Lingua 113 (2003) 967–996 www.elsevier.com/locate/lingua
A minimalist treatment of modality Jonny Butler Department of Language and Linguistic Science, University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, UK Received 27 March 2002; received in revised form 24 October 2002; accepted 24 October 2002
Abstract This paper provides an explanation for aspects of the behaviour of the English modal auxiliaries based at the syntax–semantics interface. The core idea is a marriage of Kratzer’s [Linguistics and Philosophy, 1 (1977), 337] classical analysis of modals as propositional operators with current minimalist ideas about the propositional nature of phases [Chomsky (1999) MITOPL, 18]. This gives rise to two scope positions for modals: one associated with the vP phase, and one with the CP phase. It is shown that the former scope position leads to root readings of modals and the latter to epistemic readings. # 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Modals; Epistemic modality; Root modality; Scope; Phases
1. Introduction As is well known, the modal auxiliary verbs (modals) in English and many other languages receive two distinct readings, traditionally termed EPISTEMIC and ROOT.
(1) (2)
Arthur must be in bed =‘it is a necessary assumption that Arthur is in bed’ Susan must tidy away the toys =‘Susan is required to tidy away the toys’
E-mail address:
[email protected] (J. Butler). 0024-3841/03/$ - see front matter # 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0024-3841(02)00146-8
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Must neutrally1 receives an epistemic reading in (1) and a root reading in (2). The question is how this distinction is derived. Various proposals have been put forth, each with its problems: some authors have claimed the distinction can be represented syntactically; others have claimed it is lexical; while others still have claimed it is semantically/pragmatically determined, with neither a syntactic nor a lexical difference. There is also a distinction to be made between modals expressing necessity (e.g. must, should) and possibility (e.g. can, may). A related question involves the PF reflex of modality: cross-linguistically, there is a tendency for modals have the same PF form whether they are interpreted as epistemic or root. Additionally, there is a tendency for necessity and possibility forms of modals not to have the same PF form. The scope behaviour of modals has also generated attention: modals seem to interact with other scope-bearing elements in a number of ways. For example, Picallo (1990), Brennan (1997) among others, have claimed that epistemic modals take scope over subjects, whereas root modals scope under subjects. It is also clear that modality interacts scopally with sentential negation in seemingly puzzling ways (cf. Cormack and Smith, 2002). A good theory of modality, then, should account for at least the following things: 1. The epistemic/root distinction: how and where it is derived. 2. The PF form of modals: why modals cross-linguistically show up with the same PF reflex for epistemic and root (but not necessity and possibility) senses. 3. The scope properties of modals: how these properties come about, what exactly they are, and how they interact with other scope-bearing elements in the clause. This paper pursues an approach that accounts for the points in 1–3 at the syntax– semantics interface. The core idea is the marriage of Kratzer’s (1977, 1981, 1991) semantics for modality to current minimalist ideas concerning the propositional nature of what Chomsky (1999) terms PHASES: specifically, vP and CP. The theory developed derives the epistemic/root distinction in the mapping from the syntax to the semantics: epistemic and root modals have a unitary lexical semantics as propositional operators, which allows them to be merged in either of two syntactic positions, one associated with the vP phase and the other with the CP phase. Modals are therefore predicted to have the same PF form for the two readings, since they are essentially the same lexical item, just interpreted in a different place. The scope properties of modals then arise from their quantificational nature, coupled with their syntactic position at LF. 1
The epistemic/root distinction is notoriously context dependent. We can easily interpret the modal in (1) as root, as in ‘Arthur is required to be in bed before 7 o’clock, or he’ll get overtired and won’t sleep all night’; or the modal in (2) as epistemic, as in ‘It surely must be Susan that tidies away the toys, as Arthur is too small’.
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The theory presented leads to a very simple, and independently motivated, syntax and semantics for the modals, with the mapping between the two accounting for their peculiarities in a minimal and elegant way.
2. Modality Modality is realized in Standard English mainly by the use of the modal auxiliaries might, must, may, can, could, will, would, should, ought (to), etc. (see Palmer, 1990 and Coates, 1983 for detailed discussion). Modality will for now be defined broadly as a semantic/pragmatic device that signals a speaker’s attitude towards or opinion of either a proposition P, or the relationship between a predicate p and its subject: whether they believe P/p (almost) certainly holds, has the potential to hold but in fact doesn’t hold, has the potential to hold and perhaps does . . . and so on. This will be made more precise later. 2.1. Types of modality It is generally accepted that some component(s) of the grammar recognize distinctions in ‘types’ of modality. There is no full agreement on how many types of modality exist, but the major distinction that is commonly made is between EPISTEMIC and ROOT modality,2 which will be defined in the following way: epistemic modal[ity] modif[ies] a sentence and deal[s] with the truth value of that sentence; root modal[ity] relate[s] . . . [a subject] to an activity and deal[s] with permission, obligation and ability. (Cook, 1978: 6) That is, epistemic modality makes judgements on actual or possible situations in the world; root modality mediates in various ways the relation between a subject and a predicate. As an example, must in (3) neutrally receives an epistemic interpretation, whereas in (4) it neutrally receives a root interpretation.
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2
Everybody must have got stoned =‘it is a necessary assumption that everybody got stoned (given what I know/ believe/assume)’ Everybody must get stoned =‘everybody is required to get stoned’
ALETHIC and VOLITIONAL modalities have been suggested as further major types, and it has also been proposed that root modality splits into subtypes such as deontic and dynamic (and that dynamic then splits into subject-oriented dynamic and speaker-oriented dynamic) (Palmer, 1990). See x6.4 for discussion.
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There are two points to note here: (i) apparently the same modal—must—is used, and (ii) this modal occurs in the same surface position, in both of these cases. Despite this, the way that the modals are interpreted is very clearly not the same: it seems that the interpretive class a modal falls into in a particular instance is determined by more than the PF form or position of that modal. Therefore when ‘epistemic modals’ and ‘root modals’ are referred to below, this is (as in the literature generally) shorthand for ‘modals receiving an epistemic/root interpretation’. Various explanations have been put forward for the epistemic/root distinction. Picallo (1990) suggests the difference is determined at the level of insertion (merge): epistemics are merged somewhere within the IP level, and roots, somewhere within the VP. McDowell (1987) claims that it is LF that is relevant, with epistemics appearing in C at that level and roots in VP. Brennan (1997) makes a similar claim. These accounts all more or less hinge on the difference being determined syntactically. However, it has been argued that it is rather determined in the lexicon, particularly in the early generative literature: for example Ross (1969) claimed, influentially at the time, that epistemics are lexically one-place (intransitive) predicates, corresponding to raising verbs, while roots are two-place (transitive) predicates, corresponding to control verbs. It has also been proposed that the distinction is determined contextually in the semantic/pragmatic component and does not reflect a lexical or syntactic difference (Kratzer, 1977, 1981, 1991; Papafragou, 1998). Both epistemic and root interpreted modals express either some kind of necessity or some kind of possibility relating to the proposition P / predicate p they operate over (Kratzer, 1977). For example must and may contrast in their epistemic senses in (5) and (6), and in their root senses in (7) and (8).
(5) (6) (7) (8)
You must be an ambassador to England or France =‘it is a necessary assumption that you are an ambassador to England or France’ You may be an ambassador to England or France =‘it is a possible assumption that you are an ambassador to England or France’ You must be an ambassador to England or France =‘you are required to be an ambassador to England or France’ You may be an ambassador to England or France =‘you are allowed to be an ambassador to England or France’
There is therefore a four-way split: epistemic necessity, root necessity, epistemic possibility, and root possibility. Necessity and possibility have been usefully dealt with as quantification over possible worlds (Kratzer, 1977, 1981, 1991): necessity as universal quantification (for all possible worlds, P), possibility as existential (there exists at least one possible world such that P). This will be returned in x3.1.
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2.2. Desiderata for a theory of modals Given the earlier brief review, there are clearly certain things that any good theory of modality should give us. First, we would ideally want to deal with the four-way split using at most two lots of features interacting with one another: epistemic–root and necessity–possibility. This would cut down the number of features required from four discrete ones (an epistemic necessity feature, an epistemic possibility feature . . . and so on), with a large amount of predictable internal duplication among the four, to just two binary ones with no duplication. Second, we would want to know in what part of the grammar modality splits up: if it is in the lexicon, or in the syntax, or if it is purely the result of some semantic/ pragmatic process; or even some combination of these possibilities. Third, we would want an explanation of why modality splits up like this: if the concept of modality is a semantically homogenous one, as maintained by Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991), for example, then why is it able to behave in these different ways? If it isn’t semantically homogenous, as claimed by Ross (1969) in particular, then how do we explain the similarities between the different types (e.g. the observation that both epistemic and root modality subdivide into necessity and possibility forms)? Fourth, we would want to know why the cross-linguistic tendency is for the ‘same’ modal word to instantiate both epistemic and root senses. We have seen this in English with must in (5) and (7) and may in (6) and (8) above. (9–21), taken from de Haan (1997), exemplify the situation in a range of languages. In (9–10), we see both epistemic and root necessity expressed with ta¨ytyy ‘must’; in (11–12), we see both epistemic and root possibility expressed with voi ‘can/may’.
(9)
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Sin-un ta¨ytyy menna¨ ‘you-GEN must go:INF’ ‘you must go’ (root) Leila-n ta¨ytyy olla siella¨ ‘Leila-GEN must be:INF there’ ‘Leila must be there’ (epistemic) Marja Voi leipoa jo huomenna ‘Marja:NOM can:3SG bake:INF already morrow:ESS’ ‘Marja may bake to-morrow’ (root) Leila voi olla siella¨ ‘Leila:NOM may:3SG be:INF there’ ‘Leila may be there’ (epistemic)
FINNISH
Similarly, in (13–16), we see that bori ‘may’ and prepi ‘must’ can be interpreted as either epistemic or root.
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bori na irthi ‘may:3SG:PRES PRT come:3SG:PRES’ ‘s/he may come’ (root) bori na vrethun eki ‘can PRT find:3PL:MED.PASS there’ ‘they may be there’ (epistemic) prepi ta pedja na proseksun’ ‘must DET:PL child:NOM:PL PRT notice:3PL:PRES’ ‘children must take care’ (root) prepi na vrethun eki ‘must PRT find:3PL:MED.PASS there’ ‘they must be there’ (epistemic)
GREEK
In (17), we see that gbo`do´ ‘must’ can be used to express both epistemic and root necessity.
(17) o´ gbo`do´ nı´ ı`ya`wo´ ‘he must have bride’ ‘he must be married’ (root/epistemic)
YORUBA
All the examples seen so far use discrete verbs to encode modality; (18–21) show that the generalization extends to modal affixes: -laam, glossed as ‘PERM’ (‘permissive mood’), expresses both root and epistemic possibility, -n˜um, glossed as ‘DEB’ (‘debitive mood’), expresses both root and epistemic necessity.
(18) avan peeca-laam ‘he:NOM speak-PERM’ ‘he may speak’ (root) (19) kantacaami vant-aalum vara-laam ‘Kandaswami come-CONCESS come-PERM’ ‘Kandaswami may perhaps come’ (epistemic) (20) avan angke pooka-n˜um ‘he:NOM there go-DEB’ ‘he must go there’ (root) (21) gan˜eecan mannaarkuTikki pooyi-rukka-n˜um ‘Ganesan Mannargudi-DAT go-PERF-DEB’ ‘Ganesan must have gone to Mannargudi’ (epistemic)
TAMIL
We would, moreover, want also to explain why the ‘same’ modal element isn’t used to instantiate the necessity and possibility senses of modals [(5) vs. (6); (7) vs.
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(8); etc.]. This latter point may seem trivial, since there is no reason to expect these notions should be expressed in the same way, but it should be noted that there is no prima facie reason to expect epistemics and roots to have the same PF reflex either.
3. Modals and the syntax–semantics interface 3.1. Modal semantics Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991) treats modals uniformly as propositional operators, quantifying over possible worlds (PWs) and relating them to the proposition under question. Necessity modals are treated as universal quantifiers, and possibility modals as existential quantifiers. Thus a sentence like (22) is essentially saying that Arthur is ill in all possible worlds; (23), that Arthur is ill in (at least) one possible world.
(22) (23)
Arthur must be ill Arthur might be ill
The restriction of the quantificational part of the modal (the MODAL RELATION, in Kratzer’s terms) will be taken, as in Brennan (1997) and Papafragou (1998) to be formed from Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) CONVERSATIONAL BACKGROUND: the conversational background, as its name suggests, is the contextual or pragmatic information required to understand the intended modal relation. It is defined along two parameters: the MODAL BASE and the ORDERING SOURCE. The modal base is a set of (sets of) PWs; these are the worlds that are considered relevant for assessing the modal relation. So if the modal operates over a proposition to do with Susan and Arthur, the modal base will consider those worlds where Susan and Arthur (or counterparts of them) obtain; if it operates over a proposition to do with the fact that Susan and Arthur are sister and brother, the modal base will consider those worlds where sibling relationships obtain, etc. These modal bases will form the restrictions for the particular modal expressions they are relevant to. The epistemic/root distinction, according to Kratzer, arises from the kinds of facts that are considered salient in forming a particular modal base: In using an epistemic modal, we are interested in what else may or must be the case in our world given all the evidence available. Using a circumstantial [=root] modal, we are interested in the necessities implied by or the possibilities opened up by certain sorts of facts. Epistemic modality is the modality of curious people like historians, detectives, and futorologists. Circumstantial modality is the modality of rational agents like gardeners, architects and engineers. A historian asks what might have been the case, given all the available facts. An engineer asks what can be done given certain relevant facts. (Kratzer, 1991: 646)
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This kind of information will generally be supplied contextually and mapped on to the semantic representation from the pragmatic component. The second part to the conversational background is the ordering source. The ordering source is some ‘ideal’ world with respect to which the worlds in the modal base are to be considered. The worlds included in the modal base are ordered by their closeness or similarity to the ordering source, thereby further delimiting the domain over which the modal relation is taken to quantify. That is, the modal relation is evaluated not just with regard to what worlds are included in the modal base, but with regard also to how close those worlds are to the ideal. Papafragou (1998) has suggested that the best way of formalizing this idea is with relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995): the domain of quantification is restricted to only those worlds that are relevant for consideration. This is a simplified statement of her proposal, and it seems rather trivial, but it will serve as a useful shorthand in what follows. The effect of evaluating the modal relation along these two parameters is that we get a straightforward explanation of the relativity of modality. A strong necessity modal like must says that the worlds we want to evaluate are those that are very similar to the ideal established by the ordering source in the relevant respect. A weaker necessity modal like should allows also for the evaluation of worlds less similar to the ordering source. We can see that must expresses a stronger kind of necessity than should in (24–25): it isn’t possible to say that the necessary proposition doesn’t actually hold in (24), whereas in (25) this is fine.
(24) You must wash the dishes now (! but you don’t have to) (25) You should wash the dishes now (but you don’t have to)
Modal structures, then, will have a representation as in (26), where w=world and P=proposition [I use necessity here for concreteness: possibility works in basically the same way. See Kratzer (1981, 1991; Papafragou, 1998), for detailed discussion].
(26) 8: w E {relevant PWs}. w E P
What (26) says is that for every w such that w is a member of the set of relevant worlds, w is also a member of the (set of worlds constituting the) proposition under consideration. Kratzer’s position is that modals scope immediately over the particular proposition P: ‘Syntactically, modal words are sentence operators at some level of logical form. If you prefix a sentence [at the appropriate level of logical form] with a modal, you get another sentence.’ (Kratzer, 1991: 641)
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As an example, (27) will have a logical form (LF) like (28)3 (irrelevant details omitted).
(27) Everybody must get stoned
For Kratzer, the epistemic reading of must in (27) (as in everybody must get stoned in those meetings, considering what results from them) will have a modal base that picks out worlds based on all the available facts (essentially, all worlds containing people and situations where getting stoned can be a property of people), and will consider the modal relation just with regard to those worlds in this set that are very close to the ideal established by the ordering source. The meaning will then be something like ‘for every single world close enough to the ordering source, every person gets stoned in that world’. For the root reading (everybody is required to get stoned), the modal base will pick out worlds with regard to whether certain regulations governing the (in)sobriety of people are active in those worlds, and will again only consider those close to the ordering source. This gives us a meaning like ‘for every world such that in that world appropriate regulations obtain, and which is close enough to the ordering source, every person gets stoned’. These two interpretations are acceptable translations for the two readings of (27). However, the claim that modals are uniformly propositional operators sits uneasily with the definition of modality from Cook (1978) given in x2.1, which claims that root modals in some way mediate between subjects and their properties, as well as with the findings of the syntactic accounts of modality mentioned in x2.1. Most of these accounts claim that at the point of interpretation, root modals sit syntactically
3 Every is split from its restriction body in (28) for semantic reasons discussed in detail by Heim (1982: 132–133) who proposes the syntactic operation QUANTIFIER CONSTRUAL to achieve this split. Something like quantifier construal is assumed here, but the details may be left aside.
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low down in the clause, as opposed to epistemics which sit up high. This seems incompatible with Kratzer’s account. 3.2. Propositions and functional domains Kratzer’s semantics tacitly takes the notion of ‘proposition’ to be essentially equivalent to that of ‘sentence’, on a loose definition of this term. This is of course not very controversial, but there have been recent claims in the literature that the ‘sentence’ is not the only propositional element. The claim is that vP is (at least at some point in the derivation) propositional in nature, in the sense that ‘vP has full argument structure’ (Chomsky, 2001: 21). This seems to be a purely syntactic definition of propositionality, as opposed to more traditional semantic definitions—essentially, it treats any saturated predicate as a proposition—but if it is correct it has important consequences. If vP is propositional, then we no longer predict that modals must be interpreted as taking wide scope over the whole sentence. Rather, we predict that modals will be able to scope immediately over any element that is propositional in the relevant sense—anything having ‘full argument structure’. By assumption, this means TP and vP. This being so, we expect there to be two discrete positions in the clause where we will find modals being interpreted. Modals interpreted in the higher position will behave just as in (28). But we also expect (27) to have an alternative LF where the modal sits immediately above vP. To interpret a structure like this, we need to make some extra assumptions. In (28) we tacitly ignored the relevance of traces, thus giving vP exactly the predicative interpretation of VP. However, if we are claiming modals, as propositional operators, can operate over vP, we need to take account of the subject trace in [Spec, vP]. But when it comes to interpret the overt subject in [Spec, TP], we need what it is combining with—modalized vP—to be interpreted not as propositional, but as a predicate. The extra assumptions that we will make, then, are that when a DP is remerged (moved or copied), an operator is inserted immediately below its target position to bind the variable left in the DP’s initial position (Heim and Kratzer, 1998: 186),4 and that this operator triggers l-abstraction, as defined in (34).
(29) Let a be a branching node with daughters b and g, where b dominates [is] only a numerical index i. Then, for any variable assignment a, [[]]a=lx. [g]ax/i (Heim and Kratzer, 1998: 186)
4
A more attractive interpretation of this from a minimalist perspective is that the operator is not inserted during the movement but is rather a feature that already obtains and is involved in triggering the movement; say the EPP feature on T in the examples here. See Butler (2003) for an instantiation of this idea.
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This will make no substantive difference to (28), but it will allow us to generate an interpretable alternative LF for (27) as in (30).5
The meaning we get for this structure is something like ‘every person x is such that for every relevant world which is close enough to the ordering source, x gets stoned’. The interesting thing about this meaning is that it isn’t any good as a paraphrase of the epistemic reading of (27), but it does accord much more with what we have said about root modality. The modal clearly mediates the relation between a subject and its properties, as in the definition of modality given in x2.1, but its lexical semantics can remain exactly as defined by Kratzer.. It is interesting to consider whether this reflects a real structural distinction between epistemic and root modality. It should be straightforward to check whether this is so, since the modal crucially mediates the subject-predicate relation directly by its (LF) position: interpretive judgements and syntactic scope facts should therefore directly confirm or disconfirm the possibility.
4. Empirical consequences This section will look at the interactions of modals with regard to other scope bearing elements, and demonstrate how these interactions show syntactic differences between root and epistemic modals in relevant semantic contexts. 5
The argument given by Heim and Kratzer for the type of structure in (30) is based on discussion of quantifier raising, rather than subject movement: that is, A0 -movement rather than A-movement. However, in order for their system to deal with A-movement that happens to involve quantifiers (as in 30), their proposal has to be extended to cover both situations in order for the subject to bind its trace across intervening elements and still be interpreted high enough, as Heim and Kratzer recognize (p. 216), and as the present argument shows. Apart from this, it is quite possible that there is no difference in the semantics of A/A0 -movement, since the distinction between A- and A0 -positions, if we want to retain it at all (see Chomsky, 1995 for arguments against doing so), is fundamentally a syntactic one.
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xx4.1, 4.2 review arguments presented in Brennan (1997) regarding the difference in behaviour of epistemic and root modals firstly in clauses with symmetric predicates and secondly with predicate adverbials. Brennan’s data show that epistemic modals are interpreted as operating over propositions, while roots are interpreted as operating over predicates: facts which are straightforwardly predicted by the approach taken here. x4.3 deals with the interactions of modals and subjects. Various authors (particularly McDowell, 1987; Brennan, 1997) have claimed that epistemic and root modals show clear scopal distinctions with regard to their interactions with subjects: essentially that subjects scope below epistemics and above roots. It will be shown that this is indeed the case with canonical-scope subjects, but that the picture is more complex than this if we look at indefinite subjects. Indefinite subjects vary their relative scope with root modals along two parameters: whether the subject receives an existential or a quantified reading, in the sense of Diesing (1992), and whether the modals express necessity or possibility. x4.4 discusses the interaction of modals with sentential negation. It has often been claimed that sentential negation scopes below epistemic modals and above roots (Coates, 1983; Picallo, 1990; Roussou, 1998). It has alternatively been argued that negation scopes below necessity modals and above possibility modals (Cormack and Smith, 2002). It will be shown that neither of these is quite right: we do find the scopal array necessity > negation > possibility, but we find it twice in the clause. One position is the one corresponding to epistemic modality, the other is that corresponding to root modality. 4.1. Symmetric predicates Brennan (1997) shows that epistemic and root modals have important differences in their semantic behaviour. She explains this by characterizing epistemics as ‘S(entence)-modals’—i.e. propositional operators—and roots as ‘VP-modals’—i.e. predicate operators. One piece of evidence she gives for this is the behaviour of symmetric predicates. Symmetric relations are ones for which the following inference pattern is valid: R(x,y) !R(y,x). Two classes of predicates denoting such relations are predicates with commitative with such as shake hands with, walk with, play basketball with, and equivalence relations such as get the same score as, be as tall as, and be in the same room as. (Brennan, 1997: 190) Brennan points out that if clauses with symmetric predicates also contain modals, the inference R(x,y) ! R(y,x) only remains valid under epistemic readings for those modals. (31–33) show this.
(31) (32) (33)
Arthur looks like Susan ! Susan looks like Arthur Arthur must/might look like Susan ! Susan must/might look like Arthur Arthur must/can look like Susan ! / Susan must/can look like Arthur
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It is clear that in (31), the entailment from R(x,y) (where R=look like, x=Arthur, and y=Susan) to R(y,x) goes through. Similarly in (32), if it is a necessary/possible assumption that Arthur looks like Susan it must then be a necessary/possible assumption that Susan looks like Arthur too. In (33), however, if Arthur is required to look like Susan (in order that he may be passed off as her illicitly, say) there is clearly no requirement that Susan also look like Arthur. Or if Arthur is able to look like Susan on account of his excellent impersonation skills, this in no way entails that Susan is as capable of impersonating Arthur. Brennan points out that if epistemic modals operate over propositions (that is, predicates already combined with their subjects) and root modals operate over predicates (without their subjects), then exactly the observed pattern is predicted: a propositional operator shouldn’t be able to affect the way a predicate and an argument combine, since they are already combined before it even gets a look in, whereas a predicate operator will by definition change the nature of a predicate: the subject will no longer combine with the original predicate but rather the new one, and there is no reason to suppose properties such as symmetricality should carry from one to the other. A sentential [propositional] operator would not affect the logical properties of the VP [predicate]. Since modals with [root] properties do affect such logical properties, we have to conclude that they are actually concatenated in the semantics with the VP, not with the sentence. (Brennan, 1997: 192) It should be obvious that apart from terminological differences, these observations carry straight across to the analysis given in x3.2. 4.2. Predicate adverbials A second point Brennan notes is the behaviour of VP (predicate) adverbials in modal contexts.
(34) (35) (36) (37)
Anna may take out books on semester loan (root/epistemic) Anna must teach introductory courses (root/epistemic) In virtue of being a graduate student, Anna may take out books on semester loan (root only) In virtue of being a graduate student, Anna must teach introductory courses (root only)
The presence of the predicate adverbial in (36) and (37) only allows a root reading for the modals, and what is modified is clearly not just the basic verbal predicate, but the modalized predicate [modal+vP]: ‘Anna’s freedom to take out books on semester loan is a result of her being a graduate student, [rather than] taking out books on semester
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loan in virtue of being a graduate student is something she is allowed to do’ (Brennan, 1997: 199). If the adverbial is trying to modify a modalized predicate but epistemic modals operate over propositions, the lack of an epistemic reading for the modal in (42) and (43) is expected. Again, the analysis presented here predicts these facts. 4.3. Subjects The precise claim being made here is that the distinction between root and epistemic interpretations of modals is reflected syntactically: the root reading corresponds to an interpretive position immediately above vP, the epistemic reading, to an interpretive position immediately above TP. The explicit prediction that this makes is that epistemic modals will invariably take scope over what we can call ‘canonical-scope’ subjects (i.e. subjects scoping in [Spec, TP]),6 and root modals will take scope below. This isn’t a new claim: it was noted in x3.1 that various authors have claimed that epistemic and root modals are interpreted in different parts of the clause structure. Picallo (1990) has them in different D-structure positions, McDowell (1987) and Brennan (1997) have them in different LF positions; essentially though, they all predict that epistemic modals scope higher than subjects, root modals scope lower. We have seen examples that support this claim in xx4.1, 4.2; here are some more:
(38) All languages might ultimately originate from a single mother tongue (epistemic) =‘it is a possible assumption that all languages originate from a single mother tongue’ Scope: modal > subject (39) All users can post messages (root) =‘all users are permitted to post messages’ Scope: subject > modal
A second set of predictions the analysis makes relates to certain types of quantified subjects. The scope position for canonical-scope subjects we take to be [Spec, TP]. There are certain types of subjects, though, that we assume don’t scope here. Carlson (1977) notes that bare plural indefinite subjects can be interpreted either existentially or generically when combined with stage level predicates, which are basically predicates denoting temporary properties or activities such as eating kelp, ringing a doorbell and running away, being in (or out), etc.
(40) (41) (42)
6
Witches are abroad 9. x is a witch ^ x is abroad GEN: x is a witch. x is abroad
Which I take to be DPs that are strongly quantified in the sense of Milsark (1974).
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(40) can be interpreted to mean that there exist some witches such that they are abroad (41) or that, generically, witches are such that they are abroad (42). The generalization extends to the ‘weak quantifiers’ of Milsark (1974): a, some, a few, many, and cardinal numbers. These can have either an existential reading or a ‘true’ quantificational reading (Diesing, 1992: 61). Diesing analyses the different interpretations available to bare plurals/weak quantifiers as being related to the LF (i.e. scope) position of the subject. Following Heim (1982) and Kamp (1981), she treats bare plural indefinites, and sometimes weak quantifiers (specifically, when they don’t induce a presupposition of the existence of what they are quantifying over) as introducing variables into the logical representation; these variables are bound by other higher elements, either overt quantificational/operator elements like temporal adverbs (always, never, sometimes, etc.) or abstract quantifier elements that are there to make sure nothing gets left unbound. One of these is a generic operator GEN that binds any unbound variables in whatever forms the restriction; one is an existential operator 9 that binds any unbound variables in whatever forms the nuclear scope. The latter brings about existential closure, which is how the reading in (41) is derived. Diesing claims that what forms the nuclear scope is the material from VP (=vP, here), and what forms the restriction is the material from IP (=TP).7 Existential closure, then, is taken to apply at the vP level and the generic equivalent applies at the TP level. This means that in (41), where the bare plural subject is interpreted as existential, it must be associated with its theta position [Spec,vP], and in (42), where the subject is interpreted as generic, it must be associated with its case position [Spec, TP]. Where a weak quantifier is not interpreted as presuppositional, it will have no quantificational force of its own, and so will be associated with [Spec, vP] and subject to existential closure; where it is interpreted as presuppositional, it will have quantificational force and so will be associated with [Spec, TP], binding whatever it quantifies over, in which case Gen will be redundant. Given these assumptions, the analysis presented so far makes very precise predictions about the scope interactions of indefinite subjects and modals: 1. Epistemic interpreted modals should scope higher than a bare plural/weakly quantified subject, since the scope position associated with epistemics is higher than either scope position associated with the subject. 2. Root interpreted modals should scope lower than a bare plural/weakly quantified subject when it is interpreted as presuppositional/quantificational, and higher than a bare plural/weakly quantified subject when it is interpreted as non presuppositional/existential, since the scope position associated with roots is between the two scope positions associated with the subject. 7
Here, we have to modify this slightly: the structure assumed in (30) and onwards takes the restriction to be the DP complement of the quantifier, in [Spec, TP], and the nuclear scope to be everything below this. It is necessary to assume this for two reasons: first, because the quantifier essentially combines two predicative elements, and these are the two that are available; and second because it is clear that must in (30) can’t form part of the restriction of the quantifier. This sentence means ‘for every x such that x is a person, it is necessary for x to get stoned’, rather than ‘for every x such that x is a person and there is some kind of necessity, x gets stoned’, which is about the best interpretation we can get if we adopt Diesing’s original mapping.
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These predictions are easy to check.
(43)
Some philosophers go to those seminars
Since some is a weak quantifier, some philosophers here is ambiguous between a presuppositional/quantificational and a non presuppositional/existential reading: ‘some particular philosophers (e.g. Quine, Carnap, and Socrates) go to those seminars’ and ‘there exist philosophers who go to those seminars’ respectively. If we add modals to (43) we can test the relative scope order of subject and modal.8
(44) Some philosophers must go to those seminars (epistemic necessity) Presuppositional/quantificational reading: ‘it must be the case that (at least) some philosophers go to those seminars (because Quine, Carnap, and Socrates all told me they were intending to)’. Scope: modal > subject Non presuppositional/existential reading: ‘it must be the case that there are philosophers who go to those seminars (because they’re about possible worlds)’. Scope: modal > subject (45) Some philosophers might go to those seminars (epistemic possibility) Presuppositional/quantificational reading: ‘it might be the case that (at least) some philosophers go to those seminars (because Quine, Carnap, and Socrates all told me they were intending to)’. Scope: modal > subject Non presuppositional/existential reading: unable to distinguish relative scope.8 (46) Some philosophers must go to those seminars (root necessity) Presuppositional/quantificational reading: ‘Quine, Carnap, and Socrates are required to go to those seminars’. Scope: subject > modal Non presuppositional/existential reading: ‘it is required that some philosophers go to those seminars, as a condition on our being given money to run them’. Scope: modal > subject (47) Some philosophers can go to those seminars (root possibility) Presuppositional/quantificational reading: ‘some philosophers—specifically Quine, Carnap, and Socrates—are able/allowed to go to those seminars’. Scope: subject > modal. Non presuppositional/existential reading: unable to distinguish relative scope.8
8
There are going to be gaps in the paradigm here, since we assume possibility modals instantiate existential quantification; we can’t therefore make any concrete predictions with regard to non-presuppositional/existential readings of weak subjects and possibility modals since we can’t distinguish the relative scope of two existential quantifiers (May, 1985).
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(44–47) show that (where relative scope can be distinguished) predictions 1 and 2 are correct. We see in (44–45) that whether the modality deals with necessity or possibility, it scopes over the subject. In (46–47), we see that root modality scopes under presuppositional/quantificational readings for the subject and over non presuppositional/existential readings. This provides solid evidence for the claim that there is a scopal difference between epistemic and root modality, and for the more specific claim made here that this difference derives from the ability of modals as propositional operators to merge in two distinct positions in the clause: once on top of vP and once on top of TP. 4.4. Negation The literature on negation is at least as vast as the literature on modality, and there isn’t space to do it justice here. It is noteworthy, though, that a fairly large proportion of this literature takes the form of debate over the proper characterisation of the nature of sentential negation: whether sentential negation is a propositional or a predicate operator (see Horn, 1989: chapters 2 and 7 for extensive discussion of the arguments). We can see why from a sentence like (48), which has two possible logical interpretations, informally represented in (49–50): (49) denies a proposition, while (50) affirmatively ascribes a negated predicate to a subject.
(48) (49) (50)
My hoover isn’t working :[my hoover is working] my hoover is [:working]
This is of course redolent of what we have seen with modals: we have an element which is traditionally treated as a propositional operator, but which seems to be able to affect the way a subject and its properties relate. It should be clear from this that sentential negation is amenable to just the same treatment as that given to modals above: negation can be treated uniformly as a propositional operator, which given the definition of ‘proposition’ we are using means it has exactly the two scope positions available to it that we see in (54–55). Syntactically, it seems most straightforward to assume that the lower scope position for negation corresponds to NegP (Pollock, 1989, 1997; Haegeman, 1995). As to the higher position, the close correspondence between sentential negation and focus has often been noted, in both the syntax and the semantics literature. As to syntax, Klima (1964) claims the interpretation of negation as sentential comes about because of a marker [neg] in a pre-sentential position. Lasnik (1972) expands on this, claiming that [neg] appears in a Comp(=C) position. Rizzi (1997) updates this in terms of his split-CP hypothesis, claiming that [neg] is generated as a feature of T and in order to take sentential scope, must undergo movement to his Foc(us) head. Haegeman (1995, 2000) largely follows Rizzi, but assumes that [neg] is initially generated not in T but in Neg.
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In the semantics literature, we find Jackendoff’s (1972: chapters 6 and 8) treatment of sentential negation in which sentences are split into Focus and Presupposition, where the Presupposition is the sentence with the Focus replaced by an appropriate variable: when negation appears in the Focus, we obtain a sentential negation reading. Essentially, this kind of structure says that the Focus is not a suitable value for the variable in the Presupposition, or in Jackendoff’s terms is not a member of the set denoted by the Presupposition. Negation on this view is basically quantificational. This line of reasoning is taken up by Kratzer (1989: 644–651), who explicitly suggests a treatment of negation as a restricted quantifier with the unfocused part of the sentence (Jackendoff’s Presupposition) as restriction, again with an appropriate variable for the focus added in. Lo¨bner (2000: 232) provides a different formalization of the same kind of idea, claiming ‘The negation of a sentence is formed by negating the focus of the sentence’. For concreteness, then, I shall take as a syntactic starting point a position similar to that of Haegeman (2000), where the lower negation position corresponds syntactically to Neg and the higher one to the Foc(us) position of Rizzi (1997) (this will be revised in x5.1, but not in a way that will matter to what follows). This being so, we can expect some interesting interactions with modality. 4.4.1. Modality and negation (and focus) (51–53) exemplify the first set of relevant facts. (51) The registrar mustn’t/mightn’t have got my letter Scope: epistemic modality > subject > negation (52) The children mustn’t do that in here Scope: subject > root necessity > negation (54) The children can’t do that in here Scope: subject > negation > root possibility
Negation scopes under the subject in all of (56–58): this suggests that the lower (Neg) scope position is instantiated here rather than the higher (Foc) position. Epistemically interpreted modals, whether dealing with necessity or possibility, take scope over this low negation as we would expect (51). Interestingly though, we again see that root interpreted modals have two scope positions available to them: those dealing with necessity scope over negation (52), those dealing with possibility scope under (53). This strongly suggests that not only do modals split scopally with respect to the epistemic/root distinction, but also that at least root modals split scopally into necessity/possibility, with negation in between (cf. Cormack and Smith, 2002). To instantiate the higher scope position for Neg in a declarative context, it is necessary to use marked modals: needn’t or can’t with epistemic interpretation.
(54)
*/% The registrar needn’t have got my letter Scope: */% negation > epistemic necessity
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(55) (56)
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The registrar can’t have got my letter Scope: negation > epistemic possibility The children needn’t do that Scope: negation > root necessity
Negation scoping over epistemic necessity as in (54) is acceptable only to a very small fraction of speakers. Negation scoping over epistemic possibility is fully acceptable (55), as is negation scoping over root necessity (56).9 (57–60) show that this pattern is quite general for English: elements in Foc are easily able to scope over epistemic possibility, but not over epistemic necessity.10 (57) *Mustn’t he have been going to the station? Scope: *negation > epistemic necessity (58) Mightn’t he have been going to the station? Scope: negation > epistemic possibility (59) *Where must he have been going? Scope: *wh > epistemic necessity (60) Where might he have been going? Scope: wh > epistemic possibility
Again, then, we find negation scoping between two types of modal: under modals of necessity and over modals of possibility. We seem to have not just the possibility of propositional operators scoping at two distinct places in the clausal structure, but a very precise order in which those operators can appear. The array necessity > negation > possibility appears once immediately above vP, where the modality is interpreted as root, and once immediately above TP, where the modality is interpreted as epistemic. 4.5. Summary The idea that is being pursued here is that current minimalist assumptions about the propositional nature of vP (Chomsky, 2001) predict that we will find two discrete positions in the clause where propositional operators can occur: one above vP, and one above TP. Empirical data have confirmed the prediction: modals and sentential negation, both traditionally treated as propositional operators, have available exactly 9 It is interesting that to express the scope order negation > necessity, whether the necessity is epistemic or root, we have to use needn’t. Significantly, we never find need as an unmarked modal: it is only available in negative and interrogative environments. We are assuming here that the negative environments we find it in are those where negation scopes in Foc; Rizzi (1997) also places interrogative elements in Foc. To express the scope order negation > epistemic possibility we have to use can’t (couldn’t in conditional or past tense contexts). Again significantly, we never find can as an unmarked epistemic modal: only in negative and interrogative environments. It is plausible to propose that the restrictions on the use of need and epistemically interpreted can come from their having become ‘specialized’ to signal the presence in Foc of an affective operator. 10 This is subject to dialectal variation: some dialects, particularly in Scotland, allow focalized elements to scope over epistemic necessity quite freely: I take these dialects to collapse epistemics into a single scope position.
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the two scope positions we would expect. The question remains as to exactly what these positions, syntactically, are. The next section will address this question, proposing a structure that derives us the observed facts, and dealing with some problems.
5. The syntactic hierarchy The (LF) hierarchy we have seen so far is shown in (61).11
(61)
epistemic necessity > (negation) > epistemic possibility > (strong) subject > root necessity > negation > root possibility > vP
The first question is how this hierarchy comes about. The minimal assumption would be that modals are initially merged low down—say as a v head—and undergo LF movement (or theoretical equivalent) due to the presence of necessity/possibility operators in particular positions in the syntax. Note that this isn’t incompatible with the claim that modals function as propositional operators: the formal syntactic features of modals can be merged in v before the merge of the subject in [Spec, vP] gives us a propositional element so long as the operator features are merged above the subject, since it is these operator features that we assume give modals their interpretation. The surface position of modals can be ascribed to PF movement to T. A similar treatment extends easily to negation. The precise question we need to ask, then, is in which syntactic positions the operator features sit. We have already uncontroversially placed canonical-scope subjects in [Spec, TP]. Epistemic modals and the high negation scope above these subjects; they must then be in CP. Indeed we have already proposed (x4.4), following Haegeman (2000), that the high position for negation is Rizzi’s (1997) Focus position. The structure of a Rizzi CP is shown in (62).
(62) Force > (Top(ic)) > Foc(us) > (Top(ic)) > Fin(iteness)
If negation scopes in Foc, and we want to avoid adding extra structure, epistemic possibility modals must scope in one of the two positions below Foc: Top or Fin. It is highly unlikely that modality should be in any way related to topicalization, and both of the Top positions are taken to be recursive and optional, which isn’t true of modals in general. There is evidence, though, that finiteness is relevant to epistemic interpreted modals: the data in (63–64) show that modals in Gaelic receive an epistemic interpretation when the clause is finite, but a root when the clause is non-finite 11
This is reminiscent of proposals made in Cinque (1999), which will be discussed in x6.
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(David Adger, p.c.). Similar facts have been shown to obtain for Danish (Vikner, 1988), Dutch (van Kemenade, 1985), and Greek (Roussou, 1998).
(63) Faodaidh gu bheil e tinn ‘may that be:PRES he ill’ ‘he may be ill’ (epistemic) (64) Faodaidh tu seo a leughadh ‘may you this PRT read:VN’ ‘you may read this’ (root)
GAELIC
We therefore take it that Fin is the scope position associated with modals of epistemic possibility. The scope position for epistemic necessity modals must be above Foc. Top again isn’t likely; we thus take Force to be the scope position for modals of epistemic necessity. As far as roots are concerned, there are (at least) two ways we could go: one is to take the low negation position to be Neg, as in x4.4. With a basic clause structure as in (65), the simplest assumption is then that root necessity modals scope in T. (65)
CP > TP > NegP > vP > VP
For root possibility, we then need an additional projection XP between vP and Neg to host the modal operator. This approach, which we might call the ‘XP approach’, seems reasonably straightforward, though as it stands it leaves the question as to the real grammatical nature of ‘XP’ unanswered. However, it isn’t as interesting as the second way we can go. 5.1. Phases and the functional domain It has recently been proposed by a number of authors (Starke, 1993; Belletti, 2001a,b; Jayaseelan, 2001) that the clause contains a functional layer immediately dominating vP which is structurally very similar to a Rizzi-style CP, consisting of at least the Foc and Top elements. Such a structure has been used to explain a number of facts to do with clitics and clitic climbing (Starke), Romance subject inversion phenomena (Belletti), questions in Malayalam, English pseudogapping ‘remnants’, English clause-final ‘floated’ focus markers, and focus in Malayalam and English cleft structures (Jayaseelan). Suppose that there are not just elements corresponding to Foc and Top in this low functional layer (the ‘internal periphery’, in Belletti’s terminology), but also elements corresponding to Force and Fin: that is, suppose the full structure of a Rizzi CP is repeated immediately above vP. If this is the case, it suggests an extremely tight, explicit syntactic correlation between the two positions for the necessity > negation > possibility array: specifically, that each element of the array directly corresponds to a specific position in the CP structure, as discussed above for epistemics: necessity
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to Force, negation to Foc, and possibility to Fin. This buys us all the data we have seen in a very restrictive way. The proposed structure is shown in (66).
This structure is a better one in a number of ways. First, as already mentioned, each member of the necessity > negation > possibility array directly corresponds to a particular syntactic position, giving us a more restrictive theory. Second, as pointed out by Belletti (2001a), this type of structure buys us a tighter characterization of the notion phase, the phase being the fundamental grammatical unit in the derivational cycle. The phasal elements of the clause are CP and vP (Chomsky, 1999): if the left periphery of vP is structurally akin to CP, then it is highly plausible that it is this CP structure which lends phasal status to these elements; or to put it another way, CPs (in this slightly revised sense) and only CPs are phases. It would then be only this CP layer that acted as an ‘escape hatch’ for successive cyclic movement, etc. As a more restrictive definition, this is obviously desirable. Third, we avoid a problem that is difficult to deal with under the XP approach. In the discussion of the semantics of modals in x3.2 (and of sentential negation in x4.4), it was claimed that because the lexical semantics of modals and negation defines them as propositional operators, they are able to select for any element of the clause that is propositional in the relevant sense (full argument structure). But in fact, under the XP approach this definition of propositionality applies to every projection in the clause above vP.
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989
Under the internal CP approach, while the semantics remains the same, we now find that the selectional properties are restricted by external factors: modal and negative operators (perhaps propositional operators generally) operate only in the uppermost level of phases. This section has tied the semantics presented previously to the syntax in a very tight way, suggesting that not only does the necessity > negation > possibility scope array correspond to two distinct areas of the clausal structure, but more strongly that each element of the array corresponds precisely to particular syntactic position in a CP-like structure that occurs in two parts of the clause, essentially forming the uppermost level of the phase. This proposal very cleanly buys us all the data we have seen, and avoids conceptual problems associated with the suggested alternative.
6. Cinque’s approach The claim that the various interpretations of modals are in some sense subject to a hierarchical syntactic realization is at least superficially reminiscent of claims regarding modals in Cinque (1999). Cinque claims that there is a hierarchy of modal features, each projecting as discrete modal head, interspersed through the clause. This section will examine his claims with respect to the hypothesis presented here. 6.1. Cinque’s framework Cinque (1999) takes as a point of departure two observations: one, that the syntactic order of functional morphemes in the inflectional layer of the clause (taking into account parametric differences in the realization of such morphemes—free vs. bound etc.) seems to correlate across languages to the extent that it can be considered universal; and two, that the syntactic order of adverb classes is also restricted cross-linguistically, in a way that can be seen as reflecting a similar universal configuration. Drawing on data from a wide range of languages, Cinque establishes a general hierarchal structure of functional elements which he takes to be at least an approximation of the universal hierarchy he assumes; similarly for adverbs. The major empirical achievement of the work is the demonstration that, in terms of the ‘meaning’ of each element in the hierarchies, the two mirror one another in a fairly precise way. Cinque draws two main theses from these observations: 1. Each functional morpheme of the hierarchy projects as a discrete head. 2. Each of these functional heads projects a single specifier that uniquely hosts (or is able to host) an adverb of an equivalent semantic class to the head: so that, for example, the specifiers of Tense heads host temporal adverbs, the specifiers of Modal heads host modal adverbs, and so on. The clause structure Cinque proposes is thus extremely richly articulated, the IP level alone containing thirty to forty-plus functional projections, even discounting possible projections for negation and subjects.
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The proposal in 2 isn’t particularly relevant here, so it won’t be directly addressed;12 the proposal in 1 clearly is relevant, though; in particular regarding the modal heads that Cinque posits. 6.2. Cinque’s treatment of modality Cinque proposes that his universal structure contains at least six discrete modal heads: an epistemic, a necessity, a possibility, a volitional, an obligation, and an ability/permission head, the last of which he claims may subdivide into two further heads (p. 81). A note on terminology is in order here. Cinque uses ‘epistemic’ in the same way as it is used here. His ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’ heads are supposed to host alethic modals, which he takes to be a major class discrete from epistemics. ‘Volition’, ‘obligation’, and ‘ability/permission’, he treats as subclasses of roots. ‘Obligation’ and ‘permission’ essentially correspond to deontic necessity and possibility modals in the sense of Palmer (1990): deontic modals ‘give (or refuse) permission, lay an obligation, or make a promise’ (Palmer, 1990: 70); while ‘ability’ corresponds to Palmer’s dynamic possibility, which expresses ‘neutral possibility, simply to indicate that an event is possible’ (p. 83). Cinque’s modal hierarchy is shown in (67)
(67)
epistemic > alethic necessity > alethic possibility > volition > deontic necessity > dynamic/deontic possibility
There are a number of problems with Cinque’s treatment of modality. For a start, his system fails to meet any of the desiderata for a treatment of modality set out in x2.2, (with the possible exception of a very clear statement of where he thinks modality splits up—in the syntax): there is a proliferation of different features, with a certain amount of duplication of necessity/possibility within these features; there is no explanation of why we find all these subtypes of modality; nor is there any explanation of why epistemic and root senses of modals tend to have the same PF reflexes, where necessity and possibility don’t. Additionally, though to go through this in detail would take up too much space, direct evidence for his assumptions is lacking; justification is slim at best, non-existent at worst. 6.3. Similarities and dissimilarities Despite the problems with Cinque’s system outlined above, there are still some points of superficial similarity with the system presented here, and it is worth noting what these are, as well as noting points where the two approaches diverge. 12 However, it should be noted that it is incompatible with the approach that is being taken here, since modal operator features have been taken throughout to be parasitic on independent heads (x5); see Svenonius (2001: 210–212) for further strong arguments against the general claim in 2.
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The major similarity is that both analyses posit some kind of rigid hierarchy of modal elements. The second is that the hierarchy in the two cases is at least to some extent similar: we find epistemics appearing high in the clause, above T, and roots low, and we find necessity scoping over possibility where the modals are split into these two forms. As far as the different scope of epistemics and roots is concerned, Cinque is in good company: a number of people have made the same claim, as reviewed in x2.1. It has also been previously claimed (Cormack and Smith, 2002) that modals split scopally into necessity and possibility forms. The dissimilarities between the two systems are more striking, and less superficial. First, the current theory embraces negation as a fairly important aspect, both in terms of its diagnostic power for the scope of modals (x4.4.1) and in terms of its similar behaviour in the array of propositional operators necessity > negation > possibility (x5.1). Cinque touches on the subject of negation only briefly, largely for reasons of space, but the conclusion he reaches is that ‘the evidence points towards the possibility of generating a NegP on top of every adverb-related functional projection, even simultaneously, up to a certain height (which is likely determined by semantic reasons)’ (Cinque, 1999: 126). He doesn’t specify what these semantic reasons might be. Obviously, this is a very different approach. Second, the data in (57–60) show that epistemically interpreted modals do show a scopal split, contra Cinque but analogous to root interpreted modals. The biggest difference between Cinque’s approach and the one taken here is that as far as Cinque is concerned, although some of the universal ordering he proposes may be derived from semantic considerations of some (ususally unspecified) kind, he takes it in general to be non-semantically, even accidentally, motivated, deriving from some kind of abstract computational factor(s): Certain considerations suggest that while the relative order of some [elements] may indeed reflect intrinsic logical relations among them, the hierarchy is only indirectly related to such semantic, or logical, properties. For example, certain possibilities which in terms of logical relative scope would be expected are not found, or are downright impossible, thus suggesting that the hierarchy is a construct of the computational system of language, not completely reducible to other components. Although such a conclusion may be due to my lack of knowledge or imagination, I will keep it up to disconfirmation. (Cinque, 1999: 135) Cinque proceeds to go through three examples of the kinds of things he means (pp. 135–136); there is no real need to examine these claims, since the point has probably been made that his approach is very different from the one being pursued here, though it is worth noting that Svenonius (2001: 211–212) does go through Cinque’s examples and provide strong arguments that either they can be reduced to semantic considerations, or they aren’t as universal as Cinque suggests.
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6.4. An evaluation As noted earlier, Cinque’s system fails to meet the desiderata for a treatment of modality set out in x2.2. The system presented here, on the other hand, meets them entirely: the four-way split is dealt with using not even two binary sets of features but just one; we set out exactly where and how the split is derived—at the syntax– semantics interface; and we explain why modals cross-linguistically tend to have the same PF form for epistemic and root senses, but not for necessity and possibility— because epistemic and root modals have the same lexical semantics, whereas necessity and possibility forms are distinct lexical items, in distinct LF positions, differing semantically as to whether they instantiate universal or existential quantification. As well as being explanatorily more adequate, the current theory is also conceptually much neater: essentially, it derives all its results directly from a small number of semantic considerations, in a far more restrictive and motivated way than Cinque, and in doing this it manages to capture the data very precisely. One question that should be addressed at this point is whether its empirical reach is as good: nothing much has yet been explicitly said about how the alethic and volitional readings for modals are to be derived in this system, nor whether the deontic–dynamic split proposed by Palmer (1990), and mentioned in x6.2, is worth making. In fact, all these considerations can be dealt with straightforwardly in this system, exactly along the lines set out in Kratzer (1991). The thing that will derive us the different readings is the restriction of the quantificational part of the modal (the modal relation), which, it will be recalled, is evaluated along two parameters: the modal base, and the ordering source. The modal base picks out the worlds that are relevant for consideration in evaluating the modal relation, and the ordering source further delimits the domain of quantification by allowing the relation to be evaluated with regard to how close the relevant worlds are to the ideal the ordering source establishes. We saw in x3.1 how evaluating the modal relation along the parameter of the ordering source as well as the modal base gives a straightforward explanation for the relativity of modality: a strong necessity modal like must has an ordering source which requires that the worlds in the modal base that actually get considered are very close to the ideal; a weaker necessity modal like should has an ordering source that allows worlds that are further away from the ideal to be considered also (cf. 24– 25). Volitional, alethic, and deontic/dynamic modality can be easily dealt with in the same way. According to Kratzer, the modal base of a volitional modal is circumstantial (=root): that is, it picks out worlds ‘in view of the relevant facts’ (Kratzer, 1991: 648). The relevant facts will determined, as usual, by the context of utterance. The ordering source is BOULETIC: ‘in view of what I want’ (p. 648): that is, the ideal world it establishes is one that corresponds to the relevant desires of the person to whom the volition relates. Kratzer gives an example involving a proposition something like that in (68), where this is intended to be understood as something like ‘I don’t want to go to the pub’ (or ‘I want not to go to the pub’).
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(68)
993
I won’t go to the pub
The modal base here will consist of worlds picked out on the basis of whether certain relevant facts hold in those worlds: for example, it is the evening, the speaker has a stressful deadline for the next day, the speaker has been invited to the pub by friends; and so on. The ordering source will establish the ideal world in view of the speaker’s wishes: basically, a world where they don’t go to the pub. The worlds in the modal base will then be evaluated with regard to how closely they match up to this ideal. The meaning will thus be something like: ‘in every relevant possible world that matches closely enough to my wishes, I don’t go to the pub’. This, then, is how volitional modality is derived. Alethic modality is basically ‘pure’ logical modality: that is, it doesn’t relativise the modal to any particular kind of facts, but rather considers it objectively: its necessity forms, for example, quantifying over literally every possible world. Kratzer claims that the reason alethic modality isn’t relativised is simply because alethic modals have an empty ordering source: an alethic modal is one where the modal base is epistemic (a function which assigns to every possible world a set of propositions which constitute a body of knowledge in that world), while the ordering source is the empty conversational background (the function which assigns the empty set to every possible world) (Kratzer, 1991: 645) This explains the common observation in work on modality that order matters in modal discourse: the sequence in (69) makes perfectly good sense, whereas the one in (70) doesn’t.
(69) (70)
It might be raining outside [. . .] It isn’t raining outside It isn’t raining outside [. . .] ! It might be raining outside
We can’t assert the possibility that it is raining using might if we know that, in the actual world, it isn’t: that is, might is epistemically interpreted, relativising possibility to a particular piece of knowledge. The same isn’t true of could.
(71) (72)
It could be raining outside [. . .] It isn’t raining outside It isn’t raining outside [. . .] It could be raining outside
Even when we know it isn’t raining outside, it is perfectly felicitous to assert the possibility of rain with could interpreted as alethic. The modal bases of (70) and (72) will be essentially the same: Kratzer’s ‘function which assigns to every possible world a set of propositions which constitute a body of knowledge in that world’.
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However, by assumption, their ordering sources won’t. (70) will have a non-empty ordering source which constitutes something like the actual world: a world where it is known not to be raining outside. This means all the accessible worlds where it is also not raining outside will be placed closer to the ordering source than those where it is. If the modal relation—in this case possibility—is considered with respect to all accessible worlds which come closest to the ideal established by the ordering source, those which are far away will not be evaluated. Hence (70) is bad. (72), on the other hand, will have an empty ordering source: it will impose no ordering on the accessible worlds, and this means every accessible world will be considered equally. Worlds where it is raining will be just as relevant for evaluation as worlds where it isn’t, so (72) is fine. The distinction between deontic and dynamic interpretations of root modals can be dealt with along the same lines. The modal base, as usual, will be selected with regard to certain relevant facts, depending on what the modal is intended to express in the particular context of utterance; the ordering source will be different. For deontic modals, it will establish an ideal world where the salient obligation has been met, permission has been given, or whatever. The worlds in the modal base will be evaluated with regard to this ideal, as we have seen before. Dynamic interpretations, on the other hand, are derived like alethics: their ordering source is empty. A sentence like (73) doesn’t, neutrally, express the deontic sense of can, where the modality would be relativised to situations where permission can be given or withheld, etc., but rather the dynamic sense: it simply says that Arthur has the ability to crawl. Whether he has or hasn’t permission to do so in the particular situation is of no consequence.
(73) Arthur can crawl
The empirical range of the current system, then, is just as wide as Cinque’s, and moreover it again derives solely from the semantics as it stands, with no need to extend either it or the syntax, by postulating additional features/heads, etc.
7. Conclusion This paper has proposed an explanation of the syntactic and semantic behaviour of the English modals from the perspective of the syntax–semantics interface. The fact that two scope positions for modals are available, one corresponding to epistemic interpretations and the other to root, was demonstrated by an examination of these two types of modality with respect to their interactions with other scope bearing elements. This was shown to derive directly from a marriage of Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) treatment of modals as propositional operators, quantifying over sets of possible worlds, to the current minimalist viewpoint that vP is a propositional
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element in the sense that it has full argument structure. An important outcome of this treatment was an explanation for why vP, as a propositional element, nevertheless receives the interpretation of a predicate. A stronger claim was put forward that the two scope positions observed for modals correspond exactly to two positions in the clause where CP-like structures are found, according to various authors who claim that such a structure immediately dominates vP (Starke, 1993; Belletti 2001a,b; Jayaseelan 2001). This binds the two scope positions into an even tighter correspondence: essentially, modals, and potentially propositional operators generally, are syntactically located in the uppermost level of the phase.
Acknowledgements Thanks to David Adger, Annabel Cormack, Steve Harlow, Øystein Nilsen, Ian Roberts, Neil Smith, and George Tsoulas for the usual stuff; and to Gareth Walker for wasting far more time than he needed to trying to solve my LaTeX problems. A version of this paper was presented at the spring 2002 meeting of the LAGB; thanks to the audience there for comments.
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