Treating Weapons Proliferation: An Oncological Approach to the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Technology

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Treating Weapons Proliferation

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Treating Weapons Proliferation An Oncological Approach to the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Technology David Santoro

TREATING WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

Copyright © David Santoro, 2010. All rights reserved. First published in 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–62280–7 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Santoro, David. Treating weapons proliferation : an oncological approach to the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical technology / David Santoro. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978–0–230–62280–7 (alk. paper) 1. Nuclear nonproliferation. 2. Nuclear weapons—Environmental aspects. 3. Chemical weapons—Environmental aspects. 4. Biological weapons—Environmental aspects. 5. Cancer—Epidemiology. 6. Cancer— Etiology. 7. Chemical carcinogenesis—Environmental aspects. 8. Radiation carcinogenesis—Environmental aspects. I. Title. JZ5765.S36 2010 327.1⬘745—dc22

2009027409

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: March 2010 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

To Laëtitia and my family


CON T E N T S

Acknowledgments

ix

Part I Introduction Introduction The Making of the Concept One

The Quest for the Administration of the General & Complete Cure

5 17

Part II On Weapons Proliferation Two

A Mutating Anatomical & Physiopathology

47

Three

An Open-Ended Etiology & Pathogenesis

79

Four

Serious & Threatening Pathological Effects

107

Part III On Responses to Weapons Proliferation Five

Preventing & Detecting the Disease

141

Six

Treating & Palliating the Disease

175

Conclusion

From Cure to Treatments

209

Bibliography

215

Index

251


AC K NOW L E DGM E N T S

This book is a revised version of my PhD dissertation, which I completed at Macquarie University in Sydney in 2008 with the support of an International Research Scholarship. Now that my dissertation is finished and this book is being published, I wish to express my thanks to those who have helped me, directly or indirectly, produce this study. First and foremost, I am very thankful to my advisor, Dr. Gregory Pemberton, who has been an incredible scholarly mentor and has given me great guidance throughout the course of this project. In particular, Dr. Pemberton has taught me the importance of approaching my subject from a historical perspective. In fact, he was the one who suggested that I should inquire into the conceptual and linguistic origins of the word “proliferation,” which ended up being the key to my study. For that and the numerous other useful pieces of advice that he has given me, I thank him warmly. A special thank you also goes to Ralph Cossa and Brad Glosserman from the Hawaiian-based organization Pacific Forum CSIS. Through their so-called Young Leaders Program, Mr. Cossa and Mr. Glosserman have given me the opportunity to meet and discuss with a large number of nonproliferation experts and other young professionals from all around the world in numerous conferences organized in the AsiaPacific region. The discussions and interactions I have had with them have given me crucial insights for my work. Finally, I owe a lot to my numerous colleagues and friends, and in particular Belinda, who was completing her dissertation at the same time as me. I also owe much to my family: my parents Patrick and Ghislaine, my brother Christophe, my sister Muriel, and of course Laëtitia, who, during the course of my thesis, stopped being my girlfriend to become my wife. I would like to thank them all very much for supporting me tirelessly throughout the completion of this project.


PA RT

I

Introduction


[S]ince Hippocrates, at least, the tradition of skilful [medical] practice has never been quite lost—the tradition that combines theory and practice. [Hippocrates teaches that] the physician must have, first, intimate, habitual, intuitive familiarity with things; secondly, systematic knowledge of things; and thirdly, an effective exploitation of even descriptive science. Experience shows that this is the way to success. It has long been followed in studying sickness, but hardly at all in studying the other experiences of daily life. The social sciences will become more fruitful when in certain ways the thought and procedures of social scientists conform more closely to those of medical scientists. —Professor L. J. Henderson, M.D., ref lecting on some of the thoughts developed by Hippocrates, an ancient Greek physician of the Age of Pericles known as the “father of medicine” (1941:2, 10)


I N T RODUC T ION

The Making of the Concept

Man will never discover peace and a cure for war, as we may reasonably hope that man will discover health through a cure for cancer. —Philip Jessup (1971:82) “I have bad news. I am very sorry to say, what you have is serious: it is cancer.” This is perhaps the diagnosis we fear the most after a medical examination, simply because cancer generally leads to death if left untreated. Cancer evolves from the derangement of some of the chemical processes of the body (Tannock, Hill, Bristow, & Harrington 2004; Kleinsmith 2005). It reveals its presence in cells, which make up tissues, which, in turn, make up the organs of the body. In a healthy person, millions of cells grow and divide naturally every day to replace dying cells or repair injury. Normal cells, therefore, reproduce only when instructed to do so by other cells in their vicinity, ensuring that each tissue maintains a size and architecture appropriate to the body’s needs. Cancer cells, in contrast, grow exponentially and largely irrespective of the laws that govern so precisely the growth of all normal cells. In so doing, cancer cells destroy normal cells. They are known to be “autonomous” in oncological terminology—oncology is the science of cancer (American Heritage Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 2004:572). This phenomenon can occur by the direct growth of cancer cells into adjacent tissue through a process known as “invasion.” As the cancer increases in size, it invades and destroys the normal tissue surrounding it. It can also occur by implantation into distant sites of the body by “metastasis.” This refers to the stage when cancer cells are transported

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through the lymphatic system, the bloodstream, or body spaces to form new cancers, called “secondary” cancers—cancer cells are then known to be “transplantable” in oncological terms. The most common way for cancers to spread by implantation is through the lymphatic system. Called “embolisation,” this process consists in tiny clumps of cells breaking away from the primary cancer and entering the nearby lymph vessels. These vessels are very fine channels that run in complex networks throughout the body, draining lymph f luid from the organs and tissues to clusters of tiny glands, called the lymph nodes. Cancer cells can settle in the lymph nodes and grow there, causing the glands to become swollen. This process normally occurs with the lymph glands closest to the primary cancer because they are immediately exposed to it. Cancers can also spread through the bloodstream. In this process, tiny clumps of cells break off from the primary cancer and enter the surrounding blood vessels that carry them to other organs or tissues of the body, often quite distant from the primary cancer, where they lodge themselves and begin to grow. Finally, cancer cells can spread within the body cavities such as the bronchi or abdominal cavity. As these organs are bathed in f luid, cancer cells can break away from them and f loat through this f luid to end up settling in other organs or tissues. One word is commonly used to describe all these different types of cancer cell spreading: proliferation. Defining the Word “Proliferation” According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “proliferation” was first used in English as a botanical term under the pen of Sir John Hill in the mid-eighteenth century (1759:122). The same source, however, suggests that the usage of the word really developed in the 1860s, essentially in the medical field. In fact, its emergence is directly linked to the discovery and growing understanding of cells (Triolo 1965; Fisher & Hermann 1979). In Micrographia (1665), the botanist Robert Hooke of England published the first drawing of cells present in plants. More than 150 years were to pass, however, before biologists really began to focus their research on cells. It was not before the early nineteenth century that Robert Brown, another British botanist, discovered the cell nucleus and, although he did not appreciate its significance, showed that it was

Introduction: The Making of the Concept

7

a regular feature of all plant cells (1831). A few years later, the German botanist Matthias Schleiden observed that each cell participated in the life of the whole plant organism and led a life of its own because the cell nucleus was its reproductive organ (1838). Following an after- dinner conversation with Schleiden, Theodor Schwann, a German zoologist, suggested that the cell was also the unit of structure in animal life (1847). This emerging “cell theory” was not lost to Johannes Müller, an inf luential scientist who was the mentor not only of Schwann, but also of other numerous prominent German biologists and physicians. Müller showed that tumors, like other parts of an organism, were composed of cells, and he deducted that cancer arose from cells that were abnormal (1838). This set the stage for another student of his, Rudolph Virchow, who, in 1855, further expanded these findings by putting the idea of spontaneous cell generation on a firm basis with the epigram omnis cellula e cellula (“every cell originates from another existing cell like it”). With that statement, Virchow established that the cell was the fundamental unit in which disease processes operate (1860). Now known as the father of cellular pathology, Virchow demonstrated that various functions of cell growth, metabolism, and division can fail or work in abnormal ways, subsequently leading to cancers or other diseases. Put differently, Virchow showed that cancer did not grow from abnormal cells, but that any cell could be transformed into a malignant cell and develop into a cancer. He falsely believed, however, that cancer spread like a liquid, which was later refuted by Karl Thiersch and Heinrich W. G. von Waldeyer-Hartz, respectively a German surgeon and a German anatomist, who showed that cancers metastasize through the spread of cancer cells (1865; 1872). It was in the context of describing cancer that the British physician Edmund Parkes used the word “proliferation” to refer to the phenomenon of cell division and spread, stressing that “there is proliferation and rapid cell-growth [emphasis added]” (1864:231). Similarly, Henry Maudsley, a British psychiatrist, pointed out three years later that “this proliferation of connective tissue with destruction of the nerve elements has . . . been already observed [emphasis added]” (1867:402). But the best illustration of one of the first uses of the word “proliferation” is in the Daily Chronicle at the beginning of the twentieth century. On December 2, 1905, it stated in an article entitled “Supposed Cancer Cure–Confident Claim Made by an Accrington Doctor” that “[t]he theory of the Imperial Cancer Research Committee [is] that cancer is entirely due to the proliferation

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of cancer cells and that to stop this proliferation would be to cure cancer [emphases added]” (The Daily Chronicle 1905). Coming from the Latin terms proles (“offspring”) and ferre (“to bear/ produce”) and therefore literally meaning “bearing/producing offspring” (Barnhart 2000:847), it is somehow ironic that the uses of the word “proliferation” happen to describe a deadly disease. In addition to its medical dimension, the word “proliferation” has gradually come to be used in the military domain to refer to the spread of weapons and, as the next chapter explains, to the spread of nuclear weapons in particular. Shortly after the creation (and use) of these weapons during the Second World War, it became common to refer to the threat caused by “the proliferation of nuclear weapons [emphasis added]” (Wohlstetter 1961:367). Since then, the concept has established itself in the international public policy lexicon. Nonproliferation experts make a distinction between “vertical proliferation” and “horizontal proliferation” (Starr 1984). Vertical proliferation refers to the process by which states with nuclear weapons seek to expand or enhance their arsenals. For its part, horizontal proliferation identifies the process by which states devoid of these weapons strive to adopt them. In general, the word “proliferation” is understood essentially as a horizontal phenomenon. One of its earliest definitions reads that it is “the increase of the number of states possessing independent national control over nuclear weapons, by the acquisition and development of the necessary technological capacity and industrial capabilities” (Schwarz & Hadik 1966:89). Weapons proliferation can also be of two main types, either “indigenous” or “foreign assisted.” While indigenous proliferation identifies the process when a state develops nuclear weapons thanks to its own resources, foreign-assisted proliferation characterizes the process when a state imports or steals nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons components, materials, or know-how from other actors on the international market. In reality, the distinction between indigenous and foreignassisted proliferation is far from clear because the two dimensions overlap considerably. Finally, the community of international security experts has most recently used the word “proliferation” to describe more than just the spread of nuclear weapons. As the next chapter shows, other types of weapons deemed “of concern” have been incorporated into the concept of “proliferation.” This is the case of radiological, biological, chemical weapons, their delivery systems (especially ballistic missiles), and some advanced conventional weapons, systems, and technologies.


9

Understanding the Phrase “Weapons Proliferation” The use of a scientific (medical) term to identify a phenomenon such as the spread of (nuclear) weapons has to be understood as part of the broader context of what many scholars have come to call the “scientific revolution” (Koyré 1939:6). The scientific revolution is generally recognized to have begun in 1543 with the publication of Nicolaus Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium (On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres) (Cohen 1994; Margolis 2002). It was pursued through to the mid-eighteenth century with the works of people such as Francis Bacon, Galileo Galilei, Johannes Kepler, René Descartes and, among many others, Isaac Newton. These thinkers revolutionized the way in which human beings perceived the world by claiming that the complexities of nature could be explained by specific (scientific) laws. Predominantly basing themselves on the fields of astronomy, physics, and optics, they demonstrated that these laws could be studied and understood by an intelligence capable of grasping them. Knowledge of these laws subsequently meant that future events, being systematic, could be predicted and used to alter the working of the world. As Galilei put it in The Assayer, Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe. . . . It is written in the language of mathematics and its characters are triangles, circles and other geometric figures without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one wanders about in a dark labyrinth. (Drake 1957:237–38) The advent of what came to be known as “the Age of Reason” was so powerful that it pulled the rug out from under the conventional wisdom of a divinely created reality. Scholars increasingly began to argue that science had displaced God’s will at the center of the universe. No longer was it believed that the world worked as it did because of God’s unknowable will. The belief was that it worked as it did because of the laws of science, which were knowable. This idea imposed itself strongly, despite the insistence of many of the scientists themselves, who, like Newton, warned against using the laws of motion and universal gravitation, his main discoveries, to view the universe as a mere machine. As he stated, “[g]ravity explains the motion of the planets, but it cannot explain who set the planets in motion. God governs all things and knows all that is and can be done” (Tiner 1975:107).

10


For a long time, many of these scientific hallmarks were inconsequential successes that did not become immediately applicable on a widespread basis. But the agricultural and industrial revolutions of the nineteenth century provided fertile ground for change. It became gradually possible to improve the production of most goods with some knowledge of the laws governing the functioning of machines. And so the profound effects of science began to be appreciated in human everyday life. This provided evidence that invention is the mother of necessity, not the other way around, contrary to the popular saying that “necessity is the mother of invention” (Diamond 1999:239–64). These developments marked the start of the rapid onward march of the scientific revolution. Its methodology came to inspire many fields beyond its early branch of the physical sciences. Toward the mid-nineteenth century, biology was quickly reduced to the laws of science, although that shift had somewhat started earlier, with the notable publication, in 1543, of Andreas Vesalius’s De Humani Corporis Fabrica (On the Fabric of the Human Body). Despite initial resistance from the vitalists who argued that scientific methods could only apply to the inanimate world (Keating 2002), the discovery of the law of thermodynamics and the explanation of chemistry by mathematics paved the way for a scientific approach to biology. The idea was that various aspects of the human body, such as what is now commonly referred to as the human nervous, circulatory, and cell systems, could be understood should one know the physico-chemical laws governing their functioning. This constituted, in turn, the first step toward curing diseases. Later, psychology also invoked, notably through the work of Sigmund Freud, pseudoscientific methods to explain human behavior and, ultimately, cure mental diseases. In the same way, social psychology and sociology applied similar methods to group behavior through the work of Charles Darwin, Thomas Malthus, Herbert Spencer, Charles Cooley, Edward Ross, and William McDougall. Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (1859), for instance, provides scientific evidence that all living species have evolved over time from a few ancestors through the process of natural selection. The greatest success of the application of scientific methodology in the realm of the social sciences, however, came in economics. With the rapid development of mathematical programming and control theory, it became possible to develop often near-perfect formalized methods to improve the relation between resources and their distribution. It was illustrated, for instance, by the famous general balance theory designed


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by people such as Léon Walras, Vilfredo Pareto, Kenneth Arrow, and Gérard Debreu. Thanks to this theory, specific testable models could be developed to refer to certain classes of social phenomena. But the pivotal point when the full understanding of the immediate utility of economics to improve the management of social affairs truly came with the publication of John Maynard Keynes’s magnum opus, the General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936). Following the Great Depression of the 1930s, Keynes’s masterpiece offered a (scientific) solution to mitigate the adverse effects of economic recessions. He recommended active interventionist fiscal and monetary government policy, a program that inf luenced U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt’s “New Deal” policy. In fact, what came to be known as “the Keynesian model” became the central conceptual framework for economic management in modern states from the end of the Second World War, at least until the mid-1970s. Keynes wrote his book concurrently with the development and strict systematization of National Income Estimates. An arduous record compiled long after (economic) events had taken place, these statistics had, initially, an interest of pure historical nature. Keynes’s book was revolutionary because it provided a model of the economic system in which the wide diversity of its parts could be grouped in a relatively limited number of causally important factors, whose relationships were expressed in simple language. As the famous Australian economist H. C. Coombs puts it after describing Keynes’s book as “the most seminal intellectual event of our time” in the early pages of his autobiography, “[b]etter data began to be assembled, techniques improved and the estimates began to be used, not merely for historical purposes but for analysis, with results which appeared to justify their sources” (1981:3). Alan Greenspan, who chaired the U.S. Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006, explains the impact such an approach had on him as a young man, “I immediately saw the power of these new tools: if the economy could be accurately modeled using empirical facts and math, then large-scale forecasts could be derived methodically. . . . I imagined how that could be put to work” (2008:35–36). And he added, “[t]he economists were jubilant. They thought they’d at last solved the riddle of forecasting” (2008:55). As scientific methodology had conquered the world, offering methods to understand, predict, and potentially manage events, it came as no surprise that the study of politics embraced it as well. After all, it was the only way to gain some legitimacy in the early twentieth century. As the scientist B. E. Schaar put it at the time, “[t]he scientific method which

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has resulted in such strides in all branches of science and which promises so much more when used cooperatively, should be applied to human relations, national and international” (1932:557). And so the now wellknown expression of “political science” emerged. Following the First World War, all studies of international politics belonged to the branch of the so-called science of international relations (Willoughby 1918; Barger 1928; Alvarez 1929). Lewis Fry Richardson’s Mathematical Psychology of War (1919), William Jay’s War and Peace: The Evils of the First and a Plan for Preserving the Last (1919), Hans Wehberg’s The Limitation of Armaments: A Collection of the Projects Proposed for the Solution of the Problem (1921), Philip Noel Baker’s Disarmament (1926), and Quincy Wright’s Study of War (1942), among a few others, all began to apply scientific methodology more or less explicitly to analyze the phenomenon of war. Contrary to the traditional conception that war constituted a natural instrument of statecraft, these scholars saw it as a problem to be solved, a disease to be cured. The following statement made by William Hirsch, M.D., about the First World War in an article published in the New York Times on December 27, 1914 is revealing, This terrible war, whose roaring thunders are reverberating from one end of the globe to the other, has been analogized to a disease of mankind and many have suggested a remedy, not only to cure the evil, but to prevent its recurrence. (1914) Nevertheless, it was with the creation of nuclear weapons after the Second World War that scientific methodology demonstrated its nearabsolute force in international relations. This gave rise to the subfield of “strategic/security studies.” In a 1949 article entitled “Strategy as Science,” Bernard Brodie, now considered the father of strategic thinking, aimed to develop strategy as a systematic field of analysis because it was “not receiving the scientific treatment it deserve[d],” he insisted (1949:468). Because he “had in mind an instrumental science for solving practical problems” (Betts 1997:10), he chose economics to develop strategic thinking, which he later referred to as “a guide for accomplishing something and doing it efficiently” (Brodie 1971–72:151). As John Burton, the famous Australian international relations expert, later pointed out in his Keynes-inspired book entitled International Relations: A General Theory, [In economics, there is] the presumption that there is a universal desire or need or wisdom to be satisfied in determining the most efficient use and distribution of all available resources in the


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satisfaction of wants. . . . So, too, in international relations; there is the presumption that there is a universal desire or need or wisdom to be satisfied in determining means by which relations between states might be peaceful. (1965:6) Brodie wrote his article at Yale University, but he was beginning his affiliation with the RAND Corporation. Established by the U.S. Air Force, RAND quickly became the hot spot for thinkers eager to offer tools to manage the strategic challenge brought about by the nuclear revolution. Apart from a few political analysts (such as Brodie himself, but also Alexander George, William Kaufmann, and Henry Kissinger) who were determined to think “scientifically,” most of the others were established mathematicians, physicists, or economists such as Daniel Ellsberg, Malcom Hoag, Herman Kahn, Carl Kaysen, Andrew Marshall, Henry Rowen, Thomas Schelling, James Schlesinger, and, among others, Albert Wohlstetter. It was this group of scientists who spawned of the theoretical corpus designed to manage international relations in the nuclear era. And so this explains why the spread of nuclear weapons came to be defined by a scientific term like “proliferation.” This is also why most of the literature on weapons proliferation has been centered on problem-solving. Similarly to research on cell proliferation that is mostly intended to find a solution to cancer so as to improve human health, most of the research conducted on weapons proliferation has dealt with how to find solutions to the problem for the sake of international peace and security. That search for solutions has been particularly intense since the end of the cold war. As former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director James Woolsey put it in 1993, the world is plagued by “[a] growing number of countries that are seeking advanced weapons, including nuclear, chemical, and biological ones, as well as missiles to deliver them” (Hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 1993:9). Such a bleak assessment has been widely shared among the community of international security experts. Evgenii Primakov, former director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, insisted, also in 1993, that “the spread of [advanced weapons], like the metastasis of a cancerous tumor, can destroy the entire fabric of international relations and dash hopes for creating a just and lasting world order” (Hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 1993:70). Most studies of weapons proliferation have been either “statespecific” or “group-specific.” This is because such studies give valuable insights to those who can try and solve the problem: policymakers. By providing substantial detailed information on a state (e.g., North Korea), a group of states (e.g., Middle Eastern states, rogue states), or

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a group of weapons (e.g., nuclear weapons), these studies give policymakers the knowledge they need to formulate adequate responses to the problem at hand. The downside, however, is that these studies are not optimum to understand weapons proliferation and the full spectrum of policies in place (and proposed) to address it. Although a focus on a state or a group of states can provide fertile ground for such an understanding, it cannot but run the risk of presenting information that may be valid in one case but not in others. Only “macro studies” can provide comprehensive analyses. Mainly because of their seemingly lack of policy orientation, however, they are only a handful in the analytical literature. The best ones include Brad Roberts’s Weapons Proliferation in the 1990s (1995) and Weapons Proliferation and World Order (1996), and Victor Utgoff ’s The Coming Crisis: Nonproliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order (2000). None of these studies, however, provides an analysis of the subject through a specific metaphorical approach or model. Goal, Methodology, Structure This book represents an attempt to plug this gap. It examines the phenomenon of weapons proliferation and its responses with a focus on current times and through an active use of the medical semantic field, brought into play out of linguistic and conceptual loyalty to the origins of the word “proliferation.” Put differently, it seeks to understand weapons proliferation in terms of cancer, which is the essence of a metaphor as defined by linguists (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:5). Beyond its originality, this approach hopes to be a useful contribution both to the world of scholarship and to the world of policy. Scholarship is one of the most fundamental needs of human beings. Its development, therefore, finds its own justification. Stephen Hawking, the famous British theoretical physicist known for his impressive contributions to the fields of cosmology and quantum gravity, provides a colorful explanation as to why this is the case: The discovery of a completed unified theory . . . may not . . . affect our life-style. But ever since the dawn of civilization, people have not been content to see events as unconnected and inexplicable. They have craved an understanding of the underlying order in the world. . . . Humanity’s deepest desire for knowledge is justification enough for our continuing quest. (1988:13)


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When it comes to weapons proliferation, that quest for knowledge is particularly necessary to pursue because the subject has largely remained a “puzzle” (Davis & Frankel 1993). Hopefully this book contributes to a better understanding of some essential features of the phenomenon and the way it is addressed, bringing more pieces to help complete the puzzle. The book approach will be particularly helpful in this regard because, in the words of Jan Tinbergen, a Dutch economist known for using models to analyze economic processes, “models have had a [strong] didactic [and communication] value” (1981:18). This book also hopes to inform the policy community. Although it cannot be denied that state-specific and group-specific studies are more directly useful to policymakers, these studies do not offer more than quick fixes to specific proliferation problems. Unlike macro studies, they do not look at the problem of weapons proliferation in its entirety. A strong case can therefore be mounted that a macro study offering a model will help policymakers to better approach the phenomenon because it will enable them to appreciate “the big picture.” As Tinbergen stresses, “beyond their didactic value, [models] are real and essential elements in the preparation of well-coordinated policies” (1981:18). This is the idea that “if you rename, you can reframe.” It is important because, together with knowledge development, inf luencing policy formulation through better understanding of problems is what the job of the scholar is all about. As John Burton points out, If the critical problems in international relations are finally solved, it will be through an understanding of developments taking place within the international system. The political scientist cannot produce new devices or solutions; he can observe and explain only, and thus make possible policies which reliably achieve the objectives sought. (1965:26–27) Critics will say that the analogy between cancer and weapons proliferation does not work because it is fundamentally f lawed. They will stress that, unlike cancer, “weapons do not spread, but are spread” (Mutimer 1994:25). They will insist that cancer processes, although yet to be fully understood by medical research, obey immutable biological (scientific) laws, whereas weapons proliferation is the product of human decisions, which are, in essence, full of surprises. In a nutshell, critics will point to what they like to call “human agency” as the key chokepoint in the book approach.

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This argument is problematic, on two accounts. For a start, the assumption that the natural world is governed by entirely immutable laws has been proven wrong by twentieth-century scientific research. With his revolutionary concept of “relativity,” the German-born theoretical physicist Albert Einstein showed that perceptions of the measures of time and space depend on the situation (in particular the velocity) of the observer. Werner Heisenberg, another German theoretical physicist, posited his “uncertainty principle,” the basis of quantum mechanics, which demonstrated the existence of a fundamental limit to the precision with which any natural phenomenon can be measured, introducing an element of unpredictability or randomness in the so-called hard sciences. By the same token, it would be a mistake to assume that the social world does not obey any laws. Social scientists have successfully identified trends and made relatively clear predictions about human behavior, basing their analyses on a range of key variables (Huntley 2000). The point is not to deny the existence of clear differences between the natural and the social worlds, but suggest that they are not as diametrically opposed as many scholars persist to believe. As international relations professor Morton Kaplan points out, “[p]hysical science presents analogies to the surprises that stem from parameter changes in social and political systems” (1966:16). Why, then, refrain from drawing a parallel between cancer and weapons proliferation? Doesn’t it constitute an exciting research adventure that would be a shame not to launch into? As Britain’s famous philosopher of language J. L. Austin stresses, [A] word never—well, hardly ever—shakes off its etymology and its formation. In spite of all changes in the extensions of and additions to its meanings and indeed rather pervading and governing these, there will still persist the old idea. . . . Going back into the history of a word . . . , we come back pretty commonly to pictures or models of how things happen or are done. (1961:149–50) Entitled “The Quest for the Administration of the General & Complete Cure,” the book’s first chapter offers an examination of the history of weapons proliferation. The next three chapters move on to analyze its current anatomical and physiopathology (its nature), its etiology and pathogenesis (its causes), and its pathological effects (its consequences), respectively. Finally, the two following chapters explore the four main policy responses to the phenomenon: prevention, detection, treatments, and palliation.

CH A P T E R

ON E

The Quest for the Administration of the General & Complete Cure

The essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process. —Joseph Schumpeter (1943:82) Joseph Schumpeter, one of the greatest economists of the twentieth century, approached his discipline from a three-dimensional perspective focusing on history, statistics, and theory (1954:12–13). Among these three elements, he considered one more important than the others: history. According to him, economics has had a unique evolutionary process and it is impossible to understand the economic phenomena of any epoch without adequate knowledge of historical facts, which give a historical “sense” and, in turn, a historical “experience.” Schumpeter also insisted that knowledge of history is essential to appreciate the important interactions between economic and noneconomic phenomena. Moreover, he stressed that economists often make mistakes not because of a lack of analytical skills, but because of a lack of historical knowledge. And so he suggested that more attention should be paid to the conduct of strict analytical comparisons between time and space. This reasoning applies to many fields, including the field of security studies. As the SIPRI Yearbook 1992 puts it in a paper focusing on the changes brought about by the end of the cold war, “security should be seen in its historical context: the future does not begin today, it started yesterday” (1992:5). What is the history of weapons proliferation? One of the main difficulties when inquiring into the history of a social phenomenon is to

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establish its origins. To quote the SIPRI Yearbook 1992 again, “in the history of peoples and in international relations, there are turning points and landmarks, but there is no ‘zero’ hour” (1992:5). Most historical studies on weapons proliferation begin at the end of the Second World War with the creation of atomic weapons (the A-bombs, also called fission weapons). Although this represents a crucial turning point in the history of the phenomenon, research suggests that its origins are to be found earlier. As international relations professors Joseph Nye and Sean Lynn-Jones put it in a report on the state of the field of security studies, The nuclear revolution in international politics may have given international security studies one of its raisons d’être, but it has led to a preoccupation with contemporary issues and a neglect of prenuclear problems of war and peace and of the broader economic and social context of security . . . the importance of the nuclear revolution notwithstanding, historical studies of the pre-nuclear period can shed light on contemporary problems. (1988:13) Thorough historical research suggests that weapons proliferation is one of the products of the dramatic scientific and technological escalation of weapons and methods of warfare that has taken place since the nineteenth century. The advent of the industrial age in the Western world led to considerable progress in numerous domains (steam, electricity, chemistry, biology, etc.) that gave wars and weapons a more dangerous character. With the introduction of high-explosive shells, advanced rif led artilleries, machine guns, hand-grenades, f lamethrowers, torpedoes, poison gases, fossil-fuelled ironclad warships, submarines, armed aircrafts, and tanks, it became possible to kill people dispersed over wide areas and destroy military and economic targets much more effectively. Critics will stress that history has known major technological revolutions other than the Industrial Revolution and that all these revolutions contributed to give weapons an increased killing potential. In the words of geography professor Jared Diamond “[t]he explosion of technology since the industrial revolution impresses us today, but the medieval explosion was equally impressive compared with that of the Bronze Age, which in turn dwarfed that of the Upper Palaeolithic” (1999:258–59). The consequences of these earlier revolutions, however, made scant differences in the conduct of war and the destructiveness of military operations. As Philip Noel Baker, a British politician of the 1920s, explained,

The Quest for the Cure

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although the introduction of gunpowder is perceived to have brought about revolutionary changes, “the rif les used in infantry remained no more than improved bow and arrows [and] the cannon were only a more effective form of the medieval battering-ram” (1926:39). The Industrial Revolution was truly revolutionary because it led to the widespread production of very destructive weapons. Moreover, this development took place simultaneously with the growing power of the state (due to increased centralization, bureaucratization, and democratization) and the rise of powerful ideologies such as nationalism (Viereck 1952). The idea was that every (male) citizen had the duty to defend his state and promote its international status through compulsory service in the armed forces in time of conf lict. Inf luenced by the thoughts of Prussian career soldier Carl von Clausewitz that war represented the continuation of politics by other means and not its breakdown (Graham 1911:119), these processes led to a perception that the enemy had to be totally defeated and, therefore, that its entire population was a target. The emergence of weapons proliferation can therefore be traced back to the Industrial Revolution. It is linked to the recipe for catastrophe generated by the sudden emergence of mass conscript armies of ideologically motivated citizens who had mass-produced weapons of incredible killing power and industrialized economies that could sustain them on distant fronts for a very long time. These worrying developments spurred attempts to restrict the methods of warfare and control weapons. Gradually, a body of international law developed to codify rules traditionally accepted as part of customary international law. The Declaration of St. Petersburg (1868) proclaimed that the only legitimate objective that states should have in time of war was to weaken the military forces of the enemy. It also stated that the use of weapons that inf licted “useless” suffering of disabled men or cause their death was contrary to the laws of humanity. From this rule, the use of a projectile of a weight less than 400 grams that was explosive or charged with fulminating or inf lammable substances was forbidden in wartime. The Brussels Declaration (1874) aimed to prohibit the use of poison or poisoned weapons, weapons causing unnecessary suffering, and projectiles already prohibited by the Declaration of St. Petersburg. Although it was never ratified because few states wanted to accept it as a binding agreement, the declaration led to the conclusion of the 1880 Manual of the Laws and Customs of War, which laid the foundations for the codification of the laws of war at the Hague Conferences.

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The Hague Conferences (1899, 1907) recognized the need for collective action to settle disputes between states by establishing the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the forerunner of today’s United Nations International Court of Justice. They also acted to control the effects of warfare by prohibiting or restricting the use of certain insidious types of weapons, namely asphyxiating gases, expanding bullets, and submarine contact mines. However, proposals for limiting the caliber of naval guns, the thickness of armor plate, and the velocity of projectiles, among others, were rejected and few states ended up ratifying the conventions (Goldblat 2002:19–20, 280). These attempts to control weapons and mitigate the effects of war proved unable to avoid the dreadful effects of the burgeoning trends described earlier, which came into full blossom with the outbreak of the First World War. The Aftermath of the Great War Disarmament as the Solution to Eradicate War After the unprecedented atrocities of the First World War, there was a strong sense that rapid and durable solutions needed to be brought to the problem of war. As the French proclaimed, this war had to be “la der des ders” (“the war to end all wars”). Many policymakers considered that weapons proliferation was a selffuelling phenomenon that was the primary cause of the war. Philip Noel Baker insisted that “[t]he enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them, it was these that made war inevitable” (1926:18). The general belief was that it was time to implement much bolder measures than the ones of the late nineteenth century. Disarmament, that is, the elimination of weapons, was considered the only solution to eradicate war (Wright 1924). To quote Philip Noel Baker again, The problem of security is now universally agreed to be a part of the problem of disarmament; the two now go, and must go, hand in hand; the solution of the first is therefore the chief and indispensable condition of success in the solution of the other. (1926:48) Simultaneously, there were strong pressures for the creation of an international organization to manage world affairs. The belief was that the Great War had been waged as a result of the absence of a higher legal


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and moral authority above the states. That is why, at the initiative of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, the League of Nations was created in 1919 (U.S. Department of State 1918:16), the first international organization whose central goal was to maintain international peace and security. Not only did the League strive to restrict the use of force and improve the rights of people in wartime, but it also sought to promote disarmament, on which it spent most of its time and money. As F. P. Walters, a former League official, puts it, Whatever might be the progress of the League in extending its membership, in preventing war, in settling disputes, in promoting economic and social advance, its success continued to be judged by public opinion and by its own most devoted supporters by one test above all—the test of disarmament. (1952:217) While introducing restrictions on the armaments of the vanquished states (namely through the 1919 Treaty of Versailles), the victorious powers also committed themselves to limit their own. The Covenant of the League required the reduction of weapon arsenals of all states “to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations” (Article VIII). The Parties of the League undertook to exchange information regarding the scale of their arsenals, their military, and naval and air force programs. The Council of the League formulated plans for the reductions of arsenals for the consideration of and action by governments (Walters 1952:217–30, 361–76). In 1924, the Secretariat of the League began to publish the Armaments Yearbook, providing general information and statistics on the armed forces of states. Throughout the 1920s, several texts aiming to regulate weapons production and trade were drafted under the auspices of the League. In 1925, the League also concluded the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, the so-called Geneva Protocol, in response to the use of chemical weapons during the First World War. Still in force today, the protocol outlaws the use of biological and chemical weapons, but allows their possession and their use by states attacked by others with these weapons. Following the conclusion of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact (the socalled Pact of Paris) that strongly condemned the use of force, the 1932 World Disarmament Conference was launched. This was the first conference ever convened to discuss a universal reduction and limitation of all types of weapons. Various commissions discussed the establishment

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of a system of collective security, the limitation of the strength of the armed forces, the limitation of land, naval, and air weapon systems, the limitation of national defense expenditures, the prohibition of chemical, incendiary, and bacteriological warfare, the regulation of weapons production and trade, the verification procedures of implementation of the obligations contracted by the parties, and the idea of “moral disarmament,” that is, educational programs designed to inspire mutual respect between peoples and nations (Baker 1979). The Failure of the Project However, the withdrawal of Germany from both the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, its rearmament (in violation of the Treaty of Versailles), and the onset of the Second World War rapidly brought this project to a breakdown. During the war, all the rules previously defined were violated, with the mass killing and destruction of people and infrastructure on a large scale, whether through aerial bombardments, extermination camps, or chemical and biological experiments. Moreover, the scientific and technological progress of the Industrial Revolution culminated during the Second World War with the production of atomic weapons. After the German invasion of Poland in 1939, Albert Einstein and other German scientists who had emigrated to the United States (driven by anti-Semitism in Germany) wrote to U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt to alert him to the recent discoveries in nuclear physics made by Germany (Fermi 1961; Whiting 2003), the effects of nuclear weapons, and the possible existence of a German bomb project (Rowe & Schulmann 2007:359–61). Einstein urged support for U.S. nuclear research as a prudent countermeasure. As he said to Roosevelt in his letter, “you may think it desirable to have some permanent contact maintained between the Administration and the group of physicists working on chain reaction in America” (Rowe & Schulmann 2007:360). This is how the “Manhattan Project” took shape and created the first atomic weapon, tested in July 1945 in Alamogordo, NM (Grove 1962; Kelly & Rhodes 2007). A month later, the U.S. Air Force dropped two atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The two bombs killed approximately 140,000 and 70,000 people, respectively (Selden & Selden 1989, xxi). Later, when it was revealed that Germany had not made much progress toward developing atomic weapons (Walker 1989; 1995), Einstein called his letter to Roosevelt “the greatest mistake of [his] life” (Calaprice 2005:175).


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The Nuclear Revolution Nuclear Disarmament as the Solution to Avoid World Destruction After the shock of the Second World War, the belief in the need to establish a (new) international organization in charge of the maintenance of international peace and security was still strong. And so the United Nations, for which negotiations had been initiated in 1942, came into being. Unlike the Covenant of the League of Nations, the U.N. Charter makes few references to disarmament. Principles and actions governing this issue (to be considered by the General Assembly according to Article XI) constitute only one section of the broader U.N. general principles of international peace and security. Similarly, the U.N. Security Council is limited to formulate plans and establish a system for the sound management of weapons (Article XXVI). One reason for this striking difference in emphasis is that, at the time of the drafting of the League’s Covenant, many believed the First World War to have been caused by the military build-up that had taken place before the war. Disarmament was considered the one and only solution to eradicate war. The prevalent belief in the mid-1940s, however, was that the Second World War had broken out because major powers failed to maintain an adequate military arsenal and did not use it effectively (the so-called Munich syndrome). That is why the U.N. Charter predicated on the continued existence of national armed forces, considered a necessary guarantee to preserve international peace and security. Moreover, unlike the Covenant of the League, the U.N. Charter was drafted as the war was still being waged, which naturally gave few prospects for disarmament. Notwithstanding the contents of its charter, the United Nations took a swift interest in resuming the prewar disarmament project because of the new challenges brought about by atomic weapons. The extraordinary destructive power of these weapons, whose effects could be fully appreciated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, inspired such awe throughout the world that there was a unanimous agreement that the problem had to be addressed at the highest levels. As Time Magazine put it at the time, With the controlled splitting of the atom, humanity, already profoundly perplexed and disunited, was brought inescapably into a new age in which all thoughts and things were split—and far from controlled. (1945)

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In June 1945, one month before the first nuclear test and two months before the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the leading scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project ( James Franck, Leo Szilard, and Eugene Rabinowich) had already drawn up a report, “the Franck Report,” in which they stressed the danger caused by atomic weapons (Fanton, Stoff, & Williams 1991:140–47). They indicated that the United States could not rely on its atomic monopoly indefinitely and that “if an international agreement is not concluded . . . , this will mean a f lying start toward an unlimited armaments race” (Fanton et al. 1991:144). The U.S. government took stock of the findings of the Franck Report, stating, no later than December 1945, that We recognize that the application of recent scientific discoveries to the methods and practice of war has placed at the disposal of mankind means of destruction hitherto unknown, against which there can be no adequate military defense, and in the employment of which no single nation can in fact have a monopoly. (U.S. Department of State 1946:712) Together with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the United States pushed for the establishment of a commission to deal with the questions of atomic energy and weapons. On January 24, 1946, the first U.N. General Assembly Resolution, unanimously adopted, established a special commission to deal with the issue, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (Laves & Wilcox 1946). Its goal was to eliminate these weapons and all others deemed “adaptable” to mass destruction and provide effective safeguards against potential violations. And so it appeared that Albert Einstein had had it right when he stated in 1945 that atomic weapons “may intimidate the human race into bringing order into its international affairs, which, without the pressure of fear, it would not do” (Calaprice 2005:169). A Still-Born Project At the AEC inaugural meeting on June 14, 1946, U.S. delegate Bernard Baruch put forward a proposal (the “Baruch Plan”) in favor of nuclear disarmament. Baruch insisted that “we are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead . . . , if we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of Fear . . . we must elect either world peace or world destruction” (1946:1057).


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The Baruch Plan called for the creation of an international atomic development authority that would have managerial control and ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially detrimental to international peace and security (1946:1059). The agency would also have the power to control, inspect, and license all atomic activities, as well as the obligation to share the beneficial uses of atomic energy. It would also conduct surveys of supplies of uranium and thorium (the main nuclear “raw materials”), put them under its control, and possess the exclusive right both to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives and to produce its own fissionable material. Unlike the Acheson-Lilienthal Report on which it was based, the Baruch Plan insisted on the need for immediate punishment in case of illicit activities: violators would not be protected by the veto power of the Five Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council. As Baruch put it in his statement, There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes. The bomb does not wait upon debate. To delay may be to die. The time between violation and preventive action or punishment would be all too short for extended discussion as to the course to be followed. (1946:1060) Once a system of control and sanctions would be operating, the Baruch Plan indicated that the production of atomic weapons would cease, existing stocks would be destroyed, and all technological information would be passed onto the agency. In sum, nuclear control would precede nuclear disarmament. On June 19, 1946, five days after U.S. delegate Baruch had proposed his plan, the Soviet Union rejected it on the grounds that it would interfere with states’ national sovereignty and internal affairs. Moreover, the Soviet Union contested the provision denying a Permanent Member of the U.N. Security Council the right of veto. As Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko put it in his statement, Efforts made to undermine the activity of the Security Council, including efforts directed to undermine the unanimity of the members of the Security Council, upon questions of substance are incompatible with the interests of the United Nations created by the international organization for the preservation of peace and security. ( Johnsen 1946:172)

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At the second AEC meeting, Gromyko submitted a draft convention that reversed the priorities of the Baruch Plan (Goldblat 2002:39). The Gromyko Plan pleaded for the production and use of all fission weapons to be prohibited and all fission weapons to be destroyed within three months. Only thereafter would an international agency be established to supervise the implementation of these commitments. The Gromyko Plan stressed that violations would be considered a serious crime against humanity and that appropriate punishment would be administered by domestic legislation. In sum, nuclear disarmament would precede nuclear control. It proved impossible to break the deadlock between the U.S. and Soviet opposite conceptions (Shils 1948). The crux of the problem was that the Soviet Union was much less advanced in the nuclear field than the United States. Consequently, Soviet authorities did not want to accept the Baruch Plan because it would have given a de facto U.S. monopoly over atomic weapons for several years, until the destruction of these weapons. In fact, U.S. weapons may never have been destroyed as promised in the Baruch Plan because the U.S. Congress had enacted the 1946 Atomic Energy Act (the “McMahon Act”), which was designed to keep nuclear technology secret from other countries. Similarly, the United States and other Western countries refused to accept the Soviet Plan for abolishing atomic weapons before control would take place simply because they distrusted Soviet authorities. The Baruch Plan was eventually approved by the U.N. General Assembly (1948). But it failed to prevent the Soviet Union from developing atomic weapons one year later. Joseph Stalin was reported to have told his scientists, A single demand of you, comrades: provide us with atomic weapons in the shortest possible time. You know that Hiroshima has shaken the world. The equilibrium has been destroyed. Provide the bomb: it will remove a great danger from us. (Wyden 1984:226) After the nuclearization of the Soviet Union, efforts to promote nuclear disarmament dissipated. Various plans continued to be presented at the United Nations. Most notable is the “Stockholm Appeal” (1950), a petition signed by tens of millions of people demanding that atomic weapons be outlawed and abolished. In 1952, the AEC merged with the U.N. Commission for Conventional Armaments to form the U.N. Disarmament Commission, meant to prepare a draft treaty for the reduction of all armed forces and weapons, as well as to ensure that


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atomic energy be exclusively used for peaceful purposes. These plans, however, did not produce any results, especially after the election of U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower in 1953, and the advent of his doctrine of massive retaliation against Soviet forces, which was based on the idea that the United States should not hesitate to rely on its nuclear superiority to reach its goals (Wells 1981). Meanwhile, the dynamics of vertical nuclear proliferation (or nuclear arms race) accelerated between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both parties competed fiercely against each other not only in the nuclear domain, but also in the field of bombers and missile delivery systems. Although the Soviet Union was not far behind, it was the United States that had nuclear superiority and strove to preserve it in every possible way to compensate for its enemy’s overwhelming superiority in conventional forces (Dufour & Vaïsse 1993:98). The two superpowers also competed on the international arena through their respective allied countries, which they armed dutifully (Painter 1999). Both the United States and the Soviet Union had a major inf luence over the military activities of their allies and clients. They regulated the f low of military equipments so tightly that major changes in the composition and distribution of regional military balances were almost only indicative of how much the two sides wished to compete in a given area. In this context, (horizontal) weapons proliferation was interpreted as a mere subset phenomenon to the larger U.S.-Soviet competition (Zarzecki 2002:9–11). Britain’s nuclear weapons program (1952), deeply integrated with that of the United States, and France’s nuclear weapons program (1960) were mostly perceived as reinforcing the Western bloc, despite France’s strong stance for strategic independence (Kohl 1968; Tertrais 2004a). At least initially, China’s nuclear weapons program (1964), however, was seen as bolstering the Eastern bloc. Therefore, at the time, little was done to respond to weapons proliferation, which was not seen as a stand-alone phenomenon. Some programs to address the problem, however, slowly came into being. On December 8, 1953, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, speaking at the U.N. General Assembly (Eisenhower 1960), proposed the “Atoms-for-Peace program” (Hewlett & Holl 1989; Chernus 2002). Eisenhower sought to promote disarmament through an indirect approach: build up the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, seen as the next phase of the Industrial Revolution. The idea was that nuclear powers, the United States in the lead, would contribute fissionable materials for uses to an agency that would be set up under aegis of the

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United Nations and that would make sure that adequate safeguards be put in place (Eisenhower 1960:820). To make this possible, the U.S. Atomic Energy Act was amended on August 20, 1954. The proposal was well-received internationally. The United States concluded nuclear cooperation agreements with no fewer than 40 states between 1956 and 1959 (Freeman 1960:386). And so states that accepted safeguards on nuclear materials and equipment to guard against the use of nuclear technology for military purposes were provided with research reactors, nuclear equipment, training, and reactor fuel. Concurrently, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1956 and went into formal operation in 1957 (Fischer 1997). Its main mission was to facilitate the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It was also responsible for applying safeguards (audits and on-site inspections) to verify that there was no diversion of such exchanges for military purposes (Fischer 1997:58–59). Simultaneously, the Soviet Union developed a similar program to provide peaceful nuclear technology to states in its orbit, and, in Western Europe, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was established to facilitate peaceful nuclear development within the emerging European Community. Therefore, from the end of the First World War to the late 1950s, the mainstream goal of the international community was to cure weapons proliferation through the administration of immediate general and complete disarmament. This ambitious goal is perhaps best captured in Philip Noel Baker’s book title, The Way to World Disarmament–Now! (1963). That cure, however, failed to be administered. The Changes of the Late 1950s–Early 1960s Toward Arms Control In the 1950s, the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race became unsustainable. In addition to exponential financial costs, there was an increasing danger of nuclear war. The two superpowers developed the powerful thermonuclear or hydrogen weapons (the H-bombs, also called fusion weapons). The United States tested its first weapon in 1952 and the Soviet Union did the same thing one year later (Rhodes 1995). Both of them also developed nuclear artillery shells, demolition mines, and short-range missiles. Although the United States was ahead in the race, it did not feel more secure. Or else why did it continue to build up its arsenal ( Jones 1977)? Wasn’t it what the Franck Report had predicted,


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stating that “quantitative advantage will not make [the United States] safe from sudden attack” (Fanton et al. 1991:142)? The dynamics changed when the Soviet Union shocked the world with the launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957. The journalist Arthur Krock reported that it constituted “a psychological Soviet victory in the cold war for men’s minds” (1957). The launch of Sputnik was evidence that the Soviet Union mastered intercontinental ballistic missile technology. The two superpowers had then become equally capable of annihilating each other, and they could not protect themselves because tests of anti-ballistic missile systems were repeatedly failing. As the United States and the Soviet Union controlled more or less one half of the globe, world destruction became a real possibility. This risk was palpable during the Berlin crisis of 1958–1961 (Barker 1963), and even more so during the Cuban missiles crisis of 1962 (Allison 1971; Blight and Welch 1989). This led to the release of Herman Kahn’s book On Thermonuclear War (1960) and movies such as On the Beach (1959), Dr. Strange Love (1964), or Fail Safe (1964), which depicted the dreadful consequences of a global nuclear war. Both the United States and the Soviet Union gradually came to realize that there was an urgent need to find a way out of that spiraling arms race. A full-scale nuclear war was simply not an option because it would lead to a global genocide that bore no relation to the idea of war as a rational political act in the terms in which Carl von Clausewitz understood it. Peace, however, was inconceivable because the two superpowers opposed each other at all levels, making disarmament unrealistic. And so because war was rationally impossible and peace/ disarmament was unthinkable, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded that the only way to stabilize their relations was through nuclear deterrence. Predominantly developed by international relations professors Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin in Strategy and Arms Control (1961), the rationale behind nuclear deterrence is to discourage the adversary from launching a nuclear attack by threatening him with similar retaliation (see also Brodie 1946, 1959; Jervis 1989). The adversary is expected to make the rational assessment that it is not in his interest to launch an attack because it will involve “Mutual Assured Destruction” (MAD). After its initial use in the early 1970s (Brennan 1971), the MAD concept was quickly incorporated into the international public policy lexicon because it depicted vividly the “mad” circumstances in which the world found itself. As French scholar Raymond Aron put it, “if peace [was] impossible, . . . war [was] unlikely” (1948:26).

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To work properly, nuclear deterrence required the United States and the Soviet Union to engage in “arms control.” The phrase refers to a form of cooperative policy ( Jervis 1978) designed, in the words of international relations professors Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, “to strengthen the operation of the balance of military power against the disruptive effects of the arms dynamic, especially arms competition, arms racing, and technological developments that tend to make nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence more difficult” (1998:212). The two superpowers concluded a “hotline agreement” (1963), which enabled exchanges of printed messages between them to provide a channel of communication and a safety valve to prevent a war from breaking out by accident or as a result of misperceptions or misunderstandings. In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union crafted the SALT and ABM Treaties, which set limits on their missile arsenals to reach parity (no longer superiority) and restricted the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems. Each party had to be equally capable of launching a destructive strike at their enemy and be equally vulnerable to an upcoming one from him. Despite what Bernard Baruch had indicated in 1946, the two superpowers elected neither world peace nor world destruction. They crafted a world in which they would no longer race each other with ever more destructive weapons. It was not a great world because it meant living under the threat of total annihilation (hence the expression of “balance of terror”), but, at least, it enabled the two superpowers to coexist peacefully. Toward Nonproliferation As they were stabilizing their bilateral relations, both the United States and the Soviet Union began to pay more attention to the acquisition of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, by other states. This is when the word “proliferation” became commonplace in the strategic vernacular. There was a need for the creation of a concept other than that of “arms race.” Defined as a process by which two or more actors compete in building up and improving the quality of their military arsenals at a rapid rate (Gray 1971:41), the concept of “arms race” could only identify the weapons dynamics of the United States and the Soviet Union. The spread of weapons to other states was characterized not by a competitive pattern of rapid “action-reaction,” but by a pattern of “imitation” that the word “proliferation” identified more accurately.


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The phenomenon was first conceptualized in 1961 by Albert Wohlstetter’s concept of the “N+1 problem” (1961:357). This sought to characterize, one year after France’s first atomic test and three years before China’s, the next addition (“+1”) to the existing number of nuclear-capable states (“N”), and its negative impact on the international system (“problem”). The major assumptions built in the N+1 problem are that proliferation is predominantly about the development of nuclear weapons, that it is naturally inevitable (and irreversible), and that it is intrinsically apocalyptic. Proliferation as a Nuclear Phenomenon Wohlstetter’s analysis is focused on the problems linked to the nuclearization of Western Europe. Wohlstetter assumed that proliferation had a monotypic anatomy: only nuclear weapons were regarded as malignant tumors. This was due to the highly destructive effects of these weapons, the revolution in strategic thinking that they caused, and the rapid spread of nuclear industries around the world, raising growing concerns that nuclear assets might be diverted from civilian to military purposes (U.S. Department of State 1946:713) and that they might have tragic consequences for the environment (Boserup & Iversen 1966). The proliferation of missile delivery systems, namely that of longrange systems was also of great concern. Yet, it was always incorporated into the broader concept of nuclear proliferation, as illustrated by the SALT Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty, which legislated on missile delivery systems, but were considered key to prevent a global nuclear war (Wesson 1972). Similarly, the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons was on the security agenda. After all, the use of such weapons had been formally prohibited as early as 1925 by the Geneva Protocol. Biological and chemical weapons, however, were considered taboo (notably biological weapons) and, therefore, concerns about their proliferation ended up being somehow marginalized (Krickus 1965:209). Finally, there were few concerns about the proliferation of conventional weapons because the two superpowers actively transferred such weapons onto their allies as part of their competition for global inf luence. Moreover, powerful economic and financial pressures made impossible any actions to curtail such proliferation, which, in fact, was deemed legitimate and helpful in an international system that recognized the right to self-defense, as enshrined in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. As the SIPRI Yearbook 1976 noted, “[t]he majority of nations

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in the world remain dedicated supporters of the notion that military strength is the best available means of preserving national security and promoting national interests” (1976:123). In addition to being considered monotypic, the anatomy of weapons proliferation was perceived as monomorphous. The issue was nuclear weapons themselves. In the same way as malignant cells are called cancers once they have developed to a certain level, weapons proliferation was referred to as such once nuclear technology had been turned into actual weapons, as illustrated by the element “1” of the N+1 problem. This was considered possible only with nuclear testing. As indicated in the then classified U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of September 1960, “[w]e do not believe that, in general, a country would manufacture and stockpile nuclear weapons in quantity without first having conducted testing” (NIE 100–4-60 1960:3–4). In turn, the belief was that the development of nuclear weapons would lead to the emergence of new officially declared nuclear-capable states, as was the case for the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China. And so weapons proliferation was alleged to have a linear physiology. Proliferation as a Naturally Inevitable (& Irreversible) Phenomenon The element “+” of the N + 1 problem suggests that weapons proliferation was considered inevitable (and irreversible). The implicit question that Wohlstetter asked was the following, “who will be the next state to develop nuclear weapons?” That is why he entitled a 1976 report to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Moving towards Life in a Nuclear Armed Crowd. Similarly to malignant cells that spread unlimitedly throughout the human body if left untreated, the suggestion is that nuclear weapons will spread throughout the international system if left unrestrained. Assuming that its etiology and pathogenesis (its causes) were deterministic, Wohlstetter, therefore, made a grim prognosis about the future of weapons proliferation. Many people shared this view in the early 1960s. After France’s first atomic test (1960), British scientist C. P. Snow predicted that “within, at the most, six years, China and several other states have a stock of nuclear bombs . . . I am saying this as responsibly as I can . . . that is the certainty” (Weaver, Snow, Hesburg, & Baker 1961:259). More famous is U.S. President John Kennedy’s oft-quoted March 1963 comment that he saw “the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States [having] to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have [nuclear] weapons” (1964:280). JFK based these predictions on a then classified study issued by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara


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a month earlier in which it was argued that, by 1973, eight new states would be able to develop nuclear weapons (China, Sweden, India, Australia, Japan, South Africa, Germany, & Israel) and that, in a more distant future, many more states could follow suit because the cost of proliferating “may come down by a factor of 2 to 5 times” (1963:3). These dire predictions were further fueled by the results of the “Nth Country Experiment,” which suggested that developing an atomic weapon was feasible even for inexperienced scientists. But the belief in the deterministic character of weapons proliferation is best illustrated in a then classified 1975 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) research study, The process of nuclear proliferation began when the US lost its nuclear monopoly in 1949 and would logically and conclusively be completed only when all political actors, state and non-state, are equipped with nuclear armaments. (CIA Research Study 1975:5) The Nth Country Experiment Sponsored by U.S. Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, the Nth Country Experiment was intended to determine whether a state could develop nuclear weapons from scratch (Stober 2003; Burkeman 2003). In May 1964, the laboratory hired two physicists, David Dobson and Robert Selden, with no knowledge of or access to classified information, to produce a weapons design. After three manyears of work over two and a half calendar years (April 1967), Dobson and Selden successfully produced a design for an implosion weapon that would be triggered by a plutonium pit. They developed a plan for a device that would have had as much explosive force as the weapon that devastated Hiroshima. The U.S. Department of Energy declassified the Summary Report of the Nth Country Experiment in 1995 in response to a Freedom of Information request by the National Security Archive. The report remains however heavily excised (Franck 1967). Proliferation as an Intrinsically Apocalyptic Phenomenon The word “problem” in Wohlstetter’s concept speaks for itself. Gradually, the United States and the Soviet Union came to realize that there was a growing risk in nuclear proliferation becoming an independent or semiindependent phenomenon that they would no longer control as tightly as they did (or thought they did) in the past. Without guarantee that

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their world alliance systems would remain stable, the two superpowers came to fear the possibility that nuclear war between regional adversaries allied to opposing blocs could escalate into global war, perhaps involving nuclear strikes. As the then classified U.S. NIE of June 1963 explained, The impact [of nuclear proliferation] will be in the political and psychological effects of the existence of such new weapons, the greater unpredictability of relations within and between alliance systems, and the possibility that hostilities arising out of existing or future controversies could escalate into a serious confrontation involving the major powers. (NIE 4–63 1963:3) Some experts, however, argued that nuclear proliferation could serve the cause of peace. Retired French Air Force General Pierre Gallois argued that these weapons made war rationally impossible and that their spread could stabilize international relations (Howard 1961). These arguments, however, did not weaken the conventional wisdom that nuclear proliferation was a scourge. After the French and Chinese atomic tests, the then classified U.S. NIE of October 1964 detailed that The French and Chinese nuclear programs have already intensified the strains within the major power groupings and will continue to do so. Their nuclear programs are, in a sense, acts of defiance of the US and the USSR and French and Chinese possession of nuclear weapons will be one of the factors tending to make relations within and between alliance systems increasingly difficult. (NIE 4–2-64 1964:16) That explains why nuclear proliferation was considered apocalyptic: because it complicated power relations and heightened the risks of global nuclear war. In 1960, U.S. estimates showed that if a war broke out in the developing world and escalated to the full implementation of the Pentagon’s major attack plan, between 360 and 425 million East Europeans, Russians, and Chinese would be killed (Butfoy 2005:21–22). Based on the three assumptions that proliferation is predominantly about the development of nuclear weapons, that it is naturally inevitable (and irreversible), and that it is intrinsically apocalyptic, a policy of nonproliferation was gradually formulated as a response. Its goal was to stop (or at least stall) the emergence of new nuclear-capable states, predominantly through policies of prevention and detection.


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The Nonproliferation Regime Nonproliferation began in limited agreements. The first (still born) nonproliferation project was the so-called Rapacki Plan (1958) that aimed to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe (Ozinga 1989). It was proposed by the Polish government, which feared the nuclearization of West Germany and wished to prevent the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory. In 1959, the conclusion of the Antarctica Treaty prohibited any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases or fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, or the testing of any type of weapons on this continent. In 1963, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, mainly to make it more difficult (for France and China) to develop a nuclear, namely a thermonuclear arsenal (Thee 1988:6). Finally, the year 1967 saw the conclusion of two important nonproliferation treaties, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Outer Space Treaty, which established nuclear-weapon-free zones, respectively in Latin America and in space and on celestial bodies. Following a resolution introduced by Irish Foreign Minister Frank Aiken at the U.N. General Assembly in 1961 (U.N. document 1665 [XVI]), international negotiations intensified to reach a full-scope nonproliferation agreement. They accelerated after China tested its first thermonuclear weapon in June 1967 (Walsh 1967) to culminate, one year later, with the conclusion of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force on March 1, 1970 (Bartels 1968; Willrich 1968). Under its provisions, the Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS), defined as opposed to the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) that manufactured and exploded a nuclear device before January 1, 1967 (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China), swore not to acquire nuclear weapons (Article II) in exchange for four main guarantees. The first guarantee is that no other NNWS will develop nuclear weapons so that no state will lose a comparative advantage by adhering to the treaty (Article II). The NWS also swore not to transfer nuclear weapons to NNWS or assist these states in developing them (Article I). There has been a controversy over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s policy of “nuclear sharing,” which involves member countries without nuclear weapons in the training and planning for the use of such weapons by those members states that possess them (the United States, France, and the United Kingdom). While critics insist that this violates Articles I and II of the NPT, the

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United States, the only NWS that has provided weapons for nuclear sharing, insists that such weapons are controlled by its forces and that no transfer or control will be made unless it is in time of war, making current arrangements legal (Butler 2005). The second guarantee is that NNWS have the right to exploit nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and that NWS will even assist them to do so through the provision of the necessary technology, material, and equipment (Articles III, IV, and V). The third guarantee is that the strategic situation would not be locked as such forever. This is expressed in three areas. First, the NPT was concluded for a initial period of 25 years (Article X[2]), a concession made to Germany and Italy, which had doubts about U.S. nuclear guarantees in the distant future. Second, the NPT allows its members to withdraw easily, that is, develop nuclear weapons, if they consider that their supreme interests are at stake (Article X[1]). Third, and perhaps most importantly, the NPT commits all its parties to work toward the cessation of the arms race, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament (Article VI). Finally, the fourth guarantee is that NNWS will be protected by security assurances. NWS agreed to assist any NNWS victim of a nuclear attack (through positive security assurances [PSAs] proclaimed in U.N. Security Council Resolution 255 [1968]) and not to threaten NNWS with nuclear weapons unless they are allied with a NWS (through negative security assurances [NSAs]). PSAs and NSAs are part and parcel of the NPT regime, although they are not mentioned in the text of the NPT because NWS wished to attach reservations to NSAs (Burns 1969; Bailey 1992). To ensure that NPT provisions would be respected, two other mechanisms were created: verification systems and export controls. The IAEA safeguards, in place since 1957, assumed a greater role with the birth of the NPT (Kramish 1963; Scheinman 1969). In addition to facilitating the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, it made sure that nuclear materials were not diverted from peaceful to military uses. Under the provisions of the NPT, NNWS have had to accept the IAEA’s “full-scope safeguards” over all nuclear materials and the facilities that contain those materials within their jurisdiction. Although IAEA officials can monitor activities connected with the production and use of nuclear materials, they cannot, however, investigate activities related to the development of nuclear weapons (Quester 1970). Put differently, IAEA safeguards have not been put in place to prevent


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states from using nuclear materials under their control for use in nuclear weapons. Instead, similarly to a medical check-up or a biopsy (microscopic examination of tissue or cells removed from the body) enables to diagnose cancer in its early stages to increase the chances of achieving a permanent cure, these safeguards have been designed to provide the international community with timely warning should significant quantities of nuclear materials be diverted to develop nuclear weapons. Export controls of sensitive technologies existed before the NPT. In 1949, the United States and its allies created the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) to implement an embargo on the transfer of nuclear items, munitions, and industrial goods with potential military applications to the Soviet Union and states of its sphere of inf luence (Bertsch 1983; Mastanduno 1992). The development of a nonproliferation regime led to the creation of additional export control arrangements focused exclusively on nuclear technologies. After the NPT entered into force, states supplying nuclear technology founded the NPT Exporters Committee (1971). Also called the “Zangger Committee,” so named after its Swiss chairman Claude Zangger, it is an informal organization designed to restrict the export of equipment and materials that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. Its guidelines include a list of export items that would trigger the requirement for the application of IAEA safeguards in recipient states (hence the list’s name, the “Trigger List,” first published on September 3, 1974 as IAEA document INFCIRC/209). In November 1974, an overlapping group of nuclear suppliers composed of additional states (such as France, then a non-NPT party) met in London to further develop export guidelines. The formation of what came to be known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was responding to three major developments: India’s nuclear test of May 18, 1974; growing concerns that the upward pricing policies of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was driving an increasing number of developing countries to initiate nuclear programs for energy purposes; and recent contracts signed or ongoing negotiations by France and West Germany for the supply of enrichment and reprocessing facilities to several developing states (Cirincione, Wolfsthal, & Rajkumar 2005:445). NSG guidelines extended to transfers of uranium enrichment and plutonium extraction and facilities, reinforced export conditions, and favored restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology, and weapon-usable materials (its “Trigger List” items was published on February 21, 1978 as IAEA document INFCIRC/254). Largely

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because of French and German resistance, NSG members, however, failed to prohibit the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology (the most sensitive capabilities in the nuclear fuel cycle) and to require IAEA “full-scope safeguards” as a condition of future nuclearrelated technology supply (Cirincione et al. 2005:446). In response to recommendations made to complement the restraints on supplies of nuclear materials and equipments, major powers also established, in 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The agreed guidelines covered transfers of missile-relevant equipment and technology that could help to develop missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons exceeding a range of 300 kilometers and a payload of 500 kilograms. The NPT regime, therefore, was negotiated as a bargain that sought to reconcile realities and ambitions. It took into account realities because it acknowledged the existence of the five existing nuclear-capable states (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China), whose immediate general and complete disarmament was out of reach because of cold war tensions. At the same time, the post-First World War ambition to cure weapons proliferation through general and complete disarmament was still there: the international community only instituted nonproliferation (and arms control) efforts as a stepping stone to this ultimate goal. Efforts in favor of disarmament continued to be promoted by the United Nations, as illustrated, for instance, by the Final Document of the First Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (1978). But the world moved from Philip Noel Baker’s bold demand for “world disarmament–now!” (1963) to a more modest regime establishing “arms control and nonproliferation– first,” a regime still with us today. Complaints about the NPT regime emerged immediately after it was established and remained firm during the 1970s and 1980s (Stoiber 2003). These complaints stressed the discriminatory nature of the treaty, which institutionalized a built-in difference in status among states: NWS and NNWS (United Nations Disarmament 1985:273–79). Critics also deplored the unwillingness of NWS to share nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes (Nye 1985:129). Spokesmen of developing countries criticized the restrictive measures taken by nuclear suppliers through the Zangger Committee and the NSG. They insisted that these measures were an infringement of NWS obligations to provide them with assistance for the peaceful application of nuclear technology, guaranteed under Article IV of the NPT. Debates on this matter intensified further with the oil crisis of the mid-/late 1970s


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that prompted mushroomed interest for nuclear technology. As international relations expert Steven Baker indicates, “[s]ince the oil crisis of 1973–1974 there has been a marked increase in the export of nuclear energy technology, equipment, and materials” (1976:202). Moreover, complaints were made about the unwillingness of NWS to promote disarmament, guaranteed under Article VI of the NPT. Just five years after the NPT entered into force, sociologist Alva Myrdal already stressed that “all ‘have-not’ nations . . . join in a stream of criticism, often mounting to vociferous protestation against the superpowers’ unwillingness to take steps in the direction of disarmament” (1975:31). For some or all these reasons, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, to quote a few, chose not to adhere to the NPT. Despite these problems, the measurement of what modern management terminology would today call the NPT’s “Key Performance Indicators” (KPIs) would tend to show that, on the whole, the treaty was a success in the first two decades of its existence. It managed to achieve its goal of stopping (or at least stalling) nuclear proliferation. It quickly acquired many state parties, standing as one of the most universally agreed international legal instruments (Andemicael, Opelz, & Priest 1995:38). It also contributed heavily to the emergence of a strong norm against the possession (and use) of nuclear weapons. The fact that no state openly developed nuclear weapons between the NPT’s entry into force and 1990 appeared as evidence that the treaty had succeeded in entrenching the “guiding norm . . . that the spread of nuclear weapons to more states would pose a serious danger to international security” (McMorris Tate 1990:403). This success suggested that Albert Wohlstetter had had it right about the nature of nuclear proliferation, that the NPT regime was ideal to manage the problem, and that it should be preserved as long as possible. This was comforted when the cold war suddenly came to an end and South Africa (1991), France (1992), China (1992), Belarus (1993), Kazakhstan (1994), Ukraine (1994), Argentina (1995), and Brazil (1998) adhered to the NPT. These good news were completed by the conclusion of a multilateral agreement, in 1995, to extend the duration of the treaty indefinitely (NPT/CONF.1995/32 1995), the reiteration by NWS of the commitment to security guarantees to NNWS (U.N. Security Council Resolution 984), and the establishment of nuclearweapon-free zones in Southeast Asia (1995) and Africa (1996), to join the existing ones in Latin America (1967) and the South Pacific (1985).

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The signature of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, which followed the agreement reached by NWS on a moratorium on nuclear testing in July of the same year, also stood as a major success because nuclear tests continue to be considered a necessary step to develop (and improve) nuclear weapons. Moreover, the international community applauded the consensus reached at the Conference on Disarmament in 1995 on a mandate for an ad hoc committee to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) designed to place the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the separation of plutonium under international inspections (CD/1299 1995). This was in response to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 48/75L, which, two years earlier (December 1993), had called for a “nondiscriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” In addition, the perception that the NPT was successful was comforted by the multiplication of disarmament agreements being concluded by the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia after December 1991). After the famous 1986 Reykjavik Summit, the two superpowers managed to move from arms control to disarmament. They drafted the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty in 1987, which promised the elimination of their intermediateand shorter-range missiles and their launchers. They brought to success negotiations for the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) in 1991 and made swift progress toward a follow-on (START II was signed in 1993). START treaties undertook to reduce gradually their strategic offensive nuclear weapons to equal levels. Reciprocal unilateral declarations made by then U.S. President George H. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1991 and 1992 also led to a considerable reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, most particularly in the United States (Handler 2003). Subsequently, Britain and France engaged themselves in similar disarmament processes (Cirincione et al. 2005:189–201). Proposals for the abolition of nuclear weapons multiplied, with the notable work of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. That is why the SIPRI Yearbook 1993 stressed that “[t]here is no sphere in international relations in which the end of the Cold War brought so many favorable changes as in arms control and disarmament” (1993:4). In such a context, some observers declared that “the end of history” had been reached (Fukuyama 1992) and requested for its positive fallout: the peace dividend.


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This general sense of optimism, however, could not hide some misgivings about the reliability of the nonproliferation regime. The consecutive discoveries of Iraq’s (1991) and North Korea’s (1992) clandestine nuclear weapons programs raised serious concerns about the efficiency of the NPT because these programs had gone undetected despite the apparent compliance of these countries with their international obligations (Rathjens 1995:181). Although Iraq had been an NPT party since 1969, it was only in the aftermath of its confrontation with the international community about its annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 and the establishment of a U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) mandated specifically to disarm the country (together with the IAEA), that the existence of an advanced nuclear weapons program was unveiled (Flodén, French, Jones, Pauwels, & Zanders 1998). Similarly, in the case of North Korea (an NPT party since 1985), while the IAEA did play a role in uncovering its nuclear weapons activities, U.S. satellite imagery proved crucial to detect the program (Campbell, Einhorn, & Reiss 2004:8). Both the Iraqi and North Korean nuclear weapons programs were eventually shut down. The nonproliferation regime was propped up with the establishment of more intrusive IAEA safeguards (the Additional Protocol) and reinforced export controls (the NSG and the Zangger Committee adopted stricter guidelines). But pessimism began to grow. This was exasperated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Beyond the initial risks (eventually overcome) that the 8,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine might not return to Russia (Walker 1992), the international community found itself at a loss to deal with the break-up of the massive nuclear weapons complex of the Soviet Union. Similarly, the growing convergence between military and commercial technologies and the progressive internationalization of military markets meant that weapons-related technology increasingly disseminated throughout the globe. In addition, concerns about the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons began to intensify. These weapons had been on the security agenda for a long time, and their use has been prohibited since 1925 by the Geneva Protocol. The regime against biological weapons was developed further in the 1970s (United Nations 1969; World Health Organization 1970). The preservation of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union after the conclusion of the NPT facilitated their decisions to abandon the possession of biological weapons through a bilateral agreement. That agreement served as a framework for the conclusion of the multilateral Biological and

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Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which, since 1975, has banned biological weapons. Subsequent negotiations about banning chemical weapons, however, did not pan out because states considered them militarily useful. Although a group of 39 countries concerned by the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War established the Australia Group in 1985 to control chemical exports, it was really the discovery of Iraq’s and the former Soviet Union’s biological and chemical weapons programs in the early 1990s that pushed negotiations forward. In 1993, a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) banning chemical weapons and offering stringent verification provisions was opened for signature (and entered into force in 1997). Simultaneously, in 1994, BTWC parties established an “Ad Hoc Group” to develop a binding verification system for the convention (BWC/SPCONF/1 1994). Despite these progresses, however, biological and chemical weapons have continued to proliferate, not to mention missile delivery systems and other conventional weapons, against which new responses have had to be formulated. The year 1998 exemplified all these threats, leading some scholars to call it the Annus Horribilis for nonproliferation (Mélandri & Vaïsse 2001:270). In May of that year, India and Pakistan, the last two NPT holdouts with Israel, conducted nuclear tests. Three months later, in August, North Korea fired a long-range missile in the Pacific Ocean that f lew over Japan. Finally, in December, Iraq ended up expelling U.N. weapons inspectors searching the country for biological and chemical weapons. Today, most international security experts consider that the general outlook is still bleak for nonproliferation. With the North Korean and Iranian cunning bending/breaking of NPT rules, the so-called nuclear renaissance (due to growing world energy needs), and the increasing risks that terrorists might use deadly weapons or materials in their operations (as during the attacks of 9/11), some experts have even suggested, two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, that “we may be very soon approaching a nuclear ‘tipping point’ ” (Campbell et al. 2004:4). In other words, a dangerous cascade of weapons could soon be sparked. An Incurable Disease? The history of weapons proliferation tells the story of a quest for the administration of a permanent cure for a phenomenon considered a dangerous self-fuelling disease. That cure is general and complete


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disarmament. From the end of the First World War through to the 1950s, ambitious attempts to administer it immediately proved vain. A more realistic international agreement seeking to work toward this goal on a step by step basis was reached in the late 1960s: the NPT regime, which focuses on nuclear weapons. Still with us today, that system has had mixed results and has experienced substantial strains despite amendments and additions. Why? How come the battle against weapons proliferation seems to have slipped out of hands? Is weapons proliferation, in fact, an incurable disease? Answers to these questions beg a fresh examination of the subject as it has evolved in the years following the end of the cold war. This is crucial because, as Albert Wohlstetter put it at the time of its conceptualization, If our policies are to cope with the spread of military nuclear technology rather than encourage it, it is essential that they be more symbolic and well-intended, more than “allusive and sentimental”—as Robert Oppenheimer called “atoms for peace.” They need to be concrete and aimed precisely at the problems posed by changes in the real world. Otherwise, like the nineteenth-century hospitals Florence Nightingale referred to, they are as likely to spread the disease as to cure it. (1979:1) The three following chapters will be devoted to a reassessment of the three assumptions made by Albert Wohlstetter, who, with his image of the N+1 problem, suggested that proliferation was predominantly about the development of nuclear weapons (chapter two), naturally inevitable (and irreversible) (chapter three), and intrinsically apocalyptic (chapter four). Only then will it be possible to analyze the policy responses to the phenomenon (chapters five & six). To quote Albert Wohlstetter again, it is important that there be “a preface to policy” (1979:1).


PA RT

I I

On Weapons Proliferation


CH A P T E R

T WO


Man is only man at the surface. Remove the skin, dissect, and immediately you come to machinery. —Paul Valéry (1960:578) With this formulation, poet and philosopher Paul Valéry indicates that it is possible to understand how the human body operates (its physiology) with knowledge of the parts that it is composed of (its anatomy), which can be obtained through dissection. Inspired by such a method, this chapter assesses the correctness of Albert Wohlstetter’s first assumption that proliferation is predominantly about the development of nuclear weapons. It dissects the phenomenon as it exists today to highlight its composing parts and, in turn, its operation. Put differently, it seeks answers to the “what?” and “how?” questions. Weapons of Mass Destruction Long gone is the time when weapons proliferation was solely characterized by the spread of nuclear technology. The initial focus on nuclear weapons has gradually given way, from the early 1990s, to a broader set of weapons of concern. However, little has been done to identify in a consistent manner what these weapons really are. Few explanations have been provided as to why some weapons should be singled out more than others. Following Operation Desert Storm and the discovery of Iraq’s large military machine that consisted of a nuclear weapons program and biological, chemical, and ballistic capabilities supported by an efficient

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indigenous defense industrial infrastructure (Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction 2002), nonproliferation expert Henry Sokolski showed that U.S. officials were left puzzled about what weapons other than nuclear weapons should be considered sensitive (1996a:278–79). Sokolski explains that weapons proliferation was said to deal with no fewer than a dozen types of weapons. These were (1) weapons of mass destruction (WMD); (2) WMD and the means for their delivery; (3) WMD and the missiles needed to deliver them; (4) special weapons; (5) advanced weapons; (6) advanced conventional weapons; (7) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons; (8) conventional weapons; and (9) weapons of proliferation concern. This confusion, however, gradually led to a consensus among the community of international security experts that proliferation was now to be understood as being about “weapons of mass destruction.” This was formalized in the declaration S/23500 made by the U.N. Security Council President on January 31, 1992, which considered the proliferation of these weapons “a threat to international peace and security” (codewords for justifying the use of force) and which called on all states to prevent its occurrence. The WMD concept emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. The chemical and biological experiments conducted on human beings and the two nuclear explosions on Hiroshima and Nagasaki prompted the U.N. Commission for Conventional Armaments to identify, in 1948, a specific category of weapons: WMD (U.N. Document S/C.3/32/Rev.1). Earlier, in 1946, the U.N. General Assembly had already requested the elimination of all weapons “causing mass destruction” (Resolution 1 (I), January 24). But the phrase has even earlier origins. It was initially used in reference to the aerial bombing campaigns of the Spanish civil war (notably the German attack on the Spanish city of Guernica) and the Japanese attacks against China. In his 1937 Christmas address, the archbishop of Canterbury stated, Who can think at this present time without a sickening of the heart of the appalling slaughter, the suffering, the manifold misery brought by war to Spain and to China? Who can think without horror of what another widespread war would mean, waged as it would be with the new weapons of mass destruction [emphasis added]? (The Times 1937) The U.N. document of 1948 lists as WMD “atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological


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weapons, and any weapon developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above” (U.N. Document S/C.3/32/Rev.1). The idea, therefore, is that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC weapons) are all special because of their effects, which “greatly reduce the time and the effort needed to kill” (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1993a:iii). NBC weapons have been on the international security agenda since the end of the Second World War. Nevertheless, as explained in the previous chapter, the nonproliferation community focused essentially on nuclear weapons until the late 1980s. Only in the 1990s has the full meaning of the WMD concept been rediscovered. In fact, it has even been inf lated to include missile delivery systems as well, notably longrange ballistic missiles. What are these weapons? What are their order of significance? Is there any logic to label them WMD? Are they really the only weapons of proliferation concern? Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons remain the primary objects of proliferation concern in the early twenty-first century. As international relations professors George Modelski and William Thompson put it, Nuclear armaments . . . have been a feature of world politics for the past half-century, and as nothing indicates their imminent elimination, their continued salience in world arsenals and the threat they pose to human survival continue to place them high on the global agenda. (1999:130) Nuclear weapons are by far the most dangerous weapons, with their proliferation constantly making headlines and keeping policymakers busy, as is currently the case for North Korea and Iran, but also for India, Pakistan, Israel, as well as for a range of other states able to “cross the nuclear threshold” in short periods of time. To understand why these weapons are the number one priority on the nonproliferation agenda, it is useful to grasp what these weapons are and how they work before analyzing their effects and the feasibility of defenses against them. Nuclear weapons are technologically complex devices that deliver a massive amount of explosive energy by fissioning (splitting) or fusing together individual atoms (Kokoski 1996; Cirincione et al. 2005:45–55;

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Langford 2005:31–136). Although the isotopes of neptunium (Np) and thorium (Th) can be used in fission weapons, it is the isotopes of uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu), notably U-233, U-235, and Pu-239 that are generally considered the critical raw materials because they are the elements most readily fissionable into smaller atoms. The amount of fissile material needed to make a nuclear weapon depends on many variables, but the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) considers that “significant quantities” for effective production are 25 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 8 kg of Pu. The U.S. legislation, however, has lower thresholds (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1995:11). Fission weapons provide the catalyst for more complex fusion weapons. In fusion weapons, a fission explosion creates the high temperatures necessary to join light isotopes of hydrogen, deuterium, and tritium, which produce larger explosions. The use of heat to fuse these materials explains why these weapons are called thermonuclear. Effects of Nuclear Weapons Both fission and fusion weapons have considerable and indiscriminate killing and destructive effects (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1979; Croddy & Wirtz 2005:261–65). The effects vary slightly according to their explosive yield, the height of their detonation, weather conditions, and terrain features. They consist of an immediate and powerful blast, which crushes and knocks objects down; thermal radiation, which causes f lash blindness to people looking in the direction of the explosion; and intense heat, which results in large-scale fires and ionizing radiation. Nuclear weapons also have delayed and long-lasting effects. They produce electromagnetic pulse, which destroys or damages the communications and electric power systems; and fallout radiation, which inf licts massive damage over an extended period (ranging from hours to millennia) in locations even very distant from the site of detonation. Defenses against Nuclear Weapons Defenses against nuclear weapons, either by active or passive means, are extremely difficult, if not impossible to deploy because of the considerable effects of a single nuclear explosion (Panofsky 1998:3–8). Today’s standard nuclear fusion weapon has explosive yields equivalent to 20 megatons, approximately one thousand times the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Moreover, defenses against nuclear weapons are difficult to deploy because of the numerous ways in which these weapons can be delivered


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(Panofsky 1998:4). Independent of the debate on the feasibility of missile defense systems, the multitude of nuclear delivery options available to an attacker is such that the deployment of active defenses to intercept nuclear weapons remains virtually elusive. Delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons in the form of land-, sea-, or air-based ballistic and cruise missiles for various ranges have been developed and deployed, and nuclear explosives have been weaponized into demolition munitions, antisubmarine weapons, and earth penetrators. Each intercept would have to be perfectly effective and defense would have to be all-inclusive against feasible means of nuclear attack because a single successfully delivered nuclear weapon would completely wipe out its target. Similarly, passive defenses such as bunker protections are of limited value because of the delayed effects of nuclear weapons. Biological Weapons Biological weapons are ranked number two as objects of proliferation concern. These weapons intentionally distribute pathogenic microorganisms, biologically manufactured toxins, or human-modified/made agents to cause illness or death in human, animal, or plant populations (Binder & Lepick 2001:7–28; Cirincione et al. 2005:57–62; Langford 1995:137–208). No fewer than seven states are suspected to have significantly advanced offensive biological warfare research programs: China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Russia, and Syria. Russia and possibly Iran, North Korea, Israel, and China are believed to have produced and stockpiled actual weapons (Cirincione et al. 2005:9–12). Given that biological weapons are well-suited for covert attack, bioterrorism has also been a key concern. The Japanese religious sect Aum Shinrikyo tried, in vain, to produce and weaponize biological agents botulinum toxin and anthrax (Kaplan & Marshall 1996:106–7). In 1984, the Rajneesh cult successfully contaminated salad bars with Salmonella typhimurium in more than 10 restaurants in Dalles, OR, infecting (but not killing) as many as 750 people—and it took no less than a year to detect that it was an intentional attack (Chyba 2001:2349). In late 2001, terrorists sent letters infected by anthrax spores to U.S. members of Congress and the media, killing five people and infecting eighteen others (Cole 2003). Effects of Biological Weapons Biological weapons have, potentially, considerable and indiscriminate delayed killing effects on a huge scale, and they cause mass social

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disruption once the occurrence of an attack has been detected (United Nations 1969; World Health Organization 1970; SIPRI 1971–75). Their effects, however, vary dramatically. For a start, biological weapons effects depend on the infectivity, virulence, toxicity, pathogenicity, transmissibility, lethality, and stability of the agent disseminated, which is different whether it is bacterial, viral, rickettsial, or a toxin. Bacterial agents, which are single cell organisms that either invade host tissue or produce nonliving toxins (anthrax, plague, or tularaemia), are effective agents because of their resilience and high-killing potential. Viral agents (smallpox virus, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, and other viral hemorrhagic fevers) and rickettsial agents (Queensland fever and epidemic typhus) are intracellular parasites that are also effective because of their resilience and because they cause infectious, sometimes fatal diseases. They are, however, more difficult to cultivate than bacterial agents. Unlike other agents, biological toxins (ricin and botulinum toxin) are nonliving organisms and cannot reproduce, making them less deadly agents. The effects of biological weapons also depend on the delivery device(s) used to disperse them (Binder & Lepick 2001:24). Biological weapons cannot be dispersed by a single-point explosion through artillery shells, grenades, rockets, bombs, or missile warheads if maximum efficiency is sought because the heat from the blast will kill most agents. Instead, optimal delivery is through aerosol—the dispersion of microscopic liquid droplets or dry particles of an agent or toxin in an airborne cloud. Such delivery can be carried out by (aircraft) spray tanks or infected letters. Finally, the effects of biological weapons depend on local meteorological conditions. Most agents are vulnerable to desiccation, humidity, and oxidation. Many (except toxins) die when they are exposed to ultraviolet light and oxygen (Binder & Lepick 2001:22). For all these reasons, experts contend that biological weapons are of limited effectiveness: they “only” have potential not actual devastating effects. After all, the attacks led by the Rajneeshee cult in 1984 and against U.S. members of Congress and the media in 2001 caused a general disorganization of social services and cost billions of dollars in decontamination expenses, but resulted in relatively few victims. Similarly, the Japanese religious sect Aum Shinrikyo failed to produce and weaponize botulinum toxin and anthrax despite the considerable funding and expertise it had at its disposal. That being said, today’s so-called biotechnology revolution may dramatically improve the efficiency of biological weapons (Dando 1994;


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Dando & Fraser 2001:253–56; Wheelis 2004). Let alone the creation of new viruses and bacteria, agents that are already harmful in nature could be modified to increase virulence, spread faster, and live longer. Agents could also be made suitable for any form of delivery devices and be made more resistant to meteorological conditions. Defenses against Biological Weapons Defenses against biological weapons exist, but they are costly and difficult to deploy, especially for attacks against civilians (Binder & Lepick 2001:29–39; Koblentz 2003–4:91–92). Given that biological agents are tasteless, odorless, invisible, and that they have delayed effects, a biological attack, unless delivered by an explosive munition, can take place without being noticed, and diseases can spread before any defensive measures are taken. After intelligence, the first line of defense is the alert detection of a biological attack (Binder & Lepick 2001:30–33). Today’s aerosol alert detection devices can provide the early warning necessary to launch a medical intervention to mitigate the consequences of an attack, although they lack rapidity and accuracy. The next line of defense, once the control detection has identified the attacking agent (most defense systems are agent-specific), is the protection from a biological attack, which has active and passive forms (Binder & Lepick 2001:30–33). Active protection consists in vaccinations. Although efficient, the procedure is long and complex. Once the targeted population and the specific threat agent are identified, the appropriate vaccine has to be developed and be made available, and it has to be administered to the targeted population before or rapidly after the attack. It is obviously easier to do so for a few military regiments than with the entire civilian population of a megalopolis (Franz 1994:59–60). Passive protection includes the use of physical defenses that filter the air to remove dangerous particles. If simple masks are effective (but not ideal), few people have them apart from military personnel. The most feasible type of physical defenses is buildings and vehicles equipped with filters and positive pressure systems that prevent the infiltration of biological aerosol clouds. But they remain a rare privilege of the armies due to their high costs. The last line of defense consists in the decontamination of the area exposed to a biological attack, which takes time and is costly. For instance, Gruinard Island, off the coast of Scotland, was used for field trials in 1943 to assess the effectiveness of anthrax spores as a potential

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biological weapon: it had to be sealed off from the public until 1986 (!) in an effort to decontaminate the land (Manchee, Broster, Anderson, Henstride & Melling 1983:239–40; Manchee, Broster, Stagg, Hibbs, & Patience 1989:17–18). Advances in biotechnology are also giving rise to new concerns. It is conceivable to imagine the creation of agents that mask their presence from immune-based detectors, cannot be countered by vaccines, or against which physical defenses do not work. Chemical Weapons Chemical weapons are next on the list of proliferation concerns. These weapons are human-made toxic gas, liquid, or solid agent produced by mixing various chemicals (precursors) in specific ratios to cause physical or physiological effects on human, animal, or plant populations (Meyer 2001:131–61; Cirincione et al. 2005:57–62; Langford 2005:209–311). Today, the following countries are suspected of having chemical weapons programs: China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Syria, and sometimes India, Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Sudan, Taiwan, and Vietnam (Cirincione et al. 2005:12–14). Chemical terrorism has become a major concern, notably since the use of sarin in the Tokyo metro by the sect Aum Shinrikyo in 1995 (Kaplan & Marshall 1996:206–52). These concerns were enhanced by the 2002 CNN broadcast of an al Qaeda videotape of poison gas being tested on dogs at a crude laboratory in Afghanistan and by the use of truck bombs carrying tanks of liquid chlorine by Iraqi insurgents in January 2007 (Cave & Fadam 2007). Effects of Chemical Weapons Chemical weapons have immediate killing or incapacitating effects on a limited scale because mass casualties require large amounts of chemical agents (United Nations 1969; World Health Organization 1970; SIPRI 1971–75). The attack conducted by the cult Aum Shinrikyo, for instance, had limited killing effects despite the high toxicity of the agent. That being said, in addition to causing mass social disruption (as was the case following the attack of the cult Aum Shinrikyo), these weapons remain extremely deadly. In the words of Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, “5 metric tons of the nerve gas sarin carried in bombs and dropped by two strike aircraft or the warheads of 36 Scud missiles could kill 50% of the people over 4 square kilometers” (2005:12).


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Approximately 70 chemical agents are currently considered suitable for chemical warfare (Meyer 2001:163–200). Such agents must be toxic and easy to handle, able to withstand prolonged storage without deterioration, resistant to atmospheric water and oxygen to maintain effectiveness during dispersal, and able to withstand the high levels of heat that accompany dispersal. There are six major groups of chemical warfare agents: disabling, herbicide, blood, choking, blistering, and nerve agents (Meyer 2001:163– 200). Disabling agents (e.g., tear gases such as CS, CN, and arsenicals) are incapacitating or vomiting substances used essentially in riot control. Herbicide agents (e.g., agent orange) are used to defoliate to allow for better visibility. Blood agents (e.g., hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride) block the transport of oxygen in the blood vessels, rapidly leading to death. Choking agents (e.g., chlorine and phosgene) damage the membrane of the lungs and cause suffocation, leading also to rapid death. Blistering agents (e.g., yperite [commonly known as “mustard gas”], phosgene oxime, and lewisite) produce water blisters on the skin and damage the eyes, blood cells, and respiratory tract within four hours after contact, and they can be lethal. Nerve or organ-phosphorus agents (e.g., sarin, tabun, soman, and VX) are highly toxic, spread quickly, and have rapid effects on skin contact or inhalation, affecting the nervous system and leading to rapid death. Chemical weapon delivery requires the dissemination of agents in liquid droplets or aerosol through spontaneous evaporation, aerosol devices (aircraft spray tanks), regular explosive, or “binary munitions” delivered by missiles—binary technology enables the combination of two chemicals of lesser toxicity to create a more lethal agent after the munition is fired (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1993b:34). A chemical cloud is susceptible to environmental conditions, making the use of these weapons difficult. Wind velocity guides the direction of the chemical cloud and its speed dispersal, and rain and low temperatures may reduce agent effectiveness whereas warm temperatures and high humidity can increase the toxic concentration of the chemical cloud (Meyer 2001:201–6). Defenses against Chemical Weapons Defenses against chemical weapons are relatively efficient to protect prepared military personnel (Meyer 2001:207–62). Given that chemical agents are visible and their effects immediate, a chemical attack can be noticed quickly and defensive measures can be deployed in time. These defenses, however, are costly and difficult to deploy to protect civilians.

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Alert and control detection devices are, after intelligence, the first line of defense (Meyer 2001:216–21). They are relatively efficient, but because of their costs, they are not widespread outside the military. The next line of defense is the protection from a chemical attack, which is possible only with the use of masks or body equipments. Similarly, while these efficient devices are now common in the military, they are not widespread among civilians (Meyer 2001:221–26). The last line of defense consists in decontamination and medical treatment for the victims. Decontamination of the area exposed to a chemical attack is feasible, but long and costly. As for medical treatment of victims, the results are poor unless they are administered immediately after the attack by the victim himself under the form of selfinjection, which, once again, is feasible for soldiers, who are likely to carry the necessary equipment with them, but not for civilians (Meyer 2001:226–35). Missile Delivery Systems These weapons have increasingly been folded into the WMD category. The debate about their proliferation, however, has been essentially centered on ballistic missiles due to the central role played by these weapons (notably long-range missiles) during the cold war (Painter 1999:40–44). Although the threat of long-range ballistic missiles is currently decreasing, an increasing number of states are able to launch short-range ballistic missiles (approximately 25 countries in addition to the five Nuclear Weapons States) and medium-range ballistic missiles (China, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, & Saudi Arabia) (Cirincione et al. 2005:83–118). Moreover, although their proliferation has largely been ignored, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are also proliferating rapidly (Cirincione et al. 2005:83–118; Carus 1992). As guided f lying objects powered by a rocket, missile delivery systems are of two main types: ballistic and cruise missiles (Karp 1996). A ballistic missile is a guided rocket that is powered during the initial part of its f light, and then coasts without power (mostly above the atmosphere) along a ballistic long, medium, or short range path to its target. A cruise missile is an aerodynamic system with jet or rocket propulsion that is powered all the way to its target. Another type of “missiles,” though not entirely regarded as such, is UAV, that is, remotely piloted or self-controlled aircraft that can carry cameras, sensors, communications equipment, and other payload such as weapons.


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Effects of Missile Delivery Systems Deliverable from land silos, planes, ships, or submarines, missile delivery systems have considerable killing and destructive effects. Regardless of the nature of the warhead(s) they carry, missiles can hit, from anywhere on the globe, any military or civilian target within the reach of their range in a relatively short time, thereby enabling its possessor to change the scale of conf lict. There are some differences in the effects generated by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAV. The effects of ballistic missiles are formidable because of their high speed and, therefore, their ability to deliver a surprise military blow, as witnessed, for instance, during the 1988 war of the cities between Iran and Iraq (McNaugher 1990; Fetter 1991). But ballistic missiles remain relatively inaccurate, their range tends to be limited (unless advanced and costly technology and expertise are available), and their payload is generally limited. Most missile experts, however, indicate that their accuracy is increasing, notably thanks to the widespread commercial availability of Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers. Moreover, propulsion systems are improving with the fielding of multistage systems, which increase range. A rapid shift from liquid to solid fuels also makes missiles easier to launch (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1993b:213–17). The effects of cruise missiles are also considerable (Feickert 2005). Their main advantages are their accuracy (compared to ballistic missiles), payload, f light path (well-suited to deliver chemical and biological agents), and low building costs. There are still technological thresholds limiting accuracy and speed over long distances, but they are likely to be overcome with the development of new technologies such as GPS receivers. Moreover, UAVs have been increasingly used as weapons. Their first official use was in November 2002, when a U.S. UAV Predator equipped with an AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-surface antitank missile killed, by remote control, al Qaeda operative Qaed Senyan al-Harthi (known as “Abu Ali”) and five other suspected associates as they were driving a jeep in Yemen (Hoyle & Koch 2002). Defenses against Missile Delivery Systems Defenses against missiles to protect armies in operation or the population of a country are not currently operational. Experts disagree on the feasibility of such systems. Only the United States is striving to deploy a large system of missile defenses (Boese 2004). Israel and Russia have small-scaled missile

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defense systems, respectively called “Arrow” and “Galosh.” The United States is developing a “hit-to-kill” system of missile defenses in three basic versions (short, medium, and long range), every step up representing a substantial increase in complexity and a lower probability of success. As of the end of 2009, the system was still far from being operational, although it enjoyed a few successful intercepts in some developmental tests (Missile Defense Agency). Differences & Similarities Each of the four families of WMD (if we include missile delivery systems as such) are formidable weapons. They all, however, have unique characteristics and produce different effects. Some cause the destruction of people and facilities, while others “simply” kill people, make them ill, or neutralize them. Moreover, the feasibility of defenses against these weapons varies considerably. And so it is not clear what makes them “weapons of mass destruction” (Evans 2004). There is no denying that nuclear weapons truly meet the definition of “weapons of mass destruction” because, irrespective of the conditions of their use, they have huge indiscriminate destructive and killing potential, against which there are no existing defenses. Biological and chemical weapons and missile delivery systems, however, do not necessarily generate effects of “mass destruction.” Biological weapons can kill people indiscriminately on a scale that could be comparable to that of nuclear weapons (Perry 2001; Carter 2004). Their effectiveness, however, is subject to certain conditions, and they do not destroy anything but human, animal, or plant lives. Similarly, there is little question that the lethality of chemical weapons, as measured by per unit weight of delivered munition, is much lower by many orders of magnitude than it is for nuclear weapons and, potentially, biological weapons. Similarly to their biological counterparts, chemical weapons are subject to certain conditions of use and do not cause material destruction: they “only” affect human, animal, or plant lives. As biological and chemical weapons expert Jonathan Tucker puts it, it is more accurate to refer to these weapons as “mass casualty weapons (because they) do not destroy buildings, cities or transportation . . . they unfortunately just destroy human lives” (1999:1). Moreover, although they are hard to deploy, costly, and uncertain, defenses exist against these two families of weapons.


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Missiles have a specific status because they are first and foremost delivery vehicles. Supposing that they only carry conventional explosives, missiles can have killing effects and cause huge damage, but these are far less dramatic than those of nuclear weapons. While biological and chemical weapons and missile delivery systems have the potential to cause mass destruction, they can also simply cause limited destruction. These remarks suggest that the WMD concept fails to justify why it only includes NBC weapons and missile delivery systems. With such a definitional focus on effects, the concept could technically be extended to all types of military equipments. Couldn’t simple machetes be considered WMD? After all, these weapons reportedly killed more than 800,000 people in approximately 100 days in Rwanda in 1994 (Prunier 1995:261–65). As former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan indicated in his Millennium Report, The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems—and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed could well be described as “weapons of mass destruction.” (2000:52) Currently in vogue, this argument totally dismantles the WMD concept, which suggests that only nuclear weapons should have a special status because, as the famous psychiatrist Robert Lifton puts it eloquently, they have “the power to make everything into nothing,” regardless of the circumstances of their use (1967:238). Despite the undeniable unique status of nuclear weapons, it would be a mistake to place biological and chemical weapons, and missile delivery systems at the same level as landmines, small and light weapons, or machetes. NBC weapons and missile delivery systems are fundamentally different from these weapons not because of their effects, which is too relative a notion, but because of their “leveraging power.” Coined by the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense in the early 1990s, that notion refers to military equipments that have the potential to operate decisively on the course of conf lict (Sokolski & Ludes 2001:35). In the case of nuclear weapons and, to some extent, missile delivery systems, even small arsenals will weigh heavily on the choices of leaders of both small and powerful states. Although it is not so obvious with biological and chemical weapons, they can, however, operate as strategic weapons in conf lict against similarly equipped and

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similarly sized competitors—should they be properly weaponized to achieve mass destructive effects. Moreover, even when these weapons are likely to generate only tactical results, they complicate military operations considerably because of their strong disruptive effects (Meyer 2001:12), which is why they are deemed suitable for terrorist operations. And so biological and chemical weapons are logically often called “weapons of mass disruption” or “weapons of terror” (HomerDixon 2002:54). Focusing on the notion of leveraging power enables to realize that NBC weapons and missile delivery systems do belong to a specific category of weapons. Moreover, it helps to realize that other weapons have now come to match or even exceed the effects of some WMD, notably those of chemical weapons. As international relations professors William Keller and Janne Nolan put it, Mass destruction is an ancient phenomenon, and need not employ nuclear, chemical or biological ordnance . . . [a]s the Gulf War demonstrated, the destructive power of a coordinated conventional attack can achieve levels of devastation associated with weapons of mass destruction, even on the battlefield. (1997–98:119) Other weapons and warfare systems of high leveraging power (Sokolski 1994; Hoyt 2001) include advanced space systems such as space-launched vehicles (which can easily be modified to become surface-to-surface missiles), antisatellite systems, and space-based devices transmitting information to the command and control systems of military forces. Also in this category are advanced air combat systems such as fighterattack aircrafts, air defense systems, highly sophisticated antiaircraft systems, and modern command, control, and communications systems able to guide air-to-air missiles. Similarly, advanced naval combat systems such as submarines with propulsion and difficult-to-detect minisubmarines, which can be equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles or torpedoes, are also weapons systems of high-leveraging capabilities. Finally, attention needs to be paid to advanced land combat systems such as improved firepower equipments, artillery-delivered high-precision munitions, improved maneuver and survivability equipments, and advanced armored combat systems with passive and active protection systems. The multiplication of underground military facilities is also a point of concern because of their ability to hide the production or storage of weapons and protect them from air bombardment. For instance, North Korea built a vast underground facility at Kumchang-ri, which


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U.S. intelligence once suspected to be designed to house a secret plutonium production reactor and reprocessing facility (North Korea’s Weapons Programmes 2004:14). Since 9/11, concerns have begun to be raised over any weapon or device that can cause “enhanced destruction.” That notion refers to the potential leveraging power that some weapons or nonweapons means can produce. Key examples include the crash of a kamikaze plane on a major city or on a nuclear or chemical plant (causing catastrophes on the scale of the accidents of Chernobyl in 1986 and Bhopal in 2000 for instance) or the cyber attack of the 24 U.S. government computer networks that the General Accounting Office found to be inadequately protected not so long ago (Cirincione et al. 2002:16). The notion of “enhanced destruction” is perhaps best understood when associated with the definition once used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that “a weapon crosses the WMD threshold when the consequences of its release overwhelm local responders” (BBC News 2003). With these considerations in mind, the WMD concept should be abandoned because, in the words of international relations professors Lewis Dunn, Peter Lavoy, and Scott Sagan, it “obscures reality more than it helps us see clearly” (2000:240). Perhaps it is bound to stay in popular language, however, because it fits perfectly into newspaper columns and, as international relations professor Andrew Butfoy points out, “they are three letters (WMD) that succinctly encapsulate our worst fears” (Butfoy 2005:55). Its replacement by any new concept would also run the risk of being washed away by the tide of common usage. After all, the American Dialect Society voted “WMD” the word of the year in 2002 because of its prolific use (American Dialect Society 2002). Moreover, the WMD concept is politically convenient to rationalize war. In the lead-up to the U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq in late 2002—early 2003, some U.S. officials made statements that Iraq was threatening international peace and security because of its illegal possession of “WMD,” glossing over the differences between the highleveraging capabilities of nuclear weapons, which it was almost entirely certain that Iraq did not have, and the much lower leveraging capabilities of chemical weapons, which Iraq may have possessed at the time (Perkovich 2004:5). For the sake of clear debate, the WMD concept should be discarded. Not only does its focus on effects fail to define properly the weapons it refers to, but it also casts aside many weapons of proliferation concern.

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Instead, the concept of “high-leverage weapons” appears more accurate and more inclusive. Does it mean, however, that no distinction should be made between NBC weapons and other high-leverage weapons? Despite their differences, NBC weapons all possess two common and unique features. For a start, NBC weapons have high-leveraging capabilities by nature. Unlike other high-leverage weapons, NBC weapons are not necessarily the products of the culmination of resources and competencies that characterize industrialized societies. As nonproliferation expert Brad Roberts points out, “today, any state possessing even a few badly made or stolen nuclear weapons or a batch of biological weapons has the capacity to inf lict devastation well beyond the great armies of history” (1996:246). These weapons can therefore provide high leveraging capabilities even to the least advanced societies. NBC weapons also generate a strong fear factor. While a high explosive can kill just as readily as NBC weapons, the fear of the unknown with respect to radiation, radioactivity, infection, and toxicity causes a greater response from people. Bioterrorism expert Jessica Stern points out that “psychologists and risk analysts . . . have found that fear is disproportionately evoked by certain characteristics such as involuntary exposure, unfamiliarity, invisibility, or by instances when victims may not realize they were exposed or the effects are delayed, when the mechanism of harm is poorly understood or when long-term effects or the number of people likely to be affected is difficult to predict” (2003a:160). In other words, an important psychological component is intimately linked to these weapons. NBC weapons are therefore different from other weapons: they are unconventional weapons. High-leverage weapons include both unconventional and advanced conventional weapons. Although this book looks at both categories of weapons, it focuses predominantly on unconventional weapons because of their specific features. This all goes to show that the anatomy of weapons proliferation is no longer monotypic. It is now polytypic due to the emergence of a growing number of high-leverage weapons beyond the sole nuclear weapons. Beyond Weapons Proliferation: Technology Diffusion In addition to changes in type, the anatomy of weapons proliferation has also fundamentally changed in form as a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the expansion of globalization.


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The Break-Up of the Soviet Union In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international community was confronted with the risks that the 8,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine might not return to Russia (Walker 1992:255–77). Once these risks were overcome, other equally if not more concerning dangers to peace and security surfaced: the challenges posed by the oversupply of formerly Soviet NBC weapons, as well as missile delivery systems (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1994; Cirincione et al. 2005:121–62, 365–81). In the nuclear domain, Russia inherited no fewer than 27,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads from the Soviet Union (Woolf 2002a:1). It also inherited a massive nuclear complex consisting of 10 formerly secret “nuclear cities” housing hundreds of metric tons of weapons-grade and weapons-usable nuclear materials (the world’s largest stocks), and hundreds of thousands of trained scientists, engineers, and technicians with weapons-related knowledge. While they repatriated their inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, the newly created republics of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus kept in their possession technologies and materials that could contribute to the production of nuclear weapons. The same accounts apply in the biological and chemical domains. Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan inherited the bulk of the Soviet Union’s offensive biological weapons program, the world’s largest, which included a dense network of more than 50 centers that produced significant quantities of biological agents such as plague, anthrax, smallpox, tularemia, brucellosis, the Marburg virus, and others (Cirincione et al. 2005:139–42). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan became the host of significant quantities of biological weapons samples (stored in “libraries” in large specific facilities) that could easily be used to grow and produce offensive biological agents. As biological weapons expert Amy Smithson told the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2003, The USSR redefined the horizons of germ warfare with a massive bioweapons effort that involved approximately 65,000 scientists and technicians at over fifty research, development, testing and production sites. The Soviets harnessed over fifty diseases for military purposes. Not only did the USSR harden some anti-human agents against medical treatment, it weaponized contagious

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diseases such as plague, smallpox and Marburg, a hemorrhagic fever. The Soviets also put some 10,000 scientists to work on anticrop and anti-livestock bio-weapons. (Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2003:68) Russia also inherited the Soviet Union’s chemical weapons arsenal. The largest in the world, these stocks include an estimated 39,280 metric tons (81 percent of which consist of the highly toxic nerve agents) stored both in munition containers of all sorts and in bulk storage containers (Cirincione et al. 2005:139). Finally, Russia inherited numerous missile delivery systems- and advanced conventional weapons-related technologies. It ended up with numerous land- and submarine-based strategic ballistic missiles with intercontinental range and an advanced missile design and production infrastructure (Cirincione et al. 2005:142–44). Kazakhstan and Ukraine also inherited technologies and facilities that could contribute to the production of strategic missile delivery systems. One of the main proliferation challenges resulting from the overabundance of NBC weapons, materials, and expertise in the former Soviet Union is that these technologies and know-how be bought by states or even nonstate actors. Although Russia has recently taken significant steps to improve its export control mechanisms, there have been strong doubts about its compliance with the nonproliferation rules it has adhered to (Wolfsthal, Chuen, & Daughtry 2001:175–90). As a result of widespread availability of NBC weapons-related technology, economic hardship, and strategic interests, Russia is suspected of having supplied sensitive nuclear weapons-related technologies to countries such as North Korea, Iran, and maybe others. As nonproliferation expert Dimitri Trenin puts it about Russian transfers to Iran, Despite the relatively insignificant amount of proceeds from Russia’s nuclear deal with Iran (about $800 million annually), in the often chaotic conditions of Yeltsin’s Russia, the various vested interests were able to profit handsomely, which pushed the rules governing domestic export controls to be bent. (2004:68) More recently, Russia may have made missile-related deals with Iraq before the U.S.-led 2003 invasion, in violation of U.N. sanctions (Duelfer 2004:116–19). In addition, there is the risk that Russian scientists with NBC weapons-related knowledge might decide to sell their expertise to


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would-be proliferators. After all, approximately 35,000 nuclear weapons scientists and technicians, many of whom with direct access to weapons-usable materials, are still believed to be in excess in Russia (Tikhonov 2001:7). The second proliferation danger is that NBC weapons-related technologies and materials be stolen or diverted to assist state or nonstate proliferators. Beyond the mere (although important) problem of a lack of financial resources, Russia has found itself faced with serious institutional dilemmas to maintain adequate security protections of its inherited arsenal. As pointed out by nonproliferation expert Rose Gottemoeller (now Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance in the Obama administration), [T]hroughout the Cold War, the Kremlin operated a highly effective security network around its nuclear arsenal and associated materials . . . with the collapse of the Soviet Union, that system, designed for a unitary state with a closed society and closed borders, faced realities that it was ill-equipped to manage. (2003:127) Put differently, the risk of smuggling NBC weapons-related technologies and materials is very real. In the nuclear domain, the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB), established in 1995 but covering incidents from January 1993, had logged, as of the end of 2006, 1,080 state-confirmed nuclear trafficking incidents reported by 96 countries participating in the program (IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database 2006 Factsheet 2006). As the ITDB is dependent on the provision of information by participating states, researchers from the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University sought to bridge the gap between open-source and government-confirmed information by establishing the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO) (Zaitseva & Steinhausler 2006:168–81). Covering the period since 1991 (when the first cases of nuclear smuggling from the former Soviet Union were reported in the media), the DSTO had recorded a total of 1,440 incidents as of the end of December 2005 (Nuclear Black Markets 2007:121). While more than 90 percent of these cases did not pose a significant threat to peace and security because they did not involve weapons-usable nuclear materials or hazardous radiation sources, they did involve nuclear materials, suggesting that it is possible for individuals to acquire them (Nuclear Black Markets 2007:121). This has led to increased concerns about the danger of radiological dispersion device or so-called dirty bombs, that is, weapons that use

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conventional explosives such as dynamite or C-4 to disperse nuclear materials (King 2004; Porterfield 2005). In November 1995, Chechen separatists placed a radioactive dispersal device containing caesium-137 mixed with explosives in Moscow’s Ismailovsky Park, but chose not to detonate it and, instead, inform Russian authorities of its location (Hibbs 1995). Means of radiological warfare can also rely on attacking the sources of radioactive materials (such as nuclear plants/reactors or spent-fuel storage depots) or on spreading radioactive contamination via a food chain or water table, as was the case in the murder of former Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko (USA Today 2006). Moreover, there are also significant concerns that biological and chemical weapons or samples be stolen. In fact, the danger of diversion of biological and chemical weapons-related technologies or agents is considerably high because these agents can be easily carried around: biological samples are kept in tubes and some chemical weapons could fit in suitcases. Today, for instance, there exists no adequate security and tracking system of biological agents (Cirincione et al. 2005:142). In sum, as U.S. Senator Sam Nunn points out, “the old threats we faced during the Cold War . . . were threats made dangerous by Soviet strength [whereas] the new threats we face today . . . are threats made dangerous by Russia’s weakness” (2001). The Expansion of Globalization Beyond the break-up of the Soviet Union, another major event has contributed to transform the face of weapons proliferation: globalization. While scholars have debated over how it should be defined, globalization generally refers to the growing integration of international political and economic relations that has greatly intensified in recent times. To understand its impact on weapons proliferation, it is useful to distinguish between, on the one hand, the dynamics of NBC technologies and, on the other, that of advanced conventional weapons- and missiles-related technologies because there is a clear international consensus that the former technologies need to be controlled, a consensus that does not exist for the latter. The Diffusion of NBC Technologies NBC technologies are inherently dual, meaning that they can have both civilian and military applications. Although nuclear technology can be used to improve medical treatments or generate power, it can


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also lead to the development of extremely dangerous weapons (U.S. Department of State 1946:712). Similarly, biological and chemical technologies can help to produce better medicines, more cost-effective agriculture, and improve the quality of the environment, but they can also be applied to the development of offensive weapons (Hearing before the Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, U.S. Senate 2004:22). Consequently, it has been unjustifiable to prevent the diffusion of these technologies. That is why the treaties governing them (the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT], the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention [BTWC], and the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC]) prohibit the development of weapons from such technologies, but have provisions guaranteeing every state the right to reap the benefits of their useful commercial applications: Article IV of the NPT, Article X of the BTWC, and Article IX of the CWC. Short of the proliferation of NBC weapons, it is the diffusion of the NBC technologies that has considerably increased throughout the globe, notably since the end of the cold war and the subsequent growing integration of the international economy. Nuclear technology is now widespread throughout the world. This is true of nuclear equipment and industries (power plants, research reactors, centrifuges, fuel-cycle research, and development facilities) and the expertise necessary to apply such technology, gained by many people who have received training in nuclear physics and engineering in leading American universities since the 1950s (Moodie 1995:74). As of 2007, there were no fewer than 439 operating nuclear reactors around the world with 29 more under construction, 15 of which in Asia (IAEA 2007). The SIPRI Yearbook 1972 was therefore correct in its predictions that The benefits to be gained from the use of nuclear energy are, in fact, such that its widespread use is inevitable . . . so far nuclear technology has been mainly concentrated in the industralised countries, but it will soon spread to the underdeveloped regions (1972:xxi–xxii). The progressive declining costs associated with producing nuclear power and the concurrent unpredictable oil prices have further enhanced the diffusion of nuclear technology throughout the developing world. Such diffusion will give many states the capability to develop nuclear weapons if they so decide.

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Many states have also increasingly had access to biological and chemical technologies (Moodie 1995:77–79). The raw materials (chemical precursors, biological agents), the equipment (agent production reactors, fermentation reactors, heavy water, f lash X-ray cameras), the infrastructures (petrochemical, agrochemical, fertilizer, pesticide, and pharmaceutical industries), and the expertise have all become more widely available all around the world at increasingly cheaper costs. The considerable advances in bioengineering have particularly increased the diffusion of biological technologies and, concurrently, raised the risk that their possessors decide to use them for the development of weapons (Wheelis 2004:6–13). That being said, biological and chemical weapons expert Michael Moodie stresses that “[t]he most likely short-term impact is not the creation of new ‘super weapons,’ but rather the easing of the technical problems that historically have made the development and use of biological weapons difficult and risky” (1998:8). Long gone is the time when the possession of NBC technologies was confined to a small number of states, which made the dual-use problem somewhat tolerable. Today, these technologies are widespread and the dual-use problem has therefore become virtually intractable. The Diffusion of Conventional Weapons- & Missiles-Related Technologies Advanced conventional weapons- and missiles-related technologies have also proliferated considerably since the end of the cold war (more than weapons themselves). This has mainly resulted from the emergence of two trends: the advent of new patterns in high-leverage weapons-related technology trade and the gradual move from so-called spin-offs to spin-ons. New Patterns in High-Leverage Weapons-Related Technology Trade In the early years of the cold war, trade in conventional military and missile technology was basically dominated by the West (especially by the United States) and the Soviet Union. The two superpowers provided their respective allies and friends with relatively outdated equipment. As the SIPRI Yearbook 1978 indicates, The arms exported to underdeveloped nations were in general surplus or obsolete types or second-hand—that is, the type was sold after having been replaced in some branch of the military in the industralised country . . . moreover, these arms were single weapons, which required little more in the way of spares, support equipment and service than did a civilian product (1978:238).


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From the late 1960s, more sophisticated technology began to be transferred and cooperative production ventures developed. The SIPRI Yearbook 1978 continues, The sophisticated arms . . . being developed, produced and traded are not single weapons but rather weapon systems, often requiring large additional investments for the buyer in training and education both of operators and technical staff, outside aid in the form of technical and military advisors, a special infrastructure and perhaps even a reorganisation in the structure of the armed forces. (1978:238) By the early 1980s, the quality of exported high-leverage weaponsand missiles-related technology and equipment had improved. The SIPRI Yearbook 1987 stresses that “there is an increasing f low of enhanced components and upgrading- and modernisation kits on the market” (1987:181). This gradual evolution in high-leverage weapons technology diffusion formed the backdrop against which the events unfolded after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The winding down of the cold war transformed the global military market considerably. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, highleverage weapons-related technology transfers decreased substantially, leaving the defense sector of the main (Western) producers with an overcapacity in weapons production (and an overabundance of employees). As defense budgets went down precipitously, industries were forced to consolidate themselves (and lay off hundreds of thousands of people). In the United States, some twenty large weapons producers merged almost overnight into four conglomerates: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon (Gholz & Sapolsky 1999– 2000). Although it did not take place before the late 1990s, the largest European industries also merged to give birth to the gigantic conglomerates of BAE Systems, EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company), and Thomson-CSF (Schmitt 2000). All these industries wished to remain competitive and continue to sell their goods despite improving international relations. And so they sought to find demand wherever it was, notably abroad. As the SIPRI Yearbook 1993 puts it, Governments which can no longer justify the level of military expenditure sustained during the Cold War nevertheless wish to retain industrial capacities to the degree possible. Companies which had no need to seek foreign sales in order to be profitable

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in the 1980s are doing so in the early 1990s as the level of national arms procurement expenditure falls in real terms. (1993:415) As these industries were so desperate to find clients to sustain themselves, buyers from East Asia, the Middle East, or elsewhere became increasingly able to play one company against another. They could easily inf luence the type and condition of the sale and drive its price down. In the words of international relations professors William Keller and Janne Nolan, who stress the emergence of a buyers’ market in the defense sector, “increasingly, almost everyone sells almost anything to just about anyone who can pay—and often to some who cannot” (Keller & Nolan 1997–98:113). In other words, not only did the end of the cold war lead to the growing globalization of high-leverage weapons- and missiles-related technology transfers, but it also contributed to increase the quality of what was being transferred. The transfer of finished systems and platforms has gradually given way to the diffusion of high-leverage weapons-related technological production processes and components and military know-how. From Spin-Offs to Spin-Ons The other trend contributing to the diffusion of advanced conventional weapons- and missiles-related technologies is associated with the growing convergence between civilian and military technologies. Similarly to NBC technologies, advanced conventional weaponsand missiles-related technologies have dual-use characteristics. These technologies initially emerged in the civilian sphere. Taking stock of the revolution in war brought about by technology, scientist Waldemar Kaempffert stressed, in the early 1940s, that “the course of military technology follows closely the course of industry technology” (1941:431). The emergence of steam, steel ships, railways, telegraphs, and aircrafts during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was all initially used for commercial purposes before being used to improve the way war was waged. The fierce competition that opposed the U.S. and Soviet superpowers from the 1950s, however, led to the creation, in both countries and a few others, of vast military research establishments on the cutting edge of technology. International relations expert Steven Irwin explains, for instance, that between 75 and 80 percent of U.S. computing research and development was defense-related in the 1950s (1993:125). During the cold war, it was military technological innovations that acted as an


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engine of economic growth and spilled over into the civilian sphere. The missile delivery systems and military surveillance satellites massively developed by the two superpowers created a platform for progress in the peaceful uses of space. The same also held true in the domain of advanced conventional weapons. Modern jet engines, computers, and transistors were all initially military-related technologies. The Internet, for instance, originated in the U.S. Department of Defense’s ARPANET project, a system developed by the Advanced Research Projects Agency to enable message transmission in the event of nuclear war (Abbate 1999:36–41). This process whereby military innovations were driving societal change was referred to by U.S. analysts as “spin-offs” (Keller 1995:42). Its main implication was that, contrary to NBC technologies, governments had a considerable amount of control (via their military establishments) over the diffusion of advanced conventional weapons- and missiles-related technologies. The relationship between technology in the civilian and military spheres, however, reversed again with the transition to a more digital economy in the late 1980s. Since then, it has been the commercial sphere that has produced an increasing amount of high-technology to be incorporated into the making of sophisticated weapons and other military equipment. The phrase “spin-offs” has gradually been replaced by that of “civil-military integration” or “spin-ons” (Keller 1995:43). Software, navigation systems such as GPS receivers or satellites developed in the civilian sphere have gradually been applied to military systems (such as aircrafts or missiles). As Soviet General Nikolai Ogarkov had already predicted in the late 1970s (Carus 1994:164), the mastery of C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and information) and RSTA (reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and acquisition) systems, which have played a crucial role from the Persian Gulf War of 1990–91, must now be seen as the core technologies on which superiority on the battlefield really depends. This phenomenon has been called a “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) (Toff ler & Toff ler 1993; Mazarr 1993). The move from spin-offs to spin-ons has ref lected a growing recognition that, with the end of the cold war, traditional military suppliers (particularly the United States) “no longer possess sufficient financial resources and political will to push military technology uphill by brute force” (Keller 1995:43). This shift has been linked to the enormous rise in high technology foreign direct investment among the advanced industrialized countries and to the growing economic performance of

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newly industrialized (most Asian) countries that have increasingly been able to develop and exploit these technologies (Keller 2003:187). The direct implication is the growing diffusion of military-relevant technologies throughout the globe. The indirect, and perhaps more concerning implication is the progressive loss of government control over the diffusion of these technologies, given the growing role played by the private sector in this process. Technology transactions no longer operate exclusively from government to government, but also from company to company, a trend that was first foreshadowed in the early 1990s (Anthony 1992:37). The expansion of globalization has led to the development of networks of high-leverage weapons-related technology suppliers operating through international private-sector channels. Commonly referred to as “secondary proliferation,” this phenomenon has been exemplified by the discovery of the so-called A. Q. Khan network (Corera 2006; Nuclear Black Markets 2007). The interception of the German ship BBC China in October 2003 and the subsequent discovery of several dozens of centrifuge components on their way to Libya enabled to expose the existence of a clandestine network of nuclear weapons suppliers with tentacles in more than 20 countries that involved at least 30 companies and middlemen. Run by Pakistani nuclear scientist Adbul Qadeer Khan, several government and intelligence agencies established that this network had operated for over a decade and had supplied militaryrelevant materials and technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya, perhaps without the knowledge of the Government of Pakistan itself (Nuclear Black Markets 2007:86–87). Gradually, these recipient states became suppliers and cooperated among themselves to develop highleverage weapons programs. As nonproliferation experts Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba point out, We now find that “proliferation ring members” [as they call them] support one another either directly at the state-to-state level or indirectly through once-removed private sector supplier networks. In addition, “rings” of clandestine exchanges of technologies have begun to interact and support one another. (2004:7) Networks of this type have existed for decades. Iraq is a good example (Nuclear Black Markets 2007:43–50). Although it never managed to develop nuclear weapons as such, the regime of Saddam Hussein almost succeeded in doing so thanks to an extensive covert private sector-based procurement network that it set up from the late 1970s. Initially, Saddam


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Hussein sought to develop its nuclear weapons program through the plutonium route. He imported large-scale technological equipment from other countries. After Israel’s raid on its reactor at Osirak in 1981 (Lellouche 1981; Feldman 1982b), however, he decided to abandon the plutonium option and, instead, focused on the development of a uranium enrichment capability because it is intrinsically less exposed to international scrutiny (facilities are less “visible”). And so Iraqi authorities began to establish elaborate covert procurement networks to import nuclear weapons technology. The program relied heavily on dual-use components (with false end-user statements purchased from European and American companies), which Iraqi authorities ultimately integrated into a more sophisticated system. Only after the Persian Gulf War (1991) was this well-developed network eventually uncovered and unraveled. Networks such as A. Q. Khan’s or Saddam Hussein’s can be duplicated fairly easily as a result of the growing expansion of globalization. Many experts stress that would-be proliferators remain active customers in the NBC weapons black market. With North Korea on his mind, nonproliferation expert Sheena Chestnut explains that criminal networks are likely to play an increasing role in future proliferation (2007). There has also been an increasing number of states with so-called virtual or ready-to-assemble arsenals. These states are referred to as such because they have acquired the technology and expertise required to develop nuclear, biological, chemical, or other advanced conventional weapons and missile delivery systems through “legal trade routes,” but they have not yet decided to develop weapons (Millot, Molender, Wilson 1993:10). Some experts often downplay the relevance of this concept because there insist that there is a difference between access to sensitive technology/expertise and willingness to use them to develop actual highleverage weapons. Nonproliferation expert Harald Müller, for instance, indicates that the concept of “virtual” arsenals “inserts imprecision and confusion into the proliferation debate [because it ignores] the political will, the political culture, the societal support and the intellectual, technical, and physical infrastructure for making weapons” (Müller 1997:66). Put differently, it is one thing to possess the necessary weapons capabilities, but quite another to choose to turn them into offensive high-leverage weapons: “intent” cannot be inferred from “capability.” There is a difference between availability of technology/expertise and weaponization. However, it is becoming less and less of a stretch. The lead time between capability and operational weapons has been considerably reduced over the years. A growing number of states have

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exploited this situation by maintaining a hedging strategy (Levite 2002–3:69). Meant to act as a life insurance, a hedging strategy consists in gathering the technological building blocks necessary for rapid weaponization. This was part and parcel, for instance, of the Indian nuclear diplomacy between 1974 and 1998. After an initial “peaceful” nuclear test in 1974, successive Indian governments kept the option of developing nuclear weapons open by expanding their capability to assemble weapons while refraining from militarizing them as such until 1998, when they eventually decided to cross the nuclear weapons threshold. Today, the willingness of the Iranian leadership to develop extensive civilian nuclear facilities, officially for peaceful purposes, is modeled on the same pattern because, in time, it will allow the Persian State to develop nuclear weapons if it so decides. These developments suggest that weapons proliferation has increasingly become “opaque” in character (Frankel 1991). Moreover, they suggest that weapons proliferation is best understood as a process. As cancer tumors need to be staged (and graded) to determine the appropriate treatment, the nonproliferation community has increasingly had to deal with the difficult task of assessing the actual proliferation stage to work out the best possible way to address a given situation. This is what Thomas Schelling meant when he predicted, in 1976, that it “will [soon] make more sense to describe a country’s nuclear weapons status not with a yes or no but with a time schedule” (1976:79). Such advancement toward a weapons proliferation “twilight zone” (Potter 2003:164), that is, moving toward “cancerization,” is concerning because, as the British politician Philip Noel Baker already pointed out in the 1920s, If one power has a great industrial system which its Government can immediately take over, which, perhaps, it can secretly prepare for a long time in advance, that will give it at least a considerable, perhaps a decisive, military superiority over another power which has to depend for its supplies of arms, ammunitions, uniforms and so on, on the industries of other countries, perhaps geographically remote. (1926:18–19) The problem is that it is neither possible nor justifiable to put a halt to this phenomenon. It is not possible because of the growing intractability of the dual-use problem. Most transactions conducted through the Iraqi and A. Q. Khan networks, for instance, followed the letter, if not the spirit of existing nonproliferation and export control laws.


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Some technologies can be controlled more easily than others. As biological and chemical weapons expert Michael Moodie stresses, “[t]he fact of the matter is that controlling materials and equipment is more possible in the nuclear area because they are more significant in size and signature . . . this is not the case with chemical or biological weapons” (Hearing before the Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, U.S. Senate 2004:23). The control of biological materials and equipment, in fact, is even more difficult because, contrary to the control of the production of chemical weapons, there are no precursors or specific equipment to be used exclusively for the production of biological agents for military purposes. In addition, while chemical weapons must be produced in massive quantities to be militarily significant, it is not the case for biological agents (Cirincione et al. 2005:12). Despite these differences, the control of any type of technology and expertise is difficult because of the dual-use application factor. It is not always clear on which type of applications a state is relying on—or will rely on in the future. Similarly, there can hardly be a valid justification for the denial of technology and expertise because of the legitimate and useful uses to which they can be put. Some nonproliferation experts, however, qualify the challenges brought about by the onward march of globalization by pointing to the important economic, financial, and technical difficulties that continue to handicap most states in their development of high-leverage weapons (Zimmerman 1993). It is true that few states can absorb the significant costs involved in moving programs of nuclear weapons, advanced conventional weapons, or missile delivery systems from the creation of a capability to the development and deployment of an arsenal, not to mention the creation of suitable command and control systems. In a recent landmark survey of the historical record of nuclear proliferation in 4 continents over 57 years, nonproliferation experts Alexis Blanc and Brad Roberts argue that key hurdles to the development of nuclear weapons remain. In particular, they contend that it is still difficult for states to produce weapons-grade material and design, engineer, and produce a functioning nuclear explosive device, not only because of financial and technical reasons, but also because of the nonproliferation regime (2008:1–4). Moreover, one of their central findings is that [T]here is very little experience of a state being able to significantly short-circuit the developmental pathway by gaining leapfrog technologies from others. Most of those states with high

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weapons potential or a potential for serial weapons production took a decade or two to get there. (2008:S-2) Similarly, while it is relatively easy to get hold of biological and chemical agents, the costs (and time) involved in the acquisition of effective delivery systems remain high. The ability of states to use high-leverage weapons successfully is also uncertain without the existence of proper military training, clear doctrine, and strong and supportive infrastructures, which are often lacking in the developing world, where today’s would-be proliferators are located. But this argument does not change the nature of the problem. Financial and technical hurdles remain, but the general drift is undeniably moving toward an easing of constraints. In their historical survey of nuclear proliferation, Alexis Blanc and Brad Roberts stress that there is currently a great deal of weapons potential latent in the world in the form of civil programs (and more to come), which is problematic because such programs “provide a training ground and a means of gaining experience” to build a nuclear weapons program (2008:2). Clearly, the weapons proliferation “ladder” is no longer as high and as hard to climb for would-be proliferators (Dunn & Overholt 1976:498– 500; Frankel 1991:17–18). Perhaps nonproliferation expert Derek Smith found the most colorful way of putting it, stressing that “the reality is that we live in a post-proliferation world, and so in a sense the horse is out of the barn” (2006:99). This is all the more worrying because it means that high-leverage technologies can spread much more easily to additional states, but also that they could, one day, fall into the hands of terrorists. This all goes to suggest that the anatomy of weapons proliferation is no longer monomorphous. It is now polymorphous as a result of the concomitant break-up of the Soviet Union and the expansion of globalization. These two events have led to a situation in which weapons themselves are no longer the sole objects of proliferation concern. Today, weapons-related technologies, materials, components, equipment, and expertise are also in focus. This suggests that Albert Wohlstetter’s element “1” of the N+1 problem is no longer adequate to identify what the phenomenon has become. The growing polymorphic anatomy of weapons proliferation, on which would-be proliferators have heavily capitalized, is a challenging revolution for the nonproliferation community. It suggests that traditional policy instruments (e.g., export controls) are no longer sufficient to respond to current threats. Most importantly, the emergence of what some experts have called “latent


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proliferation” strikes at the heart of the life-long disarmament agenda (SIPRI 1983:78). As international relations professor William Keller puts it, “because there cannot be an end of technology, the paradox of proliferation is here to stay” (1995:178). The physiology of weapons proliferation is no longer linear: it has now become multidimensional. A Multifaceted Disease The nature of weapons proliferation has changed considerably since the time of Albert Wohlstetter. While its anatomy was initially deemed monotypic and monomorphous, weapons proliferation has since mutated to become polytypic and polymorphous. Today, it is polytypic because it encompasses many more weapons of high leveraging capabilities than just nuclear weapons. It is also polymorphous because technology and expertise have increasingly become focal points of concern. In other words, weapons proliferation can no longer be identified as clearly as in the past because it is now a multifaceted disease of physiological stealth. Albert Wohlstetter almost anticipated the problems linked to the polymorphic character of the phenomenon. As he put it in a 1979 book about nuclear weapons, Many countries, including many agreeing not to make bombs, will come very close to it without precisely violating their agreement. They will get the fissile material—or the means to produce the material—bringing them very close to the manufacture of bombs, from supplying countries which have promised not “in any way to assist” countries without weapons to obtain them. And, like the importers, these supplying countries also can say that they are not violating their promises. (1979:1)


CH A P T E R

T H R E E


We do not know the truth without the knowledge of cause. —Aristotle (McMahon 1887:48) With this statement, the famous Greek philosopher stresses the importance of investigating into the causes of things to understand them. Knowledge of the parts constituting weapons proliferation (its anatomy) is crucial. So is knowledge of the way in which it functions or operates (its physiology). Anatomical and physiological knowledge, however, is insufficient to fully grasp the phenomenon at hand. To do so, it is essential to come to grips with the very agents that induce it. Put differently, it is necessary to study its etiology and pathogenesis, that is, its causes in medical terms. Although we like to think that we live in an age when it has become second nature to assume that solutions to problems requires comprehension of their causes, the virtues of providing in-depth answers to the “why?” question remain too often neglected. This chapter assesses the validity of Albert Wohlstetter’s second assumption that high-leverage weapons will proliferate relentlessly throughout the world because its causes are deterministic. A Natural Drive for Power & Security A Focus on Capabilities The first set of explanations to the causes of weapons proliferation dates back to the origins of the phenomenon. The First World War inspired a meteorologist named Lewis Fry Richardson to apply his mathematical

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skills to a better understanding of the weapons build-up that many observers thought had heavily contributed to the outbreak of this terrible war (1919; 1938; 1960). To that effect, Richardson asked the question, “Why are so many nations reluctantly but steadily increasing their armaments as if they were mechanically compelled to do so?” (1960:12). His answer was threefold. First, each state feels the need to develop weapons when there exist grievances sufficiently serious to justify going to war. Second, the decision to develop weapons is tempered by the costs imposed by the diversion of economic resources to military production. Third, there are factors independent of expenditure that contribute to the development of weapons. Entrenched in the traditional (Bismarckian) understanding of international relations, these considerations did not receive immediate widespread recognition because Richardson developed his thesis during the 1920s and 1930s, and it was only published after the Second World War. The nuclear revolution of the late 1940s gave him a platform for success. As there was an urgent need to find a way of managing the nuclear phenomenon to avoid world destruction, many intellectuals, Bernard Brodie in the lead, embarked on studying weapons proliferation. Because there was no empirical data (other than technical data on the physics of fission, fusion, and ballistics), the subject logically invited theorizing in a Richardsonian way. A few simple deductive ideas, based on a small number of assumptions, seemed to offer a convincing framework of analysis that could easily side-step the lack of historical evidence (Betts 1997:14). And so Richardson’s work became widely acknowledged and further developed into a theory, which came to be known as “realism”—and was subsequently applied to all types of weapons of proliferation concern (Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1948; Bull 1977; Waltz 1979). What are the arguments put forward by realists? Interestingly enough, they make two opposing claims. Some realists argue that states develop weapons to maximize their power—and so tend to adopt offensive strategies designed to modify the status quo. Other realists, however, contend that states proliferate primarily to protect their security—and so adopt more defensive strategies intended to maintain the status quo. According to some realists, states inherently wish to wield power. As international relations professors Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson put it, “the statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers” (1985:165). To illustrate their claim, power-focused realists often refer to the lessons of Ancient Greek Historian Thucydides’s famous “Melian dialogue”


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when, during the Peloponnesian War, the superior Athenian army presented a fait accompli to the Melians, giving them the simple choice to submit peacefully or be exterminated (Warner 1972:400–408). This is the idea that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Warner 1972:402). Following on that logic is that states are spontaneously driven to develop highleverage weapons simply because it is in their own nature to be aggressive or wage war against others. Power-focused realists consider that states can have numerous motives to pursue the development of high-leverage weapons. They may seek to gain something of value out of war. For instance, Iraq’s attempt to seize military control of Kuwait in 1990 was mainly motivated by territorial and economic gains (Parasiliti 2003:160). Power-focused realists also claim that states may develop weapons to teach a lesson to an adversary or to bolster claims to status, as when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in the late 1970s to support a Marxist-Leninist regime. Moreover, these realists insist that states may proliferate to annihilate an enemy, as is arguably the case of some states with regard to Israel. Alternatively, power-focused realists argue that states may be driven to develop high-leverage weapons for coercive purposes to impose their will over others in diplomatic circles or extend their regional or extraregional hegemony. Arguably, before the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein’s goal may not have been to go to war, but use his highleverage weapons to exert inf luence in the Middle East, whether on the oil sector or on the Israeli-Palestinian conf lict (Telhami 1993:442–43). Today, the same may be true about Iran and its open secretive willingness to develop nuclear weapons. Power-focused realists also stress that states may wish to use their high-leverage weapons for blackmail or intimidation. North Korea, for instance, has constantly made use of its nuclear weapons program to extort foreign aid from the international community (North Korea’s Weapons Programmes 2004:5–26). Other realists, however, believe that weapons proliferation is a response to security imperatives. According to them, deterrence serves as a key driving force in the decisions of states to proliferate because it preserves their sovereignty. Weapons are developed to indicate to potential military competitors that any attack will entail a response that will impose unacceptable punishment on them. Although security-focused realists claim that states do not necessarily need to have a perceived threat, they contend that weapons proliferation results from the need “to balance the nuclear or conventional threats . . . adversaries pose . . . to increase [states’] security in an anarchic world” (Thayer 1995:150).

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Security-focused realists argue that the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons because it felt threatened by the nuclear arsenal of its U.S. enemy in the early cold war period. Similarly, they contend that Pakistan also developed nuclear weapons because it needed to balance those of India. Security-focused realists also view the alleged chemical arsenals of Israel, China, and Iran as meant to deter chemical attacks by regional adversaries. Deterrence is not systematically “in kind,” which is when one kind of weapons is developed to deter attacks from weapons of the same kind. Weapons of one kind can be developed to deter attack with weapons of another. For instance, security-focused realists would argue that the Egyptian biological and chemical weapons are intended to deter an Israeli nuclear attack. As Abdel Fathi Srour, an Egyptian minister, puts it in 1975, “Egypt has enough of [these weapons] and it has the capability of retaliating to an Israeli nuclear blow by making use of [them if necessary]” (Feldman 1982a:69). That branch of realism evolved in the late 1980s into so-called neorealism, developed, among others, by international relations professors Kenneth Waltz, Benjamin Frankel, and John Mearsheimer. According to them, the structure of the international system is key to explain major international events such as war and peace (Waltz 1979). They contend that the long period of peace (understood as the absence of war) between the two superpowers during the cold war resulted from the bipolar structure of the international system, whose order and powerbalancing was guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union. A multipolar international system, neorealists claim, is much more volatile and subject to the scourge of war. Following on that logic is that weapons proliferation is likely to speed up with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Mearsheimer 1990a; 1990b; Frankel 1993). The idea is that the end of the cold war and the transition to a multipolar international system will weaken or put an end to traditional superpower alliances and nuclear umbrellas, unleashing feelings of insecurity that will drive states to proliferate to secure their national interests according to the famous logic of the “security dilemma” (Herz 1950:157). As physics professor Alvin Saperstein puts it, “stability decreases as the system complexity increases” (1991:68). These feelings of insecurity are likely to be strengthened, neorealists claim, by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the subsequent increased risks of civil wars within its former territory, and the growing number of regional conf licts that have erupted since the end of the U.S.-Soviet stand-off in Eastern Europe and some parts of Asia and Africa. This is how Waltz and Frankel explain the fears of the early


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1990s that Germany and Japan might decide to develop nuclear weapons. According to them, the multipolar structure of the international system acts as a strong “proliferogenic factor,” to adapt the oncological phrase “carcinogenic factor” to the study of weapons proliferation (a carcinogenic factor is a condition or substance that increases the chances of developing cancer). Although realists make two different assumptions as to why states proliferate (for power or security imperatives), they all agree that the core cause is linked to international incentives. Most importantly, all realists contend that every state that can develop high-leverage weapons will do so ruthlessly. If some have not yet done so, realists claim that it is simply a matter of time before they do. The reason is, in the words of international relations expert Henry Kissinger, that “a nation’s survival is its first and ultimate responsibility” (1977:204). This suggests that realist theory, which informs the conventional wisdom, makes a grim prognosis about weapons proliferation. Similarly to the natural evolution of cancer, this theory considers that the phenomenon is inherently deterministic and that the world is bound to witness a chain reaction (or domino theory) whereby one state after another will develop deadly weapons. According to this perspective, the only symptoms that enable to diagnose weapons proliferation is evidence of the technological capabilities to do so. Put differently, realist theory explains weapons proliferation by focusing mainly on the supply-side of the phenomenon. In these conditions, the goal to stop weapons proliferation should logically focus on the control or denial of high-leverage weapons and their related technology and expertise. Unsurprisingly, this is the central goal of the nonproliferation regime, as illustrated by the numerous export control mechanisms in place, particularly in the nuclear, biological, and chemical domains. Poor Explanatory Power Realist theory carried much strength in the 1950s and 1960s because every state (with the notable exception of Canada) that had the capability and expertise to develop nuclear weapons had done so or had initiated programs moving in that direction. It seemed that “when technology beckons, men are helpless” (Lapp 1970:178). Over time, however, the prophecies, reiterated by neorealism in the 1980s and 1990s, that we are necessarily moving toward a more “proliferated world” have not come to pass. A quick look at the historical record reveals far more variations in high-leverage weapons development than the theory assumes. In an

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analysis on the causes of nuclear proliferation, nonproliferation professor William Potter concludes that “[t]he number of states that have demonstrated both the inclination and technical ability to develop [these] weapons is small and [their] rate of . . . diffusion is slow” (2003:164). One might add that while all Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) but China have reduced their arsenals considerably, some states have also been in remission: they have agreed to abandon their arsenals. The examples of the German and Ukrainian behaviors toward nuclear weapons suffice to show the limits of realism. In the early 1990s, international relations professor John Mearsheimer argued that the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar international system would jeopardize peace, notably on the European continent (Mearsheimer 1990a; 1993). In line with neorealist theory, he argued against the nonproliferation community, which was moving heaven and earth to convince Germany not to develop nuclear weapons and encourage Ukraine to abandon the ones it had inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mearsheimer insisted that these actions were useless because Germany was bound to go nuclear and Ukraine would never give up its Soviet nuclear weapons. He even went as far as to claim that the cause of peace would be best served if Germany did go nuclear and Ukraine did retain its weapons because this would offset the potential reemergence of Russian might. The problem is that Mearsheimer’s predictions did not pan out: Germany did not develop nuclear weapons and Ukraine ended up transferring its weapons over to Russia. The History of Nuclear Proliferation In a survey of the historical record of nuclear proliferation, nonproliferation experts Alexis Blanc and Brad Roberts focus on the capabilities, not the intentions of states to develop nuclear weapons. They define capabilities as a process of four main levels (nil weapons potential, modest weapons potential, high weapons potential, and potential for serial production). These levels are reached depending on a state’s access to fissile material (whether it has only research reactors, a substantial nuclear power industry, enrichment and/or reprocessing technologies, or closed fuel cycle capabilities), its advancement in weapons design and engineering (whether it has none, latent, robust capabilities, or a basis for competitive development), and its relationship with the nonproliferation regime (whether it is an Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] party, in full or partial compliance with all safeguards obligations) (2008:1–5).


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The main upshot of their analysis is that “nuclear proliferation history is a good deal more complex than the usual cartoon depiction of an incremental addition of a new nuclear-armed state every few years” (2008:1). Through charts describing the nuclear proliferation history of Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe (2008:16, 41, 65, & 97), they show that nuclear proliferation history has had ups and downs, with a historical peek of nuclear weapons seekers at 20 (in the 1960s), a ratio of nonproliferation wins to losses at 18 to 5 in the 1960s, and, over the past 20 years, a ratio of 4 to 2 (South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine versus Pakistan and North Korea). Today, eight countries have nuclear weapons: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Israel, and Pakistan. North Korea detonated nuclear weapons devices on October 9, 2006 and May 25, 2009 and is believed to possess a small batch of nuclear weapons. Iran is also suspected of having an active nuclear weapons program. The same findings apply for other types of weapons. Empirical analysis suggests that the number of states pursuing biological weapons was high during the Second World War, low during the cold war, grew quickly in the early 1990s, and now seems to stabilize (Geissler & Moon 1999; Binder & Lepick 2001:41–81). The number of states developing chemical weapons was high during the First World War, ebbed in the interwar period, inched up during the early cold war, grew again during the 1980s, and is now ebbing again (Meyer 2001:17–128). The number of states seeking missile delivery systems was high during the cold war and has declined considerably since for most missile types, except medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (Cirincione, Wolfsthal, & Rajkumar 2005:83–118). As for advanced conventional weapons, they were transferred in large numbers to allies and clients as the cold war sharpened, these patterns then broke down with the fall of the Berlin Wall, before surging again since 1998, and even more so since 9/11. Moreover, altogether, high-leverage weapons only proliferate actively in three major regions of the globe today: the Greater Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia. Unlike the exclusive focus on the “+” element of Albert Wohlstetter’s concept of the N+1 problem, there also turns out to be a “−” element. This suggests that there is no historical inevitability to weapons

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proliferation. The dynamics of the phenomenon has shifted from the question “who will be the next state to develop weapons?” to the question “who may be the next state to develop weapons?” Defenders of the realist theory stress that states may not have developed high-leverage weapons as such, but that many have maintained “virtual arsenals.” In other words, if nuclear proliferation is defined as the testing and production of nuclear explosives and weapons by more states, then, they concede that the rate of proliferation has been relatively slow. They insist, however, that this definition is inappropriate because the spread of the ability to develop high-leverage weapons has considerably increased—and states have taken advantage of it (Frankel 1991). Defenders of the realist theory also point out that the reason why the rate of weapons proliferation may have appeared slower than the initial forecasts is simply linked to the nonproliferation regime (Davis 1993). They claim that the regime has been successful in stopping (or at least stalling) the naturally inevitable move toward a proliferated world. Put differently, many more states would possess deadly weapons had the regime never been set up. After all, it is true, for instance, that NPT parties that have individual comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and that have ratified the Additional Protocol face significant technical barriers to get their hands on or produce the building blocks required for the development of nuclear weapons—not to mention the potential political costs involved should their illicit activities be detected. Despite these arguments, the conceptual framework of realism seems too general and too simple to validate predictions about the conditions under which states develop high-leverage weapons (even virtual ones). Its mathematical abstraction struggles to explain the timing of decisions or key policy shifts because that framework operates at the international level of analysis and, therefore, leaves out a whole range of other important political, economic, cultural, and psychological factors that are part and parcel of the dynamics of weapons proliferation. Ironically enough, these limits were picked up by the very founders of the realist theory. As Lewis Fry Richardson puts it, [If ] scientific method is more trustworthy than rhetoric . . . , mathematical expressions have, however, their special tendencies to pervert thought: the definiteness may be spurious, existing in the equations but not in the phenomena to be described; and the brevity may be due to the omission of the more important things, simply because they cannot be mathematised. Against these faults we must constantly be on our guard. (1960:xv, xvii–xviii)


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Similarly, Bernard Brodie, who had been walking on Richardson’s theoretical footsteps and was one of the main passionate architects of the realist theory immediately after the Second World War, seriously reconsidered his position in the mid-1960s. He left the realist-oriented RAND Corporation for UCLA (University of California, Los Angeles) in 1966 because he was appalled by the limited contribution brought to “the understanding of the basic strategic-political problems of [the] times” as a result of the ignorance of diplomatic and military history by most international security experts (1971–72:153). As Brodie elaborated at that time, “[w]e certainly need to stress the superior importance of the political side of strategy to the simply technical and technological side. Preserve and cherish the systems analysts, but avoid the genuf lections” (1971–72:161). Brodie’s disappointment ref lected the failure of strategists then most prominent to integrate the analytical rigor of realist theory with the broader expertise in military science, politics, and history. A social scientist by training, Brodie considered these fields absolutely essential, notably to understand and formulate enlightened policies toward the Vietnam War. The problem of realism is that there is a serious risk that, in the words of international relations professor Richard Betts, “the political forest be missed for the military trees” (1997:9). The relatively poor record of the research tradition inspired by Richardson’s model reveals that much more is involved in the behavior of states than the mere development of high-leverage weapons in response to international incentives, be they for power or security imperatives. As international relations professor George Quester already put it in the early 1970s, “[w]e will have to measure political capacities for violating treaties as carefully as physical capabilities” (1972:497).

The Role of Ideas & Ideals A Focus on Intent In view of the limits of realism, an alternative school began to develop from the mid-1960s. That school has argued that weapons proliferation is not deterministic (even in “security-sensitive” parts of the world), but that its causes result from a specific and complex “puzzle” that needs to be explained. According to this perspective, a whole range of ideas creates both weapons proliferation incentives and disincentives, which vary according to circumstances, hence why some states

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decide to develop high-leverage weapons and others do not (Meyer 1984; Reiss 1988; Sagan 1996–97). Some experts point to the role of international politics in appreciating or depreciating the value of high-leverage weapons. Some states can be driven to proliferate because they consider the possession of these weapons prestigious and likely to increase their status on the international arena (Betts 1993:107–9). After all, the five Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council are also the five NPT-recognized NWS. Similarly, although India and Pakistan were widely condemned for their nuclear tests of 1998, they have recently been rehabilitated and treated as great powers. This idea that nuclear weapons guarantee a “seat at the highest negotiating table” can act, some experts claim, as a powerful drive in favor of nuclear proliferation. Considerations of prestige and status operate differently according to the type of high-leverage weapons. Nuclear weapons can clearly be perceived as a source of prestige. Behind the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, for instance, there are obvious beliefs that these weapons are fundamental symbols of power and technological competence (O’Neill 2006:4). Few of these considerations apply for biological and chemical weapons, partly because their possession is less physically visible. Missile delivery systems, especially ballistic missiles, however, can be sought for prestige. As international relations professor W. Seth Carus already observed in the early 1990s, “a country concerned about the perception of its military position may be tempted to acquire missiles even if it does not intend to use them” (1991:4). Iran and North Korea, to quote just these two countries, conduct regular military parades that proudly expose missile delivery systems as evidence of their military and industrial might (Fathi 2003; Choesang-Hun 2007). That being said, the fact of the matter is that most states are more seduced by the idea of behaving as “good international citizens” (Hymans 2006b:458). International norms against the possession (and use) of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC) weapons produce key disincentives against weapons proliferation. These norms can certainly be rejected by some states, but, in most cases, they seem to have prevented the emergence of a proliferated world, as illustrated by the high number of states without any intention to develop weapons, be it in an overt or covert form. Domestic ideas may also give states incentives and disincentives to develop high-leverage weapons. Some experts contend that the actions of states are different depending on whether they have liberal democratic institutions or authoritarian/dictatorial ones. Initially developed


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by philosopher Immanuel Kant with his concept of “perpetual peace” (Smith 1903), redeveloped by international relations professor Michael Doyle (1983; 1986), and recently revisited with a Hegelian spin by philosopher and political economist Francis Fukuyama (1992), the idea is that liberal democratic regimes, unlike others, do not go to war with one another because their institutions bring about domestic legitimacy and accountability, institutional checks and balances, and a tendency to solve disputes peacefully and cooperatively. Following on that assumption is that would-be proliferators are more likely to be nondemocratic states, and that states will abandon their arsenals when they democratize, as was the case for South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil with their nuclear weapons programs in the 1990s. International relations professor Etel Solingen argues that states with strong components of domestic liberalization are more likely to cooperate with the nonproliferation regime than their “inward-looking” nationalist and radical-confessional counterparts (1994; 2007). International relations professor Glenn Chafetz claims that “core [democratic] states,” unlike “periphery [non-democratic] states,” are likely to embrace the nonproliferation regime because of their shared values and norms, and the openness and interconnectedness of their institutions (1993). In a more recent study, nonproliferation experts Michael Levi and Michael O’Hanlon insist that the fight against weapons proliferation is best addressed through the expansion of the group of democratic states united in a security community (2005). Other nonproliferation experts argue that the actions of states are much more complex and do not solely depend on the nature of institutional systems. In an analysis of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, international relations professor Graham Allison stresses that such actions are the result of a bargain between the parochial interests or ideas of the various organizations involved in policymaking (1971). Using the same conceptual lens, several experts argue that the decision of states to develop or refrain from developing nuclear weapons is the product of an intricate decision-making process that involves many organizations (Meyer 1984; Sagan 1996–97). Nonproliferation expert Jim Walsh explains, for instance, that the Australian choice not to develop nuclear weapons in the 1950s–1960s resulted from “bureaucratic politics,” [T]he story of Australian nuclear decisionmaking can be understood, in large measure, as a contest between two powerful coalitions: the military and the civilian atomic energy agency pushing the nuclear weapons option and the combined forces

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of the Department of External Affairs and Treasury opposing it. Macro events, whether external (e.g., China’s nuclear test) or internal (e.g., a prime minister’s resignation) were used by bureaucratic actors as opportunities to advance their policy preferences. (1997:14) Bureaucratic politics, however, can also lead to weapons proliferation. For instance, French scientists and bureaucrats embarked on the development of nuclear weapons capabilities before their government gave them the green light to do so (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1977:100–101). Some nonproliferation experts argue that the economic benefits of nuclear, biological, chemical, aerospace, information, and other technologies are so high that the advancement toward a more (even just virtual) proliferated world is very likely. The economic potential of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE), for instance, was heralded by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950s, respectively through the programs Operation Plowshare and Nuclear Explosions for the National Economy (Kirsch 2005; Nordyke 2000). Although the two superpowers eventually realized in the 1970s that PNE were not always cost effective and that they posed a great deal of environmental dangers (not to mention the related proliferation risks), many of today’s would-be proliferators continue to think that PNE are of substantial economic interests in meeting energy demand (Scheinman & Potter 2005:27). These perceptions are not likely to disappear in the near future. After all, isn’t India about to take advantage of fruitful economic spillovers from its nuclear weapons program (initially started in 1974 by a PNE) as a result of the recent U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement? Although other experts insist that would-be proliferators still experience economic and financial constraints in developing these technologies, the fact of the matter is that it is becoming less and less expensive, as explained in the previous chapter. Even when economic costs are problematic, evidence suggests that they do not seem to act as a major disincentive for states convinced that they will benefit from proliferating. A good illustration is the oft-quoted 1965 reported statement made by former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that, should India go nuclear, “then [the people of Pakistan] should have to eat grass and get one or buy one, of [their] own” (Keatley 1965). When cost really is an issue, would-be proliferators tend to turn to NBC weapons because they are much less expensive and more cost effective than advanced conventional weapons, especially since the


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changes brought about by the Revolution in Military Affairs. The view that unconventional weapons provide “a bigger bang for the buck” was put forward by Ukraine in the early 1990s with regards to nuclear weapons (Potter 2003:157), and it continues to be defended or implicitly suggested today by countries such as Russia, India, Pakistan, and Iran. Similarly, states that cannot afford to develop nuclear weapons (or that can only develop a few) tend to turn to biological weapons, which are cheaper to produce and potentially as deadly. As nonproliferation experts Brad Roberts and Michael Moodie insist, The debate . . . about whether a nuclear or biological weapon is more powerful misses the point that, for a rogue state capable of acquiring at most a handful of fission-style nuclear weapons, the killing power of the available BW arsenal would far outstrip that of the available nuclear arsenal. (2002:2) Finally, other experts stress the importance of ideas held by individuals who play a critical role in formulating and implementing policymaking (state leaders, in particular). The explanation of state actions through the study of inf luential policymakers emerged in the United States during the Second World War. Psychologists and cultural anthropologists sought to produce “national character” theories of the leaders of Germany and Japan (Desch 1998:144–45). These studies really f lourished, however, during the cold war. The work of experts such as international relations professor Robert Jervis sought to better understand the leaders of the superpowers and, subsequently, appreciate (and improve the management of ) the risks associated with the balance of terror ( Jervis 1970; Jervis 1976). As the SIPRI Yearbook 1994 puts it, This notion of “national character” or “strategic culture” has been most often addressed in the literature of international relations in the context of the Cold War as a way of understanding the international behaviour of the great powers, particularly the superpowers. (1994:50) Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, these studies have gradually shifted to the analysis of the causes of weapons proliferation, with some experts claiming that states will proliferate only if their leaders decide to do so (Hymans 2006a). According to this perspective, weapons proliferation is dependent on the “belief systems” of senior leadership (Little & Smith 1988). The psychological concept of “belief system” refers to an

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assortment of fundamental assumptions that people have about the world as a result of ideologies, cultures, traditions, folklore, parental dicta, bits and pieces learnt here and there, and their perceived interests. Some experts show that many state leaders around the world totally discard weapons proliferation, notably NBC, because the strength of the taboo surrounding these weapons is deeply entrenched in their belief systems (Schelling 2000). For instance, the Japanese leadership is naturally disinclined to develop nuclear weapons because, in the words of Japan expert Brad Glosserman, “the experience of World War II is still strong in the popular consciousness and the Japanese public remains highly allergic to the thought of developing its own nuclear weapons capability” (2006:1). Similarly, Gregory Giles (2000), a Middle East expert, shows that Iranian leaders were reluctant, in the first few years of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–87), to develop and use chemical weapons as a result of moral and religious values. This all goes to show that, as international relations expert Quincy Wright noted a long time ago, [Weapons and weapons-related technologies are not] superficial devices from which all cultures can benefit and which may originate anywhere and diffuse easily and rapidly . . . on the contrary, [they] are related to the culture as a whole and the origin, diffusion and inf luence of a particular invention cannot be understood except in terms of the total culture which originated or utilises it. (1955:375–76) While state leaders can hold ideas militating in favor of nonproliferation, the reverse is also true. Using the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR), which, among other things, lists 10 major personality disorders, a working group led by the French Center of International Security and Arms Control Studies (CESIM) contends that paranoid or narcissistic state leaders are more likely to engage their countries on the proliferation route (Archambault, Grand, Pasco, & Sitt 2002:602–5). As history professor Jacques Hymans puts it in an analysis of the causes of nuclear proliferation, it is the assumption that “the combination of fear and pride . . . makes for a particularly explosive psychological cocktail [. . . leading to] a desire for nuclear weapons that goes beyond calculation to self-expression [. . . and] is neither a close call nor a possible last resort but an absolute necessity” (2006b:459). This is how international relations professor Eric Shaw explains Iraq’s build-up of high-leverage weapons (and its attempt to develop nuclear weapons) in the late 1980s by pointing out Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s


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personal vision of grandeur and his paranoid attitude toward neighboring states (2003). Today, some experts apply the same analysis to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose high-leverage weapons programs are linked not only to strong feelings of insecurity, but also to his own personal willingness to see his country lead or dominate the Middle East (Brookes 2007). By the same token, if Pakistani Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan was seeking economic and financial yield with his underground network of nuclear weapons suppliers, he also clearly intended to defy the West by spreading nuclear technology to the Muslim world, which, in addition to fearing for its survival, he wanted to play a greater role on the international arena (Nuclear Black Markets 2007:85). Proponents of these ideas do not make the same grim prognosis about weapons proliferation as realists. They do not consider the phenomenon to be deterministic because it is dependent, they claim, on certain ideas, which can produce both incentives and disincentives. They therefore focus on the demand-side (intent), not the supply-side (capabilities) of weapons proliferation. The symptoms enabling to diagnose the phenomenon tend to derive from the presence of rogue states. Recapitulating the various ideas likely to be important incentives in favor of weapons proliferation suggests that would-be proliferators are international norm-breakers, nondemocratic regimes, states under the inf luence of powerful military establishments, or states run by ruthless and imbalanced leaders. In these conditions, the method to stop weapons proliferation should logically focus on the reduction or removal of the motivations for weapons and weapons-related technology and expertise. While the nonproliferation regime does contain some elements meant to put breaks on demand (security assurances, promise of disarmament, etc.), it remains essentially focused on the question of capabilities because it is a response to a phenomenon believed to work according to the logic of realism. Unsatisfactory Explanatory Power Overall, this perspective has proved more successful than realism to explain the causes of weapons proliferation. In line with the historical record detailed earlier, it can explain why the phenomenon has not spread rapidly and why it is, in fact, potentially avoidable and reversible. Moreover, its focus on the demand for high-leverage weapons leads to an examination of all levels of analysis (international, domestic, and individual), offering relevant insights into the timing of proliferation decisions.

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That being said, this perspective also exhibits several limitations. For instance, the claim that democracies do not develop high-leverage weapons does not resist a thorough empirical analysis. After all, there are at least three well-established democracies among NWS (the United States, Britain, and France) and two others (India and Israel) among other nuclear-armed states. Similarly, many rogue states (e.g., Cuba) have not gone down the weapons proliferation road. The main reason for such limitations is that this perspective suffers from many of the same problems as realism. For all their heated differences, both approaches have a common characteristic. They consider that states have a set of innate interests that are fixed and that their behavior is determined by the environment that constrains them. In the same way as realists who put forward that states will proliferate as a result of power or security imperatives, demand-side scholars contend that states will proliferate if they present certain rogue characteristics. In other words, both approaches assume that there exist predetermined regulative rules or certainties that drive states to develop weapons. Under no circumstances do they consider states as social entities whose very self, identity, interests, and capacities are constitutive, that is, created by society and therefore not deterministic, but open-ended (Searle 1995:27–29). And so neither approach is able to explain satisfactorily why, for instance, some states initially contemplated developing nuclear weapons, then changed their minds, and, today, could tend toward recidivation, as is arguably the case of Egypt, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Turkey, and Taiwan (Campbell, Einhorn, & Reiss 2004:13–14). Only a comprehensive approach accounting both for the changes and for the continuities of the dynamics of weapons proliferation can throw some light on the agents that induce the phenomenon to occur. Such an approach will, in turn, enable to point to the symptoms of weapons proliferation, which are absolutely essential to identify to combat the disease. The conceptual framework of social constructivism appears well-shaped to that end. A Social Phenomenon Based on philosopher Friedrich Hegel’s ideas (Baillie 1964), developed by sociologist Emile Durkheim (Halls 1984; Catlin et al. 1968), and popularized by sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s book The Social Construction of Reality (1966), social constructivism contends


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that reality is constructed both by society and by individual actors, notably states (Wendt 1999). According to this perspective, a given environment does not constrain states so much in their operations, but, instead, construct their identities and interests. The idea is that the rules governing the actions of states are not regulative, but constitutive. Constructivists argue that states have the power to recreate or reinterpret that environment through their practices and interactions, suggesting that they do not tend to act so much according to a logic of consequences, but according to a logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen 1999). As international relations professor Nicholas Onuf puts it, “constructivism claims that people make society and that society makes people” (1998:59). Although the structure of the cold war system, for instance, locked the United States and the Soviet Union into a fight to death, subsequently defining their identities and interests, the leaders of both sides still had a central role to play in constructing and eventually transforming that very structure. The message conveyed by constructivists is that the methods of the natural sciences, which constitute the bedrock of realism (and, to a lesser extent, that of the opposing approach), are inadequate to explain the social world. This is because, contrary to the “objects” of the natural world, states can ref lect on their social experiences and contribute to changing the course of events (Ruggie 1998:856). In sum, this perspective argues that states are active participants in the construction of history, which, as a consequence, does not follow any cyclical or predetermined course. Have constructivists simply abandoned research on causality and explanation of phenomena for mere description of them? Constructivists generally argue that they do offer causal explanations. They reject, however, the idea that there exist timeless causal rules “linking consequences to principles” (Lalande 2006:1127–28). Instead, they address the question of causality by providing contextual explanations (Price & Reus-Smit 1998). As international relations professor Keith Krause puts it, The objective is not to explain or to predict causes in a transhistorical and generalisable context [which constructivists regard as elusive in the social world], but rather to understand and develop practical knowledge of a particular context. (2003:603) The major difference between the first two approaches and social constructivism on the issue of causality is best grasped by looking at the questions that they ask. Analysts who follow the first two approaches

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ask the “why?” question because the methodology they follow consists in identifying seemingly unchanging and timeless mechanisms leading to phenomena. To do so, they focus exclusively on variables that they regard as playing a role in the causal chain. With respect to weapons proliferation, they ask the question “why do weapons proliferate?” by focusing respectively on power/security imperatives and on the rogue characteristics of states. Constructivists do not follow such logic because they do not make any assumptions on the causes of phenomena or events. They consider that these causes emerge from specific historical and social processes. And so they tend to express themselves through the “how?” question. As international relations professor Alexander Wendt puts it, In the philosophy of science, a common way to characterize the difference between kinds of explanations is in terms of the kinds of questions which they answer. . . . Causal theories answer questions of the form “why?” and, in some cases, “how?” . . . Constitutive theories have a different objective, which is to account for the properties of things by reference to the structures in virtue of which they exist. . . . As such, constitutive questions usually take the form of “how-possible?” or “what?” . . . Constitutive theories provide explanations. These explanations are not causal, but they are explanations just the same. (1998:104–5, 108) Through a method called “deconstruction” (or “reconstruction”), constructivists show how variables are shaped by and embody the context of their original construction (Culler, 1982). In so doing, they show how these variables have been defined and have become the determining factors of a phenomenon or event. In line with such a method, some experts have “exploded the black box” of weapons proliferation (Flank 1993–94:259–94). Sociology professor Donald McKenzie, for instance, shows that the development of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems in the United States and the Soviet Union are not, contrary to popular thinking, the sole result of power/security imperatives (1990). Instead, he highlights that these weapons were the product of long, complex, and uncertain historical and social processes involving the interests of many different organizations (military organizations, corporations, laboratories), the beliefs, perceptions, and interests of various individuals (state leaders, military personnel, scientists, engineers, economists, commercial subcontractors), and technological elements.


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Through the use of the social construction of technology theory (SCOT), nonproliferation expert Steven Flank reaches the same conclusions (1993–94:263–64). He shows that the Indian nuclear weapons program results from a complex network of alliances between scientists, who initially chose to ally themselves with the government, then with the agriculture industry and, from the 1970s onward, with the military (1993–94:270–72). Flank also explains how alliances were crucial to obtain technological components for the development of an effective South African nuclear weapon, how it became difficult to maintain these alliances as a consequence of internal and external events, and how the program was eventually abandoned when these alliances ceased to exist (1993–94:273–77). In sum, constructivists point out that the causes of weapons proliferation are not unique and straightforward. Instead, they claim that such causes are multiple and complex, forming a “seamless web” of power/security, technical, political, economic, cultural, and psychological variables (Flank 1994:78). This is because weapons proliferation, as any social phenomenon, is not detached from the rest of politics. The suggestion, in turn, is that weapons proliferation never unfolds automatically, but that it is the result of a social construction. It is not deterministic, but potentially open to change. As Flank points out, Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction do not spring into being in isolation from the rest of society [but are driven by many interest groups and individuals all] subject to the competition, the ideological shifts, the quest for allies, the publicity consciousness and all the diverse political processes that characterize any other social activity in the modern world. (1994:71–72) The constructivist approach succeeds where the other two approaches fail. As a historical and sociological approach, it enables to consider all the variables that make up the complex weapons proliferation processes. In so doing, it can account for both the changes and continuities that have characterized the dynamics of weapons proliferation. But the constructivist approach also bears significant gaps and limitations. Of particular concern is that it does not provide more than contextual generalizations to explain weapons proliferation. Constructivists make a powerful argument by pointing out the illusion of the search for unchanging and timeless causes to explain social phenomena. It still appears possible, however, to go a step further in the analysis and develop a model that draws up a more elaborate list of the main agents

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that induce weapons proliferation to occur. As international relations professor Scott Sagan points out, Scholars using social science theory and historical case studies to predict the behavior of new proliferant states or non-state groups must avoid two specific dangers. First, analysts must avoid the danger of mirror-imaging, the tendency to assume that all actors in the international system will act in the same way, for the same reasons, as did the United States during the early Cold War. Second, analysts also must avoid the myth of uniqueness, the tendency to assume that because each new state or non-state group that acquires such weapons has different internal characteristics and faces different external challenges, no important patterns exist across proliferant states and even non-state groups. (2000:17) Characterizing the methodology of realism and its countertheory, the “mirror-imaging tendency” is problematic because it fails to acknowledge the social (and therefore open-ended) nature of weapons proliferation. Although the constructivist mould does acknowledge that reality because it is, in essence, a process-tracing approach, its conceptual framework is such that it could easily lead to “the myth of uniqueness.” The fact of the matter, however, is that there are general rules and processes common to all instances of weapons proliferation. Put differently, causal weapons proliferation patterns do exist. And it is important to unravel them in order to improve our understanding of the phenomenon and, subsequently, our potential inf luence over it. The GSPP & Mythmaking Approaches There are few comprehensive models highlighting causal weapons proliferation patterns. Only two groundbreaking studies can be found to this day: the “geo-socio-psycho-political” (GSPP) approach designed by the CESIM working group (Archambault et al. 2002:605–13) and the “mythmaking” approach developed by nonproliferation expert Peter Lavoy (1993; 2006). The GSPP Approach The CESIM working group contends that the decision-making process leading to weapons proliferation is determined by seven major factors.


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The first factor is the presence of a certain number of technical, human, and material resources. The CESIM working group points out the need for a network of scientific and technical capabilities, a reasonably well-developed industrial infrastructure, overt or covert facilities dedicated to the development of high-leverage weapons, sufficient financial means, and, finally, a coherent military and/or militaryindustrial organization able to put these weapons to operational use. The second factor driving weapons proliferation is linked to security considerations, which are part and parcel of any proliferating project. The CESIM working group underlines that states are more likely to proliferate, if they have evolved (are evolving) in war- or crisis-prone environments. Although not explicitly mentioned as such, the CESIM working group also suggests that weapons proliferation is made easier when the political regime lacks checks and balances. This is the case of authoritarian and dictatorial systems and, to some extent, of some democratic “presidential style” structures. In other words, the idea is that the third factor leading to the development of high-leverage weapons is associated with the institutional ease with which it can be launched. As developed earlier, weapons proliferation is generally promoted by narcissistic and paranoid leaders. The CESIM working group argues that such psychological characteristics found in leaders are the fourth factor that can drive states to develop high-leverage weapons. The fifth factor inducing weapons proliferation is when states are isolated from the rest of the international community, when they link up with other states of dubious character, and when they refuse to respect international norms, whether overtly or covertly. The CESIM working group also stresses the key role played by inf luential individuals, such as leading scientists, in promoting weapons proliferation to their leadership (sixth factor). Finally, it argues that the seventh factor driving (and sustaining) a proliferating project is linked to the chosen or forced support of public opinion. The GSPP approach offers many advantages. It acknowledges the multicausal nature of weapons proliferation and examines it accordingly. Moreover, unlike the social constructivist approach, its seven determining factors offer a workable model of analysis that clearly identifies causal weapons proliferation patterns. The Mythmaking Approach Another model throwing light on causal weapons proliferation patterns is Peter Lavoy’s mythmaking approach. Although predominantly

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focused on nuclear weapons, it is also applicable to other high-leverage weapons. According to this model, states are likely to proliferate when national elites (“mythmakers”) who wish their country to go down that road, manage to carry out five main policies successfully. These policies are (1) emphasize their country’s insecurity or poor international status; (2) portray weapons proliferation as the ideal corrective strategy for these problems; (3) articulate the feasibility of developing high-leverage weapons; (4) associate these beliefs and arguments with existing cultural norms and political priorities; and, finally, (5) convince senior state leadership to act on these views accordingly. Lavoy points out that the success of the “myth of weapons proliferation” depends on three factors. The first factor is the contents of the myth and its compatibility with cultural norms and political priorities. The second factor is the ability of mythmakers to popularize their beliefs and to persuade decisionmakers to act on it. The final one is the process whereby institutional officials reorient their priorities and integrate the popularized myths into their own organizational structures. In turn, Lavoy shows that there are two main types of myths that have played key roles in driving weapons proliferation. The first one is the myth of security and inf luence, that is, the idea that high-leverage weapons (particularly nuclear weapons) provide a powerful security guarantee while also enabling its possessors to impose their will on the international arena. The second myth is linked to the belief that highleverage weapons provide substantial technical, economic, and political spin-offs in addition to their strategic utility. The mythmaking approach offers the same advantages as its GSPP counterpart. It is an all-encompassing causal model that successfully highlights weapons proliferation patterns. That being said, however progressive these two approaches may be, it still appears possible to go a step further in the analysis and design a sequential approach pointing more clearly to the agents inducing weapons proliferation. Toward a Sequential Approach As the first thinker to analyze history by breaking up with the traditional approach (i.e., religious and mythological) and following a rational principle and a critical dimension, fifth-century B.C. Greek philosopher Thucydides introduces an interesting methodology to


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examine the causes of phenomena: the distinction between “principal” and “immediate” causes (Warner 1972:48–49). According to him, social phenomena occur essentially as a result of “principal” or determining causes. These causes, which he thinks of as “the real ones” (Warner 1972:49), are factors that shape a state’s identity and interests in a way that is favorable to the development of a phenomenon. These factors have no specific time implications simply because they are the product of history. They are reinterpreted at a certain moment as a whole and enable to understand the occurrence of a phenomenon. But there needs to be more than just “principal” causes to give rise to social phenomena. Thucydides contends that another set of causes plays a crucial role: “immediate” or triggering causes. Unlike “principal” causes, “immediate” causes are contingent. They characterize the emergence of one or many factors at a specific (datable) moment that spark or precipitate a phenomenon to occur. Put differently, these factors lead to the situation when the “tipping point” is hit, that is, when the critical point in an evolving situation is reached and leads to a new and virtually irreversible development (Schelling 1978; Granovetter 1978; Granovetter & Soong 1983; Gladwell 2000). Interestingly enough for the metaphorical orientation of this book, the phrase “tipping point” is now widely used in the world of epidemiology to refer to the name given to that moment in the development of a disease when it reaches critical mass or irreversible development (Gladwell 2000:15–29). Thucydides’s methodology proves very helpful to improve our understanding of the causes of weapons proliferation. Like any other (social) phenomena, weapons proliferation seems to have both principal and immediate causes. The first step toward making weapons proliferation a reality seems to be when some inf luential individuals seek, over time, to champion the idea by marketing it more or less forcefully—often emphasizing, concurrently, its technical feasibility in view of the assets of their country. Because high-leverage weapons remain tightly controlled by state authorities, these individuals are generally senior state officials or members of the elite. To use sociologist Malcolm Gladwell’s terminology in his analysis of the emergence and spread of (social) phenomena, these individuals are either “connectors” (people with wide social circles), “mavens” (knowledgeable people), “salesmen” (charismatic people with strong negotiating skills), or a combination of these three types (2000:30–88). These individuals strive to promote weapons proliferation, once they have integrated in their belief systems that it is the ideal solution to respond to what they perceive as a certain number

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of entrenched and enduring problems that have plagued the well-being of their country for a long period. These problems can be domestic or international in nature. Weapons proliferation promoters can be driven by domestic incentives such as the belief that, for instance, the phenomenon will lead to fruitful economic spillovers for their country in the medium and long terms. However, all indicators seem to suggest that the problems to be solved by weapons proliferation are predominantly linked to international pressures. Historical evidence shows that incentives such as the search for security, inf luence, status, or energy independence on the international arena plays by far the most important underlying role in driving the phenomenon. As nonproliferation expert William Potter points out about nuclear proliferation, “[i]f the conventional wisdom is mistaken regarding a simple, general explanation for why states go nuclear, its emphasis on the importance of international pressures on proliferation is well taken” (2003:166). Weapons proliferation promoters cannot sell their idea if the environment or historical moment in which they operate is not optimum. In other words, the second step toward making weapons proliferation a reality is when the situation is ripe for its promoters to make it a political priority. To do so means that they have to integrate the idea into the cultural values and norms of their country—although it is probably less important in the case of biological and chemical weapons because they can be developed in secrecy much more easily, that is, without the public knowing about their existence. To use Malcolm Gladwell’s terminology again, weapons proliferation takes place only with the emergence of the “stickiness factor,” that is, when the benefits to be reaped from the phenomenon suddenly “sticks” in the minds of a sufficient number of people in charge of the governance of a state (2000:89–132). The “stickiness factor” is hard to define because its presence depends heavily on context— “the power of context” as Malcolm Gladwell calls it (2000:133–92). Historical evidence show that weapons proliferation generally hits the tipping point in time of crises, understood in the literal sense. First used in English in 1543 as a medical term, the word “crisis” refers to the point in the progress of a disease when an important development or change takes place that is decisive of recovery or death (Oxford English Dictionary). Put differently, it denotes a state of affairs in which a decisive change for better or for worse is imminent. The sudden emergence of global, regional, or domestic crises, whether open or latent, tends to act, although not systematically, as immediate causes or precipitants of decisions to proliferate for those states in which


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the idea was already being marketed by inf luential people. For instance, Pakistan’s decision to explode nuclear weapons devices in late May 1998 can be explained by focusing on its long search for security and inf luence in a volatile regional environment—it fought three wars with its Indian neighbor since its creation shortly after the end of the Second World War (1947). The immediate causes for such a decision, however, are linked to India’s decision to explode its own nuclear weapons devices roughly 10 days earlier. This was the tipping point transforming the Pakistani hedging strategy into a proliferation decision. Although predominantly international in nature, the triggering causes of weapons proliferation can also be associated with domestic crises. Former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s initial decision to develop a nuclear capability may well have been influenced by international security concerns, but the immediate causes of the Indian explosion of 1974 seems to have been predominantly triggered by an attempt to divert attention from internal economic and political problems that were disrupting the country at the time (Bhatia 1979:153). In any case, crises appear to be key triggers in the immediate unfolding of weapons proliferation. A Thucydides-inspired approach to explain the causes of weapons proliferation presents many advantages. Not only does it encompass all the factors contributing to the emergence of the phenomenon, but it also highlights causal patterns, thereby avoiding what international relations professor Scott Sagan calls the “danger of mirror-imaging” and the “myth of uniqueness.” Its strength lies particularly in the fact that it breaks the causal process of weapons proliferation into two main sequences (principal and immediate causes). This enables to identify the primary cause of weapons proliferation: instability. Derived from scientific usage, the concept of “instability” refers to the condition in which a slight disturbance on a system produces an effect on that system that prevents it from reestablishing itself to its original state. In physics, for instance, a system is regarded as unstable when, after an object of that system is displaced away from its original position, forces drive that object still further away from its original position—forces automatically drive that object back toward its original position in a stable system. The concept of “instability” conveys the reality of the causes of weapons proliferation very well: crises act, potentially, as catalysts to develop weapons in state or nonstate actors where such an idea has been actively promoted, thereby leading to key changes: In the case of nuclear weapons for instance, proliferators will move from a Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) status to a de facto NWS status.

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The suggestion is that the etiology and pathogenesis of weapons proliferation are naturally open-ended, at least until the tipping point is hit. “Sequence 1 Proliferators” are not yet bound to develop weapons. They are only potential proliferators. Today, intense dynamics may arguably push in favor of the development of latent nuclear weapons capabilities in Egypt, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Turkey, and Taiwan as a hedge against a possible breakdown of their respective security environment, that is, the outbreak of a serious crisis. At this stage, however, it is impossible to argue that these states will for sure acquire actual nuclear or other high-leverage weapons because such a breakdown, which would act as a proliferation tipping point, has not taken place yet. Comprising a very tiny number today, it appears nevertheless logical to expect that “Sequence 2 Proliferators” such as, arguably, North Korea, Iran, and al Qaeda will actively try and develop nuclear weapons or other high-leverage weapons. The reason, simply, is that they have reached a tipping point and that they are therefore determined, if not committed, to proliferate. That being said, even some “Sequence 2 Proliferators” may be “solely” committed to move aggressively toward a hedge. As nonproliferation expert Brad Roberts puts it, [Only] a tiny number of states appear deeply committed to acquiring [high-leverage] weapons—and even among these high-risk proliferators it would seem that some are more committed to being seen to be moving towards having a future capability than to actually possessing such weapons. (2004:16) The main difficulty is to pinpoint whether proliferators operate in sequence 1 or 2. Conversely, the question is whether proliferators are really resolute to bring their activities to fruition. Although limited and imperfect, there are two main symptoms enabling to make a better diagnosis. First, the presence of public statements or policy debates praising the benefits of weapons proliferation can provide clear indications that the idea is being promoted. Such statements can show the resolve of leaders to engage their country down that road. The problem, however, is that they are unreliable, not always precise, and sometimes simply inexistent given the high level of secrecy that surrounds decisions to proliferate. The second set of symptoms is linked to the emergence of crises that could trigger the unfolding of the disease. Certain crises are easily noticeable. When India and Pakistan detonated nuclear weapons


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devices in May 1998, for instance, many experts feared that this might induce other countries to follow suit (Huntley 1998). Other crises, however, are more difficult to detect simply because, in the words of Peter Lavoy, “it can be difficult to get reliable information on how adversary leaders really see the world” (2006:442). In these conditions, the most effective way to diagnose weapons proliferation seems through the technical monitoring of nuclear activities conducted by states. In a recent study, nonproliferation expert Matthew Kroenig argues that although it is worthwhile to analyze which states want nuclear weapons, the key is really to understand which states are able to get them (2009). However, this is also problematic because, as discussed in a next chapter, the reliability of detection devices is uncertain and, in the case of biological weapons, inexistent. Moreover, proliferators can show unparalleled cleverness in the concealment of their illicit activities. An Avertable (& Reversible) Disease The causes of weapons proliferation are multiple, complex, and, above all, nondeterministic. Unlike what Albert Wohlstetter suggested in the early 1960s (and what many experts continue to argue today), there are no innate etiological and pathogenetic agents present in every state that automatically lead them to develop weapons with an aim to wield power or seek security. Ironically enough, Wohlstetter himself ended up recognizing that as a fact when he pointed out that, [The branching processes of the spread of nuclear weapons are] more complex than the exponential physical and biological processes which have suggested the standard metaphors of proliferation. They are not automatic, but depend on a complex set of political, military, and economic conditions. (1979:14) Still, weapons proliferation unfolds according to some specific causal patterns, best identified if the phenomenon is perceived as a two-step process that consists in deep-seated security problems built up over time that catalyze in time of crises. This suggests that the phenomenon is a potentially avertable (and reversible) disease, precisely because its etiology and pathogenesis are open-ended, at least until the proliferation tipping point is hit.


CH A P T E R

FOU R


Nothing is worth doing unless the consequences may be serious. —George Shaw (1914:57) No examination of weapons proliferation would be complete without an analysis of its consequences. As George Shaw indicates in his statement, it is essential to assess the seriousness of the consequences of any phenomena to know the urgency and type of treatment(s) to administer. This chapter assesses the validity of Albert Wohlstetter’s assumption that proliferation is intrinsically apocalyptic. Put differently, it seeks answers to the “so what?” question. Inquiring into the consequences of weapons proliferation suggests the conduct of research on one of the most central concepts that has lain at the heart of international relations in modern times: the concept of order, also referred to as stability (Bull 1961; 1975; 1976; 1977). This is because raising questions about what results from weapons proliferation is raising questions about what systems it inf luences (and how so). Although it is generally agreed that the concept of order denotes any regular or discernible pattern of relationships that are stable over a certain period, most international relations experts have shied away from identifying further what the meaning of order carries because of the definitional difficulties associated with an examination of the general concept of order (understood as international or world order) and the various forms of existing orders (regional, security, economic, cultural, environmental, etc.) (Walker 2004:9). Regarding the consequences of weapons proliferation, statements that the phenomenon is detrimental to order can be easily put in opposition

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to claims that the reverse conclusion can also be true. That is why the question is best addressed with a method that breaks apart the two main notions of the concept of order and analyzes them separately. These are, on the one hand, crisis stability/instability and, on the other, arms race stability/instability. The notion of crisis stability/instability addresses the question of whether the procurement of high-leverage weapons by some states or nonstate actors makes their usage likely. Does weapons proliferation breed weapons use? That is the consideration addressed by crisis stability/instability. Therefore, crisis stability refers to the capacity of a system to remain stable (meaning, in a state of peace, understood as the absence of war) when states or nonstate actors proliferate. On the contrary, crisis instability refers to the incapacity of a system to remain stable (i.e., forced to move from a state of peace to a state of war) when states or nonstate actors develop weapons. The notion of arms race stability/instability, for its part, addresses the question of whether the procurement of high-leverage weapons by states or nonstate actors makes it more likely for others to follow suit. Does weapons proliferation breed further weapons proliferation? That is the consideration addressed by arms race stability/instability. Therefore, arms race stability refers to the capacity of a system to absorb the demands of weapons proliferation without leading to more weapons proliferation. On the contrary, arms race instability refers to the incapacity of a system to absorb these demands, leading to even more weapons proliferation. Experts have reached different conclusions on these questions. Some indicate that weapons proliferation may be a blessing because it reinforces crisis stability and arms race stability. Others argue that weapons proliferation is to be feared because it increases crisis instability and arms race instability. Crisis Stability or Crisis Instability? Does weapons proliferation breed weapons use? Answers to this question entail an examination of why and how these weapons will be used. These considerations lie at the heart of military doctrine, which ref lects ex ante formal, informal plans, or widely shared expectations about how states or nonstate actors will use their high-leverage weapons to reach their goals (Posen 1986). Military doctrines are critical to any consideration of how high-leverage weapons will be used because


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they act as the main guide that shapes the course and outcome of events, particularly in time of crisis when decision makers have little time to think beyond the established framework. Asking the question whether weapons proliferation leads to crisis stability or crisis instability also begs for an analysis of whether these weapons will always be used in accordance with the military doctrine in place and not under other circumstances. These considerations deal with the command and control system, which is designed to ensure that high-leverage weapons will be employed only by specific individuals following orders from a legitimate authority, itself acting in accordance with the military doctrine in place. With what he calls “the always/never” dilemma, international relations professor Peter Feaver stresses that the key challenge of the command and control system is that “[l]eaders want a high assurance that the weapons will always work when directed and a similar assurance that they will never be used in the absence of authorized direction” (Feaver 1992–93:163). The problem is that decision-makers are necessarily limited to making a choice between either the “always” or the “never” option. They can choose to maintain a decentralized command and control system delegating orders on high-leverage weapons use. That system guarantees that these weapons will always be used when necessary (and also that they will be less vulnerable to a destructive strike), but it runs a higher risk that they will be used by accident or in an unauthorized manner. Alternatively, decision-makers can choose a centralized system, which guarantees that their weapons will never be used involuntarily or illegitimately, but reduces the likelihood of them being used when necessary (and increases their vulnerability to a destructive strike). Two main contradicting approaches have been developed about the question of whether the procurement of high-leverage weapons makes their usage more likely: the optimistic approach, which argues that it leads to crisis stability (peace), and the pessimistic approach, which contends that it generates crisis instability (war). A Peace-Prone Phenomenon The belief that more weapons will lead to crisis stability dates back to the advent of the nuclear age at the end of the Second World War. It is therefore predominantly based on the U.S.-Soviet cold war nuclear relationship. The optimistic approach contends that there exist two ways to make war improbable: build defenses against your enemy that are so great

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that it renders war pointless or deter (which etymologically means “frighten”) your enemy from attacking you. Optimists stress that defenses against nuclear weapons do not exist and never will. Already in 1946, many international relations experts, Bernard Brodie in the lead, stated that “no adequate defence against the bomb exists and the possibilities of its existence in the future are exceedingly remote” (1946:28). This is still true today. Although much money is being poured in missile defenses to cancel the effectiveness of nuclear weapons, these systems are not currently operational and many people are skeptical that they ever will. Optimists, however, indicate that nuclear weapons have natural deterrent effects because of their high leveraging capabilities.In other words, they point out that deterrence becomes the only possible military doctrine with nuclear weapons. In the mid-1980s, international relations professor Kenneth Waltz revisited the early claims of the optimist approach and sought to eliminate every source of resistance to it (1981; Sagan & Waltz 1995; Sagan & Waltz 2003). Experts such as retired French Air Force General Pierre Gallois had stressed, in the 1950s, that the global spread of nuclear weapons could lead to global crisis stability, but that only “enlightened states” would wisely rationalize their actions (Howard 1961:151). Waltz argues that nuclear weapons generate an incurable fear factor that alters the ways in which all states (including rogue states) think about their actions. According to him, these weapons force them to reduce their propensity to combativeness and induce caution and rationality because “rulers want to have a country that they continue to rule” (Sagan & Waltz 2003:14). And so Waltz deducts that “more [nuclear weapons] may be better” (Sagan & Waltz 2003:3) to achieve perpetual peace as described by philosopher Immanuel Kant. Waltz highlights the existence of three major risks threatening the maintenance of crisis stability. The first one is the risk that some states might decide to launch first-strikes to destroy nascent nuclear weapons programs. Although a clear risk, Waltz insists that it is highly unlikely to materialize (2003:18–20) because such preventive strikes would have to be devastating if the adversary’s nuclear weapons were to be completely eliminated. After all, Iraq did not abandon its nuclear weapons program after Israel launched a preventive strike against its Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981. A good argument can even be mounted that this further convinced Saddam Hussein that he desperately needed to build these weapons in view of his hostile neighbors. Waltz also stresses that no state would ever take the risk of launching first-strikes against


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would-be proliferators for fear that they could launch a counterattack, possibly even a nuclear one. The second risk putting crisis stability potentially in danger is linked to the absence of second-strike capabilities (Sagan & Waltz 2003:20–29). Without such forces, Waltz underlines that nuclear-armed states cannot survive an upcoming attack and launch one of their own in response. That being said, Waltz insists that no state will ever allow all its nuclear forces to be vulnerable to its rival’s first strike, and, therefore that all states will develop second-strike nuclear forces. Echoing Bernard Brodie’s statement that “superiority in numbers of bombs is not in itself a guarantee of strategic superiority in atomic bomb warfare” (1946:46), Waltz justifies his claim by arguing that only a small number of these weapons are necessary for successful deterrence. Based on the French model of “deterrence of the strong by the weak” (Tertrais 2004a:64–65), this implies that second-strike development is within reach of the organizational, technological, economic, and financial capabilities of even the least developed states. When war does occur in a nuclear world, Waltz stresses that it can only be of limited conventional nature given the fear that it could quickly becomes nuclear (2003:37). According to him, such fear will be maintained by a military doctrine that will constantly raise the stakes without escalating to nuclear strikes. This transforms wars into what nuclear strategist Thomas Schelling calls the theater of “competition in risk-taking, characterized not so much by tests of force as by tests of nerve” (1966:94). That is why Waltz deducts that wars (and warfare policies) are much less likely to occur. The nuclearization of wars is made even more unlikely by the existence of a strong global taboo against the use of such weapons. According to optimists, such taboo has helped to stabilize the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war, and it is now providing stabilizing effects in today’s world by embedding deterrence in a set of shared practices, institutions, and expectations (Schelling 2000:4). Finally, the third risk endangering crisis stability is linked to the accidental or unauthorized uses of nuclear weapons (Sagan & Waltz 2003:20–23). While they present clear dangers, Waltz stresses that the command and control systems are bound to be put under strict control by its possessors, including by “the newest and poorest ones,” simply because it is in their own interests. As he puts it, “why should we expect new nuclear states to experience greater difficulties than the ones old nuclear states were able to cope with?” (2003:21).

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Other optimists concede that nuclear proliferation increases the statistical probability of accidental or unauthorized uses, but that these risks remain “a relatively ‘low’-probability event” (Brito & Intriligator 1983:140). International relations professor David Karl argues that the command and control systems of the new nuclear-armed states may well be even more robust than those of the older ones because their arsenals are smaller and therefore easier to manage, making them less prone to accidents or unauthorized uses. In their own words, “[e]merging nuclear arsenals . . . possess the structural attributes that, according to ‘normal accidents’ principles, lower the probability of accident” (1996–97:113). In these conditions, optimists contend that these weapons (and weapons-related technologies) are unlikely to fall into the hands of terrorists. No optimist has been bold enough to claim that terrorists would hesitate to use unconventional weapons, notably since 9/11. In response to concerns that the more nuclear weapons spread, the higher the risks that some of them might fall into the hands of terrorists willing to use them, Waltz and other optimists suggest that terrorists are “limited less by ends and more by logistics” (2003:129). Put differently, nuclear-armed states are deemed sufficiently rational to have strong command and control systems that prevent terrorists from acquiring these weapons. In sum, the optimist approach stresses that nuclear proliferation is a benign phenomenon unlikely to lead to crisis instability and impact negatively on the health of international order. A War-Prone Phenomenon At the other end of the spectrum, the pessimistic approach argues that more weapons bring about crisis instability. As international relations professor Robert Gilpin puts it, “[n]uclear weapons have not made the resort to force irrelevant” (1981:230). Informing the conventional wisdom, the approach was developed at the advent of the nuclear age through the prism of the U.S.-Soviet cold war relationship. Similarly to the optimistic approach, it has been increasingly applied to other power relations, and it has sometimes involved other types of weapons. According to pessimists, the logic of nuclear optimists is f lawed and doomed to fail. As international relations professor Scott Sagan puts it, “Waltz and other nuclear proliferation optimists have confused prescriptions of what rational states should do with predictions of what real states will do” (Sagan & Waltz 2003:83).


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Pessimists insist that there is no reason to think that nuclear weapons will never be used on first-strike plans or for preventive war options. They respond to those who point to the existence of a taboo against the use of unconventional weapons by stressing that it is extremely hard (if not impossible) to assess whether these normative concerns really hold—and ever have. As international relations professor George Quester points out, “[t]he only circumstance that can fairly test the long-term viability of the nuclear taboo will, of course, be for the world to manage to keep that taboo observed and intact” (2006:14). Pessimists also argue that states confronted with would-be proliferators (or states that have a small arsenal) will not hesitate to launch preventive strikes against them. The idea is that no state will ever run the risk of enabling rivals to overtake them in the race for power. Sagan points out that the danger of preventive wars against nascent or small nuclear weapons programs is more acute today than during the cold war because nuclear proliferation is now predominantly taking place in military-run states (Sagan & Waltz 2003:92–101). Military officers generally display, Sagan points out, much stronger biases in favor of offensive doctrines. As a result of their training, they tend to see war as highly likely in the short term and unavoidable in the longer term, and tend to disregard the subsequent problems of managing the postwar world because they focus on strict and narrow operational goals. And so Sagan deducts that they are inclined to follow a “better now than later” logic, favoring “action” over “reaction,” increasing the likelihood of war (2003:54–55). Sagan concedes that civilians can also be reckless and war-prone. Even in a civilian-run state like the United States, he explains that preventive wars “were clearly imagined, actively planned and vigorously advocated by senior U.S. military leaders” (2003:60), notably against the Soviet Union and China. That being said, Sagan contends that a high degree of civilian control reduces the risks of preventive wars. Pessimists also contend that there is no guarantee that nuclear-armed states will develop second-strike capabilities because of their high costs (Sagan & Waltz 2003:63–69). Moreover, Sagan argues that it is often hard to convince military organizations to develop them because they tend to be plagued, like any organizations, by inf lexible routines that are very slow to change. Sagan points to how difficult it proved for the United States and the Soviet Union to build their own secondstrike capabilities. He deducts that new nuclear-armed states are likely to find it even more difficult to build theirs because they are essentially military-run and, for the vast majority of them, lack the necessary financial resources (2003:69–72).

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Sagan highlights two main problems even when new nuclear-armed states do manage to develop second-strike capabilities (2003:69–72). First, new nuclear weapons programs are now generally opaque, which makes survivability perceptions unclear and heightens the risk of impacting negatively on crisis stability. Second, the resulting state of deterrence is bound to be only temporary. Nuclear-armed states can find themselves in a working deterrence relationship at some point. However, pessimists contend that they will not be satisfied by this situation and will be driven to improve the quality and quantity of their arsenal to outdistance their rivals. This is how pessimists explain the constant arms races between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war, which Waltz simply referred to as “decades of fuzzy thinking” where “human error and folly” was to blame (2003:64 & 31). Moreover, pessimists stress that the presence of nuclear weapons increases the likelihood and intensity of conventional wars. This argument is captured in international relations professor Glenn Snyder’s phrase of “the stability/instability paradox,” which describes the situation when two or more nuclear-armed states can use their weapons as shields behind which they can launch strong conventional attacks with less fear of retaliation (1965). Pessimists also argue that nuclear-armed states can use their weapons for blackmail. In the eloquent words of international relations professor Robert Sandoval, With the defense of its borders entrusted to forces structured around the firepower of nuclear weapons, any nation not now a nuclear power and not harboring ambitions for territorial aggrandizement, could walk like a porcupine through the forests of international affairs: no threat to its neighbors, too prickly for predators to swallow. (1976:19) In any case, pessimists indicate that the nuclearization of wars or crises is just one click away. Although they acknowledge that nuclear weapons may produce some restraint, the suggestion is that it would be wrong to assume that this will always be the case. As Sagan puts it, “nuclear weapons may well produce prudence, but it is a prudence that leaves room for war” (2003:176). This is because human beings are capable of seemingly irrational actions, notably under pressure, such as in time of crisis. Pessimists stress that history is full of examples when wars break


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out as a result of simple miscalculations and errors. International relations professor Robert Jervis insists that [S]ignals that seem clear to the sender [can be] missed or misinterpreted by the receiver; actions meant to convey one impression often leave quite a different one; attempts to deter often enrage and attempts to show calm strength may appear as weakness. (1989:1) Using sociologist Charles Perrow’s “normal accidents” theory (1984), Sagan argues that accidental and unauthorized uses of nuclear weapons are highly likely (2003:73–82). He points to the misfortunes of the U.S. nuclear safety experience during the cold war and indicates that such misfortunes are likely to be even more serious with the new nucleararmed states, for five main reasons. First, the new nuclear-armed states generally lack the organizational and financial resources to secure their arsenals properly, making it highly possible for terrorists to get hold of these weapons (or at least their materials) and use them in a 9/11-inspired attack. Second, as mentioned earlier, states tend to develop nuclear weapons in an opaque way, which complicates the setting up of the required safety measures. Third, they tend to be located in close proximity to their rivals, compressing the time-lines for decision making and therefore increasing the risk of launching unauthorized strikes. Fourth, because they are likely to be military-run, they will have decentralized command and control systems (because military officers generally seek independence and the authority to use weapons), which statistically increases the risks of accidents and unauthorized uses. Finally, as the new nuclear-armed states tend to be in zones of conf lict, an accidental detonation of a nuclear device could well be interpreted as a provocation, which might lead to a local or even regional nuclear war. As Sagan puts it, “[a]ttacks might be initiated based on the belief that an enemy’s use of nuclear weapons is imminent and unavoidable” (2003:98). In sum, the pessimistic approach stresses that nuclear proliferation is not a benign, but a malignant phenomenon likely to generate crisis instability and plague the well-being of international order. Reassessment Both the optimistic and the pessimistic approaches proceed from an internally logical conceptual framework. Surprisingly enough, they

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reach diametrically opposed conclusions on the likelihood of war. While the former argues that nuclear proliferation preserves crisis stability, the latter contends that it increases the risks of crisis instability. Putting into light this dramatic opposition, international relations professor Bruce Berkowitz suggests that “[t]he reason is that each makes a different [and often unstated] assumption about the ability of a nuclear power to deter a nuclear attack by another nuclear power” (1985:117). In other words, Berkowitz points out that the source of the opposition between the two approaches hinges on the question of whether deterrence actually deters, thereby promoting crisis stability. A onesentenced summary of their opposing arguments could read, “while optimists argue that deterrence works perfectly towards the maintenance of peace and security, pessimists contend that it does not.” A fresh assessment of the claims made by these two approaches has to focus on whether deterrence has actually deterred. It also has to examine whether the future of deterrence is likely to ref lect its past. Moreover, it is essential to carry such assessment beyond the sole traditional focus on nuclear weapons and apply the analysis to biological and chemical weapons, missile delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons. Deterrence & Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons have been used once in history. At first glance, a historical and empirical look at the consequences of nuclear weapons on peace and security could suggest that the optimists have the upper hand. Apart from their unique use in 1945 that, one could argue, took place at a time when little was known about the dramatic effects of these weapons, it seems that nuclear deterrence has worked over the years. After all, no nuclear war has ever been fought despite the proliferation of these weapons around the globe. As Waltz puts it, “if nuclear pessimists were right, nuclear deterrence would have failed again and again” (2003:115–16). It would be wrong, however, to deduct that perfect deterrence is the only possible outcome. As historian Kim Salomon puts it, “the tendency of the past cannot be uncritically extended into the future” (1993:386). While it is both a historical and theoretical argument, it remains, in essence, impossible to draw general and timeless rules. And so a serious analysis of the consequences of nuclear weapons needs to go beyond the “simple” examination of the “final result” of nuclear deterrence. It needs to address the more crucial question


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of whether nuclear weapons have reinforced crisis stability or crisis instability. Intrinsically, nuclear weapons are not weapons of war because of their devastating effects. In some instances, they seem to have worked toward a reinforcement of crisis stability. The relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war, those between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and those between India and Pakistan immediately come to mind (Hagerty 1998:176–96). Nuclear weapons have changed the behavior of these states and seem to have reduced the likelihood of war between them. It would certainly be giving too much importance to nuclear weapons to claim that they prevented an all-out war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war. No serious analysis, however, can leave aside the key role played by these weapons in the management of the two superpowers’ strategic relations. The same seems true for the relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors and those between India and Pakistan. As international relations professors Lewis Dunn, Peter Lavoy, and Scott Sagan point out, “normative concerns appear to have constrained the willingness of both Israeli and Indian elites to discuss and resolve details of nuclear doctrine and use” (Lavoy, Sagan, & Wirtz 2000:233). These states seem to have recognized the dangers of pursuing a policy of unbridled brinkmanship thanks to their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear deterrence seems to work so long as the parties involved make the assessment that waging war will cause them “unacceptable costs” (Williams 1975:69). Nuclear strategist William Kaufmann made that point in the early days of the cold war, stating that deterrence works when it promises “to inf lict such a cost on the attacker that, even if he should be able to gain his end, it would not seem worth the effort to him” (1958:2). Only such an assessment can cause restraint and promote crisis stability. The notion of “unacceptable costs,” however, is varied and depends heavily on the parties involved. For instance, military strategist Gurmeet Kanwal shows that Pakistan’s threshold of “acceptable costs” is higher than the United States’ while China’s is probably even higher than Pakistan’s (2000:1039–75). The notion of “unacceptable costs” is also subject to changes. While Mao Zedong insisted, in 1958, that China did not fear nuclear war because of the size of its territory and population (Shihmin 2000:107), the current Chinese government no longer seems to share that view. In other words, the proper functioning of nuclear deterrence is intrinsically dependent on the context and circumstances

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in which it operates. This means that the barometer of the relations between nuclear-armed states willing to refrain from using their weapons are likely to show great variations and could, against all chances, lead to crisis instability. Nuclear weapons can enhance, in some very specific circumstances, crisis stability. It seems that the type of peace that nuclear weapons generate, however, involves so many risks of all-out war that the benefits to be reaped hardly outweigh (if at all) the costs. That is why even Kenneth Waltz stresses that nuclear weapons can only “preserve an imperfect peace” (Sagan & Waltz 2003:109). In most instances, nuclear weapons have clearly contributed to reinforce crisis instability. The presence of these weapons does not seem to prevent the outbreak of intense conventional wars. As military strategist V. R. Raghavan puts it about India’s perspective about the outcomes of the Kargil war of 1999 with its Pakistani neighbor, The conclusions drawn in New Delhi from the Kargil experience are significant. Instead of seeking a stable relationship on the basis of nuclear weapon capabilities, Pakistan has used nuclear deterrence to support aggression. Kargil indicated that armed with nuclear weapons, Pakistan has increased confidence that it could raise the conf lict thresholds with India. It demonstrated a willingness to take greater risks in conf lict escalation. (2001:2) Some states have also developed these weapons with the intention not to deter their enemies, but to use them as an aggressive bargaining or blackmailing tool (Gartzke & Jo 2009). North Korea, for instance, has sought to use its nuclear weapons (or the threat to develop them) to extort foreign aid of all sorts from the international community. The outbreak of intense conventional wars or the conduct of “warfare policies” by nuclear-armed states raises automatically the risks that the nuclear threshold be crossed at some point. Although that threshold could well be crossed intentionally, one needs to stress that nuclear deterrence will always be subjected to potential human “irrationality,” that is, miscalculations or errors, which could well lead to the outbreak of nuclear war. For instance, nonproliferation experts Timothy McCarthy and Jonathan Tucker argue that Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was partly designed to deter enemies, but that Saddam Hussein then became gradually inclined to use these weapons in a asymmetrical way as a result of his personal aspirations to become a regional hegemon (2000). They contend that the fact that Israel could retaliate


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in the event of an Iraqi attack would not have stopped the Iraqi leader, precisely because of the very nature of his character. Similarly, military strategist Joseph Bermudez insists that North Korean leaders are highly likely to resort to their nuclear weapons even though it would trigger a multilateral intervention threatening the very survival of their regime because they interpret their history as a succession of confrontations involving unconventional weapons (2000:201). Wondering whether the accident of Tchernobyl (1986) is in our nuclear past or in our nuclear future, French nuclear expert MarieHélène Labbé shows that the risk of accidental or unauthorized nuclear uses are real. The lessons of the accident of September 30, 1999 at the Japanese Tokaimura plant, with its 55 nuclear reactors, seem to justify that argument, notably given the well-known high standard of Japanese safety records and procedures (2006:85). A more recent example is the six AGM-129 ACM cruise missiles carrying a W80–1 variable yield nuclear warhead that were mistakenly loaded on a U.S. Air Force B-52H bomber at Minot and transported to Barksdale (August 29–30, 2007) without the various mandatory security precautions required for nuclear weapons. This is very concerning because beyond the direct threat to human lives, the risks of economic disruption, and environmental dangers, a nuclear incident that turns into a nuclear accident could be potentially misinterpreted and lead to the outbreak of a war, maybe a nuclear war. Finally, the intentional use of nuclear weapons by some states or nonstate actors cannot be discarded. Although nuclear weapons do not really qualify as weapons of war, they may still be used by some actors who, in the words of former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, are “madder than MAD” (Payne 1996:56). Some experts explain that today’s proliferators do not share the goal of preserving the status quo, as was the case during the cold war (Delpech 2003:41). If Iran manages to develop nuclear weapons under the cover of a civilian nuclear program, the strength of the taboo against the use of these weapons will be put to severe test. As the American Journal of International Law stresses, “[c]oncerns about Iran’s nuclear intentions have been heightened by strident statements by Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has deemed the Holocaust a myth and called for the destruction of Israel” (2006:485). More worryingly, the possession of nuclear weapons or materials by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda leaves little doubt that they would use them (Nuclear Black Markets 2007:107). Nasir Bin Hamd al-Fahd, a cleric associated with al Qaeda, released an Islamic decree (or fatwa)

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entitled “Treatise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction against Infidels” in May 2003. The treatise indicates that it would be entirely legitimate to use such weapons in retaliation for “Muslims [already] killed directly or indirectly by [these] weapons” (Dunn 2005:10). It also argues that “the evil of the infidels can be repelled only by attacking them at night with [such] weapons” (Dunn 2005:10). Waltz’s claim that “nothing can be done with nuclear weapons other than to use them for deterrence” would be put to severe test (2003:132). There is no clear-cut answer to the question of whether nuclear weapons work toward crisis stability or crisis instability. In some circumstances, they can contribute to craft an imperfect peace. In most others, however, they greatly enhance the risks of war, possibly nuclear war, with the most serious consequences for peace and security. This is especially true for new nuclear-armed states, which a recent study has found more dispute-prone than “experienced” nuclear-armed states (Horowitz 2009). Perhaps that explains why there has been a worldwide aversion against nuclear weapons. Many states, including Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and, more recently, Libya, have renounced them, considering that their security is not enhanced by the possession of these weapons. For the same reasons, entire regions of the world (Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Mongolia, and the South Pacific) have ruled out nuclear weapons and announced themselves nuclear-weapon-free zones. Deterrence & Biological & Chemical Weapons Combined with adequate delivery systems, biological and chemical weapons can be dreadful instruments of war. As developed in chapter two, biological weapons can kill by an order of magnitude close, if not superior to nuclear weapons. Similarly, chemical weapons can cause mass casualties, although on a much more limited scale. And so biological and chemical weapons can potentially inf lict “unacceptable costs” to an enemy, meaning that deterrence can work. There have been a few examples confirming that argument. As history professor John Ellis van Courtland Moon puts it, “[t]hroughout the critical phase of World War II, deterrence [with chemical weapons] held because political and military policymakers were convinced that initiation was a dangerous course of action” (1984:31). Similarly, the “peace” (understood as the absence of all-out war) in the Middle East may well have resulted from the possession of nuclear


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weapons by Israel. Deterrence has also been made possible by the possession of biological and chemical weapons by countries such as Syria or Egypt. It is alleged that Syria possesses biological warheads for its missiles that could be used against Israeli cities and that Egypt and other Middle East countries have chemical weapons to frighten Israel out of attacking them. Some experts point out that it makes more sense for the Arab countries to seek deterrence with biological and chemical weapons, Possessing nuclear weapons has no strategic value [for the Arab countries of the Middle East because they] cannot use them against Israel where the Palestinian Arabs are living and many Arab countries will be affected by the nuclear fall out . . . [that is why] what Arab states need, however, is an “above conventional” weapon—such as chemical weapons—to achieve deterrence capability. (Stahl & Kemp 1992:28–29) As for their nuclear counterparts, the successful maintenance of crisis stability through deterrence with biological and chemical weapons suffers from potential imbalances in interest and resolve. There are additional problems with biological and chemical weapons. First, all arsenals are systematically opaque in a way unimaginable with nuclear weapons. As developed earlier, this cannot but have negative impacts on the proper operation of deterrence because it is much easier to reap the deterrence benefits out of a visible and transparent weapon-system than to do so out of one whose actual existence is uncertain. At the same time, the mere idea that a country may have these weapons can enhance crisis stability. International relations professor Devin Hagerty has made that argument by focusing on the case of Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons. As he puts it, “in opaque nuclear competition, there is simply no way that Indian or Pakistani planners could have confidence in launching an entirely successful nuclear first strike” (1995–96:110). The same can be true with biological and chemical weapons. The threat that North Korea, for instance, could use its biological and chemical weapons against its neighbors if its survival is in danger contributes to discourage them from pursuing policies that could increase the risk of open conf lict. The second aspect likely to plague deterrence is linked to the effects of biological and chemical weapons. As detailed in chapter two, these effects are much less reliable than those of nuclear weapons. Biological weapons are vulnerable to meteorological conditions. Moreover, their

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effectiveness can be crippled (or cancelled) by medical countermeasures such as vaccines or other protective devices such as filtration masks. Chemical weapons suffer from the same shortcomings: enemies can protect themselves against these weapons with proper devices. Chemical weapons are known to be even less reliable than biological weapons (and more difficult to use) because large quantities of chemical agents are usually required and need to be re-applied constantly to sustain sufficiently lethal dosages. Therefore, the maintenance of crisis stability with biological and chemical weapons is not guaranteed. After all, the possession of these weapons by Saddam Hussein (and his alleged intention to use them) did not deter the United States from waging war against the Iraqi regime in the early 1990s and early 2000s. Beyond the risks of deterrence failures, there are clear risks of intentional uses of biological and chemical weapons for warfare or terrorist purposes. Biological weapons have not been used in modern warfare, with the exception of the Japanese attacks before and during the Second World War. However, they have been actively sought by terrorist organizations such as the Aum Shinrikyo sect (1980s–1990s), the Rajneesh cult (1984), and the organizers of the anthrax attacks in the United States (2001), with the latter two using them successfully. Similarly, chemical weapons have only been used in isolated instances in wartime after their widespread uses during the First World War. It remains that some states have clearly counted on them in the conduct of war: Japan against China (1937–43), the Soviet Union against Afghanistan (1979–83), Iran-Iraq (1982–86), to quote just a few examples. Moreover, the use of chemical weapons by terrorists remains a matter of great concern, as illustrated by the use of sarin in the Tokyo metro by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan in 1995. In sum, biological and chemical weapons can enhance crisis stability, but, in most cases, they tend to reinforce crisis instability. Similar to nuclear weapons, that is one of the main reasons why they have been widely rejected throughout the world. Deterrence & Missile Delivery Systems & Conventional Weapons Missile delivery systems and advanced conventional weapons are so different from one another that it is hard to lump them in the same category and draw comprehensive conclusions on their ability to preserve crisis stability. However, because they are high-leverage weapons, they


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can, by definition, inf lict “unacceptable costs.” Depending on their range, for instance, ballistic missiles can reach and destroy the strategic nerve of one’s rival(s), making deterrence theoretically possible. Deterrence with these weapons suffers from the same shortcomings as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. In addition, successful deterrence depends heavily on the context, the circumstances, the specific attributes of and synergies among the weapons at hand, and the ability to use them efficiently. For instance, the United States and the Soviet Union managed to deter each other during the cold war thanks, in part, to their respective arsenals of missiles. The Iranian and Iraqi authorities, however, launched missiles in mutual warfare strikes in the 1980s. The proliferation of these weapons tends to enhance crisis instability significantly. Two main reasons stand out. First, missile delivery systems and advanced conventional weapons belong to an extremely dynamic sector that constantly improves their performances. This is not the case of NBC weapons, whose core principles and leveraging capabilities are relatively stable. As nonproliferation expert Mark Goodman points out, The premise that tomorrow’s key technologies will be different from today’s is not true for nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons technologies of tomorrow will be essentially the same as those of today or even tomorrow. The basic physical and engineering principles for today’s nuclear weapons were developed decades ago. Some are well known in the open scientific literature and others remain closely held by the nuclear weapon states. (1997:33) Although it is not as clear-cut for biological and chemical weapons (notably due to the revolution of the biotechnology industry and the development of new chemical agents), the same logic applies in broad terms. International relations professor Graham S. Pearson reported in 1997 that The key technologies for the next ten to fifteen years in respect of CBW are . . . firmly based on the CBW agents and delivery systems that have been developed and proven over the past fifty years. Whilst recognising that novel agents may be considered in particular instances, it is equally recognized that such agents will be much more unproven and hence there will be less certainty as to whether they could be used effectively. (1997:28)

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The technologies underlying missile delivery systems and other advanced conventional weapons, however, are constantly perfected. This means that deterrence with missile delivery systems and other advanced conventional weapons can only be successful if the parties involved constantly keep up with technology improvements and integrate them into their military doctrines. Such a scenario is highly unlikely because few states have efficient military establishments to do so. Moreover, at one point or another, competing states will manage to outdistance their enemies, creating a gap that they may well decide to exploit to wage war. The second reason supporting the idea that the proliferation of missile delivery systems and advanced conventional weapons is detrimental to crisis stability is linked to the absence of taboo against the use of these weapons. Although it is considerably difficult to assess whether or not it holds, there exists a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons. The same is true for biological and chemical weapons. This is not the case for other types of weapons. In fact, it is almost the opposite. Missile delivery systems and most other conventional weapons continue to be perceived as normal instruments of national security. This is illustrated by the absence of any legal framework forbidding their development. And so not only is “the lack of stigma attached to their acquisition . . . likely to lead to their widespread proliferation” (Burt 1977:31), but the step to cross the threshold of their use will also be subsequently easier to take. In short, it is difficult to discard the arguments of the optimists that the proliferation of high-leverage weapons is benign and that it enhances crisis stability. Even though numerous problems persist and could well deteriorate and eventually lead to war, the arguments of optimists are valid in some cases, especially when dealing with nuclear weapons. A thorough analysis of the consequences of weapons proliferation on the question of war and peace, however, tends to give much more credit to the thesis of the pessimist approach. In most cases, weapons proliferation is malignant and clearly reinforces crisis instability. This does not mean that war or terrorism are its automatic outcomes, but it promises at least the emergence of strong tensions that clearly leave the door open to serious and threatening security challenges. Arms Race Stability or Arms Race Instability? Does weapons proliferation breed more weapons proliferation? With weapons proliferation resulting from instability and causing, in most cases, crisis instability, under what conditions is the phenomenon likely


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to multiply, forming an endless cycle? Put differently, what is the likelihood of the unfolding of a weapons chain reaction, especially in today’s world? And what are the implications for international order? A Weapons Chain Reaction? One of the earliest statements claiming that weapons proliferation begets more weapons proliferation by metastasis was delivered by British Viscount Grey of Fallodon at the beginning of the twentieth century. Following diplomatic negotiations between himself and the German authorities on the prevention of war in 1914, he stated that If there are armaments on one side, there must be armaments on other sides. While one nation arms, other nations cannot tempt it to aggression by remaining defenceless. . . . Each measure taken by one nation is noted and leads to counter-measures by others. The increase of armaments, that is intended in each nation to produce consciousness of strength and a sense of security, does not produce these effects. On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear. Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts, till each Government feels it would be criminal and a betrayal of its own country not to take every precaution, while every Government regards every precaution of every other Government as evidence of hostile intent. (1928:160–61) At the core of this perspective lies the assumption that weapons proliferation belongs to a particular system. The rules of that system dictate the phenomenon to repeat itself automatically according to the logic of the “universal principle of moderation” (De Montbrial 2002:30–37). Initially formulated by scientist Henry Le Châtelier, the universal principle of moderation suggests that “if an external action tends to modify a balance, the system tends to react in a way that contradicts this action” (De Montbrial 2002:31). This echoes scientist Isaac Newton’s law that two bodies constantly generate opposing forces of equal intensity to each other. When it comes to the consequences of weapons proliferation, such phenomenon of action-reaction materialized in two different (but interrelated) ways: the competitive logic and the imitative logic. Weapons proliferation can lead to competitive arms races, that is, automatic and swift responsive weapons developments of snowballing

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effects leading to the classic problems of security dilemma. Weapons proliferation can also generate more weapons proliferation as a result of the willingness of states to “imitate” others. As nonproliferation experts Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss put it in a recent analysis on the possible future rate of weapons proliferation, “even a vague, generalised sense that proliferation was inevitable and self-restraint futile—that “everyone is doing it”—could persuade countries that non[proliferation] virtue was a “mug’s game” that they cling to at their peril” (2004:4). The consequences of weapons proliferation have followed an imitative logic more than a competitive logic. While the competitive logic was rampant between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war, it has had no such dynamics with other proliferators. This was certainly true for nuclear proliferation after the Second World War, which saw Britain, France, and China engaging themselves in development programs motivated by a strong desire not so much to compete with the arsenals of the two superpowers, but rather to imitate them. Today, international relations experts Isabelle Cordonnier and Bruno Tertrais show that, for the moment, a competitive logic is doubtful in Asia because of the presence of no-first-use policies, the absence of antimissile defense, and the apparent absence of antinuclear force strategies, which were key to fuel the competitive arms race dynamics between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war (2001:80). Only in an indirect way do such dynamics take place in Asia. For instance, the acquisition of ballistic missiles by Pakistan has reduced India’s strategic depth (a key asset for its conventional defense), which has comforted the country in its decision to pursue its nuclear weapons ambitions (2001:37). The same reasoning applies more or less in the Middle East, with states developing arsenals in reaction to those of their neighbors essentially in an imitative way. Neither the competitive nor the imitative logic are automatic and immediate outcomes. As discussed in chapter three, the phenomenon is much more complex than the simple response to a (perceived) crisis characterized, for instance, by the development of NBC arsenals by rival neighbor states. Weapons proliferation is only possible with the presence of so-called principal or determining factors. Arms race instability is a likely occurrence provided there is a subtle combination between an action-reaction dynamics (whether it be through a competitive or an imitative logic) and a certain number of key determining factors. There must be a measure of action-reaction dynamics because, without such dynamics, there would simply be no arms race instability at all. But it is also essential that at least some of the required determining factors


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be in place because it is them which, precisely, determine “whether there is any available reaction that would be both expedient and relevant” (Gray 1971:77). Interestingly enough, this is how cancer operates: the development of metastases is mechanical, but certain tissues also have to possess a favorable “soil” for such growth (Fidler 2003:2). Moreover, determining factors govern “the scale and timing of a reaction” (Gray 1971:77). Military strategist Johan Hölst shows that arms race instability can be “sequential,” that is, when an instance of weapons proliferation succeeds another against which some counter-response is felt appropriate. For instance, the Soviet Union clearly developed nuclear weapons in response to the United States’. Hölst also points out that arms race instability can be “anticipatory,” that is, when states move to develop high-leverage weapons to preempt what they perceive as their rivals’ own developing weapons programs (Gray 1971:77). Today, many experts suggest that would-be proliferators could well be led to overestimate the capabilities of their enemies as a result of a lack of precise public declarations on the nature of their arsenals and subsequent doctrine. This is notably the case for biological and chemical weapons, whose possession is purely secretive. Combined with a lack of effective intelligence devices, this could drive would-be proliferators to respond by developing their own arsenals in a “non-sequential.” Determining factors also dictate whether the responding state develops high-leverage weapons similar to the ones adopted by its enemies (response “in kind”) or whether it develops different ones. They determine whether the responding state moves toward the full development of high-leverage weapons or whether it “only” adopts a hedging strategy. They determine whether the responding state develops highleverage weapons overtly or covertly. As international security expert Colin Gray puts it, “each state will have its own problems and its preferences as to the best way of solving those problems” (1971:77). In any case, evidence suggests that weapons proliferation pressures erupt in waves, as a result of a few catalyst countries that trigger reactions from others within their region (Blanc & Roberts 2008:S-2). Two of such waves developed in the 1960s and in the 1970s/80s and, today, the world seems to be poised at another potential one. The Domino Theory of the Twenty-First Century The risks of arms race instability are high today. As discussed in chapter two, the lead time required to develop high-leverage weapons used to be significantly longer. Moreover, the cold war system gave the two

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superpowers at least some leverage over who could proliferate and who could not. As international relations expert Abraham Bargman put it at the time, the superpowers had “the resources and potential inf luence to make the maintenance of nuclear peace and security a reality” (1977:123). Today, however, high-leverage weapons can be developed much more quickly by an increasing number of states. The international system has now also been subject to increased strategic volatility since the end of the cold war, giving major powers, the United States in particular, much less room to maneuver to prevent the emergence of arms race instability. Every instance of weapons proliferation could potentially spark a weapons chain reaction. That is why, as mentioned earlier, numerous nonproliferation experts have insisted that the world may have reached a “nuclear tipping point” (Campbell et al. 2004:4). This point could well be hit as a result of the failure of negotiations with North Korea or Iran to prevent them from developing nuclear weapons. A nuclear or biological 9/11-like terrorist attack in a megalopolis could also trigger numerous states to develop high-leverage weapons. As nonproliferation expert Brad Roberts puts it, “[i]n response to some catalytic events, entire regions could rapidly cross the threshold from latent to extant weapons capability and from covert to overt postures” (1999:80). Critics will stress that the development of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan (May 1998), the regular launches of a North Korean missiles (August 1998, July 2006, and April 2009), the 9/11 attacks, and the explosion of nuclear devices by North Korea (October 2006, May 2009) did not lead to wildfire-like arms race instability. This may be true. At the same time, the declining trend in weapons procurement that had begun in the late 1980s came to a halt before increasing again, slowly but surely, in all regions of the world starting at the end of 1998. As the SIPRI Yearbook 2002 indicates, Over the three-year period 1998–2001, [world military expenditure] increased by around 7 per cent in real terms . . . Apart from the spending increases that were planned in 2001, the attacks of 11 September are also likely to have an impact on future trends in military expenditure, not only in the USA but in several other countries as well. (2002:231) In addition, many more states are contemplating turning their NBC capabilities into actual weapons—and many have moved high up the


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weapons capability curve. This is notably the case of a certain number of states in the Middle East and Northeast Asia. In these regions, the international community could well witness the emergence of “clusters” of NBC weapons, to use the oncological terminology describing the high occurrence of cancer within a group of people in a particular geographical area (Merriam-Webster’s Medical Desk Dictionary 2005:152). In the Middle East, the development of nuclear weapons by Iran could lead Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps even Syria to reciprocate. The responses could translate into the upgrading of their arsenals of biological and chemical weapons or worse, into the initiation of their own nuclear weapons programs. Although its relations with Iran have improved since the early 1980s, Egypt remains deeply concerned with the Iranian revolutionary government in place (not to mention its frustration with Israel’s nuclear arsenal). It would therefore feel strategically threatened if Iran went nuclear and could consequently reconsider the nuclear option ( Jane’s Intelligence Digest 2006). The same holds true for Saudi Arabia. Middle East expert Thomas Lippman reports that senior Saudi officials revealed to Chas Freeman, a former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, that if/when Iran acknowledges it possesses or is found to possess nuclear weapons, their country would feel the urgent need to jump on a nuclear bandwagon (Lippman 2004:129). An Iranian nuclear weapons capability may not be as troubling for Syria given the virtual strategic partnership between the two states (Schake & Yaphe 2001:29). At the same time, it would constitute a blow to the Arab psyche, from which much of Syria’s identity is derived. Preoccupied by the presence of other powerful non-Arab neighbors (Israel and Turkey), Syria could therefore conclude that nuclear weapons are critical to its survival—an assessment that it may already have made in view of the recent Israeli raid against an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor (Sanger & Mazzetti 2007). Finally, a nuclear-armed Iran would also impact, although to a lesser extent, on Turkey and on a future independent Iraqi state. While somehow kept in check due to their willingness to integrate the European Union, Turkish authorities would rethink their nuclear restraint, especially if their alliance with the United States weakened (Bagci 2006). In a more distant future, it would also be difficult for an independent Iraqi state to ignore an Iranian nuclear capability in the assessment of its strategic environment, notably given its troubled history with the Persian state (Errera 2006:9).

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There are also risks that NBC clusters emerged in the Northeast Asian region (Cirincione 2000). It is conceivable that a failure of negotiations meant to dismantle the North Korean nuclear weapons program could drive Japan and South Korea to go nuclear as well. After all, Japan has felt directly threatened by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program for years, especially since the communist country f lew a long-range missile over its territory in August 1998. Arguing that the nuclearization of Japan is unlikely, Japan expert Hughes Llewelyn stresses that the option remains nevertheless on the table. After all, policymakers have made sure to remove all constitutional and other domestic hurdles to develop a nuclear weapons capability and authority has recently been centralized in the prime minister and cabinet office (Llewelyn 2007). Similarly, South Korea could decide to cross the nuclear threshold. Even former presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, who conducted a foreign policy in favor of the rapprochement and normalization of its relations with the North, repeatedly indicated that they will not tolerate their northern neighbor to acquire nuclear weapons (Cossa 2006). In fact, the South Korean government admitted in 2004 that its engineers had produced highly enriched uranium and weaponsgrade plutonium outside International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and contrary to its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations (Kang, Hayes, Bin, Suzuki, & Tanter 2005). The nuclearization of Japan and South Korea could materialize quickly because both countries have the main building blocks necessary for the development of a nuclear arsenal (Mack 1997). A nuclear-armed Japan and a nuclear-armed South Korea would automatically erode China’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. China could react by beefing up its own arsenal. In turn, this could lead Taiwan to contemplate the nuclear route as well (Campbell 2002–3:12). North Korea going “officially” nuclear could trigger an Asia-Pacific nuclear proliferation epidemic, not to mention the potential additional development of biological and chemical weapons by states of the region. These risks of arms race instability led George Tenet, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to speculate that “the domino theory of the twenty-first century may well be nuclear” (Hearing before the U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence 2003:28). Clearly, it would be wrong to say that there will be a fierce weapons chain reaction in these regions. After all, to paraphrase the famous historian A. J. P. Taylor, nothing is inevitable until it happens (1954:518). But it would also be wrong to discard the possibility. The implications would be far-reaching.


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Implications for International Order A weapons chain reaction in the Middle East and Northeast Asia would jeopardize the viability of the global nonproliferation regime, which could well become obsolete. The regime is already criticized because, at least in the nuclear domain, some states are allowed to possess nuclear weapons (Nuclear Weapons States [NWS]) while others do not (Non-Nuclear Weapons States [NNWS]). It has been further plagued by the three remaining holdout states (India, Israel, and Pakistan), which have developed nuclear weapons, and the nuclear activities of North Korea and Iran. If entire regions went nuclear, the regime would no longer make any sense—and so it could well disappear altogether. This would have serious implications for international peace and security because it would mean that the world would no longer have an immune system. Similarly to the immune system that protects the human body against diseases by identifying and killing pathogens and tumor cells, the nonproliferation regime has been set up to protect the world against the development of dangerous weapons. A weapons chain reaction would also directly threaten world peace. Although more weapons proliferation may prove, in some cases, an imperfect antidote to all-out war, overall, widespread suspicions among states would mount, tensions would grow, and the possibility of high-intensity NBC war would become more real than ever. Moreover, the risks of accidental and unauthorized uses of high-leverage weapons would skyrocket, not to mention the risks that terrorists could end up acquiring these weapons and use them. If weapons proliferation is comparable to a cancer, arms race instability represents its swift generalization throughout the regional or international system with the most threatening implications for the latter’s well-being. However, the implications of arms race instability are not as bleak as during the cold war. Back then, the phenomenon was considered apocalyptic because it could have triggered a nuclear war involving major powers, which would have been catastrophic given the large arsenals of both superpowers. Today, the threat to the existence of humanity has been relegated to the dustbin of history because of the (relative) normalization of relations between the United States and Russia and their implementation of massive strategic weapons reductions (Mankoff 2007). Although the risks of arms race instability are considerably higher nowadays, future proliferators will have much smaller and much

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less sophisticated arsenals. Current nuclear proliferators, for instance, are developing atomic, not thermonuclear weapons, which means, as international relations expert Carolyn James puts it, that “a strike from [such] mini-arsenal state[s] may be survivable—militarily, politically, and socially” (2000:725). In addition, the likelihood of them waging all-out wars against major powers is slim because of their power/technological limitations when compared to those states. Still, the risks of major NBC war, in particular against major powers, should not be ruled out. In a survey of six asymmetric conf licts of the twentieth century ranging from the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05) to the Falklands War (1982), international relations professor T. V. Paul observed that weaker states tend to look beyond mere capability when entering in conf lict with stronger states and may, therefore, contemplate waging war against them (1996). Armed with high-leverage weapons, notably nuclear weapons, tomorrow’s proliferators might even be emboldened to think that they stand a real chance against much stronger powers. This is what former U.S. Secretary of Defense Les(lie) Aspin meant when he referred to these weapons as the “great equalizers” shortly after the end of the cold war. During the Cold War, our principal adversary [the Soviet Union] had conventional forces that were numerically superior. For us, nuclear weapons were the equalizer. The threat to use them was present and was used to compensate for our smaller numbers of conventional forces. Today, nuclear weapons [and other high-leverage weapons] can still be the equalizer against superior conventional forces. But today it is the United States that has unmatched conventional military power and it is our potential adversaries who may attain nuclear weapons [and other high-leverage weapons]. We’re the ones who could wind up being the equalizee. (Sokolski 2001:143) Moreover, current proliferators are developing increasingly modern weapons capabilities. States in numerous regions of the globe are now able to tip their short and medium range missiles with heavy conventional payloads and biological and chemical weapons. In the short to medium terms, an increasing number of states will master missiles of longer range and possess more sophisticated conventional, biological, and chemical arsenals. In a more distant future, it is possible to imagine a larger group of states with the required technological capabilities to tip long-range missiles with nuclear weapons. Potentially, this would


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enable these states to wage catastrophic wars against major powers, including the United States. Such a scenario is still a long way off. In July 2006, the North Korean complete failure to test its long-range Taepo-Dong missile (theoretically able to reach the U.S. West Coast) was revealing (Mainichi Daily News 2006). At the same time, North Korea’s missile tests have been gradually improved over the years: its April 2009 missile test traveled approximately 3,100 km above the Pacific before splashing down (Chang & Olsen 2009). Finally, should today’s proliferators decide not to challenge major powers up front, they still have the option to resort to asymmetric strategies, that is, sponsor terrorists to strike them with their weapons on their behalf (U.S. Department of State 2009). Iran has stood out as one of the most active states that sponsor international terrorism (U.S. Department of State 2003; Byman 2007). NBC weapons, notably biological and chemical weapons, would prove particularly appealing to the proponents of terrorist strategies aiming to cause massive damage because these weapons have formidable effects, because they are insidious, and because it is extremely hard to detect their original users. For instance, no firm evidence exist about who are the perpetrators of the letters infected by anthrax spores sent to U.S. members of Congress and the media in October 2001. Analyzing the post-cold war world, international relations professor Richard Betts deducts that “[t]here is [therefore] less danger of complete annihilation, but more danger of mass destruction” (1998:26). And that danger of mass destruction would be exacerbated should there be a weapons chain reaction. A weapons chain reaction would therefore create serious strains on the management of regional and international affairs, which is the responsibility of major powers. In particular, it would create serious problems for the United States, for which the maintenance of international peace and security (or “nuclear peace”) has been its de facto “special project.” As international relations professor William Walker points out, [A]lthough many states gave shape to this nuclear order, it was seen by the United States as peculiarly its creation and responsibility, as the product of its exceptional genius—and with some justification. Throughout the nuclear age . . . most of the ordering ideas and most of the desire to realise those ideas, came from the United States. The American attitude towards the nuclear order has therefore always been monarchical. The United States has unquestionably

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conferred upon itself unique rights to decide when the game and its rules should be changed. (2000:709) Today, the superpower is already left in a delicate position to react to the North Korean and Iranian proliferating endeavors in view of its strong security alliances with numerous European and Asian powers. In a more proliferated world, the United States may lose its traditional inf luence. This would threaten the integrity of the regional (and potentially international) security architecture embodied in major nonproliferation treaties and agreements (Falkenrath, Newman, & Thayer 1998). The decrease in the current control and inf luence of the United States (and other major powers) over the management of regional and international affairs is not necessarily bad in itself. After all, no state is—and perhaps should be—able to dominate the world forever. History tells us that power shifts have always been a normal feature in international relations. History also tells us, however, that sudden shifts in power might well be painful and counterproductive. Interestingly enough, the same is true in the human body. As Hippocrates explains about managing patients’ diets, [T]o produce a change is no small matter, but the change must be effected well and cautiously and after the change the administration of food must be conducted still more so. Those persons, then, would be most injured if the change is not properly managed . . . sudden changes induce suffering and weakness. (Adams 1939:66–67) In international relations, power shifts are only benign if they are swiftly replaced by effective and efficient alternatives, that is, institutions capable of accommodating and responding to the need of the biggest common denominator. A weapons chain reaction would not lead to the creation of such institutions. It would only bring in more disorder to the world. It would disrupt if not destroy today’s order. And so it seems that the statement made by international relations professor James Keeley in the late 1980s that “[t]he choice may be . . . between the regime proposed by the strong and no regime at all” is still accurate today (1987:29). A Dangerous & Disruptive Disease The consequences of weapons proliferation are serious. Although there may be some rare exceptions, the phenomenon tends to enhance crisis


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instability. If it is difficult to label it peace-prone or war-prone, it is however clearly warfare-prone. Moreover, under certain conditions, weapons proliferation can lead to arms race instability that, in turn, multiplies the risks of crisis instability with the most threatening implications for regional or international order. Therefore, the following statement made by Albert Wohlstetter at the time of the conceptualization of the phenomenon remains valid today, Analysis of what it would be like to live in a crowd of countries with nuclear [and other high-leverage] weapons leaves very little doubt that the spread would introduce new and very threatening dangers to the world. (1979:14) The implications of the phenomenon on order, however, are not as bleak as in the past—at least in the short to medium terms. Once apocalyptic, weapons proliferation has become a dangerous and disruptive disease.


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On Responses to Weapons Proliferation

The world is too dangerous to live in—not because of people who do evil, but because of people who sit and let it happen. —Albert Einstein (Guinness 2005:vii) With this oft-quoted statement, the famous scientist suggests that responsible human beings are those who actively seek solutions to problems. This is particularly interesting coming from Einstein because he contributed to the creation and, to some extent, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, although he later devoted most of his life to try and solve the problem by promoting the control and, ultimately, the elimination of these weapons. So far, this book has focused on analyzing the phenomenon of weapons proliferation. It is now time, in the next two chapters, to examine the various responses that address or “seek solutions” to it. Before doing so, however, it is useful to brief ly recapitulate our main findings. For a start, in chapter two, our analysis has established that weapons proliferation has mutated from monotypic and monomorphous to polytypic and polymorphous. Today, there are many more weapons of proliferation concern than the sole nuclear weapons, and technology and expertise are also part of the equation, giving the phenomenon a multifaceted physiology. Next, in chapter three, our analysis of the etiology of weapons proliferation, that is, its causes in medical terms, has proven wrong the conventional wisdom that the phenomenon is deterministic. Weapons proliferation is primarily caused by instability linked to security issues, but it is neither unavoidable nor irreversible. Finally, in chapter four, the examination of the consequences of weapons proliferation has suggested that the phenomenon tends to reinforce

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crisis instability and that it can reproduce itself by metastasis with the most threatening implications for international peace and security. The overall finding, therefore, is that weapons proliferation of the twentyfirst century is considerably different from weapons proliferation of the late 1960s, that government policy can, potentially, thwart it, and that it is important that it does so. With these considerations in mind, what are the ins and outs of today’s nonproliferation policy? How has the traditional model evolved? Nonproliferation expert Derek Smith compares that model, based on prevention and detection as detailed in chapter one, to the U.S. isolationist response to the spread of fascism in the mid-1930s (2006:140–41). He mentions Franklin Roosevelt, then U.S. President, who insisted in its famous “Quarantine Speech” of 1937 that It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading. When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease. (1941:410) The main problem with such a policy, Smith stresses, is that much more than a quarantine ended up being necessary when the war broke loose over Pearl Harbor in December 1941. By then, the forces of the Axis powers had already spread like a cancer throughout Europe and Asia. Over the years, much more than a mere quarantine has been necessary to respond to weapons proliferation. And so the traditional nonproliferation model has had to adapt to deal with the new realities of the phenomenon. A new management model with three main goals has gradually arisen. Stopping—or at least stalling—weapons proliferation has remained a focus. The international community has continued to seek and create the conditions ensuring that the vast majority of states choose not to go down the weapons proliferation road—and so the spread of sensitive technologies has continued to be tightly controlled. The second goal has been to stop determined proliferators, refrain hedgers from turning their latent capabilities into actual weapons, and reverse instances of weapons proliferation that have already occurred. Finally, when weapons proliferation has proven inextricable, the third goal has been to cope with the problem in the best possible ways until a more permanent solution can be found. Interestingly enough, the policies conducted to reach these goals correlate with the four policies defined by the World Health Organization

On Responses to Weapons Proliferation

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to address cancer: prevention, detection, treatment, and palliation. These policies are standard across all national cancer control programs. As oncologists Jan Stjernswärd, Kathleen Foley, and Frank Ferris put it, “primary prevention, early detection, curative treatment, and palliative care are the four key components (pillars) of comprehensive cancer care” (2007:515). As in the late 1960s, the idea behind prevention has remained the promotion of nonproliferation principles and norms, in particular through various treaties, agreements, and arrangements offering compensations in return. Similarly, detection, that is, the monitoring of sensitive technology production and transfers, has continued to be essential to identify instances of noncompliance to nonproliferation rules. Both prevention and detection have been carried out in considerably updated and sometimes even novel ways to deal more effectively with the weapons proliferation realities of the 2000s. The real innovative policies now part and parcel of the nonproliferation strategy are those of treatments and palliation. Since the end of the cold war, a certain number of ad hoc but relatively specific treatments of political, economic, and even military nature have been administered to block sustained progress toward weapons proliferation and roll back those that have occurred. Moreover, palliative responses have been set up to manage weapons proliferation when it has been impossible to eradicate immediately.


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Until the ability to prevent the occurrence of cancer (primary prevention) becomes a reality, a complementary strategy is secondary prevention, the early detection of cancer through screening. —Curry, Byers, & Hewitt 2003:28

Prevention: Promoting Nonproliferation Principles & Norms The Dictionary of Cancer Terms of the U.S. National Cancer Institute defines “prevention” as “the actions taken to decrease the chance of getting a disease or condition.” That is why Desiderius Erasmus, the famous Dutch humanist and theologian, used to say that “prevention is better than cure” (Phillips 1982:182). As in the medical domain, the ends of a policy of prevention regarding weapons proliferation aim to decrease the chances of its occurrences through the promotion of nonproliferation principles and norms. By telling what is right as opposed to what is wrong, these principles and norms are of paramount importance because they establish patterns of restraint among states (Chafetz 1995). In fact, they have gained increased significance over the past few years. Due to the widespread availability of sensitive technology and expertise, there has been a growing requirement to focus nonproliferation policy on the intention of states to develop (and use) high-leverage weapons rather than on their ability to do so. The preservation of nonproliferation principles

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and norms and the articulation of new and updated ones have remained the greatest hope of shaping the intention of states so that they decide not to develop and use these weapons. Nonproliferation principles and norms are no panacea. They are never universally adhered to. They are totally devoid of coercive power, but they at least enable to point the finger at norm-breakers, and to do so in a depoliticized way. For instance, North Korea “chose” to expose itself to international condemnations by withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. Moreover, it is the strength of nonproliferation principles and norms that helps to build coalitions against norm-breakers, and which can give these coalitions legitimacy when they undertake punitive military actions. The means of proliferation prevention have generally found expression in multilateral treaties. Some declarations have also entrenched a certain number of nonproliferation principles and norms. A good example is the declaration S/23500 made by the U.N. Security Council President on January 31, 1992, which indicates that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons represents a threat to international peace and security (code words for the use of force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter). By criminalizing the phenomenon internationally, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 has also contributed to strengthening nonproliferation principles and norms. However, the preferred means to uphold and promote these principles and norms have overwhelmingly been multilateral treaties, that is, political contracts, deals, or bargains that bind their parties to assume specific nonproliferation obligations in exchange for various compensations. Preventing Nuclear Proliferation To the naked eye, nuclear nonproliferation principles and norms seemed strongly entrenched when the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995. This was confirmed by the conclusion of numerous nuclear-weaponfree zones to add to those already in place, with the latest one to date concluded in Central Asia in 2006. Significant concerns, however, were raised when India and Pakistan, the two remaining non-NPT signatories with Israel, detonated nuclear weapons devices in May 1998. Subsequently, a real crisis of confidence gradually began to take hold of the entire NPT bargain (Sauer 2006). As mentioned in chapter one, the NPT rests on an exchange


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of promises. Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) abandoned the right to develop nuclear weapons in exchange for guarantees that no other NNWS develop these weapons (Article I), that Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) cooperate with them for the peaceful use of nuclear technology (Article IV), that efforts be made (especially by NWS) to move toward general and complete disarmament (Article VI), and that NWS commit themselves to provide NNWS with security assurances. The current NPT crisis is linked to two main problems. First, any party to the NPT has the inherent right to request the “fullest possible exchange” of nuclear technology (Article IV). While such demand is conditional to its peaceful uses, the mere possession of some key elements of that technology (notably enrichment and reprocessing facilities) makes it possible for states to develop a latent nuclear weapons capability without explicitly violating their obligations, as in the case of Iran for instance. If they decide to turn their capabilities into actual weapons, states can then legally choose to withdraw from the NPT (Article X). For instance, after developing nuclear weapons thanks to the technology it acquired from the NPT, North Korea chose to withdraw from the treaty ( January 2003) and, later, tested nuclear weapons devices (October 2006, May 2009). Although this is not a new problem, it is a pressing issue today because there is a coming nuclear renaissance after more than two decades of stand-still following the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents of 1978 and 1986. This nuclear renaissance is predominantly linked to the growing global energy demand, estimated to grow by 55 percent between 2005 and 2030, and the projected limited supplies and unpredictable cost of fossil fuels (International Energy Agency 2007:4). The second problem with the NPT bargain is that there has been a growing impression among NNWS that NWS have not lived up to their disarmament commitments (Article VI). Despite the laudable efforts undertaken by all NWS (except China) in the 1990s and their reiterated commitments to this goal at the NPT Review Conferences of 1995 (NPT/CONF.1995/32) and 2000 (NPT/CONF.2000/28:14–15), suspicions have mounted among NNWS as to whether NWS will ever disarm, leading some NNWS to reconsider their options. As nonproliferation expert Brad Roberts puts it, NPT extension was won with a lot of arm twisting and there is ample evidence to suggest that a significant portion of the member states are sufficiently dissatisfied with the pace of nuclear

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arms reductions (or, more precisely, Article VI performance) of the nuclear weapon states to consider extraordinary measures. (2000:224) The Tension between Nuclear Peaceful Uses & Nuclear Nonproliferation As a result of concerns over the obsoleteness of the NPT to prevent nuclear proliferation in the context of renewed interest for nuclear power, some experts have suggested that, in theory, it would be possible to stop (or at least restrict) the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing facilities under the terms of Article IV (Annan 2004:44). Although NPT parties have the right to demand the “fullest possible exchange” of nuclear technology, there is no inherent “duty” for NWS to transfer equipment for the development of these facilities. Spanish and Mexican attempts to include the term “duty” in the language of Article IV were rejected during negotiations leading to the conclusion of the NPT (Greenberg 1993:16). However, the general belief is that a restrictive reinterpretation of Article IV would be extremely difficult in practice because NNWS would perceive it as strengthening the NPT built-in discrimination between “haves” and “have-nots” (Perkovich, Mathews, Cirincione, Gottemoeller, & Wolfsthal 2005–7:93). With these considerations in mind (and Iran continuing to bend NPT rules persistently), numerous experts have stressed the benefits of multilaterizing the nuclear fuel cycle. The idea is not new. It was proposed in the Baruch and Gromyko Plans at the dawn of the nuclear age, and never really faded away. Simply, it aims to denationalize sensitive fuel cycle activities and place the operation of nuclear facilities and the disposition of their products in the hands of a group of nations or international organizations instead of individual states. The goal is to reconcile realities (meet states’ energy security concerns by giving them a stake in the supply system) with ambitions (meet nonproliferation concerns by limiting the spread of sensitive facilities throughout the world, thereby limiting the risks of breakout, diversion, or theft). Proponents also stress that multilateralizing the nuclear fuel cycle would automatically reduce the number of inspections (and the associated costs), act as powerful confidence-building measures among states, and permit important economies of scale for facilities of notoriously high capital costs. Discussions about the multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle came back to the forefront of the nuclear nonproliferation agenda with the publication of former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei’s article “Towards a Safer


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World” (2003), which makes a case for the placement of all enrichment and reprocessing facilities under multinational control, and considers similar approaches to the management and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. A year later, ElBaradei established an international expert group, who later issued a report outlining a set of multilateral nuclear approaches (2005). Since then, much research has been done about checking the spread of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies. Between September 2005 and June 2007, no fewer than 12 proposals were put forward by governments, the nuclear industry, and international organizations. These proposals have been summarized in an IAEA report (2007) and other publications and will not be detailed here. In a very comprehensive analysis, nonproliferation expert Yury Yudin explains that although proposals differ in vision, scope, targets, and time required for their implementation, the majority of them focus on the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, that is, the supply of nuclear fuel, because a global plutonium economy is still relatively far off (2009). Apart from the Russian proposal for a Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure (GNPI), the U.S. proposal for a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), and the Austrian proposal for a two-track multilateral mechanism that are far-reaching visions addressing services ranging from enrichment and fuel supply to spent fuel take-back and reprocessing, Yudin classifies the proposals in three groups: those that offer to provide backup assurances of supply in addition to the existing commercial market, those that offer to establish a nationally- or IAEA-controlled low-enriched uranium reserves as a last resort when the existing market fails, and those that offer to establish uranium facilities under international control. Yudin further explains that the least ambitious proposals present the advantages of being able to begin their operations rapidly, but, on the negative side, that they offer few incentives for customer countries to participate because they may interpret them as hidden strategies by current suppliers to maintain their monopolistic commercial positions. More ambitious proposals, Yudin points out, offer more incentives because they are truly multilateral, but they require the development of large physical infrastructures and the resolution of complex political, legal, and financial issues. Regardless of how the situation will play out, it seems that the ideal formula will have to appeal to greater common denominator and be implemented on a step-by-step basis. Perhaps it is in this spirit that ElBaradei recently proposed a three-stage process that would first establish a system to assure fuel supply for power reactors, then have

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all new enrichment and reprocessing activities put exclusively under multilateral control, and, finally, convert all existing enrichment and reprocessing facilities from national to multilateral operations. But this remains a goal on the horizon because it would first require the conclusion of a global and verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which, as discussed later in the chapter, is quite ambitious. In addition to these proposed solutions to prevent states from developing latent nuclear weapons capabilities, others have been put forward to prevent states from freely leaving the NPT. On behalf of the European Union, Luxembourg put up a case at the 2005 NPT Review Conference for a series of penalty procedures to apply to states found in noncompliance with their nonproliferation obligations if they sought to withdraw from the NPT (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.32). Many NNWS, Egypt and Iran in the lead, strongly objected—and Iran reiterated its stance at the 2009 NPT Preparatory Commission (NPT/CONF.2010/ PC.III/WP.4). Allusions were almost made that it should remain legal for parties in good standing to withdraw from the NPT (and therefore develop nuclear weapons) to regain the leverage they lost over NWS when the treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995 on the promise that these states would disarm swiftly (Simpson & Nielsen 2005; Johnson 2005). The Tension between Nuclear Disarmament & Nuclear Nonproliferation Apart from China that has focused essentially on expanding and enhancing its nuclear arsenal (Twomey 2009), other NWS have moved forward on the disarmament front. All of them, however, have continued to give high importance to their weapons in their respective defense policies. Since its 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the United Kingdom has reduced its arsenal significantly, removing all air-delivered weapons from service (Cirincione, Wolfsthal, & Rajkumar 2005:197). But nuclear deterrence centered on SSBN (ship submersible ballistic missile nuclear powered) has remained central to U.K. policy, with British lawmakers even accepting, in 2007, a plan to design a new class of replacement nuclear-armed submarines (Boese 2007a:34–35). Similarly, after over a decade of considerable disarmament efforts, France pledged, in March 2008, to reduce the number of its nuclear warheads to no more than 300, but simultaneously continues modernizing efforts and reaffirmed that nuclear deterrence would continue to be an essential element of its defense policy (Sarkozy 2008; The French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2008). Although engaged in major nuclear reductions with the United States since the end of the cold war, Russia has


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dropped the Soviet no-first-use policy and assigned a new mission to its nuclear weapons: deterring limited conventional wars (Sokov 2004). Similarly, the United States has taken significant steps in favor of nuclear disarmament since the early 1990s, but nuclear weapons have remained essential to its national security. With the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Bush administration pushed U.S. nuclear weapons further in the background by moving from the traditional triad comprised of nuclear bombers, nuclear submarines, and nuclear land-based ballistic missiles to a three-legged triad of nuclear and nonnuclear weapons (notably precision-guided munitions), active and passive mechanisms (ballistic missile defenses and civil defense measures), and a responsive defense infrastructure (Woolf 2002b). However, the NPR also made a case for the development and deployment of lowyield and bunker-buster nuclear weapons meant to destroy hardened and deeply buried targets, such as NBC production facilities. This led to the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) Program, which, according to its proponents, would buttress deterrence and reap significant nonproliferation benefits (Scheinder 2004:6–11). Because the United States has few, if any, low-yield warheads, some experts argue that it may be self-deterred from using (or threatening to use) its high-yield weapons against today’s proliferators. The development of more usable weapons by the United States could therefore help to better deter prospective proliferators and persuade others (such as Libya) to reconsider their choices (Russell 2005:164). These experts also contend that a strengthened U.S. nuclear deterrent would provide the necessary back up to U.S. security guarantees to its numerous allies, making it pointless for them to acquire nuclear weapons. Other experts, however, stress that the development of such nuclear weapons would create more problems than solutions. For a start, they insist that this presents a dangerous stepping stone toward nuclear weapons use, which cannot be of “low-yield” and, even then, would not eliminate the issue of nuclear fall-out (Nelson 2002). These experts also argue that using nuclear weapons against deeply buried biological and chemical production facilities would not neutralize, but spread the targeted agents, and, therefore, they stress that neutralizing such facilities is best done with conventional weapons (Levi 2002; May & Halderman 2003). Most importantly, these experts contend that the development of new nuclear weapons by the United States would not serve the nonproliferation cause because it would drive some states to go nuclear or invest in a nuclear hedge to protect themselves against what they would perceive as a lowering of U.S. nuclear threshold. Moreover, such U.S.

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policies could provide a role model for other NWS, which could decide to develop new types of nuclear weapons as well. In turn, this could lead NNWS to conclude that Article VI and subsequent disarmament commitments are being disregarded, as some states suggested during the 2005 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.27). There is no denying that the maintenance of a strong and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent with commitments to extended deterrence helps to keep nuclear proliferation in check. The development of new nuclear weapons, however, seems to create significant problems. Perhaps this is why U.S. Congress rejected the RNEP (Estabrooks 2005). Since then, there have been discussions about a proposed Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program to expand on the traditional Stockpile Stewardship and Life Extension Programs, which have done much work in refurbishing and modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal to keep it af loat, but arguably cannot do so indefinitely. While RRW proponents argue that the program is meant to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. arsenal, opponents contend that it is a mere revamped version of the failed RNEP (Medalia 2006). In any event, while a strong U.S. nuclear arsenal committed to extended deterrence may serve the nonproliferation cause, it seems that positive results cannot be achieved without concurrent moves promoting nuclear disarmament. That is the only way for the nations of the world to appreciate the legitimacy of the fight against nuclear proliferation. The importance and power of the notion of legitimacy is too often underestimated in international relations. Yet, as philosopher Francis Fukuyama insists, Other people will follow the American lead if they believe it is legitimate; if they do not, they will resist, complain, obstruct, or actively oppose what we do. In this respect, it matters not what we believe to be legitimate, but rather what other people believe is legitimate. (2004:63) Arguably, that is at least partly why the Obama administration has promised to make nuclear disarmament a central goal of its foreign policy: to help make the fight against nuclear proliferation more legitimate. As President Obama pointed out, “while I know [a world free of nuclear weapons] won’t be met soon, pursuing it provides the legal and moral foundation to prevent the proliferation and eventual use of nuclear weapons” (2009b). The priorities of the new administration in this regard will be set out in the new NPR, which is in the making at the time of this writing.


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While nuclear disarmament is, by definition, an issue for all nucleararmed states, it is essentially into the hands of the United States and Russia because their arsenals are enormous compared to those of other nuclear-armed states. And so nuclear-armed states have been reluctant to make further significant steps toward disarmament before more U.S. and Russian efforts are made. The process of strategic nuclear reductions between the United States and Russia began with START (1990), which reduced their forces by approximately a third. The two states then swiftly moved onto negotiate START II (1993), which planned to reduce their nuclear forces by two-thirds and banned the use of MIRVed land-based intercontinental missiles. Extended delays in ratification, however, prevented it from entering into force, causing its demise in the early 2000s and the still death of a burgeoning START III. In 2002, the United States and Russia moved away from the START process to conclude the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). SORT commits the two parties to considerable reductions in their operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces, but, unlike the START treaties, makes these reductions neither irreversible nor verifiable. Warheads are not required to be destroyed and they can be stored (and later redeployed). And so this fueled skepticism that the United States and Russia are genuinely willing to move toward disarmament as required by Article VI of the NPT. This skepticism was exacerbated when the Bush administration announced that the United States did not plan to extend START beyond its expiration date in late 2009 (Giacomo 2007). The willingness of the Obama administration to renew (and expand) START somewhat quashed the problem. In April 2009, the United States managed to successfully negotiate with Russia the basic parameters of a follow-on treaty, which will allow them to hold from 500 to 1,000 carriers of strategic arms and from 1,500 to 1,675 warheads (Medvedev & Obama 2009). The Obama administration’s September 2009 decision not to deploy missile defense systems in Eastern Europe, which the Russian Government has opposed because it believes that they are directed against Russia, has also removed major hurdles to the conclusion of the future treaty. However, a range of other issues remain. START does not address the issue of tactical weapons, and there are strong doubts that Russia is fulfilling its reduction commitments in this regard (Kimball & Boese 2006). Moreover, engagement of other nuclear powers in the disarmament process, notably of China, remains to be worked out. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is also pending.

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The CTBT, the United States, & the Future of Nuclear Testing The CTBT aims to bring NNWS under nonproliferation principles and norms by making it impossible for them to test nuclear weapons. The treaty, however, has predominantly stood as an indicator of NWS’s compliance with Article VI of the NPT because it considerably limits the ability of NWS to develop more powerful or new types of weapons (Gallagher 2006:6–7). That is why it was mainly on the promise of its swift conclusion that most NNWS agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely in 1995. The U.S. Senate, however, failed to ratify the CTBT in 1999 (Deibel 2002). In addition to expressing doubts that the CTBT verification system would be able to detect nuclear tests, the Bush administration, which came to power soon thereafter (2001), did not seek CTBT ratification because it did not want to rule out the conduct of nuclear tests, arguably necessary to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of its existing stockpile (and, potentially, develop new weapons). This decision was made despite the findings of a 2002 report drafted by a panel of experts stressing that the country could maintain high confidence in the integrity of its arsenal with sustained administrative support and congressional funding (Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 2002). Such posture also ignored the safeguards put in place when the Clinton administration negotiated the CTBT, which enable the United States to withdraw from its obligations, that is, test nuclear weapons. The election of Barack Obama now seems to suggest that the United States will move toward CTBT ratification. President Obama made it clear in a landmark speech delivered on April 5, 2009 that his “Administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to be finally banned” (Obama 2009). The United States holds the key to the CTBT’s entry into force. According to its provisions, the treaty can come into effect only after it is ratified by the 44 states that, in 1996, possessed nuclear research and power reactors. As of June 2009, 35 of these states had signed and ratified it. Many experts pointed out that U.S. ratification would lead other major holdouts (China, Israel, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan) to follow suit (Hansen 2005:53). Meanwhile, all NWS have committed to maintaining an international moratorium on nuclear weapons testing since July 1996,


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after China conducted its last test. Similarly, India and Pakistan announced a testing moratorium after exploding their nuclear weapons devices in May 1998. However, principles and norms against nuclear testing remain weak. Although it is likely to change under the Obama administration, the Bush administration sought funds to enable the resumption of testing in less than a year (Sauer 2005, 160). Moreover, in 2002, the administration presented evidence of potential Russian activity to prepare a nuclear test on its main testing site on the island of Novaya Zemlya (Jasinski, Chuen, & Ferguson 2002). Although Russia insisted that it was solely conducting the legal subcritical nuclear tests, many Russian officials have expressed serious concerns about the safety, security, and reliability of their country’s arsenal in the absence of further actual tests (Jasinski et al. 2002). Last but not least, North Korea conducted underground nuclear tests in October 2006 and May 2009, which runs the risk of reopening the Pandora’s Box that the international community has been struggling to close and lock once and for all. Preventing Biological & Chemical Proliferation The codification of principles and norms against biological and chemical weapons can be traced back to the disarmament efforts undertaken after the First World War. These weapons had been identified earlier as objects of concern in the 1874 Brussels Declaration and the 1899/1907 Hague Conferences, but only under the terms “poison” and “gas.” The 1925 Geneva Protocol is the first international agreement that makes explicit reference to microbial and chemical forms of warfare. While prohibiting their use, the protocol does not forbid their development and stockpiling. Some of its parties also attached reservations declaring that they had the right to retaliate in kind if an adversary used these weapons first. That is why the Geneva Protocol came to be known as a “no-first use agreement” (Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 1970:5). The BTWC & the CWC as Global Disarmament Treaties In the early 1970s, the nonproliferation community sought to build up on the momentum created by the conclusion of the NPT (1968) to overcome the limitations of the Protocol. After intense discussions, it was decided to tackle biological and chemical weapons separately in the belief that negotiations over biological weapons could be reached more rapidly. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was

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opened for signature on April 1972 and entered into force in March 1975 for an indefinite duration. Central to the convention is the provision that parties cannot acquire or retain biological weapons in any circumstances (Article I). The Fourth Review Conference (1996) expanded the interpretation of this article to cover the use of biological weapons (BWC/CONF.IV/9). The negative security guarantee is reinforced by the requirement to destroy all biological weapons or divert them to peaceful uses (Article II) and by the nontransfer provision (Article III). Also key to the BTWC is Article X. Not to hamper the economic development of BTWC parties, Article X gives them the right to participate to “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of . . . biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.” Based on a similar model of prevention, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was concluded in January 1993 and entered into force in April 1997 for an indefinite duration. Under the terms of Article I, CWC parties cannot develop, produce, acquire, retain, stockpile, transfer, or use chemical weapons. They are required to declare and destroy chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities under their jurisdiction, and any (old) chemical weapons abandoned on their territory (Articles I & III). Moreover, they are required to declare the existence of all chemical industry facilities under their jurisdiction. As the BTWC, the CWC encourages the fullest possible exchange of chemical-related technology for peaceful purposes among parties not to hamper their economic development (Article IX). The BTWC and the CWC are global nonproliferation and disarmament treaties. Unlike the NPT, they make no distinction between haves and have-nots. The Normative Limitations of the BTWC & the CWC Various problems plague the BTWC and CWC, however. For a start, neither of them has been universally agreed upon. As of June 2009, the BTWC counts only 163 ratifications and 13 signatories, with the remaining 19 holdouts located essentially in the Pacific region and SubSaharan Africa. The CWC lists 188 ratifications, 2 signatories, and 5 holdouts predominantly from the Middle East. In this region, the main obstacle to universality is the political linkage between chemical and nuclear weapons. A certain number of countries, Egypt and Syria in the lead, are boycotting the CWC until Israel declares itself a NNWS to the NPT (Feldman 1997:214–15). Unavoidably, this lack of universality has put strains on the BTWC and CWC regimes, not to mention


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the strong doubts that persist over the actual compliance of some parties such as Iran, North Korea, Syria, and, for that matter, Russia and China (SIPRI 2007:590–92). The second problem is that it remains legal to develop biodefense programs under the BTWC. While most (Western) countries have always had biodefense programs, many of them have given them a major boost since 9/11 and the anthrax attacks of October 2001. The cumulative funding spent on those programs by the United States for 2001–2008 is estimated to be at more than $40 million (Federal Funding for Biological Weapons Prevention and Defense, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2008 2007:1). Similarly, the European Union has recently inaugurated a brand new $135 million program called Bio-Edep intended to protect military personnel by developing technology that could detect harmful disease agents (Global Security Newswire 2009). Many experts consider this evolution problematic because it could seriously undermine the credibility of the BTWC. As biological and chemical weapons expert Jonathan Tucker puts it, “other countries may perceive such efforts as a cover for illicit, offensively oriented activities” (Tucker 2006:28), leading them, in turn, to develop biological weapons of their own. Short of restraining themselves from developing biodefense programs, Tucker suggests that a way to break out of such a vicious circle would be for the United States and other Western countries to enhance international transparency on their activities, carry out joint programs with allies, or improve domestic oversight. Nothing of the kind, however, has been contemplated to this day. Similarly, many experts worry that the legal possession and use of incapacitating (chemical) agents for law enforcement and counterterrorism operations could erode the basic norms of the CWC (Dando 2002; Pearson 2006). They stress that these weapons are far from harmless. After all, the use, in October 2002, of an incapacitating (anesthetic) gas by Russian federal security forces to overpower Chechen rebels who had seized 800 hostages at the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow proved that the effects of such gases are wrongly referred to as nonlethal. While neutralizing the rebels (who were then immediately shot dead at point-blank), the gas killed more than a hundred of the most vulnerable hostages (Enserink & Stone 2002:1150–51). The issue of incapacitating agents was discussed at the 2008 Second CWC Review Conference, but parties failed to agree on how the development of such agents should be treated (Meier 2008a:35). Finally, as of June 2009, only three out of the seven states that declared the possession of chemical weapons managed to destroy them before the set deadline of April 2007 (Albania, India, and a country

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officially anonymous but believed to be South Korea). The other four states, Iraq, Libya, Russia, and the United States, failed to do so. As the CWC had foreseen the possibility of delays, the 11th Conference of State Parties of December 2006 granted them additional grace periods to April 2012 (CWC/C-11/5 2006). There are already indications, however, that Russia and the United States, which hold by far the two biggest chemical weapons stockpiles, may not meet these deadlines (Harrington 2007:30–31). The problem is that these deadlines cannot be further extended (Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV [A], Paragraph 26). In April 2007, for instance, Russia had destroyed no more than approximately 20 percent of its original stockpile of an estimated 39,280 metric tons. While the United States had, at the same period, eliminated approximately 45 percent of its original arsenal of an estimated 31,500 metric tons, the high costs incurred has gradually led U.S. officials to stretch out the schedules for chemical weapons destruction, notably because of the heavy financial burden of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Thränert & Tucker 2007:16). Despite the legitimate technical, financial, and bureaucratic difficulties associated with the destruction of such large arsenals, it is hard not to put some of the blame on a lack of political will for such delays. The failure of the United States or Russia (or both) to comply with these obligations is concerning: it could have serious legal and political ramifications. As biological and chemical weapons experts Oliver Thränert and Jonathan Tucker put it, If the two largest possessors of chemical weapons were to fail to destroy their stockpiles on schedule, then other member countries may ask themselves why, having never possessed such arms, they should invest considerable time and money in national implementation [of the CWC]. (2007:14) That is why CWC parties agreed that visits would be organized to chemical weapons facilities of parties that have requested extensions of destruction deadlines. Recent developments, however, suggest that the United States and Russia are stepping up their chemical weapons destruction plans to try and meet the set deadlines (Meier 2008b:41). Preventing Missile & Conventional Proliferation Despite growing concerns about the threat to international peace and security that missile delivery systems and high-leverage conventional


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weapons represent, the promotion of nonproliferation and disarmament principles and norms against these weapons is virtually inexistent. This is because they are still deemed legitimate for national security purposes (and because powerful suppliers have strong financial interests in pursuing their spread). As the SIPRI Yearbook 1995 notes, “[t]he defence of the state by conventional armed forces is, in most countries, seen as an obligation of government. Therefore, there is no normative or principled objection to the further spread of conventional arms” (1995:623). The next chapter shows that the policies undertaken to manage these weapons have, for the vast majority of them, only been palliative: they have aimed to improve state relations through threat reduction, transparency, and confidence-building mechanisms set up both at the international and regional levels. The CCW, the Ottawa Convention, & the CCM No treaty exists to prohibit missile proliferation. In the conventional domain, nonproliferation and disarmament efforts have been promoted only against weapons that represent “a global humanitarian scourge much more than a military problem” (Levi & O’Hanlon 2005:117). The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) of 1980 seeks to protect military personnel from “inhumane” injuries and prevent noncombatants from accidentally being injured or killed by weapons with nondetectable fragments (Protocol I), landmines and booby traps (Protocol II), incendiary weapons (Protocol III), and blinding laser weapons (Protocol IV). The CCW also sets out obligations and best practices for clearance of explosive remnants of war (Protocol V). The CCW is primarily palliative in nature because it “only” imposes restrictions on the use of those weapons without prohibiting them. But it has been a stepping stone to a much more comprehensive treaty, the Ottawa Convention, which was concluded in 1997 and entered into force two years later. Following the failure of negotiations within the CCW on a total ban on antipersonnel mines, Canada led the international community to agree on a separate treaty that not only bans the possession and use of these weapons, but also commits its parties to destroy their stockpiles. Although implementation is lagging (numerous state parties have had to request deadline extensions) and, most importantly, China, India, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States still stand as the major holdouts, the Ottawa Convention has achieved significant results 10 years after it entered into force. The

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use and trade of landmines have virtually ceased and the global stockpile is now totaling 167 million, down nearly 100 million from the 260 million total of the mid-1990s (Landmine Monitor 2008:8). Similarly, as a result of a deemed lack of progress about discussions on a CCW Protocol VI that would explicitly concern cluster munitions, Norway recently initiated separate diplomatic negotiations that, in May 2008, led to an agreement for a Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). The CCM, modeled on the Ottawa Convention, bans the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, or transfer of cluster munitions (Article I) and obliges its possessors to destroy their stockpiles. But the CCM has not yet entered into force and is strongly resisted by major producers and stockpilers of cluster munitions, which have argued for continued negotiations within the CCW framework (Abramson 2008). Detection: Monitoring Nonproliferation Compliance According to the Online Medical Dictionary, detection refers to the “act of . . . laying open of what was concealed or hidden or of what tends to elude observation.” That is why Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, father of the famous detective Sherlock Holmes, indicated in The Sign of Four that “detection is, or ought to be, an exact science . . .” (2003:100). With respect to weapons proliferation, the ends of a policy of detection are, similarly, to lay open noncompliance to nonproliferation rules through the monitoring of various relevant activities. Because such monitoring can, upstream, enable to deter its occurrence and stop short its development downstream, it has always been considered essential to address weapons proliferation. There was little, if any, monitoring systems included in nonproliferation agreements concluded before the Second World War. As biological and chemical weapons experts Michael Moodie and Amy Sands put it, “[it] was not needed since it was assumed that states would act like gentlemen and honour their commitments” (Moodie & Sands 2001:4). During the cold war, however, the need for monitoring systems emerged as a key requirement. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could fully trust each other that either side would comply with the obligations set by the various nuclear arms control and nonproliferation agreements. U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s famous oxymoronic credo of the time, “trust, but verify” (doverey, no proverey in Russian), illustrates that reality quite vividly (Larson 2000:232–33).


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Today, laying open noncompliance to nonproliferation rules has become even more of a necessity because an increasing number of states have signed nonproliferation treaties with absolutely no intention of complying with their obligations (Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, among others). Cloaked in the attire of the “good guys” who adhere to nonproliferation principles and norms, these states have used these treaties to gain access to sensitive technology and develop covert highleverage weapons programs. That is why the nonproliferation community has recently invested much in responding to that challenge, making the detection of instances of weapons proliferation even more of a priority than in the past. The recent revelations about the scope of nuclear black markets such as the A. Q. Khan network and the subsequent proliferation risks to states and nonstate actors have only contributed further to make the policy of detection an even higher priority on the nonproliferation agenda. Beyond national intelligence devices, the means of detection find expression in verification systems, export controls, and interdiction initiatives. As built-in mechanisms to most nonproliferation treaties, verification systems are designed to check whether its parties comply with their obligations. For their part, export controls are sets of laws or regulations agreed upon by groups of states designed to police the transfers of sensitive technological items and materials. Finally, interdiction initiatives are relatively new methods that consist in developing a broad range of diplomatic, military, intelligence, and other measures to stop shipments of high-leverage weapons or high-leverage weaponsrelated technologies and materials via air, land, and sea. Detecting Nuclear Proliferation The Additional Protocol & the New NSG Guidelines: Progress & Limits After the discoveries of the Iraqi and North Korean nuclear weapons programs in the early 1990s, the international community sought to strengthen the mechanisms enabling to detect nuclear proliferation. Initiated in 1993, the IAEA safeguards improvement plan gradually moved toward the addition of new monitoring measures and the expansion of the agency’s legal mandate. This took the form of an “Additional Protocol” to be adopted by every NPT party to supplement their existing IAEA safeguards agreement. Since its adoption on May 15, 1997, that protocol has aimed to monitor not only the correctness, but also the completeness of the declarations made by states

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about their nuclear-related activities (INFCIRC/540). According to its obligations, states have to provide a large amount of information and trade of nuclear items on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) “Trigger List” has to be reported to the IAEA. Most importantly, the IAEA can inspect and monitor many more facilities, use environmental sampling during its inspections, and have access, on short notice, to all of the parties’ declared and undeclared facilities. At the same time, in April 1992, the NSG expanded its export control guidelines to cover 65 dual-use items, not uniquely nuclear (Meeting of States Adhering to the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines 1992). The group also made it a requirement for future exports that importers accept IAEA inspections on all peaceful nuclear activities, a rule which has effectively prevented nuclear trade with India, Israel, and Pakistan, the three remaining NPT holdouts. Moreover, the group agreed that importers must commit themselves to provide adequate physical security for transferred materials and technologies, not to re-export the latter to other countries without the permission of the original exporters (and without a pledge from the other countries to abide by the same rules), and not to use any imports to develop nuclear explosives. In 2004, NSG members further expanded their guidelines to include a “catchall” mechanism authorizing members to block any export suspected to be destined to a nuclear weapons program even if the export does not appear on the “Trigger List” (NSG_GOT/PRESS/FINAL 2004). NSG members also strengthened the requirement to report their export denials to each other so that would-be proliferators cannot approach several suppliers with the same request. While these measures have considerably improved the ability to detect nuclear proliferation, problems have remained rampant. First, the Additional Protocol is not universal. As of May 2009, 122 states had signed it, but only 91 of those are enforcing it. Iran signed it and observed it voluntarily from late 2003 to January 2006. “Sensitive” nonsignatories include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, and Brazil (the latter two have well-advanced uranium enrichment programs). Problems linked to nuclear export controls are that decisions are taken on a consensus basis and that the regime is voluntary, that is, not legally binding. And so NSG members can ultimately carry out any export they wish. For instance, Russia decided to transfer nuclear fuel to Indian Tarapur power reactors in January 2001 even though 32 of 34 NSG members had insisted that this would run counter to Russia’s NSG commitments (Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes 2002:23). The growing emergence of new nuclear suppliers


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operating outside the NSG (and even outside the legal economy for some of them) has further limited the effectiveness of the NSG. Toward New Rules & New Initiatives Backed by the IAEA, the United States has suggested that the export of sensitive nuclear technology should be made contingent on the acceptance of the Additional Protocol (Bush 2004). In the words of international relations expert Bruno Tertrais, the protocol would then become the new nuclear nonproliferation “gold standard” (2005:7). Many NNWS, however, have fiercely resisted a linkage between nuclear cooperation and the adoption of the Protocol. While genuinely protesting against the imposition of further limitations over their freedom of action, some of these states have also been unwilling to give up the ability to invest in a future nuclear weapons program should they decide to do so (Boese 2005b:41). Other proposals include moving the NSG to a majority or weighted voting system to replace the consensus rule, improving membership criteria and making commitments more binding and more transparent (Beck & Gahlaut 2003). Moreover, discussions have intensified about the possible development of criteria to govern the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, with a draft text of guidelines being debated at the 18th NSG Plenary Meeting that took place on May 22nd–23rd, 2008 in Berlin (NSG_BER/PUBLIC STATEMENT/ FINAL). Effective progress toward these goals, however, has been inexistent. Recent NSG achievements include agreements that nuclear transfers to a state found in noncompliance of its safeguards obligations should be suspended, that the supplier and the recipient states should develop measures to invoke fall-back safeguards if the IAEA can no longer do it, and that the existence of effective export controls in the recipient state should be a criterion of supply for nuclear items and a factor for consideration for dual-use items and technologies (NSGBSB/Statement/Final 2006). The nonproliferation community has taken significant steps to respond to the threat posed by the emergence of new (non-NSG) suppliers of nuclear technology and the subsequent risks that this technology falls into the hands of terrorists. On May 31, 2003, former U.S. President George W. Bush (2003) announced that the United States would lead a new effort, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), to interdict the shipment of NBC weapons and NBC weapons-related technology to states suspected of proliferation activities and terrorism. Modeled on the Container Security Initiative (CSI) launched a year

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earlier and meant to increase security for container cargo, the PSI seeks to develop partnerships of states working together to conduct weaponsrelated cargo interdictions at sea, in the air, or on land within the jurisdiction of its participants. Unlike export controls that are designed to control nuclear-related technology transfers, the PSI is intended to be more proactive by interdicting sensitive transfers preemptively and on an ad hoc basis. As of February 2009, 94 states had joined PSI activities. Significant shipments of weapons equipment have reportedly been seized (Squassoni 2005b). Only two years after the PSI was created, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice claimed that eleven intercepts had been undertaken successfully, including very sensitive shipments to North Korea and Iran (2005). But assessing the success of the PSI has been difficult because governments have been reluctant to discuss interdictions publicly, not to imperil their intelligence and operations mode (Boese 2008b). Most importantly, in addition to concerns about the way it is managed (Crail 2008), the PSI remains a nonbinding voluntary activity. This means that it will work only when and if participating states decide to “activate” it. Moreover, the PSI is strictly limited to the national territory, airspace, and territorial waters of its participants and, therefore, does not directly apply to international waters. Permissions to stop and search ships can be given by countries in which the ships are registered. That is why the United States has organized arrangements with Liberia, Panama, and, more recently, the Marshall Islands, the most popular countries for shippers seeking f lags of convenience (Winner 2005:134–35). It seems, however, that the PSI “is not and cannot be a silver bullet to prevent proliferation to terrorists or states” (Perkovich et al. 2005:122). After all, would-be proliferators can circumvent its restrictions by avoiding weapons-related shipments from or through the territories of participating states. Essentially due to these limitations (and to counter NBC proliferation to nonstate actors), the United States lobbied for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted on April 28, 2004, to impose legally binding nonproliferation obligations on all U.N. member states. U.N. Resolution 1540 requires member states to establish effective domestic controls against NBC proliferation, their delivery systems and related materials and technologies, and to criminalize violations of these rules. A provision of the resolution also establishes an experts committee at the U.N. Security Council composed of representatives from each member of the council along with additional experts who work on collecting state parties’ comprehensive reports, which details the steps taken toward


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the implementation of the resolution. Despite concerns expressed against the role of the U.N. Security Council as a law-making institution, that resolution cannot but improve, in principle, the ability to detect NBC proliferation. The problem, however, is that its implementation has been relatively slow. Despite the assistance provided by the U.N. Security Council 1540 Experts Committee, implementation is taking much time, particularly in developing countries that lack expertise, resources, and simply have other priorities (Crail 2006; U.N. Seminar on Implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution in Asia and the Pacific 2006; in Africa 2007; in Latin America and the Caribbean 2007). The PSI & U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 The PSI has been created as a response to the changing dimensions of weapons proliferation, notably the emergence of illicit NBC trade. The event that triggered its creation took place in December 2002, when a Spanish destroyer noticed a Cambodian registered freighter with a North Korean crew sailing in the Arabian Sea. The Spanish destroyer thought that the vessel was suspicious because it was not f lying a country f lag indicating its country of registration. With the assistance of a U.S. naval vessel, the Spanish boarded the ship and found 15 North Korean-made Scud missiles with conventional warheads and the chemical propellant needed to launch them. The Cambodian vessel, however, was allowed to leave with its cargo because this discovery was not found in breach of any national or international law agreements. Announced on May 31, 2003 by former U.S. President George W. Bush, the PSI intends to enhance existing export control enforcement mechanisms by interdicting shipments of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and related items to states of concern and terrorists. It consists of an informal arrangement among participating countries. There exists no list of criteria by which interdictions are made. The 11 original PSI participants have only released a “Statement of Interdiction Principles” condemning NBC proliferation, permitting their own vessels and aircraft to be searched if suspected of transporting such goods, and urging that information on suspicious activities be shared swiftly to enable interdictions of cargo passing through their national airports, ports, and other trans-shipment points. It remains that the PSI does not grant its participants any new legal authority to conduct interdictions in international waters

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or airspace. It only encourages its participants to use their existing national laws to interdict sensitive trade passing through the territories under their jurisdiction. That is why the United States lobbied for U.N. Resolution 1540—to provide legal support for the PSI and keep NBC weapons-related materials and technologies away from terrorists. Adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, that resolution has made it legally binding to all U.N. member states to enhance controls against NBC proliferation, their means of delivery and related items, and to criminalize violations against these rules. The PSI and U.N. Resolution 1540 are therefore complementary because they bring together states to fight NBC trafficking. Looking to the Future: The CTBT & FMCT Verification Systems Two other mechanisms are currently waiting to be activated to detect nuclear proliferation. The first one is the CTBT, discussed earlier. That treaty has an extensive global verification system, which utilizes multiple sensor technologies intended to detect nuclear explosions. Its provisions also allow short-notice on-site inspections to investigate ambiguous events. However, the CTBT is not yet in force because some states, the United States (notably under the Bush administration) far in the lead, have been critical of its effectiveness. Some U.S. officials argue that the verification system is unable to detect low-yield tests, that is of less than one kiloton, which can be conducted by NWS (Mendelsohn 2000–2001:6). They also contend that there is no guarantee that nontesting obligations will be genuinely honored, giving potential cheaters a military advantage over law-abiding states. Moreover, these U.S. officials point out that the CTBT verification system is simply useless because would-be proliferators will only develop the rudimentary fission weapons, which no longer require testing (Mendelsohn 2000–2001:7). Most experts generally acknowledge that the system is far from perfect. But they tend to conclude that it would reinforce international peace and security simply because it would strengthen detection measures and the subsequent political costs of conducting a test (Shalikashvili 2001). The second detection mechanism is the FMCT. Yet to be negotiated, such a treaty would prohibit the production of fissile materials for anything other than verified peaceful uses. Since the adoption of an ad hoc committee in 1995 to discuss the creation of the treaty, however,


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negotiations have stalled repeatedly. Initially, some states (India, Israel, and Pakistan) only agreed to be cooperative should all past production of fissile materials be accounted for, and should a specific timetable for universal nuclear disarmament be set up (Strategic Comments 1998). Other states (China and Russia) have then linked an agreement for an FMCT to an agreement for the Prevention of an Arms Race in the Outer Space (PAROS) (Zhang 2002). Under the Bush administration, the United States opposed the creation of the FMCT on the grounds that it cannot be effectively verified (Boese 2004:20–21). That is why it presented, in May 2006, a draft text for an FMCT without any verification requirement. That proposal encountered vivid opposition from the international community and remained a dead letter (Squassoni, Demkee, & Parillo 2006:6). Time will tell whether the situation will change with U.S. President Barack Obama, who has pledged to “lead a global effort to negotiate a verifiable treaty ending the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes” (Arms Control Today 2008). As for the CTBT, most experts acknowledge that verifying an FMCT would be extremely difficult (and costly), although it would be better than nothing. In view of those verification difficulties, Robert Einhorn, a nonproliferation expert from the Center for Strategic and International Studies now serving at the U.S. State Department under the Obama administration, proposed a “Fissile Material Control Initiative” (FMCI), which would consist of voluntary arrangements by and among the relevant states to increase security, transparency, accounting, and control of fissile material stocks around the world. The idea is that this would increase confidence and accountability, and so pave the way for FMCT negotiations (Einhorn 2008). An Effective FMCT Verification System? In his article “The Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty: An Interim Report,” international relations professor Ephraim Asculai explains that the verification system of a future FMCT would have to cover all known production facilities and their products, search effectively for any undeclared facilities, search for any undeclared materials, and assure that no fissile material has been diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear explosives (2007). It is technically possible to verify all production facilities and search for undeclared ones. However, it would be very difficult and costly and it would mean that states would not have to object

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to inspectors searching their territories, which is highly unlikely, as past experiences in Iraq or North Korea have shown. As for the search for fissile materials, it is virtually impossible to complete with guaranteed success given that it is difficult to uncover them and that they can be hidden very easily. It would also be impossible to assure that there is no diversion of fissile materials from peaceful to military applications without an initial declaration of the existing stocks, which even the 1995 FMCT draft text does not include. Verifying effectively an FMCT proves therefore an extremely difficult task. Detecting Biological & Chemical Proliferation The BTWC Detection Mechanisms (or the Lack Thereof) Detecting biological proliferation is very challenging because small quantities of biological agents can be militarily significant. Moreover, biological agents are completely dual, meaning that they can be used for weapons and for legitimate applications, be it for scientific, therapeutic, or defensive purposes. Advanced biopharmaceutical plants, for instance, can use clean-in-place systems to eliminate all traces of biological agents in a few hours, causing major challenges to detect biological proliferation effectively (Tucker 2001a). That is why neither the 1925 Geneva Protocol nor the 1972 BTWC contains any detection mechanism. The BTWC only encourages its parties to consult with one another and cooperate, bilaterally or multilaterally, to solve compliance concerns (Article V) and offers the option of appealing to the U.N. Security Council (Article VI). The discovery of Iraq’s, the Soviet Union’s, and South Africa’s biological weapons programs in the early 1990s gave an impetus to develop mechanisms able to detect biological proliferation. At the Third BTWC Review Conference (1991), an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) was set up to identify and examine potential verification measures. Following a Special Conference in 1994, the AHG was formally established to negotiate a legally binding Protocol to be attached to the convention. After nearly seven years of negotiations, the AHG submitted a draft protocol ( June 2001). The protocol aimed to provide greater information about, and access to dual-capable facilities and activities that could potentially be misdirected for weapons purposes. Its provisions included four main components: (1) mandatory declarations of dual-capable activities; (2) random transparency visits to declared facilities to ensure that activities are consistent with declarations; (3) consultation procedures to clarify


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questions that could arise from declarations (including the possibility of onsite visits); and (4) short-notice challenge investigations of a suspected facility, an alleged use of a weapon, or a suspicious outbreak of disease to address concerns about possible noncompliance. The United States, however, considered that the adoption of the protocol would endanger the commercial interests of its powerful biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, and the secrets of its biodefense facilities. And so, in July 2001, it chose to reject it (Mahley 2001) and, in December of the same year, it withdrew from the negotiations, which literally buried all efforts undertaken since 1994 to develop a verification system (Bolton 2001). To date, there is no verification system to detect biological proliferation. Despite the intrinsic difficulties in monitoring biological activities, some international security experts stress that it is not an impossible task. Biological weapons expert Amy Smithson acknowledges that the 2001 Draft Protocol was unworkable. She insists, however, that despite common beliefs, it is possible to craft a system to monitor industry and biodefense facilities without compromising commercial confidentiality and national security. As she points out in a landmark report on the issue, Policymakers, industry officials and the general public are commonly told that the BWC is “unverifiable” due to the complex, dual-use nature of biological materials, equipment and technologies, and the claim that inspections would automatically reveal sensitive defense or business information. These assertions hang in the air unchallenged. (2004:vii) Setting up such a verification system would be beneficial because it would help to verify the allegations of biological weapons possession (and use) made by certain states. At the outset of the Fifth BTWC Review Conference (2001), for instance, the head of the U.S. delegation, former Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton directly accused Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan of developing biological weapons, but could not substantiate his claims (Bolton 2001). A BTWC verification system would also provide a framework to the enormous and ongoing scientific and technological advances in the life sciences, which could give rise to new dangerous weapons. The only transparency-generating tools currently available to the BTWC are confidence-building measures (CBMs). CBMs aim to reduce the ambiguity surrounding biological activities that can be

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interpreted as in violation of the convention. Initially introduced in 1986 (and strengthened in 1991), CBMs intended to compensate for the lack of detection mechanisms (BWC/CONF.II/13/II 1986; BWC/ CONF.III/23 1991). And so they were somehow disregarded in the 1990s because the nonproliferation community counted on the adoption of the protocol, which would have turned these politically binding measures into formal treaty obligations. Yet, the failure of the protocol and the subsequent diplomatic taboo concerning “the v-word,” codeword for “verification” among diplomats (Findlay 2006:21), have given CBMs a renewed importance because they are now the only instruments available to monitor, for want of a better word, biological activities. The problem is that even involvement in the CBMs process has been unsatisfactory. In addition to blaming the format of the CBMs forms (Lindstrom, Zanders, & Nixdorff 2006:49–50), experts stress that developing countries do not have the expertise or resources to get involved in the process. Even then, CBMs do not affect threat perceptions. As biological and chemical weapons expert Jean-Pascal Zanders indicates, Research suggests that accurate and complete submissions by countries in poor standing will be considered unconvincing and misleading and that these countries will continue to be viewed as noncompliant. (Lindstrom et al. 2006:48) The BTWC CBMs ● ●

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Exchange of data on research centers and laboratories. Exchange of information on national biological defense research and development programs. Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins. Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of new applications. Active promotion of contacts. Declaration of legislation, regulations, and other measures. Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programs. Declaration of vaccine production facilities.

To compensate for these problems (and address the danger of bioterrorism), the nonproliferation community has put increased emphasis on


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BTWC implementation (BWC/CONF.VI/6 2006), which requires its parties to promulgate national legislation to criminalize and enhance controls to detect biological weapons development. Despite such efforts, BTWC implementation remains unsatisfactory, particularly in developing countries that lack expertise and resources. The international community provides assistance, notably through the newly established Implementation Support Unit meant to coordinate efforts to develop national implementation procedures, biosafety and biosecurity at biological facilities, disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis (BWC/ CONF.VI/6 2006:19–20). Detecting biological proliferation, however, is bound to remain difficult. Initially established to regulate the export of eight dual-use chemical precursors, the Australia Group expanded its guidelines in 1990 to include biological agents and, in 2002, the group adopted a “catch-all” provision (Australia Group Meeting 2002) to remedy this weakness. The group, however, has run into the same problems as the NSG: decisions are only taken by consensus, commitments are not legally binding, trade remains opaque, and new suppliers operating outside the framework of the group have now emerged. The PSI and U.N. Resolution 1540 have only imperfectly remedied these problems, although it is notable that the resolution has made it compulsory for all U.N. member states (even non-BTWC parties) to criminalize, control, and secure biological activities. The CWC Detection Mechanisms While daunting, the detection of chemical proliferation is easier than that of its biological counterpart. In addition to including procedures encouraging its parties to resolve ambiguities through cooperation on a bilateral basis (Article IX), the CWC is composed of a dense verification system (Annex on Implementation and Verification) administered by an independent organization, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (Article XIII). The OPCW oversees the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles undertaken by states that have declared the possession of these weapons. It also conducts routine on-site inspections, that is, periodic and preannounced visits of chemical weapons-related facilities and chemical industry facilities to verify the contents of declarations and confirm that activities are consistent with CWC obligations. Moreover, the OPCW is mandated to conduct challenge or short notice inspections at any (declared or undeclared) facility or location in CWC parties to clarify questions of possible noncompliance. Finally, the CWC contains procedures for investigating cases of alleged use of chemical weapons (Article X[9, 10, 11]).

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Treating Weapons Proliferation Biological Pathogens ● ● ● ●

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Found in nature. Living, replicative. Easy and relatively cheap to produce. Highly diverse: numerous pathogens are suitable for biological warfare. Cannot really be inventoried because pathogens reproduce. Cannot be detected at a distance with current technologies. Present in many types of facilities and at multiple locations. Many nonmilitary applications in the biomedical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology industry. Chemical Agents

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Do not exist in nature. Nonliving, synthetic. Easy and relatively cheap to produce. Diverse: currently about 70 chemical agents are suitable for chemical warfare. Can be inventoried and tracked in a quantitative manner. Can be detected at a distance (visible). Present in many types of facilities and at multiple locations. Many nonmilitary applications in the agricultural and pharmaceutical industries.

To date, most of the OPCW’s verification resources have been devoted to oversee the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles (CWC/C-12/6 2007:8). Given that the elimination of existing arsenals is far from complete, it will remain so in the near future. The OPCW, however, has sought to optimize this verification process (through the conduct of nonsystematic inspections with smaller teams, report streamlining, etc.) in order to diversify its activities. States that possess chemical weapons stockpiles, notably Russia and the United States, have supported these policies because they are responsible for the costs of verifying destruction activities according to the CWC (Thränert & Tucker 2007:19). Although the process of routine inspections has operated smoothly since the CWC entered into force, gaps and limitations have surfaced.


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First, out of concerns for the protection of proprietary business information, the CWC Conference of State Parties has authorized inspected facilities to copy the inspectors’ notebooks, which runs counter to the immunity of inspection records granted by the convention (Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part II). For the same reasons (and due to high costs and complex logistics), inspectors have also refrained from using sampling and analysis. This creates problems because it impedes the ability of inspectors to detect chemical proliferation. The second problem plaguing the process of routine inspections is linked to the discrepancy between CWC comprehensive prohibitions and the limited scope of the verification system. While CWC prohibitions are based on the purpose for which toxic chemicals and their precursors are developed and used, the verification system is solely based on a limited number of products listed on the three so-called schedules. This is problematic because these products only constitute a snapshot of chemical weapons threats, which are constantly expanding due to regular advances in chemical technology. Nevertheless, CWC parties have been reluctant to amend the schedules for fear of calling attention to the suitability of certain agents for military purposes. Some experts also stress that it would simply be impractical to keep adding new agents to the schedules (Thränert & Tucker 2007:21). The risk, however, is that the CWC verification system creates false confidence in compliance. A good example is the case of so-called other chemical production facilities (OCPFs). Many of these facilities, which are developing exponentially (notably in Asia), do not manufacture scheduled chemicals, but could easily be converted to that purpose, giving its possessors a breakout potential for clandestine chemical weapons production. To date, the level of attention given to OCPFs has been highly insufficient—the issue was heavily debated at the 2008 Second CWC Review Conference (CWC/RC-2/4 2008:15–17). CWC Classification of Chemical Products The CWC breaks down chemical products into three “schedules”: ●

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Schedule 1: chemical products and precursors (such as VX or sarin) considered to be of high potential weapons utility and of rare industrial applications. Schedule 2: chemical products and precursors (such as phosgene) deemed to pose a “significant risk” for weapons utility, but they are also largely used for peaceful purposes.

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Treating Weapons Proliferation ●

Schedule 3: chemical products considered to have some weapons potential, but also produced in large quantities for industrial purposes.

Prohibitions are most enhanced for Schedule 1 chemicals and the least for Schedule 3 chemicals. For instance, CWC parties may not retain Schedule 1 chemicals except in limited quantities for research, medical, pharmaceutical, or defensive uses. Although the CWC encourages trade among parties, it is restricted with nonparties, outlawing the transfer of Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals. To ensure that transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to nonparties are not used for military purposes, the CWC requires exporters to obtain an end-use certificate from importing states. To plug these gaps, some experts have insisted on the need for the OPCW to conduct challenge inspections. As a British chemical weapons expert put it, “deterrence would be more effective if challenge [inspections] were used, and seen to be used, regularly where there were significant compliance concerns . . .” (OPCW Synthesis 2000). The problem, however, is that no CWC party has ever requested them. The process is not likely to be resorted to any time soon because it is complex and requires the cooperation of other member states (Article IX [17]). Other possible reasons include the fact that CWC parties may not want to disclose who they target with their intelligence activities, or the fact that they may also fear that the inspection will fail (Tucker 2001b:4–5, 18–19; Thränert & Tucker 2007:23–24). After all, despite the intrusive U.N. efforts to search for biological and chemical weapons in Iraq (through UNSCOM and then UNMOVIC), inspectors were unable to say, before the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, whether or not Saddam Hussein still possessed these weapons. Moreover, CWC parties may fear that requesting a challenge inspection would lead to retaliation because it is too politically confrontational. Note that the way the United States implemented the CWC leaves the president the right to block an inspection (routine or challenge) on grounds of national security, which could create a precedent for other parties to demand the same prerogative (Tucker 2001b:25). It remains, however, that the absence of any request for challenge inspections cannot but have a corrosive effect on the credibility of the CWC. Another way of compensating for the gaps and limitations of the CWC verification system is to make sure that its parties implement


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their obligations properly. As for the BTWC, the problem is that CWC implementation records have remained poor despite considerable assistance from the nonproliferation community. As biological and chemical weapons experts Oliver Thränert and Jonathan Tucker put it, “much remains to be done to improve the implementation of the CWC” (2007:33). The task is daunting, notably for developing countries: some of them have not yet submitted their initial declarations and others have only submitted incomplete ones. Moreover, many have not established, as required by Article VII, a national authority to monitor chemical industries and liaise with the OPCW, and they have not set up the necessary legal and administrative measures. Meanwhile, the Australia Group remains in place as a watchdog, but it is not and cannot be, as any other export control mechanism, proliferation-proof. The PSI and U.N. Resolution 1540 compensate for these weaknesses, but, as discussed previously, they are not devoid of limitations either. Detecting Missile & Conventional Proliferation The MTCR While there is no treaty to prohibit missile proliferation, the main suppliers have nevertheless set up an export control mechanism to detect its occurrence, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Concluded in 1987, the MTCR was initially intended to control the transfers that could lead to the development of “nuclear-capable missiles,” defined as missiles capable of carrying a 500 kilogram payload to a range of 300 kilometers or more. In 1992, MTCR members revised their guidelines to cover missiles capable of delivering not only nuclear, but also biological and chemical weapons, regardless of their range and payload. The MTCR has been credited with deterring or stopping short missile proliferation by making it difficult for would-be proliferators to acquire the necessary technology (Kimball 2004). The regime, however, has suffered from the same limitations as other export control mechanisms: decisions are only taken by consensus, commitments are not legally binding, trade remains opaque, and so on. And so it has not prevented India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan to expand their missile programs. With varying degrees of foreign assistance, these states have managed to deploy medium-range missiles (of a range of more than 1,000 kilometers), and they are also developing missiles of a longer-range (Cirincione et al. 2005:86–87). Moreover, they have

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become suppliers themselves, impeding the effectiveness of the MTCR, of which they are evidently not members. However imperfectly, the PSI and U.N. Resolution 1540 have responded to these problems by conducting ad hoc interdictions of shipments of missile-related technology and making it compulsory for states to enhance domestic controls over such technology. In addition, as discussed in the next chapter, a new regime has been set up to palliate the dangers of the proliferation of ballistic missile delivery systems: the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). The CCW, the Ottawa Convention, & the CCM Detection Mechanisms The vast majority of arrangements in place to address conventional proliferation are not really designed to detect (deter or stop short) the phenomenon. Instead, they are about palliating its associated dangers, that is, creating the conditions to manage it in the best possible ways. And so they will be analyzed in the next chapter, as mentioned earlier. Special attention, however, should be given to the detection mechanisms of the only three nonproliferation and disarmament treaties promoting nonproliferation and principles and norms in the conventional domain: the CCW, the Ottawa Convention, and the CCM. The CCW lacks a detection and enforcement mechanism, and there is no formal process for resolving compliance concerns. Discussions at the 2006 Third Review Conference, however, touched upon the need to include a pool of experts from which any party could seek help on issues regarding the implementation of the convention and its protocols (CCW/CONF.III/11. 2006:16–17). The Ottawa Convention is devoid of any detection mechanisms other than the obligation to report to the U.N. secretary-general on all stockpiled mines, mined areas, mines retained for training purposes, destruction of mines, national implementation measures, and measures taken to prevent civilians from entering mined areas (Article VII). In case of concerns for noncompliance, parties can seek clarification through the U.N. Secretary-General, who can decide to hold a special meeting leading to the authorization to send a fact-finding mission and, if necessary, to corrective actions or legal measures in accordance with the U.N. Charter (Article VIII). Modeled on the Ottawa Convention, the CCM, which lacks detection mechanisms, requires its parties to provide the U.N. Secretary-General with a report of its progress in implementing the treaty (Article VII) and allows them to submit a “Request


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for Clarification” through the secretary-general to verify compliance of other state parties (Article VIII). The Limits of Prevention & Detection Prevention and detection are key to fight weapons proliferation. They are not, however, devoid of any serious limitations. Although they are regularly fine-tuned to the current realities of the phenomenon, they are slow to come into focus and play their role effectively. Maybe it is unavoidable. After all, The history of the nonproliferation regime has been a game of catch-up: regulators belatedly tighten controls after digesting the lessons learned from previous rounds of proliferation, but states intent on acquiring strategic weapons capabilities find new ways to keep one step ahead. (Nuclear Black Markets 2007:159)


CH A P T E R

SI X


The goal of cancer treatment is to cure cancer or, if that is not possible, to control and slow the cancer growth so that the person can live as long as possible with a full quality of life. —Rosenbaum & Rosenbaum 2005:xvii

Treatments: Applying Remedies against NBC Proliferation The American Heritage Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (2004:838) defines the word “treatment” as “Administration or application of remedies to a patient.” This definition clearly indicates that the ends of treatments are the elimination of diseases (through remedies). It also suggests that the means used to reach these goals depend on a certain number of variables. Beyond the nature (and staging, etc.) of the disease at hand, treatment determination processes vary according to each patient. The above-mentioned definition reads “administration . . . of remedies to a patient . . . ,” meaning a particular patient. Cancer treatment options, for instance, are more numerous for young and socially active patients than for older and more passive patients for instance. That is why Sir William Osler points out that “[h]e who went about doing good was a physician of the body as well as of the soul” (1913:27). As in the medical domain, the ends of the policy of treatments with respect to weapons proliferation are to administer remedies to eliminate the phenomenon. They can either aim to block sustained progress toward its realisation or roll it back when it has occurred. Only nuclear,

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biological, and chemical proliferation is administered actual treatments. As developed in a next part, missile and conventional proliferation is addressed in a different manner. In fact, the bulk of the policy of treatments is predominantly focused on nuclear proliferation because it is, far in the lead, the most dangerous type of proliferation. Similarly, the means of such policy vary according to the type and progress of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC) proliferation. Treatments against an emerging instance of chemical proliferation, for instance, are generally different from those against a high-risk instance of nuclear proliferation. Treatments also depend on the type of proliferators, notably whether they are determined to bring their actions to fruition or only motivated by a concern to protect themselves against a future breakdown of their security environment. Put differently, treatments against NBC proliferation depend heavily on context. The conventional wisdom among the nonproliferation community is that there is much to gain by keeping uncertainty alive regarding the type of treatments to be administered because such uncertainty leaves open the possibility of the administration of decisive treatment in the minds of proliferators, thereby offering strong deterrent benefits (Roberts 1996:291). Treatments against NBC proliferation are mainly twofold. The first type is of diplomatic (medicinal) nature, consisting of inducements on the one hand and coercive sanctions on the other. Inducements or “carrots,” offer proliferators something in return or in exchange for their agreement to halt or reverse their illicit activities. They can take the form of security assurances, foreign aid, or energy supplies. Coercive sanctions or “sticks,” however, seek to force proliferators to abandon their NBC programs by imposing (or threatening the imposition of ) constraints on them. In general, these sanctions find expression in trade and financial restrictions. They can also be political in intent, such as the listing of proliferators as rogues for instance. Although inducements and coercive sanctions are different approaches, they have often been used in combination, as part of general packages, to treat NBC proliferation. Labelled “counter-proliferation” and generally administered after diplomatic treatments have failed, the second type of treatments is of military (surgical) nature. Through the use of air strikes or wider military measures, it aims to restore the statu quo ante by destroying proliferators’ NBC weapons and facilities. It can also seek to punish proliferators both by destroying its NBC weapons and facilities and by changing its pre-proliferation environment, notably through leadership or regime change. Such operations have made it absolutely crucial for its enforcers to develop, when possible, passive and active defenses and


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counterforce attack capabilities to defend against and defeat potential NBC use by the targeted proliferators. Counter-Proliferation: Myths & Realities Counter-proliferation is a U.S. by-product of the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991. Following the intervention against Iraq and the risks associated with its possession and potential use of NBC weapons, the Clinton administration addressed the need to develop proper military planning requirements. On December 7, 1993, U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin launched the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (Les Aspin 1993; Müller & Reiss 1995; Bates & McHorney 2000). The concept of “counter-proliferation” had been coined earlier by the team of his predecessor at the Pentagon, Dick Cheney. In view of the rapid proliferation of chemical and, to some extent, biological weapons in the 1980s, U.S. military planners had already begun to think about the need to project power to a NBC environment (Cooper 2001:97–98). For a long time, U.S. officials failed to define and explain counter-proliferation properly. It remained a vague concept often portrayed as the successor of nonproliferation policy. In setting out its national security strategy (2002), the Bush administration pinpointed that “counter-proliferation” referred to the military activities taken to defeat the threat or use of NBC weapons and deter, interdict, attack, and defend against the range of NBC acquisition, development, and employment situations (National Security Strategy 2002:14; National Security Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 2002:2–3). Nearly two centuries ago, Prussian military historian and theorist Carl von Clausewitz pointed out that “war is a mere continuation of policy by other means” (Graham 1911:119). Similarly, counter-proliferation is, in many ways, no more than the continuation of nonproliferation by other means. “A Matter of Opportunity” When the traditional nonproliferation model was designed in the 1960s, the bipolar structure of the international system made it absolutely impossible for the international community to conduct any other policies than those of prevention and detection. The East-West stand-off

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ruled out, in particular, the administration of coercive sanctions or military actions to restrain would-be proliferators or reverse instances of nuclear proliferation because the threat of mutual assured destruction was looming on the horizon. This meant that the traditional nonproliferation model ended up with serious intrinsic limitations, which were well-known by nonproliferation experts of the time. In 1961, nuclear strategist Fred Iklé captured the problem perfectly in his oftquoted question, “After Detection–What?” (1961). He developed his point further as follows: The current debate on arms control and disarmament puts great stress on the problem of how to detect violations of whatever agreements may be reached. . . . Yet detecting violations is not enough. What counts are the political and military consequences of a violation once it has been detected, since these alone will determine whether or not the violator stands to gain in the end. In entering into an arms-control agreement, we must know not only that we are technically capable of detecting a violation but also that we or the rest of the world will be politically, legally, and militarily in a position to react effectively if a violation is discovered. . . . A potential violator of an arms-control agreement will not be deterred simply by the risk that his action may be discovered. What will deter him will be the fear that what he gains from the violation will be outweighed by the loss he may suffer from the victim’s reaction to it. (1961:208) Insisting on the need for the development of “a program to deter evasion” (1961:220) Iklé described and evaluated various measures, ranging from political sanctions to military actions, to be taken after detection. But he was pessimistic about their prospects for success because of the nature of the cold war system. Since the end of the cold war, however, international power structures have changed considerably. Major powers have found themselves in agreement about the need to combat NBC proliferation. The five Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council, that is, the world’s security stakeholders, have all become members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (France and China joined the NPT in 1992). Similarly, most developing states have joined the main international institutions and processes. Only a small number of states have resisted the current distribution of power,


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with an even smaller group (rogue states and terrorist groups) rejecting the structure of the post-cold war and engaging themselves aggressively in NBC proliferation. International relations professor James Keeley had anticipated that reality, when he wrote, over 20 years ago, that “[d]eviants, those which persist in questioning [the nonproliferation regime], are likely to be small in number, isolated, and manageable” (1987:29). The fact that current high-risk proliferation instances have “only” been generated by isolated rogues (not peer competitors) and that the major powers have shared the same concerns over NBC proliferation has meant that these powers have been more disposed to resort to new means (treatments) to achieve nonproliferation ends. As the SIPRI Yearbook 1995 stresses, The possible spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons causes alarm among the major powers, and there is a consensus among a group of 30–35 countries that they have a strong mutual interest in taking measures to prevent further proliferation. (1995:7–8) The administration of treatments has become possible because of favorable circumstances. Perhaps it is not so surprising. After all, as Hippocrates pointed out, “healing is a matter of time, but it is sometimes also a matter of opportunity” ( Jones 1962:313). It is the same notion of opportunity that Condoleezza Rice, former U.S. National Security Advisor, highlighted in a landmark speech, We have a historic opportunity to break the destructive pattern of great power rivalry that has bedeviled the world since the rise of the nation-state in the 17th century [emphasis added]. Today, the world’s great centers of power are united by common interests, common dangers, and—increasingly—common values. The United States will make this a key strategy for preserving the peace for many decades to come. (2002) What are the risks and benefits of the main treatment options administered to respond to NBC proliferation? An important part of making a decision in favor of one particular nonproliferation treatment consists in weighing its positives and negatives, including the ability to manage its side effects, as is the case with cancer treatment. NBC nonproliferation treatments are generally applied in priority to determined or committed proliferators such as North Korea, Iran, or al

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Qaeda who are thought to pursue weapons development for purposes of aggression or coercion. Such a focus on high-risk proliferators is meant to uphold nonproliferation principles and norms. The idea is that the administration of treatments to such proliferators represents a key condition for successful prevention of the NBC proliferation disease. Moreover, treating these serious patients intends to reassure potential proliferators and, therefore, restrain them from choosing to develop NBC weapons. In addition, treatment enforcers also tend to strengthen their alliances and engage in international security consultations and cooperation with potential proliferators so as to restrain them further. Throughout the treatment of the North Korean nuclear crisis for instance, the United States has pursued active consultations with its Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese allies to make sure that none of these states would decide to develop nuclear weapons of their own as a shield from their neighbor. There are two main ways of administrating treatment options against NBC proliferation: the multilateral approach and the unilateral approach. The Multilateral Approach In theory, the administration of treatments against NBC proliferation is to be managed multilaterally, through the framework of collective security defined by the United Nations. The detection of NBC proliferation is meant to be followed by a referral of the proliferator to the U.N. Security Council for corrective or punitive treatments. That is why the NPT, the BTWC, and the CWC all assign, more or less explicitly, the ultimate responsibility for responding to noncompliance issues to that body under Article X(1), Articles VI and VII, and Articles VIII and XII, respectively. This is in line with the purpose of the U.N. Charter to address “threats to the peace, breaches to the peace, or acts of aggression,” including through the use of coercive sanctions or force if necessary (Chapter VII). As mentioned earlier, the president of the U.N. Security Council declared on January 31, 1992 that NBC proliferation was “a threat to international peace and security” (declaration S/23500). In practice, however, the administration of treatments against NBC proliferation through the multilateral approach has been confronted to a certain number of difficulties. First, as shown earlier, detecting NBC proliferation is not easy. Although Fred Iklé insisted, in the early 1960s, that such detection had “to impress the public as authoritative


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and impartial” (1961:218), the fact of the matter is that there have been no specific standards adopted by the nonproliferation community as to what noncompliance to the NPT, the BTWC, and the CWC really means and how it can be determined. The result is that each state party has drawn its own conclusions on an ad hoc basis with, in fact, only major powers being technically capable of going through compliance assessment processes, whose findings are generally not trusted by others. Moreover, as the capabilities required to develop NBC weapons are now more widely available, noncompliance determination has increasingly turned on an analysis of a proliferator’s intent, which, as nonproliferation experts Michael Moodie and Amy Sands point out, “is much too politicized a concept to be the basis for any international [treatment]” (2001:5). These detection issues have been conveniently used to suit the diverging interests of the U.N. Security Council Permanent Members (the so-called Permanent Five or P-5) as to what treatment option to administer to respond to NBC proliferation crises. Even though these powers have found themselves, since the end of the cold war, in general agreement to fight NBC proliferation, they have also often found themselves in general disagreement as to how to do so. The P-5 have generally failed to refer proliferators to the U.N. Security Council to impose coercive sanctions, or worse, to conduct punitive military actions against them. Even after North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006, international relations expert Scott Snyder stresses that “the U.N. Security Council mounted an unprecedented drive to impose sanctions on North Korea under Resolution 1718 but did not authorize collective military measures” (2007:35). Studies suggest that the reasons for such disagreements are linked to structural changes in the international political system (Roberts 2002:5–24; Einhorn 2007). Although uncertain about its role in the world and about how much it needs to invest in the nonproliferation regime (at least until 9/11), the United States has overall shown sustained leadership in the fight against proliferation. Britain and France have also tended to preach for the application of strong nonproliferation treatments. As for Russia and China, their roles have been much more ambiguous. In strategic retreat, Russia has been torn between its desire to continue to assume the responsibilities of a superpower and its necessity to act as a selfish or ordinary power. China has hesitated, for its part, between its new responsibilities as an emerging global power and its traditional commitment to nonalignment and noninterference.

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To remedy these problems, Pierre Goldschmidt, a renowned nonproliferation expert from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has recently suggested that the U.N. Security Council should pass a generic resolution laying out specific steps that its members (particularly its permanent members) would take to deal with a state found to be in violation of its nonproliferation obligations (2008). The idea is that a universally agreed predefined plan to respond to proliferation crises would considerably reduce the risks of disagreements among the P-5. So far, however, the U.N. Security Council has not contemplated passing such a resolution. Looking to the future, current problems are only likely to intensify should the number of U.N. Security Council Permanent Members increase—candidates for permanent membership include Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan (the so-called G4 nations). Although desirable to ref lect today’s strategic realities, which have changed considerably since the creation of the United Nations and the allocation of permanent memberships at the Security Council, the extension of the council’s permanent memberships would mathematically increase the chances that these powers fail to agree on what treatment option to administer during NBC proliferation crises. So far, the consequences of disagreements among the P-5 have been twofold. Some NBC proliferation crises have simply been left untreated. Although initially united to restore Iraqi nonproliferation compliance, the P-5 failed to agree on any treatment option after Saddam Hussein expelled U.N. inspectors at the end of 1998. For more than five years, until the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of the country, the Iraqi case remained completely untreated. Other NBC proliferation crises have been treated through the administration of ad hoc multilateral packages. These packages involve both inducements and coercive sanctions meant to solve the problems before their referral to the U.N. Security Council for corrective or punitive measures, as initially illustrated by the Iranian case for instance. Concurrently to the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 ( July 2006) that requires Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment and related activities, the international community offered a certain number of incentives to the Persian State. Because Iran rejected them and pursued its activities, the council adopted resolution 1737 (December 2006) to impose sanctions against it—and these sanctions were tightened further in March 2007 (U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747), March 2008 (U.N. Security Council Resolution 1803), and September 2008 (U.N. Security Council Resolution 1835).


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The historical record reveals that the effectiveness of such packages is limited short of leadership or regime change. Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and the ex-Soviet Republics, among others, all renounced nuclear weapons (programs) only after radical changes in their leaderships or regimes (Klare & Chandrani 1998:148). The numerous packages offered to North Korea and Iran have so far failed to reach their goals. The only exception that seems to prove the rule is Libya. Its leader, Colonel Gadhafi, abandoned its NBC weapons programs following secret diplomatic negotiations with the United Kingdom and the United States, enabling the rehabilitation of the country. This remains however the subject of much speculation. Experts highlight that contributory factors include the regime’s willingness to end sanctions and re-engage with the United States and the international community as a whole, the way the United Kingdom and United States undertook their diplomatic negotiations (behind closed doors), the demonstration effect of the toppling of Saddam Hussein, and the interception of NBC proliferation activities en route to Libya via the A. Q. Khan network (Bowen 2006). What are the factors that make the success of these packages so difficult? First, it is not easy for treatment enforcers to strike the proper balance between inducements and coercive sanctions, as extensively discussed in the analytical literature on the subject (Schelling 1966; George & Simons 1971; Jakobsen 1998). Moreover, coercive sanctions have often proved unable to reach their goals, especially if they are not properly calibrated and targeted. The general lack of information available on proliferators and, therefore, of what treatments might work on them, makes it even harder. Even a perfect balance between inducement and coercion does not guarantee success because proliferators are, like any other actors, capable of misperceptions or miscalculations. Perhaps that is why famous Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu indicated that “subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence” (Sawyer 1994:129). The second problem linked to multilateral packages is that they are generally found to be unacceptable by proliferators. Because the restoration of nonproliferation compliance requires a visible change in behavior, it often appears humiliating and, in fact, dangerous for leaders of a proliferating state. Leaders surrendering to international pressures may be perceived as traitors, driving political opponents to attempt to topple them. Leaders standing up to international pressures, however, tend to be supported by their population (Speier, Chow, & Starr 2001:56). More generally, it seems that proliferators are well aware of the potential

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dire consequences of their actions and, therefore, no package can realistically remove their determination to reach their goals. Perhaps this is particularly so with terrorists or state leaders willing to die for their cause. In this regard, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam’s oft-quoted statement is telling, “Jihad and the rif le alone: no negotiations, no conferences, and no dialogues” (Rubin & Rubin 2002:63). Finally, the effectiveness of multilateral packages to treat NBC proliferation is often plagued by the ability of proliferators to exploit the failure of the P-5 to be on the same wavelength and, notably, to escalate the threat or the use of force against proliferators. Through divide-andconquer strategies, proliferators have managed, often quite successfully, to remain in noncompliance of their obligations and buy time until they can bring their weapons programs to fruition (Martin 2007:81). Moreover, they have managed to take advantage of inducements given to them, which many criticize as counter-productive rewards for criminal behavior (Feaver & Niou 1996). The case of North Korea is particularly revealing. For nearly two decades, the little communist country has received various inducements and threats meant to put an end to its NBC proliferation programs. Not only have its leaders managed to take advantage of the inducements they received (foreign aid, energy supplies, etc.), but they have also bet, quite correctly so far, that the continuation of their illicit activities would be essentially inconsequential because of coalitional disagreements. As mentioned earlier, the international community did not administer any punitive military treatments against North Korea after its leaders decided to explode nuclear weapons devices in October 2006 and May 2009. In sum, the multilateral approach to the administration of treatments against NBC proliferation crises has serious shortcomings. This is problematic because, as cancer will spread by metastasis and ultimately kill if treated badly (or left untreated), an instance of high-risk NBC proliferation may spread likewise, increasing the risks of NBC war and terrorism and threatening the structure of the international system. The Unilateral Approach The obvious alternative solution is for the United States, the world’s only superpower and, therefore, its main security guarantor, to cut the Gordian knot. The United States can decide to resort to unilateral preventive treatments to deal with unresolved NBC proliferation crises. Because such treatments are administered after the U.N. Security Council has failed to act, they are generally bound to be of


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military nature (or possibly under the form of strict coercive sanctions) because they represent the ultimate bone of contention among the P-5. Treatments can take the form of surgical strikes that aim to destroy NBC weapons and facilities. One example is the U.S. decision, in 1998, to conduct air strikes against a chemical weapons factory run by al Qaeda in Sudan (Barlettai 1998). U.S. unilateral preventive military actions can also find expression in all-out wars against proliferators, generally leading to leadership or regime change. As the first all-out war against NBC proliferation, the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq exemplifies that reality quite vividly (Tertrais 2004a:32–39). Treating NBC proliferation in such a way is quite extreme because it stands outside the authority of the U.N. Security Council and, therefore, outside the established rules of collective security. At the same time, as Hippocrates pointed out, “for extreme diseases, extreme methods of cure . . . are most suitable” (Adams 1939:293). In view of the shortcomings of the multilateral approach and the possible dire consequences of NBC proliferation, U.S. unilateral preventive military actions against proliferators can be potentially effective to solve the problem, and, indirectly, contribute to reinforcing nonproliferation principles and norms. Here, the word “potentially” is crucial. The paradox of such a “bettersafe-than-sorry” approach (Sunstein 2005:15) is, as law professor Alan Dershowitz puts it that “when it is employed successfully, we rarely can be sure what it prevented [and] when it is not employed, it is difficult to assess if it could actually have prevented the horrors that did occur” (2006:159). An examination of the track record of unilateral preventive military actions against NBC proliferation can give some interesting insights about their effectiveness. In a study on the issue, international relations professor Dan Reiter (2006) shows that however attractive they may appear as treatment options, the performance records of unilateral preventive military actions have been poor. Surgical air strikes on NBC facilities have never generated positive nonproliferation developments. Although the 1981 Israeli raid against the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak has often been portrayed as a success in denying Saddam Hussein nuclear weapons, thorough analysis suggests that it only convinced the Iraqi leader to disperse and conceal his illicit activities so as to pursue them safely (Nuclear Black Markets 2007:43). Today’s proliferators, North Korea and Iran in the lead, have learnt the lessons of Osirak. They have made sure to scatter their weapons facilities throughout their territories and keep their locations secret, making surgical air strikes virtually irrelevant. Time will tell whether Israel’s September 2007 strike against

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a Syrian facility believed to be a nuclear reactor (developed with North Korean assistance) will prove a good move for nonproliferation. An assessment of the effectiveness of all-out wars against proliferators is more difficult because there has only been one “real” case of that sort so far: the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. It still remains possible, however, to draw some conclusions on its impact as an NBC proliferation treatment. The fact that no NBC weapons have been found in this country means that such a war was either unnecessary or counterproductive. The war may have cost many unnecessary lives and financial resources simply because Iraq no longer had NBC weapons in its possession. Alternatively, the 2003 war against Iraq may have been counterproductive because, should there have been any weapons in the country, these weapons might have ended up being disseminated in neighboring countries in the postinvasion chaos (Friend 2003:10). Either way, the war does not seem to have served the nonproliferation cause. In addition to doubful effectiveness, the central issue of unilateral preventive military actions, be they surgical or not, is that they are difficult to square with existing international law. Preemptive military actions, that is, actions against imminent attacks, are generally considered legal. Hugo Grotius, the famous Dutch jurist considered to be one of the core founders of international law, stressed in 1625 that “it is permissible to kill him who is making ready to kill” (Kelsey 1925:176). Pre-U.N. Charter customary international law, exemplified by the Caroline Case of 1837, also follows that line. The Caroline Case The Caroline Case is the event that defined the essential criteria giving preemptive action legal grounds according to customary international law ( Jennings 1980). In the late 1830s, an insurrection was taking place in Canada against British rulers. A U.S.-owned ship, the Caroline, was allegedly providing assistance to the Canadian rebels. As a consequence, on the night of December 29, 1837, as the ship was moored on the U.S. side of the Niagara River, British troops crossed the river, boarded the ship, killed the U.S. crew and set the ship on fire before sending it over Niagara Falls. The British argued they were acting in self-defense, but eventually apologized to the U.S. government. Over the course of diplomatic communications between the U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster and its British counterpart Lord Ashburton, two fundamental principles regulating the use of anticipatory self-defense (i.e., preemptive actions) emerged: the


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principle of “necessity” and the principle of “proportionality.” While the former requires the defending state to be faced with an imminent threat, the latter demands that the anticipatory action be “reasonable” in intensity. Since then, the demonstration of these two principles has been widely acknowledged as making preemptive actions legal (Tucker 1972:589). Article 51 of the U.N. Charter indicates that state parties have an “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member.” Some international lawyers favor a restrictive interpretation of Article 51 and suggest that actions against an imminent attack are unlawful because self-defense can be invoked “only if, and that implies after, an armed attack occurs” (Helmke 2008:293). Others, however, have a more permissive reading, stressing that Article 51 does not restrict the preexisting customary right of anticipatory self-defense. As Stephen Schwebel, a U.S. judge on the International Court of Justice, put it in his dissent in Nicaragua v. USA, Article 51 does not say “if, and only if, an armed attack occurs” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua [Nicaragua v. United States of America] 1986:347). The international legality of preemptive military actions was also confirmed by the U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, which indicated that “a threatened state, according to long established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would def lect it and the action is proportionate” (Annan 2004:63). The report even sets out a certain number of conditions, stressing that the threat must be sufficiently serious, that the military mission must have clear goals, that it must be undertaken as a last resort and proportionally to the threat in question, and, finally, that it must be based on a reasonable assessment of the costs involved (Annan 2004:67). The problem is that unilateral military actions against NBC proliferation are rarely preemptive. Clearly, it is quite a stretch to describe the development of NBC weapons as an imminent attack. In most cases, military actions against proliferators can only be labelled preventive and, accordingly, can only be deemed illegal without a mandate from the U.N. Security Council. To quote the U.N. High-Level Panel Report again, [I]f there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to. If it does not so choose, there will be, by definition, time to

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pursue other strategies, including persuasion, negotiation, deterrence and containment—and visit again the military option. For those impatient with such a response, the answer must be that, in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all. (Annan 2004:63) This is echoing the eloquent words of Louis Henkin, a renowned professor of law from Columbia University, that “to permit anticipation may virtually destroy the rule against the use of force, leaving it to every nation to claim anticipation and unleash the fury” (1963:151). These important considerations notwithstanding, the issue remains that there is absolutely no guarantee that the U.N. Security Council will respond effectively to a pressing NBC proliferation crisis. As Dershowitz puts it after insisting on the virtues of establishing a legal framework for preemptive and preventive military actions, “the problem is more with the mechanism of applying and enforcing the jurisprudence than with the content of the jurisprudence itself ” (2006:209). Hence the potential requirement for the United States, the world’s main security stakeholder, to take the matter into its own hands, as outlined in the so-called Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine Although its lineage can be traced to other planning documents, the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS 2002) is the first policy document that asserts so vividly the right to U.S. preventive military actions. The term “preventive” is not mentioned once in the NSS: there are only references to “preemptive” actions. That being said, as international law professor Anthony Arend points out, the traditional requirement of the “necessity criteria” has been relaxed (2003:96). The NSS claims that the United States “must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries . . . the greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack” (NSS 2002:15). Put differently, the United States sets out the possibility of conducting preventive military actions against proliferators, which remain outside the law at least at the present time.


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The legal issues of the United States doing it alone are problematic because they create serious legitimacy concerns. The United States could swear over and over again and even take a “Hippocratic oath” ( Jones 1962:299–301) that its intentions are geniunely motivated by the sole ethical desire to treat NBC proliferation effectively. Without an appropriate legal mandate, its actions will be perceived by the vast majority of nations around the world as clear indications that the superpower has entered its “unipolar moment” (Krauthammer 1990–91), acting as an unpredictable global hegemon. The negative side effects would be twofold. For a start, traditional U.S. allies could be led to distrust the superpower, making it harder for it to build coalitions to challenge other proliferators in the future. Such perception promises to be further enhanced by the general rejection of the use of force as an instrument of policy, notably in the developed world (Neff 2005). In this regard, a good case can be mounted that the Iraqi experience has considerably eaten away at the U.S. credibility to lead the fight against NBC proliferation because no NBC weapons could be found in this country. This is a serious problem because, as nonproliferation expert Brad Roberts stresses, the United States is notoriously “found to be chronically unreliable in uncovering, confirming, reporting, and sharing evidence of noncompliance” (2001:15). The other potential negative side effects of the unilateral approach are that some states may decide, out of fear from the United States, to engage in or accelerate their NBC weapons programs to protect themselves. Put differently, U.S. unilateral preventive military actions may be totally counterproductive. Interestingly enough, the same can be true of cancer surgery. Although intended to act as a cure, it can cause the disease to spread further if the necessary precautions are not taken (Pollock & Morton 2003). The Bush administration’s credo “the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” (Rumsfeld 2003) to justify unilateral preventive military actions against Iraq has had negative side effects for nonproliferation. It may well have contributed to the acceleration of nuclear proliferation in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere. For instance, shortly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Guardian reported that the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that “[t]he Iraq war teaches a lesson that in order to prevent a war and defend the security of a country and the sovereignty of a nation, it is necessary to have a powerful physical deterrent” (2003). That is why Dershowitz concludes that “in this high-stakes game of threat and counterthreat, timing may be everything” (2006:166),

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suggesting the possibility of the outbreak of an arms race epidemic with the most serious implications for international peace and security. In short, the existing treatments against NBC proliferation are no panacea. Although they represent an improvement because none could be applied in the past, they are plagued by serious shortcomings, whether administered multilaterally or unilaterally. On balance, the multilateral approach seems to reap more nonproliferation benefits than the unilateral approach. After all, multilateral failures to agree on necessary NBC proliferation treatment options are never final: it is always possible for concerned states to take hard proliferation cases to the U.N. Security Council many times over. Perhaps the mere existence of an active diplomatic process can be considered, in itself, a success because it is often unclear whether proliferators are truly committed to developing nuclear weapons. In a recent testimony before the U.S. Congress, for instance, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair and Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Michael Maples indicated that Iran still lacked weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and had not yet made a decision on whether to produce any (2009:19), making it obviously difficult for the international community to decide which policy responses should be administered to tackle the problem. Interestingly enough, the same is true for diseases like cancers. As Hippocrates indicates, Early determination of the patient’s treatment . . . is beneficial but complicated. For it is through many turns and changes that all diseases settle into some sort of permanence. ( Jones 1962:317) It is true, however, that proliferators may seek to buy time to win the “proliferation race” or work toward the development of a nuclear hedge. In their testimony, Blair and Maples also stress that “although we do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop them” (2009:20). And so it will take the brightest brains of the international community to collaborate and ref lect on the best course of action to adopt for each proliferation case, just as is the case for cancer treatment. To quote Hippocrates again, [W]hen a diseased condition is stubborn and the evil grows, in the perplexity of the moment most things go wrong. So on such occasions one must be bold. . . . Physicians who meet in consultation


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must never quarrel, or jeer at one another. . . . To [do] so will be a sign of weakness. ( Jones 1962:323, 325)

Palliation: Alleviating Inextricable Proliferation Threats The Merriam-Webster Medical Dictionary defines the word palliation as the actions undertaken “to reduce the violence of a disease: [to] ease without curing” (2005:595). Palliation or palliative care therefore seeks to cloak (from the Latin pallium), insofar as possible, a disease that cannot (yet) be cured. For instance, it is rare for octogenarian or older cancer patients to undergo surgery because such treatment options could prove fatal for them (and also because cancers tend to spread more slowly with age). Instead, doctors generally favor the administration of palliative care for them. That is why the World Health Organization has recently defined palliation as “an approach that improves the quality of life of patients and their families facing the problems associated with life-threatening illness.” As in the medical domain, the ends of a policy of palliation regarding weapons proliferation aim to ease or cloak its effects when it is (or appears to be) impossible to eradicate entirely. The institutionalization of arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1960s sought to palliate the fact that such superpowers could not engage themselves in general and complete disarmament. Similarly, today, many international security mechanisms have been set up to palliate the effects of the proliferation of NBC weapons, missile delivery systems, and other advanced conventional weapons. The ends of such mechanisms to address NBC proliferation are twofold. On the one hand, they consist in securing sensitive materials that cannot (yet) be eliminated and, on the other, in deploying defenses against them. Palliative mechanisms against missile and conventional proliferation are different. Their goals have been to promote transparency to generate confidence among states, and also to identify when proliferation activities can be destabilizing, which constitutes the first step toward a possible regulation/limitation. The means of such a policy of palliation for NBC proliferation have found expression in a wide range of arms control measures ranging from threat reduction programs to missile defense systems. Measures to regulate/limit the quantity, quality, or geographical deployment of

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missiles and conventional weapons are also multiple and include, in particular, confidence-building measures such as prenotifications and observations of military exercises, data exchanges, military-to-military contacts, and so on.

Palliating Nuclear, Biological, & Chemical Proliferation Threat Reduction Programs Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international community, with the United States far in the lead, established programs to secure the large quantities of NBC weapons and materials scattered all around this vast territory. Meant to reduce the risks that NBC weapons and materials be purchased or stolen by would-be proliferators, these programs are collectively referred to as the “Nunn-Lugar Programs,” so named after the Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar who sponsored the first legislation creating them. The phrase “Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs” (CTR) is often used to refer to these programs, although only the U.S. Department of Defense calls its relevant programs as such (U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency). Similar programs are managed by the U.S. Departments of Energy and State, and by countries other than the United States. After the international community managed to convince Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to transfer back to Russia the nuclear weapons stationed on their territories, the necessary protection to nuclear warheads during their transport was organized by threat reduction programs. Thanks to these programs, security systems at nuclear warheads storage facilities have been upgraded, and emergency planning and response measures have been developed together with a new modern automated system of tracking and accounting for nuclear warheads (Wolfsthal, Chuen, & Daughtry 2001:47–58). Another component of threat reduction programs has been the provision of assistance to secure the former Soviet Union’s massive stocks of nuclear weapons materials outside nuclear weapons, most of which are located in Russia: some 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium. This has been done through the Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting Program, the construction of a large nuclear material facility in Russia (the Fissile Material Storage Facility, Mayak), the U.S. purchase of Russian HEU from dismantled nuclear weapons, and the disposition


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of plutonium in excess of defense needs (Cirincione, Wolfsthal, & Rajkumar 2005:132–36). Threat reduction programs have also focused their efforts on providing nonmilitary positions to former NBC scientists and workers through the International Science and Technology Centre (and its Ukrainian Science and Technology Centre branch) and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (Wolfsthal et al. 2001:68–74; Cirincione et al. 2005:136–39). These initiatives have sought to promote the conversion of the defense industries of the Newly Independent Republics (NIS) to civilian production through the commercialization of technologies and the development of links between NIS institutes and U.S. industrial partners. The Nuclear Cities Initiative sought, until September 2006, to provide sustainable civilian jobs to weapons experts in Russia’s 10 formerly closed and isolated former nuclear cities—it was cancelled following legal liability issues between Washington and Moscow (Stone & Kintisch 2006:1550). Additionally, threat reduction programs have provided assistance to eliminate long-range nuclear missiles, strategic bombers, ballistic missile submarines, and biological and chemical weapons stockpiles (Wolfsthal et al. 2001:54–57). Threat reduction programs have had good results and made substantial progress over the years. In a recent comprehensive study, nonproliferation expert Matthew Bunn indicates that “[i]n Russia, there have been major improvements in nuclear security—the difference between the security in place at many nuclear sites today and the security in place in 1994 is like night and day” (Bunn 2008:v). But Bunn is quick to remind that much remains to be done, notably with regards to nuclear weapons materials security, of which Russia has the world’s largest stockpiles. In particular, disputes between U.S. and Russian officials over access to key facilities and administrative and legal procedures have been the cause of significant delays. Although the Bush administration had initially planned to cut significantly the budgets of threat reduction programs for these reasons, the 9/11 terrorist attacks convinced U.S. officials to pursue and, in some cases, increase funding. With the conclusion of the Global Partnership (2002), for instance, the United States gained the support of other countries, which committed themselves to providing up to $20 billion over 10 years to help Russia and other nations to secure and destroy their stockpiles of NBC weapons and materials (Statement by G8 Leaders 2002). After 9/11, the international community has also paid greater attention to the security of sensitive NBC materials beyond the former

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Soviet Union. In this spirit, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted an ambitious “Action Plan” in March 2002 to upgrade worldwide protection against acts of terrorism involving nuclear and radiological materials (IAEA Press Release 2002/4). Moreover, the enactment of the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Bill has, since 2004, enabled the U.S. Department of Defense to spend $50 million to assist countries in addition to the former Soviet Union through threat reduction programs. This has enabled the United States to fund the elimination of chemical weapons in Albania and Libya and the destruction of chemical weapons facilities in Yugoslavia. The United States is also currently contemplating expanding its programs to India, Pakistan, and North Korea (Woolf 2004; Squassoni 2005a; Squassoni 2006). In the case of Pakistan, for instance, the United States is already very active in making sure that NBC technologies and materials in this country are as secure as possible. It has funded a five-year US$3.5 billion package of economic and military assistance, and put pressure on the Pakistani leadership for the adoption of an improved nuclear oversight and control system and stricter export control laws. This has led to the enactment of the “Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material, and Equipment Related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and Their Delivery Systems Bill” by the Pakistani National Assembly (September 2004), which entails harsh penalties for violators. These efforts to apply palliative measures against NBC technology and materials have culminated with the launch of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) by the U.S. Department of Energy (Department of Energy Press Release). Launched in 2004, the GTRI aims to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism through the minimization of the amount of nuclear materials available that can be used for weapons. The GTRI intends to achieve these goals by repatriating fresh HEU and spent fuel of Russian origin, repatriating research reactor spent fuel of U.S. origin, and converting the cores of civilian research reactors that use HEU into using low-enriched uranium fuel. Moreover, the GTRI seeks to accelerate the strengthening of nuclear security throughout the world. The GTRI has recently been completed by multilateral efforts. In 2005, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which has, since 1987, obliged its parties to ensure that nuclear materials for peaceful purposes are protected at agreed levels during national and international transport (Article III), was amended to create a legal obligation on its parties to secure nuclear materials in storage and during transport, and to criminalize acts of sabotage against civilian nuclear


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facilities. Other additions include the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (2006), which seek to establish a reliable international legal mechanism for action and cooperation in that sphere (Department of State Press Release 2006). Another measure undertaken by the international community to reduce NBC threats throughout the world has been the passing of U.N. Resolution 1540 (April 2004), mentioned earlier. In addition to creating a legal obligation for all states to set up the necessary means to detect NBC proliferation, that resolution makes them legally responsible for beefing up their national security systems, which is essentially the task of the Department of Homeland Security in the United States (National Strategy for Homeland Security 2002; 2007). In his study, Bunn points to the good progress of all these initiatives, but indicates that nuclear weapons and ingredients for nuclear weapons development exist in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries. He points out, for instance, that the November 2007 break-in at a South African facility holding hundreds of pounds of weapons-grade HEU is “a reminder that nuclear security is a global problem, not just a problem in the former Soviet Union” (2008:v). And so in his recommendations for the newly elected U.S. Administration, he stresses that it will be of paramount importance for President Barack Obama to keep his campaign pledge to secure all nuclear materials at vulnerable sites within four year, notably in China, India, Pakistan, and of course in South Africa (2008:xii). Hopefully the recent creation of the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) will help to carry out this ambitious yet essential agenda. Launched in 2008 with the support of generous governmental and nongovernmental donations, WINS is meant to define and promulgate global nuclear security “best practices” to palliate the dangers associated with the growing peaceful uses of nuclear technologies and materials throughout the world. The U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement After India and Pakistan, the last two NPT holdouts with Israel, conducted nuclear weapons tests in May 1998, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1172 that condemned the two states and demanded that they join the NPT as Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). As the resolution remained a dead letter, the U.S.-led international community gradually sought to break the deadlock by engaging India and Pakistan. The catalyst leading to engagement was 9/11. Shortly after the terrorist attacks, the United States decided to remove

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its sanctions against the two countries because it wanted cooperation with them in the war against terrorism (Wagner 2001). Why Are Indian, Pakistani, & Israeli Nuclear Weapons Currently Inextricable? India and Pakistan are unlikely to give up their nuclear weapons because of the state of their bilateral relations, the Sino-Indian relations and, to some extent, the lack of progress toward general and complete disarmament. India and Pakistan have been bitter enemies since the Partition of 1947. The main cause of conf lict between the two states is linked to territorial disputes over the region of Kashmir, over which they have fought three wars in 1947, 1965, and 1999 (Ganguly 2001). In such tense environment, neither of them is likely to disarm. India’s disarmament is further hampered by its relations with China, with which it fought a war in 1962 over territorial disputes on the SinoIndian border (Pringsheim 1963). Therefore, India is unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons if China does not do so. In turn, China refuses to disarm because it contends that other Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) with much larger arsenals do not make sufficient progress toward general and complete disarmament. Israel is unlikely to abandon its nuclear weapons because of its never-ending conf lict with the Palestinians, Arab states, and Iran, which do not recognize its existence (Barnaby 1987). In July 2005, former U.S. President George W. Bush, later supported by his Russian, Chinese, French, and British counterparts, announced the possibility of a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India (Bush & Singh 2005). Representing a departure from traditional nonproliferation rules and practices (because India is not an NPT party), Bush indicated that the agreement would take effect on the conditions that India revises its international and domestic export control commitments, separates its civilian and military nuclear facilities, and puts its civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards (Boese 2005b). The agreement took over three years to come to fruition because it had to go through several complex stages. After the United States and India reaffirmed their growing strategic parternship and signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement in March 2006, it took nearly 10 months for the United States to craft and sign into law the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act


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(December 2006). The Hyde Act modifies the requirements of “Section 123” of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act to permit nuclear cooperation with India and, in particular, to negotiate a “123 Agreement,” that is, a contract that defines the terms and conditions for bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation. Despite opposition from the Indian communist allies of the ruling United Progressive Alliance, a 123 Agreement was concluded at the end of July 2007 and, a year later (August 2008), the IAEA Board of Governors approved a safeguards agreement with India. In September 2008, despite strong doubts by some members, the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted a waiver to India, allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries. This enabled the U.S. House of Representatives to pass the bill and the U.S. Senate to approve the civilian nuclear agreement allowing India to purchase nuclear fuel and technology from the United States (October 2008). In early 2009, India signed an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which, once into force, will enable inspections to be phased-in on the 35 civilian nuclear facilities that India has identified in its Separation Plan. According to its proponents, the agreement stands as a major nonproliferation success because it will finally provide some monitoring of Indian nuclear activities (Ganguly & Mistry 2006:11). There is more to gain, they say, to palliate its effects than continue to administer curative treatments against which India has proven resistant. Proponents also indicate that nuclear cooperation with India will be a blessing for its growing economy, and they stress that, according to the terms of the agreement, the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies such as civil enrichment and reprocessing items is prohibited, thus reducing the risks of enhancing India’s activities. Finally, proponents point out that in addition to opening the door to a potential client for which the United States must compete with Russia, nuclear cooperation with India also enables the United States to create a viable counterweight to the growing inf luence of China in Asia (Levi & Ferguson 2006:8). Critics, however, contend that the conclusion of such an agreement damages the credibility of the NPT. They argue that not only does it recognize India as a de facto NWS, but that it also gives (or rewards) it with access to civil nuclear cooperation, in contradiction with Article I (Potter 2005; Weiss 2007). Although former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph stressed that the United States made it “very clear that we [would] not recognize India as a nuclear weapons state” (Boese & Pomper 2006:21), critics insist that this is still problematic because it sends the

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wrong message to NNWS, which are already questioning the viability of the NPT regime as it is. Critics also highlight that the agreement could have imposed more stringent conditions and, in particular, that its terms could have made it clear that nuclear cooperation would cease if India decided to conduct a nuclear test, withdraw from safeguards, and continue fissile production (The Hindu 2008). Moreover, critics deplore the fact that the agreement focuses only on India, casting aside the other two NPT holdouts, Pakistan and Israel. They highlight that Pakistan, backed by China, has suggested that his country and other non-NPT parties should be considered for a similar agreement (Shabbaz 2008) and that Israel has pointed out that the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver to India creates a precedent enabling it to construct its first nuclear power plant in the Negev desert while benefiting from similar trade exemptions (Baruah 2007). In a nutshell, critics fear that the agreement could trigger the collapse of the NPT regime. Missile Defense Systems Another type of palliative treatment against NBC proliferation includes the deployment of missile defense systems. The idea to develop and deploy such systems was on the agenda in the early days of the nuclear age (Baucom 1992) and never faded away, as exemplified by the famous 1983 proposal made by U.S. President Ronald Reagan for an ambitious “Strategic Defense Initiative,” which intended to use ground- and space-based systems to protect the United States from attack by incoming strategic missiles (Fitzgerald 2001). However, the development and deployment of missile defense systems did not become a major issue before the 1990s because prior technological capabilities were too limited to make them a reality. From the mid-1990s, U.S. technological progress made the deployment of more sophisticated systems feasible (Deutch, Brown, & White 2000:98). Concurrently, numerous reports indicated that the missile threat from rogue states or terrorists was becoming serious. The most famous report of the kind is the so-called Rumsfeld Commission Report ( July 1998). This report became highly significant because it was released two months after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests (May 1998) and one month before North Korea fired a ballistic missile that f lew over Japan (August 1998). Its findings were confirmed by the 1999 report produced by the National Intelligence Council entitled Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015, which indicated that, in addition to the longstanding missile threats from Russia and


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China, the United States may soon be directly threatened by North Korean and Iranian missiles. Consequently, at the end of 2001, the Bush administration abrogated the ABM Treaty, the key legislative obstacle to missile defense systems (Bush 2001). Often referred to as the cornerstone of the world’s strategic stability, that treaty “sealed” the U.S.-Soviet relation of mutual deterrence during the cold war by restricting the deployment of such systems. With the ABM Treaty out of the way, the United States became free to begin the deployment of missile defense systems. And so in June 2002, six months after its formal withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, it announced that it would deploy a limited missile defense system in Fort Greely, AK. Subsequently, a small site at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA was added. Limited in scope, these initial deployments are meant to protect the U.S. territory against incoming missiles launched from states across the Pacific, such as North Korea. The United States also gradually deployed (or committed itself to deploy) missile defense systems to protect its allies in Europe and Asia (Hildreth 2005). Proponents of such systems stress that missile proliferation is a dangerous reality against which the United States needs to deploy any possible protection because the threat of nuclear retaliation might not deter today’s and tomorrow’s proliferators (Payne 2000). They also point out that nonproliferation benefits will be reaped from such deployments as would-be proliferators will be discouraged from developing weapons whose leverage capabilities will be cancelled out by such systems. Moreover, proponents insist that missile defense systems will facilitate the administration of proliferation treatments by making it easier for the United States to put pressure on determined proliferators or engage in military activities against them, knowing that the latter will not be able to launch an overwhelming counterattack. Critics, however, stress that missile defense systems will never work perfectly and insist that enemies can launch devastating nonmissile attacks against the United States, as was the case with the 9/11 attacks (Postol 2002). And so they indicate that it would be a mistake to invest considerable amounts of money on such systems. After all, a comprehensive missile defense strategy to protect the whole of the United States with ground- and space-based interceptors is estimated to cost no less than between $100 billion and $1 trillion by 2030 (Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation 2004). Most importantly, critics contend that the deployment of missile defense systems will upset the strategic balance between the United States and Russia on the one hand, and between the United States and

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China on the other. They stress that U.S. missile defense systems will drive Russia and China to enhance or expand their arsenals to be able to overwhelm the new U.S. defenses in the event of a crisis. Critics point out that it was to preserve its option to saturate U.S. defenses that Russia decided, after the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, to keep its MIRVed missiles, which were due to be eliminated under the defunct START II Treaty. They also explain that U.S. missile defense systems are a key concern for Chinese strategists, who believe that such systems will undermine China’s small nuclear deterrent. Critics underline that Chinese strategists also fear that the sale of missile defenses by the United States to Taiwan could make China vulnerable to nuclear blackmail in a major Cross-Strait crisis and, therefore, that China will find justification to further develop its nuclear arsenal (Yuan 2003). In a nutshell, critics stress that missile defense systems will fuel, not curtail proliferation. Palliating Missile & Conventional Proliferation General and complete disarmament of missile delivery systems and conventional weapons appears to be neither desirable nor feasible. It is not desirable because such weapons are deemed necessary to respond to legitimate security concerns, as enshrined in the U.N. Charter. Moreover, the elimination of all missiles and conventional weapons does not appear feasible because powerful economic and financial interests support the production and development of these weapons. It goes without saying that these interests outweigh civil society pressures in favor of stringent restrictions against (or complete elimination of ) these weapons. That is why missile and conventional nonproliferation principles and norms have been virtually inexistent (except for “inhumane” weapons as mentioned in the previous chapter). Logically, the result is that no treatment, understood in the medical sense of the term, has been administered against such proliferation. Instead, only palliative measures have been applied. In other words, the international community has only managed to agree that destabilizing weapons transfers or buildups should be curtailed, not forbidden. Various palliative mechanisms (global and regional) have therefore been set up to promote transparency of what is considered inextricable missile and conventional proliferation activities. Their goal has been to generate confidence among states and help to identify when such activities are destabilizing so as to regulate or limit them as far as possible.


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Global Mechanisms Global palliative mechanisms to regulate missile and conventional proliferation are focused on weapons transfers. One exception that proves the rule is the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), an agreement open to every state that encourages them to exercise maximum restraint in developing, testing, and deploying ballistic missiles. The HCOC also introduces transparency measures such as annual declarations and prelaunch notifications regarding ballistic missiles and space launch programs. During the cold war, the regulation of global weapons transfers was on the security agenda of the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1977–1978, the two superpowers, then the leading weapons suppliers, engaged in bilateral talks on conventional arms transfers (CAT) (Goldblat 2002:241–42). The talks, however, never produced any results. Progress really began with the 1991 Five-Powers Communiqué and Five-Power Guidelines undertook by the P-5 after the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War (Goldblat 2002:242–43). While acknowledging the need for states to receive weapons for defense purposes, the P-5 recognized that indiscriminate transfers of missile delivery systems and other conventional weapons carry the risk of instability. These powers began to agree among themselves to exercise restraint in weapons transfers. They then pushed for the creation, in December 1991, of “a universal and nondiscriminatory Registry of Conventional Arms, to include data on international arms transfers as well as information provided by Member States on military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies” (UNGA46/36L). Designed to complement the U.N. Standardised System of Reporting on Military Expenditure, which, since 1980 (UNGA35/142B), has requested states to report their military expenses, the U.N. Registry of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) calls upon all states to exercise restraint in exports and imports of the seven following categories of conventional arms: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-calibre systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships (including submarines), and missiles and missile-launchers. Restraint is particularly recommended in zones of tensions and conf licts. In addition, the UNROCA encourages all states to develop adequate laws and administrative procedures to regulate weapons transfers effectively. The regime was perfected by the conclusion, in 1996, of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Control for Conventional Arms and DualUse Goods and Technologies (WA). Replacing the defunct CoCom, the WA is a voluntary agreement open to every state. It has roughly the same goals as the UNROCA, but focuses both on conventional

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weapons (battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery, military aircraft/UAV, military and attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, and small and light weapons) and dual-use items, divided in basic and sensitive items such as stealth technology materials and advanced radars. Its goal is to block destabilizing transfers. WA members, however, do not have veto authority over the proposed exports of other members, a power which CoCom members had (and exercised). Since 1998, the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports has stood as another mechanism to regulate missile and conventional proliferation (DGE–PESC IV). An agreement among E.U. member states, the code identifies eight criteria for export licensing and operative provisions that outline reporting procedures and mechanisms for intergovernmental denial notification and consultation. The E.U. Code of Conduct on Arms Exports Criterion One

Criterion Two Criterion Three Criterion Four Criterion Five

Criterion Six

Respect for the international commitments of E.U. member states, in particular the sanctions decreed by the U.N. Security Council and those decreed by the community agreements on nonproliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations. The respect of human rights in the country of final destination. The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conf licts. Preservation of regional peace, security, and stability. The national security of the member states and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries. The behavior of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances, and respect for international law.

Treating & Palliating the Disease Criterion Seven

Criterion Eight

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The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions. The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defense with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources.

Although useful to palliate the problems of missile and conventional proliferation activities, these mechanisms have serious limitations. Participation to the UNROCA, for instance, has been poor and sloppy, notably in zones of conf licts such as in Africa and the Middle East because the provision of data is only voluntary and not subject to verification (SIPRI 2007:413; UNODA 2009:15–20). Moreover, despite progress made by the E.U. Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, there is still no consensus over what constitutes “excessive” or “destabilizing” missile or conventional weapons transfers because they are political notions par excellence. Without objective criteria, the problem is that states cannot agree to restraint weapons transfers. WA decisions to block transfers, for instance, can only be taken by consensus. Even when states agree to deny weapons exports to some recipients, decisions are not legally binding, meaning that a determined supplier could still go ahead with its sale without having to suffer any serious consequences. The most daring commitment to regulate transfers of missiles and conventional weapons is confined to the 2000 WA decision to “non-binding best practices” regarding the effective enforcement of national export controls, the disposal of surplus military equipment, and the control of exports of items considered extremely sensitive (Wassenaar Arrangement Public Statement). From 2006, however, the international community began to make significant steps toward the conclusion of an all-encompassing Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) (UNGA61/89). This push resulted essentially from a refocus of efforts following the failure of the 2006 conference to improve the U.N. Program of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) (A/CONF.192/2006/RC/9 2006), which, since then, has achieved

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modest steps forward (A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3 2008). While continuing to acknowledge the right of states to manufacture and trade missiles and conventional weapons for self-defense purposes, the proposed ATT would harmonize criteria, standards, interpretations, and implementation of national weapons transfer controls, and monitor/verify transfers of conventional weapons. Its development, however, will take time. The group of governmental experts established to examine its feasibility, scope, and draft parameters released a report stressing that, in the light of the complexity of the issues inherent to the conventional arms transfers, the only way forward is on a step-by-step basis (A/63/334). Moreover, its success remains uncertain given the limitations already plaguing existing global palliative mechanisms. Regional Mechanisms Since the end of the cold war, an increasing number of mechanisms to palliate missile and conventional proliferation have been regional in scope. They are mostly developed in Europe. Intended to achieve a balance of force between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact members through lower but equal force ceilings, the 1973 Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (the so-called MBFR Talks) never produced any results (Goldblat 2002:220–22). When they were formally ended in February 1989, however, new talks began immediately. Capitalizing on improved relations, NATO and Warsaw Pact members succeeded in concluding the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe or CFE (November 1990), which entered into force in July 1992. Of unlimited duration, the CFE introduces limitations and reductions in five main categories of conventional armaments (battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters). These are applicable to the entire land territory of state parties from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains (the so-called ATTU zone). The treaty also includes on-site inspections and calls on its parties to introduce transparency measures and report their activities through annual reports. As the CFE became increasingly inadequate to deal with the changing post-cold war environment, its parties worked to modify it through a series of conferences that were convened from the mid-1990s. This gave rise, in November 1999, to the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Istanbul Document 1999 1999:119–235). The main modifications consist in putting an end to the block-related character of the treaty (NATO versus Warsaw Pact). Instead, each state will now have a national ceiling of conventional


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weapons, states falling in the area of application of the treaty will have territorial ceilings, and the possibility of large-scale force concentrations in one state will be considerably reduced. Its entry into force will only be effective when all 30 signatories have ratified it. It will replace the original CFE Treaty. Despite some compliance issues, the CFE treaty has managed to regulate conventional proliferation in Europe quite successfully (Goldblat 2002:230). It has promoted greater transparency in military affairs, generated confidence, and eliminated the disparities most problematic to European strategic stability. Today, no state or group of states has the capability to launch a surprise attack in Europe. Moreover, the CFE treaty has acted as a model for the management of conventional proliferation in the former Yugoslavia. In setting numerical ceilings for major conventional weapons systems and, among other things, limitations on military personnel, the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control ( June 1996), which has proved successful, was heavily based on the CFE treaty (Konstanty & Schreiber 2006:21). However, NATO members, together with other states, have refused to ratify the amended version of the CFE treaty (therefore blocking its entry into force) until Russian forces pull out from the disputed Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the separatist region of Transdniestria in Moldova. That is partly why state parties failed to agree on a final document at the Third CFE Review Conference in May–June 2006 (SIPRI 2007:603–4). The Russian military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 casts even further doubts on possible progress toward the entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty, as foreign governments are still trying to figure out how many Russian forces have remained there (Boese 2008a). Moreover, in July 2007, Russia evoked Article XIX(2) and suspended its participation to the original CFE treaty in part not only for these reasons, but also to state its opposition to U.S. plans to deploy a missile defense system in Eastern Europe aiming, according to U.S. officials, to ward off a potential missile threat coming from Iran. Most experts, however, contend that the Russian withdrawal from the CFE treaty is essentially symbolic. They also point out that the overall reductions of the holdings of conventional armaments and equipment within the area of application of the treaty have been substantial, with some reductions standing even below the levels set (SIPRI 2007:604–5). Beyond the CFE framework, palliative mechanisms against missile and conventional proliferation in Europe also include confidencebuilding measures (CBMs), mainly coordinated by the Organization

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for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Although some were concluded during the cold war (the 1975 Helsinki CBM Document and the 1986 Stockholm CSBM Document), the process really developed in the 1990s through the Vienna Documents (1990, 1992, 1994, and 1999). Moreover, the conclusion of the Open Skies Treaty (1992), which entered into force in 2002 and includes a total of 34 state parties over an area stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, has allowed its parties to conduct short-notice, unarmed, reconnaissance f lights over the others’ entire territories to collect data on military forces and activities. This has enabled to promote transparency, communication, and a better understanding of conventional military activities among European states. Latin American states have also set up palliative mechanisms to address missile and conventional proliferation (Goldblat 2002:233–25, 278). Such mechanisms have a long history in the region. In February 1923, some Central American states agreed to keep their standing armies and national guards at low levels except in cases of civil war or imminent invasion by another state. Further (vain) attempts were also made during the cold war: the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho and its subsequent process strove to limit the development of missiles and conventional weapons and stop their acquisition in the region, and the 1985 Contadora Act sought to regulate military activities in the Central American Isthmus. Since the end of the cold war, Latin American efforts have proved more successful, with the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions (1999) contributing to regional openness and transparency in the acquisition of conventional weapons (provision of annual reports on such acquisitions [imports/exports or national production] to the Organization of American States [OAS]). The 2002 Lima Commitment has restricted the use of certain conventional weapons and sought to further promote transparency in armaments. Latin American states have also agreed to several CBMs following the Buenos Aires Governmental Experts Meetings on CSBMs (March 1994), the Santiago Conference (November 1995), the San Salvador Conference (February 1998), and the Summit-mandated Miami Experts Meeting (2003), to quote just a few. Although much more limited in scope, some palliative mechanisms against missile and conventional proliferation have also been set up in other regions of the world. Mechanisms outside Europe and Latin America include, for the most part, CBMs. In Asia, some limited CBMs have been concluded between India and Pakistan and between China, Russia, and the Central Asian Republics. Most of them, however, have been undertaken within the framework of the ASEAN Regional


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Forum (ARF) or on an ad hoc basis. They include military exchanges and trainings, annual defense policy statements, and notification and observation of military exercises. Virtually nothing of the kind exists in the Middle East and Africa. The Difficulties of Treatments & Palliation Only recently has it been possible to administer treatments against weapons proliferation. This constitutes a major improvement. The problem, however, is that they remain considerably difficult to administer with success. Because, as Hippocrates stated, “it is impossible to make all the sick well” (Adams 1939:42), palliative care, at least, enables to give some comfort. It is no panacea, if only because it does not offer any cure, but just temporary solutions or mitigations to the problem. It remains nevertheless better than nothing.


CONC LU SION

From Cure to Treatments

There are no such things as incurables, there are only things for which man has not found a cure. —Bernard Baruch (Gaither, Cavazos-Gaither, & Slocombe 1999:57) Treating Cancer The disease of cancer began to be documented by the ancient Egyptians in the so-called Ebers, Smith, and Petrie papyri, all of which date back to approximately 1,600 BC (Thorwald 1962:48–55, 98–99). It was Hippocrates, however, who, circa 400 BC, completed the first advanced description of cancer. He also coined the concept, calling the process karkinos, Greek for “crab” or “crayfish,” to which he added the suffix— oma, Greek for “swelling,” giving birth to the name karkinoma or, in Latin, “cancer” (Cassileth 1983:363). Some 500 years later, the Greek Clarissimus Galen, the last great physician of the Antiquity who settled in Rome in 164 AD, took the study of cancer a step further by developing a comprehensive classification of 61 different types of cancer (Fisher & Hermann 1979:428). Both Hippocrates and Galen refuted the earlier belief that cancer (and other diseases) resulted from evil spirits. Instead, they contended that it had natural causes. They argued that the human body was filled with four basic substances or temperaments called “humors”: black bile from the spleen, blood from the heart, phlegm from the brain, and yellow bile from the liver (Duffin 2001:43–46). These humors, they said, held harmoniously in balance when a person was

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healthy. An excess or deficit in one of them, however, led to diseases and disabilities. Despite deep pessimism about the prospects for cure, Hippocrates and Galen recommended strict diets, blood-letting, and laxatives to treat cancer. They assumed that it came from an excess of black bile (atrabilis) that solidified in certain parts of the body (Hayward 1965:461). Setting the general pattern for cancer understanding and management until the second half of the nineteenth century, this theory was therefore intended to administer an all-encompassing cure to the disease. The problem, however, is that it failed to produce any tangible results. Writing in the early years of the nineteenth century, British physician Thomas Denman summarized the status of knowledge on cancer stating that “little is at present known of cancer, but as an incurable disease” (1810:22). A combination of factors led to revolutionary changes in cancer research from the mid-nineteenth century. The generalization of body dissection to discover the cause of death and the emergence of a few alternative theories had, from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, already led prominent scientists to question the underlying assumptions of humor theories (Kardinal & Yarbro 1979:399). The pivotal factor responsible for change, however, was really linked to the substantial technical improvements and systematic use, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, of a technology that had existed since the seventeenth century: the microscope. This was central to the development of the cell theory by Matthias Schleiden, Theodor Schwann, and Johannes Müller and, in turn, to the development of cellular pathology by the inf luential Rudolph Virchow. In the words of Savile Bradbury, a professor of anatomy and expert in both optical and electron microscopy, “the construction of an optically efficient microscope opened the way to the discovery of the causation agents of many diseases and laid the foundations of the study of cellular pathology” (1967:34). By showing that cancer reveals its presence in cells, Virchow’s theory decisively displaced the obvious-seeming humoral explanations about chemical imbalances in the body, breaking with centuries-long tradition. To use philosopher Thomas Kuhn’s terminology (1962), “a paradigm shift” took place: the traditional conceptual framework of cancer was replaced by a new brand one. That new framework still constitutes the bedrock of current research, which remains primarily centered on the study of the cell. It is true, however, that scientists have, since then, gone beyond and into the cell. A good illustration is the clarification, by molecular biologists James Watson and Francis Crick, of the structure

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of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) molecule, the basis of the genetic code that controls all cells (1953:964–67). Scientists of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have moved to work not only on the surface of cells, but also on their receptors, hormones, mediators, and molecules, whose real properties continue to be somehow shrouded in mystery to fully come to grips with cancer and other disease mechanisms (Knowles & Selby 2005). While enabling us to appreciate the complexities of cancer, the advent of the theory of cellular pathology also contributed, from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to the development of important treatments, notably radiotherapy and chemotherapy (Crile 1960:379–80). These treatments have responded to the cancer problem much more successfully than the discredited humor remedies. In fact, progress has been so significant that an increasing number of cancers can now be cured, especially since the second half of the twentieth century, as the medical community continues to improve these treatments. Generally speaking, however, current cancer treatments have remained of relative and contextual effectiveness. Sometimes, doctors can only palliate the effects of cancer, whose onward march to cause death can still be impervious to any known curative treatment. Today, most cancer research is devoted to improve the effectiveness of existing treatments—and develop new ones. Researchers have not given up on the traditional goal of a permanent cure against the disease. But they have focused their efforts on the development and selection of the best possible treatment options to administer to current patients. As cancer expert Thomas Deeley points out, Although our armamentarium has been extended by the additions of radiotherapy and chemotherapy, the same general policy holds. Many of us are still looking for the philosopher’s stone, a simple cure, a tablet or pill for all cancers, but we deal with a disease whose forms are legion and, until such a pill is found, we must determine the optimum treatment conditions for each cancer. (1983:607) In a nutshell, we live at a time when, to echo Bernard Baruch’s statement, the cure for cancer has not yet been found. Nevertheless, the medical community is able to respond to the disease with varying degrees of success thanks to a certain number of treatments that it now has at its disposal.

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Treating Weapons Proliferation Treating Weapons Proliferation

Weapons proliferation has known a similar evolution. In the same way as the concept to which it is etymologically linked, weapons proliferation is no longer sought to be cured as much as treated. As was the case for cancer, the initial goal was to find an allencompassing cure to the problem (chapter one). True, efforts before the First World War were solely centered on limiting the effects of war and weaponry. At the time, there was hardly any focused policy intended to address the phenomenon seriously. Real interest, however, began to take shape after the Great War, when policymakers actively pushed, until the late 1950s–early 1960s, for the immediate administration of “the magic pill” of general and complete disarmament. Although they then put their ambition on hold with the advent of arms control and nonproliferation, the goal remained the same through to the late 1980s: a permanent solution to the problem. Over the years, however, the fact of the matter is that we have come no closer to general and complete disarmament than to a cure for cancer. Taking stock of that reality, this book has embarked on a reassessment of the nature (anatomical and physiopathology), the causes (etiology and pathogenesis), and the consequences (pathological effects) of weapons proliferation, respectively in chapters two, three, and four. This has thrown light on the growing complexities and changing dimensions of the phenomenon. It has shown that proliferation has gradually included many more weapons of concern than the sole nuclear weapons and that technology and expertise have also increasingly become part and parcel of the problem. Moreover, the book has explained that weapons proliferation results from complex (not deterministic) factors triggered by instability. Although its effects are no longer apocalyptic, they have nevertheless remained very threatening to international peace and security. Against this background, the study of the management of weapons proliferation has shown that, as for cancer, a new goal has gradually taken priority over the traditional quest for a permanent cure: the treatment of the problem (chapters five and six). In arms control terminology, this means that, there too, the paradigm has shifted to focus essentially on tackling specific proliferation issues, notably pressing ones, putting the implementation of general and complete disarmament on the back burner. There is no denying that this new management model has had some success in combating weapons proliferation. For all its limitations, it has

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scored some important points in preventing, detecting, and responding to the phenomenon in several effective and efficient manners. Similarly to cancer, however, proliferation treatments are, generally speaking, no panacea. The prospects for success remain heavily dependent on context and circumstances. Sometimes, only palliative treatments can be administered. Overall, today’s responses to weapons proliferation seem to correlate with the oft-quoted medical credo “cure sometimes, relieve often, comfort always.” Given the shortcomings of existing treatment options, today’s best hope to deal effectively with the problem remains, as in the past, through prevention. Interestingly enough, cancer expert Armin Braun underlines in his landmark book The Story of Cancer that “prevention is unquestionably the most effective way of dealing with cancer[s] at the present time” (1977:19). This is echoed by the World Health Organization, which stresses that at least one-third of cancers are easily preventable (World Health Organization). Therefore, we live in a world in which no cure against weapons proliferation is being administered, but only treatments of relative and contextual effectiveness. Recently, former U.S. Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former U.S. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Arms Services Committee Sam Nunn, and former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry have re-emphasized the need to make progress toward an all-encompassing cure. Their landmark Wall Street Journal articles entitled “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons” (2007) and “Toward a Nuclear-Free World” (2008), in fact, have created a strong momentum in favor of disarmament. Some countries, notably the United States under the newly elected President Barack Obama, have rallied themselves to the cause, stating clearly their intentions to rid the world of those deadly weapons (Obama 2009). But while the articulation of this vision constitutes an important and necessary first step toward the achievement of that goal, it remains, for the moment, a statement of preference, not a policy per se. As the SIPRI Yearbook 1999 points out, To state a preference for disarmament is not a policy so much as a statement of a desirable state of affairs. A policy would require the elaboration of steps and measures to reach this objective. (1999:690) The elaboration of such steps and measures has yet to be made. Sergio de Queiroz Duarte, the U.N. High Representative for Disarmament

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Affairs, reached the same conclusion when he pointed out, in a recent luncheon address, that “[w]hile there is much talk of disarmament in the air, there is still a shortage of disarmament facts on the ground” (2008:2). After all, there are currently no specific plans for the elimination of nuclear weapons, no timetables, and no benchmarks for assessing progress. This may soon change. We may well be on the eve of this overdue grand journey, which, however ethical, will be long and complicated, even with sustained and creative leadership at the highest levels of key governments around the world. Until that journey begins, however, thinking about a world free of nuclear and other high-leverage weapons will remain as elusive as thinking about a world free of cancer.

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I N DE X

Acheson-Lilienthal Report, 25 Additional Protocol, 41, 86, 157–59 advanced conventional weapons, 8, 31, 42, 48, 60, 62, 64, 67, 68, 70–71, 73, 75, 85, 90, 116, 123–24, 132, 191, 200, 201–07, see also Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Afghanistan, 54, 81, 122, 154 Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 204–05 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 93, 119 Aiken, Frank, 35 Allison, Graham, 89 Al Qaeda, 57, 104, 119–20, 185 anatomy, 31–32, 47, 62, 76, 77, 79, 210, 212 Annan, Kofi, 59 Antarctica Treaty, 35 anthrax, 51, 52, 53, 63, 122, 133, 153 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 30, 31, 199, 200 Arend, Anthony, 188 Argentina, 39, 89, 120, 158, 183 Aristotle, 79 arms control, 28–30, 38, 40, 191, 212 arms race, 28–29, 30, 108, 114, 124–35 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), 203–04 Aron, Raymond, 30 Arrow, Kenneth, 11

Article 51, 31–32, 187, see also U.N. Charter Asculai, Ephraim, 163 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 206–07 Ashburton, Lord, 186 Aspin, Les(lie), 132, 177 asymmetric conf licts, 118, 132, 133 Atomic Energy Act, 26, 28, 197 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 24–27 atomic energy, see nuclear energy atomic weapons, see nuclear weapons Atoms-for-Peace Program, 27–28 Aum Shinrikyo, 51, 52, 54, 122 Austin, J. L., 16 Australia, 33, 89–90 Australia Group, 42, 167, 171 Azzam, Abdullah, 184 Bacon, Francis, 9 Baker, Philip Noel, 12, 18–19, 20, 28, 38, 74 Baker, Steven, 39 balance of terror, 30, 91 ballistic missiles, see missile delivery systems Bargman, Abraham, 128 Baruch, Bernard, 24–25, 30, 209, 211 Baruch Plan, 24–26, Belarus, 39, 41, 63, 85, 120, 192

252

Index

Berger, Peter, 94 Berkowitz, Bruce, 116 Berlin crisis, 29 Bermudez, Joseph, 119 Betts, Richard, 87, 133 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 90 binary munitions, 55 biodefense programs, 153, 165 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), 41–42, 67, 151–53, 178, 180–81 Ad Hoc Group (AHG) and 2001 Protocol, 42, 164–66 confidence-building measures (CBMs), 166 Implementation Support Unit, 166–67 biological weapons characteristics, 51 effects, 51–53 feasibility of defenses against, 53–54 see also Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), biotechnology biotechnology, 52–53, 54, 68, 123, 165, 168 black markets, 64–66, 72–73, 157 Blair, Dennis, 190 Blanc, Alexis, 75, 76, 84, 127 Bolton, John, 165 Bradbury, Savile, 210 Braun, Armin, 213 Braun, Chaim, 72 Brazil, 39, 89, 120, 158, 182, 183 Brodie, Bernard, 12–13, 29, 80, 87, 110, 111 Brown, Robert, 6 Brussels Declaration, 19, 151 Bunn, Matthew, 193, 195 Burton, John, 12, 15 Bush administration, 147, 149, 150, 151, 177, 189, 193, 199 Bush doctrine, 188 Bush, George H., 40 Bush, George W., 159, 161, 162, 163, 196

Butfoy, Andrew, 61 Buzan, Barry, 30 Campbell, Kurt, 126 Canada, 83, 155, 186 cancer as a metaphor of proliferation, 13, 14, 15–16 history of, 209–11 mechanics of, 5–6, 32, 83, 127, 129, 131, 184 treatment of, 37, 74, 138–39, 141, 175, 179, 189, 190–91 see also cell theory Caroline Case, 186–87 Carus, W. Seth, 88 cell theory, 6–7, 210–11 Center of International Security and Arms Control Studies (CESIM), 92, 98, 99 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 13, 33, 130 Chafetz, Glenn, 89 chemical weapons characteristics, 54 effects, 54–55 feasibility of defenses against, 55–56 see also Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 42, 67, 152–54, 178, 180, 181 verification and destruction of chemical weapons, 167–71 Cheney, Dick, 177 Chestnut, Sheena, 73 China, 27, 31, 32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 48, 51, 54, 58, 82, 84, 85, 90, 113, 117, 122, 126, 130, 143, 146, 149, 150, 151, 153, 155, 163, 178, 181, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 206 Chyba, Christopher, 72 Cirincione, Joseph, 54 Clausewitz, Carl von, 19, 29, 177 Clinton administration, 150, 177

index cold war, 29, 38, 56, 65, 66, 70, 82, 85, 91, 109, 111–15, 117, 119, 123, 126, 127–28, 131–32, 156, 178, 199, 201, 205–06 end of, 13, 18, 39, 40, 43, 64, 67–70, 71, 82, 133, 139, 146, 179, 181, 204 command and control systems, 60, 75, 109, 111–12, 115 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 40, 149–51, 162, Conan Doyle, Arthur, 156 Conference on Disarmament (CD), 40 confidence-building measures (CBMs), 144, 155, 165–66, 192, 205–07 Container Security Initiative (CSI), 159–60 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Treaty on, 204–05 Conventional Arms Transfers (CAT), 201 conventional war, 114, 118, 147 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), 155–56, 172 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), 156, 172–73 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), 194–95 Cooley, Charles, 10 Coombs, H. C., 11 Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, 192–95 Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), 37, 201, 202 Copernicus, Nicolaus, 9 Cordonnier, Isabelle, 126 counter-proliferation, 176–77 Courtland Moon, John Ellis van, 120 Crick, Francis, 210 cruise missiles, see missile delivery systems Cuban missiles crisis, 29, 89 cyber attack, 61

253

Dae-jung, Kim, 130 Darwin, Charles, 10 Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO), 65 Debreu, Gérard, 11 Declaration of St. Petersburg, 19 Deeley, Thomas, 211 defense industry, 66–72, 193 Denman, Thomas, 210 Dershowitz, Alan, 185, 188, 189–90 Descartes, René, 9 deterrence biological and chemical, 120–22 missile delivery systems and conventional, 122–24 nuclear, 29–30, 81–83, 109–20, 146–48 diagnosis, 5, 104, 167 Diamond, Jared, 18 dirty bombs, see radiological weapons disarmament, 20–22, 36, 38, 43, 77, 93, 143, 191, 196, 212 biological and chemical, 151–52 missile and conventional, 155, 172, 200 nuclear, 23–28, 36, 38, 39, 40, 143, 146–51, 163, 213–14 disease, 7–8, 10, 12, 42–43, 53, 77, 94, 101, 102, 104, 105, 131, 134–35, 141, 175, 180, 185, 189, 190–91, 209–11 Dobson, David, 33 Doyle, Michael, 89 dual-use, 66–68, 70, 73, 74, 75, 158, 159, 164–65, 167, 201–02 Duarte, Sergio de Queiroz, 213–14 Dunn, Lewis, 61, 117 Durkheim, Emile, 94 Egypt, 51, 54, 82, 94, 104, 121, 129, 146, 152, 158 Einhorn, Robert, 126, 163 Einstein, Albert, 16, 22, 24, 137 Eisenhower, Dwight, 27–28

254

Index

ElBaradei, Mohamed, 144–46 Ellsberg, Daniel, 13 enhanced destruction, 61 enrichment and reprocessing technologies, 37, 38, 73, 84, 143, 144–46, 159, 182, 197 Erasmus, Desiderius, 141 etiology, 16, 32, 79, 104, 105, 137, 212 European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), 28 European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 202–03 export controls, 36–38, 41, 64, 74, 76, 83, 157–61, 171–73, 194, 196, 201–04 Fathi Srour, Abdel, 82 Feaver, Peter, 109 Ferris, Frank, 139 First World War, 12, 20, 21, 23, 28, 38, 43, 79, 85, 122, 151, 212 Fissile Material Control Initiative (FMCI), 163 Fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), 40, 146, 162–64 fission weapons, see nuclear weapons Flank, Steven, 97 Foley, Kathleen, 139 France, 27, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 85, 94, 126, 146, 178, 181 Franck, James, 24 Franck Report, 24, 28–29 Frankel, Benjamin, 82–83 Freeman, Chas, 129 Freud, Sigmund, 10 fuel-cycle, multilateralization of, 144–46 fusion weapons, see nuclear weapons G-4 nations, 182 G-8, 193 Gadhafi, Colonel, 183 Galen, Clarissimus, 209, 210 Galilei, Galileo, 9 Gallois, Pierre, 34, 110

Gandhi, Indira, 103 Geneva Protocol, 21, 31, 41, 151, 164 George, Alexander, 13 Georgia, 205 geo-socio-psycho-political (GSPP) approach, 98–99, 100 Germany, 22, 33, 35, 36, 37, 83, 84, 91, 94, 104, 182 Giles, Gregory, 92 Gilpin, Robert, 112 Gladwell, Malcolm, 101–02 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), 195 globalization, 41, 62, 66–77 Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), 145 Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure (GNPI), 145 Global Partnership, 193 Global Positioning System (GPS), 57, 71 Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), 194 Glosserman, Brad, 92 Goldschmidt, Pierre, 182 Goodman, Mark, 123 Gottemoeller, Rose, 65 Gray, Colin, 127 great equalizers, 132 Great War, see First World War Greenspan, Alan, 11 Gromyko, Andrei, 25 Gromyko Plan, 26 Grotius, Hugo, 186 Gruinard Island, 53–54 Hagerty, Devin, 121 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), 172, 201 Hague Conferences, 19–20, 151 Halperin, Morton, 29 Hamd al-Fahd, Nasir Bin, 119–20 Hawking, Stephen, 14 hedging strategy, 74, 103, 104, 127, 138, 147, 190

index Hegel, Friedrich, 94 Heisenberg, Werner, 16 Henkin, Louis, 188 Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, 196–97 Herring, Eric, 30 Hill, John, 6 Hippocrates, 3, 134, 179, 185, 190–91, 207, 209–10 Hiroshima, 22, 23, 24, 26, 33, 50, 59 Hirsch, William, 12 Hoag, Malcom, 13 Hölst, Johan, 127 Hooke, Robert, 6 Hussein, Saddam, 72–73, 81, 92–93, 110, 118, 122, 170, 182, 183, 185 hydrogen weapons, see nuclear weapons Hymans, Jacques, 92 Iklé, Fred, 178, 180 incapacitating agents, 55, 153 India, 33, 37, 39, 42, 49, 54, 56, 74, 82, 85, 88, 90, 91, 94, 97, 103, 104–05, 117, 118, 121, 126, 128, 131, 142, 150, 151, 153, 155, 158, 163, 171, 182, 194, 206, see also U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement indigenous and foreign assisted proliferation, 8 Industrial Revolution, 10, 18–19, 22, 27, Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, 40 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 28, 41, 50, 144–45 Action Plan, 194 Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB), 65 safeguards, 28, 36–38, 84, 86, 130, 196–97, 198 see also Additional Protocol International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 195 international order, 13, 107–08, 131–35

255

Iran, 42, 49, 51, 54, 56, 57, 64, 74, 81, 82, 85, 88, 91, 92, 93, 104, 119, 122, 123, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 143, 144, 146, 153, 157, 158, 160, 165, 171, 179, 182, 183, 185, 189, 190, 196, 199, 205 Iran-Iraq War, 42, 92, 122 Iraq, 41, 42, 47–48, 54, 57, 61, 72–73, 74, 81, 92–93, 110, 118–19, 122, 123, 129, 154, 157, 164, 165, 177, 189, see also U.S. invasion of Iraq Irwin, Steven, 71 Israel, 33, 39, 42, 49, 51, 54, 56, 57, 73, 81, 82, 85, 94, 110, 117, 118–19, 121, 129, 131, 142, 150, 152, 158, 163, 185, 195, 196, 198 James, Carolyn, 132 Japan, 33, 42, 48, 51, 52, 83, 91, 92, 94, 104, 119, 122, 130, 132, 180, 182, 198 Jay, William, 12 Jervis, Robert, 91, 115 Joseph, Robert, 197 Kaempffert, Waldemar, 70 Kahn, Herman, 13, 29 Kant, Immanuel, 89, 110 Kanwal, Gurmeet, 117 Kaplan, Morton, 16 Karl, David, 112 Kaufmann, William, 13, 117 Kaysen, Carl, 13 Kazakhstan, 39, 41, 63, 85, 120, 192 Keeley, James, 133, 179 Keller, William, 60, 70, 77 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 21 Kennedy, John Fitzgerald ( JFK), 32 Kepler, Johannes, 9 Keynes, John Maynard, 11 Khan, Abdul Qadeer, 72, 73, 74, 93, 157, 183 Kissinger, Henry, 13, 83, 213 Krause, Keith, 95 Krock, Arthur, 29

256

Index

Kroenig, Matthew, 105 Kuhn, Thomas, 210 Kuwait, 41, 81 Labbé, Marie-Hélène, 119 latent proliferation, 76–77, 84, 102, 104, 128, 138, 143, 146 Lavoy, Peter, 61, 98, 99–100, 105, 117 League of Nations, 21–22, 23 Le Châtelier, Henry, 125 Levi, Michael, 89 Liberia, 160 Libya, 72, 120, 147, 154, 157, 165, 183, 194 Life Extension Program, 148 Lifton, Robert, 59 Lippman, Thomas, 129 Litvinenko, Alexander, 66 Llewelyn, Hughes, 130 Luckmann, Thomas, 94 Lugar, Richard, 192 Lynn-Jones, Sean, 18 Malthus, Thomas, 10 Manhattan Project, 22, 24 Manual of the Laws and Customs of War, 19 Maples, Michael, 190 Marshall, Andrew, 13 Maudsley, Henry, 7 McCarthy, Timothy, 118 McDougall, William, 10 McKenzie, Donald, 96 McMahon Act, see Atomic Energy Act McNamara, Robert, 32–33 Mearsheimer, John, 82, 84 Melian Dialogue, 80–81 metaphor, 14 metastasis, 5, 13, 125, 138, 184 Middle East, 13, 70, 81, 85, 92, 93, 120–21, 126, 129, 131, 152, 203, 207 missile defense systems, 57–58, 149, 191, 198–200 missile delivery systems

characteristics, 56 effects, 57 feasibility of defenses against, 57–58 see also Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), missile defense systems Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 38, 171–72 missile test, 133 model, 11, 14, 15, 16, 87, 97, 98, 99–100, 138, 177, 178, 212 Modelski, George, 49 Mongolia, 120 Moodie, Michael, 68, 75, 91, 156, 181 Moo-hyun, Roh, 130 Morgenthau, Hans, 80 Müller, Harald, 73 Müller, Johannes, 7, 210 Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) Talks, 204 Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), 29, 119 Myrdal, Alva, 39 mythmaking approach, 99–100 Nagasaki, 22, 23, 24, 48, 59 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), 32, 34 National Security Strategy (NSS), 177, 188 neo-realism, 82, 83, 84, see also realism neptunium (Np), 50 Newton, Isaac, 9, 125 Nolan, Janne, 60, 70 Non-Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS), 35, 36, 38, 39, 103, 131, 143, 144, 146, 148, 150, 152, 159, 195, 198 norms, 39, 88, 89, 93, 99, 100, 102, 113, 117, 141–42, 150, 151, 152–53, 155, 157, 172, 180, 185, 188, 200 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 35, 204 North Korea, 13, 41, 42, 49, 51, 54, 56, 60, 64, 72, 73, 81, 85, 88, 104, 118, 119, 121, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134, 142, 143, 151, 153, 157, 160, 161,

index 164, 165, 171, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 189, 194, 198, 199 Northeast Asia, 85, 129, 130, 131 Norway, 156 NPT Exporters Committee, see Zangger Committee N+1 problem, 31, 32, 43, 76, 85 Nth Country Experiment, 33 nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, see Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ), 35, 120, 142 nuclear bunker-buster weapons, 147 nuclear cities, 193 nuclear energy, 36, 66–67, 90, 143–46, 197, see also Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Baruch Plan, Gromyko Plan nuclear low-yield weapons, 147 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 35–36, 142–49 Preparatory Committee, 146 Review Conference, 143, 146 nuclear policies China, 146 France, 146 Russia, 146–47 United Kingdom, 146 United States, 147–48 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 147–48 nuclear renaissance, 42, 143, see also nuclear energy nuclear revolution, 13, 18, 23–24, 80 nuclear sharing, 35–36 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 37, 38, 41, 157–59, 167, 197, 198 nuclear tests, 24, 32, 35, 37, 40, 42, 74, 88, 90, 150–51, 181, 198, see also Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) nuclear war, 28–29, 31, 34, 71, 115, 116–20, 131

257

nuclear weapons characteristics, 49–50 effects, 50 feasibility of defenses against, 50–51 see also Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Nuclear Weapons State (NWS), 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 56, 84, 88, 94, 103, 131, 143, 144, 146, 148, 150, 162, 196, 197 Nunn, Sam, 66, 192, 213 Nye, Joseph, 18 O’Hanlon, Michael, 89 Obama administration, 65, 148, 149, 150, 151, 163, 195, 213 Ogarkov, Nikolai, 71 oil crisis, 38–39 oncology, 5–6 Onuf, Nicholas, 95 opaque proliferation, 74, 114, 115, 121, see also virtual arsenals Open Skies Treaty, 206 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), see Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Organization of American States (OAS), 206 Osirak, 73, 110–11, 185 Osler, William, 175 Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs), 169 Ottawa Convention, 155–56, 172 Outer Space Treaty, 35 Pakistan, 39, 42, 49, 54, 56, 72, 82, 85, 88, 90, 91, 93, 103, 104–05, 117, 118, 121, 126, 128, 131, 142, 150, 151, 155, 158, 163, 171, 194, 195, 196, 198, 206 Pareto, Vilfredo, 11 Parkes, Edmund, 7 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), 35 pathogenesis, 16, 32, 79, 104, 105, 212

258

Index

Paul, T. V., 132 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE), 90 Pearson, Graham, 123 Permanent Five (P-5), 25, 88, 178, 181–84, 185 Perrow, Charles, 115 Perry, William, 119, 213 physiology, 32, 47, 77, 79, 137 plutonium (Pu), 33, 37, 40, 50, 61, 73, 130, 145, 192–93 Potter, William, 84, 102 preemptive/preventive military actions, 110, 113, 185–89 Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), 163 Primakov, Evgenii, 13 proliferation causes domestic incentives and disincentives, 88–91 individual incentives and disincentives, 91–93 international incentives and disincentives, 88 power imperatives, 80–81 security imperatives, 81–83 proliferation optimism, 109–12 proliferation pessimism, 112–15 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 159–60, 161–62, 167, 171, 172 proliferation threshold, 49, 61, 74, 118, 128, 130 Quester, George, 87, 113 Rabinowich, Eugene, 24 radiological weapons, 8, 65–66, 194 Raghavan, V. R., 118 Rajkumar, Miriam, 54 Rajneesh cult, 51, 52, 122 Rapacki Plan, 35 Reagan, Ronald, 156, 198 realism, 80, 83–87, 93–94, 95, 98 power-focused, 80–81 security-focused, 81–82 see also neo-realism

recidivation, 94 rehabilitation, 183 Reiss, Mitchell, 126 Reiter, Dan, 185 Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program, 148 remission, 84 Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), 91 Rice, Condoleezza, 160, 179 Richardson, Lewis Fry, 12, 79–80, 86, 87 Roberts, Brad, 14, 62, 75, 76, 84, 91, 104, 128, 143, 181, 189 Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), 147–48 rogue states, 13, 91, 93, 94, 96, 110, 176, 179, 198 Roosevelt, Franklin, 11, 22, 138 Ross, Edward, 10 Rowen, Henry, 13 Rumsfeld Commission, 198 Russia, 40, 41, 51, 57, 63–66, 84, 85, 91, 131, 145, 146, 149, 151, 153, 154, 155, 158, 163, 168, 181, 192–94, 197, 198, 199–200, 205, 206, see also Soviet Union Sagan, Scott, 61, 98, 103, 112–15, 117 Salomon, Kim, 116 sanctions, 25, 176, 178, 180–85, 196 Sandoval, Robert, 114 Sands, Amy, 156, 181 Saperstein, Alvin, 82 Schaar, B. E., 11–12 Schelling, Thomas, 13, 29, 74, 111 Schleiden, Matthias, 7, 210 Schlesinger, James, 13 Schumpeter, Joseph, 17 Schwann, Theodor, 7, 210 Schwebel, Stephen, 187 scientific revolution, 9–13 Scotland, 53 Second World War, 8, 11, 12, 18, 22, 23, 48, 49, 80, 85, 87, 91, 103, 109, 122, 126, 156

index security assurances, 36, 93, 143 security dilemma, 82, 126 security studies, 12, 17, 18 Selden, Robert, 33 September 11, 2001 attacks (9/11), 42, 61, 85, 112, 115, 128, 153, 181, 193, 195, 199 Shaw, Eric, 93 Shaw, George, 107 Shultz, George, 213 side effects, 179, 189 Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), 203–04 Smith, Derek, 76, 138 Smithson, Amy, 63, 165 Snow, C. P., 32 Snyder, Glenn, 114 Social Construction of Technology Theory (SCOT), 97 social constructivism, 94–98 Sokolski, Henry, 48 Solingen, Etel, 89 South Africa, 33, 39, 85, 89, 97, 120, 164, 183, 195 Southeast Asia, 39, 120 Soviet Union, 24–30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 62, 63–66, 68, 69, 70, 76, 81, 82, 84, 90, 95, 96, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 117, 122, 123, 126, 156, 164, 191, 192, 194, 195, 201, see also Russia Spencer, Herbert, 10 spin-offs and spin-ons, 70–72 Sputnik, 29 Stalin, Joseph, 26 Stern, Jessica, 62 Stjernswärd, Jan, 139 Stockpile Stewardship Program, 148 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 30, 31 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START), 40, 149, 200 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 198

259

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), 149 Sudan, 54, 165, 185 surgical strikes, 176, 185–86 Sweden, 33 symptom, 83, 93, 94, 104–05 Syria, 51, 54, 94, 104, 121, 129, 152, 153, 165, 186 Szilard, Leo, 24 taboo, 31, 92, 111, 113, 119, 124, 166 Taiwan, 54, 94, 104, 130, 180, 200 Taylor, A. J. P., 130 Tchernobyl nuclear accident, 119 Tenet, George, 130 terrorism, 42, 76, 128, 133 biological, 51, 122 chemical, 54, 122 nuclear, 112, 115, 119–20, 159–62, 193–95 see also Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, September 11, 2001 attacks (9/11), Rajneesh cult Tertrais, Bruno, 126, 159 thermonuclear weapons, see nuclear weapons Thiersch, Karl, 7 Thompson, Kenneth, 80 Thompson, William, 49 thorium (Th), 25, 50 Thränert, Oliver, 154, 171 threat reduction programs, 192–95 Three Mile Island accident, 143 Thucydides, 80–81, 100–01 Tinbergen, Jan, 15 tipping point, 42, 101–05, 128 Tlatelolco, Treaty of, 35 Tokaimura nuclear accident, 119 Trenin, Dimitri, 64 Tucker, Jonathan, 58, 118, 153, 154, 171 tumor, 7, 13, 31, 74, 131 Turkey, 94, 104, 129 Tzu, Sun, 183

260

Index

Ukraine, 39, 41, 63, 64, 84, 85, 91, 120, 192 U.N. Charter, 23, 31–32, 142, 162, 172, 180, 186–87, 200, see also Article 51 U.N. Commission for Conventional Armaments, 26, 48 unconventional weapons, see Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) U.N. Disarmament Commission, 26 U.N. General Assembly, 23, 26, 27, 38 Resolution 1(I), 24, 48 Resolution 48/75L, 40 Resolution 1665(XVI), 35 United Kingdom, 24, 27, 32, 35, 38, 40, 85, 94, 126, 146, 181, 183 United Nations, 23, 26, 28, 31, 180, 182 United States, 27–30, 131–35, 147–51, 177–80, 184–91, 192–95, 195–97, 198–200, 213 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), see missile delivery systems U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), 170 U.N. Program of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, 203 U.N. Registry of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), 201, 203 U.N. Security Council, 23, 48, 142, 164, 180, 185, 187–88, 190, 195, 202 Resolution 255, 36 Resolution 934, 39 Resolution 1172, 195 Resolution 1540, 142, 160–62, 167, 171, 172, 195 Resolution 1696, 182 Resolution 1718, 181 other resolutions, 182, see also Permanent Members (P-5) U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM), 41, 170 uranium (U), 25, 50

highly enriched (HEU), 40, 50, 130, 190, 192 low-enriched, 145, 194 see also enrichment and reprocessing technologies U.S. Air Force nuclear weapons incident, 119 U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement, 195–98 U.S. invasion of Iraq, 64, 170, 182, 185, 189 Utgoff, Victor, 14 Uzbekistan, 63 Valéry, Paul, 47 verification, 22, 24–26, 27–28, 36, 42, 157–58, 162–70, 203 Versailles, Treaty of, 21, 22 vertical and horizontal proliferation, 8 Vesalius, Andreas, 10 Virchow, Rudolph, 7, 210 virtual arsenals, 73–74, 86, 90, see also opaque proliferation Waldeyer-Hartz, Heinrich W. G. von, 7 Walker, William, 133–34 Walras, Léon, 11 Walsh, Jim, 89–90 Walters, F. P., 21 Waltz, Kenneth, 82–83, 110–12, 114, 116, 118, 120 Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) on Export Control for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, 201–03 Watson, James, 210 weaponization, 73–74 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 47–49, 56, 58–62, 63–68 Webster, Daniel, 186–87 Wehberg, Hans, 12 Wendt, Alexander, 96 Wilson, Woodrow, 21 Wohlstetter, Albert, 13, 31–33, 39, 43, 47, 76, 77, 79, 85, 105, 108, 135

index Wolfsthal, Jon, 54 Woolsey, James, 13 World Disarmament Conference, 21–22 World Health Organization (WHO), 138–39, 191, 213 World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS), 195

Wright, Quincy, 12, 92 Yeltsin, Boris, 40 Yudin, Yury, 145 Zanders, Jean-Pascal, 166 Zangger Committee, 37, 38, 41 Zedong, Mao, 117

261

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