The Unfinished War: Korea

THE UNFINISHED WAR: KOREA

THE UNFINISHED WAR: KOREA Bong Lee

Algora Publishing New York

© 2003 by Algora Publishing. All Rights Reserved. www.algora.com No portion of this book (beyond what is permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the United States Copyright Act of 1976) may be reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, without the express written permission of the publisher. ISBN: 0-87586-217-9 (softcover) ISBN: 0-87586-218-7 (hardcover) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lee, Bong. The unfinished war : Korea / by Bong Lee p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-87586-217-9 (soft : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-87586-218-7 (hard cover : alk. paper) 1. Korean War, 1950-1953. 2. Korea—History—1945- I. Title: Korea. II. Title. DS918.L392 2003 951.904'2—dc21 2003007791

Front Cover:

Courtesy National Archives, photo no. 111-SC-354789 LST takes in a load of North Korean refugees at Hungnam, North Korea on December 12, 1950. — This is how author’s family and some 90,000 other North Koreans, trapped in the Hanhung-Hungnam area, escaped.

Printed in the United States

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

1

1. THUS I T BEGAN

3

Korea, the Hermit Kingdom

5

Korean Nationalists

7

2 . THE LEE FAMILY UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire — World War II 3. THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING

17 19 23

Kim Il Sung Makes an Entrance

27

4. AMERICANS IN SOUTH KOREA

29

5. NORTH KOREANS DISCOVER COMMUNISM

39

6. CHAOS IN SOUTH KOREA

49

MacArthur in Japan

57

7. PRELUDE TO A HOT WAR

61

8. ON A RAINY SUNDAY ACROSS THE 38TH PARALLEL

73

Reactions of Washington

78

9. THE ROK ARMY ON THE BRINK OF DISINTEGRATION

83

MacArthur in Suwon

86

Tactical Errors All Around

88

10. AN UGLY WAR

91

11. THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS

101

12. MAO’S THOUGHT IN BEIJING

123

13. THE INCHON LANDING AND ITS AFTERMATH

131

14. CHINESE TRAPS

143

15. A BRAND NEW BALL GAME

159

VII

16. REFUGEE STORIES

171

The Plight of Refugees and Massacres of Innocent Civilians 17. AN OLD SOLDIER FADES AWAY, A NEW ONE STEPS IN

180 185

18. THE WAY WE SURVIVED THE WAR

193

19. A TALKING WAR

199

20. THE TORTUOUS PATH TO ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

215

21. SOUTH KOREA AFTER THE CEASEFIRE

233

Two Schoolgirls

239

22. NORTH KOREA NOW

247

23. OLD WAR, NEW CRISIS

257

The Nuclear Weapons Development Program

257

The Sunshine Policy

267

Military Provocations

269

What Next

273

Index

277

VIII

PREFACE I was a teenager in 1950 when one of the most atrocious wars in history started in Korea. Some memories are better forgotten. But in 1997, I had the urge to revisit that bewildering war. I was impressed to see how many new facts have come into the public domain after the declassification of some Korean War-related documents in the U.S., and some formerly classified documents that trickled out of Russia; and there were several new books published in South Korea exposing the dark side of war. When I left South Korea in 1961 to study in New York, censorship was still in force; all the new materials and fresh perspectives piqued my interest. However, most books in English do not provide Korean perspectives. The background to the War usually seems cryptic, and the narrative ends abruptly with the signing of ceasefire documents in 1953. I decided to write a book that fills these gaps and provides a cross-cultural perspective, reflecting the latest available documentary evidence and, at the same time, incorporating the experiences of my own family and other Koreans who lived through the war. Prior to starting my research for the book, I had spent over twenty years in different Asian countries working for the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations, and the Ford Foundation. Most of this time was spent studying countries, and appraising and post evaluating the success and failure of economic development projects — their causes, costs, benefits, and lessons for the future. It did not take me long to realize that even evaluating the successes and failures of the Korean War would not be simple because the allies (South Korea, the U.S., and European allies) had different objectives, and these

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The Unfinished War objectives shifted in the middle of the war from stopping the Communist invasion of South Korea to a total victory by invading North Korea. Furthermore, the Korean War was part of a larger war, the Cold War, in which the objective of the U.S. was to stop the spread of Communism. However, this book is not an academic research work designed to show who won the war or who started it. I have simply tried to present the time, the war, and the people by sharing the concrete, personal realities as I and others in the book experienced them and as I found them in the historical record. I have tried to show human sides of the war as well as the military, diplomatic, and political sides. The book provides extensive accounts of the events leading up to the war and examines the new kind of war that started immediately after the ceasefire agreement was signed. It puts into perspective recent developments such as President Bush’s remark on the “axis of evil,” North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program, and the rise of anti-American sentiments in South Korea. The book might offend some American readers — on the left as well as the right, but it presents the truth as I see it. Although I have ventured to offer my own views and interpretations here and there, in most cases, facts and events speak for themselves. I would like to acknowledge and thank my siblings, relatives, and other Koreans for sharing their stories as soldiers, prisoners of war, and refugees. A particular mention needs to be made to my elder brother, Dr. Simon (Jong Koo) Lee, M.D., who wrote a significant portion of the manuscript on the accounts of the war that he and his classmates experienced as students, soldiers and refugees both in the North and the South. I am also indebted to many historians and veterans who have provided rich accounts of the Korean War.

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1. THUS IT BEGAN On a Sunday morning, June 25, 1950, I was thirteen years old, and was at my school in Hamhung, North Korea, cleaning the schoolyard. I had closecropped black hair like any other Korean schoolboy. People who knew my family told me that I had fair skin just like my mother. Because of my fair skin and soft facial features, a classmate teased me that I looked like the princess in a play that the whole class had seen together several days before. I did not appreciate the comparison, and got into a bit of a scuffle with him. I am not sure why I was cleaning the schoolyard that day in particular, but I was often asked to do it, especially on Sundays. My family was Catholic, and my parents thought that the school wanted to keep me away from church. The North Korean Constitution provided for religious freedom as well as the freedom of speech but, as in so many other things, that seems to have been stated for the benefit of the outside world, not for us. On that morning, the yard was spotlessly clean. I just pretended to pick up some loose gravel. About 10:00 a.m., I noticed several people talking to each other around the bulletin board that stood beside the school gate, to display government announcements. Most times, the school caretaker just pasted newspapers on the board and the people hardly noticed them. The gathering in front of the bulletin board that morning was unusually large, and I had never seen people actually stand there, talking. I decided to take a look, and sidled up beside the adults; I squeezed in and, standing on my toes, read the notice. The news released that morning by the government was indeed something to talk about. “In the early morning of June 25, the South Korean Puppet armies

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The Unfinished War crossed the 38th parallel [separating the two Koreas], penetrating between 1 to 2 km north of the 38th parallel. The People’s Democratic Government of Korea [North Korean Government] ordered the border guards to repulse Rhee’s Puppet armies immediately.” The North Korean official news warned ominously, “The Puppet Government will have to bear the sole responsibility for this unprovoked attack.” Later on the same day, however, another bulletin was posted, indicating, “The Border Guard and the Inmin-gun [the People’s Army] repulsed the invading Puppet armies, and have advanced between 5 and 10 km to the south of the 38th parallel.” This was certainly a quick turn of events. That is how the war started for me. I was confused, and a little alarmed. Could this be true? Only a few days before, I had overheard my father, Dr. Myung Hoon Lee, a professor of medicine at the Hamhung Medical School, talk about a South Korean broadcast in which a South Korean Army general by the name of Kim Suk-won boasted, “If the South Korean Army decided to attack North Korea, we would have breakfast in Sariwon, lunch in Pyongyang [the North Korean capital], and dinner in Sinuiju [northwestern city on the bank of the Yalu River bordering China].” While I was trying to digest all this, my father and elder brother Simon [his Christian name], a young man of seventeen years, were listening to the one and only radio broadcast in North Korea. My “reactionary” father received the first announcement on the war with elation, thinking that the unification of Korea was finally near, but when he heard the second report, he was in disbelief. These announcements heralded the start of a war. At this time Simon was enthusiastically looking forward to college. He was the best student and all-around athlete in his class. His entrance to a good college was assured; the only but significant blemish on his resume was that his father was a member of the intelligentsia, not of the proletariat. The children of proletarian families had the first pick of schools. The bourgeois had no chance, but the children of the intelligentsia had some. In any case, a deadly shooting war had begun in which millions would soon be embroiled. America decided to intervene in the war, and it would eventually result in some 136,937 casualties including 25,801 deaths — over 30,000 according to the casualty-count of the U.S. Department of Defense. South Korea suffered a staggering 257,000 military casualties and 860,000 civilian casualties. Over a half million houses were incinerated or blasted by bombs, and four million refugees abandoned their homes to cross the battle lines with nothing but what they could carry in their hands and on their backs.

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1. Thus It Began Who started such a reckless war between fellow countrymen? Most people have decided that the Communists started the war. However, there is still considerable debate as to who precipitated the conflict; and at least in two countries, inquiries into such a question are hazardous. The Los Angeles Times (February 3, 2002) reported that a Hong Kong-based historian was sentenced to thirteen years in prison for releasing classified papers indicating that the Communist side invaded South Korea first. The world is accustomed to hearing such outrageous stories coming out of the Republic of China (PRC) from time to time; it is still a Communist state and an ally of North Korea. However, it may surprise most people that some Americans and South Koreans believe that the Communists did not start the war. Leftist American journalist I. F. Stone published a book (The Hidden Story of the Korean War) in 1952, speculating that President Syngman Rhee, the first president of the Republic of Korea (ROK), deliberately provoked North Korea to a war so that the U.S. would come to the rescue and defeat the Communists. Some South Korean leftists have come up with similar theories. Then there is the familiar accusation that the U.S. government provoked the war deliberately to benefit the “military-industrial complex” and the U.S. economy; and the respected American historian Bruce Cumings has also said that North Korea did not start the war. Why did the war start and why did the U.S. get entangled in it? Obviously, war would not have broken out if Korea had not been divided into North and South by the superpowers. However, the role of superpowers in Korea has deeper roots than most people realize.

KOREA, THE HERMIT KINGDOM The first contact between the U.S. and Korea goes back to the time of gunboat diplomacy in the 19th century when Western warships prowled the coasts of Africa and Asia in search of trade — if not a colony. Korea was known as the Hermit Kingdom because of its stubborn resistance to open the door to foreign trade. China had reluctantly opened her door to the British after the Opium War (1839–42). Commodore Matthew Perry and his “black ship” persuaded Japan to open up in 1853–54. However, Korea managed to keep the foreign powers out for decades longer.

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The Unfinished War The British and French sent gunboats demanding that Korea open its ports, but they withdrew after small skirmishes with Korean defenders. Western historians called Korea’s closed-door policy xenophobic, but Korea had its reasons. Although Korea did not have historical reasons to fear Western warships, it feared the West’s culture as well as its military power. The Confucian scholars who ruled the Chosun Kingdom, also known as the Yi Dynasty, saw nothing good that could come from opening up to the “barbarians” who dug up their sacred ancestral tombs in search of loot and tried to spread the religion of “devil worship,” as Christianity was called at that time. To the Confucians, desecration of ancestral graves was execrable, heinous conduct; and commerce, trade and industry were of little value to them because they were entirely preoccupied with moral issues and the maintenance of the social hierarchy. It was in 1866 that America first attempted to open Korea for trade. The American merchant schooner General Sherman sailed up the Taedong River from the Yellow Sea to the present North Korean capital of Pyongyang. If Korea had opened her arms and signed a treaty with the U.S., as Japan had done twelve years earlier, it is conceivable that Korea — like Japan — might have emerged as a modern nation earlier. However, the Korean court and society were not ready for that. Instead, the Koreans who gathered on the bank of the river were shaking their fists. The crew of the General Sherman, consisting of the British, Chinese, and Americans, opened fire against the crowd on the shore. The Koreans destroyed the schooner and killed all the crew. America was outraged. They took revenge in a raid that took place in 1871. Marines landed on the beaches of the west coast island of Kanghwa, which guarded the waterway to Seoul, and attacked several forts defended by Korean “tiger fighters.” The defenders fought ferociously, even with their outdated weapons, but all 650 died in the end. Commander Low was quoted to have said that the Koreans fought back with a courage “rarely equaled or exceeded by any people.” If the raiding party was meant to take revenge against the killing of the crew on board the General Sherman, the objective was achieved; but if it was meant to open up Korea, the mission failed. The Koreans might have taken a measure of pride in fighting off the Americans, but in hindsight, opening their country at this juncture might have saved Korea from decades of humiliation and oppression under the Japanese. In 1876 (only five years after the U.S. Marines withdrew from the Kanghwa Island), Korea’s ancient antagonist Japan came sailing in with her own warships. Just 22

6

1. Thus It Began years after Admiral Perry’s “black ships” opened Japan, she had already built tall warships and was flexing her muscles. Japan demanded that Korea open its ports for trade. King Kojong’s advisors of the Chosun Dynasty (1392–1910) debated the merits and demerits, and thought that this time it was indeed necessary to create an opening to Japan. A Japanese gunboat anchored menacingly at what is now Inchon. Having risen to the throne at age twelve, the king was accustomed to relying on his wife, Queen Min, to attend to the affairs of the kingdom. She was only a year older than her husband, but took a keen interest in the kingdom’s affairs. She opened two of Korea’s ports to Japan in 1876. Japan moved cautiously toward Korea; China was the Chosun Kingdom’s suzerain. An armed invasion of Korea would bring in the Chinese armies. Suzerainty was a convenient relationship for Korea. Once a year, emissaries of the two countries visited one another’s capitals with wagonloads of local products. Chinese emissaries were not allowed to stray from a designated road while traveling between Beijing and Seoul. Yet, because of this suzerainty, Korea could count on China to come to its defense in case Japan or any other country invaded it. In 1894, Queen Min invited China to send troops to counter Japan’s growing interference in Korea’s internal affairs, but the Chinese fleet was decimated by the Japanese Navy in what is known as the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. Queen Min then decided to play Russia against Japan. Russia coveted Korea’s warm-water ports giving direct access to the Pacific. Russia’s port, Vladivostok, froze over during the winter. Japan then decided to take on Russia. Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909), mastermind of the Japanese strategy, had conceived of a Japanese Pacific empire long ago while he was studying in Europe. Like many of his ancestors, Ito was convinced that the stepping-stone for Japan’s invasion of the Asian continent had to be Korea. He knew that Russia was an obstacle to his master plan, and Queen Min’s diplomatic maneuvering had to be stopped.

KOREAN NATIONALISTS The growing domination of Japan and the assassination of Queen Min gave rise to the Korean nationalists movement. Among those who resisted the Japanese, three persons stand out because of their lasting impact on Korean

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The Unfinished War history including the Korean War. In fact, their thoughts survived the Korean War and their death; and are still in the hearts and minds of the Koreans today. They are Syngman Rhee, Kim Ku, and Kim Il Sung. Rhee was born in 1875, a year before Korea opened its two ports to Japan. Rhee was born in an impoverished yangban family.1 Yangban, which literally translates to “two elite classes,” consisted of the literary and military elites during the Yi dynasty. Anyone could become yangban by passing competitive state examinations that were open to all, but during the latter period of the Yi dynasty, most yangban inherited the status from their ancestors. Rhee was nineteen when he was exposed to Christianity, which had by then made significant inroads in Korea. He entered the Paijai Academy (founded by the American Methodist Mission) to learn English. The principal and teachers were American missionaries. Once there, he was fascinated with democracy and the Western history and within a year, he was editing a student newspaper. Under the influence of the Western teachers, Rhee wrote about the need for political and social changes, reformed monarchy, and even the emancipation of women. In 1895, he was shocked by the assassination of Queen Min. The king’s life was spared but he was placed under virtual arrest, and the Japanese installed a pro-Japanese cabinet. Rhee was outraged and took part in an attempted coup d’etat against the pro-Japanese cabinet, and became a wanted man. The reform of the monarchy became secondary goal to getting rid of the Japanese influence from Korea. Eventually, he was arrested and sent to prison, at the age of 22, and ended up spending seven year in prison. In 1904, Japan mounted a surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur (Dalian, China), in what is known as the RussoJapanese War. Japan emerged victorious. A faction of the Korean government realized that Korea could no longer maintain a semblance of independence by playing Russia off Japan. It released Rhee from prison for a mission to the U.S. His mission was to invoke the U.S.-Korea Friendship Treaty signed in 1885 to ward off Japan’s growing domination over Korea. It was a long shot at best but now that China and Russia had both failed to protect Korea, America was the next possible protector for Korea. Rhee was considered a good candidate for the

1. Robert R. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd Mead and Company, 1955), hereafter “Oliver.”

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1. Thus It Began mission because of his command of English, and connections with U.S. missionaries who might be able to help him in the endeavor. Little funding was available for such a dubious mission, and Rhee was given just enough to travel to Kobe, Japan. Once there, he solicited the Korean community, sympathetic to Korean independence, for funds so that he could travel to San Francisco. He raised more money there, and went on to Washington, D.C. Bruce Cumings provides many revealing insights into the context in which the mission was launched.2 The U.S. had no particular interest in saving Korea from Japanese colonialism. Roosevelt’s main objective in Asia was to maintain U.S. control over the Philippines, which the U.S. took from Spain after the Spanish-American War of 1898. Roosevelt admired the Japanese and accepted his advisers’ judgment that the Koreans were “unfit” for self-government. According to Cumings, most Americans supported Japan’s colonization of Korea. One “progressive” wrote that Japan was a “rising star of human selfcontrol and enlightenment,” and that the Chinese and the Koreans were “horrid” races. Another person called Japan the “enlightened, anointed bearer of white civilization” in the curious guise of a “yellow people.” After defeating Russia, there was nothing to stop Japan from a complete takeover of Korea. On November 17, 1905, Ito forced the Protectorate Treaty on the Korean ministers, at gunpoint. Koreans denounced it bitterly as fraud. The means by which Japan took over Korea created a generation of anti-Japanese Koreans. Several high-ranking officials committed suicide. In the U.S., Rhee managed to see President Theodore Roosevelt at Oyster Bay in the summer of 1905. Roosevelt listened politely, but at the end of the meeting, he said, “I will be glad to do everything I can on behalf of your country, but such a request must come through the official diplomatic channels,” that is, from the Japanese embassy. Rhee’s mission had failed. After all, this was the age of colonialism and the U.S. had her own flirtation with the European invention. In fact, after the Russo-Japanese War, a diplomatic note (the Taft-Katsura Agreement) was exchanged between the U.S. and Japan, in which the U.S. recognized Japanese interests in Korea and southern China in exchange for Japan not challenging the U.S. in the Philippines. Neither the Koreans nor

2. Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), pp. 141-154, hereafter Cumings.

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The Unfinished War American missionaries who tried to help Rhee’s diplomatic mission had any inkling about this. After Rhee's failed mission, the Methodist Mission Board, which had been helping Rhee to establish contact with government officials, offered to support his education in the U.S. For the following five years, Rhee studied theology at George Washington University, earned a master’s degree in history and political science at Harvard, and received a Ph.D. in political science at Princeton. He thus became the first Korean to receive his doctoral degree in the U.S. In 1910, Korea was formally annexed to Japan. This was the end of the 600year Yi dynasty. After the annexation and the failed nationwide independence movement on March 1, 1919, many Korean patriots left Korea and established the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in the French Concession of Shanghai. Dr. Rhee was elected president of the KPG in absentia. It was at this time that the Korean nationalists began to be split between those like Rhee, who favored expelling the Japanese through diplomatic efforts, and others who favored the use of force.3 Kim Ku4 was another patriot galvanized by Japanese aggression. Although he ended up in the KPG, his path was entirely different from Rhee’s. Kim was born a commoner. As a youth, he failed in his ambition to pass the examination and become a yangban.5 Then he joined the Tonghakt movement (its religious doctrine combined certain aspects of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Catholicism) and became one of the rebel leader. The founder wished not only to spread his doctrine but also to establish a nation based on it in the southwestern part of Korea. The government naturally saw this as a seditious movement and squashed it. He then When Japanese soldiers murdered Queen Min in 1896, Kim Ku went on a one-man mission to avenge her death and, at an inn at Inchon, he attacked and killed a Japanese man (whom he suspected was one of the killers), and then drank his blood in full view of a crowd of bystanders. This Japanese spoke 3. Yi Tong Whi, who fled to Manchuria after the disbanding of the Korean Army, became the first defense minister of the KPG and later its premier. He tried to fill the high positions in the KPG with his fellow Communists and favored military action with Soviet backing. 4. His biography was prepared by Do Jin Sul, based on Kim Ku’s diaries: Baikbum Ilji (Seoul: Dolbegae, 1997). 5. His family could not afford to hire a good tutor or to buy brushes and rice paper. Although the yangban class was technically open to all, the system favored those who had money.

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1. Thus It Began Korean with a discernible accent, and he was dressed as a Korean but hid a Japanese long sword under his robe. The victim turned out to be Lieutenant Suchida of the Japanese army. Whether or not he had anything to do with the assassination of Queen Min was never established. The Japanese at that time had extraterritorial rights, and while the Japanese police pretended to make an effort to apprehend the killer(s), they quietly allowed the case to go cold. After the killing, Kim Ku asked the innkeeper to bring him paper and a brush. He wrote down his name and address for the police. He wanted to make a political statement. They showed up about three months later and arrested him. The police interrogated and tortured him; Kim fainted three times but refused to open his mouth. One day, the time to make a statement had arrived. Here was a Korean who was rumored to have killed a Japanese officer with his bare hands, then to have drunk the Japanese blood and eaten a ton of rice after the killing. Many people came out to watch the trial. A police interrogator asked, “Did you kill a Japanese at Chiha-po [the old name for Inchon]?” Kim replied, “I killed a Japanese in retaliation for the murder of the nation’s mother.” This sent a shock wave throughout the entire interrogation room. Kim Ku was being tried as a common murderer rather than as a political assassin. When a Japanese policeman asked his translator what was going on, Kim Ku cursed him, shouting, “You, Japanese bastard! Does the Treaty of Friendship permit the Japanese to kill the Korean queen? I will kill your emperor and every last Japanese. If I am not alive, my ghost will kill your emperor!” In view of the serious political implications, the interrogators stopped the trial and sent a messenger to the commissioner to take over. When the trial resumed, Kim spoke directly to Commissioner Yi Jaechung, saying, “I killed a Japanese because I was ashamed of my shadow in broad daylight. While they killed our mother, I have not heard any Korean talk about killing the Japanese emperor. You are now wearing a mourning costume, but have you not read Confucius’s Chunchu Daeui? If you have not avenged the death of your king, you do not wear a mourning costume. How could you serve the king if you look after your own position, power, and wealth first?” Apparently, Commissioner Yi Jae-chung was taken aback, although he had a job to do. The trial was adjourned. During the investigation period that followed, Kim Ku was treated with deference. Many Inchon citizens brought food and drink to his jail room. One rich and influential Korean went bankrupt

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The Unfinished War after making several appeals to the Korean court on his behalf. However, after full investigation, Kim Ku was sentenced to death; but on the day of his execution, King Kojong’s adviser noted the unusual nature of the case and the king intervened to stay the execution. Contrary to the expectations of some people, however, Kim was not released. After two years, not seeing any change in his legal status, he broke out of the prison and lived under a false name. On March 1, 1919, Kim Ku was asked to join in a nationwide movement declaring the independence of Korea from Japan. Korean nationalists had drafted a Declaration of Independence patterned after the American version. The decision to declare independence was inspired by President Woodrow Wilson’s famous assertion of the right to self-determination for national groups (at the Peace Conference for drafting of the Treaty of Versailles). Around the same time, Lenin also called on the world to support independence movements among the “oppressed peoples” of the world. Koreans believed that the claim to independence would put international pressure on Japan. Nearly two million students, ordinary people and Christians joined in the independence march. Japan took note, firing into a group of Koreans singing Christian hymns. Later, Christian leaders were nailed to wooden crosses and left to die slowly so that they could “go to heaven,” as the Japanese scoffed. Mounted policemen beheaded young schoolchildren. The police burned down churches. The official count of casualties was about 500 killed, 1,400 injured and 13,000 arrested. Korean estimates were much higher: over 7,500 deaths, about 15,000 injured and 45,000 arrested. The world was appalled and foreign nations, including the U.S., withdrew their diplomatic missions from Seoul. However, nobody was willing to go beyond such a diplomatic protest. Korean patriots left Korea and dispersed to different parts of the world. Kim Ku, having few illusions by this time, did not even participate in the march. He went to Shanghai to join the Korean Provisional Government (KPG). His first position in the KPG was as Chief of Police. After the KPG split into proCommunist and non-Communist factions, Kim Ku was approached by General Yi to join his socialist revolutionary group, but Kim refused, not necessarily on ideological ground but because he did not like the idea of receiving directives from Lenin. After the departure of Yi Tong Whi and Rhee, Kim Ku emerged as the leader of the much-diminished KPG. The armed resistance against the Japanese was shifting to the pro-Soviet faction of nationalists in Manchuria and

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1. Thus It Began Siberia. Ironically, Yi Tong Whi was assassinated by a Communist in Vladivostok. Kim Ku, with few men and weapons to fight the Japanese, decided to concentrate on assassinating key Japanese figures. The first major strike was delivered by a patriotic young man by the name of Yi Bong Chan, who was dispatched to Tokyo with a bomb. Yi threw the bomb at a car carrying the Japanese emperor, but the bomb was too weak to blow up the car. Attempts were also made against Baron Tanaka, who had drawn up a blueprint to conquer the world, and the first Japanese Governor-General of Korea. One of the most successful operations involved Yun Bong-Gil. On April 28, 1932, he threw a bomb at a group of Japanese generals and dignitaries in a victory ceremony staged in Hingkew Park. A Chinese munitions factory made the bomb; this time, they made sure it was strong enough to avoid another embarrassment. Several Japanese generals were killed and scores of others were wounded, including the Japanese minister to China, General Shirakawa. (This is where he lost his leg, so that on board the U.S. warship Missouri in 1945, he had to limp as he walked to sign the surrender document. By that time, he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs.) Dr. Rhee disapproved of such tactics and thought they would play into the Japanese propaganda that Koreans needed to be held in strict subjugation. From Honolulu, he sent a confidential message ordering that such activities be discontinued. Rhee received reluctant assurances in response. However, Koreans needed a release from oppression and found terrorism one of the few means at their disposal. The bombing incident inspired the Korean community, and financial support poured in. However, the Japanese reprisal was swift and relentless. Kim Ku became a credible nationalist in the eyes of the Chinese, who fought the Japanese invaders. Chiang Kai-shek welcomed Kim’s group in Nanjing. Kim Ku formed a Korean Liberation Army of several hundred men to fight the Japanese. In 1941, the KPG declared war on Japan. In 1942, he formally asked China, the U.S. and Britain to recognize the KPG. In 1943, Kim Ku formed a special-forces unit of the Liberation Army in conjunction with a detachment of the U.S. Office of Strategic Service in China. While the mission was in the planning stages, Japan surrendered. For all his activities, Kim Ku was called “The Assassin” by the Japanese and later by Americans, although he is known as a nationalist to Koreans. According

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The Unfinished War to young South Koreans today, he is the most respected figure in the history of Korea. Compared to Rhee or Kim Ku, Kim Il Sung, who later became known as the “Great Leader” of North Korea, was relatively unknown. As the American historian Joseph Goulden notes in his excellent book Korea: The Untold Story of the War, the original material had “the inherent credibility of, say, 1930s Hollywood fan magazines.”6 There are many biographies of Kim Il Sung in Korean, of course; the problem is how to find one’s way through the maze of blatant propaganda. This much we know: Kim Il Sung was born in April 1912, in a rural area outside Pyongyang. His original name was Kim Song-joo; he adopted the name of Kim Il Sung, a legendary guerilla leader who was much older than him. The original Kim Il Sung was about 30 years older than Kim Song-joo/Kim Il Sung. The young Kim Il Sung was a relatively minor guerilla leader in the period under discussion.7 According to one account, he was said to have scored his biggest victory in 1940. His force of about 250 men at its peak virtually wiped out a Japanese Special Police unit of 70 men commanded by Lieutenant Maeda Takeshi. Japanese newspapers treated the incident as no more than a skirmish between a small band of outlaws and the police. Most of the “bandits” were captured, and the remainder of them fled north, according to the Japanese source. The Kim Il Sung’s band of guerillas was part of a Chinese and North Korean partisan group known as the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army. In the mid-1930s, there were some 30,000 of them in the Army. By 1941, however, most of the partisan fighters had been destroyed. In March 1941, General Nozoe of the Japanese Army declared the end of the war against the anti-Japanese guerrillas in Manchuria and disbanded his unit. Nozoe claimed to have eliminated some 15,000 Chinese and Korean guerrillas from 1932 to 1941. Kim Il Sung and his remnants were the survivors that fled to Siberia. On March 15, 1941, the Soviets conscripted Kim Il Sung and his men into the 88th Special Independent Guerrilla Brigade of the Soviet Red Army, with the task of gathering military intelligence in Manchuria. Kim Il Sung ended up commanding the 1st Battalion, consisting of about 200 men, mostly Chinese, with about 60 Koreans. 6. Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: Times Books, 1982), p.11, hereafter Goulden. 7. Robert Scalopino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea: The Movement (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1972), p. 228, hereafter Scalopino and Lee.

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1. Thus It Began According to high-ranking North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop,8 Kim Il Sung used to talk about his battles with the Japanese as a modest effort, “better than doing nothing.”9 Early on, when he spoke of his past in a more humble and credible way, Kim Il Sung acknowledged that he had served under the Soviet Army; but later on, when the cult of Kim Il Sung began to be created, even such a fact was denied. North Korean playwrights wanted to assert a linear, homogeneous evolution of his family from the mythical king Tangun some 5000 years ago10 to the present day. Kim Il Sung considered that his service under the Russian army and the birth of his son Kim Jong Il in Russia were blemishes that had to be erased.

8. Hwang was the former secretary of the North Korean Worker’s Party in charge of international affairs and was ideological secretary to Kim Il Sung before his defection to South Korea in 1997. 9. Hwang Jang-yop, Euduun-ui Pyon-e Dwen Hatbyol-un Euduum-ul Balkil-su Upda (in Korean only, The Sunshine That Became Part of Darkness Cannot Bring Light to The Darkness) (Seoul: Wolgan Chosun Sa, 2001), hereafter Hwang. 10. According to Samguk yusa (Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms), compiled by 13th century Chinese historian Iryon, the Korean kingdom unfolded when a son of the Emperor in heaven descended on the Korean peninsula and married a woman who turned human from a she-bear and gave birth to Tangun. To Iryon, who was a Buddhist monk, there might not have been anything unnatural in an animal becoming human. His text is the source of most of the legends of ancient Korea.

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2. THE LEE FAMILY UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION Korean families can trace their lineages for many generations because most clans maintain books of genealogy (jokbo). My grandfather, 14 generations removed from a king, owned a medium-sized farm in a village called Seosan, in the South Chungchong Province. Kings’ descendants are numerous in Korea, although not all Lees are descendants of Yi dynasty kings. (Yi is another spelling for Lee.) One of his ancestors had converted to Catholicism and moved to this remote countryside to avoid religious persecution.11 Although not all Yi dynasty kings persecuted Christians, one wave of persecution in 1866 killed over eight thousand Catholics who refused to denounce Jesus. This was about half of the Korean Catholics at that time. After primary school, my father wanted to go to Seoul to receive his secondary education, but few families could afford to send a second son away for schooling; and in any case he was needed to attend to the farming. However, he was a top student and had no intention of spending the rest of his life in the paddy fields, so he took some pocket money and made his way to Seoul, by foot, oxcart and train.

11. One highly controversial issue at the time was the chesa ceremony, which involved paying annual visits to ancestral graves to offer food and drinks, and spending time at the grave. Korean Catholics inquired of the Bishop in China whether they could participate in the chesa rites; he considered them to be against the First Commandment: “Thou shalt have no other gods before Me.” Confucian scholars and government officials, often one and the same, perceived this anti-chesa ruling as a threat to the moral foundation of Korean Confucian society.

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The Unfinished War Once in Seoul, he showed up at the dormitory of a Catholic Church. The priest listened to the young man, and opened the door. Apparently, he was talented and determined. After his secondary school, he was one of only ten Korean students to be admitted to the Medical School of the Imperial University. This was the only university at that time. Originally, the university was established for the Japanese living in Korea, but they began to admit a small number of gifted Korean students each year with the advent of the so-called Enlightened Administration.12 Mostly children of rich and privileged families entered the university, but father was neither. He completed the six-year medical school with money he earned by tutoring children of rich Korean families. During the Japanese occupation, farmers were losing ground in every sense. Taxes took an average of half their crops. Many small farmers were forced to abandon their farms; almost half of Korean farmers had to become either tenant farmers or “fire-field people” who burned forest, planted crops, and moved on when the soils are exhausted of nutrients. Japanese became large landlords. Many Korean farmers lost their land when they failed to respond quickly to a nationwide land ownership survey (cadastre) conducted by the Japanese authority. Mother’s maiden name was Oh; her given name was Boon Yong, which translates to “outraged” — a strange name for a woman. Her mother had given birth to daughter after daughter, and she was the fifth in a row. Her father thought that by showing his indignation through his daughter’s name, his luck would change. Boon Yong’s father was a rich landlord in Hwang Gan in South Chungcheong Province and had a large house with three gates in the Kahwaedong district of Seoul, where some of the richest Koreans lived. My father was hired to tutor Boon Yong and her siblings, especially her brother. Boon Yong fell in love. Luckily, her father also had an eye on the young student from the Imperial University. He was not a yangban but had a promising future ahead of him as a doctor. This is how they met. He thought that perhaps the rich father-in-law might help him open a medical practice after his graduation. That did not actually come to pass, as Confucian traditions encourage families to support their sons and send their

12. This “Enlightened” ploy was a result of the strong international condemnation of Japan for the way it brutally suppressed the nonviolent March One Independence Movement.

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2. The Lee Family Under Japanese Occupation daughters away to join other families. Boon Yong had a surprise, too — she discovered, after the wedding, that father had married young, in the village, before, and had children. This was a shock, although for a man to have a second or even a third wife was common at that time. However, father had gone through a civil divorce, which was enough for Boon Yong.

OUT OF THE FRYING PAN, INTO THE FIRE — WORLD WAR II Upon his graduation, Dr. Lee worked as an assistant professor at the Medical College in Daegu, and then took a job as director of the Ear, Nose and Throat (ENT) Department of a new general hospital in Sariwon. That is where we were living in 1941, when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor. My brother Simon was ten years old and I was five. My sister Hyon-ja was seven and our youngest brother, Hyo-ku, was two. In 1942, everyone in town was offered a free pair of rubber shoes; I heard that it was to celebrate the conquest of Malaya by the Japanese Army. In hindsight, it was the high point of the Pacific War, from the Japanese point of view. As the war dragged on, rice and sugar were rationed. During the last years of the Pacific War, Japan was preparing for the fight to the last man, and even Korean school children were being prepared for it. Gradually, it became clear that the war was not going well for Japan. All the classes, including second graders like me, were led to a mountain at the outskirts of the city for several days. This time, it was not a class picnic; they worked to cut down pine trees and extract roots and knots. Oil from pine roots was used to clean airplane engines. During these months, it seems, Japan was running out of fuel and war materials, and there were other signs that Japan might soon lose the war. Some Korean men went looking for work and some others were drafted in the Japanese Army. Young women also left for Japan to work in factories and hospitals, but it later became known that they ended up in what the Japanese called Teishintai (comfort women brigades). It was a long time before this shocking news came out, because the women did not talk about their shameful experiences after they returned home. Not only Koreans but also young girls from Taiwan, China and other parts of Asia (with the exception of Japan) were sent to the front to service Japanese soldiers. Korean-American journalist Connie Kang wrote, “As a colonizer, the Japanese were ingenious, petty, determined, and greedy in pursuing their

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The Unfinished War goals[.] Farmers were forced to sell the best crops — fruits, vegetables, and especially Korean rice . . . at artificially low prices to Japan, . . . [then] were ordered to make their rice go far by mixing it with a substance called daedubak, the residue left over after the oil is squeezed out of soybeans, which tasted like saw dust.”13 She goes on to say, “Venereal disease was rampant among Japanese soldiers, so a decision was made to provide them with virgins.” Some girls in Korea dressed like boys and wore farmers’ straw hats when they went outdoors. Although abductions took place mostly in rural areas, everyone was afraid. Altogether, some 100,000 Korean girls were taken away, according to Kang. On August 12, 1945, the Japanese governor of South Pyongyan Province, where Pyongyang is located, listened to a short-wave radio broadcast from San Francisco, which announced that Japanese surrender was imminent.14 The governor decided to contact Cho Man Shik, who was a prominent nationalist in North Korea. Cho had the reputation of being the Korean Gandhi. He had graduated from Meiji University in Japan and was a Christian elder and a political moderate residing in Pyongyang. The Japanese provincial governor was concerned with the safety of the Japanese after the surrender of Japan, and requested Cho to maintain peace and order in the event that Japan surrendered.15 Cho agreed and later created the Security Maintenance Committee for South Pyongan Province. On August 15, Japan surrendered. Most Koreans (including Simon), who heard the Japanese Emperor’s squeaky voice offering his surrender to the Allies in difficult-to-understand Japanese, could not quite understand its immediate implications. They were rather afraid to show their joy, as Japanese police still seemed to be in charge. It was rumored that Soviet forces were rapidly marching south, but they did not enter Sariwon until August 26 or so. Most of the Japanese left the Sariwon area by train. Koreans pulled down Shinto shrines and danced in the streets. In the jubilation that followed, children saw the Korean flag for the first time.

13. Kang, K. Connie, Home was the land of morning CALM: A Saga of a Korean-American Family (Reading, Mass. and elsewhere: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company) 1995, p.56, hereafter Kang. 14. This account, provided originally by Yoshio Morita in 1964, is cited in Scalopino and Lee (1972), p. 314, hereafter Morita. 15. Morita, pp. 182-183, in Scalopino and Lee (1972), p. 314.

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2. The Lee Family Under Japanese Occupation On August 26, the Soviet Military Command announced that the Soviet occupation army would maintain law and order jointly with South Pyongan Province Preparatory Committee under Cho Man Shick. Only two out of 20 members of the committee were Communists and this composition was a fair reflection of the strength of Communists and non-Communists in North Korea at that time.16 Children found out for the first time that there had been Korean alphabets all along, called Hangul, invented several hundred years ago by King Sae-jong the Great of the Yi dynasty. They did not know about this because its use as well as Korean history and flag had been forbidden by the Japanese. In an attempt to eradicate it, leading scholars in the Korean Language Society were arrested on charges of being nationalists and some of them died in prison after torture. Novelists, poets and other creative writers were ordered to produce their works in Japanese, and in the end, the Japanese language was used in the schools. Japan also began to take metal products out of Korea. Over 50 percent of mining production was in gold. In 1936, gold production reached over 17,000 tons a year. The Japanese needed it to buy oil, metal and machinery for the war. Other valuable mineral products taken out of Korea for the war were iron, tungsten, graphite, magnetite and molybdenum. Moreover, as the fighting grew more intense, the Japanese forcibly conscripted more than 700,000 Koreans to work in coal mines and in munitions factories in Japan, as well as to serve as soldiers in Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands.

16. This was the view of one of the two Communist committee members, Han Chaedok, who later defected to South Korea. See Scalopino and Lee, p. 315.

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3. THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING Several days later, Koreans in Sariwon saw columns of Russian soldiers coming down Main Street from the north. This was quite a spectacle. The soldiers were covered in dust. Apparently they hadn’t had a change of clothing for some time. Most were on foot, but there were some green trucks with the mark of GMC (no one knew what that stood for). The trucks were part of the war supply given to Russia by Americans under the Lend Lease Act. They were provided to the U.S.S.R — to fight the Germans and the Japanese. Who could have guessed that these would be used by Inmin-gun later to slaughter American soldiers? The Russian soldiers’ reputations preceded them. They were said to be robbing men on the street and raping Korean women. It has been said that most of the Russian 25th army, which came rushing down the Korean peninsula, consisted of previous prisoners kept in Siberia. Toward the end of World War II, the rank and file of the Russian army had been severely depleted,17 and as a result, prisoners were conscripted. Korean women took to men’s disguises again, to avoid being raped. Some Russian soldiers demanded watches from pedestrians and other things. We learned that watches were particularly rare and valuable in the U.S.S.R. Some of the Russians were well educated. One day, a Russian officer, a medical doctor, called on Dr. Lee because there was no one who spoke Russian in the town. It turns out that both doctors spoke German, so they were able to converse. 17. Musashiya, p. 36.

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The Unfinished War The Russian medical officer visited Dr. Lee regularly and discussed the condition of his hospital. The Russian provided some medical supplies that the hospital sorely lacked. The toughest task that the Russians faced in Korea was not fighting the Japanese but dismantling factories, machinery and power plants built by the Japanese, to transport to Russia as war booty. Some three thousand soldiers, trucks and heavy equipment were used at the Supung Hydroelectric Power Plant alone. They also dismantled a steel plant in Chongjin, mining machinery at Gaechun, a high-frequency equipment factory at Sungjin, etc. However, the Russians were careful not to dismantle all the power generators at Supung. Otherwise, much of Korea would have been left in the dark. Koreans did not understand why the Russians were there. If anybody had the right to be in Korea, it was the Americans who had defeated the Japanese. However, most Koreans expected that the fall of Japan would automatically bring about liberation, and independence, to Korea without any foreign occupation forces. The Russian troops moving south stopped at the 38th parallel and the Americans occupied Korea below this line. Koreans did not know the significance of the 38th parallel until much later. An author compared the absurdity of drawing an arbitrary line such as this to a hypothetical situation of drawing the 36th parallel to divide America in half: “It would separate Nashville from Memphis and Oklahoma City from Tulsa. Raleigh-Durham and Greensboro-Winston-Salem would be turned into opposing border cities in the middle of North Carolina.”18 Even more outrageous was the fact that this artificial line drawn without the knowledge of Koreans (let alone their participation) hardened over time. Millions would die because of it. The decision on the 38th parallel was made on August 10, 1945, five days before the Japanese surrendered. The decision flew out of the Yalta Secret Meeting between the U.S. and USSR, in which the U.S. invited the Soviets to fight the Japanese army in Manchuria and Korea in return for certain concessions. President Franklin Roosevelt and others who negotiated the deal seemed not to have had any idea that their action was about to unleash one of the greatest human tragedies in the 20th century. The agreement was classified for a long period, and few Koreans knew about it. Now, most Koreans consider that 18. Pierre Rigoulot in his Introduction to Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, Aquariums of Pyongyang (Basic Books: New York, 2001), p. viii, hereafter Kang and Rigoulot.

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3. The Russians Are Coming Roosevelt’s decision showed a callous disregard for the Korean people and a willingness to sacrifice a small nation in the interest of saving the lives of American soldiers. The irony is the Russian army did not even make a move until after the first atomic bomb was dropped on August 6, 1945, and the Japanese military retreated in panic. At that time, the nearest American soldiers were on Okinawa, about 600 miles from the Korean peninsula. The U.S. wanted to stop the Soviet advance before it reached the southern end of the peninsula. The Yalta Conference did not specify how far south the Soviet army should march, only that there should be a trusteeship government involving the U.S. and the USSR to rule Korea for a period of time. John J. McCloy of the War and Navy Coordinating Committee directed two young colonels, Dean Rusk and Charles H. Bonesteel, to find a place to stop the Soviets. They did not even have a Korean map, let alone any knowledge of Korean geography or history. They had in their possession a Far East map. The 38th parallel appeared to be a fair division in terms of the landmass involved. Rusk and Bonesteel reported to their boss that the Soviets should be told to stop at the 38th parallel, and the Soviets did so. Thus the infamous 38th parallel was drawn. (See Figure 1.) In February, 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt did what he thought was in the best interest of the America. The Yalta Conference, where Roosevelt and Stalin met, was held over ten days from February 4–14, 1945. Some historians point out that when Roosevelt sailed to Yalta, he was ill and his brain was partly damaged by a stroke he had suffered the previous summer. According to Frazier Hunt, Roosevelt “was a dying man” and “undependable” with “his already handicapped mind inflamed with grandiose ideas of a World State that he would head.”19 A radical New Dealer, Harry Hopkins, and State Department liberals surrounded him. Even Alger Hiss, a Communist spy skillfully planted in the State Department, was in the party. While Hopkins was not a Communist, he believed in being generous with Stalin so that Stalin would be grateful to the U.S. — all at the expense of other nations, of course.20 In return for the USSR opening a second front against Japan, Roosevelt offered the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands north of Japan. In addition, it was agreed that Port Arthur (the present Dalian) would be

19. Frazier Hunt, The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur (The Devin-Adair Company: New York, 1954), pp. 379-380. 20. See ibid, pp. 380-81.

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The Unfinished War internationalized and leased to the USSR as a naval base; and the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provided an outlet to Port Arthur, would be operated by a joint Soviet-Chinese company. The twenty-odd U.S. diplomats gathered at the meeting in 1945 did not question the right of the U.S. to give away parts of China, an ally of the U.S. during the fight against Japan, to the USSR. Whatever American liberalism meant at that time, it was liberal with other countries’ real estate. To give away parts of Japan, which was about to be conquered, would have been a different matter altogether — but why Manchuria?

America’s ally China under Chiang Kai-shek was not even represented at the meeting. Korean nationalists had no idea that such a meeting had been held. It did not concern Korea, on paper; but the involvement of Soviet troops in the

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3. The Russians Are Coming Pacific War turned out to be a matter of life and death for millions of Koreans later on. The meeting was so secret that even General MacArthur, who was in charge of invading Japan, had no idea that such a meeting had taken place.

KIM IL SUNG MAKES AN ENTRANCE Kim Il Sung and his entourage, consisting of about 40 of his former guerrilla fighters, landed at the port of Wonsan onboard the Soviet warship Pugachev a month after the surrender of Japan, on September 19, 1945. About a month later, on October 14, 1945, Kim Il Sung and his Soviet advisers were given a hero’s welcome at the Pyongyang Municipal Stadium. Everyone in the stadium and those who saw the picture of a young Kim Il Sung with senior Russian military officers behind him on the podium understood that he was being anointed as a North Korean leader by the USSR. Rumors were circulating in the town that Kim Il Sung was a major in the Russian Army and was pretending to have been a legendary hero by the name of Kim Il Sung. Such suspicion was natural; most Koreans were expecting a grayhaired man of Syngman Rhee’s age. Instead, here was a young man, about 30 years old, with a Russian military haircut and an ill-fitting Western suit. The natural reaction of the audience was that this was a fake Kim Il Sung. Some people described Kim Il Sung as having a Chinese waiter’s haircut, and others said that he looked like a boxer. Kim first got off a Russian ship wearing a Russian army uniform with the insignia of major or captain. According to a person who wrote several propaganda books for Kim Il Sung before defecting to South Korea, he attached the title of “General” to Kim because he did not know what to call him.21 “Major” was hardly an adequate title for the leader of a nation. The people in the stadium felt cheated, and were angry.22 What Kim Il Sung said on that occasion was also very disappointing to Koreans: He praised the “heroic struggle” of the Red Army for liberating the 30 million Korean people, when everybody knew that it was the Americans who had fought the Japanese island by island and dropped A-bombs on Japan. Kim used extremely servile words in thanking Marshal Stalin. This was not what the people expected to hear from a legendary guerilla fighter against the Japanese army.

21. Han Chae-dok. 22. See O Yong-jinn, Hang-up Jung-un (An Eyewitness) (Posen, 1952), pp. 111-114.

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The Unfinished War Even the Soviets were not sure that Kim could assemble enough supporters to rally North Korea behind the USSR. Given Kim’s limited political experience, they angled to make the veteran Cho Man-sheik the titular head of North Korea. He was not a Communist, but he could be dispensed with in due course just as Leon Trotsky had been. General Romanenko implored Cho to support Moscow and offered him the presidency of North Korea in exchange for his support of Russia. Cho declined. It was no secret that many Korean guerilla fighters, including Kim Il Sung, joined Chinese or Russian armies to fight the Japanese. The enemies of Japan were the friends of Korean nationalists. This was natural gravitation. America was too far away and the Roosevelt Administration was not sympathetic to Korean independence. To the vast majority of the Koreans, however, Communism was a foreign idea. What concerned Koreans most were the Japanese. As the people began to learn about Communism, some four and half million Koreans (about 30 percent of the North Korean population) crossed over the 38th parallel to the south before the Korean War broke out. Contrary to the claims of some liberal historians, this was more than just a handful of landlords who had grudges against the Communists.

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4. AMERICANS IN SOUTH KOREA In South Korea, the 7th Infantry Division of the U.S. 6th Army Corps landed at the port of Inchon on September 8, 1945, and entered Seoul the following day amid what Korean newspapers called a sea of people welcoming the U.S. troops. They celebrated in cities and villages everywhere, shouting, “Mansei!” (“Ten thousand years” or “Long live Korea!”). Maj. General John R. Hodge, the commander of the 6th Army Corps, led the landing party. They were grateful to the Americans for defeating the Japanese and returning Korea to the Koreans. So they thought. On the U.S. Army’s first day in South Korea, however, Koreans received some discouraging news. General Hodge had granted the request of the Japanese Governor General Abe Nobuyuki in Korea to retain his authority over Koreans in order to protect Japanese troops and civilians who had not yet retreated homeward. Goulden said that when dejected Koreans questioned why Hodge was permitting this, he remarked privately that Koreans were “breeds of the same cat as the Japanese.” Historians have said that Hodge was a brilliant battlefield commander, but a tactless man unsuited for delicate diplomacy. Hodge’s claim to his new job in Korea was neither his knowledge of Korea nor his diplomatic skill but that he happened to have been near Korea when Japan fell. From the point of view of Koreans, they were being treated worse than the Japanese, the ones who had been defeated by America. Hodge then quickly set up the U.S. Army Military Government (USAMG). Koreans began to wonder whether they had been liberated or colonized again by a white race with high noses.

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The Unfinished War According to Kang, another of Hodge’s decisions that touched the raw nerves of the Koreans was his orders to his American soldiers not to accept any food from Koreans. Koreans were insulted that Americans refused their hospitality, although Hodge tried to explain that this was because Korea did not have enough food. The Koreans, whose pride was already crippled by the ruthless and insulting Japanese occupation, suspected that the refusal to accept their foods was a reflection of the sanitary conditions in Korea. Dr. Syngman Rhee arrived in Seoul on October 28, 1945, amid enthusiastic crowds of Koreans. Rhee was the symbol of the nation’s struggles against Japan for nearly half a century. He spoke Korean with an American accent. Some Koreans remarked that his tongue had hardened because he spoke English for so many years; yet, his reputation was such that even the South Korean Communist Party leader, Park Hung Yong, offered his party organization to Rhee and the moderate left-wing leader, Yeo Un-hyong, offered his party as well. Rhee declined both offers. Rhee was then 69 years old, but in exceptionally good health. General Hodge welcomed Rhee in a historic ceremony in which he urged all Koreans to accept Rhee as their leader; it seemed that the U.S. was behind him. This reception had more to do with MacArthur than the U.S. government. In Washington, D.C., Rhee had been received by the State Department as anything but a Korean leader. Immediately after Japan’s surrender, Rhee had gone to the State Department asking for recognition as the head of the Korean government, by virtue of his title as High Commissioner of Korea. The State Department, however, did not recognize the KPG and therefore considered that Rhee represented no one. Furthermore, State Department officials considered Rhee to be too old to be taken seriously. Even after Rhee managed to return to Seoul, President Truman made it known that the U.S. would not favor him or any other individual. Kim Ku, who had killed Japanese Lieutenant Suchida, also returned to Korea, from China, but even later than Rhee, on November 23, 1945. He arrived with a group of followers, which an American journalist called “a flotilla of paid gunmen and concubines.” To the Japanese, he was “the Assassin,” and American knowledge of Kim Ku as well as Korea was largely based on information and perceptions from the Japanese. Upon Kim Ku’s arrival, the first thing that Hodge did was to force him to sign a statement promising that he would not install the KPG in Seoul.

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4. Americans in South Korea However, Kim Ku turned out to be a huge headache for Hodge. Neither Hodge nor the other Americans in the USAMG spoke Korean or knew Korean history, and they depended on interpreters. Kim Ku called for the dismissal of all the officials that had been appointed by the interpreters. He insisted that proJapanese individuals and national traitors under the Japanese military government who had gone into hiding had now come out to buy off the interpreters so they could get positions in the U.S. military government, the district government and the police. He said, “We must clean out all these people, and at the same time, stop this spirit of dependence on foreign countries.” This was tantamount to sabotage, as far as Hodge was concerned. Hodge’s immediate mission was to install a trusteeship government over Korea. The idea for an interim government under superpower tutelage was first discussed in November 1943 in the Cairo Conference among President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek. The U.S. was the first to propose it. The idea was for Korea to go through a period of tutelage before gaining independence. The British were the least interested in giving independence to Korea or any other former colony.23 Of course, to the British, giving independence to a colony, whether in Asia or Africa, would establish an unwanted precedent for its colonies all over the world. Chiang went along with the U.S. proposal, and Roosevelt’s view prevailed. Another issue was when to grant Korea independence after a period of tutelage. The first U.S. position, drafted by Harry Hopkins of the State Department, suggested “at the earliest possible moment”; Roosevelt corrected it to “in the proper moment”; and Churchill changed it to “in due course.”24 Churchill carried the day. The U.S. Secretary of State Department Cordell Hull thought that the phrase “in due course” was inappropriate, considering that the Koreans wanted immediate freedom. Hull’s concern was well placed. When the text of the Cairo agreement was released, the Koreans who were preparing to celebrate in Chunking, China cancelled the celebration. The embarrassed KPG translated “in due course” into something that suggested “immediately”; this reassured its followers that independence was in the offing. Rhee, in Hawaii, was not sure. He 23. Cho Soon-Sung, Korea in World Politics 1940-1950: An Evolution of American Responsibility (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 17-18. 24. This and other discussions at the Cairo Conference are well documented by Korean historian Kim Gae-dong, in Hanbando-ui Bundan-gwa Cheonjaeng (Division of The Korean Peninsula and The Korean War) (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2000), pp. 3641, hereafter Kim.

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The Unfinished War wrote to the State Department asking for clarification, but they did not bother to reply. Roosevelt apparently envisaged a few decades of “tutelage”;25 he said that it had taken the Philippines 50 years to gain independence, but that between 20 and 30 years might be enough in the case of Korea. Two years later, February 1945, at Yalta, the trusteeship issue was discussed with Stalin. Roosevelt proposed that the USSR should be a party in the administration of the trusteeship government! Roosevelt had not even read the State Department position paper on the trusteeship, which advocated that the U.S. should take a dominant position in the post-war administration of Korea and that the USSR would not be a good partner. Hodge soon found out that Kim Ku, Rhee and most other nationalists were dead set against trusteeship. To Hodge, the Koreans, who had nothing, were inappropriately full of pride. Initially, the left wing was against the trusteeship also, but suddenly switched its position, apparently seeing trusteeship as an opportunity for the Communists to gain control over Korea. On December 29, 1945, the Big Three foreign ministers of the U.S., USSR and Britain met in Moscow to discuss trusteeship and the establishment of a provisional government. The South Korean people demonstrated relentlessly against trusteeship. To Koreans who prided themselves on their history as a nation with a succession of Korean kingdoms dating back for over 3000 years, the idea of tutelage sounded all too similar to the Japan’s takeover of Korea under the pretext of reform and modernization. Song Chin U, who was the head of the Korean Democratic Party, was the only major non-Communist Korean political party supporting the trusteeship. He was assassinated and Kim Ku was the suspect, although his involvement was not proven. Then Kim Ku called a nationwide strike and ordered all Korean employees of the USAMG to take orders from him. Kim Ku demanded immediate recognition of the KPG. On December 30, 1945, Kim Ku was hauled into Hodge’s office and told that the U.S. would kill him if he “double-crossed” Hodge again. Kim Ku threatened to commit suicide in Hodge’s office. In Seoul, stores and businesses closed and the employees of the USAMG went on strike. Demonstrations then spread throughout the whole country. General Hodge sent his troops into the streets to crush the “mobs.” Some 50 25. Harry S. Truman, Memoir, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1956) p. 317, hereafter Truman.

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4. Americans in South Korea years later, U.S. Army historians still do not seem to understand why Koreans did not accept the trusteeship. A U.S. Army historian, James F. Schnabel, who wrote a Korean War history in 1992, said, “The fanatic Korean dislike for trusteeship meanwhile continued to foment resistance…”26 [emphasis added]. As chaos spread in the streets of Seoul, Communist agitation was on the rise. Hodge needed a strong police chief. One of the persons to come to his attention was Chang Taek-sang. Chang was born the son of a very rich and powerful yangban. Hodge had no use for a yangban, but Chang was Westerneducated — the University of Edinburgh — and spoke fluent English. He also had acceptable credentials as a nationalist. In 1992, Chang’s daughter Chang Byung Hae (a former history professor in history and linguistics and the author of several books) wrote his biography. Chang was seventeen and studying in Japan, when Korea was annexed by Japan (1910). He left in anger and went to England. For several years in Europe, he represented the KPG. Upon his return to Korea some twenty years later, Chang refused to collaborate with the Japanese and spent time in the family business, writing poems, practicing Chinese choreography, and collecting Korean antiques — a typical lifestyle of a yangban. At that time, the police were the only armed group in the hands of Koreans. Chang’s friends advised him against taking the job. “What could an English gentleman like you and a yangban scholar do in a police force?” The perception of a policeman at that time was one who tortured and killed suspected criminals. Yet, Chang took the job because he was appalled by the assassination of his close friend and political ally Song Chin U, and the appalling general lawlessness. At that time, the South Korean Communist Party under Park Hun Yong was actively agitating against anti-Communist groups. To make the matter worse, the USAMG recognized the Communist Party (called the South Korean Worker’s Party) as a legitimate political party and gave it equal time on the radio. The Communist Party, therefore, openly propagandized its views and organized Communist guerillas in different parts of South Korea. Chang’s first test as the new Chief of the Capital Police came on January 18, 1946, just eight days after he took office. That evening, he arrived home after a late dinner meeting with the press. The emergency telephone rang near midnight. Fighting had broken out between the Communist and anti26. Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington D.C.: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1992), p. 26.

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The Unfinished War Communist groups, and the Communists opened fire, killing fifteen antiCommunist youths. Chang Taek-sang went to the scene of the shooting immediately. There were bloodstains on the white snow and several injured female students were still lying on the snow-covered ground. He mobilized the reluctant police, and after a three-hour fire fight, overwhelmed the leftist youth headquarters at dawn and captured 600 students, and confiscated weapons. This was the first time the police had acted decisively and it sent a message to the Communists that Chang’s police force would fight them. Previously, the Capital District Police had avoided getting involved in the struggle between the left and the right. A campaign to eliminate all the “people’s committees” in South Korea went into full swing. By 1946, it succeeded in disbanding most of the People’s Committees in South Korea. An exception was the island province of Cheju. In May 1946, Chang Taek-sang found evidence of large-scale currency counterfeiting at a printing press used by the Communist Party. Finally, the USAMG put out an order for the arrest of leftist leaders. The Communist Party then went underground. By this time, a large amount of counterfeit currency was in circulation. Apparently, the Communist comrades in Moscow and Pyongyang thought they could finance a revolution using several blocks of metal plates. During the counterfeiting trial, some 10,000 Communists surrounded the court and shouted, “Down with Chang Taek-sang! Down with the police!” The police also discovered that nearly 100 of the rifles they confiscated from the leftists were from a Japanese Army division that had surrendered to the Russian Army. This incident exposed yet another lie the Communists had been telling: that the Russians did not assist the South Korean Communist Party. As the Communist threat intensified, Chang began to hire former Japanese policemen for the police force. He knew that this was a controversial tactic, but he saw little chance that his green police force would improve without the infusion of experienced policemen. The downside of this decision was the inheritance of the Japanese police tactics. The ensuing crackdown on the Communists enraged the Russians. One day, Russian Ambassador to North Korea General Terentii Shtykov criticized Chang in a meeting held in Seoul, saying, “The South Korean Police is rehiring Korean policemen who served under the Japanese military government. They killed numerous Korean patriots and independence fighters. These policemen are using the same barbaric means to suppress the masses. Aren’t you the primary person responsible for this?”

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4. Americans in South Korea Chang replied, “Don’t you know that Lenin, whom you respect so much, used the old Imperial Russian policemen after the revolution? Policemen are basically technicians. If you are not an ignorant man, you will know that I am telling the truth.” Shtykov fell speechless. American high officials who were present during these heated debates were impressed. Apparently, the several weeks that he spent in St. Petersburg talking to Korean nationalists on his way to Scotland and reading through the history of the Russian Revolution had not been wasted. Dr. Rhee actively lobbied against trusteeship by writing to influential Americans and government agencies in the U.S. The relationship of General Hodge and Dr. Rhee began to deteriorate over the issue. To Hodge, Rhee was acting as if he were the Korean people’s leader, but Hodge did not think Rhee was anybody’s leader since he had not been elected to any position. Furthermore, Dr. Rhee could not be elected to any position as long as the USAMG was running South Korea. In June 1946, Hodge came up with an idea for establishing an Interim Assembly consisting of 45 elected members — thinking that leftists and Communists would have a fair share of representation in an election. The Assembly was to play only an advisory role in the USAMG. Rhee won an overwhelming majority in the election. Forty three out of 45 turned out to be support the anti-Communist positions of Rhee and Kim Ku. This went contrary to Hodge’s plan for building a broad coalition of left- and right-wing politicians. Hodge then added 45 non-elected members recommended by leftist groups “in order to give a representative character to the Interim Assembly.” In spite of some leftist propaganda to the contrary, this was the true representation of the will of the people. A popular daily newspaper Donga Ilbo commissioned a public opinion poll, which took place on July 23, 1946, asking Seoul citizens, “Who will be the first president of Korea?”27 The result indicated that South Koreans at that time expected Dr. Rhee to be their president: he had 29 percent, while his nearest rival Kim Ku had 11 percent.28 Communist leader Park Hun Yong hardly had any supporters, just one percent. He later went to North Korea and became Vice Premier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Describing Rhee during this period, a biographer of MacArthur, William 27. It covered 6,671 passers-by on four street corners in different sections of Seoul. 28. See Oliver, p. 370. The result of the poll showed:

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The Unfinished War Manchester, said that both Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee were “despots,” and for the U.S. “there was little to choose between them.”29 However, it is important to understand that Syngman Rhee was not a despot at this time. In fact, he had not even been elected to any position and had had little chance to show his colors. Rhee protested to Hodge for including the 45 non-elected leftists in the Assembly. At the end of a bitter session, Rhee said he would appeal to higher authorities. In 1947, he went to Washington and argued that the idea of trusteeship should be dropped and Hodge should be removed. However, the State Department had another plan. On October 16, 1947, the U.S. proposed to hold elections in both “zones of Korea” before March 31, 1948, under U.N. supervision, and the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) was created to carry out the election. In April 1948, Dr. Rhee supported the U.S. proposal for a national election under the supervision of the UNTCOK, but the USSR felt that the U.S. and its allies dominated it. The fact of the matter was that Rhee would have easily won the election if a free and fair election was held. North Korea immediately declared that it would not participate in the election. Kim Ku did not support Dr. Rhee’s willingness to accept a general election even if the North did not participate in it. Kim Ku feared that separate elections by South and North would perpetuate the division of Korea and might lead to war. In hindsight, he was right; but neither Kim’s plan nor Rhee’s would have made much difference as far as the perpetuation of the division was concerned. As pointed out in a top secret CIA report submitted to President Truman on February 20, 1948 (but recently declassified), the Soviet Union had been planning to create a separate state in North Korea patterned after the USSR. North Korea had already drafted and announced the “provisional constitution of Korea” and had been busy staging a Communist-instigated strike in South Korea. During the review of the Inmin-gun at Pyongyang, the CIA noted that North Korea had announced, “this army would be the liberator of the ‘oppressed’ South Koreans.” In the CIA’s opinion, there was little doubt that the Kremlin was preparing for a war. In the meantime, Rhee demanded that the agreements at Yalta and Moscow be nullified, thus doing away with both the 38th parallel and the 29. William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), pp. 539, hereafter Manchester.

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4. Americans in South Korea trusteeship, and that an independent transitional government be established immediately. Kim Ku, however, sought to bring about an accord between the left and the right to achieve unification of the peninsula. Kim Ku went to North Korea to discuss unification with Kim Il Sung. The Communists rejected every proposal made by Kim Ku’s delegation, which included establishing a democratic government, recognizing private property, holding a nationwide election and not allowing any foreign military base within the Korean peninsula. Kim Il Sung did insist on the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops and called for the differences between the North and the South to be resolved by and among Koreans. Notwithstanding this setback, upon his return to the South, Kim Ku continued to oppose holding a general election without North Korean participation. However, elections took place in South Korea on May 10, 1948. The election brought out 80 percent of South Koreans to elect the members of the National Assembly, which, in turn, elected Rhee as the first president of the Republic of Korea (ROK) on May 31. North Koreans did not recognize the election. General Hodge decided to resign rather than to work with Rhee. This was welcome news for Rhee. In 1949, an assassin, Ahn Tu-hui, killed Kim Ku. Ahn was a lieutenant in the ROK Army at the time. Ahn claimed to have killed Kim Ku because Kim was surrounded by Communists and would have ruined the country. However, later he implicated the ROK army, saying that he had been influenced by the head of their Anti-Espionage Unit. This story had many twists and turns, even implicating Rhee, and the whole truth may never be known.30 Today, few Koreans believe that Kim Ku was a Communist. He was not only anti-Japanese and anti-trusteeship, but also pro-unification at any cost. Traditionally, most South Koreans concluded that such a position was reckless and unrealistic, but recently his thought has gained popularity among the younger generations of South Koreans. The U.S. Military Government in Korea was not an exemplary good model of military occupation, perhaps because American generals and soldiers have 30. Ahn implicated Rhee and Shin on September 23, 1992, but to confuse the matter further, two days later, on September 25, 1992, he repudiated his confession, and said that he alone was responsible for killing Kim Ku. He claimed that his earlier testimony had been made under duress. There is a videotape supporting the assertion that he was under the pressure of the Kim Ku’s followers who kidnapped Ahn. In fact, one of them, Mr. Kwon, was arrested and convicted for kidnapping Ahn.

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The Unfinished War never been trained in such an art. It went on persisting with the trusteeship decision made at the Yalta Conference, over Korean objections. As an occupation force in Korea, the U.S. was naïve and arrogant; however, it was not cruel, cunning and exploitative like the Japanese. For these reasons, most Koreans did not hate Americans (although ultra nationalists such as Kim Ku apparently did).

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5. NORTH KOREANS DISCOVER COMMUNISM After the Soviet occupation of North Korea, the status of the landless and common laborers improved overnight, while the life of the landlords and “Japanese collaborators” turned into a nightmare. What was so remarkable about the North Korean land reform was that threshold level for confiscation was so low. In March, 1946, Kim confiscated land without compensation and distributed it to the landless and to tenant farmers. Any land in excess of five hectares (11 acres) owned by a family was considered ill-gotten, secured through exploitative means. The entire property would be confiscated and the family was required to leave the village for some distant location. Such a low acreage threshold was not typical either in Russia or its satellites.31 For families of the intelligentsia such as the Lee family, the change was not dramatic at first. Initially, Dr. Myong Hoon Lee was promoted from Director of the Ear, Nose and Throat Department to Director General of the Hwanghae Provincial Hospital. The promotion was merit based: he was the most senior Korean doctor with full academic credentials. His first challenge was an attempted Russian take-over of the hospital. This was one of two general hospitals in the province. The Russians had already taken over the other general hospital at Haeju as a military compound for the occupying Russian troops and now ordered the evacuation of the Sariwon general hospital as well.

31. Such a low acreage threshold and confiscation without any compensation was unprecedented. According to Kim, the landowners were bourgeois, enemies of the people, and did not deserve any compensation.

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The Unfinished War The Russians had a reputation for brutality and Koreans believed that they would shoot to death anyone disobeying their orders. In the provincial general hospitals of Pyongyang and Haeju, nurses and other medical staff abandoned their posts immediately when the Russians announced that they were moving in. However, the medical staff of the Sariwon provincial general hospital refused to evacuate the patients, claiming that it was the only remaining general hospital in the province. Finally, after a few tries the Russians decided to avoid a national incident and occupied the local school instead. The school had neither beds nor running water. Perhaps the Russians were not as brutal as many persons had feared. As an occupation force, the Soviets knew what it was doing. In February, 1946, the Russians helped Kim Il Sung create the North Korean Interim People’s Committee. Kim chaired the Committee although neither he nor the other committee members were elected. It was clear that they derived their power from the Soviet occupation army. No one could speak out against these Communist leaders or openly advocate holding an election. Some intellectuals and priests began to disappear; it was assumed that the authorities had sent them off to labor camps or simply executed them. No one could find out their whereabouts. Kim Il Sung then nationalized large industries, banks and railways, most of which had been previously owned by the Japanese, and Communist Party members took over their management. At this time, the private ownership of retail shops, personal and business services still remained in the hands of individuals. There were private practice doctors. In August, two political parties were created: the Worker’s Party and the Democratic Party. The people were given the opportunity to choose a party to join. As the head of the government hospital, Dr. Lee was expected to join the Worker’s Party but he joined the Democratic Party led by Cho Man Shik. His decision proved to be costly and life threatening. What troubled the Soviets most about Cho was that he, like most nationalists, was against the trusteeship form of government. The Soviets tried to change Cho’s position, and when he continued to resist, the Soviets stripped him of all official titles, including the chairmanship of the South Pyongan Province People’s Political Committee. Cho was then arrested and confined to the Koryo Hotel. After a while, he just disappeared. No one has ever found out what happened to him. A Communist replaced Cho as the head of the Korean Democratic Party, and Kim Il Sung allowed the Democratic Party to exist — perhaps just to show

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5. North Koreans Discover Communism the world that North Koreans had the freedom to choose political parties. Yet, he had no more intention of allowing dissent in North Korea than Stalin did in Russia. Political enemies were removed through periodic purges. In fact, some people suspected that the Democratic Party was created to flush out those North Koreans who opposed the Communists. Members of the Democratic Party were placed on a watch list. Dr. Lee’s immediate problem was a cadre officer of the Worker’s Party, Comrade Kim, who was assigned to supervise his hospital. Comrade Kim claimed to be a Chinese herb medicine doctor and had been jailed one time by the Japanese as an independence fighter. At that time, anyone who had been jailed claimed he or she had been an independence fighter against the Japanese; some, of course, were nothing more than common criminals. Dr. Lee and Comrade Kim were in conflict from the outset, ostensibly about the scientific value of herbal medicines. Comrade Kim was not pleased with Lee’s air of superiority. An unpleasant reality for Dr. Lee was that much of his work in hospital administration had to be approved by Kim. The role of party cadres was to ensure that everyone followed the Communist Party’s directives. They could easily ruin one’s life by labeling a person reactionary or antiCommunist. Such accusations could easily send one to a labor camp, imprisonment or even death. In fact, one day Dr. Lee was jailed as a reactionary. Some of the prisoners he met apparently were there for no other reason than failure to show commitment to social issues. There was no appeals process or court that would intervene in political cases. Common criminals had better chances. Political criminals could be pardoned if they denounced someone else as reactionary or anti-Communist. Sometimes, people denounced their own family members and were treated as patriots and received promotions. Perhaps, this was how it was done during the time of Stalin. In jail, Dr. Lee suffered days of interrogation and torture. During this tenuous time, the Russian surgeon in charge of the field hospital heard of Dr. Lee’s predicament and interceded on his behalf, summarily ordering Dr. Lee to be released. His ordeal with the Communists had not ended. Soon, the Russian surgeon who had been his guardian angel left North Korea. He was demoted to the position of director of a small municipal clinic without in-patient facilities. He decided to consult his classmate Dr. Lee Byong Nam, who had become Minister of Health. He had been one of Dr. Lee’s classmates at Imperial University Medical School and was originally from South Korea. Most “domestic”

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The Unfinished War Communists were concentrated in South rather than North Korea when Japan fell. Kim Il Sung had invited prominent Communists to join him in the North; several of those from the South were given cabinet posts. Minister Lee Byong Nam checked Dr. Lee’s personal records and quickly found that he was on a list of reactionaries — people on that list were to be executed without question in case of a national emergency or war, because they would be considered a security risk. Minister Lee Byong Nam belonged to the Park Hun Young’s faction of “domestic” Communists. Park studied theology in China but became an active Communist during the Japanese occupation and had been jailed for his alliance. When Kim Il Sung’s band of guerillas entered North Korea, “domestic” Communists led by Park Hun Yong did not know Kim Il Sung well. Park had run the Korean Communist Party for years before Kim appeared in North Korea. Kim needed Park and his Communist comrades. Park Hun Yong rose to the position of Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister of North Korea. Then there was the Chinese faction, North Korean Communists who had fought along with Mao in Yenan. There was intricate maneuvering to keep the Yenan faction, the main Communist force outside Korea, at bay.32 Mu Chong and Kim Du-bong were prominent leaders under Mao with thousands of troops under their command. In spite of land reform and other measures that pleased the landless, the introduction of Communism into North Korea proved more difficult than Kim had originally assumed. It seemed logical that common laborers and peasants should welcome Communism with open arms, but a substantial proportion of North Koreans did not. Koreans were orthodox Confucians. Over the millennium, Koreans had been taught the virtues of respecting their elders and the learned. Many people did not believe in the Communist version of utopia in which everyone was supposedly “equal.” (Since there was neither an opinion poll nor genuine election, the proportion is difficult to measure.) The atmosphere of coercion and threat did not help. No doubt, there were a number of genuine Communists, but this is also hard to tell because one had to pretend to be an enthusiastic follower of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung in North Korea. For students in North Korea, there were too many ideological meetings. Simon, by this time sixteen years old, was increasingly worried about our 32. For this story, Scalopino and Lee drew extensively from Kim Chang-sun, Bukhan Sip-o-nyon (First Fifteen Years of North Korea), Seoul, 1961.

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5. North Koreans Discover Communism father’s safety. His outspokenness and straightforwardness endangered the whole family. Simon decided that the best he could do for the family was to become a prominent, indispensable scientist and follower of Communism. Unless one was trusted by the Communists, there was no opportunity to go to university and become a scientist. He studied Das Kapital, Leninism, and the history of the Russian Communist Party. Eventually, Simon could discuss the facts and theories of Communism better than most card-carrying Communist members. He made speeches in school meetings praising Communism. He did not discuss his plans with siblings or parents, in order to prevent any hint from ever surfacing that his Communist activities were not sincere. In the summer of 1948, father’s appeal to the Minister of Health for a new job away from Sariwon resulted in an offer to become a professor at Hamhung Medical College. This area is far above the 38th parallel, and according to the minister, Dr. Lee had a lesser chance of getting executed than staying in Sariwon. The 38th parallel became increasingly tightly guarded, and movement of people across the line became more difficult by the day. A weekly train between Seoul and Pyongyang carrying mail was terminated. The U.S. military liaison group in Pyongyang and a Soviet military liaison group in Seoul left for good. Listening to South Korean radio broadcasts became a serious crime, and radios powerful enough to receive broadcasts from the South were confiscated. Nevertheless, listening to the news from the South became Dr. Lee’s passion, and he was convinced that the days of Communism were numbered. Hamhung, the provincial capital of South Hamgyong Province, was the second largest city in North Korea. It was infamous for its harsh living conditions and cold winters. This was where the kings banished criminals and political outcasts during the Koryo and Yi dynasties. Some were high-ranking officials who had displeased the king; few ever came home. During the Japanese occupation, many improvements were brought to the area because the Hungnam port, only 10 km to the east of Hamhung, was close to Japan and was a key strategic piece in her plan for the invasion of China. In fact, under the Japanese occupation the whole province was turned into an industrial complex. Cheap and abundant electricity from the Supung Hydroelectric Power Plant made the area ideal for petrochemical, fertilizer and other heavy industries. Factories were built to manufacture the machinery, munitions, fertilizer and chemicals that Japan needed for the invasion of China as well as for its own consumption. Many Japanese managers, engineers and skilled workers were brought in, new streets were laid and new houses were built. Such

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The Unfinished War modernization, however, made little difference during the harsh winters. Like Hamhung’s weather, the disposition of the Hamhung people was harsh and uncompromising. The minister had done Dr. Lee a great service by giving him the university teaching position in the city. A person with no useful skills and connections would have been sent to hard labor in a remote mine. But medical doctors were in short supply in North Korea. As time went by, my school became increasingly regimented. It was organized in military fashion: the school was a battalion, each grade was a company and each class was a platoon. Everyone wore uniforms and rank insignia shown in stripes and color. A more recent escapee, Kang Chol-hwan, indicated that in the post-war North Korea a student’s rank is shown by the number of stars. Apparently, today young people are taught to be physically tough, too, as if the government is breeding “pit bulls.” Kang says, “I remember a time when students in every class posted numbers representing their relative position in terms of physical strength.”33 In my time, there were meetings practically every other day. Many students were asked to make speeches. We praised the Great Leader Kim Il Sung, Lenin and Stalin, and denounced American Imperialism and puppet Syngman Rhee. These speeches were routine; we could say all the right words in our dreams. There were other class meetings where confessions were demanded of any antisocial acts and thoughts. After the war, praises for Lenin and Stalin were dropped and students were taught “the history of the revolution of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.” Students learn “useful” facts: “On what day and at what hour was Kim Il-sung born? What heroic feats did he perform against the Japanese?”34 Returning to the pre-war days in Hamhung, Dr. Lee bought a large house that required some work. The house once had been a dormitory for an electric company. He had in mind to open a clinic with inpatient facilities one day. During this time, private property was still recognized. Dr. Lee rented one room to a middle-aged woman with a shy boy a little younger than me. The boy’s father, who had managed a division of a factory during the Japanese occupation, was taken away by plainclothesmen one night and was never heard from again. The police denied any knowledge of him. The boy’s mother sold their house and was trying to make their money last by renting 33. Kang and Rigoulot, p. 4. 34. Ibid, p.5.

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5. North Koreans Discover Communism a single room. They were such quiet tenants that we never knew whether they were in or not. To Dr. Lee, Simon had become a real Communist, giving anti-imperialism arguments even to him. Practically every evening, father engaged Simon in a discussion about Communism, hoping he would grow out of it. Simon would occasionally present the Communist viewpoint: “Land is not a commodity that an individual should own. Most Korean landlords obtained land by exploitation of the poor. They collaborated with the Japanese. The practice of land ownership must cease and the land-owning class must be eradicated.” Dr. Lee could not figure out what was going on in the mind of his son. In the spring of 1950, when Simon was in his final year of the First Hamhung High School, there was a province-wide examination to select students to be sent to Moscow for further studies. Simon thought that he did well on the test. Several days later, the leader of the Youth Cadet of the Worker’s Party summoned Simon. The youth leader, in fact, had more power than the principal. The leader asked some routine questions about Simon’s school activities, then asked whether he had any relatives in Pyongyang. When Simon said no, the youth leader asked whether he knew any high-ranking government officials. When Simon said no, the youth leader hastily dismissed him. After several days, a classmate whose father worked for the provincial Department of Education whispered to Simon that he had scored the highest among all the students who took the examination in the province, but was not chosen because of his sungbun, his origin: Simon’s father was neither a Communist nor Communist material. In that society, no one with an undesirable sungbun would advance far, no matter how industrious or talented. During the October Russian Revolution, Lenin said that members of the intelligentsia were not to be trusted because they were all opportunists — they could still make good living if the revolution failed. The school announced that a classmate three years older than the other students had been chosen to go to Moscow. Ironically, he was the worst student in the class. He had been a factory worker before coming to school and a bona fide Party member. Graduation from a Russian university would almost guarantee a promising career as a leader in North Korea. Simon took the rejection well. He understood why the Communists did not try to rehabilitate reactionaries, landlords, capitalists and intelligentsia. In times of crisis, the wrong class cannot be trusted.

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The Unfinished War There were many families with far more serious problems than the Lees’. One of Simon’s classmates in Sariwon (before we moved to Hamhung) was Ahn Taeksoo. Taeksoo’s father was born into a farming family, but he had to leave his village because Taeksoo’s grandfather did not have enough land to divide among several brothers. This was and still is a common practice. Taeksoo’s father went to Sariwon to find a job. Eventually, his father became a small grain merchant. He bought grain from individual farmers and sold it to wine makers. When the Communists took over North Korea, Taeksoo’s elder brother joined the Democratic Party formed by Jo Man Shik. When Cho was purged and the party was taken over by Kim II Sung’s cronies, his membership in the party was exposed. He was a marked man since then. Under the influence of his elder brother and father, Taeksoo became an active anti-Communist. He decided to spread anti-Communist leaflets. He and his friend made leaflets condemning Kim II Sung and praising Syngman Rhee. There was no copy machine at that time. They had made a hole in their pant pockets and dropped the folded leaflets inside the pants when the market was crowded. This went on for a few weeks, and the security police were mobilized to find the saboteurs. One day, when Taeksoo was approaching his home, his sister rushed out and told him to run as fast as he could. The police had discovered the printing tools hidden in their house and were waiting for him. He had a distant uncle living in Haeju, a border town about 60 miles away; he had to hope that his relative would help him to cross the 38th parallel to South Korea. Taeksoo and his friend got on a local train and reached his uncle’s house. His uncle found a guide who led them through the heavily-mined border for a hefty fee. Just before sunrise, Taeksoo and his friend were told that across the stream, only a mile away, was South Korea, and that was as far as the guide was willing to go. From then on, he and his friend were on their own, but they had no way of knowing whether the guide was telling the truth. Shortly after they crossed the stream, they came to a bunker and heard a man’s voice. Unsure whether they were Inmin-gun or ROK soldiers, Taeksoo shouted, “Who are you?” “South Korean soldiers,” someone replied. Having no choice but to believe him, Taeksoo and his friend raised their hands, holding aloft white handkerchiefs, and walked towards the bunker. This was December 24, 1949. The boys were wearing black school uniforms and the distinguishing hats of Sariwon First High School. The officer who was on duty at the border happened to be a defector from Sariwon and recognized their hats.

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5. North Koreans Discover Communism Taeksoo’s friend was lucky enough to have a relative in the South but Taeksoo had neither relative nor friend. He called on a man who used to own a drugstore in Sariwon but now lived in Seoul. He knocked on that man’s door and the man was kind enough to provide Taeksoo food and shelter. Two days later, Taeksoo went out to look for a job. He shined shoes on the streets of Seoul, and applied at the military academy — but was turned down because he was too short. Next, he got a job selling pencils and papers on the street.

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6. CHAOS IN SOUTH KOREA Some leftist historians even in America and South Korea — not in China or North Korea — still believe that Kim Il Sung did not start the Korean War. Some of them trace it to border skirmishes along the 38th parallel prior to June 25, 1950, and the notion that South Korea was as responsible for these as North Korea. In fact, the chief of the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), Brigadier General William L. Roberts, suggested as much. No one has accused him of being a leftist, but Roberts was the most enigmatic general who only several days before the war started assured General Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), not to worry about South Korea because it would be able to defend itself.35 Korean War historians Clair Blair36 and Joseph Goulden have unflattering things to say about Roberts. From the Koreans perspective, he should have been court marshaled for misleading Koreans and inviting a colossal military disaster of South Korean Army. He retired a day before the Korean War started and avoided the question why did he hide the military vulnerability of Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. A secret report by KMAG in South Korea compared the strength of the ROK Army just before American withdrawal to that of America’s Revolutionary War Army in 1775. In March 1949, Roberts passed along this report to Lieutenant General Charles Bolt, aide to the JCS. The report contained information on the number of 35. Omar N. Bradley, A General’s Life (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1983), hereafter Bradley. 36. Clair Blair, The Forgotten War: America In Korea 1950-1953 (New York: Times Book, 1987), hereafter Clair.

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The Unfinished War fighters and bombers North Korea possessed and its elaborate pilot training programs. It must have been clear that South Korea was no match for North Korea. Yet, in Congressional testimony a mere three months later, in June 1949, Bolte — who must have had the report — said that South Korean forces were better equipped than North Korean forces and that the tactical American units could be withdrawn. Roberts went a step further by saying, “South Koreans have the best damn army outside the United States.”37 On surface, such a deception does not make sense until one understands the political situation at that time. The Truman Administration planned to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea, but some Congressmen as well as Syngman Rhee opposed the withdrawal of American troops. Some people, including an author who claims to have been a former CIA agent in Korea, Harimao T. Musashiya, even suspected that the U.S. deliberately induced the war by tempting North Korea to attack the poorly equipped and trained ROK. He could not find any reason why Washington had ignored all the intelligence reports sent by the CIA field offices in Japan and Korea, warning how strong the Inmin-gun was and how ready it was to attack the South. Roberts was certainly a politician’s general rather than a simple soldier. The CIA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. and the like of Roberts were either deceived or wanted to produce only the kind of reports their bosses wanted to hear. Washington wanted to withdraw American troops. This fits into the behavior pattern of the intelligence community. In a book published in 1983, a former CIA agent Ralph MacGhee said that the CIA was “producing only that information wanted by policymakers to support their plans and suppressing information that does not support those plans.”38 Such a culture appeared to have existed even in 1949-50 in the CIA. These generals must have known that they were deceiving Congress. On June 15, 1950, the KMAG warned the Defense Department by cable that ROK combat units possessed only enough supplies for “bare subsistence,” and that with the equipment it had, the ROK Army could not be expected to defend itself for more than 15 days. “Korea is threatened with the same disaster that befell China,” the cable warned. Such reports were not shared with Koreans, and few in the U.S. capital, least of all Congress, had access to this information. 37. The Times (June 5, 1950), quoted in Goulden, p.34. 38. A quote in Young Sik Kim’s website article “Eyewitness: A North Korean Remembers,” from Ralph McGehee’s book, Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA (New York: Sheridan Square Publications, 1983).

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6. Chaos in South Korea After America’s withdrawal, its fiscal year 1950 military assistance to South Korea was $11 million (equivalent to $77 million in the year 2000 after adjustment for inflation). As national defense expenditures go, it was not much money, but even this amount was not released on schedule. U.S. federal review processes delayed the actual delivery of supplies and equipment so long that only a small amount of the promised aid eventually trickled into South Korea. Apparently, it did not matter whether Republicans or Democrats held sway. One Republican congressman, it was reported, “fought all appropriations for Seoul.”39 What little equipment that did find its way to South Korea consisted entirely of small arms. Yet, many ROK soldiers (called ROKs by Americans) did not even have rifles. To the conspiracy theorist, this constituted still more evidence that the U.S. wanted North Korea to attack. The United States had not provided the South Korean Army with tanks because Korean terrain was not considered “good tank country.” This opinion came from none other than General Roberts, who had commanded a tank battalion in Europe during World War II before being assigned to Seoul. He certainly had technical expertise, but one could not be sure whether this opinion was based on his professional or political convictions. U.S. tanks were in short supply; in fact, there were practically none in Asia. By this time, North Korea was well supplied by its Moscow sponsor and had enough arms to equip an artillery regiment and an armored brigade complete with 120 Soviet T-34 medium tanks. As for the number of men in uniform, South Korea was outgunned there, as well: it had 95,000 poorly trained soldiers against 135,000 well trained North Korean soldiers. Notwithstanding this disturbing discrepancy, Washington hoped the ROK Army could somehow handle an invasion from the North and thus salvage American prestige around the world. To South Korean authorities, it was obvious that Kim Il Sung was trying to bring down the South Korean government by promoting insurrection within South Korea. A recently declassified CIA top-secret document supports that position. On December 9, 1947, the Central Intelligence Group (the CIA’s predecessor) briefed President Truman that Soviet and North Korean high officials had met at Pyongyang on November 19, 1947 and planned to create chaos in South Korea through a series of measures:40 South Korea had little electricity-generating capacity at that time; before the country was divided, 39. Manchester, p. 541. 40. Ibid.

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The Unfinished War most electricity was generated in North Korea. At the Soviet–North Korea meeting, it was decided to cut electricity transmission to South Korea in order to increase unemployment and create “widespread unrest.” Another decision was to create “a strong fifth column [subversive group] in important South Korean cities.” Finally, the North Koreans and Soviets agreed to maintain the Inmin-gun “in a state of readiness to occupy South Korea with the aid of the fifth column.” Kim Il Sung had almost succeeded in achieving these objectives. The Communist Party penetrated deep inside the South Korean military and government organizations. A number of top military commanders and officers, and even the former South Korean president Park Chung Hee, became members of the Communist Party. The South Korean economy was in shambles. According to Korean historian Ki-baik Lee, the “contours of Korea’s economy” under the Japanese occupation had taken an unusual shape “with emphasis on war related industry and a high degree of reliance on Japan. Accordingly, the severance of all ties with Japan following liberation inevitably dealt a severe blow to the economy.” 41 Even a greater blow was dealt when Korea was divided. The North was abundant in electrical supply, mineral resources and industrial products; the South was relatively well off in the production of consumer goods and agricultural production. Some 90 percent of hydroelectric power, 95 percent of steel, 85 percent of chemicals and 80 percent of coals were produced in North Korea and about 65 percent of food was produced in the South when the country was divided.42 To make matters worse, immediately after liberation the Japanese authorities, still in charge of Korea until the American troops landed, flooded the banking system with a huge supply of currency: a 72 percent increase in a matter of weeks. The Korean people believed that this was done deliberately to create chaos. It succeeded in creating hyperinflation. Even with American assistance in the following few years, the South Korean economy was reeling from dislocation and structural problems. There was serious inflation. The fiscal side of the economy was also mismanaged. The government did not have sufficient revenues to run the government; its tax administration was hampered by corruption; and tax collection efforts were insufficient. The government depended on American

41. Lee Ki-baik, New History of Korea, translated by Edward W. Wagner (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 375. 42. Ibid, p. 376.

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6. Chaos in South Korea aid to meeting a large proportion of the operating budget deficit. Little went for investment in the provision of basic infrastructure such as electricity generation, transportation and irrigation. None of these fiscal and monetary problems was easy to solve when the economy was sinking. The Korean leaders had found their way to the top by being anti-Communist and anti-Japanese, not for being good economic managers. The Soviet strategy of further disrupting the economy by cutting off the electricity supply seems to have worked. Nowhere in South Korea was economic dislocation more evident than on the picturesque volcanic island of Cheju. The fishing industry was the island’s mainstay, but the local people did not have the carbon rods necessary for night fishing. These rods used to come from North Korea. Coal also had come from the North, but North Korea stopped selling it to South Korea. The shortage practically shut down the island’s power plant; this, in turn, shut down the alcohol-production plant, which used local potatoes. Then the farmers had no place to sell their potatoes. The local economy collapsed, and the first rebellion broke out. Leftists claimed that it was spontaneous uprising by local residents dissatisfied with the socioeconomic condition of the island.43 The leftist “people’s committees” blamed all of this on the mainlanders and the USAMG, and the people’s committees armed their members and challenged the national police. The uprising started in April 3, 1948. A national election was scheduled for the following month. The rebel force supported Kim Il Sung’s position, calling for the withdrawal of the U.S. Army, the elimination of Syngman Rhee, and halting the national election. The rebels attacked police stations and killed pro-government civilians, following which the national police and right-wing youths embarked on a bloody and cruel reprisal. The atrocities escalated on both sides. When the police were no longer able to suppress the rebellion, the newly-formed ROK Army was mobilized to put it down. At age 27, Colonel Yu Jae Hung was appointed to the position of commander in charge of pacifying the island. Like many other Korean senior military officers at that time, he had graduated from the Japanese Military Academy; and at the time of Japan’s surrender, he was a battalion commander of the Japanese Army.

43. Park Se Gil, Dasi Ssunun Hangook Hyyondae-sa (In Korean only: Modern History of Korea Rewritten) Seoul: Dolbegae, 1988) Vol. 1, p. 135.

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The Unfinished War After graduating from the military academy, my half-brother, Soon-ku, was a brand new second lieutenant and was assigned to Yu’s regiment sent to suppress the rebellion. He was issued a long sword and a pistol. Killing the islanders was not what he had had in mind while studying at the Academy, but he was prepared to do so if necessary. When the dust settled on Cheju Island, 14,504 combatants and civilians were dead,44 some 20,000 homes had been destroyed and one third of the island population of about 100,000 had fled to protected villages along the coast.45 Colonel Yu pacified the island by promising not to prosecute those who surrendered. The government also promised to support a new life and livelihood for the rebels. But this was not the final chapter in the war of rebellion. The Communist Party decided to show its hand, and called on its “sleepers” in the Army to rise up. In October 1948, rebellion erupted in the port city of Yeosu and spread to Sunchon and other cities. One regiment of the ROK military joined the Communists — half the ROK military at that time. The Communists formed “the people’s courts,” and tried and executed captured policemen, government officials, landlords and rightists. The rebels killed more than 1,000 people in each of the two cities. At this time, Kim Il Sung and Stalin’s strategy of toppling South Korea seemed to be working. These rebellions were suppressed, but more than 1,000 guerillas fled to the Chiri Mountain. Colonel Paik Sun Yup,46 who moved from the position of intelligence chief in the ROK Army Headquarters to become the commander of the ROK 5th Division, took on the job of eradicating the guerrillas in the area. He was born in North Korea. When he was seven years old, his father died, leaving the family destitute. His mother moved them to Pyongyang from their village about 28 km to the west, and was on the brink of committing suicide. Sun Yup later thought that his best chance for a career was to enter the Japanese Military Academy in Manchuria. After graduation, he served in the 44. From the Investigative Report On the April 3 Casualty by the Cheju Provincial Assembly as revised in 1997, cited in Seo Chung Seok, Cho Bong Am-gua 1950 yeondae, Vol. 2 (available only in Korean: Cho Bong Am and the 1950s), (Seoul: Yeoksa Bipyong Sa, 2000), p.571, hereafter Seo. 45.Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997), p. 221, hereafter Cumings. 46. Paik Sun Yup, the first four-star general and a veteran of many Korean War battles, provides a detailed account of his youth and the battles that he fought in an autobiography in Korean (The Long, Long Summer Day) (Seoul: Ji-Gu-Chon, 1999).

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6. Chaos in South Korea Japanese Army for three years. After the fall of Japan, he and his brother, In Yup, worked for the nationalist and founder of the North Korean Democratic Party, Cho Man Shick. After a few months, the Paik brothers realized that North Korea was no place for anyone who had served the Japanese Military and in December, 1945, they decided to cross the 38th parallel — along with about four and half million Koreans who would eventually come to the South. Suppressing the rebellion in Yeosu fell on Paik’s lap. He said that he obtained the cooperation of the residents as soon as his division convinced them that it could defeat the guerrillas. He learned that civilians always sided with the stronger side. Survival was the name of the game. For his part, what Kim Il Sung learned was that it was not going to be easy to topple the Syngman Rhee government with insurrection alone. Park Chung Hee, who would later succeed Rhee as president of Korea and became the architect of the post-war South Korean economic miracle, was a Communist at that time. Born the second son of a farmer in a small village near Daegu, he graduated from the Manchurian Military School in 1940 and later from the regular four-year Japanese Military Academy in Japan. After his graduation, he served the Japanese Kwangdong Army as a lieutenant, but several days before Japan surrendered, Park and three other fellow Korean officers deserted the Japanese army, trekked across 35 miles of rough mountain roads and surrendered to a unit of Chiang’s Nationalist Army. Though most Korean Kwangdong Army officers defected directly to North or South Korea, Park chose to surrender to the Chinese Nationalist Army in control of much of China at that time. After waiting nine months to see how things settled, they returned to South Korea in May 1946. Park went back to military school.47 Just before the national election in 1948, he held the rank of major in the South Korean Defense Guard and participated in military operations against the Yeosu uprising although by this time Park was a cardcarrying member of the South Korean Worker’s Party. Before his involvement in this operation, Park had been an instructor in the Korean Military Academy.48 The first batch of cadets he taught was the 5th class of the academy, which in 1947 consisted of 420 young men. He was a respected

47. In September 1946, he entered the National Defense Guard Academy. This was only a three-month course. He graduated third among 194 students. 48. This was before the ROK Army was created; at that time the ROK military was called the National Defense Guard, and was an extension of the armed police.

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The Unfinished War teacher, and the cadets never forgot that. They later helped Park to stage a military coup. Returning to 1948 on the heels of a series of Communist rebellions, the ROK realized how deeply the Communists had infiltrated and went on an allout “Red hunt” intended to cleanse the ROK military of Communist infiltrators. Park’s membership in the South Korean Worker’s Party was discovered. Some 10 percent of the ROK’s soldiers and officers were jailed and interrogated. Park was interrogated repeatedly. He finally broke down and confessed his Communist Party connections. In the formal trial, Park received a death sentence; but his sentence was commuted because of the intervention of Lieutenant Colonel Paik Sun Yop, who was the intelligence chief in the ROK Army Headquarters in charge of purging Communists from the army. Although Park was a card-carrying Communist, by this time his faith in Kim Il Sung and in Communism had already waned because he knew that anyone with a past connection to the Japanese Army was being arrested and jailed in North Korea. Paik had been Park’s senior in the Manchurian Military School and the Japanese Military Academy, and knew this. However, it was Captain James Houseman of the KMAG who played the decisive role in this decision. The KMAG controlled the U.S. military aid to the ROK forces. Brigadier General Roberts was not exaggerating when he bragged that the ROK Army would fall within a week if America terminated its military aid. Because of this dependency on the U.S. military supplies, a mere captain of the KMAG had powerful influence over the entire ROK. He advised, and shared the room of, the chief of ROK Army, Major General Chae Byung Duk. Houseman suggested that Paik use Park as chief of the Combat Intelligence Section, whose job was to stop the infiltration of Communists from North Korea. Paik reminded Houseman that Park had Communist connections, and was awaiting sentencing. Houseman replied that Park knew the inner workings of the Communists, which was exactly what was needed to do the job. As predicted, Park did an excellent job of reading enemy plans and interdicting Communist infiltration. Although his life was saved, he was officially discharged from the ROK Army. He, however, returned to his job as a civilian, without pay. At that time, nobody in his right mind would have predicted that Park would one day be reinstated in the ROK Army and become South Korean president.

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6. Chaos in South Korea MACARTHUR IN JAPAN Across the East Sea (better known as the Sea of Japan, outside Korea), the Japanese revered General Douglas MacArthur. Every morning and afternoon, hundreds of Japanese patiently waited to catch a glimpse of their “white emperor.” He had disarmed Japan and brought about sweeping social and political changes including the adoption of a new, democratic constitution. His performance as a prosecutor of war criminals was somewhat mixed, from the point of view of Koreans. He brought a minimal number of war criminals to trial although he purged those suspected of war crimes and military nationalism and aggression.49 This affected less than half of one percent of the Japanese population, compared with 2.5 percent in Germany. “In Japan, no one went to jail, was fined or lost his property.”50 By and large, such a mild treatment of Japanese war criminals and ultra-nationalists did not bother Americans, although some Americans wanted to see Emperor Hirohito dethroned. The consequences of not uprooting ultra-nationalism in Japan was, however, felt by her Asian neighbors, especially Korea and China, for decades to come. They were troubled by Japan’s unwillingness to apologize for the invasions and massacres that her soldiers committed everywhere. The Japanese recently published a textbook that maintains that the Japanese takeover of Korea was not an invasion at all, since it was done with the consent of Korean representatives, and denies that the Japanese perpetrated any crimes during World War II. The issue of 100,000 “comfort women” hardly rates a mention in their textbooks. China also reacted angrily to the Japanese attempt to whitewash Japan’s militaristic past. The Nanjing Massacre, in which Japanese troops killed 150,000 civilians in China, has also been glossed over. The book avoids using the word “invasion” when referring to Asian countries, arguing instead that Japan actually helped those nations to achieve their independence earlier than they would have otherwise! The North Korean press also reacted angrily: “Japan is the gang leader of forging history[.] Imperial Japan’s evil aggression and carnage cannot be erased in a thousand or ten thousand years.” 51 The inflammatory North Korean editorial went on unremittingly, at a feverish pitch. When Prime Minister 49. Geoffrey Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die (New York: Random House, 1996) p. 517, hereafter Perret. 50. Ibid, 518. 51. Hankook Ilbo (Korea Times) July 13, 2001.

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The Unfinished War Koizumi Junichiro of Japan visited the Yasukuni Shinto shrine in Tokyo on August 13, 2001, South Korea and China objected strongly. This shrine, where war criminals have been memorialized, remains a symbol of Japanese militarism. Some Japanese disapproved of Koizumi’s visit, but most remained silent. Koreans have questioned whether the ordinary Japanese people have learned any lessons from their military government’s past so as to prevent its possible repetition. In hindsight, MacArthur could have done a better job at keeping his troops in combat condition. However, this was not his fault alone. The White House, Congress, and the Pentagon were all busy cutting the military budget and the number of soldiers in uniform. None of them suspected that America would have to fight another war sometime soon. Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, in charge of the Eighth Army in Japan, did not do much to keep his men in shape. When the JCS visited Japan in February, 1950 and inspected Walker’s four divisions under the Eighth Army, they found that they were only 40 percent combat-ready. However, the chiefs claimed to have been impressed. They said, “Excellent troops…. well trained, well led, with good morale.”52 They knew it was not true, but to say otherwise would have brought up the need to upgrade the occupation army. There was no budget for that. In fact, there was intense inter-service rivalry to grab a greater slice of the shrinking budget. It has been said that the young American soldiers who volunteered to come to Japan did so to see the world, for cheap sex (“50 cents short-time, one dollar all night”), cheap beer “fifteen cents a bottle” and enjoy the luxury of living with the help of houseboys and shoeshine boys.53 Neither these American soldiers nor Washington thought that they would actually face a war. MacArthur knew that Hodge was not doing well in Korea. Independence and unification seemed to mean a lot to the Koreans, and they were not accepting trusteeship. Perhaps it was a bad idea. However, neither MacArthur nor Hodge had anything to do with the decision to create the trusteeship government. When the Republic of Korea (ROK) was created in September 1948, Korea was no longer the responsibility of MacArthur’s Far East Command (FEC). The U.S. State Department was in charge, and the controversial General Hodge had packed up his gear and returned home — to the delight of Syngman Rhee, and perhaps even of Hodge himself. Although Korea was outside of his 52. Perret, p. 538. 53. See for example Perret, p. 538.

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6. Chaos in South Korea responsibility, MacArthur asked his intelligence chief, Major General Charles Willoughby, to monitor the military situations both in North and South Korea. Asia, however, inhabited by peoples of completely different heritages and cultures and located some 8,000 miles away, was of little interest to most Washington politicians and military strategists. However, MacArthur and many other concerned Americans were furious about the loss of China to the Communists. One such person was a young congressman from Massachusetts and a veteran of the Pacific War, John F. Kennedy. He spoke out against the Administration’s China policy. He said that continued insistence that American aid would not be forthcoming unless a coalition government was formed was delivering a crippling blow to the Nationalist Government there. He went on to say, “So concerned were our diplomats and their advisors with the imperfections of the diplomatic system in China after 20 years of war and the tales of corruption in high places that they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a nonCommunist China.”

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7. PRELUDE TO A HOT WAR In recent years, a lot more definitive information has come to the public domain regarding the roles of Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang in starting the war. As early as April 1947, Soviets started to train T-34 tank operators at Pyongyang.54 In October 1947, Kim Il Sung requested Mao to return Korean soldiers under him, and received the first contingent of 1,500 Koreans (called Northeast Korean Volunteers). They were the Koreans who joined Mao’s Army to fight against the Japanese. On February 8, 1948, Kim Il Sung established the People’s Army (Inmin-gun). All this happened when South Korea had only a national police force and the South Korean government had not yet been created. On August 23, 1948, an additional 10,000 Northeast Korean Volunteers (Mao’s 164th Division) returned to North Korea. The CIA kept the Washington policy makers informed of these developments. On October 29, 1948, the CIA warned President Truman that an armed invasion of South Korea was likely, although it would not happen until after the U.S. withdrew its troops from South Korea and after the North “attempted to ‘unify’ Korea by some sort of coup.” The reasons given for this conclusion were the “intensified improvement of North Korean roads leading south,” “the Peoples’ Army troop movements to areas near the 38th parallel [and] from Manchuria to North Korea.” The report further indicated that “Communist agents have been directed to intensify disturbances in November [1948], ostensibly to facilitate an invasion early in 1949.” The report said that such an

54. The account of North Korean war preparation is from Harimao Musashiya, pp. 95-105.

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The Unfinished War invasion might not materialize, but an internal insurrection such as Yeosu “would bolster a Soviet claim in the U.N. that the South Korean regime is unpopular and supported only by the police and the U.S. Army.” In hindsight, the CIA report was right on the mark. We now know the insurrection did not work. Against such a background, Stalin, Mao and Kim Il Sung met on December 17–18, 1948, in Moscow to discuss the next move. The North Korean delegation consisted of Kim Il Sung, Park Hun Yong (Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister) and nine other cabinet level officials. The Chinese delegation included Mao and Chou En-lai. The Soviet delegation consisted of Stalin, the first Deputy Prime Minister, Defense Minister and other top brass numbering altogether 20 persons. Who instigated the war has been debated for a long time. Washington’s initial suspicion was that Stalin was behind the invasion, but after that, the world was led to believe that it was really Kim Il Sung. There is now sufficient evidence to answer this question: both Kim Il Sung and Stalin were involved. Kim Il Sung was more eager, but Stalin was ultimately in charge of Kim Il Sung. A ciphered telegram from Ambassador Shtykov to Andrei Y. Vishinsky (the foreign minister of the USSR) on January 19, 1950, which came to the public domain in the mid-1990s, showed the true nature of the relationship that they had. Kim Il Sung said to Shtykov that he “cannot begin an attack, because he is a communist, a disciplined person and for him the order of Comrade Stalin is law.”55 In the 1948 meeting, Stalin said that North Korea was not yet ready to take on South Korea and that the Inmin-gun needed to be strengthened. Upon his return to Pyongyang, Kim started a massive buildup of the Inmingun with Soviet assistance. This involved particularly the buildup of mechanized units. (By May 16, 1949, the 105th Tank Brigade was created. Subsequently, three tank regiments, one mechanized regiment and other special units, e.g., artillery, communications and transportation battalions were created.) On July 25, 1949, another 10,000 Northeast Korean Volunteers (Mao’s 166th Division) entered North Korea and became the 6th Division of the Inmin-gun. Another ciphered telegram from Shtykov to Vishinsky sent on September 3, 1949 confirms Kim Il Sung’s eagerness and Soviet involvement. It said that Mun Il, Kim Il Sung’s personal secretary, had come to see him with Kim’s 55. The source of this and other ciphered telegrams in the following three paragraphs are from Kathryn Weathersby, “Korea, 1949-1950: To Attack or Not to Attack: Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 5 (Spring 1995).

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7. Prelude to a Hot War message that the southerners intended to attack that part of the Ongjin peninsula located above the 38th parallel. Shtykov reported that no such attack had taken place on September 2, contrary to the prediction, but still Kim asked “permission [of the USSR] to begin military operations against the south, with the goal of seizing the Ongjin peninsula and part of territory of South Korea to the east of the Ongjin peninsula, approximately to Kaesong, so as to shorten the line of defense.” Then Shtykov reported to Vishinsky that he had discouraged Kim Il Sung from undertaking such operations, but that Kim would “probably raise this question again soon.” The telegram went on to say, “There have not been any serious incidents since August 15[.] The southerners are carrying on defensive work at a faster tempo. I ask your order.” The answer came on September 11 from Andrei Gromyko of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Grigori Tunkin, the chargé d’affaires of the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang: “You must meet with Kim Il Sung as soon as possible and try to elucidate the following additional questions”: the state of the South Korean army, the condition of partisan movements in South Korea, and American troops in South Korea, among other things. In a lengthy and amazingly accurate assessment of the situation at that time in hindsight, Tunkin replied: Kim cannot count on substantial help from the partisans, a rapid victory is unlikely, the limited operation on the Ongjin peninsula might turn into a civil war, and a drawn-out war might bring the Americans to assist South Korea — this time more effectively than they did in China. The Politburo directed Shtykov that the maximum efforts should be directed to “the partisan movement” and further strengthening the Inmin-gun. We now know that the “popular uprisings” were squashed. The attempts to create a partisan uprising never ceased. On April 25, 1950, the Chargé in the U.S. embassy in Seoul, Everett Drumright, reported to the Secretary of State Dean Acheson that the ROK Army finally broke up an “organized resistance of remaining bands of North Korean guerillas, numbering more than 600, who penetrated into Odae Mountain area of Kangwon Province on or about March 25[.] With losses during the past three weeks of about 500 men and several hundred weapons, North Koreans may be loath to commit men and equipment to such adventures.”56 The Soviet hierarchy saw the world as a place full of oppressed proletariats who would rise up against their exploiters, given some 56. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950, Vol. 7, Korea (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), FRUS Vol. 7 hereafter, pp. 47-48.

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The Unfinished War external help. An internal uprising, whether genuine or not, in South Korea would give Stalin the legitimacy for intervention in a civil war just as it did in China, thus assuring that the U.S. would not intervene in the war. In spite of Moscow’s disapproval of that naked aggression, in mid-October, 1949, Kim Il Sung created a major border incident. It is not clear whether he was trying to grab the Ongjin peninsula or provoke the South to invade the North, providing him the pretext for invading the South. After a fierce battle, the North captured several strategic elevation points along the 38th parallel. Ambassador Shtykov did not report these events to Moscow. However, reports of the border clashes reached the Kremlin via other channels and Shtykov received a curt reprimand on October 22, 1949, from the Central Committee of the Communist Party, noting his “failure to present timely information to the Center on combat actions as well as his failure to implement the directive.” On January 13, 1950, the CIA sent to President Truman a top-secret report. On one hand, the CIA reported a “continuing southward movement of the expanding Korean People’s Army toward the thirty-eighth parallel,” the “influx of Chinese Communist-trained troops from Manchuria,” “the assignment of tanks and heavy field guns to units in the thirty-eighth parallel zone,” and the development of North Korean air capabilities. On the other hand, it concluded that “an invasion of South Korea is unlikely unless North Korean forces can develop a clear-cut superiority over the increasingly efficient South Korean Army.”57 The underlying assumption was that the ROK Army was sufficiently strong to dissuade North Korea from invading the South! For whatever reason, the CIA was singing a different tune than its earlier report in October 1948, which concluded that North Korea would be ready to attack the South when the U.S. left South Korea. Perhaps this report was more in line with what Washington decision-makers wanted to hear. Without doubt, North Korea already had a clear-cut military superiority. The “increasingly efficient South Korean Army” was the line that Brigadier General Roberts and Ambassador Muccio, both under the State Department, were telling everyone at that time. In January 1950, American troops had completed the withdrawn from South Korea. As if this were not reassuring enough to the Communists, on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson made the now famous gaffe 57. A weekly intelligence summary on the Far East: Soviet Relations; Korea: Troop Buildup.

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7. Prelude to a Hot War before the lunchtime audience of reporters at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.: “This defensive perimeter [in the Pacific] runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyu Islands,… from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands.” This clearly excluded South Korea and was in accord with the Defense Department’s Offtacke Strategy. Yet, when he was accused of having encouraged invasion, Acheson said that he was referring to “internal subversion,” not to “communist aggression.” No matter what he may have intended by saying it, this was the assurance the Communists needed. Perhaps the fate of 20 million Koreans was none of his concern, but that statement may have doomed the lives of tens of thousands of Americans as well. After the Acheson gaffe, the grapevine between Pyongyang and Moscow began to hum again. Another ciphered telegram of January 19, 1950 clearly implicates the USSR. Shtykov said to Vishinsky, “Comrade Stalin…said to him [Kim IL Sung]…in case of an attack on the north of the country by the army of Syngmann [sic], then it is possible to go on the counteroffensive to the south of Korea. But since Rhee Syngmann [sic] is still not instigating an attack…he (Kim Il Sung) thinks that he needs again to visit Comrade Stalin and receive an order and permission for offensive action…” On January 30, Stalin replied to Shtykov, agreeing to meet Kim Il Sung and said that he was “ready to help him in this matter.” However, he had a request for Comrade Kim Il Sung: “The Soviet Union is experiencing a great insufficiency in lead. We would like to receive from Korea a yearly minimum of 25,000 tons of lead[.] I hope that Kim Il Sung would not refuse us. ” Kim Il Sung met Stalin in April 1950. Stalin said, “due to the changing international situation,” he would agree to the Koreans moving towards unification, but that the final agreement would have to be decided together with China. If China did not agree, the decision would be postponed. Kim went to see Mao. Mao voiced his confidence that the Americans would not interfere in such a conflict. If foreign forces intervened, then China would come to the aid of the North. In the opinion of Mao, the Soviet Union could not directly participate in a Korean conflict because it had an agreement with the United States over the 38th parallel, but China had no such obligation. Subsequently, Soviet merchant ships unloaded a large quantity of war materiel at the port of Chongjin.58 Nikita Khrushchev said in his memoir, 58. Roy E. Appleman, South to The Nakdong, North to the Yalu (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), p. 12.

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The Unfinished War “Naturally, Stalin couldn’t oppose this idea [of Kim Il Sung invading the South]. It appealed to his [Stalin’s] convictions as a Communist all the more because the struggle would be an internal matter which Koreans would be settling among themselves.”59 In short, it was not about the Soviet Army invading any country, but an internal matter. There was a series of cable exchanges between the Soviet Ambassador at Pyongyang and Moscow immediately prior to the commencement of hostilities. On June 21, Kim Il Sung informed Stalin via the Soviet embassy that he would begin combat operations precisely on June 25. This is when the North launched a massive invasion of the South. This explains who started the war, but there is still a debate over the motive. Returning to 1949 in Seoul, U.S. Ambassador John J. Muccio called on President Rhee in May, 1949, and informed him that the U.S. intended to pull out its remaining 15,000 troops. Muccio asked Rhee to issue a statement concurring with the plan so that the Communists would not think that there was a rift between the two countries. Rhee asked Muccio, “What is the U.S. policy toward the security of South Korea? If the U.S. considers an attack against South Korea the same as an attack against itself, I see no need for the U.S. troops to be in South Korea.” But no such assurance came from the U.S. On June 24, 1949 Rhee wrote: “Most of our army men are without rifles[.] Our defense minister reports that we have munitions which will last only three days of actual fighting.”60 On September 30, 1949, he wrote a letter to his friends in the U.S., saying that the Soviets were giving Communist agitators money, weapons and propaganda literature to stir up the people. The letter concluded that Americans were losing the Cold War. As he was writing this letter, skirmishes along the 38th parallel were a daily occurrence. In the meantime, Brigadier General Roberts was doing everything he could to avoid military clashes that would hamper the withdrawal of the U.S. troops on schedule. He asked the ROK Army to stay back at least three miles south of the 38th parallel. In the city of Kaesong, this meant that the ROK soldiers had to retreat to the middle of the city streets instead of on a strategic hillside above the city. In March, 1949, a Communist force struck against the ROK position in the city. The ROKs counter attacked and chased the Communist force toward the 59. Strobe Talbott (translated and edited), Khrushchev Remembers (Boston and Toronto: Little Brown and Company), pp. 368. 60. This and other quotes and events confronting Rhee at this time are from Rhee’s biography. Oliver, pp. 295-299.

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7. Prelude to a Hot War 38th parallel, thus entering the three-mile zone. The next day, Ambassador Muccio visited Rhee to lodge a strong protest that the ROK had crossed the three-mile zone that he and Roberts had created. Muccio had nothing to say about the ROK soldiers being hit in the middle of the city streets, and their rights to retaliate. The next attack on the regiment proved fatal. On June 25, a ROK regiment guarding Kaesong (on its streets, rather than digging in on the hill north of Kaesong) was wiped out within hours of a North Korean invasion. Only forty soldiers escaped the attack. In the early fall of 1949, a strong Communist force of about 4,000 men attacked south across the 38th parallel on the Ongjin peninsula, an area surrounded by the Yellow Sea on three sides and the 38th parallel on the remaining side — a virtual island. After the incident, General Roberts advised Rhee to abandon the peninsula and let the Communists have it. Rhee refused. He was not having much luck with American soldiers. General Hodge had treated him as if he were his lieutenant. Now, General Roberts was doing the same. Although Roberts and Muccio were trying to reassure Rhee that the ROK Army was more than a match for the Inmin-gun, Rhee’s sources told him that his army of 100,000 was no match for the North Korean Army. Muccio tried to convince him that the ROK Army was so strong that it did not need the U.S. Army. Then came Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s announcement that Korea lay outside of the U.S. defense perimeter, on January 12, 1950. On March 8, 1950, President Rhee wrote: “The enemy in the north can sweep down on us at any moment with more arms, more planes, more of everything than we can muster against them. We have no antiaircraft guns, no planes…not even ammunition, spare parts and the other things which are necessary to keep the machinery operating[.] We are not after a large army, a large air force, or large anything. We only want to obtain forces in each branch of the military service which will be adequate for our defense.” In this same memorandum he also said, “The State Department must revise its interpretation of the American perimeter so that it includes Korea[.]” Although Rhee was not briefed about this, the CIA collected at great expense detailed data on the Inmin-gun and forwarded this information to Washington. MacArthur’s intelligence chief, Charles Willoughby, collected information on North Korea and filed over 1,000 reports to Washington. All such reports appeared to have gone unheeded. Willoughby even thought that there was a conspiracy in Washington to ignore all such information. Musashiya was

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The Unfinished War also convinced of a conspiracy. There was a disconnect between the CIA field office and the CIA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. By the time Ambassador Muccio testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 6, 1950, he was forthcoming and warned that the North Korean Army had undeniable military superiority, particularly tanks and combat aircraft. North Korea had, among other things, 100 Yak fighter planes, 70 bombers, 10 reconnaissance planes and 150 medium tanks; and by then, the USSR had trained about 10,000 North Korean soldiers in Siberia, some for up to three years. They received sophisticated training, including tank maneuvers. What the American military turned over to the ROK when they left South Korea was adequate to fight guerillas and lightly armed invaders but inadequate for defense against a well-armed military like the Inmin-gun. The Americans left no tanks, no airplanes, no heavy naval craft, and most of all, no anti-tank weapons. The weapons and equipment left by the Americans were in poor condition and there were no spare parts. They began to fall apart rapidly. When Americans actually left South Korea, President Rhee vented his frustration by publicly accusing America of abandoning his country. He insisted that if it were not for the secret American-Russian agreement made behind the back of Koreans, there would be no Communism in Korea, nor a separate North and South Korea. Acheson rebuked the “old man” for such outbursts and said that such statements only endangered the chances of obtaining American military assistance in the future. Rhee had to swallow his pride. South Korea desperately needed American military assistance. The last of the American troops sailed away on schedule. Less than 500 American advisers were left behind. These advisers were anxious to sail away, too, from what they considered a “sorry country.” South Korea was a hardship post. None of the Americans spoke Korean, and few Koreans spoke English. Months prior to the outbreak of the war, Roberts, who was nearing his retirement, entertained entourages of VIPs and journalists who visited South Korea under arrangements made by Ambassador Muccio. “When they [VIPs] began arriving in increasing numbers, General Roberts artfully stage-managed the visits and proselytized unabashedly. The visitors were wined, dined, and briefed in Seoul, then escorted to the ‘field’ to see the ROK Army in ‘action.’ The field maneuvers were executed by handpicked ROKs, who had been carefully rehearsed about what to do and say.”61 All the VIPs and journalists returned home and projected their glowing confidence in the ROK Army.

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7. Prelude to a Hot War Why did Roberts launch such a carefully orchestrated publicity campaign to convince the world that the ROK Army was capable of meeting any test the North Koreans could impose? Some suspected that he was trying to convince everyone what a fine job he had been doing so that he could get another star before his retirement.62 My supposition is that both Muccio and Roberts were trying to facilitate the Truman Administration’s decision to withdraw the U.S. troops from Korea — call it a team play. Perhaps, Roberts did not believe that North Korea would invade South Korea. In that belief, he was not alone. At the end of World War II, the U.S. went through dramatic military cutbacks. The American public demanded, “Bring the boys home!” It was time for the Americans to enjoy peacetime prosperity and pursue great American dreams. Truman reduced 12 million men and women in arms to 2 million, but in the spring of 1946, the Appropriations Committees of both Houses of Congress set a limit of 1,070,000 men. Most Americans did not believe a war with its former ally, the USSR, was likely. Yet, Roberts was the point man for the U.S. on one of the Cold War fronts. It is hard to find a legitimate excuse for his behavior. Ambassador Muccio was no better. In a post-war interview given to the Truman Library in 1971, Muccio admitted that he was aware that North Korea had advanced Soviet military hardware, including fighter planes, bombers and tanks, but admitted to having undertaken the task of convincing Rhee that the ROK Army was in such a good shape that it was safe to withdraw the U.S. troops. Of course, in his case, the rationale is simpler to find. He was a career diplomat and was carrying out a State Department agenda. This is what a diplomat does. The CIA was a young agency at that time. The Office of Strategic Service (OSS), which was the spook agency during World War II, was dismantled just after the War. Its successor, the CIA, was created on September 18, 1947. It started to operate in South Korea in early 1948, although General MacArthur did not welcome an independent intelligence unit operating outside his control. At that time, Korea was still under his control, and MacArthur had his own intelligence unit, G2, under Willoughby doing intelligence collection. The Korean Labor Organization (KLO) was created in 1948. It was a front for Willoughby’s G2 to collect information on North Korea and China. Only a

61. FRUS Vol. 7, 1950, pp. 96-98. 62. Blair, p. 55.

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The Unfinished War handful of American operatives worked in the organization,63 but the agency actually employed about 10,000 Koreans and Chinese.64 The KLO was hidden under the Oceanic Survey Department of the ROK Ministry of Fisheries. MacArthur began to intensify his intelligence gathering as China was falling to the hands of Mao; and when the CIA passed on to him the information that the USSR, Red China and North Korea met in December 1948 for something big, his interest was piqued. In 1949, the U.S. troops were already withdrawing from South Korea, and MacArthur had no official responsibility for South Korea, but G2 and its KLO continued to operate in South Korea. Musashiya claimed that the CIA Headquarters was informed of the precise date that North Korea would invade South Korea. However, exactly when the CIA Headquarters in Washington received such information is not clear. MacArthur’s biographer, William Manchester, said, “On March 10, 1950, the CIA had predicted the PA [North Korean People’s Army] will attack South Korea in June 1950.”65 This corroborates Musashiya’s claim. This prediction was also backed up by Willoughby, in the third week of March, 1950. His report was only one of 1,195 reports sent to Washington, and apparently did not impress the recipients. Maj. John K. Singlaub, who was in charge of the CIA field office in Mukden, Manchuria, infiltrated several spies into the upper echelon of the North Korean military and reported that the North Korean planned to invade the South.66 This, too, appears to have been ignored. Exactly who knew what was investigated later by Congress. In any event, such intelligence did not fit the U.S. plan for the withdrawal of its troops, and therefore might have been an embarrassment to the CIA in Washington. This was also true of the intelligence gathered by the ROK Army sources. Washington considered Korean sources to be “too emotional” and perhaps as having “an ulterior motive.” However, if Washington did not trust the CIA field office, Willoughby’s G2, the KLO, or South Korean sources whom did they trust? They trusted Roberts and Muccio, who had ulterior motives of their own but ones that served the Administration’s agenda. They were both 63. William B. Breuer, Shadow Warriors: the Covert War in Korea (New York, etc.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.), p. 20, hereafter Breuer. 64. This information is from Harimao Musashiya. His Korean name is said to be Park Sung Uk; he was adopted by a Japanese in Korea when he was child. When he took U.S. citizenship and became a high-ranking CIA agent is not clear. 65. Manchester, p. 543. 66. Breuer, pp. 20-21.

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7. Prelude to a Hot War State Department employees. If there was any ideological bias that doomed Korea, one has to point the finger at the State Department. By this time, the U.S. troops were already out of South Korea, and the State Department had spread the word that South Korea would be able to defend itself and that the U.S. would not defend her — at least according to Acheson. It would have taken a very unusual CIA chief to tell Truman and the State Department that they were all wrong. However, Washington was awash with intelligence reports — which many dismissed as rumors — of an imminent invasion of South Korea. It is also true that there were conflicting intelligence reports circulating in Washington. In early 1950, British intelligence estimated that the Inmin-gun had between 35,000 and 36,000 trained troops. Willoughby estimated that the Inmin-gun had 135,000 troops, which turned out to be more accurate. In view of such widely diverging reports, President Truman asked the CIA to resolve the dispute in early 1950. The CIA sent an agent, Lt. Colonel Jay Vanderpool, to South Korea for fact-finding. Why Washington did so is uncertain because, by this time, there was already a large and active CIA operation in Japan and South Korea. Obviously, Washington distrusted these “rumors.” Vanderpool spent a while in Japan, no doubt talking to Willoughby and others, and in South Korea talking, presumably, with Muccio and Roberts. Although the basis of his intelligence estimate has not been revealed, he sent a report to Washington supporting the British estimate of 36,000 Inmin-gun67 — a conclusion that made the CIA Headquarters and other policymakers in Washington comfortable. On Vanderpool’s way back to the U.S., the Korean War broke out and proved that these estimates were totally out of line. During Congressional investigations of the intelligence failures after the war started, CIA Director Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter testified that the CIA had compiled an intelligence estimate based on field agent reports and sent it to key officials. The report indicated some alarming activities, suggesting that an invasion was imminent.68 The CIA had the signature proof that Truman, Acheson and Louis Johnson had received such reports, although the lead witness, Secretary Acheson, testified that he had not received such reports. The delivery of such reports, even if true, was made only five days before the actual

67. Ben S. Malcom with Ron Martz, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington and London: Brassey’s, 1996), pp. 13-14, hereafter Malcom. 68. See Breuer, p. 40 for details.

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The Unfinished War invasion. While this was not enough time to build up the ROKs, even a few days’ advance warning could have saved thousands of ROKs caught flatfooted. In hindsight, what failed was not intelligence gathering but analysis at the CIA Headquarters and other agencies in Washington. Like many North Koreans at that time, Lim Kun Shick, a classmate of Simon’s on the west coast of North Korea, witnessed an unusual movement of the Inmin-gun troops in mid-June 1950.During the Japanese occupation, Kun Shick’s father had a prosperous medical practice in Sariwon. He had made enough money to buy a big, former bank building for his clinic. Thus, when the Communists marched into town, Kun Shick’s father was labeled as a bourgeois, an enemy of the people, and the big building was proof of his crime. However, he was one of few pediatricians around, and so he was not jailed. Due to his father’s influence, Kun Shick became very critical of the Communists and became proAmerican. Just a couple weeks before June 25, Lim Kun Shick’s distant relative, Captain Yoo Jin Lim, the captain of a tank battalion, stopped by Kun Shick’s boarding house in Namchun to show off his tank. It made a quite a powerful impression on the young man. Kun Shick still remembers that it was painted white inside and that the captain bragged that it was air-conditioned and could travel at a speed of 45 km per hour. Captain Lim said, “I will be the first to capture the South Korean broadcast station in Seoul and make a radio announcement to the South Korean people.” Kun Shick heard later that, in fact, a North Korean tank battalion did capture the South Korean broadcast station first and did make an announcement. He was never sure whether it was Captain Lim or someone else; Kun Shick has not seen Captain Lim since he stopped by Namchun. Kun Shick, now living in Piedmont, California, asked me, “How is it that the CIA did not know about such a big military maneuver?” We now know that the CIA in Korea and Japan knew about this, but Washington policy makers were not convinced by their report.

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8. ON A RAINY SUNDAY ACROSS THE 38TH PARALLEL On the Sunday morning of June 25, 1950, a monsoon rain was falling. It was in the wee hours of that morning when the Inmin-gun launched a massive attack all across the 38th parallel, while its navy landed troops on the east coast. The attack bore the unmistakable mark of the Pearl Harbor surprise attack by the Japanese nine years earlier. At that time, the eldest of my half-brothers, Soon-ku, was a captain in the 9th Regiment of the ROK 7th Division. After the Cheju-do campaign against the leftist insurgency, he was promoted to first lieutenant and commanded a platoon at the front line. On that morning, however, Soon-ku was on a weekend leave and was staying with his paternal aunt in Seoul. He had not been able to take weekend leave for over two months. From May 1 to mid-June of 1950, his unit had been on alert because the government expected border disturbances. On May 1, Labor Day, Communists usually staged demonstrations, and May 30 was Election Day for the National Assembly. During the previous election, the Communists agitated and attempted insurgency. However, on this Labor Day and Election Day, the 38th parallel was unusually quiet. What Soon-ku and 20 million South Koreans did not know was that North Korea was deliberately trying to divert the attention of South Korea away from the coming invasion. By midnight of June 23, the alert was cancelled. Soon-ku and almost half the soldiers of the 7th Division were allowed to take the Sunday off. The ROK 1st Division also guarding the western front above Seoul did the same. On June 25, 1950, when the news broke that a massive invasion was underway, Soon-ku was

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The Unfinished War one of thousands of ROK officers and enlisted men who failed to return to their units. The ROK 1st Division’s commander, Colonel Paik Sun Yup, was in training at what was then the outskirts of Seoul, called Shihung. Paik was tall for Koreans of his generation. He was one of the promising colonels in the two-yearold ROK Army. On June 25, his brother In Yup was the commander of the independent 17th Regiment defending the barren Ongjin peninsula to the west of the 1st Division. About 7 a.m. on June 25, Colonel Paik Sun Yup received a telephone call from his Chief of Operations, with the news of what appeared to be a massive Inmin-gun invasion. He had no car at his disposal and flagged down a passing military jeep and went to American adviser Major Lloyd Rockwell’s house in Seoul. Rockwell was a senior advisor to the ROK 1st Division. Practically all the U.S. military advisors at that time lived in Seoul. Their main job had more to do with rationing ammunition and arms to the ROKs than training them. The U.S. Advisory Group under Roberts was more concerned with the ROK invasion of North Korea than the other way around. Therefore, the advisers maintained a very strict control over the supply of ammunition to the ROK army. Major Rockwell and Colonel Paik drove north together to the division headquarters. Paik’s two regiments, the 12th and 13th, were deployed around Kaesong, practically on the 38th parallel. Its 11th Regiment was kept in reserve near Seoul. They had no idea that the invading army consisted of the elite 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions, mostly made of the so-called repatriated Korean “volunteers” from China. These were veterans of Mao’s army, who had fought the Japanese and then defeated Chiang’s Nationalist Army. In contrast, the highest level of training the ROK army received under the KMAG was “one show” of a battalionlevel maneuver. They were not prepared for the coming battles. There was not even an overall defense plan. Each ROK army division was encouraged to come up with its own individual plan. At 4 a.m., June 25, some 111,000 Inmin-gun soldiers, including 242 T-34 tanks and 1,610 artillery guns of various types, drove south. The enemy artillery could shoot almost twice the distance of the small number of artillery that the ROK had in its possession. None of the anti-tank bullets or shells in the ROK’s possession was capable of penetrating the armor of T-34 tanks. Paik found out that communication was lost with the 12th Regiment. The reserve 11th Regiment was being brought forward from Seoul. The 13th Regiment

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8. On a Rainy Sunday Across the 38th Parallel was apparently fighting the Inmin-gun well, although it, too, was giving ground according to the previously established plan of retreating to the Imjin River rather than meeting the enemy head on at the 38th parallel. The most disturbing news, however, came from Major Rockwell. At about noon, Rockwell received an order to return to Seoul because the KMAG was pulling out of South Korea. Rockwell and Paik shook hands and parted, but Paik was upset. Complex emotions erupted: Paik remembered that the U.S. had promised to help the ROK in case of war, but now the war upon them and the U.S. seemed to have decided to leave South Korea to its own fate. An immediate question was who would provide ammunitions and supplies now that the Americans were leaving. As Paik’s 13th Regiment retreated to the southern bank of the Imjin River, the Communists were in hot pursuit. The engineers had already wired the charges to blow up the bridge. Paik, however, had to wait for the 12th Regiment. It had been incommunicado for the whole day, but Paik did not believe that his entire regiment had just disappeared into thin air. At 3 p.m., what remained of the 12th Regiment crossed the bridge: no more than 40 men and the regimental commander, Chun, badly wounded and bleeding heavily. Commander Chun had to be transported to Seoul immediately. Paik could not believe it. Meanwhile, the Inmin-gun soldiers on motorcycles were following closely behind. Paik ordered the engineers to detonate the charges. The engineer pushed the detonator; nothing happened. Something had gone terribly wrong. Perhaps the cord was cut, or was defective. Hordes of Inmin-gun rushed and seized the bridge. So much for the carefully laid plan of stopping the enemy at the Imjin River; the bridge fell into enemy hands, intact. The biggest problem among the soldiers was the fear of tanks. They had never seen tanks before. Paik’s officers kept repeating, “Tank, tanks, there is no way to stop the tanks.” Even the word “tank” seemed to terrify them. Yet, Paik’s units fought for three days against overwhelming odds. At Munsan, some soldiers volunteered to strap satchel charges of explosives to their backs and hurled themselves under advancing T-34 tanks. Others charged the oncoming tanks with pole charges. Paik denied the rumor that he had ordered such suicide missions. Even such bravery had a limited effect, however, against mechanized Inmin-gun divisions moving down in force with the protection of infantry. Because of General William L. Roberts’ refusal to see Korea as a potential ground for tank battles, the ROK Army was not supplied with anti-tank mines and

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The Unfinished War rockets capable of destroying T-34s. This and a handful of other key decisions doomed the ROK Army. The ROK 1st Division reeled, recovered and then mounted a surprisingly stout defense. Amid this turmoil, Paik received a message from his younger brother, Colonel Paik In Yup, that his regiment was in a dire situation and that this message might be his last. Apparently, his brother’s independent 17th Regiment on the Ongjin peninsula was not doing as well as the 1st Division. By noon of June 25, Russian-made YAK fighter planes appeared over the Kimpo airport. They returned later in the afternoon and destroyed its communications tower and damaged several South Korean light spotter planes sitting on the tarmac. The Inmin-gun had 180 airplanes (including YAKs) when the war broke out, while South Korea had only 30 reconnaissance planes that were used to spot Communist guerillas in infested areas. The North Korean air attack did more psychological than physical damage to South Korea. The four Yak fighters, which sent bursts of fire into the Blue House, rattled President Rhee and his staff. Rhee’s staff advised him to move south immediately to avoid being captured by the Inmin-gun. According to Ambassador John Muccio, Rhee and Acting Prime Minister Shin Sung Mo, whom he met on the evening of June 25, mentioned to him that the cabinet had met and decided that it would be “disastrous for the Korean cause to have him [Rhee] fall into the hands of the Communists and that their defense capabilities were such that they had better move on out of Seoul.” Muccio tried to reassure Rhee that none of the ROK unit had given in, and said, “His [Rhee’s] military was doing a superb job.” Muccio convinced Rhee to delay his planned evacuation on June 26, but Rhee and his staff left Seoul at 2:00 a.m. on June 27. His Acting Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Shin left Seoul twelve hours later, and Chief of Staff Chae did so at 2:00 a.m., June 28. Seoul fell on June 28. Sixty-two members of the National Assembly were caught behind the lines. Eight of them were killed and 27 were kidnapped or missing. Rhee could certainly have delayed his departure at least by 24 hours, but this was hindsight wisdom. They demanded his apology, which he never gave. Historians and others said that Rhee was disingenuous if not cowardly for abandoning Seoul while leaving behind a recorded radio message urging the people to remain in Seoul and the soldiers to defend the lines to the end. In hindsight, the right thing to have done was to order the ROKs to fall back to the southern bank of the Han River, but Rhee had decided to fight for every inch of real estate. Obviously, he had no idea how outmatched his soldiers were. Muccio

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8. On a Rainy Sunday Across the 38th Parallel was telling him that the ROKs were holding up well, and his Defense Secretary was calling it a disaster. In hindsight, Rhee certainly could have delayed his departure from Seoul by 24 hours. Returning to Paik’s predicament, one encouraging development was that KMAG advisor Major Robert Donovan returned to his regiment, saying that the KMAG had cancelled the previous order to retreat from South Korea. Donovan also brought news that the ROK Army Headquarters was mobilizing six additional regiments to send north to defend the capital. Rhee decided to stand and fight. Headquarters had high hopes that he and his regiment would hold the front — a message that weighed heavily on Paik. The ROK 7th Division, however, retreated rapidly and exposed the right flank of Paik’s division. By this time, telephone lines had been cut and communications had been disrupted. An ambulance sent to Seoul with wounded men returned with them still in the vehicle. A truck sent south to bring ammunitions also returned empty. They reported that the bridge across the Han River had been demolished and that the enemy already occupied Seoul. Major Ro, in charge of supply and logistics, reported that there was very little ammunition left. That evening, bazooka shells and machine gun bullets began to hit his headquarters. Paik decided to retreat and ordered every unit to cross the river with whatever means available. This meant using rowboats and makeshift rafts, at some areas. Everyone was ordered to regroup at the Shihung Infantry School on the other side of the river. All the artillery, vehicles and other heavy equipment had to be abandoned. Ambassador Muccio, recalling the situation on June 25, reflected, “I have been unable to understand why the Communists didn’t get into Seoul the same night, because they had such a preponderance of armor and mobility, and they had control in the air, and the south had no defense against air or any kind.” He answered his own question by adding, “One was the unexpected firmness of the South Koreans. Not a single unit gave up. The second was that there was a torrential rain on that morning[.] I think what the Communists had in mind was to rush into Seoul, capture the government, and then they’d be able to present to the world that Rhee and his government had no support from the people of Korea, and the whole issue would have been settled right then and there before the U.N. or the Free World could do anything.” Col. Paik and his men’s stubborn though futile resistance served a purpose.

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The Unfinished War On June 25, 1950, Park Chung Hee, still a civilian employee at the ROK Army Headquarters, was on leave at his hometown near Gumi, just north of Daegu. About noon that day, he received a telegram from Colonel Chang Do Young, the Chief of the Intelligence Bureau, asking him to report to work immediately. Chang was not sure that Park would do so — considering his background as a former Communist. However, Park managed to get on a night train and arrived at the ROK Army Headquarters at Yongsan. A junior officer still at the Headquarters said that practically everyone had already evacuated. Park walked toward the Seoul Railway Station. On his way, he heard the sound of what appeared to be a Caterpillar tractor. Soon, he observed several Russianmade medium tanks rumbling toward the West Gate Prison, where Park had spent about a month in 1948. Apparently, the Inmin-gun were going to free the political prisoners who were being held there. When Park located Colonel Chang Do Young in the Shihung Infantry School, being used temporarily as the ROK Army Headquarters, Colonel Chang could not believe his eyes. Most leftists had joined the Inmin-gun at this time and he had expected Park to do the same. He restored Park’s former rank as major.

REACTIONS OF WASHINGTON In Washington, news of the rout of the ROK Army awoke the members of the National Security Council. On that day, President Truman was on vacation in his home state of Missouri. Secretary of State Acheson, who had proclaimed earlier that South Korea was outside the Pacific defense perimeter, took charge. With the approval of Truman, Acheson called the U.N. Security Council meeting, which promptly declared that North Korea had committed an act of aggression. The Soviet Union had been boycotting the U.N. Security Council in continuing protest that the Nationalist Chinese still represented China and occupied her seat in the Security Council. This ultimately cost the Soviets a chance to veto the resolution against North Korea. On June 25 (June 26 in Korea), the U.N. called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. On the evening of June 25 (June 26 in Korea), President Truman rushed back to the capital. He wrote later, “I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed

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8. On a Rainy Sunday Across the 38th Parallel to fall, Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea…no small nation would have courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors.” 69 The NSC meeting at Blair House in Washington D.C. started with a field trip report by Defense Secretary Johnson and Chairman of the JCS Bradley, who had just returned from Tokyo. The first question in everyone’s mind was whether the invasion was part of a larger Communist offensive. They rather suspected that it was. The meeting approved Acheson’s proposal to order the Seventh Fleet to proceed north from the Philippines to prevent a Communist Chinese attack on Taiwan and also to dissuade the Nationalist Chinese from making a move against the mainland. Truman, Acheson, Bradley and, in fact, all of the members of the National Security Council agreed that failure to protect South Korea could lead to a political and military disaster. Taiwan, Indochina, and the Philippines might be next. The NSC authorized MacArthur to send arms and ammunition to South Korea, and to use the U.S. Air Force to help evacuate American women and children. On the following day, June 26 (June 27 in Korea), Truman announced, “The United States will vigorously support the effort of the [U.N. Security] Council to terminate this serious breach of the peace.” If only the U.S. had made such a statement several months earlier, as President Rhee had begged it to do, the war might have been avoided. Why now? For Stalin and Kim Il Sung, it was a mystery why the U.S. made such an abrupt policy change. The answer was in the National Security Council’s policy document NSC-68. Precisely two months before the war broke out on April 25, 1950, Harry Truman asked the National Security Council to approve a policy paper that stated that the U.S. would resist any Communist threat to non-Red nations anywhere in the world. This policy was formulated in the aftermath of the loss of China and amid rising public criticism leveled against the Truman Administration. Truman understood that he and his party could not survive the fall of another Asian country and was “running scared from Republican critics.”70 Even John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson understood and sympathized with the outrage 69. Truman, pp. 332-333. 70. Manchester, pp. 542-543.

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The Unfinished War of the public. Ten thousand miles away in Tokyo, MacArthur was fuming and began to battle against the Truman Administration for its inept handling of China affairs. The policy, however, remained top secret. Truman could not quote from it when he wrote his memoir in 1956, and even Acheson (who wrote his memoir in 1969) could not do so. Still a mystery is why the U.S. kept NSC-68 secret rather than announcing its intent to the world. Had it announced such a policy immediately, the Korean War might have been averted. However, the document also contained sensitive statements about increasing defense spending up to 20 percent of the gross national product, which would have upset not only the pacifists and liberals, but also most Americans who were not ready for another major war. In a matter of a day, it became clear that the supply of ammunitions could not stop the Communists. On June 26, Acheson called for a stronger U.N. resolution requesting U.N. member nations to resist this aggression and contribute forces. A second NSC meeting resolved to provide air and naval support. Bradley said that the U.S. had to draw the line somewhere — and Korea was as good a place as any. He commented that jets flying over South Korea would have a great “morale effect...even if they were unable to spot the North Korean tanks.” A few days earlier, in Tokyo, he had thought North Korea would not dare attack South Korea; and now he grossly underestimated enemy resolve and capability. The speed with which the decision to intervene was made startled the Communists. Some even saw an American conspiracy: after all, America had lured North Korean to invade South Korea by announcing the Acheson Line and the like.After ordering the delivery of mortars, arms and extra ammunition to the ROK Army from the stockpile in Japan, MacArthur sent a survey team headed by Brigadier General John Church to assess the situation in Korea. On June 27, Ambassador John Muccio informed MacArthur that Seoul was about to fall and all Korea might be lost. MacArthur was as dumbfounded as Washington decision-makers. Korea was not his responsibility and he did not think much about her. He simply conveyed the following message to Washington: “Complete collapse is imminent.” By that time, it became clear that the ROK Army had little hope of holding off the Inmin-gun. In the second NSC meeting, Truman authorized the use of air and naval support and was ready to send not only U.S. air and naval support, but also American ground forces. However, Chairman of the JCS Omar Bradley

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8. On a Rainy Sunday Across the 38th Parallel successfully argued for waiting a few more days instead of taking such a “drastic step.” To the Communists, Washington made the decision to intervene with lightning speed, but to the ROK, which lost half of its soldiers in the first few days of the war, it was a few days too late. General Bradley did not help matters by dissuading President Truman from taking the right step. On June 26 (June 27 in Tokyo), Secretary Johnson and General Bradley made a scrambled-voice call to MacArthur, informing him of the NSC’s decision. Washington did not ask MacArthur for his opinion and he offered none. MacArthur was in the teleprompter room when a message arrived from Washington through a state-of-art decoding device called “telecon.” According to his biographer, Geoffrey Perret, MacArthur was shocked and could not believe the message he received: “There it was, scrolling soundlessly down the glowing telecon screen: The United States was going to commit its air and naval forces to defend South Korea.”71 All senior staffers of the Far East Command (FEC) were equally surprised at Truman’s decision. To quote some more colorful phrases from Perret, MacArthur had not in the least expected “that Missouri hayseed accidentally shot into the White House” by the death of President Franklin Roosevelt, and now “surrounded by a bunch of mealy mouthed liberals,” to have “the balls to fight.” MacArthur had no knowledge of NSC-68. He had all along believed that the U.S. would not defend South Korea. The only inkling that the U.S. might come to the defense of South Korea was provided by the staunch antiCommunist John Foster Dulles, who had visited the Far East as a special representative of the Secretary of State only days before the war broke out. He visited the 38th parallel and on the same evening, he addressed the South Korean National Assembly. That was on June 17, 1950. He said that the American people remained “faithful to the cause of human freedom and loyal to those everywhere who honorably support it.” The statement was so out of line with prior statements by U.S. officials such as Acheson, Tom Connelly (chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) and MacArthur that most people did not take it seriously. Back in Washington on June 28, Truman announced to the world his decision to go to the rescue of South Korea. In response to the call of the U.N., 29 member nations would make specific offers of assistance to South Korea. Eventually, 16 nations sent ground, air and naval forces. This included America’s 71. Perret, pp. 541-541.

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The Unfinished War Second World War allies, some Asian countries (Thailand and the Philippines) and others from as far away as Colombia and Ethiopia, which furnished ground combat troops. India, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Italy sent medical units. Air Force support arrived from the U.S. and other countries. Naval forces were sent from the U.S., Great Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. On their way from Japan to Kimpo airfield on June 27, Brigadier General John Church’s fact-finding party received a warning that Kimpo might be in enemy hands. His pilot diverted the plane to an airfield at Suwon, about 20 miles south of Seoul. Church found South Korea in utter chaos. The U.S. Military Advisory Group in South Korea (KMAG) had also disintegrated by this time. Its personnel was evacuating with the civilians or straggling all over South Korea. The road south from Seoul was jammed with fleeing ROK soldiers, refugees, reporters, and photographers. Having earlier been told of the high quality of the ROK Army by Roberts, Church was flabbergasted to find it in total disarray. He later wrote and attributed the collapse to the “lack of leadership.” Many ROK soldiers were eager to stand and fight, but they didn’t know how or where; they were leaderless. The two-year-old army did not have much in the way of experienced military officers. Church came to the conclusion that the only option left was to throw up a strong defense on the southern bank of the Han River. That morning, he conveyed the bad news to MacArthur by radio. He told GHQ that, in order to recapture Seoul and reestablish ROK Army positions at the 38th parallel, “it would be necessary to employ American ground forces.”

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9. THE ROK ARMY ON THE BRINK OF DISINTEGRATION On the battlefront around Seoul, the plan was to blow up all the bridges along the Han River to prevent enemy tanks from crossing them. Accordingly, ROK Army engineers had packed vast quantities of explosives under the vehicular and rail bridges. They were to blow up the bridges after the ROK army escaped but before the enemy tanks approached. The bridges were blown up at 2:30 a.m. or thereabouts. In hindsight, the vehicular bridge was destroyed several hours too early. Enemy troops did not reach the center of Seoul until around noon and the Han River for another several hours. At this time, the ROK 1st Division was desperately resisting the onslaught of two Inmin-gun divisions around Munsan. The ROK 7th Division was disintegrating more rapidly, but one unit was engaged in a desperate battle on the Miari Hill to the north of Seoul; furthermore, a company-sized group of ROK soldiers was dug in on Nam-san (South Mountain) at the heart of Seoul. About 80 of them were lightly wounded ROK soldiers who walked out of the hospital to defend the city. These soldiers would fight the enemy to the last man.72 These ROK soldiers on the Nam-san Mountain witnessed the mid-section of the bridge come crashing down and splashing into the river. Trucks, soldiers, and civilians plunged into the river along with it. Many more vehicles and persons later tried to cross the bridge in the dark, not knowing that the bridge had been blown. Some of them also plunged into the river. The ROK Army engineers, however, failed to destroy one span of the rail bridge. 72. This account of the ROK disaster is from Hanguk Jeonjaeng-sa (Korean War History, in Korean only) (Seoul: Korean Military Academy, August 1996), op cit, pp. 218219.

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The Unfinished War On the vehicular bridge, miles from the rail bridge, Miss Marguerite (Maggie) Higgins of the New York Herald Tribune was on a jeep with KMAG officers. She observed that the streets were so jammed with pedestrians and vehicles that no one was making much progress.73 She reported that the ROK soldiers seemed to be in good spirits, even though they had been routed. However, the civilians on foot with children and heavy burdens were not orderly. They stumbled along by the thousands. Women carried bundles on their heads. Men carried their belongings in their hands. Miss Higgins noted that the thunder of guns behind grew louder. As other journalists tried to see what was blocking traffic, suddenly “the sky was lighted by a huge sheet of sickly orange flame. The journalists suffered minor injuries but the ROK soldiers in the truck ahead of the journalists had been hit and appeared to be dead. Screaming refugees turned around and raced for the northern shore.” Who was responsible for the premature demolition of the bridges has not been answered satisfactorily. Some pointed their fingers at ROK Chief of Staff Major General Chae and others at his civilian boss. In the end, Chief Engineer Choi Chang-sik was blamed for the disaster and was executed for it. There was confusion all around. Tanks had broken into the city, and no one knew for sure how much longer the lines would hold. Telephone lines were cut and the engineers at the bridges had no way of knowing how many more troops were still north of the Han River or how close the Inmin-gun tanks were. Some retreating soldiers of the 7th Division and civilians hobbled over the railway ties to cross the river. The southbound train track was intact. Brigadier General Yu, then the commander of the 7th ROK division after the successful Cheju Island campaign, also crossed the river in this manner with some of his soldiers. They positioned themselves on the southern end of the rail bridge. The Inmin-gun tanks and artillery lobbed shells. Yu and his soldiers had only small arms and could not respond in kind. The Inmin-gun did not try to cross the river. On June 28, twelve B-26s flew out of their Japanese base and pounded lines of supply trains and other targets. Enemy ground fire was heavy. One aircraft crashed and two were badly damaged. The F-80 fighter-bombers, which flew out of a separate base in Japan, found the roads jammed with tanks, trucks, and artillery. They strafed the tanks. On the insistence of MacArthur, even the B-29s designed as “strategic bombers” dropped bombs from high altitudes. They were

73. Miss Higgins’ story is captured in Goulden, pp. 80-83.

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9. The ROK Army on the Brink of Disintegration not designed for close combat support and missed their targets more often than not. It was an attempt at intimidation. As this was happening, Maggie Higgins was crossing a mountain path to Suwon. She heard a steady drone. She looked up to see silvery U.S. fighter planes dive on Seoul. She said, “My heart pounded with excitement — this must be part of the ‘momentous event’ mentioned in MacArthur’s message.” The Koreans around her screamed with joy. Women from a nearby village rushed out to grasp her hand and pointed to the sky with ecstasy.74 At about daybreak on June 29, Col. Paik and his stragglers also crossed the Han River. They had walked all night. They were extremely tired and had not eaten for some time. At the Yongdung-po train station south of the Han River, he saw USMAG Lt. Ray May standing on the station platform. Exhausted and hungry, Paik asked May whether he had food. May had none but managed to find sugar from somewhere. Paik and his stragglers made sugar water and shared it among themselves. It had a miraculous effect on them. Paik was able to organize his thoughts and asked May about the current situation. May said, “It is desperate, but the U.S. Army may come to the rescue of South Korea. You ROKs must hold the Han River until the U.S. army arrives.” Although the major thrust was toward Seoul, there were three other simultaneous thrusts: to the central and eastern parts of the peninsula and to the small land-locked Ongjin peninsula to the extreme west. The loss of the Ongjin peninsula was anticipated and no attempt was made to defend it, but the collapse of the central and eastern fronts would endanger the western front and cut off the retreat route from Seoul. But the ROK 6th Division in the central sector made good account of themselves by holding onto the transportation center of Chunchon in the central sector and pounding the enemy column with artillery until shells ran low. Its special commando unit attacked the enemy’s artillery position with grenades and incendiary bottles. The enemy regiment spearheading the attack incurred heavy losses (40 percent casualties) in their repeated attacks, but failed to capture Chunchon on the date planned. One factor favoring the ROKs in the sector was that its commander had not issued leave passes to his soldiers because he detected suspicious enemy maneuvers north of the 38th parallel. Therefore, the entire division was on duty when the invasion started. 74. John Tolland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991), p. 57, Tolland hereafter.

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The Unfinished War The ROK 8th Division on the east coast, however, crumbled early, exposing the 6th Division’s right flank. The ROK 6th Division retreated as instructed to the southern bank of the Han River with minimal loss. They brought the ROK army fighting force to 54,000 men. Nevertheless, the ROK army losses during the first week of the fighting were 44,000 soldiers killed, captured, or missing. This was almost half its total force, and those who remained came out of the first days of the war physically and psychologically battered.75

MACARTHUR IN SUWON Early in the morning on June 29, MacArthur flew from Tokyo to Suwon aboard his private airplane Bataan. The weather was so foul that General George Stratemeyer, the commander of the Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF), almost grounded the plane. Stratemeyer was also concerned with the threat of enemy fighter aircraft and their amazingly effective anti-aircraft guns. In fact, hostile ground fire had riddled twelve of his B-26s near Munsan just south of the 38th parallel. One of them crashed during landing, killing all crew members. On that morning, four fighters escorted the Bataan. A planeload of staff and reporters accompanied the general. The fighter escort saw action. Earlier in the morning, six Yaks had strafed the Suwon airfield (although they failed to disable it). U.S. jet fighters clearing the air for the Bataan shot down two of them. When the American jets left, Yaks returned again. As MacArthur’s party was approaching Suwon, a Yak fighter-bomber was just pulling away after creating craters in the airfield and leaving smoldering wreckage at the end of the runway. Lt. Col. Anthony Story, piloting the Bataan, made an evasive move while one of the Mustang escorts went after the Yak. President Rhee flew into the airfield in a light spotter plane, also dodging North Korean Yak fighter fire. MacArthur had first met Rhee when he was still in the U.S. in exile. They shared similar values as far as Communism was concerned. Ambassador Muccio also flew in on board a separate spotter plane. General Church (who had been Korea only three days) and his subordinates started to brief MacArthur, his chief of staff Major General Edward Almond, Major General Courtney Whitney, and others present, using maps and 75. Goulden, p. 83

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9. The ROK Army on the Brink of Disintegration pointers. General Chae, the chief of staff of the ROK Army, was also present in the room. Harold Noble, a senior embassy staffer in charge of intelligence and the son of Rhee’s first English teacher at Paijai, insisted that Muccio give Chae a chance. Chae hardly spoke English, so he addressed the group through an interpreter. MacArthur asked Chae how he planned to fight the Inmin-gun. Chae replied that he would raise a million-man army. MacArthur was unimpressed. After the briefing, MacArthur, 70 years old then, insisted on going to the front to observe the situation. His advisers were against it, but MacArthur made the trip to the scene of battle — as he had done many times during the Pacific War. His party, excluding by then the entourages of Rhee and Muccio, received another air attack on the way. When his aides were hitting ditches to avoid the air raid, MacArthur sat calmly in the back seat of the car, sucking his pipe and telling his concerned staff, down in a ditch, “Those things aren’t going to hit me.”76 The field visit of this legendary American general provided an immense relief to the desperate ROKs. It was the first indication that America might be seriously considering a dispatch of ground troops to Korea. General Yu wished he had heard such news 24 hours earlier, when his troops had been crossing the river and their morale was so low that some had contemplated suicide rather than being captured alive by the Inmin-gun. The news of possible U.S. ground troop participation would have done wonders for their morale. MacArthur’s party got out of their cars on the southern bank of the Han River, near Yongdung-po. On top of a hill, MacArthur saw the ancient capital of Korea burning red as far as his eyes could see. From there, he conceived a plan. He decided that the ROK army should retreat deep to south. This would lengthen the enemy’s supply line. He would then cut it off at the rear, perhaps near Seoul. Before his return, MacArthur visited his old friend General Kim Chong-kap, commanding one of the divisions attempting to defend the river. Upon his return to Tokyo, MacArthur reported to Washington, “The lightly armed ROKs were designed for keeping law and order and were not prepared to fight against the enemy force armed with tanks and airplanes.” He concluded, as had Church, that the only way to recapture the lost territory was to throw in American ground troops. Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins told 76. Stanley Weinstraub, MacArthur’s War, (New York, London, etc.: Simon & Schuster, 2000) P.52, hereafter Weinstraub.

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The Unfinished War him to send a regimental combat team (roughly 5,000 men) immediately to Busan. MacArthur said that would not be enough. Collins asked how much more he needed. MacArthur replied that two infantry divisions should follow the regimental combat team by restructuring the U.S. occupation army in Japan. He warned that, if necessary action were not taken immediately, America might pay a costly and unnecessary price in terms of human life and prestige worldwide. If the enemy advanced much farther, it would threaten the Republic. MacArthur asked for the immediate approval of President Truman. Collins observed that it was 3:00 a.m. in Washington. MacArthur’s response was, “Wake him up.” At 4:57 a.m., Secretary of Army Frank Pace woke up President Truman with the bad news. Truman authorized MacArthur to use all the forces available to him. Losing the battle was not acceptable to Truman. Ground forces available to MacArthur at the outset of the war included one cavalry division and three infantry divisions under the Eighth U.S. Army in Japan, and the 29th Regimental Combat Team on Okinawa. Their maneuverability and firepower were well below wartime requirements. Some weapons, such as the medium tanks, were not available in the Far East, and ammunition reserves amounted to only a 45-day supply. MacArthur’s Far East Air Force (FEAF) was much better prepared, but it was organized for air defense, not tactical air support. Most FEAF planes were short-range jet interceptors, not meant to fly at low altitudes in support of ground operations. Mustangs in storage in Japan and more in the United States would later prove instrumental in meeting close air support requirements. Naval Forces Far East, MacArthur’s sea arm, controlled only five combat ships and a skeleton amphibious force, although reinforcement was close by from the Seventh Fleet.

TACTICAL ERRORS ALL AROUND The Inmin-gun halted its attack briefly, after capturing Seoul, to celebrate and repair the bridge over the Han River. Festivals were held; and Kim Il Sung gave the Inmin-gun 3rd and 4th Divisions and 10th Tank Regiment, which captured Seoul, the honorary title of the “Seoul Division.” The Inmin-gun then hesitated to make an all out, immediate attack across the Han River, partly because there was a shortage of river-crossing equipment and partly because of the shortage of ammunition and other supplies. In the days that followed,

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9. The ROK Army on the Brink of Disintegration thousands of Seoul citizens were mobilized and forced to repair the bridge and rail crossings. Writing his memoir some 45 years later, General Yu said that in his judgment, as a military tactician, they could have and should have sent tanks over the undamaged track of the rail bridge immediately. The ROK did not have anything with which to repel tanks. General Kim Hong Il was commanding all the ROK forces who were desperately trying to defend the southern bank of the Han River. Kim positioned all available forces along the bank. He had been through challenging assignments in the Chinese Nationalist Army, but this one topped them all. There was much confusion. Soldiers were discouraged, having lost buddies and commanders, and were deserting the army. As this was happening, a group of ROKs tried desperately to hold off Inmin-gun who were landing on the coastal area off Kimpo via fishing boats and rafts. An Inmin-gun reconnaissance team probed the southern bank of the river at several locations, sometimes supported by artillery and tank bombardments from across the river. The ROKs had fought well for several days, engaging the Inmin-gun on a hand-to-hand combat in one encounter. However, the contest was over on July 3, when the Inmin-gun sent the tanks over the rail bridge that they had just repaired. The major airfield at Kimpo and the Yellow Sea port of Inchon fell to enemy hands. General Yu had many years to think about the way the ROK Army fought the Inmin-gun during the first several days of the war. He wrote apologetically that his 7th Division did not make a better account of itself. He had been the commander of the 7th Division only fifteen days when the war broke out. He saw the maneuvering of T-34 tanks on the other side of the 38th parallel, and started to dig defensive trenches in case of invasion. However, before that work could be completed, the war started. And the 2.36-inch bazooka, their principle defense against Russian tanks, had tested successfully against German tanks during World War II but it was not tested against the T-34 — there was no reason to do so against an ally’s tank. In hindsight, the ROKs were badly outmatched in terms of weapons, training, and manpower. The surprise attack further ensured their early defeat. Although a series of miscalculations and intelligence failures in Washington doomed the ROKs even before the war began, the naiveté of Brigadier General Roberts and Ambassador Muccio (if not the game they played) guaranteed the horrendous casualties of the ROKs. Some anti-tank mines if not tanks in the

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The Unfinished War hands of the ROKs would have bought valuable time and saved thousands of lives, but Roberts had declared that Korea was not tank country.

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10. AN UGLY WAR Ambassador Muccio was probably as close to President Syngman Rhee as any American at that time. Muccio described Rhee as having phenomenal stamina for a man of 70, but said that “he had his better spells and less stalwart spells.” He was certainly getting old. His Austrian-born wife, Mary, helped him with his appointments with foreigners and kept in touch with the U.S. embassy. Soon after President Rhee fled Seoul, Muccio left Seoul and drove south in search of him. He found him in a house in Daejon, some 90 miles away. Muccio wanted a promise that the ROK government would remain in existence while tacitly turning the war over to America. As historian Joseph Goulden has pointed out, if the government vanished, so would any U.S. pretense at being in South Korea to defend a democratically elected government.77 The thought of surrender certainly never crossed Rhee’s mind, although Muccio had no way of knowing that. Muccio had one particularly sensitive matter to discuss with Rhee. He asked whether the Cabinet and the National Assembly could stand-down for the time being, so the war could be left to military professionals with minimal interference by politicians. Rhee accepted the U.S. suggestion, which amounted to surrendering his command of the ROK military and ignoring his National Assembly. This “agreement” was called the Daejon Agreement, but it was not approved by the ROK National Assembly.

77. Goulden, pp. 89-90.

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The Unfinished War The ROK was not a U.N. member country, and a means of coordinating with U.S. forces had to be found. The agreement between Rhee and Muccio was not put in writing, but on July 14, 1950, Syngman Rhee simply directed the ROK Army Chief of Staff, General Chung Il Kwon, who by then had replaced Chae, to place himself under the U.N. Command (UNC).78 The ROK Army was neither an integral part of the UNC, nor independent of it. The ROK had little say in the decision-making at the UNC. Subsequent statements made by Rhee indicated that he anticipated that the war would be over soon, once the United States intervened. However, this was not to be, and Rhee erupted into fits of anger when the U.S. all but ignored him. The coordination protocol that evolved included Walker or his chief of staff calling the chief of staff of the ROK Army, upon which the ROK chief of staff would issue orders to his commanders. Later, each U.S. company integrated 100 Korean soldiers, who were known as Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (better known by the acronym “KATUSA”). An American historian wrote that they were green, true, but “brave and willing, and blended into the American outfits in a way that increased the American units’ efficiency and power by a full [one] third.”79 The U.S. 7th Infantry Division had 8,000 Korean recruits within it. In September, 1950, Paik’s ROK 1st Division became part of the U.S. I Corps. Some American writers have described Syngman Rhee as a difficult, obstinate or mercurial person. However, the above action of turning over his command to the U.S. Army suggests that Rhee was an American puppet. For the Communists, he had been a puppet all along. He then tried to ignore the wishes of his National Assembly and proceeded to run the country with an iron grip. Koreans and Americans alike accused him of being a dictator. Ironically, these accusers included Ambassador Muccio, who had led Rhee along this path. It was French statesman Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929) who said, “War is too important a matter to be left to the military.” The U.S. government saw nothing wrong in asking Rhee to abandon democracy and hand over the ROK military to the United Nations Command. “Leave the war to the professionals” had a ring of practicality to it — although America would not think of leaving a real war to military men. The U.S. did not ask the U.K. to transfer its all decision-making to General Eisenhower in

78. Appleman, p. 112. 79. Frazer Hunt, The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur (The Devin-Adair Company: New York, 1954), p. 457.

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10. An Ugly War return for America’s sending its ground troops to England. There was neither a consultative body nor a combined command. Coordination between the UNC and the ROK Army was poor. The supply of weapons and ammunition to the ROK Army was neglected. In July, 1950, MacArthur’s FEC ordered the Eighth U.S. Army (known for its acronym EUSAK) to assume all logistical support of the U.S. and its allied forces in Korea. This included the ROK military, but although the ROKs held half the battle line, they had trouble getting anything approaching a fair share of the ammunition and other war materiel shipped over from Japan. Despite direct orders from General Walker, American quartermasters in the rear hijacked supplies intended for the ROKs. The ROK supplied their troops with foods, uniforms and other such supplies, but Korea had no capacity to supply them with weapons and ammunition. The Communists found it easier to attack and defeat the poorly-equipped ROK Army than they did the American units. However, when the ROK units broke and ran, they exposed the flank of the American units, causing the American units to run — once again proving the old adage that any chain is as strong as its weakest link. After his retreat to Busan, Syngman Rhee lived in a small house and did not have much say in the conduct of the war. Still being president of the ROK, however, he wished to send cables thanking those U.N. member nations that had promised their help in the war and wanted the messages routed through his embassy in Washington, D.C. However, the U.S. Army had taken control of all Korean telegraph and cable facilities, even the commercial cable between Busan and Tokyo. The only way that Rhee could send messages out was through EUSAK. Rhee called Harold Noble of the American embassy, the son of his former teacher at Paijai, and asked him to be so kind as to send the cable to the ROK embassy in Washington. Noble agreed, taking the messages to the 24th Division signal office, where a sergeant informed him that the messages would be dispatched as soon as military traffic had lessened. The next day, Noble returned to verify that the messages had gone out. They had not. The division’s public information officer had refused to send them because some of Rhee’s messages to other chiefs of state criticized the Soviet Union, contrary to command policy and the express orders of the 24th Division.

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The Unfinished War First, Noble argued with the communications officers — to no avail. Then he appealed directly to General William Dean, a long-time acquaintance. General Dean authorized the dispatch of the messages. Ambassador Muccio sympathized with Rhee on the cable incident. He thought the disdain the American military felt toward the ROK was wrong, but he could not change their attitude. Muccio said that the newly-arrived Americans made no attempt to conceal their contempt for the ROKs. Major General Hobart R. Gay, commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, told a press conference that he did not intend to take the ROKs into consideration “at all” in deciding how to deploy his troops. A few days afterward, when a ROK unit saved his right flank from a severe beating, he reconsidered. Gay also forced Korean farmers out of their homes, oblivious to the suffering that his orders caused. He even told the Korean national police to leave his zone of operation — thus undermining his own security. Walker forced Gay to rescind this absurd order.80 In the early days of the war, Kim Il Sung and Moscow had their own worries. They did not anticipate American intervention. The Inmin-gun was losing tanks to American fighter-bombers, and ROK suicide units were destroying tanks as well. He would need more men and tanks. Kim Il Sung drafted not only college students but even high school students to join the war. This decision fell upon the Lee family in a very personal way. Simon was seventeen years old. In the city of Hamhung, in mid-July, 1950, the principal of Simon’s school received a directive from a Party cadre to “volunteer” 50 students from the First High School to the Inmin-gun. Simon and other student leaders were summoned to the principal’s office. The principal, a man in his 50s from a family of landowners, had studied English in Japan. The principal was not a member of the Party but pretended to be a Communist. The person who really controlled the school was the leader of the Youth Cadets of the Worker’s Party. Simon had known the Party would test his loyalty one day, but he had not thought that it would mean going to war before he entered college. At that time, he was waiting eagerly to hear the results of his application to Kum Chuk Engineering University. He wanted to study chemical engineering and become a national hero. 80. Goulden, pp. 144-45.

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10. An Ugly War The next day, the school held a rally. Several speeches followed and a resolution already drafted by the Party was adopted unanimously; everyone in the room knew that the government would not tolerate dissent. Fifty students were selected, and all the students shouted, “Long Live Great Leader Kim Il Sung, Long Live the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” The rally was an unqualified “success.” Simon tried hard to be seen as a good Communist. Only with a good recommendation of the Party could one advance to a university. To the Communists, the ideology of a student is far more important than academic excellence. After all, why should they educate a student who may turn out to be an enemy of the “people”? It was hard to tell who was the real and who was the fake Communist. Fifty years later, in the year 2000, when President Kim Dae Jung visited Pyongyang, there were a half million citizens lined up in the streets shouting, “Great Leader Kim Jung Il!” Many of them were in tears. How many were true to themselves? A few days later, Simon and other “volunteers” boarded a train heading south. It spewed black smoke from the low-quality coal it burned. The train hid from American planes during the day and could travel only at night. There was heavy traffic along the railway. At each station, trains were loaded with either soldiers or military supplies, moving south. There were several tanks and trucks on one train. Simon and his classmates got off near Pyongyang. He received training as a T-34 tank loader, responsible for loading the shells. There were some truck drivers among the trainees who received training as tank drivers. The machine was simple. Drivers and mechanics sometimes could learn to handle it after only a few days of training. Simon was told that the T-34 was very reliable and was still the best medium tank available then. A Russian engineer by the name of Tsiganov had designed it. Its armor protection, mobility, and firepower were excellent. It had a 76mm gun, with a long barrel length with high muzzle velocity. The Christie suspension system was ideal for a hilly country like Korea. The armor was superior to German medium tanks. Yet, the diesel fuel lent a great operational range — between 200 km to 350 km — and had a low risk of explosion. The speed of 51 km per hour and its maneuverability in rough terrain were a boon. The instructor told them there was nothing in the arsenal of South Korea to stop these tanks. The training lasted only a few weeks. They hid the tanks under thatched huts during the day. American fighter planes were already making sorties over

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The Unfinished War North Korea. The supply of ammunition was low, however, and Simon was given only one chance to shoot the gun. He wasn’t even sure he hit the target. However, that was it. They had to save the ammunition for real battle. In the evenings, they were given political and ideological training. One day in early August, the tanks were loaded onto a train under the supervision of Russian officers, and his unit began to move to the front. The train moved only at night, and the days were spent in tunnels, hiding. After a week, the train could no longer move because bridges had been blown up. After this, the tanks made a slow nocturnal march on their own diesel engines, which generated 500 horsepower. Before daybreak, they had to spend time finding places to hide and camouflage the tanks. Along the way, a few of the tanks broke down, and there were no repair parts. Soon, they realized that the dear comrades in Moscow had sent old tanks to North Korea — tanks that had seen their best days during World War II. Simon did not know where he was going. No one gave such information to a lowly private. He knew that they were going in the direction of Weonju and then toward Andong. From there, Daegu was not far away. Simon was not sure how the Inmin-gun was going to defeat the Americans if all their tanks spent the whole day hiding. One fateful evening as they started their advance, there was a baptism by fire from American Mustangs. A tank in front of his caught fire from napalm, blocking the narrow road. Infantry soldiers who were riding the tank banged the turret, asking to open the hatch — but there was no room in the tank for them. Several soldiers caught fire and began to incinerate with agonizing screams. Bombs exploded, and machine gun fire caught some of the tankers who had decided to come out of the tanks rather than being incinerated within them. Simon’s tank could neither advance nor retreat. Some of the tankers got down and headed straight up a tree-covered hill. His gunner decided to get out and asked Simon to follow. Another machine gun burst broke a nearby pine tree limb. They dashed toward the tree-covered mountain. By the time the two made it up the hill, the other tankers could not be found — they had run even faster! Both of them decided they had had enough war. The idea of becoming a war hero disappeared right then and there. There was no tank to return to. Simon saw that the Inmin-gun could not possibly win this war. They had seen too many of their “indestructible tanks” hunkering down in tunnels and hiding under heavy camouflage. They decided to go home. Simon wasn’t able to fire a single shell toward the ROK side. This was a long way from Hamhung.

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10. An Ugly War Among the first things Kim Il Sung introduced within the so-called “liberated areas” of South Korea were the rapid reconstruction of the Workers Party and the introduction of land reform. The Inmin-gun immediately began to resuscitate the South Korea Worker’s Party and the People’s Committees, which had by that time been all but destroyed. Many previously unheard of organizations were created: youth groups, women’s groups, leagues of writers, etc. Artists were urged to produce ideology-oriented publications and performances. At this time, Soon-ku was hiding from the Communists in his aunt’s house. Communists were actively making rounds. They knocked the door of each house in Seoul. On the streets, Youth Group members simply grabbed pedestrians and “volunteered” them to the Inmin-gun. Soon-ku decided to move south, near Suwon, to another relative’s house. He soon learned that even out in the countryside, the Communists were looking for young people suitable for the Inmin-gun or war labor. The Communists were also looking for pro-Japanese, pro-Syngman Rhee, and pro-American elements. These “reactionaries” were tried in “people’s courts” composed of Party members with no particular legal training or expertise except loyalty to Kim Il Sung and the spirit of proletarian revolution. Few of the accused were released. Most either disappeared or were sent to the firing squad. One of most celebrated such trials involved twelve or so priests, nuns and missionaries. One person on trial was an American Catholic bishop, Patrick Byrne. The people’s court demanded that he confess to being an agent of the CIA. Although the fledgling CIA commanded little respect in Washington, D.C., it did in North Korea. Many reactionaries were sentenced to death as “agents” of the CIA. A judge said to Bishop Byrne, “You shall denounce the United States, the United Nations, and the Vatican on the radio, or you must die.” His surprising reply came without hesitation: “There remains only one course for me — that I die.” A few days later, the bishop and others were sent to a North Korean camp; four months later, die he did.81 Soon-ku was still a ROK officer, and the prospect of being caught and executed by the Party grew increasingly real. He decided that the time had arrived for him to move south and join his unit. He traveled by night and slept in 81. Father Philips Cosbie, Penciling Prisoners (Melbourne: Hawthorn, 1954), pp. 67-81.

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The Unfinished War the hills during the day, slipping across battle lines and finally making it to the ROK Army Headquarters located in Daegu. By this time, some two months had passed since the war started. The reception he got at the ROK Army Headquarters was chilling. He had already been listed as dead or missing in action. There were numerous cases like him at that time, i.e., “failure to report to the unit.” The interrogations dragged on for several days. They demanded to know what had taken Soon-ku so long to reappear: Was he a deserter? Or (even worse), was he a Communist agent now attempting to re-infiltrate the ROK army? They eventually concluded that Soonku was neither, but did note in his file his failure to report to his unit promptly. For one month, he was not allowed to wear his captain’s insignia, and when his classmates from the Academy moved up to the rank of major, he remained a captain. Meanwhile, his aunt’s family in Seoul was facing another kind of problem. There was a shortage of rice among the Inmin-gun. The bombardment was becoming increasingly effective, and supplies were not reaching the occupied area. So the Inmin-gun began to “borrow” rice and other supplies from the civilians. Though they promised to return the rice in a matter of days, several days later the Inmin-gun came to “borrow” even more. As the food situation worsened, all of those whose work did not require them to stay in Seoul were assigned by the People’s Committee to work in the mines and farms in the countryside. Those who received such assignments were ordered to leave their belongings behind for delivery later and were told to leave the city without delay. At that time, my second half-brother Hong-ku was still in Seosan, attending Hong Sung Middle School (a six-year secondary school). He had entered the school late, and he still had one more year to go before graduation. What concerned everyone in Seosan was the land reform system being introduced by the Communists. South Korea had had land reform before the arrival of the Inmin-gun.82 However, its version of land reform model was based on compensation to the landlords to be paid over time by the landless and tenant farmers who received the redistributed land.83 But this time, the Communists sought to impose the North Korean model, in which landowners received no compensation and the landless paid no money for the land. This practice sharply

82. See, for example, Park (1988), pp. 210-212.

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10. An Ugly War split farming communities. All of sudden, some of Hong-ku’s neighbors, mostly tenant farmers, declared themselves to be Communists. It was the endless meetings that bothered Hong-ku most. Day and night, the Communists taught him North Korean songs praising Kim Il Sung and provided political education. He was a practicing Catholic, and Communism did not appeal to him. Some of his fellow middle school students joined left-wing youth organizations and began to finger other students as “reactionaries” and “pro-Japanese lackeys” and to beat them up. Hong-ku was threatened. What was once a quiet rural town had turned into a battleground between the leftand right-wing groups. One day, the so-called “Democratic Youth Organization” ordered all the young men of Samsung-ri Township to gather in front of the Seosan County Office. They were trying to “volunteer” young people to join the Inmin-gun. All of them, including Hong-ku, were lined up and marched to an unrecognized location. Hong-ku thought fast, and told the leader that he had already volunteered to join the Inmin-gun through his middle school in Hong Sung, and in fact, had been on his way to take the school’s medical examination. Hong Sung being in another county, the youth leader had no way to check the accuracy of Hong-ku’s story, and released him. Hong-ku immediately went into hiding, and later went to Daegu and sought out his elder brother, Soon-ku. Soon-ku advised him to enter a ROK training program for artillery officers; its entrance examination was being held soon. That is how, several months later, Hong-ku ended up becoming an ROK officer. Communism was not as popular in South Korea as Kim Il Sung had hoped. When the war started, he did not get the kind of support he expected — partly because of the orthodox Confucian orientation of Koreans and because the South Korean government’s anti-Communism campaign worked, to some extent. Communism did not have indigenous roots in Korea. There were desertions from, and division within, the South Korean Worker’s Party. Kim Il Sung’s radio appeals to South Korean laborers to stage a 83. The government fixed the value of land at 150 percent of the value of average annual crop production. South Korean landlords received this compensation over a fiveyear period. Because of rapid inflation that followed, the actual payment received by the landlord on an inflation-adjusted basis was a fraction of the face value determined by the 150 percent of annual crop production.

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The Unfinished War general strike went unheeded, and his appeals to farmers, small entrepreneurs, merchants, artists, and intellectuals to join in a battle for the Fatherland fared no better. As he complained later to his Deputy Premier Park Hun Yong, who was in charge of organizing popular uprisings in South Korea, there were no uprisings — except by several known guerillas in South Korea.84 Reports of purges, mass killings, hard labor, and other atrocities committed by the Communists85 after their arrival in South Korea did nothing to endear Communism to South Koreans. Thousands of family members of ROK soldiers and policemen and reactionaries were executed. The number of “volunteers” dwindled after several rounds of recruitment, forced labor became increasingly common. The Communists entered the house, checked the amount of food available, designated some portion of it “excessive” and confiscated it The price of rice went up five-fold between June 25th and mid-July, 1950. Starvation was common. The price of used clothes dropped sharply because people sold clothes to buy food. The price of edible oils skyrocketed — because grass soaked in oil before eating was said to lose its toxicity.

84. Seo, pp. 743-744. 85. Ibid, pp. 562-564.

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11. THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS When President Truman authorized the use of ground troops at General MacArthur’s disposal, the Eighth U.S. Army was in Japan (EUSAK); it had been the principal occupation force of Japan. Lt. General Walton Harris Walker had commanded the Army since 1948. During World War II, he had been a tank commander under Gen. George Patton. This Texan with a stocky build and a lined face looked like an unfriendly bulldog. To his men and to war correspondents, he was just that. He suffered poor press coverage. His first mission, requested by MacArthur, was to deploy a regimental combat team quickly to Korea. The Army Chief of Staff thought that a regimental combat team should be able to slow the advance of the Inmin-gun until more U.S. troops could be fielded. Walker chose a regiment out of the 24th Division, stationed on the Kyushu Island of Japan. Like most U.S. divisions stationed in Japan, it was not combat-ready and was officially and optimistically rated at 65 percent of combat capacity. Walker stripped another two divisions to reinforce it. The budget-cutting in Washington had taken its toll on Walker’s units. The commander of the 24th Division was Maj. General William F. Dean. He had a reputation as a “can do” general and was the only division commander in the Eighth Army who had experience in leading troops in combat. He earned a Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) for personally leading a platoon through a withering German artillery barrage. His only blemish, in the eyes of some, was that he entered the Army career via the ROTC.

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The Unfinished War Walker’s order to Dean on the night of June 30 was to transfer one infantry regiment and his headquarters to Busan immediately, by air. Dean chose the 21st Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Stephans. However, even this modest airlift was not possible because there were simply not enough airplanes to transport the entire regiment.86 Most of them were tied up in evacuating U.S. personnel. The airlift was therefore scaled down to a single “combat team” of about 450 men. This was how Major Brad Smith’s 1st Battalion, now called “Task Force Smith,” ended up being airlifted alone to Korea. Neither Major Smith nor his men knew that they were about to undertake one of the most perilous missions of the Korean War. Smith’s rifle companies were under-strength and poorly equipped.87 After five years of peace, only about 75 of the 440 men had faced an enemy on the battlefield. Dean tried to get to Korea by air, but twice the plane had to turn back — once because of bad weather in Busan and another time because the Daejon airport couldn’t be found in the darkness. Other battalions had problems finding ships to take them to Korea. The 34th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Loveless, managed to find a ship on the night of July 1 and arrived at Busan the following evening. When Smith’s unit arrived in Korea, thousands of Koreans lined the streets, waving American flags, banners, and posters. At the railway station, there was even a band. Obviously, the arrival of the first contingent of American combat troops had been anticipated and well publicized. The Smith battalion made it to Daejon on July 3 and found General Church, the most senior American officer in Korea at that time, fuming over the rout of the ROK Army. One day earlier, General Church had said that he would “trade the entire ROK Army for 100 New York policemen” and that “the presence of a few Caucasian soldiers would reverse the combat disasters” of the past several days. When Smith reported to General Church, the general was brimming with confidence. He put his finger on a map at Osan, a village south of Suwon, and

86. Due to budget cuts, FEAF had only about two dozen C-54s in Japan, employed mostly in transporting emergency ammunition to South Korea and evacuating civilian personnel. 87. A 75-mm recoilless rifle platoon with four guns (of which only two made it to Korea) and four 4.2-inch mortars, two infantry companies with six other recoilless rifles (bazookas) and four 60-mm mortars.

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11. The First Hundred Days told Smith that all that was required to stop the enemy were some American GIs who would not run at the first sight of enemy tanks. A tired and frustrated General Dean arrived at Daejon sometime later and took command of all American forces in South Korea. Dean, too, assured the Task Force that the mission would be “short and easy.” He was certain that the Inmin-gun would run at the first of American uniforms. On this point, the two generals appeared to agree. They were neither the first nor the last American generals to underestimate the Inmin-gun, but this was just the kind of ignorance or arrogance that had led to the war in the first place. Dean then came up with a new and far more complex blocking plan than what Church had suggested. Standing in front of a map of Korea, he put his finger on the village of Pyongtaek, just south of Osan on the Seoul-Busan highway. By this time, two other battalions of the 34th Regiment had arrived. Dean decided to field a battalion commanded by Jay Loveless at Pyongtaek and another at Ansong, a village about eleven miles directly east of Pyongtaek. Loveless suggested that they would be “much more effective” if they fought as a unit rather than splitting the regiment into three parts. Dean dismissed this suggestion as a “negative attitude” and ordered Loveless to follow his plan without offering unwanted advice. Historian Clair Blair would later call Dean’s plan of scattering ill-equipped, under-strength battalions in this manner — especially considering the poor communications between the units, “foolhardy.” Concentrating all available forces at a more defensible site such as the Kum River, about 30 miles farther south, might have been more effective.88 However, to Dean, who suggested that the Inmin-gun would run at the sight of American uniforms, Loveless’ suggestion apparently appeared unnecessarily cautious. At this time, the ROK 17th Regiment (still commanded by Paik In Yup) was near Pyongtaek. After retreating from the Ongjin Peninsula, it fought well against the Inmin-gun 15th Division. For bravery, every soldier of the 17th Regiment was awarded a one-rank promotion. In addition, the ROK Army issued new uniforms and new equipment. The grateful soldiers had their hair buzz-cut and swore to fight the enemy to the last man if necessary, even as guerillas, if the Republic of Korea fell. Ironically, this unit would soon suffer heavy casualties at the hands of the Royal Australian Air Force near Pyongtaek. Distinguishing the ROKs from the Inmin-gun was particularly difficult near 88. See Blair, p. 97.

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The Unfinished War battle lines. The Far East Air Force (FEAF) had a similar problem.89 Making matters worse, Australian fighter-bombers mistook the Kum River for the Han River and shot at everything north of the river. The Air Force blew up a train of nine boxcars full of badly needed ammunition for the ROK Army. The explosion lit up the sky of Pyongtaek for an entire night. Meanwhile, in Pyongtaek, Dean had not made any attempt to include the 17th Regiment in the defense of Osan. He was not the only general to consider the ROKs unworthy soldiers. Syngman Rhee proposed to General Walker that he integrate ROK units into U.S. troops, but Walker did not take up this suggestion. Walker decided to keep the ROK units on the eastern front and the U.S. soldiers on the western front. Major Smith and his men stood and fought well, but they were badly outmatched and outnumbered.90 An effective air support at this critical juncture could have made a difference, but the bad weather prevented the support that Task Force Smith had been counting on. Perry’s six 105-mm howitzers, positioned one mile south of Smith’s position, opened fire when a column of enemy tanks was about a mile in front of Smith’s position. High-explosive shells hit the tanks but did not damage them. The tanks did not even slow down. Tank-busting HEAT shells were found to be effective, but Task Force Smith had only six of them. In all, American infantry and artillerymen knocked out four of the 33 enemy tanks. The remaining 29 tanks hardly seemed to notice the attack and continued south along the highway to Osan. The Inmin-gun did not turn tail at the first sight of American uniforms. One American soldier later wrote: “Instead of a motley horde armed with old muskets, the enemy infantry were well trained, determined soldiers and many of their weapons were at least as modern as ours. Instead of charging wildly into battle, they employed a base of fire, double envelopment, fire blocks on withdrawal routes, and skilled infiltration.” When Major Smith eventually gave an order to withdraw, the untrained American soldiers who thus far had fought bravely did not know how to retreat properly. They broke discipline and “bugged out” for the rear, throwing away not only their heavy Browning automatic rifles and machine guns, but also ammunition, M-1 rifles, carbines, helmets, boots, and even shirts as they plunged 89. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force In Korea 1950-1953 (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1983), p. 86, hereafter Futrell. 90. See Blair, Appleman, and Goulden for more detailed accounts of Task Force Smith.

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11. The First Hundred Days wildly toward muddy rice paddies while being chased by enemy soldiers firing sub-machine guns. Under the circumstances, Smith had no alternative but to leave behind his dead and about 30 severely wounded men on litters, who were tended by a brave corpsman who refused to flee. In all, Smith and Perry lost about 185 men killed, wounded, captured, or missing. Although better equipped than the ROKs, the U.S. troops suffered from the same inadequacies that afflicted the ROKs: insufficient troop training, and under-estimation of enemy strength from Washington to Tokyo. The utter arrogance and ignorance of Church and Dean did not help. Dean later reflected that his troops were more accustomed to “the lifestyle of houseboys” and “cheap lays in Japan” than soldiering. The desperate mission of Major Smith was to halt or delay the Inmin-gun advance long enough for MacArthur to move additional soldiers. The task force failed to do that, although it fought bravely until the time of retreat. News of the defeat had a demoralizing effect on the rank and file of the U.S. th 24 Division and on the ROKs. Doubt was raised about the effectiveness of their weapons. Confidence in the quality of their military intelligence was shaken, and the reliability and wisdom of their leaders’ tactics were questioned. However, the Americans were learning valuable lesson. In ensuing battles, other units of the U.S. 24th Division did no better than Task Force Smith. On July 8, Dean climbed a hill overlooking Cheonan city and saw one of his regiments flee without even making contact with the enemy. Dean vented his anger and frustration on the commander of the regiment. In a calmer moment on the same day, he wrote a letter to MacArthur, indicating that the training and quality of equipment of the North Korean Army had been underestimated. Its armored force, in particular, was formidable. Dean’s men could not stop the T-34 tanks with 2.36 bazookas or ordinary high-explosive 105-mm artillery shells. He urgently needed new 3.5-inch bazookas, HEAT shells, 90-mm antitank guns, and tanks. The only force that could destroy the Inmin-gun tanks without too much difficulty was U.S. warplanes. When weather conditions permitted, they scored big. A flight of F-80 jets at Pyongtaek found enemy tanks and trucks lined bumper-to-bumper on the highway. They called in all available B-26s and F-82s. Together, they scored one of most decisive triumphs by the Air Force. The combined air power that afternoon destroyed an estimated 38 tanks, 7 halftracks, and 117 trucks and claimed to have killed a large number of enemy

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The Unfinished War soldiers.91 The warplanes made enemy transportation of food and materiel increasingly difficult. Such successes were, however, limited because air operations during this monsoon season were dictated by the weather, and the enemy simply started moving at night. Most aircraft could not fly at night. The F-82s could, but the FEAF did not have many of them and kept them mainly in Japan for the purpose of interception, for which they were designed. As for the F-80s, the workhorse of the air war, they flew out of Japan and with the limited size of their fuel tanks, they could fly only fifteen minutes over target areas. Even with modified fuel tanks, to which some F-80s switched, they could fly no more than 45 minutes over target areas. The bigger fuel tank also made the F-80s somewhat sluggish. Destroying the sturdy T-34 presented another challenge, as well. The only effective weapon was the 5-inch high-velocity aircraft rocket (HVAR). Although the Fifth Air Force was in top shape during peacetime, compared with the 8th Army, the pilots got little practice with HVAR during peacetime. Yet, the U.S. Air Force represented a severe test for the enemy. The F-51 Mustangs would prove quite effective, especially with their capability with napalm. Mustangs could burn the T-34s and terrorize the Inmin-gun soldiers — who were not afraid of the normal arsenals of fighter-bombers. Mustangs would also use the Daegu K-2 and Pohang K-3 airports, thus providing longer hours of operation. The Air Force was one bright branch of the military in an otherwise humiliating fight against the Inmin-gun. On the ground, Walker and Dean agreed that the city of Daejon must be defended. In 1950, Daejon was a city of 130,000 people and one of six major population centers of South Korea. The railroad and highway branched out from Daejon to the southwestern part of Korea, the Cholla provinces. If Daejon fell, these two grain-rich provinces would be written off, too. Daegu is only some 100 miles south along the Seoul-Busan highway. Another 100 miles or so south is the major port city of Busan. Between July 14 and 18, MacArthur rushed the 25th and 1st Cavalry Divisions to Korea. By then, the battle for Daejon had already started. The natural barrier protecting Daejon was the Kum River, where a modest number of American troops of the 24th Division were deployed. New 3.5-inch rocket launchers, hurriedly airlifted from the U.S., hit two of the T-34 tanks and penetrated their armor. MacArthur ordered maximum air support for the 91. Futrell, p. 91.

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11. The First Hundred Days ground troops. Yet, the U.N. forces could not stop the Inmin-gun advance on the bank of the Kum River. It was too little, too late. The mountainous area to the east of Dean’s 24th Division was the responsibility of the ROK Army. The geography favored the defenders, but all that the ROKs could do was to inflict as many casualties as possible on the enemy as they retreated. As time passed, the ROK units were gaining experience, and many stragglers who failed to cross the Han River on June 28 did get across soon after, and rejoined their respective units. As a result, the ROK Army was slowly regaining its strength. A few episodes provide a good testimony to that fact. In one battle in the sector, Brig. General Kim Suk-won of the Capital Division, another former officer in the Japanese Army, stood in the middle of the city street with the Japanese long sword Nippon-do to discourage his soldiers from retreating. Indeed, his soldiers respected him and were loyal to him. In one battle, his 17th Regiment mounted a counter-offensive against the Inmin-gun and captured a strategic hill where an Inmin-gun machine gunner was chained to a tree so that he could not run away. Such inhumane treatment of a soldier was perhaps unprecedented in the history of human warfare. After a battle lasting about six hours, the 17th Regiment recaptured a strategic hill while killing hundreds of Inmin-gun and capturing others. Kim Suk-won did not change the tide of the war, but he protected the flank of the Daejon sector where Americans were trying to defend the city. Other similar successes have been recorded elsewhere in the sector. An Inmin-gun report later obtained from a POW mentioned that the increasing effectiveness of the ROKs held up its progress. The North Korean Supreme Command relieved and then probably shot three divisional commanders in charge of the central and eastern sectors for failure to push the advance as swiftly as planned. On July 15, the ROK created the II Corps and appointed General Yu as the Corps commander. He was 28 years old, and such a huge responsibility on a man so young is indicative of the desperate situation. General Yu’s first responsibility was to hold the Moongyong-Hamchang sector for at least five days. Otherwise, the entire American sector would be at risk. During this desperate time, one particular battle made a deep impression on him. On July 21, the enemy broke through his defensive lines behind T-34 tanks. Americans rushed 800 M-6 antitank mines to this front — but neither the ROK

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The Unfinished War soldiers nor American military advisers had seen this particular model of antitank mine before. There was not even time for the U.S. advisors to read the instructions and teach the ROK soldiers how to use them. Therefore, to stop oncoming tanks, ROK special operations units simply strapped prepared charges around soldiers’ waists and the “anointed ones” moved to the side of a tank, pulled the fuse lighter on a two-second fuse, and blew themselves up, thus disabling the tank. The 6th Division stopped four enemy tanks that way; the same special ops had destroyed eleven enemy tanks in this manner in earlier battles. General Yu did not order such operations, but he did not stop them, either. With the FEAF air support and fighting men on the ground (including the special ops), the II Corps held onto its sector until July 31, six days beyond the orders from the ROK Army Headquarters. On that day, General Yu received orders to retreat below the Nakdong River. By then, the ROK 6th Division had lost one third of its soldiers in battle. The ROKs on the east coat were less successful in holding the lines. In that sector, North Korean units moved unopposed through some of the roughest country in Korea. Luckily for the ROK and U.N. side, one main Inmin-gun force moved so cautiously that it lost a golden opportunity to outflank the entire ROK and the American lines across the peninsula. A U.S. Army war historian called this delay “one of the enemy’s major tactical mistakes.” All across Korea, from the Yellow Sea to the East Sea, the defensive lines retreated south. Often, the U.S. side disbelieved the ROK reports of enemy kills, but one American historian recorded: On August 1 GHQ [in Tokyo] and the Pentagon estimated NKPA [North Korean People’s Army or Inmin-gun] losses at 31,000 and 37,500, respectively. Later the Army discovered (also to its amazement) that the true figure was closer to 58,000. One reason for the gross underestimate was the tendency in the Eighth Army to disbelieve or discount ROK estimates of casualties inflicted on the NKPA. Because of these heavy losses, by early August the ten combat divisions of the NKPA had been reduced to a total strength of but 70,000 men. The vaunted NKPA armored force had diminished from 150 to 40-odd T-34 tanks. Owing to complete, uncontested American air and sea supremacy and the NKPA’s ever-lengthening and complex lines of communications, it could only barely supply its dwindling forces.92

92. Goulden, p. 136.

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11. The First Hundred Days The ROK side suffered as many casualties as the Inmin-gun. As Inmin-gun casualties mounted, it simply recruited increasingly younger and older persons both in North Korea and the occupied areas of South Korea to make up for the losses. The ROKs did the same. Even before the Task Force Smith saw action, MacArthur knew that he needed more troops. He wired the JCS for one Marine regimental combat team (RCT) and 700 aircraft. No longer was he under the illusion that a couple of American infantry divisions could turn around the war. On July 3, the JCS approved the dispatch of the Marine regiment and half of the warplanes requested. Soon, MacArthur again implored the JCS for the 2nd Infantry Division, the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, and a regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division for operations he planned between July 20 and August 10. Then, on July 9, he asked for additional divisions. There were only six divisions outside Japan, and now MacArthur was requesting all but two of them. What Washington initially believed to be a “sour little war” was now threatening to suck up all the military assets of the U.S. At least one of the chiefs, General Collins of the U.S. Army, wished he had spoken out more strongly against intervention. General Collins and General Vandenberg (Air Force Chief of Staff) flew to Japan to assess the situation. MacArthur said that his success or failure would depend on how fast and how much reinforcement Washington sent. For Bradley, who was more concerned with the defense of Europe, MacArthur’s view was troubling. However, from MacArthur’s point of view, Bradley’s reluctance and foot-dragging endangered the lives of some American soldiers already in Korea. MacArthur said that he was well aware of the Administration’s concern for Western Europe and elsewhere. However, he was emphatic that success in stopping the Communists here would slow them down elsewhere. Truman used similar reasoning to send American troops to Korea, but the JCS, headed by Bradley, did not share the view. The decision that emerged was to resume the draft and build up the military. On July 20, Defense Secretary Johnson ordered the mobilization of four National Guard divisions and two regimental combat teams. At the onset of the war, Truman’s decision to intervene was wildly popular. According to a Gallup Poll conducted immediately after the invasion, 78 percent of the public supported the intervention. On July 19, Truman sent a request to Congress for a staggering sum of money: an emergency $10 billion defense

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The Unfinished War appropriation. At that time, the entire fiscal 1951 budget was only $14 billion. He wanted removal of the statutory limit of 2,005,882 on military manpower. He also wanted authority to increase military and economic aid to allies, and to raise taxes to finance defense spending, and to give the government tacit control over strategic industries. Democrats and Republicans alike applauded this request and upped the ante to $11 billion. The Pentagon was authorized to raise a force of 3.2 million men and women. Freshman Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas made a stirring floor speech. Korea would go down in history “as a slaughterhouse for democracy or as a graveyard for aggression.” Another congressman proposed permitting MacArthur “to use the atomic bomb at his discretion.” In the end, Truman received power to impose rationing and credit restrictions, direct allocations of strategic materials, and control prices and wages.93 As Truman was to find out later, obtaining the initial support was far easier than maintaining it when the nation’s youth were being drafted and dying by the thousands. In Korea, when the defense of the Kum River north of Daejon fell apart, the battle around Daejon was fought in the streets. There was such confusion that on July 19, General Dean had no idea where his battle lines were. Daejon fell and Dean was captured. Blair provides a good summary of the military casualties of each side at this point in the war:94 By August 1, the American ground forces had incurred a total of 6,003 casualties. “This carnage was nearly three times that incurred in World War II on D-day at bloody Omaha Beach (2,000)[.]” While such numbers of casualties were terrible, “ROK casualties stood at an appalling 70,000.” In short, for every one U.S. military casualty, there were nearly 12 South Korean military casualties. However, American reinforcements (the Army’s 5th RCT, the Marine RCT, and the 2nd Infantry Division) were beginning to arrive at Busan. In spite of the doom and gloom projected by the British press, a brigade of British soldiers was also on the move from Hong Kong. Almost as important as the number of troops moving into South Korea was the arrival of heavy equipment: the first tanks, self-propelled guns, heavy mortars that could actually knock out the North Korean tanks, and radio equipment that actually worked.

93. Goulden, p. 136. 94. Blair, p. 172.

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11. The First Hundred Days General Walker decided to retreat to a more defensible line: on the other side of the Nakdong River. This was a rectangular area roughly 50 miles in width and 100 miles in depth. It was known to the outside world as the Busan Perimeter; it contained Daegu, the third largest city of South Korea, at the northern end and Busan at the southern end. Daegu was where Walker’s Eighth U.S. Army Headquarters was located. The first regiment of the 25th Infantry Division arrived at Busan on July 12 and entered the battle on July 20. Major General William Kean, a West Pointer who was once the chief of staff of Bradley’s 1st Army in Europe, commanded the division. He had not distinguished himself as a student and had not commanded a unit in combat action. His 24th Regiment was an all-black unit commanded by several white officers. Although Truman had ordered the integration of the Army in 1948, the Army had, until then, remained segregated. The 1st Cavalry commanded by Maj. General Robert R. Gay also arrived. Gay was once the chief of staff under General Patton. Walker was disappointed with the initial actions of these divisions. They seemed to retreat in panic when the circumstances did not justify such actions. The 5th Cavalry Regiment faced a special kind of problem. Its forward position was defended by land mines, but the Inmin-gun rounded up several hundred Korean refugees and forced them to go through the minefield, exploding the mines. The wartime atrocities had reached another unprecedented level. On August 7, General Ridgway made an uncommon observation during his visit to Daegu. With him were W. Averell Harriman, Lauris Norstad, and their aides. They met with Walker and EUSAK staff and inspected some frontline units. All three were dismayed by what they found. Later, in a damning report Ridgway wrote, in effect, that Walker’s leadership of EUSAK was abysmal. Walker could not even name the “key commanders” in the ROK Army.95 The Eighth Army as a whole, Ridgway went on, suffered from “a lack of knowledge of infantry fundamentals[,] a lack of leadership in combat echelons, [and] the absence of an aggressive fighting spirit.” The ROK forces, Ridgway concluded, “are doing better than the U.S. forces. They are imbued with the only offensive spirit observed in Korea.”96

95. Blair, p. 185. 96. Ibid, p. 186.

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The Unfinished War Flying back to Tokyo that night, Matt Ridgway believed that Walker should be relieved of command, but Ridgway refrained from discussing the matter with MacArthur. There was a danger that the general might misinterpret his motives and denounce him as a Truman lackey interfering with his operations or as a throat-cutter trying to create a job for himself. The whole world watched a war in an obscure country that they hardly knew existed. The only true super power was reeling from the punches thrown by North Korea. Newspapers all over the world showed maps of the battlefront, moving south, deeper day by day. As narrated by Goulden, an English newspaper, The Statesman, said, “The United States should recognize a lost cause and stop pouring men into this Asian sinkhole.” It urged the British government to cancel the plan to send a brigade of 1,800 men to Korea. The Soviets were utterly delighted that its surrogate was beating the mighty U.S. army that they might have to face one day.

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11. The First Hundred Days

Walker recognized the vital necessity of holding the Busan Perimeter, but he was overly fearful of his units being outflanked. The North Koreans knew this weakness. They also knew that the Americans would not fight if their supply line was cut off even for a moment. The threat of encirclement would create panic within the U.N. units. The Inmin-gun could fight by living off the land, but U.S. soldiers required not only their stateside foods, but also water purified in Japan! Walker apparently wanted authority to move his EUSAK Headquarters from Daegu to Busan. He feared the loss of his communications equipment, which was practically irreplaceable if destroyed or captured. He felt that the enemy was so close to Daegu that the equipment was endangered. This brought MacArthur and Almond flying out of Tokyo. MacArthur simply said to Walker that EUSAK must cease its withdrawals and stand its ground. There would be “no Korean Dunkirk.” Walker got the message. Regardless of how many men perished and under what circumstances, EUSAK must “stand or die.” Two days later, he spoke to General Kean and the 25th Division staff and said, “There will be no more retreating, withdrawal, or readjustment of the lines or any other term you choose. There is no line behind us to which we can retreat. There will be no Dunkirk, there will be no Bataan; a retreat to Pusan would be one of the greatest butcheries in history[.] We must fight until the end.”97 One field officer who heard this directive said his men understood the order as meaning, “Stay and die where you are.” However, another regimental commander said he and his men received the order with a “great sense of relief.”98 Later, Walker told his division commanders: “If the enemy gets into Taegu, you will find me resisting him in the streets, and I’ll have some of my trusted people with me and you had better be prepared to do the same. Now get back to your division and fight it!” Walker told another laggard general that he did not want to see him back from the front again unless it was in a coffin. Amid what was a discouraging performance of the U.S. troops, the 1st Marine Brigade was the first American combat unit to score victory. As the Inmin-gun was soon to find out, even inexperienced Marines were different from the U.S. infantry. They were a formidable combat unit of 6,534 men, not only 97. Appleman, p. 206. 98. Goulden, p. 174.

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The Unfinished War with superior training and physical fitness but also with organization and equipment, complete with new 3.5-inch bazookas, medium 105-mm howitzers, the M-26 Pershing (with a 90-mm gun), and supporting fighter planes consisted of three squadrons of F-4U Corsair prop planes and one squadron of four twoman Sikorsky helicopters, the first American helicopters to be sent to a war zone.99 Most of all, the Marines had kept in training and had the spirit of the Marines, “esprit de Corps.” They could out walk any soldier and out last any fanatical soldier in hand-to-hand combat. The Marines’ first mission was to defend the western portion of the Busan Perimeter around Chinju and Masan, cities just west of Busan. Facing this brigade was the Inmin-gun 6th Infantry Division, which earlier played an important role in the capture of Seoul and then rushed down the west coast, suffering relatively minor casualties. They remained 8,000 men strong after suffering only 400 killed or wounded. On July 28, the commander, Maj. General Wae Pang, confidently told his troops that the enemy was demoralized and that they should simply annihilate the remnants of the enemy. The “liberation of Chinju and Masan,” he said, would cut the enemy’s windpipe. However, the Marines brought the North Koreans to an abrupt halt while inflicting heavy losses to the Inmin-gun 6th Infantry Division. The victory was known as the Kosong Turkey Shoot. Before the Marines were able to celebrate their victory, however, they were ordered to move south to a new position. Enemy troops had broken through the Nakdong River and the Marines were needed to counterattack. The responsibility for the counterattack fell on the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Marine Regiment. The fight for the No Name Ridge was reported in The New York Times, warming the hearts of the Americans back home who had heard few stories of success.100 It was a fierce battle. One of the platoons leading a charge up the No Name Ridge was led by Second Lieutenant Michael J. Shinka. He had only fifteen soldiers left at the end, but refused to withdraw. When the smoke cleared, it was the Inmin-gun who had lost. When Paik’s tattered division (now down to less than 3,000 men after successive battles) arrived at Sangju on July 26, several surprises awaited him. The 20th Regiment and some young men were waiting to join the remnants of the 1st Division. This brought the total force to more than 7,000 men. In addition, 99. Blair, p. 193. 100. James Bell, in The New York Times (August 28, 1950).

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11. The First Hundred Days an artillery battalion, with new model M2 105-mm artillery, joined his division. Many of Paik’s soldiers, who had no rifles (this was the situation before as well as during the war), were issued M1s or carbines. Apparently, U.S. war equipment and supplies were now being rushed to the ROKs. FEAF air support also became more effective. Their morale soared. Paik received the first of four stars that he would eventually receive, but this was a bitter promotion for Paik. By this time, the 1st Division had retreated some 300 km since leaving the Han River. During this month-long retreat, he lost many soldiers, but those who survived had become battle-hardened, with iron legs. Some stragglers who had been lost above the Han River returned to their units. The 1st Division engaged enemies in three major battles and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. However, it lost several regimental and battalion commanders, as well as over half of its troops. By August 1, the ROK 1st Division had taken up a defensive position along the Nakdong River north of Daegu. Paik’s 7,000 men were spread thinly over a 41-km defense perimeter. The Inmin-gun, which was following close on their heels, decided to attack and break into the Perimeter. They had three times more men and ten times the firepower of the 1st Division. Paik’s men did not know the number of enemy soldiers confronting them. The enemy tried to ford the river at its shallower spots. Machine guns shot down most of them. The river and the sandy beaches were stained red with their blood. Yet, they kept on coming, and some even broke through the lines and appeared behind the 1st Division. At the front of these suicide squads were South Korean conscripts. The Inmin-gun called this human shield “volunteers.” Luckily, the morale of the 1st Division was high. They had just received a supply of new anti-tank weapons, 3.5-inch bazookas, and 57-mm recoilless guns. After brief training, each regiment was issued two to three bazookas. They organized special ops to counterattack. Their mission was to cross the river and destroy enemy tanks. With their help, the 12th Regiment destroyed the first four enemy tanks and captured another. All together, ten tanks were destroyed. Finally, the 1st Division recovered from tank-phobia and the soldiers began volunteering to join the special force to hunt down enemy tanks. The hardest battles, however, were still ahead of them. Paik got Walker’s message: “Stand or die.” There was no place to retreat to. Paik decided to make the final stand at Dabudong, which was only 25 km north of Daegu. The topography favored the defenders. If the ROK 1st Division failed to hold the line, Daegu (with Walker’s EUSAK Headquarters) would fall. The enemy was

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The Unfinished War making an all-out attack to push the U.N. forces and the ROK out of the peninsula by August 15. This was the anniversary date of the liberation of Korea from Japan. Kim Il Sung set this date as the victory day for the Communists. Battles intensified as August 15 approached. The 1st Division lost ground during the night but usually reclaimed it during the day. U.S. air support became more frequent and better coordinated with the ground operations. Usually, within 30 minutes of request, fighter planes appeared over the battlefield and provided two hours of support. Even with such support, however, the 1st Division was losing some ground each day. The attack from the elite Inmin-gun 3rd Division was sharp and brutal. August 14 turned out to be the peak of the battle. All the fronts entered hand-to-hand combat. It was too close to use rifles. Instead, they hurled grenades. Dead soldiers from both sides piled up so high that they were used as human shields. On August 15, Paik decided that the 1st Division could not hold the line much longer and requested troop reinforcements from EUSAK and the ROK II Corps under General Yu. Paik received replies quickly, indicating that the EUSAK and ROK II Corps were each sending a regiment. He was ordered to hold the lines until the reinforcements arrived. On August 16, Paik received word that the U.S. FEAF would carpet bomb his fronts and that soldiers were requested to dig trenches deeper and not to raise their heads above ground level. Apparently, the bombers intended to drop close over his troops. This gave his soldiers a ray of hope. Paik ordered all his regiments to prepare to launch counterattacks. His reasoning was: “If we are experiencing pressure, the enemy may be facing greater pressure.” Before noon, all regiments counterattacked. At about noon, B-29s pounded the western quarter of the 1st Division’s fronts. The earth shook. The bombing continued for 26 minutes. Ninety-eight B29s dropped 3,234 bombs weighing about 900 tons. An area of 5.6-km width and 12 km depth was pockmarked with bomb craters. Most of the enemy soldiers, however, had already crossed the Nakdong River and were eyeball to eyeball with Paik’s units. Although enemy casualties were not heavy, the carpetbombing devastated enemy morale. On August 17, Col. John H. “Mike” Michaelis’ 27th Regiment came to support the ROK 1st Division with its formidable firepower. The 27th Regiment was General Walker’s mobile support regiment, shuffling from one critical battlefront to another. Colonel Mike later became a four-star general and commanded the U.S. forces in Korea. Paik detailed the firepower of this regiment

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11. The First Hundred Days in his autobiography as if he were envious of all the equipment under Mike’s command: three battalions of infantry, a battalion of 105-mm artillery (18 guns), a company of tanks, a company of 155-mm artillery (six guns) and a limitless supply of ammunition. On the following day (August 18), the enemy made another all-out assault. It was a desperate battle, to be sure, but this time, Mike’s Regiment — unbeknownst to the enemy — blocked the Inmin-gun tanks. Elsewhere, Paik’s men were engaged in hand-to-hand combat with grenades and bayonets. Wounded and captured Inmin-gun soldiers smelled of liquor. Apparently, “young volunteers” were given soju (Korean vodka) before being sent off to handto-hand combat. On August 19, the U.S. 23rd Regiment also came to the aid of the ROK 1st Division. Its commander, Colonel Paul Freeman,101 spoke to Paik in Chinese. Colonel Freeman had studied in Beijing, and apparently had heard that Paik spoke Chinese. The ROK II Corps sent the 10th Regiment to support Paik. In spite of all these support regiments, the enemy attack by three divisions was relentless. This was their own attack-or-die mission. On August 20, the enemy broke through a hill defended by the ROK 11th Regiment and the ROKs were beginning to retreat. Michaelis was afraid that the enemy would encircle his regiment, and he also planned to retreat. If the 27th Regiment withdrew, Paik’s entire division would be isolated. Paik rushed in front of his battalion, which was retreating. He asked the battalion commander, Kim Jaemyong, “Where are you going?” Kim replied, “We have been cut off without any supplies. We’ve had nothing to eat or drink for some time.” Paik halted the column of soldiers and told them that there was no room for retreat. “The Americans trust us to protect their flank,” he said. “If you retreat, this may be the end of the 1st Division and the Republic of Korea. I will lead the counterattack. Shoot me in the back if I retreat.” The rest of the battalion followed Paik and they recaptured the lost hill. The front was stabilized again, and Mike apologized to Paik, saying, “I have not seen a Division Commander personally lead an attack like this. This must be God’s Army.” A bond of trust was reestablished. Trust is essential in a multinational combat mission.

101. He, too, was later promoted to a four-star general.

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The Unfinished War August 21 was the peak of the Dabudong battle. Paik wrote that this was the day of “an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.” Every hill was piled with dead bodies. All the American artillery opened fire and blazed away for five hours. Some units of the ROK 1st Division, which had already suffered 100 percent casualties and 100 percent turnover of its soldiers, suffered further losses. However, by August 22, the tide had turned. The ROK 12th Regiment, which had suffered several night attacks by the enemy, launched its own night attack and captured a key hill. The next day, Michaelis’ regiment pulled out, heading toward Masan to put out another fire. When the dust settled, the Dabudong battle cost the 1st Division 2,300 deaths, but the enemy suffered 5,690 deaths. The ROK Headquarters sent a special team of investigators to find out why the casualties were so high. The battle around the Busan Perimeter was far from over. On September 4, 1950, General Yu received a report that the 19th Regiment of the 6th Division had destroyed eight enemy tanks near Gapryong. Early the following morning, Yu went to the battle site to congratulate the special ops. They had planted newly supplied American mines along the path of tank invasion. The lead tank of a column of fourteen tanks hit a mine. While the column was stalled, the special ops went after the tanks with grenades, disabling 8 of the 14. While General Yu was luxuriating in these moments of glory, an urgent call arrived from his staff asking him to return to headquarters immediately. The bad news was that the enemy had broken through the 8th Division lines along the east coast and was threatening the city of Yongchun. From Yongchun it was only 20 miles to Daegu, still the seat of the ROK Army and EUSAK headquarters. The ROK Army was transferring the 8th Division to General Yu at this desperate moment. He knew that this was not going to be easy. The 8th Division had been the weakest link in the whole chain of defense. However, if Yongchun fell, the enemy could split the ROK defense right down the middle. The ROK Army considered this to be a battle of life or death for the ROK. Yu pulled a regiment each from the 1st and 6th Divisions — against their commanders’ dire warnings. These Divisions were also under heavy pressure from the enemy and pulling out regiments was not without risk. Yu then went to General Gay for tank assistance, but Gay refused. Next, he rushed to General Walker. They had never met before. Walker asked Yu, “Why have you come?” Yu

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11. The First Hundred Days asked for tank support. Walker said that he was willing to release one Korean battalion under the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, but he did not promise tanks. Walker asked Yu to discuss the tank problem with General Gay again. Yu went back to Gay and told him what Walker had said. The Korean battalion was at important to Gay, and he was worried. Gay asked, “So, are you going to take the Korean battalion from me?” Yu said, “No.” Gay asked, “Do you plan to retreat from Yongchon?” Yu answered, “We cannot do that. I will see what I can do. If everything fails, I will personally resist the enemy on the street.” Yu rushed to the ROK 8th Division Headquarters and asked about the situation. The 8th Division commander, Col. Lee Sung Gae, believed that Yongchun had already fallen and painted a none too optimistic picture. Yu said abruptly, “You may not withdraw from the line. Reinforcements from the 1st and 6th are coming.” The next day, on September 5, Yu received word that one platoon of tanks from the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division would be sent the following day. Apparently, General Gay had had second thoughts; either this, or EUSAK was alarmed about encirclement. Early in the morning of September 6, General Yu and his aide left for Yongchun in his jeep, although his staff discouraged him from taking such risk. When he arrived, the entire town appeared dead. He soon discovered that the enemy had already broken through and gone further south toward Kyongju, the old capital of the ancient kingdom of Silla. Even more desperate news was that communication with two regiments (the 5th and 21st) of the ROK 8th Division had been cut off. As promised, however, five U.S. tanks arrived soon after at Ohsu-dong, the outskirts of Yongchun. Villagers came out shouting Mansei, Mansei. ROK Army Captain Park Chung Inn was onboard the lead tank, pointing out which were ROKs and which were Inmin-gun. Inmin-gun soldiers stood there, stunned. They had believed that only their side had tanks. The ROK soldiers were also in disbelief, but their faces lit up when they realized that these tanks were on their side. Two reinforcement regiments, one each from the ROK 1st and 6th Divisions, were also on the way. Two enemy battalions had encircled one of the two “lost” regiments, the 21st, but it did not retreat even an inch and fought back fiercely. This regiment and the 19th Regiment killed 2,300 Inmin-gun soldiers and destroyed 30 vehicles. Another lost regiment, the 5th, also reappeared.

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The Unfinished War In the six days of battle from September 5 to September 11, the ROK II Corps killed 4,000 Inmin-gun soldiers, destroyed 5 enemy tanks and 14 pieces of 122mm artillery, and captured 300 prisoners and numerous small arms. The support provided by the five U.S. 1st Cavalry tanks, along with the air support provided by the U.S. Air Force, was critical to this success. Even the civilians pitched in. Many of the residents decided to stay put instead of fleeing to the south. They cooked food for the ROKs and carried ammunition to the front lines. A captured Inmin-gun document indicated that Kim Il Sung thought that he had the best chance of winning the war if he captured Yongchun; his troops lost that chance. The once hapless ROKs were quickly becoming veteran fighters. Yu was promoted to Major General. Three years later, the residents of Yongchun built a monument in honor of General Yu Jae Hung and invited him to open the dedication ceremony. After crossing the 38th Parallel to escape the North Korean Security Force in December, 1949, Taeksoo was determined to find a way to go to college, even if it meant he had only one meal a day. He was accepted at a university as a nightschool student. With this letter of acceptance, he tried to raise the registration fee from those who had come to South Korea earlier from Sariwon. While he was struggling to find donors, the Korean War broke out. Taeksoo had to run. With his record, he would have faced a firing squad if captured. When Taeksoo reached the Han River, he found that the Inmin-gun had already reached the northern suburbs of Seoul. When he arrived at the river, the only bridge had already been blown. The chaos on the riverbank was beyond his imagination. The retreating ROK soldiers took over practically all available boats. Taeksoo did not know how to swim but he jumped into the river, shouting for help. He hoped that some soldiers would save him from drowning. It was a gamble. Luckily, a soldier stuck out his hand, and Taeksoo safely crossed the river just ahead of the Inmin-gun. He walked for two days and was able to get on a train headed to Daegu. When he reached Daegu, he was offered two choices: either join the police constabulary or the regular army of South Korea. He felt that it might be safer with the police force, but perhaps more honorable in the army. After only two weeks of training, he was sent to the Army Engineering Corps, which was responsible for laying and removing land mines. Around this time, on top of a hill in the North Korean city of Hamhung, I was seeing sorties of American bombers attempting to destroy a railroad bridge

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11. The First Hundred Days over the Sungchon River. They went after it almost every day. The best strategy would have been to approach it in parallel formation at low altitude, but a battery of anti-aircraft guns protected the bridge from a nearby hill. The bombers, therefore, would approach the bridge along the river. Attacking it at a 90o angle made the probability of a hit low; and in fact, most of the bombs missed the bridges. I used to sit and watch from the hilltop as dozens of bombs fell and detonated harmlessly in the river. Once in awhile, a bomb would damage a section or two of the bridge. However, what was amazing was that the bridge would almost always be repaired within a day or so because thousands of civilians and Inmin-gun engineers worked all night to repair it. Toward the end of July, 1950, the bombing provided more spectacular shows than ever. Huge bombers in formation executed large-scale bombardments over Hungnam, dropping their bombs in turn. We could see the bombs fall and hear the distant kung! kung! kukung! Occasionally, there were huge secondary explosions, and smoke shot sky-high. Hungnam was five miles away, but the impacts of the 500-pound bombs seemed to shake the earth where we were in Hamhung. We were witnessing the destruction of gigantic militaryindustrial installations in North Korea. In the U.S., the Pentagon was convinced that factories in Hungnam were producing war materials not only for North Korea, but also for the USSR. General MacArthur authorized special missions to wipe them out. A plant in Hungnam was reportedly processing monazite, a primary source of thorium and other radioactive elements used in Soviet Russia’s atomic energy program. Targets in Hungnam also included the Chosen Nitrogen Fertilizer Company, the Chosen Nitrogen Explosives Company, and the Bogun Chemical Plant. The air operation began in July with 47 B-29s. The following day, 46 B-29s were engaged. Another massive air operation was conducted on August 3 — and that was the end of the largest explosives and chemical complex in Asia.102

102. Futrell, pp. 186-190.

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12. MAO’S THOUGHT IN BEIJING Meanwhile, Chairman Mao (now virtual emperor of China) had been monitoring the Korean War through his chief of staff, General Zuh De. General Zuh was receiving intelligence on the Korean War front regularly from its military attaché Colonel Wong Lichan, who was then in Korea. By this time, Mao was comfortably settled in the Forbidden City, like all of China’s ancient emperors. Zuh occupied one of the palace buildings. Why the People’s Republic of China (PRC) decided to intervene in the Korean War is one of those decisions that has been shrouded in mystery for a long time. The PRC insisted that it was to defend itself, and the rest of the world accepted this statement uncritically. Some cable traffic and other information that has leaked out of the USSR and the PRC has since indicated that the real motives lay elsewhere. Until the PRC and Russia open up their archives more fully, however, these motives will continue to be debated. Several authoritative books and articles have thrown light on this matter, as well. According to a popular war history book by Russell Spurr,103 it was on August 6, 1950, that all military leaders of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gathered at the Hall of Longevity, hidden behind the high walls of the Forbidden City. When General Peng Duhai stepped in, Mao was having a heated argument with General Ye Jianying on how long it would take to move a sizeable army to Korea. Mao said that three weeks would be enough. Ye replied that it would require four months.

103. Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China’s Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 195051 (New York: New Market Press, 1988), pp. 53-69, hereafter Spurr.

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The Unfinished War Mao asked Peng, “Old Peng, tell him he is wrong.” “Old” meant wise, venerable, and experienced, not necessarily weak and feeble. Strangely, this took place around the time the Inmin-gun had the U.S. and the ROK troops cornered in the southeast part of the Busan Perimeter. Peng was a burly man from Hunan, the cradle of the Communist revolution. This is where Mao and about 40 percent of Mao’s generals came from, as well. Peng was a peasant, talented at suggestive cursing and even better at warfare. Known for his bluntness, Peng said, “It will take more than three weeks.” Mao threw a tantrum and shouted, “Are we recruiting tortoises?” Time was of the essence, for what he had in mind. Peng knew that American ground troops had landed on Busan, but at the time, the Inmin-gun seemed to be doing well. He was surprised that Mao was even thinking about how many days it would take to send a large army to Korea. “Well,” he thought, “it never hurts to be prepared.” He respected Mao and his military judgment. As far as Mao was concerned, the decision to support North Korea had been made months ago, even before Kim Il Sung started the war. He had already promised support to Kim; and now found stronger reasons than ever to do so. As soon as the Korean War broke out, Truman’s first action was to dispatch the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits. Mao suspected that he might have to fight the Americans someday. To him, International Communism was real; and capitalism was a threat to it. He also knew that he could not fight America alone. He had to get the Soviets involved. To him, the liberation of Taiwan and the conquest of Tibet were urgent tasks. Sooner or later, Mao would have to defeat or humble the U.S. to achieve his goals. He could not fight them on the sea. Korea would be a better place to do so than on Chinese soil or Vietnam. He knew that the PLA was not yet ready to take on Taiwan. Its navy did not amount to anything. In keeping with his plan to enter the Korean War, Mao had already made moves to strengthen his forces near Korea. According to Michael Sheng, a university professor who wrote a highly revealing article,104 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Military Committee informed Xiao Jinguang, commander-in-chief of the CCP Navy, on June 30, that

104. Michael M. Sheng, Korea and World Affairs, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 1995, University of Missouri, Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea; p. 4 of the Internet version. “The creation of the NDA and its purpose,” hereafter Sheng.

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12. Mao’s Thought in Beijing the timing for liberating Taiwan must be reconsidered and that the preparation for encountering the U.S. in Korea must take first priority. This was only five days after the Korean War broke out. At that time, the Inmin-gun was winning, but American intervention had started. On July 7, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the CCP Military Committee, which decided to immediately form the Northeast Defense Army (NDA). Su Yu, the CCP general previously assigned to “liberate” Taiwan, was appointed commander of the NDA, which would initially include four infantry armies and three artillery divisions. The task of the NDA was not to defend its border (as its name suggested), but to take part in the Korean War. From the very beginning, its military training program was geared toward fighting the Americans in Korea. As early as August 4, when the U.N. forces were still hard-pressed by the Inmin-gun, Mao stated in a Politburo meeting that if U.S. imperialists gained the upper hand in Korea, they would become cockier and would further threaten China. Therefore, Mao insisted that Beijing should assist its North Korean comrades by sending in the PLA. In the same Politburo meeting, Zhou Enlai firmly supported Mao’s proposal. The timing of the intervention was not fixed at this point. According to Chen Jiang, Mao thought that he could make a better case for China’s intervention in Korea if he could prove that “China’s territorial safety was directly threatened by the Americans.”105 When the ROKs crossed the 38th parallel, the opportune time had arrived. By this time, Mao had received official requests from Kim Il Sung and Stalin to intervene. Stalin’s official request was important because the USSR would have to provide war materiel and fighter plane protection. As documented by Kathryn Weathersby,106 there had been a stream of papers and telegrams indicating what Mao and Stalin were planning. On October 2, a telegram was drafted outlining China’s intent to intervene and presenting its rationale. An American victory would mean a major setback to

105. Chen Jiang, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 153-56, hereafter Chen. 106. Kathryn Weatherby’s two papers entitled “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” November 1933; Cold War International History Project [CWIHP], Working Paper No. 8, November 1993; and “Korea, 1949-50: To Attack or Not To Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War,” Bulletin of the CPIHP, Spring 1995, 2, The Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington D.C.

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The Unfinished War Communism worldwide. Just as the Americans perceived the Korean War as a fight against Communists, Mao saw the PLA’s participation in the war as a fight against the imperialists led by America. Mao did not believe that the Americans would invade China at that time, but he perceived America and its ideology as a threat. This telegram, however, appears not to have been dispatched and another telegram was sent instead.107 On October 4 and 5, the Politburo met. Zhao and Peng Duhai supported Mao’s proposal to send troops to Korea. As Zhou Enlai stated later, the confrontation between U.S. imperialists and China was inevitable; the question was location. “The American imperialists decided to have this showdown in the Korean battlefield,” he said. “This was advantageous to us, and we decided to confront the Americans and assist the Koreans, too. Looking back, it is understood that, everything considered, it would have been much more difficult for us if we had chosen Vietnam to fight, let alone the off-shore islands of Taiwan Straits.108

With the decision to invade Korea, Beijing was prepared not only to take on the Americans in the peninsula, but also to face an American invasion of the Chinese mainland. Although none of the paper trails deny that it was Kim Il Sung who started the war, the PRC and the USSR were deeply involved in the planning and subsequent support for it. At the very least, U.S. air and naval attacks on China’s major cities and strategic locations were expected. Later, the Communists were much surprised that none of this occurred.109 Returning to August 7 in the Forbidden City, the Chief of Staff General Zhu De called his generals to the Hall of Consummation of the Martial Arts. The subject of discussion was the situation in Korea. General Nie Rongzhen, the commander of the North China Field Army, briefed the meeting, stating that war had broken out in Korea because South Korea had made an unprovoked attack against North Korea six weeks earlier. Everyone nodded. To the generals, the fact that the Inmin-gun was trying to wipe the South Korean Army off the peninsula was beside the point. 107. For this somewhat involved story, see Shen Zhihua, “The Discrepancy between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao’s 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar’s Reply” translated by Chen Jin, Bulletin of the CWIHP, 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 237-42. 108. Sheng, p. 5 of the Internet version. 109. Ibid p. 6.

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12. Mao’s Thought in Beijing General Nie continued, saying that the Inmin-gun was encountering unexpectedly heavy resistance around the Busan Perimeter, according to messages received from Colonel Wong, the military attaché to the Chinese People’s embassy in Pyongyang. As soon as Colonel Wong had arrived at Pyongyang, he rushed to the front at Kimchon, where the Inmin-gun front headquarters was located. Wong noted that the U.S. air attacks were creating havoc all along the lengthening supply lines of the Inmin-gun. In fact, while Colonel Wong was in the Inmin-gun Headquarters, the building sustained a direct hit by an American bomb. A heavier bomb could have killed nearly everyone inside, but only a few signalmen died.110 General Nie moved on to the next point, studying a file in his hand: the Inmin-gun casualties were heavy111 — 40 percent. Some generals in the room gasped and others groaned. In the PLA, a 30 percent casualty rate was considered to be a prelude to the disintegration of an army. While the news was clearly not good, it was less clear what it had to do with the assembled parties. Finally, Zhu De announced that “The Revolutionary Committee [chaired by Mao] has given a great deal of thought to this matter and it has asked us to prepare a contingency plan to back up the Inmin-gun.”112 Concerns were raised. Would the Americans use atomic bombs again? General Nie noted that since the Soviet Union now had the bomb, too, the U.S. would think twice before using it. But was this China’s problem? Wasn’t North Korea supposed to be the Soviets’ responsibility? Why should they get involved? Zhu De broke in again. “Because when the lips are destroyed, the teeth feel cold.” Everybody laughed at this ancient expression. Nie urged action; General Su Yu was reluctant, saying that the Inmin-gun was only behind schedule. Nie insisted: “That is the problem,” he said. “A prolonged war is disadvantageous to the Inmin-gun.” At that time, Peng did not know how close he was to predicting the events about to occur. Nor did he have any idea that the burden of saving North Korea would fall on his shoulders. The generals had marathon meetings over a three-week period. The situation in Korea did not improve. That was a bad news. At the conclusion of

110. See Spurr, pp. 10-12. 111. Ibid, pp. 61-63 for the briefing by Nie to the group. 112. Spurr, p. 62.

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The Unfinished War the meetings, Peng was given the responsibility of mobilizing and setting up headquarters in Shenyang, called Mukden in the old days, near Korea. None of the generals knew that it was part of an old Korean kingdom called Koguryo. Neither did they know that their intervention would cost the lives of almost one million soldiers. Peng left the meetings with instructions that plans should be prepared for all contingent situations. One thing that neither he nor other generals knew was that Mao’s mind had been made up for a long time to fight the Americans eventually, no matter what. By the end of August, the situation in Korea turned gloomy. On August 27, Mao telegraphed Peng Duhai with instructions that twelve armies be mobilized to reinforce the four armies already near the Sino-Korean border. A Chinese army consisted of between 45,000 and 50,000 soldiers. In accordance with Mao’s instruction, Zhou Enlai called another military meeting on August 31. The NDA would be strengthened to include eleven armies with 700,000 troops. As narrated by Spurr, by early September, they were on the move to Shenyang from all over China. Major Han and other members of Peng’s staff spent hectic days and sleepless nights setting up headquarters and making room for the converging armies. Mao wanted prompt action. The new headquarters, having been thrown together in haste, still had no name. Armies were ordered to report to “National Defense Headquarters.” When he heard the news, a soldier of the 38th Field Army on the move asked his pal, “Defense against what?” His friend said, “Perhaps, to defend Korea. Haven’t you read about the Korean War in the newspapers? The high-nosed, yellow-headed foreign devils are going to take over Korea first and then China.” The three field armies113 already in Manchuria were elite PLA troops that had fought the Japanese and Nationalist armies all the way from Manchuria across China to the Vietnam border, but then returned to Manchuria. More armies were gathering around Shenyang. Where they were going ultimately, and when they would make a move, was not known. The PLA took secrecy seriously. Surprise was half the battle. Major Han, General Peng’s aide, did not know what orders General Peng brought with him from the Forbidden City in that bulky briefcase, except that they involved Korea.

113. The 38th, 40th and 42nd.

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12. Mao’s Thought in Beijing General Peng called a day-long staff meeting on September 10. They met around a scale model of Korea at 8:00 a.m. sharp. The model, made of stucco, contained topography, roads, railways, airports, cities and rivers. Peng called to the attention of his staff the narrowness of the valleys and the steepness of the mountains. Roads were few and far between. Peng said, “Logistics will be extremely difficult. Supply lines will be susceptible to enemy air attacks and can be cut easily as we move deeper south.” What he did not realize — or at least did not mention at that time — was that the terrain would affect their enemies even more than the PLA. The PLA infantry was trained and experienced in crossing mountains and valleys on foot, but the Americans were dependant on jeeps and trucks and would be helpless without them. Peng urged that every effort be made to avoid being seen by enemy aircraft — moving and attacking by night, hiding by day, and using camouflage. He wanted to recommended waiting for the U.N. forces to cross the 38th parallel and engaging them at the narrow neck of the peninsula, from north of the Chongchon River (situated about 30 miles north of Pyongyang) to Hamhung. (In an ancient war between the Chinese empire of Sui and the mighty Korean kingdom of Koguryo, General Ulchi Munduck of Koguryo decimated Sui’s army of one million soldiers at the Chongchon. Such a natural barrier always favored the defender.) On October 6, the Chinese high command agreed on the details of the invasion with the proviso that the Northeast Defense Army be renamed the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) and moved into Korea immediately. On the same day, Peng Duhai, now the Commander of the Chinese troops, ordered that all preparations be completed within ten days. On October 8, Zhou Enlai flew to the Soviet Union to discuss Soviet military aid and finalize the details for the participation of Soviet Air Force. Stalin agreed to send arms for 20 divisions to Manchuria immediately, but he was reluctant to send the Soviet Air Force to participate directly. He told Zhou that the Air Force was not ready. Zhou telegraphed Mao on October 10 to inform him of Stalin’s decision, which took Mao by surprise. Mao’s telegram to Stalin on that day conveyed the “unanimous opinion” of the Politburo: They would go ahead even without Soviet air cover. Stalin was said to have been moved by Mao’s willingness to send his troops to Korea under the circumstances.

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The Unfinished War Peng decided to go to Korea to meet Kim Il Sung on October 11 to make final arrangements for the Chinese invasion. According to Hong Xuezhi, the vice-commander of the Chinese invasion force who wrote a book on his experience in Korea,114 both Beijing and Moscow realized that Kim could not hold off the U.N. forces by himself. Peng’s two vice commanders, Deng Hua and Hong Xuezhi, doubted whether the PLA could fight U.N. forces without air cover and without adequate anti-aircraft guns. They thought that they should wait until next spring to invade Korea. Peng reported this to Mao. However, Mao sent the final order to cross the Yalu.

114. Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei Yuancao Zhangzhen Huiyi (Recollections on the War of ‘Resisting the U.S. and Assisting Korea’) (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 1991). Also available in English and Korean.

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13. THE INCHON LANDING AND ITS AFTERMATH MacArthur’s FEC had been planning to land U.S. troops behind enemy lines as soon as he returned to Tokyo from Suwon on June 29, 1950. That was just four days after the North Korean invasion started. For most people, the pressing question at that time was how to slow the advance of the enemy tanks and soldiers until reinforcements could arrive. Envisioning such a strategy while watching Seoul smolder and burn was quite a feat for the imagination. However, to MacArthur, the idea of an amphibious landing behind enemy lines came as a matter of course. He owed much of his success during the Pacific War to his island-hopping strategy. He did not fight for every Japanese-held island, but cut off supply lines to island fortresses by seizing islands in the rear. This strategy saved many lives. Hand-to-hand combat was what the Japanese wanted, but that was not MacArthur’s idea of war. The only thing that MacArthur wasn’t sure about was the exact location at which to land his amphibious forces. By July 10, his staff completed a plan code named Operation Bluehearts, which would land troops on the port of Inchon, about 25 miles to the west of Seoul on July 22. The timetable, as well as the finding sufficient number and mix of troops for this operation, turned out to be far more difficult than he first imagined. General Walker was facing one crisis after another in defense of the Busan Perimeter. Every unit at his disposal, even the 2nd Infantry Division (on its way from the U.S. to Korea) and the 1st Marine Brigade, trained in amphibious tactics and already in South Korea, had to be thrown into the defense of the Perimeter. One of the problems of landing troops at Inchon was its high tide — one of the highest in the world — up to 35 feet, with high stone walls at the water’s

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The Unfinished War edge. Another problem was a narrow channel (known as Flying Fish Channel) between Inchon and the island of Wolmi-do. This was a dangerous spot for ships to navigate. Wolmi-do, which flanked Inchon, could be heavily fortified, and the Flying Fish Channel could easily be mined. If ships were to run aground in the mud flats, they would be sitting ducks until the next high tide. An alternative plan suggested by members of his staff involved a landing at Inchon in combination with a simultaneous landing at Kunsan on the west coast about 100 miles south of Inchon; or a landing near Chumunjin on the east coast. However, MacArthur had limited manpower and naval assets. He needed to use those assets effectively and decisively, rather than scattering them all over the peninsula. His idea was to trap the Inmin-gun and decimate them rather than making marginal gains by flanking movements at Kunsan. General Collins, U.S. Army Chief of Staff and General Vandenberg of the Air Force flew over to Tokyo to hear MacArthur’s plan. General Collins shook his head when MacArthur said that he needed two additional divisions. “General,” Collins said, “you are going to have to win the war out here with the troops available to you in Japan and Korea.” MacArthur held his ground, saying “Joe, you are going to have to change your mind.” Admiral James Doyle, the naval commander who was approached later by Collins for his opinion, said that landing at Inchon would be extremely difficult, although it could be done. Before his departure from Tokyo, Collins reluctantly agreed to send the rest of Marine 1st Division, but he remained skeptical about landing at Inchon. The rest of the JCS had various reasons for disliking MacArthur’s plan. General Bradley did not believe in the Marines and had said at a Congressional budget hearing several months earlier that the days of the Marines had passed and that large-scale amphibious operations would never occur again. General Vandenberg of the Air Force did not think much of the Marines either. Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, the Navy representative, had misgivings about MacArthur’s request for Marines because he would have to strip the entire Marine Corps and call up reserves to bring the 1st Marines to battle strength. That would also mean that the Marines wouldn’t be able to meet other responsibilities. The JCS told MacArthur on July 20 that he could not have the 1st Marines before November. MacArthur was furious at the delay and angrily cabled on July 21: “There can be no demand for its [the Marines’] potential use elsewhere that can equal the urgency of the immediate battle mission contemplated for it.”

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13. The Inchon Landing and Its Aftermath Eventually, the JCS caved in to MacArthur. While MacArthur was deep in planning the Inchon landing in mid-August, he received a request from the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), asking for a speech to the convention scheduled in Chicago on August 27. (He had already been criticized for calling Chiang “my old comrade in arms” during his recent visit to Taiwan. Chiang offered to send his troops to South Korea. This exchange between Chiang and MacArthur stirred up a storm of anger from Secretary of State Dean Acheson and his other State Department critics.) In the draft speech to the VFW, MacArthur discussed the importance of Taiwan to the U.S., using the often-quoted phrase: “Formosa in the hands of…hostile power could be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender[.]” He then went on to criticize those, including Acheson and even Truman, who would advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific. Appeasement was a word with an ugly connotation because of England and France’s experience with Hitler. MacArthur’s view of Asia clashed fundamentally with that of an Administration that was increasingly dominated by the State Department. On August 25, Truman discovered that MacArthur’s speech had been sent to the Veterans of Foreign Wars without obtaining clearance from the Pentagon, as required since MacArthur had begun to make statements that went against the Administration’s policy. Truman was so angry that he was about to fire MacArthur, but Secretary Johnson, who was sympathetic to MacArthur’s view, intervened. MacArthur was ordered to stop the delivery of the speech, but it was too late. It went out to the press. The intensity of the State Department’s hostility toward the Chinese Nationalists at that time is hard to understand. The State Department was trying to distance itself from Chiang — although MacArthur was not exaggerating when he called Chiang a “comrade in arms.” During their fight against the Japanese, over three million Nationalists died. Fighting the Nationalists, a large number of Japanese troops had been tied down in China. Although Mao’s army also fought the Japanese, he was fighting the Nationalists more than the Japanese, and conserved his army for the eventual fight against the Nationalists. According to the State Department, the Nationalists were corrupt beyond salvation (although this had much to do with their exhaustion from a long fight against the Japanese Army and the ensuing collapse of the Chinese economy and hyperinflation). Instead of helping to rebuild the tattered Chinese economy and

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The Unfinished War reform the administration, the State Department advocated withdrawing aid to the Nationalists. This was the same State Department that convinced Franklin Roosevelt to offer part of China to the USSR as a price for its participation in the final push against the Japanese. State Department officials and the liberal media called Chiang a “warlord” and Mao an “agrarian reformer.” They lived to see Taiwan blossom under Chiang and a billion Chinese in the mainland go through the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, which killed millions of them. It was because of the Taiwan controversy that Truman’s advisor, W. Averell Harriman, visited MacArthur on August 10, conveying the Administration’s displeasure. The occasion also provided Harriman the opportunity to learn MacArthur’s plan for the Inchon landing. Harriman liked what he heard and he said so to Truman. Lauris Norstad and Gen. Matt Ridgway, who were with Harriman, were also favorably inclined toward the Inchon plan. Ridgway reported to the JCS that MacArthur’s presentation was “brilliant, supported by every military argument of his rich experience.” Harriman said to Truman, “The three of us were enthralled by General MacArthur.” However, the JCS were uncomfortable. They asked specific details, but MacArthur was close-mouthed, fearing a security leak in Washington. It was understandable — sensitive military secrets regularly leaked out of the Pentagon and it was discovered that the Soviets had a nest of highly-placed espionage agents in the British embassy in Washington. MacArthur advised Washington in one cable that it would be “unwise” to describe fully in a message his plans for the use of the 1st Marine Division, which he had requested and the JCS had withheld thus far. The JCS decided to send General Collins to Tokyo together with Admiral Sherman. They left on August 19. MacArthur sensed that the actual purpose of their trip was not to discuss but to dissuade him from going ahead with the plan. The Navy disliked the landing site for all the reasons already cited and some other reasons as well, such as the fact that the island of Wolmi-do would first have to be bombed for at least a day to destroy the artillery, and that would alert the enemy — even if they had been caught off guard up to that point. The Navy also did not like the idea of landing the Marines in the heart of a city where every building could be a potential pillbox. The plan for the Inchon landing went against everything in the textbook.

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13. The Inchon Landing and Its Aftermath General Collins had his own reasons to dislike Inchon: he questioned whether General Walker in the Busan Perimeter would be able to break out of the Busan Perimeter immediately after the Inchon landing. Walker was too busy plugging holes in his leaky front to give much thought to a breakout. The failure of EUSAK to break out of the Perimeter “might result in disaster” for the Inchon amphibious landing force. Both Collins and Sherman counseled MacArthur to forget Inchon and strike for Kunsan. MacArthur wrote later in his memoir that he could almost hear his father’s voice telling him, “Doug, councils of war breed timidity and defeatism.” MacArthur believed that he was not taking chances with the lives of American men but that such an invasion would actually save American lives. His Pacific campaign had incurred relatively few casualties compared to the Navy’s operations on Iwo Jima and elsewhere in the Pacific. MacArthur argued that the bulk of the enemy was concentrated at the Busan Perimeter and had failed to prepare Inchon properly for defense. The very arguments raised by his opponents, he insisted, would ensure him the element of surprise. No enemy commander would think that the Americans would be so brash as to risk such an attack. As a parallel, he cited the British raid on Quebec in 1759, when a small force scaled supposedly impossible heights and caught the French by surprise. He added: “The Navy overcame similar difficulties in Second World War amphibious operations. It could do the same at Inchon.” Kunsan, for sure, would be less risky, but it was also less valuable. A strike there would not disturb enemy logistics lines. “Better no flank movement than one such as this,” he added. The only other alternative MacArthur saw was to continue attritional warfare at Busan. Then he asked, “Are you content to let our troops stay in that bloody perimeter like beef cattle in the slaughterhouse? Who will take the responsibility for such a tragedy? Certainly, I will not.” He added for a good measure: “If my estimate is inaccurate and should I run into a defense with which I cannot cope, I will be there personally and withdraw our forces before they are committed to a bloody setback. The only loss then will be my professional reputation. However, Inchon will not fail. Inchon will succeed. And it will save 100,000 lives.” He was certainly passionate. The Joint Chiefs fell silent. MacArthur wrote later, “I can almost hear the ticking of the second hand of destiny. We must act now or we will die.” MacArthur won the argument at Tokyo but the JCS were still not fully convinced of the landing site and sent a message to MacArthur on September 5,

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The Unfinished War inquiring about modification, obviously referring to the Kunsan alternative. On September 7, the chiefs questioned the landing schedule, considering that virtually all of MacArthur’s reserves were committed in defense of the Busan Perimeter. MacArthur was convinced that the JCS was trying to delay if not abandon his plan. Much valuable time had already been lost. MacArthur had to fight off not only objections of the JCS but General Walker, who protested bitterly against the idea of pulling out the Marines under him. These delays and doubts went on in spite of the fact that Truman told Defense Secretary Johnson that MacArthur should be allowed to proceed with the plan. He was impressed with Harriman’s report. After their return from Tokyo, Harriman, Ridgway, and General Lauris Norstad of the Air Force also urged the JCS to replace General Walker as the commander of EUSAK. The consensus was that Walker was worn out and lacked the finesse to control the army in the field. The JCS also dragged their feet on this recommendation. If the JCS had been more supportive of MacArthur’s pans, the Chinese would not have found the time to mobilize their troops and the course of the Korean War might have been changed. Unfortunately, the timidity of MacArthur’s superiors in Washington D.C. delayed the execution of MacArthur plan. Within days of Harriman’s return, MacArthur asked the JCS for permission to bomb Rajin, a town 35 miles from the border with Siberia. “It was the key supply center for this entire northern area, and the destruction of its transportation facilities by air would have been a perfectly safe and reasonable proposition.”115 The Far East Air Force was vigorously pressing for the bombardment. While the U.N. forces were desperately trying to hold onto a small corner of the peninsula, Washington denied the request. It became clear that MacArthur was to fight the Communists with one hand tied behind him. MacArthur finally received approval from Washington for the Inchon landing. However, on September 17, a day before he boarded the USS McKinley for Inchon, he received the news that General George C. Marshall had been appointed to succeed Louis Johnson as Secretary of National Defense. This was hardly good news for MacArthur, who held Marshall in low esteem and considered him partly responsible for the fall of the Nationalists in China. Other bad news was the appointment of Acheson’s close ally, Lt. General Bedell Smith, as the head of CIA. In 1953, he would move to the State

115. Hunt, p. 466.

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13. The Inchon Landing and Its Aftermath Department as Assistant Secretary and Allen Dulles would take charge of the CIA. In Tokyo, MacArthur decided that the invasion forces, consisting of the X Corps under the command of General Almond, would report directly to him rather than to Walker. It is not clear whether MacArthur did so because he harbored doubts about Walker’s capacity to direct both operations or whether he was trying to provide a promotional opportunity to his loyal chief of staff, Major General Almond. Whatever the real motive, it was not one of his better decisions. The X Corps under Almond consisted of 75,000 soldiers of the 1st Marine Division, the U.S. 7th Division (with 8,000 ROK recruits), a newly formed ROK Marine Division, and the ROK 17th Regiment still led by Paik In Yup, who had just recovered from a major injury sustained in an earlier battle. MacArthur was so confident of the success of the Inchon plan that he retained Almond as the chief of staff of the Far East Command. MacArthur told Almond that the invasion would be over in no time, and then he could then return to Tokyo and resume his full-time job as his Chief of Staff. This unusual decision of splitting the command stung Walker. He knew that his days under MacArthur were numbered. Notwithstanding all the actual and imagined perils of the Inchon invasion, the actual landing operations were almost anti-climactic. Deception tactics such as making bombing runs at Kunsan and other Korean ports to divert the attention of the Inmin-gun from Inchon apparently worked. Inchon and the island fortress of Wolmi-do guarding the Flying Fish Channel were lightly defended. The secret intelligence mission of Lt. Commander Eugene F. Clark and ROK Lt. Yeon Jeong, working with Korean fishermen in the area, were able to collect critical information on the tide and the depth of the Flying Fish Channel at various points, and send the information to Tokyo. Just prior to the landing operation, the Air Force and the U.S. and British naval vessels lobbed so many shells and dropped so many bombs on Inmin-gun positions on Wolmi-do that the island was pockmarked with craters. Its forest turned into an inferno before the actual landing started. The amount of firepower thrown at Wolmi-do and Inchon was several times the amount used in the invasion of Omaha Beach on DDay. It was planned in meticulous detail and executed perfectly. The Marines suffered only 21 dead, 1 missing in action, and 174 wounded. The enemy suffered 1,350 men dead, wounded, or captured. The success of the landing operations exceeded even MacArthur’s wildest anticipation.

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The Unfinished War After landing, the Marines moved out of Inchon as swiftly as possible and left control of Inchon to the Korean Marine Corps, which began to land by boat on the morning of September 15. Then the U.S. Marines struck out across a 25mile stretch of road to Seoul, destroying enemy tanks and killing hundreds of enemy infantrymen along the way. The stunning success was particularly sweet to MacArthur because the Joint Chiefs in Washington, and even the Marine generals, would not have forgiven him if anything had gone wrong. General Walker was supposed to break out of the Busan Perimeter when the Inchon landing succeeded. MacArthur had anticipated that once the Inmingun learned of the landing, they would panic. So he set his own breakout date for September 16, the day after the Inchon landing. However, the Inmin-gun at the Busan Perimeter had no idea that the Inchon landing had even taken place. Kim Il Sung kept the news secret from his troops around the Perimeter, and gambled on a new offensive. To him, it was now or never. Once again, EUSAK found itself defending its positions rather than making a breakout. The monsoon weather was so foul that FEAF planes could not provide the expected air support. Before long, however, the skies cleared and the Air Force was able to fly again. Bombs and napalm fell over the Inmin-gun, and the news of the Inchon landing that had trickled in by then broke the enemy’s will to fight. The Inmin-gun panic started. Thousands simply took off their uniforms and tried to merge into the general population or slipped into the mountains to engage in guerrilla activities. They were retreating in such haste that they fled both day and night. The Air Force strafed them and threw deadly napalm over them. ROK soldiers were also making many kills. By the last week of September, it seemed that the war was practically over. The only place where the Inmin-gun put up stiff resistance was in and around Seoul. On September 26, the Marines encountered ferocious Inmin-gun charges comparable to the suicidal Japanese banzai attacks during the Pacific War. At dawn on September 27, however, they broke off the attack, leaving hundreds of men dead in the streets. By September 28, fighting in Seoul was over. General MacArthur made a triumphant return to the city in a limousine with President Syngman Rhee at his side. The citizens of Seoul who had survived the ordeal showed up en masse to greet them. There were even a few young men in the crowd who had somehow avoided being “volunteered” by the Inmin-gun. A ceremony was held and moving speeches were delivered. MacArthur then received what he called an “astonishing message” from Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the restoration of Rhee’s

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13. The Inchon Landing and Its Aftermath government “must have the approval of higher authority.” MacArthur replied: “Your message is not understood.” He reminded the chiefs that the existing government of the Republic had never ceased to function and the U.S. had recognized the Government of the Republic of Korea as the responsible government and the only lawful government of Korea. This was yet another example of Washington belittling Rhee and the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea, for whose existence the U.N. was supposed to be fighting. This happened to Chang Kai-shek, as well, and would happen again to Vietnamese leaders. After the surprise Inchon landing, only about 30,000 North Korean troops escaped above the 38th parallel, mostly through the rugged eastern mountains. However, several thousands were ordered to hide in the mountains of South Korea and fight as guerrillas. After abandoning their tank, Simon and his gunner became deserters and had been moving north on foot for many days now. They lost track of time. They could not use the main roads. They did not want to be captured either by the ROKs or the Inmin-gun. The Inmin-gun had a way of dealing with deserters. As they moved — sometimes by day and sometimes by night — they stopped at farmhouses in remote villages for food and occasionally for shelter. They were never refused food, but Simon did not know whether their hosts were simply good Samaritans or were afraid of their sub-machine guns and pistols. They hoped that it was the former. Simon did not expect the tanks to be so helpless against American fighter planes. It was obvious to him that the Inmin-gun would not be able to fight the mighty Americans without the direct intervention of the Russians, but there was no sign that the USSR would enter the fray. It never occurred to Simon that the Chinese would be on their way to help North Korea. He wasn’t sure what would happen to him, but he was determined to reach Hamhung safely. He thought father would know what to do. His uniform was soiled, and stank. The sub-machine gun on his shoulder weighed more every day. He was disappointed in himself, but he convinced himself that he had had no alternative to joining the Inmin-gun. He had seen a lot for a 17-year-old, but he was still a boy and needed his father’s guidance and protection. In late September in Hamhung, my parents were awakened by a knock at the gate. Father asked me to go out and see who it was. It was a moonless night. I found two uniformed Inmin-gun soldiers standing there, with their arms in slings. I did not recognize them. The darkness and sleepiness did not help. Simon

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The Unfinished War and his gunner washed their faces and ate like hungry jackals under the watchful eyes of mother. Mother noticed how gaunt Simon looked and how much weight he had lost. The next morning, Simon’s gunner thanked Dr. Lee for his hospitality and said goodbye to everyone. His home was further north at the border town of Rajin. Dr. Lee found a place for Simon to hide “until U.N. soldiers arrived,” which he was sure would be soon. A farmer, a former patient of his, offered to shelter Simon His farm was so remote that hardly a soul ever came to that place. In Washington, Truman was pondering whether to carry the war further north, or to halt MacArthur at the 38th parallel. Acheson had once said that the U.N. was intervening in the Korean War “solely for the purpose of restoring the Republic of Korea to its status prior to the invasion from the north.” A halt at the 38th parallel would have achieved that objective. However, it seemed to Truman, as well as to MacArthur and the American public at large, that a complete military victory was within reach. To stop at the 38th parallel might have put Truman in a very unpopular political position. The routed Inmin-gun was offering little resistance. Washington abruptly changed its avowed policy and decided to seek total victory. Although it had no bearing on Truman’s decision, Rhee had all along said that he would not stop at the 38th parallel. On September 19, he announced that the ROK troops would continue to march northward. Rhee called ROK Army Chief of Staff Chung Il Kwon and ordered him to drive north as fast as possible, no matter what the Americans did. General Chung said that General Walker must approve any large-scale movement of ROK troops, but he was willing to oblige his president. MacArthur was concerned that a failure to destroy the North Korean armies, which managed to escape above the parallel, might rekindle the war. In fact, MacArthur was on record as saying to his visiting chiefs of the Army and the Air Force, prior to Inchon, that he intended to go all the way. The Indian Ambassador to the U.N., through whom the Communists often conveyed their messages, warned that China would intervene if the U.S. troops crossed the 38th parallel. However, Washington and Tokyo figured that China was just bluffing. As far as Washington was concerned, India — which sided with the Soviet block under the guise of neutrality — had been the mouthpiece of the USSR rather than an honest broker. On September 27, President Truman authorized MacArthur to send his troops north across the 38th parallel.

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13. The Inchon Landing and Its Aftermath The directive that MacArthur received from the JCS stated, “Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces.” Then it went on to circumscribe certain conditions, i.e., provided that by the scheduled time there had been no major Chinese or Soviet entry into North Korea and provided that MacArthur used only Korean forces in the extreme northern territory near the Yalu River bordering Manchuria and along the Tuman River bordering the USSR. Ten days later, the U.N. General Assembly voted for the restoration of peace and security throughout Korea, thereby giving implicit approval to the UNC’s invasion of North Korea. When the going got tougher, there would be disagreement regarding the meaning of these directives. On the east coast, ROK I Corps crossed the 38th parallel on October 1 and rushed north to capture Wonsan, North Korea’s major seaport on the east coast ahead of the landing of the second X Corps. On the west coast, the ROK 1st Division rushed to capture Pyongyang ahead of the U.S. Cavalry Division. It was a heady day for Paik, who returned to his hometown in triumph. All across the peninsula, the U.N. and ROK forces moved north. (See figure 3.)

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14. CHINESE TRAPS As the ROK Army and EUSAK were celebrating the fall of Pyongyang, several field armies of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (which were now called the Chinese People’s Volunteers, “CVA”) were poised to cross the Yalu into Korea. If the UNC had bombed the hell out of Andong (the Chinese city across the Yalu from Sinuiju) in mid-October, it would have caught Peng Duhai and his troops flatfooted. On October 14, General Peng Duhai watched thousands of Chinese soldiers marching south toward the 3,000-foot rail and road bridges across the Yalu River.116 That there were a large number of Chinese troops across the Yalu was no secret to the UNC. A CIA agent had returned from Manchuria with detailed intelligence indicating that some 300,000 Chinese soldiers had converged on Manchuria.117 This corroborated the intelligence collected by Navy Lt. Commander Eugene F. Clark from some 150 Korean irregulars under him. They came by this information while on a mission to steal parts from a suspected radar site. They never found the radar site but brought back disturbing news that a large number of Chinese soldiers were crossing the River. General Willoughby knew that the Chinese had the capability to intervene in Korea. However, he did not know whether they would. Neither he nor 116. They belonged to units of 38th Field Army made up of tough men of the Shandong Province. The 38th, 39th and 40th Field Armies made up the Thirteenth Army Group commanded by General Li Tianyu. 117. See Breuer, pp. 105-106 and 91-92, for the accounts of the CIA and Clark. A former officer of Chiang’s Nationalist Army was sent to Manchuria to collect the exact number of Chinese troops.

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The Unfinished War MacArthur was sure whether the concentration of the troops was for the purpose of bluffing, attacking, or defending the Chinese border. In any event, neither Tokyo nor Washington was willing to stop the U.N. forces from marching north just because some Chinese “laundry men” were on their side of the Yalu River. At this time, the U.N. side had about 250,000 troops consisting of 7 U.S. divisions, 6 ROK divisions, 2 British Commonwealth brigades (British and Australian), a British commando company, and battalions from Canada, the Netherlands, and the Philippines. Soon to join them in Korea were a Turkish brigade and battalion-size Thai, New Zealand, French, Greek, and Belgian troops. The U.N. side had vastly superior firepower, a modern navy, and powerful air forces. On the day the PLA crossed the Yalu, MacArthur was on his way to Wake Island to meet President Truman. MacArthur was not sure what this meeting was all about. He had just achieved one of the most successful military operations in the history of warfare. When the Inchon landing wound down and the ROK and U.N. troops crossed the 38th parallel, the total number of Inmingun captives rose to 130,000. The Inmin-gun appeared to have been all but beaten and the war appeared almost over. However, the British and other European countries had opposed sending the U.N. forces into North Korea, and there was a vigorous criticism leveled against him for crossing the 38th parallel although it was not his decision per se. His detractors did not see it that way. The British were particularly agitated. Perret’s supposition was that “The British in particular had opposed crossing the parallel for fear that the Chinese should respond by seizing Hong Kong.” Some regarded the Wake Island meeting to be largely a political gimmick. The Congressional elections were only two weeks away, and President Truman may have wanted to capitalize on the success at Inchon. Truman was accompanied by a group of high-powered advisors. For an hour, the president talked privately with MacArthur before the others joined them. MacArthur thought that it was private meeting, but a stenographer, behind a door left ajar, was transcribing every word spoken.118 MacArthur was later ridiculed for some of the things that he said: that the possibility of Chinese intervention was small, “victory was won in Korea,” the Inmin-gun resistance

118. Hunt, p. 474.

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14. Chinese Traps would “end by Thanksgiving,” and American boys would be back home for Christmas. On the surface, the two men ended the meeting on a cordial note, but privately they had a poor opinion of each other. MacArthur thought that Harry Truman’s original drive to defeat Communism was gone. MacArthur remarked later that a “curious and sinister change” was taking place in Washington, and that the president was surrounded by a council of caution, and was willing to settle for less than victory. In his memoir, MacArthur said, “This put me as field commander in an especially difficult situation. I had been engaged in warfare as it had been conducted through the ages — to fight to win. But I could see now that the Korean War was developing into something quite different.” To him, there seemed to be a deliberate undermining of the importance of the conflict and the lives of U.S. fighting men. Truman was also unimpressed with MacArthur, and said privately that MacArthur was “full of shit.” In October, 1950, the CIA prepared several intelligence reports regarding the likelihood of Chinese intervention.119 The first such report, on October 3, provided a vague warning of Chinese intervention. The October 12 report concluded that such intervention was not probable at that time. The October 16 CIA Daily Summary to the President said that there had been numerous reports that “four Chinese Communist units (variously identified as Armies and Divisions)” had allegedly “crossed into Korea from Manchuria.” Yet, for a reason that it did not elaborate, the report said that the “CIA continues to believe that the Chinese Communists…probably will not intervene openly in the present fighting in Korea.” On October 20, 1950, the CIA had credible information that some “400,000 Chinese Communist troops had been moved to the Korean border and alerted to cross on the night of 18 October or two days later.” Yet the CIA’s comment was that it believed that “the optimum time for such action has passed.” Thus on the eve of a new phase of the Korean War, the CIA misled Washington. The PVA started to cross the Yalu in mid-October, and by the first week of November there were about 380,000 Chinese soldiers in Korea. Some units crossed a rail-only bridge at Manpojin, 160 km farther east of Andong. Still more troops were converging on Korea from other parts of China. The Chinese armies that came to the aid of North Korea were not modern; they had no more than three regiments of Soviet 122-mm howitzers and a handful of 119. October 3, 6, 12, 13, 16, 20, 28, 30, and 31, 1950.

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The Unfinished War truck-mounted M-13 rocket launchers. The Chinese logistics were equally inadequate. The main logistical burdens in the opening months of the Chinese campaign fell on a small number of trucks and a large army of Manchurian coolies, some 100,000 of them. However, morale was high among the soldiers, who believed that they were defending China. They carried everything they needed for three to four days on their backs, including blankets and food. General Peng Duhai entered Korea two days earlier than Vice Commander Hong Xuezhi to confer with Kim Il Sung. Since then he had been incommunicado with his vice commanders for several days because he was separated from his jeep, which had the only wireless communication equipment available to him. Finally, on October 21, an anxious Hong received a telegram from General Peng Duhai: “I have met with Comrade Kim Il Sung and the situation is extremely confusing here. Comrade Kim Il Sung has been out of touch with his armies defending Pyongyang for three days.” Peng asked his two vice commanders, Tung Hwa and Hong Xuezhi, to rush to him to discuss the deployment of the armies. In the meantime, the two vice commanders had been receiving telegrams from Chairman Mao, urging them to get together with General Peng to discuss redeployment. The original plan was to position the PLA on the northern bank of the Chongchon River and fight the U.N. forces head on. But, ROK soldiers spearheading the invasion force were moving so fast that the Chinese could no longer meet the U.N. forces at the Chongchon River. Mao was monitoring the situation from the Forbidden City and sent three successive telegrams ordering his troops to utilize guerilla tactics (hit the enemy and run) instead of trying to hold onto a fixed location. He wanted to kill the maximum number of enemy rather than hold onto any particular area. This is how he had defeated Chiang, and this is what he was going to do in Korea. At this point in time, the Chinese enjoyed a tremendous advantage in that the U.N. side did not know that the Chinese had entered Korea, and the ROKs were rushing north in a haphazard manner. There were about 80 miles of no man’s land between EUSAK and the X Corps. This provided an opportunity to infiltrate a large number of the PLA without being discovered. Mao kept sending telegrams in the following days, sometimes with specific instructions, such as to attack certain ROK units at certain locations. Mao’s mind was apparently racing along the Korean battlefronts. When Tung Hwa and Hong Xuezhi arrived at a small village called Daedong to meet Peng, he was conferring with Kim Il Sung on a heated ondol

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14. Chinese Traps floor in what appeared to be a typical farmer’s house. They were smiling and talking as if they were old buddies. Kim Il Sung spoke Chinese with a Manchurian accent. In fact, he spoke Chinese better than Korean when he first returned to Korea in September 1945. Peng said to his aides that he had explained to Kim how difficult it was to mobilize the PLA, and told Kim that a price China would pay would be American bombardment of Manchurian industrial centers and coastal cities. Kim had expressed his gratitude to China for coming to the aid of North Korea in this time of crisis. Peng also learned that Kim did not have many troops left: 2 infantry divisions, 1 tank division, an engineering battalion, and an independent tank regiment, altogether 30,000 men in uniform from its original strength of 200,000 men. However, Kim said that his troops trapped behind the enemy lines would gradually return to join the Inmin-gun. When Peng was alone with his deputies, he said, “It will be our war, rather than us assisting the Inmin-gun.” It was at about this time that Dr. Lee and his family was thrown into further turmoil. The whole town was aware that the war was not going well for the Inmin-gun. Dr. Lee could hardly hide his delight. However, in late October, the entire senior staff of his medical college — doctors, especially — received a directive from the university administration to report to the campus by 6 p.m. They would be evacuating the city for a short while. They were asked to take with them only essential items such as blankets, toiletries, and spoons that they could easily carry. They were to come alone, without family members. The rumor was that they would be going to Manchuria. Boon Yong was extremely upset. She was afraid that her husband might not return alive. At this time, Simon was still hiding in the farmer’s house. Several Party cadres and armed soldiers were escorting Dr. Lee, other doctors, and university medical staff along the main road leading out of the city. It was already dark. Parts of the city were on fire. The retreating soldiers were burning documents, supplies, and buildings. On that night, whole cadres of Communist Party members were ordered to evacuate the city. One of the buildings on fire was the prison. Hundreds of political prisoners had been held in the jail, and it was rumored that they were still inside. Hamhung residents had witnessed political prisoners being simply thrown into deep wells to die. Perhaps those responsible did not have ammunition, or wanted to save it for better use. Other facilities burning were grain storage bins and armories. The

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The Unfinished War North Korean Army was making sure not to leave anything behind that could be useful to the enemy. By now, the whole city appeared to be on fire. Columns of smoke shot up. The sky glowed red. Explosions pounded the eardrums — some sounded like exploding gun shells. By then everyone, including Dr. Lee, realized that this was a general retreat. He had plans of his own. Approaching the Party officer in charge of the escort, he said: “I am very sorry, but I left my People’s ID card at home. I would like to go home and get it. It won’t take long, perhaps 30 minutes.” The Party cadre hesitated, but he knew that a person without an ID was a problem. Without it, he could not ride a train or get food rations. He told him to go, but make it fast. A couple of mornings later, Hamhung residents saw a lead unit of ROK soldiers move into the town. They were elements of the famed 18th Regiment of the ROK Capital Division. They had the marking of “white bones” on their helmets, the sign of veteran soldiers in the war. They looked sharp. The ROKs met no resistance in Hamhung. By then, the North Korean soldiers had moved out of the city. When the U.S. X Corps landed at Inchon and the Communists started to run, the Inmin-gun headquarters issued orders to their units to either bring political prisoners north with them or dispose of them locally. Naturally, in many cases they took care of the prisoners locally, using whatever resources were at hand. At the Daejon Penitentiary, they killed 1,557 out of some 5,500 prisoners. Several hundred prisoners were killed at Mogpo and Okgu. There were numerous places where smaller numbers of prisoners were killed. Some were shot by a firing squad; others were hit by blunt instruments (rifle butts, shovels, and hoes), thrown into wells, or speared by sharp bamboo sticks. Burning prisoners alive was yet another method.120 Such killings in South Korea have been well documented; but the equivalent killings in North Korea, whether in Hamhung or elsewhere, have not. In his book, John Tolland presents one group of U.N. POWs who endured the death march.121 Even before the general retreat of the Inmin-gun, the POWs — including General Dean, thousands of combatants, and many civilians such as missionaries and diplomats captured during the war — were moved to prisoners’ camps near the Manchurian border. Some of these prisoners would 120. Seo provides a complete list of such atrocities. 121. Tolland, pp. 255-264.

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14. Chinese Traps give the Communists bad publicity if retaken by the U.N. side. There were 87 diplomats and other noncombatants of various nationalities: Englishman Herbert A. Lord, the lieutenant commissioner of the Salvation Army, many Roman Catholic priests and nuns (led by Bishop Byrne, who refused to denounce God), men and women from the Methodist Mission, and Father Philip Crosbie of Australia, who had been keeping notes ever since he was captured. He survived the detention and wrote a book about the experience. In early September, this group of noncombatants was moved from Pyongyang to the Manchurian border town of Manpo, by train. The weather was good enough in early October for them to swim occasionally and wash their clothes on the banks of the great river. However, as leading elements of the ROKs spearheaded the move north in mid-October, the real ordeal began. The Communists decided to shift these and other prisoners to a broken down mining town about 12 miles from Manpo. They were forced to march behind a large group of U.N. POWs. In late October, they were ordered to move again, through rain, in the bitter cold. By this time, they could hear artillery fire and saw bands of Inmin-gun retreating north in disarray, some even without guns. On the last day of October, the prisoners were on their way to Chungganjin, more than 100 miles away. As Crosbie noted, among them were “mothers with babes in their arms, a blind nun, the tottering Father Villemot, and frail Mother Beatrix, as well as consumptive Mother Therese.” Yet an Inmin-gun major wanted the group to march like a column of soldiers. The Lord Commissioner, who spoke Korean, came forward and said to the Inmin-gun major that they would die if they had to march at that rate. The answer was short. “Then let them march until they die.” They were marched back and forth along a stretch of about 100 miles bordering the Yalu River to prevent recapture by the U.N. side, which would hardly help the Communists’ propaganda campaign. There were about 700 POWs with them. Even for them, the march was too much. Some of them had bleeding feet. The wind from Siberia began to blow hard and the weather turned cold. Some who did not move fast enough were shot to death. The POWs, soldiers and civilians alike, struggled to help each other, stronger ones carrying sicker and feebler ones, on a stretcher or on their shoulders, although they themselves were utterly exhausted, some even without shoes. During a span of eight days, 21 POWs were murdered, including Mother Beatrix. There were countless other POW incidents which Father Crosbie did not witness. There are 1,615 de-classified files on Korean War crimes perpetrated against troops serving

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The Unfinished War with the UNC in Korea; such war crimes claimed 10,233 American victims. If all crimes against ROK soldiers and civilians were included, the number would multiply exponentially.

Returning to the PVA after they crossed the Yalu, the Chinese marched south during the night and slept during the day to avoid detection. They began their daily activity after sunset at 7 p.m. and walked until 3 a.m. the following morning, covering about 18 miles in that time. Before daylight they found shelter, ate, camouflaged their equipment, and went to sleep. They succeeded in remaining undetected by the U.N. forces. Peng and his staff agreed that they had to win big in their first battle. The psychological impact of surprise and clear victory would carry them far. Their targets were three ROK divisions moving north, totally unaware of the PLA’s approach. They were the northernmost U.N. units, and a reconnaissance unit of the ROK 6th Division boasted that their horses drank water on the Yalu River. At about 2 a.m. on October 24, a telephone rang at Peng’s headquarters. The call was from the 118th Division, the only army that could be contacted by telephone at that time. There was a self-imposed blackout on wireless communication. The division commander said that they had encountered enemy units. Chief of Staff General Hae was on duty that night. He was surprised, and asked a few questions, then instructed the caller to watch the enemy movement but stay concealed. “Report back as soon as you find out whether they are Americans or South Koreans,” he added. The chief of staff woke up Vice Commander Hong, and they waited anxiously for another call. When the telephone rang, it was the commander of the 118th Division. He was sure that they had encountered a South Korean army. Hong ordered, “If they are South Koreans, let them walk deeper into our trap and then encircle and decimate them.” He immediately sent a cable to the 120th Division. “Proceed and occupy the northeastern sector of Unsan.” The Chinese were making their usual move, encirclement and surprise attack. Chinese infantry would use footpaths and mountain roads to avoid detection and pop up behind the enemy lines. They would emerge from mountainsides too steep for a motorized army. Such surprises would spook the entire U.N. and ROK forces.

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14. Chinese Traps The Korean soldiers that the Chinese encountered at Unsung were the ROK 1st Division, which resumed its northward advance after conquering Pyongyang. General Paik and his men noted that the Inmin-gun had killed all political prisoners and any suspected reactionaries before leaving the city. Dead bodies filled wells, and lay on the roadside and hillsides. The air of the city was thick with the smell of decaying bodies. On October 24, Paik was promoted as the commander of the ROK II Corps and left his 1st Division to replace General Yu, who was promoted to ROK Deputy Chief of Staff. The day before his transfer order, the 1st Division was ordered to move north and cross the Chongchon River. After crossing the river, the 1st Division felt that something was not right. Up to this time, refugees moving south had clogged the roads, but now there were no refugees in sight. The eerie silence was troubling. In the dark of the night, a regiment of the 1st Division was attacked by Chinese troops. By 9:00 a.m. on the morning of October 24, Vice Commander Hong received the first news of victory from the 120th. They struck a lead regiment of the ROK 1st Division that was advancing with ten tanks at the front. The Chinese attacked at night, with bugles blaring and gongs clanging. The ROK unit, taken completely off guard, ran in panic. They had no idea how many soldiers were attacking them. All the noise generated by the Chinese made it appear that large armies were involved. At about 10:30 a.m., Hong received news of another victory. This was from the 118th Division. They had also sprung a surprise attack and captured several hundred soldiers from a regiment of the ROK 1st Division and the U.S. 6th Tank Battalion that supported it. Among the captured were three Americans. This is how the war began, on the first encounter between the Chinese and the U.N. side. The Chinese were, in fact, as surprised to find ROKs so far north as the ROK 1st Division had been at the sudden appearance of its enemy (which was presumed defeated) at night. However, the Chinese detected the ROK first, because the ROK 1st Division moved along the main road, with armor, while the Chinese had kept out of sight. Peng had all along planned to encircle three ROK divisions and decimate them. The ROK 6th Division was way out in front, with no other units protecting its flank. On October 26, all ROK units that were covering the central sector ran into unexpected opposition in the mountainous central wilderness near Yalu. The Chinese were prevented from completely encircling and destroying the ROK 6th and 8th divisions by the late arrival of their 38th Field Army, which was

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The Unfinished War supposed to cut off the retreat route. The 38th was a highly decorated elite Chinese field army. Peng was furious: “We have almost netted the big fish, but because of these turtles, we are going to lose it!” The delay was due to refugees clogging the road, but that was not a good enough excuse for Peng. Meantime, the ROK II Corps was receiving urgent messages indicating that the 6th Division was out of ammunition. The desperate news from the ROK 6th Division did not impress American commanders; they thought that it was just an ROK panic. On October 25, the first Chinese soldier was captured. General Paik, who was fluent in Chinese, interrogated him. According to the prisoner, large Chinese regular armies were already in Korea. Paik asked General Milburn to interrogate the prisoner personally. Milburn reported the prisoner’s statement to MacArthur’s intelligence chief Willoughby. MacArthur’s FEC was, however, unwilling to believe the report of a single prisoner that a large number of Red Chinese soldiers had entered Korea. Within two days of his transfer to the ROK Headquarters, Major General Yu Jae Hung noted that his old Corps was under attack and dangerously exposed. He asked Chief of Staff Chung Il Kwon to send him back to the Corp, rather than leave this to General Paik. Chung and Defense Minister Shin Sung Mo sent Yu back to the II Corp on October 27, 1950. By this time, the Chinese had encircled the 2nd Regiment. Yu sent the 19th Regiment to the rescue. The Chinese then encircled the 19th, as well. He ordered the 7th Regiment to retreat to the Chongchon. Every unit seemed to fall apart. His old comrades in arms were in trouble, but he could do little. Yu later said, “I never felt more distressed in my life than during these several days. I bit my lip and thought, ‘An easier way out for me might be to die in battle.’ However, I was responsible for a large army.” Yu explains why the ROK 6th and 8th divisions persisted in marching so far north all by themselves. It was because on October 28, General Walker told Yu that General MacArthur had ordered an all out attack, and Yu’s troops were expected to march all the way to the Yalu. By this time, Yu said that he had information indicating that the Chinese have stepped in and that four enemy divisions had appeared in Hichun. He advised consolidating their forces at the Chongchon River rather than advancing north. Walker said, “Personally, I agree with you, but Tokyo is asking to attack without delay.”

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14. Chinese Traps Yu noted that there was no way to supply the units when they moved north; Walker promised air drops. Only on November 1 did an order arrive from EUSAK to stop the attack. By this time, his three divisions suffered heavy losses. Yu thought about this disastrous week for 40 years. By that time, the Chinese had released information on the tactical moves that they had made. Only then did Yu know for sure that his poorly supplied and equipped divisions were the deliberate targets of the Chinese. On October 27, General Paik, having been relieved by Yu, tried to return to his old division, but his jeep met a Chinese roadblock. He and his driver turned the jeep around in time to escape capture; they found a smaller back road leading to Unsan that was not guarded by the Chinese. Upon his arrival, he found his old ROK 1st Division extremely tired and dispirited from nightly attacks by the Chinese. Supplies had run low, and replenishments were not coming through. Around this time, the U.S. newspapers mistakenly reported that the ROK st 1 Division was trapped and decimated. Colonel Hennig’s wife knew that her husband was part of the ROK 1st Division and wept all night, thinking that her husband must have died. However, at that time, Hennig’s 105-mm howitzers were pounding enemy columns near Unsan. Hennig received a radio message from an artillery spotter plane, whose highly excited pilot made a somewhat garbled report, the essence of which was, “You better believe this! Our shells are landing right in their columns and they are still coming!” Meanwhile, winter seemed to have arrived ahead of its time, and neither U.S. nor ROK units were issued full winter clothing. Only several days earlier, such clothing had seemed unnecessary since the war seemed to be winding down. Nobody expected that the war would turn bad so rapidly. Hennig’s battery of artillery shot 13,000 rounds of shells. During this attack, the 1st Division infantry slipped out of the trap in an orderly retreat. Only four to five 4.2-inch bazookas were left behind. During the entire Unsan battle, the 1st Division casualties amounted to 530, a considerable loss but not a crippling one. For weeks now, the U.S. 1st Cavalry had been recuperating in Pyongyang. However, the situation deteriorated so rapidly at Unsan that by October 28, the 1st Cavalry rushed out from Pyongyang to rescue the ROK 1st Division. An enemy flanking movement appeared to be developing at this late stage of the war. They couldn’t believe it. The 8th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry rushed to secure Unsan. Light defensive positions were dug into the foothills north and west of the town.

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The Unfinished War General Walker did not understand why the so-called “large units” of the Chinese were appearing only in front of the ROK units. He even suspected some internal problems within the ROK Army. He was at the same time under a different kind of pressure from Tokyo. Messages from MacArthur showed no sympathy for the embattled ROKs. The FEC was not going to waver because a ROK division was panicking. The intelligence community was also confused. A top-secret daily report of the CIA on October 28, 1950 cited a Hong Kong source indicating, “The Chinese Communists and the USSR regard the Korean War as virtually ended and are not planning a counter offensive.” The report added that “the bulk of the Chinese Communist units had been withdrawn from Korea, leaving only skeleton forces in order to create the impression that a large number of Chinese Communist forces were still present…” It was a deception that the CIA bought. On October 29, Willoughby in Tokyo received an urgent telephone call from General Ned Almond on the east coast, insisting that he had sixteen captured Chinese soldiers. They were captured by the ROKs and turned over to Almond after interrogation. The ROKs were sure that they were part of a large Chinese army. Willoughby doubted it, but flew to Korea at Almond’s insistence. He concluded that they were Chinese, but were “stragglers.”122 Any other conclusion would overturn his previous conclusion that China would not enter Korea on a large scale at this late stage. MacArthur was also predisposed to discount a large scale Chinese intervention. Walker’s G2, which was pinpoint accurate about movements of the Inmingun around the Busan Perimeter, came to the same conclusion as Tokyo. The CIA reports of October 30 and 31 and November 2, 3, and even 10 were all variations on the same theme. There were POW reports transmitted by General Walker indicating that large armies had entered Korea. The CIA dismissed them as unreliable. The CIA’s October 31 report also dismissed a similar report from the U.S. embassy Seoul about Chinese troops; it dismissed similar reports from Hong Kong, London, and Rangoon. There was no lack of intelligence, only of open minds and credence. Ridgway wrote in his memoir, “MacArthur simply closed his ears to their [Chinese] threats and apparently ignored or belittled the strong evidence that they had crossed the Yalu in force.” 123

122. Appleman, p. 761. 123. Matt Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Doubleday, 1967) p. 47, hereafter Ridgway.

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On the battlefield, on late afternoon of November 1, the U.S. 1st Cavalry commander Major General Gay realized that his 8th Regiment was dangerously exposed. The ROK 1st Division on his flank was rapidly disintegrating. He requested permission from Walker to evacuate Unsan. The request was refused. It was too late, anyway. Rescue troops groping toward their beleaguered units in Unsan found the approach roads blocked by the Chinese. No amount of artillery or aerial bombardment could shift them. By nightfall, the 8th Regiment was enveloped on three sides by what appeared to be huge numbers of enemy forces. At 19:30 on November 1, the Chinese struck. The 1st Battalion was instantly overwhelmed. Squads of Chinese riflemen overran the forward platoons. The attackers broke through the American lines at 21:00 when the battalion’s ammunition was virtually exhausted. The 1st Cavalry was shaken by the ferocity of the attack. They had never experienced anything quite like it. The enemy attacked in the darkness. They pressed on regardless of losses. All this came with the blowing of bugles, whistles, and the beating of gongs. Sun Tzu’s ancient art of war still worked on the modern American troops. The 2nd Battalion broke next. Survivors streamed toward Unsan, mingling with the hundreds of terrified South Koreans fleeing westward across the Samtan River. The Chinese did not want to fight the Americans, first because they were told that the 1st Cavalry was peerless. However, they could not avoid it once they entered Unsan. To Hong’s surprise, when they hit the 1st Cavalry, it seemed to collapse almost as easily as the ROKs. To most in Korea, there was no longer any doubt that they had encountered a major Chinese force. However, MacArthur, in Tokyo, wasn’t sure whether this was a reconnaissance-in-force across the Yalu to probe the U.S. resolve, a Red bluff, or a full-scale Chinese entry into the war. His intelligence chief, Major General Charles Willoughby, was holding to his earlier estimate of about 30,000 or 40,000 Chinese assisting the Inmin-gun. After Unsan, Peng and his deputies could not believe that MacArthur still seemed to have no clue that a huge Chinese army was already in Korea. After the initial setback, the U.N. side began to regroup to move north again. Peng told his staff that the situation offered another golden chance to spring a trap. No one in EUSAK knew for sure how big the PVA was. They were still well disguised, surviving for days on what they carried on their backs. Food supplies during combat consisted of misugaru, a mixture made of roasted and powdered rice, beans, millet, dried peas, and corn. It was usually soaked in water before eating;

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The Unfinished War however, Chinese soldiers on the move would simply chew the dry powder and chase it down with a swallow of water. While this was nutritious food, it lacked important vegetable and protein components. After months of this diet, some soldiers would develop night blindness from vitamin deficiency. On November 3, MacArthur sent Washington an intelligence report based on a captured Communist battle order. It showed that 498,000 Chinese soldiers were in Manchuria, ready to cross the Yalu. In addition, there were district service forces of 370,000, bringing the total number of Chinese troops to 868,000. Other forces were still converging north from central China. MacArthur was convinced that the entire resources of the Chinese Red Army were being mobilized but was not sure how many of them had actually crossed the Yalu River to Korea. By November 5, MacArthur was sufficiently alarmed that he ordered General Stratemeyer of the Fifth Air Force to launch a maximum air assault of at least two weeks’ duration. He said, “Isolate the battlefield” and destroy “every means of communications and every installation, factory, and city within it.” He ordered both napalm and conventional bombs to be used. In order to isolate the battlefield, the Far East Air Force (FEAF) needed to destroy the 12 bridges along the Yalu River. MacArthur thought that he already had the authorization from Washington to do so when Secretary of Defense Marshall sent him a message saying that he “should not feel hampered strategically and tactically when he crossed the parallel.” General Stratemeyer was not sure. To make sure, he relayed this order to the Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Landenberg. When this order reached Washington, Dean Acheson reacted strongly. Truman intervened and said that such missions should be carried out “only if there was an immediate and serious threat to the security of the troops.” Washington still did not order MacArthur to withdraw. Policies were being made on a day-to-day basis. The U.S. was still trying to show that America did not have hostile intentions against China — although no amount of conciliatory gestures on the part of the U.S. at this stage would have made an iota of difference to the Chinese resolve to confront the Americans. On November 6, the JCS ordered MacArthur not to conduct the bombing and gave other directives curtailing his use of air power. First he was forbidden to make a “hot” pursuit of enemy planes that attacked his. Manchuria and Siberia were off limits for the American airplanes, whatever the purpose. He was denied the right to bomb the Soopung and all other hydroelectric power plants in North Korea, which supplied electricity to Manchuria and Siberia as well as

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14. Chinese Traps North Korea. He was even forbidden to bomb important supply centers and supply depots such as Rajin, through which the Soviet Union supplied war materials. In fact, Secretary Marshall directed MacArthur to postpone the bombing of all targets within five miles of the Manchurian border. But by holding back the air strikes, Americans would only punish the U.N. side rather than make the Chinese back off. MacArthur could not believe that protection was extended to the enemy, not only in Manchuria but also within North Korea. The bridges were the only means through which the Chinese could move their men and supplies across the wide river into North Korea, but they were to remain intact. MacArthur protested strongly and Washington gave him permission to bomb the Korean end of the Yalu bridges. The head of the Far East Bomber Command, Major General Emmett O’Donnell, protested the unfairness of the situation. “We were not allowed to violate Manchurian territory, [even an] inch of it. For instance, like most rivers, the Yalu has several pronounced bends before reaching the town of Antung, and the main bridges [are] at Antung[.] These people on the other side of the river knew that and put up anti-aircraft batteries right along the line.” One of the bomber pilots was wounded badly and returned to Japan with an arm dangling at his side. He gasped at MacArthur, through bubbles of blood, “General, which side are Washington and the United Nations on?” MacArthur reflected in his memoir, “For the first time in military history, a commander has been denied the use of his military power to safeguard the lives of his soldiers and safety of his army. The order not to bomb the Yalu bridges was the most indefensible and ill-conceived decision ever forced on a field commander in our nation’s history.” This was the beginning of a no-win war. Hundreds of thousands would die. Some blamed Secretary Marshall for the loss of China, although that is another story. Now, his lackadaisical approach to the war was threatening to destroy another American ally: South Korea. To MacArthur, this only confirmed that Truman was no longer the man that he once was.

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15. A BRAND NEW BALL GAME MacArthur decided that the best means of determining the enemy’s true strength was to mount reconnaissance in force. He prodded Walker to move north, cautiously. MacArthur flew in from Tokyo to see the attack being launched. After his ceremonial appearance, MacArthur asked his personal pilot, Lt. Colonel Tony Story, to fly to the Yalu River and follow it east to the East Sea. He wanted to see for himself whether there were Chinese troop concentrations. His staffers, who had flown in with MacArthur from Tokyo, were not sure that he should take such a chance because the FEAF had sighted 75 modern MIG fighter planes near Sinuiju, the northwestern border town on the Korean side. MacArthur insisted on seeing the Chinese and Korean border areas personally. What MacArthur saw was rugged mountains covered with snow, nothing else. If MacArthur was looking for armies riding trucks, and traditional military camps, there were none of them. While the U.N. side commenced its “reconnaissance in force,” the Chinese were prepared to spring the second trap. Their target was the ROK 6th, 7th and 8th divisions. This would expose the right flank of American troops. The Chinese troops attacked in overwhelming number while some units slipped through the ROK lines blocking their retreat routes. The ROKs were no match for the battlehardened Chinese soldiers who had been fighting a continuous war for more than a decade, first against the Japanese and then against Chiang’s Nationalist armies. The three ROK divisions crumbled.

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The Unfinished War This stripped the U.S. 2nd Division of its right flank protection. Scanning his maps, General Walker read the intent of the Chinese. It was clearly to encircle the EUSAK. For foot soldiers to encircle motorized armies was no small task, but the Chinese marched day and night, without stopping for food. They just ate their misugaru. Requests for rest were denied. In a desperate attempt to protect his flank, Walker ordered the 5,000-men Turkish Brigade to that front. The Brigade had been in the country only for a few days. Within hours, Walker received news of a stunning victory. The Turkish Brigade had killed and captured a large number of enemies at bayonet point. Walker thought that the U.N. side had finally won a major battle against the Chinese troops. The U.S. 2nd Division interpreter was rushed to interrogate the prisoners. The dead and captured “Chinese soldiers” turned out to be ROKs fleeing from the Chinese! The next day, however, there were no mistaken identities. The Turks bravely stood their ground and fought waves of Chinese troops. Most of them fought to the bitter end. It was a massacre. Only a few Turkish companies survived the battle more or less intact. Next, the Chinese went on to smash two battalions of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division. Then they marched fourteen hours nonstop and cut off a major retreat route of the U.N. and ROK forces. By this time, they had covered 43 miles. They had not slept for two nights. They marched even during daytime, pretending to be ROKs, knowing that the airplanes would not be able to tell the difference. To further deceive the U.N. and ROK soldiers, they cut off all wireless communication. Their unorthodox fighting methods — crossing mountains and fields and appearing behind the enemy in the dark of night — unnerved EUSAK as well as the ROKs. Walker was not willing to fight when his rear was threatened. But retreat is always a delicate maneuver that can turn into a rout. EUSAK ran, abandoning a large quantity of materiel. A huge number of American soldiers surrendered. In his book, Vice Commander Hong did not even bother to list the number of prisoners they captured, but listed 1,500 new model trucks, a large number of artillery pieces, and piles of ammunition and food, as if those were the real fruits of their blood, sweat, and tears. That night, the Chinese had the challenge of hiding these vehicles from American fighter-bombers; they did not have enough men who knew how to drive them. Finally, they came up with the ingenious idea of using American POWs to drive the vehicles to safe hideouts. By December 2, when the EUSAK retreat was over, three ROK divisions had disintegrated.124 The U.S. 2nd Division was wrecked. The Turkish Regiment

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15. A Brand New Ball Game had lost 1,000 men and was utterly disorganized. The U.S. 25th and the 1st Cavalry Divisions had suffered considerable losses. Among all the units under EUSAK, only the U.S. 24th Division and the Commonwealth British 27th Brigade had escaped with relatively minor losses. EUSAK abandoned Pyongyang on December 5, leaving behind about 10,000 tons of supplies and materiel. The second Chinese offensive in so many months had a devastating impact on the U.N. side, psychologically as well as physically. By December 15, EUSAK was completely out of contact with the Chinese and had fallen back to the 38th parallel. Walker and his armies were demoralized. Their confidence was shaken. Most EUSAK units retreated without making any contact with the Chinese troops. Some unkind historians called it shadow boxing. On the east coast, the plan was to pull the X Corps — consisting of the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Infantry Division and the untested 3rd Division, fresh from Japan — out of Inchon and send them by ship to the major port of Wonsan on the east coat. The idea was to trap the Inmin-gun along the east coast and then link up with the EUSAK on the west coast through the rugged interior region. This was meant to be the second landing operation following the Inchon landing. However, the operational plan quickly became irrelevant. On the east coast the ROK 3rd Division and the Capital Division simply chased the retreating Inmin-gun. The Inmin-gun put up some resistance with mortars and antitank weapons in fortified caves and pillboxes, but the ROKs simply pushed forward “by day and night, on foot and by vehicle, more often than not out of communication with any headquarters.” Some ROKs without shoes walked “on bloody feet.” 125 In this unsophisticated manner, the troops of the ROK 3rd Division and Capital Division reached Wonsan on October 10. At Inchon, the Marine 1st Division was still boarding ships for the “invasion” of Wonsan. When the landing ships finally made it to Wonsan and tried to enter the harbor, they found out that it was protected by thousands of mines. The Marines were stranded. The ROKs pushed forward and captured Hamhung and Iwon by October 24. After time-consuming operations to remove the mines, the Marines landed on Wonsan on the last day of October. Thus, during the critical one-month period following the collapse of the Inmin-gun, the most effective fighting men 124. The ROK 6th, 7th and 8th divisions. 125. Goulden, p. 249.

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The Unfinished War of the U.S. military spent their time getting on board ships and waiting to get off them. While the ships were moving back and forth along the coast in a holding pattern, the Marines were depleting the supply of food to a dangerously low level. The U.S. 7th Infantry Division which was supposed to have followed the Marines to Wonsan also spent the critical period on the East Sea — getting seasick. For reasons uncertain, this infantry division was eventually sent to Iwon, a coastal town further north of Hamhung, for landing. By this time the ROK Capital Division had already taken Iwon, and the 7th Division easily walked ashore. However, it too spent this critical period of the war on ships rather than destroying the Inmin-gun. By the time the X Corps arrived at Yudam-ri and the Changjin Reservoir (about 70 miles further north of Hamhung into the rugged mountains), it was already late November. They were strung out along 40 miles of nearly impassable mountain roads on both sides of the reservoir. The Marines climbed up cautiously, through snow and ice, around the western shores of the Changjin Reservoir (also known as Chosin) while the U.S. 7th Division moved along the eastern shore. Little did they know that some 100,000 Chinese soldiers had beaten them to the area and were waiting for them. Mao had rushed in 100,000 relatively inexperienced soldiers, from Shantung Province. According Commander Hong Xuezhi, the deployment of the IX Field Army was almost an afterthought. When Peng learned of the strength of the X Corps moving to the east coast, he pleaded with Mao to mobilize the IX Field Army to counter it. As soon as the Chinese troops got off the trains at the Yalu in November, they were marched straight to the Changjin Reservoir. By this time, the Chinese offensive on the west coast was well on its way. Obviously, the plan to link up with EUSAK needed rethinking. Historian Hammel wrote, “Far from having a merely impossible mission, the X Corps had no firm mission at all.” The original purpose of destroying the Inmin-gun along the coastal area had been achieved before the X Corps landed on Wonsan and the plan to link up with EUSAK was no longer an option. Almond could have changed the original plan then and there, but he did not. He was concurrently the chief of staff of MacArthur’s FEC; this did not help the FEC review the ongoing battlefield situation objectively. Also not helping the matter was the rough mountain ranges that run south to north in the interior of Korea, making communication difficult, but the fact of the matter was that

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15. A Brand New Ball Game Almond and Walker had poor opinions of each other and did not consult each other regularly. In the final analysis, MacArthur was ultimately responsible for creating the problem because he had made the unconventional and ill-advised move of splitting the command in Korea between EUSAK and the X Corps. The ancient Chinese sage Sun Tzu said: The army which first occupies the battlefield and waits for the enemy is well rested, but the army that arrives late and rushes into battle is tired. When the Marines were negotiating the rough terrain, the Chinese remained undetected. They were intent on making a surprise attack on the famed Marines and inflicting heavy damage on their first encounter. The battle of the Changjin Reservoir inspired some full-length books as well as chapters of books on the Korean War.126 Some light contacts were made on November 25 and 26 with elements of Chinese reconnaissance units. The Marines were not alarmed; but all hell broke loose on the night of November 27, just after the troops had polished off their Thanksgiving dinner and gone to bed. “Unexpected developments” were taking place. Elements of three Chinese divisions of the IX Field Army Group sprang into action. Then the temperature dropped to -17° F. At these temperatures, skin sticks to metal and has to be torn off. Both sides would also learn the hard way that many weapons fail to fire under such severe weather conditions. The predicament of Marine Fox Company on top of the isolated hills best illustrates the situation. “Fox Company was settled in by 2100, by which time half the men were asleep in their heavy down bags[.] No one on Fox Hill [so named after the battle] knew or had any reason to think that the company was completely surrounded, cut off by the Chinese regiments that had stolen down from the heights to sever the MSR [Main Supply route].…The Chinese hit Fox Hill just before 0230. Bob McCarty was awakened from deep sleep by a shout from his reserve squad leader: ‘Here they come!’”127 The Chinese attacked with all their disorienting cacophony, and mortar shells blasted. Chinese soldiers appeared from nowhere and hurled grenades at point blank range while others fired burp guns [Russian sub-machine guns]. The hellish din shattering the still night gave the impression of a million soldiers charging toward the lonely

126. See Eric Hammel, Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War (Novato, CA.: Presideo, 1981), Goulden, pp. 344-381, and Tolland, pp.287-353, to name only a few. 127. Hammel, pp. 96-98.

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The Unfinished War Marines, who were outnumbered in real terms, anyway. The enemy knew where the Marines were, but the Marines did not know where the enemy was. Before dawn broke, the Chinese went into hiding. Not knowing how many there were, the Marines were hesitant to go after them. They left about 400 bodies on the ground, some of them only fifteen feet in front of the Fox Company positions. The Fox Company suffered 20 dead, 54 wounded, and 3 missing. In terms of the kill ratio, it was a victory for Fox Company, but the Americans and the Chinese had different ways of looking at casualties. In any event, the battle was far from over. The fight continued in this manner for two more days before the Marines were ordered to withdraw. However, the order to Fox Company was to defend the hill to the last man because it was guarding the only possible route of retreat for the rest of the Marines. Reinforcement was not coming in because the Chinese had a chokehold around Fox Hill. Fox Company suffered 76% casualties before reinforcements finally arrived three days later. Dog Company and Easy Company of the 7th Marines suffered even heavier casualties. Easy Company had only a handful of men left after confronting wave upon wave of Chinese attacks. At the height of battle, they resorted to hand-tohand combat. Dog Company had only 16 men left after the first night. With the dawn came an eerie silence, and they could see some 450 Chinese bodies piled up in front of them. By then, the Chinese had gone into hiding to avoid air strikes. Corsairs appeared and pounded the hillsides, although they had no specific targets to shoot at. The vast majority of the Chinese found magic Chinese “boxes” to hide themselves in. Most military units might have withdrawn after the first savage contact, but the Marines stood their ground, even for hand-tohand combat, though only a few had seen action during World War II. Some had not even gone through boot camp, but the more experienced Marines had instilled in them the esprit de corps. The American casualties were intolerable, but the Chinese casualties were far higher. However, it was the news of the Marine casualties that hit all of the major newspapers around the globe. Most Americans were shocked that their boys were trapped in a remote valley, dying from Chinese human-wave attacks, and suffering from frostbite on top of nameless hills in a country thousands of miles away. The 7th Infantry Division on the other side of the Changjin Reservoir was under attack also. MacArthur realized that he had miscalculated the intentions of China. He had a lot of thinking to do. He ordered withdrawal to the port of Hungnam, but even such a move was anything but uneventful. There were more enemy soldiers who blocked the Marines’ retreat than had opposed their advance only days before.

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15. A Brand New Ball Game When the Marines regrouped at Hungnam, General Smith was still of the opinion that he could hold onto the beachhead indefinitely. MacArthur agreed. The X Corps at Hungnam could be a “geographic threat” that could deter Chinese from deepening their advance. MacArthur made several mistakes after the Inchon landing. However, in hindsight, MacArthur was right about maintaining the beachhead, because the Chinese were too badly beaten at this point to mount further attacks. But the Joint Chiefs disagreed with MacArthur and gave a direct order to withdraw the X Corps by sea and proceed to Busan, where they would become part of EUSAK. Almond started the evacuation on December 11. The frontline troops began to retreat as rapidly to the south as they had moved north less than three months ago.

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The Unfinished War A Chinese commander wrote later that they had neither the will nor the intention to pursue the Marines to Hamhung and Hungnam. The casualties were at an unsustainable level, and the Naval and Marine firepower on a flat plain would have been suicidal for the Chinese. When all the Marines were loaded onto ships headed to Busan, the 1st Marine Division had incurred 4,418 battle casualties (604 killed, 114 dead from wounds, 192 missing, and 3,508 wounded). Captured Chinese documents indicate that they suffered 37,500 casualties (15,000 killed and 7,500 wounded by the Marine ground forces, plus 10,000 killed and 7,500 wounded by air operation).128 The Marines made a good account of themselves even as they stepped into the trap. Chinese documents further indicated, The troops did not have enough food, they did not have enough houses to live in, they could not stand the bitter cold, which was the reason for the excessive non-combat reduction in personnel, and the weapons could not be used effectively.…their feet, socks, and hands were frozen together in one ice ball. They could not unscrew the caps on the hand grenades, fuses would not ignite, the hands were not supple, the mortar tubes shrank on account of the cold, and seventy percent of the shells failed to detonate. Skin from the hands was stuck on the shells and the mortar tubes.129

Even for the Chinese, who did not place as high a premium on individual human life as the Americans, their losses were unacceptable. The Chinese IX Army was no longer able to fight. General Peng Duhai was outraged. He flew to Beijing, in a state of rage, and went straight to Mao’s bedroom in the Forbidden Palace. He said bitterly, This cannot go on. Thousands of my men have turned into frozen snowmen. Those who survived the cold have been blown to pieces by American bombs and artillery. American airplanes have cut off our supply lines. There is not enough food coming through. Unless our comrades in Moscow provide us with artillery and air support, we cannot achieve our objective.

What Peng Duhai wanted was a modern army with fighter planes and artillery. Mao was not convinced, because he still believed in guerilla tactics rather than fighting as a regular army, but he appealed to Stalin. The Russians

128. Goulden, p. 380. 129. Goulden, p. 381.

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15. A Brand New Ball Game rushed in MIG fighters — it is suspected that they were flown by Russians in Chinese uniforms — artillery, and anti-aircraft guns. After the Inchon landing, MacArthur had grown over-confident. In less than three months after the Inchon landing, his confidence was severely shaken. Following the bitter Thanksgiving debacle, MacArthur cabled Washington on November 28, saying, “We face an entirely new war.” His main concern at this time was how to fight the hordes of Chinese, who were freely entering Korea from “the safety of a privileged sanctuary.” Truman used those very words just a couple weeks earlier in his November 16 speech. Truman was trying to make the point that the U.S. had no intention “to carry hostilities across the frontier into Chinese territory.” Perhaps he thought that such an assurance would make the Chinese less hostile, but it did not. In fact, Truman’s statement only seemed to embolden them. During a press conference on November 30, Truman was at pains to explain that the U.S. had tried to assure the Chinese that it had no “aggressive intentions toward China” but that the Chinese attacked the U.N. forces “in great force.” Washington had no clue that the Chinese wanted to flatten the protuberant Yankee nose no matter what. He said, “Recent developments in Korea confront the world with a serious crisis.” In response to a question by a reporter regarding the kind of weapons to be used in the battlefield, Truman indicated that atomic bombs were not excluded. That brought British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, a Socialist, flying over on the next available flight to Washington. Attlee returned home after being assured by Truman and Acheson that no such weapons would, in fact, be used in Korea. This promise took the threat of the atomic bomb out of the Korean War and China. The one thing that worried the Communists deeply was now out of play. Now that the “police action” had gone bad, finger pointing began. MacArthur was no longer invincible. “Already a surge of violent personal attacks and bitter criticism against MacArthur began to appear.”130 His critics questioned: Why did MacArthur advance without sufficient preparation or without gathering sufficient information about the mobilization of the Chinese Communist troops? Why did he send American soldiers across the narrow neck of North Korea between the Chongchon River and Hamhung?

130. Hun, p. 488.

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The Unfinished War Of course, neither MacArthur nor Washington knew that Mao had decided months earlier to send in large forces. The CIA and the State Department had no information regarding Mao’s decision. MacArthur’s G2 had nothing solid on the Chinese intention. A clash was inevitable as soon as the U.N. forces and the ROKs crossed the 38th parallel. However, forming a defensive line along the narrow neck of the peninsula would have given the U.N. side a tactical advantage, but MacArthur was overconfident. The Chinese remained invisible, and the air reconnaissance had not located any enemy masses. Washington had given MacArthur tacit approval to all of his actions. But in the wake of the Thanksgiving debacle, the JCS became increasingly critical of MacArthur and placed a number of restraints on his methods. On December 1, MacArthur answered a series of questions posed by the president of the United Press. In his reply, MacArthur went on to protest the fact that the Communist Chinese were being accorded “the privileged sanctuary” and he was not authorized to take “defensive retaliation.” The reaction from the European press was violently against MacArthur, although this was not the case in America. What the Europeans and to some extent the Americans feared most was the possibility of a general war and the siphoning off of resources that might be needed to defend Europe. On September 25, 1949, the USSR had announced that it had developed an atomic bomb. According to Musashiya, the CIA discovered that the Soviet A-bomb was in an experimental stage and would take four to five years before it could be used on the battlefield. If this story is to be believed, there was a window of three to four years in 1950 before the USSR would have become a real threat. The USSR had good reason to fake or exaggerate its success in the development of atomic weapons. That way, it could demand the respect of the West. Washington wanted to do everything possible to avoid confrontation with the Soviets. Policy-makers saw MacArthur’s aggressive statements as an increasing liability. The Pentagon issued a statement on December 6: “Officials overseas, including military commanders, [should] clear all but routine statements with their departments[.]” It was a gag order directed against MacArthur. In Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were already thinking that withdrawal from the Korean peninsula might be inevitable, although it should be done while inflicting as many casualties on the enemy as possible, “thus extracting a measure of self-respect even in defeat,” as Bradley wrote in his memoir. MacArthur did not see the situation in those terms. By then, MacArthur

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15. A Brand New Ball Game thought that the entire military resources of China, including Soviet logistics support, already had been committed to Korea. This would have left mainland China vulnerable to attack. The Chinese showed that they were poorly supplied and equipped. The logistical difficulties prevented continuous fighting, resulting in alternating periods of fighting, re-supply, and rest. MacArthur then formulated retaliatory measures which, in his opinion, would secure victory: a naval blockade of the Chinese coast and air bombardment of China’s industrial complex, communication network, supply depots, and troops massed around the Korean borders. He wanted to deny the Chinese the sanctuary in Manchuria which Truman had promised them. Unless the U.N. forces’ superior air power could be used to destroy them, he predicted, the best U.N. forces could expect was a stalemate and an unconscionable level of human loss. MacArthur saw little risk in reinforcing his troops with the Nationalist Chinese soldiers and in using them for diversionary action, possibly by counter-invasion of mainland China, if not Korea itself. In hindsight, it is not clear how effective the blockade of the ports would have been. Much war materiel was slipping through the Hong Kong-Kowloon ports under British control. However, the use of the Nationalist Army and bombing the massed troop and military and transportation infrastructure in Manchuria might have been effective. The Nationalists already had about half a million soldiers on the mainland. Had Chiang sent in an invasion force, Mao would have been forced to divert more armies to defend the mainland from Taiwan. Soldiers from all over the world, including the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa were in Korea. What was the reason for rejecting Chiang’s offer of as many as 500,000 soldiers? This might have tipped the balance of power in favor of the U.N. forces. But, the Secretary of State vetoed the idea. Muccio rationalized his boss’s decision years later by saying that, historically, Koreans feared having Chinese troops on their soil! Yet, surely he felt that South Koreans had far more reasons to fear the PLA in North Korea than Nationalist troops in South Korea. And during the Yi dynasty, Korean kings had more than once invited Chinese troops to repel Japanese invaders. MacArthur insisted that the measures he proposed would severely cripple and largely neutralize China’s capability to wage an aggressive war against Korea and other Asian countries. By then, China had not only taken over helpless Tibet, but was also assisting North Vietnam in its fight against South Vietnam and supported insurgencies in Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula. Later,

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The Unfinished War MacArthur articulated his view at the Republican National Convention of July 7, 1952: “It is fatal to enter any war without the will to win it.” The American public in general, and the Republican congressmen in particular, supported MacArthur’s view; but the president did not. General Bradley later testified before the Senate Committee on the Korean War: “Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy [of widening the Korean War] would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.” This position contrasted very sharply with MacArthur’s view that, if unopposed, the Communists would not only overrun South Korea but would go on to Japan, India, and the Middle East, and eventually to Europe and America. We now know that MacArthurs’s fear of Communist takeover was exaggerated, but the Communists would have assisted wherever there was an effective Communist insurgency. The conditions were ripe in parts of Latin America also, and certain parts of the Middle East. Western Europe, like Washington, thought MacArthur’s idea of involving the Chinese Nationalist Army was ridiculous. The British would rather see the U.S. dump Taiwan than endanger her delicate relationship with China vis-à-vis Hong Kong.

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16. REFUGEE STORIES In November, the people in Hamhung were blissfully unaware of what was happening on the battlefield. Hard core Communists had already left town and most people were willing to speak out about how they really felt about them. They had no idea that the Communists would soon return. In late November, sorties of American warplanes were becoming more frequent. By early December, the distant thunder of bombardment was heard. In the following several days, the people heard the terrifying sound of shells from naval guns screaming over the city, growing louder. Amid such bombardment, Dr. Lee received a telephone call from Dr. Choi, his fellow medical college alumnus and the head of the ROK 15th Army Field Hospital, who said that the twin cities of Hamhung-Hungnam were completely surrounded by the Chinese and that a decision had been made to evacuate his hospital to the rear. He offered Dr. Lee’s family free passage on board a Landing Ship Tank (LST). He made an identical offer to other medical professors. Every doctor accepted the offer. The Lee family had only one day to pack, and they could take only what they could carry. This was in the middle of the coldest winter in ten years. Warm clothes and blankets were essential. After debating awhile, Boon Yong decided to take the head of her treasured Singer sewing machine — she thought that it would fetch good money wherever the family went. Money would be worthless; North Korea and South Korea used different currencies. She also had two gold rings with her.

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The Unfinished War The next afternoon, a truck arrived and the Lee family, two adults and five children, each with a package in hand, managed to climb on, although it was nearly full with other hospital staff. After sunset, the temperatures seemed to drop below zero. Up in the mountains, the temperature was supposed to have dropped to -60°; at least it was less severe in the coastal cities of Hamhung and Hungnam. Still, even with layers of warm clothes and earmuffs, riding on top of an open truck in sub-zero temperatures with whistling winds was an experience. As we moved out, I heard loud thunder and saw flashes of red, far in the distance but all around us. Soon, the entire horizon lit up and stayed red for the entire night. It appeared that the whole Hamhung-Hungnam perimeter was on fire. I assumed at the time that the attack was from Chinese guns; but I learned later that it was the U.N. side’s artillery and naval bombardment, directed at the Chinese. As we crossed the final bridge to the harbor, I saw that it was wired for explosion. Soldiers were standing by to guard the charges. At the time, I thought they were waiting for the order to blow up the bridges. However, it would be several days before that happened. It turns out that we were among the earliest wave of refugees to cross the bridge. By the time we arrived at the port, the Marines had already left. They were ordered to board the ship first, because of the casualties they had suffered. By this time, the ROK Capital Division had retreated all the way from Cheongjin along the east coast to the Hamhung perimeter. Now that the U.S. Marine 1st Division had pulled out of Hungnam, the ROK Capital Division and the U.S. 3rd and 7th divisions took over its defense. The Chinese intended to destroy the X Corps and ROK Capital Division, but instead they were being decimated by fierce naval, air, and artillery bombardments. The Chinese knew that they could not fight the U.S. on the flat plains near the Navy fleet. Sun Tzu’s techniques for surprise attack had been used to good effect, but now the U.N. forces were wise to them. Sun Tzu had not taught them how to fight against a modern army with naval guns. What inflicted particularly heavy damage on the Chinese and allowed an orderly retreat of the X Corps was the Navy Task Force 90 commanded by Rear Admiral J. H. Doyle. Task Force 90 consisted of an armada of the 7th Fleet war ships with formidable firepower. The U.N. forces, including the ROKs, would evacuate practically everything with military value: 17,500 vehicles and 350,000 measurement tons of cargo.131

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16. Refugee Stories Our boat left amid such fireworks. The most vivid memory that I retained was how cold it was on board the LST, how bad the food was, and how seasick I was. Dinner and breakfast consisted of a rice ball with salt sprinkled over it. The LST sailed for what appeared to be an eternity for a seasick person before it docked at a wharf at Busan. A mass of refugees rushed out. For some reason, South Korean MPs tried to stop us from landing. They said that this was the wrong harbor, and they tried to redirect the LST to another location. Half of the Lee family got off the LST and the other half remained on the ship that sailed away. It took several days to find each other. The estimated number of refugees which fled the Hamhung-Hungnam area through sea is estimated at 91,000. Each of them has a story to tell on why they fled North Korea and what life they found in South Korea. One common factor was that they hated the Communists and feared retribution. Even to this day, the North Korean refugees have by and large remained more anti-Communist than the average South Korean. Many of Simon’s classmates also fled Hamhung. One of them, Mr. Hahn Kyong-nam, got out of Hungnam later than us. According to him, the situation in late December was considerably more chaotic than when we left. Hahn had his reason to fear Communist retribution. After Simon and some of his classmates volunteered for the Inmin-gun, Hahn decided to hide in order to avoid being conscripted. One day, the school asked all the students to come to collect their graduation certificates. Everyone who showed up was taken to an Inmin-gun training camp, but Hahn had smelled a rat and stayed away. He only came out of hiding, shouting Mansei!, when the ROKs showed up at Hamhung. When Chinese soldiers advanced to Hamhung, he had no choice but to escape the city. Like many young people at that time, Hahn left home alone. His father was too old to be drafted and he was sure that he would be back within a month, if not sooner. Hahn got out by walking all the way to the port of Hungnam on December 21 in freezing temperatures. On his way, he had to cross a small river on foot because the Americans had already blown up all the bridges to protect their retreat. Luckily, the river was frozen solid. In late December, refugees came out by the thousands. The crowd grew bigger by the day. A journalist who was on the scene reported seeing “elderly men and women carrying their possessions on their backs, mothers with their babies strapped into white cotton-cloth 131. See an on-line article posted on August 10, 2000, by the Naval Historical Center, the Department of Navy, “The Hungnam Evacuation, 10-24 December, 1950.”

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The Unfinished War slings, curious youngsters, some without parents, were eager for the ‘big boat ride’ to the south.”132 Hahn had to wait a full 24 hours before he could get on board a ship. While he was anxiously waiting his turn, he saw the awesome display of U.S. naval firepower. Many battleships in the open sea were too far away to see, but their barrage of large caliber shells illuminated the entire harbor just as if it was a broad daylight. He also saw the skies over the direction of Hamhung turn red. The battleships were firing at the ammunition depots and other war materiel. All the ammunition, food, and brand-new railroad rolling stocks which the X Corps could not take with them were blown up. The bombardment went on all day and all night. Hahn was part of one of the last groups that made it to the ship during the last days of this exodus. He landed on the Koje-do Island at the southern end of South Korea and volunteered for the ROK Army, in which he served for three years in an artillery battalion. He saw a lot of action. On the Inje front, his batteries of artillery fired so many shells day and night against the human waves of the Chinese Army that their gun barrels turned red from overheating. This was at the time of so-called the “Van Fleet shelling,” or carpet shelling of enemy-held areas. Another of Simon’s classmates, Park In-yong, shared a similar experience. He and his elder brother took an LST, out of Hungnam during the final day of evacuation. When they arrived at an east coast port of Okjin, now called Donghae, on the east coast of South Korea, they were asked to volunteer for the ROK Army, which they did gladly. When they arrived at the training camp, it was about to retreat to the south because the Chinese were coming south. During their march, they were soaked in icy rain and thought they would die from exposure. Park and two other fresh recruits knocked at the gate of a farmhouse for help. The owner fed them and the wife washed and dried their clothes while they warmed their backs on the heated ondol floor. The owners allowed them to stay overnight while their clothes dried. Park never forgot the farmer, during the 25 years he served in the ROK military. As soon as he retired, the first thing that he did was to search for the house. When he found it — now with a new tile roof instead of the straw of bygone days — a man answered the door. When Park asked him if he remembered the four stragglers in 1951, the man said, “You must be referring to my father. He’s passed away.” He also said that there were hundreds of soldiers 132. Goulden, p 379.

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16. Refugee Stories and civilians who had stopped by the house during the war. Park unloaded a sack of rice on the doorstep, but he was too late to thank the kind man who had saved him from freezing. Another North Korean refugee out of Hamhung, Dr. Donald Chung, became a cardiologist in the Los Angeles area. He wrote a book on his experience as a refugee. Anyone who was not fit to walk from Hamhung to the port city of Hungnam in sub-zero weather was left behind. Most people in that condition were not in the age bracket for military service. Dr. Chung left home, leaving behind his mother. Like many others, he believed that he would be back home in weeks, if not days. It took him 25 years. Returning from a trip to North Korea to pay homage to his parents’ graves, he wrote a book entitled The Three Day Promise: A Korean Soldier’s Memoir. It became a bestseller in South Korea and he donated the entire income from the book to the U.S. Korean War veterans’ organization. Minja Yoon also evacuated the port of Hamhung in December 1950 as the Chinese soldiers were closing in around the city. Her father was too old for the Inmin-gun, but they had another reason to be concerned. When the ROK soldiers advanced to Hamhung, one of Minja’s second cousins appeared at her doorstep. He had escaped to the South shortly after the division of Korea at the 38th parallel and became an officer of the ROK Army. He was assigned to a communications unit and came to Hamhung. This cousin not only visited her home, but also sometimes stayed in her house. The neighbors saw him. The family became enemies in the eyes of the Communists. Now, they were desperate to leave before the Inmin-gun arrived. Just as they were scrambling to leave the house, her parents decided to fetch her grandmother and told Minja to wait at the bus depot. By the time she arrived there, the depot was in complete chaos. She waited for her parents but they did not show up. Finally, her uncle arrived and decided to send her ahead to Hungnam for her own safety. He told her that he would bring her parents there soon. Minja waited and waited, but her parents did not show up. Finally, she was placed on an LST designated for POWs. Under the decks were hundreds of Inmin-gun and Chinese prisoners. She stayed on the open deck for three days until the ship was fully loaded with POWs and set sail. She doesn’t understand to this day how she avoided being frozen to death, riding on deck during the middle of that terrible winter. Minja never saw nor heard from her family again. The LST unloaded the refugees as well as the POWs on Koje-do Island. She was sent to an orphanage, while the POWs went to the Koje-do prison camp. After a year, she was moved

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The Unfinished War to the boarding house of a high school in Koje-do established by a church mission. Minja, not surprisingly, suffered from recurring nightmares; she could see her mother standing just across a small stream, but she would not cross it to come to her. Minja would shout, “Mom, why don’t you come to me?” And then she would wake up. These refugees abandoned their life savings and left behind everything they had. Thousands could not find passage out of Hungnam and some were no doubt killed as anti-Communists. In one last-minute rush to get on a ship, some 4,000 people managed to board a single LST, sinking it into the mud. ROK soldiers fired submachine guns into the air, and everyone got off while the skipper managed to maneuver his craft into deeper water.133 Then some Koreans re-boarded. Another ship, a large commercial vessel, carried about 12,000 civilians. Newspapers all over the world carried pictures of thousands of Koreans trying to flee Hungnam. A “big boat ride,” it was called. Others called it the Christmas Retreat. Some observers blame Washington for sending the U.N. forces across the 38th parallel to the north, only to fall back more or less at the 38th parallel. The invasion did not achieve its original intent, but hundreds of thousands of Koreans did escape to the south. On the west coast of Korea, refugees left by train, if they could find one. Otherwise, they traveled on foot. Lim Kun-shick, another classmate of Simon’s in Sariwon, was one of those who rode a train for part of the journey and walked the rest of the way. In early December 1950, Kun-shick noticed an increasing number of refugees moving south through the heart of Sariwon. According to him, “All kinds of people were on the move. Some appeared to be relatively wellto-do, and others appeared to be simple farmers with deep tans and wrinkles.” Kun-shick said everyone in Sariwon was confused about the exact battlefield situation at that time. The rumors were changing by the minute. Either a wave of Chinese soldiers was sweeping southward and the ROK troops were on the run, or EUSAK had steadied the battlefront and it was safe to stay put. Kun-shick’s father had his ear glued to the radio, but there was no useful information to be found. On December 5, the situation deteriorated rapidly. The highway was packed with people moving south: “The Chinese are coming!” they said. Dr. Lim decided it was time to go. His older son and daughters had already gone; the grandparents would have to be left behind — they were too fragile to join the column of refugees fleeing on foot in the middle of winter. And so Kun133. Goulden. p. 379.

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16. Refugee Stories shick’s mother, father, and four siblings packed up, taking with them the staff of Dr. Lim’s clinic including the medical assistant, pharmacist, nurse, and a servant. As was the custom, the servant woman was regarded as a member of the household rather than an employee. The family dog had to be left behind. He sensed something was wrong and barked furiously. The Lim family had completed preparations for the coming winter, and were comforted to know that the grandparents would have plenty to eat. The house was stocked with a large quantity of rice and kimchee in several 20-gallon jars. (They were buried underground except for the lids; this was to prevent the jars from freezing and cracking open.) Kimchee would last for the entire winter, fermenting ever so slowly because of the cold temperature. They also left 20 or so chickens and several ducks that would provide eggs. Dr. Lim was sure that he would return in a week or so, anyway. His wife packed enough rice, rice cakes, and toffee to last the travelers for several days, and she brought along several gold rings in case they needed money along the way. By now, everyone had heard that the ROK and U.N. soldiers were making a tactical retreat, and that they would return very soon; the Lim family felt they were pretty well prepared for a week or two away. They were just trying to run away from the Inmin-gun who might kill anti-Communists elements. An otherwise good book written by an Englishman remarked, “To a Westerner, the decision to abandon the very old and the very young seems almost fanatic. However, as the U.N. armies so often observed, the people of Korea seem to draw their character from the harsh environment in which they live. This was the kind of parting, the kind of decision that was commonplace in hundreds of thousands of Korean families that created the legions of starving orphans and infant beggars that hung like flies around every U.N. camp, supply dump, refuse heap.”134 Apparently, this military historian had no clue as to what the refugees were thinking: that this was just a one- or two-week evasion of the Inmin-gun. Filial duty is taken as seriously in Korea as anywhere on earth. He also had no appreciation of the risks inherent in a reputation as a “reactionary” or the appearance of being fit for military conscription. This was no World War II in Europe.

134. Max Hasting, The Korean War (London: Michael Joseph, 1987) p. 196, hereafter Hasting.

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The Unfinished War Even as Dr. Lim’s family rushed to the Sariwon train station, the situation was unraveling by the minute. The crowd was growing bigger and the people pushed and shoved. Kun-shick got separated from his family. At the station was a train with about half a dozen boxcars. He heard someone say that it was on its way to Seoul. The doors were shut. Apparently, a horde of refugees had already rushed into the boxcars and they were completely full. Kun-shick climbed up on top of one boxcar by the little stairs at the back. He could not find his parents, but he wanted to secure a seat somewhere on the train to the land of freedom. The train top was covered with coal residue, but most of the space was already crowded with people. Kun-shick noted that a mother had tied a rope around the waist of her daughter to prevent her from falling off. Kun-shick did not know where his parents were, but at this point the desire to live was the most compelling drive. However, the train did not budge for a whole day. This was December, amid the coldest winter in his memory. On the second day, Kun-shick managed to find his family, inside a boxcar. The people were packed like sardines and it was hard for anyone to go in or out. Eating rice was out of the question; people ate whatever other snacks they had brought with them. They peed into cans. At least, since the cars were packed, it did not feel so cold anymore. The train did not move for another two days. It was bad enough to be inside a jam-packed boxcar for three days, but an even bigger worry was that the Inmin-gun might appear any moment and shoot everybody inside. People were weighing whether it might not be better to get off the car and walk rather than wait like this indefinitely. That night, however, the train moved without warning. Kun-shick heard a scream and a thud. Someone obviously had fallen from the roof. Each time the train stopped at a station and each time it started, and each time the train made an erratic move, Kun-shick heard more screams and thuds. Kun-shick looked up at his father, wide-eyed. If he had not found his parents inside the boxcar, he might well have been one of those to fall off the roof. In Seoul, they stayed with a relative for a week. Then the news became truly ugly. People began to say that the Chinese were marching to Seoul. Hopes of an early return to Sariwon evaporated in a hurry. Even Seoul citizens were now packing to move south. Lim’s family decided to go to Kunsan, although most refugees were heading toward Daegu and Busan. Dr. Lim’s brother-in-law was a liquor manufacturer in Kunsan and had a big house.

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16. Refugee Stories The whole family of six moved on foot. By this time, they had hardly anything to eat. They stopped by roadside farmhouses to ask for food, as travelers had done throughout Korean history. Yeogwan, the traditional Korean inns, were available in towns and cities, but not out in the countryside. But thousands of refugees were on the road. Farmers could not afford to be generous to everyone. Furthermore, the southerners looked down on the northerners, calling them “38th [parallel] tramps.” Kun-shick said, “As soon as the farmers heard our northern accents, they would slam their doors. This went on for several days and we were dead tired and hungry.” However, as they were passing through a town, a train pulled in. Someone pointed and said that it was going to Kunsan. A horde of people pushed and shoved again to get on the train; Kun-shick’s parents and two of the children made it on board; Kun-shick and his younger sisters were left behind. There were so many people milling around that it was sheer madness. Soon the train began to pull away and Kun-shick saw his father feverishly waving at them to get on. Kun-shick and his sister ran as fast as they could, but the train was pulling away farther and farther. Kun-shick collapsed on the ground, desperate and out of breath. At that moment, he saw his father jump off the speeding train, and away it sped, taking the rest of the family south. Kun-shick could not remember how many days it took for them to reach Kunsan. Now and then, they would come across rivers where the bridges had been destroyed. They had to pay fishermen to ferry them across. One of these rivers flowed toward Kunsan; they found a fisherman who was willing to take them down stream, and slept the night away as his small boat took them south. And that was the last of his father’s savings — but they still had a distance to go. They asked strangers for food as they moved south. Kun-shick said, “My father led a privileged life, and was treated like a king at home, but I heard no word of complaint during this whole trip.” Finally, they made it to Kunsan. They expected that his mother and two siblings would have arrived safely ahead of them, but they were not there. Kunshick’s uncle had not heard from his mother yet. His uncle made an ondol room available for the Lims. For the first time in more than two weeks, they slept on a warm floor and ate as much hot food as they could. However, the ordeal was not over. Now, the news was that Kunsan might also fall. His uncle decided to charter a 100-ton boat and throw everything on it and move to Cheju-do Island — as far south as one could go and still be within Korea. Most of his uncle’s employees and their families decided to join them.

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The Unfinished War They were altogether a party of 300-some refugees-to-become. His uncle loaded barrels of liquor, some 1,000 sacks of rice (the raw material for making liquor), and even furniture. The journey to Cheju-do was supposed to take three days. However, within a day of leaving port, a typhoon tossed the 100-ton boat about like a toy. The boat was too big to beach on the rocky shore, and there was no proper harbor within reach. The captain navigated as close as he could to the shore, then threw out the anchor. All except Dr. Lim’s family and the crew went ashore on a small boat. Dr. Lim had no more money to spend on lodging and meals, so they decided to stay put. Other people were from the Kunsan area. Finally, the typhoon passed, but not before everyone onboard was sick, several 50-gallon liquor barrels were toppled over, and somehow a fire broke out. Incredibly, the men managed to put it out. When the sky cleared and their party came back aboard, the boat continued to sail south and landed at a small town called Hanlim on the Chejudo Island. The Lims stayed on the island for several months before they located Kun-shick’s mother. Her train had gone to Daegu and then to Busan, rather than to Kunsan. In 1953, Dr. Lim and his two children sailed to Busan to join the rest of the family. Kun-shick’s father found a job as a company doctor and Kun-shick resumed his college education in 1953. He said that although his father did not make much money as a company doctor, they did well and were happy in South Korea.

THE PLIGHT OF REFUGEES AND MASSACRES OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS The sufferings that the Lims and our family experienced cannot be belittled, but they were fundamentally different from the anguish experienced by the refugees at No Gun Ri during the first several weeks of the war — July 1950. According to an Associated Press (AP) of September 1999, some of them were intercepted and machine-gunned by American soldiers. This was big news in America and the Korean version of the story, written by one of Hanley’s coauthors, Sang-Hun Cho, was serialized in a Korean newspaper. Yet, this was not a new story. A committee in South Korea that investigated it summarized the extent and the nature of the killing in July 1994. What made No Gun Ri a big story were the interviews with the GIs who admitted that they committed such atrocities, and the documentary evidence in the archives.

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16. Refugee Stories Most Koreans never heard such stories during the war, which is understandable. There was strict censorship by the ROK, and voluntary restraints by the American press as requested by Washington. Yet, some fifty years later, the AP story broke and went on to win the 2000 Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting. A full-length book was written, complete with photocopies of once top-secret documents and references to a large number of now declassified documents.135 Hundreds of refugees (as many as 200 to 400 civilians, by some) were slaughtered at No Gun Ri. The decision to kill was apparently not made by individual soldiers out of fear or malice, but by the top echelons of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division and the U.S. 25th Division. The U.S. Fifth Air Force was asked to shoot the refugees. The headquarters of EUSAK also gave orders not to allow refugees to cross the battle lines. The civilians killed at No Gun Ri were mostly the elderly, women, and children. The soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Division acted according to the order of General Gay not to allow any civilian refugee to cross the lines. Still, officers and enlisted men down the line of command were not entirely blameless because the orders gave some leeway on children and women. No Gun Ri was not an isolated incident. General Kean, the commander of the 25th Infantry Division, operating next to No Gun Ri (a small rural village in South Korea famed for nothing but the massacre), issued an order: “All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly.” Three days later, Colonel Raymond D. Palmer of the 8th Cavalry ordered, “Shoot all refugees coming across river.” This order killed several hundred refugees. No doubt, there were many Inmin-gun soldiers infiltrating the lines disguised as refugees. A Korean witness, Kim Won Kee, said that he saw American planes drop napalm over refugees, incinerating children and everything alive. In one cave near Danyang, Chungchong Province, an American plane dropped napalm and some 300 Koreans suffocated to death. One survivor of the incident, Cho Bong Won (who later became principal of a high school), said that the villagers were only hiding there to avoid the frequent air raids. Colonel Turner C. Rogers, 5th Air Force Operations Chief, corroborates such stories. He wrote to his superior, General Timberlake, indicating that the U.S. 5th Air Force had been strafing “large groups of civilians,” and it was “sure to

135. Charles J. Hanley, Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mandoza, The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare From the Korean War (New York: Henry Holt and Company LLC, 2001), hereafter Hanley, et al.

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The Unfinished War receive wide publicity and may cause embarrassment to the U.S. Air Force and to the U.S. government in its relationship with the United Nations.” Major General Robert R. Gay, 1st Cavalry Division commander, said that he was sure “most white-clad people on South Korean roads were North Korean guerilla.” Apparently, there were white-clad infiltrators. However, that does not mean that everyone wearing white was a Communist infiltrator: perhaps half the farmers in the countryside wore white clothes at that time. They were mourning clothes. Confucian custom required lengthy mourning periods, sometimes for years — not only for the death of one’s direct family members but also for relatives, the king, and so on. Carried to the extreme, killing everyone in white clothes would have meant killing at least half the farmers. CBS newsman Edward R. Murrow observed atrocities, too. He sent a radio report to New York, saying “The U.S. military was creating ‘death valleys’ in South Korea, and wondering whether the South Korean people would ever forgive America.” CBS refused to broadcast Murrow’s report, because of the “self-censorship system that forbade criticism of the U.S. military.” There are many more such stories of hapless Koreans in Hanley’s books, Korean newspapers, and Seo and others who wrote extensively about atrocities during the war. Charles Hanley and the company tried to provide an explanation for the prevalence of such massacres by citing Howard Levie, the Army lawyer who oversaw war crimes investigations from MacArthur’s headquarters in 1950. He said that American brutalities were relatively rare in Europe during World War II, but became more common in Korea because “American soldiers considered Orientals to be ‘gooks,’ that’s why. They considered them [Koreans] to be lesser beings.” Were American racists? Levy’s explanation rings true. The U.S. Army was still segregated and racial prejudice was part of the American culture then. And it was not confined to those from the Deep South. Obviously, the killing was not motivated by racism, but by tactical considerations. However, it is hard to imagine such decisions being made so casually by American commanders in Europe during the World War II. This was an ugly chapter in the otherwise noble endeavors of the U.S.: Americans provided food and other aid and adopted orphans, and risked their lives for them. But this is not to say that all GIs were good guys. Books by Max Hastings and others including one by an ex-Marine136 show there were, indeed, bad sorts. Initially, the U.S. government denied any knowledge of this incident. After the AP story broke, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen conducted an

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16. Refugee Stories investigation. The report says that American soldiers involved in the incident were “young, under-trained, under-equipped, and new to combat” and under the command of leaders with limited combat experience. Clinton later expressed his “regret that Korean civilians lost their lives at No Gun Ri.” The U.S. Defense Department interviewed 200 Korean War veterans and 75 Korean victims’ family members, but no compensation has been paid to them. No Gun Ri did not go away. In February, 2002, the BBC documentary (Kill’em all) alleged that there was an order to kill civilians and the U.S. government tried to cover it up to avoid legal responsibility. It also reported that there were similar American massacres of Korean civilians in Pohang and Masan. Such news once again aroused the surviving family members of the massacre. The affected families and a Catholic Church group were preparing to take the matter to the U.N. Human Rights Committee. America does not accord legal protection to foreign casualties of war or to massacres in a uniform manner. Her cold-blooded reaction after accidentally bombing a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan and a wedding party in Afghanistan prove the point. By contrast, when two Canadian soldiers were killed by an accidental bombing in Afghanistan, a court martial was convened. Obviously, such differences contribute to anti-American sentiments. During the Korean War, simple collateral damages from bombing were rather common. Most of them were accepted as a military necessity. Lim Kunshick witnessed the destruction of Sariwon when the U.N. and ROK forces crossed the 38th parallel. He said, “By the time Seoul was recaptured, my family, including me, had taken refuge in a small village outside Sariwon. The city had a population of more than 50,000, but it was bombed heavily, perhaps because it was a commercial and transportation center. Soon, there was practically no building left in the town center except my father’s clinic and a police station.” Lim said, “Pretty much the whole city burned to ashes because the American bombers dropped napalm.” His family returned to the city once the bombing ceased, but the city had been burned down. Yet, Sariwon citizens received the ROK and American soldiers as liberators, and the people did not hold the burning of the town against them. Such a reaction was not always common. I came across a book written by a South Korean, with a fiery hatred against his own government and America. His short biography showed that his 136. Roger “Rog” G. Baker, USMC, Tanker’s Korea: The War in Photos, Sketches and Letters Home (Oakland, Oregon: Elderberry Press), p. 136.

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The Unfinished War whole village was bombed even though there was no Inmin-gun soldiers in it and his parents died in the raid. Such memories live long in a person. As the timeline moves further away from 1950, South Koreans who have not experienced the war tend to be more impressed by No Gun Ri and other such incidents as well as Roosevelt’s sell-out of Korea than by the blood that Americans shed on the peninsula to buy their freedom. The division of the country and the constant threat of another war are daily reminders to Koreans that they are still the victims of Roosevelt’s decision — which seems to have been taken with arrogant disregard for the interests of the Koreans themselves.

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17. AN OLD SOLDIER FADES AWAY, A NEW ONE STEPS IN In December 1950, General MacArthur told officials in Washington that unless he received major reinforcements, the Chinese could drive the U.N. forces out of Korea. At the time, there was only a small reserve of combat units in the United States, and the JCS notified MacArthur that a major build-up of U.N. forces was out of the question. They said that if it was possible, MacArthur could stay in Korea; but should the Chinese drive U.N. forces back on Busan, the JCS would order a withdrawal to Japan. Secretary Acheson seemed to have all but written off Korea. The question was how to pull out rather than whether or not to pull out. Even Truman seemed to gravitate toward such an inglorious end to the war. General Ridgway arrived in Korea amid all these political and military debates. He quickly restored EUSAK’s morale and performance. He wanted “maximum punishment, maximum delay” of any Communist advances. In the process, he fired several division commanders. Among those sacked was the 2nd Division Commander, Maj. General Robert B. McClure, who had retreated without the corps commander’s permission. Admittedly, McClure had been unable to reach Corps commander Almond during a snowstorm. Another reason for firing General McClure was that he had not flattened a Korean village in the battlefield with artillery, something that Ridgway had ordered to be done as a routine practice. In this case, there was no sign that the village was occupied by the enemy. The war had now entered a more exaggerated phase of ruthlessness. Washington would not allow the UNC to bomb Manchuria, but Korean villages appear to have been fair game. For this reason, to many Koreans General Ridgway’s legacy will always raise the question: Did he not use excessive force?

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The Unfinished War South Koreans consider that such ruthless tactics ought to have been applied to the Chinese, if anyone — not to Koreans. Returning to General Ridgway’s battlefield exploits in Korea, his first challenge came on the New Year’s Eve. Enemy forces launched another all-out attack, directing their major thrust toward Seoul. This was the third general offensive. He was not interested in defending Seoul or any other piece of land. He evacuated Seoul. The U.N. forces withdrew to a line about 40 miles south of Seoul. The residents of Seoul once again saw Communist soldiers entering the city in what was turning out to be a seesaw battle. It set off another wave of refugees, more destruction of the city, and more atrocity for those who were trapped behind the lines Only light Chinese forces pushed south of the city, and enemy attacks in the west petered out. On the central and eastern fronts, North Korean attacks did not abate until mid-January. However, beyond that time, the enemy could not sustain its offensive. As Ridgway suspected, the enemy’s primitive logistical system did not permit undertaking long offensives. The FEAF was causing havoc to the enemy’s transportation infrastructure. The Chinese were facing severe food shortages and they were already relying on local supplies to meet their food requirements. There was a limit. Ten days later, Ridgway went on a cautious counter offensive. EUSAK advanced slowly and methodically, ridge by ridge, line by line, wiping out each pocket of resistance before moving farther north. Enemy forces fought back vigorously, and in February struck back in the central region. During that counterattack, the U.S. 2nd Division successfully defended the town of Chipyong-ri against a much larger Chinese force. EUSAK then recaptured Seoul by mid-March, and by the first day of spring stood just below the 38th parallel. This was a new EUSAK. During the U.N. counter-offensive, the Chinese noted some interesting tactical changes brought about by Ridgway. He anticipated the Chinese predilection for penetrating behind the line and he blocked it by spreading out his troops seamlessly across broad fronts. The U.N. troops were no longer moving in large units. Small units were attacking from different directions. They learned to use the topography and natural settings as the Chinese did, rather than sticking to the major roads. Thus, the Chinese counter offensive flopped. Ridgway’s army was getting tougher and more skillful. Colonel Paul Freeman of the 23rd Regiment and Lt. Colonel Ralph Montclair137 of the French battalion emerged as heroes. The

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17. An Old Soldier Fades Away, A New One Steps In Greek and Turkish units also fought well. Like several other veterans of the Korean War, Colonel Freeman later became a four-star general. During this offensive, however, ROK divisions suffered heavy casualties because General Almond, who commanded the central and eastern fronts at that time, sent the lightly armed ROK divisions against the Chinese without any back-up. The heavily armed U.S. divisions were well behind the ROK divisions. The ROKs took unacceptably heavy casualties in the so-called Massacre Valley. To prevent possible adverse repercussions from the U.N. member countries supporting South Korea, the press release on the number of casualties was censored. Paik wrote that Almond, who lost many Marines at the Changjin Reservoir, might have been trying to spare the American units at the expense of the ROKs. In any event, Ridgway steadied the entire front. The debate on whether or not to withdraw from Korea became an academic issue. Ridgway’s battlefield exploits notwithstanding, he would never be an endearing figure to Koreans. He apparently had little regard for Asiatic races. According to Goulden, Ridgway visited POW camps at Busan and remarked that the North Korean and Chinese prisoners were just a “shade above the human beast.” He also said, “It is by the use of such human canaille that the Soviets are destroying our men while conserving their own.” Korean-American scientist Young Sik Kim, who posted his book-length account of the war entitled Eyewitness: A North Korean Remembers on the Web, lists several quotes on racial prejudice among American military leaders. One, originally from Goulden’s Korea, says that General Ridgway issued an order on January 8, 1951, to “shoot any civilian suspected of being a Communist before they become prisoners.” Ridgway also asked MacArthur’s permission to use poison gas. Ridgway, who so ably fought off the Communists, appears to have come close to committing war crimes — if he did not actually commit them — via orders, requests and statements such as these. Young Sik Kim was no leftist. He would perhaps consider himself a Korean nationalist. He was making a point that many top American generals were racists at that time, although he thought that America is today “the most racially tolerant country in the world.” Perhaps Kim’s history might explain his bitterness to Americans during the war. He was a North Korean refugee who

137. Lt. Colonel Ralph Montclair was a veteran of the First and Second World War, with a rank of Lt. General, but to participate in the Korean War with a mere battalion of French soldiers, he took the rank of Lt. Colonel.

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The Unfinished War received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Purdue University and taught the subject at Ohio State University. In North Korea, he was a student volunteer fighting the Communists as a member of a guerilla unit. After escaping to South Korea, he worked as an interpreter for the CIA. One day, he happened to be interpreting for a CIA officer when his former North Korean guerilla commander came to see his CIA boss. His former boss had risked his life to cross the demilitarized zone, better known for its acronym DMZ, on foot to ask for airdrops or the evacuation of his unit. The CIA officer denied both and coldly abandoned Kim’s old guerilla unit that was still operating in North Korea after the cease-fire. The Americans were still supporting some pro-American and proSouth Korean partisans behind the DMZ, but they too were later abandoned without being offered any way out of North Korea. As the war dragged on and casualties mounted, support for the war waned and the way Truman fought the war became increasingly controversial. Republicans in Congress were talking about sending a Congressional delegation to Tokyo to ask MacArthur how the war should be fought. On February 12, 1951, Representative Joseph Martin, Minority Leader of the House, deplored the “sheer folly” of not using Chiang’s troops in Korea, and weeks later sent the text of his remarks to MacArthur, inviting comment. MacArthur offered his views on March 20: Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Taiwan is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition. It seems strangely difficult for some to realize…that if we lose this war to Communism in Asia, the fall of Europe is inevitable; win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you point out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.

To Truman, such a letter to his political opponent was direct insubordination and violated his order to clear all statements other than routine matters through Washington. To Truman, this was a case of a soldier meddling in national policy. The Times of London called the letter the “most dangerous” of “an apparently unending series of indiscretions.” The British government called it “irresponsible.” More attacks on MacArthur would follow, suggesting that he “personally” wanted war against China. Republicans such as presidential contender Senator Robert Taft rallied around MacArthur, who was now at the center of a political storm.

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17. An Old Soldier Fades Away, A New One Steps In While this was going on, Ridgway opened a general offensive on April 5 toward the more easily defended lines roughly ten miles above the 38th parallel, known as the “Kansas Line.” Truman recalled MacArthur on April 11 and named General Ridgway as his successor. In a speech given to the nation, Truman said, “We do not want to see the conflict extended. We are trying to prevent a world war — not to start one.” In a direct rebuttal of MacArthur’s well known positions, Truman asked rhetorical questions: “But you may ask why can’t we take other steps to punish the aggressor? Why don’t we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don’t we assist Chinese Nationalists troops to land on the mainland of China?” He answered these questions by saying, “If we were to do these things we would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war.” This seemed to provide a potent justification for firing MacArthur, although what we know today indicates that this was an unfounded fear. MacArthur returned to America amid the thunderous ovation of a nation deeply grateful to him. Americans were shocked by the dismissal of one of its greatest military heroes. MacArthur had his opportunity to reply to Truman’s speech on April 19, 1951 to a joint session of Congress. He said, “Once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War’s very objective is victory — not prolonged indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory. For history teaches us with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war.” A Gallup poll indicated that two out of three Americans disapproved of Truman’s dismissal of MacArthur. The controversy lasted many months, but in the end the nation decided that the president as commander in chief had the right to fire a military commander. Many people did not necessarily believe that the military strategy of the Truman Administration was correct. The history of the Korean War has been rewritten many times by writers with the Vietnam War frame of mind. Some of them branded MacArthur as a warmonger who almost started the third world war, but others disagree. The events that followed have showed that the Truman Administration’s strategy did not end the war quickly, as expected, but killed a large number of soldiers and civilians, only to achieve at the end a stalemate. Did that outcome give encouragement to Communists elsewhere, as predicted by MacArthur? The answer to that question is uncertain.

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The Unfinished War To Koreans, MacArthur was the symbol of struggle against the Communists. He, more than any other American, symbolized what was great about America. He seemed to be the only American general who genuinely cared for Asians. The Filipinos admired him when he was in the Philippines, and the Japanese admired him for the reforms that he introduced in the post-war era. To Koreans, he was the only American general who attempted to unify Korea — albeit for entirely different reasons than Koreans did. For sure, he made the mistake of dismissing the possibility of large-scale Chinese intervention and not believing it even when the evidence was there, but Koreans were shocked: Is this a way to fight the Communists? Koreans respected the way Ridgway fought the war, but he was just a professional soldier, not an inspiring figure like MacArthur, who gave a purpose for the fighting and sufferings and a vision at the end of a long dark tunnel. Before going to Tokyo, General Ridgway turned over EUSAK to Lt. General James A. Van Fleet. He, too, fought well. He successfully stopped the Chinese Spring Offensive, which commenced on April 22, 1951, with 337,000 soldiers of 21 Chinese and 9 North Korean divisions. Van Fleet’s saturation shelling on the dense formation of enemy troops slaughtered the enemy in droves. This was a costly offensive for the Communists, although Van Fleet almost ran dangerously low on ammunition. The U.N. side suffered 900 casualties, but the Chinese suffered 35,000 casualties.138 The consumption rate of artillery shells was five times the normal rate during battle. Van Fleet wanted a counter-offensive, but he was not allowed to advance beyond the so-called Kansas-Wyoming lines. The Wyoming Line included a bulge projecting from the Kansas Line. The bulge was known as the Iron Triangle with Pynggang (not Pyongyang) to the north and two southern towns of Chorwon to southwest and Kumhwa at southeast. Ridgway ordered to inflict maximum damage on the Communists. This was a war to kill the enemy rather than to win the war. Van Fleet resented the no-win policy of the Truman Administration. He was a passionate anti-Communist like MacArthur and Syngman Rhee, and sought a clear-cut victory. He too did not last long with the Truman Administration. A more politically correct Lt. General Maxwell Taylor replaced him somewhat prematurely in early 1953 and went on to become the Army chief of staff and Ambassador to Vietnam. In an interview given to the Life magazine, Van Fleet said, “We could have beaten the [Communists] in the 138. Hanguk Junjaeng-sa, by the Korean Military Academy, op. cit. p. 480.

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17. An Old Soldier Fades Away, A New One Steps In spring of 1951[.] Our offensive caught the Chinese by complete surprise. We could have followed up our success, but that was not the intention of Washington. Our State Department had already let the Reds know that we were willing to settle on the 38th parallel.” Van Fleet was referring to Acheson’s statement indicating that the U.S. would settle for the 38th parallel, thus surrendering some hard-earned real estate to the Communists. Enemy forces renewed their attack after dark on May 15, but it was unsuccessful. Battles raged on, just so that the Chinese would come to the negotiating table.

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18. THE WAY WE SURVIVED THE WAR Returning to the day the Lee family disembarked from the LST docked at Busan harbor in December 1950, those who got off first were led to a cavernous theater from which all the seats had been removed. It was half full of refugees. There were some empty straw mats thrown over the cement on which we slept. Even in this southernmost city of Busan, it was freezing. The hardest thing for most North Korean refugees was to eke out a living without home, job or money. Dr. Lee and his colleagues from Hamhung joined the ROK Army as military surgeons — they were all beyond the mandatory age for military service, but there was no better option. Each of the seven doctors and their families was given a room in a yeogwan — an economy-class, Koreanstyle lodging — called Dong Sung in the central part of the city. Even a yeogwan was a luxury for a refugee family. Many lived in shacks made of makeshift materials, with roofs made of flattened cans, on the steep hillsides surrounding Busan. The Lee family of seven was given an upstairs room, perhaps 150 square feet at most. There was no heat; a bare electric light bulb hung from the ceiling and several families shared one bathroom. There was a stove for cooking and heating the room, and each family bought some utensils and coal for the stove. Although this was a huge improvement over the cement floor in the theater, it was extremely cramped and difficult. However, Hamhung was already a different world in a different era. Had they stayed there, they would not have lived to enjoy their house. Most likely, Dr. Lee and Simon would have faced a labor camp, if not a firing squad.

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The Unfinished War Hyon-ja, the elder sister, was almost 16 years old. She took job as a nurse’s aide. Notwithstanding the fact that two of my family members were working for the ROK Army, we did not have enough money to feed ourselves adequately. Dr. Lee received the equivalent of about twenty dollars a month, and Hyon-ja received far less. The government had hardly any revenue and survived on American handouts. ROK military casualties mounted daily, and the militia was grabbing young men on the street for the ROK Army. One day, Simon was taken by the militia; he was a healthy-looking eighteen-year-old. This is how he ended up in the ROK army — not out of love of country or hatred of the Communists. Simon’s military career ended abruptly when he contracted TB and was coughing blood. Simon was lucky compared with Kun-shick’s older brother, In-shick. When the Korean War started, In-shick was 22 years old, newly married, and teaching in an elementary school in Pyongyang. He and his wife left Pyongyang several days after his parents left Sariwon. As they moved south, an ROK MP captured In-shick. He was kept behind barbed wire for a couple of months. The ROK Army treated him like a prisoner because he came from the North and his background could not be ascertained. During the detention and interrogation, the food was so poor that he fell ill. One day, the ROK Army contacted In-shick’s father, Dr. Lim, then on Cheju Island. When Kun-shick finally met his older brother again, In-shick looked like a scarecrow. The ROK Army decided that he was not a spy, but decided to release him rather than drafting him into the army because he was physically too weak to serve. They did not want one more corpse in the camp. Within a month of discharge, In-shick died from illness caused by malnutrition. During this time, the food budget was quite insufficient already, but some ROK officers higher up were stealing food so that what reached some of the conscripted men or prisoners was wholly inadequate. The military and government pay was such that commanders who did not take advantage here and there would starve their own family members. An honest commander skimmed off just enough for himself and his family to survive, but the corrupt one ripped off enough to live in style. When the ROK Army discharged In-shick, he could not even speak coherently. Being the eldest son, his father, Dr. Lim, had sent In-shick to Japan for his secondary education. Dr. Lim had not spared money in raising him. Inshick thought that he was escaping the brutality of the Inmin-gun. However, that or an immediate execution like those at No Gun Ri would have been far

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18. The Way We Survived the War kinder than dying the way he did at the hands of a “friendly” government. He was only one of an unknown number of war casualties who was not even recorded as such. No one was exempt from the drudgery of life as refugee. Boon Yong decided that she, Hyo-ku, and I should peddle cigarettes, candies, and that curious American invention chewing gum, on the streets outside the yeogwan. Koreans in those days were very class-conscious. This was a humiliating experience for Boon Yong, who was from a rich yangban landlord family. Even for me, the most difficult aspect of the work was overcoming humiliation. The only consolation in being a peddler in those days was that there were many like of them throughout the city. In some streets, there would be more than one such peddler on each block. Legless and armless veterans would sell their wares on the sidewalk, too; there were beggars everywhere. Later, I ended up as a “house boy” on a train that transported American troops to the front. I cleaned up the train after each trip. I basically worked for food. On payday, the sergeant in charge of the train would give me a dollar. Still later, I worked at a Marine airbase in Kimhae. I have nothing but praise for the Marines I met — they constantly cursed, but I never heard them call Koreans “gooks.” I ended up working at a mess hall cleaning ovens, carrying boxes of powdered milk, eggs, sacks of flowers, sugar, and loads of meat and potatoes from the warehouse to the kitchen. For about a month, I stayed in a Marine barracks with twenty or so Marines. One of them asked me to write a letter to his wife’s younger sister. She wanted a Korean pen pal. A few days later, I drafted a letter in Korean and asked Mr. Min, a Korean interpreter, to translate it into English. What could I say to a stranger, thousands of miles away? I talked about my family: my father being a medical doctor but serving the ROK Army, and practically everyone else in my family serving in the ROK Army to fight the Communists. I also said how happy we were to escape North Korea and find freedom in South Korea, although our life as refugees was miserable. When I showed the letter to Roger, he seemed impressed. He circulated the letter to all the Marines in the barracks and beyond. Several days later, we had a meeting. My translator was also present. Roger asked me whether I had written the letter, and if it was a true story. I said that Mr. Min had written it; but he insisted he had only translated it. A certain Master Sergeant Thompson, whom I had never met before, with a bushy mustache, said, “Lee-san, this is a very good letter. We’d like to get it published.”

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The Unfinished War They were perhaps surprised that this young boy, seemingly like any other street urchin, had something to say about Communism and the value of freedom. I still do not know why such Korean family travails, which were common at that time, impressed the Marines. Perhaps it was the novelty of being able to present an articulate individual to represent the anonymous crowd; war correspondents followed around generals and other notables for big stories, rather than covering stories of Korean families who were uprooted and whose properties were burned to ashes. It must have had some propaganda appeal, as well. Nothing came of publishing the letter, but several weeks later I received a note from a Mr. E. L. Hogan of Pittsburgh, who owned a mining company. We exchanged several letters. Soon thereafter, I was living outside the military base, like all the other Korean laborers who worked at the base. However, all of them were grown-ups; I seemed to be the only kid doing a man’s work. I paid for room and board at a farmer’s house outside the base. Like most boys of my age, I did not know how to cook. Now that I was not with the Marines, I had nothing to do in the evening — no radio, and for that matter not even electricity, just a kerosene lamp. It was too dim even for reading. There was no telephone in this remote village, and my parents did not have a telephone, either. After about six months of such life, I searched for my parents and found out that they moved away from the yeogwan. I finally located them in Daegu. By that time, Dr. Lee had gotten out of the military service, and opened his medical practice with the help of his medical school classmate. During the war, practically all Korean people had a hard life. There were thieves, pickpockets, and con artists everywhere. The press was awash with stories of corruption in the government and the military. Most government employees had no way to feed their families unless they took bribes or their families were independently wealthy. The economy of South Korea would have been a challenge for any president, but Rhee hadn’t the foggiest notion on how to manage it. Rhee and the National Assembly had been at loggerhead over atrocities committed by the ROK soldiers at Geochang. This was a remote county surrounded by mountains that remained in the Inmin-gun’s hands until early October 1950. Even after the Inmin-gun withdrew, the ROK was suspicious of the loyalty of the residents. Then on December 5, 1950, several hundred Communist guerillas struck and occupied parts of the county until early February 1951. The police could not handle the situation and they requested the ROK Army to intervene. The ROK 11th Division, which

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18. The Way We Survived the War specialized in securing guerilla-held areas, moved in on February 5, 1951. Two days later, the guerillas attacked a police station and killed eleven policemen. The ROK soldiers responsible for protecting the police station went on a rampage. In one village, the soldiers killed 76 civilians. Most of them were old people, women, and children. To the ROKs, they were either Communists or Communist sympathizers. Young men were rare perhaps because they joined, voluntarily or not, the guerillas. In another village, soldiers ordered all the civilians to gather in the school grounds, and then burned the village. In two other villages, 106 and, respectively, 517 villagers were massacred. During the trial of those responsible for the massacre, the soldiers testified that they were merely following orders. The National Assembly demanded that the division commander and others responsible for issuing orders be punished. Throughout the summer of 1951, the trial of several involved officers continued. However, Brig. General Choi Duksin, who gave the orders, escaped all responsibility. In a way, it was ROK’s No Gun Ri. After the Inchon landing, Simon’s classmate Taeksoo’s 101 Engineering Battalion moved north, first to Seoul and finally to Dongduchon. The Inmin-gun had retreated from the town only hours earlier. The rightist group rounded up ten families who had executed rightists during the previous three months, and demanded that Taeksoo’s unit execute all ten families, including the children — for, if they were not executed, some day they might return to avenge the deaths of their parents. Such harsh punishments were used in old Korean kingdoms for crimes of treason. Taeksoo’s platoon leader obliged, rounded up the families, and marched them to a mountainside. Taeksoo noticed a girl of about sixteen following the firing squad. Asked why she was following, she said, “The chairman of the People’s Committee, there, crushed my father’s head with a heavy stone.” After Dongduchon, Taeksoo’s unit rushed to the Chinese border. He felt that finally the reunification of Korea was near and that he would be able to return home soon to see his parents and sisters. However, he had no way of knowing whether they were dead or alive. The thought didn’t linger long because, by the time Taeksoo’s unit reached Duckchon, after passing Pyongyang, the Chinese intervened. His unit retreated in a big hurry.

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The Unfinished War When Taeksoo’s unit reached Danyang — a village in Chungchong Province — at night, the platoon was attacked by Communist guerillas, which had been trapped and could not retreat to the North. By the time the battle was over, the platoon was nearly wiped out, but Taeksoo was among those who survived. The next day, at the train station, Taeksoo ran into his brother, Yusoo, who was three years his junior. They had not seen each other since Taeksoo escaped Sariwon in a big hurry before the war. Taeksoo found out that their parents and sisters were still in North Korea. Yusoo’s train left for Busan and Taeksoo’s unit began its retreat south as well. Little did they know at that time that they would one day create a major furniture manufacturing company in South Korea, and donate a huge sum of money to North Korea in the late 1990s to repave the roads in Sariwon and furnish North Korean hotels with new beds. This was done under the encouragement of Kim Dae Jung Administration’s “sunshine policy.” The two brothers were motivated by their desire to help their sister, still in Sariwon, and obtain a permission from North Korea government to visit Sariwon so that they could pay a visit to their parents’ graves in North Korea.

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19. A TALKING WAR By June 1951, the U.S. saw no point in continuing with the war. With neither the will nor the passion to win it, all the casualties appeared pointless. In an effort to determine the Communist side’s interest in a cease-fire, the State Department sent a feeler to the Russian Ambassador to the U.N., Yakov Malik. A reply came within days, indicating that the Russians were eager to participate. On June 25, newspapers in China indicated that China had accepted Malik’s proposal. On June 29, General Ridgway broadcast a statement indicating that he would be willing to have a talk with the Communists. On June 30, Syngman Rhee issued his own terms for a cease-fire, practically demanding North Korea to surrender. The UNC ignored Syngman Rhee. If U.N. forces had pulled out, Rhee’s government would not be able to fight the Communists. On July 1, a big demonstration was staged in Busan against the negotiations. Even the National Assembly, dominated by Rhee’s political opponents, also opposed cease-fire. They wanted to fight on until the country was unified in spite of the suffering and casualties that Koreans were enduring. (The number of Korean War casualties per capita was about 300 times greater than those of the U.S.) Since there were no opinion polls in those days, it was impossible to determine how many ordinary Koreans really wanted to go on fighting. However, leaving the country divided once again was unacceptable to most Koreans, and they were not ready to quit yet. On July 2, 1950, the Beijing radio broadcast, “If Americans want peace, Americans should accept Chinese terms,” which included cease-fire along the

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The Unfinished War 38th parallel. This would mean the U.N. side had to give up a large chunk of real estate gained at tremendous cost. Weakening the U.S. position somewhat was the fact that earlier on Dean Acheson had committed yet another untimely gaffe: stating that the cease-fire could take place along the 38th parallel. Talk-talk and fight-fight is an ancient Chinese war tactic. Some persons including MacArthur attributed the loss of China to the Communists to the way Secretary of State George C. Marshall tried to mediate that armistice between the Nationalists and the Communists. MacArthur wrote in his memoir, “In China, Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek was gradually pushing the Communists back, being largely aided and supplied by the United States[.] Instead of pushing on to the victory, an armistice was arranged...and General Marshall was sent to amalgamate the two components.”139 MacArthur noted that age and perhaps the war had worn Marshall “down into a shadow of his former self.” After months of fruitless negotiations, an indecisive Marshall withdrew. However, in this interval of seven months, the Nationalists had received no munitions or supplies from the U.S., while the Soviets had reinforced the Chinese Communist armies. Mao wanted to win the talking war, and he gained an upper hand over Chiang while talking. While most historians think that more than the lengthy talks contributed to the fall of Chiang, the U.N. side had a justified concern whether China would not try to strengthen her position again while the talks went on. On the U.N. side there were those who thought that they could beat the Communists on the battlefield. General Van Fleet was one of them; he remarked that the enemy was so weakened by June 1952 that EUSAK could have easily marched north and defeated the Communists. In early July, Van Fleet had prepared and submitted to Ridgway “Operation Overwhelming,” aimed at pushing the front all the way to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line by early September. Ridgway did not approve the plan and decided to pursue a cease-fire agreement. He ordered Van Fleet to hold onto the present position along the “KansasWyoming” lines. Heading the U.N. negotiating team was Admiral C. Turner Joy, a World War II veteran now in charge of naval forces in the Far East; Major General Lawrence Craig of the Air Force, Major General Henry Hodes of the Eight Army, Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, and one South Korean, Major General Paik Sun 139. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York, Toronto and London: McGrawHill Book Company), p. 320, hereafter MacArthur.

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19. A Talking War Yup. Paik was handpicked by the UNC, and did not represent or receive any instructions from the ROK in any way. Ridgway had done some homework on the art of negotiating with the Chinese. He decided that one of the qualifications for being on the negotiation team was the ability to keep from urinating for six or more hours without a break and to maintain one’s cool under insult and provocation from the Communists. “Asian experts” told the team members that they were to be mindful of the Oriental sensitivity to embarrassment — that is, losing face. The Communist side announced that its negotiation team would be headed by North Korean General Nam Il, commander of the Inmin-gun Second Army. General Nam Il was born in Korea, but when he was young, his family had fled to Siberia to escape the Japanese oppression. He later took up Soviet citizenship and spent most of his adulthood in the USSR. As a Soviet captain, he fought the Germans at Stalingrad. Later, as the chief of staff of a division, he helped take Warsaw. After returning to North Korea, he held one important position after another. Another member of the Communist delegation was General Lee Sang Jo, who had fought in China against the Nationalists and returned to Pyongyang in 1945. The third member of the North Korean team was also a military man. On the Chinese side were General Hsieh Fang and the first vice commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, General Tung Hwa. Hsieh Fang played a major role in the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek by the Chinese Communists in 1936. Immediately after the peace agreement with Chiang, he became the chief of propaganda for the northeastern Chinese provinces. After the talks started, Admiral Joy believed that General Hsieh Fang had direct access to Beijing and was controlling the negotiating position of the Communist side. On July 10, the actual meeting commenced. The venue was at Kaesong, about 50 miles northwest of Seoul. This was formerly a South Korean city, and during the ancient kingdom of Koryo it was the capital city. As the talks began, it lay about 10 miles north of the front. As Goulden, among others, has documented in detail, the opening session of the negotiations immediately turned into propaganda circus. Communist escort vehicles met Admiral Joy’s convoy at Panmunjom. Three vehicles filled with Communist officers in their uniforms led the convoy of vehicles to Kaesong. The roadside was packed with Communist photographers, and the Communist officers made victory signs at them. The U.N. team looked like POWs being escorted to prison. At the meeting, when Admiral Joy sat on his seat, he sank almost below the tabletop. The Communists had sawed the legs off his chair. Across from him, General Nam

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The Unfinished War gloated and puffed on his cigarette in satisfaction. Communist photographers took reels of films before Admiral Joy could obtain a proper chair. During a recess, a Communist guard pointed a sub-machine gun at Admiral Joy and one guard proudly explained to Col. Oliver G. Kinney in charge of liaison that a medal on his chest was for “killing 40 Americans.” General Nam Il proposed an immediate cease-fire and the establishment of a 20 km demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel. After this, POWs would be exchanged. The Communist side also demanded the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea — while there was no provision to confirm the withdrawal of the Chinese troops. Even before getting into these agenda items, an immediate problem was the objection raised by the Western press — guntoting Communist guards controlled the conference area and denied them access. The jockeying for a propaganda advantage continued for a couple weeks before talk started in earnest. The first real issue discussed was about the withdrawal of foreign troops while the press was already talking about getting “the boys back home,” exasperating Ridgway, who wanted to so in honorable terms. As the patience-taxing talks were inching forward, the Chinese brought in more troops and supplies to North Korea. The situation was alarming. It was understood from the beginning that fighting would not stop until a cease-fire agreement was reached. On July 21, Ridgway told the JCS that he intended to unleash an “all-out air strike on Pyongyang” aimed at disrupting the alarming build-up of supplies and equipment. The JCS declined. It did not want to antagonize the Communists and put the cease-fire at risk. On the issue of foreign troop withdrawal, Ridgway stood firm and told the JCS that he would recess the talks until something constructive was heard from the Communists. It would be difficult to re-deploy U.S. troops, due to the distance factor, while only a bridge separates Korea from China. Ridgway had the backing of President Truman. Notwithstanding all the State Department’s concern that this would sidetrack negotiations, the Communist side backed down and agreed not to raise the issue of American troop withdrawal. It was becoming apparent that the Communist side wanted cease-fire as much as Washington. The next round of negotiations concerned a demarcation line for the ceasefire. The Communist insisted on using the 38th parallel. The UNC did not want to give up their hard-won real estate. By August 11, negotiations reached an impasse.

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19. A Talking War A horrendous number of soldiers died in battles to occupy better vantage points, mostly in the Iron Triangle. New and evocative names were showing up on the press: “Blood Ridge,” “Ridge 983,” “J Ridge,” “Punch Bowl.” Van Fleet prepared ambitious operational plans to capture more real estate but Ridgway did not approve them. The good news on the U.N. side was that the capabilities of the ROK Army were increasing sharply. Washington wanted to upgrade ROK capabilities in preparation for the U.S. troop pull out. The firepower of the U.N. side had increased to the point that Chinese mass assaults became costly to them. Now seasoned in battle, American and ROK troops burrowed deeper into reinforced bunkers and called in hails of artillery shells when the hordes of Chinese attacked. And as the winter approached again, improved logistical support meant the UNC would be better outfitted than the Chinese to endure the cold. The Communists realized this. One disturbing sign for the U.N. side was the vastly increased number of the Chinese troops. By early September, the number of Communist soldiers increased by 61,000 men to a total of 700,000. Furthermore, intelligence reports indicated an increasing presence of Caucasians in North Korea, suggesting possible Soviet involvement. Another disturbing development was an indication of increasing Communist air strength. Yet, the Chinese did not look forward to spending another winter on the Korean battlefield. Negotiations resumed in earnest on October 19. Ridgway insisted that the U.N. should refuse to return to Kaesong and insisted on meeting in the neutral zone of Panmunjom. Washington was nervous about further delays, but reluctantly gave permission to seek a new venue. On November 12, the Communist side agreed. By this time, some four months had passed since opening the negotiations. The Communists gave up their demand to stick to the 38th parallel. The New York Times asked why the delegates were haggling over “seeming trifles” when the “big issues” had been settled already. Ridgway tried to make the point that the agreed line must be one that could be defended. Washington was under pressure from its European allies to get out of Korea. The Europeans had contributed no more than 5 percent of the men and resources but seemed to have a 50 percent say about the war. On the other hand, the ROK military, which suffered over 80 percent of the total military casualties of the war, had no say. Some narrators of the war talked as if South Korea was the 100 percent beneficiary of the war efforts by its allies and thus should not

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The Unfinished War complain. They forgot that this small, poor country was taking the brunt of fighting the “Cold” War. It had become a global war fought on Korean soil, where South Korea “loaned” the whole country and its people to the U.S. and other U.N. member countries in the fight against the Communists. Of course, South Korea wanted to remain free from Communism and become a unified country again. Even more difficult to resolve than the lines of cease-fire were the prisoner of war (POW) issues. On December 18, both sides released the number of prisoners that they held. The peculiarity of the situation was that the UNC held 132,474 POWs consisting of 95,531 North Koreans, 16,243 former ROKs who had been captured and conscripted into the Inmin-gun — in violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs — and 20,720 Chinese. The Communist side said it had only 11,551 POWs consisting of 7,142 ROKs, 3,193 Americans, and 1,216 U.N. soldiers other than Americans. The Communist side’s claim that it held only 11,551 POWs fell much short of an earlier number and list. Ridgway accused the Communists of not providing the entire list. Some 50,000 U.N. and ROK POWs were missing. The Communists claimed that many of them had died from sickness and bombing. Perhaps many of them died from starvation and executions too; but the U.N. side believed that some names were intentionally being withheld. In recent years, defectors from North Korea have confirmed that there were and still are a large number of ROK and U.N. (Caucasian) POWs in North Korea. Some ROK POWs were among those who have defected recently. While not responding to the UNC’s charges, the Communists demanded to release the names of some 37,000 additional “reclassified” ROK POWs who should be on the U.N. list. In fact, there were about 170,000 detainees in the POW camps, but not all of them were POWs as such. Held in the Koje-do camps were not only soldiers but also conscripted civilians, civilian war laborers, and even ROK youths who were mistakenly taken as enemy by American soldiers who did not speak the local language and suspected most civilians as enemy. Rear Admiral R.E. Libby delivered to the Communist negotiators a statement at Panmunjom on January 2, 1952, which shows the complexity of the situation at that time. The statement explained that the so-called POWs held by the UNC included approximately 38,000 South Koreans “who were incorrectly classified initially as POWs and who have been since reclassified as interned persons,” approximately “16,000 nationals of the ROK who were identified with” the Inmin-gun and the PVA and were now being held as POWs by the UNC, and about 11,000 soldiers of the UN and the ROK Army who were held as POWs.

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19. A Talking War The UNC demanded a one-for-one exchange of the POWs. The remainder would be repatriated to North Korea and China, except for those refusing to be repatriated. In order to make sure that the choice was not made under duress, delegates from the International Committee of the Red Cross would screen the POWs. The Communists did not agree: they wanted all the so-called POWs back, regardless of their national origins. By this time, attrition due to the war and the mass exodus of North Koreans to South Korea had depleted the North Korean population — especially in the military age group. North Korea wanted to replenish the rank and file of its army with these POWs. Even more important to the Communists was the unacceptable notion that many of their soldiers wanted to remain in South Korea or go to Taiwan. Their demand that all the POWs be returned created a moral dilemma for the UNC. At least on paper, the international law was on the side of the Communists. The Geneva Convention states that prisoners of war shall be repatriated without delay after the cessation of hostilities. This clause was created to prevent the Communists from keeping thousands of prisoners in slave labor camps after World War II. The POWs of the Korean War were peculiar in that a large proportion of the prisoners did not want to return to their families and home, and included South Koreans who should return to South Korea even if the strict letter of the Geneva Convention were applied. Complying with the 1949 Geneva Convention meant going against the intent of that Convention — returning POWs to where they wanted to go — but also going against basic human rights. On January 15, the JCS made a concession to the Communists. The U.S. abandoned a one-for-one exchange of prisoners although they stood firm on “no forcible return of the POWs.” Ridgway saw the tendency for the Truman Administration to make concession after concession in eagerness to get out of the war. Now, accustomed to getting concessions from Washington, the Communists were waiting for more concessions rather than holding earnest negotiations at Panmunjom. Truman perceived that the USSR was behind the intransigence of Communist positions. “Writing in his diary on January 27, 1952, the President mused about giving the USSR an ‘ultimatum with a ten day expiration limit.’ Unless the Soviet nudged the Chinese toward settlement, the United States would bomb Manchurian military bases, blockade China, and enter into ‘all out war.’ Truman also discussed with his aides the possible use of nuclear weapons should the Chinese violate any armistice agreement.”140 This amounted to going beyond MacArthur’s proposal.

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The Unfinished War The Europeans allies sided with the Communists and supported sticking to the letter of the Geneva Convention. This would have meant a large-scale repatriation. In spite of political indoctrination and so-called “high morale” among the Chinese soldiers, only 5,000 of the 20,720 Chinese POWs wished to return to China. While leftists were talking about Mao’s “egalitarianism” and the popular support of Communism by the masses, three out of four Chinese POWs wanted to go to Taiwan rather than to the People’s Republic of China. Accepting such choices as the true reflection of the views of the Chinese POWs would have been a humiliating moral defeat for Mao. Therefore, they dug in their heels. The U.N. side was afraid that if those anti-Communists were repatriated to North Korea and China, they might be executed. In February 1952 the negotiators discussed using an alternative to the International Red Cross to screen the prisoners, since the Communists had rejected the Red Cross. The UNC suggested Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. The Communists proposed the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Admiral Joy was instructed to object to the inclusion of the USSR as a neutral commission member, not because it was supplying war materiel to China and North Korea but because “the countries share a common border [with Korea.] To Joy’s chagrin, again and again the Communists taunted his delegation: ‘Why do you give no logical reason for opposing the great, peace loving USSR as a member of the Neutral Nations?’… Even after years of reflection, Joy was unable to perceive any sound reason for such timidity”141 [emphasis added]. Truman was no longer the man who decided to drop two atomic bombs to bring the Pacific War to an early conclusion. The Truman Administration, however, insisted on the principle of not repatriating the POWs against their wills. In late February, the JCS instructed Ridgway to screen the POWs and remove from POW status those who violently resisted repatriation and feared for their lives if returned to Communist countries. This was not acceptable to the Communists and they decided to obstruct the survey. The survey team could not even interview some 44,000 POWs because the compounds controlled by the Communists refused to let them in. The UNC informed the Communists that only 70,000 would be repatriated. This included the 44,000 prisoners who were not allowed to be interviewed. This fell far short of the Communists’ expectations. 140. Goulden, p. 591. 141. Ibid, p. 591.

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19. A Talking War The pro-Communist POWs had been intimidating those POWs refusing to repatriate for some time by then. An ingenious scheme that North Korea started was to infiltrate its agents into the POW camps, disguised as POWs, with the instructions to take over the camps and “convince” the prisoners to repatriate to North Korea. The Inmin-gun created a special unit in Pyongyang to conduct this operation. Its special agents came to the POW camps by pretending to surrender to the U.N. side. Since Koje-do was the only POW facility, there was no uncertainty regarding where they would end up. This island of about 130square-mile off the southwest coast of Korea is today home of a huge shipyard, but at that time it was a sparsely populated fishing village that had been turned into a massive POW prison. The agents brought with them small weapons and the flag of North Korea. They were not strip-searched because the Geneva Convention prohibited such search. As soon as the North Korean special agents arrived at the camps, they organized pro-Communist groups and began to terrorize everyone opposing repatriation. Some anti-Communist prisoners were killed and chopped into pieces and thrown into the dugout pits used as toilets. Communists raised North Korean flags in the camps they controlled. The POWs who refused to return to the Communist countries came under intense pressure from the Communist agents. Lee Uk and Cho Byon-am, who were Simon’s classmates from Sariwon, ended up in the Koje-do POW camps as prisoners. They now live in Seoul and told Simon the woes that they faced at the time. Lee Uk was pressed into the Inmin-gun in mid-August, 1950. After a brief period of training in Jaeryong, Hwanghae Province, he was assigned to an “independence brigade” as a liaison aide to the brigade commander in charge of “cultural affairs.” The so-called “cultural affairs” carried out political indoctrination. In early September, Lee Uk’s brigade moved south. By the time it reached Il San, now a suburb of Seoul, the U.N. force broke out of the Busan Perimeter and hit his brigade hard. They retreated to the small town of Gumchon in the Hwanghae Province just north of the 38th parallel. There, his unit dug in, waiting for a possible attack from U.N. forces. While Lee Uk’s commander was inspecting the unit’s defensive position, he stepped on a land mine and was severely wounded. Lee Uk took him to the nearest hospital. After depositing his commander, Lee decided to desert. He was not a Communist and did not see any point in fighting the U.N. or ROK forces. However, on his way to Sariwon, he was grabbed by a North Korean MP and

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The Unfinished War taken to a jail in Pyongyang. He was again able to escape, and surrendered to a unit of ROKs. That appeared to be a better option than being captured again by another Inmin-gun unit. After his surrender, he was moved around from Pyongyang to Inchon, then to Busan, and finally to Koje-do. Another POW, Cho, was drafted into the Inmin-gun as soon as he graduated from the Sariwon high school in July 1950. He bitterly resented the Inmin-gun because, in 1949, he had been arrested and tortured by the feared Security Department just because he was a close friend of Ahn Taeksoo, his classmate who fled to South Korea after being discovered distributing antigovernment leaflets in the marketplace. Cho had nothing to do with that incident or Ahn’s private war against the Communists, but he was severely tortured for several days by the Security Department, which wanted to identify Taeksoo’s network. After conscription, he was taken to a training camp near Pyongyang, but he decided to risk escape rather than taking his chances with the Inmin-gun. He hid in a small village outside the city of Sariwon for three months, until Sariwon was liberated by the ROKs. Cho did not expect that the Chinese would intervene or that the U.N. and ROK forces would retreat back to South Korea soon thereafter. He came out of hiding to welcome the ROKs. But when the Chinese troops marched to Sariwon, he decided to join other refugees moving south; but he could not get on the train headed for Seoul. It was full. So he walked in the direction of the west coast city of Haeju. By the time he and other refugees reached there, the Chinese and Inmin-gun had already encircled the area. He went into hiding again and managed somehow until June 1951, when the Inmin-gun found him. This time, he was unable to escape and was sent to a training camp in Yongbyon, a town north of Pyongyang. After a brief training, he was thrown into battle. While his unit was at the eastern sector of the frontlines, he and three of his platoon members decided to surrender to the ROK Marine Regiment. This is how Cho ended up in the Koje-do POW camp in March, 1952. He noted that in the POW camp, a fierce struggle had already started between pro-Communist and anti-Communist POWs. Each camp had already been divided into prisoners from North Korea, China, and South Korea. Cho ended up in the 83rd Brigade compound, which was dominated by anti-Communist prisoners. According to him, anti-Communist camps terrorized the Communists, just as the Communists terrorized the anti-Communists, but among antiCommunists there was no killing. Cho said that in many camps, there were contests between the Communist and anti-Communist factions. Some camps

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19. A Talking War siding with South Korea during the day were siding with the North after the sunset. Each compound, also called a brigade, contained about 4,000 prisoners, and there were between six and seven such brigades in each barbed-wire enclosures. The number of brigades increased over time. Because the number of prisoners increased each month, the number of compounds and the size of each compound swelled over time, much beyond the original capacity of the compounds. The UNC’s control over the POWs was lax. Gradually, the Communist POWs became bolder and engaged in open indoctrination and persuasion through speeches, meetings and intimidation. One day, Communist POWs killed dozens of anti-Communist POWs and piled their bodies near the barbedwire fence. The American MPs were afraid to enter the fenced-in area, so they picked up the bodies by crane from outside the fence and loaded them on a truck, leaving the area drenched in blood. The leftists no longer had to chop up the bodies with small knives and discard them secretly. The prison guards, both American and Korean, picked up some ringleaders for interrogation, but there was no physical torture involved. At least, there was no outward sign of injury or bruises. Such measures did not slow down the Communist militants. In fact, they were gaining ground. By the spring of 1952, the militants took over Lee Uk’s 78th Brigade. He was certain that his life was in danger and he escaped to join a newly created 96th Brigade. The U.N screening committee had problems entering the Communistdominated compounds. The Inmin-gun headquarters ordered the Communist POWs not to cooperate with their surveys. All of the POWs in Communistdominated compounds had to be classified as wanting to be repatriated. Obviously, there were a number of prisoners who kept their mouths shut for fear of execution. In April 1952, seven of eleven compounds remained unscreened because the militants refused to let the surveys proceed. At Panmunjom, an important concession of sorts, offered by the Communist side, came on May 2: Nam Il offered to delete the USSR from the list of the neutral nations and to forgo 44,000 former ROK soldiers pressed into the Inmin-gun. However, he insisted that not a single Chinese be left behind. The UNC refused. Finding no favorable response from the UNC, on April 28 the Communists suspended negotiations. On May 7, 1952, the Communist militants carefully executed a plan to kidnap Koje-do’s commandant, Brigadier Gen. Francis T.

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The Unfinished War Dodd, to throw off the negotiations at Panmunjom. In spite of an intelligence report warning that this plan was afoot, General Dodd went to Compound 76, which was known to be in the control of militant pro-Communist POWs. Dodd stood outside an open gate, listening to the usual complaints about food, clothes, and medical attention. Suddenly, a group of prisoners rushed up and grabbed him and carried him inside the compound. The Communist POWs now held a prize prisoner to use as a bargaining chip. This happened on the very day that Lt. General Mark W. Clark arrived in Japan to replace General Ridgway. General Ridgway was going to NATO to replace General Eisenhower, who was now preparing to run for the presidency of the United States. General Clark had made his name as a hero of the Italian campaign during World War II. General James Van Fleet was the commander of EUSAK. Each general had his own views on how to handle the crisis. Clark’s instinct was to “Let them keep that dumb son of a bitch Dodd, then go in and level the place.” The outgoing Ridgway felt the same way. Clark ordered a battalion of tanks to Koje-do and ordered the men to shoot the POWs if the militants resisted. While waiting for the tanks to arrive, Dodd “confessed” to the POWs that he was guilty of a litany of charges drawn up by the prisoners, including killing and injuring prisoners. Dodd’s successor, Brigadier General Colson, did even worse — perhaps to save Dodd. Instead of sending in tanks as he was ordered to do, he signed a document admitting many false charges, including mass murder and using poison gas. The prisoners made more demands before releasing Dodd. For this stupidity, these two generals would be demoted. Another commandant, Brig. General Haydon L. Boatner, took over the command from Charles F. Colson and sent in tanks and paratroopers and broke up the militant gangs and dispersed them to smaller units. During this two-anda-half hour battle, the militants hurled Molotov cocktails, spears, and rocks. At the end, the troops confiscated 3,000 spears, 1,000 Molotov cocktails, 4,500 knives, and other weapons. Until this time, Americans apparently did not know or did not care what was going on in the prisoners’ barracks behind the barbed wire. By the autumn of 1952, Communists infiltrated Lee Uk’s compound for a second time and fighting between pro-Communist and anti-Communist factions began again. To Lee Uk’s huge relief, the anti-Communist faction prevailed in his camp. After this incident, anti-Communist POWs were relocated to newly constructed mainland camps. Lee went to the Youngchun POW camp, located

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19. A Talking War north of Daegu. In the spring of 1953, when POWs were being dispersed to different locations, he was shifted to the Nonsan prison camp. By this time, each brigade comprised only 500 POWs. While keeping one eye on the cease-fire, Rhee was locked in a fierce political battle with the National Assembly dominated by the opposition. The opposition wanted to have a constitutional amendment to create a cabinet system of government. Its real agenda was to remove Rhee. Rhee wanted a different kind of constitutional amendment: a direct presidential election and bicameral National Assembly. Most Koreans believed that he would be easily elected under direct election — even without any foul play. The National Assembly was simply unhappy with Rhee’s dictatorial style and favored his prime minister Chang Myon to run the country. Rhee fired Chang Myon and appointed Chang Taek Sang, the former police chief, as his new prime minister. Chang Taek Sang was at that time an influential, independent member of the National Assembly. He had the best chance of being confirmed by the legislators. The National Assembly had soundly rejected Rhee’s constitutional amendments. In response, on May 24, Rhee declared martial law around Busan, then went on to stop a commuter bus of National Assembly members, and took them directly to prison. Chang Taek Sang rushed to see President Rhee at the Blue House and implored him to release the Assembly members. Rhee was furious at Chang for not supporting his decision to silence the “rabble rousers.” The U.S. government was concerned that its European allies, which were increasingly critical of Rhee’s dictatorial tendency, might withdraw their troops from Korea. Truman hurriedly dispatched a letter advising Rhee to refrain from such actions and follow democratic procedure. Rhee did not lift the martial law but refrained from dissolving the National Assembly. At this point, America devised a plan to depose Rhee. As compiled by Gye-Dong Kim, Foreign Relations of the United States (FURS) 1952-1954 and other documents on Korea have presented a detailed record of such a scheme.142 Even before the June 2 incident, in some circles of the State Department there was debate on whether or not to oust Rhee. However, such an idea did not receive wide support at that time. When Rhee refused to release the National Assembly members and lift martial law, the State Department began to be more assertive on the idea of intervening in the internal politics of South Korea.

142. Kim, pp. 520-526.

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The Unfinished War On June 25, 1952, Clark received formal orders from the JCS to intervene in case the ROK refused to accept Truman’s proposals. General Clark, however, did not savor such a role and favored a diplomatic approach. He was not sure that military intervention in the internal politics would be helpful in fighting the war. A plan that he prepared in the event an intervention could not be avoided included drawing Rhee to visit remote areas outside of Seoul and Busan, detaining him and arresting five to ten key government leaders in Rhee’s dictatorship, and taking control of the administration under martial law through an ROK Army chief of staff. If Rhee did not abolish martial law and guarantee the freedom of speech to the National Assembly and the press, the UNC would demand that Prime Minister Chang Taek Sang do it. Chang was expected to collaborate. If he did not, the UNC would establish an interim government, a de facto military government. Although key Administration and military leaders of the U.S. agreed that Clark should intervene in some manner, there was no agreement on establishing a military government. The general sense was that some of Rhee’s close supporters had to go, but that much of the government apparatus should remain. While such schemes were being drafted, one day Chang Taek Sang was meeting with the chairman of the National Assembly, Shin Ik Hee, and leftist vice chairman Cho Bong Am to resolve the constitutional crisis. According to Chang’s biographer, a high-ranking official, not identified by name, representing the U.N. Commission on Korea (UNCOK) stepped in and said, “Your country is at war but you are just fighting among yourselves. We, representing the sixteen U.N. member countries, cannot sit idle. Unless you stop the infighting, we will propose a trusteeship form of government.” To make sure that all three of them understood the seriousness of the situation, he emphasized that this was an official position of the U.N. After the man left, the three politicians sat silently, looking at each other. Apparently, they took this threat seriously. Finally, Cho Bong Am said, “Syngman Rhee is better than a U.N. trusteeship. Prime Minister Chang, you must come up with an idea quickly. Otherwise our shinju [ancestral tablet] will be taken away by a dog.” Gye-Dong Kim suggests that Clark did not leak word about a possible American intervention, although some wished that he would. If such a plan were leaked, it would have strengthened the opposition’s hands. The above scene suggests that UNCOK was trying to hint that something unusual was in store. The way the plan was described, i.e., trusteeship, silenced the opposition, whether deliberately or not.

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19. A Talking War This is how Syngman Rhee avoided being deposed by the U.S. and the U.S. avoided having that particular “blood” on their hands. Apart from moral issues, eliminating a national leader is always a risky business, even in the name of democracy and justice. When the State Department staged a coup against Ngo Din Diem later in Vietnam, the U.S. could not find anyone who was half as good as Diem to replace him. From then on the Vietnam War went downhill. Rhee’s day of reckoning would come, but he was destined to accomplish further feats before fading away into the sunset. Rhee’s popularity was beginning to slip away, although the average people and especially North Korean refugees still admired him. They worried that the naïve National Assembly members would play into Communist hands. Although most American presses appeared to be incapable of distinguishing the dictatorship of Rhee and Kim Il Sung, to North Korean refugees, the problem with Rhee’s regime was not that there was too much oppression but that it allowed too much chaos and seditious acts. Some forty years later, Kang Chol-hwan who escaped North Korea, expressed a similar sentiment: “Everyone [in South Korea] seemed to do as they wished. I have to admit that it rather worried me at first. This sort of society couldn’t last; it could never face crisis.”143 Later Kang found out how democracies and capitalism worked in spite of seeming selfishness of the people, but the above reactions of the North Korean refugees prove the point that dictatorship comes in many shades and colors.

143. Kang and Rigoulot, p. 232.

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20. THE TORTUOUS PATH TO ARMISTICE AGREEMENT Rhee remained adamantly against armistice. Rhee was not alone in this; even the opposition joined him. To the U.S., unification at this stage was a foregone conclusion, but to Koreans it was not. Korea had been a unified country for more than a thousand years before its division in 1945. This was longer than the period most European countries had fixed international boundaries. Most non-Korean historians who wrote about the Korean War were puzzled with what appeared to be the unusual obsession of Koreans for unification, but they might thought twice if it concerned their countries. What concerned Rhee as well as other South Koreans about armistice were not only unification but also national defense after armistice. Rhee feared the Communists would re-arm during cease-fire and then start another war. Rhee remembered the promise of the U.S. to provide military aid to South Korea before the U.S. troops withdrew in 1949; the promise had come to practically naught after the U.S. withdrew from Korea. He doubted that the U.S. would come back if the Chinese invaded Korea again. Another matter that irritated Rhee immensely was the fact that the U.S. did not allow the ROK any representation in the armistice talks. The only Korean in the negotiating team represented the UNC, not the ROK. In early 1952, Rhee threatened to pull the ROK Army out of the UNC in protest. Ridgway took the threat seriously enough to send a telegram to Washington suggesting that a formal agreement might be necessary to make sure that Rhee did not carry out the threat and obstruct the armistice agreement. Washington rejected this proposal, thinking that such negotiations with the

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The Unfinished War ROK would give Rhee the opportunity to demand conditions that the U.S. could not meet.144 The U.S. strategy was to stonewall Rhee and present a final agreement that he could take or leave. Rhee knew it, and others knew it too. What Rhee wanted as the minimum conditions were a mutual security pact and military assistance to strengthen the ROK Army to a level where it could defend South Korea, if not implement unification itself. Washington, however, did not like the idea of such a mutual defense pact in 1949 and did not like it now. The Truman Administration’s problem was that the war was no longer popular in the U.S. It was going nowhere, and was killing a huge number of U.N. troops each month for no apparent gain (although most casualties were on the part of the ROKs, because the Chinese were trying to convince the ROK to accept the terms of armistice). The Truman Administration found out that the path to half a victory was also not an easy one. Fighting went on. On September 5, 1952, the Chinese hit the ROK Capital Division. The battle took a terrible toll on the ROK, but they hung onto their original positions. On October 6, the Chinese hit the 9th Division at the White Horse Hill north of Chirwon. The hills and streams turned red with human blood. Some 10,000 ROKs died but their group, too, remained in control of the sector, according to General Paik who was by then the ROK Army Chief of Staff.145 Next were the ROK 2nd Division at Sniper Ridge and the ROK 5th Division on the east coast. Rhee had no illusions about the strategy of the just-elected Eisenhower. There seems to be hardly any difference between Truman and Eisenhower. He was elected to the presidency by promising that he would visit Korea. This implied to the voters that he would end the war one way or another, perhaps honorably. Eisenhower visited Korea on December 2-4, 1952 between election and inauguration, to fulfill his promise. He had no substantive discussions about the future of the war with anyone. General Clark thought that he might want to win the war and prepared elaborate plans on how to achieve a military victory should the president-elect want to consider such an option. Clark did not even have a chance to present the plans. It was apparent that Eisenhower did not have such a spectacular change in mind.146 144. Ibid, 532. 145. General Paik Sun Yup provides detailed accounts of these battles in his From Pusan to Panmunjom, (Washington, et al: Brassey’s (US), 1992) p. 207, hereafter Paik. 146. Harry J. Middleton, The Compact History of the Korean War (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1965), pp. 222-223. Middleton hereafter.

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20. The Tortuous Path to Armistice Agreement While Seoul and Washington were exchanging discordant letters on the terms of armistice, the talks at Panmunjom were stuck. A sudden breakthrough appeared when Josef Stalin died on March 5, 1953. His successor Georgi Malenkov thought that it was a waste of national resources to engage in external conflicts such as the Korean War, and Nikita Khrushchev, who emerged as the leader of the new troika, also had no passion for the Korean War. Eisenhower saw a new opportunity. Even before Stalin’s death, scientists at Los Alamos, New Mexico reported in January 1953 a successful test of a nuclear weapon in battlefield conditions: a tactical or strategic warhead that could be delivered by artillery. On March 27, 1953, the State Department and the JCS met on the possible use of such nuclear weapons.147 The new Administration decided that the taboo against using atomic bombs should be lifted. Eisenhower thought that the use of nuclear weapons was worth considering, if it could ensure victory on the Korean peninsula. He was keenly aware that his European allies would react strongly against the idea, but new Administration did not feel bound by Truman’s promise. In any event, Eisenhower thought that quick action would deprive the Soviets the chance to intervene and that the U.S. could convince the allies if they were approached quietly and unofficially.148 Another idea being advocated by the Department of Defense was the advantage of convincing the Communists that a major offensive would be launched if armistice talks did not resume and conclude quickly. On May 19, the JCS recommended air and naval operations against China and Manchuria, including use of nuclear weapons. In essence, it was a revival of MacArthur’s idea and then some. The NSC approved it on May 20. The JCS dispatched nuclear warheads to Okinawa to be used in tandem with air attacks on China and Manchuria and a naval blockade of selected ports. Secretary Dulles was in Asia as the NSC met. He went to India on May 21 and asked Prime Minister Nehru to warn China that the U.S. would bomb Manchuria unless the armistice talks were concluded quickly.149 Dulles also mentioned the successful testing of nuclear artillery shells. Yet, in another move, Eisenhower withdrew the Seventh Fleet from the straits of Taiwan and said, “We certainly have no obligation to 147. Kim, pp. 528-529. FRUS 1952-54, Vol. 15, Korea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984), hereafter FRUS Vol. 15, pp. 817-818. 148. The record of the 144th and 145th meetings of the NSC on 13th and 20th May, 1953; FRUS Vol. 15, pp. 1059-1064. 149. Dulles Memorandum, May 21, 1953; FRUS, Vol. 15, pp. 1068-1069.

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The Unfinished War protect a nation fighting us in Korea.” The message was clear: Taiwan could unleash an attack on the mainland. The CIA, in fact, organized an infiltration of the Nationalists. Even before such threats, the Communists decided to resume the talks at Panmunjom apparently because of the new USSR position. On March 28, the Communists responded to a month-old proposal made by Clark to exchange sick and the wounded POWs. As the talks restarted, Rhee renewed his agitation. As far as he was concerned, the U.S had addressed neither his security concern nor many other issues. In a letter addressed to Eisenhower on April 9, Rhee said that if the Chinese troops remained on Korean soil after armistice, any foreign troops who did not join the ROK Army’s march to the Yalu must leave South Korea. Even before this letter, the newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to Seoul, Ellis Briggs, warned his government that Rhee might release anti-Communist POWs150 and Clark warned that Rhee might withdraw the ROK Army from the UNC.151 The new policy direction from Moscow and the tough stance that the Eisenhower Administration took began to bear fruits. The actual exchange of sick and wounded POWs, known as a Small Switch, started on April 20. The Communists transferred 600 prisoners — no more than skin and bone, and many of them with untreated wounds — to the UNC and the UNC transferred 5,800 prisoners to the Communists. The Communists indicated that the remaining POWs might be exchanged along the lines that India had proposed the previous December. Key elements of the plan were to repatriate all those POWs who wished to repatriate immediately after an armistice agreement document was signed, and the other POWs would be sent to a neutral state “so as to ensure a just solution to the question of their repatriation.” No one knew what that meant for sure. Rhee was neither impressed with India’s plan nor convinced that India was a neutral nation. On April 22, Rhee confirmed Clark’s worry by declaring openly that he would pull the ROK Army from the UNC and march north alone. Ambassador Ellis Briggs urged his government to consider favorably Rhee’s demand for a mutual defense pact. America began to take Rhee’s “obstruction” and the threat of withdrawing the ROKs from the UNC seriously. Although the ROK Army would have no

150. March 2, 1953 letter from Briggs to the State Department, FRUS Vol. 15, pp. 803804. 151. April 4, 1953 from Clark to the Department of Army, cited in Kim, p. 535.

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20. The Tortuous Path to Armistice Agreement chance to unify Korea from south to north, it manned three-quarters of the front lines and could sabotage the armistice negotiations by making independent moves. To assuage Rhee’s concern about the Chinese troops remaining in North Korea after armistice, Clark decided to insert a clause in the proposed agreement that all foreign troops should leave Korea after a specified period. He then reformulated and submitted to the JCS on April 26 a plan to arrest Rhee and install a temporary government if Rhee continued to obstruct armistice.152 To the U.S., Rhee appeared as much an obstacle to armistice as the Communists. In early May, Clark prepared Operation Everready. This was basically an elaboration of Clark’s previous plan of staging a military coup and installing a military government under the UNC. Detailed plans were prepared to isolate the ROK Army units unwilling to cooperate with the coup. The U.S. still held a tight control over ammunition and supplies to the ROK Army. After the Little Switch, the talk at Panmunjom moved on to the selection of neutral countries, a country to move the POWs, and the procedure to follow for persuading not-repatriates. The first direct meeting of the two sides in many months took place on April 26. But the meeting bogged down immediately. The Communists would not accept Switzerland as a neutral nation, insisted on moving the POWs out of Korea during the screening process, and wanted a period of six months to persuade non-repatriates. Pressed to name a neutral nation, they suggested India, Burma, Indonesia, or Pakistan. Pakistan was acceptable to the UNC, but the Communists agreed to abandon their demand that the POWs be taken out of Korea and agreed to cut the persuasion period from six months to four months. They also settled on a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission composed of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden, and India. On May 7, Nam Il came up with a new plan on the exchange of the POWs: to keep the POWs in Korea during screening, and detain those who did not wish to repatriate — indefinitely, until they changed their minds. The UNC could not go along with the proposal. The POWs were not supposed to be coerced into repatriating. At this juncture, Washington came up with a compromise plan which thus far had not been acceptable to the U.S. Clark wrote:

152. FRUS Vol. 15, pp. 940-943.

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The Unfinished War I was instructed to agree to turn over to the neutral repatriation commission all Korean as well as Chinese non-repatriates — a point that made many in the ROK government feel that we had betrayed them. In addition I was instructed to agree to the Communist demand that all disputes within the Repatriation Commission be decided by a majority vote rather than by unanimous vote. This gave the Communists an edge since India, although avowedly neutral, recognized and was sympathetic to Red China.153

On May 25, Clark and Briggs visited Rhee to present the final agreement which the U.N. side intended to hand over to the Communist side. They offered economic and military aid, as inducements. The South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yong Tae Byon, was present. Clark recalled that Mr. Byon spoke almost impeccable Oxford English and was sharper and more difficult to deal with than Rhee. Byon said he could not understand how such a completely new proposal, without any prior consultation, could be presented to the Korean government just before it was to be sent to the Communist side. Even up to this time, the ROK had not been consulted on the terms of armistice. Byon said that it was tantamount to an ultimatum. Clark could not help but agree with Byon — silently. He would fail in his mission if he opened his mouth. Rhee’s concerns about national defense and POWs were still not addressed. Rhee noted that this was the critical moment and that the U.S. should not let democracy retreat. Byon accused India of selling appeasement to Washington. Rhee was adamant: You can withdraw all UN forces, all economic aid. We will decide our own fate. We do not ask anyone to fight for us[.] Sorry, but I cannot assure President Eisenhower of my cooperation under the present circumstance.154

Some Americans in Korea believed that it would be best if the U.S. offered Rhee a mutual defense pact, but on May 27 the Eisenhower Administration listed several reasons why it could not agree to that. However, it offered military assistance to the ROK to build up its military forces to 20 divisions and gave somewhat more vaguely worded assurances on the defense of South Korea. But two days later, on May 29, a joint telegram of Defense and State asked Clark to let Rhee know that they were advising President Eisenhower to accept a mutual 153. Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper &Brothers, 1954), p. 267, Clark hereafter. 154. CINCUNC to DA for JCS, May 26, 1953.

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20. The Tortuous Path to Armistice Agreement defense pact. On May 30, Defense and State agreed to cancel Everready and to offer a pact similar to those signed with the Philippines and Australia and New Zealand. Such an offer to South Korea would come with conditions: the cooperation of the ROK in the armistice agreement and the ROKs remaining under the UNC until it considered such arrangements unnecessary. Eisenhower endorsed the recommendation. Without any knowledge of this agreement in Washington, on June 2, Rhee wrote a letter to President Eisenhower outlining his demand for cooperation: a mutual defense pact, military and economic assistance, stationing American Air Force and Navy near Korea (without specifying a country), and the simultaneous withdrawal of the Chinese and American forces from Korea. The withdrawal of American troops from Korea presented problems for the U.S. because it was not clear that the ROK could defend itself and because the Chinese were in a geographically more advantageous position to intervene than the Americans. In the meantime, at Panmunjom the parties agreed on June 8 on the Terms of Reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The Communists came to learn that atomic bombs had been deployed on Okinawa and began to sense that there was a limit to American patience.155 The Communists also had a taste of escalated bombing. On May 13, American planes smashed an earthen dam, washing away five rail bridges, two miles of a major highway, and six miles of rails as well as flooding a large area. While the Communists became more pliable, the South Koreans did not. When they learned of the terms of agreement on the exchange of the prisoners, nearly 100,000 South Koreans went on demonstration against it. By a vote of by 129 to 0, the National Assembly adopted a resolution against an armistice agreement. Rhee declared a national emergency and called back high-ranking officers in training in the U.S. to South Korea. Clark and Briggs met Rhee again and asked if he would cooperate with an armistice agreement if he was offered a mutual defense pact. Rhee did not give a decisive answer. They did not offer the mutual defense pact that Washington had agreed already, deciding to wait for a more opportune time to do so. In the minds of most South Koreans, especially of the younger generations, Rhee’s legacy is not only that of a despot but also as a pawn of America; to North Koreans he was an American puppet. However, it is not clear what more Rhee 155. Kim, p.549.

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The Unfinished War could have done to assure the safety of the future generations of South Koreans. To the Americans, he was an obstinate old man; but his insistence on a mutual defense pact had served the interests of both nations well. However, Rhee was not done yet. There are several accounts of how Rhee staged a small coup against the UNC by releasing anti-Communist POWs. General Paik, who by then was the ROK Army chief of staff, wrote that at 2 a.m. on June 18, 1953, tens of thousands of North Korean anti-Communist POWs poured out of POW camps in Busan, Masan, Kwangju, and Nonsan. Perimeter wire fences were down. The U.S. Army was in control of the camps, but most of the guards were ROKs. On that night, Won’s ROK Military Police Command seized the camp guards, cut barbed wire, and turned off the lights. A handful of American MPs at the POW camp in Busan stood helplessly by as thousands of anti-Communist POWs ran out. Within a few hours, some 27,000 anti-Communist North Koreans POWs who did not want to go to North Korea vanished into the night air. Prisoners were scattered in different locations. The release was well-coordinated and went off simultaneously at all locations. A few minutes after 2:00 a.m., Paik was awakened by a telephone call from Major General Gordon Rogers, the KMAG chief. Soon thereafter, General Taylor, the commander of EUSAK, called him; and then General Clark, from Tokyo, angrily demanding to know who had ordered it. Paik called President Rhee, in bed, to convey Clark’s displeasure. Rhee said, “Okay. I see. Just tell them that I did it. I’ll put out press release in the morning.”156 On the same day, General Clark flew in from Tokyo to protest directly to Rhee. When questioned about his secret operation, the old man just shrugged it off. “Had I told my generals about this beforehand[,] their positions would have been even more difficult. Right?”157 Although the whole world condemned Rhee for this “sabotage,” it was overdue. Most post-Vietnam historians loathed Rhee for his obstinate behaviors and dictatorship, but at that time Rhee had his share of admirers in the U.S. as well as in South Korea. It is conceivable that if such a daring move were made earlier, the armistice agreement might have been reached a year earlier and tens of thousand soldiers would have avoided being killed. Even his belated “surprise” 156. Paik, P.256. 157. ibid, p. 231.

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20. The Tortuous Path to Armistice Agreement might have saved thousands of American and Korean lives. For sure, he saved 27,000 POWs from possible forced-repatriation. Over 100,000 South Koreans poured out into the streets, this time spontaneously, to celebrate the release of the anti-Communist prisoners. On June 18, POWs Lee Uk and Cho were among those who escaped. By then, they were in the Nonsan POW camp. Although Lee Uk became a free man, this was not the case with Cho. General Won Yong-duk, the head of the secret Military Police Command, prepared the actual plan under Rhee’s direction. Few in the ROK Army and none in the UNC knew of its existence. Won’s plan did not include a scheme to hide these POWs once they were released. Soon after they ran out to the open, the South Korean radio appealed to the public and the police to shelter them. An American historian wrote that the American soldiers attempted to recover the prisoners but had not been able to capture a single one, but this was not true. According to Cho, two days after his escape, he was hired by a local farmer near Nonsan to help transplant paddy plants. He had to eat and needed a job, although he had never done such backbreaking work before. And there he was, knee-deep in the water, when he was captured by an American soldier and taken back to the Nonsan POW camp. In Washington, Eisenhower and Dulles were flabbergasted and feared that Rhee’s outrageous act might kill the delicate negotiations. Eisenhower threatened to pull out the U.N. forces if this happened again. Contrary to Washington’s fear, however, Rhee’s daring move pulled the rug out from under the Communists. The Communists were willing to let the matter pass, and the talk turned more to whether or not the U.N. could control the ROK in future. By this time, the ROKs were further modernized and had become an effective fighting force. With the release of anti-Communist POWs, Rhee’s fury was spent and he promised to cooperate. He had his say on the matter, although he refused to be a party to the signing of the Armistice Agreement. With the POW matters already behind them, the negotiations moved quickly. However, one more savage battle remained. It was named the Kumhwa battle, after the southeastern-most of the three towns forming the Iron Triangle. On July 13, 1953, some 236,100 Chinese soldiers — five armies, including the crack 54th Army — attacked ROK II Corps at their stronghold where it bulged into North Korea. The Chinese took a terrible beating but gained a chunk of land. General Paik, who was ROK Army chief of staff, estimated 66,000 men

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The Unfinished War dead and wounded. That figure might have been exaggerated. Chinese General Hong Xuezhi mentions how much land area was taken from the ROKs in that battle but says nothing specific about either side’s losses except for the admission that they suffered heavy casualties. Korean War History, prepared by military historians of the Korean Military Academy and revised in August 1996, cites casualty figures of 36,381 Chinese and 12,154 ROKs. These figures may be closer to the truth. However, even this is enormous: the Chinese suffered roughly the same number of casualties that they did at the hands of the U.S. Marines and X Corps at the Changjin Reservoir battle. This was the most deadly offensive launched since the 1951 Chinese Spring Offensive. Due to the monsoon rains, cloud cover, and fog over narrow mountain passes, the usually potent FEAF air support was ineffective. The Chinese armies as usual attacked at night, encircled the ROKs, and infiltrated deep inside the ROK units, in some areas by finding out passwords from captured ROK soldiers. One of the Chinese units entered a ROK regimental headquarters and captured communications equipment, unopposed, by this means. The PVA at this time was no longer a primitive army fighting with small arms. The attackers had two artillery divisions with some 1,000 artillery pieces. Middleton said the attack was intended to make a final demonstration to Syngman Rhee of “what he could expect if he should decide to press for the unilateral military unification of Korea.”158 General Hong indicated that the attack was intended to quickly conclude the armistice negotiations — a similar point — but he mentioned that Mao remarked that a few more such victories could destroy the U.N. defense. How many Chinese died in the first such offensive alone, it seems, was unimportant to him. Mao thought that a total victory was still possible. Hong also wrote in his memoir that Rhee complained to Generals Clark and Taylor that the EUSAK did not come quickly to the rescue of the embattled ROKs. The U.S. 3rd Division, from nearby the ROKs, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team from Japan, and the ROK 7th Division under the U.S. X Corps did come to back up the ROK II Corps, but by then the battle was practically over. Taylor threatened to counterattack but did not do so. Middleton thought that the Chinese did not want to fight the Americans, and that was the reason why the Chinese stopped the attack. Paik thought the Chinese attack was slowed by effective ROK defense along the Kumhwa River, 158. Middleton, p. 229.

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20. The Tortuous Path to Armistice Agreement but Hong said that it was because the river swelled under heavy rain and the muddy road conditions complicated the transport of supplies and materiel. In Paik’s opinion, the Chinese wanted to achieve two objectives: to reduce the bulge projecting northward and to “crush the morale and spirit of a reborn, confident, and strengthened” ROK Army. According to Paik, the Chinese achieved the first but not the second objective. After both sides had played their last gambit, the Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953. The Mutual Defense Treaty, which Rhee pursued so relentlessly but which was resisted by two U.S. Administrations with equal determination, was finally ratified on October 1, 1953, after many negotiations. Once again, the Old Patriot who turned a dictator delivered an important insurance policy for the future of South Koreans. In hindsight, this might have deterred another large-scale invasion of South Korea from the north. During the final year of negotiations, some 100,000 U.N. and ROK soldiers died or were wounded. Most casualties were ROK rather than American soldiers. At the end of the final battle, a new boundary emerged, roughly along the 38th parallel, but it bulged to the north in the east coast area and dipped to the south in the west coast area near Seoul. The bulge to the north was larger than the dip to the south, but that dip brought the DMZ uncomfortably close to Seoul. (See figure 5.) The exchange of prisoners, known as the Big Switch, took place immediately after the signing of the armistice documents. The U.N. side repatriated 75,823 Communist POWs (70,183 North Koreans and 5,640 Chinese) to the Communists. However, there were still 22,604 North Korean and Chinese POWs who did not wish to repatriate. Three out of four Chinese POWs decided to go to Taiwan rather than to China. The Communists had only 12,773 POWs (7,862 Koreans, 3,597 Americans, and the remainder from 13 different countries). Some of them refused to repatriate (35 South Koreans, 23 Americans and 1 British). Some 22,600 POWs in South Korea unwilling to repatriate were loaded on a flotilla of LSTs and were taken to the DMZ on September 12. Most of them were anti-Communists. After spending about a month and half in the Nonsan POW camp, Cho was among those POWs taken to the neutral zone. On the southern side of the DMZ were compounds containing these POWs and on the northern side of the camp were smaller compounds containing 35 South Korean and 24 UN prisoners.

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Under the armed supervision of Indian troops, each side tried to give “explanations” to lure them over. Initially, the anti-Communist prisoners, both North Korean and Chinese, were afraid to go to the special tents where such persuasions were to take place, for fear of being abducted; but they found out that no one was carrying arms other than the Indian troops. Some of them became bold enough to spit at the Communists when they tried to persuade them to come to their side. The Chinese “examiners” said, “if you come back to China, all previous sins will be forgiven. Soon China will rule all Asia, so you should come over to the winning side rather than going to Taiwan.”159 Cho, like so many others, stuck to his position and was released to the ROK on January 21, 159. Tolland, p. 591.

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20. The Tortuous Path to Armistice Agreement 1954. By this time, he had spent four months in the neutral zone. Out of 22,604 POWs who were transferred from South Korea to the DMZ, 21,805 men chose to move south. “Examination” did not do the Communists much good. Some of those few who were persuaded by the Communist examiners to go to their side were sorry that they did. One was Zhang Ze-shin, a former high school principal in China. “He was demoted to teacher. Almost every day he had to stand on a table and confess his sins. After a year of this, he was demoted to janitor. He complained, and was sentenced to ten years in prison.”160 Another Chinese man, Ding Shang-wing, returned home and found out that his wife had been forced to divorce him. His daughter also left him and he was imprisoned several times, for a total of twenty years. Those Chinese who chose Taiwan had a grand reception. The sole British POW who chose to go to China returned to England nine years later. Some of his comrades never forgave him but others regarded him just a dissident. The Americans who chose the Communist side were considered turncoats who caved in to brainwashing. They were forever scorned, and movies were made about them. On the last day of the prisoner exchange, when non-repatriate POWs came out of the neutral zone, Paik was one of many dignitaries waiting on the South Korean side. He said, “When at last they came, they dismounted the vehicle in dead silence, their faces masks of pain and suffering. Once they were convinced they were really on our side of the lines[,] their sense of relief was immense.” He found out that there were “no officers among the repatriated POWs. The communists singled out the officers for persecution, and the only ones to survive captivity were those skillful enough to pretend to be enlisted men, and maintain that fiction throughout long months of captivity.” A number of American dignitaries were on hand to welcome the POWs including Secretary of State Dulles and General Clark. Paik noted that the South Korean band was playing only American songs, so he requested some Korean folk songs such as Arirang and Toraji. He said, “Hardly any Korean eye was free from tears.”161 No one knows exactly how many South Korean and U.N. prisoners were still in the hands of the Communists. A natural question was what happened to some 51,000 POWs that were unaccounted for. Ridgway claimed that the Inmingun deliberately killed many U.N. prisoners during their captivity, but North 160. Tolland, p. 593. 161. Several quotes in this paragraph are from Paik, p. 246.

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The Unfinished War Korea denied it. Even 50 years after the war, defectors from North Korea are bringing out the news that many South Koreans and some Caucasians are still held in North Korea. They were all said to have bent backs from old age and hard labor. They worked in mines and quarries. Could they be American and British POWs? Some defectors said that they were. After his release, Cho joined the ROK Infantry Officer’s Academy on April 5, 1954. After six months of training, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the ROK Army. In May 1978, he retired from the Army with a rank of Lt. Colonel and now lives in Seoul. Recently, asked for his thoughts and last wishes, he said that what he wanted most was “to know what happened to my parents in North Korea and visit their graves.” This is a common wish shared by refugees from North Korea. Thanks to Lewis H. Carlson, many first-hand accounts of American POWs were published in 2002.162 Of the 7,140 American soldiers captured during the war, only 3,597 returned. Twenty one American POWs decided to go to the PRC rather than to return to the U.S. The remainder, according to the Communists, died in captivity. The 21 American POWs who chose the Communist side were called collaborators, perhaps correctly, and some of them were suspected to have ratted on fellow American prisoners. A prevailing view was that as many as 30 percent of the POWs were collaborators, although a more reliable estimate according to Carlson was 5 percent. The American public and the media looked at the POW population as a whole as suspects. The movie The Manchurian Candidate featured a brainwashed POW as the main character, played by Frank Sinatra, and popularized the notion of brainwashing; in the process, the image of American POWs as a whole was tarnished. The notion that these men could have been brainwashed is highly dubious. What is already in one’s brain is hard to erase, although it may be relatively easy to mold young people before they are “corrupted.” Perhaps due to my father’s influence, in my case, no amount of propaganda or indoctrination at school really altered my view of Communism. Robert A. McLean, a POW interviewed by Carlson, said, “They [the Communists] never made any sense. After a few hours, you got so numb that it went in one ear and out the other.” It is believable that

162. Lewis H. Carlson, Remembered Prisoners of a Forgotten War: An Oral History of Korean War POWs (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002).

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20. The Tortuous Path to Armistice Agreement some POWs collaborated with the Communists just to survive or avoid starvation. Most North Koreans under Kim Il Sung did the same. That does not mean that they gave up their convictions. The POWs’ conditions were exceptionally harsh. Air Force pilot Robert “Bob” Coury, another POW interviewed by Carlson, said, “My personal belief is that you can break anybody down if you really want to, given the time and the right environment.” Yes, a person can be broken; but that is not same as being brainwashed. McLean said that it took his group of POWs from November, 1950, to the Easter Sunday of 1951 to march to the POW camp near the Manchurian border. They were exposed to extreme cold, starvation, and exhaustion. “You can’t imagine how tough these marches were. You really can’t. It’s hard to explain to anybody [that] we were all starving and in terrible physical shape, [and] every time I got up to march at night, I’d have to bend over and open the cuts on the back of my feet so the blood would flow and I could move my feet.” Under such conditions, it is not hard to imagine that a bowl of rice might have persuaded a POW to sign a paper denouncing America. Sometimes, a man would do it to let his wife and children know that he was still alive — as was the case with one POW interviewed by Carlson. Better training in how to cope with captivity and the Communists might have helped. The GIs were poorly trained and did not know that the Communists were using any confession for propaganda purpose and in an effort to turn world opinion against the war. It has been said that the Turks and the British held up much better under captivity than the Americans did. Only one British man refused to repatriate. Few of the British and the Turks died or broke down during the captivity. Of course, this assertion is based on the North Korean statement on the number of dead American POWs. For those GIs who survived the ordeal, not to be remembered (like the POWs of World War II or even the Vietnam War — for whom many inspiring movies have been made) must have hurt. Many, including McLean, suffered recurring nightmares, and were in and out of therapy even forty years after the war. In one session held with former POWs of World War II, McLean got so mad at their complaints about the hardship they suffered that he shouted, “You sons of bitches. You lived in a goddamn Hilton for a stalag!” That started a riot, and he just walked out and did not return. He said hardly a day passed by without experiencing flashes of his experiences as a POW.

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The Unfinished War Reflection With the signing of the cease-fire agreement on July 27, 1953, the Communists had a big celebration over their “victory.” Even today, North Koreans are taught that their side won and in fact believe that Americans are afraid of them. There was no party on the U.N. side. The mood of the Americans was somber. Most American military leaders and soldiers were not proud of their accomplishment; some felt absolutely crushed. General Clark lamented that he was the first American military general to sign an armistice agreement in a war that the U.S. had not won. U.S. veterans came home from Korea to discover that “their experience was of no interest whatsoever to their fellow countrymen.”163 As quoted by Max Hastings, one young returning GI said to his wife, “I couldn’t accept the fact that we hadn’t won, that we couldn’t beat the Communists.” When the GI talked about Mao and the number of Communists he killed, his friends just said, “You’re a McCarthyite.”164 (Senator McCarthy tried to expose Communists in key positions in the U.S., but his witch-hunt style brought more discredit to antiCommunism than the Communists ever hoped for. The people became weary of the very notion of anti-Communism.) General Arthur Trudeau, who commanded the U.S. 7th Division, said: “When we let the Russians and the Chinese off the hook in Korea, we opened the door for their victory over the French in Vietnam. We should have let MacArthur go to the Yalu and bomb the piss out of them on the other side.” Likewise, Colonel Paul Freeman said, “I thought there had been a lot of unnecessary bloodletting for a stalemate[.] We should have knocked the Chinese out of there, whatever it took. But some of the European nations were scared that we were going to start something … the absurdity of trying to destroy those Yalu bridges without bombing the other side, that isn’t the way to fight a war.”165 The Pentagon would come to the same conclusion, but not for another generation. Yet, a total victory was not possible because Washington was preoccupied with the fear of Russian armies marching into Western Europe, in spite of the fact that the Communists’ modus operandi was to instigate internal

163. Max Hastings, p. 169. 164. Ibid, p.169. 165. Hastings, p. 337 for several quotes below.

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20. The Tortuous Path to Armistice Agreement insurrections. In any event, in 1950-51, the U.S. had overwhelming nuclear weapon superiority if not a nuclear monopoly, notwithstanding Soviet experiments with nuclear bombs. Unfortunately for the free world, the State Department and the Pentagon during the Truman Administration were filled with overly cautious generals and diplomats with a European focus. The U.S. had no chance of winning the Korean War outright with such men in leadership. On the positive side, Communist expansionism was thwarted, although not defeated. Of course, America came to Korea to fight the Communists rather than to save Koreans. American policy makers in Washington and military commanders such as Dean, Kean, and Gay showed little regard for the value of Korean lives — remember the No Gun Ri. Such an attitude did not serve the war effort. In today’s parlance, the Americans that showed up in Korea were a strange mixture of racists and humanitarians. In the 1950s, the two were not mutually exclusive. Americans were condescending and arrogant sometimes, although never evil. Their policy makers were ignorant about Communism, Korea, and Asia, yet Americans were kind and gentle people. America served the world well, on balance, because she was willing to fight to stop the spread of the Communism. Without such American resolve, around the world, South Korea as well as many other countries would have fallen to Communist hands, particularly in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Latin America. After the cease-fire, America did come through with the economic and military assistance that she promised to South Korea, and stationed her troops on South Korean territory. By doing all this, the U.S. made up for many naïve and thoughtless actions taken prior to the war, such as dividing Korea, abandoning South Korea by withdrawing U.S. troops prematurely, and announcing the Acheson Line. For Koreans, the worst part of not defeating the Communists completely was that Korea has remained divided and the Korean War has never come to closure. Even some 60 years after the division of Korea and some 50 years after the bloody war ended, Koreans have not accepted the notion of two Koreas. In day-to-day conversations, Koreans do not refer themselves as either South Korean or North Korean. They have a long history as a unified country with a common language, culture, and relatively homogenous ethnicity, and the idea of a permanent division of Korea is unimaginable. The fact that Korea still remains divided and there are 22 million Koreans in the North, starving and oppressed, is

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The Unfinished War a daily reminder that Koreans are still suffering from the machinations of the Roosevelt Administration. The Korean War had a significant impact on the neighboring countries. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) emerged as a new power. However, China paid a terrible price, with an estimated 900,000 casualties. For the wardevastated Japanese economy, the Korean War was a bonanza.166 Korean Warrelated demand revitalized Japanese heavy industry, especially shipbuilding, automobile manufacturing, pharmaceutical manufacturing, beer production, and oil refining. With large military contracts pouring in from the U.S., talk of dismantling the Japanese industrial-military complexes (known as Zaibatsu) was silenced. Unfortunately for America, the lessons of the Korean War were wasted when it came to the Vietnam War. Whether the U.S. should have entered Vietnam in what appeared to be support for the failing French colonialism is another story; but once she did, Washington fell into the same trap that she did in Korea. America permitted the existence of sanctuaries and belittled nationalism, as she had done in Korea. The U.S. even eliminated Vietnam’s president, Ngo Dinh Diem, a nationalist in his own right, by staging a coup against him. While Americans had good reasons to dislike Diem for not respecting civil liberties, there was no one else who could lead the country as well. America again fought a “limited” war rather than aiming for a total and swift victory with overwhelming force. It would take another generation for the Pentagon to appreciate MacArthur’s words: In war there is no substitute for victory.

166. Brian Catchpole, The Korean War (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc., 2000), pp. 332-334.

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21. SOUTH KOREA AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE After the cease-fire, the contest between Communism and capitalism shifted to the arena of economic development. Communism was an economic ideology which promised to make everyone live better and share the fruits of the earth equally. The state would ensure the equitable distribution of wealth created by everyone. Capitalism also promises to make everyone live better by letting individuals produce wealth with minimal state intervention and by letting the “invisible hand” do the redistribution. The division of Korea into two economic systems provided a perfect ground to test the validity of the two opposing systems. South Korea had little in the way of natural resources, capital, or technology. One positive impact of the war on the Korean psyche was in shedding the lingering vestiges of the old class system: everyone wanted to become a rich commoner rather than a poor yangban. South Korea also had a relatively well-educated labor force due to Koreans’ traditional emphasis on education. The emphasis on education is one of the more enduring traditions in Korea. An article dated November 26, 2002 indicated that the United Nations Children’s Education Fund (UNICEF) placed South Korea at the top of a list of countries with effective education systems among developed countries. Japan came in second. This test was based on “what pupils actually know [reading, math and science of 14 and 15 year olds] and what they are able to do.” The UNICEF study was unable to conclude the causes of the test results or even their correlation with variables such as the amount of money spent on education. Both in South Korea and Japan, students receive support and encouragement at

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The Unfinished War home. This does not always mean that youngsters in South Korea are pressured by their parents — although it is true in many families. Perhaps, it is the culture of respect for knowledge and accomplishment that is central to South Korea’s education accomplishment. Although not enough to rebuild the devastated physical and social infrastructure, the U.S. provided generous military and other aid to the South Korean government. Yet, when the student uprising ousted President Rhee from office seven years after the cease-fire on April 19, 1960, South Korea still had a per capita income of below $100 per annum, which was on a par with the poorer African countries. Most economists labeled South Korea a “basket case.” And one year of democracy under U.S.-educated Dr. John M. Chang did nothing to the economy except by creating more chaos. What South Korea lacked more than natural resources and capital was someone to initiate the country’s process of development. General Park Chung Hee overthrew the civilian government on May 16, 1961 with a promise to eradicate corruption and bring in more prosperity, but he failed to impress most Koreans, who had no confidence in a military strongman to deliver. In 1961, he was virtually unknown. His background as an exCommunist did little to reassure the people. Donald Gregg, a former CIA operative stationed in Korea and later a U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, said that the U.S. never found it easy to deal with Park, because of his “deeply ingrained skepticism toward foreigners” and lack of attention to such issues as “human rights” or “free trade,” which interested the U.S. Park swept away old, corrupt politicians and judges and arrested professional gangsters, executing several of them and sending the rest to hard labor for road building projects. His model for nation building would be “politically incorrect” as a model for other less developed countries, but it began to work. Park also tried to eradicate corruption, although it would take much longer than his rule to change this behavior pattern. Civil servants needed to eat, too. Still, there were constant reminders that a revolution had taken place. Capitalism requires the rule of law and a judicial system that upholds such laws. Park quickly went on to prepare a five-year economic development plan. The plan, prepared with the assistance of an American consulting company, emphasized agricultural development. It would take decades for Korea to become self-sufficient in food. In a country without enough foreign exchange to buy food from overseas, that was an important goal. But South Korea had more

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21. South Korea after the Cease-fire immediate success with the export of light industrial products, namely textiles, wigs, footwear, and garments. Park had a bigger plan in mind. Although he was a soldier, he had studied the history of Japan’s economic development, especially the Meiji Restoration, which started in 1867 and ultimately transformed Japan from an agrarian into an industrial economy. Park met frequently with all of the major exporters to learn about the problems they faced, including high interest rates, difficulty in importing technology and raw materials, and bureaucratic red tape. He enacted the Foreign Capital Inducement Act in 1962, reversing Rhee’s policy of trying to keep foreign capital, especially Japanese capital, out of South Korea. Rhee had equated such investment to colonialism. In 1962, Japan was dangling $300 million in grants and $200 million in loans to South Korea, provided that the two countries could normalize relations without agreeing to the South Korean demand that Japan admit and apologize for the wrongs committed during her 37-year occupation of Korea. Park was willing to forget the past and move forward. However, most Koreans wanted Japan to apologize, and went on the street to denounce the proposed treaty. They would rather forego Japanese aid than implicitly allow Japan’s crimes to go unrecognized. Park backed down several times under the mounting opposition, but he persisted. John Kennedy, who was the U.S. president at the time, was keenly interested in the economic growth of less developed countries in general and South Korea in particular to prove that capitalism was superior to Communism. He encouraged the normalization of the relationship between South Korea and Japan. In 1965, Park finally succeeded in ramming through the National Assembly a treaty normalizing relations with Japan, even though South Korea had been unable to extract any apology. It is doubtful that any democratically-elected leader would have been able to pursue such a politically unpopular policy; but the Japanese grant and loan provided the capital needed to start industrialization. Another development that fueled the South Korean economy was the Vietnam War. During its peak, South Korea had as many as 50,000 soldiers in South Vietnam. Each of them was paid $5,000 a year by the United States. This provided South Korea the hard currency to buy much needed machinery and equipment from overseas. During the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-1966), South Korea achieved an economic growth rate of 19 percent per annum compared with the planning target of 8.5 percent. Exports grew by

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The Unfinished War 50 percent per annum, although South Korea was still running a huge trade deficit every year. All this primed the pump. Park helped to build a strong and varied industrial base: steel, shipbuilding, construction and electronics. When the Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) broke ground for the construction of a one-million-ton steel plant, observers were not convinced that there was enough demand for that much South Korean steel. Existing world supply was adequate at that time. However, POSCO eventually became the world’s second largest steel producer, with a production capacity of 21 million tons, and arguably is the most efficient steel producer. The construction industry also played an important role. Some of the companies worked in Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. Korean contractors and their engineers were willing to work in conditions that most other countries’ engineers refused to tolerate. They became known for building around the clock and finishing the job ahead of schedule. Chung Ju Yong’s biography167 provides an interesting account of how his Hyundai Construction Company ended up dredging the Vietcong-infested Mekong Delta area. Then, in 1976, Hyundai secured a $930 million contract for the Al Jubayl deep-sea port construction project in Saudi Arabia. It would be worth more than $5 billion today, after adjustment for inflation. This was the largest single project in the 20th century. In 1973, as the POSCO’s first steel plant was starting production, Park formally launched an ambitious development program of “heavy and chemical industries.” Steel provided the most important raw material for shipbuilding and automobile manufacturing. Hyundai Heavy Industry is the largest shipbuilder in the world. Other large conglomerates such as Samsung and Daewoo groups also entered the market. Most people associate Park Chung Hee with Korea’s industrialization and the expansion of its export industry, but he accomplished more than that. One of his greatest achievements was the Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement), although not many have heard of it outside of Asia. Despite its name, it was a nationwide rural development program. The success of the “movement” and news that the per capita income of South Korea’s rural households had caught up with that of urban areas made waves all around Southeast Asia. Asian 167. Chung Ju Yong, Shiryong-un Itso-do Silpae-nun Upda (in Korean only, There Is Trial But No Failure) (Seoul: Jesam Gihaek, 1991), pp. 101-102.

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21. South Korea after the Cease-fire countries were curious to see how South Korea did it. The disparity between rural and urban household income was one of the stickiest problems that many Asian countries faced. Saemaul Undong was later phased out as a result of financial scandals and politicization of its leadership groups. This all happened after Park Chung Hee was assassinated by his Korean CIA chief. However, the program served its purpose at a time when it was much needed, and a great deal of progress was achieved in improving the living standards of rural areas. By the time Park passed away, the economic contest between the North and the South was over. Today, illiteracy hardly exists in South Korea. Life expectancy at birth is 73, compared with 60 in North Korea. It may come as a surprise to most Koreans, as well as to others, that the distribution of income in South Korea is one of the most level in Asia. For example, the ratio of the 20 percent highest income group to the lowest 20 percent income group was 5.3 in South Korea in 1999, compared with 5.7 percent in India, which championed socialism; 8.5 in Singapore; and 9.0 in Hong Kong, which followed more unadulterated capitalism. Yet, Park was a dictator although far more beneficial to South Korea than Syngman Rhee as far as the management of the economy was concerned. He held on to the power until October, 1979 when his trusted intelligence chief assassinated him. Even after his demise, his two successors, also military strongmen, followed Park’s strategy of export-driven growth. They gradually opened the market to the world and permitted organized labor movement. The South Korean economy continued to grow, fending off the “oil shock,” minor recessions, and the like. It took the Asian financial crisis of 1997 to shake Korea’s confidence by exposing structural problems in its model of economic development. The collusion of the government and large conglomerates, which were supported by generous government loans and protection, created an unhealthy corporate culture. In 1997, the central bank ran out of dollars, and South Korea was dangerously close to defaulting on major debts owed to international banks. Although currency speculators may have triggered the crisis, the macro economic policy was at issue as well. South Korea (as well as many Asian countries) had artificially high currency values. The crisis forced it to make serious financial reforms. The rescue package and reforms prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were almost as painful as the financial crisis itself — so that the financial crisis came to be called the “IMF crisis.” At times, it looked as if the IMF prescription was going to kill the patient (Korea, Inc.)

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The Unfinished War rather than save it. A high unemployment rate and corporate bankruptcies hit the Korean economy hard. Elsewhere as well, in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, the IMF rescue packages and prescriptions seemed to inflict much pain without resuscitating the economy. In South Korea the gigantic Daewoo Group and a number of banks and industries went under, leaving behind huge debts to the public, banks, and the government. As the crisis deepened, South Korean middle-class families pulled their children out of U.S. universities, stopped taking overseas trips, sold gold pieces to the government so that it could convert gold to dollars, and avoided buying imported consumer goods. The government let most ailing companies go bankrupt and saved several others with the taxpayers’ money. The people reluctantly accepted such measures. Although the IMF prescriptions may or may not have done any good for other Asian countries, the South Korean economy needed some of the medicines that the IMF prescribed. The government was too deeply involved in the private sector. It was the majority stockholder in a number of commercial banks. Government support for the conglomerates in the early stages of Korea’s economic development was expeditious because South Korea did not have a viable private sector. However, this support dragged on too long for the good of the country. In the aftermath of the crisis, the South Korean government began taking itself out of the commercial banking business, exchange rate manipulation, and its close support for large conglomerates. By 1999, when Japan was still trapped in recession and other Southeast Asian countries were reeling from the crisis, South Korea slowly climbed back to the 13th largest economy in the world, albeit with a damaged credit rating. Its GDP per capita of $16,100 (after adjustment for purchasing power parity) in 2000 was sixteen times that of North Korea’s and was comparable to the lesser economies of the European Union. Against all odds, including external threats and high defense expenditures, through hard work the children of the war succeeded in producing what some economists called an “economic miracle.” Well before South Korea co-hosted the 2002 World Cup with Japan, its economy seemed to be humming again. South Korea is still not a wealthy country in terms of per capita income, but it has shown remarkable resourcefulness and dynamism as it emerged from the financial crisis. However, new challenges always seem to be around the corner.

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21. South Korea after the Cease-fire In the past decade or two, many U.S. veterans have made sentimental journeys back to South Korea. One of the first things they’ve noticed is how much the country has changed since the war. On the whole, Koreans have remained enormously grateful to the U.S. and other nations that came to their rescue. In his book on the Korean War, Max Hasting, an Englishman, compared South Korean sentiments to those of the Europeans, noting that where Europeans were resentful of the U.S., rather than grateful for its troops’ sacrifices, in South Korea (where he noted that the GIs were “terribly” arrogant and condescending), the people remained grateful. An American journalist wrote that tears flowed from the eyes of an American veteran of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division when Koreans of all ages, “even schoolchildren too young to have personally experienced the war” stopped a group of touring veterans on the streets to thank them.168 Many South Koreans believe the relationship between the U.S. and South Korea is special because two countries are “allies bonded in blood.” South Koreans also remember that America provided economic and military assistance for years even after the war ended. Without such assistance, even a larger proportion of South Korea’s GNP would have gone into national defense and importation of grain, wheat flour and other commodities. For all these reasons and more, South Korea has remained a faithful ally of the U.S. With increasing prosperity, South Korea has been paying not only for its national defense, but also for some costs of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea. It contributed generously to the Gulf War and other multilateral endeavors. When all the Western European steel producers and Japan took the U.S. to the World Trade Organization to litigate for unilaterally imposing tariffs on steel imports, South Korea refrained. This and other incidents indicated that South Korea was treating the U.S. more like a big brother than a competitor.

TWO SCHOOLGIRLS Yet, the American-South Korean relationship began to turn sour in the new millennium. Attention turned to American servicemen’s crimes against Koreans, as well as old incidents such as the No Gun Ri massacre. Crimes committed by

168. Rudy Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drum: An Oral History of The Korean War (New York, Chester, Brisbane, Toronto, Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993), p. 242.

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The Unfinished War the GIs in South Korea have been particularly troubling to South Korea, where the crime rate is only a fraction of that in the U.S. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which defines the legal status of American troops in South Korea, was first signed in 1965 and was revised in 1991 and again in 2000. As a result of these revisions, some criminal cases were brought to the jurisdiction of the South Korean courts. Still, they represented only 5.5 percent of all crimes committed by American servicemen between 1999 and 2001. To make matters worse, most Koreans feel that the SOFA does not grant the human rights of South Koreas as much weight as those of Americans (the Japanese and Germans, who also have American soldiers stationed on their soil, have similar concerns). Crimes against Koreans are far more widespread than most people realize. Two South Korean civic groups called to the attention of President Clinton a general pattern of crime against Koreans and the environment committed by U.S. troops. Between 1993 and April 2000, the number of crimes committed by U.S. soldiers against Korean civilians averaged 820 incidents per year, including some serious crimes such as a U.S. soldier strangling 31-year-old bar waitress to death in Itaewon after she refused to have sex with him. Many older generation Koreans remember a kinder and gentler side of Americans during the war. Without question, America today has far higher crime rates than it had during the Korean War, and the trend carries over to the U.S. Army. On August 9, 2000, Ahn Mi Young (Online Asia Times) reported the case of a Korean construction engineer run over by a car driven by an American serviceman. A Korean police officer involved in the investigation said, ‘‘There is neither a procedure nor clear [rules on how] legal authorities should handle...suits against American soldiers stationed in South Korea[.] The U.S. authorities came to the spot, they walked away with the American suspect, and later sent us their notice saying the car accident was the result of driver fatigue. [The case was] closed, [and there is] nothing we can do about it.’’ Some crimes have been against the environment. In 2000, the Commander of the Eighth U.S. Army admitted that the U.S. military had been illegally dumping concentrated formaldehyde, a toxic chemical known to cause cancer, into the Han River. The Eighth Army only admitted this after a South Korean environmental group publicly exposed the dumping. Apparently, it had been going on for years. Ilene R. Prusher (The Christian Science Monitor, November 10, 2000) reported Korean activists’ view that “U.S. troops are not held accountable for their crimes because the SOFA…puts prosecution of most U.S. troops’ crimes in the hands of U.S. officials, not local authorities[.] There is a fundamental

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21. South Korea after the Cease-fire problem here: The US soldiers don’t view Koreans as having the same rights as they do.” She also goes on to quote U.S. military officials: “Military personnel are given stiffer treatment [in the U.S. military courts] than they would under Korean law[.]” There is obviously a perception gap. South Koreans do not sit in the U.S. military courts as juries, and Koreans do not trust the fairness of American juries. All Koreans hear about is American soldiers getting away with “murder.” In June, 2002, the news of two young school girls run over by American minesweepers on training made the front pages of Korean newspapers. A mixed group of Koreans, consisting of those who really grieved for the dead school girls, students in search of a new cause to demonstrate against, nationalists, leftists, anti-war groups, and anti-Americans for whatever the reason began to agitate for the two GIs to be turned over for trial in South Korean courts for negligent homicide. The persistency of the demonstrations surprised most people. Some demanded the ouster of the American troops, others demanded a review of the SOFA, and yet other groups demanded an apology from President George W. Bush. The Internet generation of South Koreans admires the nationalism of Kim Ku’s tradition. They are not only against the Japanese, who have tried to rationalize their colonial past, but also remember atrocities committed against Koreans by Stalin, Mao and Americans (whether military commanders at No Gun Ri, individual American advisers before the war, or American politicians who divided Korea). Demonstrations went on almost non-stop, but when the two GIs were acquitted of negligent homicide charges in late November, 2002 the situation turned decidedly more ugly. About 700 activists chanted, “Let’s drive out the American troops!” (AP, November 24). The crowd shouted and shook their fists in front of the Korean War museum in central Seoul and proceeded to a nearby military base; the South Korean police tried to block the march. Instead of subsiding, demonstrations spread to other towns and cities, involving thousands of demonstrators. On November 26, 2002, a local newspaper (Hangyure) reported that the ROK Minister of Law, Sim Sang Myong, said that he saw no need to revise SOFA again only one year after it was revised. He explained that in no country had the jurisdiction of an accident involving American servicemen on official duty been handed over to the host country. He went on to explain that in the U.S., traffic accidents do not usually result in criminal convictions.

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The Unfinished War On November 27, President Bush apologized for the death of the two schoolgirls, through American Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. To Koreans, this tardy and indirect apology appeared insincere. The commander of the U.S. troops, General Leon J. LaPorte, made another apology and pleaded to Koreans to understand the difference between American and Korean laws on traffic accidents: the U.S. law does not incriminate drivers except in the case of intentional accidents. (This is not necessarily the case in South Korea.) The demonstrators were unimpressed. On December 7, there were 15,000 demonstrators surrounding the U.S. embassy. On December 14, there were between 30,000 and 50,000 demonstrators carrying candles. Bush personally apologized for the incident to Kim Dae Jung by telephone, but it made little difference to the intensity of demonstration. Even the conservative Grand National Party (GNP), usually in tune with the U.S. policy on North Korea, challenged a spokesman of the Kim Dae Jung Administration who had called the demonstrators a radical group. All political parties demanded a revision of the SOFA and distanced themselves from the U.S. Americans were upset when demonstrators burned the U.S. flag, but all along there has been a sense, among Koreans, that America had no respect for Korea or Koreans. A large number of ordinary South Koreans do not trust the U.S. military courts. It has become an emotional issue in spite of the fact that Korean prosecutors — who had made some preliminary investigations — hinted that the accident might have been caused by a faulty communications system in the minesweeper that crushed the two schoolgirls. Most Koreans apparently believe that American servicemen once again have gotten away with criminal misconduct and the SOFA needs to be revised. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that no such review was justified; he remarked that a revised SOFA would not have prevented the accident. True, but the demonstrations were not only about this specific case but also American arrogance and hurt national pride that derive from incidents going well beyond the Bush Administration. The new generation has read about No Gun Ri and other massacres during the war, the unwillingness of President Clinton to apologize for these, and stories about more recent crimes committed against persons and the environment. To them, the U.S. Army continues to belittle such crimes and has not punished guilty parties. Justice has not been served. Under Rhee and three military strongmen that followed, any criticism of America and anything that smacked Communism were severely suppressed. The situation has changed, and today it is more like America under President Carter.

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21. South Korea after the Cease-fire The Seoul National University invited Bruce Cumings (University of Chicago history professor) to speak at a seminar amid continuing demonstrations and burning of American flags. Cumings said that such a demonstration was useful. He ended a chapter on his 1997 book with what appeared to be a rationalization of Kim Il Sung’s “corporatism,” as well as the statement that North Korea did not start the Korean War. The younger generation of South Koreans are skeptical of their own government and of American motives. They also have problem accepting horror stories brought by recent North Korean refugees. Kang Cholhwan said, “It was terrible shock. I have been through so many awful things, and these people [the press corps which appeared in his press briefing] … were looking skeptically down their noses at me! … I found the journalist from Hangyore [a liberal South Korean newspaper] particularly irritating.… Millions of people were dying [,] and his only concern was our credibility.”169 In the run-up to the 2002 elections, the spokesman of the ruling Millennium Democratic Party said, “Friendly ties between the U.S. and South Korea can be preserved only when both sides are on an equal footing and national pride remains intact.” Partly due to the schoolgirl incident and partly due to the fear that the U.S. will touch off a war, its presidential candidate Roh Moo Hyon began to overtake the conservative candidate, Lee Hoi Chang of the GNP, in the opinion poll two weeks before the election. Roh said that “if elected, [he] would ‘guarantee the security of North Korea’” (The New York Times, December 5, 2002). He went on to win the election. Is Roh going to turn the ROK Army into a shield between North Korea and American troops? The emotional outpouring over what may be a simple traffic death may seem irrational to Americans. But even in this age of globalization, the ways of the East and the West are fundamentally different. In the West, particularly in America, the slightest grievance is aired immediately and often ends up in the courts, but in South Korea people tend to be reserved and deferential to each other, at least on the surface. Bowing to each other and prostrating to parents during holidays are some of the manifestations of such customs. Such courtesy is expected to be reciprocated. Koreans treat foreigners as honored guests and generously attribute their lack of courtesy (if any) to cultural differences. But there comes a limit, in any personal relationship. This tendency is also found among Thais, Malays, and Filipinos. The Philippines chose to close down America’s Subic Naval Base and the Clark Air Base, although that does not 169. Kang and Rigoulot, p. 223.

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The Unfinished War appear to serve the national interest of the Philippines. Nothing positive came out of the closure except restored national pride; but that was the choice that they made. After the presidential election, South Koreans seem to have sobered up. Some counter-demonstrators demanded that American troops stay in South Korea. On March 1, 2003, the national holiday celebrating independence from Japan, some 100,000 anti-Communist demonstrators showed up with South Korean, American and U.N. flags, and with placards denouncing nuclear weapons and Kim Jong Il. They called for a stronger alliance with the U.S. Meanwhile, anti-American demonstrators, who appeared with lighted candles and burned an American flag, numbered about 2,000 (The Korean Times, March 3, 2003). President-elect Roh also said that he does not wish American troops to withdraw. He apparently dislikes being under America’s thumb, especially on the question of another war on the Korean peninsula, but he is realistic enough to realize that a U.S. withdrawal would create a dangerous tilt in the balance of power in Korea. North Korea is also a threat to the stability of Northeast Asia. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington research organization, said, “Growing anti-American sentiment within Korea’s body politic serves as one of the greatest dangers to U.S. interests on the peninsula following unification (emphasis added).”170 The Center is concerned that a new SOFA or any reduction in the numbers of U.S. troops in Korea might encourage similar moves in Japan. The Center advocates that the U.S. “lean heavily” on South Korean leaders to counter anti-Americanism. South Korea is no longer dependent on America for its survival, although it still would like to enjoy American nuclear protection. Therefore, South Korea is less likely to succumb to American pressure than before. A way to defuse the intransigence is to turn the issue into an intellectual dialogue based on facts and reasoning rather than pressure from a big country on a small country. This is what Koreans resent in the first place. One thing that the U.S. could do in the interest of justice as well as improving the rift in U.S.-South Korea relations is to review and amend the SOFA. The fact that it was revised a few years ago is no reason to refuse to review it now, considering the current political atmosphere in South Korea. There is no reason to treat South Korea differently than Japan or Germany — or, 170.Jim Wolf, Reuters, September 19, 2002.

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21. South Korea after the Cease-fire if there is, the reason needs to be acceptable to South Koreans. The U.S. must extend the sense of fairness and justice beyond her borders; she may also want to share the operational command of the UNC with the ROK. Roh had a point when he voiced concern that he would have no control over a war once it started. Koreans are justifiably afraid of American moves that might turn Seoul into that sea of fire. The operational command of the UNC is still 100 percent in American hands, even though 95 percent of its soldiers are South Koreans. South Koreans today are well educated and mannerly people, although their suppressed feelings tend to explode now and then. Since the Student Revolution which ousted Syngman Rhee on April 19, 1960, Koreans are accustomed to taking their grievances to the street. Yet, Koreans can be trusted to make rational decisions if they are offered the facts, explanations of the differences in the two countries’ legal systems, and a comparative analysis of SOFAs in different countries where American troops are stationed.

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22. NORTH KOREA NOW As late as 1970, the North Korean economy was stronger than that of South Korea. It began to suffer soon thereafter, and has registered negative growth ever since. The fundamental reason for its failure is the one that brought down the USSR and its satellites: no production incentive, and undue emphasis on heavy and defense industries at the expense of the consumer sector (light industry and agriculture). A side effect of its reliance on heavy industry was an endemic dependence on Moscow for capital goods. Therefore, the economic and political collapse of the USSR has had a disastrous effect. Much of North Korea’s resources went to support a one-million-man military. To most people, the fact that North Korea has not yet fallen like other Russian satellite countries and has been able to maintain such a large military force raises a number of questions. Even more surprising has been the news that North Korea has engaged in expensive weapons development programs. Supposedly, about two million people have died from starvation in the past seven years. The Soviet empire fell when its government stores ran low on bread. Why has North Korea not fallen and how can they go on pouring resources into the military? What can we expect in coming years? North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop provides a credible answer. He was one of the secretaries of the Communist Party and the highest-ranking officer to defect to South Korea from the North. Since his defection Hwang has complained that he has been under a virtual house arrest and a gag order by the South Korean government, which did not want to upset the North-South relationship. However, he was allowed to publish a book in August, 2001. He was a close personal advisor to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s teacher. He was

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The Unfinished War credited as the principal author of the Juche (self-reliance) philosophy, the governing ideology of North Korea. According to Hwang, Juche has been used to elevate Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il to what can be best translated as Absolute Leader.171 North Korea today is not so much a Communist state as it is a feudal state. Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il saw how the people discarded Stalin’s legacy after his death and they saw other Communist leaders in Eastern Europe being deposed. Kim wanted something more permanent — a dynasty. (Juche was originally intended to be an adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the Korean situation. However, over time, it has been used to legitimatize Kim’s dynasty, like an old feudal kingdom of Korea. All foreign ideas were cut off. North Korea pulled down the ubiquitous portraits of Stalin — Kim did not want to be encumbered by Marxism, Leninism, or Maoism.) According to Hwang, the North Korean economy consists of three separate sectors: the enterprises belonging to the Party, the military, and the consumer sector. The Party-owned enterprises are synonymous with Kim Jong Il’s personal properties. Many foreign-exchange earning enterprises such as gold mines belong to this sector. Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il have enjoyed all the luxuries of the world. Their share of Party-owned enterprises is estimated to represent about 20 percent of the country’s total economy. The military sector comprises a whopping 50 percent of the total, and the consumer sector makes up the remaining 30 percent. However, the first two sectors’ shares have been expanding at the expense of the consumer sector as the economy has contracted and the shortage of electricity and raw materials increased. The actual supply of electricity was about 20 percent of the total demand. Every sector, particularly the military, went to Kim Jong Il to seek priority access. However, even the demand for those who received such sanctions exceeded the available supply. Since the consumer sector had the least priority in North Korea, it received hardly any electricity. In no small measure, this explains why the average citizens in North Korea have been starving while the military has been well cared for. At least, it had enough resources to engage in the development of weapons of mass destruction. Hwang also gave the example of steel production. In one particular month, the steel industry produced 18,000 tons of steel. It needed to sell 5,000 tons to generate enough income to operate the following month, but the military 171. This is the translation of Chuldae Suryong that Hwang said was being used in North Korea today.

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22. North Korea Now demanded all 18,000 tons for itself. The military does not pay for steel. Yet the steel industry could not refuse the demand. Another problem is infrastructure bottlenecks. Railways fail to deliver input or collect output on time. Fuel must be imported, but North Korea has hardly anything to export to earn foreign exchange. It exports minerals and metals, but mines and factories produce far below their potential because they are short of electricity. The machinery is inefficient or worn out. North Korea is suspected of trading in illegal drugs to earn foreign exchange. A North Korean ship suspected of carrying illegal drugs blew up recently when a Japanese Coast Guard ship tried to intercept it. One of the consumer sectors that has suffered the most is agriculture. Regardless of the exact number of persons who have died from starvation, an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe has been taking place in the “workers’ paradise.” North Korea and some aid groups claim that drought, floods, and other natural disasters caused the catastrophe; but the bad news comes with such regularity year after year that there has to be more than the climate involved. Its neighbor, South Korea — with a population more than twice that of North Korea — faces serious problems with the falling price of rice due to overproduction. South Korea has had its share of floods and drought in recent years, too, but it has built dams and irrigation systems to mitigate adverse weather conditions. These are the kinds of projects that North Korea has neglected for decades in order to build up its military. Another fundamental problem in North Korean agriculture stems from the collectivization of farms and the resulting lack of incentives to produce. The inherent problem in collective farms is that workers do not have to work hard; regardless of their effort, they get the same share of food from the Great Leader. He is the Santa who takes care of everyone who believes in him. Electricity is necessary to produce fertilizer, and fuel is necessary to run farm machinery. Even when food supplies are donated, there is not even enough fuel to deliver grain to the worst-hit areas. It is obvious that North Korea would be hard pressed to feed its people even with a good climate and external aid, as long as the infrastructure is full of bottlenecks and fuel shortages are not relieved. Aid agencies say many rural people are getting just 100 grams — one bowl of rice — a day. Mike Chino of CNN posted a report on a Web site (April 28, 1997), stating that some North Koreans were surviving on bark, roots, and grass. In 1996, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il called for a crackdown on cannibalism

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The Unfinished War after three cases were reported. If the people have been eating the fibers inside tree bark, many trees must have died. They have also cut down trees for fuel, which exacerbates floods. When the mountains are stripped bare, even a small rainfall becomes a torrent, washing away the soil and clogging the irrigation systems. Tuberculosis is rampant in North Korea, and hospitals constantly run out of antibiotics. According to international doctors who are helping North Korea, there is such a shortage of anesthetics that most operations are carried out without any. However, there is a special hospital in Pyongyang reserved for highranking party officials that has all kinds of advanced medical equipment. Since North Korea has no hard currency, it cannot make expensive investments in economic and social infrastructure and rehabilitate or build new power plants and communications infrastructure. Its factories do not have proper machinery. North Korea might have been able to borrow money from sources such as the Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Funds if it had not defaulted on loans in the 1970s. International financial institutions such as the World Bank have money to lend, but they, too, require North Korea to clear its bad debt before borrowing again. A natural question is why North Korea has not made the kind of economic policy changes that the PRC has. In fact it has tried, although its attempts did not go far enough to have any material impact. Its first experiment was with the Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone (FETZ) at the border with China and Russia in 1991. North Korea modeled the FETZ after the PRC’s Shenzhen Free Economic Trade Zone to attract overseas investment, but it fell far short of adopting the market-opening measures of the PRC.172 The North Korean government maintained too much control over investors, such as the right to nationalize or seize foreign enterprises, and maintained a rigid control over the hiring of local workers. Not surprisingly, the Rajin-Sonbong FETZ attracted only a small number of foreign investors. North Korean officials simply do not seem to understand how business ventures are conducted in a capitalistic economy. Several South Korean companies found this out the hard way. Many other South Korean companies that initially showed interest in doing business with North Korea were 172. See Patricia Geode, The Legal Framework for Investment in North Korea’s Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone, September 2001.

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22. North Korea Now dissuaded by the many obstacles, such as high distribution costs (caused in part by the high cost of transportation and high fees for handling goods); the lack of an official mechanism for discussing and resolving issues between the two Koreas; the absence of business information and a general lack of transparency; inadequate telecommunications, port facilities, and power; and the lack of insurance for possible economic losses. North Korean authorities act as employment agencies and set wage levels. They even require managerial staffers to be recruited locally. Under “contractual joint ventures,” a local North Korean entity takes responsibility for the company management while the foreign entity provides the machinery, technical know-how, and, more importantly, buyers for the products. South Korean investors met North Korean counterparts in Beijing and other third-country locations. Apparently, the North Korean government is afraid of the presence of South Koreans in the North. However, the experiment with capitalism vis-à-vis the Rajin-Sonbong seems to have taught North Korea that its version of capitalism does not work. Kim Jong Il visited Russia and Shanghai (including the Shanghai Stock Exchange) in 2001. In the summer of 2002, signs of change in North Korea’s economic policy began to appear. North Korea experimented with the abolishment of the system of food rationing and free housing, increased the fees for its public utilities, devalued the local currency in line with its international market value, and raised workers’ wages many times over. A special administrative region of Sinuiju, on the bank of the Yalu River across from the PRC, was launched with much fanfare. It is to be a laboratory for a market economy. It remains to be seen whether North Korea will be able to provide the necessary physical and social infrastructure, as well as to make the legal and economic policy reforms necessary to induce international investors. The challenge to North Korean leaders will be to introduce fundamental policy reforms while maintaining their grip over the people. Another North Korean defector brings revealing episodes about equality in North Korea. After her defection Shin Yong Hee, who in her younger years was a Mansoodae (Hall of Longevity) ballerina at Pyongyang, wrote about the lifestyle of Kim Jong Il and top Communist leaders.173 The Mansoodae ballet company was 173. Shin Yong Hee Jindalle Kkod Pilttae Kkaji (available only in Korean: Until the Azalea Blooms), Seoul, 1996.

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The Unfinished War the top North Korean national ballet team, which performed in Moscow, Beijing, and Seoul, as well as in North Korea. Later, Kim Jong Il turned it into a Joy Team, which performed regularly at secret parties for Kim Jong Il and other North Korean leaders. In addition to the Joy Team, some bold dancers (more like strip teasers) performed regularly and entertained Kim and his parties. One such dance team visited Europe for a month to study at the Lido and Moulin Rouge, learning the arts of seductive dancing while millions in their country were starving. Shin wrote that Kim Jong Il and other high ranking leaders who attended such parties loved to fondle young virgins. They made sexual demands on these girls, which, of course, no one dared to refuse. The book also shows why a coup d’état is practically impossible in North Korea. All the office and home telephones of military and other leaders go through official operators. In spite of such supervision, military officers in Hamhung almost pulled off a military coup in the 1980s. In the end, however, several hundred officers were arrested and executed. North Korean diplomats have not been allowed to travel with their family members. I had heard of this practice but it did not strike home until I personally met the North Korean ambassador to Malaysia at a party held at the house of the Resident Representative of the United Nation Development Programme in 1975. When I asked her where her husband and children were, she said that the Great Leader is looking after them. Even an ambassador had to leave family behind. It was because of such practice that Hwang (equivalent to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs) had to defect alone, with his aide, rather than with his family. With the collapse of the North Korean economy, increasing numbers of escapees have been arriving in South Korea. The number has been just about doubling every year (71 in 1998, 148 in 1999, 312 in 2000, 583 in 2001, and 1,141 in 2002) in spite of the perils and difficulty of escaping from North Korea. Hunger seems to be the main reason for escape. In the case of Kang Chol-hwan, he was able to cross the border by bribing the guards. The escapees brought some fresh news about North Korea. There have been disturbing reports that some South Korean and Caucasian POWs are still in North Korea. According to the Chosun Ilbo (August 16, 1999), an ROK Army POW, Park Dong II (now 72 years old), defected to South Korea via China with four members of his family. This was the fourth time that a ROK POW escaped with his family members. Another defector who claims to have been a Communist cadre member at the Gumduck Coal Mine said that there were as many as 400 ROK POWs at his

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22. North Korea Now mine in the mid-1990s, but that the number had dwindled to about 100 by the time he defected in late 1999.174 He had detailed data on 24 of them and said that he remembered 40 names altogether. In 1996, another defector, Dong Yong Sup, said that at that same mine there were several thousand ROK POWs in the 1970s. Other escapees from different mines had similar stories: some 600 ROK POWs at the Aoji Coal Mine just after the armistice in September, 1953, and about 500 ROK POWs at Hamyon Coal Mine in early 1954, etc. According Yonhap New Agency and The Korean Herald Tribune (March 15, 1999), based on accounts of North Korean escapees, North Korea detained 454 South Koreans kidnapped by North Korea from all over the world. It had long been suspected that North Korea had abducted some Japanese citizens for the purpose of training North Korean agents. North Korea had denied this all along, but admitted to it in 2002. According to the recent escapees’ stories, the POWs who are forced to work in mines and quarries are only allowed to marry women of “poor origins,” and their children are forced to work in the mines after a minimal education. One female defector in 1995 wrote an essay called Animals Without Tails, describing how several ROK POWs worked like animals in coal mines with only shovels and pick axes. Apparently some Caucasian POWs remain in North Korea also. One defector, Kim Yong, said that he saw Caucasians with blue eyes working only ten feet away from him in a mine. He believed that the men were U.N. POWs; a guard told him that these foreign POWs were captured in the battle of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir.175 The U.S. government has no evidence that any of them is American. If the North Korean defector’s word is to be believed, however, these Caucasians could be soldiers of either the U.S. 1st Marine Division or the U.S. 7th Infantry Division. Some other escapees also mentioned seeing Caucasians, and one such story specifically related to British officers. Many North Korean would-be escapees may have been intercepted at the border or captured in China and returned to North Korea. Still, between 100,000 and 300,000 North Korean refugees are believed to be hiding in China (The Guardian, July 19, 2002). What they want is, first, to survive, and then to make it to South Korea. However, the passage is perilous, if not almost impossible. China does not accept refugee status for North Koreans. Any North Korean caught in 174. December 28, 1999, Chosun.com. 175. April 22, 2000, Chosun.com.

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The Unfinished War China is handed back over to North Korea. Once they are repatriated, they invariably face hard labor or prison terms. The New York Times (June 10, 2002) reported that in 2000 and 2001, China deported thousands of North Korean escapees to North Korea, and several of them asserted that for women who are caught pregnant by Chinese men, “forced abortion and infanticide are the norm in North Korea prisons.” An Associate Press report (June 30, 2002) provides a story on the plight of a family which escaped North Korea. Once in China, escaping from it presents another challenge. Yoo Sang-joon lost his wife and two children from starvation and disease in China. He said: “I lost both my sons and I alone am alive in this affluent South Korea. I ask myself, ‘What kind of father are you?’’’ Yoo, 39, says he has tried to settle into his new home since his arrival in South Korea in December 2000, but his mind keeps returning to the wind-swept plains of Mongolia. There, under a white wooden cross, lies one of his sons, Chul Min. Yoo says that he will have no peace until he saves enough money to go back and bring his son’s remains to rest in South Korea, the place to which his son wanted so much to come. Such an effort, however, involves more than money because the South Korean government does not permit such trips for escapees. In 2002, “crashing” embassies in Beijing in search of asylum became a favorite method of escaping China. This is happening in spite of the fact that Chinese soldiers have created “Berlin walls” around diplomatic missions. But it was getting harder by the summer of 2002. On June 14, 2002, Chinese security guards even invaded a South Korean consulate office in pursuit of a North Korean asylum-seeker. In the scuffle, the Chinese injured a South Korean counselor and several other diplomats who tried to block their illegal entry to the embassy. South Korea claimed that China had violated the Vienna Convention, but China disagreed. To the credit of the PRC, however, it has not continued the practice. However, after the incident, the Chinese have been cracking down on missionary groups such as the ones who had arranged for Yoo to escape. According to Timothy Peters, an American national who has been in China helping refugees and who testified to the U.S Senate, the Chinese authorities are offering a large bounty, the equivalent of $700, to encourage its citizens to give information on foreign or domestic individuals helping North Korean refugees and for spotting refugees themselves (Reuters, July 12, 2002). North Korean refugees are now interrogated, and in some cases tortured, in order to find out

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22. North Korea Now who helped them in China. Some 200 foreign missionaries are said to have been detained in China, accused of aiding North Korean refugees. One of those detained and tried is South Korean missionary Chun Ki-won. Peters, who worked with Chun in China, accuses the Chinese government of abusing Chun while he was in detention awaiting trial. “He has been given the equivalent of one piece of coarse wheat bread per day, he’s been deprived of sleep [and] forced to clean all prison toilets,” Peters said. After paying a fine and enduring eight months’ detention, Chun was freed in August, 2002, and is awaiting deportation. According to the Associated Press (August 6, 2002), Chun helped 170 North Koreans escape to South Korea since 1999, taking them through the jungles of Southeast Asia and the grasslands of China’s Inner Mongolia, before Chinese border guards arrested him. The soft-spoken missionary said that eight months in a grimy Chinese prison has hardly shaken his faith in his work. He found his mission when he first saw some of the North Korean women in China forcibly separated from their husbands and children and sold for money by human traffickers. He insisted that he would continue to help these people wherever he happens to be. China has oscillated between trying to do what is humane and what her treaty obligation with North Korea requires her to do. While this is going on, the plight of North Korean refugees and missionaries hardly receives mention in American newspapers and television. By far the worst story out of North Korea has been its gulags. In 1999, South Korean source (Yonhap News Agency, April 23, 1999) indicated that there were about 150,000 to 200,000 political prisoners in North Korea in ten different camps. According to the report of the U.S. Congress North Korean Advisory Group (November 1999), some seven million North Koreans (or about one-third of the population) are considered to be members of a “hostile” class. The prisoners are denied medical care and regular food rations, and a large proportion of them die every year. This story has been confirmed by many more recent stories from North Koreans who escaped to South Korea. North Korea denies the existence of such camps, but satellites have captured images of them in remote locations and witness accounts have corroborated their existence. Kang Chol-hwan, whose experience has been described earlier, was a former inmate of Political Prison Camp No. 15 at Yuduk. Kang grew up in the family of a Communist official, but one day his grandfather fell from grace for reasons which have not been specified. Instead of imprisoning the grandfather alone, three generations of the family were sent to the gulag.

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The Unfinished War Kang was a mere nine years old then, but spent ten years of his childhood in the camp. The conditions were such that inmates prayed for death. He survived on corn all that time but occasionally caught frogs, lizards, rats and anything alive to supplement the diet. Some committed suicide; but those who tried it and failed paid by being sent to gulags from which nobody returned. He is now an author and reporter for the South Korean daily newspaper Chosun Ilbo. When he first arrived in South Korea and told of the inhumane conditions in the camp, not everyone believed him. He was excited when a clear picture of Camp No. 22 was released to the public recently, although it was not his camp (Chosun Ilbo, December 4, 2002) — perhaps people will take him more seriously now. His camp was by no means the worst. Unlike other gulags, half the inmates served less than a life term. Several other harrowing stories have been told by escapees from different gulags. According to Soon Ok Lee, prisoners were being used for martial arts practice and for experiments with chemical and biological weapons (The Guardian, July 19, 2002). Ms. Lee said that she survived detention because she was an accountant and kept the camp’s records. She was released in an amnesty in 1992 and escaped to South Korea in 1995. She said that nearly all the 6,000 intimates who were in her camp when she arrived had died by the time she was released five years later. As they died, each year, a fresh supply of prisoners was obtained. Such stories did not seem to inspire the Western press. They were also not welcome news to the Kim Dae Jung Administration which was trying to find a diplomatic solution to the North-South confrontation.

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23. OLD WAR, NEW CRISIS THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM It was in April 1982 when a U.S. spy satellite captured for the first time an image of what appeared to be a nuclear reactor vessel under construction at a bend of a river at Yongbyon, North Korea. Yongbyon is about 60 miles north of Pyongyang. Four years later, in March 1986, the satellite captured images of two cylindrical craters in sand which appeared to be the result of high-explosive detonations. More suspicious signs appeared.176 In May 1992, a team of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) experts headed by Director General Hans Blix visited North Korea and met with its leaders. North Korea was a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Before their visit, the team was given an intelligence briefing by the CIA and a virtual-reality tour of Yongbyon using advanced computer modeling based on aerial photographs. After the preliminary discussion, the delegates were led to Yongbyon to see the nuclear power plant, built with Russian technical assistance. There was a sprawling research complex by then. Particularly interesting to Hans Blix and his team was a reprocessing building: “six-storyhigh and two football-fields long.” The building was far more imposing than what the IAEA delegates were led to expect from the “virtual tour.” But it was only 80 percent completed; and the equipment inside was primitive and only 40

176. For the beginning of the nuclear crisis, see Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Basic Books, 1997), pp. 249–260, Oberdorfer hereafter.

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The Unfinished War percent ready for full-scale operation. At least the situation was not as bad as the CIA had suspected.177 In a follow-up visit, regular inspectors were able to obtain radioactive waste from a steel tank and a waste storage pipe. The analysis of the waste material, conducted at the IAEA’s supporting laboratories at the U.S. Air Force Technology Center in Florida, revealed that plutonium separation took place in 1989, 1990, and 1991 rather than in a single separation conducted in 1990, as claimed by North Korea. Furthermore, new satellite imagery showed evidence of new facilities being built, carefully camouflaged by huge mounds of earth and landscaping. A trench was being dug (and covered up) between the reprocessing facility and what appeared to be a nuclear waste storage facility. The IAEA pressed North Korea to accept full-scale inspection, but North Korea accused the IAEA being an agent of the CIA, and on March 12, 1993, North Korea announced that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus began the first nuclear crisis. The simmering situation landed on newly-elected President Bill Clinton. Robert Galucci was handpicked by Clinton to convince North Korea not to withdraw from the New Non-Proliferation Treaty in return for certain unpublicized incentives. Galucci demanded that North Korea allow IAEA inspectors to enter the Yongbyon site to replace films and batteries in monitoring equipment and make “other nonintrusive tests” to make sure that nuclear materials were not diverted for the production of bombs. Not much progress was made. The IAEA threatened to take the matter to the U.N. Security Council with a demand to impose sanctions against North Korea. North Korea threatened to consider such a move an act of war. The Clinton Administration decided to talk. In early October 1993, Representative Gary Ackerman, the chairman of the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee of the House of Representatives, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and State Department desk officer for North Korea C. Kenneth Quinones traveled to Pyongyang to deliver the Administration’s message in person: the U.S. wanted dialogue and negotiations. North Korea had a message ready for them, in writing. It would be willing to remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and accept IAEA inspectors, provided that (i) the U.S.-ROK Team Spirit exercise, which had been held on a regular basis for years but was considered a hostile act by

177. ibid, pp. 268–271, Oberdorfer hereafter.

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23. Old War, New Crisis North Korea, ended; and (ii) the U.S. lifted its economic sanctions and opened a round of U.S.-North Korea negotiations on broader issues. Galucci and others tried to work out a detailed accord with the North Korean Mission to the U.N., but had little success. While this was going on, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution, by a vote of 140-1, urging North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA. The only dissenting vote was North Korea; its ally in the U.N., China, abstained. In South Korea, the newly elected Kim Yong Sam (1993-1998) reacted negatively to the direct contacts between North Korea and the U.S., on South Korea’s future security — without involving South Korea itself in the negotiations. A military action to stop the North Korean nuclear program was one of the options being considered by the U.S., but Kim Yong Sam said that he never favored “U.S. plans…to attack the North Korean nuclear facility at Yongbyon” (Reuters, January 17, 2003). Several influential groups in the U.S. were calling for sanctions rather than talks. A poll showed that 31 percent of Americans considered North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons program to be America’s most serious foreign policy issue. In the meantime, the IAEA called its inspectors back to Vienna on March 15, 1994, since they were barred from taking measurements at key sites and at the plutonium reprocessing plant. (A reprocessing plant is a chemical factory for separating plutonium from spent fuel discharged from a nuclear reactor. It is during such a process that plutonium could be diverted from accepted uses to the illicit manufacture of bombs.) The board of the IAEA voted to take the matter to the U.N. Security Council. During the escalating crisis, a working-level meeting of North Korea and South Korea was held at Panmunjom. The delegates from the North and the South exchanged harsh words. North Korean negotiator Yong Su Park shocked the South Korean delegate by threatening: “Seoul is not far from here. If a war breaks out, it will be a sea of fire. Mr. Song [South Korean delegate], it will probably be difficult for you to survive.” President Kim Yong Sam was not pleased and summoned an emergency meeting of his cabinet, which approved deployment of the Patriot missiles. At this juncture, the CIA estimated that North Korea had separated enough plutonium to produce one or two 10-kiloton bombs, similar to the one dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. A bigger issue emerged in 1994: North Korea was unloading the fuel rods at the 5-megawatt reactor; the rods could be chemically treated to separate plutonium from other waste materials. The IAEA insisted

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The Unfinished War that the unloading must take place under its supervision. It wanted to conduct tests to ascertain the history of the reactor and estimate the amount of plutonium that might have been produced previously. North Korea was, however, not in the least interested in revealing such history. Robert Gallucci impressed upon his counterpart in North Korea, Kang Sok Ju, that if the unloading took place without the supervision of the IAEA, negotiations with the U.S. would terminate. On April 29, North Korea backed off a bit and invited the IAEA to witness the unloading operations that would take place in the near future. However, the two parties were unable to agree on the procedures for inspection and testing the spent rods. The talks broke down and North Korea went ahead with the defueling on May 8, 1994, without international observers. North Korea was concurrently constructing a much larger 50-megawatt reactor and an even large 200-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon. They had the potential to supply North Korea with a large number of bombs. It is still not clear whether North Korea refused oversight to hide the amount of plutonium it had separated or to keep the West guessing what it might have. Defueling progressed much faster than the IAEA expected. The opportunity to learn the history of the reactor was gone. Therefore, now, no one knows for sure how much plutonium was separated. The U.N. began to consider international sanctions and Washington began to prepare military options. The isolated and impoverished North Korean regime had few trading partners other than Japan and China. Koreans residing in Japan and sympathetic to the North had been the major source of hard currency for North Korea for decades. Cutting off this flow would have hurt North Korea, but Japan was reluctant to cooperate with such sanctions, because Koreans in Japan might agitate. Japan found a convenient pretext, in her constitution, for not participating in anything resembling military action — including sanctions. China, the major source of oil and food for North Korea, was said to have been privately irritated by North Korean intransigence and was reluctant to support sanctions. But, who can tell? China might rather have a nuclear North Korea as neighbor rather than a unified Korea friendly to the U.S. and with U.S. troops on the peninsula. However, when Clinton offered her “most favored nation” status, China eventually softened its opposition to the sanctions. On the military front, one day after the North Korean delegate at Panmunjom threatened South Korea with the possibility of “a sea of fire,” the ROK defense minister unveiled the essence of the war plan in testimony to the

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23. Old War, New Crisis agitated National Assembly. In 1994, North Korea had moved roughly 65 percent of its forces, 8,400 artillery pieces, and 2,400 multiple rocket launchers to within six miles of the DMZ, the most heavily armed 150 miles on earth today. The threat of turning Seoul into an inferno was credible. In Washington, the Pentagon had completed a war plan with the help of four-star generals called in from all over the world. The National Security Council and the Pentagon presented Clinton with a stark calculation that if a war broke out in Korea, the military casualties could reach 52,000 Americans and 490,000 South Koreans, not counting innumerable civilians. The price tag for the war was estimated at $61 billion. Clinton chose a crisis management approach rather than military confrontation. In June, the sense of crisis loomed large. By now, polls showed that 46 percent of Americans viewed North Korea the most serious foreign policy issue. As South Korea moved to a heightened level of national defense, its stock market plummeted 25 percent in two days and foods were disappearing from the supermarkets. It was during this time that former president Jimmy Carter entered the scene. He had already received a few invitations to visit North Korea from Kim Il Sung, but each time the State Department had discouraged him from going. This time, the State Department agreed to Carter’s visit to North Korea — but as a private citizen. The ROK did not look favorably on Carter’s visit because as President he had almost succeeded in pulling the U.S. troops out of South Korea. Carter’s reception in South Korea was cool. Kim Yong Sam called the visit “ill timed.” However, his reception at Pyongyang was warm. In a face-to-face meeting, Kim Il Sung said that if the U.S. supplied light water reactors, North Korea would dismantle its gas-graphite reactors (which can more readily lend to the production of bombs). This idea had been floating around for months, but it was the first time that Kim Il Sung personally proposed it. Carter’s mission as a private citizen now acquired an official stature, with communication lines humming between the State Department and Carter. A package deal that was finally struck on October 21, 1994 at Geneva is known as the Agreed Framework (AF). The centerpiece of this agreement is the provision of two light water reactors of 1,000 megawatts each, which the international consortium would endeavor to construct by 2003. The combined capacity of 2,000 megawatts was several times larger than what North Korea had planned at Yongbyon and was far beyond the electricity demand in the foreseeable future; but that was the deal. The agreement stipulates that the U.S. “will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and

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The Unfinished War supply” the light water reactors. Until the first reactor has been completed, 500,000 tons of heavy oil is to be supplied to North Korea annually for heating and electricity production. In return, North Korea will “freeze its graphitemoderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle” them. The IAEA “will be allowed to monitor the freeze” at the Yongbyon and Taechon facilities. But the actual dismantling “will take place when the LWR [light water reactor] project is completed.” The AF stipulates, “The two sides will move toward normalization of political and economic relations.” Such steps include reducing “barriers to trade and investment” and opening diplomatic liaison offices in each other’s capitals. The U.S. agreed to provide “formal assurances” to North Korea, “against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.” North Korea agreed to “take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The last, but far from the least, provision was that North Korea would remain in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The IAEA would make “ad hoc and routine” inspections of the facilities. North Korea hailed the AF as a diplomatic victory. Why not? It would get the two state-of-the-art 1,000-megawatt reactors to replace the 5-megawatt reactor in operation and 300 megawatts under construction. The mood in South Korea, on the other hand, was not so jubilant. The U.S.-led deal was seen to be too loose. There was no specific inspection regime in the AF outside of Yongbyon and Taechon. As usual, the small country of North Korea negotiated from the position of power — habits learned from the time of the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom. In the U.S., the media praised the Clinton Administration for its “brilliant” move, which it claimed would stop the proliferation of nuclear arms. Clinton managed to push off the immediate crisis and come out of the negotiations smelling sweet. However, the celebration was premature. The AF ran into trouble as soon as it was signed. The cost of constructing the reactors was estimated at $4-$5 billion. South Korea committed to pay 70 percent and Japan agreed to cover much of the remainder. The reactors would be manufactured in South Korea. The proposed contract specified the reactors would be the “South Korean type.” Seoul wanted to have its central role in providing the reactors, especially in financial terms, acknowledged. No doubt, there might have been a propaganda motive as well. But North Korea was unwilling to accept such labels on the reactors. North Koreans were, and still are, largely insulated from the news that South Korea is well ahead of North Korea.

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23. Old War, New Crisis A face-saving device created to resolve this standoff was the creation of Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), with an American executive director. Its members, in March 1995, were the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. Since then, its membership has expanded to include the E.U. and some Asian countries. Negotiations were concluded on June 12 at Kuala Lumpur. The words “South Korean type” were deleted and technical specifications describing the reactors were used instead. But as soon as the negotiations were concluded, the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), with the understanding of North Korea, announced that “Korean standard model reactors” would be provided and the primary contractor would be Korean Electric Power Corporation of South Korea. Both sides saved face. In March 1995, KEDO started operations with funds provided by the U.S., South Korea, and others (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Indonesia). The supply of heavy fuel oil, funded mostly by the U.S., started immediately but there was little progress on the construction of the reactors until August 2001, when excavation started. North Korea complained bitterly about the delay and threatened to pull out of the AF and demanded financial compensation for the economic losses it suffered as a result of the delay. The reasons for the delay since 1995 have been many and each side can point a finger at the other. There were difficulties in getting North Korean work permits and resolving contract-related issues such as hiring of local personnel, and transportation of workers and technicians from South Korea. From the point of North Korea, the U.S. side did not follow through on the normalization of political and economic relations. In Congress, the Clinton Administration faced criticism over North Korea’s unwillingness to allow broader inspections and possibly not complying with the intent of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. IAEA monitoring was confined to the Yongbyon area. From the point of view of North Korea, it had not specifically committed to broad inspections. In 1998, Speaker of the House J. Dennis Hastings asked the North Korean Advisory Group to investigate the question: “Does North Korea pose a greater threat to U.S. national security than it did five years ago?” This question was prompted when North Korea surprised the whole world by successfully launching a multi-stage missile (Taepo Dong 1) over Japan into the Pacific Ocean. North Korea then threatened to test the three-stage Taepo Dong 2 missile, with a range of 10,000 miles: it could reach the west coast of the U.S.

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The Unfinished War A report of the Advisory Group completed in November 1999 concluded that it was. It said, “While North Korea’s nuclear program at its Yongbyon and Taechon facilities appears to be frozen[,] there is significant evidence that other nuclear weapons development activity is continuing.” The report suggests that North Korea sought to obtain external assistance for its nuclear program even before the ink dried on the AF. Specific mention is made that North Korea “sold missiles and missile production equipment to Pakistan,” among other countries. On November 24, 2002, The New York Times confirmed this finding by providing some intriguing details on North Korea-Pakistan contacts. The first inklings of a nuclear deal between the two countries came in 1993 when Benazir Bhutto was the prime minister of Pakistan. North Korea had more sophisticated missile technology than Pakistan, and Pakistan needed it to target all parts of India. Pakistan had advanced technology for producing bombs from enriched uranium. North Korea had an abundant supply of good grade uranium ore. Nuclear weapons from highly enriched uranium 235, the type that was detonated over Hiroshima in 1945, could be built outside the Yongbyon area where IAEA inspectors were not allowed to wander about; and such bombs did not require test firing because the trigger mechanism was simple. The Congressional report also found that U.S. policy had not addressed the threat posed by North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and international terrorism, while U.S. assistance had sustained a repressive and authoritarian regime. It was also suspected that North Korea might be financing its weapons development program through drug trafficking (the report cited 34 documented incidents). Counterfeiting was another state-sponsored activity. Even more alarming to the Advisory Group was the intelligence that North Korea was selling missile systems, components, and technology to Iran, Syria and Egypt as well as Pakistan. If the Taepo Dong 2 were installed in the Middle East, all of Europe would fall within its range. While all these were going on under the AF, the U.S.-led coalition became the biggest supplier of food and heavy fuel oil, freeing the resources of North Korea to be used for other purposes including the build up of its military and its weaponry. One U.S. aid worker in North Korea recently called the monitoring system a “scam.” Food aid monitors have only been able to visit some 10 percent of food aid distribution sites in North Korea. The North Koreans have never divulged a complete list of where aid is distributed.

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The Unfinished War In Tokyo, at an international conference on human rights conditions in North Korea, three North Korean defectors testified that international food aid was not reaching the starving people and that the government was resorting to elaborate schemes to deceive U.N. monitors (Associated Press, February 8, 2002). The defectors said that millions of dollars worth of food aid was being stockpiled in military complexes in the mountains and was being used to feed soldiers and the ruling elite. A defector who had been a bodyguard of Kim Jong Il added, “I know about this because I worked in the security network….It’s all a farce.” Another defector revealed other incidents of carefully staged deception. The Advisory Group made some observations on North Korea’s extensive chemical and biological weapons, including the capability to deploy a full range of chemical or biological weapons (such as plague, typhoid, cholera, anthrax, smallpox, yellow fever, botulism toxin, and hemorrhagic fevers) on missiles. All along, North Korea has refused to admit that it was developing nuclear weapons. However, on October 17, 2002, the White House released the news that North Korea had admitted to having a secret nuclear weapons program. The North announced this to U.S. special envoy James Kelly during his visit to Pyongyang on October 3-5, 2002. The U.S. and South Korea had suspected all along that North Korea was developing nuclear bombs and might even have several bombs already, but North Korea’s admission has placed the U.S. and South Korea in a difficult position. The Bush Administration downplayed the predicament, since it was preoccupied with Iraq. There were and continue to be other problems. America’s staunchest ally, South Korea, has been unwilling to adhere to what it considered was a “hard line” policy of America. Newly elected president Roh indicated that he would continue with the policy of the previous administration, including economic assistance (such as the development of the Kaesong industrial estate in North Korea). For the moment, economic sanctions against North Korea as a method of containing North Korea appears to be a non-starter. Neither China nor South Korea seems to support such a move. This time, Japan seems to align more closely with the U.S., although it is not certain that she would participate in sanctions. China and Russia have been pressuring the U.S. to engage in direct negotiations with North Korea while the U.S. wants a multilateral approach. These two Korean War allies of North Korea apparently do not wish to face the issue of sanctions against North Korea in the U.N. Security Council. In the meantime, North Korea has been ratcheting up the crisis by restarting the 5-megawatt reactor, firing a cruise missile in the sea between

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23. Old War, New Crisis Korea and Japan (perhaps to warn against any naval operations including a blockade of its coast), sending a fighter plane into the South Korean air space (perhaps to test the UNC response), and issuing a warning that nuclear war could break out on the Korean Peninsula at “any moment'' in an escalation of hostile rhetoric. Even without such escalation, by their mere presence the longrange missiles coupled with nuclear weapons represent a grave threat to South Korea and Japan if not also to the U.S. Sales of such advanced weapons to sensitive regions of the world present yet another serious danger to the U.S. and her allies.

THE SUNSHINE POLICY Returning to the 1990s, the Kim Dae Jung Administration, with the full blessing of the Clinton Administration, extended its gesture of friendship and reconciliation, called the “sunshine policy”. Under the policy, the government has been sending a generous amount of rice, fertilizer, and economic assistance including money to North Korea. It has been renamed Peace and Prosperity Policy by newly elected South Korean president Roh Moo Hyon. The South Korean government has also encouraged the private sector to follow the suit. The initial intention was to open dialogue with the isolated North Korean regime and relax the tension between the two Koreas. Private individuals and businessmen responded to the call to support the government policy and to help improve the living conditions of their countrymen in the north. The first celebrated case of private sector participation involved Chairman Chung of the Hyundai Group, who drove a herd of cattle across the 38th parallel in a symbolic gesture for peace. An opposition assemblyman insists that some $300 million in cash were delivered to North Korea during the two cattle runs which took place in 1998. This was reportedly tied to obtaining the exclusive right for the Diamond Mountain tourism project. This project has managed to send more than 300,000 South Koreans on tours of Diamond Mountain in North Korea. It is a mountain that most Koreans wish to see before they pass away, but this project has resulted in huge financial losses to the Hyundai Asan Group while North Korea has earned valuable hard currency. Was this a pure commercial deal or was it urged by the government with assurance of counter payment? There is no definitive answer yet; but the government has subsidized the company to the

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The Unfinished War tune of $400 million. Even smaller businessmen such as the Ahn brothers (discussed previously in the book) made multi-million dollar donations to North Korea. Supporters of the sunshine policy claim that it has contributed to the lessening of tensions between the North and the South. Its critics, including Hwang Jang-yop, believe that the policy has only managed to resuscitate the failing North Korean regime. Certainly, it can be argued that cash assistance to North Korea has strengthened the military build up and the weapons development program rather than improving the living conditions of the average North Korean. Money is fungible. Prima facie, the policy has not materially lowered the danger of military conflict on the peninsula. On June 29, 2002, two North Korean Navy patrol boats crossed the Northern Limit Line established by the UNC in 1953 and opened fire on South Korean patrol boats. Four South Korean sailors died, 19 of the 27-member crew were injured, and one sailor was missing after the patrol boat sank. The North Korean boats also sustained damage but North Korea did not release any information on its casualties. A similar incident took place in 1999. Seoul and Washington charged that the North violated the armistice agreement. North Korean’s official news agency, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), however, said that the Northern Limit Line was illegal. It became clear later that the North wanted to redefine the 50-year old sea border. The only mystery was why it was doing so at this time, when South Korea was pursuing a conciliatory policy? Was North Korea testing the resolve of South Korea and the UNC? During the naval battle, the North Korea coastal defense force activated the radar system of its Soviet-made STYX and Silkworm guided missiles. The incident had a definite potential to escalate. After the battle, South Korea’s rules of engagement prohibiting its navy from shooting first were revised, and there was a major cabinet reshuffle, including the dismissal of the defense minister. At least, South Korean has shown its resolve to defend the borders. Then came the North Korean admission that it had a nuclear weapons development program. The South Korean government has all along been playing down information on the suspected developments. On October 21, 2002, the South Korean Defense Ministry admitted that it had learned of North Korea’s attempt to import uranium-enriching equipment from abroad in 1999, and insisted that it passed on the information to the U.S. government (The Korean Herald). In April, 1999, Hwang Jang-yop told a Japanese weekly magazine that

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23. Old War, New Crisis Pyongyang had already developed nuclear weapons using uranium rather than plutonium. Hwang was not permitted to leave South Korea to testify to the U.S. Congress. The South Korean media had been reporting on the improving relationship between the two Koreas under the sunshine policy, including market-opening measures and a rail connection between the two Koreas, rather than the increasing threats from the North. In the aftermath of the North’s admission, the South Korean Opposition asked the government to hold back on “inter-Korean exchange projects” such as the rail connection to Sinuiju and the Diamond Mountain tourism until North Korea allowed IAEA inspections. However, the Kim and Roh Administrations have continued with such projects. They have, however, supported KEDO’s decision to discontinue the shipment of heavy oil and other assistance tied to the AF, such as the provision of reactors. During the close South Korean presidential election in 2002, the opposition Grand National Party (GNP), which has the majority in the National Assembly, accused the government of secretly sending the North a bundle of money, about $400 million. People suspected that this might be just a smear campaign. But after the election, it came to light that such an amount was indeed covertly sent to North Korea through various companies of the Hyundai Asan Group. According to the opposition, the total amount sent to North Korea between 1998 and 2000, both openly in business transactions and secretly, was as high as $2 billion. Almost all of this involved Hyundai companies (The Korea Times, February 8 and 12, 2002). It was alleged that some of the money was intended to entice Kim Jong Il to come to a summit meeting. Whether it is $200 million or $2 billion, it is an enormous sum for North Korea, which has hardly any way to earn hard currency, and is certainly enough to allow her to import equipment and material for a nuclear weapons’ program.

MILITARY PROVOCATIONS Since the cease-fire, South Korea has been in a tenuous peace with North Korea, punctuated by periodic crises. In January 1968, the USS Pueblo, a U.S. Navy vessel sent on an intelligence mission in international waters off the coast of North Korea, was attacked by North Korean naval vessels and MiG jets. One

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The Unfinished War man was killed and several were wounded. The 82 surviving members of the crew were captured and put through an ordeal for eleven months. In 1974, a North Korean agent tried to assassinate President Park. Although the attempt failed, he succeeded in killing the first lady. One of the more bizarre and barbaric acts took place on August 18, 1976, when Inmin-gun guards attacked a team of U.S. and ROK soldiers who entered the U.N. side of Panmunjom in the DMZ to trim an old tree that obstructed the view from a U.N. checkpoint. Inmin-gun soldiers axed two American officers and wounded several ROK and U.S. soldiers. The incident brought the UNC and North Korea to the brink of war until Kim Il-sung expressed “regrets,” the first event of its kind, by Kim. In 1983, North Korean commandos attacked South Korea’s high level delegation visiting Rangoon, Burma (now Myanmar), killing eighteen officials, including four cabinet ministers. In 1987, North Korean agents exploded a bomb in a Korean Airlines jet killing all 115 aboard. In 1994, the first nuclear crisis erupted. Even after the AF was signed and while the assistance under the sunshine policy was being delivered, hostility never ceased. In 1996, a North Korean submarine ran aground on the east coast of South Korea with 26 commandos and crew members on board. Bloody naval clashes flared up on the Yellow Sea in 1999, and then in 2002. The latest is the second nuclear crisis, which started in 2002 when North Korea admitted having a nuclear weapons development program. What perhaps concerns the U.S. most today is not only North Korea’s development but also sales of “weapons of mass destruction” to the Middle East and other sensitive regions of the world. On August 29, 2002, the United States’ top arms negotiator, U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton, said that North Korea was the world’s foremost peddler of ballistic missile technology and related equipment, components, and materials. Bolton was quoted by the Associated Press as saying that North Korea has “one of the most robust offensive bioweapons programs on earth.” He went on to say that President Bush’s use of the term “axis of evil” to describe Iran, Iraq, and North Korea was more than a rhetorical flourish — it was factually correct; and “There is a hard connection between these regimes — an axis along which flow dangerous weapons and dangerous technology.” News events since then have supported the suspicion that North Korea has been selling missiles to countries willing to pay for them. On November 24, 2002, David E. Sanger (The New York Times) said that in July 2002, “American intelligence agencies tracked a Pakistani cargo aircraft as it landed at a North

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23. Old War, New Crisis Korean airfield and took on a secret payload: ballistic missile parts … in full view of American spy satellite.” In an apparent admission of the fact, the article said that Secretary Colin Powell was assured that “such trade will not occur in the future.” On December 10, news broke that a ship carrying 15 SCUD missiles of unknown types, rocket fuel, and chemicals which originated in Nampo, North Korea was intercepted on the Arabian Sea. Apparently, a spy satellite had been tracking the ship for a few weeks before two Spanish navy frigates participating in Operation Enduring Freedom intercepted it. This is the first time that a North Korean ship was stopped on international water with missiles on it. The high-tech spy work and the capture of a North Korean ship on the high seas had an un-dramatic ending. The ship and its cargo were apparently on their way to Yemen, an ally in the War Against Terror. The drama ended in a rather embarrassing manner from the viewpoint of the U.S. and her allies when the Spanish and American navies had to release the ship and cargo one day later, when the Yemeni government protested. There was no law prohibiting the sale of missiles to Yemen. This incident took place eight days before the South Korean presidential election. Two major candidates (conservative Lee Hoi-chang, a former supreme court judge, and liberal former human rights lawyer Roh Moo Hyon) both condemned North Korea. Lee said, “Even in the vortex of a nuclear crisis, North Korea does not cease its rash provocations, exporting missiles.” The unexpected release of the ship and the cargo the next day pulled the rug out from under such statements. North Korean rhetoric has become more outrageous, threatening to make an all out attack against South Korea and American troops there if the U.S. increased her military strength in South Korea. If the U.S. and South Korea decide to take on North Korea militarily, the final outcome is not in doubt — although defeating North Korea would be much more difficult than defeating Saddam Hussein. It boasts over a million well trained soldiers equipped with aging but sophisticated weapons, even if one is to discount biochemical and possibly nuclear weapons. Yet, to South Koreans, a victory after destroying much of their country and perhaps suffering hundreds of thousand if not millions of casualties would be hollow. South Koreans are understandably nervous today. When Bush first spoke of the “axis if evil,” he received a standing ovation in the joint session of Congress; but the majority of South Koreans were concerned

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The Unfinished War that the name-calling might doom the weakened sunshine policy — regardless of whether or not the statement was true. As many South Koreans suspected, North Korea reacted angrily (although it routinely calls the U.S. by all kinds of names), instead of being intimidated. It was a matter of saving face. North Korea has all along been telling the world and its people that American imperialism was evil, not its own regime. The U.S. did not anticipate a belligerent Kim Jong Il hurling insults, and had no immediate answer. In hindsight, perhaps Bush should have “walked softly and carried a big stick.” If the problem lay between the U.S. and North Korea alone, the U.S. could demolish the North Korean nuclear facilities; but the reprisals would be taken against the U.S. troops in South Korea and South Korea itself. The small and bankrupt North Korea is practically the only country in the world today that tries to bully America. Kim Jong Il has been variously described a paranoid, sociopath, or a madman. Under his father, Kim Jong Il used to produce propaganda movies. In a way, he lives the life of the character that he helped create. In official propaganda, his family lineage is traced to the legendary founding king of Korea, Tangun, some four thousand years ago, and the fearless Korean kingdom of Koguryo which occupied parts of what is now North Korea and much of Manchuria. Its kings did not bow to anyone, including Chinese emperors. To give more credence to his family lineage, his birth place was changed from a border town in Siberia to a slope on Mt. Paikdu, the spiritual center of the ancient Korean kingdom, now between North Korea and Manchuria. He acts like one of the ancient kings of the Koguryo kingdom. Kim Jong Il has also convinced North Koreans that North Korea won the Korean War and that America is afraid of North Korea. Whether or not he believes in these myths is not certain, but it is certain that he props up his regime by threatening to use his considerable military might. In exchange for his not unleashing terror, he wants the U.S. and South Korea to guarantee the security of his regime and provide food, energy and money to maintain that regime. South Koreans today are sharply divided on how to deal with him. The opposition party with a majority in the National Assembly has accused the ruling party of appeasement. Many South Koreans agree that the sunshine policy or any other form of conciliation is unlikely to solve the problem, but they elected a president who seems to believe in it — although he denies that he is engaged in appeasement.

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23. Old War, New Crisis The West avoided one opportunity to start a Third World War by threatening to annihilate the USSR if attacked. But the South Korean ruling party is unsure that such a strategy would work, and prefers to believe that friendly gestures and economic aid to North Korea can relax the tension. In any event, the Cold War model of nuclear brinkmanship cannot work when one party does not have nuclear weapons and the other party can hit its capital in a matter of minutes, not hours. Imagine America in the 1960s, if the USSR had succeeded in putting nuclear-tipped missiles not only on Cuba but also on Long Island and in the Chesapeake Bay. That is South Korea today. The barrels of 10,000 artillery pieces are trained on the Inchon-Seoul region of 20 million people; they are under the control of a seemingly unpredictable leader. The threat is credible.

WHAT NEXT What should the U.S. and South Korea do about North Korea and its nuclear weapons program? Clearly, broad economic sanctions, even if the U.S. chose that option, would not go down easily. China and South Korea would not go along, for the reasons discussed above. As reported by The New York Times (Feb. 23, 2003), “Mr. Roh has given strong indications that he intends to accelerate South Korea's embrace of North Korea, even as the United States looks for ways to ratchet up pressure on North Korea.” Roh spoke “in recent weeks of establishing an economic community with North Korea, stepping up trade, aid and investment there, ruling out economic sanctions and military strikes against the country and even of personally ‘guaranteeing’ North Korea's security.” Such talk has distressed many South Koreans as well as Americans. Initial diplomatic efforts by the U.S. to convince China and Russia to put pressure on North Korea have not produced anything concrete. High-level South Korean delegates went to Pyongyang, but that too did not produce any appreciable result. Both China and Russia suggested that the U.S. hold direct talks with North Korea — precisely what the U.S. said that she did not want to do. The Bush Administration insists that such talks should be held within a multilateral framework. North Korea’s immediate demands were a non-aggression treaty with the U.S., respect for North Korea’s sovereignty, and its right to economic development in exchange for dismantling its nuclear weapons development

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The Unfinished War program. Prima facie, these conditions are benign and reasonable. However, it is clear that what the North wants from Seoul and Washington is major economic concessions even as North Korea is breaking off from the AF. The U.S. has not rushed to talk with North Korea, let alone to offer a deal. The post-September 11 America, especially on the heels of the failed AF, is less tolerant. Yet, the Bush Administration is likely to explore the possibility of a deal, hopefully with the participation of North Korea’s neighbors (South Korea, China and Japan), if not the U.N., because the alternatives are even less attractive. There is little doubt as to what Kim Jong Il wants; and South Korea and other KEDO allies have it: food, money, economic infrastructure, know-how, and the market. They are particularly important, because North Korea has been flirting with coming out of isolation and following the PRC model of economic development. The success of its market opening plan depends on the inducement of foreign capital and technology and its products’ access to foreign markets. Theoretically, the consortium may be able to buy off North Korea’s entire nuclear and other WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programs at the right price. Kim Jong Il sees nuclear weapons as a means of obtaining security and prosperity. A good argument can be made that it would be far cheaper to pay him off and try to turn North Korea into a mini-China rather than confront him at this time. An unintended but beneficial impact of such a strategy, from the U.S.South Korean perspective, could be either a transformation of Kim Jong Il into someone like Deng Xiaoping — or the collapse of North Korea (especially if such a reform goes hand in hand with opening the country to the world). A big question is whether the U.S. or a consortium can trust Kim Jong Il enough to make any deal with him at all. He has not lived up to the terms of the AF and the sunshine policy has not transformed him. Would he allow inspectors to verify any future agreement, such as the dismantling of the nuclear weapons program? Considering Kim Jong Il’s past behavior, it would require an intrusive type of inspection to verify compliance. It is worth a try, although it is doubtful how far Kim Jong Il would go to open up the country. If an acceptable deal cannot be struck, America could still try to impose more limited sanctions against North Korea’s weapons trade. Then, China and Japan as well as South Korea would collaborate. From the U.S. point of view, the objective is primarily to blockade the shipment of missiles and WMD to terrorists or hostile nations in volatile regions, rather than starve North Korean

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23. Old War, New Crisis military or civilians. In fact, food aid is continuing even as North Korea is threatening to start a total war. The actual events that might unfold in the near future are impossible to predict. North Korea has as much say on the future course of the peninsula as the U.S. or South Korea. It is possible that the U.S. would withdraw its troops from South Korea if the views of the U.S. and South Korea diverge further and antiAmerican sentiments intensify. Without large numbers of troops on the ground in South Korea, in a sense the U.S. would be in a better position to take military action against North Korea, as it would not be a sitting duck for the counterattack. Then again, that might leave South Korea alone to face the threat of a North Korea invasion, in spite of the mutual defense pact. It would also not be a happy occasion for the U.S., because it would signal failed diplomacy and withdrawal in the face of gathering danger. America has been growing stronger militarily, but not necessarily in her ability to convince allies around the world to share her strategy and values. It is not a question of lack of tact in one U.S. president or another. In the final analysis, all American presidents engage in diplomacy and foreign conflicts to promote the strategic interests of the U.S. That is how it has been for any country throughout human history. However, what is good for the U.S. is not necessarily good for other countries. The history of American engagement in Korea has shown, as discussed at length in this book, the national interest of the U.S. has not always served the national interest of Korea — starting with the series of actions leading to the division of Korea and to the start of the war, in the first place. Even in their common fight against the Communists and the defense of Korea, the U.S. and South Korea did not always share the same strategy. A new and more pressing issue today is how to deal with the nuclear North. A preemptive strike against a North Korean nuclear facility may make sense from the standpoint of the strategic interest of the U.S., but not from South Korea’s. Retaliation most likely would be against South Korea, not the U.S., even if the U.S. troops had already withdrawn from South Korea. North Korea is desperately poor. One cannot discount the possibility of its invading South Korea just to grab food, fuel, and other necessaries. Kim Jong Il might have to take such a desperate gamble for his regime to survive, as many South Koreans privately believe. The real challenge for the U.S. and South Korea is how to contain, if not defeat, the Kim Jong Il regime without starting a full-scale war. In Afghanistan

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The Unfinished War and Iraq, the U.S. has tested a new, technology-savvy and intelligent military that aims to work with local groups and accommodate complex realities. Unlike the days of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the U.S. troops seek to avoid and are more able to avoid collateral damage. In Korea, the U.S. will need all of that and more. A new level of psychological warfare will be called for to frustrate the North Korean regime and formulate a common front that serves the interests of both South Korea and the U.S. The option of doing nothing, or at least nothing drastic, should be also considered seriously. One must assume that North Korea already has several bombs; and at this stage, a few more would not make a huge difference. Time is not necessarily in Kim Jong Il’s favor. The regime could crumble from within — note the increasing number of defectors. Kim Jong Il should be made aware, if he is not already, that a naked invasion or the use of nuclear weapons would bring a swift and massive retaliation.

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INDEX 38th parallel, 4, 24, 25, 28, 36, 43, 46, 49, 55, 61-67, 73-75, 78, 81-86, 89, 125, 129, 139-141, 144, 161, 168, 175, 176, 183, 186, 189, 191, 200-203, 207, 225, 267

British role, 5, 6, 31, 71, 110, 112, 134, 135, 137, 144, 161, 167, 169, 170, 188, 225, 227, 228, 229, 253 British 27th Brigade (Commonwealth), 161

Acheson Pacific Defense Line, 80, 231 Acheson, Dean, 63-65, 68, 71, 78-81, 133, 140, 156, 167, 185, 200, 231

Busan, 88, 93, 102, 103, 106, 110, 111, 113, 114, 118, 124, 127, 131, 135, 136, 138, 154, 165, 166, 173, 178, 180, 185, 187, 193, 198, 199, 207, 208, 211, 212, 222

Agreed Framework (AF), 261-264, 269, 270, 274

Busan Perimeter, 111, 113, 114, 118, 124, 127, 131, 135, 136, 138, 154, 207

Al Jubayl Deep-Sea Port, 236 Almond, Edward M., 87, 113, 137, 154, 162, 165, 185, 187

Bush, George W., 241, 242, 265, 271, 273, 274

Attlee, Clement, 167

Byon, Yong Tae, 207, 220

Beijing, 7, 61, 117, 123, 125, 126, 130, 166, 199, 201, 251, 252, 254

Byrne, Patrick, 97, 149

Biological weapons (BW), 270

Cairo Conference, 31

Blix, Hans, 257

Canada, 82, 144, 183

Blue House, 76, 211

Carlson, Lewis H., 228, 229

Boatner, Haydon L., 210

Carter, Jimmy, 242, 261

Bolt, Charles, 49

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 36, 50, 51, 61, 64, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 97, 136, 143, 145, 154, 168, 188, 218, 234, 237, 257, 258, 259

Bolton, John, 270 Bonesteel, Charles, 25 Bradley, Omar, 49, 79, 80, 81, 109, 132, 168, 170

Chae Byung Duk, 56

Briggs, Ellis, 218, 220, 221

Chang Taek-sang, 33, 34

Chang (John) Myon, 211 Changjin Reservoir, 162, 163, 164, 187, 224, 253

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The Unfinished War Cheju-do, 73, 179, 180

Coury, Robert, 229

Chiang Kai-shek, 26, 31, 200, 201

Craig, Lawrence, 200

China, People's Republic of (PRC), 5, 123, 126, 206, 228, 232, 250, 251, 254, 274

Cumings, Bruce, 5, 9, 54, 243

Chinese

Daedong River, 146

Dabudong battle, 115, 118

Communist Party (CCP), 124

Daegu, 19, 55, 78, 96, 98, 99, 106, 111, 113, 115, 118, 120, 178, 180, 196, 211

Nationalist, 78, 79, 169 Nationalist Army, 55, 74, 89, 143, 169, 170

Daejon, 91, 102, 103, 106, 107, 110, 148

Northeast Defense Army (NDA), 124, 125, 128, 129

Daejon Penitentiary, 148

Daejon Agreement, 91 Daewoo Group, 238

People's Volunteers (CPV), 129, 143, 201

Dean, William F., 94, 101, 103, 105, 110, 148, 231

Red Army

Declaration of Independence, 12

38th Field Army, 128, 143, 151 118th Division, 150, 151

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), 188, 225, 227, 261, 270

Spring Offensive, 190, 224

Deng Hua, 130

120th Division, 150

Diamond (Kumgang) Mountain, 267, 269

Spring Offensive, 190, 224

Dodd, Francis T., 8, 210

Chongchon River, 129, 146, 152, 167

Dongduchon, 197

Chosun Kingdom or Dynasty, 6, 7

Donovan, Robert, 77

Chunchon, 85

Doyle, James H., 132, 172

Churchill, Winston, 31

Dulles, Allen, 137

Clark, Eugene F., 137, 143

Dulles, John Foster, 81, 217, 223, 227

Clark, Mark W., 143, 210, 212, 216, 218224, 227, 230, 243

Cohen, William S., 182

Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), (see also U.S. Military) 93, 101, 111, 113-119, 135, 136, 138, 143, 146, 153, 155, 160165, 176, 181, 186, 190, 200, 210, 222, 224

Cold War, 2, 62, 66, 69, 125, 273

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 92, 210, 216-223

Collins, J. Lawton, 88, 109, 132, 134, 135

European Union, 238

Colson, Charles F., 210

Flying Fish Channel, 132, 137

Commander Low, 6

Forbidden City, 123, 126, 128, 146

Communist Party, 30, 33, 34, 40-43, 52, 54, 56, 64, 147, 247

Freeman, Paul, 117, 186, 230

Confucian, 6, 17, 18, 99, 182

General Sherman, The, 6

Clinton, William, 183, 240, 242, 258, 260263, 267

Gay, Hobart R., 94

278

Index Grand National Party, 242, 269

Khrushchev, Nikita, 65, 66, 217

Gregg, Donald, 234

Kim, Dae Jung, 95, 198, 242, 256, 267

Hamhung, 3, 4, 43-46, 94, 96, 120, 121, 129, 139, 147, 148, 161, 162, 166, 167, 171-175, 193, 252

Kim, Du-bong, 42 Kim, Hong Il, 89 Kim, Il Sung, 8, 14, 15, 27, 28, 36, 37, 40, 42, 44, 49-66, 79, 88, 94-99, 116, 120, 124126, 130, 138, 146, 213, 229, 243, 247, 248, 261

Han River, 76, 77, 82-89, 104, 107, 115, 120, 240 Hangul, 21 Harriman, W. Averell, 111, 134, 136 Hastings, Max, 182, 230, 263

Kim, Jong Il, 15, 244, 247-251, 265, 269, 272-276

Hermit Kingdom, 5

Kim, Ku, 8-14, 30-38, 241

Hillenkoetter, Roscoe, 71

Kim, Suk-won, 4, 107

Hingkew Park, 13

Kimpo, 76, 82, 89

Hiroshima, 259, 264

King Kojong, 7, 12

Hodge, John R., 29, 30-37, 58, 67

Kinney, Oliver G., 202

Hong Xuezhi, 130, 146, 162, 224

Koguryo, 128, 129, 272

Hopkins, Harry, 25, 31

Koizumi, Junichiro, 58

Hsieh Fang, 201

Koje-do, 174, 175, 204, 207-210

Hungnam, 43, 121, 164-166, 171-176

Korea

Hyundai, 236, 267, 269

Christianity in, 6, 8

IAEA, 257-264, 269

Division of, 25, 36, 175, 199, 215, 231, 233, 241, 275

Inchon Landing, 7, 10, 11, 29, 89, 131-140, 144, 148, 161, 165, 167, 197, 208, 273

Korean

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 257

Central News Agency (KCNA), 268

Iron Triangle, 190, 203, 223

Democratic Party, 32, 40, 46, 55

Ito Hirobumi, 7

Labor Organization (KLO), 69, 70

Japanese

Language Society, 21

Declaration of Independence, 12

Annexation, 8

Liberation Army, 13

Military Academy, 53, 54, 55, 56

Provisional Government (KPG), 10, 12, 13, 30-33

Occupation, 17

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), 263, 274

Johnson, Louis, 71, 136 Joy, C. Turner, 200

Kosong, 114

Juche, 248

Kremlin, 36, 64

Kean, William B., 111, 113, 181

Kum River, 103, 104, 106, 110

Kennedy, John F., 59, 79, 235

279

The Unfinished War Kunsan, 132-137, 178, 179, 180

Masan, 114, 118, 183, 222

Landenberg, Hoyt, 156

Massacre Valley, 187

LaPorte, Leon J., 242

McCarthy, Joseph, 230

Lee, Byong Nam, 41, 42

McCloy, John J., 25

Lee, Hoi-chang, 271

McClure, Robert B., 185

Lee, Simon, 2, 4, 19, 20, 42, 45, 49, 87, 9496, 139, 147, 173, 193, 194, 207

McLean, Robert A., 228, 229

Lee, Soon Ok, 256

Methodist Mission Board, 10

Lee, Soon-ku, 54, 73, 97-99

Miari Hill, 83

Lee, Sung Gae, 119

Michaelis, John H., 117

Lee, Uk, 207, 209, 210, 223

Milburn, Frank, 152

Lend Lease Act, 23

Millennium Democratic Party, 243

Leninism, 43, 248

Mongolia, 254, 255

Levie, Howard, 182

Montclair, Ralph, 186

Lim, Kun Shick, 72

Muccio, John J., 64, 66-71, 76, 77, 80, 86, 87, 90-92, 94, 169

Meiji Restoration, 235

Loveless, Jay, 102, 103 MacArthur, Douglas, 25, 27, 30, 35, 36, 5759, 69, 70, 79-88, 92, 101, 105, 106, 109113, 121, 131, 132-140, 141, 144, 145, 152, 154-159, 163-169, 185, 188-200, 230

Munsan, 75, 83, 86 Murrow, Edward R., 182 Musashiya, Harimao T., 23, 50, 61, 67, 70, 168

MacGhee, Ralph, 50

Nakdong River, 108, 111, 114-116

Maeda Takeshi, 14

Nam Il, 201, 202, 209, 219

Malcom, Ben S., 71

Nam-san Mountain, 83

Malik, Yakov, 199

No Gun Ri, 180-184, 194, 197, 231, 239, 241, 242

Manchuria, 10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 54, 61, 64, 70, 128, 129, 141, 143-147, 156, 157, 169, 185, 189, 217, 272

Noble, Harold, 87, 93

Manchurian Military School, 55, 56

Norstad, Lauris, 111, 134, 136

Mansei, 29, 119, 173

Northern Limit Line, 268

Mansoodae, 251

NSC-68, 79, 80, 81

Mao Zedong, 42, 61, 62, 65, 70, 123, 124, 125, 127-130, 134, 146, 162, 166-169, 200, 206, 224, 230, 241

Ongjin Peninsula, 103 Operation Bluehearts, 131 Pace, Frank, 88

Maoism, 248

Pacific War, 19, 27, 59, 87, 131, 138, 206

March One Movement, 10

Paijai Academy, 8

Marshall, George C., 136, 156, 157, 200

Paik In Yup, 76, 103, 137

Marxism, 248

280

Index Paik Sun Yup, 54, 74, 216

Park, Chung Hee, 52, 55, 78, 234, 236

Pyongyang, 4, 6, 14, 20, 24, 27, 34, 36, 40, 43, 45, 51, 54, 61-66, 95, 127, 129, 141, 143, 146, 149, 151, 153, 161, 190, 194, 197, 200-202, 207, 208, 250, 251, 257, 258, 261, 265, 269, 273

Park, Hun Yong, 33, 35, 42, 62, 100

Queen Min, 7, 8, 10

Pearl Harbor, 19, 73

Rajin, 136, 140, 157, 250, 251

Peng Duhai, 123, 124, 126, 127- 130, 143, 146, 147, 150-152, 155, 162, 166

Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone (FETZ), 250

Pentagon, 58, 108, 110, 121, 133, 134, 168, 230, 231, 232, 261

Republic of Korea (South Korea)

Panmunjom, 201, 203-205, 209, 210, 216219, 221, 259, 260, 262, 270

People's Committee, 34, 97, 98, 197

First Five-Year Economic Development Plan, 235

People's Liberation Army (PLA), 123, 143

Military units

Peoples' Democratic Republic of Korea (PDRK) or North Korea

1st Division, 73, 74, 76, 83, 92, 115118, 141, 151, 153, 155

North Korean Interim People's Committee, 40

2nd Division, 216 3rd Division, 161

North KoreanNavy, 73

5th Division, 54, 216

North KoreanPeople's Army (NKPA), 4, 23, 36, 46, 50, 52, 61-63, 67, 68, 70-89, 94, 96-127, 132, 137-140, 144, 147-151, 154, 155, 161, 162, 173178, 181, 184, 194, 196, 197, 201, 204, 207-209, 227, 270

6th Division, 85, 86, 108, 150-152 7th Division, 73, 74, 77, 83, 84, 89, 137, 162, 224, 230 8th Division, 86, 118, 119 11th Division, 196

3rd Division, 116, 161, 224

11th Regiment, 74, 117

4th Division, 88

12th Regiment, 74, 75, 115, 118

6th Division, 62, 86, 108, 118, 119, 152

13th Regiment, 74, 75

Philippines, 9, 32, 79, 82, 86, 144, 190, 221, 238, 243

17th Regiment, 74, 76, 103, 107, 137

Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO), 236

18th Regiment, 148

Port Arthur (present Dalian), 8, 25 Port of Chongjin, 24, 65

Capital Division, 107, 148, 161, 162, 172, 216

Powell, Colin, 271

I Corps, 92, 141

POWs, 107, 149, 154, 187, 204, 206-210, 222, 223, 225, 227- 229, 252

II Corps, 107, 108, 116, 117, 120, 151, 152, 223, 224

19th Regiment, 118, 119, 152

National Assembly, 37, 73, 76, 81, 91, 92, 196, 197, 199, 211-213, 221, 235, 261, 269, 272

Release of, 205, 218, 219, 222, 227 Protectorate Treaty, 9

281

The Unfinished War Rhee, Syngman, 5, 8-14, 27, 30-32, 35-37, 44, 46, 50, 53, 55, 58, 65-69, 76, 77, 79, 86, 87, 91-94, 97, 104, 138-140, 190, 196, 199, 211, 212-225, 234, 235, 237, 242, 245

Sinuiju, 4, 143, 159, 251, 269 Smith, Bedell, 136 Smith, Brad, 102 Stalin, Joseph, 25, 27, 32, 41, 44, 62-66, 79, 125, 126, 129, 166, 217, 241, 248

Ridgway, Matthew B., 111, 112, 134, 136, 154, 185-190, 199-206, 210, 215, 227 Rockwell, Lloyd, 74, 75

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 240, 241, 242, 244

Roh Moo Hyon, 243, 267, 271

Story, Tony, 159

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 9, 24, 25, 28, 31, 32, 81, 134, 232

Stratemeyer, George, 86, 156

Roosevelt, Theodore, 9

Su Yu, 125, 127

Rusk, Dean, 25

Sunchon, 54

Russian role, 28, 32, 34, 36, 45, 51, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 94, 96, 130, 166, 218, 247, 252

Sungchon River, 121

STYX, 268

Sunshine Policy, 267 Supung Hydroelectric Power Plant, 24, 43

Russo-Japanese War, 8, 9

Suwon, 82, 85, 86, 97, 102, 131

Saemaul Undong (New Village Movement), 236

Suzerainty, 7

Samsung Group, 99, 236

Sweden, 82, 206, 219

Sariwon, 4, 19, 20, 23, 39, 40, 43, 46, 72, 120, 176, 178, 183, 194, 198, 207, 208

T-34 tanks, 51, 61, 74, 75, 89, 95, 105-108

Schnabel, James F., 33

Taft, Robert, 188

SCUD missile, 271

Taft-Katsura Agreement, 9

Seoul, 6, 7, 10, 12, 15, 17, 18, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 42, 43, 47, 51, 53, 54, 63, 66, 68, 72-91, 97, 98, 103, 106, 114, 120, 131, 138, 154, 178, 183, 186, 197, 201, 207, 208, 212, 217, 218, 225, 228, 236, 241, 243, 245, 251, 252, 259, 261, 262, 268, 273, 274

Taiwan, 19, 79, 124, 125, 126, 133, 134, 169, 170, 188, 205, 206, 217, 225- 227

Taedong River, 6

Task Force Smith, 102, 104, 105, 109 Taylor, Maxwell, 190 Thailand, 82, 238 Third World, 273

Sherman, Forrest P., 6, 132-135

Treaty of Friendship, 11

Shihung Infantry School, 77, 78

Trudeau, Arthur, 230

Shin Ik Hee, 212

Truman, Harry S., 30, 32, 36, 50, 51, 61, 64, 69, 71, 78-81, 88, 101, 109-112, 133, 134, 136, 140, 144, 145, 156, 157, 167, 169, 185, 188, 189, 190, 202, 205, 206, 211, 216, 231

Shin Sung Mo, 76, 152 Silkworm, 268 Sim Sang Myong, 241 Singlaub, John K., 70

Tuman River, 141

Sino-Japanese War, 7

282

Index Turkish Brigade, 160

7th Infantry Division, 29, 92, 161, 162, 164, 253

U.N. Command (UNC), 92

7th Marines Dog Company, 164

Forces, 88, 141

8th Cavalry Regiment, 153, 155

Security Council, 78, 79, 258, 259, 266

23rd Regiment, 117, 186 24th Division, 93, 101, 105, 106, 107, 161

U.S. Congress, 50, 58, 69, 70, 109, 188, 189, 255, 263, 269, 271

25th Infantry Division, 111, 181

Defense Department, 50, 65, 183

82nd Airborne Division, 109

House of Representatives, 258

I Corps, 92, 141

Military Organizations

X Corps, 137, 141, 146, 148, 161-165, 172, 174, 224

Air Force, 79, 82, 88, 103-106, 109, 120, 129, 132, 136-140, 156, 181, 200, 221, 229, 258

National Security Council, 78, 79, 261 Office of Strategic Service in China, 13

Fifth Air Force, 106, 156, 181

Secretary of State, 31, 63, 64, 67, 78, 81, 133, 169, 200, 227

Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF), 86, 88, 102, 104, 106, 108, 115, 116, 138, 156, 159, 186, 224

Senate, 68, 81, 170, 254 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 81

Far East Command (FEC), 58, 81, 137

State Department, 25, 30-32, 36, 58, 64, 67, 69, 71, 133, 168, 191, 199, 202, 211, 213, 217, 218, 231, 258, 261

Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), 49, 50, 56, 74, 75, 77, 82, 84, 222

War and Navy Coordinating Committee, 25

Marine Corps (see also specific Units, below), 132, 138

U.S.-Korea Friendship Treaty, 8

Marine RCT, 110

Unsan, 150, 153, 155

Navy, 25, 79, 88, 90, 124, 172, 217

USS McKinley, 136

Military Units

Van Fleet, James A., 174, 190, 200, 203, 210

1st Cavalry Division, 94, 106

Vandenberg, Hoyt, 109, 132

1st Marine Brigade, 113, 131

Vanderpool, Jay, 71

1st Marine Division, 134, 137, 161, 166, 253

Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), 133 Vienna Convention, 254

2nd Engineer Special Brigade, 109

Vladivostok, 7, 13

2nd Infantry Division, 109, 110, 131, 239

Wake Island, 144 Walker, Walton H., 58, 92, 93, 94, 101, 104, 106, 111-113, 118, 119, 131, 135-140, 152, 153, 154, 155, 159, 160, 161, 163

5th Marine Regiment 114 7th Fleet, 79, 88, 124, 217

283

The Unfinished War Weathersby, Kathryn, 62, 125 Weinstraub, Stanley, 87

Yalu River, 4, 141, 143, 144, 149, 150, 156, 159, 251

Western European, 239

Yangban, 8

Whitney, Courtney, 87

Yasukuni Shinto, 58

Willoughby, Charles, 59, 67-71, 143, 152, 154, 155

Ye Jianying, 123

Wilson, Woodrow, 12, 62, 125

Yeosu, 54, 55, 62

Wolmi-do, 132, 134, 137

Yi Bong Chan, 13

Wong Lichan, 123

Yi Jae-chung, 11

Wonsan, 27, 141, 161, 162, 200

Yi Tong Whi, 10, 12

Workers Party, 97

Yongbyon, 208, 257-264

World War II, 19, 23, 51, 57, 69, 89, 96, 101, 110, 164, 177, 182, 200, 205, 210, 229

Yu Jae Hung, 53, 120, 152

Xiao Jinguang, 124

Zaibatsu, 232

YAK fighter, 76

Zhou Enlai, 125-129

Yalta (Secret) Meeting, 24, 25, 32, 36, 38

Zhu De, 126, 127

Yeon Jeong, 137

Yun Bong-Gil, 13

284