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Vickers velD Lance Cole

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First published in 2000 by The CrowooJ Press LtJ Ramsbury, Marlborough Wiltshire N 211R

Dedication

© Lance Cole 2 00

All right, re en·eJ. 10 part of this publication may be reproJuceJ or uansmltteJ in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, incluJing phowcopy, recorJing, or any information storage

For all the VCIO men, the people who designed, built, te ted, flew and ervi ·d the finest aeroplane - the best of British, and the ultimate airliner. Also in memory of Thomas Robert Godden, a gentleman, a flyer and a 10 emhusia t. Fly high into the blue, Grandfather.

Contents

and retrieval ~ystcm, without pcrn1ission in writing

Acknowledgements

from the puhl ishers. British Library ataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue recorJ for this book i; available (rom the British Library. ISB

1861262310

Photograph previous page: A rare view o( a CaleJonianfBUA VCIO in flight - clearly showing the majestic lines of the VCIO

Thanks are due to julian Temple and the staff at Brooklands Museum, including the retired Vickers veterans; Albert Kitchenside, for so mu h help in the archive, searching and identifying of information; jack Ratcliffe and Ted Petty; Mike Goodall, for his help in the photo archives; G.R. 'jock' Bryce for flight-test information; Ken Lawson, for aerodynamics advice; orman Barfield, for his knowledge Dr and papers; Trevor carr at the Duxford Aviation ociety, for access; Peter . Davis, for EAA uper VCI information; Captain Terence Brand, former BOA VC10 commander, for technical, per onal and anecdotal information; David mith ( nr Flight Engineer BOAC/BA), for his recollections; Mike Brokenshire MBE, for his information and help on the RAF VCIO story; Peter Keating; Sir Freddie Laker;

and all the retired staff from Vickers, BOAC, B A and other companies, who all helped so much. Thanks to Brian Trubshaw for checking facts and so kindly agreeing [() write the Foreword. Thanks [() RAF Brize Norton, particularly David Roe, Gary Weightman and Karen Smart. The photographs in this book were sourced from the Brooklands Archive collection, incorporating Vicker /BAC/ BAe/BOA /RAF photo archives, and the Bradley and Brownlow (Brooklands) collection. They are reprinted with kind permission from the Brooklands Museum Trust, to which a donation has been made. The remaining photos are from the author's own collection. Donation have been made [() the Duxford Museum Project and [() the Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund.

Acknowledgements

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Author's Note

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For word

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Introduction

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1

Vickers and the VC10 - The Company, the Concept and the Politics

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2

De ign Perspectiv

29

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A Detailed D scription

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4

Development and Production

72

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Flying the V 10 - A Pilot's Per pective

105

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Into Service with BOAC

112

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Airline S rvice - Oth r Operators, Africa and Beyond

125

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Maintaining th Airframe

147

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Incidents

151

The RAF and the V 10

154

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Finale

166

Appendix - Complete Fle t List and Details

168

Bibliography

170

Index

171

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Typefaces useJ: GouJy ([en), Cheltenham (headings) Typeset by Florence Production Ltd, Devon

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Author's Note Th is i primaril y the story of one aeroplane, but it is a\ 0 the story of the end of an era. The VClO had its roots in the last days of the British Empire and in the first days of the New-World order of the jet age. It was born out of several requirements and from various desigp ideas, which eventually came togethef, through fate and fortune, to create a great aeroplane. That aeroplane turnecL.o6t, through no fault of its own, to mark the end of Britain's dominance of the world airliner market. No other industrial project has ever heen so affected by politics, power games and hidden agendas. 0 other airliner ha been exposed to the effect of opinions,

ignorance and egos in the way that the VClO was. The story of the VClO is both the story of an airliner design amI of an airline world set in an age with changing horizons. It reads like the plot of an Arthur Hailey thriller. Intrigue, politics, design secrets, geo-Iolitical events, the end of an empire, and much more, are the core of the VCIO's life. Even today, the V 10 and its history are misunderstood. Many claim that the VClO should have been developed to make better use of the lengthened runways that came into being. In fact, Vickers had planned to do ju t that. It expan ion of the VC I0 into a larger, more via~ Ie

airframe was curtailed by the customer, yet it is the manufacturer that is too often blamed for failing to develop a rival to the 707 and DC-S variants. This book is an attempt to comhine all the elements of the VC 10 story in a def-initive history of the genius of Vickers design, set amid the politics and corporate history of the day. lours of detailed research have been undertaken, with those who were there when it all happened, those who drew the drawings and calculated the figures, and those who were part of the plot in the other ways. New details and new drawings have been unearthed to contribute further to the unique story of the VC IO.

Lance Cole, Wiltshire, England, 1999

The greatest tail.

7

~ Introduction

Foreword Like too many British products the VClO became immersed in politics and differing attitudes of various chairmen of BOAC. I was intimately involved in the VClO as Chief Test Pilot of Vickers-Armstrongs when I succeeded Jock Bryce, who became the Chief Test Pilot of the British Aircraft Corporation on its foundation in 1960. By this time the VClO was well underway and it was made clear to me that Jock Bryce would still make the first flight with myself as co-pilot. The VC10 order from BOAC was announced in 1958. I recall the very detailed discussions with BOAC and one saw a lot of Captains Cane and Field, under Captain Roy Alderson. All the deficiencies noted on their other jet transports, Comet and Boeing 707, were supposedly eradicated on the VCIO, which was aimed at the Empire routes. By the time the VClO appeared, there was no Empire and the airports to be used had grown long runways. However, the basic requirement of exceptional airfield performance demanded a rear-engined configuration. All the systems were duplicated without much regard to aircraft weight, but as is explained so clearly in his book, BOAC got what they asked for.

Jock Bryce and myself worked very closely on preparations for the first flight, spending many hours on the flying control rig and on learning all the other systems. There was no development simulator in those days. We had to do most things for ourselves including preparing the checklists. One item - air conditioning - had a question mark against it in Jock's mind, so he wrote 'see E.B.T.' (my initials). Unfortunately our handiwork went off to the printers before this was rectified. So there were many laughs on item 5: air conditioning - see EBT. What happened if EBT was not present? A slip of paper cured the problem just before the first flight. There was a general sigh of relief when, after much careful thought, Jock and I recommended to Sir George Edwards and Ernie Marshall that we were happy to make the first flight from Brooklands on its 3,800ft runway, instead of at Wisley which in our view did not offer sufficient advantage to justify the horrendous task of taking th is great monster - Europe's largest aircraft up to that time - by road to Wisley. Brooklands' runway was lengthened by 400ft but because of Lord Brabazon's mon-

ument, the extension was laid at a light angle to the main strip. All VClOs/Super VC10s flew out of Brooklands in this manner, and it seemed rather comical coming round the corner at some 100 knots' The first flight of G-ARTA was made on 29 June 1962 and so started a tremendously interesting and demanding flight development programme, which was not without some major incidents and problems, especially in cruise performance. No story of the VC I0, about which there have been several, has had the unique depth of detail of this book by Lance Cole. The basic theme is a tribute to the work of Sir George Edwards and the late Ernest Marshall. Lance has done this admirably and 1 here commend his work most highly. I am sure that its readers will get as much enjoyment and interest from it as I have done. The VCIO was a beautiful aircraft to fly and it provided a level of comfort that had not been experienced before. I t is a tragedy that its development did not continue, as it had so much to offer. Too many of our best inventions have followed this short-sighted route.

If today, at the end of the twentieth century, a team of engineers and aerodynamicists were asked to shape an airliner for difficult operating environments, certain essential ingredients would be necessary. The airliner could have a swept wing, sculptured shape with an ultra-efficient, uninterrupted, high-lift device-equipped wing. The fuselage could be flush fitting, the wing-box could be smoothed in, and the tail could have plenty of ventral fin area. For maximum aerodynamic effect, tuned to all airfield operating demands and asymmetric handling requirements, the aircraft would almost certainly be aT-tailed, cleanwinged design with rear- or high-mounted engines. In response to such requirements, today's designers might well produce a shape identical to that of the Vickers VCIO. Indeed, when the task of designing just such an aeroplane was set as a theory

question to a group of British aviation experts, they did draw what looked like a VCIO. The giant McDonnell Douglas/ Boeing C-17 Globemaster military transport also utilizes the high-lift, strongbody, T-tailed concept to perform exactly these tasks. It does have its engines on the wings, but those wings are highmounted - a structure that is not widely acceptable in the civil market. The capable Airbus A340 uses a 707 -style layout with podded, underwing engines, but surely that is because it is a derivative design descended from its A300 family of forefathers. Given a clean sheet, Airbus Industrie might well have aped the Caravelle and designed a rear-engined product with a clean wing. Developments in engine thrust and runway length have changed the perspective of design possibilities, making the job of hot and high payload uplifting less of a problem. Yet the fact remains that, in

Brian Trubshaw MVO, CBE, FRAes

British Airways Super VelO shows off the clean lines and elegant stance of the model.

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the context of its time, when hot and high payload uplift and range were designrelated problems, the VC 10 design was the answer. The VCIO was surely a masterpiece of thinking in an age of commercially orientated, conventionally designed airliners and the experts and commentators of the time confirm it. The efficiency of the VC IO's design was reflected in its handling qualities and superior runway performance. It is true that its early-generation engines handicapped its fuel efficiency, but that was within the context of the time and not the fault of the aircraft; indeed, until they were re-engined, its competitors also suffered the same handicap, although they made a worse job of adapting to that handicap. For example, the VCIO could uplift and have range, while the 707 of the time would require an expensive en route refuelling stop that undermined its economics.

INTROD CTIO

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A British United VelD cruises through the clouds.

It is perhaps unfortunate that the imply, its capabilities were out tanding. replacement of the VC IO's original Its p for further Super VCIO" cancelled with BOAC p;lying mdlion> in cancellation charge".

VICKERS VC 10 MK.IV GENERAL ARRANGEMENT FIG.I

An airbrushed early design rendering of the VelD. Note the fin fairing shape and engine intakes - both subsequently changed for production.

22

Such was the talc of the VClO's infancy - affected as it was by the stewardship of BOAC and by the meddling of politicans. Caught up in all this, Vickers must have felt enormou frustration; even today, former Vickers employees have strong views on the situation. The fact that a Select Committee of the House of om mons was asked to look at the whole proce s, and to focus directly on the BAC/BOA /VCtO story, indicates the extent of the mess. History reveals that there was confusion over BOAC' exact role - was it to be an airline intent solely on making a profit, with carte blanche to buy what it wanted, wherever it wanted, or was it a national flag carrier with a duty to support it own country's products (and still make a profit)? Certainly, these questions were upp rmost in the minds of those

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ers aircraft had Africa in their blood. This is a Viking of Central African Airways.

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The Vimy, in the form of the airframes that it spawned, played a part in the creation of the greatest names in Vickers history, like the Vernon and the Victoria. These in turn led to the Barnes Wallis-designed Wellesley and the B.9/32 twin-engined airframe that became the Wellington, which gave birth to civilian offspring such as the Viking and the Varsity. In the 1930s, Vickers aircraft set many world records for long-distance flights, as well as the world height record - on 16 September 1932, a Pierson-designed Vickers Vespa Mk4 flew to 43,976ft with oxygen-equipped Cyril Uwins as pilot. These successes reflect the skills and knowledge of Rex Pierson, who dominated his field up to and beyond the merger that created Vickers Armstrong and saw the birth of the Viscount for the Brabazon Committee and for the nation. Under his tutelage, the company produced nearly 40 major, standard-setting aircraft designs. Without those

who ran BOAC at the time; departing BOAC Chairman Sir Miles Thomas was the first to comment on the national-carrier role, and to ask whether BOAC was an airline or a vehicle for national selfinterest. Thomas' successor was Sir Gerald d'Erianger. I-laving run BEA, he was at least an airline man, yet hi role was a difficult one, alongside ir Basil mallpiece as BOA Managing Director. The Aviation Minister at the time was Harold Watkinson, who indicated that BOA could have its Boeing, while hi government seemed to be pushing for the purchase of a British aircraft only. These mixed messages within government panned several elections and several ministers - up to and including Julian Amery's time in the Aviation Ministry. Throughout all this, BO C had the almo t impossible job of coping with a situation that et the needs of politics and management in conflict. The British home airline market was small, and this meant that only limited orders for any airframe would be made. The home aviation manufacturers, however, needed greater numbers in order to make a profitable production run. Between 1956 and 1961, this dichotomy was at the core of the problem. Although it could hardly be blamed on BOAC, many tried to lay responsibility for the situation at BOA's door. It became obvious that the VCIO, which had not been intended for use on the orth Atlantic routes, would in fact be able to serve them and that it was, indeed, going to be used on them by BOA . However, by this time, the whole affair had been affected by interference from all quarters. It certainly seems unfair that BOA should have complained about the design of the aircraft when it had always been intended for another use - for which BOAC had speCified in the first place '

who taught Pierson and those whom he taught, the story of Vickers and the VC10 would surely not be as it is. It is perhaps a cruel irony that, in its eagerness to become part of the TSR.2 story, and to further its overall plans, Vickers allowed itself to become part of the new British Aircraft Corporation. It then witnessed the abandonment of the TSR.2, and also saw the superbly advanced fighter-bomber and civil-airframe designs, which had been readied by the company, be submerged by the plans of others. One example was the BAC One-Eleven, a Hunting aircraft design, which usurped an in-house Vickers plan for a shorthaul airbus-type airliner when the BAC group was created. This perhaps exemplifies what Vickers lost through the merger - the airbus type was to come to the fore later in various incarnations.

By the time ir Matthew Slattery had become BOAC Chairman, the affair had gone badly awry. He uggested that the airline needed a 707 rival of equally tailored design for a specific Atlantic route, but his proposal went against the decisions already taken by politicians and by BOAC itself. A lattery tried to do his job in protecting BOAC's accounts, the perennial question about BOAC's exact role arose again - wa it a commercial entity, operating totally independently, or a commercial entity with a duty to support home products, and what of the need to make a profit as well? There seemed to be no answer to the questions, the government changed, and the machination began to affect Vickers' work on the aircraft, and the VClO's delivery schedule. A number of statements were made about the disastrous ituation, most notably in the House of om mons. By late 1963, Julian Amery, the new Minister for Aviation, seemed to agree to BOAC running the airline for profit only. However, he al 0 stated that the decision about whether to use home-grown airliners or off-the-shelf Boeings would be up to BOAC, but that it was clearly allied to home political needs. Was this cane blanche to BOAC' new Chairman ir Giles Guthrie (an ex-banker) to run BOAC solely for profit, irrespective of a role in supporting the Empire and Commonwealth air routes with an aeroplane designed to do just that (which the airline had itself requested) I Guthrie took a commercial decision to do just that, and was much criticized for doing so. Was he imply doing his job, or was he forgetting BOAC's historical role and responsibilities, which had originally led it to ask Vicker to de ign an airliner to meet wideranging requirements? Amazingly, the outgoing B AC Chairman had been asked by

24

VICKERS TYPE /,000

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~t""Scale Model (M12 5),

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GENERAL

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These views of the Vl000 scale model for ditching trial show its true shape - less Comet and more A340!

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strange set of contradictions. ubsequently, the situation changed and numbers were reduced. It is worth remembering that all the design and development wa privately funded by Vickers, while BOA was a nationalized entity that was recapitalized with government (or taxpayers') money. This funding included an indirect, I ut very real, subsidy effect for placing the BOA long-haul jet order at home in Britain, according to government wishes. Sir Giles Guthrie, BOAC Chairman from 1964, did his job in fighting for BOAC's financial honour. However, the airline's original role toward the aircraft it needed seems to have changed to the po ition later adopted by Guthrie. Whatever happened, he and BOAC would not, or could not, lose - the airliner they asked for was delivered. Furthermore, the market for the aircraft, and the passengers to fill it, were there, despite BOAC's financial losses in 1959. Many of these had been related to late aircraft del iveries, to a confused management view of whi h propulsion and capacity choice to make, and to the costs inherent in a diverse and multi-fleet operation.

VIEWS.

the incoming Chairman not to order uper VC I for BOAC, yet Guthrie found that, via the Amery-guided plan, this had already happened. Guthrie wanted to cancel the VCI order entirely and go for an all-707 fleet (curiously, in luding 707 freighters - the VCIO freighter having been turned down by BOAC!) - doing much harm to the VCIO's chances. Comments in Norman Barfield's overview paper indicate that BOAC might have been allowed to order 707 if it had undertaken to order British aircraft in the future. BOAC was claiming that, even if it did this, and procured both sets of airl iners, it would still not have enough aircraft. Yet, when BOA came to negotiating with its own national aviation industry, all sorts of counter claims were made, including one that said that Vickers had demand d an order for 35 aircraft. Dr Barfield' notes confirm that a figure of 5 was mentioned in discussion by BOA ,but he relies on Sir George Edwards (Vickers Director) to refute this, stating that, in Edwards view, 'There was not the positive tand by us that we would make the aeroplane for a quantity of less than 35.' Vickers cont nds that there was no 'ultimatum' to BOAC, and that 35 was a flexible discussion figure put forward by BOAC itself. BOAC's traffic plan analy is for the future years actually stated that 35 aircraft were needed, with a potential expansion to another 27 on top of the 35. This was without mentioning the growth in freight traffic that the airline anticipated (which led to the freighter VClO ideas from Vickers). The argument over numbers raged on. BOAC claimed that it had been forced into taking too many VClOs, yet it renegotiated the original contract in 1961 to increase that number, and its own traffic predictions confirmed the increased number of aircraft required. It was a

a

Post-War Needs In the post-war days of the early 1950s, when the VI 000 was at its height and the VCIO had yet to evolve, Britain still had an empire and a massive military presence around the globe. These outposts needed servi e in military and civilian terms and there was a certa in market for an aircraft to do this. This sector of the market even had its own label - MRE, standing for 'Medium-Range Emrire' - while the routes to the Far East were known as the 'Dragon Routes'. Thus it was that Vickers rmstrongs Limited, working on an idea for meeting the Empire's need, actuall y created a world-class ai 1'1 incl'. s early as 195 ,the V 1000 project had been drawn up around the remit of the Royal Air Force's transport and supply needs. At the same time, the civil medium-range Vanjet project was also intended to meet the RAF's transport need. The Ministry of upply issued a

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VICKERS A D THE VCID - THE COMPANY. TilE CONCEPT AND THE POLITIC

specification for such a machine. At the same time, Vickers wa already doing initial design work on an even larger VIOOO derivative aircraft for the civil market, known as the VC7 project. Over the next five years, Vicker spent a ignificant amount of money on the VlOOO/V 7 and, with joint RAF and BOAC input, it looked as though the two projects coming from one basic airframe would defray co ts and allow clear figure to be firmed up in performance terms. This had happened on the Boeing KC135/707 project. There were clear contradictions in this apparently good idea. The RAF needed an aeroplane for medium-length supply sectors, mostly in 'hot and high' tropical places. It needed to be strong and, while they did not want it to be exactly slow, it had above all to be tough. They did not need a swift, lightweight, first cia arrow to champion the British Blue Riband in the skie. BOAC, on the other hand, needed just that - a transatlantic pure jet designed for the highly profitable routes to the USA and Canada. These countries were still seen in tho e days rather quaintly a part of the 'New World', but they were known to be a profit centre of growing trength - a vital arena for any airline that wished to be taken seriously. Despite the obvious contradictions, BOAC was keen to get on board with the project; perhaps the fact that million of pounds had been 10 t on the development of the Britannia still smarted in the accountants' faces. Also affecting this situation were the past machinations of the Brabazon committee, and its themes for 'streaming' what aircraft were needed and who was to bu iId them; in addition, the Brabazon airliner was in its death throes and the aunder Roe 'Prince's' flying hoat project had recently failed. The aero-political situation in the early 1950s was in a stare of confusion, with too many loose ends and too many factions fighting for the marketplace. Few were ahle to "ee the wood for the trees'. Amid all the confusion, it seemed to Vickers and to others that the V I000 was the answer, especially as Vickers had the VC7 project - the next step on from the V I000 themc - waiting in the wings for the future. The conflicts relating to the sizc of aircraft rcquircd and to the nccds of its principal u'cr seem to have been recogni:ed and ignored at the same time. The ultimate paradox is that, in the end, BOAC ordered an aircraft that exactly

met it specific tropical route needs, and the needs of the RAF transport. A version of the V 1000 would have fulfilled these requirement, yet, because there was no existing airframe to assess for a commercial app] ication (as there was in the KC135/707 project), BOAC showed little interest in the V 1000/VC7 to whi h it may have been a partner.

Regrettable Decisions and Harsh Judgement In 1955, it became clear that BOAC wanted to buy off-the-shelf 707s from Boeing as state-of-the-art Atlantic airliners, despite the fact that, good as they were, they were still in many ways firstgeneration aircraft. There was even the sugge tion that 707s hould be licencebuilt in the K and old to the Commonwealth! Britain's very real chance to seize the future, advance the art of the airliner, and stay ahead of the competition for a decade or more, was thrown away. The cancellation of the RAF order had a direct impact on the development of a potential worldleading civil airliner as a spin-off from the RAF project, but the British Government seemed unaware. Sir George Edwards, head of the Vickers team at the time of the cancellation, told the press, 'I think it is a national deci ion that we shall regret for many year' to come.' In plainer Engli h, it was a blunder. Amazingly, the blunder was compounded. Politically-inspired defence cuts killed off the V 1000's state-funded input (as later happened with the T R 2, another ail{rame of advan ed potential); again, the commercial ramifications of cancelling the project, and throwing away Britain's Icad, did not seem to dawn on the government. In addition, BOAC and the industry were still arguing about whether to go the jet-turboprop route or to take a jet-age risk. The BOAC management's decision-making process, affected by government pre sure and the fact that BOA's role for the nation remained unclear, contrasted clearly with the firm decisions taken at this time by Qantas of Australia. Through the excellence of its te hni al advi 'or', pilots and management, Qanta was even able to secure at rea onable cost from Boeing a one-off, pe ial-order airliner in the short-bodied, higher-flying

26

707-l38 model. This far more capable 707 was unique, with a degree of ' hot and high' performance. It was adaptable to both the Empire stages of the ydney-London 'Kangaroo' route, and was also able to tackle the Blue Riband, long, thin sector acros the Pacific, where its high-flying economy of operation really made a difference. Qanta used its 707-13 s alongside its later 707 -320s, tailoring their use according to route needs. It also reengined th fleet with later-model Pratt and Whitney turbofans in a rebuilding programme. Thus, it clear management decisions and its knowledge of its role paid many dividends. Qantas had been put under pressure to support British interests, and take the VCIO; the aircraft would have been ideal on some of its routes, but not on all of them, and not on the Pacific routes, which were of increasing finan ial importance to Qantas at the time. In 1961, ir Matthew Slattery, BOAC's hairman, toured Australia and supported the VCIO in public. By then, the BOAC technical department' confidential views on the VC I0 seemed to have reached the ear of others. lattery later expressed his concerns about the VCIO's economics, yet wisely felt that to ubject the aircraft to criticism before its entry into service would do no one any favours. At that time, BOAC's poor financial performance (notably in 1959/60) had opened it to criticism, yet the corporation was supporting the national interest by taking the VC 1. lattery's report to the Minister of Aviation, Peter Thorneycroft, covered a II th is, as well as the haste wi th wh ich the V 10 concept for the MRE routes had been drawn up and signed. In addition, the creation of the BAC company - absorbing Vickers et al into a greater national aircraft company affected the decision-making process. BOAC seemed to want to bend with the commercial dictates of the period after all, the corporation had an airline to run - yet inherent in its decisions lay the beginning and the end of Britain's ahility to produce a really big jet airliner. urely it was important for Britain's national airline to have an all-British fleet based on merit and not on political armtwisting? Many thought that BO C could have it all, but BOAC seemed to sec things from a different angle. The historical facts are clearly recorded. They include one incident when BOA had criticized the VClO, at a crucial

VICKERS Al D THE VCID - TilE COMPA Y. THE CONCEPT AND THE POLITICS

The VelO Man: Sir George Edwards George Edwards surely encapsulates the spirit of Vickers. He joined Vickers in 1935, quickly began to make his mark in George Stannard's engineering department, and went on to work with the company's Chief Designer, Rex Pierson. Edwards was closely involved with the development of the Wellington and did much work on its specialist roles, notably on equipping the airframe with the magnetic ring that, attached to the Wellington, was used to clear mines on the sea surface. Edwards worked on several Wellington experimental types and also worked with Barnes Wallis and his bouncing-bomb experiments. Strength of character and a personality that inspired admiration from the workforce saw George Edwards rise to assume command at Vickers after Pierson's early death just after the Second World War, just before the Viscount came to fruition. George Edwards stuck with the Viscount, and his faith saw it through. Under Edwards' command, a spirit of inventiveness, a superb degree of artisanship, and a 'can do' attitude grew within the workforce. Difficult problems were often solved by a group sitting down in an informal manner, working through their options, and achieving a remarkably simple yet effective solution to an engineering problem. There was, clearly, under Edwards, a positive team spirit. Edwards was knighted in 1957. In less than two decades, he had risen to the position of head of the new British Aircraft Corporation, and then commanded the British end of the development of Concorde. In the intervening period, he oversaw the design and production of military and civil types, notably the Valiant and the VC10. Despite being a 'boffin', George Edwards also had commercial acumen and, as a Vickers managing director, played a leading role in the tough government and commercial airline decisions and arguments. He also pushed hard for the sort of international collaboration that he knew was the only route to large-scale, international airframe construction and as such took a leading role in the Concorde story. In the darkest days of the V1000 and the VC10, it was George Edwards who went on unannounced factory walkabouts to meet, reassure and inspire the Vickers workforce. Although not a commercial pilot, he was, at Vickers, an undoubted captain of the flying industry. At the time of writing Sir George Edwards is in his ninetieth year and, as popular a figure as ever, is also a leading light of the Brooklands Museum Trust.

time when certain African and Asian 'Commonwealth' airline were interested in buying the aircraft. They were put off by BOAC's statements about the V lO's economics. According to many, BOAC's figures on the VC10's conomics did not tell the whole story - to the detriment of the airliner. It is true that the VC IO/Super V 10 was heavy, but that was inherent in its de ign. Although its AP (Aircraft Prepared for Service) weight was 7 tons greater than a 707, a number of its benefits outweighed this potential handicap. The 707 could not do what the V 10 was designed to do, a the reverse argument that the V 10 was a failure because it could not do what it wa not designed to do (be a 707 rival on 707 routes) - now seems perverse in the extreme. Surely it

is fair to say that BOAC asked for the VCIO and that it got what it wanted for the task reque ted. The argument about the economics of the Atlantic airliner seem to miss the point, yet were used for leverage against the VClO. The VC10 was judged har hly; in fa t, its achievement of its specific task wa excellent. BOAC did make the mo t of the VC] 's attributes in passenger terms, and created an advertising campaign based around the airliner the like of which had never been seen before. The V 10 had some friends within BOAC - mostly at operational and engineering level - and made many more after its introduction. In the end, BOAC de igned and created its own engineering and rooling programme for servicing its VCIOs. This programme was so good that

27

Vicker itself took on board some of the ideas.

A Difficult Climate The view of ir Giles Guthrie, BOAC Chairman from 1964, that 'the same business principles apply to air transport as they do to selling socks', reflects the climate of the period. This was underlined when, on 7 May 1964, Flight Inte111ational printed the statement and added, 'I'll bet you can't find any darned holes in that argument.' These attitudes emerged as the air raft entered ervice, and after, yet their root can be traced to the birth of the V 10. Back in 1956, it had been argued that

VICKERS AND THE VCID - THE COMPANY, THE CONCEPT A D THE POLITICS

the delay in developing an engine for the all-British product would mean that BOAC would lose out to its American rivals while BOAC waited for the VlOOO/VC7. The shrewd observer will note that those American rivals were powered by the same engine that powered the VCIO. Clearly, BOAC had had its fingers burned with the Comet and the Britannia and its judgement was affected by this. It is also true that there was, even then, a 'Boeing-only' faction within BOAC/BA, which has prevailed to th late 1990s; it has only recently been broken by the Airbus story. Vickers knew what they were doing. The Valiant, Vickers' first really big jet airframe, with its crescent wing, buried engines and great weight, was a superb product, and the V I000 took much of its lead from the work done on it. The V 1000 was way ahead of its time in structural, pressurization and aerodynamic terms. The prototype was almost complete, the expensive tooling had been forged. This was not just a 707 rival, but a great design in its own right and a stepping stone to the VC7, an aircraft that would have led the world and left Boeing way behind. Its cancellation in 1955 was a disaster. When it axed the VIOOO, Britain had thrown away the future of airliners; in the view of Vickers Managing Director George Edwards, 'We have handed to th Americans, without a struggle, the entire world market for big jet airliners.' Although much of what had been learned

on the VIOOO was saved for another day, Britain walked away from the chance to dominate the airline world for years, leaving that position to be achieved later by the Boeing 747. On the face of it, the accountants - the risk-minimizers in government and at BOAC - had won. The answer was simple: buy stop-gap aircraft, then go for the 707. Yet this answer forgot the sure and certain fact that, in order to secure further aid and government funding, BOAC would have to buy British! Foreign-currency restrictions and the needs of political parties at elections were not as divorced from the decision-making process as one might be led to believe. It came as no surprise when, after placing an initial order for 707s, BOAC announced that it needed an aircraft to serve its Empire routes. Needless to say, this aircraft would have to be better than the 707 if BOAC were to buy it. The debate about prop or pure jet was still raging, and the wasted opportunities relating to the aborted V 1000 and VC7 were still very fresh in the mind. In this climate, in 1956, the VCtO was begun as a series of derivative studies from the jet Viscount/Vanguard themes. The 707 was not yet completed, the Comet tale had created a lead and lost it, and Britain had very briefly ruled the airways and then relinquished its rule. All the time, in the background, had been salvation in the form of what would have been the V 1000 and VC7. The skies of the airlines of the

28

world were messy, and the dictates of commerce were unclear; the industry seems to have created its own mess and then had the affrontery to complain I This was not the only time such a debacle would occur; it would happen again a few years later, when the same sort of meddling ruined the Hawker Siddeley Trident. Incidentally, underlining the company's foresight, Vickers had pioneered a tri-jet formula in 1956, with the Vanjet. So, although the remains of the VIOOO and the Vanjet became the VClO, hindsight shows that, had the V 1000/VC7 and Vanjet gone ahead as separate, long-haul and medium-haul jetliners, Vickers would have had the world market for such aircraft sewn up years before Boeing and Douglas filled identical niches with the 707, 747, DC-8, DC-lO, and 7 and DC9 airframes.

n

Out of this particular debacle came the VCIO - undoubtedly one of the greatest pieces of industrial design of the twentieth century, probably the most elegant airliner ever, and certainly the best-performing airliner of its genre. It earned higher load factors than the 707 through its passenger appeal, which did not wane after the newness of the design had worn off, it required less structural work in service, and it carried enough extra passengers to offset its weight disadvantage, thus earning a profit for BOAC. The success of the VC lOis evident - but it was not indicated in BOAC statements at the time.

CHAPTER TWO

Design Perspective Requirements, Tenders and Orders Conceived in 1956, the VClO was born on to paper in 1957. BOAC had finally cut a path to a decision and had real ized the possibility of being allowed by the government to order 707s, provided they order a British machine as well. Quite whether the government meant that BOAC should procure a British 707 equivalent for the sake of it, or whether it should demand something different as well as better that could also compete on 707 routes, is a good question. Even the airline men in the industry were confused. Design proposals such as the De Havilland 120, HP97 and an Avonpowered VC 10 type fell at this first fence. It seems that it was acceptable to ask the impossible, and to complain when it was delivered. There were many different views of what was needed and how to service that need, and the design parameters took a long time to be settled. The VC I0 design reflected the needs of its intended task, but BO C complained about the way in which Vickers chose to meet their request. By spring 1957, the Chairman of BOAC, Vickers and the government agreed that Vickers would, on a privately funded basis (albeit with guaranteed orders from the state carrier), tender for the jet that BOAC never really wanted. BOAC decided that it needed twenty-five VClO-type aircraft for its southern and eastern routes for which the aircraft had principally been tailored. The airline then asked for more than th is nu mbel' of VC lOs ina larger version (wh ich became the Super VCtO), for the Atlantic routes for which it had always pinned its faith on the 707. BOAC would go on to order many more 707s and the VC 10 was stretched into the Super VClO to make it commercially viable on a seat-per-mile basis for BOAC's western and oceanic routes. It would have been even more viable if it been left as a 2l2-seater, which

Vickers suggested in the first place, but that was not to be - at BOAC's behest. There were political imperatives urging BO C to order a British craft, but the mess did not stop there. Vickers needed to sell VCIOs to make a profit and, if BOAC were to swap its existing orders for Standard VC IOs for the more economically viable Super VC lOs, the loser would be Vickers. Vickers also had to learn to create the VCIO and its advanced wing, it had to cover its costs and, although it planned to use the Vanguard jigs as much as possible, it did not know if this would be feasible. The process would take time and money, but it was an essential part of what was needed by an airline whose previous role had also been as a subsidized national institution. Vickers knew that the Commonwealth countries would provide an excellent market for the VClO, and indeed its performance tailored for their regions made it very popular in later years. However, in 1957, the company still had to prove that it could ome up with what BOAC had asked for - which was more than the best of what was then possible. BOAC needed an airliner that would carry a 35,0001b payload non-stop over 2,500 miles, and would be able to get airborne with that load from a 'hot and high' tropical airfield. As well as this, the machine would have to work on the easier Atlantic routes. This was probably the toughest commercial requirements list for an airliner contract ever; it was not an easy task, even for a company like Vickers. The original costings put each VllOI VCIO model at £1.5 million pounds in 1957, rising to a planned £1.75 million. The Super VClOs would cost over £2.5 million pounds apiece. After the contract was signed, in early 1958, for an order of thirty-five aircraft, Vickers started design work in earnest. BOAC still wanted to influence the design and its Chairman called for a stretched version. This was then seen in its Super 200 guise as too big, yet it might well have become a

29

'Jumbo' to compete with the DC-8-60 series and, in double-deck form, the 747. Between 1958 and 1960, much swapping of orders took place between the original Standard and the finalized Super variant. Such was the confusion and concern not least about delivery schedules, where delays would obviously cost BOAC hard cash - that the VC I0 contract was rewritten in 1960. The original order was changed to fifteen Standards and thirty Super models, and by the end of 1961 this had changed again, to ten Supers with three cut from the Standard order. In the end, BOAC took twelve VIIOI Standards and only seventeen VI151 Supers. At the same time, other airlines were also showing an interest in the VClO concept. British United Airways and its flamboyant head, Freddie Laker, first became interested in the VCIO as early as 1960; this airline was behind the large, left-side forward cargo door that became an option on the Standard model VC I0 airframe. Such pioneering created the mixed cargo/passenger role long before the 'combi' cabin mix was so heavily marketed by Boeing for their 747 model. Although BOAC was the launch customer, the VClO was not solely a BOAC aircraft.

Design Influences While BOAC was making order and specification changes, Vickers also had to make changes, and absorb the costs of such changes within the VClO's initial design. The original plan had been to amortize costs of the VCIO tooling by using the Vanguard jigs in Vanjet mode, which would clearly limit the scope for growing the design. Perhaps this mistake was Vickers' own, yet it reflected the procedures of the time and the way that aircraft were evolved. Even the Vickers Advanced Projects Office must have been constrained by the conservatism prevalent at the time in the British mindset and in the British way of doing things.

DESIG

PERSPECTI VE

o

o

0

+ The jet Viscount in one of the early drawings from Ernest Marshall's file. This was the first Vickers jet airliner idea.

The Vickers Vanjet VC10. Published for the first time. and proof that the VC10 label was first applied to the Vanjet studies. an early variant drawing from the Vickers design office. This is the tri-jet design. Note the Vanguard fuselage/windscreen frame. integral airstairs and buried rear-engine installation.

The Vickers Lineage that Led to the VC10 Viscount Jet Viscount

I Jet Viscount with Vanguard wing

+ pylon engines

Jet Viscount rear-engined tri-jet

I Jet Viscount/Vanguard as Mkl Vaniet

I Vanjet Mks2 and 3 (up to Mk15) with both twin and tri-jet layouts. some with Valiant outer wing

I Vanjet as two versions - short- to medium-haul (BEA) and long-range (BOACl both three-engined trijets. Avon/Conway engines

I BOAC version gains fourth engine and becomes Vanjet - VC10 MklVN with military specification optioned version for the RAF. Conway MklO engine

I Finalization of definitive VC10NllOO shape

30

Whatever the reason for the mistake, Vickers soon realized that they would have to start afresh and leave the existing framework behind. The costs rose, but so too did the chance to move the concept on. Suddenly, there was the possibility of building a six-abreast seat cabin and having larger cargo containers under the floor; now an industry standard, six-abreast seating was another Vl000jVC7 first. BOA upplied it payload and performance needs for its most difficult outstation and then it was up to Vickers to come up with the good. [n doing 0, Vickers looked to the past and to what might have been the future. The Vanguard and Vi count airliners had pioneered new construction techniques of advan ed monocoque form, and much of what had been learned through their manufacture wa pa sed on to the VClO. Most notably it benefited from the thousands of drawingoffice hour that went into the V I000 and Vanjet. Some of the ideas that would have

A rarer view of the Tay-powered Viscount in 1950. with its underwing podded engines mounted on a Viscount 630 airframe. Many have remarked on how much the later Boeing 737 resembles this aircraft.

31

DESIG

made it inro the V 1000 and Vanjet were thu incorporated, and not everything had been wasted after all. Interestingly, as with the VIOOO, Vickers included a military transporr ver ion of the Vanjet for the RAF, with a cargo floor and loading door. Both the e themes made it on to the VClO. In the end, the VClO ended up filling the design niche that the VI 00 had been cr ated to fill- the ability ro perform both a military RAF role and a civil BOAC

DESIGN Pl, RSPECnVI:.

PER PECTIVE

role, mostly on the 'hot and high' routes of Afri a and Asia. The great thing about the VClO was that it was so capable and so excellent that it could easily be modified into an Atlantic skyliner ro perform alongside the 707, although there were penalties inherent in using the design for this task, for which it had not initially been designed. 0 other airliner had been so versatile before thi, and none is obvious ro this day. The V 10 carried extra weight as a result of its origins.

Subsequent bad publicity about that extra weight and its negative effect on operating co t was a cynical ploy for corporate and financial reasons on the parr of the very company that had set the requirements in the first place. The politician got in on the act too. Roy Jenkin MP made the following statement in the House of Commons: It would he much hener for our stntus to make a highly succe""ful plane with the engine, in

A head-on view of the early jet Viscount with extended span and two engines. t'

/

r--

"1

/ /

/ /

/

+ Another derivative. the jet Viscount. with a swept tail fin and changed engine installations.

the ..,alne r'o"',tiun . . a.. . thl' American.. . han~

Negilll\"!:

thc,r" thR("'Si.

The Vanjet VC10 featured tail-mounted engines this shows the buried tail installation. However familiar this looks today, especially in view of the L1011, 727, Trident and Falcon 50, this idea was untried and unseen in 1954 when it was drawn up at Vickers.

VICKERS

VA.NJET

'1'10.-,,".

ACCOI'\I'\OD",Tl0N.

Again, a 1954 Vanjet idea, showing the cargo door and elegant tail.

An alternative, staggered seat layout was also considered and is shown in this drawing with the pitch set at a closer, but still comfortable 34in pitch.

38

39

J

DESIGN PERSPECTIVE

pecification - Vanjet VCIO MkV BOAC Version, Engines:

four Rolls-Royce

pecification Ref: B 61

on way R.Co 10

Dimensions Length:

160ft

HeIght:

39ft

Wingspan:

125ft

Gross area:

2,6

ft

WeIghts Max. take-off:

245,OOOIb

Max. landing:

171,OOOIb

Max. zero fuel:

149,OOOIb

Basic operational:

115,OOOIb

Max. payload: weep:

34,OOOIb 30 degrees

(25 per cent chord) Fuselage length:

132ft 6in

abin Dimensions Length:

92ft 4in

Freight volume:

1,640cu ft

Fuel capacity:

10l,OOOIb

(Avtur) Range:

3,000 miles wIth wing plus central tanks, 1,700 miles wIth wing tanks only

CruIse speed:

5 Omph. Pressure differential lb per sq

allowing 3< ,000ft cruise.

tn,

Conway las. In the end it was the Conway that got the better development profi Ie and the de ign graduated to the usc of four 17 ,SOOlb-thrust rated Conway . Thi~ shape and pecification for the first time defined the recognizalle VClO shape and tyle. The re lilting VC I airframe had a central keel, a trong wing and much of it' structure was machined from olid, using techniques pioneered on the Valiant and Vanguard. It would be stronger, faster, sleeker, much quieter in the cabin, and a better airfield pelformer than the 707 or DC- . It would he safe, easy to handle and not test the skills of pilots who, no matter how experienced, were transferring to the VCIO from propeller-powered machines not always an easy transition. The VCIO would offer a slow, stable approach profile in the landing pattern and give the pilot a great safety-enhancing parameter - time to get the approach right and time to monitor the aircraft and the glideslope environment, and the weather conditions and sink rate. Vicker, as~ured thar it would be very 'afe anJ al'o have that characteristic pa~senger appeal thar i, difficult (() quantify. It would build upon the reputation of the Valiant, Viscount and Vanguard and, de pite everything, it would be a world-beater.

"--------

WING TANKS. 8,450, IMP. GAL.L.S -

65,000Ib(AVTAG)

CENTRE> SECTIONTANI(, Z,OOO.IMP.GAL.L.S -

15,500 Ib,(AVTAG)

TOTAl. TANKAGE, 10!'-50 IMP. GALLS -

VICKERS

80,SOOlb(AVTAG)

VANJET ~UEL

c....ss

7'l. -

."

61

MI.l£D

-

PI£...c.

:: -= ::~~~:~~I::~lotS

-

,,~, ..

.... (.."

t.ut

.......)

= :::;:~~ )

""-....... 1t. ..T ... A'

~'!I' ",TC. ..

The three-engined Vanjet VC1D featured wing and central body tanks. as seen here. Of note is the fact that the elegant curved shape of the tailplane is already mooted at this stage. The four-engined Vanjet with its VC1D designation now took on a clearer specification that included a six, abreast layout or a mixed-class seat plan. as seen here.

40

41

VC IO.MK'!.

TANKAGE.

DESIGI PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTER THREE

A Detailed Description The :,>tructure of the VC to represented everything that Vickers had learned over the years, as well as reflccting the thinking of rhe men hehind Vickers. The VC IO's supreme elegance was thc result of the work of a committee of designers rather than just one person. Designers, engineers, stress experts, electro-mechanical experts, aerodynamicists and many others grouped together to create a form that served function, yet also boasted lines of incredihle beauty and presence. To anyone sranding under that wonderfully swept tail fin, observing the shark-finned line,' of the tailrlanc, the nose-down stance and the falcon-like angle of the wings, the VC I \ hrilliance of form is clear. Many agree that this is (he great shape of late twentieth-century industrial design, a' well a simrly being a very prctty aeroplane.

Finally, the definitive VllOO Type VC10 prototype plans, here seen with the original square wingtips and unmodified engine, stub wing, exhaust features. Note the lack of the in-board wing fence and the fifth pod for carrying a spare engine.

42

Personnel A group of talented reoplc gathered at the Vickers construction sires in the early 1950s. Their work on the airframes of that reriod proved to he a foundation for the VCto as it came into being in late 1956. It is only right to record their names to the best of the ahil ity of the arch ives and of the memories of those who remain. Any omissions are accidental. The namcs at rhe front of the Vickers VCI 'house' were ir George Edwards and Ernest E. Marshall. upporting them wcre the project managers, team leaders, section heads and assorted boffins that represented the spirit of Vickers Armstrong Ltd and its VCIO airliner. The aerodynamics ream comprised the following: Ken Lawson (Chief Aerodynamicist); Hugh Hemsley (later Chief

Vickers' Sir George Edwards (middle) and BOAC's Sir Basil Small piece (right) sign the order book for the BOAC VC10s.

43

Engineer); Basil Stevenson (Asst Chief Designer); John Hay (Assistant Chief Aerodynamicist); Roger Back (Aerodynamicisr); Heinz Vogel (Aerodynamicist). The engineering team comprised David McElhinney (Chief Stress Engineer); David James ( 'hief Structures Engineer); John Davies (Chief Weights Engineer); David Findlay (Leader Wing Stress); Alec Paterson (Fuselage Leader); Maurice Wilmer (Fuselage Projecr Manager). The systems teams, covering asrects such as weighrs, electrical systems and mechanical sysrem,>, included Ted Petty (Chief Projccr Engineer); Harry Zeffert (Leader Electrical Engineering); Jack Ratcliffe (enior Electrical Engineer); Gerry Hitch ( enior Engineer Electrical); Colin Jehu ( enior Engineer Electrical); Gordon Howells (Senior Engineer Flight Controls); George Aylesbury (Leader Mech.); G. Weber ( enior Designer/Autopilot Engineer); Jim Richards (Deputy Chief tressman); George Turner (Team Lcader); Harry Welton (Senior Foreman). Production was overseen hy Bill Potter (Assr Producrion Manager); Ken Keenan (Asst Production Manager); Wally Chapman (Assr Production Manager), who direcred the building of the first VClO, G-ARTA; and Cyril Redman (Senior Foreman). Hugh Tyrer was Vickers Chief Metallurgist, while Ted Chivers and Jack Swanson were enior Draughtsmen. Mary Raven was Ernest Marshall's secretary. 'Spud' Borer worked on the pressurization system and cabin strength de ign. The fl ight-test ream comprised the following: 'Jock' Bryce (Chief Test Pilot); Brian Trubshaw (Deputy Chief Test PilcH); Bill Cairns (acting as Chief Flighr Engineer); John Cochrane (Te't Pilot); Eddie Mc amara (Te t Pilot uper VCIO); Doug Howley (Flight Enginecr); Roy Mole (Flight Engineer); Ob ervers Chris Mullen, Roy Holland, Ian Muir and Peter Diss ( uper VCto); Dennis A kery (Flight Test Dept); P. Baker (latterly BA Chief T t Pilot, VC10); and R. Radford (Chief Pilot BAC, tanker conversions).

A DETAILED DESCRIPTION

A DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Vickers (BAC) mined the BOAC, BUA and EAAC training captains in a team run by Dennis Hayley-Bell and Lew Roberts. Representatives of launch customer BOAC were closely involved with Vickers from the VClO's early days, and even occupied their own office at Weybridge. Two important names relating to BOAC's involvement at the design stage are J.R. Finnimore as BOAC Aircraft Development Manager and Don Ashman as In-Service Engineering Manager for BOAC/BA Powerplant testing for BOAC was overseen by J. Romeril as head of its Power Unit Development Unit. Captain orman Bristow publicly represented BOAC's Aight crew team on the VC to but the original BOAC development team was headed by Captains H.J. Field and AP.W. Cane. Charles Abell was BOAC's Chief Engineer. In 1962, BOAC set up its flightmanagement team for the soon-to-beintroduced airliner: Capt A.S.M. Rendall (Flight Manager), Capt F.W. Walton (Deputy FI ight Manager) ami Capt J. Nicholl (Chief Training Officer). Senior Engineering Officer G. Sears acted as Chief Engineer Officer/Instructor with

Vickers Weybridge Advanced Project Office in the 1950s. To the right, Ernest Marshall (Chief Project Engineer). and to the left, John Davis (Chief Weights Engineer). 'Jock' Swanson in background. Ernie Marshall seems to be holding a four Dart-engined, high-winged, swept-tailed airliner proposal for SEA!

Still at the APO bureau in 1957 (left to right), Frank Ward, John Davis, Jock Swanson, Ernie Marshall, Maurice Wilmer, Sammy Walsh.

STEEL LIGHT ALLOY The VC10's monocoque frame.

Senior Engineering Officer H. Hughes running the VCIO development flying. Flight avigating Superintendent was W. Robinson. In 1963, BOAC added another nine Captains and another nine Engineers to form a core or 'nucleus' training command within the airline. Other well-known names in the command at the time were Captain Stoney, Captain Todd, Captain Phillips and Captain Gray. Unlike some members on the staff of BOAC, these people were highly complimentary about the VC 10. British United Airways also had an office at Weybridge and was involved early on with tuning the standard airframe for its needs. J.R. Sidebotham was Chief Planning Engineer, while Bill Townsend was BUA's Resident Engineer at Vickers in the so-called 'Airline Alley' offices. (Later on, Bill Richardson was British Caledonian's VCIO Engineering Officer with Vickers, or BAC, as it had become by then.) BUA's Captain P.A Mackenzie was the airline's chief VCIO pilot. East African Airways appeared later on the scene, with Captain G.W. Mitchell as Ch ief Instructor on its Super VC lOs. These were the leaders and managers of the VCIO's creation, production,

44

testing and flying; the larger workforce at Vickers that made the VClO a reality actually numbered more than 8,000 men and women.

Airframe Construction and Manufacture Vickers had worked previously on military aircraft, but they knew that the highly loaded, highly stressed approach to airframe components, which had prevailed in some of the 'short-life' military airframes in the preceding years, would be of little use to a long-life, safe and sound airliner. Viscount, Vanguard, Valiant and V 1000 experience would prove invaluable. Vickers therefore created an airframe that was not just a self-supporting monocoque similar to that which Boeing and Douglas employed in the 707 and DC-8. It was a milled-from-solid monocoque with added structural chassis sections in the form of a central keel, wing torque box, and a safety cage-style underskinsupporting structure of almost geodetic type. The basic airframe was both fail-safe and safe-fail. In other words, the under-

45

lying structure could take the loads of the principal structure if it failed, and then absorb more through a multi-load pathsurrounding network. Much of Vickers' earlier work on the Valiant's centre wing section - safely fitting four paired engines in a central wing box - had been highly advanced for its time. The result was even safer than the way the four centre-mounted, buried engines were housed on the Comer. In employing such techniques, Vickers incurred weight penalties that the 707 and DC-8, with their lighter-gauge simpler structures, avoided. However, in time it would be proven that the Vickers technique needed far less structural work and fewer repairs throughout the life of the airframe. The Vickers airframe also had to operate in harsher conditions and carry a rear-mounted engine structure - by necessity of design, not choice. From the word 'go', the VCIO was a very strong, very tough, very safe airframe, and incidents in its later life would prove that. The VCIO was so safely designed that it has almost certainly prevented passenger deaths. The VC IO's designers adopted a structure with k)w skin-stress levels, and with

A DETAILED DESCRIPTIOI

A DETAILED DESCRIPTION

sated for by the safety and aerodynamic advantage of the clean wing and the centre thrust-line power band. Through this simple yet highly effective design, a double monocoque hull with a low stre -supporting outer body was also beefed up via its central chas is. It wa true 'belt and braces engineering', in what remained the biggest jet aircraft ever made in the K or Europe right up until the Airbus A340 thirty-five years later. ny possible fuselage cracking was contained by closed-off load paths. The fu elage skin panels were gauged at 17s.w.g. and had a maximum length of only 6ft - this would stop a long crack spreading. At the top of the pressure hull

the panels were laid transversely with circumferential straps over them; beneath the floor, longitudinal trap were used. The fuselage was of oval cro -section, but with flat surface at the wing-root rib. Divided into four ection, the fu elage was ba ed on a cabin pres ure differential of91b/sq in with localized doubling. It was constructed from alloys such as Ln, DTD 50Z0 and 5010. The main underfloor keel was designed to be repairable. nlike other airliners, the door openings did not need plating or patching, as 6in radius corners and thickened surrounds toughened up the 10 al area. In the crucial wing area, the fuselage retained its pressure above the wing-skin

The VelD cockpit roof section being assembled in 1960.

multi-rath load-carrying networks underneath the skin. The metals used were copper-rich aluminium alloys and steel, as well as others. The structure as a whole is of note because it was the first time an airframe had been milled from many solid parts; over 55 per cent of the V lO's structure was machined from solid. Machining from solid billets of metal rather than fabricating greatly reduces the number of rivets needed and thus reduces the chances and causes of tre cracking, corrosion, creeping and shear strength failure. This really was unusual in a jet airliner; the Vanguard had pioneered the ideas, and the VC I0 took them to a larger scale. The American, used to fabricated, riveted, welded and bonded multi-structures, had never seen anything like it. The entire fu elage was laid up from a deep central trough or keel box and then wrapped in frames and skins. Unlike other aircraft of the time, the skin used rivets, splices, lap joints and bolted-on stiffeners in a minimal way. Instead, the VCIO had

its major stress-bearing skin panels notably the window panels - machined from solid and integrally stiffened rather than just having doubler plates. Stress levels were therefore kept more uniform and peaks and hot spots of stre s concentration were avoided. Surprisingly, the finished panel was actually lighter, with fewer crack-raising areas, and was far smoother from an external aerodynamics standpoint. As such, there was no obviou window, belt-line patch, as there is on the 707. ( otably, Fokker aped the VCI 's smooth window/fuselage design for it F.Z .) The windows, made from a product called Oroglas 55 created by the Lenning hemical company from a Rhom and Hass ( A) parent company process, to a 14 x 9in elliptical hape at ZOin pitch, al 0 broke new ground. Each window was formed by three sheet: an inner non-loadbearing trim glass covered the middle panel, which took the main pressurization loads, while a secondary, outer panel could also take a load if the main inner panel

46

failed. To double up on this fail-safe theme, the main window sheet was made bigger than the hole that it plugged, and it was inboard-mounted. By this means, it self-sealed from pressure forces and added to its own frame strength and fatigue life. The entire fuselage length of this hull was supported by hooped frames and based on that central keel. At the wing, undercarriage and tail junctions, the skin and hoops were further supported by torque boxes and diagonally split load anTIS, and via cleating and stringer that bonded the skeleton together. Channel frames were doubled up and did not simply stand alone. The threat of turbine di c damage from an exploding engine is a vital consideration with closely coupled engine and the rear end of the VClO therefore featured some ma sive reinforcing to contain any splitting or tearing that might lead to explosive decompre sion or structural failure. The weight penalties of all these safety considerations were more than com pen-

The central fuselage side panel. 35ft long and machined from solid.

47

and pressure-box area between the wheel, which doubled up to achieve that aim. Around the emergency-exit cut-out and close to the overwing hoop-frame reinforcement, the fuselage skin was increased to 0.039in in a panel of 34ft length, which greatly increased the hear strength of the area. A ZOin wide torque-type box ran rearwards, wrapped in a steel girdle based around a spine member. Wing loads were absorbed by both the spars and this stru ture, and then transferred by I-section frames into the structural body or cage over the area, which was in effect a triple torsion box. This box was also a fuel tank. Wrapped in light alloy with S.99 steel reinfor ing hoops and cross members, the

A DETAILED DESCRIPTION

A DFI AILIoD DESCRIPTION

This view shows the milled work and localized reinforcing that ensured the VC10 a safe structural life.

wing box led into each wing and spar pickup point. The wings were skinned in zinc-rich DTD 5050 high-strength alloy nn their tnp (cnmpression) surface and 24 T 24 aluminium copper alloy on the lower tension-loaded skin. All the inspection hatches were milled from solid, as were their frame housings, and they were all on the top surface of the wing. The three-part wing tructure featured integrally machined panels with localized reinforcing. There were only even panel on each wing section, which reduced the chance of a crack fracturing, and the outboard wings - of three top panels and four lower surface panels were the ame. There were ten Fowlertype flaps and near full-length leadingedge slats - with an inboard void tn control airflow disturbance and pre ure differentials near the wing-tn-fuselage join and engine-intake area. The flap hung off a beam that itself hung from a wingspar rear web. The flaps were hydraulically driven off span wise shafts and stopped travelling if any asymmetry developed.

The rear fuselage structure and engine bearers take shape.

48

The flaps were honeycomb-structured. The spoilers went up to 50 degrees and could be operated independently. The leading edges followed experience with the Vickers Viscount wing and were lowstressed, while the VCIO's slats had mechanical stops and integral de-icing ducts. They were chemically etched, using a technique that can reduce fatigue strength yet also toughens up the surface to foreign-object damage. This technique needs to be closely monitored, and it was o in the VCIO. The wing-skin milling was overseen I y Harry Welton, a senior foreman at Vicker Weybridg . The entire wing structure carried the fuel load of 17,94 imperial gallons divided into ix tank numbered I to 4 via a 1a and 4a sub-tank designation. Each engine was fed from the corresponding tank on each ide, but cro -feed was available. Without wing-mounted engine to offer bending relief, a further weight penalty was paid in beefing up the structure. However, the V 10 absorbed the problem, the only outward sign being less

49

visible in-flight dihedral in comparison to the 707. All the alloys used in fuselage and wing were ultrasonically tested for flaws before and after machining. Interestingly, the fuselage floor is a composite of end-grain balsa and steel sandwiching known as 'Mallite EGB4'. This early omposite offers low weight and high strength and was developed by the Mallinson Company. Light and strong, it also absorbed noise very well. The mounting offour engine at the rear - then unique - produced an over-engineered structure but has, none the less, proved its worth over the eal". t the rear, the kin and structure metal was of d thicker gauge, and the tringer were of Z section. There was a closely woven basket of fin and engine support beams that intersected in a manner certainly suggesting g odetic principle, if not actually acknowledging it. The angled fin spars ran down into a bridge of the main engine-support beams and 10ft long spectacle-shaped engine bearers, which had three pick-up

A DETAILED DE CRIPTION

A DETAILED DESCRIPTIO

points for each engine. These bearers (drop-forged by English Steel) and their inn r beams were machined, back-to-back channelled and th n box-reinforced, and had great hear strength and anti-twi ting torsional rigidity - es ential for a stru ture carrying the thrust offour Conway engines. The local reinforcing of this area led Vickers to claim that the structure would survive any lisastrous event or overstre sing, and that, with protected hydraulic runs and electrical routing, at least 50 per cent of systems would remain available. Later events in commercial service would bear out this claim.

The nacelle design wa, again, new ground and much work went on to create a low-drag fairing and a low-weight structure. Much of the fairing was made up of inspection panels and the inlet mouth were hollow ection with alloy leading edge. The stressing in the nacelle and engine-bearer region that is mo t often encountered is the accelerative down force encountered on landing; the weight of four Conways achieving a sink or descent rate that comes to an abrupt halt on touchdown has to be contained and ab orbed on a repeated basis. Under the tail fuselage area of any high-time VCIO

airframe there will be localized 'dimpling' of the skin where the frame has tran"ferred such loads. The in-flight loads arc actually Ie crucial. The Vickers-built 'in-house' undercarriage featured a la-degree rake-back and two- tage compressor to muffle the landing. The adverse effects upon absorption power of raking the oleo leg were minimized by cranking its main beam, giving further travel. The rear wheels also touched down first to soften the impact. A well as creating the softest landings imaginable in a big jet, this low-pressure tyred, multi-beamed, compressed landing-gear design also cased

/

/

The first fuselage takes up its final shape. No other airliner boasted a structure built like this; note the widened beams and hoops, the thick floor cross-beams and massive antitear strapping work.

The forward fuselage section taking shape. Here, the extensive use of components machined from solid is exemplified by the fuselage section being made up around a freight floor surround.

50

he downward touchdown loads transmitted up through the fuselagc and into the tail area. A hard, unyielding, vertically mountcd, truck-type gear bogie would certainly have announced the VCIO's arrival on earth to its passengers and to its engine beams and tail spars. Through good design, such ill effects were avoided to the best possible degree. Of greatest interest in structural terms were the fin and upper area of the tailplane and bullet fairing. With a T tail, the bendlllg stresse on a fin arc far higher and much more crucial in structural terms. The vertical fin must therefore withstand the twisting and loads impo ed by the horizontal tailplane urfaces. There are al 0 aerodynamic considerations, notably the deep stall phenomenon and the sweep, mach effects from the buffet zone. imilarly, the central bullet-shaped housing that divides the two eparate halve of the tailplane must cope with sparll.vise flow and vortex ffects. Given all this, it is hardly surpri ing that the V lO's tail area received so much attention from the designer.

The fin consisted of vertical pars and a framework of beams to absorh stresses. The fin skins were much thicker than normal, so chord-biased stiffeners would have become useless. The stiffening stringers were therefore placed spanwise with three s}lars and three fin frames, all doubled up by the thick skins' load-bearing capabi Iities. The tailplane was mounted from the fin-support box via two roller bearings, thus allowing pivot. The third pick-up mounting point was through a screw-type actuator that connected the fin top to a forward-reaching arm on the tailplane tructure. From here, steel and alloy sleeves carried the mounting and load forces into the various casting and rib that created the core of the tailplane before everything wa dissipated towards the tailplane tip. The actual wing structure then became conventional. At the crucial point where the panels and loads meet near the fin join, machining from solid was not possible, due to the wing-skin p sition, so localized reinforcing was employed with sub-load ~upporting

51

paths to achieve the fail-safe criteria. The tailplane carries its loads from tip to tip, but as the fin loads are passed into the fuselage they have to pass through angles, or a 'hinge' point, to put it in engineering terms. It was no easy achievement to reconci Ie all these factors and create an elegant empennage. The tailplane was swept at a greater angle than the main wing to maintain mach-related airflow properties. Aerodynamic 'flutter' implications were an essential part of the VC la's tail-unit design, and on three occasions the aircraft' tail-de ign features saved it from in-flight structural failure, thu proving the work done by Vickers to be not only necessary, but also correct. The three-piece rudder and elevators were honeycombed section, de igned for ease of replacement. With the force of four Conways only held ISin from the fuselage, and with the buffet from the thrust reversers to contend with, these surface had to be monitored and replaced when needed. Overall, the VC la's structure i stiffer than normal yet is not brittle. Unusually

A DETAILED DESCRIPTION

1961 - G-ARTA is really beginning to take shape in this view. The clever engine-mounting system is clearly seen and the tail-fin support structure is on show prior to fin attachment.

52

A DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Summer 1961 - the Vickers Hum plant presents the first completed tail structure.

53

A DETAILED DESCRIPTIO

sites were pread out and that the British aircraFt indu try saw multi-centre skilling and Fabrication as the norm. [n later year, both Boeing and Douglas sub-contracted major airFrame structure work to their various si te in the A. For the V la, major parts were transported in From Filton, Hum and South Marston near windon, where the tropicalized pitfires were made For the Far East campaign of the econd World War (and which is now, ironically, home to Honda). Other parts came From St Nazaire in France, where ud Aviation introduced the tooling and milling From solid to France, later used, like so many VClO themes, on the Anglo-French Concorde.

Powerplant, Controls and Systems Po sibly the only ben fit reaped From the delays to the V 10 project wa that its engine had the time to prove themselve in other applications and to be developed into higher thrust variants. Thus it was that the Rolls-Royce Conway proved an ideal candidate to power the VC I and, on ervice entry, had already amassed thousands of hours in use. In the opinion of many, the VC10 was the first airliner to be over-powered, and remains the only one to be so. While the accountants may have winced, the pilots and passengers were very happy, as were

The wing is joined and the aircraft begins to look the part for the first time.

For an over- tiff tructure, it can absorb stress rather than suffer From it. The structure offers exceptional stress absorption, unique level of damage tolerance and valua~ Ie long-I iFe characteristics taken to a new height. [n testing, the wing took a 6 per cent overload, and deflected by 7Ft in one direction at the tip, with a 6Ft opposite imposed flex, before Failing. The VC[O is thereFore probably one of the saFest and mo t load-capable airframes in the history of civil aviation - no mean Feat. The work on load path and Fatigue resistance broke new ground, and could only be tested in trials and in service [iFe. Fortunately, uch monitoring proved that the VC[O did not

need the very expensive rerla ement of major structural component uch as spars, skins and ribs that a(fl ict all other commercial airframes. OF course, it did need localized replacement work, and there were in- ervice stre -related events, but the basic structure was, appropriately For Vickers, built like a battleship. This great money-saving bonus For the airline operator was oFten overlooked. The aircraFt simply sailed through its 30,000-hour checks with only the basics of xpected work on the structure required, and was certificated to 60,000 hours. Much of the Frame had a 'leave-alone' design [iFe of that long. Allied to a very

54

thorough anti-corrosion system, under which the whole airframe was dipped and also entirely painted, this aircraFt's structure dared to be different and met all its requirements in a manner that silenced the many doubters of the time. The basic tandard VC10 tructure easily absorbed the 13Ft Fuselage ext nsian, fin tank and increased weight of the lengthened uper VC10 model. The variou part of the VC la's stru ture were brought together at Vicker Brookland ite near Weybridge in urrey, which was close to its other main Factory site at Wisley. As a result of wartime diversification, it wa not surprising that the

Now wearing paint, G-ARTA gets ready to emerge into the world.

55

the engineers. The pro pect of a lowtressed, cooler-running engine requiring Ie use of Full power rating, bod dwell For in-servi e liFe. Hot engines mean hot component and sub equent earlier Failure of cri tical parts. Work started on the V [a's chosen Conway 42 engine in [95 . [t was a development of the Conway 12 engine (CO.12) first een on the very early 707 . The origins of the engine had been passed down From Rolls-Royce's work on .10 and beFore that on the Avon. [t had also seen service on the Valiant, albeit buried in the wing-root rather than on the 707's wing-mounted pylons or slung at the ba k of the Fuselage, as in the VCIO.

A DET ILED DESCRIPTION

A DETAILED DESCRIPTIOI

The early on way pumped out I ,OOOlb of static thrust at a 0.6 bypass ratio. By the time the on way made it on to the VCIO, it poured out 20,3 70lb of thrust as the C0.42 Mk540 and this increased to 21, OOI~ in the onway 43 Mk550 ver ion. The onway has a fixed intake and quite a narrow mouth to the nacelle; this leads air on to static guide vanes that funnel the air to the main blade, which are seated amid a titanium duct. Air pre'sure is more than doubled (x 2.25) b fore being split in the core of the bypass duct principle. Part of the flow (38 per cent) is streamed off and guided around the combustor area and then re-streamed at the rear, while the main 62 per cent is channelled into the combustion process

at over fifteen times the intake value.

imonic Here, flame tubes coated with alloy ignite the incoming air with the dispensed fuel mixrure. After the explosive combu tion mix tage, the resulting thru t flows out and at the ame time drive the rotors that in rum feed the main intake and compres or stages. After this combustion stage the exhau t and bypass gasses come together at uch speed that they create OLllld-waves that approach the supersonic, hence the distinctive crackle or burble of the V la's engines. The vanes are pivot-mounted so that they work with aerodynamic and centrifugal forces, rather than fighting them. This improves their life and reliability. From the engine, bleed air is streamed

off for various systems, notably anti-icing and other optional, on/off bleed air requirement. Air from both the high- and lower-pressure cores is used for various sy tems, notably h.p. air for fuel heating. Fireproof bulkhead were incorporated as parr of the design change needed between the pylon-mounted CO.12 and the tub-mounted C0.42. In the CO.12, much engine hardware could be slung off the engine, but with the C0.42 VCIO in tallation, a central mounting beam had to be installed due to the engine itselfhaving to be hung off a three-point mounting from a ingle arced bearer. It therefore became neces ary to construct a servi ing 'bay' in order to work on, and change, a VC10 0.42/43 ngine. Airlines had to

The first BOAC Super VC10 takes shape in late 1963.

learn to do this in their own bays and not to over-stress the airframe or engine beams when ondu ting work. Over a decade later, shortcuts in engine-change procedures cau ed D -10 accident, but the V I operators avoided such events through good design and procedure . The improvement in thrust over the CO.12 that were needed for the 0.42 were achieved by increasing airflow, and to do this a larger low-pre ure stage was needed. In order to avoid unbalancing the engine's core, and having to add more rurbine tages, Rolls simply scaled up each stage by smaller degree - rather than just bolting on a bigger blower. This meant that they could tweak the high-pressure

stages into handling the increa ed flow without having to run the engine shafts at higher rpm or run the ri k of a hot-running engine core. Thi increased airflow boosted thrust by 16 per cent and reduced the specific fuel can umption. Aparr from an I.p. stage compressor of slightly larger diameter, much of the 0.12 dimen ions remained. Improvement to vanes and cooling were al a incorporated. The oil systems are elf-contained, the electrical generators mounted in crossfeed parallel, and thus can still run if one fails as well as being individually controllable. DC power is 115V on a 2 V system backed up by two standard-type 24V battery systems.

A clutch of VC10s, including (centre) the first BUA machine, nestles in the Weybridge factory.

56

57

An extendable ram air-driven electrical rurbine known as the ELRA T provides 8n emergency means of re-starring engine in-flight, and of powering vital instrument and elector-mechanical systems. It emerges from the parr/centre fuselage belly on pilot command and its short shaft is spun up by a small twin-bladed prop mounted on it nose. The ELRAT can be used once in flight and then has to be repacked and checked by ground engineer. On more than one occasion it has saved the aircraft. The danger of main-engine rurbine vane/disc failure is even more crucial in closely oupled engines such a the VCtO's. Although not as risky as an

DETAILED DESCRIPTIO

VCIO

FLYING

CONTROLS

AND

HYDRAULIC

SERVICES

26

~10

;----::::

:::: 3

----

BUA's first VC10 rolls on its wheels to await its wings; note the l40in x 80in cargo door.

____--JI uncontained engine failure in a wing-root l uried application such as the Comet' , much thought had to be given by Vicker and Rolls-Royce as to how to stop an adjacent engine being taken out if its neighbour exploded, A compressor casing capable of containing a blade failure was developed. The initial J.p. stage is wrapped in a flanged steel case while the stage 4 position sees a thickened magnesium cladding. Experience with the Valiant counted for much. Turbine overspeed is handled by an emergency shut-off control that selfactuates in under one second of a turbine burst from shaft failure. This was a major contribution to engine safety pioneered by the COA2. The VCIO look-alike, the Ilyushin 11-62, did not have such an excellent ystem and suffered a number of di astrous and fatal crashes due to such engine failures being uncontained. In airline 'ervice the VCI did indeed suffer a number of turbine 'bur ts', and on 'ever'll occasion~ large parts of the engine departed from the airframe. Thankfully, due to the integrity of the de igned safety systems, these engine explosion were contained, did not disable the controls and did not hreak the rear fuselage. The added safety proved itself worth every penny of its weight

SYSTEM

A

HYDRAULIC

_SYSTEM

B

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

-

Windscreen wipers parking unit ose undercarriage and steering Slats Spoilers/ airbrakes Flaps Main undercarriage Tallplane incidence control Hydraulic pumps (System A) Hydraulic Pumps (System B) Extreme emergency ram air turbo-pump

::

~CIRCUIT _CIRCUIT

ELECTRICAL

~~~~i'llil CIRCUIT

CONTROL RUN SEALS IN REAR PRESSURE BULlHEAD

Hydraulics layout.

V.C.10 FLY I NG CONTROLS

velO flying controls systems layout.

A spare Conway engine being mounted on the wing carrying point.

58

2

59

4

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 28

Left outer aHeron Left inner aHeron Right inner aHeron Right outer aileron Bottom rudder Middle rudder Top rudder Left outer elevator Left inner elevator Right inner elevator Right outer elevator Electric generator (CircuIt 1) Electric generator (Cironi t 2) Electric generator (CIrCUit 3) Electric generator (Circnit 4) Extreme emergency ram air turbo-generator

A DETAILI::D D - CRlJYrlON

A DETAILED DE CRIPTION

The Vel0 cockpit. or perhaps more accurately the flight deck. The roomy accommodation and depth of vision are apparent.

penalty, and undoubtedly allowed lives to be saved. In the combustion section, \'alves, nozzles and rube that were known to deteriorate in the CO.12 were modified, and hardened alloy gla:ing were added to crucial component. The oil system also had to be modified due to the temperature changes caused by enlarging the I.p. stages over the CO.12's de igned level,. Thus modified, the normal 0 degrees centigrade temperature is certificated up to 120 degrees centigrade. Thrust reverser were initially seen on all Four engines, but buFFet proved a

Technical Details: Rolls-Royce Take-off thrust. minimum rating at sea-level I A conditions:

20,3 70lb

Maximum continuous:

16.5601b

rUlse thru t:

4.5oolh at 35,00ft and 475 knots IA

O. 231b/hr laximum pre ure ratio:

15 to I

Engine length:

54in

Engine diameter:

5lin

Basic dry weight:

5,001lb

The prototype G-ARTA in flight. Note the square-tipped wings and exhaust cowlings.

60

onway 42

67

with specific fuel con umption of

A DET IL D DESCRIPTION

pa sengers would still have sweltered in tropical climes, and with a larger cabin and more bodies on board, it could have heen very uncomfortable indeed. Instead, Vickers and BOAC created a Fir t Class cabin that was predictably pleasant, but they et an entirely new standard of cabin design and cat comfort for long-haul Economy Class travel. The VC IO's Economy seats really made a difference when compared with previou level of cabin comfort. A revolutionary seat was designed featuring a one-piece moulded construction with a single support spar placed near the front of the scat; the three-seat units were manufactured by the Aircraft Furnishing Company Ltd.

Those sitting behind were no longer in danger of hitting their leg on a hard tructure. Each seat wa independently prung with generous cushioning and a properly padded headrest. Although light in weight and of modular de ign, the seat was extremely comfortable, more so, in fact, than many of the lightweight scats that came into use in the weight-conscious 19 0 . The boast was that thi wa the most comfortable Economy Class seat in the world. General passenger opinion at the time seemed to agree with the claim. This was the first real jet-age scat - it had a wipe-clean AB pia tic cladding around the frame and back, a table that offered two positions and a seat frame

The Elrat and Hyrat seen deployed. The Hyrat was an option not common to production versions.

problem and a hange was made that saw the outer engines only carrying the cascade-type sliding-door reversers. The uper VC 10, however, operated for some tim with all four reversers on its COA3 Mk550 engines, which, although externally similar, carried an additional stage intermediate pre sure compre"sor in comparison to the COA2. Most of the engine acce sory systems of the COA2 come from the CO.12 but have been modified for even better reliability the engine benefiting from all the early in-service learning experiences seen on the CO.12 application. Items such as the oil cooler and electrical controls on the fuel heating sub-assembly were given particular attention. Icing and cros -wind airflow problems were dealt with too, not least by positioning a static mounted Dart engine towards the COA2's intake and seeing

what happened I It was thus proved that incidence and angle variations, always critical on rear-mounted engine installations, were within safe limits. Su h work led to a 1,200-hour initial service life engine overhaul period, with that figure increasing in subsequent service life. The COA2 was first run in June 1960 and approved in 1963 after 16,500 flown engine hours during which only one unscheduled engine removal was needed. nder the route proving trials, mainly with BOAC's G-ARVF airframe, nothing went wrong. The COA3 for the uper VC I differs mainly in having its higher thrust delivered through an additional pressure tage. It delivers more thrust and does so by running at higher rpm and a slightly higher turbine entry temperature than the COA2 variant. Various component strengthening

62

deals with such rises in temperature. The two engines arc insrallationally interchangeable. A spare COA2 or OA3 can be carried under the starboard wing in a fifth pod, carrying container and fairing.

Interior There seemed little point in creating an advanced airliner with flight and structural characteristics that were beyond the contemporary accepted tandards, only to till it with old-fashioned eat" and an old-fashioned interior. If BOAC had simply tilled the VCI with "eats and furnishings of the Comet or Britannia era, the whole feel of the VC lOs' advanced nature would have been undermined. imilarly, if BOA had kitted out the VC I0 with an early-generation cabin air system in Britannia or Comet style,

Wearing an early interim livery. BOAC's G-ARVM leaves the short. 4.2000 Weybridge runway on its maiden flight. Note the runway warning strip painted on the tarmac letting the pilot know how much length is left. Behind. the Vickers factory buildings and some of the workforce looking on.

63

that introduced new safety standards. Although optimized for BOAC, this seat design was common to the standard Vickers VC 10 customer specification. Con tructed of I-liduminium alloy tube and featuring a hydraulic recline actuator, the seat was unique in it forwardedge upport-beam cantilever design and had easy-to-replace foam cushions weighing lIb loz per section. It achieved a successful compromise between comfort and economy of construction. BOA et the scat pitch at a comfortable 34in, which, combined with the scat design, gave all but the very tallest of passengers a degree of Economy Class comfort that was previously unheard of.

A DETAILED DESCRIPTION

A DETAILED DESCRIPTIO'

The production specification galleys were more standard affairs of shining aluminium and stainless reel. The forward galley featured a floor access hatch to the underfloor electrical compartment, which could not be seen by the passenger itting in Fir t Class. The cabin crew liked working the vela and a great team spirir emerged, frequently noticed by rhe passengers. However, all wa not ideal. The tandard and Super models both featured five toilets - three at the rear and rwo at the front. The thre rear toilets were beyond the galley and foodpreparation areas, which meant that the cabin crew sometimes had to make way for toilet-bound passengers while they were preparing the meal service. On the upers, the forward bar position was beside the main entrance door which made it difficult to serve pre-deparrure drinks

to Firsr Class passengers while others boarded. As seals became worn and panel gaps ar door openings degraded, noise levels in the rear cabin began to creep up. The lack of in-flight entertainment (other than cabin music) was also a rather surpri ing omission in the British Airways interior refit. adly, the idea for an underfloor minilounge on the stretched Super VCIO did not come about, but given the fact that the airliner was tight on luggage hold space anyway, thi was probably a good thing. Although most single-aisled large jet airliner interiors are fairly similar, the VCIO's claims to have the quietest, smoothest-riding cabin with the most comfortable sears was certainly true, and at the core of its pas enger appeal.

A rare shot of the early wind-tunnel testing that went on to investigate the T tail - this time without the engines in situ.

The original interior for the Standard V 10 featured a blend of light colour for the wall and ceiling mouldings, whi h were complemented by bold cushion- and seat-material colours. Although a vi ually relaxing design, it was not notably distinctive; change were made to the interior scheme on the later uper VC 10 that ubsequently found their way on to the tandards. The cabin interior of the uper V I was designed by Charle Butler Associates of ew York through a Mr Robin Day and featured a light and airy cabin designed to bring a feeling of breadth and also of confidence and modernity - in a very British

manner. The Economy seats were upholstered in a BOAC-specified two-tone weave-style check pattern with three different colour used for the headrest covers, while the side panels were picked out in a gold and ivory motif. The rear bulkheads in the First and Economy cabins featured a large illustration in the style of a classical etching, depicting a view of the River Thames and london ba ed on a 1647 drawing by the artist Wenceslaus Holler. later on in the life of the aircraft, the BOAC VCIO interior was revised into a Briti h Airways scheme that few became fond of. The seventeenth-century style bulkhead illustrations were replaced with

64

pop art' in garish colour that matched the somewhat p ychedelic hue of the revi ed interior fabrics. This cabin also brought in overhead bins, replacing the rather old-fashioned racks with which the airliner had been introduced. The interiors of BUA/BCAl and other operators used the tandard Vickers basic production aircraft interior tied to their own in-house colours. However, East African irway really went to town on the interior de ign and trim of it five uper V las. They were decorated with exquisite murals depicting safari cenes, wildlife and a map of East Africa, with strong blue ami ochre seat coverings.

The T tail and clean wings give excellent ditching characteristics. Here. a scale VelO model undergoes ditching trials.

65

Systems The V 10 airframe utilized a plethora of sub-systems, but they were all proven and with double-redundancy split-system capability, known a the dual-splir sysrem. Thu an alternative back-up path wa provided without the expen e of creating complete duplicated systems at high weight cost. The hydraulic ystem was a twin system with identical component and a running pressure of 3,000Ib/sq in. All the pre sure feed lines were made from stainless steel with the return runs being fabricated in light alloy. The fluid used was a fire-retardant brand named Skydrol SOOA. The flaps, slats, landing gear, tailplane incidence control, brakes, steering and spoilers were all hydraulically controlled. The RAF VClDs also featured a Hyrat emergency back-up system.

A DETAILED DESCRIPTION

actuation system was independent, but could operate either half of a system if its mate failed. Any runaway control surface could be overridden by the effect of the other ections - this was mo t obvious in the four section elevators and three section rudders. All the control runs from the flight deck through to the wing and control surfaces were mechanical, of rod and lever type allied to cables. The Hobson artificial feel that was brought into these control systems was in an enclosed unit. It calibrated how much feel to add via a measuring sensor system through resistance that was a function of control surface displacement allied to readings relative to airspeed and altitude. This feel unit and its working within the VCIO's systems was highly advanced, and the result of a great deal of work. It regulated feel pressure via dynamic pressure and was unusual in that it included an altituderelated change in parameters capsule. It was therefore incredibly accurate and preci.e. Under given conditions of speed and altitude, the feel force was directly proportional to the control deflection. Thus, no false sensations were offered to the pilot and no over-stres. ing could be acted out. The hydraulic pressure was . upplied through electrically driven pumps to control valves. The flaps, slats, spoilers ami elevators were all carefully machined and balanced, 'lIld 'mixed' into the overall control system.

Interior: the classic VC10 cabin design

The electrical system was a 200 volts ac supplied by four engine-driven generators, each being separately based for added safety. These arc Westinghouse brush less generators - avoiding brush wear, and ultra-reliable at high altitude. D output is via a F rranti transformer and provides a 2 -volt output of 150 amps. The Dowtymanufactured Elrat emergency turbine could be lowered on command, and provided 20Kw through a prop- pun turbineshaft linked generator. Emergency lighting came from a 6V battery. The pre urization and air conditioning were handled by two separate y tems, one providing the flight deck and cold-air intake louvres, while the other charged the main cabin. Fresh air was taken in close to the engines and fed via four compressors to the fuselage. Compressors fed the cabin-pressurization system via sliding, altitude-related input valves. The pressure system was by ormalair, while

Plannair blowers handled the cabin airflow needs. The intake for the Freonbased air-conditioning system, which has a 30-ton capacity, could clearly be seen at wing root, and provided welcome relief for passengers boarding the aircraft in tropical climes. Previously they had had to put up with sweaty propliners and warm Comets. The emergency cabin oxygen-supply system was supplied from a tanked, liquidoxygen upply base on a barometric setting. It provided a hort forced-fed oxygen blast at 0 p.. i. in each mask and then regulated itself to a 40 p.s. i. on-demand flow. The tandard in-flight pre suri:ation range is 6-9 p.s.i. The fuel system had a 17,950 imperial gallon capacity on the tamlard model with an extra fin tank on the Super model (1,350 gallons). Anti-icing was through hot-air du ting with a bleed-off temperature of 225 degrees centigrade.

66

The pilots' windscreens were coated in gold film, with in-built heating elements. Each engine used a two-shot, douhletanked fire-extinguisher system.

Controls The VCIO had fully powered flying controls with an in-built artificial feel unit. The control systems were of the splitystem type, en uring double redundancy and safe reversion to another system pathway in the event of a failure. Thu , all the major flying controls had a duplicated partner and a plit redundancy built into the ystem. The two electro-hydraul ic actuation sy'tems were divided into two group and powered from different upply ources. ignalling was duplicated by mechanical cable run. Each independent half of each respective electrical and hydraulic

Aerodynamics The VC 10's aerodynamics stemmed directly from the operator's route requirements. The only way to achieve these targets was to create the layout that resulted. The main contributors to the aerodynam ic form of the VC I were the Valiant and Vicker .113 prototype. Ken Lawson and the team at Vickers thus evolved a shape of aerodynamic elegance and efficiency, which also looked majestic. For the VC I 's intended routes - MRE, hot and high - particularly effective highlift devices would be needed. The wings would have to offer high lift on take-off and a good cruise performance at highspeed mach numbers - typically mach. 6 (to a max of mach.8 ). The tailplane and fin would also need to be effective, and the engines would need to be rearmounted and high enough to avoid

foreign-object ingestion. With the rearengined configuration deemed to be an ab olute must, mounting the tailplane either below the engines or above them was the only an wer. Initially, ome thought was given to slinging the tailplane down below the engines on a very lowset spar (see the accompanying Vanjet drawings), but practicalities, not least the dangers of over-rotation and of wing- and flap-related airflow interference, pointed to the high T tail as the only an wer. The Caravelle, the pioneer of rearmounted jets, had had its tailplane mounted halfway up the fin, but clearly the aerodynamic implications (not least of compressibility) meant that that site was inappropriate with four engines mounted as a wide, stub-type extension so close to the empennage. Any low-mounted horizontal surface could be subject to, or cause, airflow interference. 0 it was that the fin and tailplane design of the VC I0 were set, and after much wind-tunnel work and calculus, the aerodynamics team at Weybridge worked on solving the inherent problems. The fin and tailplane were given their elegant sweep-hack in order to ensure that their performance characteritics were not out of synchronization with the main wing. Therefore, to maintain mach numher performance and lift, as well as cure compressihility drag effects, they were swept at a greater angle than the wing - thus avoiding deterioration at a lower mach number than the main wing. This is how the fin and tail came to be so swept. However, a glance at the discarded VIOOO, even with its conventional tail design, shows where the elegant angle and sweep of the entire tail had its roots; the two share a family look that also filtered through from the Vanjets. This was the first use of a giant T tail and a greal deal of aerodynamic and structural work was involved in engineering its application. The only previous attempt at a large T tail had been seen on the Handley Page Victor, of which the Ttailed design was the subject of much debate. The Victor's T tail featured a highly wept double-cranked type leading edge to the elevator and a short stubtype vertical fin; as such, it closely mirrored the de ign work of the German designer Hans Multhopp. A young freethinking design genius, with an intuitive feel for airflow, Multhopp worked for Focke-Wulf and created highly advanced, swept-winged jet-fighter designs in the

67

late I930s and early 1940. Hi most radical wa the FW-TA 1 3 of 1944. This design was so labelled in order to credit the Focke-Wulf design chief, Kurt Tank, under whom Multhopp had worked, yet the T tail was Multhopp's own; it became known in the aviation industry as the 'Multhopp T tail'. The 183, and its Mk2 and Mk3 derivatives, became the benchmark for fighter design and were widely copied - notably in the form of the MIG15 and AAB-29. Multhopp's work also showed up in certain English post-war fighter designs (notably the English Electric Lightning) because, after the war, he was brought to England and placed at the Royal Aircraft Establishment. It is shocking to report that the English reputedly drew from Multhopp all of his advanced aerodynamics work, categorized it as 'Top ecret' and then placed him under house arrest and made it impossible for him to work on his own designs! ot urprisingly, Multhopp left England and set cour e for a new life in the U A. Today, the pace huttle rdlect Multhopp's later work on lifting bodies andupersonics. Multhopp was also the man behind the idea for weeping hack the main wing of an aircraft. While his fellow contemporary designer created early jet shapes with ma ive power to force straight-winged structures through the sky, Multhopp went out on his own and, with his skill in calculus and his intuitive feel for airflow, envisaged swept wings with less drag and better high-speed flow characteristics. \-Ie also thought ahout the low-speed handling of such wings and added leading-edge slats. Much of Multhopp's work filtered into post-war aeronautics, but, certainly, lhe Bell X 1 supersonic aircraft and the world's fin four-engined jetliner - the Avro anada Jet - stuck with straight, unswept wings. It was not until the VCIO, with its 32.S-degree weep, and the Convair 0/990, with it 35-degree sweep, that the art of aerofoil weep performan e caught up with Multhopp's dreams. In terms of size and aerodynamic elegance, the VCIO' T tail was the be t tribute to the Multhopp T-tail work. It certainly proved correct his 193 s hel ief that the T tail provided greater control authority at take-off and landing, and had significant drag advantage, as well as offering more pivotal effect. Vickers had, of course, carried out its own rese:olrch into the T tail and pioneered

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Aerodynamics: sculpting work on the tail design. The Standard VC10 achieved a natural nose-down pitch at the stall - a real achievement for a T-tailed aircraft with rear engines.

the bullet-type fairing intersection atop the T tail, but the fact is that it was Multhopp's work - ro which the Briti h had had access - that created the T tai I. The bullet fairing, with its distinctive kink and lender, swan-like body shape that sits atop the fin, cured the spanwise flow and drag compre sibility problems of the junction between fin and T tail. [t also helped structurally. Wind-tunnel testing revealed that a imple fin extension acting Iike an end-plate would have ufficed - ju t as it did on the later Boeing 727 and 0 -9, on which the Ttail principle was employed. However, Vickers tayed with the small bullet fairing atop the fin - it was sound both structurally and aerodynamically, and gave an unexpected performance boost. (Intere tingly, the Vanjet-V 10 drawings show both a bullet fairing and end-plate fin rop on the same aircraft! Typical Vickers over-engineering')

The excellence of the VC 10's aerodynamics is further underlined by the fact that it is the only large T-tailed airliner never to have crashed due to a T-tail deep stall. Every other large or medium-sized T-tail airliner has at some stage - in te ting or commercial service - experienced loss of an airframe in d ep-stall circumstance. The deep tall, or super tall, occurs when the main wing stalls and buffets the tail surfaces, rendering their pitching effect usele as they lie in the turbulent, broken airflow. Moreover, the high-set tail reverses the aerodynamic laws of tailplane effects in stalling. Lowet tailplanes become more effective at the tall because they move below the stalled main wing's wake; high- et tails start out in moother airflow - being above the main wing's wake - yet at the stall they dip inro that wake as the rear of the aircraft pivots downwards. This gives the

68

T tail the ability ro switch its pitch effectiveness from good ro poor at just the moment when it needs to do the opposite. This might ound like a fundamental flaw, but as it occurs at pitch angles never normally seen in commercial service. The flaw is not as great as might be imagined - especially when the safety net of the stick-push system is added. Rear-engined jets, on which the main wing and c.g. are rear-biased, and close to the elevator, are particularly susceptible ro this tailing phenomenon. The problem is made worse by the long forward fuselage, which causes airflow that is already twisting upward, to move further and add to the pitch up - when it is least needed and at the worst possible moment. This is compounded by the movement of the aircraft's point of aerodynamic entre shifting, and ad led ro by the changing effects of the airflow over the main wing,

known as the 'g' break. [f the designer i unlucky, this will occur at the time when the elevarors dip inro the tall wake and uffer a large drop-off in performance. The various T-tailed jet, therefore, suffer not just a stall, but pitch change that are affected by all these facror and are wildly fluctuating. The situation is made worse by the fact that the rearmounted engines are then blanketed in the broken air, spilling off the main wing (just like the elevators are), so that no amount of thrust can save the situation. Thus set, the rules of aerodynamics and stall recovery are also broken, and the air raft will pitch up inro a locked, noseup atti tude and become irrecoverable. With a no e-high, wings-level thunder of flapping air, the machine will des end like a brick at a massive rate of descent. The VC I0 avoided the worst of these potential problems through its power, excellent handling and uperb aerodynamics notably the wing-aerofoil performance and the strong effects of the large, hydraulically powered elevator unit being et high. The e factors delayed its tability-performance fall-off at the stall in high main-wing wake angle. adly, these positive facror were Ie s obvious in the under-powered and tub-tailed Trident; in contrast, the 727 could climb at high pitch angles despite its T tail, whereas the Trident could not. The 727 wa a good performer. [n testing, a 727 had rouched the edge of a deep stall and only the large high-set el varors, and th ir hydraulic actuation, had enabled the pilot to pitch th aircraft nose-down in time before all hope was lost. The tragic loss of the BAC One-Eleven in such a stall, and a Trident prorotype sufferi ng likewise, sharpened the Vickers team's focus on ro the V 10's stalling characteristics. [n an act of integrity, Vickers shared what they had discover d with the American. hief Aerodynamicist Ken Lawson and BAC hief Te t Pilot Brian Trubshaw both went to the A ro liai e with American de igners, and change were made ro the -9 tail design as a result. Vickers had realized that (not least on the BA OneEl ven) a larger elevaror with hydraulic, not servo tab spring ratchet power would give greater response on T-tailed air raft. [t would allow control, and thu increase safety, further inro the deep-stall envelope than a maller, less effective elevaror unit with less power, which would be more easily overwhelmed. Changes were there-

o

fore also made ro the BA One-Eleven. Of course, if wrongly piloted, the VCI would deep tall, but the large distance between the main wing and the very high tail negated the airflow-blanketing effect that tend ro cause deep stall. The in-built stick-push sy tem also contributed to preventing the V 10 getting locked into a no e-up pitch and subsequently being de troyed. However, the prorotype airframe G-ARTA was almost lost at the end of Decem ber 1963 after sufferi ng from a failure in the right inner elevator attachment bracket during stall regime test flying. G-ARTA suffered flutter immediatelyand it was only the superb technique of Brian Trubshaw in the command seat that saved the day. BOAC's VC10 Development aptain Peter Cane was also on board. They descended under emergency conditions, at one point activating the escape hatch to abandon the aircraft. The hatch and chute mechanism failed ro function properly and the crew had ro stay on board even though a 'Mayday' call had been issued. The descent needed careful balancing as the speed was low and n ar the stall level, but the aircraft remained flyable. G-ARTA landed afely but needed a new tail and repairs to her stru ture. The VC [0 had been lucky. Year later, during the V 1 tanker-conversion programme, a similar test-flight event 0 curred. The important point about the e events is that they provide positive proof of the excellence of the VCtO's aerodynamic design, particularly in reference to its behaviour at or ncar the stall. The oth I' problems at the tail involved the siting of the four engines and their effects on rudder effectiveness and of possible buffet/drag from the engines' exhaust region. Intake effects were also of prime consideration. If the engines were mounted too close ro the fuselage, airflow inro the engine nacelle would be affected by the layers of boundary air running down the fuselage and flowing off the main wing - particularly at high angles of attack. Again, there was a question over compression drag between the engine trut/stub wing and the fuselage-to-fin junction. Therefore, ro avoid the boundary layer and other effects, a ISin gap was created between the inboard engines and the fuselage. Exten ive wind-tunnel work solved the problem with the resulting engine strut design, but left a void at the rear of the strut-nacelle intersection.

69

eddon airflow tep was used to infill the area and reduce the size of the drag envelope behind the aircraft by tuning the vortice in the area. (Dr eddon was an aerodynamicist at the Royal Aircraft Establishment, or RAE.) Despite thi, flight te ting of the prorotype airframe ARTA revealed buffeting and exhaust drag. This resulted in a small change ro the engine nacelle incidence pitch and the fitting of the so-called 'beaver' tail unit, to smooth out the exhaust flow. Camber and surface changes were al 0 made ro the valley between each nacelle. Kuchemann tips were added to the main wings to further improve the drag situation. The type VltOl (BOA) VCIOs carried a drag penalty for their service lives, as the 4 per cent wing chord extension and reprofiled tips were first tried out on the B A and Ghana standard [102, 1103 model VCIOs, before being incorporated on to the uper model V 10. This machine also had a reprofiled aerofoil section. Keen ob ervers will also note that the early-development BOAC tandard airframe could be potted without the tall inboard wing fence that later appeared on these aircraft and all su~sequent V 10 airframe. This tall wing fence improved stability near the stall by funnelling localized flow over the wing and towards the engine/fuselage compressibility area, as well as stopping spanwise dispersal of air. [t wa added for certification at the end of the early development flying of GART and G-ARVA/G-ARVF. The V lO's main wing works at very low speed and at very high speed, because it i tuned to perform two tasks at different ends of the aerodynamic scale. tilizing a 'peaked' pressure pattern, the main wing was tailored to have a dual characreristic that could be set and fixed. The wing performanc peaked at the point at which the airflow in the super-fa t leading-edge sonic region itself peaked at its pressure distribution. This created a degree of forward ucrion or flow that was built into the wing's lifting character so as to deliberately create an airflow expan ion wave and allow space for the air to move. This meant that compre ion drag was avoided and the on et of shockwaves wa delayed. Luckily for the VCtO, wing design was moving on at a great pace at exactly the time when its wing was designed. Previously, set theories for angle, incidences and camber had guided designers

A DETAILED DESCRIPTION

10,000 feet plus - Fowler-type flap were chosen. They were as efficient as doubleslotted but with much less drag to slow down the aircraft on take-off. They were tuned by the Vickers team too, 0 that they also had a high drag character at th landing setting, just like double-slotted flaps but without the take-off drag of that type. Once again, Vicker created something special that was an aerodynamic fi r t. Another first was the design of the leading-edge slats. These travelled or rotated further over an axis (25 degrees) than had previously been thought possible and th rewards were a steep increase on the effi iency graphs. To avoid the wing stalling first at its tips - with subsequent spinning risks - the inboard section of the slat was omitted at the wing root. This balanced any tip-stall effect for only a small trade-off in maximum lift coefficient, which was in itself ab orbed by the wing's overall performance. An outboard wing fence also controlled lift-de troying, performance-decaying, panwise airflow, as did the tall inboard fence that was added for certification. As an added benefit, and despite the T tail and rear-biased aerodynamic, the V 10 offered a good degree of classic nose-drop at the stall. Obviously, the spectre of a nose-up pitch and deep- tall on et

haunted the designer, and achieving such a no e-drop characteristic with such a design was nor easy. Few other T-tailers have managed it. Le er features of the airframe to receive attention aw contributions to the overall aerodynamic performance from the smooth-surfaced window apertures, fairedin wing box, and flush sealing hatches with close panel gaps, all of which add speed and reduce fuel consumption through minimizing drag and turbulent airflow. With its tuned wings, advanced aerofoils, sculptured tail and expertly designed engine installation, the VCIO was highly advanced in terms of aerodynamics. This provided a basis for the aircraft to meet its design parameters and, indeed, to exceed them to the point at which the aircraft had massive, built-in potential. Once again, Vickers had come up with the best, and then added to it. Proof of this came in the form of the VClO 'copy', the Ilyushin 11-62. This Ru sian-built airliner became the only other airframe in the world to boa t a T tail, swept wing and four rear-mounted engines. The circumstances of its similarity to the V 10 make an interesting story, rather like the circum tances of the similarity between the Tupolev Tu-144 and the Concorde. Despite suggestions of intrigue, and suspicion about KGB spie

The so-called 'beaver tail' exhaust modifications to cure backflow and drag (see text).

on each item' potential effect, but on a singular ba is. However, when wings began to have varying degrees of section, sweep, camber and incidence, and ·Iats and flap, it was difficult to predict the characteristics of a wing as a whole entity. For the first time in the 195 s, the work of a Dr Weber at the RAE was crucial to achieving a complete picture in orporating all a pect of wing behaviour. For the V I what wa needed wa a way of setting such parameters before having them to hand as a set, real wing. Vickers aerodynamic t am worked with the Royal Aircraft Establishment, ational Physical Laboratory and the Aircraft Research Association for over six

months. They created a wing that was tuned to be super-critical; it maintained its flow nor just by redUCing the conventional flow eparation, but by actually removing it from its u ual home somewhere along the aerofoil section. Messrs H. Pearcy ( PL) and B. Haines (ARA) were credited with the 'peaky' wing idea and development - 'peaky' referring to the effects of peaks of airflow peed/pressure control - and their wing greatly reduced hock separation and span wise flow. This proved to be so effective on the ultimate Super VCIO that, at certain all-up max weights, the aircraft had to be flown with both aileron slightly pitched up. This created some drag to relieve the bending

70

stress on the wing as it created such superefficient lift. This was to be avoided if po ible, as it caused a significant amount of drag. Despite this 'ole deficiency, the V 10 wing design produced higher lift than it competitors. The VClO's aerofoil design was extremely advanced for it time, repreenting far more of a leap than has ever been publicly recognized. V 10 wings were thu created; they proved to be sup r-efficient at the top end of the speed range, and still worked well at low speed with flaps and slats extended. Given the VC I O's need for short-field take-off performance, i.e. on runways if 6,000 feet or less - rather than those of

77

trying to get hold of the early plans for both aircraft, the resulting Rus ian designs were not successful. Later, an Ilyushin delegation vi ited Vickers seeking help for their aircraft's problems. De'pite looking like the V 10 (albeit without the elegant tail and stance), the 11-62 failed to match the VCI 's performance. The life of the 11-62 l ecame fraught with disaster and there were many fatal accidents in airline service. One of the major problems was with the aerodynamics; the 11-62 was unahle to climh steeply and its take-off resemhled a kind of horizontal linear levitation. The pilots were trained not to expose the wing to any high attack angles. The aircmft was susceptible to the deep stall at even moderate angles of pitch and had to be flown both accurately and carefully. A· a result of this, the Russian design team is reputed to have asked Vickers for help in solving the II-62's handling problem. The II-62's other major problem area was in its engines. The four rear-mounted engines were not mounted in a protective cradle, as they were on the VClO, and control runs were not 0 well designed. ny single engine failure could rapidly affect it· neighbour and then expo e the whole of the rear fuselage to disastrous damage. everal airframe were lost through such circumstances and, sadly, many lives lost.

CHAPTER FOUR

industry, supplied components. The list of their names reads like a history of British industrial achievement: Ward Brooke Ltd, Hobson Ltd, Rist Ltd, Ferranti, Elliot Bros., English Electric, mith, Cossor, Fairey Mallinson, Porter, Thorn, Teddington, ormalair. These great names all contributed to making the VC I great in it elf, and there were many more.

DevelopDlent and Production Work on the definitive VClO began in earnest in early 1957. Vickers recruited for the drawing office and planned a major increase in staff for the beginning of the production run. Liaison with customer airline BOAC - which made clear its need for a 35,0001b payload uplift on 2,500-mile range sectors - was the core of the VC IO's development. The airline made available the details of its routes and, after the first Aight of the prototype Vickers Standard VIIOO G-ARTA at 5.25pm, on 29 June 1962 (two months after roll-out, on 15 April), waited for the production process

to take hold. It then took it own VllOl, G-AR VF ('Victor Foxtrot') on a serie of proving Aights in order to ensure that the recipe worked. BOAC's moustachioed aptain Cane, always impeccably turned out and known for his 'film tar' good looks, commanded the development profile. He had learned much through Aying on G-ARTA with G.R. 'Jock' Bryce, Brian Trubshaw and Bill aims. These pilots were assisted by techni ian/observers Roy Holland, Chri Mullen and Ian Muir. Prior to all this success, the first VCIO, G-ARTA, took shape at Weybridge in the

largest of the hangars. This place wa known to some as 'Cathedral City', reAecting the reverential atmosphere in these massive buildings, as well as their architecture. As all the pressings, millings, fabricated part and systems components came together, a distinct air of anticipation was felt - after all, this would be the largest airliner ever produced in Britain. In fact, excluding the multi-country Airbus, it is still the largest airliner ever produced by one country in Europe. Alongside G-ARTA could be found the VCIO pressure hull test specimen, which

Prototypes and Flight Testing

Messrs Bryce. Cairns and Trubshaw after the first flight of G-ARTA.

till re t today at Brooklands on the Weybridge site. Wing stressing, undercarriage tests, door-sealing experiments and all th fuel-tank work went on a event gathered pace. omponents arrived from Foxwarren (Cobham), Hum, South

BOAC's Captain Peter Cane talks VC1D details from the left hand seat.

72

Marston, Filton, and all the Vickers subites. otably, as one of the first example of Anglo-French collaboration, the milled tail-fin part were hipped in from Sud Aviation's t azair plant. Over 200 companies, mostly from the core of British

73

By late 1961, G-ARTA had started to come together, lying in the factory covered in dull ycllow-hucd anti-corrosion paint, with her tailplane set with an elegant upsweep in the climb position, looking for all the world like some giant beachcd sea creature. With the addition of the dark blue BOAC colour and grey undersides, G-ARTA took on the air of a super-sleek machine, all curves and fins, the like of which had nevcr bcen een before. Many simply stood and star d. They really did believe that this was the future. BOAC's first VClO \\''1' registered GARVA and Aew in m'ember 1962. everal of the aircraft registered G-ARV A through to G-AR VH performed de\·e1opment roles, but it was G-ARVF and G-AR VB that performed the majority of the respective, route-proving and Aighttraining roles. BOAC used G-AR VM as its prcfcrred training machine for somc time. Over the course of thc airframc and routc development changes were made to the aircraft and modifications to operational proccdurcs were carried out. G-ART performed extensive Aight te ting with Truhshaw and Bryce in control and much wa learned. Apart from the usual Aying and performance experiment , G-ARTA was al 0 equipped as a Aying laboratory, with 15 tons of te t instrumentation and 50 mile of cabling to record th certification trial. Much work was done exploring the handling profile and the crucial tall regime. Before moving to the BAC OneEleven, 'Jock' Bryce undertook the early Aying of G-ARTA prior to handing the programme over to Brian Trubshaw. Bryce, a former RAF King Royal Flight pilot with great natural talent for aircraft handling and information assimilation,

DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

had risen to prominence with his development flying on the Viscount. He then test flew through its entire development the Vickers Valiant bomber - Britain's largest jet bomber that carried a nuclear bomb, and al 0 the main tay of the RAF's AAR flight-refuelling capability for over a decade. During this development period, Bryce survived several 'hairy' moments including an in-flight fire in a wing that caused him and his crew to abandon the aircraft. Through ejecting from the flaming Valiant he joined the 'Caterpillar Club', an exclusive brigade of men who have had their lives saved through ejecting/parachuting from in-service aircraft in dire emergency. Through his work developing the Valiant's flying controls and artificial-feel units, he came to the even larger VCIO with a good idea of what would be needed. Certainly, the methods by which the VCIO's rate of roll and Dutch roll characteristics were analysed and flown stemmed from previous experience with the Valiant. Brian T rubs haw , who became the VC 10 programme's main commander in flying terms, was also a former RAF Kings Royal FI ight pilot. He had known Bryce previously and had established an enduring flying relationship. Trubshaw, later to become famous as the man who took oncorde to the air, had been an ex eptionally rated young RAF pilot who, after changes to the Royal Flight, had been streamed out and identified for a test-piloting role. Having joined up in 1943, he wa by 1949 an RAF special projects squadron pilot. Through various helping hands, he join d Vickers Armstrong in early 1950 under Mutt ummers, who was then Vickers Chief Test Pilot. There, hi rare aircraft-handl ing talent came to the fore, and he would become a senior figure in the worldwide test flying industry. He had carved his niche flying the Vanguard, and also in flying the Valiant Mk2 - the exquisite-looking 'black' Valiant, which was developed for low-level interceptor flying and had it strengthened structure painted in gleaming all-black. From those earlier experiences, Brian Trubshaw developed his core commitment to Vickers aeroplanes, and to George Edwards. uitably equipped, Trubshaw was able to take the V 10 development flying on beyond Jock Bryce's initial VCIO flying, as Bryce went to take over the One-Eleven. In tho e early day, the flying limits of the VC I0 were approached carefully and

the expected parameters of safe handling only explored to about 70 per cent of their estimated profiles. It was a tep-by- tep pro e s of caution. A the aircraft's true handling was confirmed, that percentage of performance exploration wa pushed further and the aircraft was taken up to its limits. Drawing on all his Vickers experiences (notably via the Valiant), Brian Trub haw and his crew went into uncharted territory with the stall regime, but in a safety lead process. Certification of the VC I0 took place on 22 April 1964, after two years of test flying with G-ARTA and G-ARVE.

The Drag Problem In performance terms, a drag and buffet problem was identified during early flights through a degradation in performance expectations. This resulted in the wellknown tweaks to the airframe (see Chapter 3). These included reprofi led Kuchemann tips (giving a 6ft span extension), 'Iat housing re-alignments, altered engine installation (the familiar 3-degree greater incidence to the fuselage datum line being applied to the later 'uper VCIO, but a less critical initial change also being applied to the production VIIOI tandard models), and an inboard wing fence (at 18 per cent chord), plus engine exhaust trimming vane' (the beaver tail fairing). The re-tuned' eddon' airflow step was also incorporated to the rear of the engine stub pylons. Later variants (Type 1102/3 onwards) also featured special wingtips and a wing hord increase as well as vortex generator . Vickers spent a significant amount of money and time inve tigating the drag problem. This included air-to-air photography ofG-ARTA in flight at heights up to 37,000ft at high speed. This showed how specially applied tufts of fibre moved in the localized airflow area. The pictures revealed trong turbulence and backflow - a indicated by the tufts' pattern, around and in between the paired engines' pod - and this led to remedial work, headed by Ron torey at Vickers. Early in these trials, Vickers had to go back to basics to try and find out where the unexpected extra drag was coming from. Before re orting to tuft te ts and expen ive structural alterations, they tested the wing flap and slat housing to see if all was well, with a clean, retracted

74

configuration. This meant taping up the slats and flaps and sealing the gaps between their panels and fairings. Obviously, the aircraft would then have to take off and land with no flap and no lat availabl . This would incur some risks at the higher speeds necessary. nder the command of G.R. 'Jock' Bryce during the first phase of testing, G-ARTA was taken to the long runway at Boscombe Down and taped up and test flown. This helped identify the various areas where airframe re-tuning was needed. Brian Trubshaw was al 0 involved in furthering this work. Development of the airframe went on for years, with G-ARTA working as the development airframe for another three years. Despite the major structural modifications that were worked into the uper V 10, which could not be added to the BOAC Standard models (uch as the chord extension), it was the Type 1102 and Type 1103 airframes that saw the most changes. otable, and often ignored, was the extra work to do with localized airflow behaviour on the leading edges. Whilst most commentators focus on the 4 per cent chord extension and chamfered wingtips, few have recorded the addition of inboard leading-edge fillets and vortex generators with lower surface mini-fences. These were seen on the B A and Ghana Airway airframes, and added to G-ARTA itself when it wa remanufactured to Type I 109 specification. Placed inboard of the shu-equipped wing area, near the wing root, an angled leading-edge fence triggered and tied down a localized airflow improvement effect. Approximately 12in long, these device were effe tive, if undoubtedly an 'add-on' modification. Even more major work wa carried out on the 'peaky' aerofoil section on the uper model VCIO, which could not be applied to the BOA Standards. G-ARTA flew the entire pilot's flying manual ami, in doing so, created that manual for this aircraft. Best climb rates, engi ne rpm percen tage rates, approach profiles, the stall regime and much more, were all part of the V 10 development programme. Over 2,000 stall profiles were flown by G-ARTA, with Brian Trubshaw taking over the flying programme. The BOAC production aircraft also undertook work on the 'autoland' automatic landing programme. imilarly, these aircraft went off down the BOAC route

tandard Model VC10 Four R lis Roycc

Powerplant:

onway Mk540 Lurbofans. 20,400lb (9,250kg) thrust

Dimcn ions Overall length:

159ft in 146ft 2in

pan:

9ft 6in

Height: ross wing arca:

2,932 sq ft

spect ratio:

7.5

weep at

'l.\ ch I'd:

32.5 degrees

Tailplane area:

63 sq ft

Wheelba e:

l65ft 10.5in

Wheel tra k:

21ft 5in

abin Dimen i ns Length:

5ft 6in

Max width:

11ft 6in

Max height:

7ft Sin

Freight hold vol.:

1,412

Accommodation:

Cll

ft

Up to 151 scat

Wcights Max take-off wcight:

312,OOOIb

Max landing weight:

216,OOOlb

Typical operating weight:

147,0001h

Max payload:

39,8001b

Total fllel capacity:

l7,925 imperial gallons

Performance Range with reserves: ruise peed:

4, 00 mile, or 5,040 miles with no reserves 550mph

Take-off distance to screen height 35ft at max I A: L nding run ISA MLW: ote:

,300ft at max load 6,400ft Empty VCIO took off from Weybridge in under 2,

ft!

Total number of flying airframes constructed: 1 airframes, I prototype, then 17 commercial orders delivered, Type Vl100, VIIOI. VI 102/3. Prototype later in commercial service with Lakcr a MEA (Icase), BUA/B AL BOA:

B

AlB AL:

12 airframes, G-ARVA to G-ARVM 3 airframe, G-A IX, G-A IW, G-ATDJ. Latcr 4th airframe G-ARTA

British United and Mr Laker's Cargo Door

Type 1100/09 remanufactured Ghana Airway:

be months before they entered commercial service. The BOA development flights took place with BOAC-liveried aircraft that were still the property of their manufacturer. During this time, many potential snags and early gremlin were worked out and the airframe were thus properly developed prior to being let loose on their pilots and their public. This work reaped rewards - the airline was not burdened with an unknown machine that might be beset with hidden danger. Line and operations staff down the routes were also trained up so that the VC to' service introduction would be as hassle-free as possible. Much was al 0 learned during this period about maintaining the VCIO. Early problems with oil seals, brakes and flap drives were soon sorted out. The development aircraft clocked up over 4,000 hours of flying prior to service entry, during which a nucleu of 75 Captain. 127 First Officers and 72 Flight Engineers were trained for BOA . On entry into service, the V 10 developed the reputation that it was either going to be on time, or very late indeed. In life a in birth, it did nothing by half. During the development period, BOAC also tried several experiment with its livery before settling upon the golden Speedbird theme. There are a large number of photographs d picting varying scheme. The Vicker plants saw a va't increase in workforce during the VC I0 production run and with each airframe departing Weybridge for the flight-test base at Wisley, the Vi kers hub became a veritable shrine to the VC IO. Many of the 10,000-plus workforce were happy to secure rides on the aeroplanes they had designed and built. Through the BOA machines, via the Ghanaian, igerian and BUA craft, to the RAF's VCIOs and into the day' of the BOA and East African Super VC lOs, the Vickers Weybridge plant was the centre of the V 10's excellence.

2 airframes, 9G-ABO, 9G-ABP

and proved the concept under th command of BOA's Captain Rendall as Flight Manager and the control of Captain Cane - the airline's vetO Development aptain - usually with aptains Stoney and Phillips

on board as well. As oflate 1963, G-ARVF flew dozens of flights, notably to Lagos, Kano, Khartoum, and all points south. Many of the BOAC production aircraft were completed by early 1964, yet it would

75

It is clear that BOAC had a certain attitude towards the VCto, so it is interesting to look at the approach of the type' other main customer at launch, for a different view of the airline world. Enter the character of Freddie Laker.

..,.

an inflatable lip mechanism. The vulnerable lower edge to the door opening at it sill was doubly reinforced and plated, a well as having a pop-out rubbing strip. The floor upport tructure was common to the increased bearing strength found on the RAF VCI . The later 'pecial freight floor with a more advanced load structure, designed for the BOAC uper VC I0 freighter, was not part of the B A option becau e of its weight penalty. preaders placed over the floor and lashing points allowed BUA to carry heavy cargoes, incl ud ing Freck! ie Laker's own Rolls- Royce Silver Cloud, which he took on many sales tours. For more on the BUA VC I0 story, see Chapter 7.

The Royal Air Force VCIO

This EAA Super VC10 shows off the cargo door design and the revised engine installation.

At the time of British United Airways' involvement with the VC 10, Freddie Laker (later ir Freddie) was the airline's Managing Director. He had learned the airline busine s the hard way and had gained much in doing so. He had made hi name transporting anything and everything to anywhere and everywhere. Perhap it was from this experience that the idea to use the VC I a a mixed cargo/pa enger airframe came. Whatever, F.A. Laker and British nited wanted to do things with the VC 10 that other did not have the courage even to consider. B A's basic need was for an airliner that could work on long-haul routes, feed its growing BA One-Eleven-based holiday

traffic, and service it Mini try of Defence trooping contracts. Ahove all, BUA wanted to be able to offer cargo capacity in this growing field. learly, the VClO would move B A on from its proppowered Britannia days. Laker envisaged ordering his VCIO with a cargo door that would allow him to mix and match the carrying of pas engers and bulky cargo on the ame flight. It was a ma terstroke that certainly repaid the extra cost that Vickers harged per airframe. Of course, given the V lO's outstanding performance potential, Vickers had long thought about th airframe's ability in thi arena and had designed in the cargo door and cargo

76

system from the airliner's inception. The freight door was cut into the forward left-hand front ide of the V I fuselage and featured an aperture 4in high by 140in long. Apart from a minor infringement caused by the jack, the opening was unob tructed and was hinged along its top edge with the lower edge clamping into the fuselage floor and sidewall sill. The door opened to two position, depending on loading needs. The door was plated to reinforce it and had over-centre locks to strain it into a tight fining po ition so that it could be part of the structure. A torsion bar ensured proper clamping while special saling ensured no pressure hull leakage through

The RAF VCIOs were be~t described as 'hot rods'. They featured the short body of the tandard VC I and thus did not trade performance for capacity, as the longerlodied uper model did. However, they did have the Super VCl 's engines, wings, fin fuel tank and structural enhancements. A ignificant addition was that of an auxiliary (ground) power unit mounted in the tai!cone. The aircraft also had a Hyrat emergency hydraulic generator. The RAF VC IOs were even more over-powered than the standard models and also boosted a cargo door and stronger floor; n"lilitary loads could be carried without floor spreaders. A 9ft refuelling probe was also incorporat d into the airframe. These RAF VClOs were known at their hirth as the VC10 C Mkl (Vickers model VCIO Type 1106) and were manufactured alongside the commercial variants. The first RAF m:1chine (XR 06) started it acceptance flying in May 1966 after a first flight just before Christmas 1965. Much liaison between the RAF and BOA took place during the RAF VCIO pilot training conversion programme, as it did on the maintenance front. Vick rs was justly proud that its large airliner had proved its worth in a military tran port variant. This success had fulfilled the aims of the project, which started in the 195 s as the VlOO military transport and RAF versions of the Vanjet idea. A suitably grand handingov r ceremony of the first RAF Transport ommand VClO was put on at Wisley in July 1966.

For more on the RAF VC10 story, see Chapter 1 ,

The Composite Construction Rudder Few are aware that it was the VC I , not the Airbus A30 /310 types, that pioneered the use of large, load-bearing composite structures in an airliner. In the early days of carbon fibre-based CFC composite construction, the experimental work for its use in aircraft structures took place in Iightly loaded panels. But to have a future, composites had to be appl icable to large-scale structures, so an early experiment saw a major CFC wing experiment on a British Aerospace 125 executive jet. If composites were to make it on to large airframes, they had to endure loads and conditions on a wider scale. Vicker was at the forefront of this technology in the Iare 1960 and chose the rudder of the VCI as a uitable experimental base for composite panel inve tigarion. Through much careful work, headed by British Aerospace Chief tructural Engineer A.W. Kitchenside, based at Vicker~, Weybridge, a serie~ of VC10 rudders (each over 6ft tall) were constructed and fined as single rudders within the VCIO's three-rudder design. In the event of the experimental rudder's failure in flight, two conventional honeycomb alloy rudders would remain. The composite rudders were of a CFC-faced Nomex structure with aluminium alloy mounting structures amid a polysulphide interfray. Uni-dire tiona I tape fibre and resins bonded together the cured structure, which was reinforced with polymide glas composite. A film adhesive (Ciba-Geigy) effected the bonding to the skin. Thus constructed and checked, the first composite-fibre, large-scale, high-load panels on a large airliner entered commercial service on a Briti h Airways VCIO on 10 June 197 . These panels flew until 9 Ocwber 19 , when British Airways retired the aircraft. second rudder flew from 21 February 1979 to 9 Ocwber 19 The first rudder flew 5,635 hours in 1,46 flights with the econd rudder clocking up 4,075 hours in 1,170 flights - both in normal commercial service with no incidents or problems. Detailed examination on removal revealed only surface-paint degradation that had exposed the fastener heads. 0 corrosion, delamination, degra-

77

dation of the composite mix, nor water ingress was found. Subsequent to this successful experiment, a further 3,000 hour. were notched up by a pair of composite rudders on two RAF VCl C Mkl transports. The lessons learned through thi work filtered through to the composite cowlings found on the -5 0 model Lockheed Tritar model airliner and on to the B C One-Eleven composite programme that centred on composite engine stul design. Much of what Vickers/BA learned about composites - their strengths, impact rolerance, load paths, and manufacture, stemming from the early VC I0 rudder and 125 wing experiments - was passed on to the oncorde and irbus projects. The VC I0 had broken new ground in another area. In a similar fa hion, the experimental use of carbon brakes in a ommer ial VC10 paved the way for their usc on Concorde.

VCIO G-AXLR - The RB211 Engine Testbed For reasons thar have always been difficult ro ascertain, the RAF felt able to lease out one of its VCIO C Mkls to RollsRoyce and did not operate it within its own Tran port/ upport Command fleer. In 1969, RAF V 10 registered XR 09 was transferred to Rolls-Royce aero engines and registered G-AXLR. Rolls-Royce needed a large jet transport to flight test its new RB211 high-bypass turbofan engine. The core diameter and fan disc size of the aircraft was such that there was much difficulty in finding an aircraft with an engine-mounting point that allowed ufficient clearance for the engine. The VCIO could act as a willing workhorse - with its high-mounted rear-engine po ition, the massive RB211 could be slung on ro the airframe and not risk sma hing into the ground, as it might have done if it had been hung off the wing of a contemporary type. During the engine tests the RB211 was mounted on the left side of the airframe, the main engine beam being reinforced at great expense to take the higher weight and increased aerodynam ic fronta I area effects. Due to the RB211's rop urface pylon mounting design, as opposed to the VC I 's side arm type stub wing, pecial measures were also needed to mount the engine. All went well and a series of

DEVELOPME T AND PRODUCTIO

proving Aights was initiated. On one of these an inadvertent in-Aight thrust reverser deployment occurred and it wa only through the skill of the team on board that the aircraft was landed safely, using the two right-side Conways that had been left in itu. From 1970 to mid-1972, the aircraft carried out a serie of proving Aight for the new engine. It would go on to power the Tri tar and the 747-200-300 and -400 models in uprated, developed form (the ultimate being the RB211-535 1-1). Rolls-Royce returned the aircraft to the RAF and in 1975 it was Aown into RAF Kemble, where it was set upon by variou' training teams from rescue and antiterrorist agencies in many practice sessions. The remains were used on the fire dump and then scrapped in 1985.

The Super VelO The production uper VC 10 was the result of BOA's realization that the orig-

I

ina! tandard model was not going to be as economic on a seat-per-mile basis on the orth Atlantic run a the later model 707 variants. The point that the tandard VelO was never actually designed for use on such routes seems to have been mi sed by many. Long before the fir t Aight of the tandard model G-ARTA, Vickers and BOAC had talked about a stretch to the fuselage to make the aircraft more economically viable. Vickers knew that its aeroplane had massive performance and capacity reserves within it· basic design and stretching it was never going to be a problem. The Super VC I 0 was a typical Vickers development, with much of the work taking place at Vickers' own instigation. Around this time, Vickers also drew the 265-seater Super VC 10 265 'Superb' model. In 1959, the Vickers team drew up the Super VC 10 speCification to the parameters that they felt would offer the best advantages for the customer airline. This aircraft would be used mainly on long-sector prestige runs between sea-level airports

DEVELOPM - TAD PRODUCTION

with long runways in moderate climatic conditions. The Vickers-proposed Super variant of the V 10 could have carried 212 pa engel's, and, with the addition of small change to the wings and tank, could have been a truly long-range machine. With the unchanged wing, the 212- eater was at the limit of its range re erves; a Aight from London to Lo Angele non-stop was not pos ible and in harsh winter conditions the we tbound Atlantic cro ing needed care. This aircraft was the so-called Super 200, which had a 2 ft fuselage extension and proposed 24,0001b thrust Conways to get it between London and the US Eastern Seaboard gateway airports. BOA decided that, although the stretch added extra seating capacity that was valuable in financial terms, it impinged on the trade-off between performance and range. The airline had concerns about the aircraft's range and asked for a shorter stretch, which would still offer improved economics yet preserve the range and runway performance, allowing

Super VC10 - stability on the approach.

the aircraft also to Ay on African route. Therefore, having a ked for the developm nt of the VC 10 into a true Atlantic airliner type - a requirement that was met by Vi kers - BOAC then altered the concept. The company seemed to want to preserve a dual ability that wa completely at odds with the Atlantic-range stretch mode! it had wanted in the first place! Vickers' plans for meeting the V 10's critic head on with a viable, non-tropical performance 707/DC-8 competitor were obscured. The critics had a field day,

The Rolls-Royce RB2ll test bed VC10 - G-AXLR in flight.

78

and continue to do so: 'If only the VCIO had been properly developed,' they cried. A lack of clarity and understanding once again affected the VC 1O's reputation unjustifiably. As a result of this situation, the shortened version of the real uper 212 VC I0 was created, and the definitive production uper VClO was born. The aircraft carried a 13ft fuselage extension giving a 163- eat capacity with lower seat-mile cost for its owners. The wing de ign was further refined and a new

79

interior was created. The major changes between the tandard V 10 and the urer V ~ 10 were as follows: • 156in fuselage extension • 75in between forward Aight-deck/galley area and main First Class cabin • lin exten ion between centre and rear fuselage sections • Keel member stiffened to take increased bending loads in the structure • Top skin panels stiffened in localized ar as

DEVELOP lENT AND PROD eTlON

Specification -

uper

velO Four Rolls-Royce

Powerplanr:

onway 43 (Mk550) turbofan; thrust

22,500 Ib (10,200kg) External Dimensions pan:

146ft 2in (44.5m)

verall length:

171ft in (52.32111)

Overall height:

39ft 6in (12.04111)

ross wing area:

2,932 sq ft (272.4 sq m)

weep (at quarter chord):

32.5 Jegrees

Tailplane angle/incidence:

T.P.1. + 4 ro -14

Flap ettings:

o to 45 degrees

Cabin Dimensions (excluding night deck) Length:

105ft Oin (32m)

Max width:

11ft 6in (3.51m)

Max height:

7ft 7.5in (2.32m)

Max usable Aoor area:

1.12 sq ft (104.2 sq m)

Max usable volume:

7,850 cu ft (222.3 cu m)

Accommodation Max high-Jensity eatmg:

174 at 3m pitch

Typical seating:

16 Fir t

las, 123 (BOAC) Economy at 34in pitch

Freight and baggage hold volume capacity: 1,842 cu ft (52.16 cu m) Weights

G-ARVK skims into Brooklands/Weybridge to land on the 4,200ft runway.

• Increased metal gauge in wing to wheel-well area • trengthened landing-gear side-stay frame • Main landing-gear beam reinforced • Curvature changes to panels to accommodate the stretch • Forward galley and ervice doors repositioned • Forward amenitie re-arranged • Electrical bay changes • rew toilet moved • Smaller navigator' station • Rear freight door moved • Rear passenger door placed aft of the main wing • Fin fuel tank with piping and tiffened fin plates with tank beneath of 1,350

imperial gallons capacity • Ram air intake in fin to force-feed the tank • Wing ribs strengthened • Upfloat capacity on ailerons to reduce bending stress due to weight and wing increases • Uprated Conway 43 engines • ace lies tilted up by 3 degrees • Four thrust reversers Thus equipped, the first uper model VCIO took to the air on 7 May 1964 and entered ervice just over a year later, at the b ginning of 1966. Registered GASGA, she was the first of seventeen uper VClOs for BOA , which culminated in G-ASGR being delivered in

80

1969. For a ti me, the later-model Type 1151 upers were to have the cargo door, but BOAC changed its mind. In doing so, it walked away from the chance to set the combi-convertible cargo/passenger trend that had been started British United, which the like of KLM made their own in the 1970s and Os. The fact that BOAC then ordered cargo door-equipped 707336 models wa another twist to the plot. The blue- and gold-liveri d BOAC Super VClO was a smash hit and BOAC flew the aircraft on a world premier tour to the U A and beyond after a series of proving fl ight. The first of these took place on 7 March 1965 using G-A GO, which also proved the BOAC winter route

Basic operational:

156, 281b (71,13 7kg)

Total fuel:

154,nOlb (70, I 1kg)

Max payload:

5 , lnlb (26,3 6kg)

Max take-off:

335,0001b (l51,958kg)

Max landing:

237,0001b (107 ,505kg)

Performance onnal high-speed cruise:

505h (936 kph)

L ng range economy crui e:

476kts ( 82 kph)

Average approach speed (at weight):

137kts (225 kph)

Take-off field requirements

I A ilea level9,220ft (2,810m), I A plus 15 degrees

(at max weight):

The Trident wa de ervedly given much publicity for its role in the development of automatic blind landing, but it is a lesser-known fact that the VCIO also had a hand in this technology. Vickers (as BA ) worked to create a blind-landing system that wa ultra-reliable and could bring an airliner down to a safe runway touchdown in visibility of true blindlanding category standard. Category llA

6,460ft (1,969m)

ote: Much horter take off distances for non max weight take offs umbers Type Vl151

uper VCtO BOA

Autoland

10,120ft ( ,085m), I A at 5,oooft (1,524m) elevation 11,2 Oft (3,4 Om)

Landing di tan e at max weights:

to the Caribbean via ew York. This flight was overseen by aptain orman Todd and proved invaluable in ascertaining cruise-level, power-setting and routing parameters. A second fl ight under the command of Captain Tom toney - again using G-A GO - took place on 14 March and it was thi flight that was the publicly premiered launch of the VC 10. The A me ricans' comment was, 'She's a beauty.' The fir t scheduled flight took place soon after, on I April 1965, when GA GO, wearing the short-lived BO CCU ARD livery, left Heathrow for New York JFK. With its new interior and enhanced grace - it was longer and sleeker than the shorter tandard model - it became the aircraft to see and he seen in. It was a high-class act, and Ross winton, latterly the highly respected head of the airline, made ure that high-class fittings and services went on to it. Flying it became a Blue Riband experience of excellence across the Atlantic. The aircraft and its crew, developed the sam sort of team spirit that the tandard VC10 had inspired on the Africa division. In the uper variant, a new VC I0 had been born. The strong and sleek workhorse of the Empire routes had turned into a high-performance, h igh-Icvel cru iserj the uper VCIO was the large t airliner in the world at the time, and the superior airl iner of its age. The only other uper VCIO cu tomer was East African Airways who e five superbly liveried machines served the airline for sev ral glorious years from the launch airframe 5X-UV of 1966 through 5Y- DA, 5H-MMT, 5X- VJ and the last ever VCIO to leave Vickers, 5H-MOG which erved from 197 to 1977. All of which had the forward cargo door. (Fuller detail can be found under the EAA heading.)

G-A GA to G-A

R: 17 con tructed

Type V I 154 uper VC I0 EACC: 5 con tructed

87

DEVELOPME T AND PRODUCTION

conditions that made the system really valuable. (In contrast, on the short-haul operations in fog-covered, rain-Ia hed, cross-windswept northern Europe, the Trident' autoland ystem was in regular demand.) In fact, only five airfields on the uper V 10 network had IL y tems capable of feeding the advanced narure of the air raft' autoland ystem. It was not deemed economically viable to keep the uper VC I0 autoland system in ervice and by the m id-1970s it had been phased out - more a victim of the ease of the routes flown, rather than any technical failings.

lrDarn [Pffi®®rn~@rnoo® WDOJL ~®lrD@rn

Further Developments and What Might Have Been Stretching

'oJ

SUPER

V.C.lO

GENERAL

ARRANGEMENT.

The definitive Super VC1D plans.

was first achieved, with Category ilIA certification following several years, and much development, later. From 1967, the uper VCIO was equipped with the autOland facility developed by BA and the Elliot company, with the facility first earning commercial

revenue in 196. The development aircraft was BOAC's GGG, which made hundreds of autoland, auto-coupled approaches. The development had cost a lot of money and, in reality, the Super VCIOs only occasionally encountered the sort of

82

The VC 10's basic design was so over-engineered, and it power ratings were so high, that it was easy for Vickers de igners to come up with airframe developments that were highly advanced for their time. Although these ideas did not become reality, some of them reappeared elsewhere many year later, once again underlining the depth of talent at Vickers. The tandard VCIO airframe was stretched into the uper ver ion with ease. In fact, the uper VCl 0 airframe produced was smaller than the original 212-seat stretch of the Standard, and smaller than the double-decked 265-seater VCIO that was perhaps the ultimate development idea - the Super VCIO 'Superb' model. In view of the ease of this modification, the further developments are not as surprising as they might have seemed at the time. The Boeing 707 could only be stretched so far, there was a limit to the length the fuselage could be extended and the undercarriage could not really be reconfigured for higher gros weights beyond a certain level. The engine size wa al 0 limited by the 1011'- lung nature of the wing-pylon design. The Dougla DC-S had far more inherent flexibility de igned into it. The basic -30 model' fuselage eventually became tretched by a massive amount and the long undercarriage legs and nosedown stance of this model meant that any aft-end lengthening could be accommodated without risking a tail scrape from even the slightest over-rotation. When turned into the -60 series models, and even the big fan-engined -70 models, the

B.

a.A .

(

BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION ONE HUNDRED PALL MALL ROYAL

AERO

CLUB

GAZETTE

14

VC1D advertising.

83

LONDON SW1

ENGLAND JANUARY

1964

DEVELOPME T AND PRODUCTION

THE

AUG. 1963

ROYAL AERO CLUB GAZETTE

SHELL AND BP AVIATION SERVICES (operaled In the U.K. by Shell·Max and B.P. Ltd)

VCIO pre-launch publicity.

VCIO press publicity.

84

85

DEVELOPME 'T AND PRODUCfIO

DEVELOPM

T AND PRODUCTION

This is the view to the front.

Forward galley.

DCairframe was highly flexible although it did need a completely new engine-pylon design. It.-built growth potential and greater dihedral in the wings allowed it to become the fir t of the 200seat airframes that were called 'J umbo' until the 747 established itself as the only true 'Jumbo'. The 707, even in -300 and 400 models, could never really match the DC- long-bodied, long-range variants, which became hugely popular. One aircraft could have given the longbodied DC-8s a run for their money, and this was one that was designed in the very early 1960s. That aircraft was the longrange development of the VClO. In May 1962, Vickers (SAC) presented their proposals for a refinement of the Super VC I0 that had already been created around the tandard V 10 airframe. At the time, this uper model had yet to fly, although this would happen ju tone month later, on 29 June 1962.

LRll, LRI2 and the 'Superb'

(Above) The BOAC Super VC1D interior (Economy Classl. (Below) The later British Airways refit saw overhead bins installed and new decor panels - notably in First Class, shown here, looking rearwards.

86

The ultra long-range propo al were known as LR/I and LR/2 and are not to be confused with the 'Superb' or V 10 265 model variant of the VCto. This wa a 265- eater and a greatly enlarged, double-de ked, uprated powerplant development of true 'Jumbo' dimensions that incorporated major structural changes and expense.

87

DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCfIO

The simpler, more viable LR/I and /2 are often overlooked, yet they contain some interesting design features. The LR model were created to extend the capability of the existing uper VCtO payload range proposals - taking the aircraft up to a 24, OOlb payload on a non-stop flight from London to Los Angele (LHR-LAX). The existing uper VCI maximum takeoff weight went up from 322,000Ib to 330,00 Ib for LR/l and 342,0001b for LR/2, with fuel capacity rising to 163,00 Ib and 167,0001b respectively. One of these variants was created around a theme of enlarging the uper VCIO airframe without the need for structural changes (and great expense) - there was no weight penalty. The other allowed for some minor tweaking of the airframe in a manner that both Boeing and Douglas would mimic several years later. Inherent in the creation of the LR variants was the realization that the re-engined, big-fan 707s, with their lighter all-up weights and thinner gauge tructures, would be able to fly direct long-haul Atlantic flights between the undemanding, low-level airports of London, Los Angeles, an Francisco and other Pacific coast and mid-western de tinations. A II d1ese places were equipped with long runways. In order to achi ve this, even in winter on the hostile west-

East African used exotic safari murals in its Super VelO interiors.

The safari themes extended to both cabins.

Forward galley detail.

88

89

D PRODUCTION

The original plans for the Super model VC10 included these wingtip or 'slipper' fuel tanks.

_=="--:-..:;--t-----t----......,-------i"'1500-2000·

CATEGORY mA

AUTOMATIC TOUCHDOWN SEQUENCE

i ~

vefO

AlL WEATHER LANDING PROGRAMME LEADI G DIMENSIONS

LIMIT Of CAT. n M.D.A. Length OverOlU

----------

----+-------t-----r------t--------t-----------j------+--=:;;=...;;~-=--~=~;;;;;;.;;;:~--

I

~~~ G~~C:~F,J

~~~~K CHANGE OVER

,r

(SUBSEQUENTlY RE-ENGAGE NO 1 A.pl

AI I HAPS. SPEED. r

I

DATA SOURCES FOR AUTOMATICS

I

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---

I. loS. LoCALisER

l.loS. Gli DE

--

DATA SOURCES FOR PILOT

r

-. -

,

-

,

,

'

-,

-

- -

-

-

--

..

~HEcK PHA~E

--

-

--

~ -

FlASHES-

,

---- t - - .

- -

-

ROLL OUT GUIDANCE CAT. mB

2,800 IIq. ft.

T.. ilp4ne lr Elevoltor

645 sq. ft.

Fin & Rudder

586 aq. ft.

MAIN UNDERCARRIAGE

-

4 Wheel B081e

...... --- ---i

-1 -

Wheel"" Tyre abe 50 x 18_20

Typ~

Pre.sure at MJox. A. U. W. 135 p.

•••

-

~

-+

PILOT TAKES OVER CAT.mA

-- -

-

,

••

-'

--

-~

-

CHECK PHASE

--

AUTOMATIC

HARE PHASE

_---

Mainplane I

PHASE

=

14b It.

TOUCH DOWN

~TTITUDE HOle

•••••••••••••• •••••••

--

,

-

I

I

-

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I

GlID1E SLOPE PHASE

Span

tn.

bin.

GROSS AREAS

THROTTLES I START CLOSING

-'-

,

SLOPE' STORED ATTITUDE RADIO ALTIMETER , AIR DATA SYSTEM THROTTlE CLOSE SIG~~ c_ _ _ ,MANUAL _~E_CRAB_ _ _

FLIGHT I.l.S LOCALISER DIRECTOR I.l.S GlID(~~~ SITUATION DISPLAY:EQUIPMENT STATE MANOEUVRE LIMITS HARE ARM SEQUENCE ATTITUDE HOLD INDICATOR ~.LLARE INITIATE __ THROTTLE CLOSE VISUAL CONTACT WITH RUNWAY

I

-. TRACK PHASE

RUNWAY

FADEOUT OF GliDE SLOPE TO ATiiTUDE HOlD

AUTO FLARE SYSTEM ARMED

186 ft. II 39 flo

Height

~OSE

Twin

I.

7 1.

UNDERCARRIAGE Whe~l

Wheel & Tyre dz.e 39 x 13

Pre.sure

~t

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gG"""'''''''''''''''=======~~====='''''''S===''''9~

Md.x. A. U. W. 100 p .•. i.

-

,

CAL n

CAT.mA

•

M.D.A.'100

M.D.A.'O

RVR,400 METERS

RVR,200 METERS

The Autoland parameters.

The VC10 Super 200 - note the larger doors and extended fuselage.

90

91

The double-decked 'Superb' model proposal for 265 seats - double-bubbled fuselage and re-shaped nose contours.

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS PRESmrATION NEW YORK 1960 THE VICKERS SUPER V.C.10 PASSENGER TRANSPORT AND FREIGHTER VARIANTS

A presentation is made of the economic, operational and engineering suitability of the Vickers' Super V.C.10 passenger transport and freighter variants to Pan American World Ain'/ays. These aircraft are presented in relation to the requirements defined during the recent series of discussions between PAA and Vickers. This presentation is preceded by a short review of the resources and background of experience behind these aircraft. The main technical content of the Vickers presentation to PAA is reproduced here in book form for ease of reference and record purposes.

One of BAC's re-touched photos depicting the Super VC10 200-seater model. CIVIL AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT GROUP VICKERS-ARMSTRONGS (AIRCRAFT) LTD

bound ector to the Pacific Seaboard, the Super VCLO LR/variants would n ed to carry more fuel. This led Vickers Advanced Projects Office to come up ~vith two commercially attractive VCtO airframe derivative. LR/L achieved it range increase by remembering an idea that wa originally dreamed up for the long-range Viscount. It involved the installation of extra fuel tank in the freight/luggage holds, which could be easily removed or fitted, and

which left only the basic essentials of extra piping in situ when not in use. ylindrical fuel tanks could be fitted and increase the capacity payload for a mixed-class 123-seat layout by 14,0001b in winter flying onditions, and by 1 ,0001b in summer condition . Even higher payload could be u ed if a refuelling top was incorporated, but that seemed to defeat the object of creating a non-stop airframe in the first place. In view of this, LR/2 was presented and its novel method of creating extra

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tankage, at minimum structural expense, was clever indeed. It achieved a winter payload of 20,0001b between LHR-LAX, with a fuel requirement of 167,0001b at a maximum take-off weight (TOW) of 342,000Ib. To achieve this, the structure had to be beefed up in the wing, fu eIage- keel/wi ng- box/u ndercarriage areas and brake capacity increa ed. nlike the LR/l, which was ea ily modified, the LR/2 suffered a small weight penalty, however, it tankage and range

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WEYBRIDGE

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SURREY

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ENGLAND

The rarely seen contract proposal between Pan American Airways and VickersArmstrong for the Super VC10 - with two-crew cockpit and extended range.

trade-off did make this worthwhile. By using the freight-hold cylindrical tank, and adding external wing-root tank mounted at the trailing edge of each wing - in place of the wing box to fuselage fairing void - a fuel uplift of even greater proportions was created. The wing-root tanks

added 500 gallons to the combined tankage of the main wing (L7 ,93 gallons) and fin (1,312 gallon ), of the standard airframe and to the capacity of the removable freight tanks (750 gallons forward tank, 375 gallons, aft tank). This created for LR/2 a total tankage of 20, 75 gallons

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(167,000Ib) and the range to carry a full load non-sto[ on the great circle route to and from London and the American West - a vital profit centre of increa ing importance at the time. aclly, both these highly flexible VCI0 airframe derivative were rejected by B AC. The irony is that, if they had been accepted, they them e1ve would have been of minor relevance compared with what they could have led to. If only ome confidence had been shown, a fascinating box of trick could have been opened. Another derivative that also I' quired a leap of courage was the Super VC I0 variant named the 'Superb'. This used a basic uper VCLO airframe, but created a double-bubble fuselage with a large lower-deck passenger cabin that brought the overall eat capacity up to 265 eats - a true 'J umbo' jet of the age. However, as with the advanced VCl -ba ed triple-fuselaged flying trimaran- tyle 45 - eat airliner that the Vickers Advanced Project ffice came up with in 1964, funding was not forthcoming, and the project died.

The Pan American Super VelD Vickers also made propo als to the Pan American Airways company in 196. The e were not ju I' paper dreams, but were ba ed on real possibilitie . By thi time, Vickers had achieved the unthinkable, by breaking in to the domestic American airliner market, with the Viscount. People had said it could not be done (just as they said to irbus Industrie two decades later). Yet the Viscount did it (as did ud Aviation's Caravelle). If the mcricans would buy the Vi count, why not the V L07 Vickers created a VC to for the Americans and travelled to New York in 196 to present the airliner to Pan Am. It was a bold move with a bold aeroplane. The story of the specially designed 'Pan American V 10' of 1960 is not commonly known. After a number of discussions, Vickers and Pan American, or PAA as it was more frequently known at the time ('PA AM' came later), had created an outline profile of a VCL for Pan American's needs. Above all, the airline needed a pre tige jetliner for its own longrange transcontinental, coast-to-coast s rvice in the U A, and for it own Blue Riband transatlantic services to Europe. Pacific route needs were also discussed.

DEVELOPME TAD PRODUCTION

DEVELOPMENT AND PROD (lION

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Early Super VelO thoughts included tip tanks.

SUPER V.C.IO GENERAL ARRANGEMENT Of greatest focus were Pan American's routes out of New York to London, Paris, Rome, Lisbon and Frankfurt. Pan American wa looking for a 200-seat airliner with easy, west-to-east capability and confident east-to-west performance for non-stop operation in all bur the most severe winter condition. A onestop-refuelling landing was still the norm if the average Atlantic headwinds of 60 knot rose up to a 100 knot -plus performance-sapping chill on the airliner's nose as it ploughed westward over the Atlantic. Pan American also needed a giant jetpowered freighter for its cargo division, as did many other household name, which also boasted notable cargo operations, including KLM, JAL, Lufthansa and Qanta. Vickers came up with a pure cargo-version freighter VCIO for Pan

American, based on the VC I0 F4 design that the British company intended to market worldwide. This aircraft's main claim to excellence was the very safe, very low landing speed it offered at the high I::mding weights that cargo operations impose above the passenger-carrying norms. Vickers also offered the choice of a side cargo door, or a straight-through, swing-nosed VC 10. This version would have revolutioni:ed the speed of cargo handling through its design and use of cargo-boarding piers ba ed upon the same principle as the passenger-hoarding piers or jetways. This made the mo t of palletized loading and pecially shaped containers integrated with loading and off-loading of trucked-in freight. The swing-nose VC 10 made use of Vickers' naval experience of split- and swing-wing structures for carrier-borne aircraft. On

94

top of this, the nose-loading VCIO featured loading along the axis of the aircraft' wheelbase - avoiding the need for propping the airframe through overbalancing during loading/unloading. new floor featured roller-bearing loading slides. It was heady stuff in comparison with the 7 7 freighter, which did not exist at the time! For it version of the VC I for Pan American, Vickers made the most of the clean wing, superb runway performance, the re erves of handling and safety, as well as the unrivalled low noise levels in the ca~ in. Common to both the pa senger and cargo variants was a developed RR Conway engine labelled the 'Conway 7', which offered 24,OOOlb of thrust. By coincidence, the VC I0 also had an American-designed cabin, with an interior deSigned by Butler of New York, as original specification.

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THE SHAPE OF THE FUTURE

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The Pan Am proposal included tip tanks and the extended root fillet leading-edge area increases shown in this plan view. Note the 'Shape of the Future' legend.

Perhap' the most intriguing aspect of the Pan American VC I was the fact that the leading dge of each wing was changed to incorporate a root extension fillet to provide increased wing area and more tankage. (The LR/2 had tanks on the rear trailing edge.) Also, it is clear from some early Vickers advert for the VCIO, the airframe

included wingtip fuel pod that were not dis imilar to those een on the Comet 4. Thus equipped, the Pan American VClO carried a fuel load of 20,625 imperial galIon (24,750 US gallons). The accommodation offered great flexibility, with room for 196 Economy or, in the US term, 'Coach' passengers at a

95

comfortable 33in pitch. An alternative layout at the other extreme was 54 in four-abreast, 42in pitch First Class and, behind them, 7 in a comfortable ixabreast, 34in pitch Economy ection. E pecially for Pan American, Vickers came up with the novel idea of a small underfloor compartment that could be used as a passenger lounge or a crew rest area. A short stairway led down to this exclusive cubby hole from the front fuselage area. The idea was rather along the same Iines as the lower-deck lounge of the tratocruiser and later manifested itself as a far larger, lower-deck cabin on the uper VC I0' uperb' model. Another economic advantage of the Pan American VCIO was that it was designed for operation by on ly two fI ight crew with a third engineering and systems manager stationed behind the o-pilot. The BOA Empire Route navigator, third officer and others were dispensed with. A two-crew cockpit in [960 was yet another example of Vickers fore ight, as wa the 'glass' CRT-screened VClO cockpit instrumentation that Vickers also worked on at this time. Although it never happened, the Pan American VCIO was a serious proposal. A contract was drawn up, a copy of which remains in the archive at Brookland. (see illustration on page 93). An internal Vickers memo dated 2 October 1960, from Vickers Commercial Manager to Geoffrey Knight, Vickers Sales Manager in the USA, also confirms the seriousnes of the proposal. It refers to how the deal would progress and advises that Vickers should, 'Ignore the basic price and go for a fixed price and delivery date.' Such confidential document prove that Boeing was not necessarily the automatic choice for ai rl iners at the ti me. Vickers offered Pan American a fleet of airframes for pa senger and cargo use with shared facil itie and design parameters that advanced the standards of pa enger comfort, safety, cargo handling and airfield performance, far beyond those to which that airline was accustomed. Operating the Pan American i:ed VC 10 tretched airframe with developed engines worked out at an all-in eat/mile cost of 2. 3 dollar (average) with 2.59 dollars on a 4,000-mile stage length. These highly competitive figure rose only to 3.45 dollars on a 500-mile stage length. The Pan Am VClO was destined to remain a paper aeroplane. Yet, like other

DEVELOPME T AND PRODUCTION

(Above Left) Nigeria Airways VC1D.

(Above Right) Middle East Airlines VC1D on approach. This is the leased Ghana machine.

The Short-Haul VC1D painted in BEA customer colours.

GENERAL ARRANGEMENT

VClO derivations, its design and variations were the key to securing Britain a role in the world market for large aircraft from 1960 to 1980. A Letter of Intent signed between Vickers and United Airlines for a fleet of all-cargo VClO T4s, and similar letters with Eastern and T AA of Australia, further indicate the potential that was won and lost. As had happened so often in the VClO story, such excellence and opportunity were cast to the winds of history.

(Left) A rare air-to-air of the Air Malawi VC1D 7Q-YKH.

The Short-Haul VelD The VClO airframe had massive performance reserves inherent in its design parameters. In June 1966, therefore, the BAC Project Office proposed the shorthaul version of the VClO. Some conf~sion exists about this. There were, in fact, two main short-haul VClO proposals in the post-production life of the aircraft. Seen here are the details of the 221-/230-seat, long- bodied, short-winged, 'Airbus'-standard, Short-Haul VClO. Another version was the VCll - an 80- to nO-seater that resembled the Vanjet of a decade before.

Plan for the Short-Haul VC1D - note the clipped wings and extended fuselage.

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The serene safari. EAA Super VC1D in the cruise.

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(Above) A rare view shows the Conway engine installation on MEA's OD-AFA.

(Left) What might have been - are-touched BAC shot of the proposed Super 200 variant.

British United Airways VC10 G-ASIW displays the airline's later colours.

(Left) An ex-EAA VC10 displays the wing pods and lower fuselage HDU refuelling points, plus tailcone APU.

(Below) A superb view of one of the RAF tanker conversions flying high.

Super VC10 world premier flights. This is JFK, with Constellations and the rival 707 in the background.

(Above)

The Super VC1D displays its true elegance.

(Right) The VC1D prototype G-ARTA runs up her engines for the first time. (Left)

The clean wing is shown well in this view.

(Top)

Roll-out of the prototype. (Above)

later days - one of the British Airways Supers sweeps in.

(Left) (Below)

A VC1D C Mk 1 now modified to K standard and used for VIP flights. seen with the Brize Norton terminal in the background.

VC1D with the four Conways at full thrust - cover your ears! (Below)

Gulf Air VC1D in full house colours.

(Right) Building the VC1D; a rare colour view of the construction process.

(Below) An unmarked Super VC1D shows off the type's elegant stance.

(Above) BOAC's queen of the fleet Super VC1D about to touch down.

(Right) A classic view of the RAF VC1D type.

(Left) The all-important Flight Engineer's panel. Note the duplicated throttles, the engine vibration meters and the fuel tank and feed system/transfer gauges.

(Below) A4D, the Omani machine, climbs out. (Below) The command post. The Super VC1D flight deck from the First Officer's seat.

DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

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The standard VC1D flight deck, updated for the Omani Royal Flight. Note the wire across the windscreen posts, which was added to all VC1Ds as a horizontal perspective aid to pilots.

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(Above Right) The later British Airways Super VC1D First Class cabin.

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ECONOMY ClASS-ZZI SEATSAT H·PITCH

ECONOMY CLASS LAYOUT (Left and Below)

Seat plans for the Short-Haul VC1D.

The Sultan of Oman's VIP VC1D interior,

• The VCll, proposed in 1966, and part of a presentation to TCA in Canada and NCA in New Zealand, had its origins in the early Vanjet predecessors; Vickers veterans confirm this. The 221-/230-seater aircraft was the most interesting. The forerunner of the 'Airbus' standard of configuration, although targeted at European markets, it could also appeal in the USA and Asia. Just as Douglas had done successfully with the DC-S and DC-9, the VClO was stretched, its wingspan shortened and its range curtailed to provide passenger payload, not ultimate runway performance, The wings were chopped by nearly 20ft via a 15ft 2in curtailment - thus reducing fatigue and stress, and extending spar life

despite vastly increased take-off and landing cycles. The proposal was for 221 seats at a very comfortable 34in pitch in a oneclass cabin that could take 230 passengers on ultra short-haul routes at a less comfortable 32in pitch. Payload was 44,000Ib, even at an airfield at 6,000ft elevation. The cabin doors were enlarged for a fuselage that had a major extension forward of the wing. A three-crew cockpit was planned. The engines were tweaked Conway 43s with six corrugation silencers. Ramp weight was 257,000Ib. A Bristol Siddeley Artouste 520 auxiliary power unit, or APU, provided ground-based start-up capability. Reduced thrust settings of only 17,500lb could be used to extend engine life - a reduction of nearly 4,0001b

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of thrust demand in normal service Iife at normal level airfields. Using the 2l,5001b full power setting created a nO-seat airliner with a 1,000-mile range carrying a 44,0001b payload from any runway, even a 'hot and high' one. Category 3A autoland was included, which was ideal for intraEuropean operations. This airliner also had the first use of flexible galleys that could be easily moved, and created the one-class commuter-style cabin. The main payload-to-range arenas for the ShortHaul VC10 were the 400-mile to 1,000mile sectors. Such were the reserves in the VC10 airframe that, even with the fuel-thirsty Conways (albeit operating at reduced power), the Short-Haul VClO was a very

DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

Approach speed graph for the short·haul VC10.

SHORT HAUL ~®

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SHORT HAUL ~lXQ) cheap airframe to operate. With 230 seats on offer. it was very competitive economically. BAC presented it as the '3 dollarsa-mile airliner', in reference to its seatper-mile cost at the time. In fact, it could operate at 2.52 per scat-mile in some configurations. The Short-Haul VCLO could have been applicable anywhere. For BEA, or perhaps even KLM, it would have been a major player on European routes such as London to Paris, Amsterdam to London, or Frankfurt to Amsterdam. Ln the Asian market, the aircraft would have been ideal for routes between Hong Kong and Bangkok, or Singapore and Jakarta, while in Australia, short hops such as Sydney to Brisbane or Melbourne would have been its forte. With its reserves of airfield performance, the Short-Haul VC10 could carry a decent load from any aidield, whatever the operating conditions. Despite the stretch and increased weights, it still exceeded the performance of competing airliners. For the Americans, its capabilities on routes out of Denver or Los Angeles to the Mid-West or Deep South would have been immense. It is no surprise that the BAC (Vickers) brochure for the Short-Haul VC10 mentions such routes

FREIGHTER

NORTH ATLANTIC LOAD FACTORS

BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION LA.T.A. OPERATORS 707 & DCB COMPARED WITH B.O.A.C. SUPER VC 10 100

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