Stuart Robertson Stephen Dent
CONWAY
•
Frontispiece The ~ bi.~ Rdleloev. on ~Sige to the Far ~ on M¥d'I 19+t
In me...
56 downloads
2081 Views
43MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
Stuart Robertson Stephen Dent
CONWAY
•
Frontispiece The ~ bi.~ Rdleloev. on ~Sige to the Far ~ on M¥d'I 19+t
In memory of J. E. Horwood and D. G. Robenson OBE
A Conway Maritime book Copyright C StU:lrl Robcrtson and Stcphcn Dcnt 2007 First pubhshed III Grcat Briuin ill 2007 by Conway an imprint ofAnov:l Books. The Old Magistr;nes Court. 10 Southcombe Street. London W 14 ORA www.ano..:lbooks.com All rights reserved. No part of this publication m:l.Y be reproduced. stored in a retriev:al s)"litem. or tn.nsmiued in any form or by :lny means, electronic, mechanical. photocopying. recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British libn.l)· Cataloguing in Publicltion DaD A record of this title is :I\':rilable on request from Ihe British libn.I)·.
ISBN 13: 9 781 44 86().456 Edited by: Alison Moss and John Jordan Designed by ichola Smuh. Stephen Dent and Georgina Hewin Printed and bound by CT Prmnng ltd. Chma
CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDG EMENTS
7
INTRODUCTION
8
1939-1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
22
56
88
156
184
216
PICTURE CREDITS
236
BIBLIOGRAPHY
236
INDEX
239
Acknowledgements
T
he authors wish to express their gr:lteful thanks to the following people and institutions for their assistance: Ian Proctor, Man Lee, Tham Eaton, Yvonne Oliver, and the rest of the staff at the Imperial War Museum photographic and film archives; Laun W33yers, Ed Finney, Charles E. Brocline Jr and William Dildo of the US N:J.val Historical Center: Debbie Corner, Keeper of Photographs at the ROy;Il Navy Submarine Muscum:Jo Lawler, Director of Explosion! Museum of Naval Firepower: Brian Williams, Mark Frost and John [\,erson of Dover Muscum: Kevin McLaren, Kristina Watson and Lydia Fisher at the ROy.Il COlllmission Oil the Ancient and Historical Monuments ofScothnd; Leon M. A. Homburg, curator. MarincllIuseum, den Helder; Gerry Rendle and Paul Burkhalter of Dcvonport Dockyard and Museum; Commander Erminio Bagnasco, director, Storin Mi/illlre; Volkmar Konig; Terry McGovern: Dave Bassel!;Jcan Hood: Bert Purches: DK Brown; Stephen Johnson; Geoffrey Hudson: William J. Crawford; Dee Dent; Al Fox; Leo van Ginderen: Hans Lengcrer: Waldemar Trojca; Charles Blackwood; David Evans; Martin Le Poidevin of Flyer magazine; Andy Field; Katy Goodwin; Geoff Dennison; Ian Hancock; Tony at ColorWorks, Bath; Steve Mclaughlin. Bill Schleihauf: the staff of Bath Central Library; and John Lee and Alison Moss at Conway. The authors would like to thank their families. friends and publisher for their forbearance. In particular. this book could not have been compiled withoul the aid of a number of people who generously provided images and caption
information from their own collections, as well as their tillle and knowledge. Principal alllong these are several contributors to Conway's naval annual Wars/up. First and foremost our thanks go to John Jordan. John Jordan is the editor of H--arship and also the author of two books on the Soviet Navy, and is at present working on a book on the navies of the inter-war period. Enrico Cernuschi is the author of aero Jimi iI Loro DoverI' (Rome: Rivista Marittima, 2006), now a standard text on the history of the Italian Navy COlllmissioned by the Italian Naval Academy. Vince O'Hara is the author of German Fleet al H--ar 1939-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004) and TIle US j\,lavy Agaill5t the Axis: Surfa{t Combat 194/-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007). Henk Visser is a retired officer of the Royal Netherlands Navy, and works at the Marinemuseum, den Helder. He is the author of De Konil1k/ijkI'Marille, 1922-/964. Conrad Waters is a member of the group working to return the \Vorld W3TTwo frigate HMS W/limbrel to the UK as a permanent memorial to the Rude of the Atlantic. Chris Savill is an aviation and social historian who works at The National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office) in Kew, London, and has written a number of books on aviation history. Itichard Worth and Vladimir Yakubov are the authors of Rnising tht Red Balmer: TIll' Pirtoria/ History of Sill/in's Flett 1920-1945 (Spellmoullt, 2oo7).This book has benefited greatly from all their inpul; ally errors of fact or interpretation remain the sole responsibility of the authors.
In t rod u C t jon - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The saying goes that 'the first casualty of war is truth'. A proportion of all wartime photographs - particularly colour shots - were staged, either to give false impressions for propaganda purp05t.""!i or in an effort to capture the vimal t.""!isence of situations for which genuine images did not exist. And many photographs in IOday's private collection~ were 'illegally' shot for sailors as souvenirs by official photOgraphers while aboard ship - known to the British photOgraphers as 'rabbit work' - to supplement their wages. The British attitude to official photography was less comprehensive than that of the Germans and Americans. Generally the three British service film and photographic unit~ used colour far 1t:'SS than their oPP05ite numbers. The Royal Naval Photographic Unit had been set up III 1919 and was designed to support the fleet's rt:Connaissance and publicity activitit.-s; by 1939 it had expanded to provide coverage to all the theatres where British naval forces found themsdws. Uy 1945 it employed 200 women. As the \var progressed, 1Illtially small photographic units grew into complex bodies within each armed service, employing men equipped and u"amed by them. TIllS also lIlduded cine film. By the invasion of Normandy In June 1944, the Allies were lughly organized; pre-battle preparations were dear and efficient, and the priority - the rapId dispatch of photographs bade from the landing beacht.-S - was aided by the setting up of mobile vetting centres through which film could be channelled to the rear before being released to the public. Havlllg already covered the Salerno and Anzio Iandillb"S for Life, Robert Capa's surVIVing 'slightly out of focus' shots of the American landinb~ at Omaha beach are worldfamous; notable British photOgT:lphers lIldude George Rodger and Sergeant Jimmy Mapham. operating further east on Gold and Sword beaches. As with many areas of the war, it is the endurlllg work of these eyewitness photographers - operating despite great peT'\onal danger which has heavily IIlflUellCed our emotional fascination with the evenLs of 6 June 1944, subsequently expanded upon III cinema. Nevertheless. photography of the war has itS limitS. H;lVlIlg won a battle, the victors naturally found it fundamentally easier to record the progress of their victory than the defeated theIr defeat. Consequently. by natural process, many photographs reflect a State of access peculiar to the fortunate eye-witness. The Germans produced the best Images of the first two ye:m of the war. The eV3cuation of British troops from Dunkirk is an exception that proves the rule - Operation Dynamo \V3S recorded not by official photographers (long since departed). but only amateurishly by a few British and German participants. The transfer of films to be developed \V3S also problematic at sea in a way it was not on land or in the air. Until dark-rooms were established aboard large warships, or unless special contingencies had been put in place. photographs taken at sea (whether for official war-fighting purposes or for reportage) could take days or evell weeks to arrive at the developing stage. Thus, up-to-date photography of the war at sea was at a premium fOf contemporary media and naval authorities. and remains so today. There W3S. of course, no such thing as 3n immediately 3V3ilable electronic image file in World War Two. Mally private photographic collections only saw the light of day after the \var, and continue to do so. The work of Japanese and Soviet naval photographers is particularly elusive. It IS recorded that Robert DiamelH 3cwd as the official Soviet N3vy photographcr. working Illoscly with the Northern Fleet. coveril1g Arctic oper;nions and focu~sing frequently upon the heroic aspects of the individual sailors involved. In the case of Japan, lTlany of the official record.. were destroyed at the end of the conflict. both by the deV3stating
Allied bombing c3111paign and then at the hands of the Japanese themselves. During the war Japanese propaganda photography was exhibited on the home front. even displayed in Tokyo department storts, In December 1943, by law, Japanese photographic manufacturers and photographers were forced to focus on the war effort. Photographs taken by German and Soviet civilians remain the most elu~i\'C due to the wartime and post-war conditions of those countrit.""!i. Furthermore. while sea war was one of three overlapping and competing areas of fighting, it was usually the least immediate in terms of its effect on populaces and on the services themselves. Steady pressure, patient stalking. and monotonous voyages across wide ocean routes these were the underlying hallmarks of the sea war. And just as most of the maritime war was fought out of sight of the land. the images of it can feci similarly detached and subject to the same barrier of impersonality. Of all the wars. the one fought at sea was perhaps the least human in scale. Yet paradoxically. to prosecute the sea war. each of its basic units the ships - b':lthered more men together cheek-by-jowl in one place to fight this 1I1lpersonal war than either the land or air w;ar necessitated. Visually, the war at sea reflt:cts this potent and varied mixture of the size, scale and faces of banIe, The photographic record presented here includes stills from many theatres of war - the Pacific. Arctic,Atlantic, Mediterranean. Indian - from shore to ship, beneath. upon and above the sea. Characteristic of photographs of sea \vaf is the open sea-space and the natural frame provided by the lens upon a ship or Olher object ab'3iust the ocean. The Impersonal nature of a war fought at gn'at distances contrasts with the often claustrophobic human conditions of life aboard ship, aeroplane or submarine. And yet naval war is no k'ss vivid and dynamic on celluloid than other methods of fightlllg. Few scenes from World War Two can rival the ~heer fiery terror of a massed kllmikll::U attack, the panic ofan 'abandon shIp' or the adrenaline ofan amphibious landing Oil an etlt'llly-heid shon'. Each photograph has a different story to tell, and by placing them III a broad narratl\'e context we can go some way to catching a glimpse uno remarkably diverse. fascinating. and III many cas('s largely forgonen areas of the war at sea between 1939 and 1945.
World War Two: The Naval Background War at sea can be waged III many forms. each with a SIX'cific pur~ but all with one fundament.1l aim - the injuring ofan OPPOIll;'nt's capability to use the same sea to IllS own cnds, For hundred:> of years, sea power has been created and deployed to defend and extend interests, and deny the ability of others to use the sea as a hIghway for tT:lde, COlllmunicatlon, influence and lllilitary power. As a result, few a~pects of the recent past have been unaffected by the ability of natious to me the sea for political ends. World War Two saw the greatest deployment of sea power in the history of mankind. Iluge resources were spent around the globe on creating and maintaining the tools to fight at sea. In many ways the conflict \vas primarily a maritime war. Without the posscs~ion and exercise of sea power in its wide variety of guises, Japan could not have over-run the Pacific and then been driven back, and the United States could never have projected its power across the Adantic to defeat Nazi Germany- Britain could not have reinforced the home i~land by way of Edward Steichen In convnand of the US Navy's Photographic lnstJMe. Commander Edward J- Steoehef'l was a
leadIng figure ,n the photography of the war at sea In an or-garuzabOl1aJ as well as creatrve capacity. Hen! he pen:hes on a platform overIooIang the RIght deck of an Amencan th while pursuing the construction of a surface navy up to 35 per cem of I3ritish overall strenl:,>th (a size which German naval staff calculated could not be achil·ved until 1942 an}'\vay). With a view to m3xIIllizing the number of hulls while staying within the overall tonnage
Service had enjoyed a lead after 1914, had only in 1937 been recovered [rom the Royal Air Force and mO"t operntional and projected typl"'; of aircraft were obsolescent compared to their japane'iC and American naval counterparts. The Fleet Air Arm used the monoplane Blackburn Skua and Fairey Fulmar as fighter-bombel' and the vintage Fairey Swordfish biplane as a torpedo-bomber, the latter remaining SO dependable that it outlasted its planned succcssor. the Fairey Albacore. But the Royal Navy had plenty of ~trinb"'l to its bow New fire control gear, based on the Dreyer system in service during World War One, had bccn installed. Night fighting became the special competency of the British - particularly within the Mediterranean fleet. often the cradle of leading British tactical performance and innovation. In 1939, alliance with Frnnce 'iCemed to bring added security to the Mediterranean and, combined, Anglo-French naval strength dwarfed tim of Germany. with twO battlccruisers, twenty-rwo battleships and eighty-three cruisers between them as against three 'pocket bank-ships' and eight ctuisers. And the Royal Navy still ret;;ained a priceless ;;asset in its fighting skills, confidence and reput;;atioll, which counted for much.
The German Navy Much younger and with a lor to prove, the Gernlan Kril"g5I1u"jlJl~ was almost wholly offensive III composition. The surrender of 1918 and the imposition of the VersaiUes Treaty - when the German Navy, limited to
17
-------------------_.
In t rod u c t ion - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
limits agreed with Britain. Donia opted for the 650-ton Type VI [ rather than the 1,000-con Type IX U~boat as the mainstay design. In the V-boat, Donitz had a pOlcmially \var-winning weapon. But few prC-W:lf Kritgsmari"e planners relied on the bold prediction that Norwegian, Dutch or Fn'tlch coastlines might cOllle uncler their control - and in gencnl, few staff officers shared the zealous optimism that Donia held in the 19305 about the importallce of the V-boat in ally future war against Britain. Not Intended to confront tht' British flect in any large-scale surface battles, nonetheless Germany's well-designed, over-displaced and powerful capital ships were a threat (0 British supremacy on all individual basis, and their very existence v"Ould divert significant British naV
e &-rorStll"l the
O..,tm!!"d ~ l"'\edft...
at J05IXlr iq:Is..
20
~
~
a Swonjj,sh /'11
e Tcrpedo .....
e orpedo wert' dc.uly WIth the AXIS pow...rs, the nJv)"s role was n:strined to the polll:mg of the country~ stJt\'d neutrality.
The:' RovJ.1 Amm.liJ.n NJ.\)'. J.nd its neighbour the ROy.11 New Ze.1bnd Navy. preferred to buy and nun Oriti~h-built cruisers. Austr.1hJ. ordered tWO 'County' cb~~ crui\('~ .-lUS/F. In 1939, Ontam sull held .. clear supenont) III hcr merch.1nt nurine. In percentage of world\\ Idt' IOlllla!--,,-', \he held nedrh' tv.·icc Ih.1t of her ne.1reic dement of the WOlr. [he aruck and defence of trJ.de \hlpping would. on babnc.... occupy the energlC\ of Ihe \\urld\ na\"1\'" on .1 hllherto unptl."Cedented scale.
21
19) 9 - 4 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
narrowing to focus on a few towns nill in Allied hands. ;another BritISh wilhdn1\\'31 across the sea becallle mcviuble by the end of May. As C;l!ais made Its US! sund 3g::linSI the panzers. co\'t"red by the last vesti~ of th~ French First Army. the amphibious evacuation of 338.000 Alli('d men from Dunkirk and other Ch:lIlllei seaports was begun by the Rap.! Jvy and Allied ....'ar;hlps. aided by a motley collection of tenders. tugs. s:ailing barges. fishing 00;1.[5, C€n5U) ~tealllers. private mOlor oo...t'!o. plellu~ cnlt OlnJ Slllmg pchts - the so-allt.-d 'Little Ships'. Another 200.000 men wen:: ~'acwlcd from Awntlc French ports such as SI n:ure. With Fl'3llce and lklglUlll out of the fight and Norway ;lIId Dellln;ark O\1::rukclI by C....CIlb., and with Germany's eastern ;lIId southern borders ,>«un::. Hitler could turn to the proposed m\~ion of Briuin. Opt-r.mon SC':lhon had been cOnlcmpbtcd for 5Cveral months, ;;md wllh Ihe Ch;;lnnel pora. now m Gernun control, ;m m\";lSion force t'Stlln;lIed ;II neul)' 4.000 ulldmg eralt. unk transpor~. b;lrges. rugs, Siebel femes. fWlIng cnft ;Iud motorbo;l~ \\~ usembled ;lnd kept ;II ten wys' re;ldllleiS throughout Seplember. ThIS force could h;l\'e bnded 70.000 men on the firsl cby. BUI bOld weOllher ;ldded to Gemu.n dlfficultlt'S: comnund of the ;llr \\~ not ....on &om RAF Fighter Comnund how~"t"r much Goering II10lde bo,lSIful pn:dicrions; BriUIll h;ld rescued the core of liS professlonOlI Olnny &om Dunkirk; ;lnd IIlOSI of ;III. the Royal N;Jvy wu ;JlillOSI ceruin to wre;Jk complete de\~UUOIl should ;JllY Ch;Jnlld crosslllg be ;Jttempted. no m:atter what forces Ihe Germans could throw 11110 supporung the prl:'cuious :amphibiom Cr.lft. In October the opentlon w:as suspended indefinitely.
sensibly chosen (Q relllaJn ;r, nOll-belhgerent. U\'lllg Itself from any Anglo-French n;r,v:r.1 offensive. But wuh the French knocked out by June. the British Mediterranean Fleet could no longer count on the .\filM/lt ,....·;;wolwlt. With fleets :and b;r,ses sml.tegically loc;r,ted ;r,t Glbulur :at the \\~tern entrance and Alexandri;r, in the east (O''er 1.800 nnles :apart). the Dnush under Admiral Andrew Browne Cunningham were ;r,t OIlCt:' dJvided ;r,nd t:'xposed. It w:as illlp
Nordl. Braita; 58
~
12-
Zlalt>ilha uber NN 15m
Jenuar 1lMI
I el·Keblr. Sailors stand. apparent!)' stunned and bern<Jsed. on the smoke·filled deck while the Bnush Mediterranean Reefs shells land in the harbour and among the French targets..
Mers el-Kebir. 3 July 194() The French fleet, awrungs spread. at their moonngs at Mer> el-Keblr near Ora... bef~ the bombardment by Force H OIl 3 July 1940. From left to right are Cornmondonl Tes/e. Bn!lagne. SIJ'OSbowg. Prwence. and Dunker"Ql.lf!. O!her ships were anc:hored out of shot, to the right. Note the smoke rising from the funnel of the Dunkerque. The photogldph may ~ been taken from one of the reconnaissance aln:ri!ft sent up from Force H to keep an eye OIl the French ships whrle negotia1.JOl1S were underway. an aCbOll whiCh unfortunately 1\lSt helped to increase French Indignation.
Slrosbourg escapes The Soosbowg getllng ur'>derw.l.y as Brrtrsh shells fall be)")l"ld the bre.l.k'w.l.terTo the left. Provence. whiCh did I'IOt escape. tIM her forward main t~ trained to return the Bnush fire. Srrosboutg made It to W VIChy-held port ofToulon-
Ope~oon uapulr, Pornmooth Operiltoon Cauputt. to ~ the Freod
~
bep'l
•.
••
~e.Il:IIy erooo.ch As the b~. F~ ~ .., the Botlih ports d Porurnoum and f'I)'moutl'> ~ boarded
e-'l
3 /lilt At Portsmoutr> ~ r'rlded the torpedo boats
La Rore.lrl u.s phol:OVIJlh ~ MeIpr;ir'Mne. the frerw:h tntolore IS st,. Ily.-rc; l:a.:l no fT'C>"T"Oet's of t/'Ie frerw:h ~ Me visible. ~ thn. pnotovaPh was .cwaIy taken on 3 Jury Both ...esseII were returned to ffaoce'" I'H5. ~ and
La
french contre-torpilJeurs it Porumouth Other shtps 5eIzed it Portsmouth ird.ded the conve~ Llopord. the colcnil sloop ~ de Bi=a, MId i ......-ber d 5INII ~ d the CH.5 iIld CH" I disses.
45
•
A convoy at sea Often proven ~nce the seventeenth century to be the best way of protecting I'Tlef'Chatlt sh'ppong. cO!'f'lO')'S were qulCldy rentroduced "4lO" the outbreak of war, but Ihei-
OV\nuITIbered escorts found It dlflicult. to protect thell" d'Iarges. espooaIly after the U· boal$ bases. ThIs cOl'M:l'f is lin the process of executing a tum, probably on exercise as pracuce for YAlen It might be reqored lin response to U-boat attack.
were able to use F~
Another British merchant ship is sunk The fldt,o Oemps'let' lJIe's Apapa. on M. her back broken. ¥'d steMn 1'1WI&"; c~ ~ CO'lUCt Wltn her boo~ sris n tne AtlintJc, November 1940.
46
~
witler
1940 A Briti1h escort vessel ~t Se.I
It wW\"llust C".emwl U~ts, Slrlace ~ and Ion&-range uuaft that merchant ~ ¥ld ovtno.ombefed e5Ulf1 ~ and ther ~ had to cope WIth The Atlantoe oce.u> W~ e. would n- ~ l'rom the tug IntO
5
stoml trooper'>
specqI high-speed rrootortloW; (propelled U5IOlI ., 0U!b0¥d motor W'th the propeller on the end of '" Iare shaft and steered by sn'PY tl.WTWl8 Ihts entn ~ ) to ~ the irn ~ on the ~ (..,..e 6). ~ the ~ of the dlsemb¥btJOn ~ p1K~ I.l5lrli t3fTll'S ~ ~ the open bages 7-10 !ihow tl"6, complete wrt/'I the tneky ~ of~ a gu"I cama&e KllnIa ~ that though the troops rolled ~ ther tn:ll/SeI"'l., the sea came CNer the tops of ther boots. $0 they stII got ~ cold and wet. All thts KOnl& captUred on his lela camer.l. ~ at the trne, Ioolong at how pntT\M'e it all was. he shared the mlsgMngS of many of 1'11$ fellow ollicers about the feas'bollty of the plan. Years after. espe<wly tompanng It to the AJIIl!§' preparabOnS to If'Wade Normandy four ~ later. he c()lJ\(Wl't help boJt wondel'" If I\Ml ever reaJy planoed to lIlVild@ Brnam at aI.
-
5 1
H'*"
..
-------------------------------------------
--- ~
Death of an Italian destroyer damaged ltalaan destrnyer ArtIgI.ere lies drsabled undef" the gun5 of the Royal Navy·5 a·inch gunned (f1Jiser Yori; following the night action between an Italian torpedoboat fOl"Ce and the BntiVl 6-inch light cru;ser f¥Jx off Cape Passero (aboYe).The BntiVl CruISer fini~ her off WIth a 2 I-inch torpedo (nght).
Th@ ~avily
52
1940----------------The British MediternllNn FI~t at Se~ In the early montr\S of war between Italy ¥Id ElntarrI. battle IIeeu wen! keen to br'na .oovt ¥l Roy;iI Navy '" ~ WOl1<ed Nrd to ~ il barue. of:.en inng on tuliM'I c~ rort.ialoOl'lS ¥tel t-es ....-rth the ~ not oriy of IIlIloctJna ~ but ~ of , In M:arch, tho: U-bo:at arlll had suffered its first bad month. Three of the leadlllg U-boat act:S - Sho:pke, Kretschmer and Prien - were sunk by Ufllish escorts, But the success of the Allies' strategy of Adamic convOYlllg was measured 1I0t by battles won or U-boats sunk, but by the ~fe :arrival of merchant vessels at their destinations. In the first four 1ll011th~ of 1941. ne:arly twO million roIlS of shipping had been lost, eXJccrhau:d by a lack of air cO\'er and sufficiem numbers of tramed C'Kort~ d~plte the introduction of n~ver types such as the bigger, more ca.pable 'Castle' class corvettes. Shipprds in Gernuny, Fr.mce and the Low COllntrit'$ were assembling U-bo.llts at .lin mCTeasmg r;lle. Wolf-pack tacti" were ~oming hener understood by the Allies but they ha.d no breathin~ ~pace to implemo:-m .lI counter-offensi\'e. By nud-1941, the British and Allied merchJm nurllle .lind Its crews were steadily being bled whIte in the Atla.ntic durlllg whJt the U-OO.llt cmH would come to nlltheir'HappyTime' ,The :l\'Olwnce ofloolllmg dcfeJt m the l)JUle of the Atlamic became the most cntlc.;;d priority of the British n.llVY .lind merchant marinc_
Allied Countermeasures
In
were detect:lble by High-Frequency Direction-Finding (HFI DF) equipment which could prm-;de approxinute tria.ngula.tion fixes to build up .lI plot of U-boat positions .across the Atlantic. It MC:lme possible to 6tlight HF/DF s}~tenu aboard escort vessels for tactial use, helping to locate \\'Olf-packs as soon as they signalled an atuck 011 a coo\'oy. The policy of using signals intelligence to steer COI1\'O')'5 a\\'3Y &om conuct with U-bbats was :lCtuall)' \"ery successful, particularly so when the convoys were fast-moving troop cOllvoys .lind high-speed tran.s:n!antlc passenger Imers such :IS the Quun .\fary .lind QUl'm Eli.zalKrh, whose cruising speed W.llS .liS high as 27 knots and troop C.lIp;lClty a staggermg 16,000 men. But sigll3ls II1tdJigence could play only J. slllJ.ll p:art. To aid defence, merchant ships were fitted with more AA guns .lind in some C;lSI."S catapults to bunch single-shot modified Hawker HurriC;lnes for :lntireconnai5SJnce ;Iir defence, These C.lItapult-Armed Merch;lntmen (CAM ships) we~ quite successful. though laul1chll1g .lI1l ;Iircraft destined to be: ditched \\';15 de;lrly a desperate measure designed [0 prevem mo~ powerful forces descending on a coo\'oy. L.lIter the concept w~s uken funher. resulting in the Mercrn.nt Aircnft Carrier (MAC ship), usu:ally J fb.t-decked unker or cargo vessel coO\'C'ned to bunch :and teCO\'t'r J snull number of .aircraft. All these helped aIIevi..l1te the dire need for cn-riers (which in .lIny cue could hardly be sp.ued from fleet duties), ~"Cn if ~uipped only \\;th J few IO\\'-perfornunce S\\'Ordfuh. Indeed, this '\';15 the only type th.at could ha\'C' comfortably operated off such vessels. Continuous neu .all-\\'C'a.ther air cover pfC\'C'nted subnurines from oper.lting on the sllrfJCe with impunity. The Brmsh :also mtroduced the 'River' class frigate, J significant improvement on the 'Rower' WIth double the endurance, more \\'C'apons .lind 4 knots more speed. Behind the frontline, industrial c.llpacity was being expJnded by Brit:ain and CanJdJ, but particularly in the Umted States. By mid-1941. six months before the United States entered the \var .liS a full belligerent, Allied shipping losses were being outstripped by new vessels joining the available active tonnJge. British n;l\T:ll dockyards almost stopped new construction in f.wour of repair and maintenance: meanwhile, the systematic clearing of congestion and the repair of tempor.JoTily laid-up hulls in British west-COJst and Scottish ports helped reintroduce more ships. Looking .lit this war of attrition, some historiJIlS comend that Germany could only hJ\'e \\-"On the Battle of the Atlantic in 1941; having missed the chJnce to strike a decisive blow to BriulII's Achilles heel, Germ.any had no hope once the C'\-'C'nts of December 1941 CJme to pass. But while new ships might be on the $toeb. the immedia.te effects of the loss of cugoes ....';15 another nutter. Concentrating III the mid-Atlantic \\'Ould help the GernullS to maximize their forces :md increase their stranglehold on the free mO\'C'ment of es.sential supplies across the Atlantic sufficient to seriously affect Bnuin's Jbility to suy in the fight. If the British public were feeling the pinch, the sailors aboard some mcrchant vessels experienced something nOt seen since the introduction of antiscorbutics to victuals in the nllleteenth century ~ an outbreak of seUtv)'.
The Bismarck Action and Progress North Atlantic
the V-Boat War
Allicd ingenuity w:u cJlled upon and resulted in a number of new lI1eJsure~ to counter the ill1mediate U-boat and LlIftll'affi threat. GreJter qu:mtitic~ of snull seJborne rJ.dar sets were developed for me aboard cscort ~hips, making subnlJrines theoretic.lllly do:-tecuble on the surface from beyond \;sual range. EquJ.lIv import.mtly. German VHF Slb'llJls
10
the
Even without the burdcllS of the Mediterr:meJn, the constant grind of Adamic convoying, and devoting resources to the training of the eager Canadians, the spring of 1941 was a difficult period for the Royal Navy. stretched to its tolerable limits. The Bismarck chue and engagement is a case in point: Force H (Ark Royal, Sheffitld and Rt"Olvn) h;ld to come
58
1941
from Gibralw, while big con\"O)"$ §:Ilhng from the CI)'de and L1\'~rpool w~re denuded ofescorts to free up hea"y shl~ such as the RoJ,1r)' to join the hum from me C'\oer~pressed Home A~t. With me German battlecruise~ Sthamhonr and CIIl'isnwU perched at Bn:st. me British lu.d plenty to won)" about In May 1941 even before tht' pride of their fleet, me fllt. pcmoerful and unmodernlzed oouJecruiser Hood. was blown up on 24 May III rhe onh Adannc by a salvo from the Bismarck. AU but three of Hooas crew of 1.419 were losr III \'Cry deep Waler. Sunk after only eight IUlllutes of action. her desrruction was a massive shock to the Ropl Navy and the British public: but II sounded the death~kndl on the first and only sortie for the bl'3nd-new IS-inch b'Unned German battleship. The British battleship Priu(t oj IHllrs - new and not yet properly ,....o rked up - had scored a 14-lIlch hit Oil the BIsmarck and as she steamed 011 1Il company with the heavy cflliseT P,i"z Eu~" she was down at the bow and leaktng fucl. Worse was that a thouund tom of oil could lJot be pumped from the bow. The psychology of confidence and the expectation of sucCt.'SS - or tht' opposite - were very Ill1portant to a fighting 5er\'ice's psyche and could mfluence opentional performance to a degree. Just mmutes after tht' BISmarck had sunk the Hood .lIIld seen off the PrincC' ojll:dt'S. Bis",arrk's Adnural Liitjens brwdast a messagco exhorting his crew to prep,ne ro go down galhntl}~ mdicatlng an underlymg conviction of mC'\'irable demise. (Sumlar sentiments were expressed. pcrh"ps more undefSUm:lably. \\ lthin the U-boot ann; poetry "nd lerten wnuen by crewmen rewal rhat C'\~ntual de"th "t the tuum of the enemy \\
~
~~l()I'
I •
.
w.
~ ~
b.lttle';h;p
f" . .. . took Brit st'l Prrr.e ~~ W S1an aao.;s tr>e At ~ •• lOr "lIS hostonc ~ ng WIth US ~t F1'rilr. 0 ~es.:)1'1_~ a ((lfflOy to ~ and ~ _ the bcshP the ftted f-<JIn Z ~ to ~ III a fn..Clea, II'ld ~ d:sa$troIA ~ to irr cider: and ther'I CCU'lte!: Japanese the E.ts..: roes. 'Ie
WI$
"1
..-e
' ~ J'ul and HII'l'0'1 ~ NaZI Germ.1n)':
Augl,$ll1
68
1941 Mantlme p,atrol
ajn;~ft
The Shc:w"t ~ ftylng boat. brought IntO RAF ~ tust before ~ outbre.tk of war. t..-ned out to be of ~
v,)jut
to
Coastal Corrmand for cOt'M:ly escort a
MId ant,-U-boat patrM. Thts partJClMr ~ IS
GRS of 20 I Sql...ron.
69
•
1941
HMS Suffolk in the Denmark Strait Gunners man one of the quadnJple O.S-inch lewis antiaircraft guns SItuated armdsl'lIps aboard HMS 5lJffoIk, on a patrol of the Denmark Strait between Iceland and Greenland in 194 I Ice flows can be seen In the background. The northern part of the Denmarl of history.
(above left) The battleship Okt)'Obrskoyo Revoliursya Antl·(Uro;raft guns on board the ~ ~. which rem3'oe,e" was Ol'le of the most modem So..et destro)oers of the penod. TOfl)edoed by a German MT8 in the ~ Strarts ... p,e 1941, she was towed to l ~ for ~Il': Thts l'eSlJted 11'1 a ~ 00w and 1.Ip(IMed armarTll!flt. She re-entef'ed servICe'" 1943.
The submarine Mol 72 ~ LFisarlcMch abo¥d
~
5l.bname. the 5l'Nl
200-ton(~voesseIM-171.From)Jy 194
~
u-boats m Sow:!. ~ bqan to opeme n the same deep water"5 of the ~ ~ fpds m Bare1ts Sea. On 21 I\l9ISt. Moll2 sneaIozcll'ltO ~ Fjord lndetected by the German guwd:loat and ~ torpedoes IntO a merchintrn¥l tied ~ " poet:
M-' 71 ~ her escape I\M"c he.lrd ~
IS.
but
In
fKt her torpedoes I'Iad tnI5SeCI the ship and strudc the poer: nst9i n ~Septerrbet" she b.nd her I't\aI1( ~ the hA of" ~ ste¥ner; and agan in ~ 19'41 ~ '" §hip 'NI1lch the apwn d.l.med was of 8.000 tOl'l$.In fact she was the Vesco of only 3)1 tons. Soviet submarw'les da.med thIrty·two ships of a total of nearly 96,(0) tons sunk in northem Witer5 in 1941. Accordone to German ~ only tweIYe ~ of 28.000 tons were lost. iIrld only three of the5e ihp§ of 6,C- She proved awkward to crew. requ,nng a larger number of highly skilled pe.-sonnel than were easily ilVallable to the nascent Free French Navy. There were also problems of disl:iphne Flnally,ln February 1942 she was lost WIth all hands in!iOlTleWhiil mysterious Circumstances, apparently rammed by an Americ:an merchantman off Parwna..
80
1941
(below) Rubis In contrast to Surr:;oufs less than gIoOous wartime career. that of the little Rubis (pictured afte.- the war at Toulon) was one of outstanding success. Less than a quarter of the SIZe of het" goant SISter. Rubos served throughout the war. first wrth the Monne Nal/l:lflOlf:. and then after July 1940 with the Fon:;e N(lII(I~ FfOflI;/W: !.fus, OperatJng maInly from Clur'dee and Gosport. she earned out twenty-etgtrt patrols and m,ne!ayv-og sortIeS, lay;ng 683 milles and being responsible for the 5ritJng of twenty-two enemy vessels and damag'ng two fl'\OI"e. This one small 5Ubmanrw! was creditKl wrth doing more damage to the enemy than any other French warship dunng the 51)( ~an of wa~ In 1941 Rubts WI"Viveedoed a freighter at wch close rdl'lge that the V.ock of he..- torpedoes e>q>loding damaged the submanne,s batt~ preventing her from diving and need overboard Her dedlCaled. tJgtltIy Ie loKond Ubou' ~ b u t sat ~ ¥I ~ MPon ttoe ""¥'\me (oaIooor\ serw'lg1S ~ to ttoe Scw>et t.non ~ t 9040-2 As Lord Pnvy Seal Ill! _ Lrader of ttoe ~ of CorTvnons and at. the ~ tIl5 phOIO&nph """ taozn had pst had " map- dlsci&'ee ,,,,,"It ~ 0w..rcnI o.oer the CIIoeg of the _ efli:rt Ind had ., ~ offered I'IIs ~ Wl\twl "few WCll:b he moYed 10 become MnsIcr lOr Arcn!'l. ProO.Jct,c:n
Anti'lJrtran IUns on bo3rd a battleship Ivl ogttt·lwreIled 2pdr pom-pom anu-anraft &U1
mountJn& on a battJesl'op. powbty KIlg George V_The &U1 layer on the further (right /wld) enclosed posrt>on IS locubrly teIing is tNt they not onty show major wor1c being arried out on .. $hip mat _ not one of the YlCtIms of the japanese attaCk. but major WOf"k that had ~rudy
.l
been pbnned ;and was belfll dc:Iroe as IW't of a routine prognrrme. It was business lot Peart Hubot". ;and America was already fIutrlg the vast mdustnal muscle Wt would soon bqin to crud! pPul.
as USI.W
I •
•
uss ,-""""'" The ~~ on thew ptootop-apl'l$ IS the -eraft c.vner ~one of the ~ ~ had the P>d b"t...ne to be m _ tNt fa-..eful December Su"lday. The WCll't. beIt'c urned out ~ ~ 01 her e9lt fl.-n;tl pIS on t'NlrIlTlOU"'tS. These ~ been pMt of ~ ! ~ llI"ICe she W-st enl~ ~ like other ~ the Unr'..ed States ~ I\ad 00'l&""'I'Y ~ ots ~ umtI'1; PQ$$ltWy """"" to de'end ~ ~ ~e.mdd
(left) Smoke and debris as the carrier explodes
_-...
Lemgton explodes as the fires reach the aYlatlOn gasolne storage She was the first large camet" to be sunk H'l the Pacr1ic. but eN« W ~ ~ )'l!MS ~u hke thIS would be seen tJIT1e and time agaJn by men
123
~ ll'l
the US and
.. 1942
The Battle of Midway The ~nes. N~ expected iu picket line of subrmnl"leS outside Pearl H~rbor to 1M: Admiral NOlgUmo plenty of advan 1 eq..opnent thr Ur1ey bt was ~ Ifl tNt rNrJY cooid be e¥ned. stOWed rnon: or less ~ on a shop. b.lf. ~ trlIS It po:MCled oriy the most ba$Ic means to t'lrect Its ~ II lrI!c>t men alloat. but not rn..och mere Note how the stop's AdrTn.'ty ~Me p.'ll: ~ IS c:WI'erent eadl5llZ - ew:Ient rom the ~ 'bre.Jk' on the (~ lone t'ooO
fe.sa..na
WIU'I
"''''' .....,. QJten
The May "-l been ~ &-om her- ~ Ifl f"Wd'I 191(1 ¥ld ~ the coo.ne 01 the !ileMned some 650.000 mles. c:arr')'I'li dose to one mIoon ~ On one ~ Ifl 19"13 she umed, Ifl ~ to her- 9-43~. some 15.7«) troops. malt.o'wa toUI of 16.683 souls on bo.d, a record """"'d1 ~ InIo:e/y to be br'oIr.en. ~ two ~ after tt.s ~ wzs t.lken a ~ e'SC0I"ll/'li Cl'\IISe': HMS Ct.ltJCOa .... as ~ rarrmed ~ 5l.ri: by ~ May oIf the ~ coast of Scotland. ~ """'" troops. !he ....,. could not iIfb"d to stop, ¥od so tine ~ 01 the ~s ~ wer-e ci'owned.
w.
1942
On board HM Submarine Tribune photol~
~rie's
of $Qme seventy which were aI taken by Jilek Bryson, ill! officl3l1 pho~,. for d1e Mlmstry of InfonmbOn. dUntlI the filmi"l of Close Quorten In 19-42. Their purpose wu u publicity $lilh. for the felorure film. whK:h detailed a routine Brtmh SYbfTwioe p;ltrol in the North Sm. and off the C~st of NOl"W"Y. "nd wu made uSlIll'officeo and men of HIS ~ty's subrNnnes'.WhiIe many of the photognphs are clearly posed. all give iI good impression of the cbvstrophoblc condItIOnS on boMd d wbmarioe:l. u -'I as the sornewh&t anfomW manner of dress adopted (even thouan all pr-esent IJrI"I!f"e doubdess tidied up for filmin&). These
ue
pv-t
of il
(right) HMS Tnbune!llt Holy loch tNo SLb'NrY'le ~ shop HMS Fo-th .at I-Ioly Lod\ S«>tJancl
-
(below) Stowma a torpedo A r~ er r'ld a T~ .,..
......
~e-" ~ !he ~ of a torpedo. The c< me
hz..o"... ~ t'iCI' explowe wartoead. correct st~ was
It:>I' ~ ~ ,"II! M'len
h<ed
I'l
on patrOL l4) to a dozen rnerT'Oers of \toe subman"oe"s C"the same ~t.
I
The enflne room Ger1er'il-..ew of tne oMenor of ~ ~ room
0I'l
board
HMST~.
(""") Chedon& "'" _
.."'"
The Second c.o.:s-r. of HMS TrO.no A!uy 0fI\cer Hedey 0'IIl'tes Woocky at tws drwlg sunon on tf¥, bw¥d ~ The 6epth ~ on tf¥, ~ 9>cJr"y§ tNt ~ sutltNrYIe a on the s..rl«:e ,) CIe¥ ondociJbon tNt ttvs ~ W~ posed ttenv.oe set'VOCe on the ~ and Allannc. Compieted on ~ 1940. she was twICe totpedoed, I'l August 1911 and Octobe" 1912. both tIrl'rl PlJI: to the Brooid'tn Navy Yard b- ~ She was 50id lOr 5Cnp on 1956.
1956.
135
1942
Operation Pedestal Two b3ttleships, three carriers. seven trui5e~ thirty-two destroyen ;and eight wbtNrines wen rrKluereO to proteCt JUst foorteen merdwlUnen and &\eir 85.000 tons of despenotely crucw arps 'J,Iiling from the Clyde to M~. The convoy met with submarine. ;air ;and rnotor-torpedo-bou OltClCk.$ ~i illmost the entire length of its route. Of the carriers invotved in Open.tion Pedestal. one. £ogle. wu sunk by ~1J on II Auaust. along With "ioe of the mixed escort of crui5en and destroyers and mne of the convoy. Just five surviving merch:mtrnen. indudi"ldle uraendy needed Amencan-owned and Bntish-crewed tanker Ohio. hersetf hit by an IQliin torpedo and two Gern'Wl diYe:-bombers. ~mped ,"to Grand t-brbour. Yalletu. with 32.000 tons of wpplies intKt. This wu a hugely mky and expensIV'I ,...supply optiOItion which could e;uily ~ 5een the convoy wiped out. and II"Idicates how Important I fig.una presence in the Mediternnean wu to die Royal NI¥Y.
(l'i&ht) HMS Phoebe
The fofeastJe of the ~ !'tube 0Jn'lc OperatJOl'l Pedestal. (bebw)HMS&Igle The ~ ume'" ~ escorted by I destrO)oel'" do..nlg the Sl¥S of ()penbon fledenlII
~tory
1942
,,
(
",.
HMS Indomitable Crewmen dl5pef>lng on the Rtght deck In relaxed mocxl early on ... Operatoon PedestaL Quite apart from the ~
nurnber's of sadors milhng about. Induding member's of a band. there are a runbel'" of other indicators that flying operations hir...e not been taking place, nor are II'I'UT\Itlel1t The radio masts along the sides of the deck are in the raised posrtton for ftytng ope!'atIOI1S they were lowered
-L1 •
..,
to the honzontal (as shawn 111 later photographs),There are no arrester WII'eS rigged, though the 'bowspnngs' that held them dear of the Right deck for an ain;ralt's arrester hooks to engage can be seen just outboard of the hatched lines on the deck. Near the stem are half a dozen spare wing ~s. presumably detached for maJntellanCe, v.tIiIe in the f~nd are two of the starboard crash barnef" starclIons. lying on top of whid'l are the heavy WU'l:
137
bar'ners. 'NhIch cOlJd be ngged dunng Iandll1g to ~ aJl'cl'1l1t from ~ng and rvnmng on rno any parked on the forward part of the m modget subm¥'nes ¥'Id HTBs
cOl"llpOl..nded the dlflicuIbes f"'"l the ScMet.s III SevastopoI haftlolr On 27 }l.ne the last large ScMet warshop to errter the ~ port. the destro)'er IeadeI" TosI*ent brtlught 9," men ... to the fortress and evacuated 2,300 wounded and cMlaans, &II the while under ont~ all'" attacX Shlppong nearly 2,000 tons of water ttv"ough bomb damage and nelMTllSSeS. she had to be lcrwed to ~ where she $ettJed on the shallow bottom. She was destro)oed by bombs five days later,
Submanne ().-'f aJonpde Tas/lk.eIIl The old Slb'Nme D-4 ~ To:sI*ent dl.rng ~ of~ .... 1942, Booh a1\el" ~ Will' One. [).4 was the ~ SoYiet Sl.brn¥1ne built ~ lOr the BlIdc Se4 but the desT1 sulfer"ed from many GUts and was tltSUCcessfiA. She was 5lri: by ~ fon:es olfYevpatona the foIowong ~
1942
Submvine: Shcft..2' 2 ;at Poti The .....tJnwne 1$ shown hen: h9citIg out OIl ~ CCIII"Wt sortie- n the b«kpn:lrs the WttIeshop ~ Ka'rm.ncl. By autl.ftV'I 1942 the t:..A of the 5cMet BLO S& F~ _ fon:ed to concentrate at ~ and Bab.mo ~ more and more of ots b.- wert CMrTUI'I by the Getm.rl '""'I- F\:ll:l beciwne CJ\.IOal In the resupply or ~ ~ T~ ~ tQmed ~ coastal shipping fi1:lm the Bosporus ~ to the and ~ and ~ earned 4S.lXX> men to the defence ofIwpsc by mod-October. T..apse was g.,oed
en-ne..
• (l'i&ht) Submarine ShetH2' 5mI'lg dowrl (If"I the far ntn IS the cornrnandel'" of the Slbrn¥ne. ~ A.. F. Vdyaev Wher\.,.. AI\Ied c~ passed the North Cape. b.r ~ We ScMet Sl..Ibrnan'les v.OIAd ret nto po5'bOIl between the IflboI.n:I cQ1i?' for take-off OIl the fl.gt>l dede lOse a.wort
~~
'.-.e AIlracore
00
"'It"- cleek
to lx:wTb IrieIdI
------1942
Severe bomb damage to the stem of HMS Delhi
The antI·aircraft cruiser suffered bomb damage in A1glet'S Bay dunng mopping-Up operations in Decembe.- 1942 dunng the aftermath of OperatIOn Torch. Note the men standIng on the Iowef deck of the cruiser.
-
•
The cruiser 0upIeiIt _ ... G:pIosoor6 were $0 VIOlent there were lo I"UTlber of CA5UiIt.oes on tne qMy$Ide. and the ship bosned Sor twenty dIys..
Toulon In World War Two the (l'eltest number of ships to be de:!itroye:d in one sinp actIOn occulTed in the early momi"l of 27 November 1942 at the French IUVllI base and a~J of Toulon. when the french Navy fulfilled the promise rmde two and a IWf yurs previously "Ot to let iu ships btl into GerTT'Qn or IuJ~n Iwlds. Th,s dramatJC event h.lId been prompted by the Allied invasion of A1ltf"Q and MQrocco e;J,rlier in the month. The Gemun high cOffirmnd. fc;uful that this could lead in rum to a !andinl in the VKhy-controtled southern half of france:, resolved to occupy the area. Wh,le this ~s f;1.kinS place, unopposed by the Vithy regime. which recognizl'd that to do so would have been futile. there w The seaplane carrier Commandolll Teste and the l»ttleship Prowmce Both shiPS had been at Hers el.l<etHr where the latter was severely damaged. and I'l()\fII both were scvttJed at Toulon. next 10 the 116tVaub.an.The t\MO ships had been part of the DMSIOfl des f,oIes. and both went down with the Germans actually on board. Just \Ilsl~ next to Commonoom Teste are the masts of a small 5Upply 5h1p, th@ HO~!ln, a150 5CVtlIed. In front of the stHPS can bl': sef':n w ftoats supporting arlU-torpedo netting. whldl had. ironically.
~rwd
to Impede the five 5Ubmannes whICh attempted to escape.
Another view of DupleiJl
A hautlng ..;ew seen between the funnels of a conlft-fOlprJkur. almost certll1n1y Ger(aut. scuttled on the opposde of the D~ de M,SS1essy
155
.... 194 3
aircraft and l.."SCort vl.."S$Cls employing the fruitful bough of Allied technological R"SOUrcCS. By the end of the year. 237 U-boats had been los!. And as American industrial capacity ddiven::d sufficiellt weaponry to take the offensive simultancously in the Atlantic and the Pacific. the KrirgslIIr, it was agreed to give part of the surrendered Italian fleet to the Soviet Navy (pnncipal1y the battleship Giulio C/,$llrt', to be renamed the I\'owrossiysk), and that the USSR would receive Konigsberg. a permanent warm-water pOri in the Baltic, later to be renamed Kalinll1grad, Meanwhile, stubborn German resistance funher to the east meant that the Ukrainian Black Sea pon of Odessa remallled in German hands. supplied by COIWayS from Romania (whose oil the German war effon now largely depended upon). Squadrons of swift Soviet motor boats harried them. Among a range of ex-US warships to be donated. many patrol torpedo boats of different types were handed over to the USSR 111 1943, in whose service they would pro\'e of great worth.
The Japanese Retreat from the Southern Frontier From the end of 1942 and 11110 1943, Japanese forces began to be dislodged from a number of their mosl far-flung locations. SpIll imo three groups under Geneml Douglas MacArthur (South-West Pacific Area), Admiral William Halsey (South Pacific Art"a) and Admiral Chester Nimit2 (Central and North Pacific Areas), vast American forces of men. ships and aircmfc fought their way from atoll to aloll. defeating or leapfrogging the Japanese force~ around the perimeter of conquered territories. Capture of enemy-held airfields was a top pnoril)'. In February 1943 the JapanL'Se force of 12,000 remallllng men were withdrawn from Guad,lcanal by dL'Stroycr, ceding a vital VICtory to the US Mannes. For the first timc, the Japancse had becn handed a decI~ive defeat in the air,at sea alld on tbe ground. And III the first week of March . the Japanese were taught that thL')' could nOt run slow convoys of tmllsports dunng the day with llladcquate aIr cover without great risk. Eight tr:msports en roule betweell Rabaul and New Gumea, l.."Scorred by eight destroyers, were atucked by American bombers using new skipbombing tactics. Over the course of twO days, the battle of the Bismarck Sea sawall eight transporlS alld half the destroyers sunk by bombing and stmfing. On 18 April, US P-3R fighters. acting on llnelligence Intercepts, shot down Admiral Yamamoto's aeroplallc as he flew from Rabaul to 130ugainville. killing him. Meanwhile, Japanese reinforcements were being sent using fast destroyer forces down Thl' Slot' in :an effort to
158
1 94 J
relic\"(: Ihe bl..·lea~..uered land ~rrisons. Over [he next few month~. the centrnl Solomon~ became [he scene of sever.ll hJrd~fough[ ~urface act!om, For Ihe Al1ll·rlCan~. on babnce the \1ClO~ of Ihese b.lUIC"'i. the purely otfen~'\'e pha!>e of Ihe Pacific war had begun and [he}" pl"e"sed [0 Ihe nOrlh \\~I IOwards Boug;unville and Rabaul. Fear of American urner ;,urcr.llt and a lJ(k of friendly bnd-b~ air cO\~r kepi Ihe japalll"\C frolll approachmg American fleets without their own carner baule fleel 111 a[lellJance. Uy [hl~ [llIIe, lila: '-prodUl'cd liberty ships wt:re pouring OUI of Amenc;m ~h'J"'!o';lrtb al a r.ue of about 1"11 per month. By [he middle of IIJ43,AmerIC2n h,pyartb \wn: (hurnmg out Esso,' c~ fleet carne" c:\'cr)' elghl wn'h, a \wll 2.\ IIgh[ cJrm:r. en:ry ~i.,>; wt:eks. Furthermore. ~urerior Ilc:\\ alrO'3n ~1"C"'i - m particular Ihe Grumnun F6F Hellcat fighteT and Impl'O\'l:d rawr .tnd fi!th[l'r connol wcre lIuroducerl to the tlcc:t With a growing fleet of large and hght fast carriers baded up ~ all dficil:nt fll:l:t train - conferring [he: ablh~' to condu(t ,u\ulIled .lIld \\1de-r.mging opcunom a[ an unprecedented pace and lI1[ell\uy unitt III Ihl: centr.ll PaCific pu~hed soulh \\est from Mld\\JY. The j.lr;ln~ ';I\"Y, incre;l~lIlgly composed of forces thT"O\\ n together n be:-