West African Studies
Regional Atlas on West Africa
West African Studies
Regional Atlas on West Africa Edited by Laurent Bossard
In collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States Commission With the financial support of France, Switzerland, Luxembourg and UNDP
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT The OECD is a unique forum where the governments of 30 democracies work together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to understand and to help governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, the information economy and the challenges of an ageing population. The Organisation provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies. The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Commission of the European Communities takes part in the work of the OECD. OECD Publishing disseminates widely the results of the Organisation’s statistics gathering and research on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as the conventions, guidelines and standards agreed by its members.
This work is published on the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Organisation or of the governments of its member countries.
Also available in French under the title:
Cahiers de l’Afrique de l’Ouest Atlas régional de l’Afrique de l’Ouest
Corrigenda to OECD publications may be found on line at: www.oecd.org/publishing/corrigenda.
Cover illustration: © Daniel Krüger/Grand Krü, Berlin © OECD 2009 You can copy, download or print OECD content for your own use, and you can include excerpts from OECD publications, databases and multimedia products in your own documents, presentations, blogs, websites and teaching materials, provided that suitable acknowledgment of OECD as source and copyright owner is given. All requests for public or commercial use and translation rights should be submitted to
[email protected]. Requests for permission to photocopy portions of this material for public or commercial use shall be addressed directly to the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) at
[email protected] or the Centre français d'exploitation du droit de copie (CFC) at
[email protected].
The Club du Sahel was established in 1976 at the initiative of OECD member countries in response to the droughts that had ravaged the Sahel and the subsequent food crisis. In 2001, its Board of Directors extended its geographic coverage to encompass all of West Africa, i.e. the 15 Member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as Cameroon, Mauritania and Chad.
The SWAC / OECD
Now called the Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC), it is led by a Secretariat based in Paris and administratively attached to the OECD. Supported by a network of partners and experts from West Africa and OECD member countries, its specificity lies in its approach combining direct field-level involvement with analyses of the West African context. The SWAC promotes the regional dimension of development, supports the formulation of joint or intergovernmental policies as desired by the region’s countries, and fosters dialogue with OECD countries for a coherent understanding of the changes and dynamics taking place in West Africa. For more information, please go to: www.oecd.org/swac and www.atlas-westafrica.org To contact us: Telephone: +33 1 45 24 82 81 E-mail:
[email protected] Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
3
Authors and Collaborators Editorial management: Laurent Bossard Technical co-ordination and revisions: Sylvie Letassey Translation: Leslie Diamond (special thanks to Patricia Hirsch) Design and layout: Marie Moncet
Authors:
4
Editorial support:
Eniko Edith Akom
Communicable Diseases
Philippe Bastide
Cocoa
Laurent Bossard
Languages, Transport, Telecommunications
Daniel Duris
Coffee
Donata Gnisci
Migration
Philipp Heinrigs
Oil and Gas, Transport, Telecommunications, Vulnerability in the Sahelian Zone
Madiodio Niasse
Transboundary River Basins
Frédéric Ocrisse-Aka
Languages
Dieudonné Ouedraogo
Demographic Trends
Christophe Perret
Transport, Telecommunications, Cotton, Rural Areas, Climate Change, Africa and China, Vulnerability in the Sahelian Zone
Marie Trémolières
Migration
Scientific contributions: ACMAD
Climate Change
Yao Adzigbey
Transport, Telecommunications
Agrhymet R.C.
Vulnerability in the Sahelian Zone, Climate Change
Habiboulah Bakhoum
Languages
Jean Bonnal
Rural Areas
François Bost
Transport, Telecommunications
Geneviève Braun
Rural Areas
Erwin Ebermann
Languages
Léonidas Hitimana
Rural Areas
Stéphane Jost
Rural Areas, Climate Change
Jean-François Marquet
Transport
Nelly Robin
Migration
Georg Ziegelmeyer
Languages
Sibiri – Jean Zoundi
Rural Areas
Laurent Bossard
Migration, Cotton, Africa and China, Vulnerability in the Sahelian Zone, Transboundary River Basins, Demographic Trends, Coffee, Cocoa, Oil and Gas, Communicable Diseases
Marie-Christine Lebret
Communicable Diseases, Demographic Trends
Christophe Perret
Coffee, Cocoa
Cartography: Hélène Gay
Communicable Diseases
Philipp Heinrigs
Oil and Gas, Transport, Telecommunications, Vulnerability in the Sahelian Zone
Cheikh Mbow
Transboundary River Basins
Frédéric Ocrisse-Aka
Languages, Migration
Christophe Perret
Transport, Telecommunications, Cotton, Rural Areas, Climate Change, Africa and China, Vulnerability in the Sahelian Zone, Coffee, Cocoa
Nicolas Rageau
Migration
Nelly Robin
Migration
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
F OREWORD
West Africa is an ever-evolving region. An immense space, it is a land of contrasts where, from North to South, the desert opens on to the savannah, the savannah gives way to the forest, the forest to the ocean. The density of the human population is variable with diverse peoples and numerous spoken languages. However, these contrasts did not lead to the creation of borders. Before the arrival of the first Europeans, political configurations in West Africa varied greatly from vast empires to micro-societies which did not go beyond the village or groups of villages. Within each political space, governments were more concerned with the management of the population than the demarcation of its territory through the setting up of borders. Concentrations of power were thus shifting.
Foreword Normand Lauzon. Director of the SWAC / OECD Mohamed Ibn Chambas. President of the ECOWAS Commission
Today the region is made up of shared intangible borders established less than fifty years ago. Granted these borders are still recent, but most of the population was born after their creation. Therefore much of the population has the sentiment of belonging to a nation, but for as much, regional roots remain. The vigour of trans-national languages such as Hausa, Arabic, Yoruba, Bambara, Fulah, Wolof, Akan, Fon, Gourmantché as well as many others, are a reminder that in West Africa, there must be compatibility between the local and the regional levels, the State and the region and between borders and integration. With the recent global changes, regional integration is now at the top of the African political and economic agenda. To protect itself and capitalise on its potential, it is imperative for West Africa to better define the shared interests among the countries of which it is composed. The Atlas is both a driver and a result of strategic thinking and regional synthesis. Its conception has stimulated dialogue among experts generally working independently. This has been an opportunity for the SWAC Secretariat and the ECOWAS Commission to develop a global vision of West African regional issues; to carry out strategic thinking based on solid evidence related to subsidiarity issues. We believe that the Atlas can provide
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
5
FOREWORD
southern and northern technical and political leaders with useful information to feed into debate, negotiations and decision-making. It should also be a scientific and educational tool with which to promote regional action based on complementarity, synergy and economies of scale. We hope that it will enable Anglophone and Francophone West African students to go beyond the national framework on which the educational curriculum is generally based, to have a shared understanding of their region and its interdependencies. The Atlas shall be a useful means to bring them closer together by providing them with shared references.
6
The fifteen chapters of this first edition do not cover all issues pertaining to the region. Work is underway on electricity, fisheries, regional organisations and borders which will appear in the forthcoming issues as well as chapters focusing on the urban environment, livestock rearing and tourism. As we have done over the last years, the Atlas will focus on topical issues and feed into the West African international agenda. The chapter on migration began in early 2006 after the dramatic events in the Spanish enclaves in Morocco. It fed into the preparation of a common position on migration of ECOWAS member States. The 2005 food crisis raised the issue of structural food insecurity. Thus, the chapter on the vulnerability of the Sahelian zone (April 2006) confirmed, demonstrated, and mapped out this situation. The
chapters on relations between China and Africa, climate change, as well as oil and gas, were also launched in order to respond to the needs of the international agenda. This desire to “focus on current events” and to fuel debate when it is most heated, is decisive in terms of impact. The chapters on the Sahelian zone, transmissible diseases and climate change have been used by the ECOWAS Commission to define catastrophic risk reduction mechanisms. Several chapters have been taken up by the press1 and discussed on television.2 At times the Atlas has been used in unexpected ways. The map of GSM coverage in West Africa was used and reproduced in numerous meetings and publications related to food security. It illustrates the integration of the West African agro-food market through the instantaneous circulation of information. All of this demonstrates a need for analytical, strategic and educational syntheses to which the ECOWAS Commission and the SWAC Secretariat strive to respond. The work carried out up to now owes much to the specific financial support provided by the French Co-operation, Swiss Co-operation, Luxembourg Co-operation and UNDP. We are also grateful to other SWAC donors – Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States whose regular financing has enabled much of the SWAC Secretariat team to contribute to the Atlas between 2005 and 2008.
Notes 1. 2.
Notably “Gas and Oil”, “Climate Change” and “Africa and China” in « Diplomatie » magazine: www.areion.fr/publishing/www_Diplomatie/ edito01.html. « Le dessous des cartes » / ARTE (Africa and China, Oil and Gas): www.arte.tv/fr/histoire-societe/le-dessous-des-cartes/392.html.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Atlas team is grateful to Thérèse PUJOLLE and Jacqueline DAMON – respectively President and Director of the SWAC until December 2004 – who supported the creation of the project and launched its financing plan. For their constant support, we also express our gratitude to Dr. Mohamed Ibn CHAMBAS, President of the ECOWAS Commission, to Dr. Adrienne DIOP, Director of Communications and then Commissioner for Human Development and Gender within the ECOWAS Commission, and Normand LAUZON, Director of the SWAC. The team emphasises that the chapters on rural environment and climate change could not have been produced without the expertise and knowledge of the FAO and the Agrhymet Regional Centre of the CILSS. Similarly, the Department of African Studies of the University of Vienna (Austria) provided valuable support to the chapter on languages.
Acknowledgements
Haruna WARKANI, Head of the ECOWAS Commission’s Documentation Division, played an important role as the interface with the SWAC Secretariat and greatly contributed to the dissemination of the Atlas chapters. We are grateful to Baber TANDINA, Director ad interim of the ECOWAS Commission’s Free Movement of Persons Department until December 2007, Nfaly SANOH, Director of the ECOWAS Commission’s Free Movement of Persons Department, and Yao ADZIGBEY (Principal Programme Officer for Transport of the ECOWAS Commission) for their contributions and constant use of the Atlas in their work. Collecting raw data for an Atlas – numbers and databases, studies and academic work, technical and policy documents – is not an easy task. Many people devoted time and energy to helping us. We sincerely thank them: AMOUZOU Dovi (Economic Mission in Lagos – DREE – Nigeria), BALAMI Dahiru Hassan (University of Maiduguri, Nigeria), BERNARD Eric (University doctoral student), BOLOUVI Michel (Sud Communication, Niger), CHAM Baboucar (Banjul International Airport, the Gambia), CHEIFFOU Amadou (International Civil Aviation Organisation,
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
7
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Western and Central African Office, Senegal), COZIER Thierry (Delegation of the European Commission, Mali), D’ANGELO Grégory (Economic Mission in Lagos – DREE – Nigeria), DIAGNE Ababakar Sadir (ASECNA, Senegal), DIOP Charles (International Civil Aviation Organisation, Western and Central African Office, Senegal), DIOUF Ameth (ASECNA, Senegal), DEMBELE Ousmane (University of Abidjan-Cocody, Côte d’Ivoire), ESHUN John (Contact of the Sahel and West Africa Club, Ghana), GANSARE Sanni (LARES, Benin), GELOES Ronan de (BIVAC International, Chad), GIBIGAYE Moussa (LARES, Benin), GILLET Nathalie (Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens, France), HARKOUK Arezki (GRDR, Mauritania), GRASDEPOT Olivier (Delegation of the European Commission, Cameroon), LUNEAU
Naïg (ISEMAR, France), MBOW Cheik (and team of the Laboratoire d’Etudes et de Recherches Géomatiques –LERG- of the University of Dakar), NDIAYE Pape Oumar (Dakar, Senegal), NOI Eric T. (Ghana Civil Aviation Authority, Ghana), NZEKWU Sylvia (Contact of the Sahel and West Africa Club, Nigeria), YAÏ Olabiyi Babalola Joseph (Permanent UNESCO Ambassador to Benin), OUEDRAOGO Benoît (Contact of the Sahel and West Africa Club, Burkina Faso), PAYA Fabrice (Delegation of the European Commission, Guinea), POIRSON Anne-Claire (Embassy of France, Chad), PRADELLE Jean-Marc (Embassy of France, Mauritania), RIEMBAULT Paul (Delegation of the European Commission, Chad), SOULE Bio Goura (LARES, Benin), SPASIANO Valentina (FAO), TOURRET Paul (ISEMAR, France).
8
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
T ABLE
OF
C ONTENTS
Table of Contents Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Part I. POPULATION AND SETTLEMENT Chapter 1. Demographic Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1. Major global trends . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. West African demographic behaviour patterns 1.3. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
29 29 33 37 38 38
Chapter 2. Communicable Diseases . . . . . . 2.1. Some points of reference . . . . . 2.2. Geography of diseases in West Africa 2.3. Progress and hope . . . . . . . . Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
41 41 44 53 55 56
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
57 57 58 60 63 65
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
67 67 70 76 82 84 85
89 90 95 99 104 105
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
Chapter 3. Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1. West Africa in the African linguistic landscape . . . . . . 3.2. West African diversity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3. Lingua francas or common languages . . . . . . . . . . 3.4. Conclusions with respect to the regional integration process Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
Chapter 4. Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1. International migration overview: A global view to the African level 4.2. West African migration dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3. Some issues for the future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4. What are the prospects?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Part II. TERRITORIES Chapter 5. Rural Areas and Agricultural Changes . . 5.1. Changes in the rural environment . . . 5.2. Rural economy and agricultural economy 5.3. Some challenges for the future . . . . . 5.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
Chapter 6. Transboundary River Basins . . . . . . 6.1. Regional water resources interdependence 6.2. Generally under-exploited resources . . 6.3. Diminishing surface water resources . . 6.4. Water, source of tension . . . . . . . . 6.5. Experiences in joint management . . . . 6.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. 109 . 109 . 112 . 113 . 114 . 116 . 120 . 122
Chapter 7. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1. General survey of West African transport systems . 7.2. The creation of a regional road network . . . . . 7.3. On West African roads . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4. Ports: The emergence of regional competition. . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. 125 . 125 . 127 . 129 . 130
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
9
TABLE
OF
C ONTENTS
7.5. The transit of goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6. Rail transport: Private investments and mining prospects. 7.7. The sharp increase in air transport . . . . . . . . . . 7.8. Aerial regional integration remains to be achieved. . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 8. Telecommunications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1. Telephone: The mobile telephone explosion . . . . 8.2. Internet: Cable’s new deal . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3. Towards a West African economy of new technologies Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
131 133 134 138 140
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. 143 . 143 . 147 . 149 . 150
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. 153 . 153 . 158 . 165 . 165
Chapter 10. Oil and Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1. The world of oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2. The world of natural gas: LNG opening new possibilities 10.3. Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4. West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5. Conclusion: Need for regional co-operation? . . . . . Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. 169 . 169 . 172 . 173 . 175 . 183 . 187 . 188
Chapter 11. Cotton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1. West Africa in the international market 11.2. West African cotton . . . . . . . . 11.3. Regional stakes of development . . . 11.4. A doubly regional future. . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. 191 . 191 . 194 . 202 . 205 . 208
Chapter 12. Coffee . . . . . . 12.1. Global overview . . 12.2. International trade . 12.3. Coffee in West Africa 12.4. Prospects . . . . . Sources and bibliography .
. . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. 211 . 211 . 215 . 218 . 224 . 225
Chapter 13. Cocoa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1. West Africa in the international market 13.2. West African cocoa . . . . . . . . . 13.3. Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. 227 . 227 . 231 . 237 . 241
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. 245 . 245 . 246 . 250 . 253 . 265 . 267
Part III. ECONOMY Chapter 9. Africa and China . . 9.1. Partners . . . . . 9.2. Current issues . . . 9.3. Future issues . . . Sources and bibliography .
10
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . .
Part IV. VULNERABILITIES Chapter 14. Climate and Climate Change . . . . . 14.1. Climate fluctuations in history . . . . . 14.2. International awareness. . . . . . . . 14.3. The African continent and climate . . . 14.4. Vulnerabilities and impacts in West Africa 14.5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
Chapter 15. Vulnerability in the Sahelian Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 15.1. The Sahel and its countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 15.2. Food dependency in Sahelian countries is not increasing… . . . . . . . . . . . 270
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
T ABLE
15.3. …But cereal production remains very erratic . . . . . . . 15.4. The agropastoral area: Vulnerability and unpredictability . . 15.5. Vegetation and soil problems are not just in the Sahel . . . 15.6. Most agricultural and pastoral methods are still traditional… 15.7. Facing the regional market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.8. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sources and bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
OF
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
C ONTENTS
270 271 272 277 283 283 284
Maps 0.1. 0.2. 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 2.6. 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4. 4.5. 4.6. 4.7. 4.8. 4.9. 4.10. 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5. 5.6. 5.7. 5.8. 5.9. 5.10. 5.11. 5.12. 6.1. 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. 6.5. 6.6. 6.7. 7.1. 7.2. 7.3. 7.4. 7.5. 7.6.
Population density in West Africa (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Expansion of the areas of urban market attractiveness 1960 – 1990 – 2020 . . . . 24 Distribution and evolution of the world population in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Evolution of the world urban population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Distribution and evolution of the West African population . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Trend forecast for life expectancy at birth between 2000-2005 and 2045-2050 . . . 41 Infant mortality in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Incidence rate of confirmed measles cases per 100,000 inhabitants (November 2006) 46 Number of malaria cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 AIDS cases and prevalence in West Africa (adults) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Tuberculosis prevalence (all forms) per 100,000 inhabitants in 2004 . . . . . . . 52 The major African language families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 West African languages spoken by more than one million native speakers in 2005 . 59 Common languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Number of migrants by continent in 1960 and 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Number of migrants in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Major host countries in Europe in 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Major host countries in Europe in 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Major West African countries of immigration (1976–1980) . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Major West African countries of immigration (1988–1992) . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Movements by West African refugees in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Population decline and growth in Europe and Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 West African migration to Europe and the United States in 2000 . . . . . . . . . 81 Maghreb and West African migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Degree of rurality in West Africa, 1960 – 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Settlement and agro-climatic conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 A picture of rural settlement in West Africa (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Production systems in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Principal environmental constraints in the coastal area of the Gulf of Guinea . . . 94 Forest cover in Africa (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Rainfall in West Africa (1951/75 – 1976/2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Variation in potential biomass production in West Africa (1951/1975 – 1976/2000) . 96 Cereal and cattle trade in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Fresh tomato trade between Niger, Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana . . . . . . . . 99 Palm oil trade in Sénégambie méridionale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Irrigation intensity in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 West African bio-climatic zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 Transboundary watercourses in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Main transboundary aquifer systems in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Population densities in West African river basins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Large dams in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Migration of populations with the shrinking of Lake Chad . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Bilateral agreement along the Niger River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Transport infrastructure in West Africa (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 Main paved or partially improved roads within ECOWAS . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Practicability of some roads in West Africa (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 Port traffic in West Africa (2003) (excluding oil terminals) . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Transit and re-export corridors in ECOWAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 Impact of the Ivorian crisis on cotton export corridors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
11
TABLE
OF
C ONTENTS
7.7. 7.8. 7.9. 7.10. 8.1. 8.2. 8.3. 8.4. 9.1. 9.2. 9.3. 9.4. 9.5. 9.6. 10.1.
12
Railway and merchandise transport in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . Existing and planned railways in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Air traffic in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Regional air traffic: Interstate passengers and direct connections . . . . . Mobile and fixed-line telephone subscribers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GSM coverage in West Africa (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Submarine cables in Africa in 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Internet and optical fibre cable (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Foreign direct investment throughout the world. . . . . . . . . . . . . Chinese population in selected African countries . . . . . . . . . . . . Chinese oil importations in 1995 and in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Main foreign investments by Chinese oil companies 1995 to 2006 . . . . . Destination of African oil exports in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chinese cotton imports in 1994 and in 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Crude petroleum production, consumption and major inter-regional trade flows in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2. Proven reserves of oil and gas at the end of 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3. World inter-regional gas trade in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4. Evolution of oil production in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5. Main oil and gas fields in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6. West African oil exports in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.7. Proven oil and gas reserves in Africa at the end of 2005 . . . . . . . . . . 10.8. Inter and intra-regional flows of petroleum and petroleum products in 2005 . 10.9. Oil and gas infrastructure in North and West Africa in 2005 . . . . . . . . 11.1. Production and consumption of cotton fibres in the world . . . . . . . . 11.2. Main flows of cotton exports in the world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3. Destination of cotton exports from West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4. Cotton production basins in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.5. Land suitability for rainfed cotton in Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.6. Evolution of cotton-production basins between 1960 and 2000. . . . . . . 11.7. Focus on cotton-producing zones in Burkina Faso (2001/02) . . . . . . . . 11.8. Cotton zones, ginning factories and exports of West Africa . . . . . . . . 11.9. Animal traction and cotton-producing zones in West Africa . . . . . . . . 12.1. World arabica and robusta production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.2. World coffee production and consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3. World coffee exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4. Coffee production regions in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.5. Coffee production regions in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1. Distribution of production zones and main cocoa producing and consuming countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2. Main world cocoa export flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3. Main cocoa production zones in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.4. Growth of new cocoa areas in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.1. Regional contribution to CO2 emissions (1960–2004 total) . . . . . . . . . 14.2. Africa’s climatic zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.3. A conceivable overview of climate change in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4. Monsoon cycle in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5. Changes in pluviometric indices in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.6. Flow rate of West Africa’s main rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.7. Changes in Lake Chad’s surface area (January 1999, 2003 and 2007) . . . . 14.8. Irrigation and hydroelectricity in the Niger River basin . . . . . . . . . . 14.9. Changes in the Fulah ethnic group’s migratory corridors between Niger, Mali, Benin and Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.10. Main vulnerable urban centres and coastal regions in West Africa . . . . . 14.11. Climatic zones favourable to malaria in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . 15.1. Rainfall and climate zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.2. Locusts in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
135 136 137 139 144 145 146 148 155 157 159 160 162 164
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
169 171 173 176 178 179 180 184 185 192 193 195 197 198 200 201 203 206 212 213 217 220 221
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
228 230 234 236 248 250 252 254 256 257 258 259
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
262 263 265 269 272
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
T ABLE
15.3. Soil quality and rural population densities . . . . . . 15.4. Change in the length of the vegetation season (1990/99) 15.5. The Sahel’s vulnerable zone . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.6. Agricultural production systems in Sahel countries . . 15.7. Main crops in CILSS countries . . . . . . . . . . . 15.8. Cattle in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.9. Population of the vulnerable zone. . . . . . . . . . 15.10. West Africa’s road and urban network . . . . . . . . 15.11. Ratio of cattle to rural population . . . . . . . . . . 15.12. Main sources of income . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
OF
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
C ONTENTS
273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282
Diagrams 1.1. Simplified representation of demographic transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 1.2. Demographic transition: Three groups of countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 13.1. Typical cocoa chain organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
Figures 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 1.4. 1.5. 1.6. 1.7. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 2.6. 2.7. 3.1. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5. 5.6. 5.7. 6.1. 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. 6.5. 6.6. 7.1. 7.2. 8.1. 8.2. 9.1. 9.2.
Estimated population of West Africa in 2007 by country . . . . . . . . . . . Evolution and forecast of the West African population . . . . . . . . . . . . Changes in the birth, death and population growth rates in West Africa . . . . . Evolution of the net migration rate by country 1970-1975 / 2000-2005. . . . . . Evolution of the total fertility rate 1960-1965 and 2005-2010. . . . . . . . . . Evolution of life expectancy in the four sub-regions of Sub-Saharan Africa . . . Age pyramid, 1950, 2005 and 2050. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Main causes of mortality in the world and share in Africa in 2002 . . . . . . . Life expectancy at birth for West African men and women . . . . . . . . . . Life expectancy at birth and health-adjusted life expectancy of West African women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Main causes of death among children under 5 years of age in West Africa . . . . 2004 Immunisation coverage – TB, diphtheria/tetanus, poliomyelitis and measles Doctors and nursing personnel per 1,000 inhabitants . . . . . . . . . . . . Access to safe drinking water and sanitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Number of languages and number of speakers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 15 major countries of immigration in 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Migration from West African countries to OECD countries in the 2000s . . . . . Proportion of migrants in West African countries (in %). . . . . . . . . . . . Proportion of the agricultural population in West African countries . . . . . . Percentage of the rural and urban populations with access to an improved water source (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percentage of the urban and rural populations with access to improved sanitation facilities (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Breakdown of West Africa’s working population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . West African calorific balance sheet (1990 – 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Food availability trends in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . West African decentralisation and participation typology . . . . . . . . . . . Availability of renewable fresh water in West African countries in 2003 . . . . . River basins: Interdependence and dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Trend of rainfall in the Sahel (1950-2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Flows of the Niger River in Niamey: Average variation from 1950-2000 . . . . . Fluctuation of level of Akosombo Reservoir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Evolution of average flooded areas of Lake Chad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Airports hosting more than 100,000 passengers per year (2003) . . . . . . . . Principal domestic routes in Nigeria (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Evolution of telephone subscribers in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Average expenditure per user in US$ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Africa’s main trading partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Main Chinese imports from Africa in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
. . . . . . . . .
33 34 34 35 35 36 37 41 42
. . . . . . . . . .
42 44 44 54 55 58 67 70 74 90
. 93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
93 97 97 100 104 109 110 114 114 116 116 138 138 143 143 153 153
13
TABLE
14
OF
C ONTENTS
9.3. Main Chinese exports to Africa in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4. China’s oil dependency 1990 to 2030. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5. Origin of Chinese cotton imports 1989 to 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . 9.6. Destination of cotton exports from West African countries in 2004 . . . 10.1. Projected oil consumption in 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2. Oil import dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3. Africa’s share in world proven reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4. Geographic breakdown of oil production in Africa . . . . . . . . . . 10.5. Oil production in West Africa in 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6. Crude oil price since 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.7. Price composition of petrol in Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1. Global and West African production of cotton fibre (1960/61–2008/09) . 11.2. Extra-regional export of textiles and garments in 2004 . . . . . . . . 11.3. Dynamics of world cotton exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4. Cotton production in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.5. Trends in cotton production in West Africa (1960/61–2008/09) . . . . . 11.6. Parallel trends of cotton and grain production in West Africa . . . . . 11.7. Estimated distribution of UEMOA textile market . . . . . . . . . . 11.8. The cotton industry in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1. World coffee production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.2. World coffee production trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3. Coffee consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4. Per capita coffee consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.5. World prices and production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.6. Global market prices and farm gate prices paid of producers . . . . . 12.7. Types of coffee exported . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.8. Coffee production in Africa (2000-04 average) . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.9. Production distribution in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.10. African and West African production trends . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.11. Production by country in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1. Production trends (1960–2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2. Cocoa market price trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3. Production, consumption (grinding) and stock trends . . . . . . . . 13.4. Cocoa production trends in West Africa (1960 – 2005) . . . . . . . . 13.5. Cocoa production trends in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire . . . . . . . . . 13.6. Cocoa production trends in Indonesia and Malaysia . . . . . . . . . 13.7. Plantation ageing trends in Côte d’Ivoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.1. Temperature trends over the last 20,000 years . . . . . . . . . . . 14.2. Main causes of climate change and their time scale . . . . . . . . . 14.3. Agricultural potential prospects in the world . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4. Mean temperature trends (minimum and maximum) in the CILSS area . 14.5. Poor performance of climate models in the Sahel region . . . . . . . 14.6a.Impact of climate change on millet/sorghum cereal yields in Niger and Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.6b. Percentage change in rainfed rice yields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.6c. Percentage change in irrigated rice yields . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.1. Cereal production in CILSS countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.2. Food aid to CILSS countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.3. CILSS: Coastal countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.4. CILSS: Landlocked countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.5. Breakdown of agricultural production in the Sahel’s vulnerable zone . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
154 158 163 163 170 171 174 175 177 181 182 191 192 194 196 199 204 204 207 211 211 214 214 215 216 218 219 219 219 222 227 231 232 233 237 237 238 245 246 253 255 255
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
261 261 261 270 271 271 271 277
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
22 35 45 47 64
Tables 0.1. 1.1. 2.1. 2.2. 3.1.
Surface areas and population of West African countries . . Fertility and contraception in Kenya and Ghana . . . . . Number of poliomyelitis cases in West Africa . . . . . . New trypanosomiasis cases detected in 2004 in West Africa The status of languages in ECOWAS member countries . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
T ABLE
4.1. 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5. 6.1. 7.1. 9.1. 9.2. 9.3. 9.4. 9.5. 10.1. 10.2. 10.3. 10.4. 11.1. 11.2. 12.1. 12.2. 13.1. 14.1. 14.2. 14.3. 14.4. 15.1.
Major OECD host countries (excluding Germany) in the 2000s (in thousands) Rural and urban poverty (as percentage of total population) . . . . . . . Land use in West Africa (1961 – 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contribution of agriculture, livestock farming, forestry and fishing to the agricultural sector in some West African countries . . . . . . . . Use of fertilisers and tractors around the world. . . . . . . . . . . . . Growth in agricultural crop production and yields in West Africa . . . . . Transboundary watercourse basin organisations concerning West African countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Frequency of checkpoints on some transport routes (1999-2000). . . . . . Chinese trade with African sub-regions (average 1993-2004) . . . . . . . Oil and cotton in Chinese imports from Africa (2004) . . . . . . . . . . China’s position in African foreign trade between 2000 and 2005 . . . . . China’s approved FDI outflows, by region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chinese foreign direct investments in selected African countries (2002) . . Top 10 oil consumers, importers and exporters in 2005 (in million barrels per day and % of world total) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Top 10 gas consumers, importers and exporters in 2005 (in billion cubic meters and % of world total) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oil and gas exports in 2005 in million US$ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oil intensity of selected countries in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Macroeconomic importance of cotton in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . List of industrial units involved in the cotton sector in West Africa (2006 or the most recent year) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Coffee introduction dates in West Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Share of coffee in West Africa’s agricultural exports (million of USD) . . . . Cocoa acreage trends in West Africa from 1960 to 2004 . . . . . . . . . The world’s ten biggest CO2 contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lake Chad’s surface areas (1998-2007 average) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vulnerable coastal areas and current property value threatened areas . . . Changes in mangrove swamps in West Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . Average annual variation in cereal availability . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OF
C ONTENTS
. . . 71 . . . 90 . . . 91 . . . 97 . . . 99 . . . 102 . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
117 130 154 154 154 156 156
. . . 170 . . . .
. . . .
. . . .
172 181 182 202
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
207 218 222 239 249 258 264 264 272
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
21 45 48 53
Boxes 0.1. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 6.1. 6.2. 7.1. 10.1. 10.2. 10.3. 10.4. 11.1. 11.2. 11.3. 12.1. 12.2. 12.3. 12.4.
Surface area of Africa: Perception and reality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vaccination: Remarkable progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The global fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria . . . . . . . . . Tradipractitioners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Skilled migration opportunities: Ghanaian doctors at the bedside of English and American patients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Will measures to restrict immigration to developed countries have any impacts on mobility within the West African region? The case of Senegal Migrant remittances and ODA in West Africa per capita in 1995 (in dollars) . Typology of basin organisations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . International standards on the management of transboundary basins . . . “Toll” roads as expensive as in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Natural gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Intra-regional flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The West African gas pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cotton: A long journey from India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cotton sectors in the Francophone zone before liberalisation . . . . . . . The Sikasso region in Mali: From cash crop agriculture to commercial agriculture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Constraints linked to rising production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . International market: Specialty coffees and bulk coffees . . . . . . . . . A fairly new crop for Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The sector in Côte d’Ivoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
. . . 74 . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
83 83 118 121 130 172 173 183 186 196 199
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
205 212 216 218 223
15
TABLE
OF
C ONTENTS
13.1. 13.2. 13.3. 13.4. 13.5. 14.1. 14.2. 14.3. 14.4. 14.5.
The history of chocolate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cocoa uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cocoa’s long journey from the Americas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The liberalisation of the cocoa sector in Côte d’Ivoire and its consequences . Exploitation of child labour on plantations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Greenhouse gases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Global warming “sceptics”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reliability of climate models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Climate change and destructive crop pests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rift valley fever . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
229 229 235 238 239 246 247 249 260 264
16
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
SUMMARY
The size of the West Africa region is imposing: 7.9 million km², which is 2.4 times the size of China and 1.8 times the 27 European Union countries combined. More populated than the United States, the size of its population is also impressive (315 million inhabitants in 2008). By portraying this region, its population, settlement, its territories, economies and vulnerabilities, the Atlas addresses the regional issues and West African countries’ interdependencies. It sets out the accomplishments and the dynamics of adapting to an evolving global environment. The Atlas stimulates strategic thinking on the future. This publication compiles the basic texts, maps and figures of the 15 thematic chapters produced between May 2005 and May 2008.
Summary
Demography must be taken into account so as to understand societies and create policies in all domains. In West Africa, the population dynamics are undoubtedly among the most powerful ever seen in human history. On the whole, the African continent – particularly sub-Saharan Africa – remains the last major world region where mortality rates – particularly infant mortality rates – continue to be very high and life expectancy low. Hence, it is useful to examine the major communicable diseases affecting the West African population. National languages (in comparison to international languages such as English, French and Portuguese) should be considered while carrying out strategic thinking and activities related to regional integration. The cultural areas that they form are playing a greater role in West African economic geography. West African migration is very specific. Contrary to North Africa or Central America, most migratory movements within this region are intra-regional. The region is a “natural expansion tank” of West African mobility. The West African rural environment was long considered to be unchanging. But it is in fact at the
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
17
SUMMARY
core of powerful transformations. The region will certainly be mostly urban by 2020. However, the rural population continues to increase. This new era brings promises as well as risks, notably that the most vulnerable rural population (those living in marginal areas) are likely to be subject to the disadvantages of the market without benefiting from the advantages. The topic of transboundary river basins clearly illustrates the need to address West Africa beyond the limits of regional integration organisations. The three largest river basins of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Niger, the Lake Chad and the Senegal, map out a geographical situation in which Cameroon, Chad and Mauritania stand together with institutional West Africa.
18
Much progress has been made in the region with regard to transport and telecommunications. There are many more roads today than there were thirty years ago, ports and airports are bigger and better equipped, and new information technology is rapidly developing. The first results of the revitalisation of the railroad system are appearing. A regional infrastructure framework, inexistent four decades ago, is progressively emerging, although it still needs to be completed and improved. As the third-ranking trading partner, strategic investor, development partner and future financial source, China is shaking up the balance of power established on the continent since independence. The impact is so great that traditional partners – Europe and the United States in particular – have been forced to review their relations with Africa. The euphoria that goes along with oil and gas production and exploration in West Africa shrouds
one of the region’s main characteristics: most of the countries depend exclusively, or almost, on the importation of refined products to satisfy internal demand. However, several positive changes have taken place in the region which are likely to modify regional prospects in the short term. Cotton is an important economic and social issue. West African governments are enthusiastic about this commodity as it is a source of hard currency. Farmers who cultivate cotton have seen their livelihoods improve and have become the main staple food crop producers of the region thanks to the cotton system. However, despite an increase in global demand, the future of this West African “white gold” is uncertain. West Africa was “conceived” for the most part by colonizers seeking suppliers of agricultural raw materials. Coffee and cocoa are emblematic of this history and often considered inseparable. Both are grown in the same areas and are dependent on the London and New York stock exchanges. In order to maintain or re-gain its place on the international market, West Africa will have to resolve its agronomic, land and human (exploitation of child labour) issues. Climate variability is deeply rooted within West African society. The climate changes analysed by the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) raise new fears, but also provide new opportunities for the African continent. The Sahel’s vulnerable zone, also defined as “agropastoral”, undoubtedly suffers the most from intense climate variations and food crises. Based on available data, the Atlas describes the zone, its people and how they live from a macro-regional perspective.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
INTRODUCTION
A region of the world The West African population basin includes all ECOWAS1 countries as well as its bordering nations of Mauritania, Chad and Cameroon (see Map 0.1.). The people of these three countries are closely linked to West Africa through shared languages and traditions. Their commercial trade as well as road, maritime and air networks continues to develop and grow with the ECOWAS zone. Mauritania, a member until 1999, is once again linked to ECOWAS through the ongoing negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union. It is a member of the CILSS2 and shares a common fate with the West African Sahel region. Chad also belongs to the CILSS and the lake bearing its name is at the centre of the river basin covering Nigeria and Niger.
Introduction Laurent Bossard Deputy Director of the SWAC / OECD
Finally, Cameroon, located to the extreme east of this demographic basin, trades equally with Nigeria as it does with its central African neighbours. The Atlas includes these three nations in most of the analyses even though they do not officially belong to “institutional West Africa.” West Africa covers more than one quarter of the African continent yet it is depicted on maps as a less significant area (see Box 0.1.). This immense region of 7.9 million km2 is 2.4 times the size of India and 1.8 times larger than all 27 European Union countries combined. In 2008, its population of 320 million people exceeded that of the U.S. population.3 Until recently, despite its massive size and population, West Africa’s economy and strategic position was of little interest to the international community. It was mostly known for its natural disasters, internal conflicts and poverty. No one competed for political or economic influence in West Africa. The cold and post –cold war period had fewer geo-strategic effects on the region than in other parts of Africa, Asia or Latin America. Rarely pursued, it was trapped in a lopsided dialogue with
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
19
INTRODUCTION
its former colonial powers supplemented with aid from North America and Japan.
purchasing power will be compensated by sheer volume. The benefits will be significant.
Since the turn of the 21st century, the region’s economic potential has undergone a remarkable transformation due to emerging neo-rich nations and the soaring prices of raw materials. Countries such as Brazil, China and India are now competing for West Africa’s oil, bauxite, uranium, iron and phosphates. These countries and others are contributing aid and investing in the regional market where they realise that the lack of
Brighter economic opportunities are redefining West African countries' situation, opening up new horizons and are allowing them to negotiate from a position of strength. The new partners impose fewer demands and restrictions than do the traditional relationships. Their transaction times are shorter and they are building roads and airports faster for less money. Large scale contracts have been successfully negotiated4 and new educational
Map 0.1. Population density in West Africa (2000)
N
20
Densities (inhabitants per km²) > 234 126 < 234 57 < 126 26 < 57 14 < 26 7 < 14 1,000 mm
Source: ESRI, Global GIS
0
200
400 km
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006
Produced by: M. Niasse, C. Mbow (2006)
transboundary basins. With a dependency ratio close to 100%, only 20% of Mauritania’s territory is covered by a transboundary basin. Contrarily, Burkina Faso “produces” all of its fresh water whereas 100 per cent of its territory is covered by transboundary basins.
Figure 6.2. River basins: Interdependence and dependence Dependance Ratio
Land percentage in a transboundary basin
Mauritania Niger Chad The Gambia Benin
The configuration of groundwater also portrays an important regional dimension. These resources are in the form of various types of water tables. On one hand, they are superficial water tables which are refilled, generally during the rainy season, and on the other hand, they are water tables from an ancient base, and lastly they are deep water tables of sedimentary basins. There are considerable reserves of fresh water stored in these deep water tables: on a scale of approximately several thousand billions of m3. In theory, they alone could meet the current and future needs of West Africa. However, they are of variable depths, sometimes reaching one thousand to two thousand metres
Guinea Bissau Ghana Mali Senegal Nigeria Togo Liberia Côte d'Ivoire Cameroon Sierra Leone Guinea Burkina Faso Cape Verde 0
20
40
60
80
100 %
Source: M. Niasse (2005), based on WRI (2001) and FAO Aquastat (2004) 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483611182252
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Source: ESRI, Global GIS, WHY MAP
St John
Cavally
Bia Sassandra
Komoe
Volta
Produced by: M. Niasse, C. Mbow (2006)
Cestos
Senegal
Great scarcies Little scarcies Moa Mana Morro Loffa St Paul
Corubal
Geba
The Gambia
Atui
Tano
Mono
Ouémé
Niger
Akpa Yafi
Cross
Map 6.2. Transboundary watercourses in West Africa
0
200
400 km © Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006
Lake Chad
II. TERRITORIES
111
II. TERRITORIES
Map 6.3. Main transboundary aquifer systems in West Africa
Tin Séririne
Taoudéni
MourzoukDjado
Aïr Nubian Senegalese – Mauritanian LiptakoGourma
Iullemeden Chad
Sedimentary Coast
Coast
0
Source: ESRI, Global GIS, WHY MAP
Produced by: M. Niasse, C. Mbow (2006)
200
400 km
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006
112 and are often non-renewable resources (fossil water). According to ongoing studies within the framework of the UNESCO-ISARM Initiative,2 there are eleven (11) sedimentary transboundary basins in West Africa (see Map 6.3.).
6.2. Generally under-exploited resources According to the Global Water Partnership, the withdrawal level of renewable water resources in West Africa (excluding Cameroon and Chad) is currently at 11 billion m3 per year for an available 1,300 billion m3, which is less than 1%. Agriculture uses 75% of these withdrawals, domestic consumption 17%, and industry 7%. Although it is by far the highest in proportion, agricultural use of water resources is low. Out of the 75.5 million hectares of arable land in West Africa, only 1.2% (917,000 ha) is developed for irrigation, and 0.8% (635,000 ha) is used effectively. The small number of dams also helps explain the lack of capitalisation of these resources. However, by storing fresh water during seasons and years of
excess for when needed, dams are effective tools in combating uncertainties and shortages. They also help produce electric power, and reduce energy dependence on petroleum. However, building many of these infrastructures poses a number of problems. The withdrawal level of fresh water resources is increasing very rapidly. It could increase six-fold between 2000 and 2025 if West Africa maintains its current level of access to drinking water and food security; it would then increase from 11 billion to more than 65 billion m3 per year. Concurrently, the West African population would probably double. Water consumption could therefore increase three times more rapidly than the population. This differential is mainly due to probable changes in the distribution map of the West African population with continued urbanisation as well as an increase in human population density in rural areas with good farming potential and proximity to large consumption centres. The population distribution in 2000 (see Map 6.4.) already shows high concentration zones in some river basin areas: mouth of the Niger river in Nigeria, southwest of Lake Chad
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
Map 6.4. Population densities in West African river basins Population density No data < 25 25 to 56 57 to 122 123 to 233 234 to 391 392 to 595 596 to 1,942
0
Source: ESRI, Global GIS
Produced by: M. Niasse, C. Mbow (2006)
in Niger, mouth of the Ouemé river in Benin, mouth of the Volta river, and upstream of the Volta basin in Burkina Faso.
6.3. Diminishing surface water resources Over the past few decades, West Africa has experienced a sharp decline in rainfall and average annual flow of watercourses. A break in the rainfall pattern was observed around 1968-1972. 1970 is considered as the turning point after which the decline in average rainfall worsened from minus 15% to minus 30% depending on the zone (see Figure 6.3.). This situation led to the drifting of isohyets by about 200 km to the south. An accompanying variation in annual average flows was observed for most of the rivers. In a number of cases, the decline in flows was even greater than that of rainfall; dropping to minus 30% for the Senegal River (Servat and al., 1997).and minus 60% for the Niger River (Paturel and al., 1997). During the extremely difficult years, there were exceptionally
200
400 km
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006
low water levels, to points where flows actually stopped, as was the case in 1983, 1984 and 1987 on the Bani tributary in Douna (Mali) or as in 1985 in Niamey on the Niger (see Figure 6.4.). Facing this hydroclimatic degradation, the construction of dams seems like a logical solution. Today, there are fewer than 150 large dams in West Africa (see Map 6.5.) out of a total of 1,300 on the continent,3 and 45,000 in the world.4 The region has less than two (2) large dams per 100,000 km2, as compared to 4.3 dams per 100,000 km2 in Africa as a whole. For the same surface area, China has an average of 240 large dams, India 130, Japan 670, and the United States has 75.5 Many projects are being initiated. On the Niger River alone, about twenty sites have been identified for large dams, and are at more or less advanced stages of planning. They include, in particular, Fomi and Kamarato in Guinea; Kénié, Tossaye and Labezanga in Mali; Dyodyonga and Gambou
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
113
II. TERRITORIES
between Benin and Niger; Kandadji in Niger; and Lokoja, Makurdi and Onitsha in Nigeria.
Figure 6.3. Trend of rainfall in the Sahel (1950-2000) Annual index
1.50 1.25
In most cases, the projects are conceived only at the national level, whereas the “purpose” of the dam (the river) is essentially regional, and the construction of a structure has, by definition, consequences beyond the borders. It may, in particular, result in: ] An alteration of the water quality due to increased river fragmentation. ] A change in the hydrologic regime as a result of intra and inter-basin transfers. ] A disruption of fish migration along the river and between the river and the sea; the resulting alteration of fishery resources. ] The destruction of natural habitats and of reproduction areas for 114 species such as water birds. ] The slowing down of flows; the change in sedimentary load of the water and of its temperature; the modification of the ecology of coastal and delta areas (Ravenga and al, 2000; WCD, 2000).
6.4. Water, source of tension
1.00 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.00 -0.25 -0.50 -0.75 -1.00 -1.25 -1.50 1950
1955
1960
Source: L'Hote and al. (2002)
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483653785311
Figure 6.4. Flows of the Niger River in Niamey: Average variation from 1950-2000 Index of average flows
2 1.5 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -1 -1.5 -2 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
The increase in the number of Source: Niasse and al. (2003) large dam projects or other river developments, the high degree of the north of Senegal. This project consisted in interdependence of West African countries with deviating part of the water from the Senegal River respect to water, as well as the significant reduction to a 3,000 km network of ancient watercourses in of surface water availability creates fertile ground the Ferlo, Saloum, Sine, Baobolon, Car Car and for misunderstandings and tensions between Sandougou (centre-north of Senegal) valleys. The countries of the region. In most cases, problems Government of Mauritania expressed fears with are solved through dialogue. Here are a few recent respect to the impact of water reductions. Following examples. these reservations, the Government of Senegal announced a freeze on the project. Senegal – Mauritania: The development of Fossil Valleys Burkina Faso – Ghana: More dams less electricity? In June 2000, the Government of Senegal developed In 1998, the level of Lake Volta fell sharply and a project for the revitalization of dry valleys in disrupted the operation of the Akosombo hydroRegional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
Map 6.5. Large dams in West Africa Dams Main rivers Borders River basins
0
Source: ESRI, Global GIS, WHY MAP Produced by: M. Niasse, C. Mbow (2006)
electric power station in Ghana. Some observers linked it to the increase in water withdrawals by Burkina Faso on upstream sections of the White Volta and the Black Volta; these two tributaries account for 56% of the water supply to Lake Volta in an average year. This assumption is supported by the fact that between the end of the 1960s and the mid 1990s, Burkina Faso built 1,500 small dams, constructed 3 large dams, and increased irrigated areas from 2,000 ha to 25,000 ha in the Upper Volta Basin.6 However, scientific analyses show that the total water storage capacity of all the small and large dams in Burkina Faso (including three large dams under construction) is only 1.5 billion m3, which represents less than 5% of the normal water volume of Lake Volta (Andreini and al, 2000; van de Giesen, 2001). The most plausible explanation is therefore that the decline in the level of the lake was due more to climate change and variability (see Figure 6.4.). Benin – Niger: Border uncertainties Lété Island, on the Niger River, has always been a meeting place for nomad herdsmen from Niger,
200
400 km
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006
who settle there seasonally, and sedentary farmers from Benin. To which country does the island belong? As is often the case, several documents dating from the colonial period provide contradictory information. After many years of fruitless discussions, the two Governments referred the border dispute to the International Court of Justice. This desire for peaceful settlement is certainly linked to the prospects of joint development of the river. The two countries recently signed a co-operation agreement for the construction of Dyodyonga dam on the Mékrou River (tributary of the Niger River). Another dam on the Niger River will be constructed in Gambou. Niger – Nigeria: Upstream and downstream Nigeria has made enormous hydroagricultural and energy investments downstream of the Niger River (large dams in Kainji and Jebba: 1.6 million hectares of irrigated areas, developments for river transport, and water supply to towns). The country fears that the construction of dams upstream could reduce flows in the Nigerian part of the watercourse. The concern stems from the Kandadji dam in Niger
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
115
II. TERRITORIES
23,000 km² to 2,000 km² (see Figure 6.6.). The populations have tended to follow the “migration of the lake” (see Map 6.6.). In the mid 1990s, about thirty villages were created by Nigerian immigrants in the Cameroonian part of the lake (IRIN News). These villages had schools and health centres which were managed by the Nigerian government.
Figure 6.5. Fluctuation of level of Akosombo Reservoir Level (m)
85
80
75
70 1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Source: Andah (2003), GLOWA Volta Project data
Figure 6.6. Evolution of average flooded areas of Lake Chad
116
Surface (1,000 km²)
30 25
Great droughts
6.5.
20 15 10 5 0
1960
After a tense period, the two countries unsuccessfully sought to find a solution to their dispute within the framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). In 1994, they brought their dispute before the International Court of Justice. In October 2002, the International Court of Justice delivered its verdict in favour of Cameroon. In December 2003, Nigeria started to withdraw from the disputed territory.
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
Source: M. Niasse (2005)
and, to a lesser degree, the Tossaye dam in Mali. These two developments could, according to some estimates, reduce the annual volume of water received in Nigeria by more than 10%. Furthermore, a high variability in average flows of the river has been observed in Nigeria in recent years (reductions of 20% to 50% in average flows). Concerns based on climate change over the long term and on exploitation of the resource over the medium term seem to be intermingled. Cameroon – Nigeria: The migration of Lake Chad The maximum flooded area of Lake Chad decreased from 37,000 km2 in the early 1950s to 15,000 km2 in the early 1990s. The flooded area for four (4) consecutive months decreased from
1995
Experiences in joint management
Since the establishment of the Volta Basin Authority (VBA) in 2006, all the major transboundary watercourses in West Africa now have joint organisations (see Table 6.1).
6.5.1. Advantages of co-operation on a boundary river: Example of the OMVS The establishment of the OMVS in 1972 was accompanied by a Convention declaring the Senegal River and its tributaries “international watercourses” on the territories of member States. One of the consequences of this status is that any intervention that can significantly alter the regime of the river and the conditions of its navigability requires the prior approval of OMVS member States. Furthermore, a Convention in 1978 declared water and electric power infrastructure (dams, electricity lines, port infrastructure, etc.) constructed under OMVS “joint and indivisible properties of member States”. The mission of the OMVS is to promote co-operation between member States, coordinate
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
Map 6.6. Migration of populations with the shrinking of Lake Chad
Greater Lake Chad
Towns and Villages Borders
Lake in 2002
Niger
0
30
60 km
Liwa
Chad Baga Sola be Yo u g du em ma syst o K er Riv
Bol
Baga Kawa Tourba
Darrak
Nigeria
Djimtilo
Monguno
Cameroon
C Ri har ve i L r s og ys om te e m
117
Ngala Source: ESRI, Global GIS
Produced by: M. Niasse, C. Mbow (2006)
technical studies and activities for the development of the river, as well as regulate the flow of the river to meet the needs of irrigation, electricity production, and navigation. The two major OMVS projects to date are the Diama and Manantali dams. The Diama Dam (1986), located near the mouth of the river, is intended to limit saline seeps; it creates a theoretical irrigation capacity of 120,000 hectares and improves the filling of Lake Guier in Senegal and Lake Rkiz in Mauritania. The Manantali Dam in Mali (1987) is mainly intended
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006
for electricity production (200 megawatts). It has a storage capacity of 11.5 billion m3 of water7 and creates an irrigation capacity of 225,000 hectares. More recently, member States adopted a Charter defining the principles and modalities of sharing the waters of the river between the different sectors of utilization, including the environment. The dynamism of OMVS is perhaps due to the common interests of member States and the co-operation required for managing their common
Table 6.1. Transboundary watercourse basin organisations concerning West African countries River basin Niger
Basin agency NBA (Niger Basin Authority)
Lake Chad LCBC (Lake Chad Basin Commission)
Member states 9 States: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad 5 States: Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, CAR, Chad
Establishment date 1963 1964
The Gambia
OMVG (Gambia River Basin Development Organisation) 4 States: The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal
1967
Senegal
OMVS (Senegal River Development Organisation)
4 States: Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal
1972
VBA (Volta Basin Authority)
6 States: Burkina Faso, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Togo
2006
Volta
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
border, which is the river (see Box 6.1.). Guinea's integration into the organisation could in part change the situation since, for this country, the river does not constitute a border. Furthermore, the large irrigation and navigation development projects, which are at the core of current OMVS activities, are not of direct interest to Guinea. It is certainly in the area of hydroelectric power production that co-operation between Guinea and the three States upstream could develop in the future.
6.5.2. The difficult problem of managing a transboundary river: Example of the NBA Established in 1963, the Niger River Commission (NRC) became the Niger Basin Authority (NBA) 118 in 1980. While the NRC had an essentially consultative function aimed at ensuring that a national project does not have a negative influence on the territory of another member country, the NBA had higher ambitions. Its objective was mainly to coordinate national resource development policies, plan the development of the basin, and manage joint structures and projects.
Box 6.1. Typology of basin organisations In order to analyse basin organisations, it is useful to distinguish: 1. Those which are organised around a border river: The main course of the river is the border between two States. The Senegal River, for example, is the border between Mali and Senegal over part of its course, and the border between Mauritania and Senegal over another part of its course. These three countries are OMVS member States. The recent admission of Guinea modiÀes this conÀguration, and moves OMVS to the third category described below. 2. Those which are organised around a transboundary river: This category is the most frequent in West Africa. For example, the Niger River successively runs across Guinea, Mali, Niger and Nigeria. Its main tributary, the Bénoué, runs successively across Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria. These different countries, as well as Burkina Faso, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire from where a few tributaries of the river rise, form member States of the Niger Basin Authority (NBA). The situation of the Gambia is similar (OMVG), as well as that of the Volta Basin (VBA). 3. Lastly, those managing a watercourse that is a border in some of its sections and a transboundary in others. Taking into account Guinea (upstream country and a new member of the OMVS), the Senegal river may be placed in this category of watercourses.
B
A
Border
However, it is difficult to ensure joint management of a river that is more than 4,000 km long, with a basin covering 1.5 million km² which is shared between nine states. The transboundary nature of the river does not easily lend itself to joint management arrangements in which each member state (from Guinea to Cameroon) can clearly identify benefits more significant than those it can obtain by acting unilaterally or formulating collaboration arrangements at a smaller scale. This certainly explains why the achievements of the NBA to date are mainly concentrated in
A
A B
B
Transboundary
Mixed
the area of environmental protection (control of silting and water hyacinth, etc), an important area which also has the advantage of easily obtaining consensus. In the other areas, the results are still mixed. In 2005, the Heads of State of NBA member countries adopted the Paris Declaration, which defines the general principles of good governance for the Niger Basin. Through this Declaration, NBA member countries initiated a consultation process aimed at adopting a shared vision of the river and its development. This exercise should ultimately produce an ambitious long-term development programme. Achieving these goals would refute the above-mentioned geographical determinism,
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
which does not predispose the Niger River to economic co-operation within the river basin.
] The agreement between Niger and Mali relating to co-operation on the use of water resources of the Niger (July 1988). ] The hydroecological management project of the Upper Niger between Guinea and Mali. This initiative to improve hydroecological knowledge is aimed at enhancing the ecology management policies of this part of the Niger Basin. ] The Nigeria-Cameroon Protocol Agreement concluded under the supervision of the NBA in January 2000 was aimed at coordinating the release of water from dams, consulting each other with respect to water structure projects, as well as the conception and eventual implementation of joint projects.
6.5.3. Bilateral c o-operation Difficulties of co-operation between many states on a large basin certainly account for the development of bilateral dialogue. There are five examples of bilateral dialogue along the Niger River (see Map 6.7.): ] The Agreement between Niger and Benin relating to the development of a hydroelectric power station in Dyodyonga on the Mékrou River (January 1999). ] The Agreement between Nigeria and Niger on the equitable sharing, conservation and development of their resources in common waters (1990). This agreement concerns the sub-basins of Maggia, Lamido, Gada-Goulbi, Tagwai-El Fadama, Komadugu Yobe (this last watercourse forms part of the Lake Chad Basin Network8).
These agreements came after the establishment of the basin organisations concerned (NBA and LCBC). They highlight the relevance of the subsidiarity principle more than they challenge that of basin organisations. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that in at least one case (Nigeria-
119 Map 6.7. Bilateral agreement along the Niger River
Niger’s water use (1988)
Fare sharing, conservation and development of shared water resources (1990)
Mali Niger
Guinea
Hydroecological management in upper Niger (1993)
Nigeria Hydroelectrical development of Dyodyonga. Mékrou river (1999)
Source: M. Niasse (2005)
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Cameroon
Coordination of water release and concertation on building projects (2000)
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006
II. TERRITORIES
Cameroon Agreement), it is the basin organisation (NBA) which facilitated discussions between the two countries concerned.
6.5.4. Macro-regional c o-operation Subsidiarity is at the core of the concerns of the Permanent Forum for the Coordination and Monitoring of the Integrated Management of Water Resources in West Africa (CPCS-GIRE) created in 2001 under the auspices of ECOWAS. The objective of CPCS-GIRE is to promote and facilitate the creation of consultative frameworks for riparian countries of shared or transboundary basins, while more generally fostering the joint management of shared water resources. The CPCS-GIRE Programme is coordinated by the ECOWAS Water Resource Coordination Unit (WRCU) based in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, and operating since 2004. The West African Water Partnership (GWP-WAWP) is the West African component of the Global Water Partnership (GWP). The GWP/WAWP was 120 established in 2002. Its secretariat is located in Ouagadougou. The GWP/WAWP is a regional platform for dialogue and consultations to promote the integrated management of water within States and within river basins. The African Network of Basin Organisations (ANBO) was established in July 2002. Initially designed to group the basin organisations of West Africa (West African Basin Organisations or RAOB), it was subsequently extended to all basin organisations in Africa. West Africa continues to play a key role within ANBO: the secretariat of the network is hosted by the OMVS, and the organisation is chaired by the NBA.
6.6. Conclusion On the whole, West Africa is not threatened over the medium term by lack of renewable water. In light of the theoretical availability of thousands of billions of m3, the prospect of increasing consumption six-fold between 2000 and 2020 (from 11 billion to more than 60 billion m3) is not off-putting; even if there are and will be problems at the local level.9 The problem lies in the technical and financial difficulties of
access to groundwater reserves of which very little is exploited today.10 It also lies in climate change and variability which have led to significant decline in the volumes of rivers over the past few decades. In other words, very little groundwater is exploited, and surface water is diminishing. This broadens the spectrum of water shortage which, even though it is far from certain, has encouraged States in the region to prepare for the construction of an ever increasing number of dams, irrigation canals or inter-basin transfer systems. The risks of disagreement and tension are real, but so far dialogue and co-operation have triumphed. History shows that “wars over water” are fortunately very rare. Professor Aaron Wolf stresses that “the only recorded incident of an outright war over water was 4,500 years ago between two Mesopotamian city-states over the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in the region we now call southern Iraq. Since then, you find water exacerbating relations at the international scale. But you also regularly find hostile states—such as India and Pakistan or the Israelis and Palestinians—resolving water conflicts even while disputes rage over other issues. (…) Strategically, water wars don’t make sense. You cannot increase your water resources by going to war with a neighbour unless you are willing to capture the entire hydrographic basin11”. However, interdependence is such that there is pressing need to improve the quality of co-operation in West Africa as regards shared water management. The prerequisite for such an undertaking is certainly to improve information for policy-makers, water users and the general public on climate change and variability and their impacts on fresh water resources. Indeed, in certain cases, some countries have been suspected of reducing the level of rivers by diverting very large quantities, whereas only the aridification of climate was the cause. Scientifically established information on water constitutes, more than in any other area, an essential basis for sound dialogue between stakeholders. This implies that joint observation systems should be set up, including for transboundary aquifers of which the dynamics are rarely shared. Strategic thinking on subsidiarity between the different levels of regional co-operation should be initiated.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
Box 6.2. International standards on the management of transboundary basins The 1997 United Nations Convention on the non-navigational uses of International Watercourses is the result of nearly thirty years of strategic thinking and debate by experts. Although it has not entered into force which requires ratiÀcation by at least 35 States, this Convention serves as an international standard in deÀning the responsibilities of States in the management of transboundary river basins. It deÀnes major principles such as those on equitable and reasonable use of shared watercourses, the obligation not to cause signiÀcant damage to third party countries, prior notiÀcation, information sharing between States, and consultation between riparian States, etc. The 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (or Ramsar Convention). With the exception of Liberia and Cape Verde, all West African States have acceded to this Convention. Today, the region has 46 Ramsar sites covering a total area of 10 million hectares. This Convention is particularly important for the ecological protection of wetlands. The Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), ratiÀed by all the states in the region except Sierra Leone, aims for “the conservation and sustainable use of biological resources” and seeks to “mitigate or avoid adverse impacts on biological diversity” and to “prevent any threat to biological diversity”. This Convention insists particularly on the need to conduct environmental impact assessments so as to minimise damage to ecosystems, and river ecosystems in particular. The World Commission on Dams was established in 1997 to conduct an independent assessment of world experience in the planning, construction and management of large dams, draw lessons, as well as to make recommendations for the future. Regarding dams in transboundary basins, the WCD report recommends that national water policies should explicitly include negotiation mechanisms with the other States concerned on the basis of the principles of equitable and reasonable use, prevention of signiÀcant damages, and prior information. The WCD also appealed to the international community and donors to refrain from supporting dam projects on transboundary watercourses if the riparian States raise an objection considered founded by an independent group of experts.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Bilateral Agreements offer a good basis for promoting integrated development programmes that are difficult to envisage in most river basins because of divergent interests or priorities between certain member countries of basin organisations. Basin Agencies do not all have the same purpose (boundary/transboundary river, dimension of the basin, number of member countries). Consequently, they cannot be perceived in the same manner or have the same goals. Their common link could be the development of a shared vision of all the countries concerned, dialogue on codes of conduct or water charters, and lastly, support for the implementation of bilateral agreements. The macro-regional level is just beginning. It is certainly the missing link to regional co-operation pertaining to water. It could help formulate a regional water protocol which would facilitate the task of many 121 stakeholder states in several shared basins. It is also at the West African level that states could be encouraged to ratify and implement international conventions on shared waters and the environment (see Box 6.2.). The ECOWAS Permanent Forum for the Coordination and Monitoring of the Integrated Management of Water Resources in West Africa (CPCSGIRE) could play the pivotal role of this regional process along with other regional organisations (GWP-WAWP, ANBO, etc.) that are active in the promotion of better governance of water resources in the region.
II. TERRITORIES
Notes 1.
A river basin or a hydrologic basin is part of inland territory where all surface water flows towards the same outlet (watercourse or lake). The line separating two river basins is known as “the water divide”. 2. Internationally Shared Aquifer Resources Management Project. 3. In southern Africa (particularly in South Africa and Zimbabwe) we find 2/3 of the large dams constructed in Africa. 4. As defined by the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) large dams are 15 metres or more in height or if the height is between 10 and 15 metres, having a reservoir capacity of more than 3 million cubic metres. Dams between 10 to 15 metres high with a crest length of more than 500 metres, or with a reservoir volume of more than 1 hm3 of water, or with a spillway of a capacity of more than 2,000 m 3/s are also considered as large dams. (www.icold-cigb.org/chartefr.html). 5. According to statistics provided by the World Commission on Dams (WCD, 2000) and the Large Dams Register of the International World Commission on Large Dams. 6. Source: www.glowa-volta.de/cd_v3.1/index.htm. 7. Which is equivalent to the annual fresh water consumption in all of West Africa. 8. Another bilateral agreement was concluded in the Lake Chad Basin. This is the Moundou Agreement between Chad and Cameroon dating from 1970 on levels of water withdrawals from the Logone for irrigation purposes. 9. For example, in Maradi region in Niger, in Dakar area in Senegal, or in the Ouagadougou area in Burkina Faso. 10. Some countries depend largely on aquifers for agriculture. 96% of irrigation water comes from groundwater in Saudi Arabia, 69% in Bangladesh; 61% in Tunisia; 60% in Syria; 53% in India; and 34% in Pakistan (source UNEP). In West Africa, the use of groundwater for agriculture is almost zero. 11. Aaron Wolf is Associate Professor at Oregon State University (USA) and Director of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database Project. This statement is taken from an article in the Courrier of UNESCO of October 2001: “Sabre-rattling among thirsty nations”; Interview by Amy Otchet.
Sources and bibliography ABN (2002), Réunion d’information sur les barrages de Taoussa (Mali) et de Kandadji (Niger). Niamey 6-7 août. Autorité du Bassin du Niger. Niamey. Adams, W. (2000), The Social Impacts of Large Dams: Equity and Distributional Issues. Working Paper. The World Commission on Dams. Cape Town. Nov. Source: www.dams.org/docs/kbase/thematic/ tr11main.pdf
122
Andreini, M; N. van de Giesen, and al. (2000), Volta Basin Water Balance. Center for Development Research. University of Bonn. ZEF Discussion Papers. No. 21. March. Ashton, P. J. (2002), Avoiding Conflicts over Africa’s Water Resources. Ambio. Vol 31 No.3, May. pp. 236-242. Bradlow, D. (2000), Report on International and Comparative Law Applicable to Large Dam Construction. Contributing Paper to Thematic Review V4. World Commission on Dams. Cape Town (www.dams.org). Diagne, B. (2004), “ Modèles d’organisation de bassin en Afrique de l’Ouest : le cas de l’Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS) ”. In M. Niasse, A. Iza, A. Garane, O. Varis, (eds). La gouvernance de l’eau : Aspects juridiques et institutionnels de la gestion des ressources en eau en Afrique de l’Ouest. IUCN, Gland (Suisse), et Cambridge (Royaume-Uni). Fourd, J. P. (2002), Petites retenues d’eau. Performance et coûts : Quelles leçons tirer des expériences dans la sous-région, du Burkina Faso en particulier. Communication présentée au Forum régional sur les zones humides. UICN-BRAO. Kompienga (Burkina Faso). 12-14 juin – pp. 32-47. Giesen, N. van de, M. Andreini, A. van Edig & P. Vleg (2001), Competition for Water Resources of the Volta Basin. Center for Development Research. University of Bonn. Gleditsch, N. P., O. Taylor, K. Furlong and B. Lacina (2004), Conflicts over Shared Rivers: Resource Scarcity or Fuzzy Boundaries? Paper presented to the Fifth Pan-European International Relations Conference, The Hague, 9–11 September. Global Water Partnership (GWP)-WATAC (2000), Water for the 21st Century. Vision to Action for West Africa. Global Water Partnership-West Africa Technical Advisory Committee (GWP-WATAC). Ouagadougou. Horowitz, M. M. (1989), Victims of Development. Development Anthropology Network. 7(2):1-8. ICJ (no date), Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria. International Court of Justice (ICJ): www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnframe.htm. IRIN News (2003a), Cameroon-Nigeria: Border Commission discusses handover of 33 villages. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN): www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=37536&SelectRegion =West_Africa). Oct. 29. Abuja. IRIN News (2003b), Cameroon-Nigeria: Handover of Lake Chad villages begins. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN): www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=38319&SelectRegion=West_ Africa) Dec. 9. Lagos
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
L’Hôte, Y., G. Mahé ; B. Somé and J. Triboulet (2002), “Analysis of a Sahelian annual rainfall index from 1896 to 2000”. Hydrological Sciences No. 47 (4). August. pp. 563-572. Ly, I. (2004), “ Les aspects juridiques liés à la gestion des eaux transfrontalières : Prévention et résolution des conflits ”. In M. Niasse, A. Iza, A. Garane, O. Varis (eds), La gouvernance de l’eau: Aspects juridiques et institutionnels de la gestion des ressources en eau en Afrique de l’Ouest. IUCN, Gland (Suisse), et Cambridge (Royaume-Uni). Magistro, J. V. (1993), “Ethnicity and Transboundary Conflict in the Senegal River Valley”. Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines. No.130-XXXIII-2, pp. 201-232. Mahé, G., J.C. Olivry (1995), " Variations des précipitations et des écoulements en Afrique de l’Ouest et Centrale de 1951 à 1989 ", Sécheresse, n° 1, vol 6, pp. 109-117. McCaffrey, S. (2001), “The Contribution of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses”. International Journal of Global Environmental Issues, Vol. 1, Nos. ¾. Niasse, M. (2004), “ Prévenir les conflits et promouvoir la coopération dans la gestion des fleuves transfrontaliers en Afrique de l’Ouest ”. In VertigO (Revue électronique sur les sciences de l’Environnement). Vol 5 (1). Mai www.vertigo.uqam.ca/vol5no1/art5vol5no1/vertigovol5no1_niasse.pdf Niasse, M., A. Iza, A. Garane, O. Varis, (ed) (2004). La gouvernance de l’eau : Aspects juridiques et institutionnels de la gestion des ressources en eau en Afrique de l’Ouest. IUCN, Gland (Suisse), et Cambridge (Royaume-Uni). Niasse, M. (2002), “Equity Dimensions of Dams-Based Water Resources Development – Winners and Losers”. In W. Steffen, J. Jäger, D.J. Carlson, C. Bradshaw, (ed). Challenges of a Changing Earth. Springer. Paris, London. pp. 39-43. Niasse, M., A. Afouda, A. Amani (ed.) (2004), Réduire la vulnérabilité de l’Afrique de l’Ouest aux impacts du climat sur les ressources en eau, les zones humides et la désertification. Eléments de stratégie régionale de préparation et d’adaptation. UICN, Gland (Suisse) et Cambridge (Royaume-Uni). Paturel J. E, E. Servat, B. Kouame, H. Lubes, M. Ouedraogo, J. M. Masson (1997), “Climatic variability in humid Africa along the Gulf of Guinea – Part two: An integrated regional approach”. Journal of Hydrology, 1997, 191: 16-36. Postel, S. L. and Wolf, A.T. (2001), Dehydrating Conflict. Foreign Policy. September 18 www.globalpolicy.org/ security/natres/water/2001/1001fpol.htm. Parker, R. “The Senegal-Mauritania Conflict of 1989: a Fragile Equilibrium”. Journal of Modern African Studies, 29, 1 (1991), pp. 155-171. Revenga, C., J. Brunner, N. Henninger, K. Kassem, R. Payne (2000), Pilot Analysis of Global Ecosystems. Freshwater Systems. WRI. Washington, DC. http://pdf.wri.org/page_freshwater.pdf. Seck, S. M. (1991), Les cultivateurs “ transfrontaliers ” de décrue face à la question foncière. In B. Crousse, P. Mathieu, S. M. Seck (ed). La Vallée du Fleuve Sénégal. Evaluations et perspectives d’une décennie d’aménagements. Paris. Karthala. Servat, E., J.E. Paturel, H. Lubes, B. Kouame, M. Ouedraogo, J. M. Masson (1997), "Climatic variability in humid Africa along the Gulf of Guinea – Part one: Detailed analysis of the phenomenon in Côte d’Ivoire". Journal of Hydrology, 1997, 191: 1-15. Tchoué, G. (2004), " Le modèle de l’Autorité du Bassin du Niger ". In M. Niasse, A. Iza, A. Garane, O. Varis (eds), La gouvernance de l’eau : Aspects juridiques et institutionnels de la gestion des ressources en eau en Afrique de l’Ouest. IUCN, Gland (Suisse) et Cambridge (Royaume-Uni). Turton, A. R. (2000), Water wars in Southern Africa: Challenging conventional wisdom. In Water for Peace in the Middle East and Southern Africa. Green Cross International. Genève. pp. 112-130. UNEP (2006), Challenges to International Water: Regional Assessments in a Global Perspective. WCD (2002), Dams and Development. A New Framework for Decision-Making. World Commission on Dams. Earthscan. London & Sterling. Wolf, A.T. (2001), "Water, Conflict and Co-operation". In R. S. Meinzen-Dick and M. W. Rosegrant (eds): Overcoming Water Scarcity and Quality Constraints. 2020 Focus 9: October. Source: www.ifpri.org/2020/focus/focus09/focus09_14.htm. Wolf, A.T., S.B. Yoffe and M. Giordano (2003), "International Waters: Identifying Basins at Risk". Water Policy No.5 pp. 29-60.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
123
II. TERRITORIES
Wouters, P. (2000), "The Legal Response to International Water Scarcity and Water Conflicts: The UN Watercourse Convention and Beyond". The Water Page. Source: www.Africanwater.org/pat_wouters1. htm.
Websites Autorité du Bassin du Niger
www.abn.ne
Earthprint library
www.earthprint.com
ECOWAS. Water Resources Coordination Unit (WRCU)
www.wrcu.ecowas.int/
FAO – Aquastat
www.fao.org/ag/agl/aglw/aquastat/dbase/index.stm
Global Water Partnership/Partenariat Mondial de l’eau
www.gwpforum.org
International network of basin organizations/Réseau International des organisations de bassin/
www.inbo-news.org/
IUCN – Water Resources e-Atlas
www.iucn.org/themes/wani/eatlas/
Organisation pour la mise en valeur du Fleuve Sénégal
www.omvs.org/
The African Transboundary Water Law
www.Africanwaterlaw.org/
The World Commission on dams
www.dams.org/
The World Water Week
www.worldwaterweek.org/
UNESCO / Water Programme
www.unesco.org/water/
World Resource Institute
www.wri.org/
World Water Council/Forum mondial de l’eau
www.worldwatercouncil.org/
124
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
Chapter 7. TRANSPORT Laurent Bossard, Philipp Heinrigs and Christophe Perret (SWAC/OECD)
7.1. General survey of West African transport systems The map 7.1. provides a macro-regional view of the entire West African area. This map is useful to review the organisation of regional networks without providing analytical information on their quality. With a few exceptions, this map illustrates an apparent congruity between the main urban network and the primary road system. It indicates that there is no densely populated and urbanised area with abnormally poor road access. High population densities and economic activity correspond to high concentration of roads (southern Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea, northern Nigeria, western Senegambia). The coastal route joining up approximately 2,000 km from Abidjan to Port Harcourt carries two thirds of total intraregional trade between ECOWAS countries. The west coast of West Africa has never been well-connected to the rest of the region. This problem however seems about to be resolved since significant work has been undertaken on the road links of Bamako – Conakry and Bamako – Nouakchott. The privatisation in railroad between Dakar and Bamako completes this positive evolution in regional transport. Only the Mano River countries (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone), as well as neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, seem to suffer from poor road infrastructure. A long decade of instability and conflict has triggered a double phenomenon of accelerated urbanisation and deterioration of communication networks. Furthermore, some inter-State links still need to be built or improved.
With the exception of Nigeria, where infrastructure is mainly financed by domestic resources, the West African road network depends largely on development aid which finances various projects per year, and has been doing so for several decades. These investment efforts have led to the current regional system, which, while imperfect, shows considerable progress. However, the quality of the network varies significantly. A road is built then deteriorates because of inadequate utilisation and lack of maintenance, nevertheless, users pay dearly to use them. If railroads had continued to develop after 125 independence, today they would have “eased the road” from the heavy loads carried over long distances. The current rail grid is mostly inherited from the period of colonisation. Perpendicular to the coast and disconnected from each other, their main function is related to exporting very large quantities of minerals (iron, bauxite, phosphate). Contrary to roads, they do not play a role in the integration process. The private sector taking over the Abidjan-Ouagadougou and Dakar-Bamako lines opens up however this perspective. There are numerous ports in the Gulf of Guinea which are suitably linked to the Sahelian capitals of Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey. These North-South axes are facing growing competition from East-West corridors, notably from Dakar, Nouakchott, Banjul and Conakry. The regional airport coverage also seems “adequate” in the first analysis. The airports of capital cities and in certain cases secondary towns meet, without particular difficulty, the steeply increasing demand for passenger and freight traffic. However, intra-regional air traffic is still remarkably
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
300
Kankan
Ségou
Sikasso
Koulikoro Bamako
Diéma
Bobo Dioulasso
Kaya
GHANA
BURKINA FASO
Ouagadougou
Ouahigouya
Mopti
Niger
MALI
BENIN
Kandi
Niamey
ALGERIA
Kaura-Namoda
Sokoto
Kano Zaria Jos Bauchi
Nguru
NIGER
Zinder Katsina
Maradi
Agadez
Between 1 and 2 million Between 500,000 and 1 million Between 250,000 and 500,000 Other cities
Maroua
Maiduguri Kousséri
Conakry
Kindia
Odienné Korhogo
Wa
Tamale
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005
CHAD
N'Djaména
Lake Chad
Border
Railways Main roads ECOWAS
> 2 million
Main airports Main ports
Main cities (inhabitants)
Kaduna TOGO Djougou Garoua SIERRA LEONE Parakou Pepel Minna Kara Koidu NIGERIA ué Yola Ogbomosho Marampa no Freetown Blitta CÔTE D'IVOIRE Abuja IlorinNiger Be Oyo N'Zérékoré Lake Volta EdeOshogbo Bouaké Iseyin Makurdi Man Okene Ngaoundéré Pobé Mts de Ife Daloa Mano River Akure Kpalimé Abengourou Bongs Yekepa Kumasi BohiconAbeokuta Ibadan Bamenda Yamoussoukro Monrovia Benin Onitsha Enugu Berkwai Po City LIBERIA Tema rto La Gagnoa Buchanan Prestea Bafoussam No gos Warri Aba Calabar v Nkongsamba o Abidjan Accra Onne Kumba SekondiSan Pédro Yaoundé 600 km Bertoua Takoradi Port GULF OF GUINEA Douala Harcourt Mbalmayo CAMEROON Kribi
Sangarédi GUINEA Fria
GUINEA BISSAU
Source: Sahel and West Africa Club (2005)
0
Bissau
Kayes
MAURITANIA Aïoun el-Atrouss
Zouérate
Tambacounda
SENEGAL
THE GAMBIA
Touba
Linguère
Senega l
Kamsar
Thiès Kaolack Banjul
Ziguinchor
Dakar
Saint-Louis
Rosso
Nouakchott
Nouâdhibou
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Praia
CAPE VERDE
N
126 Map 7.1. Transport infrastructure in West Africa (2005)
II. TERRITORIES
ou on Ct mé Lo
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
low as regards its potential. Nigerian air space is organised around interior traffic and not with a view towards regional integration.
7.2. The creation of a regional road network A glance into the past reveals the progress achieved by ECOWAS Member States since their independence (see Map 7.2.). In 1960, colonisation left behind a relatively poor road network in a sparsely populated area (the ECOWAS zone has around 78 million inhabitants). On the Gulf of Guinea, the lack of a coastal link between Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana illustrated the antagonism of the colonial systems. At independence, only the coastal area of Senegal, which lodged the capital of French West Africa, had a relatively dense paved road network.
In 1975, there were approximately 115 million inhabitants in the region. The “Senegalese hub” seems to rely on its assets and remains cut off by road from the rest of the region. The Bamako-Dakar railroad indeed still functions well. The coastal band of the Gulf of Guinea was set up: the road between Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana exists. The Sahelian countries remain isolated with the exception of Burkina Faso which is now connected to Accra. Nigeria structures its national network around the large North-South and East West axes. In 1990, the ECOWAS zone had 178 million inhabitants. The “Senegalese hub” had hardly changed. Bamako and Niamey were finally linked to the Gulf of Guinea. The Bamako-Dakar railroad began to collapse; the Malian capital embarked on a long period of dependence on Abidjan. Ouagadougou and Niamey had several alternatives to open up (Cotonou, Lomé, Accra,
Map 7.2. Main paved or partially improved roads within ECOWAS* 1960
1975
1990
2005
127 N
* Excluding Cape Verde
Main paved or partially improved roads Cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants
0
300
600 km
French West Africa (1959)
Source: Sahel and West Africa Club (2005) Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005
300
SENEGAL
Kayes
Koumbia GUINEA Mamou Kindia
Koundara Koutiala
Didiéni Ségou
Sabou
Koupéla
Ouagadougou
BURKINA FASO
Niger
MALI
Gaya
Niamey
ALGERIA
Maradi Sokoto Katsina Gusau
Birni Nkonni
Border
ECOWAS
1 < 2 million 500,000 < 1 million 250,000 < 500,000 Other cities
> 2 million
Main cities (inhabitants)
Kano
NIGER
Maiduguri
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005
CHAD
Kousséri
N'Djaména
Lake Chad
Road network Motorway Paved road in very good condition Paved road in fair condition Paved road in poor condition Track in good condition Track in poor condition Ferry
Bougouni Fada N'Gourma Malanville Sikasso Tumu BENIN Kandi Zaria Bobo Dioulasso Bolgatanga Djougou Kankan Kaduna NIGERIA Tegina Korhogo Garoua Parakou Wa GHANA Conakry Tamale TOGO Kissidougou Odienné SIERRA LEONE ué Sokodé Ilorin no Niger CÔTE D'IVOIRE N'Zérékoré Be Lake Volta Bo Abuja Freetown Ngaoundéré Ogbomosho Bouaké Abengourou Atakpamé LIBERIA Bohicon Man Yamoussoukro Ibadan Techiman Ganta Porto Novo Kumasi Duékoué Daloa Onitsha Enugu Monrovia Foumbam LomCoto Lagos Benin City Bafoussam Calabar é nou Aba Tema CAMEROON Accra San Pédro Abidjan SekondiBertoua 600 km Takoradi Port Harcourt GULF OF GUINEA Douala Yaoundé
Boké
Bafata
Bamako
Diéma
Nioro
Aïoun el-Atrouss
MAURITANIA
Tambacounda THE GAMBIA
Kaffrine
Sources: Sahel and West Africa Club; ECOWAS (2005)
0
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Bissau
GUINEA BISSAU
Ziguinchor
Kaolack Banjul
Thiès Mbacké
Senega l
Rosso
Nouakchott
Saint-Louis
Dakar
Praia
CAPE VERDE
N
128 Map 7.3. Practicability of some roads in West Africa (2005)
II. TERRITORIES
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
etc.). Côte d’Ivoire was set up in the South, facilitating the export of cocoa, coffee and wood. Thanks to petrol money, Nigeria continued to successfully interlink its roads through its territory. In 2005, forty-five years after independence, ECOWAS had 260 million inhabitants. Nigeria continued to develop its road network and remained ahead of the other countries in the region. Furthermore, the general picture of West Africa as a relatively coherent and structured regional network began to emerge. Along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, a road now links Port Harcourt (Nigeria) to San Pedro (Côte d’Ivoire) (see Map 7.3.). Extending this coastal road to Dakar via Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau is being examined by NEPAD; just as the Dakar-Bamako connection which would make the old Sahelian dream of having a link between the Senegalese capital to N’Djamena come true. But between the network of Sahelian towns and the urban coastal network, dynamic secondary towns are growing rapidly: Kankan (Guinea), Korhogo (Côte d’Ivoire), Tamale (Ghana), Kara (Togo) and Parakou (Benin). The population of these towns has doubled over the last two decades. They should stimulate the agro-food economy and set up the urban network of the West African SudanoSahelian zone. These new areas will require a road infrastructure already somewhat adequate and lead to the creation of a median trunk road between the Sahelian axis and the coastal axis. Besides the construction of the regional network's missing links, the future stake is making traffic more fluid on the existing network. This would mean lifting border roadblocks and other hindrances to traffic, maintaining and improving roads and developing alternative modes of transport, i.e. railroads for heavy or bulky materials (coal, minerals, cotton).
7.3. On West African roads The relatively positive macro-regional description of the West African road network should not conceal the changing and contrasting realities on
the ground. In 2005, a transporter from Niamey does not travel under the same conditions when going to Lagos or to Cotonou (see Map 7.3.). – Niamey – Lagos. The road from Niamey to Birni Nkonni is perfectly passable, even if parts of the road through some of the villages prove difficult because of the deep ditches dug by villagers in order to slow down traffic. Furthermore, numerous controls and tolls further slow the movement of vehicles. Arriving from Birni Nkonni, the traveller has two options: to turn off towards the South and cross the border towards Sokoto, or continue to the East towards Maradi and enter Nigeria to Katsina/Kano. The first option is more direct, but because of the numerous potholes on the road, exceeding 60 km/h is not possible. Moreover, there are numerous police checks between Illela and Sokoto. The second option is a lot more comfortable but also much longer. The condition of the road is “acceptable” up to Maradi, Katsina and Kano despite 129 some holes in the road. From Kano, there is a four lane highway to Kaduna. Once in Kaduna, getting to Lagos via Tegina and Illorin can be accomplished under very reasonable road conditions. – Niamey – Cotonou. From the capital of Niger to the border town of Gaya, the paved road is very practicable. After having crossed the Niger River on the Malanville Bridge, the journey continues on a fairly good road even if cars are slowed down because of the numerous bridges until Kandi. The next leg of the journey is relatively free of hindrances until Cotonou. These road conditions are likely to change according to the reconstruction work undertaken. A good road could become more precarious in a few years as a result of sporadic maintenance. Nevertheless, to travel on West African roads is expensive, sometimes as expensive as travelling on the big European toll motorways (see Box 7.1.). These West African “tolls” are more often simply “informal taxes”, which are not assigned to any
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
Some ports are almost exclusively devoted to the exportation of raw materials. Nouâdhibou in Mauritania is a rail route terminal, shipping 9 to 12 million tonnes of iron ore per year. Also Kamsar and Conakry are shipping between 10 to 15 million tonnes of bauxite each year. In Côte d’Ivoire, San Pedro exports wood, cocoa and coffee as its main activity. It is handling more cocoa exports than Abidjan. From Sekondi-Takoradi in Ghana manganese, bauxite, coffee, wood and cocoa is exported.
Box 7.1. “Toll” roads as expensive as in Europe In 2005, a heavy-loaded tractor-trailer paid 293 € for the toll road between Brussels and Barcelona (1,369 km); which is 22 €/100 km. In 2000, a heavy-loaded tractortrailer using the Bamako-Dakar route (1,245 km) had to pay on average 17 to 20 €/100 km in “informal tolls”. At the end of the 1990s, it cost 22 €/100 km between Lagos and Maiduguri (north Nigerian town located at the Cameroon border). Hence, the toll costs driving on a 4-lane European motorway or on a 2-lane West African road, passing through towns and villages, are more or less the same.
The other trading ports in the region also export raw materials, but their main activity is the import of goods.
construction fund or to road maintenance (see Table 7.1.). These practices are likely to increase roadblocks and other check points of which there can be 1 every 14 km, such as on the road from Lagos to Abidjan (69 checkpoints in total).
130
7.4. Ports: The emergence of regional competition The presentation of West African harbours would be incomplete without including Mauritania and Cameroon. Nouakchott and Douala’s harbour activity is increasingly linked to ECOWAS (see Map 7.4.) West Africa has twenty commercial maritime harbours with traffic of more than 500,000 tonnes/ year (excluding oil terminals) of which five are located in Nigeria. The number of vessels docking at West African coasts has grown from 15,000 in the early 1990s to more than 20,000 during the early 2000s. These movements generate a trade volume (excluding petroleum exports) of more than 140 million tonnes, which equals approximately 25% of total African maritime traffic, and only 1.5% of the world maritime traffic. In terms of size and activity the port of Lagos is the most important in West Africa. Its annual merchandise traffic is in excess of 30 million tonnes, which is approximately 55% of Nigeria’s port activity (excluding hydrocarbon exporting terminals) and 25% of total ECOWAS member countries port activity.
Nouakchott, Banjul, Conakry, Freetown and Monrovia essentially serve their national markets. The construction underway or envisaged on the regional interstate roads towards Bamako could change their operations in the relatively short-term. Nigerian ports essentially serve their national hinterland and towards the outlying areas of Niger, Cameroon and Benin. This area accounts for more than half of the population as well as the West African economy. Abidjan, Tema, Lomé, Cotonou, Dakar and Douala have a more regional role. These ports can not only count on their national hinterland in order to thrive. The development of the West African road network and an increasing number of alternatives to the land-locked regions puts them in a situation
Table 7.1. Frequency of checkpoints on some transport routes (1999-2000) Route
Distance Number of Frequency (km) checkpoints (km)
Lagos - Abidjan
992
69
14
Niamey - Ouagadougou
337
20
17
Lomé - Ouagadougou
989
34
29
Cotonou - Niamey
1,036
34
30
Abidjan - Ouagadougou
1,122
37
30
972
15
65
Accra - Ouagadougou Source: ECOWAS
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
Map 7.4. Port traffic in West Africa (2003) (excluding oil terminals) 2%
N
98%
Nouâdhibou Nouakchott Praia
9% 91%
Million tonnes
Lagos 5% Onne Port complex
1 24 8 15 30 Port traffic
Dakar
2003 or latest data
6% 94% 27% 73%
95%
Merchandise imported
79%
Delta port complex
Merchandise exported
10% Banjul 90%
21%
Main mineral ports
Calabar 25% 29% 75% 78% 71% Port Harcourt 22%
Kamsar 50%
Conakry
50%
10% Freetown 90% 50% Monrovia 50%
0
300
600 km
Abidjan
Cotonou
12% 25% 11% 75% 88% 34% 89% Lomé
Tema
23% 40% 77% 60% 66% San Pédro
Sekondi-Takoradi
Douala 46%
Sources: Harbour authorities; Isemar; Afristat; Mission Économique de Lagos
of direct competition. Nouakchott will soon be able to join them in this competition followed further behind by Conakry and Banjul. There is significant investment in this sector. In Nigeria the Onne Ports Complex strives to become a regional hub for the transfer of containers1 linked to the development of a growing industrial zone. Because of the status of Monrovia’s free port, cargo trading vessels in transit can dock without being taxed or paying customs duties. Lomé’s port implemented a programme, “Solidarity on the water” aiming to promote transit operations destined to land-locked countries. But a port’s competitiveness does not only depend on its infrastructure and services. It also hinges on the quality and fluidity of the land transport networks which serve it (most often being the regional interstate roads). The beneficiaries of this emerging trade competition will be the countries that have, at the same time, efficient ports; good
54%
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005
roads without roadblocks; operational rail lines and border posts with the least administrative formalities. The competition between transport corridors could be a triggering mechanism to do away with the numerous road blocks and other obstacles to the fluidity of goods and people.
7.5. The transit of goods One of the biggest economic stakes of the competition between the West African transport corridors is that of the transit of goods to and from land-locked countries. Within ECOWAS (see Map 7.5.), this concerns Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Between 1999 and 2003, transport operations to and from these countries rose by nearly 70%, from 2 to 3.4 million tonnes of goods, approximately 7.5% of total traffic at the ports of Dakar, Abidjan, Takoradi, Tema, Lomé and Cotonou. These transactions, consisting mainly of imports of consumer products and exports of agricultural
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
131
II. TERRITORIES
Map 7.5. Transit and re-export corridors in ECOWAS* N
1999 Dakar
MALI
Merchandise flows Thousand tonnes 800 1,600 600 1,200 400 800 400 200 200 100
NIGER BURKINA FASO
NIGERIA
Ports Dakar Abidjan Takoradi Téma Cotonou Lomé
Cotonou Tema Lomé Abidjan
2002
Countries BURKINA FASO MALI NIGER NIGERIA
2003
Dakar
MALI
Dakar
BURKINA FASO NIGER
MALI
NIGER BURKINA FASO
NIGERIA
NIGERIA
Abidjan Lomé Cotonou Abidjan Tema * According to the Nigerian authorities, there is no transit from and to its national ports
132
Sources: Harbour authorities; LARES; Marchés tropicaux
Takoradi Cotonou Tema Lomé © Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005
products (mainly cotton), will grow in line with economic activity and population increase.
In 1999, more than 50% of the transit traffic with these countries was through the port of Abidjan. The rest was shared between Cotonou (19%), Lomé (17%), Dakar (11%) and Tema (1%), apportioned according to their geographic location. If the port of Abidjan’s dominance was due to its geographic location as regards Mali and Burkina Faso, it was also tied to the relative quality of the road linkages and the railroad linking Ouagadougou and Abidjan. Since 1999, the instability in Côte d’Ivoire has progressively slowed down trade flows towards Tema and Lomé (see Map 7.6.). Between 2002 and 2003, the traffic of goods in transit between Abidjan and the land-locked countries has been reduced five-fold. Operations with Burkina Faso have declined from 390,000 to 15,000 tonnes. While in 1998, Burkina Faso exported 80% of its cotton through Abidjan, in 2003 not one export from Burkina Faso was registered with the Ivorian port.
The Ivorian crisis has demonstrated the ability of regional actors to swiftly adapt transit activity to circumstances and opportunities. In the future, the big transport flows could again experience such pendulum swings; not only in order to by-pass areas of political instability, but also to make use of the most competitive ports as well as the fastest and least expensive roads. The biggest challenge for competing transport corridors will be to maintain the quality of their infrastructure over the long term. From this point of view, preserving and maintaining the major road infrastructures would play a determining role. Overloaded trucks destroying the asphalt within a few months could be increasingly unacceptable,2 notably in the coastal countries concerned with optimising access to their ports. There could be greater pressure than before to comply with ECOWAS’ standards as regards the maximum truck load. Conversely, transporters would be able to obtain assurances for greater traffic fluidity and the termination of informal taxes. Finally, the revival of railroads could divert part of the heaviest transport loads3 from the roads.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
Map 7.6. Impact of the Ivorian crisis on cotton export corridors
1998
Dakar MALI
1,000 t
210,000 t
NIGER
BURKINA FASO CHAD
125,000 t
90,000 t
Abidjan
Lomé
Cotonou Douala
2003 Dakar MALI
NIGER
2,000 t
170,000 t
BURKINA FASO
165,000 t
CHAD 65,000 t Lomé
0
600 km
Abidjan
Cotonou
Tema Douala Cotton exports
From Sahelian countries From ports 240 160 80 Thousand tonnes 20
A West African railway network does not exist but there are a dozen lines which, with the exception of Nigeria, are not connected to each other. Two thirds of the 10,000 km of railway tracks date from the colonial period. From the end of the nineteenth century, extensive work was carried out: Dakar- Saint Louis, then Dakar-Bamako,
120,000 tonnes
Cotton production area Border ECOWAS
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005
Sources: Harbour authorities; SDV international logistics
7.6. Rail transport: Private investments and mining prospects
< 10,000 tonnes 30,000 tonnes 60,000 tonnes
Kumasi-Tarkwa-Accra, Lagos-Ibadan, etc. In the 1930s, most of the bigger lines that we know today were completed. Conceived with the main idea of establishing colonial power and transporting agricultural goods to the large European cities, they remained for a long time the only “modern” way for West Africans to travel long distances. Passenger rail transport will not withstand the poor management of rail lines and competition from road networks which were established in the 1970s.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
133
II. TERRITORIES
Currently, more than 8 million people take the train every year within the ECOWAS zone, two thirds of which take the “Petit Train Blue” which serves the outskirts of Dakar. With little more than one million passengers, long distance traffic in Nigeria is not significant anymore. It declined fifteen-fold between 1983 and 2001 due to the deterioration of the rails and rolling stock. Throughout the ECOWAS zone, when a traveller has the choice to take the railway or the road, they usually opt for the road. This is the case of the Abidjan-Ouagadougou route which takes 35 hours in the best case scenario. Even where road competition is negligible, passengers are still not taking the train: between Dakar and Bamako, one train per week and minimum two days travel hardly draws 150,000 passengers/year. However, the transport of goods seems to have a future (see Map 7.7.). Significant investment by large international businesses in regional railroad axes (Abidjan-Ouagadougou and Dakar-Bamako) demonstrate that the private sector believes that this is a profitable tool with which to transport 134 cereals and food products, hydrocarbons, cotton or fertiliser and chemical products. If these experiences are conclusive, a new era of rail transport could open up after four decades of dormancy. ECOWAS has commissioned a comprehensive feasibility study on the rehabilitation of the existing network and the building of new interconnecting lines. This study could help new private investors make decisions, at least on the regional axes with the highest potential traffic (see Map 7.8.). In the meantime, the railroad sector does not perform a regional role; rather the railroad system, consisting of national lines, are geared towards transporting minerals to ports and the world market. These lines carry 25 to 30 million tonnes a year of which one third is iron in Mauritania, as much bauxite in Guinea and lesser amounts of manganese in Ghana and phosphates in Togo. If a few years ago the world markets for these products were not very encouraging, the bullish trend underway driven by the Asian demand could make the building of new railroad lines an attractive investment.
7.7. The sharp increase in air transport West African air transport only represents 0.3% of world passenger and freight traffic and 10% of African activity. The traffic evolution has however experienced a remarkable recent development. The number of passengers has increased four-fold between 1975 and 2003 (from 3.5 to 13.5 million) and the volume of freight 2-fold (from 100,000 to 200,000 tonnes) (see Map 7.9.). As concerns passenger traffic, there are some thirty international airports in the region of which 21 handle more than 100,000 travellers per year (see Figure 7.1.). Only Lagos, Abuja, and Dakar have significant traffic, placing them among the 15 largest African airports.4 The geographic distribution is consistent with population density and economic activity. The three most important economic areas of Nigeria and the major capitals of the region are among the top 10 airports. Travelling within the region (including domestic Nigerian and interstate traffic) represents almost half of total passenger traffic. Tourism makes up only 50% of passengers coming from or going to other parts of the world. In 2002 nearly 3 million tourists landed at West African airports equalling 6 million passages. Tourism accounts for little less than half of the airport traffic in the region. This rapidly growing sector (the number of tourists has multiplied by 2.2 between 1990 and 2002), has significant potential to increase airport activity over the medium- and long-term. At the same time, tourism is not equally distributed within the region. Six countries (excluding periods of political crisis) attract half of the tourists visiting the region (Senegal, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Mali). Nigerian airport activity, mainly geared towards business, depends largely on the petroleum sector and its significant national trade. Air freight transport is even more contrasted between countries in the region. Only two airports have considerable traffic: Lagos and Accra (50,000 tonnes each). Trade with the global market represents almost all of the air freight traffic of goods. Exports are essentially perishable goods
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
300
Freetown
600 km
B
B
Kidira
F F
Mts de Bongs
F Yekepa
Monrovia Buchanan LIBERIA
Mano River
GUINEA
Kankan
Kaya
M
Lake Volta
Tamale
GHANA
BURKINA FASO
Ouagadougou
Niger
MALI
Blitta
TOGO
Sokoto
F
Itape
Nig er Abuja
Minna
Zaria
Katsina
Maradi
Kaduna
Kaura-Namoda
Ilorin Ogbomosho
Parakou
BENIN
Niamey
Jos
NIGERIA
ué no Be
Kano
Nguru
Non-functionning or temporarely closed railways
NIGER
0 to 500,000
ECOWAS
500,000 to 1 million
More than 1 million
Other products (2001)
0 to 1 million
1 to 5 million
More than 5 million
Minerals (2002)
Railway transport (tonnes)
Border
Other cities
250,000 < 500,000 *
500,000 < 1 million
ALGERIE
1 < 2 million
> 2 million
Main cities (inhabitants)
Kumasi
P
M
B
F
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005
CAMEROON
CHAD
N'Djaména Kousséri
Ngaoundéré
Garoua
Main exports
Phosphate
Manganese
Bauxite
Iron
Ore
Lake Chad
Maroua
Maiduguri
Ajaokuta Oshogbo Kpalimé PobéIlaro Ibadan Akure Taligbo Bamenda B Yamoussoukro M Benin Onitsha Enugu Kpémé Bafoussam Berkwai P Por City C Tarkwa Lagos Lomé oto to N no o M Calabar v Tema Aba u o Warri Nkongsamba Abidjan Accra Kumba SekondiTakoradi Port Harcourt Douala GULF OF GUINEA Yaoundé
Bouaké
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
Bobo Dioulasso
Koulikoro
Bamako
MAURITANIA
Zouérate
F Marampa SIERRA LEONE
B
Kindia
B
Sangarédi
Pepel
Fria
GUINEA BISSAU
Conakry
Kamsar
Bissau
THE GAMBIA
Linguère Touba SENEGAL
F
Sources: Atlas de la zone franc en Afrique subsaharienne (1995); Railways in Africa; Afristat; Marchés Tropicaux; Federal Ministry of Transport (Nigeria)
0
Kaolack
Banjul
Ziguinchor
Dakar
Thiès
S e ne g a l
Nouakchott
Nouâdhibou
Saint-Louis
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Praia
CAPE VERDE
N
Map 7.7. Railway and merchandise transport in West Africa
II. TERRITORIES
135
Dakar
Saint-Louis
Praia
Nouâdhibou
Tambacounda
Kaédi Matam
Rosso
Nouakchott
Zouérate
Ansongo
Railways 1,000 m gauge 1,067 m gauge 1,435 m gauge Planned interconnections
Cities Border ECOWAS
Kayes
Sources: ECOWAS; NEPAD; Atlas de la zone franc en Afrique subsaharienne (1995); Japan Railway & Transport Review (March 2000)
Banjul
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005
Birni-NKonni Dori Niamey Maradi Koulikoro Sokoto Ouagadougou Kaya Nguru Bamako Sangarédi Dosso Kaura Bissau Bougouni N'Djaména Namoda Kano Dabola Fria Zaria Maiduguri Kamsar Sikasso Bobo Dioulasso Pama Parakou Minna Kaduna Kankan Conakry Tamale Marampa Ouangolodougou Kafanchan Abuja Blitta Freetown Lafia Itape Mts de Pobé Ngaoundéré Man Mano River Bong Ijebu Kpalimé Ajaokuta ATLANTIC OCEAN Berkwai Sanniquellie Ode Monrovia Prestea Lagos Nkonsamba Dimbokro Lomé Cotonou Onitsha Kumba Buchanan AccraTema Abidjan SekondiSan Pédro 0 300 600 km Yaoundé Port Harcourt Takoradi Douala GULF OF GUINEA Mbalmayo
N
136 Map 7.8. Existing and planned railways in West Africa
II. TERRITORIES
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
SENEGAL
GUINEA
300
GUINEA
600 km
Accra
ALGERIA
Abidjan
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
Cotonou 2 Lomé Lagos Accra2
GHANA
BENIN TOGO
BURKINA FASO
Niamey Ouagadougou
MALI
Bobo Dioulasso
Bamako
LIBERIA
SIERRA LEONE
Conakry
GUINEA BISSAU
Banjul THE GAMBIA
Dakar SENEGAL
Nouakchott
MAURITANIA
Nouâdhibou
Freight 1975
Abidjan
Lagos1
Cotonou
Lomé
GHANA
BENIN TOGO
BURKINA FASO
Bobo Dioulasso
Douala
NIGERIA
NIGER
CAMEROON
Garoua
2Estimations
Yaoundé
CAMEROON
Garoua
CHAD
N'Djaména
11972
CHAD
N'Djaména
Banjul
Dakar
Sal
CAPE VERDE
Bamako
LIBERIA
SIERRA LEONE
GUINEA
Monrovia3
Freetown
Conakry
GUINEA BISSAU
THE GAMBIA
SENEGAL
Bamako
MAURITANIA
Nouakchott
Nouâdhibou
Abidjan
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
Abidjan
Niamey
NIGERIA
Kano
Garoua
NIGERIA
Abuja
Kano
NIGER
Douala
Yaoundé
32002 © Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005
Yaoundé
CAMEROON
Garoua
CHAD
N'Djaména
50,000 tonnes 20,000 tonnes 5,000 tonnes < 1,000 tonnes
>3,200,000 passengers 1,600,000 passengers 400,000 passengers < 100,000 passengers
ECOWAS
Border
CHAD
N'Djaména
Port HarcourtCAMEROON
Abuja
NIGER
Port Harcourt Douala
Cotonou Lagos Accra Lomé
GHANA
BENIN TOGO
BURKINA FASO
Bobo Dioulasso
Lagos
ALGERIA
Lomé
Ouagadougou
MALI
Accra
Cotonou
BENIN TOGO
BURKINA FASO
GHANA
ALGERIA
Niamey Ouagadougou
MALI
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
Freight 2003
LIBERIA
SIERRA LEONE
Monrovia
Freetown
GUINEA
GUINEA BISSAU
THE GAMBIA
SENEGAL
Nouakchott
MAURITANIA
Bobo Dioulasso
Passengers 2003 Nouâdhibou
Conakry
Bissau
Banjul
Dakar
Sal
CAPE VERDE
Map 7.9. Air traffic in West Africa
Yaoundé
NIGER
NIGERIA
Douala
ALGERIA
Niamey Ouagadougou
MALI
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
Bamako
Monrovia LIBERIA
SIERRA LEONE
Conakry
Bissau
GUINEA BISSAU
Banjul THE GAMBIA
Dakar
Nouakchott
MAURITANIA
Nouâdhibou
Passengers 1975
Source: ASECNA; ITA-Paris; FAAN Nigeria
0
N
II. TERRITORIES
137
II. TERRITORIES
(fruits and vegetables, fish) and imports are manufactured goods (industrial machines, computers, telecommunications, etc.). The high cost of air freight only renders air transport of goods with very high value added viable. This constraint does not open perspectives on the development of intra-regional flows in the short-term.
7.8. Aerial regional integration remains to be achieved
Figure 7.1. Airports hosting more than 100,000 passengers per year (2003) Lagos Abuja Dakar Port Harcourt Sal (Cape Verde) Abidjan Accra Douala Bamako Banjul Cotonou Conakry Kano Yaoundé Lomé Ouagadougou Nouakchott Freetown Enugu (2002) N'Djamena Niamey
Nigeria ECOWAS member countries
Others
ECOWAS non-member countries Thousand passengers per year
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
With 800,000 passengers in 2003, air travellers between the regional Source: ASECNA; ITA-Paris; FAAN Nigeria States represent only 6% of West African airport traffic (see Map 7.10). Only two airports have significant activity in to Europe but are not linked directly with any this regard and can be considered as a connecting capital in the region. hub to other West African capitals: ] Abidjan: 350,000 passengers, 12 direct regional The creation of the airline Air Afrique uniting old 138 links. French colonies soon after independence5 has ] Dakar: 200,000 passengers, 15 direct regional probably been one of the factors limiting the linking links. of Nigerian air space to the rest of the region. The closing down of Air Afrique in January 2002 and the With less than 90,000 passengers, coming from or going to an airport located in another West Figure 7.2. Principal domestic routes African country, Lagos is more of a “bridge” than a in Nigeria (2002) hub. Its only significant regional link is with Accra Maiduguri (50,000 passengers), followed far behind by Abidjan Kano N (20,000), Douala (9,000), Dakar (6,000) and Bamako (1,000). Kaduna Lagos is first and foremost an airport geared towards the rest of the world and towards its internal market. In 2001, it alone handled 1.9 million domestic passengers. The other Nigerian airports have hardly any direct regional links, the majority of passengers being domestic: Abuja 1.3 million passengers, Port Harcourt 700,000 and Kano 200,000. In total, domestic Nigerian traffic is six times greater than West African inter-State traffic (see Figure 7.2.). It is a world away from the rest of the region to which it is not very well connected. The second and fourth biggest West African airports, Abuja (the “capital” of ECOWAS) and Port Harcourt, respectively, have regular flights
Abuja
Enugu
Lagos
Calabar Port Harcourt
0
Number of passengers per year Between airports > 500,000 passengers
300 km
Per airport 1.8 million passengers
100,000 < 500,000 passengers
600,000 passengers
50,000 > 100,000 passengers
< 100,000 passengers
Source: FAAN Nigeria
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
300
600 km
Freetown
Monrovia LIBERIA
GUINEA
MAURITANIA
SIERRA LEONE
Conakry
GUINEA BISSAU
THE GAMBIA
SENEGAL
Nouakchott
Sources: ITA-Paris; amadeus.net
0
Bissau
Banjul
Dakar
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Sal
CAPE VERDE
N
Bamako
Abidjan
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
Bobo Dioulasso
BURKINA FASO
Accra
GHANA
BENIN
Cotonou
Douala
NIGERIA
NIGER
* or latest data
Port Harcourt
GULF OF GUINEA
Lagos
Niamey
Lomé
TOGO
Ouagadougou
MALI
CAMEROON
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005
Yaoundé
CHAD
N'Djaména
< 45,000 passengers
50,000 passengers
100,000 passengers
Border ECOWAS
200,000 passengers
< 10,000 passengers
400,000 passengers
10,000 < 25,000 passengers
25,000 < 45,000 passengers
> 45,000 passengers
Number of passengers in 2003* Per airport Between airports (direct connections)
Map 7.10. Regional air traffic: Interstate passengers and direct connections
II. TERRITORIES
139
II. TERRITORIES
liberalisation of the African air space a year later, has spurred the creation, or revival, of fifteen or so airlines, adding to the numerous Nigerian airlines. This process reflects very different realities from microairlines to companies owning several large carriers. In West Africa as elsewhere, the future will belong to companies that are able to structure themselves within the framework of South-South and North-South alliances.
Even if it is not yet apparent, this process is underway and should logically trigger a decompartmentalisation of West African air space and the emergence of a small number of regional companies and/or significant African companies.
Notes 140
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Very large vessels deliver containers to a distribution port (sort of hub). The containers are then loaded onto smaller vessels or on wagons or trucks that transport the containers to their final destination. Building one km of asphalted road costs around 200,000 €. 700 €/km should be spent each year to assure standard maintenance. 11.5 tonnes per axle. Johannesburg is the largest African airport (12 million passengers), Atlanta is the world’s biggest in terms of passenger traffic (79 million). As from October 1960, the Conference of French-speaking African States asked President Houphouêt Boigny to examine the idea of creating an airline bringing Benin, Burkina Faso, Central-Africa, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo together. Air Africa was officially created on 28 March 1961.
Sources and bibliography airbus (2004), Global Market Forecast 2004 — 2023. Airbus SAS, France. BAD (1999), African Development Report. Infrastructure Development in Africa. Oxford University Press, New York. Banque Mondiale (1999), Système de desserte à escales multiples ou système de transbordement. Transport maritime de conteneurs entre l’Afrique de l’Ouest et l’Europe. Banque Mondiale, document de travail SSATP No. 31F, Washington, DC. Becq, B. (1993), The sub-Saharan Africa transport policy program, road rehabilitation and maintenance: the role of RMI in World Bank financed highway and transport sector projects. World Bank, Washington, DC. Bennafla, K. (2002), Le commerce frontalier en Afrique centrale : Acteurs, espaces, pratiques. Karthala, Paris. BIVAC International (2005), Faisabilité du suivi du transit Cameroun-Tchad. Bivac International, N’Djamena. Bost, F. (2004), “ L’Afrique de l’Ouest dans les stratégies des entreprises ”, dans L’Afrique de l’Ouest dans la compétition mondiale. Quels atouts possibles ? Karthala, Paris. Buah, F.K. (1986), A history of West Africa from AD 1000. Macmillan Publishers Ltd, London. Cheneau Loquai, A. (2004), Mondialisation et technologies de la communication en Afrique. Karthala, Paris. Debrie, J. (2001), De la continentalité à l’État enclavé, circulation et ouverture littorales des territoires intérieurs de l’Ouest-Africain. Thèse de Doctorat, Université du Havre. Empresa Nacional de Administraçao dos portos (2004), Estatisticas Consolidado. São Vincente, Republica de Cabo Verde.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
Gambia Ports Authority (1999), Annual Report and Financial Statements for the year ended 31 December 1999. Banjul, Gambie. ISEMAR (2002), L’industrie maritime mondiale 1970-2000. Panorama des mutations. Note de synthèse n° 48, octobre 2002, Saint Nazaire. ISEMAR (2003), La desserte des pays enclavés : l’exemple du corridor béninois en Afrique de l’Ouest. Note de synthèse n°57, septembre 2003, Saint-Nazaire. Karanga, A. (2001), Transit par voie ferroviaire en Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre. Symposium sur le transport en transit en Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre, 27 février au 1er mars 2001, Abidjan. Laan, H. L. van der (1981), "Modern Inland Transport and the European trading firms in colonial West Africa". Cahiers d’Études Africains n° 84, Paris. LARES, IRAM (2004), “ Synthèse des travaux ”. Économie régionale, série échanges régionaux, avril 2004. Mabogunje, A.L. (dir.) (2002), Atlas du Nigeria. Éditions du Jaguar, Paris. Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens (2004), “ Dossier Fret aérien et maritime ”. n° 3072, 1er octobre 2004, Paris. Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens (2003), “ Dossier ports ”. N°2997, 18 avril 2003, Paris. Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens (2003), “ Dossier Transport aérien ”. N°2991, 7 mars 2003, Paris. Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens (2001), “ Mines d’Afrique ”. N°2915, septembre 2001, Paris. Marquet, J.-F. (2004), Les routes en Afrique de l’Ouest. Mémoire de DEA, Université de Paris X Nanterre. Martin, B., M. Micoud (1997), World Bank policy and government practice in Ivory Coast and Ghana. Structural adjustment and railways privatisation, World Bank, Washington DC. Ministère des travaux publics et des transports, République de Guinée (2004), Prestations complémentaires du PNT, programme sectoriel routier. Conakry, République de Guinée. Mission Économique du Bénin (2004), Le Port Autonome de Cotonou. 29 septembre 2004, Cotonou. Mission Économique de Côte d’Ivoire (2004), Côte d’Ivoire : le secteur portuaire. 20 octobre 2004, Abidjan. Mission Économique de Côte d’Ivoire (2004), Infrastructures et matériel de transport en Côte d’Ivoire. 4 octobre 2004, Abidjan. Mission Économique de Côte d’Ivoire (2003), Afrique de l’Ouest : le secteur ferroviaire. 1er juin 2003, Abidjan. Mission Économique du Ghana (2004), Les transports maritime, fluvial et ferroviaire au Ghana. 9 janvier 2004, Accra. Mission Économique de Lagos (2004), Les ports au Nigeria. 15 octobre 2004, Lagos. N’Guessan, N. (2003), La problématique de la gestion intégrée des corridors en Afrique subsaharienne. Programme de politiques de transport en Afrique subsaharienne, Banque mondiale et Commission économique pour l’Afrique, document de travail SSATP n° 3F, Washington, DC. Odeleye J. A. (2000), Public–Private Participation to Rescue Railway Development in Nigeria. Japan Railway & Transport Review No 23 (pp.42–49), March 2000, Tokyo. ONUDI (2002), Investir en Guinée. Guinée : pays aux ressources multiples, pays d’avenir. ONUDI, Vienne. Organisation de l’Aviation Civile Internationale (OACI) (2004), Airports: Vital catalyst for economic growth. Working Paper 199, Montréal, Quebec. Organisation de l’Unité Africaine (1968), Atlas International de l’Ouest Africain, Organisation de l’Unité Africaine / IFAN, Paris. Pedersen, P.O. (2001), The freight transport and logistical system of Ghana. Centre for Development Research, Working Paper 01.2., Copenhagen. Port Autonome de Dakar (2003), Rapport statistiques 2003. Port autonome de Dakar, Sénégal. Port Autonome de Douala (2002), Rapport sur l’état du secteur pétrolier national. Port Autonome de Douala, Janvier 2002, Cameroun. Pourtier, R. (dir.) (1995), Atlas de la Zone Franc en Afrique subsaharienne, La Documentation française, Paris. Soule, B. G. (2002), Impact de la crise ivoirienne sur la dynamique régionale : cas des pays du Golfe du Bénin. Réunion consultative, “ Dynamique régionale et crises en Afrique de l’Ouest ”, Cotonou, 16-17 décembre 2002.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
141
II. TERRITORIES
Soule, B. G., C. Obi, (2001), Les perspectives commerciales entre le Nigeria et ses voisins. Club du Sahel/OCDE, Paris. Sournia, G. (dir.) (2000), Atlas de l’Afrique, Editions du Jaguar, Paris. UNCTAD (2003), Review of maritime transport 2003. UNCTAD Secretariat, United Nations, New York and Geneva. UNCTAD (2004), Review of maritime transport 2004. UNCTAD Secretariat, United Nations, New York and Geneva. Villiers, L. de (2005), Africa 2005, Business Books International, New Canaan. Carte Michelin de l’Afrique Nord et Ouest (2001). Éditions du voyage, Paris, France.
142
Websites African Diamonds Plc
www.afdiamonds.com
African railways
www.fahrplancenter.com
Afristat
www.afristat.org
Airports Council International
www.airports.org
A-Z Worldairports
www.azworldairports.com
ECOWAS/CEDEAO
www.ecowas.int
European Commission (country sites)
http://europa.eu.int/comm/world
FAO / SMIAR
www.fao.org/giews/english/index.htm
International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH)
www.iaphworldports.org
Institut Supérieur d’Économie Maritime (ISEMAR)
www.isemar.asso.fr
Institut de la Zone Franc (IZF)
www.izf.net
Marineafric
www.marineafric.com
Missions Économiques (Afrique subsaharienne et océan indien)
www.dree.org
NEPAD
www.nepad.org
Nigerian Port Authority (NPA)
www.aboutnpa.co.uk
Organisation Maritime Pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre (OMAOC)
www.marineafric.com/mowca/omaoc/pres3-f.htm
OT Africa Line (OTAL)
www.otal.com
Ouest Afrique Economie
www.ouestafriqueeconomie.com
Port Autonome d’Abidjan
www.paa-ci.org
Ports Autonomes du Cameroun
www.camnet.cm/investir/transpor/onpc
Ports Autonomes du Cap-Vert
www.enapor.cv
Port Autonome de Cotonou
www.portdecotonou.com
Port Autonome de Dakar
www.portdakar.sn
Port Autonome de Banjul
www.gamport.gm
Ports Autonomes du Ghana
www.ghanaports.gov.gh
Port Autonome de Lomé
www.togoport.tg
Port Autonome de San Pedro
www.sanpedro-portci.com
WAEMU/UEMOA
www.uemoa.int
World Bank
www.worldbank.org
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
Chapter 8. TELECOMMUNICATIONS Laurent Bossard, Philipp Heinrigs and Christophe Perret (SWAC/OECD)
ness tool (working in network, market information). Although still marginal, a certain proportion of artisans also have access to this technology since the West African crafts industry also works, for the most part, in networks. Finally, even though until present
8.1. Telephone: The mobile telephone explosion
The use of mobile telephones has grown exponentially since the end of the last century (see Figures 8.1. and 8.2. and Map 8.1.). Whereas in the Figure 8.1. Evolution of telephone subscribers in West Africa developed countries the Million number of subscribers has almost reached its maximum, 8 Mobile telephone it remains rather low within the West African region with 6 8 million subscribers in 2003, or 3 telephones for every 4 100 inhabitants compared to 55 telephones per 100 in2 habitants in Europe. Fixed-line Even if the growth in the mobile telephone sector underway over the last years is greater in West Africa than other parts of the world, the future trends are difficult to predict. On one hand, a very important part of the regional population does not have sufficient income to access this technology. But on the other hand, the purchase of a mobile telephone is, for a growing number of West Africans, an essential investment which they will undertake even if it is a large part of their income. Commerce, at a certain level, is an activity where the possession of a mobile telephone is an essential competitive-
143
0 1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU, 2005)
Figure 8.2. Average expenditure per user in US$ Japan Nigeria United Kingdom Africa Egypt Brazil India
US$ per month
0
10
20
Source: African Telecommunication Indicators (ITU, 2004)
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
30
40
50
60
70
II. TERRITORIES
Map 8.1. Mobile and fixed-line telephone subscribers N
1998 96
6 2
3
Mauritania
Cape Verde 21
1
Chad
Sénégal 7
The Gambia
Niger
16
3 4
2
Mali
4
Guinea Bissau 3 2 Guinea
Burkina Faso
6
1
Benin
4
2
Sierra Leone 2
6
12
2
4
7
Nigeria
7 Togo
Ghana
Côte d'Ivoire
7
Liberia
Cameroon
Number of users per 1,000 inhabitants
2003
156 116
144
ECOWAS
Fixed-line telephone
Border
109
56
12 * 22 *
75
23 2
5*
Mauritania
Cape Verde
2*
Niger
Mali
8
Senegal 29 *
1
8
The Gambia
14
3
74
1
14 20
2 **
Liberia
26 10
36
5
Sierra Leone
5
Burkina Faso 34
Guinea
2*
Chad
19
Guinea Bissau
14
0
Mobile telephone
44 Benin
7
Nigeria
66
Ghana 12
Côte d'Ivoire
7*
500 km
Togo Cameroon
Sources: International Telecommunication Union (ITU, 2004); World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004)
*
Data 2002
**
Data 1998
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005
the West African mobile telephone market was mainly in the hands of European firms, much less expensive Asian products could change this situation. According to specialists, it is possible that this sector will continue to grow strongly, even though the limits of this expansion are uncertain. Be that as it may, mobile telephone operators consider the West African market as profitable
because all the densely populated areas are already covered by a network (see Map 8.2.). As regards fixed line telephones, “it assumes a fixed monthly payment, whatever the amount of usage. The prepaid mobile telephone, once acquired, can handle high variances in consumption. Within this context, small African consumers, where income is neither guaranteed nor stable, the possibility
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Ilha de Orango
Ilha Formoza
Et Tidra
Million
2002
Source: GSM World (2007)
2003
2004
2006
2011**
Source: Informa Telecoms & Media
2005
Fixed telephone line subscriptions
* *Except Cameroon ** Estimation
0
20
40
60
80
100
Mobile telephone subscriptions in West Africa*
Map 8.2. GSM coverage in West Africa (2006)
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
II. TERRITORIES
145
Sources: Eric Bernard (2004), "Le déploiement des infrastructures Internet en Afrique de l'Ouest"; Alcatel
SAT-3/WASC cable SAT-3/SAFE cable
LIBYA
TUNISIA LFON (1999)
Cape Town
SOUTH AFRICA
ANGOLA
Luanda
Libreville GABON
EGYPT
Cairo
Alexandria
SAT-
Cyprus
UAE, India Yemen
India, Malaysia
India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Singapore
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005
002)
N
Singapore, Australia, Hong-Kong, Japan
MAURITIUS REUNION
Djibouti DJIBOUTI
FE (2 3 / SA
Suez
Turkey
F
Co-owners of the SAT-3 cable Countries connected to the cable Countries not connected to the cable
Africa 46%
Asia 17%
SAT-3 / WASC (2002)
98)
SEA-ME-WE 3 (19
Italy
SEA-ME-WE 2 (Segment Bizerte 2) (1994)
Italy
BENIN NIGERIA CÔTE GHANA D'IVOIRE Cotonou Lagos Abidjan Accra CAMEROON Douala
)
Europe 23%
Dakar SENEGAL
Algiers
ALGERIA ALGERIE
Tétouan Casablanca MOROCCO
France
)
USA 14%
Brazil
CAPE VERDE
SAT-2 (1993)
Spain
97
(19
Owners share of the SAT-3/WASC/SAFE cables
Border
ECOWAS
Landing point
Submarine cable (start of service date)
Countries connected to at least one cable
ATLANTIS
2 (1999)
Portugal
o ib Dj nAd e
992
)
A (1
94
FRIC
19
A EUR
G LA
ut i(
146 Map 8.3. Submarine cables in Africa in 2003
II. TERRITORIES
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
of reducing fixed costs is a substantial advantage, even if one must pay slightly more for the communication.” The fixed line telephone’s future for the general public seems to be compromised in the medium-term, at least as it concerns high individual usage challenged by the “tele-centres”. It remains however an important prerequisite for Internet access.
8.2. Internet: Cable’s new deal1 At the same time intangible and very concrete, cyberspace is added and superimposed on to real space and depends upon the existence of satellites, cables, relays, electronic systems, etc. The West African Internet network developed particularly rapidly. Totally non-existent in 1994, the World Wide Web reached all ECOWAS countries by 1998, either by means of satellite or by submarine cable (see Map 8.3.). Between these two vectors, the African governments must make choices, taking into account the rapid technological changes, the insufficiency of their budgets and globalisation. These choices cannot operate at a purely national level. They depend on consultation at the regional level even at the continental level. Virtually, Intelsat, Panamsat and New Skies satellite systems are accessible from anywhere in West Africa. In practice, to have access zones depends upon the decision or capacity of an operator (access provider) to use and pay for satellite access. The profitability objective, which correlates to the privatisation of international services and growing competition, is not conducive to covering the entire African continent. Although the prices for satellite access have a tendency to drop rapidly, profitability areas will remain limited and concentrated in urban areas. The dependence of African countries upon a few companies has led to the development of the RASCOM2 project which should lead to a better appropriation of the system. But this project will enter into competition with ever more numerous satellite systems. On the global level, submarine fibre optic cables carry 80% of all voice communications, fax and
Internet. Less flexible than satellite, they have a higher transmission capacity. In 1999, the Atlantis 2 cable linked Senegal and Cape Verde to South America and Europe. This 12,000 km long link is connected to the already existing cables Unisur (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay) and Columbus-2 (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Mexico, United States). Introduced in 2002, the SAT-3/WASC3 cable links Portugal to South Africa, to which some coastal West African countries are linked and also are co-owners: Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Benin and Nigeria. Thanks to the SAT-3/WASC cable, the global flow towards the region increased significantly. It allows West Africa to access the world’s submarine cable system and to thus be linked with other continents, a possibility from which only Senegal and Cape Verde benefited until recently. The actual utilisation to be developed from these capacities will depend greatly upon the strategy set up by the cable operators. Will the ability to connect to the internet truly increase or will other services 147 be favoured (telephone, television), etc.? According to some analyses, nearly 80% of revenues generated by African telecommunications are currently diverted from the continent, because the traffic between two African countries goes through, almost by force of circumstance, international hubs managed abroad. In establishing direct routes between African countries, the SAT-3/WASC cable avoids diversion of the continent. From the perspective of the end user, it is likely that prices for services will decrease (Internet or telephone connection) and the diversity of services will increase.
8.3. Towards a West African economy of new technologies It is estimated that there are approximately 2 million personal computers within ECOWAS Member states. This represents one computer per 125 inhabitants compared to 1 computer for 5 inhabitants in Spain. The number of Internet users is almost equal to the number of personal computers. A large number of computer owners are not connected to the Internet whereas
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
0.25
1
EUROPE
ECOWAS Border
SAT-3 Submarine cable ATLANTIS 2 Submarine cable Existing optical fibre cable Under construction Planned cable
Optical fibre cable
600 km
> 25
10 < 25
5 < 10
2.5 < 5
Internet users (for 1,000 inhabitants) < 2.5
LIBERIA
SIERRA LEONE*
GUINEA*
GUINEA BISSAU
THE GAMBIA*
SENEGAL
MAURITANIA*
TOGO
GULF OF GUINEA
SAT 3 / West African Submarine Cable (WASC)
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
GHANA*
BURKINA FASO
MALI*
BENIN
NIGER*
Source: telegeography.com
CAMEROON
CHAD*
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2005
NIGERIA
Capacity of submarine cables
AF RIC
Source: International Telecommunication Union (IUT, 2004)
5
Downloaded bits (per inhabitant)
300
ATLANTIC OCEAN
S
A
AT L
A
RIC
ME
HA
OU T
Map 8.4. Internet and optical fibre cable (2003)
SO H UT
* Data in 2002
0
CAPE VERDE
LE
AB
2C
NT IS
EUROPE
148
N
II. TERRITORIES
A
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
many Africans access the World Wide Web at the rapidly growing number of Cybercafés. The development of internet access depends upon both a financial investment (acquiring a computer often corresponds to several years of income) and the quality and cost of the connection.
costs will decrease over the medium-term if, as in other economic sectors, liberalisation continues. The prospects for Internet development in West Africa are positive, even if they will continue to affect only a small part of the population for quite some time.
As regards the cost, the future solution would be undoubtedly to build computers in the region in sufficient quantity in order to achieve economies of scale. Assembly factories already exist in Nigeria and one is being set up in Senegal. In any case, only the regional market can be viable. Short of that, the region could, as is done for automobiles, resort to ever-increasing imports of second hand material. In the short term, the explosion of South Asian-made bottom-of-the-line computers on the regional market is also a plausible hypothesis. However that may be, and as everywhere in the world, the average cost of a computer in West Africa will certainly continue to fall even if this technology remains out of the mainstream.
Over the last few years, call-centre companies have developed. These enterprises work for European and American clients. Their competitive edge is in both easy access to a dual telephone-internet system and the low cost of local staff. A certain number of call-centre companies already exist in Senegal and Cape Verde. Their expertise lies in treating customer/data files, assuring the layout of revues and publications, offering off-site customer service to foreign clients (hot line), translating, etc. The potentials are large and should generate a new West African economy in the future based on using new technologies.
The quality of connection is constantly improving. With the exception of Guinea-Bissau, all ECOWAS countries’ bandwidth4 has significantly increased over the last few years. The submarine cable SAT-3 WASC and the land cables that are already installed or underway should speed up the process (see Map 8.4.). The scenario for all large and medium size towns in the region to have easy internet access in the years to come is feasible. The question of access costs remains. The hope is that
However, the dream of Internet everywhere and 149 for everyone cannot yet come true due to the low average income in West Africa as well as for reasons which go largely beyond the strict framework of new technology. The territorial deployment of the Internet is still largely incomplete and will remain so over the medium-term. The Internet itself is not enough. It requires at least electricity and a fixed-line telephone, two services which are still far from being accessible to the entire region.
Notes 1. 2.
3. 4.
The text on this page is largely taken from Mr. Eric Bernard’s doctorate thesis, “The deployment of Internet infrastructures in West Africa” submitted to the University of Montpellier III – Paul Valery, in 2004. The Regional African Satellite Communications Organisation (RASCOM) was created in 1992 in order to establish telecommunications services, notably by satellite, to cover the rural zones as well as the urban zones. Its aim is also to assure the development of inter-urban communications within each country as well as international communications between African countries. The organisation constitutes 44 member countries including all of the countries of West Africa. South Atlantic Telecommunications/West Africa Submarine Cable. Defined as the flow supported by a communication line. But the same bandwidth does not have the same meaning according to population size. Nigeria would need a bandwidth 344 times greater than that of Senegal in order to have the same bits/inhabitant ratio (which represents a theoretical fraction of the international bandwidth available for each inhabitant).
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
II. TERRITORIES
Sources and bibliography Bernard, É. (2003), Le déploiement des infrastructures Internet en Afrique de l’Ouest. Thèse de doctorat, Université de Montpellier. Bost, F. (2004), “ L’Afrique de l’Ouest dans les stratégies des entreprises ", dans L’Afrique de l’Ouest dans la compétition mondiale. Quels atouts possibles ? Karthala, Paris. Cheneau Loquai, A. (2004), Mondialisation et technologies de la communication en Afrique. Karthala, Paris. Economist (The) (2005), “The real digital divide”. 12-18 March 2005, London. Ernst & Young (2004), Cartographie du secteur des Télécommunications. Ernst & Young, Abidjan. Gologo, C. O. (2004), ECOWAS regional Information and Communication Infrastructure (INTELCOM II). ECOWAS, Abuja. Mabogunje, A.L. (dir.) (2002), Atlas du Nigeria. Éditions du Jaguar, Paris. Minges, M. (2005), African Telecommunication Indicators 2004 (ppt presentation). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Ntambue, T. R. (2001), L’Internet, son Web et son Email en Afrique : approche critique. L’Harmattan, Paris. Organisation de l’Unité Africaine (1968), Atlas International de l’Ouest Africain, Organisation de l’Unité Africaine / IFAN, Paris. Pourtier, R. (dir.) (1995), Atlas de la Zone Franc en Afrique subsaharienne, La Documentation française, Paris. Sournia, G. (dir.) (2000), Atlas de l’Afrique, Éditions du Jaguar, Paris. ONUDI (2002), Investir en Guinée. Guinée : pays aux ressources multiples, pays d’avenir. ONUDI, Vienne. Union européenne (2000), Télécommunication, quels schémas réglementaires pour les pays Africains à bas revenu. BIPE, ESMT, Boulogne. Villiers, L. de (2005), Africa 2005, Business Books International, New Canaan.
150
Websites Afristat
www.afristat.org
Band Width Market
www.bandwidthmarket.com
ECOWAS/CEDEAO
www.ecowas.int
European Commission (country sites)
http://europa.eu.int/comm/world
FAO / SMIAR
www.fao.org/giews/english/index.htm
GSM World
www.gsmworld.com
Institut de la Zone Franc (IZF)
www.izf.net
International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
www.itu.int
Missions Économiques (Afrique subsaharienne et océan indien)
www.dree.org
Mobile Africa
www.mobileAfrica.net
NEPAD
www.nepad.org
Ouest Afrique Économie
www.ouestafriqueeconomie.com
Telegeography Research
www.telegeography.com
WAEMU/UEMOA
www.uemoa.int
World Bank
www.worldbank.org
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
PART III. ECONOMY Chapter 9. AFRICA AND CHINA page 153 Chapter 10. OIL AND GAS page 169 Chapter 11. COTTON page 191 Chapter 12. COFFEE page 211 Chapter 13. COCOA page 227
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
151
III. E CONOMY
Chapter 9. AFRICA AND CHINA Christophe Perret (SWAC/OECD)
9.1. Partners 9.1.1. Trade
Figure 9.1. Africa’s main trading partners Million of US dollars
80,000
United States France Italy United Kingdom
70,000 60,000
China India
50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000
153
10,000
4 20 0
0
20 02
20 0
6
4
19 98
19 9
19 9
0
19 92
19 9
19 88
19 86
19 84
19 82
0 19 80
In 1978, the economic and social reforms led by Deng Xiaoping put China on track towards globalisation. Today, the country’s growth (on average 10% per year for over 20 years) is driven by exports in low-cost goods. The competitiveness of its export products and its raw material requirements are changing the parameters of the global economy. Even if it does not represent a key issue for the Chinese economy, Africa is directly affected by these upheavals.
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF (2006)
Trade with Africa has increased considerably: it increased 50-fold between Figure 9.2. Main Chinese imports from Africa in 2005 1980 and 2005 reaching $40 billion. However, this trade barely represents Metalliferous Ore 13% 2.5% of Chinese foreign trade. From an accounting point of view, Africa remains a marginal trading partner for Beijing. Cotton From the African perspective, the 3% dynamic is quite different: practically nil 25 years ago, by 2004, China had Wood Oil become Africa’s third-ranking trade 2% 71% partner, after the United States and France. In the span of one decade (1993 Pearls and Precious Stones to 2004), it has successively surpassed 3% Portugal, Japan, India, Italy, the UK and Germany (see Figure 9.1). Generally, Others 8% since 1993, Africa imports more from Source: Comtrade database, UNCTAD (2006) China – mainly everyday consumer clearly an importer with respect to Central Africa goods – than it exports to it – mainly oil and raw and southern Africa which have major mining materials (see Figures 9.2. and 9.3.). However, resources, especially oil (see Table 9.1.). the situation varies in each region; China is Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. ECONOMY
With regard to West Africa, practically all exports to China consist of oil and cotton. Yet these two commodities do not have the same status: cotton is a strategic supply source for the Chinese textile industry whereas West African oil is a marginal supply source for China (see Table 9.2.).
Figure 9.3. Main Chinese exports to Africa in 2005 Electrical Appliance 7% Telecommunication Equipment 8%
Industrial Equipment 5%
Transport Vehicules 8% Others 42%
Clothing and Footwear 14%
Textile 16%
Within a few years, China has thus become the leading trading partner for the exports of major cotton producers (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad). Conversely, West African imports coming from China continue to increase (see Table 9.3.). With its sizeable population (300 million in 2006, i.e. a third of the continent’s population), West Africa is an attractive consumer market for Chinese products. Nigeria alone represents 45% of the regional population and imports 42% of Chinese exports to West Africa. Besides Nigeria, the main destinations for China’s exports, in decreasing order, are Benin (15%), Ghana (9%), Togo (8%), Côte d’Ivoire (7%) and the Gambia (3%). The share of goods imported from China by Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana seem proportional to their population. However, the respective intensity of trade with Benin, Togo and the Gambia is greater in terms of the market size. This situation is due to their transiting of trade to neighbouring countries.
9.1.2. Investments
Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2005)
154
The participation of the African continent in the International Division of Labour (IDL)1 has been limited. Financial investments, mainly in the form
Table 9.1. Chinese trade with African sub-regions (average 1993-2004) Millions US dollars
Imports
North Africa
816
1,564
West Africa
257
1,568
Central Africa
841
71
51
401
East Africa
Table 9.3. China’s position in African foreign trade between 2000 and 2005
Exports
Southern Africa
2,239
1,311
Africa
4,205
4,916
Exports
* Sub-regions as defined by the African Union. Source: Compiled Data from the Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF (2006)
Table 9.2. Oil and cotton in Chinese imports from Africa (2004) Chinese Imports Oil Cotton
Africa Billion US dollars 10.1
% 64.2
West Africa Billion US % dollars 0.65 44.8
0.7
4.2
0.60
37.8
Others
4.9
31.6
0.25
17.4
Total
15.7
100
1.50
100
Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2006)
Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Cape Verde Chad Côte d’Ivoire The Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo
Exports
2000
2005
2000
2005
33 50 5 47 58 19 35 14 7 37 19 19 11 43
1 1 12 2 21 21 8 17 11 1 24 16 15 10
4 18 8 14 22 1 9 6 5 8 6 6 5 8 10 7 10
4 12 4 15 8 4 1 2 1 8 5 4 4 9 1 7 5 2
Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2006)
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Source: World Investment Report, UNCTAD (2006)
PACIFIC OCEAN
LATIN AMERICA
United States
NORTH AMERICA
5
55
125
Billion of US dollars
1970
1990
2004
FDI inflows
MIDDLE EAST
45
95
220
INDIAN OCEAN
SOUTH ASIA
CENTRAL EUROPE AND ASIA
FDI outflows (The top five investors in 2004)
SUBSAHARAN AFRICA
NORTH AFRICA
Spain
ATL ANTIC OCEAN
EUROPE
France
United Kingdom
Map 9.1. Foreign direct investment throughout the world
OCEANIA
EAST ASIA
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006
China
III. E CONOMY
155
III. ECONOMY
of foreign direct investments (FDIs), remain low (3% of global FDI in 2004) and vary considerably from year to year (see Map 9.1.). Although the United Kingdom, the United States and France remain the leading investors in sub-Saharan Africa, new countries in East Asia, South America and even South Africa are interested in the emerging opportunities on the continent. Among these countries, China contributed 0.7% of FDI in Africa between 1979 and 2002. Between 1979 and 2002, almost 10% of Chinese foreign direct investment was in Africa (see Table 9.4.). Over that period, six African countries were among China’s top 30 partners, including two West African countries (Nigeria and Mali).2 Until 1995, the focus was strongly on southern Africa. Since then, however, the scope of Chinese investments in Africa has broadened. Recently, the trend has intensified and China could become a major player in the future. In 2004, Chinese FDIs were more than $ 900 million of the 156 total $ 15 billion in FDI received by Africa. These investments should continue over the coming years for two concomitant reasons. Firstly, the gradual lifting of restrictions on the Chinese government, in order to prevent the increase in currency reserves from putting pressure on interest rates, should favour growth of investments outside the country. Secondly, China has made firm commitments to facilitate trade and investment in the African continent.
Table 9.4. China’s approved FDI outflows, by region Rank
Region
Number of projects
According to the results of a survey carried out in 2000 on 100 Chinese multinationals, Africa is a priority market for a third of them. Between 650 and 750 Chinese companies are now established in sub-Saharan Africa. The main investment sector is oil. But, many other sectors, viewed as high potential or profitable, attract strong capital flows from Beijing, Shanghai and elsewhere: mining, fishing and exotic wood, manufacturing industries as well as infrastructures (roads, railway, ports, airports, telecommunications, etc.). Of the thousands of projects executed in Africa, 500 are exclusively conducted by the China Road and Bridge Corporation, a construction company. The ZTE Corporation (Chinese group specialising in telecommunications, established in 1985) is launching into several African countries.
9.1.3. Migration Historically, Chinese migration to Africa goes back to the nineteenth century during the “Coolie trade” when Chinese migrants worked in the South African mines or sugar plantations on islands in the Indian Ocean. They sometimes replaced slaves that had been freed with the abolition of the slave trade. It is in fact in these areas that the strongest diasporas are found in Africa (see Map 9.2.). Over the past four decades, China has sent on temporary missions between 15,000 and 20,000 technical assistants in the medical sector and 10,000 agricultural specialists, among others.
Table 9.5. Chinese foreign direct investments in selected African countries (2002) Inward FDI stocks ($ million)
Accumulated value (1979-2002) $ million
Chinese FDI stocks ($ million)
Proportion (%)
3,672
5,482
Cameroon
1,505
16
1.1
North America
847
1,270
Ghana
1,610
19
1.2
3
Africa
585
818
Mali
523
58
11.0
4
Latin America
362
658
Nigeria
22,570
44
0.2
5
Europe
1,194
561
South Africa
29,611
125
0.4
6
Oceania
300
550
Tanzania
2,335
41
1.8
6,960
9,340
Zambia
2,241
134
6.0
1
Asia
2
TOTAL
Source: Ministry of Commerce of China, in “China: an emerging FDI outward investor” (2003)
Source: Jenkins, R. (2006) The economic impacts of China and India on sub-Saharan Africa: trends and prospects
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
Map 9.2. Chinese population in selected African countries
LIBYA
EGYPT
ALGERIA
SUDAN NIGERIA CÔTE LIBERIA A
ETHIOPIA AN NA N A GHANA
D'IVOIRE D'IIVO I
CA CA O CAMEROON G A UGANDA
SAO TOMEAND-PRINCIPE E
157
KENYA
D.R. OF CONGO
GABON ON ON GABON SEYCHELLES LL S TANZANIA
Chinese Population in Africa ANGOLA Population 2001, Ohio University database
ZAM ZAMBIA
Estimates 2002 to 2006 Sautmann Barry V.
OZ O ZAMB Z AMB BI U BIQ MOZAMBIQUE
ZI WE ZIMBABWE
MADAGASCAR
A AN SWAZILAND
30,000 5,000 to 10,000 2,000 to 3,000
OUTH U H SOUTH IC AFRICA
ESOT ESO LESOTHO
MAURITIUS
1,000 Less than 300 © Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006
In recent years, two new phenomena have occurred. Firstly, labour migration follows the penetration rate of companies; companies arrive with their own site and workforce. Part of this workforce, undoubtedly a tiny minority, never returns home once the work is completed and becomes part
of the illegal immigrant environment. Secondly, individual migrations of small entrepreneurs, often traders, restaurant owners, etc. are developing. This migration originates in China as well as European countries, France in particular. This trend is quite recent. Established in African towns,
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. ECONOMY
Chinese immigrants set up small businesses and import everyday consumer goods such as electronic appliances, textiles and clothing and compete with local traders. Social tensions could flare up between African and Asian retailers. How many Chinese people now live in Africa? There are no reliable figures: the Chinese authorities officially identify 78,000 workers on the continent. Other sources estimate that the Chinese diaspora in Africa – including descendents – could reach approximately 500,000,3 including 150,000 holding a Chinese passport. Most come from the People’s Republic of China but there are also Taiwanese and immigrants from Hong Kong who arrived before the reintegration of the former British enclave.
9.2. Current issues 9.2.1. Oil
(of which 80% would be imported). These significant volumes force China to be more active diplomatically and economically in the petrol sector with respect to other consumer countries. The Middle East is the major supplier to the Chinese economy. Considering the geopolitical tensions in the region, especially since 11 September 2001 and the American offensive in Iraq, Beijing has tried to diversify (see Map 9.3.) and secure its oil imports. This has had a significant impact on the regional (Central Asia, Southern Asia and Russia) and international (South America and Africa) geopolitical situation. Oil companies increase production contracts as well as prospecting efforts, in a context in which current oil prices enable the development of deep offshore sources or the operation of wells that had been considered unprofitable until now. Africa is considered to be an oil El Dorado. With the Middle East and South America, it is one of the regions with the largest number of new sources. Furthermore, oil found in Africa is of high quality. Even if states like Cameroon have no real growth prospects, sub-Saharan production, particularly by heavyweights such as Angola and Nigeria, will increase over the next few years. In addition, a certain number of countries have recently entered into oil production: Chad in 2003, Mauritania in 2006. Others will most probably do so in the future, such as Mali in 2008 or Sao Tome by 2010.
Economic recovery and the demographic weight of China demand higher energy consumption than in the past. The structure of this demand histori158 cally depends on coal consumption, for which China is the world’s leading producer. By the next generation, coal consumption will still dominate the Chinese energy profile. However, that does not prevent the country from developing other options whether through hydroelectricity (the construction of the Three Gorges dam4 is an illustration of this), nuclear energy, gas and ... oil. Oil, which is used in transportation and industry, is the country’s second source Figure 9.4. China’s oil dependency 1990 to 2030 of energy. Its demand has mb/d increased since the 1970s, to 15 such a point that China has become a net importer since 12 1993. In 2005, China is the second largest consumer of oil in the world with more than 6 million barrels/day behind the US (20 million barrels/ day) and ahead of Japan (5 million barrels/day). By 2030, experts forecast that Chinese demand could exceed 13 million barrels/day
60% 40%
9 Oil Dependency
6
20% 0%
3 0 1990
80%
2000 Production
2010 Demand
-20% 2020 2030 Imports in % of demand
Source: International Energy Agency / OECD (2004)
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
Between 1998 and 2005, Chinese imports of African oil increased nine-fold, rising from 100,000 to more than 900,000 barrels/day. This growth is particularly
strong when compared to its total imports of crude oil which only increased by 3.5 over the same period. 90% of these flows come from sub-Saharan
Map 9.3. Chinese oil importations in 1995 and in 2005
1995
Source of Petroleum Imports by China (%) Others 5% East Asia 41%
United Kingdom
Middle East 45%
West Africa 9%
Russian Federation
Algeria Lybia
Iran Saudi Arabia Yemen
Nigeria
Oman Vietnam
Gabon Congo
Malaysia
Angola PACIFIC OCEAN
Indonesia
ATL ANTIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN
Australia
159
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006
Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2006)
Source of Petroleum Imports by China (%)
2005
Others 5% Latin America 3%
Norway
Middle East 47%
Russia 10%
Russian Federation
West Africa 28%
East Asia 7%
Algeria
Venezuela
Ecuador
Brazil
Lybia Egypt
Iran
Saudi Arabia
Chad Oman Yemen Nigeria Sudan Equatorial Guinea Congo Gabon Angola
ATL ANTIC OCEAN
PACIFIC OCEAN
Irak
Vietnam Thaïlande Brunei Malaysia Indonesia
INDIAN OCEAN
Australia
Argentina
Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2006)
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006
Chili
Source: Petroleum companies, LEPII (2006)
PACIFIC OCEAN
Peru
Ecuador
Brazil
Venezuela
160 Nigeria
Niger
Angola
Gabon
Equatorial Guinea
OCEAN Mauritania ATL ANTIQUEMali
Algeria
Congo
Chad
Tunisia
Syria
Kazakhstan
Sudan
Oman
Turkmenistan Iran
Saudi Arabia
Irak
Azerbaïdjan
INDIAN OCEAN
Russian Federation
Map 9.4. Main foreign investments by Chinese oil companies 1995 to 2006
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006
CNOOC
CNPC / PetroChina
Sinopec
Australia
Indonesia
III. ECONOMY
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
African countries, mainly Angola, China’s leading African supplier (45% of its imports), followed by Sudan (18%), the Republic of the Congo (14%) and Equatorial Guinea (9%). The intensification of trade relations between China and sub-Saharan oil-producing countries results from growing investments by Chinese oil companies. They are now active, to varying degrees, in Sudan, Angola, Nigeria, Algeria, Gabon, Mauritania, Niger and Mali (see Map 9.4.) and could soon be active in Chad, Libya or the Central African Republic. The CNPC (China National Petroleum Company) is the company that has invested most on the continent. It is present in 8 countries with a strategic positioning in Sudan where it has a majority stake in the country’s main oilfields (Muglad and Melut). The SINOPEC group (China Petroleum Corporation) has signed exploration and production agreements in 6 African countries (Algeria, Angola, Congo, Gabon, Mali and Sudan). Finally, the CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation), reflecting China’s ambition for offshore operations, is above all visible in the Gulf of Guinea. This company targets deep-sea extraction which could be profitable over 20 years or more. It has entered the recently discovered Akpo Field in Nigeria. This company has invested $ 2.3 billion to acquire 45% of the capital. In February 2006, it also signed an exploration contract with Equatorial Guinea for the offshore S block (see Map 9.4.). West Africa is therefore not the current major issue for China: West African oil exports only amount to 5% of African exports to China. However, in the long term, West Africa is attractive because of reserves in Nigeria, recent operations opened in Mauritania and Chad with potential operations in the Sahelian strip confined between Chad and Mauritania.
9.2.2. Cotton Since the late 1980s, China has been heavily dependent on American cotton: it imports between 40% and 60% of its annual requirements from the United States and more than 75% from the United States, Central Asia, West Africa and Australia combined. The rest of its imports come
from various sources: southern Asia (Pakistan in particular), South America (Brazil), Africa, the Middle East. West Africa had a minor role, as in 1994, only 2.2% of Chinese cotton imports came from the West African region. However, since 2002, between 15 and 20% of Chinese cotton imports have come from West African countries (see Map 9.6.). Cotton exports from West Africa naturally target the most dynamic industrial zones. As for West Africa, it is estimated that in 2004 almost half of the region’s cotton was exported to China (see Figure 9.5.). In 2004, more than 50% of cotton from Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo was exported to China. Moreover, almost one third of cotton from Cameroon, Mali and Chad was bought by China and only 10% of Senegalese and Nigerian cotton. More broadly, 80% of this cotton was exported to the rest of Asia, namely Thailand, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and India. Chinese and Asian demand has therefore contributed to restructuring cotton trade flows.5 Over and above the restructuring of 161 international flows, Chinese demand has increased West African cotton exports. At the regional level, it is estimated that between 2002 and 2004, Chinese imports contributed to 41% of the growth rate in farming exports for all cotton producing countries put together. More broadly, Chinese imports contributed to 2.5% of the growth rate of total exports and to 1.1% of the economic growth rate of cotton-producing countries. Among the countries, the most visible macroeconomic impacts are in Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Togo. Chinese cotton imports contributed to 7% of the economic growth rate in these four countries. According to current outlooks, Chinese demand for cotton and Chinese cotton imports should remain high until 2010. Given its key position on the international market, China plays a fundamental role in determining the level of international prices. Growth in Chinese imports seems to have increased prices in the short term over the past two to three years. Is this situation sustainable? Will West Africa benefit from this new configuration? Very recently, Michel Fok highlighted that
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Source: Comtrade database, UNCTAD (2006)
* Data calculated in proportion to flows (see table)
Principal regions consuming African petroleum
Origin of exports (2005)*
Petroleum flows*
PACIFIC OCEAN
United States
13%
28%
0%
2%
1%
0%
Japan
European Union
1%
2%
9%
34%
1%
8%
ATL ANTIC OCEAN
Countries in the Gulf of Guinea
North Africa Chad Sudan
European Union 25
INDIAN OCEAN
Map 9.5. Destination of African oil exports in 2005 Chad / Sudan
United States
Gulf of Guinea
China
North Africa
162
2005
China
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006
Japan
III. ECONOMY
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
Figure 9.5. Origin of Chinese cotton imports 1989 to 2004 Million of US dollars
3,500
Others
3,000
West Africa
forcing 12,000 employees out of work. There were another 13,000 job losses in Lesotho. Low-cost Chinese textile and other consumer imports also devastated consumer product industries in several Nigerian cities.
2,500
United States 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2006)
Figure 9.6. Destination of cotton exports from West African countries in 2004 Million of US dollars
300 250
China Rest of the World
200 150 100 50 0 Benin
Burkina Cameroon Côte Faso d'Ivoire
Ghana
Mali
In any case, negotiations between China and African countries will be important for the future of the West African cottonproducing and textile sectors. The forum on China/ Africa co-operation could be the venue for such negotiations. Recently, China pledged to support the West African cotton-textile industry through technology transfers to “help these countries increase the volume of their cotton production and develop their cotton industry.” Within this context, China “will open clothing production plants and textile processing centres in several West African countries.”6 Could this episode be the first sign of a change in Chinese strategy in Africa?
Nigeria Senegal
Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2006)
“The cotton world is now very attentive to the impact China has on the development of rules governing transaction contracts. This country is currently setting out its own rules without completely following the Liverpool rules. Considering that it is a major destination for West African cotton, countries in that region should be extremely attentive to this development”. The other issue is linked to the impact of competition from Chinese textile exports on the West African textile sector: Chinese textile exports have harmed industries in Lesotho, Swaziland, Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, and Morocco. Since the surge in Chinese textile imports began in 2003, South Africa lost 55,000 jobs in the industry by the end of 2005. More than ten clothing factories closed in Swaziland,
But it seems important to put this impact into perspective. In West Africa, textile imports come from other regions of the world, not counting the market in secondhand clothes coming from the European Union. And, as paradoxical as it may seem, a certain number of Chinese economic operators have invested in the African textile industry. For example, in West Africa, in the four textile industries operating in Ghana, two belong to Chinese groups. Likewise, in Benin, of the three industries currently operating, 163 two are funded by Chinese companies. Could this be indicative of a trend that will be confirmed in the future?
Chad
Togo
9.3. Future issues Oil and cotton will remain key issues at the core of Sino-African relations in the coming decades.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Central Asia 10.1%
Australia 8,5%
United States 63.2%
Others 8.8%
Source: Comtrade Database, UNCTAD (2006)
West Africa 2.2%
Africa (others) 7.2%
China's Cotton Imports in 1994 0.9 billion of US dollars
WEST AFRICA
CENTRAL ASIA
UNITED STATES
1994
164
AFRICA
CHINA
AUSTRALIA
Central Asia 11.4%
Australia 5.6%
West Africa 18.1%
Africa (others) 2.6%
China's Cotton Imports in 2004 3.1 billion of US dollars
WEST AFRICA
2004
AFRICA
CHINA
AUSTRALIA
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2006
United States 56.7%
CENTRAL ASIA
Others 5.6%
UNITED STATES
Map 9.6. Chinese cotton imports in 1994 and in 2004
III. ECONOMY
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
However, they will not be the only issues at play. It is already possible to discern tension on the world steel and aluminium (bauxite) market. More generally, the African continent will undoubtedly remain an attractive market showing constant growth (if only in demographic terms) for Chinese manufactured products. The risk of a growing “invasion” of competing imports or imports preventing the development of local industry should therefore be taken into account. To balance this, two factors could encourage Chinese investors to finance West African industry. Firstly, the increase in sea transportation costs should progressively favour the creation of primary processing units in particular (iron, bauxite). Secondly, the prospect of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between African regions and the European Union should encourage Chinese industrialists (but also Indian, Brazilian, etc.) to produce within these regions in order to gain access to the
European market. The ECOWAS zone is, from this perspective, particularly well-positioned as it offers three advantages: geographic proximity to Europe, availability of raw materials (cotton, iron, bauxite, etc.) and a more available, abundant and low-cost workforce than in North Africa, for example. If this hypothesis is proven, it is probable that countries with non-convertible currency (Ghana, Nigeria, etc.) will be more attractive than countries in the franc/euro zone where production costs are higher. Political and geo-strategic considerations will undoubtedly continue to have an impact and will probably partly compensate for this bias. Whatever happens, many African leaders see the Chinese irruption on their continent as an economic opportunity – “what if development came from the East?”-, doubled by a political opportunity – “What if Africa became a strategic issue, it could leave the era of submission to go forward into the era of negotiation.”
165
Notes 1. 2.
3. 4. 5. 6.
The International Division of Labour is the breakdown of production activities between the world’s nations. However, the Ministry of Commerce of China does not include all of China’s direct investment. To get a general picture, mainland China's outward FDI should reach around $40 billion (data provided by UNCTAD) whereas those recognised by the Chinese Ministry (officially approved outflows) only represent a quarter of this amount. By including Hong Kong, the financial hub for mainland China, FDI stock will reach 450 billion US dollars. Moreover, a share of foreign direct investment would be financed by former Asian residents in African countries and are thus included in private transfers in terms of balance of payments. According to the studies conducted on Tanzania or Uganda, 20% or 30% of direct investments made by China in these countries are accounted as private transfers. See Bhinda Nils, and al. (1999) Private capital flows to Africa: perception and reality. As a comparison, there are 35 million Chinese immigrants throughout the world. The Three Gorges dam is located in the middle of mainland China on the Yangzi-Jiang River. For more information on this subject, see Chapter 11. AllAfrica.com: Afrique de l’Ouest : Coton, la Chine promet son appui à l’Afrique de l’Ouest, 8 novembre 2006.
Sources and bibliography Adie, W.A.C (1964), Chinese Policy towards Africa. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Stockholm, pp. 43-63. Aicardi de Saint Paul, M. (2004), La Chine et l’Afrique. Entre engagement et intérêt. Géopolitique Africaine. Airault, P. (2006), Ils ont choisi l’Afrique. Jeune Afrique, 12 novembre 2006. www.jeuneafrique.com Ansprenger, F. (1964), Communism in tropical Africa. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Stockholm, pp. 75-100. Balencie, J.-M. (2005), La présence chinoise en Afrique. Dans les entreprises françaises et l’Afrique, 17ème rapport, 2006, Conseil français des investisseurs en Afrique. Le MOCI, Paris, France. Bhinda, N. and al. (1999), Private capital flows to Africa: perception and reality. FONDAD, December 1999, The Hague. Part I (30 p.), part II (60 p.). www.fondad.org/publications/fl owstoAfrica.htm Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. ECONOMY
Braud, P.-A. (2005), La Chine en Afrique : anatomie d’une nouvelle stratégie chinoise. Analysis, 7 p. www.iss-eu.org/new/analysis/analy124.pdf Cerems (2006), La Chine à la conquête du continent noir. Cerems, Institut des hautes Études de Défense Nationale, 9 p. www.ihedn.fr/portail/cerems/cerems_articles_0601_Chine.pdf Chung-Lian, J. (2003), Pékin et Taipeh : les enjeux Africains. Géopolitique Africaine. www.African-geopolitics.org Chung-Lian, J. (2004), Le pétrole, nouvelle dimension des relations sino-Africaines. Géopolitique Africaine. www.African-geopolitics.org Fang, C., A. B. Babcock (2003), China’s cotton policy and the impact of China’s WTO accession and Bt cotton adoption on the Chinese and U.S. cotton sectors. Working paper 03-WP-322, January 2003, Center for agricultural and rural development, Iowa State University, Iowa. Favennec, J.-P., P. Copinschi, (2003), Les nouveaux enjeux pétroliers en Afrique. Dans Politique Africaine n° 89, mars 2003, Paris, pp. 127-148. Fok, M. (2005), Coton Africain et marché mondial : une distorsion peut en cacher une autre plus importante. Colloque Agence universitaire de la francophonie. Filières d’exportation de produits agricoles du Sud : réformes institutionnelles, négociations internationales et impacts socio-démographiques, 6 et 7 avril 2005, Bamako. Gravereau, J. (2005), Les nouveaux visages de la Chine. Dans Enjeux diplomatiques et stratégiques, Centre d’Études Diplomatiques et Stratégiques. Economica, Paris, France. Igue, J. (to be published), Impact de la Chine et de l’Inde sur les économies Africaines : Cas du Bénin, du Burkina Faso et du Ghana. Centre de Développement, OCDE, Paris. Jenkins, R., C. Edwards (2006), The economic impacts of China and India on sub-Saharan Africa: trends and prospects. Journal of Asian Economics 17, 2006, pp. 207-225. Lafargue, F. (2005), La Chine, une puissance Africaine. Perspectives chinoises n° 90, juillet-août 2005, pp. 19-30.
166
Lafargue, F. (2006), États-Unis, Inde, Chine : la compétition pour le pétrole Africain. Monde Chinois n° 6, hiver 2005/06, pp. 19-31. Locatelli, C., J.-M. Martin-Amouroux (2005), L’intégration internationale des industries chinoises de l’énergie et ses conséquences géopolitiques. Communication présentée au 5ème colloque international sur l’économie chinoise, Clermond-Ferrand, 20-21 octobre 2005, 21 p. www.cerdi.org/Colloque/ CHINE2005/papier/Martin-Amouroux_6.pdf Lowenthal, R. (1964), The Sino-Soviet Split Repercussions in Africa. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Stockholm, pp. 131-145. Ma Mung, E. (2006), Deux migrations : l’une ouvrière, l’autre commerçante. Dossier emploi, dans Libération, 15 mai 2006. Müller, K. (1964), Soviet and Chinese Programmes of Technical Aid to African Countries. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Stockholm, pp. 101-130. OECD (2004), World Energy Outlook 2004. International Energy Agency, OECD, Paris, 578 p. Order, C. (1965), Red China in Africa. The American-African Affairs Association, New-York, 16 p. Sautman, B. V. (2006), Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa. Centre on China’s Transnational Relation, Working Paper No. 12, The Hong-Kong University of Science and Technology, 40 p. Servant, J.-C. (2003), Offensive sur l’or noir Africain. Le monde diplomatique, janvier 2003. Shinn, D. H. (2006), Africa and China’s Global Activism. Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, Paper presented at the National Defense University Pacific Symposium China’s Global Activism: Implications for U.S. Security Interests, National Defense University, June 20, 2006, 8 p. Snow, P. (1988), The star raft: China’s encounter with Africa. 1st American Ed., 250 p. UNCTAD (2003), China: an emerging FDI outward investor. E-Brief, 4 December 2003, 10 p. www.unctad.org/sections/dite_fdistat/docs/china_ebrief_en.pdf Zhang, H. (2000), La politique Africaine de la Chine. Institut d’Études sur l’Asie occidentale et l’Afrique, Académie des Sciences Sociales de Chine. Zweig, D., J. Bi (2005), China’s Global Hunt for Energy. In Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
Websites Africa Energy, Cross border information
www.Africa-energy.com
Beijing Review
www.bjreview.com.cn/
Centre d’études français sur la Chine contemporaine
www.cefc.com.hk
Chinafrique
www.chinafrique.com
China Internet Information Center
www.china.org.cn
China National Petroleum Company (CNPC)
www.cnpc.com.cn
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Africa Department
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq/2913/
CNOOC limited
www.CNOOCltd.com
Development Centre (OECD)
www.oecd.org/dev
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
www.focac.org/eng/
Géopolitique Africaine
www.African-geopolitics.org
International Energy Agency (OECD)
www.iea.org
LEPII, Département énergie et politiques de l’environnement http://web.upmf-grenoble.fr/iepe The Jamestown Foundation
www.jamestown.org
UN News Centre
www.un.org/apps/news/
UN office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs, Irin News
www.irinnews.org
167
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
Chapter 10. OIL AND GAS Philipp Heinrigs (SWAC/OECD)
demand) and second, soaring oil demand, notably in China and India.
10.1. The world of oil 10.1.1. Still thirsty
The USA accounts for respectively 25% and 28% of total world consumption and imports. In 2005, China was the world’s second largest oil consumer and India was sixth. China’s 7.2% average annual increase in oil consumption during the last ten years made it the third largest importer of oil, only ten years after having been a net-exporter. China’s imports grew at an annual rate of 23% during the same period.
In a simplified way, the world of oil can be divided into two “blocks”: ] One, high consumption net-importing block composed of North America, Europe and Asia Pacific; and ] Another one, net-exporting low-consumption composed of the Middle East, former Soviet Union, Africa and Latin America. (see Map 10.1.).
169
The last decade witnessed only two major changes to this configuration. First, the emergence of Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union as major crude petroleum exporters (due to large exploration investments and a decline in domestic
Oil consumption in Europe remained relatively stable since 1980, reflecting on the one hand energy diversification and energy efficiency efforts and on the other hand slower population growth. Overall
Map 10.1. Crude petroleum production, consumption and major inter-regional trade flows in 2005 11.8 16.4
22.9
5.8
1.3
0.5
3.9
FORMER SOVIET UNION
9.9
6.2
USA & CANADA
EUROPE
0.4
0.3 3.1
3.5
1.4
25.1
2.7
5.7
4.4
0.3
11.9
LATIN AMERICA
Production
6.2
Inter-area flows in million barrels per day*
16.7
ASIA-PACIFIC
2.8 9.8
9.8
7.3
0.8
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
4.5
0.2 0.7
2.4
Consumption
0.2
China
0.2
16.4
0.5 to USA & CANADA
0.8
6.8 10.7
2.5 1.1
* only flows above 0.1 mbd are represented
Source: BP 2006
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
III. ECONOMY
Table 10.1. Top 10 oil consumers, importers and exporters in 2005 (in million barrels per day and % of world total) Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Consumption USA 20.7 (24.6%) China 7.3 (8.9%) Japan 5.4 (6.4%) Russia 2.8 (3.4%) Germany 2.6 (3.2%) India 2.5 (3.0%) South Korea 2.3 (2.7%) Canada 2.2 (2.6%) France 2 (2.4%) Mexico 2 (2.3%)
Imports USA 13.8 (27.7%) Japan 5.4 (10.7%) China 3.7 (7.4%) Germany 2.6 (5.2%) South Korea 2.3 (4.6%) France 2 (3.1%) India 1.7 (3.4%) Italy 1.7 (3.4%) Spain 1.6 (3.2%) Netherlands 1 (2.1%)
Exports Saudi Arabia 9.1 (18.3%) Russia 6.8 (13.6%) Norway 2.7 (5.4%) Venezuela 2.5 (5.3%) Iran 2.4 (4.8%) United Arab Emirates 2.4 (4.8%) Kuwait 2.4 (4.7%) Nigeria 2.3 (4.6%) Mexico 1.8 (3.6%) Algeria 1.8 (3.5%)
Source: BP 2006
for OECD countries a decrease in oil intensity1 has been observed during the last decades. Accounting for almost one third of production and half of inter-regional exports, the Middle East is the world’s petrol station. Although, Africa accounts for 12% of global production at best, it is the second largest exporting region with 16% of total exports. Today, Africa accounts for a quarter of European imports and 20% of USA and China’s imports. The 170 countries of the former Soviet Union,2 together account for 15% of world production and 14% of exports.
energy demand in 2030). World oil consumption is predicted to increase to 121 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 2030, up from 82 mbpd today. The transport sector will continue to dominate oil demand and increase its share in total to 54% by 2030. In addition, the transport sector will account for two thirds of the total increase in oil consumption. Oil demand will grow fastest in developing countries, increasing its share in world oil demand from just under 30% in 2002 to 40% in 2030. The IEA estimates that Africa will see the fastest increase in oil consumption, with 3.4% annually between now and 2030. Nevertheless, it will still account for only 5% of total world oil consumption at the end of that period. China’s oil consumption will increase at 3.4% annually and reach 13.3 mbpd, or 11% of world total. OECD countries will remain
World refining capacity is still heavily concentrated in importing regions, with USA & Canada, Europe and Asia Pacific, each accounting for around 20% of global capacity. The former Soviet Union, Latin America and the Middle East have an installed refining capacity of 10% each. Africa accounts for 4% of total refining capacity, of which only Figure 10.1. Projected oil consumption in 2030 13% is in West Africa. mb/d
%
10.1.2. Global trends: More will be flowing
30 25
5
Estimates from the IEA3 predict a 60% increase in world energy demand over the period 2002 – 2030, with fossil fuels continuing to dominate the energy mix (oil will account for 35% and gas for 25% of total
20
4
15
3
10
2
5
1
0
0
6
ss ia Ru
In di a
a Af ri c
e dl id M
he
Source: World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2004, IEA/OECD
Average growth rate
Ea st
sia
2030
rA
fic ot
Pa ci D EC
O
Ch in a cl .M ex ic o in LA
op e D
EC O
US
A
&
Ca
Eu r
na
da
2004
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482778402562
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
Map 10.2. Proven reserves of oil and gas at the end of 2005
USA & CANADA
16.8 FORMER SOVIET UNION 52.5
EUROPE 2.2 2.3
2.2 2.1 China
5.9 6.3 AFRICA 15.2 LATIN AMERICA
MIDDLE EAST 64.9 101.2
13
ASIA-PACIFIC 3.2 11.2
WEST AFRICA
6.7 16.7
Source: BP 2006
In thousand million tonnes Oil Gas (in oil equivalent)
the largest oil consumers, accounting for 47% of total consumption in 2030, down from 59% in 2002.
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
But inter-regional exports from Latin America will decrease with internal consumption off-setting 171 production increases.
However, it is changes in production that will have The decline in production in main consumption the strongest impacts on the world oil market. regions will lead to higher oil-import dependence The naturally very uneven distribution of proven (see Figure 10.2.) and consequently increase the reserves of oil and gas will lead to further concenvolume of inter-regional trade flows significantly. tration of production and exporting regions (see Oil flows from one region to another will more than Map 10.2). Especially OECD countries will see their double between now and 2030, reaching 65 mbpd. production drop. Europe’s production will decline to a third of today’s level and the USA & Canada will experience a Figure 10.2. Oil import dependence 30% decline in production. The increase in demand will primarily be met with production increases in the Middle East where half of combined world proven oil and gas reserves are located. The Middle East will contribute 70% to the total increase in production and account for 43% of total world production in 2030. The remaining 30% will come from the other main production areas, former Soviet Union, Africa and Latin America.
% 100 2002
2030
80
60
40
20
0
OECD Pacific
Source: IEA/OECD
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
India
OECD Europe
OECD North America
China
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482756705235
III. ECONOMY
import origin to reduce dependence on individual oil exporting countries.
Box 10.1. Natural gas is a fossil fuel like oil and coal. Most gas has been found during oil exploration due to geological conditions that enable gas to be trapped below ground. Today, gas provides 21% of the world primary energy supply. 37% of gas consumed is used for heat and power generation, 26% by residential and commercial users and 24% by industry. “Despite rising prices, after 2010, natural gas
10.2. The world of natural gas: LNG5 opening new possibilities
will remain the most competitive fuel in new power stations in most parts of the world, as it is the preferred fuel for high-efÀciency combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGT’s). Natural gas has inherent environmental advantages over other fossil fuels, including lower carbon content and fewer emissions of noxious gases.” (World Energy Outlook – WEO 2004).
This will not only add to the price of oil (transport costs) but also to the risk of supply disruptions at the major chokepoints in the maritime oil trade.4 Today’s energy security strategies of the major importing countries already put a premium on oil 172 from exporting regions that are easily accessible, hence reducing the transport time and cost as well as improving supply security. This is the case for off-shore and coastal oil from the West African and Latin American coasts. It takes two weeks for Nigerian oil to reach the American market compared to six weeks for oil from the Middle East. In addition, importing regions also seek to diversify
Today, natural gas is the world’s third largest energy source, after oil and coal, accounting for 21% of total primary energy use. With strong demand growth projected over the next decades, primarily from the power sector in developing countries, gas consumption will almost double between now and 2030 and reach 4,900 billion cubic meters (bcm), replacing coal as the world’s 2nd most important energy source. Due to the high costs of transporting gas, and therefore the need for production sites to be close to consumption areas, gas exports and imports are heavily concentrated in a few countries (see Table 10.2.). Today, only 26% of gas consumption is traded (compared to 62% of oil), with pipelines accounting for 74% of total gas movements and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) for the remainder Proven reserves of gas have increased steadily over the last decades and outpaced production by a wide margin. Although, Russia, Iran and Qatar hold 57% of global gas reserves, gas is more widely distributed than oil. Nonetheless, gas import dependence of OECD countries will also increase, particularly in Europe. Europe will import 80% of its
Table 10.2. Top 10 gas consumers, importers and exporters in 2005 (in billion cubic meters and % of world total) Rank
Consumption
Imports
Exports
(23%)
USA
122 (16.9%)
Russia
151 (20.9%)
405 (14.7%)
Germany
91 (12.6%)
Canada
104 (14.1%)
United Kingdom
95 (3.4%)
Japan
76 (10.5%)*
Norway
79 (10.9%)
4
Canada
91 (3.3%)
Italy
5
Iran
89 (3.2%)
Ukraine
1
USA
2
Russia
3
634
73 (10.1%) 59
Algeria
65
(9%)
(8.2%)
Netherlands
47
(6.5%)
6
Germany
86 (3.1%)
France
49
(6.8%)
Indonesia
36
(5%)
7
Japan
81 (2.9%)
Spain
33
(4.6%)
Malaysia
29
(4%)*
8
Italy
79 (2.9%)
South Korea
30 (4.2%)*
Qatar
27 (3.7%)*
9
Ukraine
73 (2.6%)
Turkey
27
(3.7%)
Germany
15
(2.1%)
10
Saudi Arabia
70 (2.5%)
Belgium
22
(3%)
Australia
15
(2%)*
Source: BP 2006 * 100% in the form of LNG.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
Map 10.3. World inter-regional gas trade in 2005
FORMER SOVIET UNION EUROPE 13.1
3.9
13.3
13.4
2.3
8.4
USA & CANADA
10.7
0.1 0.5
China
0.1
0.6
0.2
0.7 0.7 5.1
0.1
0.2
2.6
1.2
5.1
4.4
5.9
ASIA-PACIFIC
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA 3
0.6
3
LATIN AMERICA
6.2 Consumption
0.1
3.3 Production
Pipeline flows LNG flows
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
Source: BP 2006; IEA/OECD
total consumption by 2030 (an increase from 49% today). Consequently, interregional trade of gas is projected to triple.
In million barrels per day of oil equivalent
Already today Nigeria, holding Africa’s largest gas 173 reserves, is the world’s 7th LNG exporter.
10.3. Africa LNG trade (see Box 10.2.) will expand rapidly and account for 50% of total gas trade by 2030. The development of LNG will globalise the gas market by creating links between continents, which until today were too distant as to allow for gas trade.6 This will especially benefit production in Africa.
10.3.1. The new surge for African oil and gas At the beginning of this century, Africa is (again) receiving plenty of attention with respect to its natural resources. Although, it can not match resources in the Middle East and Russia, Africa will
Box 10.2. LNG is a liquid that forms when natural gas has been cooled to -162C (liquefaction). Prior to the liquefaction process, oxygen, carbon dioxide, sulphur compounds, water and other impurities are removed from the gas. LNG has a volume that is 600 times smaller than that of gas and is the only viable form to transport gas other than pipelines. Arrived at its destination, LNG is warmed into a gas again (regasiÀcation) and introduced into pipelines to reach consumers. Although, Àrst liquefaction dates back to 1873 it was only in 1961 that the Àrst liquefaction plant was commissioned in Arzew, Algeria. Technical improvements leading to signiÀcant reduction in LNG unit costs, increases in ship capacity and strong demand for gas have led to a boom in LNG over the last years. Today, there are 15 production sites in 13 countries exporting to 14 countries for a combined volume of 130 million tonnes a year using 179 operational ships. Japan is the biggest importer, accounting for 40% of all LNG traded. Malaysia and Qatar are the two biggest exporters accounting for 15% each. The IEA predicts a near doubling of LNG production over the next Àve years to reach a capacity of 255 million tonnes by 2010. Nigeria will become one of the biggest exporters, satisfying the rapidly growing markets in Europe and the USA. In addition, LNG development has led and will continue to lead to signiÀcant reductions of gas Áaring and venting, especially in Nigeria, and thereby reduce environmental degradation.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. ECONOMY
play an important role in diversification strategies and become a central part of energy security policies in all major importing regions.
production and transport (see Box 10.2) and to improvements in reserve recovery. ] High world market prices encourage investments in exploration, also in previously unprofitable (or risky) locations. ] Limited access to other major oil reserves, notably in the Middle East.9 ] Growing world demand, driven by China and India (that are also investing in countries where perceived risks are very high e.g. Sudan).
In 2004, Africa supplied 25% of Europe’s, 20% of USA & Canada’s and China’s crude oil imports (see Maps 10.1. and 10.6.). Gas exports are following an equally positive trend (see Figure 10.3.).
174
There are several external and internal factors that have contributed to the recent developments vis-à-vis African oil and gas. The internal factors that contribute to the boom in production are: ] End of civil wars (Angola). ] Proximity to North American and European markets. ] Significant growth in domestic (or regional) demand. Particularly for gas production, domestic/regional demand is a major factor given the significant transport and storage costs for gas. Gas demand in Africa is projected to increase four-fold between now and 2030, the second fastest growth rate after China. The global factors are: ] Intensified efforts by importing countries to lower dependence on too few exporting countries.7 ] Improvements in technology have led to significant cost reductions in off-shore oil exploration and production (where most of sub-Saharan African oil is found8), in LNG
10.3.2. Production is keeping up with expectations In 2006, Africa had 17 crude oil producing countries. Africa’s biggest oil producer is Nigeria with 2.6 million barrels per day or 25% of total African production. North Africa accounts for the largest share in production, 45%, but its share has been decreasing constantly. Between 1980 and 2005, Africa witnessed the emergence of several new producing countries (Chad, Sudan, Mauritania, Equatorial Guinea) as well as the increase in production in some others (Angola, Nigeria, Libya, Congo) (see Map 10.4.). In addition, in several other countries, particularly in West Africa, exploration activities are underway (see 10.4.2.).
All “oil-majors”10 are active in Africa and are expanding their activities. In 2005, Africa accounted for half of Total’s and ENI’s production; one third of Exxon’s revenues, 60% of BP’s and 33% of Exxon’s oil reserve additions11 and 47% and 43% of undeveloped acreage of Figure 10.3. Africa’s share in world proven reserves Total and Exxon respectively.
% 10 Oil 9 Gas 8
7
6
5 1980
1985
Source: BP Statistical Yearbook 2006
1990
1995
2000
2005
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482748667378
Concerning natural gas, large scale production is concentrated in North Africa, accounting for 82% of total production of which Algeria represents two-thirds. North Africa benefited from both its proximity to European markets allowing for the construction of a well developed pipeline system linking production sites to Spain and Italy and significant domestic demand. In 2005, Nigeria accounted for 15% of
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
African gas production up from 4% ten years earlier. But with the rapid growth of LNG and domestic demand, subSaharan African countries will, over the short to medium term, increase its share. The construction of the West African gas pipeline (due to come on stream in 2007) and the construction and planning of several LNG liquefaction plants should more than double Nigeria’s production over the coming years. Other LNG liquefaction plants are being built in Angola and Equatorial Guinea.
Figure 10.4. Geographic breakdown of oil production in Africa 000 bpd 10,000
8,000
Other 6,000
West Africa 4,000
North Africa 2,000
0 1965
1970
1975
1980
Source: IEA/OECD; BP Statistical Yearbook 2005
As regards reserves, North Africa accounts for the largest oil and gas reserves, followed by West Africa. At the individual country level, Nigeria accounts for the largest combined oil and gas reserves, followed by Libya and Algeria (see Map 10.7.).
10.4. West Africa 10.4.1. Nigeria and the newcomers After initial unsuccessful exploration attempts in the early 20th century it was in 1956 that commercial quantities of oil were struck in Nigeria. 20 years later Nigeria had become Africa’s largest oil producer with 2.2 mbpd. With the fall in world oil prices in the first half of the 1980s Nigerian production fell significantly.12 Production began increasing again from 1987 making Nigeria the only major oil and gas producer of the region. Today, Nigeria accounts for 86% of total West African oil production and almost all gas production. The majority of its reserves are found in the Niger Delta Basin, an area of 75,000 km2 which stretches into Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (see Map 10.5). In January 2006, Nigeria’s proven oil reserves stood at 35.9 billion barrels, equal to 32% of total African and 3% of world proven reserves. In addition, it has proven gas reserves of 5.2 trillion m3, 36% of total
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482738084311
African and 2.9% of world proven reserves. Over the last ten years Nigeria’s oil production increased by an annual average of 3% reaching 2.6 mbpd and gas production by 18% to 20 billion m3 per year. Oil and gas production will significantly increase over the coming years with recent discoveries coming on stream and additional LNG plants becoming 175 operational. Cameroon started producing oil in 1977 and reached a production peak as early as 1985 at 181 kbpd. Its current production is evaluated at 54 kbpd. Nevertheless, some major oil companies are still present in Cameroon and investing in exploration activities. Cameroon’s oil reserves are estimated at 700 million barrels. However, one major development over the last few years was the emergence of three new production countries: Chad, Côte d’Ivoire and Mauritania. Chad, which started producing oil only in 2003, after several promising discoveries in the 1970s, is already the regions second largest producer with 210 kbpd in 2006. Chad’s oil production comes from two fields in the Doba Basin, Komé and Miandoun and is exported through the Doba – Kribi pipeline. The Bolobo field is close to coming on-stream and will add to current production levels. With continued exploration activity by major oil companies in several new fields, notably in the Doseo and Lake Chad Basins, Chad’s proven reserves are now estimated at 900 million barrels.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Source: BP 2006; IEA/OECD
0.6 mb/d less than 0.1 mb/d
1. 7 mb/d
2.6 mb/d
Non oil producing countries
Angola
Gabon Congo
Cameroon
Libya
Tunisia
Nigeria
Algeria
Oil producing countries
1980
176
Egypt
0
5
10
15
20
Production
1980 2005
Exports
In % of World total
Proved reserves © Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
South Africa
Angola
Egypt
Sudan
Equatorial Guinea Gabon Congo DR Congo
Cameroon
Chad
Libya
Tunisia
Nigeria
Algeria
Côte Ghana d'Ivoire
(2006)
Mauritania
2005
Map 10.4. Evolution of oil production in Africa
III. ECONOMY
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
new significant discoveries are highest in the already producing countries like Nigeria, Chad and Mauritania. Cameroon Côte d'Ivoire Mauritania For example, Nigeria has set a target 52 Kb/d 98 52 of increasing proven oil reserves to Chad 210 40 billion barrels and production capacity to 4 mbpd in 2010. It also plans to triple Nigeria gas production by 2009. This will further 2,600 bolster its dominant position potential to increase their oil and/or gas production or develop new production. These countries are Chad, Mauritania, Côte 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482736841217 Source: IEA/OECD d’Ivoire and Cameroon and prospects for new discoveries are promising in Mali and Niger and some coastal countries. This Côte d’Ivoire, the regions third largest oil producer is underlined by the presence of some “oil majors” with a daily production of 98,000 barrels, has like Total in Mauritania, Exxon in Chad, Cameroon estimated proven oil reserves of 100 million barrels. and Niger and also of Chinese oil companies. The The majority of its oil wells, 86%, are located in China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has shallow marine areas off the coast. Production is exploration agreements in Chad, Mauritania and concentrated in the Espoir and Baobab fields that Niger, SINOPEC in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire13 and came on stream in 2002 and 2005 respectively. Gas was first discovered in the 1980s but only recently China National Off-shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has its development begun. Gas production in is active in Nigeria. 177 2003 was 1.46 billion m3 with estimated reserves of In other coastal countries, Senegal, the Gambia, 31 billion m3. Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Togo, hopes of finding oil fields In February 2006, Mauritania joined the club containing economically viable quantities of oil of oil producers. Production at the Chinguetti and gas also exist. Many independent internaoilfield averaged 52,000 bpd. Mauritania’s oil tional oil companies are active in these countries and gas production will soon increase with the and have, over the last decade, found several oil developments of the Banda (gas field), Tiof and and gas fields, but production has not yet begun. Tevet coming on stream. Mauritania has proven Exploration licenses are being bought or renewed oil reserves of 1 billion barrels placing it second in by these companies, several of which have a large West Africa. part of their exploration activity focused on the region underlining their continued interest and Ghana is West Africa’s smallest producing country expectations. All these factors seem to confirm with a daily production of 6,000 bpd. Exploration that West African oil production will continue to activities are currently underway with renewed increase in coming years without significantly interest in exploration and production licenses changing the regional composition of production. from several independent oil companies. Figure 10.5. Oil production in West Africa in 2006
10.4.2. Prospects: The big rush Expectations by countries and oil companies for discovering sizeable new oil and gas reserves in the region are currently very high. Exploration and seismic research activities are underway in all West African countries, except Burkina Faso and Cape Verde. But undoubtedly, prospects for
In terms of gas exploration and production the situation is different. Although, gas reserves were discovered at the same time as oil, commercial production only started recently. For the most time associated gas14 has been flared or simply vented by oil producers. In 2003, Nigeria, where 95% of gas reserves are associated, flared and vented close to 20 bcm of gas,15 the largest volume in the world.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Accra Lome Tano
Foxtrot Baobab Espoir Niger Delta Basin
Panthere
Abidjan
Niamey
Cotonou Lagos
Ouagadougou
Taoudeni Basin
Bamako
Monrovia
Source: IEA/OECD; Company information
OCEAN
ATLANTIC
Bissau
Banjul
Dakar
Conakry Freetown
Nouakchott
Banda
Chinguetti
Tiof
178 *some fields contain oil and gas
0
150 300 km
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
Yaounde
Rio del Ray
Komé
Bongor Basin Doba Basin Doseo Basin
N'Djamena
Miandoun Bolobo
Lokélé
Port Harcourt
Abuja
Kano
Oil / Gas basin Gas field
Bolobo Oil field*
Doba Banda
Countries with oil exploration
Countries with oil production
Lake Chad Basin
Termit Basin
Map 10.5. Main oil and gas fields in West Africa
III. ECONOMY
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
22
22
12
8
61
LATIN AMERICA
Source: UN COMTRADE (2006)
12
USA & CANADA
SOUTH AFRICA
1 9
2
Share in importing region total extra-regional imports
calculated from US$ trade data
Direction of West African petroleum exports Share of total West African petroleum exports,
8
5
EUROPE
Map 10.6. West African oil exports in 2005
6
ASIA PACIFIC
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
1
China
III. E CONOMY
179
III. ECONOMY
Map 10.7. Proven oil and gas reserves in Africa at the end of 2005
Tunisia 0.7 Libya
Algeria 28.8
39.1
12.2
9.4
Egypt 3.7
11.9
Mauritania 1
Chad 0.9
Nigeria 32.8
Sudan 6.4
35.9
Cameroon 0.7
Equatorial1.8 Guinea 2.2 Gabon 1.5 DR Congo Congo 1.8
180
0.5
Angola Oil producing countries
9
Non-oil producing countries Proved oil reserves end 2005 Proved gas reserves end 2005 in oil equivalent 12.2
In thousand million barrels
Source: BP 2006; IEA / OECD; CIA 2006
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
Calculated as quantity of gas flared per barrel of oil produced, Cameroon was the world leader with 65 cm per barrel. The three main barriers identified to gas utilisation: i) lack of efficient regulation; ii) poor access to local, regional and international gas markets; and iii) financing constraints for projects that reduce gas flaring (GCFR 2002)] have in recent years significantly been reduced in Nigeria.
Nigeria’s 2004 Strategy Gas Plan set out an end to gas flaring by 2008 and encouraged gas production through various incentive measures like fiscal and tax benefits and credit at subsidised rates of interest. In addition, demand for gas, one crucial factor in promoting gas production, is increasing rapidly in the region, as well as in other markets, and will spur regional gas production.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
10.6. Crude oil price since 1960
Real US$
Nominal US$
Ja
nJa 60 nJa 62 nJa 64 nJa 66 nJa 68 nJa 70 nJa 72 nJa 74 nJa 76 n Ja -78 n8 Ja 0 nJa 82 nJa 84 nJa 86 nJa 88 n Ja -90 nJa 92 nJa 94 nJa 96 nJa 98 nJa 00 nJa 02 nJa 04 n06
Figure Nigerian LNG production capacity, currently at US$ / barrel 22 bcm per year, is projec80 ted to increase to 73.7 bcm 70 per year by 2010,16 placing 60 Nigeria second in world 50 LNG production capacity behind Qatar. Domestic 40 demand is projected to 30 triple between now and 20 2010 with the largest 10 share coming from the 0 power generation sector. Demand for Nigerian gas elsewhere in the region Source: UNCTAD; IMF will also increase significantly. However, significant investment, private as well as public, is needed to achieve these targets. The West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) from Ecravos (Nigeria) to Cotonou (Benin), Lome (Togo) and Tema and Takoradi (Ghana), privately financed, under a World Bank (see Box 10.4) guarantee scheme highlights the positive impact of regional co-operation, strong demand, effective regulation and financing on the gas sector and hence electricity generation.
To date the only other country that could become an LNG exporter is Mauritania where initial proposals are being discussed. One decisive factor will be the discovery of sufficiently large gas reserves. Countries like Cameroon, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and to a lesser extent Senegal, will increase production to meet internal demand, principally from the power generation sector. Cameroon has already launched projects to monetise its natural gas reserves that are estimated at 300 bcm with proven reserves of 160 bcm in the Rio del Ray field. Gas production is projected to come on-stream in early 2007. Table 10.3. Oil and gas exports in 2005 in million US$
Cameroon Chad Nigeria
Exports
% of total exports
% of GDP
1,660 2,017 41,039
50 96 95
10 37 41
Source: Comtrade Database, World Development Indicators (WDI)
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482728682762
10.4.3. Politics and economics Fossil fuels play a very important role in the economics and politics of every country. Exports and imports of oil and gas account for the largest share of trade in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and 181 Mauritania17 (see Table 10.3.). With real oil prices at its highest level since the early 1980s and no imminent reasons to believe in a substantive reversal, the oil sector will continue to dominate these countries’ economies. Indeed, due to the price increases over the last two to three years Nigeria’s oil revenues have almost doubled from 22 billion US$ 2003 to 40 billion US$ in 2005. The positive impact for exporting countries is naturally mirrored by an increased import bill in net importing countries.18 In Senegal for instance, petroleum imports more than doubled between 2002 and 2005 from 300 million US$ to more than 700 million US$,19 a trend observed in all countries in the region. Also the share of oil imports in total imports has increased to around 20% in most countries and exceeding 1/3 in others. Thus, oil price fluctuations impact significantly and have worsened the external balance in net-importing countries. A problem that is further aggravated by countries’ export concentration in a few raw materials that are also subject to important price fluctuations.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. ECONOMY
consumption per GDP across countries. Table 10.4 shows that West African countries GDP in billion Oil consumption Thousands of US$ of GDP per barrel US$ in kbpd of daily oil consumption consume on average 30% Benin 4.3 14 306 more oil per unit of GDP Burkina Faso 5.2 8 646 produced than the average Cameroon 17.0 23 738 EU country. Four out of the Côte d’Ivoire 16.1 22 730 eight West African countries Ghana 10.7 45 238 cited in the Table consume Mali 5.1 8 638 more oil per unit of GDP than Nigeria 99.0 321 308 the USA. Even considering Senegal 8.3 34 245 under-accounting of GDP France 2,110 1,961 1,076 (due to a large informal United States 12,455 20,655 603 economy) or overestimating Source: BP Stat; Energy Information Administration (EIA); WDI petrol consumption, the overall picture is clear. The reasons explaining the relative importance of oil But these price increases also have a direct impact consumption are several: large share of trade in GDP on consumers via petrol prices. In most countries necessitating exporting of primary raw materials petrol prices have increased between 40-50%. and importing consumption goods; geography Given the already important share of transport (large size of countries, access to sea); the quasi cost in total factor cost, especially in land-locked total absence of alternatives to road transport and a countries, this increase had repercussions on most relatively high share of oil in electricity generation consumption products. 182 either in thermal power generation plants or in private diesel generator units.20 With 50% of oil The importance of oil consumption in these economies can be illustrated by comparing oil consumption in the transport sector and a high share of traded products, oil price increases impact most economic sectors.21 Table 10.4. Oil intensity of selected countries in 2005
Figure 10.7. Price composition of petrol in Burkina Faso 100% Total margins 15%
75% Taxes 38%
50% Transport 8%
25%
Price at coastal storage 39%
0% Source: Mission Économique (2006a)
This not only impacts the economies vulnerability to oil price increases, but also on policy options to mitigate its effects. Whereas in industrialised countries increases in oil prices will lead, even in the short-term, to reduction in consumption by using alternatives or by simply reducing consumption. In West Africa the absence of alternatives and the share of oil consumption in productive sectors reduce the possibilities of short-term adjustments through changes in consumption patterns. Policies should therefore focus on medium- to long-term consumption and cost reductions by providing alternatives to road transport i.e. rail or water ways; cheaper import costs (infrastructure); diversification of primary energy sources especially in electricity generation. The analysis of the price structure of one litre of petrol (Super 91) in Burkina Faso in April 2006 shows the percentage of taxes in the pump price. Half of Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
the taxes are accounted for by a tax on petroleum products (TPP) and the other half is made up of VAT (34%) and customs (16%). Government budgets depend, to varying degrees, on the taxation of petroleum products: 18% in Ghana, 7% in Burkina Faso (TPP only), 12% in Guinea and 15% in Senegal. With some of these taxes levied as a percentage of value (i.e. customs and VAT) government revenues have increased thanks to an increase in world oil prices. Although, there is no need to discuss the importance of government revenue, however questions concerning the economic impact of these taxes must be addressed.
10.5. Conclusion: Need for regional co-operation?
that is also favoured by states actively seeking to reduce dependence on imports and that benefit from strengthened bargaining positions vis-à-vis oil companies trying to acquire exploration and production licenses.26 But other political developments like de-regulation of petrol pricing and privatisation27 are also significantly improving the region’s attrativeness. Demand projections by refinery operators are already made based on assumptions at the regional level. The regional market is thus the logical operating environment and internalised by private operators. Regional integration organisations like ECOWAS and UEMOA can assist in this process of “private sector regional integration” by further promoting the free flow of products, harmoni-
The current euphoria of oil production and exploration in West African countries is overshadowing one important aspect of the region: most countries still depend exclusively, or almost exclusively, on imports to satisfy their domestic demand. Although, the region is among the world’s largest exporter of crude oil, it imports the majority of its petroleum products (refined crude petroleum) from outside the region. Extra-regional imports of petroleum products22 are 4.5 times greater than intra-regional flows.23 Although, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Ghana and Senegal have operating refineries, its actual operating capacities are insufficient to assure the supply of the regional market. West Africa has experienced decades of underinvestment24 in its refineries that have resulted in low capacity utilisation and inefficient distillation processes. Today, the actual petroleum product production in West Africa is estimated at 385,000 barrels per day (installed capacity 620,000 bpd) which contrasts with at least 400,000 barrels per day demand in Nigeria alone and around 600,000 barrels per day in the region. Nevertheless, the region is witnessing several positive developments that could significantly change the regional outlook in the near future. Strong and rapidly growing regional demand and high oil prices generate renewed interest from private investors in refineries.25 This is a trend Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Box 10.3. Intra-regional Áows of petroleum and petroleum products represent only a small fraction of total Áows and are structured around the Àve countries producing petroleum products in their reÀneries. Nigeria exports around 2.4 bn US$, or 5% of its total production, of crude oil to Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal. These countries produce some estimated 180,000 bpd of petroleum products, half of which are used to satisfy domestic demand. The other half is exported within the region. Côte d’Ivoire accounts for 50% of total regional product Áows, or around 45,000 bpd. Cameroon and Senegal make up, at roughly equal shares, the other half of intra-regional Áows. These Áows are relatively evenly distributed according to demand size, with a large share of Ivorian exports directed towards Nigeria. Total intra-regional Áows of petroleum products account for some 25% of total imports. However, besides these “traditional” exporters, Togo emerged as a new regional distribution hub. With the Ivorian crisis Togo has become the region’s land-locked countries main transit market, as illustrated by its signiÀcant imports from outside the region. According to Àgures from Mali’s OfÀce National des Produits pétroliers (ONAP), 42% of the country’s imports came from Togo in 2003. Another phenomenon of intra-regional trade is a signiÀcant volume of unrecorded, i.e. smuggled, petroleum Áows between Nigeria and its neighbours.
183
10
5
4
37
360
4
5
121
MAURITANIA
9
19
CÔTE LIBERIA D'IVOIRE
SIERRA LEONE
3
GUINEA
32
9
32
Source: UN COMTRADE, 2006
CAPE VERDE
2
GUINEA BISSAU
2
THE GAMBIA
9
SENEGAL
184
10
93
870 57
TOGO
8
23
BENIN20
25
46
28
610
GHANA
4
BURKINA FASO
MALI 9
34
Mexico
India 23
0
603 13
NIGERIA
NIGER
57
0
150
Million US$ 300 km
Petroleum products
Crude petroleum
300 km 0 Club 150/ OECD © Sahel and West Africa 2007
CAMEROON
5
2005 (or latest available)
13
CHAD
300 km
Source: UN COMTRADE, 2006
150
Petroleum and petroleum product imports in US$ million in 2005 (only flows above 10 million US$)
Senegal 1,237 Guinea 46 113 Bissau 276 14 Guinea Benin 40 South Africa 32 80 Sierra 14 Togo Nigeria Côte Leone 20 Ghana 16 d'Ivoire 27 204 32 Liberia 304 46 20 Cameroon 17 Cape Brazil India China Verde Brazil
276
USA 14 Mauritania
EU 25
Map 10.8. Inter and intra-regional flows of petroleum and petroleum products in 2005
III. ECONOMY
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Ouagadougou
TUNISIA
Kano
NIGER
Maiduguri
In Amenas
Bouri
Ashtart
Ras Lanuf
Source: IEA/OECD 2005; Comité Professionel du Pétrole 2005
Fo in Ri nn ss Pe Bra
B
on
Kribi
Gas pipeline under construction Tanker terminal or loading platform
LNG plant Exploration area
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
Petroleum product pipeline Refinery
City
Gas pipeline Oil field
Unity
Khartoum
El Gily
Port Soudan
Zeit Bay
Crude oil pipeline
Heglig
SUDAN
EGYPT
Assiout
Gas/condensate field
CHAD
Sarir
Tobrouk Damietta Sidi Abdel Alexandrie Benghazi Port Saïd Rahman Zueitina Idku Suez Marsa El Brega Le Caire Wadi Feiran Ras Sukheir
LIBYA
Sidra
N‘Djamena
Zawia Tripoli
La Skhirra
Tunis
Bizerte
HassiMessaoud
Kaduna
Niamey
BENIN
BURKINA FASO
MALI
ALGERIA
In Salah
Hassi R’Mel
Alger
Bejaïa
NIGERIA Doba Abuja TOGO Freetown CÔTE D’IVOIRE Cotonou GHANALome Lagos Warri SIERRA LEONE Monrovia CAMEROON Accra Port Harcourt e gl s LIBERIA Abidjan Limbe a E o a av s Douala Se scr ado n E rc to er CAPE VERDE ny g v
Bamako Banjul THE GAMBIA GUINEA BISSAU Bissau Conakry GUINEA
Dakar SENEGAL
Nouakchott
MAURITANIA
Nouadhibou
MOROCCO
Rabbat
Mohammedia
Sidi-Kacem
Oran
Arzew
Skikda
Map 10.9. Oil and gas infrastructure in North and West Africa in 2005
III. E CONOMY
185
III. ECONOMY
Box 10.4. The West African gas pipeline will carry over a distance of 678 km natural gas from Nigeria’s Niger Delta to customers in Benin, Togo and Ghana29. This 600 million US$ project was Àrst conceived in 1995 by the governments of Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo, under the auspices of ECOWAS, and is expected to be completed in the Àrst half of 2007. The shareholders of the West African Gas Pipeline Company (WAPCo) are Chevron (36.7%), the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (25%), Shell (18%), Ghana’s Takoradi Power Company (16.3%), Société Togolaise de Gaz (2%) and Société Béninoise de Gaz (2%). The World Bank through its Multilateral Investment Guarantee Scheme has provided risk insurance of 125 million US$ for this project. The pipeline, majority of which is located off-shore, has metering stations in Cotonou, Lomé, Tema and Takoradi and is expected to have a maximum capacity of 13 million cubic meters. The gas will help generate an additional 2,500 GWh (gigawatt hours) of electricity a year. It is an important component of the development of the West African Power Pool that will link power generation across a regional transmission grid to countries across the region. In addition to the economic beneÀts, the pipeline is also having important positive effects on the environment by reducing gas Áaring in Nigeria.
sation of fiscal policies and quality standards and by incorporating these aspects in the planning of infrastructures like storage, ports and land transport. Regional gas market integration is at a more advanced level. Gas markets are, in general, still 186 predominantly “regional” markets given their characteristics in terms of transport and storage.28 The West African Gas Pipeline (see Box 10.4.) might be the best example for regional energy (in particular electricity) market integration. It demonstrates, on the one hand, achievements of governments and regional institutions and on the
other, the willingness of international companies to invest in the regional market. Although, regional oil and gas markets are still in its infancy, the signs for the medium-term are encouraging. The regional oil market will, notably in the case of successful oil explorations in the region’s landlocked areas (Mali, Niger), need to find ways to maximise benefits for exporting countries but also the region. Nevertheless, oil will remain less important than gas at the regional level. A regional gas market is a crucial step towards regionally integrated electricity markets.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
Notes 1. 2. 3.
4.
5. 6. 7. 8.
9. 10.
11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.
19. 20. 21. 22.
23.
24. 25.
26. 27. 28. 29.
Oil intensity here is defined as the amount of oil consumed per unit of GDP. Russia is by far the largest producer in this group accounting for 80% of production and 90% of exports. If not specified otherwise, all estimates are from the 2004 World Energy Outlook Reference Scenarios. The reference scenario is calculated on the assumption that no major energy policy changes will take effect between now and 2030. The alternative policy scenario from the WEO 2004, that includes changes in policies, estimates world oil demand 10% lower than in the reference scenario. The lower demand is principally attributed to increased energy efficiency in transport. These chokepoints are the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal and the Bosphorus. Today, 35 million barrels pass through these narrow passages every day. Accidents or attacks that could lead to temporary closure of these maritime routes would heavily disrupt world oil supply. Liquefied Natural Gas. A widely accepted threshold level for LNG becoming economically viable over pipeline is 4,000km for onshore pipelines. Given the distribution of world reserves Middle Eastern countries will see their share in world exports considerably increase over the next years; the “Russian gas crisis” of January 2006 has also reminded European countries of the risks of strong import concentration. Off-shore oil and gas exploration also allows for direct shipping from production sites to markets and thereby reducing significantly the possibilities of production disruptions caused by attacks. This is reducing risks for oil companies that are producing in “unstable” regions. The world’s largest proven oil reserves in the Middle East (and to a lesser extent in Russia) are predominantly controlled by large state companies, e.g. Saudi Arabia- ARAMCO the largest oil company in the world with a production of 9.1 mbpd in 2005. “Oil majors” are the biggest publicly traded oil companies in the world, Exxon Mobil and Chevron of the US, Total of France, BP of UK and Royal Dutch/Shell (UK/Holland), each producing between 1.6 to 2.6 million barrels of crude oil per day. In general, these companies are only active in areas that promise significant discoveries. Reserves found and proven in 2005. The oil price shocks (1st 1973, 2nd 1979) were the results of reductions in OPEC production quotas to provoke an increase in world oil market prices. Nigeria became a full member of OPEC in 1971. In co-operation with India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and Oil India. Associated gas is natural gas which is found in association with crude oil, either dissolved in the oil are or separate as free gas above the oil. This quantity could produce more than 100 terawatt-hours of electricity, equivalent to total power consumption of sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa or if exported to US and European markets earn US$10 billion (World Bank, 2004). 5.4 bcm capacity is under construction – completion 2007; 24.5 bcm are in engineering phase – completion 2009-10 and 27.2 bcm are planned – completion 2010 (IEA 2006). Data on Mauritania is not yet available. Also affecting crude oil exporting countries like Nigeria, where imports of petroleum products increased from 0.6 bn US$ in 2002 to 1.8 bn US$ in 2005. Petroleum product prices are in addition to crude prices influenced by other factors like variations in seasonal demand and refining capacities and can therefore exhibit distinctive movements. This is not due to increased (re-) exports to Mali. According to data from the IEA, the share of oil in electricity generation in Africa was 13% in 2002 as compared to 6% in OECD countries. Chad’s only major power station is fuelled by oil. Due to the high price of oil, Chad’s electricity costs are among the highest in the world (EIA). The flows in Map 10.8. are petroleum and petroleum products (SITC code S3-33) and could in theory include crude petroleum. If some flows include crude petroleum, its share will be negligible given the limited refining capacity and the large imports of crude petroleum from other countries. In 2005, West Africa imported from outside the region 2.8 billion US$ worth of petroleum products, compared to official intra-regional flows of 0.6 billion US$. Nigeria accounts for close to 60% of total extra-regional imports. The major exporter to the region is the European Union, accounting for 75% followed by Brazil and India representing 12% and 7% respectively. With the recent price hikes in petroleum and petroleum products, these imports account for a rapidly growing share in total imports. With low crude oil prices during the period 1980-2000 refining margins were very low which resulted in underinvestment in refining capacities in many areas of the world. Tema Oil Refinery was upgraded to a capacity of 45,000 barrels per day in 1999, Cameroon’s national oil refinery SONARA has just announced an US$ 383 million upgrade of its Limbé refinery, China’s CNPC has shown interest in Nigeria’s Kaduna refinery with an obligation of re-establishing its 110,000 barrel per day capacity. As might be the case with the Kaduna refinery. E.g.: Negotiations are currently underway to privatise Tema Oil Refinery and expand capacity to 110,000 bpd. Although, LNG developments are changing rapidly, pipelines are the most efficient way of trading. A possible extension, notably to Abidjan, has already been envisaged.
Glossary Barrel: A unit of volume equal to 159 litres or 42 U.S. gallons. Basin/sedimentary basin: Refers to any geographical feature exhibiting subsidence and consequent infilling by sedimentation. As the sediments are buried, they are subjected to increasing pressure and begin the process of lithification. Sedimentary basins are the location for almost all of the worlds hydrocarbon reserves. Crude Oil: Crude oil is a mineral oil of natural origin comprising a mixture of hydrocarbons and associated impurities, such as sulphur. It exists in the liquid phase under normal surface temperature and pressure and its physical characteristics (density, viscosity, etc.) are highly variable. Energy source: Any substance or natural phenomenon that can be consumed or transformed to supply heat or power. Examples include petroleum, coal, natural gas, nuclear, biomass, electricity, wind, sunlight, geothermal, water movement, and hydrogen in fuel cells.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
187
III. ECONOMY
Field: An area consisting of a single reservoir or multiple reservoirs all grouped on, or related to, the same individual geological structural feature and/or stratigraphic condition. Flared: Gas disposed of by burning in flares usually at the production sites or at gas processing plants. Fossil Fuels: An energy source formed in the earths crust from decayed organic material. The common fossil fuels are petroleum, coal, and natural gas. Natural Gas: Natural gas comprises gases, occurring naturally in underground deposits, whether liquid or gaseous, consisting mainly of methane. Petroleum Products: Petroleum products are any oil-based products which can be obtained from primary distillation and are normally used outside the refinery industry. Primary energy: All energy consumed by end users, excluding electricity but including the energy consumed at electric utilities to generate electricity. Proved reserves: Estimated quantities of energy sources that analysis of geologic and engineering data demonstrates with reasonable certainty are recoverable under existing economic and operating conditions. The location, quantity, and grade of the energy source are usually considered to be well established in such reserves. Refined petroleum products: Refined petroleum products include but are not limited to gasolines, kerosene, distillates (including No. 2 fuel oil), liquefied petroleum gas, asphalt, lubricating oils, diesel fuels, and residual fuels. Refinery: An installation that manufactures finished petroleum products from crude oil, unfinished oils, natural gas liquids, other hydrocarbons, and oxygenates.
Sources and bibliography african Development Bank (2006), High Oil Prices and the African Economy. British Petroleum (2006), BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006; www.bp.com/statisticalreview. British Petroleum (2005), BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005; www.bp.com/statisticalreview.
188
Cornot-Gandolphe, S. and al. (2003), The Challenges of Further Cost Reductions for new Supply Options (Pipeline, LNG, GTL). Economist (The) (2006), January 5; Nervous Energy; The Economist, London. ESMAP (2006), Coping with Higher Oil Prices; Report 323/06 2006; World Bank, Washington. ESMAP (2004), Gas Flaring and Venting; Viewpoint, Note Number 279; World Bank, Washington. Hallouche, H. (2006), The Gas Exporting Countries Forum: Is it really a Gas OPEC in the Making? Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. International Energy Agency IEA (2005), World Energy Outlook 2005: Middle East and North Africa Insights; OECD/IEA, Paris. IEA (2006), Natural Gas Market Review: Towards a global gas market; OECD/IEA, Paris. IEA (2005), Resources to Reserves; OECD/IEA, Paris. IEA (2004), World Energy Outlook 2004; OECD/IEA, Paris. Energy Information Administration (2005), Country Analysis Briefs: Economic Community of West African States; US Department of Energy, Washington. Energy Information Administration (2006), Country Analysis Briefs various; US Department of Energy, Washington. Financial Times (2006) November 20; West Africa Gas Pipeline: Promise becomes a reality; Financial Times Limited. Jensen, J. T. (2002), LNG and Pipeline Economics; 2002. Le Monde (2006), February 14; Pétrole, gaz, une année à risques; Paris. Mission Économique (2006c), Le secteur pétrolier au Nigeria; MINEFI –DGTPE, Nigeria. Mission Économique (2006b), Le secteur gazier au Nigeria; MINEFI –DGTPE, Nigeria. Mission Économique (2006a), Les hydrocarbures en Mauritanie; MINEFI –DGTPE, Nigeria. Mission Économique (2006), Le marché des hydrocarbures au Burkina Faso; MINEFI –DGTPE, Burkina Faso. Mission Économique (2006), Cameroun : le secteur pétrolier; MINEFI –DGTPE, Cameroun. Mission Économique (2005), Le marché malien des produits pétroliers; MINEFI –DGTPE, Mali.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
Mission Économique (2005d), Raffinage, pétrochimie et distribution de produits pétroliers au Nigeria; MINEFI –DGTPE, Nigeria. Mohamedi, F. (2006), China’s External Energy Relations: Strategic and Corporate Dynamics; PFC Energy, Washington. OECD (2006), African Economic Outlook 2005/2006; OECD, African Development Bank, Paris. Pan, E. (2006), China, Africa, and Oil; Council on Foreign Relations. Petroleum Economist (2005b), West Africa: Nigeria prepares to join Qatar as world GTL leader; Petroleum Economist PLC. Petroleum Economist (2005a), Africa; Land of emerging producers; Petroleum Economist PLC Petroleum Economist (2004) West Africa: Gulf of Guinea’s golden triangle; Petroleum Economist PLC. Ruppert, M. C. (2003), Saudi Arabia, West Africa – Next Stops in the Infinite War for Oil; From The Wilderness Publications. Time Asia Magazine (2004), October 18; China’s Quest for Oil; Time Inc. Websites BP
www.bp.com
Chevron
www.chevron.com
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)
www.cnpc.com
Devon Energy
www.devonenergy.com
Eni
www.eni.it
ExxonMobil
www.exxonmobil.com
Hess Corporation
www.hess.com
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
www.opec.org
Repsol YPF
www.repsolypf.com
Shell
www.shell.com
Société Ivoirienne de Raffinage
www.sir.ci
Tema Oil Refinery Ghana
www.torghana.com
Total
www.total.com
Tullow Oil
www.tullowoil.com
Databases British Petroleum Statistical Yearbook IMF Statistical Yearbook International Energy Agency United Nations COMTRADE
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
189
III. E CONOMY
Chapter 11. COTTON Christophe Perret (SWAC/OECD)
11.1. West Africa in the international market 11.1.1. Global overview of supply and demand Since 1960, world production of cotton fibre has doubled from 10.2 to 20.3 million tonnes, representing a moderate average annual growth of 1.7%. Although there are numerous cottonproducing countries, global production is largely dominated by China (28%), followed by the United States (17%) and India (12%). These three countries alone accounted for nearly 60% of total global production of cotton fibre in 2004/05, compared to 47% 30 years ago. In this international environment, West Africa1 occupies a modest place: the region ranks fifth in the world and contributes only 5% of global production. It has, however, made remarkable progress by increasing its production ten-fold since 1960 to reach a total of more than one million tonnes of fibre produced per year for the past four years (see Figure 11.1.).
Between 1960 and 2000, global demand for cotton fibre increased at the same pace as population growth, i.e. 1.8% annually. By contrast, during this period, global consumption of artificial fibres increased by 4.7% per year, marking the relative decline of cotton compared to synthetic fibre. Cotton represented 68% of total fibre use in 1960; this percentage followed a downward trend to reach 38% in 2000.2 Within the clothing sector, the demand for natural fibres continues to increase and cotton remains the primary natural fibre3 used. For non-clothing use, however, demand for artificial fibres is increasing. 191 In the medium-term, given the economic and demographic projections, global consumption of all textile fibre should increase by roughly 2.3% per year until 2010 to reach 62 million tonnes. Cotton consumption should increase at a more moderate pace (1.8% per annum), and world demand should rise to 23.6 million tonnes by 2010.
11.1.2. International trade Figure 11.1. Global and West African production of cotton fibre (1960/61–2008/09) Million tonnes 1.5
Million tonnes 25
1.2
1 Mt
World production 0.9
10.2 Mt 0.6
West African production 0.3
0.1 Mt 0
1960/61
Forecast (2004/05 to 2008/09)
20.3 Mt 20
15
10
5
0
1970/71
1980/81
1990/91
2000/01
Source: SWAC/OECD (2005), data from ICAC 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483304824205
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
The difference between supply (depending on factors like the environment, agricultural policies, etc.) and demand for cotton (resulting mainly from textile industrial activities) largely explains the international cotton fibre trade. Although China and South-East Asian countries produce 50% of world cotton, they are today net importers of fibres due to their high industrial capacity and competitiveness in the textile/ clothing sector (currently, nearly
III. ECONOMY
Map 11.1. Production and consumption of cotton fibres in the world 3,730
5,195 4,510
1,835
North America
530 65 Central America
1,105 1,235
5,870 4,935 645 30 Russian Federation 1,480 China 955 385 475 Central Asia Europe 1,645 1,395 South Asia 350250 North Africa 975 Middle East 100 West Africa
South America
1,700 55 East Asia
655 30 Australia
Cotton-producing countries
350 200
Regional limit
Sub-Saharan Africa (Other Countries)
Production of cotton fibre Consumption of cotton fibre Average 2000/01 - 2004/05 (thousand tonnes)
192
© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006
Source: ICAC (2005)
South-East Asia imported two-thirds of their cotton from the US, Central Asia, West Africa and Australia (see Map 11.2.). In the future, upon the termination of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)4 exports Figure 11.2. Extra-regional export of textiles and garments in 2004 of cotton fibres should be geared more towards the Million dollar US most competitive textile and Textile exports Clothing exports 80,000 garment producers, namely 70,000 China and India.
45% of textiles and clothing are exported from this region – including intra-regional European trade). Between 2002 and 2004, China and countries in
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
China
East Asia Europe
South Asia
Source: SWAC/OECD (2006), data from WTO
North America
Middle Central East America
North South Russian SSA Africa America Federation
Oceania
The USA, which consumes 8% of the world’s cotton fibres and produces 17%, ranks as the leading cotton exporter on the international market. Given the weak industrial capacities of Africa, Central Asia and Australia, these areas also play an important role in the natural fibre export.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
South America
Source: Comtrade database, UN (2006)
Central America
UNITED STATES
Middle East
CENTRAL ASIA
China
South Asia
Russian Federation
Sub-Saharan Africa (Other countries)
WEST AFRICA
North Africa
Europe
Cotton-producing zone
America
North
Map 11.2. Main flows of cotton exports in the world
Main cotton export flows (2002-2004)*
Major textile industrial zones
AUSTRALIA
© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006
* These flows represented over 90% of exports from the USA, Central Asia, West Africa and Australia
East Asia
III. E CONOMY
193
III. ECONOMY
11.1.3. West Africa: A major player on the international market
11.2. West African cotton 11.2.1. Continental overview
None of the West African countries is today playing a major role in the international cotton trade. However, considered as a regional entity, West Africa is the world’s third largest exporter (averaging nearly one million tonnes over the 2000/01–2004/05 period, or 13% of global production), behind the USA (2.5 million tonnes, or 37%) and Central Asia (1.2 million tonnes or 17%). Cotton exports from West African countries developed quickly. The annual growth rate of West African cotton exports, which developed much more rapidly than in other regions of the world, was close to 6% in 1960. Only Australia registered a higher trend in cotton exports, with an annual average rate of nearly 11% during the same period.
Africa produces about 100 species of cotton grains, whose presence dates back to the 10th and 13th centuries. In countries with low rainfall, cotton must be irrigated. This is the case for most of the areas cultivated in Egypt and all those areas cultivated in Morocco. In sub-Saharan Africa, cotton production, mainly rainfed, is concentrated in the tropical zone where dry seasons and humid seasons alternate. There are five cotton basins on the continent, the largest being the West African basin, which stretches from Senegambia to South-Eastern Chad and even to the heart of the Central African Republic. It accounts for nearly two-thirds of Africa’s total cotton production. Out of the 12 leading African cotton-producing countries, eight are in West Africa. The rest of Africa’s cotton is distributed among four zones along a North–South strip stretching from the Nile Valley to South Africa. The most important zone is that of the Nile Valley as Egypt has been the leading African producer on average for the past five years.
Nevertheless, a short-term analysis of the international market trend presents a somewhat different picture. Over the past five years, South America, 194 the USA and Africa are the most active regions on the international market (see Figure 11.3.) and Brazil quite recently appeared as a dynamic actor. Indeed, this country could catch up with the level of Australian exports in 2006, with a volume of around 450,000 tonnes. Exports from the USA The contemporary geography of African cotton increased from 1.5 to 2.5 million tonnes, confirming is quite different from the reality that prevailed in the country’s dominant position. Exports from the 1960s. Following independence, West Africa Central Asia are somewhat on the decline. In the Figure 11.3. Dynamics of world cotton exports short- and medium-term, the USA, Central Asia Average 2000/01 - 2004/05 Thousand tonnes and West Africa should 2,500 Over 10% maintain their position Annual average growth rate of cotton exports 0 to 10% as leaders on the interna(2000/01 to 2004/05) 2,000 tional market. West Africa -2 to 0% could replace Central 1,500 Less than -2% Asia in second position, which will surely have an 1,000 impact on cotton supply from China and globally from Asia (see Map 11.3.). 500 For some years now, there has indeed been a reori0 United South West Africa Russian Europe Central China Australia East Asia South Middle entation of West African States America Africa (Other) Federation Asia Asia East Source: SWAC/OECD (2006), from ICAC data exports to this region. Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Source: Comtrade database, UN (2006)
South America 1%
South Asia 17%
East Asia 17%
North Africa 3%
China 46%
Others 0.6%
Sub-Saharan Africa 1% European Union 14%
Destination of cotton expor ts from West Africa (2004)
South America
(Excluding West Africa)
Sub-Saharan Africa
West Africa
North Africa
Europe
China
South Asia
Map 11.3. Destination of cotton exports from West Africa
© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006
East Asia
III. E CONOMY
195
III. ECONOMY
accounted for an average of only 15% of African production compared to nearly 40% for Egypt and 20% for East Africa. Cotton policies implemented from the 1970s within the francophone zone largely explain the development of cotton in this area.
11.2.2. Origin and development of West African cotton
Figure 11.4. Cotton production in Africa Average 2000/01 – 2004/05 Egypt Mali Burkina Faso Benin Côte d'Ivoire Zimbabwe Cameroon Nigeria Sudan Togo Tanzania Chad Zambia South Africa Mozambique Uganda Ethiopia Senegal Madagascar Ghana CAR Kenya
West African Countries
Other African Countries
Thousand tonnes
The second half of the 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Source: SWAC/OECD (2006), from ICAC data 19th century was a key period in the history of cotton. The 1850s were initially marked by a Box 11.1. Cotton: A long journey from India doubling of the world It was from India that the art of cotton fabric was exported to the Old World. As early as cotton price under the 445 BC, the Greek Herodotus wrote of India: “there are trees growing in the wild, whose 196 combined effects of the fruit produces better wool, more beautiful than sheep”. As early as the 7th Century, rapid development of the Arab conquerors brought the use of cotton to North Africa and Europe. Trade between textile industry in Europe Europe and India took a new turn, thanks notably to the opening of the routes to India and major strikes in India by Vasco da Gama in 1497. With the invention of the weaving trade by Jacquard, cotton (revolt by Indian soldiers was part of the European Industrial Revolution. The ginning and spinning techniques serving in companies in were later improved. In the industrialised countries, cotton clothing, even of the Ànest the East Indies). Later, cotton became accessible to all. The invention of the saw-gin was at the origin of the the Civil War in the cotton production boom in the United States. At the beginning of the 20th Century, United States (1861–1865) 90% of global cotton trade was in the hands of Europeans and raw cotton was mostly supplied by the United States, India and Egypt. Today, cotton is cultivated on all Àve deprived the market of a continents, in some 100 countries. major source of supply. The end of the hostilities Text from cotton file produced by Cirad www.cirad.fr/fr/regard_sur/coton.php certainly forced prices down but ushered in Valley, where the Soninkes have a long-standing a new era due to the disappearance of the unpaid cotton tradition, then the Casamance; without labour of slaves. European powers then turned to success. In the 1930s, the construction of the Office their African colonies under the pressure of their du Niger au Mali was initially designed for cotton industrial lobbies. In the early 1860s, an association production. There again, hopes were shattered. for the development of cotton production was Finally, it was the savannahs of French Equatorial created in Manchester at the initiative of a group Africa (AEF), lying between Cameroon, Chad, and of industrialists concerned about the supply CAR, that constituted the first major cotton basin difficulties. Very quickly, trials were launched in (see Map 11.6). Since the 1970s, the latter is still the The Gambia and Sierra Leone, and later in Nigeria. most important basin in the region (42% of West In 1903, the British established in Nigeria the British African production) ahead of the Nigerian basin Cotton Growers Association (BCGA). For its part, (38%). the French government first turned to the Senegal Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
Map 11.4. Cotton production basins in Africa
ATLANTIC OCEAN
yp Eg
West African B
tian Basin
Ea s
asin
Gre
t African Basin
at Lakes Basin
Production from Cotton Basin in Africa*
East African Basin 6%
u
Southern African Basin 13%
e th
r
frica nA
n Basin
197
So
Great Lakes Basin 6%
INDIAN OCEAN
West African Basin 60%
Egyptian Basin 15%
0
Climatic zones
*Average 2000/01-2004/05 Source: ICAC (2005)
It was only after independence that cotton developed more in the West of Africa (see Map 11.6.) under the effect of voluntary policies greatly inspired by the former colonial powers whose own textile industries continued to flourish until the beginning of the 1980s. These policies rely on parastatal enterprises that provided support to and ensured close supervision of producers in extension services, research, marketing support, etc. (see Box 11.2).
300
600 km
Cotton-production zones
Tropical climate
West Africa
Equatorial climate
Main rivers © Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006
Over the past 45 years, the areas devoted to cotton production have practically quadrupled, from 800,000 to 3 million hectares. In other words, cottongrowing areas increased from 1.5% to 3.5% of arable land in West Africa. Comparatively, grain crops such as maize, millet and sorghum are cultivated on 9, 16 and 14 million hectares respectively. The extension of cotton-growing areas was accompanied by an underlying increase in output from 400 kg/ha at the beginning of the 1960s to 1 ton/ha today.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. ECONOMY
Map 11.5. Land suitability for rainfed cotton in Africa
500 mm 1,000 mm
1,000 mm
ATLANTIC OCEAN
500 mm 1,000 mm
Land Suitability for Rainfed Cotton
INDIAN OCEAN
1,000 mm Very suitable
198
Suitable
500 mm
Moderately suitable 1,000 mm
Marginally suitable Not suitable
1,000 mm
Average annual rainfall 500 mm
1,000 mm
Isohyets 500 - 1,000 mm 0
More than 1,000 mm
300
600 km
500 mm
Source: FAO (2006)
© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006
11.2.3. An era of reforms and liberalisation Despite this performance, the cotton sector faced periods of major economic and financial crises. It was after these difficulties that structural adjustment policies, heralding the first liberalisation reforms, were initiated. Liberalisation of the cotton sector, observed in most of the countries, was the result of a number of homogeneous trends. On one hand, State corporations have been gradually transferring a number of functions (research and
development activities, inputs supply, production and primary collection of cotton and ginning activities) to the farmers’ unions or other private actors. In the case of Anglophone countries, this process has even been completed.5 Producers’ or farmers’ groups are increasingly involved in the overall management of the sectors. On the other hand, these changes do not fundamentally call into question some of the responsibilities of the State, which entail making or influencing decisions taken on price fixing, in particular. These general trends,
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
Thousand tonnes
1,400 1,200
Mali-Burkina Faso-Côte d'Ivoire Chad-Cameroon Others Cotton prices fell to 35 cents/pound in October 2001
1,000 800
Forecast ICAC
600 400 200 0 1960/61
producers such as Sodefitex in Senegal). In other cases, the public enterprises have been Benin-Togo Nigeria-Niger completely dismantled and replaced by new structures: the Nouvelle compagnie cotonnière de Guinée (CGC – whose capital is provided by private stakeholders and producers), was created at the end of the public cotton development project, and, in 2000, signed a 15-year agreement with the State. Irrespective of their nature, however, cotton companies in Francophone countries still 2000/01 have a number of prerogatives in the sector’s organisation, despite their dwindling numbers. In Ghana, activities relating to the production and marketing of cotton have been totally privatised and the State-owned cotton company no longer exists. 199 The State is limited to the role of the certification of seedlings and maintenance of rural roads. The same applies to Nigeria, where public authority intervenes in research (the Agricultural Research Institute in Zaria), in the certification and supply of seedlings through the Ministry of Agriculture, and in subsidies for fertilizers. 5 to 2008/09)
Figure 11.5. Trends in cotton production in West Africa (1960/61–2008/09)
1970/71
1980/81
1990/91
Source: SWAC/OECD (2006), from ICAC data
however, cannot conceal the diverse modes of liberalisation: ] The nature of cotton companies. In some cases, these companies are still in place but have opened their capital to producers or other national and international private stakeholders (e.g. Union Nationale des Producteurs de Coton au Burkina Faso – Unpc-B – in the capital of Sofitex in Burkina Faso; private companies (Aiglon, Dagris) within the Société Nationale du Coton au Niger; private companies and
Box 11.2. Cotton sectors in the Francophone zone before liberalisation The development of cotton in West Africa, notably in the Francophone area, is the result of the establishment and involvement of the CFDT (Compagnie Française pour le développement des Fibres Textiles, a French parastatal company founded in 1949) in the national cotton sectors, with the support of research, particularly by the IRCT (Institut de Recherche du Coton et des Textiles Exotiques founded in 1946). The nationalisation of cotton structures in the 1970s did not challenge the role of the CFDT, which owns shares in national companies: Cotontchad (1971, Chad), Sodecoton (1974, Cameroon), SodeÀtex (1974, Senegal), CIDT (1974, Côte d’Ivoire), Sotoco (1974, Togo), SoÀtex (1979, Burkina Faso), CMDT (1975, Mali). The sectoral approach adopted in each of the countries was based on joint modalities for a number of functions: price equalisation, the purchase of cotton seed, the Àxing of selling prices of inputs throughout the entire cotton zone, the Àxing of a purchase price valid for the entire collection season, and the payment on collection of inputs supplied to farmers by the cotton company without trade margin, obligation and exclusive purchase of the entire harvest by the cotton company. Source: Le coton en Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre. Situation et perspectives. Ministère français de la coopération et du développement (1991).
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. ECONOMY
Map 11.6. Evolution of cotton-production basins between 1960 and 2000
1960s
ATLANTIC OCEAN
MAURITANIA MALI
400
SENEGAL
NIGER
CHAD
800
THE GAMBIA 1% GUINEA BISSAU
BURKINA FASO
GUINEA SIERRA LEONE
BENIN
15% CÔTE D'IVOIRE
4%
GHANA
38% 42%
NIGERIA
TOGO
LIBERIA CAMEROON 200
0 150 300 km
© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006
2000s
ATLANTIC OCEAN
MAURITANIA MALI SENEGAL
400
THE GAMBIA
800
GUINEA BISSAU
NIGER BURKINA FASO
3% GUINEA
51%
7% BENIN
22% CÔTE GHANA TOGO D'IVOIRE
SIERRA LEONE
CHAD
17%
NIGERIA
LIBERIA CAMEROON 0 150 300 km
© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006 Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
] The functions of State-owned cotton companies. In some countries, these functions are limited to ginning, while other activities are carried out by private actors or farmers’ groups: in Benin, the Sonapra manages 12 ginning factories out of the 20 in operation; in Togo, liberalisation opened the market to three new operators, apart from Sotoco, for ginning and spinning activities. In The Gambia, Gamcot, a private company, manages the collection and ginning of cotton, agricultural supervision, with Sodefitex (Senegal) ensuring the technical and financial aspects. In other countries, including Burkina Faso, liberalisation adhered to the integrated sector principle, where each cotton company is responsible for organising the production, processing and marketing of cotton fibre. ] The restructuring of the sector and creation of new cotton companies were sometimes accompanied by a geographical redefinition of their activities. This is the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, where three companies share the territory: CIDT Nouvelle in the South,
Ivoire Coton in the North-West and LCCI in the North-East. In Burkina Faso, if Sofitex has conserved its role in the West, Faso Coton has taken over the Central zone and Socoma the East zone. This configuration could be adopted in Mali from 2008, or for the impending privatisation of Sodecoton (Cameroon) or Cotontchad (Chad). Subject to different and sometimes divergent national policies, cotton producers do not share the same access to extension, training, input supply and marketing services, as this will vary depending on which side of the border they are situated. Yet, the cotton-producing basins are situated along the borders (see Maps 11.7. and 11.8.). Will the process of liberalising national sectors gradually eliminate these policy disparities? The fact is that these processes today are conducted without consultation between the countries, which adopt different approaches to liberalisation. The implementation of cross-border co-operation strategies and the harmonisation of national
Map 11.7. Focus on cotton-producing zones in Burkina Faso (2001/02) Bord e Mali/ rs of the Côte Burk d ina F ’Ivoire/ aso C otton
basin
ali/ a e M urkin h t of ire/B sin o art He e d’Iv ton ba t t Cô o Co Fas
B Be ord T n ers Co ogo in/B of tto /Ni urk the n ge in ba r a Fa sin s
o/
Production 2001/02
In tonnes More than 50,000 30,000 – 40,000 20,000 – 30,000 10,000 – 20,000 5,000 – 10,000 Less than 5,000
Source: Economic and Social Importance of Cotton in West Africa: Role of Cotton in Development, Trade and Livelihoods. SWAC/OECD, November 2005
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006
201
III. ECONOMY
policies have become necessary today. It is in this spirit that ECOWAS intends to promote the “development of cross-border co-operation ties among the different national cotton companies in order to harmonise their strategies and methods of intervention, reduce costs of inputs, develop synergies and reduce costs of collection, ginning and transportation to the ports”.
11.3. Regional stakes of development
Cotton is cultivated in all the sub-humid and semi-arid zones with an annual rainfall of between 500–700 mm and 1,200–1,500 mm. Hence the crop is found in both the Northern zones of the coastal countries (Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Togo) and the Southern zones of the landlocked countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad). Cotton is also cultivated in the centre and even the south of Benin and Togo, as it has adapted to the rainfall characteristics of this region (see Map 11.8.).
These transnational basins are scattered with ginning factories (there are nearly 100 in West Africa, compared to 1,000 in the USA, whose cotton grain production is four times higher). It is from these factories that cotton is transported by road or rail to the ports of the coastal countries. Until 1999, most of the Sahelian cotton was exported through the port of Abidjan. The Ivorian crisis has compelled the economic operators to use other transit corridors as in the case of cotton from Burkina Faso, which is directed to the port of Lomé and to a lesser extent, that of Tema.
These environmental determinants make the West African cotton zones basically cross border areas. The most important of them is situated along the border areas of Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. Benin and Togo share most of the second basin.
These exports earn significant external (and budgetary) resources for national economies and have varied impacts, depending on their economic structure (see Table 11.1.).
11.3.1. Regional basins for national wealth
202
The third is centred on Northern Cameroon and Southern Chad. The fourth is basically Nigerian. A fifth basin, though marginal at the regional level, lies between Senegal, Eastern Gambia, part of Northern Guinea and the North-East of GuineaBissau. Some of these areas are bound by highly powerful socio-cultural links: the Hausa zone between Nigeria and Niger or the Senoufo zone between Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Burkina Faso.
Table 11.1. Macroeconomic importance of cotton in West Africa Average 2000-2004 Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Cape Verde Chad Côte d’Ivoire Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone The Gambia Togo
Cotton fibre exports (million US$) 142.5 154 102.8 59.7 147.7 5.3 0.2 0.1 188.1 0.2 31.8 17.5 0.2 39.6
Share in West African cotton exports 16% 17% 11% 7% 17% 1% 21% 4% 2% 4%
Share in the country’s agricultural exports 70% 75% 20% 52% 6% 1% 63% 7% 11% 38%
Share in the country’s total exports 30% 56% 7% 30% 4% 1% 30% 9% 8%
Source: FAOSTAT (2006)
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006
50 Road Ginning factory
Sahelian cotton
260 200
Cotton exports through the ports (2003)
National cotton Rail Heart of the cotton basin
Abidjan OCEAN
Means of cotton exports
Douala Cotonou Lomé
agos Lagos
Tem Te TTema e ATLANTIC TLANTIC
Conakry ryy
Bissau iss ssau
Banjul jul u ul 1,200 m m 1,500 mm
Dakar
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Thousand tonnes
300 km 15 150 0
mm
50 0 Source: FAOSTAT (2006)
500,000
200,000 950,000 OCEAN
Production from cotton basins
(tonnes of cotton seeds)
20,000 ATLANTIC
Map 11.8. Cotton zones, ginning factories and exports of West Africa
1
350,000
1,200 mm m 0m ,50
It is estimated that two to three million West African households cultivate cotton on part of their farms; the average cotton farm is one to two hectares. In
the vast majority of cases, cotton is produced with relatively few resources and family labour, which is not highly paid compared to deve-loped countries. This general observation, however, conceals the heterogeneous nature of the types of farms. While smallholder family farms, that may be under-
Limit mit of cotton-producing basin
11.3.2. From cotton production to development of grains and livestock breeding
203
III. ECONOMY
Figure 11.6. Parallel trends of cotton and grain production in West Africa Thousand tonnes
Thousand tonnes
50,000
3,500 Cereal production
45,000 40,000
3,000
Cotton seed production
35,000
2,500
30,000
2,000
25,000 20,000
1,500
15,000
1,000
10,000 500
5,000 0
0 1961
1966
1971
1976
1981
1986
1991
1996
2001
Source: SWAC/OECD (2006), data from FAOSTAT
Figure 11.7. Estimated distribution of UEMOA textile market Local production
204
Fraudulant Imports
Second-hand Clothing
In the sparsely populated sub-humid savannahs, the appearance of cash crops has facilitated the development of animal draught cultivation, as these activities make it possible to earn the necessary income to purchase the materials and animals. In the case of cotton pioneers, animal draught cultivation was used to limit weed invasion through tilling before sowing and through mechanical weeding. However, all cotton-growing zones in the region are not uniformly affected by this phenomenon; as the rates of recorded use of animal draught differs at the centre of the main West African cotton basin: nearly 60% of the cotton farms in Burkina Faso, 85% in Mali6 (see Map 11.9.).
11.3.3. The textile industry
Source: UEMOA (2003)
West Africa’s cotton production is generally underexploited;7 most of the fibre produced is exported to the international market. However, the situation is quite different in Francophone countries than in Anglophone countries. In Francophone countries more than 90% of the cotton produced is exported in the form of fibres whereas in Anglophone countries 90% and 65% of Nigerian and Ghanaian cotton respectively were consumed locally by the textile industry from 1993/94 to 2003/04, for example.
Imports
equipped or not equipped at all, form the vast majority of farms, slightly larger plantations (two to five hectares) have developed as a result of animal traction. There is also a small number of farms (20–30 ha) that mainly use family workers, but with considerable agricultural equipment for animal traction or motorised cultivation. Cotton production is never, or almost never, the sole activity practised on a farm, even if it is often the main activity. It has given rise to the development of the practice of mixed cultivation in association with millet, sorghum and, more recently, maize. The succession of cotton and grains on the same plot enables the second crop to benefit from the aftereffect of fertilizers carried by the first. This explains to some extent why cotton and grain production levels have followed the same trend since the 1980s (see Figure 11.6.).
While the first industrial plants were set up from the 1950s, it was only during the 1965–1985 period that West Africa witnessed the birth and development of the textile industry under the effect of voluntary policies implemented by the State. This “boom” period was followed by difficult years marked by the crisis in public enterprises, structural adjustments, devaluation of the CFA franc as well as competition from secondhand
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
clothing imported from developed countries and Asian textiles (see Figure 11.7.). This situation triggered a de-industrialisation process within the UEMOA zone. There were 41 industrial plants in 1980 as compared to about twenty operating today. In Nigeria, the sector professionals were equally concerned about the situation. While in 1999, there were about 100 factories based mainly in Lagos and Kaduna, today only about 20 or 40 are still operating, according to sources. There are two contradictory trends for the future: firstly, the AGOA8 agreements and the implementation of a regional policy capitalising on the textile chain within the UEMOA would improve industrial activities in the region.9 Secondly, however, the end of the ATC Agreements should intensify competition from countries like India and China, unless a regional trade policy coherent with the industrial strategy is promoted. Beyond the industrial level, the artisanal textile and traditional clothing sector (weaving, dyeing, manufacturing and selling of materials, etc.) is the second largest employer in West Africa, after agriculture. Between 65 and 70% of Malian artisans, 50% of Burkinabe artisans and 30 to 40% of Ghanaian artisans are operating in the traditional textile sector.
11.4. A doubly regional future The position of West Africa on the international market and the development prospects of the cotton sector at the regional and international levels depend on a number of internal and external factors (emergence of new producing countries, development of biotechnological cotton, competition from synthetic fibres, euro/dollar exchange rates, oil prices, etc.). Among these factors, the fight against agricultural subsidies constituted a major and highly-publicised challenge for West African cotton. The results obtained from the Doha Round Negotiations on cotton are relatively encouraging. West African countries, in collaboration with representatives of NGOs and professional organisations, have proven their ability to influence decisions made by international bodies. According to an official WTO communiqué issued during the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005: Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Box 11.3. The Sikasso region in Mali: From cash crop agriculture to commercial agriculture Cotton cultivation is a very old activity in Mali. It was imposed as an export crop by the colonial administration. One agency (CMDT) took over the cultivation, collection and ginning activities. CMDT compels farmers to increase their output (from 200 kg to 1,600 kg), by limiting the areas cultivated and fertilizer use. The farmers quickly understood that the fertilizer Ànanced by cotton can also be used for food cultivation (they sometimes “divert” part of the fertilizer to this end). Cotton revenues are Àrst invested in the increase of the herd as a form of savings; then the revenues are used to purchase draught animals and ploughs. When the pressure from CMDT eases, farmers use animaldrawn ploughs to increase the cultivated area. At the same time, given the growth in urban, local and regional demand for food, grains, particularly maize, have become traded crops. Between 1984 and 1997 in the Sikasso region, the average area cultivated by each farmer increased from one to three or four hectares. From 1977–1997, maize production increased from 10,000 to 70,000 tonnes. At the same time, cotton farming areas increased from 15,000 to 78,000 hectares with a decline in output. On a farm of 85 hectares, the distribution between cotton and grains is set at around 30 hectares for cotton/55 hectares for grain. An initial system of land repartition for crop rotation and the use of livestock for agricultural practices has taken the place of traditional shifting cultivation. The next challenge to be addressed is the disappearance of fallow lands and the need for soil regeneration. Source: ECOLOC Study, Sikasso (Mali), Club du Sahel / OECD, July 1998
Sikasso Zone cotton and maize production Cotton
1,500 t/ha
1,000 Maize 500 62
76
84
92 97
205
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIA
GUINEA
MAURITANIA
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
Source: CIRAD, Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD (2006)
ATLANTIC OCEAN
GUINEA BISSAU
THE GAMBIA
SENEGAL
ATLANTIC OCEAN
206
GHANA
BURKINA FASO
MALI
TOGO
BENIN
150
300 km
© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2006
0
Use of cattle for tilling by animal traction
< 30%
CAMEROON
Use of mules and horses for sowing, weeding, collection and transportation
> 90%
CHAD
Use of cattle for animal traction mules and horses for transportation
20 to 40%
NIGER
Use of cattle for animal traction mules and horses for transportation
Use of animals for carrying, transporting and watering
Cotton zone
40 to 75%
NIGERIA
Percentage of equipped farms
Map 11.9. Animal traction and cotton-producing zones in West Africa
III. ECONOMY
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
] “All forms of export subsidies for cotton will be eliminated by developed countries in 2006. ] On market access, developed countries will give duty and quota free access for cotton exports from the least developed countries (LDCs) from the commencement of the implementation period. ] Members agree that the objective is that, as an outcome of the negotiations, trade distorting domestic subsidies for cotton production be reduced more ambitiously than under whatever general formula is agreed and that it should be implemented over a shorter period of time than generally applicable. We commit ourselves to give priority in the negotiations to reach such an outcome”.
Figure 11.8. The cotton industry in West Africa Cotton production
Extra-regional exports
50%
40%
90% Intra-regional exports
Cotton fibre 10%
Loss 10%
Cotton seeds
Spining Oil and soap Oilcakes mill
Seeds Weaving
Market (regional or export)
Dyeing and printing Use of imported products
Industrial clothes (Wax, Fancy, etc.) Craft cloths (Kente, Mandjack, etc.)
Clothing industry
Source: SWAC/OECD 2006
Table 11.2. List of industrial units involved in the cotton sector in West Africa (2006 or the most recent year) Ginning factories Number of factories Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Chad Côte d’Ivoire The Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Mali Niger
20 15 9 10 12 1 n.a. 1 1 17 2
Oil factories
Ginning Cotton grain capacity production (tonnes) (2000-05) 650,000 535,000 300,000 230,000 420,000 10,000 n.a. n.a. n.a. 600,000 60,000
415,000 432,000 219 000 198,000 346 000 5,000 20,000 49,000 4,000 515,000 10,000
Textiles
Industrial units 2 1 1 1 1 n.a. 3 -
4 (incl. 1 inoperative) 2 5 1 (closed)) 2 (incl. 8 inoperative) 5 1 2 2 (incl. 1 inoperative) About 100 (incl. 60-80 inoperative) 12 (incl. 4 inoperative) 4 (incl. 2 inoperative )
Although the trade negotiations carried out within the framework of the Doha Development Round are currently suspended, the main lesson from the process carried out within the WTO is that it is absolutely necessary to reach a regional Nigeria 2 n.a. 378,000 n.a. understanding. This co-operation, Senegal 5 65,000 41,000 n.a. which directly involved four West Togo 6 200,000 162,000 1 African cotton-producing coun- Source: Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD (2006) tries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali), should be extended to other West African producing countries. Speaking as of the its systems and the capacity of West African one, these countries would be in a position to defend cotton sectors to organise themselves to meet the interests of this third world exporter, namely West growing demand. An approach to these challenges Africa. The future, therefore, belongs to a Common at the level of the cotton zone, i.e. cross-border Cotton Policy facing the challenges of the internabasin, deserves particular attention, in that regard. tional market, particularly China;10 and also in the The future of West African cotton may, therefore, be perceived as “doubly regional”; that is, as face of the challenge of the “rebirth” of the textile regional at the “macro” level so that West Africa can industry in the region. capitalise on its position internationally, as well as regional at the more “micro” level of the crossThe future of West African cotton will also depend border production basins. on the its cost/ quality ratio, on the sustainability Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
207
III. ECONOMY
Notes 1. 2. 3.
West Africa is defined here as the region composed of ECOWAS member countries, Cameroon, Mauritania and Chad. Source: UNCTAD, see www.unctad.org/infocomm/anglais/cotton/uses.htm The three main markets for cotton fibre are: clothing (60%), furnishings (about 33%) and professional clothing (5%). Cotton is also used for manufacturing specific textiles and for medical purposes. 4. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC): WTO Agreement on Textiles and Garments aims at integrating trade in this sector into the GATT regulations framework; expiry date: 1 January 2005. See WTO Glossary: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/glossary_e.htm. 5. Ghana was the first country to implement liberalization reforms in 1985, with the privatisation of the Cotton Development Board (CDB), now the Ghana Cotton Company Ltd, GCCL). The State holds 30% of its capital, apart from other shareholders: textile companies, input suppliers and the Agricultural Development Bank 6. DAGRIS (2002): Les filières partenaires. 7. If the textile industry alone is discussed here, it should be noted that cotton grain is largely processed in West Africa, particularly to extract the oil for human consumption and the cotton seed cake for cattle feed; these activities will be discussed in another chapter of the Atlas. With an output of 3.9 million tonnes, cotton oil is ranked fifth in terms of global cooking oil consumption. Oil cake ranks sec ond in animal feed consumption, behind soya. 8. AGOA: African Growth Opportunity Act. Promulgated on 18 May 2000 by President Bill Clinton, this law enables sub-Saharan African countries to export to the United States, duty and quota free, products that meet defined eligibility rules of which 14 West African countries are today eligible. 9. The UEMOA’s textile development strategy provides for “a dynamic regional textile industry, for processing 25% of local cotton production, creating 50,000 industrial jobs”. See the study on the identification and promotion of regional industrial units in the UEMOA cotton sector (March 2003). 10. According to current projections, Chinese cotton demand and imports should remain high until 2010. West Africa seems to have accounted for this change: 46% of its cotton was exported to China in 2004, contributing to nearly 20% of the total cotton imports of China. Can this situation be sustained? Will West Africa benefit from this new situation?
Sources and bibliography AFD (2006), La fin des quotas textiles. La lettre des économistes de l’AFD, n° 11, janvier 2006, Paris. Baffes, J. (2004), Cotton. Market setting, trade policies, and issues. World Bank Policy Research, Working paper 3218, February 2004, Washington DC. CEDEAO (2004), Cadre de politique agricole pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest. ECOWAP. Document de référence pour la première phase de consultations nationales. Juillet 2004.
208
Cheng, F., B. A. Babcock (2003), China’s cotton policy and the impact of China’s WTO accession and Bt cotton adoption on the Chinese and U.S. cotton sectors. Working paper 03-WP-322, Center for agricultural and rural development, Iowa State University, January 2003, Iowa. Club du Sahel (1998), L’économie locale de Sikasso, Mali. Etude de cas du programme “ Relance des activités locales en Afrique de l’Ouest ". Club du Sahel/OCDE, juillet 1998, Paris. CIRAD (2006), Dossier Coton. See: www.cirad.fr/fr/regard_sur/coton.php. CIRDES (2003), Traction animale et stratégies d’acteurs : quelle recherche, quels services face au désengagement des États ? Atelier international d’échange, 17-21 novembre 2003, Bobo Dioulasso. Dahou, K., T. Dahou et C. Gueye (2002), Espaces frontaliers et intégration régionale. Le cas de SKBo. Enda Tiers Monde, Dakar. Dagris (2005), Production cotonnière Africaine – Campagne 2004/05. Note de conjoncture n° 8, novembre 2005, Paris. FAO (2003), Medium-term Prospects for Agricultural Commodities, Committee on Commodity Problems, 64th Session, 18-21 March 2003, Rome. Estur, G. (2005) Situation et perspectives du marché mondial du coton. ICAC, 8 avril 2005, Washington. Estur, G. (2005) The competitiveness of African Cotton on the World Market. ICAC, January 2005, Washington. Fok, M. (2005), Coton Africain et marché mondial : une distorsion peut en cacher une autre plus importante. Colloque Agence universitaire de la francophonie. Filières d’exportation de produits agricoles du Sud : réformes institutionnelles, négociations internationales et impacts socio-démographiques, 6 et 7 avril 2005, Bamako. Goreux, L., J. Macrae (2003), Réformes des filières cotonnières en Afrique subsaharienne. Juillet 2003, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, juillet 2003, Paris. Harsmar, M. (2004), Indigenous institutions – Constraint or refuge? The case of agricultural dynamism at the Mossi Plateau in Burkina Faso. Unpublished report. Sweden. Igue, J. (2003), Le secteur informel en Afrique de l’Ouest : Le cas du tissu traditionnel. Dans L’Afrique de l’Ouest dans la compétition mondiale. Quels atouts possibles ? J. Damon et J.O. Igue (eds) Karthala/SWAC-OECD. Lagandre, D. (2005), Le secteur cotonnier en zone franc, entre succès et dépendance. AFD, Rapport thématique Jumbo, septembre 2005, Paris.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
MacDonald, S., T. Vollrath (2005), The forces shaping World cotton consumption after the Multifiber Arragement. USDA, Electronic outlook report from the economic research service, April 2005. Ministère de la Coopération et du Développement (1991), Le coton en Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre. Situation et perspectives. Groupe de travail de la Coopération française, Paris. Nubukpo, K. (2004), L’avenir des filières cotonnières ouest-Africaines : quelles perspectives après Cancun ? Communication à la Commission Économique de la Francophonie, 7 avril 2004, Paris. OECD (2004), A New World Map in Textiles and Clothing: Adjusting to Change. Organisation for Economic and Development Co-operation (OECD), Paris. Orsena, Erik (2006), Voyage aux pays du coton. Petit précis de mondialisation. Fayard édition, Paris. Perrin, S., D. Lagandre (2005), Le coton Africain face à la concurrence du marché mondial. AFD, Rapport thématique Jumbo n° 6, septembre 2005, Paris. See: www.unctad.org/sections/dite_fdistat/docs/ china_ebrief_en.pdf. Sahel and West Africa Club (2005), Economic and social importance of cotton in West Africa: role of cotton in development, trade and livelihoods. SWAC/OECD, November 2005, Paris. Sow, H. (1999), L’industrie textile dans les pays de l’UEMOA. Centre pour le développement de l’entreprise (CDE). Partenariat n° 41, mars-avril 1999. See: www.cde.int/files/pubs/13/Partenariat41.pdf. UEMOA (2003), Étude d’identification et de promotion d’unités industrielles régionales dans la filière coton de l’UEMOA, UEMOA mars 2003. UNCTAD (2005), Infocomm, market information in the commodities areas. Cotton production. See: http://r0.unctad.org/infocomm/anglais/cotton/market.htm. UNCTAD (2005), Infocomm, market information in the commodities areas. Uses. See: http://r0.unctad.org/ infocomm/anglais/cotton/Uses.htm. Valderrama Becerra, C. A. (2004), The world cotton market: a long-term outlook. ICAC, WTO African Regional Workshop on Cotton, March 23-24, 2004, Cotonou. Zoundi, J.S., K. Hussein, L. Hitimana (2006), Libéralisation de la filière coton et innovation agricole en Afrique de l’Ouest. In Cahiers Agriculture, vol. 15, n° 1, janvier-février 2006. Websites CIRAD. Dossier coton
www.cirad.fr/fr/regard_sur/coton.php
Dagris. Informations sur le coton
www.dagris.fr/infocoton.html
FAO. Land and Water Development division
www.fao.org/ag/agl/default.stm
FAO. Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS)
www.fao.org/giews/english/spot4/waf/index.htm
International Cotton Advisory Committee
www.icac.org
IZF
www.izf.net
UNCTAD. Market Information in the Commodities Area – Cotton
http://r0.unctad.org/infocomm/anglais/indexen.htm
UNSTATS. Database Comtrade
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/default.aspx
USDA. Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) www.fas.usda.gov WTO. The Cotton Sub-Committee
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/cotton_subcommittee_e.htm
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
209
III. E CONOMY
Chapter 12. COFFEE Daniel Duris (CIRAD – France)
12.1. Global overview 12.1.1. More robusta
Figure 12.1. World coffee production 140
In million of 60-kg bags
90% Total
12.1.2. The rise of Brazil and Vietnam
% Arabica / Total 100 Arabica 80 75% 60 40 Robusta
20
211 60%
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
0
1965
Since 1964, world coffee production has grown at a rate of 1.4% per year, increasing from 3.1 to 6.3 million tonnes. With a lower growth rate than Robusta (0.9% as compared to 2.7%), Arabica’s share has fallen from 4/5 to 2/3 of total coffee production over the last 40 years (see Figure 12.1. and Map 12.1.). Arabica is far more sensitive to climatic conditions and therefore subject to greater fluctuations in its production from year to year.
120
1960
There are two kinds of coffee: Arabica (Coffea arabica), cultivated at higher altitudes, and Robusta (Coffea canephora), better adapted to hot, humid regions. Arabica, which has a lower caffeine content than Robusta (1.4% and 2.5% respectively), is considered more aromatic. It is more popular with consumers, whereas Robusta has a more intense body.1
Source: USDA
Figure 12.2. World coffee production trends 100% South America
Africa 75%
Central America
Asia
50% South America 25% Africa
Africa’s predominance in the early 0% 1960-64 1999-04 1960-64 1999-04 1960s is giving way to the rise of Asia and Latin America. With the increased Arabica Robusta growth in coffee production in Asia and South America (see Figure 12.2.) crises2 and the development of alternative crops there is also relative stagnation and perhaps even a decline in production in other regions of the world. (palm oil, rubber and cocoa) that are more profitable This is due to high production costs, a series of and, more importantly, less labour-intensive. Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. ECONOMY
Map 12.1. World arabica and robusta production Arabica was the first coffee ever grown. It prefers cool climates without frost and grows best in mountainous tropical regions. It can be found in East Africa's high plateaus, Central America's volcanic slopes and South America's Andean hillsides. However, there are some production areas that are not located at high altitudes, particularly in Brazil. Robusta is produced by Coffea canephora. It prefers hot and humid equatorial climates, where cocoa and bananas also grow. It does not grow well at high altitudes. The West African plains, Vietnam and Indonesia are major production zones. Source: CIRAD (2003)
2000-04 1960-64 Arabica and Robusta Production
Coffee producing countries
65,000
117,000
(in thousand 60-kg bag)
212 Source: ICO (2007)
Arabica
Predominantly Arabica
Robusta
Predominantly Robusta
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
Box 12.1. Constraints linked to rising production Up to 80% of coffee cultivation is carried out on small family farms whose revenue depends greatly on their production. Average yields for Robusta and Arabica are 485 kg/ha and 600 kg/ha respectively, while plant material production potential is assessed at 1,000-1,200 kg/ha indicating a relatively low level of intensiÀcation. Improving average yields is one solution for increasing overall production. However, the biggest producers (Brazil and Colombia in the case of Arabica, and Vietnam in that of Robusta) achieve yields that are higher than or equal to global averages. A second way of increasing production is to increase cultivated areas. Coffee cultivation is highly labour-intensive. On average, 250-300 work days are required to produce 1 tonne of coffee of which around 80% are devoted to harvesting (daily wage labour). Hence, labour costs are a large part of production costs. Not much of the labour involved can be mechanised, particularly in the case of Arabica, which is essentially grown in mountainous regions with high population densities. Brazil is an exception, with conditions enabling almost total mechanisation of cultivation. There are various constraints to increasing Arabica coffee production. Most Latin American countries incur high labour costs and there is signiÀcant pressure on land resources, whereas for Robusta, it is not so much pressure on land, but labour availability that often proves a major problem. Finally, increased growth would require easy and low-cost access to Ànancial resources.
As of 1975, there was a spurt in Brazil’s Robusta production, which stabilised in the early 1990s. This was followed by Vietnam’s entry into the global market, which led to a significant fall in Arabica’s share in global supply.
12.1.3. Demand is concentrated in the North Since man “domesticated” its production (probably around the 15th century in Arabia), coffee has been used solely as a beverage, after roasting and
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
135
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
1,040
* United States and Mexico Source: ICO (2007)
South America
3,100
Central America and Carribean
820
NAFTA*
290
1,410
285
220
Sub-saharan Africa
930
North Africa & Middle East
Europe
2,740
820
Exporting countries Coffee consumption
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
Importing countries Coffee production
2000-04 Averge (In thousand tonnes)
Asia
1,580
Map 12.2. World coffee production and consumption
III. E CONOMY
213
III. ECONOMY
12.1.4. The emergence of new markets
In thousands of 60-kg bags 140,000
Arabica
120,000
OC
Robusta
100,000
WC
80,000
IM
60,000 40,000
EX
20,000
NM 2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1975
1970
1980
0
1965
Though produced in the South, coffee is mainly consumed in the North. World consumption,3 around 5.1 million tonnes of green coffee, is essentially concentrated in Western Europe, North America and Japan (79%), the main importing member countries of the International Coffee Organisation.4 In the context of 214 global consumption (see Map 12.2.), member countries import approximately 59.6% whereas non-member countries import 15.8%, while the remainder (24.6%) represents domestic consumption in exporting countries, the highest being in Brazil and Ethiopia.
Figure 12.3. Coffee consumption
1960
grinding. It has been prepared and consumed in many different ways over time (decoction, infusion, filtration, percolation, etc.) but there has not been any real innovation, except for soluble (instant) coffee. Global demand is relatively insensitive to price variations, although price hikes, such as those in 1977 or 1997-98, do lead to a fall in consumption. In fact, coffee consumption is strongly linked to revenues.
Overall consumption (OC), World consumption (WC), non-members (NM), importers (IM), exporters (EX) Sources: ICO & USDA
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483316806455
Figure 12.4. Per capita coffee consumption kg green coffee per capita
6
Western Europe 5.5 5 4.5
USA 4
Other importing member countries
3.5 3
1993
1994
1995 1996
1997 1998
1999
2000 2001
2002
Source: F.O. Licht
The annual growth in world consumption between 1965 and 2004 is estimated at 1.7%, i.e. higher than the growth in production (1.4%). It was particularly high in non-ICO member countries (+ 3.5%), especially the new European Union member countries and the former Soviet bloc countries (see Figure 12.3.). Non-member countries are not bound to comply with the ICO’s recommendations and generally purchase lower quality coffees, therefore at lower prices (or those not included in quotas up to 2000). This partially explains the relatively higher rise in consumption in these countries as compared to member countries. Along with the increase in purchasing
power, consumption in these countries is likely to intensify further over the next 25-30 years. In Western Europe and the USA consumption increased only by 1.2% and per capita consumption is decreasing due to competition from sweetened and flavoured drinks, especially among the youth, or due to its purportedly harmful effects on health5 (see Figure 12.4.).
12.1.5. Future prospects World consumption could reach 7.6 million tonnes and global consumption almost 10 million tonnes
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
by 2025, with production at 9.4 to 9.8 million tonnes. If domestic consumption growth in producing countries continues at the present pace (+1.5%), there could be a shortfall in supply. At a constant growth rate, Robusta production should increase by 1.75 million tonnes and that of Arabica by almost 1 million tonnes. Robusta’s share would then increase to 46% of the world market, which would lead to Robusta partially replacing Arabica.6 This is an acceptable assumption given the progress in research on aromas and decaffeination techniques to exclude organic solvents despite consumer preference for Arabica.
Rising prices led to an increase in supply after a 3 to 5 year gap, which resulted from the time taken to set up new cultivation areas or revive plantations that had been neglected during the crisis. On the other hand, falling prices led to a relatively rapid drop in production (and quality). Planters only harvested the most productive fields, neglected maintenance and even gave up all or part of their coffee plantations. Until the mid-1980s, the price differential between Robusta and Arabica was relatively small as the Robusta demand by the instant coffee industry remained high. Robusta’s attractive price as compared to natural Arabica10 led countries like Brazil and Vietnam to produce this type of coffee. This resulted in an increase in the price differential. Above all, the crises had greater impact on Robusta producing countries. Therefore, the price differential penalised Robusta growers despite lower production costs. On the whole, Brazilian and Vietnamese producers were better paid for their Robusta than West African growers (see Figure 12.6.), undoubtedly contributing to the decline of coffee plantation in West Africa and the 215 growth of Robusta in Vietnam and Brazil.
If this assumption proves true, it would be favourable to African countries. It all depends on the responsiveness of national authorities and networks (access to demand-related information and technological progress in the industry) and the incentives offered by producing countries, if any. This scenario is predicated on the improvement of cropping practices on existing, relatively young plantations7 where production can be doubled rapidly (5-10 years). It also depends on the replacement of aging plantations8 with improved planting material. Over 75% of low-production 12.2.2. Trade plantations (< 250 kg/ha) would then have to be replanted in Angola, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire and South America exports 42% of the coffee produced the DRC. Finally, this would also call for increasing in the world, followed by Asia (24%) and Africa the cropped area by improving formerly fallow and/or virgin land. Figure 12.5. World prices and production Hundreds of thousands of hectares in sub-Saharan Africa could prove In hundred US Cents/lb In million bag 130 250 highly promising, though there are Important Differential labour-related constraints (it takes 120 1 man/year to produce 1 tonne of 200 coffee) along with those stemming 110 from the isolation of some 150 100 landlocked countries (the Central African Republic, for example). 90 100
12.2. International trade
80
Arabica prices 50
12.2.1. Market and prices
Production: average mobile over 5 years
70 Robusta prices
Sources: Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens and ICO
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483325238630
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
2005
2002
1999
1996
1993
1990
1987
1984
1981
1978
1975
1972
1969
1966
1963
60
1960
0
Relatively stable between 1960 and 1975, world market prices9 were very volatile between 1975 and 2005.
III. ECONOMY
Figure 12.6. Global market prices and farm gate prices paid of producers US Cents/lb 55.00
Global prices
50.00
Brazil
45.00 40.00
Vietnam 35.00
Togo
30.00 25.00
Côte d'Ivoire
20.00 15.00 10.00
2000 Source: ICO
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483336887575
Box 12.2. International market: Specialty coffees and bulk coffees
216
Specialty coffees (10% of the market) are generally negotiated directly between producers and buyers or are paid for on the basis of their stock exchange prices (New York), often with a bonus. Bulk coffees (90% of the market) are the inputs for large- and medium-scale roasting units. Their prices are determined by the New York (Arabica) and London (Robusta) stock exchanges on a supply-demand basis. The bulk coffee market is highly speculative. The advent of Vietnam on the international market led to a considerable drop in world prices in the mid-1990s and a substantial fall in Robusta prices that continued until 2005-2006. The market is also sensitive to climatic conditions in Brazil – news about frost in June-July leads to an increase in prices, favouring both Arabica and Robusta. Coffee trading is dominated by a handful of multinationals from whom the large coffee roasting corporations purchase their supplies. These multinationals are set up in the producing countries as exporters and in consuming countries as importers.
(16%). Excluding West African countries, Africa has a 10.5% share of the global market and its coffee is exported mainly to Europe and non-ICO countries (see Map 12.3.). West Africa’s share of the market is less than 6%, apportioned between Europe and ICO non-members. The region’s countries have lost part of their market share since the 1960s. In the early 1960s, North America imported 55,000 to 60,000 tonnes of coffee from Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon, whereas in the 2000s, trade statistics indicate no imports from West Africa.
Over 95% of coffee exported by producing countries is exported as green coffee (see Map 12.3.). Producing countries export barely 4% of their coffee in the form of soluble coffee and have a very low share of roasted coffee.11 Only a few producing countries have developed their own soluble coffee industry: Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Thailand and the Philippines being the most important. West Africa has only one soluble coffee manufacturing plant in Côte d’Ivoire with a capacity of 15,000 tonnes of green coffee per year. Several coffee producing countries have attempted to sell roasted coffee for export. Apart from roasting for domestic consumption, the process remains largely marginal for exports and is limited to special coffees. This process is technically difficult as costly promotional tools have to be set up while there is fierce competition from large multinationals that are offering mixtures rather than pure original coffees. Multinationals offer consumers a coffee with the desired sensory characteristics that remain as constant as possible over time in order to maintain their market share which is achieved by optimising mixtures of different origins.
Europe imports 53% of the coffee produced, followed by North America (26%). The rest is shared between Asia and non-ICO members. Unlike producing countries, importing countries process green coffee into roasted and ground coffee or soluble coffee. Europe consumes 92.4% of its imports and re-exports 7.6% in the form of green coffee (55%), roasted coffee (13%) and soluble coffee (32%). Green coffee is generally unloaded in Hamburg and Rotterdam’s ports (less in The Hague and Trieste). It is then re-exported to non-member
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Source: F.O. Licht
Non Member Countries
13.9%
42.1%
4.2%
North America
5.6%
Europe
13.9%
23.7%
Asia
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
Soluble industry in producing countries
Main coffee export flows
Volume (%) of exports per production zone
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483358057218
10.5%
Map 12.3. World coffee exports
III. E CONOMY
217
III. ECONOMY
European countries, such as Russia or the former Soviet bloc countries, or else to member countries. North America re-exports 1.8% of its imports while Asia re-exports 6.9% (see Figure 12.7.).
and Nigeria (see Map 12.5.). Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon and Guinea alone produce 94% of Africa’s coffee, i.e. about 240,000 tonnes (see Figure 12.9.). Benin
12.3. Coffee in West Africa
Figure 12.7. Types of coffee exported Asia
12.3.1. African overview 100%
North America Europe
Asia
South AmerIca
60%
NAFTA
80%
Africa
Robusta is cultivated at low altitudes, humid equatorial and tropical areas. Arabica prefers higher altitudes with significant differences in day-night temperatures. For both, the biggest constraint is rainfall – as much its quantity as its distribution. The Northern plantation limits are generally defined by the 1,500 mm isohyet, subject to the dry season not exceeding four months. Apart from unclean floodable soil, no special soil types are particularly favourable.
40%
20%
Green Soluble Roasted Coffee
0%
Exporting Countries
Importing Countries
Source: F.O. Licht
Box 12.3. A fairly new crop for Africa
African production declined between 1960 and 2004. From 900,000 tonnes in the early 218 1960s, it peaked at 1.2 million tonnes (1980-84 average) before dropping to 865,000 tonnes at the beginning of 2000. It currently accounts for 12.3% of global production as compared to 23% in the 1960s (see Figure 12.8.). There are 26 producing countries and 3 major production regions (see Map 12.4.). West Africa (30% of Africa’s production) grows Robusta almost exclusively. East Africa (69%), with the exception of Uganda, essentially produces Arabica. Production in Central Africa12 (1%) has been declining for several decades now. There was a sharp decrease in Angola’s coffee production as from 1975 and in Congo as from 1992, essentially due to political instability.
12.3.2. West Africa a) Production areas Climatic conditions favour coffee growing in nine countries. Apart from Cape Verde, these countries are spread out across two major coffee-producing areas – one area around Côte d’Ivoire (Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Togo) and the other around Cameroon
Arabica, originating from Ethiopia’s high plateaus, was Àrst planted in Yemen in the early 15th century. Imported by Istanbul in the mid-16th century, coffee consumption slowly spread to all of Europe in the 17th century. Arabica was introduced to Java around 1690 and developed in the New World in 1720 – Àrst in the Caribbean, then Brazil, followed by Central America. In the 19th century, Europe started receiving supplies from Latin America. Europe’s mighty nations were building their colonial empires during the same period, particularly in Africa, and began introducing Arabica. Unfortunately, it did not adapt to West and Central Africa’s hot and humid areas. At the same time, new species of coffee plants were discovered in West Africa and the Congo basin (Coffea liberica and Coffea canephora) and these gradually started being planted in order to lower dependence on Latin American imports. Hence, coffee plants of African origin did not begin spreading across the continent until much later.
Table 12.1. Coffee introduction dates in West Africa Countries Côte d’Ivoire
Plantation start dates End 19th, early 20th: C.liberica 1930: Robusta
Cameroon
1913: Arabica – 1930: Robusta
Guinea
1895: Arabica – 1910: Robusta
Togo
1923: Robusta
Benin
1930: Robusta
Liberia
1875: Arabica – 1945: Robusta
Cape Verde
1790: Arabica
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
Except for coffee roasting for local markets, there is no industry in West Africa. The
229.1 175.7 169.8 51.1 50.7 43.6
Total: 862,000 tonnes
22.7 22.5 21.4 19.2 18.6
African production trends Million tonnes
1.4
8.3 6.3 6.2 4.7 2.8 2.7 2.2 2.0 1.8 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.1
0
50
100
West Africa
150
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
0.7
200
250 In thousand tonnes
Other African countries
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483343163360
Source: USDA
Figure 12.9. Production distribution in West Africa Liberia 0.2% Ghana 1% Sierra Leone 1% Côte d'Ivoire 67%
219
Nigeria 1% Others 6% Guinea 7%
Togo 3%
Cameroon 20%
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/483354015625
Source: USDA
Figure 12.10. African and West African production trends 40%
1960-64
1980-84
2000-04
30%
20%
Africa / World (%)
World
Africa West Africa (%)
Source: USDA
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
29.5%
34.1%
3.6%
30,0% 30.0%
7.5%
0%
6.9%
10%
12.3%
During the colonial period, while the UK promoted cocoa, France encouraged coffee growing (see Figure 12.11.) during the 1925-30 period, especially in Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire. Most plantations belonged to small native family farms involved in mixed farming. European plantations13 represented less than 2% of the area (see Box 12.4.). On the eve of their independence, Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon respectively owned plantations covering 600,000 and 80,000 ha. In Guinea, a support fund was set up in 1951 and by 1960 production reached almost 15,000 tonnes before falling drastically. The same year, Togo cultivated 20,000 ha and produced 12,000 tonnes.
Ethiopia Uganda Côte d’Ivoire Kenya Cameroon Tanzania Congo (ex Zaire) Burundi Madagascar Rwanda Guinea Togo Zambia Zimbabwe CAR Malawi Nigeria Angola Sierra Leone Ghana Liberia Congo Gabon Equat Guinea Benin
22.0%
b) The end of the “Golden Age” Average production today (255,000 tonnes) is less than it was in the 1960s, after peaking at almost 400,000 tonnes (see Figures 12.10. and 12.11.). In forty years, coffee’s share in agricultural product exports was down from 17.1% to 6.4% (see Table 12.2.), while agricultural exports rose by more than 80%. In fact, the trend was visible in both Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon long before the 1990 crisis. The bankruptcy of the stabilisation funds set up in French-speaking countries was one of the probable causes of this decline, but other factors also played a role. The 1983 drought highlighted the plantations’ sensitivity to climatic instability, the preference for “cocoa” in Côte d’Ivoire, the aging of plantations and their inadequate maintenance.
Figure 12.8. Coffee production in Africa (2000-04 average)
23.1%
stopped exporting coffee about ten years ago and its production no longer manages to meet even domestic consumption, as climatic conditions are not sufficiently favourable. The Cape Verde islands produce a few tonnes of Arabica, used only as niche coffees.
III. ECONOMY
Map 12.4. Coffee production regions in Africa
West W We e A Africa r
ntra n a Africa Central East A Africa
Production shares of Africa’s three producing regions
220
Central Africa 1%
West Africa 30% East Africa 69%
Robusta Arabica
Source: F.O. Licht, ICO, USDA
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
only exception is the Nestlé soluble factory in Côte d’Ivoire. It was set up shortly after independence with the target of producing 10-15,000 tonnes of soluble coffee.14 The coffee is exported to neighbouring countries, the Middle East and East Africa.
12.3.3. The failure of the coffee sector in French-speaking countries A) Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon before Liberalisation Stabilisation funds were set up in 1955. Their role – initially limited to stabilising prices for
producers – was rapidly extended to the entire sector: extension,15 input supplies, infrastructure, etc. The stabilisation mechanism was based on guaranteeing a price to producers, a scale of marketing charges for reimbursing and paying operators and a guaranteed CIF (Cost Insurance Freight) price. The funds concerned – the CSSPPA16 in Côte d’Ivoire and the ONCPB17 in Cameroon – covered the difference between the CIF price and the sale price (either through levies or by providing support, depending on the prevailing rates). Although marketing was officially private, it was under tight State control. Operators had purchase
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
LIBERIA
GUINEA
Source: CIRAD (2007)
SIERRA LEONE
CAPE VERDE
GUINEA BISSAU
1500 mm
THE GAMBIA
SENEGAL
MAURITANIA
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
GHANA
BURKINA FASO
MALI
TOGO
BENIN
NIGERIA
NIGER
CAMEROON
1,500 mm
Isohyet (1961-89)
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
CHAD
1,500
Robusta
500 - 1,000 Less than 500
Arabica
Coffee production zones
Over 1,000
Relief (meters)
Map 12.5. Coffee production regions in West Africa
III. E CONOMY
221
III. ECONOMY
the Special Investment Budget in Côte d’Ivoire and production subsidies in Cameroon. But due to lack of rational 1990-94 Average 2000-04 Average management, they were unable to Farm % Farm % support producers’ prices when global Countries Coffee Coffee products coffee products coffee coffee prices fell drastically at the end of Benin 0.1 17.5 0.3% 0.00 53.5 0.0% the 1980s. A benchmark study (Ministry Cameroon 110.7 2,235.0 5.0% 73.9 2,356.6 3.1% of Co-operation, France, 1993) has shown Côte d’Ivoire 240.8 3,320.8 7.3% 167.1 4,314.4 3.9% that stabilisation surpluses should have Ghana 1.1 343.6 0.3% 2.0 770.4 0.3% made it possible to support prices for 13 Guinea 6.1 11.9 51.5% 6.2 11.9 51.7% additional crop years in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia 0.3 3.2 10.7% 0.3 4.0 6.7% 11 additional crop years in Cameroon. Nigeria 0.7 178.8 0.4% 0.3 381.7 0.1% In fact, the stabilisation funds became Sierra Leone 4.7 14.8 32.0% 1.5 8.4 17.2% so indebted that planters received Togo 12.9 45.0 28.7% 4.9 45.5 10.7% only half the guaranteed price as of the Total 377.4 2,201.6 17.1% 256.1 3,992.4 6.4% 1989-90 crop year. The consequences Source: FAOSTAT were immediately visible – plantations were no longer well maintained, those quotas in specific areas for domestic marketing that produced limited quantities of coffee were soon and needed to obtain the funds’ authorisation to abandoned and production declined on the whole be able to export, but only if the Funds themselves (see Figure 12.11.). were not marketing coffee. The General Budget in each of these countries came from a Single Exit Tax. Confronted with this crisis, neither the ICO’s Coffee grinding too was controlled and subject to 222 the approval of the Fund in Cameroon, while being International Coffee Agreement,18 nor the STABEX19 a State monopoly in Côte d’Ivoire. were able to play any compensatory role. The ICO abandoned the quota system in 1989. Its initial From 1960 to the mid-1980s, these stabilisation objective was to keep prices within a specific range, funds accumulated surpluses that were used for thereby ensuring at least the minimum receipts Table 12.2. Share of coffee in West Africa’s agricultural exports (million of USD)
Figure 12.11. Production by country in West Africa Cameroon
300
RCI
Guinea
25
250
Togo
Benin
20
200
15
Dryness
150
10
100 50
5
0
Ghana Nigeria
12
Liberia Sierra Leone
2005
2001
1997
1993
1989
1985
1981
1977
1973
1969
1965
1961
1957
1953
1949
1945
1941
1937
1933
1929
19 29 19 34 19 39 19 44 19 49 19 54 19 59 19 64 19 69 19 74 19 79 19 84 19 89 19 94 19 99 20 04
0
Benin: Production began with the country's independence but remained marginal.
10
Guinea: Increased production up to 1962 then significant and continuous fall until the country started re-opening in 1985. Two coffee plantation support projects in 1985 to 1995.
8 6
Incomplete Data
Togo: plantation support projects from 1972 to 1982, which led to increased production.
4 2
2005
2001
1997
1993
1989
1985
1981
1977
1973
1969
1965
1961
1957
1953
1949
1945
1941
1937
1933
1929
0
Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone: The political situation in these countries - except for Ghana, a cocoa producer - thwarted all coffee production support efforts within the framework of World Bank funded projects.
Sources: FAO (1929-1959), USDA (1960-2006), Les caféiers et les cafés dans le monde (René Coste)
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
to coffee-growing States. The surpluses produced in each ICO member country could be exported to non-member countries at prices that were often lower than those of the quota system. Countries gradually started bypassing the agreement – for instance, by selling a part of their production under another country’s quota. In addition, the funds made available within the STABEX framework proved to be inadequate and were not always used for stabilisation purposes.
Box 12.4. The sector in Côte d’Ivoire About 300,000 coffee growers – the majority also producing cocoa – have plantations of 1 to 5 ha (average: 1.5 to 2 ha). The average yield is low (less than 300 kg/ ha) since the plantations are old (over 25 years), poorly maintained and extensively cultivated without inputs. As most of these farmholdings are family-owned, they use paid labour only for harvesting and some heavy maintenance work. Coffee and cocoa generate a major but insufÀcient portion of revenue, which is why food crops occupy at least 50% of the land on farms and monopolise a large section of the labour force.
b) Reforms in Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon In the early 1990s, the World Bank insisted on the liquidation of the ONCPB in Cameroon and the CSSPPA in Côte d’Ivoire and for liberalising the sector. But the two countries implemented less drastic measures. Cameroon set up the “Office national du café et du cacao” (ONCC or National Coffee and Cocoa Office) with modified prerogatives. An Inter-professional Committee (the CICC) was set up to help define the sector’s strategies. The pricing system was based on the calculation of a reference price fixed according to the daily market prices posted in London, the calculation of a farm price negotiated with traders and the determination of a minimum guaranteed price for producers (farm price less industry costs). The stabilisation system, based on the difference between the farm price and the contract reference price, was maintained. However, the producers’ remuneration depended on world prices. Special purchasing zones and purchase controls were abolished while the co-operative movement was strengthened. The reform led to the disappearance of small local exporters in favour of international companies and large-scale exporters, capable of securing client loyalty by implementing a quality policy. In Côte d’Ivoire, the 1995 Agricultural Structural Adjustment Programme (ASAP) paved the way for a series of reforms, culminating in the complete liberalisation of the coffee-cocoa sector. The CSSPPA continued to play a role until 1998 but no longer monopolised export sales. Domestic marketing was fully liberalised. Although quotas were abolished, operators had to obtain an export
Most producers are members of a co-operative. After the harvest, coffee is dried and husked in cottage-type units or by co-operatives. Following cursory sorting, the beans are delivered to the co-operative or sold to a middleman who resells them to a bigger buyer or an exporter. To ensure better quality control, some exporters have set up buying centres where producers and co-operatives sell their produce, provided it meets the requisite quality criteria; producers receive a quality and production bulking bonus. The soluble coffee factory in Côte d’Ivoire sources its beans from such buying centres, distributed across the entire production area.
223
permit from the CSSPPA. However, the stabilisation system, based on an FOB reference price and a sales price, remained in force. With the 1998/99 crop year came the end of the CSSPPA, coming into effect in 2000. Two new players then came on the scene: ] The ARCC (“Autorité de Régulation du café/ cacao” or Coffee/Cocoa Regulatory Authority): A
public
body,
responsible
for
advising
the Interministerial Committee, regulating the sector and ensuring proper control. ] The BCC (“Bourse du café/cacao” or coffee/cocoa stock exchange): A private body, managed by the sector’s professionals and aimed at fulfilling operational (commercial) functions.
These organisations were supported by other organisations
and
committees,
creating
full-fledged inter-professional network:
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
a
III. ECONOMY
224
] The “Comité Interministériel des Matières Premières” (CIMP or Interministerial commodity committee): Chaired by the Prime Minister, it defined the sector’s policy and saw to the respect of the objectives fixed by the government. ] The “Fonds de Régulation et de Contrôle” (FRC or Regulatory and Control Fund): A legal entity under private law, it was responsible for constant control over exporters’ financial commitments, collecting charges levied on the ARRC’s and BCC’s accounts and establishing the price scale. ] The “Fonds de Garantie des Coopératives Café-Cacao” (FGCCC or Coffee-Cocoa Co-operative Guarantee Fund): Its mission consisted of helping Professional Agricultural Organisations (OPA) access bank credits. ] The “Fonds de Développement et de Promotion des producteurs de Café et Cacao” (FDPCC or Coffee and cocoa producers’ development and promotion Fund): Set up at the producers’ initiative, it helped producers enter the coffee/ cocoa sector.
12.4. Prospects While losing ground on the world market, Africa and West Africa’s future is uncertain especially faced with the rise of Latin America (Brazil) and Asia (Vietnam). In 2025, global Robusta demand is likely to be between 3.4 and 4.3 million tonnes (2.5 million tonnes in 2004). To maintain its current market share, West Africa would need to produce at least 575,000 tonnes, i.e. more than twice its current production. But is this minimum target, which does not include regaining the market share lost over the last 25 years, realistic? With the same surface area, doubling the average yield should make it possible. The situation varies depending on the country, although intensification20 is essential for all of them: ] Côte d’Ivoire’s plantations, of which at least 60% are old, are decreasingly productive and need to be renewed.21 The remaining 40% need to be regenerated.22 However, the country suffers from a shortage of manpower.
] Several systems co-exist in Cameroon: intensive Robusta in the Mongo, extensive Robusta, and Arabica compete with food crops. Intensification is relatively recent. The resumption of maintenance processes should provide quick results. ] Guinea was not confronted with successive coffee crises to the same extent. Its relatively young plantations are being expanded basically by using rainfed rice producing land that is already depleted. Intensification is the sole option. ] Togo has very limited possibilities for expanding its plantations. Plantations were revived between 1975 and 1985. It is imperative to at least hold on to the existing potential. ] Cocoa is the priority in Ghana and Nigeria, so a spectacular growth of coffee production is unlikely. ] Liberia has considerable land reserves. The country is not densely populated and opportunities for highly-paid work are limited. Although more densely populated, Sierra Leone faces a similar situation. Admittedly, West Africa’s current share of Robusta’s global market is not very significant (8-9%). Nevertheless, it could become so in the coming 20-25 years. Firstly, because coffee is a profitable crop, especially in areas where cocoa cannot be grown (Western Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Togo, etc.). Furthermore, increased freight costs have given West Africa a comparative advantage over its competitors in the European and US markets. Finally, there are limited possibilities for additional production in other regions of the world.23 A minimum production target could be achieved with better plantation productivity by 2025-2030. This will be possible if regional-level consultation takes place, especially in the field of agricultural research (improving varieties). In fact, with the complete liberalisation of the coffee sector, the States could play a significant role by working on a common agricultural policy. Coffee remains and will remain an enterprise that can improve the West African farmers’ living conditions.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
Notes 1. 2. 3.
4.
5. 6.
7. 8. 9.
10.
11.
12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.
19. 20.
21.
22. 23.
Robusta is used mainly for producing soluble coffee. Its second use is in the preparation of Arabica/Robusta mixtures for inexpensive coffees. Years during which coffee prices in New York (Arabica) and London (Robusta) remained very low. For Robusta, the years were: 1981-1983, 1986, 1990-1995 and 2000-2005. For Arabica, the years were: 1981-1982, 1987-1988, 1990-1995 and 2001-2006. According to the International Coffee Organisation (ICO), world consumption is defined by the actual consumption of importing member countries added to the net imports of non-member countries. Global consumption is the combination of world consumption and domestic consumption in exporting member countries. Member countries are signatories of the International Coffee Agreement. They are divided into consuming countries or importing countries (32) and producing countries or exporting countries (45). See http://www.ico.org/listmembers.asp. Together (producers and consumers), they define the ICO’s strategies to tackle the challenges facing the world coffee sector through international co-operation. Caffeine is considered a stimulant – even a potentially addictive drug. Coffee is sometimes held responsible for cardio-vascular incidents. A second hypothesis is based on the continuance of the current ratio, i.e. 1/3 Robusta and 2/3 Arabica, with an average 1.4% increase in production. In that case, Arabica production would have to increase by 1.5 million tonnes and Robusta’s by 0.8 million tonnes to meet demand. Less than 20-25 years. More than 25-30 years. Coffee is a commodity that is listed on the New York (Arabica) and London (Robusta) stock exchanges. According to the ICO’s classification, there are 4 categories of coffee (Arabica extra-mild, Arabica mild, Arabica natural and Robusta), each listed separately on the international market. Arabica’s production costs are higher than Robusta’s (by 50-80%, depending on levels of intensification and plant health problems). On the other hand, Robusta’s prices are on average 20% lower than those of natural Arabicas (Brazilian type). Whenever Robusta prices go above 50 cents/lb, Robusta becomes very profitable for producers. Drying and dehusking is generally undertaken on the plantation. The main industrial processes conducted in producing countries consist of ensuring that all the coffee delivered by growers, of whatever grade, is in compliance with international trading standards, which includes cleaning to eliminate dust and other undesirable material, sorting to eliminate defective beans likely to affect taste quality and grading according to bean size. Angola, Gabon, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo and Democratic Republic of the Congo. European plantations were monoculture plantations and used salaried labour and inputs. It takes 3 kg of green coffee to produce 1 kg of soluble. Sector-wise specialised State companies (SATMACI in Côte d’Ivoire, SRCC in Togo, SODECAO in Cameroon) supported producers and undertook distribution activities. CSSPPA: “Caisse de stabilisation et de soutien des prix des productions agricoles en Côte d’Ivoire” (Côte d’Ivoire Fund for stabilisation and price support for agricultural production). ONCPB: “Office National de Commercialisation des Produits de Base” (National Commodities Marketing Office). Signed in 1962, this agreement was renewed 4 times until 1983 on the basis of the quota system. The 1983 agreement was extended to 1994, at which time a fifth agreement ratifying market liberalisation was concluded. This agreement, valid until 1999, was extended to 2001, the date of the last agreement on coffee currently in force. Established in 1975, STABEX (Exports stabilisation) concerned 48 agricultural commodities and compensated for the loss of export receipts suffered by all the ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) States exporting to the EEC. The first intensification level involves putting land and labour resources to the best use and is not necessarily synonymous with using inputs. Agro-forestry systems for perennial crops constitute one such constructive and sustainable solution. The second level involves intensifying foods crops in farms, thereby freeing land resources and labour for coffee. Admittedly, about a dozen years of extensive cultivation have partially depleted the land but coffee plants are relatively less demanding. Replanting is possible in leguminous plant-based agro-forestry systems. In addition, an intensification policy (fighting weeds and pruning) would help cut down the surface area used and thereby select less exhausted land. Coffee regeneration consists of pruning coffee plants in order to restore the tree’s ‘architecture’ and thereby raise productivity. Forced Robusta cropping intensification in Vietnam compromised production sustainability in the long term. Production costs in Brazil increased and mechanising Robusta cultivation proved difficult. Indonesia had no option other than to expand the surface area at the expense of classified forest reserves, with oil palms taking over any area left free. Angola had to first clear coffee plantations of mines. Uganda, another large Robusta producer, is landlocked and has high production costs (Kampala/Mombasa transportation).
Sources and bibliography CIRAD (2003), Le café, des terroirs et des hommes ; 16 p. CIRAD Internal Reports: Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Guinea. Coste, R. (1961), Les caféiers et les cafés dans le monde (Part II, 2nd volume). Daviron, B. & al (2002), Commerce agricole : l’idée de libre-échange a-t-elle vécue ? In : Déméter 2002 : économie et stratégies agricoles. Nouveaux enjeux pour l’agriculture. — Paris : Colin, 2001, pp. 9-52. Daviron, B., S. Ponte (2005), The coffee paradox: Global markets, commodity trade and the elusive promise of development. London, Zed Brooks, 288 p. International Coffee Organisation: International Coffee Agreement (1983, 1994, 2001). Laporte, B. (1992), Les réformes des systèmes de commercialisation et de stabilisation des filières café et cacao au Cameroun et en Côte d’Ivoire — Paris : Ministère de la Coopération et du Développement — 174 p. Ministry of Co-operation (1993), La compétitivité des cafés Africains, Paris : Collection Rapport d’étude — 252 p.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
225
III. ECONOMY
Ruf, F. (1987), Éléments pour une théorie sur l’agriculture des régions tropicales humides : de la forêt, rente différentielle, au cacaoyer capital travail. In: L’agronomie tropicale, Vol.42/n° 3, pp. 218-232
Statistical Data Sources FAO
Statistical Database FAOSTAT
F.O. Licht
Coffee years books (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004)
ICO
Consumption, imports and exports in member and non member countries from 1980 to 2005
Pan American Bureau of Coffee Statistical series from 1958 to 1965 USDA
Database (1960-2005)
226
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
III. E CONOMY
Chapter 13. COCOA Philippe Bastide (CIRAD – France)
13.1. West Africa in the international market 13.1.1. Overview of supply and demand Since 1960, world cocoa production has increased threefold, from 1.2 to 3.6 million tonnes. This growth was punctuated by several jolts caused by structural adjustment policies, crop infestations, diseases and market speculation, all of which have affected production. Approximately fifty countries in the inter-tropical zone grow cocoa beans, three of which dominate world production: Côte d’Ivoire (39%), Ghana (21%) and Indonesia (13%).
region’s dominance at all – in fact, it has only been strengthened further. The region has been able to increase its production in the face of rising world demand, whilst the American and Asian regions were experiencing relative stagnation (see Figure 13.1.).
From 1960 to 2006, world demand rose in step with production reaching 3.5 million tonnes. The 70 “user countries”1 include exporting countries, which have low consumption levels but process cocoa to produce by-products for the industry, as well as importing countries, which process and consume a 227 major share of the production.
The oldest of the three major production basins (see At present, while demand is stagnating in American Map 13.1.) covers Central America and stretches countries (25% of international demand) and in across South America from the western Pacific Europe (50% of the world's primary consumption), coast to the Brazilian coastline. The second can be it is increasing slightly in Asian and Oceanian found in West Africa, from Guinea to Cameroon countries (13%). West African consumption is where, apart from Benin, all the countries grow cocoa trees. Other more modest African producing marginal. countries ( 10 million
Sources: NASA / DLR, Sahel and West Africa Club (2007)
0
Dakar
Nouakchott
Accra
Less than 15
15 to 50
50 to 100
100 to 200
Lomé
1.5
Warri
0.5
River Gambia
1
Mangroves and wetlands
Banjul suburbs
Banjul City
2 0.5
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
Source: UNEP (2002)
1 1.5 2
Atlantic Ocean
Rise in sea level (meter)
Calabar Douala Port Harcourt
Lagos
Cotonou
More than 200
Rural density (inhab/km² - 2005)
Abidjan
Main coastal urban centres (Over 250,000 inhabitants)
Elevation below 10 meters
Impact of rise in sea level on Banjul (The Gambia)
Map 14.10. Main vulnerable urban centres and coastal regions in West Africa
IV. VULNERABILITIES
263
IV. VULNERABILITIES
Table 14.3. Vulnerable coastal areas and current property value threatened areas*
Senegal The Gambia Côte d’Ivoire Benin Nigeria
Submerged Surface area lost surface area through erosion (sq. km) (sq. km) 1,650 28 — 44 46 471 17.5 22,5 8,864 78 — 145
Value of property affected (million of USD) 345 — 464 4,710 9,003
Source: IUCN (2004): Reducing West Africa's Vulnerability to Climate Impacts on Water Resources, Wetlands and Desertification * Resulting from an increase in sea levels (0.5 m by 2,100)
Box 14.5. Rift Valley fever
264
An infectious viral disease, Rift Valley fever affects domestic ruminants (cattle, sheep, goats, buffaloes, antelopes, etc.), camelidae and human beings. Originating in the valley from which it takes its name, it is found in Senegal, Mauritania, Nigeria and Cameroon in West Africa. The virus is usually transmitted through the infectious bite of mosquitoes belonging to different genuses (mostly Aedes and Culex, Anopheles, etc.) or ticks. If the emergence of the disease in the form of an epidemic coincides with high rainfall periods succeeding years of drought, the epidemics shift to the dry season in West Africa.
Table 14.4. Changes in mangrove swamps in West Africa Ha Benin Cameroon Côte d’Ivoire The Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mauritania Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo
1980 4,400 267,000 89,000 64,300 12,000 285,000 245,000 19,000 140 999,000 175,000 165,600 1,500
1990 1,400 248,000 40,000 61,700 11,000 292,500 245,000 19,000 112 998,000 175,800 150,500 1,300
2000 1,080 229,000 12,700 59,100 9,000 290,000 245,000 19,000 84 997,000 176,700 135,300 960
Source: FAO (2003) Situation des forêts du monde
In West Africa, the areas most vulnerable to a rise in sea levels or extreme incidents arising from the ocean (extremely high tides) have the highest population concentrations and are sometimes the most urbanised (except for the Mauritanian coast). From Douala to Dakar, there are 12 townships of over a million inhabitants along the coastline (see Map 14.10.). Furthermore, productive eco-systems
(mangrove swamps, deltas and estuaries) are used for important economic activities in the fishing, farming and tourism sectors. The rise in sea levels has had a direct impact on these areas: submergence and coastal erosion, an increase in flood-prone areas and in salinity in estuaries and coastal water tables (see Map 14.10., example of Banjul). Without policies on adapting to these changes, a 0.5 metre rise in sea levels by 2100 will lead to direct loss of land through submergence and erosion (see Table 14.3.). Translated into economic terms, infrastructural damage is currently estimated at several hundreds of millions of dollars in Senegal, almost 4.7 billion in Côte d’Ivoire (onefourth of its current GDP) and even 9 billion in Nigeria (10% of its current GDP). Human behaviour is the main cause of the ecosystems’ degradation or disappearance. However, rising sea levels threaten the coastal regions’ biotopes (beaches, lagoons, swamps, etc.), whose disappearance, degradation or salinisation constitute high risks for resident species. Mangrove swamps, which occupy large surface areas in Nigeria, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Cameroon and Senegal, are particularly sensitive (see Table 14.4.). The submergence of these mangrove swamps or coastal lagoons could lead to a loss in biodiversity. The IUCN’s Red List currently estimates 723 endangered species18 in Africa.
14.4.7. Spatial shifts in diseases Several vector-borne diseases prevail in West Africa, including malaria, Rift Valley fever (see Box 14.5.), African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), the almost eradicated onchocerciasis and even yellow fever. Rainfall, temperature and hygrometry play an important role in the occurrence of these vectors (see Map 14.11. on climate zones favourable to malaria transmission in West Africa). Mosquitoes, the tsetse fly and the large majority of insects (including locusts) need wet and “green” areas to spread. Thus, decreasing rainfall and
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
IV. VULNERABILITIES
Map 14.11. Climatic zones favourable to malaria in West Africa
Marginal malaria
Endemic malaria
Malaria prevalence rate (%)
Climatic zones and transmission of malaria
265
0 - 20 20 - 35
Favourable climate, stable transmission
35 - 50 50 - 65 More than 65
Instable transmission Unfavourable climate
Source: Atlas du risque de la malaria en Afrique, Le Bras Jacques (2001)
desertification can limit the development of these species. In Senegal, for instance, such phenomena have resulted in the near-disappearance of A. funestus mosquitoes, which has led to a more than 60% drop in the prevalence of malaria over the last thirty years. But a drier climate does not automatically lead to a decrease in these insects’ growth areas. For instance, mosquitoes can compensate for the areas lost through the drying up of marshland by moving to other ‘habitats’, such as the swamps that form in river beds that are drying up or temporary rainwater ponds. Moreover, the increase in the number of extreme climatic events (irregular rains
© Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD 2007
in particular) could increase these insects’ growth opportunities. Apart from altering the insects’ dispersion area, climate changes can lead to human and cattle migration towards areas where fodder is available. The risk of contact with other disease-carrying insects rises and new diseases may develop. Shepherds and farmer-shepherds who fled to the South following the 1970s drought lost a majority of their livestock through African trypanosomiasis – a disease which had not yet been encountered. The most striking effect of climate change on the transmission of vector-borne diseases will probably
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
IV. VULNERABILITIES
be witnessed at the extremes of the temperature range favourable to transmission. Impacts will not be uniform: some regions will experience a rise in transmission risks, while certain diseases will disappear in others. Thus, it is probable that in a large part of Western Sahel and South-Central Africa, the climate would become unfavourable to the transmission of malaria by 2050 to 2080 – the primary cause of mortality in tropical Africa.
14.5. Conclusion The IPCC’s work shows global warming trends with near certainty and the significant role played by human activities, although it may be based on imperfect assumptions and models. Their main advantage lies in the collective awareness of what is in the general interest. It is not in the general interest to accurately forecast or know the exact “share of human beings” in climate change. What is in the general interest is knowing that Man can do a great deal to mitigate its causes and impacts.
266 Like all other world regions, Africa and West Africa must take up this challenge – essentially that of vulnerability and uncertainty. Were the widespread 1973 and 1984 droughts a manifestation of climate change? What about the 2007 floods? As in the past, adaptation to climate variability remains a priority.
Perhaps more than elsewhere, analyses of this region have remained inadequate and the conclusions arrived at by climate projections and their consequences are too uncertain to effectively anticipate risks and opportunities linked to climate change. At a time when the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) and the “regional plan of action for reducing vulnerability in the face of climate change in West Africa” are being formulated, the development of more reliable information systems adapted to local and regional contexts should be at the heart of the strategies adopted. Greater awareness and participation by local actors will also be necessary to formulate and implement these adaptation strategies.
At the international level, the post-Bali meetings as from 2008 and the Conference on food security, climate change and bio-energy in Rome in June 2008 are important events. A common stand on the issue of climate change and the ratification of the Kyoto or Post-Kyoto Protocol (“Bali Protocol”) in the African Union (AU) or Regional Economic Communities such as ECOWAS would give greater weight to African countries in negotiations. Funding opportunities associated for the most part with these negotiations would allow them to better prepare for the future.
Notes 1.
2. 3.
4. 5. 6.
7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC in English, GIEC in French) was set up jointly by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1988. The latest report (Climate Change 2007) is the fourth in a series that began in 1990; it draws up an assessment of six years of work undertaken by a network of 2,500 scientists, based on actual observations and increasingly effective climate models. Some scenarios are based on the assumption that no policy on limiting human factors in global warming is implemented. Others include such policies (mitigated projections). A downward correction has been made in temperature or sea level increases as compared to the Third assessment report (TAR, 2001). Within the framework of the TAR, forecasts highlighted a 1.4 to 5.8°C rise in mean temperature and a 0.09 to 0.88 m rise in average sea levels the world over between 1990 and 2100. Annex I countries are the industrialised States that were OECD members in 1992, in addition to transition economies, including the Russian Federation, the Baltic countries and some Eastern and Central European countries (a total of 41 countries). Although the USA did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, several American cities and states actually apply it. Lying in what is now the world’s biggest inland basin (i.e., one in which running water does not reach the sea and is lost in the soil), the Lake covered a 340,000 km² surface area (the size of Côte d’Ivoire today) and reached a maximum depth of 160 metres (currently less than 10 m), forming the fourth largest lacustral reservoir in the world after the Caspian Sea and the Baikal and Tanganyika Lakes. Today, this mechanism essentially benefits the major emerging countries (China and India). Africa Partnership Forum (2007) Climate change and Africa. 8th Africa Partnership Forum meeting, Berlin - Germany, 22-23 May 2007. The origin of the term monsoon comes from the Arabic word mawsim. For Arab sailors, it meant the season of favourable winds for sailing to India. For instance, when ocean surface temperatures are warmer in the southern Atlantic Ocean than the North, a monsoon cycle emerges in the South, which can deprive the region of its customary rainfall. El Niño (which means the Child Jesus in Spanish) takes its name from the fact that it takes shape around Christmas. It characterises a sudden change in the Equatorial Pacific’s oceanic and atmospheric circulation, which manifests in a rise in ocean surface temperatures. Some of the historical information is still available only on paper. The PRESAO, which drafts forecast charts on the probability of lower, equal or higher than normal rainfall, is an example of the tools developed. With a return to better rainfall conditions, ground water levels have sometimes recharged since the 1990s in the Sahel. [Koulm et al (2005) La sécheresse au Sahel, un exemple de changement climatique. ENPC Climate Change Workshop – VET Department].
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
IV. VULNERABILITIES
15. For more details about the hypotheses used, see: Sarr Benoît, Traore Seydou, Salack Seyni (2007) Évaluation de l’incidence des changements climatiques sur les rendements des cultures céréalières en Afrique soudano sahélienne. Agrhymet Regional Centre, CILSS, Niamey. 16. Migratory pastoralism can be defined as a livestock production system with seasonal movements of a cyclical nature and of variable scope. These movements take place between complementary ecological zones, under the supervision of a few individuals, with a large section of the group remaining sedentary. Sahel and West Africa Club (2007) Livestock in the Sahel and West Africa. Note to decisionmakers, Issue 3. 17. Tensions between northern Niger and Mali limit the availability of pastures for livestock farmers in these regions. 18. Species classified under “critical”, “threatened” and “vulnerable” categories.
Sources and bibliography AFSSA (2005), Fièvre de la vallée du Rift, www.afssa.fr/ftp/afssa/basedoc/1-fi evre_du_Rift.pdf AMMA (2002), La mousson ouest-Africaine et ses composantes. Février 2002. Andigué, J. (2007), Impacts des changements climatiques sur le lac Tchad. Centre Régional Agrhymet, CILSS. Awaïss, A. (2004), L’Initiative Bassin du Niger (IBN), développement durable et gestion intégrée d’un grand fleuve. Afrique contemporaine, été 2003. Badolo, M., E. Y. Ouedraogo (2007), Contribution à la définition d’une politique climatique sous-régionale en Afrique de l’Ouest. Revue internationale des changements climatiques en Afrique. Boutrais, J. (2007), Crises écologiques et mobilités pastorales au Sahel : les Peuls du Dallol Bosso. Climate Research 17, 123-144. CRA / CILSS (à paraître), Projet d’appui aux capacités d’adaptation aux changements climatiques au Sahel. Centre Régional Agrhymet, CRA/CILSS, Niamey. Club du Sahel et de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (2007), Élevage au Sahel et en Afrique de l’Ouest. Note aux décideurs numéro 3. Denhez, F. (2007), Atlas du réchauffement climatique. Revue Autrement. Diplomatie (2008), Menaces contre la planète. Diplomatie, hors série n° 4, décembre 2007-janvier 2008, Areion. ECA (2007), Climate change and development: Risk and Opportunities for Africa. ECA/SRO-WA. Niamey June 14, 2007. FAO (2007), Adaptation to Climate Change in Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Perspective framework and priorities. ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/009/j9271e/j9271e.pdf FAO (2007), Climate Change and Food Security: a Framework for Action, Rome, 2007. (Document to be published at the Bali Conference). FAO (2004), La biodiversité agricole en Afrique de l’Ouest : situation actuelle, expériences et perspectives. www. fao.org/docrep/008/y5667f/y5667f00.htm FAO (2003), Situation des forêts du monde. www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y7581F/Y7581F00.HTM Fischer, G., M. Shah, H. V. Velthuizen (2002), Climate Change and Agricultural Vulnerability. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis under United Nations Institutional Contract Agreement No. 1113 on “Climate Change and Agricultural Vulnerability” as a contribution to the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg 2002. Forum pour le Partenariat avec l’Afrique (2007), Les changements climatiques et l’Afrique. 8ème réunion du Forum pour le Partenariat avec l’Afrique / OCDE, Berlin — Allemagne, 22-23 mai. GIEC (2001), Bilan des Changements Climatiques : les Éléments Scientifiques. Groupe de travail I. Gigli, S., S. Agrawal (2007), Stocktaking of Progress on Integrating Adaptation to Climate Change into Development Co-operation Activities. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / OECD. GIWA (2004), Guinea Current. Régional Assessment 42, Global International Waters Assessment. IPCC (2007), Climate Change 2007. Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). International Energy Agency (2006), CO2 Emission de CO2 dues à la combustion d’énergie (Emission from Fuel Combustion, 1971 — 2004. International Energy Agency, IEA/OECD. IUCN (2004), Reducing West Africa’s vulnerability to climate impacts on water resources, wetlands and desertification. Kamga, F. A., E. Buscarlet (2006), Simulation du climat de l’Afrique de l’Ouest à l’aide d’un modèle climatique régional. Journal La météorologie no. 52. Février 2006, Société Météorologique de France.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
267
IV. VULNERABILITIES
Koulm et al (2005), La sécheresse au Sahel, un exemple de changement climatique. Année universitaire 2004-2005, Atelier Changement Climatique ENPC — Département VET. N’Djafa, O. H. (2007), L’adaptation aux changements climatiques au Sahel. Quelles réponses régionales ? Centre Régional Agrhymet, CILSS, Niamey. Nicholls, R. J. (2007), Adaptation options for coastal areas and infrastructure: An analysis for 2030. Nicholson, S. E. (2001), Climatic and environmental change in Africa during the last two centuries. OMS (2001), Bulletin de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé, “ Changements climatiques et maladies à transmission vectorielles, une analyse régionale ”. Recueil d’articles n.4, 2001, http://whqlibdoc.who.int/ recueil_articles/2001/RA_2001_4_62-72_fre.pdf Sarr, B., S. Traore, S. Salack (2007), Évaluation de l’incidence des changements climatiques sur les rendements des cultures céréalières en Afrique soudano-sahélienne. Centre Régional Agrhymet, CILSS, Niamey. Sarr, B. (2007), Le climat ouest-Africain et son évolution depuis les années 1950. Centre Régional Agrhymet, CRA / CILSS, Niamey. Sidibe, B., A. B. Bal (2007), Changements climatiques et insectes ravageurs des cultures. Centre Régional Agrhymet, CRA / CILSS, Niamey. Websites African Centre of Meteorological Application for Development (ACMAD) www.acmad.ne/ African Monsoon Multidisciplinary Analyses (AMMA) www.amma-international.org Agrhymet Regional Centre (ARC) www.agrhymet.ne/
268
Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC / OECD) www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3343,fr_2649_34421_39313186_1_1_1_1,00.html Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) www.uneca.org/ Environment Directorate (ENV / OECD) www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_33713_1_1_1_1_1,00.html FAO (website on climate change) www.fao.org/clim/ FAO (Climpag website on Climate Impact on Agriculture) www.fao.org/nr/climpag Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) www.ipcc.ch/ International Energy Agency (IEA / OECD) www.iea.org International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI) http://portal.iri.columbia.edu/portal/server.pt Mapping malaria Risk in Africa (MARA) www.mara.org.za Pensée Unique (Paroles de grands chercheurs sur le réchauffement climatique) www.pensee-unique.fr/paroles.html Système d’Observation du Cycle Hydrologique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest et Centrale (HYCOS-AOC) http://aochycos.ird.ne/HTMLF United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) http://unfccc.int
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
IV. VULNERABILITIES
Chapter 15. VULNERABILITY IN THE SAHELIAN ZONE Philipp Heinrigs and Christophe Perret (SWAC/OECD)
crops and makes more intensive farming practices risky.1
15.1. The Sahel and its countries Climatically the Sahel is defined as the area between the 200 and 600 mm isohyets (sometimes 150-500 mm) stretching through six continental West African countries (Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad) and brushing northern Nigeria and northern Cameroon.
Halfway between the 200 and 600 mm isohyets is the limit of the rainfed agricultural area, a theoretical border which has many exceptions depending on soil quality and the existence of fossil valleys. North of this line is the “nomadic area” where each year the extent of new vegetation indicates the quality of the rainy season and determines pastoral activity. South of the line are the villages of sedentary farmers, engaged in diverse activities where cattle herds move north during the annual growing season. Both nomadic 269
The vegetation is savannah – tree-dotted steppes in the south and bushes the further north you go. The wet season lasts only three months and rainfall varies from one year to another. Much of the soil is barren and vulnerable. This rules out most export
Map 15.1. Rainfall and climate zones N
Evolution of the rainfall index in the CILSS countries from 1895 to 2000
MOROCCO 1.5
LIBYE
ALGERIA
ATLANTIC
1.0
WESTERN SAHARA
OCEAN
0.0
2000
1985
1970
1955
1935
1925
MAURITANIA
1915
1.5
1900
1.0
MALI
200
NIGER
CHAD
200 600
SENEGAL
600
THE GAMBIA BURKINA FASO
GUINEA BISSAU
GUINEA BENIN NIGERIA
SIERRA LEONE
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
GHANA
TOGO
Source: Agrhymet Regional Centre (ARC), SWAC / OECD (2005)
0
500 km
CAR
CAMEROON
LIBERIA
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
Isohyet (mm/year)
Current climate zones
200
Average isohyet 1940-1967
Saharan
Sahelo-sudanian
200
Average isohyet 1968-2000
Sahelian
Sudano-sahelian
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Border
IV. VULNERABILITIES
and sedentary inhabitants have long devised ways to cope with climate variations as best they can — by nomadism, by ancient traditions of human and livestock migration in the dry season and by having extensive and scattered growing areas to reduce economic and climatic risk.
Figure 15.1. Cereal production in CILSS countries (1987/88 = 100) 300
250
200
150
Vulnerability is ever-present and 100 takes many forms in the Sahel 50 and West Africa, in both rural and * /88 8/89 9/90 0/91 1/92 2/93 3/94 4/95 5/96 6/97 7/98 8/99 9/00 0/01 1/02 2/03 3/04 4/05 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 87 urban areas as well as in poorer 0 Net Imports Population and more affluent zones. However, Gross production Available cereals crops per capita Gross production trend Trend of available cereal crops per capita the inhabitants of the agropastoral * Forecast Source: CILSS 2005 area (Sahel) suffer most from 12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482627554753 uncertainty and risk. This is where the four major droughts of the last century (1909-13, 1940-44, 1969-73 and 1983-85) aid fell sharply (see Figure 15.2.) while commercial caused the most devastation and killed the most imports increased faster than production. people. The landlocked countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, 270 It seems that due to global warming the Sahel Mali and Niger), which produce 90% of the cereals, is becoming drier. There have been two distinct constitute 75% of the population and import little, climate periods during the last century — a wet are distinct from the Atlantic coastal countries period which preceded a dry period as from the (Mauritania and Senegal), which produce few early 1970s. The southward drift of the isohyets is cereals and import much more. proof of this, which threatens the delicate balance between people and their environment. Figures 15.3. and 15.4. clearly illustrate the differences. Production in the two coastal states has stagnated and their imports have risen sharply. The 15.2. Food dependency in Sahelian agricultural sector is very small in Mauritania and countries is not increasing… average-sized, but greatly degenerated, in Senegal. They are more urbanised than most other countries The Sahel’s image is one of drought, famine and and rice, of which they do not produce enough, food shortages. But the record of individual CILSS heavily dominates their food consumption. member countries paints a different picture. Their cereal production over the past 17 years has risen In the landlocked countries, which have more faster than their population – by 73% compared to agricultural potential, cereal production is 54%. Per capita cereal availability2 also increased increasing while the share of imports remains slightly (see Figure 15.1.). almost the same. A thorough analysis of all food products shows that output of fruit, vegetables and meat rose substan15.3. …But cereal production tially over the same period throughout the Sahel remains very erratic and West Africa (a series of the Atlas will deal with agriculture and livestock). The overall share of food It seems that over the long-term Sahel countries imports remained fairly steady, rising from 19% to will probably not rely more on food imports, 21% of gross regional production. The volume of food but will be subject to sharp annual variations in Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
IV. VULNERABILITIES
Figure 15.2. Food aid to CILSS countries
400 Thousand of tonnes
cereal production which reflect the prevailing rainfed cultivation methods. Crisis management of recurrent production shortages involves extra-regional food imports in the forms of commercial imports and food aid, and using existing cereal stocks. Together they play the role of an adjustment variable between supply and demand.
300
200
100
87 /8 8 88 /8 9 89 /9 0 90 /9 1 91 /9 2 92 /9 3 93 /9 4 94 /9 5 95 /9 6 96 /9 7 97 /9 8 98 /9 9 99 /0 0 00 /0 1 01 /0 2 02 /0 3 03 /0 4 04 /0 5*
0
* Forecast So urce: CILSS 2005
Figure 15.3. CILSS: Coastal countries Net imports
Gross production
14,000
12,000
Thousand of tonnes
Since the late 1980s, cereal production has varied by an average 20% from year to year in both coastal and landlocked countries. But the two groups have different ways of stabilising cereal availability. In the coastal states commercial imports significantly stabilise cereal availability, with cereal stocks and food aid having almost no influence. In landlocked countries cereal stock management has the greatest impact on stabilising cereal availability followed by commercial imports and food aid.
10,000
8,000
271
6,000
4,000
0
87 /8 8 88 /8 9 89 /9 0 90 /9 1 91 /9 2 92 /9 3 93 /9 4 94 /9 5 95 /9 6 96 /9 7 97 /9 8 98 /9 9 99 /0 0 00 /0 1 01 /0 2 02 /0 3 03 /0 4 04 /0 5*
2,000
* Forecast
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482631657824
So urce: CILSS 2005
Net imports
Gross production
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
*
4
/0 5 04
3
/0 03
2
/0 02
1
/0 01
0
/0 00
9
/0 99
8
/9 98
7
/9 97
6
/9 96
5
/9 95
4
/9 94
3
/9
2
/9 92
1
/9 91
/9
0
* Forecast Source: CILSS 2005
90
9 /8
/8
/9 89
88
8
0 87
The Sahel’s vulnerable zone is also the “front line” against locust invasions that regularly sweep West Africa,4 most recently in 1986-89 and
Figure 15.4. CILSS: Landlocked countries
Thousand of tonnes
In the rainfall-defined Sahel, an agropastoral area (see Map 15.1), there are between 50 and 110 days of rain a year.3 North of the blue line, the length of the rainy season varies by approximately 30% from year to year. The area suffers from both persistently low and very unpredictable rainfall. This is the area we initially defined as “Sahel’s fragile high-risk zone”. It is within this area that pockets of food shortages were observed in 2005, especially in Niger.
93
15.4. The agropastoral area: Vulnerability and unpredictability
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/482716164744
IV. VULNERABILITIES
2004, causing severe damage to crops and vegetation. The insects breed in the desert in April and May. They move south and attack the pastoral area between May and July. A second wave appears in the Sahel, summer breeding ground, and the insects lay waste to crops between August and October before often moving north to winter and spring breeding grounds.
15.5. Vegetation and soil problems are not just in the Sahel
272
Table 15.1. Average annual variation in cereal availability
1 = PRODUCTION
20%
18%
2 = 1 + IMPORTATIONS
16.6%
5.5%
3 = 2 + STOCK VAR.
12.4%
5.8%
44 ==33 + +FOOD FOODAID AID +FOOD
12.1% 12.1%
5.6% 5.6%
In the landlocked countries, large producers, food stocks play a more important role in off-setting production variation; but there are extreme fluctuations in cereal availability. In the coastal atlantic countries, imports for the most part offset production variations. In both cases, food aid plays a marginal role. Source: CILSS 2005
Vegetation and soil quality are key determinants to West Africa’s food security given the large part of the population that remain directly dependent on the exploitation of these resources for their subsistence. Rainfall and rural demographic pressure are closely linked to the Sahel’s vegetation, which seems set in long-term decline as isohyets fall.
But paradoxically, the vegetation season increased in the 1990s in the Sahel, especially after 1995 when vegetation significantly spread northward. Soil suitability for agriculture varies greatly from region to region and determines significantly rural population settlement. Hence no area combines major climatic uncertainty with the exploitation of poor soil. Densely-populated areas with unsuitable soil are situated south of the climatically defined
Map 15.2. Locusts in West Africa N
Locust breeding grounds from July to September Movement of swarms from August to October
MAURITANIA MALI
NIGER CHAD
SENEGAL THE GAMBIA
Limit of the Sahel's vulnerable zone
BURKINA FASO GUINEA BISSAU
0 Source: CILSS SWAC / OECD (2005)
500 km
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Senegal
Source: CILSS SWAC / OECD (2005)
N
Rural population density (inhab/km²) > 150 inhab/km²
MARADI
ZINDER
Lake Chad
High population density on suitable soil
*Calculated upon administrative units
High population density on unsuitable soil
Niger
Low population density on suitable soil
100 to 150 inhab/km²
50 to 100 inhab/km²
30 to 50 inhab/km²
10 to 30 inhab/km²
Suitable soil
500 km
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
0
Limit of the Sahel's vulnerable zone
Average suitable soil
Soil suitability for agriculture Unsuitable soil < 10 inhab/km²
Map 15.3. Soil quality and rural population densities
IV. VULNERABILITIES
273
SENEGAL
MOROCCO
LIBERIA
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
SIERRA LEONE in the vegetation season
Trend of a shortening
MAURITANIA
WESTERN SAHARA
GUINEA
Source: CILSS SWAC / OECD (2005)
GUINEA BISSAU
THE GAMBIA
N
274
GHANA
MALI
TOGO
BENIN
ALGERIA
NIGERIA
NIGER
CHAD
LIBYE
CAMEROON
500 km
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
0
CAR
More than 100 days
From 60 to 100 days
From 20 to 60 days
Less than 20 days
Trend of a prolongation in the vegetation season
Length of the vegetation season (between 1990 and 1999)
Map 15.4. Change in the length of the vegetation season (1990/99)
IV. VULNERABILITIES
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
GUINEA BISSAU
110 days
Banjul
Dakar
50 days
OCEAN
ATLANTIC
500 km
Bissau
LIBERIA
Bamako
MAURITANIA
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
High risk Sahel's vulnerable zone
Desert region (nomadic breeding)
SIERRA LEONE
GUINEA
THE GAMBIA
SENEGAL
Nouakchott
WESTERN SAHARA
MOROCCO
Source: Agrhymet Regional Centre (ARC), SWAC / OECD (2005)
0
N
GHANA
Ouagadougou BENIN
Niamey
Average risk Sahel's vulnerable zone
TOGO
BURKINA FASO
MALI
ALGERIA
50 days
NIGERIA
Map 15.5. The Sahel’s vulnerable zone
Limit of the Sahel's vulnerable zone
CHAD
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
Border
Capitals
Inter-annual variation of the length of the rainy season below 30%
CAR
Inter-annual variation of the length of the rainy season exceeding 30%
N'Djaména
CAMEROON
Length of rainy season
NIGER
LIBYA
IV. VULNERABILITIES
275
LIBERIA
SIERRA LEONE
GUINEA
MAURITANIA
Source: CILSS (AP3A) SWAC / OECD (2005)
GUINEA BISSAU
THE GAMBIA
SENEGAL
LOUGA
WESTERN SAHARA
MOROCCO
CÔTE D'IVOIRE GHANA
TOGO
BURKINA FASO
MALI
Rice
BENIN
ALGERIA
Transhumant herding zone
D ZINDE
NIGERIA
MA R A
R
CAMEROON
Mix non-pastoral
Food crops / non pastoral
NIGER
Mix-pastoral
Food crops / pastoral
Agricultural production system
I
N
276 Map 15.6. Agricultural production systems in Sahel countries
500 km
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
0
CAR
Limit of the Sahel's vulnerable zone
CHAD
LIBYA
Cash crop / non-pastoral
Cash-crop / pastoral
IV. VULNERABILITIES
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
IV. VULNERABILITIES
Figure 15.5. Breakdown of agricultural production in the Sahel’s vulnerable zone Rice
Maize
Cotton
vulnerable zone. This confirms that vulnerability and thus food insecurity are not only characteristics of the Sahel. Therefore, most of the Sahelian population is naturally concentrated mainly in Niger, where the best soils lie.
Cowpeas
15.6. Most agricultural and pastoral methods are still traditional…
Peanut
Sorghum Source: CILSS (AP3A) SWAC / OECD (2005)
Millet Calculated on the basis of agricultural production in tonnes (2000)
The lifestyle of most inhabitants in the vulnerable zone is probably one of West Africa’s least-changed in recent decades. The main production system, apart from traditional nomadic cattle-raising, is food
Map 15.7. Main crops in CILSS countries N
Isohyet 200
Millet / Sorghum
Limit of the Sahel's vulnerable zone
Millet production zones (> 100 kg/rural inhab/year) Sorghum production zones (> 100 kg/rural inhab/year)
0
500 km
0
500 km
0
500 km
Maize / Rice
N
Maize production zones (> 50 kg/rural inhab/year) Rice production zones (> 50 kg/rural inhab/year)
Peanut / Cowpeas / Cotton
N
Peanut production zones (> 50 kg/rural inhab/year) Cowpeas production zones (> 30 kg/rural inhab/year) Cotton production zones (> 30 kg/rural inhab/year)
Source: CILSS (AP3A) SWAC / OECD (2005)
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
277
IV. VULNERABILITIES
Map 15.8. Cattle in West Africa
10 to 20 heads/km² 20 to 100 heads/km²
278
0
1,000 km
More than 100 heads/km2 Source: FAO
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
crops/pastoral. This system is centred around growing millet in northern regions, and sorghum in southern regions and is accompanied by transhumant livestock farming so as to minimise risk. This farming system is essentially defined by auto-subsistence, with little or no inputs, and monetary income from crops or livestock is small or non-existent. Between Maradi and Zinder in Niger, cowpeas, considered a cash crop although not comparable with groundnuts or much less cotton, are grown with millet and sorghum. Cowpeas are a food crop and are grown in the same way as traditional cereals (with few inputs) and largely depend on good rainfall. In the Louga area, groundnuts and cowpeas are associated with livestock in a system which also heavily relies on rainfall. Only irrigated rice paddies in the Senegal and Niger River valleys provide protection against vulnerability except during severe drought.
By simplifying, one could describe the cerealproducing areas in more or less horizontal strips: one of millet in the North; one of sorghum mostly south of the 400 mm isohyet; and an area of maize in the southern Sahel. This observation, based on agro-ecological criteria, is confirmed by production figures. Agricultural surveys suggest that about a third of the Sahel countries’ total millet production was grown in the vulnerable zone in 2000, along with 15% of all sorghum and just under 10% of maize. In this zone, millet is the main cereal crop in Chad, Mali, Niger and Senegal whereas floodrecession grown sorghum is the main cereal crop in Mauritania. Livestock plays an important role in all Sahelian countries. It accounts for up to 10-15% of the GDP in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger and Senegal. In the largely nomadic northern area, mainly camels and goats are reared. In the Sahelian zone, transhumant
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Nouakchott
San
Mopti
Gao
From 100 to 150 inhab/km²
From 50 to 100 inhab/km² From 30 to 50 inhab/km²
Tahoua
Sokoto
Maradi
Birni N'Konni Daura
Zinder
Agadez
Arlit
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
Burkina Faso
Million of inhabitants
Less than 10 inhab/km²
From 10 to 30 inhab/km²
More than 500,000 From 250,000 to 500,000 From 100,000 to 250,000 From 50,000 to 100,000 From 20,000 to 50,000
Towns (inhabitants)
Abéché
Mauritania
Main asphalted roads
Road network
500 km
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
0
Sarh
Chad
Limit of the Sahel's vulnerable zone
Senegal
Except Nigeria
Moundou
Kélo
N'Djaména
Mali
Niger
Rural population in high risk fragile zone
Kukawa Nguru Argungu Dosso Kaura Katsina Gashua Birnin-Kebbi Jega Namoda Dutsin-Ma Gumel Hadejia Maiduguri Gusau Azare Gummi Kousseri Kano Dutse Potiskum Damaturu Funtua Bama Yelwa Maroua Bauchi Biu Gombe
Niamey
Rural population density (2000)
Koudougou
Ouagadougou
Ouahigouya
Sikasso Banfora BoboDioulasso
Koutiala
Ségou
Administrative units (levels 1 and 2)
Bamako
Kati
More than 150 inhab/km²
Kayes
Border
Richard-Toll Louga Dakar Thiès Touba M'Backé Diourbel M'bour Tambacounda Kaolack Banjul Kolda Ziguinchor Bissau
SaintLouis
Nouâdhibou
Source: Agrhymet Regional Centre, SWAC / OECD (2005)
N
Map 15.9. Population of the vulnerable zone
IV. VULNERABILITIES
279
IV. VULNERABILITIES
Map 15.10. West Africa’s road and urban network
N
1975
280
2005
Town of more than 100,000 inhabitants Main paved or partially improved roads Sahelian zone (between 200 and 600 mm) 0
Source: Agrhymet Regional Centre (ARC), SWAC / OECD (2005)
600 km
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
cattle with great seasonal North-South movements are raised throughout the Sahel, along with agro-pastoral livestock rearing that migrate less and even sedentary livestock farming in the southern most parts.
plays a significant role for the rest of West Africa. The permanent migration of herds southward after the major droughts of 1973 and 19845 as well as the rapid growth of sedentary livestock farming in cotton-growing areas partly explains this evolution.
FAO estimates show, that cattle farming in the Sahel’s vulnerable (agro-pastoral) zone accounts for a relatively small number of livestock and no longer
But livestock is still a major activity in the vulnerable zone — which has a very high ratio of
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
SENEGAL
MAURITANIA
Source: CILSS, SWAC / OECD (2005)
GUINEA BISSAU
THE GAMBIA
N
BURKINA FASO
MALI
500 km
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
0
CHAD
Less than 0.5 bovines / rural inhab
Between 1 and 2 bovines / rural inhab
NIGER
Between 0.5 and 1 bovines / rural inhab
Bovine population density (2000) More than 2 bovines / rural inhab
Map 15.11. Ratio of cattle to rural population
IV. VULNERABILITIES
281
Nouakchott
Nouâdhibou
Source: Fews-Net SWAC / OECD (2005)
GUINEA BISSAU
Bissau
Saint- Richard-Toll Louis Louga Dakar ThièsTouba M'Backé M'bour Diourbel Kaolack SENEGAL THE Banjul Tambacounda GAMBIA Ziguinchor Kolda
N
Kayes
MAURITANIA
Bamako
Kati
San
Gao
Ouagadougou Koudougou BURKINA FASO
Ouahigouya
SikassoBanfora BoboDioulasso
Koutiala
Ségou
MALI
Mopti
282 Niamey Dosso
Tahoua Birni N'Konni Maradi
NIGER
Zinder
Agadez
Arlit
Moundou
Kélo
N'Djaména
0
Sarh
CHAD
Abéché Limit o off the Sa SSahel's vulnerable v ln n ble zone zo
500 km
From 50,000 to 100,000
From 250,000 to 500,000 From 100,000 to 250,000
More than 500,000
Towns (inhabitants)
© Sahel and West Africa Club / OECD 2007
* The two most important sources of income of rural households are represented (excl. Senegal)
Fisheries
Regional migration Other activities (tourism, mining)
Agricultural crops Livestock breeding and milk products
Main sources of income*
Map 15.12. Main sources of income
IV. VULNERABILITIES
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
IV. VULNERABILITIES
cattle per rural inhabitant — and is very often the main source of income for rural families.
15.7. Facing the regional market Although production methods and lifestyles in the Sahel’s vulnerable zone remain mostly very traditional, the overall environment has greatly changed over the past 30 years. The climate has become drier and the average isohyets have moved 100-150 km further south. Also, West Africa’s population has grown very rapidly, from less than 130 million to nearly 300 million between 1975 and 2005. The number of cities of over 100,000 people has risen from 30 to 135 and the network of main roads has expanded more than five-fold. The Sahel’s vulnerable zone is now home to 8 million people — about 3% of West Africa’s population — and has very few significant urban centres. Its increasing links with big urban settlement areas mean that the old Sahel lifestyles are now up against markets whose fluctuations can magnify the effect of nature’s uncertainties such as locusts and lack of rainfall. This is what happened during the 2005 dry season, especially in southern Niger, whose inhabitants are heavily influenced by northern Nigeria. But this proximity to large urban centres also provides part of the rural population with opportunities and income, especially through seasonal migration to towns and to commercial agriculture areas. The connection of the Sahel with West African markets is now a reality that neither prevention
nor management strategies of food shortages nor long-term development policies can ignore.
15.8. Conclusion The past and recent history of the Sahel’s vulnerable zone shows that this part of West Africa deserves special attention and probably special treatment in medium- and long-term development policies. Some past and present trends are not very encouraging. It is an area of structural emigration and represents only a small percentage of the region’s population. It is no longer a significant livestock breeding area and it is plagued by unpredictable weather and crop pests and now also by market uncertainties. Its demographic, economic and climatic transition is probably the most difficult and least-promising in West Africa. However, the situation and the prospects are not homogenous. The major valleys, of the Senegal and Niger rivers, have a future as irrigated farmland that 283 is still very under-used. But further east, especially in central Niger, the quest for positive connections to the Nigerian market is a more complicated issue. The economic potential of these areas is often limited and they are naturally areas of temporary or permanent emigration. The lure of more attractive urban and rural areas will probably continue. It is not about encouraging or opposing migration but rather to support those who cannot or do not want to leave the region and help them acquire the means to live in that region with dignity.
Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Most authors agree that the critical level is between 400 and 800 mm of rainfall, usually about 600 mm. Agricultural intensification is defined here as increasing the amount of labour and/or capital applied to each unit of cultivated land. Cereal availability = gross production – seeds and losses + net imports + variation in stocks. Source: The CILSS Agrhymet Regional Centre; 2005. The main invasions occurred in 1926-34, 1940-48, 1949-63, 1967-69, 1986-89 and 2004. In Niger, for example, the number of cattle has halved over 30 years due to a steady decline in available fodder.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
IV. VULNERABILITIES
Sources and bibliography Bernus, E. et S.A. Hamidou (1981), Atlas du Niger; Ed. Jeune Afrique; Paris. CILSS — Centre Régional Agrhymet / Programme Majeur Information (2001), Projet Alerte Précoce et Prévision des Productions Agricoles ; Le contexte de la vulnérabilité structurelle par système de production dans les pays du CILSS ; Niamey. CILSS (2004), Vingt ans de prévention des crises alimentaires au Sahel, bilan et perspectives ; Ouagadougou. CILSS — CERPOD (2000), Atlas migration et environnement au Sahel ; Bamako. CILSS — Centre Régional Agrhymet (2004), Atlas décennal de la sécurité alimentaire et de la gestion des ressources naturelles au Sahel (1991-2000). CILSS (2005), Gestion de la situation alimentaire 2004-2005 au Sahel. Forum on the medium- and long-term challenges for food security in the Sahel and West Africa, SWAC (OECD, Paris), 18 October 2005. CIRAD (2003), Atlas : Agriculture et développement rural des savanes d’Afrique centrale (Cameroun, République centrAfricaine, Tchad). Pôle régional de recherche appliquée des savanes d’Afrique centrale (PRASAC), CIRAD. N’Djamena, Tchad ; Montpellier, France. Club du Sahel (1996), Current Thinking on Agricultural Changes in the Sahel; Paris. ENDA-Diapol/SWAC (2004), Maradi-Katsina-Kano : couloir de développement, Paris-Dakar. FAO Agro maps: www.fao.org/landandwater/agll/agromaps/ FAOSTAT : http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/ FEWS Net (2005), Burkina Faso Livelihood Profiles. USAID, Fews Net Project. FEWS Net (2005), Chad Livelihood Profiles. USAID, Fews Net Project. FEWS Net (2005), Niger Livelihood Profiles. USAID, Fews Net Project. FEWS Net (2005), Mali Livelihood Profiles. USAID, Fews Net Project. FEWS Net (2005), Mauritania Livelihood Profiles. USAID, Fews Net Project.
284
FEWS Net, CILSS (2005), Suivi de la situation alimentaire au Sahel et en Afrique de l’Ouest. Évolution des marchés et situation alimentaire en 2004 et 2005. Forum on the medium- and long-term challenges for food security in the Sahel and West Africa, SWAC (OECD, Paris), 18 October 2005. Lerebours-Pigeonnière A. et J.C. Arnaud (2001), Atlas du Mali; Ed. Jeune Afrique; Paris. Lerebours-Pigeonnière A. et T. Ménager. (2001), Atlas du Burkina Faso; Ed. Jeune Afrique; Paris. Pélissier P. and G. Laclavère (1980), Atlas du Sénégal; Ed. Jeune Afrique; Paris. SWAC (2004), Analyse régionale de quelques indicateurs socio-économiques ouest-africains ; Paris. SWAC (2003), Transformation in West African Agriculture and the Role of Family Farms; Paris. SWAC/ECOWAS (2005), Regional Atlas of Transports and Telecommunications in the ECOWAS Zone; Paris-Abuja. WFP (2005), Interim Report: Niger — Analysis of Cereal Markets in 2004-2005. WFP (2005), WFP Emergency Assessment Brief: Niger.
Regional Atlas on West Africa — ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 — © OECD 2009
OECD PUBLISHING, 2, rue André-Pascal, 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16 PRINTED IN FRANCE (44 2009 01 1 P) ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 – No. 56533 2009
West African Studies
Regional Atlas on West Africa Recent global changes have placed regional integration at the centre of Africa’s political and economic agenda. West African countries should define areas of common interest in order to better optimise their potential. This Atlas is both a driver and the result of strategic thinking on regional integration in West Africa. Containing maps, statistics and analyses, it describes the West African region, its population, settlement, territories, its economy and its vulnerabilities. It analyses the developments and the ways in which West Africa is conforming to a constantly changing global environment. The Atlas also identifies the medium- and long-term trends and provides elements for strategic thinking on the future. Political and technical leaders of the North and South will find the information contained in the Atlas useful in debates, negotiations and decision-making. This Atlas will also interest all development actors as well as students and journalists. Educational tools (such as maps, tables and figures) will enable a broad audience to discover a region of the world which is, at the same time, promising and vulnerable. A dynamic link (StatLink) is provided for some of the maps and figures. It directs the user to a web page where the corresponding data are available in Excel® format.
The full text of this book is available on line via these links: www.sourceoecd.org/development/9789264055926 www.sourceoecd.org/emergingeconomies/9789264055926 Those with access to all OECD books on line should use this link: www.sourceoecd.org/9789264055926 SourceOECD is the OECD online library of books, periodicals and statistical databases. For more information about this award-winning service and free trials ask your librarian, or write to us at
[email protected].
XXXPFDEPSHQVCMJTIJOH
ISBN 978-92-64-05592-6 44 2009 01 1 P
-:HSTCQE=UZZ^W[: