A Road to Nowhere?: Jewish Experiences in Unifying Europe

A Road to Nowhere?

Jewish Identities in a Changing World General Editors

Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Yosef Gorny, and Judit Bokser Liwerant

VOLUME 17

The titles published in this series are listed at the back of this volume, and also at: www.brill.nl/jicw.

A Road to Nowhere? Jewish Experiences in Unifying Europe

Edited by

Julius H. Schoeps and Olaf Glöckner in cooperation with

Anja Kreienbrink

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2011

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Schoeps, Julius H. ( Julius Hans), 1942– A road to nowhere? : Jewish experiences in the unifying Europe / by Julius H. Schoeps and Olaf Glockner. p. cm. — ( Jewish identities in a changing world ; 17) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-20158-3 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Jews—Europe—History—21st century. 2. Jews—Europe—Identity. 3. Europe—Ethnic relations. 4. Antisemitism— Europe. I. Glockner, Olaf. II. Title. DS135.E84S36 2011 305.892’404—dc22 2010049726

ISSN 1570-7997 ISBN 978-90-04-20158-3 Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

CONTENTS Introduction ................................................................................ Julius H. Schoeps/Olaf Glöckner

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PART I

THE JEWISH WORLD CONTEXT Jews in Europe: Demographic Trends, Contexts and Outlooks .................................................................................. Sergio DellaPergola

3

The European Jewish Diaspora: The Third Pillar of World Jewry? ...................................................................................... Gabriel Sheffer

35

Cultural Pluralism as an American Zionist Option for Solidarity and its Relevance for Today’s European Jewry ... Ofer Schiff

45

PART II

EUROPEAN JEWISH EXPERIENCES Between Eurasia and Europe: Jewish Community and Identities in Contemporary Russia and Ukraine ................... Vladimir Zeev Khanin

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A Dual, Divided Modernization. Reflections on 200 Years of the Jewish Reform Movement in Germany .......................... Micha Brumlik

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Ghosts of the Past, Challenges of the Present: New and Old “Others” in Contemporary Spain .......................................... Raanan Rein and Martina Weisz

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The Dialectics of the Diaspora. On the Art of Being Jewish in the Swedish Modernity ...................................................... Lars Dencik

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Does European Jewry Need a New Ethnic Spiritual Umbrella? Reflections ........................................................... Yosef Gorny

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Farewell to Europe? On French Jewish Skepticism about the New Universalism ................................................................... Pierre Birnbaum

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The Return of the European Jewish Diaspora. New Ethno-National Constellations since 1989 ............................. Y. Michal Bodemann

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Reading between the Lines. Assertion and Reassertion in European Jewish Life ............................................................. Antony Lerman

189

PART III

ANTI-SEMITISM, ISRAEL AND JEWISH POLITICS Hate against the Others. About the Fatal Chain Creating Xenophobia and anti-Semitism ............................................. Thomas Gergely

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“Anti-Semites of the Continent Unite!” Is the East still Different? ................................................................................. Raphael Vago

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Anti-Semitism or Judeophobia? The Intellectual Debate in France 2000–2005 .................................................................. Denis Charbit

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From anti-Jewish Prejudice to Political anti-Semitism? On Dynamics of anti-Semitism in post-Communist Hungary .... András Kovács

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contents A Mediterranean Bridge over Troubled Water. Cultural Ideas on How to Reconcile Israel with its Neighbours and with Europe ............................................................................ David Ohana The Future of European Jewry—A Changing Condition in a Changing Context? ................................................................. Shmuel Trigano

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Epilogue Klal Yisrael Today: Unity and Diversity. Reflections on Europe and Latin America in a Globalized World .............. Judit Bokser Liwerant and Eliezer Ben-Rafael

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Notes on the Contributors ......................................................... Bibliography ................................................................................ Main Index ................................................................................. Names Index ............................................................................... List of Tables .............................................................................. List of Graphs .............................................................................

335 341 363 367 371 373

INTRODUCTION Julius H. Schoeps/Olaf Glöckner On the “Old Continent”, blessings and curses were rarely far apart. This was never more evident than in 20th century Europe: from London to Rome, from Madrid to Warsaw, the period was first marked by a euphoric belief in progress: art, science and economy were booming; philosophers and humanists argued about the best means to achieve a just society. But then—as in previous centuries—brutality returned: civilians were slaughtered; racial and political persecution cost countless lives. In this most cherished Europe, two murderous world wars broke out; two-thirds of the Jewish people were exterminated; and, after 1945, the front lines of the “Cold War” were established. It almost seemed as if the Continent would never find peace; in the long-term, worst-case scenario, it could become the staging ground for a nuclear inferno. Quite unexpectedly, the page did turn, towards the end of the 20th century. With the fall of the hated Berlin wall—for 30 years a symbol of the separation between East and West—the state Socialist regimes in the Eastern Bloc imploded, narrow-minded nationalism lost its appeal and the reconciliation of long-time enemy states began. There was an overall sense of optimism. Despite all political and economic setbacks, the blue-yellow EU flag has become a symbol of hope for many Europeans. The foundation of a common “European House” seems to have been set. But just how stable is the structure’s walls and rooms? Up to now, political scientists, sociologist and ethnologists have ventured only tentative prognoses. The controversial question remains: can 87 different peoples and even more ethnic minorities—in all, 770 million Europeans1 including some 1.5 million Jews—learn to build a harmonious co-existence? Clearly, ethnic, religious and cultural minorities also join in placing great hopes in the unprecedented experiment of the European Union. Never before did minorities in Europe find more favorable

1

Pan and Pfeil, 2006.

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legal and social conditions. Never before has Christian Western Civilization been more open to participation in society and to multi-cultural coexistence. It is even considered more or less “politically incorrect” in some countries to promote assimilation; rather, ethno-cultural selfdetermination is a widely accepted individual and collective lifestyle. Is united Europe at the start of the 21st century going through something like a second Modernity, linked today with a stable civil society that sees ethnic, cultural and religious divergences more as a boon than a danger? There is still no consensus: Skeptics say that concepts of multi-culturalism already are falling apart and they see the emergence of “parallel societies” as the negative flip side, with a lack of basic consensus on shared values and general principles. The “cartoon crisis” of 2005–2006 made it brutally clear how quickly cultural misunderstandings and religious fanaticism in Europe (and around the world) can generate a feared “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington, 1996) and mobilize significant potential for violence.2 Still: more than anywhere else, European society is committed to a common “modus vivendi” that must include all majorities and minorities. German sociologist Hartmut Esser was correct to note that all parts of an immigration society should contribute to integration, and that integration is a hands-on learning process (Esser, 1980). From the Atlantic to the Urals, from the North Cape to the Strait of Gibraltar, majority populations and minorities still take very different views of the new European freedom, based of course on their objectively different cultural and religious traditions, their divergent political approaches and their inter-cultural experiences. Of all the minorities in Europe today, the Jews—though relatively few in numbers—undoubtedly have the most comprehensive historical experience. Their nearly 2,000 years on the “Old Continent” has had its highs and lows, its breaks and continuities; time and again they

2 The so-called “cartoon crisis” followed the publication of 12 caricatures of the Islamic prophet Mohammed in the Danish daily newspaper Jyllands Posten in September 2005. This prompted massive protests by Muslims in early 2006. The protests spread rapidly around the world and in some cities resulted in violent clashes and fatalities. With the destruction of some European embassies, the cartoon controversy became a serious international crisis. Some prominent Muslims later suggested that the series of Mohammed cartoons was a “Jewish-American conspiracy” that had been “financed by Jews”. The largest Iranian newspaper, Hamshahri, promoted a so-called “Holocaust cartoon competition”. Personal attacks on Danish journalists and cartoonists continue to this day.

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have faced existentially threatening situations. Sometimes the claim of being a member of the faith that “gave birth” to Christianity could save one from fire and the sword, but by far not always. Long before Adolf Hitler came on the scene, the tools of genocide had been prepared. Hitler and Auschwitz became the epitome of an unspeakable tradition of European hatred of Jews. The Holocaust claimed millions of lives and also destroyed the long-held dream of a European-Jewish symbiosis. For many, the “Old Continent” after 1945 was—and still remains—simply a large “Jewish cemetery”, and of course the disappointment in Germany was the greatest. Leo Baeck, the famous German rabbi who himself barely escaped death in the Theresienstadt concentration camp, soberly observed after the war: “We believed that the marriage of the German spirit with the Jewish spirit on German ground would be a blessed union. This was an illusion—the era of Jews in Germany is gone forever.” (Gidal, 1988: 426) In fact, Jewish survivors hardly seemed able to build vibrant Jewish communities again, whether in Germany or anywhere else in Europe. The Holocaust weighed too heavily on them. Almost everywhere on the Continent, once thriving communities now led a “shadow existence” and remained dependent on help from international Jewish organizations such as the American Joint Distribution Committee ( JDC), United Jewish Appeal ( UJA), American Jewish Committee (AJC) and World ORT. In only a few countries did the Jewish population stabilize or even grow. Among the exceptions were Sweden and England, neither of which had been under Nazi occupation and both of which took in a considerable number of Jewish refugees after World War II. France merits a special reference: due to a large emigration from North Africa in the 1950s and ’60s, France has by far the strongest Jewish community on the Continent. But doubtless the largest surprise of the past 20 years was the enormous quantitative growth of the Jewish population in Germany, brought about by an unexpected wave of emigration from the successor states of the former Soviet Union. For Eastern European Jewry, which still formed the largest concentration of Diaspora population at the close of the 19th century, the situation had worsened gradually after 1945, primarily due to anti-religious—at times also anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist—policies in Moscow as well as in Budapest, Prague, East Berlin and other capitals of the “Eastern Bloc”. So it is hardly any wonder that a confrontation with the facts of the Shoah in Socialist states remained for a long time

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fragmentary or completely suppressed—partly because collaboration with the Nazis had been particularly intense in these regions, but also because the state-run and controlled politics of memory did not allow for special attention to Jewish victims. Only after 1989 did Eastern Europe see the start of an unbiased confrontation with the history of the Holocaust. Even west of the “Iron Curtain” it took some time before the general public was ready to approach the dark chapter of the Shoah. But by the early 1970s, the persecution and extermination of European Jewry had become a much-discussed theme, whether in universities, schools, media or even in Jewish-Christian associations. The realization gradually grew that Europe as a whole had been unable or unwilling to protect six million Jews from physical destruction by the Nazis and their local accomplices. The German-Israeli historian Dan Diner described Auschwitz as “a rupture in civilization”; his dictum remains widely accepted, and not only by scientists. Holocaust remembrance has received public recognition—for example, through periodic memorial ceremonies, exhibits, film series, centrally located memorial sites or large-scale educational programs. And for the first time, factions of the established churches began to look into their role in a nearly 2,000-year history of discrimination and persecution of Jews in Europe. Of course this did little to relieve the suffering and trauma of Holocaust survivors, but it did help the Jewish population to regain some of its trust in mainstream Western European societies.3 On the other hand, new fears arose from the fact that right-wing extremist parties achieved some spectacular electoral successes; that arson attacks against synagogues and Jewish community centers were a regular occurrence; that Jewish individuals were targets of physical attacks; and that some prominent non-Jewish politicians and opinion leaders, artists and trade unionists made polarizing, anti-Israel statements in connection with the Middle East conflict. Currently there is practically no empirical research into the question of how secure—or insecure—Jews in Europe feel today, the extent to which they identify with their respective majority societies, and the

3 A similar process of building confidence between non-Jewish and Jewish populations is also feasible in Eastern Europe, but this will require further, more systematic processing of the events of World War II in the relevant countries. Currently, some Eastern European countries are experiencing a competition over remembrance, accompanied by political disputes, with Ukraine being a particularly clear example.

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degree to which they prefer to trust in their own networks. But how do the fewer than two million Jews on the Continent see their own perspectives as a collective community? From a purely demographic standpoint, European Jewry continues to shrink. Already in the mid-1990s, British historian Bernard Wasserstein uttered a strong warning in his book, Vanishing Diaspora, that this development would amount to selfdestruction in the foreseeable future. Wasserstein saw the main causes in a disproportionate aging of the Jewish population, low birth rates, a steady increase in “mixed marriages” and a particularly Western trend toward secularization—a development that, of course, also hits non-Jewish institutions hard, including the Catholic and Protestant churches in Europe. But what keeps the European-Jewish community together, if the importance of religion is dropping noticeably? French political scientist Diana Pinto, who has a much more positive take on the Jewish future on the “Old Continent” than Bernard Wasserstein—while omitting the demographic factor—has discovered a completely new dynamism and diversity of Jewish life within and outside the established communities. Pinto suggests it is important to address a new, self-confident Jewry, which remembers—“daf ka”—its European roots and actively seeks to play a role in building the new European house. More than that: Diana Pinto considers it possible to achieve a “Jewish Renaissance” in the heart of Europe and has confidence that, in the long term, European Jewry will form a “third pillar” alongside the American Jewish community and Israel (Pinto, 2000). It seems extremely difficult to back up this kind of postulate. But: if one takes into consideration new pluralistic tendencies in Western and Eastern Europe alone—“grass roots” movements like “Limmud”, the boom in Jewish art and culture in European cities and the rapid development in education, on up to the opening of new Jewish universities—then the question arises not only about European-Jewish consolidation, but also about the expected ripple effect for the rest of Diaspora and Israel. Such considerations were also the jumping off point for an international conference that the Moses Mendelssohn Zentrum Potsdam and the research network “Klal Yisrael” (Tel Aviv) presented in May 2009 in Berlin, on the theme of “European Jewry—A New Jewish Centre in the Making?” Researchers from Hungary, France, England, Russia Germany, Israel, Mexico and Canada met in an authentic Jewish site—the former bank of the Mendelssohn family in Berlin-Mitte—to discuss opportunities, limits and dangers for today’s Jews in Europe,

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their specific place in the Diaspora and ideas for the future of the continental process of unification. A considerable number of participants from Israel and overseas offered a welcome guarantee that the conference would not mutate into a “closed” European event, but rather that it would be receptive to important external impulses and considerations. Based on the Berlin conference, this volume, too, follows a thematic sequence in which European Jewry is considered first within the context of general developments in the Diaspora; then according to an “insiders’ view” from various European countries; and finally with a discussion about inter-cultural challenges, old and new antiSemitism and overall future prospects. The book is intended as an interdisciplinary approach to a highly complex issue that is often emotionally charged, an issue that contemporary historians, sociologists, political scientists, ethnologists and cultural studies experts are sure to handle intensively over the coming years as well. But the volume also is intended for all those who, whether directly or indirectly, will take part in future “community building” activities. At the Berlin conference, Charlotte Knobloch, vice president of the European-Jewish Congress (EJC), touched on an important point when she argued that it was necessary “to quickly start intensifying the contacts among the European communities” and that the first important step would be “to make a thorough stock-taking, a description of the status quo of how the situation looks in the different European states, which needs there are and where there are links for mutual support beyond the borders.” Knobloch also emphasized that “a more exact picture of the general atmosphere than is at present available will have to be in the centre of such a stock-taking.” The authors assembled in this book are for the most part the same as those who delivered papers in Berlin; here, they present their sometimes quite divergent views on the internal and external challenges facing European Jewry. They place different emphases, for example, on the role of religious communities, the connection between Europe and Israel and the fight against anti-Semitism. The search for new collective identities is traced with both skepticism and optimism; the euphoria over European unification is questioned just as critically as are their own strategies for distancing themselves. The theme of a new Jewish self-confidence is raised, together with urgent, unresolved questions within the European (and global ) inner-Jewish discourse.

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Sergio DellaPergola provides a detailed review of the latest demographic developments in European Jewry. In his reflections he explicitly includes the communities in Russia, Ukraine and Turkey. DellaPergola seeks to prove that the “urbanization” of European Jewry continues apace and suggests that European-Jewish internal migration is strongly correlated with general processes of modernization—with all the associated advantages and disadvantages. Gabriel Sheffer classifies European Jewry within the general context of today’s “ethno-national-religious” Diaspora communities. He posits the “normalization” of the European-Jewish Diaspora and sees the growth of pluralism within Jewish communities as a strength rather than a weakness. Sheffer also considers the increasing urban concentration of European Jews to be advantageous for networking, communication and intra-Jewish solidarity. Ofer Schiff takes as his starting point the life work of the charismatic American Reform rabbi and committed Zionist Abba Hillel Silver and goes on to discuss the current shape of Diaspora-Israel-relations from a European perspective. To this day, Silver’s work symbolizes the opportunity to identify intensively with Israel and still develop a unique “Jewish agenda”. Vladimir Zeev Khanin describes the dynamic processes taking place within the Jewish populations of Russia and Ukraine. Khanin outlines the dilemma of the great “exodus” of former Soviet Jews in the 1990s, but also describes the emergence of new Jewish identities among those who stayed. He also provides a transparent portrait of the development of internationally active Jewish umbrella organizations for Russian-speaking Jews. Micha Brumlik looks back on 200 years of the Jewish Reform movement in Europe, particularly elaborating on the early days of the Reform Jewish School in Frankfurt am Main. Brumlik also provides a detailed analysis of shared elements as well as irreconcilable differences—past and present—with Jewish (neo-)Orthodoxy, and explicitly asks the Reform movement where it stands regarding what he considers a much-needed, substantive renewal. Raanan Rein and Martina Weisz describe surprisingly positive attitudes of today’s Spanish policies towards a Jewish community that is growing but that has a collective memory of centuries of persecution and expulsion. At the same time, Rein and Weisz present empirical analyses showing an increase rather than a lessening of prejudices among Spaniards against Jews and against Muslims as well.

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Lasse Dencik focuses on the Jewish population in Scandinavia—particularly in Sweden—in order to trace how combined identities (such as “Swedish-Jewish”) gain importance in liberal-modern societies. His own surveys in the Jewish communities of Stockholm, Malmoe and Gothenburg show that an intensive connection to the Swedish culture and way of life does not necessarily have negative consequences for Jewish culture and lifestyle—and vice versa. Yosef Gorny reflects on the search for new (collective) Jewish identities in Europe (and elsewhere in the Diaspora) and emphasizes that one can draw on 20th century Jewish movements and ideologies only to a limited extent. Gorny’s preferred concept of an “Ethnic Umbrella” is based on the model of ethno-cultural unity of the Jewish people that Achad Ha’am set out; his model that remains as meaningful as ever. Within the context of “Klal Yisrael” and the “Ethnic Umbrella,” Gorny considers the state of Israel as a spiritual motherland but not by any means as a dominant centre of Jewish life. Pierre Birnbaum describes the traditionally close connection of French Jews with the Republic and the State, and the skepticism that most of them feel towards an abstract European constitutional patriotism. Birnbaum contrasts Jürgen Habermas’ credo of a European universalism replacing national identities with the critical approach of FrenchJewish intellectuals like Alain Finkielkraut and Jacques Derrida, and discovers a much stronger affinity among religious leaders towards “Paris” and “Jerusalem” than to the capital of Europe, Brussels. Y. Michal Bodemann debunks the myth of a homogeneous European Jewry. Using the examples of recent developments in Germany, he shows how many unusual features have emerged there through relations between non-Jews and Jews. Bodemann suggests that the concept of a shared remembrance of Auschwitz remains illusory; he also shows how non-Jews “judaize” cultural terrain and how German society and the public have created a “sui generis” role for the Jewish community—including Russian-Jewish immigrants. Antony Lerman explains how the European-Jewish optimism of the 1990s suffered a marked setback with the events of 9/11, the start of the second Intifada, the new Gulf War and inner-European problems. Nevertheless, he believes that most European-Jewish problems today are “home made” and blames a certain organizational weakness in European-Jewish federations. On the other hand, Lerman sees a growing demand for Jewish culture and education among Jews.

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Thomas Gergely describes social-psychological and group-dynamic mechanisms that repeatedly lead to the exclusion of minorities and in extreme cases to their destruction, in supposedly civilized societies. Gergely even sees an ongoing danger of racist and anti-Semitic extremism in today’s Europe. Raphael Vago examines the ways in which anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe today differs significantly from that in Western Europe. He finds that various Eastern European countries have persistently failed to confront the facts of the genocide of their indigenous Jewish populations, and he also finds political instability—two factors that continue to leave segments of the population especially vulnerable to popular anti-Semitism. At the same time, Vago points out the danger of a growing network of right-wing extremist movements in Eastern and Western Europe. Denis Charbit elucidates how a mixture of anti-Semitism and judeophobia has alienated the Jews in France since the early 1980ies, but even worse in the first decade of the new century. While the general Jewish population does hover between outrage, seclusion and thought to emigrate, Charbit reveals the fevered and partly contrarian reactions of the Jewish intellectuals. By introducing notions of Alain Finkielkraut, Pierre-André Taguieff, Nicolas Weill and Michel Wieviorka, he outlines principal items of the new debate on anti-Semitism, and how it affects concepts of Jewish-French politics. András Kovács provides insight into the complicated relationship between Jews and non-Jews in 20th century Hungary. He shows how a subtle form of anti-Semitism was able to take persistent hold in the Eastern Bloc and how a post-Communist, Western-oriented society could generate a new, popular variety of anti-Semitism. Kovács believes there is a great risk of traditional diffuse anti-Jewish sentiment in Hungary turning into politically oriented anti-Semitism. David Ohana introduces old and new ideas of cultural Mediterraneanism (Hebrew: “Yam Tikhoniut”) as an identity-forming element, and perhaps also a reconciling element bridging the gap between Israel and the Arab countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. “Yam Tikhoniut” could also be a cultural bridge between Israel and Europe. Ohana shows that the concept of Mediterranean identity was already quite prominent in early Israeli fiction. Shmuel Trigano sets up seven conditions for the consolidation of the Jewish community in Europe as the basis for a new “Jewish Centre”.

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At the same time, he sees contradictions in the coexistence of nonJews and Jews in today’s Europe and criticizes what he considers an ambiguous attitude on the part of European politicians: on one hand, they promote remembrance of the victims of the Shoah, and on the other hand many tend to de-legitimize Israel as a vital modern Jewish state. In the epilogue Judit Bokser Liwerant and Eliezer Ben-Rafael offer systematic insights into the growing variety and dynamism of Jewish movements, whether religious, political or cultural. New configurations are evident both inside and outside Jewish communities in Europe, North America and Latin America. The boom of competition compasses religious, cultural, (ethno-)political and universalistic conceptions—and has even backlashes on Israeli society. Liwerant makes clear that Latin America has contributed one of the most powerful models of Jewish corporate experience—the ethno-cultural, ethnonational, secularized, cohesive Jewish kehilla. Though, Latin America’s Jewry is undergoing its unique serious transformations, including a new religious revival, strenthening of Mizrahi communities, but also enormous out-migration to North America, Israel and not least to Europe. Similar to Europe, the “Jewish situation” in Latin America differs from country to country. This volume may only be able to hint at other aspects of the past, present and future of European Jewry, but it also raises the next set of questions. No one seems willing to predict at this point whether Jews in Europe are really building their “common house”, linking more closely together, introducing specific Jewish experiences into the great EU experiment and thus also playing a unique role in the global Jewish world of tomorrow. Is the new, mainly culturally determinated pluralism and heterogenity an unmistakable sign of Jewish revival—or just a flash in the pan? Right now, anything seems possible. European Jewry could distinguish itself as a third Jewish center—aside Israel and American Jewry—, and at the best even as a third pillar. On the other hand there has remained certain distrust in European governmental politics, fear that home-grown judeophobia becomes the “normal case” and worry that even European Jewish roof organizations get stuck in futile infightings. Notwithstanding new hopes and visions, there is still a risk that the Jews in Unifying Europe run the “road to nowhere.”

PART I

THE JEWISH WORLD CONTEXT

JEWS IN EUROPE: DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS, CONTEXTS AND OUTLOOKS Sergio DellaPergola As part of the broader analysis of the evolving profile and experience of European Jewry, demography constitutes a primordial factor underlying socioeconomic and cultural change, as well as policy transformations and planning. This chapter aims at providing a basic quantitative framework to the more extended discussion of the Jewish experience in Europe, past, present and future.1 In long-term historical perspective, the Jewish presence in Europe underwent radical spatial, quantitative and social changes that reflected the essence of the deep conflicts, revolutions and reforms that ceaselessly shaped the continent. This was true since the end of World War II no less than before it. Large-scale immigration and emigration, before and after the Shoah, generated more than once significant shifts and replacements in the human capital of European Jewry. Over the last tens of years, growth or stability in the size of Western European Jewish communities contrasted with drastic reductions in Eastern Europe. These changes were deeply affected by the radical transitions witnessed by European political systems, in particular the build-up of the European Union and the demise of the Soviet Union. Changes in size and geographical distribution of Jews in European countries primarily reflected the main migration flows at the intercontinental, international and interregional level. Along with the main geopolitical explanatory factors, a strong connection prevailed between the level and speed of development of different socioeconomic areas in Europe and the respective Jewish presence. Another set of determinants of Jewish demographic change reflected family patterns, marriage, fertility, age composition, and the influence of Jewish identification on these factors.

1 For earlier analyses see DellaPergola, 1983: 19–62; DellaPergola, 1993b: 25–82; DellaPergola, 1994: 57–73.

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sergio dellapergola

These different variables not only deeply affected the identificational boundaries of the Jewish population, but eventually contributed to some definitional blurring of Jewish peoplehood itself. The rules for defining the target population became the subject of a lively debate between different Jewish authorities competing for leadership of the Jewish public in a public space continuously reshaped by the vastly disparate behaviors of individual Jews and by the continuous reshuffling of community organizations supposedly representing them. Intellectuals and experts, participant observers of the Jewish scene in Europe, also tended to express a great variety of opinions, some of which anchored in systematic empirical work on the ground, some aired as normative hopes and fears.2 In the light of these trends and evaluations, alternative prognoses can be developed for Europe’s Jewish population in the foreseeable future. Based on different assumptions and scenarios, the results of these projections can be compared to trends in the two main areas of the contemporary Jewish presence, North America and Israel. This may provide a sense of the likelihood and limits of the coming age of Europe as one of the major pillars of global Jewish life in the future. Europe’s Jewish Population: Historical Survey While the concept of Europe may be clear in the mind of many, the geographical and cultural limits of the continent are a subject for ample debate. Dimensions of time and space cumulate to create a highly variable picture with reference to both the geo-political boundary of the socio-cultural aggregate and to the internal variability that has been a central characteristic of the European experience in general since time immemorial (see DellaPergola, 2006: 215–221). This is especially true when speaking of the Jews whose continuous presence on the continent has lasted more than 2,200 years. Such seniority makes the Jews not only an integral part of European history and culture but actually one of its oldest and pristine components. However, the inherent weakness of a landless and powerless minority vis-à-vis territorially based societies and their constituted powers often histori-

2 See examples of contrasting views in: Wasserstein, 1996; Pinto, 2004: 679–689; Dencik, 2002: 1–34; Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, 2005: 299–368.

jews in europe: demographic trends

5

17,500

15,000

Thousands

12,500

10,000

World total Diaspora Total Europe total West Europe East Europe

7,500

5,000

2,500

0 1170 1300 1490 1600 1700 1800 1860 1900 1939 1945 1960 1990 2008

Figure 1. World Jewish population by major regions, 1170–2009

cally caused a status of dependency and instability, and translated into powerful ups and downs in the Jewish presence. At least on a quantitative scale, what is more remarkable in the European Jewish longue durée is its shifting rather than stationary geography (see Lestschinsky, 1926: 1–157; Lestschinsky, 1929/30: 123–156 and 563–599; DellaPergola, 2001b: 15–28; Schmelz and DellaPergola, 2006: 553–572). After many centuries of scarce if any demographic growth among the overall extant Jewish population, during two and a half crucial centuries between 1700 and the eve of World War II the number of Jews grew from a relatively small total of perhaps one million overall, to the orders of magnitude of ten millions and above known during the twentieth century and at present. This momentous demographic transition primarily occurred in Europe, mostly on the East side of the continent (see DellaPergola, 2001a: 11–33). It is not exclusively but certainly largely because most of the growth of Jewish population occurred in Eastern Europe, that the world Jewish Diaspora became predominantly associated and identified with

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Europe. After the legal emancipation of the Jews during the last portion of the eighteenth century, if the leading ideas and leaders in the Jewish religious and civil realm often came from Western and Central Europe, certainly the public that they addressed were primarily located in Eastern Europe. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it thus happened that many important developments that occurred in the religious, social, cultural and political realms and in which the imprint of Eastern European Jewry appeared to be dominant, significantly reflected the shift in that direction of the geographical center of gravity and critical mass of Jewish life. Figure 1 also demonstrates the gradual disassociation of world Jewish population growth from Eastern Europe during the last years of the nineteenth century and until World War II. The rise of North American Jewry and to a lesser extent of other Jewish communities overseas and in Palestine became the dominant factor, but it should be stressed that the extension of the Jewish Diaspora to new continents and areas was fundamentally fueled by large scale migrations from Europe. Because of the consequences of the Shoah, after World War II the weight of European Jewry sharply diminished while other Diaspora communities remained overall stable and the yishuv in Israel sharply increased. Other demographic factors that will be discussed later also contributed to the overall static share of Jews in Europe out of the global picture. Figure 2 compares in greater detail the internal shifts of Jewish population regional primacy over the last millennium according to eight main areas within Europe. The spectacular total continental growth during the nineteenth century, but also the more catastrophic consequences of Shoah affected particularly the complex of Poland, the Baltic States, Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine and Bessarabia (later partly superseded by Moldova). In the long run, other geo-political regions in Europe displayed periodical rotations as the most significant areas of Jewish settlement: initially it was Spain and Portugal, relieved after the great expulsion by the growth of Central Europe’s Western parts (Germany, Austria, also inclusive here of Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium) and Eastern parts (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania), later followed by the growth of North-Western Europe (the UK, here including as well Scandinavia), and more recently by the growth of France. Other regional communities such as Italy and the Balkans also had significant quantitative ups and downs over history but never constituted the main locus of the Jewish presence in Europe.

jews in europe: demographic trends

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10000 9000 8000 7000 Bul,Gre, Yug, Tur Cz, Slo, Hun, Rom Pol, Rus, Ukr, Blr, Mld, Blt UK, Ire, Scand Germ, Au, CH, Be, Ne, Lu Italy France Spain,Port

Thousands

6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1170

1300

1490 1600 1700

1800 1860

1900

1939

1945 1960

1990 2008

Figure 2. Jewish population in Europe by major regions, 1170–2009

Looking at these shifts helps to reiterate that the overarching concept of Europe cannot hold without referring to its parts separately. And when doing that, we uncover very significant internal dissonance, meaning that the decline of one part often was the underpinning to the rise of another part. The fundamental factor ceaselessly at work was the competition of several major European powers for hegemony over the continent and outside of it. This entailed repeated conflicts, rises and falls of centers of political influence and of economic primacy, and significant variations and differences in the nature of local circumstances in each nation. Among the factors to be considered in this last respect was the attitude to local Jewish populations that could range from forthcoming at certain conjunctures of time and place, to very repelling under other circumstances. Powerfully stimulated by these different attitudes, voluntary or coerced international migrations played a major role in the continuous redistribution of Jewish populations within the European continent and in the continuous population exchanges between Europe and other continents. Again in a long-term perspective that spans over a millennium, the main chronology of Jewish migrations in Europe was South-North, West-East, and East-West. And when the movement of people was over, they were quick to absorb the fundamental mores of the new place and to incorporate them within their unique, locally grounded Jewish identity.

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sergio dellapergola Population Changes since World War II

The Shoah determined the most powerful cleavage in modern Jewish history and radically disrupted what had been up to that moment the continuous build-up and transformation of European Jewry (DellaPergola, 1996: 34–51). While Shoah is not discussed here, it must be kept in mind that its after-effects long lingered within Jewish population composition and trends, and in various ways still powerfully determine the meaning of Jewish corporate life in contemporary Europe. The highly differentiated dynamics of Jewish population distribution after World War II is demonstrated in Table 1 that shows regional changes among European Jewry and compares them with other continents and areas for the years 1948–2009. Table 1. World Jewish population by major regions, 1948–2009 Region

World total Israel Diaspora, Total Europe, Total Europe, West Spain, Port, Gibr Italy France Ger, Aust, Swi, Bel, Neth, Lux UK, Ireland, Scandinavia Europe, East Former USSR in Europe Czech, Slov, Hun, Pol, Rom Bul, Gre, Former Yug, Turkey Former USSR in Asia Other Asia North Africac South Africa North America Latin America Oceania

Number (thousands) 1948 1970 2009

1948

11,500 12,662 13,309 100.0 650 2,582 5,569 5.7 10,850 10,080 7,740 94.3 3,750 3,232 1,469 32.6 9.0 1,035b 1,113 1,053 13 10 13 0.1 35 32 29 0.3 235 530 485 2.1 146 122 208 1.3

Percent 1970

2009

Percent change 1948– 1970– 1948– 1970 2009 2009

100.0 20.4 79.6 25.5 8.8 0.1 0.2 4.2 1.0

100.0 41.8 58.2 11.1 7.9 0.1 0.2 3.6 1.6

10 297 –7 –14 8 –23 –9 126 –16

5 115 –23 –55 –5 30 –9 –8 70

16 757 –29 –61 2 0 –17 106 42

436

419

318

3.8

3.3

2.4

–4

–24

–27

2,715 2,000

2,119 1,897

416 320

23.6 17.4

16.7 15.0

3.2 2.4

–22 –5

–80 –83

–85 –84

605

163

68

5.3

1.3

0.5

–73

–58

–89

110

59

28

0.9

0.5

0.2

–46

–53

–75

225

262

19

2.0

2.1

0.1

16

–93

–92

365 630 105 5,215 520 40

100 92 124 5,686 514 70

19 4 73 5,650 391 115

3.2 5.5 0.9 45.3 4.5 0.3

0.8 0.7 1.0 45 4.1 0.5

0.1 0.0 0.6 42.5 2.9 0.9

–73 –87 18 9 –1 75

–81 –95 –41 –1 –24 64

–95 –99 –30 8 –25 188

a. Core definition, not including non-Jewish members of households. b. Including 170,000 displaced persons. c. Including Ethiopia.

jews in europe: demographic trends

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International migration here again played a very important role but somewhat paradoxically the great migration streams leaving and rejoining Europe in a sense balanced each other off. Soon after the War, large numbers of displaced persons who were precariously hosted in their own Europe as a consequence of the conflict and Shoah for the most part left, primarily to Israel and to some extent to other Western countries such as Canada, Australia and the United States. European Jews were for the majority concentrated in the Soviet Union from where there was little opportunity to emigrate. Highly variable migration policies were implemented by other countries in the Soviet sphere of influence, but eventually most Jews left those countries. In Western Europe the contrary effect of de-colonization was felt. The French decolonization in particular, but also the retreat of the United Kingdom and Italy from their former colonies, protectorates and metropolitan territories in North Africa and to a lesser extent in Asia, generated wide waves of emigrations among Europeans that had settled those areas. Jews often had played a middleman economic and social role between the colonial powers and the local populations, and under the new circumstances they were put in a position that commanded them to leave nearly in their entirety. In addition to anti-Jewish hostility that to some extent had pre-existed, the crucial factor was the ignition of the conflict between the Arab countries and Israel. Jews, rightly or wrongly perceived as identified with the Israeli enemy, became the target of violence and the complex interaction that they had built through hundreds of years with the non-Jewish environment abruptly collapsed. The natural resort for those who did not choose to go to Israel was to resettle in the former colonial country of which many held the citizenship (Bensimon and DellaPergola, 1984: 436ff.; DellaPergola, 1976: xvi and 358ff.). A minority settled in other countries throughout Europe. Between 1948 and 1968, it can be estimated that over 620,000 Jews migrated from Eastern Europe, of which over half a million went to Israel (DellaPergola, 2009a: 213–236). The majority of the others went overseas and only a minority remained in Western Europe. During the same period over 250,000 Jews immigrated to France from North Africa and the total of other Jewish immigrants to Western Europe may have reached 50,000. Overall, the Jewish population of Europe decreased by 14% between 1948 and 1970; it increased by 8% in Western Europe and it diminished by 22% in Eastern Europe. After the Six Day War, emigration from Western Europe to Israel became

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sergio dellapergola

more significant. But the main event was the opening of the doors of the Soviet Union that took place in two distinct stages. The first occurred soon after the June 1967 war, when the long suppressed Jewish identity of Soviet Jews, boosted by the events in the Middle East, gained wide support in Western public opinion. The second stage was put into motion by the fall of the Berlin wall on November 9, 1989 that symbolically marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union. Since 1968 about 1.7 million Jews left Eastern Europe, of these about one million went to Israel. Of the remaining 700,000, about 120,000 went to Germany plus an equal number of non-Jewish family members. About another 100,000 Jewish immigrants arrived to other countries in Western Europe. The continental migration balance was thus clearly negative. This reverberated on the population balance. Between 1970 and 2009 Europe lost 55% of its Jewish population. In Western Europe there was a minor loss of 5%, and in Eastern Europe a drastic decline of 80% (DellaPergola, 2008a: 569–620). Within the major geographical divisions in Europe, the pace of Jewish population change was different, too. Thus between 1970 and 2008 Germany incurred the highest relative increase, followed by Spain and Portugal. Scandinavian countries were overall stable, while Italy, France, and the complex of smaller communities in Western Europe (Benelux, Switzerland, Austria) all experienced some diminution, and the more visible decline occurred in the United Kingdom. In Eastern Europe, the Balkans areas lost over half their initial population in 1970, Central-Eastern Europe lost nearly 60%, and the former Soviet republics lost 83%. As a consequence of these changes the ranking of major Jewish populations in Europe repeatedly shifted (Table 2). Between 1948 and 2009, only five countries appeared consistently among the largest ten: France, Russia, Ukraine, the UK, and Hungary. Countries that disappeared from the ten majors included Belarus, Moldova, Romania and Latvia. Countries that eventually emerged in the top list included Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. Turkey was in the list in 1948 and in 2009, but not in 1970. It is worth noting that the largest Jewish population in a single European country in 1948 was 808,000 (Russia), diminished to 570,000 in 1970 (also Russia), and again diminished to 485,000 in 2009 (France). The tenth largest in 1948 was Latvia (37,000), in 1970 it was the Netherlands (30,000), and in 2009 it was Turkey (18,000). These figures clearly outline the prevailing trend to a shrinking European Jewry. Notwithstanding its much reduced population size, European Jewry

jews in europe: demographic trends

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Table 2. Largest Jewish populations in Europe, 1970–2009 Rank

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

1970

1989

2009

Country

Population

Country

Population

Country

Population

Russia Ukraine France UK Belarus Moldova Hungary Romania Turkey Latvia

807,900 777,100 530,000 390,000 148,000 98,100 70,000 70,000 39,000 36,700

Russia France Ukraine UK Belarus Moldova Hungary Germany Belgium Netherlands

570,000 530,000 487,000 320,000 112,000 66,000 57,800 33,500 31,800 30,000

France UK Russia Germany Ukraine Hungary Belgium Netherlands Italy Turkey

485,000 293,000 210,000 120,000 74,000 48,800 30,500 30,000 28,500 17,700

Total 1–10 Total Europe 1–10 as % of total

2,891,100 3,231,900 89.5

2,176,300 2,433,900 89.4

1,337,500 1,469,000 91.0

tended to become geographically more concentrated. In 1948 the ten major countries included 85% of the total population in Europe; in 2009, the share of the ten largest had increased to 91%. These changes also meant a drastic shift of the Jewish population’s center of gravity from the East to the West of the continent. Figure 3 demonstrates the changes between 1970 and 2008 through a simplified four-fold typology. Clearly the main change was determined by the exodus from the former Soviet Union, while countries member of the European Union, as an aggregate, remained overall quite stable. The significant bottom line was that after many centuries of predominance of Eastern over Western European Jewry, the West regained the predominance that it had since the beginning of the Jewish settlement on the European continent. European Jewish Migrations and Émigrés As noted, migrations played a very significant role in the restructuring of European Jewry. Large scale immigration compensated and replenished the rank and file of European communities for the otherwise negative demographic trends. A particular inflow of immigrants came from Israel, although the estimates often heard about the numbers of Israelis in Europe hardly find support in the available statistical sources.

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sergio dellapergola

3500000

3000000

2500000

Other East Europe, Balkans Former USSR Europe Other West Europe European Union 15

2000000 1500000

1000000

500000 0 1970

2008

Figure 3. Jewish population in Europe, by major geographical divisions, 1970–2008

Data by European governments about the number of foreign citizens in each country point to a continental total of a few tens of thousands, without counting those who emigrated to Israel and returned to the countries of origin after some time. But the fact remains that large numbers of Jews left Europe since World War II. The only country for which such emigration is clearly documented year by year is Israel (see Figure 4), and the emerging overall image provides useful insights regarding the underlying mobility mechanisms. For the forty years period 1968 to 2008, Figure 4 shows the number of migrants from nine Western and four Eastern European countries along with the total number of immigrants to Israel. To enhance the comparisons, the data for each country are presented in similar graphical display, somehow as if they were percentages, regardless of the magnitude of the actual numbers involved.3 Total immigration to Israel over the past 40 years was clearly dominated by the surge of immigration from the FSU since 1990. Some earlier increase was also visible just after the June 1967 war, but it was quickly superseded by 3

See Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, Jerusalem (yearly).

jews in europe: demographic trends

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the earlier wave of Soviet Jewry in the early 1970s, and by a more modest revival in the late 1970s. The migration experiences of different Western countries offer an interesting case for comparison because it might be inferred that most of the time they did not reflect particularly strong negative pressures enhancing emigration. The similarities and dissimilarities offer some ground for speculation, after keeping in mind that the absolute numbers of migrants and their ratios to the total Jewish population were quite low. Clearly the Six Day War offered an occasion for more intense consideration of the Israeli option in all countries, but in some cases (France, the UK, Germany, Belgium, Italy) the response was quicker and relatively more intense than elsewhere (the Netherlands, Switzerland). That more intense stage had concluded by the mid 1970s. A second more modest wave was visible nearly everywhere around 1982–1983, at the time of the first Israeli war in Lebanon, especially in the UK and the Netherlands. Particularly sharp anti-Israeli response at that time might have generated an unpleasant public atmosphere in some of the countries. A further minor migration wave appeared in the early 1990s, more visible in France, Belgium, and Switzerland. And finally again in the early 2000s most countries, led by France experienced somewhat increased emigration. Such broad co-variation suggests a certain similarity in the way of operating of the likely main stimulants to Jewish emigration: experience or fear of anti-Semitism, and temporary economic recessions. Turning to some of the major countries of origin in Eastern Europe, the picture is evidently different because of two main reasons. The first is that Jewish emigration was not free but highly regulated whereas periods of relatively high openness to emigration alternated to period of frontier closure. The second reason is that because of large scale emigration, in some cases the remaining Jewish communities were so small that any further emigration was of very little quantitative import. The latter applies especially to Poland and Romania, where most of Jewish emigration occurred between 1968 and the 1980s, and in fact much more had occurred between 1948 and the 1960s. The opposite time schedule is true for the FSU and Hungary where in different measures most of the immigration came from the 1990s and later. But in the case of these two countries, too, emigration was responsible for radical changes in the sizes of the remaining Jewish populations. The

14

sergio dellapergola France

World 225000

6000

200000 5000 175000 150000

4000

125000 3000 100000 75000

2000

50000 1000 25000 0 1968

0 1973

1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

2008

1968

1973

1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

2008

Germany

UK 350

2000

300 1500

250 200

1000 150 100 500 50 0 1968

0 1973

1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

1968

2008

Belgium

1973

2008

The Netherlands

350

350

300

300

250

250

200

200

150

150

100

100

50

50

0

0 1968

1973

1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

2008

1968

1973

1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

Figure 4. Migration to Israel from European countries, 1968–2008

2003

2008

jews in europe: demographic trends

15

Switzerland

Italy

250

350 300

200 250 150

200 150

100

100 50 50 0 1968

1973

1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

2008

FSU

0 1968

1973

1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

2008

Poland 2000

200000 175000

1500

150000 125000

1000

100000 75000

500

50000 25000 0 1968

0 1973

1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

1968

2008

1973

Romania

Hungary

5000

350

1978

1983

1988

1993

1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

2008

300 4000 250 3000

200 150

2000 100 1000

0 1968

50

1973

1978

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

2008

0 1968

1973

1998

Figure 4. Migration to Israel from European countries, 1968–2008

2003

2008

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sergio dellapergola

case is clearly shown here for an emigration that was highly regulated in each country by the respective governments. The large scale Jewish emigration from Europe in the course of the twentieth century was a main determinant of the creation of very significant communities of European émigrés out of the continent. For example, most of the Jews in the United States are of European origin, but looking only at those who in the year 2000 resulted born in Europe their number exceeded 350,000, of which 112,000 were born in Western Europe and 238,000 born in Eastern Europe (DellaPergola, 2003: 66ff.). These figures do not include non-Jewish members of Jewish households. In Israel in 2008, the number of European born Jews was 999,000, plus another 697,000 born in Israel of a Europeanborn father, for a total of 1,696,000.4 When we add smaller numbers of European Jews in other extra-European countries, and a full count of those born there of very recent European ancestry, an estimate approaching 2.5 million individuals can be obtained worldwide. All in all, the number of European Jews who live outside Europe is today vastly superior to the number of Jews who live on the continent. In the era of transnationalism, to maintain and nurture a certain mode of Jewish civilization does not need to be strictly tied to territory. Variable Jewish Population Definitions and Estimates The population trends outlined here so far were based on numbers that mostly reflected the core Jewish population concept. But it should be acknowledged that among the consequences of the process of increasing integration of Jewish communities in the broader societal context, expressed among other things by a rising rate of intermarriage, is the need to build up of a complex definitional approach to the definition of who is Jew. In our practice the core Jewish population includes persons who, in censuses or other social surveys, define themselves Jewish or persons with Jewish parents who define themselves lacking a religious identification; the extended Jewish population also includes persons with Jewish background who declare an identification other than Judaism; and the enlarged Jewish population also includes any other members in the same nuclear families without Jewish ancestry. Lack

4

Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, cit., 2009.

jews in europe: demographic trends

17

of specification between these different alternative definitions stands at the origin of most controversies about the number of Jews in a given country or area. Unfortunately there are only few instances in which a complete typology can be specified of the various groups and sub-groups that constitute the broadest possible extension of the relevant subject of investigation. One such example comes from the 2001 Census of Scotland whose returns are available separately and in greater detail than those of the main part of the United Kingdom (Graham, 2008). In 2001, 8233 persons in Scotland declared that either their upbringing or their current religion was Jewish. Of these, 5661 (69%) had both Jewish upbringing and current religion; 1785 (22%) had Jewish upbringing but were not currently Jewish; and 787 (9%) had not a Jewish upbringing but were currently Jewish. The total of those with Jewish upbringing thus was 7446, and the number of those currently Jewish was 6448, a difference of 998—a net loss of 13% over the initial number (see Figure 5).

Upbringing: No Religion (129) 2%

Accessions (converts) Upbringing: Not Jewish Current: Jewish Upbringing: (787) 12% Non-Jewish religion (317) 5%

Current religion: Jewish (6448) 100%

Upbringing: Refused (341) 5%

Upbringing & current religion: Jewish (5661) 88%

Current: Non-Jewish religion (620) 8%

Upbringing: Jewish (7446) 115%

Current: No Religion (774) 10%

Current: Refused (391) 5%

Secessions (losses) Upbringing: Jewish Current: Not Jewish (1785) 24%

Source: Graham, 2008.

Figure 5. 2001 Census results—Jews in Scotland

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sergio dellapergola

It is hard to say whether such lifetime negative identificational balance would characterize the whole Jewish population of Europe. It is more likely that the results of such lifetime comparison would be highly diverse in different parts of the continent. Nonetheless, it is highly revealing that the one and only detailed observation available from an official state source should produce such a result. It tends to reinforce the opinion that in a free world where individual choices play an increasingly important role vis-à-vis normative community constraints, a significant turn-around of identities constantly takes place between entering and exiting a positive Jewish identity. And the net result may well be one of a weakened interest to be part, or at least to explicitly state belonging with the Jewish section of total society. Widely different figures may emerge out of alternative identificational options that refer, for example, to those who ever identified with Judaism, or to those who currently do, or to those who currently do plus their non-Jewish family members. Table 3 provides examples of estimates that may be suggested for 17 selected countries with the largest Jewish populations in Europe. Four types of estimate are reported, reflecting the official national census returns when they exist; our estimates of the core Jewish population based on careful evaluation of all available sources; our estimates of the enlarged Jewish population, including as well the non-Jewish family members, and in a few cases also the Law of Return estimates that also include non-Jewish children and grandchildren of Jews, and the respective spouses. At a first glance it appears that in some cases census results are significantly higher than the current estimate (Belarus, Latvia, Russia, Ukraine). This simply reflects the continuing emigration and erosion of the Jewish population since the date of census. In several other cases, the census estimate is lower than the core estimate (Austria, Romania, United Kingdom). This reflects the widespread assumption that a certain fringe of the Jewish population preferred not to declare itself as such in the census. These supposed Jewish unknowns need to be reintegrated in the overall total. In one case, Hungary, the gap between census and estimate is particularly wide (13,000 as officially reported in 2001, and about 49,000 as estimated in 2009). Core Jewish populations are evaluated with an accuracy rating that takes into account the more or less recent date of the baseline and the method of data collection and updating. Enlarged Jewish populations are obviously larger than the respective core population, but the amount of difference has to be evaluated case by case (see for example: van Solinge and

jews in europe: demographic trends

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Table 3. Main Jewish populations in Europe. Estimates by various sources and definitions, 2009 Country

Austria Belarus Belgium Francea Germany Hungary Italy Latvia Netherlands Romania Russia Spainb Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom Ukraine a. c. d. f.

Last National Census

Core

Enlargedd

Our estimate 1.1.2009

Accuracy ratingc

266,741 (2001)

9,000 17,000 30,500 485,000 120,000 48,800 28,500 10,000 30,000 9,800 210,000 12,600 15,000 17,700 17,700 293,000

B (c)(r) B (c) D B (s) B (r) C (c)(s) B (r) B (c) B (s) B (r) B (c) D C (s) B (c) B (s) B (c)

15,000 34,000 40,000 580,000 250,000 90,000 35,000 20,000 43,000e 18,000 430,000 15,000 22,000 25,000 21,000 350,000

104,300 (2001)

74,000

B (c)

150,000

8,140 (2001) 27,800 (1999)

13,000 (2001) 14,600 (1997) 6,179 (2002) 233,600 (2002) 17,700 (2000)

Law of Returnf

50,000

150,000

650,000

225,000

Including Monaco. b. Including Gibraltar. A=Best; B, C = intermediate; D=Poorest; (c) Census; (r) Register; (s) Survey. Total members in Jewish households. e. Persons with at least one Jewish parent. Jews, children and grandchildren of Jews, and respective spouses, no matter if not-Jewish.

de Vries, 2001; Kovács, 2004). Finally, the Law of Return potential, which actually is a theoretical notion, is estimated for four countries in Eastern Europe. The assumption is that the number of eligible for the Law of Return may become in the course of time three times or more as large as the original core population. Evidently, undifferentiated use of these various estimates is bound to enhance strong disagreements about the actual Jewish population size. Experience teaches that— inasmuch as the data were collected seriously and impartially, if they exist at all—the ensuing disagreements can be solved by making reference to one unified definitional system. Regional Development and the Jewish Presence Describing the main changes in Jewish population size may be useful for a general assessment of continental patterns, and history certainly

20

sergio dellapergola

is the prime factor to be considered when trying to provide an overall assessment of the destiny and evolution of European Jewry. But in view of the already noted fragmented character of European history, still the question remains whether it would be possible to find a parsimonious explanatory key of greater analytic potency to the emerging distribution of Jewish population. Such an explanation, beyond the more explicit and known factors, would be able to detect some leading forces underlying the overall continental experience in its entirety. One important aspect to be considered is the West-East gradient that long prevailed in European politics and to a large extent, though not completely, became superseded with the end of the Cold War and the gradual eastward expansion of the European Union. Significant demographic, economic and cultural structural differences that go back not only to the previous generations but deeper into the past are still visible in the social fabric of the continent. Some of these differences are demonstrated in Figure 6 that shows the spread of two indicators for the total population, the GNP per inhabitant and the net balance of international migration, by major regional divisions within countries.5 In both cases, East European regions display significantly worse conditions than Western regions, as shown by lower GDP and higher emigration frequencies. There also appears to be a positive gradient when moving from the more peripheral to the more central regions of Western Europe. The question under investigation here is the relationship between the size of the Jewish presence and the changes therein, and these underlying socioeconomic differences. To operationalize the latter, we use the Human Development Index—a composite measure of health, education and income in real purchase power terms—for each country.6 HDI is a measure of the societal context of Jewish life, not a direct measure of the life quality of the Jewish population itself. However, we can posit it as a relevant measure of the socioeconomic status of Jewish communities in that—if not to the same extent for each individual—the macro-social context does significantly affect one’s own opportunities and sense of wellness. We look at country HDI levels in about 40 countries in the baseline year 1975, and follow the changes in Jewish population size between 1970—close the baseline point—and in 2008 (Figure 7). Each point in the figure rep5 European Commission, Eurostat, Eurostat Regional Yearbook, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2008. 6 United Nations, Human Development Programme, Human Development Report, New York, 2009. The Index of Human Development ranges between 0 and 1.

jews in europe: demographic trends GDP per inhabitant

21

Net migration

GDP per inhabitant, in PPS, by NUTS 2 regions, 2005

Net migration by NUTS 2 religions, average 2001 to 2005

Percentage of EU-27 = 100

Fer 1000 inhabitants