A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement 1848–1971 (Cambridge Latin American Studies (No. 27))

CAMBRIDGE LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES

EDITORS

MALCOLM DEAS JOHN STREET

CLIFFORD T. SMITH

27 A HISTORY OF THE BOLIVIAN LABOUR MOVEMENT 1848-1971

THE SERIES 1 Simon Collier. Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence, 1808-1833 2 Michael P. Costeloe. Church Wealth in Mexico: A study of the Juzgado de Capellanias in the Archbishopric of Mexico, 1800-1856 3 Peter Calvert. The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914: The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict 4 Richard Graham. Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 1850-1914 5 Herbert S. Klein. Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 1880-1952 6 Leslie Bethell. The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question, 1807-1869 7 David Barkin and Timothy King. Regional Economic Development: The River Basin Approach in Mexico 8 Celso Furtado. Economic Development of Latin America: Historical Background and Contemporary Problems (second edition) 9 William Paul McGreevey. An Economic History of Colombia, 1845-1930 10 D.A. Brading. Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1763-1810 11 Jan Bazant. Alienation of Church Wealth in Mexico: Social and Economic Aspects of the Liberal Revolution, 1856— 1875 12 Brian R. Hamnett. Politics and Trade in Southern Mexico, 1750-1821 13 J. Valerie Fifer. Bolivia: Land, Location, and Politics since 1825 14 Peter Gerhard. A Guide to the Historical Geography of New Spain 15 P.J. Bakewell. Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico, Zacatecas 1564-1700 16 Kenneth R. Maxwell. Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal, 1 750-1808 17 Verena Martinez-Alier. Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth-Century Cuba: A Study of Racial Attitudes and Sexual Values in a Slave Society 18 Tulio Halperin-Donghi. Politics, Economics and Society in Argentina in the Revolutionary Period 19 David Rock. Politics in Argentina 1890-1930: the Rise and Fall of Radicalism 20 Mario Gongora. Studies in the Colonial History of Spanish America 21 Arnold J. Bauer. Chilean Rural Society from the Spanish Conquest to 1930 22 James Lockhart and Enrique Otte. Letters and People of the Spanish Indies: The Sixteenth Century 23 Leslie B. Rout Jr. The History of the African in Spanish America: from 1502 to the Present Day 24 Jean A. Meyer. The Cristero Rebellion: The Mexican People between Church and State, 1926-1929 25 Stefan De Vylder. Allende's Chile: The Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular 26 Kenneth Duncan and Ian Rutledge with the collaboration of Colin Harding. Land and Labour in Latin America: Essays on the Development of Agrarian Capitalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

A history of the Bolivian labour movement 1848-1971 GUILLERMO LORA

Edited and abridged by Laurence Whitehead Translated by Christine Whitehead

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge London New York

Melbourne

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo, Delhi Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521214001 © Cambridge University Press 1977 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1977 This digitally printed version 2008 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Lora, Guillermo. A history of the Bolivian labour movement, 1848-1871. (Cambridge Latin American Studies; 27) Abridged translation of Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Bolivia - Economic conditions. 2. Labor and laboring classes - Bolivia - History. 3. Trade-unions - Bolivia - History. I. Whitehead, Laurence. II. Title. III. Series. HC182.L6613 330.9'84 76-22988 ISBN 978-0-521-21400-1 hardback ISBN 978-0-521-10021-2 paperback

Contents Editor's introduction Book 1: Protection versus free trade 1 2 3

The new republic The economic policies of Belzu and Linares Artisans and protection under Belzu

Book 2: Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists 4 5 6 7

The rise of the mineowners The politics of artisan and mutualist groups after 1870 'Socialism' in the provinces The Revolution of 1898

page vii 1 1 10 18 30 30 47 53 62

Book 3: Workers and the Liberal Party 1900-20

70

8 9 10

70 85 98

The Liberals and labour The decline of working-class Liberalism The first socialists

Book 4: The nineteen-twenties

110

11 12

110 138

The first strikes Students, anarchists and Marxists (1925-32)

Book 5: From the Chaco defeat to the Catavi massacre 1932-42

169

13 14

169 187

From military defeat to'Military Socialism' The post-war labour movement

Book 6: The workers become revolutionary

214

15 16 17

214 235 241

The Catavi massacre The Miners' Federation The workers in the revolutionary struggle (1946-52)

vi

Contents

Book 7: The rise and fall of the Central Obrera Boliviana 18 19 20

The COB and the revolution (1952-6) Inflation, stabilisation and the COB The miners and the fall of the MNR

page 277 277 302 320

Book 8: The military versus the unions

340

21 22 23

340 356 361

Repression Barrientos and Ovando The People's Assembly

Notes Editor's suggested reading Index

371 395 397

Editors introduction An independent Bolivia has been in existence for a century and a half, although the present-day frontiers are much more recent. Throughout that period there have been two main economic activities: very-low-productivity agriculture for local consumption, and relatively-high-productivity extractive industries for remote world markets. Until the eradication of malaria about 30 years ago almost the entire labour force was concentrated on the western third of the present-day territory, scattered across the lunar landscapes of the Altiplano or huddled in the few overcrowded temperate valley basins. Whether engaged in agriculture or mining, the living conditions of Bolivian workers were miserable, and even in the 1960s average income per capita was reckoned to be lower than in any other South American republic. (This calculation may no longer hold true since 1974, when oil and natural gas for the first time overtook minerals as the chief source of Bolivia's foreign exchange, but although average income may now be rising fast, the benefits are being very unevenly distributed.) So miserable were the health and nutritional conditions of most Bolivians that the natural population-growth rate remained low; and so remote and inaccessible was the republic from world markets that virtually no immigrants could be attracted in. Quite the contrary, in the twentieth century Bolivian workers have migrated in tens of thousands to the nitrate mines of northern Chile, the sugar harvests of northern Argentina, and more recently to the factories of Cordoba and the construction sites of Buenos Aires. Currently Bolivia's population of around five million is overshadowed by that of her coastal neighbours: there are twice as many Chileans, three times as many Peruvians, almost five times as many Argentinians, and twenty times as many Brazilians. It is thus easy to forget how differently the demographic balance was believed to be at the time when this history begins. Yet in 1851 Jose Maria Dalence (calculating on the basis of the inadequate census data then available to him) reported that Bolivia was the third most populous republic in South America — only surpassed by Brazil (with a population calculated at 2.29 times that of Bolivia) and Peru (1.09 times her size). With 2.1 million inhabitants, there were thought to be 50% more Bolivians than Chileans and it was believed that Bolivia had more than double the population of Argentina.1 Furthermore the Bolivian economy had, for almost three centuries, been geared to the great silver wealth of Potosi, with the result that artisanal production had developed to a considerable pitch of perfection, catering for a market that, by the vii

viii

Editor's introduction

standards of the continent and the times, had been remarkably large and sophisticated. The conditions of the artisans (which is discussed in the opening book of this history) should not therefore be lightly dismissed as historically insignificant. Certainly by the twentieth century Bolivia's weight in the sub-continent had dwindled almost to nothing. Demographically stagnant, militarily ineffective, physically inaccessible, and just about last of all to achieve some export dynamism from the world market, Bolivia may well seem one of the least likely places to encounter anything like a modern and classconscious proletariat. In fact the census of 1900 makes it very clear how incipient any such development must have been, for it records only 12,625 mineworkers (a category including owners together with wage labourers) amounting to 0.8% of the labour force and only 439 printing workers. These figures may be compared with those for workers engaged in various aspects of textile production — some 320,000 almost entirely using preindustrial techniques. These proportions indicate why Juan Albaracin Millan says of Bolivia in the considerably more prosperous year of 1913: 'The little sindicatos of artisans and the incipient socialist groups in the mining centres were impotent to act or even make themselves heard. Their presence is significant mainly as a historical antecedent to the formation of political awareness among the Bolivian people, rather than as an active element in the struggles of that time.' 2 There is no denying the narrow social base on which the first modern labour organisations of Bolivia originally rested, nor can it be claimed even now that large scale wage labour accounts for a high proportion of the Bolivian workforce. As recently as 1950 the census only recorded 36,000 full-time wage labourers in the mines, only 44,000 in industry, and 22,000 in construction; and the statistics for 1970 collected from the 1,000 largest industrial enterprises only recorded a labour force of 21,000 people — i.e. the average size of plant was 21 workers, and barely a score of enterprises employed more than 100 workers. (The nationalised mining enterprise, Comibol, employed 23,000 workers however, and the 22 leading private mines employed another 5,000.)3 Nevertheless Lora's history makes it clear that labour organisations modelled on ideas generated by European socialists, as filtered into Bolivia most notably through Chile, have a long history in the republic, and have intervened extensively and on occasion even decisively in the course of national affairs. In this type of society organisations with a relatively small permanent membership have proved capable of mobilising, at least temporarily, many times their own numbers. To obtain a realistic picture of the relative importance of organised labour in Bolivian political life the 1950 census figure of 102,000 non-agricultural

ix

Editor's introduction

wage labourers given above may be compared with data about some middle class occupational categories. Thus, on the eve of the 1952 revolution the republic had only 1,100 practising lawyers, and about 700 doctors and 700 civil engineers and architects, together with a few hundred other professionals of graduate standing. Similarly the 1950 census also recorded only 12,400 university students (only 1,400 were female), most of whom never graduated. But successive Bolivian governments have found that it only requires a few hundred students to mobilise on a well-chosen issue, to bring onto the streets thousands of secondary school children through whose families the agitation may spread to much of the urban population. This book is not, of course, the work of an academic historian. Guillermo Lora did work for one year (1970—1) as a professor of social history at the University of San Andres in La Paz, but that cannot compete with the more than 30 years he has dedicated to establishing in the Bolivian labour movement one highly specific variant of European socialist doctrine, namely Trotskyism. The original Spanish text, from which the present volume has been abridged, was written primarily for Bolivian labour leaders and student activists and contained lengthy passages expounding Marxist theory, or conducting polemics against rival political movements. The first half of the Spanish original (up to the Chaco War) has been published in La Paz in three volumes. (In certain of Bolivia's mining camps it is said that party activists lend out these books at a few pence a time to mineworkers who wish to know some history but cannot afford to buy books.) The first three volumes may therefore be compared with the English abridgement. Such a comparison would show that a great deal both of research and of interpretation has been omitted, so that the didactic effect of the original has been considerably diminished. In justification it must be pointed out that the English version is under one-third the length of the original. Although full responsibility for the abridgement rests with me, this version has been looked over by the author, who approved my decision to emphasise as much as possible the main flow of the historical exposition. There is as yet no Spanish edition with which the second half of this volume may be compared (apart, that is, from the last chapter, The People's Assembly, which is ruthlessly summarised from Bolivia: de la Asamblea del pueblo algolpe de 21 de agosto, a book published in Chile in 1972, but now virtually unobtainable). The years 1930-70 were ready for publication in La Paz in 1971 but when General Banzer seized power that project became impossible. Once again they were set up for publication in Santiago in 1973, but General Pinochet's government naturally destroyed all trace of the work. In addition to these setbacks, Lora has spent most of the last few years dodging arrest and seeking to maintain some degree of

x

Editor's introduction

clandestine party organisation. This has made it impossible for him to consult public libraries, and his own private collections of books have been repeatedly parcelled up, raided and moved from hideout to hideout. It has therefore proved impossible to maintain the normal standard of bibliographical reference in this volume. Something of the author's lifestyle will have become apparent from this account of his difficulties with publication. More biographical information is contained in the history itself, which, from the mid-forties onwards, becomes more the documented account of an active participant than the reconstruction of events by a historian. He was born in the mining town of Uncia in 1922. His father may be seen in the photograph published on the cover of 'La Masacre de Uncia' by G. Rivera. The photograph shows four victims of the 'massacre of Uncia' of 1923 (described here in chapter 11) with a small crowd of sympathetic onlookers in the background, one of whom was his father. A biographical sketch of his younger brother, Cesar, is included in chapter 21. Guillermo Lora read some law at Oruro university but lacked the funds or inclination to complete his studies and never qualified or practised as a lawyer. Since the late forties he has been General Secretary of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR), with the result that he was in Paris, attending a conference of the Fourth International, at the time of the April 1952 revolution. Since 1954 his party has broken with the Fourth International (which recognises a rival group inside Bolivia), although it has taken part in some international groupings intended to reconstruct the Fourth International. Thanks are due to the translator, Christine Whitehead, who persevered even in the face of the most intractable nineteenth-century Bolivianisms. Thanks are also due to the late Professor David Joslin, who offered great encouragement to a somewhat rash proposal, to my secretary, Philippa Gibson, and to Mrs Patricia Williams and Iain White of Cambridge University Press who made it practical. February 1977

Laurence Whitehead

Booki:

Protection versus free trade i. The new republic Until 1952 less than 10% of Bolivia's population were able to participate in the country's elections, but the economic and social transformation of Bolivia has been accomplished by the remaining 90% of the population, the exploited, the uneducated and the illiterate. These people, the majority, are capable of playing a role in history beyond the imagination of even the most astute members of the oligarchy. A generation ago 80% of the population were still illiterate (above all the peasantry and the working class), and an even higher proportion never really used written sources of information. Consequently, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois reformers adopted the slogan 'Literacy will liberate the Indian', but until 1952 the school system was tailored to the requirements of the landlord regime and of a few capitalist employers. Even now education is monopolised by a minority, and the means to satisfy even the most basic necessities of life are beyond the reach of the masses. The overwhelming majority of the population, consisting of peasants, workers, artisans, and state functionaries, are poorly fed, inadequately clothed, and unprotected from the ravages of disease. Since the time of the Inca Empire the Altiplano region (which for practical purposes was really all that Bolivia consisted of in the nineteenth century) lacked any contact with the sea other than the coast near Arica, now in Chilean hands.1 The port of Aritofagasta was Bolivian until 1879 when the nitrate war broke out between Peru and Chile, but even before then the coastal region, remote from the centres of population, was little known to Bolivians. To reach the sea required a journey of many months and the crossing of the Atacama desert. The country has since paid for its lack of a coastline in heavy tributes to neighbouring countries for transit rights. Surrounded by giant Andean ranges, the Bolivian heartland seems very isolated. Far from the sea, Bolivia is therefore, in many ways, also far from the outside world. Its landlocked condition also forms a barrier to modern culture; all new ideological currents take a long time to reach Bolivia. 1

2

Protection versus free trade

The establishment of Bolivia as an independent and sovereign republic in 1825 was the result of rivalries between the colonial viceroyalties of Lima and Buenos Aires, which to a certain extent the creation of the new state served to diminish. A late nineteenth-century liberal writer said that Bolivia was the key to stability and equilibrium within the continent.2 In recent years, however, but for the intervention of US imperialism, Bolivia would have become the apple of discord among its more developed neighbours, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru. Its future development seems to be linked to the degree of political and economic control which these countries manage to exert over it. Bolivia borders on five countries and has had frontier disputes with all of them, resulting in successive losses of territory. The most important chapters of her history include the wars fought for the possession of primary products: the nitrate war against Chile, the rubber war against Brazil and the petroleum war against Paraguay. The energy needs of Argentina and Brazil, the most industrialised countries of South America, shape part of Bolivia's foreign policy, since they have both built railways and pipelines to Bolivia's hydrocarbons zone. By 1960 Bolivia had a population of 3.6 million inhabitants living in an area of 1.1 million square kilometres.3 About 60% of the population are concentrated in one-third of the land area, the Altiplano and the adjacent valleys. The aymara and quechua speakers are concentrated in those regions, which are the most densely settled rural areas and are extremely important agriculturally. But on the large estates the scientific use of fertilisers was almost unknown and in places the fields were simply left uncultivated for 10 or even 20 years to restore their fertility. The agrarian reform carried out in the 1950s has produced a large number of minifundia, not conducive to mechanisation. By contrast there is a shortage of population in the eastern lowlands, where at the moment land is concentrated in a few hands. This presents a problem which will have to be faced in the future. In addition to the great mass of smallholders and the remaining large estates there are approximately 1,500 scattered Indian communities in which illiteracy and extremely primitive agricultural techniques prevail. In general these communities today retain only a few of their former traits. Under the influence of more developed social forms they have lost their egalitarian attitude towards women, and have adopted modern practices with regard to the law of inheritance. Capitalism has shaped the principal cities of the country, without completely destroying their indigenous characteristics; that is to say, they still bear signs of our cultural backwardness. At the same time the penetration of finance capital has given rise to a proletariat which is highly concentrated geographically. There are 8,000 workers in the mining centre of Catavi, and the handful of factories in La Paz employing some 20,000 workers.

3

The new republic

At the time of the Spanish Conquest, the agrarian economy was highly productive, although it was based on the most primitive technology. A rudimentary knowledge of genetics permitted the improvement of indigenous root crops and resulted in more than 200 varieties of potatoes and tubers, which today are the staple food of the people of the Altiplano. The Incas were familiar with only a few grain crops, quinoa, millet and a few others, but these had an exceptionally high nutritional content. Maize had been introduced into the Altiplano from the lowlands, and was grown on the shores of Lake Titicaca. The Incas practised rotation farming and used llama-dung and decomposed fish as fertilisers. In order to make use of the steep mountain slopes they built elaborate terraces and enormous aqueducts were constructed to irrigate the dry lands. Ploughs were not used until the Spanish introduced the Egyptian sort, nor were animals used in agricultural work. The only beast of burden was the llama, which has remarkable powers of endurance, and although it could only carry up to 12 kilos, it could travel 30 to 40 kilometres a day on very little food. Large numbers of llamas were bred and reared with great care on the high rough pasture. The alpaca and the vicuna provided wool and meat, and llama skins were used for shoes. The peasants still use llamas today, and in the colonial period and early republic they were widely used in the mines. Many regions of what is now Bolivia were already converted into mining zones under the Inca empire and the yanaconas and many of the subjected peoples were forced to work in the mines extracting precious metals. The mita, as this system of labour was called, was invariably used both in the mines and in public works, and took the form of a tribute exacted from the subject peoples. Gold, silver and copper were the only metals the Incas used; iron was unknown and the use of lead and antimony compounds was not introduced until the conquest. Their mining techniques were primitive. To extract the ore, the miners worked suspended on ropes down narrow shafts where many died of suffocation. The Incas concentrated the ore by the principle of differential density, and they used air currents in the high mountains to process gold. But their knowledge of smelting processes and their achievements were limited, because the only fuels they had were brushwood and llama-dung. Nevertheless, they used copper to make cutting tools, notably axes which were the dignitaries' symbols of office, and they succeeded in tempering it almost to the fineness of steel. Gold and silver were used lavishly by the monarch and in the temples dedicated to the sun. Since there was no knowledge of the wheel before the conquest, the Inca had to make his long journeys carried on a litter. Cotton was not used, even though several excellent strains were to be found in the eastern low-

4

Protection versus free trade

lands, but woollen cloth, hand-woven in small workshops, was of a very high quality, and a limited number of dyes were extracted from plants. The Spanish brought with them not only the Christian religion, but also a more advanced technology and the basic elements of a new social and economic order. They brought gunpowder and firearms to South America, and the triumph of the conquerers can be said to owe more to the horse and the wheel, to gunpowder, armour and firearms than to the Bible and the Cross, which were incomprehensible to the indigenous population. The innovations introduced by the Spanish ranged from iron, the Egyptian plough and the use of lime in buildings, to the plumbline, the set square and the compass; from the mill and the manufacture of glass to money and international trade. They introduced horses, oxen and sheep. They also introduced a new religion and with it a higher culture with writing, books, printing presses, mathematics, stringed instruments, and soap. The Spanish imported new institutions, too: large estates, artisan industry and servitude, which gave the colonial economy some feudal characteristics. The conquerors also took advantage of many existing institutions, adapting them to serve their own interests. To obtain labour for the mines and workshops they turned the mita into a system of brutal exploitation and forced labour. The Indian communities were to some extent conserved to avoid a complete breakdown in agricultural production, to provide a minimum subsistence for the population and to facilitate the collection of tributes. The new rulers put the traditional authorities under the control of corregidores (local government officials) to ensure effective control over the population. They used the traditional religious rituals to spread Christianity, with the result that, even today, Bolivian Catholicism is heavily impregnated with pagan forms. The main changes in the economy were caused by the introduction of the encomienda and the repartimientos, which involved the allocation of land grants and the use of Indian labour to the Spanish conquerors and were the forerunners of the large estates and local political power of the landowners in the republican era. This process entailed the expropriation of Indian lands, creating a new class of landless labourers, the colonos, who were obliged to provide free labour and perform menial tasks for the landowners. The Spanish did not formally enslave the Indian population, whom they regarded as subjects of the Spanish Crown; instead African slaves were imported for certain kinds of agricultural work in the eastern lowlands, but the largest concentration of slaves, in the region of Santa Cruz, were nearly all dispersed or wiped out between the slave uprising of 1809 and the end of the independence wars. During the colonial period the most valuable form of property was control over mineral wealth, and the Spanish Crown monopolised all mining

5

The new republic

activities and also the extraction of quinine. Overseas trade was also the monopoly of the metropolitan country and all direct trade between South America and other European powers was forbidden. Because of their local power, criollos (locally born descendants of Spaniards) grew rich and soon controlled the extractive industry, the workshops and the land, and dominated the local trade and contraband activities. However, despite their economic power they felt oppressed, seeing themselves ignored in the political sphere and obliged to pay taxes and tributes to the Crown. Furthermore the central authorities made intermittent efforts to improve the conditions of the indigenous population at the expense of the criollos. The criollos were the main beneficiaries of Bolivian Independence which was secured in 1825 and they moulded the fledgling republic according to their interests. Their 'Liberal' programme can be summarised thus: political emancipation from Spain, freedom to trade with any country and freedom to exploit the peasants and workers. For the mass of the population independence meant 'liberation' from the controls of the Spanish crown, as a result of which their situation was even more insecure than under the colony. There was now no defence for the Indians against encroachment on their community lands and the new dominant class recognised only one type of freedom: the freedom of the powerful to exploit to the utmost the rest of the population. The main feature underlying Bolivian history from independence to the 1860s is the complete collapse of the mining industry, which had been the principal economic activity of Alto Peru during the colonial period. There were several reasons for this rapid decline. The price of silver fell considerably on the world market, while further difficulties arose within the mining industry itself: the exhaustion of mineral veins, the lack of capital needed to concentrate low-grade ores and the problem of flooding which affected many mines. Underlying all this was the rudimentary state of mining technology. According to D'Orbigny, only 50 or 60 of the 5,000 mine shafts in the famour Cerro de Potosi were still being worked in 1829; the rest had been abandoned because of flooding or rockfalls.4 In his statistical study of Bolivia, Dalence estimated that in 1846 there were ten thousand abandoned silver mines in the republic, of which two-thirds were flooded and the remaining third had been abandoned because the 'output did not cover the costs of production'.5 Basing himself on Dalence, Ramon Sotomayor Valdez paints the following picture of the mining industry in the first half of the nineteenth century: Although fabulous quantities of treasure have been extracted from Bolivia's abundant mines by rudimentary and destructive methods of exploitation, these methods also resulted in the premature closing of

6

Protection versus free trade

many rich deposits owing to subsidence. We should not be surprised at the sad decline of the mining industry, considering that in addition to these poor techniques of extraction there have been a multitude of misfortunes which have obstructed production; in particular the fifteen years of war for independence caused great insecurity, destruction of capital and shortage of labour.6 The first fifty years of the republic were characterised by the smallness of exports compared with the demand for imports, and there was a chronic deficit in the balance of trade. Agriculture was the main productive activity; the mining industry was in the hands of small producers and the artisans controlled production in the cities. The most important source of revenue for the impoverished state was the poll tax levied on the Indian communities. This rickety economy was just about able to keep going by salvaging some of the vestiges of the colonial era. Colonial techniques enabled production to continue in a diminished and degenerated way and sustain the republic through its first 50 years of existence. The Spanish crown had always taken a great interest in introducing new techniques of mineral processing. In the colonies, the miners themselves developed their own specific techniques of production and the Spanish gained a reputation in Europe for their achievements in the field of mining. To take the most famous example, Bartolome de Medina (1554) introduced the use of mercury in the processing of silverand this discovery revolutionised the mining industry when it was introduced in Mexico and Peru in 1557 and 1571 respectively.7 After independence, however, the small producer was unable to take over the innovating role the Spanish Crown had played in mining production, and the quality of mining technology declined. Of course, it must be remembered that the mining industry was already in a state of crisis during the last years of the colony, due to falling prices and increasing production costs as the more accessible veins became exhausted and mines were flooded. Furthermore, in its eagerness to increase the dependence of the colonies, the metropolitan country resorted to measures which were counterproductive as far as its own economy was concerned. Potosi, for example, was obliged to use mercury brought all the way from Almaden in Spain, despite the fact that mercury had been discovered in the slopes of Coabliqui near Huarina in the nearby province of Omasuyos, and at San Miguel in Paraguay. Although the Laws of the Indies ruled that mercury deposits found in America should be worked, the authorities showed no interest in complying with the law. Then when England went to war with Spain, it became impossible to transport essential supplies of mercury to the mines of Potosi, and silver production was accordingly reduced.

7

The new republic

As for industry under the colonial regime, Spain prohibited trade with the major manufacturing countries, but was itself unable to supply the colonies with many products, so local enterprises were established in the colonies, producing woollen and cotton textiles, sugar, soap and a few other less important commodities. Tadeo Haenke, a scholarly botanist from Bohemia, has left us the following description of industry at the end of the colonial period, which the republic inherited: For a long time glass has been manufactured in the Rio Grande Valley in the province of Cochabamba . . . Sheep's wool is woven mainly into plain-coloured baize and light cloth. The government has permitted the manufacture of textiles, and granted exclusive privileges to different workshops. The province of Cochabamba, which produces and consumes perhaps as many textiles as all the other provinces put together, has soils and lands suitable for the cultivation of cotton. [He added that the city of Cochabamba alone, 'according to precise calculations made by the Royal Treasury' used between thirty and forty arrobas of cotton a year] and this branch of industry is the only one to give employment to the city's large and steadily-growing population. Not only does this trade benefit the commerce of the city considerably, but it also provides the main means of subsistence for many workers of the lower classes. The cotton fibres grown in Cochabamba are inferior to the Asian varieties, but during the present war they have been the only ones available in the interior provinces and have provided clothing for countless inhabitants . . . How many are employed in the skilful art which converts one arroba into a length of cloth? Men, women and children find occupation in ginning, spinning, teasing and weaving, each one according to his age and ability . . . These local industries are still in the early stages of development, but they have achieved a great deal with the limited knowledge that they have been able to acquire of this most invaluable skill, even though they use very inadequate tools and instruments and badly built workshops, and lack machinery which would facilitate their various tasks. As a result of systematic training by the conquerors, the neighbouring peoples of Mojos (in the Beni lowlands of Bolivia) have made greater progress in this branch of industry than anyone else in the continent.8 The government-controlled, centralised system of colonial production gave way to chaos under the republic. In mining it was replaced by the inadequate efforts of the small mineowners who themselves worked their deposits, together with the labourers brought from their estates. They coined money from bars of silver or exported the bars in small quantities,

8

Protection versus free trade

or smelted tin by using the most primitive methods, for export in the form of ingots. The obrajes (workshops), a legacy of the colonial era, produced a limited amount of low quality cloth. These and other activities, such as sugar refining, dominated the internal and external trade of the country. The economic crisis which developed at the end of the colonial period intensified in the early years of the republic. The colonial legacy was not, as some reactionary theorists imply, a strong economy, or a powerful or rising social class, but a deformed economy, a bankrupt mining industry and a derisory textile industry, which could only keep going as a result of the complete isolation of the country. In the absence of any stimulus from other sectors of the economy, the artisan industries languished in Bolivia's tiny cities. Such international trade as there was encountered the obstacles posed by tariffs and the rise of protectionism. During the colonial period guilds of artisans had been organised and had achieved a high degree of influence and also of notoriety. But with the collapse of the colonial economy in the republic, the organisation of the guilds was destroyed, impoverishing and demoralising the artisans and causing disorder. This state of affairs continued until the government of Belzu (1848-55) energetically adopted the cause of protection on behalf of such incipient industry as survived and encouraged the reorganisation of the artisan guilds. The criollos who created the new republic depended only partly on mining and manufacturing. They were above all landowners and 'their' labourers not only worked the land but also transported goods for them, e.g. from the coast to the interior. By the end of the colonial period the textile and mining sections were in decline, and the landlords also felt that their freedom to demand services from their rural labourers was restricted. From the very beginning of the republic, therefore, the dominant class was reactionary in outlook and incapable of renovating the economy. Protectionist and even autarchic laws were frequently enacted in republican Bolivia. Through such legislation the governments sought in vain to overcome, politically, difficulties which were really caused by the low level of technology and the almost complete absence of capital. The economic situation was so grave that there was little scope for primitive capital accumulation to take place of its own accord. We shall see that subsequently there was an invasion of international capital which took place at a time when capitalism had already developed into its mature form of imperialism. This inflow of capital replaced the critical period of primitive accumulation and cut short the development of a Bolivian capitalism. This economic process which tied Bolivia to the world economy by an umbilical cord determined many of the specific characteristics of the country's subsequent

9

The new republic

social development, such as the political role played by the dominant social classes and the dual character of the country's economy. The pioneers of the mining industry could not pass into the capitalist stage of production by themselves because, although they owned the mines, they did not have at their disposal sufficient quantities^of money, equipment or consumer goods to mobilise a workforce of any considerable size, so labour remained confined to the land and to the artisan workshop. However, these pioneers did invest in the nascent industry, even though they usually lost everything, because the resources they controlled were insufficient to meet the needs of the industry. Where did these resources come from? Some people maintain that they were the product of the hard work and ascetic habits of a few farsighted men. However, even writers who are themselves members of the Bolivian upper class admit that these resources were transferred from the big estates, that is from the ruthless exploitation of the peasantry and the expansion of large private landholdings at the expense of the Indian communal lands. Since there have been no great waves of immigration into Bolivia, the working class has been drawn from the peasants and the artisans. In an attempt to make up for the acute lack of economic resources and machinery in the nineteenth century, unremitting physical effort was demanded of the workers. There was no such thing as shift work, and indeed the 20hour day, known as the doblada, was not uncommon, combined with the well-known system of contract labour. The economic chaos and the disarticulation of the republic caused by the lack of roads, industry and commerce, which would have bound the different regions of the country firmly together, were reflected at the political level in the power struggles of the caudillos (local bosses). It would require close examination to identify what social forces in existence at this time might have the potential to lead the country from this desperate situation of poverty and isolation. But most of our historians, on the contrary, have concerned themselves only with the description of spectacular coups d'etat. The isolation, backwardness and provincialism of the country were virtually elevated into a virtue and an ideal by the caudillos. But while they were absorbed in their power struggles a silent transformation was taking place in the economy. Through the scanty opportunities afforded by our incipient international trade, capitalism was beginning to gain a foothold in Bolivia. The government's protectionist measures were an attempt to defend the country from this development. They seem to be meaningless in a country with scarcely any manufacturing production and an insignificant international trade; in 1846 the total value of exports and imports

10

Protection versus free trade

was only about nine million pesos, while the value of internal trade was forty-five and a half million pesos. But by 1876 the value of imports alone had risen to seven million pesos which gives an idea of the slow yet persistent way international trade was growing.

2. The economic policies of Belzu and Linares

The wars of independence, which were fought in the cause of free trade and were aimed at establishing an economic system based on the unrestricted competition of goods from all countries, foreshadowed the destruction of the Bolivian textile industries and of the various artisan industries which were still producing a considerable quantity of fairly-high-quality products. The idea that, in order to consolidate the sovereignty it had won on the battlefields, an independent nation should open its doors to the influence of the technologically-advanced manufacturing societies, became a principal element of post-independence ideology. In theory this meant that the commercial capitalist and the large factory would replace the small artisan producer and the relatively independent mine-owners, but the isolation of Bolivia throughout most of the nineteenth century and its relatively late incorporation into the world capitalist economy made it impossible to implement this revolutionary free-trade programme quickly or fully. Geographical isolation enabled the incipient national industries which, it must be remembered, were still in a pre-capitalist stage, to gain political strength and secure the postponement of the objectives put forward in 1825 and obtain the introduction of protectionist measures for a short time. The governments of Santa Cruz (1829) and Belzu were the most important in promoting protectionism. In practice, protectionism sought to compensate for Bolivia's technical deficiencies by legislative fiat and to prolong the colonial system of production based on feudal serfdom and gamonalismo (the accumulation of land and power by local estate owners, either by violence or by manipulating the legal system to despoil the Indian population).1 It would be wrong to identify the protectionism of Santa Cruz and Belzu with that of the new capitalist countries of Europe. They did

11

The economic policies of Belzu and Linares

nothing to emancipate the country from its colonial past and, despite their undoubted merits and popularity, they cannot be considered as the builders of a new Bolivia. The credit for this must go to those who espoused the opposing school of thought; to Linares, for example, the statesman who did so much to secure the triumph of free trade. The tendency towards a policy of promoting national industry was already apparent in 1825. Even the 'liberal' Sucre was important in promoting such measures as we can see from the records of the sessions of the Permanent Deputation. A memorandum was considered from 'Su Excelencia el Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho de 25 de Octubre' (Sucre) in which he pointed out that, under the existing laws, the manufactured goods produced in the city and province of Cochabamba had to bear taxes of as much as 33% of the value of production. 'As a result of this unjust and imprudent measure there is continual contraband activity which is detrimental to the public treasury.' The document continues that 'The Junta declared that it would be very pleased to exempt the said manufactured goods from all taxes, in order to help those engaged in this worthwhile activity, and to ease the great costs they had to bear from the taxes but that, in view of the present scarcity of public funds, it was necessary to maintain a tax of six per cent.'2 The introduction of legal measures of this nature shows two things: firstly the government did not show the slightest hesitation in aggravating the poverty of the majority of the population, even after the discontent created by the long, exhausting struggle for independence, in order to salvage a weak and declining industry. Secondly, the minority which benefited from the national industries had decisive political influence at the time. By taking advantage of their influence in government circles many of them grew rich from the traffic in merchandise which was ostensibly shielded from foreign trade. Fraud, favouritism and contraband were important sources of economic power for the dominant class. For example, tocuyo (coarse cloth) was one of the articles it was forbidden to import but a few privileged men dealt in it illegally: 'At the moment of the decree which imposed this prohibition, a large quantity of the said materials was imported by a wealthy commercial house in Sucre, which then obtained permission to retail it in the markets throughout the country.'3 Despite the ban on importing certain goods, the output of nationally produced articles declined before the silent invasion of cheaper, higher quality, manufactured products, which either reached the market legally despite the customs duties or came as contraband. All this harmed the small national industry (which was too weak to provide a basis for the

12

Pro tection versus free trade

emergence of a local bourgeois class) and rendered it defenceless against the competition of the large scale industrial production of Europe. The conflict between an economy still based on colonial institutions and the modern capitalist products which began to invade the Bolivian market was reflected in the passionate attacks that the protectionists launched against the free traders and which, for the most part, national historians have chosen to ignore. Few documents exist about this important episode in Bolivia's past but those available indicate clearly the objectives of the opposing groups. In a well-researched study Gabriel Rene Moreno sets out the fundamental features of the polemic. In 1845 La Epoca took the liberty of attacking the state monopoly on exports of silver bullion and demanded unrestricted exports which would be equally advantageous to private commerce and the state, since the latter 'appears to be incapable of preventing illegal exports'. On the other hand, there was El fcco de Potosi, a paper opposed to free trade and representing the interests of the public employees at the silver mint. It launched a campaign against La Epoca's views and spoke with scorn of the 'apostles who have come to Bolivia to preach a new kind of self-denial... who represent not the Bolivian nation but foreign business'.4 In contrast to La Epoca, El Eco certainly was Bolivian and, although weak, it leapt into the arena in defence of what it considered to be the national interest. La Epoca, it claimed, would have preferred that it 'keep a shameful silence while the wealth of Bolivia trickles out of the country unobserved and the plagues of Egypt sweep in, so that the spirits of destruction are left in possession of this beautiful but sadly ruined land, which owes it name to Bolivar and its glory to the valour and patriotism of its sons'.5 El Eco de Potosi, a distinguished newspaper of this period, violently denounced the way the proceeds of silver exports (which, at the time, was the most important metal produced) were being used to import overseas manufactured goods which destroyed national production: 'We are greatly alarmed at the inflow of foreign goods into the country, which is rapidly becoming a flood. The Bolivian people must wake up to this danger or our foreign trade policies will sacrifice our interests to the interests of others.'6 Thus we can see that protectionism was not just an incidental phenomenon which appeared sporadically in legislation but one of the underlying political issues which came up all the time in newspaper debates. The attempt to resist the capitalist invasion was presented as the essence of nationalism and patriotism. Journalists throughout the country, realising that competition from cheaper and better foreign goods would lead eventually to the subjection of the country, began to see virtues in the old economic policies of the colonial era, with its state monopolies and forced con-

13

The economic policies of Belzu and Linares

sumption and production by royal command and administrative compulsion. For example, they produced statements like this: We all know that even under the discredited colonial system this country was highly industrialised. How shocking then that after Independence we should see the strange spectacle of our industry ruled by the foreign competition which has been forced upon us. Thus the fount of our prosperity is drying up before our eyes, and the industries which are essential for our progress are paralysed — all this in the name of a revolution and a new freedom which we believed were intended to promote our wellbeing. In the country as a whole, overseas trade has caused the disappearance of almost a thousand textile workshops, whose products clothed three quarters of our population. In the hardworking city of Cochabamba foreign trade has paralysed the various industries which have supplied our vast provinces since their establishment in the earliest days of our civilization, although with a little more encouragement they could have reached a level of perfection. Foreign trade is responsible for the contempt and insults which are now directed against the products of all our artisans, and foreign trade has caused the miserable and ill-clad state in which they now find themselves. Foreign trade has made us slaves to a host of spurious necessities and has promoted the consumption of luxuries which contrasts sharply with the poverty of the rest. Apart from the grave effect on national morality, all economists agree that such luxury consumption is harmful to the wealth of a country because of its wastefulness. If our communications with Europe were quicker and easier we would even receive our daily food from abroad and would resign ourselves to a spectacle of unploughed fields, abandoned flocks and ruined agriculture - although some people would probably be found to applaud such a scandal, describing it as the height of progress, a great leap forward for the nation and the final triumph of civilisation over outworn traditions.7 The protectionists hoped in vain for the kind of trade which would provide incentives for local producers and profits for the criollo merchants, instead of enriching foreign manufacturers. They raised the alarm against the dangers of a system of trade which would reduce the Bolivians to a servile dependence on foreign powers. ElEco de Potosi declared: We oppose the kind of trade which fails to promote national production and only wakens the appetite for consumption; which, indeed, threatens the progress of national industry and obstructs free competition, which is essential for the wellbeing of the consumer. We oppose trade which is

14

Protection versus free trade

concentrated in the hands of a few foreigners so that they can accumulate riches which in due course they will take out of the country. Because of the geographical location of Bolivia and our difficult communications, foreign commerce only supplies imports to the Bolivian consumer at excessively high prices, so that it is very costly to satisfy the demand this trade creates. As we pay for these imports only in silver, foreign trade becomes more and more ruinous for the nation . . . We oppose a type of trade which threatens our hard-won liberty, submitting us by shameful treaties to the dictates of foreign powers.8 As for the free traders, their newspaper, La Epoca, was one of the most important in Bolivia's history and was regarded as one of the best on the continent. Rene Moreno had the following to say on the line the paper followed: 'The most notable feature of this paper was the prudent, liberal criteria it adopted on both external and domestic issues. Above all, it avoided undue deference to the existing government. It did not follow the other newspapers in singing praises to the good sense, the grandeur, the opulence and the fame of the Bolivian people.'9 The fact that foreigners such as Juan Munoz Cabrera and Domingo de Oro, the Argentine editors of La Epoca, could enter into government service at this time has been explained by the argument that little distinction was made between the citizens of Bolivia and those of the United Provinces of the River Plate. This is obviously true, and to a considerable extent the active participation of foreigners in national life was nothing more than a continuation of the patterns established during the wars of independence, when revolutionaries fought their enemies all over the Latin American continent-nation, regardless of their area of origin. Nevertheless, there were clearly powerful economic interests behind de Oro's political activities: The choice of his new residence was not a question of chance but of material interests . . . Bolivia was at that time, as it is today, the centre of the mining business and Domingo de Oro went to Bolivia as the associate and representative of two well-known Chilean industrialists, Don Matias Cousino and Don Rafael Torre-Blanca, who had patented an amalgamating machine to treat silver in Chile and who wished to extend the patent to Bolivia and Peru.10 Who opposed free trade? Rene Moreno's answer was: 'The legion of state employees, whose function in the colonial system was to mint the blocks of silver into stamped coins.' He added that, by careful observation, one could identify 'in the speeches of the upper classes the reflection of the demands made on them from below to express the fears and passions of the mestizo masses'.11 According to El&co dePotosi, the mestizo masses were the mass of labourers, ruined by the closure of a thousand workshops

15

The economic policies ofBelzu and Linares

as a result of unrestricted overseas trade and by the disappearance of the industries of Cochabamba. These were mainly artisans who had strong reasons to hate the free trade which had produced 'contempt and insults' for their products. The interests of these impoverished masses were expressed intermittently in the 'popular' governments, above all that of General Manuel Isodoro Belzu. They gave his government frenzied support and in return they obtained a series of protectionist measures, intended to strangle the destructive foreign trade. Protectionism enjoyed great support and protectionist governments were soon the most popular. This economic background enables us to explain the extraordinary phenomenon of Belcista policies. In 1852 a weekly paper, El Estandarte, appeared in La Paz. It received money from the Belzu government to lead the campaign for protectionism and to combat free-traders, especially those opposed to the state monopoly in exports of silver bullion. It was edited by a small group of studious young men who later became famous in political and literary spheres. Among them was Bernadino Sanjines Uriarte who became well-known as an economist. As a journalist he wrote under the pseudonym of 'Truhan' and his biting irony and criticism of contemporary customs were unmistakable. Under the title 'We must become civilised . . . and starve' he wrote a series of humorous articles in which he criticised the free trade system for depriving the labourer of his work 'in order to replace it with business for the importers'. In contrast, he praised protectionism because it would enable industry to grow and would benefit those who Juan Mas called 'the local proletarian classes'.12 One of Sanjines' main preoccupations was to denounce the excessive taxes imposed on basic necessities produced within the country, such as coca from the Yungas, sugar from Santa Cruz, flour from Cochabamba and wine from Cinti, and to point out the contrasting treatment of similar Peruvian products which were exempted from taxes under the treaty of Arequipa. In due course, the young intellectuals working on the newspaper found themselves obliged to criticise various measures taken by Belzu's government. As a result the subsidy to El Estandarte was stopped and its editors became the targets of government persecution. Sanjines was obliged to flee to Chile and when he later returned to Bolivia, it was as a follower of Linares, the free-trader. Attempts to explain political conflict in Bolivian history as the simple clash of personalities, as battles between Ballivianists and supporters of Santa Cruz, between Belzu's followers and those of Linares, reflect a wish to classify for its own sake and to reduce the complex texture of living history to formalistic schema. This type of analysis tends to forget the under-

16

Pro tection versus free trade

lying issue — that of the continual struggle, sometimes visible, sometimes below the surface, by the mass of poor mestizos, who are the essence of the Bolivian nation, to defend their interests as small producers and artisans against the most dynamic sector of the land-owning oligarchy, described by the reactionary Rene Moreno as the 'educated classes'. Whether in government or in opposition, the upper classes increasingly sought to open the country to international trade, because they hoped it would enable them to establish a solid base as a dominant class. One of the recurrent features in our literature is to consider history as the exclusive product of a few great men, but underlying the bloody struggles between the different political bands was the continual and decisive conflict between protectionism and free trade. It was only after the decline of national industry got well under way that a sector of the dominant class, principally large landowners who liked to think of themselves as a landowning aristocracy, began to campaign, from their positions in the government, in favour of free trade and the complete disappearance of Bolivia's famous cotton workshops, small factories and smaller mines. It was over the ruins of these enterprises that merchandise from the great metropolitan powers entered Bolivia. The outlines of this new liberal economic policy, so different from that of Belzu, were traced during Ballivian's government (1839—47) and filled in during the regime of Linares (1857-61), the free trade government par excellence. Linares was an aristocrat and set up a regime which catered for the interests of the gamonales of the countryside and ignored the demands of the popular masses, gravely injuring their material interests. In this way the caudillo of the Partido Rojo foreshadowed the Liberal regimes which were to come and which would intensify the subjection of Bolivia to the international market and foreign powers. In contrast to Belzu, the government of Linares favoured almost absolute free trade and cancelled all protectionist measures, attacking the whole system of state monopoly. In 1858 the bank Belzu had set up to give the government a monopoly over the export of quinine was dismantled. The 40% tax on imports of coarse cloth was abolished and replaced by a tax of 13% on cloth entering by the customs houses of Oruro and La Paz and 12.5% on that imported through Cobija. The followers of Linares included the boldest sectors of the dominant class determined to replace the state monopolies by private enterprise. Linares' programme reflected the harsh reaction which Belzu's artisansupported regime had provoked among the oligarchy. In the words of the oligarchic Mariano Baptista, Linares was opposed to Belzu as a 'shameless ruler, an ignorant caudillo who ruled without any programmes or objectives, relying only on force to keep himself in power'.13

17

The economic policies of Belzu and Linares

Free trade was imposed from above in an authoritarian manner after crushing the resistance of the artisans. It was to the direct advantage of the dominant class, who made up in economic power what they lacked in numerical strength. The government's dictatorial policies served its liberal economics. Linares outlined his programme as follows: In order to stimulate the mining industry and increase our volume of trade I shall end taxation on all metals exported in bulk . . . Likewise, internal customs barriers are obstacles to trade and encourage smuggling. One of my objectives has been to abolish them and to this end I authorised Senor Fernandez to undertake negotiations, which unfortunately failed to reach completion. My instructions to Senor Fernandez spelt out the advantages of unrestricted internal trade, which would not only eliminate smuggling, but would leave traders free to take their goods to the best market and save us the necessity of employing so many public officials.14 Thus Linares' crucial idea was that Bolivians should abandon all thought of industrialising the country and should concentrate all their efforts on producing primary materials for export. His analysis, which follows, is penetrating and perceptive. The laws of the world market condemned Bolivia to be a source of primary products, a nation with no large-scale industry. Nothing has shown the absurdity of our protectionist system more clearly than what has happened in the coarse cloth (tocuyo) industry. Despite protection, production has not increased nor have the quality and prices of cloth improved, and foreigners have continued to bring in imports without paying a penny in taxes. In view of these circumstances and my own principled opposition to any kind of industrial restriction, I decided to lower the heavy tax which imported coarse cloth had to bear. Since that measure was enacted, the greater part, though not all, imports have entered the country legally. It was an error for some of our statesmen and counsellors to believe that we could become a manufacturing nation. We could not; not even over a long period of time. Moreover, no one seems to have realised that the intelligent development of primary material exports could be a source of great wealth for us.

18

Protection versus free trade

3. Artisans and protection under Belzu

Although artisan guilds were introduced to Bolivia from Spain, we do not propose to discuss their importance during the colonial period or the significant role they played in the wars of independence. Instead our analysis will begin in the 1840s. Most writers who have written on the history of the Bolivian labour movement have ignored the fact that under General Manuel Isidoro Belzu's government there was a powerful movement aimed at the reorganisation of the artisan guilds, which were in a battered and demoralised condition at the beginning of the republican era. Most commentators prefer to start their analysis only at the end of the nineteenth century when a large number of artisan mutual societies were organised. Leon M. Loza was the first person to write about the artisans under Belzu, and although in his work he does not state his source, he in fact based his observations on the long neglected documents which can be found in the Coleccion Oficial1 He approached the problem from the point of view of the relations between Belzu and the mass of artisans. Loza says that Belzu's government adopted a policy of fraternisation with the 'democratic elements' in order to win their support and backing for his administration, and Belzu therefore sought to promote 'a strong spirit of association among the artisans and manual workers'. As the workers organised, gained political consciousness and became better-off economically, the government also grew stronger. Belzu also flattered the artisans 'speaking of them with most respect and crediting them with a high level of culture, he gave them a certain feeling of dignity within their social sphere'.2 Loza and others, such as Ezequiel Salvatierra, say that the guild of carpenters and tailors was organised in 1854, implying that no workers organisations of any sort existed before this date. However, after looking more closely at the historical evidence we can say that these guilds were merely reorganised at that date. On 20 April 1854 the masters of the carpenters' guild met in the city of La Paz to decide on the 'measures that should be taken to ensure the good conduct of all who exercise the trade and to establish the most orderly and productive system of work in the workshops'.3 The same document reveals that Belzu's government had earlier approved the reorganisation of the carpenters' guild of Sucre: 'By its approval of the code of regulations, agreed upon by the masters of the carpenters' guild in the capital, the Supreme Government has clearly demonstrated its desire to see all artisans of the republic imitating the laudable example set by their companions in Sucre.' The La Paz carpenters

19

A rtisans and pro tection under Belzu

thus followed the example of those in Sucre, and it would be a mistake to assume that of the two the La Paz guilds were the better organised. In turn, on 1 August 1854 all the Masters of the guild of tailors in La Paz met together and agreed to draw up a code of regulations to improve their conditions of work. They stressed that the 'Supreme Government has expressed its desire that all guilds should draw up codes of regulations to systematise the work of their members and to ensure their good conduct, and it is necessary to comply with these instructions'.4 We can conclude from this that it was the government which, out of concrete political necessity, organised and strengthened the artisans and their guilds. In fact, from the beginning of the regime, the artisans saw that they could rely on the government itself taking the initiative and that they did not have to fight against the authorities to win the right to associate. The regulations of both guilds were duly approved by the government. They were clearly intended to recreate the corporate organisation of craft work characteristic of the Middle Ages. As long as the guilds remained strictly controlled within this type of closed structure it was impossible for the mechanisms of capitalist market forces to develop fully. In fact the guild system provided a community for all the artisans who practised the same trade. Historically it was an association for protection and mutual aid and was heavily impregnated with the Christian ethos (an aspect which had political, as well as religious, significance). There was very little social distance between masters, journeymen and apprentices; being an apprentice or a journeyman was essentially a transitory state, a rung on the ladder which had to be climbed. Once he was skilled in his trade, the apprentice would in turn become a master. In a feudal type of society the objective of the guilds was to defend the professional interests of the artisans against manorial authority. It also guarded against competition between masters within the guild. The regulations of the guild required the artisan to 'work well and loyally' and fixed the quantity and quality of goods produced, the methods of production and the amounts of raw materials to be used. As a consequence of these provisions, the techniques of the artisans did not develop; generation after generation, for hundreds of years the artisans used the same simple tools and the same methods of work. On the other hand their art and skill improved until they reached perfection. During their period of study and apprenticeship they came to know their branch of production thoroughly and often succeeded in become true artists in their trade. But the regulations of the guilds contributed to the stagnation of production, were an impediment to the development of their tools and placed a great deal of emphasis on the manual skill of the artisan. The regulations of the carpenters' and tailors' guilds, which were

20

Protection versus free trade

approved in 1854, fit perfectly into the medieval conception of the corporative organisation of work. What we have just said about guilds throughout the world can be applied perfectly to the Bolivian guilds in a general way. An analysis of the regulations of these two guilds will enable the reader to understand the pre-independence mentality that inspired them. Such detailed regulation of the entire work process was a serious obstacle to the adoption of more productive techniques. The regulations of the carpenters' guild

The guild carried out its work under the vigilance of the ecclesiastical authorities and the police. Its regulations laid down in minute detail the days on which workshops could be opened. According to the first article of these rules, no carpentry shop could open its doors and no work could be done on holy days. If there was an urgent reason for doing so, the artisan first had to obtain the permission of the parish priest and the police. Failure to observe this rule incurred severe penalties: a fine of four reales for the first offence, a fine of two pesos or four days imprisonment for the second, and eight pesos or the closing of the workshop for a month for the third. As is well-known, the Church rules that no one could work in pursuit of gain on days laid aside for religious festivals. However, not even the strict measures which regulated the lives of the guilds could prevent the artisans from celebrating that traditional secular holiday - 'Saint Monday.' Thus the third article of the regulations prohibited the masters and journeymen from staying away from work on Mondays 'without a just cause'; transgressors had to pay cash fines. 'Nevertheless the Masters are allowed to entrust someone to take charge of the workshop, but if they fail to work four Mondays in the month, their case will be submitted for consideration by four Masters and will incur the prescribed penalty'.5 Under a police ruling of 15 May 1846 the masters were obliged to keep special books in which they had to register all their contracts. The master was the head of the workshop. It was his responsibility to see that work was done well and he was the only one who could deal with the customers. Article fifteen forbade the journeyman to arrange 'any contract whatsoever, without the permission of his master, under pain of forfeiting the products of his labour, and of being held responsible for the quality of the workmanship'. Masters were obliged to see that goods were of high quality, and that they were handed over to the consumer within the agreed time. There were also rules establishing the payments the masters could receive: 'if his own tools are used in the work, and he supervises it, he may receive one quarter of its value, after deducting the costs of the materials'.

21

Artisans and pro tection under Belzu

Each master's monthly contribution to the guild of one real was to be paid to a treasurer who should be 'elected by a plurality of the votes of the masters'. The same applied to any fines that the guild imposed. These funds were to be used for mutual aid and various social purposes: 'Firstly, to assist any master who is ill, provided that his illness is not the result of his vices or excesses, and that he lacks the means to purchase medicines. Such aid will last until he recovers. Secondly, in the case of death, to pay the expenses of a modest, decent funeral. It is the duty of the senior Master to inspect the treasurer's accounts every three months, and to pay the treasurer what the Senior Master considers a just salary.' In order to give these regulations the full stamp of legality, it was necessary to obtain the authorisation of the Police Intendant, who was empowered to ensure the compulsory collection of fines from those who had infringed the rules. One of the basic functions of the guild was to take care of needs of the masters and journeymen. If the guild did not have sufficient resources to fulfil its duties the statutes ruled that it could resort to voluntary contributions: 'Article 10: If there is a shortage of funds for funerals, the masters agree to voluntarily donate a moderate contribution.' Article 12 of the regulations ruled that a fund should be set up for widows and orphans, and laid down how it was to be operated: 'If a master dies, leaving his wife or children in poverty, the guild, after paying the funeral expenses and after establishing the good reputation of the wife, will determine the amount to be given to her, depending on the state of the coffers. The male children will be handed over to,accredited Masters to receive their education.' Article 14 laid down the conditions required to qualify as a Master: In order to qualify as a master and open a workshop, it is necessary (a) to prove one's skill by an examination held under the auspices of the Senior Master and judged by four Masters; (b) to deposit a surety of 200 pesos against the responsibilities which might fall upon a Master; (c) to possess the necessary tools and a reserve of 200 pesos to supply all the needs of the workshop. These strict regulations resulted in the creation of a closed world. Anyone who did not conform was virtually outside society and was contemptuously dismissed as a vagabond: 'Every journeyman who is not enrolled on a register or who, being so, does not regularly attend some workshop will be regarded as a vagabond.' The regulations of the tailors' guild

The guild was organised vertically and showed not the slightest tendency

22

Protection versus free trade

towards democracy in favour of the journeymen and apprentices. The masters were the unquestioned higher authority and the workshop served their interests. They enjoyed political influence and social respect. Article 1 of the guild's regulations states that the journeymen 'will be directly subject to their respective masters', who in turn depended on the senior master of the guild. The latter, who was empowered to summon the junta of masters, was to be 'obeyed punctiliously'. Those who did not attend were liable to a cash fine. The master not only owned the workshop, he also had to answer for everything that happened in it. He was required to deposit a sum of 200 pesos with the police 'as surety for the responsibilities which fell upon him by virtue of his trade'. Since a master might resist the movement of journeymen from one workshop to another, the only recourse open to a discontented journeyman was to seek permission to move from the senior master who, 'after learning the reasons of the journeyman and hearing the reply of the master who opposed the transfer, could give permission'. These regulations made the journeyman an integral part of the workshop and he could not easily free himself from its discipline. If contracts for the completion of work were not fulfilled, the injured party could have recourse to the senior master who 'will immediately order the detention of the responsible master in the police barracks where he will stay until he has delivered the work' (Article 5). If one of the journeymen was responsible, then he lost a quarter of his next wage packet; in case of a dispute, the senior Master acted as judge (Article 7). The masters and journeymen did not merely have duties in the workshop; the statutes also aimed at maintaining good relations between the guild and the rest of the population. So that clients should not be cheated, the statutes ruled that 'any master or journeyman who intends to leave this city should make this known to the senior master and the public through an announcement in La Epoca at least ten days beforehand'. Anyone who contravened this rule was forbidden to reopen his workshop and lost all possibility of being readmitted to the guild and 'the creditors must present evidence of their claims to the police, so that their demands can be met from the surety money deposited by the absent master'. The masters were not allowed to close their workshops, for the rules specified that no workshop might suspend its operations. So 'whenever masters have urgent reasons for leaving the workshop, they must leave someone to represent them, to maintain order among the journeymen and to attend to any customers who arrive' (Article 10). Absenteeism on the part of the journeymen was expressly forbidden and penalties were laid down for those who failed to come to work: a fine of two reales on the

23

Artisans and protection under Belzu

first occasion and 'in the case of repeated offences, the senior master may order his arrest for a period not exceeding eight days'. The regulations also included some articles to protect the journeymen. Article 14 states that the masters were obliged to provide the men dependent on them with work throughout the whole week 'in accordance with their skills'. If there was not sufficient demand for goods in the workshop, then the journeyman could undertake to work on his own account. 'Any master, who, through carelessness or bad management, fails to provide work for his journeymen, must pay them a daily wage for all the days they are unoccupied for this reason.' The statutes specify in minute detail the tests a journeyman had to perform to qualify as a master. The candidate was required to design and mark out a garment indicated by the tribunal and, after cutting the cloth, he was required to sew it personally in the presence of the senior master and the masters of the examining committee. The certificate of approval was only given if the work was considered perfect and it was proved that the candidate had a comprehensive knowledge of his trade. It was the task of the senior master to inspect the licences of all the masters to ensure that they fulfilled all the requirements laid down in the regulations. An assistance fund was set up into which were paid all the fines levied. This fund provided aid for masters and journeymen who were ill and lacked resources for medical attention once again 'provided that their illness is not the result of their vices'. The amount of money given was left to the discretion of the senior master. All masters were required to pay an initial contribution of one peso and then a weekly subscription of two reales into an emergency and burial fund; any master who failed to pay lost 'his capital and the right to draw on the fund'. The fund was to help masters who were in short-term economic difficulties: 'Any master who finds himself without resources to pay his journeyman may apply to the senior master, who, having ascertained his reasons, may authorise the treasurer to pay him the amount required' (Article 26). These loans were interest-free and had to be repaid within eight days. If the master failed to do so, he had to 'pay an interest of four reales for the next eight days. If he still has not paid in this time, the Senior Master can order him to pay under judicial compulsion, and if he fails in this way to obtain the money owed, it can be obtained from the Intendent, who will deduct it from the master's security'. If the amount in the fund reached 500 pesos, then loans could be made 'for business transactions related to the trade which masters wish to undertake: in this case the borrower must pay interest of one per cent a month' (Article 30). The tailors asked the government to ratify the regulations of their guild

24

Protection versus free trade

and at the same time they asked the government to put greater emphasis on the adoption of protectionist measures to avoid the damaging effects of goods imported from overseas on the small industries organised in guilds: 'In submitting this petition we wish to make it known to the Supreme Government that all the masters of the tailors' guild would like the government to agree to introduce effective measures to prohibit absolutely imports of readymade clothes.' The tailors admitted in their petition that in general the system of import prohibitions was pernicious and hateful since it would deprive the country of perfectly made goods, the product of European genius, and would retard the progress of the country. 'But these two arguments do not apply to the tailoring trade, which is of such a nature that it cannot be perfected beyond certain limits. The masters of La Paz and of the whole republic can pride themselves on having reached the highest level of perfection.' (At this point in time, however, the dispute did not really revolve around the degree of perfection of the products made by the criollo artisans, but rather the shattering impact which lowpriced imported goods were having on their economic situation.) The petition concluded: 'We hope that, on the basis of these considerations, the President of the Republic, who is so eager to protect the working classes, will deign to grant our petition.' It is interesting to note that the document makes no mention of the high costs of national production, which was entirely based on manual labour with rudimentary tools and antiquated techniques. What considerations motivated the artisans? The sacred principle of survival, not simply as individuals but as a guild. Desperately, passionately, they tried to defend an economic and social order which was inevitably doomed to crumble away. Hints of socialism? No. Their declared and overriding aim was the salvation of the small primitive workshop. The social and political influence of many of the masters whose names appeared at the foot of this petition cannot be doubted; nevertheless many of them did not even know how to write their names. The backwardness of the country was also reflected at the cultural level. The establishment of the trade schools

On 30 April 1826 the first trade school was opened in accordance with the decree of 28 February 1826, which was enacted by Sim6n Bolivar on the suggestion of the Prefect of La Paz, the then Colonel Andres de Santa Cruz. It functioned for 14 years until it was closed in 1840 'for political reasons and because of the civil war provoked by ambitious caudillos. General

25

Artisans and protection under Belzu

Belzu reorganised the Professional School of Arts and Trades and it reopened on 20 September 1851 with Evaristo Reyes, who had graduated as a teacher in France, as its first director. The school building was purchased by Belzu with his own money. The day the school was inaugurated one of the corridors collapsed killing 30 people; miraculously Belzu escaped unharmed.'6 Always interested in destroying the privileges of the aristocracy, Belzu's government re-established education for the artisans with the aim of strengthening them as a class and improving their productive activity in the workshops. His central idea was that education should cease to be a privilege of the minority. For example, a decree of 6 August 1853 declared that 'with the arrival of the Government in the loyal and valiant city of Cochabamba we have been convinced of the grave consequences for society which result from restricting public education to the study of law and theology'. Therefore 'trade schools are being established in the cities of La Paz and Cochabamba. These colleges are to be governed by regulations which are shortly to be published and will provide free apprenticeships for the less well-off youths of society . . . The colleges which already exist in the cities of Oruro and Potosi will confine themselves to teaching the theory and practice of mineralogy and other similar activities.' The decree, issued five years after Belzu came to power, was dated 'the 45th year of Independence and the 5th of Liberty'. Master artisans were themselves given the task of teaching in the trade schools. They were only entitled to a salary if they taught at least 12 pupils. Both day and boarding pupils received the proceeds from their work until they passed the first examination. When they were qualified as journeymen, 'the master decided the proportion of the value of each artefact he was to receive'. Half of the earnings of the boarders was paid to the college, while day pupils kept the profits from their work. The master was obliged to pay out of his own pocket the salaries of one or more auxiliary masters to stand in for him when he was absent or ill. He was also required to equip his workshops with the best tools and materials. As the government's measures were designed to encourage the education of the masses, they began by setting up 25 scholarships for 'orphans and poor families'. Work in the trade schools began at five in the morning in the summer and an hour later in the winter. The day began with prayers in the chapel; this was followed by one hour of study, three hours of 'scientific' classes, six hours in the workshops and two hours dedicated to religion. By 1855 the number of pupils in the two trade schools had reached 135, by no means a negligible figure for the time.

26

Protection versus free trade

The government of Belzu

Alberto Gutierrez was the first historian who was perceptive enough to realise that the coming to power of Manuel Isidoro Belzu signified the beginning of a new era in the life of the nation; for previous historians it was nothing more than another barracks revolt. Gutierrez wrote: 'This act of war (the battle of Yamparaez on 6 December 1848) put an end to one historical era to open up a new one in national life.'7 This new era in Bolivian politics was marked by the decisive and violent eruption of the artisan and peasant masses on to the political scene in such a way that they made a considerable impression on the nature of the popular government. The immediate result of this mobilisation of the masses was to unite against them all those groups in society which had aristocratic pretensions. Gutierrez writes that, with Belzu's ascent to power and the support he obtained from the masses backed up by those military units in his command, an opposition party was bound to be organised 'composed of the most educated and aware sectors of contemporary society, who, both by work and by deed, would support the cause of constitutional legalism'. Luis S. Crespo writes that on his return to La Paz after putting down the pro-Ballivian rebellion of March 1849 Belzu made the following speech to the impressive crowd which gathered to meet him: Comrades, an unfeeling bunch of aristocrats has become the arbiter of your wealth and your destinies. They exploit you ceaselessly but you don't see it; they trick you night and day but you don't feel it; they accumulate vast fortunes from your toil but you aren't aware of it. They share out the lands and jobs, the honours and dignities among themselves and leave you with the poverty, the shame and the hard work, and you keep silent. How much longer are you going to go on sleeping like this? Wake up now; it is time to question the titles of the aristocracy and the basis of private property. Aren't all Bolivians equal? Surely we are all equal, for we are all members of the same species — man. Why then are they the only ones to have the opportunities for material, intellectual and moral improvement? Why not you? Why are they the only ones to enjoy fat inheritances, silver plates, houses, estates and farms? Why not you? Comrades, private property is the principal cause of most of the crimes and offences committed in Bolivia; it is the cause of the continual battles between Bolivians; it is the cause of the egoism which dominates the country, of that egoism which is condemned for all eternity by universal morality. No more property, no more property

27

Artisans and protection under Belzu

owners, no more inheritance! Down with the aristocrats! Let the land be for everybody. We have had enough of the exploitation of man by man! Is there any reason why only the Ballivianistas should occupy the highest social positions? Aren't you Bolivians too? Weren't you born in the same privileged land as they were? Friends, property, in the words of a great philosopher, is the exploitation of the weak by the strong. The ownership of property is based fundamentally on chance . . . Take justice into your own hands then, since the injustice of men and of our time denies it to you.8 Six years later, at the end of his term in office, Belzu was fully aware of what had happened in the country. His message to congress in 1855 was about five thousand words long and, of these, six hundred were devoted to a discussion of the new social force which he himself had helped to set up. 'Under my auspices new groups have emerged on the political scene which augur well for order and peace. The classes who have been disinherited by the injustice of our times, people who have been bowed under by the weight of their deprivation, have climbed up out of the rubbish heap and taken their place beside us'. 9 Belzu was sure that he had made a decisive contribution to the unleashing of a profound revolution which 'has been achieved in our country under the influence of civilisation'. The political mobilisation of the masses had stirred up, as Belzu was aware, 'the fears and prejudices of certain classes who still try to claim for themselves the title of the privileged'. On the other hand, the poor felt greatly encouraged and had become 'men of faith and courage'. He observed that the emergence of this powerful new group had been marked by a few setbacks, but argued that these could be avoided by wise governments if they managed to control the mass movements themselves; but if they failed to do this, the torrent would burst its banks and inundate society, quite beyond control: 'Gentlemen, make the necessary reforms for yourselves if you don't want the people to make a revolution their way.' Belzu angrily attacked the 'anti-social' idea that the 'lower orders' (as he called the artisans and peasants) were incapable of being educated, becoming civilised and taking an active part in public affairs: 'Educate them, instruct them, improve their condition, let them participate in your rights, in keeping with the spirit of the times. Give them security, work and a living wage and then you will have nothing to fear or lament. Americans! Be consistent with the spirit of democracy which you invoked when you declared your independence.' Belzu points out here how the dominant class was incapable of putting into practice the ideology of the independence movement. Directing his words both to his enemies and to

28

Protection versus free trade

his supporters, he said that the masses could not be contained by violence or by 'a rod of iron' but they could be restrained, by winning them over politically and letting them participate in the government. 'Protect them, so that they will respect you.' He advised them that they should try to bring justice within the reach of everyone: what he called 'establishing the communism of justice' with the aim of 'preventing political communism'. He then went on to justify the populist policies of his government, arguing that the artisans and Indians were 'docile, submissive and hard working' and that there was no reason why they should not climb the rungs of the social ladder. The wealth of the country promised a happy future for the masses and 'before long they will surely become very useful property-owners and citizens'. Belzu stressed his belief in Christian principles, saying: 'By promoting the development of the poor so that they are beginning to defend our republican institutions, by raising those humiliated races up from their downtrodden, servile state, I believe, gentlemen, that I have acted not merely in accordance with the needs of our society but also in accordance with the divine precepts of the gospel.' Even though the disinherited gave him their enthusiastic support and regarded him virtually as a god, Belzu left office tired and disappointed. Hardly had he declared that there were no political prisoners in Bolivia than new crimes and offences were committed which demanded the enforcement of severe laws. There were continual revolutions, revolutions in the south, revolutions in the north, revolutions stirred up by my enemies, led by my friends, plotted in my own house, planned at my own side . . . Good God! They forced me to fight all the time. It was, however, an unequal fight because I had to fight evil with goodness, combat treachery with generosity and dignity . . . I was attacked by some people, betrayed by others, ill-used by nearly everybody, besieged by people scrounging for jobs and begging favours. I had to spend my time fighting opponents and keeping myself going amidst the dangers, the ingratitude and the opposition. If, for these reasons, I have not been able to achieve everything I so ardently desired, I must tell you, I have never deviated from my intentions. As I have already told you, my intentions were honourable and patriotic. As an upright soldier, as a man of faith and of conscience, I declare to you gentlemen, in the face of my enemies, that I have never betrayed my principles. Belzu wanted to see all the exploited become property-owners and good citizens who would be a stabilising factor in the life of the nation. But his republic of small property-owners who, through their numbers, would reduce the violence of conflicts between classes, was condemned to failure

29

Artisans and protection under Belzu

by the hard facts of the colonial-based economy. One could not hope to build a broad-based democracy on such a fragile basis. From the moment when, for the sake of its own survival, the artisan industry shut Bolivia's market off from world trade, the country had no way out of its economic depression. There can be no doubt about Belzu's creative energy and enthusiasm, but even though he tried, through his policies, to cooperate in the development of the productive forces, he showed that it was impossible to transform the economy by using the peasants and the artisans as a starting point, because their situation merely reflected the legacy of outmoded colonial structures. Belzu's temporary strength obliged him to identify himself with reactionary anti-capitalist forces, and the popular regime found itself obliged to fight for the continuance of the country's backwardness and isolation.10

Book 2:

Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists 4. The rise of the mineowners One can but ask what became of the wealthy mineowners of the colonial period, and the powerful guild of azogueros (silver smelters), who in their time created the exceedingly important bank of San Carlos de Potosi. These men built their wealth on the corpses of the mitayos (forced labourers). They worked together in the guild to introduce many revolutionary changes in the mining industry, and were prepared to overcome any obstacle. Unlike other Latin American countries, Upper Peru did not have a powerful merchant sector with strong connections with European capitalism; this is to say, it lacked the nucleus for a potential contemporary bourgeoisie. The wars of independence had disastrous consequences for the mining industry. The majority of mines were abandoned, including the Real Socavon de Potosi, which was not worked again until 1851, when the indefatigable entrepreneur, Don Avelino Aramayo, set up a company to re-open it. But as yet this has not produced satisfactory results, owing to the shortage of capital. However, capital is now available in the United States, where the idea has arisen of re-organising the Bolivian enterprise into a more efficient one, based on the capital, personnel and machinery which can be found in the United States for such a colossal undertaking. The fulfilment of this plan would not only enrich the entrepreneurs who sponsor it, but also re-establish the proverbial grandeur of the city of Potosi, and the economic well-being of the surrounding regions.1 The fifth decade of the nineteenth century saw the most serious efforts made by Bolivian entrepreneurs to develop the mining industry, but these attempts just provide us with more evidence of their inability to do so. As a result of the painful experience of their failures, the mineowners began 30

31

The rise of the mineowners

to consider seeking the assistance of foreign capital. Some of them, like Avelino Aramayo and Aniceto Arce, hired the services of pamphleteers and politicians, in order to convince public opinion and the state of the necessity of this course of action. The main objectives of the activities and campaigns of the mineowners, pamphleteers and governments were to facilitate and guarantee the development of capitalist enterprises, promote the construction of railways, carry Free Trade to the limit, and abolish the bullion laws. Their programme came into its own after the 1870s. The Aramayos The Aramayos became a family of mineowners. The first, Jose Avelino Ortiz de Aramayo, laid the basis of numerous mining companies, and the last, Carlos Victor Aramayo, played the role of the potentate who witnessed the decadence of the consortium created by his predecessors.2 We are using the Aramayos as an example because, like Aniceto Arce and a few others, they not only accumulated fortunes but also developed an overall philosophy about the future of the country which, hardly by coincidence, fitted in with their own interests. This family of entrepreneurs who came to be great magnates were descended from an ancient Spanish family, that had long been the lords of the vast region of Chichas. Jose Avelino Aramayo, who is often referred to simply as Avelino Aramayo, was born in the small village of Moraya in Chichas on 25 September 1809, and died in Paris on 1 May 1882 at the age of seventy-two. Recognising that the mining industry could only emerge from its backward state if it were given a powerful impetus, he began to gather round him skilled men from Germany and elsewhere, a step which foreshadowed the future transformation of the mining industry by technical assistance from other parts of the world. The specialists Aramayo brought to Bolivia introduced important reforms in the smelting processes, and pushed forward the development of large-scale enterprises. He also imported specialists to handle the administration and accountancy of his firms, anticipating to some extent what is happening today. Aramayo's enterprises functioned as a training centre in mining questions; for example, Aniceto Arce (President, 1888-92) started off by working under Aramayo. Jose Avelino Aramayo had some part in the exploitation of every mine of importance at the time. In 1853 in Carguaicollo he built the first railway lines in the interior of a Bolivian mine, and a decent road to transport the ore. He started smelting by the ton in Sevaruyo and introduced calcination in double-chambered furnaces. Also in Sevaruyo and in other mines Aramayo started a savings scheme for the workers, based on a 10 per

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

cent deduction from their pay. In 1863 he submitted proposals to the Bolivian government for the construction of a railway between Iquique and Oruro. Ruck argues that if Aramayo's plans had not been frustrated by the revolution of Melgarejo (President, 1865—71), Bolivia would have retained the coastal region and 'the guano beds of Mejillones, worked with English capital'.3 These ideas imply a whole programme: the development of the country and the defence of its territorial integrity depended on strong investments by foreign capital, and on the integration of the country into the world market and its association with the interests of the highly developed countries. Jose Avelino Aramayo was the first to travel to Europe in search of markets for minerals such as bismuth, and for capital to develop the mining industry. The Aramayos and England

In 1856 Jose Aramayo set up the unsuccessful Sociedad del Real Socavon which aimed to promote the exploitation of the Cerro de Potosi. The company, established with Bolivian capital and shareholders, collapsed when faced with technical and financial obstacles. Later his son, Felix Avelino Aramayo, formed a new company, this time with the firm intention of attracting foreign capital. The company was to be set up in London and based on the properties held by the Compania del Real Socav6n and aimed at raising £200,000 in capital. In England, on 20 August 1869, the Potosi (Cerro Potosi, Bolivia) Silver Mines Co. Ltd was set up and Fred B. Walter became its London agent. Many Bolivians waited in suspense to see what the Aramayos would say and do, for they considered that the future of their country depended on the investment of large amounts of foreign capital. The agreement reached in London was enthusiastically welcomed, not only as a fortunate event for the Aramayos but also as the opening of a new path for Bolivia. M. Reyes Cordona congratulated Jose A. Aramayo in Paris on 12 October 1869: Your son has had the good fortune and the skill to negotiate an agreement for which all Bolivians must congratulate him, since it is almost certain that it will bring a new era of prosperity and all kinds of improvements to our fatherland . . . I believe, therefore, that it is a very significant achievement to have obtained the decision in London to invest in Bolivia.4 The importance of the Aramayos' company and its extension on to an international level have been discussed by Mariano Baptista (President,

33

The rise of the mineowners

1892—6), who can perhaps be considered as the theoretician who justified the new ideas of the large mineowners: To get our mining shares quoted in the hectic transactions of the London capital market, to develop these mountains and convert them into market value, to transform them into money, into bank notes, into credit notes which can be traded in the world's greatest financial centre - how fruitful it will all be! How incalculable! And what jobs in the future for our youth, who are not idle, no, but only unfortunate in that at present they lack opportunities to work.5 But the company Felix Avelino Aramayo set up in England collapsed because when the British shareholders asked their government if it would protect the investments they were planning to make in Bolivia, Lord Clarendon replied: 'Our diplomatic relations with Bolivia have been broken off completely. In that country neither foreign lives nor foreign capital are safe and the word of its governments offers no guarantee whatsoever.' (Britain had no diplomatic representation in Bolivia between 1853 and 1903.) Hence constitutional government became as important for the mining enterprises as the capital provided by foreign shareholders. The Conservative Party (with which many mineowners became identified after the War of the Pacific) sought among other things to put an end to the barracks revolts and the palace adventures of the caudillos of the past. It was not a question of a lyrical attachment to constitutional forms, but rather a clear desire to gain plentiful profits in peace and tranquillity. The British capitalists had demanded stable and responsible governments as a basic prerequisite for investing in Bolivia. Using the metaphoric language of criollo democracy, the Conservatives translated this desire into the need to fight for the constitutionalisation of the country's politics. Until the 1880s the mineowners, who were anxious to find foreign partners, limited their political activities to occasional attempts to introduce new issues into the national political arena and to supporting certain pamphleteers. But after the War of the Pacific it was the large mineowners who succeeded to the presidency of the republic and the key political posts. The first political party formed by the mining industry was the Conservative Party, which was associated with the interests of British capital and held power from 1880 to 1898. The Aramayos and politics

Even before the Conservatives came to power it was clear that the progressive mineowners, who were the most advanced sector of the small

34

Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

ruling class, wished the state's function to be that of administrator of the general interests of the mining sector. It is here that we have to look to find the main reason why the largest mining entrepreneurs became active politicians and writers. For them it was a vital task to change the direction of Bolivian politics in order to further their industrial plans. The mineowners formed parties, agitated actively on the streets and when political conflicts became violent they took their place at the barricades. Not until later did this superestado minero6 contract the services of professional politicians to perform these roles, which had by then come to be considered unbecoming for a captain of industry. Jose A. Aramayo was the representative for Chichas in the Congress of 1857 and the Constitutional Assembly of 1871. It is said that he was a clear and persuasive speaker, and even if this had not been the case his parliamentary speeches would have gained importance because they were on the theme of the abolition of the state monopoly of silver, a monopoly which the large mineowners and progressive intellectuals considered to be the main obstacle to progress of the country and of the mining industry. During the government of Linares, who encouraged a variety of reforms, Aramayo held the post of Counsellor of State, from which he put forward a plan for the reform of the mining code. Subsequently, President Frias (1872-5), who regarded him as a champion of Bolivian interests and offered him the Treasury, but he declined it. In the 1870s Jose Avelino Aramayo set down in print his ideas on the development of the mining industry and the economy and on Bolivian politics: Those states whose favoured situation enabled them to make immediate contact with foreign civilisations have advanced most easily, and today we can have the satisfaction of seeing some of them in a flourishing condition. It is the action of foreigners, their industrial skills and their capital, which has been well received and guaranteed by these countries, that has brought them progress and commercial prosperity. My long career in world trade, my constant observation of the more or less rapid, more or less perfect progress of each country according to its own habits and customs, has made me think that the lack of economic education is the main weakness which has set back industrial progress in Bolivia.7 Not even Linares had felt able to abolish the state monopoly in the production of precious metals (the decree of 28 July 1858 establishing free trade in minerals applied only to base metals) and in the 1860s, under the pretext of combatting the increase in smuggling, Melgarejo's government had relied on government authorised monopolists to buy products such as

35

The rise of the mineowners

silver and quinine at fixed prices. Aramayo argued that these monopolies were aimed at robbing the producers: 'If you look at the rules of these banks and their system of buying bullion, you will see that there is no industry in the world more heavily penalised than the mining industry and no profession more outraged and harassed than that of the mineowner.'8 He showed that the banks improperly kept for themselves 30% of the price of silver, and he maintained that through such a system the state was supporting the vices of monopoly, fraud and scandal 'to the detriment of the general interest'. While other Latin American countries were making progress, Bolivia, he argued, was going backwards as a result of military dictatorships. Bolivia is the only republic of the day which does not have a mile of railway . . . not a single mile . . . and the riches of Mejillones have been given away. How happy Bolivia will be, how undoubtedly happy, on the day when it succeeds in shaking off the military yoke, for then, and only then, will we be able to devote our energies to industry . . . How can a people be happy when it groans under the rule of the sword? How, when the generals and presidents transfer the most able people from productive activities to live a life of ease? Aniceto Arce and the Huanchaca Mining Co.

When we refer to the age of Aniceto Arce we are really speaking of the age of the silver and copper mineowners, and, in political terms, of the Conservative or Constitutional party. It is impressive to recall that in 1843, at the age of 19, Arce participated, not as an ordinary member but as one of the leaders in the formidable expedition of General Manuel Rodriguez Margarinos, who was sent by President Ballivian.to explore the Chaco and the course of the Pilcomayo river. He returned from Paraguay with the well-deserved prestige of a hero. In 1847 he was admitted to the legal profession, which, then as now, was the most over-subscribed occupation in the country. When he was only 22 he began to prospect for mines, not out of any instinctive inclination for such activity, but because he hoped to build up a substantial fortune. However, his early prospecting ventures were fruitless, and this failure may have inclined him towards politics, where he thought he could triumph more easily. In 1850 he was elected deputy, at a time when Bolivia was ruled by Belzu's government with enthusiastic popular support. Arce was one of a small minority in the legislature who dared to oppose the caudillo. 'During the congressional session of 24 September 1850, Esteban Rosas presented a bill proposing to re-establish constitutional rule. It was supported by six

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

deputies including Lucas Mendoza de la Tapia, Evaristo Valle and Aniceto Arce. A company of soldiers immediately entered the congressional chamber, arrested the supporters of the bill and led them off to jail.'9 Later Arce and the other politicians were imprisoned in the unhealthy, humid region of Guanay, which is so famous in the annals of our interparty struggles. He managed to escape to Chile, where he acquired useful experience as the administrator of a silver mine. When President Acha (1861-4) found himself obliged to take action on the chronic economic problems of the country, he felt the best step would be to appoint Arce as Minister of the Treasury. History cannot conceal the high-handed nature of Arce's first period in office. As a Minister he showed no signs of his future promise as the most significant reformer of the republic. He was then the perfect conservative and failed to rise above the routine of the colonial era, with its absurd system of taxation. After the victory of Melgarejo, Arce decided to devote himself to his mines in Huanchaca. A relative of his had been working the silver vein of Pulacayo on a small scale since 1833 but with limited success, and on 6 June 1856 Arce bought him out for 40,000 pesos. Arce was one of the few who had any confidence in the potential wealth of the Pulacayo mines, and in 1864 he arranged for the other partners in the company to lease him the firm. Mining operations expanded and the prosperity of the mine increased, but this posed serious problems: the need to install modern concentration plants capable of obtaining higher recovery-rates from the ore, and to modernise work in the interior of the mines so that ore extraction could be speeded up and made more efficient. But Arce and the other partners realised that before they could increase production, and hence profits, and before they could invest in mechanisation, they would need to attract a considerable volume of capital to meet more immediate necessities. It was the most prosperous mine of the time, and the Huanchaca company showed what the Bolivian magnates could achieve with a maximum of effort, but as they had insufficient capital they were unable to finance a thorough modernisation of the mining industry. In 1872 a group of Chilean businessmen visited Huanchaca, and the following year the Compania Huanchaca de Bolivia was set up, in which English and Chilean capital played an important part, bringing the total capital to six million Chilean pesos.10 British capital was behind the Chilean shareholders, and thus indirectly it eventually came to control the banking activities and the mining industries; the Compania Huanchaca, the Corocoro de Bolivia, and the Compania Minera de Oruro. It may seem surprising, but until then Arce was burdened with debts. The Company was now able to begin work without further mishaps, and began to make significant profits.

37

The rise of the mineowners

By 1877 it was already employing 1,567 workers, and by 1878 the company was in full production. The war of 1879 caused problems and necessitated the establishment of a provisional directorate in Sucre, headed by Gregorio Pacheco and Manuel Argandona, which tried to work out a route for the export of minerals via the Atlantic, because of the increasing difficulties of exporting through Antofagasta. Arce and the War of the Pacific

As Vice-President of Bolivia Arce was in a difficult position when war broke out with Chile in 1879. Naturally he has been accused of collusion with the Chileans. It is said, for example, that, taking advantage of his position as the government delegate in the south of the country, he took part in intrigues which ran against the government's war plans: 'In exercising his duties, he showed either a decided intention to destroy the armed units of the area or else sheer incompetence. Abusing his office, he dissolved a battalion based in Oruro and contracted the soldiers to work as day labourers in Huanchaca, at a time when the government was trying to reorganise the army.'11 Similar accusations were launched to justify the exiling of Arce and others who shared his ideas against the war, though many were the product of chauvinistic sentiments which had been wounded by the disastrous result of the war. Arce's lack of enthusiasm for the war can partly be deduced from the following defence he made: Today all kinds of accusations and calumnies are levied against me but I can tell you this, that the most valuable resources offered to General Daza for the war were mine. The Huanchaca company gave three loans for the war effort: one of 60,000 pesos in hard cash, another of 70,000 and a third of 30,000. Could one reasonably ask more of me? I wrote a letter refusing to spend another 10,000 pesos of my own money in payment for provisions that had been distributed to the fifth division in my name. If I had paid this sum, this would also have been considered as a further loan from me.12 Far from being a gift from Arce's pocket to the country, however, the loans were a business transaction for the Huanchaca company: 'It is true that the Compania Huanchaca charged interest on the 100,000 pesos it advanced to the government, but is there any company in the world which lends money interest free? Sr Quijarro, the editor of the La Paz newspaper El Comercio, who is at present the Bolivian minister in this country (Argentina) has shown the legitimacy of the transaction' he continued. The transaction was extortionate if one bears in mind that the company was

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

making loans and advances against the security of funds which it should have paid the government as mining royalties. For President Campero (1880—4) and his followers the war was fought in the name of patriotism and honour. But Arce thought the war was used as a pretext to suppress democratic rights and as an excuse for the bankruptcy of the economy: In the name of patriotism and war they extract forced loans, double the existing taxes and create new ones; but we never see the new battalions; ministerial salaries increase instead of decrease . . . public liberties are suppressed, individual rights are abolished and public funds are squandered under the pretext of the war and yet they are not fighting the war and nor will they. Arce proposed peace as the only solution and argued that only Chile could grant this 'since we are completely isolated and abandoned'. Arce resisted the government's war plans, both in his political capacity from within the government and in his economic capacity, through his mining companies and the Banco Nacional de Bolivia. He publicly proclaimed his plans for reaching a direct settlement with Chile. He did all this, not as an agent of the Chilean government but in defence of his own mining interests, which were by now closely linked with those of the British. His interests lay in defending the prospects for the expansion of the mining industry and in supporting the construction of railways between the Altiplano and the coast to overcome the huge distances without roads. During the war Daza's government confiscated the Chilean shares in the Huanchaca company and other firms, and the dividends were collected for the Bolivian treasury. But it would be a mistake to conclude from all this that Arce was a Chilean agent and a traitor to his country. Support for this thesis can be found in many documents including some we have referred to here, but it avoids the fundamental problem. What else could a social class do which was structured in such a way that its historic mission was, as its own theoreticians argued, to bring foreign capital into the country, to convert Bolivia into a producer of primary products, especially minerals, and to promote the construction of railways? What else, in short, if its mission was to accelerate the entry of Bolivia into the world capitalist economy by seeking assistance from abroad? This social class had no alternative but to rely on one or other capitalist group, British, Chilean or North American, and to act on its behalf within the country and defend its interests of international expansion as if they were its own interests. After the war there were no further obstacles to the growth of Huanchaca's prosperity and in February 1884 the company's shares were quoted at ten thousand francs on the Paris stock exchange. But as the company's

39

The rise of the mineowners

operations expanded Arce had to look for still further sources of capital. (In 1888 the company constructed 45 kilometres of the railway line linking Huanchaca and Uyuni.) There was little hope of raising the necessary funds for expansion in Bolivia, which was a classic example of poverty and had only one bank, the Nacional, with a capital of one million pesos. Once again, therefore, he turned to Chile for finance and the Compania Huanchaca transferred its headquarters to Valparaiso to avoid possible pressures from the Bolivian government in the aftermath of the Chile—Bolivian war. In 1891 the company was reorganised with a capital of £1,600,000 and control passed into the hands of the English. In order to facilitate its exports, the company financed the construction of a railway from the Chilean frontier to Uyuni. This railway was later to be incorporated into the Bolivian Railway Co., when the British firm gained the monopoly of Bolivia's railway network. Thus the loss of Bolivia's coastline was followed by a period of intensified need for foreign capital, particularly to establish a rail link to the sea. Civilian and constitutional forms were emphasised, and the increased power of the mineowners (allied with foreign capital and seeking to provide it with the legal framework it required) can be seen from the fact that the Conservative presidents came from their circle: Gregorio Pacheco, 1884—8, Aniceto Arce, 1888-92, and Mariano Baptista, 1892-6. Felix Avelino Aramayo was a leading light in the opposition Liberal party. The first mineowner to become President of Bolivia was Gregorio Pacheco. Gregorio Pacheco

Pacheco was born in the insignificant little village of Livilivi, in the south of the country, on 4 July 1823 and he died in 1899. Although he was one of the mining magnates he was not the most important; he cannot be considered as a pioneer of the mining industry. He was not an innovator of mining techniques, production methods or organisation, nor did he point out any new paths for the future development of Bolivia. He was born into a family which had come down in the world economically but which, as is usual, still took pride in the aristocratic lineage of its ancestors. A self-taught man, he knew no other school than the hard struggle of life, and he grew physically strong as he had to wrestle with nature to earn his living. At the age of 22 he travelled to Europe with his cousin Narciso Campero, whom the government had sent to take up the post of secretary in the legation in Spain. Before setting out they had set up a trading company and it was as the representative of this company, not as a tourist, that Pacheco travelled to Europe where he carried out business

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

transactions and studied accountancy. He returned to Bolivia a year later and the goods he brought back yielded enormous profits which enabled him to expand his field of operations. Pacheco's company was based in Tupiza and from there he extended his activities towards the mines in the south. His main activity consisted in buying silver bullion, mostly from the famous mine of Portugalete, and exporting it to Chile and Argentina. The trade he practised in imported goods and agricultural products was a subsidiary of this mining commerce. All the business of any volume he transacted revolved round the mining industry. The protectionist measures introduced by Belzu ran contrary to Pacheco's business interests as an exporter of silver. He therefore gave his wholehearted support to unrestricted freedom of trade which was seriously challenged by the new President. In order to circumvent the restrictions on the export of silver, Pacheco turned to smuggling. Contraband activities flourished in reaction to the state monopoly, which decreed that all silver should be minted in the Casa de la Moneda: 'It was not regarded in a bad light that people sent the bullion they had acquired to somewhere like Argentina, instead of to Potosi.'13 Pacheco the smuggler was also an energetic conspirator, and thus on both counts he found himself on the wrong side of the law. He fought in favour of the political group which claimed to defend 'the constitutionalist cause of the country'. In his thirties, he not only proclaimed his support for Linares but also took up arms against the Belzu government, joining a revolutionary army organised in Tupiza. On 10 July 1855 these revolutionaries were defeated at Mojo by government troops, and Pacheco and Ramirez had no alternative but to flee to Argentina, where they remained for a year. From 1856 he devoted himself to mining, and it was in Portugalete that he acquired his organisational ability and tenacity. Gradually, through a series of bold financial transactions, he came to own the whole mine. Ostentatious gestures of charity gained him prestige and a good reputation in important social circles and permitted him to conceal his misdeeds and weaknesses. He began to buy up a large number of urban and rural properties, and once he had become the sole owner of the Portugalete mine, he started to lay the foundations of a large mining enterprise which would cover the whole of the southern region of the republic. To this end he entered into negotiations with Aniceto Arce, Manuel Argandona and Belisario Pero, and in 1878 with them he set up the Compania de Colquechaca. It must be acknowledged that Pacheco was a progressive industrialist

41

The rise of the mineowners

and for this reason he was opposed to the use of servile labour and the inhuman exploitation of the workers. Furthermore, this was before the era of the huge impersonal mining company and he was able to be a paternalistic employer. Although one cannot talk of a system of industrial security in the mining industry at that time, when accidents were very frequent, Pacheco did introduce pensions for invalids and for the families of men killed in the mines. As President of the republic he forbade the whipping of soldiers. It was inevitable that once Pacheco had become a wealthy mineowner and a leading spokesman of the basic industry of the country he should begin to take a more active role in politics, for it was at the political level that national problems, including those of the mining industry, were resolved. He was certainly a very active politician. As early as 1864 he had been elected deputy, but was not very outstanding. In the elections of 1884 the mineowners fought among themselves for the presidency. There were no important differences in the programmes of the two candidates, Pacheco and Arce, and it can be said that the principal aim of both of them was to consolidate the predominance of mining interests in the country's political life. Pacheco, who had organised the ephemeral Democratic Party, won slightly over 11,000 votes, which was not enough for him to be named President immediately, and it was only thanks to an agreement with Arce that congress did in fact appoint him.14 Pacheco said that he wished to combat the aristocratic tendencies of the leading sectors of the Conservative party and give the industrialists a more influential role in politics. There were no rebellions whatsoever against his government, because he had made a pact with the Conservatives who agreed to wait patiently for their turn to govern. His administration was preoccupied with economic problems and Pacheco proposed the introduction of taxes on imports, especially luxury goods and alcohol. Yet on the other hand he put pressure on Congress to reduce the export taxes on minerals. Arce, the politician

The Conservatives' ideas were contained in the manifesto of 10 May 1880, written for Arce's campaign for the Vice-Presidential election: The most pressing need in the Republic today is for civil order in all areas of public life. Only under a regime based on peace and progress can the field of liberty be sown and bring forth the fruits of progress. Social peace is the basis of all positive action. Peace in the government,

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

peace in the workplace, peace throughout the land. The country does not want and cannot want an aggressive government which creates a powerful lobby of warmongers through its reliance on war.15 In his programme for the 1884 election Arce declared: I was educated in the school of hard work, and if I come to power my aim will be to organise and consolidate industry and to transform the structure of the economy by relying on the unrestricted development of production and by establishing communication routes which will bring the cities of the republic together and link them to the neighbouring republics.16 Despite his unpopular stand in the war, Arce obtained almost as many votes as Pacheco in the 1884 election. Pacheco, as we have seen, was elected with Conservative support in the congress and promised to support Arce in the 1888 election. During Pacheco's presidency Arce campaigned vigorously for railway construction. Thus, for example, in its session of 25 October 1886 Congress discussed the question of the construction of railways, a basic plank in Arce's politics. The Huanchaca mining company introduced a proposal for the extension of the Uyuni railway to La Paz via Oruro 'on condition that the company was given a guarantee of a 6% return on the capital it invested'. There was violent opposition to this proposal. The deputies with the clearest understanding of the problem pointed out that Arce's interest in the matter derived from his position as the principal shareholder in the Huanchaca company, since the railway would, above all, serve the interests of the large mineowners. Arce put forward the proposals for the railway line built by the Compania de Salitres de Antofagasta from Pampa Alto across the Bolivian frontier to Huanchaca and extended from there to La Paz. But the opposition Liberal Party intervened in the matter and combated the initiative passionately, alleging that this line was strategically placed to favour the designs of Chile to invade the country.17 However, the violent attacks launched on him by the opposition did not prevent their proposing an electoral pact with him in 1888. Indeed, the fact that politicians were continually changing from one party to another shows that it was very difficult to discern any differences between the Liberals or Reivindicacionistas, the Conservatives or Practicistas, and the Democrats headed by Pacheco. ElMunicipio, a La Paz newspaper, wrote that there were such similarities between the Conservatives and the Liberals that adept politicians switched from one group to the other in pursuit of favours or in response to the manoeuvres of leading personalities. At the Paria talks in 1888 Arce and Camacho reached the conclusion that their parties were pursuing the same ends. Camacho proposed a scheme

43

The rise of the mineowners

for electoral collaboration which was really a repetition of the manoeuvres between the Conservatives and Pacheco's Democrats: 'With both the leaders united by a common outlook, the two parties will maintain their separate identities and the followers of each will show confidence in the other as follows: the Liberals will vote for Senor Arce as Vice-President and the Conservatives will vote for General Camacho for the same post. Then whichever party wins the Presidency will see that after two years in office the new President resigns, allowing the successful Vice-Presidential candidate to serve out the remaining two years.'18 But Arce, whose victory was already assured (he won 25,000 votes compared to Camacho's 7,000), rejected the proposal out of hand. During his presidential term railway construction pressed ahead, despite the attacks of the Liberals. In 1892, when the railway to Oruro was officially inaugurated, the newspapers launched vehement attacks against the scheme, using the Liberals' arguments. 'Cursed be this railway', declared one paper, 'if it serves to condone all the base actions of this government, given over to political prostitution.' And in a tone of even greater wrath a La Paz paper exclaimed: 'The engines which come into the centre of Oruro bear the following inscription: The Antofagasta—Bolivia Railway. This inscription is equivalent to saying that Chile has taken possession of Bolivia and that the Huanchaca magnate is the protagonist in this drama. Bolivia is no more: it is all over.'19 Arce showed his steely temperament in squashing the opposition of parliament and the press and the revolts of the Liberals, who, ironically, had coined the war cry 'Order within the law' only shortly before. In his speech inaugurating the railway Arce declared 'We must make Bolivia advance through the vigour of its industry, the dignity of its hard work and through that peace and order which makes nations great and strong.'20 Not all the mineowners, however, were in the Conservative camp. To complete the picture we shall conclude with a sketch of the Liberal Felix Avelino Aramayo, whose family fortunes have already been described. The relative insignificance of party labels should become apparent. Felix Avelino Aramayo

Felix Avelino Aramayo, the first born son of Jose Avelino, was born in France in 1846 and died in the same country in 1929. He spent his childhood in San Joaquin and his early education was a combination of private tuition and firsthand observation of the administration of his father's enterprises. San Joaquin was at that time both a mine and a hacienda;21 agricultural and industrial activities were not yet completely differentiated.

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

It was the Aramayos themselves who later played a leading role in effecting this transformation. In 1863 Felix Avelino was taken to Europe where he spent the next two years at Bruce Castle school in London. Then, because of difficulties in his father's business, he had to return to Bolivia to continue building up the family's fortune in the mining business. His activities as a mining entrepreneur began in 1866 when his father, a long-established political militant, had to flee to Argentina to escape persecution by the government of Melgarejo. In 1867 he returned to Europe to investigate the London market for Bolivian bismuth. In December 1868 he managed, after lengthy and difficult negotiations, to set up a bismuth refinery and smelter in England under the direction of a Mr Forbes. In 1871 we find him back in Latin America, forming a company to extract silver from the rich deposits discovered at Caracoles the previous year, while at the same time negotiating a concession for a railway between La Paz and Arica. On the death of President Ballivian (31 January 1874), Tomas Frias succeeded to the presidency. He seemed to Aramayo to be a man of integrity and likely to guarantee order; hence Aramayo's spontaneous and decisive support for him. When in 1875 Quintin Quevedo rebelled against the central government, Aramayo took up arms to defend the constitutional regime. After the battle of Tarajtela near Tupiza he was given the rank of lieuteuant-colonel in the militia as a reward for his decisive action. In 1876 he declined the offer of election as the deputy for Chichas but later, during the War of the Pacific, he took up this post. Over the question of the war he differed from the other mineowners who openly favoured a settlement with Chile. Aramayo thought Bolivia should ally itself with Argentina, 'the only possible ally', and strengthen its ties of unity with Peru. In 1897 Aramayo took up the post of the head of the Bolivian delegation in London and from this position he played an important role in the conflict over the territory of Acre, which was rich in rubber and was claimed by Brazil. Bolivia's weakness lay in the fact that it had never taken possession of the disputed territory; its rights to it were only written ones, to be found in documents and treaties. Brazil, on the other hand, controlled the navigation of the rivers in the Amazon basin and collected taxes on the profitable rubber trade. After much fruitless diplomatic wrangling, the Bolivian statesmen reached the conclusion that the only way to save the territory from Brazilian expansion was to get the great powers interested in it. Aramayo shared this point of view. In July 1901 an Anglo-American syndicate was formed with £500,000 capital, which leased the territory of Acre and the rights to its adminis-

45

The rise of the mineowners

tration and exploitation for a period of 30 years. Article 10 of the agreement established that the syndicate would collect the taxes imposed by the national government, of which 60% would be handed over to the treasury while the syndicate would retain the remaining 40%. Brazil was immediately aware of the dangers which the formation of the syndicate implied, for it opened up the possibility that the English and United States governments might intervene in defence of their subjects. Thus the diplomats of Rio de Janeiro accused the Bolivians of handing over a parcel of their territory, located in the heart of South America, to foreign powers. Meanwhile, for the Bolivians the problem remained that the syndicate still had to take possession of the territory of Acre. A mixed commission was set up to do this but it was unable to reach its destination because of the hostile environment. Realising that the situation was hopeless from their point of view, the syndicate started negotiations with the Brazilian chancellor, Rio Branco, and on the receipt of compensation from Brazil they demanded the rescinding of the contract by the Bolivian government. Aramayo has left us an account of all these manoeuvres in a pamphlet which expresses his reactions of disillusionment and bitterness.22 Although he was a long-established supporter of the Liberal Party, Aramayo nevertheless disagreed with, and kept his distance from, General Montes. He was much more favourably disposed towards General Pando, who later became a leading figure among the liberal republicans. Aramayo's main political contacts in the Liberal Party were with Escalier, Roman Paz and Salamanca and their followers. In 1916, when he was seventy years old, the Republicans invited him to be their candidate to the Presidency of the Republic, but Aramayo was a tired, old man by now, and felt incapable of carrying out great plans for the government. At a younger age he would have accepted, but the offer arrived too late in his life. Aramayo completed his career as a businessman and politician in 1917 by founding, jointly with Escalier, the newspaper La Razon. This paper was to be one of the leading dailies in the country, and the spokesman of capitalism and reaction. Aramayo gave financial support to the republican opposition which overthrew the Liberals in 1920 and thus, even though he had preached the necessity of establishing stable constitutional governments, he was responsible for inciting a rebellion. Conclusion

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the development of the mining industry of the Altiplano was in the hands of the criollo leaders of

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

independence and their descendants. Prospectors, bewitched by tales of the lost mines of the Inca Empire and the Colony, have an important place in the history of this era, which seems to us now so like a legend. Large-scale mining operations were unknown until the beginning of the twentieth century. The industry consisted chiefly of isolated efforts by persevering men, who usually ended up in a state of financial ruin. They were preoccupied with the need to overcome the technical difficulties and the shortage of capital necessary for the organisation of large-scale productive units. In a later period, finance capital was to fulfil these tasks effortlessly. But the scattered pioneers who resisted the uncertain future offered by collaboration with foreign capitalists in adventurous financial combination were, by their weakness and isolation, doomed to failure. Now, in retrospect, we can see that only the absolute control of the mining industry by international capital would permit it to become a powerful, dominant, modern sector of the national economy. The lonely efforts of the national producers were incapable of developing the industry to such a level, because of the backwardness of the country, the absence of a powerful national bourgeoisie, and because of the exceptional physical obstacles to production which are encountered in Bolivia. The most progressive measure of the dominant class, the fundamental objective preached by radical intellectuals, was to seek the technical and economic assistance of foreign investors in order to develop a capitalist mining sector. Only the construction of decent roads, railways and telegraphic cables permitted communication over the enormous distances and across the treacherous mountain ranges. The lack of water in some areas, and the danger of floods in others, meant that costly aqueducts, tunnels and powerful pumpingmachinery were required. Large-scale production was inconceivable without electricity and the building of large hydroelectric plants. The penetration of solid beds of rock only became possible with the introduction of powerful drills. The extreme complexity of the minerals required the replacement of primitive methods of purification by modern ones, based on the most recent advances in metallurgy. International capital made this progress possible, but the sectors of the national upper class which sought its intervention found themselves, in due course, reduced to the role of its agents.

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The politics of artisan and mutualist groups

5. The politics of artisan and mutualist groups after 1870

Paradoxically it was a popular government, which came to power on a wave of peasant revolts and with the support of the artisans, that finally abolished the state monopoly on trade in precious metals. Augustin Morales, the disgraced army commander, who overthrew the dictator Melgarejo after six years in power, first seized La Paz in January 1871 and held it thanks to the support of the local population. Morales himself gave instructions for barricades to be built in La Paz. 'The Chief of the National Guard, Dr Agustin Aspiazu, was in charge of carrying out these instructions, and young people and artisans helped to build the barricades.'1 Aspiazu was a distinguished intellectual who fought for the under-privileged and was always on the side of the progressives and liberals; he later wrote for El Artesano. It was not long, however, before some of the groups which had carried Morales to power found him disregarding their needs, as has so often happened in Bolivia's history. Morales summarised his programme with the famous phrase 'More freedom and less government' and the brains behind his administration was the hero of the peasantry, Casimiro Corral. Under such influences, despite his reliance on support from the artisans, Morales enacted the law of 8 October 1872 which included the following provisions: (a) that from 1 July 1873 silver bullion could be exported without restrictions, apart from the payment of a tax of 50 centavos per mark. (b) Crude silver could be exported, subject to a tax based on the mineral content of the ore rather than its weight, as before. (c) The Casa Nacional de la Moneda was required to pay the current international market price for silver. (d) All privileges and concessions granted to individuals for the export of silver bullion and unrefined silver were abolished. (e) The state monopoly of gold mining was abolished and private exports were allowed, subject to a tax of 20 centavos per ounce. (f) A 4% tax was imposed on coin exports. (g) The money raised from these taxes was to be paid to the Casa Nacional de la Moneda to purchase and mint silver.2 Within a few years there was an artisan movement for the repeal of this

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

law, equating their own interests with those of the nation as a whole. Thus, on 12 July 1876 an open assembly was held in the University of Sucre to discuss the needs of the department of Chuquisaca and ask the government to take steps to remedy the situation.3 The hard core of the meeting consisted of the artisans whose interests had been seriously affected by the free trade measures of 1872. This gathering was something like an open council meeting, a type of demonstration which is still popular nowadays. The artisans thought that they were taking the bull by the horns by showing that free trade conspired against the Civil Code. Their arguments were very formal and at times simplistic. They argued that the unrestricted export of bullion would transfer the monopoly of buying minerals from the state, which administered it in the public interest, to the bankers, mineowners and merchants for their own private gain. According to the Exposition, this clamorous demand arose out of 'the state of poverty in which the people were living'. The hundreds of citizens who attended the meeting believed that the repeal of the free-trade legislation could overcome many of their problems. They argued that the concept of economic freedom was being misinterpreted to justify a monopoly of bullion exports in the hands of bankers, mineowners and merchants. If these resources were returned to the state and used for minting coins, the Treasury would prosper and the circulation of money among the population would increase. Gregorio Pacheco who had made his fortune in the mining industry, had been responsible for putting pressure on the docile legislature to approve the law permitting the unrestricted export of bullion. The free-traders became alarmed at the growing discontent of the masses and sent a report to the Executive dated 28 July 1876 and signed by Jose Maria Calvo in which they justified the mineowners' point of view. The mineowners argued that the 'abolition of the state monopoly in the export of bullion has been a necessity', because Bolivia could not 'continue to give the world such proof of its backward state' when everywhere else in the world 'the splendid principle of industrial freedom' was being proclaimed. In the Exposition the artisans replied to the mineowners' arguments, suggesting that the mineowners were not free-traders at all but, in fact, were private monopolists, meaning that they were usurping a privilege which belonged to the state. 'This' they added, 'is the fundamental error of the mineowners: . . . they can only sell their bullion freely by breaking the conditions under which they accepted their mining concessions.' The artisans then listed the evils which had been caused by free trade. 'The free-traders cut back public education' knowing that in Bolivia there are no teacher-training colleges and no teachers. Education was therefore

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The politics of artisan and mutualist groups

left in the hands of incompetent people and, instead of being educated, young people were becoming demoralised. The free traders had authorised the government to 'pledge the customs duties of Arica for several years to service the Valdeavellano debt'.4 They had also approved a loan often million pesos which 'was squandered by Colonel Church'.5 And it was the free traders who had relaxed 'the need to meet one's obligations by abolishing judicial compulsion for the payment of debts'. 'Only communists', the meeting declared 'and those who want to usurp the property of others' could support such a measure.6 The artisans then went on to compare the work of Belzu with that of Linares. 'Even though Belzu was not an educated man like Linares, he increased the number of free scholarships in all the colleges of the republic' They remembered that he had also sent young people to study in Europe and to 'bring back new kinds of looms and concentrating plants for the mining industry'. He began public-works schemes in all the major cities of the republic. 'He repaired churches such as San Miguel; he paid all the public employees promptly and paid their pensions too. He helped the monasteries and convents and the poor, and lastly he invested the surplus generated by the people's efforts in things they needed, like streets and squares. If in Belzu's day we had had the mines of Caracoles and the guano and nitrate beds, we would have heard the whistle of steam engines and the noise of trains on all our public highways.' With pride the artisans looked back through history to show that artisans were better than intellectuals: 'Victor Hugo, Lamartine, Luis Blanc, etc. were defeated by French politics; but Lincoln, a woodcutter, Johnson, a tailor, and Wilson, a cobbler, acted like statesmen in the Northern Cabinet, correcting and rectifying the evils which their learned predecessors had committed in preparing for the terrible war with the southern barons.' The artisans continued their manifesto by appealing to 'the patriotic fervour and good sense' of the President, Hilarion Daza, and asking him to revoke 'the free-trade law of 1872', which is 'a charter for swindlers and cheats'. But they warned Daza that 'a merchant, who is also a shareholder in the bank, has threatened that, if the state monopoly is restored, it will not be long before the bankers, mineowners and merchants get together and set up a fund to buy off generals and colonels, and thus gain control of the army'. After all, they reminded the President, it was merchants who gave money to Gainzo to buy over General Sucre's bodyguard and spark off the revolution of 18 April 1828. Merchants sent money to the commanding officers of the First battalion at Yamparaez in 1848 so that they would provoke a revolution, resulting in the assassination of General Blanco. Merchants brought Velasco, Belzu, Linares, Melgarejo, etc. to

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

power, 'giving them money, which was then repaid to them threefold through concessions for the collection of customs duties, or for importing merchandise through Arica or Cobija, or through privileges to export silver bullion'. It was understandable that their fears of losing their business, 'which consisted in speculating in the values created by the work of others', were so great that they began to buy off generals and political leaders, to provoke coups d'etat and set up governments subordinate to the economic power of the free-traders. 'The mineowners, bankers and merchants have rifles, as we saw in the last election crisis (May 1876) when they made a display of their modern arms and their skill as marksmen. Furthermore, they have money which is an all-powerful weapon.' But, stated the manifesto, the people of Bolivia were not perturbed by such threats (although the artisans clearly hoped that Daza might be alarmed by them). 'There are only a hundred signatures to the free traders' proclamation and against this minority there are ten thousand artisans and labourers in Sucre who are ready to support the government's decision and put down those who insult the chiefs of the armed forces and the poverty of the people'. If the 'worthy General Daza' organised committees for the protection of public order and armed the master craftsmen who had property and wives and children, then he would have nothing to fear. 'Given that the government rests on the people and that the people are accustomed to defying their oppressors, the peace will not be disturbed.'7 The popular assembly in Sucre was just another incident in the unequal battle between the popular forces and a small handful of wealthy mineowners. The artisans reminded Daza that, since the law of 1872, palaces and huge monuments had been built in Sucre by the mineowners, merchants and bankers. Alongside this grandeur one could see hundreds of old people, women and children coming to the President to beg for 'alms, so that they could buy a bite to eat'. The artisans asked the ministers of state to 'weigh this in the scales of justice. On one side place the horrifying poverty of three million inhabitants who, with anguished cries, beg you to suspend the October law. On the other side place the wealth of the men who wrote the report of 28 July. Then put your hands on your hearts and follow the sentiments God inspired in you.' The truth of the matter was that, while the poor had to bear all kinds of heavy taxes, the mineowners could export their silver without any restrictions and on extremely favourable terms. 'The bread and meat which the poor eat are heavily taxed. Cattle bear a ten per cent tax plus the costs of transport, slaughtering, skinning and curing. A ten per cent tax has to be paid on wheat, in addition to the first-fruits tribute, storage and milling costs and the tax of 40 centavos per fanega which has to be paid to the

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The politics of artisan and mutualist groups

public treasury. And is there any reason why bread must be kneaded with the tears of the poor, while the wealthy mineowners, who exploit millions of mineral veins granted to them by the state, are exempt from paying the veintenas, diezmos quinto and cobos which they paid under Spanish rule and have even been exempted from the tax of half a real per mark which used to be used to finance the Pichincha College?' The mutualist groups

The social content of this Exposicion is impressive, but in general the artisans were not very politically coherent and such organisation as they had tended to come from without. In fact, towards the end of the century efforts were intensified to reorganise the guilds as mutual aid societies. This reorganisation reflected the struggle between the liberal masons and the clericalists for the support and control of the artisan movement. Because they were directed by social forces external to the artisans, these organisations were still unable to express clearly the actual interests of the master craftsmen. Indeed the mutualist nature of the societies has left its mark on the labour movement to this day. For example, in La Paz in 1877 workers and intellectuals cooperated in setting up the Sociedad Fraternal de Artesanos y Obreros. The Gran Logia del Peru was the organising force behind the society and, because of its connections with freemasonry, the Catholic artisans did their best to destroy it and replace it with another organisation more susceptible to the influence of the Jesuits.8 The history of one of the first mutual societies shows how the artisan organisations had become a battlefield in the conflict between the liberals and the clericals. On 24 May 1883 the Sociedad Fraternal de Artesanos de Socorros Mutuos, which was composed of artisans and industrial workers, was reorganised. According to its statutes it was an apolitical but Catholic organisation, but before long it was taken over by the liberals and masons and began to become politically militant. Some of its founding members decided to modify the structure of the society and called a meeting on 30 September 1885. They began by excluding the progressive elements and declaring that the society was essentially a Catholic one, and to emphasise this they changed its name. They adopted the following resolution: 'It has been agreed to reorganise the original Sociedad Fraternal de Artesanos de Socorros Mutuos under the new name of Sociedad Fraternal le Artesanos Obreros de la Cruz, under the patronage of Jesus the Merciful. The present statutes will be maintained until new ones, based on the Catholic faith, are drawn up.' 9 The society came to be known simply as the Obreros de la Cruz.

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

In opposition to the Catholic-controlled organisation the progressives set up the Sociedad de Obreros El Porvenir, but even this was dedicated to Our Lady of Mount Carmel.10 'They then began to attack the brotherhoods controlled by the Jesuits, who publicly accused them of being fearsome socialists. This happened in 1888, when the members of El Porvenir closed their ranks in the battle against Catholic obscurantism.'11 The Sociedad de Obreros El Porvenir was reorganised on 27 May 1900 because its earlier leaders had diverted it from the end laid down in its statutes. With its progressive leadership, this society became extremely important in the labour and socialist movements. Worker-intellectuals such as Jose Benito Rodriquez, Ricardo Perales and Ricardo Aliaga, all members of El Porvenir, founded the first popular university in 1910 with the direct assistance of eminent freemasons, including Nestor Morales Villazon, Norberto Galdo, Humberto Munoz Cornejo, Vicente Mendoza Lopez and other 'distinguished intellectuals of the time'. But the university was not fired by the same revolutionary spirit as the one set up in Peru by Jose Carlos Mariategui and Victor Raul Haya de la Torre. The Sociedad de Obreros El Porvenir also played an important part in setting up the Marxist Centro Obrero de Estudios Sociales in 1914. The mutual societies allowed women to take part in their activities, which was a remarkable step forward. The Sociedad Union Obrera was founded by liberal workers in Potosi on 21 July 1898. The society's main aim was to fight against the repressive conservative government and combat the spread of religious obscurantism. In order to circulate their ideas they started a paper, La Union Obrera. In March 1900 the Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de Artesanos was founded in Oruro. According to a speech made by its secretary, Casiano Salazar, its aim was to combat the influence of the Jesuits. Salazar argued that the formation of the society constituted a great advance in practical terms and that, as the society was founded on a solid basis 'it would be impossible to destroy it, given its impeccable record'.12 The society's first president was the liberal lawyer and journalist, Leon M. Loza. On 1 August 1912 the Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos 25 de Mayo of Potosi sent out a circular to all similar organisations in the country proposing the formation of a national federation. They were sure that such a federation would become one of the most powerful groups in the country: 'The federation will be strong and powerful; it will provide increased employment and it will facilitate the exchange of ideas. In short, it will make for real fraternity.' But they failed to realise that, even if the federation was strong in terms of numbers, it could not become a decisive force in the political and economic processes of the country for the simple reason that the artisan industries were now definitely on the decline.

53

'Socialism' in the provinces

Even so, the mutual societies continued to grow in numbers well into the twentieth century and they produced many of the labour and socialist leaders of the pre-Chaco-war period. Very often the guiding principles of the mutual societies were drawn from the artisan movement, and their language often revealed the close links between them. The majority of the artisans still had not freed themselves from the influence of the Conservatives, and it was only the more advanced sectors of the artisan movement who were Liberals. It was only after the federal revolution of 1898, when the Liberal Party was already in power, that the majority went over to the Liberals. This is confirmed by Jose Valenzuela, a liberal artisan who made a name for himself as one of the first workers to be elected to a municipal council and as a founding member of the Sociedad de Obreros El Porvenir. He complained that the artisans contributed to the stability of four conservative governments between 1884 and 1898, and that it made him very bitter to have to admit to the corruptness of his fellow artisans: 'And what for?' he asked. Tor the money that was scandalously given out in return for votes?'.13

6. 'Socialism' in the provinces Tarija in the 1840s

Juan C. Paz and his son Paulino arrived in Tarija on 4 February 1841 fleeing from the persecution of the despotic government of Rosas in Argentina. 'In Tarija Don Juan Casimiro and his sons dressed their wounds and looked after them until they were healed. They started their lives anew and, as in their home town of Cordoba, they became politically active and continued to set a fruitful example.'1 Politically and intellectually the Pazes were disciples of Esteban Echeverria, an Argentinian who did much to spread the ideas of the European revolutions of 1830 and 1848 to the young intellectuals of Argentina and other Latin American countries.2 It was the Paz family who brought some of these new ideas to remote Bolivia. They came as foreigners and, because of their progressive ideas, they continued to be regarded as foreigners in our backward country.3 Bolivia, and especially Tarija, which is on the frontier with Argentina,

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

became a place of refuge for Rosas' opponents. The future wife of President Belzu arrived in Bolivia with the exiles. At one point Tarija became a garrison for the anti-Rosas forces, and guerrilla bands set out from there to harass the mazorqueros (the supporters of Rosas). We know for certain that many Bolivians took part in these expeditions. Curiously, many people in Tarija became very involved in the party conflicts in Argentina and forgot about the problems of their own country. 'People began to get together in the Paz's house; their numbers increased daily and they were very enthusiastic.'4 As Argentina continued under the strong government of Rosas, bands of men were sent as marauders across the frontier, acting in liaison with the rebels in Jujuy and Salta. Cautiously an armed expedition was prepared which, according to its leader, aimed at 'deposing and executing Iturbe, the Governor of Jujuy, and his ministers and intendant, who, under orders from Rosas, had mercilessly oppressed the people of Jujuy'. The expedition left Tarija on 3 September 1844. It was composed of a hundred armed citizens, organised in military fashion with commanders, officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. Many of them were Bolivians and some of them were well-known, respectable people. This expeditionary force, and others which later set out for north Argentina, were invariably defeated. While in Tarija, Paulino Paz kept in touch with opponents of Rosas, such as Echeverria, Cane, Mitre and Sarmiento, who were wandering all over Latin America. But his political activities were not confined to writing letters. He also introduced the young people of Tarija to the ideas of the Associacion de Mayo, an organisation he had founded in Buenos Aires, and converted them into opponents of Rosas. Their militant, and at times dangerous, opposition to Rosas gave the Tarijehos an escape-route from reality, although at times it was an uncomfortable way of escaping. They only considered Bolivia's problems indirectly and then only to try to generalise the theories of the Argentine thinker, Echeverria, and the experience of the struggle against Rosas. As Paulino Paz used to say: 'We are not interested in this government or that but in the system of which it forms a part.' Using the Associacion de Mayo as their model the Pazes called an open assembly in Tarija to discuss and set up an organisation called the Association of Peoples' Volunteers. The group's basic programme was drawn up by Paulino Paz and was closely based on the ideas put forward by Echeverria in his Dogma SocMista. This took place about 1847. After Belzu came to power in 1848 he reached an agreement with Rosas. The Association of Peoples' Volunteers therefore allied themselves with the anti-belcistas, although they did not develop any open campaign of

55

'Socialism' in the provinces

opposition. When, in the middle of 1852, Belzu visited Tarija, the members of the Association had already equated Belzu with Rosas. They 'considered that Belzu had reduced Bolivia to a state of submission and they feared that the menace of Rosism would never cease to threaten all lovers of liberty'. As an expression of their political opposition to Belzu they refused to attend the festivities held in honour of the president's visit, and their absence was very conspicuous as many notable citizens were in the Association. Belzu now knew what to expect. The government ordered all Argentina exiles to leave the country and, on 15 April 1853, the Association of People's Volunteers was banned from holding meetings. Belzu made it known to Juan Casimiro Paz that 'his presence on Bolivian territory was a threat to public order and that if he did not leave the country in the shortest possible time, he would be arrested and jailed in the general prison and proceedings taken against him'.5 The Pazes were therefore obliged to return to Cordoba, but they returned to Tarija a few years later. These measures spelt the end of this exotic 'socialist' group. The 'Tarija socialists' were fiercely opposed to both popular governments of the time, those of Rosas and Belzu. This in itself is enough to show the mistaken nature of their political position. The Association of Peoples' Volunteers left no profound mark on the Bolivian labour and socialist movements; it just became a historical curiosity. Its outlook was basically that of the Argentine emigres, even though Bolivians took an active part in it. The Association's programme was summarised in the following phrases: 'Unity and strength to combat dictatorships. Solidarity with the exiles in Bolivia. Brotherhood with all men who love freedom.' As we can see, this was strictly a declaration of opposition to Rosas drawn up by a group of people who, by chance, happened to find themselves in a certain town in Bolivia. Only by implication can this statement be made to mean that the Association of Peoples' Volunteers was also fighting against dictatorship in Bolivia. The members of the Association could not have been unaware of the popular nature of the movement headed by Belzu because, from its earliest stages, it was present in Tarija as an artisan movement. On 27 November 1848, when the news of Belzu's victory reached Tarija, the Commander, General Jose Baldivieso, called the workers together and suggested handing over the local government to them, considering that, until then, 'they had suffered ill-treatment at the hands of the rich and respectable people and that now they ought to govern with General Manuel Isidoro Belzu, who was himself an artisan'.6 As a result of this meeting a document was drawn up which seemed to be offering the unconditional support of all the people of Tarija for Belzu's government.

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

The Santa Cruz Egalitarians

In 1876 Andres Ibanez's Egalitarians took over control of the isolated lowland city of Santa Cruz for 160 days and their revolution lasted for six months. This fact alone is enough for us to consider this movement as one of the most important in the nineteenth century and it was undoubtedly a direct forerunner of the Bolivian socialist movement. Andres Ibariez was born in Santa Cruz on 30 November 1844. 'He studied law in Sucre where he qualified as a lawyer at the age of 24 . . . On returning to his home town, Andres Ibanez set himself up as a lawyer, not for the sake of his own personal enrichment, but to defend the poor without charge. His socialist inclinations led him to act on behalf of the unprotected exploited classes, not for his own material benefit, but simply to serve a cause which was stirring his conscience and for which he was already sketching out programmes which would favour the majority of the nation.'7 Ibanez brought his supporters together in a club and they became known as the Egalitarians. The Club de la Igualdad had its own newspaper, ElEco, which began publication in 1873. Ibanez was one of its editors. It carried the heading 'A newspaper of the people and for the people' and it fought some memorable campaigns, sometimes in defence of the club's ideas, sometimes in defence of general interests. The ideas and activities of the club were confined to Santa Cruz where there were other newspapers which fiercely disagreed with the Egalitarians, such as La Voz del Oriente, edited by Antonio Vaca Diez. Soon both its supporters and its opponents identified the club as the spokesman of popular plebian interests and as the leader of the mass of disinherited people. People either defended it heatedly or else they attacked and persecuted it. The Club de la Igualdad had an important and heated polemic with its principal opponent over the candidates for the presidency in the 1876 elections. The opportunity permitted them to clarify their ideas and also to bring to general notice the tactics they were using in their daily battles. The numerical strength of the Egalitarians was beyond question and, for this reason, they were asked to support one candidate after another. Antonio Vaca Diez published an open letter to the Club de la Igualdad in El Cometa, urging them to come out in favour of Jose Maria Santivanez.8 The proposal was discussed in a public meeting and the Club published its reply: no one denied the merits of Jose Maria Santivanez; indeed they were ready to acknowledge them enthusiastically; nevertheless the Club 'decided unanimously, at a meeting of more than 500 of its members, to give their votes to General Hilarion Daza'. The Egalitarians started from the premise that, generally speaking, the country's lot would be the same whether Daza

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'Socialism' in the provinces

or Santivanez became president, and indeed the Club supported the electoral programme of Casimiro Corral and liked many of his radical ideas. Nevertheless they decided to support Daza. This was because they wrongly calculated that, by catching hold of the coat tails of the military leader, they would become an important political force. Instead of remaining loyal to their principles, they preferred to get what benefits they could out of a temporary political alliance. They were soon to learn better, for once Daza seized power (4 May 1876), Ibanez's followers were driven to rebel against the government and Daza retaliated with unparalleled cruelty. Ibariez himself had taken up arms against the government of Frias in early 1875, but had been defeated in a battle at Trompillo in March 1875 and again at Pororos in November. However, he had 'continued to threaten the city of Santa Cruz until the end of May 1876, when he entered the city and gave his support to General Daza'.9 However, at the end of September 1876 the authorities of Santa Cruz gave orders for Andres Ibanez's arrest and they arranged to send him to La Paz for the central government to deal with him. On 1 October the troops who were meant to be escorting him to La Paz rebelled and killed the commander general, Ignacio Romero. It seems that about 8 o'clock at night the city of Santa Cruz garrison mutinied, firing shots into the air and shouting 'Long live the union! Long live Doctor Ibariez! We want our pay! Long live General Daza!'10 They then released Ibariez from jail. He was immediately named prefect of the department by a popular assembly, which was no doubt under the impression that General Daza's government was not going to oppose the step. On hearing the shots, people imagined that Ibariez had been executed and rushed to the main square. When they saw him, the crowd cheered loudly and pledged him their support. On 2 October Ibariez called a public meeting and sent out criers to every street corner to announce it. The meeting was held in the college chapel and a document, which was drawn up 'appointing the political and military authorities and granting them the powers necessary to handle the situation, carried more than 700 signatures'. From a letter of'Protest' signed by several 'honourable' citizens on 1 April 1877 we can get some idea of the meeting's social composition: 'The meeting was composed entirely, with very few exceptions, of men from the popular masses.' The signatories of this letter included many people who at the time swore to give Ibariez their loyal support. We know from articles in El Eventual11 that the artisans mobilised themselves enthusiastically behind their leader. 'Very few respectable people, who numerically speaking are hardly worth taking into account, sided with Ibanez in the rebellion.' The wealthier families left the city

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

immediately, and it is said that this exodus reached such proportions that the artisans were no longer able to find a market for their products and found themselves in desperate straits. The paper emphasises that the supporters of Ibanez were 'idlers, delinquents, people with little respect for the property of others, or else people intimidated into supporting him'. Rashly El Eventual declared that the meeting which named Ibanez prefect was attended only by 'two or three timorous men and the Egalitarians, who gave him the title he had always coveted and then authorised him to pay out money to the mutinied troops'. When, as a result of the revolution, Ibanez became prefect and commander general of the department of Santa Cruz, he raised the federal flag. Federalism was no novelty, nor can it be said that it had exclusively progressive connotations; it was part of the Bolivian political tradition. Many regions attempted to escape from their backwardness and counteract the extreme centralisation of the government by claiming the right to run their own interests for themselves and doing without excessive central direction. Pedro Kramer comments: 'The most serious federal movements in Bolivia took place in Santa Cruz.'12 In declaring themselves federalists, the revolutionaries hoped that the rest of the country would follow their example, but this did not happen. The Egalitarians remained, or perhaps we should say languished, in isolation. In order to maintain themselves in power they had to impose a series of taxes which turned part of the population against them. A movement which deserved to reach the whole nation was doomed to failure in its isolated provincial corner. Many of Ibanez's statements revealed his socialist principles, for example the following passage appeared in his message of 3 October 1876: 'What the people want is equality in matters of property. We shall do our utmost to achieve this and thus present ourselves as worthy of the nation.' The Egalitarians' socialism was certainly not influenced by Marxism, rather by Proudhon and some of the Utopians. Ibanez took upon himself the task of extending the uprising to the provinces of Santa Cruz and he set out for Vallegrande, leaving Mario Fabio, a Paraguayan, behind as commander. According to Molina, Fabio used this power to commit a series of excesses.13 The central government reacted hastily to the daring revolt. It declared a state^ of emergency in Santa Cruz and sent a military mission, under the command of General Carlos de Villegas, to put down the rebellion. On 3 March 1877, on hearing that the government troops had reached Samaipata and that other troops were approaching from the Beni and other provinces, Ibanez left Santa Cruz with a group of supporters who remained loyal to him to the end and set off in the direction of Chiquitos. The group

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'Socialism' in the provinces

consisted of about 300 badly armed, but well led, Egalitarians. The government troops entered the city of Santa Cruz on 28 May 1877 without firing a single shot. Ibanez hoped to be able to start a guerrilla war from the jungle or the unending lowland plains in the hope of later retaking the city. He thought it unlikely that the government troops would be able to catch up with him, given that they were led by people from the Altiplano. No sooner had Ibanez left Santa Cruz than the government, the landowners and the gente decente hastened to classify him as a dangerous communist and urged that he should be put to death. One paper wrote that 'in order to remove the socialist cancer which, starting with Santa Cruz, is beginning to infect Bolivian society' it was necessary to resort to the remedy which had already been applied several times in the country, that is 'to punish anyone who, in the future, publishes Egalitarian ideas or speaks of them in public'. In addition, of course, the caudillo should be pursued and hunted down. President Daza gave instructions that the rebels were to be treated harshly, given a summary trial and sent to the firing squad. According to Kramer 'Ibanez and his companions withdrew towards the Brazilian frontier.'14 Villegas pursued them through the jungle in the hope of finishing them off. He eventually caught up with them at San Diego, and his troops put to death every prisoner that fell into their hands.15 On arriving at the village of Santa Ana in the Mission de Guarayos on 28 April 1877, Villegas' troops arrested and shot Benjamin Urgel because they believed him to be spying for Ibanez. On 30 April they came across Jose Manuel Chavez and immediately shot him because they supposed he had been sent by Ibanez in search of news. The Altiplano troops managed with difficulty to overcome the hazards of the jungle and arrived at San Diego where some of the Egalitarians were captured, 'although the famous Paraguayan, who had tyrannised the peaceful lives of the citizens of Santa Cruz, escaped. Nevertheless, with the capture of the other individuals, they felt that they had satisfactorily accomplished their mission.' They were all executed by firing squad, including the great Ibanez himself. 'At dawn on 1 May 1877 the band headed by Andres Ibanez was surprised and Ibanez and ten of his fellow criminals were captured, as were two of Ibanez's spies and accomplices. All these people were executed immediately after a summary court martial.'16 Thus the Egalitarians were slaughtered by the many units of soldiers sent to pursue them. After Ibanez's tragic death El Eventual declared: 'The inhabitants of Santa Cruz, who felt that their lives and property would not be safe until the communist leader disappeared, can now live in peace.' Thus ended a movement which had real artisan support and which had

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

attempted daring and important social reforms. For example, Barbery, a member of the municipal council, had proposed the creation of a bank to make loans to poor artisans, and that the Commune should start the bank by granting it a sum of 5,000 pesos. Was this the result of Proudhon's influence or of the Junta Central de Artesanos? It hardly matters that El Cometa poured scorn on the matter: 'We read every one of the articles and explained them all, and the measure was approved with a "y e s " from the artisans . .. What a joke!' The Egalitarians proudly headed their papers with their war cry 'Long live equality', but their isolation gave the movement little chance. Furthermore, their socialism was too diffuse and not perhaps representative of most people's wishes. Although their declared aim was federalism, even this could not prosper within the narrow limits of Santa Cruz. The government only needed to mobilise part of the army to put down the rebels. It is hard to explain why Ibariez was unable to defeat the government troops, using guerrilla tactics and his knowledge of the terrain. After the defeat of the movement, it was clear that the landowners were alarmed not so much by the armed uprising, which they soon saw was a lost cause, but by the persistence of Ibariez's ideas. They saw that the danger lay in the fact that the well-organised Egalitarians were capable of winning all the elections. The anti-Ibanez newspapers reminded their readers of the Egalitarians' electoral strength: 'For the last three or four years the municipal councillors and deputies have been elected from the ranks of the Egalitarians. Patriotic men, who make up the sensible part of the population, can no longer ensure the victory of candidates who represent the interests of the country.' Ibanez's supporters were denounced as communists and accused of circulating ideas which threatened the traditional institutions of society: property, the family and the state. EIRegenerador, for example, wrote: 'For some time now part of Santa Cruz society, who call themselves the Egalitarian Party, have been spreading disruptive ideas in the city', and added that it was only the ingenuity of a handful of individuals which resulted in the people being led 'along the twisted paths of their evil designs'. Ricardo Jaimes Freyre

The influence of Ricardo Jaimes Freyre, modernist poet, historian, statesman and victim of criollo politicking, was initially diffused not from a provincial city but from neighbouring Argentina. He was a socialist thinker but not a political activist, and placed Karl Marx alongside Tolstoy as the main

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'Socialism' in the provinces

influences on his thought. He derived his ideology from Argentina, not backward Bolivia, and was carried along by the stream of new ideas which affected so many Latin American intellectuals at the end of the nineteenth century. On 1 April 1897, in Argentina, the first number appeared of the revolutionary socialist newspaper La Montana, directed by Jose Ingenieros and Leopoldo Lugones. 'The following declaration appeared on the first page: "We are socialists because we are fighting for a social system in which all the means of production will be socialised, and production and consumption will be organised freely in accordance with the needs of the collectivity . . . ' 17 Together with the Nicaraguan modernist poet, Ruben Dario, Jaimes Freyre attended the socialist meeting held in the Club Vorwaerts in 1898, at which Lugones, Payro and Dickman spoke. Then in 1898 Daniel Sanchez Bustamente founded the Revista de Bolivia in Sucre. It was to become extremely important in the cultural history of the country. It had a large circulation by Bolivian standards and exercised a profound influence on national literature. The poems of Ricardo Jaimes Freyre and Ruben Dario were published in the review, for the first time in Bolivia. The Revista de Bolivia helped Bolivian literature to break out of the rigid forms of old-fashioned romanticism and develop wider literary horizons. In 1899, Jaimes Freyre aroused great admiration in Latin America with his Castilia Barbara. This outstanding work was not really a specifically Bolivian product, but showed considerable influence from abroad.18 The poet made no secret of his socialist ideas. He once quoted to Calixto Oyuela, Jose Ingeneiros' remark about Bolivia, The country is in the hands of merchants.'19 His socialism was modelled on that of the Socialist party of Ingenieros and Palacios in Argentina; he was a great friend of the socialist from Tucuman, Mario Bravo, and participated actively in election campaigns and in polemics with the clericals. He once taunted a monk with the memorable phrase, 'I have seen a woman give birth on the steps of the Vatican.' Although he did much patient research into colonial history, he never looked deeply into Marxist theory. He was often carried away by idealism, at least the objective idealism so dear to Hegel. 'The state is real', he would say, 'since it exists in the cerebral convolutions of every being.' In 1906 he wrote his fine poem 'Rusia', whose greatness lies not only in its beauty but also in its prophetic tone. Enorme y santa Rusia, la tempestad te llama! Mujik, tu arado hiere; tu voz, mujik, hiere y mata; como la negra tierra los pechos abririas; tineranse en tus manos las hoces de escarlata . ..

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

La hoguera que consuma los restos del pasado saldra de las entranas del pais de la nieve. It might have been better if Jaimes Freyre had written the hymn of redemption of the Bolivian Indian, who was as despised and exploited as the Russian mujik, but unfortunately he was so much under the influence of foreign countries that he never really turned his attention to this aspect of national reality. Despite all his limitations, Jaimes Freyre wrote as a committed socialist, which is the essential point. The modernist poet was won over to Marxist ideas in Argentina; his friends and disciples in Bolivia never got that far. This difference in attitudes can be explained by the difference in the level of political development of the two countries. But when he returned to Bolivia he stopped being an active socialist and joined one of the political groups of the feudal bourgeoisie. Indeed, in 1924 he was spoken of as a probable candidate for the Presidency, and the rumours gained in strength when Juan Manuel Sainz was dropped from the running. Because he accompanied President Saavedra to Lima for the commemoration of the centenary of the battle of Ayacucho, Jaimes Freyre came to be considered as the official candidate. At this time he was Ambassador Extraordinary in the USA and, on the suggestion of his friends in the Republican party, he returned to La Paz to clear up the problem of who was to be the Presidential candidate. In the event, however, he did not discuss the question with his friend, Saavedra. Instead, on his own initiative he renounced his candidacy once and for all, and returned to the USA almost immediately to continue his work as a diplomat. Criollo politics put an end to him both as a poet and as a socialist.

7. The revolution of 1898

Since the time of Belzu a regional conflict between La Paz and Sucre had been developing. Sucre, Bolivia's capital city, symbolised the spirit and ambitions of the Conservative Party, with its close links to the Church and hence to intellectual obscurantism. By contrast, La Paz was the capital of the budding Liberal movement, with its daring ideas and its violent anticlericalism, anxious to extend its economic power into the political realm.

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The Revolution of 1898

The civil war of 1898 has been interpreted simply as a conflict between the North, seen as a region of aggressive men, displaying great initiative and vitality, and the South, seen as an area of aristocratic landowners, who still lived off their memories of the colonial era. But in fact this regional conflict was only the superficial expression of a more profound political and social phenomenon. The debates between La Paz and Sucre over which city should be the capital of the country and the seat of government, and whether the country should have a federal or centralised system of government, were in essence the expression at the ideological level of the clash of economic interests between the upper classes of the two cities. With the development of the mining industry and the construction of railways La Paz had become the commercial centre of the country. Sucre, on the other hand, which had as yet no rail links, remained isolated, with its economic activities limited to agriculture. The fall in the price of silver in the world market and the consequent bankruptcy of the Bolivian mining industry served as the economic background to these events: 'The British capitalists, who were in possession of large sums of gold, imposed the gold standard. Those who favoured silver or bimetallism fought against this, but were unsuccessful. The consequences of this change were felt in all the markets.'1 The collapse of the silvermining industry brought ruin to the economy in general. Pedro Kramer records the collapse of the native industries, and points to commercial treaties and the decline of the mining industry as the causes. National agriculture and manufactures had reached a certain level of growth because the products of the departments of La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and Chuquisaca could obtain good prices in the mining centres of Potosi, Colquechaca, Oruro and Corocoro. But 'the collapse of the mining centres resulted in even greater damage to the country than the civil wars . . . the tocuyo, baize and pottery industries and all agricultural products were affected'.2 Later on, Kramer adds: The mining industry, the most important industry in the nation, is, today, in a state of ruin. Potosi and Corocoro are in decline, and the depressed state of the mining centres has in turn affected commerce and agriculture, and seriously damaged our incipient manufacturing industries. This general recession has not merely affected the economy, but has also had disastrous repercussions on a political and social level; the old civil conflicts have been replaced by the more modern class-based variety.3 It only needed some incident to turn the long silent struggle between the growing commercial centre of La Paz and the pleasant open spaces of

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Mineowners, artisans and Utopian socialists

rural Chuquisaca into an open conflict. The Northern politicians knew what they were after, and deliberately sought a pretext to precipitate a showdown. 'On 14 November 1898, a federal committee was set up in La Paz, comprising six members of each party. They sent a telegram to Sucre suggesting to the Liberal leader in Congress, Don Ismael Montes that the La Paz delegation "introduce a federalist reform in Congress" as a mandate from the sovereign people, not merely as a parliamentary manoeuvre. The telegram arrived at the very moment when the La Paz delegates were putting the proposal for reform to Congress.'4 Congress accepted the reform in principle but the conflict had now reached a climax and the congressional majority went on to confirm Sucre as the national capital. The La Paz representatives of both parties, who had unanimously voted against this measure, walked out of both chambers of Congress. Nobody could doubt that these events signalled the beginning of a revolution. When, on 28 November, the delegates returned to La Paz they were welcomed by exultant crowds, and the Minister of State, Don Macario Pinilla, who had just resigned his post in solidarity with the La Paz delegates, was showered with praise. In view of the gravity of the situation President Alonso issued a decree on 5 December, announcing that he was taking over direct control of the armed forces, in his capacity as Captain General, in order to make the government's presence felt in the northern provinces. He declared that he saw it his duty to sign the law confirming Sucre as the capital of the republic, which had just been approved in Congress, even though he agreed with the critics who said that it was an unfortunate moment to do so. He expressed the hope that from then onwards 'the vehement controversy aroused by the matter would cease'. The threat contained in this statement was quite obvious and did not leave any room for misinterpretation. The leaders of the movement in La Paz could not yet count on the support of the city's commander-inchief, or of the forces under his command. They called another mass meeting on 12 December which was larger than ever and showed that the people of the city were ready to attack the city garrison unarmed if the authorities did not come out in support of their subversive activities - euphemistically described by the rebels as a movement for 'evolutionary reform'. The coup was accomplished. A governing junta of the city was immediately formed, comprising the Prefect, Serapio Reyes Ortiz, the senator for Sucre, Colonel Jose Manuel Pando and Doctor Macario Pinilla.5 The so-called Federal Revolution is another instance where the masses of the population, especially the peasantry and the artisans, intervened

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decisively in a political crisis. The Liberals were able to defeat the Conservative government because they were able to get the support of the colonos from the haciendas, the members of the threatened peasant communities and the impoverished artisans. Of course the masses found some encouragement in the statements of the Liberal politicians, but the political leaders of the movement were very concerned to control and supervise the behaviour of the masses in the war to avoid their getting out of control. Interested accounts take care to avoid discussing these problems but it is usually possible to discover them by reading between the lines. Consider for example the following description: The crowd, headed by members of the Federal Committee and the representatives of the department, started to run through the streets shouting 'Long live Bolivia and the Federation.' The euphoria was impressive, the people were already very difficult to restrain and, blind with impatience, they surged forward towards the city barracks, determined to attack it. But the Prefect hastened to the scene and managed to take control of the situation. The city was saved from the horror of an unrestrained clash between the soldiers and the mob, which might have caused destruction and irreparable damage in the city.6 The working class which was slowly forming in the mines gave its unanimous support to the Liberal General, Pando; the miners of Colquechaca are a notable example of this. The militant stance of the young workers caused great alarm among the opponents of the Liberals. But as far as the peasants were concerned it was not the progressive speeches of their temporary leaders that roused them to action. They were looking for something more tangible and therefore much more frightening: the reconquest of their lands which, throughout history, had been usurped from them under one pretext or another. Whether the federal government in La Paz incited the peasants to revolt or not has been the subject of a heated debate among the Liberals who benefited from the revolution. There is, however, a very frank account of what happened by the eminent Liberal, Bautista Saavedra (President, 1920-4), who writes: The Federal Government Junta gave orders at the very beginning that the Indians of the Altiplano should be persuaded to take up arms against the enemy who were approaching this city (La Paz) and it would be pointless to deny this . . . It is well known that Sr Luis F. Jemio, who was in charge of the vanguard troops, sought help from the Indians in the areas along his route to attack the 'unitary forces', as the enemy army was then called.7 The peasants were sure that they were engaged in a life-and-death struggle and that there was no possibility of reaching an agreement with

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the people who had usurped their lands. Once they had entered the war they sought to annihilate their enemy physically, as for example at Ayo Ayo, where the troops from Chuquisaca were wiped out. The Liberals, on the other hand, were able to reach an agreement with their political enemies, who were members of their own class. A decree issued on 31 October 1899 declared that 'all Bolivians enjoy the rights and guarantees granted by the political constitution of the state, and all people who left the territory of the Republic because of the recent civil war can now return to their homes'.8 However, the peasants were not fighting for the constitution to be respected but rather for their lands to be restored.9 The language the peasant masses used was very different from, and indeed opposed to that of the Liberals. Official spokesmen gave various explanations of the almost spontaneous explosions of patriotism, although they carefully excluded the enormous hunger of the majority of the population for land, as a possible explanation. Instead, they said that people were tired of the previous regime, or that, preoccupied with the need to establish a constitutional order which was something more than a simple fiction, they fought for honest, free elections, and that the confirmation of Sucre as the national capital had inflamed the popular feelings and offended the self-esteem of the people of the north. The role of the exploited classes in the Federal Revolution can be clearly seen from the events which took place at the mining centre of Corocoro in January 1899. On 21 January the Sucre squadron of Alonso's southern army lost their way while out searching for provisions, and ended up camping in the main square of Corocoro. The 'mass of Indians' who were pursuing them stationed themselves on the hill tops surrounding the town. Throughout the night they menaced the squadron. At dawn on the 22nd the host of Indians began to grow, and they were joined by large numbers of miners and workers from the town. Armed with sticks and stones, they all joined in a general attack which began at noon. 'The soldiers defended the entrances to the streets, firing repeatedly and killing 28 of the attackers and wounding many more. At three o'clock the intensity of the attack increased and the squadron was obliged to retreat hastily.'10 The management of the Corocoro mining company were accused of complicity with the southern army for providing them with large quantities of dynamite, gunpowder and weapons. The infuriated crowds, having shown their rejection of Alonso's government, now turned against the company.

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The 23rd January dawned and the Indians were still holding their positions. The soldiers demanded forage, but this was refused them and they could only obtain it by force . . . By 11 o'clock the local magistrate had forced the people to hand over a few sacks of barley. On seeing this, the Indians charged down from the hill tops and set fire to the forage. A section of the armed forces left the main square and opened fire on the Indians who were harassing them. The miners and other townspeople then advanced from the hills and a terrible, unequal battle began. The soldiers of the Sucre squadron were armed with accurate rifles, while the defenders of the great federal cause fought in the open against them with the courage of true patriots, armed only with stones. Later, at 2 a.m. on the night of the 25th, the Junin squadron arrived, saying that they had come to bring aid to the town of Corocoro and asking the townspeople to guarantee their safety. But their real motives were different. Not knowing where the Sucre squadron had disappeared to or how difficult its situation had become, they had really come to find and protect it. The townspeople gathered together and refused to help the commanding officer and instead urged him to surrender. This he refused to do, and, only 29 minutes after his arrival, he began to withdraw from the town, pursued by the Indians and the townspeople.'11 [The Subprefect's report on the events adds that] through administrative and legal proceedings carried out in every canton of the province, the truth about the participation of the Indians and workers of the province of Pacajes in the recent civil war has been established. The Compania Corocoro de Bolivia had infringed the neutrality which the most elementary principles of international law lay down . . . Sr Ole Aandstad, an intelligent and respectable gentleman, set himself against the people of Corocoro, the Indians of Pacajes and all the inhabitants of La Paz. The public's anger became obvious on 15 January, when notices appeared posted on the church doors and the front door of the management's office . . . These posters warned that the Compania Corocoro de Bolivia would be completely destroyed because it had supplied dynamite and gunpowder to Alonso's army.'12 In other cities when the revolutionaries threatened to get out of control, that is to say to attack the interests of the rich Liberal leaders, the armed forces were given the task of maintaining order. For example, in Cochabamba 'the prefect could not exercise his authority because 150 men of the garrison troops refused to obey orders and left the plaza the same night. Anticipating this crisis and the threat it posed to the population of Quillacollo, the authorities managed to take the precautions necessary to

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protect the lives and lands of the people of Cochabamba.'13 It should be noted from this account that the artisans tried to attack the rich in general, including the Liberals. In a report dated 26 September 1899, the Prefect of Oruro wrote that, as a result of the political disturbances which started in La Paz on 12 December and which later spread throughout the republic, the Indian population was in a continual state of unrest, especially in the more densely populated rural areas, and were threatening the basis of public order, 'encouraged by disreputable lawyers with no sense of responsibility, who shamefully exploited the ignorance of this unfortunate race. Consequently the daily excesses... of the Indians made it necessary to send in public forces to protect their victims.'14 This passage refers to city people stirring up the peasantry, but the agitators who went out from the cities to the countryside could hardly have made much impact, because they were so few in number. From the reports of the authorities we know that the regular forces of the revolutionary army were insufficient to pacify the rebellious peasants, and that even after cruel and fierce fighting they were unable to reach the scene of the trouble immediately. 'However, with the aid of the national guard, they managed to placate the unrest temporarily and, following orders from the Prefect of La Paz, they managed to take the majority of the leaders prisoner, and hand them over to civil tribunals for proceedings to be taken against them.'15 Thus more names were added to the long list of peasant martyrs: they had to undergo persecution, prison cells, legal proceedings, and finished up in front of the firing squad. The remark in this report that the national guard could only put down the revolts temporarily shows that rebellion was widespread in the countryside. The following passage points to the objective of the rebellious peasantry, which was simply to seize possession of the haciendas, whether they belonged to Liberals or Conservatives: 'Later, the Indians of Penas in the province of Paria tried to take possession of the haciendas of La Yoroma, Rosario, Manuel J. Rivera, Liberato Tovar and other landowners, and this gave rise to a new conflict which endangered the lives of these landowners as well as those of the townspeople of Huancani and Challapata and the villages around that wild area.'16 According to the writer of this report, the peasants were trying to take over the haciendas by violence and to kill their former owners. The Liberals had only one reply to the peasants in revolt: to turn them back with a hail of gunfire. No one has as yet counted and catalogued the enormous numbers of massacres which took place. The Indians differed from the city artisans in that the upper strata of

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The Revolution of 1898

the artisans had gone over completely to the Liberals, while the peasants were the first to free themselves from the political leadership of the feudal bourgeoisie, and put forward their own programme of action. The artisans joined the Liberal party, formed part of its electoral base and enthusiastically supported the new government which was set up in 1900. The most advanced peasants, on the other hand, dreamed of setting up their own state, and reached the conclusion that they could only rely on their own forces. But in 1899-1900, as in 1781, 17 the rural revolutionaries were defeated because they lacked any revolutionary leadership from the cities. The artisans were on the side of the Liberals, not the peasantry. Although the peasants and artisans had fought together under the leadership of the federal leaders, once the federal forces had triumphed the peasants carried on their own rebellion and came into conflict with the city population. It was in this that the peasants' weakness lay.

Book 3:

Workers and the Liberal Party 1900-20

8. The Liberals and labour Introduction

Of the Latin American republics, Bolivia's working class is one of the most indigenous in its composition. Foreign investment was confined to the mining industry and the railways, hence the demand for manual labour was easily met from within the country. The Bolivian proletariat has always been recruited from two main sources: the peasantry, who live in conditions of extreme poverty and who have progressively been displaced from the best lands, and the impoverished sector of the petty bourgeoisie. This second group, especially the artisans among them, have experienced a process of economic decline which has been much too rapid to be offset by Bolivia's industrial development, and our factories have been insufficient to absorb all the sectors of the population displaced from other economic activities. The growth of industry in the main cities was initially accompanied by the proletarianisation of women and children, so the budding labour organisations added to their programmes demands for special treatment for these sectors of the working class until gradually the number of women and children in mining work was reduced. The rhythm of proletarianisation in Bolivia has been slow compared with other countries, and for this reason it has been unnecessary to resort to immigration as a source of working class recruitment. The dispossessed who cannot find employment in industry live in ever-increasing poverty. The artisans' present standard of living is much worse than that of the proletariat, even though this itself is low. In Argentina, by contrast, the situation is the reverse. 'The industrial proletariat in Argentina was formed basically by waves of European immigrants . . . From the end of the last century until approximately 1930 the growth of the working class was based on European immigrants, mainly Spanish and Italian . . . Many of these workers were highly qualified and they made a decisive contribution in laying the foundations of our national 70

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industry.'1 The immigrant workers brought to Argentina not only their technical ability but also their political ideas. They included many survivors of the Paris Commune and militants of the First International. By contrast, the Bolivian proletariat, which was completely indigenous, started from a very low level as far as its ideological formation was concerned: it had to carry the dead weight of the country's illiteracy and lack of education. This fact is crucial in explaining the painful and distorted process of the formation of class-consciousness in the country. Because of the embryonic state of Bolivian industry, part of the labour force was obliged to emigrate to Chile and Argentina in search of work. These migrants became proletarianised and influenced by Marxist and anarchist ideas, and a high proportion of Bolivia's labour leaders during the first decades of this century were returned migrants. The numbers of Bolivians, especially peasants, who migrated to the Chilean nitrate deposits, were extremely large. A report by the Prefect of Oruro, Eduardo Diez de Medina, mentions the repatriation in 1914 of 8,000 migrants from the north of Chile. 'Now that we have seen the wretched physical and economic conditions in which the migrants return, it is clear that we must avoid the emigration of the lower classes of the population in the future.'2 The newly returned migrants began to organise a series of disturbances, with the result that 'it was necessary recently to send forces to Changolla to protect the lives and property of the inhabitants of the region.'3 As the country could not provide work for such a large number of workers, they soon became completely destitute and charitable organisations had to set up soup kitchens to feed them. Since Bolivia has a mineraldependent economy, unemployment can rapidly reach dramatic proportions. Every time there is a slump in world mineral prices thousands of workers are thrown out on to the streets. On one such occasion the authorities of Oruro reported: 'When, at the end of last year [1914], many mining companies closed down or cut back production, large numbers of workers became unemployed. The authorities, therefore, encouraged the development of cottage textile production in the rural villages, and recently a good quantity of cloth, contracted by the police inspectorate, has been sold to La Paz under very favourable conditions.'4 (The surplus labour force and the annual export of labour continue to be a problem. Thus in the single year 1965, 19,000 men emigrated to Argentina, which is the equivalent of more than half the workers employed in the nationalised mines.) The recent history of the Bolivian labour movement can be divided into two broad periods. In the first period, prior to 1920, the feudal bourgeoisie, represented principally by the Liberal Party, monopolised political power.

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The second period is characterised by the efforts of the working class to win its political independence, organise itself and act in its own class interests. This distinction does not refer to stages which are clearly separable in time and ideology, but rather to the way the labour movement as a whole developed under the pressure of the contradictory tendencies which were continually being generated. The process did not occur at a steady pace; the struggles of the exploited cannot be isolated from the general political situation of the country, and indeed one of the most enduring characteristics of Bolivian labour organisations has been their instability and incoherence. For most of its existence the Bolivian labour movement has consisted not of real trade unions but of mutualist societies, yet, despite this fact, the few contemporary studies of these organisations treat them disparagingly. 'The origins of the long history of the mutual societies are well known, but their development is closely related to the rise and fall of the Liberal Party, which took advantage of the workers' organisations and used the traditional means of encouragement to bring out their members on to the streets on election day.'5 Observations such as this contain a good deal of truth, but they gloss over one point which is very important for the later history of the labour movement, namely that there existed elements within the old mutual societies which sought to convert them into militant organisations, and group all the associations of the regimes into federations. This development was a response to internal necessities rather than to foreign ideologies, which only reached the Bolivian labour movement belatedly and were adopted in a distorted form. The fact that in later years these militant organisations and so-called federations were unable to free themselves entirely from their early mutualist history can be attributed to the incipient state of the country's industrial development, which did not favour the emergence of more specific types of labour organisation. The history of Bolivia's economic development, which is very different from that of the advanced industrial societies, influenced the peculiar way in which the labour organisations developed. The economy has moved forward in jumps, cutting short a series of stages. The labour organisations which arose in other Latin American countries, which were more open to the influence of the developed European countries, have also by-passed a number of the organisational forms which occurred in Europe and have often been regarded as the normal pattern of development. It is fair to say that when Bolivia has copied forms of organisation from other countries, they have taken on a peculiar character of their own. Thus Bolivia's development cannot be categorised according to any a priori schema and our labour organisations display a mixture of

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characteristics corresponding to various stages in the development of capitalism. Bolivia's history is not scarred with wounds incurred in the transition from feudalism to the industrial revolution, and the labour movement has not acquired the long experience of those working classes which have passed through a whole series of different organisational stages. Elsewhere in Latin America the freemasons were a focus of subversive activity, and they often led groups of artisans who had been dismissed from the patron-dominated corporations. In our country, too, it was the freemasons, freethinkers and anti-clericals who were the first to promote the working-class movement and even organised mutual societies. The masonic lodges, which were closely linked to the Liberal Party before the Federal Revolution of 1899—1900, were markedly subversive in character. Thus, for example, in a memorandum of 1885, Zolio Flores, a major figure in Bolivian freemasonry, said: 'Permit me in concluding this report to direct a few words of encouragement to the young men selected to join our ranks, who are called upon to make a social revolution which will assure the future of the country.'6 The economic crisis which resulted from the war of 1879 and the intensification of social conflicts which followed from the penetration of foreign capital after 1885 provided a conjunction of circumstances favourable to the development of mutual societies. We have already seen that the Sociedad de Obreros de la Cruz was organised while the Bolivian people were still suffering the consequences of this economic crisis. Years later the first craft organisation, San Crispin cobblers' society, was formed. It made the first attempt to set up a cooperative, although, of course, it failed and was turned into a mutual-aid society. The society also had the honour of sending the first working-class deputy to parliament. Then in 1902 the Sociedad de Aurigas y Cocheros (drivers and coachmen) was founded. With regard to these organisations it would be artificial to try to differentiate the cooperative stage from the craft stage and separate them in time. Referring to the early days of the labour movement Arturo Segaline writes: 'From 1833, when the first labour organisations were founded, it was artisans who owned their own small workshops and their own tools who predominated in all of them. Industry as such did not exist. In the beginning the organisations were strongly mutualist in orientation. They were founded under the patronage of the saints, with no ideological line whatsoever. They were all strongly influenced by the dominant political currents and their members belonged to the government party.' 7 Later, Segaline notes, some organisations were formed to defend the workers against attacks from the government. We could say that they arose out of the defensive needs of the moment, because peaceful citizens who

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did not support the government or the existing system were liable to be persecuted. On the other hand, as still happens today, members of the government were made honorary members of some labour organisations, and in this way the government began to exert influence in the labour movement. It would be a mistake to think that the mutual societies were always the way they have become known to us since: inflexible bodies concerned exclusively with pooling benefits from their members. They had an era of splendour and combativity which can be judged from the political aggressiveness of their journals. This stage coincided with the Liberal Party's campaign against the conservative oligarchy which led to their seizure of political power. After the Liberal victory of 1898, however, the mutual societies became more rigid, lost their militant character and scaled down their activities to the provision of mutual aid in the most restricted sense of the term. The printers

The formation of the Union Grafica Nacional in La Paz in 1905 was a landmark in the history of the organisation of the working class. From this date onwards the printers became, for a long time, the virtual leaders of the Bolivian labour movement, and the Union Grafica later became the backbone of the oldest workers' federation. The Union Grafica Nacional was based on similar principles to the 'artisan organisations at the time of the French Revolution, which were a mixture between mutual-aid societies and religious brotherhoods and which collaborated with the nascent capitalism of the t i m e s . . . Since the owners of the printing presses could take part in the organisation, one of them was designated president, and before long a manager of one of Patirio's mining companies was named Honorary President.'8 The history of the Union Grafica shows that the early workers' organisations aroused a feeling of solidarity among the exploited, although they were ideologically at the service of capitalism. The Liberal Party approved the organisation of the printers and party militants played an active role in its promotion. However the guild spirit of the leadership was not completely surpassed and, indeed, an artisan-type outlook predominated in the leadership of the unions until very recently. These features of the Union Grafica Nacional corresponded exactly to the level of development of Bolivia's printing industry in the early years of the century, when it consisted of a few small workshops scattered throughout the country. It differed from the present situation in that the industry was not yet concentrated almost

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entirely in La Paz, as it is now, when the La Paz publishers and newspapers can suffocate any initiatives in the printing field that appear in the cities of the interior. The Union Grafica Nacional was organised by the owners of small printing presses and by typographical workers who had already become proprietors or hoped to do so sooner or later. The leadership of the organisation was in the hands of the proprietors, and the workers hardly even had a passive role in it. They were all supporters of the Liberal Party. The labour organisations of the period not only supported the government which had emerged from the Federal Revolution, but were also an important force at the electoral level. As always happens, the printers' leaders included many intellectuals who, in the long run, proved to be able writers. Jose L. Calderon and Luis S. Crespo are notable examples and it is an indication of their importance that they later organised the first Workers' Federation of La Paz. According to its statutes, the main objective of the Union Grafica Nacional was the defence and mutual protection of the printing workers — it could hardly have been otherwise. However, as the number of capitalisttype enterprises increased the wage labour force expanded, and soon the necessity was felt of creating an organisation which would combat the predominance of the employers and overcome the limitations of the artisanal Union Grafica. In 1914 younger members revolted against the narrowlydefined mutualism of the Union Grafica and set up the Centro Tipografico, which in a limited way tried to overcome the guild-type norms of the Union Grafica. According to Alvarez, however, 'although owners of presses were not allowed to be members of the new organisation, it could not rid itself of certain organisational biases. Its programme still put special emphasis on mutual-aid questions. In short, it was a mutualist organisation, with no trace of trade unionism whatsoever.'9 According to a report in the newspaper El Figaro, the workers were extremely dissatisfied with the conduct of the Union Grafica, so a commission was appointed charged with the setting up of the Centro Tipografico, whose ends were to be mutualist and fraternal. The Centro did not last very long as, on 20 February 1916, the Federation de Artes Graficas was founded, incorporating all the printing workers of La Paz. The first point that must be made clear is that after the Federation de Artes Graficas was founded there were still no enterprise-based unions or even union committees. All the activities of the labour organisation were carried out within the federation itself. Secondly, it is not entirely accurate to say, as for example Waldo Alvarez does, that this body 'was the first real trade union organisation in the printing trade'. Rather

16

Workers and the Liberal Party 1900-20

the idea was to set up a protective organisation with a strongly mutualist basis, as the statutes of the federation show: 'Article 1. To announce the foundation in the city of La Paz of the Federation de Artes Graflcas, a craft organisation for mutual aid and protection.'10 The Federation's objectives included the following: (a) To bring together everyone 'of either sex who performs manual labour in the printing industry within the laws of the Republic'. This form of words allowed the owners of workshops, especially small ones, to join, (b) To defend the interests of the printers and secure their moral and material improvement 'using, to this end, all the legitimate means available'. The statement about the moral and material improvement of the members is, as we have seen, common to all the mutual societies and guild-type organisations, which kept a paternalist watch over the training of future masters. Nevertheless, the first part of the article states that the federation would defend the printers, by implication against the power of the employers, (c) To ensure that industrial establishments comply with limitations on the size of the work force, as may be decided by the federation; to regulate the amount of the work which can be reasonably demanded of the worker, and to control the number of apprentices admitted to the workshops.11 The federation took upon itself the task of limiting the number of apprentices in the printing shops with the obvious aim of avoiding competition between workers and also between the future proprietors of presses. At that time the ultimate aim of apprentices was still, in the long run, to become owners of workshops. Another of the statutes seems to have been copied straight from the regulations of the nineteenth century guilds or from the Junta Central de Artesanos: 'To establish a technical training school of graphic arts, to improve working standards and to grant diplomas to first, second and third category workers.' Even protection against unemployment caused by conflicts between workers and employers was regarded as an aspect of mutual protection: 'To assist members in cases when they suspend work in pursuit of just demands; if an employer fails to respect the conditions established by negotiations; or where they lose their work as a result of retirement through old age or disablement, or for such reasons as the federation may deem worthy of attention.' The benefits available to the members included the following: 'Article 38: If a member falls ill, he will receive medical attention and the medicines he needs, and from the day when, in the opinion of a doctor, the illness becomes serious, he will receive one boliviano a day. If, 70 days after falling ill, the illness has, in the opinion of the doctor, become chronic, and providing it has been established that the illness was contracted in the course of his work, he will be paid a lump sum of 30 bolivianos and, for as

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long as his illness lasts, he will receive the necessary medicines and the attention of a doctor.' Similarly, in the case of a work stoppage for reasons beyond members' control, 'such as questions of honour, the closing of a workshop, the reduction of wages or the absence of work, after the first eight days members will receive a sum not exceeding one boliviano per day, until work is found for them or up to a maximum of 30 days'. Like the nineteenth-century guilds, the federation considered that the social security of its members was its own obligation, not that of the state: Any member who incurs injuries in the course of his work will be attended immediately by a delegate from the federation . . . who will administer first aid. Any member who is disabled will have the right to receive financial assistance from the social funds, the amount to be determined by the directorate. Furthermore he will have the right to medicines and medical attention, although without this discouraging him from asking the employer, in whose service he became unfit for work, to give him some financial help towards the treatment of his injuries, in accordance with normal humanitarian principles . . . Any member who is completely disabled or is declared permanently unfit for work by a doctor has the right to receive an annuity of five bolivianos a month from the social fund . . . On the death of a member, the federation will give his family the sum of 200 bolivianos, in cash, for his funeral... In this case all members are obliged to pay one boliviano as a special funeral subscription. Another article of the statutes proposed: 'To maintain close relations of friendship and solidarity with other organisations that pursue identical ends', and further: 'To draw up a timetable of work, with eight hours as the maximum for day work and six to seven hours for night work (for the morning newspapers).' Perhaps the most important aspect of the Federation de Artes Graficas was its recognition of the strike, that is to say direct action, as a legitimate method of struggle. (Conflict with the employers had already led Bolivian workers to resort to unofficial strike action.) Article 12 stated that: 'When a conflict arises between the workers and the employers over questions of work, the federation is empowered, if it considers it necessary, to send a commission of three or more members to conduct investigations as it sees fit in order to clarify the motives of the conflict. Above all, it will attempt to obtain assurances from the leaders that while conciliatory negotiations are in progress no member will stop work.' And Article 15 added: 'In case of a strike, the membership must abide by whatever the General Junta agrees. Once a general or partial strike has been declared, members are

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obliged to respect the resolutions passed by the assembly.' But on the other hand, the federation emphasised the wish to remain within the limits of legality: 'Article 13: When a strike is being prepared, the federation will inform the relevant authorities in writing, outlining briefly the reasons for the strike and naming the employers who are the cause of it.' Another article of the statutes, namely that proposing the establishment of a strike fund, contained an important lesson for the future, even though it was never actually carried out. Whereas the young men in the Centro Tipografico had been defeated by the times and the material conditions, and their efforts had degenerated into undiluted mutualism, the Federation de Artes Graficas paid a different tribute to its age: although it could not free itself entirely from the guild ethos, it did nevertheless begin a significant struggle for economic improvements and developed a spirit of solidarity among the printing workers. The printers founded their own newspapers, which were able to give some cohesion to the scarce cadres of the organisation and which had an important educative function. The first of the federation's newspapers was called Libre Palabra (no doubt a grammatical error, since the correct Spanish would be Palabra Libre - Free Speech), and its first number appeared in La Paz on 17 March 1921 under the directorship of Diego Vasquez H. It carried the following heading: 'Organ of the Federation de Artes Graficas: Studies in sociological science, art and criticism.' It was published in tabloid form and contained six pages of four columns, and the first number announced that it would appear every Monday. From the third number onwards the name underwent a slight modification and it began to be called Palabra Libre. The number which appeared on the first of May contained articles on the international significance of May Day, although it said nothing about its repercussions in Bolivia. The line followed by the federation and its newspapers had nothing to do with Marxism; rather it was a pure expression of reformism. Slowly events began to convert the federation into a kind of opportunistic labour aristocracy and this explains why a young revolutionary opposition, strongly influenced by Marxism, emerged so abruptly within the federation and campaigned to transform it into an organisation with an independent class line, sharply separated from the right-wing politicians. This revolutionary group forced a split in the federation in 1931 and set up the Sindicato Grafico, with the hope of ultimately setting up a national printing workers' union. The new organisation expressed its political line in the following words: 'Our trade unionism is revolutionary and starts from the principle that there are two factors of production, capital and labour, which divide society into two parts, the exploiters and the exploited, giving

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rise to the formation of two distinct classes. We consider it the duty of the printing workers to take up the position which the class struggle demands.'12

The Centro Social de Obreros

Many of the labour organisations of the early twentieth century, including the Centro Social de Obreros, declared in their statutes that they were nonpolitical organisations, but, despite such claims, the workers were invariably organised by the Liberals. The government party virtually controlled their activities and subsidised them financially. The Centro Social de Obreros was formed in La Paz in 1906 on the initiative of the carpenters' and tailors' guilds, with Ezequiel Salvatierra as one of its principal founders. Some of its members were soon elected to municipal councils and others stood as candidates for Congress, as we can see from a curious document written by a carpenter called Jose Valenzuela, in which he asked the artisans to vote for him as Liberal deputy for La Paz. Valenzuela participated in the organisation of the Centro Social de Obreros and he had already served in Congress as a Liberal. Like many others, he had also been active in political street-fighting and had suffered political repression. In his election manifesto Valenzuela argued that, given a broad definition of liberalism, his right as a citizen to be elected to parliament could not be denied: If democracy really exists in our country and consequently every individual who is enrolled in the civil register is eligible and qualified to vote, then I believe that I am completely entitled to put myself before you as a candidate for election as deputy for this city. There are no privileged classes or dominant oligarchies in countries which are fortunate enough to enjoy the customs of democratic government, because it is the nature of democracy to recognise the sovereignty of the people as the driving force of the state.13 Valenzuela's arguments start from a premise of class conflict (which is not a liberal premise) and he maintains that in the class struggle numbers are the predominant factor. He argues, therefore, that it is the numerical power of the majority which has brought about a transformation of the country's legal system, by 'giving the modern constitution an egalitarian spirit'. If it is the power of numbers which triumphs on the battlefield and by its sacrifice makes our national frontiers respected, and if it is the support of the majority which raises certain personalities, whether they are well-intentioned or not, to positions of high public responsibility, then

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the majority, the true sovereign, should also take an active part in the running of the state through its elected representatives. . . In asking you to vote for me as the representative of the ideas and opinions of the artisans in parliament I do not pretend to have all the knowledge necessary for the task; but what I lack in education, I make up for in courage, republican spirit and patriotism and in loyalty to the principles of the ruling party . . . I am the son of artisans and have to struggle to earn my living. I could easily have passed over my responsibilities as a member of the Liberal Party, but I have decided to face them because I realise that, above my personal interests, there is the general interest, the interest of the nation.14 Apart from its electoral role the Centro Social de Obreros brought together all the most progressive groups of artisans. It issued advice on how to run artisan organisations and it was a centre of innovatory ideas. According to Article 4 of its statutes, the aims of the society were, firstly, to extend education throughout the working class by setting up elementary and technical schools, and by organising cultural evenings, public meetings, intellectual gatherings and an annual exhibition of work; and secondly, to establish relations with all the artisan societies and centres in La Paz, the rest of the republic and also abroad, in order to bring about the unity of the working class. It is important to stress these two aims of uniting the working class and solving the problems of workers' organisations. The Centro Social aimed to set up a central organisation of artisan societies, and soon they achieved this objective with the foundation of the Federation Obrera de La Paz. The Centro Social was one of the best organisations of its day and it was the school where many outstanding workers were formed, who were later to become leaders of labour organisations and hold seats in parliament and on the municipal councils. In 1914 a night school was set up with financial assistance from the state to fulfil the Centre's educational plans, and President Montes made a personal donation. Later, however, the school's teachers came to hold important positions as reactionary politicians. The Centro Social de Obreros was located in the building which is now the Paris Cinema and it had a library, a billiard room and other amenities. Perhaps the most important example the society set for the future was its consumers' cooperative which was organised in 1910. It was the first of its kind and had its own well-stocked shop, 'which, as well as providing services for its members, is intended to counteract, as far as it can, unreasonable rises in the prices of basic commodities'.15 The cooperative functioned satisfactorily until the end of 1912, but then it went bankrupt because of

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the unscrupulous dealings of the administrator and treasurer and the collapse of the banking institutions where the reserve funds were deposited. In October 1912 the creditors of the Centre began judicial proceedings for the payment of outstanding rent and the litigation continued until 1923. The Centro never recovered from this painful experience which, combined with internal political disputes, contributed to its collapse in the middle of 1920. The Agustin Aspiazu Society

In 1904, before the printing workers had managed to organise themselves, the Bolivian political scene, which was dominated by the ruling Liberal Party, was surprised by the appearance of the Agustin Aspiazu Society. The Society's members called themselves 'radical socialists' and published a propaganda sheet which was to serve as 'reading matter for the people'. This group is important in the history of the Bolivian labour movement because it was the first intellectual society to call itself socialist and to seek close and direct contact with the most advanced sectors of the working class. To a large extent this society was responsible for making May Day known in Bolivia as the day of the international proletariat and of protest against the injustices of capitalism. The intellectuals of the Agustin Aspiazu Society came to influence the ideas of a considerable number of workingclass leaders of the time. It would be absurd to claim that their publications reached the bulk of the people, but they were read by young artisans who were becoming distrustful of the Liberal Party, and by progressive intellectuals. The society indirectly influenced the Radical Party, which formed in 1910, and broke away from the government in 1913. The second article of the Society's statutes declared that 'it followed the ideals of the learned Latin American, Agustin Aspiazu'.16 Aspiazu was an intellectual who had also participated actively in politics; he could be called a left wing liberal and he had won the confidence of the artisans in their street battles against Melgarejo in the 1860s (see above, p. 47). The society had two aims: firstly, to circulate radical socialist propaganda and secondly, 'to study the Bolivian nation, its population, history, geography and resources'. The Agustin Aspiazu Society was a group of extremely daring, freethinking, anti-clerical young men. They accepted the leadership of 'the international congresses and assemblies of socialists and radicals' but they wished to retain sufficient autonomy to formulate their own programme. The Society aimed to bring together all Bolivia's restless and progressive intellectuals, but it was in practice an organisation which also made contact

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with the advanced sectors of the working class through public meetings, street-corner oratory and the distribution of pamphlets. The most precocious of its members showed signs of having read socialist propaganda and in some of their writings even claimed to support Marxist ideas, but adding that the proposed social transformation should take place within the framework of the law. The inspiration behind the Agustin Aspiazu Society came from the Peruvian radical leader Miguel Lino Urquieta, a perceptive intellectual with a sharp pen.17 He was a progressive man for his time and was open to the influence of the socialist ideas which were arriving from Europe. When he wrote about the problems of Bolivia or his own country in his stinging ironical tone he gave an impression of gloomy scepticism, but in fact this was not his attitude. All his hopes lay in socialism which he regarded as a system in which 'the social classes will be free to realise their egalitarian and libertarian aspirations'. What most impressed Urquieta was the enormous mass of the indigenous population, which seemed to him at that moment like 'a great mountain of granite which will block the stream of human progress for many years to come'.18 After a scholarly review of the past, he declared that the peasants of Bolivia and Peru lived in worse conditions than the pariahs of India, the wretched helots of Sparta, the slaves of Rome and the serfs of the Middle Ages. Their conditions were worse because their exploiters did not even recognise the peasantry's 'need to feed itself and obliged them 'to provide everything for the masters of the estate, the community, the farm, the province and the state. These masters are all bloodsuckers aided by the priests, black vampires whose mystical incantations are designed to reduce the peasants to an animal level of insensibility so that they no longer feel the sapping of their life blood.' According to Urquieta, the existence of exploitation and inequality is not enough to give rise to a demand for change; it is necessary to develop people's awareness of this calamitous state of affairs so that they struggle to overcome it. Only then can there be a socialist struggle. He added: There is some truth in the idea that socialism is the protest of empty stomachs against full bellies but it is not the whole truth. In addition to the material question of hunger and how to overcome it, there stands out another all-important question — the question of human dignity. For the more strenuously man struggles to enjoy his natural rights, the more he realises the true value of these rights and the more pitiful he finds those who have lost them. The first obligation which the intelligentsia of these two countries

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[Peru and Bolivia] need to recognise is social and human rather than national: it is the redemption and regeneration of the Indian. This cannot be done by waiting for him to reach the average level of our societies through his own isolated evolutionary process; such levelling was never possible. Rather we ourselves must pause in the progressive path along which we are obviously moving, stop to call him to us . . . He concluded with the ringing denunciation that: 'It can be said without exaggeration that of every three Bolivian and Peruvian fortunes, at least two are not really hoarded in the form of gold or silver but of drops of Indian blood minted into coin.'19 Tomas Monje Gutierrez, then a vigorous young man, was the leading activist and visible head of the society. His ideology as director of the society is contained in an article, 'Nuestra Lucha', written in 1907. Despite his protests to the contrary, we can see that he was not a dialectical materialist but a rationalist intellectual, a freethinker and a fanatical anti-clerical: The present process of economic development goes beyond the limits set by Nature and is converting the struggle for life into the struggle for capital; through saving, which is synonymous with avarice, capitalism exploits mankind, depriving humanity of one of its most inherent rights, namely the right to gain a livelihood by working the land . . . Once we are convinced that this is true and that this distorted evolutionary process under the form of capitalism oppresses humanity, then our efforts must be directed to the eradication of economic privilege (the bourgeoisie) and the disastrous social consequences it produces.20 In the next sentence he maintains that his thesis is nothing less than the application of scientific socialism, which opens the way to the 'struggle for equality', whose triumph 'will not be accompanied by oppression and will not be imposed by compulsion'. This equality would be the basis of 'a universal Humanitarian Republic'. He saw the fulfilment of these objectives as a task which would take several centuries: I well understand that the introduction of such an altruistic doctrine will take many centuries, as the best thinkers have already foreseen, because an essentially egoistical environment cannot consent to a system so antagonistic to its general manner of being . . . In the meantime we must undertake active propaganda campaigns in favour of the eventual transformation. In another article in the same journal Tomas Monje Gutierrez expressed his rabid anti-clericalism, a common trait of the freethinkers, anarchists and socialists of the time. He portrayed the free man as the antithesis of the man deformed by religion. 'Do you not understand that, through the

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power of reason, religions and all the dogmas that embellish them disappear? Can you conceive of a free man who would accept the tyranny of doctrines which enslave him?' In another article C. Cabrera wrote the following description of the sad situation of the proletariat: 'It is said that there is no proletariat in Bolivia, but without going much further we can ask: what of the forced labour of more than ten hours a day in the mines? What of the exploitation, and even enslavement, of the unfortunate rubber-tappers? What of the outcasts on the Altiplano, whose rights are totally denied and who are reduced to the degrading and wretched state of beasts of burden for the landlord and the priest?' He replied to the argument that socialism was impossible to achieve with a quotation from Merlino: 'You say that socialism is impossible? Impossible after the French Revolution and the scientific work of a whole century? It was Utopia but it has become science. Today it is the demand of the people, tomorrow it will be reality.'21 The young intellectuals of the society were concerned by persistent propaganda from the right to the effect that there was no exploitation in Bolivia and that there was not even any social question to worry about. Ezequiel Calderon gave a surprising answer to this line of thought, arguing that Bolivians had to become socialists in order to avoid suffering the disastrous consequences of capitalism in the future: Tomorrow railway lines will cross our country. Immigrants will fill the cities and then spread out to the countryside, and the supply of labour will exceed the demand. New industries will be created and, together with the existing ones, they will expand and the workers will be ousted by machines. Small capital will be absorbed by large capital. The workshops of our workers will have to close and small industry will disappear . . . Then the struggle for life will become harder and more cruel. .. Only by becoming socialists now can we avoid the bloody ordeal endured by modern societies . . . Do you want to live like people in other countries — in a continual state of disorder, with no peace in your homes, constantly pursued — when by becoming socialists now we can harmonise labour and capital? Then let us be socialists.22 Alcides Arguedas also wrote something for the Society: 'You want the improvement of the masses? Then do not submit them to obligations which they are not yet ready to appreciate. Above all do not tell them they are great, when in reality they are still in a state of somnolence. First you must raise them up from their degradation. To do otherwise would be wicked.'23 This observation seems to have been carefully considered and it already expresses the outlook which the author was to make famous in his book Pueblo Enfermo, published in 1909.

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9. The decline of working-class Liberalism

By the First World War the Liberal Party was losing its influence over the nascent Bolivian labour movement. This chapter seeks to trace the process by which the moderate Federacion Obrera de La Paz was replaced by the more radical Federacion Obrera Internacional, and to show some of the tensions contributing to the formation of a separate working-class identity. We begin with the foundation of the Federacion Obrera de La Paz. The Federacion Obrera de La Paz (or the Federacion Obrera Boliviana as it was sometimes called) grew out of a meeting held on 5 April 1908, attended by the presidents of the various artisan organisations. At the meeting it was decided to set up a Junta Central de Artesanos and the provisional organising committee was instructed to arrange for all the guilds in La Paz to send delegates. The statutes of the Federation show that it was, beyond doubt, an attempt to revive the Junta Central de Artesanos of 1860. Nevertheless, its sponsors had to make concessions to the changed situation and they began by adopting a different name for the organisation. Once it was established, the Junta was renamed the Federacion Obrera de La Paz and its constitution was approved on 10 November 1910. It was strictly a mutualist organisation and, as W.A. Alvarez puts it, 'It did nothing more than carry out the instructions of its party (the Liberals).'1 It therefore met with immediate resistance from the young members of the Centro Social de Obreros. The formation of the Federacion Obrera was the Liberal government's culminating achievement in the field of labour organisation. Its objectives were laid down as follows: (1) To bring together all artisans and protect and provide them with brotherly help in the many ups and downs of life. (2) To exercise a direct influence on the intellectual, moral and material development of the artisan population. (3) To secure the foundation of an arts and trades school which will provide special education suitable for the working class [ . . . ] (6) To improve the working conditions of the labouring classes in all possible fields, using all legal means [. . . ] (9) To promote the establishment of a workers' bank for the labouring classes. (10) To organise and preside over an annual workers' festival on the first of May.2 The stated aims and objectives of the Federacion Obrera make it sound

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like a medieval guild: 'To exercise supreme power of direction, inspection and control over all guilds and every individual artisan; this power only to be exercised on matters of common concern . . . To promote improved guild organisation through central influence and intervention, to ensure that all artisans respect order, duty and work. To this end the Federacion Obrera will revise the existing regulations of guilds, where these are available, and will draw up regulations for those guilds which are not yet properly organised.'3 The Federation adopted the standard presented to it by the then Prefect of La Paz, Fermin Prudencio, and adopted as its emblem the medallion donated by the well-known Liberal leader, Claudio Pinilla. Its honorary presidents were selected from the most prominent Liberal leaders of the time. Thus, Fernando Guachalla, the presidential candidate, was the honorary president in 1908, as was Ismael Montes in 1909, Claudio Pinilla in 1911 and Juan Maria Zalles in 1912. The Federation produced its own newspaper, El Trabajo, which was the first twentieth-century workers' newspaper in Bolivia. It also expanded its activities in the field of workers' education. But like many other organisations, it gradually shifted its attentions to producing and promoting candidates for municipal and congressional elections. As an unconditional supporter of the ruling party, the Federacion Obrera became less and less militant and gradually lost contact with the most advanced sectors of the working class. Those workers, who rejected the servile outlook of the Liberal artisans began to organise a new federation, under the influence of dissident politicians centred at this time in the Radical Party. In August 1911 there was a public clash between members of the decrepit Federacion Obrera de La Paz and those of the incipient new federation, the Federacion Obrera Internacional (FOI). The Federacion Obrera de La Paz had invited all 'its affiliated societies to organise and participate in a popular celebration'. The government provided a subsidy for this, as for previous social gatherings, which might distract the poor's attention from their grievances, and the prefecture had set up a large marquee with a placard over the entrance bearing the name of the Federation in large letters. As soon as the festivities began, members of the FOI, who had earlier taken up positions round the site, began to bombard the Liberals with stones, forcing everyone to flee. A circular letter dated 14 March 1913 shows that by this time the Federacion Obrera de La Paz felt the need to make great efforts to restore enthusiasm among its members and Wen to persuade representatives of the various guilds to attend its assemblies. The FOI by now was very active and had won the support of large sectors of workers. It is significant that, after five

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years of an almost uneventful existence, the orthodox Liberal federation found itself obliged to circulate its members to remind them of its objectives. In the last years of its existence its activities were reduced to little more than the occasional social event. It is true that in El Figaro of 4 May 1914 we find the following comment: 'Labour Day was celebrated with enthusiasm . . . The workers showed their level of education by their display of literary, biographical and charitable performances . . . We congratulate the working class in the executive committees of the Sociedad Internacional de Obreros and the Federacion Obrera.' However, the following year Guillermo Penaranda published a caustic attack on the Federacion Obrera de La Paz: With the approach of May Day the decrepit Federacion Obrera has sent out circulars convening a meeting to renew its executive. I am convinced that the Federacion Obrera only shows signs of life for 30 days before the first of May and then only so that a handful of workers, who form a minority in the guilds, can take on themselves the appointment of delegates, as has happened on most occasions in the past . . . A workers' federation is supposed to be the organised leadership of the class it represents. So, if it lacks the support and sympathy of the majority of the workers, then it has become redundant and the correct course is to form a new one which takes into account the causes of present discontent.4 At this stage it may be helpful to look at the careers of some of those people who played an active part in the labour movement during the Liberal period. The following are thumbnail sketches of four fairly representative figures, presented in order of increasing radicalism. Jose L. Calderon

Jose L. Calderon was active in the labour movement for several decades. He was a typical product of the artisan workshop and the mutual societies. He started his working life as a typesetter and finished up as the owner of an important printing firm. Since he was a printing worker, he was one of the artisans' most progressive and educated leaders. The printing workers became powerful in the labour movement, not because of their numbers but because they were in daily contact with the world of ideas. Calderon was born in La Paz in 1861 and was a progressive man for his times, though he did not for one moment agree with the theories of socialism. His views were those of an honest liberal who lived in daily contact with the underprivileged. Since childhood he had been familiar with the harsh realities of poverty.

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He attended the Seminary College and left after obtaining his bachillerato. Eager for further education, he enrolled in the law faculty, meanwhile earning his living by working as a printer, where he came into close contact with the workers and came to identify with the working people . . . It was then that he began to turn his thoughts to politics.5 Jose Calderon was typical of the artisan leaders of the day who made enormous efforts to get through university. Once he had become the owner of the printing firm Editorial de la Prensa, he founded two newspapers, El Telegrafo and El Liberal, to propagate his ideas to the people. He was first elected deputy for the Liberal Party in 1910 and later President Montes sponsored him as a candidate to oppose Bautista Saavedra, who had recently returned from Europe. In a manifesto published on 27 April 1910 Calderon has left us a succinct summary of his ideas on social questions: I am and always have been an orthodox liberal... I have defended the integrity of our territories and social justice . . . Through my practical example I have promoted these ideals, especially among the working class who are the main factor in the country's wealth . . . With the construction of the railways and the establishment of repair shops and steam-powered plants, legislation on industrial accidents has become indispensable.6 First and foremost an artisan and only secondly a Liberal, Calderon came out in favour of protection to shelter precarious national industries and avert the danger of unemployment. It is a constitutional duty to protect our national industries. Unfortunately we are witnessing their stagnation if not their definitive collapse, as a result of foreign competition which is often favoured by the same governments who levy heavy taxes on domestic products, with the result that there is very high unemployment, and capital is leaving the country never to return again in any form whatsoever. In this way the country is being converted into a mere consumer. In Congress Calderon was a pioneer social reformer. In 1911 he introduced proposals for social legislation and he was one of the first deputies to argue that workers' rights should be codified in law. He was the founder of the Union Grafica Nacional and of the first Federacion Obrera. As the President of the latter he earned the praise of a contemporary observer: 'A short time ago, in this city, the Federacion Obrera was formed, composed of all the guild societies. Under the intelligent leadership of its president, Sr Jose L. Calderon, it is pursuing highly useful and honourable ends.'7 At the end of his career Calderon was elected to the municipal council in 1918, where, in collaboration with David Landa, a young jewellery worker,

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he put forward proposals for the creation of a social club and a consumers' cooperative society to retail basic necessities.

Ezequiel Salvatierra Yaiiez

Ezequiel Salvatierra was born in La Paz in 1886. Like many other labour leaders, he spent some time at the seminary school and he received his secondary education at the Don Bosco College, where he specialised in carpentry and cabinet-making. He was the first person to qualify as a master carpenter at the early age of 16. In 1904 he won a scholarship to study at the Escuela Profesional in Santiago, Chile, and on his return to Bolivia in 1905 he opened his own workshop as a cabinet-maket. Some of his works were sent to an exhibition in Turin, where they received an honourable mention. 'In 1906, together with other prominent artisans and workers in La Paz, he founded the Centro Social de Obreros and has devoted almost all his energy to this organisation ever since.'8 Salvatierra was also one of the founders of the Federacion Obrera Internacional and in 1912 he became the director of its newspaper, Defensa Obrera, in which he put forward his advanced views on trade unionism. With other members of the FOI he helped to set up the first Partido Socialista, which was a workers' party with a working-class line. In the elections they won two seats on the municipal council and one in the Chamber of Deputies. During 1916 and 1917 he was harrassed by the authorities and obliged to live in the copper-mining town of Corocoro, under the close vigilance of the authorities. There he immediately made contact with the town's very active mining union and took part in a strike on 23 December 1918 for the eight-hour day and for free medical attention. On his return to La Paz in 1918 he was present at the reorganisation of the FOI when it was renamed the Federacion Obrera de Trabajo (FOT). In the same year, together with others in his trade, he founded the Sociedad Gremial de Ebanistas y Carpinteros. He has been the brains of this organisation ever since and has served as its president more than 12 times.9

Romulo Chumacero Sandoval

Romulo Chumacero Sandoval was born in Sucre in 1882.10 The son of a poor family, he obtained his only formal education in the municipal primary school and was apprenticed to a tailor at a very early age. He lived for 40 years in the city of Potosi, where the greater part of his political

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activities took place. He began as an anarcho-syndicalist, but soon turned towards Marxism and he defined himself as a Marxist-Leninist. In 1913 he joined a group of progressive intellectuals and workers who founded the Defensa del Trabajador, whose line was clearly Marxist, though events showed that at this stage Chumacero's Marxism was still heavily influenced by anarchism. In his own words, 'the aim of the society was to work for the working class through a socialist, Marxist-Leninist organisation'. There is no doubt that this was one of the first Marxist organisations in the country, with a clearly defined ideological line. In spite of this, Romulo Chumacero never became a member of any political party. In about 1914 the telegraph workers in Potosi went on strike, but the strike failed because 'the guild members lacked social consciousness and, as they were not properly organised, they sold out to the government. After analysing the reasons for the failure of the strike, Defensa del Trabajador contacted the various labour organisations in the country with a view to forming a federation and organising a congress, from which, they hoped, a party composed entirely of workers would emerge.' But the Montes government ferreted out the revolutionaries, arguing that they were promoting political disorders 'which have nothing to do with the workers'. In Potosi Chumacero started a newspaper called El Socialista, but only a few numbers appeared since it was distributed free and soon ran into economic difficulties. As for ideological influences from outside the country, Chumacero remembered receiving the review Juventud and another left wing newsheet from Chile, which was then 'the centre of rebellion in Latin America', as well as propaganda from Argentina. In Sucre he was president of the Federation Obrera for a year and it was there that he began to talk about the internationalism of the working class. In the early 1920s he set up the Ferrer school of social studies, and in giving the school this name the Bolivian revolutionaries paid a moving tribute to the legendary figure of Francisco Ferrer y Guardia, 'the apostle of Spanish anarchism'. Chumacero was president of both the second and third national workers' congresses, and his presence and ideas contributed to the radicalisation of the resolutions adopted. He also attended the socialist convention in Oruro in December 1921, where it was agreed to promote the formation of branches of the Partido Socialista in every district of the country. In his Testamento Chumacero showed that he had a fairly well-developed idea of what a working-class party should be: 'In my opinion the Partido Socialista of Bolivia should be a class party. Opportunists and traffickers in socialism should not be allowed to join, because if they do, the masses will lose confidence in the party. Nor should the party agree to any kinds of

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political deals.'11 Romulo Chumacero died in Sucre in 1966. The case of Chumacero shows how radical ideas were beginning to filter into Bolivia in the early years of the century, at first reaching only very few scattered working class leaders. Another significant influence was the contact which was being established between the university students and the artisans. The First Student Congress

Although it is usually maintained that the first national student congress was held in Cochabamba in 1928, in fact the Centro Universitario de Potosi convened a gathering of delegates from all the universities in the country as early as July 1908. The items on the agenda included a discussion of the ways in which popular education could be effectively extended, especially to the 'indigenous class'. At this time the municipalities ran schools for artisan children, and the students argued that 'all children of artisans should be required to attend school. . . and fathers who fail to register their sons should be liable to severe penalties'.12 To reinforce this they proposed that masters of workshops and anyone engaged in manual work should be forbidden to employ either children under the age of eleven or children over this age who could not show that they had completed six years of primary education. With these proposals the students were simply trying to get the old guild regulations implemented. They continued to regard education as the responsibility of the parents and not of the state. The most progressive students proposed the setting up of night schools for artisans. In fact this was not a novelty; the education of the poor had long been a preoccupation of social reformers. Benjamin Fernandez, a positivist, had been a forerunner in this field. In 1885 he 'undertook the noble task of instructing the working class' but his efforts were wrecked by opposition from the clergy. In 1903 the Pastor Sainz workers' night school was set up in Sucre, named, paradoxically, after one of the owners of the Colquechaca mine. At the Potosi meeting Avila, one of the Sucre delegates, carried on this tradition, calling for contributions from the rich to rescue the masses from ignorance: 'Since the government has insufficient funds to pay teachers for the workers, the wealthy classes should take over this role from the government and found institutes for working class education.'13 Avila reported that in Sucre the students had already organised a sort of cultural extension service which, to some extent, enabled the students to reach the artisans: 'The scientific groups in Sucre have already done this and are enthusiastically organising lectures on scientific topics. The Centro de Estudios Medi-

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cos, the Centro Cientifico Universitario and the Liga Cientifica Universitaria all give frequent public lectures attended by large audiences of artisans.'14 Anze, a delegate from Cochabamba, made a passionate speech in defence of the Indian sector of the population. (This was a topic which was to be discussed without fail at every subsequent student congress.) 'By educating the Indian', he said, 'the Bolivian people can achieve great progress.. . We all know that in Bolivia there is an oppressed race, victimised by the impositions of an exploiting class who have the insolence to portray the indigenous race as uneducable.'15 The congress passed a motion proposing that 'societies for the protection of the indigenous class' should be set up, composed of local councillors and delegates from the Consejo Superior de Instruccion. These societies would appoint travelling teachers to visit every place with over 50 inhabitants. The students proposed that landowners should be required to send their colonos to the nearest school, facing penalties laid down by the Society if they failed to do so, and that these Societies should form temperance leagues and provide instruction in hygiene for the benefit of the Indians. The decline of the Liberals

Having considered some of the new influences that were being felt by sectors of the working class, it is time to turn our attention to the Liberals, to see why their popular appeal was weakening. Initially, after the social upheavals of the last years of the nineteenth century, the arrival in power of the Liberal Party had given grounds for hope. But soon after the Liberal victory the basis was laid for the future split in the Party, when a dispute about the budget accentuated the differences between the followers of the rival revolutionary leaders, Pando and Montes. Later in 1912 the foundation of the Ateneo Boliviano was a landmark in the disintegration of the Liberal Party. Salamanca, Saavedra, Sanchez Bustamente, and Tamayo among others broke away from the main body of the Party, and through their debates and literary activities in the Ateneo sought a new theoretical position reflecting their desire for progress and their defence of orthodox liberalism. The so-called 'Radical Generation' was made up of progressive young liberals. They were a kind of liberal left who hoped that through their criticisms the ruling Liberal Party could be persuaded to rectify its errors. The history of the Partido Radical is, above all, the history of the news-

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paper campaigns inspired by Franz Tamayo. In 1913 the workers engaged in bitter opposition to the Liberal Federation Obrera de La Paz joined up with these young Radical politicians in rebellion against Montes and his followers. This alliance resulted in the formation of the Liga Obrera Radical, inspired by Franz Tamayo and Tomas Manuel Elio. In the election campaign of April 1916 El Figaro reported: 'Since the Radical Party proposed Elio and Tamayo as its candidates, they have received widespread, indeed unanimous, support from the working class. Workers of all political colours have met the candidates and promised their disinterested and spontaneous support for them as the true defenders of the people.' (13 April) The Radicals were persistent in their efforts to portray themselves as the defenders of the workers. The El Figaro editorial of 19 April commented: The Radical deputies opposed the introduction of a new tax on wages and salaries, arguing that such taxes were a levy on labour and that in a country like ours, where wages and salaries do not rise in relation to the cost of living, where labour is not organised and does not have sufficient guarantees, the proposal of such a tax should be rejected outright.' One of the main founders of the Partido Radical was Franz Tamayo, who originally entered parliament as a Liberal and who, in his early parliamentary speeches, stood out as a defender of the Liberal programme. Even at its peak the Partido Radical was never a major electoral force in the country. Indeed Tamayo alone was the Partido Radical. Lacking a strong popular base, political imagination and prominent personalities, the Partido Radical was incapable of really threatening Liberal predominance; the aggressive personality of Tamayo was the Party's only asset. From our point of view the most important thing is that the Partido Radical was the first to set up an organisation with working class characteristics — the Liga Radical Obrera — and it was also the party most influenced by the socialist ideas then penetrating the country. In 1920 Felipe Guzman claimed that 'the Partido Radical bears a resemblance to the socialist movement, sharing ideas aimed at protecting labour and defending it against the tyranny of capitalism. Radicalism calls upon the labouring and proletarian classes of the Republic to raise high their banners and march forward together to economic liberty and the reign of social justice.'16 The Partido Radical was thwarted by its internal contradictions. On the one hand it merely sought to extend the work of the Liberal Party, but for this purpose the Republicans proved more suitable. On the other hand, it also depended on the workers' organisations for support, and to some extent adopted reformist-socialist ideas, thus provoking great alarm among

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the feudal bourgeoisie, but without ever expressing enough conviction to fire the workers. These vacillations contributed to the eventual disappearance of the Partido Radical. In their search for political ways of improving their socio-economic situation the workers turned not only to the Radicals but also, in some cases, to the new Republican groups which had also broken away from the Liberal Party. The Republicans proposed honest elections, and, in order to win working-class support, their programmes also included promises of social legislation. These opposition Liberals tried to disguise themselves with popular trimmings. Under the influence of that eminent, but stubborn, politician Daniel Salamanca, the Union Republicana drew up the following programme at its inaugural convention: an end to corrupt elections; the restoration to parliament of its dignity and independence; education of the people for democracy; a balanced budget; a revised tax system and a revised constitution to restrict the powers of the executive, in particular concerning the state of siege; the introduction of habeas corpus; guarantees to ensure the complete independence of the judiciary; encouragement of working-class organisation; laws regulating wages, the length of the working day and industrial accidents and laws for the protection of children.17 It is easy to see that the republicans were merely repeating the general themes of Liberalism, which dated back to General Camacho's programme of December 1885. Even so the Republican groups, especially the followers of Bautista Saavedra, encouraged the political participation of the middle classes in order to challenge the Liberal Party, which had become rather oligarchic as a result of the economic advantages it had obtained in power. Although returning to Camacho's programme, the Republicans could not ignore the pressing needs of the workers, since they now constituted an important electoral force. The elections of 3 May 1914 were one of the factors which precipitated the formation of the Uni6n Republicana, which established itself as a 'political party, destined to defend truly liberal principles, the institutions of the nation, the public interest and the constitution of the state, against a man [Montes] who has ruled in an authoritarian manner and wishes to continue doing so, regardless of the limitations imposed by the law.'18 The Union Republicana summoned all its leaders to a meeting in La Paz on 10 August 1914, but extraordinary (although not altogether unexpected) repressive measures were put into force to prevent the meeting from taking place. On 8 August a state of siege was declared throughout the republic because, the government argued, the war in Europe was producing imbalance in the economy and causing unemployment and poverty. But in

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fact the real motive lay in the secondary reasons put forward by the government: The fundamental basis for the rule of law and for social peace is the general acceptance of constitutional legality. But these principles are, at this very moment, being threatened by the subversive propaganda of various political groups, who have made no secret of their intention to attack the stability of public institutions. Thus a state of unrest has been created throughout the country, justifying resort to article 26 of the Constitution.' On the afternoon of 8 August, when the Republican delegates were already in La Paz, the police raided the printers where independent and opposition newspapers, such as La Verdad, La Republica, La Action, El Diario and El Detective, were published, 'drove out the journalists and printing workers, locked and bolted the doors of the offices and, in short, ruthlessly crushed the freedom of the press'. On 10 August the Republican delegates, who were by now awaiting exile in various La Paz prisons, circulated a document which was to be important for the future of the Republican parties, in which Daniel Salamanca was appointed party leader and authorised to draw up the party's definitive programme, which has been outlined above. Montes was accused of returning the country to the era of military caudillos. Thus, the Republicans never for a moment queried the basic principles of Liberalism; indeed, they did their utmost to defend them (at least so long as they were in opposition) and to insist on them with an exaggerated kind of puritanism. Therefore, especially in the early period, they resolutely defended the free play of market forces in industry and commerce, bitterly criticising all attempts at state intervention and denouncing every state monopoly. When the Radicals and Republicans broke away from the Liberal Party they naturally attacked those organisations, such as the Federation Obrera de La Paz, which were identified with the government. They therefore supported the rival body, the FOI. The FOI

In an article written in 1913 Ezequiel Salvatierra maintains that the Federacion Obrera Internacional was founded on 23 May 1912.19 El Boletin de la Defensa Obrera reports that 'at the last minute' the FOI decided to take part in the civic parade on 16 July 1912 and, after inviting 'working people' to take part in the procession, concluded: 'All members of the working class, without regard to age and nationality, should rally behind the banner of the FOI and thus pay tribute to the first martyrs of Independence. The workers should not be indifferent to showing their patriotism. All come to the parade and swell the ranks of the FOI!'20

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Moises Alvarez writes: In 1912 the FOI was organised to bring together a few guilds which were in opposition to the old Federacion Obrera de La Paz, discredited by now as a conservative organisation serving the interest of the Liberals. The leaders of the FOI were obviously aware of the ideas and social doctrines which had been taken up by the proletariat in Europe and, following the example of the first international workers' congress in London, they adopted the red flag with a black stripe. There was no clearly defined socialist or syndicalist doctrine in the FOI, only a sincere and honest desire for reform plus a certain degree of class consciousness.21 Arturo Segaline tries to identify an anarchist line in the FOI: 'At this time, when the workers began to come under the influence of pseudoanarchist literature, some sectors began to organise themselves and form labour associations, leading eventually to the formation of the FOI.' 22 It would be misleading to label the FOI as a member of any particular socialist school. The fact it adopted the red and black flag should not be interpreted as proof of its ideological position; this merely showed that foreign influences were in the air. The FOI was in fact a very open organisation where a variety of different progressive groups coexisted and ideological differences were not of primary importance. The young artisans were, at one and the same time, open to the influence of social democratic socialism and anarcho-syndicalism. Although the FOI began as a centre for the radical artisans who rejected the moderation of the Federacion Obrera de La Paz, it did not completely reject the principal idea of the liberal artisans, namely that of securing the welfare of the workers through progressive social legislation. But on the other hand, and it was here that the real importance of the FOI lay, it made a strenuous effort to free the workers from the stultifying influence of the Liberal Party and to establish their own independent class-based political position. The FOI started its own newspaper, Defensa Obrera, edited by Ezequiel Salvatierra, who has an article in Defensa Obrera which gives an idea of the aims of the FOI. The organisation rejected the traditional political parties outright; it did not consult with the politicians of the oligarchy or name them as its honorary presidents. In Salvatierra's words: 'The organisation of the FOI caused surprise in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, since it was set up without the assistance of the reactionaries and has not appointed any of them as its advisers. Furthermore, it does not go grovelling to the politicians.'23 By forming the FOI its leaders wanted to show that the progressive workers no longer supported either wing of the Liberal Party, since 'neither of them was contributing to the emancipation of the proletariat or bringing any benefits to the workers'. Salvatierra adds that the politicians

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sought power simply to loot the Treasury and indulge in riotous living 'while the people live in a state of hunger and poverty, which is aggravated by oppressive taxes and unjust laws.' The confused socialism of the FOI is expressed in the following statement: We want our complete emancipation so that the social wealth belongs to society as a whole; no one can take away what mother nature has given us. Social redemption is our ideal. We are preparing for the coming of a new society which will replace the rottenness and corruption of the existing order. Our slogan, therefore, is Unity, Freedom and Work, and we have adopted the red flag, the international flag, as our banner . . . We want the proletariat to organise in militant unions to oppose the greed of the capitalists. The FOI faced a series of difficulties to successful consolidation. In contrast to the Federacion Obrera de La Paz, it faced a hostile government which obstructed its course. In the La Paz newspaper, La Razon, where the FOI published a workers' page, it claimed to be the leader of 'all the working classes of the republic', but in fact it never fulfilled this ambition. Indeed, it did not even have the support of all the guilds in La Paz, not even the printing workers. Eventually, in July 1918, the FOI was reorganised and adopted a 14point programme whose whole tone was very different from that of the pre-war Federacion Obrera de La Paz. The points included a demand for labour legislation which would cover the following aspects of work: (3a) To secure labour legislation which takes into account the sex and age of the worker, and the salary and hours for the various types of work, be it physical or intellectual, in particular seeking to establish an eight-hour day. (3b) To cover industrial accidents by a well-drawn up law which takes into account the various types of accidents and which provides compensation appropriate to the type of employment, the risks involved and the circumstances [ . . . ] (3c) To protect the rights of children and old people through really humane laws, and also to see that the rights of the female sex are respected and legally guaranteed. (3f) To create a savings fund to provide for workers in their old age. They also wanted to 'gradually build up popular universities, at first in the departmental capitals and then in the capitals of the provinces', and they declared that they would not tolerate party politics which were contrary to their principles: '[The FOI] will only accept the political leadership of an organisation which has a programme drawn up at a workers' congress specially convened for the purpose.' The programme stated that all

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workers in the country, regardless of their age or sex, were automatically members of the FOI: Those who contribute moral and financial support are considered active members and they can speak and vote in meetings. The presidents and secretaries of artisan and workers' organisations are automatically considered to be delegates.' The twelfth point of the programme declared that 'the FOI will establish and support a newspaper, no matter how great the effort, which will be the official mouthpiece of the labouring classes of the country.'24

io. The first socialists The commemoration of May Day

The provincial calm of La Paz under its serene blue sky was disturbed by unusual bustle on 1 May 1906. The Sociedad Obreros El Porvenir had decided to commemorate the events of May 1886 in Chicago.1 This was the first event of its kind in Bolivia. Although the artisans limited their activities to a meeting in the Municipal Theatre, at which the speeches concentrated on praising the Liberal government, the fact that the event was commemorated at all marked a significant change in the outlook of the labour movement. In the first years supporters of the Liberal government received official support for their celebrations which consisted of dances and theatrical performances, but later the left wing of the labour movement, strongly influenced by a diffuse kind of Marxism and by developments in neighbouring countries, transformed May Day into a day of protest and combat. Despite its official beginnings, the initiative of the Sociedad Obreros El Porvenir must be regarded as a step forward. Every group which took up a left wing position, and this included the Liberal left, rallied behind the red flag on May Day and thereby proclaimed their radicalism in order to gain influence in the labour movement and win supporters and votes. Thus, for example, the Agustin Aspiazu Society took to the streets waving the red flag to explain to the surprised artisans the meaning of May Day. From then on the labour organisations included the commemoration of May Day in their statutes. In the history of the labour movement May Day came to represent the struggle against capitalist exploitation and to be specifically associated with

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the campaign for the eight-hour day and improved conditions of work. The transformation of Bolivian labour organisations from collaborationist mutual societies into revolutionary Marxist groups is closely linked to the campaign to make known the real meaning of the workers' 'festival' as a day of combat and revolutionary reaffirmation. The mutual societies celebrated the 'festival' with masses, dances and speeches in praise of the prevailing government. On the other hand the radical sector of the artisan movement fought street battles against the old mutual societies in order to establish the true significance of the events of 1886 in Chicago. In a note dated 8 April 1913 the president of the FOI wrote to the associated organisations as follows: It is my honour to inform you that as the first of May is drawing near the assembly of the FOI has agreed to remind you that it is the duty of every worker to take part in this world wide festival in commemoration of the martyrs sacrificed for the labour movement in Chicago. For this reason, the Federation, over which I have the honour to preside, invites your distinguished organisation to take part in the commemoration and requests that you name representatives to take part in the drawing up of the programme. In 1916 Ezequiel Salvatierra commented as follows on the meaning of May Day to the Federation Obrera Sindical of Corocoro: 'The wind still moans in protest against the bourgeoisie and its instruments of oppression. The names of our apostles — Spies, Schwab, Neebe, Parsons — are now written in the eternal history of our martyrs . . . But they have not been avenged; the crime remains unpunished . . . Chicago awaits the hour of our revenge.'2 On May Day 1917 one of the outstanding events was a speech by Jose Vera Portocarrero when he harangued the crowd at a football match, urging them to imitate the crowds of the Semana Tragica in Barcelona by marching against the government and the Liberal Party. The press were unanimous in their protests, calling Vera an anarchist.3 Later on in 1919 Vera wrote a pamphlet in which he expressed his admiration for the Russian revolution and commented as follows on the meaning of May Day: In Haymarket [Chicago], on the night of 4 May [1886], an unknown person threw a bomb . . . it was a signal for the hired thugs of capitalism to begin a cowardly massacre of defenceless victims. They were killed in the streets of Chicago and their blood, so generously spilt, has written scarlet pages in the history of the proletariat. . . The first of May is the day when all class conscious workers throughout the v/orld stop work and meet together to exchange ideas and plans in anticipation of a future of universal peace.4

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The Centro Obrero de Estudios Sociales

Chronologically speaking the first significant Marxist group in the labour movement to last for any length of time was the Centro Obrero de Estudios Sociales (COES) which was organised in La Paz in 1914. It was headed by an untiring labour leader from Oruro, Ricardo Perales, (who, a symptom of the conditions of his times, was both a tailor and a lawyer). Initially the COES was composed of reformist socialists and anarchists, but it gradually evolved towards Marxism. Its declared aim was to form a socialist party and promote the establishment of trade unions. Later its most outstanding members moved from a social-democratic position to a position based on the principles of the Communist International, taking the organisation with them. At the beginning the COES concentrated on studying social problems and bringing culture to the people through the intensive activities of its drama group, its own publications and even through newspapers which had nothing to do with the labour movement. But as the Centre grew more radical it began to look for more active ways of establishing contact with the workers. The evolution of the Centre can be summarised thus: from its initial enthusiasm for education, which to a certain extent simply took up the tradition of the Liberal organisations, it moved to a position of militant political intervention in the class struggle, until it became a leading force in trade union and political action. The COES set out to organise trade unions based on more advanced ideas than the traditional guild organisations. It is interesting to compare some of its early statements with the later ones. In an article published in 1915, Ricardo Perales wrote: It is useful to restate some of the points made in the declaration of principles of the COES. They stress (1) the need for solidarity and cooperation between workers, not only in La Paz but in the interior of the Republic; to this end the Centre maintains correspondence with various other groups; (2) the need for intensive activity in the field of education; (3) that the Centre does not take sides on the religious question and respects the beliefs of its members. One point which has still not been settled is the question of the political opinions of members, which has been raised by the committee which drew up the declaration of principles. This issue was the subject of a calm, reasonable discussion, in which some people were prepared to admit very broad freedoms to members on the political question, while others favoured moderate restrictions.5 Similarly, according to Guillermo Penaranda, politics was of only secondary importance to the COES: 'The Centre has not been founded with

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the primary aim of opposing the party in power or any other party. Our only concern is to see that the advantages granted to the privileged classes are extended to benefit our class too.' 6 However, by 1919 the COES had not only adopted Marxist ideas but enthusiastically supported the formation of a socialist party. A manifesto published in 1919 included the following statements: It is now time to establish working class solidarity throughout the country at all costs, so that in each main town a socialist society or centre can be organised to combat injustice and our merciless enemy, capitalism . . . We must wipe out regional hatreds; these should not exist among the proletariat. Frontiers are false social conventions created by statesmen, by the powerful . . . In reality there is only one frontier, the frontier which divides the poor from the rich . . . Patriotism means hatred; it divides everything that is good. Patriotism just breeds cruelty and insatiable greed, and shields abominable crimes; furthermore it generates imperialism . . . Capital is international and capitalists use nationalist sentiments simply to further their own interests and to increase the exploitation of the workers. Capitalism is our greatest enemy .. . Comrades: Organise, sacrificing yourselves if necessary in the process. Don't wait for others to do it for you because that is impossible.7 On its front page the manifesto bore the slogan: 'Workers of the world unite.' On 22 September 1920 the leadership of the COES founded the Partido Obrera Socialists, 'after a huge assembly attended by the most outstanding figures in the labour movement'.8 Julio M. Ordonez was appointed Secretary General and Nestor Maceda Caceres, secretary. The new party immediately embarked on an election campaign with Augusto Varela as its candidate. Thus COES had overcome its early anarchist prejudices against political participation and had reached the conclusion that, in order to defend the interests of the workers effectively, it was necessary to intervene in party politics and even to learn to use parliamentary means. In practice the activities of COES were almost entirely confined to La Paz even though the declaration of principles stated that it aimed to become the leading workers' organisation at a national level. Its most significant achievement in the interior of the country was the direct influence it brought to bear on the Federacion Obrera de Uncia in the tragic events of June 1923.9 Cultural agitation

The COES organised the Rosa Luxembourg drama group, a very influential

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element in the development of the labour movement. Its aim was to bring culture to the masses — not culture in abstract but revolutionary culture. The group produced plays by left wing Bolivians and foreigners. The Rosa Luxembourg and Luz y Verdad theatre groups were the first attempts at political theatre. Many important labour leaders took part in the plays and cultural groups, which provided the best means for intellectuals to approach the workers. The main instigators of these activities were Ricardo Perales and Angelica Ascui. The latter has left us an account of the Rosa Luxembourg group: Full of youthful enthusiasm, on 1 May 1918 we presented our first play, ElSendero del Crimen, written by our untiring comrade, Dr Ricardo Perales. The function was sponsored by the COES. We were all new to acting, none of us had any experience, but we were optimistic and walked on to the stage resolved to do or die . . . From then on we worked unceasingly to achieve our ideal and a year later we had the group well organised. On May Day 1919 we made our first appearance under the symbolic name of the Rosa Luxembourg drama group. We were not motivated by the wish for sudden greatness, still less by the desire for money or fame. Our only aim was to attract the attention of those who are victims of the injustices on which our present social order is based, to prevent them from being deceived by erroneous ideas and to point out the true way to happiness and the fulfilment of humanity, with our eyes fixed on the red dawn of the future, the red dawn which leads us on to victory. We loved the theatre and continued to fight for ideals through it, preferring to use Bolivian actors and Bolivian plays.10 The socialist parties: The Partido Socialista of 1914 The social upheaval created by the First World War favoured the attempts to set up a working class political party in Bolivia. The need to organise such a party arose out of internal developments, but it was also encouraged by international experience and influences. The workers in neighbouring countries, notably Chile and Argentina, had organised themselves politically into socialist parties affiliated to the Second International. This was, however, a very brief period in Bolivian history which hardly left a mark. There were various attempts to set up socialist parties at different times and in different places. Retrospectively we can see that the Partido Socialista (which was also called the Partido Socialista Obrero and the Partido Laborista) was a nucleus within which developed a conflict between the

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petty-bourgeois socialism of a nationalist kind and the proletarian tendencies of a communist variety. The battle between these two tendencies destroyed the party, leaving a residue of splinter groups, none of them capable of developing into organised parties. Activists in these splinter groups in many cases later became leaders of right-wing parties. The leader who had the greatest influence among the vanguard of the Bolivian working class was the Chilean, Luis Recabarren,11 who, in 1912, participated in the organisation of the Chilean Partido Obrero Socialista on Marxist lines, while the Iquique newspaper El Despertar was widely read by the Bolivian labour leaders. It was members of the FOI, among them Ezequiel Salvatierra, who, in 1914, founded the Bolivian Partido Socialista, based on the principles of international social democracy. The party contested elections, winning two seats on the municipal council and one in the Chamber of Deputies. Their programme emphasised the improvement of workers' conditions through democratic means, the introduction of legislation to protect labour, and in the longer run the harmonising of relations between labour and capital. Their minimum programme read as follows: We do not yet advocate communism in the extreme revolutionary and egalitarian sense of the term, nor are we subordinated to any international bodies; but we are sure that the profound social transformation now under way will, in the future, lead us to universal collectivism . . . The nationalisation of industry, the participation of the state in the means of production, the participation of the wage-earning classes in the benefits of their work, the division of the land, etc., are all aspects of the advance of socialism. The main plank of the programme was the 'socialisation of all the means of production' but more immediately realisable demands occupied the most prominent place in the programme: 'We will begin our political activities by securing the rights of the wage earners and by making unionisation obligatory, and by promoting the creation of worker organisations within our own country. Only when we have achieved a total transformation within the national boundaries shall we be in a position to promote other transformations abroad.' These socialists preferred to use peaceful means of struggle so long as they were not met with violence, in which case they would have no alternative but to employ force and violence themselves. This party faded out of existence and in the 1920s innumerable new parties appeared all calling themselves 'socialist'. The need was evidently recognised for the working class to follow its own independent political line but it was first necessary to throw off the influence of the old parties.

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As late as 1926 the most radical leaders were still stressing that the most urgent task to accomplish was still to detach the workers from their loyalty to the parties controlled by their class enemies: The politically conscious workers must set up a vigorous organisation to combat the imperialist bourgeoisie. They must organise a party of their own, very different from the bourgeois parties, the Republicans, the Liberals and the Radicals. Our liberation from the present oppressive system depends on organising ourselves into unions, putting all our efforts and devotion into the creation of a communist party and developing an iron determination to fight to the end. We must immediately organise the vanguard of the Bolivian proletariat into a communist party, under whose firm leadership we can organise the exploited masses and prepare the battle for their emancipation.12 The socialist parties: The Partidos Socialistas in Oruro, La Paz and Uyuni

The echoes of the Russian revolution took a long time to reach Bolivia and arrived in a very attenuated form, through the activities and publications of organisations in other countries. In 1919 the Federation Obrera de Chile approached the Bolivian labour organisations with a view to maintaining closer relations with them and coordinating activities: Comrades, we must realise that the working class can rely only on its own resources. Our ideals will never triumph if we do not form a solid single block, capable of resisting that enslaving monster, capitalist exploitation . . . For this reason, worthy comrades, I believe that it would be very advantageous to us all if we followed the example of the diplomats of our respective countries and build up strong relations of affection between the working classes of Bolivia and Chile. The attitude of the FOCH made a deep impact on the Bolivian activists who hoped these moves would 'wipe out the deep-seated regional prejudices and help us forget the bitterness and hatred resulting from the wars of conquest'.13 From 1919 onwards there was a lot of public propaganda in the railway centre of Oruro, where Chilean influences were strongest, in favour of the formation of a socialist party in the city; newspaper articles were written on the subject and leaflets were widely distributed in the streets. The following is an example of the propaganda: There are efforts to convince you that the socialist workers have made an alliance with the government party. It is a scurrilous lie! On the contrary, the workers who have banded together around the red flag, who have taken food to the victims of the Uncia massacre, who

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have brought help to the miners of Huanuni, Monte Blanco and Colquiri, who have demanded that Congress adopt labour legislation, and who are busy organising a night school to educate the workers; in short, the workers who have dedicated their lives to the cause of the labour movement, these workers have solemnly sworn, in the name of God, their honour and their native land, to unite together in defence of the sacred banner of the proletariat. Workers: those of you blind enough to support the bourgeois parties should think carefully about the danger they pose to your class and to your cause. Workers, will you join the party of the rich, or the party of the poor? If you are poor, you should join us!14 In La Paz similar propaganda appeared attacking the bourgeois political parties in the following vitriolic terms: Why do you editors of La Republica, La Verdad, La Industria and all the other newspapers grovel like worms before the petty tyrants who rule us? You cowardly lackeys, why, in your craven efforts to praise your masters, do you publish venomous lies about the organised working class? You despicable weaklings, you know that we, the workers, are opposed to all the bourgeois political parties, the Liberals, the Republicans and the Radicals. You will trample over us no more. We shall win our economic, political and social rights, for the good of the people and our own well-being. You'd better understand that, you idiots!15 The recently formed Partido Socialista of Oruro made its political debut in the municipal elections of 1919 by putting up three candidates, all artisans. The party's programme was moderately reformist; it aimed to 'promote primary education by opening new schools in the outlying districts of the city, and to enable workers to continue their education to school certificate level at a night school soon to be set up. We shall seek to set up municipal stores which can supply provisions at reasonable prices. The prices and weights of basic necessities will be controlled. Taxes on food products will be reduced.'16 Then in September 1920 the COES set up its own political organisation, the Partido Obrero Socialista (POS) in La Paz. The new party entered electoral politics by supporting the candidacy of Augusto Varela. The programme adopted by the POS of La Paz in October 1920 was unanimously approved at the socialist convention in Oruro in 1921 and also by the founding meeting of the Partido Obrero Socialista de Bolivia in Cochabamba in December 1921. The POS's programme read as follows: Socialism is already a universal doctrine. It is based on the teachings of social philosophy, ethics, science and economics, and aims to create a

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new social order permitting all human beings a life of love, beauty, harmony, equality, justice and freedom — in short a life of happiness.. . The mission of socialism is to wipe out social injustice and make class conflicts disappear, to extend education, the right to work and wellbeing of all men; to ensure that each individual's vocation is considered at school, so that each person's work can be made more efficient without demanding more effort and can be an agreeable pastime instead of a monotonous routine. In this way work can be made a valuable achievement, instead of being an inherited curse. The bourgeoisie was described as an insignificant minority, able to exploit and oppress because 'it owns most of our natural resources, the land, the means of production, and has access to knowledge since it is a privileged class'. The proletariat, on the other hand, was described as the vast majority 'who are obliged to work for the bourgeoisie by their need to survive and who, for their work, receive only a fraction of the value they produce, just enough to satisfy their barest necessities. Since they do not know their rights and recognise the bourgeoisie as a superior class with the right to rule, they surrender all claims to their real economic and social well-being'.17 The programme of principles was reformist and included the following points: on the individual and society: the abolition of the death penalty and the rehabilitation of offenders. A campaign to teach the principles of personal hygiene and the provision of universal public health facilities; the creation by the state of public welfare establishments. Freedom for the social and political organisations of the proletariat. On political institutions: free, secret and universal suffrage for both men and women; constitutional reform and the establishment of a functional parliamentary system; the abolition of the state of siege; managers and representatives of capitalist companies to be forbidden to hold government posts or be elected to parliament. On social questions: the absolute independence of women in the exercise of their civil and political rights; the absolute right to divorce with free legal proceedings; the state to take the responsibility for the feeding, clothing and housing of all children of primary school age. Unrestricted, free, compulsory education; latifundistas to be obliged to set up rural schools. The abolition of pongueafe and colonato (serf-like labour obligations) and the adoption of a minimum wage for rural workers; agricultural service to replace military service for the indigenous race; a campaign against alcohol and the closing of factories manufacturing spirits. On labour legislation: the 48-hour week; legislation on accidents at work; minimumwage laws; the regulation of domestic service. The prohibition of the employment of boys under 15 and girls under 18; protection for female

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minors; maternity leave for female workers. 'The worker not to be held responsible for the destruction or damaging of machinery, tools or instruments of production; materials to be provided for the worker.' The closure of company stores in the mines and their replacement by free commerce; the abolition of private and secret police forces. On the economy: the nationalisation of the land, forest resources, communications, waterfalls which can provide energy and of mineral resources; workers to share in company profits; the restriction of rents to a certain percentage of the value of the property; progressive taxation on commercial and industrial profits; the creation of a compulsory savings scheme for workers and employees, administered by the deduction of a fixed percentage from their wages. Although it had a precarious existence, this new attempt at organising a party created a wider impact than its predecessors. Initially there were three workers' socialist parties: in La Paz, Oruro and Uyuni, although there were doctrinal differences between them. They could not all even be classified as social-democratic parties, since some of their programmes were largely derived from liberalism. It is likely that some other attempts to form socialist parties in various parts of the country have escaped our notice. No sooner had the new parties gained some strength than they became concerned to unite with other groups and set up a unified socialist party on a nationwide basis. It is worth pausing to consider why each of the unified parties in turn immediately split up again into local groups. It should be remembered that the socialist political movements sprang from the trade unions, which in turn were unable to organise themselves in a national confederation. The strong influence of the artisans made them tend towards localism or guild federalism. It was this factor which recurred at the political level and hindered the formation of a single Bolivian socialist party, causing any national organisation to disintegrate once again into many local parties. The socialist parties: The POS in Potosi and Cochabamba

The Potosi section of the POS was set up at the beginning of 1922. Its secretary general, Enrique G. Loza, expressed his optimism on the progress of the party in Aurora Roja: Bolivia is progressing. United, the proletariat is rising up in rebellion, as can be seen from the recent general strikes and the large militant meetings in La Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba, Uyuni, Potosi and other towns. That sleeping lion, the people, has stirred and its fierce roar has thundered out against those perpetual drones: the clergy, the bourgeoisie

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Workers and the Liberal Party 1900-20

and capital. Fortunately, throughout the country the workers' press is reviving: El Pensamiento in Sucre, El Federado in Cochabamba, Palabra Libre and Aurora Roja in La Paz, La Action Directa and El Ferroviario in Oruro, La Voz Socialista in Uyuni. Soon the Partido Obrero's paper, La Bandera Roja Socialista, will be appearing in the rich mining region of Potosi . . . There, too, the voice of protest has been recently heard and the mining proletariat have held colossal meetings of protest against their exploiter, the mineowner, Soux . . . The Bolivian proletariat is organising to obtain its just and legal rights, unfurling the red flag which signifies the destruction of the existing social order, to be replaced by a regime of justice for the outcasts and for the people in general.18 On 18 February 1922 the 'socialist workers' of Cochabamba (that is to say, the Partido Socialista) distributed a leaflet announcing their decision to boycott the newspaper El Republicano, because its owner went back on a promise made by the editor to allow the workers to publish a weekly page in the paper: 'We wish to inform our fellow workers that the owner has refused to let us print the Sunday page which the editor promised us .. . For this reason the distinguished young editor, Sr Canelas, has resigned his post with El Republicano. We therefore appeal to our comrades not to buy this bourgeois newspaper and wait until we workers have our own newspaper.'19 The POS worked in close cooperation with the different labour federations, such as the railway workers, the drivers, the bricklayers and the hotel employees. In the municipal elections of 1923 the workers' candidates put out leaflets proclaiming that 'for the first time in the history of our country the workers can go freely to vote, without selling their conscience for money or for drink'. The importance of influences from Chile can be demonstrated by considering the career of Enrique G. Loza, who was a disciple of the Chilean Luis Recabarren. Recabarren (1876-1924) was one of the labour leaders who exercised the greatest influence over the advanced sectors of the Bolivian working class at this period. He was a printer who became the most important and controversial figure in the Chilean socialist movement. He was the founder and organiser of the weekly paper El Despertar de los Trabajadores of Iquique, which was the official spokesman of both the Partido Obrera Socialista and the Federation Obrera de Chile. This newspaper also had a wide circulation within the Bolivian labour movement and influenced many Bolivian trade union leaders. A whole generation of labour leaders learnt their ideas from the campaigns and experience of the Chilean trade union movement. Recabarren was the crucial link between the FOCH and Bolivian socialists and anarchists such as Loza.

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Enrique G. Loza was born in Uyuni, an important working-class centre because of its proximity to the Pulacayo mines and because the largest railway repair shop was located there. From an early age Loza showed a great concern for social problems. Although he was a tailor by trade, he made great efforts to educate the workers with whom he came into contact. He was a self-taught man and had read voraciously, although somewhat unsystematically. As he himself says, he had to acquire his education without abandoning his work for even a moment, since he had no other way of earning his living. His publications show that he attained considerable skill as a writer, a remarkable achievement for someone who started off without any formal education. About 1914 he moved to the Chilean port of Iquique to acquire experience of the political movement there, but he was always determined to return to Bolivia to lead the working-class movement. Before he left, he had acquired experience in working-class journalism, which was a recent phenomenon in Bolivia20 and he put this experience to use in the struggle for socialism in the foreign countries he visited. His way of life — he never set up shop permanently anywhere — made him a passionate advocate of internationalism, convinced that national frontiers were erected by capitalism with the sole objective of oppressing the masses. Recabarren was the teacher Loza had lacked in his youth, and his school and university were the FOCH. In Iquique Loza was a member of the Juventud Carlos Marx circle and also took part in forming various centres of popular education. He edited and wrote for Pueblo Escucha and, while always continuing his work as a tailor, he managed to write various propaganda pamphlets. The most important of these was Vision del Porvenir21 in which his lyrical style cannot conceal his great confusion between anarchist and socialist ideas. The work is a passionate attack on the injustices of capitalism and proposes the formation of a working-class socialist party as the only way of terminating the exploitation of the people. When he talks about socialism he takes the opportunity of quoting Juan B. Justo's definition of socialism, which is more a romantic declaration than a scientific presentation of the problem: 'Socialism is the sovereignty of light over darkness.' To the vacuity of this idea Loza adds: 'Socialism crystallizes human perfection through modification.' After 1920 he was one of the main activists in the attempts to form a Bolivian socialist party, notably in Uyuni and Potosi. But late in his life, after the Chaco War, he came to support the so-called 'socialism' of the military governments then in power.

Book 4:

The nineteen-twenties i i . The first strikes President Bautista Saavedra, 1920-25 'The year 1920 marked a crisis in Bolivian politics. The Liberals... were ousted in an almost bloodless revolution in July 1920 by the Republicans under the leadership of Bautista Saavedra.'1 In power Saavedra repeated the bitter experience of Belzu. Like Belzu he found himself obliged to rely on the artisans for support, and like Belzu he was generous to his political enemies, offering them ministries and allowing exiles to return, but they responded only with contempt and intransigent opposition. Saavedra deserves some credit for his efforts to draw up a coherent body of social legislation in an attempt to catch up with the achievements of economically more advanced societies, and for his willingness to make the government more responsive to the growing demands of the underprivileged sectors of society. His government introduced compensation for industrial accidents, a compulsory savings-scheme and an improved strike law, and set up the Institute of Social Reform. But it would be wrong to think that Saavedra adopted these laws simply because they coincided with some of his own personal theories. In fact, as this history is intended to show, the introduction of these reforms must be seen as a response to the campaigns mounted by the labour movement. The workers had pinned their hopes for change on the various political upheavals which affected the country, and they had given enthusiastic support to successive governments in the hope of being granted political freedom and some measure of economic well-being. But, after repeated disappointments, the vanguard of the working class became more and more aware of the need to set up a revolutionary workers' party. Of course, their efforts to establish a working-class party came into conflict with the idea (propagated by the dominant class but also widely accepted among the working class) that the workers were not sufficiently educated to 'aspire to power'. In this respect, regimes which were populist in appearance had very 110

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The first strikes

damaging effects on the workers' consciousness, disorientating them and reducing their militancy. Saavedra was able to use certain groups of workers against his political rival, Daniel Salamanca, and Salamanca's Partido Republicano Genuino in turn was able to mobilise groups of workers against Saavedra. Eventually, however, Saavedra's government's responsibility for the massacre of miners at Uncia in 1923 discredited it in the eyes of the working class. The main support for Saavedra's government came from the middle class and the artisans, and to this extent he followed on in the tradition of the Liberal Party. But now there were two new contending forces in the political arena: the large mineowners, on the one hand, and the workers who were beginning to organise themselves, on the other. Despite conflicts with some individual capitalists, Saavedra mostly supported the mineowners and tended to regard the organised workers as communist conspirators. His government promoted the rise of United States involvement in the political and economic activities of the country. British capitalists had played an important role under the preceding Liberal regimes, but Saavedra soon became extremely dependent on the bankers of Wall Street, who provided a large refunding loan to help finance various schemes to which Saavedra had committed the prestige of his regime. This dependence on foreign funds was nothing extraordinary: Saavedra simply followed a course which was to become the norm in future years. In 1921 tin prices collapsed suddenly in the general post-war recession and the new government found itself faced with a huge budget deficit. 'The Saavedra government soon needed money and so badly that, towards the end of 1921, it agreed to a six months' loan of $1,000,000 at 6% from the St Louis firm of Stifel-Nicolaus, which contained, as alternative to an exorbitant commission of $90,000, an option on the blanket loan which the government was considering and a preferential option for three years on any external loan the government might make within that period.'2 The preferential option clause put the Bolivian government in the hands of Stifel-Nicolaus and prevented an alternative loan from the National City Bank from materialising, since the clause excluded the government from seeking the best terms in the open market. The opposition parties therefore concentrated their attacks against Saavedra's government on the terms of the loan. The terms show how far the United States bankers would go in their eagerness to exploit a weak South American state. The Nicolaus loan totalled $33 million at 8%. This was a sum far in excess of the amount originally contemplated by the Bolivian government, and at the time it was the largest loan contracted by the Bolivian government and the one with the worst terms. Almost half the state's revenue was pledged as security, as

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follows: the tax on mining claims or concessions, the revenue of the alcohol monopoly and 90% of the revenue received from the tobacco monopoly, the tax on corporations other than mining and banking, the tax on the net income of banks and the net profits of mining companies, the tax on mortgage interests, all import duties, including surcharges, and export taxes and 114,000 shares in the Banco de la Nation Boliviana. Further, 'it was stipulated in the contract that a Permanent Fiscal Commission of three, two members of which should be nominated by the bankers, should have charge of the collection of taxes in the Republic during the quarter-century life of the loan . .. and the power to revise the nation's accounts.'3 The opposition in Bolivia singled out the Nicolaus loan as 'one of the worst manifestations of Saavedrismo'.4 While the Saavedra regime was occupied with these loan negotiations and the resulting domestic polemics, Bolivia's working class was trying out new forms of organisation and new methods of struggle. We must now examine the developments among railwaymen and miners which came to a head under Saavedra's rule. It will be necessary to trace the origins of these events back to the last years of the Liberal regime. The railway workers

The earliest railway workers to attempt to organise themselves held a meeting at Mollini station on the Oruro-Cochabamba line on 3 March 1912. In the same year the railway workers of Uyuni set up a mutual-aid society. Later in 1918 the workers on the Antofagasta—Bolivia railway organised themselves. But the most important early organisation was the Liga de Obreros y Empleados de Ferrocarril, which was the direct forerunner of today's railway unions. The Liga expressed a left-wing outlook but it was by no means a revolutionary organisation; rather it was reformist and worked within the legal framework. The Liga came into being in 1919 as the result of a clash between the workers and the management of the Bolivian Railway Co.: More than 20 office workers in the head office of the Bolivian Railway Co. collectively resigned because of the systematic hostility of Mr R.W. Martin, who was the acting administrator in the absence of J. Backus. The. company refused to accept their resignations, fearing serious consequences if they left. As a result of this, more than 70 of the firm's employees met on 1 August 1919 and drew up a document committing themselves to establish an association for the protection of the workers' rights. They invited their companions working for other railway companies to join them.5

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The Liga was set up on 3 August, at a meeting attended by 182 workers and employees of the Bolivian Railway Co. and the Guaqui—La Paz railway.6 Foreigners working on the railways were invited to join, as were railway workers in the interior of the country. The workers on the Machacamarca—Uncia line affiliated, as did the workers of the Luz y Fuerza Electrica company of Cochabamba and of Bolivian General Enterprises Ltd. Thus the Liga became a nationwide organisation, with objectives which included acting as a mutual-aid society, improving workers' conditions, and fighting for the introduction of social laws, such as legislation on industrial accidents and the provision of pensions. The Liga reached its peak of success between October 1919 and January 1920 when, according to its leaders, it had more than a thousand members. Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the Liga's activities was the creation of a strike fund. The Guaqui railway workers went on strike on 7 October 1919, because the administration of the Southern Peru railway company refused to meet their demands. In this, its first conflict with the employers, the Liga collected 1089 pesos for the strikers, a considerable sum for those days. The Liga also showed its solidarity with other labour organisations in their conflicts with the employers. 'The Liga has given 300 pesos to the telegraph employees, to cover the debts they incurred in their recent strike.'7 The setting up of the liga had immediate beneficial consequences. The workers in various companies won pay increases and improved conditions, such as, for example, the workers on the Machacamarca-Uncia line, who presented their demands to the employers on 7 November 1919, and reached an agreement with them on the 1 lth. The railway lines have played an important role in the spread of revolutionary ideas and activities in Bolivia. The Liga's executive felt that they should concentrate their efforts on organising trade unions in other sectors of the economy, especially the mining industry. On 22 November 1919 the executive sent out a circular to their branch committees in the interior, instructing them to form groups in the mining centres with a view to setting up a powerful miners' union. Thirteen thousand copies of the circular were printed for distribution to the miners. This document pointed out that federations of bank and commercial employees had already been formed, and suggested that, after the organisation of the miners, steps should be taken to organise factory workers. A footnote to the circular stated that 'the organisation of the miners should take place in an orderly fashion, without resorting to violence or subversive activities'. In late 1919 a serious impasse arose between the central committee and the Uyuni and Oruro committees, which was to split the Liga completely in March 1920. In December 1919 the Oruro and Uyuni committees sent a

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telegram to the La Paz committee, asking for money from the central strike fund to be sent to workers on strike in the Chilean section of the Antofagasta-Bolivia railway. The executive replied that the difficult financial situation of the Liga made it impossible for them to send financial aid to their Chilean brothers. The Oruro and Uyuni committees then proposed that the workers of each company should set up their own central committee, from which a general executive committee of the union should be appointed. The Liga rejected this proposal, and the schism became final on 6 March 1920, when the Federacion Ferroviario was set up in Oruro, composed exclusively of workers on the Antofagasta-Bolivia line.8 The split was fatal for the Liga. Their president's report for 1920 recommended that new associations be set up on the lines of the Federacion Ferroviario, in effect destroying the central organisation. The president of the Liga, Hector Borda, drew the conclusion, presumably based on the suspicion that the Liga had been split for political reasons, that trade unions should confine themselves to economic matters, and that they should leave politics to the political parties. 'I want to warn the unions that any alliance with the political parties would be a grave error and dangerous to their interests.'9 Although he argued that the strike was the only weapon available to the proletariat for ensuring that their rights were respected, he warned them that even this could be a two-edged weapon and could be detrimental to the unions if they were badly led. The Bolivian Railway Co. workers' petition

Before the Liga split, on 23 December 1919, the workers of the Antofagasta-Bolivia Railway and the Bolivian Railway Co. presented a comprehensive petition of demands, which can be considered as an antecedent of Bolivian social legislation. The workers managed to win many useful concessions in the agreement they eventually reached with the company on 9 February 1920. Their petition included the following demands: I. That Bolivian and foreign workers and employees should be treated equally. (The company agreed to this.) II. That the company should not employ children under the age of twelve in Uyuni, and under 15 in other areas, and that illiterate children should not be employed. (The company said that although there was no law forbidding such employment, they would try to meet the workers' demands as far as possible.) III. A minimum salary ranging from 60 to 120 pesos a month, and 3 to 6 pesos a day. (The company merely promised this for the future, arguing that it was in economic difficulties.)

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The first strikes IV. The drawing up of a scale as the basis for promotion and pay increases for workers and employees. (This was conceded.) V. Fifteen days paid holiday a year, and travel concessions on the railway. (These were granted.) VI. The abolition of fines and temporary suspensions. (This was rejected.) Black-listing only when explicit regulations were infringed. (This would be the responsibility of the general administrator.) VII. It was agreed that the office workers should work a seven-hour day and that if, in exceptional circumstances, they were required to work overtime, they would be paid a higher rate. The standard working week for manual workers would be forty-eight hours, and machine operators could do up to twelve hours overtime. VIII. The setting up of an obligatory savings fund, based on a deduction of 10% from the wages bill, which would earn an annual interest of 5%. (The company agreed to support this scheme, provided that it was made voluntary and not compulsory.) IX. The company should set aside a percentage of its profits for pensions and compensation for accidents at work. (The company promised to study the problem and work out proposals on the basis of practices in other countries, but in the meantime it offered to give each worker a bonus on retirement, based on his record at work.) X. A life pension scheme, based on the following rates: a quarter of the highest salary earned by a worker in his lifetime, on retirement after twelve years' service; three-eighths after fifteen years; ninesixteenths after twenty years, and full wage after thirty years. (The administrator said that it was a good idea, but that he would have to consult the London office. In the final written agreement, this point was ignored.) XI. That 'the company shall be responsible for accidents incurred by employees, workers and day labourers working in its service'. XII. The workers obtained pay increases of from 10 to 15%, the latter figure applying to the lowest paid workers. Day labourers, foremen and road workers were excluded from this rise.10

The Federacion Ferroviario The programme of the OruroFederaci6n Ferroviario hardly differed at all from that of the Liga. Initially the Federation had to overcome the fears of many workers about organising; 'People should stop being afraid of showing open support of the Federation since Mr Backus, the company's

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representative, said at a recent meeting with members of the executive committee that he welcomed the setting up of such an organisation.'11 The railway workers were in the vanguard of the trade union movement and formed one of the strongholds of the newly-formed Partido Socialista. When Saavedra came to power, a few months later the railway workers hoped the new government would look favourably on the workers' demands: 'Comprehensive labour legislation protecting workers and employees should be introduced as an act of justice towards the proletariat. The state should move gradually towards the socialisation of our basic industries, or at least part of them, making the national wealth the property of the state. As a minimum, the state should participate in the wealth produced by the large industries.'12 In December 1920, the railway workers held their first congress. It was attended by 80 delegates from the federated committees and other workers' organisations. Also present was Dr Ricardo Soruco Ipina, a member of parliament who, although he officially figured as a member of the Salamanca wing of the Partido Republicano, was regarded as the railway workers' representative. He made a speech declaring 'If the Partido Republicano were to attack the rights of the working class, I would prefer to break my affiliation with it, and become simply the representative of the railway workers, taking my seat on the benches of the extreme left.' Soruco soon became the focus of a major conflict between the Oruro Federacion Ferroviaria and the government. The incident began in the legislature where a reactionary, pro-clerical deputy, Abel Iturralde, threatened to have Soruco shot for his socialist ideas. Oruro became the centre of a railway workers' strike in protest against Iturralde's behaviour. The Salamanca Republicans tried to extract some advantage for themselves from this situation and at times, in their Oruro newspaper, La Patria, they even seemed to identify themselves whole-heartedly with the workers on strike. They tried to claim that Iturralde was typical of the outlook of the Saavedra regime, even though in fact the government had disowned responsibility for him. The events were reported at length in La Patria. The members of the Federacion Ferroviaria demanded that Iturralde should apologise to Soruco, but after six days he still had not done so. The authorities were beginning to harass the railway workers' leaders, and the Intendant of La Paz threatened to exile the president and secretary of the Federation, if they continued to exercise their sacred right of protest, by demanding an apology to their representative . . . In the light of this intimidation . . . yesterday afternoon at 5.20 p.m. the Federacion Ferroviaria ordered its members to stop work .. . The Saavedra government has infringed the constitution, violated rights and

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liberties, denied all honour and dignity to the people, and now it shows its contempt and scorn for the decent working class. [A subsequent editorial added] As long as the Saavedra government remains in power the proletariat can hope for almost nothing from the administration, which is in the hands of a conservative party, a party which is the bitter enemy of the new socialist ideas hostile to conservatism and all its dogmas and prejudices . . . The workers of Bolivia should realise that, as long as the clerical Saavedra regime persists, they will only be cheated and attacked.13 Then, on 15 January 1921, the railway workers declared a general strike throughout the republic to protest against the insult to Soruco. There was a demonstration of 10,000 workers in La Paz, and the Partido Socialista of Uyuni pledged its support, as did other organisations. The demonstrators insisted that Soruco had been sent to Congress on behalf of the mass of workers to speak for them on questions of labour legislation. The most notable aspect of this strike was that the workers urged the soldiers not to open fire against people of their own class. The La Paz authorities brought out large numbers of troops to guard the railway installations, and several labour leaders were arrested. The strike ended on 21 January when the railway workers reached an agreement with President Saavedra. 'Eventually, as a result of the railway workers' action, the government of the day introduced the Supreme Decree of 24 November 1924, providing social benefits for the workers and creating a distinction between workers and employees.'14 The Federacion Obrera (Seccion Boliviana)

The Federacion Obrera (Seccion Boliviana) was set up in Viacha in 1920, under the direct influence of the Federacion Obrera Chilena. It was composed exclusively of workers on the Arica—La Paz railway. The workers on the Bolivian and Chilean sectors of the line collaborated closely. In late 1920 the workers on the Chilean section came out on strike, supported by the Bolivians. On 6 December the workers reached an agreement with the company, and their demands were met. But the failure of the company to comply with the agreement led to another strike in 1922. The workers of Viacha informed the FOT of La Paz that they had gone on strike to secure the enforcement of the 1920 agreement, the reinstatement of Giraldo Moreno, the president of the railway workers, and the sacking of certain members of the administration who were unacceptable to the workers. Arturo Borda, the president of the FOT and brother of Hector Borda the founder of the Liga Ferroviaria, went to Viacha to help resolve the conflict,

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and obtained assurances from the army commander and the police that they would not intervene. In an attempt to break the strike the employers took on non-unionised Chilean labour, but this did not succeed in weakening the solidarity and discipline of the strikers. The agreement reached on 1 June 1922 represented a significant victory for the workers. Thus up to 1922 it was the railway workers who played the leading role in promoting modern trade unions in Bolivia. But in 1923, with the strike and resulting deaths at Uncia, the focus of attention shifted to the country's mineworkers. The defeat of the Conservative Party had coincided with the final collapse of Bolivia's silver mines, but after 1900 a new mineral export had risen to take its place, namely tin. The new mining magnates, most famous of whom was Simon I. Patirio, were generally favoured by the Liberal Party,15 and operated even larger and more profitable enterprises than those of their predecessors, the silver barons. Their already huge fortunes were multiplied several times over by the First World War, and it was in the resulting boom-time conditions that trade unionism reached the mining camps. Once again then the origins of this process of class organisation must be sought in the last years of Liberal rule. The massacre of Uncia According to Rodolfo Soliz,16 the first big clashes with the miners took place in July 1918 at Simon I. Patiiio's La Salvadora mining company, at the Callaperia or Patino section, situated about 300 metres above Miraflores. 'The workers were tired of putting up with ill-treatment and insults from the management of this section and one pay day they protested because they had not been paid their full wages. Their protest met with a violent reaction from the local official, who appeared armed with a whip.' The workers replied spontaneously by attacking and stoning the company stores and the accounts office. On hearing of this unexpected turn of events, the manager, Maximo Nava, arrived on the scene, accompanied by employees and members of the White Guard (as Soliz calls them), armed with carbines and pistols. A fierce battle broke out between the two groups. 'The workers used explosives and dynamite to make bombs out of tin cans and bottles.' It is claimed that some people were killed and that the manager personally killed an apprentice, but in fact he was only wounded by a stone. The people supporting the company barricaded themselves in Miraflores where the concentration mills and electricity plants were located. Nava

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managed to inform Patirio's representative, Arturo Loayza, of the scale of the rebellion, and the company got the Liberal President of the Republic, Jose Gutierrez Guerra, to send an infantry regiment to Uncia. Meanwhile the battle continued, with Nava and his supporters in the heights of Miraflores while the workers held the road to Oruro. 'At one o'clock in the afternoon the workers opened fire and attacked Nava's men. Ayala, a mechanic, was killed.' At four the soldiers arrived and ruthlessly broke up the workers' bands. The persecution of the leaders continued for several months. Soon after this it seems that the managers of La Salvadora and the Empresa Estahifera Llallagua reached an agreement to increase their control over the workers, fearing that what had happened at the Patino section would be repeated on a larger scale. Emilio Diaz, the Chilean manager of Llallagua, tightened up discipline, also cutting salaries and the pay of the contractors. The miners decided to react by stopping work and asking for a settlement of their accounts. The workers from Cancaniri, Azul, Blanca and other sections went down en masse to the administration offices at Catavi, where they were met with a hail of bullets from Diaz and his men. The shots dispersed the crowd and caused several deaths, although the survivors were never able to find out exactly how many. Some corpses disappeared into smoke in the calcination furnaces of Catavi, it was claimed. Another appeal to the government resulted in the arrival of more troops to protect the company's interests. This brutal way of resolving the camp's social problems was to be repeated intermittently, and after every strike in which people were killed the rumour of bodies being incinerated in the furnaces of Catavi would recur. Patirio's biographer Carrasco tells us that shortly before this strike the tin magnate had decided he could no longer personally administer his principal mine. 'Patino soon found the man he was looking for to manage La Salvadora. He was Maximo Nava. A brave, educated, intelligent man, he was just the person to replace Patino in the mine . . . Nava was tall; his bushy grey beard and his energy seemed to instil fear, but he was a generous man and was extremely tactful in his dealings with the workers and employees.'17 However, it would be more accurate to say that, in Nava Patino found a good bully, able to keep the workers in order and also to defend his property from his Chilean rivals who owned the nearby mine of Llallagua and who, thanks to their new administrator Diaz, were having some commercial success. Nava's name and valour became legendary in Uncia. He was not only a courageous man, but also a great womanizer, and

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left his surname scattered generously around. It seems that Patirio rewarded his manager generously. In the end, however, Nava committed suicide, shooting himself in the head. In 1921 there was a major strike at Pulacayo, in the south of the Department of Potosi. The manager, Antonio Nunez, decided to increase the rents paid by the small traders who had stores in the mining camp. This measure was aimed at giving a monopoly of trade in the camp to Portillo y Cia. The people affected by this measure, mainly the women, met in El Poligono, where they got the support of the miners, who decided to strike if the manager refused to agree to their demand of 'free trade'. Carrying banners, the people went down to the administration offices, where 'they only got the company to agree to their demand by threatening the company's spokesman with a stick of dynamite'.18 But no event was so influential in the Bolivian trade union and revolutionary movement as the massacre of 1923. Before this date there had been many strikes and confrontations with the government, but none of them had been aimed specifically at winning the right for trade unions to organise. For the working class organisations and the socialists, 4 June became a day of struggle for the Bolivian workers and it acquired, perhaps, even greater importance than May Day. Year after year the left commemorated the day of the massacre and used it to show their rejection of the government and of the capitalist system. A great deal has been written about the massacre, but the report produced by the Centro Obrero de Estudios Sociales entitled Fundacion de la Federation Obrera Central de Uncia remains indispensable. (It was partly written by Guillermo Gamarra who played a leading role in the strike which led up to the massacre.)19 The Federacion Obrera Central de Uncia

The Federacion Obrera Central de Uncia (FOCU) was founded on 1 May 1923 by 'the workers of the area, who were no longer prepared to endure the iron rule of the capitalists, and especially of Emilio Diaz, the manager of the Compariia Estariifera Llallagua'. Its foundation came at the climax of a demonstration in memory of the Chicago martyrs and 'in protest against the present unjust social order'. There had already been numerous attempts in the mining district to set up an organisation to defend the workers and win recognition for their rights, always ignored by the capitalists. But these efforts had invariably failed because of the hostility of the authorities, who generally followed the instructions of the companies' managers.

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The Federation was set up as the spokesman for all the workers in the region (not only those working for Patino's La Salvadora company and for the Chilean company Estanifera Llallagua) and it was decided that a sub-committee should be set up in each of the mining companies. Immediately the local authorities and the companies began to attack the Federation. Diaz sacked ten workers for attending the May Day rally and tried to set up a rival mutual aid society, but the first decision it made was not to recognise the Federation and very few members enrolled. The Federation was set up with the aim of 'working for the solidarity, comradeship and economic improvement of the mining workers', but it was not recognised by either of the powerful mining companies. This was at the root of the whole conflict which followed. Gumercindo Rivera, who did what he could to salvage the FOCU's documents, reports that the idea of setting up a workers' central in the most important mining district of the country came from the May Day Committee, and that the Federation was to include all the workers in the towns of Uncia and Llallagua, as well as the miners in the two principal tin companies.20 May Day 1923 in Uncia was not a day of festivities and celebrations but the start of the fierce battle for the right to organise. An enormous crowd of workers gathered outside the railway station; Rivera says there were about 5,000 there. In the early afternoon they set off menacingly down the narrow twisting streets, with thunderous cries of support for the Federation. Their bronzed faces displayed their resolution to defy the domination of the employers and to denounce the continual abuses committed by Diaz. The crowd stopped in the Plaza 6 de Agosto, where there was a series of speeches, some fiery and incisive, others conciliatory, and clothes were distributed to orphans. The Federacion Obrera Central was then formally inaugurated, giving this May Day meeting an extremely important place in the social history of the country. In Uncia, the capital of the province of Bustillo, in the department of Potosi, on 1 May 1923 at 15.30 hours, the workers of Uncia and Llallagua gathered together at a rally to commemorate the glorious festival of Labour which marks the date of the beginning of the emancipation of the proletariat . . . and unanimously agreed to found the Federacion Obrera Central de Uncia, a patriotic organisation aimed at uniting workers in solidarity in their common struggle, and at overriding all political differences and bitterness which only tend to divide the forces of the working class... It was then agreed to send a note to the Supreme Government of the Republic protesting against the unspeakable abuses and attacks of the Chilean citizen, Emilio Diaz,

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the manager of the Compania, Estafiifera Llallagua, on the Bolivian workers . . . 21 Thus the Federation began its bitter struggle for recognition. It started by demanding the reinstatement of the ten workers who had been sacked, but this demand was not met because the workers in question had, under pressure from the employers, asked to be paid off. The Federation campaigned actively and its membership grew rapidly. The companies thought that they could contain the growing influence of the Federation by a few tactical manoeuvres. On 4 May Francisco Bilk, the manager of La Salvadora, called Guillermo Gamarra and Marcial Arana, president and secretary of the Federation respectively, to his office. Bilk told them: 'The FOCU must be a purely local organisation. It must not include other places in its sphere of action and it must have no contact with other federations.' Gamarra, who had worked with the Centro Obrero de Estudios Sociales in La Paz for eight years, replied: 'If the FOCU were just a local organisation and if it were unable to act outside Uncia and maintain relations with all workers' organisations in Bolivia and the rest of the world, then it would have no reason to exist, as it would not be able to work for its ultimate aim — the social revolution - an aim which is now being pursued by labour organisations in various countries.' Bilk's next step was to try to buy off Gamarra, as he was not only the visible leader of the Federation but also its most able organiser. 'Bilk proposed that Gamarra should resign his post with the Federation, and offered him a better job in return. Gamarra protested vehemently against this underhand suggestion, saying that he would not resign the post his work companions had entrusted to him, and that he would rather die than betray them so shamefully.' The manager realised that it was impossible to influence the leaders of the Federation, still less to control them, and that he would have to resort to more effective methods than persuasion and bribery. The government saw that the wave of rebellion was growing daily and that tough measures would be needed. Thus on 12 May Nicanor Fernandez, the district attorney from Oruro, was sent to Uncia, accompanied by a detachment of troops from the Camacho artillery regiment. 'As soon as they heard of this, the executive of the Federation had an interview with him, and informed him of all the iniquitous abuses the capitalists had committed against the Federation's members.' Taking advantage of the presence of a government representative, and perhaps to see how he would react, the Federation set about organising the branch committee for Catavi. But it survived no longer than a day because all its members were sacked and told to leave the mining camp within two days. The workers protested to

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Fernandez about this, but to no avail. He merely replied: 'I cannot get involved in the affairs of the company; the company has its interests to protect.' The troops were put at the disposal of Diaz but, despite their presence in the district, it appears that the employers and the authorities decided that they would only resort to force if other methods of undermining the Federation failed. The FOCU's objectives came down to one point: to win the right to organise themselves in a federation and to win guarantees for its members so that they could not be fired for taking part in trade union activities. This objective — the right to associate freely — concerned not merely all the miners but the whole working class, and indeed other sectors of the population. The 1923 strike was an important step on the road to union recognition, a provision which was eventually written into the Constitution in 1938, though in fact this clause is still frequently disregarded. As we have seen from the preceding events, the miners continued to trust in the impartiality of the government and hoped that it would grant them some concessions peacefully. It was only through painful experience that they learnt that the government was completely at the service of the capitalists. The Federation appointed a commission to go to La Paz to put the following points to the government: I. Application of the residence law to the manager of the Compariia Estanifera Llallagua. II. The sacking of the following watchmen . . . who are used by the manager of Llallagua to carry out his savage orders. III. The reinstatement of the following members of the Federation .. . who have been dismissed from their jobs in the Catavi smelting plant. IV. The right of all members of the Federation freely to enter the mining camp of the Compania Estanifera Llallagua and guarantees for them. V. The recognition of the FOCU and its branches in the La Salvadora and Llallagua mining companies. VI. Guarantees for the members of the federal sub-council of Catavi. VII. To protest in the name of the FOCU, against the slanderous accusations made by self-interested groups who allege that the Federation is politically motivated. While the commission was in La Paz a new government representative arrived in Uncia on 19 May. This time it was the Minister of Public Works and Communications. Again the workers lodged their complaints against the company and presented him with a copy of the petition sent to La Paz.

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The Minister, who had been expelled from the Partido Socialista in 1921, made a demagogic speech in the main square, in which he said that the workers were right and that they should ask for Diaz to be sacked. At this, the workers felt sure that the government would back their demands and cheered the President and the Republican Party. Meanwhile, in La Paz the commission seemed to have won some concessions. The Minister of Government replied to their demands as follows: On the first point, it appears that there is no case for applying the Residence Law to Sr Diaz but the government will do what it can to improve relations between him and the workers. . . The government will bring its influence to bear in securing the dismissal of the night watchmen guilty of attacks on the workers. The fourth point is accepted so long as it does not infringe on the freedom of the Llallagua company . . . The fifth point has already been settled . . . since the companies have made it known that they will not oppose the formation of organisations composed of the members of each mining camp.22 But the companies did not comply with a single one of these points. Instead their opposition intensified. Ernesto Fernandez, the Secretary General of the Federation, and regarded by both the employers and the authorities as the leading activist in the Federation, was arrested on 31 May by the Police Intendant. Fortunately some workers managed to free him. The leaders of the Federation only began to prepare for a strike after the management had rejected the agreements reached with the government. It seemed the only action that might save them, especially if it became a national strike. 'The committee sent telegrams to the various federations in Bolivia asking for their support in opposing the tyranny which prevailed in the mining camps. Organisations in Oruro, Cochabamba, Sucre, Uyuni and elsewhere answered the call for solidarity with their brothers in Uncia.' A telegram was also sent to the Chilean workers' confederation asking for their support since the head office of the Llallagua company was located in Santiago. The government replied to the strike threat by declaring a state of siege on 1 June. By now there were four regiments posted in Uncia, and from 2 June troops of armed soldiers patrolled the streets. The evening before the tragic day the Federation decided to send a new commission to La Paz, composed of people outside the workers' organisation: the parish priest of Uncia and the sub-prefect of the province of Charcas. But the commission had no time to do anything. On 4 June at 11 o'clock Lieutenant Colonel Villegas, Major Ayoroa and Bilk visited Gamarra at his work in the repair shop of the Socav6n Patino

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to ask him to come and talk with them in the sub-prefect's office to see if they could find a way of resolving the conflict. The other workers, who instinctively realised that their leader was running into danger, told him not to go but he ignored them. As the president of the Federation approached the sub-prefect's office a number of workers blocked his path, saying that it was all a trick. They only let him go through after Gamarra had explained to them that it was just a question of trying to solve the deadlock. Once inside, Gamarra found himself with Gumercindo Rivera, the vice-president of the Federation. Lieutenant Colonel Villegas, who was the acting subprefect, told them: 'I have to inform you that you are under arrest, on orders from the government'.23 Meanwhile a large crowd of workers was gathering in the square outside the office and, certain that their leaders had been arrested, they began to call for their release. Gamarra and Rivera, fearing the workers were in danger of attack from the army, came out to the door of the office and addressed them: 'Comrades, we have just been informed that we must go to La Paz to see members of the government. We have decided to go. You need not fear for us. Everything the Federation has done it has done openly. You can return to your homes and wait and see what response we get from the government', Comrades, we are very grateful to you for the stand you have taken; it shows the strength of the solidarity in our ranks . . . But do not make any attempt to get us released because you will get nothing from the insensitive officials who are responsible for the situation and who, for no good reason, have imprisoned us as if we were criminals. Do they think they can terrorise us in this way? They are very wrong. Men of conviction and high ideals never submit. We will go to La Paz and present ourselves to the government. But we will go with our heads held high and our consciences calm, and we will vindicate ourselves. . . The government will have to accept the truth of our case and will regret having believed in the local officials, who have sold their consciences for money. We shall be back at your side in a few days, ready to carry on working even more resolutely for the freedom of our class and against the despotism of the capitalists. It does not matter ii anything happens to us because you are there, thousands and thousands of exploited workers who will replace us in our posts of honour and sacrifice. For the last time, I beg you, return to your houses. Any protest will be useless in the face of the bayonets.24 But the crowd of workers did not move. They stood still and demanded the release of their leaders. Major Ayoroa warned the crowd to disperse.

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When they refused, he ordered the battalion to open fire. The workers' report of the events continues: The soldiers refused to go out into the streets. Major Ayoroa became enraged and forced them to go out, with blows. Once again he gave the order to open fire against the workers. The soldiers complied, but fired over the heads of the crowd so that no one was hurt. On seeing that his orders had not been obeyed to the letter, Ayoroa became even more furious and, shouting obscenities at the soldiers, he seized a machine gun and killed four workers, injuring 12 more, three of whom died a few days later. Thus the brutal massacre began.25 All the witnesses of the terrible event agree that it was Major Ayoroa who was responsible for killing the workers. The day after this slaughter about 6,000 workers from Uncia and Catavi joined the strike, which continued until 9 June when a new government representative (the future President, Hernando Siles), arrived and offered the workers a very unfavourable set of terms. The parish priest took part in the negotiations and advised the workers to accept the terms proposed by the company. These included dividing the Federation into two independent organisations with no connection between them. Thus the Federacion Obrera Central de Uncia was completely destroyed. Immediately after the massacre the persecution of the leaders began. Gamarra and Rivera were imprisoned in Corque until late November. Ernesto Fernandez was deported to Peru and other leaders were also arrested. On 8 June, while they were still on strike, the workers petitioned the government for the release of the prisoners. Saavedra sent them the following reply: 'You must always be hardworking and peaceful, then you will always have the support of the government to protect your legitimate demands . . . You must return to work and only when you have done so will the government arrange for some of your comrades, the least dangerous ones, to return . . . ' 26 Since a state of siege had been declared the workers' organisations in the cities were unable to make any kind of protest on behalf of their brothers in Uncia who had been the victims of a cold-blooded massacre .. . The FOT was in a state of disorganisation because the majority of the organisations affiliated to it had become inactive, hence it was unable to make a strong stand . . . It did send a delegate to investigate what was happening, but he got no further than Oruro because only the army, government officials and employees of the mining companies were being allowed to use the trains. . . The most he could do was join in the fruitless protests which the Oruro Federation made to the authorities . . . The La Paz FOT and the Rosa Luxembourg Drama Group

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put on a play on 28 June to raise funds for the families of the men killed, and the secretary general of the FOT made a speech, informing the public of the origins of the massacre and protesting against this crime . . . Because they did not have any concrete information about the massacre and because of the state of siege, the other Bolivian labour organisations remained silent in the face of the crimes of 4 June 1923.27 After the events of 1923 the miners persisted, with admirable tenacity, in their attempts to set up an organisation to defend their interests. In fact, since then there has always been some kind of federation in existence, even if it was often reduced to a small group of men working in semi-clandestine conditions. The Federation was officially dissolved in 1926, and in 1927 the Liga Obrera de Trabajo was established briefly, but its leaders were soon arrested. Guillermo Gamarra

Guillermo Gamarra Baragan was born in La Paz in 1891. He was a carpenter by trade. In 1921, before going to Uncia, he was president of the Centro Obrero de Estudios Sociales; then, as we have seen, he was president of the Federacion Obrera Central de Uncia. Later, on his return to La Paz, he was elected secretary-general of the woodworkers' union in 1926. He was undoubtedly the central figure of the events of June 1923, in which he showed the strength of his personality and his Marxist orientation, which, to a large extent, was the result of his work in the Centro Obrero de Estudios Sociales. His role in the events at Uncia won him the praise of Miguel Viscarra, president of the miners' organisation in Llallagua: 'Gamarra was ready to sacrifice himself and endanger his own interests for the sacred cause of liberty and justice.'28 Gamarra has always been proud of his work at Uncia, believing it to be the most important thing he has done in his life. He does not simply dismiss it as youthful irresponsibility. Three years after the massacre La Republica, a pro-Saavedra La Paz newspaper, alleged that the leaders of the Federation had deliberately precipitated the massacre in order to serve the interests of the traditional politicians opposed to Saavedra. Gamarra replied to the article: The Federacion Obrera Central de Uncia was not subordinated to, or influenced by, persons outside the working class. I have never belonged to any of the traditional political parties, nor do I now. The rest of the executive committee of the Federation were not involved in party politics either . . . What the members of the Federation were doing was preparing a peaceful work-stoppage in order to secure the dismissal of

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the despotic and arbitrary manager of the Llallagua mines, Sr Emilio Diaz . . . If your newspaper classifies us, the real leaders of the FOCU, as agitators, so much the better. There will be agitators in Bolivia as long as the working people suffer hunger and poverty. There will be agitators until we put an end to the unspeakable abuses of capitalists.29 Federaciones de Trabajo

Not only were the railwaymen and the mineworkers attempting to establish effective trade unions in the early twenties. There were also efforts, in the principal cities, to form trade councils grouping the wage earners of various sectors. To these we shall now turn. The Federacion Obrera de Trabajo was organised in La Paz in 1918 and, until the formation of the Confederation Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia in 1936, it was to be one of the principal centres of working class organisation. The FOT was a continuation of the Federacion Obrera Internacional, which was reorganised in 1918 although it did not change its name immediately. The programme adopted in 1918 referred to the need to establish comprehensive social legislation, 'based on the most modern scientific principles which answer the needs of present and future generations', and labour legislation which would fix work conditions in accordance with the age and sex of workers and would establish the eight-hour day and regulate the determination of wage rates. It also proposed the introduction of legislation on industrial accidents (one of the main concerns of the labour movement at the time), and laws to protect women and children working in factories. It suggested the creation of an old-age-pension fund, to be financed by contributions from the workers and administered by the state, and urged the state to 'promote compulsory education for all classes and especially the indigenous race'. The programme repeated the idea of establishing popular universities, something which had become a tradition among the labour organisations.30 From the beginning the FOT made it one of its tasks to wean the workers away from the influence of non-working-class political parties. It set out its line on this question in a manifesto dated 28 August 1921: The FOT proclaims, with the vehemence of free men, that we are above the low, mean passions displayed by the tendentious press which supports the evil caciquismo prevailing today. We are anxious to make it known once more to the whole nation and, if possible, to the whole of Latin America, that the FOT has no part in the archaic practices of criollo politics, whether of the Radical, Liberal, Democratic or Repub-

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lican variety. Consequently we denounce the prejudgements and biases contained in statements by all of these political groups as false and insincere. They have made many ridiculous statements, based on total ignorance and hatred of the working class, to the effect that the Federacion Ferroviaria and other labour organisations are intimately connected with certain bourgeois political leaders, who are currently in opposition. The FOT denounced the petty and insidious campaign which the bourgeois parties were waging against socialism 'without realising that this body of social and political ideas is making gigantic steps forward in all democratic societies and even in some monarchies'. Could a socialist party ever reach some compromise with the bourgeois parties, the FOT asked itself. 'Never', was the reply, 'because we are convinced that criollo politics will be the same for all time. The experience of almost one hundred years of the Republic has produced the cultural and moral decay of certain classes and the adoption of caudillo-style government, first by the military and now by commercial interests.' It is time to wake up from our lethargy and abandon these shameful interparty squabbles which just degrade our class. It is time to free ourselves from self-interested politicians, obsessed with their own petty ambitions. It is time for the organised workers of Bolivia to think about their own future and firmly to insist on working class democracy so that we can act politically as a class, following the teaching of Karl Marx's doctrine that in this way we can take responsibility for our own historical development. The FOT was based around the following organisations: the COES, which was the brains of the organisation, the hotel, electricity and tramway workers' societies, the carpenters and cabinet makers, tailors and cab drivers' organisations, the Sociedad Obreros de la Cruz and the Centro Obrero de Protection Mutual. The Federacion Ferroviaria and the printing workers were still not members of the FOT in 1921, although the FOT regarded them as allies. Through the Centro Obrero de Estudios Sociales the FOT tried to organise trades councils in the interior of the country. In turn this gave rise to several attempts to organise a national labour confederation. But the FOT's work was not merely organisational, it also led several important campaigns in support of workers' demands, such as the successful general strike of 1920 in support of the telegraph workers, who were threatened with dismissal for striking, and the 1922 railway strike at Viacha. Behind the various Federaciones del Trabajo was the Partido Socialista (about which we shall have more to say in the next chapter), whose formal

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organisation dates from 1919. The labour federations were very closely linked with the party and their newspapers served as its spokesman too. The FOT's paper, Accion Libertaria, bore the heading 'Organ of the Federation Obrera del Trabajo and of the Partido Socialista'. Accion Libertaria was the FOT's first newspaper. It appeared weekly under the editorship of Augusto Varela, with Carlos Mendoza as administrator. The issue of 1 May 1921 published part of the polemic between Ricardo Jaimes Freyre, then Minister of Education, and the reactionary senator, Abel Iturralde. The poet discussed the difference between anarchism and socialism, commenting on the confused terminology used by Iturralde. 'How is it possible', asked Jaimes Freyre, 'to be"both a socialist and an anarchist at the same time? Iturralde uses the phrase "without government"; that is the meaning of anarchism. Socialism on the other hand, means giving the state wider functions, and thus it accepts the principle of authority or social control. They are, therefore, diametrically opposed doctrines.'31 What we do not know is whether the Bolivian workers were aware at this time of Jaimes Freyre's past history as a militant socialist in Argentina (see above pp. 60—2). His poem 'Rusia' was published in the same number. Accion Libertaria also put the then obligatory stress on anti-clericalism, and an article on peasant revolts brought into the open the protests of the peasantry against the gamonales. It also pointed to the need for a workers' newspaper: 'Brother, you know very well that for a long time now we have needed a newspaper which would make known your sufferings, which would publicise the injustice and humiliation and all the terrible things inflicted on you by the foremen, the employers, the capitalists, and indeed almost everyone around you.' There was one very important new feature in the FOT which pointed to the future: it actually thought in terms of taking power, albeit by electoral means: The FOT will always put forward its .views on any national problem which affects the workers, lobbying the relevant people for laws favourable to the proletariat and demanding participation in the management of production and consumption of capital and labour. Exercising its right, both as an organisation and as individuals, the FOT aspires to take state power through the electoral process, in order to serve the permanent interests of the people. It will also exert pressure for the introduction of labour legislation.32 However, the FOT itself had no centralised unified leadership and instead an anarchistic kind of federalism prevailed: 'The FOT guarantees complete autonomy to the affiliated unions in questions of finances, internal organisation and relations with other unions.'33 At the third workers'

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congress in Oruro in 1927 (which will be considered in the next chapter) the FOT put forward proposals for the creation of a national workers' confederation. The proposals, which were rejected by the congress, were clearly anarchist in inspiration and sharpened the conflict between them and the Marxists, laying the basis for a future split in the FOT. The proposals suggested that the confederation should have a decentralised structure which would 'facilitate its organisation and development and give more initiative to local associations'. This idea was the main point of conflict with the Marxists, who wanted a centralised unified organisation. The anarchist ideas of the FOT appeared most clearly in the declaration of principles which they tried to get through the 1927 congress. The unalterable, inevitable objective of the proletariat is, through its trade unions, to create a social order based on the organisation of production and exchange and the equitable distribution of products through the associations in the trade union confederation . . . No outside force can be permitted to play any role, however small, in the leadership of the unions, because this can only have harmful effects. In their struggle against capitalism the Bolivian unions must make use of the universal weapons, the strike and the boycott . .. The National Convention declares all Bolivian Indians to be completely free and in the same conditions as the rest of the population of the republic. As a result, all obligations to perform unpaid services should be abolished. Their apoliticism emerged in the proposal that 'the organised workers who make up the Confederation Sindical Boliviana cannot, either as individuals or as a group, belong to any political party without thereby ceasing to belong to the sindical organisation'.34 Within the FOT there was a fundamental contradiction: while slowly but systematically wage labourers rallied to the movement, the leadership remained in the hands of artisans. This was one of the causes of its organisational weakness, its federal structure and the corruptibility of its leaders. At one point in the mid 1920s there was such a slackening-off of the FOT's activities that one observer regarded it as almost moribund. 'It is clear why the FOT has ceased to be active. Many members of the provisional executive committee are members of mutual or beneficent societies, and others are leaders of associations which no longer appear to be functioning and are completely disorganised. Of the five members of the executive committee, only one . . . has shown any signs of interest that the federation should continue to work for the exploited and oppressed.'35 Rivera reported that in 1925 only 13 groups and organisations were affiliated to the FOT and in all they had barely 630 members. Besides the unions and mutual societies a few cultural organisations were also affiliated,

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notably the anarchist Centro Obrero Despertar and the communist Centro Obrero Libertario. For many years Marxists and anarchists coexisted in the FOT. The Federation Obrera del Trabajo of Oruro The Federacion Obrera del Trabajo of Oruro was set up on 1 May 1919. Although it was intended to be a national organisation, events restricted its activities to the Oruro area. In contrast to what happened in the rest of the country, the Oruro FOT kept out of politics to a large extent. This was due to the influence of the anarchists who, especially through the Moises brothers, were to play a decisive role. The Oruro FOT was heavily influenced by that of La Paz and came under the growing influence of Marxism, but it ended up a staunch defender of anarchism. Organisationally it aimed at uniting the artisans with the numerically-small proletariat in the mines and industry, though it must be stressed that the organisation was based primarily on the artisans and only secondly on the proletariat. On paper its regional councils included Sucre, Cochabamba, Potosi and Santa Cruz, with local centres in the most important mining centres. But the absence of La Paz, which was the most important centre at this time, shows that, despite the Oruro FOT's proud claims, it could not be considered as a national confederation. But it did try to act as one when, in 1927, it sent an official letter to President Siles requesting an interview with him on behalf of all the departmental and local councils with the exception of La Paz. Although 1927 was the year when the Marxists began to gain the upper hand in the unions, the idea still prevailed that it was possible to reach an agreement with the government. The Federacion Obrera del Trabajo of Cochabamba

Cochabamba became one of the most important centres of the socialist and labour movements, especially in terms of ideological influence. The most important left wing politicians in the post-Chaco-War period came from this area. The FOT of Cochabamba was founded in 1918 and continued to function until 1932. The confusion between the FOT and the Partido Socialista was perhaps more complete in Cochabamba than elsewhere in Bolivia as the same people played leading roles in both organisations. The intellectuals had easy access to the federation and could exercise a strong influence on the trade-union movement. The Cochabamba labour leaders were certainly the most intellectual, and they started in-

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numerable newspapers which served as spokesmen for both the unions and the Partido Socialista.36 The federation went through several periods of depression and organisational crisis in which the unions virtually ceased to exist. According to a contemporary newspaper, there was not one labour organisation functioning in Cochabamba in 1926. However, starting with the reorganisation of the printing workers in the Union Grafica Cochabamba, the labour movement was revived and the federation held its first departmental congress in 1928. At this, the communists gained the upper hand in the organisation and many of the former leaders, who had not expected this move, took the easy way out, abandoning trade union activities. By 1930 this was producing renewed weaknesses in the organisational structure of the federation. In an attempt to reconcile the workers the Union Grafica Cochabamba called a meeting to discuss the question. But not all the unions responded favourably to the printers' idea. The resentment and separation from the movement of many of the leaders was definitive; others thought that ideological differences ruled out all possibility of reaching any agreement. The reply of Semiramis Jaldin throws some light on the relations between the Marxist-Leninist vanguard and the spokesmen for other kinds of socialism: Comrade president, you know very well that I have never hauled down my flag but still hold it high with the slogan 'Revisionist evolutionary state socialism'. I do not belong to the communist group because I think it is the ultimate in degradation, as its activities have shown, and its ideas are contrary to human nature. Only bourgeois failures, degenerate politicians and defective members of the aristocracy rally under the communist flag.37 The best comment on Jaldin's last sentence is to consider more biographies of labour leaders. For example, Arturo Borda did not rally under the communist flag, whereas Rigoberto Rivera did. Arturo Borda

Arturo Borda was born in La Paz in 1883. His father was a colonel in the army and his family belonged to the upper strata of the middle class. He attended only primary and secondary school. 'His socialist activities began in 1899, at the time of the federal revolution, when he started to give lectures to workers' circles.'38 His main occupations were writing, painting, acting, agitating and organising in the labour movement, and getting drunk. (There was a point in his life when the real Borda only appeared after he

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had had a few drinks.) 'For a time he was a customs messenger, then he spent 16 years as an auxiliary lieutenant at the Ministry of Defence, after coming up through the ranks. After that he worked as an assistant in the traffic department of the Bolivian Railway Co. in Oruro. During the Chaco War he was a second-class commissar in the police investigations department in La Paz and for two months he even stood in for a friend as chief detective (and he knew the underworld of La Paz like the back of his hand!)'39 He took part in the setting up of the first railway workers' organisations and assisted in the foundation of the Ateneo de la Juventud and the Ateneo Feminino. He acted and designed sets for the Luz y Vida and Rosa Luxembourg socialist theatre groups, which made frequent tours round the country. Borda held various posts in the La Paz FOT, including that of secretarygeneral, but he then drew away from the federation, perhaps because a period began in which he was superfluous, because he could not understand the significance of the battles between the various ideological groups for the control of the labour movement. He was not a Marxist but, in fact, was something of an anarchist since he rejected all authority and control and even order. His activities in the labour movement were just instinctive. As a simple labour leader he showed no great enthusiasm about the events surrounding the formation of the Partido Obrera Socialista in Oruro. He was sceptical and even scornful about politics and politicians, as we can see from his autobiographical writings. I do not belong to any political group because here, as everywhere else in the world, the political parties are just motley groups of plotters . . . Here there are only three parties, the Liberal, the Republican and the Radical, and another one which is in the process of formation, the socialist party. But how can a few misers, who are anxious for the benefits of power and who have virtually auctioned off our national frontiers, be called liberals? And the republicans? What can one say about a republican party in a republic? They must be joking to give it a name like that. And the so-called radicals? What are they? Just plain radicals? How come? Are they democratic radicals, aristocratic radicals, moderate radicals (!), socialist radicals, autocratic radicals or enslaved radicals, republican radicals or monarchist radicals, all at the same time? What are they playing at - tossing a coin and calling heads or tails? And what's their line? I don't see how, under such a broad generic term, they can argue for any doctrine based on the truth. And what's the funniest thing of all is that all the parties have the same programme and yet you believe in their promises.40

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But despite all this Borda was taken in by the promises of the Siles government (1926-30) and joined the ranks of the pro-government labour organisations. As secretary general of the FOT Borda was commissioned by Siles to visit the mines in the south of the country and report back on how the social legislation which had been enacted up till then was being enforced. Borda reported back as follows: The law on accidents is a dead letter everywhere outside the immediate radius of Oruro and La Paz, to the extent that in the more remote industries, especially the mines, it is just as if the law did not exist. This suits the interests of the companies and the workers are ignorant of their rights under the law. And since the companies are interested in maintaining this state of ignorance and the workers are struggling to alleviate their poverty, there is a latent spirit of conflict and there are strikes between capital and labour, which are prejudicial to the country in general but most especially to the workers, since the capitalists can rely on their vast resources. But as it is the duty of the Supreme Government to protect public order, it need do no more than peacefully ensure that the law is being complied with, and in doing so it will win the gratitude of the proletariat who produce the wealth of the nation.41 Borda made the following comments on conditions in the mines: As for the workers who operate the drills, resting against their shoulders, the vibration pulverizes their very lives . . . They are paid five pesos an hour and at the end of three months they are like walking corpses. As for the workers in the calcination furnaces . . . it is a miracle that they don't get calcinated to the marrow in a very short time . . . There are companies where children of eight years old and upwards work 12 and 24 hours a day for a derisory wage. The women who work in teams as porters have to carry a load of one quintal every journey, and work for 12 and 24 hours for a wage of one peso 20 centavos or one fifty, even when they are pregnant. . . With reference to medical services... there are some firms which have a doctor and a hospital, though they are badly equipped and serve mines between 30 and 100 kilometres apart. But there are some firms that do not even have this. A quarter-century later Borda wrote for the last time, expressing his bitterness and suffering and summing up the essence of his attitude to life and society: When one has spent one's life tortured minute by minute, with one's most urgent needs unsatisfied, and one's high ideals swept away by the insulting and outraging destruction of time and the health and fortune of vain fools, one is filled with such contempt that it is incomprehensible to anyone who has not experienced it.

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Borda died on 17 June 1953. One dry Monday he had a terrible, urgent need for a drink; he just had to have alcohol if he was to go on living. He went round all the bars in the Chijini quarter of La Paz, asking for something to drink, and everywhere he got the same answer - no. He stopped at a small tinplate shop and pleaded for something to quench his thirst. He was told they only had hydrochloric acid. Borda asked them to give it to him. He poured some out and drank it. The poison destroyed his oesophagus completely, and he died in great agony. Rigoberto Rivera Argandona

Rigoberto Rivera Argandona was born in La Paz in 1896. Rivera, who ended up a firm communist, received part of his political education in Chile as a member of the FOCH, and was secretary of the Tarapaca section of the FOCH in 1918. He became secretary-general of the barbers' guild, CESO, the Centro Obrero Internacional, in 1921, and of the Centro Obrero Libertario in 1922. He also served as secretary of the La Paz FOT in 1918, and worked with the hotel employees' and woodworkers' union. He played an active part in the Partido Obrero Socialista, founded in La Paz in 1920. Rivera was also an active journalist, which was nothing exceptional at that time, when labour leaders felt that it was one of their duties to improve their educational level. In addition to his work as director of Aurora Roja he wrote regularly for the communist paper La Correspondencia Sudamericana, published in Buenos Aires (one of his careful reports is quoted above, p. 131), and the Chilean socialist paper ElDespertar. He also worked for Action Popular, Action Libertaria and La Raza, and participated in setting up the Rosa Luxembourg and Los Precursores drama groups. To earn his living he worked as a barber in a modest little shop. To the end he remained loyal to his Marxist ideas, and was most eager to help clarify controversial aspects of Bolivian social history. He died in total poverty.42 The eight-hour day

According to Pereira there was a strike in La Paz in 1922 which was 'to a certain extent the beginning of the struggle for the eight-hour day, since on 4 June 1923 the first strike demanding this right took place in the mining centre of Uncia, which ended in the terrible massacre, so wellknown to every member of the working class.'43 Arturo Segaline, despite his careful study of the labour movement, also falls into this error: 'The 4th of June is a memorable day for the Bolivian worker because it is the

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day on which the movement for the eight-hour day began, as in Chicago 47 years earlier. In Bolivia the miners of Uncia, which is the fief of the mining magnate Simon Patino, declared a strike demanding their right to an eight-hour day and an improvement in their starvation-level wages.'44 Neither of these two influential labour leaders takes the trouble to identify their sources for such an important statement. On the other hand, it does seem to be a Bolivian custom to write history on the basis of rumours propagated by people who claim to have been in contact with the old labour leaders. In fact, an article in La Nation in late 1919 reported that the miners of Huanuni had unanimously decided to fight for the eight-hour day. According to the text of the article, the only way to put an end to the miners' strike would be for the Patino company and the Prefect of the department to sign an agreement with the union ratifying eight hours as the maximum working day in this mining district. Then in 1922 there were two important strike movements but neither of them posed the problem of the length of the working day. In early February 1922 the ultramontane Abel Iturralde, then head of the La Paz municipal council, issued an order forbidding night work for drivers and instructing any of those who did work at night to drive their passengers to the police station. The La Paz FOT mobilised all its forces and managed to get the order revoked. A law of 21 November 1924 was the first to establish the eight-hour day for employees in commerce and other industries. The first article of the law states: 'The employees of commerce and other industries will only work eight hours a day. If, in cases of necessity, they are required to work longer, this will be regarded as overtime and they will be paid double the ordinary rate.' This law bears the signature of President Bautista Saavedra and of Roberto Villanueva, and it only conceded the eight-hour day to employees of commerce and other industries. But gradually, as pressure from the different sectors of the work force increased, the scope of the law was broadened. The law of 8 January 1925 was the first to do this by interpreting the law of 1924: 'The term "and other industries" includes the employees of the mining companies and those who receive monthly salaries in the offices of the State railway companies and privately owned railway companies.' After the railway employees the tram drivers were included in the scope of the law. But despite the fact that the scope of the law was gradually broadened, it was still limited to salaried employees and did not include wage workers. On 1 May 1921 Vertiz Blanco, a well known anarchist who was then treasurer of the FOT and was later to be one of the founding members of

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the La Paz FOL, made a rousing speech in the Municipal Theatre, calling on all the workers of Bolivia to fight without rest until they obtained the eight-hour day. At the end of 1928 Vertiz Blanco, by then leader of the anarchist FOL, led a strike and massive demonstration which forced the authorities to grant this demand. However, the workers of Bolivia have learnt from bitter experience that rights granted in law are one thing and the conversion of such laws into tangible reality is another. In any case, the credit for the general establishment of the eight-hour day in law must go to the anarchists. I visited Blanco shortly before he died of old age, bowed down by a life of hardship and sacrifice and by his unceasing activity in favour of the working class. He drew himself up beside his sewing machine and told me with pride: 'In 1921 it was my aim, as a militant, to secure the eight-hour day, and in 1928 I led demonstrations on the streets until my ideals were realised.' Our homage to this brave anarchist.

12. Students, anarchists and Marxists (1925-32) The first worker congresses

The first congress of Bolivian workers was convened by the Federacion de Ferroviarios and was held in Oruro in 1921. It was attended by railway workers, tramway workers, miners, printers, commercial employees and the federations of artisans. The basic aim of the congress was to set up a national confederation but this proved impossible because of the tense conflicts between different groups at the congress. The progressive sectors of the working class clashed violently with the workers who still followed the traditional political parties, especially the governing Republican party. The second congress was.organised in 1925 by the COES and was attended by the more progressive elements of the working class, who tended towards Marxism. A leaflet published by the Popular University on 20 June gave the following reasons for summoning a congress: Until now the labour societies and the working class federations have had no defined orientation; they have been unable to act unitedly and have lacked means to coordinate the various organisations so that they could assist each other in the pursuit of common goals. In the struggle

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to secure the legitimate demands of the working class a central organisation is from now onwards absolutely indispensable. The authors of the circular did not conceal their Marxism: If today the exploited can lose nothing more than their chains and they have a world to win, then we must set out, as the Republic enters the second century of its existence, to break these chains so that we can move on to conquer the world. We must carry out Marx's instructions of long ago, so often quoted yet so seldom fulfilled: 'Workers of the world unite'. The congress was held in La Paz and was timed to coincide with the celebrations of the first centenary of Bolivian independence, thereby taking advantage of the slight increase in public liberties which the government felt obliged to grant for the occasion. A representative of the Peruvian students, Manuel Seoane, attended the congress and on his return to Peru he published his impressions of Bolivia as a book. His analysis was not very satisfactory, even allowing for the fact that the information available to him was incomplete and deficient, but the following points are of interest: The only trade unions are those of the railway workers, who recently held a successful strike; the miners in some parts of the country, and industrial workers in the capital, truckers, cabinet makers and carpenters, tramway workers, drivers, mechanics and similar occupational groups. There are a few moderately strong groups such as the Centro Obrero Libertario, Grupo Brazo y Trabajo and the Agrupaci6n Communista which are spreading progressive ideas, and there are some less important groups which are somewhat weakened and divided by their sectarianism. Their activities are limited because they are disoriented by the nature of the Bolivian situation.1 As for the congress, Seoane reported: Romulo Chumacero and Carlos Mendoza were president and secretary respectively. About 50 delegates attended from different parts of the country and from the various workers' organisations... A few dozen chairs squashed together, a red flag, a simple platform, portraits of Marx and Lenin and the symbolic banner of the hammer and sickle. In the audience Indians and Cholos pressed together full of mystical hope and a vague but powerful optimism. This is what Sorel has called the new myth of the crowds. One night I received a special invitation. The confederation's statutes were being discussed and Carlos Mendoza, a most active and intelligent organiser, and Angelica Ascui, an untiring comrade worn out to the point of exhaustion by her demanding work, had conscientiously prepared far-sighted proposals framed in the context of the class struggle.

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The organisation was to have nothing to do with bourgeois politics. The class struggle was to be its only objective, they said, and capitalism its unceasing enemy. In cases of conflict, strike and direct action would be their weapons.2 This congress was attended by the anarchists, who had not yet organised their own trade unions, as well as by the Marxists, but it was the Marxists whose analysis and proposals were adopted. From 1926 onwards, Marxist influence in the labour movement increased. For the first time the leaders and theoreticians were faced with the problem of differentiating themselves from and defeating the anarchists, who up till then had held the key posts in the labour organisations. The Third International turned its attentions to Bolivia and tried to organise its own party there. The communists made their presence felt through the last of the FOT newspapers Bandera Roja and Trabajo. The South American Secretariat of the Communist International underlined the objectives of the struggle: The revolutionary workers, peasants and students of Bolivia have several immediate tasks to realise: the formation of a communist party in Bolivia and the organisation of the worker and peasant masses. To this end they must learn how to take advantage of every opportunity, even of the reaction unleashed against them. They must arouse the masses, organising them to protest against the raids on Bandera Roja, and to demand the release of prisoners and guarantees for workers' newspapers. They must be taught to understand that only the unity of the proletariat and the peasantry can obstruct the reaction, that only by the organisation of a vanguard party can a successful struggle be waged against the government of fascist reactionaries.3 At this time the university students had mobilised to fight for university reform. The campaign was closely coordinated with the labour movement, and progressive students were prominent among the communist propagandists. Indeed, many of them were employed as workers at the same time as they studied. In 1928, the Siles government committed all kinds of abuses against the 'intelligentsia', who came out on to the streets to fight for university autonomy. A note sent to the FOT and signed by Jose Aguirre Gainsborg reported that nearly all the members of the Federacion Universitaria of La Paz had either been jailed or had fled to escape arrest, and urged the workers to take up a firm stand by the students for their joint defence.4 Bandera Roja The first number of Bandera Roja appeared in La Paz on 8 June 1926. It

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was run initially by Carlos Mendoza Mamani, Oscar A. Cerruto, Rafael A. Reyeros and Julio M. Ordonez. Felipe Reque Lozano was the administratorcum-director. It appeared regularly on a weekly basis until 1927, and reached the record for a workers' paper of 52 editions. Bandera Roja tried hard to make itself the organ of all the various revolutionary workers' organisations and to override their ideological differences. Intellectuals had to find ways of resolving the problem posed by their need to carry their ideas to the majority of the masses who had little education. They therefore had to develop their own particular journalistic techniques, popularising their ideas in simple language and short straightforward articles, referring to national events and problems and avoiding abstract or remote topics. Illustrations and engravings were used to enliven these articles and make them easier to understand. The most enthusiastic of the team was Oscar Cerruto, who in the edition of 15 June 1926 published a violent attack on American imperialist penetration in Bolivia: Bolivia is mortgaged . . . Bolivia's external debts are beyond all possibilities of repayment, and the situation becomes more complicated and difficult every day . . . Yankee imperialism has obtained the most indefensible concession one can imagine from the Saavedra government — 3,145,500 hectares of petroleum-bearing lands have been granted almost without conditions to the powerful Standard Oil Company, the notorious and sinister arm of American imperialism . . . Nearly all our tin mines are also in the hands of North American companies. It is from the clubs of La Paz and the cabarets of New York, the very metropolis itself, that they are controlled and administered. Bandera Roja can be regarded as the first newspaper to show the influence of the Third International, but nevertheless it also expressed the local conditions in which the trade union movement was developing. Thus it was exaggeratedly anti-clerical, denouncing the immorality and arbitrary actions of the bishops and lesser parish priests: Like a slippery eel the priest worms his way into the consciousness of the people in order to subdue and corrupt them . . . Workers, students, free men, let us set ourselves this task: let us demand the separation of the church and state, and expel the priests from Bolivia.5 The first number paid tribute to the victims of the massacre of Uncia. They published for the first time the complete facts about this tragic episode, and also printed a large part of the report submitted by Guillermo Gamarra in his capacity as president of the Federation Obrera of Uncia. The writers of Bandera Roja knew what journalism was about, and they printed photographs of those responsible for the massacre with a black surround: Bautisto Saavedra, 'the vicious, despotic, ill-tempered personality who ordered the massacre'; and Hans Kundt, 'the German mercenary hired

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by the tyrant Saavedra, who was responsible for this national tragedy'.6 However, the tone of the newspaper did not correspond exactly to that of other publications of the Third International; it was a typical product of the country, and reflected its cultural backwardness and its political primitivism. For example, an editorial declared that 'Bolivia is like a brothel; many of its people and institutions have prostituted themselves to the highest bidder. But these trembling servants of the bourgeoisie will be made to shriek like the whores they are.' Many of its articles expressed a kind of puerile extremism, which was much closer to anarchism. For example: 'Another of the recent advances made by the proletariat is to abolish the unfriendly and embourgeoisified title "sehor", replacing it by the melodious term "compahero" or "camarada". "Sehor" is a form of address used by members of the bourgeoisie to distinguish them from us, while the term "compahero" is the egalitarian term used among brothers of the same cause.' Bandera Roja also produced some typically Stalinist slogans, without any analysis or explanation of the matter in question. 'The Italian reformists and fascists are partners in crime: the first betrayed the proletariat, enabling the second, led by the bandit Mussolini, to strike them a deadly blow.' For the Comintern one of Bandera Roja's main purposes was to promote the organisation of a Bolivian communist party. However, the Bolivian marxists avoided stating this idea fully and explicitly. For the most part Bandera Roja argued that the main channel of working-class organisation should be through trade unions, and only rarely did they talk of a party. The editorial of 9 December 1926 was one of the most categoric statements on this question, but even this refers to a working-class party as if it were something extremely remote. 'What should the working class do to free itself from the exploitative bourgeoisie? Should not the workers ignore the dishonest suggestions of the bourgeoisie and reserve their votes exclusively for individuals who belong to the same class as themselves, or who are proven sympathisers? Should not the workers set up their own party which would be a workers' party, and which would become the biggest and most influential and powerful party in the republic?' Indeed, Bandera Roja and the associated labour organisations sponsored candidates, who were either actual workers or sympathisers with their cause. In the municipal elections of 1926 the newspaper, with the support of various federations and trade unions, nominated Demetrio Carrasco, a 'comrade' lawyer who declared himself to be the 'lawyer of several federations and workers' societies', as their candidate for the municipal council of La Paz, and they launched a very active propaganda campaign on behalf of the 'candidacy of the organised proletariat'. Although unsuccessful in

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the city, on 12 December worker candidates emerged victorious in various districts. Thus, in the copper-mining town of Corocoro the Uni6n Obrera candidate was elected; in Uncia 'Comrade Desiderio Aillon, the popular workers' candidate, won'. Even in Chayanta, a remote peasant municipality, 'Comrade Juan Manuel Crespo' was elected.7 Although Bandera Roja energetically denounced the bourgeois parliament, it approved the tactic of taking advantage of it 'until the ideal of the communist international is moulded in the minds of the workers'.8 However, the editors of Bandera Roja were already bold enough to speak up publicly for the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This would be the consequence of a social revolution provoked by the disastrous policies of the reactionaries, the paper argued.9 In July 1926 Bandera Roja's campaigns provoked the authorities into taking repressive measures against it. The editors denounced the attack on the paper and called a meeting of workers. The following day the police raided its offices, thus violating the law, and arrested the eidtors and, on the suggestion of the Peruvian Ambassador, representing the tyrannical regime of Leguia, deported Serafin del Mar. Of the editors, Julio M. Ordonez and Rafael Reyeros have been arrested and Oscar A. Cerruto, Carlos Mendoza and Felipe Reque Lozano, who escaped arrest, are being hunted down by the police as well. These measures are so arbitrary that even one of the bourgeois newspapers protested against them.10 There were two other main problems which preoccupied Bandera Roja: the eight-hour day and university autonomy. The first issue had become the common cause of all the trade union organisations, while progressive intellectuals were involved in leading the fight for university reform. The combined efforts of the FOT, other labour organisations and Bandera Roja, gave rise to the creation in November 1926 of a committee for the eighthour day. Its aim was to secure the enforcement of a law which was already on the statute book. 'How many industrial establishments comply with the eight-hour-day law? None. If the workers demand that the law should be respected, the employers make this conditional on the workers accepting a cut in their wages.' A serious conflict soon arose between editors of the paper and the owner-administrator Felipe Reque Lozano. The owner sought the support of the labour organisations and the FOT itself. Several organisations formed a committee on behalf of Bandera Roja and an assembly was held to discuss the views of the intellectuals on the editorial board. The meeting came out on the side of Reque Lozano and decided that Bandera Roja should be declared the official newspaper of the labour movement. The following

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team of workers replaced the intellectuals: Guillermo Gamarra, Guillermo Maceda Caceres, Rigoberto Rivera, J. Valenzuela and Nicolas M. Zevallos. Subsequently Bandera Roja returned to the theme of anti-clericalism in every number, in a vulgar, gross and far from edifying way. This reflected the fact that the worthwhile intellectuals had been expelled from the editorial board. In Number 18 they started a long scandalous campaign against Bishop Julio Garret. Political campaigns

In late 1926 and early 1927 the FOT and Bandera Rofa launched a campaign against proposed increases in taxes, especially the road tax: The road tax has been in existence for many years . . . Before 1925 it was two pesos, but under the pretext of raising funds to celebrate the centenary of Bolivian independence it was raised to four pesos. After the centenary celebrations were over, the President proposed to Congress that the tax should remain at four pesos throughout 1926. The socalled 'representatives of the people' in parliament, who always in fact respond in a docile manner to the measures suggested by the executive, agreed to this proposal. .. The new President [Siles] has now proposed to increase the road tax to twelve pesos . . . under the pretext . . . of financing the construction of roads over the republic . . . On 16 March the Oruro FOT answered the call for action made by the workers' newspaper and organised a large meeting to protest against the proposal.11 The La Paz FOT followed the example of the Oruro workers and 'summoned the proletariat in general to an open meeting on the 23rd of the present month. The meeting was enormous - it was estimated that twenty thousand workers and employees attended the protest meeting organised by the FOT.'12 The protests resulted in a victory for the workers, and President Siles acceded to their demands. The city-based agitation then spread out to the countryside, and in July and August 1927 about a hundred thousand peasants in Cochabamba, Potosi and Sucre rose up in revolt against the authorities and the landowners. In the department of Cochabamba thirty thousand peasants gathered together around Vacas and Tiraque. The authorities and landowners fled the district, and the landowners demanded the government's protection. Around Sucre the peasants were crushed when the army general staff turned their machine guns on the protesters. In the Altiplano the repression was even more brutal. Eight hundred soldiers of the Camacho regiment set out from Oruro to 'restore order' to the large haciendas and the peasant communities. The foreign press agency, UP, reported that

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'there was only one death among the soldiers and the whites, but more than 200 Indians were killed'. President Siles and the labour movement

Despite his difficulties with the workers in the first year Siles had some success in winning over workers' leaders during the course of his government. With the help of some FOT leaders circles of workers were organised to support the policies of Siles. In September 1927 some FOT leaders even set up a tenants' association. In the same month the Centro Patriotica proDefensa Nacional Hernando Siles was formed. According to the official newspapers it was a group formed by 'distinguished intellectuals and workers'. The president of the new patriotic centre was Justino Valenzuela Catacora. In their declaration of principles the Silista workers proclaimed their whole-hearted support tor the Supreme Government, and announced their intention of founding committees of the Centro in all the mining and industrial centres. The government newspaper ElPais commented that 'it should be noted that people like Sr Arturo Borda have approved the creation of this organisation and have offered to co-operate with its sponsors'. (The same Arturo Borda, ex-president of the FOT, whose biography was sketched above on pp. 133—6). The labour leaders who had gone over to Siles were called on to combat the President's predecessor and greatest enemy, the populist Saavedra. They were signatories of the following attack on Saavedra in ElPais: 'The people still vividly recall the mass shooting of the working people at Uncia by Colonel Ayoroa, Saavedra's most faithful servant. Likewise they still remember the savage stoning of distinguished members of the Republican party including Doctor Salamanca, Bolivia's greatest orator, and Sr Monje Gutierrez and many others in Oruro . . . ' They swore never to forget the huge impositions which Saavedra had made on the people. Then came the inevitable hymns of praise to the ruler of the moment: 'Today's President Hernando Siles is making great efforts to save the finances of the tin industry . . . ' The Centro de Defensa was eventually set up on 14 February 1928. It resolved firstly 'to declare open support for the government of Dr Hernando Siles, who has every intention to improve the situation of the workers', and secondly 'to support the Partido de la Union Nacional, for its programme is quite progressive enough for us and will satisfy the immediate needs of the proletariat'. In 1927 the Workers' Congress proposed that the police force on the mining camps should be composed of workers, and Siles hastened to implement this reform. The Centro de Defensa Obrera did not miss the opportunity to express its gratitude to and praise

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for the government: 'The last session agreed unanimously to offer a vote of thanks to Your Excellency for the excellent decree requiring the police forces of the mining camps to recruit from the working classes, thus meeting the demands of the recent workers' congress in Oruro The Oruro congress decided to set up a Confederacion Nacional de Trabajo as a national confederation of trade unions, and a manifesto of the Centro de Defensa Obrera dated 1 March 1928 appeared with the signatures of Rodolfo Solis, Montana, Borda and Valenzuela in the name of the confederation: We are firmly convinced that the present government is determined to introduce legislation in favour of the working classes, and that the young nationalist members of parliament are unanimously resolved to second this proposal, and thus comply with the programme of the party that has brought them to parliament . . . The Centro de Defensa Obrera Nacionalista Hernando Siles reminds all the workers of their collective interests and calls on all workers to unite with the government in order to make the companies comply with the Supreme Decree which orders the setting up of a police force composed of workers in the mining camps... Many labour leaders sincerely believed that by working with President Siles they could obtain positive benefits for the working class; we could say that they were honourably deceived; Arturo Borda, the strange bohemian artist, should be included in this category. But there were also others who apparently hoped to use the labour movement for their own personal gain. On 28 October 1925 Siles was told that a Dr Siles Club had been formed in the mining centre of Pulacayo, to campaign for him in the elections, and the Club asked him to send money for this purpose. Siles' private secretary, Gosalvez, had to reply: 'As for financial assistance, I must tell you frankly that I do not have the means to finance the campaign for the elections.' Nevertheless Siles did his best to win the confidence of the workers. In July 1926 he visited the mining centres of Uncia, Llallagua and Huanuni, where there were noisy demonstrations of support. He also visited the scene of the Uncia massacre, as part of his campaign to destroy Saavedra's popularity. He wrote a friendly letter to Arturo Borda about the report which the latter had made on the terrible working conditions in the mines. It was dated 17 February 1927 and said: My esteemed friend, I have received your letter of the 14th in which, as you had offered to do, you told me your impressions of your recent tour round the mining districts, and suggested some ideas for improving the situation

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of the proletariat, which are worth considering. I am very grateful to you for your report. I have as yet to study it in detail and formulate some legal provisions to satisfy the workers' justified demands. I was pleased to hear that you approve of the decree relating to the company stores. Your friend and servant . . , 13

Pre-Chaco student congresses

Cochabamba and the other universities have produced many left-wing politicians who have exercised great influence in the labour movement: Jose Antonio Arze, Ricardo Anaya, A. Villalpando, A. Valencia, E. Arce Loureiro, Jose Aguirre Gainsborg, are a few examples. But most of them ended up betraying their left-wing ideas and only a few became proletarianised and remained revolutionaries. The intellectuals, who at one time or another took Marxist ideas to the masses, came from the universities. Around 1925 a student federation was set up in Cochabamba which played an important role in organising a national Federation Universitaria Boliviana (FUB). Indeed the organisation of a national student congress was its main objective. The National Convention of Students held in Cochabamba in August 1928 indicated that the most progressive members of the student body were moving towards Marxism. Representatives from all over the country attended the convention, including some of the most outstanding student activists of the day, who had already put their courage to the test in the fierce campaigns against the Siles Government. There were three main influences on the FUB: the university reform movement which started in Cordoba, Argentina, and spread throughout the continent; the Russian revolution, whose influence reached Bolivia through the propaganda and activities of the communist parties in Latin America; and finally, the Bolivian labour movement which was then setting up trade unions and proposing a class-based party. The congress adopted the statutes proposed by Jose Antonio Arze. The aims of this national student organisation were to include the following: to produce a single ideological platform for the country's student population, to facilitate cooperation between manual and intellectual workers by organising worker—student solidarity committees and working for the unionisation of teachers and intellectual workers in general, and to establish a Liga Pro Indio (a movement in favour of the Indian peasantry). They also sought changes in the laws regulating education at all levels, starting with the establishment of university autonomy, and they would try to

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persuade the government to promote more modern teaching methods in the educational system.14 A programme of principles was adopted on the basis of the proposals of Arce and Anaya (two student leaders who were later to become the main leaders of the Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR)). Its main clause declared: 'The youth of Bolivia can no longer remain indifferent to the profound social transformations which are going on throughout the world . . . the youth of our universities proclaim their unwavering opposition to the forces of reaction and their solidarity with free-thinking youth, the organised working class and the high-minded, impartial intellectuals of the world.' University students would never abandon their right to take positions on social problems, they added, and concluded by pointing out that the defects of contemporary society also affected the life of the university, obstructing the achievement of its high ideals. But even in the first proclamation of the student generation of 1928 there were signs of the revisionism that was later to become so marked: 'The new creed is based on principles of reform. The youth of Bolivia realise that, to be effective, these ideas must be applied in accordance with the relative conditions of time and place.' There can be no doubt that this concluding sentence reflects the influence of Haya de la Torres' Peruvian party APRA, which used this formula as part of its theory. Even if the students were moving towards Marxism, they were still a long way from being Marxists. The students proposed that the handling of educational matters should be entrusted to the universities, and that a national council for education should be created. Future educational legislation should be based on the following principle: Education should be aimed at the all-round development of the personality, that is to say, the harmonious development of the physical, intellectual and moral faculties. Integrated schools should prepare everyone for both manual and intellectual work . . . the new school should set out to create what, in the future society, will be a community of useful, equal workers. The historic significance of this congress is that it adopted the following immediate objectives: the unionisation of the working and middle classes, the emancipation of women, national unity through a federal system of government, the formation of a political party on a new basis (although they did not suggest that this should be a class-based party), honest elections (a liberal dream), the socialisation of private wealth, that is the nationalisation of the mines and petroleum deposits, and the curtailment of latifundismo. (About the same time the workers started to use the slogan 'The land to the Indians, the mines to the State.') On the international

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front they proposed the creation of a confederation of Latin American university students, which would spread the new ideas of thinkers such as Ingenieros, Vasconcelos, Palacios, etc., and the organisation of a Latin American confederation of labour. Finally the students expressed the hope for a society 'with no gods in the heavens and no masters on earth'. 15 This first programme of the student movement was inconsistent and its theories were confused. It contained a lot of lyrical proclamations and a multitude of secondary details which could well have been included in a separate document. Hence it has long since been forgotten. The second students' congress was held in Sucre in 1929 and, according to Javier Baptista, a journalist, it was very extremist. Then in the 1930 revolution the students contributed to the success of a revolution inspired by the mineowners against Siles, by fighting at the barricades against the government. Only the students affiliated to the masonic lodges understood what it was all about; the rest fell into a reactionary trap, thinking they were working for the social revolution. The so-called 'Revolution of Villazon' is an example of the unrealistic voluntarism which prevailed on the left at this time. At dawn on 16 June 1930 the police station, customs house and other government offices in Villazon were attacked. The rebels took over this remote but strategic frontier town and converted it into their general headquarters. They were a group of young left-wingers, including some who had first taken up arms in the university reform movement and others who had been active in the trade unions. They were headed by Roberto Hinojosa, who had been president of the Federation de Estudiantes de Cochabamba in 1920. They managed to get the support of part of the garrison of the frontier town for their coup, which, they argued, had the decisive support of labour and left-wing groups in the interior of the country. The young rebels started from the supposition that, given the loss of prestige and the corruption of the Siles government, a bold coup leading to the control of any town in the country would be enough to ignite a revolutionary movement throughout the land. However, the government isolated Villazon and accused the rebels of common assault. A large edition of their manifesto, 'To the Bolivian nation on the first day of the revolution', was distributed in the hope of provoking countrywide uprisings. This document outlined the programme and objectives of the 'first democratic republic in South America', which, it claimed, was born in Villazon. 'Land and Liberty is the watchword of the Bolivian revolution, which will spread like flames until the latifundios are seized and divided up under a lease system.'16 Another war-cry typical of the labour movement was also included: 'The mines to the State, or more precisely, mines for the workers of Bolivia.' With attacks on the large mine-

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owners and the Standard Oil Co. and the Nicolaus and Speyer contracts the manifesto also acquired an anti-imperialist tone. The manifesto also promised university reform and a reformed army. What caused the greatest impression outside Bolivia was the declaration that the revolutionaries would work for a South American confederation, 'in spite of the regional differences and hatreds provoked by past generations who lacked a wide continental vision'. Finally the manifesto added: 'We do not wish to be a colony of Bolshevism, because Moscow is not the ideal centre to direct our revolution, either ideologically or politically.' Observers outside Bolivia were falsely impressed by these events at Villazon. The only ones to escape this error were the Bolivians themselves, who considered the famous 'revolution' to be an isolated, exotic adventure. When the news about Villazon appeared in the press everyone was surprised, especially the labour leaders. Nobody had been informed about the plans and 'revolutionary' schemes of Hinojosa, who was not a member of any political party and nor was he a trade-union leader. Hinojosa later maintained that his movement failed only because 'there was an unexpected problem with rail transport'. He gives so much importance to this coup that he thinks he was responsible for the overthrow of President Siles, which took place very shortly afterwards. The reactionaries merely took advantage of what he had done: 'The news of the revolution made the rotten Siles regime crumble . . . with a single push I would have toppled the puppet from his throne . . . It was others who did this, but only after we had deprived Siles of all legal and popular support.'17 However, the real reason for the failure of the Hinojosa revolution was its isolation. The government only needed to mobilise a few troops (two regiments, according to La Revolution de Villazon) to put down the rebels. The downfall of Siles was followed by a referendum held under the provisional government of Blanco Galindo, who was a freemason and the manager of one of Patirio's companies in Cochabamba. The referendum resulted in the granting of autonomy to the universities, which meant that they were to be self-governing and in control of their own finances. Many advocates of university reform believed that at that moment, with this one narrow reform, they were entering an era of socialism. But history has shown that, far from being socialist, this measure was a cynical manoeuvre on the part of the ruling class to buy off the students and neutralise the student population at least for the moment. 'Although university autonomy was an idea thought up by the reformists, it was used by the elite to create their own shock force and divide the local universities into assault groups. Autonomy freed the universities from the weak influence of the state only to subject them to the total influence of the oligarchy.'18

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The anarchists

Up to this point the Marxists, both those with social-democratic inclinations and those affiliated to the Third International, had coexisted with the anarchists in the same workers' organisations and had worked together on the same 'revolutionary' newspapers. In general, these tendencies were not yet separately organised along clear-cut ideological lines. As we shall see, at the Third Workers' Congress in Oruro in 1927, the conflicts between the 'authoritarians' and the 'libertarians' came out into the open and resulted, in 1930, in a violent and apparently irreversible split. However, considerably earlier, from about 1920, there were already specifically anarchist organisations in existence, such as the Centro Obrero International, which published a newspaper, Aurora Roja.19 The anarchists were largely organised by foreigners, such as Fournarakis, a militant of the Argentine anarchist movement FORA who came to Bolivia when he was exiled from his own country; Armando Trevino, a Chilean cobbler who belonged to the IWW; a Spaniard called Nicolas Mantillas, who acted politically under the name of Rousinol; Renjel, a Mexican who was in Bolivia in 1928; and another Argentinian called Huerta. The Federation Obrera Local de La Paz

In 1926 the anarchists decided to organise the Federation Obrera Local (FOL) of La Paz in opposition to the FOT. The FOL later rejected the decisions reached at the Third Workers' Congress at Oruro, which was almost completely dominated by the Marxists. The anarchists only managed to secure control of two significant organisations, the La Paz FOL and the Oruro FOT. The La Paz FOL was made up of trade unions (with apparently 38 unions affiliated) and the Despertar anarchist group, but another anarchist group, La Antorcha, did not affiliate. The founding unions included the woodworkers, who played an important role in the battle for the eight-hour day, the bricklayers, the tailors and the workers in the match factory. Later on the unions of the cardboard factory and the large Said textile factory also affiliated. Thus the La Paz FOL became a very important focus of mass organisation and at one point it was numerically stronger than the La Paz FOT. In 1928 the La Paz FOL started to publish its own weekly paper, Humanidad, of which only a few numbers appeared. Given the current practices in the labour movement, it was surprising to see on the title page the announcement that the paper was directed by 'Sr' Guillermo Pelaez, 'Sr' G. Maceda, 4Sr' D. Osuna and 'Sr' Luis Salvatierra. This must have

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caused a scandal, because in the fourth number (14 May) a notice appeared. 'What is our foreman doing, prefacing the names of the editors with the title "Senor" on the front page of the paper? How absurd! What nonsense! Calling a few poor little workers who are equal to the rest of us workers "Senor". It is enough to make one die of laughter.' From the fifth number onwards the offending title disappeared. (Compare the Bandera Roja article quoted on p. 142.) The articles of Luis Salvatierra show that he was simply a rebel who did not take the trouble to analyse the real causes of the existing social problems: 'Mother, look at your son exploiting his brothers in the mines, in the fields, in the workshops; look at him sowing poverty and contaminating the air with the deadly stench of slavery and speculation. Mother, you should be horrified, really horrified, at the macabre dance of the monsters you bore.' 20 On the other hand, the number dated 14 May included an article by Ramon Iturri Jurado, under his pen name of Tomas Catari, urging the workers to organise themselves in unions. He came out energetically in favour of the workers' press, arguing that the workers should read it and boycott the bourgeois press. The workers should prefer the workers' papers because they are written by calloused hands in everyday language; they make instructive and honest reading; their ideas are sincerely expressed and are in accordance with the workers' opinions; they could not care less about the academic niceties of the wealthy newspapers, which are written for the rich and are supported by them. An effort was also made to bring women into journalism. They had already given ample evidence of their devotion to the cause in propaganda and organisational activities. Narcissa D. de Rocha wrote an article denouncing the wretched situation of the working class woman and mother.21 An article in the fifth number stated categorically that in Bolivia 'the social question exists', although admitting that it was not exactly the same as that of European countries. 'It does not even resemble the Russian situation, as many have tried to argue. Indeed, not even in the neighbouring republics is the working-class problem the same as here.' The characteristics of the country made it inevitable that the labour movement would be defined by the interests of the artisans: 'The workers of La Paz only think of becoming the owners of a small workshop where they can be the boss.'22 However the social question was tackled from a different angle in the sixth number: 'A worker in the mines of Corocoro exhausts all his energy and wastes his youth to earn a miserable wage, while the mining company makes vast profits which it refuses to share with the worker, although he sacrifices his life in the process of production.'23

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Another article showed that the FOL followed a 'Libertarian syndicalist' line: 'There are three kinds of syndicalism: one is red, because through its activities it seeks to establish a communist state — that is to say, the dictatorship of the proletariat, as in Russia. The second kind is yellow, because it collaborates with bourgeois politics. Lastly there is liberterian syndicalism, which has nothing to do with politics, whether communist, socialist or republican, and seeks to solve the workers' problems directly; that is to say, the union negotiates directly with the capitalist or the authorities, without allowing any intermediaries to act for them.'24 As a corollary of this position, Humanidad and the FOL continually denounced all attempts to involve the working-class movement in politics and stressed the failure of parliamentary methods. 'There is nothing more dangerous to the working class in its struggle to secure its rights than the meddling of individuals whose activities are directed towards political ends.'25 But Humanidad\ vociferous campaigns did not meet with an adequate working-class circulation, and it ran into economic difficulties which forced it to cease publication. In the seventh number the editors gave full expression to their disappointment: We do not know where the apathy of the working class is leading us. We do not understand the hostile atmosphere which extends throughout the labour organisations of the Republic in a most alarming manner. This reaction makes the few of us who have made great efforts to promote the discussion of social ideas in this part of South America very sad, and it fills us with pessimism.26 The financial accounts of the paper were published in the same number; they were depressing. Despite collections from social evenings and financial assistance from the FOL there was a deficit of 141 bolivianos for the publication of six numbers. Of course, these anarchists had to compete with other labour leaders who were prepared to participate directly in political life. Thus, for example, in late 1928, just before another election campaign, progressive elements of the labour movement joined together in another political organisation, the Partido Laborista. This new version of the Partido Socialista differed qualitatively from the earlier attempts to set up a party. The Partido Laborista was to be a united front of manual and intellectual workers. Until then it had been argued that there should be no outside influences on the workers' party, which had meant that petty-bourgeois intellectuals were excluded. Now the doors were opened to the intellectuals who emphasised their 'communist position'. The second circular issued by the party was directed especially to all

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industrial workers, and explained why the name Partido Laborista had been chosen: We have been repeatedly deceived by political parties led by hypocritical so-called 'doctors'; parties where the worker has been used by his leaders in pursuit of their petty ambitions; parties where personal greed has been more important than the programme;. . . Eight years ago a group of workers formed the Partido Socialista which fought a number of energetic campaigns; but since the tyrannical regime of the time put strong pressure on them, and since the name of the party aroused many ill-founded suspicions in an environment which is not conducive to doctrinal considerations, the name of the party had to be changed .. . Now, learning from the experience of past struggles, we have decided to take the name of the Partido Laborista, without losing sight of our basic doctrines which are essentially Marxist. The circular stressed that the party aimed at the maximum well-being of the people through the socialisation of the means of production, and added that: 'The Partido Laborista is the people organised as a party.' 27 The party adopted Marx's phrase: 'The emancipation of the workers is the task of the working class itself as its slogan, and as its symbol the hammer and sickle enclosed in olive branches against a background of a rising sun. (A copy of the symbol which appeared in the publications of the Comintern during 1920.) In 1928 these details tell us more than any programme and show that people 'affiliated to the Third International' as the 'nationalists' like to call them had managed to win key posts in the labour movement. Differences emerged within the new Partido Laborista as to whether or not they should participate in the municipal elections of December 1928. Some members were opposed to taking part, either because they thought the party was too weak or because there were no guarantees for the workers: RIGOBERTO RIVERA: I only want to say this, that in practice there are no guarantees for the workers. E. SANABRIA: We must confront all the dangers and a committee should be set up to demand the necessary guarantees from the authorities. J. FERNANDEZ: I think we should contest the elections; given that our situation is very tight, we should set up small commissions to handle the propaganda. A. MACEDA: At any other time we could remain indifferent, but this time I think we must take part in the elections. MAX LANDA: There is a majority in favour of taking part.

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G. GAMARRA: I regret to say that I disagree with the majority of my comrades and support the opinion of comrade Rivera. E.G. LOZA: It grieves me that we are faltering in the pursuit of our cherished objectives, just because of the fear of the state of siege. Great revolutionaries such as Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev and others triumphed because of their relentless determination to continue the struggle. We must take part in the elections, despite all the difficulties. In the last few days I have been visiting our companions in one workshop after another and they have told me that this time they are willing to abandon their traditional political affiliations, even if only temporarily, to help the cause of the working class on election day.28 Once the elections were over little was heard of the Partido Laborista until the general elections of May 1929 when once again it becan to circulate manifestoes. In an appeal for votes, which indicates the extent to which they were blinded by electoralist illusions, the party proclaimed: To try to corrupt the voters by offering them money is the worst abuse in a democracy. Fortunately the electoral code provides the voter with a refuge in the secret ballot, a device which enables the voter to follow the dictates of his conscience . . . Workers who have really clear consciences and want to see our institutions improved should elect their representatives from among the qualified members of the proletariat . . . The Labour candidates will not offer a single penny to the electors because they believe such conduct would degrade the workers. All they offer in exchange for the working class vote is to defend the interests of their class in parliament and the municipal councils, and to fight with all their might for the abolition of taxes, which day by day become more of a burden and more unjust.29 (However the Partido Laborista encountered a series of difficulties and failed to establish a stable organisation. In a letter dated 12 November 1930 they informed the Prefect of La Paz that they had reorganised themselves with a view to participating in national politics. On 20 November the Prefect replied that before they could be granted guarantees he must receive their programme, the documents of the foundation of the party and the names of the members of its executive committee, the location of its headquarters and its meeting places. Unable to do this, the Partido Laborista found itself in an illegal situation.) Another potential rival to the anarchists for the leadership of the working class was the clandestine Communist Party. Around 1928 the South American Bureau of the Communist International instructed its Bolivian cells to change their tactics with reference to building up the party. They decided that the climate of political persecution obliged the party to go

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underground to avoid being destroyed by the police before it could get established. This catalyst group was to remain in secret as long as necessary and was to use infiltrationist tactics to win over other organisations to communism and to lead the masses indirectly. The bureau gave instructions as to how the party was to be organised. The clandestine Communist Party, which survived until the Chaco War, recruited its cadres among intellectuals as well as militant workers, and in this it differed from previous efforts to organise a communist party. The party published very little propaganda and even this did not reach many people, certainly not the peasants and workers, as the Bureau had instructed. The clandestine Communist Party was not a party in the strictest sense of the word. Rather it was a small circle of friends who, in order to give the impression that they were strongly organised, banded together on the executive committee. Nevertheless, they felt that they were in touch with the masses and deluded themselves that they were directing the labour movement through the few prestigeful leaders they recruited. The communists worked in the same tradition as the old socialist parties, which were just small cliques, and completely ignored the organisational principles of Bolshevism. Communism became an individual secret rather than a powerful propaganda movement capable of reaching the masses. It does not follow that because a party has to work clandestinely it should also conceal its ideas (which is what the Bolivian communists, incorrectly, tended to assume). Rather, clandestinity means that the party's activities should escape the control of the police. The weakness of this underground Communist Party can be measured by the scarcity of its propaganda and by its complete incapacity to coordinate the activities of its persecuted and imprisoned cadres, or to provide its militants with organisational and material assistance. Almost all its energies were spent in secret indirect attempts to capture the leadership of a few unions and in correspondence with persecuted workers. One of these letters sent by the executive committee of the Communist Party to some imprisoned comrades reads as follows: The executive committee of the Communist Party write to you in the hope of establishing close contact with you and other imprisoned comrades. We well understand your difficult situation but, because of the limited resources of our organisation, which is just beginning to develop, we have not been able to send you any assistance. The party's executive has, however, organised a prisoners' aid committee. Unfortunately this committee has not been able to do very much because of lack of experience of its members - a factor which is common to the majority of the Bolivian labour organisations. . . Despite the difficult situation in which

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you find yourselves, the executive committee of the Communist Party thinks that comrades should take advantage of their confinement to set up a communist organisation in the locality; they should do all they can to make contact with the indigenous masses to attract them to the Communist Party.30 The international conflict between the Stalinist bureaucracy and the Left Opposition did not reach Bolivia in the pre-Chaco War period. The clandestine Communist Party knew nothing about this dispute and therefore did not develop any ideological splits. During the Chaco War a large number of Communists were drafted into the army, and the clandestine Communist Party was practically destroyed by the political repression. At this time there were in fact several Marxist groups which were willing to use any method, including the falsification of delegates' credentials, in order to seize the leadership of the labour movement. In reaction to these tactics many unions became receptive to anarchist arguments and, between 1927 and 1931, the latter seized their opportunity to acquire massive though temporary support from the labour movement. Particularly after the economic crisis began in 1929 the anarchists, for a while, came to play the leading role. Thus in 1930 the Federation Obrera de Trabajo (FOT) of Oruro was reorganised by the anarchists, many of whom came to Oruro from other cities or from abroad. The old FOT had ceased to function and the trade unions were in a state of disorganisation, but the new leaders very soon had the most important groups of workers in the department organised and ready for combat. For example, the Sindicato de San Jose, on the outskirts of Oruro, began to function again on 25 March 1930, at a time when the mining company employed 3,500 workers. Women workers were organised for the first time in Oruro in the Sindicato Feminino de Oficios Varios, which fought some memorable battles against the authorities and the employers. Soon this union became one of the most combative in the FOT, which based its organisational structure on the La Paz FOL. Most of the women in the union were traders in the markets. The anarchist FOT of Oruro became a very substantial organisation, which was highly disciplined, combative and very active. The FOT's first big conflict came when the employers of the San Jose mine tried to obstruct the FOT's activities. After negotiations with the Prefect a referendum was held among the workers, who gave the FOT their overwhelming support. The anarchists realised that it was essential for the future strength of the federation to organise unions in the largest mining camps — Catavi-Siglo XX, Uncia and Huanuni — which were isolated in the mountains behind Oruro. But the strict control exercised by the authorities of these districts obstructed their efforts at reorganisation. Very

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often the delegates sent to the large mining camps were arrested by the police. It proved impossible to organise the workers of Catavi and Uncia into unions affiliated to the FOT, but a union was set up in the mine of Huanuni under the leadership of an anarchist called Lara. The Oruro FOT defined its ideological line thus: Our doctrine is that of anarchistic communism and our method of struggle is libertarian syndicalism'. However, on 10 June 1930 (in the middle of the political crisis which led to the overthrow of President Siles by the army), the FOT's office was closed by the police and its leaders were arrested. The anarchist 'revolution'

This was the time at which the anarchists of the La Paz FOL had laid plans for their own revolution. What were they hoping to achieve and what was their programme? There do not appear to be any documents about this event and the participants who are still alive dismiss it as a juvenile error. (Their average age was then about 30.) It seems that the anarchists were pushed into taking such action by the misery of the masses who were then living through the ordeal of the Great Depression: unemployment was acute and they could not endure the existing state of affairs any longer. Furthermore, repression increased daily: indeed the anarchist leaders of Oruro were brought to jail in the police station of La Paz at the very time of the revolution. The desperation produced by these conditions led the anarchists to take part in a conspiracy. A meeting of the La Paz FOL was told that Pablo Maras had secured the support of the Carabineros regiment and that through a conscripted comrade they had also won over part of the Colorado regiment. The FOL leadership was clearly split: Osuna and Carlos Calderon opposed the uprising, not for ideological reasons but because they thought it was inadequately prepared; but Cusicanqui and Maras managed to enthuse their companions with the plan and precipitate the events. One night a group of the conspirators met near the cardboard factory in the Purapura quarter of La Paz and, armed with dynamite and firearms, set off to capture the strategic points. Another group, under Cusicanqui's command, was to approach from the Tembladerani quarter of the city. The office of the butchers' union in Los Andes was to serve as the base for a third group. It had been arranged that when a third explosion of dynamite was heard, the doors of the main barracks in Miraflores would be opened from within to let the revolutionaries enter and carry off supplies of arms. The third explosion sounded at midnight and a squadron of the Colorados (who had been warned earlier about the events) emerged from the barracks

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to capture the conspirators who were approaching. Even onlookers and 27 soldiers were arrested, and they were all taken off to the Panoptico prison, together with the arrested anarchists who included Pablo Maras and Flores, who remained in prison for a month. Two rebel squadrons did manage to get out on to the streets, but the officers came out from their mess across the road and fired on them until they dispersed. The other group of anarchists were pursued through the north of the city but managed to escape without being captured. There is no doubt that the conspiracy had been betrayed and that some of their supporters had withdrawn. The next day the press gave large headlines to their adventures. At the meeting which planned the uprising there was some discussion of the programme the revolutionary government would have adopted if the movement succeeded. Those who favoured the uprising argued that the FOL's action would spark off a continental upheaval and their revolutionary coup would be followed by others in Argentina, Chile and Peru. Only Huerta put forward solid arguments against this kind of reasoning: a revolution of this kind would give rise to a dictatorship, that is to say a type of regime which was the very opposite of what anarchist principles stood for. He posed an old insoluble problem. We are assured that, in addition to the La Paz conspiracy, anarchists in Oruro agreed to coordinate with Marxist groups, with a view of a revolutionary coup, and it is said that work was under way to win over the Camacho regiment. Although none of this is very certain, what is certain is that there was a great increase in agitation as a result of unemployment and increasing poverty. In Oruro the unemployed were organised by Agustin Orgaz. The Fathers of Mercy opened soup kitchens, but this charitable gesture was insufficient to quell the hunger of the population. Anarchist-organised meetings became increasingly frequent all over the country and in La Paz there were clashes between demonstrators and the police. Following the overthrow of President Siles the world economic crisis continued to deepen and in Bolivia poverty and unemployment increased and the country was shaken by a wave of agitation. To relieve the growing social unrest in Oruro the authorities provided employment for 1,000 workers in public-work schemes. At the time, Oruro was the city most ripe for a possible revolutionary outburst. The unemployed attacked restaurants and hotels, and it became necessary to set up soup kitchens to feed them. Unemployment became worse as workers were laid off in the copper mine of Corocoro and many other mines. La Republica of 6 November 1930 reported: 'Unemployment increases: more than 300 workers have been laid off at the Animas mine, which belongs to the Minas

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de Bolivia Company owned by Aramayo. The exact reason for this decision is not yet known but it is probably due to the present low price of tin. The majority of these workers have set off in search of work in the mines of Huanuni and Llallagua.' It was in this climate that, on 5 August 1930, three leaders of the Confederation Boliviana de Trabajo were delegated to ask the new military government for guarantees so that they could hold a national congress. This congress, which is often referred to as the fourth congress, produced a showdown between the Marxists and the anarchists. The latter considered it as the first congress because it approved of libertarian apolitical syndicalism as its ideological line. Despite their ideological rejection of politics the anarchists of the La Paz FOL were, as we shall see below, firmly convinced that they had contributed to the revolution against Siles, 'giving their moral support and even shedding their blood'. It is clear that the workers did participate in a limited, almost underground, way in the movement led by the military. Nevertheless the new regime continued to repress the labour movement, just as the previous regime had done, and a group of communist agitators were imprisoned. The labour organisations were not only mistaken about the nature of the revolution which overthrew Siles; they also persisted in claiming that they had played a part in it, either in the hope of gaining some immediate advantage or in an attempt to influence the development of government policies. But unfortunately the military junta was not favourably disposed to the workers. At the Oruro congress the anarchists took the initiative from the very beginning. They had no intention of continuing the work of the previous three congresses, which they considered unrepresentative because they were controlled by the bolsheviks. This time the anarchists intended to convert the congress into an element of an anarchist federation in the 'Bolivian region' and, for this reason, they persisted in calling the Oruro congress the 'first congress'. It opened on 6 August 1930 and the anarchosyndicalists were in a majority from the beginning and became the only group present after the FOT delegations from La Paz and Potosi walked out. However the anarchist confederation hardly had any time to begin its activities before government repression put the leadership out of action. It disappeared altogether in 1932, when the government gave orders that all trade union activities should cease because of the war with Paraguay. The basic weakness of the confederation lay in the fact that it could not muster reliable support from the various federations, the only exception being the FOT of Oruro and the La Paz FOL. The following letter from Modesto Escobar to Manuel Cruz Duran, dated 28 September 1930, shows clearly

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the difficulties the new workers' confederation encountered: Salvatierra, Jorge Moises, Luis Gallardo and other comrades, including Tordoya, were detained by the Prefect of Oruro, Colonel Aliaza, and were sent to Todos Santos at least a fortnight ago. Legal proceedings are now being taken against Raquel, the Moises' sister, with the aim of confining her in Carangas. The bolsheviks are responsible for all these manoeuvres, with Hugo Sevillana acting as the main instrument of the Prefect. After the Oruro congress, which many regarded as a complete failure since it shattered the apparent unity of the labour movement, the anarchists became the main target for government repression. On 4 October 1931 the office of the La Paz FOL was closed down. El Socialista reported that the authorities gave as their reason the need for the defence of 'social order and tranquility'. Likewise the women's union failed to meet when it found the federation's headquarters closed. Instead its leaders were taken off to the central police station. The anarchists wanted to impose their ideas and were not inclined to compromise with anybody. Their immediate aim was to differentiate themselves clearly from the 'authoritarian socialists', and it did not worry them that to do this they had to split the labour movement. In this they followed the example of the FORA in Argentina. After the Chaco War broke out in June 1932 the anarchists drew up another plan to overthrow the government of Salamanca. By this time the FOL had become a conspiratorial organisation and was riddled with distrust. Former members of the FOL are still alive who accuse Modesto Escobar of being a police agent and maintain that he confessed to this. There was a concrete case of working class betrayal in Bolivia during the Chaco War. A revolutionary congress made up of 200 delegates from the army, the cadets, the Indian population, the trade unions, etc., approved all the details for a social revolution, named the general command and decided on the date for the overthrow of the bloodthirsty government of Daniel Salamanca. Then the leader of this movement, a man who had suffered imprisonment, exile, insults and illnesses, and was the most active of militants, handed over all the plans, documents and lists of names to the government. This wretched member of the working class was called Modesto Escobar.31 This disaster finished the anarchists as a serious force in the Bolivian labour movement. The mobilisation against the Chaco War

The Marxists and the anarchists had torn the trade union movement apart

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but they were in complete agreement on one thing: their total opposition to the war against Paraguay which could be seen to be approaching, as the governments of the two opposing countries took up positions which could only favour the interests of the rival imperial powers, and the ruling classes turned to war as the best safety valve for the tremendous social unrest caused by the slump. War is more than the thundering of cannons and the seizure of strategic points on the battlefield. In order to implement the policies ordered by their governments, warring armies need more than weapons; they also need the psychological preparation of the population so that they can rely, at least temporarily, on the support of the majority of the citizens. The revolutionaries were swamped by a wave of chauvinist sentiments, astutely promoted by the government, forcing the 'defeatists' to work in very adverse conditions. The war was the turning point for all those groups which called themselves Marxists, because they found themselves required to stand up against the powerful pressures from the enemy classes. The Oruro FOT, an anarchist group, was the first to bring out an antiwar manifesto, a violent document which rapidly became the declaration of principles on which the agitation of the Marxist and anarchist groups was based. The anarchists maintained their opposition to the government and to the war to the very end. The same cannot be said of the organisations controlled by the Marxists. They tended to back down under pressure from the government and some, like the La Paz FOT, ended up endorsing the government's war plans in supposedly 'socialist' language. One of the most important anti-war demonstrations disturbed the calm of rural Cochabamba. It was organised by the Federacion Obrera, headed by Pedro Vaca Dolz and A. Valdivia Rolon, and the Federacion de Estudiantes, in which the most important figures were Jose Antonio Arze, Ricardo Anaya and Jose Aguirre Gainsborg. It was a huge protest by the workers, who demanded bread, called for the destruction of the bourgeois society and for the formation of a united front of the exploited, and condemned the feudal bourgeoisie's preparations for war. The atmosphere was electric; out came the red flag and banners depicting the hammer and sickle, the five-pointed star and the silhouette of Lenin. In a resounding voice, the poet Guillermo Viscarra Fabre read out the Oruro FOT's antiwar manifesto. On the back of a photograph of this scene, Adalberto Valdivia Rolon wrote: 'This martyr (Viscarra) of the proletarian cause is now in prison for the crime of reading out the anti-war manifesto. The rich, the government and the priests are the ones interested in suppressing the freedom of thought, so that they can prolong the exploitation and banditry of capitalism.'

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On 20 July 1932 the Salamanca government had taken advantage of the war to declare a state of siege 'in view of complications which may jeopardise the peace of the nation'. This measure was designed to legalise the systematic and severe repression of the revolutionary leadership. In his message to Congress on 20 September 1932 the President of the Republic stated that In view of the gravity of the situation (the Executive) has been obliged to take active measures to repress communism. Communist activities have intensified because of the recent conflict. Although the mass of the people, whose patriotism cannot be doubted, have condemned these activities, we have considered it necessary to take legal steps to repress such activities. The persistent, calculated propaganda of the communists is intended to destroy discipline in the army, inciting the troops to disobey orders and turn on their officers and commanders in an attempt to place us in a very difficult situation. Mass arrests followed immediately. Jose Aguirre Gainsborg, Ricardo Anaya and Porfirio Diaz Machicao among others were arrested and taken to La Paz. As we have already seen, a revolutionary congress composed of delegates from the army, cadets, labour organisations and peasantry plotted to overthrow the Salamanca government. Marxists and anarchists cooperated in this, despite their ideological differences. In January 1933 the authorities announced that they had discovered a communist plot aimed at overthrowing the government, taking power and inciting the citizens to disobey the armed forces. Several people were arrested, most of whom were members of the FOT while the rest were FOL militants, but they were all people who had come out on to the streets to protest against the war. From this moment onwards the socialist and trade union movements stagnated and lost their strength. Worst of all, a whole generation of magnificent leaders were reduced to impotence and sterility in exile. The Chaco War constitutes a dividing line in the history of Bolivian social struggles, separating the tradition of the past from the modern trade unionism of the post-war period. It is almost as if they were two completely separate stages, bearing no relation to each other. The legendary figure of Tristan Marof

Gustavo A. Navarro, better known by his pseudonym Tristan Marof, was born in 1898 in Sucre. The location of his birthplace was to be an important influence in his life. The capital of the republic — at least it is still officially the capital - has always been a stronghold of social prejudice.

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Even the upper strata of the artisans have aristocratic pretensions and consider it a high honour to serve a count (even though he may have come down in the world). Marof was of very lowly origins and has never been able to overcome his resentment against those of his countrymen who had the privilege of being born with noble titles or were favoured with fortunes. The scorn with which the aristocrats treated the intelligent young Navarro deeply wounded him and he has never been able to get entirely over this trauma, not even with the help of Marxism. Nevertheless the influence of Chuquisaca32 on the writer and politician was not entirely negative; it is reflected in the brilliant wit and irony which distinguish him as a magnificent pamphleteer. Many of his novels are Rabelaisian in their humorous social criticism. His biting satire and his political militancy seem to have been inspired by some deep-seated urge to get revenge on the aristocrats and the powerful, who always excluded him from their closed circles. But although the haughty city of Charcas was the birthplace of Marof, Europe was his source of inspiration. As a socialist, Marof appears to a large extent to be an overseas product, and he expresses the peak of foreign political influence on the country, even though he added a criollo character of his own. In spite of his enormous defects his name acquired great importance in the period 1925—35, that is to say up until the end of the Chaco War. Rather than an ideologist or a political leader (in the latter role he was useless), Marof was a symbol of Bolivian socialism. His legend, rather than the things he wrote, swept the whole nation and fed the hopes of the oppressed. The power of this symbol was created in part by the press campaign against him, and in part by the desperate search of the people for a leader. Both before and after the Chaco War everybody automatically regarded Marof as the leader in his own right. Those who thought like this included simple townspeople who belonged to no political party but wanted profound social changes, those who regarded themselves as Stalinists, and also the anti-bureaucratic socialists, and even the anarchists. Apart from Marof there is surely no one else in the whole of Bolivia's history on whom such distinct political tendencies and social classes have rested their hopes. There was not a workers' or a students' congress that failed to invoke the name of the globetrotting, persecuted politician, or to pass votes of solidarity with the 'leader of the exploited'. However it was an inevitable consequence of the development of the socialist movement and of Bolivian politics that the mythical figure was deflated by the first contact with reality. When Marof returned to his country, amid an atmosphere of general expectation, he was unable to lead the workers' and peasants' revolution as expected, and was even unable to

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set up the powerful socialist party that had been awaited so long. It is disillusioning to report that his political activities have hardly left any visible traces. He will pass into history as a writer rather than a politician. Gustavo A. Navarro - he used his real name in his early writings and at the beginning of his political life — first appeared in politics as a member of the Republican party, and, as such, he took part in the so-called revolution of 1920 which brought to power Bautista Saavedra, a man whom Marof always admired. Immediately after the revolution Marof was appointed governor of the Panoptico (the La Paz jail), but according to him, he only held the post for 24 hours. President Saavedra then sent him to be consul in Genoa, a journey which was to determine his future. In Europe he became a left-wing revolutionary and openly espoused Marxism, thus apparently breaking with his past and rejecting the attractive future of a politician at the service of the established order. This radical change in his position was due to the influence of the powerful left-wing currents which stirred Europe after the First World War and the Russian Revolution. In his book La Justicia dellnca, published in Belgium in 1926, the slogan 'Land to the people, mines to the state' appeared for the first time. For decades these words exuded a certain magic and were used as a rallying cry. The workers' congress of 1927 adopted them as their slogan. In February 1927 Marof made a propaganda tour round Bolivia which ended in his arrest. He was exiled and set off for Mexico, stopping in Peru on the way to talk with Mariategui. Why give Marof such an important place in the history of the labour movement? Not because he initiated or introduced Marxism to Bolivia; we have already seen that left-wing radicalism had its own history before he appeared on the scene. His importance lies in the fact that, in his time, he was the best propagandist of the new ideas and acted as a catalyst for the masses who were just beginning to wake up to trade unionism and politics. For this reason, his subsequent defection was a cruel blow to the working class and the cause of the revolution. Something more must be said: Marof never organised a trade union or built up a political party — a fact which reveals his opportunism. In 1934 he attended the founding meeting of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) organised by Bolivian exiles in Cordoba, Argentina, and, owing to his popularity rather than his ideological maturity, he became the most prominent spokesman of the new party. As I have argued elsewhere,33 Aguirre Gainsborg was mistaken to remain in the background himself and support Marof as leader of the POR, despite his obviously middle-of-theroad line in political matters. During the Chaco War Marof came into contact with groups of exiles, a

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large number of whom had refused to enlist in the army while others had deserted from the battlefield. This was an environment where, unlike Bolivia, the internal conflicts of the worldwide communist movement were reflected. These groups were politically very active and anxious to obtain government permission to return to Bolivia. Marof was prominent in the campaign waged by the Bolivian left against the war and, as a result of his activities, the Argentine authorities handed him over to the Bolivian government. Marof took advantage of the press publicity surrounding this event and maintained, without providing any concrete evidence, that he had been condemned to death for being a socialist. The incident gave rise to a great mobilisation of the Argentine left and of public opinion. The details of this episode have been published in a book, Habla un condenado a muerte.34

After the Chaco War Marof broke with the POR and proclaimed his own party, the Partido Socialista Obrera de Bolivia (PSOB), which supported President Busch and later opposed the MNR. In the 1940s he became openly reactionary and towards the end of the decade worked as private secretary to Presidents Hertzog and Urriolagoitia (1947-51). Carlos Mendoza Mamani

Carlos Mendoza Mamani was born in the city of La Paz on 4 November 1898. His father was a famous lawyer, Jose Quintin Mendoza, while his mother came from a wealthy peasant family which had a dairy on the outskirts of La Paz. He received his secondary education at the Colegio Nacional Ayacucho, which was once a seed-bed of rebellion and left-wing politics. He studied law at La Paz University and, although he completed his studies in 1925, he was not allowed to graduate formally as a lawyer until 1930. This may seem surprising, but it can be explained. Racial and class discrimination has been a phenomenon of all the Bolivian universities, especially in the period prior to the university reform. In a number of faculties descendants of peasants, whose features or surnames gave them away, had to overcome all sorts of obstacles, artificially put in their way by the professors, before they could graduate. The guardians of our culture had such a colonial mentality that they could not conceive of a Sr Choque or a Sr Mamani (typical peasant surnames) as a doctor or a lawyer. To a considerable extent the student's surname was more important than his ability. The date of Carlos Mendoza's admission to the legal profession was repeatedly postponed partly because he was called Mamani and partly because he defiantly proclaimed his bolshevik ideas. While he studied he also worked as a tailor's apprentice, thus joining the

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legion of artisans who thought it their duty to become lawyers, partly in order to defend their class and partly in order to move upward in the social scale. About 1917 he joined the COES and was one of the founders of the POS. Later, in 1928, he founded the clandestine Communist Party, under instructions from the South American Bureau of the Communist International. He was, in short, the first active communist in Bolivia. But although Carlos Mendoza Mamani worked directly under the South American Bureau, he did not become identified with sectarian Stalinism, nor even did he understand its monolithic organisational criteria. In 1932 a delegate from the South American Bureau arrived in Bolivia and, behind the back of Mendoza, the secretary general of the party, summoned an open meeting of workers and labour leaders, thus violating the elementary rules of conspiratorial work. The foreign delegate was arrested and detained by the police for several days. These events caused great uneasiness within the party and, in response the South American bureau exerted pressure to get Mendoza expelled from the executive of the clandestine Communist Party.35 Mendoza also played an outstanding role in the trade union movement. From 1925 to 1930 he was a labour organiser among the workers of La Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba, Potosi and Sucre, financing himself from his own resources. He took part in the formation of unions in the Said and Yarur textile factories, the Garcia shoe factory and in the unionisation of the butchers, the paper-boys and various peasant groups in the vicinity of La Paz. He took over from Arturo Borda as president of the La Paz FOT, and from 1925 onwards played an active role in the organisation of trade union congresses. He wrote for and edited various labour newspapers. He suffered all the consequences of his revolutionary ideas and knew how to face up to repression. He was arrested and detained innumerable times and twice served terms of imprisonment. On the first of these occasions he was freed by a powerful mobilisation of the masses which culminated in a general strike. He was imprisoned a second time during the Chaco War. His training as a lawyer enabled him to defend labour leaders tried by military tribunals for their resistance to the war. Mendoza was one of the labour leaders whose revolutionary activity came to an end with the Chaco War, which cut short one phase in the political mobilisation of the masses. In the post-war period he participated only occasionally and ended up taking no part at all in political and trade union activities. When the Ministry of Labour was first set up under the Toro government, the President discussed with Mendoza the possibility of his taking up the post, but it is said that other men with ministerial ambitions circulated rumours of intrigues, which resulted in Mendoza being

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imprisoned in the remote outpost of Todos Santos. Without a party, betrayed by his companions, and having broken all his ties with the Communist International he became very demoralised. Mendoza is now a sick old man and earns his living as a lawyer, totally forgotten by revolutionaries and trade unionists. He has rugged, granitelike features and unmistakable Indian traits. It is said that he has not written anything about his experience as a revolutionary, but that he continues to trust in the inevitable triumph of socialism.

Book 5:

From the Chaco defeat to the Catavi massacre 1932-42 13. From military defeat to 'Military Socialism'

After the Chaco War the petty bourgeoisie almost effortlessly assumed control of the labour movement. The war had elevated the middle classes to a position of primary importance in the country's political life and they had been radicalised by the mobilisation for war. As a result of this new situation the pre-war attempts by the workers to set up class-based political organisations suffered a setback. In the immediate post-war period the independent socialist movement lost ground. The working class in general became alienated from politics, with the result that the workers' parties either found themselves isolated or else, in order to survive, joined up with petty-bourgeois groups and parties and soon became absorbed by the socalled state-socialist party which supported successive military regimes. Once again intellectuals and students revived the claim that they had some special right to lead the masses, a course which always results in the workers sacrificing themselves for interests other than their own. Since almost all the Marxist union leaders were in exile, the unions tended to lose their class ideology and become dominated by chauvinist ideas. Thus, for example, remaining labour leaders organised the Confederation de Trabajadores de Bolivia in January 1935 and on 1 May 1935 (six weeks before the end of the war) issued a May Day manifesto which scarcely differed from the declarations of the dominant classes: Bolivia, represented by the mass of her workers, has never placed any obstacles in the path of peace and, indeed, a fair-minded peace will be welcomed. We feel that it is now time to put an end to the war, not because we fear we might lose it (on the contrary, our present military position could scarcely be better), but because we think it justified to make some sacrifice for the peace and unity of America. But workingclass opinion, especially that of neighbouring countries, must recognise 169

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that, despite our willingness to make this sacrifice, we cannot stand there with our arms folded while the enemy is still facing us.1 The CTB therefore urged the working class of neighbouring countries to put pressure on the arbitrators to reach an agreement on the peace terms which would take into account 'the state of patriotic fervour prevailing in Bolivia'. Various labour leaders who had made names for themselves as radicals or Marxists tried to place the blame for the defeat (rather than the war itself) on the right wing politicians. They were careful not to accuse the military commanders, since they counted on the army acting as friends of the people and allies of the revolutionaries. For example, on 1 January 1935, Enrique G. Loza sent a letter to General Penaranda, Commander-inChief of the armed forces (subsequently President of Bolivia, 1940—3), asking him to distribute to the soldiers some leaflets Loza had written. Unfortunately we do not know what the leaflets were about. The General took the trouble to reply to the one-time agitator as follows: 'The leaflets will, as you requested, be distributed to the soldiers on the battlefield, who will certainly appreciate your work'. Action Obrera (a newspaper which Loza helped to edit) commented: 'This letter shows the constant contact which exists between General Penaranda and the workers. The significance of this is clear: as a son of the people, General Penaranda's relations with the people are very affectionate, because his army is quite simple the army of the proletariat put at the service of justice.' The traditional parties were in a state of crisis, the petty bourgeois socialists were atomised and the Marxists had almost disappeared, so the army, although it had lost the war in a disastrous manner, in due course became the arbiter of national politics and acted as the principal political party. Around the armed forces gathered a mixture of ambitious careerists and genuine reformists. However this process did not occur immediately the war ended. Initially the labour movement tried to prop up the civilian government that had been formed by Vice-President Tejada Sorzano, following the military leadership's decision to depose President Salamanca in November 1934. According to the 1930 constitution, Salamanca and Tejada Sorzano had been elected for four years only, ending in August 1935. By the time the war ended in June 1935, it was proposed to extend this term for a further twelve months. Thus, on 27 July 1935 there was a large demonstration to demand the continuation in office of the Tejada Sorzano government (a request conceded by the President the following day and subsequently ratified by Congress). Alfredo Patzy, President of the league of commercial and industrial employees, made a speech on behalf of the CTB which combined euphoria and menace: 'If the govern-

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ment is not permitted to continue in office . . . then the CTB will rise up and impose the will of the workers and youth who fought for their country.' Addressing himself to Tejada Sorzano he said: 'In the name of the Bolivian proletariat and of the other class-conscious and independent sectors of the country, I invite you to continue in office as President of the Republic until 6 August 1936 . . . If you do not do so, the resulting disorder will be your responsibility. Most excellent President, save our country!' Then the CTB, acting in association with the National Youth Association, Beta Gama, turned its attention to the search for a legal way for Congress to prolong the government. They presented a ten-point petition to Congress demanding the convocation of a national convention which should include representatives of the manual and intellectual workers; the repatriation of prisoners; the right to work for war veterans; the reorganisation of retailing to permit consumer participation; the creation of a social security scheme for workers and employees 'on the lines of the project drawn up by the Beta Gama association'; a general readjustment of wages to compensate for the declining purchasing power of money; the creation of an economic council to tackle the post-war economic and financial problems; CTB participation in public administration and the participation of workers in the cabinet. The CTB later modified the last point, and on 7 August they sent a letter to President Tejada Sorzano informing him that, in accordance with their statutes, they had decided 'not to insist on this point of the petition, and had resolved to leave the President free to appoint to the cabinet whoever he felt appropriate'. This was intended as an interim measure until the Socialist Party was reconstituted, after which the labour leaders believed its nominees ought to participate in the Liberal President's cabinet. However, at this stage they still objected to the appointment of members of the armed forces as ministers of education and agriculture, although qualifying their objection with the remark that 'This Confederation maintains the most cordial and sincere relations with the army and recognises the intellectual ability of the military to manage public affairs.'2 Young intellectuals, radicalised by the war, were not so slow to recommend themselves to the military. To explain this it should be recalled that before the war the Partido Nacionalista (organised from the Presidential Palace by President Hernando Siles in 1929) had attracted an important group of young intellectuals. The party's main weakness consisted in the fact that it had been organised by a government in power. One of its leading figures, Enrique Baldivieso, considered in 1935 (that is to say, too late) that the group came to power prematurely and that this was an 'error'. He

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added that, as a result, the dominant feature of the party in its first years was confusion. What the party had called 'democracy' was a fascist-type 'functional democracy'.3 Indeed, just before the overthrow of Siles the intellectuals of the party had published a manifesto addressed to the workers of the workshop, the countryside and the mines; to the university students and 'intellectual workers', and to the commanders and officers of the army and the militants of the various parties. The manifesto began by proclaiming 'equity and social justice', but reminded the workers that they were only one factor in the economic and social life of the country, and that it was their duty to reject all forms of 'red extremism'. It was the mission of students and 'intellectual workers' to direct the organisation of the country and to give the people guiding lines for their daily conduct: 'We insist on the right of intellectuals to intervene in determining the destiny of nations.'4 After the war the left of this former Nationalist party easily absorbed nuclei of socialist workers, such as those grouped around the printers' leader, Moises Alvarez. This Nationalist left was anti-communist and repudiated 'extremism', a position which served to recommend it to the military. The history of the Partido Nacionalista followed a strange course. The drafting of its theoretical position took place last and not first, and in fact coincided with the collapse of the party as a result of internal conflicts. On 1 October 1935 the Partido Nacionalista held a convention attended by delegates from all over the country. Jose Tamayo, the president of the Executive committee and the leader of the young left, launched into a diatribe against 'the evil conduct of the traditional parties who are responsible for the enormous sacrifice of the Chaco War'.5 Other speakers on the left made it clear that they rejected the right-wing past of the party in which they had begun their political lives. At this meeting Carlos Montenegro put into circulation one of his most successful ideas: he claimed that his ideology had been forged in the Chaco and was a political response to the failure of the war. 'Bolivian youth will fight for their ideas, spurred on by the memory of their dead . . . We too will fall, if necessary, in the battle for those ideals which unite the country's youth in the nationalist left.' At six o'clock that afternoon the convention was suddenly transformed: the party split and disbanded. The left walked out of the convention and the party, and when they returned to the hall a few minutes later they renamed themselves the Revolutionary Socialist cell, setting up an ad hoc executive committee, whose members included Enrique Baldivieso, Jose Tamayo and Carlos Montenegro. The new organisation accused the traditional regimes of'having created an omnipotent aristocratic class', and of having progressively aggravated the poverty of the working masses 'by

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supporting a mining oligarchy, which uses the armed forces for its own ends, appropriates the sources of wealth and means of production that rightly belong to the state and the collectivity, and amasses vast profits generated by the hard work of the working classes, while the great majority of the Bolivian population works for a miserable wage, scarcely sufficient to satisfy their basic needs'.6 Despite all their declarations of humility, their pacts and promises, it was not long before the Revolutionary Socialist cell transformed itself into the Partido Socialista Boliviana at the end of October 1935. To many people on the left this socialist party, led by Baldivieso and Tamayo, seemed to offer new hope and even many Marxists saw it as the vigorous focus needed to neutralise the campaign of confusion unleashed by ex-President Bautista Saavedra's Partido Republicano Socialista. The PRS had for some years been trying to make political capital out of the radicalisation of the middle class. Just before the war it had also transformed its programme, and this had been presented as a decisive step towards its becoming an authentic socialist party. The concurrent establishment of a national council composed of 50 members had been interpreted by the press as 'depersonalising the personalist party . . . and socialising it in preparation for the coming of socialism in Bolivia, so that this political force can then be turned into a socialist party'. 7 Towards the end of the Chaco War and immediately afterwards, Saavedra's party began to take a leading role in placing responsibility for the war and for its disastrous outcome on the more traditional parties. Middle-class intellectuals, who were eager to lead the protest movement and already had connections with the army, moved over to Saavedra's party, and they were followed by some Marxists and labour leaders who wanted to harvest the fruits they had sown in the past. Thus, like the Baldivieso—Tamayo party, Saavedrism gained supporters especially among the progressive intellectuals, and the party appeared to grow stronger as it was attacked with increasing intensity. However the old pre-war Partido Socialista Boliviano published a long manifesto, signed by Alberto Lopez Sanchez, Enrique G. Loza and G.D. Penaranda, which made the following expose of Saavedra's socialism the Partido Republicano Saavedrista has suddenly started to call itself "socialist" without even going through the formality of a party convention and in obvious contradiction to its past record'. Saavedra could not appeal for support from 'pure hearts', they argued, since he was responsible for massacring the miners of Uncia, Llallagua and Catavi, and for shooting down the peasants of Jesus de Machaca. Neither, they added, could he claim 'to be free from all blame for the disastrous war', which was really the work of all the traditional parties. They pointed out that his govern-

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ment's actions were the very opposite of socialism. In had forbidden mothers to work as teachers, sold out the country by contracting the Nicolaus loan, obstructed the unionisation of teachers and telegraph and railway workers, and shut down workers' newspapers. Every paragraph of the manifesto concluded: 'Comrades, don't let yourselves be taken in.'8 The last days of the Tejada Sorzano government

Under attack from these movements of the radicalised middle class, the weak Liberal government of Tejada Sorzano had to attempt negotiations with both the Partido Republicana Socialista and the Baldivieso—Tamayo party in an effort to set up a national coalition cabinet ahead of the elections, which were scheduled for 31 May 1936. This was Tejada's last attempt to keep his party in power. The parties he consulted were willing to talk but they failed to reach any agreement. Everybody, including the President knew that a military conspiracy, led by Colonel David Toro and Colonel German Busch, was drawing menacingly towards a climax. While publicly they were negotiating with the Liberals, the Saavedristas and the newly organised socialists also sought contact with the military and soon joined the conspiracy. Ever worsening social conditions and a wave of strikes formed the background to these manoeuvres. On 4 February 1936 the Saavedristas and the Baldivieso-Tamayo party signed a coalition pact which described Bolivia as undergoing a grave constitutional crisis and enduring 'an absurd economic system, which we have tolerated only for reasons of patriotism during the period of international conflict'. The pact stated that to endure this system any longer would be to become accomplices in the 'destruction of the vital forces of the Republic'. It was necessary to demand fundamental changes in the structure of the country, 'without, however, ignoring the sociological factors which are specifically Bolivian'. They pointed to the 'exclusivist and all-absorbing predominance of capitalist privileges' as one of the principal causes of the country's lamentable condition.9 There was no mention of the army in this first document, which implied the creation of a political front against theTejada government. However a subsequent resolution, signed on 16 May for the Republican—Socialist coalition by Saavedra and Baldivieso, made it clear that they were now working with the enemy. This resolution nominated a list of people for ministerial posts, adding that 'the designation of the military ministers will be the exclusive prerogative of the army'. With very few modifications Colonel Toro's first cabinet followed the suggestions of this document. The coalition programme included the following points: every inhabi-

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tant or resident of the Republic should be obliged to work and the state should provide work for every fit person, 'or, if there is no work, a living wage'. Membership of a trade union or occupational association should be an obligatory prerequisite for citizenship. 'The contract with the Standard Oil Co. should be revised and the existing legal proceedings against the company should be completed, proceeding to the nationalisation of the company.' Mining taxes should be revised 'so that the state can share progressively in mining profits as a partner'. The means of communication should be nationalised. Social legislation should be extended to provide a complete body of laws of work, covering the hours for day and night work, wages, regulations on women and children at work, paid holidays, the protection of mothers and setting up of nurseries.10 The Revolution of May 1936 In April 1936, the FOT, headed by Waldo Alvarez, presented a petition to the Tejada government demanding a 50% reduction in the price of basic necessities and a 100% wage increase for all workers and employees in both the public and private sectors; the suppression of monopolies, the banning of night work for women and children; the suspension of the state of siege; freedom of assembly; the introduction of social legislation; work for war veterans and protection for people disabled or orphaned in the war. Soon afterwards a huge May Day demonstration shook the city of La Paz. Not only the unionised workers of the city participated but also vast numbers of unorganised people. The demonstration impressed on both the shaky government and the military conspirators that they must take the labour unions into account as one of the country's decisive political forces. Then on 6 May the printing workers demanded a 100% rise in wages. The employers demanded time to study the petition and called for government arbitration. The printers rejected these proposals, coming out on strike on the 10th, after which no newspapers appeared in La Paz. The FOT, backed up by the anarchist FOL, joined the strike, repeating their demand for general wage increases. The revolt against poverty acquired unexpected dimensions because of the extreme political instability which prevailed. The army, at the instigation of Colonel Busch, promised not to intervene against the workers, so the repressive capacity of the government was enormously reduced. Part of the union leadership (for example Moises Alvarez, who carried great political and intellectual weight) had joined the Baldivieso—Tamayo Socialist Party, as a result of which the Revolutionary Committee included worker militants with sufficient authority to precipitate a strike whenever

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it was politically opportune. These conspirators were in constant touch with the rest of the trade union leadership. Although there was no written pact between the unionists and the conspirators, in practice they established a perfect division of labour. The FOT called a strike, which put the government in an untenable position; the army and its cronies dealt the final blow. The strikers organised pickets to maintain order and defend private property against any possible excesses. The union leadership definitely did not want things to go any further than the strike, leaving others to settle the question of power by violence. The Revolutionary Committee was thus left free to carry out its plans patiently and calmly, uncertain that the popular euphoria would not blow them off course. The coup finally came on 17 May 1936 when the military, backed up by the party coalition, ousted the Tejada Sorzano government. In his declaration of resignation on the same day, Tejada gave the impression of leaving office voluntarily. Colonel Busch, the young hero who had achieved fame for his exploits in the Chaco War, was the leading figure in the revolutionary movement; so much so that in a way it was he who took power, only to hand it over to Colonel David Toro — the army chief of staff. A decree of 17 May 1936 announced the creation of a mixed civilianmilitary Junta, under the new president, Colonel Toro. The ministries were shared out equally: four for the army and four for the civilian party coalition. A small notice appeared in the press immediately after the coup. It read: 'Yesterday (18 May) at 13.30 hours, delegates from the different organisations in the FOT met at the government palace at the invitation of the mixed civilian-military Junta and decided to call off the strike from 14.00 hours today (19 May).'11 The strike had accomplished its end of toppling the Tejada government, and the new government negotiated a series of demands, introducing immediate reforms. Once the victory of the coup d'etat was assured, the FOT and FOL leaders declared that the revolutionary movement was all their own work. On learning of the bloodless revolution, La Republica commented: 'The revolution was virtually inevitable once the printers and industrial workers came out on strike demanding wage increases. In the course of the strike the idea became accepted that the Liberal regime would have to go. At 7 am on 17 May a commission of representatives of the Republican Socialist and Socialist parties and the military demanded the President's resignation.' On 17 May there was no fighting in the streets. The self-styled socialists and revolutionaries confined their activities to symbolic acts. For example, Baldivieso's followers occupied the Club de la Union, a traditional strong-

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hold of the social elite, and hung an enormous red flag over the entrance. Right-wingers declared that the municipality had become a stronghold of Bolshevik extremists, who were accused of throwing stones which hit a few honourable gentlemen and damaged the occasional prettily painted mansion. Everybody congratulated themselves because the spectacular change of govetnment had been achieved without a single shot being fired. Only the new rulers' speeches inspired fear in some quarters because of the frequent declarations in favour of socialism. The right concluded that a real revolution was taking place. The workers, however, were a little disconcerted because they had never imagined that a social change could be achieved so easily and painlessly. The governments of Toro and Busch, 1936—9

The programme drafted by the coalition parties referred to above was presented to the Junta and to some extent influenced the measures adopted by the Toro government. On 25 May 1936 the council of ministers adopted it as 'the minimum programme of the socialist government'. In addition, Jose Tamayo was appointed mayor of La Paz which, because of its economic and political importance, was a key post. As a consequence of the Chaco War the purchasing power of money had begun to decline drastically, with dire consequences for the workers and large sectors of the middle class, whose real earnings were eroded. This was at the root of the social agitation and gave an impetus to the reorganisation of the trade unions that was taking place at this time. Their immediate task was to fight for wage increases and to combat the tendency towards speculation which appeared in all sectors of the economy. From the very beginning there was a fierce, though initially subterranean, dispute within the civilian party block which supported the government. In May 1936 Bautista Saavedra made a great effort to present his party as though it had always been socialist: 'More than the satisfaction of personal interests, we have always wanted the reconstruction of the country on a socialist basis; this is nothing new.' He then reviewed the 'socialist' measures his government had adopted: it had introduced legislation on industrial accidents, a compulsory savings scheme for workers, protection of commercial and industrial employees, pensions for railway workers, etc. However, the government was under no illusion that the alliance between the Baldivieso socialists and Saavedra's Partido Socialista would be very stable. It did not take long for this fragile coalition to break up, leaving Toro at the mercy of Busch and the other army chiefs. On 20 June 1936 'the army decided to remove from the government the political

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parties which had assisted in the revolutionary movement'.12 After eliminating the so-called socialists who had helped them in the May coup, the military leaders declared that, in the future, they would rely directly on the organised working class and the war veterans. The ground for this move had been prepared immediately after the coup, when two new ministries had been created: the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum and the Ministry of Labour. Waldo Alvarez, a printing worker and secretary general of the FOT, was provisionally named Labour Minister, 'as the representative of the working class, until such time as they organise themselves throughout the republic and designate their own representative to the government'.13 From the very first moment both the unionised and un-unionised workers were inclined to believe that the creation of a Ministry of Labour was a real victory and not merely a temporary government concession. The unions were convinced of their right to participate in the appointment and running of the Ministry. The government, on the other hand, hoped that if the unions, which they believed to be a powerful force, nominated the Minister of Labour, that would oblige the workers to give their full support to the government. However, once the military discovered that the unions were not so strong or so very difficult to divide, bribe or intimidate, they simply annulled the concession they had granted and the new ministerial post was filled in December 1936 by Javier Paz Campero, a leading lawyer for the Hochschild mining interests. After a series of setbacks and disillusionments the labour movement began to discover that a worker disguised as a minister, in a government which did not represent the workers, was little more than an ornament, designed to confuse the workers. They suffered the same experience in 1946 and 1952. In August 1936 the Toro government introduced another measure intended to enlist worker support for the government; it made unionisation obligatory. Perhaps more than any other piece of legislation, this decree showed up the real nature of the 'socialists' who for a while accompanied the military in power. Besides obliging everybody to be a member of a union, the decree modified the structure of the government, replacing classical representative democracy by 'functional democracy' of a fascist type. The first article of the decree obliged everyone living in Bolivia, man or woman, to join a union, 'whatever their role in the production, distribution or use of wealth'. Union membership cards, which could be obtained by enrolling in the National Register of Trade Unions (dependent on the Ministry of Labour), became 'an essential prerequisite for the extension of citizenship papers'. The unions were to pass under 'the protection and permanent control of the socialist government' and were incorporated

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into the state machinery, 'the base for the functional constitution of the public powers' (Article 3). The employers as well as the workers were required to organise themselves into unions and, although the labour unions were autonomous, they were obliged to form mixed committees with the employers whenever it was necessary to reach agreements between capital and labour, and to agree jointly on ways to improve production. A legal code was announced which would regulate in minute detail how the unions were to function. The aim was to bring the unions into the state machinery. 'The Bolivian Socialist State is not only willing to cooperate wholeheartedly in the organisation of unions, but has taken on the task of establishing them officially, through the Ministry of Labour which has been chosen by the working class itself.'14 On 4 July the Asamblea Nacional Permanente de Organizaciones Sindicales (ANPOS) was inaugurated. This was one of the most important things accomplished by the left-wing elements grouped around the Minister of Labour. Although in theory it was meant to orient and coordinate the work of the Minister of Labour, in fact it became the high command of the unions and the left. Some Marxists were sure that they would be able to convert the Ministry of Labour into their own stronghold, from which they could control the masses and determine the political future of the government. Hugo Sevillana, one of the leaders of the printers' union, was appointed as an advisor to Alvarez, as was Ricardo Anaya, a prominent leader of the Cochabamba university left, who soon moved to La Paz together with his closest political collaborators. Jose Antonio Arze returned from Lima in June 1936 to take up the post of legal adviser to the minister. The conflicts between the different left-wing groups were naturally reflected in ANPOS. Initially they were all united in the hope that they could transform society almost painlessly from above, thanks to the influence which the military had kindly conferred on these theorists of socialism. But internal differences soon developed, and when they realised that they could achieve very little through advising a Ministry controlled by a worker, their activities were reduced to interminable, insubstantial discussions. It should be noted that from the moment the Ministry was first set up there were heated arguments, which soon produced a split between the group gathered around Anaya and Arze, and Aguirre Gainsborg's Bloque Obrero Socialista de Izquierda, which put forward clear, radical proposals for the Ministry to act on . . . When this produced no results, Aguirre's block refused to attend meetings, and eventually the anarchist workers dealt the final blow by walking out in a spectacular fashion, protesting that they were getting nothing practical out of the discussions.15

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The government decided to mobilise the whole of the active population in an intensive production programme. At this time the world price of tin had recovered, and it was only with difficulty that Bolivia was able to fill the quota allocated to it. There was also the problem of reincorporating the Chaco War veterans into productive activity. This was the background to the decree of 6 July 1936 making work obligatory. If this law and the one referring to the unionisation of the whole population had been enforced, the country would have been turned into one enormous military barracks. Obligatory work was one of the points in the minimum programme referred to earlier. The main clauses of the decree stated: 'Work is made compulsory for all residents and inhabitants of the Republic' Within 20 days people were required to obtain a certificate of work; demobbed soldiers were required to return to work within 20 days; every individual without a work card was to be declared unemployed and therefore liable to be drafted into 'work brigades or detachments, organised by the state'. Also within 20 days enterprises were required to inform the Minister of Labour of their labour needs, so that they could be filled by the state. The law was applicable to all persons between 20 and 60 years of age. The details for enforcing the decree appeared on 24 July 1936. They were extremely severe: work certificates were to be produced 'whenever the authorities demanded', anyone not in possession of his work certificate would be at the disposal of the authorities. 'The security police will set up a special section to deal with the detection, detention and allocation of the unemployed.' The work brigades were to be sent to the mines and then to the other industries, in that order of priority. In fact, the decree introduced a system of forced labour. The measures referred to here show that Toro's military government made the most resolute attempt to establish fascism that the country has ever seen. What is remarkable is that some intellectuals and politicians who considered themselves to be Marxists cooperated in these endeavours. One such ally of the military was Moise's Alvarez, the socialist labour leader, who favoured state promoted unions as the best way to overcome the political and cultural backwardness of the workers, since he considered them incapable of establishing viable organisations on their own. Moreover, he thought this step would elevate the unions to the position of 'organisms essential to national life'.16 The creation of the Ministry of Labour, the introduction of compulsory unionisation and other measures of social protection certainly aroused great enthusiasm in the masses, and frequent street rallies were staged in their support. In an attempt to flatter the workers, the government even addressed them as 'comrades'. It followed naturally that, at the beginning of 1937, the formation of a

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government-sponsored socialist party was announced. The regime not only openly supported the formation of the party, but even ruled that public employees must join it. The ministers of state went off into the interior of the country to set up local committees of the Partido Socialista del Estado, which rapidly absorbed the bases and middle levels of leadership of Baldivieso's party. Shortly afterwards, popular enthusiasm for the reforms of the 'military socialists' reached its climax when, on 13 March 1937, a simple Supreme Resolution confiscated the concessions and properties of the powerful Standard Oil Company of Bolivia, which had been found guilty of tax evasion. In May the national committee of the Partido Socialista del Estado was set up and the members of the cabinet were named honorary members. The new organisation was strengthened by other groups of socialists who went over from the Partido Socialista, which virtually split. Pressure was put on the leaders of the CSTB to join the Partido Socialista del Estado. However all these efforts were frustrated by the fall of Colonel Toro on 13 July 1937. For personal motives rather than for reasons of principle, the military hierarchy simply withdrew their support from President Toro and this was enough to determine his downfall. Despite public opinion, the army elevated Busch, the hero of the Chaco veterans, to the Palacio Quemado. The coup had all the characteristics of a barracks revolt. Lieutenant-Colonel Busch put out an extremely brief manifesto to justify his actions, in which he justifiably claimed the responsibility for the coup of 17 May the previous year, which was carried out 'to save the nation from the dangers of anarchy'. The declaration contained three points: a promise to comply, strictly and permanently, with existing international treaties; to maintain public order, and to respect 'legally-acquired private property', thus ensuring once again that private interests would not be sacrificed to the interests of the collectivity. Whereas on 17 May the army found itself having to rely on the political parties to take power, on 13 July 1937 the change of guard took place without the participation of any political parties. Busch declared: 'I have assumed the leadership of the nation solely at the mandate of the army and I will not seek support from any particular political party.' 17 The civilian socialist party had entered a period of crisis, split by personal ambitions rather than differences of programme. The army, by contrast, had acquired greater political selfconfidence, so now the civilian political leaders had to seek the protection of the armed forces in order to achieve anything. Busch's first cabinet was comprised basically of military men, though he also included a few civilians, selected for their personal merits rather than party affiliations. Thus Enrique Baldivieso was included in the cabinet as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

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Undoubtedly the most important measure of the Busch government on social matters was to draw up a body of laws to protect the workers, which passed into history under the name of the Busch Code. Although the truth is that the new labour code had been elaborated under Colonel Toro's government, when Waldo Alvarez was Minister of Labour. This code was a coherent whole, unlike the enormous confusion of contradictory laws which had hitherto existed. The code had far-reaching political repercussions. It established the pro-labour character of the new government, automatically making Busch the hero of the labour movement. By the end of 1937 the government had acquired the enthusiastic support of the masses and this gave it a substantial degree of political stability. The hero of Chaco came to be identified both by his supporters and by his opponents as the leader of the left, although he had done nothing equivalent to the nationalisation of Standard Oil. The labour code adopted a 'protectionist' policy towards the national labour force, although this was unnecessary since there were not many foreign workers in the country and it was meaningless as an attempt to overcome the acute problem of unemployment. The code stated: 'In no firm or enterprise shall the number of foreign workers exceed 15% of the total, and they may only be employed as technicians.' The code also declared that: 'The working day shall not exceed eight hours a day or 48 hours a week. Night work shall not exceed seven hours.' But, given that the code also authorised piece work and overtime, the limitation of the working day has been constantly and legally ignored. For example, this is what happens even now in the mining, textile and construction industries. The code laid down that there could only be one union in each enterprise and that 'In the case of industrial unions, a union cannot be formed . . . with less than 50% of the workers in the enterprise.' Chapter 10 of the Busch Code acknowledged the right to strike and drew up regulations intended to prevent strikes from getting out of government control and becoming 'subversive'. Employers were entitled to resort to the lock-out in certain circumstances, and worker—employer conflicts were required to be submitted to arbitration. However, the measure which immortalised Busch was, undoubtedly, the decree which obliged the mining companies to hand over all the foreign exchange earned by mineral exports to the Banco Central. This decree was enacted on 7 June 1939. The decree caused a tremendous upheaval and was interpreted by the dictator's 'socialist' friends as amounting to the expropriation of the capital of the mining industry. In fact, however, its scope was limited to regulating the foreign exchange earned by mineral exports, especially tin. The large mining companies were allowed to con-

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tinue to incur expenditures abroad, such as paying dividends, buying materials, etc., on condition that they accounted for them to the bank. The Banco Central was to receive the remainder and to this effect, by a decree of May 1938, Busch had raised the parity of the pound sterling to the boliviano from 90 to 140. He also raised the level of taxation levied on mining profits,18 and the obligation to hand over foreign exchange earnings at an exchange rate fixed by the government without reference to the value of the currency amounted to a further tax on the exporters. The state obtained profits by re-selling the foreign exchange thus obtained at its real price, as determined by supply and demand. Although the Bolivian government continued to be subordinated to the power of the mining industry, there was an obvious conflict between them. At the root of this contradiction was the growing financial requirement of a state which depended almost exclusively on the mining industry for its financial resources and therefore found itself needing to demand ever greater contributions from it. In this conflict, the long and heated polemic between the defenders of the inviolability of private property and the spokesmen of the state was, in the long run, more important than Busch's interventionist measures. To illustrate this we can take what the managers of the large mining companies said on the eve of the decree, when, realising they had lost their fight, they changed their tune and tried to reach an understanding with the government which had challenged their privileges. Miguel Echenique, who at the time was a representative of the huge Patino Company, virtually issued an ultimatum to the government, in the tone of one who was certain that his words would define the future of the national economy and politics. From the mineowners' point of view, the taxes on the mining industry had reached the limit and were seriously obstructing its development. 'It has been remarked, quite rightly, that the mining companies are working for the exclusive benefit of the state and not for their owners', he said. The immediate problems of industry were, he claimed, the low level of production, the shortage of labour and heavy taxes. These reasons explained why the mineowners refused to improve the living conditions of the workers and obstinately rejected the proposed law which aimed at fixing a minimum wage in the mines. The mineowners demanded the improvement of 'the exchange rate for the foreign currency which the state appropriates from the mining industry'. When the decree was first enacted the large mineowners tried to get it suspended 'until an agreement is reached between the government and the mining industry'. But their delaying tactics were of no avail since the government was determined to impose the decree in the form it had been drawn up. The mineowners thought that experience would show that sec-

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ondary modifications would be necessary, 'since it is simply impossible to comply with some of the decree's requirements, however hard we may try'. The large, medium and small mineowners organised a committee to press Busch into making substantial changes in the decree. Busch refused to meet the committee and sent them a letter saying: 'The decree . . . will be maintained without alteration.' However, when the Association of Mining Industrialists expressed their fears that the decree was the first step towards the expropriation of the mining industry, the President hastened to deny this. The large mineowners argued that the obligation to hand over all their foreign exchange earnings (calculated on the basis of their export licences) was impracticable. The government knew that the measure would arouse strong opposition from the mineowners who were used to managing their foreign-currency reserves discretionally, but the measure was indispensable in order for the state to accomplish its task of regulating the national economy. The state needed to know 'in the most minute detail about the most important branch of the economy, since it determines the availability of gold reserves, which are not the property of individuals but of the nation'.19 Despite the President's determination, the large mineowners continued to exercise influence on the governmental team which surrounded Busch. If the communications the government addressed publicly to the Association of Mineowners seemed somewhat severe, this was to convince the people that their government was prepared to enact its radical measures without hesitation. In private, however, a significant concession was made to the mineowners, as Patino's confidential correspondence reveals: 'The only concession our representative has been able to obtain, after insistent demands, is that the government will authorise the export of the company's minerals for the months of June and July on the old basis',20 that is to say, handing over only 45% of their foreign exchange earnings. This concession which was really a negation of the historic decree, was made secretly, and the mineowners agreed not to publicise it: 'It would be useful, therefore, if all exports are carried out discretely, avoiding all publicity.' No special amendment to the decree was introduced; everything was arranged through telegrams from the Treasury to the customs authorities, authorising the exports. But the truth about the secret negotiations between the mineowners and the government leaked out. The rumour that there were likely to be alterations to the decree spread rapidly and caused an outcry among public opinion. Therefore, on 29 June, the President's private secretary issued the following denial: Given that certain interested persons are circulating . . . tendentious rumours about possible modifications in the decree of the 7th of the

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present month . . . the private secretary, on the specific instructions of his Excellency the President of the Republic, declares that the said decree will not be modified in the slightest degree. Busch had presented his case for the decree in a major speech on 10 June. He pointed out that the concentration of all the foreign exchange earnings of the mining industry in the hands of the state bank amounted to a form of control over exports. The decree was a way of ascertaining the answers to the following questions: 'How much gold leaves the country? How much remains? How much benefit is obtained by the country which produces the wealth? Should this wealth promote the development and progress of the country which produces it, or the progress of others?'21 He noted that Argentina, Chile and Brazil 'control 100% of their foreign exchange transactions, to the benefit of the nation', and yet this was not regarded as a heresy against democracy 'nor as an attack on the rights of freedom and property'. Bolivia's terrible state of poverty made the adoption of such controls even more necessary, since the country 'has just emerged from a tragic war, the consequences of which are just beginning to be felt, and since we are basically dependent on a single export product; if we do not control our own economic resources, our independence and sovereignty as a nation is curtailed'. The President stressed that his aim was simply to supplement the country's political independence with a measure of economic independence. The government realised that the mineowners would use all their resources to resist such a radical measure and suspected that there were many dangers ahead: 'I have weighed up the enormity of the steps I am taking and realise that all kinds of dangers are lying in wait. But I am approaching the situation calmly, and if my government falls, it will have fallen for a great cause: the economic emancipation of my country.' Mario Flores, the owner-editor of La Noche and a journalist with a somewhat shady career, wrote an enthusiastic article entitled 'We must support President Busch', in which he presented himself as the spokesman of the popular will, representing 'the students, the workers, the middle class and the elite'. 'The hostile propaganda of the foreign press, acting in the service of economic imperialism, tries to label the political situation in Bolivia as fascist one minute and communist the next. Their efforts are in vain. The Bolivian people know, and no one can deceive them into believing otherwise, that the government of Col Busch is Bolivian and nationalist and has none of the shameful characteristics of any foreign regime . . . ' He thought that the decree would raise Bolivia from 'a nation of contemptible Indians' and end the 'inferiority complex which has prevented us from behaving with dignity in the past'.22

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There can be no doubt that the wave of support for the decree of 7 June came basically from the popular classes and was, initially at least, spontaneous. Then a committee including representatives of the labour organisations, students, war veterans, mutual societies, employees' organisations, etc. was formed to organise the enormous demonstration of support for President Busch which took place on 15 June. A few days before the demonstration the CSTB and the executive of the Legion de ExCombatientes published a manifesto in support of the decree, which, they argued, represented 'the first step in the liberation of this humiliated, longsuffering people, who for one hundred years surrendered their wealth to foreign countries'. In ordering that 100% of the foreign-exchange earnings of the mining companies should be handed over to the Central Bank, Busch had put an end to 'the paradox of a wealthy country inhabited by a poor people . . . now all the money that is paid for our minerals will stay in the country and be used to promote agriculture, the construction of roads, education and the well-being of all Bolivians'.23 The authors of the pamphlet added that all Bolivia had received from her fabulous mines was starvation wages and tuberculosis. 'Even the state itself was proletarian, since its miserable budget was insufficient to meet the needs of a country as vast as ours, where everything is still to be done.' The decree of 7 June was one of the measures introduced by Busch after he had officially proclaimed himself dictator on 24 April 1939. The bold reform was aimed at winning mass backing for the dictatorship, or at least minimising the counter-productive effects on public opinion of the dissolution of the constitutional regime. However, at dawn on 23 August 1939, two shots rang out which ended Busch's life and the dictatorship. Somewhat timidly the press circulated the official version of events: the dictator had committed suicide. But the majority of the population remained convinced that he had been assassinated by the rosca?* Four years later La Fragua expressed the popular belief in print, in an article written by people directly concerned in the tragedy. 'Men of his stature do not commit suicide . . . A President who says in an energetic tone "No revolution will oust me from office" does not commit suicide - especially when two months before he had seen the whole people deliriously proclaiming their support for him in an enthusiastic demonstration.' Then La Fragua claimed that: 'Threatened interests are responsible for the tragedy. Whether the deed was done by his own hand or by the hand of hired assassins, these interests killed him.'25 The dictator's tragic death turned him into a legendary hero, martyred on behalf of Bolivia's economic independence and of the rights of the proletariat. An impressive crowd (certainly more than a hundred thousand people) took to the streets for Busch's funeral procession. The poor and

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downtrodden formed the bulk of the distraught wailing mass. Among the speakers at the funeral were General Quintanilla (head of the armed forces, who quickly took over the presidential palace), Enrique Baldivieso, Angelica Ascui and others in the name of the FOS. Rogerio Prado, speaking on behalf of the railway workers, described the deceased dictator as 'the liberator of the proletariat'. All the labour organisations were present with their banners draped in black. The provisional government of General Carlos Quintanilla, which took over after Busch's mysterious death, introduced a decree in October 1939 which suspended the exporters' obligation to hand over all foreign exchange. Thus it was never possible to discover what the benefits of Busch's daring decree would have been; it became a matter for theoretical speculation. President Quintanilla's reaction to Busch's radical measures was excused on the grounds that the war in Europe made it necessary to introduce 'emergency measures' which would permit the country to receive 'the maximum benefit as a producer of primary products'.

14. The post-war labour movement After the Chaco War the Federaciones Obreras de Trabajo were slowly reorganised, and further efforts were made to set up a strong, central tradeunion organisation. The new Minister of Labour, Waldo Alvarez, played a particularly important role in the foundation of what was to be the CSTB. The news that a congress was planned led to discussions in work places and departmental labour federations about the labour movement's priorities. For example, well before the congress, the metallurgical workers' union, one of the mainstays of the Potosi FOT, listed the following immediate necessities: (1) the employers should immediately undertake the construction of workers' housing, 'as the only way of solving the grave housing problem'; (2) a single exchange-rate for all imports and exports, to avoid speculation which harms the poor; (3) the establishment of public libraries in order to improve the culture of the working class; (4) facilities for the union to import materials and tools for the machine industry on their own account; (5) the introduction of a minimum wage.1 This platform is interesting because it indicates the limitations of the

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labour movement on which the CSTB was based. Artisans were clearly predominant and there were virtually no large groups of vertically-organised workers in the CSTB. Indeed, there was a clash at the congress between this kind of union and the railway workers' organisation. We know from newspaper reports that the government gave financial help for the organisation of the conference and paid the travelling expenses of 100 delegates. The left regarded the congress as 'their' congress and it was attended by important Marxist leaders, such as Ricardo Anaya and Aguirre Gainsborg, as well as by the most outstanding union leaders. In all there were 134 delegates at the conference, an impressive number for the time. The different areas of the country were represented as follows: La Paz 42 delegates, Oruro 26, Cochabamba 10, Sucre 5, Potosi 10, Uyuni 2, Tarija 6, Tupiza 5, Santa Cruz 2, Beni 1, Corocoro 1. The Congress opened on 29 November 1936 with Waldo Alvarez making the opening speech. 'He began by saying that the government had played no part in organising the conference; that it was all due to the initiative of the Frente Unico Sindical of La Paz. The Minister called on the proletariat to unite in opposition to international capitalism, fascism and the bourgeoisie'. He knew that the workers supported the existing regime, but, in a fit of sincerity and with a presentiment of future events, he added: 'The working class will know up to what point it should continue supporting the government and will do so as long as the government stays on the path of genuine socialism.'2 Gabriel Moises, on behalf of the Oruro delegation, proposed the nationalisation of all the country's mines and industries, the unionisation of all workers, independent of government control, and the formation of a popular revolutionary front. Bernardo Garamendi of Tarija was loudly applauded when he proposed that non-commissioned officers, soldiers and war veterans should be called upon to cooperate with the proletariat 'in the great task of national reconstruction'. He spoke out against wars and against fascism. Speaking on behalf of the school teachers, Victor Vargas Vilaseca attacked the Bolivian intellectuals for having betrayed the proletariat and declared himself to be both a worker and an intellectual at the same time. He referred to the close ties which existed between the workers and the teachers. The unionised school teachers repeated the point they had already made at earlier congresses, that education should serve the cause of workers' emancipation. Yolando Justiniano, of the anarchist union at the Said Yarur textile factory, stressed the question of the class struggle, condemned the emergence of fascism, and stressed the urgency of fighting for the rights of working-class women. Another idea which received the whole-

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hearted support of the congress was the proposal to nationalise the Standard Oil petroleum concession. The congress sought to regulate the length of the working day according to the nature of different types of jobs (six hours a day in the mines; seven and eight hours in factories and industry) and resolved that all workers should be entitled to Sundays off. The denunciation that in several mines and enterprises in the interior of the country there were still people who had to work 14 and 15 hours a day caused a great stir. It was shown that not only the eight-hour day law was being ignored, but also the rulings on minimum wage-rates. The congress also wanted wage-rates to be fixed according to the cost of living, and resolved that it was necessary to establish 15-days' holiday a year for employees and workers in factories and commerce and for public employees. The predominance of Marxist-inclined delegates soon became apparent, and this gave rise to a series of internal disputes. The sectarian polemics displeased many of the delegates 'and, disgusted by the manoeuvres of the "politicians", the members of the Conferencia de Ferroviarios decided to withdraw from the congress and organise their own railway workers' congress'.3 This was a hard blow for the CSTB. Nevertheless, despite the initial confusion, the CSTB became a powerful confederation and for some time provided the labour movement with effective leadership. It was undoubtedly the most powerful trade-union confederation until the organisation of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) after the 1952 revolution. The CSTB rejected all idea of apoliticism and declared itself a revolutionary organisation, and was soon engaged in the formation of a political front with the left-wing parties. Although a large number of delegates favoured neutrality vis-a-vis the rival Internationals, the Marxists succeeded in affiliating the CSTB to the Stalinist CTAL. The congress agreed that it should 'maintain relations with other leftwing groups who are fighting along revolutionary lines for the emancipation of the proletariat'. It recommended 'open battle against nazi-fascism' and all reactionary organisations. The CSTB should sponsor the formation of a popular left-wing front in cooperation with the authentic socialist parties, the communists, trade unions and 'cultural groups proved to be on the left'. Another document proposed the creation of workers' militias 'under strict discipline and based on a true class-strategy'. The militias were to be entrusted with the defence of 'our conquest, the Ministry of Labour' (though in fact it was already lost), 'and the few trifling concessions we have won up till now'. For the union leaders of the time this paragraph implied cooperation with the so-called 'socialist state', but never-

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theless it left open the possibility of direct action to solve the workers' problems independently of the government. The creators of the CSTB betrayed their political line in the phrase, 'lastly, we shall defend the present socialist state', adding, however, a rider which expressed the doubts which were beginning to develop among the workers about the ruling junta, 'as long as it does not abandon the pro-labour principles it proclaimed in the revolution of 7 May'. Among the many demands drawn up were the following: all gold and mineral deposits not yet conceded to private companies should be reserved to the state; the state should become a partner in the export of minerals and take 40% of the earnings; a forced loan should be exacted from the mineowners to strengthen the currency; Standard Oil's concessions should be rescinded; the state should organise producer, credit and consumer cooperatives. Workers should share in the profits of private companies and there should be a minimum wage based on the cost of living, and equal pay for equal work for everybody (men and women, Bolivians and foreigners). The education budget should be levelled-up with that allocated for defence. Steps should be taken to prevent the flight of capital. All these demands had an anti-capitalist tinge. Other 'special resolutions' passed at the congress included a demand for the dissolution of the mutual societies, which were regarded as dens of corruption, 'as can be seen in various mining centres'; and a request that the government 'recognise the trade unions as the only legal form of working class organisation'. They also expressed their support for the Spanish proletariat and asked for a general amnesty for all political prisoners, 'whether they are workers or intellectuals, trade unionists, communists, socialists, or left-wingers'. They also requested an amnesty for all the people who had been persecuted for their pacifist ideas in the war against Paraguay. The congress requested the government to guarantee that the Ministry of Labour 'would continue under our complete control', with the CSTB's rights extended to include 'intervention in the appointment of functionaries, assessors and other important officials'. The question of nominating a candidate to be Minister of Labour gave rise to a very heated debate. The situation was made even gloomier by the criticisms levelled against the conduct of the ex-Minister of Labour, Waldo Alvarez, who had resigned a few days before the congress in accordance with his promise on taking office. This was an opportunity for the organised workers to consolidate their right to appoint a Minister of Labour who would represent the trade union movement in the government. But most of the debate consisted of criticisms against the ambitions of the leaders who wanted to become ministers.

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However the political situation was such that Waldo Alvarez was to be the first and last worker minister in the military 'socialist' government. The Marxist and anarchist leaders were so concerned with their efforts to become part of the government that they did not notice that a political change had taken place. Initially Colonel Toro had turned to the labour movement for support and had given many concessions to the workers. But by the end of 1936 it was evident that the unions were not such a solid powerful force as he had imagined, and that, in fact, they were deeply divided by ideological and political differences and ambitions and were organisationally weak. Once the congress began, Toro felt free from all obligations to the unions. Therefore, he alone appointed the new Minister of Labour on his own authority, despite the resolutions passed by the workers' congress. 'The whole CSTB went to see President Toro to propose that G. Moises should be appointed Minister of Labour in the new Government. The President informed them that he would not take their proposals into account as he had already decided to appoint Dr Javier Paz Campero to the post, a decision which, he was sure, all the workers would appreciate.'4 Paz Campero was one of the leading lawyers for the Hochschild mining company and was 'socially and sympathetically a part of the oligarchy'.5 As a result, shortly afterwards the CSTB withdrew support from the Toro government and 'declared that its claim to be socialist was fraudulent'. The Oruro conference

The CSTB later held a conference in Oruro from 16 to 19 October 1937 under the presidency of Pedro Vaca Dolz. The conference resolved that the CSTB should participate directly in the preparation of all government measures relating to the workers' interests. They decided to inform the Busch government that they wanted the trade union movement to play a direct role in drafting the Labour Code, and that they felt the plans presented by the Ministry of Labour needed substantial changes. It was also resolved that the working class needed its own political party and a Partido Obrero was set up which represented the final break from the government's variety of 'socialism' but which was, in fact, a mere duplication of the CSTB and soon faded out of existence without making the slightest impact. The conference also proposed that workers should be given a favoured position in electoral matters, demanding the introduction of 'a system of qualified votes in favour exclusively of the trade unions and intellectual workers'. They also demanded the outlawing of fascism and the cancellation of the contract by which an Italian Mission were to re-

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organise the security forces. This was a very daring demand, given the open sympathies expressed by many young Bolivian officers for fascism. By this time the CSTB was claiming to have set up federations in all the departmental capitals and in the mining centres of Uyuni, Colquechaca, Corocoro, Pulacayo, Tupiza and Uncia. In fact these Federaciones Obreras Sindicales (FOS) were only created in the departmental capitals, though even there they were very badly organised, but in the provincial centres they existed only in name. CSTB delegates met the President of the Republic on 27 October, and the President agreed to recognise the CSTB as a legal entity and, as such, as the only body to represent the Bolivian proletariat. President Busch said he would select the workers' representatives to the Economic Council from the list of names submitted by the conference. He also 'granted extensive guarantees for the functioning of the workers' movement in general', permitting their free development both on a political and on a trade union level. He offered to consider the resolutions of the conference and guaranteed the existence of the peasant union of Ucurena and similar organisations.6 In December 1938 another conference was held in Oruro, during which Luis Penaloza called a private meeting of the worker delegates, who had come from all over the country, and notified them of a proposal drawn up by President Busch and Captain Belmonte offering 50% of the seats at the forthcoming National Convention to the trade unions. After clearing up a few doubts and misgivings on the part of the anarchists, the proposal was accepted. But 'for various reasons it never materialised, mainly because of the misguided Partido Obrero which, instead of accepting the offer, spent the evening in doctrinaire discussions, the minutes of which were later delivered to the police station, by certain people who regarded themselves as Marxists and rebels. This episode put an end to the party and to Busch's offer.'7 The student movement The IVth convention of the FUB, held in Sucre in December 1938, marked a new stage in the radicalisation of the student movement, and a strictly Marxist programme was approved. The meeting was attended by outstanding politicians, students and labour leaders, who were to play important roles in future social conflicts.8 The conference approved two fundamental documents: the FUB's programme of principles and a tripartite pact between workers, students and teachers. The programme of principles was a short document drawn up by Ernesto Ayala.9 The political line of this

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widely-diffused document was based on the theory of the permanent revolution. It started by declaring that 'university reform is an integral part of the social question', adding that 'the student movement cannot act in isolation from the class struggle'.10 Until this moment it had usually been argued that the educational system, and more especially the universities, would play the leading role in creating the new society. The programme of principles, however, posed the problem correctly; a new educational system would only be possible as the product of a new society: 'AH the postulates of the FUB are class demands; they can only be achieved in a society which has an entirely new social, economic and judicial structure.' 'A consideration of the existing social structure, which is in a state of disintegration, shows that the mass of manual and intellectual workers can only achieve their social and cultural emancipation through their own efforts. But unless they have vanguard organisations capable of directing the protests of the oppressed masses towards concrete solutions, the simple disintegration of capitalist society will get us nowhere', the programme continued. It went on: 'The FUB is an organisation at the service of the manual and intellectual proletariat who are struggling to construct the basis of a new society. From now onwards the FUB will, therefore, play its role as a progressive organisation with a class basis and a clearly defined political position.' But this document stops where it should really have started. It does not contain a single word about the question of power, which is basic both at a theoretical level and in day-to-day politics. All the lessons of revolutionary struggle in other parts of the world were ignored in Bolivia, and the FUB's sterile debates did not even raise the question of whether a workers' government was viable or not in a backward country. This question was not tackled until the Thesis of Pulacayo in 1946 (see pp. 246-52). On the other hand, the tripartite pact signed by representatives of workers, students and teachers turned out to be very important for the trade-union movement and the struggles of the oppressed in general, and it established a crucial principle which came to guide the students' and teachers' movements: 'The conference, with the participation of the CSTB and the National Teachers' Union, resolves that the organisations signing this pact, in a spirit of socialist solidarity, commit themselves to fight at all times for the total emancipation of Bolivia's exploited and oppressed majorities and to establish a front to resist imperialism in all its guises; and as an immediate objective, to demand that all democratic liberties are respected.' A month later the tripartite pact was ratified by the second congress of the CSTB, held in La Paz in late-January 1939.

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The second congress of the CSTB The long-awaited second congress of the CSTB eventually took place in La Paz between 22 and 30 January 1939. As a result of the progress it had made, the CSTB found itself faced with a big problem: how to organise large sectors of the working class and incorporate them effectively into the struggle. The situation was such that the organisation of unions solely on horizontal lines was no longer efficient. About 100 delegates attended the congress; they included eleven miners, two railway workers, three transport workers, five photographers. The other delegations were organised on a regional basis: the FOS of Tarija had ten delegates, Oruro three, Cochabamba eight, Chuquisaca eleven, Potosi eight and La Paz twenty-eight, Federico Gonzales, of the La Paz FOS and secretary general of the CSTB, gave a report on the activities of the executive committee of the CSTB. He said that it had taken on the difficult task of reorganising the national confederation, 'overcoming many obstacles, created particularly by theorisers and intellectuals, who, at every opportunity, have tried to create confusion in the trade union movement'. He pointed to moves made by the railway workers towards the uniting of the labour movement and the agreement reached with the Parliamentary Labour Block as some of the positive steps that had been taken. The FOS of Chuquisaca reported that, as a result of intensive organisational work after the Chaco War, it had now organised 28 unions. Its greatest problems were economic ones, since its attempts to set up a strike fund had been unsuccessful. It provided free medical attention for its members and maintained good relations with the authorities, who allowed them to send worker delegates to supervise certain local government activities. They had set up a secretariat of peasant affairs to defend the peasants before the authorities. Faustino Castellon, secretary general of the Cochabamba FOS, reported that in his city they had set up a consumers' cooperative in response to the rising cost of living, but its funds had been embezzled and this had led to the demoralisation of some of the unions. The secretary general of the Potosi FOS said that living and working conditions were desperate, and that therefore the Labour Code should be put into effect as soon as possible. The reorganisation of the union movement had had the following results: the miners' union now had 500 men and 300 women members; the metallurgical workers' union had reached a membership of 2,000 and had opened its own office. He described the transport workers as the 'vanguard of the organised workers in the Potosi

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district'. In all, 22 organisations were affiliated to the FOS, 'including the students' federation, the united front of ex-prisoners, and the 25 December and 15 May Societies, giving a total of 8,000 affiliated workers'. Furthermore, the Potosi FOS had put into effect the resolution passed at the first CSTB congress, sponsoring the formation of a popular front, 'thus bringing together all the socialist forces of the district'. Santiago Abaroa of the Oruro FOS denounced 'certain political elements', whose treacherous behaviour had produced discontent among the workers in his region, thereby splitting the union movement. But as a result of hard work, the departmental FOS had succeeded in reorganising the central miners' union with 1,500 members, and four sectional unions with between 400 and 600 members, and the drivers' union with 1,100 members and over 1,000 other workers in 12 unions. Primitivo Torrico and Angelica Ascui reported for the La Paz FOS that 26 unions had been organised, and at times the La Paz section had taken over the reorganisation of the CSTB. They had brought 20,000 people out on to the streets for the 1938 May Day demonstration, and had helped to put on two plays, Cursed Money and The Miners' Strike. The Parliamentary Labour Block (which had 24 members) also gave a report. Personal interests and susceptibilities had to be overcome before a working relationship could be established between the executive of the CSTB and the parliamentarians, and 'it was revealed that the Parliamentary Block had tried to dominate the confederation'. On the question of voting for certain members of the Supreme Court, the parliamentarians explained that they had done so only when they were sure that they were 'suitable people . . . We are certain that our votes will ensure that the petroleum concessions will not be returned to Standard Oil'. They had managed to get a law passed which granted the colonial mine-shafts of the Cerro de Potosi to the miners. The proposal had been combatted fiercely by the right wing press. The Labour Block had also secured the adoption of a decree creating a pension fund for retired railway and tramway workers and their widows and orphans. One of the most important resolutions passed at the second congress was on the question of politics. They agreed to work for the unification of all the left-wing organisations, on the basis of ideas and convictions rather than personalities. They added that the approval of a left-wing political programme 'and the choice of tactics to be adopted to obtain social justice requires the convocation of a congress representing all left-wing organisations in the country . . . ' In another resolution they agreed to use all the means available to destroy 'the hegemony of the traditional parties which

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is used to thwart the workers' parties', and declared that 'it has become essential at this moment in the social struggle for the Bolivian proletariat to form its own political party'. Nevertheless, despite this clear definition of their left-wing position, a growing body of delegates favoured an apolitical stand for the CSTB. This paradox was due to justified fears on the part of pro-Marof delegates that Arze's supporters might draw the CSTB into the political party they were planning to create; this obliged the Marofists, somewhat unwillingly, to resort to the tactic of apoliticism. Thus a resolution was adopted which proclaimed the 'complete autonomy' of the second congress 'and of its organisation, the CSTB, which shall not intervene in party political activities or sign or draw up pacts and political programmes, and will dedicate itself solely to trade-union activity within the revolutionary class struggle' In accordance with the long tradition of labour congresses, the CSTB drew up a document on the Indian problem. It began by stating 'the problem of the Indian is a problem of land', and reached the following conclusions: (1) that the land should belong to those who work it, and that productive activities should be collectivised; (2) the Indian communities should be given state protection; (3) peasant juntas should be created; (4) the standard of living of the peasants should be raised and pongueafe and other forms of servitude should be abolished; (5) rural schools should be protected from landowner control. The departmental labour federations were instructed to organise the peasants and assist them in obtaining their economic rights. Representatives of the agrarian unions were invited to attend the next congress, and it was decided to campaign to set up a bank for the benefit of the peasantry. The CSTB leaders were serious about their tripartite pact with students and teachers so that when, in April, a conflict broke out in the universities, the CSTB handled the negotiations with the authorities for them. The university students also worked closely with the CSTB. On 10 March a large open meeting was held under the auspices of the CSTB in support of the expropriation of the Standard Oil petroleum concessions, since at the time it was rumoured that the imperialist company was trying to regain what it had lost. The manifesto which was read out and widely distributed bore the signatures of representatives of the students, teachers and CSTB. Thus the tripartite pact was being made a reality. The CSTB was preoccupied with serious political problems. According to its executive committee, 'President Busch sympathised with the aspirations of the workers . . . Busch always showed us his goodwill, and perhaps we would have gained some effective victories if his short-sighted,

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opportunist ministers who prefer to ingratiate themselves with the capitalists rather than the working people, had not intervened.' Things changed after the dictator's death, when the right rallied behind the new President, General Quintanilla. The socialists, war veterans and university students set up a revolutionary committee, which the CSTB was asked to join. The CSTB leaders demanded that 'the economic and organisational demands of the workers should be put above all other considerations', and that one guarantee would be for the cabinet to be composed of people who had the confidence of the workers. After a while the CSTB withdrew from the committee which, they said, did not support their point of view strongly enough. 'Both the veterans and the university students wished to use us as their tools, making use of our name, and then dismiss us with contempt.' The CSTB executive committee urged the workers to demonstrate for a left-wing cabinet. But when the CSTB tried to use the May Day demonstration of 1940 to demand 'wage increases, a reduction in the cost of living, and government policies favourable to the workers . . . the La Paz FOS refrained from declaring its support for this and from bringing the masses out on to the streets'. The La Paz FOS was certainly following a very different path from the CSTB. In a circular sent round to the various unions, dated 22 October 1939, the CSTB had called for a demonstration and mass meeting in favour of wage increases and to press the government to put a stop to inflation and speculation, adding that, in accordance with the terms of the tripartite pact, the students and teachers should join the demonstration. The Secretary General of the La Paz FOS replied that the demonstration should be exclusively a workers' affair, and that they were only seeking economic advantages and should not therefore be considered a political movement. By a special announcement the FOS called off the demonstration and decided instead to hand in a petition to the government giving them 'eight days to satisfy the just demands of the working classes'. This experience in La Paz and the failure of attempts to stage a strike in Potosi made the CSTB realise that the trade unions were still too weak to cope with attacks from the right. Despite the fact that the second congress had forbidden the CSTB to become involved in party politics, the executive committee felt it ought to declare its position with regard to the May 1940 elections. The right-wing Concordancia was singled out as the chief enemy, but the opportunist left was also denounced. The CSTB made three recommendations: (1) to urge the workers only to consider their class interests and demands; (2) to unmask the agents of the rosca and the phoney socialists, who sow confusion among the exploited masses; (3) to

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urge the workers to vote for genuine militants 'with a long revolutionary tradition. The purchase of votes is an insult to the workers.' The CSTB split (August 1940) Gradually the opposing groups in the CSTB became polarised, a process which eventually caused the organisation to split up. Although on the surface the division appeared to be a clash between personal interests, in fact political differences were at the root of the conflicts. Personal disputes between the leaders certainly contributed to precipitating the crisis, but they were based on political differences. The Stalinists or supporters of the Frente de Izquierda Boliviano (FIB) attacked the executive committee, the majority of which was composed of followers of Marof and independents opposed to the FIB's plans for the union movement: Once again those discredited people have reappeared to contest us. Although at the second congress they supported the motion favouring the adoption of an apolitical position by the CSTB, they have now turned up, under the leadership of C. Arratia, at an open meeting of the La Paz FOS, to propose that it affiliate to the FIB. The La Paz unions rejected their proposal, partly out of respect for the resolution passed at the second congress, and partly because they know the self-interested people in the Frente too well.11 The political conflicts within the CSTB were accentuated when the need arose to adopt a coherent attitude to the pressures coming from the FIB. When the FIB decided to hold a congress in Oruro on 25 July 1940, some sectors of the labour movement, notably the railway workers and the printers, decided to affiliate to the FIB, thus weakening the position of the CSTB. The FIB's basic programme, drawn up before the Oruro congress, contained one point which related directly to the CSTB; it proposed 'the recognition of the CSTB, to make it represent the free opinions of the Bolivian trade unions instead of being a mere appendage of the government party. Therefore an intensive campaign must be launched to persuade the country's unions to organise an authentic national directorate which expresses the opinion of the workers.'12 Jose Antonio Arze, the secretary general of the FIB (who had polled surprisingly well in the Presidential election of March 1940), sent a note to the executive of the CSTB inciting them to attend the Oruro congress at which a Stalinist political party, the Partido de La Izquierda Revolucionaria, would be founded. The CSTB rejected the invitation, arguing that participation in the congress would amount to union participation in politics, something expressly forbidden by article 28 of their statutes. They added

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that 'the left-wingers of the FIB are trying by every means to use the labour movement as an instrument for their own self-advancement', and they instructed the departmental federations not to attend. The CSTB's refusal to attend the congress constituted a momentary victory for the Marof group, who, nominally at least, prevented the incorporation of most of the organised working class into the party controlled by Jose Antonio Arze. But in the long run the CSTB's tactics were disastrous, since they set the union leadership against the majority of their bases, who urgently sought the unity of the working class. By its reckless tactics the CSTB made itself vulnerable to the attacks of its adversaries and eventually this led to the division of the confederation. The argument that the CSTB was prohibited by its statutes from participating in politics was a mere sophism, since, as we have seen, the CSTB never ceased to be involved in agreements and manoeuvres of a political nature. The CSTB's strange attitude can only be explained by the decisive influence of Marof's supporters. In August 1940 the differences between the national leaders of the CSTB and most of its departmental federations came to a head. Heated discussions took place over the interpretation of article 28 of the statutes, but the opposing groups could not be reconciled: 'The majority favoured some reorganisation of the CSTB, but insisted that article 28 should not be modified, while a tiny minority came out in favour of establishing relations with the PIR. The great majority of the delegations remained loyal to the CSTB and only two dissidents resigned.'13 The split was then consolidated, with the old CSTB headed by Pedro Vaca and including delegations from Tarija, Cochabamba, La Paz, Sucre, Oruro, Catavi and Colquechaca and representatives of the miners of Bolivia and the taxi-drivers' union pitted against a PIR-controlled CSTB, with Aurelio Alcoba as secretary general, which included several union leaders. Alcoba toured the country trying to win over the departmental federations to his new organisation. In some areas he received a hostile reception. As a result of the split the CSTB ceased to exist as a major workers' organisation. The political differences between the two groups became the most important aspect of their day-to-day activities, and mutual recriminations became almost a vital necessity. In 1944 the PIR group set about organising a third CSTB congress in the hope that its success would eliminate their enemies. The agenda for the congress referred to the need to reform the statutes of the CSTB, particularly article 28, and to revise the CSTB's declaration of principles. The rival CSTB sent delegates to the interior to snatch support away from the PIR and cause the proposed congress to fail. The PIR threw all its resources into getting the miners and railway workers

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to attend the congress, and in July 1945 a document eventually appeared convening the congress, signed by representatives of both these groups and of the transport workers' union. Jose Antonio Arze

Jose Antonio Arze is regarded as one of the greatest Bolivian sociologists (or perhaps it would be better to say professors of sociology) and as an outstanding Marxist theorist. He passed into history as the founder of the Partido de La Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR), which was the embodiment of his political ideas. Like Marof he was an intellectual and politician, with a wide knowledge of European culture. Arze was born in Cochabamba in 1904, the son of an impoverished petty-bourgeois family, whose income came from mining and agriculture. Miguel Bonifaz, one of his disciples, has written a eulogistic account of his life, from which some of the following information is drawn.14 The Russian Revolution and the Cordoba university reform movement had a formative influence on the young intellectual. At an early age he began working as a secondary school teacher, and soon he was organising educational centres for artisans. In 1921 he founded the Centro Superior de Artesanos de Cochabamba, and the Cochabamba municipal authorities sent him abroad to study the operation of similar institutions elsewhere. Throughout his life he was more a teacher than a politician. Arze graduated in law from Cochabamba university in 1925. He was one of the organisers and leading figures of the students' congress of 1928 at which the Federaci6n Universitaria Boliviana was set up. Arze soon became a kind of specialist in university affairs, especially university reform, and he wrote a great deal on the question. He was a born teacher and devoted most of his energy to sociology. His greatest achievements were in the field of education, but the qualities that made him a good teacher also account for many of his weaknesses in other fields. He tried to apply his academic schema to politics and never had either the time or the inclination to make a proper study of Bolivian society. Arze was one of the organisers of the anti-war movement in 1932, as a result of which he had to go into exile in Peru, where he remained for the duration of the war. In Peru he worked in journalism and teaching and came into close contact with the Marxist movement. Because of his attitude to the war his enemies accused him of being a deserter. It is not true, however, that his conduct was the result of cowardice; an intellectual Marxist and opponent of the war could not have done otherwise. In fact, he showed great courage in denouncing the imperialist character of the war

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at a public meeting at La Paz University in 1932, and in going against the wave of chauvinism which gripped the country at that time. Arze followed the school of thought which classified Bolivia as a feudal country and believed that a bourgeois-democratic revolution was the next stage of historical development, and that the possibility of socialism could not be considered until there had been a long period of bourgeois democracy. These ideas pushed him towards Stalinism, even though his intellectual interests and his bohemianism pulled him in other directions; he was never able to overcome this contradiction. In his sociological statements he argued that the Bolivian situation was not suitable for the formation of a bolshevik-type workers' party, and recommended instead the setting up of a popular multi-class party. He began his political life in the Partido Nacionalista which was organised by the government of Hernando Siles, and then after the Chaco War he joined Enrique Baldivieso's Partido Socialista. Nevertheless he was also secretly involved in more extreme activities. For example, he proposed the setting up of the Confederaci6n de las Republicas Obreras del Pacifico (CROP), whose ultimate aim was to set up a socialist confederation of the three Pacific countries, Bolivia, Chile and Peru. When this became known in 1936, Arze became the target of attack by the right-wing elements in the new party. The statutes of the CROP were published in La Chile as part of Carlos Montenegro's efforts to isolate the Marxists in the Partido Socialista: 'A sensational document, which was circulating secretly, has been discovered by some socialists, who immediately asked us to reveal the communist affiliations of certain people who have penetrated the Partido Socialista and the FOT have started a miserable campaign of disruptive activities, sowing suspicion, slander and intrigue among the socialists.'15 According to Arze, the CROP was organised 'at a time when there was no authentic left wing party'. It was a clandestine organisation with Moises Alvarez as one of the founding members. It seems that in 1932 the organisers themselves realised that the movement was a failure, since they had only managed to establish a very small organisation (a sort of intellectuals' discussion group) totally isolated from the masses. Arze himself criticised their actions: 'We who had organised the CROP subsequently decided to dissolve it, because we realised, among other things, that politically it was a mistake to maintain it as a more or less academic, secret organisation, which is what it had become.'16 Arze was also attacked from the left for organising the CROP without any directives from the Communist International which, as we have seen, was interested in creating and strengthening the communist parties in Latin

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America. To this Arze replied that he had no relations of any kind with the Third or Fourth Internationals. But in fact this is far from certain, since he did attend a congress of Latin American communist parties in Montevideo. Arze returned to Bolivia in 1935 and was among the intellectuals who collaborated with Toro's military government, taking up the post of legal advisor to the Ministry of Labour. But he found it difficult to work with the 'socialist' reformism of the military government and eventually the President exiled him to Chile in 1936. At the time, the Communist International was actively promoting popular-front policies, and the setting up of the Frente de Izquierda Boliviano (FIB) in Santiago in 1939 was the most serious attempt to apply this tactic in Bolivia. Arze was undoubtedly the inspiration behind the FIB but he was not a sectarian Stalinist. Arze wrote a pamphlet justifying this tactic; it is full of quotations and has certain sociological pretensions, but it is undoubtedly the best thing he wrote on politics.17 When the PIR was founded Arze became its leader and theorist. He was responsible for drawing up its statutes, while Ricardo Anaya wrote the programme. In his time Arze was the idol of many students who in 1940 put him forward to run for the presidency against General Enrique Penaranda, the government's candidate. Arze's campaign performance was far from impressive and it seemed as if he simply wanted to avoid such a great responsibility. He later developed the theory that the Villarroel—MNR government (1943—6) was fascist, but he only adopted this position after his public offer to cooperate with the military president had been rejected. He was elected deputy for La Paz in 1944 but his parliamentary performance was worse than mediocre. In July 1944 an attempt was made on his life at the instigation of the RADEPA military lodge. Later, under the prorosca 'national unity' government of Hertzog, he became president of the lower house. During the war he adjusted his politics to the pro-North-American line taken by Moscow. The PIR participated in the Frente Democratica Antifascista and the Union Democratica Boliviana, and even formed an electoral alliance with the Liberal Party. This policy of 'national unity' implied collaboration with the rosca, and, as we shall see in Book Six, resulted in the destruction of the PIR. In 1948 Arze went to Europe and by the time he returned to Bolivia in 1951 the PIR had split and given rise to the Communist Party. He virtually abandoned politics and dedicated all his energy to sociology and teaching. His irresponsibility and dissipation were proverbial and ended up destroying him. He died on 23 August 1955 aged 51.

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The post-war labour movement

The Daza Rojas brothers

Both the Daza Rojas brothers were dedicated activists, and played important roles in the trade union and socialist movements. In 1940 they were both members of the Executive Committee of the CSTB, opposed to the initiatives of the FIB. Of the two, Arturo was the more active and intelligent, and he has left a witty autobiographical account which traces the ups and downs of his life. Arturo Daza Rojas was born on 12 February 1890, in the valley of Cliza near Cochabamba. He was the son of a modest small-town family, though he claims that he was a descendant of none other than President Hilarion Daza, a ruler whom he tried somewhat weakly to defend. Young people of the small towns who wanted to earn some money and improve themselves had no alternative but to emigrate and work in the Chilean nitrate mines. Arturo's parents, like many others, went to Chile, taking their sons with them. Here, Arturo says of himself: 'I began to work, grinding nitrate and sewing sacks, and I began to understand the character and psychology of the workers, who had been brought together from Chile, Peru and Bolivia in a communion of effort and sacrifice, by the need for work.'18 The nitrate workers were called 'pampinos' because the nitrate beds are situated in the pampa, which has been described as 'a motionless sea, crested with waves of s a l t . . . a broad expanse of desert . . . a milky grey wilderness, dotted with telegraph poles. Lonely and arid, with not even a blade of grass to brighten the treeless plain. Sand, salt flats, and here and there a playful dust cloud, laden with dirt and grit, swirling over the wilderness.'19 Daza was apprenticed to various trades, and after losing two fingers in his efforts to become a mechanic, he eventually ended up as a carpenter. Soon the Daza Rojas brothers found themselves participating in the Chilean socialist and labour movement. Arturo's political activities began as a reporter for Pueblo Obrero, a paper edited by Osvaldo Lopez in Iquique. At the same time he began his process of self-education: 'We read newspapers and workers' leaflets, and all the books and magazines we could lay our hands on.' In December 1907, 'the workers throughout the nitrate zone of the province of Tarapaca went out on strike, and more than 30,000 of them crowded on to trains to the port of Iquique where they demanded redress of grievances from the national government'. The workers in the demonstration in Iquique were shot down, and although Daza himself did not participate in the demonstration, the event left an indelible mark on him, perhaps determining his future.

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From Chaco defeat to Catavi massacre

In Huara the Daza brothers 'met for the first time, the greatest leader of the Chilean working classes, Luis Emilio Recabarren Serrano, who preached the gospel of socialism the length of the country from Iquique to Punta Arenas. I remember him haranguing the crowds from a kiosk in the square, speaking eloquently of working-class unity and social regeneration . . . It was there that we became associated with the labour movement, and took out shares in the printing press ElDespertar de los Trabajadores'20 Daza began to write for the newspaper of Recabarren (even though the editors had to correct his articles from beginning to end!). From very early on he showed a talent for satire, which he used skilfully to criticise the upper strata of society and its oppressive social customs. Later the Daza brothers moved to the copper mines of Chuquicamata, in search of better wages. A North-American company had become lord and master of the whole region, and bitterly persecuted the socialists, who in the face of a thousand difficulties managed to circulate propaganda leaflets. Militant workers, including the Daza brothers, had to travel several kilometres from the mining camp in order to meet by night and plan the formation of a union affiliated to the Federation Obrera de Chile (FOCH). Soon Arturo and his brother were sacked as dangerous agitators. After this Arturo started to work as a bookseller, a trade he exercised with dignity until the end of his days. In Calama and Punta de Rieles he set up an agency where he sold EINorte and El Socialista of Antofagasta, making a point of arguing his ideas as he sold the papers. After being jailed for a month in Antofagasta, Daza fled from the political persecution in Chile (there was a rumour going round that all communists would be thrown into the sea), and returned to Bolivia, stowed away on a train. In order to put into practice the socialist ideas he had acquired abroad, Daza joined the Partido Obrero Socialista, and gave himself over, body and soul, to the organisation. In Oruro he worked as a carpenter, but he soon got tired of sawing up planks, and returned to his trade as a 'cultural agitator', wandering around the streets of the city selling Ideas y Figuras, a magazine edited by the anarchist Alberto Giraldo. He also continued to read and distribute ElDespertar and ElBonete which were sent to him from Chile. Bit by bit he accumulated sufficient money for a ticket back to the region he loved so much — Cochabamba. Cochabamba became the centre of his activities, and he became enthusiastic about starting a propaganda paper in the city, so, with Valenzuela Catacora, he brought out Claridad. Then in Daza's restless mind a new idea took shape: he would go to the mines (where the largest number of workers were concentrated) as a trader, and spread socialist ideas in this way. 'With

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the depression that followed the 1929 crisis, unemployed Bolivians returned from the nitrate fields of Chile in their thousands. Most of them had some socialist ideas, and they participated in the first hunger march, and helped form the first unions in Cochabamba.' Redencion, the newspaper of the Cochabamba FOT, was virtually the creation of the Daza brothers, and the most outstanding workers and left-wing intellectuals of the day, including Aguirre Gainsborg, wrote for it. In 1931, in reply to President Salamanca's campaign in favour of war with Paraguay, the revolutionaries organised the Comite Obrero Communista Anarquista (COCA). 'This committee met in the countryside, often opposite the electricity station, on the other side of the river Rocha, hidden among the leafy trees.'21 COCA organised several demonstrations against the war, and consequently a number of its leaders were arrested, Arturo Daza among them. However, he managed to escape, and fled to La Paz. During the war he was arrested again, and this time exiled to Peru. In Puno, Daza set up a bookstall, where he sold Bolivian literature. In due course he made his way to Lima, selling trinkets on the way. In the Peruvian capital he succeeded in overcoming his desperate poverty and began to print song-books. But in order to earn his fare home to Bolivia, he had to work in the port of Huacho. By this time he had become a strong opponent of drinking and smoking, an obsession that was to grow with age. He returned to Bolivia shortly after the war, and back in La Paz he set up a secondhand bookstall in the Plaza de San Francisco, which soon became regarded as an 'anarchist' centre, since its owner was very frank about his political opinions. In his old age he defended the La Batalla printing press with his bare hands, when it was raided by the MNR shock troops. Marof has called him 'the socialist party's poet and humorist', but in fact he was the most impoverished, most sacrificial militant. He was in a bad physical condition: a blow on the head from a drunk had left him deaf. The ironic tone employed by Daza to describe his political activities hid a deepseated bitterness, because for him politics was synonymous with failure. For Daza the progress humanity had achieved was superficial, since the human body had not been purified of 'the pernicious impurities and unhealthy ingredients which are used to make up the chemical composition of the blood which gives the human species life. The main elements are denaturalised foods and decomposing flesh. If we consider in addition the toxic substances such as nicotine, opium and alcohol, etc. which are consumed by most people, then we must doubt whether the highest species of life on this planet can survive.' Such was the philosophy he expressed in his autobiography. It is hard to tell whether or not Daza was talking seriously when he

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applied these theories to politics. He said that the 1952 revolution was a failure because Bolivian blood was poisoned, and the people did not know how to cure themselves with natural remedies. In his autobiography there is a chapter dedicated to his political trajectory, which might be summarised as his transition from militant Marxism to vegetarianism. It is not, however, essential to be herbivorous to be an exemplary revolutionary! The truth is that the labour leader was tired of battling; he was looking for an argument which would help him explain his complete disillusionment with political practices and his conclusion that social revolutions were futile. Daza was a self-taught man and an avid reader. His socialist ideas came from reading novels with a social content, and from left-wing pamphlets and newspapers, rather than from the study of serious books. He was very widely read, though his choice of reading was somewhat haphazard. I have seen him, an old man, dictionary in hand, deciphering the secrets of some dense text. He was not an intellectual, but he never stopped studying throughout his eighty years, which he lived to the full. He was an enthusiastic globe-trotter, and learnt his geography by exploring the remotest corners of his country, which he deeply loved. Neither saint nor sage, he was a man with the courage to face the consequences of being a militant revolutionary and of propagating his curious ideas. Above all, Arturo Daza Rojas was passionately honest and upright. He therefore rejected all politicking, and went to great lengths to avoid all publicity and personal prominence. He died in La Paz on 10 February 1961. Victor, Arturo's younger brother, was also born in Cliza, four years after Arturo, in 1894. He too obtained his early experience of politics and trade unionism from the Chilean nitrate mines. He worked closely with Arturo in spreading socialist ideas and in organising unions, and to this day continues to regard himself as a disciple of Recabarren. His life could be viewed as an extension of Arturo's for he grew up and decided his path somewhat under the shadow of his elder brother. He is probably the author, frequently quoted in this study, who wrote under the pseudonym Andrescho Kespe. Victor became subsecretary of the northern zone of the FOCH and continued his political work in Tarapaca until mid-1919, when the authorities expelled him from Chile. On his return to Bolivia he was one of the organisers of the Cochabamba FOT, and in 1924 became its subsecretary. In response to one of the resolutions passed at the Third Workers' Congress a group was formed to make propaganda among the peasantry. On Sundays they travelled out to Tiraque, Jallpatio, San Benito, Tolata, etc., thus incurring the wrath of the latifundistas and the clergy. Consequently the

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Daza Rojas brothers, Alberto Bolivar and four students were arrested, and after being ill-treated in the police cells in Cochabamba they were sent to LaPaz. The FOT of Cochabamba was also active in the educational field, and Victor Daza helped to set up a night school, where various artisan trades were taught. At the beginning of the Chaco War Victor Daza was arrested, among others, but after promising not to make propaganda against the war he was released. He went to the front as a mechanic and then was evacuated after contracting malaria. He held many posts in the trade-union movement including that of secretary of the CSTB from 1938 to 1941. He now takes no part in trade-union or political activities and, as so often happens in our country, has long been forgotten by both his supporters and opponents. Angelica Ascui

Angelica Ascui Fernandez was an exceptional woman. From about 1920 onwards she played an important role in the labour movement and after the Chaco War she became particularly active in political and trade union activities. The first thing that must be said about her is that she was not a worker; her family were artisans and she never set foot on the factory floor. Instead she became intellectualised; her comfortable economic position (she came to have a healthy income and own several houses in La Paz) enabled her to take advantage of her natural ability and artistic inclinations. She came to socialism through the workers' drama groups. She was self-educated and only managed to achieve a rudimentary grasp of Marxist ideas. Angelica Ascui was very different from most of the left-wing activists in that she radiated sympathy and livened up any organisation she took part in. She was small and dark with sparkling black eyes and a good figure; an attractive woman full of criollo charm. She dressed well and always took great care in her appearance; indeed she looked like a middle-class employee rather than a worker. Why then was she a rebel? It was certainly not poverty which led her to fight against the existing order. At the time, according to the conventions of right-wing conservative circles, girls who went on the stage were frowned upon, but the labour organisations which used the theatre as a means of propaganda did not share this attitude. Thus the ambitious and restless girl found an opportunity for self-expression in the workers' drama groups. Angelica Ascui began by acting in left-wing plays written by worker and socialist leaders, and thus naturally came to identify with the labour movement. On the other hand, her artistic, trade union and political activities

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enabled her to rise socially and make a name for herself. When the social elite shut their doors in her face, she defied them and converted herself into a personality of the left. She entered the La Paz drama school in 1918 and joined the Illimani national drama school in 1925. The following year the Centro Artistica Union named her their leading actress. She also acted with the important Tiahuanacu theatre group, which travelled to Chile in April 1930 on a cultural mission. The Chilean critics were surprised at the lack of theatrical activities in Bolivia and stressed the strong emphasis on folklore in the work of the group. Angelica Ascui regarded the theatre as a way of educating the people and as a means of making propaganda. She put forward these ideas in an introductory speech to one of her many performances: 'We need this type of play to educate the proletariat, or rather to guide them, spreading the new ideas which will save humanity. With these arguments we can make people wake up and see the social injustices which surround them. Then they will go forward to the social revolution, to the social ideal of the anarchists: communism.' She took part in the national workers' congress of 1925, as a delegate and member of the Popular University, and presided over a commission to report on ways of securing better wages in all industries. The commission also discussed measures to protect women and children and to secure them wages which reflected 'their condition and the necessities of life'. She devoted a lot of her time to organising working women, especially the seamstresses who spent long hours at their sewing machines in their own homes and who constituted a substantial sector of the female population. An untiring militant, she made the most of the decree of 1936 which made unionisation obligatory, so that in July 1938 a general handiworks union was formed, of which she became secretary-general. At the second CSTB congress she put forward a 12-point programme of demands in favour of women workers. These included: the extension of the obligatory unionisation law to women; the setting up a women's section, with its own secretary, in every union; equal pay for equal work; free trade-schools for women workers; nurseries at the place of work; pre- and post-natal rest with pay; special legislation to protect working women and children; the establishment of women's pages in the trade union newspapers; the representation of women at workers' congresses. She urged that 'all wives, sisters, daughters and mothers of labour leaders should take responsible roles in the movement to organise women'. Angelica Ascui continued her political activities into the 1940s, being at one point a supporter of Marof and then, until 1945, of the PIR. She also played a leading role in various feminist organisations.

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The post-war labour movement

Jose Aguirre Gainsborg

Jose Aguirre Gainsborg, one of the principal revolutionaries of the 1930s, was born in the Bolivian Consulate in New York on 8 July 1909 when his father, a renowned literary and political figure, was a member of the Bolivian diplomatic mission. He was born into the Bolivian aristocracy and intelligentsia. (He was the grandson of the famous novelist Nataniel Aguirre and a descendant of the great Peruvian pamphleteer, Manuel Gonzalez Prada.) Nevertheless, he lacked economic resources, and at the age of nineteen was obliged to find work as a teacher of geography and history at the Instituto Americano. In 1932 he graduated from the law faculty of Cochabamba University but, for reasons of conscience, the young lawyer never exercised his profession or called himself 'Doctor' (in a country where this title has become a term of contempt through over use). By this time he was already a revolutionary. He made his political debut as a student leader, being one of the leading figures of the university-reform generation and, as such, coming into contact with Marxism and the labour movement. The university students of this period provided the ideological and political leadership of the various groups of workers and socialists, which were composed mainly of progressive artisans. Marxism, in its criollo version, became 'revolutionary socialism', a position which nevertheless retained something of a foreign flavour. This brand of socialism normally consisted in little more than the rambling vacuous repetition of generalities in current use, or the recitation of slogans learnt from the few propaganda leaflets which, escaping police vigilance, penetrated the country's intellectual isolation. This pseudo-intellectual posture of the students served to conceal their tendency to vacillate or capitulate before the rosca. University students with, at the most, a very superficial acquaintance with Marxism were presumptuous enough to suppose that they had the right to lead the masses and resolve all political problems in their name. Most of the revolutionary leadership of the labour movement emerged from the universities, which at that time were hotbeds of radicalism, but very few of them managed to break free from these negative features of 'student socialism'. Since Bolivia is a backward country with only a very small proletariat, they argued that middle-class intellectuals must play a decisive role in the revolutionary process. This doctrine gained currency in the thirties and has since become part of the ideological stock-in-trade of opportunists and capitulators who call themselves Marxists. It was in this unhealthy atmosphere that Jose Aguirre's intellectual formation took place but, nevertheless, he reached the conclusion not merely that was it essential for the students to unite with the workers in

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their struggle, but that the intellectuals should subordinate themselves politically to the working class. The university-reform movement reached Bolivia ten years after it first started in Cordoba, and the Bolivians merely regurgitated the slogans and ideas worked out in Argentina. Aguirre Gainsborg's signature appeared among others on the manifesto put out by the students of La Paz on 27 July 1929, summarising the ideas of the reform movement. 'The issue of educational and university reform which is one of the basic problems in Bolivia shows all the signs of generating a revolutionary movement. Revolutionary in the sense of subverting the present order in our universities, and of fighting to free them from political influences and vested interests.' As a student in Cochabamba he was already a revolutionary and fought side by side with the local labour movement, notably in the mass mobilisation against the 'Ley de Defensa Social'. For example, at one meeting in 1932 he expressed student solidarity with the workers, and 'he launched an all-out attack on the laws favouring Patino .. . This vibrant speech was well received by the audience which, although composed mainly of bourgeois and indifferent people, applauded enthusiastically.'22 The people who were later to become the principal figures in the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) started off as militants in what we have called the clandestine Communist Party, which was really a group dominated by intellectuals, without any clearly defined organisational form. Aguirre joined in August 1930. The Chaco War destroyed the party, whose membership was composed of people who had developed a rudimentary knowledge of Marxism, and had become left-wingers under the influence of the Russian Revolution, but whose ideology was not at all Stalinist. The struggle of the International Left Opposition had not yet produced any repercussions in Bolivia. The extremely low cultural level of the country left its mark on the political and ideological movements. It was not until much later that international developments on the left made any impact on Bolivia, and then only in a diluted way. When the Chaco War broke out Aguirre, like many other left-wingers, remained a convinced opponent of the war. He believed that if the people were mobilised into a powerful movement, the international war could be contained or transformed into a civil war to overthrow the local ruling class. 'Aguirre Gainsborg was among the first to oppose this act of madness, perpetrated by certain shortsighted men. Soon the indomitable militant was imprisoned in a very inhospitable part of the Altiplano. A little later, however, his prison sentence was changed to exile in Chile',23 thanks to the influence of his father, Jose Aguirre Acha, the diplomat and internationalist, poet and novelist.

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When Aguirre went into exile he had had only limited experience in the student and labour movements, the latter being highly disorganised and dominated by artisan leaders. In Chile, however, he made contact with a real revolutionary school and joined the Chilean Communist Party which at this time was profoundly shaken by the Trotskyists' opposition to the bureaucratic degeneration of Stalinism. In this environment the young politician showed his mettle. In Chile he had the chance to satisfy his thirst for knowledge and delve into many theoretical issues. An authentic revolutionary, he was immediately won over to the Chilean Left Opposition, which at one point acquired a very impressive membership. His was not a unique case; all his generation were caught up in the Left Opposition's bitter fight against Stalinism. The exiled Bolivians formed the Izquierda Boliviana in which Aguirre's influence was decisive, and he was jailed for attending an extremist congress which was discovered by the police. Aguirre was a gifted man, and had an admirable career in the Chilean Communist Party; however, he resigned from the party because of his deep political convictions. He was not, it should be noted, expelled for 'fractionalism' as so many others were. Aguirre was one of the best militants of the Izquierda Comunista, the Chilean section of the International Communist Opposition. But although the Chilean Izquierda Comunista was numerically a powerful movement, and an important force ideologically, it failed to make bolsheviks of all its cadres, and tolerated too much petty-bourgeois democracy, which atomised the party and shattered its future. Aguirre then took part in the activities of the Chilean Partido Obrero Revolucionario, which was Trotskyist from the very beginning. The virtual destruction of the Bolivian Communist Party in the Chaco War, and the betrayals of the Stalinists, made it urgent to set up a proper working-class party in Bolivia. Aguirre was the first to realise this and fought, against great obstacles, to achieve this end. His greatest achievement in exile was the setting up of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, which was created by the fusion of various left-wing groups in a congress in Cordoba, Argentina. Initially, Tristan Marof, the left-wing leader and writer, was named the head of the new party, but its ideological position (which is the most important in a political organisation) was drawn up entirely by Aguirre Gainsborg. The POR was conceived of as the Bolivian version of the Left Opposition, although not all of its friends held exactly the same idea. Aguirre returned to Bolivia at the end of 1934. His stay was to be a short one, but fruitful in terms of political work. He had two basic problems to contend with: firstly to penetrate the labour movement, and secondly to unite around the new party as much as possible of the atomised

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left, whilst excluding those who had stifled revolutionary ideas in the name of 'unity'. In addition, he joined the Beta Gama group, which was composed of intellectuals who either came from the petty bourgeoisie or had close ties with the Bolivian aristocracy. Its members included two future founders of the MNR, Hernan Siles Zuazo and Walter Guevara Arce. Beta Gama also called itself Accion Nacionalista, and lacked any clearly defined principles until Aguirre arrived. Aguirre started by changing the name of the group which began to call itself Accion Socialista Beta Gama, and its programme was a compromise between the revolutionary ideas of Aguirre and those of the moderate socialist majority. It seems that the extreme isolation of the POR led Aguirre to think, although only momentarily, that because of the political backwardness of the proletariat, the middle class should assume the role of the revolutionary leadership. But neither his work in Beta Gama, of which he was the brains, and the editor of its magazine, nor his battles in the Frente Unico de Izquierdas made him forget that it was necessary to extend the ideas of the POR to wider groups of people. At a time when the great majority of Marxists and left-wingers rallied round the 'socialist' Military Junta headed by Colonel Toro, displaying unmitigated servility towards the new President, despite the arrests and exiles ordered by the 'socialist' colonel, Jose Aguirre was alone in his denunciation of the government's 'socialist' position. Therefore, on 12 May 1936, the government, obviously troubled by Aguirre's continual activity, ordered his arrest, accusing him of being responsible for a general strike which had just broken out. However, three days later he was freed, after invoking the law of habeas corpus, and was therefore able to attend a meeting of the strike committee, where he made a vehement speech demanding the suspension of the state of siege. During August and September of the same year he found himself engaged in an intense battle with the La Paz FOT, which he wanted to channel along revolutionary lines, and give it an honest and capable leadership. In an open letter Julio Lara, one of his Saavedrista opponents, declared that: 'It is essential that the FOT should eliminate from the ranks of the working-class movement the influence of pseudo-intellectual communists, headed by Aguirre Gainsborg, who are acting as disruptive agitators.' Aguirre was arrested again on 24 September 1936 and deported to Arica, Chile, together with the future PIR leader, Jose Antonio Arze. During his second period of exile he joined the Chilean Trotskyist organisation. He remained abroad until 1938. In October 1938, at the second conference of the POR, he broke definitively with Tristan Marof, who wanted

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to form an unprincipled group of adventurers instead of the bolshevik party, so passionately defended by Aguirre. On 23 October, a rainy spring day in La Paz, Jose Aguirre Gainsborg fell to his death from the big wheel at a fun fair. He was only twenty-nine. Although it has been remarked that Aguirre died a stupid death, history has confirmed his basic ideas, which in itself is a sufficient justification for his life, however short.

Book 6:

The workers become revolutionary 15. The Catavi massacre Conditions in the mines

In order to present objective data on the health and industrial safety conditions which prevailed in the mines at this time, we have selected as an example the Catavi mining company, because it was the largest and best attended. Towards the end of 1948 Dr Guillermo Guerra of the Department of Health and Industrial Safety of the Workers' Insurance and Savings Fund made a study of silicosis and tuberculosis in the Catavi district. Among workers in the interior of the mine he found that the 'incidence of the disease is very high. 97.84% of the cases had the disease, while only 2.16% were completely free of it'.1 As an explanatory factor, he mentioned the large numbers of peasants who went to work in the mines. Before moving to the mines the peasant's isolated life, based on small villages with few inhabitants, generally protected him from infection. But this changed with the transition from rural life to large centres and work underground. 'It is the peasants that must be regarded as the principal factor in the spread of tuberculosis. Over time, as a result of their migrations, and in particular the frequency of migration, they have brought about increasingly higher indices of infection, which are continuing to rise.'2 The geological composition of the rocks flanking the principal mineral veins in the Siglo XX mine contains loose silica (Si.O2) in proportions ranging from 23% to 70% and this makes work there extremely dangerous.3 Silicosis is an as-yet incurable and progressively debilitating disease. According to Guy and Purdey, 'Silicosis is the result of a chemical reaction which produces an acid when the silica is dissolved in the fluid present in the lungs. Various studies have shown the possibility of preventing or arresting the progress of silicosis by inhaling aluminium metal dust which, on combining with the silica, prevents it from dissolving, thus limiting its harmful effects.' Although Bolivia is a mining country and its valiant labour force is being destroyed by silicosis, unfortunately no studies or experiments on 214

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this question have been carried out in that country. Recommendations have been made that dry mining should be forbidden and that drilling operations should only take place in conjunction with the use of water sprays, which reduce the quantity of silica particles in the atmosphere, but these proposals have never been effectively implemented. Only a few of the workers use masks but they do not use them properly, either because they have not been shown how or because much of the apparatus is defective. The masks can only be used for an hour at a time, because after that they obstruct breathing. The location of the Siglo XX veins and the fact that the temperature outside the mine is lower than inside mean that conditions are suitable for natural ventilation, but unfortunately little attempt had been made to utilise these advantages. Safety helmets were only used by 30% of the workers in the interior of the mine and special work-clothes, such as gloves, shoes and protective coats, were unheard of. 'No section of the mine provides adequate sanitary facilities for the large number of miners who work underground.' There was no drinking-water and no facilities for eating away from the dust, smoke and smell, which were centres of infection. The workers ate their light lunches wherever they were working. They had nowhere to wash their hands, and they used the water from the drills to wash with, and the abandoned shafts and storage recesses were used as lavatories. 'Because of the deficiencies in ventilation, the accumulated excrement gives off foul odours, which in some places are unbearable and can reach the communication passages and workplaces, consequently posing a real health hazard.'4 At this time the theoreticians and journalists at the service of the large mineowners put forward various puerile arguments against mounting pressure to make improvements in working conditions and grant better wages. For example, Bilbao La Vieja argued: 'When wages are increased, giving miners the opportunity to earn more, they simply work less and earn the same as before.'5 The assumption was that the miner lived in the same way whatever he could earn, and that by some inexplicable aberration he had no ambition to live better. 'Their demands for higher wages . . . answer not to the desire to earn more money but to earn the same amount more easily.' A very widely used argument was that the workers spent their extra earnings on alcohol. According to Bilbao La Vieja the workers at Siglo XX 'spend 25 million pesos a year on alcohol. This represents almost a quarter of the Signo XX wage bill.' Such writers also tried to deny the Bolivian workers the right to fight for higher wages with the argument that their productivity was much lower than that of workers in other countries: 'Work-checks on the loaders in Bolivian mines show that they move 2.5

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tons per shift. North American workers usually move 20 tons in the same time.' Bilbao La Vieja added that the Bolivian mines employed a very large number of people, 'not because of the lack of mechanisation but because of the low level of skill of the workers'. However, it is necessary to add that in other countries, unlike Bolivia, capital is invested in training the workforce. The low productivity of the Bolivian labour force cannot be denied, but the explanation lies in the general backwardness of the country and in the appalling living and working conditions of the workers. For example, studies of the largest mines show that the conditions are so bad that the first signs of silicosis appear in the miners in less than 18 months, and after three years the worker is incapable of earning enough to sustain himself. In the coal mines of the advanced countries, by contrast, the miners work for 20 or 30 years, and even to the age of retirement. But the miners did have some defendants. For example, Ultima Hora on 15 March 1943 asked: 'Is the fate of the miner an enviable one? Definitely not. . . For them there is no sun, light or a i r . . . ' adding that, since the industry was in a period of boom and was accumulating profits, the miners had a right to higher wages. 'If the miners ask for better housing, canteens, ventilation; if they demand greater comfort for their large families, they are acting within their rights.' Similarly they had a right to demand sportsfields, improvements in the company stores and social legislation. The state and the capitalists, the article went on, have an obligation to provide social services, because 'in this way they protect the human capital which transforms financial and industrial capital and makes it profitable'. Ultima Hora concluded by saying that Bolivia should take greater care of its miners than of its metals, 'thus saving the valuable human capital which today is being silently used up in the entrails of the mines or in the desolation of squalid housing'. The background to the Catavi massacre

Thus the tragic events of December 1942 which we are about to discuss were by no means an isolated incident. They were part of a series of conflicts, some more acute than others, which took place not just in the Catavi district but throughout practically the whole country. And at the root of these conflicts were the terrible living and working conditions, aggravated by the continuous devaluation of the currency and the associated rises in the cost of living. At the end of 1941 there was a general strike, after a petition had been presented to the government demanding a 100% wage increase across the

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board, price reductions for food products produced in the country and the lifting of restrictions on flour imports. The petition also demanded that 'fictitious companies' should not receive foreign exchange allowances and that the government should put an end to speculation. In reply the government introduced a single exchange rate, which had the effect of pushing up prices further, and, in order to resist the insistent demands for wage increases, it declared a state of siege. On 10 October the railway workers issued the government with an ultimatum to grant the increases within 48 hours. The government replied declaring that it would 'put an end to these excesses'. Therefore, on 12 October, strikes broke out in various areas of the country. The railway workers, miners, printers and some white collar organisations came out. The government immediately took repressive measures and many labour leaders were arrested and sent to the island of Coati on Lake Titicaca. The strike was called off when the railway workers of Oruro reached an agreement with the authorities, 'which granted very broad guarantees for the unions and authorised the immediate release of the arrested leaders and a general 20% increase in wages and salaries. The workers had won a magnificent victory over a government which was an instrument of the oligarchy.'6 Also in late 1941 the Catavi workers' union and Siglo XX miners' union presented a joint petition to the Patino company demanding wage increases ranging from 10% to 60%, according to the category of the worker, and the freezing of prices in the company stores. These demands arose out of the terrible living conditions of the mineworkers and because the company was making enormous profits, thanks to the high price of tin as a result of the world war. The company responded with an offer of increases ranging from 10% to 25%. On 29 November the unions rejected this offer and proclaimed their intention of going on strike if their demands were not met. However the existing labour law prescribed that conciliation and arbitration should precede strike action, so the Ministry of Labour sent a commission to Catavi in an attempt to persuade the workers to follow the legal proceedings rather than take strike action. The unions agreed to this and the arbitration tribunal met in La Paz, eventually proposing as a compromise solution wage increases ranging from 10% to 30% and the stabilisation of prices in the company stores. But despite the hopes of the authorities, the unions rejected these terms, and the Inspector General of the Ministry of Labour was obliged to travel to the mining camp and notify the workers that the offer was the final one and that no further demands could be considered. However, on 27 February 1942, another conflict began to develop in Catavi. This time the issue revolved around the company's decision to

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increase the working week by changing from half-day to full-day working on Saturdays. After negotiations between the company and the workers in the presence of the Inspector of Labour of Uncia, it was agreed not to implement the company's decision. As a result of mounting labour agitation, on 13 April 1942 the Penaranda government signed a notorious decree on state security. The government had reached the conclusion that the state of siege measures gave the authorities insufficient powers to control the rebellious masses and that the special circumstances of the world war obliged the state to confer extraordinary powers on the executive. In the words of the decree: 'The rupture of relations with the totalitarian powers makes it necessary to adopt extraordinary measures to ensure the security of the state against the danger of internal agitation directed from abroad.' The second chapter of the decree was aimed at preventing economic sabotage. Article 4 authorised the substitution of troops for regular workers if they stopped work and the conscription of civilian technical personnel to operate the plants affected by work stoppages. Workers could be held liable for civil damages as a result of strike action, and the same applied to agitators who incited strike action 'before the process of arbitration has been completed or in defiance of the decisions of an arbitration court'.7 Nevertheless, towards the end of 1942 another conflict broke out, this time in the mines of Potosi. The workers asked the Hochschild Unificada Company for a pay rise and the freezing of prices in the company store. By mid-November relations between the workers and the company had become very tense and there was talk of an agreement between the unions of Potosi, Catavi, Oruro and Llallagua. Thus, at a union meeting in Potosi on 8 December, a letter was read out from the unions of Catavi and Siglo XX expressing solidarity with 'any movement by the Potosi workers'. At this point the Minister of Labour intervened to authorise some concessions on the question of prices and, in an attempt to conciliate the workers, he promised that President Busch's Labour Code would soon be enacted. Thus for a while tranquillity returned to the mines of Potosi. The tin strike

The mining strike of late 1942 and the subsequent massacre are internationally known as the 'tin strike', owing to the account of the events written by Martin Kyne of the North American CIO.8 It hit the international headlines as one of the most appalling crimes committed by Bolivia's oligarchic governments. The conflict began on 30 September 1942 when the Catavi union pre-

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sented a demand for wage increases ranging from 20% to 70%, according to the type of work. The workers justified their demand by drawing attention to the record company profits generated by the high demand for minerals in the international market. Patino's managers simply ignored the petition and the workers had to send a commission to La Paz in order to get the conflict recognised by the authorities. The official conciliation council could not meet, because the company refused to send any representatives on the feeble grounds that the unions of the Catavi district were illegal. The employers put forward three main arguments, which were then taken up by the government and turned into its official policy: firstly, the unions were regarded as illegal because, the company claimed, membership only embraced 5% of the labour force and not 75%, as specified in the labour laws; secondly, the conflict was political and not strictly industrial; it violated international agreements and ignored the decrees aimed at protecting mineral production; thirdly, a state of siege should be introduced to put an end to the agitation. One after the other, the nationalist and right-wing political leaders argued that the USA was obliged to solve the problems of the country in return for the disinterested aid it was giving the 'democratic' cause during the Second World War. The PIR, which still controlled the labour movement at this time, did not disagree with this opinion, following the Moscow line that it was its duty to cooperate with the North American imperialists in their battle against Germany, as far as possible avoiding conflicts and strikes in the mineral-producing centres. Logically one would expect this international policy to have led to collaboration between the Penaranda government and the PIR but internal necessities prevented this. By combating the PIR, which at the time was the political expression of the left and the labour movement, the government hoped to corner the unions and neutralise the new 'nationalist party, the MNR, which was beginning to make headway in the labour movement and was daily gaining strength. By this time, indeed it looked as if it was likely to replace the PIR as the leader of the masses. At this time the Catavi union (based on the ore-concentration plant) was the most influential of the miners' unions and not the Siglo XX union (based on the mineshafts), as is the case today. On seeing that their negotiations with the government and the Patino company had failed completely, the Catavi union declared that they would come out on strike on 14 December 1942. In reply the Minister of Labour made a curious proposal: he promised to put into effect the Busch Labour Code, if they called off the strike, and in fact the law was promulgated on 8 December. Also on 8 December representatives of the mining companies, fearing the

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growing social unrest, met the President and told him that the mining industry needed greater guarantees and requested him to veto the Labour Code, arguing that 'if it is enforced it will put a further burden on production costs, which will make wage increases and improved social services impossible'.9 They were so anxious to get the labour law vetoed that they put forward proposals for possible wage increases and improvements in the social services in exchange for the veto. Realising that the promulgation of the Labour Code was a matter of urgent necessity, the government managed to neutralise the powerful pressure of the mineowners. It hoped to secure a number of immediate political advantages from doing so. The Minister of Labour argued as follows: I argued against the vetoing of the Code and tried to show that its promulgation would conciliate the interests of the workers and the companies, since I believed that this measure would be enthusiastically welcomed by the former, while for the latter it would remove all the threats of strikes and persistent demands, including those for new pay increases. I added that the hostility of the workers would disappear, because they would feel adequately compensated by the new obligations in their favour, which the code imposed upon the companies.10 The Catavi conflict played an important role in the battle about the implementation of the Labour Code. The government tried to convince the workers at this point in the conflict that its promulgation was their principal objective, and told them that they would have to abandon their intransigent position if the code was to be implemented and that its promulgation would have to be followed by a long period of social peace. The workers had sent delegates to La Paz to negotiate their demands with the government. There they received threatening instructions from the Ministry of Labour to return to Catavi and get the workers to withdraw their demands for wage increases in exchange for the promulgation of the Labour Code. The delegates returned to Catavi, but the workers decided to continue to press for their demands and threatened a general strike of miners if they did not receive a favourable reply within five days. The union informed the government of this decision on 9 December. As always, as soon as there were signs of labour unrest, the armed forces were immediately put on the alert; the Minister of Defence and the higher echelons of the military hierarchy always played a direct role in all labour problems. 'The President of the Republic and the Ministers of Government, Defence and Labour declared the strike illegal. At the same time the military commander of the Oruro district, Colonel Luis Cuenca, was instructed to take charge of the controlling of Catavi and the strikers if a workstoppage occurred.'11

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Colonel Cuenca, the highest military authority in the mining district, which had been declared a military zone, arrived in Catavi on 9 December. On the 13th, the miners' leaders were arrested. The workers mobilised at once to demand the release of the prisoners. (The miners have always been noted for their unconditional solidarity with persecuted leaders and rankand-file workers.) The police opened fire on the workers and the first victims fell. On the same day a state of seige was declared throughout the departments of Potosi, Oruro, Chuquisaca and Cochabamba. Between 15 and 20 December Colonel Cuenca unsuccessfully tried every means of persuasion to get the workers to go back to work. The strike continued and, on instructions from the Ministry of Labour, an attempt was made to reopen negotiations. The government hoped by this to interrupt the strike and then remove the union leaders. The leaders reiterated their demands, adding a further one: that the company should pay them the wages owing to them for the days worked before the strike. Colonel Cuenca commented: 'I came away with the impression that the union executive was intransigent and was acting maliciously.' There was no justification for holding back the wages for work that had already been done, but employers have always used the hunger of the workers' families as a way of breaking strikes. This time it was the government which gave the order to suspend payment 'until the workers drop their subversive attitude'. This inflamed the workers even more. Mass meetings were held not only in Catavi but also in nearby Miraflores, Siglo XX and Cancaniri. Under such powerful pressure, the military authorities were obliged to authorise the payment of wages on Sunday, 20 December. On Monday the sirens sounded for work, but no one turned up. The union leaders had planned a demonstration for 21 December to press the company into acceding to their demands, and that day there was great activity and agitation in all the Patino mines. In the early morning Colonel Cuenca sent a note informing the union that, in accordance with the prevailing laws, any mass meeting would be broken up. Major Bustamente, who delivered the note, was jeered by the workers who were in the union office, and Pedro Ajhuacho, one of the leaders, replied that the union would carry out the workers' decisions. Soldiers patrolled menacingly round the mining camps and allowed no one, not even the women, to leave the camp. The company stores remained closed. In Catavi soldiers fired on a crowd of workers who were heading towards the management offices. It is said that 35 people fell, either dead or wounded. In reply the workers decided to gather together a large crowd in order to reach the offices. An estimated 8,000 workers were mobilised with great rapidity; the largest contingent of demonstrators came from

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Siglo XX. When the crowd drew near the offices the soldiers opened fire. It was 10 o'clock on a sunny morning. The workers scattered and took refuge wherever they could. The shooting continued until three in the afternoon. Following an old custom, women and children made up the front lines of the demonstration, in the hope that this would deter the troops from firing. A year later, Antonio Gaspar of the Catavi union gave the following account: 'At the head of the demonstrators, who were demanding bread, was an old woman carrying the national flag; she received the first round of machine gun fire and fell with the tricolor draped round her. We asked for bread but received bullets.'12 The troops then raided all the mining camps to wipe out the centres of resistance, as the officers put it. The abuses they committed are beyond description: they formed part of the punitive exercise the armed forces carried out after every labour conflict. It is the only opportunity the army has to show off its ability to shoot and its unparalleled valour. The raids continued until 23 December. The Minister of Government produced a list of 19 dead, including three women, and 40 wounded, but even the most cautious observers claim there were 40 dead, while others put the figure as high as 400. But the number itself is not important; what is important is the oligarchic government's policy to use violence to solve social problems. There has been much debate as to whether the government did or did not give orders to the army units to open fire on the miners. But the order had been implicitly given from the moment that the Catavi district and the strikers were put under military control. On 9 December the President and the Minister of Government had sent a telegram to Colonel Cuenca, confirming earlier instructions to the effect that the government had decided to promulgate the Labour Code, and had simultaneously put into effect the Decrees of 12 and 27 December 1941, adding: 'You are authorised to punish the disobedient, submitting them to military jurisdiction.' The Minister of Labour confirmed these instructions, telling Colonel Cuenca from La Paz on 9 December that I am informed that you intend to return to Oruro. I call upon your civic duty and the responsibility you have assumed before the government as its intermediary to control the working class and avoid the proposed strike . . . If, having exhausted all methods of persuasion, you have obtained no favourable results, you should energetically repress any violence. Catavi and parliament

Towards the end of August 1943, when the parliamentary debate on the

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Catavi massacre was still going on, Timoteo Pardo, the former secretarygeneral of the Catavi union, sent a long letter to the Chamber of Deputies giving an account of what really happened. The account of the events given to Congress by Pedro Zilveti Arce, the Minister of Government, was based almost entirely on information provided by the military authorities, and Pardo's letter was aimed at correcting this situation. According to Pardo, the Catavi strike was legal and peaceful: 'All along we wanted to resolve the conflict peacefully.'13 Although the strike had been organised for 14 December, on the 13th the workers were provoked: 'At about midday the platoon of soldiers under the command of Captain Gamarra opened fire on a small group of workers, who were quietly making their way to the barracks to put forward their demands.' In response to this, the strike was brought forward a few hours. It is worth noticing that 'five minutes before the workers downed tools, I [Pardo] proposed an eight-day truce to Colonel Cuenca, to enable us to define our terms, but the military commander flatly refused to agree to this'. This would seem to indicate premeditation on the part of the military hierarchy to use force against the workers. Pardo denied accusations that the strikers had used dynamite and Molotov cocktails: 'We had presented our demands respectfully, in the hope that they could be settled in the best possible way.' Clearly straying somewhat from the truth, he also denied charges that the workers had been drinking on the 20th, using the argument that patrols of soldiers had been controlling the camps and that the workers were paid too little for them to drink. He went on to say: 'I categorically deny that we were acting under the influence of any political group. The PIR, as can easily be verified, has no organisation in Catavi, Uncia or Llallagua. Furthermore, the rumour that we were in contact with the "nazis" is a vile slander, which I reject.' He added that lies of this nature enabled the rosca government to disguise its responsibility for the events at Catavi. The Minister, Zilveti, had accused Ajhuacho and Pardo of embezzling union funds, a charge which Pardo indignantly denied. He, in turn, accused Colonel Cuenca of stealing a large sum of money from Jose Olivares, a worker, and of taking a typewriter, a radio and various other objects from the union office. Finally, he made it clear that, on the day of the massacre, 'the workers were not carrying the red flag, but the Bolivian flag and a white flag'.14 Two years after the massacre, Pregon published a horrifying account of the events at Catavi by Julio Laredo, a worker who had been injured in the shooting. Laredo said that when the strike broke out, the company closed its stores: 'They wanted to starve us out and force us to give up the strike.

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We had no bread, no meat, nothing. Catavi was surrounded by soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. We remained in this situation for a week.'15 According to Laredo the workers held a meeting on the eve of 21 December at which they resolved to demand that the management re-open the stores. 'On 21 December 1942 we set off to Catavi in a demonstration. The troops told us to turn back. As we continued to advance on the management's offices, they began to fire on us with machine guns. Hundreds of workers, women and children f e l l . . . I was hit by several bullets in the left leg.'16 As always happens when workers get killed in large numbers, legends began to grow up. Laredo says that many of the wounded were arrested and led away with their wounds unattended. Many corpses were said to have been dragged away and buried in ditches. 'Their families were not even allowed to hold Christian vigils for the victims of the carnage . . . Those who managed to find the bodies of their relatives had to do so secretly by night.' Laredo testified that members of his family had seen hundreds of wounded people being buried alive, 'crying for help', and that hundreds of corpses had been thrown into a common grave. The Magruder report

One of the consequences of the Catavi massacre was the creation of the Magruder commission, which was extremely important in making known the working and living conditions of the Bolivian working class. On 2 January 1943 the Bolivian government requested the US State Department 'to send North-American experts to join Bolivian officials appointed for the task in a study of the condition of the worker, especially the miner, in Bolivia, with a view to securing future improvements'. The object of the proposal was to 'maintain and increase Bolivian production of strategic minerals'.17 The commission reached the conclusion that the human problems of production could only be solved with financial assistance from the USA: 'Several of the problems studied and the solutions proposed in this report can only be tackled if there is a sound economic base and an intelligent and methodical investment plan. Consequently the commission recommends that a central coordinating and executive body be set up.' 18 In fact the commission was intended to discredit the parliamentary interpellation expected from the opposition. Time and again in the debates Ministers pointed to the commission as evidence of the government's continuing concern for the conditions of the workers. The commission was revealing about these conditions. It reported that:

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The diet of the average Bolivian worker is far below the standards normally considered necessary for good health, and the food consumption of many groups of workers is dangerously low. The average food consumption in Bolivia is below the essential minimum, even in terms of mere quantity. The prevailing expert opinion is that the limited range of foods and the insufficient quantities consumed by workers, especially in the Altiplano, amounts to malnutrition.19 Nobody denied the fact that the miners were obliged to live in extremely bad housing conditions, but the report added that there was also an acute shortage even of poor quality housing; in Catavi houses were needed for 2,000 miners. 'Despite recent improvements', said the Magruder report, 'many of the workers, even in some of the large mines, live in dark, unhealthy, miserable one-roomed huts, which are unfit for human habitation and lack even the most elementary sanitation facilities.'20 The working methods and living conditions of the miners had changed little since 1928, when doctors Felix Veintemillas and A. Valle had reported on health conditions, making recommendations which deserved as much attention as those in the erudite reports of the foreign experts: Given the disastrous health conditions in which the miners live: undernourished, intoxicated with alcohol and coca, in an atmosphere saturated with mineral dust and toxic gasses, spending eight hours a day working at up to 500 metres below the ground where temperatures reach 30°C, then coming up quickly in lifts to a surface temperature of several degrees below zero; spending another eight hours in their miserable shacks in an atmosphere almost as poisonous as that of the mines, it is easy to deduce that their respiratory and circulation systems are subject to conditions so hard that the human body cannot withstand them for long. It is inevitable that they soon succumb to this formidable combination of adverse circumstances.21 The parliamentary debate

Towards the end of December 1942 the MNR deputies put forward their views about the Catavi massacre in a resolution to the Minister of Labour, Juan M. Balcazar. One paragraph read: 'The government's policy of abdicating all say in wage disputes entails serious dangers for the country .. . One of the principal causes at the root of the Catavi conflict was this peculiar unacceptable policy of non-intervention.' By attributing an independent, conciliatory role to the state, in conflicts between workers and capitalists, the MNR gave proof of its reformist, legalist position. In his reply Balcazar pointed to the government's efforts to solve the conflict by

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peaceful methods, and repeated the argument that the strike was illegal and for this reason it had been put into the hands of the military. He added that the government was drawing up a policy of social reforms to reduce the likelihood of such disagreeable incidents occurring in the future.22 The youth section of the Liberal Party detached themselves from the party in protest against the way the Liberal ministers and deputies had become involved in the repressive policies of the Penaranda government. In a long letter to Tomas Manuel Elio, the president of the party's national committee, they argued that although they rejected all kinds of communist extremism, they were nationalists and believed that whatever wage demands the hungry miners made were justified and that the violent repression of the Catavi miners constituted a grave political and moral error. 'Hunger is not lessened by criminal onslaughts nor is violence suppressed by greater violence on the part of those who, to establish the rule of justice, resort to force. The government had an obligation to set a sensible example to the workers by responding to their exuberance with moderation, and to their demands with reasonable acceptance.'23 The Minister of Government issued a communique listing the legal dispositions which, according to him, had been infringed by the strikers. The charge of illegal conduct was the most important point in the government's case against the workers, but there was certainly no law which authorised the assassination of the offenders. The Executive used the argument that the Catavi union only had 300 members, which was an insignificant number given that there were 6,000 workers employed by the company, and that the union, therefore, was illegal. Article 103 of the Labour Code stated: 'A union cannot be formed with less than 20 workers in the case of craft or professional unions, nor with less than 50% of the workers in an enterprise, in the case of industrial unions.'24 The government stubbornly insisted that the Catavi conflict was a political one, directed by the PIR and planned to link up with other similar conflicts in Oruro and Potosi, leading up to a general strike. This plan would indeed have been the logical response to the government's conduct, had a genuine workers' federation existed, but since the FSTMB (Miners' Federation) was not yet organised, each miners' union acted independently of the other. The CSTB's activities were limited to publishing a few communiques and its PIRista leadership made every effort to avoid becoming involved in the conflict. The political consequences of the Catavi massacre were unexpected. The PIR lost its position as the vanguard of the workers and the MNR began its rapid rise as a popular 'revolutionary' party. Some union leaders were arrested, while others managed to flee. Various PIR militants and

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leaders of the CSTB, whom the government accused of working with the strikers, were also arrested. In Bolivia parliamentary censure motions have never threatened the Executive but, on the other hand, they can be a means for achieving certain political ends and can convert a small party into a popular organisation or, at least, one with mass appeal. This is what the MNR managed to do in 1943. The PIR and MNR groups in Congress and the Liberal deputy, Angel Mendizabal, each put forward censure motions, motivated by the tragic events at Catavi which were a subject of continuing concern to public opinion. The sixth congress of university students was inaugurated in La Paz on 16 July 1943 and the Catavi events were the main focus of student protests. Among the speakers to launch vigorous attacks on the government were Roberto Mendez Tejada, Secretary General of the La Paz FUL, and Hernan Melgar, President of the congress and a member of the PIR.25 The students held a noisy demonstration outside congress, shouting slogans against the rosca. Up till then the university students had acted as though they were predestined revolutionary leaders, but after the Catavi crisis they began to play a more humble and effective role as collaborators in the collective task of political agitation. In retrospect it is easy to see that the government's plan was to split the opposition front by focussing all its attacks on the PIR while leaving the rest of the opposition to carry on their attacks in parliament. Just as the PIR began to decline as a mass party after Catavi, Ricardo Anaya's reputation as a brilliant parliamentarian faded in the parliamentary debates of 1943. A liberal democratic intellectual, who dressed up his speeches with a few quotes from Marxist writers, Anaya had in the past been a magnificent debater, overshadowing the other PIRista leader, Jose Antonio Arze, whose parliamentary performance was not very impressive. But Anaya's speeches in the debates on Catavi were weak and full of doubts and hesitations. Because the PIR has played no role in the strike and because of its position of support for the Allies, the leader of the PIR could neither assume full responsibility for the strike nor launch into a real attack on the government and the United States. Minister Zilveti's reply crushed the PIRistas and roundly silenced his accusers. The dust was shaken off the police archives and Zilveti produced a history of the PIRista leaders from the creation of the CROP to the foundation of the PIR, alleging possible connections with Chilean socialists and communists and arguing that Anaya's party was a communist cell dependent on the Chilean party and that, despite its proclamations of support for North American democracy, it was provoking political strikes in order to take power. The accusations contained false information, but they were made in such a vehement way

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that they made a strong impression on public opinion. In an eight-column article La Noche argued 'that proceedings should be opened to investigate the truth of the accusations made yesterday by the Minister of Government against the PIR'.26 The PIR made the initial error of introducing censure motions only against the Ministers of Government and Labour, thereby implying that the massacre was not an integral part of the government's overall policy but merely the error of a few people. In contrast the MNR presented the following motion on 10 August 1943: 'The undersigned deputies... in defence of the Bolivian workers, move the interpellation of the cabinet for its manifest partiality in the service of the large companies and for employing violence to solve social problems, a policy which culminated in the massacre of Catavi.' The MNR carefully delimited the political objectives of its parliamentary initiative: 'The speaker, Paz Estenssoro, defended the proletariat from a profoundly nationalist point of view, far removed from any internationalist theories.'27 The party used the legislature as a platform to gain the allegiance of the workers, to take up their banner and appear in their defence. It thus entered into competition with the PIR for their support. Previously from its foundation, in 1940 and 1941, the MNR had adopted the same attitude in support of the striking railway workers, and again in 1942 over a strike of printing workers. By its vigorous attacks on the government and imperialism and its bold, if opportunistic, campaign on behalf of the oppressed miners, the interpellation proceedings enabled the MNR to grow in strength and size. Instead of denouncing the nationalist deputies, the government confined itself to reasoned debate with them and thus the party, so recently founded, was able to make political capital out of the interpellation. Paz Estenssoro distinguished himself, not so much by the profundity of his arguments or his oratorical skills, as by his measured courage and his opportune use of cutting, defiant phrases. 'The orders to carry out this slaughter came from the Waldorf Astoria in New York.28 If the President of the Republic and his ministers are not punished, then the chains which enslave the Bolivian people will be pulled tighter.'29 This was his most effective remark. It was above all thanks to the propaganda skills of the journalists on La Chile (a pro-MNR paper that employed such noted writers as Augusto Cespedes) that the attention of the man in the street and the workers was concentrated on the MNR's parliamentary activities. The party organised a demonstration to back up the deputies' interventions. Although the interpellation contained a great deal of farce and rowdiness, it nevertheless helped to transform the MNR into a mass party. There is no doubt that, by his handling of the situation, Zilveti Arce helped bring the MNR to the

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public eye and thus made its path to power easier. It is uncertain whether at the time the MNR had thought out the logical consequences of these tactics, but the parliamentary debate certainly helped the party to reach an agreement with the young officers of the RADEPA military lodge grouped around Colonel Villarroel. The way was thereby smoothed for the revolutionary coup of 20 December 1943, of which Zilveti Arce, the Minister of Government, was to a considerable extent the unintending author. As one author commented in 1944, 'No recent revolt compares with the last change of government in its precision and technique. The symbolic issue which united the revolutionaries was the iniquitous massacre of the workers of Catavi.'30 Everybody was sure that the issue really belonged to the PIR, and that it had been usurped with the tacit assistance of the Penaranda cabinet. 'Leader of MNR steals show from PIR who fail. Outstanding performance from young politician', was the headline given to one report of Paz Estenssoro's speech.31 The Trotskyists, virtually unheard of at the time, published two documents entitled Ahora interpelamos nosotros and La masacre de Catavi. They were certainly not read by many people and simply represented preparatory work for future political activities. In the course of the debates Zilveti read out part of a leaflet distributed by the POR during the strike, in which it declared: 'The Catavi union has gone on strike, by-passing a series of reactionary organisations (CSTB, FOS). All unions should imitate this initiative . . . ' It was only once they realised the great advantages the MNR was reaping from the Catavi events that the right-wing parties and the PIR really stressed the idea that the MNR was a Nazi fascist-backed party. Some labour federations helped to circulate this idea. For example, on 24 December 1945, the Cochabamba FOS levelled the following accusations at the MNR: The nazis who instigated and prepared this crime [of Catavi] rejoiced because they had achieved a result which they could use as a pretext for taking power. They did not know that the true defenders of the national proletariat had seen through the manoeuvres by which they had, on the one hand, instigated the Catavi strike and, on the other, promoted the butchery of 21 December. We have not forgotten, comrades, that it was the notorious Ajhuacho, an MNR agent, who led the comrades of Catavi and Llallagua into an ill-prepared strike, disobeying the instructions of the CSTB. Ajhuacho stupidly carried out the policies of the MNR, which was seeking to provoke the workers into taking mass illegal action, firstly because it is an agent of reactionary capitalism and was and is the most dire enemy of the workers, and secondly because it

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sought just such a crime as justification for its demagogic dictatorship in alliance with international capitalism. The influence of the PIR and the Marofistas is evident in this document. In 1943 in the Chamber of Deputies Juan M. Balcazar went to the ridiculous extreme of arguing that members of the crew of the Graf Spee had become propagandists and were working in the labour organisations. 'I have been informed that two fugitives from the Graf Spee were in Catavi working as ideological advisers, and that they stayed for three months, disguised as miners. They attracted the attention of the workers, who were amazed that these more or less well-dressed, fair-haired men were content with wages of 40 or 50 bolivianos a day. They were also surprised that they spent more than they earned.' The censure motion had another unexpected result. Some of the government party and government supporters defected to the opposition. This was not so much the triumph of truth and reason, but rather reflected the disintegration which afflicted the government. It only survived because Congress, after some dirty dealing by certain professional politicians, recorded a vote of 48 in support of the government and 47 in favour of the censure. Fifteen deputies did not vote. As a result of these proceedings, Enrique Baldivieso and three others asked to withdraw indefinitely from the Partido Socialista, a move which represented yet another antigovernment protest. The revolution of December 1943 'Triumph of most popular revolution in political history of Bolivia' read the front page headline of La Calle on 21 December 1943. The day before, a swift audacious coup had brought to power the young officers of the military lodge Razon de Patria (RADEPA) and the MNR. The revolution acquired unexpected dimensions, which its civilian and military authors had certainly never anticipated. Their immediate aims, according to the accounts of leading participants, were simple-minded and did not envisage the mobilisation of the masses which the coup in fact produced. Major Alberto Taborga, who claims authorship of the coup for himself, says that the young officers overthrew General Enrique Penaranda to avert a rival coup by General Ichazo. He lists the subversive activities of that officer and, although these accusations cannot at present be verified, it should be remembered that Taborga had access to government information at the time. 'Ichazo began his career of subversion in 1942. In 1943, with the passive complicity of President Penaranda, he organised a powerful motorised unit

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(12 assault tanks) called the Escuadron Escolta, whose officers and soldiers all came from Ichazo's own region (Tarija). It was this final provocation by Ichazo which precipitated the revolution of 20 December.'32 Zilveti Arze, the Interior Minister in Peharanda's cabinet, has confirmed this information. The coup was originated and carried out by the RADEPA faction of the army. Ever since the Chaco defeat the Generals had been anxious to control political power in order to hide their responsibility for the disaster, and at certain periods after the war the army was the only real political force in the country. The Generals took advantage of this situation for their own self-interested ends. But the young officers, acting, we can accept, disinterestedly and in search only of the greatness of their country, arrived at their own conclusion: only they, working outside the political parties, could transform the country and perhaps return to the glorious days of Santa Cruz and the Ballivian. Such beliefs explain and to a certain extent justify the proliferation of secret military lodges, which have left such a mark on the political development of the country. Several such lodges were born in the Paraguayan prisoner-of-war camps, and their views, although rather naive, expressed the rebellion of the young officers against the ineptitude of the generals and colonels, and the dishonesty and incompetence of the old politicians. Pedro Zilveti Arce has published part of the statutes of RADEPA, which confirm the political immaturity of the young officers. They seemed to believe that all the country's problems could be solved by a tight-knit clandestine organisation devoted to punishing by death all traitors and enemies of the fatherland. This document indicates that the lodge regarded the appointment and removal of the President as one of its particular tasks: 3. Special Junta meetings will be convened as follows: . . . (b) when significant revolutionary movement take place in the republic; (c) when a change of President becomes necessary; (d) when the time comes to draw up a new plan of action to guide the government — after the fulfilment, of course, of the previous plan.33 Alberto Ostria Gutierrez has described the revolution on 20 December 1943 as a flash of lightning. The operations began by surprise at 1.30 a.m., and four hours later the coup was completed. It was the decision of Major Alberto Taborga, head of the Traffic Police and right-hand man of the President, to go over to the rebels that sealed Penaranda's fate. The President had been increasing the size and improving the equipment of this force, in order to ensure the stability of the regime.34 Taborga maintains that it was he who planned and carried out the revolution, which was to be an exclusively military affair. But it turned out otherwise. It seems that Taborga was surprised to find the MNR leaders in the

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The workers become revolutionary

government palace at midday on 20 December, and even more so to find that a decree had already been drawn up naming a civilian—military coalition cabinet in which he was to hold the post of Minister of Government. What happened was, as Zilveti Arce reveals, that a few months earlier Major Antonio Ponce reached an agreement with the MNR leaders on a joint coup to establish a RADEPA/MNR government. The young officers wanted the backing of a popular party which could provide them with the support of the workers and large sectors of the middle class. Moreover, both groups had one feature in common: their sympathy for the Axis powers, although neither would admit openly to this. The MNR played virtually no role in the coup; civilians played no part in the events and knew nothing of the officers' plans. It was really a symbolic gesture for MNR militants to occupy the automatic telephone exchange, an operation carried out when the coup had already succeeded. For obvious reasons La Calle called this 'a daring manoeuvre'. 'Before the coup itself, the daring operation of occupying the telephone exchange had to be carried out rapidly. This task was entrusted entirely to members of the MNR.' The first declaration of the new government, signed by Gualberto Villarroel and Victor Paz Estenssoro, set our justifications for the coup and promised repeatedly to carry out an effective democratisation of the country. From the start, the new government sought by every possible means to impress the USA, and put aside their pro-Nazi sympathies. Peiiaranda was criticised for wavering over Bolivia's collaboration with the United States. These men deserve to be censured by the nation for preventing the benefits of collaboration with the USA from reaching the people. Their criminal indifference towards the poverty of the people and their insatiable greed have obstructed the attempts of the Washington government to alleviate the misery of the Bolivian workers . . . The frivolity and irresponsibility of the government just overthrown was a major obstacle to an agreement which would provide equitable benefits to Bolivia and the United States. The leader of the 'nationalists' lost no time in declaring 'As for international policy, we will continue to support the cause of the United Nations, since the Bolivian people, through their representatives, have pledged their support for the Allied cause. All international agreements, including the Atlantic Charter, will be zealously supported by the new government.'35 In an interview with the Mexican journalist Adolfo Gallo, Victor Paz added 'We will continue to cooperate with England and we will send our tin to be smelted in Liverpool. This is another way in which

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The Catavi massacre

Bolivia can maintain its position as a nation at war with the totalitarian countries. This means that whereas the deposed government only carried out its agreements half-heartedly, we will open our doors to all the democratic countries...' The policy was decided. President Villarroel did not deviate one inch from this position of subservience to imperialism in pursuit of diplomatic recognition for his government from the bloc of countries headed by the United States. Even so, the State Department decided to put the new government in quarantine because of the alleged pro-German attitudes of the La Calle group, whose leading members were prominent in Villarroel's first cabinet. The Department of State published a memorandum giving details of the links the young officers and the MNR leaders had with Nazi agents in Bolivia, and recommending that the Villarroel government should not be recognised. This decision was endorsed by 19 countries who were later joined by Great Britain and Canada. Only Argentina dared to go against the United States line, and for six months Bolivia was relatively isolated. Commercial relations deteriorated, and technical and economic aid programmes were suspended. The government started a series of manoeuvres aimed at proving that its members had abandoned forever their possible sympathies for the Axis countries. It began by removing the MNR ministers from the cabinet. The property of Axis nationals was confiscated and, to the shame of the country and the government, 83 Japanese and German subjects were arrested and despatched to prison in the United States. Finally the government declared that elections would be held on 2 July 1944. By taking these steps, the regime hoped to show that it had embarked on a new democratic phase which would meet with the approval of the United States. The reply was not long in coming. The State Department sent an observer Avra Warren, to Bolivia to assess the changes in Bolivia's internal politics. At the beginning of June 1944 Warren produced a report favourable to the government. He noted that 'there was now not a single representative of MNR in a position of importance', and that Major Villarroel had assured him 'that the MNR had no practical possibility of getting a majority of votes in the forthcoming elections, nor of making an alliance with other parties to obtain a majority'. On the basis of Warren's testimony, the United States decided to recognise the Bolivian government on 2 June 1944 36 Although Villarroel had started off by promising to respect all democratic rights, he soon found he had no alternative but to initiate a policy of repression against the Right, who were continually conspiring. At the same time, he organised the workers and introduced important social reforms, in

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The workers become revolutionary

order to win the unconditional support of the masses. In practice his government soon became a kind of Bonapartist regime under continuous pressure from American imperialists on the one hand and the Bolivian proletariat on the other. The Stalinists were incapable of understanding this phenomenon and threw their full support behind the Americans and the local rosca which opposed the Villarroel regime. The new regime sponsored the first peasant congress and also introduced a decree (15 May 1945) suppressing unpaid labour in agriculture and abolishing pongueaje. However, the requirement that wages be paid for all agricultural labour was simply a bureaucratic measure, which had no force.37 Another decree required landowners to establish and maintain rural schools. A commission was organised to draw up proposals for a Rural Labour Code, but this never progressed beyond good intentions. The Federation of Miners was formed under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour, and factory and railway workers and other labour groups received open support from the government. The principal social measures the government introduced were: (1) The law of 7 February 1944 which established guarantees for trade union leaders, in that 'the workers or employees elected to executive posts in unions cannot be dismissed from their jobs without proceedings having been taken against them'. (2) The decree of 27 November 1944 requiring union dues to be collected at source by the employer. (3) The law of 18 December 1944 declaring 21 December 'the Day of the Bolivian Miner', in tribute to the miners who fell in the massacre of Catavi. (4) The decree of 21 December 1944 establishing that Christmas bonuses be paid separately from productivity bonuses. As we have seen, the Villarroel government came to power by means of a coup d'etat, which took place without the knowledge or participation of the people. But the President's constant struggle against reactionary forces inside the country, and his need to muster popular support against the pressures of US imperialism, obliged him to mobilise the workers and the peasants; given the circumstances, he therefore deliberately transformed his government into a popular regime.

23 5

The Miners' Federation

16. The Miners'Federation (Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia)

For a long time the miners had wanted to create their own national organisation which might, in time, assume the leadership of the whole of the Bolivian proletariat. However since the most class-conscious sectors of the working class were to be found in the mines, remote from the cities and centres of government, this militated against effective organisation and resulted in a weak horizontal trade union structure. In consequence, the trade union movement as a whole was torn between the conflicting influences of the urban artisans on the one hand, and the militant nuclei of mine and railway workers on the other. Numerous attempts were made to set up a central federation of miners' unions, but in practice most of the federations which existed before 1944 were confined to limited regions. The unions in each mine invariably affiliated to the labour federation of their department, although such affiliations were, at times, only nominal. Oruro, which is surrounded by mines, most of them small and worked only intermittently, was always an important regional focus for the miners' unions and also exercised some influence over the Llallagua region. The most serious effort before 1944 to set up a national federation of miners' unions was made by the CSTB. The second national workers' congress, in La Paz in January 1939, discussed the problem of organisation and recognised the need to establish verticallys-tructured federations to strengthen the most important sectors of the labour movement, the miners and railway workers. Until that time, the only groups with organised national confederations were in the transport sector. Under the inspiration of Victor Daza Rojas the four miners' delegations present at the congress decided to organise the miners at a national level, and the congress authorised them to act as propaganda committees in their respective districts, with a view to convening the first national congress of mine workers in Oruro.1 This first so-called National Congress of Mineworkers was held in Oruro on 8 August 1939, under the auspices of the Oruro FOS and organised by the Marofists who were eager to strengthen their positions in the CSTB. However, the results of the congress were limited since it became a mere forum for disputes between the different political groups who were contending for the leadership of the Left. Besides the miners' delegates, rep-

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The workers become revolutionary

resentatives from the departmental federations were also present, as well as people who had nothing whatsoever to do with the union movement. Although the congress was attended by a considerable number of delegates, there were no representatives from Siglo XX-Catavi, Huanuni or from the mines of the south. The congress was to demonstrate that it was pointless even to attempt to create a national organisation without these key districts.2 Luis Entrambasaguas was named Secretary General and a committee was appointed to represent the various districts present, but this executive committee proved to be unworkable because of the geographical dispersion of its members. Hence this first serious attempt to set up a national confederation was, in practice, ineffective. From the very beginning it followed the pattern set by the CSTB, in which bureaucratic manoeuvres were regarded as a substitute for a real mass-movement. Thus the miners had to wait until the foundation of the FSTMB, following the coup of 1943, to obtain an effective national union. After the revolution of 20 December 1943 Juan Lechin (whose career we shall discuss later) was appointed sub-prefect of the province of Bustillo, where the Siglo XX—Catavi mines are situated. At the time this was quite an important post in the mining districts, as the sub-prefect was supposed to ensure that the powerful mining companies complied with the laws. At one point Lechin had a serious argument with the administrator of the Patino Company, and this caught the attention of the workers, who were always on the look-out for anyone who could put the all-powerful gringos in their place. Although at this time Lechin was simply a member of the MNR with very little knowledge of the miners' problems and grievances, he thereby established a reputation among them as a good official. The FSTMB was created in 1944 at a congress at Huanuni. Many commentators have argued that Lechin was responsible for organising the congress, but in fact this is just one of the many errors propagated about him. In fact it was the Sindicato Mixto of Huanuni, where the influence of the Marxist Moises brothers in the executive had been replaced by progovernment workers, which was responsible for preparing the congress. The chief inspiration came from Emilio Carvajal, an important member of the MNR, who was later elected to Congress and then, after the Revolution of 1952, became President of Comibol and subsequently emigrated to Argentina. Lechin certainly had nothing to do with organising the congress. It was therefore a surprise for the delegates to the Huanuni congress (some of whom were genuinely representative of the miners while others were self-appointed) that the Catavi delegation should include Lechin, who, perhaps not everybody realised, was a local government official based on Uncia. Veneros, Gaspar and other miners' leaders later revealed that it was

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The Miners' Federation

they who provided Lechin with credentials enabling him to gain access to the congress. They had done so at an executive level, without the knowledge of the workers. The congress was convened by the Sindicato Mixto of the Bolivian Tin and Tungsten Mines Corporation, one of the companies of the Patiiio group, for 3, 4 and 5 June 1944 in Huanuni. Neither the Oruro unions nor those of Siglo XX—Catavi had any part in convoking this congress, a fact which was not accidental. The credit for promoting the organisation of the miners must go to the Villarroel government and, in particular, to the MNR. This decision was part of a broader strategy: to gain the support of the majority of the workers in order to neutralise the 'democratic' campaign waged by the Stalinist CSTB. Since the CSTB claimed to be the sole coordinating body of the labour movement, it publicly disowned the Huanuni congress. The Huanuni union which sponsored the congress was completely controlled by the MNR through, among others, Emilio Carvajal. This meeting has gone down in history as the first miners' congress and historians have all forgotten the earlier meeting sponsored by the CSTB in August 1939. The resolutions adopted by the first congress of the FSTMB included the establishment of 21 December as the 'Day of the Bolivian Miner' in commemoration of the Massacre of Catavi, a demand for uniform prices in the company stores in all the mining camps, and the introduction of a minimum wage to be observed by all companies. Apart from Lechin the remaining delegates to the congress had strong roots in the mining camps. Mario Torres, a laboratory assistant at San Jose (Oruro) made his first appearance as a union delegate. Cdsar Toranzo, who was to become Inspector of Work under Villarroel's government and then a compliant government arbitrator during the repressive period of the sexenio (1946—52), was one of the representatives from Milluni, where he worked as a nurse. (Later, in Chile, he had the nerve to pass himself off as a doctor, educated at the Sorbonne.) The chief representatives from Catavi were Veneros, a staunch anti-Marxist, and Antonio Gaspar, who already had considerable experience in the trade-union movement behind him. President Villarroel and the Minister of Labour were invited to the opening of the congress, as were the press. The congress's pro-government and pro-MNR position was obvious from the very beginning. For this reason and because it justifiably feared that a government-controlled miners' federation would soon become its most dangerous rival, the CSTB refused to recognise the congress and issued a communique stating that it, the CSTB, was 'the highest authority of the proletariat in Bolivia'. It argued that the congress was being held for political ends and that it was illegal

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The workers become revolutionary

because it had not been authorised by the CSTB, and warned the miners not to be taken in by the MNR. The CSTB concluded by promising to convene their second miners' congress in the near future. However, the CSTB's denunciation of the Huanuni congress had not the slightest effect on the miners. It showed how far removed the artisan-led and based CSTB was from the most important groups of workers, and how little it had to offer the working class. Both the Stalinists and the shortsighted rosca press surprisingly agreed in attributing little importance to the inaugural congress of the miners' federation, an event which was in fact of enormous significance in the history of Bolivia. Its opponents believed that the organisation would cease to exist as soon as it lost government support. They failed to realise that it is not important who initially organises the workers, for once they are organised they will follow their own directions. La Razon merely published a very brief note on the congress: 'Final preparations are being made for a miners' congress at Huanuni. Several members of the Government have been invited to the congress.'3 This was all the press of the day had to say. At the Huanuni congress Emilio Carvajal was appointed Secretary General of the miners' federation in recognition of his ability and the work he had put into making the new organisation possible. Lechin was given the post of permanent secretary, making him responsible for day-to-day administrative matters and the carrying out of agreements reached by the FSTMB, and in 1945 he was still signing trade union documents in this capacity. Nobody thought of proposing the appointment of an executive secretary since this has never been a part of the Bolivian trade union tradition. It was not until later that this innovation was thought up to permit Lechin to become an autocrat within the Federation. The congress decided to set up an office in La Paz so that the permanent secretary could conduct the Federation's everyday business with the authorities. Thus Lechin started off in the Miners' Federation as a subordinate official. But soon the permanent secretaryship became a key post and from it Lechin manoeuvred continually to replace Carvajal as the Federation's leader. In this way Lechin sought to gain political influence within the government; he was not trying to take revolutionary ideas to the masses. He was able to ingratiate himself thanks to his devotion to work, his sympathetic personality, and because he enjoyed the friendship and goodwill of both the authorities of the Ministry of Labour and the workers themselves, and he showed enviable diligence in resolving small union conflicts. Thus when the second miners' congress took place in Potosi in July

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The Miners' Federation

1945 Lechin had already assumed virtual control of the Federation. Carvajal attended the congress as secretary-general, even though his influence had diminished considerably. Lechin, who had already gained the upper hand, continued to figure as permanent secretary and gave an interview in this capacity to the La Paz paper Pregon, claiming that '2,000 miners from Potosi will attend the congress'.4 The second congress determined the future of the Federation, altering the structure of the executive and making explicit its support for the Villarroel government. The Minister of Labour and other government figures were invited to the congress, which was attended by delegates from 25 unions. Lechin became executive secretary and Mario Torres was elected secretary general. Carvajal, who had been responsible for creating the FSTMB, was quietly ousted from the executive team as a result of Lechin's behind-the-scenes campaign against him. It was the tradition in Bolivian trade unions to regard the secretary-generalship as the chief office in the union. The post of executive secretary, created by Lechin so that he could gradually take over the new organisation, at first seemed likely merely to duplicate the functions of the secretary-general. In practice, however, the latter soon became a mere assistant to the executive secretary. The congress ratified the Federation's support for the Villarroel government, responding to the efforts of the Ministry of Labour to control the unions. The congress approved a timid resolution which merely contained short term demands and a flattering vote of thanks to German Monroy Block, the Minister. This union support was crucial to the MNR if they were to beat off attacks from both the rosca and the Stalinists. In return the government gave the unions its backing and financial assistance. The Federation agreed to promote unionisation even in the smallest mining companies, and the principal resolutions passed included the following: 1. To ask the Supreme Government to grant an amnesty for all labour leaders. 3. To petition the National Convention to institute Saturdays as a day of rest for employees and workers. 4. To put an end to the independent status of the Workers' Saving and Insurance Fund and transfer it to the Ministry of Labour. 5. To request the State to take over all German-made machinery, which at present is being systematically destroyed.5 The Minister of Labour commented that: 'The miners congress has made a very good impression on me . . . I feel that the unions are now building up a solid organisation which will enable them to form a united workers' movement . . . Secondly, and perhaps it is here that the real success of the

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The workers become revolutionary

congress lies, I have noticed that these organisations are becoming less involved in politics, and dedicating themselves more strictly to social questions, which will benefit not only the miners but all workers in general.'6 The petitions drawn up by these first two miners' congresses were based on the assumption that the government would protect the Federation and act as its ally against the employers, especially the large companies. Their demands were moderate and, as in the case of the Savings Fund, the most they asked for was state control of various minor organisations. The Federation's relations with the anti-government, Stalinist CSTB were somewhat confused: attempts at reconciliation were followed by more mutual recriminations. It seems that the miners' leaders hoped to gain control of the CSTB from within and had not yet decided that it was necessary to replace the artisan leadership of the whole labour-movement by a proletarian one. Thus in July 1945 a document signed by, among others, Emilio Carvajal on behalf of the Federation, appeared convening a third CSTB congress. This third congress was held in Catavi at the beginning of March 1946, a few months before the overthrow of President Villarroel. It was here that the first signs appeared of a swing to the left by the miners' unions. Trade union leaders always tend to be more right wing than the rank and file workers and they only reflect the radicalisation of the bases after a considerable time lag. The labour leader who is under continual pressure from hostile classes and the government has difficulty in perceiving militant attitudes developing among the membership. Thus it was a mistake of the press, the rosca and even the Stalinists at the time to suppose that what happened at the Catavi congress was something sudden and unusual. In fact revolutionary anti-MNR ideas had been gradually gaining a hold among the union rank and file for some time. Lechin's new found 'Trotskyism' reflected this process somewhat imperfectly, and at the same time there was a growing influence of the POR in the mines, which emerged at the Catavi congress as a dangerous workers'-opposition group. At this time I myself, then a little known POR leader and university student, addressed a workers' congress for the first time, and from the platform of the Luzmila theatre in Siglo XX I harangued a packed audience of miners. It was only after a heated debate that I had been allowed to speak. My speech aimed at showing the workers a revolutionary path, very different from the progovernment line of the MNR or the PIR's policy of collaboration with the rosca. Although my arguments got a sympathetic response from the workers (to a large extent simply because of their novelty), they were of course unacceptable to the government-controlled delegates to the congress. The Stalinists, who had very few delegates present in the congress, used

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The workers in the revolutionary struggle (1946-52)

the press to develop the ridiculous idea that the workers were becoming fascist and accused the POR of working for the government. The fact is that Lechin helped the Trotskyists to penetrate the unions — in fact I even travelled to Catavi in the same railway carriage, provided for the executive secretary of the Federation. But despite this, Lechin did not dare to risk an open break with the MNR. A government team, including the Minister of Labour, was sent from La Paz to watch the direction of the debates at the congress. The most heated arguments were between the Trotskyists and the representatives of the MNR leadership rather than with their allies among the worker delegates. Lechin, who was playing off the two opposing groups, failed to present a project which he had been given to defend, but nevertheless the platform drawn up by the POR was approved by the congress. Thus for the first time a Bolivian workers' congress discussed the intrinsic limitations of reformism and the need for a frontal attack on the capitalists' manoeuvres to undermine the value of any social gains secured by the working class. A programme of transitory demands was also drawn up, including a price-related scale of wages, collective contracts, workers' control of capitalist enterprises, independent trade unions and the establishment of strike funds. By comparing these demands with those of the Thesis of Pulacayo (see pp. 246—51), approved at the following FSTMB congress in November 1946, it can be shown that the POR did not alter its position in the slightest between the two congresses, despite the social upheaval produced by the coup of 21 July 1946.

17. The workers in the revolutionary struggle (1946-52)

The role of Lechin

Because of its need for support the Villarroel—MNR government had made a great contribution to organising the masses, though not with the intention of liberating them but rather to use them for its own ends. The unexpected consequence was that the government found its own position undermined for, as soon as the workers were mobilised, they began to seek ideological and organisational autonomy and sought to follow an independent class

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The workers become revolutionary

line which threatened to transcend the limitations of the government's policies. This phenomenon became particularly marked towards the end of the Villarroel regime, when a confrontation between organised workers and the government seemed imminent. Juan Lechin, the new executive secretary of the FSTMB, had some part to play in this process but he played it pragmatically, reflecting, perhaps unconsciously, the conflicting ideas within the labour movement, oscillating between the pro-government position and that of the Marxist left. The Stalinist PIR, which already regarded Lechin as one of its worst enemies, saw the situation in quite different terms and were not even aware of the potential for conflict between the government and the Miners' Federation. In their view the miners had become fascists and were simply being manipulated as pawns by the government. As a consequence of this analysis the PIR sought to win the confidence of the right and began to oppose the Villarroel government from a counter-revolutionary position. This conduct gradually lost them the support of the working class. A union leader with no experience in a revolutionary party and no knowledge of the basic elements of revolutionary theory naturally becomes an empiricist and relies on his limited instinctive resources. In the best of cases what happens is that such a 'leader' does little more than follow the masses. On the other hand, such an individual, with no basic knowledge of politics, is also open to the most direct influences from the trade union rank and file, although he is bound to distort these influences in his efforts to interpret them. Lechin was such a case and honestly, one supposes, he decided to move away from the MNR and to link up with the POR, which at this time was just emerging into public prominence. At one point he talked of breaking entirely with the government group because, as he himself told me, he thought the MNR was incapable of liberating the masses. It is fair to say that, given his low level of political development, Lechin arrived at this decision in a somewhat contradictory fashion, not as the fruit of theoretical considerations, but simply under the influence of the most advanced sectors of the proletariat who were beginning to free themselves from the influence of the MNR. His lack of political experience laid him open to the influence of Trotskyism, which was carrying out an energetic campaign among the miners. Lechin did not hide his sympathies for the POR and he even attended training courses given by POR militants in La Paz. This group of young Marxist politicians welcomed Lechin with open arms for two reasons: they saw him as someone who was prepared to become a revolutionary leader and they thought that he would help to carry Trotskyist ideas to the unions. At one point Lechin was indeed successful in the second capacity. I first came to know him at this time, and

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The workers in the revolutionary struggle (1946-52)

he seemed to see me as his ideological mentor. But to become an orthodox Marxist it is necessary to understand Marxism and unfortunately not everyone is capable of diligent study. Lechin did not even manage to decipher the Communist Manifesto and all efforts to make him a serious student of Marxist ideas were fruitless. Perhaps some of the blame for the poor results must be attributed to the deficient teaching methods of his inexperienced teachers. During the uprising of 21 July 1946 in which the Villarroel regime was overthrown, Lechin acted with the POR and appeared fully to accept the demands made on him by the party and party discipline. Then in the course of the terrible years of the sexenio,1 1946—52, he became secretly affiliated to the POR, but it was always necessary to have a party militant posted at his side to guide what he did and said. The POR leaders made the mistake of trying to submit to party discipline someone who had not even assimilated the party's programme. This was undoubtedly Lechin's most radical phase and the unquestionable popularity he enjoyed at this time has no parallel in Bolivian social history. However, as we shall see below, the revolutionary Thesis of Pulacayo (see pp. 246—51) was approved behind his back, while the occupation of the San Jose mine by the workers failed because he hesitated and attempted to reach a settlement with the rosca government and, in fact, shirked responsibility for the whole scheme. He made deals with the regime which succeeded Villarroel, especially the PIR wing of the government, and there is even evidence that he promised to back Hertzog's candidacy for the presidency in 1947. He subsequently worked closely with the Minister of Labour, Monasterios, who was a member of the right-wing PURS, to eliminate the Trotskyists from the miners' congress of Telemayu. He entered Congress for the first time as a member of the Bloque Minero Parlamentario, which emerged from a front formed by the POR and the FSTMB, but from his seat in the senate he continued his policy of not causing too much trouble for those in power. At that time and subsequently he merely read out speeches prepared for him by others, so that any collection of his speeches would doubtless be full of incongruities. In order to understand the revolutionary struggle of the sexenio we must first examine the political analysis adopted by the FSTMB at its 1946 congress and then we can turn to consider the course actually adopted by Lechin in the following years. The miners' reaction to the overthrow of Villarroel

The radicalisation of the workers, the first major signs of which had ap-

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The workers become revolutionary

peared at the Catavi congress, took on a new direction after the tragic downfall of the Villarroel government on 21 July 1946. International capital and the freemasons certainly played a crucial role in the July uprising, and the organisations controlled by the Stalinist PIR channelled popular discontent in favour of the counter-revolution. The result of the street fighting was to hand power to the worst enemies of the working class: the lawyers of the large mining companies, the agents of imperialism and prominent freemasons. The restoration of the oligarchy had begun. The workers, and particularly the miners, were quick to realise that the overthrow of Villarroel meant the return to power of the rosca and consequently the systematic destruction of their recent social conquests. Under these circumstances Villarroel became a revolutionary symbol. In shouting 'Viva Villarroel' the miners were defending the gains they had made during his presidency, though they were obviously expressing their aims in a somewhat inappropriate way. A good indication of the state of mind of the miners at this time can be gathered from the terms of the pact between miners and students, signed in the city of Oruro in July 1946 just after the lynching of Villarroel. The workers held mass assemblies in the mines, at which it was agreed that the programme approved at Catavi should be adopted as a common programme by the students and workers, and the need to defend the workers recentlyacquired benefits was stressed. A United Proletarian Front was proposed and the need for independent trade unions was emphasised. The workers openly opposed the new governing Junta which was regarded as the unconditional servant of the reactionary feudal bourgeoisie. Delegates of the Federaci6n Universitaria, including a few Trotskyists but mostly members of the PIR, were gathered in the Prefect of Oruro's office when a mass of workers surged in to deliver the message of their comrades in the assemblies: they would defend the gains they had already won and they would fight untiringly against the new rosca government. The miners came in wearing their safety helmets, with sticks of dynamite in their belts. After the briefest of explanations, they obliged the students to sign a pact, in which the students' only contribution was to append their signatures, approving the Catavi resolution as a joint worker—student programme. Thus the miners imposed their way and the programme first adopted in Catavi became the rallying-cry in the cities. This was a hard lesson for the university students, who had generally backed the government which had emerged from the counter-revolutionary coup. The only preparation the students had had for this significant act had come from the small group of PORistas active in the university. The significance of the pact lies primarily in the fact that, at a crucial point in the struggle,

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the workers were able to impose their view on the petty-bourgeois intellectuals of the university. The. miners' mobilisation against the new government was spontaneous and they pressured the executive of the FSTMB into convening an extraordinary congress to discuss the Federation's position vis-a-vis the new political situation. The meeting was held at the Pulacayo mine which, in the not-so-distant past, had formed the basis of Aniceto Arce's powerful mining company Huanchaca de Bolivia. I myself drew up the document put to the congress by the Siglo XX—Catavi delegation and which has since become known as the Thesis of Pulacayo. It is therefore necessary for me, at this point, to write something about myself, though I shall do so as briefly as possible. At the time I was a university student and a member of the POR and my main concern was to integrate myself into the working class. I spent less time in the university than in working-class areas, especially the mines, where I was busy organising party cells and therefore becoming involved in trade-union activities. I was no stranger to the problems of the workers; on the contrary for several years I had lived their life. I had been among those arrested as a result of the strike and massacre at Catavi in 1942; when I was detained on Oruro railway station the police found in my pocket a manifesto calling on the urban workers to support the miners. At the end of 1945 the Siglo XX workers made me their spokesman at the conciliation tribunal, which met in the municipal chambers of Uncia to demand the introduction of compulsory incentivepayments and Christmas bonuses in the mines. A few years later, as a deputy, I brought up the same question in Congress. I was certainly not a worker but an intellectual. I emerged from my seclusion in dusty libraries to mix with the workers and learn to express, as best I could, their most urgent needs and the great destiny which awaited them. The Thesis of Pulacayo, therefore, incorporated a great deal of my own ideology (which at the time was fully attuned to the developments that were taking place in the trade union movement), my few virtues and my many defects. The document has since become one of the rallying points of the masses and had therefore become, to a certain extent, depersonalised and it would not be an exaggeration to say that it was an expression of the working class as a whole. Yet for me this remains the most important thing I have said, done, or written. The Thesis was put to the conference, after some careful conspiracy, without the knowledge of the executive secretary, Lechin, whose main interest was to demonstrate his complete ascendancy in the working class. The Siglo XX delegation and a few other Trotskyist supporters knew about the proposal and were prepared to defend and support it. It was approved

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by the congress largely because it came as a surprise. The debate revolved around secondary details and whether or not it was an opportune moment to make the document public. It should be remembered that the principal document approved at the previous congress at Catavi had been disregarded by Lechin, who had tried to shelve it. His position at the Pulacayo congress can be explained to some extent by the fact that he had not entirely freed himself from his MNR past and that he was chiefly concerned with finding a way of reaching some agreement with the new government, so he regarded any radical statement of principles with mistrust. The Thesis of Pulacayo

'Bolivia is a backward capitalist country. Qualitatively speaking, capitalist exploitation predominates over the other diverse economic formations which occur in the country and which are a legacy from the past. Although it is a backward country, Bolivia is only another link in the world capitalist chain. The apparent peculiarities of the nation are in reality merely a distinctive combination of features which are fundamental to the world economy.'2 From this definition follow the particular characteristics of the social classes within Bolivia's revolutionary process. The attitude of the proletariat and other classes towards the problem of how to overcome this backwardness and begin to develop along the lines of civilisation is determined by the fact that the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution had not been completed (i.e. the bourgeoisie had failed to liquidate precapitalist socio-economic formations). Even so, the country had been obliged to assimilate some of the most up-to-date forms of international capitalism, thereby jumping stages and giving rise to a 'combined' type of development, in which some of humanity's earliest forms of social organisation co-exist (or survive) side by side with the most advanced forms of bourgeois society. Since the feudal bourgeoisie demonstrated itself incapable of carrying out its historical tasks, and given the geographical dispersion and the backwardness of the vast mass of peasants and the impossibility of consistent and independent class action by the petty bourgeoisie, it was left for the proletariat to bring about these bourgeois-democratic reforms which are the precondition for the creation of a socialist society. The political consequence of this analysis followed fairly obviously: 'The proletariat, even in Bolivia, constitutes the revolutionary class par excellence' The mineworkers were therefore defined as the vanguard of the whole country. Of course the assistance of other social classes in the daily struggle is indispensable and they may assume a revolutionary attitude

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when the government threatens their interests, but they cannot be counted on to carry the struggle to its ultimate conclusion. On the contrary, their main characteristic is that they stop half-way, when they think that their immediate objectives have been fulfilled or when they think that an alliance with their enemies of yesterday could bring them some advantage. The proletarian revolution in Bolivia does not imply the exclusion of other exploited social groups. On the contrary, it requires that the proletariat enter into a revolutionary alliance with the peasants, artisans and other sectors of the petty bourgeoisie. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the projection of this alliance to the level of the state. The terms 'proletarian revolution' and 'dictatorship of the proletariat' are used to emphasise the leading role of the working class in the transformation and in the new state.3 Until the Thesis of Pulacayo, as this study has shown, the labour movement had not been able to free itself from class collaborationism, which had hampered the ideological emancipation of the working class and had led to the adoption of reactionary positions by the labour movement. The class struggle is, in the last instance, the struggle to appropriate surplus value . . . We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the struggle against the employers is a struggle to the death, because it revolves round the very existence of private property. There can be no truce in the class struggle . . . It is here that we differ from the collaborationists who, in their sophistry, argue that the objective should not be the destruction of the rich but the enrichment of the poor. Our objective is the expropriation of the expropriators.4 Any attempt at collaboration with the exploiters, any concessions to the enemy amounts to a betrayal of the workers. Class collaboration implies the renunciation of our objectives. We reject the petty-bourgeois illusion that the class problem can be resolved if it is turned over to the State, or other institutions which pretend to be above class interests. Such solutions, as the history of the national and international labour movements has shown, always mean giving in to capitalist interests . . . Arbitration and the legal regulation of the class struggle are generally the first step to defeat. We will fight to do away with compulsory arbitration. Conflicts should be resolved under the direction of the workers, and by them alone.5 Commenting on the experience of 1936, when a government which did not represent the working class appointed 'worker' ministers, the Thesis pointed out that 'worker' ministers do not change the structure of bourgeois governments. As long as the State defends the capitalist nature of society, 'worker' ministers are

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merely puppets of the bourgeoisie. Any worker who is weak enough to exchange his position in the ranks of the revolutionary struggle for a bourgeois ministerial post is a traitor. The idea of 'worker' ministers is a bourgeois tactic to deceive the workers, inducing them to abandon their independent methods of struggle and to depend entirely on the protection of the 'worker' ministers.6 The sections of the Thesis concerned with short-term measures repeated the decisions of the Catavi congress but added the following: the occupation of mines, the creation of a central labour organisation and the arming of the workers. Experience, both before and after 1946, showed that the employers, represented by the state, manipulated the currency (to diminish its purchasing power) in order to reduce the value of wage increases achieved after bitter struggles, strikes and massacres. In reply, the Pulacayo congress voted to fight for a wage-scale related to the rising cost of living. Unions in many countries have made the reduction of the working day one of their main objectives. At Pulacayo it was decided to campaign for a 40-hour week, a very modest demand considering that by this time the workers in other countries were demanding a 36-hour week. (This demand was especially modest considering that it is now beyond discussion that the conditions of work in the mines require that miners work a shorter week than other workers.) Following Trotsky's transitional programme [adopted at the founding conference of the Fourth International in 1938], it was also decided to campaign for a flexible scale of working hours, related to the number of unemployed. The Thesis also discussed trade-union independence, not because it favoured apolitical trade unionism but because, at this time, there existed a greater danger than apoliticism, namely the danger of government control through the fifth column of the restored oligarchic government, the PIR. The Stalinist CSTB had become a government agency. The Thesis observed: We can have no confidence in an organisation which has its permanent secretariat in the Ministry of Labour and sends its representatives to make propaganda on behalf of the government. The FSTMB is absolutely independent of the bourgeoisie, of reformist movements and of the government. It has a revolutionary trade-union policy and regards any agreement with the bourgeoisie or the government as a betrayal.7 From 1945 onwards the large mineowners were continually announcing heavy losses and the need to cut back production. Every demand for wage increases or better conditions was met with the threat to close the mines. Statistical data was published which claimed to show enormous rises in production costs and excellent living conditions for the miners. The government made no inquiry as to whether or not these implausible claims were

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justified. The Thesis of Pulacayo claimed that: 'the large companies keep two sets of accounts: one to show the workers and use as a basis for paying taxes to the state, and another to calculate their real profits. We cannot accept the fraudulent figures in the official account books.' 8 At the time many 'socialist' groups allied to the rosca, from the PIR to the PURS, made demagogic proclamations about 'the nationalisation of the mines', meaning that they wanted some government control over the all-powerful mining companies. It was, however, either naive or deceitful to give the impression that the counter-revolutionary government established in 1946 might nationalise the mines. In the Thesis of Pulacayo this issue was clarified. It was proposed that the miners occupy the mines, an act signifying nationalisation without compensation, in which the workers would take the destiny of the mines into their own hands (i.e. the proletarian form of nationalisation). The occupation of the mines must be seen as a tactic leading to the seizure of state power, for direct workingclass participation in the nationalisation would immediately pose the question of which class controls the state apparatus. The publicity given to this resolution advocating the occupation of the mines startled both the government and the employers. Some left-wing critics thought that it was merely an impractical slogan, which might mobilise the workers but which could not be carried any further. Others said that it was only because of the privileged position of the workers that they could make such a threat. The large mineowners saw it as a serious challenge and were put on the defensive by the threat. The moment was therefore opportune for a workers' offensive. To pause would be to give the class enemy time to muster support and launch his own attack. At Pulacayo it was therefore agreed that the best response to Hochschild's plan to sack workers was the occupation of the San Jose mine. The rank and file unionists approved this tactic and the FSTMB was prepared for such an emergency. The weakness and disorientation of the government Junta and the defensive posture of the large mineowners made this measure feasible, but the plan was not in fact carried out. At a subsequent miners' congress in Colquiri in June 1947 the failure to seize the initiative at San Jose was regarded as a great mistake by various worker delegates. This conclusion is reinforced by the consideration that the solution actually adopted was damaging to the interests of the state. What would have been the consequences of the occupation had it taken place? The government could not face an indefinite occupation of the mines: either the tactic would become generalised, leading to an attempt to take over state power, or else the employers would have to accede to the workers' economic demands in order to recover their property. Given

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the circumstances we can be fairly sure that, in the case of San Jose, the second outcome would have prevailed and the occupation was planned with this end in view. It was evident that this measure would have generated acute worker-employer conflict. Hence a few hours before the occupation was scheduled to take place, Lechin and a couple of other leaders weakened in their determination and agreed to prolong the deadline for negotiations with the government. Thus a magnificent opportunity was lost with momentous consequences for the future of the labour movement. Not only in San Jose but throughout the whole country the workers became demoralised. Their retreat enabled the employers to recover the initiative, just when they had come to believe that they had lost definitively. Nevertheless, although they had lost the initiative, the workers did manage to get almost all their immediate demands met and the employers signed a generous settlement. This shows how desperate the companies were. If there had been no hesitation at San Jose, the large mineowners could have been made to surrender much more and the subsequent defeat at Oploca might have been averted. When a conflict developed at the mine of Oploca the situation had changed a great deal. In Oploca the conditions were not right for an occupation of the mine and some of the workers realised this. Nevertheless an abortive attempt was made to occupy the mine and this setback consolidated the large mineowners' recovery. The Thesis of Pulacayo also discussed workers' control, in the sense of the control of the companies by part of the working class. The delegates to the congress were in agreement that workers' control meant the handing over of an enterprise to the class as a whole, who, in order to administer it, would have to create some special body, subject to the will of a general workers' assembly. (After 1952 the MNR adopted the term 'workers' control', giving it quite a different meaning, in which control by the class was turned into control by a bureaucracy.) The resolution in favour of arming the workers was the logical conclusion of the main line of argument of the Thesis: namely that the dominant class must be overthrown by a revolution. The Thesis was careful to avoid considering the technical details, stressing instead the need to create the necessary mentality. First the miners must understand why they should be armed and then they themselves could find the ways of getting arms. 'Every strike contains the needs of civil war and we should therefore be properly armed. If we are to win, we should not forget that the bourgeoisie has armies, police forces and fascist bands.9 We should therefore organise the first cells of the proletarian army. All unions should form

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armed pickets, composed of the most militant young workers.' This is the intellectual origin of the worker and peasant militias of the 1950s. It was also agreed at Pulacayo to set up strike funds. However, for bureaucratic reasons this commitment was not fulfilled, as a result of which many strikes were unsuccessful.10 The Thesis also proposed that, once a basic living wage, related to the cost of living, had been established, the company stores should be abolished. This would mean replacing payment in kind by an additional monetary payment. It was designed to prevent the companies from defeating strikes through their control over the supply of food products. The Stalinist CSTB had a predominantly artisan leadership and a petty bourgeois ideology and now represented a stage in the labour movement which had been transcended. Following the formation of the FSTMB the need for a central workers' organisation politically controlled by the proletariat became apparent. It was in this sense that the Thesis of Pulacayo referred to the creation of a new trade union confederation. 'The ideology of the proletariat and not of the petty bourgeoisie should be dominant in the workers' confederation. Furthermore, it is our task to give it a revolutionary programme . . . ' First the Central Obrera Nacional and later the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) based their ideas on this thesis, although the latter ended up selling out to the MNR government. That, however, was the fault of the union bureaucracy and not of the Thesis of Pulacayo. The criticisms of the Thesis

The most serious criticism levelled at the Thesis of Pulacayo was that it contains the germ of a possible deviation towards anarcho-syndicalism, that it was an attempt to convert a trade-union programme into the programme of the revolutionary vanguard and, indeed, that it proposed to place a workers' confederation in the position which really should be filled by the political party of the proletariat. It was argued that the Thesis did not state categorically that a political party, the POR for example, must be the vanguard of the future revolution. But this argument forgets that, given its nature as the programme of a labour federation, the function of the Thesis was basically to analyse the political tasks of the proletariat with reference to the other social classes and the revolutionary process. The Thesis could not lay down what the relations should be between the revolutionary vanguard (the political party) and the class; the political party would have to establish that. These critics should ask themselves whether or not they think it important that ever broader sectors of the

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proletariat should acquire class consciousness. Do they deny that it is of the utmost importance to take revolutionary ideas to the rank-and-file workers? Such work could help to overcome the imbalance which existed between the overripeness of the objective conditions for the revolution and the incipient state of the subjective conditions, in the sense that the revolutionary vanguard was virtually non-existent. Do the critics think it more important to sing the praises of one political party or another, however justifiably, than to organise the exploited along revolutionary lines? One day, to the surprise of the workers, all the newspapers in Bolivia, both large and small, unexpectedly published the entire text of the Thesis of Pulacayo, thus making it the centre of a fierce ideological and political dispute. It was only subsequently revealed that the Patirio company was behind this publicity campaign. This apparently extraordinary move was the result of an inaccurate appraisal of the situation: it was hoped that the public circulation of the secret document would mobilise opinion against the extremists. What in fact happened was that, on the contrary, the publicity given to the document sharpened the fighting spirit of the masses. 'On learning of the Thesis of Pulacayo, which was then circulating secretly, Patirio ordered his companies to ensure that it was diffused as widely as possible in the Bolivian press, so that the country could be made aware of the impending danger, while there was still time.' It was difficult for the mineowners to get the document published, as the newspapers were not willing to publish it as an item of news, and instead Patino had to insert it as a paid advertisement at considerable expense . . . 'Nobody commented on it. The country was deaf and blind.'11 It is not, however, true to say that no comments were made; in fact the rosca newspaper published editorials thundering against the Thesis. The Bloque Minero Parlamentario

After the Pulacayo congress, and in accordance with its general line, the FSTMB formed an electoral front with the POR, which took the name of the Frente Unico Proletario. The Front was important in the trade union movement from 1946 to 1949. It was a strictly proletarian Front and should not be confused with an anti-imperialist Front. It was possible to set up this political block because the MNR had been temporarily removed from the political scene by the repression that followed the overthrow of Villarroel. The MNR's union activists found themselves virtually abandoned by their party and hence were more open to radicalising pressures from the rank and file. This gave the misleading impression that there were only PORistas in the labour movement.

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In the general elections of 1947 the Frente Unico Proletario, which many workers regarded as their own party, won seven seats in the chamber of deputies and two in the senate. These included Lechin as senator for Potosi department and myself as deputy for the Bustillo province of Potosi, where the Siglo XX and Catavi mining complex is located. The Thesis of Pulacayo stated that parliament should be used as a platform for revolutionary agitation and the miners' representatives should be guided by the action of the masses. But to act on this declaration the parliamentary group needed a clearly defined ideology and to be directly accountable to the rank and file of workers. In parliament the worker finds himself in an environment which is strange to him and he needs to resist the pressure of ideas foreign to the labour movement, and the temptations of his new bourgeois way of life. The Bolivian working class has no parliamentary tradition. Parliament has never been seen as a way of resolving their problems or of reaching socialism. Certainly, there have been 'worker' representatives in the legislature, from almost the beginning of the twentieth century. Many of them were workers; some were lawyers, and some had no fixed occupation. But since the legislature has always been ineffective vis-a-vis the executive, the Bolivian parliament has at most featured as a safety valve for popular discontent. The general elections of 1947 took place in a climate of revolutionary effervescence. Under these conditions, the capture of seats in parliament was not a step towards greater revolutionary mobilisation of the masses. On the contrary, it created illusions among some sectors of the working class that legal methods might suffice to block the successes of the rosca. The Marxists tried, however, to subordinate parliamentary methods to those of the working class. When the Bloque Minero Parlamentario (BMP) was eventually excluded from the legislature, this demonstrated that the attempt to transform parliament into a revolutionary battleground was scarcely practical within the framework of Bolivian 'democracy'. In retrospect we can see that the parliamentary tactic was applied at an inopportune moment, and this was one cause of the ensuing tendency towards political apathy. The responsibility for this error falls almost entirely upon myself. Nevertheless, the behaviour of the BMP may be considered as a model of the way Marxists should act at the parliamentary level. The case of the BMP is an exceptional one in Bolivian history, not simply because of its size but because, for the first time, there was a labour group acting in defiance of the government and the other political parties. Until then labour deputies had either supported the government of the day

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or had collaborated with other non-labour parties. The BMP's programme was drawn up by the POR, and this party provided the political guidelines of the Bloque. The achievements and setbacks of the Bloque Minero in parliament must be attributed to the POR, although this party was hampered by some negative aspects of the trade union leadership which had a low theoretical level, a marked tendency towards opportunism, and little or no stomach for a long and hard revolutionary struggle. During the electoral campaign all the BMP candidates had seemed committed to the revolutionary programme, but once in parliament the careerism and personal ambitions of some of the representatives became apparent. In addition to the few Trotskyists and those union leaders who would later join the POR, there were some members of the Bloque who had entered politics via the MNR, and although they had been momentarily carried away by the radicalisation of the labour movement their real interest was in reaching some kind of compromise with other classes in reformist tactics and perhaps in the return of an MNR-type regime. The principal members of this group were Juan Lechin and Mario Torres. When a union leader enters parliament he becomes insulated from the influence of the workers, while the influence of the dominant class grows stronger as a result of various pressures, ranging from open bribery to the purchase of his vote in exchange for improvements in his constituency, to laudatory newspaper articles, banquets and social acceptance. The worker who emerges from a wretched life in the mines is permanently tempted by the magnificence and pomp which surrounds him in his new environment. There is a great gap between the salary of a day labourer and that of a member of parliament, and this difference is almost immediately reflected at a political and social level. The worker in parliament soon becomes more bourgeois; everything in his new situation incites him to succumb to this temptation, and the danger is even greater given that in many cases he is cut off from the support of his own organisation. Only a high level of political consciousness and strict party control can protect workers who become members of parliament. The BMP suffered not just from the embourgeoisement and opportunism of some of its members, but also from its acute inexperience. More time and energy was devoted to fighting these internal dangers than to combating the external enemy. As leader of the BMP in the Chamber of Deputies, I addressed the FSTMB's Congress at Telemayu in 1948, reminding them that even though they now had their own representatives in parliament the workers must maintain the strength of their own organisations and remain loyal to the principle that the emancipation of the workers can only be achieved by

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their own efforts. 'By turning parliament into a platform for revolutionary agitation . . . we have really been acting as anti-parliamentarians within parliament.'12 In Congress the credentials of the elected members of BMP were called into question; they were accused of being under age, of having been prosecuted for offences, and attempts were made to declare their elections invalid. It was only under great pressure from the mass of workers, who publicly threatened to come out on strike, that the BMP deputies were allowed to take their seats. Perhaps another motive was that the government parties believed that once the BMP was admitted to parliament it could be controlled from the government or at least neutralised. At the miners' congresses and in my writings at this time and later, I revealed that Mario Torres approached the leadership of the PURS offering to cooperate with the government in return for government recognition of his credentials as a deputy. Torres has never made a convincing refutation of this charge. However, the plans of the PURS to tame the new deputies were thwarted when the BMP resolved to use parliament as a forum for revolutionary agitation. The authorities then tried to divide the BMP by offering bribes to some of its members, then they tried to exclude it from the legislature. A boycott directed from the Presidential palace was designed to make the BMP's parliamentary initiatives unworkable. All proposals put forward by the BMP deputies were automatically postponed indefinitely by the majority even when they only concerned the problems and needs of the provinces. All the other political groups formed a united front to prevent the miners from sitting on the parliamentary commissions which are so important in the mechanics of legislation. The BMP's work in parliament included studies and proposals on social legislation, basic wage-rates related to price increases, the Indian problem etc. However, the only legacy of this work are parliamentary documents which are probably by now being gnawed by rats in the congressional library. The Bloque Minero's report of 1948 asked: 'Is there any need to revise our parliamentary tactics? The experience we have lived through and described suggests there is not. But there is a need to educate leaders capable of carrying out these tactics effectively. It is obvious that such a process of education cannot be carried out satisfactorily within the unions. Only a political party of the working class can provide such a team.'13 The government was obviously extremely worried by the activity of the BMP, which practically took over the leadership of the trade-union movement. President Enrique Hertzog in a report in 1948 denounced the opposition's abuse of democratic guarantees: 'The freedom of association and assembly has been used to further the comings and goings of conspirators

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and gives them immunity. Parliamentary immunity has become a shield which protects the frankly subversive activities of some national representatives, connected to labour organisations, of which they are leaders although they are not themselves workers and have nothing in common with the interests of labour.'14 (The statutes of the FSTMB stated that these people elected to parliament by the miners became ex offido union leaders.) The PIR At this time the other working-class party, the PIR, was in difficulties, as a result of its total commitment to a government which was soon felt to be the bitter enemy of the workers. This was the period when the PIR really destroyed itself. The process began in Potosi in 1947. The tragic events of 28 and 29 January 1947 have gone down in history as the massacre of Potosi. The Junta which succeeded Villarroel (and which some people have even called socialist) was in power at this time and the PIR was one of the mainstays of the regime. About 30 members of the Sindicato de Metalurgicos were marching on the police station to demand the release of their leaders whom they believed had been arrested. The authorities opened fire, killing several workers. This happened on the afternoon of 28 January. The following day PIR militants, who had been armed by the police, entered the mining camps, shooting and killing workers. The people responsible for the massacre have never denied their role in it and have tried to justify their action by arguing that such extreme measures were necessary to combat the MNR and POR workers. A few months later, on 9 June 1947, the fourth FSTMB congress opened in Colquiri. The main preoccupation of the upper and middle levels of the union leadership was to find some way of avoiding the destruction of the unions by the coalition formed by the large mineowners and the government. At this time the PIRista Minister of Labour, Alfredo Mendizabal, played a very sad role within the labour movement. The country was still governed by the 'National Unity Cabinet', a government which launched threats almost daily against the 'extremism' of the miners' unions. At the inauguration of the congress Mendizabal said: The democratic process which we are trying to construct does not lend itself to demagoguery or to the teachings of revolutionary pamphlets. Inundated with slogans about the dictatorship of the proletariat and internal war, which are contrary to all principles of revolutionary tactics, the workers have been provoked into anarchistic uprisings which under-

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mine the stability of the nation. I call upon you to reconstruct a democratic Bolivia. Disorder, chaos and demagoguery are the instruments of fascism and are leading us along the path to destruction.15 Lechin replied by reading a speech written by members of the POR: 'We have chosen to follow the difficult path of class struggle rather than the ministerial way. We are proud to say that, despite all the veiled proposals, we have no wish to exchange our glorious position as revolutionaries for the comforts of a bourgeois ministry.'16 The 1947 congress approved a document drawn up by the POR entitled Tactical Advice: How to retreat without being destroyed. We now confront the urgent need to modify the tactics followed by the FSTMB up until now, since the present political situation is greatly changed from that prevailing at the time of the Pulacayo congress.. . How should we characterise the present political juncture? The Hertzog regime is undeniably at the service of international mining interests and at the moment it is backed up by the so-called 'National Unity Cabinet' [the PURS, the PIR and the Liberal Party]. This political alliance lends the government some temporary stability . . . But why has this national unity government been formed and against whom is it directed? The answer can be deduced from the reactionary press which has clearly indicated that the target is the mineworkers' movement and that the government's principal mission is to destroy this movement. Recent errors in trade union policy are in danger of threatening the upsurge of the labour movement and could lead to a decline in the revolutionary process. In the case of the miners' union, the main errors were first the handling of the occupation of San Jose and then the Oploca case. The occupation of the San Jose mine was abandoned because the leadership of the union in that mine was uncertain about the move, despite the fact that the conditions were exceptionally suitable: the government was weak; the management was beating a retreat and the workers had enormous confidence in the tactic. These two failures led to the demoralisation and confusion of the workers and enabled the companies, now feeling stronger than before, to launch an offensive. They are the origin of the companies' present efforts to destroy the union movement. When revolutionary upsurges lose their momentum, this becomes apparent in the fall-off of mass support and the occurrence of organisational splits. These phenomena have only begun to appear in the FSTMB , but it is clear that demoralisation exists in our ranks. It follows that our movement, if not entering a phase of decline, is at any rate facing a period of stagnation. The most important task of the

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moment is to halt the retreat and prevent these set-backs from destroying the labour movement. Some people say that we should begin to retreat, that it would be suicide to try and hold our present position. We say we should begin to retreat, maintaining a tight control over the masses, so that the rosca is unable to destroy us completely, and so that a new and fiercer workers' offensive can be launched tomorrow. Our tactic can be summarised thus: we must take one step back without losing sight of our objective, so that we can later take two steps forward. That is the task of the moment. It is clear that the rosca's aim is to destroy the labour movement in one of two ways either by corruption (giving a ministry to the FSTMB, for example) or by dissolving it as an organisation.17 The new stage brought to light the great organisational weaknesses of the FSTMB which were common to all Bolivian unions. Such weaknesses, said the report, 'permit our enemies quickly to reoccupy the positions we have abandoned. The current infiltration of fifth columnists and the disorientation of the masses are the price we now pay for our negligence.' However, hardly any of the union leaders grasped the new situation. Some persisted with the old tactic of drawing up ambitious demands, others wanted to acquiesce submissively to the wishes of the government (whose principal objective at this time was the acceptance of large scale redundancies). In the background there was a persistent radio and press campaign aimed at discrediting the union leaders, denouncing the pro-Marxist inclinations of some of them and the corruption of others. As a response to the rosca's campaign against the unions the Colquiri congress resolved to denounce all attempts at dividing the movement and to expel anyone who attempted to do so . . . To promote distrust of the government among all sectors of the population, denouncing every inopportune step it takes, and above all exposing the infringements of civil liberties .. . wresting as many institutions as possible, especially the trade unions, from government control... In the past we have launched suicidal mass struggles without any economic backing. We must now build up large enough stores of basic necessities, money etc. to enable us to hold out for at least two weeks and we must organise an efficient system of distribution.18 The congress proposed the creation of a strike fund to finance a 'massive strike', capable of thwarting the destructive intentions of the reactionaries; the formation of armed pickets in anticipation of the next massacre; systematic work to win over the soldiers and non-commissioned officers to a

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revolutionary position, and the adoption of a campaign of denunciations, on the principle that 'to expose a plan is half-way towards defeating it.' By the time of the congress wide-scale sackings and the use of the blacklist had already begun at Catavi, where 140 workers and employees had recently been sacked. It therefore approved a resolution to Request the Supreme Government to intervene immediately to reinstate the dismissed workers to their jobs in the Patirio company, in accordance with the law and in defence of the dignity and decorum of the country. We protest against the abuses committed by the Patino Mines Co. in total disregard for the laws which regulate the institutional life of our country. We urge the Minister of Labour and Social Security to intervene immediately to secure an effective solution to this conflict.. . If these demands are ignored, this miners' congress reserves the right to declare a general strike throughout the republic . . . 19 It was agreed that the FSTMB leadership should go to Catavi, where they would first call a staggered strike and then, if necessary, a general strike. This plan was denounced in the Chamber of Deputies by Ponce Lozada on 25 September 1947, after the crisis which will be described later in this chapter had come to a head. In the course of a speech attacking the Bloque Minero Parlamentario he read out a telephone conversation which had taken place between the miners' deputies in Oruro and Lechin in Cochabamba: 'G. Lora speaking . . . I'm glad to tell you that the plan is very simple and has been ratified at Colquiri. We are travelling to Llallagua today to oppose the planned dismissal of the workers. We shall first declare a staggered strike and then a general strike.' But Lechin was absent from the scene of events, enjoying the fresh spring air and sunshine of the Cochabamba valley while the workers waited nervously for the clash with the reactionary forces. Lechin's behaviour as a trade unionist and politician has always been characterised by this tendency to flee from responsibility the moment events reach a critical point. He is careful to defend his position from both flanks, so that he can enter into talks and agreements with the enemy, conveying the impression that inflexible radical elements, acting behind his back, are responsible for the conflict. This enables him at the opportune moment to emerge as arbitrator between the opposing forces. For a long time his opportunism enabled him to make political capital out of the struggles of the working class. It should be stressed that until the fourth congress at Colquiri the Trotskyists provided the leadership to the FSTMB and Lechin did nothing to differentiate himself from them, but at later meetings Lechin worked closely with government spokesmen against the Trotskyists.

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The masacre blanca20 of 1947

The PIR has made great efforts to show that the dismissal of all the workers from the Catavi company of the Patiiio group (which has gone down in history as the masacre blanca) took place not merely without its consent but against its wishes.21 But the decree which authorised this extraordinary attack on the workers bore the signature of two well-known members of the PIR and of some others who secretly sympathised with the PIR. The idea of the dismissals was thought up by Patiiio as a way to resolve the acute social problems in the mines. The course of events was as follows. On 15 October 1946 the Sindicato Mixto of Catavi and that of Siglo XX presented a petition demanding, among other things, that they should be paid bonuses still owing for the years 1944 and 1945, and demanding a minimum wage of 37.60 bolivianos a day and rises for all workers ranging from 5% to 60%. On 30 April 1947 the findings of the arbitration tribunal were published, endorsing a substantial part, though not all, of the union's claims. The findings were rejected both by the company, on the grounds that their representative was absent from the arbitration proceedings, and by the workers who, on 2 May, resolved that 'the findings are opposed to all considerations of equity and justice and an insult to the workers'. The miners gave the authorities five days in which to revise their arbitration findings, and on 8 May they came out on strike at the same time organising their own militias. The management argued that it was the government's duty to send soldiers and police to the conflict area to put an end to the strike. 'Within the constitutional framework the company has limited its demands to requesting that it should not be abandoned to the whim of the unions, and that the union police [the name given to the workers' militias at that time], so highly praised by government spokesmen, should be replaced by the regular police force of the state. Invoking these legal precepts, we insist that the state can never renounce its duty to maintain order, thereby giving in to the miners' unions which are armed and involved in subversive action.'22 In support of their arguments the management quoted the Thesis of Pulacayo, which they rightly regarded as a major threat to the capitalist system. Whenever the Patino company addressed itself to the Executive (which was in fact the only branch of government with any power in Bolivia) it did so in this arrogant threatening tone, as if it were more powerful than the government itself - which it was. The government on the other hand always responded in a servile manner to the great consortium. The only thing that the government could legally do was to insist that the arbitration findings must be generally accepted, although permitting

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the modification of details in the light of experience. It appears that this was suggested in the cabinet, but the ministers were under powerful pressure from the Patino company, which was seeking to dismiss all its personnel so that it could eliminate the 'agitators' and then re-employ the remaining workers on worse terms. Alfredo Mendizabal, the PIRista Minister of Labour, made it known to his Permanent Secretary (Oficial Mayor) that President Hertzog had circulated a document for discussion which read as follows: Given that at the moment we are living in a period of transition, in which subversive elements are trying to incite the masses to violence and the government to the use of force; given that the miners have a central thesis approved in Pulacayo which they follow and intend to carry out; given that the union leaders have clearly decided to provoke periodic conflicts to arouse class hatred, social revolution and civil war; . . . given that the leaders of the FSTMB, by adopting this outlook obey the directions of the nazi-fascist movement, defeated on 21 July 1946, to which they belong; and given that one of them, the deputy Lora, has recently said that, in accordance with the declaration of Pulacayo, the miners will use force to oppose any measures the government takes to repress the strike: It is decreed that (1) the government will not enforce the ruling of the arbitration tribunal. (2) the Patino Company will proceed to dismiss, with compensation, all those who went on strike as a result of the resolution passed on 2 May. (3) The company, as soon as it has completed paying compensation to the dismissed workers, will proceed immediately to the reorganisation of operations, based on a rational plan, including an adequate scale of remuneration and a system of incentives designed to promote productivity. New contracts, approved by the authorities, will be offered to those workers who freely choose to continue working, always provided that they are not involved in subversive activities. From this it can be seen that, as had often happened in the past, the government was seeking to break the union movement by the use of blacklists. On 24 July 1947 Patino Mines and Enterprises submitted to the government their plan for the reorganisation of work at Catavi. The aims were to re-establish trade-union activities within the limitations laid down by the law, to restore authority to the management and technical and administrative personnel, and, particularly, to secure 'the political neutrality of the unions and hence social peace'.23 To achieve these ends the company proposed to dismiss all their personnel, paying compensation for dismissal. It publicly proclaimed its 'goodwill and generosity' by offering redundancy pay even to those workers who would later be recontracted.

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According to the 1938 Ley General de Trabajo, the dismissal of workers in the course of a worker—employer conflict is forbidden. On 24 July the Bloque Minero Parlamentario secured the approval of a minute from Congress, reminding the Executive that it was its duty to order the reinstatement of the workers who had been illegally dismissed. Despite this, the company saw this conflict as an opportunity to get rid of a number of 'agitators'. However, after lengthy negotiations, the Ministry of Labour and other branches of the Executive declared that the dismissed workers should be reinstated in accordance with the law, and they sent numerous communications to the Patirio company informing it of their decision. This intervention was ineffective, however, and the company continued with its plan to clean up the unions while, whatever their public declarations and promises, the government in practice cooperated with the Patino company in removing 'agitators' from the mining centres. For example, Rivera, the sub-prefect of the Catavi area, passed on to the unions the instructions he had received from President Hertzog in La Paz by telegram on 25 June: 'Dismissed workers must leave area as soon as possible; cannot be permitted to remain under any pretext; if fail to do so will be considered agitators, enemies of public order.' This mass dismissal of the labour force in order to eliminate the union leadership was in direct defiance of trade-union law. The existing labour legislation guaranteed the right to form trade unions and prohibited the companies from drawing up black-lists. While the official negotiations were being dragged out in La Paz Patino secured the services of the PIR and the PURS members in the mines to help in the propaganda campaign to justify the dismissals. Certain Catavi union leaders were the first to agree to leave, and they went because the company paid them more compensation than was required by law. 'The company has gone ahead without difficulties although, in view of the doubts about the support available from the authorities, it has had to pay additional sums of money to certain dangerous elements to induce them to sign an agreement voluntarily.'24 From Catavi on 5 September Davila informed Lechin, Baptista and Monje what had happened the previous day: 'More than 2,000 men abandoned their work at the instigation of fifth columnists and told the management of their support for the plan of total dismissals. They were undoubtedly pushed into this by the employees.' Disorieritation led to indiscipline and a lack of confidence in the FSTMB: 'Since indiscipline is spreading and we fear loss of control over the masses it is very urgent that Lechin comes immediately, since any delay will lead to regrettable friction.' Lechin's reply was typical of him: 'If the workers doubt the honour of the

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Federation, I will be present midday tomorrow to be judged by an open assembly and for the workers to impose the deserved penalty. But just as I am ready to accept any sanction, I request that they await my arrival, rather than be led to disaster by traitors.'25 The demonstration in favour of the company's plans and the systematic press campaign around the issue served to justify the Supreme Resolution of 5 September 1947 which entirely accepted the company's point of view. 'The Executive declares the conflict which has arisen between the workers of Catavi, Llallagua and Siglo XX and Patino Mines Enterprises to be terminated owing to the capitulation of the workers, since their request for the dismissal of the workforce has been accepted and will be carried out on the lines agreed to by the Supreme Government.' This document bore the signatures of the PIR's Ministers and presumably it was drawn up by Alfredo Mendizabal. The political bureau of the PIR met immediately and declared its opposition to the measure, insisting on the resignation of Mendizabal and Henrich from the cabinet. The PIR deputies were subsequently extremely anxious to obliterate the memory of their direct role in the Masacre Blanca and to prevent their Marxist enemies from gaining popularity as a result of it. Years later, at its sixth congress in 1956, the PIR admitted that the Supreme Resolution of 5 September 1947 had been a blow to the party's political future, despite all the efforts made to disclaim responsibility for it. The congress did not, however, consider that the measure was as bad as opponents of the National Unity cabinet had tried to claim. In defence of this view it argued '(a) that this resolution did not authorise a general dismissal but the retirement of workers who wished to go after receiving their redundancy pay. (b) Many Catavi union leaders asked to be dismissed and received bonuses for this, (c) The dismissals were demanded by a considerable majority of workers, (d) In 1945 . . . similar dismissals were authorised in Huanuni.' The congress also maintained that the PIR could not be held responsible for signing the Resolution, since its political bureau had explicitly 'declared itself against it. The Resolution was the responsibility of only two members of the PIR who, in their capacity as Ministers, disobeyed the instructions of the party.' 26 However these two members were not expelled from the PIR during its fourth congress in October 1947, a fact which the sixth congress attempted to explain. The labour organisations and the POR opposed the National Unity Cabinet's prostration before the interests of the imperialist companies and called for a general strike. The Executive's first reaction was to freeze the union's bank accounts and harrass the union leaders. Then on 18 September a state of siege was declared throughout the country on the grounds that

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'the government is in possession of sufficient evidence to prove that agitators and subversive elements are planning to unleash a bloody civil war'. President Hertzog (whose democratic principles have bever been questioned, according to his supporters) explained his attitude in a message dated 19 September 1947: The social unrest provoked and directed by Villarroel's supporters has led the country to the paradoxical situation where a dozen irresponsible individuals, who call themselves union leaders and whose minds are poisoned by the worst kind of revolutionary Marxist ideas, long since abandoned everywhere else . . . are trying to make themselves masters of Bolivia, speaking in the name of the proletariat about whose needs and sensibilities they know nothing. The Thesis of Pulacayo is just a conglomeration of second-hand, outdated phrases, endlessly repeated: 'direct action of the masses', 'class struggle at all costs', 'dictatorship of the proletariat', 'confiscation of the mines and private property'. . . This document is an insult to common sense and in any civilised country would be regarded as a crime against the social order, the authors having put themselves beyond the law as enemies of the community . . . In the last few days they have been provoking a revolutionary general strike, protected by parliamentary immunity of which they have made a mockery. Their criminal abuse must be stopped. The slogans of social revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat chanted by these false apostles of the labour movement are a technique to conceal their lust for power and positions of command, their wish to pillage the wealth of the nation and their urge for revenge, born from their sense of inferiority and hatred for everything that is superior, honourable and strong in the social life of the country. It certainly will not be the proletariat which takes command of the state, but those selfproclaimed leaders, who are not members of the proletariat nor even workers of any description, and who have never known the satisfaction of achieving anything through their own hard work, whether physical or mental. They are parasites, both biologically and intellectually, and the general strike they have called is merely a manoeuvre to cover up the fact that they have been embezzling union funds.27 Time magazine summarised the outcome of the conflict as follows: 'For his part, tin baron Antenor Patino was fully content. His plan was working. When he recontracted his miners, he would only employ non-unionised labour, those who were not "agitators". This would break the National Federation of Tin Miners.'28 In response, a Comite de Coordination de Trabajadores de Bolivia had

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been set up, made up of all the labour federations, including the CSTB and the FOS, to act as a real centralised national organisation. The organisation attacked the Supreme Resolutions of 5 and 6 September, thereby completely breaking off relations between the labour movement and Hertzog's oligarchic government. The congress of Telemayu (1948) Following these setbacks differences appeared within both the union leadership and the BMP, reflecting the controversy between the PORistas and Lechin. At the time, as we have seen the unions had been defeated in disputes at San Jose, Oploca, Catavi and Viloco, and the strike at Colquiri had been crushed, events which, taken together, represented a nation-wide defeat for the labour movement. I and three other members of the BMP analysed these questions in a letter to the rest of the Bloque on 26 October 1947, as follows: . . . Evidently we face a crisis of union leadership which reflects the setbacks suffered by the labour movement. The leaders have proved unable to make themselves revolutionaries, and their radical stance is merely a tactical response to the pressures from the rank and file . . . Within the BMP and FSTMB there have always been two distinct tendencies, one of which has temporarily bowed its head before the revolutionary leaders, thus creating a spurious impression of political unity .. . One of these tendencies is identified with revolutionary Marxism, that is to say with Bolshevism, and is expressed at the union level in the Thesis of Pulacayo. This tendency prevailed from the congress of Pulacayo to the congress of Colquiri; it was the official spokesman of the labour movement, under pressure from the rank and file, everyone expressed allegiance, albeit reluctantly in some cases. It fought to carry out the decisions of the FSTMB congresses and argued that if the leadership abandoned its political principles it would be exposed as traitors. The other tendency is frankly opportunist, and according to circumstances it changes its colour from the brightest red to the darkest blue. The members of this group almost all come from the MNR and they have failed to overcome the prejudice and opportunism acquired in that party. When the labour movement experienced a period of revolutionary enthusiasm they posed as ardent defenders of the Thesis of Pulacayo, but now they say that this document should be shelved for the time being, in order to work with moderation in accordance with the circum-

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stances of the moment. . . These members or sympathisers of the MNR regard their stated aims as a scholastic matter; they talk revolutionary language, but they take reactionary decisions. For them the issue is not, it seems, one of policies, but merely who shall occupy the positions of leadership. Influenced by the propaganda of the press, which is in the service of the large mineowners, this faction is manoeuvring, with a considerable amount of personal intrigue, to replace the leader of the BMP. What do they hope to achieve by this? To introduce reactionary tendencies into the parliamentary activities of the BMP, whilst sheltering behind our revolutionary prestige?29 The fifth congress of the FSTMB began on 13 June 1948 at Telemayu. It was the scene of a bitter dispute between the Trotskyists, particularly myself, and Lechin's group, which had reached a secret agreement with the PURS Minister of Labour, Ernesto Monasterios, to purge the intransigent revolutionary elements from the FSTMB. At the congress of Telemayu an attempt was also made to revise the FSTMB programme. The Trotskyists had to face not merely the supporters of Lechin and of the government but also the Falangistas (FSB), who had suddenly begun to organise among the miners. All these groups took up anti-POR positions. From this time onwards, Lechin did his utmost to eradicate the influence of the Trotskyists in the mines. He had reached an agreement with members of the FSB and arranged for a group of them to go to Siglo XX under the leadership of Gustavo Stumpf in order to combat the POR from within the labour movement (an unsuccessful effort). At the opening session of the congress the Minister of Labour was heckled when he declared that It is false and anachronistic to portray the state as the enemy of the working class and the unconditional ally of capitalist forces. Through its structural and political evolution the state has ceased to be a means of oppression at the exclusive service of one class. The working classes should form a united democratic front against those local Nazi-Fascist elements who are trying to regain the power which was taken from them by a rising of the people. The workers should also expel from their ranks anyone who treacherously tried to infiltrate the labour movement to distort its purposes, and they should combat the false doctrines of pro-soviet communism or of trotskyism. Early on in the congress various top leaders of the FSTMB spoke out against the Thesis of Pulacayo which they had publicly defended in the past. Now they thought the moment had come to abandon its revolutionary line and reach an agreement with the government. For example: 'ABEL MEALLA (FSTMB): I too consider that the Thesis of Pulacayo needs revision, and support the motion to this effect . . . When the mem-

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bers of the BMP say they are acting according to the postulates of the Thesis of Pulacayo, we must recognise what they really mean is that the thesis is used to shelter the vanguard of a political party, the POR . . . The thesis is used by the Fourth International.' Not even Lechin (later attributed authorship of the Thesis of Pulacayo by his adulators) hesitated to come down publicly on the side of the revisionists, who were acting according to the wishes of Hertzog's oligarchic government. He said: 'I go along with the feeling of the majority of the delegates who wish to see the Thesis of Pulacayo revised, and I propose we set up a commission to this end. The commission should be asked to revise the document as quickly as possible, since the present situation cannot go on any longer.'30 The Trotskyists were not opposed to further discussions of the FSTMB programme, with the proviso that the local unions must be consulted. Now that the Lechinists had gone over to the enemy, this was the only way to resist the government's manoeuvres. Thus the congress agreed unanimously to revise the thesis. In practice, however, this was never done, because of the laziness of the right wing. They felt they had done their duty merely by public endorsement of the position favoured by the Ministry of Labour. The fall of President Hertzog

Both President Hertzog and the mining companies supposed that the labour movement would be unable to reorganise itself after the Masacre Blanca at Catavi but events proved them wrong. An alternative view prevailed among the Marxists, namely that the government's drastic measures would have only a temporary effect on the labour movement, which would soon return to the attack. This analysis considered that once the 'democratic constitutionalist government had exhausted all possible political manoeuvres, the revival of the labour movement would drive the regime to resort to violent methods of destroying the unions.' President Hertzog nailed his flag to the mast with his famous phrase 'My government will not be stained with blood'; but of course the predictions of the left referred to the regime in general, rather than any particular, replaceable individual. Contrary to the employers' expectations, strong, determined unions were secretly reorganised in Siglo XX, Catavi, Huanuni and Viloco, defying all the obstacles presented by the companies and the government. One such hurdle was the surrounding of the most important mining centres by the armed forces and police to prevent 'extremist' leaders from infiltrating the camps and, as the press put it, spreading their malevolent influence among the workers.

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The mining superstate urged President Hertzog to apply severe measures against these revived workers' organisations. The Patiiio company pressed Hertzog to break up the union movement by means of violence, but the President maintained the illusion that he could avoid staining his regime with blood. His last card was to try to divide the revolutionary unions, especially the FSTMB, backing an attempt by the so-called 'free' unions to bury the Thesis of Pulacayo. Tristan Marof was the President's private secretary at this time, and his followers were used to divide the labour movement. But this effort to split the unions was one of the failures of the government's 'pacifist' policy, the immediate result of which was to strengthen and unify the unions around the FSTMB. So eventually, following a government setback in mid-term parliamentary elections, on 7 May 1949, Hertzog summoned 'the honourable presidents of the legislative chambers, the ministers of state and the leaders of the democratic parties... and in their presence asked the Vice-President of the Republic, Mamerto Urriolagoitia, to assume the position of interim head of state'. This apparently trivial change of personnel actually signified an important change of policy on the part of the Executive, above all with reference to the labour movement. The crucial fact was that the mining companies were determined to crush worker resistance by a policy of violence. It was of little importance which politician carried out this policy and, for his part, Urriolagoitia was ready to go down in history as the author of some of Bolivia's bloodiest massacres. Hertzog tried to excuse his resignation on the grounds of ill-health. The fact is, however, that he had sufficient time and strength to write a 40-page message to parliament, and that the PURS proposed to make him their leader, something they would hardly have done if he had really been a sick man. Hertzog was taken off to Chulumani, more as a prisoner of the large mineowners than as an invalid, to avert the possibility that his presence in La Paz might create problems for the Executive's new violent strategy for repressing the miners. Soon the press, the PURS and Hertzog himself realised exactly what had happened. Hertzog had been replaced by Urriolagoitia for strictly political reasons. ElDiario, for example, commented that Hertzog 'was in undisguised detention' in Chulumani. In confirmation of this, in March 1950, the ex-President finally wrote a violent, revealing letter to the then leader of the PURS, Edmundo Vasquez: Doctor Vasquez, Do you believe that the government should immediately resort to the use of violence as soon as the workers present their demands? I have never seen this as a solution . . . It is very easy to criticise and attack

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people but, burdened with the responsibility of maintaining order as I was, the first priority was to avoid useless bloodshed, which, experience shows, may have very far-reaching consequences . .. Didn't I have the Catavi union leaders responsible for the attacks on radio Sucre arrested and sent to the courts, who then ordered their release? Weren't dozens of agitators justly expelled at one time or another from that mining camp? . . . In September 1947, when the workers were dismissed with compensation, didn't my government do everything it legally could to help the company to get rid of them? What did you want done at that time, Doctor Vasquez? What happened at the end of May was the result of bloody events, and the outbreak of a revolutionary strike. But under any other conditions we would have had to be insane to shoot and kill . . . I had only intended to discuss the matter generally, but there is one small detail I must refer to briefly. I was not permitted to return to my post during that crisis (May 1949). All sorts of arguments and reasons were put to me urging that I must not obstruct their plans and I had to accede . . . Therefore, it did not fall to me to be present during those events, but God knows that it was not because I was unwilling, and He knows that, despite my weak state, I would have found the strength to fulfil my duty as I have always done.31 The massacre of Siglo XX

With Hertzog out of the way, the government could change its tactics towards the labour movement. In May 1949 it sought another violent clash with the miners, so that the FSTMB could be broken by a show of force. In Siglo XX, important leaders of the Federation and of the local organisations (including Torres, Guarachi and myself) were arrested by the police. Similar operations took place simultaneously in other areas of the country; Lechin was arrested in Oruro. A precise account of the events can be found in two of my earlier works.32 They show that at approximately 10 a.m. on Saturday 28 May the leaders of the FSTMB were called to the telegraph office in Catavi to communicate with the Minister of Labour. An official van was placed at our disposal and Torres, Capellino, Toranzo, Guarachi, the Secretary General of the Catavi union, and myself set off. When we arrived at the junction of the Uncia and Catavi roads, about 2 kilometres from Llallagua, we were intercepted by about a hundred policemen who had earlier taken up positions in the rugged terrain. For about half an hour we tried to resist arrest, but the soldiers eventually overpowered us and put us onto a lorry belonging to the Patirio company. The lorry sped off to Oruro with the five prisoners aboard, guarded by thirty heavily-armed

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policemen and escorted by two vans full of officers. In Oruro we attempted to escape but failed, and were detained at the local police station and subsequently deported to Chile. The arrest of the union leaders in Llallagua was part of a nationwide roundup of union leaders and radical politicians, in an attempt to decapitate the increasingly threatening left-wing opposition. Such a decisive step could only have been agreed on by a cabinet meeting. Within a quarter of an hour of the arrests the news was circulating rapidly round Siglo XX, Catavi and Llallagua. The instinctive reaction of the workers was to call an immediate walkout. The middle-level union leaders, anxious that the rank and file should not get out of control, called an assembly at which 400 or 500 people approved a call for a general strike and demanded the release of the FSTMB's leaders. Some of the labour leaders, in their search for a way out of the chaotic situation, even proposed that the strike should turn into an occupation of the mine. Without anyone realising where it originated, the miners struck upon the idea of taking some of the management staff of the company as hostages, until the prisoners were released. The idea was taken up enthusiastically and, since the rank and file workers with their simple, direct approach identified the foreign managerial staff as their oppressors, it was these who were taken as hostages. The operation was carried out so swiftly that the troops did not have time to enforce order and protect the company's managers. Documents found later in the Patirio offices give a report of the speeches broadcast on the miners' radio: Brothers . . . we are once again on the verge of a massacre. They have arrested our most important leaders, Lechin, Lora, Toranzo and others . . . The soldiers are now taking up their positions before us. We request the assistance of all our comrades, because the government and the company are once again preparing to kill our fellow workers, our wives and children . . . We have captured 33 gringos as hostages and we will hold them until our leaders are returned; if they do not return, the gringos will pay for this new crime of the government with their lives. The news that North American hostages had been taken and that some of them had died was anxiously taken up by the teleprinters and it was soon plastered over the front pages of newspapers all over the world. All the mass media and many governments, including some which called themselves socialist, published diatribes against the 'savage' (the word was continually repeated and stressed) Bolivian miners. A colonialist mentality prevails even when it comes to judging the value of human lives. We are faced on the one hand with the assassination of some 200 or 300 workers (the government said 144 died and 23 were wounded) and on the other with

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the death of two foreign technicians and one Bolivian employee of the Patirio company. The miners have always maintained that the hostages were killed by soldiers, and this version is the more plausible. Looked at in historical perspective the hundreds of worker victims must not be forgotten in the concern over three hostages who died in the union offices. The workers managed to seize the police barracks at Siglo XX and then set off towards Llallagua to take over the local administration offices, but the Colorado regiment sent a detachment to reinforce the post. From time to time, Bolivian and also North-American planes flew over the camp, so that people soon feared that it would be bombarded. On instructions from Catavi, the soldiers withdrew to the crossroads. It seems that when the news was received about the death of the hostages, the soldiers were ordered to march on Llallagua again, but this time they met fierce resistance from the workers' pickets, who used slings to hurl sticks of lighted dynamite at them. As one officer recalls: We had to spread out along the ridge which separates the two encampments and put out the lights near our positions so that we would not be located. But the miners from Llallagua who followed us from behind took advantage of the darkness to surprise and disarm the isolated posts. We reacted to this danger by ordering the troops to capture or kill the marauders. Those from Llallagua were silenced once and for all.33 Machine-gun fire rattled against the zinc roofs, but the soldiers had to change their positions continually to avoid being located. The workers showed that (thanks to their unlimited initiative, their great mobility and their skill in handling arms and dynamite) they were capable of neutralising and even defeating the regular troops. Nevertheless, they were only fighting to repel the immediate threat from the army. They did not have the will to sustain a long systematic struggle, and nor did they have sufficient ammunition or arms. Above all, they lacked leadership, and were not organised for such an eventuality. The Catavi—Siglo XX area had been declared an emergency zone and put under military command, and the real authority in the area was the colonel in charge. Both the sub-prefect of the province and the Labour Inspector had sold out completely to the Patino company and the army hierarchy. Things had always been like this. The big mining companies gave the orders and the generals and colonels obeyed, and most got some personal advantage for doing so. From past experience the Patiho company knew how to persuade the military that the defence of its own rights and privileges was identified with the defence of their own personal interests. The 'defenders of public order' had good reasons for placing their arms at the disposition of the company.

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The Patino company gave a monthly subsidy of 700 pesos to all single officers and 1,500 pesos to married ones. Furthermore, we received a carton of Derby cigarettes a week, free entrance to all the cinemas, and the company stores provided us with the same services as the company management . .. The soldiers received three pesos a day in provisions, two tickets a week to the cinemas and a packet of cigarettes. With the money our regiment saved we built living-accommodation for the officers, which still exists in Potosi. The officers of the Ingavi regiment were given a saddle-horse and an Argentine horse. Economically our officers were doing as well as Mr Deringer, the manager of the company. The police who covered Siglo XX, Llallagua and Uncia were paid bonuses and the chief civil authorities received a free car, house and food.34 The massacre of May 1949 and the strike that followed interrupted the course of development of the political struggles within the BMP. There is no doubt that the conflict was leading up to a split and that sooner or later it would have been reflected in a fight for the control of local union organisations, but when the government repression intensified, and the masses were once again threatened with a massacre, it became necessary for the BMP to turn all its attention to providing them with leadership. The members of parliament took up their positions in the front line, and ended up acting as the de facto directorate of the FSTMB. The involvement of the BMP's leading members in such political and trade-union activities, and particularly in the strike which began on 28 May 1949, was more than Bolivia's limited democracy could tolerate. The time had come for the BMP to be completely crushed by the majority in parliament, which included various self-styled 'Marxists'. At the end of July 1949 criminal proceedings were taken against the BMP members of parliament and some well-known leaders of the MNR. On 3 August the prosecutor, Belisario Illanes, asked the Minister of Government, Alfredo Mollinedo, to secure their expulsion from parliament and withdraw their parliamentary immunity. They were accused of causing social disturbances, and the death of the hostages at Siglo XX. The Chamber of Deputies should not extend its immunity to these crimes. It is a moral, legal and constitutional duty to hand those responsible over to be judged according to the law of the land . . . Nor should immunity be extended to professional agitators by the Honourable Congress... for these wrong-doers are prostituting the trade-union movement and turning it into a political party of a perverse nature, encouraging the class struggle and the appropriation of public and private wealth.35

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The workers in the revolutionary struggle (1946-52)

The trial dragged on throughout 1950. The FSTMB's main leaders remained in Chile (with the exception of myself)-1 returned to La Paz and was arrested. Sentence was finally passed in January 1951. Four local trade unionists from Siglo XX were sentenced to death, another four were given ten-year sentences, and a further eight were jailed for six to eight months. Although Lechin and I were among those accused, we were not sentenced. In fact, I was not even allowed to appear at the trial. None of the four sentenced to death were in fact executed, and they were released from jail in the revolution of April 1952. Thumbnail sketches of the four who were singled out for trial and condemned to death may throw light on the claims of the judge to be a man of law, and on the true posture of a government which called itself democratic. Juan Chumacero Poveda (who was 30 years old, and married with two children when he was sentenced) was born in Colquechaca and was of peasant origin. He became a bricklayer to avoid working down the mine, but in the mining centres the choice is usually between becoming a miner or facing unemployment. Chumacero's dedicated support for the trade union movement was based more on instinct than on political theories. Because of his innate talents as an agitator and his untiring trade union activities he obtained a position in the union leadership, and when the tragic events occurred in May 1949 he was its financial secretary. But he never had the opportunity to give coherence to his enthusiasm through political education. He cannot be regarded as a top-ranking leader but rather as an extremely enthusiastic militant (and thus he was capable of reaching the most backward sectors of the working class). He was a born orator and had a perfect knowledge of Quechua and knew how to make an emotional and convincing speech. For him, as for many other labour leaders, the 1952 revolution meant the end of his activities among the workers. He later went out into the rural areas of Chuquisaca as a peasant leader. There, he was tragically assassinated.36 Lucas Oxa Choque (then a married man of forty) was a peasant from Huari and worked as an unskilled worker down the mines. He had little education. Before May he had shown little interest in labour activities, but the strike brought out his qualities as a leader. He distinguished himself on 28 and 29 May by his enthusiasm and drive. He escaped from jail after being imprisoned for more than a year. After 1952 he was re-employed by the Catavi Mining Company. He is now an old man and I have seen him occupied in his menial job. An anonymous hero forgotten by almost all those around him, he remains proud of his past. Manuel Rocha Ajata (then 25 and married) was born in the barren

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The workers become revolutionary

Carangas area and left peasant life in the hope of finding better conditions. He was an unskilled worker and played no part in union activities. The police brutally tortured him to make him sign false declarations, and he eventually gave way fearing that all was lost. One of the documents drawn up by the authorities and the companies reads: 'Armed with a revolver, Juan Chumacero forced me to throw lighted sticks of dynamite from the window.' The police had promised to release those who compromised the union leaders, but this promise was not kept in Rocha's case. Rocha had little or no education and was unable to see the real implication of what was happening at the Uncia trials. He saw himself as the victim of a monstrous apparatus manipulated by alien forces. He searched round desperately for any way of escape. He in fact had played no part in the May events, and has since disappeared from history without leaving the slightest trace. Primitivo Martinez was the fourth person sentenced to death; but four people of this name worked in the Patino company. To which one did the sentence apply? For the Judge this was a minor detail, of little importance. No evidence was produced at the trial to prove that these four had killed the hostages, yet the judge considered that they were responsible for the alleged crimes. The whole trial was a travesty of justice. Sixth FSTMB congress

On 2 June 1950 the FSTMB issued a communique, signed by Grover Araujo, suspending the sixth FSTMB congress (which had been arranged for 6 June) since the government had refused to grant the workers guarantees. At the end of October 1950 a delegation from the Federation (Araujo, Luna and Miguel Burke) went to see the Minister of Labour, Roberto Perez Paton, to ask him for guarantees and facilities to hold the congress. Before he would grant them official approval the Minister demanded 'that the sixth congress reaches a decision as to whether or not the Thesis of Pulacayo is still in force. The Thesis has provoked public opinion to reactions hostile to the workers because it is a communist document, the principal objective of which is the abolition of private property, and it advocates direct action by the masses and a revolutionary strike to achieve this purpose and to take power.'37 The deputation got round this by implying that they would accept the government's conditions and by promising to include on the agenda the replacement of the Thesis of Pulacayo by a 'democratic' document. Meanwhile the government was very busy trying to divide the unions. A branch of the ORIT, the CTB, was already functioning in Bolivia, and

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The workers in the revolutionary struggle (1946-52)

yellow unions were being set up. The government's activity was obviously producing results, since some areas refused to send delegates to the FSTMB congress. Nevertheless the sixth congress opened on 9 November at the mine of Milluni, near La Paz. The Minister of Labour made a speech which was a direct attack on the Federation's traditional position: The miners are at last free of those unhealthy influences which have given rise to such painful experiences and so many disappointments, influences which promoted an atmosphere of general distrust, making the workers seem recalcitrant extremists and enemies of public peace. Now they can speak for their own interests without outside interference. They can proclaim their inherent rights and demand the compensation which is legitimately due to them in exchange for their efforts in the production of wealth for the community . . . However, the middle-level trade union leaders, representing the outlook of the rank and file, showed they were still determined to fight against the government's offensive and to defend the ideological position and the social gains they had established in the past: CALVETTI (Pulacayo): We should call for a determined struggle on behalf of the union leaders and for the strengthening of the FSTMB. FELIPE BERNAL (Chojilla): The government should respect the General Labour Law, the Constitution and the laws guaranteeing trade union immunity. It should abolish the black-lists, which have put hundreds of workers out of work, and the 'concentration camps' which have been established in many mining districts.38 Some government supporters tried to substitute a document written in the Ministry of Labour for the Thesis of Pulacayo, but the congress ratified the Thesis as the FSTMB's programme and rejected the 'Antithesis of Pulacayo'. This was a serious setback for the revisionists. Among the resolutions passed at the congress were ones calling for a general amnesty and the return of exiled trade union leaders, another instructing local unions to draw up a petition of demands based on the needs of their districts, and a further one requesting the support of all labour organisations in the country for the struggle initiated by the FSTMB. Lechin and Torres were once again appointed to the leading posts in the Federation. Deteriorating living-standards and working-conditions combined with the government's repressive measures, especially the black-list system, had evidently radicalised the workers and convinced them that the government was their worst enemy. During the whole of this period mass political activity was centred on the Miners' Federation. The various attempts to set up a new central labour organisation (by this time the CSTB was nothing more than a bureaucratic team at the service of the reactionary govern-

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ment) all started with the miners. Both the MNR and the POR were in opposition to the government, and at the union level there were frequent tacit agreements between the two political organisations. But despite their radicalism and their militancy most workers, and especially most miners, rallied to the leadership offered by the petty-bourgeois MNR, a party which only reluctantly expressed Marxist ideas, in preference to the POR. This occurred because organised labour held the large mining companies responsible for the government which had come to power after 21 July 1946. It followed almost automatically that Villarroel was now seen as a paradigm of proletarian radicalism and the defender of the workers' interests. Villarroelism became synonymous with the MNR, and the MNR found itself obliged to take up the name of the President who had, in fact been betrayed by the party's leadership in July 1946 and whose wish to detach himself from the manifestly disloyal Paz Estenssoro had hardly been a secret. Among the workers, especially the miners, the name of Villarroel was used demagogically as the symbol of the workers' profoundest aspirations, and no attempt was made to point out the differences between Villarroel and the MNR. The MNR leadership confused the situation even more with its hysterical and misleading anti-imperialist campaigns. To a certain extent the MNR's numerical strength was a product of its confusion, made possible by the party's lack of a clearly-defined ideological position. Only by experiencing the weaknesses and limitations of a second MNR regime were the workers able to transcend the MNR and the myth of Villarroel. The propaganda of the Marxist groups and parties played only a secondary, though by no means insignificant, role in this process. The POR at this time existed more as a set of ideas than as a tightly-knit organisation. Everything the POR did contributed to the numerical, though not the political, strengthening of the MNR. A superficial analysis of this situation has led some observers to the conclusion that the Thesis of Pulacayo made possible the triumph of the MNR in 1952, so that the efforts of the Trotskyists were, from the party's point of view, wasted. However, our work did in fact have enormous importance, for it enabled PORista ideology to penetrate the social and intellectual life of the country to the extent-that after the insurrection of April 1952 (which brought the MNR back to office and Paz Estenssoro to the Presidency) the ideas contained in the Pulacayo Thesis became the predominant political tendency.

Book 7:

The rise and fall of the Central Obrera Boliviana 18. The COB and the revolution (1952-6) Antecedents Both in terms of organisation and of ideology the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) is the highest achievement so-far of the Bolivian labour movement. If the workers ever really had a revolutionary leadership, it was the COB. Many people have regarded the formation of the COB as unanticipated, as merely a product of the 1952 revolution or a creation of the MNR. But in fact it was the culmination of the whole history of the labour movement, an expression of its rich experience and of the level of development of its class consciousness. Equally there can be no doubt that the COB was the product of intense and persistent campaigning within the labour organisations by political parties. Following the revolution of 9 April 1952, the COB became the most important political force in the country, and the struggle for the control of the country centred around it. This fact confirms the importance of the proletariat, especially the miners, in the revolutionary process. From the 1920s onwards, the main preoccupation of the unions had been to set up a national labour organisation. Various attempts to do this had failed but, as we have seen, the various national workers' congresses did adopt truly revolutionary programmes which were intended to provide a basis for labour unity. The pre-Chaco-War experiment had a certain degree of success but it could not withstand the sharp conflicts between the anarchists and the marxists. Every attempt at unity and cooperation between the two conflicting forces was short-lived, and plagued with difficulties and misunderstandings. The defeat of the anarchists enabled the workers to unite briefly around the CSTB, which depicted itself as a revolutionary organisation, the heir of everything positive that had been done before. But eventually the CSTB was defeated by developments within the 277

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The rise and fall of the COB

labour movement itself, developments to which it was unable to adapt either organisationally or ideologically owing to the stultifying control of the PIR, a party which invariably compromised with reactionary forces. The CSTB was the last artisan-based confederation, and this to some extent accounts for its structure and ideological orientation. Its leaders believed that the proletarian sectors of the labour movement must follow the leadership of the artisans (the fact that the vote of affiliated organisations was not weighted in accordance with their membership automatically gave the artisans undue representation). This outlook reflected some of the conservative traditions of the Bolivian labour movement. Many of the early labour leaders acquired their political training from the old leftwing parties and regarded themselves as something of a labour intelligentsia. The CSTB's structure and political line became increasingly divorced from the working class as it developed, during the thirties and forties. Not merely had the proletariat grown in size as a result of the rise of factorybased industry in La Paz1 and the expansion of the construction industry, but it had also undergone a transformation of outlook. The struggle for economic improvements had increasingly made the proletariat more politically aware as well, and from this had sprung an independent, classbased, political outlook, with a revolutionary orientation. One result of these processes was the creation of the vertically-organised labour federations, based on a single industry, in place of the all-inclusive local organisations, like the FOS. The CSTB, far from welcoming these new vertical organisations, opposed them, and the Stalinists launched a desperate campaign for unity around their own discredited banner. In an attempt to win over the miners to the declining CSTB, they relied on the PIRista leaders of the railway workers, amongst whom they still enjoyed some prestige. It was not merely a matter of simple union differences, of clashes between ambitious leaders, or disputes of that kind. In reality there were political differences intermingled with the union conflicts which gradually became more important until they determined the direction in which the labour movement would develop. Two relatively new parties, the POR and the MNR, attacked the Stalinists head-on and campaigned for a new way of securing a united labour movement: by the formation of a central labour organisation which would be led by the proletariat and based on genuine revolutionary principles. But the unions had to learn from experience and overcome various deficiencies before this programme could be fulfilled. The alliance formed between the FSTMB and the POR in 1946 was one of the factors which contributed to the creation of the Central Obrera Nacional (CON), the most serious attempt to replace the CSTB with a national proletarian organisation before 1952.

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The COB and the revolution (1952- 6)

On 11 December 1946, that is to say almost immediately after the congress of Pulacayo, the FSTMB met with representatives of the federation of flour-mill workers, the national federation of printing workers and the factory workers' union of Oruro, to discuss the setting up of the CON. These organisations agreed to put the proposal to their local unions and to prepare for a national workers' congress, at which the delegates would be elected on a proportional basis, so that the miners would have a decisive vote within the CON. In its first manifesto the CON pronounced its opposition to 'those who claim to be pro-labour and yet make pacts with the rosca thereby betraying the oppressed classes', and denied the allegation of the government and the PIR that the CON was a fascist-dominated organisation.2 As for the CSTB, the manifesto declared that it was controlled by 'a political party which is unconditionally at the service of the rosca. The Bolivian proletariat, therefore, will have nothing to do with the CSTB, a rotting corpse which is only propped up because the bourgeoisie fears to stand alone against a rising labour movement committed to the final destruction of capitalism and its lackeys.' This aggressive attitude lost the CON many supporters, since many workers preferred to stay on the sidelines waiting for the outcome of the dispute. The moment to bury the CSTB had not yet arrived. From its foundation the CON was composed of the most modern sectors of the proletariat. The CON was certainly one hundred per cent revolutionary, and its organisation was modelled on that of the FSTMB, while its aims were those set out in the thesis of Pulacayo. Given the circumstances prevailing in the country at the time, this revolutionary puritanism carried with it the implicit risk of sectarianism. In accordance with the hallowed tradition of the Bolivian labour movement (a tradition that would soon be taken up by the COB), the CON began to organise peasants into unions, which were enlisted into the Central. An impressive campaign was launched, denouncing the landlords and linking the peasantry to the broader struggle against the rosca, the CSTB and Stalinism. This campaign was conducted through leaflets and the pages of Lucha Obrera (the PORista newspaper) which enthusiastically supported the new organisation. For example, in January 1947 a peasants' protest was violently repressed in a remote corner of the Altiplano, at Topohoco in the department of La Paz. It was a repetition of the usual experience: whenever the peasants attempted to unionise and resist the abuses of the landowners and the local authorities, they were violently and mercilessly crushed. Among the victims of the repression were members of the anarchist FOL, which had been organising in that part of the country-

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The rise and fall of the COB

side. The CON issued a statement which said: The demands of the workers and peasants have always been met by the lethal gunfire of our uniformed oppressors.. . and this time in Topohoco it is the rosca—?lR alliance in connivance with the CSTB that is responsible.' It added that the CSTB's silence over the killings was motivated by the need to protect the PIRista ministers, Alcoba and Bilbao la Vieja. The causes of the massacre were the peasants' attempt to construct schools, 'a clarion call of the peasant awakening', and form unions, 'which will destroy once and for all the regime of slavery in which millions of peasants are exploited to the benefit of the large landowners'. The landowners were organised into the Sociedad Rural Boliviana, which had asked the government to put down, with violence if necessary, the rebellions that had broken out across the countryside. The commander of the Oruro military region, Colonel Jorge Blacutt, accused the FSTMB of 'instigating the Indian movements'. The secretary-general of the FSTMB was quick to write correcting this impression. The POR, however, made no secret of its activities. In Lucha Obrera of 23 March 1947 a bilingual (Spanish and Aymara) article appeared inciting the peasants to organise unions and affiliate to the CON 'in order to break the chains of pongueaje, there is no alternative but to organise ourselves, like our brother workers, in unions . . . Fight, Indian brothers, by organising unions! In every hacienda, in every ayllu, a powerful, disciplined union should be formed. Let us imitate the example of our brothers in Cinti and elsewhere who have already organised unions and now form part of the powerful CON.' The unionisation of peasants started in areas which were traditionally the most rebellious and where the miners' unions obviously had influence (areas around Potosi and Colquiri, for example). The CON had an immediate impact because of the widespread appeal of the Thesis of Pulacayo, and because since the coup of July 1946 workingclass opinion had been considerably radicalised. But the CON failed to destroy entirely the influence of the CSTB in the labour movement because it was unable to win the support of national organisations of factory and railway workers; the PIR was still very strong among the latter. The small size of the CON executive is another indication of the limits to the CON's development. The executive consisted of Nelson Capellino, secretary general; Jose Mario Zapata, secretary of relations; and Miguel Alandia, secretary of union organisation. These men were later to re-appear as the driving forces behind the COB. The organisation of the COB

The tremendous social upheaval of 9 April 1952 was the final development

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The COB and the revolution (1952- 6)

which made possible the organisation of the COB as an effective national labour confederation controlled by the proletariat. The COB was a revival of the CON, both in terms of its ideology and its personnel, and like its predecessor it was organised by the FSTMB (on the basis of the experience accumulated during the sexenio). Having defeated the rosca, the victorious workers also crushed the Stalinist CSTB which dissolved itself almost unnoticed. The COB was organised almost automatically on 17 April 1952. The inaugural session was convened by Juan Lechin and German Butr6n, who were at the time Ministers of Mines and Labour respectively. Miguel Alandia, Edwin Moller and Jose Zegada, who through their tenacity had come to hold very important places in the labour movement, were responsible for the behind-the-scenes organisation.3 The first executive committee included Juan Lechin as executive secretary, German Butron as secretary general, and Mario Torres as secretary of relations. The committee was made up of representatives of the Marxist parties (the Communist Party, created in 1950, and the POR) and of the MNR. At the time an extremely broad democracy existed in the labour movement; all different tendencies, whether political or otherwise, were able to express themselves freely, and the will of the majority prevailed without any kind of interference. In the social disintegration and chaos which followed 9 April, the COB emerged as the focus around which the workers could organise. It was the only body with the cohesion to point out a direction, not merely discussing, but legislating and seeing that its instructions were implemented. The COB was the master of the country, and indeed for a certain period it was the only centre of power worthy of the name. Lechin (who had helped organise and lead the insurrection in La Paz) was seen as incarnating the radicalism of the masses and his influence grew out of all proportion; his authority became complete and unquestioned. His strength derived from a powerful groundswell of mass sentiments fully expressing this historic moment, the product of a spontaneous surge of popular feeling. His tremendous weaknesses only became evident later. At the beginning the POR clearly prevailed in the COB, both because of the proportion of its leaders who were PORistas or members of the Trotsky ist faction of the MNR, and because the ideology of the Fourth International was widely accepted by those who had made the April revolution. There were very few Stalinists in the COB, and they represented mainly petty-bourgeois organisations such as the students and the teachers. Only later did Lechin artificially inflate the number of his supporters, in order to combat and neutralise the Trotskyists. The COB's May Day manifesto, drawn up in the midst of a revolutionary euphoria, expressed the basic ideas of the Trotskyists: the immediate

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The rise and fall of the COB

nationalisation of the mines under workers control; an agrarian revolution through the transfer of the land from the latifundistas directly to the peasant sindicatos (the Stalinists merely talked about agrarian reform, and produced an indigestible concoction of writings by Mao-Tse Tung about 'rich and poor peasants'); the introduction of universal suffrage and full citizenship for illiterates; the dissolution of the army and its replacement by armed peasant and workers' militias. With the announcement of this programme the stage was set for the approaching conflict between the MNR government and the rival power represented by the organised workers. An outline of the COB's first programme of principles was published at the end of 1952. It was drawn up on the lines of the Thesis of Pulacayo and embodied the theory of permanent revolution. It argued that the Bolivian proletariat was the most recently formed in Latin America but that it was also 'politically the most advanced and militant. Its high level of class consciousness has transcended the level of mere economist reformist conciliatory struggles. Its objective is to provide the revolutionary leadership necessary for the complete transformation of society . . . As the anti-capitalist anti-imperialist struggle which begins within national boundaries is intensified, it extends to an international level and acquires a permanent character. Our firmest objective is to create the United Socialist States of Latin America which, once established, will save the Bolivian revolution from suffocation by the imperialist economic blockade.'4 The document contains the following basic demands: 'The immediate nationalisation of the mines, without compensation and under workers' control, and of the railways under the administration of the railway workers; the occupation of the factories by the workers; the nationalisation of latifundia and their transfer to the organised peasantry for exploitation within a collective system.' The right wing of the MNR immediately intensified its attacks on the COB, using the proposed programme of principles as their justification. 'The battle was provoked' says Alfredo Candia (one of the organisers of the April 1952 insurrection) 'by the COB's programme of principles which, when it was published in the newspapers, was immediately seen to be of communist inspiration and structure. Consider, for example, its proclamation of a People's Republic of Bolivia and its call for the immediate occupation of the mines by the workers without compensation for the former owners, in accordance with Lechin's original proposal. Our nationalist group [i.e. the right wing of the MNR (G.L.)] recognised the danger posed to the national revolution and replied with a manifesto published in one of the last numbers of En Marcha, a newspaper of the time. Our docu-

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The COB and the revolution (1952- 6)

ment refuted all these communist ideas including the confiscations which they wished to press on the MNR government. When we showed our manifesto to the genuine movimientistas they all agreed with it.' 5 The abortive counter-revolutionary coup of 6 January 1953, in which Alfredo Candia participated, was a reaction of the right wing of the MNR to the threat of a seizure of power by the left in the COB. It was not merely a question of resisting the appointment of various COB leaders to high governmental posts. The conspiracy failed, but the left of the COB failed to take as much advantage of this defeat of the right as they might have done. Initially the COB was a popular front, a coalition of various social classes, around revolutionary, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist objectives. The labour movement was united within the COB for the first time, since the rival labour confederations, the CSTB and the CBT, had dissolved themselves and instructed their members to join the COB. Robert Alexander, who has interpreted the revolutionary process from the viewpoint of the MNR's right wing,6 takes an entirely simplistic view of the process, as if the balance of political forces within the COB were just the product of manoeuvres and fraud. He also attributes the predominance of the POR in the COB in the early post-revolutionary period to two factors: (a) the necessity for the provincial affiliates 4to name people resident in the capital as their representatives', and (b) the main MNR union leaders 'were too involved with their responsibilities in helping to administer the new regime to pay attention, as they might otherwise have done, to the COB'. He regards the subsequent rise in influence of the MNR in the COB as the consequence of the nationalisation of the mines - a measure which he describes as a defeat for the position held by the PORistas, and a product of the MNR's decision to remove the PORista delegates from the unions. In fact the powerful pressure from the rank and file overrode sectarian divisions and obliged the labour leaders to relegate their personal ambitions to a secondary level. But it should be noted that the COB did not just embrace labour unions, nor did it limit its activities to promoting the formation of working-class federations. It also included popular associations which, although they called themselves unions, were not strictly speaking so. 'The COB is not a trade-union organisation exclusively for the proletariat; it constitutes a vast network of mass organisations, including bodies which are not strictly unions (for example tenants, housewives, students). That is to say it brings together all the oppressed groups in the nation who face economic, social and cultural problems connected with the process of the national revolution.'7

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The rise and fall of the COB

The peasantry The organisation of the peasantry into sindicatos had been going on for a long time, as we have seen. The revolutionaries, especially Marxists and anarchists, had made serious efforts to penetrate the countryside and organise the victims of feudal exploitation into unions. Whenever these 'sindicatos'8 managed to establish themselves they formed an effective power base, indeed at times they were the only centre of power in a region, and were capable of defying the authority of the government and even of supplanting local officials. An organisation of this kind, more a soviet than a union, was bound, for its very survival, to create its own armed force. Hence the organisation of militias was something very natural for the peasant sindicatos. When the COB was formed, the peasant unions were busy occupying the lands which they believed should belong to those who tilled them, and the landowners were being expelled by violence. Obviously this was a situation which favoured the expansion of COB influence. There was no question of forcing the peasant unions to affiliate; they were just swept along by the current into the only existing mass organisation. Neither did their presence undermine the character of the COB for it, too, had many obvious characteristics of a soviet. The militias

The COB did not merely pass resolutions; it actually carried them out without waiting for the approval of the central government, and frequently its decisions clashed with those of the government. For the majority of the masses, the COB was their only leader and their only government. One of the COB's aims was to dismantle the oligarchic army which had for so long served the exploiting classes, putting down internal rebellions, rather than defending the territorial integrity of the nation. The army had been a basic prop of rosea power so the COB wanted it replaced by armed militias of workers and peasants, which would not be dependent on the MNR government but could be organised and controlled by the COB itself. These militias were armed with the weapons seized in raids on the army's arsenals. They were extremely enthusaistic, although rather disorganised, and they could be considered an authentic working-class revolutionary force. After a while an attempt was made to transform these chaotic militias into a proper worker—peasant army, which would be the armed wing of the COB. A national Militia Command was organised, and for a time it was headed by Mario Torres. According to the COB's organis-

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The COB and the revolution (1952- 6)

ational report, the local militias 'should consist of all the armed personnel in a given union. The militias will then be divided into squadrons often men each with their commander.'9 At the next level there were Regional Commands parallel to the COB regional committees and 'responsible to the command of their Militia Secretaries'. The Militia Secretary of the national executive committee of the COB was in charge of all the militias in the country, and he was 'also empowered to coordinate action with the revolutionary armed forces of the country'. When the MNR government gave in to pressure from the United States and reorganised the regular army,10 these militias were doomed, for the two organisations were incompatible and one of them was superfluous. The COB documents explained the militias in a confusing way: 'In the period of the national revolution, the armed militias of the working class are the beginning of social democracy.' However, the account of their functions is more precise: 'Their task is to defend the revolutionary process against assaults from without by the counter-revolutionary oligarchy, from thermidorian coups from within, and from any combination of the two.' By 1957 the leadership of the COB had begun to realise that the reorganisation of the army along traditional lines constituted a serious threat to its own existence and to that of the militias. But to some extent the labour bureaucrats adopted a contradictory attitude, on the one hand condemning the reconstitution of the army, and on the other recommending the coordination of activities between the militias and the regular army. 'We can see that attempts are being made to reconstitute the army in its traditional form. The formation of political cells within the army has been forbidden, and there is talk of introducing automatic rifles - similar to those used by NATO forces - which, because of their different calibre, will make the workers' and peasants' weapons outdated.' They went on to claim that the ground was being prepared for a military coup against the workers. Faced with this possibility, they declared 'The COB must secure the implementation of its policy that, of every three guns imported into Bolivia, two should be handed over to the union militias, and it must seek implementation of the resolution passed at the VI MNR convention on the establishment of labour and political commissars in the army.' Worker ministers

Immediately after the April revolution, labour leaders occupied three ministries. This fact has given rise to considerable misinterpretation. Some people have argued from it that during the first stage of the revolution there was a period of co-government, but this is an extremely superficial

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The rise and fall of the COB

conclusion. As we have seen, in 1936 and in 1946 incoming governments appointed certain union leaders as ministers, in order to create a spurious impression of radicalism. By contrast, after 1952 it was the workers who were in the dominant position, having crushed their class enemies. But they simply handed power over to the MNR. However, there was not a total or immediate capitulation, and all along there were signs of a divergence in outlook between the workers and those who had assumed the role of political leadership. For example, a worker who supported the MNR would not think of Victor Paz and Hernan Siles in the same way as Lechin. The latter was considered, over and above his party membership, as the genuine spokesman of the workers and as the one who had emerged from the ranks of the workers. In fact the first worker ministers were real representatives of the workers engaged in imposing the COB's decisions on the government. It was therefore vital that the ministers should be accountable to the COB assembly and should keep it constantly informed about their work. Thus one COB resolution read: 'As long as they hold ministerial posts, Comrades Juan Lechin and German Butron are obliged always to report back on any matter affecting the balance of forces between the exploited and the exploiters. Delegates to the COB have the right to demand information from the worker ministers, and to present interpellations, whenever they see fit.'11 Initially, Lechin was the real representative of the workers and peasants in the cabinet and in the ruling party; he was at first the only leader with solid support. Indeed the stability of the government depended on him. This situation arose in the absence of any strong working-class party. Paz Estenssoro was acute enough to realise this and gradually began to undermine Lechin, the labour leader who seemed his main ally and source of support. But to both his supporters and his opponents President Paz gave the impression of being the prisoner of the COB. As Paz himself put it to the first COB congress 'The decisions of the COB carry great weight in the government's policy making.' Later the role and function of the worker ministers changed radically and they came to act as a petty bourgeois fifth column in the labour movement, merely representing the wishes of the government. It has been discovered from experience that at times of working-class passivity the worker ministers contented themselves with seconding the decisions of the National Political Committee of the MNR and did their utmost to ignore the interests and outlook of the union rank and file. As the POR commented in 1960, 'The struggles for ministerial posts between little groups of union bureaucrats cannot be regarded as a struggle to secure working-

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The COB and the revolution (1952-6)

class representation in the cabinet. Likewise the so-called self-criticism meetings of the COB are only aimed at deceiving the masses. The attempts of the bureaucrats to control "their" ministers have nothing to do with the interests of the working class.'12 It has also been claimed that the workers and peasants shared power by virtue of their representation in parliament. But this is also an erroneous conclusion. The fact that a class or party has representation (even a representation which is a genuine expression of the will of the masses) does not mean that they have control of the state apparatus, least of all in a presidential system of government like that of Bolivia. Parliamentary activity has had negative results for the revolutionary movement. Honourable labour leaders were swamped by those who made a lucrative business out of their subservience to the party. The MNR's deputies ended up being controlled by their stomachs; besides their new parliamentary salaries they also received an extra remuneration from the Political Committee of the party. Under such conditions it could not be claimed that these members of parliament expressed the ideas and aspirations of the workers. At times the left-wing of the MNR did have an undisputed majority in parliament, but this never induced the parliament to abandon its right-wing line. It was as early as 13 May 1952 that the first sign appeared of slackening pressure from the workers. They were beginning to believe that the pettybourgeois government (which they thought to be the same as a workers' government) could be left to carry out a revolutionary programme of its own accord. On that day imperialist interests (operating from the shadows but maintaining strong ties with some sectors of the MNR) won their first victory over the government with the postponement of the minenationalisation programme, and the decision to set up a 'technical commission' which would plan and carry out the nationalisation. The immediate effect of this intelligently calculated manoeuvre was to neutralise the working class, lulling them into a state of passivity. Until this moment the COB had led the demand for the immediate nationalisation of the mines, under workers' control and without compensation. After 1 May the workers' ministers, the COB leadership and the masses themselves, contented themselves with waiting, perhaps reluctantly, for the government to carry out its plan. On 22 October 1952 the COB wrote to the President repeating its views on nationalisation. Owing to the efforts of the three large mining companies it stated, 'successive governments have confined their activities to measures exclusively favouring the private profitability of the companies, totally neglecting the needs of the labour force and the opportunities for development in potentially rich regions outside the mining zone, and indeed the

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The rise and fall of the COB

need to promote agriculture and industry in general'. The COB blamed the mineowners for the fact that the country's rail and road networks were confined to the Altiplano and Cordillera regions, 'an arrangement which suited the interests of the companies who, motivated only by the lust for profit, have subjected our economy to an uneven process of development, to the benefit of imperialist interests'. Bolivia's semi-colonial condition was attributed to the internationalisation of the mining companies 'who evaded their obligations to the country in which their wealth was generated'. Thus, the most vital decisions concerning Bolivia 'were taken abroad, and the government simply acted on instructions received from the headquarters which the mining companies maintained, and indeed will still maintain, in imperialist countries'. The three big companies were accused of pursuing a colonialist policy which did not leave even the barest minimum of economic resources for the workers' subsistence. Their working methods were anachronistic, described as 'the most brutal in the world'. The wages they paid were unbelievably low 'since their prime concern was to obtain the greatest possible profit from the minimum of investment, the companies ignored the most elementary safety regulations for their workers'. Every time the workers protested against this regime of exploitation and poverty, the companies 'who manipulated the powers of the state at their will' drowned the discontent in a blood-bath. The surplus value usurped from the workers 'enabled the companies to accumulate enormous fortunes on a world wide scale'. The COB's letter ended 'we conclude . . . from this analysis that the just thing to do is to nationalise the mines without compensation, and with workers' control, including worker participation in the administration.' However, a few days later the COB's executive secretary, Lechin, and secretary-general, German Butron (both worker ministers) appended their signatures to the MNR's distinctly different nationalisation decree. In the event the decree of 31 October 1952 was so enthusiastically applauded by the working class that there was no possibility of organising large-scale opposition or even effective criticism, despite its very obvious limitations. There was a similar reaction to the agrarian reform decree of 2 August 1953, despite the fact that it obviously fell far short of what the peasants were achieving by directly occupying the land. The decree changed the attitude of the peasants, and from then on the peasant militias centred their effort on unconditionally defending the MNR regime. Many evidently found it less disturbing to receive their lands in private plots from the government rather than to organise collectively and fight for it. In this way the newly emancipated peasants, who were becoming smallholders,

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The COB and the revolution (1952-6)

began to form a social group capable of neutralising the workers' movement. The labour movement's loss of initiative was apparent in the activities of the COB. It became progressively less capable of exerting pressure on the government, and more isolated from the local unions of which it was constituted. MNR domination of the COB

Taking advantage of the state of passive expectation of the workers concerning the imminent nationalisation of the mines in the second half of 1952, Victor Paz Estenssoro took his first steps to win control of the unions by working through their leaders. At this point the MNR leaders in the COB set up headquarters in the Presidential Palace and, on the instructions of the National Political Committee of the MNR and with the consent of Lechin, they set about expelling the Trotskyists from the unions, or at least rendering them politically impotent. Various tactics were used to achieve this end; for example they exploited the traditional antagonism between the Stalinists (i.e. the Communist Party and the rump of the PIR) and the Trotskyists, allying with the former and offering them a series of concessions in order to strengthen their campaign against the Trotskyists. Later, however, the repression was also extended to the Communist Party. In addition the MNR began artificially increasing its number of union representatives, regardless of the will of the unions, setting up phantom organisations, and compelling public employees and those dependent on government favours to submit their organisations to the MNR leadership. Thus the government, as the POR denounced at the time, managed to insert into the COB 'a team of public functionaries who are the centre of the government electoral machine'.13 The Secretary of Press and Propaganda of the Government, Jose Fellmann Velarde, who was the brains behind this campaign, became a delegate to the COB, representing the state employees, that is to say his own subordinates. In the first phase of the revolution the MNR delegates, who were elected by the rank-and-file and who had not been bought off by government money since they earned their livings in the factories, generally joined ranks with the POR delegates against the errors and abuses of the COB executive committee or against the 'democratism' of the servile Stalinists. But the second wave of government supporters in the COB were well-paid bureaucrats, who did not take part in or even listen to the debates but merely voted according to the instructions issued from the Presidential Palace. The first step towards the destruction of the COB was the silencing

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of the Trotskyist opposition by means of this manufactured majority, which functioned as an electoral machine and which was well lubricated with money and all kinds of privileges. The second step was the purging of POR militants from union executive committees. In order to achieve its aims the MNR proceeded systematically to undermine all aspects of union democracy, which had been the fruit of long experience and hard struggles, and set about bringing the labour organisation under state control. Regularly elected leaders were replaced by appointees named by the President or the 'worker' ministers, who built up their own economic and trade union machines. In one instance the MNR went so far as to break up a meeting of the Santa Cruz COD by gunfire in order to remove a POR delegate to the COB. Initially in many work-places the MNR party Commands were subordinate to the unions, which expressed the revolutionary will of the workers. But later, when the decline of the labour movement set in, the Commands began to fight for the control and leadership of the unions. For example, in the mine of Siglo XX the MNR Command cooked up a set of absurd accusations against the POR workers, in order to eliminate them from political and union activities, and put them under arrest. The PORistas were accused of blowing up industrial plant and of setting free Falangist prisoners. The situation of the POR was made even worse by an internal crisis,14 but by this time the government party was confident that it had solid support and had won permanent control over the unions. In consequence the MNR stopped its purge of the Marxist opposition half-way, although at a later stage the MNR turned against the Communist Party. It is now clear that the MNR made a great mistake in not completely destroying its adversaries on the extreme left when it had the opportunity to do so. For, once differences began to appear between the MNR leadership and the union bases, these elements once again reappeared in the front ranks of the opposition. The first COB congress

The first COB congress was repeatedly postponed by the Executive Committee until the MNR had succeeded in removing most of its opponents from leadership positions in the unions. Thus a fierce battle took place between the different tendencies within the labour movement before the first national gathering of the COB could get down to discussing organisational and political problems. The first congress opened on 31 October 1954. Most observers were under the false impression that the government had placed all its resources

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at the service of the COB, but really the situation was the other way round: the union leaders had sold out completely to the government. It was laid down that 'delegates will be democratically elected by general assemblies of the rank and file to be held before 30 September at the latest, in the presence of representatives from their respective national organisations'. Following the practice established by the FSTMB, it was established that these assemblies convened to elect delegates should also elect the Executive Secretary of the COB, and their decision should be binding on their delegates to the congress.15 This was basically a publicity stunt on the part of Lechin, who wanted to appear as if he had been elected by a unanimous majority of all the members affiliated to the COB. As a result of this manoeuvre, Lechin was elected by acclamation and the votes of the opposition went unheard. The fact that preferential treatment was given to the proletariat as against the peasantry and the middle class in the allocation of delegates to the congress should be regarded as progressive. The miners were allocated 60 delegates, factory workers 30, railway workers 26, and so on in diminishing proportions (flour-mill workers 7, printers 7, rubber-tappers 7, etc.) giving a total of 177 delegates for the proletariat. The middle-class sector had 56 delegates and the peasantry 50. By the time the first congress took place, the executive committee was composed entirely of long-established MNRistas plus people who had left other political groups since 1952 to join the government party: Juan Lechin was Executive Secretary, German Butron General Secretary, Nuflo Chavez Ortiz Secretary of Peasant Affairs, and Mario Torres Secretary of Relations. It was officially stated that there were five representatives of the workers in the cabinet: Mario Torres, Minister of Mines and Petroleum; Nuflo Chavez Ortiz, Minister of Peasant Affairs; Miguel Calderon, Minister of Labour and Social Security; Angel Gomez Garcia, Minister of Public Works and Communications; and Jose Fellmann Velarde, Subsecretary of Press, Information and Culture. The delegates to and participants in the various preparatory commissions of the congress were overwhelmingly drawn from the MNR with only a handful of independent Stalinists; and the occasional shameless Trotskyist. Some delegates to the congress were simply denied the opportunity to speak — including myself, although until the eve of the congress I was accredited to the COB as a delegate from the Santa Cruz Central Obrera Departmental (COD). Another scandal, perhaps the worst and certainly the only one reported in the press, was that the 50 delegates sent to the congress by the peasant unions were debarred and replaced by nominees

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The rise and fall of the COB

from the Ministry of Peasant Affairs. Lawyers from the Ministry spoke on behalf of the Santa Cruz peasants while the real delegates were either tricked by the authorities or ran out of money and had to go home. Ultima Hora published a plea from the Santa Cruz peasant leaders for permission to take part in the congress, but they were ignored. President Paz Estenssoro's speech was certainly the most important and the most loudly applauded of the congress. He defined the relations between the COB and the government very frankly, sketched an outline of future developments and put the case against the left opposition, who were of course absent from the congress: Our government is fundamentally composed of workers, peasants and people of the middle class. The workers constitute our basic support and for every day over the past two and a half years we have geared our policies to serving the working classes . . . This solidarity between the government and the people has enabled us to carry out great tasks and has enabled us to defeat counter-revolutionary attacks... I take this opportunity of thanking you, comrades, for your continual support, with which we have carried through the National Revolution. It is your support, comrades, that enables us at this very moment to carry out the most far-reaching changes to have taken place anywhere in Latin America and, indeed, I would dare to say, in any of the dependent and semi-dependent countries of the world.16 This was the last time a President could indulge in the luxury of speaking in such a paternal tone. Subsequent COB congresses were to be the scenes of violent polemics and clashes between the government and the increasingly hostile workers. 'Certain left-wing groups, Paz continued, 'criticise us dishonestly when they say that it was the people of Bolivia who, without any political leadership whatsoever, defeated the oligarchy in the events of 9 April, and that the petty-bourgeois government of the MNR only nationalised the mines and put through an agrarian reform because of the irresistible pressures from below.' Paz went on to argue that the unions should no longer act as militant organisations dedicated to fighting the employers since they were part of the government and they could no longer operate in the same way as they had when confronted by an oligarchic government, and when no changes had been made in the economic structure of the country. The unions should co-operate with their government, and help it to resolve the problems which arose from the revolutionary process itself. These were the arguments that successive MNR regimes were subsequently to use for their attack on the labour movement and their revolutionary critics. Paz justified his position with the argument

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The COB and the revolution (1952-6)

that a backward country could only make a 'national revolution' (that is to say a democratic one led by the middle class, and not a socialist one) and he added that a workers' government could at the most hold power only very briefly, since it would be immediately swept aside by the imperialists and their allies. Analysing this speech from an historical perspective, one reaches the conclusion that Victor Paz was outlining an antilabour programme (certainly this is what was said when it was later put into practice) and yet he did so to thunderous applause from the delegates of the first COB congress. Lechin's opening speech was a report of the COB's activities since its foundation. It was written by Agustin Barcelli and was therefore full of quasi-trotskyist statements and terminology. In this speech Lechin gives us another example of the way he could adapt to the changing political situation and respond to the current outlook of the masses. He used the occasion to cover up the wide differences which had separated the unions from the MNR government, and to line up with the President, presenting Paz Estenssoro as if he were another labour leader. He described the COB as 'an integral part of the revolutionary regime . . . For the first time in the history of the Latin American peoples a working class holds political power, sharing in the rights and responsibilities of government equally with the other classes and fulfilling the aspirations which have been held by the people for more than a hundred years . . . It would be unjust to omit the name of the man who throughout the sexenio held aloft the banner of struggle, who was our guide and teacher; the man who on the triumph of the revolution was loyal to his people, and has honestly and faithfully carried out the aims of the revolution. That man is here among us, sharing our fate and our worries; his name is on the lips of all Bolivians and he is regarded everywhere, from the humblest shack to the grandest palace, as the symbol of patriotism and loyalty. That man is Victor Paz Estenssoro.17 Lechin went on to say how pleased he was that labour organisations of different political tendencies had been invited to the congress and, while regretting the absence of pro-US organisations, he took the opportunity of making known his sympathy with them: International, continental and national labour organisations have come to our congress to bring the encouragement and moral support of the workers of the world to us, and to show their growing interest in the progress of our revolution. We regret that unforeseen circumstances have prevented the delegations of the CIO, ORIT and AFL from attending. Nevertheless we have received expressive letters of apology which compensate for our inability to embrace directly the representatives of

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The rise and fall of the COB

the millions of workers, our working brothers of the world, who belong to these organisations and who are watching our revolution with appreciation and interest. . . He went on to say: Our revolution is an authentic popular revolution; thus it is neither 'bourgeois' nor 'proletarian'. It is not bourgeois because in Bolivia the bourgeoisie is in an embryonic form and in any case is opportunist and failed to join with the popular movement. It is not proletarian because the workers were not the only element to take part in the April events. (As in any revolution many social classes played a part, but one group always leads. The COB's documents and Lechin's own report refer to the workers pulverising the heavily armed regiments. It was in the nature of the proletariat to take up the vanguard role in the struggle when it found itself in combat with its enemy, but the workers failed to maintain the same position after the revolution when the question was who should take power in place of the dispossessed rosca. This contradictory attitude was due to the absence of a working class party.) But, continued Lechin, our revolution stands for genuinely proletarian ideals: workers' control, with the right of veto; growing union participation in power; the recognition in practice that the COB is a partner in the government; all these are genuinely proletarian principles... But these proletarian conquests do not mean that we are moving towards the dictatorship of the proletariat or towards a democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants. Obviously not, since the workers do not constitute a class force of primary importance, and the peasantry do not constitute a well-defined political force. To justify his pessimism about the future of the workers, Lechin merely reiterated the arguments of the government and of reactionary ideologies about the fate to which Bolivia was condemned by its geographic location: a small country with no outlet to the sea, surrounded by non-worker governments, could not possibly entertain the idea of setting up a workers' government. 'In a landlocked nation located within the area where the economic, political and cultural pressure of the greatest power in the world is most strongly felt, we cannot possibly take on a struggle of such scale. Bolivia is not a continent-country.' He attributed the government's great reforms to the active cooperation of the COB in the government, and added that to leave the cabinet would mean defeat for the COB: 'Thus I am convinced that it is essential for us to remain in power, sharing it with the other allied classes. If we are not

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united in this way, we face the danger of defeat, either from within or from outside.' He then spoke of the revolutionary conquests that had been made, referring to some which Victor Paz had deliberately omitted from his epeech, since without doubt they concerned the vulnerable side of co-government: 'The present government regards labour leaders as invested with a trade union immunity which is inviolable in just the way that MPs enjoy parliamentary privilege in genuinely parliamentary democracies.' Lechin made this solemn declaration, despite the fact that every day labour activists (only a small group, to be sure, and most of them trotskyists) were being systematically harrassed. Lechin commented: 'Some people say that there are no trade-union freedoms, since labour leaders are being arrested, but great care is being taken to explain why these arrests are being made . . . Union leaders have been arrested when they have been caught in the act of conspiracy; they have never been detained for their union activities.' He also approved of the arrest of those who led the peasants in direct land seizures. 'They tried to provoke the peasants into using violence, on the pretext that the Revolutionary Government was not going to grant them land. This might have created a state of anarchy in the countryside, which would have benefited the rosca? A special section of Lechin's report was devoted to workers' control, with the right of veto, which he always regarded as one of the greatest conquests of the April revolution. [Workers' control] means that the production of more than eighty per cent of our foreign exchange is under the supervision of the workers, their unions and the FSTMB . . . In Bolivia workers' control has acquired a really revolutionary and democratic meaning . . . The introduction of the right of veto puts the responsibility into the hands of the workers for the administrative policy of the mines . . . This right has existed for more than a year now and that experience has convinced even its most staunch opponents that workers' control is the best defence of the workers' interests, the best guarantee of economic progress, and the best safeguard against the bureaucratisation of the COMIBOL. He concluded that the COB should extend the campaign, pressing for workers' control in the private companies as a necessary complement to the national planning of the economy. The mirage appeared of a Bolivian state strong enough to subject finance capital to its interests, although experience has clearly exposed this illusion: 'Now [the investor] can no longer regard us as a place to invest on his own terms and subject to his laws. Now he must recognise that he is

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The rise and fall of the COB

dealing with a sovereign state, one which is ready to give all kinds of guarantees to foreign capital, but always provided that the investor respects our laws, and accepts the conditions laid down by the state.' The MNR actually imagined that this policy could lead the country to its liberation. This congress approved two documents of fundamental importance to the labour movement: an ideological programme and the statutes of the COB. These documents provided a solid basis for the COB's future activities, and some observers attribute the organisation's strength to its unity over the programme, although this was, strangely enough, approved unanimously and without significant debate: The Ideological Programme fell into two parts: the first dealt with the international situation and the second defined the process of the National Revolution. It was a novelty for a labour programme to devote so much space to foreign political problems. This section began with an extended criticism of Stalinism and a denunciation of 'peaceful co-existence' as a revolutionary tactic, arguing that in fact the tensions between the imperialist and socialist blocks would inevitably lead to another world war. The second part analysed the situation of the country in terms drawn from Trotskyist tradition and contained various abbreviated, and at times distorted, passages from the Thesis of Pulacayo on class relations in Bolivia. According to the programme, the dominant class was divided into two sectors: 'the so-called national bourgeoisie which is beginning to develop in the country and which generally speaking is interested in the present revolutionary process', and the oligarchy or rosca, 'the social group which was ousted from power by the popular insurrection of 9 April 1952 thanks to the decisive intervention of the workers (the factory workers and miners.)' This conclusion served to justify the multi-class nature of the MNR and the popular (rather than proletarian) nature of the revolution and government. There was a notable failure to examine the way in which the experience of the sexenio, and the revolution itself, had altered the political consciousness of the masses. In fact, the authors of the COB programme were ex-PORistas who had decided to leave the party and work towards the radicalisation of the MNR from within. They were unable entirely to throw their past overboard, and continued to use the revolutionary language with which they had impressed the workers when they were PORistas. Hence the COB's programme borrowed the POR's description of the April 1952 revolution: ' . . . This movement, which began as a simple coup d'etat, was rapidly transformed by the revolutionary insurgence of the aforementioned social groups, especially the working class, who converted it into a successful insurrection.' But this apparently accurate description was then negated by

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the argument which followed: It was 'groups of the petty bourgeoisie (both dependent and independent), the middle class and the workers in the MNR who were the driving force behind the great movement of national and social liberation on 9 April 1952.' The programme characterised the revolution as one of 'national liberation', and regarded the future of the 'social revolution' as unclear since 'it depends on the revolutionary capacity of the working class in close alliance with the poor peasants and the exploited sectors of the urban middle class, and on the development of the economic and political conditions, both internal and international'. It was through 'workers' participation in the government, workers' control with the right to veto, and through the unions and militias of the workers and peasants' that the revolution should be defended. The interests of the workers could be satisfied from within the MNR provided that the workers exerted pressure on the government, 'through their ministers', and through their unions. Likewise the militias should be regarded as an instrument of political struggle and should be highly politicised. Their discipline should be derived from deep ideological convictions. Every factory should be converted into an armed fortress of the revolution: 'We must prepare to crush any danger of invasion which may arise.' It can be seen that the COB was far from being a narrow labour organisation, its statutes described it as 'a genuine centralised system of revolutionary councils, whose historical origins are to be found not so much in the English trade unions as in the Paris Commune'. Juan Lechin Oquendo

Juan Lechin Oquendo was born in 1914 in the copper town of Corocoro, which was then one of the most important mining centres of the country, where an enormous number of workers was concentrated and where progressive ideas were widely diffused. But it would be mistaken to suppose that the destiny of the future labour leader was determined by his contact with the militant workers of Corocoro. In fact Lechin did not come into contact with the labour movement until he had reached the age of 30, an age by which most rebels already have their past histories. He was educated at the Instituto Americano, a school to which the socially aspiring middle class send their sons, but left early in order to take a course in accountancy. His friend and biographer, Agustin Barcelli, adds that he left school to earn his living and that 'he enjoyed sports and played football and basket ball very well.'19 He went to the Chaco War as a soldier 'and through his distinguished action at Cuatro Vientos and Kilometro Siete' he was promoted to sergeant.

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The rise and fall of the COB

It should be recalled that the revolutionaries and people on the Left fought against the war and paid for their intransigent opposition by imprisonment and exile. Indeed, the more dedicated opponents of the war died before firing squads in the sands of the Chaco. We can conclude that Lechin was simply drawn by the patriotic current and did not stop to analyse the meaning of the war; he was not a critical thinker and did not share the preoccupations of the best men of his era. He was basically a sportsman who had no wish to get entangled in complicated issues; he returned from the Chaco little changed by the experience. For large numbers of veterans the war was a spiritual and ideological upheaval which made them look for new solutions to the tragic, bankrupt state of the nation. This process seems to have had no impact on the young Lechin. How then did he become a labour leader? How did he manage to rise above the old union leaders and the left wing ideologists who had been passionately involved in the struggle for so much longer? His rise has been described above. It can be attributed to the following factors: the bankruptcy of the Stalinists as union leaders; the absence of a powerful working class party; and the support he received from official propaganda and the state machinery. During the period of preparations for the revolution of 9 April 1952 he abandoned his position as a POR sympathiser and apparently rejoined the MNR. For Lechin the MNR's victory meant his rise to power - he was to be Minister of Mines and then Vice-President. However, the events of 9 April radicalised the masses even further, and Lechin found himself obliged to use borrowed language to express this phenomenon. Once again, this time from the balcony of the Presidential Palace, he used Trotskyist slogans but, as always happened with Lechin, there was a great gulf between what he said and what he did. His speeches were full of orthodox Marxist terms, yet his conduct as a member of the new government revealed his capitulation to the new President, Victor Paz Estenssoro. This duality soon permitted him, perhaps without his realising it to become the safety valve of a regime that was in fact far from being either pro-worker or anti-imperialist. He publicly declared himself in favour of the immediate nationalisation of the mines, without compensation and under workers' control, and he gave the impression of agreeing when the COB proposed the nationalisation of the land and opposed the idea of parcelling out the large haciendas in a way that would transform the peasantry into small landowners. He also appeared to favour the destruction of the caste-based army, and he explicitly proposed its replacement by worker—peasant militia. Yet, as a Minister of State, he signed decrees which were directly contrary to these radical proposals. The mines were nationalised in a bourgeois manner,

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The COB and the revolution (1952-6)

recognising the companies' claims to extravagant and unjustified compensation and, although workers' control was proclaimed, the law actually laid the basis for the eventual elimination of the workers from the administration of the mines. The agrarian reform merely converted the former serfs into smallholders and even enabled some of the landowners to take advantage of legal loopholes in order to save their land. During the first moments of the revolution Lechin declared: 'The Bolivian proletariat, the miners, who have not forgotten the bloody reprisals taken against them, want nothing to do with the defence of this army. The defence of our revolution, of the events of April, brought about by the workers of the country, rests in our own hands. It is the proletariat, armed with weapons seized from the military, that will defend and protect the government. We don't want an army with gold braid, boots and spurs won in victories over defenceless people. It is the army dressed in overalls, with guns slung on their shoulders, inspired by their class consciousness, that will save the country and defend it from its enemies. The workers and peasant militias of today, raising aloft the banner of the revolution, will take the place of the generals.'20 But the same Lechin who delivered this revolutionary speech ended up signing a decree which reorganised the army and reopened the Military College. Eventually Lechin himself paid for this error, since he was one of those to fall victim to the brutal repression of the military governments of the sixties. The COB was set up in April 1952 along the lines indicated by the Thesis of Pulacayo, that is to say as the national directorate of the proletariat. Almost without discussion Lechin was appointed Executive Secretary for life. As we shall see, the fate of the COB followed the fluctuations of the revolution as a whole and the internal relations of the various political forces. Initially it was the real centre of power and Victor Paz was reduced to being virtually the prisoner of the COB, but subsequently the COB began to lose its power, ending up as a simple instrument of the government. At the beginning the MNR government was vehemently antiimperialist, but it finished up a servile instrument of the State Department, permitting the Pentagon to take extensive control of the country and to build up a massive military apparatus on Bolivian territory. Through the MNR the North Americans actively pursued and eventually achieved their objective of isolating the revolutionary and trade union groups. From the early stages of the revolution onwards Lechin maintained that any profound transformation of the country was impossible without American help, and there could be no mistake about the aims behind his day-to-day activities: he was out to win the confidence of the State Department in order to become President of the Republic. This can be deduced from all

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his public activities, from public statements that he was an anti-Communist leader, from his Vice-Presidential visit to Formosa (in 1962) in which he paid tributes to Chiang Kai-Shek, and from his complicity in the harassment of Marxist leaders, accompanied by his ostentatious servility towards the United States. Lechin has acted on the principle that political skill entails always facing two ways at once. Thus he would publicly approach centre and right wing parties while making secret pacts with the Left, in order to protect himself on both flanks. Not for nothing was he a labour leader, and he had to take care that his policy of making concessions to the USA did not put an end to his popularity with the masses and his political career. Secretly he explained to some workers that his contacts with the imperialists, his antiCommunism and his enthusiasm to reach agreements with the Right were merely tactics which would enable him to take power and then to carry out a revolutionary workers' programme. But empiricists in politics and trade union activities always lose sight of the ultimate objective of the struggle and become bogged down in day-to-day activities. It is specious to pretend that Lechin's wing of the MNR (since 1964 a separate party called the Partido Revolucionario de la Izquierda Nacionalista, PRIN) did not share responsibility for the acts of the first three MNR governments. Lechin's support for successive Presidents (which was at times the only support that counted) was far from disinterested. It enabled him to secure control of various government resources, as a result of which some people considered that he was the real power behind the throne. There is no doubt that Lechin showed great skill in maintaining his control over the labour movement, despite its tendency towards radicalisation. Up to 1952 he gave the impression of being fully identified with the workers' aspirations and ideologically aligned with the Marxists. But later the 'worker' Minister had to resort to a series of subterfuges in order to disguise the growing gap between his proclaimed ideas and his actions. This incoherence explains why Lechin never exerted ideological control over the labour movement. He utilised typical bureaucratic measures to secure its submission, setting up a great apparatus which distorted the will of the rank-and-file unionists. The union bureaucracy came to identify itself with the left wing of the government, which was formed around the privileges obtained through the monopoly of certain key posts in the administration of the nationalised mines, autonomous bodies and the state itself. As a government, the MNR was extremely anxious to eliminate the rival power of Lechin and to re-establish control over the workers. After about 1956 the official wing of the MNR therefore treated Lechin as though he were a fervent Marxist. On these grounds, in January 1964 at the last MNR

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convention before the military coup, Lechin and his friends were expelled from the party, as a result of which they had no choice but to organise their own, the PRIN, which was in fact just a new version of the MNR, the aim of which was simply to take power as quickly as possible. However, the PRIN misinterpreted the aims and activities of the military command and as a result failed to become the immediate successor to the MNR in power. It was, in fact, the greatest error of Lechin's political career to support the generals who conspired against the Paz Estenssoro government in 1964, arguing that the armed forces alone could break the repressive apparatus of the MNR's Political Control. His support for the military was based on the mistaken opportunist calculation that they would hand over power to him. Immediately after the coup of 4 November 1964 he tried to enter the Presidential Palace at the head of his followers, but he found the doors bolted and was met with machine-gun fire. This was a symbolic event, which indicated that it had become almost impossible for Lechin to become President of the Republic. He then supported the measures taken by the ensuing Military Junta formed by Generals Barrientos and Ovando, virtually throwing himself into their arms. The PRIN was the axis round which the Comite Revolucionario del Pueblo was organised to support the counter-revolutionary government which had emerged from the coup. But the generals came to power to carry out the colonising objectives of American imperialism and to use military force in order to destroy the trade unions and popular organisations. The Left was therefore persecuted mercilessly, and when Lechin and his friends tried to put pressure on the new government, they too were accused of being communists. As we shall see in book eight, in May 1965 Lechin was arrested and exiled to Paraguay. This move was designed by the government to bring the workers out onto the streets in protest, so that it would have some justification for breaking up the unions. As a final gesture, the expiring COB called a general strike, in reaction to which, as we shall see, the army occupied the mines. Lechin returned from exile at the beginning of 1970 when the new government of General Ovando was attempting to win popular support. He resumed his posts as Executive Secretary of the FSTMB and of the COB when these organisations re-emerged from clandestinity. In the crisis of October 1970 Lechin's support was crucial to General Juan Jose Torres' bid for power on the fall of Ovando. During the Presidency of Torres a People's Assembly was organised, of which Lechin was elected President. When Torres was overthrown by a right-wing coup in August 1971, Lechin once again went into exile.

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19. Inflation, stabilisation and the COB The next stage in the history of the COB was largely determined by two outside events: the MNR convention at the beginning of 1956 and the monetary stabilisation decree of December 1956. The left wing of the MNR was grouped around the COB bureaucracy, since the first national congress of the COB had carried the union leadership into the government party, in accordance with the fiction of cogovernment. This fact had a decisive influence on the internal life of the MNR, not surprisingly considering that the COB, as the left wing, came to control a large part of the resources of the party apparatus. But the MNR convention of 1956, in which Lechin's followers had a majority of the votes, exposed the political incompetence of the COB bureaucrats. The right of the party, which was led by Walter Guevara Arce,1 was defeated and the centrists felt obliged to tag along behind the left. Nevertheless the Lechinistas did not have the courage to campaign for their own men and their ideals; it was at this convention that Lechin, in the name of the COB, proposed the candidacies of Hernan Siles and Nuflo Chavez as the MNR candidates for the President and Vice President respectively in the 1956 elections. From this moment the defeat of the MNR's left was inevitable, as we shall see. From the Chaco War onwards the country had been suffering from a continuous and increasingly severe inflation. The average annual rise in the cost of living index in the city of La Paz was 18.2% from 1945 to 1951. During the whole of this period there was chronic inflation, though it was limited compared with what was to happen after 1952. Then the revolution of 1952 unleashed a rapid process of inflation. Production declined markedly and exports diminished, while simultaneously the demands of the population rose. Between 1952 and 1953 the La Paz cost of living index rose over 150%, the highest rate in the history of the country, (although an even higher rate was registered subsequently, in 1956). Basic necessities were imported at preferential exchange rates and then rationedout through the unions at artificially low prices, and in practice came to form a significant part of the workers' remuneration. The suppression of this practice and the devaluation of the currency in 1956 had the inevitable result of decreasing the purchasing power of the workers. The fact that after 1952 there was a very rapid decline in the value of money tends to confirm that inflation is a necessary feature of revolutionary periods. Con-

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sider, for example, the inflation which occurred during the French, the North American, the Russian and the Chinese revolutions. Controlled inflation may permit the effects of the crisis to fall on certain sectors of the population. In Bolivia it has always been used in such a way that the mass of the people, the working and middle classes, have to bear the weight of the crisis, rather than the employers and imperialists. I argued that it is a vital interest of the workers that 'the weight of the economic crisis does not fall on them, and that their real earnings do not decline and that the proletarian family is not destroyed by poverty; that controlled inflation falls on the capitalist sector and serves to slowly expropriate this sector and the imperialists. The working class must defend a level of wages sufficient to provide a human standard of living.'2 Either through deceitfulness or naivety (and the subjective motivations of the labour leaders are hardly important compared with the catastrophic consequences of the MNR's economic policies), the COB bureaucrats by contrast confined their observations to the technical aspects of inflation. Then, on 15 December 1956 the monetary stabilisation decree was introduced. It was the cornerstone of the domestic policy to be followed by the new right-wing government of President Hernan Siles Zuazo. The basic elements of the decree were set out in a speech to the factory workers of La Paz by Mr Eder, the imperialist nominee who prepared the stabilisation plan.3 Eder said that, in order to achieve monetary stabilisation, it was necessary: 'To balance the national budget, by cancelling all development plans which required dollar expenditure, and then to eliminate the deficit in the balance of payments.' In practice the application of this measure led to a large increase in the number of unemployed, and depressed the level of real wages. Eder recognised that the change in the exchange rate would lead to rises in the cost of living: 'When the stabilisation is put into effect there will be a slight increase in the cost of living. This is inevitable, but it will not be a large increase. Some products, bread for example, will cost more. At the moment it is being sold at a ridiculously low price.' Eder then went on to tell the astonished workers that they would have to 'tighten their belts', adding naively, 'not much, just a little, not too much . .. you won't have to tighten your belts too much, but you will have to do so a little'. Eder started from the supposition that all the people (including the peasants, the factory and mineworkers, and the large sectors of the middle class) lived virtually exclusively from the black market, and he therefore concluded that the stabilisation policy would not fall very heavily on them since they were all paying extortionately high prices. In fact, however, the workers were severely hit by the removal from the shops of articles at

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The rise and fall of the COB

reduced prices, since subsidised goods formed an important part of their wages. There was also the fact that a considerable proportion of the poor sector of the population obtained supplementary earnings from the black market. In the interstices of the inflation, private trade flourished, mostly managed by people from the middle class. In order to make their proposals acceptable, the proponents of the stabilisation plan claimed that the sacrifices of the people would only last for three months and then, once production picked up again, wages would gradually be increased, given that they were already insufficient when the stabilisation decree was introduced. But all these hopes were soon shattered by the reality of the situation. In April 1957 Eder was obliged to spell out the details of his sinister programme to strangle the economy: 4In all, during the last five years the country has spent forty million dollars a year more than its income, that is to say - if US aid continues at twenty million dollars a year - the country will have to reduce its expenditure by forty million a year until the stabilisation policy works by raising the level of agricultural production, or until a suitable climate is created for the investment of new capital.' The stabilisation decree introduced radical changes in the system of exchange rates. A single exchange rate at 7.700 bolivianos to the dollar replaced the different exchange rates which were formerly applied to different categories of imports and exports. This astronomic devaluation (in certain cases the previous rate had been as little as 190) was aimed, among other things, at helping the nationalised mining enterprise, COMIBOL, which was in a bad financial situation. Despite all the decrees the value of the currency continued under pressure until it reached the level of 12.00 bolivianos to the dollar in 1958, and thus the fall in real earnings was much greater than anticipated in the decree. The system of subsidies for imported food products and raw materials was abolished, as were price controls. Free trade was introduced, signifying that there would be no further extension of the policies of nationalisation and workers' control. The government was empowered to raise the prices of public services in general 'so that they cover their operating costs and depreciation, and so that they leave a reasonable margin of profit'. The provision of cheap products in the stores of the mining and railway companies was ended. However, one exception was made, almost certainly because it was feared that otherwise the resulting inflation would lead to an outbreak of popular discontent: a limit was imposed on rent increases. Wages and salaries were frozen for a year (a measure subsequently extended) but a formula was devised to compensate public employees to some extent for the rise in the cost of living and the ending of subsidies in

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the company stores. For some time thereafter trade union campaigns revolved around the issue of 'just compensation'. Union reactions to the stabilisation policy Initially the Lechinista bureaucracy (which defied the wishes of the member unions on this question) stressed the need for a stable currency and endorsed Eder's promises. It was only when the workers discovered that the value of their wages had fallen, and began angry protests, that the Lechinistas belatedly criticised the decrees of 15 December and suggested some amendments. A national meeting of FSTMB leaders was held shortly before the monetary stabilisation decree was enacted. Congressional representatives of the mining districts and the leaders of the COB and the FSTMB (above all, Lechin and Torres) all reassured the delegates that they would take the responsibility for the consequences of the policy, and they signed public statements to that effect. Even so the union representatives, sensing that a change in monetary policy might be catastrophic, refused to accept the Eder-Siles plan until they knew all the details. Defying the wishes of the FSTMB leadership, the Siglo XX-Catavi mineworkers issued a communique stating that they would not permit their real earnings to fall or their social benefits to be undermined, nor would they allow large-scale redundancies in the mines. All of these things did in fact occur later as tragic consequences of the Eder plan. About this time Lechin made a very significant speech to the COB: The stabilisation was vital for our people . . . No politically aware worker could oppose the government's decision to prepare and adopt a stabilisation plan. Mr. Eder's declarations were seen as opening a new phase of the National Revolution . . . US aid was beneficial and opportune. It has enabled us to face the most difficult and dangerous stage of our revolutionary process. American wheat, milk and dollars enabled us to overcome the grave situation of structural crisis which resulted from the revolutionary measures.4 Lechin then went on to say why he had supported Eder's activities: 'He says that "no measures will be taken to harm the economic position of the workers" and repeats time and time again that "although this is a radical measure it will not affect the economic well-being of the majority classes in any way".' However, Lechin responded to the workers by adding that the compensation given to employees for rises in the cost of living was quite insufficient.

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The rise and fall of the COB

The COB endorsed Lechin's approach and resolved that a series of amendments to the stabilisation decree should be passed on to President Siles for his consideration.5 The labour leaders stated that they would support the stabilisation plan provided that real wage levels were maintained. They pointed out to the President that 'We workers have already been sacrificed during the inflationary process, so we must ask, is it just that we should also be sacrificed in the phase of stabilisation?' In order that the national income should be more equitably distributed, the COB proposed the introduction of high taxes on the 'monied classes.' 'It should be remembered that even capitalist countries impose wealth taxes of over 50% on large fortunes, and tax large gifts and inheritances, etc. Since the working classes have supported the worst of the inflationary process and now must suffer the sacrifices which the stabilisation programme demands, it is only fair that the wealthy classes should also meet part of the burden through a national taxation policy.' However, the government simply ignored the COB's proposals and to avoid any interference with the stabilisation programme it set about breaking the rebel unions and crippling the left wing of the MNR. On 20 June 1957 the Vice President of the Republic, Nuflo Chavez, presented the Presidents of the Senate and Congress with his resignation. He apparently resigned because of the public campaign waged against him by supporters of the President who opposed the way, as Vice President, he had permitted the Lechinistas to gain control over the resources of the legislature, and because of a slanging match which had broken out between the Vice President and Mr Eder, with each accusing the other of intending to enrich themselves through dealings concerned with the proposed redemption of the foreign debt.6 One point made by the Vice-President may be taken as an indirect condemnation of the COB leadership: he had been against the Eder plan from the very beginning, he claimed, because he considered it was an attempt to stabilise the currency through a simple banking operation; that it would put an end to economic diversification and favour private enterprise at the expense of the nationalised sector, and that it would lead to a decline in wages and the standard of living of the workers. There can be no doubt that Lechin knew of Chavez' opinions on the question, yet even so he set about encouraging the workers to place their hopes on the Eder plan. According to his own testimony, Chavez only attended one early meeting at which the stabilisation decrees were discussed, and he claims that even his 'North American friends' were scandalised by Eder's ideas. Chavez wrote 'I opposed the policy of dismissing workers, and instead looked for ways of transferring those displaced to other activities.' He then went on

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to make some scandalous accusations against Eder, whom he referred to as an adventurer: 'He had been blackmailing us, even threatening to cut off American aid if his plan was not carried out exactly as he wanted.'7 It is clear from later events that Chavez was confident that Congress, where the left had a majority, would refuse to accept his resignation. But in the meantime the Siles group took up the offensive and they succeeded in splitting the Lechinista group in Congress. Under these circumstances, when the Vice President withdrew his resignation, he met with an unexpected response. Congress merely debated and accepted his resignation, and ignored his manoeuvres. This outcome was a severe defeat for the Lechinista left and indeed for the COB itself. The second COB congress, June 1957

The stabilisation plan profoundly shocked the union membership, while the COB leadership vacillated in the face of the government's attack. As a response, the second COB congress was convened in La Paz from 1 to 10 June 1957. 'In its capacity as the principal organisation of the workers, peasantry and middle class, the COB has a duty to . . . formulate solutions to the problems of the majority of the nation, above all with reference to the stabilisation plan.'8 The various sectors were represented in exactly the same proportions as at the first congress, and altogether there were 439 delegates. This time there was no possibility, as there h'ad been at the first congress, to identify the COB congress with the government and the MNR as a whole. The battle between the Silistas and the left of the MNR was carried into the congress, where the faction being directed from the Presidential Palace launched a remarkable attack on the power of Lechin and his followers. The fact that President Siles had succeeded in organising his own support within the camp of his adversary shows that the left wing was now in retreat. This political situation forced the Marxists to rally to the COB bureaucracy, and once again the differences between them and the Lechinistas became of secondary importance. In his address to the Congress, Siles challenged the Lechinistas as follows: 'I will not return to an inflationary policy under any conditions or pressures whatsoever.'9 His categoric tone indicated his confidence that the majority of the nation supported his monetary stabilisation policy. He then demonstrated that it was Paz Estenssoro who had decided on the stabilisation, and portrayed himself as humbly continuing his predecessor's policy: 'When I took over the Presidency in the gloomy days of August 1956, one of my first concerns was to find out what Comrade Paz Estenssoro thought... I wanted to find out his opinions about the pre-

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liminary recommendations of Dr Eder. Paz thought that in general the plan was a good one, and there was no other alternative for the country.' According to Siles, all the leaders of the MNR and especially those who represented the unions shared responsibility with the government for the stabilisation policy, since they had all attended the meetings where it was analysed and since modifications had been introduced at their suggestion. The immediate consequences of the stabilisation decrees had been catastrophic: poverty increased, unemployment rose astronomically, and many industries were paralysed. Siles told the COB congress that the only solution was an increase in American aid so as to create conditions which would encourage greater private investment. 'There is one way to achieve these objectives. That is a programme of supplementary aid designed to broaden and improve the Supervised Credit scheme, and to begin immediately a minimum development plan which would cover the principal branches of the national economy.' In an attempt to present himself as a paradigm of honesty compared with the Pazestenssoristas (whose corruption had been denounced so often) Siles then made some sensational accusations against people who enriched themselves through dealings in foreign exchange and then put their fortunes in foreign banks. He asked the COB to set up a commission of economists to study 'how to increase wages along the lines suggested by the COB, and especially comrade Lechin, that is to increase wages without devaluation and without returning to the inflationary process and without frightening off the possibilities of private investment'. Nevertheless, Siles offered the hope that if production began to increase visibly by 1958, wages could be unfrozen and some increases could be granted. The workers in general, despairing of their poverty, had begun to urge the suspension of compensation payments to the former owners of the large mining companies. The President replied that this 'extremist' campaign was discrediting the country abroad and hindering efforts to secure credit from international organisations. In any case, Siles demanded, how could the COB leaders go back on their word?: 'Perhaps all the union leaders of all the mining districts have forgotten that the decree of 31 October 1952 stipulated that the former owners of the large companies would be compensated? Didn't Lechin himself sign this decree? Wasn't Mario Torres the Minister of Mines present when this decision was made?' He repeated the old phrases that not to pay compensation would amount to confiscation of the mines and the government would thus be regarded as communist. The miners' delegates had already resolved at an FSTMB meeting at Pulacayo that the workers' compensation for the abolition of subsidies at the company stores should be fixed at 12,500 bolivianos, and

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that this demand should be met by June 30 or else they would call a general strike. Taking the bull by the horns, the President urged the COB delegates to retract their commitment to a general strike unless, before June 30, the government raised the cost-of-living compensation. He argued that by making the strike official the COB would be setting itself against the country: 'Aren't people already stockpiling basic necessities in case there is a general strike? Aren't they already going off to the banks to ask for dollars, and won't this pressure increase the peso price of dollars? He had been publicly labelled a reactionary and anti-worker, but he rejected this charge in the following words: 'To increase wages and salaries, that is to say to increase the number of bank notes, without increasing the quantity of goods is to deceive the masses. Someone who deceives the masses is a reactionary.' Siles was prepared to play his last card and practically offered to resign the Presidency unless his opponents gave way, a tactic he was repeatedly to use. Since the delegates at this congress were deeply divided on allegedly theoretical grounds, the government machine immediately arranged for all sorts of organisations, ranging from Chaco War veterans through MNR bodies to housewives, to issue statements denouncing the strike. Eventually, after the congress had ended and on the eve of the longawaited strike, the executive committee of the COB called it off. They stated that this action was taken at the request of various labour federations. By their retraction they acknowledged that they had made a mistake in their choice of tactics for combating the stabilisation plan. They had become victims of a paper war. Apparently the President's speeches, a succession of anti-strike pronouncements, and the tenacious campaign by the MNR newspaper La Nacion, whose editor had been declared 'an enemy of the workers' by the second COB congress, were enough to put an end to the threat from the organised labour movement. On 5 July 1957 President Siles made a speech 'thanking the nation and the workers' for not having carried into effect the threatened general strike: 'Fortunately the Bolivian people stopped short at the edge of the abyss.' Siles clearly hinted that the COB 'which had been set up with the full backing of the MNR', could not and should not deviate from the official government line. To guarantee this objective, he proposed the 'restructuring' of the COB: 'The resolution passed at the last workers' congress calling for a general strike was put through by Trotskyist leaders', (here Siles is undoubtedly referring to ex-Trotskyists who had gone over to the MNR and were working with Lechin) 'and backed up by Falangistas. Last week's national pronouncement against the strike shows that the executive committee of the COB should include representatives of other large groups of workers, such as the railwaymen, factory and construction

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workers, drivers, printers, petroleum workers and others, as well as the miners and peasants.' In fact, the government was building up an alliance of trade unions opposed to Lechin — it became known as the Bloque Reestructurador. The failure of the strike produced crises within both the COB and the MNR. On 5 July the COB leadership announced a meeting which would be a session of criticism and self-criticism. This method was considered the best way of overcoming past errors (the bureaucracy was looking for scapegoats), of forgetting the political thesis they had approved, and of opening the doors to the pro-government dissident unions, whose number and quality was impressive. But those labour leaders who were following instructions from the Presidential Palace sabotaged this Lechinista arrangement. On 9 July a communique appeared from the railway and building workers' organisations, the taxi drivers, the bank employees, workers in telecommunications and telegraph, the printers and the petroleum workers.10 It declared that the proposed self-criticism was inappropriate, since it should have taken place during the second COB congress. Anyway, it added, since the leaders of the COB did not propose to resign, they were preventing any genuine 'restructuring' of the organisation. This Bloque Reestructurador was organised and controlled by the Silistas. Its divisionist position could clearly be deduced from the proposals it put forward for the revision of the statutes and programme of the COB. The proposals, which were aimed at justifying the support of certain sectors of the union bureaucracy for Siles, had very definite Stalinist traits. It set out to alter the structure of the COB and of the most important federations and even of the local unions. All were to be transformed from opponents of the existing regime to supporters. The radicalisation of the FSTMB

The meeting of miners' leaders which took place in Potosi at the end of 1957 was an important step forward on the road to the renewed radicalisation of the miners. At the eighth FSTMB congress held in Pulacayo in March 1957 the effects of the government's pressures and threats had still been apparent. The Potosi meeting, however, pointed the way to an independent class-based political line, proposing a break with the Siles government. The Marxists were able to play an important part in the meeting, where individuals who were to become prominent Marxist leaders made their first appearance: for example, my brother Cesar Lora, and Ireneo Pimentel, a Stalinist from Siglo XX. Also from Siglo XX came Filemon Esc6bar, a young Trotskyist. Seeing that they lacked a majority in this

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meeting, the right wing of the MNR organised street demonstrations and put pressure on the delegates from outside. Thus the meeting took place amidst the hostility of Silista crowds who demanded the heads of the leftwingers. The majority in the meeting aimed at cementing the unity of the working class — not just of the miners but of all the workers. To achieve this they agreed that they must shelve their differences over abstract principles and seek to bring together all sectors of the labour movement around a platform of immediate urgent demands. Faithful to its tradition, however, the leadership of the miners' Federation was unable and unwilling to free itself completely from the influence of the government. It had postponed the date of the meeting so that parliament could grant the President extraordinary powers to deal with economic matters. When the debates reached their most crucial point and the government was under bitter attack the FSTMB bureaucracy exerted pressure for the meeting to be brought to a hasty end. This behaviour confirms that its main aim was still to negotiate with the government and reach an agreement which would bring the Federation some short-term advantages. When the rank and file were on the offensive the Federation's leaders adopted a radical posture and gave the impression of being opposed to the government, but when Siles began to threaten them, they once more hastened to proclaim their loyalty to him. The Potosi meeting undoubtedly placed the miners at the head of the struggle for wage increases and against what they called the 'misgovernment' (desgobierno) of the MNR. The meeting reached the following decisions: (i) That the miners should be politically independent and should break with the reactionary policies of the Siles regime. In other words, the meeting proposed the ending of co-government between the MNR and the COB. They also deplored the decision of Congress to grant extraordinary powers to the President in economic matters, (ii) They rejected the monetary stabilisation plan which would increase the poverty of the masses. (iii) They demanded just wages and the establishment of a basic wage, related to price increases. The voting on political questions revealed the balance of forces between the opposition and the pro-government delegates. Seventy-eight delegates voted to reject the government's policies; eight voted in support of the government and there were 15 abstentions. The delegates' lack of confidence in their leadership was revealed by the approval of a resolution demanding that union decisions should be binding on the worker members of parliament. The meeting also voted in favour of maintaining the workers'

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immunity from dismissal, a conquest secured after 1952 and which was now being seriously threatened by Siles' proposed decree on 'free contracting'. The official reactions to the resolutions passed at Potosi were, to say the least, contradictory. Siles argued that the meeting, together with the failure of the attempted general strike on 1 July, should be considered as great triumphs for his government. The daily press of all colours (Catholic, imperialist and governmental) comforted itself with the idea that the meeting had been a failure and that the path was clear for building up a new workers' outlook responsive to the requirements of the government and the imperialists. LaNacion, a government paper, claimed that the miners' meeting had been easily broken up by the MNR demonstrators. The truth is that there was a lapse of three hours between the closing of the meeting and the MNR demonstration, which La Nacibn described as monstrously large, speaking of 25,000 movimientistas protesting against the communists. In fact they dispersed for fear of a counter-demonstration. It was in July 1958, at the ninth congress of the FSTMB, that the basis for an anti-government leadership of the miners was laid. This congress also placed the working class as a whole to the left of the MNR. The FSTMB decided on Colquiri as the seat of the ninth congress, after careful consultations with the unions of the district. But despite this, the government's local supporters, who had given birth to the so-called Bloque Reestructurador of pro-government unions (which the workers referred to as the 'Destructor'), launched an attack on the delegates who had come for the congress before the congress itself had begun. Armed elements, who had managed to secure support from a small disoriented sector of workers and who obviously had the support of the Political Police of the MNR, broke up the congress with gunfire. There is no doubt that this assault was organised by the Ministry of Government. This new development pushed Lechin towards a radical position and at times obliged him to identify with the Marxists. But on the other hand, the government's harassment of the Lechinistas obliged the Marxist revolutionaries, whose influence in the union movement was growing daily, to moderate their criticisms of the Executive Secretary and of the union bureaucracy. The government's attempt to silence the workers' opposition with bullets had a counter-productive effect, since it radicalised all the delegates, including the moderates and apolitical ones who were normally inclined to compromise. This armed attack involved more bloodshed: several workers were wounded and the delegates had to flee on foot to the city of Oruro. Lechin was obliged to flee along the mountainsides and through the mineshafts. It was due to the pressure of the Marxists, especially of the POR

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militants, Cesar Lora, Isaac Camacho, etc., that the delegates reassembled in San Jose, where the local worker-militias guaranteed the safety of the meeting. The ninth congress proposed that the FSTMB should place itself at the head of the national revolutionary majority. On economic matters the congress ratified the platform of demands approved at the Potosi meeting. On political questions the delegates' opinions were very clear cut. They all denounced the government as directly responsible for the attack at Colquiri and they ratified the decision taken at Potosi on the dissolution of 'cogovernment'. The executive denounced co-government as the cause of the country's misfortunes. This did away with the possibility that the government could continue to use 'worker' Ministers to disorient the workers and divert them from their strategic objective. It was agreed that there were two factors conspiring against the very existence of the COB: the growing bureaucratisation and corruption of its leaders, and the divisions within it fostered by the government. The ninth congress, therefore, proposed that the FSTMB should become the basis of a powerful democratic COB, unhampered by bureaucracy. The anti-national conduct of the present government clashes violently with the will of the workers, who are trying to consolidate the gains they have made up to now. Political developments have given rise to two clearly defined camps: (a) the government which is at the service of the imperialist and bourgeois interests, and (b) the labour movement which seeks the consolidation of the process of the national and social liberation of Bolivia. The latter has for a long time been composed of the union rank and file, and it is the task of the leading cadres to orient themselves correctly within this antagonism. The present government is anti-popular because it is trying to carry out policies contrary to the basic interests of the country. The union movement cannot be held responsible for these misfortunes, since it has not been consulted or taken into account in the formulation of these policies.11 The congress then took an extremely delicate decision from the point of view of the future of the labour movement: it decided it was necessary to disband the MNR militias, since these groups of armed workers had degenerated into servile agents of the government and the MNR Special Commands, which were following a reactionary anti-union policy in the work centres. At a given moment the conflict between the MNR regime and the labour Left was translated into a clash between trade unionists and the Special Commands and their militias.12 On 29 July 1958 the FSTMB presented a list of demands which included

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those approved at the ninth miners' congress, the most important of which was a demand for a pay increase for all mineworkers. The ensuing restrained discussions and fruitless efforts to reach an agreement directly with Comibol reflected the initial desire of the labour movement to obtain some tangible concessions, however small. Fruitless strikes and the invariable rejection of all the union's demands was threatening to dishearten the rank and file. The miners had put forward their pay claim and in reply the arbitration tribunal, which acted as a docile tool of the government and Comibol, decided to abolish the subsidies on the prices of nine articles in the company stores, in accordance with a curious counter-proposal put forward by Comibol in the middle of the conflict. The tribunal's findings, therefore, meant a further fall in the real income of the miners. Arbitration was useless, since every pay claim threatened to upset the stabilisation plan, which was the only programme President Siles had to offer. In late February 1959 a miners' conference at Oruro studied the four counter-proposals suggested by Comibol when the miners appealed against the tribunal's findings. The conference was extremely aggressive, and the Ministers who attended it made several concessions under pressure from the masses. Anibal Aguilar, the Minister of Labour, said there was complete agreement between the FSTMB's proposals and those of the government. Yet on their return to La Paz these Ministers defended the promise the government had made to the IMF to the effect that subsidised prices, including those in the mining-camp stores, would be abolished immediately. At this extremely inopportune moment the leaders of the FSTMB expressed, without any qualification whatsoever, their support for 'the revolutionary trade-unionist spirit of the Ministers'. This was the first sign of the alliance formed between Silistas and Lechinstas which persisted throughout the ensuing strike. The Oruro conference nominated the unions which were to form the strike committee, whose members were to be based in La Paz with a second group based on Oruro. The strike was to be coordinated from these two cities. But the obstructionist tactics of the FSTMB executive frustrated this plan: This mandate was not carried out because the delegates who had gone to La Paz were sent back to Oruro, with instructions that the committee should function exclusively from the mine of San Jose. Later this transfer, which had taken place exclusively on the orders of the FSTMB executive, caused the strike committee many difficulties.13 Lechin and his group were determined not to leave control of the strike in the hands of a committee composed of people who had always disagreed with the leadership's ideas and actions. On 27 February the strike com-

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mittee assembled in Oruro and set about its internal organisation. The result of the voting was a surprise for many people and pointed to the direction the conflict would take. The opponents of Lechin's compromises with Siles secured a majority on the committee. Before reaching Oruro these delegates had had to fight and win a real battle within the unions themselves. The strike committee was composed of 12 representatives from various mines, with Cesar Lora from Siglo XX as President. The organisation of the strike required the creation of local committees as well as the national strike committee, and thus an entire network of leadership was set up. The FSTMB bureaucrats and their followers thought these organisations would disappear with the failure of the strike, but in practice, once the conflict was under way (as a result of pressure from the local unions expressed through the committee), the middle level leaders gave their support to the local committees. Although this development was a response to the pressure of events rather than a conscious decision of these leaders, its effects were ideal in that it eliminated the continual clash between the two conflicting directorates. At a national level, however, this edifying example was not repeated. The FSTMB leaders had to express support for the strike committee because the majority of the workers demanded it, but in practice they fought ceaselessly against it. The strike committee obtained its support from the most radicalised, major mining centres, a fact which is indicative of the committee's revolutionary potential. The Federation, on the other hand, counted on the cooperation and passivity of the weakest, most isolated and dispersed sectors of miners who were the least politicised. The advantage of the strike committee consisted in its potential as a rallying point for all the workers, including those who had dropped out of trade union activities, in protest against the continuation in office, year after year, of leaders they distrusted. The committee functioned as follows: the basic decisions were taken by workers' assemblies; the Oruro committee used the Comibol radio network to hold daily discussions with the various mines on problems as they arose. The committee sought to complement this broad-based democracy with firm unity in action. The Federation, on the other hand, resorted to underhand manoeuvres in order to split the movement, proposing divisive ideas at the very moment of action. According to the national strike committee: The miners' conference called for the strike, but responded to the Minister of Labour's appeal by granting 10 days for negotiations. The conflict was basically about a 31.5% pay claim,14 and the question of abolishing price subsidies in the company stores was no longer at issue.

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Nevertheless the government asked for 10 days in which to discuss the prickly question of the subsidised prices with the IMF. In this way the government focussed the conflict on a problem which the workers had not put forward and did not wish to discuss. The dominant attitude at the conference was one of distrust in the government's promises. . . Virtually none of the promises which had been made to the FSTMB had been fulfilled. In was for this reason that the conference set up the national strike committee.15 At one stage the actual organisation of the strike was of less importance than the need to win widespread support from public opinion. While the government made great efforts to denounce the influence of extremists, the strike committee's propaganda activities were virtually non-existent and certain confusionist elements were even allowed to put out misleading communiques in the name of the committee. One of the reasons for this was the committee's lack of finance. The strike committee's cause was also seriously prejudiced by the fact that the Federation monopolised the propaganda, a development which was almost inevitable, given that the committee was working from Oruro. The miners' general strike began at zero hours on 3 March 1959 in accordance with the formal declaration signed by the national strike committee and the FSTMB leaders, although not until after a clash between the leaders who favoured a postponement and the rank-and-file delegates who wanted the conference decision carried out. According to the committee's report, the FSTMB personnel and some local delegates arrived in Oruro on 2 March to propose the postponement of the strike. The Secretary General of the Federation, Mario Torres, demanded that the executive be given at least a few hours more, arguing that 'he had received a note from the government through Minister Tamayo asking for more time'. After a stormy meeting this proposal was unanimously rejected, since the workers were already mobilised and ready to begin the strike and since agreeing to Torres' proposal implied the defeat of the movement before it had even started. Then at 11 p.m. on 2 March, after the strike declaration had been circulated, Lechin broadcast from La Paz to all the mines. 'He was insistent that the strike should be postponed, even if only for a few hours, arguing that the lapse of 10 days had not yet expired.' The strike committee rejected Lechin's suggestion and the strike began as arranged. The strike call was respected in a disciplined but enthusiastic manner in all the mines except Huanuni and Colquiri, although the latter had earlier contacted the committee promising their support. 'On the 4th, when the strike was already under way, Lechin insisted

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that it be called off for the sake of his own position and because the international situation (resulting from an article in Time magazine16) ruled out the possibility of discussion with the government and because public opinion was turning against the miners.'17 He added that at the moment there was no possibility of finding a solution to the conflict and that they were running a risk of losing the support of the rank and file. The President of the committee replied that public opinion was not against the strike, and that 'the publication which appeared in Time made no difference to the outlook of the government. The committee argued that suspending the strike was the same as breaking it, and this would have disastrous consequences for the labour movement.' The committee alleged that the obstinate determination of the FSTMB leaders to break the strike was prompted by their secret wish to return to co-government. 'These remarks received no reply because at this point the Executive Secretary of the Federation walked out of the radio office, an action which was not lost on the miners who were listening in to the discussion.' On 5 March at 5 p.m. the Ministers of Agriculture and Labour arrived in Oruro, accompanied by the Director of Comibol. Asked how they proposed to resolve the conflict, they replied that they would request the suspension of the strike until the international situation had improved and they had been able to raise the funds necessary to finance an improvement in the miners' wages. After an interval proposed by Torres, the entire committee walked out of the meeting, seeing that the government had no proposals to make which could end the strike. The committee warned of the danger that the government could make political capital out of the FSTMB's statements, which were the cause of the difficulties that had arisen in the Consejo Central Sud (especially in the mine of Siete Suyos) and in Colquiri, and of the fact that Huanuni had not come out on strike. 'The movement could not hope to triumph if there was one directorate in La Paz working for the suspension of the strike, while the national strike committee in Oruro was working to consolidate it, in accordance with the wishes of the rank and file.'18 On the 6th the first possibility of a settlement emerged. Broesma, the manager of Comibol, proposed a 12.5% across the board wage increase, plus a further 2.5% for the reclassification of workers, backdated to 1 October 1958, and the establishment of'a time span within which price subsidies would be abolished, mine by mine, in the company stores.' After consulting the unions the strike leaders made the following reply: (1) they would not discuss the question of subsidised prices because the conflict was not about that issue; (2) they accepted the retroactive character of the increases to 1 October 1958; (3) they agreed to the 2.5% for reclassifi-

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cation. (4) they proposed a 20% rise in wages and salaries. It is obvious that Comibors proposal was an attempt to pass off as a wage increase what was nothing more than compensation for the abolition of subsidised prices, but at the same time the proposal showed that there were possibilities of resolving the conflict. It is worth while examining the reasons why Huanuni did not join the strike. 'The workers are deeply divided and there is great opposition to the government, as was seen when Catavi and Siglo XX workers were arrested. But the present FSTMB executive has shown that it is incapable of polarising the growing discontent in Huanuni', commented the report of the strike committee. 'The government used all its resources to convert the Huanuni district into a government stronghold, as a counterweight to Siglo XX— Catavi. Besides the pressure and control exerted by the government policy, the miners were offered double shifts and special bonuses if they stayed at work.' Colquiri sent delegates to the strike committee and the FSTMB but only a part of the workforce came out on strike. 'Only the interior mineworkers came out on strike, and not until four days after it had begun. Their high level of class consciousness, their militancy and their radicalisation enabled them to break police control and create their own strike organisation . . . The committee was able to establish that the Special Command of the MNR, under the direction of the deputy, Dalence, put pressure on and issued threats against the strikes.' Recalling the tragic events at Colquiri the previous year when the miners' congress had been broken up, the strike committee made plans for the strikers to be transferred to San Jose, where they could be protected. The leaders of Siete Suyos began by explicitly campaigning for more time to be given to the government. 'The committee sent some activists to the area, which came out on strike after 10 days. The vacillating elements in Siete Suyos used Lechin's arguments as a pretext for their opposition to the strike. Also in the Southern Central Region the MNR special command at Atocha, directed by Guarachi, used force to try to make the workers of the Animas Mine return to work, but the rank-and-file workers responded violently to this provocation.' 'In every work place the workers' militias were put on the alert to resist the provocations of the government and its agents.' Mutual recriminations between the Federation and the strike committee became very bitter, but on the suggestion of the Catavi delegation it was agreed to postpone all discussions on internal differences until the strike was over, and to divide the functions of the two teams of leaders; the Federation was entrusted with the negotiations with the government in La

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Paz, while the national strike committee in Oruro was to concern itself purely with the functioning of the strike. This agreement was a setback for the strikers and a significant victory for the traditional union leadership. However, as soon as this division of labour had been agreed upon, the national strike committee set about winning the support of other sectors of the union movement, despite the opposition of the FSTMB. The committee made contact with the bank employees, rural and urban school teachers, factory and construction workers and the Oruro railway workers, public employees and finally with the Central Obrera Departmental of Oruro, all of which responded favourably. 'The railway and telecommunications workers and the bank employees proposed a general strike.' Various inter-union pacts were signed in support of the strike, all of which revealed the weakness of the COB as the driving force of the labour movement. In La Paz the COB, under pressure from the bases, declared that it was preparing to call a strike and summoned a meeting of labour leaders to study the miners' problems. 'However', continued the report of the strike committee, 'the mobilisation was weak because the proletariat has not yet completely overcome its organisational crisis and because the split promoted by the government in the ranks of the workers has not been entirely overcome. Nevertheless we should not forget that the novelty of our strike lies in the fact that it is not isolated with a hostile public opinion, as has been the norm in the recent past.' There was, in any case, virtually no prospect of implementing the COB's call for the unions to get onto a strike footing. Before the miners' leaders could formulate a counter-offer to the proposals of the authority, the government produced a Supreme Resolution which brought the conflict to an end. On 13 March it resolved to abolish all subsidised prices in Comibol stores. 'The Strike Committee and the local unions, on hearing of this decision, announced their firm rejection of it. Large demonstrations were held in Catavi, Siglo XX, Potosi and other mining districts.' Then on 15 March various leaders of the Federation headed by Mario Torres, asked the Strike Committee to suspend the strike since they had secured a concession concerning the price subsidies. 'The concession was that there would be a 120-day delay before the subsidies were entirely abolished, during which time discussions would be held on a mine by mine basis.' The issue was put to the rank and file, who resolved to end the strike once the Federation and the government had agreed on a formal document setting out the terms. 'In view of the discussion over this question, the strike was called off on 16 March, by radio messages from the FSTMB and not, as might have expected, from the Strike Committee.' The terms agreed were: (i) a 20% increase, backdated to 1 October 1958,

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in wages, salaries, bonuses and piece work rates; (ii) continuation of the price subsidies until Comibol and the unions completed their studies and agreed on the compensation to be offered for their abolition. Following the 15-day-long strike the workers emerged with their morale intact, but suspicious that they might have been cheated by the leader of the Federation. There was a strong reaction, extending to a willingness to renew the strike, when it became known that the government was implementing the original terms of the Supreme Resolution and immediately abolishing the price subsidies. But those local union leaders who had supported the Strike Committee and had expressed the opposition of their members to the abolition of subsidies found themselves displaced by more compliant leaders, who were quickly given recognition by both Comibol and by the FSTMB. With the strike called off, the Strike Committee disbanded, and the militants denied recognition, the balance of forces had again swung in favour of the Silistas, while the most advanced sectors and the 'extremists', especially the Trotskyists, became victims of harassment. At an FSTMB meeting convened in Catavi to study ways of carrying out the government's decisions within a few hours it was announced that the abolition of price subsidies had been accepted. Comibol called the leaders together and made them sign an agreement drawn up in Comibol's offices. The opposition was reduced to Siglo XX and the Trotskyists. The miners lost confidence in the leaders who had signed the agreement, and trade union activity fell to a low level.

20. The miners and the fall of the MNR The eleventh FSTMB congress

After 1952 the FSTMB congresses took the following form: when there was a need to fight against the government and put a stop to anti-worker measures (which at the same time would be an attack on the interests of the left wing of the MNR) a united front was automatically produced between the Lechinistas and the various Marxist groups. But every time the Federation bureaucracy supported official policy or came out in defence of Comibol the congress would centre around a conflict between the Lechinistas and the Marxists. At times such conflicts were limited to theor-

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The miners and the fall of the MNR

etical disputes, but at other times they developed into a battle for the control of the FSTMB. After four years of stabilisation and austerity, Siles finally completed his Presidential term in 1960, and preparations were made for new elections. Promising to revive the revolution, Paz Estenssoro secured the MNR's nomination for a second term, helped by support from the COB bureaucracy. In exchange Lechin secured the MNR's Vice-Presidential nomination, which assured him of victory at the polls. As a result of this realignment within the MNR, at the eleventh miners' congress held in Huanuni in May 1961, the governing party secured a majority. The FSTMB's leaders defended the new Triangular Plan (intended to rehabilitate Comibol by resort to foreign credit and advice),1 while the Marxists attacked it fiercely. But the most important dispute concerned an indirect attack on the Lechinistas, in which a great effort was made to remove Lechin's completely discredited ally, Mario Torres, from the executive of the FSTMB. Proportional voting had earlier been established, so that, to some extent, the revolutionary ideas of the large concentrations of miners such as Siglo XX, Huanuni or Colquiri, could carry more weight, but the FSTMB bureaucracy discovered a way of circumventing this advance. They easily conjured up a docile majority based on the small unions from the private mining sector, which were politically extremely backward. Some of these unions only existed in the imagination of the bureaucrats. This way the continual re-election of the old leaders was assured. As a challenge to the Left Mario Torres was appointed president of the congress. The Siglo XX delegation immediately opposed his nomination and walked out of the congress, followed by other delegates. It was therefore necessary for the congress to appoint a commission to persuade them to return. In subsequent years the battle against the Triangular Plan was to become the principal activity of the FSTMB, and the Lechinistas later changed their position without giving any satisfactory explanation. At the Huanuni congress this means of capitalising Comibol was presented as the main objective of the FSTMB, as if the plan had been devised by the workers themselves. The Triangular Plan was treated as though it automatically meant higher wages and an abundance of tools and equipment. Armando Morales, the spokesman for the San Jose mine, posed the problem in his usual cynical manner: 'He accused the extremists of trying to make the Triangular Plan fail, although at the same time it was the extremists who demanded subsidised prices and punctual payment of wages, which was precisely what the Triangular Plan would achieve - an improvement in the economic situation of the workers.'2 Lechin did not hesitate to follow the same line, or perhaps it would be

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better to say that he orchestrated the campaign from behind the scenes. 'Some time ago the workers were realistic enough to argue that capital must be found for Comibol, no matter where the credit came from. Thus, if Comibol obtains credit somewhere, it is adopting a progressive attitude which cannot be regarded as counter-revolutionary. For this reason we must support the plan. Some hotheaded leaders are trying to push the workers into an isolationist position.'3 Very few resolutions proposed by the Left were approved. The most important of them was a resolution referring to the defence of the Cuban Revolution and denouncing the North American's plans for an invasion of the 'free territory of America': 'The miners of Bolivia declare their active solidarity with the Cuban Revolution and, if the Bolivian government breaks off relations with the revolutionary government of Cuba, we shall mobilise immediately.' Relations were later broken off,4 but the promise to mobilise was not carried out. Third COB congress

By May 1962, however, when the COB met for its third congress, the upper levels of the union leadership appear to have realised that reactionary forces had won some key political victories and were strongly placed to undermine the conquests of the revolution. In the words of Juan Lechin: The growing aggressiveness of the fascist groups, who are busy undermining public order so as to restore the privileges of the oligarchy, can be largely attributed to the evident weakening in the workers' front and to the atomisation of the forces who have an interest in supporting the great objectives of the National Revolution . . . On this occasion we must not make the same mistake as at the Second Congress, which the workers left more divided than they had ever been before, because there was a clash between two conflicting political theories, and the debate about them only served to break the unity which had hitherto distinguished us, especially since the National Victory of April. Unexpectedly he went on to talk about the favourable international situation for the 'triumph and consolidation of genuine movements of national liberation'. However, he added, the working class prefers peaceful ways of structural change . . . Consequently, although the labour movement is ready to triumph through violence, this does not mean that the peaceful way should be dismissed, however minimal the possiblities it offers, provided, of course, that the objective conditions are such that the opposing classes realise that it would be useless to resist and more convenient to capitulate.5

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Lechin developed the proposition that both the union leaders and MNR militants were 'co-responsible for what has been done and for what has been tolerated from the revolution of 9th April up to today'. He added that the COB and the MNR should be regarded as Siamese twins: 'The first was the firmest supporter of the second, and shared in its victories and its defeats. For this reason it is impossible to say whether the COB was allpowerful because it had the backing of the MNR, or whether the MNR was undefeatable because its strength lay in the power of the COB. Thus, when the National Revolution becomes stagnant, so too does the COB.' What Lechin wanted was to close the gap which had been produced during Siles' government between the government and the workers. 'We believe that there is no sensible alternative but to maintain the existing revolutionary regime, perfect its goals and correct its errors . . . For their collective selfdefence the labour movement and the MNR have no alternative but to reinforce their mutual strength, coordinate their activities and jointly endeavour to deepen the National Revolution.'6 Lechin's strategy differed greatly from the objectives of the Marxists; for Lechin it was not a question of overthrowing the MNR regime but merely of perfecting it: 'We declare that the regime which arose out of the April events can be perfected and, so long as the facts do not contradict us, we must try to strengthen the regime and, through patient, responsible and continuous pressure, direct it to higher objectives which will correspond to the new balance of international forces and to the growing political consciousness of our masses.' He then argued that the demands for higher living standards need not pose a threat to the political stability of the country, provided that the issue was presented in the following terms: 'Either wage increases are needed or there must be price control and a reduction in the prices of basic necessities through various practical measures.' Lechin was dreaming of some Utopian lowering of prices 'which would not only benefit certain sectors of the working class, but all the working population, and would bring about a real increase in the purchasing power of the people'. Wishing to emphasise the possibilities for reform of the MNR government, Lechin diagnosed all its ills as due merely to the appearance and growth of what he called 'the cancer of insensitive, complacent bureaucracy, a monstrous power which easily engulfs opponents and is hard to fight'. His solution therefore was that the government apparatus must be purged of its bureaucratic tendencies, not an easy task politically because it implied a campaign against the right wing of the MNR. Lechin was sure that the Triangular Plan would save the mining industry, and he only objected to some defects in its application: 'Up till now as

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far as Bolivia and Comibol are concerned the only practical result of the Triangular Plan has been to regularise the payment of salaries. The Triangular Plan has been fully implemented on only one point so far, that is the punctual payment of extremely high salaries in dollars, to the members of the group of assessors, who show few signs of deserving the high remuneration so liberally established for them by the lending nations.' He then went on to say 'The lack of a stable overall policy towards domestic private enterprise has brought negative results. We have moved from a rigid control of exchange rates and extreme, counterproductive protectionist policies to absolutely unrestricted exchange and the paradox of encouragement to foreign competitors.' He added that the state, the workers and the business community all had a common interest in promoting domestic industry — a typical employer's idea which was repeated ad nauseam. 'There is no doubt that the recovery of privately-owned national industry can take place very rapidly if it is offered adequate, real, incentives, which will last for a definite period of time, so that the industrialist knows what to expect at any moment.'7 He dedicated a special section of his speech to the Alliance for Progress. He had unlimited confidence in 'the good intentions of President Kennedy' and so was full of confidence in the Alliance for Progress itself, but, he added, its application 'is being obstructed by an inefficient, insensitive and possibly reactionary bureaucracy'. Finally, Lechin asked the delegates to reconsider the problem of the armed forces in order to eliminate 'all antimilitary feelings, which are erroneous and negative, for they artificially divorce the working masses from those who should, in co-ordination with the popular militias, be the armed branch of National liberation'. Lechin's ideas on the army had changed a great deal since 1952. He now considered that the April Revolution had given rise to a new army: 'Logically the revolution posed the problem of the armed forces, whose organisation and outlook had now to be related to the requirements of our advance towards economic independence, and the defence of the interests of the Bolivian people.' Eager to gain the confidence of the army, he talked about the precarious condition of the commanders and officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers: 'It is necessary to amend these lamentable oversights and meet their legitimate needs', he urged. The twelfth FSTMB congress

The last official congress of the FSTMB before the overthrow of the MNR was held at the end of 1963, once again in Colquiri. It was an important event in both trade union and political history. The workers were by now

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aggressively anti-MNR but this anti-MNR feeling was distorted and capitalised by the Lechinistas, that is the union bureaucrats who had always found ways of perpetuating themselves in the key posts. The growing antiMNR feeling among the workers implied a shift to the left in the tense political situation. Lechin shared the workers' anti-MNR feelings and, by playing upon them in pursuit of his personal political interests, he stunted their revolutionary character. From the platform at Colquiri he announced his alliance with the Falange (FSB) and the military. Political developments favoured the creation of a left wing front, extending the tacit collaboration which already existed at local union level. But the Lechinistas proposed a much wider national alliance which required the workers to abandon their most progressive ideas and forget that the military was the greatest threat for the future of the revolution, and which, in short, would enable the Right to assume partial or total control of the masses. The Lechinistas argued that it was both possible and advisable to form a political front of all the political groups who had come out in favour of wage increases for the unions. Lechin had already reached agreements with the FSB and the military in La Paz and on the basis of this, without the knowledge of the FSTMB congress, he began to draw up a list of Federation leaders, in which FSB members were included. At this point in the proceedings the government had lost all its influence among the workers. The situation required all the trade unionists to form a united front against the government's continual onslaughts. The PORistas tried to alert the workers against the coming Right wing coup, but they were outnumbered by the combined strength of the Lechinistas and the Stalinists. The conduct of the Communist Party was motivated by the wish to secure help from the Lechinista bureaucracy to keep the Trotskyists out of the FSTMB. The Lechinistas, as usual, sought to discredit the revolutionaries, and this time they took special care to eliminate all criticisms of the military and to bury the traditional radicalism of the miners in a shower of verbiage. The official text of the Thesis of Colquiri has not yet been circulated, nor is it likely to be in the future either. Here we shall refer to the version published in Masas, which reproduced the entire text of the Trotskyists' proposals with notes on the amendments to the initial document. The opening paragraphs of the thesis state that: the government, on the instructions of US imperialism, is implementing a sinister plan to divide and physically eliminate the unions and destroy their leaders. Trade-union guarantees, which our class won after painful battles, have been repeatedly infringed and converted to mere lyrical declarations. We are back to a system of blacklists aimed at removing

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the best worker militants from their places of work, just as in the worst days of the rosca.8 The POR's denunciation of the anti-worker, pro-imperialist nature of the government was approved without amendment, as were its rejection of governmental attempts to destroy the unions and of the economic measures imposed by the Triangular Plan. The congress approved the following statement: 'Faced with an anti-worker government, we consider that the most urgent task of the present moment is to defend the existence of the trade unions which are in serious danger of succumbing to the government's reign of terror.' But the Lechinistas did not like it when the Thesis spoke of an independent working class and warned that the workers should not become pawns in the electoral game, and they ensured that such declarations were deleted. In the same way, they eliminated the paragraphs referring to the type of political alliances which the FSTMB could make. The Thesis went on to stress the urgency of arming the proletariat in order to guarantee the future of the revolution and the integrity of the unions. It was here that the Lechinistas showed their true colours by opposing the POR's severe criticisms of the army which had been reorganised by the Pentagon. They angrily opposed the last chapter of the document, which read as follows: The anti-union government and the imperialists are insistent in their efforts to disarm the workers and peasants and to reorganise the massacring army. But we miners insist that the only army which should exist is one based on the worker—peasant militias, which should be well armed and organised. The army has been reorganised and equipped by North American imperialism. The first steps in this direction were taken by the reactionary President Siles. This army has revived its caste spirit and has become a real political power. It has taken on the task of resolving all social conflicts, and is playing the role of a political force which transcends all party or sectoral differences. The present anti-worker government tends to resolve all social conflicts through the despotic intervention of the armed forces. It follows that, in the future, violence will be used to silence the just demands of the proletariat. We miners have only one way to respond to this situation: we must arm and discipline ourselves, so that in turn we can put up violent resistance to the threat of massacres presented by the present government . . . Since we are called on to fight an anti-union, proimperialist government, and we are forced to measure our strength against that of the army, we are obliged once again to regard the direct action of the masses as of primary importance.9

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This thesis was confirmed a few months later, when the new army clashed with workers of Siglo XX in the narrow pass of Sora Sora. The fall of Paz Estenssoro

From the moment the stabilisation policy was introduced every demand made by the unions, however modest, was liable to turn into a political conflict. This tendency became more marked during the third government of Victor Paz (May-November 1964), as outbursts of social agitation undermined the regime, which was pitted against the COB and the Lechinistas, who were excluded from power. Since the government was unable to cope with opposition pressures on its own, it became totally dependent on the armed forced, to the extent that the military were free to oust the discredited politicians of the MNR at the first opportune moment. This political situation led irresistibly to the establishment of a military regime. Mass opposition to the government began with the miners and other working-class groups who were the first to free themselves from the influence of the MNR. Once the most revolutionary class had taken the initiative, broad sectors of the middle class joined the revolt. Its leadership lacked coherence and direction, and at times it was the students and teachers who assumed the leadership of the other sectors in their battle against the government. But before the agitation could reach its peak it was frustrated by the intervention of the military. Both before and after November 1964 the peasants trailed behind the anti-MNR forces of the cities, the factories and the mines. Their political inexperience, their geographical dispersion, and their lack of education meant that their political learning-process was extremely slow. Indeed the peasants remained the MNR's last bastion of support. They could be mobilised every time the party needed to swell the numbers at 'spontaneous' pro-government demonstrations, and so they were used as a counterweight to the urban opposition. The government manipulated the peasants as their major source of votes. While the professional politicians were engaged in long discussions with Victor Paz, or conspiring with the generals who daily milled about the Presidential Palace, the organised workers engaged in direct action and even began taking up arms. The political parties, both those of the right and those that passed themselves off as left wing, were convinced that the popular movement lacked the strength to overcome the monstrous repressive apparatus set up by the MNR. They concluded that only the army could overthrow the regime. But it was an error to suppose that once the military had become masters of the situation they would share the aims of

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the mass of the people. In fact the interests of army and populace were diametrically opposed, and they were to follow completely different paths. Despite this, opposition politicians kept calling on the barracks and appealing to the Generals to make a revolution for them. Later on they were to protest that, although they had inspired the movement against Victor Paz, after its success they were let down by their military allies, and in some cases were even persecuted. But it is clear that the military leaders never seriously considered acting as the agents of any third party, whatever they promised to the civilian politicians (if indeed they promised anything). Both in La Paz and in the interior of the country, student agitation reached a peak in the fortnight following 20 October 1964. To put down the unrest, the government relied on the carabineros and the army, and a general wave of repression was unleashed against the left. Thus the student mobilisation (which took place parallel to that of the unions and in constant contact with them) gave an opening to the ambitious Generals. Cochabamba

The following extracts from the diary of a Cochabamba student illustrate the events of this period: Tuesday 20 October. After a meeting in the faculty of finances, at 17.30 hours we came out to protest against the imprisonment on Saturday of Willy Camacho. We gathered in the main square . . . where we found ourselves surrounded by the police, who dispersed us with tear gas. We managed to hold out on some street corners but eventually, as our number dwindled, we were forced to withdraw. On 21 October, barricades were set up and the streets round the university were blocked. The diary continues: We had an interview with the acting prefect, Colonel Augstin Morales Duran, who ordered us to take down the barricades. We replied that we would as soon as Camacho had been freed . . . At about 10 a.m. the police attacked the first time, using tear gas. We retaliated with stones and bricks. One student threw a Molotov cocktail with such accuracy that it landed almost on top of a carabinero. About midday the battle grew fiercer. The students were getting past the police so the government's militias intervened, armed with rifles and machine guns, and forced us back. This exasperated the students even more, and with remarkable courage they replied to the bullets with stones. By mid-afternoon there were few University students left out on the streets where the skirmishes were taking place; almost all those involved

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were secondary-school students. During the afternoon police reinforcements arrived from La Paz by air. By nightfall, we were surrounded by a large force of carabineros . . . We captured one carabinero and two plain clothes policemen as hostages. The Minister of Government arrived in Cochabamba to talk to the student leaders, in the hope of putting an end to the upheavals. He promised to free Camacho and agreed to exchange the three hostages for an equal number of students detained by the police. A meeting held in the University patio at 11 p.m. agreed to accept these terms. This event resulted in the death of one student, with ten wounded, and many policemen suffered from bruises. On 26 October the students of Oruro organised an aggressive demonstration in protest against the action of the authorities in Cochabamba. Two students were killed and many more were wounded. There were further clashes in Oruro on the 28th, when the funeral procession for those killed on the Monday was dispersed by bullets. Students, miners and factory workers fought back, and more people were killed and wounded. On the same day, students in Sucre battled with the police almost all day, and many were wounded. In Tarija, too, young people put up barricades, but in that city there were no clashes with government forces. Then on 29 October (the day of Sora Sora, to be discussed shortly) 'the students of Cochabamba attacked Prensa Libre, and the house of the leader of the MNR's political committee'. The third of November was a crucial day and, according to the diary quoted 'after four days of struggle we were overcome by the feeling of defeat'. Oruro had been put under military rule and the miners had returned to their camps. In La Paz the most militant worker and student leaders had been arrested. In Cochabamba the unrest had been cowed when the peasants were called in to encircle the city, and it became apparent that any demonstration was liable to be put down by a hail of bullets. Then, 'When normal activities seemed about to recommence and the citizens were setting off for work, soldiers from the CITE (Centre for Training Special Troops) entered the Plaza 14 de Septiembre, surrounded the area, and within a few minutes had taken over the prefecture. After brief talks the police went over to the insurgents who, by 8.30 am. on November 4th, were in control of the situation' in Cochabamba. La Paz

In La Paz the agitation reached a climax on 29 October. For that day, stu-

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dent leaders and opponents of the government had called a 'freedom march' starting from the University, which had become the stronghold of the opposition. 'Faced with this delicate situation, the MNR decided to respond by holding a simultaneous demonstration of party militants, peasants and workers.'10 In the hope of avoiding 'bloody and unforeseeable consequences' Paz Estenssoro decided that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Alfredo Ovando (in whom he had the greatest trust), should persuade the opposition to confine their activities to the precincts of the University, while he (Paz) would persuade his followers to stay in the area of the Plaza Murillo. However, on the night of the 29th the Cabinet was informed that some groups had left the University buildings and 'were ransacking and setting fire to the Ministry of Public Health, and attacking the Municipal Library and the offices of the newspaper La Nacion. The Ministers were agreed that the situation had become one of open sedition centred on the University. The armed forces were therefore ordered to bring the University under control, and General Ovando carried out these orders, arresting about a thousand people who had taken refuge in the University. Meanwhile news of the clashes at Sora Sora began to arrive. Sora Sora

On 28 October 1964 delegations of miners gathered in Oruro to attend the funeral of the students killed in the street-fighting against the Paz government and the army on the 27th. Catavi and Siglo XX were represented by small groups, and the majority of demonstrators from the mines were students from Llallagua's militant secondary school, the 'Primero de Mayo'. After the funeral there were new clashes, and the miners' radio stations of San Jose and Machacamarca, Huanuni and Siglo XX, redoubled their attacks on the government, vehemently denouncing the shooting of workers in Oruro. These broadcasts increased the feelings of tension in the working class. That afternoon the unions held small assemblies in Catavi and Siglo XX and it was decided to march on Oruro, perhaps to fight a decisive battle against the armed forces which were in control of the city. Catavi only provided enough men to fill one lorry, and Siglo XX enough for three. This small convoy of armed miners set off for Oruro at night on the 28th. Only the political activists took part (members of the POR, PC and a few from the PRIN). The majority of the miners were not involved . .. Meanwhile, throughout the country rebel radio transmitters reported that miners were marching on Oruro to overthrow the hated regime of Victor Paz. It is easy to appreciate that in such circumstances

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the forces of order were given ample warning to station themselves at strategic points in order to block the advance of the workers.11 It was agreed in Huanuni that the miners would first advance to Sora Sora, where dynamite was to be distributed, and then continue to Oruro. At this point Daniel Ordonez and other CP leaders climbed into an ambulance (which they did not leave until the action was over), no doubt in the belief that it would be respected by the enemy. At Sora Sora the Trotskyists' leader, Filemon Escobar, proposed the formation of a unified leadership to include representatives of all the political groups present. This was rejected on the grounds that Ordonez and other CP members were already leading the operation. The Trotskyists also suggested that their forces should wait until dawn in order to find out about the situation in Oruro and to locate the position of the government forces. This, too, was rejected, with the reply that the ambulance could obtain such information. The people in the ambulance ascertained that it was safe to advance as far as the meeting of the Oruro and Machacamarca roads. At the crossroads a peasant reported that soldiers were stationed a few yards away. Filemon Escobar immediately ordered his group of miners to leave their lorry and throw themselves flat on the ground. The soldiers (who were located on both sides of the road) then fired flares, and 20 minutes of cross-fire ensued. The leading lorry from Catavi managed to reach the works at Machacamarca, several kilometres away, and summoned the workers there by sounding the siren. Some from Sora Sora made their way there on foot but others remained stretched out under the lorry. By 4 in the morning the groans of the wounded could be heard; there were nine in all. By dawn of the 29th it became clear that the Communist leaders had fled at the sound of shooting and, worst of all, they had failed even to send the ambulance to pick up the wounded. Filemon Escobar climbed onto a lorry and said 'All the workers of the Frente Democratico should join me and return to Huanuni. We cannot fight alongside the Stalinists, who are cowards and traitors.' By 11 that morning more armed Trotskyists had arrived in Huanuni and were immediately organised into fighting groups. This enlarged contingent soon returned to Sora Sora, from where they advanced a further four kilometres until they reached the crossroads. Advancing from two directions, the miners battled with the army for more than four hours, and the miners made the troops retreat. According to La Patria of Oruro, many soldiers were wounded and there were some deaths. The Trotskyists even took some prisoners and managed to capture machine guns and automatic rifles. However, as they advanced cautiously towards Sora Sora, the Trotskyists were counter-attacked by two hundred soldiers

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who kept up a barrage of gunfire. The miners found themselves at a severe disadvantage, and it was very difficult for them to break through this barrier. The attempt would probably have resulted in the death of all the Trotskyists. Cesar Lora hastily discussed this issue with his group and it was decided to return to Huanuni (which was at this moment securely in the hands of the workers). The rearguard contented themselves with patiently waiting for the outcome of this confrontation, and then fled to Huanuni. Had the Stalinists not been, as always, such cowards and traitors, the miners of Siglo XX-Catavi and Huanuni might well have gained control of Oruro, in which case they could have precipitated the downfall of the anti-popular Paz Estenssoro regime and changed the whole course of the upheaval. The Military Junta

As it turned out the disloyalty of General Ovando (the Commander of the Army) proved to be one of the key factors facilitating the rapid overthrow of Victor Paz for, while the President continued to regard his army commander as his most loyal supporter, Ovando was actively involved in organising the conspiracy. After the event the army described the coup as follows: On 3 November the armed forces, headed by General Rene Barrientos Ortuno and General Alfredo Ovando Candia, rose up en masse against the government, first at the Cochabamba garrison and then, twenty-four hours later, in the decisive events of the 4th in La Paz, they sealed the fate of the tyrant. Already before that, on 1 November, signs of the rebellion appeared when the Ingavi and Politecnico regiments adopted an institutionalist position and refused to fire on the people in a fratricidal battle . . . All plans of resistance were abandoned when the Oruro garrison also joined the revolt, thus demonstrating the total unity of the armed forces.12 The Military Junta declared that its first objective was 'to re-establish the fullest public liberties and unrestricted respect for human rights as set out in the Declaration of the United Nations'. The new military rulers also thought it opportune to reiterate their firm intention to 'attract and guarantee foreign investment in the unexploited riches of the nation', and declared that they were fervent supports of the Good Neighbour policy and the principles set down in the Alliance for Progress. Finally they declared that 'the Nationalisation of the mines, the Agrarian Reform and the Fiscal and Educational Reforms were irreversible'.13 As for the politicians, at the time I commented on their predicament as

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follows: 'All the political parties, with the exception of the revolutionary Marxists, formed a common front to encourage the military coup. They united around one simpleminded aim: the generals were to remove Victor Paz and then to hand over power to the civilian politicians . . . They are now paying a high price for their blindness.'14 In essence this curious alliance of parties was counterrevolutionary (even though it included the Stalinists and members of the PRIN), since it sought to blot out the profound differences which separated the revolutionaries from the rosca. It was destined to enlist the exploited masses in the monotonous chorus of praise to the generals. The Revolutionary People's Committee called itself the 'popular parliament'; it met in the legislative chamber and was in constant conclave with the victorious generals. But it had a short life. The moment it attempted to turn its strength against the military regime, it was promptly dissolved. It seems that the generals hoped that their mere presence in the Palacio Quemado would secure the support of the workers, who would cooperate enthusiastically with all the proposals of the Junta. Since they were sure of the cooperation of the political parties, they turned their attention to the trade unions, urging them to set aside their intransigent attitudes, drop their demands for wage increases, and back the new government and its plans for the reorganisation of COMIBOL. The government followed this line for about six months, but the workers, and especially the miners (but not, needless to say, the top level of the union leadership), were in the opposition from 4 November onwards. It was not long before General Barrientos paid a visit to the principal mines. Despite the carefully orchestrated receptions the authorities could hardly conceal the hostility of the workers. However, in Siglo XX he was welcomed by the Communist union leader Daniel Ordonez whose speech included such phrases as 'The Paz Estenssoro regime could never solve our main problems. We need diversification of the mining industry in Bolivia; we need smelters; and above all we want no more poverty in our country. We pay you our respects, General... It is always being claimed that the mines are centres of extremism and arbitrary conduct. On this visit you have been able to judge for yourself, since we miners treat people for what they are worth . . . ' Soon afterwards the junta, distrustful of the masses, introduced 'Operation Disarmament' which was intended, in the words of its sponsors 'to withdraw from circulation the weapons held by the people and return them to the Armed Forces'. Rifles and machine guns (mostly unusable) were collected up in a blaze of publicity. This programme did not, however, operate in the mines. Only after the military junta had exhausted peaceful methods did it resort to a policy of brutal repression. Reactionary

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governments always end up trying to curtail the freedom of the trade unions and restrict their legal rights. The extreme politicisation of Bolivian unions and the ideological independence of their leaders have always worried the authorities. In May 1965 the military junta introduced Decree No. 7204, giving the Minister of Labour such powers that not only were trade-union freedoms abolished, but the unions themselves were virtually liquidated. Trade-union leaders were forbidden to belong to certain parties, and the rank-and-file authority was supplanted by bureaucratic instructions from the Ministry of Labour. The workers' reaction was to organise clandestine measures. The significance of the coup Considering the social and political character of the organisation which led the coup (the army), and considering their intentions and achievements, and above all considering that the operation was planned and executed under the direction of imperialist forces, it is impossible to deny that what took place on 4 November 1964 was a typical counter-revolutionary coup. It is false to maintain that the coup was the culmination of a revolutionary mass mobilisation against the MNR. The truth of the matter is that the masses knew nothing of the Generals' conspiracy, and it developed quite independently of their actions. The basic reason why the army seized power with US approval was that the final Paz Estenssoro government had shown itself unpopular and unviable. It was incapable of controlling the workers and inducing them to accept the conditions required by Washington. According to our creditors, Bolivia's economic deterioration could only be rectified if all the labour movement's demands for better living and working conditions were resisted, and above all if the wages and social benefits of the workers were reduced, while their rhythm of work was intensified. The Paz government was incapable of implementing this programme or even of giving it effective expression. Its attempts to carry through such measures met with strong resistance in the mines where the government's efforts provoked a threatening mobilisation of workers, which it was unable to repress effectively, however much it might have wished to. Thus US security-officials came to regard the civilian MNR government as a factor which favoured the emergence of a dangerous Communist threat. In other words, they feared that the Left might end up overthrowing the MNR and seizing power. The moment had come when only the armed forces could defend interests and privileges favoured by the USA. Thus the coup of 4 November was essentially preventive. It was directed against the social bases of the revolution, rather than against Paz

33 5

The miners and the fall of the MNR

Estenssoro and his friends. Its timing was determined by the rising momentum of the mass movement. The military had achieved a brief tactical victory over the demonstrating civilians and this encouraged the army to act quickly and thereby ensure that their palace coup was not transformed into a real popular revolution. Although the civilian MNR proved itself incapable of fully developing a bourgeois democracy, it remained formally committed to certain liberal principles which restricted its effectiveness as an agency of repression, and it dared not move on from influencing the labour movement through corruption and bureaucratic manipulation to the more drastic method of outright physical coercion as the main instrument for regulating governmentworker relations. Of course it is true that the MNR did arrest, imprison and kill workers and left-wing opponents, but such extreme tactics were only used as a last resort and in exceptional cases. What was at stake in the coup was not any modification or amendment of the MNR's ideology (which consisted essentially of trying to transform the economy within narrow capitalist limits and of harmonising the development of the country with the plans and interests of the US government). The change only concerned methods, not objectives, with the new junta replacing the civilian government's pseudo-democratic tactics by ones that were purely military. The MNR's tradition as a popular 'revolutionary party' had, at crucial moments, proved a burden to the Paz government. He could not jettison this tradition, for it was part of his political capital. So what was at issue in the coup was the replacement of the dilatory manoeuvres favoured by the MNR by a much more direct onslaught on the power of the labour movement. Such considerations must have weighed with US policy-makers at the time of the coup. It is common knowledge that differences and tensions existed between the State Department and the Pentagon, especially with regard to Latin American policy. While the former was sponsoring various civilian and 'democratic' governments, the latter favoured the establishment of directly pro-American military dictatorships. In the event, the Pentagon's line prevailed throughout Latin America, and in Bolivia they had been organising the army for some time back with this end in view.15 In any case all the country's professional politicians had already committed themselves to the cause of the generals, so they had no alternative of their own to offer the Americans. The military regime made a point of stressing, especially in its early months, that its immediate purpose was not to undo entirely the work of the MNR. Instead, they promised to continue much as before, but eliminating what they referred to as the terrible inheritance of the Paz Estenssoro

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clique. So firm were they in this position that they were willing to cooperate with ex-President Siles Zuazo and other politicians who, although they were disaffected from Paz, continued to work within the MNR. Later of course such men fell into disgrace, but that was because they were too ambitious and refused to serve the military regime with sufficient abnegation. Supporters of the MNR have tried to defend even the last government of 1964, by arguing that the intransigence of the left-wing opposition and the militancy of the masses contributed to the success of the reactionary coup. By this reasoning they arrive at a simplistic conclusion: the revolutionaries should have closed their ranks behind the MNR government and refrained from anything which might provoke the military hierarchy. What this amounts to saying is that the Marxists should have committed political suicide in order to leave the MNR free to continue governing. The restoration of the oligarchy

There was nothing very new about US intervention in the internal life of the country, or government measures designed to permit the unrestricted exploitation of Bolivia's natural resources, for the MNR government had itself pursued its own version of these policies. What was significant about the Junta was that now the old rosca believed that the moment had arrived for revenge, and in this it was by no means mistaken. For the November coup ushered in an open restoration of the oligarchy. This meant more than just intensified efforts by the government to protect the material interests of property-owners. In addition, the rosca began once again to play a part in political life. We can see this in the way it resumed its hold over the social and cultural life of the country and over the creation of ideology. From the coup onwards, not only were official policies designed to promote private enterprise, but also the rosca was physically re-installed in the seat of political power, just like in the old days of Liberalism. The key posts were occupied not merely by right-wingers but by well-known representatives of the oligarchy. Pampered sons of high society returned to occupy the posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Economics was handed to the director of a large company who expressed the outlook of the rosca. Leading members of the rosca returned from exile and their honours and decorations were returned to them. The Condor of the Andes was once again pinned on the flabby chests of all kinds of ageing oligarchs. The public administration and state enterprises were all reorganised to the disadvantage of those strata of the middle classes which had benefited most from the MNR.16

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However, the balance of political forces in the country did not permit a peaceful restoration of the oligarchy. A government by one of the traditional right-wing parties, or even the Falange, would have lacked sufficient force to impose the exceptional measures which were required by the reaction. In order for an attack on the revolution to succeed, it required a disguise of populist poses and pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric. The old order could not of course be restored by means of some democratic formula, or consultation with the people; that was not the rosca's way. On the contrary it was bound to resort to violence and military might. In conclusion, it was mistaken to see the military Junta as the negation either of the MNR as a whole or of the Paz Estenssoro wing of the party, which in its final stage was clearly identified with the counter-revolution. Rather, the military regime was a continuation and extension of the rightwing tendencies displayed by the MNR. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to regard the military dictatorship as a simple repetition of the MNR regime. On the one hand it is true that the MNR government never went so far as to outlaw Marxist parties directly, whereas the military government had no scruples about this. On the other hand the same thing would, however, have happened if the right wing of the MNR had managed to seize power on 6 January 1953 (when their attempted coup failed). But not even the most resolute supporters of an oligarchic restoration could hope to eliminate all the revolutionary transformations which have taken place in the country. These changes have become part of the national patrimony and will serve as a touchstone for the construction of the future society. Thus the Sociedad Rural de Cochabamba (which is composed of the ruins of the latifundista class) never dared claim the return of their big haciendas; the most they demanded was a restriction on the scope of the Agrarian Reform law. (The extreme slowness of the Servicio de Reforma Agraria gives room for considerable chicanery.) The restoration might undermine or annul certain partial aspects of the great reforms, but the rosca could never achieve its dream of a complete return to the old order. The FSTMB conference of December 1964

A month after the coup d'etat of 4 November 1964 another miners' conference was held in La Paz. At this important conference the political positions of the different ideological groups within the labour movement were defined. The largest group was Lechin's new party the PRIN, but it was deeply divided between those delegates who were subject to the pressure of the rank and file and the PRIN leaders, who were seriously

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competing with the military regime and still harboured hopes of taking power through their agreements with the government. This division within the Lechinista group strengthened the radicals. Lechin felt it was more convenient not to attend the conference. He was, however, working behind the scenes, directing the manoeuvres of the most enthusiastic PRINistas. The decisions of the conference amounted to a tacit censure of Lechin's conduct at the crucial moments on 4 November. As soon as the PORistas put their proposals to the conference, Lechin gave instructions for the preparation of counter-proposals, referring to a Nasserite tendency within the army, which made it inopportune to criticise the armed forces.17 In this way he attempted to justify his compromise with the counter-revolutionaries. The Trotskyists have argued on various occasions that the material conditions for the development of Nasserism in Bolivia do not exist because of the extreme weakness of the Bolivian petty bourgeoisie with regard to the imperialist oppression. The PRIN merely proposed that the conference demand immediate elections without the participation of the military or the post-coup government. But this proposal was unacceptable to the meeting, because all Bolivian workers had enough experience to know that it was impossible to defeat the generals by resort to the ballot box, and because there was a strong feeling in the air that the Military Junta was pushing the country towards civil war. The conference rejected all the recommendations and the underlying assumptions of the PRIN thesis. The attitude of the Sindicato de Metalurgicos of Potosi to a large extent determined the line of the conference. Their delegation, headed by Trotskyists, proposed the need for the working class to develop an independent class-based political line and made clear their repudiation of those responsible for the coup of 4 November. Thus the conference rejected any alliance with non-revolutionary political groups. The PORistas campaigned for the conference to condemn the Military Junta and denounce the proimperialist army as the principal threat to the revolution and the very existence of the trade unions. They argued that the replacement of Victor Paz Estenssoro's clique by the Military Junta did not modify the essentially anti-national and anti-worktng-class character of the government. However the conference's committees made a synthesis of the POR's proposals which deliberately concentrated on moderating the sharpest criticisms of the military regime. For example, in the original the Military Junta was described as the culmination of the Right wing pro-imperialist tendencies which had been at work in the MNR regimes and was, therefore, condemned as being further to the Right than the Paz government. However,

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in the end, the conference merely resolved that the two regimes were identical. The POR explained the coup as follows: The basic cause of the coup of 4 November lies in the fact that representatives of the United States, in this case of the Pentagon, decided that the last MNR government was unviable. The Paz government, supported by an atomised and completely anti-popular party, was incapable of adequately implementing the plans approved by the State Department, most notably the Triangular Plan which was not yielding the desired increases in production. Experience has shown that a government which clashes with the interests and feelings of the workers is incapable of saving the country's economy. Our oppressors decided that the moment had arrived to change the methods of government, though not the system itself or its objectives. Rigged courts, fraudulent elections and the intermittent persecution of union leaders were, they considered, no longer sufficient and therefore military methods would have to be used . . . In other words, the Military Junta constitutes a fascist version of the regime headed by Victor Paz.18 The Left suffered a setback when the entire third chapter of the PORista thesis, referring to the arming of the workers and the strengthening of the militias, was eliminated. But on the other hand the conference adopted the proposal of the Potosi delegation that the FSTMB should withdraw from the People's Revolutionary Committee, a broad political front headed by a prominent leader of the PRIN which had been created to back up the new regime. The contradiction between the two tendencies was most apparent in the section on 'methods of struggle' which, at the specific request of Lechin, referred to the need for honest democratic elections, despite the fact that a few lines earlier the resolution had rejected parliamentary methods as an ineffective way of combating the military threat.

Book 8:

The military versus the unions 21. Repression The military junta on the offensive

The miners' intransigent position against the military government gradually won over other sectors of the labour movement, and the opposition grew in strength as various political parties, which had at first supported General Barrientos, turned against him. At the May Day demonstrations of 1965 the demonstrators singled out the Military Junta as the target for attack and, although he tried to cool the spirit of the unions, Lechin adopted a radical position, taking care, however, not to identify himself with the communists. 'At midday, it was Lechin's turn to speak, and from the balcony of the FSTMB office he appealed to the Junta to adopt a new political and economic line adjusted to the current situation of the country . .. Later on he condemned the United States intervention in Asia and the armed invasion of the Dominican Republic . . . It was the hope of the people that the armed forces would fulfil their promise to preside over honest elections, he declared.'1 Shortly afterwards, on 12 May 1965, the miners, factory and construction workers, and the rural and urban school-teachers signed a pact in La Paz, proclaiming that they would struggle together to defend the trade unions and to secure social and economic improvements for the workers. This proclamation took place while the COB was still in existence. The Sub-secretary of the Ministry of Government, Antonio Arguedas,2 responded by telling journalists that he would prove, in the courts of justice, the double identity of Lechin, who was accused of holding documents as a Chilean citizen. Later, events revealed that this bold accusation was designed to facilitate Lechin's removal from the leadership of the unions. The national executive committee of the COB declared all the workers' organisations on a state of alert and announced that the Executive Secretary of the COB was in danger of arrest. Their communique read: 'Juan Lechin is the object of a persistent campaign of persecution by the Depart340

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ment of Criminal Investigation (DIC) . . . The COB condemns the repressive policy which the government has adopted and which is beginning to take effect with the harassment of comrade Lechin. It is evident that the suspension of elections is a step towards military dictatorship . . . ' The picture became even gloomier when it was known that the Paraguayan press had announced the arrival of Lechin in exile. In fact the Military Junta had decided to use Lechin's arrest as a means of provoking the working class to a showdown, so that it would then proceed, regardless of all restraints, to reorganise Comibol in order to cut its losses and boost production. On 15 May 1965 Lechin was exiled to Paraguay. A communique of the Ministry of Government declared: The Military Junta will maintain authority inflexibly, within the legal framework which regulates all the government's actions. Trade-Union Law will be respected, as will all the rights of the working class, but the latter should not allow themselves to be led into irresponsible activities of the type into which this master of adventurism and corruption, who for 30 years has persistently deceived the working masses, has sought to precipitate them . . . ' 3 By the 16th the most important mines had been taken over by the workers' militias, without waiting for a decision from the national executive of the FSTMB or the COB'. 'The political events in La Paz have mobilised the armed militias in the mining districts and they have taken control of the main mining centre of Catavi-Siglo XX . . . According to radio reports from these areas, the Catavi union has issued an eight-point communique warning the armed forces "not to continue with the provocation, or else the miners, peasants and middle class will force them to bite the dust in defeat, just like Victor Paz".'4 The union leaders announced that they had taken over armed control of the district to avoid a surprise attack 'by the gorilas5 at the service of Yankee imperialism'. All approaches to the mines were guarded, housewives stocked-up with provisions for the coming battles and the agents of the DIC were told to leave Llallagua. Other mining districts immediately copied this example, and the university students offered to cooperate with the miners. The general strike which ensued revolved around three national demands (1) the immediate return of the Executive Secretary of the COB; (2) a general increase in wages; and (3) the maintenance and enforcement of the legal guarantees which protect trade-union activities. To justify the strike and extend it throughout the country the Executive Committee of the COB issued a long manifesto, which was a direct attack on the military Junta and which revealed the influence of the POR. But events showed that the COB leaders, who had become unexpectedly radical in the absence

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of Lechin, were no longer in control of the labour movement. The COB manifesto called on the Bolivians to crush the military regime, which was described as the embodiment of fascism: The generals are using violence and machine-guns to impose on us the the colonising plans of the Yankees. Bolivia is being turned into a military base of imperialism. Their objective is to reduce production-costs by increasing the poverty of the masses. The present regime is governing against the people and on behalf of international capitalism. This is fascism! The only purpose of the State of Siege decreed by the Military Junta is to crush the labour and revolutionary movements. The people's democratic guarantees have been abolished. Our native land is nothing more than a barracks, where the sword of an inept diminutive general holds sway . . . This is fascism! Following in the footsteps of the sadly famous butcher General Hugo Ballivian, [President, 1951/2] the Military Junta has ordered that all union posts be declared vacant. When the wishes of the rank and file are replaced by nominees of the General it means that the unions have ceased to exist. The constitution and the laws, which, up till now, have regulated the life of the unions, have been replaced by military orders. The workers are no longer allowed to think for themselves and choose their own political ideas; they must simply obey a sergeant's orders without thinking.6 The government's decisions to increase the size of the army's budget and to introduce the militarisation of labour, which opened up the possibility of the legal imprisonment of union leaders, were condemned as totalitarian. The document stated that one of the military regime's objectives was to militarise work 'in such a way that strikes and the struggle for better living and working conditions will be outlawed . . . In order to increase the profits of the employers and the imperialists, the government is going to throw out of work all the workers they regard as superfluous, thus adding to the mass of unemployed.' The manifesto stressed that the strike had not been called in the interests of any leader or any personal interest: 'It is to serve the people themselves, the workers, the peasants and the impoverished majority of the middle class.' The aim of this revolutionary movement was to close 'all the doors through which the rosca or their puppets seek to creep back'. Its strategic objective was to form a government of the Bolivian people, 'of workers and peasants and those who love their country and reject a dictatorship sold out to imperialism.' 'The future of the country and of the revolution is in the hands of the

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heroic miners who have risen up in arms. They have given us a magnificent example which we should imitate: the general strike has been accompanied by a general mobilisation of the worker-peasant militias who, at an opportune moment, will become guerrillas fighting for the liberation of our people. The miners will lead us to victory provided they obtain sufficient active support in the cities.' Finally the manifesto appealed to the soldiers, non-commissioned officers and young officers to join the popular revolutionary movement: 'The guns should be turned on the fascist generals.'7 However, in the cities the strike was relatively weak from the very beginning, revealing the bankruptcy of the COB leadership. In order to crush the miners, the government had to attack the mining camps, shooting miners who resisted and putting mining camps under military command. In La Paz the factory-workers' radio, Continental, was silenced by mortar fire; in an assault on the building-workers' union office one of the union leaders was killed. The mine of Milluni was first bombarded from the air, after which regular troops moved in to fight the workers, who had dug trenches to defend themselves. The mine of Kami was occupied peacefully when the army came to requisition the arms which the unions had accumulated. Siglo XX suffered the fury of the regiments which were sent to occupy the rebellious centres. The soldiers broke into every house, turning mattresses inside out and rummaging through chests, and searching the roofs looking for arms and dynamite. Hundreds of workers fell in the May onslaught. The anti-worker decrees of May 1965

These events were followed by legal measures authorising the destruction of the unions, attempts to subject them to close official vigilance, reductions in wages and the recontracting of personnel by Comibol. On 17 May 1965 the 'liquidation' of the unions was decreed, recognition was withdrawn from the union executives and various pro-labour regulations ceased to be enforced. On 23 May the most important of the decrees crushing the labour movement was enacted. Colonel Lechin (Juan Lechin's half brother), President of Comibol since the November 1964 coup, said that 'as a result of the decrees all union leaders will be sacked; those workers who wish to retire may do so, and in the meantime the rest will be recontracted'. The decrees, he said, 'mean the end of the extremist dictatorship of the unions, under which the country has lived for the last 12 years'.8 The decree stated that: During the last 12 years the most alarming and demagogic unruliness has prevailed, with the adoption of an irresponsible wages policy which

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could and can only be financed by the wasteful allocation of vast sums of money . . . Extremist and anarchist leaders, prompted by financial incentives from the government, have incited the miners to violate continually the basic norms of respect and worker discipline, on occasion giving rise to armed uprisings commanded by local bosses who had converted various mining zones into their own fiefs, making rational technical and administrative management impossible and in turn leading to disorderly and uneconomical exploitation of the mineral deposits . .. That from the end of 1963 to 1964 an irrational and counter-productive wage system prevailed in most sections of the Corporation, and this system, instead of stimulating a healthy level of output and higher productivity, brought about a disproportionate rise in labour costs and intensified social unrest among the workers. . . 9 It was decreed that from 1 June 1965 the wage-scales and the contract rates would be lowered to the levels in force in the Quechisla mine on 13 August 1964. This measure implied a 40% cut in wages for many workers. At no point did the workers express their support for this way of reorganising the enterprise, still less did they accept the wage cuts. Initially their opposition was unexpressed but it soon became openly apparent. Meanwhile the government went to great lengths to try and induce the workers to work tranquilly and to resign themselves to the distant hope that a rise in Comibol's profitability would be followed by some improvement in their own living conditions. Some second- and third-rank unionists rose to high positions of leadership in the unions by befriending the company or the government, but they soon found themselves obliged by pressure from the bases to shift to the left, and hence their names too were added to the government's black list. The clandestine unions

When the army and the police attacked the mines in May 1965, the best union militants left the districts and went to nearby villages where they set up centres of resistance to the military regime and its plans to reorganise Comibol. The clandestine unions were indispensable organisations for the continuation of the workers' struggle. The leaders of the clandestine unions used to make secret visits to the interior of the mines, where they held unexpected meetings and left instructions before disappearing once again under the cover of night. The clandestine unions were able to exist and function thanks to the cooperation of groups of university students and the intelligent use of radio transmitters and newspapers. They started in Siglo XX and the example was copied in other mines, but the real centre

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of the movement soon became Oruro, where the best leaders were concentrated. It was, however, extremely difficult to set up a national underground directorate. There was a conference in Oruro, and a clandestine meeting of the FSTMB in the university of La Paz, but they produced few results because of the conflicts between the different political groups on the left. The clandestine unions drew up a programme which was adopted by Siglo XX, Huanuni, San Jose and Potosi. It included the following points: (1) To use all methods to oppose the generals' fascist government. To fight against the military servants of the Yankees and not to falter until a government of workers and peasants was established. (2) To secure the repeal of the decrees reducing wages and secure their restoration to their May 1965 level. (3) To demand the withdrawal of the armed forces and police from the mines and an end to the persecution of the workers; that no worker should be penalised for his political ideas, and that all workers sacked after May 1965 be reinstated. (4) To demand unrestricted freedom for trade unions and respect for the laws guaranteeing the freedoms of trade unionists. They declared that the government was committing an abuse by appointing trade union leaders: the fate of the unions should be decided by the rank-andfile workers.10 This programme can be reduced to two basic points which guided the workers' actions at every moment: the restoration of wages to their May 1965 level and the withdrawal of troops from the mines. The generals tried time and again to silence the growing social unrest by the use of force; they also tried to carry out some economic reforms, but without achieving their objectives. The night of San Juan

The resistance of the workers, especially the miners, began to acquire massive proportions and to be a danger to the stability of the military regime. On the basis of past experience it was possible to foresee that the Executive and the armed forces would make a preventive attack in order to overwhelm the most important mining centres. The events of June 1967 were the most dramatic examples of this policy. In February 1967 Vincente Mendoza, a leading Christian Democrat, was sacked as Minister of Labour. Mendoza had promised a favourable solution to the demands put forward by the legal unions six months earlier, and his dismissal shattered the illusion that there might be a peaceful settle-

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ment. The workers of Siglo XX—Catavi intensified their opposition, concluding that 'Barrientos and company were resolved to use violence once again in response to the workers' demand for the restoration of their wages' (to the May 1965 level). According to observers who were in the mining camps at the time, the official announcement of the existence of a guerrilla movement led by Che Guevara (in March 1967) temporarily paralysed the miners, but then they gradually began to concentrate their attention on the struggle for their immediate interests once again. On 19 April a general assembly of Catavi workers agreed to convene a national miners' meeting, to which other sectors of the labour movement and university students were invited. On 6 June the delegates assembled in Huanuni, where they approved the following demands and resolutions:11 (1) The restoration of miners' wages to their May 1965 level. (2) The reinstatement of union leaders and rank-and-file workers who had been sacked since May 1965. (3) To support the guerrillas by providing them with food and medicine. (4) To hold a national meeting of the FSTMB in Catavi-Siglo XX on 24 June. (5) To hold a demonstration of popular unity in Oruro on 8 June. On 6 June the government declared a state of siege to force the cancellation of the demonstration and the miners' conference. The repression was aimed principally at the miners, and troops and carabineros were sent to the mining camps. Everything the miners' leaders did and said was blown-up out of all proportion by the government, which used every device to identify the miners' struggle with the guerrillas in the South East of the country. After the massacre President Barrientos (1964—9) made the following declaration: I'm not making up a story; the fact is that the subversion developed in the following way. First there were militant meetings at which the participants declared their support for the guerrillas and collected money for them. Then they threatened the constitutional government. Later the radio stations of Huanuni, Catavi and Siglo XX made broadcasts inciting the people to overthrow the government, start the class struggle and set up a proletarian government. Finally the reds and the corrupt old union leaders declared the three most important mines in the country to be territorio libre, where nobody could enter without their permission. Because of this the government instructed the armed forces to occupy the mines and restore order and authority. This would have happened in any country.12 During the MNR regimes both the mines and the universities had on

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occasion been declared territorio libre, and in fact they functioned as such, because the repressive forces did not enter them and they even served as asylums for government opponents. The Executive acted as if it knew nothing about them, either because it did not regard them as important or to avoid a confrontation with the workers. To declare an area territorio libre is an old tactic in the revolutionary struggle and does not mean the setting up of an independent state. According to Huascar and Reynolds, the leaders of the Catavi and Siglo XX unions were in Huanuni on 8 June getting ready to board a freight train to Oruro for the demonstration, when word arrived that soldiers had uprooted 100 metres of railway track down the line and that about a thousand soldiers had taken up positions in the neighbourhood. 'The government had given orders that the miners were not to be allowed to pass, whatever the cost in lives. The massacre which had been planned for that day was now postponed until the 24th of the same month.' 13 After a long heated discussion it was agreed to hold the unity demonstration in Huanuni instead of Oruro. The miners confirmed that the congress would be held on 24 June and reaffirmed their support for the guerrillas, pledging half a day's wages per worker to the movement. From 9 to 23 June the union leaders concentrated on preparing for the miners' congress, which now showed signs of becoming a much widerbased meeting since the factory workers and university students were also promising to attend. The government's objective was therefore to prevent the conference from taking place, for fear that the meeting might generate a powerful leadership for the growing revolutionary movement. During this period the Catavi and Siglo XX mines once again very naturally emerged as the leading sector of the labour movement. Shortly before the congress was due to start dozens of police agents from La Paz arrived in the Catavi district with orders to arrest union leaders. 'On the evening of the 23rd some of the delegations began to arrive, for example the representatives of the factory workers from Oruro and Cochabamba. Despite systematic harassment we met early to approve the convening of the congress in the name of the FSTMB'. Most of the miners' delegations arrived that day too, as did representatives of the factory workers of Santa Cruz and a delegation of students from La Paz. Meanwhile ordinary miners prepared to celebrate the night of San Juan, a traditional event in the countryside and the mining camps, and even in the cities. For most people in the district, political and trade union problems became matters of secondary importance. However, a large assembly of workers approved a pact between the unions and the political parties of the left (the POR, the two communist

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parties, the PRIN and the MNR). This front was to fight for the restoration of wages and salaries and to defend the unions. The parties which agreed to the pact undertook to guard the offices of the Siglo XX union. On the night of San Juan it was the turn of the pro-Moscow Communist Party to stand guard (which was why one of their leaders was shot when the troops invaded the camp). By 8 p.m. that night Siglo XX and Catavi were completely relaxed: the political tension had given way to a festive atmosphere and innumerable bonfires cast huge flickering shadows against the squat building. But while these celebrations were reaching their conclusion, detachments of Rangers took over key positions in the camps without the workers realising. In a lightning operation the troops reached the Plaza del Minero, which has a monument to the miners in the centre and is flanked by the stone building of the trade union headquarters and the famous radio transmitter, La Voz del Minero. The Oruro newspaper, LaPatria, published the following comment: 'Yesterday at 4.55 a.m., as dawn broke, the mining camps of the region were woken by the noise of gunfire. The sound of rifles, machine guns and dynamite explosions accompanied the bloody operation carried out by the armed forces and mine police.'14 The workers in the La Salvadora zone and in Llallagua were surprised by the noise of the gunfire, and at first they thought it was just the usual explosions and gunshots which always accompany festivities in the mining camps. But the noise grew louder every minute and the rumour that troops had entered the mining zone spread like wildfire. In no time at all the pitiful moans of the wounded could be heard amidst the desperate cries of women and children. Bullets flew in all directions and it was obvious that a trainload of troops had entered the district. The workers now belatedly recovered from their surprise but, obviously enough, they had no time to put up an organised resistance to the invaders. The troops had taken the precaution of disembarking from the train a couple of kilometres from the station, so that they could filter silently into the very heart of Siglo XX without giving the miners time to react. The surprise operation (which met with not the slightest resistance) was aimed at taking the union office, an objective which was quickly accomplished. The soldiers killed Rosendo Garcia as they seized the union office. With daybreak it became apparent that most of the dead and wounded were people from the La Salvadora camp who had been on their way to the first shift. The invaders shot everyone who tried to escape. By 6.30 a.m. the army was in control of Siglo XX. The union building was occupied and surrounded by soldiers. Ambulance sirens wailed as the hundreds of wounded and tens of dead were collected and taken to Catavi. Machine

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guns bristled from strategic corners. The only reaction open to the miners was to gather at the pitheads and try to piece together what had happened. In the afternoon many bodies were laid out in the Racing Club.15 Initially it was said that there were 16 dead and 71 wounded, but on 2 July La Patria reported that the death toll had risen to 20. On the 26th the innocent victims of the massacre were buried, and their funeral turned into a huge protest against the government and the army. A crowd of about 30,000 people protested angrily against this most recent cowardly massacre. That the workers should put up such a public display of defiance immediately after such a terrible bloodbath must command admiration. The whole district was fully informed of what had happened, owing to the Catholic radio network Pio XII, which was not seized by the troops on 24 June and provided a detailed account of the tragedy. After the occupation, Siglo XX and the neighbouring areas were declared a military zone, a situation which outlived General Barrientos himself (he was killed in a helicopter crash in April 1969). The establishment of a military zone allowed the government to purge the unions, to arrest all suspects and to impose a military cordon round the largest mine in the country. The government's original objectives included the seizure of the union offices in both Siglo XX and Huanuni, the confiscation of their radio transmitters (accused of broadcasting lies and subversive messages under the inspiration of Che Guevara), and the arrest of all union leaders and workers on the intelligence service's blacklist. Both the government and the army justified their behaviour with the allegation that the occupation of the mines averted a worse bloodbath which would have resulted from continued extremist subversion. Large numbers of workers were arrested in their houses without any formalities whatsoever. 150 workers, wearing their heavy work clothes, were sent direct from their icy mining encampment to concentration camps in the heart of the Amazon jungle. Others were sent to prison and later tried for trumped-up crimes. Thus the bloodbath was followed by a prolonged regime of intimidation. After the guerrilla movement began the intelligence services of the Ministry of Government and the army were largely taken over by the NorthAmerican CIA. It must therefore have been they who were mainly responsible for the planning and execution of the military occupation of the mines (an operation carried out by the Rangers — a special US-trained unit). Since the central objective of the operation was to eradicate all political and union activists, the repression was also extended to the cities, where many of the principal miners' leaders were arrested.

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Even so, on 26 June, the miners gathered at level 411 inside the mine and went on strike. It was the only means available to express their opposition to the government. The following day another meeting was held in the same place, which some of the union-leaders managed to attend. A list of the workers who had been arrested was drawn up and it was agreed to stay on strike. Other resolutions and demands were also passed, including: (1) The immediate withdrawal of troops from the mining areas in order to avoid even more serious conflicts and other unforeseen circumstances. (2) The restoration to the union of the union office and the La Voz del Minero radio station. (3) The immediate release of all the arrested union-leaders and workers. (4) The payment by Comibol of its accumulated debt to the workers since the unilateral pay cut of May 1965, so that the miners' families could move to the cities where they would be safe. (5) The payment of compensation by the government to the families of the dead and wounded. (6) The collection of 15 pesos a fortnight per worker to pay for union expenses and to buy arms. (7) The continuance of the left-wing united front in order to strengthen the union movement. (8) The organisation of a 48-hour general strike to back up these demands. The general strike lasted 16 days and was accompanied by a wave of protest in which the students played a prominent part. On 27 June the university of La Paz was declared territorio libre and a place of asylum for victims of political persecution, and the students voted Generals Barrientos and Ovando (President and Commander-in-Chief) enemies of the people. The revolutionary movement in the cities was strengthened by the continued resistance of the miners, who held further discussions in the mines to find the best methods of struggle and a way to fuse the political and union movements. They agreed to set up a national clandestine committee to draw up inter-union pacts and to maintain the left-wing front. But many of these agreements could not be implemented because the main leaders were arrested and the underground committees did not take the necessary precautions to ensure their survival. On 30 June a strike committee was set up headed by Berrios and Cordoba.16 This committee started negotiations with the government and accepted an extremely humiliating agreement to end the conflict. They accepted all the conditions imposed by the Barrientos-Ovando regime. On 20 July the High Command of the Armed Forces put out a revealing communique in which they tried to show that there were close links between

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the guerrillas, 'organised by Castroites', and what they referred to as 'the commotion in the mines, organised many months ago by mercenaries of the Castroite adventure'. The document saw Castroite guerrilla activity behind all the 'existing disturbances and others which are being planned'. It seemed as if the army felt that there had not been enough bloodshed on the night of San Juan, an operation they described as designed to defend public order according to the constitutional mandate. The generals hypocritically tried to make out that they were the ones most interested in clarifying the tragic events at Huanuni and Siglo XX. The army document reads: 'In defence of the prestige of the armed forces the government will ask the honourable national congress to undertake an impartial inquiry to find out the truth and identify those responsible to the people. The most severe legal penalties must be applied to the authors of this lamentable episode.' In this way the government tried to pretend that the authors of the massacre were the militants languishing in prison. Cesar Lora

The organisers of the clandestine unions were fiercely persecuted by the government, which used every conceivable tactic against those who were brave enough to stay in the country and organise resistance to the government and Comibol. Among those who most suffered the consequences of the repression were the PORista leaders. My brother, Cesar Lora, who was killed in the course of the struggle just as he was making progress with the establishment of underground unions, was one of the main figures in the revolutionary opposition. As an adolescent he had shown himself to be a rebel with a great interest in politics, and at a young age he became involved in conspiratorial activities with peasant leaders of North Potosi. 'He worked in the mines for about 11 years, in order to be able to fight better for the liberation of the proletariat and to experience for himself their way of life and conditions of work.'17 For Cesar Lora the years 1947—8 were times of trial and suffering. He was recruited into the army and soon rebelled against the absurdity and servility of barracks discipline. As a punishment he was transferred to Curahuara de Carangas, a freezing inhospitable area of the Altiplano. There he participated in a revolt against the brutal military hierarchy and, as a result, he was imprisoned and tortured. After a trial by court martial he was sentenced to two years in prison and served his time in the Panoptico, the main jail in La Paz. On this, as on subsequent occasions, he displayed great courage and developed a spirit of solidarity with his political companions and with the poor in general.

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From 1949 onwards he worked within the mine. He was one of many Trotskyist militants who decided to work in the mines in order to associate himself with the most important sector of the Bolivian proletariat. Taking advantage of his formidable physique he became one of the thousands of miners in the Catavi company. He lived the same life as them, sacrificing his health, barely able to feed himself on his meagre wages, with a squalid hut as his shelter. But he thought this hardship worth while since in return he had the satisfaction of educating the workers, teaching them to fight for a better society and helping them to assimilate the Trotskist programme. In time he became one of the best drillers in the Catavi district. His natural intelligence helped him to master all the ins and outs of mining and he could debate on an equal footing with the engineers and the best technicians in the company. The most humble workers saw him as their defender, and when it came to the assessment of how much each worker had produced, he was indispensable, since he saw to it that errors were amended and that the workers were not deceived. At the beginning of 1951 he was sacked by Patino Mines and suffered the harassment which the powerful mining companies directed against all the well-known union activists. Nevertheless he immediately joined the campaign to organise a union of the unemployed and became one of its leaders. It was in this capacity, with gun in hand, that he took part in the revolution of 1952. At the end of 1952 he went to work in Comibol, the new nationalised company, and began to make known his anti-MNR position at a time when the MNR had won the support of almost all the workers. The Trotskyists were able to talk in the work centres because of the enormous prestige they had won in the past. Lora's continual propaganda and his organisational activities soon drew the attention of the government's security forces, and at the end of 1953 he was arrested, together with other PORistas, and once again imprisoned in the Pandptico where he remained until 1954. The following year he managed to return to Catavi, and in the union elections of 1956 he secured the post of Secretary of Conflicts, but he soon resigned in order to fight the union bureaucracy without restraint. His opponents conspired to kill him and one day they derailed a truck with the intention of crushing him against the mine wall. His collarbone was shattered as a result of the accident, and despite two operations it never healed completely. In 1958 he was arrested again, this time on the instructions of President Siles, and was only released because the workers threatened to call a general strike in his defence. As we have seen, the miners' conference of February 1959 in Oruro ratified the previous year's demand for a pay rise and, since Comibol's counter-offer was inadequate, a miners' strike was called. The

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workers elected C^sar Lora as President of the national strike committee. At this time the Siles government, representing the right wing of the MNR, attempted to break the labour movement by dividing it, buying off its leaders and setting up government-controlled unions. These were the 'sindicatos reestructuradores' with their stronghold in the mine of Huanuni which was fortified with a militia of well-armed Silistas. This mine was strategically located on the main road to Siglo XX—Catavi and enabled the government to isolate the largest mining centre from the other mines in the country. However, the government plan was threatened when 'the heroic workers of Huanuni defied the Silista machine guns and rejected the old leadership in the union elections of 24 December 1959, but the defeated candidates refused to accept the results of the democratic union elections and retook the union by force'18 in January 1960. Cesar Lora was at the head of the Siglo XX workers who went on strike in support of the deposed Huanuni leaders, and condemned the usurpers when they violently broke up a peaceful demonstration in Huanuni in favour of the democratically elected leaders. In reply a force of Siglo XX workers descended on the government stronghold and after a bloody battle managed to recapture the main square of Huanuni from the militias. Cesar Lora was one of the leaders of this operation, risking his life several times in the course of the fighting. As a Marxist Lora believed that trade union activities should be subordinated to revolutionary politics. He was not interested in merely capturing the leadership of the union for its own sake regardless of the method. Rather he wanted to convert the union into a stronghold of revolutionary activity committed to the interests of its members. To accomplish this he had to confront a union bureaucracy which had become entrenched and was growing rich under the shadow of government protection. Cesar Lora headed the valiant group of Trotskyists who fought unceasingly from their position in the rank and file against those who prostituted their union leadership and appropriated union funds. The leaders of Siglo XX never published any accounts to show how they managed union funds. They used their privileged position to make deals with the traders who supplied the company stores and they became importers of secondhand clothes or machines, or else they set up consortiums to make money out of various branches of ComiboPs activities. C^sar Lora, however, was regarded as a model of honesty and because of his upright conduct he was appointed President of the committee to look into the finances of the Siglo XX union at the end of 1962, which made some alarming discoveries of misappropriation of funds. From 1962 onwards Cesar Lora headed the opposition to the Triangular

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Plan, which he considered was designed to solve Comibol's difficulties at the expense of the real earnings, employment and working conditions of the workers. With other PORistas he brought out a pamphlet entitled A Reply to the Anti-worker Plan. The Problems ofComibol. They argued that the solution lay in adapting the concentration plants to the low-grade ore now being extracted and not in reducing the number of workers or limiting their earnings as the government and managers of Comibol proposed. At the Colquiri congress in 1963, when the Lechinistas had eventually broken with Victor Paz, Lora was elected a member of the executive committee of the FSTMB. The following year 700 workers quit Comibol in protest against the Triangular Plan. Lora and other Trotskyists helped to organise these unemployed, to find them work and to reorganise their lives. In December 1963 the army surrounded Catavi, demanding the release of the American technicians who had been captured by the workers and were being held hostage. Lechin tried to act as conciliator but the workers howled him down, and when his life was threatened, Cesar Lora intervened to ensure his safe return to La Paz. Later, in 1964, Cesar again intervened in a demonstration, this time to prevent the miners from lynching some corrupt bureaucrats. During the crisis of May 1965 he put forward the only reasonable proposal at that tragic time, namely that the FSTMB should resort to guerrilla tactics to drive the army out of the mining camps. But, owing to the sectarianism of some elements in the FSTMB leadership, this suggestion was turned down. The Lechinistas and the Stalinists at this point were still trying to do a deal with the military government rather than face the need to fight back. After the military occupation of the mines Lora and other POR leaders left Siglo XX to continue underground resistance. He was one of the leaders of the strike committee, and he managed to escape through the police net to La Paz where he brought the factory workers out on strike. The government then outlawed him and he returned to his work organising clandestine unions. Shortly afterwards, while travelling with Isaac Camacho to a secret meeting with the workers of Siglo XX, he fell into a government trap. 'On 29 July [1965] we arrived in the vicinity of Sacana, which is three leagues from San Pedro de Buena Vista. When we reached the confluence of two rivers we met a group of armed civilians . . . They overpowered us and prepared to take us to San Pedro, when, only a few yards from the point where the two rivers met, they began to beat Cesar Lora brutally. As I struggled to get free I heard a gunshot and as I turned my head I saw Cesar Lora fall to the ground with blood pouring from his head. He died almost instantly.'19 The authorities confiscated his corpse to avoid it being taken

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to Siglo XX, and it was only because of pressure from the workers that he was finally buried in the mining camp which was the scene of his battles, his victories and his defeats. Fifteen thousand people marched in the funeral procession, which was marked by defiant speeches and dynamite explosions. Isaac Camacho

Isaac Camacho was born in the mining town of Llallagua and was educated at the Instituto Americano in La Paz. In La Paz he later came into contact with the POR and in due course he sought work in the block-saving section of Siglo XX - a section where the conditions were so awful that only the most suicidal miners were willing to work there. There he fought to improve the working conditions of his companions and soon gained a reputation as a dedicated leader. Camacho was Cesar Lora's inseparable companion, sharing all his campaigns. He survived the ambush at Sacana and proceeded to take Cesar Lora's place in the leadership of the clandestine unions. The Generals could never forgive him for being an eyewitness to the assassination of Cesar Lora and the government set out to isolate him. He was arrested once again by the armed forces in Siglo XX in September 1965 and taken to the concentration camp of Alto Madidi, after which he was transferred to the Panoptico in La Paz. But even under these circumstances he did not abandon the fight in defence of the workers. I have a letter written by him to the miners and university students of Potosi on 15 March 1966, in which he congratulated them for giving financial help to the families of those killed by the army in Siglo XX in May and September 1965 and urged them to go on fighting against the military government. He was eventually released after a labour campaign in his favour and immediately rejoined the union leaders at Catavi. It was Camacho who drew up the petition presented to the President of the Republic, General Ovando, in March 1966, demanding the reinstatement of the workers who had been sacked for their trade union and political activities. The petition also demanded that Comibol continue to educate the children of dismissed workers in company schools, and demanded improvements in the educational system. It also asked the company to provide medical aid for the sacked workers and their families. Camacho was the brains behind the miners' strike of 1967 which followed the night of San Juan, discussed above. Immediately afterwards he was elected Secretary of Relations of the FSTMB. However, on 1 August 1967 the front page of Presencia announced

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TOR miner leader arrested'. Camacho had managed to escape from Siglo XX after the night of San Juan and he was responsible for a large part of the resistance to the military government. When he returned to Catavi his hiding place in Llallagua was discovered by the police; somebody must have betrayed him. Government forces threw a bomb into his hideout and Camacho was carried out on a stretcher, believed to be dead. When he turned out to be alive he was immediately tortured in an attempt to make him reveal where the miners had hidden their arms. Later the Minister of Government, Antonio Arguedas, said that Camacho had been exiled to Argentina on 9 August. But his party, the POR, made minute investigations of all the places where he could possibly have gone and they reached the conclusion that he had been assassinated whilst he was in the power of Arguedas, who has admitted acting under the supervision of the CIA.20

22. Barrientos and Ovando We have seen that President Barrientos used fierce repression against the labour movement, although resistance, under the leadership of the miners, never ceased. Considered more generally, Barrientos established a strong government which left him free to act as he wished. His acts of demagogy and neurotic provocation were perhaps the required trappings to his role as a caudillo (a caudillo of the right, obviously enough). Although he led the air force, he enjoyed the support of most of the army, despite the ceaseless attempts at conspiracy made by its commander, General Ovando and his followers, among whose ranks should be noted the future president, Juan Jose Torres (at that time still a Falangist, according to the subsequent revelations of that party's leader, Mario Gutierrez). He enthused his followers with his view of the historical destiny of the armed forces, and he was himself convinced that he had become a leader of continental stature. Perhaps his proudest day was when a group of counter-revolutionary Cubans based in the US decorated him as victor of Che Guevara (assassinated by the Bolivian army after capture on 8 October 1967). His was the only military regime ever to enjoy real peasant support, not merely from the caciques, but also from vast sectors of the peasantry itself. For the

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peasants saw his regime as a guarantee of their ownership of the land which they felt to be threatened by Falangist efforts to undo the land reform begun in 1952. (It must be recalled that at this time the Falangist Party opposed Barrientos in contrast to the support it gave to other generals, although since his death it has tried to capitalise on the Barrientista political legacy.) After almost two years of sharing power with Ovando, when elections were held in July 1966, Barrientos managed to gather together an alliance of civilian supporters composed of the Social Democrats (a managerial party, one of whose leaders, Luis Adolfo Siles, became VicePresident), the Christian Democrats, the Popular Christian Movement (a breakaway from the MNR), and the PIR. The opposition was divided into the so-called extremist parties who claimed to represent the working class and advocated abstention, and the Falangists who put up a candidate of their own, the aged General Bilbao Rioja.1 Barrientos felt confident that by means of gifts and cajolery he could secure unlimited support, not only from the army but also from the broad mass of the population. To some extent he consolidated a power base independent of the armed forces, and enabled his immediate collaborators (many of whom were close relatives, especially of the Galindo clan) to form an inner circle, busily using their power to accumulate personal fortunes. He became famous for his endless visits to every corner of the country distributing presents to the peasantry. When asked where he obtained the funds for this distinctive mode of political campaigning he would reply that his 'friends' had contributed them. It subsequently emerged that his government had secured large sums, even from such multinational enterprises as Gulf Oil.2 Even before his death, rumours of his shady transactions were rife. 'The air was soon thick with stories about secret agents, arms-smuggling transactions involving millions of dollars, leakages and betrayals from within the government itself, tales of romantic intrigues and revenge, and the grievances, poorly concealed, of the army commander, General Ovando . . . ' 3 When General Velasco Alvarado seized power in Peru in October 1968 and introduced a sweeping programme of reforms, Barrientos felt upstaged. In addition to this external incentive to adopt dramatic new measures, a spectacular move was also required if he was to regain the initiative in internal affairs and crush the Marxist opposition. The whole country was shaken by a rumour that the constitutional President had decided that on 1 May 1969 he would declare himself dictator, nationalise many big businesses and physically eliminate some hundred political and trade-union activists.4 Even the entrepreneurial class were uneasy, knowing as they did that the temperamental President was capable of anything. It

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was not until later, after his death, that the right began to idealise him as the kind of ruler who could impose the peace and order necessary for economic advance. At midday on 27 April 1969 confused accounts of his death began to circulate. The indefatigable traveller had been involved in a helicopter crash, in which the machine had burst into flames incinerating the President, his aide-de-camp and the pilot. He was on a fairly routine trip to a group of Cochabamba peasants. According to the official account, as his helicopter took off from a deep ravine near Arque it struck an overhead electric cable. The local peasantry claimed to have heard shots being fired at the helicopter but the government explained that these came from the machine guns carried by the Presidential party, which had been detonated by the heat of the flames.5 Barrientos had made it clear that he would stop at nothing to prevent General Ovando from returning to the Presidency. At the time of the crash Ovando was in the USA, although closely informed of developments in Bolivia. Since the death of Barrientos cleared the way for Ovando's return to power, it was inevitable that rumours would circulate that the crash had not been accidental. To reassure public opinion the government ordered an investigation which reported that no bullets were found in the corpses. Despite this many people remained unconvinced. In the words of El Diario: 'Was it a crime or an accident? The truth was never established although most people suspected the former.'6 It subsequently emerged that the helicopter in which Barrientos died was the one which Gulf Oil had been 'persuaded' to donate for his election campaign of 1966.7 In the editorials of the time the next step was depicted as a model of constitutional propriety. In accordance with the Constitution, the elected Vice-President, Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas, was installed in the Presidency. What really happened was that, although the plans were already complete, General Ovando held back from carrying out his coup. For four months he respected the Constitution in order to inherit the political capital of Barrientos and, above all, win over the latter's peasant following. Indeed Barrientos was scarcely in his grave before Ovando had been declared Maximo lider of the Peasant Confederation. The new President, Luis Adolfo Siles, was son of President Hernando Siles (1926—30), brother of the Falangist Jorge Siles (subsequently nominated the rector of La Paz University by General Banzer), and half-brother of the MNR leader and former President, Hernan Siles Zuazo (1956—60). Overshadowed by his sponsor Barrientos, he failed to establish a political identity of his own. His proclaimed intention was to continue the work of the arbitrary caudillo, but acting strictly within the Constitution. However,

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since he lasted less than four months in office, he achieved nothing worthy of mention. The labour movement was just beginning to reorganise and recover from the exhausting struggle against Barrientos when the military threw out Siles and opened the way to new developments. At dawn on 26 September 1969, while President Siles was visiting the provincial capital of Santa Cruz, the military deposed him and announced a new government based on 'the mandate of the armed forces'. This proclamation did not denounce the legacy of Barrientos; on the contrary it claimed to be a continuation of his work. In reality, however, the new regime attempted to rectify the military's past conduct. President Ovando built up 'a team of young well-intentioned politicians and technocrats',8 well known for their opposition to the policies of Barrientos. Various opposition demands were quickly satisfied, including the nationalisation of Gulf Oil and the re-establishment of trade-union rights. These specific measures could be derived from the nationalist analysis embodied in the 'armed forces mandate' which emphasised the assertion of national sovereignty over Bolivia's natural resources, the construction of mineral refineries and smelters, the pursuit of an independent foreign policy, and improved living conditions for the working class.9 The very day of the coup the new regime cancelled the petroleum code enacted by the MNR in 1955 which had become notorious for its generosity to foreign investors. The 17th October was named 'the Day of Dignity', as Gulf Oil was nationalised and its prospecting rights were cancelled. Another early measure of the Junta was the repeal of Barrientos' Law of State Security, which had been used to hamper the labour movement. As a result, by early 1970 the revival of the labour movement was already becoming noticeable. Furthermore, a 'revolution universitaria' was under way, which culminated in the overthrow of the old externally-accountable academic authorities. The new university authorities were accountable only to the students and staff, who participated on a 50/50 basis in their election. The most militant student groups went further and attempted to launch another rural guerrilla operation in the jungles of Teoponte, but this foco was dramatically extinguished — indeed its failure was so total that it ended not only in tragedy but also in ridicule. Although Ovando's government began as an imitation of the nationalist militarism being established by General Velasco in Peru, the formula did not last for long. The 'armed forces mandate' proclaimed 'the repudiation both of Western capitalism and of atheist, Communist totalitarianism', but the Junta soon moved to the right. The radical civilian ministers were soon dropped. One of them, Marcello Quiroga Santa Cruz, explained that even when they had military backing they lacked militant mass-support. In fact they also lacked the

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backing of an effective political party and they found that this could not be organised from above. In April 1970 the 14th Congress of the Miners' Federation was held in Siglo XX and although Lechin (recently returned from exile) was re-elected Executive Secretary, a radical tesis politica was adopted.10 On 1 May 1970 the 4th Congress of the COB opened (also presided over by Lechin) and it also adopted an extremely radical political analysis. The basic position of the two principal labour organisations was that the working class should reject the Junta's bourgeois nationalism and press forward towards a real socialist revolution under proletarian political leadership. The radical text of this thesis was drafted by the Trotskyist mineworkers of Siglo XX and then revised by the national leadership of the POR, which eliminated any remaining suggestion of concessions to the nationalist viewpoint. However, the final document approved by the FSTMB and the COB was not one hundred per cent Trotskyist. The Stalinists managed to tack on whole paragraphs. Their amendments gave rise to heated debate in the political commission of the Miners' Congress and subsequently in that of the COB. In fact almost all other diverse tendencies of the Bolivian left can agree at least in their rejection of our theory of permanent revolution. Nevertheless, although the Trotskyists could be outvoted in the meetings at which resolutions were composited, the radicalism of the rank-and-file delegates ensured that our point of view generally prevailed in the text of the final political thesis. As Secretary-General of the POR I was therefore able to announce in the COB Congress that my party would vote for the final text, considering that it was in essence on the right lines. The preamble to the COB thesis began as follows: 'We declare that our objective is the struggle for socialism. We declare that the motor-force of the revolution is the proletariat . . . ' The first section contains the following key sentence: 'The bourgeois-democratic experiment currently being attempted has no chance of continued survival in its present form. Either it will become socialist through a working-class seizure of power, or it will fail.' However, Section 5 hinted almost openly at the stage theory of revolution favoured by the Stalinists. Instead of advocating the achievement of socialism through a worker—peasant alliance, it spoke of a broader anti-imperialist 'popular front which entails bidding for the support of much of the country's bourgeois and petty-bourgeois strata'. The resolution sought to justify this strategy (which entailed giving selective support to the nationalist Junta) as follows: 'The working class supports the anti-imperialist aspects of nationalism, i.e. those nationalist measures whose appeal derives from the contradictions between the local bourgeoisie and imperialists, but rejects those aspects of nationalism which reflect the national pride of the

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bourgeois classes and their aspirations to exclusive rights as exploiters of the working class.' However the thesis also included the following passage which was possibly what induced General Ovando publicly to denounce the political thesis. 'In general terms we could say that nationalist military governments come into existence where the bourgeoisie has failed to construct an effective political formula of its own. They offer an alternative route to the construction of capitalism. It is evident that the army (including left-wing elements which must be recognised to exist) is a product of the particular type of dominant class found in a country such as ours. It therefore reflects the limitations and weaknesses characteristic of national bourgeoisies in the current phase of history . . . thus we are certain that the present democratic opening and the government's progressive measures can only fructify on condition that the proletariat takes control of the process.' This document was first adopted by the Congress of the Miners' Federation, and when it came up for consideration at the Fourth Congress of the COB, the unusual situation arose that both the representatives of the POR and those of the COB joined together in its defence against the critics, who in turn belonged to two antagonistic tendencies - the nationalists and the ultra-leftists. However, from the moment the COB Congress closed, its political thesis was universally regarded as a Trotskyist document. It was also recognised as the precursor of the People's Assembly which was to be created the following year.

23. The People's Assembly From the Comando Politico to the People's Assembly In October 1970 a reactionary coup was attempted to overthrow the vacillating government of General Ovando. The labour movement was just emerging from the dark era of repression which Barrientos had inaugurated, and it was still unclear in October 1970 whether the workers still went in fear of repression or whether their old militancy and willingness to take to the streets had revived. It became apparent that during the events of October this change in mass attitudes had taken place. Initially Ovando was ousted without bloodshed and a right-wing military triumvirate took over the government. Then the left-wing sectors of

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the army (left-wing only in relation to the Bolivian army, which it will be recalled had been re-created by the MNR under the inspiration of the USA) and the civilian nationalists rallied round Juan Jose Torres, then a general without a post, who proclaimed himself President and set up his headquarters at the Air Force base at El Alto above La Paz. This was the moment that the Comando Politico of the working class was organised. (It was the immediate predecessor of the People's Assembly.) The Comando met in the main hall of La Paz University. It was created by trade union and civic organisations and left-wing political parties, which gathered to oppose the right-wing coup. It declared that its intention was to give political leadership to the masses at that moment of difficulty. In fact it was organised as a popular forum and at that time no one envisaged it acting as a deliberative or executive body. The Comando Politico called a general strike to force the resignation of the reactionary triumvirate, composed of Generals Guachalla, Sattori and Albarracin. For the labour leaders and associated politicians, this decision was really a leap in the dark, since no one could be confident that the strike would achieve its aim. In fact their stand produced a surge in the political consciousness of the masses, and the scale of the strike was enormous: rarely had an event of such impressive dimensions been seen. The triumvirate resigned, leaving the way clear for General Torres to take over the Presidency. Within the Comando there was fierce debate as to whether or not the working class should ally themselves with Torres. The nationalists and Stalinists proposed their unconditional support to Torres and sought to proclaim him the 'people's President', as a means to secure their eventual entry into the government. The rest of the Marxist left fought to maintain the political independence of the Comando and to rally the workers around an independent class position, and this line finally prevailed. The issue was not posed very clearly, since the force of events had thrown Torres and the Comando Politico together as allies against the right-wing conspiracy; there was in fact a tacit front. During the crisis the leaders of the Comando Politico had turned their attention to obtaining arms for the masses, requesting them from Torres. But he had begun to hold conversations by telephone with the military High Command in Miraflores, which was where the rebellious generals were holding out. Everyone supposed that Torres, a friend of Ovando, would in view of the difficult situation he confronted have no alternative but to arm the people, as the only way to strengthen his own position. But as time passed the hope grew fainter and fainter that a clash between the opposing sectors of the military would enable the masses to arm themselves. It was evident that the generals had decided, regardless of their political differences and personal ambitions, to

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maintain the unity of the army, avoid bloodshed, and reach a political agreement within the framework of the institution, that is to say putting above all else the need to defend the integrity of the armed forces. This settlement achieved, Torres sought to strengthen his new government by offering 25% of the ministries in his new cabinet to the Comando Politico. The discussion provoked by this offer was undoubtedly crucial since the outcome would determine the whole course followed by the labour movement. The nationalists and Moscow communists were ready to accept the offer of the President, which indeed they considered generous, although in fact Torres was careful not to offer the most crucial posts his team would have kept the ministries of the Interior, of Finance, and the Presidency of Comibol and of the other autarchic bodies. The issue was therefore whether the labour movement would become incorporated into a government of petty-bourgeois nationalists, in which case it would lose its separate identity. Such a move would have shut off all possibility of setting up a workers' government. The efforts of Torres to win a mass following and thus strengthen his position vis-a-vis his military opponents were not exhausted even when this first offer was rejected. He then offered the Comando Politico half of the ministries, although always defending his right to put his own men in the key posts. This new proposal was so tempting, especially to the professional politicians, that the Marxists were unable to muster a majority for its outright rejection. But the opportunist tendency was brought under control, since the Comando Politico was persuaded to attach such conditions for accepting the ministries that they would have been effectively removed from the control of the President. Thus the ministers would be appointed by the Comando, which would mandate them and could recall them at any time; a political adviser would work alongside each minister, etc. However, this experiment was never put to the test, since Torres withdrew his offer, using the argument (which was in fact untrue) that various barracks had risen up in arms because they thought the President had become a communist. It seems that his curious offer to hand the control of half the ministries to the Comando Politico was merely a manoeuvre enabling him to gain time and to put pressure on the military High Command. Later on Torres declared that no worker ministers were appointed because the Comando took too long to name them. Was it really just a question of a few hours? Within a mere 70 days the outlook of the workers had changed completely. On 10 January 1971 the government announced that a 'fascist plot' had been discovered. In fact, the right wing of the military had never stopped conspiring for a single moment, but from time to time the govern-

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ment announced the discovery of plots, basically in order to elicit from the labour movement public pronouncements in support of the government. The workers quickly responded: they came out on to the streets to defeat the plot, with a vitality which threatened to displace the feeble regime of General Torres. Many miners, armed with dynamite and a few guns, entered La Paz and virtually occupied it. The clamouring mass concentrated in the Plaza Murillo and began a bitter dialogue with the President of the Republic. The principal cries were for 'arms to the people', 'workers' government', 'Long live socialism, shoot the gorilas\ 'disarm the army' etc. Torres made a vacillating speech, full of contradictions, which could barely be heard above the protests, the whistles and the mocking laughter. When, in an effort to get applause, he offered popular participation in the government, the workers replied that they demanded a workers' government and socialism. It was thus that the People's Assembly was born. After the January events, it was natural that a qualitative modification of the Comando should be suggested, changing its objectives rather than its form of representation. In October 1970 it was over-optimistic to hope that the Comando could become a form of popular parliament, but after January 1971, it was natural that it should turn itself into a centre of power, preparing for the creation of a worker—peasant government. The delegates to the Assembly were elected by direct vote in work-place assemblies, and were mandated by their bases. Their expenses were paid by their organisations (which was one of the reasons why the Assembly sat for such a short time). It must be admitted that the process of naming the delegates was extremely slow, but this was a necessary price if the representation was to be genuine. Intermediate organisations such as regional assemblies, and special assemblies in working-class districts, were also created to link the People's Assembly with the rank and file. The national leadership did not have the time or the resources to travel throughout the country setting up these local assemblies, but they arose spontaneously from local trade-union and political activity. Within the assembly a broadbased democracy prevailed, although to many commentators it seemed incomplete and even dictatorial because the right to differ had its limits. Credentials were only accepted from organisations that accepted the antiimperialist programme drawn up by the COB in May 1970 and the purposes specified by the People's Assembly itself. Its formal inauguration in the former hall of Congress was arranged for 1 May 1971 which in Bolivia (unlike so many parts of the world) is still regarded as a day of protest and of reaffirmation of the revolutionary struggle. But once the basic documents had been approved in the Comando

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and various preparations had been completed, it became apparent that the workers were responding very poorly and showing a tremendous negligence in the appointment of delegates. Perhaps they had become over-confident and had concluded that everything would work out well whether or not they took part in the day-to-day organisation. The upper levels of the leadership, especially Lechin (who, as Secretary General of the COB had been made President of the Assembly) became extremely sceptical about the prospects of holding a successful inauguration on 1 May, and proposed that the inauguration should be postponed. The situation was rather delicate since the government had virtually defied the Comando to show its strength, by announcing that there was no reason to hand over the Legislative Palace to an organisation which functioned outside the law. The Comando replied that the Assembly's existence need not await the approval of anybody, nor the introduction of any law. On the date announced it would simply move into the Legislative Palace. The lst-May demonstration was impressive in terms of numbers, but it was very apathetic, and some small groups of workers carried photographs of President Torres. He was trying hard to win the popularity of the masses, and he took up a place at the head of the demonstration. But the mass of marchers scornfully turned aside leaving his contingent to walk alone, so he retreated to the Presidential Palace. When some of the workers and students reached the Plaza Murillo, they found the doors of the Legislative Palace were open and they went straight in. Thus, the first official session of the People's Assembly was marked by heated speeches and an atmosphere of optimism, but the first full session of deliberations was postponed until 24 June, the anniversary of the Night of San Juan. The Assembly and Comibol

In its attempts to win working-class support (indispensable if it was to govern effectively) the Torres government drew up proposals for workers' participation in the management of Comibol. A similar measure was implemented by decree in the state oil company, YPFB. In both cases the terms of the proposal seemed to imply equal representation for workers and the state - at any rate there would be an equal number of workers and company representatives at each level in the management and administration of the companies. But in fact the general manager of the two enterprises would be appointed by the government or the full-time management, and he would be able to break deadlocks with his casting vote. The oil workers fell for this proposal and enthusiastically endorsed the government's decree. The bureaucratisation and apoliticism of their union

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explains their attitude, together with the fact that their leaders were recruited from among the white-collar workers, many of them well paid and trusted by the company. It was thus up to the miners' union to take the bull by the horns and present a working-class standpoint, posing the issue of the administration of state enterprises in terms of the revolutionary process. In contrast to the government's proposals, the FSTMB persuaded the Assembly to swing the balance in its favour by demanding the right to appoint the general manager and annulling the system of the casting vote. The Assembly thus showed that it had learnt from the negative experience of workers' control during the MNR regime. The principal defect of that experience had been that representation was individual and not collective, and that increasing bureaucratisation had freed the workers' representatives from rank-and-file control. It was therefore proposed that union assemblies should be the maximum authority, supervising the workers' participation in the administration of Comibol. Whoever controls Bolivia's mines becomes master of the country. Proposing control of the mines by the working class implied making the official government unworkable and relegating it to a totally useless role. Therefore, majority workers' participation in Comibol could only be obtained, as was stated very clearly in the Assembly, through a powerful mobilisation and a fierce revolutionary struggle. Sooner or later the question of power would arise. Moreover, the struggle to secure this coparticipation was the best means of mobilising the masses towards the capture of power. There can now be no doubt that the August 1971 coup was precipitated to prevent the mines from falling into the power of the workers. The counter-revolution of August 1971

For months Torres balanced on a knife's edge. Tensions mounted as the conflicting extremes built up their strength but hesitated to launch an open attack. There is information which shows that the US Embassy viewed the military government with great distrust, since it had virtually ceased to govern. Each of the conflicting groups tried, one way or another, to use the government against its adversary. At no point could the Torres regime consolidate total or even predominant control over the armed forces. The regime devoted most of its energy to attempts at winning over the conspiring generals, making progressively larger concessions to them, so that they always retained considerable freedom of movement. Following each

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abortive coup, the officers involved were mostly just posted elsewhere (there were even cases where they were allowed to remain in command of troops). The counter-revolutionaries concentrated on sapping the government's military support, so that by 19 August the President was only in control of about 20% of the military commands, and even that with difficulty. Given the experience of the previous October the gorilas worked with resolution and patience until they had achieved a correlation of military forces which was obviously in their favour, in order to capture political power, if possible without fighting. They needed a quick, decisive victory to avoid the masses taking to the streets and changing the course of events. Even the military leaders who supported Torres shared this same preoccupation; they unmistakably feared the civilian masses more than the right wing of the army. In fact, a mere three days elapsed between the beginning of the revolt in Santa Cruz and the exit of Torres from the Palacio Quemado. Nevertheless, this short space of time was sufficient for the masses to take to the streets: as the hundred dead and five hundred wounded eloquently and tragically demonstrate. At 11 p.m. on 19 August the Comando Politico began a meeting. (With the People's Assembly adjourned, it was the responsible body.) It decided to summon the workers to direct resistance against the conspiracy. All the political parties represented in the Assembly were invited to join a united military effort. The Comando put out a document including the following statements: The Comando Politico, in the name of the People's Assembly, reiterates that its basic objective is the construction of socialism. This can only be achieved through total victory over the fascist military and the forces of reaction, and the destruction of their economic power, which unfortunately remains intact in many sectors. At this crucial moment we must denounce the way reactionary forces are openly conspiring, and even using elements of the state apparatus and its resources. It is the hesitation, weakness and dangerous lurches from right to left of the Torres government which are to blame. The Bolivian people can no longer tolerate this situation. Any concession to the fascist gorilas, or any agreement with them, is a direct blow against the revolutionary process, a betrayal of the national interest, and a service to imperialism. Hence the Comando Politico, as leader of the united anti-imperialist revolutionary front, calls on all Bolivians, men and women, workers and radical intellectuals, soldiers, non-commissioned officers and young

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revolutionary officers to prepare for combat, and take to the streets. Once and for all we must defeat the gorilas, the reactionaries and the servants of imperialism. On the afternoon of Friday 20 August an enormous anti-fascist demonstration was held in La Paz. The workers responded well to the summons from the Comando Politico and the COB. Their march lasted approximately four hours. Once again Torres, confronted by a mass mobilisation, sought to follow their lead in a servile manner. When the demonstrators shouted 'Jota, Jota, dales duro' ('Give it to 'em hard, J.J.', meaning Juan Jose), Torres replied like a little boy 'I'll give it to them hard.' The mocking laughter and boos that the demonstrators reserved for Lechin showed once again that events had overtaken him. As Ultima Hora (which had been very pro-Lechin) reported on 23 August: 'Lechin spoke amidst much heckling and calls for a clear political stand. The veteran who had once been able to dominate crowds with his revolutionary oratory was this time incapable of imposing himself. He responded in terms, perhaps different from those he had planned to use, going so far as to urge the unity of all the forces of the left, and urging that they seize the property and enterprises of those involved in the conspiracy.' That night discussions in the Comando Politico revolved entirely around the problems of arms. Torres and his ministers had promised time and again that they would if the need arose give arms to the people, a promise that had created exaggerated expectations among some sectors of the working class. Recognising that throughout the country the reactionary coup was gaining ground and its prospects of success were steadily increasing, the Comando resolved to send one last Commission (composed of Lechin, myself, Mercado, Lopez, Reyes and Eid)1 to the Presidential Palace. We were to inform the President that if he failed to keep his promise and hand over arms, the People's Assembly would take action into its own hands. But Torres refused us, on the grounds that if he tried to take arms from the soldiers in order to give them to the workers, the remaining officers on his side would join the revolt. Saturday, 21 August, dawned as a day of great tension; the night before, La Paz had trembled under the impact of dynamite exploded by the miners arriving from the nearby camp of Milluni. Lechin read a communique over the radio, calling on the people to assemble in the Plaza del Estadio, bringing arms with them. Soon 2,000 persons were concentrated there. The Minister of Government2 had promised the Comando Politico that loyal troops (this is to say, the Colorado regiment, commanded by Major Ruben Sanchez, and the San Jorge garrison) would occupy Laika Cota, a hill that dominates the centre of the city and is strategically vital. Covered by fire

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from these forces, armed workers and students were to attack the Army HQ in nearby Miraflores. However, rebellious troops of the Castrillo regiment seized the hill before the Colorado regiment could get there and set up their machine guns on it. The military leadership of the Comando Politico assembled near the Plaza del Estadio to direct operations as agreed, but found themselves unable to give effective instructions because of the lack of exact information about developments in the military situation. The crowd which had assembled in the Estadio raided the War Intendancy and captured a large quantity of arms, but most of these proved totally unusable. From Laika Cota hill the Castrillo regiment fired down on the people milling round the Estadio, but more serious were the snipers in support of the right-wing conspiracy, firing from nearby rooftops. Many were killed and wounded by this combined fire. Workers and students joined with the Colorado regiment in an assault on Laika Cota, and eventually managed to dominate the machine guns of the Castrillo regiment. But then it was 8 o'clock at night and the rebellious Tarapaca regiment had brought up its assault cars. They first appeared in the upper region of the city (the factory zones) sowing terror and destruction in their path. Radio Illimani, the State Radio, began to broadcast instructions on how to sabotage the advance of the tanks, but it was too late to carry out such plans. When the tanks reached the Plaza Murillo the radio stopped transmitting, and Torres abandoned the Palace to take asylum in the Peruvian Embassy, together with his ministers and Major Ruben Sanchez. The events in Oruro

As soon as the union leaders in Siglo XX heard of the military rebellion in Santa Cruz they declared a state of emergency, and summoned the union militias to defend the mining camps and guard the union offices. The following morning (20 August) the union leadership instructed the miners to down tools and set off for Oruro where an anti-fascist demonstration had been called by the FSTMB. At about 1 p.m. thirty lorry-loads of miners set out from Siglo XX. However, halfway along the route they met some workers coming from Oruro who reported that the city had been taken for the rebels by the local regiment of Rangers. As a result, half of the lorries turned back to Huanuni while the rest continued towards Oruro. However, by the evening this rump force also decided, in a short assembly held on the outskirts of Oruro, that they must return to Huanuni as well. The union leadership from Siglo XX, Catavi and Huanuni, set up a common leadership which included representatives from the unions of Santa Fe, Japo and Machacamarca and the small mines around Oruro.

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The military versus the unions

On the morning of Saturday 21 August another workers' assembly was held in Huanuni at which reports from La Paz were presented. This meeting decided to await final instructions from the FSTMB. However, at the same time a general assembly was held in Siglo XX which decided to march on the city of Oruro and retake it. When the lorries from Siglo XX reached Huanuni on their way to the attack large numbers of Huanuni miners followed their lead. On arrival at the Machacamarca cross roads these forces were informed that a railway convoy carrying reinforcements and arms to the rebels at Oruro had been located between Machacamarca and Antequera. A group of workers immediately prepared to destroy the convoy while the rest continued towards Oruro. However, when the convoy reached Machacamarca the fight proved unequal, since it was guarded by a hundred and fifty soldiers armed to the teeth, while between them the workers only had five rifles and little ammunition. They were beaten off at a cost of four dead and several wounded. Without more arms, better information and more leadership the miners' intervention was condemned to fail. Unfortunately there is no space here to set out the debate being carried on by the various elements of the Bolivian left about the conclusions to be drawn from the events which have just been outlined.3 After the defeat Since the coup of 21 August, systematic violence has been used to destroy the labour unions, popular organisations and revolutionary parties. It might be objected that in fact the large unions (most notably the miners) have not yet been totally destroyed. Only the national and departmental levels of organisation have been disrupted so far, with their leaders in jail or in hiding. It seems that the government's intention is first to wipe out all the nuclei of resistance in the cities and only then to move against the main mining centres. It has thus been the petty bourgeoisie, especially the intellectual sectors (university and secondary-school students, teachers and journalists) who have so far suffered the main brunt of the government's attack. After this, if the government is successful, it is obvious that the repression will be extended to sectors of the working class.4 However, even at the moments of greatest repression, the gorilas have never been able to totally silence the people; there has always been at least passive resistance by the lower classes to the excesses of the authorities. Since 21 August the tactical problems of the revolution have once again been centred on the need to convert this passive resistance (generally expressed in intermittent outbursts) into an active resistance, to generalise the discontent and raise it to a political level.

Notes

Editor's introduction 1

2 3

Jose Maria Dalence, Bosquejo Estadistico de Bolivia, Chuquisaca, 1851, pp. 204/5. All his figures refer to the 1840s, when there were believed to be a mere 300,000 Paraguayans and only 180,000 Uruguayans. El Poder Minero En La Administration Liberal, Editora Urquizo, La Paz, 1972, p. 197. However, the Ministry of Labour estimated that in 1975 there were 250,000 union members in Bolivia divided between 600 unions: 63,000 factory workers, 50,000 mineworkers, 35,000 in commerce, 25,000 in construction, etc. This list omits the urban and rural teachers, despite their considerable weight and influence.

1. The new republic 1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Editor's Note: The physical isolation of highland Bolivia and its economic and political implications are discussed at length in J. Valerie Fifer, Bolivia: Land, Location and Politics since 1825, Cambridge, 1972. Julio Mendez, Realidad del Equilibrio Hispano-americano y necesidad de la neutralization perpetua de Bolivia, Imprenta de la Patria, Lima, 1874. Ministerio de Hacienda y Estadistica, Division Politica, La Paz, 1962. The 1976 census reported a total population of 4,687,718. Alcides D'Orbigny, Description Geogrdfica, Historica y Estadistica de Bolivia, Paris, 1845. Jose Maria Dalence, Bosquejo Estadistico de Bolivia, Sucre, 1851. Ramon Sotomayor Valdez, Estudio Historico de Bolivia, Santiago de Chile, 1874. Alfonso Teja Zafre, Historia de Mexico, Mexico, n.d. Tadeo Haenke, Introduction a la Historia Natural de la Provincia de Cochabamba, first edition, Cochabamba 1798, Anales de Biblioteca edition, Buenos Aires, 1900.

2. The economic policies of Belzu and Linares 1

2 371

Editor's Note: According to Wilfredo Kapsoli, 'The word comes from "gamonito", a parasitic plant which digs into the roots of trees and feeds from their sap. In popular usage the same qualities are attributed to the hacendados, enganchadores, tinterillos, etc. who live off the unpaid labour of the peasantry.' Los Movimentos Campesinos en Cerro de Pasco 1880/1963, Huancayo, Peru, 1975, p. 26. Trabajos de la diputacion permanente instalada el 9 de noviembre de

372

3 4

5 6 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Notes

1825', published in Boletin de la Sociedad Geografica de Sucre, vol. XIII, Sucre, 1912. R. Sotomayor Valdez, Estudio Historico, op. cit. The reference here is to the Argentinian journalists Domingo de Oro and Juan Muiioz Cabrera, the editors of La Eppca during the government of Ballivian (1839-47). After 1848 La Epoca supported Belzu and protectionism. Gabriel Rene Moreno, Ensayo de una bibliografia de los periodicos de Bolivia, Santiago, Chile, 1905. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Arturo Pinto Escalier, 'Semblanza de D. Domingo de Oro' in La Razbn, La Paz, 30 October 1949. G. Rene Moreno, Ensayo de una bibliografia, op. cit. Juan Mas, Siluetas contemporaneas: El Doctor Bernadino Sanjines Uriarte, La Paz, 1898. Mariano Baptista, El 14 de enero en Bolivia, Valparaiso, 1861. Mensaje del Ciudadano Jose Maria Linares al Congreso de 1861, Valparaiso, April 1861.

3. Artisans and protection under Belzu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Coleccion Oficial, La Paz, 1876. Leon M. Loza, 'Abolengo del sindicalismo boliviano actual', in Protection Social, La Paz, 1948. Coleccion Oficial, op. cit., vol. 16, p. 241. Ibid. Ibid. Ezequiel Salvatierra, Proceso historico del obrerismo en Bolivia and Histbria del gremio de carpinteros, from the originals in the archives of E. Salvatierra. Alberto Gutierrez, El Melgarejismo antes y despues de Melgarejo, La Paz, 1916. According to Luis S. Crespo, 'Monografia de La Paz' in Boletin de la Sociedad Geografica de La Paz, n.d. Mensaje que el Presidente Constitutional de la Republica Boliviana presenta al terminar su periodo a las cdmaras legislativas, Sucre, 1855. Editor's Note: Belzu endorsed the Constitution of 1851, according to which the Presidential term was reduced from eight years to five. In August 1855 he handed over office to his constitutionally elected successor. He retained a degree of popularity (particularly in La Paz) over the following turbulent decade, but in March 1865, after entering La Paz at the head of an uprising, against Mariano Melgarejo (President 1864—71), he was unexpectedly assassinated.

4. Rise of the mineowners 1 Modesto Omiste, 'El Cerro de Potosi', in the Revista de Buenos Aires, 1881.

373 2

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Notes Editor's Note: In 1929 the British Ambassador in La Paz described Carlos Victor Aramayo as follows: 'He was educated at one of our public schools and finished at Oxford, speaking our language like one of us. Senor Aramayo is well off, and much given to polo'. F.O. 420/277, Part 28. Doc. 35, p. 122. Ernesto O. Ruck, Biografia de Don Avelino Aramayo, Potosi, 1891. Adolfo Costa Du Rels, Felix Avelino Aramayo y su epoca, Buenos Aires, 1942. Mariano Baptista, Obras Completas, La Paz, 1933. Editor's Note: Literally 'mining superstate', a term widely used in Bolivia to refer to the large mineowners who were believed to manipulate the formal political structure in their own interests. Jose Avelino Aramayo, Informe sobre los asuntos de Bolivia, London, 1877. Jose Avelino Aramayo, Bolivia, Apuntes sobre el Congreso de 1870, Sucre, 1871 (a passionate denunciation of Melgarejo's Presidential Message of 1870). The silver monopoly was abolished in 1872. Ignacio Prudencio Bustillo, La vida y la obra de Aniceto Arce, La Paz, 1951, an excellent biography. Alberto Gutierrez, Hombres y Cosas de Ayer, La Paz, 1918, who claims that Arce held 1,000 of the 6,000 shares issued by the new company. Santiago Vaca Guzman, El Dr. Arce y la politica boliviano. Buenos Aires, n.d. 'El Manifiesto del Senor Arce' published in El Nacional, Buenos Aires, 12 and 13 May 1881. Jaime Mendoza, Figuras del Pasado, Gregorio Pancheco (rasgos biogrdficos), Santiago de Chile, 1924. Editor's Note: In this election campaign it has been alleged that 'Pacheco spent 3.5 million pesos and Arce 2 million, sums considerably larger than the national budget'. Jose Fellmann Velarde, Historia de Bolivia, Vol. II, La Paz, 1970, p. 311. Alcides Arguedas, Historia General de Bolivia. El proceso de la Nacionalidad, La Paz, 1921. Ibid. Enrique Finot, Nueva Historia de Bolivia, La Paz, 1946. Alcides Arguedas, Historia General de Bolivia, op. cit. Ibid. Ibid. Adolfo Costa Du Rels, Felix Avelino Aramayo y su epoca, op. cit. Felix Avelino Aramayo, La cuestibn del Acre y la Legacibn de Bolivia en Londres, London 1903.

5. The politics of artisan and mutualist groups after 1870 1 2 3

Rafael Diaz Romero, Informe del Jefe del Estado Mayor General sobre la campaha del Norte, Sucre, 1871. Anuario de Leyes y Supremas Disposiciones de 1872, La Paz, 1873. Exposicion que los artesanos de Sucre dirigen al Supremo Gobierno para la suspension de la Ley de 8 de octubre de 1872, Sucre, 1876.

374 4 5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Notes Editor's note: Valdeavellano y Cia of Lima lent the Bolivian government 500,000 soles in 1872. The debt was finally paid off in 1878. Editor's note: In 1869 Melgarejo's government authorised Colonel Church to raise a loan in England for the construction of a railway in the Amazon basin, pledging some of Bolivia's customs duties as security. In 1872 Morales' government ratified the concession to Colonel Church. It was discovered, when the loan fell due for repayment (1877—9), that Church's enterprise had no resources of its own. Exposition, op. cit. Ibid. E. Salvatierra, Proceso Historico del Obrerismo, op. cit. Estatutos de la Sociedad Obreros de la Cruz, fundada el 30 de septiembre de 1885, La Paz, 1937. Estatutos de la Sociedad de Obreros El Porvenir, La Paz, 1942. Felipe Ortiz Madriaga, Organizaciones obreras en sus distintas fases, La Paz, n.d. El Vapor, Oruro, 16 April 1904. Jose Valenzuela, Carta politica a mis co-artesanos de La Paz, La Paz, 1902.

6. 'Socialism' in the provinces 1 2 3

4 5 6 1 8 9 10 11

Heriberto Trigo Paz, Los Paz y el Dogma Socialista, Tarija, 1957. Editor's note: See Tulio Halperin Donghi, El Pensamiento de Echeverria, Buenos Aires, 1951. Editor's note: Paulino Paz was born in Cordoba province and was a first cousin of General Jose Maria Paz, one-time Governor of Cordoba, whose Memorias Postumas (4 vols, Ediciones Estouda, Buenos Aires, 1957) are among the most lucid and informative sources for early Argentine history. Four Paz brothers took refuge from Rosas in Tarija, but only Paulino became a Bolivian. His sons, Luis and Domingo Paz Arce became large landowners and prominent Conservative politicians in Tarija after the Pacific War, but lost much of their land in the Federal Revolution of 1898. In 1907 a grandson was born to Domingo Paz Arce on the residual family estate at San Luis — Victor Paz Estenssoro, founder of MNR, and President 1952— 6 and 1960—4. (Jose Fellmann Velarde, Victor Paz Estenssoro: El Hombre y La Revolution, La Paz, 1955, Chapter 3.) Trigo Paz, op. tit. Bernardo Trigo, Las tejas de mi techo, Tarija, 1934. Ibid. Heberto Ariez, 'Semblanza de un revolucionario' in Presencia, La Paz, 6 August 1967. El Cometa, No. 6, Santa Cruz, 30 April 1876. M. Ordonez Lopez and Luis S. Crespo, Bosquejo de la historia de Bolivia, La Paz, 1912. Defensa de la revolution del doctor Andres Ibahez, Tacna, 1877. El Eventual was a fortnightly paper published in 1877 in an effort to contest Egalitarian ideas.

375 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Notes Pedro Kramer, General Carlos de Villegas (estudio historico biografico), La Paz, 1898. Placido Molina, Observaciones y rectificaciones a la historia de Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Una nueva republica en Sudamerica, La Paz, 1936. Pedro Kramer, General Carlos de Villegas, op. cit. J.H.G., 'Diario de la Fuerza Expedicionaria que marcho a la provincia de Chiquitos en persecution de la pandilla capitaneada por Andres Ibahez' in El Regenerador, Santa Cruz, 26 July 1877. Ibid. Ricardo Jaimes Freyre, Poesias Completas, compiled and with a preface by Eduardo Joubin Colombres, Buenos Aires, 1944. Ignacio Prudencio Bustillo, 'Letras Bolivianas' xnRevista Universitaria, La Paz, March-April 1930. Eduardo Joubin Colombres, op. cit.

7. The revolution of 1898 1 Pedro Kramer, La Industria en Bolivia, La Paz, 1899. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Alcides Arguedas, Historia General de Bolivia, op. cit. 5 Ibid. 6 Diez de Medina, La Revolucion Federal, La Paz, 1900. 7 Proceso Mohaza. Defensa del abogado Bautista Saavedra, pronunciada en la audiencia del 12 de octubre de 1901, La Paz, 1902. 8 Memoria del Seeretario de Estado, Appendix, Part III, La Paz, 1899. 9 Editor's note: For a careful examination of the role of the peasantry in these events, see R. Condarco Morales, Zarate, El Temible Willka, La Paz, 1966. 10 Memoria del Seer etario de Estado, op. cit. 11 Ibid. 12 Informe del Subprefecto de Pacajes, quoted in P. Kramer, op. cit. 13 Ibid. 14 Informe del Prefecto de Oruro, 26 September 1899. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Editor's note: See Boleslao Lewin, La Rebelion de Tupac Amaru (Buenos Aires, Hachette, 1957) and Lilian Estelle Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt (Norman, Okla, 1966). There is also a brief analysis by Oscar Cornblit in Raymond Carr (ed.) Saint Antony's Papers No. 22: Latin American Affairs (Oxford, 1970), who distinguishes between Cuzco, the crucial city that, from the outset, withheld support from the revolution, and Oruro, where indebted mineowners initially favoured the revolt but subsequently turned against the mobilised rural population. 8. The Liberals and labour 1

La estructura de la clase obrera de los paises capitalistas, by Paulino

376

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

15 16 17

Notes Gonzales Alberdi (of the Central Committee of the Argentine Communist Party), Prague, 1963. Eduardo Diez de Medina, Informe del Prefecto, Comandante General y Superintendente de Hacienda y Minas del Departamento, Oruro, 1915. Ibid. Ibid. Cronica, La Paz, 21 January 1941. Quoted in the Boletin de la Masoneria Boliviana, No. 24, January 1944. Arturo Segaline, La tragedia de las organizaciones obreras en Bolivia, n.d. (in the archives of G. Lora). W. Alvarez, Historia de la Luchas de los Trabajadores Grdficos, La Paz, 1952. Ibid. 'Estatutos de la Federation de Artes Graficas' in Palabra Libre, La Paz, 21 July 1921, Nos. 15 and following. Ibid. W. Alvarez, Historia de las Luchas de los Trabajadores Grdficos, op. cit. Jose Valenzuela, Carta politica a mis coartesanos de La Paz, op. cit. Ibid. Also at this time there was a debate in the press about proposals to change the second article of the constitution and introduce a new one allowing freedom of worship, but Valenzuela did not approve of this idea: 'I have strong reasons for opposing this reform. I think it is inopportune, given the general inclination in the country towards Catholicism, and the feelings of the Catholics can only be hurt by petulant and insensitive actions. It is said that the reform is being introduced as a way of attracting immigration to the unpopulated regions of the country, but surely this can be achieved by granting immigrants civil status independently of any religious formalities. Nevertheless, we who have been born into the Catholic faith should not become alarmed if people of other religions become naturalised Bolivian citizens. Their religions cannot outshine the truth that radiates from our Church, whether there is a law to this effect or not.' Contrato suscrito entre Ibahez y el Centro Social de Obreros, 1910, in the archives of G. Lora. 'Estatutos de la Sociedad Agustin Aspiazu' in Hoja de Propaganda No. 3, La Paz, 14 July 1905. Urquieta's ideas and examples first began to circulate from the Peruvian provincial capital of Arequipa at a time when a strong current of anarchism was provoking alarm among the Peruvian upper classes. Urquieta's programmes can be found in El Independiente and El Ariete, which are papers of paramount importance in the history of Peruvian thought. 'Urquieta had anticipated various reforms of the Russian revolution in his programme published 14 years earlier. For example, he proposed compulsory expropriation of property in the social interest and the division of large landholdings, arguing that property should belong to society as a whole. He advocated the

377

18 19 20 21 22 23

Notes organisation of people according to their role in society (in guilds), as a basis for corporative representation (in something like Soviets).' (Miguel A. Urquieta, 'Gonzales Prada y Lino Urquieta', an article written in La Paz in 1926 and published in ElDiario, 28 July 1931.) On one of the many occasions he was exiled from Peru Urquieta came to La Paz. He immediately gathered round young people interested in new radical ideas, and the group he formed gave rise to both the Partido Radical and the Sociedad Agustin Aspiazu. Espinoza y Saravia, Elio, Monje Gutierrez and many others came under his influence as they strolled around the Plaza de San Francisco where Urquieta used to meet them regularly. M. Lino Urquieta, 'Lo primero el pan' in Hoja de propaganda No. 3 de la Sociedad Agustin Aspiazu, La Paz, 14 July 1905. Ibid. Tomas Monje Gutierrez, 'Nuestra Lucha' in Hoja de Propaganda No. 5 de la Sociedad Agustin Aspiazu, La Paz, 1 May 1907. C. Cabrera, Troblemas Sociales' in Hoja de Propaganda No. 5 de la Sociedad Agustin Aspiazu, La Paz, 1 May 1907. Ezequiel Calderon S., 'Seamos socialistas' in Hoja de Propaganda de la Sociedad Agustin Aspiazu, La Paz, 1 May 1907. Alcides Arguedas, 'Retazos de Ideas' in Hoja de Propagande de la Sociedad Agustin Aspiazu, La Paz, 14 July 1905.

9. The decline of working-class Liberalism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10

Waldo Alvarez, Historia de las luchas de los trabajadores grdficos, op. cit. Estatuto Orgdnico de la Federacion Obrera de La Paz, sancionado por la asamblea general de 10 de noviembre de 1910, La Paz, 1912. Ibid. El Figaro, 9 April 1915. From a biographical sketch of Calderon by members of his family, a copy of which is in the author's records. Jose L. Calderon, Mis ideales, La Paz, 27 April 1910. Julian Cespedes, Problemas Sociales, La Paz, 1911. Ezequiel Salvatierra, Datos Autobiograficos, 1965, in the records of G. Lora. During the 1920s and '30s Salvatierra played an active role in the labour movement through the FOT and the Partido Socialista, and cooperated with the student movement. He was gaoled several times for his political activities. He participated in campaigns against foreign clergy and foreign companies, such as the Canadian-owned Bolivian Power electricity company. In the early 1940s he was involved in municipal government, and in 1943, until he quarrelled with the government, he was briefly subprefect of the province of Murillo. In his seventies he was still busy putting his papers in order and writing, and still taking a keen interest in the labour movement. This account is based on the notes taken by Agar Penaranda during

378

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Notes conversations with Chumacero. The quotations which follow are Chumacero's own words. Romulo Chumacero, Testamento, 1936, in the records of G. Lora. Redactor del Primer Congreso Nacional Universitario, Potosi, 1908. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Felipe Guzman, Discurso en la Convention Radical, Oruro, 1920. Alfredo H. Otero, Breves Apuntes, La Paz, 1926. Domingo L. Ramirez et al., Desde elDestierro, Tacna, 1914. Ezequiel Salvatierra, La Federation Obrera International, Su fundaciony labor, La Paz, 23 May 1913. Boletin de 'La Defensa Obrera', 'Al pueblo obrero la Federacion Obrera Internacional', La Paz, 16 July 1912. Moises Alvarez, Organisation Sindical en Bolivia, La Paz, 1937. Arturo Segaline, La tragedia de las organizaciones obreras en Bolivia, op. tit. Defensa Obrera, La Paz, May 1913. Tagina de la Federacion Obrera Internacional' in La Razon, La Paz, 13 June 1919.

10. The first socialists 1

2 3 4 5 6

Editor's note: In 1884 the US Federation of Organized Trades (a recently established labour confederation) passed a resolution setting 1 May 1886 as the deadline for the inauguration of the eight-hour system in all trades. As the date approached labour agitation increased, particularly in Chicago where a Central Labor Union (under the influence of the International Anarchist Congress) won the support of most labour unions. Strike action was met by lock-outs and the employers resorted to hired gunmen, but industrial action seemed to be producing results. However, on 3 May police fired on a crowd demonstrating against the importation of blacklegs and on 4 May, when police attempted to break up the resulting protest meeting at Haymarket Square, several of them were killed by a bomb. Eight local leaders (mostly German-speaking immigrants and anarchist advocates of violence) were then tried, seven were condemned to death, and four were executed. There was no attempt to prove that any of them had thrown the bomb. It was because the US labour movement designated 1 May as the date to press for the eight-hour day that the Socialist International in Europe adopted May Day as a special day of agitation, an anniversary subsequently celebrated by Socialists and Communists but neglected by most American workers. Quoted by Enrique G. Loza, Vision del Porvenir, Iquique, 1916. 'Pagina Obrera' in El Figaro, 1 May 1917. Jose Vera Portocarrero, Orientaciones Obreras, La Paz, 1919. Ricardo Perales, Nuestros Ideales, La Paz, 1915. Guillermo Penaranda, 'Nuestros Propositos' in El Figaro, 26 June 1915.

379 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Notes Manifiesto del Centro Obrero de Estudios Sociales a los trabajadores de Bolivia, La Paz, 31 December 1919. Hombre Libre, 18 November 1920. See next chapter. Angelica Ascui, 'El Cuadro Dramatico Rosa Luxembourgo ante la sociedad' in Cultural, review of the Centro Social Educativo, La Paz, 1928. (For Angelica Ascui's biography, see above pp. 207-8). See below, p. 108. 'Llamado de un obrero de Bolivia en pro de la Constitution de un Partido Comunista', Petit Lenin, La Correspondencia Sudamericana, No. 15, 15 October 1926. 'Pagina Obrera' in La Patria, Oruro, July 1919. 'A la clase obrera de Oruro', leaflet signed by 'the socialist workers' Oruro, 1 December 1919. 'Reptilesi Oidnos!', undated leaflet. 'Al pueblo elector', leaflet signed by the 'socialist workers', Oruro, 10 December 1919. Programa de Principios del Partido Obrera Socialista de La Paz, La Paz, 1922. Aurora Roja, No. 3, La Paz, 5 June 1922. Leaflet headed: 'El pueblo obrero sufre un atropello por la parte de la burguesia' signed by 'the socialist workers', Cochabamba, 18 February 1922. He had been director of Luz y Verdad in La Paz and wrote his first articles in Uyuni and Potosi. Enrique G. Loza, Vision del Porvenir, Iquique, 1916.

11. The first strikes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13

Margaret Alexander Marsh, The Bankers in Bolivia, New York, 1928, p. 96. Ibid.,?. 91. Ibid.,?. 101. Ibid.,?. 107. Memoria del Sr. Podte del Directorio Central de la Liga . . . , La Paz, 1920. 182 employees and workers attended the founding meeting. A eta fundamental No. 1 de la primera asamblea para formar la Liga de empleados y obreros de ferr o carriles, La Paz, 3 August 1919. Memoria del Sr Presidente del Directorio Central de la Liga de Empleados y Obreros de Ferrocarriles, La Paz, 1920. Ibid. Ibid. Pliego de peticiones del personal de empleados y obreros de la Section Boliviana del Ferrocarril de Antofagasta a Bolivia y de The Bolivian Railway Co. Respuesta de la Administration y acta de acuerdos, La Paz, 1920. Federation Ferroviaria (Oruro), Boletin No. 1, Oruro, 6 March 1920. 'Memoria del Sr Presidente . . . ' op. tit. La Patria (Oruro), 3 January 1921.

380 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

Notes Historical synopsis of the union, written for the Confederation de Ferroviarios and published in Rebelion, No. 3 (La Paz, 31 October 1954). Editor's note: See Juan Albarracin Millan El Poder Minero en la Administration Liberal, La Paz, 1972. Rodolfo Soliz G., Massacres Obreras en Bolivia, La Paz, 4 June 1944. Manuel Carrasco, Simon I. Patiho, Un Procer Industrial, Cochabamba, 1964. Editor's note: Carrasco was Patiiio's official biographer in Spanish. A much fuller biography has recently been published in English. See Charles Geddes Patiho: The Tin King (Robert Hale, London, 1972), which, however, closely follows Carrasco's previous work and outlook. Based on information given to the author by Tomas Martinez, who had worked at Pulacayo. Fundacion de la Federation Obrera Central de Uncia, an undated 28page mimeographed pamphlet, a copy of which can be found in the author's library. Gumercindo Rivera, La Masacre de Uncia, Oruro, 1967. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 94-5. Fundacion de la Federation Obrera Central de Uncia, op. cit. Gumercindo Rivera, op. cit. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. In a note dated Llallagua, 25 July 1923. Guillermo Gamarra, Carta al director de la Republica, La Paz, 7 June 1926. Federacion Obrera Internacional, Nueva Programa, La Paz, 1918. Action Libertaria, No. 22, 1 May 1921. Estatuto Orgdnico de la Federacion Obrera del Trabajo de La Paz, La Paz, n.d. Ibid. Troyecto de Estatuto Organico que presentara la FOT a la convencion de Obreros de Oruro' in El Pais, La Paz, 12 April 1927. Rigoberto Rivera, 'La Federacion Obrera del Trabajo de La Paz' in Correspondencia Sudamericana, No. 6, Buenos Aires, 1926. One of the most important was Claridad, a weekly which circulated in Cochabamba in 1921 with a print of 2,000. Its administrator was J. Valenzuela Catacora. Semiramis Jaldin, Respuesta a la circular de la Union Grafica Cochabamba, Cochabamba, 24 October 1930. From an autobiographical sketch written by Borda in 1951, published in La Nation, 28 October 1962. Ibid. Arturo Borda, 'El Loco' in La Patria, Oruro, 7 January 1921. A los trabajadores de Bolivia. Informe del compahero Arturo Borda, presentado al Presidente de la Republica, Dr Hernando Siles, acerca

381

42 43 44

Notes de la ineficacia de la legislation de trabajo, respecto al proletariado national, La Paz, 14 February 1927. Based on some autobiographical notes written by Rivera on 15 February 1957. Ismael Pereira, Introduction a la interpretation marxista del desarrollo sindical en Bolivia, La Paz, 1945. Arturo Segaline, La tragedia de las organizaciones obreras en Bolivia, op. tit

12. Students, anarchists and Marxists (1925—32) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25

Manuel Seoane, Con el ojo izquierdo mirando a Bolivia, Buenos Aires, 1926. Ibid. 'Sobre la situation en Bolivia' in La Correspondencia Sudamericana, No. 11, Buenos Aires, September 1926. G. Lora, Jose Aguirre Gainsborg, La Paz, 1962. Oscar Cerruto 'El Cura un Peligro Inmediato' in Bandera Roja, La Paz, 14 June 1926. 'La Masacre de Uncia (4 de Junio de 1923). Antecedentes y detalles completos del hecho criminoso' Bandera Roja, La Paz, 8 June 1926. Bandera Roja, La Paz, 16 December 1926. 'El Parlamento y el proletariado', in Bandera Roja, 16 August 1926. 'El triiinfo del proletariado', in Bandera Roja, 26 July 1926. La Correspondencia Sudamericana, op. tit. La Correspondencia Sudamericana, No. 20, 15 March 1927. Ibid. Correspondence of Hernando Siles in the author's archives. Reglamentos de debates, estatuto orgdnico, programa de principios de la FUB, Segunda edition, La Paz, 1929. Ibid. Roberto Hinojosa, La revolution de Villazbn, La Paz, 1944. Ibid. Augusto Cespedes, El Dictador Suicida, Santiago, Chile, 1956. The following is an example of its style: 'If we lived under a syndicalist regime we would not allow the millionaire Simon I Patiiio to have two palaces in La Paz, two in Oruro and two in Cochabamba, etc. We would say to Sr Patiiio, "You and your family can live quite comfortably in one palace, so you can keep one of them; the rest will be for the workers who have nothing".' Aurora Roja, No. 3, 5 June 1922. Luis Salvatierra, Humanidad, No. 6, 4 June 1928. Narcisa D. de Rocha, 'La Mujer proletaria' in Humanidad, La Paz, 21 May 1928. 'El problema economico-social en Bolivia' in Humanidad, La Paz, 21 May 1928. 'La cuestion social en Bolivia' in Humanidad, La Paz, 4 June 1928. M.K., 'El sindicalismo' in Humanidad, La Paz, 14 May 1928. 'Obrerismo Politico' in Humanidad, La Paz, 14 May 1928.

382

26 27 28 29 30 31 32

33 34 35

Notes

Humanidad, La Paz, 15 June 1928. Circular No. 2 of the Partido Laborista, La Paz, 4 December 1928. Minutes of the meetings of the Partido Laborista, in the archives of E. Salvatierra. Partido Laborista a las clases trabajadores, La Paz, 4 May 1929. Letter from the Executive Committee of the Communist Party to Arturo Segaline, La Paz, 14 September 1932. Adalberto Valdivia Rolon (alias Pedro Uncia), Auto-criticay plan de trabajo presentado por el c. Pedro Uncia a la Conferencia Comunista del Sur del Peru, n.d. Editor's note: The city now called Sucre has also been known as Chuquisaca, Charcas and La Plata. It was a centre of Spanish administration in the colonial period. Since 1899 the seat of Bolivia's government has been La Paz, although Sucre is still the legal capital and the seat of the Supreme Court. Guillermo Lora, Jose Aguirre Gainsborg, La Paz, 1962. Tristan Marof, Habla un condenado a muerte, Cordoba, 1936. Information supplied to the author by Carlos Mendoza Mamani.

13. From military defeat to 'Military Socialism' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

'Manifiesto de la Confederation de Trabajadores de Bolivia', Tribuna, La Paz, 1 May 1935. The signatories included Ezequiel Salvatierra, Moises Alvarez and Enrique G. Loza. ElDiario, La Paz, 8 August 1935. ElDiario, La Paz, 3 October 1935. Manifesto de los intelectuales jovenes a la Nacion Boliviana, La Paz, 4 June 1930. The signatories included Antonio Diaz Villamil, Jose Antonio Arze and Augusto Cespedes. Ultima Hora, La Paz, 3 October 1935. Ultima Hora, La Paz, 31 October 1935. Ultima Hora, La Paz, 2 March 1932. 'Contra-Manifesto Socialista al Programa Republicano Saavedroso', Ultima Hora, La Paz, 14 October 1935. Text published in La Republica, La Paz, 29 May 1936. Text published in ibid. La Republica, La Paz, 19 May 1936. Enrique Baldivieso 'No necesito rehabilitation politica', La Jornada, La Paz, 3 September 1936. Decreto Supremo of 22 May 1936. Instrucciones para la constitution de sindicatos, La Paz, July 1936, signed by Waldo Alvarez as Minister of Labour. Andrescho Kespe (probably Victor Daza Rojas), Evolution economica, social, politica y cultural del obrero boliviano, La Paz, 1953. Moises Alvarez, 'La organization sindical en Bolivia', in the Ministry of Labour's Boletin, La Paz, September 1937. Lt-Col. G. Busch 'A la nacion', La Calle, La Paz, 15 July 1937. Editor's note: Carlos Victor Aramayo considered that there was a

383

19 20 21

22 23 24

Notes conflict between the June 1939 Decree, which simply assumed that 30% of the gross value of exports could be regarded as profits and then imposed a 40% tax on these inferred profits, and the unrepealed Law of 8 November 1923, which taxed profits as presented in the accounts according to a sliding scale. He claimed that as a result of this conflict, which remained unresolved for the next four years, each mining company opted to pay profits-tax according to the definition most favourable to its own interests. In the case of his enterprise, after the death of President Busch he subsequently informed the Minister of Hacienda, Dr Espada (who took office in November 1940), that, although it would be the more costly of the two alternatives, his company would pay tax according to the 1923 formula rather than the 1939 version, because a Law must take precedence over a Decree (the more so since he considered the Decree unconstitutional). However Dr Espada disbelieved his claim that the 1923 tax would generate more revenue than that of 1939, and insisted on payment according to Busch's decree. Subsequently, when all the accounts had been completed and dividends payed out on the assumption that the company's tax liability had been fully discharged, the Minister discovered his mistake and 'unblushingly' ordered application of the 1923 Law which yielded a higher revenue. Carlos Victor Aramayo, Memorandum Sobre los Problemas de la Industria Minera de Bolivia, La Paz, 1947, pp. 26—7. However, Sr Aramayo does not give precise dates for these negotiations, which followed the outbreak of the Second World War, an event which greatly enhanced the profitability of the mining enterprises. Letter from Busch to the Association of Mining Industrialists, La Paz, 20 June 1939. Letter from Miguel Echenique to the Vice-President of Patino Mines, La Paz, 18 June 1939. Such was the scope of the decree; it went no further. If the measure caused such a scandal and was classified as socialist, this was because the state had been monstrously subordinated to the interests and control of the mineowners. LaNoche, La Paz, 13 June 1939. CSTB and the Comando Supremo of the Legion of Excombatants, Al pueblo trabajador de Bolivia, La Paz, 11 June 1939. Editor's note: According to Carlos Victor Aramayo (a writer with more reason than most to know about the topic) the term rosca (meaning literally 'little kernel') 'originated in Bogota and was imported to Bolivia by the Saavedrista newspaper of La Paz La Republica in about 1931 . . . little by little the term has shed its original connotation and has been stretched beyond the realm of mining to embrace any individual or company that has by any means, however honest, become at all prosperous or contented . . . more recently (by contagion I believe from Argentina as a result of the 1943 Revolution) the word 'rosca' has come to mean something else again, increasingly hard to distinguish from 'aristocracy' or

384

25

Notes 'oligarchy', the motive being to express contempt for the great men who figure in the country's history'. Memorandum Sobre Los Problemas de la Industria Minera de Bolivia, La Paz, 1947, pp. 60—3. La Fragua, La Paz, 23 August 1943.

14. The post-war labour movement 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8

9 10

11 12 13 14 15 16

'El proximo congreso sindical y el Sindicato Central Metaliirgico' in Action Socialista, La Paz, 3 November 1936. 'Se hizo devocion de fe revolucionaria en la inauguracion del congreso sindical' in Crbnica, La Paz, 30 November 1936. Agustin Barcelli, Medio Siglo de Luchas Sindicales Revolucionarias en Bolivia, La Paz, 1956, p. 145. A. Kespe, op. tit. H. Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia 1880-1952, Cambridge, 1969, p. 257. However, on 27 March 1939, Busch enacted a decree outlawing communism and anarchism as being opposed to the national interests. In view of 'the increasing number of secret extremist social organisations, acting under foreign directives and with outside support, aimed at disrupting the nation', the Junta decided to ban 'all such activities and the circulation of these doctrines, and to lay down severe penalties for the contravention of the law'. G. Busch, Mensaje a la Convention National de 1938, La Paz, 1938. A. Kespe, op. tit. The delegates included Jose A. Arze, Ricardo Anaya, Abelardo Villalpando, Alfredo Arratia, Eduardo Arze Loureiro and Liberio Justo, an Argentinian. The workers present included Romulo Chumacero and Roman Vera Alvarez, the delegate of the CSTB. A teacher, Humberto Quezado, represented the Confederacion Sindical de Maestros. Roberto Alvarado, a Stalinist, was elected secretary general. These names are enough to show the Marxist orientation of the congress. A delegate from Chuquisaca, who started as a member of the POR and in the 1950s became prominent in the left of the MNR. Federation Universitaria Boliviana: IV Convention de Estudiantes. Informe del Sec. Gral de la FUB. Reglamento de Debates. Estatuto Orgdnico. Programa de Principios de la FUB. Pacto Tripartito Obreroestudantil docente etc. Sucre, 1938. Letter by Pedro Vaca, La Paz, 28 June 1940. FIB, /Hacia el Congreso de Izquierdas de Oruro!, no date. Andrescho Kespe, Evolution economica, social, politica y cultural del obrero boliviano, La Paz, 1953. Miguel Bonifaz, Breve Noticia Biografica de Jose Antonio Arze, Oruro, 1963. La Calle, 13 September 1936. Jose Antonio Arze, A proposito de la CROP, La Paz, 14 September 1936.

385 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Notes FIB, Hacia la unidad de las izquierdas de Bolivia, Santiago de Chile, 1939. Arturo Daza Rojas, Sensacionales y veridicas aventuras humoristicas y tragicas de Cochalin, primero en Bolivia, Chile, Peru y Argentina, La Paz, probably written in 1958. Luis Gonzalez Zenteno, Los Pampinos, Santiago, Chile, 1956. Arturo Daza Rojas, op. cit. Ibid. Redencibn, Cochabamba, January 1932. La Noche, La Paz, 25 October 1938.

15. The Catavi massacre 1 Guillermo Guerra, Estudios de silicosis y tuberculosis (efectuados en el distrito minero de Catavi), La Paz, December 1948. 2 Ibid. 3 Manuel Caceres, Condiciones de higiene industrial en la mina de Siglo XX, La Paz, December 1948. 4 Ibid. 5 Bilbao La Vieja, 'El obrero de minas de Bolivia es el mas caro del mundo' in Ultima Hora, La Paz, 27 December 1944. 6 Agustin Barcelli, op. cit., p. 154. 7 LaRazon, 14 April 1942. 8 Martin Kyne, Informe al CIO sobre las condiciones del trabajo en Bolivia, n.d. (The source of the Spanish translation is probably the newspaper La Calle (La Paz) 15 April 1944. Ed.). 9 J.M. Balcazar, Los problemas sociales en Bolivia, una mistificacion demagogical La 'Massacre' de Catavi, La Paz, 1947. Balcazar was Labour Minister at this time. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 'Lo que dijo un obrero de Catavi (Asamblea Departmental del MNR en Oruro)' in La Calle, La Paz, 18 November 1943. (This episode was subsequently reconstructed by members of the local community for a semi-documentary film about the recent history of the mine, El Coraje del Pueblo, Bolivia, 1971. Ed.) 13 'Carta dirigida a los diputados por el trabajador Timoteo Pardo' in La Calle, La Paz, 21 August 1943. (The MNR was labelled 'nazi' by many of its enemies.) 14 Ibid. 15 Julio Laredo Fiorilo 'Enterraron vivos a centenares de obreros para barrar las huellas de la masacre' in Pregon, La Paz, 20 December 1944. 16 Ibid. 17 International Labour Organisation, Los problemas del trabajo en Bolivia. Informe de la Comission Mixta Boliviano-Estado-unidense del Trabajo, Montreal, 1943. 18 Ibid.

386 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

34 35 36 37

Notes Ibid. Ibid. Feliz Veintemillas and A. Valle, El Mai de Mina y su Legislation social, La Paz, 1928. 'Explica el Ministro del Trabajo el proceso de la huelga de Catavi' in ElDiario, La Paz, 3 January 1943. 'Jovenes Liberales se apartan de su Partido' in La Calle, La Paz, 31 July 1943. 'La huelga de Catavi frente a la ley' in Ultima Hora, La Paz, 19 August 1943. 'Se inauguro el sexto congreso universitario' in La Calle, La Paz, 18 July 1943. La Noche, La Paz, 19 August 1943. Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Victor Paz Estenssoro y la masacre de Catavi, La Paz, 1943. Where Patiho had his New York headquarters. MNR, Victor Paz y la masacre, op. cit. Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, Una revolution tras los Andes, Santiago, Chile, 1944. La Noche, 24 August 1943. Alberto Taborga, Un majadero en la cruz, La Paz, 1957. Pedro Zilveti Arce, Bajo El Signo de la Barbarie, Editorial Orbe, Santiago, 1946. Similarly in 1875 the masonic lodge which was trying to set up a nationwide organisation, listed as one of its tasks the election of the candidate for the presidency of the republic. '[The candidate] who has received an absolute majority will be proclaimed candidate by the Brotherhood. The executive will communicate this result to the Central Junta as a mandate so that all the brothers work for this candidate.' Estatutes de la Logia Masonica 1875. (A copy exists in the author's archives.) Alberto Ostria Gutierrez. Un pueblo en la cruz, el drama de Bolivia, Santiago, 1956. Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, Una revolution tras los Andes, Santiago, 1944. Editor's note: See also Cole Blaiser's detailed study of US-Bolivian relations 1941—6 in the Hispanic American Historical Review, February 1972. Legislation Campesina. Disposiciones legales para la reforma agraria, La Paz, 1953.

16. The Miners' Federation 1 Andrescho Kespe (probably Victor Daza Rojas) Evolution economica, social, politica y cultural del obrero boliviano, La Paz, 1953. 2 Editor's note: The Sindicato de Trabajadores Mineros de Llallagua, representing the largest concentration of mineworkers in Bolivia, was founded in 1942 under the sponsorship of the young PIRista deputy for Uncia, Raul Ruiz Gonzalez, who had been elected to Congress by a large majority in 1940.

387 3 4 5 6

Notes 'El congreso minero' in La Razbn, La Paz, 8 June 1944. 'Reportaje al Sr J Lechin, Secretario Permanente de la Federacion de Mineros' in Pregon, La Paz, 29 June 1945. 'Congreso Minero de Potosi' in Ultima Hora, La Paz, 21 July 1945. 'El Congreso de Trabajadores Mineros realizado en Potosi tuvo un gran exito' in La Razon, La Paz, 10 July 1945.

17. The workers in the revolutionary struggle (1946—52) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25

The six years of repression from the overthrow of Villarroel to the Revolution of 9 April 1952 are referred to as the sexenio. Tesis de Pulacayo. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. This is a reference to the Falange Socialista Boliviana. G.L. A few organisations in the past had managed to confront this problem intelligently. The Liga de Empleados de Ferrocarril, for example, placed great importance on the strike fund. Manuel Carrasco, Simon Patiho, un procer industrial, Paris, 1960. Records of the Telemayu Congress, in the author's archives. Ibid. Enrique Hertzog, Mensaje al Hon Congreso Ordinario de 1948, La Paz, 1948. Documentos del IV Congreso de Mineros in the author's archives. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Editor's note: The term masacre blanca (literally white massacre) refers to the mass dismissal of workers as a way of eliminating troublemakers and breaking up labour organisations. The term implies a contrast with the alternative traditional technique for achieving the same results — a 'red' massacre, in which workers were killed. Rene Canelas L., 'Notas sobre el despido general de obreros en Catavi' in Revista Juridica, Cochabamba, June 1951. Patino Mines: Nota dirigida al Ministro de Trabajo, La Paz, 28 May 1947. Patino Mines and Enterprises, Los conflictos sociales en 1947. I. Documentos, II. Notas finales por el Dr Jose E. Rivera, La Paz, March 1948. Letter from the Patiho Mines Company to the Ministry of Labour, 13 June 1947. Telephone conversation between Davila in Catavi and Lechin, Baptista and Monje in La Paz, Catavi, 5 September 1947.

388 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

Notes PIR y Desarrollo Nacional, La Paz (1961), p. 67. Enrique Hertzog, 'Mensaje de S.E. el Sr Presidente de la Republica' in La Razbn, La Paz, 19 September 1947. Time Magazine, New York, 22 September 1947 (retranslated). Guillermo Lora, 'Oportunismo en la lucha sindical' included in the pamphlet Definition, La Paz, 1948. Actas del Congreso de Telemayu. 1948. A copy in the author's archives. Edmundo Vasquez, Bolivia en la encrucijada comunista, Lima, 1955. Guillermo Lora, Lo que ocurio en Catavi, Temuco, 1949, and Desarrollo de los sucesos de Siglo XX segun datos del proceso judicial (1951), unpublished. Rene Lopez Murillo, Los Restaurados, La Paz, 1966, p. 76. Ibid., pp. 6 2 - 3 . Communication del Ministro de Gobierno, Justicia e Inmigracion a la Camara de Diputados, La Paz, 8 August 1949. Editor's note: On Chumacero's subsequent activities see Heath, Erasmus and Buechler, Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia, New York, 1969, p. 128. Documentation del VI Congreso Minero, in the author's archives. Ibid.

18. The COB and the revolution (1952-6) 1 In 1943 Eduardo Lopez, President of the Camara de Industrias, made the following statement on the industrial situation: 'Until recently, apart from alcohol and spirits, no other local raw materials were in demand as inputs for our industries. Only since 1925 has foreign and national capital been invested in the industrial sector . . . However, since 1932 a certain number of industries have been established which make an important contribution to the national consumption of industrial products.' According to Eduardo Lopez, the world crisis of 1929 and the Chaco War made it necessary to think about Bolivia's national resources 'since the country did not have enough foreign exchange to go on importing'. In 1910 the principal industries were beer and tobacco, but 'by the end of 1942 there were 322 industrial establishments functioning which can be classified into two groups . . . factories which supply 100% of local consumption needs (maize- and wheat-flour mills, breweries, cigarette factories, soap, candles and glass) and factories which supply only part of the nation's needs (wool, cotton and silk textiles, cement, shoes, hats).' The first serious step towards creating an inclusive factory workers' federation was the Union Sindical de Trabajadores Nacionales Fabriles, which was founded in La Paz in 1941 and continued to function until 1951 when it was re-organised as the Confederacion General de Trabajadores Fabriles (CGTFB). The Union Sindical brought together the factory workers of the city of La Paz and,

389

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14

15

Notes although it was defined as a local organisation in its statutes, as its name showed, it was hoped to extend it into a national organisation. Editor's note: Throughout the forties its enemies described the MNR as Nazi-Fascist. The meeting was attended by 2 labour leaders representing the mines, 2 factory workers, 4 railwaymen, 2 bank employees, 2 printers, 2 employees in the private sector, 2 building workers and 2 peasants. COB, Programa de Principios, 1952. Alfredo Candia, Bolivia, Un Experimento Comunista en America, La Paz, 1956. Robert Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, New Brunswick, N.J., 1958, p. 105. With the encouragement of President Victor Paz Estenssoro, a Spanish translation was published in La Paz in 1961. E. Moller, O. Capriles, etc., Informe de los labores de la Secretaria de Organizacion del CEN de la COB, La Paz, May 1957. They were very different from what we usually call 'sindicatos' since they included the whole population of an area and their functions were not limited to demanding improvements in their living and working conditions and fighting against the abuses of the gamonales and the authorities. They also took upon themselves the control of all aspects of life in the area and the solution of day-to-day problems within the community. They were controlled by large assemblies which, favouring the interests of the great mass of the peasants, functioned very democratically. COB, Informe Organizativo, 1957. A process described in Laurence Whitehead The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-colonialism (Haslemere Group pamphlets, London, 1968). Rebelion, La Paz, 31 October 1954. Tesis sindical del POR, 1960. Partido Obrero Revolucionario, Tesis Politica del X Congreso Nacional. Editor's note: The tenth Congress of the POR, held in June 1953, decided that there was no immediate prospect of the party taking power, and that the first task must be to win majority backing for the party's positions. The Latin American Bureau of the Fourth International attacked this thesis as 'defeatist' and 'capitulationist', and encouraged members of the Bolivian party to organise against those who supported it. In 1954 the dissidents secured control of the party newspaper Lucha Obrera, and so in November of that year Guillermo Lora founded a rival publication, Masas, which remained committed to the Congress decisions of 1953 and was disauthorised by the Fourth International. In addition, in 1954 many prominent PORistas, such as Edwin Moller and Ernesto Ayala Mercado, decided to enter the MNR in the hope of strengthening the left-wing tendencies within the government. Central Obrera Boliviana, Cartilla de Orientacion. Primer Congreso Nacional de Trabajadores, La Paz, October 1954.

390 16 17 18 19 20

Notes Discurso del Jefe de la Revolution National c. Victor Paz Estenssoro, en la inauguration del Primer Congreso de Trabajadores. La Paz, 1954. COB, Primer Congreso National de Trabajadores. Discursos, La Paz, 1954. Programa Ideolbgico y Estatutos de la COB, La Paz. 1954. Agustin Barcelli, Medio Siglo de Luchas Sindicales Revolucionarias en Bolivia, Bolivia, 1956, p. 348. Lechin y la Revolution National, La Paz, n.d.

19. Inflation, stabilisation and the COB 1 Editor's note: One of the party's founders, Guevara Arce held various important posts in the first two MNR governments and made a serious bid for the party's Presidential nomination in 1960. When his defeat by Paz Estenssoro became apparent he left the party, organising his supporters into the MNR Autentico. This party, renamed the PR A, supported General Barrientos after 1966, in some of whose cabinets Guevara Arce served. 2 Guillermo Lora, La estabilizacion una impostura, La Paz, 1960. 3 See George Jackson Eder, Inflation and Development in Latin America: a case study of inflation and development in Bolivia, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1968. (Editor's note: Eder points out, of course, that he was invited by the Bolivian government, but makes plain that he used his external support to reinforce his authority within Bolivia.) 4 La COB y la Estabilizacion Monetaria, La Paz. 5 COB, Nota dirigida al Xcmo Presidente Constitutional. . . Herndn Siles Z . . . proponiendo medidas dentro del Plan de Estabilizacion en beneficio de los trabajadores. La Paz, 23 January 1957. 6 La Verdadera renuncia del Vice Presidente c. Nuflo Chavez Ortiz, La Paz, 1957. 7 Editor's note: See Eder, pp. 435—41 for one account of this polemic. 8 COB, Segundo Congreso National de Trabajadores de Bolivia Sindical, La Paz, 1957. 9 Discurso pronunciado por el Dr H. Siles ante el II Congreso National de Trabajadores, La Paz, 1957. 10 The pro-government press put out lists of these organisations almost daily, with the implication that the majority of the working-class organisations were outside the COB. 11 Programa Obrero (documentos bdsicos del movimiento minero), La Paz, 1959. 12 Editor's note: The MNR's Special Command at Colquiri was held responsible for breaking up the first session of this congress, abetted by MNR militias sent from the Huanuni mine. Eventually an open battle in Huanuni, in January 1960, broke the power of these militias and left the FSTMB supreme in the mining camps. 13 Comite Nacional de Huelga de la FSTMB, Informe, Oruro, 1959.

391 14 15 16

17 18

Notes Editor's note: A few months before the boliviano had been devalued by almost a third. Comite Nacional de Huelga, op. cit. Editor's note: An article in Time magazine had quoted the opinion of an American official in La Paz that Bolivia was unviable and should be divided up between the neighbouring countries. The article provoked anti-American riots and acute embarrassment for President Siles. Comite Nacional de Huelga, op. cit. Ibid.

20. The miners and the fall of the MNR 1

2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

16

Editor's note: The Triangular Plan was formulated in 1961 to provide $37.5 million in loans from the USA, West Germany and the IADB, for the rehabilitation of the nationalised tin mines. The Plan has been critically evaluated by an American economist with experience of AID in Bolivia (see Melvin Burke, Combined International Assistance to a Nationalised Industry: A Case Study of COMIBOL (preliminary draft, unpublished), University of Maine, March 1974. 'XI Congreso Nacional de la FSTMB' in Control Obrero, La Paz, June 1961. Ibid. Editor's note: In 1964, at a time when Lechin was seeking an alliance with the army to oust Victor Paz Estenssoro, and relations with Cuba would have been a divisive issue. Juan Lechin Oquendo, Discurso inaugural del Secretario Ejecutivo de la COB. HI Congreso Nacional de Trabajadores, La Paz, 1962. Ibid. Ibid. Tesis de Colquiri, La Paz, 1964. Ibid. Jaime Otero Calderon, Dilucidacion Historica, La Paz, November 1968. Otero was secretary to the Cabinet, in November 1964. 'Asi fue la batalla de Sora Sora', Vistazo, La Paz, 8 November 1964. Jaime Otero Calderon, op. cit. 'La Junta de Gobierno define sus propositos', Bolivia, La Paz, January 1965. Guillermo Lora, /Abajo la bota militar!, La Paz, 1965. Editor's note: More information on the effects of US military aid to Bolivia can be found in William H. Brill, Military Intervention in Bolivia: The Overthrow of Paz Estenssoro and the MNR (ICOPS), Washington, 1967. Editor's note: Compare Richard Thorn's statement (from a different political viewpoint) that after 1964 'the government once again was able to avail itself of the services of the middle class and professionals, who had stood at the sidelines during the period of the MNR . . . the rudiments of a government bureaucracy, which was not so intensely

392

17

18

Notes motivated by politics, began to appear. Many of these tecnicos had found shelter in AID during the MNR years . . . ' James Malloy and Richard Thorn (Eds.), Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952, Pittsburg, Penn., 1971, p. 199. Editor's note: It may be relevant to recall here that Lechin's halfbrother, Colonel Juan Lechin Suarez, was appointed President of Comibol following the military coup. He has played an important role in successive military regimes since then, but has certainly never particularly favoured the labour movement. El pensamiento politico de los mineros, La Paz, 1965.

21. Repression 1 'Severos ataques a la accion de la Junta' in El Diario, La Paz, 3 May 1965. 2 Editor's note: Arguedas acquired world-wide notoriety in 1968 when he abandoned his post as Minister of Government under President Barrientos, announcing that he had been an agent of the CIA but that in atonement he had sent Che Guevara's diary to Fidel Castro, thereby cheating the Bolivian military of a lucrative publishing contract. Arguedas eventually went into exile in Cuba, where he was greeted as a comrade by Castro. The POR, however, accuses him of being responsible for the death in custody of the Trotskyist miners' leader, Isaac Camacho, whose biography is sketched at the end of this chapter. 3 Version oficial del destierro de Lechin, La Paz, 15 May 1965. 4 'Las minas en poder de milicias obreras' in Presencia, La Paz, 16 May 1965. 5 Translator's note: The term gorila literally means gorilla. It is used to refer to those sectors or members of the Armed Forces most disposed to uphold the established order by means of violence and repression. No doubt the term was coined because it implies the predominance of brute force over intelligence in these animals. 6 'Aplastemos a la bota militar', Manifiesto de la COB, La Paz, May 1965. 7 Ibid. 8 'La Comibol en emergencia adoptara medidas radicales para rehabilitar las minas' in Presencia, 24 May 1965. 9 Ibid. 10 'Programa de los sindicatos clandestinos' in Masas, La Paz, 21 August 1965. 11 Mariano Baptista, Ted Cordova, etc. Guerrilleros y generales sobre Bolivia, Buenos Aires, 1968. 12 Ruben Vasquez Diaz, Bolivia a la hora del Che, Mexico, 1968. 13 Huascar and Max Reynolds, 'Masacre de San Juan' in Masas, La Paz, 1 January 1969. 14 La Patria, Oruro, 25 June 1967. 15 Huascar and Reynolds, op. cit. 16 Cordoba was, in my opinion, a member of ORIT. G. Lora.

393 17 18 19 20

Notes Alberto Saenz, Asi asesinaron a Cesar Lora, La Paz, 1966. A. Saenz, La Masacre de Huanuni, La Paz, 1960. 'Relato de Isaac Camacho' in Escritos de Cesar Lora, La Paz, 1969. Editor's note: In the summer of 1971 the newly organised Asamblea del Pueblo, which was essentially a reincarnation of the COB, took up the case of Isaac Camacho. It established a special commission to investigate the assassination of trade union and student leaders under the Barrientos government, and sent representatives to interview Antonio Arguedas who, after handing Che Guevara's diary to the Cubans, was living in exile in Havana. The investigation was never concluded but further evidence published in El Diario, 14 July 1971, tends to support the conclusion that Camacho died at the hands of his captors.

22. Barrientos and Ovando 1 Editor's note: Barrientos received 678,000 votes, compared with 138,000 for Bilbao Rioja. In all 850,000 votes were reported cast, out of an electorate of 1,100,000. In La Paz, however, Barrientos received only 45,000 votes, compared with Bilbao Rioja's 31,000, and other parties which totalled 30,000, together with the over 10,000 null and blank votes also recorded. 2 Editor's note: This information was confirmed by the Chairman of Gulf Oil Corporation, Bob Dorsey, in a letter to President Banzer dated 14 May 1975 and published in Presencia, La Paz, 17 May 1975. In 1966 'we were urged to provide a helicopter for his use, and we agreed . . . At the end of the rental period General Barrientos, by then elected President of the Republic, strongly urged Gulf to provide him with the helicopter on a permanent basis. Our company made arrangements with the manufacturers by which the helicopter was acquired for General Barrientos. The sum involved was approximately $110,000, including both rent and purchase price.' Dorsey's letter also referred to subsequent payments of $110,000, in which 'there are certain indications that various representatives of the political party of General Barrientos may have been involved. Mr Dorsey resigned as Chairman of Gulf Oil on 14 January 1976 in a move attributed by the Financial Times (London, 16 January) as an attempt to dissociate the company from its record of illicit payments to political figures. 3 'Barrientos: El General del Pueblo' El Diario, La Paz, 6 August 1975. 4 El Diario, ibid., reasserts this conjecture as follows: 'It was argued that Barrientos should proclaim a dictatorship to overcome those who were preventing him governing in his own way.' 5 Barrientos was born in Tarata in 1919. His family was poor and he received his primary education in a local Franciscan seminary, passing directly from there to the Colegio Militar. Many of his Presidential speeches were written by Fernando Diez de Medina, a Presidential adviser who subsequently wrote what purported to be the General's biography (Barrientos: El General del Pueblo, La Paz, 1972). In fact

394

Notes the book is not so much a biography as an indiscriminate hymn of praise to the President's political judgement and in particular to the quality of his speeches. Editor's note: There is also a quite informative critical biography by Raul Peria Bravo, Hechos y Dichos del

6

1 8 9 10

General Barrientos, La Paz, 1971. El Diario, ibid.

Editor's note: See note 2 above. Ultima Horn, La Paz, 6 August 1975. For the full text see G. Lora (ed.) Documentos Politicos de Bolivia, La Paz, 1970, pp. 594-602. Editor's note: The text was published in Masas, No. 370, 2 May 1970, which makes clear the strong PORista influence it contains.

23. The People's Assembly

1 2 3

4

Lopez & Reyes of the FSTMB, Eid of the Confederacion Universitaria Boliviana (CUB). Editor's note: The Minister was Major Jorge Gallardo Lozada. In 1972 he published his own account of the events of the previous year De Torres a Banzer (Buenos Aires, Edicion Periferia). Editor's note: There is a full discussion in Lora's latest book, Bolivia: De la Asamblea Popular al Golpe del 21 de Agosto, Santiago de Chile, 1972, from which this final chapter has been ruthlessly condensed. Another viewpoint can be found in New Left Review, London, July—August 1972. My own interpretation was published in Current History, February 1972, Philadelphia. Editor's note: Particularly fierce repression followed the 66% devaluation of October 1972. Subsequently, in November 1974, all political parties, especially in La Paz, were put into recess, and the trade unions were put under the authority of Co-ordinadores Laborales appointed by the Ministry of Labour. In practice, however, some strong local unions managed to survive through 1975 and Lora continued working with them clandestinely.

Editor's suggested reading The best general survey in English of post-revolutionary Bolivia is James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952, Pittsburgh, Penn., 1971. Herbert S. Klein has written an informative history of Parties and Political Change in Bolivia 1880-1952, Cambridge, 1969. J. Valerie Fifer covers a similar period from an economic geographer's perspective in Bolivia: Land, Location and Politics since 1825, Cambridge, 1972. Those interested in the independence period should consult Charles W. Arnade The Emergence of the Republic of Bolivia, Gainsville, Florida, 1957, and perhaps also William Lofstrom 'From Colony to Republic: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Change' Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 5, Part 2, November 1973. For the point of view of the mining rosca, Lora's account might be compared with Charles F. Geddes Patino: The Tin King, London, 1972. A good short survey of the history of the mines is Norman Gall's 'Bolivia: The Price of Tin', American Universities Field Staff Reports, New York, 1974, Vol. XXI, Nos. 1 and 2. The period 1900-32 is discussed from the perspective of economic history in Laurence Whitehead 'The Impact of the Great Depression on Bolivia', Proceedings of the XL International Congress of Americanists, Genoa, 1975, Vol. IV. Specifically on the mineworkers, current living-conditions and the resultant social and political attitudes and labour organisation have been surveyed by a USAID Evaluation Officer, John H. Magill, Jr, Labour Unions and Political Socialization: A Case Study of Bolivian Workers, New York, 1974. On the agrarian side, the great regional diversities are well expounded in Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia, New York, 1969 by Dwight B. Heath, Charles J. Erasmus and Hans C. Buechler (see especially the section by Erasmus) and the effects of the revolution in six rural communities are systematically compared in William J. McEwen et al. Changing Rural Bolivia, Oxford, 1975. Also worthwhile is 'Peasants and revolution: the case of Bolivia' by Andrew Pearse in Economy and Society, Vol. I, Nos. 3 and 4, August and November 1972. On the general politics of the revolutionary period there is not yet an entirely satisfactory treatment in English, but readers should consult James M. Malloy Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution, Pittsburgh, Penn. and perhaps Robert J. Alexander The Bolivian National Revolution, New Brunswick, N.J., 1958, which, however is quite dated. Another approach can be found in Laurence Whitehead 'The State and Sectional Interests: The Bolivian Case' European Journal of Political Research, June 1975. On the economy a useful introduction remains Cornelius H. Zondag The Bolivian Economy 1952-65: The Revolution and its Aftermath, New York, 1966. Much more massive (and revealing) on the 1950s is George Jackson Eder Inflation and Development in Latin America: A Case History of Inflation and Stabilisation in Bolivia, Ann Arbor, 1968. The political implications of Eder's work are discussed in Laurence Whitehead The 395

396

Editor's suggested reading

United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism, Haslemere Group pamphlet, London, 1968. There have, however, been great changes in the economy since the late sixties. The literature in Spanish is of course much vaster and more detailed. It may still be worth reading the much attacked Historia General de Bolivia (1809-1921), La Paz, many editions by Alcides Arguedas, which was first published in 1922, and his deeply pessimistic essay Pueblo Enfermo. From the opposite point of view the background to the 1952 revolution is vigorously portrayed in the writings of Augusto Cespedes (a founder of the MNR), notably El Dictador Suicida: 40 Ahos de Historia de Bolivia, Santiago de Chile, 1956 and El Presidente Colgado (Buenos Aires, 1966). Another MNR leader of the forties, Luis Penaloza, has made a massive, if ill-disciplined, attempt to analyse the Historia Economica de Bolivia, La Paz, 2 vols., 1953—4, and a third, Jose Fellman Velarde, has dedicated much of his considerable energies since the coup of 1964 to writing an indispensable general Historia de Bolivia, La Paz, 3 vols, 1968—70. In addition, two more specialised works should be singled out. Ramiro Condarco Morales deserves acclaim for Zarate, El 'Temible' Wilka: Historia de la Rebelion Indigena de 1899, La Paz, 1965. Less scholarly but of particular interest for its account of the mining industry around the time of the First World War is Juan Albarracin Millan's El Poder Minero en la Administracibn Liberal, La Paz, 1972. On more specific topics readers should consult the bibliographies prepared by Charles W. Arnade (a) on the historiography of colonial and modern Bolivia in the Hispanic American Historical Review, August 1962, and (b) a discussion of sources on the revolution 1952—9, in the Journal of Inter-American Studies, July 1959. The Land Tenure Centre Library of the University of Wisconsin at Madison has prepared a more recent general bibliography on Bolivian agriculture, economics and politics (updated to 1970). Ronald H. Chilcote has compiled a reading-list covering the publications of the Bolivian Left in 'Cambio Estructural y Desarrollo en Bolivia' Desarrollo Econbmico, No. 24 (Buenos Aires), January—March 1967. Finally, Guillermo Lora has edited a useful and varied compendium of Documentos Politicos de Bolivia, La Paz, 1970.

Index Accidn; La, 95 Accidn Directa, La, 108 Accidn Libertarian, 130, 136 Accidn Obrera, 170 Accidn Popular, 136 Acha", Jose* Maria de (President 1861-4), 36 Acre, dispute, 44ff agrarian economy: after independence, 6, 8; colonial, 4;Inca, 3 agrarian reform {see also landowners, peasantry), 2, 66, 282, 288, 299, 332, 337 Agrupaci6n Comunista, 139 Aguilar Penarrieta, Anibal, 314 Aguirre Acha\ Jose\ 210 Aguirre Gainsborg, Jose\ 140, 147, 1 6 2 3,165,179, 188,205,209-13 Agustin Aspiazu Society, 81, 98, 377 Aill6n, Desiderio, 143 Ajhuacho, Pedro, 221, 223, 229 Alandia, Miguel, 280-1 Albarracin Milldn, Juan, viii, 380, 396 Alberdi, Paulino Gonzales, 376 Alcoba, Aurelio, 199 Alexander, Robert, 283, 389, 395 Aliaga, Ricardo, 52 Alonso, Severo Fernandez (President 1896-9), 64, 66 Alvarez, Moists, 96, 172, 175, 180, 201, 378, 382 Alvarez, Waldo, 75, 85,175, 178, 182, 187,190,376,377,382 anarchism {see also Marxism, socialism), 96,130-1,140,151,157-62; sources of, 71, 90, 99, 151, 161, 376, 378; outlawed by Busch, 384 anarchist 'revolution', 158ff anarchists, 96, 99, 138, 152-3, 157-62, 179, 188, 205, 279, 284, 344; conflict with Marxists, 131-4, 151 ff, 157-62; oppose Chaco War, 162, 205 anarcho-syndicalism, 160, 251 Anaya, Ricardo, 147ff, 162-3, 179, 188, 202,227, 384 Animas (mine), 159, 318 anti-clericalism, 83, 100, 130, 141, 144, 149

397

Antofagasta, 1, 37, 4 2 - 3 , 114, 204 Aramayo, Carlos Victor, 31, 160, 373, 382ff Aramayo, Felix Avelino, 33, 39, 43ff, 373 Aramayo, Jose" Avelino Ortiz de, 30—2, 34,43,373 Araujo, Grover, 274 Arce, Aniceto (President 1888-92), 31, 3 5 - 9 , 41ff, 245, 373 Argandona, Manuel, 37, 40 Argentina, 40, 44, 70,165, 233, 372; as source of anarchist influence, 151, 161; influence on Bolivia, 14, 53ff, 61,71,210 Arguedas, Alcides, 84, 373, 375, 377, 396 Arguedas Mendieta, Antonio, 340, 356, 392, 393 Arica, 1,44,49,50, 212 Ariete, El, 376 armed forces {see also troops), 170—81, 324-7, 332-45, 362-9; and downfall of Victor Paz, 327, 332-7; and General Torres, 362ff, 366ff; and Italian fascism, 192; and labour disputes, 220, 351ff;and Lechin, 298ff, 301, 324-6, 338, 340ff; and mineowners, 27Iff; and trade unions, 333ff, 340ff, 362; and worker militias, 285, 333, 362ff, 368-9; as leading political party, 170, 174, 176, 181; dissolution proposed, 282, 284, 364; generational split, 231; RADEPA lodge, 202; withdrawal from mines demanded, 345 Arnade, Charles W., 395-6 Arratia, C, 198 Artesano, El, 47 artisans {see also guilds), viiff, 6, 15, 18ff, 25ff, 47ff, 50ff, 53, 55, 57ff, 60, 65, 68ff, 80ff, 85ff, 98, HOff, 152, 164, 167, 207; production, 8, 19, 23ff, 52, 63; representation in labour movement, 131, 188, 240, 278 Arze, Jose' Antonio, 147ff, 162, 179, 196, 198, 200-2, 212, 227, 382, 384 Arze Loureiro, Eduardo, 147, 384 Ascui, Angelica, 102, 139, 195, 207-8, 379

398

Index

Aspiazu, Agustin, 47, 81 Aurora Roja, 107-8, 136, 151 Ayala Mercado, Ernesto, 192 Aymara language, 2, 280 Ayoroa, Major, 124-6, 145 Balcdzar, Juan Manuel, 225, 230, 385 Baldivieso, Enrique, 171ff, 174, 176, 180ff, 201,230, 382 Ballivia'n, Adolfo (President 1873-4), 44 Ballivia'n, General Hugo (President 19512), 342 Ballivia'n, General Jose1 (President 183947), 16, 26ff, 35, 372 BanderaRoja, 140ff, 142ff Bandera Roja Socialists La, 108 Banzer Suarez, General Hugo (President 1971- ), 358, 393 Baptista, Mariano (President 1892-6), 16,32,39,372,373 Barcelli, Agustin, 293, 297, 384-5, 390 Barrientos Ortuno, General Rene (President 1964-9), 301, 332-3, 340, 346, 349, 356ff, 390, 393ff Batalla, La, 205

Belmonte, Captain Elias, 192 Belzu, General Manuel Isidoro (President 1848-55), 8, 15, 18, 25ff, 35, 40, 49,54-5, 110, 372 BetaGama, 171, 212 Bilbao la Vieja, Roberto, 280 Bilbao Rioja, General Bernardo, 357, 393 Bilk, Francisco, 122, 124-5 Blacutt, Colonel Jorge, 280 Blaiser, Cole, 386 Blanco, Vertiz, 137-8 Blanco Galindo, General Carlos (President 1930-1), 150 Bloque Minero Parlamentario (BMP), 243, 252ff, 255, 262, 265-6, 272 Bloque Re-estructurador (of COB), 310, 312,353 Bolivar, General Sim6n (President 1825-6), 24 Bolivian Railway Company, 39, 112, 114ff, 134 Bonifaz, Miguel, 200, 384 Borda, Arturo, 133-6, 145ff, 167, 380 Borda, Hector, 114, 117 Brazil, 2, 44 Brill, William H., 391 burial funds, 21,23, 77 Burke, Melvin, 391

Busch, Colonel German (President 1937-9), 166, 174-7,181ff, 184ff, 186, 192,218, 382-4 Butr6n, Germdn, 281, 286, 288, 291 Cabrera, C, 84, 377 Cdceres, Manuel, 385 Calder6n, Carlos, 158 Calder6n, Jos^ L., 75, 87ff Calder6n, Miguel, 291 Calder6n S., Ezequiel, 377 Calle,La, 201,228-33 Calvo, Jose" Maria, 48 Camacho, General Eliodoro, 42-3, 94 Camacho, Isaac, 313, 354-6, 392-3 Campero, General Narciso (President 1880-4), 38-9 Candia, Alfredo, 282ff, 389 Canelas, Demetrio, 108 Capellino, Nelson, 280 capitalism: and the Bolivian state, 260, 266; British and Chilean, 33, 38-9, 63; denounced by COES, 101; denounced by opposition parties, 174; development hampered by guild system, 19, 29, 75; reached Bolivia in mature form, 8-10, 30, 46, 72, 84; shaped the principal cities, 2, 70; Thesis of Pulacayo on, 246; US displaces British, 111 carabineros, 158

Caracoles (mine), 44, 49 Carrasco, Demetrio, 142 Carrasco, Manuel, 380 Carvajal, Emilio, 236-40 Castellon, Faustino, 194 Catavi, 2, 119, 122, 126, 157, 173, 199, 214, 253, 270, 330, 348,355; 'masacre blance', 260-5, 267, 318; massacre of, 216-24, 229, 237, 245, 261, 385;sindicato, 219, 223-6, 236-7, 262ff, 267, 269, 273ff, 305, 318,341,346,352,369 caudillismo, 9

census results: 1900, viii; 1950, viii; 1976, 371. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 349 Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) {see also Confederacion Sindical de Trabajadores Bolivianos, trade unions), 189, 277ff, 340ff, 368; organisation of, 280-5; and MNR, 323; ideological programme, 251, 296; First Congress, 290ff; Second Congress,

399

Index

307ff; Third Congress, 322ff; Fourth Congress, 360 ff Central Obrera Departmental (COD) of Orurp, 319 Central Obrera Departmental (COD) of Santa Cruz, 290-1 Central Obrera Nacional (CON), 278ff Centro Obrero de Estudios Sociales (COES), 52, 100-2, 105ff, 120, 167; influence outside La Paz, 105ff, 122, 127ff, 138 Centro Obrero Internacional, 151 Centro Obrero Libertario, 132, 136, 139 Centro Social de Obreros, 79ff, 85, 89 Centro Tipogra'fico, 75 Cerruto, Oscar A., 141, 143, 381 GSspedes, Augusto, 228, 381-2, 396 Chavez Ortiz, Nuflo, 291, 306ff Chicago, Haymarket Riots, 98ff, 378 Chilcote, Ronald H., 396 Chile: and coastline, 1-2, 38; influence on Bolivian Left, 71, 89-90, 102ff, 108-9, 117-18, 151, 203ff; Communist Party of, 211, 227; mineowners of, 14, 3 6 - 9 , 4 3 , 119, 124 Christianity, 4, 19, 28, 5 0 - 1 , 99, 141, 376 Chumacero Poveda, Juan, 273-4, 388 Chumacero Sand6val, R6mulo, 8 9 - 9 1 , 139,378,384 Church, Colonel George, 49, 374 Clarendon, Lord, 33 Claridad, 204 class consciousness, formation of, 71—4, 87-91, 9 6 - 9 , 110-23, 152-5, 2 3 9 42, 252, 270-82 Club de Igualdad, 56ff Cobija, 16,50 Cochabamba: anti-war demonstrations, 162; colonial economy, 7; economy after independence, 11-15; FOS, 194, 229; FOT, 124, 132, 205ff; in 1899 revolution, 67ff; peasant revolt, 144; press, 108, 380; socialism in, 107-8; student activism, 147-9, 200, 210, 328; trade schools, 25 Colquechaca (mine), 40, 63, 65, 192, 199, 273 Colquiri (mine), 105, 265; sindicato, 280, 316-18, 390; Thesis of, 325 Comando Politico de la Clase Obrera, 362ff, 367, 369 Comercio, El,37 Cometa, El, 56, 6 0

Comite Obrero Comunista Anarquista (COCA), 205 Communism: in 19th century, 28, 48, 59-60; feared, 111,163, 334; of PIR alleged, 20Iff, 227; outlawed by Busch, 384 Communist Party (see also Stalinism, Third International): proposed (1926), 104, 140-2; clandestine, 155ff, 167, 210; established, 202, 281, 289-90, 325, 3 3 0 - 1 , 340, 347-8, 363, 376 Condarco Morales, Ram6n, 375, 396 Confederaci6n Boliviana de Trabajo (CBT), 283 Confederaci6n de las Repiiblicas Obreras del Pacifico (CROP), 201 Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Bolivia, 169-71 Confederaci6n Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia (CSTB) (see also workers' congresses), 181, 186-207,'226, 229, 235-40, 248, 251, 265, 2 7 5 83 Confederaci6n Universitaria Boliviana (CUB) (see also Federaci6n), 394 Conservative Party, 3 3 - 5 , 41, 53, 62, 118,374 Cornblit, Oscar, 375 Corporaci6n Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL), viii, 236, 304, 314-16, 320-2, 333, 341, 343-4, 350-5, 363-6, 391 Corocoro (mine), 89, 99, 143, 152, 159, 192,297 Corral, Casimiro, 47, 57 Correspondencia Sudamericana, La, 136 Costa du Rels, Adolfo, 373 Crespo, Juan Manuel, 143 Crespo, Luis S., 26, 75, 372, 374 Cuba, influence of, 322, 351, 391-3 Cuenca, Colonel Luis, 2 2 0 - 3 Dalence, Jose" Maria, vii, 5, 371 Daza, General Hilaridn (President 18769), 37, 49, 5 6 - 9 , 203 Daza, Rojas, Arturo, 203-6, 385 Daza Rojas, Victor (probably 'Andrescho Kespe'), 206-7, 235, 382, 384, 386 Defensa del Trabajador, 90 Defensa Obrera, 89, 96 de Oro, Domingo, 14, 372 Despertar, El, 103, 108, 136 Despertar de los Trabajadores, El, 204

400

Index

Detective, El, 95 Diario, El 95, 268, 377, 382 Diaz, Emilio, 119-24, 128 Diaz, Machicao, Porfirio, 163 Dfaz Romero, Rafael, 373 Dfaz Villamil, Antonio, 382 Diez de Medina, Eduardo, 375-6 Diez de Medina, Fernando, 393-4 D'Orbigny, Alcides, 5, 371 drama groups, 100-2, 126-7, 134-6, 207-8 Echenique, Miguel, 183, 383 Echeverria, Esteban, 5 3 - 4 , 374

kco, El, 56 tco de Potosi, El, 12-14 Eder, George Jaclcson, 303-7, 390, 395 Eid, Oscar, 368, 394 eight-hour day, 9, 77, 89, 94, 97, 99, 115, 136-8, 143, 151, 175, 182, 189,378 elections: of 1870s, 50, 56; of 1880s, 4 1 - 3 ; of Liberal period, 79, 8 6 - 9 , 94, 103; of 1920s, 108, 130, 142-6, 153-5; of 1936, 174; of 1940, 197, 202; of 1944, 233; of 1947, 253-5; of 1966, 357, 393; CSTB favours qualified vote, 191; FSTMB and, 338-41 Elio, Tomds Manuel, 93, 226, 377 emigration, vii, 71 En Marcha, 282 Entrambasaguas, Luis, 236 Epoca,La, 12, 14, 22, 372 Erasmus, Charles J., 395 Escalier, Jose" Maria, 45 Esc6bar, Filem6n, 310, 331 Esc6bar, Modesto, 160-1 Estandarte, El, 15 Eventual, El, 5 7 - 9 , 374 exploitation: denied by the Right, 84; denounced by Belzu, 26ff; of mineworkers, 84, 118; of peasantry, 9, 62, 8 2 - 4 , 92, 106; restrained by Pacheco, 41 factory workers, 113, 278, 282, 291, 309, 347, 371, 388-9; of La Paz, 278, 303, 343, 354, 369, 388 Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB), 266, 290, 309, 325, 337, 356-8 Federaci6n de Artes GraTicas, 7 5 - 8 Federaci6n Ferroviario, 114-16, 129, 138

Federaci6n Obrera Central de Uncia (FOCU), 120-7 Federaci6n Obrera de Chile (FOCH), 104, 108,117, 124, 136, 204, 206 Federaci6n Obrera de La Paz, 80, 8 5 - 8 , 97 Federaci6n Obrera de Trabajo (FOT), 89, 117, 126, 140-5, 151, 160-2, 167, 377;and 1936 strikes, 175-6; membership, 131; of La Paz, 128-37; ofOruro, 132, 157, 162 Federaci6n Obrera Internacional (FOI), 85-9, 9 5 - 9 , 103; membership automatic, 98 Federaci6n Obrera Libertaria (FOL) of La Paz, 138 Federaci6n Obrera Local (FOL), 151-3, 157-61,175-6,279 Federaci6n Obrera Sindical (FOS), 192— 8, 229, 265, 278 Federaci6n Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (FSTMB): formation of, 235-9; radicalisation of, 240-4; Pulacayo Thesis of, 246-52; and Parliament, 254-6; Colquiri Congress (1947), 256-9; and Catavi dismissals, 261-3; Telemayu Congress (1948), 265-7; leaders arrested (1949), 269-72; Milluni Congress (1950), 274-6; and CON, 278-9; and COB, 280, 291; and economic stabilisation, 305, 310; Colquiri Congress (1958), 312-14; miners' strike (1959), 314-20; Huanuni Congress (1961), 320-2; Colquiri Congress (1963), 324-7; La Paz Conference (1964), 337-9; clash with military (1965), 340-4; Siglo XX Congress (1970), 3 6 0 - 1 ; and People's Assembly, 364-6; and August 1971 coup, 368-70 Federaci6n Universitaria Boliviana (FUB), 147, 162, 192-3, 200, 244 Federacirin Universitaria Local (FUL) (La Paz), 227 Federado, El, 108 Federalism, 5 8 - 6 4 Fellman Velarde, Jose, 289, 291, 373-4, 396 Fernandez, Ernesto, 124 Fernandez, J., 154 Fernandez, Nicanor, 122-3 Fernandez, Ruperto, 17 Ferrer y Guardia, Francisco, 90

401

Index

Ferroviario, El, 108 Fifer,J. Valerie, 371,395 Figaro, El, 75, 87, 93, 377-9 Finot, Enrique, 373 Fisher, Lilian Estelle, 375 Flores, Mario, 185 Flores, Zolio, 73 Fourth International, x, 389 Fragua, La, 186 freemasons, 5 1 - 2 , 73, 149-50, 244, 376,386 free trade, 10-11; after 1956, 304; imposed from above, 17 free traders, 14-16, 31, 35, 4 0 - 1 , 47, 50 Frente de Izquierda Boliviano (FIB), 198, 202-3 Freyre, Ricardo Jaimes, 6 0 - 2 , 130 Frias, Ionia's (President 1874-6), 34, 44,57 Galdo, Norberto, 52 Gall, Norman, 395 Gallardo Lozada, Major Jorge, 394 Gamarra, Guillermo, 122-8, 141, 144, 155,380 Gamonalismo, defined, 10, 371 Garamendi, Bernardo, 188 Garret, Bishop Julio, 144 Gaspar, Antonio, 222, 236-7 Geddes, Charles, 380 Gonzales, Federico, 194 Gonzales Prada, Manuel, 209 Guachalla, Fernando, 86 Guerra, Guillermo, 385 Guevara, Ernesto (Che), 346, 349, 356, 392-3 Guevara Arce, Walter, 212, 302, 390 guild masters, 20ff guilds, 8, 18ff, 30, 51, 7 4 - 8 , 8 5 - 6 Gulf Oil Corporation, 357-9, 393 Gutierrez, Alberto, 26, 3 7 2 - 3 Gutierrez, Mario, 356 Gutierrez Guerra, Jose* (President 191720), 117 Guzmdn, Felipe, 378 Haenke, Tadeo, 7, 371 Halperin Donghi, Tulio, 374 Haya de la Torre, Victor Raul, 52, 148 Heath, Dwight B., 388, 395 Hertzog, Enrique (President 1947-9), 166, 243, 255-7, 261-8, 387-8 Hinojosa, Roberto, 149ff, 381

Hochschild, Mauricio, 178, 249 Huanchaca, mining company, 35—8, 42, 245 Huanuni (mine), 105,146, 157-8, 236, 263, 347, 351, 369-70; sindicato, 236, 267, 316-21, 330, 345-6, 353, 369, 390; strike (1919), 137 Humanidad, 151ff Ibanez, Andre's, 5 6 - 9 Ideas y Figuras, 204 illiteracy, 1, 24, 71, 114 illiterates, votes for, 282 imperialism, American, 141, 322—6, 335, 339-41, 349; and MNR, 2 8 5 7, 299, 334, 339, 389-91 imperialist blockade, of revolution, 282, 334 import duties, 12, 16, 41 independence, 5, 10, 27 'Indian' issue, 1-2, 28, 6 5 - 8 , 8 2 - 3 , 92, 131, 139, 145-8, 161, 185, 196, 280 Industria, La, 105 inflation, 171, 175-7, 197, 217, 248, 302ff, 3 0 7 - 8 Iturralde, Abel, 116, 130, 137 Iturri Jurado, Ram6n, 152 Jaldin, Semiramis, 133, 380 journeymen, 20ff, 25 Junta Central de Artesanos, 60, 76, 85 Kami (mine), 343 Kapsoli, Wilfredo, 371 Klein, Herbert, 384, 395 Kramer, Pedro, 5 8 - 9 , 63, 375 Kundt, Hans, 141 Kyne, Martin, 218, 385 labour force, composition, viii—ix, 70 La Chojlla (mine), 275 landowners: and rural education, 92, 106; and Villarroel, 234; repress peasants, 68,144, 279; expelled from countryside, 284, 337 La Paz: anarchists attempt revolution, 158; and Liberal Party, 62ff, 85ff, 92ff; August 1971 events, 368ff; customs house, 16; factories, 2; factory workers, 278, 343, 388; FOS, 195-8; FOT, 212; guilds, 18-19, 86; 1871 insurrection, 47; 1952 insurrection, 281; mayor, 137, 177; municipal council, 142; printers, 95—

402

Index

7; printing industry, 75-6; sole base Magruder, Judge Calvert, 224 of COES, 100-1; student demonMalloy, James, 392, 395 strations, 330; trade schools, 25, 76, Maras, Pablo, 158-9 80,85 Margarinos, General Manuel Rodriguez, La Salvadora (mine), 118, 122ff 35 Lechin Oquendo, Juan: and foundation Maria*tegui, Jose1 Carlos, 52, 165 of FSTMB, 236-8; early career, Marof, Tristdn (Navarro, Gustavo A.,), 241—3; and Hertzog government, 163-6, 196-9, 205, 208, 211, 230250, 254, 257, 259; conflict with 2, 268, 382 POR, 266-7; arrested (1949), 269ff, Marsh, Margaret Alexander, 379 273; and COB, 281, 286-8, 291-6; Martinez, Ionia's, 380 biography, 291—301; and stabilisation Marxism {see also anarchism, socialism): plan, 305-8; and miners' strike and BMP, 253; and MNR, 276; of (1959), 316; and Triangular Plan, Ce"sar Lora, 353; of COES, 100-1; of 321-4; and military junta, 338-43; CSTB, 188ff;ofFOT, 129; of and recreation of COB, 360; and Gamarra, 127; of Lechin, 242ff, 259, People's Assembly, 361, 365, 368 298, 300, 324; of Partido Laborista, 154; of pre-war students, 209; of Lechin Suarez, Colonel Juan, 343, 392 radical intellectuals, 82ff; of R6mulo Lewin, Boleslao, 375 Chumacero, 90; of second workers' Liberal El, 88 congress, 139—40; of Sindicato Liberal Party, 39-45, 53, 62-5, 69-74, 79 Grdfico, 78; of students, 147; of 85-98, 104, 110, 118,134, 171, 174, union leaders, denounced, 264; 226,257 popularised by Trista'n Marof, 165; Libre Palabra/Palabra Libre, 78, 108 versus opportunism, in FSTMB, 265 Liga de Obreros y Empleados de Ferrocarril, 112ff Marxists: and Chaco War chauvinism, 162; and effects of Chaco defeat, Liga Obrera Radical, 93 169ff, 180;and FSTMB, 310-2, Linares, Jose* Maria (President 1857-61), 338ff;and Lechinistas, 320; and 11, 15-17, 34,40,49, 372 Ministry of Labour, 179; and MNR, Llallagua (mine), 119-23, 173, 235, 290; and parliament (1949), 272; 259, 270-2, 330, 341, 348, 355-6; and peasantry, 284; conflict with sindicato, 386 anarchists, 131-3, 140, 151-5, Loayza, Arturo, 119 160ff Lofstrom, William, 395 London, 32-3, 36, 44 Mas, Juan, 372 L6pez, Eduardo, 388 Masas, 325, 389 L6pez, Arias, Victor, 368, 394 May Day, 78, 81, 85-7, 98ff, 120-1, L6pez Murillo, Rene, 388 137ff, 364, 378 L6pez Sanchez, Alberto, 173 Mealla, Abel, 266 Lora, Ce'sar, x, 310, 313, 315ff, 332, Melgar, Herna'n, 227 351-5 Melgarejo, General Mariano (President Lora, Guillermo, ix-x, 240-5, 253-4, 1865-71), 32-4, 44, 47-9, 372-4 259-61, 265-73, 290-1, 303, 332- Mendez, Julio, 371 3, 360, 368, 381-2, 388-91, 394, Me"ndez Tejada, Roberto, 227 396 Mendiza"bal, Alfredo, 256-7, 261-3 Loza, Enrique G., 107-9, 155, 170, Mendiz^bal, Angel, 227 173,378-9,382 Mendoza, Jaime, 373 Loza, Le6nM., 18,52, 372 Mendoza, Vincente, 345 Lucha Obrera, 279-80 Mendoza de la Tapia, Lucas, 36 Mend6za L6pez, Vicente, 52 Maceda, A., 154 Mend6za Mamani, Carlos, 130, 139, 141, Maceda Ca'ceres, Guillermo, 144. 151 143, 166-8,382 McEwen, William J., 395 militias: and Lechin, 297-8; of mineMagill, John H., 395 workers, 313, 318; of MNR party,

403

Index

313, 390; of workers, 189,251, 339, 343, 369-70; of workers and peasants, 282, 284ff, 326-9; workers take over mining camps, 341 Milluni (mine), 237, 275, 343, 368 mineowners: and Busch government, 183ff; and Lechin, 236; and 'masacre blanca', 260-7; and Thesis of Pulacayo, 248-52; denounced, 173, 186, 228, 288; in 19th century, viii, 11, 30-8, 4 1 - 8 ; nationalisation, 188, 308; oppose Busch Labour Code, 220; property threatened, 148ff; resist workers' demands, 157, 215, 219; tin magnates displace silver barons, 118 mine workers {see also under specific mines, trade unions, FSTMB), viii, 31, 41, 6 5 - 7 , 84, 89, 105, 111-13, 118-27, 132-8, 146-60, 183, 1 9 4 9, 204, 226, 234-47, 259ff, 273-5, 291, 310-19, 325-33, 340-52, 364, 371; and armed forces, 299; and Falange, 266; and Villarroel, 276; influence peasants, 280; living conditions, 189, 214ff; militias, 260; proposed arming of, 248—50, 258; representatives in parliament, 254ff; strike, 217ff; take hostages (1949), 270; working conditions, 224ff mining industry: and foreign capital, 39ff, 111; attempted revival in 1850s, 3Iff; collapse in early 19th century, 5, 7; colonial, 4 - 6 ; pre-conquest, 3; taxation of, 175, 183-7; tin displaces silver, 118; working conditions, 146, 288 Ministry of Labour, 178-80, 190, 202, 217-22, 225-30, 234-43, 248, 256, 259-62, 266-75, 281, 291, 314-15, 334, 345 mint {Casa de la Moneda), 14, 40, 47 Moists, Gabriel, 132, 188, 191, 236 Moists, Jorge, 132, 161 Moise's, Raquel, 161 Molina, Pldcido, 58, 375 Moller, Edwin, 281,389 Mollinedo, Alfredo, 272 Monasterios, Ernesto, 266 Monje Gutierrez, Toma's, 83, 145, 377 Monroy Block, German, 239 Montenegro, Carlos, 172, 201 Montes, General Ismael (President 1904— 9 and 1913-17), 45, 64, 8 0 , 8 6 - 9 4

Morales, Agustin (President 1871-2), 47 Morales, Armando, 321 Morales Duran, Golonel Agustin, 328 Morales Villaz6n, Nestor, 52 Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), 202-5, 212, 219, 225-31, 236-7, 251-6, 265, 276-83, 2 8 9 90, 321, 348, 357-62, 366; and COB, 297, 302, 307, 323, 335, 390; and Lechin, 298, 300; approves strikes, 228; Convention (1956), 302ff, 310-13, 318; downfall, 3 2 7 30, 334-6, 391; 'nazi-fascists', 257, 261,266,389 Municipio, El, 42 Munoz Cabrera, Juan, 14, 372 Munoz Cornejo, Humberto, 52 mutualist societies, 5Iff, 7 2 - 5 Nacidn, La, 137, 309, 312, 330 nationalisation: of Gulf Oil, 359; of mines, 188, 249, 282, 287, 298, 308, 332; of Standard Oil, 175, 181, 189 nationalism, economic: of Busch, 185; of Chavez, 307; of Lechin, 295ff; of Ovando, 359 Nava, Mdximo, 118-19 Navarro, Gustavo, A., see Tristdn, Marof Nicolaus loan, 111, 150, 174 nitrate mines, 203

Noche,La, 185,228 None, El, 204 Obrajes, 8 oil workers, 365ff Omiste, Modesto, 372 Oploca (mine), 250, 257 Ordonez, Daniel, 331-3 Ordonez, Julio M., 101, 141-3 Organizaci6n Regional Interamericana de Trabajo (ORIT), 274, 293 Orgaz, Agustin, 159 Ortiz Madriaga, Felipe, 374 Oruro, 4 2 - 3 , 5 1 - 2 , 113-16, 124; anarchists in, 157—9; army versus miners, 330; August 1971 events, 369ff; centre for clandestine unions, 345; COD, 319; customs house, 16; factory workers, 144, 279; focus for miners' unions, 63, 235; FOS, 195, 235; FOT, 132; in 1781, 375; railhead and centre of labour organisation, 104—8; student demonstrations, 329; trade schools, 25

404

Index

Ostria Gutierrez, Alberto, 386 Osuna, Demetrio, 151, 158 Otero, Alfredo H., 378 Otero Calder6n, Jaime, 391 Ovando Candia, General Alfredo (President 1966 and 1969-70), 301, 330-2,350,355-8,361-2 Oxa Choque, Lucas, 273 Pacheco, Gregorio (President 1884-8), 37-42,48, 373 Pais, El, 145 Pando, General Jose" Manuel (President 1899-1904), 45, 63-5, 92 Paraguay, 2, 35, 59, 160, 162, 341 Paraguayan prison camps, 231 Pardo, Timoteo, 223, 385 parliament: and trade unions, 254-6, 311; and working class, 253, 272, 287 Parliamentary Labour Block, 195 Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR) {see also Communist Party, Stalinists), 148, 198-203, 208, 219, 223-9, 240-4, 248-9, 256-63, 278, 357, 386 Partido Laborista, 102, 153ff Partido Nacionalista, 171ff, 201 Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR), x, 165, 210-11, 240-4, 251-4, 263-7, 276-83, 286-90, 312, 32530, 338, 341, 347, 351-6, 360, 389, 392; and Lechin, 298; elements enter MNR, 296 Partido Obrero Socialista (POS), 101-7, 167, 204; of La Paz, 136; of Oruro, 134; of Potosi, 107 Partido Republicano Genuino, 111, 116 Partido Republicano Socialista (PRS), 173-7 Partido Revolucionario de la Izquierda Nacional (PRIN), 300ff, 330-7, 348 Partido Socialista, 89-90, 101-3, 116, 129-30, 154,201,230, 377; expelled Minister (1921), 124; of Cochabamba, 108, 132; of Oruro, 105-8; of Uyuni, 107-8, 116; programme, 103ff; reorganisation planned, 171 Partido Socialista Boliviana, 173-7, 181 Partido Socialista del Estado, 181 Partido Uni6n Republicana Socialista (PURS), 243, 249, 255-7, 262, 266-8

Patino, Antenor, 264 Patino Mining Company, 217-19, 2367, 252, 259-62, 268-72, 352, 387 Patino, Sim6n I., 118-21,136, 150, 183ff, 237,252, 380-6 Patria, La (Oruro), 116, 331, 348-9, 379-80, 392 Patzy, Alfredo, 170 Paz, General Jose1 Maria, 374 Paz, Juan Casimiro, 53-5 Paz, Paulino, 53-5, 374 Paz Arce, Domingo, 374 Paz Campero, Javier, 178, 191 Paz Estenssoro, Victor (President 1952— 6 and 1960-4), 228-32, 276, 28693, 301, 307, 321ff, 327-34, 374, 386,389 Pearse, Andrew, 395 peasant militias, 284-8, 326-9 peasant sindicatos, 282-4, 291, 351, 389; organised by CON, 279 peasantry, 1-3, 9, 26, 47, 65-70, 82, 106, 130, 143-4,166, 173, 192-6, 214, 279, 284, 288-91, 327-9, 356-8, 371, 375; and Villarroel, 234; leadership from mineworkers, 273, 388 Pelaez, Guillermo, 151 Pefta Bravo, Raul, 394 Pena, Luis, 192, 396 Penaranda, General Enrique (President 1940-3), 170, 202, 218, 232 Penaranda, Guillermo, 87, 100 Pensamiento, El, 108 People's Assembly, 301, 364-6, 393, 394 Perales, Ricardo, 52, 100-2, 378 Pereira, Ismael, 136, 381 P&ez Paton, Roberto, 274 Per6, Belisario, 40 Peru, 1-2, 44, 52, 82, 148, 200, 209; Ambassador, 143; coup of 1968, 357; source of anarchist influence, 376; students, 139 Pimentel, Irineo, 310 Pinilla, Claudio, 86 Pinilla, Macario, 64 Pinto Escalier, Arturo, 372 police: abolition of private and secret forces proposed, 107; and fall of MNR, 328ff; close Oruro FOT, 158; employed Arturo Borda, 134; infiltrate FOL, 161; in mining camps, 145, 260, 269-72; intervene against

405

Index

FOCU, 124; not to intervene in railway strike, 118; supervision of guilds, 21 Ponce, Major Antonio, 232 population, vii, 2, 371 Portillo y Cia, 120 Portocarrero, Jose" Vera, 378 Portugalete (mine), 40 Potosi, 52, 89, 107-8, 280, 319; FOS, 194; miners and students, 355; silver mines, vii, 5 - 6 , 30, 32, 63, 218; sindicato, 256, 338; trade schools, 25 Pregdn, 223, 239 Prensa Libre, 329 Presencia, 355 primitive accumulation, 9 printers, 172, 175-9, 217, 228, 279, 310 proletarian army, advocated, 250, 258 proletarian front (1946-9), 252 proletariat, 2, 70, 84, 96-106, 130, 142-5; and COB, 283; and socialist revolution, 360ff; arming of proposed, 326; CSTB as sole spokesman for, 192, 196; dictatorship of, 143, 153, 247, 256; dictatorship of, Lechin's view, 294; false apostles of, 264; given majority in COB, 291; growth of, 278; mineworkers leadership of, 235, 277, 330; most admired in Latin America, 282; Thesis of Pulacayo on, 246; vanguard role in 1952, 294 property: benefits of, 28; evils of, 26 property rights: discussed by Busch, 185; guaranteed by Busch, 181, 184; jeopardised by Busch, 182ff protection: during colonial regime, 7; after independence, 8 - 1 2 protectionism, 12-15, 24, 40, 47ff, 88, 372; Lechin on, 324; of Busch's Labour Code, 182 Prudencio, Fermin, 86 Prudencio Bustillo, Ignacio, 373, 375 Pueblo Escucha, 109 Pueblo Obrero, 203 Pulacayo (mine), 36, 109, 120, 146, 192, 273, 380; Thesis of, 193, 243-6, 252, 260-8, 274, 280, 299 Quechisla (mine), 344 Quechua language, 2, 273 Quevedo, Quintin, 44 quinine, 5, 16, 35

Quintanilla, General Carlos (President 1939-40), 187, 197 Quiroga Santa Cruz, Marcello, 359 Radical Party, 81, 86, 92ff, 104, 134, 377 railway workers, 104, 108-18, 137-9, 188-99, 217, 228, 234, 278-82, 291,309-10,319 railways, 3 1 - 5 , 38-43, 63, 126 Raza, La, 136 Razdn, La, 45, 238, 372, 385, 387 Raz6n de Patria (RADEPA), 229-30 Recabarren, Luis, 103, 108ff, 204, 206 Rene Moreno, Gabriel, 12-16, 372 repression: of Andre's Ibanez, 58; of peasant rebels, 68, 144, 173; of striking miners, 125ff; of clandestine Communist Party, 157; of Right by Villaroel, 233; of Left by Victor Paz, 328ff; limited under MNR, 335; less limited under military junta, 342ff, 347ff; after 1971, 370, 394 Republica, La, 95, 105, 127, 159, 176, 382, 383 Republican party, 45, 9 3 - 5 , 104, 110, 116,124,134,138,165 Republicano, El, 108 Reque Lozano, Felipe, 141, 143 Revista de Bolivia, 61 Reyeros, Rafael A., 141, 143 Reyes, Evaristo, 25 Reyes, Sim6n, 358, 394 Reyes Ortiz, Serapio, 64 Rio Branco (Chancellor of Brazil), 45 Rivera, Gumercindo, x, 121, 125, 131, 380 Rivera Argandona, Rigoberto, 136, 144, 154,380-1 Rocha Ajata, Manuel, 273ff Rodriquez, Jose* Benito, 52 Roma"n, Paz, 45 Rosas, Esteban, 35 Rosas, General Juan Manuel de, 53ff Rosca, 186, 197, 202, 209, 238-9, 244, 249, 252, 257, 296, 336-7, 383-4 Ruck, Ernesto O., 373 Ruiz Gonzalez, Raul, 386 Saavedra, Bautista (President 1920-4), 6 2 - 5 , 88, 92, 94, 110-27, 141, 145, 165,173,177 Salamanca, Daniel (President 1931-4), 45, 9 2 - 5 , 111, 145, 1 6 1 - 3 , 170, 205

406

Index

Salvatierra, Luis, 151-2, 161, 381 Salvatierra Yafiez, Ezequiel, 18, 89, 9 5 6, 103, 372, 374, 377-8, 382 Sanabria, E., 154 Sanchez, Major Rub&i, 368-9 Sanchez Bustamente, Daniel, 92 Sanjin6s Uriarte, Bernadino, 15 San Jose" (mine), 237, 243, 249ff, 257, 265; sindicato, 157, 313, 321, 330, 345 Santa Cruz, 56ff; COD, 290-1 Santa Cruz, Colonel Andre's de (Prefect of La Paz), 24 Santa Cruz, General Andre's (President 1829-39), 10, 15 Santivdnez, Jose* Maria, 56 Sarmiento, Domingo F., 54 Segaline, Arturo, 73, 96, 136, 376, 378, 381-2 Seoane, Manuel, 139, 381 Sevillana, Hugo, 161, 179 Siete Suyos (mine), 317-18 Siglo XX (mine), 215, 222, 253, 2 7 1 - 2 , 319-20, 327-33, 341-4, 348-55; massacre of, 269ff; sindicato, 219, 236-45, 260-7, 273, 290, 305, 310, 315-21, 346ff, 360, 369-70, 386 Siles, Hernando (President 1926-30), 126, 132-5, 140, 144-50, 158ff, 171,201, 358,381 Siles Salinas, Luis Adolfo (President 1969), 357-8 Siles Zuazo, Herna'n (President 195660), 212, 286, 302-14, 321, 326, 336, 352, 358 silicosis, 214 silver: mining, 30—6, 40; prices, 5, 47, 63; processing with mercury, 6; state monopoly on exports, 12—15, 3 1 - 5 , 40,47-9 Sindicato GraTico, 78 socialism (see also anarchism, Marxism): as means to pre-empt capitalism, 84; in backward countries, 293; in 19th century, viii, 24, 5 2 - 6 2 ; of 1930 coup, illusory, 150; of Arze, 201; of FOI, 9 6 - 7 ; of Freyre, 130; of Loza, 109; of Marof, 164; of Partido Socialista, 103; of POS, 105; of postChaco parties, 172-3; of Saavedristas, disputed, 172, 177; of Toro government, 177-80; of Urquieta, 82ff; reformism of Radical party, 93; reformism of socialist parties, 107

socialist intellectuals, 81 Socialists El, 90, 161, 204 Sociedad de Obreros El Porvenir, 5 2 - 3 , 98 Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de Artesanos (Oruro), 52 Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos (Potosi), 52 Sociedad Fraternal de Artesanos de Socorros Mutuales, 51 Sociedad Fraternal de Artesanos Obreros de la Cruz, 51,73 Sociedad Fraternal de Artesanos y Obreros, 51 Sociedad Obreros de la Cruz, 129 Sociedad Rural Boliviana (SRB), 280 Sociedad Rural de Cochabamba, 337 Sociedad Uni6n Obrera (Potosi), 52 Sora Sora, 327-31 Soruco Ipina, Dr Ricardo, 116 Solis, Rodolfo, 146 Sotomayor Valdez, Ram6n, 5, 371-2 Soviets, of workers and peasants, 284 stabilisation, monetary, 303—9 Stalinism, 157,167, 278-82, 289-91, 310, 325, 331-3, 354, 360-2, 384; criticised by COB, 296 Stalinists (see also PIR), 198-202, 2 1 0 1 1 , 2 3 4 - 4 2 , 2 5 1 , 256ff Standard Oil Company, 141, 150, 1 9 5 6; nationalisation proposed, 175, 181,189 strike: at Catavi(1942), 219-23; at Uncia (1923), 126;general (1936), 174-6; general or staggered proposed (1947), 259-64; general (1957), 309; general (1965), 301, 341; general (1967), 350, 355; general (1970), 362; in early twenties, 137; in nitrate mines, 203; miners (1949), 270; miners (1959), 314ff; railmen, 117; right to, 77, 110, 114, 121-3, 182, 218,261-2 strike funds, 78, 113-14, 194, 241, 251, 258,263,316 strikes and food supplies, 251, 258, 341 Student Congress (Potosi, 1908), 91 students: first contacts with artisans, 91; and Catavi massacre, 227; and mineworkers, 244, 327ff, 341-7, 355, 370; and CSTB, 196-7; and COB, 281, 350; and Marxism, 147ff, 192, 200ff; and university reform, 140, 147; and workers, 209, 365-70;

407

Index

mobilisation of, ix, 140; oppose Chaco War, 162; unrealistic voluntarism of, 149 Stumpf,. Gustavo, 266 Sucre (also called Chuquisaca, Charcas, and La Plata), 48-50, 62, 124, 192, 194, 382; confirmed as national capital (1898), 64; guilds of, 18-19; peasant revolt, 144; stronghold of prejudice, 163ff; trade schools, 91 Sucre, General Antonio Jose" de (President 1826-8), 11, 49 Supreme Court, 195

trade union leadership: defects of, 254; dismissed, 262ff, 275, 290ff, 342ff trade union militias, 251, 339-43, 3 6 9 70 trade union organisation, 278, 289, 310-15,321,334,343 trade unions (see also Central Obrera Boliviana, Federaci6n Ferroviario, Federaci6n Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia, etc.), 7 2 - 8 , 89, 100-7, 113-28,131, 138ff, 146-8, 163, 191-200; and anarchism, 1 5 1 61; and armed forces, 333—65; and Busch's Labour Code, 182; and Taborga, Major Alberto, 230-1, 386 CSTB, 188ff; and fall of Tejada tailors'guilds, 18—24 Sorzano, 176; and import quotas, Tamayo, Franz, 92ff 302; and Marxism, 132, 139-44, Tamayo, Jose\ 172-7 157, 167; and Ministry of Labour, Tarija, 5 3 - 5 , 374 178; and MNR government, 292, tax revenue: falls in 1921,111; from 325ff; and Villarroel, 234, 244, 248, mining profits, 107, 175, 183ff, 187; 276; compulsory membership proin 19th century, 6, 11, 3 6 - 8 , 4 1 , posed, 175-8, 208; in clandestinity, 4 7 - 9 ; from rubber exports, 45; 344_54; in mines, 217-19, 235ff, pledged as security for loan, 112 259ff; not English, but French taxation of wages and salaries, 93 example followed, 297; organisational taxes: on basic necessities, criticised, 15, weaknesses, 258-63; post-Chaco 50, 88; on basic necessities, reductions reorganisation, 177-9; recognition promised, 105, 155; proposed increase refused, 121-3, 157-60 defeated, 144 Triangular Plan (for Comibol), 321-6, teachers' union, 188, 193-6 339, 353ff, 391 Teja Zafre, Alfonso, 371 Trigo, Bernardo, 374 Tejada Sorzano, Jose" Luis (President Trigo Paz, Heriberto, 374 1934-6), 170-6 troops (see also armed forces): easily Telegrafo, El, 88 suppress Villaz6n 'revolution', 150; Teoponte, guerrillas, 359 incited to disobey, 117, 158, 163; Territorios, Libres, 346-7 occupy Catavi (1942), 221ff; occupy textile imports, and domestic production, Llallagua (1949), 271; occupy mining 7-17 camps (1965), 347ff; occupy Uncia Third International (Comitern), 100,140(1923), 124-6; used to protect company interests, 119-23, 218; 2, 151, 154-5, 167-8, 189, 201ff versus miners at Sora Sora, 331ff Thorn, Richard, 391-2, 395 Time, 264, 317,388,391 Trotskyism, Trotskyists (see also POR), tin prices, 111, 118, 160, 180 211, 229, 240-8, 259, 264-7, 276, Toranzo, CMsar, 237, 269-70 281, 289-91, 309-10, 320-31, 338, Toro, Colonel David (President 1936352ff, 3 6 0 - 1 ; and Lechin, 295 7), 167, 174-82,212 Torres, General Juan Jose" (President, Ultima Hora, 216, 292, 368, 382, 385 1970-1), 301,356, 362-8 Uncia, 192, 218, 223, 236, 245; elecTorres, Mario, 237-9, 254-5, 269, 275, tions, 143; massacre of (1923), x, 281,284,291,308,316-21 101, 104, 111, 118-27, 137, 141, Torrico, Primitivo, 195 145—6, 173; mine workers, 157; police, 272-4 Trabajo, 86, 140 trade schools, 24ff, 49, 51, 76, 80, 85 unemployment, 71, 7 6 - 7 , 88, 94, 158— 91, 105 9, 352-4

408

Index

Uni6n GraTica Cochabamba, 133 Uni6n GraTica Nacional, 74ff, 88 United States (see also imperialism, American): and MNR, 285-7, 299, 308, 334-5, 339, 389, 391; and trade unions, 301, 325; Embassy distrusted Torres, 366; government, 219,224,232-3 university: autonomy, 140-50; of Cochabamba and demonstrations, 328ff; of La Paz, 362; popular, 128, 138, 208; racial discrimination in, 166; reform, 193, 200, 209-10; revolution (1969), 359 universities and fall of MNR, 329ff Urquieta, Miguel Lino, 82ff, 376-7 Urriolagoitia, Mamerto (President 194951), 166, 268ff Uyuni, 42, 107-13, 124, 192 Vaca Diez, Antonio, 56 Vaca Dolz, Pedro, 162, 191, 199 Vaca Guzma'n Santiago, 373 Valdivia Rol6n, Adalberto, 162, 382 Valencia Vega, Alipio, 147 Valenzuela, Jose\ 53, 79, 144, 146, 374, 376 Valenzuela Cotacora, Justino, 145, 204, 380 Varela, Augusto, 105, 130 Vasconcelos, Jose", 149 Vazquez, Edmundo, 268, 388 Velasco Alvarado, General, 357, 359 Vera Portocarrero, Jose*, 99 Verdad, La, 95, 105 Viacha (railhead), 117 Villalpando, Abelardo, 147 Villarroel, Colonel Gualberto (President 1943-6), 202, 229-33, 237, 240-4, 264, 276 Villaz6n, 'revolution' of, 149ff Villegas, Lieutenant Colonel, 124-5 Viloco (mine), 267 Viscarra, Miguel, 127 Viscarra Fabre, Guillermo, 162 Voz del Oriente, La, 56 Voz Socialista, La, 108 War of the Pacific (1879), 1, 33, 37ff, 44,73 Warren, Avra, 233 Whitehead, Laurence, 389, 394-6 women, participation of, 102, 120, 152, 157, 161, 194, 207ff

women's rights, 106ff, 128, 135, 174-5, 188,208 worker participation: in cabinet, 171, 178, 247ff, 258, 281, 285ff, 290, 313, 363; in drafting Labour Code, 191; in parliament, 253, 287; in state enterprises, 365 workers' congresses: first, 138; second, 138ff; third, 145, 151,165,167; fourth, 160ff; to found CSTB (see also CSTB, COB), 188-91 workers' control, 250, 282, 287, 299, 304;Lechinon, 294ff working class (see factory workers, mineworkers, printers, railway workers, etc.), win, 70, 365, 371 Zalles, Juan Maria, 86 Zapata, Jos£ Mario, 280 Zegada, Jose", 281 Zevallos, Nicolas M., 144 Zilveti Arce, Pedro, 223, 227-31 Zondag, Cornelius H., 395