Who Governs Southern Europe?: Regime Change and Ministerial Recruitment, 1850-2000 (Special Issue of the Journal South European Society & Politics)

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WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE?

Books of Related Interest EUROPEANIZATION AND THE SOUTHERN PERIPHERY edited by Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTHERN EUROPE Coping with the Consequences edited by Nancy Bermeo GENDER INEQUALITIES IN SOUTHERN EUROPE Women, Work and Welfare in the 1990s edited by María José González, Teresa Jurado and Manuela Naldini THE BARCELONA PROCESS Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community edited by Álvaro Vasconcelos and George Joffé SPAIN The European and International Challenges edited by Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs SPAIN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN SINCE 1898 edited by Raanan Rein

WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE? Regime Change and Ministerial Recruitment, 1850–2000 Editors

PEDRO TAVARES DE ALMEIDA ANTÓNIO COSTA PINTO NANCY BERMEO

FRANK CASS LONDON • PORTLAND, OR

First published in 2003 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS Crown House, 47 Chase Side, Southgate, London N14 5BP This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” and in the United States of America by FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS c/o ISBS, 920 NE 58th Avenue, Suite 300 Portland, OR 97213–3786 Websitewww.frankcass.com Copyright © 2003 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Who governs Southern Europe?: regime change and ministerial recruitment, 1850–2000.—(Special issue of the journal South European Society and Politics; v. 7, no. 2, Autumn 2002) 1. Cabinet officers—Europe, Southern—History—19th century 2. Cabinet officers—Europe, Southern—History— 20th century 3. Elites (Social sciences)—Europe, Southern —History—19th century 4. Elites (Social sciences)— Europe, Southern—History—20th century 5. Europe, Southern—Politics and government—19th century 6. Europe, Southern—Politics and government—20th century I. Almeida, Pedro Tavares de II. Pinto, Antonio Costa III. Bermeo, Nancy Gina, 1951—IV South European society & politics 352.2′93′094 ISBN 0-203-49966-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-58282-9 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0 7146 5335 7 (cloth) ISBN 0 7146 8277 2 (paper) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data: Who governs Southern Europe?: regime change and ministerial recruitment, 1850–2000/editors, Pedro Tavares de Almeida, Antonio Costa Pinto, Nancy Bermeo.—1st ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7146-5335-7 (cloth)—ISBN 0-7146-8277-2 (pbk.)

v

1. Europe, Southern-Politics and government. 2. Elite (Social sciences) 3. Power (Social sciences) 4. Spain-Politics and government. 5. Portugal-Politics and government. 6. Italy-Politics and government. 7. Greece-Politics and government. I. Almeida, Pedro Tavares de. II. Pinto, António Costa. III. Bermeo, Nancy, Gina, 1951– D974.W5 2003 2003007391 This group of studies first appeared in a Special Issue on ‘Who Governs Southern Europe? Regime Change and Ministerial Recruitment, 1850–2000’ of South European Society & Politics (ISSN 1360-8746) 7/2 (Autumn 2002) published by Frank Cass. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher of this book.

Contents

Preface

1

Portuguese Ministers, 1851–1999: Social Background and Paths to Power Pedro Tavares de Almeida and António Costa Pinto

4

Ministers and Regimes in Spain: From the First to the Second Restoration, 1874–2002 Juan J.Linz and Miguel Jerez with Susana Corzo

38

Ministers in Italy: Notables, Party Men, Technocrats and Media Men Maurizio Cotta and Luca Verzichelli

109

Ministerial Elites in Greece, 1843–2001: A Synthesis of Old Sources and New Data Dimitri A.Sotiropoulos and Dimitris Bourikos

143

Ministerial Elites in Southern Europe: Continuities, Changes and Comparisons Nancy Bermeo

191

Abstracts

213

Notes on Contributors

216

Index

218

Preface

In modern polities, Cabinet ministers are major actors in the arena of power as they occupy a strategic locus of command from which vital, authoritative decisions flow continuously. Who are these uppermost policymakers? What are their background characteristics and credentials? How are they selected and which career pathways do they travel in their ascent to power? This set of research issues, commonly raised in elite studies, has guided the present collection of essays, which provides the first comprehensive, empirical account of the composition and patterns of recruitment of ministerial elites in Southern Europe throughout the last 150 years, thus encompassing different historical circumstances and political settings— liberal, authoritarian and democratic. In spite of their national specificities, the four countries examined here (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece) share some basic structural and cultural features as well as similar experiences in their political development, namely as regards regime change. The aim of this volume is to assess how and to what extent different regime types and modes of transition have propelled elite transformation in such countries, and to scrutinize national similarities and differences, in order to identify major trends and variations over time and across space. For each country study, national experts were asked to address three main topics. First, to define the periodization and nature of major regime changes, underlying the principal factors potentially affecting political recruitment and, more specifically, providing quantitative information on the size of the ministerial elite, Cabinet duration, the length of ministerial careers and the mobility through ministerial portfolios. Second, to outline the social profile of the entire group of ministers in each period, and to single out the main changes and continuities over time. Resorting to techniques of collective biography, the following principal background variables are explored, as systematically as possible: place of birth (or residence), age, gender, educational credentials (academic degrees, fields of study, universities attended), and occupational training and status (public versus private employment). Social origins are also appraised, albeit in more qualitative terms.

2 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE?

Lastly, to examine the political cursus honorum of Cabinet beginners, explaining how different institutional frameworks and political environments have changed the opportunity structures and the rules of the selection process. Particular attention is paid to parliamentary, local government and top bureaucratic careers, which are often strategic springboards to ascend to a ministerial position, as well as to the role played by political parties, secret societies (for example, Masonry) and organized interest groups. In the context of democratic regimes, the study examines how the ideological diversity of parties explains contrasts in the background characteristics and political careers of ministers. Moreover, the importance of informal networks (family ties, schoolmate solidarities, clientelistic bonds) is also highlighted. In short, the expected outcome of this research agenda is to determine what kind of attributes, skills and experiences have provided an advantageous position for entering the ministerial elite over time. To allow both historical and cross-national comparisons, common standards for data aggregation were established and, whenever possible, implemented. The field of political elite studies has a long and rich tradition—its intellectual history, major findings and controversies are to be found in a number of reappraisals, the most stimulating one still being Robert Putnam’s The Comparative Study of Political Elites (1976). Yet, as it was pointed out a few years ago by Samuel J.Eldersveld in his book Political Elites in Modern Societies (1989:xi), ‘despite the assumed importance of political elites, there has been rather limited empirical research until lately, and very few comparative empirical studies of elites’. The panorama has changed, however, in the last two decades, and several relevant, empirically grounded collective works, with a longitudinal and comparative perspective, and focusing on different groups of political rulers were produced or are under preparation, thus enabling a better understanding of key issues in elite recruitment in a variety of national contexts and, through it, of the changing character of power structures in modern societies. Among such studies, we should mention the volumes on The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe (1991), edited by Jean Blondel and Jean-Louis Thiébault, and on Parliamentary Representatives in Europe, 1848–2000 (2000), edited by Heinrich Best and Maurizio Cotta, both of them being fruitful sources of inspiration for our own research agenda. Following this trail of rich empirical elite studies, the present collection of essays fills a gap in the existing litterature, enlarging our knowledge on political elites in Southern Europe and providing solid foundations for further investigations. *** This volume has its origins in the research project ‘Regime Change and Ministerial Elite Transformation in Southern Europe, 19th– 20th centuries’, launched in 1999 and funded through the allocation of a grant

PREFACE 3

by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology. In the two following years, other institutions directly or indirectly supported the costs of meetings within this project: the Luso-American Foundation for Development, Lisbon; the Southern European Research Group (SERG), Princeton University; and the Arrabida Summer University, Portugal. The first preparatory meeting, devoted to the discussion of the research design, gathered all collaborators at Princeton University, under the auspices of SERG, in June 2000. We are most grateful to William Branson, Edward Freedland and Philip Nord, who have helped us with their comments and suggestions. Some preliminary findings of the empirical research were discussed in the roundtable ‘Who Governs Southern Europe?’, held at the Center for European Studies (CES), Harvard University, in May 2001. We are deeply indebted to Charles S.Maier, who was director of the CES at the time, and Michael Baum, who was responsible for organizing the roundtable and is the chairperson of the Portuguese Studies Program, for their generous invitation and academic hospitality. Juan J.Linz was the discussant, and his thoughtful comments were most valuable. We have likewise greatly profited from the vivid interaction with the audience. Our second meeting was held at the Arrabida Convent, nearby Lisbon, under the auspices of the Arrabida Summer University, in September 2001. The essays collected in this volume are revised versions of the papers submitted there to collegial critique. In this workshop stimulating papers presented by Jean Blondel and George Pagoulatos were also discussed, and we have benefited from the helpful participation of Jan Pakulski. We acknowledge the Centra de Estudos de História Contemporânea, ISCTE, for institutional and logistic support. The Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, provided funds that were indispensable to complete the preparation of this volume. Finally, special thanks are due to Stewart Lloyd-Jones, director of the Contemporary Portuguese History Research Centre, University of Glasgow, who revised the English style of the final manuscripts of the four case studies. PEDRO TAVARES DE ALMEIDA ANTÓNIO COSTA PINTO NANCY BERMEO

Portuguese Ministers, 1851–1999: Social Background and Paths to Power PEDRO TAVARES DE ALMEIDA and ANTÓNIO COSTA PINTO

Regime discontinuities involving the replacement of the governing elite as well as the reshaping of fundamental institutions and values are a distinctive feature of the political history of modern Portugal. The purpose of this contribution is to assess the impact of these successive regime changes on the composition and patterns of recruitment of Cabinet ministers—the core group of decision-makers—and to point out the most significant trends over time: that is, from the mid-nineteenth century, when the Constitutional Monarchy was consolidated, until the present democratic regime. PERIODIZATION AND NATURE OF REGIME CHANGES In the political development of modern Portugal, five major regime changes can be identified: these chronological milestones are 1834, 1910, 1926, 1933 and 1974. In the aftermath of the 1834 civil war, the old absolutist order was finally dismantled, giving birth to a new political context and social environment. The establishment of the Constitutional Monarchy introduced a limited representative democracy—with the franchise being restricted by the application of property qualifications—as well as many of the institutions of modern governance. The social configuration of the ruling elite changed, with the sharp decline of the aristocratic element and the increasing predominance of individuals from a middle-class background. This trend is very clear during the second half of the nineteenth century, as some figures show. Between 1851 and 1910, only

The authors would like to acknowledge the team of researchers responsible for background data collection: Tiago Roma Fernandes, Rita Almeida de Carvalho, Paulo Jorge Fernandes, Tiago Pires Marques, Fernando Moreira, Marta Carvalho dos Santos, José M.Tavares Castilho and João Pedro Ruivo. Also, special thanks are due to Inácia Rezola, for her collaboration in the database design and management.

PORTUGUESE MINISTERS, 1851–1999 5

about 14 per cent of all Cabinet ministers were nobles, and most of them had been ennobled after 1834. Since 1870, no Prime Minister has been drawn from the older Portuguese aristocratic families. Also, fewer than one tenth of all members of the Chamber of Deputies between 1851 and 1890 were members of the titled nobility (Almeida 1995). With the early years of the liberal regime being marked by successive violent conflicts between rival factions, a steady process of consolidation only began following a successful military coup in 1851 that led to an enduring ‘elite consensus’, with a regular and peaceful rotation in power that was anchored in a stable two-party system. For this reason, 1851 is the starting point for our inquiry into ministerial recruitment. The two main elite parties that emerged during the 1850s incorporated the existing political factions and diverse networks of local notables. They were typical patronage-oriented parties, which were increasingly reliant on access to governmental resources as the state bureaucracy and its activities expanded. Although these parties had a low level of formalization, with weak organizational structures and volatile electoral support, they played an increasingly important role in screening and selecting the political elite. Hence, fewer and fewer independent and unaligned parliamentarians were elected. Moreover, with the Prime Minister effectively being the leader of one of the parties, Cabinet membership was based on personal and partisan loyalty. The existence of Cabinet as a specialized political institution and the central role of the Prime Minister (which was granted legal recognition in 1855) were both innovations established by the liberals during the 1830s (Tavares 1909). According to the Constitution, the monarch was vested with the executive power—appointing and dismissing ministers at his discretion, and retaining prerogative powers to dissolve the elected chamber of the bicameral parliament. In practice, however, the Prime Minister was responsible for government policy and the selection of ministers, although he could ignore neither the monarch’s personal antipathies nor the pressures exerted by the more influential leaders of his party. The principle of representative government also established a pattern of interaction between Cabinet and Parliament, with the former being derived from and controlled by the latter. Throughout the liberal period, however, the rules of the game were continuously subverted. In fact, the fate of a Cabinet did not depend on the legislative election results, since it was the Cabinet that ‘made’ the elections, which were thus converted, in Rokkan’s terms, into a mere ‘ritual of confirmation’. In short, the political engineering worked as follows: when a Cabinet was replaced—whether as the result of urban protest, opposition pressures, or by the mutual agreement of political leaders—the new Cabinet held early elections through which it legitimated its own authority and secured control of parliament. By mobilizing the state apparatus’s coercive and


distributive resources, and through a complex process of bargaining and trading-off with local notables, the party in office usually returned a large majority of deputies. Parliament was thus clearly subordinated politically, a fact that was underlined by the dominance of Cabinet in the law-making process (Tavares 1909; Almeida 1991). Paradoxically, this perversion of the democratic rules did not affect Parliament’s status as one of the central arenas for public discussion, and as the main channel for the selection and recruitment of the political elite. As we will show below, a parliamentary career was then an inherent feature of the homo politicus, and a major requirement for the attainment of senior leadership positions. It should also be noted that the persistence of high property qualifications for parliamentary candidates throughout this period resulted in a clear social bias in recruitment to the legislature, restricting access to elite positions to a small number of individuals. Hence, the relevance of family connections and oligarchic trends in the formation of the political elite (Almeida 1995). Naturally, the mechanics of power alternation noted above was only viable on the basis of a pact, explicit or not, between the two major dynastic parties. While the so-called ‘politics of agreements’ (to use the language of the time) enabled the durable pacification of political life, it did not prevent governmental instability completely—the average Cabinet life span during the Constitutional Monarchy was 17 months (see Table 2)— nor did it prevent the gradual erosion of the policy-making institutions’ legitimacy once rotation in office had crystallized into a competition for private accumulation and the clientelistic distribution of valuable statecontrolled resources. These delegitimating factors were, of course, exploited in the political campaigns of the republican counter-elite that emerged during the late 1870s and founded an active and well-organized party that was to become an important force in the major urban centres. A second regime change occurred in 1910 with the overthrow of the monarchy in a revolutionary coup led by republican officers aided by armed civilians. The establishment of the First Republic brought significant changes in the composition of the ruling elite. There was a clear discontinuity in respect of senior -and middle- ranking personnel (for example, ministers, parlamentarians, prefects), and political recruitment was opened to a wider social spectrum that now incorporated a large number of people from lower middle-class backgrounds (Marques, 1967; 1991). The new ruling elite seized power on the basis of a political programme that focused on two main goals: democratization and secularization. The latter was pursued through the implementation of radical anti-clerical policies, which created a religious-secular cleavage that was to have a negative impact on the regime’s viability as it pushed the Church into a


TABLE 1 NUMBER OF CABINETS AND MINISTERS, 1851–1999*

* From 1 May 1851 to 25 October 1999. 1 Includes Prime Ministers. 2 Includes a Cabinet that was appointed and dismissed on the same day (15 January 1920). 3 Includes individuals officially appointed to Cabinet, but who did not take office. 4 Excludes the so-called ‘Ministers of the Republic’ for the Azores and Madeira, which have been considered autonomous regions since the promulgation of the 1976 Constitution. 5 The number of individuals who were appointed Prime Minister. Excludes duplications (Salazar is counted twice as he was the last Prime Minister of the Military Dictatorship and first of the New State). 6 The number of individuals who were appointed Minister. Excludes duplications, as some individuals were ministers during different periods. TABLE 2 CABINET DURATION AND SIZE

1

Including Prime Minister.

position of outright hostility. Democratization was to be achieved by the introduction, amongst other measures, of universal male suffrage and the establishment of a genuine parliamentary system. However, fearing that the Church and the monarchists would use an extended franchise to mobilize the peasantry, the republicans restricted the right to vote to literate adult males, with the result that the Republic’s electorate was smaller than that of the Constitutional Monarchy. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, despite the restricted size of the electorate, the First Republic experienced periods of intense social and political mobilization, which were partly caused by the emergence of new socio-economic cleavages.


TABLE 3 NUMBER OF CARRY-OVER MINISTERS*

* Individuals who were appointed ministers in different political regimes.

The 1911 Constitution reinforced the role of Parliament—a bicameral legislature that was to be directly elected. The President was elected by Parliament and had no powers of dissolution, whereas the Cabinet was directly responsible to the legislature. The subordinate constitutional role of the President did not, however, prevent the incumbent from influencing the formation of Cabinets. In 1919, an amendment to the Constitution granted the President the power to dissolve Parliament. Yet, it was during the turbulent post-war period, when there were few parliamentary majorities and a profusion of coalition governments, that the legislature played a more active role in the making and breaking of Cabinets. While a two-party system prevailed during the Constitutional Monarchy, the First Republic’s political system can best be characterized as a ‘dominant-party multiparty’ polity. The Democratic Party, which inherited the organizational resources and Jacobin ideology of the original Republican Party (Partido Republicano Português—PRP) following its split in 1912, enjoyed almost complete electoral dominance—remaining in power, either alone or in coalition, for most of the First Republican period. The fragmentation and polarization of the political system during the postwar period, however, resulted in the emergence of several small and highly ideological parties that operated in both the parliamentary and extraparliamentary arenas, thus weakening the Democratic Party’s internal cohesion and leading to a decline in its popularity (Martins 1998; Pinto 1998). Political instability and elite disunity were endemic features of this period, and they are clearly demonstrated in the figures on Cabinet longevity and ministerial turnover. The average lifetime of republican Cabinets was little more than four months (see Table 2), and 83.5 per cent of Cabinet ministers remained in office for less than one year (see Table 4). It is also significant that the short-lived First Republic is the political regime in Modern Portugal that holds the record in terms of the total number of ministers (see Table 1). Cabinet instability certainly had a


TABLE 4 DURATION OF MINISTERIAL CAREERS (%)*

* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. TABLE 5 MOBILITY OF MINISTERS THROUGH PORTFOLIOS1 (%)*

1 Different portfolios held by ministers throughout their entire ministerial career in each period. Portfolios held on an interim basis are not included. * Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

detrimental impact both on the effectiveness of policy-making and on the viability of the regime itself (Schwartzmann 1989; Lijphart 1984). A major source of the First Republic’s instability was the succession of military conspiracies and coups, two of which led to short dictatorial interludes: the first in 1915 and the second in 1917–18. While the former of these dictatorships simply sought to wrest power from the Democratic Party and hand it to the conservative republican opposition, the latter, led by Sidónio Pais, attempted a complete regime change: soon ‘after coming to power, Sidónio exiled a good part of the republican elite, broke with the Constitution of 1911, and advanced the institutionalization of a plebiscitary presidentialist dictatorship’ (Pinto 1998:10). The sidonist dictatorship could not however survive the assassination of its charismatic leader. Regardless of its specific traits, the military coup that led to the collapse of the First Republic followed this trail of praetorian interventions. The collapse of the First Republic took place during the post-First World War wave of European democratic regime crises and breakdowns, and was


caused by a heterogeneous conservative military-civilian coalition rather than by a fascist party (Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell 1999). Mainly rightwing republicans, the generals who led the 1926 coup d’état sought support from certain elements in the conservative and Catholic elites in the creation of the first dictatorial governments. Nevertheless, the military retained control of the majority of ministerial portfolios and local administrative posts until 1932. Successive political and economic crises, however, forced them to negotiate with those civilian elites several pacts conducive to the institutionalization of a new regime. The New State that emerged out of the Military Dictatorship was consolidated during the 1930s under the leadership of António de Oliveira Salazar—a young university professor and member of the Catholic Party who had joined the government as Minister of Finance in 1928. From within the government, Salazar created a weak and elitist single party, the National Union (União National—UN). This party never had any power over the government, as its main functions were those of exercising political control over and selecting the members of the National Assembly (Assembleia National—AN) and of the local administrations (Cruz 1988; Schmitter 1999). The 1933 Constitution, a product of several compromises with the conservative military, formally maintained fundamental freedoms and ensured the direct election of both the President and the National Assembly, created a Corporatist Chamber with few powers, and ensured that the government was responsible only to the President. The actual operation of the New State’s political system altered very little throughout its long existence. The most significant change occurred in 1959 when the method of electing the President was altered in the aftermath of a dissident general’s Presidential campaign that had led, with support from the democratic opposition movement, to an unprecedented degree of popular mobilization. From that time on, the President was to be indirectly elected (Pinto 1995). Salazar was the manipulator of a perverted rational-legal legitimacy, and he made little use of charismatic appeals. His traditional Catholicism, combined with his juridical and financial education, distinguishes him from the other European dictators of this period. Cold and distant from both his ministers and his supporters, he cultivated a small circle of ‘political counsellors’ and stamped governmental and political management with his own style: an almost obsessive belief in centralization and interest in minutiae. Unlike the other dictators, who assumed personal responsibility for the most important portfolios, such as foreign policy, internal security, and the armed forces, Salazar took firm control of the more ‘technical’ ministries. The armed forces may have been the main threat to the institutionalization of Salazarism during the 1930s, yet the dictator succeeded, with the support of an ageing President, in overcoming the


military elite when he became Minister of War in 1936. Nevertheless, some legacies of the Military Dictatorship remained visible well into the 1940s and 1950s with the continued presence of members of the armed forces as censors and prefects and at the most senior levels of the political police. The locus of power and political authority within Salazarism rested always with the dictator and the government, who made the great majority of decisions. In several of the other fascist era dictatorships, single parties functioned as parallel political apparatuses. This never happened in Portugal: here the political control was mainly effected through administrative centralization, the political police, censorship, and the corporatist apparatus, rather than by the single party. The relationship between Salazar and his ministers was typified by the concentration of decision-making authority in the hands of the former, and the decrease of the latter’s autonomy. Moreover, Salazar also reduced the President’s independence and denied the National Assembly any supervisory control over the government. The dictator effectively eliminated the Council of Ministers (Cabinet), which was soon substituted by meetings with individual ministers. Cabinet meetings had become purely symbolic by the mid-1930s, only taking place when there were foreign and domestic policy problems that deserved to be shared with the nation, or when there were important Cabinet re-shuffles. The tradition of collective ministerial dismissals was also abandoned in 1936 when Salazar began to replace up to one-third of his ministers every three to four years. The centralization of power and the increasing number of organizations that were directly dependent from Salazar led to the creation in 1938 of an institution designed specifically to support the Prime Minister: the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. ‘Rather than being just the inevitable consequence of an expansion of the State, this concentration of power was a guiding principle of the regime, controlling the departmental bureaucracy’ (Lobo 2001:71). It was not until 1950 that Salazar created a Minister of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, to whom he began to delegate some responsibility for the coordination of the government. The least important ministers practically ceased to have any direct contact with the dictator from this point. The initial Ministers of the Presidency included some of the regime’s most notable figures, including Salazar’s successor, Marcello Caetano, who used this office to create important networks of influence. In 1961, Salazar began cautiously to reduce the status of this portfolio, and chose less ‘political’ personalities to occupy the office—a practice that was continued by his successor. The ‘technical’ legitimacy of the ministerial function was a constant theme of the dictator’s discourse: the true political areas of the regime were not initially elevated to ministerial rank, remaining dependent from the Prime Minister. This was the case with the National Propaganda Secretariat (Secretariado de Propaganda National—SPN), for example,


which was promoted to ministerial status as the Ministry of Information and Tourism only after it had been de-politicized. Salazar’s official discourse was that despite ‘politics, as a human art [being] forever necessary as long as mankind exists; government…will increasingly be a scientific and technical function’ (Nogueira 1978:290). It is not surprising that the New State has been characterized by the long time ministers served in office: one-quarter remained in government for more than eight years, while another one-quarter retained their positions for between four and eight years (see Table 4). The lack of mobility through ministerial portfolios is also remarkable (see Table 5), suggesting the progressive nomination of specialists for those portfolios. Salazar loosened his hitherto iron grip on government, largely as a consequence of the outbreak of the Colonial Wars in 1961, and increased the independence granted to the more technical ministries, which allowed him to concentrate his efforts in defence and foreign policy matters. Reflecting the expansion of the administration, and its extended control, there was a concomitant increase in the size of the government that was shown through the creation of an ever greater number of Secretaries and Under-Secretaries of State. These positions were to become a fast track to ministerial careers, as we shall see below. Centralization of the public administration was accentuated during Salazar’s regime, and the stability of appointments to the bureaucratic elite was a characteristic of his rule. Signs of change only began to appear towards the end of the 1960s with Caetano’s attempts at technocratic modernization. Salazar’s substitution by Marcello Caetano in 1968 heralded a significant renewal of the dictatorship’s political elite. Caetano replaced a large number of Salazar’s ministers, reorganized the single party by introducing younger blood, and outlined his proposals for administrative modernization that included increases in the technocratic component within government. The increased degree of ‘limited pluralism’ within some of the regime’s institutions was apparent, particularly within the National Assembly which was opened to a small ‘liberal’ sector. Portugal’s transition to democracy began with a military coup on 25 April 1974. Occurring at the height of the cold war, when there were no great international pro-democracy pressures, the rupture provoked by the Portuguese ‘Captains’ led to an accentuated crisis of the state that was driven simultaneous by the movement towards metropolitan democracy and the decolonization of Europe’s last empire. The most complex phase of the democratization process took place between 1974 and 1976, the year in which the new Constitution was approved, and in which the first legislative and presidential elections took place. The divisions that arose as a result of decolonization—the initial cause of the conflict between the captains who led the coup and the conservative generals—stressed the political role played by the Armed


Forces Movement (Movimento das Forças Armadas—MFA), whilst clearing a space for the political and social mobilization that produced the crisis of the state: ‘at that moment, Portugal experienced the most intense and sweeping mobilizations of all the new democracies’ (Schmitter 1999: 360). As one analyst of the Portuguese transition has noted, the crisis of the State was a ‘window of opportunity’ for the radicalization of the social movements, one that should not be ignored in any analyses of this period (Muñoz, 1997). It was in this context of powerful social and political mobilization (with nationalizations, agrarian reform of the large southern latifundia, the occupation of urban buildings, and a strong military presence in political life and in the regulation of the social conflict) that the moderate political parties, in alliance with members of the military, defeated the radical left and their military allies. Alone out of the four principal founding parties of Portuguese democracy, the Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português—PCP) had a long history of clandestine organization within the country. The Socialist Party (Partido Socialista—PS), which was founded by Mário Soares in West Germany in 1973, was heir to the republican and socialist elements of the electoral opposition to Salazarism. The remaining two centre-right parties were only formed in 1974: the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democrático—PPD)—since October 1976, the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata—PSD)—founded by the ‘liberal wing’ that emerged during the last phase of the authoritarian regime; and the Social Democratic Centre (Centro Democrático e Social— CDS), a Christian liberal conservative party that was on the verge of being proscribed in 1975 (Bruneau 1997; Frain 1998). In an atmosphere of political purges and measures introduced to punish the authoritarian regime’s political and administrative elites, the parties of the right were pressurized not to accept leaders from the previous regime as their political programmes shifted considerably to the centre and the left (Pinto 2001). The MFA’s decision to respect the electoral calendar was the key element in the establishment of the democratic regime’s founding legitimacy. Elections to the Constituent Assembly on 25 April 1975 gave the moderate parties powerful leverage. The PS won with a working majority, followed by the PSD; the PCP, however, only obtained 12 per cent of the vote. The d’Hondt system of proportional representation was adopted as a means to ensure that the diverse range of political forces contesting Portugal’s first democratic elections obtained representation without also leading to an excessive fragmentation of the party system. There were six Provisional Governments between 1974 and 1976, each with representatives of the three main parties (PCP, PS and PPD). These Cabinets proved to be extremely unstable, as can be seen in their average duration of 4.3 months (see Table 2). As would be expected given the nature of the transition, there were no ‘carry over’ ministers, and military


officers held several civilian ministerial portfolios; besides, two of the three Prime Ministers and the two Presidents of this period were also military. Nevertheless, the various pacts that were celebrated between the MFA and the political parties ensured the establishment of a democratic regime— even if it was to be supervised by the armed forces (Graham 1992). The moderate party elites who supervised the consolidation of Portuguese democracy had to cope with a complex heritage. The 1976 Constitution had a long ideological preamble that consecrated the revolutionary nationalizations and agrarian reforms, as well as the military’s tutelary political presence with the institutionalization of the Council of the Revolution (Conselho da Revolução—CR), which retained important powers over the armed forces and functioned as a constitutional court. In an arrangement that was imposed by the MFA on the political parties, the CR was to be placed under the direct control of the President, who was also a military officer: in this case, the leader of the coup that had contained the radical left. The 1976 Constitution created a semi-presidential regime. Directly elected by universal suffrage, the President became both commander of the armed forces and the person to whom the government was politically responsible. He had the authority to dismiss parliament if the government did not have a stable majority, giving him the power to ‘engineer a majority himself’. He also retained a pocket veto with which he could prevent any law from passing. The period between 1976 and 1982, when the Constitution was revised to abolish the CR and reduce the President’s powers, was one of heightened tension between the President and the political parties at a time when the PCP remained out of the government. The first years of democratic consolidation were dominated by unstable coalitions and three Presidential Cabinets. Those years were of economic austerity during which agreements were reached with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). With the 1982 revision of the Constitution, the PS, PSD and CDS managed to secure governmental control over the armed forces, enhancing the role of parliament and removing un-elected military officers from important power positions. The political parties became increasingly dominant within the political arena. By 1985, all candidates contesting the Presidential elections were civilians, with Mário Soares, then leader of the PS, becoming the first democratically elected civilian President. While some analysts continue to believe that the President retains significant powers, the reality is that Portugal has become closer and closer to the model of a parliamentary democracy (Sartori, 1994). Curiously enough, the emergence of a centrist party sponsored by President Ramalho Eanes during his second mandate, and which had been spectacularly (and ephemerally) successful at the 1985 election—winning 18.4 per cent of the vote—did not lead to a major fragmentation of the


party system. Rather, it produced a shift towards a bipolar competition between the PS and the PSD, at the expense of both the PCP and the rightwing CDS. From 1987, when the centre-right PSD led by Cavaco Silva formed a single-party government, the previous pattern of coalition governments came to an end, replaced by a series of single-party majority PSD (1987–95) and PS (1995–2002) governments, ‘with a remarkable increase in cabinet durability not preceded by any change in electoral law’ (Bruneau et al. 2001:28). Democratic consolidation, accession to the European Union (EU), economic development, and a new impulse for social change coincided during the 1980s in a ‘virtuous circle’ that linked the economy and politics (Maravall 1997:82). Accession to the EU was a policy shared by all parliamentary parties, with the exception of the PCP, and represented a new framework for both democratic consolidation and economic development. It was in this context that a second revision of the constitution in 1989 removed constitutional obstacles preventing the privatization of the substantial nationalized sector. As mentioned above, Portugal has a long tradition of political and administrative centralization. If we exclude the grant of autonomy to the island regions of Madeira and the Azores through the creation of regional parliaments and governments in accordance with the 1976 Constitution, the new regime may be characterized as being a ‘high Unitarian democracy’ (Diamandouros and Gunther 2001:20). Although regional identities are very feeble in metropolitan Portugal, proposals for the creation of semiautonomous regions were included in the manifestos of the political parties as a decentralized device that would lead to administrative modernization and rationalization, and as a means of creating a greater opening towards civil society: however, it was a policy that neither governments of the left nor of the right were to implement. Accession to the EU in 1986 was to introduce a supplementary external spill-over, particularly with the influx of Regional Development Funds. However, the persistence of complaints against regionalization from a part of the electorate led to the rejection of the proposal in a poorly attended referendum in 1998. Portugal thus continues to be one of the most centralized of all Europe’s democracies. This is naturally reflected in the way in which public administration has developed. With democratization, state expenditure has risen substantially, largely as a result of its increased participation in the provision of health and education services and in the extension of social security—those services having been neglected by the previous regime (Maravall, 1997:54– 7). The growth of the central civil service has outstripped that of the local administration to the extent that around 83 per cent of all public employees during the democratic period are employed by central government (Barreto, 1996).


WHO GETS TO POWER? THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF MINISTERS Our study looks at all members of the Portuguese ministerial elite from May 1851 to October 1999. During this 148-year period, Portugal was governed by 118 Cabinets that incorporated a total number of 769 ministers (including 72 prime ministers). The background information on the ministers was drawn from several printed sources (biographical dictionaries, official directories, newspapers, etc.) as well as from some primary source material that is available in historical archives, and was entered into a specially designed database. As regards the ministers of the democratic regime, a few personal interviews were also conducted in order to collect more detailed biographical data. Unfortunately, only a very small number of ministers have published autobiographies or memoirs, and there is a shortage of academic monographs on the lives of both past and present politicians—even the most prominent ones. The aggregate analysis of biographical data presented here is the first comprehensive empirical study on the composition and recruitment of the Portuguese ministerial elite, since the few quantitative works published on the subject are focused on specific chronological periods and use a limited set of background variables. Age During the last century and a half, and regardless of the political regime, the majority of first-time ministers fell into the 40–49 age group, and their average age was either 46 or 47. The only exception to this pattern occurred during the Military Dictatorship, when the ‘standard’ age for entering the Cabinet was between 50 and 59, and the average age rose to 49. This rise was caused by the fact that a substantial proportion of ministers were drawn from the senior hierarchy of the armed forces. In terms of the age of first-time ministers, the Constitutional Monarchy occupies second position in the ranking, with 41.3 per cent of first-time ministers being appointed after they had reached 50 years of age. The reasons accounting for this high proportion of ministers recruited in the oldest age groups are the significant presence of high-ranking military officers, and the long parliamentary careers that many ministers enjoyed prior to their elevation to the Cabinet. The authoritarian New State was another regime in which seniority was valued, with almost 39 per cent of all first-time ministers being appointed after their fiftieth birthday. It should be noted, however, that contrary to a popular belief, which is founded on the longevity of the Salazarist regime, Salazar’s regular Cabinet reshuffles effectively prevented the formation of a gerontocratic authoritarian ministerial elite (Lewis 1978).


TABLE 6 AGE DISTRIBUTION (%) AND AVERAGE AGE OF MINISTERS*

1

Includes only ministers first appointed after 1 May 1851. Includes only ministers first appointed after 21 July 1976. N=Number of known cases. * Age at time of first appointment. ** Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. 2

In contrast, the First Republic and post-authoritarian Democracy account for the largest proportion of younger first-time ministers. As far as the latter regime is concerned, almost one-third of all first-time ministers during the transitional period (1974–76) were less than 40 years of age when they were appointed. The youth of the new regime’s ‘formative elite’ is also evident in the age distribution of the deputies elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1975, where 50 per cent had not reached their fortieth birthday (Freire 2001). This ‘trend’ was reversed during the period of consolidation, when the proportion of Cabinet beginners aged between 30 and 39 declined to 23 per cent. Nevertheless, the median age (46 years) of Portuguese ministers during the democratic period is lower than the average for all Western European democracies between 1945 and the mid-1980s, which Jean-Louis Thiébault refers as being 48 years (Blondel and Thiébault 1991:21, 71). Geographical Origins Unlike in other southern European countries, regional identities in continental Portugal are weak and diffuse. They have neither been an important factor in Portuguese political life, nor have they led to demands for territorial autonomy. Consequently, in terms of geographical analysis, the contrast between urban and rural areas, and the specific role played by the largest cities is a more appropriate indicator than regional differentiation.


Taking information on places of birth into account, the most important observed trend throughout the period being studied is the predominance of Lisbon, and its over-representation despite some rather significant variations in magnitude between regimes. The proportion of ministers born in the capital city has varied between one-fifth and one-third of all ministers, while the city’s population only raised to a maximum of about ten per cent of the total population of the country. Most likely, metropolitanism—that is, ‘the tendency for one or a few large cities to dominate the politics of a nation’ (Frey 1965:131)—would be more accentuated when data on the previous place of residence of ministers become available. This seem to suggest the persistence of high levels of centralization in elite recruitment. Since the mid-nineteenth century, and in contrast with the country’s dominant demographic profile—in 1991, only 39.4 per cent of the population were living in towns with more than five thousand inhabitants (Rodrigues and Pinto 1997:11)—the largest proportion of Portuguese ministers have been born in the major urban areas. This trend was reversed briefly during the First Republic, when a slight majority of ministers (52.1 per cent) came from small towns and villages. A similar phenomenon had occurred with the establishment of the French Third Republic (Estèbe 1982), and in both countries it seems to be closely connected with the lower social status of the new ruling elite. In the present democratic regime the urban background of ministers has been clearly reinforced: nearly two-thirds of them were born in the major cities. The transition to democracy also brought a novelty: a sizeable minority of ministers (ten per cent) of the provisional governments were born in the former African colonies, which by that time achieved independence. Educational Credentials Data on the educational background of ministers show a striking and persistent feature across regimes: almost all of them had either a university degree or had graduated in the military academies. In other words, ministers without higher education training were atypical. The lowest proportion of those with higher education may be found during the Constitutional Monarchy (93.5 per cent), and the highest during the authoritarian period (100 per cent). This did not alter with democratization (see Table 8). Even within the left-wing parties, academic credentials have been an indispensable prerequisite for access to the most senior political positions. When we consider that in 1981 only 1.6 per cent of the Portuguese population had a university degree (Barreto 1996), it is undeniable that educational qualifications have acted as a powerful social mechanism restricting the range of elite recruitment. We should note that


TABLE 7 PLACE OF BIRTH OF MINISTERS (%)*

1 And surrounding areas. N=Number of known cases. * Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

TABLE 8 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF MINISTERS (%)*

* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. N=Number of known cases. 1 Includes six ministers who were military doctors.

from 1945 to the mid-1980s, the overall proportion of university educated ministers in the older Western European democracies was 77 per cent (Blondel and Thiébault 1991:21). The proportion of civilian ministers with a doctorate is also impressive, and reached its peak during the authoritarian regime (43.4 per cent). As we shall see below, this accounts for the importance of university professors as a reservoir for ministerial recruitment.


TABLE 8a UNIVERSITY DEGREE OF CIVILIAN MINISTERS (%)*

* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. N=Number of all university educated civilian ministers. TABLE 8b FIELDS OF HIGHER EDUCATION OF MINISTERS (%)*

* Multiple coding has been applied as some ministers held degrees in two or more academic fields. Percentages do not, therefore, total 100. N=Number of ministers who completed their higher education studies.

Several aspects of the ministers’ fields of higher education should also be mentioned. Training in the Military Academies was the dominant credential during the First Republic and, rather obviously, the Military Dictatorship, and the second largest academic background in both the Constitutional Monarchy and the New State. It was also prevalent amongst ministers during the transition to democracy in the mid-1970s. A decisive consequence of the consolidation of democracy was a break with this long tradition of military participation in political office. Among civilian ministers, those holding degrees in law maintained the highest share throughout the entire period. Graduates in Medicine had some relevance during the First Republic, but afterwards became increasingly marginal. Engineering emerged as the second largest discipline in the


TABLE 8c PLACE OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION STUDIES OF MINISTERS (%)*

authoritarian period, and since 1976 it has seriously challenged the traditional hegemony of legal training. In the Democratic regime there has been a clear diversification of expertize amongst members of Cabinet. Accompanying the rise in engineering graduates there has also been a rapid expansion in the number of ministers with degrees in economics and in management. This picture is congruent with the demographic trends in the professions: between 1970 and 1990, there was a steady growth in the number of engineers, and a remarkable increase in the number of economists (Carapinheira and Rodrigues 2000:132). Another distinctive trait of ministers’ educational profile during democracy has been the increased cosmopolitanism, with those taking their undergraduate or postgraduate degrees at foreign universities accounting for almost one-quarter of all ministers appointed since 1974. During the transition to democracy, the majority of those who had studied or taken degrees abroad had gone to France. Since 1976, however, the United Kingdom comes clearly ahead, and the predominant postgraduate qualifications taken there are in the academic fields of Economics and Engineering. Two institutions dominated Portuguese higher education until the early decades of the twentieth century, and played a crucial role in the socialization and recruitment of future political leaders: the University of Coimbra, with its Faculty of Law; and Lisbon’s Military School (Escola do Exército). The creation of faculties of Engineering and of Law in Lisbon during the First Republic contributed decisively towards reinforcing the capital city’s status as a privileged location for university-level education. If the number of students of higher education in Lisbon represented less than 36 per cent of the national total in 1900, by 1930, this proportion had risen to 51.7 per cent, while the proportion studying at Coimbra fell from 44 to 28 per cent over the same period (Marques 1991:560). Data on the places of the higher education studies of ministers confirm Coimbra’s decline and Lisbon’s rise, a trend that has been reinforced during the


Democratic period. Whereas 55 per cent of Constitutional Monarchy ministers received their higher education at Coimbra, only 13 per cent of Democracy’s ministers were graduates of that university, while an impressive 78.6 per cent studied in Lisbon. Occupational Profile Recruited from a highly educated middle class, the majority of Portuguese ministers have also been drawn from a narrow professional range. Prior to the consolidation of contemporary democracy, the two most important occupational categories were the military and university professors. On the whole, the contingent of public employees has predominated, a characteristic that in part reflects the central role that the state has performed in the structuring of the occupational market, where it is the major employer in some professions. The ministerial elite’s dependence on state employment (as it is the case for other political office-holders), may be considered an indicator of weak elite autonomy (Etzione-Halevy 1993). The strong presence of the armed forces at the ministerial level is principally a result of their direct involvement in regime transitions and crises. During earlier periods, however, the military’s involvement was also connected with their monopoly of technical expertise (in engineering, topography, and mining, for example), which gave them an influential role in critical areas of state-building. It was not uncommon, for example, for ministers of Public Works to be recruited from the military during the Constitutional Monarchy. After the Great War the military’s presence in government was exacerbated by their direct political interventions, which culminated in Military Dictatorship in 1926. With the consolidation of the New State, however, military ministers’ numbers not only declined, but those who remained were appointed on the basis of more ‘technical’ criteria. If during the 1930s they could still secure such positions as the Interior Ministry, at a time when the state’s repressive apparatus remained marked by its previous connection to the Military Dictatorship, from the early 1940s they were almost exclusively restricted to those ministries associated with defence and the colonies. The democratic transition of the mid-1970s saw the brief emergence of middle-ranking officers who had been politicized during the Colonial War. From 1976 on, the proportion of military officials within government declined dramatically, representing only 3.8 per cent (see Table 9): by 1980 even the defence portfolio came to be occupied exclusively by civilians. The importance of university professors (in particular, professors of law) is not in itself surprising, but it was during Salazar’s regime that this numerically small body was to become the single major source of ministerial recruitment, and one that, at 33 per cent (see Table 10), was


TABLE 9 MINISTERS’ OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND (%)*

* Occupation immediately before first ministerial appointment. Multiple coding has been applied. N=Number of known cases.

significantly higher than the European average. Even when we limit our comparison to authoritarian regimes alone—and with Franco’s Spain in particular—the difference is noticeable. Enjoying great social prestige, they were transformed into a ‘super-elite’, sharing the leading positions within the state apparatus, government and the public economic sector between themselves. By the 1960s, for example, professors of law enjoyed greater prestige than leading industrialists (Makler 1968). Another significant group of professors represented within Cabinet from the 1950s were those coming from the Faculty of Engineering who were associated with economic development and infrastructural modernization projects, and who occupied the Ministries of Economics, Commerce and Public Works. University professors were to remain the largest single category of ministers in contemporary Portuguese democracy (32.1 per cent), albeit with two significant differences from the authoritarian regime: (i) not all of


TABLE 9a OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MINISTERS ACCORDING TO EMPLOYMENT STATUS (%)

N=Number of known cases.

them came from the highest ranks of the university profession, and (ii) law professors ceased to dominate. Many of the university elite that had been associated with Marcello Caetano (who was himself a law professor) were to play an important role during the first years of the democratic regime. Nevertheless, since 1976 engineers and, especially, economists were favoured in the ministerial selection processes, provoking a relative decline in the number of law professors. This tendency was stimulated by the economic crises and the 1978 and 1982 IMF negotiations, and later by the demands of European integration. The consolidation of democracy is associated with some important changes in the ministerial elite’s occupational background, particularly with the re-emergence of the liberal professions and of a large proportion of professional managers (24.5 per cent). Lawyers were the dominant civilian element of the republican elite, followed by medical doctors (12.1 per cent). If the former continued to be an important source of recruitment of the political elite, the latter—a professional group that had typically been associated with political notables—have been eclipsed as a result of increasing technical and state demands placed on the profession. Lawyers, given their protected position within civil society, constituted an important reserve of pro-democratic counter-elites during the authoritarian regime, and their return to the political elite was a natural consequence of the transition to democracy. In the democratic regime, lawyers have become one of the dominant professional groups within both the parliamentary and party elites. Their lesser importance within the ministerial elite, particularly when compared with the professional managers, can perhaps be attributed to the increasingly technical nature of ministerial functions since the 1980s, and the consequent need to recruit trained specialists. If we look at the occupational distribution of ministers, we see that public employment is a structural characteristic of the Portuguese ministerial elite, peaking at 86.4 per cent during the New State (see Table 9a). This trait, however, should not be confused with the presence of


those with a purely bureaucratic background. The significant proportion of senior public servants in the democratic regime (13.2 per cent) includes managers of the state’s regional development commissions—almost all of them being engineers and economists. Even under Salazarism, it was the military and the university professors who constituted the majority of ministerial office-holders, with very few of the members of the bureaucratic elite actually attaining ministerial rank. Whilst simultaneously strengthening the government’s political control over the judiciary—therefore reducing its formal autonomy—the New State also sought to prevent members of the judiciary from joining the regime’s political institutions. Both the First Republic and the present democracy were and are political regimes in which the occupational background of ministers has demonstrated the least dependence upon the State. In the former, this was due to the importance of liberal professionals, whilst in the latter, it is a result of the supplementary growth of both managers and economists within the private and mixed sectors of the economy. The left-right cleavage—which in the Democratic period has been represented through the two main parties of government, the PS and the PSD—has not been translated into substantive differences with respect to the occupational background of their respective ministers. Gender It is only recently that Portuguese women have obtained political rights. Despite feminism having been a component in the republican movement at the beginning of the twentieth century, the First Republic denied women the right to vote. It was only in 1933, in Salazar’s New State, that some women were enfranchised, albeit under conditions that were more restrictive than those that applied to men. Equal political rights, in the context of a reduced franchise, were only granted in 1969, with Marcello Caetano’s arrival to power, on the basis of a report that stressed the usefulness of obtaining some more ‘conservative’ votes for the governmental party (Lucena 1976). The first three women deputies entered parliament in 1934, having stood on the single party’s list. The representation of women in parliament was to remain poor until the end of the authoritarian regime, and it was only during the 1960s that the first woman was to enter the government: as an Under-Secretary of State, however, not as a minister. The demands for women’s political and civil rights were only met with the transition to democracy, and the question of the lack of women in the parties’ leaderships, within parliament, and within the government only entered the political debate during the 1980s. With Portugal having one of the largest rates of female employment in Western Europe since the 1960s,


the contrast of this with the presence of women within the legislature and the executive is particularly noticeable (Barreto 2000:119). While the number of women parliamentarians increased dramatically— from five per cent in 1976 to 17 per cent in 1999—this increase has been driven more by the parties of the left than by those of the right, with the PCP having the highest percentage of women deputies since 1976, followed 15 years later by the PS, which has established an internal system that is designed specifically to increase the number of women candidates. The Portuguese case also seems to demonstrate that the closed party list system of proportional representation increases women’s chances of entering parliament (Siaroff 2000). During the 1990s, 12 per cent of Portuguese deputies were female—a figure that is only slightly below the EU average (Viegas and Faria 2001)—although the indicators showed that ‘civic and political demobilization’ of women remained high (Cabral et al. 1993). A moderate proposal advanced by the PS, which sought to establish gender quotas for candidates to Parliament, was rejected in 1999 as a result of opposition from both the parties of the right and the PCP, thereby demonstrating elite resistance towards a culture of ‘parity’ through positive action. The number of women (seven) in the Portuguese ministerial elite is very small, accounting for less than four per cent of the total number of ministers between 1974 and 1999. The first woman to become a member of the executive was Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, an independent who was appointed Minister for Social Affairs in July 1974, and who later led one of the governments appointed by President Eanes in 1978. The more significant increase in the number of female Secretaries of State improved the overall average to eight per cent at the beginning of the 1990s if we consider all members of government and not only ministers. The rate of increase has been irregular, however, as no political party has a specific policy aimed at increasing women’s participation in government. It only really became noticeable when in 1995 the PS, after ten years of centre-right governments, nominated a government in which 15.8 per cent of the members were women—although this proportion was to decrease following the first government reshuffle (Viegas and Faria 2001:27). The creation of a Ministry for Equality in 1999 was also a PS initiative, albeit a short-lived one, as the ministry was soon dissolved. If the left-right division may be a reasonable explanation for the variation in the number of women in Parliament, the same cannot be said for the ministerial elite. Moreover, and as in other European democracies, ‘specialist recruitment patterns’ appear to have been the most important factors enabling women to enter government (Davis 1997).


POLITICAL PATHWAYS TO THE CABINET: THE MAIN CAREER PATTERNS The main career path leading to the Cabinet during the Constitutional Monarchy was through Parliament, with the overwhelming majority of ministers having had previous legislative experience (87.1 per cent), either as deputies (82.6 per cent) or as peers (21.3 per cent) (see Table 10). Former deputies with long parliamentary careers were more common within ministerial ranks: more than two-thirds of ministers had served three or more terms in the legislature (see Table 10a). The fact that a successful political cursus honorum required many years of parliamentary service is clearly stated in the memoirs of many liberal politicians of the time (Cayolla 1928; Cabral 1930). The small number of ministers who were not recruited from Parliament were mostly military officers. For the majority of ministers, serving in Parliament was the starting point of their route to Cabinet. Most likely as a consequence of traditional administrative centralization, positions in local administration were not perceived as promising routes for the progression of political careers. The figures confirm this belief, with only approximately ten per cent of Cabinet members having served as mayors at an earlier stage in their career. The empirical evidence that is available on parliamentary deputies during the late nineteenth century reveals how few of them had previously served as either mayors or as local councillors (Almeida, 1995). As for the position of Prefect—a position that was crucial in the intermediation process between national and local politics—this was an important springboard to Cabinet office, which one-fifth of ministers utilized, although it should be noted that most of these men had also served as Parliamentary deputies or as Peers. Although poorly organized and riven with personisms and factions, the two major parties played an increasingly important role in the electoral and parliamentary arenas from the late 1870s, and controlled the major routes to power. The chances for aspiring politicians to obtain Cabinet rank were therefore greatly enhanced if they associated themselves with one or other of these parties: the proportion of ministers with political affiliations was very high. However, it is difficult to know with certainty how many ministers had been party leaders, particularly given the low level of formalization of party structures (see Table 11). Leadership experience gained in one of the organized interest groups was confined to a small number of ministers (7.8 per cent). We should also note that the impact of secret organizations and of informal relationships in the selection and reproduction of the elite is difficult to assess, although it is an aspect that should not be neglected. Thirty ministers (17.2 per cent) were Freemasons, while family and kinship relationships also played a part in both parliamentary and ministerial


TABLE 10 POLITICAL OFFICES HELD BY MINISTERS (%)*

N=Number of all ministers, except during the Constitutional Monarchy. For this period only those ministers first appointed after 1 May 1851 have been included. * Before their first appointment to Cabinet. Multiple coding has been applied when minister have held different political office, therefore percentages do not total 100. 1 The post of Secretary of State, a provisional creation of the First Republic (1916– 17), became a permanent office dating from the early years of the New State. 2 Individuals who had been ministers during the previous period. 3 Includes 14 individuals who were ministers during the transition to democracy (1974–76), and one who was a minister in the last Cabinet of the New State.

recruitment: relatives were often elected in the same constituency and appointed to the same ministerial portfolios (Almeida 1991; 1995). The change of regime from the Constitutional Monarchy to the First Republic had two main effects on the pattern of ministerial recruitment. On the one hand, the proportion of ministers with parliamentary experience dropped sharply, from 87.1 per cent to 67.5 per cent (see Table 10). Moreover, while during the Monarchy there was a high proportion of ministers with long parliamentary careers, in the First Republic the proportion of ministers who had been elected to parliament only once increased dramatically to 53.7 per cent (see Table 10a). This suggests that there was a high turnover of both parliamentarians and ministers: an intense elite circulation that provided more opportunities for those aspiring to political office. On the other hand, the proportion of Cabinet members appointed without previously holding political office increased from 6.4 per cent to 20.2 per cent, a trend that was largely the result of the consolidation of an alternative route to power: the armed forces. It is also worth noting that it is in the First Republic that we find


TABLE 10a MINISTERS’ PREVIOUS PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIENCE (%)*

* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. N=Number of all ministers who were elected to parliament prior to first ministerial appointment. 1 Includes only ministers first appointed after 1 May 1851. 2 Sá Carneiro and Magalhães Mota were elected deputies to the New State’s 1969 National Assembly as members of a small reformist and pro-democratic parliamentary group (the Liberal Wing); Jorge Campinos and Lopes Cardoso were elected deputies in the first democratic elections, held on 25 April 1975. TABLE 11 PREVIOUS PARTY AND INTEREST GROUP LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCE OF MINISTERS (%)

N=Number of all ministers, except during the Constitutional Monarchy. For this period only those ministers first appointed after 1 May 1851 have been included. 1 Refers only to the regime’s single party (National Union, which was founded in 1930 and renamed National Popular Action in 1969), and thus excludes any party leadership positions held prior to the authoritarian period.

the highest proportion of ministers with prior service as mayors and councillors (13.2 per cent). The political parties of the First Republic, and the dominant Democratic Party in particular, played an active role as the gatekeepers of elite recruitment. With the exception of some military officers and a few civilians, ministers were usually affiliated to a political party, and at least 20 per cent of them had previous party leadership experience. Freemasonry, which had close links with the Democratic Party, was a major source of recruitment to the ministerial elite, providing a total of 89, or 36.6 per cent, of all Cabinet


members. In contrast with the Monarchy, political endogamy was rare within the Republic. Salazarism, as an authoritarian regime with a weak single party, adopted a much more ‘bureaucratic’ channel of elite recruitment. Only 31.1 per cent of Salazar’s ministers were either national or regional UN leaders (see Table 11), and around one half were not even members of the party (Cruz, 1988). Compared to the other dictatorships of the 1930s—Italian Fascism or Francoism, for example—we see that the Portuguese regime’s party was much weaker and did not monopolize the selection of the ministerial elite. As Clement Moore noted: ‘The party cannot establish its legitimacy, it would seem, unless it acquires some autonomy as an instrument for recruiting top political leaders. Thus dictators who attain power through other bases of support often have difficulties creating a party to legitimate their regimes’ (Moore 1970:51). Salazar created the UN, but gave it only a limited role. Promotion to governmental positions via the leadership cadres of either the militia or the paramilitary youth organization, the Legião and the Mocidade respectively, was even less likely. The UN played a significant role in the selection of deputies to the National Assembly, and it was within this institution that the greatest equilibrium between the regime’s informal ‘political families’—the Catholics, monarchists, and republicans—was to be found (Carvalho 2002). There was a great stability in the New State’s ministerial elite recruitment methods. A large proportion of the regime’s civilian Cabinet ministers had initially served as Secretaries and Under-Secretaries of State (34 per cent), had been deputies to the National Assembly (30.1 per cent), or had served as procurators in the Corporatist Chamber (25.2 per cent). An increasing number of ministers emerged with no previous history of involvement in any of the regime’s institutions (28.1 per cent: see Table 10). This proportion was not to change much over time, and remained significant even within Marcello Caetano’s two ministries (Castilho 2001; Carvalho and Fernandes 2002). During the New State, the most important ministerial portfolios were clearly controlled by a small group of dignitaries, or ‘notables’, who belonged to the leadership of the single party, and also occupied senior positions in the public administration and the universities. Several of those UN ministers had also been deputies to the National Assembly. Participation in the single party was, therefore, ‘quite helpful [when] combined with other qualifications…[such as] a brilliant academic or civil service career, and identification with other groups’ (Linz 1976: 184). The Portuguese case seems thus to confirm Linz’s thesis that when the single party is weak, the chances of ascending to the governing elite are slight ‘without [first] belonging to a senior administrative body’—in such


cases the party is only a supplementary guarantee (Linz 1976; cf. Pi-Suner 1978:184). During its first phase, the New State strengthened the role of the prefects to such an extent that they became the single party’s main organizers during the 1930s. In association with the UN, they controlled all mayoral nominations, and were important instruments for controlling local politics —especially in the organization of ‘elections’. The majority of prefects were members of the armed forces until the end of the 1930s: afterwards civilians came to dominate, as the Prefecture was perceived to be a good launch-pad for obtaining a position in the National Assembly, although it rarely led to a ministerial appointment. Nominations to the Corporatist Chamber (Câmara Corporativa), representing the nation’s ‘organized interests’, was the responsibility of a state council, which the Dictator presided over until the 1950s—although the creation of the various corporations thereafter made very little change to the proceedings. Being the more ‘technical’ chamber of the New State’s bicameral legislature, a ‘limited pluralism’ of interest group representation was permitted. Given the nature of the ‘reports’ that the Chamber had to produce, the presence of university professors and senior members of the administration was common in some of its commissions. Unsurprisingly, one-quarter of the ministers were then drawn from the Corporatist Chamber. Progression through the offices of Secretary and Under-Secretary of State was also to become a privileged route towards membership of the ministerial elite: one that a significant proportion, around one-third, of ministers had followed. Following the 1974 coup, a large group of military officers, lacking any real political experience, controlled important ministerial portfolios in the Provisional Governments. The first civilian ministers were well-known members of the democratic and communist opposition, however, and most of them had served long political apprenticeships in the regime’s prisons or in forced exile. Some of the leaders of the right-wing parties had also been actively involved in politics, particularly during the final years of the regime, when they were members of the ‘reformist’ group that had initially supported Caetano. Since 1976, a parliamentary career has become once more the single most important path to ministerial office. Another significant political experience of ministers, which often goes together with a representative background, has been holding a position as Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. Whilst still corresponding to a minority of cases, membership of a cabinet ministériel (that is, the staff who directly assists a minister) has been a promising springboard for those aspiring to ministerial office (see Table 10). Almost one-half of all ministers have had partisan leadership experience, either at the national or regional level (see Table 11). Local political careers are still not favoured routes to reach ministerial office,


which is in contrast with the situation in most West European democracies, where the average proportion of ministers who have been involved in local and regional politics is around 50 per cent (Thiébault 1991:34). With democratization, prefects have become increasingly irrelevant as they have progressively been dominated by local branches of the national governing party. Also, between 1974 and 1999 only a few ministers (4.9 per cent) had previously served as local councillors (but none of them as mayors). Nevertheless, the importance of elected local officials is increasing in the selection of the national political elite. The reinforcement of local autonomy and the increased financial muscle of many of the larger local authorities that has come about as a consequence of EU membership, is changing the image of local government. The symbolic prestige of the mayor’s office in both Lisbon and Oporto has been enhanced during the late 1990s, mainly as a result of the 1996 election of the former mayor of Lisbon, Jorge Sampaio, as President of the Republic. A growing number of parliamentary deputies also have been elected after having served an ‘apprenticeship’ in local government (Magone 2000; Freire 2001). It should be stressed that the number of ministers with a parliamentary background, accounting for approximately 51 per cent, is much lower than the Western European average of around 75 per cent (Winter 1991: 48). With respect to the length of parliamentary service, we note that a large proportion of those who were deputies (38 per cent) were elected only once, some of them having never actually served in Parliament due to their receiving promotion to the Cabinet within a matter of weeks after their election. Even the assumption that ‘prime ministers and deputy prime ministers are more likely to be parliamentarians’ (Winter 1991:62), must be treated with caution in Portugal’s case. Two factors may have contributed to the reduced number of ministers with parliamentary experience in the Democratic period. On the one hand, the party leaders who have been appointed to the position of Prime Minister have always enjoyed a great deal of autonomy in the selection of their ministers (Silva 2002). On the other, the parliamentary groups have tended to occupy a subordinate position within the party’s internal power structures. Additionally, it is significant that once the parties obtain power, it is normal for them to effect a ‘governmentalization’ of their leaderships through the control exercised over them by ministers who also hold key positions within the party leaderships (Lobo 2002). The relative devaluation of a parliamentary background in ministerial careers is undoubtedly related to the elevated number of technocrats and independents having little political experience, who have served in the governments of the Democratic period—particularly in the more technical portfolios. In fact, almost one-quarter (23.3 per cent) of ministers have not held any political office prior to their appointment. During the early period


of Portugal’s democratic consolidation, the semi-presidential nature of the political system (which was later reformed) favoured the formation of presidential ministries peopled by independent personalities. However, the recruitment of the latter has also been promoted by the parties, with a view to increasing their political legitimacy and the technical efficiency of their governments. This is, in part, symptomatic of a structural fragility of parties in democratic Portugal: despite their protagonism on the political stage, parties’ roots are shallow, and their penetration of civil society is weak. CONCLUDING REMARKS Regime changes in modern Portugal were generally violent processes with an abrupt rupture, both from the previous political institutions and from its underlying values. The military were key actors in most regime changes and political crises, and therefore an important source of recruitment of the governing elite. Except for the transition from the Military Dictatorship to Salazar’s New State, every regime transformation also brought about a radical alteration in the membership of the governing elite. As Mattei Dogan and John Higley have noted, ‘in many regime changes the entire group of uppermost political rulers is replaced, while the turnover of political elites at middle levels is more limited’ (Dogan and Higley 1998:21). In Portugal, however, regime changes have propelled an extensive replacement of the political personnel at different levels—from ministers and parlamentarians, to prefects and other middle-ranking officials. In some cases other institutions and elite groups were affected, and not solely those occupying formal leadership positions in the previous regime. In this respect, the greatest rupture with the past undoubtedly occurred during the mid-1970s’ transition to democracy, when the nature of change also affected several members of the social and economic elites. None the less, as regards the configuration of the ministerial elite, we find significant continuities over the whole period studied here. Overwhelmingly recruited among middle-aged men from a highly educated middle class, Portuguese ministers prove to have formed an ‘elitist’ group drawn from a very narrow professional spectrum. Moreover, this image remains constant across party lines. The two single most important occupational categories, until the consolidation of contemporary democracy, were military officers and university professors. Lawyers and other liberal professionals—medical doctors, etc.—only gained some importance during the First Republic. On the whole, professionals working in the public sector have been the majority. The consolidation of democracy during the 1970s is associated with two important changes in


the occupational background of the ministerial elite: the re-emergence of liberal professionals, and the appearance of a large number of managers. As far as the political cursus honorum of Portuguese ministers is concerned, two characteristics are worth noting: the persistence of the relative unimportance of local politics; and, as a secular trend, the declining role of parliamentary experience. In Portugal, unlike in many of the other western European countries, there is a long tradition of separation between politics at the national and the local levels. Consequently, local politics has never been a promising route to ministerial office. Prior to the authoritarian period, parliamentary experience was regarded as an essential prerequisite for a ministerial career—at least for civilians. The contemporary democratic regime, however, has not clearly resumed this tradition of the liberal past, while it has favoured the enhancement of more technical credentials and technocratic backgrounds in ministerial recruitment. As the comparison with other European democracies reveals, this tendency does not arise only from the growing complexity and technical character of policy-making; among other factors, it is also connected with the weak penetration of parties in civil society. REFERENCES Almeida, P.Tavares de (1991): Eleições e Caciquismo no Portugal Oitocentista, 1868–1890,Lisbon: Difel. Almeida, P.Tavares de (1995): ‘A Construção do Estado Liberal: Elite Política e burocracia na “Regeneração”’, unpublished doctoral thesis’, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Archer, G.M. (2001): Caracterização das Mulheres Eleitas: Autarquias Locais,Lisbon: STAPE. Barreto, A. (ed.) (1996; 2000): A Situação Social em Portugal,Lisbon: Institute de Ciências Sociais. Berg-Schlosser, D. and J.Mitchell (1999): Conditions for Democracy in Europe: Case Studies,London: Macmillan. Best, H. and M.Cotta (eds.) (2000): Parliamentary Representatives in Europe, 1848–2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries,Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blondel, J. and J.-L.Thiébault (eds.) (1991): The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe,New York: St. Martin’s Press. Bruneau, T.C. (ed.) (1997): Political Parties in Portugal: Organisations, Elections and Public Opinion,Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Bruneau, T.C.et al. (2001): ‘Democracy, Southern European Style’, in Diamandouros and Gunther (2001:16–82). Cabral, A. (1930): As Minhas Memorias Políticas: Na Linha de Fogo,Lisbon: Livraria Popular de Francisco Franco. Cabral, M.Villaverdeet al. (1993): ‘Atitudes da População Portuguesa Perante o Desenvolvimento’, in T.Gouveia (ed.), Sociedade, Valores Culturais e Desenvolvimento,Lisbon: Dom Quixote, pp. 23–64.


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Schmitter, PC. (1979): ‘The Régime d’Exception that Became the Rule: Forty-Eight Years of Authoritarian Domination in Portugal’, in L.S.Graham and H.Mackler (eds.), Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and its Antecedents,Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Schmitter, PC. (1999): ‘The Democratisation of Portugal in its Comparative Perspective’, in F.Rosas (ed.), Portugal e a Transição para a Democracia,Lisbon: Colibri, pp. 337–63. Schwartzmann, K.C. (1989): The Social Origins of Democratic Collapse: The First Portuguese Republic in the Global Economy,Lawrence, KS: Kansas University Press. Siaroff, A. (2000): ‘Women’s Representation in Legislatures and Cabinets in Industrial Democracies’, International Political Science Review21/2, pp. 197–215. Silva, A.Cavaco (2002): Autobiografia Política,Lisbon: Temas e Debates. Stock, M.J. (1989): ‘Elites, Facções e Conflito Intra-Partidário: O PPS-PSD e o Processo Político Português de 1974 a 1985’, unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Évora. Tavares, J. (1909): O Poder Governamental no Direito Constitucional Portuguez,Coimbra: Imprensa Académica. Thiébault, J.-L. (1991): ‘Local and Regional Politics and Cabinet Membership’, in Blondel and Thiébault (1991:31–43). Viegas, J.M.Leite and S.Faria (2001): As Mulheres na Política,Oeiras: Celta. Winter, L.de (1991): ‘Parliamentary and Party Pathways to the Cabinet’, in Blondel and Thiébault (1991:44–69).

Ministers and Regimes in Spain: From the First to the Second Restoration, 1874–2002 JUAN J.LINZ and MIGUEL JEREZ with SUSANA CORZO

PERIODIZATION, REGIMES AND THE NATURE OF REGIME CHANGES IN CONTEMPORARY SPAIN Following the ‘revolt of Aranjuez’, Carlos IV abdicated in March 1808 and his son Fernando acceded to the Spanish crown. On 5 May 1808 both resigned the crown to Napoleón, who put his brother on the Spanish throne and enacted the Estatuto de Bayona (Bayonne Statute), a pseudoliberal charter. Resistance to the French led to the formation of provincial juntas that constituted the Junta Central, which convened a unicameral parliament in Cádiz including representation from both metropolitan and overseas Spain, and enacted a liberal constitution that was to be particularly influential in Portugal, Italy and the Spanish colonies in America. The French Revolution had a significant impact in Spain, notably on the work of the Cortes of Cádiz, including the change from estate to national representation, and the introduction of equal citizenship. Although a large part of the elite accepted the ideas of constitutional government, on his return from France in 1814, Fernando VII refused to accept the Constitution of Cádiz and established absolute rule. In 1820, an army pronunciamiento, sent to put down the rebellion in Latin America, forced him to swear to uphold the Constitution: however, with the help of the Holy Alliance, he soon re-established absolutism. Only after the death of the king in 1833 was the ancién regime defeated in Spain, although not without a long war of succession between his brother, Don Carlos, and the supporters of his daughter, Isabel II, which was also a war between the defenders of absolutism, the special role of the Catholic church and traditional institutions, and those of liberalism. Nevertheless, the fight against the traditionalist reaction would continue for almost half a century, after two further wars in 1846–49 and 1872–76 (Carr 1982; Linz et al. 2000:371–2). From then to the present, Spain has known the following periods and regimes:

MINISTERS AND REGIMES IN SPAIN 39

1833–68: Isabeline Period:

• A constitutional monarchy outlined by the Estatuto Real (Royal Statute) enacted in 1834, and largely regulated through the Constitutions of 1837 and 1845, with two consecutive Regencies (of María Cristina and General Espartero respectively) before the heiress ascended to the throne. 1868–74: Six-year Revolution (Sexenio): • Revolutionary period (1868–71): overthrow followed by provisional government and a new Regency of Serrano. • Parliamentary monarchy as outlined in the 1869 Constitution granting universal suffrage, and which had only one monarch, Amadeo of Savoy (November 1871–February 1873). • First Republic (February 1873–January 1874), conceived to be federal and extremely unstable, born as parliamentarian and evolving into a presidential regime in a constitutional project that never received approval. • De facto dictatorship (January–December 1874): centralist, authoritarian and conservative disguised as republican and considered to be the Spanish version of MacMahon’s French Republic. 1874–1931: First Bourbon Restoration

The authors wish to thank Juan Morell and Charles Powell from the Ministerio de la Presidencia (Prime Minister’s Office) and the Cabinet of the President of the Congreso de los Diputados, respectively, as well as the staff of the archives of both chambers, who made our work much easier. They would also like to acknowledge the help they received from Nieves Ortega and Manuel Torres, fellows of the Political Science Department of Granada University, who were responsible for coding and introducing most of the background information into the database; Gloria Martinez helped in different research tasks, and joined Rocío Aznar and Katya Lorente to go through the lists of past deputies to collect data on parliamentary careers; Maribel Bernal collected data on the nobility and, with Carlos Jerez and Nieves Ortega, co-operated in the control of different variables. Winiefred Travers at the Sociology Department of Yale University made the frequent interchange between Juan J.Linz and Miguel Jerez possible. Last, but not least, Rocío de Terán created the best atmosphere during working visits to Linz’s home in Hamden. Susana Corzo cooperated with Juan J.Linz and Miguel Jerez in designing the database, and was responsible for its management.


• A liberal oligarchic constitutional monarchy, although in many respects —particularly during its first half—close to a parliamentary regime compatible with both restricted and universal male suffrage between 1876 and 1923. • Ministery-Regency (1874–75) • Reign of Alfonso and Regency of María Cristina (1875–1902) • Constitutional reign of Alfonso XIII (1902–23) • Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923–30): military corporatist; Dictablanda (weak dictatorship)1 and second transition government. 1931–36: Second Republic • A liberal democratic parliamentary/semi-presidential regime until the outbreak of the Civil War. 1936–39: Second Republic during the Civil War • A regime that probably bore little relation to liberal democracy, although it would insistently be presented as such by most of its defenders. 1936–75: Franco Regime • Strong totalitarian tendencies evolving into authoritarianism. 1975 to present: Second Restoration in the person of Juan Carlos I of Bourbon.2 • Transition to democracy (November 1975–July 1977).3 • Parliamentary monarchy (July 1977–present).4 Regime change in Spain followed different paths during the past 150 years: (a) pronunciamiento, when the constitutional monarchy of Isabel II was put to an end in 1868, and when her dynasty was restored six years later by her son Alfonso; (b) conventional coup d’état, resulting in the dissolution of parliament, both in January 1874 and September 1923; (c) quick and incredibly peaceful substitution of the salient, exhausted regime through the smooth elite-led transfer of power following the overwhelming defeat of monarchist candidates at the 1931 local elections in Madrid and virtually all provincial capitals, heralding the arrival of the Second Republic;


(d) military uprising followed by a bloody civil war in the case of Francoism, a regime that was fully institutionalized in December 1966 with the approval by referendum of the Ley Orgánica del Estado (Organic State Law), an instrument designed to establish the Francoist ‘constitution’ that had been accumulating since 1938 in the form of Leyes Fundamentals (Fundamental Laws); and (e) transition through reforma pactada/ruptura pactada, when democracy was re-established in Spain after four decades of dictatorship (Linz and Stepan 1996: Ch.6). As a bitter paradox for Franco’s more enthusiastic followers, the key instrument for the last regime change in Spain through that successful formula would be an eighth fundamental law: the Law for Political Reform, which was promoted by Adolfo Suárez only a few weeks after being appointed Prime Minister in July 1976 by King Juan Carlos—who had himself been designated successor by the Caudillo. This norm allowed the creation of a completely different type of legislative body, following free elections with the participation of political parties, which were then to be to be legalized. The members of the corporatist Cortes (the legislature created by the dictator in 1942 and partially appointed by him) committed hara-kiri only two days before the first anniversary of Franco’s death. Once approved by referendum a few days later, the road to democracy was open, even if there were still some serious obstacles to be overcome. SCOPE OF THIS STUDY AND SOURCES CONSULTED The Spanish Consejo de Ministros (Council of Ministers) can trace its origins to the Junta Suprema del Estado (Supreme State Council) that was created, and later abolished, by Carlos III in the late eighteenth century. After the French invasion and subsequent War of Independence a cabinet, roughly similar in its general characteristics to that of the present, acquired formal existence. Curiously enough, this cabinet was to emerge at the beginning of the Spanish monarchy’s last despotic period, during the socalled ‘ominous decade’, and not in the short periods of freedom and Constitutionalism of the final years of Fernando VII’s reign.5 The Council of Ministers and its Prime Minister, already as constitutional organs separate from the Crown, would acquire constitutional rank through the Estatuto Real (Royal Statute) and subsequent Constitutions. (Only during two short periods, in the early stages of Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship, and later, during the Civil War until early 1938 in Nationalist Spain, did that organ disappear.)6 The first steps towards the creation of a cabinet that was relatively independent of the Head of State can be dated from 1834 (during monarchical periods, only the cabinets of Amadeo of Savoy and,


following the introduction of the 1978 Constitution, of Juan Carlos I were either largely or totally independent of the monarch). Considering those facts, one possible choice could be to include in our study all the ministers, either from 1823 or 1834, or, at least, from 1851— the year in which the old denomination Secretario de Estado (Secretary of State) for identifying cabinet members disappeared.7 Another alternative could be to start in September 1868 with the first government of the Gloriosa Revolución (Glorious Revolution), since this belated bourgeois revolution, through its proclamation of national sovereignty and its logical correlations—universal suffrage and the largely symbolic redefinition of the role of the Head of State—heralded the beginning of the liberal-democratic cycle in Spain. However, maintaining the first consolidated regime criteria adopted by the directors of the present work, we decided to begin with the first government of the first Restoration in 1874, since none of the preceding regimes were even minimally consolidated.8 As Linz has stated, the political system established in that year, and reflected in the 1876 Constitution, was successful in this and other aspects: ‘After a period of rapid political democratization, turmoil, localism encouraged by a Federal Republican ideology, and a revival of Carlist insurgency, the Restoration represents a period of peace, relative stability, considerable civil liberties, significant but insufficient economic progress, formal democracy—despite the survival of oligarchic structures, [and] a centre-right compromise between clericalism and the anti-clerical tendencies so dominant at the time in Europe’ (Linz et al. 2000:373). From the inauguration of the first Restoration cabinet in 1874 until the last reshuffle of the second Aznar government in early July 2002, a total of 647 people have, at some time, occupied the office of minister or President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister)—or both—in a total of 1573 positions at the summit of the executive. They were distributed as follow: 117 (Ministry Regency, Alfonso XII, and Regency of María Cristina); 158 (parliamentary period under Alfonso XIII); 36 (Primo’s Civil Directory, Dictablanda and transition government); 89 (Second Republic, April 1931– July 1936); 46 (Second Republic during the Civil War); 120 (Franco’s Regime); 33 (transition to democracy); and 130 (Parliamentary Monarchy). During these 127 years, there have been a total of 42 different Prime Ministers and more than 110 cabinets (see Table 1). Data published by the historians José Cuenca and Soledad Gallego (1998), including the usual socio-biographical variables up to the first Aznar government, as well as those patiently gathered by Juan J.Linz and Rocío Terán during many years, and material on the Franco regime that was published by Miguel Jerez, have been used as the main sources in the construction of our database. (Press reports and the Presidency of the


TABLE 1 NUMBER OF CABINETS, MINISTERS AND INCUMBENCIES, 1874–2002*

* From 31 December 1874 to 9 July 2002. 1 Including Prime Ministers. 2 We considered a new cabinet was in haugur rated eve ery time a Prime N Minister was an appointed by the Head of State, even if the person was a reappointment from the previous cabinet. However, we made three exceptions: Negrín’s Civil War cabinet, because of the many and substantial changes to its composition in April 1938, in the so-called Gobierno de Unidad National; Suárez’s July 1977 cabinet, following the first free elections since 1936; and, for practical reasons, the Franco regime in which the General was the head of government until 1973. (In this case the criterion adopted was the numerically relevant change of positions, except for the cabinet inaugurated in September 1942 because of the highly political significance of certain inclusions and removals in the April 1939 Gobierno de la Paz.) 3 Number of people appointed Prime Minister. This figure excludes duplications, as few individuals were Prime Ministers in two different periods. 4 Number of people appointed minister. This figure excludes duplications since few individuals were ministers in two, or even three (just one case), of the periods considered. 5 Except for General Franco, multiple incumbencies by the same individual have been counted.

Government’s website have been used to extract information on more recent cabinets.)9 For data concerning the party identification of ministers and Prime Ministers appointed before the Civil War, we have relied on Tusell (1990); while for the ‘political families’ of Franco’s ministers we have used Alvarez


Puga et al. (1970), De Miguel (1975), Jerez (1982), and the military yearbooks. José Ramón Urquijo’s recent publication (2001) offers an exhaustive guide to cabinets, ministerial appointments, dismissals, and departments, which allowed us to complete and review our database in this respect. In order to verify the previous condition of parliamentary representatives—and the number of legislatures in each case—the following sources were used: for the lower or single chambers: J.Paredes et al., Los diputados del Congreso español, 1811–1939,10 and the computerized listings of the Congreso de los Diputados (1977–2001); for the upperhouse, we used Próceres y Senadores, 1834–1923, and Senadores, 1977– 1993 (Madrid, Senado, Secretaría General, 1993), and its computerized lists and web page for more recent years. In order to detect those ministers who during the past six decades have been previously appointed or—more exceptionally—elected members to Franco’s Cortes, we relied on Maestre (1977), whose data continue to November 1976. In general terms, relatively good primary sources are available for ministers during the Franco Regime—and for those of the Second Republic. However, the sources for the First Restoration period are poor and unreliable. Conversely, secondary sources are adequate up until the first years of the present democracy, although there is a shortage of biographies, with even Prime Ministers being reluctant to publish their personal memoirs. MAIN FEATURES OF THE DIFFERENT REGIMES In this section we consider the most relevant traits related with our topic for each of the five political regimes that have existed since 1874: constitutional arrangements—primarily those concerning the executive branch of government, but also others, such as the role of parliament and electoral regulations; the party system; and the cabinet structure and composition (including the continuity/discontinuity of political elites). It would be particularly interesting to analyse the first government of each regime—as well as those of the transition periods— since they represent a founding elite. They derive their authority from the institutions of the previous regime, from a revolution or coup d’état, or exceptionally from an election, like the second Suárez government (July 1977). Since they appear at moments of crises, they generate or consolidate a new leadership. Regarding the party system, there are at least two good reasons for emphasizing its relevance in order to study the ministers of the different regimes being considered here: on the one hand, there is an obvious difference between a regime in which a one-party cabinet is the regular pattern and another in which a coalition cabinet is the norm; on the other hand, attention must be paid to the fact that ministerial duration— something that is highly relevant when attempting to discover the ‘regular’


traits of the individual occupying these positions during a specific period— is normally associated with cabinet duration. As Daalder and Lijphart, among others, have pointed out, cabinet duration has often accounted for such characteristics as the fractionalization of parliamentary parties, the number of parties in cabinets, and the coalition status of governments (Blondel and Thiébault 1991:79). Just as in France and most other European countries, the first revolutionary experience did not lead to the consolidation of a stable political system in Spain. Following a period of radicalism, followed by a transitory return to absolutism on two different occasions, Spanish constitutionalism was forced to incorporate a political formula that recognized the Crown’s strong pre-eminence within the political process. After a short and politically unsatisfactory period (1834–37) during which the Cortes surrendered its legislative initiative, a more stable system that was based on a distribution of power acceptable to both sides was constructed under the Constitutional Monarchy. Through this formula, the Crown obtained a new prerogative: the so-called poder moderador (moderating authority) that was constitutionally delimited in other countries (that is, Brazil and Portugal), although not in Spain, where it inspired constitutional practice without ever becoming a norm (Artola 1990:182–3). This means that Prime Ministers were freely appointed and dismissed by the Head of State who also retained the right, within certain bounds, to suspend and dissolve parliament, approve laws, and exercise a limited veto. As a counterweight, parliament could approve or reject cabinets through the exercise of its vote of confidence. In the case of a conflict between cabinet and parliament, the King was the ultimate arbitrator, with the authority to change the cabinet’s composition and bring it closer to the Cortes’s opinion, and to dissolve parliament in order to verify if it continued to have the support of the electorate. Ministers were, therefore, subject to both royal and parliamentary confidence, although the former was much more decisive. The 1837 Constitution inaugurated the Constitutional Monarchy, and, according to some interpretations, was a model that remained in force until 1923, since the Constitutions of 1845, 1869 and 1876 only introduced minor modifications (Artola 1988:153). In our view, however, the 1869 Constitution outlined a democratic parliamentary monarchy, even if the parliamentary system was limited by the fact that the cabinet required royal approval in addition to having the confidence of the Cortes. Legislative authority was an exclusive competence of a parliament that was, with the exception of the indirectly elected Senate, elected by direct universal male suffrage. Nevertheless, it must be accepted that this Constitution had almost no genuine effect during the four years of its theoretical validity (Sánchez Agesta 1974: 329ff).


It must be emphasized that, until the first breakdown of liberal constitutionalism in 1923, the difference between progressive and moderate situations—whatever the specific name of the parties11—was determined by the basic laws rather than by the Constitution.12 Parties on the left, with different names and ideologies throughout the century, were in favour of national sovereignty and fought to consolidate an electoral regime that was more open to popular participation, succeeding in obtaining the definitive introduction of direct universal male suffrage in 1890;13 they also fought for press freedom, greater freedom of speech, and for the election of mayors by the elected councillors rather than their appointment by the government. Conversely, parties on the liberal right were in favour of granting powers to the Crown, a bicameral parliament, and a restricted franchise. A succession of organic laws, which were occasionally accompanied by changes in the Constitution that were more apparent that real, was the usual practice throughout the different phases of political conflict. Electoral manipulation thus became the real factor that differentiated Spain’s political experience from that of the other European countries that had similar political formulas at that time (Artola 1988: 153ff). During the first decades of the Constitutional Monarchy, neither the two Regents nor Queen Isabel II were willing or able to play the role of the neutral and moderating power that was the premise for regime consolidation under those historical circumstances. Isabel II only rarely, and never after the appointment of General Espartero in 1854, permitted the formation of liberal progressive cabinets, and even when she did, they were always of short duration since she was afraid that they represented a serious threat to the throne, given that they were supported by the so-called demócratas, who tended towards republicanism.14 As a result of their exclusion from cabinet, the representatives of those social sectors stood strongly against electoral corruption and the sham parliamentary system and decided to withdraw from the political system and pursue the revolutionary route. The revolution finally broke out in September 1868, and the Queen was forced into exile. A new electoral law granting universal male suffrage was passed in November of that same year. The Cortes that was elected a few months later approved the 1869 Constitution, and after considerable manoeuvring and in the face of much international tension, Amadeo of Savoy was elected King of Spain in November 1870. The new king retained the same powers of arbitration and supervision of the other institutional powers that had been enjoyed by his predecessor, although now these powers were held in the name of national sovereignty and not that of the shared sovereignty of the monarchy and parliament that was characteristic of the previous regime. Seven cabinets and four Prime Ministers came and went in quick succession before Amadeo ended his 25 month reign by abdicating. The King had become increasingly


discouraged by the attacks on him that were emanating both from the right —including the anti-system Carlists—and the left; he was also disappointed at losing the support of all the main parties except Ruíz Zorrilla’s Radicals.15 A federal Republic was immediately proclaimed. The new regime had four Prime Ministers and seven different cabinets in the course of one year, and had to confront a Carlist uprising and a rebellion of extremist federal Republicans. In January 1874, parliament was closed by a general, and the unsuccessful attempts to enact a new constitution came to an end. A new provisional government, led by General Serrano, was appointed. Serrano had already held this position following the triumph of the September Revolution, and he had also been one of Isabel II’s most prominent ministers. Before 1874 had ended, Serrano was in turn overthrown by a pronunciamiento that proclaimed Alfonso XII king.16 The Sexenio certainly brought about a new liberal-democratic cycle in Spanish constitutionalism. It represented a break insofar as it resulted in the recognition of new rights, the extension of electoral suffrage and an increase in the number of guarantees. The fact that 69 of the 74 ministers of this period obtained cabinet position for the first time during these years also demonstrates how the Sexenio represented a break with the past: however, it would be a mistake to believe that these elites represented a complete discontinuity, since a significant number of ministers (35.1 per cent) had been parliamentary deputies during the previous regime (28.4 per cent, if we leave aside those who had been deputies only during the legislature that opened following the 1854 revolution). Less than half of the members of the Constituent Cortes of 1869 were newcomers, while the 13 portfolios held by the five individuals who had previously been ministers under Queen Isabel covered important areas, such as Foreign Affairs (2), Interior (2), Finance (1), War (2), and Navy (3), as well as occupying the Prime Minister’s office. After the short life of the First Republic, both the monarchy and the Bourbon dynasty were re-established under the new king. The leading Alfonsine politician, Cánovas, who in August 1873 obtained full power from the Crown to lead the restoration movement, and who would have preferred a transition without military intervention, set about constructing a new liberal constitutional monarchy modelled on the British example. With this purpose in mind, 600 former legislators were consulted (excluding the republicans—most of whom were in exile). They accepted the basic outline of the future Constitution and formed a 39 man commission (later reduced to 38) that was charged with preparing the draft constitutional document (Linz 1967a:202; Torres del Moral 1990:135–6). Following a new election, with universal suffrage, the 1876 Constitution was enacted, and remained in force until 1923. The extent of electoral suffrage was restricted in 1878.


Following the King’s death, the Queen Regent called upon Sagasta, the Liberal leader, to form government; he reintroduced universal male suffrage in June 1890, increasing the size of the electorate from 807,000 in 1886 to 4,100,000 (participation had fluctuated considerably after universal suffrage was originally introduced: from 70 per cent in 1868 to 46 per cent in the election of 1872. It now declined to 50 per cent before increasing to a maximum of 67 per cent during the Restoration period). The Regency lasted until Alfonso XIII’s assumption of power in 1902. After the 1923–30 dictatorship, and the period of uncertainty from 1930–31, Alfonso XIII was to leave the country following the proclamation of the Second Republic. Cánovas and Sagasta were already veteran political leaders by the onset of the new regime, both having been elected deputies almost continuously since 1854. Both men had the personality and capacity to decide. Among the 117 ministers and Prime Ministers of the first half of the Restoration, 27 had occupied the same position either during the Sexenio or under Isabel II (and one had been a minister during both periods). In the 1879 legislature, the first one that was elected by the restricted suffrage reintroduced by Cánovas, a similar proportion of deputies (23 per cent) had obtained parliamentary experience prior to Alfonso XII’s return (the proportion was higher on the Liberal benches, but was also significant among the minority dissidents). In this respect, the first period of the Restoration, despite being a regime change, represented much less of a break and discontinuity with the political classes of the past than is true of the twentieth century regime changes we will analyse later—with just two exceptions at the cabinet level: the time between Primo de Rivera’s Dictatorship and the Second Republic; and the Second Republic during the Civil War (Linz 1972; Linz et al. 2000:379–81) (see Table 2). The Restoration was a time during which the legislature was able to enact much of the basic legal framework of Spanish government and administration, although not to solve many of the basic political problems, particularly the regional and social questions. It was also a period in which, at least initially, the army withdrew from active interference in politics. It was an intentional compromise designed to slow down the process of revolutionary mobilization without rejecting modern European political institutions. The last effort to retain control of Cuba and the Philippines, and the war with the United States that ended with Spain’s defeat in 1898, led to a profound crisis that was reflected not so much within the parties and political elites, but in the rise of peripheral nationalisms, and the intellectual critique of the system (Linz et al. 2000:372–3). Parliament, the power of which could have been greatly expanded due to the ambiguities of the Restoration Constitution between 1876 and 1923, lost power to the monarch. Heads of Government frequently found their authority undermined by the Head of State: in the 21 years between 1902


TABLE 2 CONTINUITY OF MINISTERS THROUGH DIFFERENT PERIODS

and 1923, there were 32 Prime Ministers, and 36 governments with an average life of approximately seven months (Tables 1 and 3). The causes of this process are difficult to explain. Some attribute it to the personality of Alfonso XIII, while others emphasize the absence of solid governmental majorities, incompatibilities and personal vendettas between politicians (even of the same party), extra-parliamentary pressures from the streets, civil society associations (including the Freemasons), and, ultimately, the army. Not one of the democratic forces was able to force a constitutional revision that would limit royal authority, democratize the Senate and restrain the growing veto power of the army (which had initially accepted the system) (Linz 1967:202). The Restoration is normally considered to have been an oligarchic regime in which personal and familiar links were commonplace among members of the political class. Political clientelism (caciquismo) was the rule (Varela Ortega 1977; Robles Egea 1996). However, most of the 240 people who occupied the highest positions in the executive were professional politicians who frequently demonstrated a considerable degree of independence from external pressure groups. Certainly, there was no divorce between economic interests and the political elites, as studies by Tuñón de Lara (1967) and others have clearly demonstrated, nor was there a systematic subordination of the politicians to organized interest groups. Looking at the most senior level of the executive, we see that only 11 out of a total of 25 individual Prime Ministers between 1868 and 1915 were of high social origin. The remainder were from middle-class backgrounds, including Cánovas and Sagasta, who between them governed for a total of


22 years—nearly one-half of this whole period.17 Only one Prime Minister was a member of the nobility, 12 were lawyers, eight were military officers, four were university professors (including two professors of law), and one was an engineer (Cabrera and Del Rey 2002:100–101; and our own data). The revolutionary experience of 1868 had made the Crown more amenable to a certain degree of political openness, offering its support in turn to the two dynastic parties that appeared in 1874 as the inheritors of the main political parties of Isabel II’s reign: the Conservative (Liberal Conservador—Liberal Conservative) and Liberal (Liberal Fusionista— Liberal Fusion) parties. All other parties had neither sufficient representation or popular support to be relevant in the formation of government in the Sartorian sense. In addition, most of them excluded themselves from the system. Conflicts developed at the social level, however, with long-term consequences for the stability of the political system. The Restoration system remained a two-party one until the 1910s when, following the deaths of the principal architects of the turno pacífico (the agreement to rotate in office regardless of the election result),18 Cánovas (who was assassinated) and Sagasta, it experienced a major crisis, with both the Liberals and, later, the Conservatives, splitting into factions that often defined themselves as political parties in their own right. The resulting tensions enhanced the King’s position as arbiter, enabling him to choose who should be Prime Minister and prevent others, even those such as the Conservative leader, Maura, who had parliamentary support, rising to power (Linz 1967b:202ff; Linz et al. 2000). For some years the changing tendencies follow a similar path, and oneparty government continued to be the rule until the crisis of 1917 that opened the way to the first coalition government of Alfonso XIII’s reign (the only precedent occurred in 1884, when Cánovas’s fifth government included representation from the rightist Unidad Católica), which was also the first government to incorporate a regionalist party with the inclusion of the Catalan Lliga Regionalista. Three further coalition cabinets followed between 1921 and 1923, which included members of such parties as the Partido Liberal Demócrata, Liberal Progresista, Izquierda Liberal—all factions of the Liberals; the Mauristas—which resulted from the division of the Conservatives; as well as the Lliga Regionalista, and the Reformists. In total, 92 per cent of the Constitutional Monarchy’s governments, over a period of almost 50 years, were one-party governments (Table 3). During the first phase of the new Constitutional Monarchy, the alternation of power between Conservatives and Liberals worked reasonably well, with 25 cabinets in 28 years. The changes in government were not so much the result of changes in the electorate’s preferences as the


TABLE 3 NUMBER OF CABINETS, PARTY DOMINATING, DURATION AND SIZE

* The second figure inside the bracket refers to the number of coalition cabinets; ** One day cabinet; *** Only in the second cabinets of both Largo Caballero and Negrín (Nov. 1936 and Aug. 1938, respectively). C=Conservador; L=Liberal; PCE=Partido Comunista de España; PNV=Partido Nacionalista Vasco; PP=Partido Popular; PSOE=Partido Socialista Obrero Español; UCD=Unión de Centro Democrático. 1 Except for the first Silvela cabinet, formed in April 1899, in which the number of cabinet members fell to seven as a result of the assumption of the portfolio of State by the prime minister himself, and the suppression of the Ministerio de Ultramar following the loss of the last colonies in America and the Philippines. 2 One would have to distinguish the Civil Directorate of Primo de Rivera and the shorter two transition cabinets after his dismissal. 3 The ninth cabinet (Aznar-II) inaugurated in April 2000 was excluded from this computation even if it could be taken for granted that—in normal conditions—it will last until the end of the legislature, in the year 2004.

product of the King granting the Prime Minister the power of dissolution, and the practice whereby the Minister of the Interior classified the candidates and then exerted his influence to ensure a majority whilst


safeguarding the other party’s representation and that of the minorities. Voter apathy and indifference, more than coercion and electoral fraud, allied with the conviction of the ‘dynastic’ parties’ politicians that they would not be excluded from access to power for too long, allowed caciquismo and turnismo to function (Varela Ortega 1996). To a certain extent it reflected the failure and exhaustion of the previous government, and a hope for some change: it was, in a sense, a ‘perverse’ form of consociational politics. The competition for power between the Conservatives and the Liberals was largely reduced to a conflict between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, that was, according to the critics, controlled by the Ministry of Interior’s corrupt electoral practices. Neither party presented any real policy alternative or represented any distinctive social interest. Although there is much truth in this image, our research suggests that, at least since 1902, ministers and deputies of the two parties were not exactly two sides of the same coin. There are two questions requiring an answer: why, given the social changes taking place, did these parties not become more differentiated from each other? And, since they had yet failed to represent the new social groups and their opinions, why were they not displaced during the 1920s by powerful new anti-system parties such as the Republicans or the Socialists? Following the extension of the franchise in Italy in 1913, both the Socialist Party and the Populari obtained a significant parliamentary representation. Their inability to achieve a proportional representation within government was largely a result of their refusal to join, and a consequence of the difficulties involved in forming coalitions. The absence of the Spanish Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español—PSOE) in Spanish cabinets prior to 1923, however, was a direct result of their lack of representation in the Cortes; although the increasing importance of regionalist, nationalist and separatist parties in some of Spain’s regions was certainly another factor that accounts for the failure of these parties. The Restoration’s two-party system began to disintegrate during Alfonso XIII’s reign, with no opposition party emerging to fill the resulting vacuum. Instead, the principal parties fragmented. The Conservatives split into two, with some following Maura and the rest—the idóneos, who were ready to participate in government—following Dato. After the assassination of Canalejas, the Liberals divided into rival personalist factions led by Romanones, Santiago Alba and García Prieto. In the meantime, the armed forces became a more significant political actor. While there were fewer military officers in the cabinets, a few more ministers in civilian portfolios held at some point of their careers a military background, mostly in the legal services of the army (Table 4). Rather than parliament asserting itself and the parties becoming more powerful actors, Alfonso XIII’s influence on the political system grew


TABLE 4 MILITARY OCCUPYING MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS (%)*

N=Number of cases in each category. * Portfolios held ad interim have not been counted. Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. ** Until May 1937 there were two military ministries: War and Navy (Navy and Air from early September 1936 until its integration in a single National Defence Ministry eight months later). Under Franco the original Defence Ministry split into three different departments—Ejército, Marina and Aire—when the General made up his second cabinet in August 1939. With the new democracy a single Defence Ministry was re-established in July 1977. The legal staff members of the armed services are counted as military but most of them had other careers in civilian life before being appointed to the cabinet: under Afonso XII and the Regency they were three; in the following period (1902–23), four; during the Civil Directorate/ Dictablanda, two; under Franco, six; during the Transition, two; with the new democracy, the minister of Defence in the last Aznar cabinet (the only not strictly civilian reaching this position after the approval of the Constitution).

during the 1910s. He established direct contacts with the armed forces, and encouraged an atmosphere of mistrust and conflict to emerge between the political leaders and their followers by supporting some and vetoing others. The combination of the distortion of the electoral process, the fragmentation of the leading parties and the monarch’s meddling in the cabinet formation process, meant that those forces that were either on the margins of, or external to, the dominant two-party system came to play an increasingly important role. The leaders of these forces had considerable prestige, and could, on occasion, work together to advocate constitutional


reform. Despite their small parliamentary representation, three of their leaders—Cambó, Ventosa and Pedregal—were appointed to cabinet positions after 1917 (Linz et al. 2000:384). The consequence of Alfonso XIII’s 1917 decision to ignore calls from dissenting parliamentarians and discontented trade unions for an overhaul of the Restoration’s political system and an enlargement of its social base was to be felt in 1923, when he was confronted by a crisis that was caused by the political system’s lack of legitimacy. His only alternatives for the resolution of this crisis were either to lead a programme of reforms, or accept a military dictatorship.19 Following Primo de Rivera’s ‘Velvet Glove’ coup, the King urged the leader of the military movement to form a new cabinet. While Alfonso XIII had the right to nominate his own cabinet, the fact that parliament was not recalled within the time limits established by the Constitution allows us to assess his action to have been unconstitutional. Originally shaped in the form of a Military Directory, in which Primo de Rivera—a member of the agrarian aristocracy of Jerez who had inherited the title of Marqués de Estella created in the Carlist wars—reserved both access to the King and the authority to issue decrees to himself. Attempts were made to institutionalize the new regime after the dissolution of the Cortes, through the creation of a single official party and a consultative National Assembly modelled loosely on the Italian fascist example. However, the chamber, which was established in 1927, had an extremely short life; and the single party never amounted to anything more than a patriotic association led by generally apolitical men whose primary interest was to obtain power. Primo de Rivera’s regime, therefore, destroyed the legal-rational component of the 1876 constitutional compromise, and led many people, even members of the old party elites, to question the role of the Crown to such an extent that they were not prepared to defend it (Maura 1981; Seco Serrano 1969; Ben-Ami 1983; Linz 1987; Artola 1988; Linz et al. 2000). The Dictatorship’s institutional ambiguities were significant. The regime’s very existence was in profound and permanent violation of the 1876 Constitution, yet it made continuous reference to it, and the persistence of some of the Constitution’s formal elements were combined with a complete lack of progressive institutional order and its persistence with ambitious constitutional projects. The regime was built on a tripartite base that included the Dictator, the King and the Army. Their reciprocal, yet unequal relationships constituted the regime’s legal basis. In order to best understand the ‘real and effective constitution’ of the Dictatorship, however, it is first necessary to assess the relative strengths of the main social forces that successively informed it: the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie, the financial and land-owning members, and the Maurist bourgeoisie (followers of the influential former Prime Minister who was the object of a Royal veto during the crisis of 1909). These forces initiated


the regime’s ideological evolution, pushing it towards a traditional stance, thereby giving birth to the Dictatorship’s institutional projects. These politicians, however, were unable to construct a constitutional formula that could appeal to the lower social classes while remaining acceptable to the middle and upper classes (Malerbe 1978). The Dictatorship perhaps precipitated, and certainly accelerated, the disintegration of the dynastic parties, hastening the disappearance of a political generation: an instrumental event leading to the establishment of the new Republic in 1931. When it made its first appearance in 1923, the Dictatorship did not enjoy the support of a mass movement, and nor was it able to create a real single party of the type that was appearing in Europe at the time. Thanks to the Dictatorship’s tolerance towards both PSOE and its trade union federation, the Unión General de Trabajadores (General Workers’ Union—UGT)—whose leaders Primo de Rivera had attempted to co-opt—the party was able to build the foundations that would lead to its becoming a mass party during the Second Republic. This third period combines three quite distinct cabinets following the two year Military Directory (1923–25), in which both the position of minister and under-secretary were suppressed. The first of these was Primo de Rivera’s only civilian government (3 December 1925–30 January 1930). The second government (30 January 1930–18 February 1931) was led by General Berenguer, who was appointed to the position by the King following Primo de Rivera’s resignation. This government—45 per cent of whose members had already served in cabinet during the Constitutional Monarchy—proceeded to introduce some limited liberalization. The third was Admiral Aznar’s short-lived government (18 February–14 April 1931), which was formed by political notables—including several former prime ministers and cabinet ministers—with the task of managing the transition to constitutional rule: a task in which they ultimately failed. Given these ‘internal’ distinctions within the period 1923–31, it is clear that, unlike the others in our study, there is no single identifiable regime type during these years. The Second Republic initially enjoyed extensive and enthusiastic popular support. Once the King left Spain, the Republicans who had in August 1930 agreed on the so-called Pact of San Sebastián—in which the participants agreed to establish a revolutionary committee and recognized the need to grant Catalonia autonomous status—formed a provisional government. The arrival of the Second Republic meant overcoming the agony of the corrupt Restoration, of Miguel Primo de Rivera’s so-called ‘iron surgery’, and the attempts to return to the absurdly described ‘constitutional normality’. The following analysis of Ramírez summarized the situation:


History and events prevented any return to the past. There was a new class—the proletariat—which was much more virulent than that which should be expected in such a poorly industrialized country. The UGT and the CNT, both as protagonists and as new agents of change, arrived at the gates of political and economic power, just as the bourgeoisie had done at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The intellectuals embarked on an extensive campaign in support of the Republic… The institutions of the monarchy suffered a catastrophic loss of prestige… Monarchists surrendered their ground to the Republic (no less a figure than Alcalá Zamora, who was supposed to assuage the fears of the Conservatives, became President of the new regime). A weak, but worthy republican bourgeoisie emerged, with Azaña at its head. The Republic was born, sponsored by such notable and varied patrons…, and was driven forward by the only seriously organized political party at that time: PSOE. Possibly once, when the time was right, and before it became diverted by its own internal factions, PSOE’s ‘big idea’ was to secure and maintain a Republic that was never to become a socialist Republic—despite the accusations of the monarchist right: accusations that were echoed and amplified in the ABC newspaper (Ramírez 2000:40–41). In marked contrast to the Dictatorship, which had governed without introducing any substantial reforms, both the Republicans and the Socialists clearly favoured innovation. In a political climate that was aggravated by the difficulties caused by the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the new political leaders experienced serious difficulties as they attempted to govern. They tried to resolve several long outstanding social and political problems, some of which had been ignored since they had first been raised during the country’s first democratic regime 60 years earlier. The Republic’s first concerns were: to improve working-class living conditions; to restructure the system of land ownership that condemned many peasant families in Andalusia and Extremadura to permanent misery and long periods of unemployment; to improve literacy rates and the socio-cultural condition of women; to contain the presence of the Catholic Church; to restore balance to an army that had too many officers for its size; and to produce a political settlement to the demands for Catalan and Basque selfgovernment (Linz 1978). While other European nations were able to achieve similar goals gradually, over decades, Spain’s new and inexperienced political class—in which 96.6 per cent of ministers and approximately 85 per cent of deputies were novices20—sought to effect all of these changes almost immediately. The 1931 Constitution was conceived to be a key enabling instrument for these radical transformations. By advancing many elements of the social state formula, and representing the ideals of humanist socialism—at


least in some of its key components—it heralded the beginning of a new democratic cycle in Spain after the failed experience of the Sexenio. Whilst technically successful in some aspects, such as the regulation of the problem of the regions and in the creation of the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees (which influenced Italy’s reconstruction after the Second World War), the Constitution’s two major mistakes were related to its attempts to deal with the religious question and, as we shall see below, the formula that regulated the relationship between the branches of power: between the executive and the legislative branches in particular. These errors clearly contributed to the death of Spanish democracy, the last in a chain of European democratic breakdowns that affected Italy, Portugal, Germany, and Austria. This also accounts for many of the distinctive features of the Spanish Republic’s crisis, including foreign intervention in the Civil War. That Spanish democracy survived the rise of fascism in other countries helps explain Spanish’s socialism’s unique response, as well as the fact that Spain and Portugal are the only countries in which the regimes established after the breakdown of democracy survived until 1976–77 and 1974, respectively. We should not forget that in both Spain and Portugal, the army played a direct role in overthrowing the democratic regimes, bringing their experience much closer to the Latin American pattern. Spain’s relatively high degree of political mobilization is in marked contrast to the Portuguese and Latin American examples, however, and, in this respect at least, resembles the European cases. Perhaps more than in any other case except Italy, the deep social cleavages and conflicts lay behind Spain’s political crisis (Linz 1978: 142 ff). The 1931 Constitution restored the unicameral parliamentary model of 1812, and although it created a regionalized state (the Estado Integral), the bicameral system was rejected as it only reminded its framers of the Restoration Senate. During previous constitutional periods the cabinet had developed into an informal collegiate body that was separate from the Crown: the 1931 Constitution institutionalized this separation for the first time. A complex system of checks and balances was created, leading to some functional confusions emerging between the President and the cabinet. The appointment of the Prime Minister and his cabinet was regulated by Section V (President of the Republic), article 75 of the Constitution: ‘The President of the Republic shall freely appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, and on his proposal, the Ministers. He shall necessarily dismiss them in the event that members of Cortes explicitly deny them their confidence.’ All such motions of confidence were regulated by article 64: The Cortes can decide a vote of censure against the government or one of its ministers. Every vote of censure has to be proposed and


seconded, and presented in writing, with the signatures of 50 serving deputies… The proposal may not be debated or any vote called until five days after its presentation. The government or the minister will not be obliged to resign where a vote of censure does not receive the approval of an absolute majority of all elected deputies (i.e. to pass, a motion of censure required 234 votes). The Constitution created a semi-presidential system in which the President was free to appoint and dismiss prime ministers without any need for parliamentary approval. The government remained in office unless defeated in a vote of no-confidence, which required an absolute majority. The system was one of dual confidence: no government could be formed against the wishes of the President, and none could stay in power against the wishes of a parliamentary majority. The President himself had only limited powers to dissolve parliament. There were only three censure motions called during the Second Republic —two of which were defeated in the vote. The third, a dubious ‘no confidence motion’, did manage to unseat a government. Only two of the governments that were formally presented to parliament received parliamentary assent without a vote being taken; nine presented themselves and received a vote of confidence, while one presented itself only to fail a motion of confidence, forcing its resignation. Five governments did not formally present themselves, one of which received an indirect vote of confidence, while two did not present themselves because Cortes had been dissolved. Given this, it is clear that we can neither speak of the Second Republic as a purely parliamentary regime, and nor can it be described as a strictly presidential one, although it made the creation of two consecutive presidential governments possible. The presidential government that was formed on 30 December 1935, while the Cortes was suspended, consisted of a Prime Minister and five ministers who were not deputies, and a further four ministers who represented minor parties. When this government was called to appear before the Cortes’s Permanent Council (Diputación Permanente), at the request of CEDA, it decided to dissolve parliament and call early elections to be held on 16 February 1936. There are fundamental differences between the republican period in Portugal 1910–26 and the Spanish Republic 1931–36. One is that Portugal did not expand suffrage—including women’s suffrage—the way Spain did. Equally if not more significant is the presence in Portuguese cabinets— including premiers and civilian ministries—of military officers and their absence from those positions in the Spanish cabinets. The cabinet could not control parliament since the President was only allowed to instigate two dissolutions during each mandate. For this reason, the executive was overly dependent on a chamber that obtained political


superiority while it was drafting the constitution. Nevertheless, government instability, with 19 cabinets in only five years, was more the result of the party system than a reflection of executive weakness in relation to parliament. The party system during the Second Republic was highly fragmented, particularly in the constituent assembly where several small regional, personalist and ideological Republican factions had sprung up during the brief period of increased liberalization after the fall of the dictatorship and the monarchy. The new regime was among the most significant examples of an open competitive structure, in which coalition governments were the rule. This meant that changes in government were commonplace between and within legislatures, as the parties of each different coalition were constantly changing in their search for a stability that was never achieved; consequently many of the coalition governments incorporated a large number of different political parties: for example, during the second legislature, which lasted from November 1933 to February 1936, there were ten different governments, each of which included at least four different parties, and almost all of which incorporated and excluded major parties (Table 3). Some time had to pass from the domination of the Left in 1931 before the Right could create a new mass party: CEDA (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas). This new party could, perhaps, be labelled conservative Demo-Christian; in addition, the old dynastic and ideological divisions between the Carlists, Alfonsists and the regionalist right (especially the Lliga) persisted. The Radicals, who, given their traditions and their electoral strength, had the potential to emerge as a large and powerful party of the centre, had to face both the competition from, and the attraction of the bourgeois anti-clerical left. This was particularly true following the 1933 elections, when they could only govern with support from CEDA. When faced with socio-economic issues, such as agrarian reform and collaboration with the Socialists, also split the bourgeois centreleft. The 1933 elections produced a conservative-centre majority that could have, theoretically at least, sustained governments until September 1937. In fact, however, it produced a number of unstable governments: a stalemate that led to the mentioned two presidential cabinets during which parliament was suspended and finally dissolved. It is not easy to explain the developments that occurred during the so-called bienio negro. One suggestion is that CEDA’s perceived ‘semi-loyalty’ to the regime—an assessment that is grounded in the party’s commitment to reform what they believed to be a partisan Constitution, while their opponents identified the Constitution with the regime itself—and, following CEDA’s entry into government, used this to justify the revolution of October 1934. The October 1934 revolution was also the first manifestation of the left’s ‘semi-’ or ‘dis-’ loyalty toward bourgeois democracy. Another factor was


the role of the presidential veto preventing CEDA’s access to executive power, its destabilization of some of the Radical governments, and its ultimately futile hopes of creating a new political centre, something unlikely to be successful with an electoral law that favoured polarized coalitions. All of these factors and the fractionalization of the party system at the centre combined to create a Sartorian type of polarized pluralism. The two major mass parties of the 1930s—PSOE and CEDA—were under-represented in government considering their parliamentary strength, their share of the electorate, and the extent of their support within organized institutional groups, such as the UGT and the Church. Both parties, and PSOE after 1933 in particular, were internally divided between those who wished to operate legally within a reformed system, and the ‘maximalists’ who no longer believed that the system deserved their loyalty, and who were eager to collaborate with the disloyal opposition: PSOE with the Communists, and CEDA with Calvo Sotelo’s monarchists. Their ambivalence, whether latent or open, made it difficult for these parties to aspire towards a share of government responsibility; in fact, accepting such responsibilities in the spring of 1936 would almost certainly have caused a split within PSOE. Their ambivalence towards the system also made potential partners mistrustful and reluctant to form coalitions with either of these parties. In the case of CEDA, the presidential veto prevented it from entering government and increasing its political influence. This is the main reason why most Second Republic governments were formed by the main centre-left and centre-right parties, the Izquierda Republicana and the Radicals; either in coalition with smaller partner parties or independents, or, in the case of Portela’s cabinet of 1935–36, by forming minority governments that incorporated people who were not members of parliament. PSOE’s only government experience was gained in the first four cabinets of the Republic; 881 days out of a possible 1,920. Just three of the 19 ministers in office during this time were PSOE members, although they did occupy some of the more important ministerial portfolios: Labour, Justice, Finance and Public Works. Despite being the second largest group in parliament, 387 days passed from the opening of the legislature before CEDA was given ministerial representation: a move that immediately provoked the Asturias Revolution of October 1934, a general strike, and the declaration of ‘independence’ by the Catalan regional authorities. CEDA’s involvement in cabinet lasted 436 days, and was limited to seven ministers at a time when there were a total of 19 individuals appointed to cabinet position. Nevertheless, CEDA’s influence within government, and the political system in general, was much greater than the number of portfolios its supporters obtained. That said, however, for almost one-third of the Second Republic, neither CEDA nor PSOE were represented at cabinet level, and, combined, only provided ten of the 89 individuals who occupied


the 238 ministerial positions that were created. These facts must be taken into account when looking at the subsequent tables as they indicate the existence of a considerable separation between the real social and the formal political power, and between the political and parliamentary leaderships and official government positions. The constraints imposed on the formation of coalitions, and the presence of both disloyal and ‘semi-loyal’ oppositions, support by abstention and not by votes of confidence, and the reluctance to call on the support of certain parties, led to the formation of governments in which even the larger centre-left and centre-right parties had to include individuals from minor parties. Azaña’s Acción Republicana (Republican Action—later renamed Izquierda Republicana) could count on the support of the Catalan Esquerra (Catalan Left)—which controlled the regional government in Barcelona—and the Galician regional party, ORGA, to construct stable coalitions. The Basques’ strong opposition to the regime’s early anticlericalism, and their suspicion of the right’s Castilian centralism prevented their main party, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV—Basque National Party), from providing a single member to any pre-Civil War cabinet. The Radical Party, led by Lerroux and his successors, faced a difficult task in late 1935 when they were called to construct a coalition. Lerroux’s break with Azaña, in whose first cabinet he had participated, and his desire to incorporate the Catholic masses who had been alienated from the Republic, made coalitions with centre-left Republicans impossible. The Radicals’ only potential partners were either small personalist factions, or, in the case of CEDA, too far to the right for some of its followers. This resulted in a period of considerable political instability both prior to and following the 1933 elections, when 25 new ministers entered cabinet in just 387 days (compared with a total of 19 during the previous 881 days). The Radicals’ coalition with CEDA—which was always an uneasy alliance—was as distasteful to an ideologically Catholic party as the earlier alliance of Acción Republicana with the Socialists had been to many bourgeois left-republicans. This effectively forced the Radicals to seek alliances with minor parties like the Agrarians, the Catalan Lliga and leading independents; these groups often exacted a heavy price for their support. Under these circumstances, the President attempted to exert his influence over the cabinet formation process. PSOE’s refusal to enter government following its participation in the victorious Popular Front electoral coalition of February 1936 forced Azaña and his successor, Casares Quiroga, to govern in a minority coalition that included the Esquerra and the more moderate Unión Republicana (Republican Union). The added parliamentary representation of Izquierda Republicana (87 deputies), Esquerra (36) and Unión Republicana (39) gave the coalition a total of 162 votes from a total of 474. This coalition


government was confronted with the series of crises that culminated in the Civil War. If we consider PSOE, Acción Republicana in 1931 (on account of Azaña’s leadership), Izquierda Republicana in 1936, the Esquerra (because of its regional dominance), the Radical-Socialists in 1931 (because of their parliamentary strength), the Radicals and CEDA as the major parties of the Second Republic, then we note that, between them, they only provided 55 of 89 ministers and 93 out of a total of 238 ministerial portfolios. Despite the political fragmentation, the proliferation of small parties of the centre and the strength of the various regional parties, the separation between the left and the right was clear. Only four individuals served as ministers in the Republican-Socialist governments of the early Republic and in the Radical-dominated governments of 1933–36 as well as the Popular Front cabinet of spring 1936. One of this small number was Alejandro Lerroux, the old leader of the Radicals; another was one of his followers, Martínez Barrio, who responded by forming the Unión Republicana; the third was another member of the Radicals, who followed Martínez Barrio out of the party, while the fourth was a serving army general whose participation in cabinet was professional rather than political. Not one of the centre parties was able, after the autumn of 1934, to participate in the formation of alternative coalitions (Allgemeinkoalitionsfähigkeit) in the way that the Radicals had in France during the Third and Fourth French Republics, or as some Christian Democratic parties have been able to do in post-war Europe. One of the reasons that may explain this failure is that, except in a few districts, the electoral system effectively forced the minor parties to enter electoral coalitions. Another explanation is the ideological nature of Second Republic politics, and the ambivalent attitude of many political leaders towards parties they believed were only ‘semi-loyal’ to the Republican system: PSOE and CEDA. The two mass parties did not help matters by behaving in a manner that only served to confirm many of their opponents’ suspicions (Linz 1967b). Conflicts between the various political personalities made it even more difficult for some individuals to serve together in cabinets that reflected only small policy shifts, or that acted as bridges between the different phases of the Republic: it is for this reason that we can distinguish well-defined clusters of individuals serving within the various cabinets. That great symbol of democratic instability, Germany’s Weimar Republic, from its creation in 1919 to the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor—up to and including the unstable presidential ministries of 1932–33—had a total of 264 cabinet positions, either as ministers or as members of the Peoples’ Representatives Council (Rat der Volksbeauf tragten). A total of 99 individuals occupied these 264 portfolios during the 14 years of the Weimar Republic’s existence. In comparison, in the five-year life of the Second Spanish Republic, from its creation on 14 April 1931 to


the Nationalist insurrection of 18 July 1936—a total of 63 months—89 individuals occupied 238 ministerial positions (seven of which were partial changes). On this basis alone, it would appear that the Spanish Republic was much more unstable than the Weimar Republic, upon which its Constitution was modelled (Linz, 1967b; and our data). Significantly, during the crisis of 1936—at a time when the parties were becoming increasingly polarized and their leaders displaying greater animosity towards one another—some of the more moderate politicians came to believe that ministries led by personalities and with emergency powers were the only way to overcome the difficulties. Later, as the army’s 17 July pronunciamiento threatened to drag the country towards Civil War, Martínez Barrio—the most centrist of the bourgeois left politicians— who had been charged by President Azaña to form a government, proposed a coalition cabinet that included General Mola, one of the leaders of the insurgency. Almost certainly a last desperate attempt to defuse the situation, it was condemned to failure with Mola’s alleged response: ‘Ni usted ni yo podemos echarnos airás’ (Neither you nor I can turn back the clock). Nevertheless, the fact that the attempt was made reflects the importance that all attributed towards the cabinet as the locus for political integration. From 1931 to 1936, none of the extremist movements—the anarchosyndicalists (a mass ideologically driven trade union movement), the Communists, fascists, the traditionalist or authoritarian monarchists— participated in government. Their time was to come in the wake of the polarization that destroyed the regime and which had crystallized in the Civil War. It was then that the extremists entered governments on each side of the conflict. There were a total of six cabinets led by four different Prime Ministers during the Civil War—including Martínez Barrio’s ephemeral 24 hour cabinet. Most of the members of this short-lived ministry and its successor, which was led by Giral, and which survived until September 1936, were either left-republican deputies (three had been deputies at the time of the Constitutional Monarchy) or former ministers (one was a member of Esquerra; another was an independent left-republican whose father had served as a minister during the last Regency). Only one portfolio in Martínez Barrio’s cabinet, that of War, was held by a serving officer in the armed forces; in Giral’s ministry, serving officers occupied both the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Interior. The other two cabinets, which were led by the socialists, Largo Caballero (a veteran UGT leader) and Negrín, were larger coalitions that systematically excluded the military from their ranks. These ministries incorporated two communists, then in early September, a representative from the Basque PNV A few weeks later, and following the precedent set by the Catalan Generalitat, four anarchist leaders were included. The entry of the Basque nationalist as a Minister


without Portfolio was part of an agreement made by Largo Caballero that promised the immediate enactment of the Basque autonomy statute. Basque autonomy was approved in early October, at parliament’s first meeting following the outbreak of the Civil War—a meeting that was attended by approximately 100 deputies: most of whom represented Popular Front coalition parties. The exit of the CNT and UGT ministers during Negrín’s first cabinet came about in response to the refusal of the trade union organizations to collaborate with the government. In August 1938, the sole PNV minister, Irujo, resigned in protest at Negrín’s policy towards the Church and the repression of the Marxist POUM. The resultant reshuffle brought in another CNT leader and a new Basque nationalist to join Negrín’s final ministry; however, the former was accused of being a ‘negrinista’, while the latter was a member of Acción Nacionalista Vasca (Basque Nationalist Action—ANV), and not the PNV The number of manual workers occupying ministerial office was large in all of the Civil War governments, with the exception of Negrín’s second ministry (April 1937–April 1938). Largo Caballero’s second ministry included six manual workers— excluding the Prime Minister, who had been a professional politician since 1904—the highest proportion of any Spanish cabinet. Largo Caballero’s second ministry also included a woman, with the anarcho-syndicalist Federica Montseny occupying the Ministry for Health and Social Assistance and becoming the first woman minister in any southern European country. As a consequence of the insurgents’ assault on the capital, both the government and parliament transferred to Valencia in early November 1936. Parliament sat very rarely, and held its final session in Figueras (near Gerona) when the war was almost over. In the meantime, right wing deputies had abandoned parliament, with a significant number either being arrested or shot during the first weeks of the Civil War. Considering the circumstances, and the fact that many of the war-time cabinets did not have the opportunity to obtain the support of the legislature, to talk of parliamentary—let alone democratic—government would be misleading. Interestingly, however, the large majority of Civil War Republican ministers were parliamentary deputies; the only significant exceptions being (if we exclude the few military ministers) during Largo Caballero’s second government, which included CNT ministers, and Negrín’s final government (the last Republican war ministry) which incorporated five ministers who had never been elected to parliament. Apart from Hungary, the Civil War republican governments were the only European ones west of the Soviet border in which Communists held cabinet position, and the only ones ever to have included anarcho-syndicalist ministers. There are important facts that we must emphasize in any comparison between governmental structures during the 1930s with either the


Constitutional Monarchy or the Dictatorship. Firstly, and with the exception of Chapaprieta’s and Portela’s governments of late 1935, there was a significant increase in the size of ministries from their original 9–11man membership. This was particularly true of Lerroux’s first Radical governments, and of the Civil War cabinets, where the size of the cabinet reached 18 members, Prime Minister included. The actual size of cabinet had not altered from early 1860 to March 1918, when an additional ministry was incorporated, raising the total size of cabinet from nine to ten ministers (see Table 2). Similarly, there were no significant alterations in portfolio titles during this period, apart from the introduction of Education during Silvela’s second ministry in 1900. (The number of portfolios remained at nine since, with the loss of the Philippines and its last colonies in America, the Overseas Ministry was abolished.) The introduction of Ministers without Portfolio, which first appeared during the Radical-CEDA coalition government of October 1934, became increasingly common, particularly during the Civil War when its use was dictated by the necessity to construct stable coalitions. The Republic introduced a number of new ministerial portfolios: Communications (which had a precedent in the Provisional Government); Health, which was created in September 1935, and was closely related to the Ministry of Labour; Propaganda, created during Largo Caballero’s second government; and the expansion of the Navy Ministry to include Air (to become the Naval and Air Ministry) during the Civil War. Nevertheless, this tendency to create new ministries was not novel; it had been practised during the 1920s when equally important ministries were established, such as the Ministry of Labour in 1920, and the National Economy Ministry that was created at the end of the Dictatorship—not to mention the expansion of the Labour ministry to include Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión). Primo de Rivera introduced another systemic innovation with the creation of the office of Vice President (Deputy Prime Minister) in 1925, and while this disappeared with his fall from power, it was to be revived temporarily in 1933–34 and 1938–39 (during Lerroux’s second government and Franco’s first government, respectively), and permanently in July 1962. While the Republic may have awoken the hopes of the Spanish people, the outcome of the Civil War meant the destruction of Spain’s democracy and the installation of Western Europe’s second most durable dictatorship, after neighbouring Portugal (Linz 1978). Franco’s regime, like the one it displaced, represented almost complete ministerial discontinuity from that which had preceded it (Tables 1 and 3). Only Primo de Rivera’s Civil Directory, in which all ministers were novices to that position, had a greater level of ministerial discontinuity. Not one of Franco’s ministers had served at that rank during the Second Republic: the only two with previous ministerial experience, General Martínez Anido and


Eduardo Aunós, had both served under Primo de Rivera. (This situation is altered slightly if we consider the parliamentary experience of Franco’s ministers, where a total of 11 had been deputies: six during the Republic; two during the Constitutional Monarchy; with a further three having served in both—representing approximately nine per cent of Franco’s ministers. However, it should be noted that two of these former deputies were military officers, while a third, Serrano Suñer, was Franco’s brotherin-law.) Moreover, with the exception of Serrano Suñer, not one of this small number of Franco’s ministers was appointed a second time. Aware of Primo de Rivera’s lack of success in obtaining the support of Restoration politicians by rewarding them with ministerial office, Franco was to make no special effort to restore specialist politicians from the past, either to occupy second level administrative positions (Jerez, 1982), or to sit in his largely self-appointed corporatist Chamber. Only 8.4 per cent of the Asamblea Consultiva’s (Consultative Assembly) 359 members, and 3.1 per cent of the 992 individuals elected to one of the Republic’s three parliaments sat in Franco’s non-democratic Cortes, which had more than 550 members in each of its ten legislatures—and most of these had been members of the 1933 parliament (Linz 1972, 1979). One of the defining characteristics of Franco’s regime as an authoritarian regime—without denying the existence of totalitarian tendencies within it— was its ‘limited pluralism’ (Linz, 1964, 2001). It was a pluralism that included not only those social forces that occupied the conservative side of the political spectrum, that is, the professional officer corps, the Church, and certain economic interests: it also incorporated people from a range of political backgrounds who had several different aspirations. The concept of society, its institutional goals and social linkages that were expressed by the Falangists, the Traditionalists, the authoritarian Catholics in both the Asociación Católica National de Propagandistas (Catholic National Association of Propagandists—ANCdeP) and Opus Dei, and the Monarchists, were quite different, often conflicting, and had their roots in society before the regime. Such diversity was not incompatible with loyalty to the Caudillo and was used by him as he consolidated and maintained himself in power. The regime’s ‘limited pluralism’ meant that people connected to and supported by different groups entered into a sort of ‘coalition government’ whose members were chosen by Franco. These members were not chosen to represent their supporters, and they all had to swear their undying loyalty to the Caudillo. The main aim of the large negative coalition that supported the Alzamiento (uprising) was to put an end to democracy in Spain: the overthrow of a system that had allowed the introduction of policies that were a direct threat, or, at the very least, in opposition to their interests. These policies were varied, and extended to education, church-


state relations, army reform, political decentralization, labour laws, agrarian reform and so on. While Italian Fascism provided more inspiration to the Franco regime than Salazarism (Costa Pinto 2002:437ff.), the political strength of Franco’s regime lay with the army and the Catholic Church—to a much greater extent that in either Italy or Nazi Germany, where the army was clearly subordinate to the regime party. Franco created an institutional system that included bodies such as the Junta Política (Political Committee) and the Consejo Nacional de FET-JONS (FET-JONS National Council)— the official name for the party that had been created by Franco out of the fusion of José Antonio Primo de Rivera’s small fascist party, Falange Española (Spanish Phalanx—the Falange) and Comunión Tradicionalista, the corporatist Cortes and the Council of the Realm. The 50 member National Council was appointed by Franco in October 1937 to represent the new political factions; three of its members were women. Thirteen members of this body were to go on to attain ministerial rank: three Falangists out of its 18 members, including the Falangist sympathizer, General Yagüe; two Traditionalists from 11; one Monarchist from five; one former CEDA deputy, Serrano Suñer; four military officers from eight (including Yagüe); and two others from the remaining five who did not fall into any of these categories. Although FET-JONS had become a largely empty bureaucratic apparatus by the 1940s, many of its ancillary organizations (particularly the vertical unions) were to continue playing an important role until the end of the regime. All of these institutional bodies were created through a series of ‘Fundamental Laws’, which the regime used in its attempt to institutionalize itself as a representational system different from the pluralist Western democracies without, however, making the regime’s official single-party the dominant power centre within the system. Corporatist ideologies would serve Franco and his supports as they created the political institutions they hoped would continue after Franco’s death. As is usual in authoritarian regimes, none of the legal texts recognized the separation of political power between the legislature, executive and the judiciary: sovereignty neither rested within, nor was it shared with, the legislature (Linz 1979). According to Article 22 of the Ley Orgánica del Estado (State Organic Law): ‘The institutional system of the Spanish state is based on the principles of unity of power and co-ordination of functions’, while Article 6 states that: ‘The head of state is the supreme representative of the nation, personifies national sovereignty, exercises supreme political and administrative power, is vested with the national leadership of the Movement…[and] guarantees and insures the regular functioning of the senior organs of the state and the proper co-ordination between such organs.’


The Regime’s cabinet, which Franco presided over every week—even when he was on holiday—was the real centre of power in a manner that was in stark contrast to the situation in other dictatorships, such as the Soviet Union (where the Communist Politburo was the supreme body), Fascist Italy (where the Fascist Grand Council functioned in parallel with the cabinet), and Nazi Germany (where Hitler made unilateral decisions). Furthermore, when ministers enjoyed Franco’s confidence, they were often allowed to exercise a considerable degree of autonomy in their areas of competence: although this was perhaps less true in certain strategic ministries, such as Defence and Foreign Affairs, etc. To be a minister under Franco meant that one had reached the apex of power: FET-JONS’s Political Committee was never a threat, and for years was moribund. Frequent cabinet reshuffles were Franco’s main means of implementing policy changes. Through them, the Caudillo altered the regime’s internal balance of power by weakening one of its ‘political families’, while strengthening another. The single party was itself represented by the Minister-Secretary of FET-JONS (later renamed the Movimiento) who discussed party affairs either within cabinet or directly with Franco. Franco’s first regular cabinet was formed at the beginning of 1938 to substitute the administratively weak civilian Junta Técnica del Estado (State Technical Committee) that had been created in October 1936.21 Serrano Suñer, who displaced Nicolás Franco as Secretary of the Executive and accumulated the Interior Ministry, played a decisive role both in creating this ministry and in shaping its political orientation in the direction of Italian Fascism. As was true of all of Franco’s governments, this first ministry was a coalition of many—but not all—of the forces supporting the Nationalist cause; nevertheless, not all of Spain’s many rightist tendencies were involved, and those that were, did not necessarily obtain representation proportional to their electoral strength during the Republic (Tusell 1992). The distribution of portfolios established a pattern that was to be repeated throughout the dictatorship’s existence, without it actually becoming a rule: the Falange occupied the ‘social’ ministries: Agriculture and Syndical Organization; the Traditionalists received the Ministry of Justice (which was responsible for the regime’s relations with the Church); two of the more technical portfolios—Budget and Public Works—went to the moderate Monarchists who had been radicalized into extreme rightwing positions during the Republic; the third technical ministry—Industry and Commerce—was occupied by a Naval Lieutenant Colonel of engineering who was born and raised in the Galician naval town of El Ferrol at roughly the same time as Franco. The Interior Ministry, which was divided into two separate portfolios in an experiment that was not repeated, was shared between Franco’s Falangist and ex-CEDA deputy brother-in-law, Serrano Suñer, and Martínez Anido, who died during the


war without being substituted as Minister of Public Order (Viver 1978; Jerez 1982). Of all the military officers called to political office by Franco, Martínez Anido, Gómez Jordana (Vice-President and Minister of Foreign Affairs), and Dávila (Minister of National Defence) were the only ‘old generation’ generals in his first cabinet. The military, however, continued to occupy important portfolios, even after Franco’s death and the end of his regime: these included the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (1939–40 and 1942–44), Interior (1941–73 and 1979–80), and those linked to the area of Defence (1939–79), as well as the office of Prime Minister until Carrero Blanco’s death in 1973. Moreover, military figures were frequent incumbents of the more technical ministries until the mid-1960. Additionally, General Muñoz Grandes occupied the new position of Minister Secretary General of FETJONS in the first government after the Civil War. The contentious Education portfolio was initially awarded to an extreme right-wing monarchist who was not linked to Church organizations, although it soon passed to another monarchist with clear pro-Church sympathies, and who remained in office throughout the 1940s. This first Franco ministry had a short life: during the regime, only Carrero Blanco’s 1973 government had a briefer existence. Following the end of the Civil War, the new regime issued a decree in August 1939 that reorganized the state’s central administration. The more important changes introduced by this law were: (a) The abolition of the office of Vice Prime Minister, although this was compensated for by the creation of the Subsecretaría de la Presidencia (Prime Minister’s Under-Secretary), which was granted ministerial rank in 1945. (b) The Ministry of Defence was divided into three separate portfolios; one for each branch of the armed forces, Tierra (Army), Marina (Navy), and Aire (Air Force). According to some interpretations this was done to increase the number of political appointments which could be used to reward the loyalty of their comrades-in-arms, as well as to reduce any potential opposition from senior ranking officers. (c) The Secretary General of the party was elevated to the rank of Minister. This portfolio was vacant twice: for 14 months (March 1940– May 1941), and for a much longer period at the end of the Second World War (until late 1948). Three months before its disappearance with the return to democracy, a law of 1 April 1977 renamed it the Ministro Secretario del Gobierno. This law reorganized the organs dependent on the National Council and established a new juridical order for its associations, officers and resources (Roman 1997:49–50). (d) Responsibility for labour relations was divided between the old Ministry of Labour and the Delegación Nacional de Sindicatos,


originally dependent on the General Secretariat of FET-JONS, and whose National Delegate was elevated to cabinet rank in 1969. While other ministries were to be added during the 1950s, the basic structure of the cabinet remained unchanged, albeit with three important exceptions. The first of these was the reintroduction of the office of Vice Prime Minister, the incumbent of which was a military officer until 1973. The second change separated the position of Prime Minister from that of Head of State, with Carrero Blanco being appointed to the former. Thirdly, in 1969 the leader of the official state syndicates (trade unions) was appointed to the cabinet as a Minister without Portfolio. There is no real agreement concerning the actual number of cabinets during the Franco Regime.22 Some authors contend that there was only one ministry with occasional changes of individual personnel until 1973, when Carrero Blanco was appointed Prime Minister. However, we believe that there were a total of 11 distinct ministries: the short Civil War ministry; the Gobierno de la Victoria (Victory Government); the September 1942 cabinet that was appointed in response to clashes between Falangists and Carlists as well as in consequence of developments taking place in the Second World War, which included three important appointments, including the pro-Allied Conde de Jordana who replaced the pro-Axis Serrano Suñer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the July 1945 cabinet, which was a reaction to the Allied victory, and which saw the exit of all those who could be perceived as obstacles to Spain’s approaches towards the victors, including the General Secretary of FET-JONS. Alberto Martin Artajo, formerly the General Secretary of Catholic Action, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position he retained until 1957, in the hope that he could act as a bridge between the regime and the Christian Democratic forces that were coming into ascendancy throughout liberated Europe (Linz 1964; Tusell 1984); with the exception of the 1962 government which lasted for three years, there were a total of five ministries between 1951 and 1973, each changing at five or six year intervals; Carrero Blanco’s 1973 ministry; and Arias’s government that ended with Franco’s death in November 1975. While the Organic Law established a five-year mandate for Prime Ministers, with the exception of Franco himself, no Prime Minister appointed after 1967 (the year the relevant law came into force) survived for more than three years: Carrero Blanco was assassinated, and after the death of the Caudillo, Arias offered his resignation to the King and was asked to continue as PM of a new cabinet. In the course of 40 years, a total of 120 individuals (including Franco) held at least one ministerial portfolio. The main factor in explaining any individual’s selection for ministerial office—and indeed the criteria for


attaining any senior political position under Franco—was the individual’s affinity with at least one of the ‘political families’. However, while this may be the main factor, it is not the only one: examples where independents participated as ministers were not infrequent, and links to more than one group or ‘political family’ usually facilitated a political career. The only a priori condition was absolute loyalty to General Franco, with even the slightest suspicion of anything less leading to immediate dismissal. Many of the other factors leading to ministerial positions being offered to individuals during the Franco regime are common to most political regimes: family ties; wealth; friendship; and membership of certain bureaucratic bodies—in other words, being well connected. Certainly, in an extremely personalist regime, and in a country in which cliques and power clans proliferated, the ‘best connected’—in terms of political usefulness—were the ones retained by Franco and other influential leaders around him. In reality, however, it was Franco who established the ground rules when, in October 1936, he appointed his brother Nicolás as Secretary of the State Technical Council, and when, one year later, he gave Serrano Suñer a large degree of autonomy in the formation of his new regime’s first government, allowing him to occupy the Interior Ministry and remain as Cabinet Secretary (Tusell 1992). He also tended to promote his comrades in arms from El Ferrol, his own birthplace, and those military leaders whose seniority was similar to his. Nevertheless, this in no way minimizes the fact that Franco was willing to reward personal competence and professional ability, particularly during the second half of his regime, in his choice of cabinet ministers (Jerez 1982, 1996). Leaving aside military and ideological factors, one of the main considerations adopted for appointing someone to Franco’s cabinet was his increasing use of, to use Parsonian terminology, ‘adscriptive achievement’. Irrespective of an individual’s social background, a brilliant academic record and success in the competitive examinations of any of the administration’s leading professional bodies—State Advocate (abogado del Estado), or a lawyer of the State Council (letrado del Consejo de Estado), for example—represented an ‘adscriptive’ mark. Often the accumulation of such achievements, including being a university professor or a member of one of the elite engineering professional bodies, was even more important than any nepotistic ties. Naturally, if these individuals had also had some form of relationship with either the Falange, the Catholic organizations— such as the ACNdeP—and later Opus Dei, or if they had entered the military judicial service, then this was counted as a bonus. Within the government, the Secretary General of the regime’s party occupied a special position. The Secretary General represented the integration of the single party into the state and its government, which through its various organizations (Press and Propaganda, the Women’s Section, the Youth movement, the Spanish University Union, etc.), and, for


some time within the public administration, increased its standing in the state’s estimation. With the advent of democracy, many of these activities were transferred to different ministries. There existed a certain dualism between the party’s General Secretary and the Interior Ministry, which incorporated a political factor—largely dominated by the large contingent of Falangists—in respect of nominating representatives at the provincial and local levels. Apart from the early years of the regime, none of FETJONS’s General Secretaries obtained the power enjoyed by their Italian Fascist counterparts. All of the ministers occupying the three military portfolios—Army, Navy and Air Force—were professional military officers. During the Constitutional Monarchy, the Ministries of War and of the Navy were often given to civilians, while that was the general rule during the Second Republic, where prominent civilian leaders, such as Azaña, Martínez Barrio, Lerroux and Gil Robles, occupied the Ministry of War. Even during the Republican Civil War cabinets, military officers occupied the Ministry of War only during the first two governments, being replaced by civilians for the remainder of the war, while the Navy portfolio—later Navy and Air —was held by civilians all the time. In addition to their monopoly of the military portfolios, military officers during the Franco regime were also appointed to other senior cabinet positions. For example, Admiral Carrero Blanco was Under-secretary to the Prime Minister (ministro subsecretario de la Presidencia) before being appointed Vice-president then Prime Minister, while Generals Gómez Jordana and Beigbeder were both Ministers of Foreign Affairs during the first years of the regime, and Navy Engineer Suances twice Minister of Industry and Commerce (1938–39 and 1945–51). Similarly, for many years, members of the armed forces legal services—men who also had other careers—held a number of important ministries, including Interior and General Secretary of FET-JONS (Table 4). Franco’s advancing years and his physical decline, which became apparent at the beginning of the 1970s, contributed greatly to the appearance of a large number of regime supporters who understood that it would be impossible for them to maintain the same level of political control following his death. In the meanwhile, the regime’s fragility became obvious. The contrast between the notable economic development of the 1960s and the lack of any political development was evident. This imbalance, a reflection of the regime’s crisis, generated a feeling of precariousness during the regime’s final years that were marked by judicial processes that had important international and domestic repercussions. For example, the ‘Burgos Trial’ of 1970, in which a military tribunal handed down nine death sentences (which were commuted by Franco, who came under very strong pressure to do so) and a total of 513 years imprisonment for the defendants who had been charged with terrorism; in 1973, nine leaders of


the illegal trade union movement, Comisiones Obreras (Workers’ Commissions—CCOO), were sentenced to a total of 150 years imprisonment at the ‘Trial 1001’ (Carr and Fusi 1981:146, 156). The regime’s feelings of fragility were reinforced towards the end of 1973, when ETA assassinated Franco’s recently appointed Prime Minister, Carrero Blanco. With the death of Franco on 20 November 1975, and Juan Carlos I’s ascension to the Spanish throne, Carlos Arias Navarro became the Prime Minister of a government that included some reformers, who favoured a slow and controlled transition towards democracy. Arias Navarro’s failure led to the King replacing him with Adolfo Suárez on 7 July 1976. Suárez had been a member of Arias Navarro’s government, and was made Prime Minister in accordance with the constitution that Franco himself had approved. His government’s immediate task, one that Suárez had assumed on accepting his appointment as Prime Minister,23 was to push ahead with the transition to democracy with the enactment of the Law for Political Reform in late 1976. This law provided for a constituent election to take place on 15 June 1977: the first competitive elections in Spain in 40 years.24 Suárez’s own new party, the Unión de Centra Democrático (Democratic Centre Union—UCD), won a plurality in these elections, and on 4 July 1977 he presided over the drafting of a new constitution and the organization of the March 1979 general elections, which his party also won. Following the municipal elections of 5 April 1979, Suárez formed his second government (which was the first constitutional democratic government since the Second Republic), and remained Prime Minister until his resignation in February 1981. The new democratic Constitution defined Spain as a Parliamentary Monarchy, making Spain the only kingdom in southern Europe. This document also granted autonomy status to three of Spain’s “historic nations”: Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, whilst allowing the rest of the country’s regions, and even some of its provinces, to seek autonomy within the state. Since 1983, a total of 17 Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomous Communities—CCAA) have been created, including Andalusia, Valencia and the Canary Islands, each with its own separate government. The accumulation of substantial administrative powers by the several CCAA has had a serious impact on the nature and definition of government in present day Spain. These effects can best be illustrated by examining the configuration of democratic Spain’s pluralist party system. Since 1977, there have been a total of eight elections to the bicameral Cortes, and many more for the country’s 17 autonomous parliaments. The elections have been held in conditions of complete normality, and in many cases have been largely unexciting. Politically, the elections have played a


vital role in the consolidation of Spain’s democracy, as they have encouraged inter-party competition and marked a definitive break with the country’s history of discontinuity, electoral fraud and political polarization, thus guaranteeing Spain’s admission to the select club of countries with stable and efficient democratic systems. Spanish elections are also significant at the theoretical level. The establishment of Spain’s new democracy places it among those countries with a history of discontinuous democratic party politics. Although there are some elements of continuity with the past, they have remained weak— not surprisingly so, given that the Republic fell in 1939 and Franco died in 1975, thereby surviving much longer than Mussolini, Salazar or Hitler. This also means that, as in the Greek and Portuguese cases, the return to party politics took place in a different historical context to that existing in Western Europe after the Second World War—Italy included—with the result that the Spanish parties and their patterns of interaction may be considered to be distinctively new. A feature that makes Spain quite unique in Western Europe is the fact that we must analyse party systems, rather than simply a party system. This situation reflects both the relevance of peripheral nationalisms and the series of major electoral changes that have marked both the transition to, and the consolidation of democracy. Spain is a multi-national, multi-cultural, and asymmetrical federal state (although there is some debate about this) in which the state party system coexists alongside a variety of regional party systems. In each of these, a particular nationalist or regionalist party (or parties) plays a decisive role; regional cleavages have a different impact on electoral behaviour, and different patterns of competition operate in both the Cortes and the regional parliaments. Moreover, over the last 20 years, major changes have taken place in both the format and the mechanisms of party competition at the national level, which allows us to distinguish three periods, each of which is characterized by distinct party systems or at least by different party formats. A fundamental change occurred in 1982 with the disappearance of the UCD, the party that had won pluralities in the 1977 and 1979 elections, and which had played a crucial role in the successful return to democracy. The resulting electoral realignment produced a change from a moderate multi-party system to one that seemed likely to develop into a predominant party system, led by PSOE. After a decade of Socialist dominance, there has been a return to the ‘moderate multiparty system’ at state level during the 1990s. The disappearance of the UCD, the changes of the identity of leading parties, and the series of distinct party formats are probably unique in the context of democratic politics in any European country (Linz and Montero 1999). From the beginning of the Second Restoration in the autumn of 1975 until the summer of 2002, Spain has had 11 different cabinets: the most recent of which was appointed in July 2002 by José María Aznar. The first


two (Arias II and Suárez I) were non-democratic, and non-party governments. The rest were all democratic one-party cabinets: Suárez II and III (UCD); Calvo Sotelo (UCD); González I to IV (PSOE); and Aznar I and II (PP). However, it could be argued that both the last González and the first Aznar cabinets were de facto coalition governments since they were supported by stable agreements with peripheral nationalist forces, particularly by the Catalan Convergència I Unió (Convergence and Union — CiU). In other words, these governments can formally be described as being minority cabinets, although not as substantive minority government. With respect to the formation of these minority governments, it is important to note that this invariably has obviated the need to negotiate with the third state party, whether by the leadership’s choice, or for reasons of ideological or leadership incompatibilities (for this latter, the case of González and the Izquierda Unida’s leader, Anguita, from 1986 to the late 1990s is instructive). The cabinets that emerged with the new democracy have the character of a true parliamentary government with similar features to those of other Western European parliamentary governments; however, as Bar said: ‘not surprisingly, a number of administrative features of the current Spanish government have been inherited from structures which pre-date the democratic monarchy, especially since the transition was smooth and orderly and did not cause any substantial break in the formal structure of the central public administration’ (1997:116). Concerning its size, the number of ministers reached its peak during the second year of Suárez’s last government, with a total of 26, including the Prime Minister. There were probably so many because of the need to satisfy different interests inside a party in which his leadership was being contested. In the PSOE government of 1982, the cabinet was reduced to 17, and has oscillated between 15 (in the first Aznar cabinet) and 19 ever since. The progressive devolution of powers to the Autonomous Communities—and the transfer of others to Brussels—has reduced the competence of many ministries, and can help explain the moderate size of more recent cabinets. The structural difference between PSOE’s cabinets and those of the transition, the UCD and the PP, is basically that in the former there was just one Vice Prime Minister who had little connection to any particular area of government (although the first Vice Prime Minister had control over his party throughout his eight years in office), while the Vice Prime Ministers of other governments, with the main exception of Suárez’s last ministry, held other ministerial portfolios. The form of government introduced by the new constitution is, like that of Germany, a rationalized parliamentary system in which the position of cabinet is formally pre-eminent and politically hegemonic; this preeminence being the result of both technical-constitutional and socialpolitical factors. Antonio Bar’s summary of the status of, and the


regulations governing the Prime Minister and cabinet in the 1978 Constitution—particularly in his most recent work on the Spanish cabinet— clearly demonstrates that Spain is now a parliamentary democracy in which the cabinet is, by and large, dominated by the Prime Minister (Bar 1985, 1997), while the executive is protected by a mechanism known as the ‘constructive vote of no confidence’ (Article 67 of Germany’s Constitution), which protects it from parliament. These rules, combined with a moderate multiparty system and considerable party discipline, have ensured the continued governmental stability that has been reflected in our data. During the first 25 years of Spain’s new democracy, cabinet stability, measured by prime ministerial longevity, has been greater than in any regime since 1833 (with the obvious exception of Franco), with a median duration of 34.7 months—37.1 months if we consider only the cabinets appointed after the Constitution (Table 3). It should be emphasized that all but two of them served their complete term. The two exceptions both occurred while the UCD had a parliamentary plurality: Suárez’s third government (the first government elected following the introduction of the new constitution), which ended with his resignation in February 1981; and the succeeding government led by Calvo Sotelo, which lasted for 22 months. The only Prime Minister who has not yet exercised his authority to call an early election is the present incumbent, Aznar. The duration of the rest of the legislatures has ranged from 33 to 43 months. Spain’s ‘reshuffle rate’, however, has been relatively high in comparison with other European countries during the post-Second World War period (Bar, 1997:131). There was much less stability during the transitional period, given that Arias’s second ministry did not last seven months, while Suárez’s first ministry only survived for one year. There have been a total of 130 individual ministers holding 254 portfolios between July 1977 and July 2002:51 in UCD, 53 in PSOE, and 28 in the PP’s governments.25 The transitional cabinets differ from those of neighbouring Portugal insofar as that in Spain these cabinets did not result in the total displacement of the previous regime’s elites. This was largely as a result of the differing nature of each countries’ transition: while in Spain the transition can best be described as being a ruptura pactada/reforma pactada (agreed break/agreed reform), Portugal’s transition was driven by a military coup. Consequently, there was an almost complete absence of a prominent military component (apart from the military portfolios during the earlier part of the process), and a greater willingness to incorporate leftwing opposition parties in Portugal. Only one former minister from the Franco regime,26 and nine from the transition period cabinets were to occupy ministerial office following the June 1977 elections. All of the latter nine had served in Suárez’s first cabinet, while three of them, Calvo Sotelo, Martín Villa and Suárez


himself, had been members of Arias’s first post-Franco ministry; none of these nine were to serve as ministers after 1982.27 Of the 33 ministers of this ‘pre-democratic’ transitional period, 85 per cent were newcomers to ministerial rank, including the Parliamentary Monarchy’s first two Prime Ministers, and the first to hold the newly combined Ministry of Defence portfolio (which incorporated the former Ministries of the Army, of the Navy and of the Air Force). However, the overwhelming majority of the 51 UCD ministers had previously occupied second or third level executive positions during the last years of Franco’s regime and the transition,28 and almost one-third of them had been members of the corporatist Cortes— although this proportion declines to roughly one-quarter if those holding ministerial position only after Franco’s death are excluded. (It should be borne in mind that according to the Ley de Cortes—Parliament Law—of 1942, all ministers appointed prior to the 1977 democratic election automatically obtained life membership—procuradores natos—of Franco’s Cortes) (Linz 1979). It is apparent that, on the whole, the UCD ministers were not a group of political novices. This becomes even more clear when we look at those who were identified as azules (blues), as opposed to the other three ideological groups within this young and ephemeral party; that is, the Christian democrats, the liberals, and the social democrats (Huneeus 1985; Hopkins 1999). Nevertheless, few of these individuals remained in active politics following the UCD’s defeat in the October 1982 elections, with only two of the 51 achieving ministerial position after this date: the social-democrat Fernández Ordóñez, who had occupied an important position during the last years of Franco’s regime, and who was included in González’s first cabinet; and the Christian democrat, Arias Salgado, who became a minister in Aznar’s first ministry. The arrival of PSOE to power in October 1982 marked a clear break, not only from Franco’s regime, but also from the transition period. This break continued at the national level until 1996 with the election of the Partido Popular (Popular Party—PP)—now with a new generation of leaders who had emerged during the late-1980s. Continuities with the predemocratic period have persisted within the local authorities, but in different proportions according to region; for example, 32.7 per cent of Galician mayors during the latter years of Franco’s regime, while only 14.7 per cent of Andalusian mayors, maintained that position after the first democratic municipal elections of April 1979. Data for both regions show a declining tendency in these figures during the 1980s, but again at clearly different rates: 20.8 and 17.3 per cent, in 1983 and 1989, respectively, in Galicia where both conservative and clientelist tendencies were stronger (an overwhelming majority of the Francoist mayors continuing during the new democracy were candidates in the lists of the state-wide national parties of the right or centre, in those of the moderate nationalists, or in those of


independent electoral coalitions, rarely on the left); and 5.6 and 2.6 per cent for Andalusia where the left got much better results (Márquez 1992, 1993). In terms of personnel, there is also a high degree of discontinuity between the memberships of Franco’s parliaments and those of the Parliamentary Monarchy. Only 12.9 per cent of parliamentarians elected in June 1977 had also been procuradores under Franco, although this does not take into account the 41 ‘royal’ senators—a designation that does not exist under the new constitution—16 of whom had been procuradores. The presence of former members of the corporatist Chamber, not all of whom were necessarily Franco supporters,29 declined substantially in the first elected parliament after the enactement of the Constitution (to 8.6 per cent), before disappearing as a consequence of the collapse of the UCD and the right’s poor electoral performance up to 1993 (the proportion of former procuradores amongst the centrist parliamentary deputies was only four per cent above the average, among the small parliamentary representation of Alianza Popular their number was about one-half of the group, while there was none among the socialist deputies).30 As would be expected given the length of time that had passed in Spain before its transition to democracy compared to both Italy and Germany, there are few parliamentary careers that began during the Second Republic being resumed under the new democracy. In addition, the presence of the former Republican deputies in the new chambers was largely symbolic since they did not play any significant role (Morán 1996). At the elite level, then, we can see that there was a clear breach with the past that was common within all parties at the national level, although it was less pronounced within both the UCD and the PCE (Spanish Communist Party), and relatively delayed within the PP. BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MINISTERIAL ELITE It is important to remember that the number of ministers is obviously greater for the more continuous and stable of the regimes we are examining here: the Constitutional Monarchy, the Franco Regime, and the post-1977 Parliamentary Monarchy, and for the shorter, unstable Second Republic. The transitional regimes—the civil period of the Dictatorship and the transition in its aftermath, the Civil War Republic and the post-Franco transitional regime—were all relatively short, and offered fewer opportunities for ministerial appointment (although the numbers were often quite significant given their brevity). Consequently, the percentages may be somewhat misleading.


Age and Gender Distribution Age at the time of first ministerial appointment is in part a reflection of regime changes. The rise to power of extremist groups (like the fascists), which generally attract the young, contrasts with the more continuous cursus honorum that prevails in stable regimes. It is therefore no surprise that in the Constitutional Monarchy a large number of ministers were over 50 years of age, particularly during the second period under Alfonso XIII. As we will see in more detail below, these ministers had gone through a process, which included a long period in parliament and other political offices, before rising to cabinet rank. In Primo de Rivera’s Civil Directory there were a few younger ministers; however our table, which combines the Civil Directory and the Berenguer and Aznar transition governments in which politicians of the traditional parties entered, shows the largest number of older ministers. We may be surprised to discover that the Second Republic, a new regime, should show a large number of older ministers in addition to those in the 30 to 50 age group. However, if we consider that many republican politicians had been in the opposition to both the Constitutional Monarchy and the Dictatorship for many years, and that they came to power not by revolution, but as a result of the breakdown of the previous regimes, then we should not be too astonished. In fact, some of the younger ministers were neither Socialists nor Republicans, but those of the CEDA, whose leader was aged 36 when he became a minister (Table 5). The governments of the Civil War Republic included the largest number of ministers under the age of 40, mainly members of the Communist Parties (Spanish and Catalan) and of the CNT. The data for the Franco Regime, which covers almost 38 years, reflect the entry of new young elites, just as we might expect with the presence of a fascist movement and the Civil War generation; however, we also note a significant ageing as the regime stabilized and ministerial rank was obtained through a cursus honorum process. The brief reforma/ruptura transition to democracy during the 1970s was not led by a new and young elite—with the exception of Prime Minister Suárez (who was born in 1932) and a few of his colleagues. Suárez’s relative youth was quite probably one part of the explanation for the hostility that he encountered. The Parliamentary Monarchy presents the most radical generation shift of all the regimes analysed, with an average age of 44.7 years, and with 81 per cent attaining office before their fiftieth birthday. Very few of the Parliamentary Monarchy’s ministers were more than children during the Civil War, and of those that were, none served under the PP. With the exception of the two military officers who served in Suárez’s democratic governments, no recent minister took part in the Civil War (although one of PSOE’s ministers fought in the French Resistance and was interned in


TABLE 5 AGE DISTRIBUTION, AVERAGE AGE, AND PRESENCE OF WOMEN (%)*

*

Age at time of the first appointment. Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. N=Number of individuals

Buchenwald concentration camp). This is not entirely surprising given the emergence of new parties, such as the UCD, and the renewal of both PSOE’s and the PP’s leaderships prior to their electoral victories, not to mention the relative youth of the three Prime Ministers at the time of their first appointment (Suárez, 43; González, 40; Aznar, 43), and the progressive exclusion of the previous political elites, that was completed following PSOE’s electoral victory in October 1982. According to some interpretations, the pattern of Spain’s transition to democracy reflects a number of generation divides. In general terms, these divides relate to the generation of politicians that emerged during the 1950s, whose main tasks involved dismantling the Franco Regime and paving the way for the restoration of democracy. Meanwhile, the generation that emerged during the 1960s entered the ranks of the opposition in order to fulfil their no less historic task of installing the left in power in 1982,31 whilethe arrival of Aznar’s team at Moncloa in 1996 represented the incorporation of the first generation to emerge in a post-dictatorial context. As in most countries around the world, ministers in Spain have until recent times invariably been males—with the above mentioned exception of the anarchist, Federica Montseny, who attained this rank during the first year of the Civil War. A further 45 years were to pass before the next woman entered the cabinet as Minister of Culture in the final UCD government, and almost six more before González appointed two women to his government as Minister for Social Affairs and Government Spokesperson (appointments that were made in the wake of PSOE’s 1988


Congress, which passed a resolution reserving for women 25 per cent of the positions on all of the Party’s ruling bodies—this almost certainly provided the ‘moral’ impetus for González’s appointments). In each of the three examples given above, the ministries to which women were appointed were all created ad hoc, of a generalist nature and of limited importance, which was a faithful reflection of the degree of specialist knowledge that Spanish women had had until fairly recent times. Women in Spain simply had not had the opportunity to take up political careers (Bar 1989:69–70). Although the number of female ministers increased in 1993 and again in 1996, women never accounted for more than 23.5 per cent of the total. In 1999, their numbers fell before stabilizing in subsequent years. Since 2000, women have made up more than 30 per cent of the membership of both houses of parliament (Congress and Senate), and from 1999 and 2000 respectively, the leader of Congress and of the Senate have been women. Women equally account for over 30 per cent of Spain’s representatives to the European parliament (Anuario El País 2000). The presence of women in the parliaments of the Autonomous Communities is also increasing at different rates: 35 per cent of Andalusian deputies and 40 per cent of Valencian deputies are women (Anuario El País, 2001; Coller 1999:196). The political importance of the ministerial positions occupied by women has also improved during both of the PP’s governments, with portfolios such as Education, Justice, Science and Technology, and even more recently Foreign Affairs, being added to the social portfolios that were previously considered to be the only ones suitable for women. Geographical and Regional Origins The geographical and regional origins of the ministerial elites—using place of birth as an indicator—has changed throughout the years, partly as a result of demographic changes. As the number of ministers born in Madrid has increased, the numbers born in Spain’s former colonies has dwindled to zero. As can be seen in Table 6, the number of ministers who were not born in a major city represented less than one-third of the total in all periods except the early Restoration and the Second Republic. In this latter period, 45 per cent of ministers were from rural or semi-rural areas. Ministers of the two most recent periods have come overwhelmingly from urban areas, accounting for practically two-thirds of the total. Table 6a presents figures on the regional distribution of ministers according to their place of birth: specifying the over- or underrepresentation of each area in relation to its share of the population close to the time of birth. As in most countries, the over-representation of the capital is a constant. However, according to our calculations, Madrid was much more over-represented during the transition and most of the older


TABLE 6 PLACE OF BIRTH OF MINISTERS (%)

*

Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. Provincial capital and other important cities, sometimes with more population than the provincial capital (i.e., Vigo).

1

regimes than it has been during the Parliamentary Monarchy. During these earlier regimes, the proportion of ministers born in the capital was around six times its share of the population, while during the two republican periods the capital provided approximately 75 per cent more ministers than its proportion of its population. In view of the autonomist/nationalist sentiments in Catalonia and the Basque Country, the presence or absence of ministers with roots in these areas is particularly interesting. The Catalans obtained their most significant representation in the two Republics (roughly 15 per cent) and the Parliamentary Monarchy (8.5 per cent). During the 1930s Catalans were over-represented, something that can partially be explained by the very positive relationship that Azaña developed with the Esquerra leader, Companys, and—for the Civil War period—by the failure of the military uprising in Barcelona that secured both the city and most of Catalonia for the Republic until January 1939.32 The Basque Country was poorly represented during the Constitutional Monarchy, which is not surprising given that so many Basques voted for the Carlists and other Catholic ‘nondynastic’ parties. This fact did not affect Navarra in that period, however, where support for the Traditionalists and the PNV limited their


representation in the mainly anti-clerical Republican cabinets. This was not a problem during the Civil War, however, when both regions were overrepresented by up to 2.5 times their share of the population. Contrary to the image of a Castilian dominated Spain, the CastilianLeonese heartland was not strongly represented in either the Constitutional Monarchy or the Dictatorship’s cabinets. During the Second Republic, the picture was similar to that of the second Restoration period (10 per cent of ministers from 15 per cent of the population). Curiously enough, under Franco Old Castile and León’s representation declined even further, and only recovered during the transition of the 1970s. Now, in a period during which the region’s population is in decline, it is slightly over-represented in government for the first time. Spain’s largest region, Andalusia, has always had a significant presence in the ministerial elite; nevertheless, it has been greatly under-represented in proportion to its population since the Second Republic, and particularly so during the transition to democracy. The fact that Felipe González, who was born in Seville, was Prime Minister for 13 years of the current regime, has done little to help Andalusian representation. Another populous region, Galicia, which is famed for its networks of political bosses (caciques) and local notables, has also been under-represented, except during the Dictatorship—probably because this was Franco’s home region—and the last transitional period. Valencia and Murcia, which are the last of the populous regions, fared well during the Second Republic because of their strong support for bourgeois republican parties—the Radicals in particular; since then, however, they have been seriously under-represented at the ministerial level. All of this presents us with an overall picture in which no region has been totally excluded from the government of Spain, and no region has been able to dominate. The support of regimes, the personal ties of political leaders, and the presence of anti-dynastic and nationalist parties all combine to affect—to some extent—regional representation in government. Educational Credentials As can be seen from Table 7, the overwhelming majority of ministers, with the exception of those in office during the Civil War Republic, have been university graduates. While an overall majority of ministers studied law, during the Second Republic there was a substantial proportion of humanities graduates. During the Franco Regime, a large number of ministers had engineering degrees, while during the Parliamentary Monarchy there has been a high proportion of economics graduates (Table 7a).


TABLE 6a REGIONS OF BIRTH OF MINISTERS AND LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION (%)*

* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. = signifies that representation is equal to proportion of the total population > signifies that the area was over represented < signifies that the area was under represented (differences lower than 0.5%, or 1% in regions with over 10% of the national population, are ignored) Source: Censo de población de hecho por municipios y periodos. Madrid, Institute Nacional de Estadística, 2002. According to data available, the year 1900 was taken as reference for ministers of the first five periods. For the Franco regime, Transition to democracy and Parliamentary Monarchy, 1910, 1930 and 1950, respectively.


TABLE 7 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF MINISTERS (%)*

*

Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

The University of Madrid’s status as Spain’s main higher education establishment is reflected in the presence of a larger number of its graduates in the various cabinets. While the proportion has varied—slightly fewer during the first part of the twentieth century, slightly higher during the Parliamentary Monarchy (a partial reflection of Madrid’s demography) —Madrid graduates have been ever present. During the Second Republic, the increased number of Catalan ministers led to a rise in the proportion of graduates from the University of Barcelona. Graduates of private universities, and the Jesuit University (which was granted official recognition by Primo de Rivera) in particular, were present during the Dictatorship, the Franco Regime and the transition to democracy. The presence of a graduate from the Jesuit University in Civil War Republic cabinets may seem incongruous, especially given the regime’s anti-clerical policies; however, it can be explained by the presence of a leader of the PNV, Irujo. Of the few Constitutional Monarchy ministers who had studied abroad, almost all had done so in France. The number of ministers with foreign degrees increases slightly during the Republic, as a number of them had obtained fellowship that took them to Germany; however, France continued to be the preferred destination in this category. There were many more ministers with foreign degrees in the Franco Regime, when the United States makes its first appearance as a destination. The US became a more popular destination with the transition to democracy and during the Parliamentary Monarchy, although for all this time France has remained the location of choice. Many of the biographies that have been written about, and the autobiographies that have been written by ministers of the Parliamentary Monarchy, indicate that a large number of ministers have


TABLE 7a FIELDS OF HIGHER EDUCATION OF CIVILIAN MINISTERS (%)*

*

Multiple coding has been applied as some ministers held degrees in two or more academic fields, therefore percentages may not total 100.

studied abroad at some time in their educational career. This is a major change from the relative isolation of Spanish elites during the earlier periods (Table 7b). Occupational Profile The affinity between politics and government and the legal profession, and its decreasing importance in recent times, can be found in all countries. The emergence, and even dominance, of other professional specializations is confirmed in the Spanish data. As can be seen from Table 8, the number of lawyers is particularly large during the second phase of the Constitutional Monarchy—reflecting the stable and continuous cursus honorum—and continues to be significant in the Republic, before diminishing during the Franco regime (although many senior civil servants and university professors of this period also had legal training, with some possibly having practised law).


Ever since the nineteenth century, university professors have always been present in the ministerial elite. However, this occupational group was to gain real ascendancy with the advent of the Second Republic. Their presence did not decline during the Franco regime, reflecting the political diversity of academic professions. The number of professors declined during the transition to democracy, before coming back strongly in the Parliamentary Monarchy, where they account for 40 per cent of all ministers—one fifth of those who served in PP cabinets—not all with full tenure. School teachers have not made much impression within the ministerial elites, with the one minor exception of the Second Republic, where the rise of the provincial middle class was also reflected in the number of middle ranking civil servants, notaries and property registrars— two occupations that are somewhere between liberal professional and civil servant. There has also been a dearth of engineers within the ministerial cadres. The most striking development of the last 25 years, however, is the extremely rapid growth in the number of economists. The presence of military officers, particularly during the non-democratic periods, is significant; although we should remember that cabinets were substantially smaller during the earlier periods, and that military officers very rarely occupied civilian ministries. We should also note that a third military portfolio was created in 1939 and existed until 1977—giving more opportunities to the men in uniform. The most significant development was their dramatic decline with the onset of the Second Republic, during which both military portfolios were normally held by civilians, and yet again during the Parliamentary Monarchy, with the concentration of the three military ministries into the single Ministry of Defence, which since 1979 has been held by civilians (although Aznar recently appointed a former Navy lawyer to this position—see Table 4). Curiously enough, no other legal staff members of any of the armed services—all of whom have a second profession—has held a military portfolio during the period being examined. It is only during the Constitutional Monarchy and the Franco Regime that armed forces’ lawyers have been in cabinet, with some occupying the Interior and other positions, including that of Prime Minister during the second Restoration period, when García Prieto led the government four times. Two General Secretaries of Franco’s Movimiento were also armed forces’ lawyers over a combined period of 20 years. Some of the officers that became ministers during the Franco Regime had retired during the Second Republic, and had exercised different professions before becoming ministers. In their memoirs, many of the leading politicians of the Constitutional Monarchy describe their professional activities as writers and journalists, reflecting the importance of the press in shaping public opinion. During the first phase of this regime, their number is considerably greater amongst


TABLE 7b PLACES OF HIGHER EDUCATION STUDIES OF MINISTERS (%)*

*

Multiple coding has been used as some ministers made their studies in different places, therefore percentages may not total 100. N=Number of university educated ministers, including legal staff members of the armed services.

ministers connected to the Liberal Party (20.7 per cent) than those in the Conservative Party (12.7 per cent); this difference increased during the regime’s later phase as the proportion of different occupations changed. A significant number of Second Republican politicians were either writers (for example, Azaña) or journalists; these occupational groups, though, lose their importance in Franco’s ministerial elites. Moreover, with the disappearance of the party press, and as a consequence of the social


TABLE 7c FOREIGN COUNTRIES IN WHICH MINISTERS ATTENDED UNIVERSITY (%)

N=Number of ministers in each period.

changes that had taken place with democratization, these professions have not managed to regain their lost significance. PSOE’s electoral weakness during the early decades of the twentieth century effectively excluded it from access to power. With the onset of the Second Republic, however, Largo Caballero and other working class politicians entered government. There were no ministers from working class backgrounds during the Franco regime, and there has been less than a handful during the Parliamentary Monarchy—all during PSOE governments. This has also been the case for farmers, since in Spain there were no significant agrarian parties, added to the fact that landowners— both nobles and bourgeois—were more likely to describe themselves as belonging to another profession, laying stress on their academic qualifications, during the earlier regimes. This has led to a situation in which there is an absence of ministers identifying themselves with the agrarian milieu—despite its demographic, economic and social importance during the earlier periods being studied. Although our data concerning the private-public nature of the professional occupations need more work in respect of ‘mixed occupations’ (that is, to discriminate between the main and the occasional or residual professions), it is nevertheless clear that, with the exception of ministers in the Civil War Republican cabinets, socio-professional links to the state are a constant of the entire period under investigation. This picture is particularly characteristic of the Franco Regime and the transition to


TABLE 8 MINISTERS’ OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND (%)*

* Occupation prior to first ministerial appointment. Multiple coding has been applied. † Including Air Force; N=Number of individuals.

democracy, while there is a greater professional equilibrium with the


TABLE 8a OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MINISTERS ACCORDING TO EMPLOYMENT STATUS (%)*

*

Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. N=Number of known cases.

ministers under Alfonso XIII and the Second Republic (Table 8a). Social Origins: The Nobility Unfortunately, with the exception of the nobility and landownership during the second half of the twentieth century, data concerning social position and parental occupation that would allow us to determine the social origins of ministers, is quite fragmentary for most periods. In general terms, however, it would not be too contentious to assert that the ministerial elites have been dominated by people of middle-class origins, and that, moreover, this group has, with the exception of the brief Civil War Republic, become hegemonic during the twentieth century. The greatest middle-class component can be found within Franco’s ministerial cadres—with the Caudillo himself being the son of a naval paymaster. Meanwhile, the ministers of both the Second Republic and, especially, the Parliamentary Monarchy have tended to be of professional middle-class origins—with a few exceptions in PSOE governments (Cuenca and Miranda 1998:77ff.). The assessment of the aristocratic component presents many complexities. First of all, we have to be sure that aristocratic background precedes appointment to cabinet. With the exception of the republican years, quite a few members of the elite—ministers, parliamentarians, military officers—were elevated to the peerage either while in office or shortly after leaving it (or, as in the cases of assassinated Prime Ministers Canalejas, Dato, Carrero, and most of the few Franco regime generals that received a title, posthumously). We obviously do not count them as having aristocratic origins. Another problem, one that can be handed differently,


concerns the hidalgos, that is, those of aristocratic descent (which was necessary for a career in Spain’s eighteenth-century army and navy), many of whom were of a low economic status—but usually with title to some land: should these people be considered to be members of the nobility? The hidalguía can be even more confusing considering that those coming from the Basque country and some northern provinces could all claim to be hidalgos. To resolve this, we have defined members of the nobility to be individuals with an aristocratic title. An additional problem is caused by assessing the date at which aristocratic title was awarded; in some cases the minister had been made a peer immediately prior to his ministerial appointment, in some others they had inherited their aristocratic title through their family’s earlier military, political or, increasingly, business successes. In some studies, for example Nikolaus von Prevadovich’s examination of the Austrian elites, those peers who obtained aristocratic title during the nineteenth century as a reward for their family’s earlier professional successes are not considered to be aristocrats, simply because the ‘old’ aristocracy was unwilling to consider them to be their equal (which is apparently different from the situation in Prussia and the United Kingdom). In order to distinguish the ‘old’ from the ‘new’ aristocracy, we have included the former in a separate category—those from aristocratic families that obtained their title before 1808. With our less stringent criteria, international comparisons seem to suggest a much weaker presence of the Spanish aristocracy in the political elite (further analysis shows this to be the same for other elites, including the military).33 One reason was the less salient role of the old nobility, particularly in the XIX century, compared to the aristocracies of most of the older European states, including Portugal: The nobility’s…image at the beginning of the nineteenth century was a negative one. It was a perception that neither the Napoleonic War, nor the ensuing political changes did much to rectify…having lost their local privileges, those without title disappeared from the political scene; while those with title, particularly the important ones, tended to renounce their old life styles and integrated themselves into the urban centres where they became the upper class; the small local nobility, to the extent that it had survived, formed pockets of resistance against the modernization of the state and the nationalization of politics—they supported the Carlist cause and they were the bosses controlling the caciques (Alvarez Junco, 2001:88 ff.). Our data are consistent with this analysis, and demonstrates the relatively small contribution made by the ‘old’ aristocracy to the cabinets of the Constitutional Monarchy up to 1923. The ‘new’ aristocracy, many of whom were actually of middle-class origin, made an almost equal


TABLE 9 MEMBERS OF THE TITLED NOBILITY AMONG MINISTERS

Source: Grandezas y titulos del Reino: guia oficial (1910; 1963–64).

contribution (Table 9). During the third period, the aristocracy made its largest contribution within the transitional government of Admiral Aznar; however, all but one of these aristocratic ministers were members of the ‘new’ aristocracy. The Second Republic, which refused to recognize aristocratic titles, had no aristocratic ministers—either from the ‘old’ or the ‘new’ aristocracy.34 Franco’s Regime, while restoring and recognizing noble titles—including those of the Carlist kings—did not represent a return to aristocratic government; this is because those who were awarded peerages after they had left office (often posthumously) do not meet our definition of what constitutes membership of the nobility. Since 1975, aristocratic presence within the ministerial elites has remained very low.35 Political Career—Ministerial Office To accede to a cabinet position in the parliamentary regimes generally presumed previous election as deputies. This was particularly true in the Constitutional Monarchy and the Republic, where a large number of ministers had previously been elected more than three times. In the Republic, which only had three legislatures with high turnover due to the changing political winds, a large number of ministers had only served in one or two, and only a small minority in more than three—meaning that they had also been elected under the Constitutional Monarchy. The number with no parliamentary experience was relatively small (Tables 10, 10a and 10b). Parliamentary experience, particularly in the lower chamber, has been important during the Parliamentary Monarchy, with one-third of all ministers having been elected deputies twice or more. Since it was a new regime, however, without any continuity with the Second Republic, the cooptation of outsiders on the basis of their expertise became more significant. Two-fifths of ministers at this time were never members of any


parliament, rising to 46 per cent if we exclude those whose only previous parliamentary experience was as senators. More than one-half of the members of Primo de Rivera’s ministries had no previous parliamentary experience. Their numbers were large in the final ministries of the Constitutional Monarchy, mainly as a consequence of the recuperation of veteran politicians. Over 90 per cent of Franco’s ministers had never served in a legislature—a fact that should not surprise us given the Regime’s rejection of political parties. The Falange had never obtained representation in the Second Republic’s Cortes, and only a few members of the extreme right-wing anti-republican parties that did have parliamentary representation during the Republic, Renovación Española (Spanish Renewal) and the Tradicionalistas, were represented in Franco’s early ministries. The distinctiveness of the Civil War Republic is reflected in the incorporation of communists and anarcho-syndicalists into government, where 34.8 per cent of all ministers had no previous parliamentary experience. With the important exception of the Republic—a regime in which onethird of its ministers had previously served as mayors and local councillors —the presence of ministers whose only previous political experience was gained in local politics was uncommon. The Franco Regime, during which most mayors, councillors and provincial council presidents were appointed by the civil governor and the Minister of the Interior, had the least number of ministers with experience only at the local level, followed by the last transition to democracy and Primo de Rivera’s Dictatorship, which were also periods during which municipal governments were not popularly elected, or only partially (during the transition). In the Parliamentary Monarchy, less than ten per cent of ministers have previously had local political experience, a fact that probably has more to do with the traditional separation of local and national politics that Spain shares with its neighbour, Portugal, than with the lack of sufficient time in which to develop a career through this long route: in any case, this explanation can only possibly be relevant in the case of ministers in the UCD governments. The data indicate that, with the exception of the Second Republic, ministers with previous experience in senior position within the state’s central administration is extremely common. At least one-quarter of all ministers in the Parliamentary Monarchy have previously been either an Under-secretary or a Secretary of State—positions that were created in 1977. The same is true of the Constitutional Monarchy, where almost onequarter of the ministers had previously been Directors General—a senior position that was commonly held to represent the culmination of an administrative career, although it was a political appointment. More than one-half of the 33 ministers during the transition to democracy had also been Directors General. Much rarer, in all of the regimes being examined,


TABLE 10 POLITICAL OFFICES HELD BY MINISTERS (%)*

*

Before their first appointment to Cabinet. As multiple coding has been applied where ministers have held several political office, the percentages may not total 100. 1 The office (designated during non-democratic regimes) elected by indirect suffrage to administer each province. 2 Primo de Rivera’s Asamblea National Consultiva (1927–30); Franco’s ‘organic’ Cortes (1943–77). 3 When the 32 ministers appointed prior to inauguration of Franco’s Cortes are excluded, this figure rises to 65.5%. 4 The position of Secretary of State was created in July 1977. 5 Those who had served as ministers in earlier regimes.

was the presence of former Civil Governors; this is particularly true of both the democratic regimes and the Civil War Republic, where the presence of people with this experience was extremely exceptional. The creation of the Autonomous Communities during the Parliamentary Monarchy has led to experience at regional government level providing the final step towards national office; indeed, quite often either this or a career


TABLE 10a PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO FIRST MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT (%)

Sources: Paredes et al.; Cuenca and Miranda (1998); computerised rolls of the Congreso de los Diputados (1977–2001); Próceres y Senadores, 1834–1923; Senadores, 1977–1993; and computerised rolls for Senate in remaining legislatures. 1 Until 1923. 2 There was no Senate between 1923 and 1977. TABLE 10b MINISTERS’ PREVIOUS PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIENCE AS DEPUTIES (%)*

*

Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

in parliament represent the main route to attain national office. This tendency, which was already important during the first PSOE government, has become accentuated during the most recent legislatures, given that the PP’s victories in several important Autonomous Communities preceded their first general election victory in 1996 (José María Aznar was President of Castile-Leon immediately prior to becoming Prime Minister in 1996).


Unfortunately, our data on political careers and links with organized interest groups during the earlier regimes being examined are rather incomplete, while that on the Franco Regime requires more study. Nevertheless, it would not appear to be too controversial to state that a large proportion of ministers during democratic periods were leaders of their respective parties at either the national or the regional levels, an assertion that seems to be confirmed by the few PSOE and CEDA ministers during the Second Republic, and by the majority of ministers during the present Parliamentary Monarchy (Huneeus 1985; Hopkins 1999; Baón 2001; García Guereta 2001; Parrado 1999). As for the interest groups, we have already noted the presence of trade union leaders in some of the Second Republic’s governments, particularly Largo Caballero’s in Civil War Republican ministries. There have only been a few isolated examples of business leaders obtaining ministerial position, partly the result of the precarious nature of organized business interest groups in Spain until recent times (Linz 1981). Accurate data are available that indicates the presence in republican cabinets of a significant number of Freemasons, just as during the Sexenio. At least 20 ministers had been members of a Lodge, although we should be aware that one of the most prominent—Manuel Azaña—only joined after he became a cabinet minister. This group—which mainly consists of members of Acción Republicana, Izquierda Republicana and the Radical Party, as well as members of the various regionalist parties—included three prime ministers, one of which was also President of the Republic. Three of them were also ministers during the Civil War Republic, two as Prime Minister.36 Ministers with links to pressure groups during both the Franco Regime and the transition to democracy—excluding those connected to the large bureaucratic bodies—maintained links with Acción Católica, the ACNdeP and Opus Dei, given that, with the exception of the Chambers of Commerce, most organized business interest groups had ceased to exist. The practical absence of representatives of organized business groups within the cabinets of the Parliamentary Monarchy is interesting—there has only been one, during the UCD governments. More interesting, however, has been the dearth of trade unionists obtaining ministerial rank —particularly given the fact that the country was governed by PSOE between 1982 and 1996. The proportion of ministers maintaining prolonged ministerial careers of four or more years is much greater under the Parliamentary Monarchy than during the shorter and more unstable regimes, as well as during the transitional periods. The fact that we also find that this proportion exceeds that found during the Constitutional Monarchy is more difficult to explain when we take into account that, for the purposes of calculating this variable, this regime had been considered as a continuous whole, and that


TABLE 11 DURATION OF MINISTERIAL CAREERS (%)*

* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. Figures include all ministers to 9 July 2002, the date of the second Aznar government’s most recent cabinet reshuffle. N=Number of ministers.

the Parliamentary Monarchy has seen three successive parties in government during its 25-year existence, little more than one-half as long as the duration of the First Restoration, which was extremely stable for the first half of its existence (Table 11). The majority of ministers led only one department, regardless of the regime. This tends to suggest that there was a high degree of specialization. The pattern was weakest during both the second phase of the Constitutional Monarchy and in the democratic periods. It reached its zenith during the Franco Regime, where the ministers were either specialists or were appointed to political portfolios according to the political strength of the respective ‘political families’. The proportion of ministers occupying three or more cabinet positions was greatest during the Constitutional Monarchy and the Second Republic, reflecting both these regimes’ lesser emphasis on specialization, and, in the case of the former, the existence of a distinct political class that was participating in its cursus honorum by gaining experience in different ministerial positions. The proportion of non-specialist ministers is significant during the Constitutional Monarchy, the Second Republic, and the Parliamentary Monarchy: periods during which the occupation of two different ministries for political reasons is a frequent occurrence, given the multiparty and factionalist nature of some of these regimes (Table 11 a). One theme that future studies of political elites will have to pay increasing attention to, given the federal and national structures within the Spanish state, is the movement of elites from the centre to the Autonomous Communities, and vice versa. As we have seen, some politicians who had established themselves within the Autonomous Communities went on to become ministers at the national level. Similarly, a number of national


TABLE 11a MOBILITY OF MINISTERS THROUGH PORTFOLIOS (%)*

* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. N=Number of different portfolios held by cabinet ministers over their entire ministerial career during each period. Interim portfolios have been excluded.

ministers have also moved in the opposite direction: a journey that has been made both directly from the cabinet and after several years in opposition at the national level. In addition to this tendency, we also have to be aware of the European Union, which will lead to even more movement from Madrid to Brussels and Strasbourg. Even international organizations, such as the United Nations (UNESCO) and, more recently, the Secretary General of NATO, have provided further career opportunities for ministers of the Parliamentary Monarchy. Speculating about the overall composition of Spanish cabinets over the years enables us to suggest some general conclusions. The ministerial elite is fairly heterogeneous; it has largely been recruited from every part of the country; and it has not been dominated by any particular age group. In terms of occupational backgrounds, civil servants, military officers and professionals have had a significant presence by which the ministerial elite may be characterized. Most ministers have come from either middle-class or upper middle-class backgrounds. If we are to accept their self descriptions, taken from their memoirs and other sources, we see that relatively few of them have been either businessmen, farmers or landowners with no ancillary occupations (unlike the proud junkers of East Elbia), and that, unlike many British Labour Party Members of Parliament, practically none of them was from a manual labour, trade union background. Their professional backgrounds tend to suggest that ideas, ideologies, mentalities and legalistic considerations were as, or even more important to them than the representation of economic or class interests.


NOTES 1. The name given to the first short transitional government after Primo de Rivera’s resignation in early 1930, followed by another transition government in February 1931 that broke down with the proclamation of the Second Republic in April 1931. For simplicity purpose we have labelled the third period in our analysis Civil Directorate/Dictablanda. 2. ‘Instauration’ would probably be a more appropriate label to characterize the initial phase of regime change for two main reasons: on the one hand, Franco had originally designed a new type of monarchy that was founded by himself, and not necessarily linked to the old dynasty; on the other hand, Juan Carlos’s father, Don Juan, who was in exile in Portugal when Franco died in November 1975, did not renounce his right of succession to the Spanish crown in favour of his son until 17 months later, just a few weeks before the first general elections. However, it is clear that this monarchy could not be a simple continuation of Franco’s regime. It could be argued that Don Juan’s claim was weakened both by the fact that, many years earlier, he had approved the education of Juan Carlos in Spain under Franco’s supervision, and that he never contested either the proclamation of Juan Carlos as Franco’s successor, ‘with the title of King’, in 1969, or his final proclamation as head of state. In any case, as professor Tomás Villarroya wrote in his comments on the 1978 Constitution, Don Juan’s final renunciation of his dynastic rights, and his son’s acceptance of those rights that his father had received from Alfonso XIII ‘renewed the continuity of succession, and in someway, the instauration of a monarchy in a dynasty initiated by Don Juan Carlos was converted into a restoration’. 3. It could be argued that the transition process did not really start until July 1976, following Suárez’s appointment as Prime Minister by King Juan Carlos. However, the fact that Franco’s death cleared the way for a new Head of State who immediately declared his desire to be ‘King of all the Spanish people’, then the entry of some individuals who had recently made public calls for a return to democracy into the first cabinet of the Parliamentary Monarchy, and the timid steps taken towards opening up the regime by this cabinet allows us to identify that moment as the beginning of the transition process. As far as the end of the transition period is concerned, it is clear that it had not yet been completed prior to the approval of the 1978 Constitution through a popular referendum. In fact, the transition was probably not completed until the Catalan and Basque autonomy statutes were approved in 1979. 4. By the same token, the regime could not be defined, strictu sensu, as parliamentary until the derogation of the Leyes Fundamentals by the new constitution in 1978. Nevertheless, the fact that both King Juan Carlos and the cabinet resulting from the first free elections—certainly an important moment in executive-legislative relations— imposed upon themselves institutional power restraints—the final one being acceptance of regular control by Cortes from November 1977—would justify the use of the label


5.

6.

7. 8.

9.

10.

‘Parliamentary Monarchy’ to describe the entire period following the inauguration of the Constituent Assembly. The Supreme State Council was created by Royal Decree in July 1787. It included the creation of seven secretariats, and may be considered to be the predecessor of the modern Council of Ministers since it was the first time that this type of body had a collective character, as well as a stable and formal existence. It was abolished in February 1792, and substituted by the Council of State, which was the re-establishment of an earlier institution. The Council of Ministers was created by Royal Decree in November 1823 as the King’s advisory and consultative body (Bar 1983:101–5 ff.). General Primo de Rivera substituted it in 1923 with a Military Directorate, which was itself replaced two years later by a Civil Directorate. At the beginning of the Civil War, the insurgents created the National Defence Council (Junta de Defensa National), which was replaced by the State Technical Council (Junta Técnica del Estado) on 1 October 1936. Finally, a cabinet composed of ordinary ministerial departments was reintroduced by a law of 30 January 1938. The Bayonne Stature changed the secretariats into ministries for the first time. The exact date of the creation of the first Restoration cabinet—the Regency Cabinet (Ministerio Regencia) that was led by the Conservative Party leader, Cánovas—is 31 December 1874, only two days after Alfonso XII, who was in Britain at the time, was proclaimed King of Spain by General Martínez Campos in Sagunto (Valencia). This cabinet was confirmed by the King on 13 February 1875, once he officially became Head of the Spanish State. General elections were not called until one year after the pronunciamiento; however, it is our opinion that the fact there were no substantial differences between the composition of the three non-representative cabinets preceding those elections, and those immediately following the introduction of the new constitution, justifies all of them being included in the Constitutional Monarchy. Juan J.Linz and Rocío de Terán’s original files, extending from 1808 to 1960, were computerized as IBM cards 30 years ago—unfortunately, modern computers are unable to read them. The main sources used by Linz—and Jerez for Francoism—were the Enciclopedia España, the Guía Oficial de España, the Anuario Militar de España, the Guía Oficial de Grandezas y Títulos del Reino, the official records of the various bureaucratic bodies, biographies, personal memoirs, and the daily press, etc. (for more details on these and other sources, see Jerez [1982:46–8; 488–9]). Although this unpublished source details each deputy’s electoral district for each legislature, there remain some lacunae. For the missing cases, we checked the work published by Cuenca and Miranda (1998), even though they offer little information in respect of this variable. For the three legislatures of the Second Republic, we have used the small booklets that were published by the chamber, and which provide an alphabetical list of all deputies, giving details of the district they represent and their address, as well as other typewritten sheets that classify the deputies by their party in parliament in the constituent assembly, 1934 and 1936.


11. For a summary of the years from the 1830s to the 1920s, see Varela Ortega and López Blanco (1990:202–3). 12. The point is made by Artola (1979); laws about elections, freedom of the press; right of association. 13. According to Varela Ortega and López Blanco, ‘universal suffrage was introduced [in 1868 and 1890] well before it could develop into the Progressive and Liberal parties’ main demand. Actually up to 1870s, the priority for Progressives of all shades was access to power’ (1990:185). 14. The Progressives controlled cabinet for only one-fifth of Isabel’s reign; and only on three occasions did their Prime Ministers retain office for more than one year. This contrasts with the ten moderate Prime Ministers who remained in office for more than one year (Artola 1991:183–4). 15. See Artola (1991); Ramírez (2000:30); and Solé and Aja (1977, 62). 16. Serrano, who retained Prime Ministerial authority until Martínez Campos’s pronunciamiento, was succeeded by another general, Zavala, who had also served as a minister twice (State and Navy) under Isabel II, and MateoSagasta, who had been a member of the Revolutionary Council (Junta Revolucionaria) before going on to become a minister, then Prime Minister. 17. Cánovas was the son of a school teacher, while Sagasta’s father was a merchant in a medium sized town in Castile. 18. It has been said that a ‘secret pact’ was made between Cánovas and Sagasta following a series of meetings that took place after Alfonso XII’s death in 1885, by which the substitution of the conservative cabinet by a liberal one was agreed (the so-called Pacto de El Pardo—El Pardo Pact). However, the turno pacífico had already existed de facto since 1881. 19. It is unclear if Alfonso XIII personally instigated the coup—a belief that was shared by large sectors of the political class—or whether he just accepted it (Tusell 1987; Calero 1988:90). 20. That picture does not change when considering the position of member of the Consultative Assembly as an equivalent of deputy. Only four members of the former body returned to its successor in 1931, and in 1933, 16–4.5 per cent— even if there was a large bloc of right and centre-right deputies, most of whom lost their seats in 1936 (Linz 1972:572). 21. In September 1936, Francisco Franco was elected Head of the Government of the State (Jefe del Gobierno del Estado) by his colleagues in the Defence Council (Junta de Defensa). This was an equivocal title that enabled him to become Head of State (Jefe del Estado) just two days later (when the official record issued the formal appointment), and Head of Government (Jefe de Gobierno) in January 1938 (it was not until June 1973 that he was to appoint Admiral Carrero Blanco to replace him in the latter position). Additionally, the law of April 1937 made Franco head of the official party. Unlike in Italy and Portugal, where the Head of State and Head of Government remained clearly separate, the situation in Spain became confused: ‘Since the same individual exercised both functions, together with the power that each of them gave, personal and institutional factors were superimposed’ (Baena del Alcázar 2002:326).


22. The difficulties of periodizing the Franco Regime, and distinguishing cabinets as units of analysis, as well as characterizing individual ministers by ‘political families’ are analysed by Amando de Miguel (1975). 23. Speaking as the Minister and Secretary General of the almost defunct official single party, Suárez had made a complex appeal to Cortes in which he argued that liberalization and, eventually, democratization was necessary. This speech was apparently instrumental in leading the King to appoint Suárez, a man of his own generation, as the successor to the clearly floundering Arias (Linz and Stepan 1996:93). For more on the appointment of Suárez, see Colomer (1995). 24. The following measures preceded these elections: in March, a wider amnesty (the July 1976 amnesty excluded those individuals who had made attempts against the life or integrity of any individual), and a new electoral procedure, also approved by decree, was introduced; in April the official party structures, including the vertical unions, were dismantled, and the Communist Party and opposition labour organizations were legalized on the personal decision of Prime Minister Suárez. 25. As a result of a second reshuffle of Aznar’s second government in early July 2002, four more individuals have attained cabinet rank. 26. Pío Cabanillas Gallas, the most prominent liberal in Arias’s first cabinet, in which he held the Information and Tourism portfolio, and bête noire of the Franco ‘bunker’. He was dismissed ‘on Franco’s insistence’ after eight months in office (Carr and Fusi 1981: 200). Only one other of Franco’s ministers obtained a position in the executive during the Parliamentary Monarchy, although only at the regional level: Manuel Fraga, founder of Alianza Popular, was elected president of the Galician government in late 1987, after having served as leader of the parliamentary opposition during the preceeding five years. 27. The difference exists only when we count the ministers in constitutional governments—that is, those after 1979—who occupied a position in nondemocratic governments (one in the final government of the Franco Regime, and seven in those of Juan Carlos’s first governments). Suárez’s first constitutional government incorporated the majority of them. 28. According to Laura Román data for the period 1975–82, 88.2 per cent of the appointments to the position of Vice Prime Minister and 75.2 per cent of ministerial appointments were given to individuals who had held senior political positions within the executive (Director General or higher) during the previous regime, or who had at least been appointed in those years (1977, 88 ff.). 29. For example, during the final phase of the regime, some university rectors and the heads of official professional associations had been appointed because they had been elected in relatively free elections. 30. As had happened with the UCD’s ministers, the fact that the proportion of former procuradores amongst the centrist parliamentarians had declined from 16.3 per cent in 1977 to 12.5 per cent in 1979. While some of these individuals had participated in the democratic opposition, their biographical details reveal that a large proportion of them had such a background. Obviously these were not the only ones that had been linked to Franco’s


31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

regime at some point. It is certain that, according to Tezanos’s estimates for the Constituent Assembly, some 44 per cent of UCD’s deputies had occupied political positions at that time, especially at the intermediate levels of the central executive authority, as well as at the local level and within the trade union apparatus (Del Campo et al. 1982:37–8). Pradera (1988) argues that this interpretation had become unsustainable as a consequence of González’s 1988 reshuffle that enabled the independent writer, Jorge Semprún, and the veteran socialist leader, Enrique Múgica, to enter PSOE’s second government. These men entered politics in the 1940s and 1950s, respectively. Paradoxically, it was the consolidation of democracy that, with the exceptions noted above, signalled the political death of those generations. There were three Catalan Prime Ministers, and at least one Catalan in each ministry during the Sexenio; however, during the early Restoration period, no Catalans entered government until 1890. Catalan presence increased to two ministers in the years 1917–18 (García Prieto’s and Maura’s cabinets), a number that was not reached again until the Second Republic’s provisional and constituent governments, before peaking during Largo Caballero’s second cabinet. Economic and education portfolios were the most common positions awarded to Catalans, and it was not until the Parliamentary Monarchy that a Catalan was to be appointed to either Defence or Foreign Affairs (Ainaud: 1996). Guttsman (1963:77, 102, 106), who defines aristocracy as ‘all those who were descended from a holder of a hereditary title during their grandparents’ generation, thus excluding the sons of the newly ennobled and those others who had received hereditary titles themselves’, finds that 49 of the 101 cabinet ministers between 1886 and 1916 were ‘aristocrats’ (26 of 47 Conservatives, and 23 of 53 Liberals), while from 1916 to 1955, there were 38 aristocrats from 186 ministers (31 of 98 Conservatives, including four Labour cabinet members). See Chapters V and VI on the role of aristocracy in politics. Luis Companys, who was a minister in Azaña’s government before becoming President of the Catalan Generalitat in 1934, was the only exception, since his mother was a member of the titled aristocracy. During both the transition period and the Parliamentary Monarchy, only three ministers had aristocratic titles: Areilza— who was a member of Juan Carlos’s first cabinet—and Soledad Becerril and Esperanza Aguirre, of the UCD and PP, respectively. The list of ministers who were also Freemasons was taken from the Salamanca Archive, which was made available to the authors by Professor Luis P.Martin of the University of Clermont Ferrand, France.

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Tusell, J. (1987): Radiografía de un Golpe de Estado: El Ascenso al Poder del General Primo de Rivera,Madrid: Alianza. Tusell, J. (1992): Franco en la Guerra Civil: Una Biografía Política,Madrid: Tusquets. Tusell, J. (ed.) (1990): Manual de Historia de España,Madrid: Historia 16. Urquijo, J.R. (2001): Gobiernos y Ministros Españoles (1808–2000),Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas. Varela Ortega, J. (1977): Los Amigos Políticos: Partidos, Elecciones y Caciquismo en la Restauración (1875–1900),Madrid: Alianza. Varela Ortega, J. (1996): ‘Orígenes y Desarrollo de la Democracia: Algunas Reflexiones Comparativas’, in J.Varelaet al., Política en la Restauración, 1875– 1923, vol. 7: Sistema Político y Elecciones,Madrid: Institute Universitario Ortega y Gasset. Varela Ortega, J. and López Blanco, R. (1990): ‘Historiography, Sources and Methods for the Study of Electoral Laws in Spain’, in S.Noiret (ed.), Political Strategies and Electoral Reforms: Origins and Voter Systems in Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,Baden-Baden: Nomos. Viver, C. (1978): El Personal Político de Franco (1936–1945),Barcelona: Vicens Vives.

Ministers in Italy: Notables, Party Men, Technocrats and Media Men MAURIZIO COTTA and LUCA VERZICHELLI

Ministers are a rather special group within the larger body of the politicians. They are the politicians who have to carry the political responsibility for the specialized policy functions that relatively developed polities such as modern states are expected to perform. Because of this institutional role they are also very close (although the degree of this proximity may vary somewhat) to the centre of the game for power and its legitimate control. In the end they occupy a political space that is defined on the one hand by the functional requirements of the state at a given point in time, and on the other by the pressures of the dominant political power game of that period, and by the interest those involved in this game have in controlling the administrative apparatus of the state. Competence, effectiveness and specialization versus political legitimation and political loyalty are thus the competing criteria that are involved in the selection of ministers. Under different political regimes these two requirements may change in their specific contents, but not in their fundamental nature. In the period covered by our research, very significant changes have taken place on both dimensions in Italy (as in most countries of Europe). On the first dimension, the actual requirements of policy making and administration have changed from the period of the minimal state to the age of the welfare state and then to that of international liberalism. On the second, the nature and bases of the political game for deciding who can legitimately seek to control executive power have also changed: monarchic

This research was made possible, thanks to the funds provided by the University of Siena (PAR 2001 funds) and the Italian National Research Council (1998 and 2000 funds). The research was conducted in connection with the European Science Foundation Eurelite Network (European Political Elites in Comparison: The Long Road to Convergence). The authors acknowledge the help of Francesco Marangoni and Davide Orsini, who collected the data from several biographic sources. Maurizio Cotta is responsible for the first part of the contribution, while Luca Verzichelli is responsible for the section on the Republican age.


legitimacy has been displaced, first by restricted representation, then by mass representation in the age of the great social cleavages, and finally by mass representation in post-modern politics. Both dimensions of transformation have affected, in a visible way, the government structure and its personnel. The transformation of the political game has had a very significant impact upon the channels of recruitment and the career patterns of the political elites. On the other hand the transformation of the functions and role of the state, vis-à-vis society and its problems, has been visibly reflected in the number of ministers—which has grown steadily over the past century (see Figure 1)—and in the competencies of the executive, which have expanded from the relatively limited functions related to maintenance of internal and external order to the much broader palette of functions connected with the promotion of the economy and social equality (Ferrera 1985) (see Figure 2). It must be added, however, that these transformations, which for the greatest part of the period examined here had followed a fundamentally linear trend of growth, have probably entered into a phase of slow-down or even reversal during recent decades. A sign of this could be the decline in the number of ministers and the growing transfer of functions away from national government to independent authorities, local governments, or supranational bodies. It is reasonable to expect that the combined effects of these changes should have had a significant impact upon the features of the ministerial elite. In order to explore this relationship we have identified six main periods of Italian political history which we will use to discuss how much the features of the ministers have changed from one to the other. These periods are as follows: • • • • • •

The early years of the parliamentary Monarchy (1848–61; 1861–76) The developed parliamentary system (1876–1913) The first age of mass suffrage (1913–24) Mass democracy after fascism (1946–92) The crisis of party democracy (1992–96) Majoritarian democracy (1996–)

THE EARLY YEARS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY MONARCHY (1848–60; 1861–76) This was the period during which a previously absolute monarchy was transformed into a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy. For Italy, this was also the period of national unification under the leadership of one of the regional states. Italian parliamentary democracy was in fact the offspring of the constitutional monarchy that had developed in the

MINISTERS IN ITALY 111

FIGURE 1 POOL OF MINISTERIAL POSITIONS: MINISTERS AND JUNIOR SECRETARIES (1861–1922 AND 1945–2001)

Kingdom of Sardinia between 1848 and 1860,1 after King Charles Albert of Savoy decided, in the wake of the great European upheavals of 1848, to

TIMELINE OF THE ITALIAN MINISTRIES (1861–1922)

FIGURE 2a 112 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE?

FIGURE 2b TIMELINE OF THE ITALIAN MINISTRIES (1945–2001)



grant to his state a liberal constitution. As a result of the 1859 War of Independence and the subsequent process of Italian unification (1861), the Savoys became the reigning dynasty of the Italian state with the constitution of this regional state becoming that of the new national state. The Italian political system therefore inherited some crucial elements of an older political tradition. It must be said that while the Statute Albertino (that is to say, the Piedmontese constitution of 1848, which lasted until the new republican one of 1948) did not clearly define a parliamentary regime (and in fact did not formally spell out the principle of the political responsibilities of the government toward parliament) its implementation very soon took on some of the characteristics of that regime. More specifically, Prime Ministers and their cabinets had to have a majority in the elected chamber (Romeo 1984). At the same time, it was quite clear that the monarchy was not yet confined to a purely symbolic role, and was yet able and willing to play a political role in the formation and dismissal of cabinets (and in the selection of ministers). This period was also characterized by a very restricted franchise (Ballini 1989), the clear predominance of a parliamentary class of notables (Farneti 1971; Cotta, Mastropaolo and Verzichelli 2000) and a lack of organized political parties. Parliamentary life was organized on the basis of two broad political groupings: the Destra Storica (historic right) and the Sinistra Storica (historic left).2 Attitudes towards the monarchy and the process of Italian unification marked the original divisions between these two groups, with the Destra being monarchist and in favour of a more prudent unification—guided from above by the Piedmontese state—while the Sinistra was republican and supportive of ‘democratic’ action from below by the patriotic movements that rose against the former rulers of the regional states (Mack Smith 1997). Neither of the two groupings could be considered cohesive parliamentary parties; they were, rather, loosely connected ‘political areas’ within which members of parliament formed smaller groups and cliques, often with personalistic or regional bases. If we consider only the Italian Kingdom, this period saw 13 cabinets (with eight different prime ministers) and 86 ministers (see Table 1).3 The average duration of a cabinet was approximately 14 months (23 months for prime ministers). Governmental instability, one of the lasting features of Italian politics, manifested itself from the beginning. The average tenure for ministers was, at 2.4 years, longer than that of cabinets, however (see Table 2). The political background of the ministers was, to a large extent, a parliamentary one, but a significant number of them had served only in the Senate (see Table 3). If we consider the fact that the Senate was not based on electoral representation, but rather on nomination by the King (upon proposal from the government), it is easily seen that nearly one-quarter of


TABLE 1 NUMBER OF CABINETS AND MINISTERS, 1861–1922 AND 1946–2001

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set.

the ministers obtained their office without having played any representative role. The social profile of this group of politicians is fairly clear. A very large proportion of them had an aristocratic background and three main categories, landowners, high military officers, and senior public officials, counted for more than half of the ministers (but nearly two-thirds in the Kingdom of Sardinia) (see Table 4). A closer analysis of the cases would show that a good number of officers and high public administrators with an aristocratic background were also landowners (the same in fact could be said for a significant proportion of ministers coming from the free professions). The traditional social establishment made up of aristocracy and upper bourgeoisie linked to landownership and service to the state (army and bureaucracy) thus played a dominant role in the selection of the ministerial elite. These data also confirm that loyalty and connections to the monarchy were an important element in the selection of ministers during this period.4 It must be kept in mind that the monarchy was for many good reasons (one among them its role in uniting the country) still a significant actor in the power game and that the links of the monarchy with the upper social classes and state bureaucracy (in particular its upper strata and the military sector) remained very strong for a long time. The fact that a good proportion of ministers came from this social milieu meant that they had in this period a sort of double allegiance, to their political faction and to the voters because of the political process of selection, to the monarchy because of their social and professional background.5 The next important group of ministers was that characterized by a middle class background. Approximately 40 per cent of the ministers came from the liberal professions (mainly lawyers, but also a few engineers, doctors, architects) and from different sectors of cultural life (journalists, university teachers, etc.) (see Table 4). The smaller size of this group indicates that while the process of electoral representation was indeed opening access to the ministerial elite for new social strata, the grip of the traditional establishment was still rather firm.


TABLE 2 TENURE, DURATION AND TURNOVER

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set. Notes: 1 Same as well as differents jobs. 2 Percentage of new ministers in each cabinet.

Given the special features of the history of Italian political life, and in particular the fact that the ‘parliamentarization’ of politics (and specifically of the executive) took place more or less at the same time as the process of national unification, special attention should be paid to the territorial aspect of its origin when analysing the ministerial elite. Given the mode of national unification adopted—incorporation of the new territories into the existing Piedmontese state—it is not surprising that the core of the ministerial class was originally dominated by ministers coming from that region of Italy (see Table 5). Yet already during this time the first process of territorial extension of the political elite and the incorporation of politicians from the other regions was taking place.6 Active participation in the Risorgimento, the movement for the independence and unification of Italy, was a further important component of the recruitment profile of government members (Farneti 1971). A rather significant number of ministers had, at some time during the previous years, experienced political imprisonment or exile because of their opposition to the absolutist regimes of the regional states and their support for the unification movement (Table 4). An even larger group had taken part, in some form or another, in the military activities of the wars of independence.


TABLE 3 PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIENCE BEFORE FIRST MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set. Note: 1 Since 1948.

The picture provided by these data become even more distinctive when we consider only the top ranks of the cabinet (Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, War). Under the Kingdom of Sardinia these positions had been occupied mainly by Piedmontese aristocrats and a few senior state bureaucrats. The only non-aristocratic premier had been Gioberti, a priest and famous political thinker who advocated a confederate solution for the unification of Italy. After unification and during the governments of the Destra, we begin to see the mixing of different regional elites as a few aristocrats from central Italy and some more senior civil servants come to join the Piedmontese ministerial elite. To sum up, it can be said that the first period of representative politics in the history of the Italian state did not signal a complete break at the executive level with the pre-representative past. High social origin, a career in senior position within the state apparatus and proximity to royal power —all elements that had characterized governmental elites in the past—did not disappear once electoral processes and representative institutions were introduced (with, it should be remembered, the consent of the king). To a great extent, these elements were transfused in the new politics of parliamentary representation and combined with it. There was, of course, also an infusion of new elements that were more distinctly products of electoral and parliamentary politics. However, their weight remained limited for some time. This period was also crucial because it was when the shaping of a national political elite took place. The incorporation into the original Piedmontese elite of other regional components succeeded, but did not yet produce a geographically balanced group of politicians. The


TABLE 4 MINISTERS IN LIBERAL ITALY. PROFESSIONS, PATRIOTIC BACKGROUND AND NOBILITY (%)

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set. TABLE 5 REGIONAL ORIGINS OF MINISTERS: GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS (%)

Note: Because of a small number of Ministers born abroad, totals will not necessarily add to 100. Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set.

process of opening involved, in a more pronounced manner, the regions of central Italy that had played a more active role in the movement for unification, while the south and the islands lagged behind.


THE DEVELOPED PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM (1876– 1913) In 1876 the domination of the conservative political elite that had led the process of national unification was broken and the Left conquered executive power (Cotta 1992). The political change was favoured, on the one hand, by the internal exhaustion of the Destra storica after the completion of national unity, and on the other by the increasing moderation of the Sinistra storica, which had watered down its ‘democratic’ and republican ideals and had come to accept the role of the monarchy. With the passage of time, the traditional division between Destra and Sinistra was bound to fade away, and the main divide became that between these increasingly similar groups on one side and the new extreme left on the other. The end of the age of the Destra storica marked a discontinuity of some importance in the recruitment of ministers, however. Only 14 ministers of that period (approximately 16 per cent of the total) entered the cabinets of the subsequent period, and some significant changes in the qualitative profile of ministers took place. In the governments of the new period, the weight of the aristocracy declined as did that of the two occupations that traditionally had a close association with it, that is, the landowners and military officers. The occupations typically associated with a middle-class background—the legal and other liberal professions, academics and a variety of intellectual positions—now became the recruiting ground for more than half of the ministers (see Table 4). The average educational level also rose during this period (see Table 6). This transformation is also evident when we look at the central position of the cabinet—Prime Ministers with middle-class backgrounds now prevail. If we break this period of about 40 years down into two sub-periods (1876–1900 and 1901–13), the main noticeable changes between them are the significant growth in the number of liberal professions and academics and the increasing civilianization of cabinets (see Table 4). With regard to the more political aspects of ministers’ career paths, we can detect a growing importance of parliamentary careers. A somewhat larger number of ministers came from the elected chamber (see Table 3), and they typically entered the cabinet after an extended period of parliamentary service. The length of service in the cabinet, as well as the continuity between one cabinet and the next, also became greater (see Tables 2 and 7). From the aspect of territorial representation, the geographical spread of the ministerial elite became more balanced during this period. The number of ministers from north-western and central Italy, the two areas that during the first years of unification had the lion’s share of ministers, declined just as the number of ministers from the south and the islands increased (see


TABLE 6 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF MINISTERS (%)

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set. TABLE 7 MOBILITY OF MINISTERS THROUGH PORTFOLIOS (%)


Table 5). Politicians from these areas even began to be promoted to the highest cabinet ranks. Taken as a whole, these data suggest that the game of representative politics was becoming more firmly entrenched, and that it was having a stronger impact upon the governmental processes. A new class of politicians were making their way into government, politicians who did not derive their legitimacy and political strength from their relationship to royal power or from their upper-class origins, but rather obtained their position as a result of their success in taking part in the (restricted) electoral competition and parliamentary game. However, it would be a mistake to overemphasize the extent of change. The data presented here suggest that the balance between the members of the traditional establishment and the new breed of middleclass politicians within ministerial ranks did not change dramatically as much as it did incrementally (Mastropaolo 1986; Rogari 1998). The old elite did not disappear completely, and although reduced in size, it retained an important role in the political game. A very clear sign of this can be observed by looking at two of the most important cabinet positions, Foreign Affairs and War, where an aristocratic background and links to the crown continued to have great importance. It must be remembered that,


despite the ongoing ‘parliamentarization’ of the executive, the role of the king in the process of government formation, as well as during its life and in the events leading to its termination, remained significant (Fabri 1991). A further element deserving attention is the fact that the weight of a career in public administration (in its civil component) continued to increase—confirming the proximity between the political role of the minister and bureaucratic experience. THE SHORT AGE OF MASS SUFFRAGE PRIOR TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF FASCISM (1913–24) Universal male suffrage was granted in 1912 and implemented for the first time in the elections of 1913. The real impact of this innovation, which increased the electorate from 2,930,473 (8.3 per cent of the population) to 8,443,205 (23.2 per cent) (Ballini 1989), was only felt after the war, however, when the elections of 1919 shattered the long domination of the liberal elites. Following the rapid growth of the Socialist Party, and the birth and immediate success of the Partito Popolare (the newly formed Christian democratic party), the party system was profoundly reshaped (Farneti 1978). The new mass parties managed to win control of a majority of seats in parliament, yet, because of the ideological differences between them, they remained unable to build a political majority, leaving the leadership of the governmental process in the hands of the seriously weakened Liberals. The main political theme of this short age (by 1922 Mussolini’s government, had begun the gradual transformation of Italy’s liberal democracy into a quasi-totalitarian regime—which was more or less complete a few months after the semi-competitive elections of 1924) was the encounter between the traditional parliamentary notables and the new breed of party men. It soon became apparent that the two types of politicians could not work easily together, with the formation of cabinets taking on a distinctly new character. Instead of freely picking his ministers from within rather loose parliamentary factions and groups, the designated prime minister was now confronted with parties and their leaders who sought to choose the ministers they believed were entitled to be included in the new cabinet. Even more shocking for some of the old liberal parliamentary leaders was the fact that Don Luigi Sturzo, the head of the new Partito Popolare, was a priest and not even a member of parliament. It is not surprising, therefore, that the formation of governments became ever more problematic and their stability declined quite markedly. Due to the brevity of this period, which was brought to an end by the breakdown of democracy (Farneti 1978), the new mass parties were unable to wrest control of the government-making process from the old liberal elite. With the exception of Bonomi—a reformist socialist who had left his


party before the war after he had failed to convince it to adopt a more cooperative attitude towards the existing regime—all of the prime ministers of this period were recruited from the traditional groups of the centre and of the right. All attempts by the Partito Popolare to win the premiership for one of its leading figures failed. The Popolari and the reformist socialists managed to obtain some cabinet positions, yet, despite the changed parliamentary equilibrium, the liberal elite maintained a disproportionate weight in cabinet. The mainstream socialists were left completely in the cold. Out of a total of 107 ministers during this period, only nine came from the Partito Popolare—a party with 20 per cent of the parliamentary seats and accounting for approximately 40 per cent of the governing coalition—and five from the reformist socialists. All the others were traditional Liberals. Despite these serious limitations to the renewal of governmental elites, the qualitative outlook of ministers demonstrated some significant changes. Of all the ministers of this period, only 26 (approximately 25 per cent) had served during the previous period. The entire group displayed a rather more distinctly middle-class outlook than in the past, as the percentage of ministers with an aristocratic background almost halved. Unsurprisingly, the number of ministers who were landowners or military officials also declined as the number of liberal professionals and public administrators remained stable. Interestingly enough, the professional group with the highest growth was the intellectuals; and if we add those with an academic background, then about one-third of all ministers were ‘experts in ideas’ (see Table 4). It is amongst them that some of the new politicians of the age of mass politics can be found. Some of the signs pointing to a certain degree of de-structuring of the ministerial elite that are noticeable during this period are probably linked to the difficult transition to the age of mass politics. Along with increased cabinet instability (the duration of cabinets was significantly lower than in the previous period, and the length of service of prime ministers also fell dramatically), there was also an increase in the rate of ministerial turnover, with the result that the average length of ministerial tenure declined (see Table 2). Finally, during this period there was also an increase in the number of ministers without a parliamentary background (see Table 3). The failed consolidation of the Italian political system as a parliamentary democracy with universal suffrage interrupted the transformation of the ministerial elite into one that was based on the typical recruiting mechanisms of that type of regime, that is, mass organized parties. The 1913–22 period was, thus, a brief spring that did not produce the fruit that could reasonably be expected.


FROM LIBERALISM TO DEMOCRACY: A SYNTHETIC ASSESSMENT The 60 years from Italian unification to the breakdown of democracy was undoubtedly a time of significant change: (1) If we consider both the increase in the number of ministers and the creation of the sottosegretari, the size of the government almost tripled (see Figure 1); (2) The social background of the ministerial elite changed significantly— the traditional upper classes (aristocrats, landowners, senior military officers) increasingly gave way to the middle classes (lawyers and intellectuals) (see Table 4)—together with this, the educational level of ministers increased (see Table 6); (3) The geographical origins of ministers became more balanced as a result of the nationalization of political life (see Table 5); (4) The extent of the ‘parliamentarization’ of the executive elite, as measured by the percentage of ministers with a background in the elected chamber, increased slowly, although the length of that experience also became more substantial (see Table 3); (5) If we compare the features of the ministerial elite with those of the parliamentary class of the same period (Cotta, Mastropaolo and Verzichelli 2000:231–42, various tables), some important differences can be detected. In the first decades in particular, the proportion of aristocratic ministers was higher than the proportion of aristocratic deputies. Even more noticeable was the larger number of military officers, senior civil servants and university professors. On the other hand, the proportion of ministers with a background in the legal profession was significantly lower than the number of lawyers in parliament. These data suggest that links with the monarchy, the state apparatus, technical qualifications and social privilege continued to play a significant role in the recruitment of the executive and delayed the rise of professional or semi-professional politicians whose status was based on popular mandates. The interruption of the democratization of Italian politics caused by the rise of Fascism halted the transformation of the ministerial elite. Many of the implications of mass democracy were to come into effect only with the return to democracy following the Second World War.


MASS DEMOCRACY AFTER FASCISM (1946–92) The Development of Party Government in the Republican Age Fascism and its subsequent collapse resulted in an unequivocal break in the ministerial class. The liberal elite, which had—to a limited extent—been coopted into the first Fascist cabinets,7 disappeared from the scene altogether. This new period was, right from the outset, dominated by the mass parties that had led the resistance to the German occupation. As a consequence of this, the development of the new democratic regime was based on the dominance of a strong system of party government (or partitocracy) whose first and most distinctive character was the presence of ‘party-men’, both in parliament and the cabinet.8 The data presented in our tables do not cover the cabinets of the transition and instauration period that occurred between the end of the Mussolini’s regime on 25 July 1943 and the elections to the Constituent Assembly of 2 June 1946. Nevertheless, a cursory examination of the composition of the six cabinets of these difficult times,9 is enough to note the rapid disappearance of those purely parliamentary politicians who had been connected to liberal Italy, and the rise of the party politicians linked to the new mass parties, who were rapidly to establish themselves as the country’s political elite. The elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1946 signalled the return to representative politics and parliamentary government. The principle that a cabinet must have the support of the parliamentary majority was implemented de facto—before it was formalized by the 1948 Constitution. At first, the grand coalition of anti-Fascist parties (that had been formed during the transition and excluded only some small right-wing parties) provided the political basis of cabinets. This arrangement was not to last, however. A crucial watershed came with the controversial Atlanticist policy promoted by the then Prime Minister, De Gasperi, and which was supported by the DC (Christian Democrats) and its centrist allies. This resulted in the exit of the Communist—and most of the Socialist— ministers from the cabinet in May 1947 (only the recently formed Social Democratic Party, which was loyal to the Western alliance, remained in government). This policy was confirmed by the electorate on 18 April 1948 when the first republican parliament was elected and the ‘long cycle’ (Cotta 1996:36ff.) of Italian democracy was inaugurated. From then until 1992, the cabinet remained the reserve of the centrist parties (DC, Liberal Party, Republican Party and the Social Democratic Party) and from 1963— following its break from the Communists,—the Socialist Party. The two points that have to be addressed here are: (1) to what extent did the features of the ministers of the ‘long cycle’ differ from those of the


previous periods; and (2) what, if any, changes took place during this extended period of continuous development? Some features of the ministerial elite are extremely clear: the ministers were, generally, university educated; they were middle-aged when they entered in office; and they were, in their overwhelming majority, male (see Tables 6, 8 and 9). In these respects at least, they were not very different from their predecessors. The exclusion of women from ministerial office stands out, given the fact that women had been enfranchised in 1946. Women did not make their way into cabinet until the 1970s, when such portfolios as education and family were (occasionally) made available to them. A limited presence of women ministers only became a commonplace during the 1990s. This feature should not come as much of a surprise, particularly when we consider that Italy has one of the lowest levels of female parliamentary representation in Western Europe, and that the majority of cabinet ministers are themselves recruited from parliament (Cotta, Mastropaolo and Verzichelli 2000; Best and Cotta 2000). With respect to the educational background of ministers, the most important difference from the past is the almost complete disappearance of ministers with a military education—a feature that had been present in a significant portion of the pre-Fascist ministerial elite (see Table 6). One of the clearest effects of the Fascist interlude and the dramatic military defeat that brought it to an end, has been the ‘demilitarization’ of government. Since the war, ministers with military backgrounds have become a rarity: there were some during the first transitional governments and one officer held a ministerial portfolio in one of the technical cabinets of the 1990s. When we consider the professional experience of the ministers during this period, the importance of the legal and academic professions is quite clear. On a somewhat lower level, we also find school teachers, civil servants, journalists and businessmen (see Table 10). Compared to the past, the most significant change is the decline in the number of ministers with experience in public administration (both civil and military), and the appearance of a substantial group of politicians emerging from full time positions within the party or trade union bureaucracies. These numbers become even larger if we consider that some of the professional categories listed here (in particular the law profession and journalism) admit different levels of professional engagement. In fact, closer scrutiny shows that many of the lawyers were never active professionals and that some of the journalists—who were officially registered in their professional association —had worked exclusively for their own party newspapers and were, in fact, simply career party political functionaries. If this is the global picture, significant variations in the proportion of different backgrounds also emerge with the passing of time. The most visible noteworthy change is the decline in the proportion of lawyers, where the downward trend—dating from the 1950s to the 1990s—is


TABLE 8 AGE AT TIME OF FIRST MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT


striking. Only to a very limited extent is this decline compensated by the growth in the number of ministers with other liberal professional backgrounds. More significant during the 1970s is the challenge coming from full time party or union officials. During the 1980s and 1990s it is senior civil servants, judges, university professors, journalists and media professionals who take over, while full time professional politicians start declining. By looking at the occupational background of ministers (which obviously is only one element defining their profile), we already see some indications that two waves of transformation took place during the ‘long political cycle’ of the second half of the twentieth century. During the earlier and longer part of this phase, we observe the rise of professional party politicians at the expense of an older breed of relatively independent parliamentary politicians. However, this process appears to have reached its zenith towards the end of this sub-period, culminating in the decline of that type of politician. A new type then appears for whom the resources of specialized knowledge or a role in the media are more important than resources derived from mass organizations. The evidence provided by this type of data remains, however, relatively limited, because it does not inform us as to what extent the occupation reported was a real activity or simply nominal. In order to obtain a more sound evaluation of the background of ministers it is useful to look into other aspects of their career, and in particular to assess the length and level of their political involvement prior to achieving ministerial rank. The first aspect to be underlined is that during this period, a background in electoral politics has almost become a sine qua non for access to the cabinet (see Table 3). Given that the Senate (the upper house) is also elected, and considered the electoral equivalent of the lower chamber: and since approximately 90 per cent of all cabinet ministers have been recruited from one or other parliamentary chamber—or from both (a position which they kept during their ministerial service)—ministers without a parliamentary background have become the exception. Furthermore, the data suggests that, in most cases, parliamentary experience does not simply mean being elected to parliament, but signifies extended parliamentary service—an average of almost two terms for new ministers (see Table 3).


TABLE 9 WOMEN AND GRADUATE MINISTERS (%) AND MEAN AGE OF MINISTERS BY DECADE

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set. TABLE 10 MAIN OCCUPATION OF MINISTERS, BY DECADES (%)


Given the high degree of electoral competition in the Italian system—both within and between political parties—this is not an inconsiderable factor.10 It is possible, during the first decades of the Republic, to document the emergence of a pattern of intra-institutional career paths, which begins with parliamentary selection and develops into articulated institutional training. This pattern is mainly based on the acquisition of political skills and resources via a three-step process. First, a significantly long parliamentary tenure that, particularly in the extremely competitive environment of the Christian Democratic Party, could be interpreted as a


test of the personal degree of consensus of the potential minister. Second, experience as a parliamentary leader in the presidential office of a legislative committee (often in the policy sector corresponding to that of the future ministerial office).11 Finally, a period of ‘socialization’ within the executive, but outside the inner circle of strongest ministerial positions, thereby ensuring a sufficient degree of institutional skills. Past studies focusing on the problem of the transformation of governmental elites have often defined the above characteristics as typical requirements of a Christian Democratic model of ministerial recruitment (Zuckerman 1979; Calise and Mannheimer 1982; Dogan 1989). Considering that the ministers emerging from that party always accounted for at least 50 per cent of all cabinet members, and that uncertainties within the parliamentary majority were often conducive to the formation of minority cabinets composed entirely of Christian Democrats (Marradi 1982), we can easily subscribe to such an interpretation. We should add, however, that non-DC ministers did not show a markedly different pattern of recruitment and circulation. In any event, a national parliamentary career was not the only important political asset for ministers—an active involvement in local politics has also represented a significant resource. In fact, more than half of all cabinet members have either been elected councillors or members of local executives at either city, provincial, or regional levels12 prior to being elected to parliament (see Table 11). From a developmental perspective, one also notes that from the 1940s until the 1970s this proportion has continuously increased. It was not until the 1980s that this trend changed and an increasing detachment from local politics seemed to set in. It would appear, then, that during the so-called ‘First Republic’, a large number of ministers have been nurtured through an extended career in electoral politics, which begins at the local before moving on to the national level. If we add the data relating to party political background (see Table 12) the picture becomes more complete. Between 1945 and the mid-1970s, the overwhelming majority of Italian ministers had not just been party members before their first nomination to cabinet rank, they had also occupied positions of responsibility within their party organizations. Moreover, in the majority of cases these were senior national positions (often following periods at more junior, local level, offices). Their political career, moving from the periphery to the executive centre of the national political system, has usually been paralleled with advancement within the party organization. Taken as a whole, these data suggest that labelling members of the ministerial elite solely on the basis of their ‘private’ occupations can offer only a limited understanding of the factors determining their selection and career trajectories. For most of the ministers, their private occupations were merely an early point of departure, which was then followed by a


long and articulated period of political activity that, in most cases, had either interrupted their original profession or, at least, had limited its importance. For a great many of them, politics—in its party-organizational and electoral aspects—had become the primary centre of interest. This type of political background should not come as a surprise given what we know about the way ministers were (and to some extent still are) selected. The process was rather precisely (even if informally) defined throughout the period 1946–92. The leaders of the governmental coalition —that is to say, the chairmen of the parties involved—decided, on the basis of size, how many ministries (and which ones) each party would get. After that it was left to each party to select its own ministers. When a party became factionalized (as happened to the DC and, to a lesser extent, the Socialist Party), an internal party decision defined how many ministers each faction should have, leaving it up to the individual factions to select their cabinet representatives (Verzichelli and Cotta 2000; Verzichelli 2001; Mershon 2001). Given the manner in which the selection and nomination game was organized, it is easy to understand why a successful party and electoral background became the crucial factor in obtaining a ministerial appointment (Calise and Mannheimer 1982). Technical competence was, on the contrary, a much less significant element. Even without other specific variables to measure this, the high level of homogeneity in terms of educational and professional backgrounds and, above all, the relatively strong pattern of consequentiality from party to parliament and then to government can be taken as a proxy for the high degree of generalism of First Republican ministers. The problem of party control over the recruitment of the national group of rulers has always been a crucial theme in the interpretation of the Italian case. The political class, as expressed by the governing parties, was undoubtedly the product of a representative process in which elected positions (both local and national) and a party career (again both local and national) were strictly interconnected, and in which the ordering of positions was not random, but rather followed a precise career pathway— albeit with some differences between the individual parties (Cotta 1979). Very clearly, ministers—who constitute the top stratum of this political class—followed this trajectory. Votes and preferences counted, as did links to the factions within the party. Traditional interpretations of the opportunity structures available to Christian Democratic politicians have also stressed the importance of connections with the trade unions (the CISL in particular), employers’ associations (Confindustria), and other interest groups (among which the Coldiretti, the association of small farmers, used to be the most important). Given the factional nature of the largest governmental party, there has always been a need to represent this political complexity by


TABLE 11 LOCAL ELECTED POSITION PRIOR TO FIRST MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT, BY DECADES (%)

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set. TABLE 12 PARTY OFFICES BEFORE FIRST MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT, BY DECADES (%)


projecting personalities with very different backgrounds and linkages, even into the ministerial core. Our data confirm that all these groups have played a significant role in the career of ministers, with over half of all ministers between 1946 and 1992 having had some kind of affiliation to one or more of them (see Table 13). The ministerial elite recruited during the 1950s and 1960s (that is, during the ‘golden age’ of Christian Democratic rule) showed a particularly high level of ‘interconnectedness’ with the main interest organizations. In the end, however, as a complex yet none the less united entity, the party controlled the process—both at the very beginning of the parliamentary-governmental career (as a consequence of its screening parliamentary candidates and its ability to help candidates by placing their names at the top of the preference list), and at the specific moment of cabinet formation—thanks principally to the role of the party’s national leadership during institutional negotiations. The delicate balance between the pressures exercised by individual top leaders and the party’s national apparatus, demonstrates a peculiar feature of party government in Italy. It is a feature that can best be defined as ‘party control from within and from outside’ (Cotta and Verzichelli 1996).


‘From within’, because the majority of ministerial personnel comprised ‘generalist’ party politicians (Blondel 1991) who were accustomed to representing their own parties within the cabinet. ‘From outside’ because the degree of ministerial autonomy was limited (especially among Christian Democrats) by the power of the party’s leaders who remained outside the cabinet, preferring to rule from within the membership party.13 The final point to be touched upon is that of the intra-governmental careers of ministers. Duration of ministerial service, progression from junior to senior positions, and degree of specialization are the main variables that must be taken into account. With respect to the first point, in the Italian political system—which is best characterized as suffering acute governmental instability, with conflict-ridden coalitions and internal party factions—we should expect important constraints limiting long and linear ministerial careers. What comparative data there is available indicates that the duration of ministerial careers was, indeed, significantly shorter for Italian ministers than for their European peers (Bakema 1991). The 3.5 years on average that Italian ministers retain their cabinet position is among the shortest averages in any European country. Internal comparisons, however, show that the Italian ‘age of party government’ has resulted in a substantial lengthening of the average occupation of ministerial positions when compared to previous historical periods (see Table 2). To qualify this picture, one should also note that the average length of time served is affected by the existence of a large number of extremely ephemeral ministers, many of whom remain in the cabinet for only a few months. There is, on the contrary, a core of ministers who accumulate substantially longer ministerial service—the average ministerial tenure of the sub-group that includes the Prime Minister and the Treasury, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior and Justice Ministers during the years 1945–92 is 4.9 ministerial offices. This would suggest that, from the point of view of Italian political history, the second post-war period—in spite of its problems —can be considered a period during which the trend towards a parliamentary based ministerial elite was successfully consolidated. While the position of sottosegretario (junior minister) cannot be considered to be a necessary step on the ministerial career ladder, about half of all the ministers during this period have occupied these positions (see Table 14). Again, we can see from the descriptive tables that the relevant percentages are particularly significant during the 1960s and 1970s —the ages of centrismo (centrism) and centro-sinistra (centre-left) (Verzichelli and Cotta 2001). This is indeed the ‘golden age’ of Italian party government, when parties extended their full control over executive appointments and when the stability of the political-parliamentary elite reached its maximum values. With respect to the generalist/specialist dimension of ministerial careers, our data indicates the predominance of ‘generalist’ politicians within


TABLE 13 INTEREST GROUP AFFILIATION BEFORE FIRST MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT, BY DECADES (%)

TABLE 14 JUNIOR MINISTERIAL OFFICE BEFORE FIRST MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT AND AVERAGE DURATION OF JUNIOR MINISTERIAL OFFICE


ministerial ranks. If we use the frequent movement from one ministerial post to another as an indicator of this ‘generalism’ (Blondel 2001), we find that during the First Republic a majority of ministers switched at least once, whilst more than one-third occupied at least three different positions (see Table 7). The majority of ministers who remained in the same post without moving tended to be those with short careers. This result is consistent with the ‘partitocratic’ model of ministerial career that was typical of this period (the ‘Christian Democratic’ or ‘First Republic’ model) and is linked with the attempt to maintain a continuous equilibrium (in terms of factional representation, regional representation and the balance of power between party leaderships and the governmental elite) by means of the rapid circulation of the ministerial elite from a ‘first ring’ of less important ministerial posts to the ‘inner circle’ of top ministries.


Signs of Change or Decline? Ministerial Recruitment During the 1980s In the preceding pages we have tended to use aggregate data for the period 1945–92, data that enable comparisons to be made between this period as a whole and other periods in Italian history. We have articulated our analysis in decades rather than by breaking the time periods down to the duration of coalition cycles (Verzichelli and Cotta 2000).14 The main reason for this is that the overall continuity of this period appears more significant than the discontinuities. An exception should be made for the last ‘short cycle’ (Cotta 1996) of this period, however—the pentapartito years—which coincides, more or less, with the 1980s. Some of the specific features of this political cycle (which began with the Spadolini government of 1981, and came to an end with Andreotti’s government of 1991) appear to have potential relevance for the recruitment and career paths of the ministerial elites. The first is the rise of a five party coalition model (including Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social-Democrats, Republicans and Liberals), in which the DC’s traditional pivotal role gave way to a more balanced relationship between the largest party and its partners, first among which was the Socialist Party. The second is that control over the highest prize (the Premiership) ceased to be the DC’s prerogative and became the object of tense competition between the parties. The third is that other important ministries, which had been the domaine reservé of the DC, fell into the hands of the smaller parties. Added to these elements is the increasingly diffuse perception of a mounting crisis affecting parties and their mass organizations, while at the same time the top leaders of the two largest parties (the DC and the Socialist Party) were becoming ever more important. Some of the variables examined so far provide some support for the idea that the 1980s was a unique period. The first point to be noted is that ministerial turnover increased, with more than 60 per cent of all ministers at the beginning of the 1980s being ‘beginners’. This higher than usual rate was a result of the efforts of the new Christian Democratic leadership to promote a transformation in the party, mainly by attempting to obtain greater control over the top ranks of the party elite (that is, the faction leaders and their lieutenants in the executive), and to reduce internal party factionalism.15 However, a large number of the newcomers also came from other parties. In the Socialist Party, which returned to power after seven years during which it offered only external support to the government, Craxi promoted the rise of a new generation of younger politicians (‘i quarantenni’—the ‘40 year olds’). Similarly, a number of novice ministers came to the fore within the Republican, Liberal and Social Democrats. Alongside this greater renewal of the ministerial elite there were also some signs of an incipient destructuring of the career and recruitment patterns of


past years. The number of ministers with a purely party bureaucratic background declines (see Table 10), and at the same time there is a rise in the number of ministers with neither a past career within the parties (see Table 12) nor with experience of local elected office (see Table 11). The parliamentary and ‘within-government’ phases of political careers also seem to count less, with average time spent as a deputy prior to ministerial appointment declining, and with a smaller number of ministers having previous experience as junior ministers (see Table 14). The dominant type of minister of the past (the party-man with a well structured electoral career) does not disappear altogether, but it does lose ground. Interestingly enough, we note the appearance of a small, but significant, number of technocratic (or semi-technocratic) ministers occupying key roles, such as the Ministry of Public Administration or the Treasury.16 This change, however limited, is probably linked to the new complexities of the coalition game, and with the political costs involved in some ministerial positions. Giving some posts to independent or semi-independent ministers may have been an answer to the necessity of ‘doing something unpleasant’ in some policy areas, without overloading the parties with too many heavy responsibilities while other parties took the ‘sweeter slices’ of the cake (Verzichelli 2001). The extent of change should not be overestimated, however. No significantly different patterns of ministerial recruitment were established during this period. An indication of this is the fact that, at the end of this period, the office of Prime Minister went to Giulio Andreotti, who, having held several ministerial positions since 1947, and having been Prime Minister on five previous occasions, was obviously not a homo novus. In fact, one could say that his last time as leader of the cabinet—between 1991 and 1992—coincided with the failed attempts to ‘delay’ the crisis of Italian party government, and was the final test for a generation of ministers who can be connected with the patterns of elite circulation described above (Cotta and Verzichelli 1996). More than representing the beginning of a new pattern, the 1980s can be seen as a time during which limited change signaled the coming of a crisis without overturning established models. Opportunities for more substantial innovations were thus lost. The Crisis of Party Democracy (1992–96) The 1990s saw a the emergence of a sudden and dramatic crisis within the Italian system of party government (Cotta and Isernia 1996). As a result of the unexpected breakdown of the five traditional governing parties and the inability of the opposition parties to present an alternative, there followed a series of ‘technical governments’. The Amato government of 1992, at least in part, and, more fully, the Ciampi and Dini governments of 1993


and 1995, respectively, can be defined thus. These governments were formed on the basis of the highly selective functional needs of the country at that historical moment (facing a currency crisis, reducing the budgetary deficit and the huge state debt, implementing electoral reform, and introducing pension reforms), rather than as a result of party political priorities. It is not the case that two of the Prime Ministers were high officials of the technocratic institution that is the Bank of Italy. During this period, it was only with the first Berlusconi government (1994–95) that a return to a fully political cabinet was attempted; however, this government’s early failure meant that the interruption to the technocratic period was short-lived. Under the technocratic governments, as in other governments during the 1990s, the proportion of ministers without previous parliamentary experience was much higher than in the past (see Table 3). If we define a ‘technocratic minister’ as a person totally lacking in both a parliamentary and party political background and having rather, some specialist background that is related to the ministry he or she occupies, then the Ciampi and Dini governments appear to be full of such people (see Table 15). These ‘technocratic ministers’ also play a significant role in the other two cabinets of this period. This new phenomenon, which indicates a clear break with the ‘long cycle’ of 1946–92, may be linked with a broader European trend apparent during recent years, and which is characterized by a general growth of technically specialized ministers (Blondel 2001). In Italy, however, this trend has clearly been strengthened by other factors: in primis, by the deep organizational decline (and, in some cases, the collapse) of political parties; and secondly, by the appearance of a number of ‘crucial’ ministerial posts within the government where pressing functional requirements favour the recruitment of purely technocratic or mixed (politicians with technical skills) personnel. This development was probably encouraged by Prime Ministers as a means of obtaining greater control over the cabinet, with the help of technical watch-dogs. The Treasury is the best example of such ‘technocratic’ positions. Some other aspects that are related to the profiles of the 80 ministers in charge during the 1992–96 crisis can be observed in our data. The first concerns their educational background, where we note an increase in the number of university graduates, and particularly of graduates from outside the legal field—with a substantial increase in the number of ministers with degrees in economics, engineering, medicine, and social sciences (see Table 16). As for the professional background, we can see an increase in the number of university professors, senior civil servants (and judges) and of representatives of the other liberal professions (with the exception of lawyers). Conversely, we can detect a strong decline in the number of


TABLE 15 TECHNICAL MINISTERS BEFORE AND AFTER 1992 (%)

ministers involved in the legal profession, and also in the number of fulltime party and trade union officials (see Table 10). As should be expected, there is also a strong decline in the number of ministers who had occupied a full-time party position, or who had been elected to local political office prior to their appointment to cabinet position (see Tables 11 and 12). Combined, these data clearly highlight the crisis experienced by the traditional party and election-centred recruitment model, and, equally clearly, demonstrate that new channels of access to ministerial office were being opened. Some changes can also be seen with respect to ministerial careers. Tenure and duration of ministerial occupancy both decline abruptly (see Table 2). This should not come as a surprise, especially given that the four cabinets of this period did not last long, and that there was no ‘political continuity’ between them. It can also be seen that circulation within ministerial posts is drastically reduced compared with previous periods. It is very rare for any minister to move from one ministry to another during this period. Of course, this data is influenced by the short time-scale involved in analysing this period. However, if we control the rate of mobility by tenure, then the lower degree of ministerial mobility stands out. The fact that many of the ministers had been selected for their specific technical qualifications to occupy a particular position and are, therefore, less suited to lead different ministries, is one of the factors that explains this finding. MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY (1996–) After the failed start with Berlusconi’s brief first government in 1994, it is only with the elections of 1996 that we begin to see the emergence of a new


TABLE 16 FIELDS OF HIGHER EDUCATION AMONG MINISTERS (%)

pattern of government formation in Italy. With two main coalitions competing in the electoral arena, each of them indicating a candidate for the position of Prime Minister, government formation is radically altered from the processes of the past (Bull and Rhodes 1998; Cotta 2002; Verzichelli 2002). The leader of the government is, de facto, chosen as a consequence of the result of an election and has a much more important role in shaping his cabinet. The coalition nature of cabinets means that the role of the parties has not been completely eliminated, however, and consequently that the Prime Minister’s authority cannot be absolute. The recruitment of ministers is, therefore, a result of two forces—that of the Prime Minister (and coalition leader), and that of the parties within the coalition. Any analysis of the new ministers will need to assess the effects of this new situation. What type of features characterize the processes of ministerial recruitment and career, and define the new profile of cabinet members? With just one majoritarian legislature completed, five cabinets (our present data do not include the ministers from the second Berlusconi cabinet of 2001), and only 54 ministers, it is too early to produce a well articulated picture. However, we can attempt a first portrayal on the basis of three general elements. First, the general trend towards a decrease in ministers with a purely party background is confirmed (see Table 12); second, we have an increasing number of people with backgrounds in local elected office following the reductions witnessed during the 1980s and 1990s. The two features that were in the past linked, primarily because of the close interconnections between the party organizations and electoral life, have become increasingly independent from one another. The declining strength of party organizations means that a career within party ranks is a less important source of recruitment to the senior political elite. The opposite is


true with respect to a background in local and regional government (see Table 11). The increased strength and importance of these institutions that was gained during the 1990s as a result of successful political reforms (and probably also to the crisis of national parties) are well known.17 Our data indicates that this phenomenon has also had an impact upon the national political elite. With respect to the occupational background of ministers, it should be noted that a significant—even if reduced—representation of ‘technocrats’ persists despite the return to political and party-based cabinets. Principal amongst this ‘technocratic elite’ are university professors, senior civil servants and a few individuals directly co-opted from the top economic elites (see Table 10). We should also note that there has been a limited, but none the less significant growth in the number of women entering the ministerial elite. There is now more a pronounced variety within the general profile of the ministerial elite. The profiles of individual ministers range from the technocrat, selected because of his functional abilities, through the ‘personal loyalist’ directly recruited by the Prime Minister to assist with the implementation of the political agenda, to the more traditional figure of the ‘party watch-dog’, who has to represent his party’s official position within the governing coalition. The results to date are of a provisional nature. The institutionalization of a ‘majoritarian democracy’ is still at its beginnings in Italy, and it will be some time before the new system produces all of its potential effects upon the process of ministerial recruitment and a new ministerial elite is consolidated. NOTES 1. For those who are not familiar with Italian pre-unification history it should be clarified that the Kingdom of Sardinia, as it was officially denominated, was in fact a state composed of Piedmont (which had become its real core), Savoy (from where the local dynasty originally came, but which was to be given to France in exchange for its support for Italian unification), Liguria (gained after the Napoleonic period) and Sardinia which had brought for the Dukes of Savoy the much desired title of king but had little political weight. 2. The qualification ‘storica’ is commonly used to distinguish, both from the organizational and the ideological point of view, the Right and the Left of this period from the Right and the Left of later stages. 3. For purposes of comparison we have also displayed in Table 1 some data concerning the period 1848–60. 4. The point has already been raised by Farneti (1971) with the support of his quantitative analyses.


5. A few words are required here about the Italian aristocracy (or, better, aristocracies given their roots in the regional states of the country). As in most states with a long absolutist tradition, the aristocracy was a social group with close links to the monarchy. It was not the kind of independent aristocracy of the British type. Although some of the families with older titles often had a more independent background dating back to the middle ages, most of them had fallen under the influence of local monarchies and their courts. This was obviously the case for those who had acquired their titles more recently as a result of service to the monarchical state. To an extent this aristocracy can be seen as the upper stratum of the class of state servants. To nuance this image it must be said that the aristocrats who became prime ministers (starting with Cavour) were also parliamentary leaders. 6. Also for the new regions, members of the aristocracy and landed gentry were predominant. 7. Out of 74 ministers appointed by Mussolini in his governments, five had been ministers in the Liberal age. 8. For a detailed historical account of the instauration of democracy in Italy at the end of the Second World War see Part IV of the classic work by Martin Clark (1984). On the nature of party government in Italy, see Pasquino (1987) and Cotta and Verzichelli (1996). 9. After the fall of Mussolini (25 July 1943) the King appointed as the new prime minister one of his generals, Pietro Badoglio, who formed a bureaucraticmilitary cabinet with the goal of disengaging Italy from the alliance with Germany and leading the country out of war. After that, the German troops occupied a good part of the country and, having freed Mussolini, created the Italian Social Republic in the Northern part of the country. The Badoglio government ruled only over the southern part of Italy under Allied occupation. During 1944 a second Badoglio cabinet was formed, which included representatives of the opposition parties. Another couple of cabinets followed during the liberation war, led by the old reformist socialist leader, Ivanoe Bonomi, who had already been prime minister for a short time before Fascism. After the liberation (June 1945) a fully political cabinet was formed, with the resistance hero and leader of the Action Party, Ferruccio Parri, as Prime Minister. Significantly enough, the next cabinet and the last of this installation period was guided by Alcide De Gasperi, the unquestioned leader of Christian Democracy which was rapidly emerging as the central political force of this period. 10. Until the reform of 1993 the electoral system of the Chamber of Deputies was a PR list system which gave to the voters the possibility of expressing one or more preference votes among the candidates of the same party list. 11. This pattern is rather significant during the first two decades of the ‘First Republic’, when the percentage of ministers coming from the leadership of parliamentary committees was, respectively, of 23 and 37 per cent. 12. The data about regional experience are until the 1970s extremely sparse, because until then elected regional councils existed only in the five regions with a special autonomy status. 13. As is well known, after the first De Gasperi years, the general secretary and other key figures of the DC leadership did not occupy governmental offices.


14.

15.

16.

17.

The few attempts to cumulate party and cabinet leadership, promoted by two of the most dynamic leaders of the party (Fanfani at the end of the 1950s and De Mita during the 1980s) failed after short periods of a dual mandate. These phases are the rise and decline of a centrist coalition (1948–60), the two cycles of centre-left governments (1963–75), the short period of national solidarity (1976–79) and the five-party coalition (1981–91). On the impact of change due to the emergence of the third generation of DC leaders and particularly the role of De Mita’s secretary, see Leonardi and Wertman (1989). During the 1980s, we find Professor Massimo Severe Giannini (twice) as Minister of Public administration, Professor Antonio La Pergola (twice) as Minister of European affairs and the former governor of the central bank Guido Carli (twice) as Treasury Minister. During the 1990s the Treasury was continuously in the hands of technicians such as Professor Barucci, Carlo Azelio Ciampi (another former Governor of the central bank) and Lamberto Dini (a former vice-governor of Banca d’Italia). It should be remembered that mayors and presidents of the provinces have been directly elected since 1993, and heads of regional governments since 1995. Moreover, the devolution process determined by different ordinary laws and by a constitutional amendment at the end of the 1990s, made local government much more powerful and visible than 15 years previously.

REFERENCES Bakema, W.E. (1991): ‘The Ministerial Career’, in J.Blondel and J.-L.Thiébault (eds.), The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe,London: Macmillan. Balllini, P. (1989): Le elezioni nella storia d’Italia dall’unità al fascismo,Bologna: il Mulino. Berselli, A. (1997): Il Governo della Destra,Bologna: il Mulino. Best, H. and M.Cotta (eds.) (2000): Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848– 2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries,Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blondel, J. (1991): ‘The Ministers of Finance: A Special Type of Minister?’ European University Institute Working Papers, Series SPS, No. 31. Blondel, J. (2001): ‘Ministerial Careers in Europe’, paper presented at the Seminário de Arrábida, 17–18 Sept. 2001, ‘Regime Change and Ministerial Recruitment in Southern Europe, 19th–20th Centuries’. Blondel, J. and J.-L.Thiébault (eds.) (1991): The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe,London: Macmillan. Bull, M. and M.Rhodes (eds.) (1998): The Crisis of Italian Politics,London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass. Calise, M. and R.Mannheimer (1982): Governanti in Italia,Bologna: il Mulino. Clark, M. (1984): Modern Italy, 1871–1982,London: Longman. Cotta, M. (1979): Classe politica e parlamento in Italia,Bologna: il Mulino. Cotta, M. (1988): ‘Italy: A Fragmented Government’, in J.Blondel and F.MüllerRommel (eds.), Cabinets in Western Europe,London: Macmillan.


Cotta, M. (1991): ‘Conclusion’, in Blondel and Thiébault (1991). Cotta, M. (1992): ‘Elite Unification and Democratic Consolidation in Italy: A Historic Overview’, in J.Higley and R.Gunther (eds.), Elite and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cotta, M. (1996): ‘La crisi del governo di partito all’italiana’, in Cotta and Isernia (1996). Cotta, M. (2002): ‘II secondo governo Berlusconi’, in P.Bellucci and M.Bull (eds.), Politica in Italia,Bologna: il Mulino. Cotta, M. and L.Verzichelli, (1996): ‘Italy: The Sunset of a Partycracy’, in J.Blondel and M.Cotta (eds.), Party and Government: An Inquiry into the Relationship between Governments and Supporting Parties in Liberal Democracies,London: Macmillan, pp. 180–201. Cotta, M., Mastropaolo, A. and L.Verzichelli (2000): ‘Parliamentary Elite Transformations Along the Discontinuous Road of Democratisation: Italy 1861– 1999’, in Best and Cotta (2000:226–69). Cotta, M. and P.Isernia (eds.) (1996): Il Ggigante dai piedi di Argilla,Bologna: il Mulino. Dewinter, L. (1991): ‘Parliamentary and Party Pathways to the Cabinet’, in Blondel and Thiébault (1991) Dogan, M. (1989): ‘How to Become Ministers in Italy’, in M.Dogan (ed.), Pathways to Power: Selecting Rulers in Western Democracies,Boulder, CO: Westview. Fabri, M. (1991): ‘Governo e sovrano nell’Italia liberale’, Rivista Trimestrale di Scienza dell’Amministrazione3, pp. 103–86. Farneti, P. (1971): Sistema politico e società civile,Torino: Giappichelli. Farneti, P. (1978): ‘Social Conflict, Parliamentary Fragmentation and Institutional Shift and the Rise of Fascism’, in J.J.Linz and A.Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of the Democratic Regimes: Europe,Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Ferrera, M. (1985):Il Welfare State in Italia,Bologna: il Mulino. Leonardi, R. and D.Wertman (1989): The Italian Christian Democracy,London: Sage. Mack Smith, D. (1997): Modern Italy,New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Marradi, A. (1982): ‘Italy: From “Centrism” to Crisis of Centre-Left Coalition’, in E.C. Browne and J.Dreijmanis (eds.), Government Coalitions in Western Democracies,New York: Longman. Mastropaolo, A. (1986): ‘Sviluppo politico e parlamento nell’Italia liberale: Un’analisi a partire dai meccanismi della rappresentanza’, Passato e Presente12, pp. 29–93. Merlini, S (n.d.): ‘Il governo’, in R.Romanelli (ed.), Storia dello stato italiano,Rome: Donzelli. Mershon, C. (2001): ‘Party Factions and Coalition Government: Portfolio Allocation in Italian Christian Democracy’, Electoral Studies20, pp. 554–80. Pasquino, G. (1987): ‘Party Government in Italy: Achievement and Prospects’, in R.S.Katz (ed.), Party Government: European and American Perspectives,Berlin: de Gruyter. Pasquino, G. (1994): ‘La coalizione del pentapartito’, in L’Italia fra crisi e transizione,Rome-Bari: Laterza.


Rogari, S. (1998): Alle origini del trasformismo,Rome-Bari: Laterza. Romeo, R. (1984): Cavour e il suo tempo.Rome-Bari: Laterza. Verzichelli, L. (2002): ‘La formazione del governo parlamentare: Tra vincoli antichi e potenziamento istituzionale’, in C.Barbieri and L.Verzichelli (eds.), Le Istituzioni del Governo in Italia,Genoa: Name. Verzichelli, L. (2001): ‘La distribuzione delle spoglie ministeriali: Proposte per l’analisi comparata, con una indagine sul caso italiano’, Quaderni di scienza politicaVIII, pp. 51–98. Verzichelli, L. and Cotta (2000): ‘Italy: From Constrained Coalitions to Alternating Governments?’ in W.C.Müller and K.Strom (eds.), Coalition Governments in Western Europe,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zuckerman, A. (1979): Italian Christian Democracy: The Politics of Factions,London: Sage.

Ministerial Elites in Greece, 1843–2001: A Synthesis of Old Sources and New Data DIMITRI A.SOTIROPOULOS and DIMITRIS BOURIKOS

The study of political elites has a long tradition in political science. Because this kind of study has been subjected to reasonable criticism, as being descriptive and elitist, it has lost momentum in the post-war period. Since the mid-1970s, however, it has re-surfaced as a comparative study of bureaucratic, parliamentary and ministerial elites (Dogan 1975; Putnam 1973, 1976; Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981; Czudnowski 1983). Since the late 1980s, there has been a revival of the study of political elites in connection with successive waves of democratization in southern Europe, Latin America and eastern Europe (Burton and Higley 1987; Higley and Gunther 1992; Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley 2000). But if there have been so many similar previous studies, some of which have debatable explanatory potential, why study political elites again? Indeed, the study of elites offers a static view of society and a circumscribed view of politics, limited to the attitudes of people at the top of the political system. However, given the increasing importance of the executive branch of government throughout the twentieth century and the preponderance of the state in southern Europe, the study of social background characteristics, credentials, professional origins and career pathways of ministers constitute a first step toward explaining who holds political power, how and why.

THE LIMITS AND PROBLEMS OF PAST APPROACHES TO GREEK POLITICAL ELITES The discussion of political power is sometimes neglected in studies of elites, since they tend to focus on profiles of individuals rather than on structures.

Field research for this study was conducted in Athens between May 2000 and March 2002. The research was partially funded by Princeton University. Some empirical material was provided by Stefaphanos Geroulanos. The authors wish to thank Popi Sotiriadou for her help in the layout of the contribution.


The lack of focus on power is also relevant to the different concerns of modernization theories which have motivated many studies on political elites of developing societies. Examples from the Greek case may illustrate some of these problems. There is a study of the Greek ministerial elites in 1946–76 which tries to answer the question whether the renewal of those elites has kept pace with the modernization of the Greek economy and society after the Second World War (Koutsoukis 1982). The study concludes that the rise of a new urban elite of technocrats and the spread of universalistic criteria in society have not influenced the recruitment of ministerial elites, which remain traditional in their profile: ‘There is a lag between elite transformation and socio-economic change’ (Koutsoukis 1982:21). This kind of reasoning, although placing the study of elites in an evolving socio-economic context, has difficulties in explaining research findings since it tends to neglect the intervening political structures, such as political regimes, parties and state structures, which shape individual behaviour. Despite its problems, the above study contains useful empirical material which will be presented in this analysis. Equally problematic is another approach to elites, which basically recognizes a divide between elites and masses and, in the case of developing societies, tries to map relations between the two in terms of vertical, individual patronage ties. In studies which adopt this approach, patronclient relationships are understood as benefiting the partners of the relationship. There is a relevant, often cited study of Greek politics which covers the period 1843–1965 and includes a historical survey of Greek cabinet ministers (Legg 1969). Legg’s monograph has been criticized from a theoretical point of view (Mouzelis 1978). It is woven around the idea that ‘the essential element of Greek polities’ is ‘the clientage system based on the mutual obligations of individuals’ (Legg 1969:313–14). In a typical functionalist fashion, the concept of clientelism becomes the main explanatory device of many observed differences of the Greek political system from other democratic systems. Despite its merits in terms of comparative analysis, this is a one-dimensional explanation which not only tends to ignore issues of collective action, including class conflict, but also underestimates the fact that patron-client ties are essentially power relationships. However, the above study also contains empirical material useful for the purposes of our analysis. Since the ‘locus’ of power par excellence used to be and still is the modern state, one may try to trace linkages between the evolution of elites and the development of the state in modern society, in other words, to note parallelisms between the historical trajectory of a certain state and the changes in the profile of political elites which have been at its helm. Research on elites may not necessarily be compromised by the theoretical problems noted above. While the sketched criticisms are valid for some of

MINISTERIAL ELITES IN GREECE, 1843–2001 145

the relevant literature, the study of political elites is not necessarily an empiricist exercise, limited to registering the average values of variables which characterize members of parliament, cabinet ministers and top civil servants, such as gender, age, education, profession, and social class origin. Studying elites is not meant to imply that the study of politics is limited to examining the ‘mental maps’ and political activities of a handful of powerful people either. Even though such maps and activities are very useful to know, the study of elites, such as the governing ones, is meant to show which social groups and categories prevail politically in a certain society in the sense that they are over-represented in the centres of political decision-making. Presumably, this also means that we can predict how the costs of any new public policy may be distributed. For instance, when a new tax is to be levied among various social sectors, those groups and categories which prevail politically may be least affected. This can be analysed in terms of the interplay of ‘social’ with ‘political capital’, which may serve as a useful conceptual insight. It is possible that research may go beyond aggregates of individual elite characteristics and focus on outlines of career pathways to power, as Costa Pinto, Tavares de Almeida and Bermeo suggest (2000). It may also be possible to look at background characteristics and credentials of individual ministers with the aim of reconstructing linkages of ministerial elites not only to political decision-making areas but also to centres of social and economic power. For current elites this may be feasible. For past elites, one has to rely on existing sources which may have been conducted with a different aim, because of different concerns (see a list of primary sources on Greek elites in the last section of the references of this study). There may also be historical periods with no relevant sources at all and other periods with only a few sources. Elite studies, such as the aforementioned two studies of Greek elites, were conceived in the context of structural functionalism. As is well known, structural functionalism was particularly interested in social and political stability. Even though this current of thought helped push aside the earlier empiricism of social science research, it offered a static view of politics and society, a snapshot of who constituted elites and what their attitudes were at a single point in time. It is possible to overcome this static view by introducing a macro-historical perspective, that is, an analysis of changes in elites over time. By studying the evolution of the social profile of governing elites over time, one may obtain a dynamic view of politics and society. One may confirm or refute the hypothesis that any long-term changes at the level of social structures may be reflected at the level of the top officials of the political system. It is interesting to show how the social composition of governing elites is to a certain extent affected by changes which have already taken place in


society. The reverse may also hold true: elites may and indeed often do change faster than the society to which they belong. In this vein, our principal aim in this contribution is to construct the social profile of Greek ministerial elites on the basis of several variables and then to discuss which political and social trends have been manifested at the level of cabinet ministers over approximately one and a half centuries (1843–2001), by placing such trends in the context of large-scale political and societal changes. In concrete terms, the study of political elites, especially of ministerial elites, may be fruitful if placed in the context of political regime alternations and wider social changes. This analysis continues with a section on the modern Greek state and society and on the availability and limitations of data on Greek ministerial elites. In the main body of the study the following variables are compared in a diachronic manner: average cabinet size and cabinet duration, number of ministers and prime ministers, age, gender, geographical and regional origin, occupation, education, political longevity and political nepotism of Greek ministerial elites. The comparisons are attempted in the time span between 1843 and 2001, while contrasts between the ministerial and the parliamentary elites are presented for the period 1974–2001. Finally, in the last section there is discussion of the findings and conclusions. A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE MODERN GREEK STATE The modern Greek state was established as the Kingdom of Greece in 1830, after the successful War of Independence, which had been fought against the Ottoman Empire in 1821–27. During this war three national assemblies of representatives of the Greek revolutionaries took place and national Greek governments were formed. This was the period of the First Greek Republic (that is, the first political regime without a king). Detailed studies on Greek politics during the first half of the nineteenth century (Petropulos 1968; Loukos 1988) and the few such studies of the second half of that century (Kitroeff 1990:150) point to the painful emergence of modern political institutions, suffering from factionalism, in a pre-modern, predominantly agrarian society. The role of ministerial elites is commensurate to the role of the state in society. It has been suggested that the nineteenth-century Greek state was comparatively overdeveloped (Tsoucalas 1983). The development of twentieth century Greek society can also be understood in the light of the large presence of the state in society. That is, it can been analysed on the grounds of the growing importance of the state for Greek populations living inside and outside its borders and of the state’s intervention in more and more sectors of social life (Hadjiiossif 1999b:10–11). This observation may help us assess the rather large size of Greek ministerial elites: Legg (1969) counted 931 ministers in the period 1843–1965, while Koutsoukis


(1982) counted 589 ministers in the post-war period of 1946–76. These figures are probably the result of high government turnover, particularly in the nineteenth century and the inter-war period, as well as the result of the expanding activities of the state and the concomitant proliferation of ministries. The study of the particular political and economic development of Greece can go some way towards explaining this trend. For instance, the economic power of Greek ship owners should be related to the existence of a separate Ministry of Naval Commerce, while an unfortunate tradition of periodic police surveillance and oppression may be linked to the preservation of a separate Ministry of Public Order. This ministry (which is still in existence) may be regarded as a relic of earlier periods of dictatorial rule or of restricted democratic freedoms. In addition to the large number of ministers, another particular aspect of our case is the distance between appearances and reality. In Greece—as in other southern European countries—there is a recurrent distance between formal principles and procedures, on the one hand, and substantive social and political developments, on the other. Such developments lie hidden below the level of the formal functioning of the system, which is encoded in constitutional provisions. In other words, Greek formalism is part and parcel of the political system and presents an issue for systematic political analysis (Mouzelis 1978). Formalism is manifested as legalism in the form of multiple and contradictory regulations which govern Greek political and economic life. Excessive legislation is a recognizable aspect of the Greek state. The large presence of lawyers among the members of parliamentary and ministerial elites, which will be indicated later in this study, is related to formalism and legalism. If one is impressed by the size, the rather high educational level, the legal expertise, and the cosmopolitanism of Greek ministerial elites, which will be shown below, then one may draw the wrong conclusions about the quality of Greek political elites. Their performance in managing the state and the economy has varied a lot and has often been at odds with what their typical credentials would indicate. Also the number of ministers of Greek governments may have been inflated, not so much because of real governing needs but because of the tendency of some Greek prime ministers to accommodate political allies and friends by inventing new ministerial posts. A somewhat similar point can be made for the formal and informal aspects of modern Greek democracy. At the formal level, to the extent that democracy used to be equated to parliamentarism, modern Greece is one of the oldest European democracies. Constitutional monarchy emerged first in 1843, the year our analysis starts. However, this was not a democratic regime. If universal male suffrage is an indicator of the advent of modern democracy, modern Greece is a comparatively early democracy since the suffrage was established in 1864, earlier than in many European countries. If, however, another indicator is adopted, that is, the appointment of new


governments on the basis of majority rule in the parliament, the date is moved to 1875. Since then, in a span of one hundred and twenty five years, most governments in Greece have been democratically elected, with the exception of very short intervals of authoritarian rule (1925–26, 1936– 40 and 1967–74, that is, for a total of twelve years) and occupation by foreign powers (Germany, Italy and Bulgaria in 1941–44). While the difference of democratic from authoritarian periods is clear, a note on the kind of democracy is necessary. In substantive terms, the quality of democracy in Greece has been uneven, particularly during the First World War and the two decades following the end of the Second World War. In those times, some democratic procedures, including the exercise of a few human rights, were restricted. This point does not imply that democracy in Greece was just a façade for long periods of time. After all, during the twentieth century, pure authoritarian rule lasted only for twelve years in Greece. However, throughout a long period, roughly between 1830 to 1974—even during some periods of democratic rule—the political participation of some categories of the population (for example, members of the left-wing parties, women) was constrained. Women voted and took part in parliamentary elections for the first time in 1953, while the Communist Party was outlawed between 1947 and 1974. Also there have been various interventions, both domestic (for example, by the King in 1965) and foreign (for example, by the US ambassador in the early years of the cold war) which have affected the size, composition and duration of some Greek governments. Although there were functioning democratic institutions in Greece in 1946–67, the post-war democratic regime as a whole was weak and frail (Nicolacopoulos 2001). It was not until after 1974 that a fully-fledged democracy was established (Diamandouros 1986, Voulgaris 2001). Taking into account such domestic and foreign confining conditions may help place the study of elites in perspective. A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE ON GREEK POLITICAL ELITES On the topic of Greek ministers, there is a single chapter of the aforementioned monograph by Keith Legg covering the period from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-1960s (1843–1965; Legg 1969: 297– 311). Legg has studied the educational background, occupation, family tradition in politics, and regional origin of ministers for the above period. (His biographical data for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is not always reliable and is drawn on biographies of politicians cited in an encyclopedia, the Megali Hellenike Encyclopedia, in parliamentary records and in two post-war editions of the Greek Who’s Who.) Legg has also conducted a sample survey of 55 parliamentary deputies of the 1964 parliament (Legg 1969:301, 303, 320 and 345). There is also a compilation


of data on all Greek prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs (Makrydemetris 1997, 2000). For the period up to the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century there are books and articles of political history with biographical data on selected politicians (usually in an appendix, for example, Veremis 1997) and biographies of a few prominent prime ministers (Flerianou 1999), but no studies synthesizing the material. One may find lists of the members of all governments since the early 1830s (Ailianou-Tsingou 1959; Dakin 1972; Provatas 1980 and, among our primary data sources listed at the end, Koukounas 1999). However, in such sources the names of politicians are usually cited with only one additional piece of information, such as the ministry in which they served (Dakin 1972: Appendix B) or the region or prefecture in which they were elected (Enossi teos Vouleuton 1995). There is also some biographical data on military officers who later engaged in politics (Veremis 1997). For more in-depth analysis one may go to a single case study on nineteenth century Greek politicians of a southern region (Achaia) by Christos Lyrintzis (1991). His study contains details of the family trees and the cursus honorum of politicians who originated in that region (Lyrintzis 1991: Appendix 1). The author traces the decline of old-style notables (in Greek: tzakia). The notables prevailed in politics in the larger part of the nineteenth century, basing their political domination on family tradition, intermediation between local society and central government, social esteem, personal status, and the rental of taxes. Leaving economic development to merchants and rich farmers, they became full-time politicians by developing patronage relations with the lower urban and rural strata. However, in the last two decades of the nineteenth century they faced economic crisis and antagonism from the rising urban middle classes, which were represented by a new political elite, primarily composed of merchants and lawyers. Gradually, just before and just after the turn of the nineteenth century, the state and new political parties started playing a growing role. The new political elite employed innovative means of political domination, such as control of political party mechanisms and expertise on administrative and financial matters, and became a protagonist of the political scene in the first decade of the twentieth century (Lyrintzis 1991: 181–3). Many Greek historians have underlined the importance of the coup d’état of 1909 as a turning point in Greek politics (Dertilis 1977; Mavrogordatos 1983; Veremis 1997). The main relevant point is the renewal of the Greek parliamentary elite, evident in the composition of the two parliaments elected immediately after the coup d’état of 1909. As Legg writes: ‘The prevailing recruitment pattern was abruptly broken in October 1910. The revolution of 1909, the political intervention of junior officers, and the leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos brought new men into top


political roles.’ However, ‘although the events of 1909 brought new men into the political arena, the leadership, even among the new men came from families wealthy enough to send their children abroad for study’ (Legg, 1969:302, 304). For the twentieth century there are no in-depth studies of particular groups of politicians. Good research exists only at the level of parties and their social bases (Mavrogordatos 1983). To start with, we may divide the period 1910–41 into two sub-periods, one of which is longer than the other. The first, longer, sub-period (1910–36) includes almost ten years of continuous wars (the two Balkan Wars, the First World War and the Asia Minor expedition) between 1912 and 1923; but it also includes the Second Greek Republic of 1924–35. The second, shorter, sub-period includes the Metaxas dictatorship (1936–41). The tables presented in this study reflect this division into two sub-periods, 1910–36 and 1936–41, since the periods correspond to two sharply different regimes. The period of the war and occupation of Greece (1941–44) is not studied in the paper since political power rested in the hands of the German, the Italian, and the Bulgarian armies which divided the territory of Greece among themselves and appointed authorities at will. The post-war period can be divided again in two sub-periods. First is the period of restricted democracy (1944–67), during which the Left was to a large extent excluded from the political system since it was closely monitored by the state mechanism. Second comes the period of the Colonels’ authoritarian regime (1967–74). For the first 30 years of the post-war period (1944–76), there is some data in Legg (1969) and only one survey of cabinet ministers, in the aforementioned study by Koutsoukis (Koutsoukis 1978, 1982). The latter’s survey focuses on a few social variables and is based on published biographical data for the ministers who served in governments of the right and the centre (1946–67), the military dictatorship (1967–74) and the first elected conservative government (New Democracy Party—ND) after the fall of the dictatorship. The work of Koutsoukis is based on various secondary sources (such as Ailianou-Tsigou 1959 and the Megali Hellenike Encyclopedia), Greek periodicals and the daily press, international sources such as Keesing’s Contemporary Archives and informants in Greece and the USA (Koutsoukis 1982:40). The names of cabinet ministers are available in very rare sources (Embassy of the USA in Greece 1971), but other relevant information is limited only to the ministry they served and the period of their tenure. For the Colonels’ regime (1967–74) there are very few sources anyway (Diamandouros 1986; Athanassatou et al. 1999), which cover systemic rather than personnel aspects of the rise and decline of that dictatorship. Short biographical notes on the political fate of a few high ranking military officers who became ministers in cabinets during 1967–74 can be found in


newspaper archives and parts of books (Woodhouse 1985: x–xii; Meletopoulos 1996: passim, Papachelas 1997:433–9). Finally, for the immediate post-authoritarian period (1974–81), there is no specific analysis of ministerial elites. However, there are a few studies of the parliamentary elites (Metaxas 1981; Perdikares 1981) and in particular of the parliamentary deputies of the Socialist Party (PASOK, by Nicolacopoulos 1977, 1981) and the conservative party (ND, by Pappas 1999). Data on some party cadres of the socialist party are available for very few electoral districts for the period 1974–81 (Lyrintzis 1983; Spourdalakis 1988). For the decades of the 1980s and the 1990s there are only newspaper articles on parliamentary elites, usually published in the aftermath of each national election. On the basis of existing research, it is possible to compare Greek ministerial elites with parliamentary elites. Some ministers, who were cardcarrying party members, have not been elected to parliament. They have been appointed as ministers, since the current Greek constitution (of 1975, amended in 1986 and in 2001) does not require ministers to be members of parliament. Other ministers, of both socialist and conservative governments, have started their political career without first passing through the party hierarchy. Yet, if we assume that politicians of the two larger political parties (ND and PASOK), which have alternated in power since 1974, form a wider ‘political class’, we may try to compare results on our research on ministerial elites with results of the available studies on parliamentary elites (Metaxas 1981; Perdikares 1981; Nicolacopoulos 1977, 1981, 2001; Lyrintzis 1986; Drettakes 1991; Pappas 1999). This is a legitimate comparison since governments in post-authoritarian Greece have since 1974 been single-party majority governments. With the exception of a ten-month period (June 1989-April 1990) during which coalition governments were formed, since 1974 (that is, for the last 28 years), the socialist party (PASOK) and the conservative party (ND) have enjoyed the absolute majority of parliamentary seats while in government (ND—1974– 81, PASOK—1981–89, ND—1990–93, and PASOK since 1993). Sources and Validity of Data Because of this dearth of information, we have made an effort to find new, unpublished data on Greek cabinets and ministers. We have sought such data in rare publications (such as leaflets issued by parties during electoral campaigns) which contain biographical notes on politicians and in newspaper reports, published each time new governments are sworn in. New data could not be found for the period until the end of the Second World War. Until that period our analysis is based on Legg (1969). It was possible to do field research and find new data for the post-war period (1944–67) and for the post-authoritarian period (1974–2000). For the


post-war period there was some data by Koutsoukis (1982). His data cover the period 1946–67 and 1967–74. We thought it important to compare the findings of Koutsoukis with our own, which refer to those post-war politicians who served as ministers at least three times in 1944–67. (While Koutsoukis started counting in 1946, the year of the first post-war elections, we started with the first Greek government of the post-war period, formed in the fall of 1944 when the country was liberated.) We found that in this period 166 ministers had served three times or more. Data were available for only 107 of them (whom we will call the post-war inner elite). We were interested in finding out whether these ministers shared any traits which set them apart from the rest of the members of post-war cabinets. We did field research also for the post-authoritarian period, in an attempt to present, for the first time, empirical material on post-1974 Greek ministerial elites. As noted above, this involved research on all those who had served as ministers, that is, on 411 politicians (Table 1), and particularly on 139 politicians who served as ministers at least three times. This post-authoritarian inner elite of 139 politicians was selected out of the 411 individuals who had served as ministers at least once between July 1974 and October 2001 (including the new October 2001 cabinet of Costas Simitis, but excluding all caretaker cabinets). Our hypothesis was that after the Second World War and again after the fall of the Colonels’ regime, there was in Greece an elite within the ministerial elite, that is, a smaller set of politicians who were able to reproduce their political power. The thinking behind this hypothesis is related to the well-known trend of elite reproduction, the effort of those in power to retain their posts and prolong their stay in power. The effort obviously involves limiting the access of competitors to the same posts. The idea is familiar not only to students of political elites but also to sociologists. As is well known, Robert Michels (Michels 1966) has talked about the ‘iron law of oligarchy’; while Max Weber and later Frank Parkin have discussed the related concept of ‘social closure’, to describe the selfreproducing behaviour of upper social classes (Parkin 1971). But, in the first place, is there such a distinct inner ministerial elite in Greece? This is an interesting, albeit secondary, question of our essay. To answer this question, as we noted above, we sampled those politicians who had been ministers for at least three-times (excluding caretaker cabinets) in 1944–67 and in 1974–2001. The primary question of our paper is the following: what is the evolution of the social profile of Greek ministerial elites? In order to answer this question, we have made a diachronic presentation of these elites in 1843–2001. We have attempted the comparison in terms of age (at first cabinet office), gender, occupation,


TABLE 1 NUMBER OF CABINETS AND MINISTERS

Sources: Elaboration of Legg (1969:298, Table 12.1) for the period 1910–64, of Makrydemetris (2000:158, Table 14) and own research. In case of discrepancies, our own research is used. The number of ministers in 1944–67 is underestimated due to lack of reliable data for 1944–46. Koutsoukis (1982) starts counting from 1946.

geographical origin, education, political career (office held before the ministerial appointment), and family involvement in politics. Before continuing, a note on the validity of data is pertinent. Generally, the data in this study are more reliable for the second half of the twentieth century than for previous periods. In what follows, we have tried to match three sources (Legg 1969; Koutsoukis 1982; and our own research) which may be based on different definitions of variables, and the corresponding operationalizations may differ. As a rule we have tried to make our definitions conform to the lowest common denominator of the other two sources, in order to trace historical patterns of the same variables. For example, in studying the regional origin of ministers we have added the share of ministers from the Peloponnesus region to the share of ministers from the Sterea Hellada region, since Legg had done so in his research and it was also possible to present the data of Koutsoukis in the same manner. Such compromises may be debatable, but we think that the general picture is true, to the extent that the original pieces of information are correct. It should be remembered that data on ministers can be found basically in the curriculum vitae of politicians which are submitted by themselves and cannot be verified by independent researchers, given the very large size of ministerial elites. For instance, it should be noted that the percentages of military educated ministers in Table 7b do not always correspond to the equivalent percentages of former military officers in Table 6 which presents an occupational distribution of ministers. The same holds for other fields of study such as law, medicine and engineering, which differ from the corresponding shares of lawyers, medical doctors, and engineers in the table presenting the occupational distribution of ministers. In addition, since some ministers have declared that they have studied more than one subject or that they have exercised more than one profession, multiple coding has been used in the relevant tables. In short, discrepancies among tables are due to unreliable information found in the


biographies of ministers or to multiple coding or to the percentage of unknown or unspecified occupations and fields of study. PERIODIZATION OF THE EVOLUTION OF GREEK MINISTERIAL ELITES The seven historical periods for which we have obtained some comparable data are the following: first, the early period of constitutional monarchy in the nineteenth century, which roughly lasted between 1843 and 1878. The cut-off point is set at 1878 because in that year the last of the members of the old political elite (Admiral Voulgaris) passed away (Legg 1969:300), while a little earlier (in 1875) the King (George I) had accepted the principle that the post of the prime minister was to be held not by any political leader of his choice, but by the leader who enjoyed the ‘declared’ confidence of the parliament’s majority. Second, the period at the turn of the century, 1878–1910. The cut-off point is set at 1910 although the regime did not change in that year, but in 1924, when the monarch was deposed and when the Second Greek Republic was instituted (it lasted until 1935). However, in 1909 there was a coup d’état by military officers who sought to circumscribe the powers of the royal family. Upon the invitation of the coup’s leaders, the charismatic Cretan politician Eleftherios Venizelos appeared on the political scene of mainland Greece. With him, a new party system emerged owing to the creation and high electoral success of his new party (the Liberal Party). This shake-up could be seen as the functional equivalent of regime change in 1910. Third, the period of the Balkan Wars, the First World War and the interwar years, which was the period 1910–36. Venizelos would dominate Greek politics until the mid-1930s. His conflict with the king (Constantine I) would polarize Greek politics throughout this period. In fact, after the defeat of the Greek army by the Turkish army in Asia Minor (1922), a political turmoil followed, the king fled to exile, and a republic was instituted (the Second Republic, 1924–35). Fourth, the period of the Metaxas dictatorship, 1936–41. This was a brief but brutal dictatorship led by a former military officer, Ioannis Metaxas, and favoured by the king (George II). The king left the country in 1941, when Greece was occupied by Nazi Germany, Italy and Bulgaria. The occupation armies left in the fall of 1944 and an armed clash between the communist partisan forces, on the one hand, and the royalist Greek army, on the other, took place in the late 1944. Fifth, the restricted democracy, which lasted from 1944 to 1967. Parliamentary elections took place in the spring of 1946 and the monarchy was re-instituted by referendum in the autumn of the same year. A Civil War between the right and the left took place in 1946–49. During this war,


parties of the right and the centre ruled in coalition. After the end of the Civil War, in which the left was defeated, there was a long period of restriction of political rights for all those suspected for leaning to the left. This was a period of domination of Greek politics by three political forces, that is, the King, the army and the right-wing political elite (with interludes of governments of the centre in 1950–52 and in 1963–65). Democratic freedoms were exercised to the extent that they did not disturb this tripartite power bloc. The 1950s and 1960s were also a period of economic reconstruction and uneven and dependent development. In the early 1950s the right was organized in a single party, which remained united—although it changed titles and leaders (it was first led by Alexander Papagos, then by Constantine Karamanlis). The centre remained fragmented until the early 1960s. It was then united under the leadership of George Papandreou (the father of Andreas Papandreou) but ruled for somewhat less than two years (1963–65). The left was represented by a party (EDA), which attracted the votes of the communist side of the Civil War and independent socialists and left-leaning democrats. EDA gained strength during the late 1950s but its activities were monitored by the state apparatus (the army, the police, and the justice system). Monitoring became repression during the next, sixth period. Sixth, the Colonels’ regime, which lasted from 1967 to 1974, was a purely military dictatorship, which was not institutionalized (Diamandouros 1986), was unable to gain roots in society, and gave its place to democracy after the Cyprus debacle in the summer of 1974. This débâcle diminished the political role and social status of the Greek military. Seventh, the current, post-authoritarian period of the republic (the Third Greek Republic), which was proclaimed after a referendum that took place in late 1974, after the fall of the dictatorship. For each of the seven periods there are data only on the aforementioned variables and for samples of different size. Thus, there are data for 147 ministers in the period 1843–78, for 96 ministers in 1878–1910, and for 300 ministers in 1910–36 (on the basis of Legg 1969); for 288 ministers in 1946–67 (on the basis of Koutsoukis 1982) and for 107 ministers of the same period who were appointed at least three times (on the basis of our own research), for 147 ministers in 1967–74 (on the basis of Koutsoukis 1982); and for 411 ministers in 1974–2001 as well as an inner elite of 139 politicians who were appointed to a ministerial post at least three times between 1974 and 2001 (on the basis of our own research). So for the period 1944–67 and for the period 1974–2001 there are four samples, that is, two all-compassing samples and another two samples which are sub-sets of the former ones. The first sample—post-war sample I—and the corresponding postauthoritarian sample I are all-encompassing and include all ministers. The


samples exclude those ministers who participated in caretaker cabinets, formed for short intervals a few months before general elections in order to oversee the electoral procedures. (An example is the cabinet of I. Grivas, which was formed for a few weeks during the autumn of 1989.) The other two samples are smaller, are only a part of the corresponding first samples, and include those politicians who served as ministers at least three times between 1944 and 1967 (post-war sample II) and between 1974 and 2001 (post-authoritarian sample II). As noted earlier, ‘sample II’ constitute the elites within the elites, that is, one inner elite for the post-1944 period and another for the post-1974 period. The point is to see whether there is any meaning in setting apart as a social and political elite those politicians who had a frequent participation in cabinets. To sum up this section, there are very few primary sources, and even fewer secondary sources for some periods of Greek political history. Yet, despite the limits posed by the lack of primary and secondary sources, it is possible to review some patterns of the social background, credentials, and modes of selection of members of the Greek ministerial elites. We now proceed with a short presentation of cabinets, prime ministers, and ministers in 1843– 2001. THE EVOLUTION OF MINISTERIAL ELITES IN GREECE, 1843–2001 Number of Cabinets and Ministers There are data for the number of cabinets, prime ministers, ministers, as well as the average cabinet size and duration (Table 2). Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century there was high cabinet instability, but there were not many different Prime Ministers (Table 1 above). In the second half of the nineteenth century the number of cabinets exceeded by far the number of people who became prime ministers. A small number of political leaders prevailed in the political scene. They presided over feeble political parties (which were ‘parties of notables’) and were able to shuffle and reshuffle their cabinets. By contrast, in the first few decades of the twentieth century, there was a high turnover of both cabinets and Prime Ministers. This was the result of extraordinary systemic changes in Greek politics, including what amounted to regime change in 1910 (and the passage of the constitution of 1911), the schism between liberals and royalists which reached a high-point in the mid-1910s, the instauration of the Second Republic in 1924, and the frequent presence of the military in politics (coup d’état of 1909, the very short-lived authoritarian regime of 1925–26, an aborted pro-liberal military coup in 1935, and the onset of Metaxas’ dictatorship in 1936).


TABLE 2 NUMBER OF CABINETS, AVERAGE CABINET SIZE AND AVERAGE CABINET DURATION (IN MONTHS)

Sources: Elaboration of Legg (1969:298, Table 12.1) for the period 1910–64, of Makrydemetris (2000:158, Table 4) and own research. Koutsoukis (1982:88, Table 3) gives different figures. In case of discrepancies, our own research is used.

Thus it can be argued that because of the parallel volatility of cabinets and Prime Ministers, the period of 1910–36 (which in this study is treated as a whole) presented more overall political instability than the previous periods under study. While during the comparatively short dictatorships of 1936–40 and 1967–74 there were inadvertently few cabinets and Prime Ministers, during the intervening period of 1944–67 cabinet instability was high and the number of Prime Ministers comparable to that of the inter-war period, that is, also high. This time, political instability cannot be attributed to regime changes or military interventions. Rather it was the outcome of the lack of mass political parties (with the exception of the Greek Communist Party— KKE which, however, was outlawed in the post-war period, between the time of the Civil War and the fall of the Colonels’ regime). Extreme fragmentation characterized the political parties of the right and centre in the immediate post-war period. As noted above, the centre remained fragmented until the end of the 1950s. With the exception of KKE, it was not until 1974, with the emergence of PASOK, and until 1981, with the fall of ND from power and its subsequent re-organization, that parties of the ‘mass type’ appeared in Greek politics. Two other tendencies can be observed in regard to cabinet formation. The first is related to the above tendency of prolonged political instability. The instability is also manifested in the duration of cabinets, which averaged less than one year in the nineteenth century and in the inter-war period. The duration was three times longer at the end of the twentieth century (that is, during the post-authoritarian period, see Table 2). The second tendency is related to the number of ministers per cabinet. The average size of cabinets grew steadily from one historical period to the next. This tendency must be attributed to the increasing presence of the state in economy and society, which was a world-wide trend during the greater part of the twentieth century.


Average Age Owing to lack of data, diachronic comparisons on the average age of ministerial elites can be made only for the second half of the twentieth century. At the end of the twentieth century, Greek society was ageing. Along with Austria, Germany, and Italy, Greece had one of the lowest fertility rates in Western Europe. It is expected that by the mid-twentyfirst century, the elderly will constitute a sizeable proportion of Greek society. In that respect, Greek politicians remaining active in politics until old age, seem to underline this general societal trend. In Greece during the late 1980s and the early 1990s a common impression about the political elite was that it consisted of very old politicians. There were some facts justifying this impression. At the end of the 1980s the leaders of the three largest political parties (Andreas Papandreou of PASOK, Costas Mitsotakis of ND, and Charilaos Florakis of KKE) were in their early seventies. Other leaders were older still. For instance, Constantine Karamanlis, founder of New Democracy and former Prime Minister (1955–63 and 1974–80), and Xenofon Zolotas (post-war governor of the Bank of Greece), were to come back in 1990 (in their eighties), the former as President of the Republic, the latter as Prime Minister in a short-lived coalition government (November 1989–April 1990). Yet, if one looks at the larger picture of Greek ministerial elites, this impression is not borne out by the facts. Between 1946 and 2001, the average age of ministers at first appointment was lower during the postauthoritarian period (1974–2001) than during either of the two previous regimes (1946–67 and 1967–74—see Table 3). With regard to the inner elite of 107 ministers, their average age was slightly lower than the wider ministerial elite of the period 1946–67 as a whole. This does not alter the general picture, which is that of a decline in the age of ministers during the last quarter of the twentieth century. The fall in the mean age of ministers was probably due to the rise of a new political elite, the PASOK ministers who formed many successive cabinets in the 1980s (Lytintzis 1986). The picture of the parliamentary elite is different. A trend of rising age is observable among parliamentarians between 1977 and 1981 and again between 1985 and 1989. This trend can also be observed during the 1990s. In detail, and in terms of age, ND’s parliamentary groups, formed after the elections of 1974 and 1977, looked rather old. More than two-thirds of the conservative deputies were over 45 years old (68 per cent of all ND deputies in both the parliament of 1974 and the parliament of 1977). In the parliament elected in 1981 the deputies of the new governing party, PASOK, were comparatively younger: 58 per cent of the socialist deputies were over 45 years old, but this percentage rose to 78 per cent in the 1985 parliament. This change was partly due to the fact that in the general


TABLE 3 MEAN AGE OF MINISTERS AT TIME OF FIRST APPOINTMENT

Sources: Koutsoukis (1982:91, Table 4) for 1946–67 and our own research. The caretaker cabinets are excluded. There are no data for the pre-1946 periods. In the post-war period, sample (I) is reported as in Koutsoukis. Post-war sample (II) includes only those ministers who held office three or more times between 1944 and 1967. The same holds for post-1974 sample (II).

elections of 1985, preferential voting, that is, the freedom of voters to choose among many candidates of their preferred party in the same district, was abolished by the PASOK government. In that year, party lists were formed by the party leaderships and candidates were placed on the lists in hierarchical order, mostly on the grounds of their leverage with the party leadership. The average age of deputies in the 1985 parliament was higher than that of the 1981 parliament. In 1989, preferential voting was re-instituted and in the two consecutive elections of that year the average (mean) age of all parliamentarians fell slightly (from 51 years to 49). In the parliament elected in 1990, among the deputies of the governing conservative party, again more than two-thirds (65 per cent) were over 45 years old (Drettakes 1991:25, Table 1.4; for ND; also, for the same party, Pappas 1999:95, 98). When in 1993 PASOK replaced ND in power, 68 per cent of the socialist deputies were over 45 years old (our own research). When PASOK was again returned to power in 1996, the share of deputies over 45 years old rose to 75 per cent. In the parliament elected in 2000 the share remained the same (75 per cent). The main finding is that in terms of age there was a renewal of the parliamentary elite in 1974 (at the regime change), in 1981 and again in 1989. Another finding is that, compared to the past, the parliamentary elite of PASOK, which came to power in 1993, is composed of relatively older deputies. The same cannot be said for the ministerial elite, however. During 1981– 89 the mean age of socialist ministers was approximately 46. During 1990– 93 the corresponding mean age of conservative ministers was 53, while in 1993–2000 the mean age of socialist ministers was 44 (our own research). The post-1974 inner elite of 139 ministers did not differ much in this respect (their mean age was approximately 46). The most important general finding is that there was a noticeable decline in the mean age of ministers during the 1980s and the 1990s. This was probably due to the rise of a new


political party, PASOK, to power. The elite of this party included young members of the resistance against the Colonels’ regime who, after 1974, chose to follow a political career and obtained ministerial posts in 1981 and 1985 when PASOK won two consecutive electoral victories. In short, the first impression about the advanced age of contemporary Greek ministerial elites is wrong. If anything, while the general Greek population has gradually aged and the average age of the parliamentary elite has fluctuated, the ministerial elite seems to have become younger. Gender Distribution Traditionally, Greece was and remains a male-dominated society. This is reflected in the gender composition of ministerial elites for the largest part of the last 150 years (Table 4). During the post-war era, this pattern was visible both in the all-encompassing and in the inner elites. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, Greek women made inroads into both higher education and the labour market, particularly in the service sector. However, they have not yet been admitted to political institutions to an equal degree. To students of southern European politics it comes as no surprise that Greek ministerial elites have been male-dominated. The peak of this trend was the cabinets of the Colonels’ regime, in which no women were included. Comparing the pre-authoritarian with the post-authoritarian period, we see a small improvement in the most recent period (Table 4). While almost no women were included in the cabinets of the constitutional monarchy (1946–67), approximately five per cent of all ministers in the post-1974 republic were women. This improvement was probably due to the fact that Andreas Papandreou’s 1981–89 and Costas Simitis’ 1996– 2001 PASOK governments and Costas Mitsotakis’ conservative government of 1990–93 each included a few women. The largest participation of women in government occurred in the PASOK cabinet formed by Simitis in April 2000, when five of the 43 ministers and deputy-ministers were women. The observed trend is also reflected in the gender composition of the Greek parliament (Metaxas 1981; Perdikares 1981). Women were vastly under-represented in all of the parliaments formed between 1974 and 2000. The proportion of women parliamentarians ranged from two per cent in 1974 to eight per cent in 2000 (our own research). Overall, women are still excluded from the top echelons of Greek politics, although their role has increased in Greek society.


TABLE 4 GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF MINISTERS (%)

Sources: Legg (1969:302); Koutsoukis (1982:89–90), and own research for postwar sample (II) and for the period 1974–2001. Post-war sample (II) refers to the period 1944–67 and includes those ministers who held office at least three times.

Geographical and Regional Origin Over time Greece has become a society with a very uneven urban-rural distribution. As has been the case in other southern European societies, Greece has witnessed large waves of external and internal migration throughout the twentieth century. In the post-war era, these waves took the form of migration from the rural areas towards Athens and Piraeus, which together form the country’s largest urban centre. At the same time, there is a popular impression that the country’s political personnel used to come disproportionately from the Peloponnesus and, more generally, from the regions of southern Greece. This trend is related to the fact that, until the First World War, the territory of the Kingdom of Greece was limited to, roughly, the southern half of the current Greek territory. During the nineteenth century, these original territories included the southern part of what is today the country’s mainland (Peloponnesus and Sterea Hellada, the so-called ‘Old Lands’) because these territories were acquired by the modern Greek state at the time of its inception. The ministerial elites came more often from this area than from the so-called ‘New Lands’ that were acquired during the 1910s (see data in Table 5a and in Legg 1969:308, Table 12.7). The urban area of the capital, which includes Athens and Piraeus, has grown disproportionately since the early 1920s, when it received an influx of migrants from the Greek-speaking areas of Asia Minor, and particularly since the end of the Second World War, when internal migration has led to the gradual desertion of entire villages. Today, around 40 per cent of the population of Greece lives in its capital city. This corresponds with the current preponderance of Athens in the economic, political, and administrative life of Greece. However, it was not always like this.


The Importance of Stereo. Hellada and Peloponnesus It was natural that political elites in the new kingdom would come mainly from the ‘Old Lands’, mostly from the Peloponnesus, where the War of Independence (1821–27) had been mostly fought. However, as the state expanded to include other Greek-speaking populations living in the mainland of the Balkan peninsula and in the islands (the ‘New Lands’), the representation of politicians and administrators coming from the ‘Old Lands’ (the original kingdom) did not decrease commensurately. In the eyes of some Greeks, the state was, for a long time, staffed by an ‘Old Land’ officialdom who gave preferential treatment to the interests of the population living in those parts of the country. To what extent was this image true over time? Tables 5 and 5a point to the importance of southern Greece and of the country’s capital city in modern Greek politics. In detail, if one may judge the relative influence of the southern regions in Greek politics from their share of cabinet members in the total of Greek ministers, then the peak of this influence occurred during the midnineteenth century. However, this finding needs to be differentiated. We had better compare the share of ministers from certain regions against the relative share of the population of these regions as a proportion of Greece’s total population. In other words, one may compare the ratio of the population of these regions in the total population with the corresponding ratio of ministers from the same regions in the total of members of ministerial elites. The comparison, made on the basis of information provided by Legg (1969:308, Table 12.7) and by our own research, shows that the political influence of the ‘Old Lands’ was disproportionately large in comparison to their share of the population between 1910 and 1967. However, this does not hold true for the periods prior to 1910 and after 1967. While the data are not very reliable, prior to 1910 it would appear that the influence was not large given that the share of ministers coming from Peloponnesus and Sterea Hellada did not exceed the share of the total population living in these areas. As far as the period after 1967 is concerned, that is, the period of the Colonels’ authoritarian regime and that of the post-authoritarian republic, the situation was as follows: on the basis of the censuses of 1971, 1981, and 1991, the population of the southern regions accounted for 52 per cent, 53 per cent, and 53 per cent respectively of the Greek population. The comparable shares of ministers were 52.4 per cent for the period 1967–74 and 42.2 per cent for the period 1974–2001 (our own research; the cited percentages refer to the added percentage shares of ministers coming from Athens, Piraeus, Peloponnesus, and Sterea Hellada in Table 5a). The conclusion is that during both the Colonels’ regime and the Third Greek Republic, the ‘Old Lands’ as a whole were not over-represented within the ministerial elites.


TABLE 5 PLACE OF BIRTH OF MINISTERS

Sources: Legg (1969:308, Table 12.8); Koutsoukis (1989:108, Table 2), and own research. Legg only goes up to 1965 (post-war sample I). Koutsoukis has no equivalent data for the immediate post-war period (1946–67). In the post-war period, sample (I) is reported as in Legg. Post-war sample (II) is based on our own research for the period 1944–67, as are data for 1974–2001. A dash signifies that no data are available.

However, if one focuses on a specific area of the ‘Old Lands’, that is, the region of Peloponnesus, and compares census data on the population of this southern-most region of Greece’s mainland with the share of Peloponnesian ministers, the result is different. The population of Peloponnesus between 1971 and 1991 was almost stable and ranged from 10 to 11 per cent of the total population of Greece. In the two regimes of this time (the Colonels’ and the post-authoritarian regime), Peloponnesian ministers accounted for 22 per cent and 17 per cent respectively of all ministers in the wider elite. This result was true also for the postauthoritarian inner elite (20 per cent of the 139 persons who were appointed as ministers three or more times were Peloponnesians). It seems that during the last 25 years of the twentieth century, the Peloponnesus region has continued to be over-represented within Greek cabinets. The Importance of Athens Even after the addition of new lands (such as Thessaly) to the Kingdom of Greece, ‘the original kingdom, including Athens, continued to be the dominant region’ during the nineteenth century (Legg 1969:310). While during 1843–78, a considerable portion of ministers came from Greek-speaking areas outside the Kingdom’s borders, by the turn of the nineteenth century this portion had diminished considerably, and the newly acquired territories remained under-represented. During 1878–1910, Athenians were over-represented among ministers (Athenians accounted


TABLE 5a REGIONAL ORIGINS OF MINISTERS (%)

Sources: Koutsoukis (1982:97, Table 8); Legg (1969:308, Table 12.7), and own research for the post-war sample (II) and for the period 1974–2001. The percentage totals of Koutsoukis do not add up to 100 per cent. In this table the geographical regions rather than the official administrative peripheries are used, since the latter did not exist before 1986. Some geographical regions are shown together because Legg (1969), who studied the nineteenth century, lists together regions incorporated in Greece at approximately the same time. Our own post-war sample (II) covers the period 1944–67.

for 21.9 per cent of all ministers; see Table 5; while only nine per cent of the Greek population lived in Athens in 1907). In 1910–36, the proportion of Athenians fell slightly; however, compared to its share in the population, Athens remained over-represented within the elites. This held true even after the addition of the ‘New Lands’ of northern Greece (as a result of Greek victories in the Balkan and First World wars) and after the influx of Asia Minor refugees following the 1922 defeat by the Turkish army.


Under the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936–41 there were fewer Athenian ministers than ever (8.8 per cent; Table 5), while the predominant regions were again Peloponnesus and Sterea Hellada (Table 5a). Characteristically though, during the Metaxas regime the number of ministers from the Ionian islands, that is, the dictator’s homeland, doubled in comparison with the immediately previous historical period (see Table 5a and Legg 1969:308, Table 12.7). To what extent did these trends hold during the post-war period? Data from the three successive political regimes in 1944–2001 show a steady presence of Athenian-born politicians among the overall ministerial elite (the percentage of Athenians remained around the 20 per cent mark—see Table 5). However, there was a variation, as the over-representation of ‘Old Lands’ (mainly Peloponnesus), continued throughout the post-war period (Legg 1969:308, Table 12.7). Moreover, our own research on the post-war period shows that the presence of ministers coming from the ‘Old Lands’ was very accentuated among the inner elite of 107 ministers of 1944–67. In fact, with the exception of the Metaxas regime, in no other period of the twentieth century was over-representation of ‘Old Lands’ as high as during the post-Second World War period. During the 1967–74 authoritarian regime, Athens and the ‘Old Lands’ were still strongly represented among the ministerial elites. In the postauthoritarian regime, data show similar trends, but this time there was a rise of ministerial elite representation from Macedonia, Thrace and the Aegean Sea Islands (Table 5a). All the above regions together included more than half of all ministers. Over time we see the increase in representation from the northern region of Macedonia. This development may be attributed to the fact that, over time, and with internal migration, many politicians came from the urban centres, among which the most prominent was Thessaloniki—the largest city of the Macedonian region. Between the Colonels’ regime and the Third Republic there was also an increase in the number of ministers from Crete. This development may be explained by the fact that Crete has been a traditional PASOK stronghold. In sum, in the past most ministers came from Peloponnesus and Sterea Hellada. This trend declined somewhat in the last stages of the ‘unification of Greece’ (Dakin 1972), that is, with the acquisition of territories with Greek-speaking populations in the Balkans in the twentieth century. Over time, the importance of Peloponnesus has declined, but this region has never lost its primacy among Greek regions in terms of its share of ministers. At the same time, there has been a gradual increase in the share of Athenian and Macedonian ministers. These changes may be accounted for by the post-war currents of internal migration towards the largest cities (Athens and Thessaloniki), where a sizeable portion of contemporary ministers were born. At the end of the twentieth century, Peloponnesus and Athens remained over-represented within the ministerial elite. This


particularly holds true for the inner elite of the post-war and postauthoritarian period (Table 5a above). Occupational Background Which occupations and professions predominated within Greek cabinets? On the basis of Table 6, we may observe the following trends: on the one hand, lawyers have always been—and remain—the largest single professional category among ministers. Their significance diminished only during periods of authoritarian rule. The reasons for the large representation of lawyers in ministerial elites will be discussed later in this section. On the other hand, former military officers, who were never absent from cabinets, have had a fluctuating presence, with high points during periods of irredentist mobilization (1878–1910) and authoritarianism (1936–40, 1967–74). Their numbers fell to an all-time low during the post-1974 republic. Civil servants, once largely represented (1843–78 and 1910–36), were also comparatively well represented among members of the post-war inner elite during 1944–67. The presence of former civil servants among ministers declined substantially, to the point of reaching insignificance, in the post-1974 period. This development was probably related to the decline of the social status and political power of civil servants over time. It may also be due to the fact that after 1974, political parties rather than public services became more attractive to young men and women who wanted to make a career in the public sphere. Public services became subsumed to the power of political parties, the authority of senior civil servants was diminished, and their salaries and public image were unattractive. Finally, after 1974, the financial cost of waging an electoral campaign rose steeply and probably could not be borne by civil servants. The other less sizeable, but nonetheless interesting trends, are the following. Full-time politicians were a significant category during 1843– 78, but were in decline throughout the first half of the twentieth century. By ‘full-time politicians’ we mean those people who entered politics immediately after finishing their studies, that is, people who had never exercised an occupation, but who were able to embark on a political career by drawing either on family resources or on their own involvement with political party mechanisms. The share of full-time politicians among ministers increased yet again during the post-war period of restricted democracy and decreased during the post-1974 republic. University teachers, engineers, medical doctors and, although less so, journalists (and writers) periodically strengthened their participation in Greek cabinets from the end of the Second World War until today—without, of course, ever reaching the proportions of lawyers (or of former military officers during

Sources: Elaboration of Legg (1969:305, Table 12.4); Koutsoukis (1982:152–4, Table 28), and our own research. There are no ‘totals’ since multiple coding has been used when an individual had a plurality of occupations. The item ‘bureaucratic’ from Legg’s data is included in ‘civil servant’. A dash signifies that no data are available. Sample (II) for the post-war period 1944–67, and data for the period 1974–2001 are based on our own research. A full-time politician is someone who has never exercised any specific occupation, but has always been a party cadre, parliamentarian or minister.

MINISTERS’ OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND BEFORE FIRST MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT (%)

TABLE 6



the dictatorships). This was generally the evolution of the occupational profile of Greek ministers. In detail, the 1843–78 ministerial elite was initially composed mainly of bureaucrats, military officers or life-long politicians rather than lawyers (Table 6 and Legg 1969:305). However, as the nineteenth century came to a close, the basic trends were the increasing presence of lawyers and the entrance of former military officers into politics. During 1843–78, twothirds of ministers had been bureaucrats, military officers or full-time politicians, while lawyers accounted for a very small portion. During 1878– 1910, the proportion of civil servants decreased. The proportion of military officers increased slightly, while that of lawyers and businessmen (merchants, industrialists, etc.) more than doubled (Table 6, based on Legg 1969:305, Table 12.4). Generally, it seems that at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, urban professionals and former military officers were on the rise among the ministers. What was the occupational background of the ministers in the first half of the twentieth century? Compared with the previous period, in 1910–36 there was a steep rise in the number of lawyers and other professionals and an increase in civil servants, while the number of businessmen slightly decreased (Table 6). Most ministers during this period had practised law and other professions. By contrast, under the Metaxas regime of 1936–41, the military were the largest occupational category in the ministerial elites, with lawyers being the second largest. Things changed again during the post-world-war era, when lawyers became the most highly represented occupational category once more. Typically, post-war and post-authoritarian Greek politicians were lawyers by profession, although former military officers retained a large ministerial representation. Furthermore, a portion of ministers began their political careers in middle-level governmental positions, as secretary generals of ministries. How can the continued strong presence of lawyers among ministers be explained? Firstly, this is not a peculiarly Greek phenomenon. One has only to think about the nature of statecraft, which requires knowledge of, and experience, in legal matters. Following the collapse of ‘pre-democratic’ governmental forms (for example, imperial power, absolute royal authority, despotic rule) in Europe, the creation of modern constitutions and the construction and daily operation of liberal political institutions has depended on a knowledge of the law. Secondly, in countries such as Greece, which have experienced late and uneven industrial development, the state has been instrumental in economic and social development. In this case, the result was that both individuals and businesses have been much more dependent on the state than was the case with countries which had experienced earlier and more advanced capitalist development. In this context of strong state intervention, formalism and legalism, lawyers were


the only professionals equipped to function as intermediaries between the citizenry and the central authorities. Analysing this phenomenon in nineteenth-century Greece, Constantine Tsoucalas writes that law studies lead ‘potentially to the peak of state and financial bureaucracies’ (Tsoucalas 1977:441). Our data confirm this general picture, but there are two noteworthy tendencies, which we summarize below. State Officials (Military Officers and Magistrates) The first tendency, which has already been noted above, is the presence of former military officers in cabinets, even at times of democratic rule (with the exception of the post-1974 democracy). While this tendency was expected in the Colonels’ regime, it was smaller, yet visible, during the period before the dictatorship, as our research and that of Koutsoukis (1982:152–4) have shown. This trend had to do with the de facto important role of the army in the period after its victory in the Greek Civil War (1946–49). A look at the inner elite of 1944–67 shows that while lawyers continued to constitute the majority of ministers, the second most important category was that of civil servants, followed by former military officers and full-time politicians (Table 6, post-war sample II). This may be explained by the over-arching role of the state in post-war Greek society. Particularly after 1949, in parallel with the state’s monitoring of left-wing and even centrist political parties and citizens, an effort was made to reconstruct the economy and public administration almost from scratch, and to safeguard the country’s pro-Western orientation following the Second World War and the Greek Civil War. The strong presence of representatives of the state apparatus in politics continued in a different manifestation during the 1967–74 authoritarian regime. The proportion of military officers within the Colonels’ regime was double that of the post-war period, while the percentage of lawyers fell. Among the ministers appointed by the military dictators, the proportion of former judges, albeit small (at 8.8 per cent), was much higher than their share in cabinets either before or after the 1967–74 regime. The tendency for military officials to join the political elites was almost extinguished after the collapse of the Colonels’ regime. During the last decade of the twentieth century, only a very small group of parliamentarians and ministers were former officers. This development was probably a consequence of the Cyprus debacle, which discredited the officer corps for a long time, as well as a result of the difficulties in raising funds to meet the substantial costs of post-1974 election campaigns. During the Colonels’ dictatorship, there was also an increase in the generally small numbers of engineers, architects, and academics in the ministerial elites—a development that continued after the fall of the dictatorship.


The Rise of Non-Legal Professions and a Few Prestigious Occupations After the coup of 1967, the percentage of engineers (and architects) among ministers of the junta was four times as high as in the post-war period of 1946–67 (Table 6; Koutsoukis 1982:152, Table 28). This may have been a result of the ill-conceived effort by the dictators to reorganize the state and economy, and to promote a technocratic public image in an attempt to obtain legitimacy. Finally, in our comparison of the post-war restricted democracy with the military dictatorship, we found that whilst during the post-1944 period, businessmen (that is, bankers, industrialists, merchants, etc.) accounted for 7.6 per cent of the ministerial elite, this rose to 12.2 per cent during the dictatorship (see Table 6; Koutsoukis, 1982:154). An important tendency during the post-1974 republic, which was already visible under the Colonels, was the rise of the non-legal liberal professions and of a few prestigious salaried occupations (for example, university professors). This tendency has also been noted by research on the parliamentary elites and party cadres (Metaxas 1981; Drettakes 1991; Lyrintzis 1986). With regard to the ministerial elites—notably in the case of the post-1974 inner elite of 139 ministers—the presence of lawyers was higher than in the all-encompassing and larger post-authoritarian elites (42.2 per cent in the former in comparison to 34.9 per cent in the latter; see Table 6). It would appear that the post-authoritarian inner elite was a stronghold of lawyers, to a much larger extent than the corresponding allencompassing ministerial elite. As far as the parliamentary elites are concerned, the majority of postauthoritarian deputies have been lawyers; however, the second and third largest occupational categories are engineers (including architects) and doctors. In both 1974 and 1977, more than half of all ND deputies were lawyers (55 per cent and 57 per cent respectively); in 1981 and 1985, almost half of all PASOK deputies were lawyers (49 per cent and 47 per cent respectively); and in 1990, 40 per cent of ND deputies were lawyers (Drettakes 1991:62, Table 3.2; for ND, see also Pappas 1999:99–100). There was a decrease in the presence of lawyers among all deputies in the parliaments of 1993, 1996 and 2000 (only 30 per cent of deputies in the April 2000 parliament were lawyers). The proportion of lawyers among socialist deputies in particular fell from 35 per cent in 1993 to 31 per cent in 1996 and then to 25 per cent in 2000 (our own research). During the same period, there was a rise in the percentage of engineers and architects, employees and university professors. More specifically, the proportion of engineers and architects among PASOK deputies almost doubled between 1977 and 2000, rising from nine per cent in 1977, to 18 per cent in 1996, then falling to 16 per cent in 2000. During this same period, the proportion


of doctors amongst PASOK’s deputies fluctuated between 12 and 14 per cent. Similar trends were apparent in the post-authoritarian ministerial elite in respect of engineers and, less so, in that of doctors. Secondly, it seems that journalists and university professors were joining the ranks of ministers in ever rising numbers (Table 6). How can we explain these two developments? The increased numbers of engineers and doctors may be attributable to the changing nature of the Greek state. In ‘late-late industrializing’ countries, the state has gradually tended to become a planning and programming agency, shedding its previous regulatory and/or interventionist role. In performing this new role, technocrats are more necessary than lawyers. The second development may be attributed to the ever higher social status enjoyed by occupations that are related to the mass media and scientific expertise in contemporary societies. Journalists may build political careers by exploiting their highly visible public status, whilst university professors may enter politics as a consequence of their expertise. The Least Represented Occupations among Ministerial Elites Having looked at which occupations were most represented among the ministerial elites (Table 6), it is also interesting to note which ones were least successful in achieving cabinet representation. While the increased percentage of judges in the Greek dictatorial cabinets (1967–74) may imply something about the strong, conservative kernel of the state—composed of the military and the judiciary in the post-1944 era, state officials and civil servants were, in the main, either unsuccessful or were reluctant to enter the ministerial elite. For instance, during the period of post-war restricted democracy, civil servants were the second largest group after lawyers in the inner elite of 107 ministers. However, their share was small. Former civil servants accounted for only 15.9 per cent of all post-war ministers who completed three or more terms in office. In contrast, only three per cent of the 139 post-1974 inner-elite of ministers were former civil servants (Table 6). The declining social status and political power of civil service and the high financial cost of running an election campaign have already been mentioned as possible reasons for that trend. A more general point, which is related to the structure of historical relations between politics and administration, may be added to these reasons. In post-1944 Greece, while informally the civil servants were closely monitored by the political elites, the official division of politics from administration has been kept intact. There has been little, if any, mobility between the political and the administrative elites. This trend was also evident in the study of


parliamentary elites, where very few former civil servants could be found. This was probably the result of the almost complete control of bureaucrats by politicians, control that was made effective through enduring bonds of clientelism which have survived several political regimes in modern Greece, and which have assumed several personal and systematically organized forms. Among the other professional groups that have been unsuccessful in penetrating ministerial circles have been private employees, artisans, and manual workers, along with merchants, industrialists, and bankers. This may have been expected in the case of the first three groups—given that political capital is increasingly acquired by access to economic capital. We can assume that employees, artisans and workers were not represented among the political elites since they lacked economic capital and consequently, as individuals, could not easily amass political capital. This probably held true in Greece for most periods of the twentieth century. But how can we explain that the above professional categories were not even represented among the ministerial elite of a socialist party such as PASOK in the last quarter of the twentieth century? A possible explanation may be that PASOK was not a typical socialist but a hybrid party, which had partly inherited political personnel from the centrist party of Centre Union of the 1960s. Centrist parliamentarians held many cabinet posts of PASOK in the 1980s. Another explanation may be that PASOK represented the interests of the urban middle classes to a larger extent than the interests of workers, artisans or employees. For different reasons, the upper classes were also under-represented among the ministerial elites. Comparing the three post-war Greek regimes (1946–67, 1967–74, and 1974–2000), we see that the presence of merchants, industrialists and bankers in cabinets was limited during 1946– 67, before reaching a relatively high point during the dictatorship. However, their presence has decreased dramatically and was even more limited during the post-1974 republic (Table 6). At the individual level of analysis, one may argue that members of this group need not formally take political power into their hands in order to rule, and that politics has become too expensive an investment; also that the high profile that is part and parcel of ministerial position may actually hamper the business interests of individuals who are interested in making profits. At the societal level, one may consider the fact that, for some time now in southern Europe —and in Greece in particular—business interests have not enjoyed the legitimacy of other interest groups (Greek Review of Social Research 1988: 138, Table 11). Businessmen have a very poor public image in Greece—and are amongst the least popular of all the socio-professional categories.


Education On the basis of our data (Tables 7 and 7a), it would appear that nineteenth century Greek elites were highly educated, with half of all ministers having had a university (or the equivalent higher military) education during 1843– 78. During the twentieth century, the participation of graduates of cadet schools was much higher prior to the Second World War than during the post-war period. The most important finding is that the proportion of university graduates has risen throughout the past 160 years, reaching 80.8 per cent during the last quarter of the twentieth century (Table 7, sample I). There is very little information with respect to postgraduate studies. What information exists refers only to the post-war period. We can see that while in the post-war some ministers had done postgraduate studies, the number of ministers with Masters’ degrees and Doctorates has declined since 1974 (Table 7a). TABLE 7 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF MINISTERS (%)

Sources: Elaboration of Legg (1969:303, Table 12.3); Koutsoukis (1982:116, Table 13) and our own research for post-war sample (II) and for the period 1974–2001. A dash signifies that no data are available. Post-war sample (II) covers the period 1944–67. Multiple coding has been applied.

With respect to the field of study (Table 7b below), the trends in education resembled occupational trends. There was a heavy presence of law graduates, reaching a peak during the immediate post-war era (1946– 67) before declining somewhat after 1967. Graduates of cadet schools were strongly represented during the period 1878–1910, as well as during the two twentieth-century dictatorships (1936–41 and 1967–74). Another trend during the post-war period has been the rise of economics and management graduates. The most popular institute of higher education during the post-war period—the only period for which data are available—was the University of Athens (Table 7c below). This has not made that university an elite institution, however, as the members of the social and economic elites used


TABLE 7a UNIVERSITY DEGREE OF MINISTERS (%)

Sources: Elaboration of Koutsoukis (1982:114, Table 12), and our own research for post-war sample (II) and for the period 1974–2001. A dash signifies that no data are available. There are no data for the period before the Second World War. Post-war sample (II) covers the period 1944–67.

to pursue studies abroad (Table 7d). An initial preference for studying in France and Germany has given way to a preference for the United States and later, although to a much lesser extent, the United Kingdom. It may be hypothesized that the population categories with higher education qualifications will be disproportionately represented among the ministerial elites. In Greece this hypothesis is confirmed. Legg has observed that the nineteenth century Greek ministerial elite was highly educated, and that to a large extent it comprised law graduates and those who had studied in France and Germany. As we have noted above, following Legg, we have divided the second half of the nineteenth century into two distinct periods, 1843–78 and 1878–1910. We have observed the following basic trends. First, during 1843–78 there was an increasing presence of law graduates over time which was accompanied by the entrance of military school graduates into politics. At this time, more than one-third of all ministers had studied law. During the following period, 1878–1910, more than half of all ministers had studied law, while approximately one-quarter of all ministers were graduates of military schools. A similarly increasing trend can be observed regarding the elite’s education abroad. While a little more than one-third of all ministers during 1843–78 had studied abroad, by 1878–1910 half of all ministers had done so (Legg 1969:303, Table 12. 3). Parallel trends occurred throughout the twentieth century. During the period 1910–36, more than half of all ministers were law graduates (53.6 per cent, almost as many as had studied law during 1878–1910; Table 7b). Between 1910 and 1936, the second largest category was those ministers who had been professionally trained in the military (16.6 per cent),


TABLE 7b FIELD OF HIGHER EDUCATION OF MINISTERS (%)

Sources: Elaboration of Legg (1969:303, Table 12.3); Koutsoukis (1982:116, Table 13), and our own research for post-war sample (II) and for the period 1974–2001. Multiple coding has been applied. (In elaborating the second source, we included agronomy in engineering and veterinary in medicine in order to make comparisons possible.) The item ‘Gymnasium’ (i.e., Greek secondary school) in Legg’s data has been included in ‘other’. A dash signifies that no data are available. Post-war sample (II) covers the period 1944–67.

representing a reduction of almost half in relation to the period 1878–1910 (28.1 percent). The educational background of one-third of ministers during 1936–41 is not known (Table 7b). However, law and military school graduates were strongly represented in Metaxas’ ministerial elites (29.4 per cent and 20.5 per cent respectively). As far as law studies are concerned, there was some continuity between the pre-1941 and post-1944 periods. Law graduates were dominant amongst ministers of the post-war era. For a 30-year period (1946–74), a little under two-thirds of all ministers were educated in law, while roughly one-seventh were graduates of the military schools (Table 7b, sample I of the post-war period). These trends were also demonstrated in Koutsoukis (1982:116, 210–11), and were, more or less, confirmed by Legg’s research, which used data for the first two decades after the end of the Second World War (1946–65)—albeit with different estimations. According to Legg (1969:305, Table 12.4), during the two decades after the Second World War, the percentage of law school graduates among ministers was high (33 per cent), and the percentage of military-trained ministers comparatively lower (17 per cent).


There was a change observed in comparing the period of 1944–67 with the dictatorship of 1967–74. As a result of the military intervention of 1967 that brought the Colonels to power, the percentage of law graduates among ministers declined, whilst that of military-trained ministers increased. As far as their place of study is concerned, during both periods more than half of all ministers had studied abroad. However, while before the breakdown of democracy in 1967 the majority of foreign-trained ministers had studied in France or Germany, during the Colonels’ regime the largest portion had studied in the United States (Table 7d; Koutsoukis 1982:127–8, Tables 18 and 19). Type of University Degree For the reasons explained above, the proportion of military school graduates fell dramatically during the post-1974 republic (Table 7). The type of university degree held by ministers also differs from one regime to the other. While in 1946–67 and then 1967–74, the percentage of ministers with either a Masters or a Doctorate degree was relatively high, this proportion fell between 1974 and 2001 (Table 7a). The same trend was also observed among the members of the post-authoritarian inner elite (sample II of the post-1974 period; the differences between Tables 7 and 7a are due to multiple coding, that is, to the fact that some ministers had more than one type of degree). This post-1974 trend may demonstrate various things: either the members of the most highly educated elite refrained from embarking on political careers in the post-authoritarian period; or the numerous PASOK cabinets that were formed in the post-authoritarian period (if only by the sheer number of this party’s deputies who have become ministers) reflected the more popular origins of this party’s political personnel compared to the social origins of the conservative and dictatorial cabinets that were in power from 1946 to 1974. Field of Higher Education As has been noted above, Greek ministers have traditionally studied law—a tendency that is also found among parliamentary deputies. This tradition declined somewhat during the military regime, largely as a result of the rise in the proportion of military graduates among ministers. Significantly, however, even during the dictatorship the largest category among ministers was law graduates (Table 7b). During the post-authoritarian period, the preponderance of law graduates has been balanced by the relative rise of three more educational categories among ministers—economics, social science, and engineering


graduates (Table 7b). This also holds true for the inner elite of the post-1974 period (sample II). The same development may also be seen among post-1974 parliamentary deputies, the vast majority of whom have received university education. In 1974 and then again in 1977, more than half of the conservative deputies were law graduates (60 per cent and 58 per cent respectively; Metaxas 1981:43, Table 15). Later, the share of graduates of other schools increased. Schools and Places of Education In Greece there are no elite institutes of higher education of the kind one finds in France, although the Law and Medicine Faculties at the University of Athens, as well as the Polytechnic University (‘Polytechneio’, which is also located in Athens) have enjoyed some prestige. The data on national institutions of higher education (Table 7c), show that most ministers had studied in the University of Athens throughout the post-war and postauthoritarian periods. Within the post-war inner elite (sample II of 1946– 74), the presence of graduates from the University of Athens was much greater than in the larger, all-encompassing ministerial elite. This difference was less apparent when comparing the post-authoritarian elite (sample I) with the corresponding inner elite (sample II of the post-1974 period; Table 7c). Over time, there has been an increase in the number of graduates from other Athens universities—namely the Polytechnic, the Panteios School, and the Athens University of Economics and Business (formerly the ASOEE). These increases correspond with the rise in the number of engineering, social sciences, and economics graduates among ministers. The patterns of Western influence on Greece are reflected in the fact that some members of Greece’s ministerial elite have pursued advanced studies abroad (first degree or postgraduate degrees; Table 7d). Between 1946 and 1967, the largest categories consisted of ministers educated in France and, less so, in Germany. This also held true for the post-war inner elite. During the dictatorship of 1967–74, the single most important category were ministers educated in the United States. During the post-authoritarian period, all categories diminished, including those relating to the post-1974 inner elite. These patterns probably attest generally to the long-term influence of Western Europe on Greece, as well as to the particular political influence of the United States from 1967 to 1974. The most important finding seems to be the small percentage of foreign-educated ministers during the post-authoritarian period. As noted above, this trend may again be attributed to the popular social profile of PASOK ministers, who constituted the majority of post-1974 cabinet members.


TABLE 7c HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTES ATTENDED BY MINISTERS (%)

Sources: Elaboration of Koutsoukis (1982:121, Table 16), and our own research for post-war sample (II) and for the period 1974–2001. Multiple coding has been applied. Koutsoukis does not distinguish between the two political regimes of the 1946–74 period. A dash signifies that no data are available. There are no data before the Second World War. Our own post-war sample (II) covers the period 1944–67. TABLE 7d FOREIGN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION ATTENDED BY MINISTERS (%)

Sources: Koutsoukis (1982:127, Table 19) and our own research for post-war sample (II) and for the 1974–2001 period. Multiple coding has been applied. A dash signifies that no data are available. ‘None’ signifies that they studied only in Greece. There are no data prior to the Second World War. Our own post-war sample (II) covers the period 1944–67.

Political Career—Political Office Because of a lack of information, it is difficult to trace the political careers of ministers. There are no data for the years from 1843 to 1946, and only sparse and often unreliable data are available for the following years. Generally speaking, it seems that the last step before becoming a minister


during the second half of the twentieth century was to become a parliamentary deputy (Table 8). Other spring-boards to ministerial positions, such as the posts of Prefect or General Secretary of Ministry (a post one level below that of deputy minister), were less likely to lead to ministerial office. Among members of the post-war inner elite, two-thirds were deputies prior to becoming ministers; and among members of the post-authoritarian inner elite, more than 80 per cent were deputies. The greater visibility of parliament compared to other political institutions, may be an explanation for this finding. The lack of any decentralized structures in Greece may also be taken into account in explaining the lack of career paths that lead from the periphery to the top of the state. With respect to the post-authoritarian period, for which there are more data, we may enquire whether the length of parliamentary experience is related to the achievement of ministerial office. Among the wider ministerial elite of this period (411 ministers of sample I), one-fifth had been elected to parliament only once before becoming ministers, while a further one-quarter had been elected twice. Only one-fifth of the ministers had been elected three or more times. It would appear that a long parliamentary career is not a prerequisite for ministerial rank in contemporary Greece. Political Nepotism The former Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, was the son of George Papandreou—Prime Minister in 1944 and again from 1963 to 1965. The eldest grandson of the latter, also named George Papandreou, is the current Minister of Foreign Affairs. The present Prime Minister, Costas Simitis, is the son of a well-known left-wing politician who participated in the antiNazi resistance of the 1940s. The current leader of New Democracy (the conservative party), Costas Caramanlis, is a nephew of the former Prime Minister and President of the Republic, Constantine Caramanlis, who founded New Democracy in 1974. Can we say that political nepotism is, therefore, rampant in Greece? It is difficult to reach this conclusion on the basis of the available data (Table 9), signifying that the above cases may simply be impressive exceptions. Legg (1969) offers some information for the whole period of 1843–1965. Political bequest was already practised in nineteenth-century Greek politics. Between 1843 and 1878, and from 1878 to 1910, there was a small increase in the percentage of ministers whose father or some other relative was involved in politics. The percentage of ministers whose father was a politician rose slightly (from 40.1 per cent to 47.9 per cent; Table 9). The percentage of ministers who had some relative in politics, that is, either a minister or a deputy, also rose slightly (from 6.7 to 10.4 per cent).


TABLE 8 POLITICAL OFFICE HELD BY MINISTERS PRIOR TO FIRST MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT (%)

Sources: Koutsoukis (1982:169–71, Table 32) and our own research for post-war sample (II) and for the period 1974–2001. This table is incomplete due to lack of data for the earlier periods and to the inapplicability of many of the listed categories in the case of Greece (e.g., colonial governor, Regional Deputy, etc.). A dash signifies that no data are available. There are no data prior to the Second World War. Multiple coding has been applied. Our own post-war sample (II) covers the period 1944–67.

This was the high season of political nepotism in modern Greece. Compared to the apogee of nepotistic political recruitment, which existed at the turn of the century, by 1910–36 the share of ministers whose father was a politician fell dramatically and decreased further between 1936 and 1941. However, the share of ministers who had a relative (other than father) in politics did not follow suit. After 1944, nepotism was on the rise once more, given that during the first 20 years of the post-war period, more than one-third of all ministers had either their father or another relative in politics (37.3 per cent, postwar sample I. This share was comparable to the figure for the 1910–36 period, but lower than the corresponding figures for the nineteenth century (1843–1910). Nepotism was very apparent in the period during and immediately following the civil war (1946–51), when slightly less than half (45 per cent) of all ministers belonging to parties of the right and centre,


TABLE 9 MINISTERS WHOSE FATHER OR OTHER RELATIVE WAS INVOLVED IN POLITICS (%)

Sources: Legg (1969:307, Table 12.5) and our own research. Post-war sample (I) covers the period 1946–65. A dash signifies that no data are available. In the column 1843–78, we have included participants in the War of Independence (1821–27) in our item ‘Unknown’, because this category had no meaning or equivalent in any historical period beyond this first one. There are no data for the cabinets of the military regime of 1967–74. By ‘involved in polities’ we mean that someone had at least one term in public office, including mayorship, general secretariat and/or ministerial position. By ‘relative’ we mean other members of kin except father or mother.

came from families involved in inter-war period politics (Legg 1969:307, Table 12.6). There is a lack of data for the years between 1965 and 1974, and Koutsoukis cannot provide us with any information. During the post-1974 period, there are no data for half of the ministers. As far as the remaining ministers are concerned, it would seem that nepotism was very limited in comparison to earlier historical periods (Table 9). To the extent that this is a valid indication, it may be accounted for by the emergence of new generations of politicians, such as young members of the resistance against the military regime of 1967–74, and new political parties, such as PASOK, in the last decades of the twentieth century. CONCLUSIONS We can trace the evolution of the Greek ministerial elites less accurately for the period of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, and more accurately for the period from the end of the Second World War to the present. Some patterns can be discerned only in the form of the research hypotheses outlined below. The size of ministerial elites in Greece during the past 160 years is considerable. This is due to high levels of political instability, illustrated by the frequent turnover of governments and the state’s increasing role in society. Generally, we know more about the democratic period than we do


about the authoritarian interludes in Greek politics. This is not surprising. Authoritarian regimes lasted for comparatively short time-intervals in Greece (1925–26, 1936–40 and 1967–74), while parliamentarism (not always equivalent to fully-fledged democracy) has been the rule for the rest of the period between the mid-nineteenth century and the present. In this respect, transitions from authoritarian rule have not led to important changes in the political elites that assumed ministerial posts, since the dictatorships did not last long enough to have a long-term impact on political personnel. Through the last 160 years there has been an evolution in the occupational background of Greek ministers. This can be summarized as a slow shift from politicians who relied on tradition and social status to politicians who rely more on their expertise. Since the end of the nineteenth century in particular, lawyers have had an increasing presence in Greek governments, a presence that declined slightly—and temporarily—during periods of authoritarian rule. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the representation of lawyers has continued to decline. At various moments, in particular during authoritarian regimes, former military officers also had a considerable presence among ministers. For instance, the nature of the Colonels’ regime presents few surprises for the study of the profile of cabinet members: the most important occupational category among ministers was that of military officers (our Table 6; Koutsoukis 1982:116, Table 13, and 122, Graph 4). In addition, there was no ‘carry-over’ of the 1967–74 political personnel into the governing personnel of the post-authoritarian, democratic regime. This may be explained by the fact that the rupture between the authoritarian and the democratic periods, which took place in 1974, was abrupt, owing to the military defeat of Greece in the conflict with Turkey over Cyprus, and by the fact that the deposed military regime was discredited as a whole. This development does not mean that the military, that is those retired officers who entered politics, have been absent from post-1974 Greek cabinets. Such cabinets have often included former officers. The officer corps has enjoyed a fluctuating, yet generally high social status throughout modern Greek history. The political role of the military as an institution, particularly after the end of the Civil War (1946–49), cannot be ignored. However, as we have stressed, both the presence of former officers in cabinets and the role of the military as an institution were reduced after the fall of the Colonels’ regime in 1974. Turning Points and Continuities With regard to the carrying over of political personnel, and the continuity or discontinuity of the political system, it is useful to look at any continuities with the periods prior to and following Colonels’ regime. If


one asks whether there were any historical moments when new individuals entered Greek politics the answer is that there were many such moments. For instance, immediately after the end of the Second World War, there was almost no renewal of the political personnel due to the Civil War which broke out in 1946 (Nicolacopulos 2001:85). However, in the early and the mid-1950s new leaders such as Alexander Papagos, Constantine Caramanlis and Spiros Markezinis appeared on the political scene in the capacity of prime minister (the first two politicians) or minister (the third one) and created their own parties (all of which were right or centre-right wing). In addition, some renewal of the parliamentary elites took place in the two elections of 1950 and 1951, in the first case owing to the good electoral performance of new politicians belonging to parties of the centre and, in the second case, owing to the emergence of new politicians belonging to the right-wing party of Papagos (Nicolacopoulos 2001:118 and 134). However, this renewal referred to individual members of parliament, not to social categories and social strata which were represented at the level of ministerial elites. In contrast to changes at the individual level of analysis, at the collective level the renewal was much less stark. In that respect, it is useful to compare the restricted democracy that existed from 1944 to 1967, on the one hand, and the parliamentary democracy instituted in 1974, on the other. After 1974, changes occurred in the social composition of Greek ministerial elites: officers faded away, and the share of lawyers decreased (without losing their primacy), while the share of other liberal professionals, such as engineers, architects, and doctors, increased among cabinet members. In the long run, the impact of authoritarian regimes on the composition of ministerial elites in Greece was minimal. Rather, as we explain below, there were a few turning points within the evolution of democratic regimes which marked changes in ministerial elites. On the grounds of the available data, it can be argued that there were a few high points in the evolution of the Greek ministerial elites. Two of the high points seem to be the emergence of Venizelos’ Liberal Party during the 1910s, following the 1909 coup d’état, and the rise of PASOK to power in 1981. In the first case, with the rise of Liberalism we have a culmination of a long process: at the beginning of the twentieth century a new urban elite, mostly representing the liberal professions (mainly lawyers), replaced traditional notables who had enjoyed power throughout the nineteenth century on the basis of tradition, status, and patronage networks in the regions of their origin. Since then, lawyers have predominated in the cabinets formed by parties of the right or the centre during the inter-war and post-war periods. The second turning point was the ascent of PASOK to power in 1981. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, left of centre and socialist ministers of PASOK, with no links to the traditional conservative post-war


political class, dominated cabinets. A large number of them were lawyers, but gradually, as PASOK formed several cabinets between 1981 and 2001, other professions, such as doctors and engineers (and less so economists) were also represented in the ministerial elites. In other words, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed the rise of liberal professions to parliamentary—as well as to ministerial—positions. The situation changed to a certain extent during the second half of the twentieth century. Generally, we may conclude that, contrary to common belief, in the last decades of the twentieth century the Greek ministerial elite was not ageing; it seemed to become younger over the span of the last five decades. However, the gender composition of the elite has not changed over time, since it has been and remains male dominated. Another continuity with the past is the fact that lawyers have constituted and continue to constitute the majority of ministers. Yet, over time, this majority, which was once absolute, has become relative, as a consequence of the rise of other professions (for example, engineers and economists). This trend emerged during the dictatorship, but was particularly manifest during the 1980s and 1990s. During the last years of the twentieth century, an increase in the number of journalists and university professors has also been evident, constituting a new development in the occupational background of ministers. A similar change is evident in the ministers’ educational qualifications. Since the transition to democracy in 1974, the preponderance of law has been balanced by economics and engineering as well as the social sciences. A discontinuity with the past has been the decrease in the number of ministers who have studied abroad, with a gradual reduction in the number of foreign-educated ministers. As for the political career of ministers, this did not seem to have been dependent on long parliamentary experience. The parliament was the ante-chamber of the cabinet, even for ministers who had been elected only once or twice to the parliament. Concluding Remarks Was there an elite within the elite? There seems to be no value in the distinction between the wider, all encompassing ministerial elites of 1946– 67 and of 1974–2001, and the inner elites of the corresponding periods. In respect of most variables, the differences between those who became ministers three or more times and the remainder of cabinet members were small. More concretely, members of the inner elite during the post-war period (107 members of sample II) were, on average, somewhat younger than ministers of the post-war elite as a whole (288 members of sample I). Members of the inner elite came disproportionately from Athens and Peloponnesus, and included more lawyers than the wider ministerial elite.


In terms of fields of study, the inner elite included more law graduates and many more economics and management graduates than the wider ministerial elite. More graduates of the University of Athens appeared in the inner elite, and fewer of them had studied abroad. There were also some noteworthy differences between the inner and the wider elites during the post-authoritarian period. Among the members of the post-1974 inner elite (139 ministers of the post-1974 sample II) there were proportionately more lawyers than among the members of the ministerial elite as a whole (411 ministers of the post-1974 sample I). The inner elite included more graduates of the University of Athens, and the average age of inner elite ministers was slightly higher than that of the post-1974 elite as a whole. All of these differences may point to a more traditional social profile for the members of inner elites (lawyers, who had come from the south of Greece and had studied at the University of Athens). However, overall, the differences are not substantial and do not cover most of the analytic dimensions we have used. There is not enough evidence to claim that there was a distinct inner elite within a larger ministerial elite, either immediately after the Second World War, or following the fall of the Colonels’ regime. How may one interpret the long-term historical patterns described in this analysis? It is difficult to form explanatory hypotheses that hold true for the entire period under study. As noted above, we can compare the situations at the beginning and the end of the twentieth century. The Greek case of ministerial elites at the beginning of the twentieth century may be couched in Weberian terms as a transition from the type of politician who lived for politics to another type—that of the politician who lived both for and from politics (Lyrintzis 1991:170). Nineteenth-century notables who lived for politics were gradually replaced by lawyers. Lawyers, in turn, were motivated to participate in politics because of their expertise and skills as intermediaries between citizens and the state. They also benefited from politics by aggrandizing their clientele and strengthening their social status. To explain the decreasing role of lawyers in governments at the end of the twentieth century, it may be useful to look at the changing functions of the modern Greek state. It is no longer an administrative state. At least since the end of the Second World War, it has been an interventionist state, emphasizing planning and programming, and concentrating on public works, economic growth, and social welfare transfers. Today, in a period of prolonged state retrenchment (for example, through privatizations) and the introduction of new technologies in state organization, governments require the technical expertise offered by engineers and economists, and not only the skills offered by lawyers. The general trends shown above illustrate a mixture of continuity and discontinuity in several characteristics of the Greek ministerial elites. Currently, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, an old and a new


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Primary Data Sources: Voule ton Hellenon (1977):

1929–1935 1935 1974 [Registry of Senators of the Years 1929–1935 and Members of Parliament from the Parliament of 1935 to the Parliament of 1974], Athens. Voule ton Hellenon (1986): 1822–1935 [Registry of Representatives, Senators and Members of Parliament, 1822–1935], Athens.


Voule ton Hellenon (1987): [Greek Members of Parliament and the European Parliament], October 1987. [Encyclopedia PapyrousLarousBritannica] (1980), Athens. Eleutherotypia (1989): ‘H ’ [The New Parliament] (special edition), Vols. 1–4, Athens 1989. Eleutherotypia (1998): ‘ 60 ’ [Constantine Caramanlis: 60 Years of History], (special edition), 2 April 1998. Kathimerini (1986): [The 300+24 of the Parliament and the European Parliament] (special edition), Athens, 1986. Kathimerini tes Kyriakes (1998): ‘ ’ [Constantine Caramanlis], (special edition), 26 April 1998. Kathimerini tes Kyriakes/Epta Hemeres (1999): ‘H . 1980–1990 [Greece in the Twentieth Century. 1980–1990], 25–26 Dec. Koukounas D. (1999): 1926–1949: [Greek Politicians 1926–1949: Historical Biographical Dictionary], Vol. 2, Athens: Metron. Makedoniko Praktoreio Eideseon (1996): H [The Third Greek Democracy and its Institutions] Thessaloniki: Parateretes. Tziovaras G. (1996): 1833–1996, Athens: Pontiki. To Pontiki (1990): ‘ 1990’ [The Elections of the 8th April 1990], Athens. To Pontiki (1994): ‘ 1993’ [The Elections of the 10th October 1993], Athens. Who’s Who (1981), Athens: Orizon.

Internet Sources: http://www.elections.gr/ http://www.ekloges.gr/ http://www.parliament.gr/ http://www.primeminister.gr/

Ministerial Elites in Southern Europe Continuities, Changes and Comparisons NANCY BERMEO

More than a quarter of a century has passed since Robert Putnam argued that ‘changes in the composition of political elites’ provide a ‘crucial diagnostic of the basic tides of history’ (Putnam 1976:166). Yet, surprisingly few scholars have used this diagnostic in recent times. As Suzanne Keller reminds us, the ‘19th century was preoccupied with elites while the late 20th century ignores them’ (Keller 1991:xi). This is not to say that elites play no role in social science theory today. The literatures on democratization and economic liberalization are replete with references to elite pacts, elite bargaining and elite constraints. We, as political scientists, have in fact been preoccupied with what elites do in certain settings but we have spent comparatively little time studying who elites are, and how they get to be elites in the first place. Latin Americanists, from a variety of social science disciplines, have recently developed a broad literature on technocratic elites, but Europeanists trained in political science have tended to focus their energies elsewhere. With a few notable exceptions,1 comparative projects are distressingly rare. I use the term ‘distressingly’ because the quality of governance ultimately rests on the qualities of those who govern. If we ignore these qualities and reify elites as empty vessels who react only to contemporary constraints in an effort to maximize whatever preferences we project upon them, we risk overlooking the essentially human dynamic of politics. Elites formulate preferences and weight constraints in accord with what they have been taught, where they have been, and where they think they might be going. Any vessel’s direction is determined not only by the ‘basic tide’, but by the

An earlier version of this study was written for the Arrábida Seminars of 17–18 September 2001 organized by Professors Pedro Tavares de Almeida and Antonio Costa Pinto and titled ‘Regime Change and Ministerial Recruitment in Southern Europe’. The author is indebted to the organizers for their advice and their patience and to the Luso-American Development Foundation for financial support. Figures used in this contribution are from the 10 March 2003 version of the other essays included in this collection.


identity of the sailor. Valerie Bunce illustrated this long ago when she studied the impact of leadership change on policy-making in a variety of industrialized states. She found that ‘the changing of the guard’ translated into meaningful policy change ‘in every country’ she studied (including the Soviet Union) and that ‘new leaders make a difference in [both] the rhythm of policy change and the types of policies that are advocated’ (Bunce 1981: 62, 224). Our study of ministers in southern Europe differs from hers in that it does not focus explicitly on the question of succession, but it is based on the same observation that Bunce draws in her conclusion, namely, that ‘who rules does indeed make a difference’ (Bunce 1981:256). More recent work on political recruitment has highlighted the same theme, calling our attention to the ‘growing consensus’ that the background of political elites exerts influence on ‘attitudes, priorities and behavior’ (Norris 1997b:230). What are the backgrounds of the political elites who rule southern Europe today and how have they changed over time? The information generated by this project is so broad in scope and rich in meaning that a single essay can illuminate just a few of its many implications. This conclusion is thus constrained, of necessity, in two ways. Historically, it focuses on only the last transitions studied here; those from dictatorship to democracy. Conceptually, it focuses on only selected subject areas. First, it traces continuities in the qualities of elites across regime types. Then it gives an overview of changes across regime types. In a third section, it asks, whether southern Europe is governed by politicians or technocrats and then concludes with a brief discussion of what the answer might mean. Continuities from Dictatorship to Democracy Since democratization is a process and not an event, continuities from dictatorship to democracy should be expected. Yet, the continuities we see across these cases are surprisingly few. A first involves the continuity of working-class exclusion. In Portugal, Spain and Greece, ministers today, like ministers during the dictatorships, are drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of the university-educated. Only 1.2 per cent of the cabinet members in Portugal’s consolidated democracy had neither a military nor a civilian degree. The comparable figure for Spain is nearly identical at 1.5 per cent. Greece is only slightly higher at 2.4 per cent. The last dictatorships in each state had few or no ministers without a degree—so these figures represent a slight change—but it seems that today, as in the past, a university degree is a necessary requirement for ministerial office. The glaring exception to this generalization is contemporary Italy where the percentage of ministers without university degrees averaged around nine per cent for most of the post-Second World War democracy. Surprisingly, the percentage of ministers without university degrees was

MINISTERIAL ELITES IN SOUTHERN EUROPE 193

actually rising as the millennium approached. A full 16.7 per cent of cabinet members serving between 1996 and 2001 had no university degree. Putting these facts in a larger regional context is illuminating. When compared to Europe as a whole, the Italian case looks less exceptional. In Britain, Sweden and Germany, for example, the proportion of universitytrained ministers averages less than 75 per cent. In France too, only an estimated 82 per cent of all ministers have university degrees (Thiébault 1991a:26). Portugal, Greece and Spain stand out in their emphasis on university education as a requisite for a ministerial post. It is likely that these contrasting patterns are due to different histories of party-trade union relations but this can only be verified through additional research. For now we can draw two firm conclusions: first, that democratization did not alter the weight of the university-trained in Portuguese, Greek or Spanish cabinets, and second, that there is no singular southern European pattern when it comes to working-class inclusion. Italy, on this dimension at least, is more similar to Germany and Britain than geography alone would predict. The second exclusion brought to light by this project involves the continued under-representation of women in the ministerial ranks. Here, as with our previous variable, we find some improvement from the period of dictatorship (where there were no women ministers) but the extent of improvement varies across countries. The percentage of female cabinet ministers is less than four per cent for Portugal and six per cent for Greece. In our other cases, the percentage is substantially higher. Women currently occupy ten per cent of cabinet posts in Spain and 13 per cent of cabinet posts in Italy. A cross-national project comparing women’s access to cabinet positions in 1994 suggests that these figures are out of keeping with other European countries. The number of women in the ministerial ranks was highest in the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden—where it reached or exceeded 30 per cent. The average for western Europe as a whole was 17 per cent (Vianello and Moore 2000:277). An annual breakdown of the Portuguese and Greek figures might show that exclusion is diminishing over time and it would certainly make the comparison just cited more meaningful. However, the aggregate figures are still out of keeping with advances that Portuguese and Greek women have made in other aspects of national life. Ministerial cabinets remain a surprisingly male domain. Changes from Dictatorship to Democracy The southern European ministerial elite has changed dramatically since the breakdown of dictatorship in the mid 1970s. These changes dwarf the continuities described above. No individual ministers who had served


dictatorships served democracies after the changes of regime in Portugal, Greece or Italy. In Spain, too, there was a high level of discontinuity between regimes. Only one minister from the Franco regime and nine from the transitional government returned to ministerial office after the democratic elections of June 1977. Only two ministers who served in the first elected government obtained portfolios after the electoral defeat of the UCD and both of these were from other parties. Thus even in Spain, an example of a ‘transition from within’, there was nearly a total turnover in the political elite between dictatorship and democracy. The level of discontinuity we see in southern Europe contrasts markedly with the pattern in former communist regimes. Though the ratio of old to new elites is hotly contested, none of the East European countries, with the possible exception of the Czech Republic, managed a total replacement of communist elites (Wasilewski 1998:167). In Russia, too, elite discontinuity was also decidedly lower than in our southern European cases: 16 per cent of Yeltsin’s first cabinet had participated in a previous Communist government (Lane and Ross 1998:37). A second dramatic change in the composition of cabinets involves the decline of the military as a source for ministerial recruitment. In Portugal, the proportion of ministers with military background dropped to 3.8 per cent—down significantly from 26.2 per cent under the dictatorship. In Greece, the decrease was even more dramatic. The percentage of the ministerial elite drawn from the military dropped from 25.6 per cent to 3.1 per cent. In Spain, the figures are most striking. Under Franco, a full 33.3 per cent of all cabinet posts were filled by military men. Under the new democracy, the figure dropped to 2.3 per cent. In Italy too, there seems to have been an ‘almost complete’ ‘civilianization of governments’. The superiority of civilian power and its clear separation from military power are hallmarks of consolidated democracies. Cabinets in democracies are both administrative and representative institutions (as Blondel and Cotta remind us). Thus, one would expect that representative institutions would replace the military as centres for elite recruitment after democratic transitions took place. These expectations are borne out in all four southern European cases—though there is substantial variation across our cases in the importance of particular representative institutions as sources of recruitment. Parliament—the most visible representative institution of all—is a major pool for recruitment in all four southern European countries. In Portugal, 51 per cent of all ministers have been MPs. In Spain, the percentage of ministers with parliamentary experience is close to 54 per cent. The role of parliament as a recruitment centre in Italy is 80 per cent and in Greece it stands at 68 per cent. The Iberian figures are well below the average of 75 per cent cited by Lieven de Winter for western Europe as a whole (de Winter 1991:48).


In Greece, Portugal and Spain, the connections between cabinets and legislatures have grown stronger with democratization. The SalazarCaetano regime drew fewer than one-third of its ministers from the legislature, the Franco regime drew only 9.2 per cent and the Greek dictatorship drew only 7.6 per cent. Since cabinets are—as Cotta describes them—‘the top’ of the representative process (Cotta 1991: 176–7), it is both predictable and proper that their connections to parliament would be strengthened under democracy. Local representative institutions are a much less important recruitment pool than national legislatures in all four of the southern European states. In democratic Portugal, only 7.3 per cent of all ministers were mayors, local councillors, or prefects immediately before being named to cabinet positions. (The comparable figure under the dictatorship was substantially higher—at 16.4 per cent.) In Greece, 8.9 per cent of democratic ministers occupied these local offices. (The comparable figure for the dictatorship is quite similar though the relative importance of the prefect’s office has dropped dramatically.) The role of local government as a recruitment pool is substantially greater in federalist Spain where regional government is relatively strong. For many Spanish politicians, holding a high regional office has been a stepping stone to the national government. This is a substantial change from the period of the dictatorship where almost no ministers held regional offices, but even in Spain, only 13.8 per cent of all ministers in the current regime have held regional or provincial office and a modest 8.5 per cent have been local councillors or mayors. Though local government has not been deemed an important recruitment channel in Italy in the past decades (Thiébault 1991b:42–3), the increasing importance of Italian regional governments might change this equilibrium soon. Though the precise figures for the Italian case are not available, Cotta and Verzichelli report that the percentage of ministers in the 1990s who had held local offices was nearly 40 per cent. On this variable as on many others, the Italian case comes closest to the western European norm. Thiébault estimates that in western Europe as a whole an average of 50 per cent of all ministers come from local or regional political offices (Thiébault 1991b: 42–3). Political parties—representative institutions of a different sort—provide a third pool for recruiting elites in all democracies—and some dictatorships. Although our data do not permit comparison across all four countries, there seems to be substantial variation between countries and across time in the role of parties as recruitment centres. In Portugal, nearly 50 per cent of all ministers have been party leaders (of some sort). This is substantially higher than under the Salazar-Caetano regime where only 31 per cent were party leaders. It also marks a dramatic increase over the First Republic in which only 21 per cent of all ministers were party elites.


In Italy, the role of political parties in the recruitment process for ministers was paramount for decades but now seems to be changing. From the first post-war elected government through the 1980s, the percentage of ministers holding party offices before their first ministerial appointment varied between 90 and 73 per cent. For the vast majority of the elite, a career that included an office within a political party was a requisite for ministerial appointment. From 1992 through 1996, however, as Italy’s party system fell into crisis, the percentage of the ministerial elite with previous party office dropped to just over 40 per cent. By 1996–2001, it had increased but climbed to only 60 per cent. We cannot know whether the previous party-based path to ministerial office will be fully restored. In any case, it is worth noting that party leadership is a more travelled route to power in western Europe more generally. As Jean Blondel reminds us, nearly 60 per cent of all western European ministers had sub-national leadership positions in parties before assuming office and a full 75 per cent had national level positions (Blondel 2001:3). A fourth and final ‘representative’ pool for recruiting elites lies in the interest associations of civil society. The data on interest groups as a route to power for ministerial elites may not be comparable. Thus we cannot know with any certainty what the formal links between civil society and ministerial appointments are. What we do know is that some 11.1 per cent of ministers in democratic Portugal were leaders of trade unions or professional associations; that the interest groups furnished 3.8 per cent of democracy ministers in Greece and that a similar body furnished a similar proportion of ministers in democratic Spain. These figures have no counterparts in the dictatorial period. However, put in context with our data on parliament, local and regional government, they do show that arenas with open party competition are a decidedly more important route to ministerial power than civic and class associations. Whether this is a function of the weakness of civil society merits future study, but it is interesting to note that Italy differs from its southern European counterparts on this measure, as well as on so many others. A study published in 1991 reported that 31 per cent of all Italian Ministers were affiliated with either trade unions or employer’s associations. This affiliation pattern (which compares favourably with those of Norway and Sweden) probably reflects dramatic differences in relations between parties and class associations across southern European states (Thiébault 1991a: 29; Cotta 1991:187). We can (and should) evaluate ministers by their position in the economy as well as their position in representative institutions. Here, too, some interesting contrasts emerge. In both Portugal and Greece a career in business or in banking is decidedly not the route to ministerial power. Fewer than two per cent of all ministers in either country took this route. In Spain, the percentage of ministers coming from business and banking is


only slightly higher at 5.4 per cent. In Italy, the percentage of businessmen securing ministerial positions dropped from a high of 12 per cent in the 1940s to only three per cent most recently. For two of our cases, the direct role of business elites in cabinets has declined since the period of dictatorships. For Greece, the current figure represents a dramatic change from the dictatorial past where the business sector provided 12 per cent of all ministers. For Italy, the figure represents a significant drop from the time of Mussolini when businessmen and bankers constituted 8.5 per cent of all cabinet members (Gentile 2000: 471). In Portugal and Spain, businessmen did not often hold cabinet office even during the period of dictatorship. In Portugal, fewer than three per cent of the dictatorship’s ministers were ‘capitalists’. In Spain, the figure for the Franco regime was only 1.7 per cent. Aside from the extraordinary governments that followed the Portuguese Revolution, Southern European governments have aimed, for the most part, to support capitalism without the active participation of capitalists in cabinet government. The rise of Berlusconi in Italy should not blind us to the fact that business elites are less likely to hold ministerial posts in the South of Europe than in older European democracies. Thiébault reports that the percent of cabinet posts held by businessmen in western Europe as a whole is as high as nine per cent (Thiébault 1991a:22). The percentage of businessmen in cabinet government pales in comparison to the percentage of lawyers. Individuals with law degrees make up between 36 and 40 per cent of all ministers in democratic Greece and democratic Portugal. In Spain, 60 per cent of cabinet members were trained in law, while in Italy, the comparable percentage in the post-war period ranges from 54 per cent to a high of 67 per cent. In each of the cases for which we have data, nine per cent of practising lawyers in cabinet government has increased with democratization. In the Greek dictatorship, lawyers comprised only 15 per cent of cabinet ministers. Under Franco, they comprised only 34 per cent and under SalazarCaetano only 6.8 per cent. The comparable figures for democracies are 31 per cent, 42 per cent and 20 per cent. Whether lawyers or not, the ministerial elite of the ‘new’ democracies in Greece, Portugal and Spain are decidedly less dependent on state employment than their predecessors under dictatorship. In addition to showing that there is ‘little, if any, mobility’ between Greek ‘administrative and political elites’, Sotiropoulos and Bourikos argue that ‘state related occupations and professions…have gradually given up their age-old domination of cabinets’. In Portugal, the proportion of ministerial elites who were employed by the state before assuming office has dropped dramatically from over 86 per cent under the dictatorship to 55 per cent under democracy. The percentage of ministerial elites employed exclusively in the private sector (as opposed to both the private and the public) has


TABLE 1 ITALIAN MINISTERS EMPLOYED IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR BEFORE ASSUMING OFFICE

Source: Cotta and Verzichelli, this volume.

risen to 25 per cent. In Spain we see a similar pattern. Nearly threequarters of the ministers in Franco’s cabinets were dependent on state employment. Today, under the parliamentary monarchy, the proportion has dropped to 57 per cent. As in Portugal, approximately one-quarter of all cabinet ministers come from the private sector. In Italy the ministerial elite is significantly more dependent on state employment. The percentage of cabinet members whose main occupation lies within the state sector has risen dramatically since the 1950s to a recent high of 70.5 per cent. Table 1 shows the trend. These figures illustrate yet another dimension on which the Italian ministerial elite differs from its counterparts in the rest of southern Europe. If we assume that independent sources of employment have implications for autonomy, we may conclude that the ministerial elites of the new democracies in Greece, Portugal and Spain have grown increasingly autonomous since democratization while the Italian elite has not. Generalists, Specialists, or Both? Our discussion of the professional identities of ministerial elites brings us to a series of questions that Jean Blondel posed in a recent essay on elites in western Europe (Blondel 2001). Are the ministerial elites of our southern European democracies primarily politicians, technocrats or some combination of the two? (Blondel 2001:12). We can only sketch a partial answer and must be modest in our conclusions due to differences in the data collected, but two hypotheses emerge from the data at hand. First, it seems certain that Portuguese, Spanish and Greek ministerial elites have substantially more technical training today than their predecessors did under previous regimes. Using the data from our case studies, and aggregating percentages for all technical fields, we can see that the proportion of ministers with technical training rose from 21 per cent to 56 per cent in Greece; from 40 per cent to 63 per cent in Portugal and from 38 per cent to 54 per cent in Spain. In Italy, however, the weight of the technically trained is dramatically different in two respects. First, the percentage of cabinet ministers with technical backgrounds is relatively low in comparative perspective. An


TABLE 2 MINISTERS WITH TECHNICAL EDUCATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE UNDER DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY

Source: Studies in present volume and Gentile (2000:470).

average of only 28 per cent of cabinet members in the post war period were trained in technical fields. Even in the years between 1992 and 1996, when Italy’s governments were thought to be most technocratic, the percentage of technically trained ministers reached only 35 per cent. The second feature that distinguished the Italian case from our others is that the proportion of technically trained ministers has not risen since the time of the fascist dictatorship. Twenty-eight per cent of Mussolini’s cabinet members were trained in technical fields. The comparable percentage for democratic Italy is remarkably similar. What shall we make of the impressive change in training accompanying the transition from dictatorship to democracy? It would be a mistake to consider these figures evidence that Greece, Portugal and Spain have become technocracies. In order to answer Jean Blondel’s question properly, we have to recognize that technical training does not remove one— automatically—from the category of ‘politician’. The distinction between specialist and generalist is not so clear-cut (Bakema 1991:95), and as Putnam, among others, forecast, ‘the hybrid figure of the politiciantechnician’ might ‘be the most significant trend in elite composition’ in contemporary times (Putnam 1976:214). It is hard to know who is a hybrid and who is not without studying individual biographies, but analysing these data in the context of what we have learned about the connections between ministers and representative office, we can see the outlines of another (very tentative) generalization. Simply stated it is that the weight of technocrats, and hybrids versus pure politicians varies considerably across states. The percentage of ministers who held some sort of political office prior to assuming a ministerial


position is dramatically higher in Greece and Italy than in Portugal and Spain. In Greece and Italy, under five per cent of ministers assumed their cabinet posts without having held a political office. In Portugal and Spain, nearly one-quarter of all ministers had no experience as political office holders. Table 3 tells the story. These figures are especially interesting if put in a broader European context. The Portuguese and Spanish figures are quite similar to those for Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, and Sweden. These five countries’ cabinets were ranked (in the 1990s at least) among the most technocratic and the least ‘political’ in western Europe. The figures for Italy and Greece, on the other hand, are closest to those of Germany, the Irish Republic and Great Britain (Cotta 1991:180–81). TABLE 3 MINISTERS HOLDING POLITICAL OFFICE BEFORE ASSUMING FIRST MINISTERIAL POST: GREECE, ITALY, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN COMPARED

Notes and Sources: Multiple coding has been used to reflect multiple office holding. Figures are for cases with complete data only, thus the data from Greece in column I are calculated from Table 8 of the Greek study. Data in column II for Greece are as recorded by Sotiropoulos and Bourikos. Italian data do not provide a separate count of those holding mayoral offices. Figures represent aggregations of data for the entire democratic period from 1946–2001, totalling 535 cases from Table 11 and 409 cases from Table 3. The figure of 4.0% for those holding no political office is taken from Cotta (1991:181). Portuguese data are taken from Almeida and Costa Pinto, Table 10. Figures for Spain are taken from Linz and Jerez Mir, Table 10. * Italian figure includes mayors, prefects and regional office holders.

Since no minister secures office without at least the tacit backing of a political party, all cabinet members are ‘politicians’ in some sense—no matter how they were trained and what positions they held before attaining ministerial status. But the variation in technical training and previous political experience across our four cases suggests that the mix of politicians, technocrats and hybrids among ministerial elites in southern Europe may be just as diverse as it is in western Europe as a whole. The diversity within the southern European cases is depicted in Figure 1.


FIGURE 1 TECHNICAL TRAINING AND PREVIOUS POLITICAL EXPERIENCE AMONG MINISTERS IN ITALY, GREECE, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN

What is the explanation for this diversity? Although a convincing answer would require substantially more research, it is possible to offer some speculative hypotheses that might be investigated in the future. My guess is that the diversity in our cases derives from three related factors: differences in the timing of democratization, differences in the timing of entrance into the EU and finally, differences in the nature of political parties. It is not coincidental that ministers in Greece, Spain and Portugal are the most likely to have technical training. Each of these countries made the transition to democracy and the transition to European Community membership almost simultaneously. Thus, from the very inception of their new democracies, cabinets in all three states had to cope with the broad and highly technical tasks of preparing for EC membership (Barreto 1999:102; Pridham 1995:175). They also had to cope with the burdens of making an economic recovery while constructing new political institutions (Linz, Stepan and Gunther 1995: 112). The weight of technical tasks created a demand for ministers who were technically trained. This demand was increased by the well-documented need to ‘signal’ technical competence to outside actors in Brussels, in Washington and elsewhere. The signalling behaviour that has been well documented in Latin American states (Schneider 1998:85–92) was an important component of the Spanish and Portuguese cases. Portugal’s resort to IMF stabilization programmes made the importance of signalling and the role of technocrats especially important there, but both of the Iberian states felt a need to signal competence to domestic and foreign investors. Greece confronted similar incentives prior to the election of Andreas Papandreou’s socialist party, but Papandreou’s ‘anti-EC agenda’ carried protechnocratic incentives of its own. The Greek Socialists’ emphasis on state


interventionism and state-led development created a need for socialist technocrats within the state. The fact that Papandreou was part of the community of economists himself made it likely that previous trends would continue, though with different personnel and different goals.2 Italy’s experience with European integration was dramatically different from those of its southern European neighbours. Since Italy was a founding member of the European Coal and Steel Community, it helped design the structures to which its neighbours would seek access decades later. Italy never had to petition for EC entrance in the sense that Greece, Spain and Portugal did, and, thus, it confronted a dramatically different set of incentives and constraints. The effects of European integration in Italy were delayed and highly uneven in large part because integration was only ‘at its inception’ when Italy’s democracy began to reconstitute itself (Pridham 1995:187). The signals emanating from an inchoate set of new organizations in the 1950s were much weaker than those sent by the mature EC in the 1970s and 1980s. In any case, Italy lacked the tradition of technocrats in government established historically in Portugal and Spain. As stated previously, under Mussolini fewer than 30 per cent of all ministers had training in technical fields (Gentile 2000: 470). In Portugal and Spain, the comparable figures were 40 per cent and 38 per cent respectively. Although the incentives for change emanating from Brussels grew over time, Italy’s ‘adjustment to European pressures…has been hitherto realized without any substantial reform of the institutional framework’ (Hine 2001: 67). There were signs that ‘the politico-administrative elite’ was ‘reorienting its professional preferences’ by the end of the period studied here, but as recently as the late 1980s, civil servants and MPs believed that the EU had not had a systematic influence on ‘politico-administrative elites’ (Hine 2001:60). Although the overall crisis of the Italian political system has allowed experts and technocrats to become ‘increasingly “internalized”’ in the policy process, they still tend ‘to resemble more an epistemic community’ used for consultative purposes (Hine 2001:66) than a group that has had durable effects on the composition of cabinet government. Although the educational profile of Italy’s ministers may eventually converge on the profile we see in the rest of southern Europe, the timing and history of democratization and European integration set Italy on a trajectory that would make it different from its neighbours for years to come. The history and nature of party formation explain why ministers in Italy and Greece are not as likely to be named to cabinet positions without previous political experience. Cabinets are shaped by many relationships, as Jean Blondel has argued, but ‘parties are the institutions which really


count’ (Blondel 1988:11). Parties differ in consequential ways across these systems. For most of the period studied here, Italy operated as a partitocracia—a state ruled by parties. The fact that Italy’s transition to democracy was completed in the 1940s meant that its party system was at least 30 years older than those of the new Iberian democracies (Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros 1995:22). It took shape in a decidedly more impoverished economic environment with more traditional social structures and longestablished networks of patronage. In a pattern that would contrast markedly with the experience of both Portugal and Spain, the stabilization of party leadership was ‘almost immediate’, party identification quickly became intense and ‘widespread’ and official membership (in one party or another) became commonplace (Morlino 1998b:329–32). Parties in Italy, unlike parties in Portugal and Spain, became ‘formidable structures of interests and solidarities, reference points for social measures, agencies of penetration into society and distributors of sanctions and rewards’ (Farneti 1985:123). Even after voter volatility and the growth of civil society challenged partitocracia in the 1980s, party ‘penetrations of many sectors of society’ remained (Farneti 1985: 123). Patronage was key to the electoral success of most Italian parties and had profound effects on their internal governance.3 The Christian Democrats, the party that dominated cabinet governments for most of the period studied here, was, for most of its life, ‘a party of notables with unmatched seniority and clientele-type relationships’ within the organization itself (Farneti 1985: 162). Given this context, it is not surprising that Italian cabinets were packed with ‘insiders’ who had worked their way up well-worn and longestablished ladders of hierarchy. The polarization between ‘left and right subcultures’ (Gunther and Montero 2001:137–8) that dominated Italian politics for most of the period studied here, made party bonds and performance in office requisite tests of loyalty. The fact that Italy relied, more than any of its three neighbours, on coalition governments reinforced this tendency further. Coalitions had to be forged with promises of cabinet portfolios and coalition partners were unlikely to allocate these hard-won positions to anyone who was not a tested insider. Political parties in Greece had several similarities with parties in Italy and these proved consequential for the naming of ministers. The first similarity regards party penetration of state and social institutions. In democratic Greece, ‘neither the state nor civil society have enjoyed any significant degree of autonomy from political parties’ (Pappas 1999:204). Parties were so dominant that ‘young technocrats would turn into “traditional” politicians themselves’ rather than try to survive on ‘their presumed technical expertise’ alone (Pappas 1999:87). Levels of party identification in Greece were, for much of the period studied here, ‘similar to those found


in Italy’ and substantially higher than those in Spain and Portugal (Morlino 1998a:170–71, Gunther and Montero 2001:111). The second similarity shared by Greek and Italian parties in the period studied here regards the pervasive resort to various forms of clientelism. Whether embodied in the ‘traditional clientelism’ of the New Democracy party that ruled Greece until 1981, or in the ‘machine polities’ of the Socialist party that ruled from 1981 until 1990 (Mavrogordatos 1983:50), ‘clientelism stands out as one of the main variables that explain modern Greek polities’ (Pappas 1999:69). As happened in Italy, clientelism vis-à-vis voters was mirrored by patron-clientelism within party organizations. The highly personalist nature of the parties that governed Greece for most of the period studied here made the display of obedience to party leaders essential for promotion through the ranks. Under PASOK, for example, expulsions were a routine form of discipline for members of parliament who struck an independent course (Clogg 1987:130–31). Even when ministers were brought into government from outside the ranks of parliament, they were always tested allies. Getting into high political office without working one’s way through pervasive party channels was, thus, comparatively unlikely in Greece as well as Italy. The political parties that ruled the new Iberian democracies differed from the major parties in Italy and Greece in important ways. They were certainly not devoid of personalism and internal patron-clientism in the period studied here but a relatively long experience with competitive politics meant that these norms were more deeply rooted in the Greek and Italian systems. Though Greece had only a restricted democracy before the 1967 dictatorship, it did have a competitive party system that dated from at least the end of the Civil War. The Italian system was, at minimum, thirty years older than the systems in Iberia. More consequential than differences in the age of parties are differences in their strengths. Portuguese parties are relatively weak in large part because they were ‘created late and did not have time to build up mass organizations’ (Magone 2000:361). Since parliamentarism is not deeply rooted in Portuguese society (Magone 2000:363; Magalhaes 1995), drawing ministers from outside parliament has lower costs. Low levels of partisanship (Gunther and Montero 2001:111) mean that drawing ministers from outside traditional party ranks does not alienate voters. Indeed, since both parties ‘consciously pursue a catch-all strategy’ (Morlino 1998a:196), bringing in ministers from outside the network of current office holders might actually attract votes. Spain’s party membership and party identification scores are the lowest in southern Europe (Morlino 1998a:169–71). Political parties are characterized by ‘low levels of membership, a lack of rootedness in society… and a tendency towards ideological imprecision’ (Heywood 1995:189). Each of these factors facilitated the bringing in of ‘outsiders’ to the cabinet.


The costs of nominating independents to cabinet positions were also reduced by two other factors; Spanish voters are considerably less polarized than voters in other European countries (Maravall and Santamaria 1989; 228–9; Morlino 1998a:193) and they have relatively low levels of party identification. In systems where parties are not deeply rooted in the electorate, the offices secured through party competition need not be a prerequisite for a cabinet position. The explanations I have posed for the variations in cabinet composition in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain underscore consequential differences among the countries of southern Europe. These differences and other possible causes behind the variations in composition require more research in the future. More research should also be dedicated to the consequences of variation in cabinet composition. Do the different patterns described above have any effect on either economic development or the workings of democracy? On this question too, our answers can only be tentative given data and space constraints, but we can formulate some hypotheses that are worthy of future examination. The first is that the aggregated profile of cabinet portfolios probably has no independent effect on the way countries are ranked by investors. A higher percentage of cabinet portfolios going to the technically trained may raise a country’s own standing over time but does not automatically raise a country’s rating relative to other countries as a place for investment. This point is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 below. Figure 2 shows us how investors ranked the economic performance of all four of our cases from spring 1994 to spring 2002. If the relative value of performance ratings were a simple function of signals sent by appointing technically trained, politically independent ministers, Portugal and Spain would be rated higher than Greece and higher still than Italy. Greece receives consistently lower ratings but Italy’s ratings are as high or higher than Spain’s or Portugal’s despite the aggregated profile of its cabinets over time. The same pattern emerges with political risk ratings, as evidenced by Figure 3. Greece is rated as the most risky environment for investment, but the other three cases do not differ dramatically from one another. In fact, they all converge over time, probably due to the strictures related to European Monetary Union. These are crude indicators and since ratings are not available before 1994, they give us a picture of less than a decade of each case history. Despite their shortcomings, these data do suggest two alternative hypotheses. The first is that the signalling function of cabinets is not decisive in investor projections about either economic performance or political risk. Projections might be made on the basis of other factors. The second and more likely interpretation is that the signalling function is consequential but is rooted in specific ministries and not whole cabinets. Having the Ministries of Finance, Economics and Trade controlled by technocrats


FIGURE 2 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE RATINGS: GREECE, ITALY, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN

Source: Euromoney September 1994–September 2002. Note: A rating of 25.00 is the highest and best rating.

might indeed be consequential but the composition of cabinets as a whole is less so. These hypotheses need to be examined with more precise data in the future. Future research should also be dedicated to the relationship between technocratic cabinets and the quality of democracy. The sobering truth is that technocratized governments can help democracies or harm them. In countries with strong traditions of societal corporatism, such as the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden, technocratized governments have fared well as problem solvers and bolstered the legitimacy of democracy through a combination of high inclusion and high performance. In Latin America— even in relatively wealthy economies like that of Argentina—technocratized governments get much worse reviews. If technical skills bring too much autonomy from other political actors and too much autonomy from voters as well, they harm the credibility of party systems and, indeed, the whole electoral process. How have the nature of cabinets affected citizen feelings toward democracy in southern Europe thus far? We would need to conduct focused survey research to answer this question with precision. However, the evidence at hand suggests that a relatively high proportion of technocrats in government is not incompatible with high levels of satisfaction with democracy. The worst-case Latin American scenario appears not to be developing in Southern Europe. Table 4 presents the evidence.


FIGURE 3 POLITICAL RISK RATINGS: GREECE, ITALY, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN

Source: Euromoney September 1994–September 2002. Note: A rating of 25.00 is the highest and best rating.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to know what factors individual respondents consider when they are asked to assess their level of satisfaction with their country’s democracy. We cannot know the extent to which the nature of cabinets entered into respondents’ assessments or even if respondents were aware of who particular cabinet ministers were. We do know that the pattern of satisfaction with democracy across our cases correlates closely with the pattern of cabinet composition described above. Spain and Portugal have the most technocratic cabinets (meaning that they have the most members who have technical training and no previous experience in elected office). Yet, Spain and Portugal also have the highest levels of satisfaction with democracy. Italy has the least technocratic and most political cabinets and has the lowest score for satisfaction with democracy. The profile of Greek cabinets is mixed and the level of satisfaction with democracy in Greece is, correspondingly, higher than in Italy but lower than in Portugal and Spain. Levels of dissatisfaction follow a similar pattern, being dramatically higher in Italy where cabinet elites are most likely to be packed with pure politicians and lowest in Spain and Portugal where cabinets have taken on a technocratic hue. These data do not ‘prove’ that technocratic government is good for democracy but they do show that technocratic government and satisfaction with democracy can, in fact, be compatible.


TABLE 4 SATISFACTION AND DISSATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY: GREECE, ITALY, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN

Sources: Averages from data for autumn 1985–autumn 2002, as reported in Eurobarometers 31, 34, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 48, 49, 51, 52, 56 and 58. Data available on-line at europa.eu.int/comm/public-opinion. Note: Four answer choices were given; very/fairly satisfied are counted as ‘satisfied’ and not very/not at all satisfied are counted as ‘not satisfied’. Standard Eurobarometer surveys are conducted twice a year but satisfaction with democracy is not always reported. These numbers reflect all available data from autumn 2002. No data are available for Spain or Portugal prior to autumn 1985.

Concluding Thoughts Cabinet elites in each of the four countries embraced by this study have changed dramatically since the beginning of the last century and especially since their last experience with dictatorship. Each state’s elites have changed in ways specific to its historical experience. Indeed, the variation among Southern European countries is as great as that among West European countries as a whole. Italy stands out as dramatically different on several important measures. This said, it is certain that technical training has increased in importance as a factor determining ‘who governs’ throughout the South. This observation brings to mind the central argument of the original Who Governs? by Robert Dahl. Although Dahl posed his question some forty years ago, and asked it of a city government very far from southern Europe, his argument resonates clearly with the facts uncovered by these case studies. After showing how and why ‘patricians’ and ‘entrepreneurs’ had yielded the reins of New Haven’s government to the sons of recent immigrants, Dahl foresaw the increasing importance of a group he called the ‘New Men’. A change in the ‘character of the main political issues’ suggested to Dahl that ‘the new men in polities’ would ‘be the bureaucrats and the experts—and the politicians who knew how to use them’ (Dahl 1961:60–62). The case studies described here are very much a story about the retreat of patricians and the rise of ‘new men’ (and in a few cases, ‘new women’). The twentieth century changed the ‘character of the main political issues’ confronting cabinet elites throughout the South from those of largely agricultural economies to those of advanced industrial economies. The changes in the elites of Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain are, thus,


undoubtedly a result of the drive for economic modernization. This is why, in each of these cases, the rise of a technically trained elite began under dictatorship. But the changes traced here are also the result of both democratization and the drive for European Union. In each of our cases, a century of democratization has meant elite replacement with a new emphasis on education rather than birthright. In each of our cases, the drive for European unification brought new incentives to nominate ministers who were not merely university educated but educated in a particular way. As the issues related to unification became more technical, technical training began to be seen as a requisite for sound policy-making. What an increasing proportion of technocrats in government might mean for southern European democracies in the long run remains an open question. We have suggestive evidence that it has not hurt legitimacy as of yet and that it might indeed lead to higher levels of satisfaction. But the challenge of balancing popular representation and elite expertise remains extremely difficult. Finding the politicians that Dahl referred to—that is, finding the ‘politicians’ who ‘know how to use’ the ‘experts’ is now a much greater problem than finding the ‘experts’ themselves. NOTES 1. The noteworthy exceptions are Pippa Norris, Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies, New York: Cambridge, 1995; Heinrich Best and Maurizio Cotta, Parliamentary Representatives in Europe, 1848–2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000; Ezra Suleiman and Henri Mendras, Le Recrutement des Élites en Europe, Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1995; Jean Blondel and Jean-Louis Thiébault, The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe, London: Macmillan, 1991; and Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, Cabinets in Western Europe, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988. All but the last of these focus on legislative elites. 2. PASOK finally came around to a pro-EC policy by 1993. Papandreou’s replacement by Costas Simitis marked a return to a pro-European attitude on the part of governing elites. By 1996, ‘there was a wider…acceptance of the EU in general [and] the socioeconomic reforms necessary as the price to be paid for joining the EMU (Pagoulatos 2001:199). 3. Sidney Tarrow documented the importance of clientelism and partisanship for Italian local officials in Tarrow, Between Center and Periphery: Grassroots Politicians in Italy and France, New Haven, CT: Yale, 1977, esp. pp. 173– 202.


REFERENCES Anderson, Jeff (ed.) (1999): Regional Integration and Democracy: Expanding on the European Experience, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Bakema, Wilma (1991): ‘The Ministerial Career’, in Blondel and Thiébault (1991: 70–98). Barreto, Antonio (1999): ‘Portugal: Democracy through Europe’, in Anderson (1999: 95–122). Best, Heinrich and Maurizio Cotta (eds.) (2000): Parliamentary Representatives in Europe, 1848–2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries, New York: Oxford University Press. Blondel, Jean (1988): ‘Introduction’, in Blondel and Müller-Rommel (1988:1–16). Blondel, Jean (2001): ‘Ministerial Careers in Europe’, paper presented at the Seminário de Arrábida, 17–18 Sept. 2001, Conference on ‘Regime Change and Ministerial Recruitment in Southern Europe, 19th and 20th Centuries’. Blondel, Jean (2002): ‘Party Government, Patronage, and Party Decline in Western Europe’, in Gunther, Montero and Linz (2002:233–56). Blondel, Jean and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds.) (1988): Cabinets in Western Europe,New York: St Martin’s Press. Blondel, Jean and Jean-Louis Thiébault (eds.) (1991): The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe, London: Macmillan. Bruneau, Thomas C., Nikiforos Diamandouros, P., Gunther, Richard, Lijphart, Arend, Morlino, Leonardo and Risa A.Brooks (2001): ‘Democracy, Southern European Style’, in Diamandouros and Gunther (2001:16–82). Bunce, Valerie, 1981: Do New Leaders Make a Difference?Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Centeno, Miguel A. and Patricio Silva (eds.) (1998): The Politics of Expertise in Latin America, New York: St Martin’s Press. Cotta, Mauricio (1991): ‘Conclusion’, in Blondel and Thiébault (1991:174–98). Clogg, Richard (1987): Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy, London: Hurst. Dahl, Robert (1961): Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. De Winter, Lieven (1991): ‘Parliamentary and Party Pathways to the Cabinet’, in Blondel and Thiébault (1991:44–69). Diamandouros, P.Nikiforos and Richard Gunther (2001): ‘Introduction’, in Diamandouros and Gunther (2001:1–15). Diamandouros, P.Nikiforos and Richard Gunther (eds.) (2001): Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Earned, Paolo (1985): The Italian Party System, New York: St Martin’s Press. Featherstone, Kevin and George Kazamias (eds.) (2001): Europeanization and the Southern Periphery, London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass. Gentile, Emilio (2000): Fascismo e antifascismo: I partiti italiani fra le due guerre, Florence: Le Monnier. Gunther, Richard and José R.Montero, 2001: ‘The Anchors of Partisanship: A Comparative Analysis of Voting Behavior in Four Southern European Democracies’, in Diamandouros and Gunther (2001:83–152).


Gunther, Richard, Montero, José Ramón and Juan J.Linz (eds.) (2002): Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges, New York: Oxford University Press. Gunther, Richard, Diamandouros, Nikiforos P. and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (1995): ‘Introduction’, in Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle (eds.) (1995:1–32). Gunther, Richard, Diamandouros, P.Nikiforos and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds.) (1995): The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective,Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Heywood, Paul (1995): The Government and Politics of Spain, New York: St Martin’s Press. Higley, John, Pakulski, Jan and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski (eds.) (1998): PostCommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe, New York: St Martin’s Press. Hine, David (2001): ‘European Policy-Making and the Machinery of the Italian Government’, in Featherstone and Kazamias (2001:25–46). Keller, Suzanne (ed.) (1991): Beyond the Ruling Class, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. King, Anthony (1981): ‘The Rise of the Career Politician in Britain—And Its Consequences’, British Journal of Political Science11/3, pp. 249–85. Lane, David and Cameron Ross (1998): ‘The Russian Political Elites, 1991–95: Recruitment and Renewal’, in Higley, Pakulski and Wesolowski (1998:34–66). Linz, Juan J., Stepan, Alfred and Richard Gunther (1995): ‘Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, with Reflections on Latin America and Eastern Europe’, in Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle (1995:77–123). Magalhaes, Pedro (1995): ‘A Actividade Legislative da Assembleia da Republica e o Seu Papel no Sistema Politico’, Cadernos de Ciencia Legislacao, 12, Jan.–March, pp. 87–119. Magone, José M. (2000): ‘Political Recruitment and Elite Transformation in Modern Portugal, 1870–1999: The Late Arrival of Mass Representation’, in Best and Cotta (2000:341–71). Maravall, José Maria and Julian Santamaria (1989): ‘Transición Política y Consolidación de la Democracia en España’, in Tezanos, Cotarelo and de Bias (1989:183–249). Mavrogordatos, George (1983): Rise of the Green Sun: The Greek Election of 1981,London: Centre of Contemporary Greek Studies, King’s College. Morlino, Leonardo (1995): ‘Political Parties and Political Consolidation in Southern Europe’, in Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle (eds.) (1995:315–88). Morlino, Leonardo (1998): Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis: Parties, Groups, and Citizens in Southern Europe, New York: Oxford University Press. Norris, Pippa (1997a): ‘Introduction: Theories of Recruitment’, in Norris (ed.) (1997: 1–14). Norris, Pippa (1997b): ‘Conclusions: Comparing Passages to Power’, in Norris (ed.) (1997: 209–31). Norris, Pippa (ed.) (1997): Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies, New York: Cambridge University Press. Pagoulatos, George (2001): ‘Economic Adjustment and Financial Reform: Greece’s Europeanization and the Emergence of a Stabilization State’, in Featherstone and Kazamias (2001:191–216).


Pappas, Takis S. (1999): Making Party Democracy in Greece, New York: St Martin’s Press. Pridham, Geoffrey (1995): ‘The International Context of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective’, in Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle (1995:166–203). Putnam, Robert (1976): The Comparative Study of Political Elites, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Sani, Giacomo and Paolo Segatti (2001): ‘Antiparty Politics and the Restructuring of the Italian Party System’, in Diamandouros and Gunther (2001:153–82). Schneider, Ben Ross (1998): ‘The Material Bases of Technocracy: Investor Confidence and Neoliberalism in Latin America’, in Centeno and Silva (1998: 77–95). Tezanos, José Félix, Cotarelo, Ramón and Andrés de Bias (eds.) (1989): La Transición Democrática Española, Madrid: Editorial Sistema. Thiébault, Jean-Louis (1991a): ‘The Social Background of Western European Ministers’, in Blondel and Thiébault (1991:19–30). Thiébault, Jean-Louis (1991b): ‘Local and Regional Politics and Cabinet Membership’, in Blondel and Thiébault (1991:31–43). Torcal, Mariano, Gunther, Richard and José Ramón Montero (2002): ‘Anti-System Sentiments in Southern Europe’, in Gunther, Montero and Linz (2002:233–56). Vianello, Mino and Gwen Moore (2000): Gendering Elites: Economic and Political Leadership in 27 Industrialised Societies, New York: St Martin’s Press. Wasilewski, Jacek (1998): ‘Elite Circulation and Consolidation of Democracy in Poland’, in Higley, Pakulski and Wesolowski (1998:163–87).

ABSTRACTS

Portuguese Ministers, 1851–1999: Social Background and Paths to Power PEDRO TAVARES DE ALMEIDA and ANTÓNIO COSTA PINTO This study provides an empirical analysis of the impact of regime changes on the composition and patterns of recruitment of the Portuguese ministerial elite throughout the last 150 years. The ‘out-of-type’, violent nature of most regime transformations accounts for the purges in and the extensive replacements of the political personnel, namely of the uppermost officeholders. In the case of Cabinet members, such discontinuities did not imply, however, radical changes in their social profile. Although there were some significant variations, a series of salient characteristics has persisted over time. The typical Portuguese minister is a male in his mid-forties, of middle-class origin and predominantly urban-born, highly educated and with a state servant background. The two main occupational contingents have been that of the university professors—except for the First Republic (1910–26)—and the military, the latter having only eclipsed with the consolidation of contemporary democracy. As regards career pathways, the most striking feature is the secular trend for the declining role of parliamentary experience, which the democratic regime did not clearly reverse. In this period, a technocratic background rather than political experience has been indeed the privileged credential for a significant proportion of ministers. Ministers and Regimes in Spain: From First to Second Restoration, 1874–2002 JUAN J.LINZ and MIGUEL JEREZ with SUSANA CORZO This contribution studies the composition of the Spanish cabinet elites through different political regimes and transition periods, those regimes

214 ABSTRACTS

including a constitutional monarchy, two democracies, two dictatorships and a people’s Republic. The discontinuity of ministerial elites is the rule, with the relative exception of the two transition periods in the early 1930 and the middle 1970s. The elite in general is fairly heterogeneous, recruited more or less from the whole country and not dominated by a particular age cohort. In terms of occupational background the important presence of civil servants, professors, military officers and professionals, characterized the elite. Many if not most of them would be of middle class milieus, sometimes upper sometimes middle-middle class. Apparently not many were businessmen, farmers or landowners without ancillary occupation— like the German Junkers—and practically none manual worker-trade unionist like many of the Labour Party MPs in Britain. The professional background suggests that ideas, ideologies, mentalities, legal thinking, were as or more important than the representation of economic or class interests. For each period attention has been paid to the most relevant aspects of the institutional framework, party system and cabinet structure, as well as the extent of elite replacement and—when applicable—the nature of regime change. Ministers in Italy: Notables, Party Men, Technocrats and Media Men MAURIZIO COTTA and LUCA VERZICHELLI The study explores the long-term transformations of social and political profiles of ministerial elites, in a country where the process of democratization started in the second half of the nineteenth century and was interrupted for more than 20 years by the Fascist regime (1924–43). After presenting a brief assessment of the role and composition of the Italian cabinets along the distinct phases of democratic life, the article gives attention to some specific indicators concerning the social origins and the political background of the ministerial elite. The main evolutional feature shown by the data is the transition from the predominance of a ‘notable’ type of minister (before Fascism) to the absolute prevalence of partyprofessionals. The consolidation of the new pattern was achieved thanks to the long period of democratic and party stability which followed the Second World War, and was characterized by strong unwritten rules of ministerial recruitment and circulation. These included a long party career, an almost compulsory ‘parliamentary’ path to ministerial offices, a fairly proportional allocation of positions according to regional origins and the limited importance of technocratic competencies. The final section focuses on the changes that occurred within the Italian ministerial elite during the last decade: here the weakening of the party-professional pattern of recruitment, the greater role of technocratic careers and a more

WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE? 215

pronounced variability in the social and political backgrounds are in evidence. Ministerial Elites in Greece, 1843–2001: A Synthesis of Old Sources and New Data DIMITRI A.SOTIROPOULOS and DIMITRIS BOURIKOS The study of Greek political elites used to be concentrated on parliamentary deputies. Ministerial elites were rarely studied. In this article, we take a long-term view of the Greek ministerial elites, studying their socio-political profile from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. We find that this profile does not change so much with regime change, as with political developments at certain time points within specific regime periods. At these points, new political leaders were ushered in to power. Examples were Eleftherios Venizelos in 1911 and Andreas Papandreou in 1981. Changes in personnel were not accompanied by changes in geographical origin or professional outlook, which took much longer to effect. In the nineteenth century mainly landowners and state officials dominated cabinets. After the beginning of the twentieth century, liberal professions, particularly lawyers, were over-represented among ministers. This pattern continued throughout the twentieth century. Both the predominance of lawyers and the changes in the profile of ministers over time are attributed to the type of state built in modern Greece, a clientelist, over-centralized and legalistic state which only recently has started its transformation, requiring a different, more modern type of politician. Ministerial Elites in Southern Europe: Continuities, Changes and Comparisons NANCY BERMEO Ministerial elites in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal have changed dramatically since these states began their slow march to democracy in the 19th century. Though changes have not homogenized the ministerial elites of Europe’s South, each country has responded to the pressures of modernization, democratization and Europeanization with an increased role for the technically trained in government. Italy’s response to these pressures stands out as unique, but each of the other states has managed to combine a decrease in the role of pure politicians with high rates of public satisfaction with democracy.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Pedro Tavares de Almeida is professor of political science at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Nova University of Lisbon. His main interests focus on the sociology of elites and electoral studies. His publications include Eleições e Caciquismo no Portugal Oitocentista (1991), Legislação Electoral Portuguesa 1820–1926 (editor, 1998), and Políticos e Burocratas. O recrutamento da elite governante no Portugal Liberal (forthcoming). Nancy Bermeo is professor of political science at Princeton University. Her research interests focus on the causes and consequences of regime change in Europe and Latin America as well as the politics of economic reform. She is the author of The Revolution Within the Revolution: Workers’ Control in Rural Portugal (1986) and Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times (forthcoming), and the editor of Liberalization and Democratization (1992), Unemployment in Southern Europe (2000) and Civil Society Before Democracy (with Philip Nord, 2000). Dimitris Bourikos is a political scientist who has studied at the University of Athens. His research interests include Greek political elites, social care services, and European integration, on which he has published several articles. Susana Corzo is professor of political science at the University of Granada. Her main research interests are political elites and political clientelism, power structures and politics agenda. She is the author of El clientelismo politíco. El Plan de Empleo Rural en Andalucía (2002) and of several articles on Andalucian political elites. Maurizio Cotta is professor of political science and director of the Centre for the Study of Political Change at the University of Siena. His main interests are in the field of the comparative study of political elites and political institutions and of Italian politics. He is author of Classe politica e parlamento in Italia (1979), co-author of Scienza Politica (2001), and co-editor of Parliaments and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe (1990), Party and Government (1996), The Nature of Party Government (2000), and Parliamentary Representatives in Europe (2000).

217

Miguel Jerez Mir is professor of political science at the University of Granada. His main research areas are political elites, interest groups, political science as a discipline, and Spanish politics. His books include Elites políticas y centres de extracción: España, 1938–1957 (1982), Corporaciones e interesses en la España actual (1995), and Ciencia política, un balance de fin de siglo (1999). Juan J.Linz is Sterling professor of political science at Yale University. He has written extensively on the processes of regime change, democratization, presidential systems, federalism, and national identity. Among his recent publications are The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (co-editor with A.Stepan, 1978), Problems of Democracy in Developing Countries (co-editor with L.Diamond and A.Stepan, 1988–89), The Failure of Presidential Democracy (with A. Valenzuela, 1994), and Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Post-Communist Europe (with A.Stepan, 1995). António Costa Pinto is researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, and professor of modern history and politics at ISCTE. His research interests include authoritarianism, democratization, and political elites. He recently published Salazar’s Dictatorship and European Fascism (1996) and The Blue Shirts: Portuguese Fascism in Interwar Europe (2000), and edited Modern Portugal (1998). Dimitri A.Sotiropoulos is assistant professor of political science at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of the University of Athens. He has published articles and books on Greek politics, public administration, and the welfare state, as well as on democratization in postcommunist Balkans. These include Populism and Bureaucracy: The Case of Greece under PASOK, 1981–1989 (1996) and Is Southern Europe Doomed to Instability? co-edited with Th. Veremis (2002). Luca Verzichelli is professor of political science at the University of Siena. He has published extensively in the field of empirical analysis of political class and about budgetary processes in Italy. His recent publications include La politica di bilancio (1999).

INDEX

Achaia 160 administrative elites see bureaucratic elites. Aegean Sea Islands 177 age of ministers 1 Greece 169–72, 198, 199 Italy, 134, 143 Portugal 18–20 Spain 86–8 Western Europe 20 Alba, Santiago 57 Alcalá Zamora, Niceto 60 Almeida, Pedro Tavares de 155 Alphonse XII (King of Spain) 45, 50, 52 Alphonse XIII (King of Spain) 43, 46, 51, 53, 55, 56, 58, 86, 99 Amadeo of Savoy (King of Spain) 42, 45, 50 Amato, Giuliano 145 anarcho-syndicalists 68, 69, 102 Andalusia 80, 85, 90 Andreotti, Giulio 143, 144 Anguita, Julio 82 architects 125, 182, 183, 197 Argentina 222 Arias Navarro, Carlos 77, 79, 81, 83, 84 Arias Salgado, Rafael 84 aristocracy 5, 6, 53, 58, 98, 99–101, 123, 125, 128, 129, 131, 132 Armed Forces 14, 16, 18, 32, 34, 57, 58, 69, 75, 79, 98 artisans 185 Asia Minor 166, 173, 177 Asia Minor Catastrophe 161 Athens 173, 176–8, 187, 190, 199

Aunós, Eduardo 71 Austria 61, 100, 169, 215, 222 Azaña, Manuel 60, 66, 67, 68, 78, 90, 98, 106 Aznar, José María 45, 47, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87, 88, 96, 105 Aznar, Juan Bautista 60, 101 Azores 17 background variables 1, 2, 18, 153, 155, 156, 159, 164 Balkan Wars 161, 165, 177 Balkans 178 bankers 184–5 Bar, Antonio 82 Barcelona 66, 90, 92 Basque Country 80, 90, 100 Baum, Michael 3 Beigbeder, Juan 79 Berenguer, Dámaso 59, 86 Berlusconi, Silvio 145, 147, 148, 211 Bermeo, Nancy 155 Best, Heinrich 2 biographical data 18, 47, 94, 159, 160, 162, 163, 214 Blondel, Jean 2, 3, 208, 210, 213, 214, 218 Bonomi, Ivanoe 130 bourgeoisie 59, 64, 66, 68, 92, 98, 123 see also middle class Bourikos, Dimitri 212 Branson, William 3 Brazil 48 Brussels 82, 216, 217 Bulgaria 158, 161, 166

218

INDEX 219

Bunce, Valerie 206 bureaucratic elites 14, 15, 27, 34, 105, 123, 127, 129,144, 184, 192, 217, 224 see also civil servants (senior) businessmen 106, 109, 134, 180, 181, 183, 185, 211, 212 Cabinet see government. caciquismo see clientelism. Cadiz 41, 42 Caetano, Marcello 13, 14, 27, 28, 33, 34, 209, 210, 212 Calvo-Sotelo, José 65 Calvo-Sotelo, Leopoldo 81, 83, 84 Cambó, Francesc 58 Canalejas, José 57, 100 Canary Islands 80 Cánovas del Castillo, Antonio 51, 52, 53, 55 career patterns see political career/ experience Carrero Blanco, Luis 75, 76, 77, 79, 100 Casares Quiroga, Santiago 67 Catalonia 90 catholics 9, 33, 42, 65, 66, 69, 72, 75, 90 Chapaprieta, Joaquín 70 charismatic 11, 12 Charles III (King of Spain) 44 Charles IV (King of Spain) 41 Charles Albert of Savoy (King of Sardinia) 122 Christian democrats 84, 137, 140, 141, 142, 143, 218 Ciampi, Carlo Azeglio 145 civil servants 18, 24, 27, 96, 108, 134, 178, 181, 182, 184, 200, 208, 217 senior 94, 105, 123, 125, 132, 135, 146, 148, 155, 156, 180 civil society 17, 27, 36, 37, 53, 210, 211, 218, 219 class associations 211 cleavages: left/right 28, 29, 37, 64, 65, 66, 67, 84, 122, 127, 133, 166, 168, 169

religious 9, 45, 66 social 9, 118 territorial 20, 81, 89–92, 127, 128, 173 clientelism 6, 7, 53, 56, 85, 92, 154, 185, 218, 219 Coimbra 24 Communist Party see parties communists 65, 68, 69, 70, 102, 133, 166, 208 conservatives 55, 56 Constantine I (King of Greece) 166 cosmopolitanism 24, 94, 158 Cotta, Maurizio 2, 208, 209, 210 counter-elites 7, 27 coups d’état see military coups Craxi, Bettino 143 Crete 178 Cuba 53 Cuenca José 47 Cyprus 196 Czech Republic 208 Daalder, Hans 48 Dahl, Robert 224 Dato, Eduardo 57, 100 Dávila, Bernabé 75 De Gasperi, Alcide 133 De Miguel, Amando 47 democracy (levels of satisfaction with) 222, 223, 224 democratic regimes: breakdowns of 11, 62, 188 see also military coups transitions to 14–16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 34, 37, 43, 46, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 92, 94, 99, 106, 195, 196, 198, 208–13, 214, 218 democratization: 9, 14, 16, 206, 207, 209, 211, 213, 216, 217, 224 Denmark 215 deputies 6, 19, 28, 29, 30, 33, 35, 51, 52, 56, 58, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 85, 88, 102, 132, 159, 171, 182, 183, 185, 190, 192, 194

220 INDEX

dictatorships 11, 12, 18, 23, 26, 36, 42, 43, 46, 47, 59, 61, 71, 72, 74, 76, 84, 85, 86, 88, 90, 92, 94, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 105, 106, 108, 161, 163, 166, 168, 169, 172, 176, 177, 178, 181, 182, 183, 188, 192, 196, 199, 208, 209, 211, 212 fascist 12, 118, 132, 133 Dini, Lamberto 145 Dogan, Mattei 36 Eanes, António Ramalho 17, 29 economic elites 37, 148 see also bankers, businessmen, industrialists, landowners economic modernization 79, 224 economists 23, 27, 28, 96, 198, 200 economy 16, 17, 28, 157, 158, 211 economic crises 27 education of ministers 1, 37, 165 Greece 165, 186–92, 198, 206 Italy 128, 131, 134, 139, 146, 207, 217 Portugal 21–4, 206 Spain, 92–4, 206 Western Europe, 21, 207 Eldersveld, Samuel J. 2 elections 6, 7, 12, 15, 16, 17, 48, 49, 64, 66, 80, 84, 85, 130, 133, 147, 166, 167, 171, 172, 197, 208 electoral manipulation 6–7, 49, 50, 56, 58, 80 electoral regulations 48 electoral system: 17 proportional representation 15, 56, 74 d’Hondt formula 15 electorate see suffrage elegibility 7 elite autonomy 24, 141 elite circulation 14, 36, 48, 52, 71, 72, 83, 84, 129, 131, 133, 137, 142, 143, 144, 160, 164, 208, 224 elite continuity 30, 48, 51, 131, 164 elite disunity 10 elite replacement see elite circulation,

elite recruitment 5, 7, 9, 18, 24, 26, 27, 32, 33, 37, 77, 78, 118, 123, 125, 127, 131, 132, 137, 138, 139, 140, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 154, 209, 210, 211 centralization of 20 elite settlements 6, 7, 16, 44, 83, 86 elite theory, 2, 117, 153, 154, 155, 156, 205, 206 elite volatility 168 employees 183, 185 employer’s associations 211 endogamy see family connections engineers 23, 27, 55, 96, 125, 165, 180, 182, 183, 184, 197, 198, 200 Espartero, Baldomero 42, 50 European Coal and Steel Community 217 European Monetary Union 222 European Union 17, 29, 35, 108, 216, 224 European integration 27, 217 exile 11, 34, 125 family connections 2, 7, 30, 33, 53, 71, 74, 75, 77, 166, 193, 194, 195 farmers 109, 160 fascism 33, 72, 74, 132, 133, 134 Ferdinand VII (King of Spain) 42, 44 Figueras (Spain) 70 Finland 215 Florakis, Charilaos 170 France 20, 24, 42, 48, 67, 94, 187, 188, 190, 192, 207, 215 Franco, Francisco 26, 33, 44, 46, 47, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 92, 94, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 105, 106, 108, 208, 209, 211, 212 Franco, Nicolás 74, 77 Francoism 33, 44 free professions see liberal professions Freedland, Edward 3 French Revolution, 41 Galicia 80, 85, 92 Gallego, Soledad 47

INDEX 221

García Prieto, Manuel 57, 98 gender of ministers 1 Greece 159, 172–3, 198, 200, 207, 208 Italy 134, 148 Portugal 28–9, 207, 208 Spain 88–9, 207 Western Europe 28 geographical origins of ministers 1 Greece 164, 173–8, 199 Italy 125, 127, 128, 132 Portugal 20–1 Spain 89–2 George I (King of Greece) 165 George II (King of Greece) 166 Germany 61, 68, 74, 82, 83, 85, 94, 158, 161, 166, 169, 187, 188, 192, 207, 215 Gerona 70 Giral, José 69 Gómez Jordana, Francisco 75, 76, 79 González, Felipe 81, 82, 84, 87, 88, 92 government: caretaker 163, 164, 167 ‘civilianization’ 26, 128, 134 coalition 9, 16, 17, 48, 55, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 74, 81, 131, 133, 138, 143, 144, 148, 162, 170, 218 composition and structure 13, 14, 48, 49, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 82, 118, 133, 208, 220, 223 duration 10, 15, 17, 48, 50, 83, 123, 130, 131, 168, 169 formation 6, 58, 66, 74, 75, 82, 129, 130, 131, 132, 140, 147, 168, 169 presidential 16, 29, 36, 63, 68 provisional 15, 20, 34, 60, 83, 101 reshuffles 13, 19, 29, 45, 74 single-party 17, 48, 55, 162 stability 10, 11, 15, 63, 64, 68, 83, 123, 130, 131, 141, 168, 169 Greece 206, 207, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 224 Athens, the importance of 176–8 authoritarian power 158

Civil War 166, 169, 182, 196 Colonels’ authoritarian regime 161, 163, 166, 169, 172, 176, 178, 181, 182, 183, 188, 192, 196, 199 Constitutional Monarchy 158, 165, 172 Constitutions 162, 168 cosmopolitanism 158 Cyprus debacle 167 Democracy (post-1974 republic) 158, 159, 163, 167, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 176, 178, 181, 183, 185, 188, 189, 190, 192, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 212 economic power of ship owners 157 economy 157, 158 First Republic 157 ‘inner elite’ 163, 164, 167, 170, 171, 172, 176, 177, 178, 182, 183, 184, 189, 190, 192, 198, 199 internal migration 173, 178 Kingdom of 156, 173, 176 legalism 158, 181 liberalism 197 Metaxas dictatorship 161, 166, 168, 177, 181, 188 ‘New Lands’ 173, 174, 177 number of cabinets and ministers 168, 169 occupation by foreign powers 158, 161 ‘Old Lands’ 173, 174, 176, 177 police surveillance and oppression 157 population ratio 174, 176 post-war 154, 157, 158, 161, 163, 167, 169, 173, 177, 181, 182, 185, 187, 188, 190, 194, 197, 198, 199 previous studies of Greek politics 154, 155, 157 privatizations 200 restricted democracy 161, 166, 180, 182, 184, 197 Royalists 166, 168 Second Republic 161, 165, 168 State, growing importance of 157, 160, 169, 181, 182, 184, 195, 199, 200

222 INDEX

Third Republic 167, 176, 178 transition towards democracy 214, 215, 216 ‘unification of 178 War of Independence 156, 157, 174 war with Turkey 196 Western Europe influence 192 Westernization 200 Grivas, I. 167 Higley, John 36 Hitler, Adolf 68, 80 Hungary 70 independents 6, 36, 135, 144, 220, 222 industrialists 26, 59 intellectuals 60, 131, 132 interest groups 2, 30, 35, 53, 105, 106, 140, 185 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 16, 27, 216 Ionian Islands 177 Irish Republic 215 irredentist mobilization 178 Irujo, Manuel de 94 Isabel II (Queen of Spain) 42, 43, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55 Italy 42, 56, 61, 62, 72, 81, 85, 158, 161, 166, 169, 207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 224 CISL 140 Coldiretti 140 Confindustria 140 Constitutions 133 ‘demilitarization’ of government 134 Democracy 132, 133, 134 Fascism 118, 132, 133 First Republic 138, 139, 142 generalist/specialist 142 Italian Kingdom 123 Kingdom of Sardinia 122, 123, 125 Majoritarian Democracy 118, 147–9 mass democracy 118, 132, 133–42 mass parties 130, 131, 133, 143 national unification 122, 125, 127– 32

nationalization of political life 132 organizational decline of political parties 145 ‘parliamentarization’ of politics 125, 128, 129, 132 Parliamentary Monarchy 118, 122– 9 party government 141, 145 patriotic movements 122 pentapartito years 143 Piedmontese State 122, 125 restricted franchise 122 Risorgimento 125 Republic 137 sottosegretario, 132, 141, 144 Statuto Albertino, 122 ‘technical governments’ 145 Wars of Independence (1859) 122, 125 Jerez, Miguel 47 journalists 98, 125, 134, 135, 180, 183, 184, 198, 200 Juan Carlos I (King of Spain) 43, 44, 45, 79 judges 135, 146, 181, 182, 184 judiciary 27, 73, 184 junior minister see Secretaries of State Karamanlis, Costas 193 Karamanlis, Konstantine 166, 170, 193, 196 Keller, Suzanne 205 kings (role of) 6, 48, 49, 53, 55, 122, 125, 127, 129 Koutsoukis, K.S. 157, 161, 163, 164, 167, 182, 188, 195 landowners 98, 109, 123, 128, 131, 132 Largo Caballero, Francisco 69, 70, 71, 98, 106 Latin America 42, 62, 153, 205, 216 lawyers 27, 37, 53, 78, 94, 96, 98, 125, 132, 135, 146, 158, 160, 165, 178, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 212 legal training 23, 26, 27, 146

INDEX 223

Legg, Keith 154, 157, 159, 160, 161, 163, 164, 167, 176, 187, 188, 194 legitimation/legitimacy 7, 15, 33, 36, 58, 117, 118, 129, 222, 224 charismatic 12 rational-legal 12, 58 Lerroux, Alejandro 66, 70, 71, 78 liberal professions 27, 28, 37, 125, 128, 131, 135, 146, 183, 197, 198 liberals 52, 55, 56, 84, 130, 131, 133, 143, 144, 168 Lijphart, Arend 48 ‘limited pluralism’ 34, 72 Linz, Juan J. 3, 34, 45, 47 Lisbon 20, 24, 35 local councillors 102, 209 local politics 209, 210 Greece 209 Italy 118, 138, 148, 210 Portugal 11, 18, 30, 33, 34, 35, 37, 209 Spain 81, 91–2, 102, 105, 106, 108, 209 Western Europe 35, 37 Lyrintzis, Christos 160 Macedonia 177, 178 MacMahon, Edme Patrice Maurice 42 Madeira 17 Madrid 89, 90, 92 Maestre Rosa, J. 47 Maier, Charles S. 3 managers 27, 28, 37 María Cristina of Bourbon (Queen Regent of Spain) 42 María Cristina of Habsburg-Lorena (Queen Regent of Spain) 43, 46 Markezinis, Spiros 196 Martín Artajo, Alberto 76 Martín Villa, Rodolfo 84 Martínez Anido, Severiano 71, 75 Martínez Barrio, Diego 67, 68, 69, 78 Masonry 2, 30, 32, 33, 53, 106 mass politics 118, 131 mass movement 59, 68 mass parties 64, 67, 130, 131, 133, 143, 169

Maura, Antonio 55, 56 mayors 30, 32, 34, 35, 84, 85, 102, 209 medical doctors 27, 37, 125, 165, 180, 183, 184, 197 merchants 160 Metaxas, Ioannis 161, 166, 168, 177, 181, 188 metropolitanism 20 Michels, Robert 164 middle class 5, 24, 37, 53, 59, 96, 99, 101, 108, 125, 128, 129, 131, 132, 160, 185 lower 9, 59 upper 59, 108 military (the) 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 24, 26, 27, 30, 32, 34, 36, 37, 53, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71, 75, 76, 78, 83, 87, 96, 98, 108, 123, 125, 128, 131, 132, 134, 160, 161, 165, 166, 178, 180, 181, 182, 184, 188, 190, 196, 197, 200, 208, 209 Military Academies 21, 23, 24, 187, 188 military coups 6, 11, 34, 42, 43, 44, 58, 68, 90, 160, 165, 166, 168, 197 ministerial careers 1, 14, 106, 107, 128, 141, 142, 167, 168 mobility 13, 108, 137, 141, 142, 144, 146, 147 ministers (role of) 1, 117 Mitsotakis, Costas 170, 172 modernization 14, 17, 26, 154, 200 modernization theories 154 Mola, Emilio 68 monarchists 65, 68, 72, 73, 74, 75, 168 Montseny, Federica 69, 88 Moore, Clement 33 Muñoz Grandes, Agustin 75 Murcia 92 Mussolini, Benito 130, 133, 211, 212, 214, 217 Napoleon I 42 NATO 108 Navarra 90 Negrín, Juan 69, 70 nepotism 77–8, 193–5

224 INDEX

Netherlands 207, 222 New Haven (Connecticut, USA) 224 Nord, Philip 3 Norway 207, 211 notables 6, 7, 27, 33, 60, 92, 122, 130, 160, 168, 197, 218 occupational profile 1, 165 Greece 178–85, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200 Italy 125, 128, 131, 132, 134, 135, 141, 146, 148, 214 Portugal 24–8 Spain 94–9, 108 oligarchic trends 7, 45, 53, 164 Oporto 35 Opus Dei 72, 78, 106 Ordoñez, Fernández 84 Ottoman Empire 157 pacts see elite settlements Pagoulatos, George 3 Pais, Sidónio 11 Pakulski, Jan 3 Papagos, Alexander 166, 196, 197 Papandreou, Andreas 166, 170, 172, 193, 216, 217 Papandreou, George 166, 193 Paredes, J. 47 Parkin, Frank 164 Parsons, Talcott 78 Parliament 6–7, 9, 11, 28, 29, 30, 35, 48, 49, 50, 53, 58, 64, 65, 69, 70, 72, 83, 85, 86, 102, 122, 125, 128, 129, 130, 132, 134, 137, 138, 139, 158, 160, 162, 171, 173, 183, 192, 197, 198, 209, 220 parliamentarism 158, 195, 220 parliamentary elites 141, 156, 158, 160, 162, 170, 171, 172, 183, 184, 192, 197 see also deputies, peers and senators parties 6, 16, 28, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 44, 55, 56, 64, 65, 66, 68, 72, 73, 81, 143, 145, 147, 169, 180, 210, 216, 218, 219, 220 centrist 17, 166, 169, 182, 197

fascist 11 leadership of 30, 33, 35, 36 left-wing 21, 28, 49, 102, 166, 182 right-wing 15, 28, 29, 49, 166, 169, 197 single 11, 28, 33, 34, 58, 73, 166 socialist 171, 183 as recruitment centres 210 Greece: Centre Union, 185 Communist Party (KKE) 159, 169, 170 EDA 166 Liberal Party 165, 197 New Democracy Party 161, 162, 170, 171, 183, 193, 219 Socialist Party (PASOK) 162, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 178, 183, 185, 189, 192, 195, 197, 216, 219 Italy: Centre-Left (Centro-Sinistra), 141 Christian Democratic Party (DC) 133, 137, 139, 140, 143, 218 Historic Left (Sinistra Storica), 122, 127 Historic Right (Destra Storica), 122, 127 Liberal Party 133 Partita Popolare 56, 130, 131 Republican Party 133 Social Democratic Party 133 Socialist Party 56, 130, 133, 139, 143 Portugal: Catholic Party 11 Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português)15, 16, 17, 28, 29 Democratic Party (Partido Democrático)9, 10, 11, 32, 33 National Union (União National) 11, 33, 34 Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democrático)15 Republican Party (Partido Republicano)7, 9 Social Democratic Centre (Centro Democrático e Social) 15, 16, 17

INDEX 225

Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata)15, 16, 17, 28 Socialist Party (Partido Socialista) 15, 16, 17, 28, 29 Spain: Alianza Popular 85 Basque National Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco)66, 69, 90, 94 Basque Nationalist Action (Action Nacionalista Vasca)69 Catalan Left (Esquerra) 66, 67, 90 Catholic Action (Acción Católica) 76, 106 Catholic National Association of Propagandists (Asociación Católica National de Propagandistas)72, 78, 106 CEDA 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 72, 75, 86, 106 CNT 69, 70, 86 Comunión Tradicionalista 73 Communist Party (Partido Comunista Español) 85 Conservative Party 98 Convergence and Union (Convergència I Unió) 81 Democratic Centre Union (Unión de Centra Democrático) 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 106, 208 The Falange (Falange Española) 73, 74, 78, 102 Galician Regional Party (ORGA) 66 Izquierda Liberal 55 Izquierda Republicana 65, 67, 106 Izquierda Unida 82 Liberal Conservative (Liberal Conservador) 55 Liberal Fusion (Liberal Fusionista) 55 Liberal Party 98 Liberal Progresista 55 Lliga Regionalista 55, 64, 66 Mauristas 55 Partido Liberal Demócrata 55 Popular Party (Partido Popular) 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 94, 105 POUM 69

Radical Party 66, 106 Republican Action (Acción Republicana) 66, 67, 106 Republican Union (Unión Republicana) 67 Socialist Party (PSOE) 56, 59, 60, 65, 66, 67, 82, 83, 84, 87, 98, 99, 105, 106 Spanish Renewal (Renovation Española) 102 UGT 69 Unidad Católica 55 partitocracy 133, 142, 218 party system 48, 63, 64, 65, 80, 81, 130, 165, 122 fragmentation of 9, 15, 17, 56, 57, 58, 63, 64, 65, 67, 169 multi-party system 80, 81, 83, 108 predominant party system 9, 81 two-party system 6, 7, 9, 55, 56, 58 ‘party watch-dog’ 148 peasantry 9 Pedregal, José Manuel 58 peers 30 Peloponnesus 164, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178, 199 Philippines 53, 70 Pintasilgo, Maria de Lourdes 29 Pinto, António Costa 155 Piraeus 173, 176 ‘polarized pluralism’ 65 political career/experience of ministers: 2 local politics 30, 32, 35, 37, 105, 138, 139, 140, 144, 146, 148, 209, 210 parliamentary 7, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 102, 105, 123, 132, 137, 138, 145, 192, 198, 209, 220 Greece 192–5, 198, 214, 215, 218 Italy 123, 125, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 148, 210, 214, 215, 218 Portugal 29–36, 210, 214, 215 Spain 52, 77, 101–9, 214, 215 political police 12 political imprisonment 34, 79, 87, 125

226 INDEX

Portela Valladares, Manuel 65, 70 Portugal 1, 42, 48, 61, 62, 63, 71, 72, 83, 100, 105, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 224 absolutism 5, 125 administrative centralization 14, 30 agrarian reform 16 Armed Forces Movement (Movimentodas Forças Armadas, MFA)14, 15, 16 centralization of power 13, 17, 18 civil war 5 colonial war 13, 26 Constituent Assembly 15, 19 constitutional reforms 9, 16 Constitutional Monarchy 5–7, 9, 18, 21, 23, 24, 26, 29, 30, 32 Constitutions 6, 9, 11, 16 Corporatist Chamber 11, 33, 34, 211 Council of the Revolution 16 decolonization 14, 21 democracy 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 35, 36, 37, 210, 211 democratic consolidation 16–18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 35–6, 37 democratic oposition movement 12 and European Union 17, 35 First Republic 7–11, 19, 20, 23, 24, 28, 32–3, 37, 210 Legião Portuguesa 33 Military Dictatorship 11, 12, 18, 23, 26, 36 Mocidade Portuguesa 33 National Assembly 11, 12, 14, 33, 34 New State 11–14, 19, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28, 33–4, 36, 210 and Post-First World War 11 presidential powers 9, 16 regional identities 17, 20 regionalization 17 revolutionary coups 7, 14 Salazarism 12, 27, 33, 72 Sidonism 11 and Spain 61, 62, 63, 72, 83, 105

transition towards democracy 14– 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 34, 37, 211, 214, 216 prefect 12, 30, 34, 35, 36, 102, 105, 192, 209 president of the Republic 9, 11–12, 16, 35, 62, 63, 64, 66, 106, 170 pressure groups 106 See interest group Prevadovich, Nikolaus von 100 prime minister 6, 13, 16, 35, 36, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 53, 55, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 69, 70, 76, 77, 79, 82, 83, 84, 86, 98, 122, 128, 130, 131, 141, 144, 145, 147, 148, 165, 168, 168, 169, 193, 196 Primo de Rivera, José Antonio 43, 45, 46, 52, 58, 59, 60, 71, 73, 92, 102, 105 private sector 212 professional politicians 53, 132, 135, 146, 180, 199 professors 94, 134 university professors 23, 24, 26, 27, 34, 37, 55, 78, 94, 125, 132, 135, 146, 148, 180, 183, 184, 198, 200 Prussia 100 public sector 26, 180, 200, 212 nationalizations 16, 17 Puga, Alvarez 47 Putnam, Robert 2, 205, 214 Ramírez, M. 60 rationalized parliamentary system 82 referendum 17, 167 regime change and transitions 1, 5, 7, 11, 36, 41, 50, 51, 52, 63, 86, 118, 133, 165, 168 regime crisis 11, 58, 79 regionalization 17 Regional Development Funds 17 see also European Union republicans 7, 9, 11, 15, 27, 33, 50, 51, 63, 67, 69, 127, 143, 144 Robles, Gil 78 Rokkan, Stein 6 Romanones, count 57

INDEX 227

Ruiz Zorrilla, Manuel 50 Russia 208 Sagasta, Práxedes Mateo 51, 52, 53, 55 Salazar, António de Oliveira 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 26, 28, 33, 36, 80, 209, 210, 212 Sampaio, Jorge 35 Sartori, Giovanni 55 secret societies, 30 see also Masonry and Opus Dei Secretaries of State 14, 33, 34, 35, 45, 105, 132, 141, 144 Under-Secretaries of State 28, 33, 34, 35, 59, 75, 105 secularization 9 Senate 49, 53, 88, 123, 137 senators 85, 102 Serrano, Francisco 42 Serrano Suñer, Ramón 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77 Seville 92 Silvela, Francisco 70 Simitis, Costas 163, 172, 173, 193 Soares, Mário 15, 16 ‘social closure’ (Weber; Parkin) 164 ‘social’ and ‘political’ capital 155, 200 social democrats 84, 143, 144 social elites 37, 164 see also aristocracy, bourgeoisie and middle class (upper) social origins 1 Greece 167, 189 Italy 123, 125, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 134 Portugal 5–6, 9, 18–29, 24, 37 Spain 53, 55, 78, 99–101 Socialist Party see parties socialists 15, 64, 66, 67, 69, 81, 131, 133, 143, 166, 171 Sotiropoulos, Dimitri 212 Soviet Union 70, 73, 206 Spadolini, Giovanni 143 Spain 26, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 224 absolutism 42, 48

Alfonsists 64 alternation of power 55, 56 anti-clericalism 45, 66, 90 Army powers 53, 57, 58 Autonomous Communities (Comunidades Autónomas, CCAA) 80, 82, 88, 105, 108 Basque autonomy 69 Bayonne Statute 41 Bienio Negro 64 Blues (Azules) 84 Carlists 50, 64, 76, 90 Civil Directorate/Dictablanda 43, 46, 86 Civil War 43, 45, 46, 47, 52, 61, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 76, 78, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 94, 99, 102, 106 CNT 60, 69, 70, 86 Constitutional Monarchy 42, 48, 49, 51, 55, 60, 69, 70, 71, 78, 85, 86, 90, 94, 98, 101, 102, 105, 108 constitutionalism 49, 50 Constitutions 45, 49, 50, 51, 58, 59, 61, 62 continuities with the pre-democratic period 84 Cortes 48, 49, 50, 56, 58, 62, 63, 72, 73, 80, 81, 84, 102 Democracy 61, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 92, 94, 105 Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera 43, 71 ETA 79 and European Union 108 executive powers 83 Falangists 72, 76 FET-JONS National Council (Consejo National de FET-JONS) 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79 First Bourbon Restoration 42, 45, 47, 52, 53, 89, 71, 107 First Republic 42, 50, 51 fragmentation of parties 56, 58, 64, 65, 67 Franco Regime 43, 46, 47, 71, 72, 76, 84, 85, 86, 88, 92, 94, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 105, 106, 108, 208, 209, 211, 212

228 INDEX

and French Revolution 41 General Workers’ Union (UGT) 59, 60, 65, 69 Generalitat 69 generation divides 87–8 ‘Glorious Revolution’ 45 and Greek case 80 Head of State rights 48, 49, 53, 73 Holly Alliance 42 and Hungary 70 Isabeline Period 42 and Italian Fascism 72, 74, 78 liberalism 42 Military Directory 58, 59 Ministry Regency 45 minority government 82 moderating authority 48 nationalisms 53, 56, 69, 74, 81, 90 Nationalist insurrection of 1936 68 and Nazi Germany 72, 74 Parliamentary Monarchy 42, 43, 46, 49, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 99, 102, 105, 106, 108, 212 Political Committee (Junta Politica) 72 and Portugal 61, 62, 63, 71, 72, 80, 83, 105 presidential powers 62, 63, 65 pressure groups 53 Pronunciamiento of 17 July 68 Radicals 64, 65, 92 Regency of Serrano 42 ‘Revolt of Aranjuez’ 41 Revolution of 1868 50, 55 Revolution of 1934 64, 65 royal powers 50, 53, 55, 56, 59 Royal Statute 45 Second Republic 42, 44, 46, 47, 51, 52, 59, 60, 61, 63, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 78, 85, 86, 89, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 99, 101, 102, 106, 108 Second Restoration 81, 90, 98 semi-presidential system 62 Sexenio 42, 50, 51, 52, 61, 106 Siva, Aníbal Cavaco 17 specialization of ministers 108

State Technical Committee (Junta Técnica del Estado) 74 traditionalists 72, 73, 74, 102 transition government 46 transition towards democracy 43, 46, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 92, 94, 99, 105, 106, 214, 216 UGT 69 ‘Velvet Glove’ 58 Victory Government (Gobierno de la Victoria) 76 war with the United States 53 and Weimar Republic 68 Workers’ Commissions (Comisiones Obreras—CCOO) 79 specialists 13, 26, 29, 71, 102, 135, 142, 145 see also technocrats. state 6, 24, 26, 27, 117, 125, 154, 155, 157, 158, 217, 219 bureaucracy 6, 125 centralization 13, 14, 17, 30, 157, 160, 169, 181, 182, 184, 195, 199, 200 crisis 14 dependance on 24, 28 State Council 78 Sterea Hellada 164, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178 structural functionalism 155, 156 Sturzo, Don Luigi 130 Suances, Juan Antonio 79 Suárez, Adolfo 44, 48, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 87 suffrage Greece 158 Italy 118, 130–31 Portugal 5, 9, 16, 28, 63 Spain 49, 50, 51, 52, 63 Sweden 207, 211, 215, 222 technocracy 14, 117, 145, 213, 214, 215, 222 technocrats 36, 37, 139, 144, 145, 148, 184, 200, 206, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 219, 222, 223, 224 Terán, Rocío 47

INDEX 229

Thessaloniki 178 Thessaly 176 Thrace 177 Thiébault, Jean-Louis 2, 20, 210, 211 trade unions 58, 106, 109, 134, 140, 146, 207, 210, 211 Tsoucalas, Constantine 181 Tuñón de Lara, Manuel 53 Turkey 196 turnover (ministerial) 10, 32, 36, 127, 128, 131, 143, 157, 195 see also elite circulation Tusell, Javier 47 UNESCO 108 United Kingdom 24, 100, 187, 207, 215 United States 53, 94, 159, 161, 187, 188, 192 urban centres 20, 24, 89, 90, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178, 190, 199 urbanization 20 Urquijo, José Ramón 47

Ventosa, Juan 58 Veremis, Thanos 159 voter volatility 6, 218 Voulgaris, admiral 165 Wall Street Crash of 1929 61 Washington, DC 216 Weber, Max 164, 199 Weimar Republic 68 welfare 18, 117, 200 Winter, Lieven de 209 working class 61, 69, 98, 109, 185, 206, 207 World War (First) 9, 11, 158, 161, 165, 173, 177 World War (Second) 61, 76, 81, 83, 158, 163, 173, 177, 180, 182, 186, 188, 195, 199, 207 writers 98, 180 Yagüe, Juan 73 Yeltsin, Boris 208 Zolotas, Xenofon 170

Valencia 70, 80, 92 Venizelos, Eleftherios 160, 165, 197, 210

compiled by João Pedro George

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