A Vision of Transdisciplinarity: Laying Foundations for a World Knowledge Dialogue

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Author: Frederic Darbellay | Moira Cockell | Jerome Billotte | Francis Waldvogel

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A VISION OF TRANSDISCIPLINARITY

Cover drawing by Stéphane Fretz. Vanité, 2008, ink on paper, 27 x 20 cm.

A VISION OF TRANSDISCIPLINARITY LAYING FOUNDATIONS FOR A WORLD KNOWLEDGE DIALOGUE Frédéric Darbellay, Moira Cockell, Jérôme Billotte, Francis Waldvogel, Editors

EPFL Press A Swiss academic publisher distributed by CRC Press

Taylor and Francis Group, LLC 6000 Broken Sound Parkway, NW, Suite 300, Boca Raton, FL 33487 Distribution and Customer Service [email protected] www.crcpress.com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

is an imprint owned by Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes, a Swiss academic publishing company whose main purpose is to publish the teaching and research works of the Ecole polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne. Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes EPFL – Centre Midi Post office box 119 CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland E-Mail : ppur@epfl.ch Phone : 021 / 693 21 30 Fax : 021 / 693 40 27 www.epflpress.org © 2008, First edition, EPFL Press ISBN 978-2-940222-28-5 (EPFL Press) ISBN 978-1-4200-9228-8 (CRC Press) Printed in France All right reserved (including those of translation into other languages). No part of this book may be reproduced in any form – by photoprint, microfilm, or any other means – nor transmitted or translated into a machine language without written permission from the publisher.

4ABLEOF#ONTENTS

!CKNOWLEDGEMENTS IX

)NTRODUCTION XVII

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For a knowledge dialogue between natural and social sciences

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Table of Contents

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#ONTRIBUTORS

!CKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A need for the creation of a more constructive and innovative dialogue between the natural and technical sciences, the social sciences and the humanities of our time is becoming more and more widely acknowledged by the academic and scientific community. It was with the objective of creating a forum for discussion and debate that would allow these different branches of our academic and cultural heritage to renew their connections with each other that the first Symposium of the World Knowledge Dialogue (WWWWKDIALOGUE CH) took place in Crans-Montana (Switzerland) during the three days of 14-16 September 2006. This encounter between leading researchers from different and complementary horizons marked the starting point for a much larger and more ambitious project aimed at uniting the forces of experts from all academic branches in the common cause of understanding and resolving complex issues which face the contemporary world. The idea for this publication was sparked by the enthusiastic response to the first international event of a series, itself made possible thanks to the synergistic and generous collaborative efforts of numerous different university, institutional, scientific and personal networks operating both locally and globally. Within this context, we thank the members of the Rectors’ Conference of the Swiss Universities (CRUS), the University of Geneva, the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, the University of Lausanne, the University of Zürich, and the Swiss National Science Foundation for their unanimous support of the World Knowledge Dialogue’s initiative. Our gratitude goes also to the State Secretariat for Education and Research (SER) of the Swiss Confederation (Government), to the Swiss Federal Council and to M. Pascal Couchepin in particular (Swiss Federal Councillor, Head of the Department of Home Affairs), to the Canton du Valais, to the Institut Universitaire Kurt Bösch (IUKB), to the Fondation Hans Wilsdorf, to Berger van Berchem & Cie and to anonymous donators for their precious and enthusiastic support. The first WKD Symposium also benefited immensely from links to the European scientific community, with the notable participation of M. Jàn Figel’, European Commis-

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Acknowledgements

sioner for Education, Training, Culture and Multilingualism who underlined his support for the project in a speech highlighting the central role of dialogue between academic branches in the processes of knowledge acquisition and innovation. Thanks go equally to the European Science Foundation (Strasbourg / France), the Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina (Halle / Germany), the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (Münich / Germany) and the Fondation Science et Cité (Bern, Switzerland) for their collaboration and support. Within the global context, the WKD initiative salutes the Swiss Embassy in Tokyo (Japan), the Swiss House in Singapore (Asia) and the Swiss Scientific Consulate “Share” in Boston (USA) for their valuable contributions to communication and organizational aspects of the first Symposium. The WKD’s International Scientific Board, Honorary board, and Foundation board (whose numerous members are listed on the Internet site of the WKD /WWWWKDIALOGUE CH), made invaluable contributions to the design of the scientific program of the first WKD Symposium. We thank each member for sharing their stimulating points of view concerning the multiple challenges and goals of interdisciplinary dialogue. Thanks to passionate contributions (comprised within the present publication) of Speakers and Chairpersons alike, towards the goal of establishing constructive and illuminating dialogue perfused with complex and multidimensional themes, the banner phrase «World Knowledge Dialogue» took on real meaning during the Symposium. These dynamic exchanges were immeasurably enriched by the frank and lively involvement of Young Scientists who attempted to situate their own work within a perspective of dialogue. Altogether around 250 participants hailing from 34 countries combined their efforts to make the World Knowledge Dialogue into a powerful vector for interdisciplinary communication. The realization of this book marks yet another step in the WKD Foundation’s mission ; to foster awareness of, encourage and support, the taking of proactive steps towards achieving a better understanding and a mutual respect between the cultural and scientific branches of our academic institutions. It is for academics themselves to better define and implement those steps. We are indebted to all those who contributed to the process by investing time and effort to elaborate their own reflections on how the complex interactions between science and society affect the world and their place in it. Everyone participating at the Symposium workshop debates helped enrich the content of the reflections summarized herein. Finally we are grateful to the 2006 Symposium’s Speakers who have shown tolerance, generosity and understanding in according us liberty to paraphrase and analyze their contributions in the cause of bridging the traditional communication gaps between academic cultures. May ‘Research’ and its practitioners in all disciplines find in these pages the same testimony of gratitude that we extend to all those institutions, individuals and networks who, from near or far, have helped, encouraged and set the scene for a truly progressive dialogue of knowledge to take place in a spirit of respect for their differences and their complementary value.

Frédéric Darbellay, Moira Cockell, Jérôme Billotte, Francis Waldvogel Crans-Montana, Switzerland, June 1st 2008

&OREWORDS

7HERE AND7HENCE by André Hurst

These questions go way back. They are asked at the very beginning of Plato’s Phaidros (“My dear Phaedros, where are you going, and whence ?”). It could look just like a friendly inquiry about daily whereabouts, but evidently, at the beginning of a book in which ultimate views about the world will be exposed, it should certainly be read also as the ultimate question. Asking the ultimate questions, giving the ultimate answers through various theories of everything has often been considered the major occupation of our species (“By its very nature, mankind wants to know”, says Plato’s pupil Aristotle). Asking “where and whence ?” has thus been done for a long time, in many ways, and is still done currently. But it is done in very different ways, depending on whether you stand in the field of anthropology or in the field of quantum physics, to give just two examples.

-ETHODOLOGIESMAYCHANGE FUNDAMENTALQUESTIONSREMAINTHESAME If methodologies can differ and the fundamental questions remain the same, should we not help by a dialogue between the different fields of knowledge ? This, up to a point, is already done in so-called interdisciplinary studies (but which, very often, turn out to present us with just one more “discipline”, such as the many “comparative” this or that to which the academic world has become familiarized). The contribution of the “World Knowledge Dialogue” (WKD), with the help of scholars from all over the world, aims at trying to elucidate a new way of exploring all our different forms of knowledge (and, admittedly, the definition of these is itself unclear) in order to find methods and ways of expressing them that could help them to advance in harmony one or several steps further. This view has been adopted unanimously by the Swiss Rectors’ Conference : the country not only enjoys the presence of many first-rank scholars, whether foreigners or Swiss, it

Forewords

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can also take advantage of their world-wide networks and has in and of itself a long tradition of multiculturalism that favors all forms of dialogue.

!DDRESSINGANURGENTNEED The first session of the WKD at Crans-Montana (Switzerland) provided up to a point the very proof that something of this kind was urgently needed. Indeed, it could be said that the dialogue was very timidly attempted, and what one could actually witness was only a first step towards the goal : representatives of sciences and of humanities accepting to make contact, to speak in the presence of colleagues of different fields about unfamiliar basic questions, sometimes unknowingly imitating each other. There was unanimous agreement on one thing : the perspective for dialogue had to be brought further, we had not succeeded completely at the first try and, hence, the problem was, and is, a real one. One thing, at least, came undoubtedly out of this first session : we are not alone. This very comforting consideration is applied in its synchronic and its diachronic dimension : participants came from the world at large, and this should go on, as it is an essential feature of the concept itself ; in addition to this, participants bridged the generation gap. The young scientists, perhaps still less influenced by the traditional borders of their discipline, turned out to be very active and very effective participants. Their presence is a guarantee for the future of the dialogue to which we hope to bring our contribution. If there is a message this publication would like to convey to its readers, it certainly is : feel invited (and free) to join us.

4HE2ULESOFTHE'AMEFORA +NOWLEDGE$IALOGUE by Dame Julia Higgins

The First World Knowledge Dialogue in Crans-Montana in September 2006 was an enormous and courageous experiment, not just for the organizers but also for all the participants. As the scientist in residence I had the challenging job of setting the scene and laying out the “rules of the game” for such a dialogue in an introductory talk. At the time of the meeting I still held my (time-limited) role as Foreign Secretary of the Royal Society, the United Kingdom’s Academy of Science and one of the oldest in the world. Founded in 1660 just after the restoration of the monarchy in the UK, the society was an early expression of a revolution in thinking about the natural world, which was sweeping through Europe. This birth of experimental science was expressed in the Royal Society motto “Nullius in verba” – which translates literally as “nothing in words” but means to imply “believe what you see, not simply what you are told”. My use of this motto to introduce my “rules of the game” produced intense irritation in at least one attendee who wrote to me afterwards saying that I had immediately downgraded the potential contributions from the participants from an arts or humanities background for whom words are all important. I did not mean to do this but his reaction was perhaps correct as this revolution in science and the pre-eminent position it gave to experiment rather than opinion is often seen as the beginning of the divergence of science from arts into what a much later author, C.P. Snow called “the two cultures”. However if one reads the history of the subsequent centuries and looks at the literature produced, it is evident that educated men and women expected to be able to engage in both cultures, probably at least until the end of the 20th century. The aim of the WKD is of course to restore that earlier state of communication and continuum of understanding.

Forewords

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!NEXPERIMENTINDIALOGUE The vehicle chosen by the first WKD symposium for developing these processes of communication was to use two overarching themes- “Complexity” and “Origins and migrations of modern humans”. The speakers to the themes had been engaged in pre-meeting discussions – sometimes face to face and sometimes through electronic media. At the meeting itself as well as the main speakers’ presentations, there were a range of short presentations, and extended discussions involving the whole participating audience. The aim was to identify, develop and refine a process for sharing views, a method to aid future discussion and perhaps to begin discussions that might eventually lead to reform of university education. These were certainly not minor aims or limited aspirations and that we did not fully achieve all (or even any) is no more than to be expected in such a new departure.

+EEPITSIMPLE In my introduction I identified seven crucial rules for the debate and I believe these will stand for future dialogues : t Listen – all too often we hear but do not listen to what is being said because of our own education and culture ; t Explain yourself clearly- the audience is composed of people with very wide ranging backgrounds, and most likely different from your own ; t Leave your prejudices at the door ; t Avoid jargon ; t Be uncritical of others ideas ; t Be unafraid – carrying debate into someone else’s area of expertise can be very nerve wracking ; t But above all - enjoy the intellectual adventure ; I concluded my introductory remarks by explaining why I became engaged with the WKD. No-one can be blind to the enormous problems facing us in the 21st century – energy requirements, water – too much (floods) too little (drought), food production, health, aging populations. The list is terrifying. Science can identify these global problems and may provide some of the tools for dealing with them, but only society can truly solve them. The open and friendly dialogue between all intellectual capabilities is essential if we are to move forward.

)NTRODUCTION

&ORA7ORLD+NOWLEDGE$IALOGUE by Frédéric Darbellay, Moira Cockell, Jérôme Billotte and Francis Waldvogel

Two roads diverged in a wood, and I– I took the one less traveled by, And that has made all the difference. Robert Frost (1874–1963), The Road Not Taken (1920) Learn from yesterday, live for today, hope for tomorrow. The important thing is not to stop questioning. Albert Einstein

#ONSTRUCTINGADIALOGUEBETWEENACADEMIA´S±TWOCULTURES² Knowledge, our priceless wealth of observations and discoveries, should – in order to remain valuable knowledge – be permanently enriched and reorganized by our history, our beliefs and our culture. Our perception of the world – whether gathered directly or through scientific equipment – is confronted daily with our personal experience, with the testimony of others ; what we “know” about life, evolution, democracy, social organizations, etc is the result of a permanent interplay of external information and personal interpretation, an everlasting interaction between the object we observe and the subject we are. Obvious though such a statement might appear when stated thus, is it really always the case ? Is this how knowledge has been perceived in the past and how it is understood today ? Are the supposedly more objective sciences, such as physics, biology, genetics, indeed in a permanent interplay with the realm of the social sciences, law, and philosophy ? Is their mutual understanding an achieved reality, a permanent quest, something that just happens naturally, or only an unachievable idealist fantasy ?

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Introduction

!DYNAMICPROCESS Although complete unification and understanding between the natural / technical sciences and human / social sciences can never be achieved precisely because of the dynamic nature of the interplay between them, the effort to reconcile them – with its ups and downs – provides one of the most enriching discourses to have prevailed through scientific history of mankind. At various periods of history, the gap between cultures has been bridged and given us an encompassing view of mankind’s acquisitions in science and the humanities. More recently, however, this trend has changed : During the last three centuries, we have witnessed an explosion of the intellectual effort devoted to the pursuit of the natural / technical sciences, stimulated by the invention of the experimental scientific model. But a corollary effect of the enormous expansion of the natural and technical fields has been their fragmentation into scientific disciplines with increasing specialization of practitioners in these fields.

$IFFERENTCULTURES This effect has been so profound that in his famous Rede lecture of 1959, the physicist and writer C. P. Snow aptly described a generally perceived situation of cleavage existing between humanist and scientific intellectuals of the epoch. The situation he portrays is of two different cultures of research with utterly distinct manners of thought and practice, each totally incomprehensive of the other, mutually incapable of initiating any sort of dialogue. This apparent disjunction of the intellect into distinct modes of human thought, personified by the academic branches of the humanities and social sciences on the one hand and the natural and technical sciences on the other has been the basis for debate throughout the history and philosophy of science. It is more than ever relevant in the present day ; for no single discipline of study or individual branch of knowledge can hope to offer breakthrough solutions to the daunting problems of our civilization such as violence, self-afflicted diseases, unequal distribution of food and water, climate control, to name but a few.

#ONSILIENCE The idea of reconciliation between the primary different academic branches is close to E. O. Wilson’s original concept of consilience. It calls for members of all branches of the academic community to cooperate in an interdisciplinary perspective in a spirit of respect for the alternative systems of logic that are inherent to different cultures of study and research. E.O. Wilson’s inaugural address during the first Symposium of the World Knowledge Dialogue (available at WWWWKDIALOGUECH) reiterates the argument. To paraphrase Wilson : “There is no inherent epistemological fault-line between the different approaches to knowledge acquisition. Cooperative exploration enriches humankind’s capacity to comprehend itself and its environment and increases the body of knowledge available for transmission between individuals of different cultural, geographical and generational backgrounds”. The same rationale underpins the work of this book, which

For a World Knowledge Dialogue

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touches upon an astounding diversity of interests and opinions and is brought together by its authors shared commitment to fostering cooperative exploration of the knowledge acquisition process by experts across the cultural and disciplinary spectrum.

7ORLD+NOWLEDGE$IALOGUE The term “World Knowledge Dialogue” conjures up a colossal range of expectations among those who hear it. While such diversity is entirely appropriate to the aims of the World Knowledge Dialogue Foundation, we feel it necessary to specify that we have organized this publication with a few principal objectives ; to situate the current state of such a dialogue within a broader historical context ; to establish a conceptual framework within which to identify the essential elements of productive dialogue between the two cultures ; to identify where the most serious splits and epistemological divergences between academic disciplines currently lie in order to surpass the dualities that place them in opposition to each other ; to set in place a means of benchmarking the process of dialogue as a first step to ensuring that it evolves in a productive manner. By seeking to uncover the causes of misunderstanding and lack of mutual respect between the proponents of the two cultures we hope to demonstrate that their diversity of approach can be an asset rather than an obstacle to progress. Through the illustration of case studies in which different modes of thought and argumentation have been brought to bear on broad problematic themes, this publication aims to provide authoritative backing to the concept of multidisciplinary synergy as a generally applicable tool for problem solving.

3URPASSINGDISCIPLINARYFRAGMENTATION The desire to facilitate a productive dialogue between the different branches of academia has become a central preoccupation within the upper echelons of teaching and research at national, European and global levels and is now frequently proclaimed in the public statements of their institutions. Rather than simply add to the chorus, we have set out to help transform the deceptively simple wish into a practical process of achievement ; by inviting researchers from across academia to situate the act of reflection at the very heart of complex issues which currently demand humanity’s most urgent attention ; by asking them to consider both the potential and the limitations of science to offer solutions to some of these pressing issues ; by encouraging them to appraise potential obstacles and conflicts of interest inherent to the process of dialogue in full conscience of the alternative. The gap between the natural / technical sciences and the humanities / social sciences can be considered as a particular case of the fragmentation of disciplines, but there is also more to it. Specialization in the natural sciences is a direct consequence of the reductionist approach of research, and is also influenced by the division of labor that prevails nowadays in all human endeavors, where it supposedly increases productivity and efficiency. In addition, specialization has been institutionalized, because it allows a clearer evaluation of performance, an easier attribution of resources, and a straightforward professional and public recognition : faculty structures, academic organizations, specially meetings and publication vehicles have all followed the same path, leading to a scientific world of

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the 21st century which is discipline-oriented, specialized and non communicative. The preconception that such a split makes for an efficient division of labor within society is enshrined in the structure of our educational policies as well as in the organization of our economies. Most academics make a clear and irrevocable commitment early on to pursuing a career direction in the natural sciences or the humanities. Few individuals find it possible to pursue both in any depth. The result of this mutually exclusive commitment is a marked disequilibrium in the value that many of us accord to these two complementary areas of knowledge.

#OMPLEXITYANDREDUCTIONISM This organization of how scientific research is conducted is now challenged by an important fact : in all evidence, the purely reductionist approach – a heritage of our industrial revolution – is no longer appropriate to the complexity of our material and living world. Indeed in many disciplines and institutions, there is already a growing trend towards adopting a multidisciplinary approach to scientific problems : systems biology is a case in point, characterized as a first attempt to put together our acquisitions in physics, chemistry, genetics, molecular and cell biology, informatics and robotics to reconstruct the processes subtending life and death into a comprehensive, internally consistent system. Ranging over vastly different scales – self-assembly processes, events at the nanometer level, astrobiology, the concepts of altruistic and aggressive behavior, climate change – are but a few other examples where the use of veritable arsenals of tools and methodologies converge. But the complexity of our world and the problem of how to integrate our knowledge of it becomes even greater as we reach beyond the objective world and include the human and social sciences in our quest for understanding. Although certain domains of these disciplines are amenable to a «scientific» approach as described above – for instance, experimental psychology, neurosciences, statistical branches of the social sciences – the bulk of intellectual activity in the humanities will never be amenable to such an approach. It betrays a lack of respect towards such disciplines to believe that their study is merely behind and will some day be performed with the sole armamentarium of the natural sciences. So just what are the fundamental issues responsible for the frequently perceived antagonism between the academic cultures of the natural / technical sciences and the humanities / social sciences ? And how can we set about resolving them ? Clearly a better and more broadly disseminated understanding of the distinct steps in the process of knowledge acquisition in the natural / technical sciences and in the human / social sciences, is necessary if we want to bridge the contemporary culture gap between them.

+NOWLEDGEACQUISITIONASAMULTISTEPPROCESS Knowledge acquisition is a process that has been at the core of epistemological research. Epistemologists consider certain mental tools as either indispensable or highly advantageous to participating in the construction of our knowledge : for example the attributes of


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memory and consciousness are elementary ingredients for processes of acquisition ; and comparison, classification are used in both the natural sciences and in the humanities. Two other elementary mental tools are worth mentioning : perception and testimony. Perception is the first step in the process of data acquisition in the natural sciences, since there is no result without observation or experimentation. On the other hand, testimony can be viewed as the basic ingredient for creativity in the humanities ; history, social sciences, philosophy and ethics, require statements from others in order to create fertile ground for discussion. Of course this distinction may be considered as an exaggeration to make the point. Clearly in daily life, all humans enrich their personal knowledge base with implicit and explicit testimonies from others, but in the natural sciences, this testimony is considered dubious as long as not proven or independently verified. The humanities and social sciences also have a tool to reinforce the value of testimonies : coherence. Explanations, theories and testimonial observations must reinforce each other to result in a coherent intellectual construction. Coherence of various facts and ideas in the humanities has the same intellectual value as coherence of experiments and hypotheses in the natural science and could be a first platform of intellectual exchange.

4HECASE STUDYCONCEPT The case-study concept of the WKD project is designed to provide a testing ground wherein the participants from all disciplines can rapidly acquire a minimum of shared information upon which to build. It is also intended to illustrate that the mental boundaries we choose to place between domains of expertise are mere operational concepts, tools of reductionist thinking that can be moved at will if there is an advantage to be drawn in doing so. However the principle of division into two clearly distinguished academic camps has held sway for so long, that we now have only the most rudimentary notion of where the territories of individual disciplines lie with respect to each other. Thus, in order to identify where the best potential for synergies between the different modes of thought, argumentation and action of the natural sciences and the humanities might lie, a first and foremost requirement might be to chart out a (still reductionist) virtual snapshot of current intellectual space that natural and social scientists alike can share. Of course when we talk about communication between academic cultures we really mean communication between the individuals who as a collective comprise the group that represents the culture. Better communication, when it comes about, is first effected at the level of individual researchers in individual disciplines. Each scientific or humanist discipline has its potential partners in the traditional camp of the «other culture», but these differ with each specific instance of cooperation due to the tremendous diversity of knowledge : astrobiology may benefit from links with philosophy, the issue of medical drug abuse with social sciences and psychology, children’s’ rights with pediatrics and social psychiatry etc. In each attempt, an inventory of what is just beyond reach within that discipline has to be established. As an example, in the field of anti-obesity research – regarded as a typical medical and public health problem – the limits to the progress of our understanding lie almost certainly outside these fields and only the integration of an effective means to instill behavioral changes (itself an ethical issue) would increase the likelihood of success.

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Another possible approach to be explored in terms of looking for new ways to communicate between the cultures can be classified as systemic : certain domains of intellectual activity in their own right are also intrinsic tools of communication between the two cultures : mathematics, statistics, language theory are well established tools, but these examples are quite limited. History and philosophy of science are certainly neglected areas of communication with many potential bridges to offer. More recently, network theory, system theory, analysis of complex systems have shown how promising such approaches are. Finally, the opportunity for dialogue between knowledge fields is an exciting and open field for epistemologists : the basic questions being not “how do we learn ?” but “what are the limits of learning and understanding ?” “Which ones exist because of the limitations of our brains’ activities ?” and “which are a consequence of our mental constructs ?”

#OOPERATIVEEXPLORATIONOFTHEDYNAMICSOFKNOWLEDGEPRODUCTION Any attempt to study the process of cross-disciplinary dialogue is faced with the lack of a truly objective means of defining what is commonly understood by the term interdisciplinary research. Therefore when setting in place our testing ground for analysis of interdisciplinary exchange mechanisms, we aimed to broadly represent a variety of approaches to interdisciplinary inquiry. The range of themes that were selected to initiate debate during the first WKD Symposium, invite cooperative inquiry at different levels of understanding. One debate, inspired by diverse aspects of the topic “Neurosciences” highlights how this highly successful, rapidly progressing, transcultural approach has begun to raise new fundamental questions in domains as far flung as philosophy, ethics and theology. In contrast, debate inspired by the theme of complexity, itself a newly emerging field of study by the natural science disciplines, highlights both the advantages and the limitations of adopting purely reductionist approaches to knowledge acquisition – the derivation of laws, principles, paradigms etc. As another example, the debate centered around the theme of a single specific issue of societal concern, namely human migration, highlights how its understanding has benefited from a comprehensive approach mobilizing forces from paleontology and anthropology to linguistics and molecular genetics. Finally the debate over issues of governance and institutional approaches to restructuring of education and research policy illustrates the impossibility of entirely dissociating the intellectual aspects of a general debate on knowledge acquisition from the political ones.

#OMPLEXITYANDNEUROSCIENCESINDIALOGUE The publication is organized in five chapters, around diverse complementary themes, which contribute to the general reflection on the problem of a knowledge dialogue. The first chapter deals with the issue of complexity as encountered in the pioneering domain of cognitive science. Symposium presentations by Gerald M. Edelman (From Brain Dynamics to Consciousness : How Matter Becomes Imagination) and Jean-Pierre Changeux (Towards a Neuroscience of the Capable Person : Unity, Diversity and Oneself as Another), are available for consultation at WWWWKDIALOGUECH. They are set in the context of interdisciplinary stakes in the analyses by Frédéric Darbellay.


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In his on-line conference, Gerald M. Edelman, one of the world’s most eminent neuroscientists, considers the quest to understand consciousness through the study of brain dynamics. Professor Edelman’s theory of “Neural Darwinism”, a multidisciplinary theory that combines insights about brain composition, connectivity, structure, function, and evolution, has great implications in the search for neural correlates of consciousness. He conveys in simple terms, what neurobiologists understand about a process known as neuronal group selection that describes how the brain is able to learn and adapt. In the second keynote lecture, one of the founding fathers of Neurobiology, Jean-Pierre Changeux, discusses Paul Ricoeur’s concept of a capable person, a rational and conscious individual engaged in social relationships and with personal identity and how the study of neuroscience, in particular cognitive neuroscience, can help us understand the evolutionary processes behind this capable person. An important message from the lecture is that the present-day vision of establishing a neuroscience of the capable person can become a reality but that work is still in progress. Like the ultimate aim to bridge the culture gap between humanities and natural sciences, the problems are dynamic and the solutions are not fixed.

.EWDISCOVERIESDE½NINGCOMPLEXITY The second chapter focuses on particular aspects of complexity, i.e. complexity and biological systems ; complexity in climatology ; complexity – an approach from epistemology and philosophy. Conference presentations by speakers on this theme, Geoffrey West (Searching for Simplicity in Complexity ; Growth, Innovation, Economies of Scale, and the Pace of Life from Cells to Cities), John Schellnhuber (Understanding and Managing Planetary Complexity) and Ian Hacking (Why Physics is Easy and Autism is Hard), are available on the World Knowledge Dialogue Internet site (WWWWKDIALOGUEORG). The content of the first two conferences is enriched by editorial summaries by Moira Cockell and Francis Waldvogel. An article written by Ian Hacking himself accompanies the third conference. Each symposium presenter exposes both his own work and new discoveries in the broad field of Complexity. More than just a showcase for different research areas, the speakers discuss seminal works in their respective domains that attempt to simplify problems and look at complexity from the point of view of both the natural sciences and the social / human sciences – in order to arrive at a more lucid and unified understanding of the topic. Complexity manifests itself in systems ranging from individual organisms to the largest economic, technical, social, and political systems. All the methods that try to handle it do so by trying to understand its dynamic, non-linear behavior. By confronting and allowing these approaches to interact, by exchanging views on different complex systems, we expect to gain new ideas and to try to shed light on such questions as : Which way did science work until now, how did it evolve, and how might it evolve in the future ? How can big pictures emerge from a sea of data ? Can certain biological processes be defined quantitatively to reveal an underlying simplicity ? Can the complexity of social organizations be modeled using methods similar to those used in other systems, and result in general formulas that predict societal behavior ? Theoretical physicist Geoffrey West, president of the Santa Fe Institute (SFI), poses such questions in his presentation. John Schell-

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Introduction

nhuber, Founding Director, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, talks about complexity involved in atmospheric dynamics. His own answers to the central question “Why is planet Earth alive ?” are discussed in terms of the phenomenon of a global carbon cycle. Professor Schellnhuber invokes the Cambrian Explosion and Lovelock’s Gaia theory and explains why, in a billion years the Earth will have fallen out of the habitable zone of the solar system. He predicts that at the current rate of unchecked development, global warming will have reached a point of no return by 2080 and argues that the situation warrants natural and social scientists to come together to find ways to break the urbanization mode in which we currently exist. In essence, Schellnhuber emphasizes that a global movement is imperative for such an auto-evolution to be successful. For Ian Hacking, Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy of the University of Toronto, Canada, and member of the Collège de France in Paris, complexity has an essential ontological aspect that is often overlooked. Complexity is frequently depicted in terms of an object in the world. But in Hacking’s view, complexity is not “in things” but is a “relation between people and things”. It is goal-directed or context-driven. For instance a common object such as a leaf, which is simple for most people, is a subject involving complex details for a plant physiologist. Hacking elaborated the argument that we should comprehend complexity in terms of what we want to understand, predict and / or control. It is in this context that he chose the intriguing title of his presentation : Why Physics is Easy and Autism is Hard. The speaker mentioned two of his recent interests – studying the physics of absolute zero and autism in children. Evolving over eleven years, the two have become fields of major research. The title comes from his observation that while to the uninitiated both fields appear to be equally complex, much is known today about physics in the ultra-cold domain of absolute zero whereas autism still remains an almost total enigma.

2E¾ECTIONSONCOMPLEXITYANDKNOWLEDGEDIALOGUE The third chapter in the collection is dedicated to diverse reflections by WKD 2006 participants, about complexity within the context of a knowledge dialogue. In a contribution entitled Knowing Complex Systems : The limits of understanding, Paul Cilliers (University of Stellenbosch, South Africa) attempts to characterize and define the potential and limitations of different tools employed in the field of research. He presents a viewpoint of the social sciences in terms of a complex system and argues that due to their non-linear nature, such complex systems are not compressible or amenable to reductionist approaches. His perspective on complexity contrasts with the simplification principle that his natural scientist counterparts usually work towards attaining. As complex systems are open systems, he argues, they cannot be understood completely without also understanding their environments and their history. In similar vein, Edward G. Slingerland (University of British Columbia, Canada) argues in Consilience and the Status of Human-Level Truth that one of the primary barriers to humanities / natural science dialogue is the intuition that integrating human-level truths into a scientific framework is somehow inappropriately “reductionist”. In search of “consilience” between the natural sciences and humanities, he reflects on the mind-body dualism that appears to be an inextricable part of innate human cognitive endowment. In his contribution Boundaries : Boundaries between disciplines and boundaries in the mind, Ernest Hartmann (Tufts University School of Medicine, Bos-


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ton, USA) treats the concept of boundaries, providing an interesting foil to the earlier discussions on complexity viewed from many perspectives by discussing the concept of boundaries and limits from the vantage point of psychiatric research : Abstraction of the complex, dynamic and multidimensional nature of mental boundaries and understanding how different boundaries influence each other, may guide us to make choices that permit natural and social sciences to work better in unison. The article by Daniela Finke (University of Basel, Switzerland) An immunologist’s view on establishment of a knowledge dialogue argues that in order to better understand the complex nature of biological systems, immunologists like herself need both profound knowledge of their specialist subject and dialogue with other disciplines. She addresses the question of how such a dialogue between immunologists and representatives of other disciplines can be achieved in practice. Finally, some perspectives and pitfalls of transdisciplinary dialogue in academia are reviewed. The article of Mark M. Freed (Central Michigan University, USA) Towards a Nonmodern Nonhumanism sketches a genealogy of thinking about the integration of the sciences and humanities in order to raise some questions about what a methodology of crossed views might look like. The three theorists discussed (Jürgen Habermas, Jean-François Lyotard, and Bruno Latour) offer critical accounts of Modernity that alert us to important considerations in carrying out such integration. His observations do not add up to a single methodology of crossed views, but they point to considerations that ought to be factored into attempts to reconfigure the relations between the sciences and the humanities. This chapter finishes with the contribution of Michel Alhadeff-Jones, (Columbia University and Université de Paris 8) Promoting scientific dialogue as a lifelong learning process, in which his perspective of dialogue between sciences and between scientists is elaborated. He considers this dialogue as a complex and critical learning process. He argues that it can be conceived in several ways – as conversation, expression, performance and negotiation –and is a process of transformation of knowledge from one form to another. From a practical point of view, he suggests that this logic argues for applying novel concepts gleaned from studies of science as a social practice and about researchers as adult learners to the design and management of dialogue forums like the World Knowledge Dialogue.

/RIGINSANDMIGRATIONSOFMODERNHUMANS Chapter four is focused on particular aspects of complexity at the crossroads between the domains of paleontology, anthropology, genetics and linguistics. The symposium presentations of Ofer Bar-Yosef (Human Migrations in Prehistory – the Cultural Record), Bernard Victorri (The Origins of Modern Humans : Linguistic Issues) and Svante Pääbo (A Genetic View of Human Origins) are available for consultation online at WWWWKDIA LOGUECH. Editorial summaries of these conferences by Moira Cockell describe their content. The problem of human origins has long been a natural pivot for interdisciplinarity, attracting the efforts of researchers from diverse fields such as archaeology, anthropology, genetics, linguistics and psychology. This chapter describes an exercise in interdisciplinary dialogue between proponents of technically demanding specialties that have evolved complex vocabulary repertoires specific to their own domain. Three eminent scientists present separately derived perspectives that converge on the topic at hand. Ofer Bar-Yosef, Pro-

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Introduction

fessor of Anthropology at Harvard University and internationally acclaimed archaeologist, guides the listener at an exhilarating pace, through 5 million years of human evolution. His discourse traces the migration of prehistoric humans, using evidence derived from observations of cultural developments and trajectories. He also incorporates arguments based on molecular and nuclear genetic evidence to build the case for the emergence of mankind from Africa. Bernard Victorri, Director of Linguistics research at CNRS, Lattice Laboratory, France, gives a linguist’s viewpoint on the question of human origins. He attempts to mirror the process of human migration in his description of the development of the rich diversity of human language and argues that the methodology of constructing language families may shed new light on ancient language relationships that have become obscured among the background noise of language evolution. The relationships he has uncovered appear to confirm the out-of-Africa emergence theories as well as propose new migratory patterns for humans. They show how language theories, a kind of human science, may help validate claims laid by natural science disciplines like genetics. Svante Pääbo, Director of the Department of Genetics at the Max Planck Institute of Evolutionary Anthropology in Germany then presented his view on human migration based on genetic studies. He proposes that most genetic variation present within the world’s present populations also supports the hypothesis of humankind’s African origins. He also gives his view of the implications of his recent research on the FOXP2 gene ; a gene thought to be involved in conferring to humans the evolutionary advantage of articulated speech and language, that is nonetheless highly conserved in mammals. He envisions following the evolution of subtle genetic changes in FOX2P as a way to trace the exact timepoints of the divergence between chimpanzees, Neanderthals and Homo sapiens. This chapter presents the real possibility of disparate disciplines converging to tackle comprehensive problems and illustrates the principle of coherence as an assessment tool when verging into domains where the natural scientist’s concept of “proof ” is inappropriate. Further study of the modes through which the problem of human origins is approached may suggest analogous methods through which other inter-disciplinary dialogue may proceed.

!CADEMICINSTITUTIONALGOVERNANCE EDUCATIONANDEXPERIENCES The final chapter deals with the institutional and academic dimensions that relate to a knowledge dialogue in the widest sense of the term and describes several transdisciplinary initiatives and experiences as seen from the context of researchers in different career stages and different cultural environments. In the first contribution ; (Societal Responsibility of Universities. Wisdom and Foresight Leading to a Better World, Richard R. Ernst (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich, Switzerland) gives his own view of what should be the role and responsibilities of institutions and individuals involved in education, in a world that he deems to be presently on a non-sustainable course. He argues that universities’ role in educating the future political, economic, and spiritual leaders gives them a particularly strong responsibility to attempt to change this situation. According to him, academics as a body have a moral obligation to interest themselves in trans-disciplinary and trans-cultural connections because, he believes, it is where the clues to solving society’s major problems are likely to come from. In this context, the work of Veronica Boix Mansilla (Harvard Graduate School of Education, Harvard University) offers a series of


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analytical and semi-quantitative insights into the dynamics of successful interdisciplinary dialogue (Patterned diversity in interdisciplinary dialogues : Lessons from an empirical study of interdisciplinary research at the frontier). In recent years, interdisciplinary research has been equated with all things novel, collaborative and adventurous. Under closer scrutiny, cross disciplinary dialogue confronts researchers with new communicative and epistemic demands, including the demand of establishing consensus on what constitutes a productive dialogue and a fruitful interdisciplinary synthesis. This paper synthesizes the lessons learned in an empirical study of interdisciplinary work by acclaimed experts at five major research institutions in the Unites States. The other pieces in this chapter are testimonies describing the motivations, current status and challenges encountered, in specific and concrete examples of interdisciplinary dialogue that are taking place in a selection of the higher research and teaching establishments from several different countries. In order of appearance in the text, are contributions from Timon P. McPhearson and colleagues (Columbia University) : Increasing Scientific Literacy in Undergraduate Education : A Case Study from “Frontiers of Science” at Columbia University, Markus B. Karner (Singapore Management University) : Organizing Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue in Academia : Debating Complexity and Organic Development at Singapore Management University, Akimasa Sumi (University of Tokyo) : New initiatives of the University of Tokyo toward establishing a strategy for sustainability through knowledge structuring and a transdisciplinary approach and Zalina Ismail (Universiti Sains Malaysia) BRAINetwork : An Experiment in Transdisciplinarity. The chapter closes with three texts from young researchers who express their personal views on the practice of interdisciplinary dialogue in a more general, abstract sense of the term. Ravi de Costa (York University) reflects on the complex relations between Knowledge and ethnic culture and sets out the views and experiences of interdisciplinary research held by a early-career social scientist. Mary Louise Gifford (The Energy and Resources Institute, New Delhi) discusses the links between science and society The Paradigm Shift in the Relationship Between Science and Society, within the context of her own experience in working as an assistant to the chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Dan T. A. Eisenberg (Northwestern University) presents a graduate student’s perspective on the current state of health of anthropology as a pivot for multidisciplinary dialogue in his article entitled Anthropology in the United States- when dialogue IS the discipline : A multilevel evolutionary consideration of knowledge production. In concluding this brief overview of the rich and diverse contributions to this book, we invite readers to peruse the detail for themselves and give free reign to the multiple and complex influences it will have on their own perceptions of a world knowledge dialogue.

#HAPTER #OMPLEXITYAND .EUROSCIENCESIN$IALOGUE 4OWARDSA.EW4HEORY OFTHE"RAIN

&ROM"RAIN$YNAMICSTO#ONSCIOUSNESS (OW-ATTER"ECOMES)MAGINATION Analysis by Frédéric Darbellay of the presentation1 by Gerald M. Edelman

Prevalent views of higher brain functions are based on the notions of computation and information processing. These views suggest that the brain can be viewed as a Turing machine. Edelman argues that various lines of evidence appear to be incompatible with this position and suggest instead that the brain operates according to a set of selection principles.1 Most approaches to the understanding of consciousness are concerned with the contributions of specific brain areas or groups of neurons. By contrast, in considering what kinds of neural processes can account for key properties of conscious experience such as its unity and its diversity, the research undertaken by G.M. Edelman and his research group at the Neurosciences Institute in San Diego addresses a general theory of the brain and consciousness. Their findings have been published in a series of books that are accessible to a broad audience : [Edelman, 1987, 1989, 1992, 2004, 2006], [Edelman and Tonioni, 2000].

!NEUROSCIENTI½CVIEWOFCONSCIOUSNESS The study of consciousness has historically been the domain of philosophy, but recent technological advances have led to the development of new and complementary approaches to this complex issue. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and magnetoencephalography (MEG), now permits observation of the blood flows that accompany localized neuronal activity in different parts of the brain as well as enabling the magnetic micro-variations triggered by inter-neuronal electrical currents to be monitored. The results of studies conducted using such techniques provide supporting evidence for neu1

A video of the presentation is available at HTTPWWWWKDIALOGUECH.

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Complexity and Neurosciences in Dialogue : Towards a New Theory of the Brain ?

ral correlates of consciousness in human subjects. Edelman’s group has also constructed unique, brain-based devices (BBDs) based on the theoretical principles he has elucidated. These have in turn allowed Edelman and co-workers to study detailed neural dynamics during behavior in a real world environment and suggest the possibility of constructing a conscious artifact in the foreseeable future. The impact of such developments is not merely technical. The ability to observe physiological changes in the working brain at a level of resolution that permits their precise correlation with the specific complex sensory-motor and / or cognitive tasks being undertaken, has led to a rethinking of mechanisms underlying thought and consciousness. The multidimensional phenomena of the mind and of the conscious being are no longer the exclusive province of the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, metaphysics or ethics, but are rather an area for constructive dialogue between these fields and the contemporary cognitive neurosciences.

#ONSCIOUSNESSACOMPLEXPHENOMENONATTHECROSSROADSBETWEEN BIOLOGYANDPSYCHOLOGY The strong hypothesis underlying Edelman’s work and, more broadly, the field of cognitive neurosciences itself is that psychological phenomena in general and consciousness in particular are entirely appropriate subjects for investigation by the scientific method. Recent advances in the neurosciences offer a number of promising avenues for the scientific exploration of consciousness that take into account not only the dynamic nature of cerebral functions but also the obligatory context-dependence in which all cognitive activity (e.g. perception, vision, memory, etc) takes place (perception, vision, memory, etc). The scientific analysis of consciousness derives from a central question : how and in what way can the activation of neurons give rise to sensations, thoughts, and subjective experiences ? Apparent in the very formulation of this question is the notion that the fields of biology and psychology are not separate but overlapping ; they must meet, reconcile, and join forces to gain an understanding of the dynamics and the reciprocal causalities that unite them despite their differences.

4HEBRAINISNOTA4URINGMACHINE The goal of this research field is to develop a new theory of consciousness based on the way our brain actually functions [Edelman, 2006]. The approach depends on understanding these processes and seeks to explain the molecular mechanisms of consciousness, cognitive function and dysfunction, as well as the various forms of cognitive activity. Learned behavior, memorization, and cognitive activity in general, mobilize extremely complex brain functions. The enormous neuronal plasticity manifested by the exercise of such functions exemplifies the principal that the human brain is not a predetermined system but rather has an innate capacity to be ever changing according to experience and interactions with psychological and social environments. The complexity of the brain has multiple levels of organization that range from the microstructure of proteins to cellular interactions, from the cell to the organ, from the organ to the macroscopic organism in

From Brain Dynamics to Consciousness : How Matter Becomes Imagination

5

its totality. Thus, the analysis of consciousness needs also to be perceived in terms of a multi-layered system that extends from the analysis of intersynaptic linking molecules all the way to the total brain. The difficulty lies in passing from a purely descriptive characterization of cerebral function to an explanation of the nature and the functional unity of complex cognitive functions like consciousness.

(UMANCOGNITIONPROVIDESACOMMONANALYTICALFRAMEWORK The difficult task set out by current neuroscience research is to bridge the gap which has long separated natural sciences from the humanities by attempting to express the differences and the similarities between them within a common analytical framework addressing the function of human cognition. To do so, it draws on the range of different disciplines that examine the complex relations linking the concept of the psyche to the biological function of the neuronal system. Understanding these interactions requires recourse to many domains of expertise, including biochemistry, immunology, medical imaging, evolutionary biology and psychology. This interdisciplinarity safeguards against a strictly materialist approach that would reduce consciousness and other cognitive activities to mere biological function. It also avoids the risk of falling into an opposite reductionism that would relegate all phenomena of the psyche to purely psychological or social functions by arbitrarily neutralizing the role of cerebral functions and even denying the physical-biological dimensions that underlie all cognitive action. The study of consciousness is now resolutely at the intersection between neurobiological sciences, the humanities and the social sciences. A central theme is concerned with the way in which biology relates to the psychological activities of a thinking being. The focused questions that can be asked within this context are myriad ; what are the biological bases for the emergence of visual perception, sensory-motor activities, or higher consciousness of humans ? How does memory function ? How far is it possible to understand and explain consciousness by scientifically analyzing cerebral function ? Research on consciousness is progressing rapidly and in the process is already transcending the traditional divisions among biological, psychological and social sciences in order to link them within the new domain of cognitive science. This interdisciplinary reconfiguration leads to the elimination of the famous Cartesian mind-body duality, which argued that perceived reality, i.e. humans’ conscious life, could not be explained without reference to two different and irreducible principles, the world Descartes divided into res extensa (physical) and res cogitans (mind, spirit). In contrast Edelman’s view incorporates tacit acceptance that the functions of mind and body are interdependent entities.

#ONSCIOUSNESSASANEMERGINGCONDITIONOFNEURONALORGANIZATION The body of Edelman’s work in the years from 1987-2006 is founded on a postulate of scientific materialism according to which consciousness is considered as an emerging condition of the neuronal organization of the brain. While this puts it roughly within the tradition of analytical psychology that was founded by Gustav Fechner (1801-1887), and further elaborated by Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) and William James (1842-1910),

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Edelman’s contributions have also radically modified fundamental conceptions by incorporating the spectacular advances of contemporary neurosciences. They avoid the risk of biological reductionism by focusing on a specific aspect of the anatomy of the brain with respect to the physiology of neuronal zones and circuits that appear to be related to particular states of consciousness. The function of the brain, both in its entirety and in the sub-regions of the cortex involves a high level of plasticity and depends in part on changes linked to the nature of its use. This dependence on context implies that there exists a dynamic variation in the operational circuits of the brain. The example of visual perception is particularly illuminating in this context. The diagram reproduced in Figure 1, elaborated by G. Kanizsa in the tradition of Gestalttheorie is reconsidered in some of Edelman’s work [Edelman, 1992, 2004]. In its upper part, it represents two superimposed triangles whose angles are disconnected but give the impression of a white triangle with undefined but nevertheless clear borders. This first perceptual illusion is interesting because it shows that the white triangle appears in and through contextual interaction : it is the three black objects at the summit of the angles, which create the context within which the white triangle emerges distinctly from the background of a second triangle. Neither triangle exists, however, in and of itself. It is the brain, on the basis of an active and differential perception within a given context, which constructs them. The role of context in subconscious visual perception is also evident in the optical illusion illustrated in the lower part of the diagram. When moving one’s field of vision from left to right, the observer passes from a relatively disjointed perception of 8 angular micro-figures to the mental perception of a three dimensional cube that is partially obstructed by three transversal opaque bands. Visual perception in these cases is not simply a passive recording of external stimuli but rather a complex process of mental and physical co-construction dependent on context.

Fig. 1 Triangles and cubes of Kanizsa


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#ONTEXTISEVERYTHING Similarly, the notion of an interaction between cerebral function and context is also manifest in the brain’s conscious activities. This point is illustrated by the models Edelman proposes of causal chains [Edelman, 2004] (and see Fig. 2), which are established between the brain, the body and the world, via what he calls the dynamic core. According to this hypothesis, conscious processes emerge from a large number of re-entrant interactions (the bidirectional transmission of information between the groups of neurons) through which the cognitive system, the brain and the rest of the body interact. The dynamic core plays a central role in this interactive process : this term refers to a system of interactions among groups of neurons, present especially in the thalamocortical system. These neurons behave like a functional cluster in which reentrant interactions amplify certain signals and give way to states of consciousness. The reentrant activity of the dynamic core serves as an interface among the complex interactions of the brain, the body, and the outside world via real experience and behavior of the human subject. The nature of different brain states such as sleeping, waking, conscious, unconscious, results from the particular dynamic interactions that occur at the point where brain functions, memory systems and contextdependent information meet. Conscious experience is thus a dynamic process and not a thing in itself, to paraphrase William James (1842-1910).

Fig. 2 Causal chains : the dynamic core.

.EURAL$ARWINISM One of the essential points of Edelman’s work is to demonstrate that neuronal and cognitive activities are not automats or Turing machines ; they do not operate as closed systems but are rather only perceivable in terms of their dynamic interactions with the body and the contextual environment. We conclude this brief presentation by referring to one of the most significant contributions of G.M. Edelman’s work : TNGS (Theory of Neuronal Group Selection). This theory is also called neural Darwinism because it was inspired by the theory of evolution developed by Charles Darwin (1809-1882), The major tenets of Darwin’s theory of selection of the fittest from a population with a rate of naturally occurring variation, have been expanded and refined to apply to the study of cognitive functions and their adaptive relation to environmental and contextual variability. Neural Darwinism is a general theory of the organization and functioning of the brain and attempts to

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integrate the contributions of anatomy, evolutionary biology, and psychology. Reference to the Darwinian principle of natural selection is one of the constants within the corpus of Edelman’s research, being already apparent in his Nobel-prize winning contributions to our understanding of the immune system and recurrent in his early contributions in the field of neurobiology as well as in his later attempts to explain cognitive aspects of perception, memory, language, and consciousness. The Darwinian principle of selection / adaptation also extends from the neural-anatomical and biochemical levels of neural networks to more general psychological and philosophical aspects linked to consciousness and superior cognitive capacities.

.EURALCORRELATESOFCONSCIOUSNESS The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection / TNGS sheds new light on the complex question of consciousness and its link to human brain activity. It adopts a Darwinian model by identifying the complementary principles of variation and selection in its analysis of the central nervous system. TNGS is based on three fundamental principles [Edelman, 1992, 2004] and cf. Fig. 3 below) : 1. Developmental selection gives rise to a set of diverse neuronal circuits. Vast repertories of circuits within the microanatomy of the brain are established during the brain’s development. The genetic code does not supply the specific diagram of connections but rather defines a set of constraints on the selection process. 2. Experiential selection refers to changes in the strength of connections among synapses that selectively favor certain pathways, reinforcing some and weakening others. A secondary repertoire (sets of variants in a selective system) of functional neuronal circuits forms on the basis of the existing neuroanatomy by means of a selective reinforcement of groups of specified neurons and a weakening of the synaptic effectiveness of other affiliated neurons. cell division cell death

(1) Developmental Selection yielding 1° repertoire time 1 (2)

Expriential Selection

process extension and elimination CAM action

time 2

changes in stengths of population of synapses

yielding 2° repertoire

time 2

stimuli time 1 (3)

Reentrant Mapping

Map 1

Map 2

stimuli stimuli to map 1 to map 2 time 1

Map 1

Map 2

time 2

Fig. 3 The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (TNGS), or Neuronal Darwinism.


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3. Reentry assures spatial-temporal correlation and conscious integration among neuronal group maps. This key process coordinates cerebral maps through continual reentry signaling across reciprocal connections. The circles on the right side of the map indicate reinforced synapses. Reentry refers to the permanent and dynamic process of recursive signaling passing through massively reciprocal fibers, which connect the maps, built in each of the cortical zones. The integrative process achieved by reentry links the content of these zones though linking fibers in the associative cortex and is the basis for the emergence of consciousness by virtue of the function of the dynamic core, which allows coherent and synchronous events to appear in the brain. Starting with the selective processes (1 and 2) that concern repertories of neuronal variants, a series of neuronal networks and functional circuits are created in order to build a second repertoire of selective events. Later and continual reentrant events in (3) are dynamic and recursive processes that continually reconfigure the maps. During embryogenesis, a repertoire of neuronal circuits is created in the brain. These circuits are either reinforced or weakened by developmental and experimental selection and by a process of reentrant maps. The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection is a theory of emerging consciousness both from the point of view of evolution and of neurophysiology, and posits a significant plasticity of thalamo-cortical networks and interactions. Neuronal systems are thus evolutionary systems that take into account and integrate factors derived from ongoing experience. The theory of the brain proposed by Edelman is based on a model of the emergence and function of consciousness rooted in the double principles of selection and adaptation : epigenetic development occurs though selective stabilization of synapses dependent on the topology of the network of connections that are established among groups of neurons. The design of these neural connections is established at birth but they are not fixed in cerebral time or space. They evolve in response to sensory stimulations. Certain combinations of connections will be more or less stabilized, while others will be dismantled and reconfigured. Consciousness is considered as a process that can in part be explained by specific forms of organization of neurobiological material. The connectivity among groups of neurons in the brain emerges through a course of generalized variation-selection that produces the intra- and inter-group architecture of neurons distributed through numerous different zones of the brain, resulting ultimately in the complex cognitive functions such as perception, memorization, categorization, and consciousness. Neural Darwinism offers a heuristic tool to analyze and understand the complexity of the human brain, whose neuronal building blocks are organized into interactive networks that are neither deterministic nor purely linear, because they both differentiate in response to, and interact with, information coming from the psychological and social contexts. Here there is no reductive materialism ; consciousness is nothing without the body ; it is a dynamic process and not an object fixed in time and space ; and it is thus unique to each individual and to each moment in time. The brain is without a doubt one the most complex systems to undergo scientific analysis, a subject Wider than the Sky, to echo Emily Dickinson’s poetic reference.

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THE BRAIN is wider than the sky, For, put them side by side, The one the other will include With ease, and you beside. The brain is deeper than the sea, For, hold them, blue to blue, The one the other will absorb, As sponges, buckets do. The brain is just the weight of God, For, lift them, pound for pound, And they will differ, if they do, As syllable from sound. Emily Dickinson (1830 - 1886) : Complete Poems, 1924.

2EFERENCES Edelman, G. M. (1987) Neural Darwinism : The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, Basic Books, New York. Edelman, G. M. (1989) The Remembered Present : A Biological Theory of Consciousness, Basic Books, New York. Edelman, G. M. (1992) Bright Air, Brilliant Fire. On the Matter of the Mind, Basic Books, New York. Edelman, G. M. (2004) Wider Than the Sky : The Phenomenal Gift of Consciousness, Yale University Press, Yale. Edelman, G. M (2006) Second Nature : Brain Science and Human Knowledge, Yale University Press, Yale. Edelman, G. M., Tononi, G. (2000) A Universe of Consciousness. How Matter Becomes Imagination, Basic Books, New York.

!DDITIONALLITERATUREONTHESUBJECTOFCONSCIOUSNESS Baars, B. J. (1988) A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Damasio, A. R. (1994) Descartes’ Error : Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, Grosset/Putnam, New York. Chalmers, D. J. (1996) The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press, New York. James, W. (1981) The Principles of Psychology, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Kim, J. (1998) Mind in a Physical World : An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation, The MIT Press, Cambridge. Koch, C. (2004) The Quest for Consciousness : A Neurobiological Approach, Roberts & Company Publishers. McGinn, C. (1996) The Problem of Consciousness : Essays Towards a Resolution, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford. Metzinger, T. (Ed.) (2000) Neural Correlates of Consciousness : Empirical and Conceptual Questions, The MIT Press, Cambridge. Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions, Cambridge University Press, New York. Papineau, D. (2002) Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Searle, J. R. (1997) The Mystery of Consciousness, Granta Books, London.

4OWARDSA.EUROSCIENCEOFTHE#APABLE 0ERSON5NITY $IVERSITYAND/NESELF AS!NOTHER Analysis by Frédéric Darbellay of the presentation2 by Jean-Pierre Changeux

La science n’a pas la philosophie qu’elle mérite. Gaston Bachelard (1953) Il existera toujours une marge d’incertitude, une frange de remise en question pour toute avancée de la connaissance scientifique. Est-ce une raison pour renoncer à en savoir plus ? Jean-Pierre Changeux (2002)

Jean-Pierre Changeux sets out to establish a plausible bridge between the humanities and the neurosciences based on Paul Ricœur’s concept of the capable person, defined as a rational and conscious individual engaged in social relationships and with personal identity, in other words able to perceive of “oneself as another”. He asks us to consider if cognitive neuroscience can help us understand the individual as a member of society, and conversely, what can one anticipate as an impact of such debate on the evolution of the neuroscience ?

0ARADOXES Starting from apparent paradoxes in our “scientific” knowledge of the biology and evolution of the human brain and its capacities, Changeux invites us along a path of logical stepping stones that lead from the genomic and epigenetic organization of the human brain, to the generation of cultural diversity, social communication and ethical considerations. 2

A video of the presentation is available at HTTPWWWWKDIALOGUECH

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He explains how it is now becoming possible to study the neurobiology of concepts such as self, personal memories, internalized rules, social conventions and violence inhibition mechanisms and proposes that this is not only theoretically and experimentally plausible, but ethically desirable. Changeux makes powerful arguments that the pursuit of objective knowledge and scientific enquiry can provide a force of reconciliation at the world scale level and be a step towards a modern secular humanism.

!DIALOGUEOFTHENEUROSCIENCES Research in the neurosciences undertaken since 1975 by Jean-Pierre Changeux at the Institut Pasteur have substantially contributed to the enrichment of fundamental knowledge about the relationship between cognitive skills and the molecular and neuronal functions of the human brain. His research work is also the focus of the courses he has taught at the Collège de France, where he held the chair in Cellular Communications (1976-2006). Beyond the prescribed domain of cognitive neurosciences, Changeux’s scientific work is characterized by openness toward and interaction with other research areas related to philosophy, ethics, the arts, society, and culture. Since writing his famous book L’Homme neuronal [Changeux, 1983], translated in English as Neuronal Man [Changeux, 1985], which established a basis for major discoveries about human brain functions, he has adopted a non-reductionist view of complex thought mechanisms in which the development of the nervous system takes place in the context of individual trajectories and in interaction with the physical and sociocultural context.

.EUROSCIENCESANDHUMANISM Even though refractory to reductionism, mental activities are partly explained by biological functions of the brain and are thus linked both to their physiological, anatomical basis and to the social context through which they acquire meaning. This anti-reductionist position provides the opportunity for an interdisciplinary dialogue with multiple networks at the different levels constituting human psycho-physical activities (individual, psychological, social). This double path both deepens disciplinary understanding within the neurosciences and progressively opens this research domain toward an interchange with other types of knowledge. One of the inspirations for this openness to interdisciplinarity is found in Conversations on Mind Matter and Mathematics [Changeux and Connes, 1995], co-authored with the mathematician Alain Connes and translated from the original [Changeux and Connes, 1989], which seeks to examine the links between the nature of mathematical objects and the structure of the human brain, understood in its full complexity. This broadening of research horizons is also evident in the importance granted to ethical aspects of scientific research. Changeux, who was president of the National Consultative Bioethics Committee for Health and Life Sciences (CCNE), used the occasion of a 1991 scientific gathering of psychologists, anthropologists, philosophers, jurists, and neurobiologist to examine the multidimensional question of ethics and the role played by biological sciences in this context [Changeux, 1993]. This reflection about the ethical implications of research contin-

Towards a Neuroscience of the Capable Person : Unity, Diversity and Oneself as Another

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ues in another collective work edited by Changeux [Changeux, 1997], in which progress of scientific knowledge and the development of new biomedical technologies are clearly put into perspective in the course of discussion about evolving ethical, cultural, moral, philosophical, and religious values in contemporary society. This open dialogue between specialists from the life sciences and the humanities finds common ground in the goal to understand the complexity of the human brain, which unites knowledge about genetic mechanisms in a constructive interaction with values of ethnic and cultural diversity [Changeux, 2003].

3CIENCEANDART Aesthetics is also an area subject to particular attention from Changeux. Based on advances in neurosciences and cognitive psychology, he tries to understand the complex mechanisms that result in esthetic pleasures, both from the perspective of creation and contemplation of the arts [Changeux, 1994]. Similarly, Changeux explores the naturally transdisciplinary theme of light, in terms of an object of scientific study and as the subject of philosophical and artistic reflection, from the complementary perspectives of the history of art, the history of science, astrophysics, and biology [Changeux, 2005]. Situated on the boundary between scientific data, technology developments, and artistic creations, this work invites us to follow the history of ideas from the XVIIIth century to the present and shows the tight linkages between the development of scientific methods and theories and the joint evolution of mentalities, societies, and cultures. In this brief overview of an rich and diverse intellectual trajectory a particular line of thought moves from neurosciences to esthetics, by way of ethics, with the underlying principal that these diverse domains of knowledge, apparently disconnected can be linked and discussed together, thereby dispelling the notion that disparate scientific fields are irremediably closed off from one another. In this process one can identify a form of modern humanism in the sense that the scholars seek points of contact and articulations among the sciences, more precisely among sciences of the brain, philosophy, ethics, esthetics, sociology, and culture.

/NETOONE In this context, it is important to emphasize the dialogue between Changeux and Paul Ricœur in their dual production [Changeux and Ricœur, 1998], translated in English [Changeux and Ricœur, 2005]. The exchange between neurosciences and philosophy has become ever more necessary while the much desired communication remains difficult because the stakes, the logics, the concepts, and the methods that accompany the construction of knowledge in these domains are relatively divergent. The common effort of Changeux and Ricœur is nevertheless valuable because it acknowledges from the outset the confrontation among scientific paradigms and then proceeds to argue points of view from the perspective of a constructive and interdisciplinary dialogue between science and philosophy about progress in the neurosciences and its ethical implications. Their goal is to build bridges between neuronal man, whose actions depend on complex mechanisms of the cerebral system, and man in action as a subject evolving within the social world

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who cannot be reduced to his biological functions. The philosopher and the biologist are invited to move away from confrontation and rather to dialogue to understand the complexity of the human subject in its totality. This attempt to overcome the independence and boundaries of the fields of neurobiology and philosophy acknowledges and confronts the disciplinary prejudices that see the philosopher reproaching the neurobiologist for his reductionism or the neurobiologist accusing the philosopher of abstract discussions of human nature that neglect the biological dimension of behavior. Ignored, this double reproach can only exacerbate institutionalized disciplinary divisions and reinforce misunderstandings about the impossibility of communication. Dialogue is often difficult but its necessity has perhaps become inevitable and thus the approach that Changeux and Ricœur promote is particularly valuable.

&ROMNEURONALPERSONTOCAPABLEPERSON The concept of the capable person as defined in Soi-même comme un autre [Ricœur, 1990], translated into English as Oneself as Another [Ricœur, 1992], defines man as a being aware of the consequences of his acts and implicated in the dynamics of his context-dependent actions. What characterizes humanity is the capacity of man to be himself as he interacts with others. Man is a conscious actor, capable of speech and actions within a social context that incorporates values defined both by the self and by the other. To be oneself is to have one’s own identity even as one reflects that of the other : identity is constructed by oneself and through another in a sort of coming together of the difference of the other with one’s own identity. The concept of self, or consciousness of self, is not an immediate given. It is rather co-constructed through mediation with the other. It is made and remade in practical interaction with the world. The capable person is the product of a whole life from birth to death and is a complex identity with a double structure that corresponds to Ricœur’s terminology of sameness, which refers to a certain permanence of identity over time, and to a selfhood, which is a more dynamic and changing side of the person as an actor in the social and cultural world.

/NESELFASANOTHER Based partly on the rich concept of the capable person, Changeux places neuroscientific discoveries within a broader philosophical context : man is at once neuronal, individual, and social ; a true and complete person in the sense that he is capable of consciousness, language, action, and symbolic activities. The advantage of this approach is in its ability to draw the neurosciences toward the understanding of the capable person. In using cerebral imaging methods, the domain of neurosciences ranges from discerning the molecular structures that act as building blocks of the body and the brain, to the study of superior cognitive capabilities. The fundamental challenge is to describe and understand human nature ; that which makes man human. Changeux invites us to engage in this critical reflection in his reflective work L’Homme de vérité [Changeux, 2002], translated in English as The Physiology of Truth [Changeux, 2004], in which he proposes a confrontation between the approaches adopted by life sciences and those of human sciences. His project of relat-


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ing neurosciences and philosophical reflection recognizes the important role played by anatomic and neuronal organization of the brain in achieving advanced cognitive activities. Progress in brain research, even though data are still limited given the breadth and complexity of the field, nevertheless permits us to see the problems of thought, consciousness, and relations between body and mind in new terms. By setting aside ideological polemics, we are able to treat delicate and difficult questions based on rigorous scientific reasoning, distinguishing the role played by a kind of nature-based culture from what can be expressed as a cultural appropriation of nature. As Changeux [Changeux, 2002] himself says, based on illuminating comments of Bachelard in Le Matérialisme rationnel [Bachelard, 1953], “Science does not have the philosophy it deserves.” By this he emphasizes the importance of material events as objects of legitimate scientific study – events or dimensions that idealist philosophers have not taken into account or have simply neglected in their reference to “materialism without matter” [Bachelard, 1953]. Evidence of materialism of knowledge-based substance requires that this materialism exist within a broader individual, social, and cultural context. Changeux’s concepts allow us to describe a category of materialism that is truly learned and not naïve.

#ULTURALEPIGENETICS Changeux emphasizes the significance of the fact that in the course of mammalian evolution, the duration of the period of synaptogenesis increases from a few weeks in the rat to almost 15 years in humans. During this period an epigenetic appropriation of developing circuits by cultural processes, such as spoken/written language, symbolic systems, moral rules… takes place. As a consequence an important epigenetic variability develops between individual brains (even from genetically identical individuals). Yet, the mathematical formulation of the selective stabilization theory (introduced in the presentation by Gerald Edelman), states that “different learning inputs may produce different connective organizations and neuronal functional abilities, but the same behavioral abilities”. The epigenetic hypothesis allows Changeux to imagine the development of the brain as interplay between actions of genes and the characteristic evolution of learning and experience unique to each individual. The several billion neurons that are the essential components of the human brain form networks articulated in turn by a trillion synapses that are themselves the connections establishing fixed and stable links with a large number of other cells. Beyond this relatively stable architecture, each neuron is has uniquely defining characteristics that contribute to the brain’s infinite capacity for diversity and variability. The process of development of individuals is both embedded in the species and also specific : all individuals are different, even though they are embedded in genetic organizations relatively similar within each species. The brain’s great neuronal plasticity is a fundamental characteristic, which intervenes from the earliest stages of embryonic development, giving neurons and their synapses the capacity to change properties as a function of their type of activity. Coordinated neuronal organization occurs from the micro-molecular to the supra-macromolecular level through a certain conservation/stabilization of assemblages of neurons that guarantee the acquisition and maintenance of the structure of neural networks. Matter is hierarchically organized all the way up to superior cognitive functions [Changeux, 2002]. Neurosciences thus study rules of brain organization in terms of physi-

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cochemical processes by breaking down the object of study into its parts (organs, areas, modules or functional groupings) and by perceiving these different parts in terms of their integration into higher organizational levels where they play differentiated roles in cognitive activities.

/UR±STATEOFMIND²ISNOTPREORDAINED For [Changeux, 2002], the brain as a system can be described as both open and motivated : open because it continually exchanges energy and information with the surrounding world ; motivated because it responds to experiences of the world through self-organizing activities. Epigenetic development concerns what is added to genetics to contribute to the evolution of individuals, groups, and cultures. Genetic programming is an important factor but is unable to explain everything. Indeed, research biologists and social scientists agree on the hypothesis that genetic traits are the result of a complex covariation with evolving sociocultural factors, ultimately producing neuronal and behavioral individuals and social groupings. This concept opens a vast domain of research into the functioning of non-linear networks of genetic regulation through processes of neurogenesis and synapsogenesis, all in dynamic relation with contextualized experiences of individuals. An individual’s organization of neurons and their functional links, depends both on his genome and its evolution and on the interaction with the cultural context during his development. Today there is a resurgence of fundamental questioning about the origin of language and thought and about the respective place of genes and culture in the formation of the brain, memory, and cognitive skills. This renewed interest even concerns studies of the development of synaptic connections and the role played by the neuronal level in the construction and organization of knowledge. By refusing purely metaphysical explanations, it becomes possible to reject culture as a preordained state and rather to see it as the result of an emerging co-construction of the individual and the collective, which also mobilizes the neuronal system in its role in the exchange of representations and the communication among individuals, groups, and societies. In fact, it is now becoming a generally accepted concept that understanding neuronal function is a necessary but insufficient condition for understanding human complexity. If mental faculties, reflexive consciousness and the capacity to produce and exchange knowledge are studied scientifically, they are equally seen as part of a philosophical dialogue. Borrowing a modified version of Bachelard’s formulation, we can perhaps say that science may aspire to have the philosophy it deserves and, inversely, philosophy might count on science to listen to its concerns.

2EFERENCES Bachelard, G. (1953) Le Matérialisme rationnel, PUF, Paris. Changeux, J.-P. (1983) L’Homme neuronal, Fayard, Paris. Changeux, J.-P. (1986) Neuronal Man : the Biology of Mind, Oxford University Press, New York. Changeux, J.-P. (dir.) (1993) Fondements naturels de l’éthique, Odile Jacob, Paris. Changeux, J.-P. (1994) Raison et plaisir, Odile Jacob, Paris. Changeux, J.-P. (dir.) (1997) Une même éthique pour tous ?, Odile Jacob Paris.


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Changeux, J.-P. (2002) L’Homme de vérité, Odile Jacob, Paris. Changeux, J.-P. (dir.) (2003) Gènes et Culture, Odile Jacob, Paris. Changeux, J.-P. (2004) The Physiology of Truth : Neuroscience and Human Knowledge, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Changeux, J.-P. (dir.) (2005) La Lumière au siècle des Lumières et aujourd’hui, Odile Jacob, Paris. Changeux, J.-P., Connes, A. (1989) Matière à pensée, Odile Jacob, Paris. Changeux, J.-P., Connes, A. (1995) Conversations on Mind, Matter and Mathematics, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Changeux, J.-P., Ricœur, P. (1998) Ce qui nous fait penser. La Nature et la Règle, Odile Jacob, Paris. Changeux, J.-P., Ricœur, P. (2000) What Makes Us Think ? A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue about Ethics, Human Nature and the Brain, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Ricœur, P. (1990) Soi-même comme un autre, Éditions du Seuil, Paris. Ricœur, P. (1992) Oneself as Another, The University of Chicago Press Chicago.

#HAPTER .EW$ISCOVERIES $E½NING#OMPLEXITY

3EARCHINGFOR3IMPLICITYIN#OMPLEXITY 'ROWTH )NNOVATION %CONOMIESOF3CALE ANDTHE0ACEOF,IFEFROM#ELLSTO#ITIES Summary by Moira Cockell and Francis Walvogel of the presentation3 by Geoffrey West

Life is the most complex phenomenon in the Universe manifesting an extraordinary diversity of form and function over an enormous scale. Yet, as Geoffrey West shows us, many of its most fundamental and complex phenomena scale with size in a surprisingly simple fashion. He explains in simple terms, using examples from the study of animal and plant vascular systems, growth, cancer, aging, sleep and mortality, how these so-called “quarter power scaling laws” follow from fundamental universal principles leading to a general quantitative, predictive theory that captures the essential features of many diverse biological systems. West extend these ideas to discuss and speculate about equally complex phenomena, namely social organizations : asking to what extent are social organizations an extension of biology ? Is a city, for example, “just” a very large organism ? He argues that the analogous “social” scaling laws his work has uncovered point to general principles of organization common to all cities. However the analogues to metabolic rate and behavioral times in cities scale counter to their behavior in biological systems : in particular, the pace of life in cities increases with size. This has dramatic implications for growth and development : innovation and wealth creation can fuel social systems, but if left unchecked, can potentially sow the seeds for their inevitable collapse.3

#OMPLEXITYATRULYINTERCULTURALTOPIC The topic addressed in this presentation is truly intercultural : it spans from mathematics to physics, to basic questions in biology, and extends into social sciences by trying to understand growth and fate of living entities from simple organisms to cities. The presentation examines two major interdisciplinary themes : 3


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New Discoveries Defining Complexity

Firstly, can we conceptualize the sciences (either biological or social) in mathematical terms such as physics ? In other words, can we develop a set of “Newton’s laws of biology” from which we could in principal, derive in a quantitative manner, everything that can happen in those systems ? The simple answer is probably no, because the inherent complexities of the systems do not allow such quantification. Nevertheless, a slightly different version of this question can be answered more fruitfully as there are mathematical ways to describe certain global behaviors. These can be applied to such philosophical considerations as why it is that we age and die ; why humans have a mean natural life span somewhere between 50 to 100 years ; what determines the mean and the upper limit of the scale of human life, whereas mice have a natural life span of 2 to 3 years [Enquist, 1999 ; Brown, 2000 ; West, 2000 ; West, 2001]. Secondly, this presentation examines the degree to which social organizations can be considered as an extension of what we know (mathematically speaking), about biological systems [Anderson, 1988 ; Arthur, 1997 ; Bar-Yam, 1997, 2000, 2004 ; Belew and Mitchel 1996 ; Blum and Durlauf 2006 ; Cohen and Segel 2001 ; Cowan 1994 ; Kohler, 2000]. West points out that we frequently employ terms that have biological meaning, such as the concepts of the organism, metabolism, growth, evolution and so on, to describe diverse aspects of our social organizations such as cities, armies, corporations etc. He asks if these terms are merely used as loose metaphors, or alternatively reflect that mankind added some new dimension to his own complex system, the world we live in, when it became organized as a social structure ?”

±,IFE²ISCOMPLEX BUTOBSERVESSOMESIMPLERULES Some of life’s complexity is illustrated by the almost illegible global metabolic charts or by maps of the myriad neurological pathways that function in individual living organisms. Despite this, life also conforms to rules of extreme simplicity. Take for instance, the relationship between the measurement of overall metabolic activity (measured in watts) and mass of organisms. One might have naively predicted that an increase in mass by 10 would increase the metabolic rate by 10, and so on. In practice the relationship is logarithmic, with a slope of 3/4. This rule holds all the way from mouse to elephant. It is a mathematical expression of the fact that metabolism costs a lot more to a mouse than to an elephant and an illustration that life exhibits a remarkable economy of scale. The relationship of a 3/4 slope between metabolic rate and mass also holds in the taxonomic classes of smaller structural units of living things, down to cells in culture, mitochondria and bacteria – indeed it is maintained over a scale spanning at least 27 orders of magnitude. Small may be beautiful, but large is definitely more efficient. This interesting relationship goes far beyond metabolic rate, since any type of physiological constant follows the same relation. Diverse phenomena such as the rate of evolution, heart beat rate and many other functions that are only indirectly associated with metabolism, decrease with size following the same kinetics. These observations allow to derive some other interesting implications : thus for instance, the number of heart beats occurring in the natural life span of a mammal, multi-

Searching for Simplicity in Complexity

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plied by its species-specific life span, is a biological constant. That is to say, the heart organs of a tiny shrew with an average life span of only a few months and a human being with an average human life span will beat for approximately the same number of times before expiring. A similar quarter-power scaling relationship also holds true for the ratio of white matter – grey matter in the composition of human brain tissue. Indeed, the number “4” plays such a recurring role in mathematical descriptions of life, that it merits consideration as being in some sense key to our understanding of life itself.

/RDERNEEDNOTBEEASYORINTUITIVETOPERCEIVE Such mathematical relationships are so fundamental, that they extend to all living organisms. They reveal a type of order in the universe that is neither immediately perceivable nor intuitively expected, when for instance we observe the elements in a photographic image of a randomly selected human being surrounded by an apparently random selection of plants in a forest. Nevertheless, the universality of life’s scaling laws mean that one can also derive the average number of trees of a given size in a defined area of forest from a mathematical formula where the only known variable is the size of the tree trunks. What is the origin of this type of constancy ? The short answer is that it reflects generic properties of life networks. Such network properties are universal, well ordered hierarchically and have two defining characteristics : a) the networks are space filling ; b) their terminal units are the same size – i.e. their capillaries are the same at all scales. Despite the enormous variation among the forms of living organisms, each one complies with a set of constraints that network properties impose. Metabolic rate can be considered as an overall estimation of the “activities of life” of any living structure. It is a parameter that provides information about the burn rate of energy produced by that particular living organism. In terms of how that energy is used, a part goes into the maintenance of that organism, and part goes into its growth. A remarkable phenomenon is that if the observed growth curves for the full spectrum of living organisms are plotted, the curves show an impressive similarity. All are sigmoid, showing slow initial growth, then logarithmic development that finally levels off. Even more remarkably, when the same growth curves are appropriately rescaled, they become superimposable. The simplicity of the relationships that we derive from such mathematical analysis of biological living systems now permits us to ask questions in terms of these same fundamental scaling laws, such as what differentiates the growth of a cancer from either the growth of healthy tissue or from the growth of a fetus ? Many, if not all, living organisms organize themselves socially. Thus it is of great interest to ask if it is possible to extend the relationships described above to living organizations’ social organizations. In other words, do analogous power laws apply to the scaling of phenomena such as the growth of the infrastructure of cities ? The answer is yes. We can indeed clearly demonstrate that as cities grow, the rate of growth of numerous urban organizations ; road surfaces ; number of gas stations etc, increases in accordance with the same scaling laws that we derived for biological systems.

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$IFFERENTSCALINGLAWSFOR±BIOLOGICAL²AND±SOCIAL²PHENOMENA A mathematical description of the growth of complex societal phenomena can also be derived. However, while these growth curves are similar in shape to the growth curves for biological systems, there is one remarkable and important difference in the equation that describes their growth. A parameter called β (the growth constant), is always less than 1 in the mathematical description of rates of biological phenomena, and infrastructure growth. In contrast, it is found to be consistently greater than 1 in equations that describe the growth of human sociological phenomena involving creative and innovative inputs such as registration of patents, developments of creative employments etc. Thus two clearly distinct categories of scaling law exist. In simple terms, this difference means the following : when the growth constant β is less than 1, the growth within a system remains sublinear, the economy of scale rule is respected, and the system remains within the boundaries of sustainable efficiency. Natural living systems function in this way over an immense range of size / mass and the curve of such a data graph remains infinitely sigmoidal. On the other hand, when the growth constant β lies above 1, growth becomes supralinear, rapid growth continues without asymptote, unchecked, and in a limited amount of time the curve goes into infinity – in other terms into a crisis : Put in everyday words, one can apply the maxim “the bigger you are, the more you get, the more you want” to describe the trend. The trend is characteristic of the growth curve of patents, creative employments, clinical use of new antifungal drugs, wealth production, and so on – indeed of all socially important urban organizations !

!MATHEMATICALCONCEPTOF±SUSTAINABILITY² These mathematical expressions demonstrate that reaching of a critical situation where rapid or brutal readjustments become a necessity for continuation is an inherent property of the unchecked growth of urbanized societies. Such growth is ultimately unsustainable. Even when crises of growth can be solved by the advent of new innovations (such as has happened in our society with the introduction of informatics), the mathematical model also predicts that the periods of time periods between “crises” must get shorter and shorter. An accelerating treadmill of novel innovations becomes imperative to survival of the system. The implications of the “greater or less than 1” status of the mathematical constant beta can also be expressed in other, more explicit words, “Pace of life” effectively decreases with size if the growth constant β is inferior to 1, as documented by most studies on efficiency-based, biological systems. In contrast, if β is greater than 1, the pace of life increases with the size of the system under observation. This phenomenon has been documented for many characteristics of the urban systems. For instance, it is has been observed that diverse parameters ranging from the speed of walking to crime rates, increase disproportionately with the increase in size of cities. In conclusion, mathematical models based on some simple relationships of living structures can help us to conceptualize the improvement in efficiency of the biological systems as their size increases. Furthermore they bring to our attention how, if used in an unchecked way, the emerging characteristics of mankind such as creative ingenuity, can


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drive the growth curves of the parameters with which we measure economic and societal success, into reiterative crises that must occur at ever shorter time intervals.

2EFERENCES Anderson, P. W., Arrow, K. J., Pines, D. (Eds) (1988) “The Economy as an Evolving Complex System”, Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, vol. 5, Addison-Wesley. Arthur, W. B., Durlauf, S. N., Lane, D. A. (Eds) (1997) “The Economy as an Evolving Complex System II”, Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, vol. 27, Addison-Wesley. Bar-Yam, Y. (1997) Dynamics of Complex Systems, Perseus Books. Bar-Yam, Y. (Ed.) (2000) Unifying Themes in Complex Systems : Proceedings of the First International Conference on Complex Systems, Perseus Books, New Hampshire. Bar-Yam, Y., Minai, A. A. (Eds) (2004) Unifying Themes in Complex Systems II : Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Complex Systems, Perseus Books, New Hampshire. Belew, R. K., Mitchell, M. (Eds) (1996) : “Adaptive individuals in evolving populations : models and algorithms”, Santa Fe Institute Studies in The Sciences of Complexity, vol. 26, Addison-Wesley. Blume, L. E., Durlauf, S. N. (Eds) (2006) The Economy as an Evolving Complex System III : Current Perspectives and Future Directions, Oxford University Press. Brown, J. H., West, G. B., Enquist, B. J. (2000) Scaling in Biology : Patterns and Processes, Causes and Consequences, Oxford University Press. Cohen, I., Segel L. A., (Eds) (2001) Design Principles for the Immune System and Other Distributed Autonomous Systems, Oxford University Press. Enquist, B. J., West, G. B., Charnov, E. L., Brown, J. H. (1999) “Allometric scaling of production and lifehistory variation in vascular plants”, Nature 401, 907-911. West, G. B., Brown, J. H., Enquist, B. J. (2000) The Origin of Universal Scaling Laws in Biology, Oxford University Press. West, G. B., Brown, J. H., Enquist, B. J. (2001). A general model for ontogenetic growth, Nature 413, 628-31. Cowan, G. A., Pines, D., Meltzer D. (Eds) (1994) Complexity : Metaphors, Models, and Reality : Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity Proceedings, Perseus Books. Kohler T. A., Gumerman, G. J. (Eds) (2000) Dynamics in Human and Primate Societies : Agent-Based Modeling of Social and Spatial Processes, Oxford University Press.

5NDERSTANDINGAND-ANAGING0LANETARY #OMPLEXITY Summary by Moira Cockell, Francis Walvogel and S. Kadner of the presentation4 by Hans Joachim Schellnhuber

Schellnhuber’s presentation elaborates how the Earth System has evolved over billions of years through strong interactions between the geosphere and the biosphere. He discusses the evidence that global industrialization has recently pushed this process into a new stage where humankind is dominating the planetary biogeochemical cycles and argues that the most severe – yet unintentional – consequence is anthropogenic climate change that will profoundly affect nature and civilization on Earth. His lecture attempts to be both general, by addressing the big co-evolutionary picture, and specific, by providing examples of pertinent scientific challenges. In Schellnhuber’s view, “Coping with climate crisis is possible, if we dramatically improve our understanding of the systems involved and generate novel strategies for managing environmental complexity at all relevant scales. Solving the climate problem may actually bring about a transition to global sustainability where humankind is widely controlling its own subsistence conditions.” However, he is convinced that the objectives and risks of auto-evolution cannot be addressed within a purely scientific framework, and cites the inadequate current debate on geoengineering schemes (like deliberate sulphur contamination of the stratosphere) for greenhouse effect containment, as evidence for the urgent need for wider engagement. “The true limits of “improving” both the design and the crew of spaceship Earth, can only be assessed through a fundamental, unprecedented trialogue between philosophy, ethics and science,” says Schellnhuber. 4

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Understanding and Managing Planetary Complexity

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7HYUS The fundamental question of why life can exist on Earth, and how it came to emerge on this planet alone among those we know of (more than 200 exoplanets without the slightest trace of life have been discovered by now), is crucial to our understanding of the presentday complexity of our planetary environment. This environment sustains humans, animals, plants, viruses, bacteria and fungi. Somehow, the oxygen-photosynthesis cycle, which arose through the most primitive life forms more than 3 billion years ago, was the essential driving force for more complex organisms to emerge from the simple archaic cells with the capacity to reproduce. Three ingredients – water, CO2 and sunlight – were essential for the necessary chemical reactions to take place. These same physical conditions also allowed the progressive development of what we now call the “greenhouse” effect. The greenhouse effect’s protective functions were themselves an important element in creating the conditions in which life could develop further. The natural greenhouse gases provide an additional 33 degrees of warmth to the planet’s surface, ensuring that water is present in liquid form. Without it, the mean temperature of our planet would have decreased to far less than 0°C.

±(ABITABLEZONES² The global carbon cycle is, in fact, a self-stabilizing feedback loop that is ultimately responsible for the stable geobiological system. Besides its important atmospheric processes, the stability of the CO2 cycle is largely dependent on the Earth’s plate tectonics. This is because over the long term (with a turnover time of around 500,000 years) the Earth’s carbon gets precipitated from the atmosphere and buried in sediments that can be re-ejected into the atmosphere by volcanic activity. It is hypothesized that our neighbor planet Mars is not habitable (any more) because its own plate tectonics movements came to a standstill at some point in the distant past. Atmospheric conditions play a vital role for the development of biological systems, but the distances of the planetary orbits from their energy source, the Sun, are also decisive. By taking into account parameters such as temperature and CO2 content, it is possible to estimate the theoretical habitable zone of our solar system and to follow the changes in it over time. Such an assessment shows that one billion years ago, the habitable zone contained Mars and Earth’s position. Today, due to the continuing increase in the Sun’s luminosity, only the Earth belongs to that zone. Extrapolation of such data reveals that in another 500 million years, the Earth is likely to have crossed the threshold and, having run out of atmospheric CO2, will lie outside of the habitable zone. However, it should be noted that the weathering processes, which are responsible for this long-term removal of CO2 from the atmosphere, occur on a time-scale of millions of years, while the anthropogenic tampering with the CO2 systems happens on a scale of hundreds of years.

'AIATHEORY The premise that both biological and geological systems of planet Earth are closely linked, and are the driving forces of the present dynamic equilibrium that sustains life, is the basis

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of the Gaia theory, largely conceived and developed by James Lovelock. In essence, the theory takes account of the fact that life and its environment are in a state of constant coevolution. It is the complexity of this co-evolution that is the object of research of many scholars in astrophysics, climate science and anthropology. Originally born by the Gaia theory, the advent of methods to make quantitative assessments of how such planetary changes interact with each other, has given rise to the field we now call “Earth System Analysis”. In spite of being a highly theoretical science, there is nevertheless good evidence to substantiate our faith in the predictive value of Earth System models. For instance, such purely mathematical models are able to recapitulate the explosion of multicellular, complex life forms that occurred on this planet some 540 million years ago. In both quantitative and qualitative senses, we are able to draw a much more detailed picture of how human life and its environment have co-evolved over the last million years : Quaternary climate changes probably drove the early evolution of hominid species, while the emergence of capacities for communication and organization in their descendents may have caused the extinctions of species that were rivals in the competition to exploit resources. Relatively recent environmental and climate changes that have had crucial consequences for human populations in terms of food production, access to freshwater, displacement of communities, economy, technology and community governance, provide strikingly close-to-home illustrations of how biological and geological systems co-evolve. For example, a climate-ocean-biosphere model that uses only orbital parameters without any other data, predicts that about 6000 years ago, a regional climate phase transition triggered the browning of the Sahara. Cave painting records document the fact that the great desert had previously accommodated farming communities. Consistent with the time of the simulated climate change, there is abundant evidence that a population movement away from the Sahara and towards the big river valleys occurred, bringing with it the sociopolitical and economical consequences of the so-called “hydraulic cultures” (Egypt, Mesopotamia, Western India). Robust Earth System models also enable us to make predictions about where present trends in the dynamics of human and environmental co-evolution are leading. They suggest that across the planet there are now many discrete geographical regions and largescale ecosystems at risk of undergoing phase transitions that will, in turn, cause knock-on effects on their neighboring geographical regions, and may even set off a series of irremediable chain reactions.

4IPPINGPOINTS At least a dozen of so-called tipping points are at (more or less imminent) risk of undergoing environmental change at a level that will have rapid and irreversible consequences for the life that they contribute to sustain. Among them are the Greenland ice sheet, the thermohaline circulation system of our oceans, the Amazonian rainforest, the Indian monsoon and the El Niño Southern Oscillation system. The Earth System model “CLIMBER” is just one simplified way to illustrate the interconnected dynamic effects that such predicted climate changes could have. It provides a means to show graphically how global warming due to human activities can destabilize the carbon cycle. Correlative evidence that recent global climate change is a consequence

Understanding and Managing Planetary Complexity

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of human activity and not simply part of a regular pattern has accumulated to such a level that it is now widely accepted. We can for instance monitor the past dynamics of CO2 levels, which act as a surrogate indicator of the planet’s temperature over a long period of time. By analyzing ice cores of up to 2-km length in Antarctica, the atmospheric concentration of CO2 over the past 700,000 years can be reconstructed, showing that for most of that period a stable pattern of regular fluctuations prevailed. We also know now that during the last 10,000 years, a time span that is consistent with the onset of large civilizations in the human cultural record, the temperature of the planet became essentially constant. CO2 levels first began to rise dramatically above the previously recorded maxima approximately one hundred years ago, a time that correlates with the dynamics of the Industrial Revolution. The planetary level of CO2 now exceeds its previous standard range by 40%. Moreover, if the current trends of human activity continue to reinforce this phase transition, we can expect the planet to undergo a further 3-5 degree increase in temperature by 2100 as a result. A central chart, the “Tipping Points Map of the Earth System” can be employed to envisage the consequences. As a metaphor, these tipping points can be considered as the “vital organs” of our “body Earth”. We can use the model to examine what happens if we activate the tipping points one by one : it is well known that the thermohaline circulation (or ocean conveyor belt) plays an important role in maintaining climate stability as, for instance, demonstrated by one of its components, the Gulf Stream. The melting of the polar ice sheets, by changing water density and temperature, would be expected not only to have a catastrophic effect on this oceanic conveyor belt, but would also lead to massive leaking of methane, a potent greenhouse gas, from the continental shelves. There would be many other possible consequences – one can almost speak of chain reactions – on these interconnected tipping points : changes in the El Niño Southern Oscillation system would affect the Indian monsoon, which itself would modify the snow cover in Tibet and the Himalaya, which would affect in turn the biostability and the dust reserves in the Sahara. The African dust storms are capable of crossing the Atlantic Ocean and fertilize the Amazonian forest. A similar theoretical scenario can be imagined if we consider the effects of instability of the Antarctic ice sheet. It would have an impact on the circumpolar deepwater formation, which in turn would affect the climate conditions and the marine life in the Atlantic. In brief, most, if not all, abrupt transitions at the tipping points are likely to exert amplifying effects on each other’s behavior.

4OTAL%ARTH3YSTEMMODELSINTEGRATINGTHE±HUMANDIMENSION² OFSEMI RATIONALDECISIONMAKING It is abundantly clear today that unless we find ways to reverse the current trends, anthropogenic greenhouse emissions will bring some of the systems described previously into motion and might even trigger something like a runaway greenhouse effect. Whatever the particular tipping point that initiates the potential knock-on effects, in the future our planet is likely to witness changes of almost inconceivable magnitude. If the human race is to continue to co-evolve with its environment in face of the global changes that our activities have provoked, we need to respond rapidly with a global alteration of our habits. Instead,

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we are presently facing global autism. Without developing a radically novel approach that puts together all the combined interdisciplinary forces of humankind’s intelligence and reasoning capacity we will have no chance to avoid the climate chaos likely to start within this century. Many models indicate that it will then become impossible for the planet to escape from a new, self-sustaining cycle of ever-escalating temperature increase. The conditions are clearly defined : if we continue to do business as usual, the emission of greenhouse gases will continue to increase dramatically, whereas – in order to be sure that we do not risk to set in motion the tipping points scenario – we must find a way to substantially decrease greenhouse gas emissions within the next decades. This implies fundamental changes to the very foundations of our civilization. It will, at the very least, require a reinvention of the concepts of urbanity and rurality as well as a self-conscious process of human autoevolution designed to transcend the environmental problems we have created.5

2EFERENCES Bunde, A., Kropp, J., and Schellnhuber H. J. (Eds) (2002) The Science of Disasters. Climate Disruptions, Heart Attacks, and Market Crashes, Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York. Grassl, H., Schellnhuber, H. J. et al. (2003) Climate Protection Strategies for the 21st Century : Kyoto and beyond, WBGU, Berlin. Grassl, H., Schellnhuber H. J. et al. (2005) : World in Transition : Fighting Poverty through Environmental Policy, Earthscan, London. Lenton, T. M., Schellnhuber, H. J., Szathmáry, E. (2004) “Climbing the co-evolution ladder”, Nature 431, 913. Lenton, T. M., Held, H., Kriegler, E., Hall, J. W., Lucht, W., Rahmstorf, S., Schellnhuber, H. J. (2008). “Tipping elements in the Earth’s climate system”, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 105, 1786-93. Lovelock, J. E. and Margulis, L. (1974) “Atmospheric homeostasis by and for the biosphere : the gaia hypothesis”, Tellus : A Bimonthly Journal of Geophysics, 26(1), 2-10. Rahmstorf, S. Schellnhuber, H. J., (2006) Der Klimawandel. Diagnose, Prognose, Therapie. Verlag C. H. Beck, München, Germany. Schellnhuber, H. J., & Wenzel, V. (Eds) (1998) Earth System Analysis. Integrating Science for Sustainability, Springer, Berlin. Schellnhuber, H. J. (1999) “Earth system analysis and the second Copernican revolution”, Nature 402 Supp. C19-23. Schellnhuber, H. J., et al. (Eds) (2006) Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Schubert, R., Schellnhuber, H. J., Buchmann, N., Epiney, A., Griesshammer, R., Kulessa, M., Messner, D., Rahmstorf, S., Schmid, J. (2006) The Future Oceans – Warming Up, Rising High, Turning Sour. WBGU, Berlin. Schwartzman, D. (2002) Life, Temperature, and the Earth : The Self-Organizing Biosphere, Columbia University Press. Steffen, W., Sanderson, A., Tyson, P. D., Jaeger, J., Matson, P., Moore III, B., Oldfield, F., Richardson, K., Schellnhuber, H.J., Turner, B.L., and Wasson, R.J. (Eds) (2004) Global Change and the Earth System : A Planet Under Pressure. Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York.

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Recommended further reading [Bunde, 2002 ; Grassl, 2003 ; Grassl, 2005 ; Lenton, 2004 ; Lenton, 2008 ; Lovelock and Margulis, 1974 ; Rhamstorf and Schellnhuber, 2006 ; Schellnhuber and Wenzel, 1998 ; Schellnhuber, 1999 ; Schellnhuber, 2006 ; Schubert, 2006 ; Schwartzman, 1999 ; Steffen, 2004].

7HY0HYSICSIS%ASYAND!UTISMIS(ARD by Ian Hacking6

The organizing theme of this symposium session is complexity. Hence the very titles of the two previous presentations : Geoffrey West : Searching for Simplicity in Complexity ; Growth, Innovation, Economies of Scale, and the Pace of Life from Cells to Cities. John Schellnhuber : Understanding and Managing Planetary Complexity. Regardless of how well informed we are about their topics, these two talks captured our attention because they try to understand issues that affect every one of us. Their research is daunting, because what they work on is relentlessly complex. They are experts who think hard about complex systems. The organizers of this weekend asked a philosopher to pitch in to help think about what they do : To say what complexity is, and how we make sense of it.6 I shall proceed in four stages : 1. Explain my paradoxical title ; 2. Observe that complexity is in the eye of the beholder ; 3. Mention some fundamental knacks by which different sciences make sense of complex systems ; 4. Apply these considerations to the work of Drs. West and Schellnhuber.

0HYSICSISSIMPLE Philosophers notoriously talk in general terms, but I try to anchor thinking to down-toearth examples. My title comes from an incident. I first met John Schellnhuber in August 2006 in Boulder, Colorado. He had come for a meeting with other global leaders in climate change research at the U.S. National Center for Atmospheric Research. Later in the day I met with a physicist at the University of Colorado. Eric Cornell is a notably successful 6


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Fig. 1 Photograph taken by Eran Tal (Philosophy PhD candidate) of Physics PhD candidate Rockson Chang in Aephraim Steinberg’s lab, Quantum Optics Group, University of Toronto, August, 2008.

experimenter – he did the research for which he got a Nobel Prize when he was about 30, in 1995. In the course of our conversation he said, “Physics is easy because we only do simple problems”. That is a paradox. Physics covers a host of activities, so let us be specific. Cornell works on ultracold physics. “Ultracold” ? Almost absolute zero. A thousandth of a millionth of a degree Celsius above zero. In 1925 Einstein foresaw that strange things happen to atoms that cold. Only in 1995 did two labs, one in Colorado and then one at MIT, succeed in making a new state of matter in the ultracold, what is called Bose-Einstein Condensate. Cold physics is a “hot” topic. Why ? The new state of matter has innumerable bizarre properties – as if there were steam, water, ice, and then something absolutely new in the history of the universe. Labs all over the world are using it to find out about light, about atoms, and even about the void. Cold atoms are so unenergetic that you can study them in the raw.7 They may teach us even about the neutron stars. We cannot experiment on stars ! But we have reason to think that they are stable objects because of strange quantum properties of their ingredients, and we are beginning to be able to investigate those ingredients in the ultracold laboratory.8 7

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We can actually see, what you would have thought Heisenberg taught us was impossible, the macroscopic wave function of those cold atoms that are bosons – because condensate consists of atoms in the same ground state, their average wave function is just the wave function of each individual atom. Hot stars are stable because the energy of nuclear fission balances the gravitational force that would make them implode. Neutron stars are cold, but they are made of fermions, no two of which can be in the same state thanks to the Pauli Exclusion Principle, so by Heisenbergs’ law when they begin to implode their momentum must increase, thus counteracting gravity. Pairs of fermions are bosons, and hence can be studied in the ultracold lab.

Why Physics is Easy and Autism is Hard

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The paradox is clear. This can’t be simple ! It took 70 years to pull off Cornell’s trick. It does not need massive investment and armies of scientists, as does high energy physics at CERN. All the work is done on the top of a table by a small handful of people, seldom much more than six in a research group. But as you can imagine, the published papers of this research look complex. So does the tabletop used in this kind of work9 : That looks bafflingly complicated, even if it is human-sized. So what is simple ? I am going to emphasize the laboratories rather than theories because people tend to think that in the end science comes down to theorizing. I want to bring to this World Knowledge Dialogue a variety of dialogues, including those between theory and experiment ; and, in one talk, to speak about cutting edge physics and a current crisis in developmental neurobiology.

!UTISMISHARD Autism may be defined by specialists as a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by impairments in reciprocal social interaction, communication deficits, and repetitive, restricted patterns of behavior and interests. To put it in more personal terms, autism is devastating not only to a child’s development but also to a family. A child with severe autism is somehow not there. Nobody nowhere, as the title of one autobiography has it [Williams, 1990, 1994]. Very often physically healthy (though there is a high incidence of other problems) he – and it is usually boys – just does not respond. It is not merely that he does not learn to speak until years after his peers, and then inadequately. He is a child with no affect, who never snuggles. He is obsessed with things and order, but does not play with toys in any recognizable way, and certainly does not play with other children. He mercilessly echoes a few things you say, or a phrase from a television advertisement. He has violent tantrums, not the usual sort of thing expected by parents who live in a community rich in children, but screaming, hitting, biting, smashing. Alternating with a placid gentleness, maybe even a smile – but not really for you, mother. Your child seems unreachable, loveable and gentle but unbearably other. And autism is for life. Autism is not always anything like as serious as my vignette suggests. We now have a whole range of what are called “Autistic Spectrum Disorders”. About two in every 300 young children are now being diagnosed as autistic. We are finding out a lot about the human brain, but despite various sorts of hype one encounters in the media, we know absolutely nothing about what causes autism, and not much about how to help the autistic compensate for their disability. It is a good subject to put beside ultracold physics, because in terms of research, they are roughly the same age. Of course there have been autistic people forever, and the disorder was identified 65 years ago, but it became a hot topic for research only around 1995, the year in which we first saw Bose-Einstein Condensate. Twelve years later there are many more autism researchers around the world, in various disciplines, than there are ultracold

9

Photograph taken by Eran Tal (Philosophy PhD candidate) of Physics PhD candidate Rockson Chang in Aephraim Steinberg’s lab, Quantum Optics Group, University of Toronto, August, 2006.

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physicists. The word “autism” passed from obscure to common parlance ; it has become sufficiently familiar for us all to know what John Schellnhuber meant when he used it in his presentation (Sect. 2.2), to say that people and governments who could not face the current realities of climate are autistic, that is to say, locked in upon their own inner world. Autism researchers do genetics, brain scans, autopsies, and innumerable psychological tests – anything from any available toolbox. Little hints keep cropping up.10 Unfortunately, to put matters in very cruel way, thus far, research has found out almost nothing, except what was known from the day autism became a diagnosis – that many more autistic children are boys than are girls, in a ratio of 4 to 1. So why is ultracold physics so “easy” and autism so hard ?

#OMPLEXITYISLESSINTHINGSTHANINTHEEYEOFTHEBEHOLDER One man’s “simple” is another man’s “complex”. Pluck a leaf from a tree. Nothing could be simpler. With the exception of the Inuit cultures of treeless parts of the northern hemisphere, the vocabulary of every society on the planet has a simple short word that means leaf. Now let your leaf fall : it flutters to the floor. Try to describe that motion exactly – it is not at all like Galileo’s shot dropped from the leaning tower of Pisa. The fall of each and every leaf from a tree is a complex story in its own right. A physicist will not in practice be able to tell you anything much about the fall of your leaf. For a plant physiologist, that very leaf that you picked constitutes an entire and extraordinarily complex system. Dictionary definitions make the point that it depends on how you look at something, whether it is complex or not. Here are three definitions I have found. Something is complex when it is not easily analyzed ; when it is hard to understand fully ; when it necessitates earnest study or examination in order to understand or cope with it. It is people who find things hard to understand, who study earnestly ; it is people who find things easy or hard to analyze. Complexity is a relation between people and things. Part of Geoffrey West’s title, “Searching for simplicity in complexity,” suggests that there is complexity out there, and we look for a hidden simplicity that is also out there. For a moment I encourage a reverse point of view. The simplicity or complexity is in the eye of we who are trying to understand what is out there. It is true that one important technical definition puts complexity in a thing, or rather in a sequence of numbers. An entire branch of mathematics, called complexity theory, developed around 1960. The degree of complexity of a sequence is defined as the length of the shortest computer program needed to generate the sequence. A sequence is absolutely random when the shortest program is as long as the sequence itself. To connect this with the real world, take the sequence of temperatures at noon in Geneva, every day since records began, and on into the future. The sequence is random if the best program to generate the sequence is, in effect, the list of numbers themselves. Such a sequence is “objectively” complex, but it is not that kind of complexity that makes autism hard, or lack of it that makes ultracold physics easy. 10

I do not mean to diminish findings such as this one, with 120 authors from 19 countries : [Szatmari, et al., 2007] But the history of identifying autism genes demands caution. I do not, however, support the scepticism of Jay Joseph [Joseph, 2006].


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4HREEKNACKSANDHOWWEGOTTHEM I shall mention three familiar fundamental tools by which human beings have been able to come to understand, and to some extent predict and control, the material world around us. I call them knacks to make plain that I am only pointing. A knack is a specific talent for something, especially one difficult to explain or teach. It also suggests an element of quickness of hand or eye or mind. I want just those connotations. Too often we turn important ideas into idols that become untouchable. Take “Quantum Mechanics”. That is a general name for one of the most profound body of ideas and practices yet engineered by the human mind. It is the successor of Newtonian Mechanics, and seems a long way from more humdrum automobile mechanics. If you are inclined to idolize quantum mechanics, as I am, it is good to learn from a classical scholar [Hadot, 2006], who observes that the Greek word “mechanics” first meant trickery – the trickery with which one could interfere with and make use of nature. Quantum mechanics is quantum trickery. The optical table that I showed in my photograph is a wonderful example of quantum trickery writ small and material. It is helpful to use a historical template to produce a scheme in which to represent scientific activity. The sciences employ many very distinct types of reasoning, each of which depends both on some human cognitive capacities and on the world within which we have evolved. The growth of scientific knowledge is first of all not finding things out, but discovering how to find out, discovering capacities within ourselves as human beings, capacities thanks to which we are able to find out. Each such discovery relies on new social practices, new institutions, new ways of communicating, and new ways of talking. Each such discovery is a long slow accumulation of wisdom and trickery.

0ROOF MODELSANDTHELABORATORY Curious people have been looking, exploring, trying things our forever, but our first big step on the road to present science was discovering our capacity to prove unexpected conclusions from rather simple premises. “A new light flashed upon the mind of the first man (be he Thales or some other) who demonstrated the properties of the isosceles triangle” – thus Kant.11 After that, said Kant, “the royal road” to knowledge. Although I defer to Kant, and am happy to invoke a legendary Thales, it was only very recently that a historian of classical mathematics turned away, from a chronology of theorems proved, to a “cognitive history”, that is, a history of the discovery and exploitation of some peculiar human cognitive capacities [Netz, 1999]. That is the first knack of the sciences, demonstrative proof. We often say that the sciences as we know them began in the 17th century, during the so-called scientific revolution. I am happy with that abstraction, and will abstract again. A whole new style of thinking arose, what Husserl referred to as the Galilean style. That is, using mathematical structures to make hypothetical models of some incomprehensible phenomena, and controlling the models by observations and measurements that can be made against nature. That is the second knack through which the sciences approach nature. 11

Critique of Pure Reason B xi.

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The amazing thing about hypothetical modeling by mathematical structures is that it works. The cosmologist Steven Weinberg observed that there is not the slightest reason why structures devised by the human mind should be so rich in understanding complex systems in nature. They do, and are the only show in town, according to the grammarian Noam Chomsky, who alluded to Weinberg and then back to Husserl : “We have no present alternative to pursuing the ‘Galilean’ style in the natural sciences at least” [Chomsky, 1980 : 9]. (It is no accident that the cosmologist and the grammarian said that the Galilean style is all we have : because you cannot do much in the way of experiments in either cosmology or grammar. Today’s string theory is the perfect exemplification of what we might call the pure Galilean style, untouched by experiment and unable at present to reach out to it. Galileo was the first man to make serious use of the telescope to extend our powers of sight. But if you cannot see or measure what exists in nature, how do you control hypothetical models ? The third fundamental new discovery of how to find out was what I call the laboratory style of thinking, which is not a matter of observing and measuring what already exists, but of making and doing. For an early example, take Robert Boyle and his air pump for creating a void, a vacuum in a container. That was something new ; it could be probed, investigated, on top of a table. There are two essential elements : the making of apparatus, and the creation of new phenomena, which simply do not exist in the universe, before they are produced by human apparatus. Where I say create phenomena, you may prefer to say purify, or, with excessive modesty, make in a manageable and measurable form in a laboratory. That is the third knack, the creation of artificial phenomena using apparatus made to work in a laboratory. We are able to create phenomena about which we can make new hypothetical models that suggest new things to create in the laboratory that provoke changes or additions to hypotheses – an incredibly fertile dialectic. One reason to single out Boyle is that there is now a classic historical work that shows how radical Boyle was [Schaffer and Shapin, 1986]. Another – which one learns from that book – is that a great man of the preceding generation, Thomas Hobbes, saw clearly that Boyle was firming up a new style of thinking, and hated it. There are quite enough public phenomena in the world already, Hobbes says huffily, in a tract directed at Boyle. We do not need more, that are produced in a closet, and checked only by the members of a secret society (the Royal Society of London). God has given us enough quite enough phenomena to work with, Mr Boyle, and we do not need you to give us more dubious ones.12 Hobbes was radically wrong ! I value him because he saw a dangerous new thing being made before him, and no one else at the time, perhaps not even Boyle himself, understood that. The power of the laboratory to create new phenomena in the light of hypothetical models, and in turn to modify the models, was once a controversial discovery. There are more styles of scientific thinking in our tradition, and more emblems of their discovery. Think of Pascal and probability ; that is another knack that I shall briefly mention in connection with Geoffrey West’s material. Think of Linnaeus for his radical transformation of the classification of and relations among living things. But the knacks that legend attributes to Thales, Galileo and Boyle suffice here, for I was asking a specific question, half of which is, why is physics simple ?

12

For Hobbes’ own words in his Dialogus Physicus (1661), see [Schaffer and Shapin, 1986 : 351].


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Answer : because at any moment we approach a problem with these three distinct styles of reasoning, at each stage doing what is simple in the light of what has gone before. We remake the world in the light of our models ; we revise our models in the light of our remaking. Every individual step is simple relative to what we know how to do. Look back at that photograph of a table. It is, first of all, a very precise table, into which one screws various lenses and mirrors and lasers, all old technology. I have not shown the traps for atoms, which are nearby, and rely on well understood electricity and magnetism. I have not shown the cameras for photographing clouds of atoms, which are precise forms of the digital cameras used by grandparents for taking snaps of their children. I have not shown the small computers on a nearby table, or the coffee cups, pencils and whiteboard. Getting all of this to work in an intelligible way requires a vast array of skills. Physics is not easy in the sense of easy to do. But because we relentlessly make the phenomena in the light of theory, and relentlessly modify theory in the light of new phenomena, this hand-in-hand partnership makes sense of Cornell’s remark, “Physics is easy because we only do simple problems”. Why is autism not easy in this curious sense ? Part of the answer is that the third knack is simply not applicable, because we cannot put children’s brains into the laboratory. More importantly, we do not yet have deep models of the human brain : I say this with no intent to slight the models developed by my colleague Jean-Pierre Changeux, presenting elsewhere in this conference. What is amazing is what we can find out about the brain using our meager repertoire, as illustrated by the achievements of Gerald Edelman. But we lack the intimate dialogue of theory and laboratory that makes physics “easy”. I now turn to the complexities studied by John Schellnhuber and Geoffrey West.

-ONSOONSANDOTHERREALWORLDCOMPLEXITIES To what extent is the human race – that’s us – warming up its planet ? We, our planet, and its climate, constitute an organic system that is very hard to for us understand, to predict, or to control. That is why we call it complex. Again let us be specific and consider one of John Schellnhuber’s fields of research : he asks, under what conditions could the Indian Summer Monsoon collapse ? Although the monsoon causes widespread damage in Bangladesh even now, if it failed for several consecutive years, millions of people would likely starve to death. One cannot literally experiment on the climate : it is empty to say that the whole world is a laboratory. What Dr Schellnhuber and his colleagues do, is to make fairly detailed theoretical models of the Summer Monsoon, and use computer simulation to see what will happen. I say detailed, but the assumptions will be staggering in their absurdity. Start with simple assumptions about the distribution of temperatures in a rectangular block of air over the Indian sub-continent, 3 kilometers high, and suppose all highly relevant parameters are contained in it. What is the control on such models ? You cannot make experiments. Why should we believe any of its predictions ? The answer is a new concept, the robustness of models. Other workers make other simplifying assumptions. Models are credible when any plausible model gives about the same predictions as other plausible models. Models are credible only when they have been challenged by other models. It is not that we claim any one

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model is right, but collectively that they are robust. But we never get down to the kind of “simplicity” illustrated by ultracold physics. Dr. Schellnhuber’s work on the Monsoon is in a time frame of short duration, a couple or three centuries at most. Geoffrey West has done a lot of thinking about complex systems in the very long term. Using some of the strategies he learned as a physicist, he tries to understand some very general constraints on how human-sized, life-forms can evolve, do evolve, have evolved, or might evolve. Human-sized ? Mites to Whales, Lichen to Redwoods, but not bacterial sized, where most evolution on the face of the Earth has occurred. Dr West has crafted an astonishingly powerful account of the constraints on the sizes, life-spans, appetites, metabolism, breath-rate (etc.) of sexed organisms. It is astonishing because they all fit, from Mites to Whales, into a set of what we see as a simple input-output energy equation. It fits the data so well that we could call this West’s Law. His presentation to this meeting moved from long-term evolution into a relatively short time-span. The life of cities : complex organizations of myriad smaller organizations, embedded in yet larger complexes. The interactions boggle the mind. This is of immense practical importance today, when the city, rather than the region, or the nation state, is once again becoming the dominant life form for humans. The great cities of the world, such as Mumbai, Saõ Paolo or Dakar, did not exist a century ago. West posed a question similar to the one at the core of Schellnhuber’s research on the Monsoon. Under what conditions could the Indian Summer Monsoon collapse ? Under what conditions might a modern megacity grow so vast that its social organization collapsed into horrendous chaos ? Just as the dinosaur got too big for its boots, according to West’s equation, so the megacity might approach critical size and collapse. Why should we believe the equation ? It is rather like an empirical, inductive, generalization that fits data astonishingly well, and for which West has sketched an underlying rationale. But could it not be just an accidental uniformity ? An unkind comparison would be with what is called Bode’s Law, an eighteenth-century generalization about the distances of the planets from the sun, and the axes on which they rotate. It did lead to the prediction of a planet between Mars and Jupiter, in what has since been found to be the asteroid belt, of which the biggest object is Ceres. Neptune does not fit well with the Law, but Pluto was found near where Neptune was expected. Two things make the law attractive. First, it is a very simple linear equation ; second, the probability of the planets being distributed at random and yet fitting the Law is very small. Here another knack, another style of reasoning barely mentioned earlier, is used : probability. We may still ask why the Law holds so well. There are a few physical models (knack 2) that predict it – they involve planetary resonance and degrees of freedom, and imply that any stable system of planets must satisfy the Law. Most astrophysicists, however, think that Bode’s Law is not a law but just a coincidence. West’s law fits the data ; use the right logarithmic scale and you get a simple looking line. Now use the knack of probability thinking : It is initially that method of reasoning that makes West’s Law so credible, although he also has theoretical reflections to motivate his Law. He has vastly better probabilities for his Law than had Bode, but we still need more in the way of hypothetical modeling in order to feel that we have an understanding of the phenomena. Such is the ongoing nature of the growth of knowledge.


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2EFERENCES Chomsky, N. (1980) Rules and Representations, Columbia University Press, New York. Hadot, P. (2006) The Veil of Isis : An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature, Harvard University Press, Harvard. Joseph, J. (2006) The Missing Gene : Psychiatry, Heredity, and the Fruitless Search for Genes, Algora Publishing, New York. Netz, R. (1999) The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics : A Study in Cognitive History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Schaffer, S., Shapin, S. (1986) Leviathan and the Air Pump : Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Szatmari, P. et al. (2007) “Mapping autism risk loci using genetic linkage and chromosomal rearrangements”, Nature Genetics 39, 319-328. Williams, D. (1990) Nobody Nowhere : the Extraordinary Autobiography of an Autistic Child, Times Books, New York. Williams, D. (1994) Somebody Somewhere : Breaking Free from the World of Autism, Times Books, New York.

#HAPTER #OMPLEXITYAND+NOWLEDGE $IALOGUEIN$ISCUSSION

+NOWING#OMPLEX3YSTEMS 4HE,IMITSOF5NDERSTANDING by Paul Cilliers

In different contexts there are different criteria for what qualifies as sound knowledge. To a large extent, science still makes use of a traditional understanding of knowledge that derives from Enlightenment thinking. This approach relies on objective experimentation, logical deduction and reductive thinking. Despite the usefulness of this approach, it cannot be used with success when dealing with complex systems. Complexity theory realizes this, but much of the work done in complexity reverts to the traditional reductive criteria. It is argued here that an acknowledgement of the complexity of the issues we deal with implies an acknowledgement of the limits of the knowledge we can have about them. A complex system can be given several different descriptions that are not reducible to each other, but are not arbitrary either. Perspectives from the social sciences and humanities should not be made to fit traditional scientific criteria, they should be used to reflect on these criteria critically. In this paper, following Morin, a distinction is made between “restricted complexity” and “general complexity”. It is shown that restricted complexity does not escape the old rationality. The introduction of a more radical understanding of complexity leads to a critical position that does not allow “scientific” knowledge to trump all other forms of knowledge. There is an inescapable normative dimension to all things complex. This implies that the claims we make about complex things are always provisional and limited. Such claims should thus be made with a certain humility.

!LEGACYOFENLIGHTENMENTTHINKING To a large extent we still live in a world where “scientific” knowledge trumps all other forms of knowledge. This state of affairs is a legacy of Enlightenment thinking, in the sense that the quest for verifiable knowledge was understandably based on a need for objectivity. [Novotny, 2001 : 50-51] describe this process in the following way :

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Complexity and Knowledge Dialogue in Discussion

In its historical contest with religion, a triumphant science acquired a monopoly of describing and explaining “reality”, which both resisted and also validated human wishes, fancies and follies. Because the physical world, including its chemical and biological processes, came to be regarded as the most substantial component of the “real world”, a scientific definition of reality became ever more plausible. As a result the authority, values and practices of science permeated many other dimensions of society. The everyday world shrank to what scientists had “discovered” and were able to exploit. This traditional or, if you wish, modernist style of scientific thinking is no longer adequate – to the extent that it ever was. The reason for this is not because of a frivolous postmodern reaction to modernity, nor is it merely because of some logical problem with the verification of experimental processes (in the tradition of Popper, Kuhn or Feyerabend) ; it is a result of the complexity of the phenomena we deal with. Contemporary society is characterized – irreversibly – by pluralism and diversity and also, we argue, volatility and transgressivity. It can no longer be understood either in terms of the norms and practices of scientific rationality […]. [Novotny, 2001 : 21] What is at stake when we deal with complex things is thus the appropriate style of rationality. The argument is that the traditional modernist rationality – established in the first half of the 17th century and based on the ideas of Galileo, Newton and Descartes in the context of a more settled Europe after the peace of Westphalia see [Toulmin, 1990] ; a style of thinking fundamental to the establishment of the Royal Society (or more precisely, The Royal Society of London for the Improvement of Natural Knowledge, with the now extremely disconcerting motto nullius in verba) – is not adequate to complexity. Edgar Morin [Morin, 2007 : 5] gives specific content to the inadequacy of what he calls “classical science”. For him “classical science rejected complexity in virtue of three fundamental explanatory principles : 1. The principle of universal determinism, illustrated by Laplace’s Daemon, capable, thanks to his intelligence and extremely developed senses, of not only knowing all past events, but also of predicting all events in the future. 2. The principle of reduction, that consists in knowing any composite from only the knowledge of its basic constituting elements. 3. The principle of disjunction, that consists in isolating and separating cognitive difficulties from one another, leading to the separation between disciplines, which have become hermetic from each other. For Morin, this tradition has lead to wonderful results, but only in a limited context. In order to deal with a complex world, however, we need to acknowledge the limitations of this approach. An epistemological shift is required which replaces “reduction” with “distinction” and “disjunction” with “conjunction” [Morin, 2007 : 10]. In what follows an attempt will be made to give some content to this epistemological shift.

$EALINGWITHCOMPLEXITY An interest in complexity science has blossomed in the last three decades or so. Fuelled by the work of, amongst many others, Prigogine, Maturana and Varela, Mandelbrot, Kaufman, Gell-Mann and a generation of chaos theorists, the characteristics of complex

Knowing Complex Systems : The Limits of Understanding

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systems have been studied intensively and numerous institutions have been founded devoted solely to the investigation of these issues. As can be seen from the present volume, the topic has become of central concern in a host of other disciplines. The mere fact that a lot of attention is being paid to complexity is, however, no guarantee that the epistemological shift referred to above has taken place. Morin is quite explicit that, even in complexity theory, the dominant or traditional rationality has largely been retained. In order to make this explicit he makes a distinction between “restricted complexity” and “general complexity”. Restricted complexity is, for Morin, exemplified in those approaches to complexity that developed from chaos theory and fractal mathematics. These approaches focus on underlying patterns and universal principles that are still highly reductive in nature.13 Restricted complexity made […] possible important advances in formalization, in the possibilities of modeling, which themselves favor interdisciplinary potentialities. But one still remains within the epistemology of classical science. When one searches for the “laws of complexity”, one still attaches complexity as a kind of wagon behind the truth locomotive, that which produces laws. A hybrid was formed between the principles of traditional science and the advances towards its hereafter. Actually, one avoids the fundamental problem of complexity, which is epistemological, cognitive, paradigmatic. To some extent, one recognizes complexity, but by decomplexifying it. In this way, the breach is opened, then one tries to clog it : the paradigm of classical science remains, only fissured. [Morin, 2007 : 10] General complexity, Morin argues, is not merely a methodology ; it involves a rethink of our fundamental definitions of what knowledge is. When dealing with complexity, the traditional method of analysis does not work. What is more, the divide between subject and object cannot be maintained in any clear way. This is how Morin formulates it : In opposition to reduction, [general] complexity requires that one tries to comprehend the relations between the whole and the parts. The knowledge of the parts is not enough, the knowledge of the whole as a whole is not enough … Thus ; the principle of reduction is substituted by a principle that conceives the relation of whole-part mutual implication. The principle of disjunction, of separation (between objects, between disciplines, between notions, between subject and object of knowledge), should be substituted by a principle that maintains the distinction, but that tries to establish the relation. [Morin, 2007 : 10-11] This approach is clearly not in favor of a general vagueness see [Cilliers, 2005] ; it hangs on to distinctions, but always within a certain context. [Morin, 2007 : 18-20].

13

Byrne [Byrne, 2005] argues in the same way. He distinguishes between “simple” complexity and “complex” complexity, and then insists that simple (restricted) complexity plays in the court of current orthodoxy : “This is why simplistic complexity is so attractive to the worst sort of evolutionary psychology and contemporary ideologues of market models. Write a few rules – the selfish gene, the territorial imperative, profit maximization, rational choice, or, preferably, a combination of all of these, and away we go. Simplistic complexity does deal with a kind of complex emergence but it remains reductionist” [Byrne, 2005 : 103]. McLennan [McLennan, 2003] makes a similar argument about the way in which complexity theory has been applied to Sociology. It seems, for him, as if complexity theory – and what he refers to is “restricted complexity” – is not providing a critique of outdated meta-paradigms, it is simply providing a new one.

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To my mind, Morin is absolutely correct about the fact that much of complexity theory remains trapped within a traditional rationality. I witnessed a prominent theorist in the field claiming that everything which happens in society is reflected in the Dow Jones index, thereby reducing all the complexities of human society to a single index, and a financial one at that. The current interest that many complexity theorists have in power laws is evidence of a similar form of reduction. It rests on the problematic assumption that the world is fractal in nature. At least in the biological and social domains scale matters very much. Our knowledge of things complex cannot be free-floating and general, it is contingent and historically determined. Perhaps certain natural phenomena are more amenable to descriptions in terms of a “restricted” complexity, but to develop a deeper understanding of human and social phenomena we will have to move beyond Enlightenment rationality, even if that rationality is spruced up with a bit of chaos theory.

#HARACTERIZINGCOMPLEXITY A characterization of complex systems closer to Morin’s idea of “general complexity” must lead to a critical perspective. This view argues that complexity theory does not provide us with exact tools to solve our complex problems, but shows us (in a rigorous way) exactly why these problems are so difficult. This view has a more skeptical perspective on what can be done with complexity theory, and is developed from the following characteristics : 14 1. Complex systems are open systems. 2. They operate under conditions not at equilibrium. 3. Complex systems consist of many components. The components themselves are often simple (or can be treated as such). 4. The output of components is a function of their inputs. At least some of these functions must be non-linear. 5. The state of the system is determined by the values of the inputs and outputs. 6. Interactions are defined by actual input-output relationships and they are dynamic (the strength of the interactions change over time). 7. Components on average interact with many others. There are often multiple routes possible between components, mediated in different ways. 8. Some sequences of interaction will provide feedback routes, whether long or short. 9. Complex systems display behavior that results from the interaction between components and not from characteristics inherent to the components themselves. This is sometimes called emergence.

14

These characteristics were formulated in collaboration with Fred Boogerd and Frank Bruggemans at the department of Molecular Cell Physiology at the Free University, Amsterdam, based on the arguments in [Cilliers, 1998], and used in [Cilliers, 2005].


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10. Asymmetrical structure (temporal, spatial and functional organization) is developed, maintained and adapted in complex systems through internal dynamic processes. Structure is maintained even though the components themselves are exchanged or renewed. 11. Complex systems display behavior over a divergent range of timescales. This is necessary in order for the system to cope with its environment. It must adapt to changes in the environment quickly, but it can only sustain itself if at least part of the system changes at a slower rate than changes in the environment. This part can be seen as the ‘memory’ of the system. 12. More than one description of a complex system is possible. Different descriptions will decompose the system in different ways. Different descriptions may also have different degrees of complexity. If one considers the implications of these characteristics carefully a number of insights and problems arise : 1. The structure of a complex system enables it to behave in complex ways. If there is too little structure, i.e. many degrees of freedom, the system can behave more randomly, but not more functionally. The mere ‘capacity’ of the system (i.e. the total amount of degrees of freedom available if the system was not structured in any way) does not serve as a meaningful indicator of the complexity of the system. Complex behavior is possible when the behavior of the system is constrained. On the other hand, a fully constrained system has no capacity for complex behavior either. (This claim is not quite the same as saying that complexity exists somewhere on the edge between order and chaos. A wide range of structured systems displays complex behavior.) 2. Since different descriptions of a complex system decompose the system in different ways, the knowledge gained by any description is always relative to the perspective from which the description was made. This does not imply that any description is as good as any other. It is merely the result of the fact that only a limited number of characteristics of the system can be taken into account by any specific description. Although there is no a priori procedure for deciding which description is correct, some descriptions will deliver more interesting results than others. 3. In describing the macro-behavior (or emergent behavior) of the system, not all the micro-features can be taken into account. The description is a reduction of complexity. Nevertheless, macro-behavior is not the result of anything else but the micro-activities of the system. Yet, to describe the macro-behavior purely in terms of the microfeatures is a difficult task. When we do science, we usually work with descriptions that operate mainly on a macro-level, but these descriptions will, more often than not, be approximations of some kind. These insights have important implications for the knowledge-claims we make when dealing with complex systems. Since we do not have direct access to the complexity itself, our knowledge of such systems is limited in principle. The problematic status of our knowledge of complexity needs to be discussed in a little more detail.

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#OMPLEXITY LIMITSANDKNOWLEDGE The argument that our understanding of complex systems is problematic in principle can be made in the following way : To fully understand a complex system, we need to understand it in all its complexity. Furthermore, because complex systems are open systems, we need to understand the system’s complete environment before we can understand the system, and, of course, the environment is complex in itself. There is no human way of doing this. The knowledge we have of complex systems is based on the models we make of these systems, but in order to function as models – and not merely as a repetition of the system – they have to reduce the complexity of the system. This means that some aspects of the system are always left out of consideration. The problem is compounded by the fact that that which is left out, interacts with the rest of the system in a non-linear way and we can therefore not predict what the effects of our reduction of the complexity will be, especially not as the system and its environment develop and transform in time.15 We cannot have complete knowledge of complex systems ; we can only have knowledge in terms of a certain framework. There is no stepping outside of complexity (we are finite beings), thus there is no framework for frameworks. We choose our frameworks. This choice need not be arbitrary in any way, but it does mean that the status of the framework (and the framework itself) cannot be used as the basis for objective knowledge. The generation of knowledge of complex systems is an exploratory process. As the context in which this knowledge is to be useful changes, will have to continually revise the framework that generates this knowledge. Our knowledge of complex systems is thus always provisional. We have to be modest about the claims we make about such knowledge. An understanding of knowledge as constituted within a complex system of interactions would, on the one hand, deny that knowledge can be seen as atomized “facts” that have objective meaning. Knowledge comes to be in a dynamic network of interactions, a network that does not have distinctive borders. On the other hand, this perspective would also deny that knowledge is something purely subjective, mainly because one cannot conceive of the subject as something prior to the “network of knowledge”, but rather as something constituted within that network. The argument from complexity thus wants to move beyond the objective / subjective dichotomy, as Morin [Morin, 2007] also argues. The dialectical relationship between knowledge and the system within which it is constituted has to be acknowledged. The two do not exist independently, thus making it impossible to first sort out the system (or context), and then to identify the knowledge within the system. This co-determination also means that knowledge and the system within which it is constituted is in constant transformation. What appears to be uncontroversial at one point may not remain so for long. One should also be careful not to interpret this state of affairs as somehow inadequate, as something to be improved upon. There is a necessary relationship between the imposition of a limiting framework and the generation of knowledge. One cannot have knowledge without a framework. Despite the fact that our knowledge is of necessity limited, these limits are enabling, they allow us to make claims that are neither relativistic nor vague see [Cilliers, 2005]. At the same time, however, such knowledge is not the result of

15

These ideas are elaborated upon in [Cilliers, 2000] and [Cilliers, 2001].


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free-floating truths ; it is contextualized, in time and space. Because it is not objective, and because we know that, we cannot use this knowledge as if it is objective. There is always a normative dimension to the claims we make, and we have to stand in for it. We cannot shift the responsibility for the effects of our claims onto some process we call “scientific”.

!SSUMINGRESPONSIBILITY To a large extent the framework within which the natural sciences operate has to work with the illusion of objectivity. It is necessary to be absolutely as objective as possible, while simultaneously acknowledging the limits of the strategy at stake and of the reach of the claims made. Most good scientists will acknowledge this. The problem is, however, severely compounded when the methods of the natural sciences are imposed upon or, even worse, embraced in a simplistic way by the social sciences and humanities. The impression is then created that a traditional understanding of truth, which is problematic even in the natural sciences, should form the criterion for proper work in social sciences. It is not possible to think what the motto nullius in verba could mean in the human context ! We are not faced with a set of problems we can solve in a piecemeal way by chipping away at it using experimental procedures and good old Enlightenment rationality. We are confronted by a complex problem that is transforming not only while we are investigating it, but also because we are investigating it. An understanding of “general complexity” should help us to understand this process. The generation of knowledge is not a linear process, but one that is folded in on itself. Useful knowledge is making and unmaking itself continuously. For example, a Marxist perspective on the economy can be proven wrong at some stage, for example by the failure of Stalinist communism, but can again become useful as something containing important critiques of rampant and destructive capitalism. The central thrust of a general theory of complexity should therefore, to my mind, be a critical one. It should be constantly vigilant about the limits of our understanding instead of making brash and reductive claims about the insights gained from some mathematical model, like a power law, for example. This is not to argue that complexity theory cannot provide us with useful tools or help us with the generation of new insights : To the contrary. The insights from fractal mathematics, chaos theory and complex adaptive systems are fascinating. The argument is about the reach of these theories. If we still operate in a context where knowledge generated in the framework of the natural sciences trumps other forms of knowledge, it has become necessary to actively resist this tendency. This is the motivation behind seeing complexity theory as a critical position. Such a role for complexity theory would entail to simultaneously work on the generation of new ideas and to resist a simplistic assimilation of these ideas. It involves acknowledging the temporal nature of what we do and not to be intimidated by a culture of performance in which everything has to de done quickly and efficiently without giving enough consideration to the costs involved see [Cilliers, 2007]. The price we pay for clinging to a modernist rationality can be seen on many levels in our globalized world. From the perspective of philosophy, the most important one is the distortion it brings to our understanding of what it is to be human. Complexity theory should help us to deal with this question, rather than to play in the park with big business

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and grand politics. We cannot look to scientific rationality to solve our ethical dilemmas. We will have to deal with them as contingent and unique things. Acknowledging complexity should help us to humanize science, not the other way round.

2EFERENCES Byrne, D. (2005) “Complexity, Configurations and Cases”, Theory, Culture & Society 22(5), 95-111. Cilliers, P. (1998) Complexity and Postmodernism, Understanding complex systems, Routledge, London. Cilliers, P. (2000) “Knowledge, Complexity and Understanding”, Emergence, Vol. 2(4), 7-13. Cilliers, P. (2001) “Boundaries, Hierarchies and Networks in Complex Systems”, International Journal of Innovation Management 5(2), 135-147. Cilliers, P. (2005) “Complexity, Deconstruction and Relativism”, Theory Culture & Society 22(5), 255-267. Cilliers, P. (2007) “On the Importance of a Certain Slowness”, in Gershenson C., Aerts D. & Edmonds B. (Eds), Worldviews, Science and Us : Philosophy and Complexity, 53-64. Morin, E. (2007) “Restricted Complexity, General Complexity”, in Gershenson C., Aerts D. & Edmonds B. (Eds), Worldviews, Science and Us : Philosophy and Complexity, 5-29. McLennan, G. (2003) “Sociology’s Complexity”, Sociology 37(3), 547-564. Nowotny, H., Scott, P., Gibbons, M. (Eds) (2001) Re-Thinking Science, Polity Press, Cambridge. Toulmin, S. (1990) Cosmopolis : The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, Free Press, New York.

#ONSILIENCEANDTHE3TATUS OF(UMAN ,EVEL4RUTH by Edward G. Slingerland

One of the primary barriers to humanities / natural science dialogue is the intuition that integrating human-level truths into a scientific framework is somehow inappropriately “reductionist”. This paper argues that this intuition is based upon a mind-body dualism that is an inextricable part of innate human cognitive endowment. Pursuing “consilience” between the natural sciences and humanities thus requires the cultivation of a dual consciousness, where we acknowledge our inability to escape the lived reality of human-level concepts, while simultaneously seeing them as physical processes amenable to natural scientific explanation. E.O. Wilson, who delivered one of the keynote addresses at the 2006 World Knowledge Dialogue Symposium, has famously argued for the need for “consilience” between the natural sciences and the humanities : that is, uniting both areas of inquiry into a single, continuous chain of explanation [Wilson, 1998]. One of the main sources of resistance to consilience is the pervasive fear among humanists that bringing scientific frameworks to bear on human-level issues would be fundamentally and perniciously “reductionist”. There are reasonable and unreasonable aspects to this fear. Teasing the two apart involves getting clear about what it means to “reduce,” what different varieties of reductionism look like, and what status human-level concepts would have in a the sort of verticallyintegrated chain of causation and explanation that is arguably the goal of humanities / natural science dialogue.

4HEBOGEYMANOFREDUCTIONISM To begin with, it is important to realize that any truly interesting explanation of a given phenomenon is interesting precisely because it involves reduction of some sort—tracing causation from higher to lower levels or uncovering hidden correlations. We are not satis-

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fied with explanations unless they answer the “why” question by means of reduction : by linking the explanandum (philosophical jargon for the “thing” or “problem” that requires explanation) to some deeper, hidden, more basic explanans (the philosophical term for the “thing” or “solution” that explains a problem). Reduction is what we do as scholars, humanistic or otherwise, and when someone fails to reduce we rightly dismiss their work as trivial, superficial, or uninformative. When the deeper principles behind things are poorly understood – that is, when lower levels of causation underlying phenomena we are interested in explaining are not accessible to our prying – we are often forced to invent vague, place-holder entities to stand in for the missing information. Sometimes we are aware that this is what we are doing. For instance, Mendel could reason about the inheritance of traits without knowing how information about them was physically instantiated or transmitted, and Darwin could similarly map out the implications of natural selection without any clear conception of the substrate of inheritance. In such cases there is an implicit faith that the lowerlevel entities and processes will eventually be specified ; if not, the theory may have to be abandoned. A discipline can find itself in a dead-end, however, when it has postulated vague, placeholder entities without realizing that this is what it is doing – when it takes these unspecified and unknowable entities or faculties to have genuine explanatory force. The force of the argument of cognitive scientists and evolutionary psychologists who are pushing for consilience or vertical integration between the humanities and the natural sciences is that the humanities are stuck in this sort of dead-end, continuing to rely on impressivesounding but explanatorily empty entities and faculties such as “learning” or “intelligence” [Tooby and Cosmides, 1992 : 122-123]. Just as the entity of “protoplasm” postulated by early biological theory turned out to consist of a collection of distinct intricate structures with specific functions, so too will words like “learning” and “rationality” turn out to be a blanket terms for what are really a collection of specific, modular, evolved cognitive processes that allow human beings to selectively extract and process adaptively-relevant information from the world. Human level meaning emerges organically out of the workings of the physical world, and we are being “reductive” in a good way when we seek to understand how these lower-level processes allow the higher-level processes to take place.

&ROMPHYSICALISMTOTHEHUMANITIESLEVELSOFEXPLANATION Having sent the bogeyman of reductionism back to its cave, it is now possible to talk about good and bad forms of reductionism – because, of course, it is really “greedy” or “eliminative” reductionism that most humanists are really worried about. In order to distinguish productive, explanatory reductionism from crudely eliminative reductionism, it is important to get some clarity about the heuristic and ontological status of entities at various levels of explanation. Although no evolutionary psychologist or cognitive scientist would purport to be an eliminative reductionist, and all give lip-service to the idea that higher levels of explanation can feature emergent qualities not present at the lower levels, there is a common tendency to nonetheless privilege the material level of explanation : we are “really” just gene-designed robots or physical systems, no matter how things might appear to us phe-

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nomenologically. There are some very good reasons for this privileging of lower levels of explanation. To begin with, the physicalist stance (i.e. the notion that everything which exists can be described in terms of its physical properties) has proven extremely productive, allowing such dramatic technological developments as supercomputers and pharmacological treatments for mental illnesses. Moreover, there is an a priori reason for giving precedence to the physical : the structure of the various upper levels of explanation emerges out of and depends upon the lower levels, so the lower levels are causally privileged in this way. Molecules form and behave in accordance with more basic principles that govern both inorganic and organic substances, which means that a hypothesis in molecular biology that violates well-established physical chemistry principles is wrong, or else gives reason for us to rethink our physical chemistry. It is equally the case, however, that as we move up the explanatory chain we witness the emergence of what appear to be new entities, which possess their own novel and unpredictable organizational principles. The field of organic chemistry is based upon principles that emerge at the level of organic molecules, and which cannot be fully predicted from the perspective of physical chemistry. Generalizations about the behavior of organic molecules also tend to be less precise, and more subject to ceteris paribus or qualifying clauses, than the principles of physical chemistry. Similarly, no amount of intimacy with quantum mechanical principles will allow one to predict the behavior of macro-level solid objects. Even within what are sometimes assumed to be single fields, such as biology, there exist multiple levels of explanation, with structures at the higher levels being in no clear way predictable from or simply reducible to the levels below, and causal predictive power moving in both directions of the vertically-integrated chain. This mutual dependence and interaction of levels of explanation is taken for granted in the natural sciences, and is in fact one of the guiding principles driving natural scientific inquiry. The argument behind consilience, of course, is that the various levels of explanation in the humanities need to be hooked into their proper place at the top of this causal explanatory chain.

4HELIMITSOFPHYSICALISMWHYWEWILLALWAYSBEHUMANISTS Such a vertically-integrated approach to the humanities would see human-level realities – free will, beauty, virtue, morality – as emergent properties of physical systems put together in sufficiently complex ways, rather than the result of the mysterious and inexplicable movements of a “ghost in the machine”. Many hard-core physicalists therefore argue that, since human-level concepts are helpful for certain heuristic purposes, but possess no underlying reality, the rigorous study of human affairs will eventually be able to dispense with them entirely. A common analogy drawn by those who feel dualism will soon go the way of bell bottoms and disco balls is the shift in human sensibilities that occurred with the Copernican revolution presented a view of the solar system that that contradicted not only Scriptural authority but the evidence of our senses : the Bible states quite clearly that the sun moves around the earth, and this also happens to accord with our everyday sensory experience. Yet the accumulation of empirical evidence eventually resulted in Copernicanism winning the day – trumping both religion and common sense – and nowadays every educated person takes the heliocentric solar system for granted.

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A basic problem with this position, however, is that there is a profound disanalogy between the Copernican revolution and the revolution represented by physicalist models of the mind. The Ptolemaic model of the solar system which places the earth at the centre of the universe, falls quite naturally out of the functioning of our built-in perceptual systems, but it is not itself part of that system : we do not appear to possess an innate Ptolemaic solar system module. Switching to Copernicanism, at least intellectually, requires us to suspend our common sense perceptions, but it does not involve a direct violation of any fundamental, innate human ideas. Physicalism as applied to mind does require such a violation, and this has a very important bearing on how realistic it is to think that we can dispense with mentalistic talk – that is, reference to “thoughts,” “desires” or “beliefs” as the causes of human behavior – once and for all. It has been argued that human beings are born dualists [Bloom 2004] : that is, we appear to inherently feel that there is something special about our own species, and that this specialness has to do with a kind of mental or spiritual substance completely distinct from the physical world and its laws. This appears to be an ancient human trait,16 although the extent to which it is species –specific is unclear. The inescapably felt reality of the mental / spiritual for human beings means that human-level concepts will always appear to have a special claim to reality for us.

4HEORYOFMIND OR WEAREROBOTSDESIGNEDNOTTOBELIEVETHATWEAREROBOTS The idea that human beings, like all other animals on the planet, are physical systems produced by a mindless, purposeless process of differential reproduction combined with natural selection fundamentally contradicts our conviction that human beings have souls. Of course, many modern western secular intellectuals might protest that they do not believe in a “soul,” but no cognitively intact person can get away from the powerful intuition that there is something special about people that makes them different from mere things. The precise characterization of what this special something might be differs slightly from person to person, but it usually centers around the possession of free will, as well as the dignity and responsibility that goes along with such autonomy. Although we are obviously capable of entertaining non-dualist ideas at some abstract level, we seem to have evolved in such as way as to be ultimately invulnerable to the idea of thoroughgoing physicalism. The cognitive module producing this fundamental intuition has come to be referred to by cognitive scientists as “theory of mind” (ToM), which governs our interactions with other people – causing us to “paint” mental properties onto what, when we take a step back, we can acknowledge is really just a sequence of physical states : pupils dilating, limbs moving, jaw and lip muscles contracting in a certain sequence. We cannot help but see 16

As Professor Bar-Yosef ’s contribution to this volume explains, archaic modern humans have been burying their dead for at least 92,000 years, and elaborate, ritualized burial is as good a litmus test as any of the presence of dualism. When an implement breaks, you throw it away, and the remains of living prey are disposed of as quickly and conveniently as possible. Special treatment of the human corpse indicates that a shift has occurred, and the human body is now being viewed as linked to something fundamentally distinct from objects.


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the physical movements of other human beings as being caused by the workings of a nonmaterial mind, full of desires, thoughts, beliefs, and fears. This theory of mind also seems to be somewhat overactive : we have a tendency to project these non-material mental qualities onto almost anything that moves in a particular kind of way : geometric shapes in a short animation or single dots moving around on a screen appear irresistibly to us to be involved in goal-directed, mentalistic behavior, and for this reason engage our sympathy. We all know this experience, having to deal daily with stubborn, diabolical computers bent on erasing our data or crotchety old cars that refuse to start. The anthropomorphic drive seems to be universal [Guthrie, 1993], and appears quite early in development [Bloom, 2004 ; Kelemen, 2004]. We are obviously capable of withdrawing our projections when we have to, but it takes cognitive effort, which suggests that it does not come naturally and is not easily sustainable. Unless we evolve into a different sort of creature, then, we will apparently continue to irresistibly see meaning in the world – populating it with “angry” seas, “welcoming” harbors, and other human beings as unique agents worthy of respect and dignity. We will continue to perceive our work, families, and lives as being “meaningful” at some inchoate level, and to be strongly motivated to make the appropriate changes whenever we begin to lose this sense. As scientists, we can acknowledge that this feeling is, in some sense, an illusion. For better or worse, though, in terms of our human perceptions, we are apparently designed to be irresistibly vulnerable to this illusion – in this respect, Appearance is Reality for us human beings. This is where, in fact, we see the limits of a thoroughly “scientific” approach to human culture, and need to finesse a bit our understanding of what counts as a “fact” for beings like us.

(UMANREALITYISREAL Humanists and natural scientists concerned with the issue of levels of explanation and emergent properties have much to learn from the work of the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor. Taylor is a humanist who has grappled with vertical integration and come away unimpressed, and he sees his work as a defense of humanism against the reductionist threat posed specifically by sociobiology, and more generally by the broader “naturalistic” bent of the modern world. We do not have to follow Taylor to his conclusion, which is essentially to reaffirm the dualistic gulf between the Geistes- and Naturwissenschaften, in order to feel the power of his basic position. His conception of human-level reality provides us with a nuanced, sophisticated model for understanding the place of the human in the great physicalist chain of causation. One of Taylor’s most important points is that human beings, by their very nature, can only operate within the context of a normative space defined by a framework of empirically unverifiable beliefs [Taylor, 1989]. The Enlightenment conceit that one can dispense with faith entirely, and make one’s way through life guided solely by the dictates of objective reason, is nothing more than that : a conceit, itself a type of faith in the power of a mysterious faculty, “reason,” to reveal incorrigible truth. In addition to the panoply of “weak evaluations” – such as a preference for chocolate over vanilla ice cream – that we are familiar with, humans are also inevitably moved to assert “strong” or normative evaluations. This latter type of evaluation is based on explicit or implicit ontological claims,

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and therefore is perceived as having objective force rather than being a merely subjective whim. For instance, I do not particularly like chocolate ice cream, and believe that the flavor of vanilla ice cream is superior. I do not, however, expect everyone to share my preference, and am certainly not moved to condemn my wife for preferring chocolate. I am also not inclined to sexually abuse small children, but this feels like a qualitatively different sort of thing : abusing small children is wrong, and I would condemn and be moved to punish anyone who acted in a manner that violated this feeling. If I were pressed on the matter, this condemnation would be framed, moreover, in terms of beliefs about the value of undamaged human personhood and the need to prevent suffering and safeguard innocence. All of the classic Enlightenment values that we continue to embrace as modern liberals – the belief in human rights, the valuation of freedom and creativity, the condemnation of inflicting suffering on innocents – are strong evaluations of this sort. Although the Enlightenment philosophes began disengaging these beliefs from their explicitly religious context, and we in the last century have more or less completed this process, this does not change their status as beliefs. The “self-evident truths” enshrined in such classic liberal documents as the Declaration of Independence of the United States and the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights are not revealed to us by the objective functioning of our a priori reason, but are rather items of faith. Taylor argues that metaphysically-grounded normative reactions such as these are inevitable for human beings. The fact that we cannot coherently account for our own or other’s behavior without making reference to them, as well as the fact that they irresistibly present themselves to us as objective despite our lack of proof for them, says something important about what it means for something to be “real” for human beings. To reformulate Taylor’s insights into a naturalistic framework, we can say, in terms of naturalist perceptions, that our overactive theory of mind causes us to inevitably project intentionality onto the world – to see our moral emotions and desires writ large in the cosmos. It would be empirically unjustified to take this projection as “real”. Nonetheless, the very inevitability of this projection means that, whatever we may assert as naturalists, we cannot escape from the lived reality of moral space. As neuroscientists, we might believe that the brain is a deterministic, physical system like everything else in the universe, and recognize that the weight of empirical evidence suggests that free will is a cognitive illusion [Wegner 2002]. Nonetheless, no cognitively undamaged human being can help acting like and at some level really feeling that he or she is free. Similarly, from the perspective of evolutionary psychology, I can believe that the love that I feel toward my child and my relatives is an emotion installed in me by my genes in accordance with Hamilton’s Rule. This does not, however, make my experience of the emotion, or my sense of its normative reality, any less real to me. Indeed, this is precisely what I would expect from the third-person perspective : the gene-level, ultimate causation wouldn’t work unless we were thoroughly sincere at the proximate level. The whole purpose of the evolution of social emotions is to make sure that these “false” feelings seem inescapably real to us, and this lived reality will never change unless we turn into completely different types of organisms. Completely extracting ourselves from moral space is as impossible as stopping our visual systems from processing information when we open our eyes, or our stomach from registering distress when our blood sugar level drops below a certain point. In this sense, then, human-level truth is inescapably “real”.


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4HEIMPORTANCEOFPHYSICALISM WHYITBOTHDOESANDDOESNOTMATTER To the extent that human-level reality will always have a hold on us, then, we are entitled to say that physicalism does not matter. This leads Taylor to conclude that the inevitability of human-level concepts is not merely a phenomenological observation, but rather a clue as to the “transcendental conditions” of “undamaged human personhood”, and thereby a refutation of any sort of third-person, naturalistic account of the humanities – and, by extension, of the project of consilience. If human reality is indeed real for us, why not follow Taylor and say that it is just as real as anything studied by the natural sciences ?

7HYPHYSICALISMDOESMATTER In short, because it is not the case. There is an important difference between literally believing that God created the world in seven days and thinking that this is a beautiful story that can mean something to us metaphorically, but must be put aside when we go about our daily work. Evolution is such a relatively new idea, and its message so fundamentally alien to us, that its real implications for our picture of human reality have yet to fully sink in, which is why most liberal intellectuals continue to believe that Darwinism does not seriously threaten traditional religious beliefs or conceptions of the self. It clearly does, however, and once we have begun down the physicalist path we cannot go back to the old certainties. This is not merely because it would be illogical to do so – although it would – but because we just seem to be built in such a way that we want to deal with and picture the world as it “really” is, no matter how unpleasant. This makes it impossible for us to continue to embrace, at least in precisely the same way, traditional religious ideals that appear to be in conflict with what we are convinced we now know about the world. And – at least as long as physicalism remains our current best explanation of the world – any religious or philosophical belief based on dualism is going to be in this sort of conflict. This is where the Copernican analogy is helpful. We quite happily live our everyday lives in a Ptolemaic solar system, seeing the sun rise and set and enjoying the felt stability of the earth under our feet. We are capable of acknowledging, though, that this appearance is an illusion, and that the earth is really racing through space at 108,000 kilometers per hour around the sun. Why does it matter what is “really” the case, if it makes no difference to the way we see things ? It matters because making important, practical decisions based on what is really the case, as opposed to what seems to be the case, works better. Launching satellites or sending off space probes simply would not work very well unless we suspended our intuitive Ptolemaic worldview when engaged in this sort of work. The same is true of human-level realities. The realization that the body-mind is an integrated, physical system is counter-intuitive, but treatments based upon this insight appear to be more effective than dualism-based treatments – pharmaceutical interventions, for instance, have arguably done more for the treatment of mental illness in a few decades than millennia of spiritual interventions, from exorcisms to Freudian analysis. Recognizing that there is no point at which the ghost enters the machine allows us to go ahead with stem cell research, and understanding that personhood is not an all-or-nothing affair helps us

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get a better grip on what is going on with severe dementia in the elderly. Physicalism matters because it simply works better than dualism, and – once the reality of this superiority is fully grasped – this pragmatic consideration is an irresistibly powerful argument for creatures like us.

$UALCONSCIOUSNESS How can physicalism both matter and not matter ? To take moral intuitions as an example, we need to see why it is important and revealing to ask about the adaptive forces that cause us to feel the force of moral claims rather than simply experiencing them as unquestioned truths. We also need to recognize, however, that, no matter what the origins of these intuitions, they are the spontaneous product of a very powerful, built-in faculty, the output of which seem inescapably right to us. This means that, as empirically responsible humanists, we need to pull off the trick of simultaneously seeing the world as scientist and as humanist, holding both perspectives in mind and employing each when appropriate. Thus requires cultivating a kind of dual consciousness, viewing human beings simultaneously under two descriptions : as physical systems and as persons. On the one hand, we are convinced that Darwinism is the best account we have for explaining the world around us, and therefore that human beings are physical systems and the idea that there is a “ghost in the machine” should be abandoned. On the other hand, cognitively intact humans apparently cannot help but feel the strong pull of human-level truth. When it comes to dual consciousness regarding physical and human levels of explanation, it appears that the human level will always be much more vivid and real to us – evolution would have done a poor job if it were otherwise. This means that taking the physicalist stance will require the same sort of effort and training that any counter-intuitive ability requires, and our ability to embrace physicalism in everyday life will always be somewhat limited. Francis Crick, at one point in his discussion of the “astonishing hypothesis” that the mind is nothing other than the brain, observes somewhat bemusedly : “I myself find it difficult at times to avoid the idea of a homunculus. One slips into it so easily” [Crick, 1994 : 258]. Crick was not alone. The interpretive space involving the perception of agency and consciousness, in ourselves as well as others, is a product of one of the most basic of human cognitive modules, and we will never escape its gravitational pull for long. One way to understand the kind of dual consciousness required by consilience is through the metaphor of “lending” employed by Immanuel Kant in a curious passage from the Groundwork, where he declares that we must “lend” the idea of freedom to rational beings : Now I assert that every being who cannot act except under the Idea of freedom is by this alone – from a practical point of view – really free ; that is to say, for him all the laws inseparably bound up with freedom are valid just as much as if his will could be pronounced free in itself on grounds valid for theoretical philosophy. And I maintain that to every rational being possessed of a will we must also lend (leihen) the Idea of freedom as the only one under which he can act. [Kant, 1785/1964 : 115-116] We know, in the physicalist sense, that we are not free, but in our everyday lives we cannot help acting as if we are free, lest we find ourselves exiled from the Kingdom of Ends – that is, no longer recognizable as undamaged human agents.


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%MBRACINGCONSILIENCE To conclude, then, we should not allow our distaste for physicalist explanations of the human to turn us into reactionaries. The subject of humanist inquiry is not the workings of some Cartesian Geist in the machine, but rather the wonderfully complex set of emergent realities that constitute the lived human world, in all its cultural and historical diversity. The realization of the thoroughly physical nature of this reality does not condemn us, however, to live forever after in an ugly world of things. For undamaged humans, other humans can never be a existentially grasped as mere things, and our promiscuous projection of teleology onto the world assures that we will continue to find the whole materialist universe a rather beautiful place once it is properly understood. Our innate cognitive mechanisms ensure that the modern scientific model of human beings as essentially very complicated things will not lead to nihilism or despair, nor ultimately detract from the felt beauty and nobility of human existence.

2EFERENCES Bloom, P. (2004) Descartes’ baby : How the Science of Child Development Explains what Makes us Human, Basic Books, New York. Crick, F. (1994) The Astonishing Hypothesis : The Scientific Search for the Soul, Simon & Schuster, New York. Guthrie, S. (1993) Faces in the clouds : A new theory of religion, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Kant, I. (1785/1964) Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals (trans. H. J. Paton), Harper Torchbooks, New York. Kelemen, D. (2004) “Are children intuitive theists ? Reasoning and purpose and design in nature”, Psychological Science 15, 295-301. Taylor, C. (1989) Sources of the Self : The Makings of Modern Identity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Tooby, J., Cosmides, L. (1992) “Psychological foundations of culture”, in Barkow, J., Cosmides, L., Tooby, J. (1992), The Adapted Mind, 19-136. Wegner, D. (2002) The Illusion of Conscious Will, MIT Press, Cambridge. Wilson, E. O. (1998) Consilience : The Unity of Knowledge, Knopf, New York.

"OUNDARIES"OUNDARIESBETWEEN $ISCIPLINESAND"OUNDARIESINTHE-IND by Ernest Hartmann

Boundaries are everywhere. Whether we consider the world outside, or the world inside our heads, we find regions, topics, or entities of some kind, and also boundaries between them. The regions, topics, and entities have been studied in detail, while the boundaries have generally been neglected. My collaborators and I believe that a study of boundaries in the broadest sense will be useful to us in numerous ways, as this paper will discuss. The boundaries are usually considered as simply imaginary lines.

#ANBOUNDARIESBESTUDIED I will demonstrate that boundaries can indeed be studied. In fact my collaborators and I have been studying them in detail, starting with boundaries within the mind. What makes boundaries amenable to study is the recognition that they are neither imaginary nor are they one-dimensional lines. Boundaries in the mind can be relatively thick or relatively thin. “Thick boundaries” means separation, keeping things in distinct compartments, making clear distinctions : black vs. white, good vs. evil, us vs. them. “Thin boundaries,” means easily crossable borders, merging or blending, shades of grey rather than black and white. The starting point of our studies of Boundaries in the Mind is an obvious one. No matter how we think of the content of our minds – whether we think in everyday terms of thoughts, feelings, memories ; in cognitive psychology terms of perceptual, semantic and memory processes (or “modules”) ; or in psychoanalytic terms of ego, id, superego, defenses, etc. – we are speaking of parts, regions or processes, which in some sense can be considered separate from one another, and yet which are obviously connected. The boundaries between them are clearly not absolute separations. The boundaries can be relatively thick or solid on the one hand, and relatively thin or permeable on the other hand.

Boundaries : Boundaries between Disciplines and Boundaries in the Mind

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Psychologists have explored many different aspects of boundaries including perceptual boundaries, boundaries related to thoughts and feelings, boundaries between states of awareness or consciousness, sleep-dream-wake boundaries, boundaries related to memory, body boundaries, interpersonal boundaries, boundaries related to sexual identity and other forms of identity, group boundaries, and boundaries in opinions and judgments (Table 1). All this is discussed in detail elsewhere [Hartmann, 1991 ; Hartmann, 2001]. Table 1 Types of Boundaries. Perceptual boundaries Between sensory inputs Sensory focus or “bandwidth” Around perceptual entities Boundaries related to thoughts and feelings Between two thoughts or two feelings Between thought and feeling Around thoughts and feelings (free association) Boundaries between states of awareness or states of consciousness Sleep-dream-wake boundaries Between sleep and waking Between dreaming and waking In and around the dream Daydreaming Boundaries related to play Boundaries related to memory Early memories Recent memories and memory organization Personal past Future plans Boundaries around oneself (body boundaries) Barriers against stimuli The skin as a boundary Posture and musculature as boundaries Personal space Interpersonal boundaries Boundaries between conscious and unconscious and between id, ego, and superego Defense mechanisms as boundaries Boundaries related to identity Sexual identity Age identity : Between adult and child Constancy of identity Group boundaries Boundaries in organizing one’s life Boundaries in environmental preferences Boundaries in opinion and judgments Boundaries in decision making and action

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0EOPLEWITHVERYTHICKORVERYTHINBOUNDARIES The concept of thick versus thin boundaries as a personality measure becomes most clear if we examine the many kinds of boundaries, as in Table 3.1, and consider extreme examples for clarity. A person who has very thick boundaries in all senses would be someone with a sharp sense of focus, who can easily concentrate on one thing while ignoring others. This person does not experience synesthesia (i.e. the neurological coupling of multiple bodily senses, such as for instance, the systematic association of particular sounds with particular colors. He or she keeps thoughts and feelings separate (“I don’t let my feelings get in the way of my thinking”), and is absolutely clear about when s/he is awake, or asleep or dreaming, experiencing no in-between states. This person has a clear sense of the separation of past, present, and future (“that was then, this is now”), a very definite sense of space around him / herself (“this is my space, this is yours”), and a clear, delineated sense of sexual identity (“I am a man, you are a woman, vive la difference”). The person will have a definite group identity (“this is my group, we do such and such ; other groups are totally different) and will tend to see the world in terms of black and white, us versus them, good versus evil. A person at the other extreme, a person with thin boundaries in all senses, may experience some synesthesia, will tend to let a lot of sensory material in at once, and may have difficulty focusing on one part of the input. This person will usually experience thoughts and feelings together (“I can’t imagine a thought without a feeling”), and will often experience states of being half-awake and half-asleep, or will become deeply immersed in daydreaming or in reverie, so that at times the boundary between real life and fantasy may be unclear. There will be less sense of clear body boundary and personal space. This person may be very aware of the past, and have it blend with the present (“I am grown-up, but in a lot of ways I’m still a child”). Similarly, this person will accept mixtures in sexual identity (“I am a man, but there’s a lot of feminine in me too”). He or she will not feel solidly a member of one group, but may be an individual taking part at times in many different groups, or perhaps a “citizen of the world”. In judgments or opinions about the world, this person will tend to think in terms of shades of grey, rather than black and white (“it all depends, s/he’s good in some ways and bad in others”, “it’s different at different times”, and so on). Here are two actual people from our files. Chuck is a businessman in his forties. His life is well-organized and well-regulated. He has a weekly schedule that guides him not only through his workweek but his weekends as well. He attends church and several community meetings regularly. He thinks in black and white terms, and keeps everything in airtight compartments. He believes that logical thought will solve any problems that come up in his life. Chuck can be emotional. He likes good food, he enjoys sex, he gets angry at times, but he definitely believes in keeping his emotions separate from his thinking. “My feelings just get in the way of making the right decision”. He and his wife seem to get along well. They never have fights. On the other hand they never seem very close or passionate. Their lives seem like two parallel lines that never touch. Chuck is a man with thick boundaries in just about all senses. Chuck and I sometimes discuss people who are very different from him. For instance, some women and men he knows seem to use their feelings all the time and do not to make clear distinctions the way he does. Though he agrees that such people may sometimes be interesting and creative, he is uncomfortable thinking about them. I ask him what image comes to mind. Chuck says, “If I were like that, I’d be a puddle on the floor”.


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Heather is nothing like Chuck. Unmarried, 35 years old, she plays the guitar, and she’s a composer. She’s creative and flexible in many different ways. She does not stick to a topic very well, and finds herself wandering off in all sorts of directions in her conversations. It’s hard for her to look something up in an encyclopedia, because other items nearby fascinate her, so she has to follow up on them as well. She sees the world in shades of grey : she notices gradations and appreciates many different points of view, so that it’s hard for her to make a clear-cut decision. Heather is unusually sensitive to sound and to bright lights. She’s also emotionally sensitive and easily hurt. She remembers crying inconsolably for weeks when a pet rabbit died. She and her boyfriend have a passionate, intense relationship. They’ve already broken up and reconciled three times in the one year they’ve been together. Heather is someone with thin boundaries and she mostly associates with others like herself. She considers her friends interesting, unfettered spirits. She also knows some people like Chuck. Of these, she says, “They’re all right in their place, but they’re kind of dull, rigid, unimaginative”.

-EASURINGBOUNDARIESTHEBOUNDARYQUESTIONNAIRE Chuck and Heather are extreme examples, lying at the two ends of the continuum running from very thick to very thin boundaries. We designed the Boundary Questionnaire (BQ) as a tool allowing us to quantify the thick-to-thin boundaries continuum. The BQ is a 138-item questionnaire (see Table 2) that has now been taken by at least ten thousand persons, and has been related to many other variables such as occupation, gender, and types of psychological problems that may occur [Hartmann, 2001]. Chuck scores very low (thick) and Heather scored very high on the BQ. Most of us are somewhere between the extremes, and some of us have a mixture of thin and thick boundaries. However there is a considerable statistical consistency in the Boundary Questionnaire, with high item-total and inter-item correlations. For instance people who give a high score to the item “At times I feel happy and sad at once”, and “I spend a lot of time daydreaming, fantasizing, or in reverie” are likely also to agree with “I believe many of the world’s problems could be solved if only people trusted each other more”, but are unlikely to endorse “Good fences make good neighbors” or “Each nation should be clear about its interests, its own boundaries, as well as the interest and boundaries of other nations”. In other words, the relationships are not random ; people who have thin boundaries in one sense are very likely to have thin boundaries in other senses as well. This has important implications for the ways people form bonds, and how they view broader societal, interdisciplinary or international relationships. For example, people with thick boundaries approach religion, science, and art in solid, black vs. white, thick boundaried ways. When they think about conflicts between nations, they think in terms of making a thick boundary peace. You build walls to separate the combatants, or if you can’t build walls, you make ironclad agreements defining who owns what, etc. A powerful legal document is more or less a wall. People with thick boundaries cannot imagine any different sort of peace. People with thin boundaries tend to think more in terms of thin boundary peace. Tear down the walls or at least move in that direction. Realize gradually that the enemy and we are not so different after all. Perhaps we can join

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Complexity and Knowledge Dialogue in Discussion Table 2 Boundary Questionnaire : Examples of Questions.

Category 1 : Sleep/Dream/Waking

Category 2 :

Category 3 :

Category 4 :

Category 5 :

Category 6 :

Category 7 :

Category 8 :

Category 9 :

Category 10 :

Category 11 :

Category 12 :

When I awake in the morning, I am not sure whether I am really awake for a few minutes. I spend a lot of time daydreaming, fantasizing, or in reverie. Unusual Experiences At times I have felt as if I were coming apart. I have had déjà vu experiences. Thoughts/Feelings/Moods Sometimes I don’t know whether I am thinking or feeling. I can easily imagine myself to be an animal or what it might be like to be an animal. Childhood/Adolescence/Adult I am very close to my childhood feelings. I have definite plans for my future. I can lay out pretty well what I expect year by year for the next few years. Interpersonal When I get involved with someone, we sometimes get too close. I am a very open person. Sensitivity I am very sensitive to other people’s feelings. I am unusually sensitive to loud noises and bright lights. Neat/Exact/Precise I keep my desk and work table neat and well organized. I am good at keeping accounts and keeping track of my money. Edges/Lines/Clothing I like heavy, solid clothing. I like stories that have a definite beginning, middle, and end. Opinions re Children, etc. Children and adults have a lot in common. They should give themselves a chance to be together without any strict roles. I think a good teacher must remain in part a child. Organizations In an organization, everyone should have a definite place and a specific role. A good relationship is one in which everything is clearly defined and spelled out. Peoples/Nations/Groups People of different nations are basically very much alike. There are no sharp dividing lines between normal people, people with problems, and people who are considered psychotic or crazy. Beauty/Truth Either you are telling the truth or you are lying ; that’s all there is to it. When I am in a new situation, I try to find out precisely what is going on and what the rules are as soon as possible.

or confederate in some way. Overall, people with very thick boundaries can be considered “black-and-white” people and those with thin boundaries “shades-of-grey” people. Aside from the BQ we also have preliminary data on biological / physiological measures of boundaries and these correlate well with the BQ. For instance, people who score thin on the BQ show changes in their skin temperature when they imagine they are holding an ice cube, or imagine they are sitting by a fire. Studies relating BQ scores to brain imaging studies have not yet been done.


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7HOHASTHICKORTHINBOUNDARIES Certain groups or professions may be characterized by unusually thick or thin boundaries. First, even though the items were very carefully written to have no intended gender bias, women consistently score slightly but significantly “thinner” (one half of a standard deviation) than men. There is also a slight age effect : older subjects score slightly thicker than younger subjects [Hartmann, 1991 ; Harrison, 2006], however no long-term studies have been done as yet to determine how boundaries develop and change over the years within a single person. Significantly thinner boundaries compared to control groups have been found in art students [Beal, 1989 ; Hartmann, 1991], music students, and mixed groups of creative persons [Beal, 1989], frequent dream recallers [Hartmann, 1991 ; Hartmann, et al., 1991], adults with nightmares [Hartmann, 1991 ; Levin et al., 1991 ; Galvin, 1993], adolescents with nightmares [Cowen and Levin, 1995], “lucid dreamers” [Galvin, 1993], male as well as female fashion models [Ryan, 2000], persons with unusual mystical experiences [Krippner, et al., 1998], and persons with a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder, Schizoid Personality Disorder or Schizotypal Personality Disorder [Hartmann, 1991]. Interestingly, although art students have much thinner boundaries than average, this is not true of established artists, who as a group have boundary scores in the normal range [Beal, 1989]. Groups that score significantly “thicker” than average on the BQ include naval officers, salespersons, lawyers, patients with a diagnosis of Obsessive-compulsive Personality Disorder, persons suffering from “alexythymia” that is, an inability to express emotions verbally [Hartmann, 1991], and patients (from two different sleep disorders centers) with a diagnosis of Sleep Apnea [Hartmann, 1992].

"OUNDARIESINRELATIONSHIPS I will discuss briefly how our “boundary style” – our thick or thin boundaries – affects many aspects of our lives. One of the most important boundaries in our lives is the boundary between others, and ourselves, especially “significant others” and ourselves. One could say without much exaggeration that every play and novel ever written deals with some aspect of these boundaries. I will outline here some of the major ways in which boundaries are involved in relationships, and how our internal boundaries affect our personal relationships. I will suggest that psychotherapy – where boundaries have been described and studied in great detail – can serve as a model for examining other more basic human relationships such as love and friendship. “We”, meaning you and I, or all of us, is a simple word but a very difficult notion, often slow to mature. No matter what our style of boundaries, it is an effort to balance a tenuous “we” with a previously established and sometimes overwhelming “I” and “you”. Especially when we have thick boundaries or are in a thick-boundary mode, it is much easier to think in terms of “I” and “You” roles. I’m an Easterner, you’re a Westerner. I command, you obey. I lead, you follow, etc. The idea of a more-or-less equal “we,” consisting of multiple interactions and interconnections is not always easy for us. It is especially difficult in traditional societies, and at times of threat or danger. It appears to be

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more difficult for men than for women. When there is less threat, the ideal “we” can slowly grow and develop. This applies to individuals, to groups and to nations. A relationship between two people depends to some extent on their individual boundary styles. Two people who each have thick boundaries, such as Chuck and his wife, and are comfortable with their boundaries, can sometimes form a satisfactory “thick boundary relationship”. Each of them does his or her thing, and they interact at times when they happen to have the same interests or want to do the same things together. This sort of relationship can work very well for some people. It can be a peaceful relationship, though from the outside it sometimes looks like two children in “parallel play”. However, life is seldom so simple. Even people who start off with thick boundaries sometimes find their boundaries thinning and shifting when they fall in love. Two people with very thin boundaries often have an intense but stormy relationship. They may feel wonderfully close, but sometimes too close. They may become almost merged. One may feel the other is invading or taking over. Each is likely to be sensitive and easily hurt. There are likely to be arguments or fights, slamming doors, multiple separations and reconciliations. A relationship between two people with very thin boundaries is often beautiful and powerful, and often does not last very long. In people with a mixture of boundaries, a relationship, too, will have mixtures of thin and thick boundaries. There will be times of thinning boundaries – perhaps a brief intense period of being totally in love, – and then periods of thicker boundaries and more distance. With people, as with nations, periods of threat or danger often lead to thickening of boundaries. A person who feels hurt or threatened tends to shift toward thinking more of his own needs, goals and preferences. Thus some relationships move between loving, “thinning” times and more standoffish thick boundary times. In times of threat or danger, it may be more difficult to develop a new “we”, but there is a tendency to strengthen or thicken the boundary around a “we” that is already well established. In a tight two- person relationship, we tend to think “us vs. the world”. If we have a strong family relationship, we think in terms of the family vs. the rest of the world. In dangerous times, we often thin or reduce the boundaries between those inside the “we”, and strengthen the boundary around us, separating us from the dangerous world. Ah, love let us be true To one another ! for the world, which seems To lie before us like a land of dreams, So various, so beautiful, so new, Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light, Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain ; And we are here as on a darkling plain, Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, Where ignorant armies clash by night. (Mathew Arnold : “Dover Beach”) Two people, each of whom has thin boundaries and feels vulnerable, sometimes form this kind of “thick-boundary” bond to protect them from the rest of the world.


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,OVE FRIENDSHIP PSYCHOTHERAPY Thinking in terms of boundaries can help us understand all relationships in a new way. I’ll start with a discussion of psychotherapy and then use that as a model to discuss our more important relationships known as friendship and love. Psychotherapy – by which I refer to psychoanalysis and to all the psychodynamic therapies derived from it – consists of allowing the client or patient to free associate, to talk of whatever comes to mind or whatever seems important. Gradually, with the help of the therapist, the individual sees connections, comes to understand her or his life better, and perhaps make changes so that life actually improves. This process involves a breaking down of barriers and defenses of many kinds. There is an increasing openness, allowing potentially dangerous feelings and thoughts into awareness. The process of therapy clearly includes a thinning of boundaries, and it can make the client or patient feel very vulnerable. Thick boundaries are necessary too. Openness and thinness inside are possible only if the surrounding framework is thick and solid. On a physical level therapy takes place in a quiet, isolated or soundproof room, so that there are literally “thick walls” around the therapy. Usually there is absolute privacy and confidentiality. This too is a thick boundary. Even more important, the framework of therapy involves definite black and white rules. It must be absolutely understood that the therapist is listening for the patient’s sake, and is not introducing his or her own issues. In order for the process to work, certain things are absolutely forbidden. There must be no sex with a patient, no borrowing or lending money, etc. I have described psychotherapy as “making connections in a safe place”. The safe place is not only a peaceful quiet room but also absolute trust about the framework and the rules mentioned above. This trust develops only gradually. It sometimes takes a long time to achieve, and is in itself a major part of therapy. As this trust, based on solid (thick) features, is gradually established, the more thin-boundary aspects of the therapeutic work can take place. Defenses and other rigid patterns can be broken down and examined, connections between the present and past can be made, feelings for the therapist emerge and can be related to past feelings. Without the thick boundary framework, the fragile process of therapy is easily destroyed. I suggest that the same model (thinning of boundaries within a thick-boundary frame) applies to friendship and to love. It may at first seem bizarre to start with an artificial and recently developed concept such as the psychotherapy relationship – something humans have managed to live without for millennia – and use it as a model for other more basic and more necessary relationships. However, it makes sense to me, precisely because therapy is in some ways simple, artificial and isolated and therefore has been examined carefully in ways that the more tumultuous and complex “outside” relationships cannot easily be examined. I believe that love and intense friendship can be perceived in terms of a gradual thinning of boundaries, along the lines of “opening up”, sharing ideas, exploring feelings etc. They work best if there are solid underlying, well-understood, rules guiding the relationship – a thick-boundary framework, understood by both persons. There is acceptable behavior, and non-acceptable behavior in every relationship. The rules usually work best if they are black and white – in other words “thick”. There are many sorts of rules in these “thick boundaries”. Privacy, trust, and safety summarize a great deal of what is important,

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just as in psychotherapy. Friends and lovers must be trustworthy and reliable in ways that make both of them feel safe. “I’ll always be there for you”. “I won’t tell anyone else what you’ve shared with me”. “I won’t sleep with anyone else”. “I’ll never hurt you intentionally, and if I hurt you unintentionally, you’ll tell me so we can work it out”. There are definite differences between psychotherapy on the one hand and love or friendship on the other, in that therapy is a one-way relationship or asymmetric relationship while the others are, in principle symmetric, two-way relationships. In therapy, maintaining the all-important thick boundaries is the therapist’s responsibility, not the patient’s. The therapist must keep communications private, the patient need not. The therapist must not scream at the patient or ask the patient for sex. The patient is free to do these things, and the therapist must answer, not by screaming back or having sex, but by helping the patient explore what’s going on. In friendship and love the two people have joint responsibility for maintaining the boundaries. This is not always easy. Some friendships and loves become too lopsided or one-way. But accepting this important difference, I believe that the model of thinning boundaries within a thick-boundary framework can be useful in looking at our friendships and loves (and incidentally, at the relationships between different academic disciplines). There are several sorts of love and friendship that don’t work out. If the thinning isn’t occurring, then the relationship isn’t progressing. “We’re not feeling any closer. This isn’t going anywhere”. If the thick framework isn’t there, the love or friendship can becomes chaotic. If one person breaks the rules of the framework, the other feels betrayed. If the thick framework is not the same for both, not understood in the same way by both, or not based on a mutual respect, that again can lead to problems. In many areas thick boundaries are valued (in government and business for instance), and thin boundaries often neglected. However, in close relationships, the opposite is often true. In love, in friendship, and in psychotherapy we can easily become enamored of the “thinning” – the openness, the freedom, the exploration – and neglect to check on the state of the walls.

)DENTITYTHEGROUP THETRIBE THENATIONWHOAM) Starting with the individual, one of the great questions we all struggle with is “Who am I ?” Each of us answers the question in different terms, and using a somewhat different vocabulary. We are all members of the species Homo sapiens, or if we are religious believers, all “children of God”. We are part of a group, or of many groups. We are also part of a family, maybe of an extended family grouping, part of an ethnic group or a race, or part of several. We are citizens of a town, a nation, a group of nations. We also have jobs, careers, and roles in our society. Which of these defines us, which of the groupings tells us “who we really are” ? The way we answer these questions has everything to do with our boundaries. Some are happy to think of themselves as having a number of different overlapping or shifting group identities. These people usually have relatively thin boundaries in other senses as well. Others develop a very thick boundary around their group identity (“This is my tribe !” “These are my people”, “This is our land”) and these are often people who have thick boundaries in other senses too. When one feels one’s own group is threatened,


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almost everyone tends to shift towards thicker group boundaries (see The Amoeba Principle, below.). This occurs even in those who have relatively thin boundaries in most areas. The more we feel surrounded by enemies, the more we think in terms of “my group” or “my tribe”. Such thick-boundary group solidarity can be useful at times of great external danger, but it can also become a danger itself. The recent history of Yugoslavia and of the Middle East illustrates this dramatically.

"OUNDARIESANDPHILOSOPHYTHELIFEOFTHEMIND Philosophy concerns itself with large issues such as the nature of the real, the good, the beautiful. What I will do here is to present briefly a few thoughts about aspects of philosophy where consideration of thick and thin boundaries may be useful. Classically the first major portion of philosophy is metaphysics, dealing with basic questions about being and knowing. Is there such a thing as ultimate reality ? Ultimate truth ? Can we know them ? In at least one sense a study of reality can be considered a boundary issue. We know from our studies that people with thick boundaries distinguish reality and non-reality very definitely. They know, or claim to know, exactly what is real and what is unreal. Individuals with thin boundaries tend to have a less definite or more flexible sense of reality. They may have in-between states somewhere between the real world and fantasy. They may claim the distinction between reality and dream, or reality and non-reality is fuzzy or not very important. They may discuss a variety of realities. Probably for all of us “real” and “not real” are most distinct when we are in a thick boundary mode of functioning (see below), perhaps working hard to solve a particular problem. For instance if we are astronomers plotting the trajectory of an asteroid that might hit the earth, we need to know exactly which signals on our screens are “real” and which are “unreal”. The distinctions are less necessary, and become less definite, when we are dreaming or daydreaming, at the “thin” end of the continuum. Thin boundaries come into play when we’ve done all we can in our realistic frame, and want to dream up something new. Perhaps at times of peace and prosperity – associated with thinner boundaries (see below) – we are open to more possibilities in our views of reality. Truth is another basic category of thought. Our sense of truth vs. falsehood is certainly influenced by boundaries. Someone with thick boundaries thinks in terms of absolute truth : something is true or it is false, that’s all there is to it. The thin-boundary view involves a more relative view of truth and falsehood. Something may be true in one sense, but not in another, or true for one person but not for another. Life is sticky and complicated ! Many other basic philosophical terms such as “the good” or “the beautiful” are similarly influenced by our boundaries. They can be considered in absolute, black-andwhite terms, or in a more relative manner. It may be worth looking at whole systems of philosophy in the light of boundaries. One might consider Aristotle, Kant, and the “neo-Aristoteleans” to be aiming at the ultimate “thick-boundary philosophy”. Everything can be carefully classified and categorized. Our advancing knowledge of any field leads to ever clearer and more definite categories. Kant spoke in great detail of the categories of our thought and experience. His view is that making distinctions and making categories is the essential quality of the human mind.

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Plato and his many followers take a more thin-boundary approach. There may be a belief in absolutes, but the absolutes are “up there” somewhere in the ideal world, and all we can do down here is to question our assumptions and our knowledge, become aware of how little we know with certainty, and thus slowly approach, but never reach, the ideals such as true reality, or true beauty. Another perhaps thin approach is taken by linguistic philosophers who try to show that all our knowledge and our categories are matters of language, or matters of definition, so that we do not know anything with certainty. Nietzsche stated that studying a man’s philosophy tells us far more about the philosopher than about the world. In other words our philosophical systems are part of our psychology, and we project onto the world our own styles, needs, and preferences. Our research on boundaries is in perfect agreement with this view. A person’s basic thick or thin boundary style influences the shape of his or her philosophy and the way he organizes his world.

4WOKINDSOFPEACETHICK BOUNDARYPEACEANDTHIN BOUNDARYPEACE There are two different almost opposite kinds of peace and two corresponding ways for nations to make peace. There is the “thick-boundary peace”, the paradigm and symbol of which is the wall. In the extreme case the two parties literally build a wall to separate their territories. This is the peace that China tried to achieve with its Great Wall. A “thick-boundary peace” need not include physical walls. The boundaries can be expressed in binding documents as well as in stone. A fundamental belief of thick-boundary peacemakers is that territory, rights and privileges must all be divided and spelled out with the utmost clarity. “These areas are ours, these areas are yours.” “We will have access to 50% of the water from this river, and 50% will be yours, etc.” This is reminiscent of divorce agreements or legal agreements between corporations, and indeed the parties that forge an agreement following a contentious legal divorce are making a “thick-boundary peace”. The guiding principle is that the more clearly the two sides spell out their territories, interests and concerns, the more solid the peace will be. Just as a wall must be carefully built if it is to endure, so must the legal agreement. In this view, every detail is important. Solid lines of demarcation are essential. The wall still looms in the background. Totally different is “thin-boundary peace”. In its ultimate form, there are no walls. Dividing lines may be present, but are of little importance. Agreements as to exactly who owns what are insignificant details. Legal documents may exist, but no one pays much attention. The essence of the “thin-boundary peace” is similarity rather than difference. There is a gradual realization that “we are not very different after all. Perhaps we do not need to be enemies ; perhaps we can tear down the walls and let the frontier guards do something more productive”. “Thin-boundary peace” involves the leveling of walls. It may involve unification, merger, possibly even embrace. Those working hard at building walls or forging agreements to institute a “thickboundary peace” generally consider what I call here a “thin-boundary peace” to be an unrealistic hope, a utopian ideal, totally unattainable in the real world. However this is far from the case. The peace that exists at present between the ancient enemies France and Germany can be considered a “thin-boundary peace”. Frontiers are still present, but they are permeable, easy to cross. They do not matter very much.


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“Thick-boundary peace” is often made by leaders who have thick boundaries themselves, in the psychological senses we have discussed. Conversely people with thin boundaries are more likely to envision or plan a “thin-boundary peace”. However government and business leaders – people in power, are seldom characterized by thin boundaries. The above sections summarize a few of the ways in which thick and thin boundaries can be important in our lives.

/URBOUNDARIESCANCHANGETHEWAKING TO DREAMINGCONTINUUM Though each of us may have a tendency towards thick or thin boundaries overall, our patterns are not totally fixed. To a certain extent our boundaries change, even in the course of an ordinary day. When we are involved in a focused waking activity, such as doing a math problem or chasing a fly ball in the outfield, we are functioning very much in a thick boundary mode. We want to be precise, we want to get things right, we do not want to be distracted. We need an exact answer to the math problem, nothing vague. We want to be precisely at the place where the ball is going to fall to earth so we can catch it. We need to carefully distinguish relevant information (signal) from irrelevant information (noise). When we are not engaged in such focused waking activity, we spend time in looser, less focused thought. When we close our eyes and let our minds drift, we indulge in reverie or daydreaming, and at night we dream. In these states we function in a thinner mode. There’s an entire continuum, from focused waking mental activity at one end, to daydreaming and eventually dreaming at the other end. In a focused waking activity, we resemble a person with basically thick boundaries. On the daydreaming and dreaming end of the continuum we function more like a person with basic thin boundaries. We engage in free association or loose association. We jump readily from one item of information to another, though the items are linked only very tenuously. We use the mechanism Freud labeled “condensation” – combining several items from memory into one image. For instance my dreams sometimes take place in a city that’s Boston, but also New York. In fact, people with very thick boundaries overall tend to spend much of their time in focused waking activity. And people with thin boundaries function at the daydreaming and dreaming end of the continuum more readily and more frequently. People with thin boundaries overall appear to be shifted towards the right end of the continuum, My colleagues and I have done a study of dreams and daydreams showing first of all that dreams are scored significantly more “dreamlike” and “bizarre” than daydreams. However, the daydreams of students with thin boundaries are scored (on a blind basis) just as “dreamlike” and just as “bizarre” as the dreams of students with thick boundaries [Kunzendorf, et al., 1997]. Thus we can consider the “state” continuum running from focused waking at one end, to dreaming at the other end, to be closely related to the “trait” continuum running from very thick boundaries to very thin boundaries [Hartmann, 2007 ; Hartmann and Kunzendorf, 2007]. Indeed there are a number of studies showing a high correlation between thinness of boundaries and amount of dream recall. People with thin boundaries recall more dreams than those with thick boundaries, and their dreams are also more dreamlike and dramatic, with more powerful imagery (summarized in [Hartmann and Kunzendorf 2007]).

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4HEAMOEBAPRINCIPLE ATTACKORSTRESSPRODUCESTHICKENINGOFBOUNDARIES Our boundaries also can change in more dramatic and important ways, especially when we feel threatened. We have called this the Amoeba Principle. The amoeba spreads out its pseudopods when undisturbed, but when touched or threatened it reacts by pulling together, and thickening its “skin”. Like the amoeba, an individual who is threatened or attacked “pulls himself together”. He becomes defensive. He develops thicker boundaries in many senses. Societies react in exactly the same way. When attacked, we not only fortify our literal borders, but we think increasingly in terms of “us vs. them”, “good vs. evil”, “black vs. white”. Our boundaries tend to thicken. When we are threatened, our laws become tougher ; mitigating circumstances are brushed aside ; we no longer think “Well, he’s guilty but he had such a difficult childhood”. We tend to think more in absolutes. There are already a number of experimental studies in this area, showing that when people are made to feel threatened, by being asked to consider their own mortality, their opinions and judgments change in a number of areas. The participants shift towards “sticking to their own kind”. They become more absolute in their judgments, and tougher in sentencing hypothetical lawbreakers (Summarized in [Pyszczynski, 2003]). In many ways they are developing thicker boundaries. The results are very much in agreement with the Amoeba Principle.

)MPLICATIONSBOUNDARIESINOURSELVESANDINTHEWORLD Studying boundaries, and learning to recognize our own boundaries does not lead to any immediate action. Rather boundaries give us a new way to look at the world. We become aware of new sides of our relationships and ourselves. We have seen how consistent people are in their boundary styles. People who keep thought and feeling separate and experience no half-asleep or other in-between states, are also usually those who have powerful tribal or group memberships, and those who think in terms of thick-boundary peace. All this often goes on without awareness. Once we notice our boundaries, we can change our actions or at least attempt to change them. Many people are able to make significant changes in their lives once they became aware of their boundaries. Many of us have appreciated only the organized, logical, focused thick-boundary parts of our minds, and neglected the broader, more emotionally-influenced parts of our minds that emerge in dreams and daydreams. It turns out that these thin-boundary aspects of ourselves can be useful in scientific and artistic creativity, and even in making major decisions about our lives [Hartmann 2001, Chs. 9 and 14]. Thin as well as thick boundaries are important. In our close relationships, some of us make the opposite error, valuing only the thin boundaries. Love, friendship and psychotherapy, as we have seen, have a lot in common. They all involve a thinning of boundaries, which works best within a thick-boundary framework. In love and friendship the thinning and merging have been appreciated, but the importance of the thick-boundary framework has often been unrecognized. Likewise it is important for us to appreciate the power of the Amoeba Principle. If we become aware of how our boundaries tend to change under threat, and usually thicken under threat, we can examine ourselves more rationally. This affords us more freedom to accept the changes in ourselves, or to discuss and question them.


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)TTAKESALLKINDS Examining large questions such as boundaries between nations and the differences between “thick-boundary peace” and “thin boundary peace” allows us to look at international relations and peace in new ways. It becomes clearer that we tend to project our inner boundary styles onto the world. People with thick boundaries tend to make thickboundary peace. In government and business, and in academia, the top positions are often filled by people (men, generally) with thick boundaries. Greater awareness of boundaries may allow these powerful people to become aware of other (thin-boundary) possibilities they have overlooked. Noticing and acknowledging the nature of their boundaries may sometimes induce them to seek advice from people with thinner boundaries. Boundaries obviously play a major role in how we organize our academic disciplines. Most often those in charge of institutions and educational programs will have relatively thick boundaries. They will tend to be Aristoteleans or Kantians, and emphasize the importance of making careful distinctions, and defining fields and disciplines precisely. They may be less interested in, or aware of, inter-disciplinary possibilities, and the importance of thin boundaries. Becoming more aware of boundaries in all the senses we have discussed can help these leaders to appreciate aspects of thin boundaries as well. Here also, it is important to be aware of the Amoeba Principle. In times of stress and danger, when we feel surrounded by enemies in one way or another, there will be a tendency to reaffirm solid black-and-white distinctions, in academia as elsewhere. At such times, crossing of boundaries, developing new vaguely defined fields or projects will be considered a luxury than cannot be afforded, or even a danger that could undermine our strength and cohesiveness. Interdisciplinary projects, and in general a crossing of boundaries, will be easier to initiate and will be more encouraged at times of peace and prosperity. I have outlined here three major themes relating to boundaries in our lives. The importance of our basic boundary style (thick and thin boundaries), the strong relationship between the thick-to-thin boundary continuum and the focused-waking-to-dreaming continuum, and finally the Amoeba Principle, the way boundaries change under threat. I believe that greater awareness of our boundaries and the forces that change them will make us more conscious of our world, and ourselves and more aware of the ways we impose our internal styles on the external world. More complete self-knowledge will eventually lead us to better action in the world. Knowledge of our boundaries is a part of the task set us by the oracle at Delphi : Gnowthi Seauton (Know thyself !).

2EFERENCES Beal, S. (1989) The Boundary Characteristics of Artists. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Boston University). Cowen, D. & Levin, R. (1995) “The use of the Hartmann Boundary Questionnaire with an adolescent population”, Dreaming 5, 105-114. Galvin, F. (1993) The Effect of Lucid Dream Training upon the Frequency & Severity of Nightmares. (Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Boston University). Harrison, R., Hartmann, E., Bevis, J. (2006) “The Boundary Questionnaire : Its preliminary Reliability and Validity”, Imagination, Cognition and Personality 25, 355-382. Hartmann, E. (1991) Boundaries in the Mind. A New Psychology of Personality, Basic Books, New York.

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Hartmann, E. (1992) “Boundaries in the Mind. Boundary structure related to sleep and sleep disorders”, Sleep Research 21, 126. Hartmann, E. (2007) “The Nature and Functions of Dreaming”, in Barrett D. and McNamara P. (Eds) : The Science of Dreams, Praeger, Westport. Vol, III, 171-192. Hartmann, E., Elkin, R., Garg, M. (1991) “Personality and Dreaming. The Dreams of People with Very Thick or Very Thin Boundaries”, Dreaming 1, 311-324. Hartmann, E., Harrison, R., Zborowski, M. (2001) “Boundaries in the Mind : Past Research and Future Directions”, North American Journal of Pyschology 3, 347-368. Hartmann, E., Kunzendorf, R. (2007) “Boundaries and Dreams”, Imagination, Cognition and Personality 26, 101-115. Krippner, S., Wickramasekera, I., Wickramasekera, J., Winstead, C. (1998) “The Ramtha phenomenon : psychological, phenomenological, & geomagnetic data”, The Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research 92, 1-24. Kunzendorf, R., Hartmann, E., Cohen, R., Culter, J. (1997) “Bizarreness of the Dreams and Daydreams Reported by Individuals with Thin and Thick Boundaries”, Dreaming 7, 265-271. Levin, R., Galen, J., Zywiak, B. (1991) “Nightmares, Boundaries, and Creativity”, Dreaming 1, 63-74. Pysxczynski, T., Solomon, S., Greengerg, J. (2003) In the wake of 9/11 : The Psychology of Terror, American Psychological Association Press, Washington. Ryan, C. (2000) Personality of Fashion Models. (Unpublished master’s thesis, Saybrook Graduate School, San Francisco).

!N)MMUNOLOGIST´S6IEWON %STABLISHMENTOFA+NOWLEDGE$IALOGUE by Daniela Finke

Research in Immunology has developed rapidly, and as a consequence of the increasing amount of discoveries in biomedical sciences, many sub-disciplines in immunology have been founded. In order to understand the complex nature of biological systems, immunologists need both profound knowledge and dialogue with other disciplines. In this article, the question is addressed as to how such a dialogue between immunologists and representatives of other disciplines can be achieved. The origin of scientific reasoning and inspiration is assessed. Three different approaches of dialogue as well as its framework requirements are discussed : (i) problem-based research, (ii) analogous research, and (iii) evaluation of research. Finally, perspectives and pitfalls of a transdisciplinary dialogue in the academy are reviewed. Overall, this discussion aims to foster dialogue and debate on the opportunities of crossing scientific boundaries.

'ROUNDSFORSCIENTI½CREASONING In the Hellenic world, philosophy and science were inseparably combined in one individual person. The origin of philosophy has been called “wonder” (thaumazein) by Plato in Theaetetus, and Aristoteles follows this assertion in Metaphysics. Influenced by a humanistic education, my movement to fundamental research was driven by astonishment and curiosity in human nature. Without wondering, we would not mount an experimentally testable hypothesis. Karl Popper suggests in his book the logic of scientific discovery, that every scientific theory consists of an irrational act of creativity (induction) followed by rigorous logical consequences (deduction) and testing of the initial hypothesis [Popper, 1959]. To achieve this, immunologists use objective instruments and parameters, by which immunological networks can be monitored. The enormous progress in technological development in biomedicine in the last 40 years has permitted testing of biological

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assumptions that could not be experimentally tested before. Therefore, scientific knowledge is restricted by the available tools in experimental research. “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”. In other terms, our current accuracy of measurement does not necessarily imply that our measurement is sufficient to recognize all biological processes in a living organism. This thought reminds me of Plato’s allegory of the cave, which describes prisoners in a cave sitting with their back to the entrance of the cave. Looking at the wall they see merely shadows of images that they believe to be reality. My own research specialization evolved from a long-standing interest in communication. When, during the course of my medical education, I entered the field of immunology, I began to reflect on how information about infections or chronic diseases was communicated within our body. All living creatures including humans, animals, plants and even microorganisms need defense strategies to survive. The immune system is such a defense system that is specialized to respond to various stimuli such as bacteria and viruses. In vertebrates it has evolved from simple innate defense strategies to a complex system of organs, circulating cells and proteins, which are able to protect the host from infections. Under certain circumstances, however, the immune system is no longer able to discriminate between “self ” and “non-self ”. This inability has fatal consequences for the body, and a chronic autoimmune disease (e.g. diabetes mellitus type I, rheumatoid arthritis, multiple sclerosis) can develop, wherein cells and organs of the body become targets for the immune system to attack. After completing my University studies, I moved into basic research, although MD PhD programs were not yet founded in Germany. I started the equivalent of an MD-PhD thesis in Wuerzburg, Germany, in the group of an eminent virologist, Prof. V. ter Meulen. As a participant of the Graduiertenkolleg “Infectiology”, initiated by Prof. J. Heesemann, I profited from the exposure to topics outside my research field. During the study period, a lab rotation had to be done in research groups belonging to the faculty of biology. T.M. was a most influential and charismatic teacher. He organized workshops, where, after a long day of scientific presentations, we all sat together until early in the morning to discuss topics in science, culture, history, philosophy, politics and community. Later, in the laboratory of Hans Acha-Orbea, a recipient of the Josef Steiner Young Investigator Award in cancer research, I was confronted with challenging ideas of how virus-infected cells inform the immune system that the host is infected. During evolution viruses have developed strategies to circumvent the cross talk of the immune system ; by inhibiting transmission of the “danger-signal” their presence provokes they are able to escape an anti-viral immune response. Hans Acha-Orbea liked to explain the concept of virus-host interactions by adopting interchangeably, either the perspective of the virus or the host. This turned out to be an advantageous approach that fostered his creativity and led him to a number of important discoveries. When I wanted to join the laboratory of Jean-Pierre Kraehenbuhl, one of the leading scientists in intestinal immunity and a very talented musician, he imposed one condition : to practice Cello that I had barely touched for several years. Jean-Pierre, who was passionate about controversial ideas and discussions, allowed me to develop my own projects and create the fundament of my later research direction, which is focused on the development of the immune system. Intercommunication between various cell subsets is required for the development of the immune system. This activity of cells, which organize their environment, is a general concept in organ development and pattern formation (Fig. 1a). The term “organizer” was

An Immunologist’s View on Establishment of a Knowledge Dialogue

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introduced by Hans Spemann and Hilde Mangold in 1926, when they discovered that a transplanted dorsal piece of the amphibian embryo can induce a twin embryo in a recipient amphibian embryo. We and others have identified analogous organizer mechanisms in developing lymphoid organs (for review see [Finke and Meier, 2006]). The similar rules found in organ development of different species, influenced my reasoning.

Fig. 1 Organ formation and survival of immune cells as well as cancer cells require a crosstalk between different subsets of cells. During organ formation (a), an organizer cell initiates pattern formation through inducing a positive signal and lateral inhibitory signals. The immune cells (b) and cancer cells (c) need stromal cells for their recruitment, growth and survival.

Although a huge body of experimental data has helped to unravel some of the mysteries of the immune system, there are many paradoxes, which are not fully understood. One paradox emerges from studying the immune system during pregnancy. The immune system of a pregnant woman should normally attack any foreign tissue, and her developing embryo is just that, since it expresses proteins encoded by genes from parental chromosomes [Moffet and Loke, 2006]. The theory of tolerance of the mother to her embryo was formulated by P. B. Medawar, Nobel Prize winner for Medicine / Physiology (1960). To this day, many questions regarding the mechanism of tolerance during pregnancy remain open and probably will not be fully resolved in my time. However, a mind open to challenging ideas and a continuous willingness to learn is one of the essential prerequisites for successful progress in immunological research. Challenging ideas frequently emerge when a research topic is located at the boundary of two or more disciplines. Trained as an MD and working as a biologist, I profit from the medical background in pursuing fundamental research. A hybrid between clinicians and researchers, as I am, can bridge the two, since research interests are often linked to a clinical context. In the course of my career, I have encountered a number of clinicians and scientists sharing common interest in biomedicine, and a good number who found the other party inferior and not worthy of exchanging opinions and knowledge. Imagination and creativity are essential for developing new ideas and finding problem-oriented solutions beyond known concepts in immunology. Many scientists foster their creativity by additional activities in visual arts and music. From Pythagoras onwards, science and music have been intertwined. In making music, taking a deliberate brake in exercising can improve the quality of the sound one produces. One explanation is that the

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musician steps back from single phrases to a comprehensive understanding of the entire composition. If I approach too close to a computer screen, I can see single pixels but will lose the view of the whole picture. Likewise, our cognition in immunological research needs not only a profound knowledge of our own field but also a perspective of distance and an open mind to new ideas and experiences in un-related fields.

)NTERDISCIPLINARYRESEARCH The origin of diseases of the immune system is often complex and comprises genetic and environmental determinants as well as mental and social factors. Therefore, more than one discipline is involved in solving problems in immune health care and research. An interdisciplinary venture relies on the expertise of several professions and is characterized by a collective approach in finding solutions for one complex problem. In my opinion, the field of immunological research would benefit from an interdisciplinary problem-based approach. An approach, where several disciplines try to answer questions by using analogous concepts, is more risky, but may lead to fundamental discoveries and changes of paradigms. The critical evaluation of natural sciences by social sciences and humanities is an interdisciplinary approach, which is already established at most Universities. At the same time, it is probably the most debatable and conflict-ridden approach.

0ROBLEM BASEDRESEARCH Problem-based research projects integrate disciplines, which use paradigms and tools that are not necessarily applicable to the others. One possible example of problem-based research is diabetes mellitus type I, an autoimmune disease that emerges mostly during puberty. Every year, more than sixty five thousand people are diagnosed worldwide with this disease, in which the immune system is no longer able to discriminate between “self ” and “non-self ”. As a result, cells of the immune system “auto-react” and destroy the insulinproducing cells. Insulin is a hormone that helps the body to use glucose for fuel. Without insulin, blood-glucose levels become elevated. The origin of the disease is multi-factorial and still not fully understood. To remain as healthy as possible, patients are dependent on cost-intensive daily injections of insulin. Despite this, they have a reduction in the quality of life and life expectancy. Networking collaborations between immunologists, microbiologists and endocrinologists help to identify the origins of the disease and provide new strategies for prevention and therapy. In addition, the collection of biomedical data and the use of bioinformatics and mathematics should allow both modeling of tolerance pathways and predictions about the role of the immune system in diseases. Social sciences help to clarify if the onset of the disease is correlated with mental factors, and how social parameters may influence the prognosis of the disease. Research in transplantation surgery advances the therapeutic use of transplanting insulin-producing cells. New achievements in engineering science allow the development of easy-handling insulin pumps and automatic blood glucose measurement. Finally, economical analysis provides information about the health care costs. In order to achieve problem-oriented initiatives, framework research programs have to be installed where opinions are exchanged and questions and requirements can be formulated together.


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A second example for problem-oriented research in immunology is studying “immunological stress”. The function of the immune system is influenced by many factors including genetics, age, gender, alimentation, hygiene, and mental stress as well as social and economic pressure. Other factors need to be explored. For example, does religiousness have an influence on the immune status ? In an interdisciplinary framework, representatives of genetics, immunology, neurobiology, social sciences, philosophy and theology could try to define a paradigm of “immunological stress”. The objective could be to proceed in this issue from a conceptual assumption to an objective analysis. Both examples illustrate that knowledge of different disciplines can be complementary used and may help to identify new, problem-oriented solutions. One principal requirement for a problem-based research approach is to have a platform for learning everyone’s terminology, for communicating results and for establishing a collective commitment towards therapeutic strategies. Understanding the complexity of the immune system requires a profound knowledge of biology and chemistry. Similarly, a chemist who wants to unravel the complex interactions of molecular components of organic and inorganic matter has to enter the domain of physics and mathematics. There has been an explosion in scientific knowledge over the last century and as a consequence, life sciences have become divided into various highly specialized research domains. Immunology itself has become subdivided into various sub-specialties to the extent that one individual immunologist would probably feel lost in a conference devoted to a distant immunological field. Research specialization is to some extent contradictory to the complexity of biological systems. For example, understanding the pathogenesis of a viral infection is impossible, if the analysis of virus-host interactions is reduced to one gene that is involved in the viral life cycle and pathogenesis. Virus-host interactions are complex systems, which encompass multiple components, from molecular interactions to cellular crosstalk amongst various cells of the immune system. The function of the immune system may be better understood through an integrated approach of understanding immunological networks. From the general systems theory formulated by von Bertalanffy [von Bertalanffy, 1969], immune systems biology has evolved as a tool to map biological functions and pathways in a single assay, and to monitor collective behaviors of many molecules simultaneously [Sette, 2003 ; Brusic, 2003]. Bioinformatics and computer-based re-modeling provide valuable tools to immunologists to make predictions in terms of our basic understanding of the immune system and in terms of disease prognosis / therapy. Altogether, a problem-based scientific approach integrating both theoretical models and databases, experimental validation and epistemological processes of various disciplines will aid the combat of immunological disorders.

!NALOGOUSRESEARCH Human cognition benefits from the knowledge of analogous approaches across various disciplines. In the mid 20th century, a young man named Georg von Békésy decided to study the function of the ear as compared to a telephone. His job was to develop a method to test telephone lines. After work he did his own studies on how sound is communicated in the inner ear. For his fundamental discoveries he was awarded with the Nobel Prize for Medicine / Physiology in 1961. Yuri Lazebnik from the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratories described an experimental approach in biochemistry by applying it to a problem in engineering. He compared “a radio function to a signal transduction pathway in that both con-

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vert a signal from one form into another” [Lazebnik, 2002]. If one essential component of a radio is removed, it will not work any more. Similarly, gene deletion can lead to a severe dysfunction of the immune system. All biological systems function through a network of various signals on a molecular and cellular level. The function of the immune system is based on a continuous crosstalk between cells of the immune system and the environment. The concept of immunological communication bears a striking analogy to the concept of hosttumor interactions. Similar to cells of the immune system (Fig. 1b), tumor cells interact with environmental cells (named “stromal cells”), which produce factors necessary for the survival of tumor cells (Fig. 1c). In analogy to the immune system, tumor cells can induce their surrounding environment to produce the appropriate growth and survival factors. Little is known about analogous paradigms of communication in humanities or social sciences. There is, however, evidence for a common path of communication irrespective of whether radio transmitter, or cells in plants, animals and humans are compared. Messages from a transponder are translated into signals. A receiver responds to these signals only if amplifiers or repetitive signals lead to stimulation, which is above threshold levels. Similarly, immune cells only get activated if an activation signal is above threshold levels. We may learn more about the mechanism of communication if we gain insights into analogous models of other disciplines. A scientific approach that integrates developmental immunology and other disciplines could be to study how networks develop. During embryogenesis the immune system develops its various branches of defense by generating a network of cells and soluble factors. If the balance between these components is disturbed, a severe disease can develop. Autoimmune diseases, immunodeficiency diseases and allergies are examples of such a disturbed equilibration of the immune system. The general rules for developing a complex network are largely unknown. Networks form also in other domains, for example in a community, a city or a state. If networking in a community does not function, the community breaks apart. What are the criteria that control the growth and coherence of a network ? Furthermore, which factors restrict the size of such a network ? Social science, philosophy, mathematics and engineering could each be integrated in this project. There is a strong demand for education to provide information about concepts before learning detailed information. Many students in immunological courses do not see the wood for the trees, because they are overrun by information and data that apparently have no relationship to each other. As a consequence, they fail to recognize the interplay between relatively simple and logical concepts of the immune system such as the principle of selection, recognition, maturation, threat and death. Comparing data amongst natural sciences, social sciences and humanities may improve our knowledge and facilitate the learning of analogous concepts in human nature.

%VALUATIONOFRESEARCH The objectives of an immunologist are based on the motivation to explore something that he / she does not understand. Why do all the components of the immune system exist and how do they work ? What is behind the curtain ? A variety of parameters influence our reasoning such as social, economic, cultural and historical factors. Holism, reductionism and vitalism were mainstream concepts amongst natural scientists of the 19th century. Even Louis Pasteur concluded from experiments related to fermentation that life is to some


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extent self-determining and cannot be explained by the laws of chemistry [Bechtel and Richardson, 1998]. The doctrine of vitalism was later disproved. Experiments in the 1980’s led to the conclusion that our body generates “suppressor cells”, which can actively inhibit an immune response. This doctrine was rebutted 10 years later, since the hypothesis on how these cells were generated turned out to be wrong. Today, the existence of cells named “regulatory T cells” with a suppressive phenotype is broadly accepted and we know that regulatory T cell biology is more complex than previously thought. Altogether, although we use objective measures, immunological research is not itself objective and scientific conclusions are inevitably coupled to a subjective outlook and the fads of the respective epoch. Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker describes this as a subjective biology that is made by subjects and restricted by all conditions of subjectivity (der Garten des Menschlichen, II, 2). A subjective outlook can lead to false interpretations. Peer reviewing by external experts in the field may minimize the risk of false interpretations before data are published. On the other hand, knowledge embedded in personal experiences and intuition may help to discover new immunological pathways that are contradictory to a conventional dogma. In this case, it can be difficult to convince a reviewer of the significance of a study, albeit based on solid and reliable data. The dialogue with social sciences and philosophy may help to critically review scientific hypotheses and conclusions in the context of individual outlook, society and history. Such a critical evaluation is not always acceptable to natural scientists. In addition, it may be difficult to determine the influence of these parameters upon the accuracy of research. Therefore, the goals and consequences of evaluating natural sciences by social sciences and philosophy have to be studied and precisely defined. Critical evaluation of experiments has become an important component of ethics in biomedicine. Immunological experimentations with recombinant organisms, animal models or specimens of human origin must pass a critical in-depth evaluation by a bioethical committee consisting of experts and individuals from unrelated fields. The final goal is to commission biomedical research to the service of humanity and human health.

#HANCESANDPITFALLSINTHEACADEMICCOMMUNITY In order to implement an inter- and transdisciplinary dialogue at the academic and institutional level, the objectives and methods for its achievement have to be explored. To this end, common themes first have to be identified and discussed amongst various disciplines. Transdisciplinary thinking was shown to be achievable through multidisciplinary problem-solving [Lambert 2005]. Problem-based learning is part of the reformed curriculum at the medical faculties in Switzerland. Therefore, a problem-based dialogue between researchers, lecturers and practitioners would be a first step towards testing the feasibility of incorporating transdisciplinary projects at the University. To foster cross-disciplinary understanding, the jargon has to be comprehensible. Therefore, participants have to familiarize themselves with the vocabulary of the other disciplines. Finally, the opinions of all participants have to be integrated in a new framework of reflections that concern all participants. In summary, a training of all participants is required to learn how to cross disciplinary boundaries before starting a collaboration. Publishing and obtaining funding are highly competitive in immunology as well as in other life science areas. In order to survive the competition, a researcher has to develop

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a profound expertise in his domain of research, and performance is measured by first or last-author publications in leading journals. Crossing boundaries and exploring unknown research fields may result in loss of productivity as measured by the standard performance criteria. Initiation of multi-and transdisciplinary projects therefore carries the risk of sacrificing a specialized research project to the pursuit of something more superficial. An interdisciplinary dialogue is an unproven venture demanding long-term investment. There is no obvious proximate advantage of an interdisciplinary engagement for the specialist career in immunology, and interdisciplinary initiatives are often spare time jobs. In addition, sharing scientific ideas requires absolute trust in the confidentiality of all collaborators. Having expertise in a research domain is often linked with the acquisition of scientific authority, academic or political influence and gain of financial support. Many scientists (some more than others) tend towards defending their specific domain because of the risk to lose these elements (Fig. 2). This is a major problem not only within the health care system but also amongst fundamental researchers, translational researchers and practitioners. A scientist in the field of immunology is recognized for publications in international journals in terms of number and impact factor. Currently, the impact factor of interdisciplinary journals is relatively low, something that may dissuade someone from investing in a multidisciplinary approach if he or she is ambitious for peer recognition and academic promotion. An interdisciplinary dialogue is time – and energy – consuming and can create conflicts. Prejudices, senses of being inferior or superior and misunderstandings are likely to emerge from an interdisciplinary approach. Therefore, a successful dialogue overall

Fig. 2 Science world. Some prefer to make a little firework in their own garden rather than to collaborate on launching a rocket with an important payload (source : drawn by D. Finke).


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depends on identifying those scientists who are motivated to undertake this venture and to invest in an inter- and transdisciplinary dialogue alongside their specific career progress, and last but not least before their retirement. In order to achieve the objective of a collaborative project amongst various faculties, new funds have to be raised. Beside European grants and international networking programs, the Swiss National Science Foundation has recently started a new program to promote interdisciplinary projects (HTTPWWWSNFCH%CURRENT$OSSIERS3EITENINTERDIS CIPLINARYASPX). In addition, Universities could contribute to multi-and transdisciplinary initiatives by awarding additional grants and fellowships, and by supporting transdisciplinarity in education. In Switzerland, strong efforts are currently under way to support transdisciplinary research as well as interdisciplinary education.

#ONCLUSIONS A dialogue between immunologists and scientists of other disciplines requires the individual participants to have detailed expertise together with the willingness to explore an unknown field. At the moment, an interdisciplinary approach is still an exploratory venture, which has no guarantee for success nor immediately contributes to an individual scientific career. However, there is a strong need for exchanging knowledge amongst highly specialized research fields in human health care. A problem-oriented initiative is a promising approach, which may challenge current concepts in immunology and lead to new solutions. The creation of a platform, where practitioners, lecturers and scientists can meet to learn each other’s language and to identify collective questions is a fundamental requirement before starting interdisciplinary research projects.

2EFERENCES Aristoteles, Metaphysics 2.982b12-13. Bechtel, W., Richardson, R.C., (1998) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge, London. Brusic, V. (2003) “From immunoinformatics to immunomics”, J. Bioinform. Comput. Biol. 1, 179-181. Finke, D., Meier, D. (2006) “Molecular networks orchestrating GALT development”, Current Topics in Microbiology and Immunology 308, 19-57. Lambert, R.D., Monnier-Barbarino, P. (2005) “Transdisciplinary training in reproductive health through online multidisciplinary problem-solving : a proof of concept”, European Journal of obstetrics & gynecology and reproductive biology 123, 82-86. Lazebnik Y. (2002) “Can a biologist fix a radio ? – Or, what I learned while studying apoptosis”, Cancer Cell 2, 179-182. Moffet, A. and Loke, C. (2006) “Immunology of placentation in eutherian mammals”. Nat. Rev. Immunol. 6, 584-594. Plato, Theaetetus 155d3. Popper, K. (1959) The Logic of the Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London. Sette, A., Fleri, W., Peters, B., Sathiamurthy, M., Bui, P. O. (2005) “A roadmap for the immunopics of category A-C pathogens”, Immunity 22, 155-161. Von Bertalanffy, L. (1969) General System Theory, Revised Ed., George Braziller, New York. Von Weizsäcker, C. F. (1983) Der Garten des Menschlichen, II, 2, Fischer Taschenbuchverlag GmbH (Ed.), Frankfurt am Main.

4OWARDSA.ONMODERN.ONHUMANISM by Mark M. Freed

This paper sketches a genealogy of thinking about the integration of the sciences and humanities in order to raise some questions about what a methodology of crossed views might look like. The three theorists discussed (Jürgen Habermas, Jean-François Lyotard, and Bruno Latour) offer critical accounts of Modernity, which alert us to important considerations in carrying out such an integration. Habermas argues that Modernity has meant the imposition of “instrumental reason”, originally associated with the natural sciences, as the dominant paradigm of knowledge and the consequent marginalization of moral and aesthetic reason. He insists that the antidote to the domination occasioned by instrumental reason entails putting all three modes of rationality back in communication with one another. Jean-François Lyotard is equally suspicious that some versions of rationality have displaced others, but remains skeptical that the kind of reunification Habermas has in mind will result in any real synthesis, insisting that such attempts at integration will necessarily eliminate voices from the conversation. Bruno Latour contends that the division of the natural sciences and the humanities is itself a consequence of the intellectual constitution of Modernity, which can only be rectified by abandoning the sharp ontological distinction between humans and nonhumans. While these observations do not add up to a single methodology of crossed views, they do point to considerations that ought to be factored into attempts to reconfigure the relations between the sciences and the humanities.

7HATSHOULDAMETHODOLOGYOFCROSSEDVIEWSLOOKLIKE The World Knowledge Dialogue has set itself the goal of facilitating greater communication between the sciences and the humanities under the motto “Towards a Modern Humanism”, and it has given the participants of the first symposium the task of beginning

Towards a Nonmodern Nonhumanism

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to conceive of that integration in the form of a “methodology of crossed views”. It has to be said that such integration has not always been anticipated as an unconditional good. My intent in this essay is to sketch a genealogy of suspicion toward such a project in order to raise some questions about what such a “methodology of crossed views” might look like. While these engagements with the relation of the sciences and the humanities do not add up to a single methodology of crossed views, they do point to important considerations that will need to be addressed. The genealogy I have in mind can be punctuated by three figures : Jürgen Habermas, Jean-François Lyotard, and Bruno Latour. All three offer critical accounts of the cultural phenomenon known as “Modernity”. It is in the early Modern period – roughly the beginning of the seventeenth century – that both the “modern” natural sciences and the humanism that undergirds the humanities / human sciences begin to emerge, and I want to suggest, first, that it is within the historical trajectory of Modernity that we ought to begin considering the benefits and liabilities of linking the natural / human sciences with the humanities.17

-ODERNITY The term Modernity is used within the field of cultural theory / history to designate a state of social organization characterized above all by a specific way of handling questions of meaning and value. According to Jürgen Habermas, Modernity’s distinctive engagement with such questions is a direct function of its self-conscious relation to the past. Thus, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity Habermas begins characterizing Modernity with reference to its consciousness of time : it is, he insists, grounded on a sense of rupture occasioned by the discovery of the New World, the Renaissance, and the Reformation, “three monumental events around the year 1500 [which] constituted the epochal threshold between modern times and the middle ages” [Habermas, 1987 : 5]. Breaking from the past, Modernity sets itself the task of deriving its own criteria for what is true, good, and beautiful : “Modernity can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which it takes its orientation from the models supplied by another epoch ; it has to create its normativity out of itself” [Habermas, 1987 : 7]. This requirement for self-generated criteria was satisfied, 17

A first question needing clarification is what, exactly, is to be integrated with what? While the general meaning of the term “natural sciences” is relatively clear, what is being referred to by the labels “the human sciences” and “the humanities” is less consistent. A first division between the natural and human science can safely be made by distinguishing the study of natural phenomena from that of human (social) phenomena. A second division might then be made between the human or social sciences on the one hand and the humanities on the other. The former (fields such as sociology, political science, psychology) study human phenomena using (generally) the methods of the natural sciences – that is some form of quantitative analysis. The humanities, on the other hand, also study human phenomena although they have developed their own analytical methods (historical, linguistic, logical, teleological, comparative, etc.). One very important thing at stake in negotiating the integration of these fields, then, is what kinds of analytical methodologies will operated in this newly defined territory. While it is yet to be determined what shape(s) the integration(s) of these domains of human understanding might take, I will provisionally group the natural and human sciences together on the basis of their (generally) shared reliance on quantitative analysis, and I will consider the humanities as a separate field of inquiry. For the purposes of the following deliberations then, I will understand “integration” in terms of integrating the natural and social sciences with the humanities because, as I hope to show, part of what separates them is the forms of rationality underlying each.

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methodologically, by the Enlightenment via “immanent critique”, that is, reason’s investigation into its own operations. This is famously exampled in Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy. The Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of Judgment articulate, respectively, the cognitive conditions that make possible the highest forms of knowledge, goodness, and beauty. The important implication for the trajectory of Modernity – and for re-thinking the relation between the sciences and the humanities – is that, according to Kant, truth, goodness, and beauty operate according to fundamentally different modes of reason.

4HEENLIGHTENMENT The separate treatment of truth, goodness, and beauty in Kantian critical philosophy serves as an exemplary gesture of what Habermas refers to as The Project of Enlightenment, a response to the dissolution of the once-unified worldviews of revealed religion and metaphysics which treated questions in all three cultural domains within a single conceptual framework [Habermas, 1981 : 9]. (In Europe in the Middle Ages, for example, questions of truth, goodness, and beauty were all treated under the auspices of Christianity.) In the wake of Kant’s example, the Project of Enlightenment decoupled questions of truth, goodness, and beauty from one another in order to investigate each according to its own internal kind of rationality. These domains became, respectively, science, morality / justice, and art. The goal of the Enlightenment was to pursue research in each of these cultural spheres according to each sphere’s distinctive internal logic, and then to pour the results back into society for the increased rationalization (and therefore improvement) of everyday life. Vestiges of this plan are still to be found not only in the distinction between primary and applied research but also, and more generally, in the faith the Western world has historically placed in technological progress. It is reasonable to regard the phenomenon of Modernity, especially its Enlightenment phase, as the historical context in which the opposition between the natural sciences and the humanities arises. If the separation of the sciences and the humanities has led to undesirable consequences, the fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in our modernism.

)NSTRUMENTALREASON Habermas insists, however, that in its historical unfolding, Modernity’s increased rationalization has not meant the unequivocal improvement of everyday life but very likely the opposite. Drawing on the analyses of his Frankfurt School precursors (Georg Lukács, Max Weber, Theodor Adorno, and Max Horkheimer) Habermas explains that so-called “instrumental reason”, initially associated with the natural sciences, has come to dominate moral / practical and aesthetic reason. In Dialectic of Enlightenment Horkheimer and Adorno contend, for example, that “what men want to learn from nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men” [Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972 : 4]. According to Habermas, it was the Marquis de Condorcet who, in the seventeenth century, began extending the methods of the natural sciences to other domains of human explanations. What began, therefore, as an effort to understand and control nature developed into meth-


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ods of controlling and dominating humans18. The dark occasion of Horkheimer and Adorno’s writing is the Holocaust, which, in the architecture of Nazi death camps, provides a compelling example of instrumental reason put to horrific use. Their underlying thesis is that the horrors of World War II were not the result of an egomaniac’s attempt to take over Europe, but an evolved consequence of Enlightenment reason itself. Less dramatically, but persisting more into the present, “Fordism” and “Taylorism” are examples of the application of scientific principles for more efficient management of industrial production and, crucially, workers. Habermas regards this tendency to domination as a structural feature of a reason oriented toward the knowledge of objects – the underlying form of scientific reason. Domination results when a subject (observer) treats all non-self entities – including other subjects – as means or instruments for the realization of its own will.

$ISTINCTIVEFORMSOFRATIONALITY Habermas’ strategy for neutralizing the dominating tendency of instrumental reason calls for putting all three spheres of culture back into communication with one another in order to counter-balance instrumental with moral and aesthetic reason. This can only happen, he insists, if the paradigm of knowledge of objects is replaced with the paradigm of communication between subjects – that is, between individuals. Habermas explicitly advocates completing the project of Enlightenment by re-integrating the spheres of culture separated by Modernity [Habermas, 1981 : 11]. Initially, then, Habermas’ call for the reintegration of the cultural spheres looks like a model for the integration of the sciences and the humanities called for by the WKD. As a defender of the Project of Enlightenment, however, Habermas is not without his critics, and his confrontation with one in particular – Jean-François Lyotard – has become exemplary of the confrontation between defenders of Modernity and those who sense the need to overcome it. Lyotard shares Habermas’ concern that in the historical unfolding of Modernity various domains of human understanding have not been allowed to operate according to their own distinctive forms of rationality. While Lyotard agrees with Habermas that Modernity has meant the ascendancy of something like instrumental reason, he is equally suspicious that the reunification of cultural spheres Habermas has in mind will not mean any real synthesis between theoretical, moral, and aesthetic experiences but simply a new structure of domination that continues to subordinate certain kinds of experience and modes of rationality [Lyotard, 1979 : 72]. In The Postmodern Condition : A Report on Knowledge, Lyotard offers a diagnosis of the status of knowledge in the contemporary moment that shares important points of correspondence with Habermas but comes to a different conclusion. According to Lyotard, in the postmodern era, the determination of which scientific statements are “true” 18

The move from dominating Nature to dominating humans puts me in mind of Kenneth Bainbridge’s chilling comment at the first atomic test at Los Alamos. Before the test Brainbridge and the other scientists were apparently able to differentiate themselves from the “sons of bitches” in the military on the basis that they were pursuing science, not trying to kill people. The story goes that immediately after the detonation Bainbridge turned to Oppenheimer and said : “Now we’re all sons of bitches”.

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takes place not according to exclusively scientific criteria but, rather, within an essentially political context – that is, according to considerations of power [Lyotard, 1979 : 41-47]. He argues that in the era of Big Science, the testing of scientific hypotheses requires expensive equipment such that without large sums of money, one is unable to provide proof for the validity of scientific statements, and without proof, one is unable to participate in the determination of truth. According to Lyotard, the two groups able and willing to fund Big Science – governments and corporations – have a motive other than the disinterested pursuit of knowledge. Governments fund research into weapons programs in the interests of national defense (or offense), for example, and corporations fund research in order to increase competitiveness, productivity, or market share : that is, to make more money [Lyotard, 1979 : 46-46]. And indeed, a tiny percentage of scientific funding today does not come from either government or industry. Lyotard concludes that “in the discourse of today’s financial backers of research, the only credible goal is power. Scientists, technicians, and instruments are purchased not to find truth, but to augment power” [Lyotard, 1979 : 46]. The will to augment power presents itself as another instance of what Habermas refers to as “instrumental reason”.

3CIENCEANDPOLITICS Lyotard points out, however, that the branch of human understanding called “science” operates according to categorically different procedures than the branch of human understanding called “politics”. Most importantly, the statements that embody understanding in science belong to a fundamentally different class than those that embody understanding in politics. Science, Lyotard observes, is composed of descriptive statements about the way the world is, and they are validated according to their correspondence with their referents. Politics, conversely, is made up of prescriptive statements about the way the world should be, and are validated according to vastly different procedures. For one thing, whereas scientific statements are determined to be “true” or not, political statements are more commonly determined to be “just” or not. Consequently, statements of one class cannot (properly) be evaluated according to the rules of the other because the relevant criteria are not the same : the “language games” of science and politics, Lyotard insists, are “incommensurable” [Lyotard, 1979 : 26 ; Lyotard, 1988 : 128].

,ANGUAGEGAMES Lyotard’s thesis about the incommensurability of language games directly challenges Habermas’ call for the re-integration of cultural spheres on the basis that such re-integration would very likely subject some domains of human understanding to the validity criteria of a different domain. This implication has specific bearing on the question of connecting the sciences and the humanities because it raises difficult questions about what a “methodology of crossed views” would look like. Could the integration avoid the application of a single procedure of verification across both domains of human understanding ? And if not, according to what criteria would the validity of statements in this hybridized domain be adjudicated ?


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In bringing to light these difficulties, Lyotard’s argument about the incommensurability of language games makes a case for maintaining the autonomy of science, morality, and art : including, more generally, the autonomy of the sciences and the humanities. Acknowledging these methodological difficulties means that whatever shape the integration of the sciences and humanities takes, it must allow these domains of human understanding to maintain their distinctive procedures and contents – even if those contents come into direct conflict with one another. Somewhat paradoxically, given the dangers of an overextended instrumental reason and the difficulties of incommensurability, preserving the conflict as a conflict may be precisely the point of facilitating communication between the natural sciences and the humanities. Lyotard uses the term le différend to designate “a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of rule of judgment applicable to both arguments” [Lyotard, 1988 : xi]. Acknowledging the integration of science and humanities as an instance of le différend means allowing these domains to make their own content contributions, as opposed to using, in the manner of instrumental reason, one domain as a means to fulfill the other’s goals. Practically speaking, without this respect for the autonomy of the various branches of understanding, it is difficult to imagine how supporters for the project will be successfully recruited. Failing to treat the integration as an instance of le différend means perpetuating the very worst instincts of Modernity : the continued instrumental use of one form of reason for the domination of human beings and alternative bodies of knowledge. Lyotard’s thesis about le différend further suggests that the sciences may need the humanities to secure the social and discursive conditions necessary for the sciences to engage in open investigation – wherever that inquiry leads. The postmodern humanities help maintain a climate sympathetic to open inquiry by continually reminding us of the contingency of all positions / perspectives. They thereby resist the hardening of any position into the kind of dogmatism that shuts down “dangerous” research in the name of whatever absolute principle is being touted at the moment. The humanities cannot continue to secure these conditions if they, too, fall under the spell of a reason that subordinates all questions to a single end (instrumental reason) or one that insists on a single correct way of looking at the world (religious fundamentalism). Something like this appears to be going on in the United States in the case of the Bush administration’s resistance, in the name of economic prosperity, to the general scientific community’s interpretation of global climate change and in its effort to curtail stem cell research on the basis of a particular interpretation of “morality”. These considerations suggest that even the sciences cannot will the extension of a rationality that claims objectivity to all domains of human understanding.

(UMANWELLBEING There are, potentially, many motivations for integrating the sciences and the humanities. I take it, however, that at least one justification for such a goal is to bring considerations of human wellbeing (variously and broadly conceived) to bear on the output of scientific research. It has often been pointed out, for example, that since Hiroshima, at the very latest, it has become urgent to rethink the notion of science and technology as being unequivocally good. One model for integration along these lines would turn to the humanities for a stance specifically beyond the horizon of instrumental reason from which the products

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of the sciences might be contemplated. The results of such reflection on the natural sciences would have to take the form of prescriptives about what research should and should not be carried out. And although Habermas’ account of Modernity points to the need to balance instrumental reason with other considerations, Lyotard’s thesis about the incommensurability of science and politics raises serious doubt about what such an integration would accomplish. The intractability of this problem calls for some new, perhaps highly unconventional, thinking. But, if the genealogy sketched out above is correct that the current configuration of the sciences and the humanities is the result of Modernity itself, the integration of these domains called for by the WKD will not be effected without radically re-imagining the landscape of these questions. The standoff of the Habermas-Lyotard debate thus points us in the direction of a third moment in the genealogy of suspicion toward the sciences and humanities as they are currently constructed, though not, again, to a solution but to additional features to be taken into consideration in configuring a methodology of crossed views. Like Habermas and Lyotard, Bruno Latour is concerned about the effects of the overextension of a particular mode of reason, and he offers a critical account of Modernity roughly parallel to those of Habermas and Lyotard which, however, gestures toward still different implications.

±0URI½CATION²AND±MEDIATION² Latour characterizes the underlying conceptual structure of Modernity as composed of two sets of intellectual practices. Practices of “purification” isolate new nonhuman entities from a previously un- or less-differentiated world : for example the division of matter into atoms, then into protons, electrons, neutrons, and later into quarks, neutrinos and, maybe, most recently into vibrating strings. Practices of “mediation”, on the other hand, combine these newly differentiated entities with human interests. The development of antibiotic medications, disease resistant crops, and psychopharmacology “socialize” newly purified nonhumans into the human world [Latour, 1993 : 10-13]. Both purification and mediation remain necessary to the intellectual constitution of Modernity, for without new purifications there are a finite number of mediations possible ; similarly, without mediation there is little point in purifying new nonhumans. Despite both being necessary, however, in order to be effective the two practices must be kept separate : mediation can slow down or stop purification if it takes the form of anxiety about the consequences of introducing new nonhumans into human society. Genetically altered organisms released into the environment, is one instance of contemporary concern about the effects to the human world of the introduction of new nonhumans. Consequently, science has tended to privileged purification while surreptitiously pursuing mediation : “the essential point of this modern constitution is that it renders the work of mediation that assembles hybrids invisible, unthinkable, unpresentable” [Latour, 1993 : 34]. Latour’s concern is that this de-privileging of mediation has resulted in the proliferation of hybrid human / non-human “monsters” that humans can no longer control : nuclear weapons and ozone holes, for example. Latour’s larger point, then, is that the proliferation of uncontrollable human/nonhuman monsters is a direct consequence of science’s modernism, that is, its nearly exclusive identification with purification.


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"EYONDLANGUAGEANDHUMANCOGNITION Latour is equally critical of the persistence of modernist purification in even the “postmodern” humanities, pointing to the “linguistic turn” in philosophy and cultural studies around the beginning of the twentieth century [Latour, 1993 : 62]. The term refers to the general tendency to treat questions in the humanities as semiotic : that is, as questions about meaning rather than being. In particular, Latour has in mind the privileged place of “discourse” in contemporary humanities work : the view that language and the conceptual categories with which humans make sense of the world have only an uncertain relation to what lies beyond language and human cognition. Because human thought cannot operate apart from language and the categories we use to organize understanding, certainty about what lies beyond this realm of discourse is not theoretically possible. One early twentieth-century articulation of this position is Wittgenstein’s famous proposition 7 from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus : “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen” [About that which one cannot speak, one must pass over in silence]. On this model, therefore, talk about “reality” – the way the world actually is – is meaningless. One implication of this view has been to purge the humanities of reference to the nonhuman world – to anything beyond language and discourse – on the grounds that nothing meaningful can be said about it.19 According to Latour, this view makes “discourse not a transparent intermediary that would put the human subject in contact with the natural world, but a mediator independent of nature and society alike” [Latour, 1993 : 62]. Latour’s account of the persistence of modernism in contemporary thought raises important considerations for a methodology of crossed views. According to his account, modernist purification in the sciences leads to the hypostatization and retreat into a nonhuman world ; in the humanities it leads to the hypostatization and retreat into an exclusively human domain. Combined, these developments point to the most general and pervasive effect of modernism and one that stands in the way of the WKD’s goal : the sharp ontological distinction between a nonhuman domain of Nature separated from a human realm of Culture. It would seem that this fundamental conceptual feature of the contemporary intellectual landscape would have to be overcome by those seeking to get the sciences and the humanities into purposive communication with one another. In short, they will have to recognize their domains as overlapping. Latour’s recommendation is that we stop being modern – that is, stop conceiving of Nature as distinct realm separated from Culture. Since postmodernism only perpetuates modernist purification rather than overcoming it, the only real alternative is to become thoroughly “unmodern”, “amodern”, or “nonmodern”. This involves (re) connecting the work of purification with that of mediation in order to reassemble nonhuman Nature and human Culture into a single, continuous domain in order to contemplate the consequence to the human world of introducing new nonhumans. This does not (necessarily) entail a complete reconstruction of the natural sciences or the humanities. A reconfiguration of those conceptual boundaries is virtually unthink19

It is worth noting that the natural sciences underwent this same purification around the same time in, for example, the work of Ernst Mach, whose positivism attempted to purge science of all metaphysics – that is, to eliminate the use of all terms like “heat” and “mass” on the basis that these are abstractions corresponding to nothing real in nature. See [Mach, 1959].

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able. But it might mean – probably does mean – that those who sense the urgency of addressing the fragmentation of cultural spheres will have to deviate from the familiar ways of looking at the world supplied by the sciences on the one hand and the humanities on the other.

4HEDISTINCTIONBETWEEN.ATUREAND#ULTURE From the point of view of the sciences, abandoning the ontological distinction between Nature and Culture will mean conceiving of science not as a discourse of immutable truths validated by the way the world really is, but as a discourse that interlaces the human and nonhuman domains through production of human / nonhuman hybrids that science makes available via its practices of mediation. Making this realization will at least point us in the direction of reconnecting the spheres of culture that became fragmented in Modernity. This alternative, “nonmodern”, conception of science, which Latour terms Science No. 2, refers to “the gaining of access, through experiments and calculations, to entities that at first do not have the same characteristics as humans do. […]. Science No. 2 deals with nonhumans, which in the beginning are foreign to social life, and which are slowly socialized in our midst through the channels of laboratories, expeditions, and institutions […]” [Latour, 1999 : 259]. In short, a nonmodern conception of science recognizes the human dimension in the production of knowledge about the nonhuman. If handled appropriately, this may go some distance to obviating the problem of incommensurable language games by reconceptualizing science along lines more parallel to discourses about the human.

4HESHAPEOFTHINGSTOCOME The shape of nonmodernism in the humanities has yet to be worked out. It will, however, entail thinking through questions of meaning and value without modernism’s purification, including its central purified entity : “humanity”. Something like this has been going on for quite a while. Modern philosophy is conventionally understood to begin with Descartes’ effort to establish one truth upon which the rest of human understanding could be built. In cogito ergo sum Descartes thought he observed the certainty of self-consciousness – that is, the irrefutable certainty of a self conscious of itself. The Cartesian cogito installs the self-conscious human self at / as the center, thereby establishing not just humanism (the positioning of human concerns as central) but, more specifically, subject-centered reason, which Habermas regards as the nucleus of instrumental reason. The humanist subject rests upon the hypostatization of an autonomous, atomistic, nuclear “self ” at the center of an individual’s identity, which, however, turns out on closer inspection not to be as autonomous or transparent as Descartes thought. Beginning most notably with Karl Marx in the middle of the nineteenth-century, a central and persistent concern of Western philosophy has been the demystification of the supposed self-sufficiency and autonomy of the Cartesian subject. With reference to either its ontology (mode of being) or its ideology (the system of ideas it carries with it), Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Althusser, Foucault, and Derrida all uncover in one way or another the contingent nature of the subject. A consequence of de-centering the Cartesian subject has been that, without this central anchor


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point, the “humanism” which such a subject supports has become a problematic and largely abandoned concept in contemporary philosophical and cultural work, so much so, in fact that a number of theorists have begun to use the term “posthuman” and its corollary “posthumanites”20. Latour observes, however, that these understandings of the self are carried out largely in reference to the subject’s dependency on a social (human) context – still cut off from Nature and therefore still an instance of modernist purification [Latour, 1999 : 65]. One implication of his account of the proliferation of human / nonhuman hybrids is that the humanities will increasingly have to take account of the nonhuman dimensions of the human world. Despite the ongoing critique of the humanist subject, this work has yet to be extensively undertaken. I submit, then, that the problem to be addressed by an integration of the sciences and the humanities is specifically a problem of Modernity, and, moreover, that humanism is precisely what we do not want. Continuing to think of Nature and Culture as discontinuous perpetuates the view of science and humanities as incommensurable language games. Collapsing the distance between them, however, incurs the risk of obliterating le différend. This is a real danger for which there are no clear methodological solutions. The best we can do as we attempt to think the sciences and humanities together is to keep our ears open to voices threatened with being eliminated from the conversation. It is difficult to predict how many of those working in the scientific and cultural fields will be willing to abandon conventional (Modern) ways of carving up experience. I suspect few, at least at the moment. But something on these lines will be necessary if we are to effect a genuine integration. A methodology of crossed views, therefore, will not be served by a modern humanism, but something more like a nonmodern nonhumanism.

2EFERENCES Habermas, J. (1981) “Modernity versus Postmodernity”, New German Critique 22, 3-14. Habermas, J. (1987) The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, MIT Press, Cambridge. Hayles, K. (1999) How We Became Posthuman : the Virtual Body in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics, University of Chicago Press Chicago. Horkheimer, M., Adorno, T. (1944) Dialectic of Enlightenment, Continuum, New York. Latour, B. (1993) We Have Never Been Modern, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Latour, B. (1999) Pandora’s Hope : Essays on the Reality of Science Studies, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Lyotard, J.-F. (1979) The Postmodern Condition : A Report on Knowledge, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Lyotard, J.-F. (1988) The Differend : Phrases in Dispute, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Mach, E. (1959) The Analysis of the Sensations : and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical, Dover Publications, New York.

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See for one example Kathryn Hayles’s How We Became Posthuman : Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics [Hayles 1999].

0ROMOTING3CIENTI½C$IALOGUEAS A,IFELONG,EARNING0ROCESS by Michel Alhadeff-Jones

The aim of this paper is to reconsider some of the stakes involved in the dialogue between sciences and between scientists, considering it as a complex and critical learning process. Dialogue – as conversation, expression, performance and negotiation – can be conceived in several ways. It carries both an epistemic and an experiential side. It involves simultaneously heterogeneous theories and identities. Because it involves fragmented scientific languages, it also requires a shared vision. But above all, what seems critical to acknowledge is that dialogue is a matter of transformation. And because transformation is also a matter of learning, the promotion of dialogue between sciences should be perceived as a virtuous spiral involving : instrumental learning (to dialogue), communicational learning (what we mean by dialoguing) and emancipatory learning (to challenge our core assumptions about dialogue and sciences). Considering the evolution of sciences as a double process embedded in the production of knowledge and the self-development of researchers raises the question of how to conceive simultaneously the relationships between these two major stakes. From a practical point of view, considering scientific dialogue as a lifelong learning process would finally suggest the management of forums like the World Knowledge Dialogue (WKD) as a privileged educational opportunity to be designed following what is known about science as a social practice and about researchers as adult learners. Based on the first edition of this forum, four suggestions are finally considered : favoring heterogeneity ; valorizing formal knowledge as well as lived experience ; acknowledging the learning dimension involved in the process of sharing ; and confronting professional experience with knowledge produced about sciences.

Promoting Scientific Dialogue as a Lifelong Learning Process

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#ONCEIVINGSCIENTI½CDIALOGUE $IALOGUEASACOMPLEXPROCESS From the etymological point of view, “dialogue” has been used in various ways, enriching its meaning. Its Greek and Latin origins (dialogos, dialogus) evocate the idea of carrying a conversation ; it appears then connoted by the initial use made by Aristotle and Plato to describe their philosophical discussions and their interchange of thoughts. In French, from the 16th c. the word is used to describe in a literary work a conversation between two or more persons. Its uses in theater first and then in cinema, radio and TV contributed to stress the expressive and performative dimensions which may be associated to it. During the 20th century, the term “dialogue” takes a new color with its use in politics. It becomes then synonymous with social negotiation, or diplomatic contact, between the representatives of two nations, groups, or the like. This expression appears finally connoted as a valuable or constructive discussion or communication [Rey, 2000 ; Simpson et al., 1989]. Looking to promote dialogue between scientists can be indeed interpreted following the various meanings attached to this word. The enterprise can be perceived through the philosophical dimension associated to an exchange of thoughts. It can also be interpreted as an opportunity for people to express themselves following a logic of representation allowing them to perform according to the rules of their disciplines. It finally stresses the value of communication, which is always a negotiation of meanings and values, belonging to the groups represented. Considering “dialogue” as a complex process should constitute an invitation to take into consideration its heterogeneity of meanings. Its use should always bring into question what is involved by such a process. Beyond the knowledge shared, what is expressed ? What is performed ? What is negotiated ? What is represented ? What is constructed ? Following this perspective, this paper proposes to look beyond the knowledge shared and challenge what the process of dialoguing carries by itself, especially in terms of learning.

$IALOGUE IDENTITYANDSCIENTI½CWAYSOFKNOWING What makes scientists similar enough to dialogue with each other and different enough to learn something from each other ? Adopting a perspective inspired by anthropology of knowledge [Morin, 1986, 1991 ; Le Grand, 2004], identity and otherness (altérité) characterizing heterogeneous positions seems to appear at the core of the resources grounding a possible dialogue between scientists. They can be perceived at least at two levels : an epistemic one (every scientist refers to specific epistemologies, theories, methodologies, frameworks, etc.) and an experiential one (every scientist has his / her own personal and professional life experience). Wanting to learn from each other does not mean that scientists necessary share the same finalities. Various reasons and motivations may justify their interest for dialogue, from both a personal and a collective point of view : shared ques-

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tions, curiosity and epistemic interest, as well as financial, political or social motivations are part of them. Finally, various conceptions of dialogue coexist in the academic field. From interdisciplinarity to multidisciplinarity and pluridisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity and multireferentility, the ways of conceiving the relationships between scientific disciplines are heterogenous21. Because such conceptions have a history of shaping the evolution of their understanding, they carry by themselves a justification to dialogue about the ways of dialoguing [Ardoino, 1993 ; Le Moigne, 2001a, 2001b ; Morin, 1997, Nicolescu, 1996, 2005 ; Rege Colet, 1993].

2E¾ECTINGONDIALOGUEASACRITICALPROCESSOFLEARNING As any observation is fundamentally grounded in the position of the observer, it seems important to locate the following ones in regard of my own background. As a researcher and professor working in the field of organizational psychology, adult education and in philosophy of education, my main topic of interest is related to the development of a capacity of critical reflection among adults [Alhadeff, 2003, 2007a], and more specifically, among novices and professional scientists, considered as adult learners. More specifically, I assume the strong necessity for researchers to be able to develop critical skills and knowledge allowing them to reflect on their own work and the practices of their peers as well. Such a position involves an understanding of critique as a complex phenomenon [Alhadeff, 2004, 2005] involving the adoption of a constructivist epistemology [AlhadeffJones, 2006 ; Le Moigne, 2001a]. It fundamentally requires the adoption of a complex way of thinking [Morin, 1990b, 2007] which recursively supposes the consideration of the idea that “critique” is located at the borders between several fields of study (philosophy, psychology, sociology, literature, etc.) [Alhadeff, 2007b]. If such a critical ability involves the capacity of reflecting on one’s own assumptions about oneself and the world [Mezirow, 1991], one has to admit that it supposes a learning process too. Learning to develop a critical understanding can be then perceived as an individual and as a collective process based on knowledge development, as well as personal and organizational development. Considering the specificities of adult learning, enhancing critical reflection among scientists involves the consideration of both their knowledge and their personal life experience [Dominicé, 2000].

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Nicolescu [Nicolescu, 2005] proposes, for example, the following distinction : “Multidisciplinarity concerns itself with studying a research topic in not just one discipline only, but in several at the same time. Any topic in question will ultimately be enriched by incorporating the perspectives of several disciplines. Multidisciplinarity brings a plus to the discipline in question, but this “plus” is always in the exclusive service of the home discipline. In other words, the multidisciplinary approach overflows disciplinary boundaries while its goal remains limited to the framework of disciplinary research. Interdisciplinarity has a different goal than multidisciplinarity. It concerns the transfer of methods from one discipline to another. Like multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity overflows the disciplines, but its goal still remains within the framework of disciplinary research. Interdisciplinarity has even the capacity of generating new disciplines, like quantum cosmology and chaos theory. Transdisciplinarity concerns that which is at once between the disciplines, across the different disciplines, and beyond all discipline. Its goal is the understanding of the present world, of which one of the imperatives is the unity of knowledge” [Nicolescu, 2005 : 5-6].


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0ROMOTINGSCIENTI½CDIALOGUE #ONSIDERINGDIALOGUETHROUGHHETEROGENEITY FRAGMENTATION ANDTRANSFORMATION The position just described brings me to interpret issues related to scientific dialogue through at least three lenses. First, it supposes to question the nature of the epistemic and experiential heterogeneity grounding every situation of dialogue. From an epistemological point of view, it involves the revisiting of how we define the specificity of each scientific discipline [Piaget, 1970] and the fundamental heterogeneity they carry [Ardoino, 1993 ; Habermas, 1976]. From an experiential point of view, it also supposes the recognition of what constitutes the identity of the researchers involved in scientific activities [Dominicé, 2000] and what characterizes their implication in regard of the knowledge produced [Ardoino, 2000 ; Devereux, 1967 /1980 ; Holton, 1978 /1998 ; Morin, 1986, 1991]. It seems critical today to question how scientists are able not only to cross disciplinary borders, but also to challenge the ethical and moral concerns which may or not justify to do so. A second approach supposes then to address the need to decompartmentalize scientific discourses, and to restore some of the philosophical questions associated with their development. Such a perspective would include reflection on the contemporary fragmentation of sciences and their ethical challenges [Morin, 1990a], the risks associated to their own development [Beck, 1986 /2001], the normative dimension they carry [Foucault, 1964] and the risks related to their institutionalization [Illich, 1971] or the limits associated to the rationality which underlies their development [Horkheimer, 1974 ; Lyotard, 1979]. Finally, a third lens would bring the question of the transformational dimension associated with the process of dialogue, considering the people and the institutions involved. Following this perspective, the transformation promoted through dialogue can be interpreted as a learning process [Burbules, 1993] involving, at various levels of organization (individual, group, institution, etc.), instrumental, communicational and emancipatory issues [Mezirow, 1991]. From an instrumental point of view, it identifies the means developed in order to reach the finalities associated with the situation of dialogue. From a communicational perspective, it questions the meanings shared and the values attributed to dialogue. From an emancipatory point of view, it finally suggests the exploration of the assumptions framing and binding the situation of dialogue itself. These three layers appear at this point as a relevant lens to revisit the experience lived during the World Knowledge Forum.

)NSTRUMENTAL COMMUNICATIONALAND EMANCIPATORYPERSPECTIVESONDIALOGUEDEVELOPMENT My participation in this first edition of the World Knowledge Dialogue (WKD) has been an opportunity to conduct a kind of “ethnographic” observation, raising questions about science as it is understood and practiced. Following are some questions born from reflections that initially emerged during these three days. Exploring a situation of dialogue from an instrumental point of view brings us to question the “best practices” developed or promoted to build a “good” dialogical environment. As mentioned above, establishing a dialogue suggests conversation, expression, performance, and / or negotiation of knowledge, meanings and values. If dialogue is a conver-

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sation, what are the best ways to settle it ? If it involves self-expression, how do we promote it ? If it supposes a performance, how do we evaluate it ? And if it includes a negotiation, how do we arbitrate it ? From a learning perspective, challenging the instrumental learning involved by a dialogical environment should bring to question what has to be learned in order to share, exchange, give, receive or take knowledge, meanings and values with people whose backgrounds may differ drastically from each other. Following a communicational approach [Mezirow, 1991], questioning the meanings associated with a situation of dialogue raises different issues. How are we defining the “best practices” shaping a situation of dialogue ? What are the standards used to identify when there is, or is not, a “good” dialogue ? How do we define what should be a “good” dialogue among scientists ? If the importance of recognizing “heterogeneity”, favoring “decompartmentalization”, and promoting “transformation” may be acknowledged, are we sure everyone involved puts the same meanings behind these words ? Challenging the communicational learning that underlies a dialogical environment should bring us to question what has to be learned to make sure that we share the same understanding of the vocabulary used, and more broadly the assumptions framing the context of dialogue itself. Exploring the instrumental and communicational dimensions involved by a dialogical situation finally brings us to challenge and question the core assumptions framing our conceptions of “dialogue” (and beyond dialogue, “science” itself). How did we learn to justify and legitimate the forms of dialogue that we are privileging ? How do we know that they are the “right” ones ? Identifying our core assumptions about dialogue supposes to reinterpret our experience as scientists and as human beings. It requires us to take the time to reflect on our own experience and the way we learned to interpret it.

"RIDGINGTHEGAPBETWEENKNOWLEDGEPRODUCTIONANDSCIENTISTS SELF DEVELOPMENT AN±ACADEMICNOMAN´SLAND² There are many ways to tackle the series of questions raised in the previous sections. On one hand, the scientific field is full of researches highlighting the processes of knowledge production, including its dialogical dimension (philosophy and history of sciences, sciences and technology studies, etc.) [Andler, 2002 ; Dubois, 1999 ; Pestre, 2006]. On the other side, studies in adult education, higher education, psychology and sociology (among others) provide many insights about how adults and researchers develop themselves, individually and collectively [Tennant 1993]. What appears as striking is that in the middle of these two sets of approaches, remains a “no man’s land” of the academic field. Indeed, beyond the general evolution of concepts and technologies, the decontextualized theories of self development, the specificity of scholars career, and the biographies of a handful of famous scientists, what do we know today about the mutual influence between the lifelong development of researchers and the evolution of scientific knowledge ? From an experiential perspective, every day, among the thousands of universities and centers of research worldwide, millions of scientists build up knowledge in the same time they develop their own personal and collective skills. The ability to dialogue (within a team, a department, a faculty, an institution, or with outsiders) is part of such a process. What do we know about these experiences ? How can such experiences be used to understand and improve knowledge production ?


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0ROMOTINGDIALOGUEAMONGSCIENTISTSAS ALIFELONGLEARNINGOPPORTUNITY During the past 30 years, “lifelong learning” has progressively emerged as a core concept in educational sciences, allowing to describe and to promote new solutions to cope with social changes and the contemporary reconfiguration of adult life [Medel-Añonuevo, 2001]. In many ways the need to promote “dialogue” today in the scientific field can be interpreted as a side effect of the evolution of society and knowledge. Because such social and professional changes affects scientists as well as their practices, it seems relevant to question the way researchers learn to cope with their changing work environment and the new demands of knowledge production. Among others fields of research and practice, adult education provides various resources to deal with the stakes mentioned above. Being informed by these contributions, and based on my participation to the WKD, the next sections propose a set of suggestions allowing to reconsider the process of knowledge and personal development promoted by this forum.

&AVORINGHETEROGENEITY As previously suggested, to acknowledge the identitary dimension of doing research (what makes everyone be a singular researcher with his / her own expertise / identity) may help to shape an area of encounter between scientists. In order to help recognize the heterogeneity grounding dialogue between sciences, an optimal balance has to be found between the various cultures and sub-cultures of sciences (disciplines, trends of research, school of thought) represented during the conference and the lectures. For the same reason, national, cultural, linguistic, gender and generational diversity has to be promoted and explicitly recognized during the event.

6ALORIZINGFORMALKNOWLEDGEASWELLASLIVEDEXPERIENCE Because dialogue requires time and space to be developed, enough room has to be provided during the event to facilitate the encounters. Because every researcher (some more than others) may already have experiences related to disciplinary borders crossing, it can be useful to explore them. To do so, we have to recognize that inter-/ multi-/co-/transdisciplinarity can be experienced following a formal way (institutionalized) but also in the daily life, following informal paths. This first edition of WKD has been the opportunity of questioning some institutionalized practices. It may be beneficial to recognize the value of informal experiences of disciplinary borders crossing. This should constitute by itself a possibility of dialogue.

!CKNOWLEDGINGTHELEARNINGDIMENSIONINVOLVEDINTHEPROCESSOFSHARING If we consider talking scientifically about genetics, those best qualified to do so are likely to be experts in genetics (as it has been done, actually). If we consider the aim of developing dialogue among people and promoting inter-/multi-/co-/trans-disciplinary learning, we must also invite experts mastering such a process in order to facilitate it ? Because recognizing scientific heterogeneity is a challenging experience involving learning, it can

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be managed as a learning opportunity. It may be interesting and helpful to consider the participation of practitioners already trained and experienced to facilitate and promote effective dialogue and transformation among participants. From such a perspective, the WKD could be understood as a lifelong learning opportunity targeting a public constituted by humanists.

#ONFRONTINGPROFESSIONALEXPERIENCEANDKNOWLEDGEPRODUCEDABOUTSCIENCES Because science is a social field itself, it may be interesting and helpful to consider the participation of researchers working on science as a field of study. Psychologists, sociologists or anthropologists of sciences may represent good professional observers. They may help to develop a reflexive point of view on the process of dialogue promoted by the conference. Finally, from a theoretical and epistemological point of view, various researches have been done on inter-/multi-/co-/trans-disciplinarity as specific methodologies of research. To consider including in the program discussions or lectures made by researchers working on these approaches may help clarify the kind of work promoted and the specificity of the knowledge produced. It may help develop a meta-understanding of the stakes involved.

#ONCLUSIONS The aim of this paper was to reconsider some of the stakes involved in a dialogue between sciences and between scientists, considering it as a complex and critical learning process. Dialogue – as conversation, expression, performance and negotiation – can be conceived following many ways. It carries both an epistemic and an experiential side. It involves simultaneously heterogeneous theories and identities. Because it involves fragmented scientific languages, it also requires a shared vision. But above all, what seems critical to acknowledge is that dialogue is a matter of transformation. And because transformation is also a matter of learning, the promotion of dialogue between sciences should be perceived as a virtuous spiral involving : instrumental learning (to dialogue), communicational learning (what we mean by dialoguing) and emancipatory learning (to challenge our core assumptions about dialogue and sciences). Considering the evolution of sciences as a double process embedded in the production of knowledge and the self-development of researchers brings the question of how to conceive simultaneously the relationships between these two major stakes. From a practical point of view, considering scientific dialogue as a lifelong learning process would finally suggest the management of forums like the WKD as a privileged educational opportunity to be designed following what is known about science as a social practice and about researchers as adult learners. From a personal point of view, participating in the WKD was an enriching experience for at least two reasons. On one hand, it stimulated a personal discovery of scientific fields and cultures with which I was not necessarily familiar. On the other hand, it reinforced my belief in the necessity to build bridges between these fields and those constituting my own scientific background in adult education. Science is not only a process of knowledge construction, it is also a human adventure and a lifelong learning process for those who produce it. It involves organizational and personal dimensions whose recognition


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does not happen automatically. In a period of time, when scientific discoveries tend to be reduced to their instrumental and technological advances, the recognition of the human dimension of knowledge production should not be taken for granted. I wish this kind of encounter would find its position in the larger process of building a new culture of science based on personal and collective learning. By bringing people to share the same humanist values, I wish it would help promote an interpretation of science involving more than just epistemological, theoretical, methodological and technical considerations. I wish it would help to restore an understanding of science that recognizes and values the learning experienced by those who build it, a vision of science rehabilitating the fundamental human nature of knowledge production.

2EFERENCES Alhadeff, M. (2003) “Rethinking Transformative Learning and the concept of ‘Critical Reflection’ through the Paradigm of Complexity”, Paper presented at the 5th International Transformative Learning Conference “Transformative Learning in action : Building bridges across contexts and disciplines”, New York, Teachers College, Columbia University. Alhadeff, M. (2004) “Conjuguer l’hétérogénéité de la critique en sciences de l’éducation : de l’hypocrit(iqu) e à l’hypercritique”, in Arce R. et al. (2004), La pensée critique en éducation, St-Jacques de Compostelle, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 34-46. Alhadeff, M. (2005) “Complexité de la critique et critique de la complexité en formation”, in Clenet J. & Poisson D. (Eds), Complexité de la formation et formation à la complexité, Paris, L’Harmattan, 227-242. Alhadeff-Jones, M. (2007a) Paradoxes de l’accompagnement et (r)éveil d’une pensée critique, in Boutinet J.-P., Denoyel N., Pineau G. & Robin J.-Y., Penser l’accompagnement adulte, Paris, PUF. Alhadeff-Jones, M. (2007b) Education, critique et complexité : modèle et expérience de conception d’une approche multiréférentielle de la critique en Sciences de l’éducation. Doctoral dissertation in Educational sciences, Université de Paris 8, Paris. Alhadeff-Jones, M. (2008) “Three generations of complexity theories : nuances and ambiguities”, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 40(1), 66-82. Andler, D., Fagot-Largeault, A., Saint-Sernin, B., (2002) Philosophie des sciences (Tomes I et II), Paris, Gallimard. Adoino, J. (1993) “L’approche multiréférentielle (plurielle) des situations éducatives et formatives”, Pratiques de Formation/Analyses, 25-26, 15-34. Ardoino J. (2000) Les avatars de l’éducation, Paris, PUF. Beck, U. (1986/2001) La société du risque. Sur la voie d’une autre modernité, Paris, Aubier. Burbules, N. C. (1993) Dialogue in Teaching. Theory and Practice, New York, Teachers College Press. Devereux, G. (1967/1980) De l’angoisse à la méthode dans les sciences du comportement, Paris, Aubier. Dominicé, P. (2000) Learning from our Lives. Using Educational Biographies with Adults, San Francisco, JosseyBass. Dubois, M. (1999) Introduction à la sociologie des sciences, Paris, PUF. Foucault, M. (1964) Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique, Paris, Union Générale d’Éditions. Habermas, J. (1976) Connaissance et intérêt, Paris, Gallimard. Holton, G. (1978/1998) The Scientific Imagination, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. Horkheimer, M. (1974) Théorie traditionnelle et théorie critique, Paris, Gallimard. Illich I. (1971) Une société sans école, Paris, Seuil. Le Grand, J.-L. (2004) “Quelle anthropologie en formation d’adultes ? Essai de topographie d’un champ de recherché”, Pratiques de Formation/Analyses, 47-48, 9-42. Le Moigne, J.-L. (2001a) Le constructivisme. Les enracinements, (tome I), Paris, L’Harmattan. Le Moigne, J.-L. (2001b) Le constructivisme. Epistémologie de l’interdisciplinarité, (tome II), Paris, L’Harmattan. Lyotard, J.-F. (1979) La condition postmoderne, Paris, Éditions de Minuit.

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Medel-Anonuevo, C., Ohsako, T., Mauch, W. (2001) Revisiting Lifelong Learning for the 21st Century, Hambourg, UNESCO Institute for Education. Mezirow, J. (1991) Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass. Morin, E. (1986) La Méthode (vol.3) : La Connaissance de la Connaissance, Paris, Seuil. Morin, E. (1990a) Science avec conscience, Paris, Fayard. Morin, E. (1990b) Introduction à la pensée complexe, Paris, ESF. Morin, E. (1991) La Méthode (vol.4) : Les Idées. Leur habitat, leur vie, leurs moeurs, leur organisation, Paris, Seuil. Morin, E. (1997) “Sur la transdisciplinarité”, La Revue du M.A.U.S.S., 10, 21-29. Morin, E. (2007) “Restricted Complexity, General Complexity”, in Gershenson C., Aerts D. & Edmonds B. (Eds), Worldviews, Science and Us, London, World Scientific, 5-29. Nicolescu, B. (1996) La Transdisciplinarité. Manifeste, Monaco, Editions du Rocher. Nicolescu, B. (2005) “Transdisciplinarity – Past, Present and Future”, Paper presented at the Second World Congress of Transdisciplinarity : “What Education for Sustainable Development ? Attitude - Research – Action”, Vitória/Vila Velha (Brazil). Pestre, D. (2006) Introduction aux Sciences Studies, Paris, La Découverte. Piaget, J. (1970) Epistémologie des sciences de l’homme, Paris, Gallimard. Rege Colet, N. (1993) “Pluridisciplinarité, interdisciplinarité, transdisciplinarité : Quelles perspectives en éducation ? Etude du discours des professeurs des Sciences de l’Education de l’Université de Genève”, Cahiers de la Section des Sciences de l’Education 71, Genève, Université de Genève. Rey, A. (Ed.) (2000) Le Robert, Dictionnaire historique de la langue française, Paris, Le Robert. Simpson, J. et al. (Eds) (1989) Oxford English Dictionary Online (2nd ed.), Electronic resource, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Tennant, M. (1993) “Perspective Transformation and Adult Development”, Adult Education Quarterly, 44(11), 34-42.

#HAPTER /RIGINAND-IGRATIONSOF -ODERN(UMANS0ALAEONTOLOGY !NTHROPOLOGY 'ENETICS AND,INGUISTICSIN$IALOGUE

(UMAN-IGRATIONSIN0REHISTORY¯ THE#ULTURAL2ECORD Summary by Moira Cockell of the presentation by Ofer Bar-Yosef

Professor Bar-Yosef develops the theme of archaeology of human migrations as a vehicle to address the wider epistemological question of “how do we know what we know ?” He describes some of the major inferences that can be drawn, and explains the variety of approaches that are currently used, in exploring the trajectory of humankind’s colonization of the planet. Along the way, he points out specific examples of how the different methodologies and analytical tools available to “state of the art” paleoanthropology complement each other ; sometimes reinforcing a hypothesis and sometimes revealing where there are weaknesses, ambiguities or gaps in our current understanding.

-ULTIPLEWAVES The earliest traces of hominin colonization locate humankind’s ancestors to a part of the East African continent at around 2.5 million years ago. The first of several major, temporally separate transmigrations of early hominid species appears to have occurred between 500,000 years and 1 million years later. We can no longer tell whether such distinct mass migration events were prompted by pressure to escape zoonotic diseases, occurred in response to other selective pressures or were the outcome of incidental attraction to new areas. However by tracing the geographic trajectories of cultural signatures such as toolmaking capacity, we can still deduce the dispersal routes that such migrations followed and posit how the paths of different cultural migrations may have intersected. Such deductions are based on the principal that guided, learned behaviors such as tool making are transmitted from one individual to another. As a consequence, migrating groups of individuals tend to leave similar cultural traces both in their homeland and in their new environment. The stone tools found in the Tabun cave layers suggest that certain characteristic tool making techniques have been stably transmitted through individual

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populations for periods approaching 40,000 years. Thus archeological evidence of stone tools with similar characteristics is a strong indicator of the geographic trajectory taken by past migration events. Nevertheless, by its nature, the reconstruction of prehistoric events from archaeological evidence is usually based on serendipitous findings that form only a partial picture, allowing us to reasonably dismiss certain hypotheses, and favor the likelihood of others.

'APRESOLUTION Some of the gaps that remain in our current view of the chronology of events leading to the colonization of different parts of the world by modern man should be resolvable by applying molecular and genetic techniques to distinguish between certain hypotheses. For instance although both molecular genetic evidence and fossil records support the idea that prehistoric hominid species living in the Levantine had ancestors that came from Ethiopia, it is still unclear whether these Archaic modern humans came out of Africa closer to 220,000 or 130,000 years ago. Archeological studies of multiple sites around the Mount Karmel region have used multiple indicators such as intentional burial behaviors, decorative use of seashells and use of red ochre, to discern trends in the geographic and temporal trajectories of the different hominid species that have inhabited the area. Such studies indicate that Archaic modern man certainly inhabited the Levantine between approximately 140,000 and 90,000 years ago, but was subsequently displaced some 80,000 years ago by a new wave of migrating Neanderthal species who populated the entire near east for at least 20,000 years and eventually spread as far as central and northern Asia. Archaeological techniques also indicate that approximately 50,000 years ago, another migratory event, known to archaeologists as the Upper Paleolithic Revolution, occurred. Around this period, Modern humans migrated through the Levant and possibly through the Arabian Peninsula, into Eurasia and Australia. A controversy still remains over where these Modern humans originated. One proposal based on comparison of stone tool characteristics suggests that their origins were in South Africa. This hypothesis is somewhat at odds with paleogenetic data and others favor the alternative view that the ancestors of Modern humans came rather from regions of the Nile valley and possibly parts of East Africa.

#ONTEXTDEPENDENCY It cannot be over-emphasized how much the deductions that archaeologists make from the cultural signatures of artifacts of learned behavior must always be assessed in the larger context defined by any other archaeological and paleoarchaeological clues that are available. As an example, it would be valid to assume a priori, that any particular group of the stone tool sets recovered from excavations of the mount Karmel regions might have been the cultural forerunners of Modern man’s stone tools. Only the knowledge that Archaic modern man was superceded in his Levantine habitats by a genetically separate species, that later became extinct, allows one to conclude that none of the tools found in the lower

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layers of the Tabun caves can be the prototypes for those fabricated by Modern man in the same geographical locations during the Upper Paleolithic era. As Modern humans progressed from the Levant towards the West, the Neanderthal populations were split and forced to retreat both towards northern Europe and southwards towards the Mediterranean. The existence of remaining outgroups of these branches of the Neanderthals’ descendants in both Gibraltar and in the Crimea can be dated back to between 24,000 years and 28,000 years from the present day. However the displacement of the Neanderthals from the central part of Europe probably did not take longer than a couple of thousand years at most. After the splitting of the Neanderthal territories of Central Europe, the species’ ultimate extinction is presumed to have come about as a consequence of reduced population size, competition for resources and possible physical conflicts with their rivals. While a low level of interbreeding between the Neanderthal and Modern human species might have occurred, it is unlikely ever to be genetically verifiable.

!RTIFACTS There is a higher risk of misinterpreting data obtained at the geographical boundaries of contemporary populations of Neanderthals and Modern man since archeological discoveries may easily become mixed. In one example of this, it has been widely reported in both the media and in learned archaeological texts that a group of late Neanderthals in central France had developed uncharacteristically complex tool-making techniques that are more reminiscent of Modern man’s capacities. Given the absence of continuity of such finds over a substantial temporal or geographical span, it seems much more plausible that the so-called Chatelperronian tools found in the region were actually made by a community of Modern humans. However the group probably lived in sites that had been recently populated by late Neanderthals such that the traces of both species became intermingled. Radiocarbon and thermo luminescence dating of materials excavated in layers from two cave sites in the Southern Caucasus are consistent with the model that the region was one of the later enclaves of the Neanderthals, while Modern humans seem to have arrived there some 35,000 years ago, having first entered Europe some 20,000 years earlier via a route that traversed Bulgaria and progressed west along the Danube.

.O±TIME MACHINE² Expert archaeologists have by no means reached a consensus opinion about all of the major trajectories of hominid migrations. This should serve to illustrate the often-subjective nature of archaeological interpretation and remind us that archaeological reconstructions remain models rather than facts in either the scientific or the philosophical sense of the word. As such they must always remain open to revision in the light of new evidence. Among the currently most-topical areas of controversy, a trajectory for the colonization of Australia via the southern tip of India has been suggested. It is largely based on similarities between stone tool sets recovered from archaeological sites in Africa and India. Carbon dating of tool sets, dates the origins of those recovered from South Africa to approximately 60,000 years ago and those from India to 35,000 years ago. However the relevance of their

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similarities to the construction of a dispersal route model for Australian colonization is eliminated by other reliable data placing the colonization of Australia to around 45,000 years ago.

$IFFERENTROUTESTOTHESAMEPLACE In a similar vein, until very recently the generally favored model for colonization of the Americas has been that it occurred via a dispersal route that progressed from Siberia to Alaska and then proceeded southwards into Southern California and Northern Mexico. This model is now challenged by the recent discovery that contemporary species of American squash plants are of Asian origin and not as previously thought, African. One implication of the new discovery is that the peoples who originally colonized Northern Mexico and imported the first squash seeds must have reached there by boats and not by land. Thus, the possibility arises that our ancestors in different parts of Asia were able to build sea-craft that allowed them to colonize the Americas from the south. In conclusion, given sufficient time and careful fieldwork, the dispersal routes of humans can be traced archaeologically. However, when genetic evidence is available or readily obtainable it should motivate archaeologists to enhance fieldwork, improve dating and speed publication of their findings.

2EFERENCES Bar-Yosef, O. (1998) “On the Nature of Transitions : the Middle to Upper Palaeolithic and the Neolithic Revolution”, Cambridge Archaeological Journal 8(2), 141-163. Bar-Yosef, O. (1999) “Lower Paleolithic Sites in South-Western Asia - Evidence for “Out of Africa” Movements”, Anthropologie, XXXVII(1), 51-69. Bar-Yosef, O. (2000) “The Middle and Early Upper Palaeolithic in southwest Asia and neighboring regions. The Geography of Neandertals and Modern Humans in Europe and the Greater Mediterranean”, (Ed.) BarYosef O. and Pilbeam D., Peabody Museum, Harvard University, Cambridge, Bulletin No. 8, 107-156. Bar-Yosef, O. (2001) “Dating the transition from the Middle to Upper Paleolithic”, Datation : Actes des Rencontres 19-20-21 Octobre 2000, Barrandon J.-N., Guibert P.and Michel V., Antibes, Association pour la Promotion et la Diffusion des Connaissances Archéologiques (APDCA), 279-293. Bar-Yosef, O. (2002) “The Upper Paleolithic revolution”, Annual Review of Anthropology, 31, 363-393. Bar-Yosef, O. (2003) “Away from home : prehistoric colonizations, exchanges and diffusions in the mediterranean basin”, Échanges et diffusion dans la préhistoire Méditerraneenne, B. Vandermeersch, Paris, CTHS : 71-82. Bar-Yosef, O. (2006) “Neanderthals and Modern Humans : A Different Interpretation”, When Neanderthals and Modern Humans Met, N. J. Conard, Rottenburg, Tübingen Publications, Kerns Verlag : 467-482. Bar-Yosef, O., Belfer-Cohen, A. (2001) “From Africa to Eurasia – early dispersals”, Quaternary International 75, 19-28. Carbonell, E., Mosquera, M. et al. (1999) “Out of Africa : the dispersal of the earliest technical systems reconsidered”, Journal of Anthropological Archaeology, 18(2), 119-136. Conard, N. J., Bolus, M. (2003) “Radiocarbon dating and the appearance of modern humans and the timing of cultural innovation in Europe : new results and new challenges”, Journal of Human Evolution 44, 331-371. Forster, P. (2004) “Ice ages and the mitochondrial DNA chronology of human dispersals : a review”, Philosphical Transactions of the Royal Society London B 359, 255-264.

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Kuhn, S. L., Brantingham, P. J. et al. (2004) “The Early Paleolithic and the Origins of Modern Human Behavior”, The Early Upper Paleolithic beyond Western Europe, Brantingham P. J., Kuhn S. L. and Kerry K. W., Berkeley, University of California Press, 242-248. Mellars, P. (2006) “Why did modern human populations disperse from Africa ca. 60,000 years ago ? A new model”, PNAS 103(25), 9381-9386. O’Connell, J. F. and Allen, J. (2004) “Dating the colonization of Sahul (Pleistocene Australia-New Guinea) : a review of recent research”, Journal of Archaeological Science 31, 835-853. Petraglia, A. M. D. (2003) “The Lower Paleolithic of the Arabian Peninsula : Occupations, Adaptations, and Dispersals”, Journal of World Prehistory 17(2), 141-179. Villa, P. (2001) “Early Italy and the colonization of Western Europe”, Quaternary International 75 (Out of Africa in the Pleistocene, Straus, L. G. and O. Bar-Yosef, editors), 113-130.

4HE/RIGINSOF-ODERN(UMANS ,INGUISTIC)SSUES Summary by Moira Cockell of the presentation by Bernard Victorri

What can today’s languages tell us about early human migrations ? How does the science of linguistics contribute to the comprehension of human origins ? What is its potential to advance our understanding of these issues further and what are its limitations ? What are the foreseeable areas where collaboration between linguists and other domains should yield synergistic advances in our knowledge ? Bernard Victorri responds to these questions with yet others : when did our ancestors start speaking and why ? Do all human languages originate from a unique “mother tongue”, or from several independent sources ? Did the introduction of language precede the development of human rational thought or was it the other way round ? These are questions that the analytical methods and tools of historical linguistics alone have not the power to answer, but which might be amenable to comparative methods. He describes how constructing a genealogy of modern languages permits us, in some sense, to go back in time and reconstruct the common ancestor from which all the languages of a family derive. While the accessible time-depths are still too short to address the issue of the origin of language, when they are employed in conjunction with population genetics and archaeology, such studies play an important part in tracing back the history of early migrations of modern humans.

,ANGUAGEISDYNAMIC The present extent of language diversity is such that linguists define around 5000 different spoken languages that are in current use around the world. Other languages have certainly come and gone, leaving little or no written evidence of their past existence. Many of the

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languages in practice today are in the process of extinction. Yet others have undergone recent periods of rapid expansion. It is this dynamic repertoire that provides the raw material that linguists examine for evidence of relationships. Linguistic method involves a reiterative process of applying criteria that permits different languages to be assembled into families and hierarchical groupings. Systematic description of the similarities and differences between modern languages allows linguistics to reconstruct a picture of the evolutionary trajectories that they have followed.

4REEDIAGRAMS In principal, if all of the past steps in language differentiation were equally traceable, it would be possible to reconstruct a faithful tree diagram of how different languages have branched from common origins regressing as far back in time as the scale of human culture itself. In practice, both the number of iterations and the time span over which we can reconstruct the language evolution process is small and the accuracy of our conjectures diminishes with each individual step of the process. The present day state of the art allows us to reconstruct a few of the major trajectories of language evolution with good probability of accuracy over a period of some 6,000 years. However, much language data is still anecdotal and not widely available to broad study, thus adoption of modern techniques to aid collection and systematic analysis of data is soon likely to considerably extend and refine the historical picture of modern language evolution. Nevertheless even the most optimistic estimates suggest that linguistic techniques alone will be unable to retrace the main branches of language divergence beyond roughly 10,000-15,000 years. How do we set about assembling groups of languages ? The first step is based on the relatively simple observation that many different languages employ vocabularies of words (cognates) with similar sounds and meanings that share fairly obvious common origins. The technique of identifying and classifying cognates allows to assign the entire repertoire of modern languages to a few hundred different proto-languages and to follow the history of language evolution over a time span of around three thousand years. Even within this first hierarchical level of groupings, not all rules of language are conserved among individual families ; the lack of common rules for grammatical declension among the modern languages of Latin origin is one example of this. This type of language comparison reveals information about the dynamics of language spread. It can indicate which languages are falling out of use and which are currently enjoying success. We can deduce for instance from the large number of different modern languages in the Bantu family, that within the last 2,000 years, proto-Bantu speakers underwent a large and rapid expansion across the southern half of the African continent. In another example of expansion, the Malayo-Polynesian family constitutes more than 1,000 distinct present day languages spoken across an area extending from Madagascar to Hawaii and New Zealand. Simple logic suggests that such a spectacularly rapid geographical spread of its speakers must have occurred by migration using sea and costal navigation routes and indeed cultural records suggesting that these island peoples have a particularly strong seafaring history are consistent with the same hypothesis.

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0ROTOLANGUAGE The second less trivial step of assembling protolanguage families into larger subgroups attempts to unravel more ancient language relationships by comparing a battery of sophisticated linguistic machineries such as syntactic structures, polysemy and indicators of temporal and spatial concepts. This type of operation presently extends the time-span over which the trends of language evolution can be reconstituted to around 6,000 years or so. It was first successfully used in the 19th century to demonstrate the common origins of the so-called Indo-European languages, which are spoken today across much of Europe and Asia. By the same criteria that assign the Indo-European languages to a single common progenitor or proto-language, the so-called Finno-Ugric languages of Finnish, Hungarian and Estonian are deemed to constitute a separate group with shared origins, In contrast, the modern Basque language of Northern Spain is unrelated to any other known language and is presumed to be the last remaining trace of a group that has otherwise become obsolete. Analyses of distantly related language groups allow us to make inferences about the migrations of the peoples who spoke the proto-languages from which the modern versions are descended. For instance, it is clear that a larger group of languages on the African continent is loosely related to the proto-Bantu family. This group (the Niger-Congo languages) extends over a wider area of South Africa, but interestingly, bears no relationship to a second, smaller group (the Khoisan languages) that is prevalent in sporadic discrete locations distributed throughout the same geographical area. Reconstructions of the trajectory of the spread of the Niger-Congo languages, suggest that the Khoisan speaking populations were pushed south towards the Kalahari Desert and surrounding areas by migrating populations originating from the direction of West Africa. Similarly, the observations that nine other language families are loosely related to the Malayo-Polynesian languages, and that all are found exclusively in the region of Taiwan, strongly suggests that the peoples who spoke the prototype language of this group (proto-Austronesian) were indigenous to Taiwan for many thousands of years before a single branch of them took to the sea in search of new habitats. Models of the trajectory of the spread of the MalayoPolynesian branch of the Austronesian languages, suggest that it began spreading from Taiwan approximately 6,000 years ago and took until about 2,000 years ago to reach the island of Madagascar. These few examples illustrate that linguistics provides us with sufficient information to formulate robust models of how languages have spread over large geographical areas. Such data can reasonably be incorporated into models of human migrations based on other investigative techniques such as archaeology and genetics. In combination, models based on different techniques impose enormous constraints on each other. As a minimum we must try to ensure that models with overlapping timeframes are not inconsistent and if they appear so we should be prepared to re-examine the data from all sides. We should also bear in mind, that while the transmission of language, stone tool making and genetic sequences, all leave temporal and geographical traces of human activity, the rules and constraints that apply to the passage of each are not the same. It is precisely this characteristic that ensures they are not simply three redundant approaches to the same question and that their combined value is greater than the sum of their parts.

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,IMITS How far back can the trajectories of language evolution be traced ? It seems plausible to envisage that a third iterative step will become practical and will yield new insights as the current technological revolution in data collection methods bring quantitative and qualitative improvements to the second ? The limitations of the timeframe to which it can be applied, suggest nevertheless that historical linguistics cannot bring evidence to bear on the specific question of the geographical origins of humankind, However, although it is unrealistic to expect that linguistics can identify the universal mother tongue or progenitor of all human language, it can lead us to propose hypotheses for why human language communication evolved to become so complex. We can speculate that the emergence of concepts such as argumentation and narration, which are thought to be unique to human communication, may actually define fundamental precepts of human cultural and societal development.

2EFERENCES Bellwood, P., Fox J. J., Tryon D. (1995) The Austronesians : Historical and Comparative Perspectives, Australian National University, Canberra. Cavalli-Sforza, L. (1996) Gènes, peuples et langues, Odile Jacob, Paris. Dessalles, J. L., Picq P., Victorri B. (2006) Les origines du langage, Editions du Pommier, Paris. Dixon, R. M. W. (1997) The Rise and Fall of Languages, Cambridge University Press Cambridge. Heine, B., Nurse, D. (Ed.) (2000) African Languages : an Introduction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Hombert, J. M. (Ed.) (2005) Aux origines des langues et du langage, Fayard, Paris. Johansson, S. (2005) Origins of Language, Constraints on Hypotheses, John Benjamins, Amsterdam. Lass, R. (1997) Historical Linguistics and Language Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Mallory, J. P. (1989) In Search of Indo-Europeans : Language, Archaeology, and Myth, Thames and Hudson, London. Nettle, D. (2002) Linguistic Diversity, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Nichols, J. (1992) Linguistic Diversity in Space and Time, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Renfrew, C. (1988) Archaeology and Language : the Puzzle of Indo-European Origins, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Renfrew, C., McMahon, A., Trask, L. (Eds) (2000) Time Depth in Historical Linguistics, McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research. Ruhlen, M. (1994) The Origin of Language : Tracing the Evolution of the Mother Tongue, John Wiley & Sons. Trask, R. L. (1996) Historical Linguistics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

!'ENETIC6IEWOF(UMAN/RIGINS Summary by Moira Cockell of the presentation by Svante Pääbo

The advent of new molecular genetic tools means that the “big” questions of how we humans came to be and how we differ from the species that are our closest living relatives, can now be addressed more powerfully than ever before. Just as human culture has left us clues as to its geographical and temporal trajectory in our present environment, the genetic makeup of modern day humans bears the trace of its evolutionary path. In the same way that linguistics and archaeology attempt to reconstruct the lineage of our cultural history, the science of comparative genomics attempts to reconstruct our ancestral pedigree by interpreting the clues that lie within our own DNA. There are several broad questions about our genetic history for which we are able today to provide clear answers. We now have the potential to address from a genetic standpoint, what distinguishes the human species from other animals and accounts for its phenomenal success to date, in adapting to and exploiting its environment. The complete genomes of humans and chimpanzees are in hand, with other primate species to follow. Equally exciting are the proliferation of studies of gene expression, which examine how the genetic code is employed differently in various tissues and species.

2ECONSTRUCTINGOURANCESTRALPEDIGREE Genetic studies have established that our closest relatives among other living organisms are to be found among the great ape families of Africa. They reveal that humans and chimpanzees shared a common ancestor who lived some 4 to 7 million years ago, while humans and gorillas shared a common ancestor who lived some 6 to 8 million years ago. The sequencing of the complete human genome has established that we each have over 3 billion base pairs of DNA code stored in our chromosomes. By aligning and comparing

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the exact DNA codes within the same small portion of the individual genomes of a large number of randomly selected people inhabiting different geographical locations on the planet, we can obtain a representative measure of genetic variance within the contemporary human population. Comparison with similar data collected from apes then allows us to estimate how the amount of variation between individuals of one species compares to another. One thing such studies tell us is that the level of genetic variation among humans is remarkably small compared to that observed among members of the world’s chimpanzee, gorilla or other great ape populations. A randomly selected pair of human genomes is approximately two to four times more closely related than a randomly selected pair of chimpanzees, despite the much more widespread distribution and vastly greater size of the human population as compared with chimpanzees and other apes. The finding is an indication that constraints on human evolution have been quite different from those that applied to the genetic history of our animal relatives.

±/UTOF!FRICA² Further analyses of human genetic variation illustrates another important point ; although we may discern the geographical antecedents of an individual person with relative ease, we cannot deduce from this information which genetic variants he or she will carry in any particular part of the genome. The broad patterns of genetic variation among humans suggest that all contemporary humans are rather recent descendants of African populations. In order to progress further in understanding the genetic underpinnings that make human beings unique, a crucial issue is how we define what constitutes a human-specific trait. A number of traits that appear superficially defining for humanity are still too vaguely defined to be amenable to genetic studies. In fact, closer inspection has taught us that many of the traits that have traditionally been invoked to put humans on a pedestal and differentiate them from other species, actually reflect quantitative rather than qualitative differences. It has only recently become clear that tool use, cultural evolution and the rudiments of language, are phenomena that also exist in chimpanzees and other apes. The need to define more rigorously whether there exist any genuinely qualitatively humanspecific traits, is an area where input from diverse disciplines such as animal behaviorists, comparative psychologists, linguists, would now be extremely valuable. The comparative analysis of genomes and gene function in humans and the great apes allows us to directly see mutations in the genetic code, and identify which of them may have led to important differences in gene activity. The results acquired so far indicate that gene activity in the the male germ line has been the target of much positive selection in both human and chimpanzee ancestors. There are also more subtle indications of positive selection in the brain, but only in humans and not in chimpanzees. Comparative expression studies within different tissues of a single organism should in future be helpful to understand how genetic changes affect functional aspects of gene regulation ; What genes are turned on and off ? ; When and where are they expressed in our bodies ? ; How are their individual expression patterns coordinated with each other ?

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4HEGENETICBASISOFHUMAN SPECI½CTRAITS In the meantime a few genes do qualify as good candidates for being involved in humanspecific traits. Studies of the genetic changes associated with the evolution of one such gene called FOXP2, illustrate some of the challenges that face comparative genetics today. It has emerged from medical studies, that FOXP2 is somehow involved in language articulation. The presence of a characteristic set of heritable language defects in some humans of correlates with the presence in their DNA of mutations that specifically inactivate this gene. However as FOXP2 also controls the expression of many other genes, we are still far from understanding the molecular basis for its influence on language articulation. Interestingly, the overall sequence and structure of the protein encoded by FOXP2 has been maintained over a very long period during evolution, indicating that its functions are not uniquely associated with language. Nevertheless, several alterations to a particular part of its sequence show clear evidence of having undergone recent positive selection. Based on the studies available, it is plausible that the differences between the human and ape sequences allowed better coordination of the oropharynx muscles, thus increasing the repertoire of distinguishable noises that could be generated. Ethical considerations clearly prevent our testing this hypothesis by attempting to generate the reverse changes in humans, however several other investigative approaches might be considered. If sufficient sequencing resources ever became available, one could hope to identify naturally occurring back-mutations in the human population and ask whether their presence also correlates with any language-related phenotype. The use of animal models to investigate whether genetically engineered introduction of the same alteration to the DNA sequence gives rise to any characterizable change in the animal, might constitute an ethically tolerable alternative approach. However, an obvious limitation is given by the fact that modifications in FOX2P are hypothesized to have influenced “late” events in the human evolutionary trajectory. Pääbo’s group have shown that FOX2P was the target of positive selection that most probably occurred during the last 250,000 years, i.e., much later for instance, than the divergence between anatomically modern humans and the Neanderthals. This is compatible with the idea that articulate language was a trait that distinguished modern humans and Neanderthals. Thus, recreation of the human FOXP2 sequence in a mouse or other small mammal, could well have no discernable effect, simply because such species probably lack other evolutionary changes in the molecular machinery that acts in concert with FOXP2.

.EANDERTHALGENOMES Some might argue that all the most interesting genetic changes in our genomes are likely to have occurred in the relatively recent past. Recent advances in the ability to study ancient DNA, promise to revolutionize humankind’s capacity to identify genetic changes that have characterized the latest stages of its evolutionary trajectory. In the last decade, Pääbo’s group has developed techniques for the retrieval of DNA from archaeological and paleontological remains. They have used them to study the genetic makeup of the Neanderthals ; the more archaic form of hominin species that archaeological records show to have peopled Western Asia and Europe before modern humans migrated from Africa.

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Comparative analyses of the mitochondrial DNA sequences from Neanderthal bones recovered from different archaeological excavation sites in Europe and western Asia suggest that the Neanderthals diverged from the ancestors of modern humans about half a million years ago. Together with other findings, they support a scenario in which modern humans originated from small African populations that colonized the rest of the world rather recently. There appears to have been no substantial mixing of their gene pool with the resident archaic humans who were their evolutionary contemporaries. With state of the art techniques, it now appears a feasible task to obtain a rough draft of the complete Neanderthal genome sequence from particularly well-preserved bone that is essentially free of contamination by human DNA. This tool should in principal allow to identify regions of the human genome where recent positive selection has taken place and thus furnish us with candidate genes that may influenced humanity’s most recently evolved features.

2EFERENCES Enard, W., Khaitovich, P., Klose, J., Zöllner, S., Heissig, F., Giavalisco, P., Nieselt-Struwe, K., Muchmore, E., Varki, A., Ravid, R., Doxiadis, G.M., Bontrop, R.E., and Pääbo, S. (2002) “Intra- and interspecific variation in primate gene expression patterns”, Science 296, 340-343. Enard, W., Przeworski, M., Fisher, S.E., Lai, C.S.L., Wiebe, V., Kitano T., Monaco, A.P., and Pääbo, S. (2002) “Molecular evolution of FOXP2, a gene involved in speech and language”, Nature 418, 869-872. Enard, W. and Pääbo, S. (2004) “Comparative primate genomics”, Ann. Rev. Genomics Hum. Genet. 5, 351-78. Green, R.E., Krause, J., Ptak, S.E., Briggs, A.W., Ronan, M.T., Simons, J.F., Du L., Egholm, M., Rothberg, J.M., Paunovic, M. Pääbo S. (2006) “Analysis of one million base pairs of Neanderthal DNA”, Nature 444, 330-36. Kaessmann, H., Wiebe, V., and Pääbo, S. (1999) “Extensive nuclear DNA sequence diversity among chimpanzees”, Science 286, 1159-1162. Khaitovich, P., Hellmann, I., Enard, W., Nowick, K., Leinweber, M., Franz, H., Weiss, G., Lachmann, M., Pääbo S. (2005) “Parallel patterns of evolution in the genomes and transcriptomes of humans and chimpanzees”, Science 209, 1850-1854. Khaitovich, P., Enard, W., Lachmann, M. Pääbo, S. (2006) Evolution of primate gene expression”, Nature Reviews Genetics 7, 693-702. Krings, M., Stone, A., Schmitz, R.W., Krainitzki, H., Stoneking, M., and Pääbo S. (1997) “Neandertal DNA sequences and the origin of modern humans”, Cell 90, 19-30. Pääbo, S. (1989) “Ancient DNA ; extraction, characterization, molecular cloning and enzymatic amplification”, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 86, 1939-1943. Pääbo, S., Poinar, H., Serre, D., Jaenicke-Després, V., Hebler, J., Rohland, N., Kuch, M., Krause, J., Vigilant, L., and Hofreiter, M. (2004) “Genetic analyses from ancient DNA”, Ann. Rev. Genetics 38, 645-79.

#HAPTER +NOWLEDGE$IALOGUE !CADEMIC)NSTITUTIONAL 'OVERNANCE %DUCATIONAND %XPERIENCES

3OCIETAL2ESPONSIBILITYOF5NIVERSITIES 7ISDOMAND&ORESIGHT,EADING TOA"ETTER7ORLD by Richard R. Ernst

The essay summarizes this author’s view on the role and responsibility of universities and researchers in a world taking a course that all too often deviates from a beneficial, sustainable direction. In many respects, we are living today shortsightedly on the account of future generations. In this situation, universities carry a heavy load of responsibility, bearing in mind that they educate the citizens of tomorrow, especially the political, economic, and spiritual key leaders. The independence of academic teachers gives them the liberty to express their views freely and honestly in the hope of influencing the long-term societal development. Scientific explorations of the foundations of nature are important for gaining further knowledge to address urgent issues of our common future. However, in addition, we academics are obliged to develop wisdom for comprehending the transdisciplinary and trans-cultural connections that provide clues for solving major pending problems. An overarching view may help us to conceive innovative societal models and to find possible avenues that will lead towards sustainable prosperity and human dignity for all citizens on our globe. What shortsightedness and overestimation of ourselves to believe that the world has been created just for the sake of man ; and that our obligations are restricted to picking and enjoying the fruits, and to multiply ! What arrogance to claim that we are the crown of creation ! Such a conclusion could perhaps be drawn from Moses 1 :28 and 1 :29 : “Be fertile and become many. Fill the land and conquer it. Dominate the fish of the sea, the birds of the sky, and every beast that walks the land. Behold, I have given you every seed bearing plant on the face of the earth, and every tree that has seed bearing fruit. It shall be to you for food”. These words had been written more than 3000 years before the limits of growth became frightfully apparent. It does not take much foresight to predict a finite lifetime of human civilization, provided we continue our present lifestyle and are not willing to make major concessions for preserving our living grounds. Soon, fossil energy will be gone ; soon, the oceans will be devoid of any eatable fish ; soon, the water level in many counties

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Knowledge Dialogue: Academic Institutional Governance, Education and Experiences

will be too low to pump out sufficient drinking water or even water for irrigation ; soon, the fertility of the over-exploited fields will start to decrease at a dangerous rate ; soon, the man-made climate change will be too rapid and radical to permit us to take proper remedies ; soon, antibiotics needed to prevent epidemics become ineffective ; soon, the gap between the rich and the poor will become sufficiently large to lead to unrest on a global scale. A truly doomsday scenario is inevitable unless we drastically change our attitudes ! Changes are needed in our educational endeavors as outlined in Part 1, as well as in the relations of the university to society as discussed in Part 2.

7ISDOMANDRESPONSIBILITYINACADEMICEDUCATION In spite of all our precious genes, we are born in a rather helpless state. We need a great deal of love, care, and of education in order to become viable members of human society. Our inborn instincts are not sufficient for survival and for contributing our share to the survival of mankind. Twenty and more years are needed for trimming ourselves for social integration, for reducing our inborn egoism, and for developing compassion, mutual understanding, and responsibility. Few societal issues receive wider public agreement than the need for first class education within our schools and universities. Indeed, it is likely that the level of education worldwide will determine the ultimate fate of mankind and of the global environment. We often use the term “Knowledge Society” to emphasize the importance of knowledge for success in business and in life. Those who know more are expected to accomplish more and to earn more and in the end, they are expected to live a happier life than the rest – this is true, to some extent, but is “knowledge” alone really sufficient ? In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia (WWWWIKIPEDIAORG), we read : “Knowledge is information of which a person, organization or other entity is aware. Knowledge is gained either by experience, learning and perception, or through association and reasoning. The term knowledge is also used to mean the confident understanding of a subject, potentially with the ability to use it for a specific purpose. The unreliability ofmemory limits the certainty of knowledge about the past, while unpredictability of events yet to occur limits the certainty of knowledge about the future. Epistemology is the philosophical study of the nature, origin, and scope of knowledge”. Knowledge is gained from experiments and measurements, followed by data processing and data reduction. Knowledge is ‘known information’. It fills heads, books, and computer memories, and can be retrieved by sophisticated information retrieval systems. However, the ultimate goal is not the collection of knowledge or facts but attaining, what we may call, “wisdom”. Wisdom characterizes a state of comprehensive humanness. In its evasiveness, it is much harder to comprehend than knowledge. It cannot easily be measured nor quantified. In Wikipedia we find the following definition : “Wisdom is the ability, developed through experience, insight and reflection, to discern truth and exercise good judgment. It is sometimes conceptualized as an especially well developed form of common sense. Most psychologists regard wisdom as distinct from the cognitive abilities measured by standardized intelligence tests. Wisdom is often considered to be a trait that can be developed by experience, but not taught. When applied to practical matters, the term wisdom is synonymous with prudence. The status of wisdom or prudence as a virtue

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is recognized in cultural, philosophical and religious sources. Some define wisdom in a utilitarian sense, as foreseeing consequences and acting to maximize the long-term common good”. Wisdom is, so to say, the ultimate distillate of lifelong experience. Wisdom might be found in immortal books, wisdom might be transferred from great teachers to students ; but without personal experience, true wisdom cannot develop nor will it last. Wisdom has much to do with a broad view, with the comprehension of connectivity. Wisdom does not brag, it does not serve personal advantages, and it will never lead to exploiting others. Wisdom is accompanied by modesty, truthfulness, and farsightedness. The term wisdom is often used in combination with compassion. In fact, the two terms can hardly be separated. Both have the same goal : living in harmony with the environment and contributing actively to the wellbeing of others. Compassion comprises the emotional aspects, such as love and pity, while wisdom results from a deep understanding with a strong intellectual component. Knowledge is indispensable for reaching wisdom and for exerting compassion, but it is operative on a different, more supportive level. It acts like inorganic soil, like a fertilizing agent on which life in the form of plants, animals, and tenderhearted beings can subsist. But its neutrality may also allow weed and deadly bacteria to grow. An obvious example is the knowledge on nuclear power that can be used for peaceful and for destructive purposes. Knowledge does not establish a matching pair together with compassion.

4HEFUNCTIONOFSCHOOLS The preceding remarks define also the ultimate goals of our schools and universities. They carry the ambition to convey more than just knowledge in the form of facts that fill notebooks and heads. The goal is to render the students fit for life, hopefully for a happy and rewarding life. We know that intelligence, brainpower, and factual knowledge are insufficient for acting as a human being. It is evident that knowledge must be supplemented by years of personal experience, by inter-human relations, by joy and suffering. One might argue that such experience can not be gained in formal schooling, and that schools may safely restrict their function to providing knowledge and skills, in other words, to the training of well qualified professionals, leaving the human development of the students to their own initiative outside of the school. Indeed, this attitude is being pursued all too often at universities by educating specialists who know an incredible amount of details about a very narrow subject. Encyclopedic knowledge seems to be indispensable in many professions, particularly in the scientific world, if one wants to succeed and to advance to the front line where the current innovations take place. I would like to argue differently : Life is too short and too precious that one can afford to spend preparatory twenty or even twenty five years in school, just memorizing facts and recipes, in the hope that they can once, in the future, be applied fruitfully to “real life”. We like to use the metaphor of stuffing a backpack with knowledge for life, but often the contents will become outdated or irrelevant much before an occasion arises for their profitable application. I prefer schools with a lively community of students and teachers working on real problems and acquiring lasting experiences invaluable for life. Experience cannot be gained without doing experiments. “Trial and error” and “learning by doing” are in this context of utmost importance. The learning efficiency of sitting in a lecture room with

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unidirectional teaching can be frightfully low. It is advisable to reduce such classroom activities to a minimum. A limited number of survey lectures might be useful for conveying fascination and enthusiasm to the students in view of what they are supposed to learn, but the learning proper must be done by the students themselves in the laboratory, in nature, in discussion groups, in the library, or in a quiet room by reading and writing. Project-oriented learning has particularly high efficiency. Projects provide a realistic environment where many unforeseeable incidences occur, just as in real life. In taskoriented learning, the students themselves select those courses or study subjects that are relevant for solving the problems encountered in the course of their projects. In this way, student researchers are naturally filled with motivation to study in depth the relevant subjects. They develop personal initiative to structure their own learning process. Frequently, the curiosity, excited in this way, carries the researcher to different subjects, off the main road, that might even lead to an unexpected discovery or to novel insights. It is here that serendipity has the raw material on which to act. Old teaching wisdom dictates that the foremost teaching goal is to motivate the student, to stimulate his or her curiosity, and then the learning will proceed by itself.

)NTERDISCIPLINARITY Interdisciplinarity appears to be sufficiently important to deserve a special, rather extended section within this brief essay. Project-oriented activities and “learning by doing” are invariably inter-disciplinary and reach beyond the scope of a single faculty. Nature does not classify the problems to be solved according to anthropomorphic disciplines ! Innovation and creative problem solving happen most frequently right at the interdisciplinary boundaries. An excellent example for demonstrating the importance of an inter-disciplinary approach is the field of science in which the author was active for more than 40 years, Nuclear Magnetic Resonance or NMR [Ernst, 1987]. A brief synopsis of NMR shall serve for illustrative purposes. The story starts in the rather esoteric field of elementary particle physics. Many atomic nuclei possess a built-in magnetic moment. Applying a strong external magnetic field leads to a precession of the magnetic moments about the direction of the field with rates determined by the magnetic field strength. This precession of atomic nuclei in a magnetic field is called nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR). It is a fundamental phenomenon that reveals most enlightening applications of quantum mechanics for demonstrating basic principles. However at first, it hardly appeared to be useful for a broader society. By pure accident, it was found 1950 that the chemical environment of the nuclei has a magnetic shielding effect on the magnetic field experienced by the nuclei and is reflected in the measured NMR frequencies. Each atomic nucleus within a molecule exhibits a different resonance frequency, and each molecule shows a characteristic spectrum of frequencies. These “fingerprints” allow for powerful applications to the chemical analysis of substances and in this way, NMR became an indispensable analytical tool in chemistry and in the chemical industry. Experimental NMR developed into a truly high-tech field that, in many respects, stretches current technical limits. Extremely strong and stable magnetic fields are needed.


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The emitted NMR signals are incredibly weak and require advanced high-frequency electronics for their reception. In addition, complex computer routines became indispensable for the analysis of the highly informative experimental data. NMR truly challenged the technological development. Mathematics in the form of the Fourier transformation has lead to a revolution in the experimental NMR procedures. The Nobel Prize citation of the author mentions this achievement as a major breakthrough. The recording of the inherently low sensitivity NMR spectra could be speeded up several orders of magnitude by a pulsed excitation of all resonances in parallel. With a mathematical Fourier transformation, the various resonance frequencies can then be disentangled readily. The gained sensitivity improvement was seminal for the application to complex bio-molecules and for entering the medical field. Later, it was found that the three-dimensional structure of biological macromolecules in solution could be determined by an extension of NMR spectroscopy, making a great impact on molecular biology. Instead of one-dimensional NMR spectra, two- and threedimensional spectra are used for this purpose. 2D and 3D spectra visualize the mutual proximity of nuclei within the chemical bonding network of the molecules. Inter-nuclear distances can also be measured and represented in this way. Based on two complementary types of two-dimensional spectra, it is then possible to triangulate the positions of the magnetic atomic nuclei within a biological macromolecule. This allows the determination of accurate three-dimensional models of bio-molecules. The molecular structures thus obtained became indispensable for studying the function and interaction of biologically relevant enzymes and functional building blocks. Three decades ago, an exciting possibility was discovered for medical NMR applications. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) beautifully reveals the inner secrets of patients in a clinical environment. By the application of magnetic field gradients, it is possible to localize the origin of an NMR signal emitted from an organ in a human body and to derive fascinating images that reveal much about healthy or diseased organs and delivers invaluable information for a clinician who is planning surgery. Today, MRI provides the most powerful and universal diagnostic tool for clinicians interested in the health condition of soft tissue. Especially in the context of cancer diagnosis, the method is of undisputed value. Most recently, functional MRI (fMRI) procedures were developed that allow a detailed study of brain functions. Today, most of the functions of a brain can be localized accurately in the brain matter. This development has paved the way to revealing insights for psychologists who can study in great detail the human reactions and the interplay of various senses. For numerous brain diseases, diagnostic markers have been developed already. Much further development can be expected in the near future, improving our understanding of the most complex and most fascinating human organ, the brain.

!METAPHOR NMR has taken advantage of mathematics, physics, and electronics for solving problems in chemistry, biology, and clinical medicine. In the near future, even the practice of clinical psychology might become unthinkable without access to functional MRI. Today NMR is indeed today a truly multi-disciplinary endeavor.

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A close interaction between academic institutions and industry was seminal for the design of the required sophisticated NMR spectrometers. The development started in the 1950’s within the Stanford Industrial Park that was the birthplace of the famous Silicon Valley. It became a metaphor for the benefits of university-industry collaboration. The development of NMR spectrometers at Varian Associates in Palo Alto, California, presents an excellent example for such fruitful interaction. The author was personally active at Varian in the 1960’s. A similar collaboration between academia and industry, on a somewhat smaller scale, took place a little later in Switzerland between ETH Zürich and the company Trüb-Täuber. It led finally, to the foundation of Bruker-BioSpin, the present worldwide market leader in NMR. The author was also actively involved in this interaction. Multi-disciplinary research activities and cooperation are indispensable in many other fields as well. In this context, one often makes the experience that collaboration between narrow-minded experts, knowledgeable in one field only, is difficult if not impossible. Collaboration is most efficient when the involved researchers are acquainted themselves with several fields. A strong overlap of knowledge is highly desirable. The consequences for university teaching are obvious. Multi-disciplinary education is a must for those who desire to work at the frontier of science. Obviously, the wide range of inter-disciplinary demands on the students and researchers is enormous. Nevertheless, disciplinary detailed knowledge, in at least one field, is indispensable. All-rounders without depth will achieve little or nothing. One may summarize the situation in the aphorism : Focusing is indispensable for understanding, while widening the scope is needed for comprehension.

(UMANITIESANDSOCIALSCIENCES Multi-disciplinary education does not stop at the outskirts of science. We should not forget how much in our world is beyond the realities explored by the exact, natural sciences. The sciences impose on themselves restrictions for exploring exclusively phenomena of nature that can be measured reproducibly and quantitatively. The humanities have a wider scope and deal also with all human and inter-human aspects. They try to comprehend human reactions and thoughts, feelings, anxieties and happiness, perhaps even love and hatred. And the social sciences provide clues for understanding the functioning and malfunctioning of human communities and societal structures. Their fascinating and highly relevant conclusions cannot be disregarded, when planning our future. Technology is not sufficient ! Many phenomena in the human sciences cannot be quantified. Nevertheless, today, the human sciences are under pressure to apply methods similar to the ones of the natural sciences in order to be taken seriously. Sometimes, one is struck by the feeling that the powerful methodology of the natural sciences is running like a steamroller over the human sciences. Many of the relevant subtleties of the humanities are swept under the carpet in this way. A certain resistance against the rational and materialistic attitudes of the natural sciences is in order to save some of the traditional humanistic spirit. There is little doubt that we, “the exact scientists”, can learn much from the humanities and social sciences. On the other hand, the latter are equally dependent on our technological discoveries and achievements for their professional functioning and for their


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personal survival. Obviously, there is an urgent need for breaking the long-standing barriers between natural sciences, humanities, and social sciences, also within our universities. We need combined projects addressing questions that cannot be solved by one discipline alone ; and many questions concerning our global future are of this kind. In addition, we need discussion groups and think tanks that combine the knowledge of all faculties in order to progress, perhaps, towards the ‘wisdom’ necessary for developing visions of a beneficial, future. I will return to this point below.

4HEARTS While the humanities are still part of an intellectual perception of reality, the arts are devoted, in addition, to human sensuality in its widest meaning. In the arts, the senses and their sensations are taken seriously, even if many experiences happen rather subconsciously, such as in musical adventures. The humanities attempt to rationalize artistic impressions, functioning as external observers of the arts and applying a descriptive, historical, and analytical view. Often, they concentrate on a classification of the art’s products, while the innermost artistic message can only be emotionally experienced by a devout, patient, and humble observer and by active artists themselves. A true appreciation of art requires a personal involvement in the form of a performing artist or interpreter and is beyond an impersonal scientific and often rather stuffy humanistic analysis. Let us read, as an example of revealing art, some beautiful words, written by Jalaluddin Rumi : The morning wind spreads its fresh smell. We must get up and take that in, that wind that lets us live. Breathe before it’s gone. Twenty-five unpretentious words that span a poetic world, full of spirit ! Here, the author seems to me to be not far from what we aspire to mean by the term ‘wisdom’. How should we scientists deal with the arts ? Shall we ignore art or try to integrate it into our scientific edifice ? Shall we take advantage of artists’ gifts to enhance the appeal of our results for better performance on the intellectual market ? I am convinced that true art can never be “useful” in this sense. Art cannot be exploited or it ceases to exist. Art has rather a complementary function that supplements other, more intellectual human activities and sets an imaginative and reflective contrast. The relevant contacts between the arts and the sciences happen deeply within our personal sense of life, the domain where all experiences and emotions unite to form our self, the self that defines our identity and that renders our life meaningful and unique. Here in the union of arts, humanities, and science, finally, we find the true origin of all encompassing wisdom. Wisdom is often transitory. It may be experienced just as brief glimpses or flashes of revelations that reveal eternal insights and lead to moments of comprehension. Such mental experiences have enormously stimulated the development of all human activities from the arts to religion, and to science. In fact, science and the arts have much in common. It is said that those humans who maintain some of their youthful curiosity and spontaneity often tend to become scientists, or artists. Both are fields driven by creativity and invention.

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4HETWO LEGGEDPERSON In place of a summary, I would like to invoke the metaphor of a two-legged person for describing my vision of a well-balanced human being. The first leg stands for his (or her) professional activities, which might have been developed to near perfection. Nevertheless, it remains difficult for a professional to hop on a single leg towards a distant goal down a long and dusty road. Symbolically, he or she needs a second leg, representing his or her complementary passionate interests. These may be and should be centered far outside the professional realm, forcing the person into an almost painfully wide spreading of the imaginary legs – painful, for example, due to the lack of time needed to pursue all interests simultaneously. Only these additional passions, irrespective of their particularities – they need not be artistic – give the person a safe stand and allow him to progress. The spare-time passions provide more than just relaxation and enjoyment. They are often a rewarding source of professional and human creativity and inspiration. Analogies between remote subjects, brought into juxtaposition within our mind, are most inspiring and invaluable for inventive searchers and researchers. Indeed, in personal terms, I like to consider myself as such a two-legged, perhaps even a three-legged person. My early personal interest for science, particularly for experimental chemistry, developed during my teens in parallel to my active enthusiasm for music, having played the violoncello and composed classical music. Chemistry and music formed my two legs for the first 35 years. And indeed, they were complementary in many respects ; my knowledge of NMR opened the avenues to the wide world ; and music laid the foundation to a harmonious family life, my wife playing the violin and I playing the cello already on our very first encounter. In addition, I experienced how mentally similar the activities of a scientific author and of a musical composer are. Having written a piece of complex music is as equally rewarding as writing a complex scientific paper. Both evoke a mix of pride and inadequacy. In retrospection, I was hardly ever satisfied with my own products in either field. There are indeed close analogies between science and writing music. For example, a sonata and a scientific paper are similarly structured with “introduction”, “exposition”, “development”, “recapitulation”, and “coda”. The parallel voices in a musical composition find their analogy in the harmonious or disharmonious cooperation of several authors on a research work. Musical compositions are full of symmetries and broken symmetries that are so essential in fundamental physics as well as in nature. Symmetries radiate special appeal to the human mind. They act on us like rhymes in poetry. We all know that three legs are better than two for a stable stand. Indeed, I later came to acquire a third leg that has been very precious and important to me. I discovered my love for Tibetan paintings quite accidentally [Ernst, 2001, 2004]. Tibetan painting art is unique in the way it blends with the entire daily and spiritual life of Tibetans. Through fascinating and most colorful paintings, called thangkas, one easily gains access to virtually all aspects of their culture and customs. All human activities are represented skillfully in this great art of Central Asia. Tibet holds a special position at the interface between the different Asian cultural trends originating from India, China, Persia, and Mongolia. All these cultures left their traces in Tibetan painting art. Nevertheless, the latter developed its own very particular style. Tibetan painting art is inseparable from Buddhist philosophy and spirituality. Even for a rational Western scientist, Buddhism is easy to comprehend due to its simple philo-


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sophical and ethical rules that are not in contradiction to our basic scientific principles. The colorful surface of Tibetan painting art and the enormous complexity of the Tibetan pantheon can be disturbing (and fascinating) on the first sight. But soon one realizes that the multitudes of displayed deities have been conceived as metaphors for philosophical principles and are in no way assuming or even frightening. It is the author’s experience that the deeper one digs into the fundamentals of a particular religion, the more similarities between religions one discovers. In fact, all the great religions have common foundations and only their superficial and, after all, irrelevant manifestations differ. It is just such irrelevancies that are indeed responsible for many of our sad clashes of cultures. If we would take them less seriously in their claims for infallibility, the coexistence of cultures could be more harmonious. In this way, we have closed the circle from the introductory critical remarks to a more comprehensive view of the position of man and woman in the universe. The first part of this essay may be taken as a plea for education towards bias-free and limit-less openness, combined with critical thinking, and, most importantly, combined with wisdom and compassion, leading to personal responsibility.

4HECURRENTWORLDSITUATIONANDTHERESPONSIBILITYOFUNIVERSITIES The attainment of personal wisdom, described above, helps individuals to become wellbalanced human beings. But academic professionals are not luxury plants, nurtured by society, for their own pleasure. The dilemma is well expressed by Nawab Jan-Fishan Khan (19th c. Afghanistan) : The candle is not there to illuminate itself. The academic community has a mission and a function within human society that alone justifies the great public expenses for universities. First of all and most importantly, as discussed above, universities have an educational function, fostering a next generation of citizens, specialists, and societal leaders. Education is by far the major obligation of universities. Karl Popper said [Popper, 1996] : “I am thinking of the obligation of each intellectual to help others for liberating themselves and for developing a critical mind, a duty which most intellectuals have forgotten since Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Unfortunately, the desire to impress and, as Schopenhauer said, to infatuate instead of instructing is wide spread among intellectuals”. Students shall be educated broadly and comprehensively as explained in part 1. We do not need mere experts knowing everything about very little. Encyclopedic knowledge is better stored in databases. Society is in need of innovative and initiative citizens who are ready to assume responsibility. Before mentioning possible societal responsibilities of academics, let us have a candid look at today’s world.

!SOBERVIEWOFOUR,IVES Our daily lives become ever more hectic. Competition is lurking behind each corner. In order to succeed, everybody has to run faster. We scientists have to produce more inventions and to write more papers per unit time, stimulating industry to produce more (often useless) consumer products. The consumer is encouraged to buy and consume more to

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keep industrial productivity up. Indeed, the term “consumer” is a very ugly, but accurate designation of our function from the viewpoint of economic productivity. We serve as incessantly consuming black holes for empting the shelves in the supermarket. Occasional abdominal pains are regarded as quite natural and further stimulate the sales of pharmacies and the visits of medical doctors. A well functioning self-sustaining system of consumption ! – We produce piles of waste in this manner ; and in the evening before sleeping, we ask ourselves : what sense does all this hectic activity make ? We can hardly expect to find a reassuring answer. Nevertheless, next morning, we continue to operate our senseless treadmill. Robert H. Frank, a professor at Cornell University has well characterized the situation : “That many goods become more attractive to us when others also have those means that consumption spending has much in common with a contagious illness. The explosive proliferation of sport-utility vehicles in American parking lots is simply unintelligent” [Frank, 1999]. True, there is no life without dissipation. Thermodynamically, life represents a state far from equilibrium that can only be maintained by dissipation. To live means to commit environmental sins. The pertinent question is not whether to live on the account of the surroundings or not, but to which extent, and how this extent could be further minimized. Today, humane forces that could give life a deeper meaning, a sense, are lacking. The balance of incentives and interests, described in the first part, has been lost. The only remaining drive (today we would call it a Mega-trend) is making money. In some “advanced” countries, even the children in elementary school are trained in the procedures of fast moneymaking. Indeed, all forms of success are, ultimately, measured in monetary units. The dance around the golden calf with all its excesses has become actual reality today as hardly ever before in history since Moses and Aaron in the 13th century BC ! Ethics has no longer a place in our world, except when it can be exploited for moneymaking purposes. Money-mindedness is probably the most abundant and most dangerous disease today !

!SOBERVIEWOFTODAY´SWORLD Our world seems to be in a process of disintegration, despite all available means of communication and much too inexpensive means of transportation. Also in our world at large, fairness and compassion are ebbing, leaving behind plain ruthless egoism and hardheaded money-mindedness. Politics . Perhaps, the most frequently declared political goal today is to install universal ‘human freedom’ for all citizens in all countries ; freedom from all conceivable restraints. Its attainment appears to sanctify nearly all, even detestable means to reach the goal. Freedom is unquestionably one of the most precious of human rights. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations of the 10th December 1948, ‘freedom’ is defined in a universally accepted formulation : “Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”.


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Inspired by this admirable document, a number of major wars has been started and, some of them, not yet terminated. Often, it is claimed that bringing freedom to an alien country gives the aggressor blessings, rendering him a savior ! – Blessing – by whom ? It is certainly not by the UN or by the World community ! In many cases, ‘bringing freedom’ is no more than just a pretext for extending the domain of influence and power, leading to commercial dominance and opening new markets for questionable products, and getting access to the dwindling energy resources. Once again, monetary and power cravings are the real driving forces. The justification of aggression is frequently based on undeniable historical facts but the chain of previous historical fact is often purposely discontinued at an instance suitable to leave the guilt on the shoulders of an adversary. Instead of justifying crimes, it would be more appropriate to listen to Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) : “an eye for an eye – makes the whole world blind”. Crimes, even crimes done in revenge, never lead to a lasting and just peace ! Economy. Another misunderstood interpretation of ‘freedom’ underlies the ideology of ‘free market economy’. A free market implies freedom for the stronger, the more successful entrepreneurs. It gives the stronger ones the ’freedom’ to take advantage, by legal means, of the weaker ones, making grandiose profits on the account of the needy. This process further enriches the rich and impoverishes the poor. Today, all success of business is measured in monetary units by using the shareholder value as a well-accepted indicator. Right is merely what pays out ! Free market economy is conceived as a freely running system under the only constraint of optimizing profits. The principle is highly functional, and, at first sight, also appears to the advantage of the consumer when, under competitive pressure, prices drop (usually, quality drops as well !). However, the consumer’s advantages are illusory because the large and powerful international companies decide on the products the consumer has to consume. Psychological marketing, exploiting the naivety of the consumer, is of paramount importance today. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the free market system is the disrespect of possible long-term damage of the environment and the plundering of the finite natural resources. Well before the damaging effects of our selfish misusage become apparent, the gains are dissipated in luxury. The claimed self-correcting features of a free-market feedback system are ineffective in the longer term ; they just serve only to optimize the short-term profits. Here the instigation of control mechanisms by impartial authorities is indispensable. The consequences of the ruthless usage of misunderstood ‘freedom’ in political and economic respects are become frightfully apparent today. Our world is in the course of being split into two parts ; the affluent one and the suffering, despairing, and impoverished one. Obviously, a split world is an inherently unstable one. The strong gradient of wealth and (apparent) happiness engenders a strong surge to commit crimes for correcting injustice and suffering. This gradient can only be maintained by brute force, for example by the building of separating walls and barbed wire fences. The first known example is the Great Wall in China With many further real walls erected in the millennia since then. Even, more mental walls have been created to also separate social groupings, and some of these also still exist today. Certainly, the worst walls are those in our own heads. They lead to preconceived notions and to racial hatred.

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/URACADEMICMISSION As I see it, in this sick world, the academic community is obliged to fulfill a rescue mission. It is essential to realize that this mission is truly long-term. An immediate beneficial result can hardly be expected. Universities and the academic community possess no executive power. Their influence is through conviction by giving good advice and through public teaching. By far the most powerful means universities possess to influence the steering of our global space ship is through education of students. Today’s students are tomorrow’s leaders in politics and in industry. The positive seeds that are implanted into their brains might germinate after one or two decades. But several further societal obligations rest on the shoulders of our universities : Life-Long-Learning. We all know how essential learning and re-learning remains during the entire life span. Obviously, everybody has his personal responsibility to remain up-to-date. But the universities should be encouraged to offer opportunities to all for the refreshment of one’s own knowledge. Academics in industry and public life should obtain opportunities to return regularly to the university to refill their intellectual backpack, to get acquainted with the most modern technology, and, particularly, to critically reflect on the present course of industry, society, and our world today. The preparation of suitable courses and seminars by the faculty is quite demanding. Often, the professionals in industry have gained more experience and know far more than the university professors, scratching their heads detached in their ivory towers. For this reason, it is indispensable that all university professors spend at least once in their career an extended time period in industry or in a public institution outside of the university. Only in this way, can they develop a proper understanding of life beyond their realm. I myself spent nearly five years in industry in the US just after finishing my studies, and have I profited enormously from the experience for the entirety of my subsequent career in teaching and research. Life-Long-Learning applies to everybody, and universities should also offer courses for non-professional citizens. Many possible means exist for implementing this demand : from TV broadcasts to articles in the daily, weekly, or monthly press, to public lectures, courses on special subjects, and days of Open House at university institutes. In this context, let me just mention two recent activities at ETH Zürich in which I was personally involved. Last year, ETH Zürich celebrated its 150 years jubilee [Eberle & Schwyzer, 2006]. On this occasion, 150 professors were asked to interact with the public in the streets of Zürich. Small pavilions were erected at some busy crossings in downtown, equipped with PowerPoint projection and screens, and seats for about 80-100 participants. Here, 430 lectures were presented in three weeks on subjects freely selected by the professors. Most of the lecture events were overcrowded. The public interest was enormous and the response very positive. I hope that we will be able to continue this kind of teaching activity in the near future. A major goal was to stimulate the discussion with the public for gaining valuable input to the university faculty and to increase the public trust in the universities. The professors were excited about their positive experiences. Surely, they would do it again ! Another, on-going activity is entitled “ETH in Dialogue”. The initiative consists of an open-ended offer of ETH faculty members to present lectures at varied occasions all around Switzerland. For this purpose, an Internet access exists where the list of possible


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lectures is publicized, and at which requests for lectures can be placed (WWWETHIMDIALOG ETHZCH). In this way, it becomes possible to adorn any planned event with a fascinating lecture by an ETH faculty member, perhaps even a birthday party for Grandma ! This is an attractive way of spreading knowledge and reflection to the general public. Last but not least, it presents good opportunities to stimulate young people for studying sciences. Conceiving a beneficial and sustainable future. Who else, if not the universities and the academic community, has an obligation to reflect on our common global future ? We cannot expect much long-term reflection from society’s busy operators, the politicians and business leaders. They are fully absorbed by solving today’s problems in the hope of surviving in their posts and of making short-term profits for their companies (and for themselves). The short-term responsibilities on their shoulders weigh heavily and leave them little room for farsighted planning of a global future. The academic community at universities does not suffer from this kind of load. Many have tenure and are free to conceive novel, unheard ideas. Indeed, this is one of their primary obligations. To some extent, they are paid for serving as critical voices that offer alternative avenues towards a better world. The universities should serve as incubators of novel concepts and act as radiating cultural centers that stimulate the discussion in the general public. Let me mention a few issues of global importance that ought to be discussed in university circles in this context : International cooperation and regional unions. The international collaboration between governments, functions rather poorly today. Nation States mostly defend their own interests, analogously to the comportment of individuals. The European Union, however, is a shining positive exception in a dark world. Just compare the state of Europe sixty years ago with the present. Nobody could have imagined that a peaceful cooperation and coexistence of former enemies would ever be possible. Despite all its difficulties, the European Union functions very well, and another major war in Central Europe seems virtually inconceivable. Its origin was an economic collaboration in a competitive world, but slowly, also a political unification is taking place. Europeans consider themselves truly as “Europeans”. The experiment has worked better than was to be expected. Why not use the EU as a role model also in other regions of the globe ? Already in 1932 Albert Einstein wrote the following to Sigmund Freud : “Thus I am led to my first statement : The quest for international security requires that each nation unconditionally surrenders some fraction of its liberty of action, of its sovereignty” [Einstein and Freud, 1966]. In none of the world’s regions, will it be easy to find a common denominator, but the example of ‘Europe’ shows that it is not impossible. For example, an East Asian Union is imaginable, unifying Japan, Korea, Mongolia, and hopefully also China. A South Asian Union could bring together peacefully India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and even Pakistan. It would also highly desirable to conceive an Islamic Union in the Middle East. As is well known, it had its predecessors with the United Arab Republic and some other attempts at unification. Their failure is no excuse for not trying again. Indeed, without a unified voice, the area has no chance of facing the devastating pressure from outside. Unless the Arabic countries take coordinated action, they make themselves co-responsible for today’s tragedies within and around their countries. Such thoughts might be worth discussing in conscientious university circles in order to prepare the public opinion for moves in the proper direction.

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International organizations. Regional unions would be beneficial but are insufficient. Strong international organizations and binding international agreements are needed, in addition, to define the rules of peaceful cooperation and problem solving. – Democracy is advocated as the best system for internally organizing a State. Each individual has the same rights and obligations, defined and guaranteed by the State laws. – On the international level, similar principles could apply as well. Each State should be entitled to the same rights and obligations, warranted by international laws. Unfortunately, the most powerful State on our globe blocks the installment of an efficient network of international laws and organizations that could implement these laws. Selfishness prevails in the international relations that seem to reflect a state of development several hundred years behind the situation within modern democratic States where the concepts of equal rights have become commonplace. Indeed, that same superpower is the most active promoter of inner democracy, but at the same time a real stumbling block for reshaping of international relations, in a democratic manner. It is urgent to develop a new spirit at universities that, finally, may inspire a new generation of far-sighted politicians. Joseph E. Stiglitz, a US Nobel Laureate in economic of 2001, said : “We cannot go back on globalization, it is here to stay. The issue is how we can make it to work. And if it is to work, there have to be global institutions to help set the rules” [Stiglitz, 2003]. Energy problem. Finding solutions for the threatening Global energy problem is of immediate academic concern. Our future may crucially depend on a conscientious usage and fair distribution of presently available forms of energy, and on making new sustainable energy resources accessible. Major technological breakthroughs are needed towards this goal, but, in addition, the present misusage of energy must be minimized. It is inconceivable that all global citizens could ever dissipate as much energy as we today in “advanced” countries. Again, binding international agreements are needed, together with an energy-conscientious education of the population. Universities have a great responsibility in this respect. Converting the free market into a responsible market economy. It is apparent that an unlimited free market cannot solve the long-term problems of mankind. As mentioned above, short-term thinking and egotistic reasoning prevail today, as mentioned above. Adam Smith characterized the human motives in his well-known saying : “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our necessities but of their advantages” [Smith, 1776/1937]. Indeed, his words reflect facts about “natural” and inborn human behavior that we experience daily. But he seems to disregard the constraints imposed by society and by our responsibility for their beneficial long-term development. This acceptation of responsibility cannot result from the human instincts to which his words refer. Only by conscientious education and by convincing role models, it is possible to motivate people to behave in a compassionate and unselfish way to help others. My preferred (perhaps utopian) model of an economic system is a “responsible market economy”. In contrast to the “free market economy”, where the personal profits and the shareholder value are the driving forces, in a responsible market economy, the partici-


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pant acts out of conviction that certain actions are needed for the sake of today’s or tomorrow’s society. And he does not ask for his own personal gains, whether directly or indirectly. Altruistic behavior would be the basic drive in such a model. Maybe this sounds too idealistic, but still I think it is a goal that is worth pursuing. Certainly, universities are the proper place to further discuss the consequences and how to reach such a goal. Help for the poorest on the globe. For easing the fate of the poorest people on the globe, it seems to me indispensable to implement a responsible market economy. Indeed, they need help and support to be able to live a humane life. A free market economy cannot provide this perspective. It invariably leads to exploitation. Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Laureate in economics of 2001, writes : “International humanitarian assistance is a form of collective action that springs from a shared compassion for others. As efficient as markets may be, they do not ensure that individuals have enough food, clothes to wear, or shelter. Poverty can lead to environmental degradation, and environmental degradation can contribute to poverty” [Stiglitz, 2003]. Helping the poorest has much to do with ethics. I think that ethical principles should be articulated more in our university courses. They are the basis of a well functioning human society. After all, it is immaterial where we draw our ethical principles from. They are virtually identically found in the foundations of all our diverse philosophical and religious systems. From Christian to Islamic, to Buddhist, and Hindu thoughts, the same principles of charity and compassion prevail in all great traditions. Ethics in a scientific context has been discussed in a convincing way by Hans Jonas [Jonas, 1979] : “Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life”. He writes further : “Prometheus, liberated at last, who received from science inconceivable power and from economics the restless impetus, calls for an ethics which, by free restraint, limits its potency from becoming fatal to human beings… What can serve as a compass ? The envisioned danger itself !”. Respecting cultural diversity. The Clash of Civilizations is in full swing today, partially because of the short-sightedness of politicians and their self-centered advisors, partially due to disastrous effects of unrestricted profit optimization. – Following the theme touched above, indeed our world cultures have more in common than is apparent on the first sight, and their coexistence and mutual enrichment should cause no major difficulties. This is also what we experience daily in our universities where fruitful collaboration is easily possible across all racial and cultural barriers. In this sense, the life at universities might serve as a metaphor for peaceful human coexistence. The university is an ideal meeting place for different cultures, for becoming acquainted with each other, and for understanding each other. When we actively take advantage of this unique situation, we could contribute significantly to the inter-cultural understanding and to world peace. We should not forget that our cultures are treasures of heritage that we must preserve. Cultures are our living grounds that give us confidence and stability. Some of those who have lost their cultural roots might become terrorists, as they have nothing left that they could lose or sacrifice – except for their own life. Many more subjects could be mentioned that should form part of the academic obligations. We are encouraged to constantly question our value system in the hope of finding universal wisdom that better reflects the needs of our own and the future society.

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#ONCLUDINGREMARKS When we step back and impartially observe the course our world has taken, we might arrive at a frightening doomsday scenario that leads sooner or later to a technological and societal dead end. The energy dilemma clearly reveals that we are irreversibly depleting resources. But we also deplete them in many other respects ; we deplete goodwill and societal balance. We deplete the significance of compassion in favor of personal monetary enrichment. When all these precious resources are gone, human culture is gone, and we endanger our own existence. In this situation, universities share co-responsibility for developing a beneficial and sustainable future of our globe and of the human community. Besides our basic research efforts, we need to spend some of our resources to clarify our dangerous global situation and to find avenues for improving the chances of a happy continuation of human culture. We need the courage to articulate our views, peacefully of course. And we have to sensitize and train our students in a way that they can contribute actively to a beneficial future. Our responsibility is great and unique. Let us recognize our role and improve our performance, even if the direct profits for us, teachers, seems to be negligibly small. Certainly, the satisfaction will remain to us that we might have contributed all we ever could to save our beautiful world and our precious living grounds. In conclusion, we should perhaps take to heart the words that Karl Popper expressed on December 17, 1993, in Berlin : “Optimism is our duty. We all are co-responsible for what is coming” [Popper, 1996].

2EFERENCES Cowper, W, (1785) The Task. Eberle, M. K. & Schwyzer, N. (2006) Heute für Morgen. Das Gestern feiern. Das Buch zum Jubiläum 150 Jahre ETH Zürich, Verlag NZZ. Einstein, A., Freud, S. (1966) Warum Krieg ? Ein Briefwechsel, Diogenes, Zürich. Ernst, R. R. (2001) “Arts and Sciences. A personal perspective of Tibetan painting”, Chimia 55, 900-914. Ernst, R. R. (2004) Science and Arts, EPR Newsletter 14, 14-19. Ernst, R. R., Bodenhausen, G., Wokaun, A. (1987) Principles of Nuclear Magnetic Resonance in One and Two Dimensions, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Frank, R. H. (1999) Luxury Fever. Money and Happiness in an Era of Excess, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Gibran, K. (1926) Sand and Foam, Knopf, Reissue Edition. Jonas, H. (1979) Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die Technologische Zivilisation, Insel Verlag, Frankfurt am Main. Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, transl. John H. McDonald. Popper, K. R. (1996) Alles Leben ist Problemlösen. Über Erkenntnis, Geschichte und Politik, Piper, München. Rumi Jalaluddin, (13th century/1997) The Essential Rumi, transl. Coleman Barks. Smith, A. (1776/1937) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Random House, New York. Stiglitz, J. (2003) Globalization and its Discontents, W. W. Norton & Company.

0ATTERNED$IVERSITYIN)NTERDISCIPLINARY $IALOGUES,ESSONSFROMAN%MPIRICAL 3TUDYOF)NTERDISCIPLINARY2ESEARCHAT THE&RONTIER by Veronica Boix Mansilla

In recent years, interdisciplinary research has been equated with all things novel, forward looking, collaborative and adventurous. Theoretical Physicists have begun to model phenomena traditionally beyond their purview : life, death, human interactions and consciousness [Wolfram, 2002 ; Crutchfield, 2002 ; West, this volume]. Artists on the other hand are borrowing computer-code and embedding themselves in biological engineering labs to redefine aesthetic expression [Simbiotica, 2007]. It is increasingly clear that the most pressing challenges of cultural and environmental survival (e.g., mitigating climate change, developing biomedical technologies, legislating migration) can only be addressed at the fertile intersection of multiple disciplines. Under closer scrutiny, cross disciplinary dialogue confronts researchers with new communicative and epistemic demands, including the demand of establishing what constitutes a productive dialogue and a fruitful interdisciplinary synthesis. Together with a growing number of initiatives such as those held by the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, the United States National Academies of Sciences, and the Tälberg Forum in Sweden, the World Knowledge Dialogue Foundation sheds a committed light on the need for (and difficulties of) cross disciplinary dialogue. On the ground, this timely call for exchanges across C. P. Snow’s two cultures often meets the challenge of cross disciplinary communication, the obstacle of contrasting epistemologies, and above all the lack of clear parameters to determine what constitutes a productive dialogue and interdisciplinary synthesis [Snow, 1993].

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#ONTRASTINGVIEWSOFINTERDISCIPLINARITY For example, in a now classic intellectual dispute, E. O. Wilson and Stephen J. Gould proposed contrasting views of interdisciplinarity. Wilson confers to science a privileged place as a unifying ground for all forms of knowledge by virtue of yielding findings that are highly reliable, law-like, and rigorously measured. “Complexity is what interests scientists… and reductionism [viewed as science’s unique leverage] is a way to understand it” [Wilson, 1998 : 54]. In Wilson’s view, interdisciplinary coordination involves reducing problems of study in the social and cultural world (e.g., social behavior, art, and technology) to their basic bio-chemical components (e.g., the neurological categories that might explain the social or creative experience). Gould, on the other hand, critiques Wilson’s proposed reductionism and argues that the best interdisciplinary work recognizes the intrinsic differences in disciplinary forms of knowledge, each embracing a unique [and often complementary] form of explanation [Gould, 2003 : 255]. Unibus Plurum, he argued, is the epistemic high ground. Independently of whether one finds oneself agreeing with one or another position, their accounts speak to the very problem examined in this paper : how disciplinary insights can be brought together and their integration assessed. Concerned with the chasm between a growing call for interdisciplinary research and the lack of an empirical understanding of cognitive, epistemic, social and institutional foundations of interdisciplinary work – my colleagues and I at the Interdisciplinary Studies Project at the Harvard Graduate School of Education turned our eyes to the work and views of 55 experts at the frontiers of knowledge production in established interdisciplinary research institutions in the Unites States 22 : The Santa Fe Institute, the MIT Media Lab, the Center for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania, the Center for the Integration of Medical Innovations and Technologies and the RED group at Xerox Parc (see Table 1). We asked (1) How do researchers integrate disciplinary traditions to advance their inquiry ? (2) What criteria do they use to validate their findings ?

Table 1 Expert sample by institution and main disciplinary affiliation. Institution and number of faculty/ experts interviewed

Informant

Main disciplinary affiliation of informant

Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania [BioE] N=6

XUP01 XUP02 XUP03 XUP04 XUP05 XUP06

anthropology/communications history/philosophy sociology philosophy sociology philosophy

22

Acknowledgement : I am grateful to the informants in this study for their time and thoughtfulness during extensive interviews ; the Atlantic Philanthropies for their generous support of our work and the World Knowledge Dialogue Foundation for its inspiring vision. Note : An extensive account of these findings will appear in the journal Issues in Integrative Studies.

Patterned Diversity in Interdisciplinary Dialogues

Institution and number of faculty/ experts interviewed

Informant

Main disciplinary affiliation of informant

CIMIT N=7

XC01 XC02 XC03 XC04 XC05 XC06 XC07

engineering medicine (cardiology) physics (medical instruments) medicine (cardiology) medicine medicine (pediatric transplant surgeon) engineering

MIT Media Lab N = 13

XML01 XML02 XML03 XML04 XML05 XML06 XML07 XML08 XML09 XML10 XML11 XML12 XML13

computer science computer science computer science/art linguistics/comparative literature/psychology history/technology in education computer science computer science/science journalism computer science/artificial intelligence/ poet engineering (electrical) history/computer science computer science musician (composer + performer) computer science

Santa Fe Institute N = 15

XSF01 XSF02 XSF03 XSF04 XSF05 XSF06 XSF07 XSF08 XSF09 XSF10 XSF11 XSF12 XAS01 XAS02 XAS03

physics biology/genetics physics physics liberal arts/ marketing finance/economics physics liberal arts biology/physics chemistry English history/sociology /public policy music/physics film making/media (video artist) music

Xerox Parc N=9

XRX01 XRX02 XRX04 XRX05 XRX06 XRX07 XRX08 XRX09 XRX10 XRX11

Audio engineering/design computer science/theater/fine arts communications research architecture/computer science engineering/film/education engineering art/poetry design/technology writer/artist (“media art”) music (composition)/art/engineering

Human Biology, Stanford University [Hum Bio] N =5

XST04 XST07 XST11 XST12 XST18

health policy neuroscience ecology anthropology/biology developmental psychology

139

140


Predictably our analysis revealed a striking variety of kinds of interdisciplinary integrations, e.g. ranging from computer models of social entropy, empirical approaches to bioethics, the creation of cognitively informed works of art and digitally augmented violins. Perhaps most interestingly, however, our analysis suggested that amidst the broad variety of seemingly idiosyncratic interdisciplinary research practices, at least three approaches to interdisciplinary inquiry can be identified : I term them conceptual-bridging, comprehensive, and pragmatic. Each approach embodies its own preferred epistemological mechanisms for disciplinary integration and the validation criteria by which experienced scholars and scientists assess, accept or reject interdisciplinary findings. In what follows, I introduce each approach, illustrating them with our informant’s observations. I do so with the hope that a detailed characterization of the core intellectual mechanisms that enable experts to merge disciplinary traditions can inform scholars interested in advancing quality interdisciplinary dialogues.

!CONCEPTUAL BRIDGINGAPPROACHTOINTERDISCIPLINARYRESEARCH We are now looking at many kinds of networks. When one says “networks”, biologists think “metabolic networks”, or if you’re an electrical engineer you think “power grids”, or if you’re a neurobiologist you think “neural networks”. Many basic, common questions cut across different disciplines – questions that bear on how to quantify how the topology of a network controls or facilitates the behavior of the network. [Crutchfield, 2002] The research of James Crutchfield, a leading Theoretical Physicist at the Santa Fe Institute, eloquently illustrates a conceptual-bridging approach to research. In it disciplines are brought together under a unifying concept, principle or mechanism thought to account for a variety of phenomena. Such an approach pivots on the identification of a bridging motif (e.g., “network” “innovation”) that has instantiations in a variety of disciplines as the object of formal understanding and modeling. Crutchfield’s own research examines the origins of evolutionary innovations. It attempts to shed light on why periods of evolutionary stability (where few phenotypical changes are recorded) have been interrupted by periods of rapid innovation (with the emergence of new forms, functions, and species) ? He does not analyze the fossil record, nor does he experiment with gene distribution in rapidly growing fruit fly populations. Instead, he develops computational systems that emulate innovation in complex evolutionary processes. In his view, a mathematical theory of evolutionary dynamics seeks to “articulate a conceptual model of phenomena that range from the molecular scale of genes to the geological scale of macroevolution.” He does not seek to establish a causal relationship between phenomena at these different scales, but rather parallelisms in the way innovation behaves. Three cognitive-epistemic moves characterize a conceptual-bridging approach. First, the concept of “innovation” is selected as a bridging motif because it is implicated in microphenomena studied by molecular biology and macro-evolutionary phenomena typically studied by paleontology. As a unit of analysis, “innovation” provides a level of characterization that enables the integration of disparate phenomena into a single account expressed in mathematical algorithms. Second, researchers establish productive analogies to link disciplines. Analogies often cross the natural/social sciences divide such as the study of

Patterned Diversity in Interdisciplinary Dialogues

141

“innovation”, “entropy”, and “equilibrium” in biological and economic systems. Third, researchers translate concepts and finding across disciplinary languages. If analogies allow researchers to build initial links, translation enables them to integrate epistemologies. For example, in a study of voting practices in his model of the political life of Renaissance Florence, John Padgett adopts an algorithmic language to describe historical phenomena and “manipulate” them to explore how patronage networks and policies may have interacted to yield republicanism at the time. cv [a variable in his model] is cost of voting, analogous to cp the cost of partisanship. Unlike the cost of partisanship, I assume the cost of voting is quite low cv

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