The Works of John Locke in 9 volumes, vol. 3 (1696)

THE 5 1

WORKS OF

J O H N LOCKE, IN NINE VOLUMES.

---cL.

THE TWELFTH EDITIOS.

VOLUME THE THIRD.

LONDON:

,

C. Baldwlo, Printer,

New Bridge Streef, Londoa

C O N T E N T S OF THIS

V 0 L U M E. PAGE

A LETTER to the Right Rev. Edward Lord Bishop of Worcester, concerning some Passages relating to Mr. Locke’s Essay of Human Understanding, in a late Discourse of his Lordship’s in Vindication of the 1 Trinity.. Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to his Letter .................................... 97 An Answer to Remarks upon an Essay concerning Human Understanding 1% Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to his second Letter 191 Index.

........................................ ..................................

..............................

A

L E T T E R TO THE RIGHT REVEREND

EDWARD, LORD BISHOP OF WORCESTER, COSCEHHING SOME PASSAGES RELATISO TO

MR. LOCKE’S ESSAY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

IN A

LATE DISCOURSE OF HIS LORDSHIP’S, IN VINDICATION OF THE TRINITY. #

’T’OL. 111.

B

..

A

L E.T T E R TO THE RIGHT REVEREND

EDWARD, LORD BISHOP OF WORCESTER.

M Y LORD,

I CANNOT but look upon it as a great honour, that your lordship, who are so thoroughly acquainted with the incomparable writings of antiquity, and know so well how to entertain yourself with the great men in the commonwealth of letters, should a t any time take into your hand my mean papers: and so far bestow any of your valuabIe minutes on my Essay of Human Understanding; as to let the world see you have thought my notions worth your lordship's consideration. My aim in that, as well as every thing else written by me, k i n g purely to follow truth as far as I could discover it, I think myself beholden to whoever shows me my mistakes, as to one who, concurring in my design, helps me forward in my way. Your lordship has been pleased to favour me with some thoughts of yours in this kind, in your late learned '' Discourse, in Vindication of the Doctrine of the B2

4 Mr. Locke’s LetteF to the Trinity ;*’ and, I hope, I may say, have gone a little out of your way to do me that kindness : for the obligation is thereby the greater. And if your lordship has brought in the mention of my book in a chapter, intitled, ‘‘ Objections against the Trinity, in Point of Reason, answered ;” when, in my whole Essay, I think there is not to be found any thing like an objection against the Trinity : I have the more to acknowledge t o your lordship, who would not let the foreignness of the subject hinder your lordship from endeavouring to set me right, as to some errours your lordship apprehends in my book ; when other writers using some notions like mine, gave you that which was occasion enough for you to do me the favour to take notice of what you dislike in my Essay. Your lordship’s name is of so great authority in the learned world, that I who pro€ess myself more ready, upon conviction, to recant, than I was at first to publish, my mistakes, cannot pay that respect is due to it, without telling the reasons why I still retain any of my notions, after your lordship’s having appeared dissatisfied with them. This must be my apology, and I hope such a one as your lordship will allow, for my examining what you have printed against several passages in my book, and my showing the reasons why it has not prevailed with me to quit them. That your lordship’s reasonings may lose none of their force by my misapprehending or misrepresenting them (a way too familiarly used in writings that have any appearance of controversy), I shall crave leave to give the reader your lordship’s arguments in the full strength of your own expressions ; that so in them he may have the advantage to see the deficiency of my pnswers, in any point where I shall be so unfortunate as not to perceive, or not to follow, the light your lordship affords me. Your lordship having in the two cr three preceding pages, justly, as 1 think, found fault with the account of reason, given by theunitarians and a late writer, in those passages you quote out of them ; and then coming to the nature of substance, and relating what that author has

~ i s n o p~f Woriester.

5 said concerning the mind‘s getting of simple ideas, and those simple ideas being the sole matter and foundation. of all our reasonings ; your lordship thus concludes, Then it follows, that we can have no foundation of c c reasoning, where there can be no such ideas from ct sensation or reflection.” Now this is the case of substance; it is not introcc mitted by the senses, nor depends upon the operation cc of the mind ; and so it cannot be within the compass that it is hard to determine what conformation, siae, and place, the soul has in the body : that it is too subtile to be seen : that it is in a human body as in a house, or a vessel, or a receptacle, 0. 5!2. all which are expressions that sufficiently evidence, that he who used them had not in his mind separated materiality from the idee of the soul, I t may perhaps be replied, that a great part of this, which we find in c. 19. is said upon the principles of those who would have the soul to be '(anima inflamI grant it : but it is also to be " mata, inflamed air." observed, that in this lgth, and the two following ohapters, he does not only not deny, but even admits, that so material a thing as inflamed air may think. The truth of the case, in short, is this: Cicera was willing to believe the soul immodal, but when he sought in the nature of the soul itself something to edablisk this his belief into a certainty of it, he found himself at a loss. He confessed he knew not what the soul was : but the not knowing what it was, he argues, c. 2. was no reason to conclude it was not. And thereupon he proceeds to the repetition of what he had said i n his 6th book de Repub. concerning the soul. The argument, which borrowed from Plat0 he there makes use of, if it have any force in it, not only proves the soul to be immortal, but more than, I think, your lordship will allow to be true: for it proves it to be eternal, and without beginning, as well as witHout end; '6 neque . 1' nata ceite est, et aeterna est," says he. Indeed from the faculties of the soul he concludes right, that it is of divine original: but as t o the substanee of the soul, he at the end of this discouse eoneerning its faculties, c. 95, as welt as at the beginning of it, c. 29, is not ashamed to own his ignorance of what it is : '6 anima sit animus, ignisve nescio ; nec me pudet, ttt istos, fated neseire quod nescism. Mud, si ulk alia,

488

de re obscura affirmare possum, sive anima, sive ignis. sit animus, euni jurarem esse divinum,” c. 25. So that all the certainty he could attain to about the soul, was, that he was confident there was something divine in it; i. e. there were faculties in the soul that could not result from the nature of matter, but must have their original from a divine power : but yet those qualities, as divine as they were, he acknowledged might be placed in breath or fire which I think your lordship will not deny t o be material substances. So that all those divine qualities, which he so much and so justly extols in the soul, led him not, as appears, so niuch as to any the least thought of immateriality. This is demonstration, that he built them not upon an exclusion of materiality out of the soul ; for he avowedly professes, he does not know but breath or fire might be this thinking thing in us : and in all his considerations about the substance of the soul itself, he stuck in air or fire, or Aristotle’s ‘(quinta essentia;” for beyond those, it is evident, he went not. But with all his proofs out of Plato, to whose authority he defers so much, with all the arguments his vast reading and great parts could furnish him with for the immortality of the sod, he was so little satisfied, so far from being certain, so far from any thought that he had, or could prove it, that he over and over again professes his ignorance and doubt of it. In the beginning he enumerates the severaI opinions of the philosophers, which he had well studied about it ; and then, full of certainty, says, “ haram sententiarum q i m vera sit, deus aliquis videret, quae veri bimillima magna quae(r stio,” c. 11. And towards the latter end having gone them all over again, and one after another examined them, he professes himself still at a loss, not knowing on which to pitch, nor what to determine : 6‘ Mentis acies,” says he, ‘‘ seipsam intuens nonnunquam hebescit, ob earnque causam contemplandi diligen‘( tiam ornittimiis. Itaque dubitans, circunispectans, hzsitans, multa adversa revcrtens, tanquani in rate in 6‘ mari immenso, nostra vehitur oratio,” c. 30. And to conclude this argument, when the person he introduces as djmursing with him, tells him he is resolved (6

‘6

6‘

((

((

I

(0

the Bishop of W o ~ c e s t e r .

a9

to keep firm to the belief of immortality: Tully answers, c. 82. Laudo id quidem, etsi nihil animis oportet " confidere ; nioveinur enim s q e aliquo acute concluso, labanius, niutamusque sententiam clarioribus etiam in " rebus ; in his est enim aliqua obscuritas." SOunmoveable is that truth delivered by the spirit of truth, that though the light of nature gave snnie obscure glimmering, some uncertain hopes of a future state; yet hunian reason could attain to no clearness, no certa'inty about it, but that it was '(JESUS CHRIST Tim, i.lo. ('alone who had brought life and immor" tality to light through the gospel." Though we are now told, that to own the inability of natural reason to bring immortality to light, or, which passes for the same, to own principles upon wliich the imniateriality of the soul (and, as it is urged, consequently its immortality) cannot be demonstratively proved ;does lessen the belief of this article of revelation, which JESUS CHRIST alone has brought to light, and which consequexitly the scripture assures us is established and made certain only by revelation, This would not perhaps have seemed strange from those who are justly complairied of, for slighting the revelation of the gospel, and therefore would not be much regarded, if they should contradict so plain a text of scripture in favour of their all-sufficient reason: but what use the promoters of scepticism and infidelity, in an age so much suspected by your lordship, may make of what conies froin one of your great authority and learning, may deserve your consideration. And thus, my lord, I hope I have satisfied you concerning Cicero's opinion about the soul, in his first book of Tusculan Questions ; which though I easily believe, as your lordship says, you are no stranger to, yet I humbly conceive you have not shown (and upon a careful perusal of that treatise again, I think I may boldly say you cannot show) one word in it, that expresses any thing like a notion in Tully of the soul's immateriality, or its being an immaterial substance. From what you bring out of Virgil, your lordship concludes, (' that he no more thzn Cicero does me any '( kindness in this matter, being both assertors of tbe '(

'(

490 Mr. Locke’s s e e d Reply 6‘ soul’s immortality.“ My lord, were not the question of tbe soul’s immateriality, according to custom, changed here into that of its immortality, which I am no less an assertor of than either of them, Cicero and Virgil do me all the kindness I desired of them in this matter; and that was to show, that they attributed the word G6 spiritus” to the soul of man, without any thought of its immateriality: and this the verses you yourself bring out of Virgil, Xneid. 4. 385. 6‘ Et cum frlgida mors animee seduxerit artiis Omnibus umbra locis adero, dabis improbe p n a s ;”

confirm, as well as those I quoted out of his 6th book : and for this monsieur de la Loubere ehalI be my witness, in the words above set down out of him ;where he shows, that there be those amongst the heathens of our days, as well as Virgil and others amongst the ancient Greeks and Romans, who thought the souls or ghosts of men departed did not die with the body, without thinking them to be perfectly immaterial ; the latter being much more incomprehensible to them than the former. And what Virgii‘s notion of the soul is, and that 6c COP~UB,” when put In contradistinction to the soul, signifies nothing but the gross tenement of flesh and bones, is evident from this verse of his A3neid. 6, where he calls the souls which yet were visible, -‘‘ Tepues sine corpore vitae.”

Your lordship’s answer concerning what is said, Ecdes. xiii. turns wholly upon Solomon’s taking the soul to be immortal, which was not what I questioned: all that I quoted that place for was to show, that spirit in Engiish might properly be applied to the soul, without my notion of its immateriality : as pn7 was by Solomon: which whether he thought the souls of men to be immaterial, does little appear in that passage, where he speaks of the souls of men and beasts together, as he d m , But fhrtkur, what I contended for, is evident h r n that place, in that the word spirit is there applied, by wr ‘tFanstatm, to the souls of beasts, which your

I

to the Bishop of Worcester. lordship, I think, does not rank among& the immaterial, and consequently immortal spirits, though they have sense and spontaneous motion. But you say, " if the soul be not of itself a free-think. " ing substance, you do not see what foundation there '' is -in nature for a day of judgment." Ans. Though the heathen world did not of old, nor do to this day, see a foundation in nature for a day of judgment ; yet in revelation, if that will satisfy your lordship, every one may see a foundation for a day of judgment, because God has positively declared i t ; though God ha9 not by that revelation taught us, what the substance of the soul is ; nor has any where said, that the soul of itself is a free agent. Whatsoever any created substance is, it is not of itself, but is by the good pleasure of its Creator: whatever degrees of perfection it has, it has from the bountiful harid of its Maker. For it is true, i n a natural as well as a spiritual sense, what St. Paul gays, (' not '' that we are sufficient of ourselves to think cor, 5. 6' any thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God." But your lordship, as I guess by y m following wmds, would argue, that a material substance cannot be a free agent ; whereby I suppose you only mean, that you cannot see or conceive how a solid substance shouw begin, stop, or change its own motion. To which give me leave to answer, that when you can make it conceivable, how any created, finite, dependent substance, can move itself, or alter, or stop its own motion, which it must, to be a free agent; I suppose you +vi11 find it no harder for God to bestow this power on a solid, than an unsolid created substance. Tully, in the place above quoted, could not conceive this TuscGn. power to be in any thing, but what was c.23. from eternity : " cum pateat igitur aeternum '6 id esse quod wipmm moveat, quis est qui hanc natu" ram animis esse tributam neget ? " But though you cannot see how any created substance, solid or not solid, can be a free agent (pwdon me, my lord, if 1 put in both till your lordship phase to explain it of eithei, and show the manner how either of them can, of ituelf, &ye

992 Mr. Locke's setand Rep& itself or any thing eke) yet 1 do not think y'ou Will sd far deny men to LK1 five agents, fiom the difficulty there is to see how they are free agents, as to doubt whether there be foundation enough for a day of judgment, It is not for me to judge how far your lordship's s p culations seach; but finding in iriyself nothing to be truer than what the wise Solomon tells me, " as thou '' knowest not what is the way of the spirit, Bccles. xi. 5. (' nor how the bones do grow in the womb , '' of her that is with child; even so thou knowest not '' the works of God who maketh all things," I gratefully receive and rejoice in the light of revelation, which sets me at rest in many things, the manner whereof my poor reason can by no means make out to me: omnipotency, I know, can do any thing that contains in it no contradiction ; eo that I readily believe whatever God has declared, though my season find difficulties in it, which it cannot master. As in the present case, God having revealed that there shall be a day of judgment, I think that foundation enough to conclude men are free enough to be made answerable for their actions, and to receive according Yo what they have done ; though how man is a free agent, S U ~ ~ ~my S Sexplication or comprehewion, In answer to the place I brought out of Chap x d v . St. Luke, your lordship asks, (' whether ver. 39. . " from these words of our Saviour, it fol" lows that a spirit is only an appearance? " I answer, No ; nor do I know who drew such an inference from them: but it follows, that in apparitions there is something that appears, and that that which appears is not wholly immaterial ; and yet this was properly called rudpa, and was often looked upon by those, who called it ~ d p ina Greek, and now call it spirit i n EngIish, to be the ghost or soul of one departed; which, I humbly conceive, justifies my use of the word spirit, for a thinking voluntary agent, whether material or immaterial. Your lordship says, that I grant, that it cannot, upon these principles, be demonstrated, that the spiritual substance in us is immaterial : from whence you conclude, '' that then my grounds 9f certainty from ideas are

to

the Bishop of 'Worocster.

49s

plainly' given up." This being a way of arguing that you oRen make use of, I have often had occasion to consider it, and cannot after all see the force of this argument. I acknowledge, that this or that proposition cannot upon my principles be demonstrated; ergo, I grant this proposition to h false, that cwtainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas : for that is my ground of certainty, and till that be given up, my grounds of certainty are not given up. You farther tell me, that 1 say, the soul's irnmateriality may be proved probable to the highest degree t which your lordship replies, " that is not the point. " for it is not probability, but certainty, that you are '' promised in this way of ideas, and that the fbunda'' tion of our knowledge and real certainty lies in them : $' and is it dwindled into a probability at last ?" This is also what your lordship has been pleased to object to me more than once, that I promised certainty. I would be glad to know in whut words this promise is made, and where it stands, for I love to be a man of my word. I have indeed told wherein I think certainty, real certainty does consist, as far as any one attains it ; and I do not yet, from any thing your lordship has said against it, find any reason to change niy opinion therein : but I do not remember that I promised certainty in this question, concerning the soul's immateriality, or in any of those propositions, wherein you thinking I corne short of certainty, infer from thence, that my way of certainty by ideas is given up. And I am so far from promising certainty in all things, that I am accused by your lordship of scepticism, for setting too narrow bounds to our knowledge and certainty. Why therefwe your lordship asks me, '' and is the certainty" [of the soul's being immaterial] ('dwindled into a probability at last?" will be hard to see a reason for, till you can show that I promised to deinonstrate that it is immaterial; or that others, upon their principles without ideas, being able to demonstrate it immaterial, it comes to dwindle into bare probability, upon my principles by ideas. One thing more I am obliged to take notice of. I have said, that the belief of God king the founds-

'p

hfr. Lo~ke’8second &ply tion of all religion and genuine morality, I thotlght t c no arguments, that are made use of to work the per‘‘ suasion of a God into men’s minds, should be invacc lidated, which, I grant, is of ill consequence.” To which wmds of mine I find, according to your particular favour to me, this reply: c 6 that here I must cc give your lordship leave to ask me, what I thidk of G( the universal consent of mankind, as to the being of cc Gad? Hath not this been made use oE as an argu‘(ment, not only by Christians, but by the wisest and ‘‘ greatest men among the heathens? And what then cc wouId I think of one who should go about to invalidate this argument ? And that by proving, that it