WWII Aircraft Warplane Development 1939-45

PUTNAM'S HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT Series Editor: . ·pJanett PUTNAM'S HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT Aircraft of the Second World War...

Author: Philip Jarrett

730 downloads 4766 Views 41MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

PUTNAM'S HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT

Series Editor: . ·pJanett

PUTNAM'S HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT

Aircraft of the Second World War The Development of the Warplane 1939-45 Series Editor: Philip Jarrett

Tirk page photograph: CSAAF /'-51

,\I"$/n lm.ttWl( ... :-.:"",.y"",, and I«tur-e< iIl"IlIlnd lhc "'OII.J, Dnaibcd '" ·/..",encII Ieadonc .....--.1 "Tlln·. he .. thor author of "'..... ZO boob .00 ",,,n(roul lIrtK:Io:s UlduJme 8nm4 r",r-rin At""_. tr"".np 1H"I",mJ fHt~id/,mt:'" and S",',......Sy>""" hal ra--crld)' been ~

*'.............

.00 '" lorl bcumc _ mnor 0( AlrtllfUn.!he R",-.J AcronMJDcaI Socxt)', """~pt'f lie ...... , IISliu.nl cUltor of At~,., Mo,mhl" from 1\l?3 to 1\180. and prodlKtlOIl ~Ior of Jo"lilJIl f",mlUtlOfWl from 1\180 10

,,.,

.\1 J P 1Jooo')-n.\1>chKI Bo-"}'W'I ",tanl '" ..woon ,,-as ....den ....tIm lhe huge R.IOI ,Lr$hlp paned

10'" o·,crhclld. Il) 1M mld.193Qs "" ",., n:cordJna and lOOn pholOinophlllg ~,,(raft. and lhrou&hoot the hostl1ll>CS he compiled ~ rKDr'lk; of lhc C'\"mlS from , nnp>
~

tum a

!laban modd.....,.(1 motor .. , )'OU"i bo)' lie hat _nl1m "idd\' on ilUtorr'IUU\... lusl"'> and "'" '-'ks tnduJc: TN R.of.m Am> """N,AI« lutplu". and. a. ro-author. TN Rollt·N,,>'C~ C"..... He is Cumor of ACT'OI\lluua \II, lite Sctcnce .\Iu§(Uffi.IAlnJnn. tlOIS'

Introduction I>r Alfred Price Dr Alfred P.-icc .......-ai

as an IIrC1T" officer in !he RAJ'. sp«u.Its'l1g m el«lronic and alf fi&hU"l ~ Upon lea'~1\ll the S icc in 19- ~ he became' full-umc ll\"WJOIl "TIt and • !he ",thor ..., ro-tIuthor of ~ 1 boob.~. IlII 1 - . . tJ/ 0..,*"","" &t.1I tJ/ Hruatll:" lIoJfJnlll.ly, anJ TN S/'Ulirr SUIry He 1">oI.k, H<SllX)' PhD from I ~ U ,......" and i, a l'eOo..., of lhc R"'''llli,lOr 1Soc>et)"

7

Axis Aircraft at the Outbreak of\X'ar

II

2

Allied Aircraft Development in the Early \Var Years

33

3

Fightcr Developmcnt) l\'tid-1941 to A-tid-1945

59

4

The Bomber Revolution

91

5

Airmobility: Aircraft in Support of Ground Forccs

127

6

Naval Aircraft in the Second \'(forld \'(far

149

7

The Helicopter's First \X'ar

177

8

Armament Diversifies

193

9

The Well-equipped Warplane

221

10

Propulsion

251

11

Testing and Ferrying

267

12

Training: a Vital Command

285

Index

299

".,.,-f,,,,

E1fanap R~ aran IIJI Reo hat b«n 1Il\-oh"ft! ",th he:1I_ COI'I(n for _ than lhln,,)"Can, ""'n'ng and publishing lhe """"3 inul"llllls IId,,·Q(tltJ' J,,~r.....,1OIWl and UdiJ.J1ol and, from 1969. bulkhnc Up' unoque rolJ«uon of It.."'"" rotunal H......"OJ"!er .\I~ lie :ako "'f'RXn1ll the Itcbrorter mdlnlJ) on K"\-n-al _ional and 'memat>onal bodws. and III .... eekends nICS Ius ",,'n "nlasoIt> IndUok 1lor ,',''Z for I~ fir'll lmu ,1/ Jwu 1939. As fl:'1lh tM Hoo:ker 1j-phoon, 1M tksign m:u pwglltJ by trlgint probbu, althollgh in 1M ~ of 1M Gin/lUll Ulrcraft '''~' m'n' r.w«rl!aud by btirtallarJCY /II 1M RL\f

"I

7..erstorergruppen pending the delivery of adequate numbers of Bf II Os, and also In !he Nachtjagdgruppen, Development of the replacement Sf 100F "i!h Iughcr pcrfomun~. including a maximum s~ of 6OObn,Ih (373mph) but weaker armament, was already under wa)'. and mention should also be made of a carrier·bome \-crsion With Improved range, the Hf 109'1', under development at the outbreak of war The success of !he Hf 109 made the higher echelons in the LurtW'atre reluctant to oonsider another fighter, but !he \'3lue of hea\ier llfTllament and a more robust undercarflage led Udet's orgamsalJon reluctantJy to consider just such a requirement. By the outbreak of war, therefore, work ....'lIS well ad\'3ncc:d on !he Fw 190 with a radial, air.cooled engine, and in]une 1939 the prototype made its maiden flight. The lack of integration \\ithin Udet's organisution mean! that [WO years were to elapse before tJle n~w figiller entered scn'ice, and it required a jagdgcschwadcr technical officer to provide the direction which was to make the Fw 190 <me of the great fighters of the Second World War. Udet's influence, and that 0 f the Nazi Party in the shapc of Messerschmin's good friend Rudolf Hess, also helped ensure the Luftwaffe I)ad a long-range fighter (Zerstonrr or Destroycr in German terminology) in the Bf 110. of which 102 were available.lne Bf 110 was typical of attempts b)' many air forces during !he 19305 to develop an alrcrnrt which could either accompany bom~r form:llions throughout their missions or intercept enemy bombers far from their targets (an important requirement in the days before radar WllS widel)' lI\'lIilable), Curiously, although the Luftwaffe had developed drop-woks b)' the outbreak. of war, the idea of extending smgle.cngme fighter range b)' these means does not appear e\'en to han~ ~ considered, although a similar CTlUc1Sm might also be applied to the US Eighth Air Foftt in 1942,

18

airfields behmd enemy lines. Not e\'cn the So\'iet A,r Force, which had pioneered airborne operations, had such a force. Ital)' Serond only to the Luftw~dffe in prestige at the outbreak. of the Second \'('orld War was haly's Regia Aeronautica. Europc's second autonomous air force, It had some 2.800 first-line aircraft in September 1939,'Ine prestige had been gamed through the inheritance of the mantle of the greal prorhet of air power, Gen Guilio Douhet, through IU operational experience in Ethiopia and Spain 35 \\~II as numerous record-breaking flights. Consequently many air forces ordered Itnlian aircraft before lhe Second \'('orld \'\'ar, and as late as the summer of 1940 C\'Cn the RAF \\'35 seeking Caproni light bombers. "ne reallly was that the Regia Acronautica \\'lIS a turkey rather than an eagle, due largel)· to luly's w~ak mdustrial base, \\ith both a.trcrart comparues and component manufa.cturers under-capnaliscd. leading to low rates of production. Nevertheless_ industry was seeking to meet the Regia Acronautica:s expansion plan, Programme R, and all the modem bombers such as !he CRDA Cant Z.I OO"7bis Alcione (Kingfisher), Fiat OR 20 Cicogna (Stork) and Sa\'Oia-Marcheni S.-9-1 Spaniero (Sparrow HaWk), were low.wing cantile\'er monopl.ancs "1th retractable undercarriages, while the other compo-nent of the GruPPI Bombardamento TeTTCSte. the S.81 I'ipcstrello (Bat) bomber-transport had a fixed under· carriage. Howcvcr, as \\i!h most of !he Regia. t\eronautiea's combat aircraft, their fuselages were all of

l..ike lhe Jil 52, Ik Soooia-.\lo1'CMui 5.81 PJplStrtl/Q (Bat) a bombn mil/sport frhich saw almm.1t Mn'1a ", Spain, fr1urt it prot1td obwInctm,ytl tt'tll In 1939 llfornud Iht backbolle of 1M Gnippi BT. aluu)f(glr incrMsingly il m:u U'CU

ratricted to mghl bombiflg.

traditional construction, with steel tube or wooden air· frames CO\'cred "i!h wood or doped fabric, and most of the bombers had sunilar cO\'CTings on their \\lngs. Compared \\1th the all-metal monocoque, these weaker structures look a higher proportion of the take-off weighl, imposing penalties upon both range and pay· load, \\ hile !he m31crials were more vulnerable to eO\ironmental conditions which reduced aircraft life. The problem \\'3S compounded by the inabilily' of Italian aero-engme manufacturers 10 pro\'ide high. power, waler-cooled, in-line motors, which forad them 10 rei)' upon radials oftcn dcveloped from foreign

IUJJy~

tkgom eaminj Rillnit; deU'Adriati£o (Cam) Z.I007bis Akiolle (Killgjis!ur) trlltrtd seTt--Ke in 1939 alld htlptd form Ihe badtbont of 1M tmrll/'U Grupp'- BoII/bardommtt TtrrtSu, ytl If aJso SIlmmllristd the fl.1ta)mnsn of the Ira/ian airaufl indllstr;)~ Millg of all-fJ:OOdtn collSmielion btcallSe there m:u insufficinu im;n/mtlll for all·,nelal aircrafl, and hunng tlrru tIIgl/lel btcause t~ i"dustry m:u i"wpablt of producing high-powend engillo.

19

AIRCRAFT OF TilE SECOND \\:"ORLD \\:'AR

,'XIS AIRCRAFT AT Till; OUTBREAK OF WAR

nle prQ/Q/ype Sociela AI/onimu Piuggio PI 08 jour-tllgilled bomber jlf?1:v ill /939, und was Ihe ol/Iy Axis dedicalCd heavy bomber design fdlh sepamw e'lgines to see opermiollalseN,,'ice. Although the lYx:ke-lntif Fw 200 flew bomber missions cnvr Britain, II "'Os ,I,'signl!d as al/ airlilll'r, wI/iiI! lite engines of lite cot/Wllpornry f1eillkl!! He 177 f!'ere paired ill tn'O I/oulles.

All imporUJII/ !eSSO'1 of Ihe Spallish Civil Ifill' f''OS Iht req/liremem for a dedicated dive-bomber, alld all Ilalil/ll rtlSPOIISt UYI.! Ihe Sm:(}ia-Marchelti S.85, '/I.'hich fl.-as ill service with 960 Gruppo ill 1939. The design proved a fail/lre alld Iht S.85s «'ere rgy, INIng slow o.nd ladtlng firrpor«r.

finl jlmm in 1939, the Fio.J CR.25 uw o.1sD an o.tlonpt ti) prodllU i) limg-nmge eseurtfightC' /iJu the Bf 110, and om prodIKtw,. mac.h.i'le WS luaJ o.J' 0. 'hadt' by the ItaliiJn A,r AI/o.dre in &r/in. lu i,UJikqllQ,cles as a fig/rtC' fCtT't: quidlJy ua/istd o.IId It uw produced Orlly /or lire wutegic rtronnaissanu rolf, o./ulOugh It uw a/so uud to DCOTl transport o.Ircraft·

17Je SA /nd.m~ ,\frcduUlidle e AmmamidJe ,\faw.ono./I Ro 'Rolllm) 37 nltnrd snt-ia in the mid 1930swafighltTrt'COlmo.lSuma o.irnuft. So o.t/cmpt UW ll1ade 10 n!forc~ lhe fcrnJn rtqlllrt"I~m, amJ Ir m:u r/" baJu Corps alfnuft of II" Rtgla Ammallllal. A roJlQ/ mgwtd f.:vnitm, tM RrJ J ihrs, slIppILnu:meJ tIle Ro J'; ", the SqlladnglU! O.uenUZIOIU! AtTta,

Orlt of Eu~'s leaJ",g UlrnuJt exporters t:W tht Sot:ittd lIa/lima Cupro".~ v:hidt prodllUJ a sru:auion of OmStTf.'(/· "t~ dn,gllS. ltrdMJ, as £lu as 1940 Brilo.in's Air ,\llnl$lry U'clJ '" the wu s/o.~ ofordtT",g SO"le Ca 310s. 17Je Ca 133, ofv:/ridl o.n o.lr o.mblllana f.'fi'SWn is sen!~, uw Q typica.l bo",btT-trurlsport dntg'l, o.nd /omwd tile badtbo,U! of lhe coIomala"rforulnA~ by 1939,

Freccia (Arrow) and the Macchi MC200 Saena (lnunderbolt) bolh embodied modem constrUction techniques. but lhe emphasIs was upon manocu\Tabibl)' and me)' had only 1\\'0 12.-mm machine-guns, while transparent canoPl" m each design were replaced by open cockpitS at pilotS' request to prm;dc better visibilil)'. Bolh aircraft were handicapped br ha\;ng to usc lhe 8~Ohp Fiat A.7-1 RC 38 at a time when the Bf 100EI had a I,050hp liquidroduction bt:gan in 1939 as the Ba 88 lince a..rnx), The Unce could carry up to 500kg (I,OIOlb) of bombs, but II was underpowered and the massh'e naceUes for the l:>iaggio 1~X1 RC 40 radials created tremendous drag in an otherv.ise dean airframe. An unusual feature of Regia Acronautica policy was a series of requirements for aircraft dedicated to the

colonIal policmg role. The original design was Caproni"s Ca 133 bomber-transport, a hlgh-braced-wmg monoplane with three: radial engines capable of carr),ng 500kg (I,IOOlb) of bombs extemaUy or eighteen soldiers IOternally. A new gencration of multi-role aircraft was in production by 1939 from Caproni Bergamaschi, bascd upon the Borea (North \'('ind) light airliner. All were t\\in-engmed, canule\"er-wlng monoplanes of tmdmonal l.:onStrul;'uon. The Ca 309 Ghibli (Desert \'('lnd) ha\'lng II fixed undercarriage, but the Ca 310 Liberccio (Southwest \'.;Iind) and the Ca 311 had retractable undercarriages. Although lightly armed (three 7,7mm m:lchine-guns) and carrying a bomb load of only -IOOkg (880Ib) these alrerafl and e\"Olutionary dC\'elopmentS were to be used extensh'cJy during the Second World War and many were exported. The Ca 309 was manufal;'tured undcr licence in Bulgaria wilh 240hp Argus As IOC engines as the Papagal (Parrot). Given Mussolini's determination to ensure that the Mediterranean was IH(;Ire Noslmm (Our Sea) the Italian nel.'l was well served with seaplanes which could patrol the waters around the navy's eXlcnsive nelwork of bases. "Ine twin-huUed Savoia S.55, used for many recordbreaking flightS, was being \\;thdrawn and had been largely replaced by the single-engined Cant Z.501 Gabbiano (Seagull) flying boat. In the offensh'e role the elegant trimotOr Cant Z.s06 Airone (Heron) floatplane had entered scn;cr with the Gruppi Bombardamento ~ larittimo in 1938, and could carry a torpedo or a 800kg (1,76-1lb) bomb IOtemally. To direct the na\1"S guns the battk'Shlps and crulscrs carried the ,\1eridionali Ro 43 noalplane, although its performance both in the air and in waters other than flal calm were poor. 10 provide air protecuon for the flcct al 5Ca, a fighter \'ersion of the Ro ~3 was produced as the Ro 4-1. Itaban aIrcraft \\"Cre extensh-ely exported to Europe,

the :\ liddle East and Latin America. In addition to aircraft sclected for the Regia Aeronauuca, a number of deSigns were buIlt Specifically for expo" or buill under hl;'ence. One of the most successful was a IWIn-engmed \'ersion of the S -9, the S.-913, which was tined with a \llriety of engines depending upon the customer's choice. Romarua's first batch had I,OOOhp GnomeRhOne KI4 II C32s, while the 5ecOnd batch, JRS.798, had the 1,220hp Junkers Jumo 211 Da liquid-cooled vee engine and was manufactured under licence from 19~0 with a rcdesigned tail. The Caproni Ikrgamaschi Ca 135 had been an unsuccessful competitor \\ith the Cam Z.1007 and S.79, but It had some export success, customers including Hungary, which selected the version with I'iaggio I~XI RC -10 radials (Ca 135bis), this version featuring a manually operated dorsal turret. Hungary also selected the

A

lief'

III

UW IIrL

22

TI,e Offitme M«umidlt 'Rcggialle' SA (Cap rom), rom· mOll/y ca/i£J Rl'fgwlIe, prodllr;£d tlw Re 2000 Imnretlore (/lIttTUp'orl to mL!tt a Rqia Anv'lOlI/iro requiremmt for a IIlOnopwllt' fighler. Aillumgh. Ii ttUS not seltt:ttd for domtSI~ use,fro'" 1939 It uw txpor,ed to olld abo miJmifa.24E fighter. 11 was scheduled to recci\'e four rifle-ealibre (7.92mm) machine-guns, but the difficulties of acquiring these and other components in a Europe now al war, as well as the lack of machinc tools, prevcnted the fighter entering sen'ice until eariy 1941. Japan Italian aircraft sold tojapan participated without distinction in a conflict which ended immediately before the outbreak of the Second World W·ar. In May 1939 a dispme on me Manchurian-Mongolian border betw{'{'n the Khalkin Gol rh'er and me dllage of Nomonhan flared into a full-scale war in which the Fiat Type [ (DR.20) was used. The battle ended in ignominious defeat for the japanese, who lost 158 aircraft destroyed or damaged beyond repair_ This conflict actuallr saw the third clash betw{'{'n Russian and japanese pilots, who had met on the Korean border in 1938 and in China from 1937_ On paper japan had more than 2,000 fifSl·line aircraft, bm janus-like organisation fragmented its strength into the Army Air Force OAAF) and Nav)' Air Force ONAF), and it was the fonner Sen'ice's air arm which was humiliated. The role of the japanese Army was to secure national interests on the cast Asian mainland, Ihe prime threat being pereei\'ed from the Soviet Union, while in the absence of any Japanese entllUsiasts of Douhet, its air arm existed to support that rolc. Its early leaders had been officers 'ticket punChing' before transferring to omer commands, one of the most distinguished being Lt Gen 'Ibjo Hideki, who was Inspector General of the jAAF between December 1938 and july 1940, then became \X'ar l\-linister, and in 1941 the Prime Minister. In 1939 a new plan to expand me jAAF by a third 10 142 squadrons (Chutai) was accepted_ By this time the jAAF was developing its own career structure, yet the definition of aircraft requirements still tended towards the conservati\'C while benefiting from a substantial capital in\'estment into the aviation industry made during the early 1930s. This ill\'estment meant that by 1939 most japanese combat aircraft were cantilever monoplanes with mOllocoque airframes, almough the failure to dc\'elop modern liquid-.coolcd in-line motors meant that most aireraft had radial engines, MostjAAF aircraft represented First World War requirements in the shape of late 1930s te Caplaill (laler Major) Flljila 111::0 U'OS one ofthe few visiollaries iI/ l/se Japanese Army Air Force, alld his demand for a high-performal/ce. rccomU1issallu aircrafr led /0 lite appearalice ill November /939 of Ihe prOlOl)'/'e Atiuubishi Army Type 100 commalld recomUJiSSilnu aerop/alle (Ki-46). The second version, pic/IIrtd herr, tvas Ihe Ki-46-1l fvilh MilSllbishi Ha /OZ t"gines, which fJ,'OJS fasrer rlU1/l rhe Ki-4] and ell/ered 5eroice ill 1940.

torpedo attacks until the battleships could fight lhe decisi\·e action, their guns being directed by observation aircraft. ",. 'Ine japanese Nav)' was no exception, and e\'en until the end of lhe Sccond \'('orld War il was dominated by traditionalists who belicvcd in thc suprcmacy of lhe battleship. This orlhodoxy was ehallenglxi by two men, lhe most notable of whom was Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, newl)' appointed commander·in.chief (officially commander of the Combined Fleet) in September \939, and lhe charismatic Commodore (Rear Admiral in November) Onishi Takajiro_ A brilliant staff officer who had exploited every opportunity to broaden his horizons, Yamamoto had lectured on the importance of air power, and especially torpedo bombers, as an instructor in the Naval Academy in lhe 1920s. He had headed lhe JNAF in lhe mid-I 930s, and as a Navy Minister encour· aged lhe construction of aircraft carriers to take the baltic to the enemy. He was complemented by Onishi, a founder of lhe Nakajima Aircraft Company and by 1941 chief of Slaff of lhe land-based II th Air "'leet. who sought also to exploit lhe numcrous islands on lhe cast· em edge of japan's Pacific empire for land-based air power. The majority of the aircraft in sen·ice in 1939 came from programmes initiated between the 8th and \1 th rears of the Showa reign (8-Shi to II-Shi), i.e, 1933 to 1937. The long-range, land-based strike force largely had the M.ilSubishi Na\'y Type 96 Attack Bomber (G3M), dewloped al the instigation ofYamamoto when he headed the Na\·al Bureau of Aeronautics' Technical Division. 'Inc specification he issued in 1933 wcnt only to Mitsubishi and produced a twin-engined torpedo bomhcr whose operational debut in August 1937 involved a 2,OOOkm (1,250-mile) transoceanic bombing 27

AXIS AIl{CRAFT AT T1I1' Ol;TIjREAK 01' WAR

i\ll{Cl{i\i'T 01' TilE SECOND ""OKLO WAK

simplified designation G5N. but it pro\'ed unsuccessful. Like the JAAF, the jNAF suike force consisled mainly of smgle-engmed aircraft, although 10 this case because they were dcsigned primarily to operate from aircraft carriers. By 1939 a \\holt"sale change in the di\"C:bomber and torpedo-bomber squadrons was well ad\lIllCC'd.....;!h uaditional-COn5tructlon biplanes of the 8-Shi and 9-Shi programmes bemg replaced by monocoque-construCllon, cantile\"Cr monoplanes. Re-cqulpmenl of the torpedo bomber units had been gi\"Cn priOrtl). for thc Yokosuka Na\')' T)"e 96 Carrier An3ck Bomber (B4Y) \\11 oc\"Cr more than a stop.-gap design follo.....ing !he failure of the Yokosuka Type 92 (D3\). The IO-Shl (1935) specificatlon laid greal emphasis upon endurance, which ....-as 10 be up 10 se-.-en hours. and an external payload of SOOkg (I.-60lb). The ....inner of the competition \\115 the Nakajima Na\')·Typc: 9- Carrier AIt3ck Bomber CBS!'.'), which entered senice in 1938 and was the first japanese carrier-borne aircraft ....1th a rttraetable undercarnsge. The aircrafl possc:sscd a formidable range of bet.....een I, II Okm (normal) and 2.260km (maXimum) (590nm and 1,220001), .....hich was unmalched by American torpedo bombers e\'en in 1944. So radical was the design that a consernlJ\-e fall-back design \lith a fixed undercamage ....-as produced by Musublshi as the B5M. but saw linle actiw St'T\;cc. In 1939 a 14·5hl specification for a replacement aircraft ....-as iSSUed. calling for a range of between 1,850km (\\ith SOOkg load) to 3.300km (withoUl bombs) (1,000 10 1,800nm), which led 10 19.\ I to the Nakajima Na\'}' Carrier Attack llomberTeuzan (Heawnly Mountain), or B6N. In re-cquipping di\'e-bomber units the Na\'y pro\·ed mOTe conservative, and during 1939 the Aichi Na\'}' ·I)·pc 96 Carrier Bomber (DIAl), strongly influenced by thc I'kinkel lie 66. was due for replacement by the Aichi NIl\')' Type 99 Carrier Bomber (D3A), which relaine
"_-3

I

29

,.

~ 8

..

I\IRCII.AI'T OF TilE SECOND ",,'ORLD WAR

AXIS ... III.CII. ... FT AT TilE OUTBREAK OF \'('AII.

For /ong-ronp rccomwuumu Ik J(lpan~ Sovy rt/~d In /939 upon I~ fOllr mginM Kmronishi Sary I'}'~ 97 Ji)ing boot (H6Kl, frilh 0 no",101 ro~ of ,nort lhon Z,ZOOnm (4,OOOkm,.lt awfmlllfflll)' OKOfml~1l'ddllnll8 rh~ tror, fl:hm 1/ f.-W codaw,,~tor when re-engined with the Rolls-Royce: ,\ lerlin, This development is dealt \\ith in anolher chapler. The Royal Na\1' also took an Interest in US fighter designs, and on the faU of France look O\'tt a French order ror single.scal Grumman G·36A aircraft.

XalllcJ lIre n"i1dC\E the DU-7 first flew In AuguSI 1939 and, after the German im'llsion. lhe oUtslllndlOg French orders were taken O\-cr by Lhc RAE

'Iltcrcaftcr, lhe US Army Air Forces adopled lhe type as the A·20, lhe .A' prefi" standing ror attack. llte RAF used its first DB- ~s as tT:Iiners, Ihe name Boston being adopled. A quantil)' ofOll- ~s and DB-7As were convened Into night intruders and nightfighlers in Urnaln and called Havocs, 'Inc I\lk I had two 1,200hp Twin Wasp radials, while later delivcries wcre fitted \\;lh 1,6oohp Wright Doubk-Row Cyclones. As a nighlfighter the Havoc had a 'solid' nose housing eight 0.303 machme.guns and airborne radar, while the intruder version had a glazcd nose with guns in Lhc lower nose, a Vickers K gun in Ihe dorsal position and 2.400lb (I,OOOkg) or bombs. 'Inc II:I\'OC II nighlflghtcr had an unglazed nose accommodating no rewer lhan tweh'e 0.303in machineguns. 'Ine light bomber version of lhc aircraft, thc BOSlon Ill, was lhe mOSt widdr used variam with lhe RAF, dcliveries beginning in spring 1941. It pro\'e-d lhe ideal replacement ror lhe obsolescent Blenheim, which had borne the brunt of the daylight bombing since the war began and had suffered hC2v)' casualties. 'Inc Boslon 111 was rast, wllh a ma"imum speed of over 300mph (~82km/h), manocu\'rable and well liked by its crews. The Mark III had a span or 6 HI ~in (18m) and a range of jusl over 1.000 miles (1,600km) when fully loaded. \,\'llh a Cl'C\\ of rour it had a rtU"imum bomb load or 2,0001b (907kg), Gun annament consisted or four fixed 0.30310 machine-guns in lhc nose. and I\\;n 0.303s in the dorsal and \'CntT:Il gun posLUons. An inuuder \'ersion of the Boston III carried four 20mm cannon in an

39

ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF\'l'1 Ot'o\Il'XT I" THE EARLY WAR YEARS

-"amtJ lhe .\larykmd by tile IJrIIlsh, III,S .\farrin bomber uw IWI orJtreJ by t}~ L'SIIAG. Mos, of/~ supplioJ to 1M RAFnYn KIlt 10 tM MidJle Eas,. V:Mre till!)! ~ ugdjor boll/bmg anJ rea",nolswna. Tk .\lary·land uw also fI~d by Somll AftUan A,r T"Oru sqUadrollS. From lilt Jlary'wnd uw dn:e/opeJ I/~ wl'l" IJolwlIOre bomber for tilL RAT; tt:hKh had bm" ptTjormallU anJ Ins t:rrlmped cm:r QaOnJlIfod.mon _ und~rfu~lag~

p:ilck.. 'Illc .\larks IV and V which huer In the war had a power-opcruted min-gun dONial turrel. A light attack bomber which failed to gam a US conlt3Ct but \\ hich W3S supplied to Europe was lhe ,\ lartin 167, named l\laryland by the RAE A lhrce-scater. the ,\ laryland was powered by tv.o I,200hp Twin \X·asp radi· als mltially, wllh single and laler two·s13ge supcrcharg. ers. II earned up to 2.000lb (9Irkg) of bombs :md six machine-guns. four of which wer~ in the wing. Some sc\'enty-five Marylands were taken O\'er from French orders, and alwgelher the RAF acquired 225. the majorit}' being shipped to the j\ liddle EaSt for bombing and ap~rcd

171L AJartin Balti/tlon den:lepmclIf of rilL .\Ia,,"n Mory'kllld uhi€h uw origll/olly dnlgl/td to Frel/ch reqllirtIIImrs olld lalCr lI$td by the RAT: Classifitd as a liglrt bo",~r, rlrt Ball/more uw I.Jrgcr and fi,urer tholl Irs forebear and carr~d Niter dtkmittt a"'WtlWll. Tilt &JIll/lOre sert'td III tilL JhJJk East and Iwly.

photogrnphic reconnaissance work. It had \'ery cramped crew poslUons ~parated by bulkheads, and was only moder-ucl)' suc sfu!. A more capacious, higher powered development 10 British reqUIrements was the Martin Baltimore. which fiNit fle\\ m June 19~ 1 and entefC'd RAF scn;cc early in 19~2. Ukc the Maryland, the Baltimore was employed in the ,\ leditcrrancan area. A tala.! of 1,"73 was produced for the RAE T\\'O imponant and ",;dely produced American medium bombers began flight tests In 1940, th~ North American S-25 Mitchell and the Martin S-26 Marauder. The original protOt},pc for the 13-25, the NA-IO, was desuo)'ed dunng IOlUal flight tCSlS in 1939. but the USMC was so Impressed th3t it called for major design changes to be Ulcorporated and had enough falth to place an order for IS~ of the new NA-62. the first of which fk"\\ in August 1940. A mid·",;ng 6~ft -in (2Om)-span aircraft ",;th two 1,700hp R-2600 radials, the 3-25, had a fivc·man crew, a five-gun armameO! and earned 3,l)(M)lb (1,360kg) of bombs.The range was 1.350 miles (2.1 OOkm), and it had a maximum speed of O\tr 3DOmph (482km/h). To soh'e stability problems. dihedral on the outer wing panels was deleted. O\'Cr 9,700 MuchcUs of all marb were built, of which SOO-plus were delivered to the RAE 111e ch3nges 1ft the Mitchell, parucularly concerning annamem (a prime consideration in the Second World War), arc considcred e1sewherc 1ft thiS work. When the US Arm)' Air Corps issued a requirement for a high-performance medium bomber in Januarr 1939, the ~mphaSIS was laid on speed. The Glenn Martin company's submission was ba~d on an aircraft with a \'ery high wing loading (i.e. a small wing area) and a high degree of strc::tmlining. Uke the 13-25, the resulting aircrnft by M::trtin, the 13-26 Marauder, had a tricycle undercarriage. The high wing lo::tding ine\'itably led 10 high landmg speeds and training problems. With a ShOulder-wing, the 1:\-26 had plenty of fuselage capacity, allowing a bomb load of 4,800lb (2,I77kg). Armament consisted of nose and tail 0.30in machine-guns plus twO 0.50s mounted in a dorsal turret. Powered by two 1,850hp R·2800 Double Wasp radials, the ,\ larauder could achieve 315mph (SOOkm/h) at 15,OOOft (4,57001) and crUIsed at 265mph (-426kmjh). Range was 1,000 mill'S (I,600km) and ser\'ice ceiling 25,OOOft (7,600m). 'IlIe US Army Air Corps became the US Army Air Force in June 1942, and its fiNiI Marauders were delivered that year, while aircraft supplied to the RAF did not become operauonal unul mid 1942. On subsequent \"3riants the wmgspan was increased from 65ft to 71 ft (19m to 21m) and armament was steadil}' increased. Production continued through 10 April 19-45. Two American four-engmcd bombers were to ha\'C a m310r effect on the outcome of the Second \X'orid \X'ar, namely the DoelOg 13-17 Hymg Fortress and the

A 1~'lly armed hl8h perfi)rnlallU nu:dlllm bomber, tlu: .\Iort", H-Z6 Murouacific and European war theatres in 1942. '111e second hea\'y da)' bomber to achie\'e fame, the B·24, was a later and very diffcrcnt-looking aireraft. It also had the distinction of being produced in larger quantitics than any other single Allied type during the Second 'X'orld War (a total of owr 18,000). When, m 1939, the Army Air Corps formulated a spccificalJon for a heavy bomber, it demanded better range and cap.aclly than the B-17, together with high s~d. Consolidated Aircraft set out to meet these using the Davis patented long.span, narrow-chord \\ing. This hlgh.aspect-ralJo \\1ng had a low angle of :mack, and ilS design thus gave high bft and low drag, which meant in· creased range. On the Consolidatt.'d ,\lodel 32 bomber. whieh became the 8·24. the shoulder-mounted ",ing allowed for

a la~ bomb bay with the bombs Stowed \'crtically, and a catwalk between the front and rear sections of the fuselage. h also had roIlcr·shuuCl bomb doors which rt'~ duced airflow disturbance associaled with conventional bomb-bay doors. Finally, lhe Model 32 was the first hea\1' bomber wnh a nosewheel undercarriage, the main legs retracting outwards into the winp. While the USAAC ordered a small number of early Liberators, the RAF ordered 285, of which 120 had originally been ordered by France. The first of these were used as transports. As a result of operational experience, the RAF Liberator Is were fitted with O.Sin maehineguns, Olle each in the nose and tail, one either side of the fuselage and one in a tunnel gun position underneath. In addition, self-scaling fucl !links and imernal armour were fitted. The Liberator wcnt imo RAF squadron service with Coastal Command in June 1941. With its range of 2,200 mill'S (3.530km) it ....-as known 9S a VLR (very long l".mge) aircraft, and for the first time Britain could begin 10 close the gap in mid-Atlantic where German U·boots had been operating unhindered by land-based aircrnfl sun'elilance and anack. The 8-24 Uberator ....'3S steadily de\'eloped and had a distinguished career in bomber, maritime and transport roles. The early marks had four 1,2oohp Pratt & 'X'himey R·1830-33 engmcs wlUI mechanical superchargers. Span \\'35 110ft (33m) and length 63ft 9in (19m). Gross weight was 53,6OOlb (24.3ookg), maximum speed 292mph (460km,Ih), cruising speed 228mph (366kmlh)

OPMI'~T

1:-0 THI:: I::ARLY \\:'AR YEAkS

First flov:" in 1939, 1M Lodth«d P-J8 ughming remomed 11/ prodllcria" mllll tM tnd of rllt mlr. Jim, and poutmd of lo1lg ro~, tM U'glllllinz carmd a heavy nose armamenl, and mrl1oSllptrcharga-s for 1M AJI/sim mglnes fNf't (Orr~d", die booms. (fl,t famolu n.ltm m tht Lx/wll"g's IIluory uw /ht $hoo/mg Jou-n (If a bomfJr:r cor')1llg the Japolll:U Arhmru/ Hit/Willow. 500 ,,,,ksjro,,,, wfightm'bast.

and scn'ice ceiling 30.5ooft (9,300m). Bomb load was 4.000lb (I,800kg). Britain pionccrro the use of air·surface,\·essel (AS\') radar for airborne maritime sur\"eiUance. This became a ma)Or factor In the U·boat war. The equipmenl was steadily de\"elo~d for longer range and clearer prescota· Lion for the operator. With its exceptional range the LiberalOr made full usc of ASV in both British and American service, the former from June 1941 on.....ards. The first Coastal Command aircraft 10 be fined with ASV was also American, the ubiquitous Lockheed Hudson. 'Ibis type was the first American aircraft to be used operationally by !.he RAF in !.he Second World War. The Hudson was a military conversion of the Lockheed 14 civil tr,msport, and was purchased in quantity by the Briush in 1938. II was a classic example of a good basic airframe being adapted to undertake numerous tasks in a wide \-ariety of climates. 'Ine Hudson .....a s used for maritime reconnaissancc/anack, general reconnaissance, bombing, training and as a transport. Powered b)' tWO I, loohp Wright Cyclone radial en· gincs, the Hudson had a maximum speed of 246mph (395km,1h), cruised at 170mph (273km1h), and had an endurance of 6hr, "Inc weapon load (of bombs or depth charges) "''3S 750!b (340kg), and armament consisted of two 0.303 machine-guns in the nose, 1\\'0 in a dorsal Boulton l:>aul turret and one in the belly. A crew of five .....a s carried. TlIe successor 10 the Hudson \\-as another aclapl:iltion of a Lockheed transport, this time the Model 18, Bearing

a close resemblance 10 the Hudson, the type was known as the B-34!B~37 Lexington in the USAA.F. the PV·I With the US Na\1', and the Venrura in the R."o.E With IWO 2.ooohp I~ratt & Whitney Double 'X'asp engines, the Vemura had a maximum speed of 300mph (480kmih), cruised at 260mph (420kmlh), had a range of 1,000 miles (I,600km) and a service ceiling of 25,OOOfI (7,26001). Armament was tWO 0.50 and six or eighl 0.303in guns plus 2.5OOlb (I,135kg) of bombs. 'Ibe Vcntura saw limited service with Bomber Command in 1943 and then served with Coastal Command and the air forces of AustrJlia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada. A radical American fighter design was ordered in quantity by Britain in 1940 but later cancelled, which caused arguments and recriminations. The aircraft, the Lockheed »·38 Lightning, was designed to meet a 1937 USMC requirement for an inlerceptor to auain 360mph at 20,OOOft (6,OOOm) and reach that height in six minulcs - \'cry ambitious for that prc....-ar period. Lockhttd chose a Iwin·boom, Iwin-enginc layout with radiators and IUrbosuperchargcrs mounted in the booms behind the Allison in-line engines. The pilot sat in a centnll nacelle .....hich also housed the single cannon plus four machme.gun armamenl. The RAF had ordered 143 Lightnings in March 1940, and there \\'3S also a French contract, These were aU 10 be powered by the same unsuperchargro 1,040hp Allison V-1710-33 engine as the Curtiss Tomahawk, also orderro by both nations. The orders .....e re placed before

ALLIED AIRCRAFT DE\"ELOP.\\ENT

AIKCKAFT 01-' THE SECOSI) \'('OKI..O ,"'AR

the long~drawn-oul Battle of Britain had been fought and many lessons about air fighting had been learned, particularly me need for climb and altitude performance. Wimout superchargers Ihe Lightning clearly did not meet European conditions, and tile RAF cancelled me order following trials \\im three aircraft al A&AEE Boseombe Down in late December 1941 and early 1942. Lockheed wanted the contract adhered to on the original terms, but this was nOi found possible. At the time mere was also a shortage of superchargers in the USA. As a result, the USt\AF took O\'er the British order and placed a larger one following America's entry into the conflici. The USAAF subsequently used the Light· ning in all war meatres as a long-range fighter, fighler~ bomber and reconnaissance aircraft. Production continued until 1945. The final version, the P·38L, had a top speed of 414mph (666kmJh), could climb to 20,OOOft (6,OOOm) in se\"en minutes and had a service ceiling of 44,000ft (13AOOm). In addition to the aircraft detailed abo\'e, a varicty of other types were purchased by Britain, usually in smaller quantities" One exception was the North American NA~16 I-Ian"ard two-seat adv:lllced trainer, which remained in RAF service until the late 1950s. First ordered by me RAF in 1938, the Harmrd was entering service by the end of that year. Contracted and paid for up to early 1941, Harvards for the RAF lotalled 1,100. Under Lend-Lease a further 4,000 were delivered. "Ille USA employed the type in large numbers as the T-6 Texan.

"Ille Harvard was used under the air training scheme in Canada and Southern Rhodesia and the commonality with the Texan was a major asset after December 1941. The Harvard was of metal construction and powered by a single 550hp Pratt & \\;'hitncy \\;Iasp radial. Maximum speed was 205mph (330km/h) and endurance 3.9hr. "I11e arrangements between the USA and Britain were quite remarkable. A non-combatant up to Decem· ber 1941, America was supplying large quantities of war material, including hundreds of aircraft, to a friendly nation at war. By 1941 Britain was quite literally running out of dollars, and faced a situation where she would be unable to pay for the aircraft she so desperatcl~' needed. On 11 March 1941 President Roose\"elt signed a Congressional 'Lend-Lease' Bill which completely ahered the sirumion right through until the defeat of Japan in 1945, Under 'Lend-Lease' the USA could sell, transfer, exchange, lease Or lend any defence article, providing the receiving country's defence was deemed to be vital to the defence of the USA. Continued deli\'erics \0 Britain were thus assured. It had not, howe\"er, been a one·way street. In the 1938-9 period British contracts with American ftrms were worth morc than those placed by the USAAC. These sen"ed to 'prime the pump' of US industry at a time when American rearmament had hardly begun and, as mentioned earlier, allowed for much needed factor~' and workforce expansion. In addition, as noted

•

..

""'-.:0.-

~-~--::-~

~

~

-..

~

--~_.

--

~"""-ember /940. l"Yd for for fnngrrJlIgt prtdsitm bomlnng,fXlIJrfindmg, doy wuJ nightfighrin" low-kt~/ otttJdl, rteOlmaUkllfa, manllltU arttJdl arJJ sP«io' Jutin, 1/ mtllJ!1ud In RAF sn1.1« umi/ rM adt~m of 1M Qmbtnu ~t bomber. /lJustraud is the third (PRJ pro/Or~, If'405I.

four Bristol Hercules rndlals. The Vulture COnsisted of m"O RoUg..Royce l~eregnn~ one abo\·e the other, driving a single cl1lJ\kshaft. This resulted in an X,configuration engine rated at I,sOOhp, but With considerably higher power potenual. The A\TO bomber design, the Trpc 679, subsequentlr named the Manchester, retained the Vulture, while the Handley Page pro~t, which became the Halifax, was switched to a four·Merlin layOut in 1937. The Manchester soldiered on with the Vulture. It flew in protOlyPC form in Jul)' 1939 and first entered sen·ice with Bomber Command in November 1941. The airframe was excellent, but the Vulture wa!! a constant source of trouble. It did not reach its designed power

pilot and four CK'o\'. Bomb load was 4,OOOIb (l,ISOkg) and range 2,200 mil~ (3,540km) at ISOrnph (290km,/h) at 15,OOOn (4,Y'Om). Armament comprised a min-gun nose mrret, a four-gun tail mrret and m·o beam gum. Span was 86ft 2in (26m), and length 64ft 7in (19m). \'('ellington production totalled 11,461. The medIUm bombers had emerged as a resull of RAF spedficaoons ISSUed in 1932 and 1934. By 1936 the Air Slaff, watching the growing power and size of the Luftwaffe, issued far.slghted specifications for new and larger bombers carrying increased bomb loads. Tko wcre to be twin-engined and one four-engined. Avro and Handley Pagc had the Rolls·Royce Vuhure engine specified, while the Shorts design was to have

TM mostfonwu.s Brilish heotry bombn of the &amdlri1rldlrar. rhl Avro wnaurer, nus tM rmill of Ik marriage of rhlfintclass /\t",ldrmtr aIrframe, trhidl htJd lfro unreliable Iidrure mgma, rrrth four Ro//s-Ru)'u Alerlim. In the S«Qnd half of rhl UlQr w wnaurer jcntKd the badfbu~ of Bomfxr Command, albn,g U'lm tht Halifax, wuJ aJrrUd tM kJrgal bumbs, indtlding 1M Kianr 11,OOO/b 'Grand Slom'.1//uslraud is 1M prototype lAnauln- I,a COIffXTltd Afanchtsur.

52

If'rm tM I~,u:asrer,d~ HOIl(JJ.e)' Page Ho/ifox froS the mainsw)' of rM RAr""'s bomber oflmsit:e against Germany. Earl)' mtJrIu haJ /\'mill mginn unriJ. rrilh 1M .\fk 1/1, t~ oircraft sra'ldiJrd,stJ on rhe /Itrcuks raJIO/. The HalIfax fMS also rrlckly Ij~d

for man"time from rrilh CoasraJ Co",nlOnd wuJ as a glickr mg.

OUtpUt and engme failures were frequent. If ROlls-Ro)'ce had not had alllls efforts concentrated on the Aledin, the compan)' .....ould certainly ha\·e developed the Vulture 10 an acceptable standard. As it .....as. time and effort were at a premium and the Vulture was an also-ran. There then occurred one of the most remarkable aircraft transformauons in wartime. A\'ro fitted a Manchester aIrframe \\ith four Merlins and flew it in Januar}· 1941. 'lbe result, as the Lancaster, became the best·known and most successful RAF hea\'y bomber of the war; it was also the largest load<arrier of aU Allied bom~rs, being capable of delh"Cring the giant 22,OOOlb (9,980kg) 'Grand Slam' bomb. Apart from a change to Hercules radials on 300 LancaSlcr lis and modified bomb bays, the Lancaster airfr'J.me was to remain virtually the same throughout the wor; a tribute to good design. The L:mcas{er I had four I,280hp Merlin XX engines, carried a crew of seven and was armed with twin 0.303in maChine-guns in nose and dorsal positions and a four-gun turret in the tail. Its span ""liS 102ft (3101), length 69ft 4in (21m) and its all-up w('ight was 50,OOOlb (22,680kg). ,\lax.imum speed was 287mph (460kmJh), cruising speed 200mph (320kmlh) and range 1,660 miles (2,670km) with 14.000lb (6,3S0kg) bomb load; ceiling ""liS 19,ooofl (S,790m). 'Ibe four·,\1erlin Halifax fll'w on 25 OCtober 1939, th~ first prodUCtIon aIrcraft follO\\ing on II October 1940. By the fol1o\\ing month me first squadron was ~mg formed. Like the Lancaster, the Halifax had a crew of SC\"en and a range of 1,860 miles (3,OOOkm) with S,800lb (2,630kg) of bombs; its max.imum speed was 265mph (426krnJh) at 17,500ft (5.33Om) and se.nice

ceilmg 22,800ft (6.9SOm). Its span was 98ft lOin (29m) and loaded \\"eight 58.ooolb (26.300kg). Armamem was t\\"O 0.303in guns in a nose turret and four in the tall, while some airtT'J.ft had ~am guns. The maximum bomb load was 13,OOOlb (5,900kg). Mllny detail modifiamons were carried OUt on sub-marks until the Hercules-engmed Mark III became a definith'e produc· tion variam. "Ibe hislOry of the Short Stirling ""liS a somewhat djlT~rent matter. Air ,\ linistf)' policy changed with the increasing perceh·ed threat and, as a result, apart from the Manchester and Halifax, which were initially classified as medium bombers to 1'.13/36, a further requirement, Il I2/36, was issued for a fast four*Cngine, long-range heav}' bomber. lbe word 'fas!' has to be taken in terms of the aircraft in sen'ice in 1936. For example, thc Faircy Hendon and [he Handley I~age Heyford bombers had top SIX.'Cds of I55mph and 142mph respccti\·e1y. Short·s submission for B. I 2136 was for a large fourHercules aircraft with a crew of sc\·en or eight, using tcchnolog)' bascd on the company's prm·en firing boats. -Ibe Air ,\ linistfy, howe\"~r, placed sc\'eral restrictions on Ihe specification including, ridiculous as it may seem, a limit on the "ingspan to fit a standard RAF hangar. This meant thal the wing was oflow aspect ratio, thus limiting the opernuonal ceiling - a definne draw·back when in ser\'lce. 'fbe Stirling had a wing span of 99ft lin (30m) and a length of 87ft 3in (26m). As it had a shoulder-wing it possessed a \"CJ"}' tall main undercarriage. Production of the Stirling ""liS held up by Lufm"liffe bombmg raids, but It went mto senice "1th No 7 Squadron in August 1940,

53

AIRCR"'FT OF THE SECOND WORLD \l;> ... R

ALLIED ... IRCRAFT DEVELOl'MENT IN THE E ... RLY "'· ... R YIiARS

"',

- --'

,

a,.. ;-"- '-:4: : , . , . ,

...... '::-'-

,

'

/;Z

71re first fOllr-lmgined bomber lQ be /lsed opera/iollally ill lhe u:ur, the Shorl SU·rti,lg Wilh fOllr Hercules rudials illilially OL'e1i/ ill/o sqUadroll servia ill Augmf 1940. Beca/lse of ils 1or1J-ClSp€ll-TUlio willg itJ servia ailillg was limiud. As a bomber the Slirling was !twllsed ill 1944, bw it was fllidely employed as a glider /IIg and lrolls/xm.

during !.he Battle of Britain. The Stirling !.hus 3chieved t.....o 'firsts', !.he first four-engined monoplane bomber to go into service wi!.h !.he RAP and !.he first to go on operations in !.he Second World War, The Hercules delivered 1,4oohp, and wi!.h these !.he Stirling h3d a maximum speed of 260mph (420km/h) and a maximum cruising range of 2,330 miles (3,750km) with 3,500lb (l,590kg) of bombs, or 590 miles (9S0km) with 14,0001b (6,350kg) of bombs. Its aU-up weight was 59,400lb (26,940kg). Its armament comprised a two-gun nose turret, a four-gun tail Nrret and, initially, a ventrnltwo-gun 'dustbin'. Later !.he ventral turret was removed and a two-gun dorsal turret fined.The turrets had hydraulic reeuperators, but unfortunately !.he location of m'o of them coincided wi!.h the RAF roundel on !.he fuselage. By using the roundcl as a target, enemy fighters were able to PUI the turrets out of action, As a result, the recuperators had to be mo\'Cd. Through 1940 and 1941 Britain was developing and gaining operational experience on the types of large long-range bomber which would fonn the backbone of Bomber Command's operations at night. At the same time, the USAAF was modifying and perfecting its own key four-engined day bombers, the B-17 Fortress and the 8-24 Liberator, described earlier. In 1943-45 !.he two great air fleets would conduct a round-the-clock campaign, a form of air warfarc ne\'er before seen. Two events of Ma}' 1941 ....'tre ultimately 10 change military and civil aviation completely on the one hand, and bring untold destructive power from !.he air on the o!.her. On ISMay 1941 a 29ft-span (8m) single-seat monoplane, the E.28/39, took off from Cranwell,

Lincolnshire, flown by P E Sarer. In one \·ital respect it differed from all other aircraft in Britain, for it had no propeller. It was in fact jel-propellcd, and the onl)' machine of its kind, apart from twO in Germany, the Heinkel He 178 and He 280, which had also flown in protot)'pe form, Neither side was aware of the other's gas turbine work. Flight Lieutenant (later Air Commodore Sir) Frank Whittle had pioneered gas turbine design development, and his firm Power jets Ltd was given a contract in 1939 to build a flight engine. Design and development of the airframe was entrusted to !.he Gloster Aircraft Company under !.he terms of specification E.28/39, the 'E' slanding for experimemal.

Ouuide GenoollY the first jet aircraft to fly uw the Gloster £.28139, fllhlCh took tf) the air fvith a Whittle WI tlIrbojet ellgine 011 15 M'ay 1941, From this design grew the two great jet /!/Igi"e industries of lhe USA and Bri/ain, and it led the way to the civil alld military jet fleets of loday.

54

• TIre /3oei"g 8-29 Supeiforlress represellled a quall/IIIII leap in aircraft design.I\"ilh i,s high speed of350mph, presmrised cabin, reII/O/ely coll/rolkd gUll /IIrreu alld range of ()(.ltr 3,000 miks, il was remarkable ill Ihat the original official requiremell/ was issued ill February 1940. The 8-29 uw Ihe Iype wltidl dropped thejiNI 1'/.1.'0 atomi' bombs orl Hiroshima and ,""agaroki ill 1945.

Powered by an 860lb-thrust Power jets \Xl. I gas turbine, the E.28/39 had a maximum speed of 466mph (750km/h), well in excess of any piston-engined aircraft of the period. It could climb to 30,000ft (9,OOOkm/h) in 22min, and had a service ceiling of 32,OOOf( (9,750m) and a loaded weight of3,7481b (1,7ookg). A second protot)'pe was built, but later crashed when !.he ailerons became jammed during a high-altitude flight. The first prototype continued flying at intervals !.hrough to 1944 with higher powered engines and other refinements. In 1946 it was put on permanent display in the Science Museum in London, In November 1940 the RAF issued a specification for a min-engined jet fighter based on designs submitted by Gloster Aircraft. In February 1941 an order was placed for m'el\"e 'Gloster-\'\'hittle' aircraft, a type which was to become the Gloster Meteor. As related earlier, Britain shared its technical secrets wi!.h USA and !.his included Whittle's aero gas turbine work, It was to ha\'e far-reaching consequences QS companies in both countries turned tOwards the gas turbine first for fighters, then for bombers and latcr transports. 'fbe technology b-.aP became ever wider between the victorious Western Allies and those nations defealed or left to mark time during the Second World \X'ar, It can all be traced back to Whittle and the E.28/39. 'Inc second key e\'ent of May 1941 was !.he issue of a

lettcr by tllC USAAC to Boeing, stating that an ordcr would be placed for 250 aircraft of a 'supcrbomber' type, Boeing h3d received an official requirement for such an aircnl.ft in February 1940. It was to carry 2,0001b (900kg) of bombs at a speed of 400mph (640km/h) Qnd have a range of S,333 miles (8,S80km). A tricycle undercarriage, pressurisation and hem'}' defensive armament were specified. Boeing had been working on designs of such a bomber since 1938, and three prototypes had been ordered in 1940.The project was known as !.he modcl345, the army designation was XB-29, and it later became famous as the 8-29 Superfortress which was to lay waste the cities of Japan by dropping the first (wo atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even to consider such an incredibly ad\'anced project in 1940-41, wi!.h littlc money a\'3ilable, represcllled one of the most farsighted acts in !.he history of military aviation, Russia In the early hours of 22 june 1941 Hitler im'aded !.he Soviet Union in Operation 8arbarossa. Surprise was complete, and by noon on the same day 1,200 Russian aircraft had been destroyed on the ground and in !.he air. Losses of bases and equipment continued as tile German army advanced, In !.he early stages the main opposition came from Polikarpov 1-152/1-153 biplane and

55

AIRCRAFT OF

T~II:

SECONU \l:'ORI.U \l:'AR

Al.I.[ED AIRCRAFT DEYELO[',\IENT [N THE EARLY WAR YEARS

Uibliography

jackson, A j, Avro Aircraft siflte 1908 (Putnam, London 1965) Jackson, R. Air Irar over Fralla! 1939-40 (Ian Allan. London 1974)

Andrews, C F, Vickers Aircraft since 1908 (Putnam. London 1969)

James, D N, GIOSler Aircraft sillce 1917 (Putnam, London 1971)

Angle, G D, (ed), Aerospltcrc 1939 (Aircraft Publications, New York 1939)

111t! 11-1 Shmrmooik armOllred groutld-allack aircraft played a major part iPl the ultimate Soviet victory uver the German i'lvasion roll/lI1llS_ Heat/ily armed, rhe 11-2 tllas prodlla!d at the rate of 1,200 per JIIomh, and productioll for OlllStripped mOSI otlter SWJlld tl'-brld Hur types. Illustrated is all Il-2A·13.

1-16 monoplane fighters, both of which had been combat-tcsted in Spain. Mosl of the bombers in Soviel operational service were also obsolescent and suffered accordingly at the hands of the Luftwaffe. Howevcr, a number of modern designs .....c re already well inlO the development/production phase. As the Germans approached !\,Ioscow a remarkable operation was undertaken. Threatened factori,.:s were mo\'ed by r'Jilway to cast of the Ural mountains and to Siberia. It was a mammoth undenaking, but it was successfully concluded. The Luftwaffe had failed to dewlop a suitable tong-range bomber and, therefore, the new factory sitcs were safe from allack. In these faclOries Yak-I, MiG-I, MiG-3 and LaGG·3 fighters were steadi1r produced and developed, incorporating the lessons learned from combat experience. Designer Ilyushin built the 1l~2 single-engine close support/anti-tank aircraft which became famous as the 'Shturmo\·ik'. This was flown in October 1940 and pUt into large-scale production in March 1941. Its armament was twO cannon and two machine-guns, and it had a top speed of 292mph (470km/h). Ultimately the Russialls built 36,000 11-2s. Like the Luftwaffe, the Soviet Air Force concentrated on light and medium twin-engine shon-range aircraft. A lypical example was the l'etlyako... I'c-2 with a three-man crew, two M-I05R in-line engines of 1,IOOhp and carrying a bomb load of up 10 2,200lb (I,OOOkg),

Balchin, N, The Aircraft Builders (HAlSO, London 19.n)

Lumsden, A, British PistonAero-Ellgilles O/Id Iheir Aircraft (Airlife, Shrewsbury 1994)

Barnes, C H,SllOrtJAircraft silla! 1900 (putnam, London 1967)

Mason, F K, Hawker Aircraft since 1920 (Putnam, London 1961)

Barnes, C H, Bristol Aircraft since 1910 (Putnam, London 1964)

Nowarra, N j & DU\'al, G R, Russiwl Civil and l\lilitary Aircraft, 1884-1969 (Fountain Press, London 1971)

Bowers, P M, Boeing Aircraft sma! 1916 (Putnam, London 1966)

Swanborough, G & Bowers, P M, United StaleS Military Aircraft sillce 1909 (putnam, London 1989)

Bridgman, L (cd), Jalle's All the Iforld's Aircrafl 1941 (Sampson Low, London, 1941)

Swanborough, G & Bowers, I' M, Uniled Stares Navy Aircraft since 1911 (pumam, London 1968)

Brown, D, Shores, C & Macksey, K, The Gllincss History of Air lfbifare (Guiness Superlatives, Enfield 1976)

lapper, 0, ArmstrollK lrIhi,u'Orlh Airr:raft sina! 1913 (Pumam, London 1973)

Franeillon, R j, Grllmmall Aircraft sillce 1929 (Putnam, London 1989)

Taylor, M. J H (ed), Jane's Encyc/Qpedia of Aviatioll (Bracken Books, London 1989)

Francillon, R j, McDolI/lcll DOllg/as Aircraft since 1920, lobi 1 (I"utnam, London 1988)

Thetford, 0, Aircraft of the Royal Air Fora si,lU 1918 (Putnam. London 1971)

Armament consisted of four machine-guns. The Pe-2 had a span of just o\'er 51fl (15m) and a maximum speed of 335mph (540km/h). The \'ery heavy aircraft losses incurred br tllC So\'iet Air Force in 1941 led to urgent requests to Britain and America for warplanes. There then began a steady flow of fighters and bombers including "Iomahawks, KillYhawks, Hurricanes, Airacobras and BOSIOIlS. As the war progressed more ad\'anced types were supplied. In total, the USA ultimately sent 14,833 aircraft to Russia, while Britain's direct contribution included no fewer than 2,952 Hurricanes.

Capable of over 330 mph, Ihe Petlyakoo Pe-2 «', its loaded weight of 2800kg (6,173Ib) being about l60kg (3501b) less than mat of the Spitfire VB. On me orner hand, the larger wing of the Spitfire gave it a wing loading at 271b/sq ft (I.13kg/m J ), compared with 35.51b/sq ft (1.49kg/m l ) for the German fighter. Thal meant me Bf 109 was inferior to the British fighter in a turning fight. Thc Spitfire VB was me more heavily armed, carrying two 20mm Hispano cannon and four 0.303in machineguns spaced out across the wings. The 'Fricdrich-2', in contrast, was armed principall)' for fighter-to-fighter combat and had a single 15mm cannon and two 7.9mm machine-guns grouped close together in the nose of the aircraft. -I'nroughout the remainder of lIle war me de\"elopment of fighter aircraft in Great Britain and Germany

The air superiority fighter in mid·1941 In rnc middle of 1941, nearly tv.o years into lIle Second \\?orld \,\Iar, twO aircraft stood out as representing the state of the art among the air superioriry fighters then in service: the Supermarine Spitfire l\brk VB and the Mcsserschmin Bf I09F-2. Both fighters were de\'c!oped \'crsions of designs that made their initial flights more than half a decade earlier, and both were in large-scale production. When, in !:he mid-l 930s, me)' had designed me two fighters, both Reginald Mitchell and Willi Messcrschmin had the same goals in mind. Each sought to producc a short-range interceptor fighter with the highest possible speed and climbing performance, mating the smallest possible airframe to the most powerful engine then available. Gi\"en lhe similarity of lhe requirements, it is hardly surprising that me resultant aircraft should ha\'e sc\"eral points in common. Both were low-wing monoplanes with all-metal stressed-skin construction, faired cockpits and retractable undercarriages. When considcring the rclath'e merits of these fighters, howe\"cr, one mUSI bear in mind that airCr'.l.ft design is largely a matter of compromise. If the designer concentrates on improving one aspect of performance or combat capability, almost ine\'itably this will be at the expense of something clse. Arguably, Willi Messerschmill did slightly better tllan Reginald Mitchell in designing the smallest possible

Tile limglll F4U CONair was tlu! fastest and 1Il0st effectiw carrier-home fighterlfigluer-bomber type 10 see /a.rge-scale seruice during the Suond lri.lr/d Irar. (Sec pages 64 and 74-5)

1u:u broadly comparable machines u:hidl rallked as the mosl effeclive air SlIpen"on'ly fighters ill $(!rvU:e ill mid- / 94 /. Left: A SIIf'Cr",arine Spitfire I '8 of No 92 SqlliulrrJll. Right: A i\1esserschmill Hf 109 'Friedricll' ofJagdgeuhwader 2,oll/side its camouflaged hallgar ill lIorther'l France. (Spitfire: Vickers; J\fesse"ichmilt: 'Via Schliephake)

58

59

FIGHTER DEVELOPMENT, ,\IID-1941 TO MID-1945

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECOSD \l'ORJ.D \l:'AR

\

nu: Spiifire XII tooS optimiu:d for operatiO'1S at low allitude, and had irs willgs dipped 10 give a" i"crellled rote of roll. followed one of Iwo separate paths. On one of these paths, the well-proven Spitfire and Bf 109 designs were developed to squeeze the laSl drop of performance out of them. On the other path, new fighter types were built and introduced into service. In the next twO sections we shall obsen'e the aircraft that emerged from each path of development, and see how they fared in service.

the structure was liable (Q suITer a catastrophic failure and break up. To cope with each major increase in weight, therefore, a fighter's airframe had to be strengthened to restore its safe loading factor. And, naturally, each such increase in strength brought with it a further twist to the weight spiral. During the Second World \X'ar Supermarine pushed the process of incremental developmem of the Spitfire further than anybody else. After the Mark VB, the next major impro\"emem to the performance came in the spring of 1942 with the imroduction into service of the Spitfire ,\.\ark IX. 'll1is was powered by the new !\'lerlin 61 engine filled with two supercharger blowers in series, one feeding into the other. AI sea level the new engine developed a maximum of 1,565hp, JUSt under loohp more than the Merlin 45. AI high altitude the effect of the two-stage supercharger was more profound. At 30,OOOft (9, 150m) the ,"1
nc . . .

of NdI l'(.lna",

Wing loading

Fw 190A·3

Apr 1942

1,700hp

673kmJh 418mph

3,977kg 8,:701b

1.8"'1>g/m2 44.51blsq fl

Fw I90A·8

Apr 1944

1,700hp

657km/h 408mph

4,381kg 9,660lb

2,06kg!m 2 491b/sq ft

Fw 19OD-9

SCI' 1944

2,240hp

686km/h 426mph

4,299kg 9,4801b

2,02kg/m 2 48.llb/sq f(

66

Enlered sen;ce

MIO·19..\~

Figum /or imllal pf'OdlltlUm l'tT1Um of ~odr 1)'/1'

DC\'elopmcnt of L;S Na\')' FighteNi

US Army Air Force FightcNi

Tn"

t>E\'E1.0P.\IEST ••\110-19'..\1 TO

us

67

l'lGllTI,R OEVELOI',\lli'':-'' . .\IID· 1 I).: 1 TO .\110-1945

AIRCRAFT OF TUE SECOSD IX'ORLD \TAR

Th~ GrumlJ/Q/1 F6F Nellcal carrier fighur haJ a cQ/lJit!erable perforlll(Jllle adtxlIIlage over Ihe Japanese A6:\15 'Zcke 52', and played a II/~jor pari i" Ihe CS Naval victories itt flte Paalic Ihcatrt dl/ring 1943 and 1944

I

_ "";:10

/

T

r'lXM-n'illf Fm 1905 ofJo.g~ 51 Opmlling linda harsh tt'lnrerronduwns al ajorL'YJrd alrfltld In RussitJ. Xote lhal t1It aircraft in flu bat:Jr6round is N.n.'l1Ig Its mgmt cJwnged in the opnl. (Romm)

VB which soldi~d on untillhe Spitfire IX e:nterro S/:r\;cc. From Ihen on Ihe paformantt of Ihe Spitfire ad~ \-anced the faster, and Ihe Mk XIV had a clear margin of superiority even O\'er Ihe Fw 1900. For the Japanese Navy Ihe moment of trulh came in Ihe summer of 1943, when the US Na\]' introduced Ihe Grumman F6F Hellcat. This was powered by a 2,OOOhp Pratt & Whitney R-2800-IOW, an engine similar 10 !.hat fitted to the Thunderbolt. The new American fighter had a maximum speed of 376mph (605km) at 22,8ooft (6,900m), gh;ng it a comfortable performance margin over !.he 'Hamp'. With the next generation of JapaneS/: fighters stiU more than a year from sef';ce, the outclassed 'Hamp' had to continue to bear the brunt of the

-

-~''

1M Nakajima Ki-84 'Frank 'v:as Ollt of Iht btJl fighun in trllh fht ]apa"m Army AIr Foret,

Enterro scn-i«

F1gllrn Pr inlfial prodl'Clion tltJ'Sion of tJU1r

jul

Nakajima

K.i

~3-IIB

19~3

Engine power

Nakajima Ki 8~ 'FrMlk'

Aug

19.J~

,\\aximum speed

\X'eight (normal loaded)

f)'Pt

\X'ing loading

1,130hp

515km1h 320mph

2.412kg 5,3201b

0.96kgim 2 n.9lbjsq ft

1,900hp

624kmJh 388mph

3,612kg 7,9651b

1.26kg..m2 29.91b/sq fl

'Oscar'

...

urt.'let

Japanese Ann}' Air Force Fighters 1)..,.,

air fighting over the Pacific. Now the 'tightness' of its original design was a liability, because Ihe airframe could not accept an engine developing more than 1,3OOhp, Mitsubishi did its best to squeeze more performantt from the existing auframe, but 1,l,;th little success. The cleanest airframe design of any fighter of thiS pt:riod wu that of Ihe North American P-51 1\\uStang. The IJ·51A.lhe initial production \"Cf$ion, was powered b}' Ihe Allison V·171 a engine and was quite an effectl\"e low-altitude fighter, \",'hen the fighter was re-cnglned ,,;th the ,\\ertin 61 built under licence by the liS Packard company as !.he \'-165()"J, the Mustang reaUy came into Its own. The Spitfire IX used the Rolis-Royce-bwit \·er· sion of the same engine. \'Ct, when the twO fighters flew at similar Ihrottle settings, the Mustang was between 20

and 30mph (32 and 48km.'h) faster, depending on altitude, \Xtith a maximum speed of +-IOmph C08klll/h), the ,\ lusrang was faster than an~- piston-n1glned fighter opposing iL .\10f'COl'er, cafT~1ng two 75 Imp gal (3010 htre) tanks. its operational radius of action of 650 miles (1.().45km) took It to Ikrlln and beyond. The appearance of large numbers of Thunderbolts and Mustangs o\'er Germany in the spring of 19~~ cauS/:d a cflSis in the Luft\\-affe. Home defence umtS flying the Bf 109 and Fw 109 found themsel\'CS In a sort of 'Catdl 22 situation', If a fighter carried enough firepower to destroy the American hea\'}' bombers, it was 100 hea\1' and uO\\;eldy to engage with the American escorts. If Ihe armament was reduced so that the fighter could dogfight with Ihe American escons, it could not engage Ihe bombers with much chance of success. As a makeshift solution, the Luft\\'affe introduced separate Gruppen equipped with 'heavy' and 'light' fighters. The: 'heavy' fighter type was the Specillll)' modified Focke·\X·ulf Fw I90A-8 'Sturmbock' ('bauer· Ing ram') fitted with tWO 20mm and two 30mm l\tK 108 cannon. This \-er$ion earned extrll. steel armour to prote
./;

//;

\\

If /

.' t

'.

/

1!

..,;J",,,,

~[

. • "" ! L 'Pi! ! ,;

!i~l~l!ii!itjti(

~ib~~H~Hjrime Ministcr Winston Churchill, the Meteor was ordered into production with an order for 120 aircraft. Laler this was increased to 300. -111us, by the beginning of 1944, the RAF and the Luftwaffc each had a turbojet-powered fighter type in production. Both were ordered for usc as home air defence fighters, hO\"e"er, so the chance of their meeting in action was small (in fact, they newr did). In the e,'ent, however, neither the Me 262 nor the Meteor was the firsl jet-propelled fighter 10 go into action. "Inat honour went to the Messerschmitt Me 163, a small rocket-propelled target defence fighter. "[be development of the rocket

-Ifl'arittg a special s/lil to give proreClloII from colltaet witll tile wlatile l:StolT fllel, a pilm boards a i\lesseruhmill tHe 163. The small dimellsiolls of Ille rocket-powered fighter are readily apparetll ill this photo.

85

AIII.CRAFT OF TilE

SECO~O

\\:'011.1.0 \\:',,11.

FIGHTER rocket motor at full power for only four minutes. Once the fighter had rcached its operational altitude and accelerated to fighting speed, the pilot would shut down the motor and deli\-er his attack coasting along at high speed. As the fighter slowed, the pilol fired the rockel in short bursts to restore his fighting speed. In tllis way he could extend the l'vle 163's endurance at high altitude to about eight minutes, gidng the fighter an cffecth'e combat radius of action of about 4Qkm (25 miles) from base. Because of the explosive nature of the T-Stoff, it was important to exhaust the fuel before landing, and the rocket fighter returned to base as a glider. However, as some Me 163 pilots discovered to their cost, gliding could be an unhealthy activity in areas where American escort fighters were on the prowl. The M.e 163 had a sparkJing speed and climbing performance, yel it operated too dose to the limits of what was possible for it to achieve much in action. Moreover, the "FSloff was rather too exciting for general service use, and the fighter's formidable rate of fuel consumption gave it a very restricted radius of action. At the peak of its deployment there were JUSt under a hundred Me 163s in sen'ice with IWO front-line Gruppen, yet there were ne\'cr more than thirty or them serviceable, and on no dar did more than ten of the rocket fighters go into action. On its most successful day the Me 163 shot down only four enemy aircraft. In its sen'ice career lasting almost a year, it is doubtful whether the rocket fighter accounted for more Ih:m sixteen enemy aircraft in tOlal. It will be remembered that the Meleor I had been placed in production to coumer lhe threat from the no\'cl

fighter outpaced that of the two turbojet powered types, and the Me 163 began flying practice interceptions against Allied aircraft in May 1944. Power for the Me 163 came from a Walter 509A bifuel rocket motor. This ran on two liquid chemical fuels, code-named '"!:Stoff and 'C-StofT' by the Germans. 'I: Stoff was highly concentrated hydrogen peroxide, an unstable and highly corrosive compound liable to decompose on contact with copper, lead or almost anything combustible. When it decomposed, the chemical produced heat at a rate similar to that of gunpowder. Not least of its unendearing qualities was that it would decompose violently if it came imo contact with human flesh. At take-off the Me 163 carried more than 1.5 tonnes of the vile liquid, which must have done little for Ihe pilofs peace of mind. The other fuel carried by the fighter, C-Stoff, was a relatin'ly Slable combination of methyl n.kohol, hydrazine hydrate and a little waler. The IWO fuels came IOgether in the rocket's combustion chamber in the ratio of about three parts ofT-Stoff to one part of C-Sloff. This caused a violem chemical reaction that produced a jet of superheated sleam and nitrogen with a velocity of 1,980m/see (6,5OOfl/sec) and a temperature of 1,800"C. That gave a thrust of 1,7ookg (3,750Ib). When an Me 163 look off, just over half of its weight was fuel. At full thrust the \'O\\-er them was ready

for mass production. Nor did Adolf Hitlers order regarding the initial use of the Me 262 as a fighter-bomber cause any appreciable delay in the t}"~'s operational introduction as a fighter. First and al\\"3)'$;, the main factor

How they Compared: De Havilland Vampire I versus Spitfire XIV During the Second \'("orid \X'ar the jet fighter types that .....e nt into action produced uniformly disappointing results in terms of the number of e~)' aircraft they shot down. HO\\~\'ff, there can be no doubt that, had the war continued a fe..... months longer, this picture would ha\'e changed radically. In 1946 the RAF flew a comparath~ trial in .....tuch it pined a de Ha\'iIland Vampire I ....ith a Gobltn II engine against a Spitfire XlV. As has ~n seen elsewhere, the Spitfire XlV was one of the mosl effeeth~ pislon-engined fighlers at lhe end of the ....'31'. Yet as these excerpts from the official report show, the Vampire oUlclassed the Spitfire in e\-ery aspect of combat performance that really malteredo Maximum leve/ speed The Vampire is greatly superior in speed to the Spitfire XIV at all heights. Its speed ad\'3ntage is shown below: Alli/ude ground level 140mph (225km/h) 5,OOOft (1,500m) 120mph (193km1h) IO,OOOft (3,OOOm) II0mph (I77km/h) l5,OOOft (-4,600m) IIOmph (I 77km1h) 20,OOOfI (6, 100m) IOSmph (169km/h) 85mph (I 36km1h) 2S,000f1 (7,600m) 30,OOOft (9, 100m) 70mph (112km/h) -40.000ft (i2,200m) 90mph (145km/h) Aeultrtuion and d«ekrotion \'('ith both :un:ntft In line-abreasl formation al a speed of 200mph (322km/h) lOchcated, on the word 'Go' both engines ....-ere opened up 10 a maximum power simultaneously.The Spi~ initially drew ahead, bul after a penod of approximately 25 M.'COnds the \"amplt'C gradually caught up and quickly accderated past the Spitfire. Tbe rate of deceleration for the Spitfire is faster than the Vampire e\"Cfl when the Vampire uses Its dl\~ brakes. This shows that the Vampire's di\~ brakes are not as efreeth'e as they should be. Dit:lg progress had bem made. Tile differellces bel«-eCII Ihis amblillg ArmS/rollg lI'lhit«'Orllllf1hitky 1/ al/d Ihe Arodo jel bomber, fdudl fiefl; almosl four lillles as fast and twice as lIigh, provide ample etlidel/u of spectaclllar advam:es.

124

Bomber Command

125

Lufluxlffe

(Grafton/Collins,

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECOND ,",'ORLD W ..\ R

5 Airmobility

"

Peter Hearn

H"i,h 110 aircrafl designed specifically for tral/sporl, at the oll/break of Ihe u'Or Ihe RAF relied on wmJerled bomben or requisitioned airliners, $//ch as this Halldley Page H,R42,for aena/movement of troops and stlpplies,

nle Douglas C-47, knoum as Dakola to lite Bri/l51t forces alld SkYlrai'l 10 Ille American, u'Qs derived from 111i! DC-3 air/iller (JIld become the lraflspor/ rrorkhorn of Ihe Allied foren,

126

Fallschirm;ager Olney had expected di\·e bombers. 'Illey had expected artillery fire, They hnd expected the dis tam rumble of armour, But the few lookouts in their emplacements on Belgium's fori Eben Emacl had not expcclcd these grey, bat-like figures swooping grncefully and silently from a dawn sky, Mesmerised, they \\'alched in the half-liglll as the flring vehicles ploughed into the grass amongsl them; vehicles thai borc on their flanks - thcy realised tOO late - the black cross of Germany. From cach glider poured nine close-helmeted figures, firing as they came. The few defenders on the surface of thc fort were overwhelmed by smallarms fire, grenade and flame. Others fled 10 join the main body of the fort's garrison in the supposed safeI)' of tile underground maze of tunnels, sheltcrs and gun emplacements, there to be tr.lpped and further stunned as specially prepared hollow charges tore through the six-foot-thick reinforced concrete of the emplacements to destroy the great guns inlendcd to dominate this \·ital slretch of the bordcr between Belgium and Germany. Within minutes, a fort manned by 1,200 men and considered impregn::able had been neutr.lliscd by se\'enry-eight troops who had swooped upon it from dawn skies, at the cost of only six of their number, Thus began the German assault on the Low Counrries on 10 '''lay 1940. Further west, other glider-borne troops were taking the bridges of Vroenhofen and Velchrezelt. Paratroops were spilling from their Junkers Ju 52s from heights as low as 100m (300ft) to seize other river crossings at ,"I.oerdijk and Dordrccht. In Rotterdam itself, 50 paratroops jumped into a spons stadium, and 120 men were landed on the river Maas in 12 Heinkel He 59 seaplanes. A larger force of paratroops seized Ihe airfield at Waalha\'en, while further north others were dropping on to Ihree airfields around The Hague, baltling to sccure them for the airlanding of reinforcements and supplies. Although the assault on The Hague was fiercely resisted and losses of aircraft were hea\1', Rotterdam was held by German airborne trOOps until the 9th Panzer Division entered the city on 14 Mar, having rolled along the carpet of intact bridges and neUlralised stTongpoints laid for it by the 'Fallschirm;ager' - Germany's young 'hunters from the sky', Holland surrendered to tile invaders that evening, Belgium followed suit twO weeks later. 'lltis assault on the Low Countries was the largest

and most dramatic airborne operation of the Second \,(Iorld War so far, but nOl the first. In Fcbruary 1939, and again in Novcmber, small groups of Russian paratroops jumped near Summa and Petsamo 10 cut communications in support of the im'asion of Finland. On a much larger scale, in September 1939,4,000 paralroops and 12,000 airborne infantrymen had stood in readiness on Silesian airfields for operations against Poland at the outbrcak of the war, but so dcvastatingly swift had been the ad\'ance of Germany's Panzer divisions that there had been no call for airborne assault - although the 16th Regimem of the 7th Air Division had been airlirted to forward baule positions north of Lod;,: 10 fight as ordinary infantry. In April 1940 O\'er 500 tr.lllsport ::aircraft, mostly Ju 52s, with smaller numbers of heavy Ju 90s and FockeWulf Fw 200s, had spearheaded and then supported Germany's invasion of Denmark and Norway, Initial assault from the sky had achieved immcdiate results, largely tluough audacity and surprise rather than by weight of arms. During the brief and victorious campaign that followed, the Germans airlifted 29,280 men, 2,376 IOns (2,414 IOnnes) of supplies and 259,300 gal (980,000 Htres) of a\'iation fuel into the combat zone. This combination in 1940 of assault by parachute and glider, airlanding by tr.lnsport aircraft and subscquem resupply and reinforcement from the air, was the first major demonstr.ltion of the concepts of airmobility and airborne operations conceivcd and developed by haly, Russia, and abo\·e all by Germany during the years between the twO world wars. The support of ground forces from the air had become an integral pan of the German doctrine of'B1ir.drrieg': surprise assault by fastmo\'ing columns of tanks, artillery and motorised infantry to break through or bypass the linear defence still favoured by tr.lditional military thinking, The role of air support in this novel method of warfare was: 1 To gain air superiority 2 ·10 provide reconnaissance 3 ·10 bomb and str.lfe in close support of the advance 4 '10 deli\·cr troops from tllC air ahead of or on lhe nanks of the ad\'8ncing mechanised columns 5 >[0 resupply and reinforce the ground assault. This doctrine had a \'igorous and far-sighted proponent in Generalleutnant Kun Student, commander of Germany's fledgling airborne forces. It also had the personal backing of Hitler, and of Goering as commander of the Luftwaffe.

127

AIRCRAFT OF Till' SECO:"O

\\~ORLO

\t'AR

AIR.\I0B1LITY

..

GUI1lQllY'S starlltllg IIU of paratroops III 1940 relied llpoll 11U! Jlmkers JII 52, td,id! remail/ed (he badtbo"e of Germa" airlllobtl,ly (Immg/10111 the ttur" Jllmps tt:ere I/!~ PJMrtSl, unsuccessful bids for Douglas DC·3s. NO! until America enlered Ihe war would this eminently suitable aircraft hi: made a\'3itable to Britain's airborne forces (sec pholo abilot Regimen! as he watched W'aeo machines being uncrated and assembled.Tne CG-4A could carry thirteen troops or light \'ehicles and guns, and had a nose door. It was small enough for twO at a time to be towed by a C+47, usually in tandem. Of a further 2,000 gliders built in America, the largest was the \'hilippines. These and similar operations may tlll\"C~ been low in numbers but were high in the basic ingredient of successful airborne assault, audacity and sur· prise. The only glider-borne assault in the Pacific came in 1945, towards thc cnd of the war, when se\'en US gliders landed troops in northern Luzon to hasten the capture of the island. It was through resuppl)' and reinforcement that the transport aeroplane best ser\'ed the ground forces in the Far ..::aSt and Pacific, In retrospect it can be argued thaI not enough use was made of airmobility in a militllry theatre of \':ISI distances, most of them scattered o\'Cr the sc:a or rugged lerram, Howe\'er, limited resourcts and in some caSts an uncertainty of \itlll air superiority undoubtedly influenced air rransport operations in these areas. With few hospilable airfieldS, the sc:aplane came into its own as a means of communication in this zone. Across the PaCIfic (and across the Atlantic) Pan-Am's giant Boeing 314 Clippers pTO\ided a 10ng-l1mge miil-

AIR,\I08ILITY

drop and glider, and at the end of the operation were mostly alrhfted OUt of the banle zone, An increasingly \1Ilued aspecl of air support, the recovery of the wounded, \\':IS demonstrated in the Burma campaign. Mostly they wert flown out of the forward areas by light aU'CTafl. Some wert actually rttumed by glider, for among the ingeruous mno\':Iuons In concepl and technique born of this campaign "':IS a sySlem whereby Waco gliders that had dell\'ered their load could subsequently be The 'snalched' from the ground by a kn\'-fl~ing helieopler also made an appeara.nce in support of the Chmdlts, the Sikorsky R-4 and later the R-5 being used for communicauons and casualt}' C\':Icuation, Orde Wingate died III an air crash before thc end of his campaign, but not before his \;sion, wdl supported by colleagues and by sc:nior commanders, had inspired a maJOr ad\':Ince 10 the concept of aumobllIt}',

c-r.

Japan devtlqped an ajrbo,,~ capability basnJ on GeTman IIKthods, btU madt onry hmiud 14M of g1idvJ, mainry clrring 10 a Jadl oft/xr:ing airr:roft. Tht Kolmsai Ku-7.S«n here, mu Iht largat lUSQult gljder bUIlt In Japan and could hold lhnIy-rtro lroops or an Dghl-Um tank, By tht ttmt of III first flighl, mAugust 1944,Japan fWS las",g tht tror, and It did IIot progrtss «yo"d the exptrimcJIlul Stage.

tar)' passenger senice for th~ Allies similar to thai provided by Imperial A1rways ft)1ng boats \130 the African routes. \'('ithin the war zone, US Arm)' Air Force and GS Na\1' flying boats such as thc Martin 1>B2'\\-1 Mars and the smaller Catalina and Mariner v..ert used for supply and communications. Brilllin's Short Sunderland flying boa15 pro\'lded both stnteglC and in-theatre support. The China·Burma-Indla theatre saw tWO outstanding examples of air transport support. From 1942 to 1945 US and Chinese forces operating out of southern China were sustained by massi\'e airlift from bases in India and Burma. l>Ushed westwards by thrtal ofjapanesc fighlers, this route had to surmount the Himalayas; 'Crossing the Hump' il was cal1ed. 'l1"Ie operation began with C-47s ,each carrying three Ions of supplies. As the C-47s were progrcssi\'cly replaced by Curtiss C-46 Commandos and smaller numbers of Douglas C-54s and Consolidated C-109s, the monthly airlift rose from 2,800 Ions (2,840 tonnes) in February 1943 to 7,000 tons (7,110 tonnes) by December of that year, then to 12,000 tons (12,200 tonnes) in early 1944. A morc direct use of air support was provided in Burma for Orde Wingate's 'Chindits' in their long-range penetrations of Japanese-held terrilory east of the Chindwin river. Wingate had pre\'iously employed Ri\F transport support in a successful campaign againsl the Italians in Ethiopia. Now, this 'genius for unorthodox and no\'C1 warfart' as his commander, Gen ''''a\'dl, called him, inspired an operation that prtsaged modem concepts of air mobililY with its total integration of air and ground forces employing an ingenious \'lIriet}· of techniques and airborne operation. Hi firsl infiltration of j3pan~ territor)' in 19",,2 in\"Ol\'ed 3,000 men in eight sc:parale 'columns' m0\1ng by fOOl through hazardous lerram whert their success and \'ery sun1val depended

136

The 'ChlnJ,,' Ulmpaiglls III Burma sat: lhe Second U'arld Ir;'r~ bur txampk of al' tra,1SfKJ71 in SlIppt1Tt of a ground wmpalgll. mdudillg the torly lISt of hdicopttrs for a"''''I1/mlaJ

/~d

l..oatkJ weighl ,\fax.",,,m U1UIsp«d

3 x I,OOOhp Bramo 323R-2 radials H7kmjh (r2mph) (2,~ 73 miles) 3,970km (111ft lOin) 3~.05m 25,llm (82ft 4in) 35 trOOpS or 5,670kg (J 2,500lb) of freight.

Span &"glh /.-1

,HaxWIIlIll speed

RfJ'lgt

Span I~ngrh

Load

Loadtd «Ieighl ,\!aximllllll(ltv speed

Span

6 x 990hp Gn6me·Rh6ne 14N ~8/49 radials 214km/h (I 37mph) 1,121km (696 miles) 55.15m (181ft) 28.35m (93ft 4in) 130 troops or 9,752kg (21,500lb) offrcight.

Ullglh

LoaJ

2~Ohp

7.296kg 209kmjh 24.36m IS.76m 22 troops 2,721kg

(16,094Ib) (130mph) (80ft ~in) (51ft lOin) or (6,OOOlb) of freight.

ITALY Savoia-.\tarchcui SM.81 and S.\1.82 f.'lihtary de,'e!opmem of the m-motor S~1,73 ci\illr.lns· port, and Italy's predomJOant paratrooptng. troop lr.lns· port and freighting aircraft.

Fie eler Fi 156 Storch A communications and liaison aircraft with outstanding STOL performance, ideal for clandestine support. Ix

39.-IO-4kg (86,860lb) 218krnJb (Irmph) \\ith He IIIZ tow 55m (180ft 5in) 28.15m (92ft 4in) 130 trOOpS or up to 12,196kg (26,8~6Ib) offrcight,

Gotha Go 242 (glider) A twin-boom freight glider well suited to the carriage of guns, small "ehicles or light tanks. Introduced in carl)' 19~2 and used mainly for supply missions on the Russian From. Twin engines were added to create the unsuccessful Gotha Go 244.

,\lesserschmin Me 323 High-wmged. six-engine monoplane. Germany's main heavy.1ift aircraft, valuable on the Eastern Front but an easy prey to fighters elsewhere. Laler \'ersions mounted defensi\"e 20mm cannon in four power-operated turrets,

Engmes

2,09Okg (~,6301b) 209km/h (130mph) 21.98m e2ft lin) 11.201m (36ft lOin) 9 troops or 1,236kg (2,-S01b) offK'lghl.

Messer-schmitt ,\le 321 (glider) Hea\)' tnilnsport glider. one of the largest aircraft of the Second \X'orid \'rar. Used rocket·assisted take-off and sperial rug aircraft.

junkc-n ju 352 An all-wooden \-enion of the cancelled ju 252 proiect, produced only in small numbers as a freighler with rear loadmg doors, Not usually employed In an assault role. but used for reinforcement and supply.

Engmc

A fl-uvt of C-47s drops Allied troops beyond the Rhine dllring the Wsl of the grcat alrbome assall/u of lire Second I\,&,/d ,\ tore than 20,000 lIIen fl-'crelallMd by pamchlllt alld glider in Ins tha" two hOlln.

(l09mph) (2.ul miles) (46ft 9in) (32ft 6in)

GER.:\lANY

The mamstay of ~nnan}"s air uanspon fleet, derived from early junkers tinl airliners. Rugged performance rrnlde It an Ideal front-hne support aircraft for freighting, paratrooping, and 1rOOp-landing roles.

•

17Skmjh 38Skm 14.2Sm 9.9m 2 passengers.

3)( 750hp Nfa-Romeo RC35 radials

Argus ASIOC-3 in·line

145

AIRCRAI"T 01" TilE 51,CO".;'I> WORI I> WAR

l\laxlmlllll SpaJ

Rallge Spall UlIgI"

(-oaJ

326km/h (I 96mph) 1,311 km (932 miles) 22.96m (78ft 9in) IS.33m (60ft 1m) 16 paratrOOps or ~,761kg (IO.500lb) offrelghl.

AIR,\IOBILITY

-l x 1,600hp Bristol Hercules xn radials 280mph (449km/h) 3,000 miles (4,823km) (30.I-m) 99ft S-ft 3in (23.92m) 40 troops as passengers, or 24 paratroopers.

EngllltS Maximum

speed

Rangt SPOil Lmglll LctVI lIre U'Qn, dramatiaJ/ly ,mpl"UUd a carrUr's ability /i;I attadt tPlemy u'Qnh,ps btcause lIre dive bomber could in tjJUI bt aimtd at a /IIm:ill, ship. CS Navy Dalllllksses /iilt this O'lt, sllO«'II wilh dit.-.e brakts extmdtd, u:o" tIlt Raith of I/re Coral Sta alld Afldu'Q)" Ihe firsl 111 history i1l which llie ships mt:olved >/l.'Vtr tame U'ilhm visllal rx}flUU:I. dominant, The Luftwaffe controlled all land-based aircraft and seaplanes, and only grudgingly helped the navy with such essemial sen'iccs as reconnaissance in support of U~boats. The halian navy did operate aircraft based on board its battleships and cruisers, but it could nOl control thc much more important land-based reconnaissance and strike aircraft, Nor could it force the Italian air force to pro\~de strike aircraft (thc land-based Aeronillro"tt) in sufficient numbers. The So\'i~t Na\]' did control its own land-based aircraft, whose assigned roles induded auacks on enemy naval bases as well as on enemy ships. Thus the na\'31 air arm induded com'entional land-based bombers which we~ expected to carry mines and torpedoes; they were organised In mine-torpedo regiments.lbe later missilecarrying regiments were their direct descendantS. Somc important faclS of life Iimiled the effecth'eness of aircraft at 5,,\

AIRCRAI'T 01' THE SI":COSU WORLD WAR

As in I~ CSA, lhe aJt~1l 0/ Vlflna In lhe Z,OOOhp diJss wk.'cd mllny probln,u. Hocft:cr, II f..'UJ n,."h mort difficulr for tll~ Bnruh alrmJft mduJlry to ~Itch tO'1ro) 1)'fJn in rr;arti",~.AJ a rrJult, oircra/t trhich JJwllld 1Im.y: trll~J JCN.'1Gt Ohm., 19-11, Ilk tlliJ l:aut)' Flrtfly I, did 1I0t op~ar m m/lllbrrs IImil tlu: md o/Iht U't1r.

the Fulmar soon entered service. Its performance was 10deed limiled, but when guided by radar it could beat off bomber anacks quite effectively. IJendmg the (,,"ailabilitr of the Fulmar, the na\'y placed a few ex-RAF GIOSler Gladiators on board ,\ Icditerranean Fleet carriers. The ships carrying them lacked radar, 50 they cannot ha\'e been of vcrr great use in combat. Br this orne se\'C'ral new engines In the 2.000hp cia \\'C'rc In prospect, notably the Rolls-Royce Griffon and the Napier Sabre. A follow-on Gnffon FR spectficauon, which produced the Fairey FireRy, was issued. E\'C'ntually a Griffon-engincd version of the Barracuda would also be built. For the moment. the Barr.lcuda was condemned 10 low performance because other types of aircraft claimed much higher priorities for the new cngines, There was much grumbling in British aeronautical circles at the low performance of existing aircraft. ,\ Ian)' felt thaI the second-scat requirement was to blame. As a consequence, a specification was issuro for a Sabrcenginro smgle-seat fighler. As eXpe WOIl.! D '«'AR

Sot alll/~ aircraft bought i" Ihe pmr:ar Bmull mobdualum prr:n.y:J Juuessful. The Sau".krs-R~ lLru:idlfalitd w haJly /hal t
SA\·AJ. AIRCRAFT IS'I HI: SI:COSD WORLD WAR

Like lhe Royal Xov,)~ lhe CS Sat" of 1941 paid a perfornla/let penalty for rurner operatum. Thest early Grlllm"all F4F tr"iidalts thoro a" Important l.:S Sai-')' fealUrti lighl bomb ~ bought w lhal aircraft COI,Id tupport landi"g op. nalWm. ~ CTOUD IIPlW the rri"gs i,tdiaJu participatIon III preu:ar an~. The red circks in the stan of W 'lalwnoJ mSlgnia t.'Tn' elJ",maud dllnng 1941 for fear of being misUJkOl for wJapanLSe rismg sun 'nttalball'. For lhe same muon. many Bntuh and Co",momrcalth aIrcraft opnr1tlllg In tlre Pacific Thealrt! hod the rtd willa of their roundels tliminaud. and laU7 had l;S-styw horizontal frhlle ban added.AIIJumgh qmu otudasud by Ihe Zaos.lriidalts m'rt' retaltted lhrollgh the frar MCallY lhcy amid OfJffOle from small arort carnen. (Oddlj~ the RiJ)'Cl1 XQt.')' managed 10 operate Hellcau an.! CorwIn fro", milch Ill/! some decks at this lime.)

of fighle~ and bombe:~ (Grumman F4F \X'ildcal, Douglas SOD Dauntless, and Douglas TOO De\-aslator), Howe\"er, a further new generntion was in prospect. the \X'righl R-2600 and the Pran & \Xlurney 2800. offering aboul mice Ihc output of the earlier engines, They powered the aeroplanes whIch entered ser\1Ce from 19.a2 on. By that time a further new geneMltion W3S represented by the \\;'right R-3350 and Pratt & \Xllllney R...B60. They were Incorporated In warume designs, including the Douglas BT2D, which became the postwar AD Skyraider. Thc main prewar fighter competition (1935) produced the Grununan \'Cildcat and the unsuccessful Brewster F2A Buffalo. Although outperformed by the Japanese Zero, and hence replaced in first-line units by the next-generation Grumman Helical and Vought Corsair, Ihe Wildcat sur\'i\'cd in production for use on board escort carriers. A hea\'ily redesigned \"ersion, the F2l\ \, was de\'e!oped for this imporulnt duty__ A 1938 competitlOn for a hIgher-performance fighter powered by the new R-2800 engine produced the Vought F41j Corsair, Grumman fallmg to com;nce the na\1' to bur its ahemati\'e. How('\~r. after the fall of France In June 19-10 the company managed to comince the na\'y to buy a redesigned, uprated \"('[sion of the F4F, powered by the new R-2600 engine. Shifled to the R2800. it beciime the \-ery successful F6F Hellcat. 11$ appearance was forrunatc, because b)' 1942 the Corsair was nOt ret considered entirely acceptable for carrier 0jXl'200ns. Br 1944 both the Hellcat and Corsair w~ in senice in \'ery large numbers, and bolh pro\"ed quill.' successful. Both were modified In \\"3rome as single-seat nightfighters. at a time when all other Allied nightfighle~ had a separate .radar operntor. A further fighter competition was held in 1940. It was

Through Iht inltf'f&Qr pmod, liM olher air arms, the CS wmpemlO'U 10 cJwou the aIrcraft it fl.ymld hr,y. TIte B~Sler Buffalo (shou:n In British nlarklngs as a BlljfakJ Ii btal a Gmm'lI4n biplane daign /If 1935. Tvrtllnarely Gnlr""wn m:u pt'r''''tted to offrr a ralher diffrrem monoplane, u:hich h«a,,~ the U"i/dcat; lhe Bl,jJaJo m:u kss Iha" SIIcussfill III Yrt.'fa.

As ", the ca.u of titC 1935 ",,,,petllion, Gnunman aw al1k to rrcoup ItS 1938 /ou.lri.lrlr Oil a Corsair alurnalitv began in 1940, and lhe result, the Helkot,enter'td combal in 1943. Tllis example is", BrIluh "wrk",,,. Dapile iu fm"i~ success lhe HdJau did nOf offrr perfcrlllallU m
SECO~IJ

\\'ORLD \VAR

SAVAL AIRCRAFT IS THE

SECO~D

'X'ORLD \1:'AR

expected, but by 1941 the Martin Mariner was in service, along with the Catalina. The new four.engine flying boat became the huge f\'!artin PBn I ,\tars; il was soon redesigned as a long. mnge transport. Like most Coronados, the Mars was also used as transport rather than a patrol bomber. The most striking wartime parrol bomber development was the shin towards land-based aircran. 'Ille US Na\'y flew i:s first Second \Xrorld War ASW patrols out of Iceland in the summer of 1940, using PBYs.111at autumn and \\;nter it became ob\;ous that such aircran could not operate reliably, and in October 1941 the navy received 20 Lockheed Hudsons, essentially small airliners conn'rted to maritime patrOl aircran for the RAE One of them sank the first U·boat credited to a US air· craft. In US service the pao Hudson dC\'c\oped into the PV-l Venrura (first delivered December 1942) and, late

flying boat, the XPBS; the bureau almost immediately let a contr3ct to Consolidated for an alternath'e, the PB2Y, which became the wartime Coronado, It ftew in 1938. These aeroplanes used de\'c\opmcnts of the R-1830 engine; the PBY was powered by earlier \"ersions. As in the single-engine aircran, the next step was due to the appearance of new engines, in this case the R2600. The bureau announced competitions for four- and n\;n-engine seaplanes in the autumn of 1936. J'ooiartin won the 4,OOO-mile nvin.engine competition with its PBM Mariner, which served alongside the Catalina throughout the war. By 1937 the bureau had three aeroplanes under de\"C!opment, the PBS, PB2Y, and PB,"t It immediately ordered the PBM, on the basis that it would be easiest 10 maintain and offered the best performance. Development proved more difficult than had been

The ~('tlrtime L"S Navy lleeded high-endllrance airilca.irn, which as !.he Cien'3

licensee In the UOiled States held lhe p:nem rightS 10 the cyclic collccm·c-pilch hub mechanism. mistakenly ftlayed With the Autogiro. The patents held by Pitcairn made il \"Cry difficult for any o!.her Amt:rican designer 10 develop a controllable helicopter, and thiS was certall1ly the problem facing Igor Sikorsky when he relUrned to rolary.wing dcwloprnenl in the immediale prewar period. Initially hisVS-300 pro. lotypc wen! through a \'11riety of major changes invol\'ing the number and layoul of rotors, blade design. powerplantS and fuselage Structure before he finally admined defeal and used a hub control system that infringed !.ht: I>itcairn-held paten\. The V$-300 was first flown unlethered in l\ lay 19.10. but nOt until Dect:mber 19.1 1 was final success achie\'ed. In pan Sikorsky \\'115 drh·en by the US Army Air Corps, which was beginOing to show greal interest in the helicopter but insiSlcd that only a single-molor configuration was practical. The expcrimenl:ll VS-300 was therefore followed by the VS·316, which used the same main rolQr,anti-torque Ulil rotor configuration and lhc patemed hub conrrol but II1rroduced a two-seat cockpit and a fabric-cowred fusclagc. Development of this new model. designated the XR..... by the USAAF, \\'35 approved on 17 December 19~0. TnI.' first protot}l>C \\'3S rolled out In D«embcr 19.1 I, the month the USA dedared \\'11r on japan, and three dars before Germany and Italy declared \\'3r on lhe USA. Firsl flown on 1.1 january 19~2, the XR..... 500n

1-'

186

l'kdt lal/dmg trials U'lth ,ht Sikorsky XR-4 tqlllptXd U'llh pomocn fiOOIS f«Tt carritd Dllt 6)' th~ L"S AmI)' tar/)' in lht progrumllll!, clII.'Duraged by thl! Royal Xut.:l', telll,h kJU' ,ht R-4 u.s fht allSfr« to tIre C·boallhrral m the Atlall/ic.

d~. 'tlopmal/

demonstrated real polential as a practical helicopter, and Vought·Slkorsky began 10 negotiate a licence agreemenl \\1th I~tcairn for the production and sale of the hub control mcchaOism. In july 19~3 Pitcairn agreed, and in a patriolic geslure asked for only a negligible royall')' on all helicoplers manufactured for the US go\·cmmcnt for [he duration of the hostiliti~. (This patriotism was later re· warded by the go\'ernmem reneging on the agreemem and purchasing poslwar large numbers of Bell, Hiller, I'iasecki and Olher helicoptcrs which infringed the patent. I~tcairn sued, and in 1977 was awarded compensation amounting to more than 532 million.) In April 19~2 the XR-4 was demonsuated at the Vought-Sikorsky factory in Stratford, Connecticut, before a gathering of US and British mililary oflicials. and this was followed a month laler by a 760-mile (I ,223km) deliver~' flighl from Stratford to Dayton, Ohio, where lhe helicopter was to undcrgo official U$AAF evaluation. Over the next sc\"Cral months tests were carried OUI 10 establish the \'a,lue of Ihe XR~ for bombing submannes, pilot training, and all·terrain operations with large rubberised floatS. By january 19~3 the trials had been com· pleled and the Ann}" had decided 10 order thirty pre·producuon yR..... models for further Service e\'3lua· tion" The fitst three of lhese. designated YR.....A, were basically similar to the XR-4 but had a more powerful. ISOhp engine. The rt'malning twenty-seven were YR~Bs "ilh an enlarged cabin, Subsequently se\"Cn YR.....8s \\"Cre transferred 10 the RAF as the Ho,..erfly I, and three

to the US CoaSI Guard as the HNS-1. all for e\·aluauon and mining. Initiall~' the US Navy had showed no imel't"St at all in the XR-.J or any other kind of hehcopter, on the grounds that 'no rotary·wlng aircraft had yet been able 10 carry 453kg (I ,OOOlb) useful load, and was ne\·er likely 10 do so'. (They were obviously unaware of Focke's success.) The CoaSI Guard and the British Royal Na\"y were more optimistic, and now saw considerable \·:lIue in heliCopters for anti·submarine com·o)" protection. By early 19~3 continuing German U-boal successes against Atlantic COIWOyS reinforced British and American imer· eSI in the helicoptcr's potcntial for convoy proleclion, and in 1\ lay 19H !.he XR-4 was used for a two-day demonstration of its shipborne ability, flying on and off a rudimentary 50ft (15m) square slaned wooden pial· form aboard a tanker, the 55 Bllllker Hill, moored in Long Island Sound, May 19H also marked !.he delivery of the firsl US Army yR..... (.12-10723.1) which, accompamed by the XR·~, was "own from Stratford 10 FOri ,\lonmouth, NC\\ jcr~, for tests \\"lth the Signal Corps, followed by the fltst public demonstration of the helicopter in front of the Capllolln \X"ashlngton D.C. In july 19~3 a second series of dcck~landing tC5ts wefC carried OUt. this ume on a wooden platform O\'er !.he stern of a uoopship. the ss Jamn Parker. On this oc· casion take-offs and landings were carned out by both the XR..... and YR..... while the \"C$sd was under Wlly in 187

AIRCRAFT 01' TilE SECO:-;IJ WORLD \l;'AR

THE IlELICOPTER·S F[RST WAR

,

TM R-4 btcomt lhe jirst American helicoprer to tnt" productum «11m It a:as orrkrtJ In qllallllly by tire l.:S Arnry in tQrly 1943. OpnaIWrrol wt:iufolloa:td Q )'tar laler_

open seas off Long Island. During the second day of trials the shIp was roUlng at up to 10°. and the uind O\"CT the deck was reaching ~Omph (64kmJh). Konetheless both helicoplers, one with a wheded undercarriage and the other with pontoon floats, were operated on and off the deck with little ttoubk, Despite the success of the rrials, the US Na\1- still took little interesl, 1Ilthough the CoaSI Guard receiwd its firsl HNS-I \'ariant in October 19~3_ This was deliwred to Floyd Bennett Field, where lhe USCG began experimenting with rescue techniques and equipment, and on 3 janullr)' 19.f4 a helicopter from this base was used to deliver blood plasma from lower Manhauan Island to SlInd)' Hook, New York, where survivors of an explosion aboard the destroyer uss 7imlcr were being treated_ Later that same month a helicopter pilot training operation was set up at Floyd Bennen Field, to be equipped with twenty HNS-Is lransferred from an Army order for 100 full.production R-~Bs being manufactured during 19~4_ In No\-ember 1943 a new YR-·m (42-1072~0) \\'as handed O\"l.~r to lhe Army at 5lratford and immediately dismantled at nearb)' Bridgeport for shipment by Curtiss C~6 lransporl to Alaska for cold-weather trials. These included I(>SIS \\ith a liner (stretcher) capsule on the port side and practitt 'case\'ac' ~e operations_ Although the helicopter carried out no real ~e missions in Alaska, the experientt was 10 prove useful fi\l~ months later, when an urgent requesl \\'as recei\·ed to use the R-4 to carry OUt a caSC\'aC operanon m the CBI theatre_ On 20 April 1944 a Vulltt L-I B light aircraft of the

188

Ist Air Commando Group, supportmg Chindit operations againsl the j3p3n~ m Burma, \\'as tt)ing three Bntish soldle", two wounded and one \\ith malaria, to hospital when Its engine failed and the pilol was forced 10 land m the lunglc some 100 miles (160km) behind enemy lines, All four men suni\"Cd the crash, but there was nowhere ne3rby where an aeroplane could land 10 cffect a rescuc. FoUowlng a request from the local Anny commanders, five early Sikorsky YR·4B helicopters had JUSt been airlifted 10 the Group base at Hailakandi in India, ahhough lhree were almost immediately \\Tinen ofT in accidents, 1c3\'ing just two for operational use by mid-April. These were based at Lala Ghat in cast Bengal, and a message was sent 10 the unit, which agreed to attempt a rescue. On 21 April II single YR-~B (43-28223), piloted by 1st Lt Carter Harman, took off from Lala Ghat and staged north-west to jorhat, crossing a 6,000(( (1 ,800m) mountain range (11 roll/e, Refuelling stops were necessary approximatelye\-ery l60km (100 miles). After an o\"ernight star, Harman continued the flighl to Ledo, and then 10 Taro, where an extra fuel lank \\'as roped to the roof of the cabin for the last leg o\"er more mountains 10 a Chindit strongpomt codenamed 'Aberdttn'_ The helicopter arri\"Cd on the afternoon of 23 April and was immediately refuelled and scnt on the rcscue mission. Initially Harman ftcw the YR-4B some 20 miles (32km) to a lighl-aeroplane SD"lp on a sandbar, while the Slranded group was told by a dropped note 10 descend from the ridge where they \\"Cre hldmg and head for a paddy

'-...-'.~

1M S,,wrsky XR-S uw brlilt in 1943, fl.'jth 1M !wyal Sat" t"t'rJ' mrICh in mind as the jUl/Irt (lISlO",", I...adt oj inurnt fro'" /lle L"S Sot:l' and o/JuT rror priorlrw col/spind /0 tklay tktvlopmmr. and /ht rror a:as Ol'tr btfort It could nil" sut:iu.

field about five nules (8k1n) from the strip. Harman then made twO fflghts to the paddy field, remming 10 the airstrip e.ach nme With one of the wounded, who \\"ere reco\"ered 10 ·Aberdeen· by light aeroplane. Afler the second flight the underpoweredYR-.JB wem unsen'iceable 0\\1ng to the engme owrheatmg In the hIgh temperatures. but on the follo\\1ng morntng Harman was able 10 rescue the remaining two men before returnmg 10 'Aberdeen· later the same dar. This was the first rescue operation performed by a helicopler. O\-er the next ten days Harman carried OUt four more missions from ·Aberdeen', including one into a 3,OOOft (900m)-high clearing close [0 japanese forces, where tWO wounded soldiers (one clinging 10 lhe undercarriage Struts) were successfully lifted out in one Right. 113rman was subsequently awarded the DPC, h3ving completed eighteen successful rescues before the sun'iving YR-~Bs succumbed 10 a lack of spare parts and the harsh operating conditions. In the final stages of thc war R-4s were used in the Philippines by the 38th Infantry Di\ision to e\""lICU3te casualnes from mountain positions. Despite the successes achie\·ed "ith the R~, it had ne\·er really been inlended as much more than an experimenlal and lJ'aining helicopter. As early as February 19.J2, therefore, Stkorsky \\'as planning a larger aircrafl, Ihe \'5-327, capable of carrying a more realistic payload and With grealer range and perfonnance. lksignated the XR.S, the new helicopter \\'as originally intended for the ~hort-range reconnaissance and liaison role bOl. al-

though thiS was later broadened 10 include rescue and air ambulance roles. senior Army officials showed little interest, Howcver, intense interesl from the British Air Commission (BAC) in the XR-5 for the anti-submarine role finally won the day. InitiaUy four prototypes \\"Cre ordered, two for the USMC and IWO for the British, despite continuing and considerable opposition from the US Na\·y_ The first XR-S Ae,," in August 1943, and was followed by contraCIS for a t0131 of 450 aircrafl, 200 for the USA.cellent scn;ce throughout the conflict. France The Arm~e de rAlr introduced twO new rifle-calibre guns for use in the mid-1930s, the fast-firing Dame gun and the l\ tACo both designed and produced in 7.5mm calibre. The Ilispano type .40.4 20mm gun was the Slandard cannon fitted to French aircraft. It had originally been designed to be mounted bem-ecn the cvlinden of the Hispano HSI2X :u.:ro engine, to fire through the hollow propeller shaft and conscquentI)· being known as the ,\lOU'llr cmlnem. The ftrst fighter so armed was the low-"ing De\\'Olune 0.510, but it was later fined to the 0.520, \\hich had a smgle .404 ftring through the propeller hub, plus 1\\'0 MAC machine-guns in the win~,

I>I\'F.RSIFIES

Russia The armed forces of the USSR and Germany wen: able to d("\-elop and produce thcir mtlllary eqUipment without the constant calls for financial cutbacks whIch plagued the defence deparunenlS of democracics_ In the $onet Gnion any promismg design of military equipment was gi\'en Sen'icc trials. A number of gun deslgncn were also given facilities to develop a series of aircraft guns which were probably the best in the world lit thai time.·l'he first to be accepted for use was the ShKAS, designed by B G Shpilarnyi. 'l11is was a fast-ftring 7.62mm calibre gas operated gun used m the 19305 and throughout the war. The same designer was responsible for the Sh\'f\K 20mm cannon, 11 very ad\"'3.nccd gun which also saw ""despread usc m the "'"'3.r. The standard Russian hea')'calibre machlOe-gun "'"'3.S the Bcrcsin BS 12.-nun, which compared fa\"OUf1Ibly In some fCSpectS ";th the 0.50 calibre Browning and was gas~a5Sisted recoil operated. It ""'3.S inuoduced m 19.41. Another fortmdable gun was the 23mm Volko\'-Yartsyev (VYa), which \\"'3.S also brought into service 10 19.41. It fired a 200g (7.07oz) shell at a phenomenal nOm (3,020fl) per st.'COnd, and was used wi!h greal success againsl the German Panzer units. The SO\;et Air Force also used some Vickers and o!her foreign designed aircraft guns, but tile foregoing were the main weapons used by the airmen of the USSR in the initial stages of the war. Germany The Strength and ingenUIty of the German armamenl induslJ"Y smce the lum of the century has pro\;dcd lIS armed forces "1th \\~apons which often seemed one jump ahead of the OPPOSition. In the Fint \Xorld War the aircraft, guns, and S}Tlchromsmg gear supplied to German a\'ialors oflen gave them an ad'"3ntage over

n

R/lssiall ellr f1.v:apollS in 1940.1bp: Ihe ShKAS //Iachille-gllll: Deslglled by B G Shplm/llyi, Ihis bell-fed 7.62/11111-calibre gllll «'us Ihe fusICSlji""ll (l,SOOrpm) Ulr fU-grrnmJ auads 4 ,\tGI 51 ,10 1011l1n camlon, Slgltud atldfired by fhe pilot 5 ,\lG 1 J 1 '" kJt«r rtar Ikfmu /'OSI/WI!, movub1JJ 11I0011f/l'1l 6 LA)'I()lIt of ammflmtlon "~::l/I~ StOffXlgt 7 Ref:i 11D !bouom),arw 1.4tt !lop) slglllS /or fix~d camlOtI and dlt.'t bolllbillg resptctityly.

their Allied opponcnls. Whcn the Armistice was signcd in Novcmber 1918 !here were se\'cral new types of lIircf1lft guns about to come IOtO service. One of these was the revolutionary Gast gun. firing 1,600 rounds a minUle: another \\"3S the STH SzakalS 20mm aircraft cannon, The DreySed fightcr gun

195

AR.\tA.\tE:\T

AIRCRAFT OF THE SECO-":O \t'ORLO \t'AR

the beams, where the Welhngtons' multi-gun tufTets were least effecti\'C. Ten wert' shot dov.n. and one .\1esscrschmitt diwd into the harbour, Although this was, from the Gennan \'Iewpolnt, a succ
In the first years of the war German bombers were defended mainly by free-mounted MG IS and MG 18s on ball mountings fined mto cabin windows, and these \\ere aimed by ring-and-bcad sights, Rear defence positions were filled with the 'VE' ring-and·bead system mounted on a sight bar which ....'3S compensated for deR«,tion. Many cock.a.hoop fighter pilots closing m for the kill were IOSIIO gunners usmg this sight. De I Dee to develop a de\;ce \\im which gunners could locate and fire at an incomIng fighter before seeing it. 'Inc design leader was Dr Alan Hodgkin and the project was codcnamed 'Village Inn', At this time (1943) German nightlighters were beginning to take :a significant toll of RAF bombers, and mil defence turrets equipped with such II device would be much morl.' l.'ffeeti\'C. Gi\'en thc oflicilll title of Airborne Gunlayillg Turret (AGLT) the system consisted of a small rotating radar sc:anner mounted under me turret from which radio sign:als were transmitted and where me echoes were receh'ed from lin}' lIircrnft lIppro:aching from the rear. Black boxes remOte from the turret then processed me signals and tnlnsferrcd me resulting 'blip' to the gunner's gyro sight screen by way of a small cathode ray rube at me side of me sight, and a prism. To O\'ercome the serious problem of friendly lIircraft being detected and fired at, a s~'stem was devls«i m which infrared l.amps would be inSlalled in the nose of bomber aircraft which would projei:t 'code of lhe day' signals. Infrared detectors mounted at the side of the gunner's sight would identify mcse tnlnsmissian, Tesung was carried out at the 'Telecommunication Research esmbhshment at Defford, and in 1944 No 101 Squadron became the first to have Lancaster turrets \\;th AGl.:r instlllled. Th~ more units were equipped, and some success was reported, but trouble ",ith the scanner

AIKCKAI''l" OF TilE SHCOSD WOKLD '""All.

AR,\IA,\IEST DIVERSIFIES

linked with computers which calculated the deflection and angular differences of the barbettes and sight, was remarkably effective in preliminary trials. Howe\'er, further de\'elopment ceased when the war in Europe came to an end. The General Electric Remote Control Turret system (RCT) The Boeing 13-29 \\l1S the ultimate bomber of the Second \'(Iorld War, and its defence system was also the most advanced to sec sen'ice during this period. As mentioned in the turret section, this system consisted of lowdrag turrets armed with 0.50 calibre Brownings which were remotely controlled by gunners from sighting stations, the tail turret being manually controlled. Each gunner had a fire controller incorporating a reflectortype sight. As he aligned the sight on to a target, a central fire control computer analysed the signals and sent electrical impulses to the turret concerned. These signals were amplified and fed into an Amplidyne generator, which energised the turret drive motors to the required aiming point directed by the gunner. If the target moved out of his line of sight, the gunner could pass the target on to anothcr gunner. Looking into his screen, the gun~ ner saw a circle of red dots, and adjusted these to fit the size of the target. He then tracked the target, keeping a centre dOl on target. As in the gyro sight, he would already have set the target's wingspan on dial. Although this system was \"Cry effective,japanese fighters accounted for quite a few B~29s during the attacks on the japanese homeland, and as with all gunnery from bomber formations there was a high risk of hitting other aircraft in the group.

The lOp sigJl/il/g staliOI/ alld IIpper /IIrret of Ille Boeillg B29 ReT dl'/ellu. system. Desiglled by Ihe Gel/eral Ekctric Compal/Y, Ihis f('(.lS Ihe IIIOSI am'allccd bombeT defencc system of Ihe Suomi lI'iJrld I\'ar. Sigl/als fro'" llle gllllller's sights rure processed i/l a cOli/piller rdluh amolllarically aligned llle tllrrel gll/IS 0/1 fhe target.

drh"e, and modification of the system, delayed funher installations and Ihe project lost its priority status. J\'le::mwhile the war was drawing 10 a close, and further com'ersion of turrets ceased. Rcmotely sighted turrets In May the British Air Ministry placed an order for com~ prehensi\'e remotely controlled turret systems for Bomber Command aircraft. The main contractors were BoullOn I>aul, British Thompson Houston and Vickers. Vickers.Arrnstrongs worked on a system in which cannon armed barbcues in the rear of engine nacelles were controlled by means of their J\ktadync all-electric system.The gunner was 10 be seated in a tail sighting cabin, with an unimpeded field of view. Trials of the system re\'ealed that distortions set up in the wing structures seriously aITected gun alignment. An additional requirement for AGLT delayed the project further, and although it was showing great promise il was evcntually cancelled with the end of hostilities. Boulton Paul and 13TH were also nearing completion of the parallel project when the war ended. "rl1is comprist'd mid-upper and \"entral turrets armed with twin Hispano cannon, sighted and controlled by a gunner in a remote tail position. Boulton Paul completed the twO turrets, and the 13TH control system, using an electric Amplidyne layout

difficult. 'Inc ob\'ious solution was to prO\'ide some means of powered control, and although many countries set up design teams to investigate such systems, it was the British who did most of the pioneering work The Bristol Aeroplane Company produced a hydraulically powered pillar mounting in 193-1, and in the same year Barncs Wallis designed a slipstream-powered turret for the Vickers G.4/31 biplane and \Xlestland designed a rear defence turret, operated by a 2-1V motor, for its tailless Pterodactyl V fighter. Howe\'cr, thc most promising turrets were produced by two conl;ems who werc to become world leaders in turret development, Boulton Paul and Frazer~Nash. When Boulton Paul announced that their new Overstr.l.nd bomber was fitted with a fully powered front turret, the world aviation press hailed it as a bre3kthrough in aircraft armament. In prnctice, howe\"er, the compressed air bonks of the pneumatic power system could not be maintained for a sufficient timc to be pr3CtiCai. [n 1932 Archibald Frazer·Nash and his partner, Gratton Thompson, submitted a half-scale ntodel of a hydraulically powcred gun turret for e\"aluation at the Air Armament School at Eastchurch. It was seen to give accurate control, and the partners were gh'en a contr.l.ct for a turret to be fitted into the new Hawker Demon tWOscat fighter. 'Inc development period of the Demon turret was rather prorracted, but with the help of a team of talented engineers the system was impro\'ed, being used in the encloscd power turrets which armed Avro, Short and Vickers-Armstrongs bombers during the 1939-45

war. Frazer-Nash carried out de\'elopmental work at "!olworth in Surrey, and the Paroall Aircraft works at Yate, ncar BriSIOI, was purchased for turret production. Output from Yate during the Second \"'orld War amounted 10 o\"er 60,000 turrets; 219 different designs arc listed, of which 27 were fitted to RAF aircraft. After the problems with the Overstrand turret, Boulton Paul, under the dynamic john North, signed an agreement with French designer j 13 A de Boyson to manufacture a turret control system for the company's new two-scat Defiant fighter. 'lbe concept of a two-seat fighter, dating back to the successful Bristol Fighter of the First. World War, proved to be a costly failure, but the new four~gun turret was a success. The control system consisted of a self--contained hydraulic power unit inside thc turret, the only requirement from the aircraft systems being electrical power and oxygen. After the success of the Defiant turret (the Type A), the company went on to produce other designs for Bomber Command aircraft using the same power unit. Handley Page used Boulton

I'll/hol/gh il uw the most advanced turrel of i/$ k;'ld 0/ Ihe olllbre"k of u'ar, Ihc Arms/rollg ]\';7/1·/[I.'orlh ll'7Ii/ky~ FN4A taillllrret of 1938 protItd 10 be very cold and IlIIcomjortabk 01/ 10llg /liglll operl1liOlIS over GerlllallY, (Sec also page 192.)

Glle oj the most effective mid-lIpper lurrets U'aS the &lIltoll Palll 'I)'PC A. 11lls company lISell all ekClro-hydmulic power /lIlil cOlI/ained i'l the IIIrret, reqlliril/g I/O vlllm!rablc oil pipillg in Ihe fuselage. The Iype A uw IIsed Oil mally RAP al/d Lend-Leasc (;S aircraft.

..

The Development of Powered Gun Turrets History As higher-performance bombers came into sen'icc in the 1930s, it was soon realised that defensi\'e gunners would hll\'e to be protected against the stronger slipstream forces and freezing temperatures encountered at higher altitudes. Some manufacturers provided elaborate windscreens, while others fitted transparent cupolas mounted on circular rings which could be manually retated by t.he gunner, who elevated his gun by hand. Some of these enclosures, such as the Bristol 'parrot cage' turret on the BristolType 120 aircraft of 1932, were mounted on the reml\'ing ring of a Scarff ring mounting. There were some ingenious \'ariations, Armstrong \Vhitworth patenting a linkage which balanced the weight of the gunner with his gun, giving effortless elevation. Although these manually operated turrets sheltered the gunner from the elements, slipstream forces on the barrel when firing to the beams made gun alignment

206

207

AtRCRAI'T

or

THE SECO:>;!) ,"'ORL!) ,"'AR

AR.\IA.\It:::>;T DJ"t::RSIl'Il:S

Paul turrets in its Hahrax. and many Amencan bombers used by the RAF were fitted with Boulton Paullurrets on arri\dl in the t,;K. ,\ lany cannon-armed designs were submmed by Boulton Paul and Frazer-Nash for RAF use bul not accepted, as .....ere a series of dcslgns for turrets armed with 0_50 calibre Browning guns. The reason these turrets wcre not accepted \\dS an edict from the Ministry of Aircraft Produeuon, which stated thaI the upheaval of production mvo!\'ed could not be justified in those cnucal early ~~ars of the "ar. Another pioneer turret produeer "dS the Bristol Aeroplane Compan)', which introduced a semiretractable turret for its t\\in mgmed Blenheim bomber of 1937. The turret. dcsignatt'd tht' ~'PC B1, was fully PQ\\~ud by a hydrauliC s~'5tem based on me company's I>owt'ud pillar gun mounung of 193..&. The armament of a smgle I..('\\is gun was progressl\-ely increased after war was declared, but tht' Blenheim was by then obsolescent and \'tty nlinerable to fighter attack. As will be secn later. Bnstol produ~d the most effeeti\-e British rurrct later In the war. American turrets After studying early reports of the war in Europe, the USAAF's planning staff soon realised that their t'xisting and plannt'd bomber aircraft were wot'fullr underarmed. A rapid bomber rearmament programme was orgaOlsed, and tht' ma)or manufacturers were told to submit designs for power operated rurrets armed with 0.50 calibre Browning guns. An urgent request "dS sent to the British Air Mmistry to send current power rurrets to \'('right Field, whert' they could be used either as patterns for poSSible licensed producuon, or for assessment by US designer! and engineers from prospcrtiw manufacturers. The British were only too pleased to oblige, as \,ital Lend-Lease moterial was greatly assisting the war effor!. The general layout and controls of the British designs were used on some of the resulting American rurrets, bUI in general, given the huge manufacturing and design capAcity of lhe US industry. they were original and highly clliciem, using the latlo'St power and control technology. As the Browning M2 0.50 calibre gun was adoptcd as standard, all ammunition and associated equipment was common to the different rurret ~'pes. As in Britain, the power source \·aried. Bendix, ,\ \artin Emerson and Grumman used an electrical Amplidyne system which gavc a vcry accurate response. 11lis system W3S frcc from the oil leaks associated \\ith hydraulics. and 11 was also simpler to fit with gunfire safety CUt-o{f equipment. Sperry, ,\\otor I'mducts and Consolidated Opted for hydraulic power units. in which an electrically dri\'en pump provided prcssuriscd oil independent of the an'craft hydraulic system. The guns "-ere cocked by hydraulic rams on these turrets, while gunners," the electncally powered rurrets were pfO\'1d-

_ _ _ _~ .... ~ ..U.."'ON ~

_ _ _ _.....aul type D, powered br an upgraded BP electrohydraulic system. The type D was fined to latc-series Handley Page Halifllxcs, the guns being mounted low and to either side of the gunner and fed by ammunition boxes back in the fuselage \ia duclS and feed assisters to the base of the turret. -Ine Frazer-Nash FN82 ,,-as made to a Similar specification With the exttption of the power system, which wa a beefed-up FN hydraulic unit powered from pumpS fined to one of the aircraft's engines. 'Inc third hell\1·-calibre turret was a prh-ate-\-enture design produced by Rose Bros of Gainsborough. Designed by K H Nlckolls. the pnnople designer of the STA.>\G

wed 01/ lilt Ato.ro Ullcoll/. II fOOS ptXCCred by r/~ Brit/oj 'All Eke/ric'Sys/em, givlIIN very qlll"ck and aU:llra/e respomes.

radar-controlled naval AA system, it was controlled by the gunner manipulating his gunsight, which was connected to hydraulic \·alves. As he aimed the sight at the target the guns automaocally followed. It was armed with 0.50 calibre Brownings, lind was so roomy that tWO gunners could be accommodated for training purposes. 1\ \cnrion must be made of the Vickers-t\rmstrongs hea\·y dorsal turret, in which a huge 40mm gun was mounted. -Ine \'('ellington protor)·pe was used for firing trials of this big mushroom-shaped rurret, which was speofied for a \'('elllngton 'hea,'y fighter'. 'Inc concept of a hea,,· bomber destroyCT was pro\o.ed to be mistaken and the project was dropped. 1\ lueh more successful \'-as the Bristol type B17 dorS31 turret, by far the most ad\-anced turret produced 10 the UK. Powered by the Bristol 'all elcctric' system, it "'"S similar 10 the US Martin and Emerson turrets, and was armed with twO 20mm I-lispano Mk V cannon, aimed ",ith a gyro sight. It was not used operationally as its scheduled host, the Avro Lmcoln, dId not SC"C w:lorti~ sen;cc. As mentioned 10 212

the alfl:raft. This turret was not part of the ReT system, being operated and controlled by the gunner. The RCT turrets were all elecmcally powered, $clsyn generators in the turret housing powering the drh·e motors in response to signals from the sighting stations. \\;fhile B-29 gunners were scatcd in prcssuriscd and heated sighting stations, RAF and 8th Air Force gunners had 10 endure hours in frcezing conditions, flying through shell splinters and fighter anaek. RAF gunncrs could not e"en sec fighters climbing imo position from below, hidden in the land mass. It has been suggested that the turrets should ha,·e been taken out to imprO\·e bomber performance, but many German fighters were lost to the fire of their rifle-calibre guns. The fact that they were there, especially in daylight operations, was II deterrent to attacking fighter pilots, who often broke away p~maturely. It must be said, howevcr, that the fighter alwlI~'S had the advantage of a rclati\·cly stable target, and could choose his approach. The gunner had to manipuliue his rurret in the few seconds of:m attack and, before the ad'~nt of the gyro sight, make the nect:ssary allowances to hit his fleeting attacker. II could be argued that, had the production of Mosquito bombers been vastly increased, they could have replaced the Lancasters and HaJifa.xes and 53\"Cd thousands of li\"", but this .....o uld not ha'·e been possible in the time available.

the sighting section, lloulton Paul produc«l (wo remotely contrOJ1ed turrets for the Lancaster remote control defence system, comprising dorsal and \·entral turrets controUed from a tail sighting position. Fined with twin Hlspanos, these turrets were controUed by a computer linked with Amplidyne generators and a Ward Leonard system. -'ne gunner could selCCt either or both turrelS, his gunsight being controlled by sen·o-mOlOrs linked to the computer. The scheme was initiated as carly as 1942, but various problems prevented its introduction into squadron scn·ice. The Gencral Electric ncmote Control nlrrct system ThiS system is described in the sighting section. It was remarkllbl)' similar to the British system described above, but with the advantage of American technical re!lOurces lind production facilities it ,,-as completed in time for operations in mc Far East. The turrets of the Boc=lng B-29s were compact units armed with Noin O.50s, each turret carrying 1,000 rounds of ammunition. The guns were re-perauons. Rheinmetall-Rorsig produced the Fohn series of aircraft rocket missiles \\ hich wert' issued in three calibres: 6Smm, 73mm and 100mm (FZ 65. FZ 73 and Fz 100).

rockets used powder propellent and eXpIOSI\"e, "lth impact fuses and small stablllslOg fins. They wcre slghled by Specially graduatcd rcflector sights.

l..L Pr'Cflr rodw llUtalkJt/tJl/ on u Soprrilh Pup al Eastchllrch

III

Aircraft Rocket Weapons

(ktobrr 1916.

During the uneasy peace afler the Annisticc, Russia, Germany and Britain saw the posslbillDe5 of these mis.siles, and formed design teams to develop rockel types and launchen whIch could be used in any fUlure hostilities.

\X'hen a state of war exists, !.he combatants proceed 10 drop or pro~ mIssiles and explosl\'l~s at each other to cause death and destrucnon. The means of delivery have \"3ried O\~r me years. but have mainly been guns or aeroplanes. Howe\'er. as the Chinese disco\"Cred in All 1200, rockets can be used. The ad\"3mage of rockets is that they need no heavy launch or firing mechanism, a simple rail or tube bemg all mat is requlr
Amm.·n himd-ertmk Iitt RollJ·Ruyct ,Her/ill engillt 0/ all RAF Hllrricant .\fk / 11/ tar'" 1940. The pllol does IIOl ap!'Nr to ht tqllipped frllhflYl1lg dOlhllW or poradl/lle, or 10 be conumroll,'K on Ihe Slar/-llp proudu". Thu u mon lhan likely Ollt 0/ tilt nWIIN'OlIS 'pholO opportllnity' postJ shou u:hldl churocltr'uJ prtJ.J ortlnlln O/lhe time.

222

\\~EI.L.EQt:lPI'El)

\\:·ARPI A"I'

A LockllUd P-l8 Ugillmllg "·'Ilt lurbl»u/,C antcnn3e_ Almough radar had been expenmented ";m in the GSA hefore 19-11 and cxpenmemal sets had b«n evaluated in bolh ships and aircraft, It was not unuJ 8nush sOenusts \;siloo Ihe GSA in Delober 19-W and dIsclosed the progress made \\11b ccnumetric, ca\;ty magnetron-

I

based systems that the technology took off al the Radiation Laboratory of !be Massachusetts Institute of Technology. From 19~ 1 onward the Allies were rarely shon of ideas lind production facilities for all types of radar, On the Olher side, although German scientists exhibited corresponding innO\'alion and in the lasl two years of war wetC beginning to mateh system-by-system !be radars arrayed against the Luftwaffe's ain_Taft and guns. they were handicapped by three non-scientific aspects of !belr work.. FirsLly, J !Iller decided that aU research, including radar. be rcstricled to pro)CCts which could be put into operation withoul delay, Secondly_ !b~ Luftwaffe high command failcJ 10 appreciale me polenlIal of radar, l1mdly, German scientislS, although aware of !be need for crntimctrie eqUIpment, dKt not rC'3hse the

.,.

~ CS Xat,,'s singk-st:a1 Grlllm,um F6F-3X HtlkJg lite CQnvemional Iricyde lIose«:lteti relraclable tal/dillg gear_

The German air force's range of aircraft types included only a few with a noscwheel undercarriage: notabl)' the Me 262, Do 335, the Arado 232 and 234 and the He 162 and 219, '111e Arado 232 TausendfUssler (,\o1i1lipede) had altogether 25 wheels, Three were in the tricycle nosewheel retractable landing gear, The others, in ele\'en pairs along the underside of the fuselage, enabled the aircraft to be taxied o\'cr soft or une\'en ground once the main wheels were partl)' retracted, The Al1ldo 232's multi-wheded undercarriage anticipated those of modern military transport aircraft such as the C-130, A wrsion of the Bf 109, the G-2/R1, was equipped with a 'tricycle' undercarriage in which an extra, jeltisonable oleo leg was filled, long enough to keep the fuselage le\'el, This was dcdsed so th3t a 1,120Ib(500kg) bomb could be carried under the fuselage. Howcver, none of the principal [ypes of German propellerdri\'en bombers had a nosewhecl undercarriage. The Do 335 fighter was [win-engined, with one propeller pushing and one pulling; it had to ha\'e a nosewheel

All experimemo.l version of Ille I\lesserscllmill 81 109 equippel/ faith all auxiliary Imdercarriage wlleciLO provide grormd clearallle for exceplionally large ilems carried mukr Ihe utllre seclioll, $l/c}, as Ihis 500kg bomb-After 'ake-off the auxiliary u.'lreel and leg U'tTe jelliumed arid de$ceTlded by parachll/e,

AIRCRAFT OF TilE SECO:\D \\WORl.D W'AR

TilE WELL.EQUII'I'!CI> WARI'LANE

A Spilfire Fe teitll Ille 'tropiwl'-Iype air imake desiglled to keep dmt and salld pam'c/
undercarriage in order to keep the fuselage level when on the ground because of the tail-mounted pusher propeller. British designers were constr3ined by a combination of tr:adition :and lhe pressures of war to stick to lhe tailwheel layout. Only when the RAF began to acquire American aitcraft such as the Boston, 1\ brauder, Liberator and B·25 l\ litchell did the merits of the nosewheel undere:arriage become so app:arent that the Air Ministry encouraged its usc. At the same time it has to be noted thai many of the aircrafl designs submitted by individual companies competing for Air ,\tinistry contracts would ha\·e had nosewheel undercarriages. Some companies, howe\'er, such as Handley Page and Ano in the UK, tended to specify a conventional tailwheel :arrangement. As far as the mechanism and 'plumbing' were concerned the nosewhed undercarriage presented no serious design and construction problems. However, there were sometimes difficulties with avoiding nosewhecl 'shimmy' (a rapid oscillation from side to side). An essential accessory was an anti-shimmy hydraulic damper. It also required a strengthened fOJ"\\'ard section of the fuselage and room in which to house the nosewheel and leg when retracted, The nosewhccl undercarriage introduced a different landing technique compared with tailwhecl aircraft, which were often set down on all three 'pointS'. This technique could not always be used safely with a nosewheel, although by the mid point of the war 'tail draggers' were usually landed in what was termed a 'wheeler', with the tailwhcel held off until the main wheels had

made contact with thc ground. Those pilots who used this method found the lr::lllsition to landing a nosewheel aircraft fairly easy, Extreme environments \,\'ith the exccption of Russia, the principal air forces of the late 1930s and early 19405 paid only slight attention to thc needs of operating aircraft in extreme conditions oftemperaNre, humidity, dust and mud. Howe\'cr. even the RussiQn air force found itself in difliculty in hcavy snow and extremely low temperatures during the RussoFinnish war in the winter of 1939-40, and an RAF Blenheim squadron sent to help Finland was unable 10 cope with the winter conditions. The l.uftwaffe was faced with the problem of excessive engine wear from dust ingestion when operating from unprepared runways in Spain prior to 1939. The RAI~ which exercised military control over the north western parts of the Indian sub-continent and Mesopotamia, had long experience of clogged radiator cores and engine lives reduced by ingested sand. Howe\·er, in general, it was not until air forces were forced by circumstances in thc war to continue air operations in extreme el1\'ironments and not wait for more favourable conditions, that extraordinary steps had to be taken (0 mitigate ad\·erse effects, Additional filters, designed to reduce sand and dust ingestion, were added to engine air intakes. The fine nose lines of Spitfires and Hurricanes were spoilt by the bulky filters fined for usc in North Africa and other 'dusty' areas. In contrast the DB 601 engine in the Bf 109 and the Italian Macchi C.202 had a comparati\'ely compact filter alongside the engine on thc left of the cowling.

236

A ,\'ortll Amerimll JJ·Z5 of fhe l"SIIAF ill lI/asklJ. 17le engilles are pre-lieuttd by U slllall petrol engill/.' lI11it fdliclifeeds hOI air Ihrollgh trlll/killg to Ihe mgiJle I/acelles.

intcr\'als to prevent them being damaged and to ensure that they l"Ould be started without delar Another remedy for difficult starting in extremc cold was the dilution of an engine's lubrication system with fuel. Setting contained fires in the induction system was a regular practice on the Eastern Front. Between the extremes of the Arctic and the desert environments were the tropical monsoon conditions that turned airfields into lllkes. Aircraft lind engines often had to be sen'iced in the open and with no special equipment to 1I11e\"iate the problems of the mechanics. This applied particularly 10 the RAF and the Japanese air forces oper· ating in South East Asia and to the USAAF, USN and USMC in the I>acific campaigns. Dc Ha\·iIland Mosquitoes used in that part of the world were lost because the adhesive used to join the composite wood srructure failed under effects of high humidity and temperature. 'Ibis is an example of where there was no specialised equipment 3\'ailable either to detect, othcr than by visual means, or remedy structural failure.

Starting engines in extremely low temperatures required the provision of mobile hot-air supply units. ·Illese fed hot air through flexible trunking connected to thc co\·ers placed owr the engine. In the absence of heating systems the mechanics had to rUIl the engines at

Ice prevention and removal Operational dem:ands meant that pilots had to lake their aircraft through air conditions in which ice would form on wings and empennage; it might e\'Cn form on the propeller blades. Various methods were in use to pre\·ent (anti-icc) or disperse (de-icc) ice such as: tluid pumped

The leading edge of the willg of litis JJoeillg B- / 7 is formed by illflatabl
Tin: \l'U 1.• fQL:II'I'ED WARI't.A"r,

based on air war experience, tbe French \\'Cre unable

out wough hol~ along the leadmg edge or through a porous \\ick; rubber 'boolS' fixed along leading edges thai could be mflated and deflated by the cycbc application of compres$C'd air, hoi air dUeled from the engme exhaust or from a combustion hellier and c1cctricaUy heated clements on cnllcal surfa~. The laSI method placed a he:.!\1· load on an aircraft's eleclrical s~'Stem

lYIIestrallon In the 19305 and 19~0s cockpit fenestration dcslgn for mulli-engine aircraft could be dhided intO twO basiC profiles: the lrodllional stepped nose, as common III tinl trnnsports, and the unbroken nose line famurcd (or many German aircraft; and, later 10 the war. adopled by Boeing for tbe B-29. Although the semi-spherical array of small wmdows was IIltended to give wide fields of vicw forward. upward, below and on both bows II exposed tbe crew 10 intense sunligtll. At night. particularly in rain, tbc muillple reflections of lights on the ground. such as when landing. gll\'e the pilOi a dangerously distorted \'iew. I>erhaps one of the most significanl changes in cockpil fenestration tbat occurred at the end of the 1930s concerned the design of canopies on single.scat aircraft. Pilots of 19305 biplane fighters disliked a completely enclosed cockpil because it added to the difficulties of \isuaUy searching for tbe enemy, This pilOl'S \;ew upward, downward and to Ihe ides was already hampered by tbe \\ings, the imerplane StrulS and riggmg \\ires. The increasc in performance of the monoplane fighters PrWlcued an enclosed cockpll. Each of tbe three principal fighters in the Battle of Bntain in 19~0 had a distinelh'C cockpit \\indscrecn and canopy. The Bf 109 canopy and windscreen had an angular shape made up of indi\idual flat panels. The canopy was lunged on the righl to a11o\\ access 10 the cockpll. Hou'C\'cr this had the disad\-antage thai the aircrafl C()uld nOi be taxied \\ith it open, 1111,' American Bell Airacobra had a car-type door, as did the early mark of the Hawker -I)-phoon: the door had 10 be closed once the engine was started, The Bf 109 cockpit closely confined the pilol: ils dimensions seemed 10 ha\'c becn related 10 the average shoulder width and scated

Cockpits and their equipment

TIlls FocU-lrulf FUJ I90A-3 weJrPlt mlphasius W CDmpaMWtJy high Standard offinish and iktalh applud 10 Gnman weJrPIlS, lIIdudlllg die prutiswn ofa floor. 70 die kft of 1M Rai rtjf«Ior grlnsight art tM rrnmd countm /or tM armament; a detad rwl prouided ill Bmish fighlm.

238

10

make any COntribution to design in general.

/'I/rodllctioll Before describmg me principal characteristics of the cockpits of Second \X/orld \'('ar aircraft it is important 10 consider the relationship of the cockpit and its equipmcnt to the :Iircraft as a whole. At the end of the 20th century we ha\'e become used to the concept of the man-machine interface and 10 integrated systems throughout an aircrafl. We no\\ expect that adonic systcms will ha\'e built-in intelligence so that they C'.In perform their functions \\ithout human m· ten·ention. In 1939 the idea of built-in lesl (BI"n and sdf-monJlonng were \'lnuaUy unknown Within the prescnt mcamng of thOSt: terms. Two aspects of the Second \'\'orld War cockpIt iJIuSlTate these conccplS: Firsl, some instruments had 10 be interpreted by the pilot in order to oblain tbe required informatiOn. This interpretation 10c1uded app1rmg colttCung factors in order to obtam a 'true' readmg. S«ond, engme control and monitoring was often Wlthoul Ihe benefit of aUlomalic s)'Su:ms, For example American engines were not, in general, equipped \\ith automatic boost and mixture controls. This meanl that the: pllol had to watch orefuUy the engine instruments when makmg large thronle mo\'(~ments. In contrast British and German enginl'S were given more comprehensive aUlOmatic comrols. These relie\'cd tbe pilot of lhe need constantly 10 monitor cngme mdlcations, particularly when concentrating on a larget or e\'ading the altentions of enemy fighters during an aerial banlc. German cockpits had equipment, including instruments which made them inslantly distinguishable from American British. Italian and Japanese types. In general German COCkPllS \\'Crc equipped, botb in detail and o,·erall, 10 a \'Cry high standard compared with those of British aircrafl. \\ IIches, selector levers, inStruments and the minutiae, such a labels, were carefully dcslgncd. U'iring was confmcd 10 conduits.The cockpit equipment reflected the generaUy high quality of German design and manufacture. American COCkpIts. compared \\1tb British, were in geneml far more comfortable for tbe ~'. 'There was eXlensi\'C padded lining 10 isolate tbe crew from exlernal noise, Ash trays were often pfO\ided. French cockpils poor to 1940, as a man-m3ehme imerfaee, \\ere a nuxture of German and Bnush ideas. Witb onl)' six montbs in which to perfect bener cockpits.

77t~ codtpit ofa Hf I09F, shmrillK 1M hillgaJ canopy tdridl had to be cloKJ br/orr IOX)'1'Il. A Maw" of fJ~ unllour plali"g /or Ik pilot's YOI few fix~d 101M CiJnopy.

239

AIRCRAFT OF '1111:::

SECO~lJ

WORLD WAR

TilE

Before Ihe 'bllbble'-Iypc <wwpy becollle COIIIIIIOII, t'aU human factors or eTgonomics In the control inlerface such as the COCkpll, Auempts \\'crt' made by some designers to Improve the control interfaCC', There were man~' cockpit layouts proposed by pilots \\ no. after all. wen:: in the best position to comment based on the experience of slrung for many hours m diScomfort, unable to obuun accur.uC' mstrumenl readings or employ safe msuument scannmg techniques. unable to see ahead clearly m precipitation and so on. One dcslgner in particular made a big elTon in this respcrl. This was Martin-Baker. whose ,\tll 5 was not only onC' of thc most ad\"3nccd of all piston-engincd aircraft but had a cockpit in which ergonomiC con~iderations had been applied.

Shrewsbury, 1983).lncludcs dctailcd descriptions of aircraft equipment. Coombs. L F E. CockPits of rh~ RAJ-" ( Momh{\" London, 1983,

ries III Avup4J'll!

Coombs. L F E, TIll! AIFcrufr Cockpit (Patrick Stephens. \Xellingborough. 1990). The chaplers on military COCkpits pfO\idc a compreheosl\'c sun·cy of dewl· opments and problems,

Saward, D. Group Caplam, 'Bomber' Harm (Buchan & Enright. J.ondon, 198-l).

scienusts. HIS book is a detailed study of the different radar sySlems used by the Luftwaffe.

Saward. D. Group Captain. 77ll! Bo",bcr"J Eyt: (Cassell. London. 1959). As r:;adar adviser to 'Bomber' H:mis, Saward was doSC' to the 'sharp end' of airborne radar de\·e1opment m the Rt\E

\X'illiams. T I. A /llStor)' of Ttch/lolcgy 101 I'll P.Jrt /I (OUP. Oxford. 19~8), A useful source of refcrencn to t~hnical dl:\·clopments in a\;ation.

Trenkle, E BorJftmkgerart tkr delludu:II l.JiflwofJt 1935-45 seldorf, 1958). One of thc top r:;adar

F!I:(hr journal, \"3rious, London, 1939-1945, Gro\·er,J H H, RndioAids foAIT Sat'lgdlloll (Heywood, London, 1956), Out-of-prim dcscriplons of warume na\;gational sySlems. Gumlon. \XI T, At/iollies (Patrick Ste\·clls, Wellingborough, 1990). Vcry useful c1l:arly Sl:t out descriptions of how wartime radar and olher e1ec· tronic systems operJted,

STOL, VSTOL,JATO '111e rotary-\\ing aircraft only JUSt made it in time for the \\'ar. Ilc)\\·ever, its impact on opcrotional effectiveness was small. Design oflices III Germany, japan, Italy. Bruam and the USA \\ere ll\\"3re of the potential of thc rotary wlllg but n:aliscJ that for high speed and for large aircraft thcrt' Wcrt' both drawbacks and limnations. E\"en at this C"oIr1y stage of de\-elopment the helicopter was limited in liS use to sp«lalJsed functions. 'Inc rotating wing was not ~dy to gl\"e fighter and bomber type aircraft the abl.lit) to takC'-QlT and land in a short distantt or to ho\"l~r. Neither was it going to help \\lID Q\·er-thenormal·load takc-QlTs, Therefore recourse had to be made to m-flIght n:fuelling, rocket assisted Iakc-Qff (RATO) and to comPOSItes such as the Ju 88 carrying a fighter on its back, Other methods of enabling take-(lff weight to be above the normal or 10 extcnd the range mcluded the use of additionallifting surfaces that could be jenisoned once the aircraft was airborne.

Ilartcup, G, TI,e Challenge of IruT (Da\'id & Charles. Newton Abbot, 19iO), Includes details of aircraft eqUIpment such as gunslghts. bomb sights and radar, Her ,\ta;esty's Stationarr Office. I~bomrory of the Air (London, 1948). An out-of-prim insight into the dC\"elopmem of aircraft equipment by thc RAE, jewcll. J, &rgill«nng for uk (Maron-Raker. Denham. 19~9). CO\-ers safety eqUipment, c,ection seats and cable CUItCfS, Lovell. Sir Oc:rnard, lXIl(xS oflrur (I hlger, Bristol. 1991), As the 'father' of plan position rodar, such as HlS, Sir Rcmard CO\"C'rs the complete devC'lopment of systcms \\ hich enabled the RAe:- to nangate and bomb with deadly accuracy. Miller & Sawers, The '1ccJmie-t'a!t't to (fVereomt problems willt the IOf/) QCtalle ratillg of colllemporary fllel ami /0 replace Ihl' 1I1Q/l/ttl/al/Cl'i/llellsit't plIshroJ-operau:d fOllr-tXI/ve cylinder heads ," lhelr pret-'iolls range. Tht 24, 9-hlrt PtrStIlS, Sttll here ill a de l/tr.:illalld Flamingo. could git-e 890hp alld pnn-ed extremely reliable, bl/l it d~IIded 0/1 high-grude halld assembly and fittillg. The SlIbseqllell/ c!mlknge for the Bfl5wl company «'as /0 trQ/lsfer litis techllology /0 qllamity prodliCliOI/ for Ihe expa'ldillg Roya/ Air Twa afler 1935"

A l10eillg 11-1 7 FO~'lIg Fortress i1/ the Middle r-tm, showing its air-cooled I\"right Cye/olle radials with cme/illgs remove,! for servicing, The 1/i'le-cY/;'lder R-1820 (/,823ill), 29.88 lilrt's) gave 1,OOOhp for take-off score of lo\\'er installed \\'eight (no water jackets, coolant and radiator) and reliability. CeTiainly airline experience pointed to the undesirability of water joinlS in aircr'.lft required to perform reliably over long distances and to timetables. Thus Imperial Airways m:ade particular use of air-cooled Bristol radi:als developed by the singleminded engineer A H Roy Fedden. In the USA the emerging airline net"'.ork used radials from the Wright and Pratt & \'i1hilney companies, !\'\cntion should :also be made of the J3panese radi:als, made principally by Nakajima and MilSubishi. Licences for Bristol and Pratt & Whitney engines had been taken out in japan, and although these undoubtedlr contributed to the learning curve, the Japanese engines showed originality, I'articular features were the use of \"Cry fine cylinder fins, f:;m cooling and close-fitting cowls. Thl"SC fe:arures were cle3rly intended to reduce the drag of the radial installation, but a penalty was the tendency of the fine-pit.;:hed fins to fill with oil and dust. Although japanese radials were good at the beginning of the Pacific war, they were b3rely powerful enough, and the superiority enjoyed by the MilSubishi Zero fighter for a period w:as obt:ained at the s:acrifice of both prOlectin~ armour for the pilot and the number and calibre of

guns, t\S the \\':ar progressed the japancse engine industry was unable to spare the resour.;:es to de\'c!op and build me more powerful units which would have allowed the aircraft to meet the newer, heavily armed American aircraft on equal terms. The major difference between American radials and those by Bristol, the pre-eminent British make, was that from 1927 onwards Roy Fedden at Bristol steered the company to development of the single-slee\'e-\'ah'e engine. In these engines the task of arranging inlet and exhaust opening is done by a sliding inner .;:ylinder liner, the sleeve, with Specilllly shaped ports Cut in a band ncar the top. As the slee\"e rises and falls with a circular motion, the ports line up in rurn with inlet and exhaust passages. This layout was 3CtiVc!Y promoted at high le\"el in the Air Ministry by 1"larry Ricardo, me nOled British internal combustion .;:onsu[tam, on the basis of his experimental work. The attraction was that it abolished the conventional poppet exhaust valve with its red-hOI head, whkh was a potential source of both pre-ignition and 'knock'. With the current fucl of [ow octane rating this meant that the engine .;:ould be designed for a significantly higher compression ratio, giving a major impro\"ement in power output and Cl;onomy, For Fedden

254

arrangement of camshafts, pushrods and rockers for four \'alves per q'linder bc.;:ame almost 'an impossibility to .;:ontemplate'. ,\ lany regarded the pursuit of the slee\'e-valve engine as a chimera, for it required advances in both materials and machining te.;:hnique, The difficulty is that the fit of piston in the slee\'e must be right, at all conditions from .;:old start to high temper'Jture at maximum power. So, too, must be the fit of me outer diameter of the sleeve in the outer finned qlindcr barrel. The problem cannol simply be solved by making these fits rather loose, because an intimate contact is essential between slee\'e and barrel to allow heat to flow to the cooling fins. Even Da\"id I'ye, Deputy Director ofScicntifk Research at the Air ,\Iinistry, was sceptical, remarking: 'The singlesleeve-\"3h"e engine has been a sickly child e\"er since it was brought to birth' and querying whether it might be a case of 'infant mortality', [t was a serious criticism that no-one had made a success of it, and he felt that there would be lillie interest in it if it were not the only wa~' out of the 'impasse of the red-hOI exhaust \'alve'. The programme, with hindsight, might ha\'e been a huge

there was also another attraction, Bristol engines had aimed at a higher outpul per litre Ihan its competitors, and in consequence used four \'a!\'CS per cylinder rather than two.'lllis had been possible 10 arrange in the singlerow engines, but as power requirements rose and tworow engines became necessary, redden reflected that the

II BriSlof Blellheim IIacelle,sJurdJillg lhe "i"e~ylim/er Alerellry ellgille. The 24.9-/ilrt ellgillt had lhe same imemal dimtl/sio/lS as the PersellS bllt I/sed Ihe earlier fOl/r-t-afve cyfilU/er hcad. The t-ah'l's, with springs and rockers, call be scm i/1 Ihis viefl,!.

255

.\IRCRAFT OF Till, Sl:'.l;OSD WORl.D \\-Ail.

I'ROI'l,;I.SI0~

dl\crsion of effon. and It is IlOtc\\orthy that Bristol radials COSt about twice as much per horsepower m the Second \Xo..ld \X"ar as the Rolls-Royce .\ lerhn. It is SJgmficam that no other engine manufacturer brought an aIr-cooled slen--c-\OIwc into production. although it "OIS tried, as we shall see, In somc hquld but it did not reaDy h~lp the

'11l~

Supercharging Throughout the interwar period supercharging de\'doped liS a technOlogy to improve lh~ power of aero en· gtnes, lind by the outbreak of ....'lIr all the impon:lont

258

engines had some form of forced: inducnon, I~n of the Impetus for thiS derived from me car racing world, where the potential of a superchllrger for forcing in a greater weight of mixture per stroke than a cylinder could aspire naturdUy pushed up lhe power output dramatically, Bugaru. Alfa Romeo and the German 'State' Grand l'Tix designs by Auto-Union and Mercedes aU made extensi\·e usc: of the technique. It WliS also used in a\iation for the Schneider Trophy conte"s, the best·kno.....n example being the Rolls+Royce R engtne used in 1929 and 1931 in the .....inrung Supermarine 5.6 and S.68 seaplanes. With a supercharger designed by J E Ellor, a former RAE Famborough engine expen, the R engtne produced 2,330hp on a special fuel contatntng gasoline, benzol, mcmanol and terra ethyl lead. 'llle de\'elopment work for the 1931 engine gained Rolls-Royce, according to compan)' lore. the equivalent of five years' experience at the normal pace of de\'e1opment. HoYo·c\'er, the attraction of supercharging for military engines was not so much to mcrease the ground·le\ocl power of the engine, since that usuaUy ....'lIS already set at the maxunum that the engine could stand continuous!}' ....ithout beginning to suffer mechanically or through d~t· onation. Rather. the supercharger .....as added to allow the engine to maintain its rated power at altitude. for othcrwise me power of a piston engine decreases directly as the aircraft climbs and the air becomcs minncr. Thus combat in lhe Battle of Britain could frequently take place at 15.000ft. and the aircrafl of either side could not ha\·c fought al these altitudes without superchargers to maintain an artificially dense:: aunosphere in their inlet manifolds. As th~ war progressed the slTUgglc in the air bc:cune. to a cenain extent, a competition for :dutude to escape Ihc enemy, leading to tnettaSingly po.....erful and better designed supercharger.; and culminating. as in the '\krl.in, in a two-stage. two-speed supercharging arrangement v.;th intercooler, The competition for pOwer, which ruled combat engine development, was also a competition for height.11le First \X!orld War had proved that me aircraft with higher altitude capability had th~ option or avoiding imercqr tion, or had the achllntage if combat occurred. However, as piswn.cngtoed aircraft climb t!le1' COler thinner air and the engine recci\"n Icss fuel/air nuxture at each power stroke. A~ro-cngine supercharger.; .....
TI'STtSG AND I'I;ltKY1SG

A wp/IIreJ ,\ hlSllblsJu Zrro fl.~arlllg Amrrlcm, markings 'IIIJergoeS N.-uIIlOlio".J-38 LighUlings, RepUblic 1'-~7 Thunderbolts and North American 1'-51 ,\(rI'«PI-hOllr triPs, bm UVl! sak fro'" tht t--boars Ixfotr. n,is Mid t..'W brought alTOU b)' atl A'IJ:1D-Ca,tadiall-AwtTiam CTCU'. maktng IanJfall in jlls, 0Vl.T tlgllt hOIITS.

278

in stages, demand on shlppmg was drarn3tically reduced. This roUle had been opened by Imperial Airways in 1936, but conditions were still extremely primitive, and for the HurriCAne pilots, led In small formauons by one or two Blenheims \\;m na\;gators. lbe great stretches of empty desert must ha\"C seemed as daunung as the AtJantic. Nonemelcss. by June 19"" over 150 aircraft a monlb were bl=lng scnt 'up the linc-to Egypt. and by the time Axis fol"CC$ were expelled from Africa in ,\13y 19"'3 the RAF had ferried more: than 5,300 aircraft across me continenL A major obstacle to expansion h3d been returnmg ferry crews to 'Hlkoradi Transport aircraft h3d been largely neglccted in the RAFs prewar expansion. and though BOAC D.H95 Flammgos and Lockheed I...s shuttJed across the continent taking \;tal spares and VII's

to Caito and returning with ferr)' crew. they had too few machines. So In mid-19"'1 Plln American Airways ....'as controcted to operate a trans·African airline service, and later to delh'C'r lend·lcasc transports and bombers dire..

Avro AI/som from 10 FTS, 1em /Jil/, Shropshire. The A'lSon rras /lUll 10 'raill al/,ypes ofaircrerv ill 'he UK alld 'hm/lg/10111 'he Commollweal'h.

to 500ft (150m), followed by a climbing rum on 10 270" 10 1,000fl (300m). The pilOt would turn to 180", when the llarepath could be \"agucly \·isib1c on his left-hand side. He would thcn turn across wind on to 90" and begin his turn towards the llarepath and his final descent. During lhe winter of 1940/41 enemy air attacks on aerodromes were frequent, especially at night. Night flying was therefore carried out at satellite airfields where flarepaths were hooded, making thcm invisible from 3.oooft (900m). The introduction of a primitive glide path indicator and, later. the geneT3tor-opcrated Chance light (which provided a floodbeam only at the momelll of landing and was then switched ofl), gavc some further relief, but nighl instructing continued to be a vcry dangerous business" Originally night flying ceased on the receipt of an air raid warning, but in October 1940 Flying Training Command was ordered to continue flying. irrespective of any form of attack. It is difficult to imagine, and for those who took part, to rCi;apture, the dangerous and difficult circumstances facing instructors and pupils alike at this time. The result was thaI courses had 10 be shortened, and consequently slandards deteriorated.

sclectcd pupils were taken direct from Elementary Flying Schools and sent to Operational Tl'3ining Units (OTUs). AI this stage they had done barely fifty houtS" firing, of which only a little less than half h:ad been solo, and all on elementary trainers. Some were sent 10 RAF Abingdon 10 ny \X/hitley bombers and others to RAF Bicester for con\"ersion to Bristol Blenhcims. The course lasted twelve weeks and in\"olved o\"er 120 hours' flying, a third of which was at night. However the loss rale, both during training and subsequently on squadrons, made il impracticable and the scheme was abolished. Climate "111e variable British climate disrupted flying training, especially as the majority of Training Command aerodromes were gT3SS :and prolonged periods of rain frequently made tllem unsen"iceable. E\"ery hour available had to be used and dawn-to-dusk day flying was a matter of routine, followed by nighl instruction. Under blackout conditions on the darkest of nights, oflen in low cloud and with no discernible horizon, circuits were completed on instruments alone, Sperry gyro compasses would be set at zero and the take-ofT climb would be

288

A Miles Magister. Miles Master II and Airspeed Oxford of the Ce/llral Flying School, photographed in SepulI/bI!r 1942. Tile l\lagis'C1' was a ligh' mOlloplalle IIsed for primary trailling, the A'Jaster II UlQ.S all advallced trai"er for 'hose COltVeflillg 0'1 10 operationaljig/llers, alld the Oxford played a major role ill tile 'railling of mlllti-engine pilots"

Canada - the big de:il Meanwhile, the Empire rlying Training Scheme had become a reality, prodding an opportunity for the RAF to decentr:alise flying tmining. Hard pressed by Canada and otller Dominions, Britain had been forced to increase her commiunent. She proposed the lransfer of entire flring schools, but Canada wellt further and insisted on a supply of aircraft as a condition of acceplance. Some 3,500 training aircraft were required to launch the project in Canada. J-!owe\'er, there ....'as a problem witll the type of aircmft. "'be vasl projected expansion of Bomber Command swung the balance hea\"ily in fa\'our of multiengine pilots (about five or six being needed to each single-engine pilot), and sufficient Oxfords and Ansons could not be provided. Consequently, many potential bomber pilots had to be trained on single-engined I-Iarvards" By the end of 1940 four SFTSs had been transferred to Canada and were in operation, as were thirty-six Empire Schools; 520 aircrew were lTained, of which 240 were pilots. In early 1941 all RAF pupils going 10 Canada had completed EfTS training in the UK. As the elimination factor ....'as high during primary training, this

ensured that cadets making the long journey to Canada had prO\"ed their :aptitude in the air. It was also more cost.etfecti\"e, although the \'Slue of "all-through' training in a stable background at adjacent airfields far OUIweighed the disadvantages. Consequently, grading schools were established in the UK 10 deal with thc aptitude problem, and in the summer of 1941 the RAF began opening EFTSs in Canada. -rbese foundations pro\idcd a basis for rapid de\'elopmcnt during the following year, when the output rose to 16,653 aircrew, including 9,637 pilOts. 1941 - global expansion In May 1940, with the need for airerew becoming even more urgent, the British gO\"ernment held tentative talks with the US gO\'ernmelll regarding pilO! training in the USA. They were told thaI all military flying schools there were fully occupied with America's own needs. It was then suggested that primary training could take place in American civilian schools, but the authorities in Washington expressed the view that pupils would be better trained in Canada, using American aircraft and instructors" Understandably, the US government did not

289

AIRCRAt'T 01' THE SECO:->,D \l'ORLO WAR

TItAtNI"G

"lsh 10 compromise ilS neuualit)', and although the Canadian offer was aeceptC'd, onl)' \"Cry few liS aircraft and instructors were prmided. The proteCt was reopened in August 19~, when the: Bntish gm-cmment was dcsperatdr anxious to explore any possibility of additional rrairung. ThiS nrne it was proposed to set up civilian schools in me USA to rrain British pilots undcr direct, paid contract. 'Inc problem of neurrality WliS lIgQin Q srumbling block because of me Taft Act, but was circumna\'igated by proposing to sell nonmilitary rraining on a commercial basis. The solution did not, howc\'er, dispel all me difficulties, me main two being me enormous dollar cost to me UK and a lack of suitable trdining aircraft in the USA for ci\iIJan school usc. Ne\"Crtheleu, the scheme was put 1010 operation in July 194\, sOOnl)' after Germany had invaded the $o\iet Union.The alrcnlft shortage was gn:3tJy alIe\i3ted by the introduction of the Lend-Lease Act earlier 10 the year, enabling the USA not only to prm'lde the aircraft so urgently nceded, but also to build six British lo'~ing Training Schools (BVrSs) and bear a large proportion of the COsl! themsekes. It was typiC'dl of US efficiency Ihat the six schools wcre operating within a matter of weeks. A no\"el feature of me BFTS scheme was that it pro\ided a complete rraining course from primary to graduation at the same station; a continuous production line p~s. Furthermore, the RAF had I3ken a firm hand to ensure that the synabus co\-cred aU aspens of £1"'1'5 and SloTS tr.I.inin&. All of the instructors \\"Cre ci\ilians, most of whom had a great deal of fl}lng and inSlnieling expniencc, The schools took 200 caders for a 20wcd~ cou~, of which about 20 per cent were American cadets, Thc}' flew Stearman )YJ: I-s or Fairchild J7T-I9s at pnmary level and North American A·I:.(, Tcxans (Harvards) or Vultec B'j: 13A ValianLS al basic and ad\"lInced le\·el. Thus me BFTSs could only provide graduates who had been trained on single-cngined aircraft. Phillip Murton (later Sqn Ldr), who rrained at No 6 School at Ponca City, Oklahoma, comments:

I'

t

-

Rear Admirol Joh" Hrnry TOfI:'ffJ USlv, ongmator of the TtJfDeTJ Sdu:tr~, tt:hJ€II playtd a ,najOr rok m lroml"f British naval (alkrs m 1M t'SA. headquarters at Maxwell Field. Alabama, and thc TOwf:rs Schemc, named after Admiral Towen, US Na\'y, and operated \\ithin the US Na\1' organisation. The Arnold Scheme was named afler Gen Henry 'Hap' Arnold, Chief of Staff of the US Army Air Corps, as it was in 1941. During the initial stages of the Arnold scheme the USA was a neurral country, and (0 circum\'em the'laft Act British cadets were issued visas 10 Canada and en· tered me country in grey flannel SUilS and wore KD uniforms on the Sl3uons. Tins was a1lTlO5t history repeating itself, because Germany had circum\'Cnted the Versailles Treat)' in buildmg the Lufw:affe. German piiQrs had posed as South Tyrolean tourisrs and $C'Cfctly crossed me border into hair to tr.I.in \\ith the Regia Af:ronautica, and had ""Om Italian Air Force uniforms, 'lne Germans had been accepted as students 10 Italy: the British caders were officially ci\'ilians off-station, but came under Air Corps disciplinary rules and regulations al all times, In their early stages of rraining RAF cadets found the discipline imposed on them by me Army Air Corps frustrating and somewhat crude. It took Ule form ofa system known liS 'hazing', which derh'cs from the word 'haze',

The quallt)" of instruction

i1 II diY cult OIX 10 as~. Gc-nc:ra1ly the X)'ing imtruetion was good, In th3t the in1uucton 1U~ a)lIld Xl' 8uI t:ht'). "'"n'e, for the IT1(l$I part, ulllIbk 10 expbln In the:ur or on the: Sround ... 1'1)' an lllfcnIfl did catliln tllln", or what one: had 10 do to X)' correctly_ From the: RUdent'S poUlI of \'P il .....s large!)' II

quesoon of cop)""',

This was described b)' BiD Williams, who also O"llincd at I'onca, as a 'situng by Nellie' technique! Apart from me BPTS operation, there were two otller schemes: the Arnold Sehemc, operatcd within the Soulh-cast Army Air Corps Training Center, with its

290

A VITAL COMMA:->,D

'J71~ COlIJolidaltd PBY Catalina, ~mp~d (1$ 0" tuhlQJIC~d trai"a "",10 1M Towns SdIn,~ in 1M USA, uw the only fully opnaliortal madlifU! jiotxn during training,

was conduci\'e to acrobatics. The American system of pilot traJrung included three phases: pnmar)', NSIC and advanced. Basic training constitulcd an Intermediate stage between prirtl2ry and ad\"lInced traimng, The BT-13A Valiant \\"lIS used b)' lile BFTS and Arnold and TowCfs schemes for thiS intermediate stage. 'Inc aircraft for ad\'anced t:raining \\"Cre the Curtiss A'1:9 and the Cessna KI: 17 Bobcat, twO tOl3l1y dIfferent twin-cngined machines. While the Curtiss had a gliding angle like a brick, the Cessna AT-17 was more of a gentleman's aircraft, made of steel tube, wood and fab-ric, with the air and gentili!}' of a more advanced Anson. lne dlfferenl tiring characteristics of the tWO machines certainl~' made a pilot more adaptable, which ""liS a considerable asseL Asymmetric fl}ing, general handIJng, instrUment, formation and night fl}ing plu tlCfl da~ at anolhcr school for ground and aerial gunner}', made up the course. 'Inc ')oo-crs Scheme wus opcraled b)' the US Na\1' for training O3\"lI1 fl}ing personnel, its primary object being to train aircte\\' for service wim RAF Coastal Command and the Acet Air Arm. Na\-"lI1 cadelS, hQ\\'· ever, received more flexible, and in mOSI cases longer, training than their counterpartS. At primary level the basic trainer was the Na\'al Aircraft Factory N3N, nicknamed 'Canary', an uncluttered, dual-controlled biplane

meaning 'to punish with unnec~ry \\"Orlt'. ThiS training ""liS designed to break a rrutn down and rebuild him the ""lIy the USMC \\"lInted him. The Stearman used for primary training ""liS a considerably larger and more powerfUl machine than lile de Ha\'iUand Tiger Mom. It required firmer and morc 1'05iti\'e handling than the Molil, and iLS additional power

TII~ Boting Sttamu;m P1:11 Kayde/ was a reUhly used American elementary or primary pilol t1Uiner.

29\

AIRCRAFT OF THe SECOND \t'ORLD WAR

TRAINI:-IG

administered from one base in Onawa. All SFTSs were to be expanded, and RAF EFTSs brought under cj\'ilian operation. This agreement made for greater efficiency, and laid the foundations for greater expansion. It also provided an invaluable forum for representatives of host coumrics who wcrc providing overseas training at a crucial time during thc expansion of thcir own air forces. \'(Ihen the conference was taking placc Iherc wcre siJo;\y-eight EAT schools and twenty-se\'en RAF transferred schools. By the end of 1942 Ihese had incrcased to ninety-two neATP schools supported by sixty-two ancillary units. -I"be basic memods and systems of RAF flying training cvolved over the years werc, broadly speaking, adopted throughout. 'Inc Canadian experience of Bob Stanford, an RAF cadel, is typical of thousands of his contemporaries. He completed grading school in the UK at 15 EFTS Carlisle, flying Miles Magistcrs. The '''-\aggie' ....-as a low~wing monoplane powered by a 130hp de Ha\'illand Gipsy Major I engine. It had a leisurely landing speed of only 45mph (72kmJh), was fully acrobatic and introduced fledgeling pilots to the nO\'clry of trailing-edge split flaps al an early stage. At 15 EFTS cadets had to solo before transferring to Canada, whcre Stanford was posled to 34 Errs at Assiniboia in Saskatchewan. -Inc EI;-rs occupied a gnlSS airfield, with newly constructed hut accommodation. The aircraft Iype was the de Havilland D.H.82C. a standard Tiger Mom equipped with a sliding Perspex canopy. Thc station was, in facl, a standard RAF EFTS plonked down in the middle of the Canadian prairies,

Onc mrlili-engil/ed pilot lrainer !lsed 011 the AdtJallced course ill lhe USA tl.U5 lhe Cllrtiss AJ:9, kllown as the ']up'.

Popularly kmlUm as lire 'Vibrotor', tire 111llee BT-/ 31bJiam was extensively !Iud as a basi, lrainer ill tile USA.

A VITAL COMMAND

built by the US Navy. Pupils then went on to fly more ad\-anced machines, the Vought 03U Corsair and Vought OS2U Kingfisher, a monoplane alternatively fitted with floats. In addition courses \\"Cre run by Pan American Ain\'ays to train British navigators. The Ottawa Conference, convened by the Canadians on 6 june 1942, re-e\'aluated all systems of flying training in an attempt to standardise and co-ordinate them lhroughout the North American continent. This agreement embodied major changes, not least a change of name, from thc Empire Air Training Plan to the Commonwealth Air Training Plan. Under Ihc control of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCA""), all schools and supplementary units, togelher wilh resources, were

Bombing and gunllery troi"i"g ill the USAAF was carried 0111 in the Beuhcroft AT-/ / Kansas, a txlrwm of Ihe company's ubiquitou.s Model /8.

De Haf/l1/tmd's D.H.82A Tiger MOIII uw one of the most falluJlls alld widely used primary trai,lers of the Second Ifvrld Ifilr. This is a Canadian example, designated D.H.8ZC, Wilh ilS Perspex canopy removed, leaving o1lly the front windshield.

292

293

AIKCKAI''l" OF TlIfo SI'COND IX'ORLO \l:'AR

TRAISISG

The Nortll America" Harvard admllced tramer was univnsaJiy ~",plo>,~d tl/rfmgltoll/ thrte ROlF Harturds pou m f.'U:jomwtioll in /94/.

lilt

ot'trseas air tra"''''8 pro~cu. Hm,

Ai~~M Oxjordsjrom 24 Air School SAAF, Nigd, Transvaal. The original Oxfqrd Mk./s _

tra"''''I, and l1It Midis atmsJtAtJy for pilol training otltntaS.

29~

uutifor a// asP«1S ojaimnc

with RAF flying instruclors and Scn'ice back.up. Flying conditions wen: idcal, and cadcts were able 10 have four or fin~ lcssons m a full dar's flying. Learmng 10 fly \\'3S far ~asi~r than in th~ UK. Navigation \\'3S simplc because road and rail lines ran din:ctly east and west. south and north in symmetrical fashion. Gram ele\"'3tors display~d their location and the air WllS dear. \\1th \;sibiliIY of fifty miles or mon:o Then: was bttle rurbulence and none of the complexlOes of a congested landscape. All of these factors helped to engender confidence. enablmg the pupil to master hiS machinc in the "ide open spaces. lneTiger ,\loth Stanford Aew was the .\\k II \'Crsion of the O.lI.60T "11h staggera1 and sweptback \\;n~ (the la"er 10 allow casc of exit br parachute from Ihe from COCkpll). PoweKd by a 130hp Gipsy .\lalOr ~ngme, this light. full)' acrobatic. scnsiti\-e machme "'3S a delight to Ar. II demanded perfect co-ordinabOn and a gentle lOuch, but could COlX' ";th the ham-fisted \\ hile allo\.\ing the unlnlUated a gl'('at deal of licence. II IS fair to say that most people should ha\'l: been able to fly a Tiger Moth, but few could fir It accurately. Sianford logged -8 hr 50min al 34 EFrS on a course lasting three monlhs. Then he was posted to 32 SFTS at Moose Jaw f1ymg the Han'3rd IIA. similar to me L"S AT6C. ItS quahues as an ad\'3nced training machine were such that O\'~r 20.000 Ilan'3rds W~I'(' buill in \'3f10US coumries. Slepping OUI of a Tiger ,\ loth inlO me cockpit of a Han"':lrd could come as quite a shock. S,ttmg up hIgh in the 'office" facing a mass ofinSlrumentS and me big Pratt & \'l;'hitney radial engine and feeling the stick and the toe brakes, could made one wary of touching an)' Ie\'er in case the undercarri3ge folded! The SFI"S course laSled for three and a half months, during which Sianford logged 122hr 55min, including twenty hours' night flying, despite the approach of the C3n3di3n winter, when tempellnures fell to minus 60°. His grand tOial of flying hours when he was awarded his wings amoulUed 10 203hr Smin. He had started his flying Ir'.lining on 29 June, shordy after the Ollawa Agreement had been signed and the Commonweallh Air Training had become fully operational. Meanwhile, global flying training had gathered momentum. Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, had opened 25 EFTSs at Bel\'edere, near Salisbury, in May 1940. as part of the Rhodesian Air Training Group. SOUlh Africa followed under the Joint Air Training Plan. New ualand and Australia were already totall~' committed, and apart from local training, "-ere feeding training sehools in Canada.

A VITAL COMMt\SD

19H, In splle of Ihe territorial expansion of the Luftwaffe training organisation throughoUi EurolX', II began to fragment. The major trammg schemes of 1940, 19~ 1 and 1942 wcre being clipped or cancelled. Courses had to be shortened in order to replace combat losses, and there \\'3S a shonage of A)1ng mstructors and of Iwm-cngmed aircraft. such as the rock.e~\'\tulf Fw 58 \'l;clhe. Thc I.uftwaffe training organisation \\'3S shori nol only of pupils. bul also of ground staff. who were being dh'erted 10 infanlr~' rcgimenls 10 fighl, mainly on the RUSSian front. My 1942 the Lufl\\'3ffe \\'3S fighting on three fronts; the &n'let L"l1Ion. the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The manpo"er difficulty and shortened courses had to affect the quahl) of aircrews. In contrast. by courtesy of the global training scheme and accelerating aircraft prj). ductlon, the RAF was undergoing the biggest expansion of Its history. Durmg thiS period the liSA had entered the war. and Ihe L"SAA.r was using the UK \irrually as an unsinkable aircrafl carrier. -Inus, the 'numbers gam~' in men and machines began to make its impact on the air war. The pl3nnlng and uming of the Comrnonweallh Sch~me "'3S ~rfect. b«'aUK It began to lXak al the particular lime that Luft\\'3ffc training began to fragment. In 19~2 Ihe scheme produced ~4.338 tramed alr~', and In 1943 this increased to 58.601. Germany, by comparison. was totally unable to compete with Ihis \"ast training organlsauon WhiCh, at Its peak, had three times the number of trammg estabhshments sen;ng the Empire Air Forces. \X'ilh a popuhlUon of some 88 million, Germ3ny had about double the number of potential UK pupils (hc3Ithy. educated youths born in the rears 1922-4), but the glob31 scheme was able (0 dr.lw upon members of these age groups throughout the Commonwealth, and the USA witll a population of 188 million. The US Army Air Forces alone gr.ldu31ed 193,440 pilots during the Second World War.

The Luftwaffe The losses sustained b)' the Lufl\\'3ffe during the baltiCS of France and Smam were substantially increased when Germany 1I1\'3ded the &n;et Union in June 1941. By

German au AdoljGa/kllJd (kft) talking to GoJVCJ1 ,\fOUkn.

295

AIRCRAFT 01' TIlE SECOND WORLI) WAR

IItAINIKG

Generalleutnant Adolf Gall:md's concise comments postwar reflect the Luftwaffc's situation from 1942 onwards: l)ilOi traming has nc\'t.Of been sufficicnt. \X'e had nOi enough lraining schools. not cnough instructon:, nOI enough airr:raft, not enough time and finally nOI (nough fud. I ha\1: been f\\1C( to 'X'mrupeg for the Common"1:alth Alluew Trammg reunions. I have admired rour trammg organiS2tion which was 0\\ ned by a rich Air Force, The UK B}' the end of 1941 It b«ame ob\;ous thai the global tralrung scheme would be producmg far more aircreY. than O'nIs and squadrons could absorb, Furthermore, pilots and navigators tramed OVCTSe3S were 10la1lr with· OUt experience of British weather conditions. the blackOUt and map reading. Dunng 1942 Ad\'an~d FJ};ng Umts (AFUs) were established 10 sol\1: these problems, ln~ courses "1:re not merel)" designed to keep pilots In flring practice as a SlOpgap, 001 as a definile $lage in training policy. Sing!e.-engme pilots completed fort)' hours' fl.}1ng 10c1uding dar, night, and ad\':Inced fl.}ing in .\tiles MaSlen:. Twm.-engme PIIOLS compleled eight}' hours including day, night, beam approach training, and advanced dar firing" Ith simu1aled night flying in O;tl;fords. Along5ide Ihis inlensi\'e training was a eomprehensi\'e ground programme im'ol\'ing navilr.ltion, signals and bombing. The AfUs conunued to operate unul the end of the Euro!X'an war, and were gradually phased out in 1946. 11 IS qUite r(markable thai o\'er 88,000 aircrew were trained and graduated in the UK, despite lhe climate and olher delractions, lnis is roughly half the tOlal ourput from Canada, Ihe mainspring of the global scheme. Furthermore, the UK provided the specialist courses enabling the gl'3duate 10 go to war well able 10 master Lhe technological developments in aircraft and systems as these became more complex. Summary Any ft)ing If1lining syslem which enables a graduate to progress on to more advanced machines and take part in aerial warfare justifies itself. Tlle training schemes described above reflecl, 10 .. ccrlain e;tl;lcnl, the characteristics of the countr}' concerned. Both Germany and America employed rigid military discipline combined "1th a 'coP)' the m~tructor' techmque. 'Inere was no such discipline in RAF training. and instructors e;tl;plained the behaviour of the aircrafl in \'lIr);ng conditions of flighl. In early 1946 the author was an insuuctor al 15FT'S al Spltalgate, OULSide Grantham, lincolnshire, flying HaT\'lIrds, There WllS an Inlake of Turkish and Dutch pupils and tlus brought conSiderable language 29.

difficulties, especially with the Turks. InstrUClors were forced to adopt the 'copymg' lechmque, and II worked well because the coumries concerned paid large sums 10 the Treasury as pari of Ihe deal! 'Ine global schemes outlined abo\'e had many other altribut apaTl from fl}1ng trammg. Bnosh cadets post· ed across the world, for example, found themsel\-es actmg as unofficial ambassadors for the '.\lother Counlfy'. People "'limed 10 know about Ihe Hattie of Brilain and hO\\ the 'Old Country' was COping with the bombing, Blood lies linking Britain to her Dominions and Commonwealth were strengthened by the ad\'em of war. ThIs large-seak m\'a$lOn, comprlSmg the pnme of Bnush youth. did much 10 forge strong(f hnks whIch were Im'll.luable, The schemes also pro\ided the basis for the dC\'elopmcm of Commonweallh and Dominion air forces, and in so domg gave the Im!X'tus for the regeneratIOn and de· \"('Iopment of the a\laUOn mdustries Within the eountries concerned. 'Inc American M:hcmes generaled a close liaison bel\\"ttn the RAF and Lhe !-leet Air Arm and the liS Army Air Force and the liS Na\")' which proved in\'ll.Iuable during the course of the war. The end product of the emerpnse "'liS the mass OUIpUI of tramed alrcrew, and f1ymg was the powerfUl mag· nel "hieh attracted youth from all O\'er the world, Flying pro\'ided the 'icing on the cake' during months of intenshoe trJ.ining, and the ultimale challenge for all those in\'Olved, The Luftwaffe, whose flYing trammg orgamsation "':IS spread across the countries Germany had conquered, was unable to lap the reservoir of youth from Within. A cadet's ambition was to win his wings and then flr Lhe aircraft of his dreams. bUI the war is riddled with unforeseen clrcumSlances. Many of those who gained their wings in the summer of 1944 were hoping that me war would last long enough for lhem 'to have a go' in Europe, the only alternative being lhe Far East. Waiting for a posting was frustrating, wilh Lhe Allies advancing swiftly through lklgium and into Holland. E\'enIS were mO\ing fast and many fell Lhat the end of the war was in sight. 'Inen, on 17 September, some 10,000 paratroopers, including glider pilots. 'hil the dl'Ck' at Arnhem, and only about 3,000 came out. Consequently the army be· came desperately shoTl of glider pilolS - so much so that Brig George Chatterton (a prewar RAF pilot) talked to hiS comactS in hIgh places at the Air Ministry and succeeded 10 'borrowmg' 1.500 RAF pilols for conversion on 10 i:liders, '(nis was an incredibly large number of hIghly tramed men, by any slamiard, to ha\"(' available 'at the drop of a hlll·. It demonstrated that the resen'Oir of talent crealed by O\-erseas firing tr'aining pro\-ed m\'aluable 10 an entirely unforeseen conlel«. 'Ine newlr tramed RAF ghder pilots "tte then split inlo

A VITAL COMMAND

Output of pilots and other aircrew - Dominion sources

Ty1>C and year of OUtput 1940 pilOis Na\ig:nors \X'OP AGs and AGs

Tow 1941 I)ilots Na\igalOT'$ WOP AGs and AGs

Tow

New Zealand

South Africa

Southern Rhodesia

10lal

Canada

AUSlralia

240 112 168 520

60

318

110

39 '4 153

318

110

728 151 222 1,101

9,637 2,884

1,.367 681

1.284 23 110 1,41-

13,921 4,217 5.538 23,6-6

1,666

21,306 11,551,912 9,563 44,338

1.292

341 629

~.132

1.296

16,653

3.344

1,292

9-0

14,135

3,033 l,r5

943

1,529 2,541 1-0

943

4,240

83.

2,309 3.250 918

836

6,477

'02

2,025 2,403 742

1942

Pilots Na\;galoT'$ Air bombers \\:lOP AGs and AGs

7,4~ 1,-~2

2r

Total

6,896 30,177

2,280 6,688

3,869 1,662

Total

15,894 8,144 6,445 8,695 39,178

1944 (to 30 September) 1'11015 Navigators Air bombers \\:IOP/AGs and AGs TOlal

8,807 7,953 5,131 7,998 29,889

1,328 3,708

'02

5,170

309 1,677

14,206 11,232 5,873 9,635 40,946

Grand total

116,417

23,262

3,891

16.857

8,235

168,662

1941 Pilots Na\'lgaton Air bomben: WOP/AGs and AGs

Summary I'ilots Navigators Air bombers \,\'OP/AGs GRAND TOTAL

3 38 9,369

1,68-l 696

387 2,290

2,083 239 419 2,741

1,188 180

24,991 13,295 7,.363 12,952 58,601

75,152 40,452 15,148 37,910 168,662 to September I 9~4

Remarks 1 'Ine country is that in which the mining "'liS carried OUI and docs nol indicate the minces' nationalilY, 2 'Inc figures are those for outputs from the 51"-1'5 or ilS equI\'lIlent, i.e. an Australian trainee who did his EFTS tramlng in Australia and his SFr$ m Canada would be shown under Canada. 3 'Ine figures include lJ'3inces retained to meel the Dominions' own local requirements.

297

AII(CI(AI'T 01' TilE SECOND \\:'ORI.D \\:'AI(

twO groups; about half of them were pOsted to UK airfields for the Rhine crossing. and the remainder were earmarked for India 10 lake part in airborne operations in South East Asia. It was the luck of the draw for many cadets who had tr'J.ined at a specific time during the course of the war. Sometimes courses had to be shortened, while later in the war they were extended. There were so many \'ariables for training organisations to cope with, nOlleast the e\"er-increasing targets for manpOwer to fly and operate the machines. Hence, 'Flying Training' was a Vital Command, and a key piece on the operational chessboard.

Bibliography Golley.John, Aircrefl.' t'lIlilllllCd (Patrick Stephens. Yem'il. 1993).

Index

Lce,Asher, The German Air r-orce (Duckworth, London, 19~6).

Lee, Asher, Goering Air Leader (Duckworth, London 1972). Tlmtum IV, \'\! 1-1, and Hoffschmidt, EJ, Tile Riuo"d r",11 of the German Air r-orce (W E Inc, Old Greenwich, Connecticut, USA. 1969).

Page referenees In 'I<Jira refer to illustn.uons. and (11~ UI bold 10 lables and diagrams. Airel"lilfllYpes and engine types are gl'QlJped under thtlr manufacturen. Colons 1:1 stpanlle ai~l'\Ifl I)l'" numbtn from p"lle numbtn. A~'S5lma (Ethor") 19.97.136 Agu'l.l (It) 158 Aichi 87A: 160 Alch1DIA1:28 Aid'; 03A 28,19,160,161 D3Al: 118 AIChl EIOAI: 31 AiduEIIAI:31 A!chi E13A: 30 ai~re,," 8 rondllion. 7. 107, 140 ~fely

14,144-8.

r~

lraining 10. 14. 18.43.87,99. 101, 139. 160. 267-8.28s-911 airmobilil)" 9. 18. 127-48 m lliso "mkr Britain. Gertrulny, Iwy,Japan, USA Airspeed AS6 En,x,)" 131 Ainpeed AS.IO Oxford 28-,289.289,294 AU"1pttbn 135, 180 Henncn, AJrVice-Man.hal D CT 45 Ikrlln 107, 110, 115, 117, 142-3, IB.s, 212 Bf type numbet1 I« M~S(TSChmin b,plar>e5 7. 12, 21 , 31. 33, 54--5, 99, 131, 174, 239,291,293 Blacl:burn Fird>rantl 166 Blackburn Skua 164. 164. 165 Bloch 151: 3-1 Bloch 174/175: 35,)6 Bloch, Mared 33 Blohm und Voss It\" 138: 17, 233 Bluhm und vO'S' B' I.. !; 240, 140 Blohm und Voss 8\" 221: 233

B,\ I \XI cna:mo 26-1 It\1\J:' 132: 18, 182, B.\\W 1321'1' 14, Il.\\\\:· 13m 110 liM\\:' 801: 67, 82, 256 BM\J:' 803.157 Rock. Captain l' 123 !klemg H-17 1'I),ng Fonrns 7, 36, 4-()--41. 54. 101, 101-(" /OS, 110, 173, 203. //6.123. 235. 2)7. 241-1. 244-". 154. r I, 180 ll-17li:41.101 B-17C:41,41.101-1 ll-I-I;: 41_1, 103, 105 IJ-I7l': 105 IJ-I-G 105.105 1k>ci"ll1!.29 Superforlress 9, 55, 55, 114-15. 120-23. Ill. 198,213.235.239,241.147 Iloc1ng 314 Chpper 136 Hoeln8 Slearman 1"1:17 Kaydct 296-91. 1111 bomber rok: sa also di,..,..bomber role a"d u>t-40 Kmyhawk 55, 250 P.40E: 281

INDEX CurunSBC PO SII2C HeUdl\"er 166, 170. 170, 266. 268 XSB2C-I 266 S1I3C: 170 Curnu SC Seahawk. 174 CurU1li SOC 174 S03C &an~ 174 Curmsl'-40'lhrnaha"k 36-8, 37, 43, 56, ',X'arh.a" k 36 ~~Uia 24, 109,285 fJ0 17Z: 13, 14,99 Dol1UCr Do 18: 17 Domillr Do 19 109 Domier Do 23: 14, IS Donuer Do 24: 129 Domicr Do 26: 129 IJornier Do 12~' 15 IJornICr Do 215: 14 IJornter 0 217: 16. 106, 110, Ill, 183, 211, 217,240 0 2171.:: 16, 195 Dom",r Do 335 !'feil 23H. 245, 246 Douglas A-20 BOSlOll 7, 39, 100-101 A-2OC: 100

300

A_2OG Douglas Douglas Dougl.,

162 A-26fB-.26 In,..der 240 AD Skyra,der 168, 171 BT2D: 168 Dou.il.~ C-JJ 134 Doogln C·47 DakOlaJSkytram 9. 126.1J2, 134, 134-8.14Q-11, 141, 143, 144, 146,

181 Douglas C-54 Sk}m~ler 136,281-2,282 [mll.sCG-17; 135 Douglas 0B-3; 107 Douglas 01l_7: 39, 100-101, 107 DB-7A Havoc 36, 39, 50, 101 DB-711 Boston 36, 39-40,19,56, 101,241 Douglas DC-2' 134, 136,282 Dou.ilal DC-3: lJl. 134, 116 Doullas DC-4. 28, 282, 282 lmglas SIll) Dauntless 151. 168. 170-71 S1l2]) 170 Douilas SO Sk.yra!dcr 170 DougiasTHD ~-aStaIOr 160, 168.170, 170 Douhel, General Glubo 19-20,24 Do"'dm" Air ChIef .\lanhal Sir Hugh 99 1Wrt, HMS 158,217 li:g}t>I 278-9. 28~ ~",I\I1ooA"Cr, Geocrall),.1ghl U ]]9--40 eic1 p",cr 221-5 I'lb. Sir Hugh 217 Embry. ',X'I Cdr Bas~ % 1",,1''''(1 Meruy (GB) 181 limprtu oj /lnl"m, SS 110 e"lllnC'S 7-3, 10,222-3,251-65 air-«>Oled 167,252-7,262 en"'ronmenul d.mage 236-9 iCl 8. 10, 54, 55, 83-6, 247, 272-4 'knoclfd uNhr Bmain, I'... nee:, 1t,,11". Germany,Japan,

Russ'a. USA Finl.nd 107. 127. 236 Fi'~l \t'orld \I'ar 11-12, 17-18.24, 115, 156, 163, 193-4. 196, 207, 251, 253, 257, 259 "kt.ner 1'1184: 184 Fkun.... 1'I185= 184 F\C11rter F1265: 184. 184--185 Fleuner 1'1282 Kolibn 18J-5, 185, 186 Fkuner Fl339 185 tlight coolTOI ~}"$.em. 243-4 fllgh. leslllllll0. 124.267-74 lnIininj 267-8 lr.losonie 271-2 floalpl.nes 11, Il. 17. 23, 152, 157, 161, 166,

."

tlling bocIts Ii, 23. 30. 129, 136, ISO. 157-8, 160,166,173,241,274--5 Fockc-Achieh. rompan,' 9,179,181-2 l'odn. Dr Alan 205 ~ 9•.B-,"" -.96. 110, II", 123, 11--3, 138.1-'1,1-'3,1-,296 HorikoW. In, 160 H_.LSS 103 Hunpr~ 21,11, U-I.IOh~'e (RIG) 107 ;\1-I05R alpX' (RLn) SS. 108 '\\xdlI C 202 236 MIttIu MC.lOO Santa 12. 24 madtmo:ttTS 271-3 MAD (mapdl( aoomaI)' chthol'm. Obcnt \l:'olfram ,'On 12, 1-1, 15 Rod, Ma...... jQhn 131 mel'''1 ,,-npon. 10,05. 65,81, 123, 154, 114-10, 21S, 11S. 247 rockcl,.wst(d takc--off (RATO) 248 rockct-propolled aircra(t8--9, Rs-6. 119-20, 247.173--4 RoIt.-Ro,w ttl&U'" 65, 251-2, 260, 264 CRe) 260,16/ EaP: 260, 262.162 Gnff... 94, ISS, 166 Mmln I, 46-9, 51-2. 60, 94. II~, 135• 151-1.151.256. 256, 259-60, ;n. rol ~48,SI

R 259 \'ul~ndl ... t""m Kur, 127-8.133, U5,141 Slubla:ruppcn 8, 12, /

WWII Aircraft Warplane Development 1939-45

Japanese WWII Aircraft in colour

Italian Aircraft of WWII - Aircraft Specials series (6022)

Italian Aircraft of WWII - Aircraft Specials series (6022)

Japanese WWII Aircraft in Colour - Volume 1

Scale Models - Warplane Special

US Navy Aircraft Carriers 1942-45. WWII-Built Ships

WWII Aircraft Vol. I - Modeling, Detailing, Painting Weathering and

F5. Warplane for the world

F-18 Hornet. Multi-mission warplane

Us Armored Artillery Wwii

Wwii Transport & Halftracks

Italian Aces of WWII

French Bombers of WWII

Modelling WWII Figures

WWII Allied Vehicles

Fleet Submarines WWII

Japanese Military Timepieces of WWII

Aircraft Instruments

Aircraft performance

Japanese Aircraft

Origami Aircraft

Aggressor Aircraft

Aircraft Structures

Aircraft Systems

Concept Aircraft

Aircraft Modelling

Aircraft (Objekt)

Glare - History of the Development of a New Aircraft Material

WWII Aircraft: Modeling, Detailing, Painting Weathering and Building Dioramas (Volume 1

363rd Fighter Group in WWII

WWII Aircraft Warplane Development 1939-45

Japanese WWII Aircraft in colour

Italian Aircraft of WWII - Aircraft Specials series (6022)

Italian Aircraft of WWII - Aircraft Specials series (6022)

Japanese WWII Aircraft in Colour - Volume 1

Scale Models - Warplane Special

US Navy Aircraft Carriers 1942-45. WWII-Built Ships

WWII Aircraft Vol. I - Modeling, Detailing, Painting Weathering and

F5. Warplane for the world

F-18 Hornet. Multi-mission warplane

Us Armored Artillery Wwii

Wwii Transport & Halftracks

Italian Aces of WWII

French Bombers of WWII

Modelling WWII Figures

WWII Allied Vehicles

Fleet Submarines WWII

Japanese Military Timepieces of WWII

Aircraft Instruments

Aircraft performance

Japanese Aircraft

Origami Aircraft

Aggressor Aircraft

Aircraft Structures

Aircraft Systems

Concept Aircraft

Aircraft Modelling

Aircraft (Objekt)

Glare - History of the Development of a New Aircraft Material

WWII Aircraft: Modeling, Detailing, Painting Weathering and Building Dioramas (Volume 1

363rd Fighter Group in WWII

Recommend Documents