and idlr specula-

fundamentally good, but that none is absolutely had; they all oHer

tion of no immediate use and therefnrl' of no value. Common

their members certain advantage~. with the proviso that there

'>l'mc,

then, seems to lcJ.d to two contradictory judgmcnh con-

is invariably a residue of evil, the amuunt of \vhich seems tore-

cerning philosophy. On the one hand, it ~ees philo~ophy as a rare

main more or less constant and pcrhaps corresponds to a specific

and therefOre prestigious discipline and, if it lives up to its prom-

inertia in social life resistant to all attempts at organization." 5Y

ises, as an important spiritual exercise. On the other hand, it

[NP, pp. 255-56]

deduces from the variety of comp~..·ting philosophical doctrines that philosophy is inconsistent and fickle, hence a mere intel-

On the Normative Character of Philosophical Thouyht [!54 J Philosophy is the lo\'e of Wisdom. One sees immediately

sophical speculation, is contradicted by the filet that philosophers

that \Visdom is for philosophy an Ideal, since love is desire for

throughout history have been the objl'ct of hostility and even

something that it is possible to possess. Thus, at the origin of the

persecution, sometimes hy political leaders and sometimes by

lectual game. Yet this judgml'nt, which tends to discredit philo-

philosophical quest i'i the confession of a lack, the recognition

the masses themselves. If the teaching-; and examples of the phi-

of a gap bet\veen an cxi.;,tence and a need. \Visdom is more than 'iCience in the strict and contemporary

losophers are so 'videly feared, then tht.· activity must not be

sense of the word, for hl>rt commem,,ratil>lll>fBougk· (197K).

attendPn the L~nT from 1921 to 19~4. taught b~ the philo~ophcr Emik Chartic1 (better known under the 1wn n.Hllt' "AI.1in"). Alain taught tilt' philmophv UIUJ'St'

1927

from 1903 to llJ33, interrupted <mly by World \\'ar I, when he voluntaril) enlisted (he was too old to be drafted) .1nd sened in the artillery. In his readings of the great philosophical ,md literary texts, Al.:~in led hi~ students to ana-

Canguilhem played a major rok that ynr in the iconocl.l'>tic rn·uc that Ecole

lyle rritically and to rc~pect rhnc writing~. whilt> t>mpha'>iring a neo-K;mtian

Nnrmale student~ l>rg.Ull!nl .md st.lg~"d ar the l'nd of each aco1demic ~'ear. llc

perspectiw·, .1~ \n·ll a~ his own qaunLh pacifism- ,m t'thi(., based on a fumia-

wa.,

mcntal d i.~tru'>t ol' power ("/c cir111 en (Ontrc lcs pouvt~irs") and of republ ic,m gt•n-

the name of the dircctqr qf the Fcok Norrnalc, Cu.,tave Lan'>trt· 1k L.:tng~on," ,, purl i1wolving

considered p.:~nicularly outragcn11~- ''Sur l'lltili~.HirH1 rk., intellectuel'i

A

VITAL

RATIONALIST

CRITICAL

AIBLIOGRAPHY

en tt•mps de guerrl'" and "Complaintc du capitainc Cambusat" (Cambmat wa5

in N\mes. Michel Alc-xandre (1888~1952), then a lycb· professor in that city,

.1n officer n·sponsiblc

the military instruction of the Ecole, Normale stu-

with his wife Jeanne, assumed most of the editorial burden ohvhat was then

f(>r

dents). Canguilhem was author of the first and coauthor of the second, with a

a weekly publication. \\'hen Alexandre first met Alain he \.,·as twenty years

group offdlmv students including Sartrc. Sirint'lli ha~ rt•printed the text of both

old; he remained a devoted disciple throughout his life. l.ibres propos quickly

songs (sec Giniration intellectuelle, pp. 326~28) and provides wbstantial mate-

attracted enough attention among French intellectuals that Gallimard de-

rial about the context of these events. Lanson hdd Canguilhem and others

cided to publish it under its prestigious "NRF' imprint in 1922~23 and

responsible for these actions, and the inscription "PR" (for "revolutionary prop-

1924, when the journal ceased publication. A second series of Libres propos

aganda") was recorded in the military dossiers of the culprit~- who \Vt're sup-

was published as a monthly from March 1927 to Septt•mbt.:r !935; ~t·~·

pmed to become officers at the end of their "military preparation" at the Ecole

Jeanne Alexandn·, l'd., En Souvenir de Michel AIC\andre: Le\ons, tcxtcs, lcttri'S

Normal~.:

(Sirindli, p. 339). Canguilhem purposely failed the examination con-

(Paris: Mercure dl' France, 1956), pp. 499~514. In 1931~32, Canguilht·m

cluding this preparation in Spring 1927 by allowing the base of tht..: machine

as~umed the main editoriV' ,] Ia Liglll' dl'' droits de \'hommc," Librcs propo~ (Feb. 20, 1929), pp. /.s-79.

Haticr, 1927). C.G. Heman! [pseud.J, "La Logique de~ jugcmt:nt~ de valeur," Uhre~ propos

C. G. Bernard [pseud.J, "F.~~aio;. Esquisse d\mr politi(jUl' de f'aix. Pn~ambule," I ihres propa> (March 20, 1929), pp. 135-38.

(Aug. 20, 1927), pp. 24.S-5l.

"l e Sourire de Platon," l:urope 20 (1929), pp. 12Y--HL

Review of E. Goblot, -lraitC tic logiquc (Parb: Collin, 1Y27). "E~~ais-

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A Ia Manil·re de ...• " I ihrc~ propos (Oct. 20. 1927). pp. 34_)-45.

/\ pa~tidw of the work of Voltaire, whose name is facetiously used to

Review of Alain, On/C chapitrcs sur Pia ton ( 1928). rhe tide of the review is taken from Alain\ Sourcnirs wr Jules l.o9ncau, where he had written, "we

the text. An appcnckd note reveals the real authors to be Canguilhem

forget the ~mile of Plato." Jules l.agneau, who remaim a ~ymhol oft he self

and Sylvain Rrou~saudier, a fellow slUdent at the Ecole Normale. Most of

abnegation, devotion to philmophy and high moral ~tandard~ maintJ.ined b~

~ign

tht· Ecole\

~orne profe~sors of the early Third Republic, had been Alain's philmophy

director, Cmtan:: Lmson, and his reactions to the antimilitarist content of

teacher at the lycl·e. !'hat same year, Canguilhem reviewed the posthumom

the text is published in Sirinelli, pp. 324-25. The

pa~tiche mock~

publi( ation of ~orne of LagneJ.u 's lectun·s (see below, two entries down).

the revm·. "Montagne~

et frontitTes." I ihrn propo~ (Nov. 20, 1927), pp. 401-402.

Emile Routroux, [)es V(;ritCs Cternelles chC/ Descartes, Tht-se latine traduite par M. Georges Canguilhem, l·ll·w de ITcolc Normale SuplTit:ure. PrdJ.ce de

M. Uon Brunsdwicg, de l'lmtitut (Paris: I ibrairil' Fdix A Iran, 1927). A french translation oflmile Boutroux's 1874 Latin doctoral dissertation. A new edition was published in !985. The 1927 edition include~ a ~tudy

by I {•on Rrunschvicg on Routroux\ philosophy, "La Philosophic

d'Emile Boutroux,"

~\hich i~

not included in the 1985 edition; it cJ.n, how-

ever, be found in LCon 13runscln-icg, Ecrits philosophitfUI'S (Paris: Pre~ses Univnsitaire~

"Maxime Leroy,

Dcswrtc~

lc philosophc au mmquc," f:urope 21 (1929), pp. 112-56.

Revie\\'. "Cl·ll·bres lecours pmnomC par G. Crm,,lui!hcm, owCw· de 1'/Jnin'flllt:, f'ro{csscur de ph1lo10ph)(•, Q

fa ,h;tnbution des pril du !rdc ,Jc Chorlc~dlc, I~· lltuillct 1930 {Charlcville:

typographic el lithogr,lphie P. Anciaux, !930). A vcr~ rare cight-pag:e publication, by the lych·. with an "official" title

(Jnguilhem had arrangl'd a leave from tt·aching during the academic ~·cdr 19 31-

page bc,1rint! the in'l ription "Ville de Ch,ulevillt·, I \Tt't' Chan!\, Acadt-rnic

3.:>. A\ \-lichel

de Lillc.'' It is the text nl the addrc~~ given by CangltillH'm, the nc,vcomer

assun1ed rt"ipon\ibility I;H nliting I ih"-'1 prop01· (~ee Andrl· Sernin, .-1/mn: Un Sa,qc

on the teaching staff of the lydT, at the dosing cercmonie5 for the academic

dans lo citC [ P.uis: Robert Laffont, !98.5], p. 29H).

,\]~·x,wdrc

\l'a\

qw•rwhdnwd b~- hi~ te.Khing dutic~. Canguilhcm

year, arrt·ndcd by gr protest,

de Vigilance des lntellectucls Anti-Ll~Ci)tes

J.

Benrubi, L·~ Sources ct les courants de

was crt'ated in response to the ~cbruary 19_~4 riots in Paris and the threat

lo philmophic contemporaine en Frame (Alcan)," furore B (193 J), pp. 451-53.

offascbm, and it remaint'd in t'Xi)tence up to the war. Its leader~ wne the

temporaine (La Renaissance du Livre),

t·thnologi~t Paul RivPt, 1\-ho chaired the committee, the ph~~icist Paul

Rev in\-.

Langevin and Alain. During tht·~e ~--ears, Alain was often ill and Ulhlhle tn

1934

attt'nd ~ume meeting~; Canguil\wm's ti'iend Michel Alexandre wondd wh~titute t~lr him on tht'~t-' o (st·t' Jeanne Alnandre, .:d., fn .\ouvcn1r

"Dt:U\ lltHLvcaux lines franyais sur les origine~ de Ia gut'rrc" Libres propos (Jan.

19 H), pp. 40-44.

de .Hichel AlcwnJrc: lc•t;om, tc\tcs, lcttn·s [Paris: Mercur.__• de

~·r,mct•, llJShJ.

p. 520). Thus, Canguilhem himself was Cjllite clo'>e to the ,Ktion ot the

R...:vit'\\' of Camille Rloch, In Causes de Ia tJllarc mondialc (Paris: Hart-

committee. The b(wl..lct ha., three part'>: "Proposals fix an Agricultural

mann, 1933), and Jules Isaac, 1914- Lc Prob/Cmc dn orif!inc~ de Ia guerrc

Policy," a two-part appendix comisting of the results of a surve

bt•g,m n(·ralc· \\lith C.m1illt" Planet, /rmtf de f,,,!Jique ct de morolc (l\·1ar~t·ille: lmprinwrie F. Robert et fih, 19 39). This texthoqk ha~ hccotn(· l''l:trcmcl) rliHkult to find; the Bib\iothCqut• nationak in P.1ri~ h.1~ one cop~-- Pbnet ,,-a~ teaching at dll' lycb· ol ,l\1ar~l'ille while Canguilhem wa~ at the lyd'l' of l<wlou~e. Two nther textbook~ h) the

\,lflH'

, tln p~ychnlng\ and andwtic~ ~ th1.· or her subjt"ct.;; that

l't

de logiquc. lndic,ltion~ bihliographiC]Ues,"

BulfcTJ/l de Ia rot ulcd dco; Lc/IJCI de St[(/Sl'PIIftJ 20. 3 ( 194 2 ), PP· 110-12. A bibliography (for students preparing the Certij)cut rm.:~lisnw ( lnl·dit prl·wntl· p.u G. ( ,\n-

by jt:'tr.l~hourg in 1944: fi-01n ]94:-\ until \9) 5 he \\"as inspecteur gt··nl·ral dt· philmophie.

tcmporoinc {Pari~: Ln fditiom nwrltc.1ln deb l>iane li-an~·Ji\l', l'l51), n!l. l.

pp. 27-32.

I.

VITAL

CRITICAL

RATIO"JALIST

BIBLIOGRAPHY

cellulaire" (pp. 213-15), "Note sur lc~ rapports de Ia tht>orie cellulaire et

Included, "ith revi~ion:-., in La Connaiuomc de lo ric (1952).

de Ia philosophic de Lcibnit" (pp. 215-17) and

"Extrait~

du l>iscours wr

!'anatomic du ccrveau t(·nu par StCnon en 1665 .'! messieurs de I'Assembli·l'

1952

de chez monsieur ThCvcnot, 13esoins et tendom('l, Texre~ choi~is et pn~sent{·s par C...:orge~ Canguillwm (Paris:

a Paris" ( pp. 217-18 ).

The second t"dition, "rt-vi\Ce et ilugment{·e," was puhli~hed by Vrin in 1965, and ha~ ~incc hccn rt•printed many times; extr,H t~ from the fitrh t'di-

I lachett \\',1'>

of the Hi~torv of Science in 19SH, and he became a hdl rncmiH'r in ]9h0. Jk ~erved

as viLt· president cicnccs, vol. 2 (Pari~: Prt'~~es Uniwr~it.lirc~de Fr of Darwin 17-J.)-JX)Y (1:3altimore: Johns llnpkins llnivenity Pre""·

1959), .hchives interndlronales d'hi51oirc de~ Hienw \3 ( 1960), pp. 157-S9.

1962, volume 12 (1966) in 1968; volumes 13 (1969) and 14 (1970-71), the last to appc.1r, did so as special issues of the Revue d'ht~toirc des ,·tien(es, another

K.eview of Alvar Ellegard, Dorwrn and the General Reader (Gbteborg: /\\mctvi~t & \Vickscll~.

j,mrnrvlf\•>phe~." ,')cicnu'\ 24(March-April 19&3), pp. 7-HJ. keprimnl in !:'tudes d'hnt01re ct de phdu>ophre dn sfiCrkl'1. / rambted intu

in HnJ~_,c~_,, on h·hruar~ '-1, IIJ02. Heprintnl in the second ,·ditinn (Jf l_o

Italian in !969.

Connoissan,-,. Jc Ia ric ( 1965 ).

[Comments inl-lgrC,qatiOil, Philosophic, 1961: Ropport de .H. Etienne .)ouriau,

1964

prtisidcnt du jur_l· (Paris: Mini\tl~re de l'Cdm·,ltion nationale, lmtitut PC.da-

gqgJquc National. 1%2 ), pp. 3-4. "I li\tnirc des rt.·ligions et hi~toire de5 science" dam Ia th0oric du ktichi5me che1

l'vlimcographed.

Auguste Comte." in -HCiongcs Alcwndrc K01 r;on de l'homme," ArchiH'5 intcr-

Review.

nationalcs d'histoire des sciences 17 (1964), pp. 209-22. Lecture giwn at the lnstitut ltalil'n, in Pari~, nn June 3, !Y64, on the

4£Jrigatic>n de phdosophic. 1965: Rupporl de .11. Georges Can9ui/hem, prisidcnt

occasion of the four hundredth annin:rsary ofGa\i\eo's birth. Reprinted in

du jury (Paris: MinistL'-re de I'Cducation nationale, lnstitut PCdagogique

Ewdes d'hntoire ct de philosophic dn wcnccs (1968).

National, 1965 ).

fComments in] "Point de vue philo~ophiquc sur \'inadaptation dan~ le monde

Mimeographed. "Philosophie et Science," Revue de J'mscigncmcnt philosuphiquc 15.2 (Dec. 1964-

contcmpnrain," Rccherchcr; ct dt!bats (i'v1arch 1 normal ~~t !e patho!ogique (1963-66)," pp. 169-222, and a brief"Avertisscment" (p. i). The "Nouvelles rCflexions" correspond in part to a course given

by Canguilhcm J.t the Sorbonne the preceding year (M.

Fichant, "Georges Canguilhem et l'idt-e de Ia philosophic" [1993], p. 38). Thi~ edition appeart'd in tht· "Collection Galien," edited

·1'7

by Canguilhem.

A

\ITAL

CRITICAL

RATIONAliST

HIBLIOGRAPHY

{\968). The Cohlrimentation chez Claude Bernard" "Claude Bernard et Xavier Bichat," Actes tlu XI~ Con9res international d'histmre

(pp. 143-55), previously unpubli~hcd; "Claude Bernard et Richat" (pp. 156-62), based on a p,lper publi~hed

des sciences (I 96 5 J 5 ( 1968), pp. 287-92.

in the proceedings of the Xlth International Congress for the History of Sci-

Published in Etudes d'histoire et de philosoph1e des sciences ( 1968).

Etudes d'histoire et de philosophic des sciences (Paris; Vrin, 1968 ).

ence, in Warsaw and Cr-pistCmologie biologique'· (pp.

211-25), previously unpublished. based on a paper presented

to

the SociCtC

beige de philosophic, in Bru~sds, on February 10, 1962, translated into

Ia signification de \'oeuvre et Ia ler;on de l'homme" (pp. 37-

50), published in 1964;

German in 1979;

"Fontenelle, philosophe et historien des sciences" (pp. 51-58), pub~

"La Constitution de Ia physiologie comme science" (pp. 226-73), pub-

lished in 1957:

lished in 1963; "Pathologie et physiologit' dt' Ia thyroide au XIX.:- siecle" (pp. 274-304),

"La Philosophic biologique d'Auguste Comte et son inlluence en France au XIXc siecle" (pp. 61-74), published in 1958;

published in 1959;

"L'Ecnle de Montpcllicr jugCe par Auguste Comtc" (pp. 75-80), pub~

"Mode!es et analogies dans la decouverte en biologie" (pp. 305-18),

lished in 1961; "Histoire des religions et histoire des sciences dans Ia tht!orie du

Ia

published in English in 1961; "Le Tout et Ia partie dans Ia perm:."' biologique" (pp. W:l- 33 ), publi~hnl

ft!ti~

chisme chez Auguste Comte" (pp. 81-98), published in 1964;

in 1966;

"Les Concepts de 'lutte pour !'existence' et de ·~eJection naturelle' en

"Le Concept et Ia vie" (pp. 3.35-64), published in 1966 [this article

1858: ChMles Darwin et Alfred Russel Wallace" (pp. 98-111), published

is sometimes erroneously c.itcd as "La Nouvelle connaissancc de !.1 vie."

'.~.

r A

VITAL

RATIONALIST

CRITIGAL

which is actually the title of the subsection of the book to which this ar-

AI8LIOGRAPHY

An exchange with Fram;:ois Dagognet, broadcast on 1-rcnch educational

ticle belongs];

television, Febru,uy 20, 1968.

"Qu'est-ce que Ia psychologic?" (pp. 365-81), firq published in 1956;

"Un ModE-Je n'est rien d'autre que sa fOnction," in .".1inistCrf' de ]'Education

reprinted here without the commem by R. PagCs and the follmving "Note"

Nationale, Entreriem philosophiques: A l'usaw des profeueurs de philosophic

by Canguilhcm, both of which can be found in the Revue de mitaphysiquc et

de !'ensei9nemcnt ~ec.mdaire (Paris: lnstitut pt>dagogique n.ltional, 1968),

de morale in 1956, and in the reprints of the Cah1crt p(Jur f'analrse in 1966

PP· I Jl-l6.

and 1967; "ThCrapcutic[UC, cxpCrimcntation, rcsponsabilitC" (pp. 383-91), pub-

1969

lished in 1959. This book has been reprinted many times. It was translated into Japanese

"jean Hyppolite (1907-1968)," Revue de mitap~l'sique et dl' nwale 74 (April-June

in 1991. Extracts from the fifth edition (1989) of this book are included in

1969), pp. 129-lisis (Paris: Hat:hette,

"C. Konoew~ki, Ia Pn·cholooie dynam1quc cr /na!Jtti dans /'histoire des sciences de Ia vie (1977) Extracts from this article are included in this

"Logique dll vivant et histoire de Ia biologic," 3cienccs 71 (March-April 1971),

pp. 20-!5. An t·ssay review of Franyois Jacob\

"Bichat, Marie, Franyois-Xavier," in Charles C. Gillispie, ed., Diccionary of Sci prniou~ year, with a ne-w "Avant-propos" (pp. 1-4 ). I o norma/_1 !o paroiOoico (Mexico: Siglo 'eintiuno editores, 1971 ).

between 1931 and 1934. ''Judith Swazey, Reflexes and ,lleror Integration: Sherrinoton's Comcpt of lnteorative Action, I larvard University Press," Clio Medica 5 ( 1970), pp. 364-65.

A wcond t~dition was published in 1978; this translation was ma(k trnm the French edition of 1966, including its new wcond part.

Review.

1972

[Introduction] "Georges Cuvicr: Journees d'Ctudes organisecs par I'Institut d'histoire des sciences de I'Univer~ite de Paris, les 30 et 31 mai 1()69 pour le bicentenaire de la naissance de G. Cuvier," Revue d'histoire des sciences

"P1dace," in lnedirs de Lt~morck, Prt-sentt-~ p.u _r..,.ta~ \'.1chon, G. Romwau, Y. I aissus

23.1 (1970), pp. 7-8.

(Pari~:

Mapist~mologil' biologique dam l'hi~toriographie scientifique contt'mporaine" (pp. 11-29), publisht'd in Italian in 1976; "Qu'est-ce qu'une idt?ologie scientifiqud" (pp. 33-45), published in 1970; "line Ideologie medicale exemplaire.le ~ysteme de Brown" (pp. 47-54), based on the paper published in 1974 under a different title in the Procet:dings of the Xlllth International Congress lOr the Histo;y of Science in Moscow, August 18-24, \971; "I'Effet de Ia bactCriologie dans !.1 fin de~ 'ThCories mCdicale~· au XIX'. siCcle" (pp. 55-77), based on a lccwre presentt·d in Barcelona in April 1975, translated into German in 1g7g: "La Formation du concept de regulation biologique aux XVIII'. et X!Xc ~iCcles"

(pp. 81-99), an t'Xtend\·d ver:-.ion of the p on that article <md raise\ five questions, which Canguilhem amwcr\ (pp. SH-60). "Ct·lntin Rougll·," 4nnuoire de l''lssociation des anciem dCrcs de /'Ecole ,\'ormole Supirieurc(I97H), pp. 29-12.

Canguilhem had written his "Diplt\me d'l·tudes ~upt>rieures" under the supervision of Celestin Bougl(· in 1926 (see above, first entry under

1926). On the ;Varma/ and the PcuhofoHicaf, trans. Carolyn H. F,nnett, with the edito-

Revie1v. "J. Schiller et T. Schiller, Henri Dutrochet," Archive~ internationales d'histoirc des ~cience~

17

Raiwn pri1·entc 46 (1978), pp. 55-68.

et rationaliti dans f'hi>toire des sciences de !a vie.

I a f-ormation du concept de rCf1cxe aux

"Une Pt·dagogie de Ia gui'rison est-elle pos~ibld" Nouvelle re;uc de psrchonohse

rial collaboration of Robert S. Cohen. lntroduc tion by Michel Foucault (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978).

27 (1977), p. 340.

Translation of the IY72 \tTond, reviwd hench edition. Reprinted b~

Review. "Souvenir de Lucien I !err," Rulletin de Ia SociCu> des om is de l'Fcole ,\'ornwle

430

Zone Rooh in 1989; extrdct\ included in thi\ reader.

4l'

A

VITAL

CRITICAL

RATIONALiST

()normal co patolowUl (Rio de Janeiro: Forensc-Universitaria. 1978).

Portuguc\t' translation oft he 1972 ~econd, n·vi~ntitled

une nouvelle Cdition," p. vi).

ofaconferencein 1984(pp. F11-.f11).

"Gustave i'vlonnd, philosophc, pt;dagogu.> (1%0). published in 1962; with a "Pre-

Dagognct (Paris: Vrin, 1984), pp. 7-1/J.

sentation" hy Etienne Balib: Ct!h!cr_> S. 1.S. 1 { 19~4 ). pp. ~ 1-34.

4l4

411

A

VITAL

CRITICAL

RATIONALIST

1985

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"Lecture et souvenir de Jean Rrun," in Franyois Dagognet et al., Une philosophic du seuil: Hommage Dijon,

[Comments in J Comiti- consultatif nati(Jnal d'Cthique pour les sciences de Ia \·ic ct de Ia sante, Rapport 19f/4 (Paris~ La Documentation fran~aise, 1985),

1987), pp. 1-7. Published in a Festschrift prt'scntt'd to Jean Brun, a Fn·nch philo~opher

who had been a stufh:nt ofCanguilhcm at tht' l.yt:l:t' Fermat, in Touloust',

pp. 182-84. Comments on three papers pn•sented by F. QuCre, M. Glowinski and

in 1937.

M. Pel icier at a roundtable on the "Problf-mes d't">thiques poses par Ia re-

"Discours de Monsieur George'> Canguilhem prononce le 1'"r decembrc 19R7 ,l

cherche sur le systCme nerveux humain,'' organized by the French National

\'occasion de Ia remise de Ia M{daille d'or du CNRS," Medaille d'or du C,\'RS

Committee on Ethics in the Life Sciences and Medicine, December 6, 1984.

1987 (Paris: Centre National ric Ia Recherche Scientifique, 1987).

Emile Boutroux, Des Viritis titernelles chez Descartc.~. Tht'>.se latinc traduite par M. Georges Canguilhem, elf.ve de !'Ecole Nonnale Superieurc (Paris: Vrin, 1985 ). Reprint of the 1927 edition, then published by Felix Alcan, lacking the preface by LCon Brunschvicg; with a short "Avant-Propos" by Jean-l.uc

"Avertissement des editeun

a !.1 prt>miere edition," in Jean

Cavailli:~,

Sur Ia

l.o9ique et Ia theorie de Ia science• (4th ed., Paris: Vrin, 1987), pp. ix-xiii.

The first thre(• t'ditiqn~, l:wginning in 1947, had been published b~· the

i\1arion. ''Fragments," in Revue de mitaphysique et de morale 90.1 (I 985 ), pp. 9 3-98. "Striking fragment~" selected from the works ofCanguilhem, by Dina Dreyfus, Claire S.J.Iomon-Bayet and Jean-Jacque~ S.1lomon. "Descartes et Ia technique,"

A two-page printed text of Canguilhem's acceptance speech of the CNRS's gold medal for scientific achievement~.

Cahier.~

5. TS. 7 ( 1985 ), pp. 87-9 3.

Reprint of the paper first published in 1937.

Pn.:~scs Univer~itairt·~

d(• France.

Seijou to Byouri (Tokyo: Hosci University Pres~, 19H7).

Japant'St' tramlation, by l~lkehi~a Taki1.ama, of Lc Normt!ll't ll' Pathoh',qlqut•.

''PrdJ.ce," llutpr.• o.md hchnDIDgy 4 (1987), pp. 7-10. Thb text

wa~

Canguilhem's contribution to "Science: Ia renaissance

d'une histoire," a colloquium held in memory of Alexandre Koyre in P.ui~

1986

on June 10-14, 1986. It i~ printed here as the introduction to a special journ.J.I issue of the proceedings of that colloquium.

"Sur l"llistoire de Ia folie' en tant qu'hCnemenr," I.e Debat 41 (Sept./Nov.

1988

1986), pp. 17-40. Note on the circumstances surrounding Canguilhem's report on Foucault'~

doctoral dissertation. Didier Eribon published the report in 1991

(sec below, first entry under 1991).

ldeolow· and Rationalitr 1n the History of" the Life Sciences, lrans. Arthur Cold.

hammer(Cambridge. MA: .'-..tiT PrL·~~. 1988). Translation of the second, rcvi-.ed French edition (\981); extracts in-

1987

cluded in this reader. "Pres{'ntation," in h·es Sch\\aru, E.\pCnenCt' er umnaiswnce du trarail (P,uis:

"La Decadence de l'idte de progrf-s," Rn·ue de mCtaphyr;iquc ct de morale 92

Editions Sociales, 1988), pp. 19-22. "I.e Statut epistCmologiqul' dt' Ia medf"cinc," 1/isto~v and Philosopht of the /1fr

(1987), pp. 437-54.

4]6

4l7

A

Scicn~e•

VITAL

PATIONALIST

CRITICAL

10 (suppl. 1988), pp. 15-~9.

"PresentJ.tion," in Fran\oi~ De laporte, Hi.1toirc de Ia jlhrc jounc (P.tri~: Payot,

Included in this redder.

Jq8q}, pp.

liansh,woincn no reh•h1 (!Okyo: Howi University

Pre~~.

19HH).

Il-l~-

Translated into Spanish in 1989, English in 1991 and Japanew (in pres~).

Japanese translation, by Osamu Kanamori, o( La formation du concept de

"Preface," in Anne fap:ot-Largeault, v~ Causes de Ia mort: liistoirc nalllrcllc ct

rCjh:-1c. "La ~antC:·,

BIBLIOGRAPHY

fOctwrs de risque (Pari~: Vrin I Ly(ln: lnstitut intndisciplin,lin: d't:·tudes

concept , u!gain·

d

question philnsophique,'' Cahicrs Ju >lminairc·

epi~tt-mnlogiques.

ile philosophic 8: Lo santC (Strashuurg: Editions Ccntrt• de Documentation

"PrCsentation," in J1ichcl Fouwu!t ph1losophc: Rcnconfrc imernationale, Poris 9,

en I I istoin· de Ia Philosophic, I9H8 ), pp. 119-3 3 ·

10, II janvier 1988 (Paris: Sl'uil, 1989), pp. 11-12.

!"he text of a lecture given t edition; excerpts from tht' firs\ cditi•m are in· eluded in thi~ reader. The ,\'orma/ and the Pathological (1\'cw York: Zone Books, 19H9).

Reprint ofth1· tr.mslation publhht•d by Reidd in 1978; rxtr,ltts included in thi~ reader.

"Rapport de M. Canguilh{'Ol sur le manu.\crit di·po5l' p.tr i\1. Michel foucault, dire' teur de l'lmtitut fratH,.-ais de !lam bourg, ('n vue de l'nht1·ntinn du pnmi~ rl'imprinwr cnmmt· these princrpale de dPctnrat l'\ lettrn."

Canguilhem's rcpiJrt (r\pri! 19. 1900) on Foucre~\es

aU.\

Rt·vinv of the 1966 editiom of the book published under that title.

.\TI/' er X\'/fr siCdcs (Pari,:

llniversitaires dt.: France, 1955), L'AnnCe psrchologiquc 56 (1956),

1968

p. 329. Unly the aUlhor\ initials ar.:- given.

Frederic L. Holmes, Review of Claude Bernard, Lcc;ons sur /.!s phe'nomCncs de fo 1·ie

1957

com mum au., llllimou~ ct <JU'< vCfi•;Wux (Pari~: Vrin, [96fl), in IIi~ 59.)

(1968), pp. 149-50. (An1m~mousl.

C. Rudolph. Rcvil'w ofCI.1udc Rt•rnard, Lcc;om .wr lc1 phCnom~'nes de /(1 , 1e wm-

Re\'inv of Lr Furmat1on du con,:mographie ... Lc- 'Normal' en rholu·

19Bb

C.M.P.M. llertogh, B,1(hclard en Caneuilhem: cpHtcmologische Discontmwreit en het medisch normbcrwip (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1986).

D. Chevroton, Review of Du Dh·cloppcment 0 l',:mfution (Paris: Pre~~e~ Uni\'t'rsitaires de France, ll)85), I'Anm!c Psycho/v~J!'}!Irges Canguilhem," pp. 271-78:

Micht>l Hchant, "Georges Canguilhem et ]'Idl-e de Ia philosophic,"

Francisco

Pierre M.acherey, "De Canguilhem .l Cmguilhem en passant par Fou-

PP· 37-48; Frane'," pp. 279-85;

a Canguilhem," pp.

104-\09;

Claude Debru, "Georges Canguilhem et Ia normativitC du pathologiquc: Dimensions CpistCmologiquc~ et Cthiques," pp. I 10-20; Anne Marie Moulin, "La MCdecine modcrnc selon George~ Canguilhem. 'Concepts en attente'," pp. 111-34; Elis.abcth RoudincKo, "Situation d'un textt": Q\l't"st-ce que Ia pychoIogie?" pp- 135-44; Yvette Conry, "La FDrmation du concept de miotamorpho-;e: Un Essai d'application de Ia probli:matiquc canguilhiomienne du normal et du pathologique," pp. 145-57; Gerard Molina," 'Darwin et Y../allacc .. .', trente ans aprl.-~," pp. 158-74;

Yves

Schwart;r, "Une Rcmontt>t> en

troi~ temp~:

Georges Canguilhem,

Ia vie, le tr,wail," pp . .305-21; and Michel Deguy, "Allocution de cl()ture," pp. 324-30. Includes a letter received from Canguilhem, on p. 324. Franrs without french may wish to comult

21. "l e Concept," p. 360.

my tramlation ofTh~ New Scientific Spira (Roston: Ac-acon, 1985), which con-

21. lb;d., p. 362.

tains biographical and other information. -TRANS.]

23 ..\{iche! FoucJ.ult, "Le d(• Ia soma de~ ,-ristam {Paris: A lean, 1918).

tiom nfan ephtcmolof~ical bn·aJ.. (rupluft") or "tear" (dCchirurc) ushl by Bache lard,

2. No doubt, a "naturJ.I object" is not naturally natural but ratlwr the object

i~ hotrmved from }:an Cavaill~~: " ... L·e~ fractures d'indCpendJ.nce succe~sives

of common rxpcrience and perception within a culture. For exampk. the object

qui

"mineral" and the object ''crystal'' have no significant exi~tence .1part from the

ni-cc~~dirl'tncnt et pour k dCpol~ser" (Sur ld lotJI4tiC et lc~ thCorie, p. 2H).J

ch,l(jll lie 1\h·ndel," lecture de\i"ered

Uniwr'>ity ol

Wi~l~m~in Pre~\,

1962). p. 103.

2':J. Koyri·, 1 rom the Clascd Warld tr> rhe Infinite Unnwse (Baltimore: John~

ar the Palais de Ia \)i·couvcrte, Paris, 1965. \9. In this case, thl' name of the science was translt-rred post hoc to the

30.

ideology; in tht• CJSt' of atomism, it wa'> the other way around. 20. Gerd Ruchdah\, "On tht> Pre~uppositions oft I i'>torians of Scienn·," in Alistair Camcwn Crombi~· and l\·1ichad l]o..,kins, cds .. I 11~/LJ~\' of

Hopkins University Pre~~. 1957).

Sciemc

1 ( 1% 7),

21. See the inaugural lecture in a course on the general history of'>cience, ColiCge de Frann· (March 26, IR92), printed in Revue owdentale, May 1, IR92,

Koyr{·, (he Astronomical Revolution: Coperniws, Kepler, Borelli, trilns.

H.F.\V. Maddi5on {lth.lca: Corne!! Uniwrsity Pre~~. 1971), P· --1-0. 11. t:C>r a ~-ritiquL', ~l't· Michel Ft>tlt'.111it. lht> t)rdcr of lhmgil,lires de Franct', !951). p. 25. See also "1 'Actualite de l'hi~toire

de~ sciences," lecture delivered at the Pdlai~ de Ia DCcouvnte, Paris. 23. Bachclard, I'ActivitC rationo/11tc, p. ). See also I e Rationalisme appliqtk:, p. 112: "Ration,1li~t thinking do('S nm 'begin.' It corn·cb. It regulorite\. It

normali,rcs."

ungen:'' ~·lcrtcilahnchrift }iir du: prakrnche Hei/kundc (Prague, 1858), vnl. -1, pp. 50-72. 35. Du Bob-Re)mond i5 known !()r the concluding word, "lgnorahimu~!." of his Uher die Crcnl Du Bois-Reymond's lecture on Ll Mettrie in Reden (Leipzig. 1886), val. I, p. 178. Du Bni-.-Reymond \urdy was not unaware that La Mettrie had '>"ougl1t and found asylum at the court of Frederick l! in 1748.

55. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 14.

56. Ibid., vol. I, P· 246. 57. Ibid .. p. 284.

38. Du Bois-Reymond neglected a point that was clear to Konrad Ec-khard, namely, the relation between the problem of sympathies and that of reflexes.

58. The concept of mca'\UH' in cumparativt" anatomy appear'i in Claude Perrault, architect and anatomist. In the prditce to Mt~moiri'I pour sen·1r 0 J'histoire

39. I have not been able to consult this work, but I have already noted [ear-

nt'ries, ,..oJ. 2, p. 205.

human body." Quoted in fran~oi" Dagngnd, Pour une rhiorie gCnirale de~ form
41. Ibid, p. 117. 42. According to Fritz

Lejcun~. LcitjOden zur (;cschichte

dcr Medi!in ( 194.3),

p. 12 3, Prochaska performt'd more than three thous.and operations to remove cataracts.

(Pari~: Vrin, 1975), p. 178. Bur lor Blainville and Maupic-d, the man-measure is

the more-than-animal-man: that is the criterion ol' perfection in the series.

59. See especially Blainville and Maupied's Histoire, vol. 3, pp. IS and 337;

43. Du Bois-Rt:ymond\ lecwrc is not mentioned in Fearing'~ tnt or bibliography.

and Cuder ~·t Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, p. 431: "M. Cuvier. in my view, is one of tht> mo:-.t emint•nt examples of political philosophy in action.''

44. Blaitwille, Cuvia et Geoffroy Saint-HJ!Q/re (Paris: Librarie j.B. Baillif.re,

60. Ibid., mL 1, p. vii.

1890), p. 436; compare Duvernay. l'./vtice histonquc sur les our raws a Ia vic de

61. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 16.

11. Le B'vn Cm'ier (Park EG. Levrault, 1833). The "science of finance," in which

62. Ibid., p. 529.

Cuder took courses at the Caroline Academy, included economic theory and

63. Ibid.

practice, ''policy science" and

technolog~··

64. ibid., vol. 2, p . .58.

45. Blainvil\c, CUVJ~'r ct Geoffroy Soinr-Hi!airl', pp. 48-49. 46. Georges Cuvier, HJStoire des .\ciences nuturcllcs (Paris: Fortin,

Ma~son,

1841-45), vol. 3, pp. 14-15.

47. Blainville and Maupied, Histoire des 1ciences de !'organisation et de lwrs profVCs, commc base de Ia philmophie (Paris: j. Lecoffre, 1847), vol. 2, p. 65.

P.o\.H 1

Two:

Ev!s·r£MOLOGY

\. /\ristotlt:. De anima, trans. Kenelm Fo:-.ter and Silvester llumphries ( Nc\V Haven, CT: Yale University Pres-;, \95\), ILl, art. 217-IY. p. 163.

2. Ibid., 11.2, art. 254, P· 184.

48. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 25 3, 27 3, 2!'.0.

l. Ibid., ILl, pp. 196-203.

4~.

4. Jean-Baptiste I amarck, Rccht•nhe" (AT Vl.109-14), in ibid.,

and Paul Tannery, eels., Oeuvres de Dcswrtes (Paris: Vrin, !974), vol. 4, pp.

686, 695. 29. "(Cor) enim non viscus nobile

l"t

primTps nt ut

u.~quc

adco uti per-

pp. 164-66.

hihetur sed meru~ musculus, carne tantum et tendinibus more coeterorum

n.

const.tns, et sanguini clrcumpellendo imerviem" (\Villi5, Pharmaccuticcs rationo/is

Ibid.

24. Descartes, "Treatise on Man" (AT XI 129-31), in ibid., p. 100.

[ih73l, pt. I, sec. 6, ch. 1). See Appendix, p. 174. See also De wnauini~ inwles-

25. De~cartes, Discour~e four in "Optics" (AT Vl.!09-14), in ibid.,

Lentio (1670), in Opcro omnid, vol. I, p. h6~ ("ex quo liquet cor c.~~t· mnum

pp. 164-66. Rabelais's friend Guillaume Rondclct (1507-1566) ofMontpellier

mu'>culum") and De nervorum descriptio cl usus (1664), in ibid., vol. I, p. 368

appears to have been the first to hypothesize that nerve~ consist of independent

("Uicrndum crit quod ipsius cordis com pages, c.trne val de fibrosa constans,

bundles of centripetal and centrifi.1gal conductors.

potim musculm quam parenchyma appdLui debet").

26. In the 1664 preface to Descarte~'s "Treatise on ~v1an," Clerselier points

30. "In cordc, sicut in toto praeterea musculoso gcnere, spirituum insitorum

out that the nerve\ in'>ertion into the muscle, and thnefore the mmdc\ expan-

particuli~ ~pirituosalinis copula ~ulphurca a ~angine '>uggt"~ta Jdjungitur; quae

sion hy the animal spirits, were poorly represented by Louis de La Forge, \vho

matnies, dum spiritus agitantur, denuo t"li~a. ac velut cxplosa (non secus a

beliewd that the nerve~ conducted the nm\· of spirits into the muscle~. whereas

pluveris pyrii particulae accemae ac rarcfactae) rnusculum, ~ive cor ipsum, pro

Descarte5 taught that "the nerw~ fibers and branche~ rami!)' in the muscles them-

nixu motivo efficiendo inflant ac intunwbciunt" (Willi~. De ncrrorum dCI"criptio

those fiber~ S\vcll or collapse, their arrangement cau~es the mm-

et ums). On the compariwm of the heart to a hydraulic machine: "Circa motum

des to swell or collap~c .tccordingly, producing various effl·cr.." (AT Xl.119-202),

5anguinis natural em, non hie inquirimm de circulatiorH" t"jus, sed quali cordis

sclvn, and

dS

A

VITAL.

NOTES

RATIONALIST

,t vasorum structur,\ velut in m>1china hydraulica comtanti ritu circumgyr('tur"

muswhui, in vol. 2, p. 681.

40. "We call 'reflex movements' movement~ due to a stimulo-motor ner-

(De febribus: [1659], in Opera omnw, vol. l, p. 71). 31. "Calorem tamen cor omnino a sanguine et non sanguis a corde mutuatur"

Hnts lOree produced by the unconscious fUnctional activity of the sensory nerve~.

It would be more correct to call them movements produced by a nervous reflex

Wi\lis, De sanguinis: incales:centia, in ibid., vol. I, p. 663 ).

1

J.ction, for it is not the movement who'ic direction changes but the nervous

32. Cf ibid., vol. I, p. 661. 33. Willis, Ccrcbri anatomc (1664), ch~. 9, \0 and 14, in Opera omnia,

Ioree, which we regard as ha\'ing been somehow rdlected insidC' the organism

.ol. 1, pp. 28qff., 320. In De fermentatione (ibid.), p. 4. Willis describt·~ a still

sn that a centripetal motion becomes a centrifugal one. But the fir~t expres-

.nd explains how it works. The hierarchical arrangement of the terms "distilla·

sion is convenient, and it~ use is sanctioned by custom" (Henri r~·1ilne-Edward~.

ion," "purification," "mblimation" and "spiritualization" provides remarkably

f_er;ons wr la physiologic compardc de /'hommc ct des animaux [Paris, IH78-79J,

_•recise corroboration of an idea of Gaston Bachdard's: "Imagination necessJ.r-

n>l. 13, p. 112).

ly ascribes value .... Consider tht' .-.I chemists. For them, to transmute is to •erfect ... for an alchemist, a distillation is a purification that t•nnobles a \ubJance by remo\·ing its impurities." See I_ 'Air ct les songt>.> (Paris:

J. Corti,

194 ~ ),

42. J.A. Umer, Lntc GrUnde eincr Pht H(llogic der eigcnt!ichcn thu·mchen Natur thrermhen Kiirpcr ( 1771 ). sec. 495.

43. It is cheating a little to include the name ofLegallois, whose first paper

'P· 296, 298. 34. Willis. De motu muscular! (Landini: Apud Jacobum Martyn, 1670), in

on his experiments with cutting the spinal cord dates from 1809. As lOr Whytt, I mention him only insobr J.S his cnnct'ptions coincide at various

>pcra omnia, vol. 1, pp. 680-84.

35. De fcrmenta/Jonc cnntains all the- physical and cht>mical preliminaries o \Viii is's phy~iological theories: we: esp. ch. 10, "De natura ignis et obiter de olore t't \uce: Ex preamissis non difficile nit pulveris pyrii in tormcntis be\licis

tlll_l~e

point~

with

of authors .,.,_.hn made explicit use of the nt)titm of reflection.

44. Johannes MUller, flandbuch der Physwlogic dn Memchen (Coblent: J.llolschcr, 1833-37), bk. 3, ch. 3, sec. 3. 45. Franyois Jacob, La Logiquc du vivant (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), p. 302.

1sitati naturam explicMe." 36. On tht' .:1natomy and physiology of the nt.'f\'(", see Ccrebri anotame,

4n. Aristotle, De af)lm£1, tram. J.A. Smich (OxfOrd, UK: Clart'ndon Press,

190X-12\. II. I.

h. \0. 37. "Quippe spiritus animale~ a Cerebra ct Cert>bt·llo, cum mcdul!ari 1triusque append ice, velut a gemino luminari aflluentes, Systt·ma nervmum

47. Aristotle, De pnrobu_\ animalium, tran~. William Ogle (London: K. Paul, French, 1882), 1.5. 48. Aristotle, De gcneratione onimalium, trans. David Balmc (OxfOrd, UK:

rradiant" (Cerchri anatome, vnl. \, p. 3 36). 38. "Quapropicr Ionge me !ius ju~ta hypothesim nnstram, hos spiritu~ c .:mguinis llamma emis.so~. lucis radiis, sJ.IIem iis aurae J.eriquc interte:-;ti~. ~im· lcs dicamm" (De anima brutorum, in Opera omnia, vol. 2, p. 31). "Spiritus tnimales, velut lucis radios, per to!Um systema nervosum dithmdi supponimu~"

Clarendon Press, 1972), IV. tO. 4(}. Dc~cartes, "Principle~ of Philosophy" (:\T VIIIA,326), in /'h,• Philosophical ~"Vritinw of Descrartn, tr,m~. F.S. llald.11W and C.H.I. Ros~ [Camb11dge, l!K: C.tmbridgl'

in ibid., val. 3, pp. 302-304. S. "To More, 5 February \649" (/\T V."267-70), in ibid., pp. 360-67. On the

470

Univl'rsity Press, 1911], vol. 1. p. 195).

47 1

A

VITAL

RATIONALIST

10. "Description of the Human Body and All of!ts Functions" 1 (AT 11.225 ),

NOTES

[(AT Xl.520], in Oeuvres de Deswrtes, val. 11, p. 520).

2 L "Accretio duplex est: alia mortuorum et quae non nutriuntur, fitque

in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I, p. 315. 11. See Ra)'mond Ruyer, Elements de pl,rcho-biologie (Paris: Presse~ Llniver .\t !Cntl/1( .'\pmr, tran'>. :\rthur Co\dhammn

n·printed in F.milc Cley, Essais de philosophic ct d'histoirc de lo bioloaic (Paris:

(Boston: Beacon, !984). p. 136. 72. The first two fOrmulations arc to be fnund in Bernard\ I a Science cxpdri-

ivtasson, 1900).

SO. (;eorgcs Pouchet published an interesting biographical not

mtl/11

anun,qic contcmporaine (Paris: Alcan, 19 3f\ ), p. 8; sec alsop. 9. 3. Ari~tntle. Politics, in The Ra~ic WMh vj ,.-lnstotlc. l'd. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, l447),1.ii.11. 4. ThCophile de Bordeu, Rech de vCritC: Pal'tcur, Ranord, 1--ontencl!e, Lo R,,Lhc-

jiiUWvld (Paris: Stock, !942), P· %.

1%1). p. 171.

10. Aristotle, Maaph_tsics, in The Ra~ic HOrh {'/Aristotle, art. 966a, p. 718.

21. See Kant's Appcndh to the Transccntlt•nt,ll Dialectic in the

CrilhjUt'

of

42. Bernard, Introduction ti I'Ctudc de Ia midecinc t'lpCrimcnwlc (Paris: Lihrairic J.B. Baillit~re, 186S ), tram. by llcnry Copley Grt·enL' a~ Introduction to the Stud!

oj' F IP