The UN World Food Programme and the Development of Food Aid

The UN World Food Programme and the Development of Food Aid D. John Shaw

The UN World Food Programme and the Development of Food Aid

Also by D. John Shaw FOOD AID AND THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (co-edited with J. P. Greaves) FOOD POLICY, FOOD AID AND ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT (co-edited with H. W. Singer) POVERTY, DEVELOPMENT AND FOOD: Essays in Honour of H. W. Singer on his 75th Birthday (co-edited with Edward Clay) THE QUEST FOR FOOD SECURITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (co-edited with Hélène Delisle) WORLD FOOD AID AND EXPERIENCES OF RECIPIENTS AND DONORS (co-edited with Edward Clay)

The UN World Food Programme and the Development of Food Aid D. John Shaw

Foreword by Sir Hans Singer

© D. John Shaw 2001 Foreword © H. W. Singer 2001 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2001 by PALGRAVE Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE is the new global academic imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division and Palgrave Publishers Ltd (formerly Macmillan Press Ltd). ISBN 0–333–67668–8 hardback ISBN 0–333–67669–6 paperback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Shaw, D. John. The UN World Food Programme and the development of food aid / D. John Shaw. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–333–67668–8 (cloth) 1. World Food Programme—History. 2. Food relief– –International cooperation—History. I. Title. HV696.F6 S53 2000 363.8'56—dc21 00–053046 10 10

9 09

8 08

7 07

6 06

5 05

4 04

3 03

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

2 02

1 01

To my wife, Ileana, my rock and my strength, and to my son and daughter, David and Elizabeth, for their understanding and support

This page intentionally left blank

Contents List of Figures and Tables

viii

Foreword by Professor Sir Hans Singer

ix

Preface

xiii

Acknowledgements

xv

Key Events

xix

Notes on the Text

xxv

List of Abbreviations 1

xxvii

Introduction

1

2 The Birth of WFP: One Man’s Inspiration

6

3 Antecedents: A Tale of Three Cities

19

4 The Experimental Years: 1963–5

37

5 Food for Development

67

6 Emergency and Relief Operations

145

7 Managing Food Aid Resources

188

8 Constitutional Change: The Byzantine Vortex

205

9 Reform and Renewal: Future Directions

225

Statistical Appendices

253

Notes

256

Bibliography

266

Dramatis Personae

291

Index

296

vii

List of Figures and Tables Figures 5.1

Share of WFP development commitments by country group, 1976–95 5.2 Regional WFP commitments for development projects and relief and emergency operations, 1963–95 6.1 WFP commitments for emergency operations by type, 1963–95 6.2 WFP commitments for emergency operations by region, 1963–95

86 87 157 159

Tables 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 7.2

World Food Programme resources, 1963–74 WFP development commitments by region, 1963–95 WFP commitments by category of development project, 1963–95 WFP commitments for emergency operations by type, 1963–95 WFP commitments for protracted refugee and displaced person operations by region, 1989–95 WFP commitments for emergency operations by region, 1963–95 WFP food deliveries by commodity category, 1991–5 Major donors to WFP by type of pledge or contribution for biennium 1995–6, as at 31 December 1995

68 84 85 155 156 158 190 191

Statistical Appendix Tables 1 Regional WFP cumulative commitments for development projects and relief and emergency operations by category and type approved up to 31 December 1995 2 Total WFP commitments and number of development projects and emergency operations by region, 1962–95

viii

253 255

Foreword The World Food Programme (WFP) occupies a high place among the achievements of the United Nations. As with all aid agencies, inside and outside the UN system, there have been difficulties and failures, but, on balance, WFP is a success story. It has become an acknowledged centre of expertise and experience in the effective delivery and use of food aid for development and in times of emergencies. Nobody is better qualified to write the history of WFP than John Shaw. He was associated with WFP for over thirty years, almost from the start of its operations, in a succession of senior posts. Since his official retirement in 1994, he has continued to give his attention to the role of food aid in general, and to WFP in particular, in food security, economic development and relief efforts for the sufferers of conflicts and disasters. His present book – following upon extensive previous writings on food aid and development and authorship of many important papers, documents and reports – shows his encyclopaedic knowledge of the history and operations of WFP. It represents a major contribution to the history of food aid since the Second World War. My own involvement with food aid was closely linked with negotiations in the 1950s concerning the creation of a multilateral soft aid programme in the United Nations, a Special UN Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). It eventually became clear that the financial soft aid then under discussion would go to the World Bank rather than to the United Nations as the International Development Association (IDA), the soft aid window of the World Bank. But it also became clear by the late 1950s that a multilateral extension of the United States food aid programme (enacted as Public Law 480 in 1954) was acceptable to the republican administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower and also formed part of the proposals of the Democratic Party’s presidential campaign that led to the election of President John F. Kennedy. In these favourable political circumstances, a multilateral food aid programme under the auspices of the United Nations that would help to reduce the burdensome and costly US food surpluses of the day became feasible. Given the existence in the UN system of a specialized agency in food and agriculture, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), it was clear that this particular segment of the original SUNFED proposal would remain in the UN system. Both the UN and FAO, under the vigorous leadership of its directorgeneral B. R. Sen, seized the opportunity and set up a group of experts (of which I became chairman) to give shape to the general idea and provide a set of guidelines. Subsequently, WFP was successfully negotiated and established ix

x

Foreword

on a three-year experimental basis (1963–5). Later, it developed into one of the major operational organizations of the United Nations system. All this is described in detail in John Shaw’s book. What have been some of the major achievements of WFP? Five contributions may be singled out as specially important. First, by giving it a multilateral dimension, WFP has helped to depoliticize food aid and use it as an instrument for achieving universally recognized objectives in both development aid and as relief in conflict and emergency situations. In addition, multilateral procurement and delivery of food aid can be more costeffective and result in better resource management than unco-ordinated, and often conflictive, bilateral efforts. WFP has acquired considerable expertise and experience in the shipment, delivery, purchase and monitoring of food aid, and has become a major transport and logistics arm of the UN system. Over the years, a supply system has been developed that is appreciated by donors and recipient countries alike. This expertise is at the service of bilateral donors and increasingly used by them, especially in large-scale and complex emergencies. WFP also provides an indispensable source of food aid information through its international database, INTERFAIS, which is at the disposal of decision-makers throughout the world. Second, WFP has helped to establish a policy framework for food aid both for development and in times of emergency. Through its governing body, guidelines and criteria for food aid were developed which, although not always followed, still provide the best available policy framework for food aid globally. As part of its functions, WFP also administers an International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR), the only international facility available to respond quickly to emergencies whenever and wherever they occur. Although the IEFR has not fully lived up to its original expectations, it now includes an Immediate Response Account (IRA), a cash reserve to purchase food to respond to emergency food needs quickly. Both the IEFR and the IRA are still too small and unpredictable, and their use not fully multilaterally controlled, to ensure that all needs are satisfied, but the framework for effective action is in place, once the political will to expand and use these facilities is there. It is one of the functions of WFP’s governing body to create this political will and give meaning to the much-invoked concepts of ‘international community’ and ‘international solidarity’. Third, WFP has helped to pioneer the project approach to food aid. Originally restricted to supporting development projects (apart from a modest allocation for emergency aid) in order to keep it small and non-competitive with the bulk supply of food aid under the United States food aid programme Public Law 480, WFP has made a virtue out of necessity and pioneered labour-intensive foodfor-work programmes and the development of human resources through providing support for nutrition, health, education and training programmes for

Foreword xi

vulnerable groups of people. This was even before human resources were universally recognized as the key to development, as they are now. Fourth, the role of WFP in emergency aid has expanded greatly from the original small provision and now absorbs the major part of its resources. WFP has emerged as the principal international channel for emergency food aid, and a natural co-ordinator in large-scale and complex emergency food relief operations. This humanitarian function transcends the debate about the development function of food aid. Support for it is the nearest we come to an approach to the concept of a truly ‘international community’. Finally, with its dual functions of providing development and relief assistance, WFP has been well placed to play a major role in what has come to be called the ‘continuum’ between relief and development. From its inception, it has supported disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation activities as well as post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes. And its emergency assistance has been used, to the extent possible, to serve both relief and development works. There is still much to be done to create a link between relief and development. Indeed, food aid can be visualized as a means for preventing conflicts and resolving tensions before they develop into fullscale emergencies. A future task of WFP will be to stimulate the international community to remove the artificial dichotomy between emergency and development assistance in the process from crisis to recovery and development, and to broaden the humanitarian consensus from acute emergency relief to the full circle of prevention and preparedness linked to rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. These and other tasks for the future emerge clearly in John Shaw’s book. It should be read not only by those concerned with the history, but also with the future, of food aid as an essential part of the ultimate goal of achieving global food security. H. W. SINGER

This page intentionally left blank

Preface I was in my office at the University of Khartoum in the Sudan one day in March 1963 when three people visited me. One of them spoke: ‘We are from the World Food Programme. We would like you to be a consultant for us.’ This came as a complete surprise to me. I had no idea what the ‘World Food Programme’ was, and I had no advance intimation that I would be approached to act as a consultant for that organization. I invited them into my office and over refreshments learned about the new United Nations organization that had recently begun operations and who my visitors were. One was Sushil Dey, who had invited me to be a consultant to WFP, an Indian who was director of WFP’s Programme Development and Appraisal Division and a leading light in the development of the organization. The others were Marcel Ganzin, a Frenchman who was WFP’s nutrition adviser, and Dr Kool, a Dutchman and economic adviser to WFP. They were visiting Sudan to appraise a government request for WFP assistance to help in the resettlement of people whose homes and land at Wadi Halfa, close to the Sudan/Egyptian frontier, were about to be flooded as a result of the construction of the High Dam in Egypt. They were to be resettled at Khasm el Girba in eastern Sudan, where I had been undertaking research work. I accompanied the three visitors to the resettlement area, which was to become the site of the first WFP-assisted development project (Sudan 001). I was then invited to be consultant to WFP for Africa and the Middle East. A few months later, I received another visitor. This time it was Dr Hans Singer (now Professor Sir Hans Singer), who at the time was UN special adviser to the executive secretary of the recently formed United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He had already played a leading role both at the United Nations in New York and at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Rome in the creation of WFP. Thus began a glorious friendship that has endured to the present time. Little did I know at the time that these two events were to be the beginning of what proved to be an involvement in food aid and an association with WFP that was to last for over three decades. I subsequently joined the staff at WFP headquarters in Rome, Italy, first as a senior evaluation officer, then as senior economist and head of the Policy Unit in the Office of the Executive Director, later as economic adviser, and, finally, as chief of WFP’s Policy Affairs Service until my retirement in August 1994. Two main reasons have motivated me to write this book, which is the first comprehensive history of WFP. First, a deep feeling of obligation to set on xiii

xiv Preface

record over 30 years of experience during which I enjoyed the highest job satisfaction. Second, an abiding sense of frustration that so little of the work of WFP seems to be known outside a relatively small circle of those immediately involved. Throughout this account, it should be remembered that WFP was specifically established with the aim of reaching and benefiting abjectly poor people in the world’s poorest countries with two of their greatest needs – food and work. The main purpose of the book is to examine the issues and challenges facing WFP set against the background of the development of food aid generally, including the early work involved in the antecedents to WFP, and the unique way in which WFP was born. In describing these events, the book contains information which is placed in the public domain for the first time. My collection of WFP documents and papers has been deposited in the British Library of Development Studies at the University of Sussex in England. We live in a highly dynamic and changing world. In many ways, this book is a tribute to the people and governments in developing and donor countries, and to the dedication of WFP staff and their collaborators in other aid agencies, in their endeavours to seek a better world for the most disadvantaged of its citizens. I hope that this work will be of assistance to all those involved in the future of food aid generally and of WFP in particular. D. JOHN SHAW

Acknowledgements This book has involved much research and travel, visiting archives and libraries, and interviewing and corresponding with people prominent in the history of WFP. Without their co-operation, it would not have been possible to have given many of the details contained in this work, some of which are revealed publicly for the first time. In many ways, this book is an outcome of the generosity of their time, opinions and recollections, and their collaboration in searching through a great deal of historical and archival material. I hope that I have adequately conveyed a sense of indebtedness to them and, particularly, that they feel that the final product repays with gratitude all the help they gave me. I begin my debts of gratitude with those pioneers who were most instrumental in the birth and advancement of WFP. Principal among these outstanding personalities are two people. More than any other single person, Hans Singer played a major role in the debate and discussions leading up to the creation of WFP. He read the entire draft manuscript of the book and made many perceptive comments for its improvement. It is particularly fitting that he has provided a Foreword to the book. I am also profoundly grateful for the friendship and encouragement he has extended to me over the past 35 years. Senator George McGovern (now United States ambassador to the United Nations food and agriculture agencies in Rome, Italy), who, when the first director of the United States Food for Peace programme and special assistant to President Kennedy, courageously took the initiative to propose the establishment of WFP, also helped me considerably. Despite a heavy work programme, he corresponded extensively with me, allowed me to interview him, provided me with personal material and access to his papers at the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University, and reviewed in detail the chapter of the book dealing with the part he played in the birth of WFP. I am deeply indebted to him for his co-operation. Governor Orville Freeman, secretary of agriculture in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, gave me his recollections of the support he provided during the crucial early days of WFP, and allowed me access to his personal papers, including the complete collection of the public statements he made during his period of office. Raymond Ioanes, a senior official in the United States Department of Agriculture at the time, sent me his personal account of the support he gave George McGovern at the historic meeting at FAO in Rome, Italy in April 1961, when the proposal to establish WFP was made. xv

xvi Acknowledgements

Others who were especially helpful in clarifying events leading up to the creation of WFP include: Dr Don Paarlberg, who was Food for Peace co-ordinator in the final days of the Eisenhower administration, and a major figure in the US food aid programme in the United States Department of Agriculture; and Francis X. Sutton of the Ford Foundation, who endeavoured to put me in touch with key personalities in the White House during the Kennedy administration. Mary Chambliss of the Foreign Agricultural Service, United States Department of Agriculture, and Tim Lavelle, special assistant to the director, Office of Food for Peace, US Agency for International Development, helped me personally with their own experience and documentation. Sartaj Aziz, senator and former foreign minister of Pakistan, provided me with his recollections and personal papers relating to the 1974 United Nations World Food Conference, when he was a senior FAO official and deputy director-general of the conference, which led to a broader mandate and role for WFP. Dr Thomas J. Knock of the Department of History, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, who is writing a biography of George McGovern, provided me with personal material concerning senator McGovern’s background and achievements. Richard Woodhams, assistant executive director at the International Grains Council in London gave me documentation relating to the background and history of the Food Aid Conventions. I have also benefited from the friendship and encouragement of Professor John Toye, a former director of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, UK; Simon Maxwell, director, and Dr Edward Clay, research officer, at the Overseas Development Institute, London; Dr John W. Mellor of John Mellor Associates, Inc., a former director-general of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, DC; and Dr Richard Jolly, formerly special assistant to the UNDP administrator and principal co-ordinator of the UNDP annual Human Development Report, and a previous deputy executive director of UNICEF. For their co-operation in guiding me through a vast amount of historical and archival material relating to WFP and its background, I would like to record my sincere appreciation to: Mary Hall, former archivist and staff of the FAO Archives, and staff of the David Lubin Library, FAO, Rome, Italy; Dr Marilla Bliss Guptil, chief, and Seymour Edwards and other staff, of the United Nations Archives and Records Centre in New York; Maureen Ratynski and Nanci St. John at the Dag Hammarskjöld Library at the United Nations, New York; Dr William Johnson, chief archivist and staff of the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston, Massachusetts; archivists John Wilson and Mike Parrish at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas; Dr Charles E. Hanrahan, senior specialist in agricultural policy, and Mary Dunkley of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Dr Milton O, Gustafson, senior archivist at the United States

Acknowledgements

xvii

National Archives at College Park, Maryland; Susan Fugate, Alan Haeberle and Cheryl Toefield of Special Collections, Lowell Dyson, Economic Research Service, and Susan Chapman, Reference Section, at the National Agricultural Library, Beltsville, Maryland; Professor G. Edward Schuh, dean and Dr Stephen Sandall, director, The Humphrey Forum, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Dallas Lindgren, reference archivist, Hubert H. Humphrey Collection, Minnesota Historical Society Research Center, St Paul, Minnesota; Dr Ben Primer, university archivist, Nanci Young, Susan Illis, Monica Ruscil, Dan Linke and Lisa Weinstein at the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University; and Mary W. George, head, General and Humanitarian Reference Division, Harvey S. Firestone Memorial Library, Princeton University, New Jersey; staff at the Walter William Fondren Library, Rice University, Houston, Texas; and staff at the British Library of Development Studies and the Library of the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, United Kingdom. I am particularly grateful for the professional way in which Maria M. Ellul, president of Kitba Consulting Services, Inc. in Houston, Texas prepared the statistical tables and figures that appear in the book. I am especially indebted to WFP staff at country offices throughout the developing world as well as at WFP headquarters in Rome, Italy. In particular, I would like to mention Dorothy Simpson-Bordi, Tiziana Cassotta, Nicole Jacquet, Paolo Grillo, Fiorella Pantaleo-Tabellini and Andreas Psoroulas for responding to my constant requests for WFP documentation and papers; Trevor Page, previously chief of WFP’s Emergency Service, for reviewing the chapter on WFP emergency and relief operations; and George-Andre Simon and Gian Piero Lucarini who provided the data on which the statistical tables and figures in the book are based. Doug Coutts and Masood Hyder, formerly director and deputy director and staff at the WFP North American Office in New York and Bernd Kaess, formerly director and Heidi Johnson at the WFP Geneva Office provided me with documentation from, and kept me informed of developments in, the United Nations and the UN organizations at those locations. Finally, I owe so much to my wife, son and daughter, to whom this book is dedicated. I alone am responsible for the views expressed in this book and for any shortcomings therein. D. JOHN SHAW

This page intentionally left blank

Key Events 1943

1945

1946 1948 1949 1950

1954

1955 1958 1960

International conference on food and agriculture convened by US President Roosevelt at Hot Springs, Virginia, in May, which laid the foundation for the creation of FAO. An agreement signed in Washington, DC, in November which led to the establishment of the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), the first significant experiment of a multilateral agency to deal with food aid. Creation of the United Nations and signing of the UN Charter in June at an international conference in San Francisco, California. Foundation of FAO at a conference in Quebec City, Canada in October. Proposal to establish a ‘world food board’ considered at the first FAO conference in Copenhagen in September. The proposal was not approved. Start of the European Recovery Programme (the ‘Marshall Plan’), which continued to 1952. Proposal to establish an ‘international commodity clearing house’, rejected by the FAO Conference. Negotiations throughout the 1950s to establish a soft-lending multilateral financing facility, known as the Special UN Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) at the United Nations in New York, leading to the creation of the International Development Association (IDA) at the World Bank in 1959. FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal formulated and Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal (CSD) set up in Washington, DC. Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480) passed, which institutionalized United States food aid. FAO pilot investigation in India on the use of project food aid (the Ezekiel study). FAO proposal for an international emergency food reserve (the ‘Three Circles Plan’) not approved. ‘Freedom from Hunger Campaign’ launched, following FAO Conference resolution 13/59 on 27 October, later extended to 1970. Vice President Nixon and Senator Kennedy announce support for a multilateral food distribution system during the US presidential election campaign. Senate concurrent resolution No. 114 of 8 August requesting approval of a multilateral food aid facility passed in the US Senate but not in the House of Representatives. xix

xx Key Events

1961

1962

1964 1965

President Eisenhower’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September included a proposal that ‘a workable scheme be devised for providing food aid through the UN system’. UN General Assembly resolution 1496 (XV) on ‘Provision of food surpluses to food-deficient peoples through the United Nations system’ adopted on 27 October. Establishment by President Kennedy in January of a Food for Peace office in the White House and appointment of George McGovern as the first director of the Food for Peace programme. President Kennedy’s Executive Order No. 10915 of 24 January on United States food aid to promote the interest of peace in a significant way. Independent expert group report on an ‘Expanded program of Surplus Food Utilization’ presented to the FAO director-general in February. George McGovern’s statement to the FAO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee on the Use of Food Surpluses for Food Deficit People in Rome, Italy, on 10 April proposing the establishment of a multilateral food aid programme on a three-year experimental basis; endorsed by President Kennedy on 21 April. President Kennedy address to the UN General Assembly on 25 September proposing that the decade of the 1960s be designated as the ‘United Nations Decade for Development’. Endorsed by the UN General Assembly in resolution 1710 (XVI) of 19 December. FAO Conference and UN General Assembly parallel resolutions establishing WFP on a three-year experimental basis on 24 November and 19 December respectively. First session of WFP’s governing body, the Intergovernmental Committee, in February. Addeke Boerma appointed as WFP’s first executive director in April. OECD study on ‘Food Aid and its Role in Economic Development’. McGovern’s letter of resignation as director of the Food for Peace programme to President Kennedy on 18 July. UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) supports the continuation of WFP after the experimental period. Five WFP studies by independent experts to assist in the consideration of the future development of multilateral food aid programmes. Creation of UNDP with the amalgamation of the UN Special Fund and the UN Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance. Parallel resolutions of the FAO Conference and UN General Assembly in December establishing WFP on a continuing basis ‘for as long as multilateral food aid is found feasible and desirable’ on 6 and 20 December respectively.

Key Events

1966 1967 1968

1970

1972 1974

1975

1976

1977 1978

xxi

Report of WFP study on programme food aid in Jamaica; not approved by WFP’s governing body. First Food Aid Convention negotiated together with an International Wheat Agreement as part of an International Grains Arrangement. Sushil Dey appointed as acting WFP executive director in January following the election of Addeke Boerma as FAO director-general. Francisco Aquino appointed WFP executive director in August. UN/FAO ‘multilateral food aid study’ pursuant to UN General Assembly resolution 2462 (XXIII) of 20 December. Review of WFP staffing, management and organization by Booz, Allen and Hamilton. WFP governing body study of the ‘Role of Food Aid during the Second United Nations Development Decade’ of the 1970s, pursuant to UN General Assembly resolution 2462 (XXIII). UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Sweden. World Food Conference organized by the United Nations held in Rome, Italy, from 5 to 16 November adopted, inter alia, resolution XVIII on ‘An improved policy for food aid’ and recommended the reconstitution of WFP’s governing body, and establishment of World Food Council (WFC), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the FAO Committee on World Food Security (CFS). Reconstitution of WFP’s governing body from the Intergovernmental Committee (IGC) to the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA) as recommended by the World Food Conference following UN General Assembly resolution 3404 (XXX) of 28 November. Establishment of the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR) by UN General Assembly resolution 3362 (S-VII). FAO Global Information and Early Warning System established. First UN World Conference on Women, Mexico City, Mexico. First session of the CFA in April/May. Thomas Robinson appointed acting WFP executive Director in May following the resignation of Francisco Aquino, and full executive director in July 1977 until his retirement in September 1977. UN Decade for Women (1976–85) designated by the UN General Assembly. ILO Conference on Employment, Income Distribution, Social Progress and the International Division of Labour, Geneva, Switzerland. UN Conference on Human Settlements, Vancouver, Canada. Garson Vogel appointed WFP executive director in September. Modalities of operation of the IEFR approved by the CFA at its sixth session in October.

xxii

1979 1980 1981 1982

1984 1985 1986 1988 1990 1991

1992

1993

Key Events

The CFA recommended a set of ‘guidelines and criteria’ for all food aid at its seventh session in May. Second UN Conference for Women at midpoint of UN Decade for Women, Copenhagen, Denmark. Bernado de Azevedo Brito appointed acting WFP executive director in May following the death of Garson Vogel. Juan Yriat appointed acting WFP executive director in February following the resignation of Bernado Brito. James Ingram appointed as WFP executive director in April. FAO World Conference on Fisheries Management and Development, Rome, Italy. Third UN World Conference on Women to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the UN Decade for Women, Nairobi, Kenya. Comprehensive organizational and management review of the WFP secretariat by McKinsey and Company. COPAC/WFP International Symposium on Food and Co-operatives for Development, Vienna, Austria. World Summit for Children held by UNICEF in New York. Revision of WFP general regulations and enlargement of the CFA approved, entering into force on 1 January 1992. UN General Assembly adopts resolution 46/182 on 19 December on the strengthening of the co-ordination of UN humanitarian assistance. Catherine Bertini appointed as WFP executive director in April following the completion of the term of office of James Ingram. WFP report on the integration of multilateral non-emergency food aid with government development programmes and with other assistance provided by the UN system. FAO/WHO International Conference on Nutrition, Rome, Italy. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs set up in New York. UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace. UN General Assembly passes resolution 47/199 on 22 December on the country programming of UN development assistance. World Bank Conference on Overcoming Global Hunger, Washington, DC. UN World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, Austria. UN General Assembly adopts resolution 48/162 on further measures for the restructuring and revitalization of the United Nations in the economic, social and related fields, including the establishment of similar executive boards for the UN funds and programmes, including WFP.

Key Events xxiii

1994

1995

1996 1997

1998 1999

WFP policy seminar on ‘Hunger and Social Action’. WFP’s new mission statement adopted by the CFA. UNFPA International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt. UN World Summit on Social Development, Copenhagen, Denmark. Fourth UN Conference on Women, Beijing, China. UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Development. First session of WFP’s executive board held in January. FAO World Food Summit, Rome, Italy. UN secretary-general Kofi Annan’s proposals for reform of the UN system. WFP/UNU seminar on ‘Ending the Inheritance of Hunger’. WFP consultation on the theme ‘Time for Change: Food Aid and Development’. WFP executive board decides that WFP should continue to provide development as well as emergency assistance.

This page intentionally left blank

Notes on the Text 1. All monetary values are expressed in United States dollars ($), unless otherwise stated. 2. All quantities are given in metric tons, unless otherwise specified. 3. One billion equals 1,000 million. 4. All statistical tables and figures have been produced from the WFP INTERFAIS database, unless otherwise stated. The values given in the tables have been rounded to the nearest US$ thousand or US$ million, unless otherwise stated. 5. Low-income, food-deficit countries include all net cereal-importing countries with a per capita GNP not exceeding the level used by the World Bank to determine eligibility for soft lending from its International Development Association (IDA). 6. In its resolution 2768 (XXVI) of 18 November 1971, the United Nations General Assembly singled out the poorest countries for special attention. They were called the ‘least-developed countries’ (LDCs) and were defined as ‘countries with severe long-term constraints on development assessed on three basic criteria: per capita GDP of $100 or less at 1970 prices; share of manufacturing of 10 per cent or less of GDP; and 20 per cent or less literate persons aged 15 years or more’. New criteria established in 1991 defined LDCs as ‘those low-income countries that are suffering from long-term handicaps to growth, in particular low levels of human resource development and/or severe structural weaknesses’. 7. The WFP administrative regions referred to in this study are as follows: SubSaharan Africa, comprising all the countries south of the Sahara, except South Africa, and including the islands off the coast of the African continent; the Europe, Middle East and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region encompasses all African countries north of the Sahara and those of southern and eastern Europe and the Middle East, including Afghanistan, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Pakistan, Romania and Turkey, and the republics of the former Yugoslavia and ex-Soviet Union; the Asia and the Pacific region includes all countries east of Thailand, including South East Asia and the Pacific Ocean islands; the Latin America and Caribbean region comprises all Central and Latin American and Caribbean countries south of the United States. 8. To 1967, WFP was written in the American spelling ‘World Food Program’. Thereafter, it has been written in the English spelling ‘World Food Programme’. xxv

xxvi

Notes on the Text

19. WFP’s governing body, originally the Intergovernmental Committee (IGC), was reconstituted as the Committee of Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA) in 1976, and changed to the Executive Committee in 1996. 10. Up to and including its twenty-second session in October 1986, the reports of the CFA sessions were referred to as the ‘Report of the United Nations/FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes’. Thereafter, they were called ‘Report of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes’.

List of Abbreviations ACABQ

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (UN) ACC Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (UN) ACC/SCN Administrative Committee on Co-ordination/Sub-committee on Nutrition (UN) CARE Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere CCP Committee on Commodity Problems (FAO) CEC Commission of the European Communities CFA Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes CFS Committee on World Food Security (FAO) COPAC Committee for the Promotion and Advancement of Co-operatives CRS Catholic Relief Services CSD Consultative Sub-committee on Surplus Disposal (FAO) DHA Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN) ECOSOC Economic and Social Council (UN) EPTA Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (UN) EU European Union (formerly European Community) FAC Food Aid Convention FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN FFHC Freedom for Hunger Campaign (FAO) FFP Food from Peace Programme (US) FFW Food-for-work GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDA International Development Association (World Bank) IEFR International Emergency Food Reserve IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute IGC Intergovernmental Committee (WFP) ILO International Labour Organization IMF International Monetary Fund INTERFAIS International Food Aid Information System (WFP) xxvii

xxviii List of Abbreviations

IRA ITSH JIU LDC MOU NGO ODA OECD OPEC PROs SADC SUNFED UN UNBRO UNCTAD UNDP UNESCO UNFPA UNHCR UNICEF UNIDO UNRRA USDA WFC WFP WHO

Immediate Response Account (of IEFR) Internal transport, storage and handling Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations Least-developed country Memorandum of understanding Non-governmental organization Official Development Assistance Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Protracted refugee and displaced person operations Southern Africa Development Community Special UN Fund for Economic Development United Nations United Nations Border Relief Operation (Thailand) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Development Programme United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Fund for Population Activities United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Industrial Development Organization United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration US Department of Agriculture World Food Council (UN) World Food Programme World Health Organization

1 Introduction

The world has been able to produce enough food to provide every citizen with an adequate diet to lead a healthy, active and productive life. Yet the hungry-poor (those earning less than the equivalent of one dollar a day, or who spend most of their income on food), comprising one-fifth of the developing world’s population, do not have enough to eat. The co-existence of hunger with the capacity to end it is one of the gravest paradoxes of our time. It is not only morally repugnant and unacceptable but politically, economically and socially indefensible. Poverty is the underlying cause of hunger. Other factors, including political irresponsibility, corruption, civil unrest, ethnic and religious conflict, sudden natural disasters, and prolonged and widespread drought, have compounded further the problem of poverty, and thereby hunger. The indications are that food aid, along with other forms of assistance, will be required, possibly on an increasing scale, in the years ahead. In many developing countries, concerns such as malnutrition, population growth, higher food import requirements but worsening foreign exchange earnings and balance of payments, debt servicing, unemployment, environmental degradation, water shortages, human insecurity, international migration, and the burgeoning needs of the victims of natural and man-made disasters are creating a demand for more food aid. Yet food aid is controversial. Detractors point to the political and commercial motives of donor countries that have sustained food aid flows. These dangers, which apply to all forms of aid, must not be ignored. But the essential value of food aid deserves equal prominence. Food is vital in the affairs of all nations, particularly in poor, food-deficit countries with inadequate food production or insufficient foreign exchange to import the food they need. For poor, food-insecure people in those countries, the quest for food pervades their daily lives. For them, what are the best ways of providing and using food aid? Food aid should be oriented towards the objective of eventually eradicating hunger and poverty. It should also have as 1

2

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

its basic objective its own elimination – to help countries and people toward self-reliance and enable people to feed themselves. The World Food Programme (WFP) was created in 1961 as the organization in the United Nations system concerned exclusively with food aid, thereby providing an additional dimension to multilateral assistance. From the beginning of its operations in 1963, WFP’s mandate has been to use food aid to support economic and social development, provide food and associated logistics support in times of emergency, and generally promote world food security. From an initial three-year experimental programme (1963–5) with less than $100 million of resources, WFP has grown to become the principal international channel of grant food aid for both development projects and emergency relief. In playing this dual role, WFP has been at the forefront of the United Nations system’s attack on hunger and poverty, and WFP has been well placed to play a link role in the continuum from emergency relief to development. Priority is now given to supporting disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation and post-disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation activities as part of development programmes in the poorest countries. Conversely, emergency assistance is used, to the extent possible, to serve both relief and development purposes. In both cases, the aim is threefold: to save lives; improve the nutrition and well-being of the most vulnerable people at critical times in their lives; and create employment, income and assets, thereby promoting the selfreliance of poor people and communities, particularly through labour-intensive works programmes. In the first case – saving lives – food aid is essential for human protection and preservation. In the second case – nutritional improvement – food aid is an investment in the development of human resources. And in the third case – creating self-reliance – food aid is used to help mobilize the most abundant resource of poor people, their own labour, thereby creating employment and income, and building the infrastructure necessary for sustained and equitable development. From its inception, WFP has operated under certain basic principles, which were prominent at its birth in the early 1960s. The broad developmental scope of WFP was expressed in the title of the original study that led to its creation, Development through Food. The activities of WFP were to be people-centred, based on the strong conviction that sustained and equitable development could best be achieved if the beneficiaries of WFP assistance themselves had a personal or collective stake in the development projects it supported. WFP was born in the halcyon days of the United Nations. The first United Nations Development Decade of the 1960s, proposed by United States President John F. Kennedy, had just been launched. A newly accepted principle of international solidarity and burden-sharing in development co-operation had expressed itself in a greater willingness to give assistance to developing countries.

Introduction 3

In this inspiring international environment, the United States made the original politically bipartisan proposal for the establishment of a multilateral facility for food aid within the United Nations system. All contributions to WFP’s resources were to be made on a voluntary basis, as a supplement to bilateral food aid, and in addition to other forms of assistance. Priority was given to benefiting poor and food-insecure people in rural areas in the most needy, food-deficit countries with the aim of promoting food and agricultural development and nutritional improvement. Emphasis was placed on supporting development projects with specific objectives and target groups of people rather than providing bulk food aid that was already being provided bilaterally on a government-to-government basis. Preference was given to direct distribution of food commodities to identified beneficiaries: sale of the food aid commodities supplied, which was the principal way of using food aid provided bilaterally, was highly restricted and kept under constant review. A multifaceted concept of additionality was made a keystone in WFP’s policies and programmes. WFP food aid was provided in order to increase the levels of consumption, investment, employment and income beyond what would have been possible without such assistance. Operating under the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal (FAO, 1954), the main underlying concerns were to provide food aid in ways that actively promoted development in the poor developing countries, rather than merely to get rid of unwanted agricultural surpluses that could not be disposed of through commercial trade or subsidized exports, to stimulate rather than discourage to agricultural production in food aid recipient countries, and to avoid disruption of international agricultural trade. The advantages of channelling food aid multilaterally through a United Nations organization were appreciated at the outset. Food aid was to be provided with no political or commercial strings attached, for which much of the food aid provided directly by the main donor countries was criticized. Contributions could be made by many countries that complemented each other, leading to international burden-sharing, facilitating resource management and making food deliveries more cost-effective and timely. And a close rein was to be kept on administrative overheads which, for WFP, at less than 6 per cent of total annual expenditure, was one of the lowest of any development assistance agency. Finally, WFP was expected to stand at the other end of the aid spectrum, away from neo-colonialism and paternalism. Even by the standards of the United Nations systems of the time, and well in advance of today’s emphasis on national execution and capacity-building in developing countries, WFP was to be non-interventionist. Governments in developing countries alone could request and receive WFP food aid in support of the implementation of their own development plans and programmes. They were also to be responsible for

4

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

the utilization of the aid provided in accordance with agreed purposes. Ownership of the food aid commodities received passed to the recipient government at the port of arrival or frontier station in the case of landlocked countries. And the roles of WFP staff were restricted to providing supervision, advisory assistance and training. During the first thirty years of operation, WFP provided over $13 billion of aid, involving more than 40 million tons of food. In those three decades, WFP assisted more than 1,600 development projects and supplied humanitarian aid through over 1,200 emergency and relief operations, providing food to poor and food-insecure people in most of the developing country. Many have benefited directly and indirectly from this investment through the work and income generated, the infrastructure built or repaired, and many lives have been saved. In the process, WFP became within the United Nations system: the largest supporter of development projects involving and benefiting poor women in developing countries; the largest provider of grant aid for environmental protection and improvement activities in developing countries; and the largest purchaser of food and services in developing countries and a major supporter of South–South trade. At the same time, WFP established the largest global network in food aid, with staff deployed in more than 80 country offices, serving more than 90 developing countries. WFP witnessed dramatic changes in the composition and size of its assistance, and its share of total world food aid, in the 1990s. Two-thirds of its assistance was distributed for relief and emergency operations in 1994: only five years earlier, the reverse was the case. And the bulk of its relief and emergency assistance now goes to the victims of man-made disasters, within developing countries, rather than those caused by nature. At the same time, total WFP aid has fallen sharply as global food aid has diminished. As bilateral food aid has declined disproportionately, however, the share of world food aid channelled through WFP has increased. This book gives the first comprehensive account of the history and experience of WFP set against the background of the development and evolution of food aid as an international aid resource. It starts with the birth of WFP, which was due to the inspiration of one man, George McGovern, the first director of the United States Food for Peace programme and special assistant to President Kennedy. It then describes WFP’s antecedents, and the prominent role played by another man, Hans Singer, which arose principally out of three related developments: initiatives in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to set up a world food security arrangement, starting with the proposal for a ‘World Food Board’ immediately before and after the Second World War, and study of ways to use the large accumulation of agricultural surpluses constructively for development in the developing countries; attempts to create a major soft financing mechanism within the United

Introduction 5

Nations, centred around the proposal for a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) and the use of commodity aid; and the history and experience of the United States food aid programme, particularly under Public Law 480 that was enacted in 1954, almost a decade before WFP began its operations. The book then proceeds to give a detailed account of WFP’s three initial experimental years (1963–5), which were to lay the foundation for most of the activities of WFP that has endured almost to the present. Subsequent chapters analyze WFP’s experience in using food aid for economic and social development projects; in emergency and relief operations; the management of food aid resources; and constitutional and other changes as WFP has evolved and matured. The book ends with a chapter on future issues and concerns, including the roles of WFP in a future food aid regime, and the impact of reforms within the United Nations system.

2 The Birth of WFP: One Man’s Inspiration

Few international organizations have been born in the personal and unusual way in which WFP was created. The birth of WFP in 1961 was due to the inspiration of one man, George McGovern. At the time, he was the first director of the newly created Office of Food for Peace in the Executive Office of United States President John F. Kennedy and special assistant to him. It is important to understand this background as it left its mark on WFP that has remained to the present day. This is how, and why, it happened.

Multilateral food aid proposal In 1960, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution on the ‘Provision of food surpluses to food-deficient peoples through the United Nations system’ (UN, 1960c). The director-general of FAO was invited to undertake a study of how this might be done (FAO, 1961a) (see Chapter 3). Before submitting the study for approval, it was discussed by an FAO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee in Rome between 5 and 12 April 1961. President Kennedy requested George McGovern to represent the United States at the meeting. McGovern was assisted by Raymond Ioanes, an experienced senior officer of the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), who was the principal officer in USDA responsible for the United States food aid programmes, and by Sidney Jacques of the US State Department. Shortly after taking office in January 1961, President Kennedy had requested McGovern to undertake an evaluation of the past operations of the Food for Peace programme and propose ways of improving it. In his report to the president on 28 March 1961, McGovern said, among other things: we should support an expanded role for the FAO – a role where it will have responsibility for developing and executing a multi-lateral food distribution program. There should not be fear that a multi-lateral approach will conflict 6

The Birth of WFP: One Man’s Inspiration 7

with the US Food For Peace Program. On the contrary, world food needs are so great that there is need for both approaches.1

One man’s initiative Recalling the evaluation of the Food for Peace programme, which Ioanes had helped to prepare, and in order to stimulate progress, McGovern suggested to the other members of the US delegation that a concrete proposal be made to the Intergovernmental Advisory Committee in order to move the process forward.2 This came as a complete surprise to them. There had been no discussion, and hence no agreement, on any proposal in Washington prior to the departure of the US delegation for Rome. The FAO study contained no specific proposals and the committee had been appointed only to provide advice, not to present government positions. McGovern’s colleagues felt that there was now insufficient time to get any proposals approved in Washington. However, McGovern persisted. He requested the other members of the delegation to draft a proposal while he undertook to get clearance from the White House. This unconventional procedure was even more unusual in that permission to proceed was sought over a weekend. McGovern contacted his deputy in the Office of Food for Peace, James Symington, by telephone and requested him to speak to Theodore Sorensen, special counsel to President Kennedy, about the draft proposal. Sorensen, a friend of McGovern who had the ear of the president, later spoke by telephone with McGovern, and ‘within 24 hours’ permission was obtained to go ahead. This demonstrated how in the early days of the Kennedy administration quick action could be taken through direct contact with the White House. It also showed the close relationship, and high regard, McGovern enjoyed with President Kennedy. Although McGovern had not discussed the proposal, even in broad outline, with President Kennedy before he left for Rome, he felt that it reflected the president’s views regarding a broader and more constructive use of food aid and his strong support for the United Nations. (The full text of the proposal is given in the appendix at the end of this chapter.) The multilateral food aid programme that McGovern proposed was circumscribed in a number of ways. It was to be limited to $100 million in commodities and cash when, in 1961, the value of farm products shipped under the United States food aid programmes alone was $1.3 billion and US food surpluses in stock had reached 112 million tons. It was restricted to three years, and to be conducted on an experimental basis, with a decision on its continuation dependent on an evaluation of experience. The activities of the experimental programme were to be restricted to meeting emergencies and to pilot development projects, such as school lunch and labour-intensive projects. They were not to include

8

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

large-scale, bulk, programme food aid that the United States and other donor governments were providing bilaterally. The proposal reflected perfectly the three dominant forces that fashioned McGovern’s overriding philosophy throughout his public life: support of the American farmer; the constructive use of food surpluses; and resolving international problems through the medium of the United Nations. The elements of McGovern’s proposal were carefully crafted and based on a political judgement that they would be acceptable to all concerned in Washington, bearing in mind past hostility to the United Nations and multilateral assistance both in the Departments of Agriculture and State, and in the White House itself. The proposal did not involve much additional funding. The resources pledged by the United States would, in the main, come out of sunken capital in the form of the large food surpluses that had accumulated in governmentheld stocks. No formal commitment was made of supplementary cash resources; that possibility would be ‘explored’ in Washington. The size of the total proposed resources ($100 million over three years) was calculated to be large enough to be meaningful to other delegations, but not too large to create opposition in Washington. And they were to be ‘a supplement to bilateral arrangements’. The primary aim would be to meet emergencies, although pilot projects in such fields as school lunch and labour-intensive food-for-work projects would also be supported in order ‘to develop some diversified experience’. This, too, would not antagonize the United States and other bilateral food aid programmes. A project food aid approach had only just started under the United States food aid programme itself, and further experimentation with this approach was welcome. This avoided the criticisms that had already been made of the effects of US bulk programme food aid on international trade and domestic food production in recipient countries. It also facilitated evaluation of the impact of food aid on individual development projects and specific groups of poor and hungry people. The proposal stressed the multilateral nature of the proposed new programme. (The word ‘multilateral’ occurred four times in McGovern’s brief and concise statement.) It was to be ‘a truly multilateral program with the widest possible contribution by member countries’. This served notice that the United States was not prepared to address the food problems of developing countries alone. International burden-sharing was needed to tackle their dimensions, politically and financially. This would help both to meet the costs involved and to give an opportunity to all donors to contribute according to their comparative advantage in terms of food commodities (and the kinds of food needed), money for transportation and administration, and services, such as shipping. FAO, and its director-general in particular, were given a major role in the proposed new multilateral programme. This was in recognition of FAO’s mandate

The Birth of WFP: One Man’s Inspiration 9

and early work on food surplus concerns and issues, and confidence in the ability of FAO director-general, B. R. Sen, to run the proposed programme effectively. McGovern had met with Sen in Washington in February 1961. Both respected each other. McGovern wrote to President Kennedy, ‘I think it is very important that assurances be given to Dr. Sen that the US Food for Peace Program will explore various possibilities of multilateral distribution of agricultural abundance’, the first hint that he was already contemplating the ideas that were later to emerge in the initiative he took at the Intergovernmental Advisory Committee meeting in Rome.3 For his part, Sen recognized the strategic role that McGovern played in advancing progress on his study concerning a multilateral food aid facility. In his autobiography, he wrote: This bold initiative by Senator McGovern, who was then Director of the Food for Peace programme in the White House, finally got my proposal off the ground. … Senator McGovern is one of the finest, most liberal political leaders I have come across … I cherish him as a very close friend. (Sen, 1982, p. 202) McGovern’s proposal, and the concise, yet detailed, way in which it was presented, caught the delegates from other countries by surprise when he made it to the Intergovernmental Advisory Committee on 10 April 1961. They called for an adjournment to consider how to respond. Eventually, however, the proposal was accepted, and the rest is history. McGovern reported to President Kennedy on his proposal when he returned from Rome. Kennedy gave the proposal his personal endorsement at a press conference on 21 April 1961 (US, 1962, p. 307). Looking back at his initiative, McGovern still regards the proposal with satisfaction. It represented the best possible pragmatic political action at the time – an unambiguous proposal leading to concrete action.4 The United States reiterated the proposal at the FAO Council meeting in Rome in June 1961. The proposal was incorporated into parallel resolutions that were passed by the FAO Conference and the United Nations General Assembly on 24 November and 19 December 1961 respectively that resulted in the establishment of WFP, if only on a three-year experimental basis (FAO, 1961b; UN, 1961a). WFP was born.

Other proposals But discussion on McGovern’s proposal was not quite over. Officials in the US delegation at the United Nations in New York were working on another, and much larger, multilateral food aid proposal. McGovern had been briefed on

10

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

this proposal. He was not opposed to it but was sceptical that it would clear the various US departments in Washington and the United States Congress. That was why he went ahead with his proposal in Rome after obtaining approval from the White House.5 In his first address to the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 1961, President Kennedy proposed that the decade of the 1960s should be designated as the ‘United Nations Decade for Development’ (see Chapter 3). This proposal raised hopes in many quarters, and especially among developing countries, that the United States would be prepared to increase substantially its aid programmes, including food aid, as part of the UN development decade. An additional $400 million of food aid for economic and social development (as opposed to meeting emergencies, which was the main purpose given in the McGovern proposal) was mentioned, although never officially, by the United States government.6 The larger food aid proposal would be administered through the United Nations Special Fund in New York. The Special Fund had been set up as a new UN agency in 1958, following a US proposal in the UN General Assembly, to finance technical assistance provided largely by the UN specialized agencies. Paul Hoffman, a highly respected American, who had been administrator of the Marshall Plan, which provided massive aid to war-torn Europe after the Second World War, had been appointed as managing director of the Special Fund in 1959, an added reason for proposing the channelling of the larger food aid proposal through the Special Fund. The prestige of the Special Fund would be increased and the optimal use of food surpluses for economic development assured by fusing financial, technical and food aid in one assistance programme. The two food aid proposals had to be reconciled so that a common position could be presented by the US delegations at the FAO Conference and the UN General Assembly at the end of 1961.7 McGovern initiated a meeting in New York with US representatives to the United Nations on 10 November 1961. A second meeting was held at the Department of State in Washington four days later. The State Department generally favoured a limited experimental plan along the lines proposed by McGovern in Rome and the larger food aid proposal was no longer pursued. It was recognized, however, that if the three-year experimental multilateral food aid programme was successful, it could encourage, rather than foreclose, a larger UN food aid programme (McGovern, 1964, pp. 109–10). Both proposals were preferred to other schemes. The Prime Minister of Canada laid a proposal for a ‘world food bank’ before the UN General Assembly in 1959. A comprehensive commodity plan was also proposed (Haas, 1969, p. 155). These alternative proposals did not receive serious consideration, particularly after US opposition was known and McGovern’s proposal was approved (Wallerstein, 1980, p. 170).

The Birth of WFP: One Man’s Inspiration 11

Motivation What had motivated McGovern to make his proposal? ‘Food, farmers and his fellow men’ were described as the three foundation stones on which McGovern’s philosophy of life was built, underpinned by the strong and enduring belief that ‘one person, despite weaknesses and mistakes, can make a difference’ (The New York Times, 1961; McGovern, 1977, p. 297). McGovern was born and raised in a small rural community in South Dakota, one of the most agricultural states in America. Although not of farming stock, he saw at first hand the poverty of the farming community through the economic depression of the 1930s and the decline of farm incomes. He also witnessed the growing paradox of accumulating agricultural surpluses at a time when hunger existed at home and abroad. His concern for his fellow men stemmed from a deeply religious background. Son of a Wesleyan Methodist minister, he studied for the Methodist clergy until he changed to an academic career, with a strong interest in the history of America intellectual thought, before finally entering politics. His commitment to the United Nations, and to solving the problems of the world through the combined action of the ‘brotherhood of man’ was instilled in him at an early age through the state’s public school system and his post-graduate academic studies. These forces came together to create ‘an old-fashioned free-enterprise capitalist and a practical internationalist’. Throughout his political career as congressman and senator for South Dakota in the US House of Representatives (1957–60) and Senate (1963–8), McGovern consistently pursued his aims of giving fairness to the United States farmer, sharing America’s agricultural bounty at home and abroad, and supporting the United Nations and international action. As a member of the agriculture committees in both the House and the Senate, he became a leading spokesman for the American farmer and an authority on American agriculture (McGovern, 1967a,b). Even before that, when he was building up a Democratic Party in a largely Republican state, he vigorously opposed the agricultural policies of the Eisenhower administration that from 1953 had led to a decline in farm prices and incomes and a rise in government-held grain stocks as farmers opted to leave their output in government hands rather than pay off their agriculturesupport loans. At the same time, he had a ‘thoroughly realistic appreciation of the potentials and pitfalls of the (Food for Peace) program’ (The Washington Post, 1961). He understood that food could not be a substitute for financial and technical assistance. There was a good case, therefore, for co-ordinating the Food for Peace programme with other aspects of US aid, without downgrading the programme in the process. Appropriations for the programme were largely a book-keeping transaction. Storage, transportation and administrative costs

12

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

were real, but the food itself had already been purchased by the US government, and the use of food surpluses represented a saving in storage costs. Famine and emergency relief were important but they were only one aspect of a programme that had many possibilities for using food aid productively. But this required changes in attitude. Abroad, it was necessary to persuade governments that food aid could contribute constructively to economic development and was not merely America dumping unwanted food or disrupting other markets. At home, it was necessary to convince Americans that abundance was an asset rather than a curse, and that the food aid programme offered a challenge as well as an outlet for humanitarian impulses. McGovern issued a press release in 1959 on a ‘Food for Peace Resolution: American Farm Production a Force for Freedom and Peace’, which he mailed to all members of Congress.8 The resolution stated: many Americans and a considerable portion of the Congress are troubled by the paradox of mounting American farm surpluses and costly storage programs in a world where most of the people are crying for food … a broader and more imaginative use of surplus farm commodities can play a major part in advancing the economic development and political stability of underdeveloped nations.

Kennedy’s views President Kennedy had formed his own ideals about food aid. During his presidential campaign, he had seen for himself the bitter paradox of hunger among the poor in America, while mountains of food accumulated. In a speech on 22 September 1960 in McGovern’s home town in South Dakota, Kennedy said I don’t regard … agricultural surplus as a problem, I regard it as an opportunity … not only for our own people, but for people all around the world … I think the farmers can bring more credit, more lasting good will, more chance of freedom, more chance for peace, than almost any other group of Americans in the next ten years, if we recognize that food is strength, and food is peace, and food is freedom, and food is a helping hand to people around the world whose good will and friendship we want. (McGovern, 1977, pp. 82–3)9 During the presidential election campaign in 1960, he began to consider favourably the idea of a multilateral food aid programme. He proposed to

The Birth of WFP: One Man’s Inspiration 13

hold an international conference on food and agriculture, similar to the one convened by President Roosevelt at Hot Springs, Virginia in 1943: to deal on a constructive multilateral basis with the food needs of the world. This conference should, of course, be held under the sponsorship, and in cooperation with the United Nations Organization. This conference should have as its specific goal the organization of an agency to undertake the transfer of surplus food and fiber stocks from nations with surpluses to those nations in desperate need of such supplies to combat hunger and to promote economic development.10 In a press release in October 1960, he added ‘pending such a conference and creation of “a world food agency”, negotiate long-term agreements for donors countries to supply food commodities for food-for-work schemes’, clearly the embryo of what turned out to be WFP.11 The president of the National Farmers Union, James G. Patton, recommended that such a conference be held for the specific purpose of setting up a new agency, under but not in FAO, to administer a multilateral food aid operational programme for the dual purpose of spurring faster economic growth in the developing countries and at the same time build up the power of the United Nations in the attack on world poverty.12 However, the first public document containing a US proposal for a multilateral food aid facility appears to have come not from Kennedy but from the then vice president, Richard M. Nixon (Wallerstein, 1980, pp. 167–9). During the 1960 presidential election campaign, Nixon suggested that the United States should support the creation of a multilateral surplus food distribution system. His motives were mixed. It would not be harmful to US friends and allies since they were expected to participate in it. It would not be subjected to criticism directed against US unilateral aid as it would be administered through the United Nations. It would project a positive international image for the United States. And it would ‘outinnovate’ his presidential opponent, Senator Kennedy, who was also calling for new food aid initiatives, including a multilateral food aid mechanism. Ultimately, a proposal was presented to the UN General Assembly by President Eisenhower on 22 September 1960 when the US presidential election campaign for his successor was already in full swing. In making the proposal for a multilateral food aid facility, he said: The United States is already carrying out substantial programs to make its surpluses available to countries in greatest need. My country is also ready to join with other Members of the United Nations in devising a workable scheme to provide to Member States through the United Nations system relying on the advice and assistance of the Food and Agriculture

14

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Organization. I hope the Assembly, at this session, will seriously consider a specific program for carrying forward the promising food for peace program. (UN, 1960a)

On 27 October 1960, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which invited FAO to provide a study on the establishment of multilateral procedures by which ‘the largest practicable quantities of surplus food may be made available ... as a transitional measure against hunger’ (UN, 1960c). During the presidential election campaign, in October 1960, Kennedy announced the appointment of a ‘committee of distinguished citizens’ to make recommendations for his new administration, should he win the election, ‘to transfer the “food for peace” slogan into a truly effective long-range use of our food abundance’. Subsequently, after Kennedy won the election, the committee was transformed into the American Food for Peace Council as a non-partisan advisory group to advise the president and the new director of the Food for Peace programme on the most effective uses of the US food surpluses. In his inaugural address as president on 20 January 1961, Kennedy stated:

The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life … To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves … If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich. (US, 1961, pp. 1012–13)

The new president was so seized with the importance of the United States food surpluses to combat hunger at home and abroad, and as a tool for American foreign policy, that his first two executive orders on assuming the presidency related to these matters.13 The first executive order, issued on the day after his inauguration, provided for an expanded programme of food distribution to needy families in the United States. The second executive order, issued three days later, outlined the responsibilities of the newly appointed director of the Food for Peace programme. Subject to the direction of the president himself, the director was made responsible for ‘continuous supervision and coordination’. In a memorandum to federal agencies of 24 January 1961, the president described further the role of the director of the Food for Peace programme, and added that he would be ‘located in the Executive Office of the President’ (US, 1962, p. 6).

The Birth of WFP: One Man’s Inspiration 15

In his ‘State of the Union’ address on 30 January 1961, ten days after his inauguration, President Kennedy stated: This Administration is expanding its Food for Peace Program in every possible way. The product of our abundance must be used more effectively to relieve hunger and help economic growth in all corners of the globe. And I have asked the Director of this Program to recommend additional ways in which these surpluses can advance the interest of world peace – including the establishment of world food reserves.14 In a ‘Special Message to the Congress on Agriculture’ on 16 March 1961 (US, 1962, pp. 192–200), Kennedy outlined the policy framework that was to move the focus of the United States food aid programme from the disposal of surpluses to the constructive use of abundance both at home and abroad. In a ‘Special Message to Congress on Foreign Aid’ on 22 March 1961 (US, 1962, pp. 203–12), Kennedy called for a comprehensive overhaul of United States foreign aid, noting that its aid programmes and concepts were ‘largely unsatisfactory and unsuited for our needs and for the needs of the underdeveloped world as it enters the Sixties’. He called for a new organizational structure for US aid but added that that was not enough. ‘We need a new working concept. At the center of the new effort must be national development programs’, which would include all types of United States assistance, including the Food-forPeace programme, ‘while recognizing its essential role in our farm economy’. Why was Kennedy so interested in the Food for Peace programme? In an illuminating address to the American Food for Peace Council in San Francisco on 29 January 1962, Theodore Sorensen, special counsel to the president, identified three reasons.15 First, it was a means of helping the president’s agricultural policy of ‘supply management’, a programme of production controls combined with higher price support. Secondly, Food for Peace helped to fulfill the aims of Kennedy’s foreign aid programme. And thirdly, ‘Food for Peace was one program that could create the contentment and order on which freedom and peace could thrive. It can strengthen and help build the bodies which in turn help to build the institutions of peace.’

Achievements By the end of McGovern’s short period as director of the Food for Peace programme in 1962, over a third of all US overseas economic aid was in agricultural products. The Food for Peace programme had become ‘the single most extensive foreign aid programme in American history, with exception of the Marshall Plan’ (Knock, 1992, p. 3). In his letter of resignation to President Kennedy on 18 July 1962 to seek election to the US Senate, McGovern summed up the multiple achievements of his 18-month period in office. Food for Peace

16

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

had brought many mutual benefits to the United States and the developing world by being: an outlet for costly farm storage; a device to support farm income; a commercial market development tool; a resource for economic development; an ‘invaluable aid’ to world health; a ‘powerful corrective to the misery on which tyranny thrived’; an ‘indispensable foundation stone’ for a free and peaceful world by which ‘the American farmer (was given) a vital role in US foreign policy’. McGovern singled out one ‘priority recommendation’. He strongly urged that ‘the United States take an even more active lead in providing a daily school lunch for every needy child in the world. No form of overseas assistance could return greater dividends for so little cost. We should undertake this task with renewed energy “because it is right”.’ McGovern’s work has been described as ‘probably the single greatest humanitarian achievement of the Kennedy–Johnson era’ (Knock, 1992, p. 10). What direction might United States food aid policies and programmes have taken had Kennedy lost the presidential campaign to Nixon in 1960? It is difficult to know what might have lain down the road that was not taken. What we now know is that when Nixon eventually became president, he modified the Food for Peace programme to make it a tool of diplomacy with the help of his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger. As a result, the humanitarian, social and economic elements of the US food aid programme were downgraded; ‘food for peace’ gave way to ‘food for war’ (Wallerstein, 1980, pp. 45–7).16 By 1973, almost half of all United States food assistance was flowing to South Vietnam and Cambodia as the Nixon administration attempted to circumvent the increasingly stringent financial limitations imposed by congress on US assistance to the war effort in Southeast Asia. This was at the expense of food aid to the hungry poor in developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and support of WFP and NGO food aid programmes. Had Kennedy not been assassinated, and perhaps served a second term, the evidence suggests that he would have pursued his aims of a strengthened United Nations and enlarged the UN programme of assistance with United States support while, at the same time, continuing the use an expanded US food aid programme in the causes of peace and development. In his ‘State of the Union’ address on 11 January 1962, for example, he stated: A newly-expanded Food for Peace Program is feeding the hungry in many lands with the abundance of our productive farms – providing lunches for children in schools, wages for economic development, relief for the victims of flood and famine, and a better diet for millions whose daily bread is their chief concern. These programs help people; and, by helping people, they help freedom. (US, 1963)

The Birth of WFP: One Man’s Inspiration 17

And in his last address to the United Nations General Assembly on 20 September 1963, he said: A United Nations Decade of Development is under way … But more can be done … And … a worldwide program of farm productivity and food distribution, similar to our country’s Food for Peace program, could now give every child the food he needs. (UN, 1963) McGovern vigorously opposed Nixon’s food aid policy in the US Senate when Nixon became president. He was appalled to see the instrument of ‘Food for Peace’ transformed into an instrument of war. In June 1965, McGovern introduced a bill, ‘The International Food and Nutrition Act’ (S.2157), in the US Senate, which called for a world-wide effort to eliminate hunger. The act, had it been passed, would have resulted in a considerable expansion of US food aid and allocations to UN organizations, including WFP. The bill was read twice and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. By then, the Vietnam war had come to divert and dominate attention and discussion in the US, and no further consideration was given to this bold initiative. McGovern continued to pursue his vision at home and abroad during his remaining time in the US Senate, and into his presidential election campaign in 1972 and beyond. At the UN World Food Conference in Rome in November 1974, when there was a serious world food security crisis, he proposed that with global military expenditure running at over $200 billion annually, ‘all nations should agree to reduce their arms spending by 10 percent’. The $20 billion thus saved would be transferred to an ‘International Food and Rural Development Authority’. At the same time, he requested the oil exporting countries to agree to a similar transfer of 10 per cent of their oil profits that had been increased substantially, which would have added another $7 billion. He told the conference, ‘We can and must end hunger and malnutrition, but this will not be done if the major powers continue to waste their substance in military overkill. Nor will it be done if those who have oil beneath their feet continue to accumulate riches beyond reasonable use’ (McGovern, 1977, p. 271). His proposal was not adopted. What might have happened to the US food aid programme and to WFP had McGovern won the US presidential election in 1972? The indications are that both would have flourished, on a significantly larger scale, in the cause of peace and the conquest of hunger. He had already shown that ‘one person … can make a difference’.

18

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Appendix: Statement by the Honourable George S. McGovern, Delegate of the United States of America* (FAO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee, Rome, Italy: 10 April 1961) 1. The United States favors a multilateral approach for the use of agricultural commodities as a supplement to bilateral arrangements. 2. We think FAO should have a major role in such a program, in co-operation with other UN organizations. 3. We believe this should be a truly multilateral program with the widest possible contributions by member countries. 4. We recognize that countries are here to advise the FAO Director-General on his report – not to take government positions on subjects covered in his report. Because of the need to move to the consideration of specific action proposals, however, we have been in touch with our Government over the weekend. 5. As a result, we are authorized to propose that an initial program on a multilateral basis might aim at a fund of $100 million in commodities and cash contributions. For its part, the United States would be prepared to offer $40 million in commodities, and the possibility of a supplementary cash contribution will be explored in Washington. 6. The $100 million total would be available for use over a fixed forward period. We are thinking of three years. 7. We recognize the desire of the (FAO) Director-General to make the widest possible use of commodities in alleviating malnutrition. However, we continue to believe that the primary aim of the program in its initial stage should be to meet emergency needs. At the same time, we would support use of the program fund for pilot activities in other fields such as school lunch or labor-intensive projects, in order to develop some diversified experience. 8. Specifics including additional staffing would have to be worked out for consideration by governments. This could be the responsibility of the (FAO) Director-General in informal consultation with individual countries. 9. The purpose of our proposal is to help in launching a multilateral program utilizing food to test approaches. After such experience, we could then examine the question of future additional work. * Director of the Food for Peace Program, Executive Office of the President. Source: FAO (1961) Development Through Food (Rome: FAO, pp. 121–2).

3 Antecedents: A Tale of Three Cities

Background WFP had its antecedents in the various attempts to set up some form of multilateral world food security arrangement since the time of the League of Nations before the Second World War. These attempts tried to rationalize food production, supply and trade for the benefit of both producers and consumers, in developing and developed countries. They focused attention on two basic concerns: first, to reconcile the interests of producers and consumers by protecting them from uncontrolled fluctuations in world agricultural production and prices; and secondly, to use agricultural output in excess of commercial market demand (the so-called agricultural ‘surpluses’) to assist economic and social development in developing countries, without creating disincentive to their domestic agricultural production or disruption to local or international trade. This chapter describes these antecedents and the many attempts to set up a world food security arrangement in what I have called ‘the graveyard of aspirations’ (Shaw, 1998). These attempts are described briefly here because they indicate the kinds of problems involved, the mood in the international debate, and the issues that WFP were to face when it was eventually born in 1961. The pre-history of WFP is closely tied up with the work of FAO in Rome, Italy, the United Nations in New York, and United States agricultural and foreign policy and the interests of the World Bank in Washington, DC. We saw in Chapter 2 that WFP owed its origin to the initiative of one man, George McGovern. Similarly, as we shall see in this chapter, one man was to figure prominently in the pre-history of WFP, and in the work and studies leading up to its establishment. That man was Dr Hans Singer (now Professor Sir Hans Singer) who, at the time, was a senior official in the Economic and Social Department of the United Nations secretariat in New York. Singer had a major 19

20

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

impact on the international food aid debate (Hopkins, 1992). He also played a strategic role in the establishment of WFP (Singer, 1983; 1984). The origins of multilateral food aid can be traced to two meetings that took place in 1943 (Singer et al., 1987, p. 26). In May of that year, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt convened a meeting at Hot Springs, Virginia, which laid the foundation for the creation of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). In November, an agreement was signed in Washington, DC, which led to the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), the first significant ‘experiment’ of a multilateral agency to deal with food aid (Woodbridge, 1950). Two others, operating on a smaller scale, were the United Nations Works Relief Administration for Palestinian refugees in the Middle East, and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.

FAO’s pioneering work From its inception in 1945, FAO persistently advocated the establishment of some form of world food security arrangement and the constructive use of surplus agricultural commodities for development and emergency relief in developing countries. Equally important was the avoidance of potentially destructive effects through the dumping of unwanted surpluses in developing countries, thereby impeding agricultural development and trade. The first FAO director-general, Sir John (later Lord) Boyd Orr, took a proactive stance on both issues (Boyd Orr and Lubbock, 1953). A first step was to form an ‘International Emergency Food Council’, a body with powers to cope with the immediate, short-term chaos caused by war devastation in Europe and Asia. But a more far-reaching proposal was to establish a ‘World Food Board’. The board would have the functions of: stabilizing prices through buffer stocks schemes; holding a world food reserve against famine; financing surplus disposal programmes to needy people; co-operating with a credit-issuing agency, which would assist countries to develop their agriculture and ancillary industries; and co-ordinating bodies dealing with individual food commodities (FAO, 1946). The proposal was considered at the first FAO conference at Copenhagen in September 1946 but was not approved. In 1949, the proposal was revived in the modified form of an ‘International Commodity Clearing House’ (ICCH), as an action arm of FAO (FAO, 1983, pp. 5–8; Hambridge, 1955, pp. 71–2; Yates, 1955, p. 84). The ICCH proposal was turned down just as decisively as the previous proposal. The major industrialized countries were adamantly opposed to any centralized and multilateral world food management arrangement. While these attempts did not succeed, the FAO secretariat continued to keep the issues alive through a series of seminal studies and reports throughout the 1950s. Three publications were to have

Antecedents: A Tale of Three Cities 21

particular relevance when WFP was eventually established in 1961. The first concerned the identification of principles and guidelines for the disposal of agricultural surpluses, first adopted in 1954 in the face of growing food surpluses in the United States, which became known as the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal (FAO, 1954). These Principles, which were not legally binding but provided ‘consultative obligations’, were to form the cornerstone for all WFP’s activities. Three general principles were recommended. The solution to problems of agricultural surpluses should be sought, wherever possible, through efforts to increase consumption, rather than through measures to restrict supplies. Disposal of excess stocks of agricultural products should be done in an orderly manner to avoid sharp falls in prices on world markets. And there should be an undertaking from both importing and exporting countries that disposal of surpluses would be made without harmful interference to normal patterns of agricultural production and international trade. A special Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal (CSD), a subcommittee of FAO’s Committee on Commodity Problems, was set up in Washington, DC to monitor adherence to these principles that has remained in place to the present time. The second FAO study concerned the use of agricultural surpluses to finance economic development in developing countries, based on the results of a pilot investigation in India (FAO, 1955). This study laid the foundations for the project approach to the use of food aid subsequently adopted by WFP. The results of the study showed in detail how the large amounts of capital represented by food surpluses could be used to finance a general expansion of investment programmes in developing countries. The third FAO related to proposals for the establishment of an international emergency food reserve (FAO, 1953; 1956). Few developing countries had established national food reserves, which was the subject of another FAO study (FAO, 1958). This strengthened the case for an international arrangement for emergency relief to deal speedily with emergencies. Several alternative plans evolved. One proposal, called the ‘Three Circles Plan’, was designed to combine speed and flexibility of relief operations with the acceptance and use of different kinds of contributions. The ‘three circles’ of the plan consisted of: an inner circle of financial contributions on an agreed scale; a second circle of contributions in kind; and an outer circle of ad hoc contributions. Although the plan was found to be technically sound, it was not pursued. A number of resolutions were adopted by the FAO Council and Conference on these and related subjects, and passed to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the UN General Assembly for action, which led to nothing, or to calls for further studies (FAO, 1973). The main reason for lack of progress was the reluctance of governments, mainly in developed countries, to approve measures that might weaken their national initiatives and powers

22

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

of control. The climate of opinion was against multilateral action in operational fields as distinct from advisory or informational roles. But as we saw in Chapter 2, persistence eventually paid off. In the context of FAO’s Freedom for Hunger Campaign, a resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly in October 1960 on the ‘Provision of Food Surpluses to Food-Deficient People through the United Nations System’ (resolution 1496 (XV)), which invited FAO, in consultation with others, to establish ‘without delay’ procedures by which, with the assistance of the United Nations system, ‘the largest practicable quantities of surplus food may be made available on mutually agreeable terms as a transitional measure against hunger’. FAO was invited to submit a study of the subject for approval (UN, 1960a,b,c; 1961b). An expanded programme of surplus food utilization The FAO director-general, B. R. Sen, appointed a small group of ‘high-level, independent experts’ to assist him in preparing the study. Hans Singer was appointed as its chairman.1 The group met at the height of the Keynesian consensus, with its emphasis on full employment, active government demand management, and the welfare state. Of the five members of the group, three were direct students of Keynes, the fourth was an economic development thinker in his own right, but fully in the Keynesian vein, and the fifth was an agricultural expert in the American ‘New Deal’ tradition of President Roosevelt. It was no surprise, therefore, that the group’s report had a strong Keynesian flavour. The whole emphasis of its report was to deal with the surplus problem not by curtailing production but by expanding demand. In a spirit of optimism that matched the time, the group considered that the resources to implement a far-reaching programme were already available. In its opinion, a transfer of two-thirds to three-quarters of one per cent of the Gross National Product (GNP) of the developed countries over a period of five years, and probably less for another decade, would provide sufficient means for helping people in the developing countries to help themselves. (Under the Marshall Plan, the United States had transferred about 3 per cent of its annual GNP for four consecutive years.) This would represent a much smaller international redistribution of income than the national redistribution of income achieved by progressive taxation within most of the developed countries, when they were less rich than they were in 1961. The group pointedly added, ‘To think that the developed world cannot spare three quarters of one cent from each dollar of its income for an international program of economic aid is to show failure of imagination and failure of will’ (FAO, 1961a, p. 75). Food aid from the food surpluses that existed was seen to be an important part of the resources needed for economic development in the developing countries. Far from being a waste, it could be a blessing, if matched by other

Antecedents: A Tale of Three Cities 23

resources, and used as an essential part of a coherent aid programme (as in the Marshall Plan), and, to borrow from the Keynesian concept, would ‘turn the stone of surpluses into bread for development’. A subsistence fund A central part of the expert group’s case was that surplus food products could form an important part of capital in its original sense of a ‘subsistence fund’. ‘If sufficient foodstuffs could not be supplied in a country to meet the increased demand from the additionally employed workers on construction or other investments, then either more resources (circulating capital) would have to be spent for (food) imports, or the amount of additional investment would have to be reduced’ (FAO, 1961a, p. 82). Additionally employed workers would have to be fed during the period of construction, before the fruits of their work and of investment could supply their needs, or enable them to buy their subsistence. Without such a fund, additional investment would not be possible, and inflation would become rampant. Food surpluses used for economic development would enable hungry people to produce either their own food or other products to buy food. Freedom from hunger could ultimately be achieved only through freedom from poverty. The group estimated that about $12,500 million of agricultural commodities would become available as ‘surpluses’ over a five-year period for use outside normal commercial market channels, either bilaterally or through the United Nations system. It recommended that about two-thirds of these resources should be used in economic development programmes and one-third for social development. Food aid for economic development Between $1,550 million and $1,650 million of surplus food a year might be used for economic development programmes over a five-year period. The aim would be to provide developing countries with a positive incentive for maximum national effort to increase their rate of growth. The primary criterion was, therefore, to maximize additional national effort, not to maximize income per dollar of aid. International aid should strengthen the national effort and shorten the time to reach the desired goal to the point where a satisfactory growth rate could be achieved on a self-sustaining basis. National food reserves A small part (about 8 per cent, or $200 million a year) of the total surplus food should be allocated for the establishment of national food reserves in developing countries to the extent that they could equip themselves with the appropriate storage facilities and institutional and logistical arrangements to manage and handle the reserves. Surplus storable foods could be made available for the

24

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

initial reserve stocks as one-time contributions, although this did not preclude later contributions to offset prolonged periods of sub-normal production caused by such factors as drought. Developed countries not supplying surplus food could provide other outlays (e.g., storage facilities) necessary for establishing national food reserves. An international emergency food reserve In addition, an international emergency food reserve should be established to provide relief food grants to the victims of famine and other physical disasters. (No reference was made to man-made disasters at this time.) These food grants would be provided from national food reserves in contributing countries. The group estimated that about $150 million a year would be required for this purpose. It was to take another 14 years before an International Emergency Food Reserve was established in 1975. Food aid for social development Resources should also be made available to promote social development. Two criteria were suggested for planning such programmes: (a) moving gradually toward a situation in which the developing countries themselves would be able to take over these programmes; and (b) avoiding action that would depress prices to domestic producers or lessen incentives for maximum food production in the recipient countries. The channelling of food surpluses into social development programmes was not regarded as detrimental to local agricultural production since it represented additional consumption, and the beneficial effects of improved nutrition could be striking. Four types of social development programmes were identified. First, land reform programmes during which, while land was redistributed, there might be a decrease in agricultural production, or an increase in the proportion of local production consumed by farm families, so that deliveries to the urban markets, the ‘food capital’ of industrialization, would be reduced. In both cases, food surpluses could be provided to offset the shortfall. The group estimated that about $50 million to $100 million of surplus food would be required a year for this purpose. Secondly, school feeding programmes should be supported at a cost of about $500 million a year as part of the process of human capital formation, which had come to be recognized as a basic necessity for economic development, and as productive as physical capital formation. The better feeding of school children (and of students in higher educational institutions) was seen as a move in the direction of greater equality of opportunity, which was regarded as a basic step in fostering self-help and economic development. Around $7,000 million per year ($2,500 million for foodstuffs and $4,500 million for transport and distribution) was required to feed all children between the ages

Antecedents: A Tale of Three Cities 25

of 5 and 14 in the developing countries with a single meal a day of 60 grams of wheat, or its equivalent, and 25 grams of dried skimmed milk. Half that amount would be required if the programme were restricted to those actually in school. The availability of meals would encourage school attendance and improve food habits. Thirdly, the possibility of extending aid to the poorer students at the secondary and higher levels of education and in training programmes should be explored. This was regarded as an important foundation group in economic development. A major obstacle in implementing development programmes in developing countries was a shortage of trained personnel. Aid in overcoming this shortage was a long-term matter but was one of the most fruitful investments that could be made. Where inability to finance their subsistence while in education and training was a limiting factor, provision of some resources for institutional feeding might be considered, at least on a modest scale. The cost of providing two simple, but nourishing, meals to half the students and trainees in higher education and vocational training centres in developing countries was estimated to be $1,500 million a year. The group suggested that $100 million to $200 million a year be devoted to such ‘food scholarships’ over a five-year period. Lastly, $200 million might be provided per year over a five-year period in relief and welfare programmes for the old, handicapped and destitute. International machinery While the major part of international aid would continue to be provided bilaterally, the expert group recommended that it should be supplied within a multilateral framework (FAO, 1961a, pp. 103–4). A consultative, multilateral framework would assure that bilateral and international aid activities would be provided within coherent and consistent country programmes of assistance. For incorporating the use of surplus food into development programmes, and advising on the general economic requirements of the developing countries, FAO should work closely with the United Nations, and particularly with its Regional Economic Commissions in Africa, Asia and Latin America. To ensure that surplus food was combined with additional financial and technical aid in packages of assistance, FAO and the United Nations should work closely with such financial institutions as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the newly established soft-lending facility of the World Bank, the International Development Association (IDA). Much of the technical and training work involved, as well as pilot projects and surveys, could lead to action by the United Nations Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance of the United Nations (EPTA), later to be merged to become the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

26

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Country programming The vital function of country programming for external assistance, including food aid, was highlighted, anticipating by more than three decades the country programme approach that was eventually adopted by WFP (WFP, 1994f). The various projects comprising a development programme could be interrelated and would reinforce each other. A country programme, not a project, approach would determine the criteria for the productive use of aid capital, including food aid, and would be a guard against fungibility (Singer, 1965). Three basic principles were proposed for country programming. First, it should be approached entirely with the interest of the recipient developing country in mind, and should be determined by demand in the developing countries, and not by the surplus food available. Second, all potential recipients of additional food surpluses should be treated on a basis of equality so that each country had the same opportunity to benefit. Third, high and uniform standards should be applied in assuring that the additional surplus food was only used for constructive objectives, which the involvement of international organizations could ensure. The individual country programme, drawn up with the help of the international organizations, would normally include an assessment of the additional financial and technical assistance required to accompany the surplus food, which would enhance the value of the total aid programme. An approximate idea of the amounts of aid available should be provided. Surplus-giving countries should, therefore, indicate their willingness to earmark surplus food as aid. Since it would not be known what proportion of total aid requirements would be handled multilaterally, which would be determined by the recipient countries individually, part of the total earmarkings would be made available on a flexible basis for multilateral transactions. The views of the expert group were taken fully into account in the report of the FAO director-general to ECOSOC. Although a number of their recommendations were well in advance of their time, their value was subsequently recognized.2 The experts’ report was well received by officials in key positions in the United States. In a memorandum to President Kennedy, the US ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai E. Stevenson, described it as ‘One of the most remarkable documents on the subject’,3 and Willard W. Cochrane, director of USDA’s Agricultural Economics Service, found it ‘an excellent report. The analysis of the role of food aid in economic development is in my opinion, highly competent and informative. I know of no better analysis in the literature on economic development’.4 Joint proposals were made by the UN and FAO regarding procedures and arrangements for the multilateral utilization of surplus food, including the establishment of a ‘Surplus Utilization Fund’ to be administered by a joint ‘UN/FAO Surplus Utilization Division’, later to be called the World Food

Antecedents: A Tale of Three Cities 27

Programme and the WFP secretariat respectively. The political climate was such that within less than a year after the expert group had submitted its report to the FAO director-general in February 1961, WFP was established as an experimental programme.

Initiatives at the United Nations A number of initiatives taken at the United Nations in New York were also directly and indirectly to have an influence on the establishment of WFP. The two most significant were: a proposal to set up a UN Special Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED); and President Kennedy’s proposal to make the 1960s a ‘United Nations Development Decade’. UN Special Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) Negotiations went on throughout the 1950s to establish a soft-lending multilateral financing facility at the UN to assist developing countries undertake their development programmes. Hans Singer played an active part in this initiative. He described his emerging interest in food aid at the time as follows: It was also in casting around for possible financing for SUNFED that I became very interested in 1954 in the establishment, under Public Law 480, of the US food aid program and in the possibility of an international food aid program which had begun to emerge in Rome. ... This interest led me to my involvement in laying the ground for the UN/FAO World Food Programme. (Singer, 1984, p. 301)5 SUNFED was not approved, mainly due to opposition in the United States.6 However, the proposal was later adopted by the IBRD in the form of its soft financing window, the International Development Association (IDA), despite initial opposition from Bank staff, particularly its president, Eugene Black, who feared that the provision of soft loans would undermine its main lending operations and its financial viability (Kapur et al., 1997, p. 155). The United States also favoured this arrangement. The voting system in the Bank, which was based on financial contributions, gave the US a commanding voice, quite different from the voting system in the United Nations, which was on the basis of one country, one vote. In 1960, when acting as an adviser to the then UN secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld, Singer drafted a proposal that the IBRD should be responsible for targeting food aid toward the reconstruction and development projects it was supporting. This would have resulted in a fusing of financial and food aid in works programmes that Singer also advocated later in jointly-funded projects between the Bank and WFP. Hammarskjöld contacted the then president

28

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

of the IBRD, Eugene Black, proposing that the Bank establish a separate management division to undertake multilateral food aid. The proposal was declined (Hopkins, 1992, p. 242; personal communication, 26 January 1996). The schism between multilateral soft financing and food aid, with the former going to the World Bank and the latter to WFP, was to have lasting negative repercussions. It was to result in a lower level of co-ordination of financial and food aid than might have otherwise occurred, to the mutual detriment of both types of assistance. It was also to result in different methods of appraisal, operational procedures and evaluation, even mind-sets, and odious comparisons, in which food aid came to be regarded as a ‘second class’ resource. This also reflected the state of affairs in bilateral aid programmes where food aid was handled differently from other forms of assistance, by separate administrative units, and with special legislative, financial and operating procedures, inhibiting the fusion of the different forms of aid. On the other hand, the birth of WFP might be seen as part of a wider compromise in which food aid and pre-investment financing were given to the United Nations as ‘consolation prizes’ for the loss of a soft financing facility to the World Bank. United Nations Development Decade President Kennedy proposed the designation of the 1960s as the ‘United Nations Decade of Development’. In his address to the UN General Assembly on 25 September 1961, he said: Political sovereignty is but a mockery without the means of meeting poverty and illiteracy and disease. Self-determination is but a slogan if the future holds no hope. That is why my Nation, which has freely shared its capital and technology to help others help themselves, now proposes officially designating the decade of the 1960s as the United Nations Decade of Development. Under the framework of that Resolution, the United Nations’ existing efforts in promoting economic growth can be expanded and coordinated. New research, technical assistance and pilot projects can unlock the wealth of less developed lands and untapped waters. And development can become a cooperative and not a competitive enterprise – to enable all nations, however diverse in their systems and beliefs, to become in fact as well as in law free and equal nations. (US, 1962, p. 623) The UN General Assembly approved Kennedy’s proposal, which created the ‘atmosphere’ for positive action that helped in the approval of the new World Food Programme. In the ‘Proposals for Action’ to be implemented during the development decade that were published by the United Nations in 1962 (UN, 1962c), after the decision to establish WFP on an experimental basis had

Antecedents: A Tale of Three Cities 29

been made, reference was made to the roles that WFP could play in meeting emergencies and in supporting development projects.7 A number of new approaches were also identified, which were relevant for the planning of WFP activities. These included: the concept of national planning for social as well as economic development; the importance of the human factor in development and the urgent need to mobilize human resources; and the need to tackle the problem of under-employment and unemployment that existed throughout the developing world. The underlying theme was co-ordinated and cohesive action in which the various UN bodies combined their resources in national programmes of assistance at the country level.

The evolution of United States food aid Early history The early history of United States food aid was also to have a major effect on discussions that eventually led to the establishment of WFP.8 United States food aid programmes served multiple, and often conflicting, goals at home and abroad (Leach and Hanrahan, 1994). They originated in relief assistance provided to victims of natural disasters, famines and civil disturbances at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The first recorded legislative act of this kind was in 1812, when the US congress passed an ‘Act for the Relief of Citizens of Venezuela’. The first major US food aid operation occurred during and after the First World War for relief and reconstruction programmes in the war-torn countries of Europe. When this operation ended, the United States was still producing considerable surpluses of cereals that could not be sold commercially on the international market. Ways of disposing these burdensome food stocks were sought, which were costing the taxpayer increasingly more for the federal government to store. During the economic depression of the 1930s, President Roosevelt resolved to address the crises it created, including agricultural price and supply problems. Accordingly, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was enacted, with its innovative combination of ‘parity’ price supports and production controls, the former being a political quid pro quo for the farmers’ acceptance of the latter. The act provided a way of increasing ‘food aid’, and enabling US farmers to earn more income, by allowing surplus food to be exported at prices below the international price. The Export-Import Bank, established in 1934, was used to promote US exports by providing loans at concessional rates to foreign governments and businesses for the purchase of US commodities. A ‘Grain Stabilization Board’ was set up to finance these exports. And a ‘Commodity Credit Corporation’ (CCC) was created to manage releases from the increasing government food stocks for food aid and subsidized exports,

30

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

thereby stabilizing, supporting and protecting farm income and prices in the United States. Although the 1933 act was successful in raising average farmer income substantially, it did little to address the problem of surplus stock accumulation. Despite these and other measures, the end of the period between the two world wars was characterized by mounting domestic agricultural surpluses and generally ineffective efforts to dispose of these surpluses either through domestic programmes or through increased international trade and aid channels. The Second World War gave a further boost to United States food aid. Under the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, some $6 billion of agricultural products were provided to European allies. The Surplus Property Act of 1944 and the Agricultural Act of 1949 authorized the CCC to sell stockpiled surplus commodities on the international market at below market price. Surpluses were also made available for disaster relief under special legislation, such as the Indian Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951 and the Pakistan Relief Act of 1953. This legislation included the sale of US surplus agricultural commodities for local currencies. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 (PL 82-165) contained a new budgetary provision under which food aid was also provided. At the end of the Second World War, the United States again came to the aid of European countries in a massive reconstruction effort that involved the largest aid programme in world history. Under this European Recovery Programme, more popularly known as the Marshall Plan (after its originator, President Truman’s secretary of state, George C. Marshall), $13.5 billion of aid was provided between 1948 and 1952, almost one-third of which consisted of food, feed and fertilizer. It demonstrated that if well managed and administered, and combined with financial assistance, food surpluses could contribute effectively to reconstruction and could help provide the basis for stability and economic growth (Adams, 1968). The Marshall Plan also proved to be a boon to US domestic agriculture. It provided a guaranteed export market for US farm output at the very time when high levels of peacetime production were resumed (Wallerstein, 1980, p. 4). But it took another major military conflict, the Korean War (1950–3), to provide temporary relief, when once again the growing surplus burden became a major asset. The Marshall Plan and the Korean War were to prove to be a major watershed in US food aid policy. The explosion in the scale and pace of technological advance in US agriculture led to ever-increasing surpluses as supply increasingly outstripped domestic and international commercial demand (Benedict and Bauer, 1960, pp. 60–1). Hoping that the problem would go away, the response of the US congress and the White House was to adopt ad hoc measures, which, in reality, supported high levels of production long after changes in postwar demand for US farm products had indicated the need for a major adjustment in national agricultural policies. It was at this point

Antecedents: A Tale of Three Cities 31

that a mixture of political, economic, social and humanitarian objectives were brought to bear in fashioning the United States food aid programme largely in the form that we know it today (Austin and Wallerstein, 1978; Ruttan, 1996, p. 152). In the late 1940s, the US faced new economic and political challenges as European countries began to emerge from the devastation of war and rebuild their economies. Despite persistent imbalance between agricultural production and demand, leading to huge surpluses, US farmers had benefited from a large and growing overseas market and a considerable food aid programme. Now, new challenges were emerging. European agricultural production began to rebound and demand for US farm commodities declined as competition increased and the need for a large US food aid programme in Europe receded. However, the farm price support systems instituted in the 1930s remained largely in place, and the impact of new technologies helped to create enormous food stocks in government inventories, draining financial reserves and leading to heated bipartisan debate about how to resolve the problem. This was not the first time that this situation had emerged, but the scale of the problem was unprecedented and demanded long-term solution. At the same time, the US emerged as the world’s pre-eminent economic power, a role that brought with it new global political leadership and responsibility. The United States began to assume more vigorous leadership role in world affairs, especially concerning halting the spread of communism, and particularly in developing countries. One way to secure the allegiance of such countries was to provide economic assistance, including, and especially, food aid. In theory at least, countries receiving US aid were more likely to be US allies, and if they received US food aid, they would eventually become commercial markets for US agricultural commodities as their economies developed. At the same time, it would relieve economic pressures of mounting food stocks held by the government at the taxpayers’ expense, and avoid politically awkward domestic agricultural reform measures. Public Law 480: the institutionalization of US food aid Out of this mixture of motives was to come the historic Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, which became widely known by its number, Public Law (PL) 480 (Baker, 1979, pp. 1–7; Epstein, 1987). The act was to institutionalize, and provide the legal framework for, the US food aid programme basically in the form that largely endured almost to the present day. PL 480 finally marked a recognition that the paradox of United States surplus food production alongside hunger and malnutrition in the world could no longer be considered to be isolated and temporary occurrences. It established a relationship between US domestic agricultural and foreign policy interests and external assistance that shaped the country’s food aid policies and programmes.

32

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Under PL 480, US food aid was classified into three categories or ‘titles’, reflecting a mixture of different motives, objectives and interest groups:


Title I: Sales for foreign currency. The major part of US food aid was to be provided as bulk, programme aid on concessional credit terms and sold in the recipient countries. The sales proceeds were to be used for no less than eight purposes: development of new markets for US agricultural commodities on a mutually benefiting basis; purchase of strategic and critical materials; procurement of military equipment; financing the purchase of goods and services for other ‘friendly countries’; promotion of balanced economic development and trade among nations; payment of US obligations abroad; loans to promote multilateral trade and economic development; and financing international educational exchange.
Title II: Famine relief and other assistance. Not more than $300 million of food aid commodities provided under PL 480 was earmarked for emergency assistance to meet famine or other urgent relief requirements through voluntary relief agencies (to the extent practicable) and intergovernmental organizations, including WFP.
Title III: General provisions. Under this title, food commodities were made available to US private voluntary organizations for distribution in food aid programmes in the United States itself and abroad. Barter of food aid commodities was also permitted for strategic materials and goods not produced in the United States. The food aid debate US food aid increased rapidly with the passage of PL 480. By the 1960s, it reached over 18 million tons a year at a cost of $1.6 billion (US, 1964). At the same time, it became the subject of increasing criticism by politicians and academics alike. Senator Humphrey from Minnesota, who was later to become vice president in the Johnson administration, along with McGovern, led the attack by politicians, calling for major reform measures and the establishment of a ‘food for peace’ programme (Humphrey, 1958). One indelible mark was the close association of mutual self-interest between US domestic agricultural, political and commercial concerns and the humanitarian and developmental needs of developing countries. Whatever other objectives were stated, US food aid was identified with two overriding objectives: the development of commercial markets for US food commodities; and the disposal of unwanted US food surpluses. PL 480, therefore, became one of the most popular but, at the same time, most controversial of US assistance programmes. Feeding poor and hungry people in distress appealed to the strong humanitarian instincts of the American people who were prepared to give generously of their bounty, but the question was repeatedly asked ‘who

Antecedents: A Tale of Three Cities 33

is helping whom?’ The level of food aid tended to be conditioned more by stock and price levels than by the needs of developing countries. The paradox emerged of food aid being more available when least required, and less available when most required. Political support for food and financial assistance in the United States also differed (Ruttan, 1993, pp. 1–36). The major constituency supporting financial aid was typically in the executive administration and foreign policy establishment. Food aid, on the other hand, traditionally enjoyed strong support from the American public, especially the farm community, the Congress, and special interest groups in agricultural commodities, shipping and handling. Simply put, food aid was the farmers’ friend; financial aid was the taxpayers’ enemy. Strikingly, while the US Congress never refused a food aid budget below the president’s requests, other economic assistance budgets always received a mauling. Since the time PL 480 was enacted in 1954, food aid has traditionally been treated separately from other forms of US aid, and as an inextricable part of an omnibus farm bill which has been passed at periodic intervals of four to five years, financed out of US Department of Agriculture appropriations. This, in turn, has led to marked differences in responsibility for policy, programming and operations between food aid and other forms of US assistance, and a lack of coordination among the different types of aid in country assistance programmes. Other differences emerged. Different methods of appraisal, operational procedures and evaluation were adopted to those used for financial aid. Food in surplus had to be ‘disposed of’, and was being used as a ‘second class’ resource to financial aid. More attention was given, for example, to accounting of the food commodities provided, for which elaborate and costly procedures were devised, than to evaluating the benefits (or otherwise) of food aid to the recipients. The differences between US financial and food aid, and even within US food aid, led to sharp differences of view in the academic world, and to publications on US food aid that are quoted to this day (Ruttan, 1993; Ruttan, 1996, pp. 184–90).9 One school of thought represented a ‘marriage of convenience’ between the disposal of agricultural surpluses and development assistance (Cochrane, 1959; 1962). The heart of its argument ran as follows. The transfer of surplus food formed a ‘policy bridge’ whereby the pressures of surpluses in the US and of population and income increases in developing countries could be moderated. Adjustment time could be bought to solve the problems of developed and developing countries simultaneously. It was appreciated, however, that the use of farm surpluses alone, even on an increasing scale, would not solve their problem sustainably. Other considerations were necessary. Competing nations burdened with agricultural surpluses might be invited to participate in a ‘food for development’ programme under multilateral arrangements. In this way, a formal international food aid programme under the sponsorship of the United Nations might come into being.

34

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Another school of thought was sharply critical of the ‘marriage of convenience’ persuasion (Schultz, 1960). The potential benefits of a food aid for development programmes in developing countries were considered to bear little resemblance to what was actually happening on the ground. The cost of the PL 480 to the US had been grossly exaggerated. The value of the PL 480 commodities to recipient countries was about 37 cents for each dollar of CCC costs in the mid- and late-1950s. Even charging 50 per cent of the costs to the foreign aid programme would overstate the value of assistance to recipient countries except in times of severe food shortages. The cost to the United States measured in terms of the marginal revenue forgone from export sales was probably close to zero, but only if it was assumed that the programmes that generated the surpluses must be taken as ‘a fact of life’ and no alternative resource uses could be considered. Finally, food aid could be expected, except in emergencies, to have a negative effect on the domestic agricultural production and trade of food aid recipient countries, and on the decision of recipient governments to invest in their own agriculture (Kern, 1968). Yet another view was that of the food aid recipient countries themselves (Sen, 1960).10 As in the United States, so also in the developing countries, the implications of food aid were not clear. When PL 480 was first mooted, the public statements of some US spokesmen often varied from those of US official representatives at the conference table. The former tended to create the impression that since agricultural surpluses were a burden for the United States, they could be taken away as a free gift by needy countries and used for giving relief to the poor. US officials tended to emphasize that these surpluses were a scarce resource for developing countries, which would vie with one another to obtain them. Hence, they felt it their duty to impose conditions that would limit the amounts received to the minimum required and to prevent misuse. They also felt that the surpluses could prove useful for inducing recipient countries to follow certain political, economic and social policies. Thus, the face that the United States presented to developing countries was a ‘combination of a kind-hearted humanitarian, an anxious salesman, and a hard-headed negotiator’ (Sen, 1960, p. 1031). Food assistance given for emergency relief did not create difficulties, and was always welcome. Furthermore, much hesitation disappeared when food aid was integrated with recipient countries’ own programmes for economic development. In the last analysis, there was the realization that a soundly planned and effective food aid programme was equally necessary for the recipient country and for the United States. To the former, it was necessary because otherwise economic progress would be slow. To the US, it was necessary because it would face serious storage and price problems, which could jeopardize the stability of its economy. Recognition of this mutual self-interest was the basis for success.

Antecedents: A Tale of Three Cities 35

Much of the academic debate and research on food aid over the decade following the enactment of PL 480 centred around the arguments of these three schools of thought. An extensive specialized literature emerged.11 But intellectual investment in the subject was less than might have been expected given the magnitude of the food aid provided. With notable exceptions, development economists tended to avoid the subject, or came to it with a preconceived dislike, largely because it was perceived as surplus disposal, as opposed to development assistance (Witt, 1964). The issues were blurred by new participants in the policy debate who produced populist literature on the world food problem that emphasized philosophical and moral arguments and the responsibility of developed countries, particularly the United States, to ‘feed the hungry-poor’. It was not until the latter part of the 1970s that the contradictions in the economics literature on food aid were clearly revealed (Isenman and Singer, 1977, p. 223). Many economists viewed food aid and other forms of assistance from remarkably different perspectives. Most economists appeared to believe that financial aid should be used to increase investment, employment and output in accordance with well-considered development plans and/or signals provided by market forces. They would be disturbed if it was used instead for short-term consumption increases, or for low priority development projects with uncertain impact. At the same time, it was inconsistent to insist that food aid should be used for short-term consumption increases or for ad hoc ‘additional’ projects not included as top priority in development plans, and to criticize food aid because it benefited consumption, not investment. These contradictions were well established in the ‘conventional wisdom’ on food aid by the time WFP began its operations. By the beginning of the 1960s, the battleground between the food aid protagonists and their detractors was well established in the burgeoning literature and international debate. The main advantages of food aid were seen to be: its particular relevance for addressing the problems of poor and hungry people; its ability to support employment-creation programmes, through labourintensive projects, without causing inflation; the creation of stable prices for producers and consumers, if the timing of food supplies was right; and, significantly, its ready availability as an additional aid resources on account of its strong support in donor countries by politicians and the general public. Set against these advantages, the main shortcomings of food aid were described as: the disincentives it created to increasing domestic agricultural production in recipient countries through depressing food prices, distorting government policies and disrupting trade; the creation of a dependency syndrome; the political and commercial forces of donors that motivated food aid flows; and its inferiority to financial assistance as a doubly-tied aid resource.

36

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Legacies These, then, were the legacies that WFP acquired from the ‘tale of three cities’. A number of them were positive, couched in the spirit of an idea whose time had come. Others were less favourable, some downright negative. WFP did not begin with a clean slate. Many of the basic ideas and concepts which WFP acquired were developed in FAO. WFP owed its birth to the vision and tenacity of FAO leadership, supported by senior management at the United Nations in New York. The legacy of the United States was also profound. It was after all leadership at the highest level in Washington that was initially responsible for the birth of WFP, and for its generous support. But there were less fortunate legacies to emerge from the policies and practices of the PL 480 programme that had come into operation almost a decade before WFP began. In the next chapter we shall see how these legacies affected WFP in its experimental years before it was launched on a continuing basis.

4 The Experimental Years: 1963–5

The experimental years (1963–5) were to have a profound effect on WFP activities for most of the next three decades. Three ‘bodies of evidence’ had an influence on whether the Programme should continue after the experimental period. First, were the activities conducted by WFP during the experimental period. Second, were the findings of a study programme that was requested in the United Nations General Assembly resolution approving the experimental programme. And third, was the support given to WFP both within and outside the United Nations system, and by the activities of the bilateral food aid programmes, particularly that of the United States.

Pioneering The main purpose of the three-year experiment was to explore as widely as possible the ways in which a multilateral organization could use food effectively as a resource to promote development as well as to respond rapidly to emergency needs. This learning experience was to take place in three spheres of assistance: emergencies; pre-school and school feeding; and other economic and social development projects (WFP, 1965a). With hindsight, setting a time limit of three years was to prove to be a very short period in which to carry out the experiment from scratch. There were few established ground-rules to guide operations. That the experiment succeeded was due to the dedication of a small band of ably-led pioneers in the WFP secretariat, guided by the governing body, the Intergovernmental Committee (IGC), the support of many donors countries, in the developed and developing parts of the world, and the co-operation of officials in recipient countries, the two sponsoring organizations, the United Nations and FAO, other UN agencies and NGOs. An important additional factor was the timing of the experiment. As we saw in Chapter 2, just before WFP was established, 37

38

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

the 1960s had be designated as the ‘United Nations Decade of Development’, with its promise of increased aid for developing countries in a spirit of international burden-sharing, and in the context of a multilateral approach to international co-operation through the United Nations system, which was enjoying its halcyon days. A major factor, which beset the entire experimental period, was that the pace of work had to be geared to the short span of authorized life of three years. Each task had to be performed in accordance with an inexorable timetable. Although a three-year experimental period was originally envisaged, in reality the experiment was to take place over only two years. By the beginning of November 1964, almost all the high protein commodities and the cash resources had been committed. There was little time left after that date to obtain more experience, even if more resources were made available, and to examine the results in order to make a decision on the future of the Programme by the end of 1965. To give some idea of the intense and concerted effort required of the small band of pioneers, visits were made by senior WFP staff to over 60 developing countries between July 1962 and March 1963 to acquaint governments with the new opportunities provided by the Programme. Mainly as a result of these visits, the number of requests for assistance stood at 193 by the beginning of November 1964. Those requests had to be examined, processed, approved or rejected, implemented, and evaluated as far as experience allowed. Emergency operations Requests for emergency assistance were received and responded to from September 1962. Ten involved natural disasters (an earthquake, a volcanic eruption, floods, hurricanes and cyclones) and seven were man-made disasters resulting in refugees and displaced persons in countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. It was found difficult to respond quickly to requests for emergency aid (see Chapter 6). Emergency operations therefore formed only a small part of WFP activities during the experimental period. Economic and social development projects The main focus was on providing support for pilot economic and social development projects in as many developing countries and development sectors as possible. Special emphasis was placed on labour-intensive projects in rural areas, particularly those with a demonstration value. The type of aid granted by WFP was particularly suitable for the large subsistence farming sector characteristic of the economies of developing countries. Food aid could play a more essential role in projects involving a relatively high amount of labour. The pilot activities were not limited to these types of project, however, and covered many economic and social sectors. By November 1994, the largest number of approved project was in Asia (41 per cent), followed by Africa

The Experimental Years: 1963–5

39

(30 per cent), southern Europe (15 per cent), and Latin America and the Caribbean (14 per cent). Seventeen different types of projects were approved, which could be grouped into four main categories as far as the use of food aid was concerned. Food-for-work programmes The first, and largest, category were labour-intensive works programmes in which food was provided to workers and their families in the form of rations calculated to meet their nutritional requirements as part of their wages. Most of these projects were designed to promote agricultural development. Others involved the construction and improvement of economic and social infrastructure. And a small number were industrial and manufacturing projects. A common feature was the mobilization of unemployed and under-employed workers through the creation of useful employment, thereby improving their standard of living and speeding up economic and social development. This early experience indicated that one of the greatest under-utilized resources of developing countries were the people themselves. The provision of food could help to tap this resource. But other inputs, and financial and technical assistance, were needed to improve the quality, scope and speed of implementation of the work undertaken. For this reason, a number of the early pioneering projects were undertaken in co-operation with other United Nations agencies, bilateral aid programmes and NGOs. They also showed that a great deal of organizing ability was required, which was often a scarce factor, but that for undertakings carried out on a community basis, much of the required organization could be provided by local leaders and the people themselves. Land settlement and reform A second category of projects involved the settlement or resettlement of people in new agricultural schemes or after land reform measures had been implemented. Food was provided to settler families until they could produce their own food. Experience with this type of project showed that food aid could play a key role in easing the burden and hardship of settlers on new lands. However, it had to be carefully calibrated. It should not create a disincentive for the settlers to attain their own food self-sufficiency as soon as possible. But it should not be withdrawn too soon, thereby creating unnecessary hardship. These projects could only benefit from food aid if they were carefully planned and prepared, which was not always possible to ensure during the short period of the experimental programme. Special feeding programmes The third category embraced pre-school, primary school, and various other types of educational and training programmes. Food aid was seen to act as a

40

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

resource to improve nutrition and school performance, provide an incentive for children from poor households to attend school regularly, and help offset the cost of education and training programmes. While the original scope of WFP in this field was limited to school feeding programmes, it was quickly realized that there was a much wider possibility for food aid to contribute to what came to be called the ‘development of human resources’. This included the improvement of the nutrition of mothers and pre-school children, assistance to educational and training programmes after the primary school stage, including literacy campaigns, and public health and hospital feeding programmes. But many of these programmes required a longer time span for their benefits to be fully realized than a three-year experimental programme could provide. Hence, the relative small share of this category of projects in the totality of WFP activities during the experimental period. Animal production projects The fourth category involved projects for the promotion of livestock production where feed, and not food, aid was provided. Two main types of projects were involved: dairy production schemes designed to increase the production of milk and dairy products; and schemes to improve grazing conditions in semi-desert regions. Animal production was also encouraged as part of larger agricultural production projects as an incentive for mixed farming and improved land management, leading to increased farm incomes. Livestock projects of these kinds presented opportunities for the conversion of low-value feed grains in surplus in donor countries into high-value protein foods in developing countries. Early experience made it clear, however, that other conditions were essential for their success. There should be simultaneous efforts to increase the domestic production of feed supplies, or increase the ability to pay for feed imports on a commercial basis, during the time that WFP aid was provided. There should be a systematic plan to reduce livestock numbers on overgrazed land and improve the productivity of the herds. And technical advice and assistance should be closely integrated in planning and implementation of projects in this field. Policies, administration and procedures The experimental period helped to establish WFP’s basic policies, administration and procedures that remained largely in force for the next three decades. Policies Project aid. From inception, WFP was restricted to providing assistance to specific, individual development projects or emergency operations executed by developing-country governments. This so-called ‘project approach’ was in marked contrast to the ‘programme approach’ adopted under the United States

The Experimental Years: 1963–5

41

food aid programme, which provided food aid in bulk for balance of payments and budgetary support, and for supporting US political and commercial objectives. A number of reasons were put forward for adopting a different policy for WFP aid. The WFP experiment had specifically been proposed to test out the use of food aid in support of different types of development projects. This approach was considered to be the best way of adhering to the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal and avoiding any disincentive to agricultural production in recipient countries and disruption to international trade that had been attributed to the US food aid programme. The project approach facilitated evaluation of the effects of WFP aid on economic and social development. WFP food aid was to be supplementary to, and not in competition with, bilateral food aid, and should therefore be kept to a moderate size (Singer et al., 1987, p. 29). It was much more difficult, and time-consuming, to disburse large amounts of aid – any aid – on a project-by-project basis than for macroeconomic purposes using the bulk food aid programme approach. Other reasons were mentioned. It was hoped that WFP would attract more donors and hence forestall the creation of other large-scale bilateral food aid programmes, which would compete with those already established. This particularly applied to Western Europe where, through the adoption of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), large-scale food surpluses had began to be created. The establishment of a small and circumscribed WFP also provided a token to the United Nations multilateral system at a modest cost and posed no threat to the large bilateral food aid programmes or to commercial trade. Nutritional considerations. There was, at first, an ambivalent attitude within the WFP secretariat, which was later to return, regarding whether the emphasis should be placed on the nutritional or income-transfer value of the food commodities supplied by WFP. The former approach was adopted in conformity with the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal. The aim was to provide a food ration which, together with local foods, made up a complete and balanced diet. When beneficiaries were almost entirely dependent on WFP for their sustenance, a full family ration was provided. Where the quantity of local foods available was more substantial, the WFP ration was reduced pari passu within the overall nutritional target. Where workers were separated from their families and WFP food rations were only distributed to them, the calorie level aimed at was higher to take account of the level and conditions of the work. In feeding programmes, WFP rations were calculated to meet the particular nutritional needs of specific groups. This nutritional approach was to create operational problems in trying to synchronize the delivery of several food commodities from different sources, and to add significantly to supply costs. Direct distribution in kind. Preference was given to the direct distribution of food commodities in kind, free of charge, to beneficiaries engaged in new

42

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

activities. Under these circumstances, it was easier to verify that the commodities provided by WFP did not displace existing supplies on the market and resulted in a net increase in consumption. Sales policy. It was recognized, however, that for administrative and operational convenience, as well as to meet some specific requirements of a project, it would be expedient in certain circumstances to sell some of the food commodities provided. Ground-rules were established for WFP’s sales policy soon after the Programme began operations (WFP, 1963c). Projects involving sales were exceptions to the general rule of direct distribution. Each proposal for sale of WFP supplies had to be examined on its own merits and cleared by the FAO’s Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal (CSD). The principal consideration was to guard against sales depressing local market prices. Proceeds from the sale of WFP food commodities were to be spent in implementing the specific project which was approved by WFP, and should not go to meeting the costs of other projects, or to augment the general budget of the recipient government. Three types of sales were envisaged: (i) sales on the open market in a recipient country; (ii) sales inherent in the purpose of the WFP-supported project, such as dairy development schemes, where toned milk containing WFP-supplied dry skim milk was sold, or price stabilization schemes, where WFP-supplied grains provided to establish such schemes were sold to stabilize prices and the proceeds used to replenish the reserves; and (iii) sales to designated project beneficiaries outside normal markets at subsidized prices, as at remote work-sites where food supplies were limited and at high prices. Sales proceeds could be used to buy locally-produced tools, material and equipment required for the implementation of a WFP-approved project. In these cases, additional employment would be created and the income generated would be mostly spent on food. Or the sales proceeds could be used to help offset the internal costs of transporting, storing and handling the WFP food commodities provided. Food as wages. From inception, WFP adhered to the ILO convention governing work for which normal paid labour was employed in supplying food as wages (ILO, 1949).1 Governments were expected to pay at least 50 per cent of wages in cash in order to allow workers to meet their non-food needs. This requirement also avoided placing workers in a position in which they would be obliged to sell some of the food they received to buy non-food items. Family food rations were provided to project workers based on the most adequate and well-balanced diet possible within the limits imposed by the level of wages rates in operation and the commodities available to WFP. Wages-inkind would then be appropriate both in composition to improve nutrition and energy, and as a proportion of the total wage to meet the needs of workers’ families, without provoking sales. Certain exceptions were recognized where WFP commodities were provided in addition to the prevailing wage rate. This was done to attract workers to

The Experimental Years: 1963–5

43

projects in remote areas or in difficult working conditions, where markets was poorly developed and food prices high. WFP food commodities were provided through canteens or stores at the project sites at subsidized prices and within the principles established by the ILO convention. The goods and services bought with the sales proceeds were provided for the benefit of the workers and not for securing a profit. Exceptional cases were also recognized where governments were not able to pay 50 per cent of the wage in cash. In post-emergency, relief or public works programmes, for example, a rotation of labour was allowed so that the maximum number of people were employed. In these circumstances, it was judged that the gains from a wider spread of employment outweighed the disadvantages of lowering the level of remuneration or maintaining a smaller workforce. WFP assistance was also provided to groups of voluntary workers engaged in community development projects to enable, or encourage, them to undertake work of benefit to their own community. WFP abided by other ILO conventions, which ensured that no coercion was applied in mobilizing and using community action (ILO, 1930; 1957). The attitude of workers to partial remuneration in food was taken into account. WFP sought to ensure that the cash portion of the wage was fixed as an appropriate percentage of the wage for similar work in the locality of the WFP-supported project. The commodity composition of the WFP ration given was determined by those food items that the worker’s family wanted to eat. The scope for food aid, therefore, depended on the ability to supply foods that the recipients wished to consume themselves. Aid to governments. Requests for WFP aid could only be made by governments in developing countries. WFP undertook to deliver all its assistance to them on a grant basis, free of charge. Title to the commodities passed to the recipient government at the port of entry, or frontier station in the case of landlocked countries. Costs of unloading and internal transport, handling, storage and distribution of food aid commodities, and of any necessary technical and administrative supervision, fell to the recipient country. However, this condition could be waived by the WFP executive director, in exceptional circumstances, where a government was unable to meet these costs, or arrangements could be made for them to be met from other sources. Administration WFP’s administration and management was to be conducted by a governing body, called the ‘Intergovernmental Committee’ (IGC); and an administrative unit or secretariat. Governing body. The IGC was set up to provide guidance on the policies, administration and operations of WFP, including examination and authorization of requests for WFP aid and approval of WFP’s annual budget. The committee consisted initially of representatives of 20 member states, which

44

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

was increased to 24 states in 1963. Half were elected by ECOSOC and half by the FAO Council, taking into account the need for balanced representation between the economically developed countries and less developed countries and other relevant factors, such as geographical coverage of all regions. In appointing its representative, each elected country was requested to pay due regard to the complexities of the executive functions and operational planning required to conduct the experimental programme. Each member nation had one representative and one vote. Provision was made for two regular sessions of the IGC a year and for holding special sessions as necessary. Decisions on important questions required a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, although no votes were called for during the experimental period. Administrative unit. The WFP secretariat was located at FAO headquarters in Rome, Italy, headed by an executive director with the status of a UN undersecretary or assistant director-general. Although the secretariat enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy, it did not have independent legal status and was not a self-contained entity. To obtain the technical expertise required, the secretariat had to consult with, and seek advice and co-operation from, its parent bodies, the United Nations and FAO, and operate in close liaison with other UN agencies, bilateral programmes, and NGOs. For this purpose, staff in the United Nations, FAO, ILO, UNESCO and WHO were appointed as liaison officers to WFP, paid for by the Programme, to foster close working relations between those UN organizations and WFP. Close working relations were also proposed with UNICEF, UNHCR and the World Bank, but WFP liaison officers were not appointed in those organizations. The costs of the technical services provided to WFP by these UN bodies were reimbursed by the Programme. Financial, personnel and other administrative services were provided also by FAO on a reimbursable basis. WFP did not appoint its own independent representatives in recipient countries. Instead the resident representatives of the UN Technical Assistance Board (which later became the UNDP) were appointed as WFP representatives of WFP, in addition to their other responsibilities. WFP officers were appointed by the executive director to supervise distribution of WFP commodities in recipient countries. They worked under the supervision of the UNDP resident representative. These complex arrangements were devised for several reasons. WFP was set up as an experimental programme for a short period of three years with an uncertain future. It would be unwise to establish an elaborate self-contained structure. And administrative and management costs should be kept to a minimum, consistent with operational efficiency. These costs amounted to approximately 5 per cent of the total value of pledged resources for the first two years of the experimental period, or 6 per cent if the cost of field supervision of projects was included. The United Nations and FAO had strong mutual self-interest in

The Experimental Years: 1963–5

45

making the WFP’s experiment a success, and in contributing WFP resources to the implementation of their own programmes. The WFP experiment was approved at a time when a high premium was placed on strengthening co-ordination among the agencies of the UN system in the context of the UN Decade for Development. While food aid could play an important role in fostering economic and social development, that role could be enhanced if food aid was fused with financial, technical and other material assistance provided by other aid agencies. Indeed, it was envisaged that much, if not most, of the aid provided by WFP would be invested in joint or co-funded projects implemented with other UN agencies, including the World Bank. While these explanations seemed reasonable and rational at the time, they were to lead to problems that are described in Chapter 8. Procedures Procedures were laid down during the experimental period for requesting, approving and evaluating WFP aid that were to remain largely in place almost to the present time. They were more elaborate and demanding than many of the other UN agencies, not only because of the experimental nature of the Programme, and the need to observe closely the experience gained, but also because of the uncharted and uncertain nature of the effects of the type of aid provided (Shaw, 1970a). Requests for WFP assistance were made by governments in developing countries in accordance with a standard pro forma provided by the Programme (WFP, 1965b). They were first scrutinized at WFP headquarters to ascertain that they complied with the Programme’s rules and regulations. Satisfactory requests were then sent to the UN specialized agencies for appraisal of their technical and economic feasibility. All requests went to the parent organizations, the United Nations and FAO. They were also sent to the UN agencies according to their spheres of interest: for example, to the ILO, where employment and training conditions and standards were involved; to UNESCO, where education was concerned; and to WHO to check on health implications. At the same time, the CSD was consulted to ensure that requests for WFP aid complied with the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal. Requests that passed scrutiny could be approved in one of three ways: by the IGC at one of its twice-yearly sessions; by IGC members through a correspondence procedure of up to 45 days when, for reasons of urgency, a request needed to be approved quickly between sessions; and by the executive director by authority designated to him by the IGC if the food/feed value of the request, based on current international prices, did not exceed $500,000. A ‘plan of operations’, or ‘letter of understanding’ was drawn up for each WFP-assisted development project or emergency operation respectively, governing the terms and conditions on which the Programme’s aid was provided. These legal

46

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

instruments were signed by a representative of the recipient government and of WFP. They itemized the obligations of WFP in terms of the commodities and services it was to provide, and of the recipient government concerning its responsibilities, including the precise ways in which WFP food aid was to be utilized. Recipients governments were required to designate an executing authority to manage and administer the assisted development project and to report to WFP on its progress. Even after the signature of plans of operation, recipient governments were also required to submit to WFP a ‘letter of readiness’ confirming that all measures preparatory to the implementation of a project had been undertaken. This confirmation was examined at WFP headquarters to ensure that it complied with the government’s obligations as laid down in the concerned plan of operation. Upon finding it satisfactory, instructions were issued for the shipment of WFP commodities to commence. In view of the experimental nature of WFP, evaluation of all WFP-assisted development projects was mandatory. Standard clauses were therefore included in plans of operation making it obligatory on governments to provide facilities to WFP for observing the implementation of WFP-assisted development projects. Recipient governments were required to assist in project evaluation by providing regularly information and data in accordance with specific guidelines give in an annex to plans of operation. Governments were also required to provide quarterly progress reports on the implementation of projects and annual audit accounts, and final certified audit accounts of the use of WFP assistance at the end of project implementation. Progress, interim evaluation and terminal reports were presented to the governing body by the WFP secretariat. Any additional WFP assistance to on-going projects was made conditional on their performance.

Study programme The resolutions establishing the WFP experimental programme called for ‘expert studies which would aid in the consideration of the future development of multilateral food programs’. After taking into account the views of other bodies with special competence in the subject, the IGC recommended that studies be undertaken on five topics: 1. The Demand for Food and Conditions Governing Food Aid during Development (Dandekar, 1965). 2. The Impact of Food Aid on Donor and Other Food-Exporting Countries (Allen, 1965). 3. The Linking of Food Aid with Other Aid (Chakravarty and Rosenstein-Rodan, 1965). 4. Operational and Administrative Problems of Food Aid (FitzGerald, 1965). 5. The Role of Multilateral Food Aid Programmes (Dessau, 1965).

The Experimental Years: 1963–5

47

The studies were carried out by independent experts, who were eminent authorities in their fields.2 They were responsible for the views expressed. The subject-matter of the study programme may be divided into two broad categories. The first (comprising studies numbers 1, 2 and 3) included an analysis of the potentialities and problems of food aid from the viewpoint of both recipient and donor countries, and the optimal role of food aid in the totality of foreign aid. The second (comprising studies numbers 4 and 5) concerned the operational problems of food aid programmes and the scope of multilateral food aid. The potentials and problems of food aid An important conclusion to emerge from the first three studies was that while food surpluses were likely to accrue, at an increasing rate, in the future, the opportunities for using them effectively in developing countries might not expand commensurately. Long-run changes were needed in developed countries’ agricultural policies to avoid turning food surpluses from an asset into a burden and obstacle to economic and social development. These policy changes were unlikely to take place in the near future to restrain the emergence of very large surpluses. The application of modern science and technology to agriculture had led to a rate of increase in productivity that outran the growth in demand. Ways and means had to be found of using surpluses efficiently. One inherent danger was that the utilization of food surpluses might retard the adaptation of agricultural production in developed countries to commercial demand. Food aid programmes could be more effective if donor countries were to adopt policies that would reorient their patterns of agricultural production in order to reduce surpluses of foods needed less, and increasing those needed more, by developing countries. This would not raise serious problems of supply management in donor countries. Close international co-operation, especially between North America and Western Europe, would also facilitate a readjustment in pledges to WFP in order to respond better to the needs of developing countries. Food aid programmes should be viewed for their effects on the commercial exports of other countries, and the absorptive capacity of developing countries. The effect on trade appeared to have been exaggerated since it had not taken into account the indirect benefits of food aid, such as taking surpluses off commercial markets, and stimulating demand for food through increased employment and income in developing countries. The potential capacity of developing countries to absorb food aid appeared to be very large as many were food-deficient. Potential harmful effects could be avoided if food aid were granted as part of well-designed development plans in developing countries. Thus linked, food aid would not provide a disincentive either to domestic production or to

48

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

normal commercial imports in the aid-receiving country. In the absence of such plans, the scope for food aid might be more limited. In such cases, resort could be made to specific uses and safeguards to avoid the negative effects of fungibility, through the provision of food aid on a project basis. Divergent views were expressed on the use of food aid in labour-intensive projects. In one study (Dandekar, 1965, pp. 43–6), the scope for food aid was considered to be limited as it was unlikely to cover a sufficient proportion of total project costs. Another study was more optimistic. It developed the concept of what was called ‘closed loop’ projects, defined as those ‘which could speed up the absorption of labour into productive work by spending the food aid possibly as wages in kind, without draining away scarce resources from other sectors of the economy’ (Chakravarty and Rosenstein-Rodan, 1965, p. 17). The greatest limiting factor was the organizational ability required to prepare and supervise projects of this type. The studies concluded that there was likely to be considerable scope for food aid in developing countries. If appropriately supplied in terms of timing and magnitude, it would be just as important as other forms of aid. However, any successful programme of food or other aid required a great deal of coordination among donor countries and within aid-receiving countries. Donor co-ordination might best be achieved by adopting the formula of ‘bilateral aid within a multilateral framework’, which would include international agreements on sharing the burden of aid and international financial consortia. Co-ordination within aid-receiving countries was easier to achieve where governments were already committed to planning for development and for the eradication of poverty and hunger. Operational and administrative problems The operational and administrative problems of food aid were considered by comparing food aid supplied by the United States and the newly established WFP experimental programme (FitzGerald, 1965). By mid-1964, United States commitments of project food aid had a market value of about $125 million compared with about $53 million by WFP. United States experience served to substantiate that this type of food aid was both a viable and valuable instrument for development. Comparisons between the United States and WFP programmes had to take account of certain basic operational and administrative differences. The United States already had a considerable development aid programme, with a large and experienced field staff, by the time the WFP experiment began. The United States project food aid programme could, to a large extent, use the operational and managerial facilities set up for its bulk-supply food aid, thereby reducing costs. Potentially, it was easier to co-ordinate food aid with non-food assistance (financial, technical and material) for development projects from the aid resources provided by a single, large donor country,

The Experimental Years: 1963–5

49

although, in reality, the United States food aid programme was run and managed largely as a separate entity, and co-ordination with other types of US development assistance was limited. On the other hand, WFP was a new, experimental programme with a short duration. Administrative, managerial and operational procedures had to be developed from scratch under ‘forced draft’ owing to the limited duration of the experiment. As WFP was not a self-contained entity, there were additional, and time-consuming, responsibilities. The different views of donor and recipient countries had to be reconciled in the governing body. Food, cash and service resources had to be garnered and co-ordinated from many sources. And technical services and non-food inputs required for development projects had to be obtained from other UN organization, bilateral sources and NGOs. The scope of multilateral food aid While there were some disadvantages of multilateral project food aid, particularly in terms of the lapse of time before deliveries could be effected, other advantages were identified (Dessau, 1965). It made possible the mobilization and co-ordination of food commodities from many countries and permitted nutritionally adequate rations to be provided. It supported the principle of burden-sharing in the international community whereby each country could contribute according to its comparative advantage in food commodities, cash and services. It could draw on a wide range of professional and technical competence in the UN system in the formulation, appraisal and evaluation of WFP-aided projects, and engage in joint and co-funded programmes. And, most significantly, developing countries could consider it to be another, and possibly preferable, source that took the politics out of food aid. The value of a multilateral programme would be enhanced if it resulted in avoiding the establishment of a number of bilateral project food aid programmes. This would lead to appreciable savings in administrative and operational overheads, and eliminate or reduce duplication and conflict. Consultation between the United States government and WFP was recommended to discuss such matters as project criteria and operational standards, and to share experience as to how, and in what ways, food aid could be most effective. (Such exchanges were less than they might have been. There were apprehensions that other WFP members countries might have seen such consultations as giving one country undue influence, and perhaps control, over a multilateral organization.) All WFP food aid was provided to governments in receiving countries and title to the food and feed commodities was transferred to them on receipt. The United States, on the other hand, engaged in ‘trilateral agreement’, which included, as the third party, United States private, voluntary and nongovernmental organizations, who were responsible for delivering, storing and

50

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

distributing the food aid provided by the United States government and for supervising project activities. They retained the title of the food aid commodities up to the point of distribution to project beneficiaries and reported on their utilization. Special roles for WFP, as a multilateral programme, were identified (Dessau, 1965, pp. 37–8). WFP could help create and centralize the knowledge needed to work out the principles of food aid as an effective resource for development. It could also become a catalyst for, and promoter of, the harmonization of all food aid programmes. There was the likelihood of the simultaneous existence of several surplus areas, in North America, western Europe, some developing countries, and in the centrally-planned economies. A ‘surplus war’ could have disastrous repercussions both on international markets and on general economic development. Co-ordination of the utilization of food surpluses from a number of sources could best be undertaken by WFP as a multilateral institution. The utilization of food surpluses in developing countries also raised special problems, which a multilateral agency was best placed to resolve. The functions of food aid agencies needed to be defined and coordinated globally, so that they could take the cohesive action most favourable for development. A multilateral agency could best help in these tasks.

Other developments Other developments were taking place, both within and outside the United Nations system, that gave support for the continuation of WFP after 1965. Developments in the UN system FAO activities Activities within FAO were to lend special support for WFP’s continuation. Freedom from Hunger Campaign. In 1960, a five-year international ‘Freedom from Hunger Campaign’ (FFHC) was launched by the FAO director-general, B. R. Sen, later extended to 1970, which was ‘intended to be primarily educational in character – to make the Governments and peoples all over the world aware of the nature of the problem so that integrated efforts can be made both nationally and internationally to overcome it’.3 National FFHC committees were established in many developed and developing countries, including the United States, to help make people aware of the magnitude and dimensions of hunger, and of the measures to overcome it. An important part of FFHC activities was the publication of a series of ‘basic studies’ by FAO and other United Nations organizations covering a wide range of subjects related to the problem of hunger. The FAO director-general’s report that led to the establishment of WFP was published in the FFHC Basic Studies

The Experimental Years: 1963–5

51

series (FAO, 1961a). A World Food Survey was undertaken by FAO under FFHC auspices (FAO, 1963a). The survey, published when the WFP experiment had just began, reached the broad conclusion that between one-third and one-half of the world’s population suffered from malnutrition. While improvement had occurred in the developed countries since the last world food survey had been undertaken in 1952, progress in the less developed countries was hardly enough to regain the unsatisfactory pre-war level. Other FFHC Basic Studies, such as Nutrition and Working Efficiency (FAO, 1962a), Education and Training in Nutrition (FAO, 1962b), Population and Food Supplies (UN, 1962a), Aspects of Economic Development – The Background to Freedom from Hunger (UN, 1962b), Possibilities of Increasing World Food Production (FAO, 1963b), Malnutrition and Disease. A Major Problem of the Human Race (WHO, 1963), Hunger and Social Policy (ILO, 1963) and Education and Agricultural Development (UNESCO, 1963), served to increase awareness of the various dimensions of hunger, and the importance of food and nutrition at a time when WFP was pioneering its role during the experimental years. They also provided background information and material for the briefs of delegates at the ECOSOC session in Geneva, the UN General Assembly in New York, and the FAO Council and Conference in Rome when discussions on the continuation of WFP took place. World Food Congress. A high point in the FFHC was reached with the holding of a ‘World Food Congress’ in Washington, DC in June 1963, attended by 1,300 people from over 100 countries. Opening the meeting, President Kennedy recalled that twenty years previously President Franklin D. Roosevelt had launched the first World Food Congress by declaring that ‘freedom from want and freedom from fear go hand in hand’. Kennedy added: So long as freedom from hunger is only half achieved, so long as two thirds of the nations have food deficits, no citizen, no nation, can afford to be satisfied. We have the ability, as members of the human race. We have the means, we have the capacity to eliminate hunger from the face of the earth in our lifetime. We need only the will. (FAO, 1965b, p. 63) A paper on WFP, which was submitted to the congress, recognized that FFHC had ‘created the climate for giving concrete shape to the proposal for multilateral utilization of surpluses. In that sense, the Program is a direct and tangible outcome of the Campaign’ (FAO, 1963c, p. 3). The paper noted that because of its title, WFP tended to be thought of as a special organization for the distribution of food to the hungry. Although emergency relief and the feeding of special vulnerable groups were recognized obligations of WFP, its major significance lay in its role as a new instrument of economic and social development.

52

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Among its recommendations, the Congress called for ‘the formulation of a world plan in quantitative terms based on nutritional and economic development needs which would indicate the type and magnitude of external assistance needed. The aim would be to eliminate hunger within a specific period.’ Support for WFP was urged ‘in view of the usefulness and importance of multilateral food aid as an additional form of development capital … and of supplementary and food for work programmes’ (FAO, 1965a).

Two other FAO initiatives were to serve the WFP cause. In 1962, FAO conducted medium-term projections for agricultural commodities to the year 1970 (FAO, 1962c). And an important study was produced by the CSD on ‘Changing Attitudes to Agricultural Surpluses’ (FAO, 1963d). Agricultural commodity projections to 1970. FAO projections showed that demand for food would increase more rapidly in developing than in industrialized countries because of their more rapid population growth and increasing incomes as they strove to accelerate economic growth. Income elasticity of demand for food was also considerably higher than that of industrialized countries. According to FAO projections, the growth of demand for food in the industrialized countries was projected at 2 per cent, lower than the rate of growth of food production, despite measures taken to reduce the area under production. Food surpluses would therefore accumulate. This led to two important conclusions: surplus food production might become a long-term phenomenon; and concessional food aid from food surpluses was therefore likely to continue through supply management programmes. Changing attitudes to agricultural surpluses. At the same time, a change in attitudes toward agricultural surpluses was taking place from ‘surplus disposal’ to using surpluses to meet nutritional needs and assist economic development in the developing countries. In a landmark study, a CSD ad hoc group noted that ‘the most significant change is that instead of contending with unintentional surpluses, the thinking is now directed more toward the planned use of existing and future surpluses for meeting new demands arising in many developing countries’. There were signs of an emerging philosophy that a fuller utilization of the world’s agricultural producing capacity could be justified to meet world needs, both on humanitarian grounds and to assist economic development. In some cases, this had led to suggestions for a planned approach to both the production and disposal of surpluses. As a possible solution to surplus problems, the development of some broad international understandings and, in particular, the negotiation of international commodity arrangements, had been suggested, but were still only in the early formative stages.

The Experimental Years: 1963–5

53

When the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal were drawn up in 1954 (FAO, 1954), surpluses were regarded as a temporary problem. The possibility of deliberate production to meet non-commercial food needs was not considered. There had also been a shift from spasmodic food aid programmes, particularly to relieve distress in emergencies, to highly organized and sophisticated longer-term programmes for nutritional improvement and economic development. The techniques of surplus disposal had also evolved. Not only had a multilateral dimension been introduced through WFP but two contrasting developments were taking place. There was a tendency for adjustments to be made in some surplus disposal programmes, which had the effect of moving away from the purely concessional toward transactions that were more nearly commercial. Conversely, the accumulation of surpluses was bringing about a liberalization of credit terms in some countries that resulted in the introduction of concessional features into transactions that were otherwise commercial. Finally, there had been a growth of consultative arrangements between the interested parties and of bilateral and multilateral efforts to maximize the benefits of food surplus programme, while avoiding their possible negative effects on agricultural production and trade. This required a balanced judgement, as reflected in a revision to the FAO Principles, which stated: In weighing the advantages to countries benefiting from special disposal measures against the possible harm done to other countries, account must be taken of the relationship of possible sacrifices to the economic capacity of the countries concerned, and in particular to the effects of such sacrifices on their rates of development. (FAO, 1992, p. 23) Action at the United Nations While these activities at FAO in Rome were generally supportive of WFP’s aims and objectives, action at the United Nations in New York, and elsewhere in the United Nations system, was also helpful. UN Development Decade. The United Nations Development Decade for the 1960 was under way. The report of the UN secretary-general, which made ‘Proposals for Action’ for the decade, included references to the roles of WFP for both development and in emergencies (UN, 1962c, pp. 91–2). The report noted that WFP represented an experimental extension of the idea of multilateral aid in physical commodities. The UN secretary-general considered that WFP: contained the seeds of something greater … It will be helpful if the advanced countries come to think more about the possibilities of bringing their surplus resources and capacities to bear upon the promotion of

54

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

development in the less advanced countries. At the same time, aid conceived of in the concrete form of commodities may help the under-developed countries to discover for themselves constructive uses, and pre-conditions for the effective use, of such aid, which otherwise might have remained concealed by the financial calculus. (UN, 1962c, pp. 91–2) The report suggested that the whole area of supplementary aid in the form of surplus commodities and the utilization of surplus capacity deserved further exploration within the United Nations, where equal weight would be given to the protection of commercial trade, and the interests of producers in developing countries, as well as the inherent potential of such aid for speeding up development. Food aid, literacy and education. In December 1963, the UN General Assembly requested a study on food aid for literacy projects, including the free distribution of food to school-age population and, where feasible, in broader community development and adult literacy projects. The study, produced by the WFP secretariat, provided a general framework for WFP assistance in this field and for co-ordinated action with other UN agencies (WFP, 1965c). Projects in the UN domain. In his statements at IGC sessions during the experimental period, the UN secretary-general continually referred to developments at the UN in New York of relevance to the WFP experiment. He reminded delegations of WFP’s aim of achieving the widest possible experimentation with projects not only in the field of agriculture, which were clearly in the interest of FAO, but in the economic and social spheres, falling within the mandate of the UN, which demonstrated an interaction between older and newer forms of international development assistance. By the mid-point of WFP’s experimental period, about one-third of the projects approved for WFP assistance were in development areas of concern to the United Nations. UNCTAD 1964 conference. Some specific developments in the UN system were of advantage to WFP. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 made specific reference to WFP and: expressed the belief that food aid should become an integral and continuing part of international aid under the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and that it should be possible to develop a useful and generally acceptable system of food aid on the basis of experience with the present modest pilot programme sponsored by the UN and FAO. (UNCTAD, 1964) The UNCTAD conference recommended that resources should be provided in cash as well as kind to cover administrative and freight costs and to enable

The Experimental Years: 1963–5

55

purchases to be made of a range of foodstuffs, in addition to those donated, in order to provide a nutritionally adequate diet. Those purchases should be made as far as possible and economical in exporting developing countries to help expand their exports, thereby benefiting both food-deficient and food-exporting developing countries (WFP, 1964b, annex II, p. 7; annex III, pp. 1–2). Creation of the UNDP. The amalgamation of the United Nations Special Fund and the UN Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) into a new United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1965 was of special importance for WFP. It was considered that this would establish the basis for an enlargement and strengthening of UN aid as a whole and facilitate linking of food with other types of aid within the overall framework of UN country aid programmes. And it was seen to have special administrative benefits as UNDP representatives also acted as representatives for WFP. This led the UN secretary-general’s representative to state at an IGC session in 1964 that ‘We are at a turning point in this (WFP) experiment’ (WFP, 1964b, annex III, p. 3). ECOSOC support. In 1964, ECOSOC expressed satisfaction with the progress made by WFP. It noted that WFP had moved from the stage of preparation and determination of its main policies and procedures to that of initiating and supporting operational projects. Its shape and characteristics were now well defined; and the conditions had been created for its operational tasks and the appraisal (evaluation) of its activities. WFP operations represented a growing share of the total aid of the UN system, and its activities were being dovetailed into those financed by other UN bodies to mutual benefit. Developments outside the UN system While these developments within the United Nations system were supportive of the aims of WFP, other developments were taking place elsewhere that also lent support for the continuation of the Programme. OECD food aid study Principal among these developments was a study of food aid and its role in economic development undertaken by OECD in 1962 that led to a statement on food aid by OECD ministers of agriculture in November of that year. The study and statement were important as OECD contained the major donor countries and therefore had a strong influence on aid policies and operations. The wide-ranging study (OECD, 1962) succinctly described the basic principles by which food aid could contribute to economic development. Population growth and the rise in income associated with economic development led to increased demand for food. This could be particularly large because at low income levels a substantial part of any increment in incomes was spent on food. It might not be possible to satisfy this increased demand from domestic production alone. Food imports could only take place at the expense of imports

56

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

of capital equipment and, therefore, at the expense of overall economic development because of shortage of foreign exchange. If the demand for food was not satisfied, food prices might rise, causing general inflationary pressure, which could also jeopardize economic growth. Food aid programmes could help overcome these difficulties and enable a higher volume of investment to be maintained. They could enable food to be provided as wages-in-kind, thereby making it possible to use unemployed and under-employed workers on labour-intensive development projects within the framework of an overall development plan. Food aid could also help to establish food reserves, thus mitigating the risk of sudden food shortages, and enabling higher targets to be established in national development plans. Food aid could also facilitate desirable changes in the agriculture systems of recipient countries by providing extra food supplies to compensate for temporary reductions in domestic food output when such changes were brought about. The effects of food aid on receiving countries, on world trade and on the donor countries themselves were analyzed. There were dangers that food aid might depress the market for domestic agriculture in receiving countries, and encourage recipient governments to place less emphasis on developing their own agricultural sector. However, the indications were that food aid had gone largely to meeting food shortages and that these potential adverse effects, if any, ‘have therefore been small’. Food aid could displace commercial imports, but this could be avoided by ensuring that it represented additional consumption, in the sense of consumption that would not take place without food aid. On the other hand, food aid could have beneficial effects on world trade by enabling countries with limited foreign exchange to maintain their imports of other goods and services. In donor countries with surplus food production, there could be a shortterm advantage in providing food aid. Revenue foregone might be nil or negligible, and in the short run the productive resources used to produce the food might have no alternative employment. If food aid programmes were maintained over a long period, however, they might cause agricultural output to be higher than would otherwise be the case, and diminish the incentive for productive resources, especially labour, to move into other occupations. The study concluded that ‘for the next decade at least, and probably for much longer, the disparity in the food situation as between the low- and highincome countries will persist’. The basic question was whether food aid was a desirable way of putting the productive resources of the developed countries at the disposal of the less developed ones. This might be the case ‘so long as the productive resources in the agriculture of the developed countries cannot easily be shifted to other uses’. Countries with agricultural surpluses were prepared to give them as aid, while in the short run they might not be willing to give aid in other forms. ‘Food aid may thus represent in the short run a net addition to the total amount of aid.’ However, food aid should not be

The Experimental Years: 1963–5

57

regarded as a permanent arrangement. It could not remove the need for other forms of aid. Food aid should be more closely integrated into the development plans of receiving countries and ‘there should be more provision than there is at present for co-ordination between food aid and other aid programmes’. The study’s findings were discussed among OECD ministers of agriculture in Paris in November 1962. They concluded that ‘in circumstances where food shortages constitute a factor limiting the rate of development, and where a country has inadequate foreign exchange to import additional food on a commercial basis, the provision of food on a grant or loan basis can, during a relatively limited transitional period, accelerate the rate of development’. NGO support Strong support for the continuation of WFP came from a less likely source. In a combined letter to the UN secretary-general on 3 November 1964, the executive authorities of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA), and the International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP) expressed ‘the hope that the United Nations would consider their views on “An expanding world food program” with particular attention’.4 This was the first time that these world-wide non-governmental organizations of workers, consumers and farmers, with about 300 million members, had agreed on a common policy. A press release by the three organizations, issued on 9 November 1964, urged: member governments of the United Nations and of the competent Specialized Agencies to develop without further delay a dynamic policy of food aid as part of a general policy for economic development and the improvement of living conditions everywhere. The renewal and substantial expansion of the UN/FAO World Food Program is, in their opinion, a first and essential step in that direction. The press release noted that: Programs for food aid have a special appeal to public opinion in the wealthier countries, whose support is essential to the implementation of any extensive policy of international assistance. This is why they usually provide food aid additional to other forms and also one of the reasons why the three international organizations, with their widespread membership, are in a position to give support to these programs. Bilateral project food aid Another supportive development was the introduction and expansion of project food aid in the United States and other food aid programmes. Its popularity served to give added encouragement for WFP’s continuation.

58

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

PL 480 was amended in May 1960 to allow the provision of food aid on a grant basis to promote and support economic development projects. US foodfor-work programmes were designed to enable unemployed people to be put to work on labour-intensive public works. Other possibilities of using project food aid were considered. Feed grains were provided to stimulate livestock production and increase the availability of animal protein foods. Although these projects were generally very small, they provided valuable experience in the possibilities for developing the livestock sector in developing countries through the provision of feed aid. Other bilateral food aid programmes were being conducted and coordinated under the Colombo Plan by which aid was provided to the developing countries of the then British Commonwealth. Australia and Canada were the main donor countries. The main receiving countries were Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India and Pakistan. Wheat and wheat flour were the main food commodities provided. In the decade ending in 1961/62, about 1.7 million tons were supplied. Funds generated from the sale of the food aid commodities in the receiving countries were used to meet the local costs of approved economic development projects (FAO, 1964).

Continuation The results of the experimental years, the conclusions of the study programme, and developments within and outside the United Nations system, provided a strong case for the continuation of WFP after 1965. Executive director’s recommendation for WFP’s continuation The executive director of WFP recommended what the future activities of WFP might be, assuming agreement was reached to extend the Programme beyond 1965 (WFP, 1965a, pp. 69–93). While WFP would continue to bear responsibility for providing food in emergencies, experience had shown the difficulties of supplying relief quickly as WFP did not hold food reserves and did not have transport and logistics facilities under its own control. WFP assistance was therefore likely to prove more effective in the work of reconstruction and rehabilitation after emergencies and in disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation activities. The main focus of WFP’s future assistance should, therefore, be in support of economic and social development based on free and direct distribution of food to beneficiaries, with limited sale of food in exceptional situations, in order to comply with the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal. But interpretation of the FAO Principles had been somewhat one-sided. The interests of the exporting developed countries had received much more attention than the possible disincentives to agricultural producers in food aid receiving countries.

The Experimental Years: 1963–5

59

More balanced consideration should, therefore, be given in a future multilateral food aid programme. Some relaxation of WFP’s sales policy might, however, be in order. The disadvantages of possible market displacement by sale of WFP commodities might be weighed against the countervailing advantages of achieving the objectives of a particular project, such as increased efficiency and output in the long run, as contemplated in a revision of the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal (FAO, 1992, p. 23). There was one important area on which the experimental period had provided no experience. Early thought had been given to WFP experimenting with the country programme approach.5 But WFP’s general regulations drawn up by the Intergovernmental Committee for the experimental period specified adopted the ‘project approach’, thus implying exclusion of the wider country programme approach. In any event, lack of resources and no authorization to make longer-term commitments beyond the three-year experimental period precluded any experimentation with the country programme approach. If those constraints were removed, the executive director considered that ‘a start could be made with such an approach under a new multilateral food aid program without prejudice to the continued development of the project approach, which should remain a primary and characteristic activity’ (WFP, 1965a, p. 73). In estimating the rate of growth of WFP beyond 1965, the executive director projected that $833 million of aid in commodities and cash might be committed for the five years 1966–70. Of that total, 63 per cent would be for development projects, 30 per cent for development plans, 4 per cent for emergencies, and 3 per cent for administration. About 70 per cent of total commitments were estimated to be in commodities and the remaining 30 per cent in cash. The original target of one-third of WFP donations in cash was predicated on operational needs related only to the project approach. Purchases of food to balance diets would not be necessary for aid to national development plans. And administrative expenses were expected to fall as the scale of operations increased.

Joint views of UN secretary-general and FAO director-general on WFP’s future The UN secretary-general and the FAO director-general expressed ‘broad agreement’ with the executive director’s recommendations for WFP’s future and had ‘no hesitation in stating our conclusion that the results of the … experimenal period … have been sufficiently positive to warrant its [WFP] continuation and indeed expansion’ (UN and FAO, 1965).6 They noted that a considerable increase in food surpluses was expected in the future, with wider spread in their geographical occurrence and commodity

60

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

composition. WFP had handled only about 2 per cent of total non-commercial food aid during the experimental period. Even after an expansion of the magnitude proposed by the WFP executive director, it would still handle only about 10 per cent. Bearing in mind the preference that some developing countries had shown for the multilateral channelling of aid, and the distinct advantages of the multilateral approach to food aid, an increased multilateral share in the totality of food aid seemed justified. It would also constitute an important addition and complement to the other programmes of multilateral aid provided through the United Nations system. Within the project approach, all avenues should be explored, including: the possibility of larger projects – meaning pro tanto fewer projects; assisting a wide range of programmes; and joint projects with other UN bodies and financial institutions. Technical officer in other UN agencies could perhaps assist more fully the work of WFP. In these ways, ‘it may well be found in the end that the targets set by the Executive Director can be reached and exceeded’. This did not preclude ‘a cautious beginning with new approaches’. A country programme approach, supplemented by projects, had much to commend it. Many approaches could be adopted between individual project and fullfledged comprehensive national development plan, which could be supported by food aid. These various approaches offered ‘a wide and promising opportunity for extending the scope of the WFP in the next phase, beyond the original project approach’. The executive heads concluded that ‘an expanded WFP must have as its primary objective to benefit the people [original emphasis] in developing countries, of whom most are farmers and their families. Benefits to the rural [original emphasis] population should be a special priority consideration for the WFP.’ This did not mean that the only effective way of benefiting the rural population was by direct agricultural or rural development projects. There should not be a narrow sectoral interpretation of what projects and programmes WFP should assist. Any such limitation on the range of projects would run counter to the desire for a maximum effort in economic and social development. IGC’s recommendations on WFP’s future WFP’s governing body considered the future of WFP at its session in March/April 1965 on the basis of the executive director’s report on the experimental years, the five WFP-commissioned studies, the joint views of the UN secretary-general and the FAO director-general, and the supportive statements of other UN and non-UN aid agencies and organizations. This substantial body of documentation, and favourable comments made on WFP’s experiment in ECOSOC, the UN General Assembly, the FAO Council and Conference and elsewhere, provided the momentum that led to the IGC’s

The Experimental Years: 1963–5

61

recommendation that WFP should continue on an ‘open-ended’ basis ‘for as long as multilateral food aid is found necessary’ (WFP, 1965d, p. 2). There was unanimous agreement in the IGC that the provision of food aid linked to specific development projects should continue to be the main activity of WFP. Agreement could not be reached, however, concerning WFP’s involvement in the country programme approach. Instead, the WFP executive director was requested to carry out a detailed study on the subject. The committee would decide on whether to proceed further in the light of the study’s results. A target of $275 million was set for WFP resources for the three years 1966–8, of which at least 33 per cent should be in cash and shipping services. This would permit the purchase of commodities to balance diets and cope expeditiously with emergency needs, which, as far as possible and economical, should be bought in exporting developing countries to help boost their exports. Proposals for modifying WFP During discussions on the future of WFP in the IGC, two specific proposals were made for its modification. The government of Israel called ‘for the promotion of the multilateral food aid program as an essential and continuous field of action in an international aid program’.7 The study recommended the gradual and systematic increase of food production for food aid transfers, at concessional prices or as grants, rather than relying on unpredictable surpluses alone. The second proposal, made by the government of Argentina, was for the conversion of WFP into a multilateral ‘World Food Fund’.8 The proposal related to a recommendation on WFP made at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 (see Chapter 3), that in reviewing WFP’s future, ‘due account be taken of the relationship and effects of a modified programme on the expansion and development of commodity trade of the developing countries’ (UNCTAD, 1964). Contributions to the fund should be half in kind and half in cash, the cash being used to buy commodities in foodproducing developing countries. The greater proportion of the fund’s resources would be used as non-project aid in general development and mass feeding programmes. The fund would support rather than disrupt commercial trade and its activities would be co-ordinated with international agricultural commodity agreements. There was much support for the Argentine proposal, and the IGC agreed that it should be studied by an independent and authoritative specialist. S. R. Sen of the Planning Commission, Government of India, was appointed to undertake the study (Sen, 1965). In reviewing his study, the IGC agreed that while a number of fundamental issues raised were of particular significance to WFP, the study went beyond its terms of reference (WFP, 1965d, pp. 11–12). The committee therefore decided to refer the proposal to its parent bodies for

62

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

consideration, which led to a further study on multilateral food aid (see Chapter 5). Approval of WFP’s continuation Neither proposal influenced the decisions on the continuation of WFP. The political climate was such that within a little more than six months of submitting the IGC’s recommendations on the future of WFP to ECOSOC and the FAO Council, parallel resolutions were adopted in the UN General Assembly and the FAO Conference in December 1965, which approved the continuation of WFP (FAO, 1965c; UN, 1965b). At the end of WFP’s experimental period on 31 December 1965, 101 countries had participated in the experiment as donors or recipients, or both. Total resources contributed to WFP reached $93.7 million, just short of the target of $100 million, which was later reduced to $84.5 million to take account of lapsing pledges and price changes. During the three years of the experimental period, 32 emergency operations were carried out in 25 countries and 116 development projects were supported in a wide variety of economic and social development sectors. It was estimated that up to 200,000 workers were employed in WFP-assisted development project in 1965 alone, the last year of the experimental period. As WFP provided rations to a worker and his family, about one million people benefited directly from the Programme’s assistance, and more indirectly from the work programmes carried out, giving an indication of the potential scope of the future activities of the Programme. The pioneering zeal and spirit of optimism was carried forward into the continuing phase of WFP’s activities. At the pledging conference for WFP resources for the three years 1966–8, the United States representative said: With this pledge ($130 million toward a target of $275 million) the United States gives its full support to the principle of multilateral food aid … With the future in mind, we urge that we work toward further expansion of the World Food Programme … The task we face is enormous – but not impossible. I am thoroughly convinced that the Nations of the world, working together, can eventually eliminate hunger from the face of the earth. We are here today to re-dedicate ourselves to this goal. We have made a good start. The spirit of the World Food Programme is a positive force for the benefit of mankind. May this spirit lead us to the day when hunger will indeed be banished from the earth.9 However, he issued both a challenge and a warning. He added: In order to emphasize the truly multilateral nature of the World Food Program it is essential for us to keep our contribution in balance with those

The Experimental Years: 1963–5

63

of other Nations; and therefore it will be reduced proportionately if there is any shortfall in the target level of $275 million.

Lessons from the experimental period What were the main lessons to emerge from the experimental period (Dawson, 1964; O’Hagan and Lehti, 1968)? The overall view was one of significant achievement in the face of considerable challenges. Despite early suspicion by some major food aid recipient countries, such as India and Pakistan, that multilateral food aid through WFP might reduce or replace bilateral food aid, especially from the United States, and would be more difficult to obtain (Singer et al., 1987, p. 29; Wightman, 1968, p. 46), an impressive number of requests were submitted for WFP assistance in spite of the growing operations of the US PL 480 food aid programme. Many recipient countries showed preference for multilateral food aid provided on a grant basis, through an international agency in which they had a voice (Acock, 1967, p. 2). But controversy in the food aid debate continued. For donors, the direct transfer of food as aid was particularly attractive (Smethurst, 1969, p. 205). It involved no balance of payments problems, was relatively inexpensive in terms of opportunity costs, and was overvalued in data on international aid. It was a politically convenient way of buying off farm pressure groups and shelving the problems of agricultural adjustment in food aid donor countries, whilst persuading consumers and taxpayers that they were helping to avoid some Malthusian catastrophe. At the same time, antagonists continued to regard food aid as the epitome of all that was worst in the aid business – highly tied, politically convenient to donors, and potentially harmful to recipients. Country studies of the impact of the US food aid programmes completed before WFP began operations confirmed that viewpoint. One of the reasons for insisting that WFP adopt the project approach was to avoid the counterproductive effects of US bulk food aid revealed in these studies (Smethurst, 1969, ff. 3; Sen, 1983, ff. 26). The focus during the experimental period was understandably to gain sufficient experience, in a crucially short period of time, to qualify WFP for continuation. This led to the adoption of procedures and practices which were later to haunt a continuing WFP. A governing body meeting twice a year for little more than a week at a time could hardly be expected to give detailed attention to an array of policy and operational concerns. Delegates who had competence in the operational aspects of development projects did not necessarily have the same ability in policy matters. Working under pressure, representatives from the major donor countries tended to dominate discussion. It was not possible for members of the governing body to give detailed consideration to requests for WFP assistance in the time available. Although project

64

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

evaluations were mandatory, encouraged by donor countries, they tended to focus more on the accountability and utilization of the food aid provided than on the wider economic and social impact. Procedural improvements were necessary if policy and operational considerations were to be more than perfunctory, and project approval and evaluation were to become more than a charade. It was only much later that donors were encouraged to visit WFP-supported projects in the field, and to take part in selected WFP evaluation missions, at their expense, and a special Sub-Committee on Projects (SCP) was established to review requests for WFP assistance to individual development projects and make recommendations for approval, amendment or rejection to WFP’s governing body. Two important precedents were set. No requests that were submitted to the governing body were rejected, although some were modified. And the governing body insisted that it was a technical, and not a political body, so that when later an attempt was made by the United States to turn down a request from Vietnam, patently on political grounds, it was overruled by the committee. The position of the United States was a cause of special concern. It provided over half the resources made available to WFP in the experimental period. Such dependence on one donor could be destabilizing. The United States itself found this imbalance troubling. It had hoped that the creation of WFP would encourage other donors to share the burden of contributing to a multilateral programme constrained to operate under the project approach, which would also ensure that no large-scale bilateral food aid programme would be established in competition to PL 480, particularly in the European Economic Community. The United States enjoyed other special advantages. It was the only major donor with detailed knowledge of WFP-assisted development projects and their performance through the reports of USAID country mission reports. Under the terms of US participation in WFP, USAID country missions were required to clear a request for WFP assistance if US commodities were required, the only donor to impose bilateral restrictions on a multilateral programme. Requests might not be approved if either they contravened the technical provisions of the PL 480 programme, or if they conflicted with general US policies regarding which developing countries could be assisted. Other constraints were that US food aid commodities had to be transported in US ships, and three-quarters of US food aid commodities had to consist of bagged, fortified or processed products. These requirements were resented by other members of WFP’s governing body who feared that they could lead to the ‘bilateralization’ of the multilateral programme. A major limitation was the size and level of appointment of staff in the WFP secretariat. From the outset, emphasis was placed on keeping WFP programme

The Experimental Years: 1963–5

65

and administrative costs to a minimum. The number of staff appointed, and their level of appointment in comparison with staff in other UN bodies, was such that administrative overheads accounted for less that 6 per cent of total expenditure during the experimental programme. This was diseconomically low in some critical areas of WFP’s work, and would need to be reviewed if the Programme’s activities were to be significantly expanded. So, too, would be the working relations between WFP headquarters and field staff. Under the pressures of the experimental period, there was little delegation of responsibility to WFP country offices. Requests for WFP assistance were sent to the UN co-operating specialized agencies for technical scrutiny with a tight deadline. The comments of officers in these agencies, made on top of their usual workload for projects in which they had no stake, were often perfunctory and in general terms. This arrangement would also need to be reviewed if effective technical scrutiny was to be improved during the post-experimental period. And the UN co-operating agencies might do more to draw to WFP’s attention projects that they were supporting that could benefit from food aid, thus ensuring the fusion of financial, technical and food aid. The experimental period proved to be invaluable in revealing the practical operational problems that had to be overcome in using WFP assistance effectively and efficiently (UN, 1965a). The costs of delivering WFP commodities to development projects, particularly those involving several food items in ‘supermarket’ rations in order to provide a balanced diet, were often more than the value of the foods provided. Small consignments were delivered on liner vessels at high unit costs. With growing experience, transport costs were reduced through improving shipping schedules and making combined shipments to a number of projects in the same country on charter vessels at lower transport costs. Packaging and labelling of food commodities were also to cause difficulties in the early days of WFP operations. Consignments sometimes arrived without labels, and in containers too big to distribute to single beneficiaries. Arrangements had to be made for the project authorities to have on hand suitable containers for individual rations. Similarly, adequate labelling, particularly of canned products, was essential, and in picture form so that it could be easily understood by illiterate people. It was also important for the project authorities to have on the label an indication of the safe storage life of the commodity in question. The provision of storage in recipient countries where facilities were inadequate or deficient was a basic concern for WFP. WFP therefore arranged for a survey to be made of storage problems by a highly specialized institution in this field (Hall, 1965). One outcome of the survey was the decision that all WFP field officers should receive intensive training in storage practices in

66

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

order to provide advice and training to government officers in recipient countries. Training programmes were provided to WFP staff at the Tropical Stored Products Centre in the United Kingdom. Evaluation of WFP-assisted projects was both conceptually and operationally difficult (WFP, 1974e). Evaluation of the overall impact of WFP assistance was not always feasible and required more time and funds than were available during the experimental period. A small project in a large country, for example, could not be expected to have a significant effect on the country’s overall economic and social development. It was difficult to estimate the effectiveness of food aid in projects in which it represented only a small part of total costs. A conclusive assessment of the overall effect was possible only for relatively large projects in which food aid represented a significant part of total investment. The method of evaluation should therefore be fashioned to each individual project, although some common features would pertain. The need to co-ordinate the various branches of government within recipient countries with an interest in WFP assistance was recognized, for which something like to an inter-ministerial committee on WFP affairs might be established. Similarly, co-ordination of aid programmes, including food aid from different sources, was necessary. The pressure of work by a small secretariat during a short experimental time period limited the amount of consultation and co-ordination that could be achieved. A particular problem was that UN and bilateral aid organizations had their own planning, programming and budgeting cycle, which were difficult to synchronize, making co-ordination of international co-operation a general problem. Faced with these difficulties, the achievements of the experimental period were even more remarkable. They also revealed the paradox that those countries most in need of food aid often had the least capacity to absorb it.

5 Food for Development

Although WFP had an important role to play in emergencies (see Chapter 6), its main focus of attention for most of the first 30 years of its operations was on using food aid in support of economic and social development projects. Two distinct phases may be discerned during this period: the first decade to the major watershed of the World Food Conference in 1974 during which WFP was faced with unstable and fluctuating resources and searched for a distinct identity; and much of the next 20 years during which project food aid was fully developed and institutionalized. The remaining years in the 1990s, during which emergency operations were to become WFP’s main concern, are described in Chapters 6 and 9.

The first decade: growing pains Unstable and fluctuating resources The first decade of WFP operations was dominated by concern about the instability and fluctuations of its resources, and the need to maintain a balance between pledges, commitments and disbursements (Table 5.1). The WFP secretariat was to learn that this was to be a fact of life of all food aid programmes, not least its own. The high expectations after the experimental period were tempered by the realization that resources would not grow at anything like the rate anticipated from the rhetoric surrounding the UN Development Decade and the recommendations contained in major studies that were undertaken during the 1960s (Pearson, 1969; UN, 1969b). Unlike the early experimental period, when the concern was that there might be insufficient requests to absorb the resources available, there were now insufficient resources to meet all demands. Carry-over wheat stocks held by the main exporting countries at the end of the 1965/66 season, the main commodity available to WFP, had been run down by almost 30 million tons 67

68

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Table 5.1

World Food Programme resources, 1963–74 (US$ million)

Pledge period 1963–65 1966–68 1969–70 1971–72 1973–74 1

2

3

Proposed target 1

Approved target 2

100 275 200 400 400

100 275 200 300 340

Resources pledged 3 85 187 320 243 359

Proposed by the WFP executive director and approved by the UN secretary-general and FAO director-general. Approved by the IGC and endorsed by ECOSOC and the UN General Assembly and the FAO Council and Conference. Resources pledged to WFP by the end of the pledging period.

Source: World Food Programme.

over the previous five years, a far cry from the situation at the beginning of the 1960s when stocks were at historically high levels. In a statement to ECOSOC in 1966, the executive director of WFP noted that a ‘fundamental change’ had overtaken the Programme (WFP, 1966g, p. 21). While food aid had started principally as a response to over-production in the major food-exporting, developed countries, it was now turning into a response to under-production in the developing world. This implied, he suggested, deliberately producing food for food aid, a proposition that was to be frequently repeated, and the desirability of pooling resources and sharing costs, and thus underlined the need for giving a multilateral character to food aid. Food aid should be a concern of every country, whether food importer or exporter. All should have a stake in avoiding a catastrophe that might hit the most vulnerable countries and people first, but would quickly engulf all. WFP’s resource situation dramatically changed by 1969 with the return of structural grain surpluses in both North American and the EEC countries. For the first time, resources pledged to WFP passed the target set. But shortages of certain commodities, particularly rice, dried skim milk and protein-rich foods, continued to hamper WFP assistance in certain regions, especially Asia, and for certain types of projects, such as nutrition improvement programmes and dairy development schemes. By the early years of the 1970s, WFP’s resource situation was to take another turn for the worse, this time with even more serious consequences. World grain supplies reached their lowest level since the end of the Second World War. The problem was exacerbated by major commercial wheat sales by the United States to the former Soviet Union at subsidized prices (Morgan, 1979). World food prices escalated steeply. At the same time, world oil prices were hiked twice by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). WFP lost 40 per cent of its resources in real terms. Most donors made their

Food for Development

69

contributions to WFP in financial terms, which provided less quantities of food as prices rose. WFP transport costs also increased as oil prices escalated, making serious inroads into the Programme’s limited cash resources.

Stringent management measures A number of measures were taken in order to contend with WFP’s rollercoaster resource instability. The number of requests presented to the governing body for approval was sharply reduced. The nadir point was reached in October 1973 when no project requests were submitted for IGC approval in a holding operation that continued until there was a revival in WFP’s resource position, representing ‘a unique backward step in the history of the Programme’ (WFP, 1973b, p. 30). Rigorous criteria for the selection of WFP-assisted projects were drawn up, to which were added criteria for project ‘soundness’ (WFP, 1966b, pp. 10–11). Priority was given to the least-developed countries in the allocation of WFP aid (WFP, 1974a).1 Highest priority was given to projects involving the nutritional improvement of the most vulnerable groups of mothers, pre-school and primary school children, and to those aimed at increasing agricultural production. No new projects for the feeding of students and trainees above the primary school level, for mining and industrial workers, or for feeding livestock, were considered. Signature of agreements for 21 projects previously approved, involving $85 million of WFP aid, was suspended and commitments to ongoing projects in non-priority countries and project categories were significantly reduced. Several other management measures were taken in order to contend with resource instability. One measure was to distinguish between two categories of commitments: ‘unconditional’ commitments of resources within the current pledging period for which contributions to WFP were assured; and ‘conditional’ commitments thereafter, which depended on the level of resources provided in subsequent pledging periods. Another measure involved the contortions that had to be followed in order to avoid the lapsing of resources. Other measures were adopted to increase flexibility and economy in resource deployment. Procedures were adopted for the approval of ‘quasiemergency’, later to be called ‘quick-action’, projects (WFP, 1970c; 1974b). As the name implies, these projects could be put into operation quickly, as in the case of forestalling emergencies, or in post-emergency operations, or in pilot projects as a bridge to full-fledged development projects. They proved to have three important operational advantages. They helped to forestall slowly developing emergencies, or to reduce their effects. They reduced the pressure on WFP’s emergency resources as they were resourced from the Programme’s development, not emergency, allocations. And they allowed time to draw up

70

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

requests for full-fledged development projects, for which they provided valuable operational experience. The size of WFP-assisted development projects was also increased. Each food aid instalment, whatever its size, involved fixed administrative and operational overheads on the part of recipient governments, donor countries and WFP staff in preparing and processing requests for aid, and in their shipment, delivery, handling and distribution. Larger WFP-assisted development projects could not only improve operational efficiency but also increase their impact in the developing countries. This did not rule out smaller activities, which could be combined into one large project in the same country for operational purposes. But it did call for greater co-ordination with other external aid agencies, multilateral or bilateral, or through aid consultative group or consortia, which facilitated the combination of financial, technical and food aid. Engaging in larger projects also raised the profile of WFP among other aid agencies and increased its attractiveness as a partner in joint ventures. While larger projects lifted WFP into a new aid league, both within and outside the UN system, they were to give rise to new concerns in the governing body. First, was the imbalance they created in commitments among the developing regions and countries. Second, was the high proportion of new commitments that was taken up by a small number of large grants. And finally, there was concern that they might tie up a disproportionate amount of future resources, the level of which was uncertain.

Country programme food aid: the Jamaica mission An important consideration was transferred from WFP’s experimental period that could have a major effect on the future of WFP (see Chapter 4). No decision had been reached by the IGC on whether WFP should engage in programme aid in support of a country’s national development plan in addition to assistance for specific development projects. Instead, the governing body invited the executive director to carry out a detailed study to determine the feasibility of the country programme approach. Jamaica was chosen for the study, in agreement with the government. An appraisal team visited the island in November 1965. Its objectives were: to explore criteria for formulating and evaluating a request for programme food aid; and to consider problems likely to arise in administering programme food aid. At the time of the visit, the country’s five-year ‘Independence Plan’ was about half completed. It had run into financial difficulties largely on account of a sharply rising demand for food, triggered by the implementation of the development plan, and the limited possibilities for increasing domestic food production. A food gap of about $19 million had emerged between the likely value of food imports in the remaining two years of the development plan

Food for Development

71

and the amount that would have been imported on the basis of previous import trends (WFP, 1966c). This gap included $8 million of cereals, $6 million of meat and meat products, and $5 million of dairy products. There appeared to be scope, therefore, for programme food aid to compensate for the large demand for food created by a high rate of economic growth. The possibility was explored of supplying WFP food aid in the form of wheat or mixed cereals (rice, wheat flour and maize) but the government had already made plans for the construction of flour mills and the commercial importation of wheat, and feed grains for livestock were being supplied bilaterally by the United States. WFP was unlikely to have the meat and dairy products required. There was no effective role for WFP programme food aid for Jamaica at that time, therefore, even if it was approved by the IGC. A strong government administration, supported by good statistical and other services, would be required to devise the economic indicators and controls measures necessary to use programme food aid effectively. Conversely, governments would be relieved of all the technical and administrative details associated with the implementation of food aid for individual development projects. This was an important consideration when government administration was stronger at the centre than at the local level. The IGC’s discussions of the Jamaica study and its decision on any future involvement of WFP in the programme approach were crucial in determining whether the Programme would embark on this new line of assistance, and possibly significantly increase its share of global food aid, or whether it would be restricted to a more limited role of only providing project food aid and emergency assistance. The comments of the major donors were particularly revealing. They showed that there was a general unwillingness by donors to relinquish control over a substantial share of their own food aid resources. They argued that food and funds were too limited to embark upon programme assistance at a time when WFP resources represented less that 5 per cent of global food aid. ‘Even more important’, the United States representative commented, ‘the WFP staff was limited, and it had to concentrate on projects to obtain the best possible results. Good projects should not be sacrificed for a doubtful program approach’ (WFP, 1966d, p. 10). Members of the IGC were also invited to submit written comments on the Jamaica mission’s report (WFP, 1966e,f). Their replies drew attention to the general unreliability of national statistics and development plans as a basis for calculating the level of country programme food aid, and to the inherent difficulties of estimating the change in import demand for food arising from the execution of development plans, which were seldom implemented as originally proposed. And different methods would be needed for developing countries, both for estimating the level of programme aid required, and for administering it.

72

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

The report of the Jamaica mission was sent to the FAO Committee on Commodity Problems (CCP) and to the CSD. As expected, both warned of the possible disruption to commercial trade likely to be caused by programme food aid, reflecting the thinking of the main food exporting countries. The director-general of FAO also expressed concern about the impact on domestic food production in recipient countries of bulk food aid of this kind. The WFP executive director acknowledged that the report of the Jamaica mission represented only a ‘starting point’ for consideration of the overall dimensions of food aid under the programme approach. He recognized that the work involved went beyond the competence of the WFP secretariat and that the co-operation of other UN agencies would be essential if work was continued in this field. He suggested that the committee might bring the findings of the Jamaica mission to the attention of those governments that provided bulk food aid under bilateral agreements, as a veiled criticism of their programmes. He recalled that one of the functions of a multilateral food aid programme might be to propose principles and procedures that could be generally applied by all food aid programmes (Dessau, 1965). If the report of the Jamaica mission contributed to that end, the time and effort spent would not have been entirely in vain. There is no evidence that the report had any impact on the way in which bulk programme food aid was provided bilaterally. The IGC did agree, however, that the executive director should prepare an outline for a further study on the feasibility of multilateral food aid in support of national development programmes for its consideration. The outline was submitted to the IGC in 1967 (WFP, 1967b). While the outline was being prepared, two other important developments took place that had a bearing on the study outline. The first was the conclusion of negotiations under the ‘Kennedy Round’ of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1967, which established a Food Aid Convention as part of a new International Grains Arrangement. The second was a joint study of multilateral food aid by the United Nations and FAO. They raised the prospect of substantial additional resources being made available to the Programme, thereby removing one of the main objections raised to its involvement in country programme food aid. Food aid conventions: unfulfilled expectations From the beginning of the 1960s, as their large stockpiles of grain were drawn down, Canada and the United States sought to share the burden of providing food aid to poor developing countries with other major industrialized countries, especially in Western Europe and Japan. They had provided little or no food aid but were now, it was argued, strong enough economically to shoulder part of the burden. At the same time, the European Community (now the

Food for Development

73

European Union) and its member countries had accumulated large surpluses as a result of their agricultural protectionist policy that had begun to affect Canadian and United States agricultural trade. An opportunity came with the Kennedy Round of Tariff Negotiations in the GATT (Parotte, 1983; IWC, 1974; 1988). The primary focus of the Kennedy Round, as in previous GATT negotiations, was to reduce tariff barriers on industrial goods. But the main participants, prompted by Canada and the United States, decided that on this occasion agricultural commodities, and more particularly wheat and coarse grains, should also be covered. Discussion centred on the formulation of an agreement covering world trade in grains, which would replace the existing International Wheat Agreement of 1962. In view of the concerns of Canada and the United States, coverage of the proposed agreement was extended to include food aid. As the new aid commitments would be costly for the non-traditional food aid donors to undertake, the major exporting countries offered them concessions in the industrial trade sector as part of the bargaining process. As a result, an International Grains Arrangement was negotiated in 1967 with two inseparable parts, an International Wheat Agreement and, for the first time, a Food Aid Convention (FAC). The object of the 1967 FAC was to provide guaranteed aid in the form of cereals or cash to purchase grains for shipment as aid. Each member agreed to provide a minimum quantity of food aid in physical terms irrespective of fluctuations in production, stocks and prices. The United States proposed an annual minimum of 10 million tons of cereal food aid in the aggregate. The twelve original members of the FAC finally agreed to provide a minimum of 4.5 million tons.2 Subsequently, most members exceeded their minimum obligations. Each FAC member was responsible for the allocation and shipment of its own supplies. There was no stipulation about the destination of shipments, save that they should be made to developing countries, or about whether they should be provided on grant or non-commercial credit terms. (In fact, the food aid provided under the 1967 FAC was provided entirely on a grant basis.) Multilateral channelling was, however, encouraged, with special reference made to the advantages of using WFP. This raised expectations of a large increase in WFP resources, which proved to be unfounded. While the Scandinavian countries, Finland, Norway and Sweden, channelled all their relatively small FAC contributions through WFP, the major donors either provided only small amounts or none at all. Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States restricted their contributions to WFP to direct contributions to its regular resources. The EEC preferred to set up its own food aid administration and programme rather than rely on the services that WFP might have provided (Cathie, 1997). The result was that only 5 to 6 per cent of the aggregate

74

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

shipments of FAC grains were channelled annually through WFP during the three years of the 1967 FAC, which mirrored the proportion of food aid handled globally by WFP.

Multilateral food aid study While WFP was still a fledgling organization, calls for its significant modification and enlargement were made. In addition to the Argentine proposal to convert WFP into a ‘world food fund’, Uruguay proposed that WFP become a ‘world food bank’, the Netherlands proposed the creation of an ‘international emergency food aid facility’ (see Chapter 6), and the Lebanon proposed the establishment of a ‘world commodity organization’ (WFP, 1972a). None of these proposals were to be adopted. A UN General Assembly resolution was passed in December 1965 which called on the UN secretary-general, in co-operation with the FAO directorgeneral, to undertake a comprehensive study of multilateral food aid (UN, 1965c). The resolution was passed immediately after the one adopted by the UN General Assembly which approved the continuation of WFP ‘for as long as multilateral food aid is found feasible and desirable’ (UN, 1965b). The resolution noted that ‘the problem of hunger will continue to be one of the most serious problems facing the international community in the years to come’ and that ‘the experience gained by the World Food Programme and the increase in its resources should enable it to enlarge its potential in this field’. The various proposals intended to make WFP a larger and more effective instrument of international co-operation gave rise to fundamental issues that went beyond the terms of reference of WFP’s governing body. The study was prepared at a time of critical food shortages in several developing regions, and broke new grounds (UN, 1968a).3 It called for future food aid transfers to developing countries to be planned in response to forecasts of their demand requirements and not by the food surpluses of developed countries as in the past. Four main purposes were identified for which food aid was needed, each of which required different ways of estimating needs and different institutional arrangements for its supply: ‘economically determined needs’ – that part of the gap between domestic production and total effective demand, which a food-deficit developing country could not import without harming excessively its economic development; multipurpose national food reserves; emergency food aid; and nutrition improvement programmes. The study reasoned that the basic principle of future food aid operations, whether bilateral or multilateral, should be the planned provision of supplies, based, as far as practicable, on a systematic analysis of the needs of each developing country. FAO already projected long-term trends but the time period covered by these projections was too long to be useful for operational

Food for Development

75

purposes. FAO therefore proposed the preparation of regular annual reviews of the medium-term food outlook. The international community should determine the minimum level of stockholding of the main food commodities that would provide satisfactory global food security in the event of unforeseen natural disasters. The national food reserves of developed countries might be extended to cover the emergency needs of developing countries. If such a principle were accepted internationally, it would be for the co-operating governments to decide whether to negotiate the maximum commitment of each country, or whether it would be sufficient for them to act as an ad hoc consortium, called together when necessary by the director-general of FAO.4 Regarding nutrition-improvement programmes for vulnerable groups, including young children and pregnant and nursing mothers, FAO’s mediumterm food outlook reviews could provide a continuous measure of progress by developing countries towards the attainment of established nutritional goals. Additional information would be required, however, for building up special nutrition-raising programmes. UN agencies, including UNICEF and WFP, could assist national governments in reaching these groups. Far more accurate data were required, however, if food aid programmes of this nature were to be systematically extended. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) could assist in assessing requests for food aid in support of a national development plan, including the availability of associated financial and technical assistance resources. FAOs could assess the impact of planned programme food aid on domestic food production and international trade. And the IMF could consider the balance of payments aspects and the internal monetary impact in the recipient country of large-scale food aid transactions. To co-ordinate all food aid at the country level, WFP could join the aid consortium or consultative group that had been set up under the auspices of the World Bank and UNDP for the major food-deficit developing countries. The study concluded that the UN systems’ ‘main contribution must come from its information and consultation activities’. These included: estimation of prospective food deficits of various kinds; early warning of food shortages; and an inter-governmental appraisal of the prospective food situation based on them. By providing a clearer picture of requirements for food aid supplies, the commodities required, the supplies likely to be available, and food aid activities currently undertaken and planned for the near future, these ‘informational activities’ should assist governments in directing their food aid operations to where the need was most urgent, and avoid any waste of resources. Both ECOSOC and the FAO Conference endorsed the aim of using existing institutions, particularly WFP, in considering arrangements for expanded multilateral food aid. At the end of its discussion of the multilateral food aid

76

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

study, the UN General Assembly requested the executive heads of the UN and FAO to give particular attention to the problems of co-ordinating all food aid programmes and to assessing the adequacy of existing multilateral institutional arrangements for handling a substantially increased volume of food aid. Food aid during the UN Second Development Decade Six months after the UN secretary-general’s multilateral food aid study was completed, the UN General Assembly passed another resolution on ‘Multilateral Food Aid’ (UN, 1968b). On this occasion, the resolution was specifically directed to WFP’s governing body. It called on the committee to give its views on four specific issues: the UN secretary-general’s and other UN studies on multilateral food aid; recommendations on food aid and related issues to assist in preparations for the ‘United Nations Second Development Decade’ of the 1970s; ways and means of improving WFP, including resource allocations to the Programme under the Food Aid Convention (FAC) 1967; and finally, examination of the possible inclusion of forms of aid in kind other than food in WFP’s resources. There was a mixture of motives for adopting this resolution so soon after the UN secretary-general’s report on multilateral food aid. Commodity aid in kind was seen as one form of multilateral resource transfers that might increase significantly during the United Nations Second Development Decade. It also provided an opportunity for another airing of the various proposals to reform and modify WFP so that it might become a major force in world food aid. The IGC requested the executive director to prepare the ground for its response to the UN General Assembly resolution. The committee agreed that he should be assisted by a group of qualified people, with the support of the United Nations, FAO and WFP secretariats.5 The group was asked ‘to consider and submit alternative policy choices for decision by the IGC’. Their report should be ‘concrete and practical’. A comprehensive draft report was prepared by the group and discussed by the IGC in April 1970 (WFP, 1970a). It was amended in the light of the comments of IGC delegations and was intended to establish a set of guidelines for WFP’s operations during the next ten years (WFP, 1970b). Food aid, development and undernourishment The IGC’s report stressed that the world food problem was an inseparable part of the broader problems of development with which the UN Second Development Decade was concerned. Economic progress would, among other things, raise food supplies, either through increased local production or through commercial imports, and increase effective demand, thereby improving nutritional levels. But despite the considerable progress expected by the

Food for Development

77

end of the UN Second Development Decade, many people in developing countries would be unable to obtain sufficient food. At the same time, FAO and OECD projections indicated that during the 1970s developed countries might produce more cereals and dairy products than could be absorbed in commercial markets. Food aid could help in transferring surpluses to needy people, subject to appropriate safeguards. The IGC gave no recommendation concerning the total volume of food aid that might be provided during in the 1970s because of difficulties of forecasting likely availabilities, and of assessing the capacity of receiving countries to use food aid effectively. However, one specific proposal was made. Supplementary food aid should be provided to 60 million of the most vulnerable people in developing countries with about $600 million of food aid, which represented about half the total flow of food aid in 1970. The IGC predicted that during the 1970s, food stocks in developing as well as developed countries would increase, thus enlarging the number of food aid donors, widening the commodity composition of food aid, and increasing the amount of reprocessing in recipient countries of the food aid commodities provided. But the volume and composition of food aid supplies in the 1970s might be expected to continue to reflect largely the stocks available in donor countries and, therefore, might be liable to considerable fluctuations. However, the annual average level around which these fluctuations might occur could be higher than the level of about $1.3 billion during the 1960s due to the impact of technological improvements in agricultural production and the increase in aid anticipated during the UN Second Development Decade. Various techniques had been proposed for increasing the involvement of food-exporting developing countries in food aid programmes. The principal alternatives were the establishment of a multilateral fund to purchase foodstuffs from developing countries, and the negotiation of international trade agreements on individual commodities, which might include special provisions for food aid.6 While recognizing that food aid might continue to be supplied mainly on a bilateral basis during the UN Second Development Decade, the IGC recommended that the UN General Assembly should draw the attention of member states to the advantages of channelling a greater proportion of food aid through multilateral channels, particularly WFP. WFP during the UN Second Development Decade The IGC considered that while WFP should continue to pursue the project approach in the use of food aid during the UN Second Development Decade, it should also experiment with other approaches to help development. However, the number of sound projects which recipient countries could formulate and implement, and their administrative and budgetary capacities to handle

78

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

project food aid, were limited. WFP and other aid programmes should help developing countries reduce those constraints. The need to improve the planning and co-ordination of emergency food relief operations was also recognized. WFP should rapidly obtain and disseminate information on the emergency food aid required by an afflicted country and shipments made for all sources. Contact points should also be established in the main donor countries and relief agencies, and close collaboration fostered with non-governmental organizations. The feasibility of setting up emergency food reserves in regions subjected to frequently recurring disasters should also be examined. The report acknowledged that while the project approach had much to commend it, it was not free of disadvantages. There were also a number of developmental needs that could be better met in other ways. A solution might be found in what was called a ‘multi-project approach’ by which projects could be considered jointly in the context of a country’s development plan.7 It would also facilitate WFP’s support for integrated regional and area development programmes. The multi-project approach had a number of advantages. WFP supplies could be switched from activities within a multi-project that were performing badly to those progressing well. Small-scale activities could be incorporated or they could be brought together in the framework on what came to be called ‘multi-purpose projects’. A number of small activities could, therefore, be supported in one approved project without creating excessive overhead costs. The IGC recognized that food aid could also support the national development plans of developing countries. Preference could be given to assisting countries whose development plans involved a considerable expansion of employment, and thus demand for food. Within this approach, food aid could be tied to an approved body of projects to be executed as part of a development plan. In addition, if there was a major expansion of WFP resources, contributions might be made on a significant scale for the establishment of national food reserves. WFP collaboration with the United Nations and its specialized agencies ‘should be deepened and become more sustained’. Closer attention should be given to: the association of WFP assistance with the technical services provided by the United Nations and its specialized agencies; the formulation by them of projects within their own mandates, which could benefit from WFP assistance; provision of technical advice and support during the implementation of WFP-supported projects; and, specifically, closer collaboration with UNICEF. The IGC also called for closer collaboration between WFP and international organizations outside the UN system and with bilateral food aid programmes. WFP aid had not been provided in association with food aid from other

Food for Development

79

programmes during its experimental period because of the need to evaluate WFP assistance by itself before a decision was taken to continue the life of the Programme. This was no longer necessary. WFP could take part in consultative groups and consortia, and in jointly-financed projects, in which its food aid could be combined with bilateral assistance. Collaboration with nongovernmental organizations should also be ‘substantially increased’. Non-food aid in kind The proposal that WFP should provide non-food items in kind, in addition to food commodities, proved to be a controversial issue. The IGC discussed the subject extensively in 1968 following a detailed study by FAO in the previous year (FAO, 1967; Kristenson, 1968; WFP, 1968a; 1969a). The subject was revived again in 1974 with the call for a world fertilizer fund following a UN General Assembly special session on raw materials and development (WFP, 1974c, p. 30). The non-food items that might be channelled through WFP were identified as fertilizers, pesticides, specific types of farm machinery and storage equipment and materials. The impact of WFP-assisted projects could be considerably enhanced if food aid was accompanied by these non-food inputs. More aid could be provided by supplying non-food items at concessional prices than by providing food aid alone, and surplus capacity in developed countries would be utilized, thereby creating greater employment. The IGC acknowledged that within the UN system, WFP was the most appropriate body for channelling aid in kind. However, the committee concluded that in view of the lack of interest shown by most potential donors in making non-food aid in kind available to WFP, the danger of such aid displacing pledges in food, and the desirability of WFP concentrating its efforts on food aid, it was inadvisable to embark on changes in WFP’s operations. If new developments occurred during the 1970s, however, the IGC would be prepared to re-examine the question of expanding WFP operations to include non-food items. No new developments occurred to cause the governing body to change its mind. Instead, WFP set up a non-food items unit in 1974 to obtain non-food items for WFP-assisted development projects and emergency operations. Nonfood items directly related to WFP food aid were provided, such as trucks to transport food from ports and border stations to project sites and distribution centres, storage and packaging facilities, insecticides and fumigation materials, and kitchen and canteen equipment. Tools, equipment and materials needed to implement WFP-assisted development projects were also supplied. Donors mainly provided non-food items in kind but some also made cash grants available to WFP on an annual basis for the purchase of the items required (WFP, 1975f; 1984h; 1985g).

80

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

World Food Conference 1974: a major watershed No one predicted a world food crisis, which severely restricted WFP activities, when the IGC completed its report in 1970. A new agenda was to be imposed on WFP. Events leading up to the world food crisis of the early 1970s demonstrated how unpredictable and fragile the world food security situation was, and how quickly it could change.8 World grain markets continued to suffer from heavy surpluses at the outset of the 1970s. There was an abrupt change in 1972, however, when a combination of factors came together causing a negative chain reaction. Adverse weather conditions affected production in several parts of the world simultaneously. The sudden drop in production occurred at a time when Canada and the United States were grappling with supplymanagement programmes designed to bring down their large food surpluses by taking land out of food production. The former Soviet Union, after a disastrous food harvest in 1972, became a major grains importer when it purchased over 17 million tons of wheat at concessional prices, mainly from the United States (Morgan, 1979). This led to a record level of world trade in cereals, which could only be achieved by drawing on food stocks, which were reduced to their lowest levels in over two decades. Prices, triggered off by Soviet Union purchases, rose abruptly to four times their previous level. At the same time, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised oil prices to unprecedented levels, which had the immediate effect of increasing fertilizer and transportation costs. Against this background, it was projected that food aid would be needed for ‘at least for the next decade’ (UN, 1974b, p. 187). A major problem, however, was instability and a marked reduction in food aid supplies. From a maximum of 16.8 million tons of cereals in 1964/65, food aid dropped to less than seven million tons in 1973/74.9 In effect, food aid flows shrank at a time when they were most needed. In September 1973, US secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, proposed that a world conference should be convened under United Nations auspices to address the crisis. The UN General Assembly agreed and an intergovernmental ‘United Nations World Food Conference’ was held at the ministerial level in Rome, Italy in November 1974 (UN, 1973). Numerous proposals for national and international action were drawn up before the conference was convened (UN, 1974a,b). In the event, the conference did not reach agreement on the overarching strategy and institutional arrangements proposed for achieving world food security. However, it did adopt 23 resolutions relating to various aspects of the world food problem (UN, 1975a). One of the resolutions concerned ‘An improved policy for food aid’. The resolution recognized that food aid ‘will continue to be needed, primarily for

Food for Development

81

meeting emergency and nutritional needs and for stimulating rural employment through development projects’. But a longer-term policy was required to ensure a reasonable degree of continuity in physical food aid supplies. (The developmental aspects of the resolution, and of the conference generally, are dealt with here; the emergency food aid aspects are considered in the next chapter.) Donor countries were urged to ‘accept and implement the concept of forward planning of food aid’. A target was established of ‘at least ten million tons of grains a year, starting from 1975, and also … adequate quantities of other food commodities’. A proposal to provide a minimum share of the annual food aid target (20 per cent was indicted) to WFP on an assured basis was not approved (UN, 1974b, p. 193). Instead, donors were urged ‘to channel a more significant proportion of food aid through WFP’. The need to co-ordinate all food aid policies and programmes was also recognized. For this purpose, it was recommended that the IGC should be reconstituted as the ‘Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes’ (CFA) (FAO, 1975; UN, 1975b). In addition to carrying out the functions of the IGC regarding the administration and supervision of WFP, the CFA would undertake the wider functions of: providing a forum for intergovernmental consultations on national and international food aid policies and programmes, especially with a view to improving co-ordination between bilateral and multilateral food aid; reviewing trends in food aid requirements and availabilities; and recommending to governments improvements in food aid policies and programmes on such matters as programme priorities, the composition of food aid commodities and other related subjects. A proposal to establish a ‘world food authority’ was not approved. Instead, a ‘World Food Council’ (WFC) was recommended, at the ministerial level, as a UN body to report to the UN General Assembly on implementation of the World Food Conference resolutions and to serve as a co-ordinating mechanism for all UN agencies on policies concerning food production, nutrition, food security and food aid. A number of the food aid recommendations of the conference were not implemented. It was to take a decade before the annual ten million ton target of food aid in cereals was reached (WFP, 1984a). Nevertheless, the conference was to provide a major watershed in WFP’s development. An immediate effect was a substantial increase in WFP’s resources as several donors increased their contributions, making it at one time the largest source of grant aid in the United Nations system. At the same time, its responsibilities were considerably expanded and widened. There was no further discussion on the role that WFP might play ‘beyond the project approach’, or to its conversion into something akin to a ‘world food fund’. However, the CFA was established in 1976, giving

82

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

the WFP secretariat the much wider responsibilities of servicing a new governing body charged with providing a forum for discussion on all food aid policies and programmes. The results of CFA deliberations were to be conveyed to governments, not directly, but through the WFC. And yet another FAO committee was established, the ‘Committee on World Food Security’, adding a further body to those already concerned with food aid issues, and to problems of institutional incoherence in international discussions and decisions regarding food aid (see Chapter 9). At the request of the WFC (UN, 1976a), and after extensive debate, the newly constituted CFA unanimously agreed on a set of ‘guidelines and criteria’ for all food aid as a framework for implementing the resolution of the World Food Conference on an improved policy for food aid. Two issues caused protracted discussion: the relative priority to be given to food aid in support of food security schemes in developing countries; and the concept of forward planning of food aid on a multi-annual basis (WFP, 1979a, pp. 5–8; 1979a, p. 6). Although the guidelines and criteria were not legally binding, they recommended that two priorities should be given in the allocation and use of food aid: first, to low-income, food-deficit countries; and secondly, to meeting emergencies, to projects designed to increase agricultural, especially food, production, employment and incomes, and to nutrition intervention programmes. Although they were not closely followed by bilateral food aid programmes, the guidelines and criteria were to provide the framework for WFP assistance for the next 20 years.

The next twenty years: institutionalizing project food aid By the end of the first decade of WFP operations in 1972, $1.2 billion of assistance had been committed to 540 development projects in 94 developing countries, and annual food aid disbursements had reached $170 million. An estimated 24 million people had benefited directly from WFP assistance (WFP, 1973a). The next ten years were to witness a steady growth, refinement and institutionalization of WFP project food aid for development, so that by 1982, WFP had committed about $5.3 billion of assistance to over 1,100 development projects in 114 developing countries, directly benefiting 94 million people (WFP, 1983a). WFP became one of the major funding programmes of the United Nations system and a principal source of grant aid to the poorest sections of the populations of developing countries. By the end of the first 30 years of operations in 1992, WFP had invested over $13 billion (involving more than 40 million tons of food) in 1,600 development projects to combat hunger and promote economic and social development throughout the developing world. In 1992 alone, WFP commitments

Food for Development

83

to on-going development projects totalled $3 billion and provided food to an estimated 52 million people. WFP was the largest source of grant development assistance to the poor in developing countries, as well as the principal channel for emergency aid, in the United Nations system. In the process, three notable distinction stood out. WFP was the largest source of assistance within the United Nations system to development projects involving and benefiting poor women in developing countries; the largest provider of grant assistance for environmental protection and improvement activities in developing countries; and the largest purchaser of food and services in developing countries among United Nations agencies, and a major supporter of South–South trade (WFP, 1993a). Project food aid was not without its critics (see, for example, Jackson, 1982). But WFP received high praise when its work was periodically reviewed by the FAO Council and Conference and by ECOSOC and the UN General Assembly. A comprehensive review was conducted to strengthen the steps in WFP’s projects cycle from identification, preparation, appraisal and approval of WFPassisted development projects to their implementation, monitoring and evaluation (WFP, 1984i). Emphasis was given to placing poor and food-insecure people at the centre of all projects. A sequence of key questions were raised at the inception of their formulation: who are the poor and food-insecure; why are they poor and food-insecure; what are the causes of their condition; is food aid required; and, if so, in what ways and on what terms and conditions should it be provided? Over the first 30 years of WFP operations, changes were manifested in several ways. There was a gradual shift in focus to Sub-Saharan Africa, which became the main recipient of WFP development assistance, followed by South and East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe, the Middle East and the Commonwealth of Independent States (see Table 5.2). A broad category of agricultural and rural development projects received about two-thirds of WFP development aid commitments, while projects for human resource development received one-third (see Table 5.3). There was a deliberate attempt to allocate development commitments to the neediest people in the poorest countries. Priority was therefore given to countries classified as least-developed, and to low-income, food-deficit countries, to which an increasing proportion of WFP development aid was allotted (see Figure 5.1). A marked difference developed among the recipient regions in the ways in which WFP food aid was used (see Figure 5.2). While the largest share of WFP assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe, the Middle East and the Commonwealth of Independent States went to emergency operations, the largest share in the Asia and Pacific region went to directly productive projects, and in Latin America and the Caribbean to human resource development.

84

Table 5.2 WFP development commitments by region, 1963–95 (values in US$ million)

Year 1963–75 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Total commitments

Sub-Saharan Africa Value (%)

1,822 642 367 392 492 479 543 613 696 925 642 629 621 779 575 480 448 421 253 254 248

323 157 60 120 193 152 239 246 168 325 192 241 227 266 141 143 165 168 115 53 58

18 24 16 31 39 32 44 40 24 35 30 38 37 34 25 30 37 40 46 21 23

South and East Asia Value (%) 570 226 150 129 234 113 156 179 291 339 238 163 205 282 184 164 133 136 59 129 143

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States (ex-Soviet Union). % – Share of total commitments in the year. Source: World Food Programme.

31 35 41 33 48 23 29 29 42 37 37 26 33 36 32 34 30 32 23 51 58

Latin America and the Caribbean Value (%) 245 30 51 44 5 85 36 34 112 137 62 110 110 121 106 113 89 74 49 52 30

13 5 14 11 1 18 7 6 16 15 10 17 18 16 18 24 20 18 19 20 12

Europe, Middle East and CIS Value (%) 685 229 106 99 60 129 112 154 124 125 151 116 79 110 144 60 61 43 30 20 17

38 36 29 25 12 27 21 25 18 13 23 18 13 14 25 12 13 10 12 8 7

Table 5.3 WFP commitments by category of development project, 1963–95 (values in US$ million) Human resource development Secondary MCH and and other primary educational Subtotal schools training

Agricultural and rural development

Year

1963–75 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Total commitments

Agricultural production

Rural infrastructure

Settlement

Food reserves

Value

Value

(%)

Value

Value

(%)

Value

1,822 642 367 392 492 479 543 613 696 925 642 629 621 779 575 480 448 421 253 254 248

661 341 125 162 217 120 202 326 343 431 345 348 211 314 326 141 189 104 82 67 118

36 53 34 41 44 25 37 53 49 47 54 55 34 40 57 29 42 25 32 26 48

260 98 35 30 62 58 105 61 63 80 102 33 70 70 21 51 92 82 22 27 40

196 40 56 36 44 65 128 70 66 39 37 80 17 49 39 18 5 4 1 19 –

11 7 15 9 9 13 24 11 10 4 6 13 3 6 7 4 1 1 – 8 –

39 – 6 – 4 6 14 10 – 5 15 49 – – 1 – 6 – – 3 –

Source: World Food Programme.

15 15 9 8 13 12 19 10 9 9 16 5 11 9 4 11 21 19 9 11 16

Industry and mining

(%) Value (%)

Value (%)

Value

(%)

Value

(%) Value

(%)

3 – 2 – 1 1 3 2 – 0 2 8 – – — – 1 – – 1 –

504 136 125 139 149 216 75 139 208 332 107 83 307 294 162 260 134 230 132 73 54

140 27 20 25 16 14 19 7 15 25 37 37 16 52 26 10 22 1 16 65 36

8 4 6 6 3 3 3 1 2 3 6 6 3 7 5 2 5 — 6 25 14

644 163 145 164 165 230 94 146 223 357 144 120 323 346 188 270 156 231 148 138 90

35 25 40 42 33 48 17 24 32 39 22 19 52 44 33 56 35 55 58 54 36

1 – — – – – – – – 2 – – – – – – – – – – –

1160 479 222 228 327 249 449 467 472 555 499 510 298 433 388 210 292 190 105 116 158

64 75 60 58 67 52 83 76 68 60 78 81 48 56 67 44 65 45 42 46 64

28 21 34 36 30 45 14 23 30 36 16 13 49 38 28 54 30 55 52 29 22

16 – 1 – – – – – – 14 – – – – – – – – – – –

85

MCH – Mother and child health centres. — Less than 1%.

(%)

Subtotal

Other

86

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

(%) 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 19 76 19 77 19 78 19 79 19 80 19 81 19 82 19 83 19 84 19 85 19 86 19 87 19 88 19 89 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95

0

Low-Income, Food-Deficit Countries Least-Developed Countries

Other Developing Countries

Figure 5.1 Share of WFP development commitments by country group, 1976–95 Source: World Food Programme.

Functions of food aid WFP experience in providing assistance to development projects showed that food aid could have a number of functions in achieving different objectives. And each function raised different issue for project design, implementation and evaluation (Katone-Apte and Maxwell, 1983). At any point in time, a given unit of food aid could only achieve one function, but it was possible for food aid supplied to a development project to serve a number of functions. The main functions of WFP project food assistance were identified as:












nutrition improvement when rations were supplied to people with deficient diets; income transfer to workers on labour-intensive works projects who received part, or in some special cases, all of their wages in food rations for themselves and their families; incentive or enabling participants to engage in activities on their own land, or in community development projects, or for children and students to attend school, other educational institutions and training centres; tiding over farmers engaged in transforming their traditional farming system or settlers on newly developed land during the period until their crops came into production; budgetary support to governments in recipient countries by releasing funds previously allocated for uses now met by food aid, or by creating funds through the sale of WFP food commodities; and

Food for Development

Sub-Saharan Africa

87

Asia and Pacific

18%

14% 4%

22% 4%

60%

18% 60%

Human Resource Development Total 22% Economic and Social Infrastructure

43%

6%

Directly Productive Projects

29%

Relief and Emergency Operations

Europe, Middle East & CIS

Latin America and Caribbean

19%

9% 22%

4%

49% 51% 20%

26%

Figure 5.2 Regional WFP commitments for development projects and relief and emergency operations, 1963–95 (by value) CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States (ex-Soviet Union). Source: World Food Programme.


support for policy change by recipient governments, as in structural and sec-

tor adjustment programmes. These functions were performed through two main groups of development projects: agricultural and rural development projects, principally, but not only, through food-for-work programmes; and projects for the development of human resources involving improvements in health, nutrition, education and training. Preference was given to the first group of projects as they promised to provide employment and income for the poor, yield quick returns, generate demand for food, and contribute toward self-reliance. Projects in the second group were less favoured because of their open-ended

88

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

nature, and the difficulties of assessing benefits. Three other types of projects received WFP assistance – animal production, industrial development and the establishment and maintenance of food reserves – but these involved only a small part of WFP assistance, and have largely been discontinued (see Statistical Appendix tables 1 and 2). Food-for-work programmes Access by the poor to food and work for the construction of essential infrastructure and the accumulation of assets has long been seen, both in economic theory and in practice, to be an effective means of alleviating hunger and poverty and attaining food security. The model is deceptively simple (Kahn, 1931; Shaw, 1995). Obtaining adequate food dominates the lives of poor, food-insecure people. Promoting the productive use of their most abundant resource – their own labour – for increasing their income and assets can lead to self-reliance and to equitable economic and social development. Constructing and maintaining basic infrastructure is essential for economic growth. Labour-intensive work programmes that provide food and employment for the poor are therefore seen as the cement that holds the model together. Yet this has proved to be a controversial arena in both theoretical and practical terms. The intensity of the controversy, and the fact that food-aided labour-intensive works involve a concatenation of many factors, have made generalizations difficult, leading to the conclusion that success or failure depended on the site-specific situation in each case. It is therefore not surprising that WFP’s experience with food-for-work (FFW) programmes has been mixed. In assessing this experience, it is necessary to distinguish between two components: the types of work implemented; and the FFW programmes designed to support the labour involved in those activities. Types of works activity Seen from the perspective of their main objectives, FFW programmes may be classified as follows (World Bank, 1976, pp. 14–16):


Relief programmes which respond to emergency situations and are mainly designed to provide food and employment, instead of relief food handouts, to supplement or replace sources of employment and income reduced or destroyed by disasters, and to help rebuild local infrastructure and assets.
Low-cost infrastructure and asset-creation programmes where the main emphasis is on the infrastructure or assets constructed or repaired, rather than on the immediate welfare of the workers involved.

Food for Development

89




Income-augmenting programmes that supplement the normal earning activities of those they employ, mostly in rural areas. They thus take account of seasonal employment patterns and involve activities that can either be completed quickly or interrupted during periods of high agricultural activity.
Long-term employment-creation programmes designed to absorb structural unemployment and are associated with other activities, such as training for specific jobs, land reclamation and improvement measures, and relief for high levels of urban unemployment. Seen from the perspective of the food aid provided, there have been four main types of WFP FFW programmes:


Labour-intensive public works schemes in which food is provided as part, or in some cases all, of the wage. Normally, a family food ration has been provided directly to workers in return for work performed, based on nutritional requirements, but there have been cases where food commodities have been sold to workers at subsidized prices or where workers have received cash wages and bought food commodities supplied by WFP at reduced prices through fair-price shops located close to work sites. In accordance with the provisions of the ILO convention governing the protection of wages (ILO, 1949), normally at least half of workers’ wages should be paid in cash, although there have been special circumstances in which all workers’ wages have been paid in food rations.
Community development programmes for which food has been provided as an incentive for, or to enable, members of poor communities to work together on the creation or improvement of infrastructure for the benefit to the community as a whole. As a rule of thumb, these voluntary workers were required to work a minimum of 24 hours a week for a basic WFP family ration. Participants working for lesser periods were entitled to a supplementary ration in the form, for example, of selected protein-rich commodities to improve the dietary standard, although flexibility was allowed to take account of the precise conditions of each project. The food ration was determined by nutritional need (WFP, 1967c).
Farm improvement and settlement programmes involving farm households working on their own lands, or settlers in new agricultural schemes, where WFP family rations have been provided during the period when the farming system has been transformed and land taken out of production, and new lands brought into production.
Reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes following natural or man-made disasters when the able-bodied victims have been employed in cleaning up the effects of the disasters for a short period of six months to one year, during which WFP family rations have been provided. These programmes

90

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

may be followed by full-fledged development project in which prolonged employment might be provided under one of the three categories mentioned above. Most FFW programmes supported by WFP have been in rural areas, although projects in urban areas have also been supported to alleviate poverty and create employment, mainly in slum clearance and urban renewal projects. A major problem has been to devise schemes that make permanent improvement in the lives and livelihoods of the urban poor, avoid leakage, and ensure that food reaches the intended beneficiaries, and is not sold, in locations of functioning markets (Shaw et al., 1994). Infrastructure is one of the major sectors of economic activity in developing countries (Ahmed and Donovan, 1992). Its construction, rehabilitation and maintenance account for a significant share of domestic gross capital formation, and contributing between 3 and 8 per cent to GDP (Gaude and Watzlawick, 1992). Returns to investment have been seriously eroded through the rapid deterioration of the infrastructure created. WFP has therefore had a direct involvement in maintenance and rehabilitation activities from the start of its operations (Jennings, 1987; Jennings and Shaw, 1987).

Assessing FFW performance There is a considerable literature on FFW programmes.10 The overall consensus is that FFW programmes can bring food, employment and incomes to poor people if the local conditions are right (Lewis, 1954; Schultz, 1964; Costa et al., 1977; Maxwell, 1978a; WFP, 1978a; Clay and Singer, 1985; Thomas, 1985; Gaude et al., 1987; Bryson et al., 1991; ILO, 1992). The synergistic relationship between increased food consumption, greater work capacity and productivity, and hence higher output and incomes, has been emphasized (FAO, 1962a; Szal and Thorbecke, 1985) but has also been challenged, with a call for more concern to be placed on the quality of the diet and less on the quantity of food intake (Edmundson and Sukhatme, 1990). Specific advantages have been distinguished in the assessments of FFW programmes (WFP, 1978a, pp. 30–2). There is a general macro-economic advantage in the sense that payment in food eliminates or reduces the demand for other commodities, and by insulating FFW programmes financially from the rest of the economy, prevents any disincentive effect on domestic agriculture or any inflationary effect on the local economy. Payment in food can act as an incentive for local participation in works programmes. Poor communities have literally to earn their daily bread. If their basic food needs are provided through food aid, this releases their labour, which can be invested in farm improvement, community development projects or public works programmes.

Food for Development

91

Payment in food can have a favourable nutritional effect by increasing the proportion of income devoted to nutritious foods. These advantages might justify the use of the FFW mode, even if at greater cost and with lower productivity than payment in cash. FFW programmes have been supported by WFP as one approach to mitigating the social costs of economic adjustment. They have also carried special benefits for women in the work force (see section on gender benefits below). A detailed study of WFP assistance for employment, carried out by ILO and WFP on the occasion of the ILO Conference on Employment, Income Distribution, Social Progress and the International Division of Labour in 1976, concluded: WFP has made, and is making, a valuable contribution to the utilization of food aid to generate additional income and employment, particularly for the poor who are more likely than others to find the terms on which WFP-supported projects offer employment acceptable; most of these projects therefore tend to make for greater equality of income distribution. The programme tends to counteract widespread biases in favour of capital-intensive technology, and to promote a labour-intensive development pattern, though this is not to say that fuller employment, and fairer income distribution, are its only objectives. It has directly provided employment for something of the order of six million people. Analysis shows that there must also be quite considerable indirect income and employment effects. (WFP, 1976b, p. 43)11 The study observed that food aid alone should not be expected to provide the solution to filling the vast gap in employment opportunities. In some countries, however, particularly the smaller developing nations, and in some sectors of national economies, the impact of WFP aid on employment had been significant. WFP had also demonstrated lines of attack on unemployment and under-employment that could be further developed through national and international efforts. Against these potential advantages, a number of criticisms of FFW programmes have been made. FFW involves greater costs and administrative burdens than payment in cash and reliance on the market to supply food to project workers, supplemented, if necessary, with an injection of food aid (Drèze and Sen, 1989). Food aid commodities distributed as payment in kind might be unpopular because they are inappropriate to the local diet. FFW can raise complex political, social and cultural issues. It might be considered degrading or as harking back to the colonial past. But food has been widely accepted as an addition to cash wages, or as an incentive to self-help ventures. In some circumstances it is preferred, particularly when food is in short supply,

92

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

and where markets are functioning poorly and food prices high (WFP and ADB, 1987). Payment of wages in kind may lead to discontent and lower productivity rates. A fall in food prices can lead to a decline in the real value of the food ration paid to workers. And disruptions in food supply may lead to delays in food ration payments. Much of the criticism levelled against FFW programmes may apply to public works programmes generally. Financial, technical and administrative resources are often inadequate to implement them effectively. Money might not be available to pay the cash component of wages and part of the food rations provided may be sold to meet non-food needs. And the work programmes may not be sustainable when food aid comes to an end. A major reason for the poor work performance of many FFW programmes has been that they have been started as a relief measure for abjectly poor and disadvantaged people during and after emergencies. The activities undertaken have often been more designed to provide welfare to the beneficiaries than as an integral part of development work. Efficiency has therefore been compromised. In these cases, it would be more appropriate to evaluate results in terms of the welfare benefits transferred than of physical output produced. Other prominent and recurring criticisms of FFW programmes have been that: they have often not reached the poorest of the poor; they have tended to create only temporary work; the infrastructure and assets created have benefited more the better-off sections of the population; and more attention should be given to in-depth assessment of their performance. A paradox has been noted that productivity is much higher in what might be called ‘foodfor-farmers and settlers’ programmes but that they tend not to reach the very poor (Stevens, 1979, pp. 102–34). Several reasons have been identified for low productivity. Motivation might be poor, especially if wages are below market levels, or if workers do not derive benefit from the activities undertaken. Productivity may be held down by the relief character of the FFW programmes and by the poor condition of the workers they attract. Administration and supervision may be inadequate, leading to inefficient use of resources. And workers may be poorly equipped with tools and insufficiently trained. However, WFP experience with FFW programmes has demonstrated that they can: effectively target poor and destitute people; generate jobs quickly; significantly augment incomes of the really poor; and, when properly designed and managed, can yield important productivity increases. More attention is now being given to targeting and assessment for which food insecurity and vulnerability information and mapping systems and appropriate indicators have been developed (FAO, 1998; Yohannes and Webb, 1999). Much of the early inspiration for FFW programmes came from Asia, particularly China and the Indian sub-continent (Dreze, 1988; Shaw and Clay, 1993, pp. 57–73; WFP, 1994e; 1994i; Zhu Ling and Jiang Zhongyi, 1995). The relative success of the Chinese and Indian experience may be largely attributed to

Food for Development

93

some key factors. A policy commitment has been made at the highest political level to address the problems of poverty and emergencies as a matter of priority. Financial resources have been committed that can be drawn upon quickly in times of need. A strong local government administration has been in place to carry out poverty alleviation and emergency programmes quickly and efficiently. And finally, a shelf of well-designed, labour-intensive work, programmes has been readily available that can be executed speedily. The experience of the national FFW programme for water and land development in Bangladesh, which WFP has been supporting since 1975, has also been particularly illuminating (Hossain and Akash, 1993). Although begun in order to provide relief to large numbers of people rendered destitute by acute famine and the war of independence in 1974, the programme was envisaged to change gradually over time to become a development undertaking. As Bangladesh is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world, it was also designed so that it could be expanded rapidly to provide food and employment for the victims of recurrent natural emergencies. WFP commissioned an in-depth study of the FFW programme, which was conducted jointly by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in the early 1980s, one of the few such studies to have been carried out (BIDS and IFPRI, 1985; Hossain and Akash, 1993). The study showed impressive short-term benefits. FFW activities were undertaken during the dry season (mid-December to midMay). Workers were paid entirely in wheat. The FFW programme had considerable success in reaching the target group of very poor people. Net income earnings of participant households were 55 per cent higher during the work period than they would have been in the absence of FFW. They were helped to get out of the debt trap and the cycle of abject poverty. While immediate and relief benefits of the FFW programme had been impressive, the longer-term developmental impact were short of expectation (Ahmad, 1983). A special effort was required to move the programme from relief to development. A government/donor task force was established on ‘Strengthening the Institutions for Food Assisted Development’ (SIFAD) in 1988 (Hyder, 1996). It recommended: better integration of food aid resources into the national and sectoral planning process; reinforcement of the role of the line ministries in implementing food aid programmes; enhancement of the capacity of local authorities to use food aid effectively; more rigorous appraisal of food-aided projects so that they were technically and economically sound and socially relevant; greater diversity in the use of food aid; and reinforcement of the monitoring and assessment process, with a gradual shift in responsibility from donors to the government (SIFAD, 1989). With some exceptions, FFW programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa have been much smaller and less structured than in Asia. The concept of a rural employment-led equitable growth strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa supported by food

94

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

aid was presented to the CFA session in May/June 1984 based on the policy and research work of IFPRI (Mellor, 1983; WFP, 1984f ), which led to the conclusion that: Three central problems facing Africa today – food security, growing unemployment, and poor infrastructure – need to be, and can be, addressed simultaneously by appropriate action through labour-intensive public works programs … Targeted food, income, and health interventions, along with public works programs, emerge as complementary instruments for improving economic growth, food availability, and nutrition in many African countries. (von Braun, Teklu and Webb, 1991, p. ix) The experience of FFW programmes in Ethiopia, the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, is especially revealing, particularly concerning the food versus cash wage debate (Webb and von Braun, 1994, pp. 106–14; Holt, 1995). Studies found that most participants preferred a food wage. Given that income transfer was a key objective, the real value of the family rations provided as wages was found to be higher than the purchasing power of cash wages. Moreover, food wages were more urgently needed, and more popular than cash wages would have been, particularly during the peak of the Ethiopian famine in 1985–6. Where market integration was poor, they operated very differently from one region to the next. Food transfers in public works programmes played a valuable role in regions in which markets were most constrained. A cash-for-food pilot initiative was tried out in certain parts of Ethiopia on the assumption that lack of purchasing power, rather than food, was the cause of hardship. The monthly payments proved to be insufficient to cover subsistence requirements for an entire month, and participants tried to earn extra income from other sources. Payments were often delayed or interrupted for several months, which forced many households to borrow money from moneylenders against the value of the next cash payment at interest rates averaging 100 per cent, which severely reduced the quantity of food that could be purchased. Cash recipients had difficulty in obtaining food from distant food markets and stimulating the flow of food from surplus to deficit regions, which was exacerbated by government policy of restricting grain movement between localities during the famine. Many households had to buy food locally, causing local inflation of food prices. Many participants therefore favoured receiving wages in grain at their doorstep than face the problems associated with cash payments. Controversy still surrounds FFW programmes (Clay, 1986). The conclusions of a major World Bank study undertaken over 30 years ago are still broadly valid (World Bank, 1976, pp. 77–8). More attention has been given to the problems encountered in FFW public works programmes than to their potential.

Food for Development

95

A realistic assessment of their potential role is required, recognizing both their strengths and limitations, and detailed attention to the variety of political and management problems that stand between promise and fulfilment. Both advocates and critics, in seeking to make generalizations, underestimate the overwhelming importance of the specific, temporal, economic, social and political context within which FFW programmes are implemented. It is interesting to note that the IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank have joined with WFP in supporting the expansion of employment-generating public works programmes targeted on poor households as an effective way of mitigating the social costs of the economic crisis of the mid-1990s in several Asian countries (Gupta et al., 1998). The development of human resources Encouraged by the international community and guided by scientific opinion, WFP has given high priority to nutrition-improvement projects. Scientific evidence has shown that adequate nutrition and good health are crucial to the quality of life and general well-being of people, particularly in the early stages of life (Scrimshaw, 1997). They also have important social and economic implications for developing countries (Belli, 1971; Berg, 1981; Biswas and PinstrupAndersen, 1986). Adequate dietary intake (including micronutrients) at critical times of life is a major factor in determining physical and mental development and resistance to disease. And education and training are regarded as essential factors for the development of human resources, which has come to be regarded as a precondition for economic progress (UN, 1962c). Four target groups were identified in WFP human resource development projects: 1. pregnant women, nursing mothers and pre-school children; 2. primary school children; 3. students and trainees in post-primary educational and training institutions; and 4. patients in hospitals and primary health programmes. The types of projects and the uses of food aid have differed for each of these groups. Nutrition improvement for mothers and pre-school children Pregnant and nursing women and pre-school children are the most vulnerable to nutritional and health deficiencies in the developing world. Top priority has therefore been assigned to helping them (WFP, 1972b,c). By the end of 1995, WFP had committed assistance valued at $1.5 billion to 163 projects in this category (see Statistical Appendix 1). Providing them with food supplements has

96

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

been shown to be highly cost-effective in protecting the lives and health of young children (Gwatkin et al., 1980; UNICEF, 1985; Berg, 1987; Rivera, 1993). But controversy has remained in both theory and practice (Payne, 1986; 1987). And while increased household income can have a positive effect on food intake, it can have a less robust effect on the nutritional status of certain household members, particularly women and children. Other factors could therefore account for raising their nutritional status (Marek, 1992). With technical assistance from FAO’s Food and Nutrition Division, guidelines were established for WFP-assisted supplementary feeding programmes for mothers and pre-school children (Gongora and Shaw, 1977; Shaw, 1985; Katona-Apte, 1993; WFP, 1995c). Food supplements for young children were calculated to provide about half their daily energy, and most of their protein, requirements. For mothers, the aim was to supply the whole of their additional energy and protein requirements for up to six months of pregnancy and six months of lactation. In extreme situations, however, a full basic ration has been provided as beneficiaries had little food of their own. WFP food rations have been provided for women to take home, although there has also been supervised feeding at distribution centres. As a matter of policy, WFP has encouraged breast feeding and promoted appropriate weaning practices. Infant formulas and breastmilk substitutes or weaning foods have been provided only in special cases. Early experience in producing new food mixtures with WFP aid to relieve child malnutrition showed that they were generally unsuited to reach low-income groups through the normal retail trade as they were too expensive (Orr, 1977). Instead, WFP assistance was provided in order to promote and support good weaning practices based on locally-produced foods. Where skim milk powder was provided (enriched with Vitamin A), mothers were encouraged to use it as an additive to a weaning gruel, and not as a reconstituted drink, to avoid problems arising from unsafe drinking-water and unclean feeding bottles. Lactose-intolerance has been encountered but has not posed a major problems (Dustin, 1982). Blended foods have been supplied for older babies and young children. Cooking time has been reduced through providing processed foods, which is particularly important where fuel is limited and costly. Considerable experience has been obtained over the past four decades in the execution of these supplementary feeding programmes by WFP, bilateral agencies and NGOs (see WFP, 1978a; Maxwell, 1978b; WFP, 1979f; Burgess, 1982; Clay and Singer, 1985; Figa-Talamanca, 1985; Singer and Longhurst, 1986). Positive results have emerged. Observable improvements in the nutritional status of mothers and pre-school children have been noted. The birth-weights of infants who have received food supplements regularly have increased. Mothers have been attracted to distribution centres, where they have received health and nutrition education and child-care guidance, and they and their

Food for Development

97

children have been immunized, checked and screened, and serious cases of malnutrition detected and treated. WFP aid has played a catalytic role in helping to establish closer co-operation among different government ministries and departments so that the interrelationships of nutrition, health and education have been brought together in a ‘seamless web’ of concerns in a relationship of ‘cumulative causation’ (World Bank, 1980). The provision of food aid has encouraged governments to invest more in health and nutrition services for the poor. Involvement of local communities has been fostered and supported, thereby helping to build up local capacity and institutions. Organizational, managerial and logistical systems have been established, often for the first time, to reach out to the poor and provide them with food and basic health and nutrition services. Day-care centres have been established for young children, thereby easing the burden on women working outside the home, facilitating their employment in income-earning activities, and providing a vehicle for controlling the health and nutrition of their children. A significant, ‘silent’ achievement has been the prevention of blindness in children. On the advice of WHO, WFP has supplied dried skimmed milk enriched with Vitamin A since the 1970s (WHO, 1976). WFP was able to prevent blindness in many cases not only by its own action but also indirectly by virtue of the general value of its governing body recommendations to other aid organizations. WFP could therefore take credit for having initiated one of the most effective single measures leading to the prevention of one of the world’s prevalent forms of blindness.12 A number of criticisms have been made, however, concerning the effectiveness of supplementary feeding programmes for mothers and pre-school children. Their outreach has been limited to the distribution network and logistical facilities available. Reaching those in greatest need has, therefore, been particularly difficult. Food supplies have been irregular or disrupted. Insufficient attention has been given to providing micronutrients, including iron and iodine, as well as Vitamin A, as an integral part of supplementary rations. Insufficient has been known about the distribution and use of foods within the household (Katone-Apte, 1983). Take-home rations have been shared among household members, thereby diluting their effect. Supplementary feeding programmes have been accused of creating a mentality of dependence rather than a spirit of self-reliance, and may have adverse effects on dietary patterns and food habits, leading to dependence on imported foods and a decrease in breast feeding (Stewart, 1986). But many factors can create these adverse effects, and in the absence of scientifically varifiable data, it has been difficult to extricate the precise role of food aid (Coles, 1984). In appropriate cases, it might be more beneficial to select food supplements on the basis of their maximum income-transfer effect than on their nutritional content

98

The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

(Reutlinger, 1983; Reutlinger and Katone-Apte, 1983). Or low-status, but nutritious, foods might be provided that are mainly consumed by the poor. Lack of adequate health services, nutrition education and training raise other issues. If supplementary feeding programmes are not associated with well-designed health services and nutrition education, then, at best, they may only help, as a temporary measure, to prevent a decline in nutritional status. Shortage of trained staff can result in inadequate supervision, defective recording and reporting, and lack of compilation and analysis of data. In such situations, food aid becomes merely a handout and stimulates a curative rather than preventive approach to removing the effects of nutritional deficiencies. In the absence of adequate staff, medical and health personnel may be diverted from carrying out their professional duties to supervise the distribution of food. WFP has provided advice on the organization and management of food distribution centres and has encouraged staff training. And FAO’s Food and Nutrition Division has provided training programmes and manuals for personnel engaged in group feeding programmes (FAO, 1981; 1993). Considering the large amount of food aid that has been invested in such programmes, there have been few good, scientific studies of their impact (Sahn and Pestronk, 1979; Mason et al., 1982). Important, sometimes unintended, benefits may not be recorded because assessment is focused narrowly on quantitative nutritional outcomes. The implications of supplementary feeding programmes should also be seen in a wider national and food policy framework (Mellor, 1980; WFP, 1978a). But in-depth evaluations, covering a number of years, are difficult and costly to implement. They require the interaction of specialists in different disciplines and co-operation among staff of a number of UN and other agencies concerned, which has been deficient. Other concerns have occupied the attention of WFP’s governing body. WFP assistance to supplementary feeding programmes has had to be extended because of the inability of recipient governments to take them over after the initial period of WFP aid. As they are ‘open-ended’, they can take up an increasing proportion of WFP resources, leaving less for other types of development projects. A WFP report emphasized that supplementary feeding programmes were by definition of a continuing nature (WFP, 1968b). They made a vital contribution to the development of human resources, but did not yield returns in the short run. They would only become self-sustaining in developing countries as economic growth occurred. Countries where such programmes were most justified were among the poorest and would therefore take the longest time to reach the point when they could be continued without WFP assistance. Governments could assume responsibility for their implementation only in progressive stages. They should nevertheless make realistic plans to continue these programmes on their own when food aid came to an end. While there was considerable scope for increased WFP assistance to human resource development projects, the rate of expansion was another matter (WFP,

Food for Development

99

1969c). That would depend on several factors including: closer inter-UN agency co-operation; the balance of assistance with other types of development projects; the desire and ability of recipient governments to allocate national resources to them; and the availability of resources to WFP to meet increased demand. A resolution was adopted by the 1974 World Food Conference on ‘Policies and programmes to improve nutrition’, which called on international agencies, NGOs and donor countries to assist governments in developing countries ‘to introduce in the period 1975–76, emergency programmes for the supplementary feeding of a substantial number of malnourished children’ (UN, 1975a, p. 9). As a result of the considerable increase in its resources following the conference, WFP was able to expand its assistance to supplementary feeding programmes. In the Indian sub-continent alone, three WFP-supported nationwide programmes were formulated for Bangladesh, India and Pakistan which, in total, were expected to reach over half a million mothers and 2.5 million preschool children. Over $71 million of WFP aid was committed to these programmes, involving 173,800 tons of food, for one year alone. These new and large-scale programmes had three distinctive features. They were formulated with the close co-operation of aid agencies both within and outside the United Nations system. The concept of integrated programmes for mothers and children was developed, which involved the provision of an integrated package of inputs and services. Supplementary feeding programmes alone were insufficient. And inter-ministerial and inter-agency co-ordination was stimulated. A major review of supplementary feeding programmes for young children in developing countries was produced in 1979 (Beaton and Ghassemi, 1979). The ‘general impression’ gained from the review was that: food distribution programs directed toward young children, as now being operated, are rather expensive for the measured benefit. However, the reviewers remain unconvinced that the benefit usually measured, physical growth and development, is neither the total benefit to the family and community or even the most important benefit. Therefore it would be deemed unwise to withdraw such food distribution programs until there had been opportunity to assess their true effects and benefits. (p. i) The review concluded that ‘for many countries, and for many years to come, food aid must continue and must be increased if nutritional conditions are to be improved’. The scale of food distribution programmes, while accounting for substantial amounts of money (or food equivalents), was probably much too small to have a major impact on total communities or countries. If supplementary programmes were to expand to the point that they could exert real impact, their objectives should be clearly defined, and designed, implemented and assessed accordingly.

100 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Partly because of a misreading of the review’s findings, which were widely distributed and quoted, its immediate effect was to call into question the validity of supplementary feeding programmes and to seek other ways of addressing the nutritional and related problems of young children in developing countries, including labour-intensive works programmes supported by food aid as a nutrition intervention (von Braun, 1993). In his address to the World Food Conference in 1974, WFP’s executive director had already pointed out that supplementary feeding programmes had certain drawbacks and suggested that ‘it may prove best to deal with malnutrition by securing a balanced diet for the families of workers participating in rural development projects’ (WFP, 1974d). As one of the authors of the review pointed out over ten years later, ‘the review was interpreted as concluding that the reviewed programmes had little or no effect’ (Beaton, 1993). In essence, what the review suggested was that few operational feeding programmes had demonstrable effects on anthropometric outcomes. But there were a number of perceived purposes of supplementary feeding programmes, many of which were poorly understood. The target age group should determine which effect was to be expected, and supplementary feeding programmes should be designed and evaluated accordingly. If such programmes continued to be assessed only in terms of anthropometric responses and prevention of growth failure in young children, other important potential benefits would be missed. Studies of supplementary feeding programmes carried out in the 1980s did not show a significant improvement over those conducted during the previous decade (Mora, 1990). A detailed study of the cost of supplementary feeding programmes, including those assisted by WFP, carried out for the World Bank in 1991, showed a wide range of costs per beneficiary. Costs ranged between $19 and $300 (in 1988 US dollars), with a median of $74 and a mean of $80, which was only slightly higher on average than the costs of targeted food subsidy programmes (Horton, 1991). Co-operation between WFP and UNICEF was recognized as being of particular importance in the implementation of supplementary feeding programmes from the inception of WFP’s operations. A memorandum of understanding was signed between the two organizations in 1976 covering collaboration in development and nutrition policies and emergency preparedness. A joint workshop was held in November 1985 in order to obtain a clearer and more comprehensive understanding of the various ways by which food aid could help alleviate the problems of children in the developing world, especially in the times of economic recession that were experienced throughout the 1980s (Greaves and Shaw, 1986). Following the workshop, a joint letter was sent out by the executive directors of WFP and UNICEF to the staff of the two organizations urging a further strengthening of collaboration, to which was attached guidelines on the use of food aid and modalities for co-operation. Another

Food for Development

101

WFP/UNICEF memorandum of understanding in emergency and rehabilitation situations was signed in 1998 (WFP, 1998a). These initiatives provide a basis for increased co-operation between the two organizations. The UN Administrative Committee on Coordination Subcommittee on Nutrition (ACC/SCN) has played a useful role in clarifying the nutritional issues in food aid (ACC/SCN, 1993a).13 An ACC/SCN working group on food aid in nutrition was set up in 1983. Guidance has been given on the management of successful nutrition programmes (ACC/SCN, 1991). The ACC/SCN has also issued a statement on the benefits of preventing growth failure in early childhood, which notes that evaluations have shown that ‘supplementary feeding programmes, where enough food is delivered to and consumed by young children in need, are effective in: preventing growth failure; protecting against the negative effects of diarrhoeal diseases on child growth; and improving educational performance, in later years’ (ACC/SCN, 1993b, p. 36). The statement goes on to say that: Programmes that integrate interventions designed to attack the multiple causes of growth failure are most effective in improving child growth. These programmes can be viewed as investments in the future, for they lead to adults with a greater capacity for healthy, productive lives. Interventions that prevent growth failure in early childhood, it is now clear, can be expected to have a range of important short-and long-term benefits.

Primary school feeding programmes Feeding children in primary schools was identified as one of the main activities of WFP from the outset (WFP, 1963a). By the end of 1995, over $2 billion of WFP aid was committed to 200 projects in this category (see Statistical Appendix 1). Three interrelated objectives were established: improving nutrition and health; increasing the range of school enrolment to include the children of poor households, including girls, encouraging greater regularity of school attendance, and reducing drop-out rates; and improved school performance. Nutrition and health conditions among primary school-age children were found to have important effects on educational performance and to be a major cause of ‘educational wastage’ throughout the developing world, representing one of the most significant educational problems, and involving high human and capital costs (Pollitt, 1984; 1990). There were other reasons for the popularity of primary school feeding programmes. They had been found to be effective in a number of developed countries over many years. They were perceived to be basically important for the development of human resources, which was essential for economic and social development (Singer, 1972). They were strongly supported by the general public and by politicians alike in

102 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

developed and developing countries. And they were considered to be relatively easy to implement, and to create no displacement effects as they involved additional consumption. WFP has contributed either to assist governments launch large-scale, in some cases nationwide, primary school feeding programmes, or to expand such programmes to cover a larger proportion of the primary school population than was previously possible. The number of primary school children reached with WFP assistance has been small in comparison to their number throughout the developing world, to say nothing of the children of primary school age who do not attend school. In some countries, and regions within countries, however, the impact of WFP assistance has been more noticeable. In Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius and Swaziland, for example, most of the primary school children have been reached. In other countries, such as Algeria, Brazil, Colombia and Sudan, considerable numbers of school children have benefited. WFP recognized at an early stage in its operations, however, that to launch large-scale school feeding programmes, as many governments wished to do, would be less than responsible until the financial, technical, logistical and administrative resources required for their implementation were firmly secured from internal resources and from external aid (WFP, 1969c). The extensive evaluative literature on primary school feeding programmes has shown that the nutritional, health and educational promise that they hold has been difficult to achieve in the reality of many developing countries (WFP, 1968c; 1978a,h; Burgess, 1982; Levinger, 1983, 1984; Clay and Singer, 1985; Figa-Talamanca, 1985). The general obstacles to educational progress in developing countries, particularly in Africa, have tended to reduce the gains which food aid could assist in achieving. While teachers and officials have often reported improvements in the nutritional status, health, alertness and proficiency of children receiving school snacks and meals, from the few detailed evaluations that have been carried out, the results have been generally inconclusive. The neediest children, those who do not go to school, or who attended infrequently, are rarely reached. This is particularly the case in the least-developed rural areas, which have the lowest provision of educational facilities. Evaluators have therefore concluded that school meals programmes have a built-in bias against the poor, and for urban areas (Maxwell, 1978b; Stevens, 1979). Other factors have compounded this problem. Many programmes have suffered from irregularities in food supplies, and from shortage of personnel and cooking and serving facilities. Feeding might not be targeted on the most needy and has often been stretched to cover all children in school, irrespective of their nutritional and socio-economic status. Hot school lunches have tended to be served more frequently in schools where children are least disadvantaged. Furthermore, school feeding programmes address an age-group that has passed

Food for Development

103

the greatest risk of acute malnutrition and it is difficult to repair the effects of inadequate food intake in the pre-school years. Their dependence on imported donated food may create inappropriate food habits, and may be counterproductive to attempts at self-sufficiency. In the absence of adequate personnel, teachers have been diverted from their educational roles to engage in food preparation and distribution. And they have been considered not to be costeffective, although cost-effectiveness has rarely been examined in detail. Costs have been estimated to range from $20 to $50 per child a year. An additional factor, which has often been overlooked, is the opportunity cost to poor households of sending their children to school, affecting school enrolment and attendance (Schuh, 1983). This often presents a barrier to school attendance. Children of poor families make a significant contribution to total household subsistence and income. To provide adequate incentive for them to attend school, food and other aid would have to offset the opportunity cost involved. Rather than providing only a snack or meal at school, it might be necessary to give additional assistance to the household as a whole. This would augment the stock of human capital by improving the nutrition and health of the household, increase schooling, and provide income transfers to the poor and disadvantaged to enable them, perhaps for the first time, to make longer-term investments that would raise their productivity and increase their income-generating potential. Seen in this way, the food aid provided would be demand-enhancing rather than merely supplyaugmenting. Despite these criticisms, the validity of school feeding programmes remains. They are therefore likely to continue because of their visibility and popularity. WFP and other food aid agencies have taken steps to address their problems. Continuity and regularity of school feeding programme are essential if parents are to be motivated to send children to school, and keep them there. Adequate administration and efficient logistics are necessary to keep a steady supply of food. WFP and UNESCO, in co-operation with FAO, UNICEF and WHO, have carried out joint workshops and published guidelines to improve these aspects of school feeding programmes (WFP, 1965c; UNESCO, 1980; 1983; Guruge, 1983; FAO, 1993). Targeting areas and schools with the highest prevalence of malnutrition would reach the neediest children among school attenders. Community participation might be developed further by involving parents in food production, preparation and distribution activities. And greater use might be made of locally-produced, rather than imported, foods as a way of ensuring their continuation. A reassessment of WFP assistance for education was carried out in 1990 and submitted to the World Conference on Education for All in Bangkok, Thailand (WFP, 1990g). A number of previous findings were reiterated but with a new emphasis. The effectiveness of WFP assistance depends crucially on the degree

104 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

to which governments in developing countries are taking steps, within their capabilities, to improve basic education. The educational environment is thus a key factor to be taken into account in deciding whether to begin, or to continue, WFP support for school feeding programmes. Many of the constraints in the education system cannot be addressed directly by food aid. These problems need to be removed with the help of external assistance if the objectives of school feeding programmes are to be realized. The effective co-ordination of food aid with other forms of external assistance in a combined programme of aid will therefore be a key factor in planning and implementing school feeding programmes in the future. In 1997, WFP’s governing body agreed that WFP could play a useful role by sharing its experience with school feeding programmes with other aid agencies and by facilitating an exchange of expertise and experience among developing countries (WFP, 1997a). Post-primary education, training and literacy programmes By the time WFP began its operations in the early 1960s, there was greater appreciation of the importance of the human factor in development, and the urgent need to mobilize the human resources of developing countries (UN, 1962c; Schultz, 1993). The dilemma was that expansion and improvement of educational and training facilities on an appropriate scale would take up a sizable part of their resources. And the pressing demands of other investment requirements, particularly those of a short-run, directly productive nature, made it difficult to allocate an adequate level of resources to bring about the necessary improvements in these facilities. Food aid, along with other forms of external assistance, was therefore seen to have a role to play in supporting the expansion of human skills and capacities (Hay and Clay, 1986). Although only a small part of WFP assistance has been invested in postprimary education, training and literacy programmes (See Statistical Appendix 1), it has shown the benefits that could accrue if larger resources became available to the Programme. Over 150 programmes have been supported with $630 million of WFP aid. A considerable diversity of educational and training institutions and centres have been supported by WFP aid, particularly in the agricultural sector (Shaw, 1970b; WFP, 1983b). These have ranged from university faculties of agriculture and advanced agricultural colleges which produce highlevel manpower, to training centres which provide instruction for intermediatelevel managers, and vocational and on-the-job training for farmers, rural leaders and various types of rural occupations. Several WFP-supported projects have been multi-purpose, combining various levels of education and training. Other types of projects have included on-the-job training, including community development activities during which training courses have been provided. In other WFP-assisted projects, the establishment of co-operatives and similar people’s organizations has proved to be an effective way of giving instruction

Food for Development

105

in improved agricultural practices and trades to dispersed, rural communities. WFP aid has been provided for the training of women and adolescents in rural areas and for the construction and enlargement of educational and training centres. In African and Asian countries, WFP has supported governments in the establishment of national youth programmes which provided vocational training in farming and rural occupations before settling them on the land, thereby providing employment in directly productive occupations. Another special feature has been the provision of WFP assistance for the implementation of adult literacy campaigns, with an emphasis on functional literacy. The general aim was to help governments implement projects that demonstrated the impact of functional literacy on economic development. Training was also provided for adult literacy teachers. Finally, instruction and training was included in a number of WFP-assisted agricultural and rural development project as an integral part of their activities. These projects included land development and improvement, the promotion and diversification of crop production and land settlement schemes. WFP assistance has taken a number of forms. The amount of food provided has been calculated in terms of rations per student or trainee which, together with local foodstuffs usually supplied by the recipient government, has provided beneficiaries with an adequate and balanced diet. Cooked meals have been served at boarding schools, education institutes, and training centres and camps. In some cases, food packages have been distributed periodically to students and trainees and their dependents. The availability of such assistance has acted as an incentive, or in the case of needy families, provided an important means, for students and trainees to attend the various educational and training courses, often for the first time. It has also improved regularity of attendance and contributed toward greater proficiency. Food aid has provided compensation for the loss of time and income of those attending training courses. WFP rations have also been provided as part-payment of wages to workers engaged in the construction or extension of education and training centres, and the development of farms and agricultural plot close to training institutions, which have had the dual function of providing facilities for practical training and for supplying food to help support the feeding programmes. Funds formerly allocated for feeding programmes at the educational or training institutions have been released for investment in the expansion of existing, or the creation of new, educational and training facilities. In some cases, sale of part of the commodities provided by WFP has been approved and the sales proceeds used to further the educational and training activities of the projects concerned. Savings and sales proceeds accruing from WFP assistance have been used to buy locally produced materials, tools and equipment to build additional facilities, including boarding accommodation, and to provide training

106 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

materials and equipment for workshops and farms attached to training centres. In the case of WFP support to universities and training colleges, the resultant savings from the feeding budget have been used to increase the number of scholarships available for deserving students from poor families. In these various ways, WFP assistance has provided a means for increasing investment in urgently required educational and training programmes. As useful as it can be, however, food aid cannot solve all the problems facing developing countries in their attempts to expand and improve their educational and training facilities. There have been cases where WFP assistance has been provided to institution and centres that have had insufficient, or poorly trained, teachers and instructors, or inadequate teaching materials, or have provided training in areas for which there was a limited job market. WFP aid can be most effective if there is full government commitment to increasing and improving its educational and training programmes and if it is linked with other forms of aid as an integrated part of an overall aid programme. WFP assistance has acted as a catalyst for the provision of other forms of aid. Many of the education and training projects that have received WFP assistance have also benefited from technical assistance from FAO, ILO and UNESCO, and financial and material aid from UNDP and UNICEF. Bilateral aid programmes and NGOs have also provided support in the form of teachers and instructors (in a number of cases through the US Peace Corps or UN voluntary services) who have also helped in the administration of food aid, and materials, tools and equipment to provide practical instruction. UNICEF has provided kitchen and canteen equipment. Hospitals and public health programmes $176 million of WFP aid has been provided to 55 projects involving hospitals and public health programmes (see Statistical Appendix 1). The catalytic and motivative effects of this additional aid has had a noticeable impact in certain countries, and regions within countries, particularly as investment of public funds in this sector has been very limited. The provision of WFP assistance has made it possible to serve a better protein-rich diet in hospitals, which has helped to speed up the recovery of patients, and released beds for other patients. The provision of WFP foods could also be used to instruct those handling hospital feeding programmes in the preparation of improved, protein-rich meals, and to introduce nutrition education and improved eating habits for patients. This opportunity been taken only in a few cases, mainly owing to the shortage of qualified staff. Many of the benefiting hospitals have not been able to continue the provision of protein-rich meals on the termination of WFP aid owing to the shortage of funds. A significant, and in many cases, more lasting benefit of WFP assistance has been through the release of funds from hospital feeding budgets to finance the

Food for Development

107

expansion or improvement of hospital facilities and staff training, and to encourage a more equitable distribution of expenditure in the health sector between urban and rural areas (Dustin and Lavoipierre, 1981). These benefits were not always achieved. There were cases where the budgetary savings resulting from WFP assistance were used to defray operational and maintenance costs, or spent in other ways not agreed between the government and WFP. Another important component of public health programmes has been the improvement of safe drinking-water supplies and the reduction of water-borne diseases. Experience in this sector has been limited. Only a few projects have been approved that deal exclusively with this aspect of public health, although many WFP-supported development project have included a public health improvement component. WFP aid helped in the recruitment of temporary workers and augmented the remuneration of permanent staff to implement special disease control campaigns. More recently, WFP has provided assistance in the fight against the AIDS crisis, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. WFP has provided assistance in communities and geographical areas where HIV and AIDS are prevalent, often administered through NGOs that have established contacts and programmes at the community level. WFP assistance has taken various forms including: providing relief to households with high dependency ratios; feeding hospital patients or providing take-home rations to patients’ families; feeding children in orphanages; providing support to potential victims and their families while they acquire income-generating skills; and support for health counsellors while in training. Special and sectoral studies Apart from the mandatory evaluations of individual WFP-supported development projects, a number of special and sectoral evaluations have been carried out by WFP, usually in co-operation with UN specialized agencies, or with consultants who were recognized authorities in the subject concerned. These studies were carried out to assess the results obtained in a particular sector, identify problems, improve future project design and implementation, and strengthen further collaboration between WFP and other UN agencies. The results of these studies are summarized below. They show the considerable diversity and versatility of WFP assistance and its innovating, motivating and catalytic roles. Gender and development By the beginning of the 1990s, WFP had emerged as the largest single source of grant assistance in the United Nations system to development projects that involved and benefited women in the rural areas of the developing world. Of the $3 billion of WFP assistance invested in the operational development projects at that time, over half directly supported the advancement of poor rural

108 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

women. This did not include the substantial emergency relief food provided to the victims of natural and manmade disasters, most of whom were women and children (WFP, 1992b). How did this come about? Research and practical experience had shown that women play pivotal roles in the social and economic development of their families, communities and nations. But this has often been done in the face of formidable cultural, social and economic constraints. Nowhere was this more evident that in maintaining the ‘three pillars of food security’: sustainable food production; economic access to available food; and nutritional security for all family members (Quisumbing et al., 1995). Improvements in household welfare depended not only on the level of household income, but also on who earned and controlled that income. Women, relative to men, tended to spend their income disproportionately on food for the family and improvements in children’s nutrition, health, education, and general growth and development. And ensuring household nutritional security through the combination of food and other factors such as child care, and access to clean water and sanitation, were almost the exclusive domain of women. This raised the question of how to take these gender-sensitive factors into account in the design, implementation and evaluation of development project (Katone-Apte, 1986; Quisumbing et al., 1998). Although women’s roles had been recognized, there remained a great deal of tokenism in supporting and strengthening their activities. Women continued to be ‘helped’, often through projects exclusively for them, thereby marginalizing their impact. The United Nations Decade for Women (1976–85) provided the impetus that helped to make a difference (UN, 1972). In common with other aid organizations both within and outside the United Nations system, WFP was stimulated, for the first time, to take stock of what it had done to improve the status of women and enhance their contribution to development, and to identify what more might be done in future (WFP, 1975a). Two important facts emerged. First, the inclusion of women in the development process could not be taken for granted but had to be a deliberate and conscious concern. Secondly, because of the close affinity between women and food, food aid had a special potential for improving women’s status, providing as it did a vehicle for bringing new ideas, particularly in rural areas, and offering possibilities to women for assuming new roles in addition to their traditional tasks. WFP declared its full commitment to meeting the aims of International Women’s Year in 1975. The executive director stated that ‘Common sense urges it; common humanity demands it. Not just for this year but for all the years to come’ (WFP, 1975b). A number of studies and reports were presented to WFP’s governing body throughout the UN Decade for Women making it one of the most documented of any single issue (WFP, 1975a,c; WFP, 1979d, e, g, 1980b).14

Food for Development

109

Surveys showed the high proportion of women engaged in the labour force in FFW programmes. The structure of the regular labour market in developing countries often precluded women. Only the very poor would work for food. Women, especially when single heads of households, were too often in that category. FFW programmes were flexible and women found their timing, particularly in off-season employment, to be compatible with their domestic and other responsibilities. Payment in food was attractive to women as they had more control over food than cash. One of the best and largest examples of WFP-assisted development projects for the benefit of women was in Bangladesh. An initial large-scale supplementary feeding programmes for abjectly poor women and their children was transformed into a development programme. Women were provided not only with WFP food rations but also with a package of development services, functional literacy and training in income-generating activities for which there was a ready market. They were also encouraged to join savings and credit schemes, which were supported with funds provided from the sale of WFP wheat. The underlying premise was that by providing this package of development assistance as well as food rations, poor women had the chance, for the first time, of breaking the cycle of abject poverty and joining the mainstream of development (Islam, 1991; WFP, 1994i, pp. 33–62). Two sets of obstacles and imperatives emerged from WFP’s ten years of experience during the decade for women. The first consisted of institutional factors within WFP, which were shared by other aid organizations. These were mainly related to conceptualizing the issues for the advancement of women during various phases of WFP’s project cycle. The second consisted of factors conditioning the roles and status of women within the countries receiving WFP assistance, and linking national macro-economic policies to actual living conditions at the family and village levels. A WFP strategy to the year 2000 was produced to assist governments in developing countries in the fuller integration of women in national development programmes, particularly in the field of food security (WFP, 1985f). This included: improving support to women in food production; establishing priorities in FFW programmes; intensifying support for female education and training; supporting community-based skills training for employment, income generation and nutritional improvement; strengthening collaboration with aid agencies both with and outside the United Nation system; and improving the operational dimensions of WFP activities. Other issues were subsequently highlighted. One cross-cutting concern was the need for greater recognition and appreciation of the ‘continuum’ in women’s productive and reproductive roles (Hammam and Youssef, 1986). Both roles are performed in a continuum of labour time allocations, which have a finite limit. A major failure of both national policies and programmes,

110 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

and of international assistance, was that in addressing women’s reproductive roles in the social sectors and their productive role in the economic sectors, separately and disfunctionally, they dichotomized in development programming what was not separated in reality. The resultant additional burdens placed on women tended to lower their productivity and diminished their capacity to fulfill their domestic responsibilities, including child care. Another issue concerned whether development project should be designed and supported exclusively for women. It was recognized that under certain conditions it made sense to limit eligibility for project benefits primarily or solely to females (WFP, 1980b, pp. 14–15). However, in many cases this approach was no more successful at improving women’s status than were previous policies and programmes that were targeted at the household, and thereby implicitly at men (Pena et al., 1996; Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997). A comparative review of WFP-assisted projects in Latin America focused on women concluded that: projects exclusively for women were neither automatically gender-responsive nor necessarily beneficial to women; social empowerment and economic viability were often not coterminous in programmes involving women’s groups; economic enterprises that benefit women were often under-capitalized; the outreach capacity of mainstream economic institutions and services often needed to be strengthened in order to deliver inputs and services to women in poverty groups; and socio-economic expertise and guidance were needed in the design, implementation and evaluation of projects exclusively for women (WFP, 1989e). These findings underlined that successful projects or policy formulation were unlikely without gender analysis that went beyond a ‘women-in-development’ approach in which only differences in resource access, ownership and control between man and women may be identified. With gender analysis, on the other hand, the determinants of gender ‘asymmetries’, and their consequences for individuals, households, communities and economic development, were recognized (Murphy, 1995). WFP’s experience, along with that of other aid agencies, showed that there are no ‘best’ recommendations of general applicability. The appropriate choice depended mainly on local community characteristics and project goals. This led to the concept of ‘mainstreaming’ gender issues so that all project resources can be drawn on and is therefore more likely to be sustainable (WFP, 1998b). These ideas were already incorporated in a food aid strategy for women in development that was presented to WFP’s governing body in 1987 (WFP, 1987b) and in detailed sectoral guidelines in 1989 (WFP, 1989f). WFP’s strong and persistent attempts to enhance the role of women in development over a period of 20 years were capped by far-reaching commitments made on its behalf by its executive director at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China in 1995 (WFP, 1995d; 1996a, pp. 4–5). WFP would

Food for Development

111

use its food aid to change behaviour and improve the status of women. While beliefs and prejudices that did so much damage to women worldwide could not be quickly changed, ‘Each small change in behaviour will one day pay off in a change in attitude’. In countries with major gaps in literacy, education and basic skills between the sexes, WFP would commit at least 60 per cent of its food aid resources to women and girls. In emergencies, WFP would see to it that women took the lead in managing the relief food aid provided in co-operation with NGOs and other UN agencies.15 More than 50 per cent of WFP school feeding resources would be allocated to girls and WFP would double funding for women’s literacy projects. WFP would also expand the use of food aid in refugee camps to support training for women in basic education, work skills, family planning, health and nutrition. WFP would target food aid better to overcome vitamin and mineral deficiencies among women, by fortifying or adjusting WFP food rations. WFP staff would be more attuned to women’s issues and would be assessed on their performance on gender issues. And more women would be hired and promoted with a minimum aim of attaining the UN secretary-general’s goal of 25 per cent of high-level posts for women and full gender equality by the year 2000. There had already been an impressive change since 1992 when, for the first time, a woman was appointed as WFP executive director. By 1995, the number of women in high-level appointments had been increased to 22 per cent. Implementation of these commitments has begun. Guided by a task force of senior managers, WFP country offices and each headquarters division have contributed to an action plan for WFP to meet its commitments by 2001. Consultations have been held with WFP’s operational partners on how to carry out WFP’s policy to distribute a targeted 80 per cent of relief food directly to the senior female of a household. And memoranda of understanding have been signed with NGOs, which include reference to the involvement of women at all levels of food aid planning, management, distribution and monitoring. Environmentally sustainable development For over 30 years, WFP has been the largest source of grant assistance in the United Nations system for activities in developing countries aimed at reversing environmental degradation and increasing agricultural productivity in sustainable ways. Well before it became ‘fashionable’, WFP provided support to projects of this kind. Food aid was a particularly useful resource, especially in the least-developed countries. The projects involved were labour-intensive and could be carried out by unemployed and under-employed workers at times of the year that did not attract them away from other productive employment. Employment in these activities helped to address the seasonal dimensions of hunger and poverty by providing food and work (Chambers et al., 1981). As

112 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

projects often took place in poor marginal areas, provision of assistance was automatically targeted on the poorest and most vulnerable people. Counterpart funds from the sale of food aid commodities on a selective basis could also be used to buy locally-produced equipment, tools and materials needed for environment protection works, thereby creating additional demand and employment opportunities. But there was another compelling benefit of food aid. Environmentimprovement and protection work involve substantial investment in order to obtain long-term gains. People and governments in poor developing countries lacked the capital to undertake the necessary activities that did not yield immediate returns. And they found it difficult to obtain financial assistance, particularly on grant terms, to carry out the works required, or on the scale that was needed. As a result, activities that could lead to more sustainable forms of development were not carried out. As used by WFP, food aid could make investments easier by phasing and segmenting the costs involved at the household, community or national levels. Food aid was provided to help cover the high initial labour costs of soil conservation work on farm land. Farmers were then left with only the need for routine maintenance. Bigger and better harvests resulting from soil conservation works more than compensated for the cost of maintenance, and farmers were able to take care of their soil on a sustainable basis. At the community level, food aid served a similar function by augmenting communal resources. The high initial costs of works such as the construction of check dams to prevent erosion of communal hill tracts were offset through FFW programmes. Once the initial costs were met, communities were left with the relatively low maintenance costs of protecting the communal structures. WFP assistance also helped to promote environmental protection activities on a regional or national scale. For example, FFW programmes were used to plant trees in watersheds where eroding soils would otherwise fill reservoirs downstream. In such cases, WFP assistance acted as a budget supplement by helping to meet the labour costs involved. Local or national governments could thereby carry out more tree planting to protect the land and reservoirs than would otherwise be possible. In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, (the Earth Summit), was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. WFP took the occasion to review its work in environmentally sustainable development (WFP, 1989g; 1992c). At the end of 1991, WFP resources in this area totalled over $1.1 billion, more than a third of all WFP development assistance, in over 150 projects, making WFP, with the World Bank, the world’s largest providers of development assistance for this purpose. Some of the most successful of WFP-assisted projects have been in Asia. On the Loess Plateau in north-western China, expanding and exploitive agriculture

Food and Development 113

on steeply sloping land had resulted in advanced environmental degradation and silting and flooding in the lower reaches on the Yellow River (WFP, 1994i, pp. 63–100). An integrated agricultural development project was implemented through a WFP-supported FFW programme. Dramatic changes were made in the use and management of land over the four years of WFP assistance, which stemmed environmental damage and diversified and increased farmer income. The project provided a demonstration of what could be done and is being replicated in other parts of the Loess region by the government with the help of other donors, including the World Bank. WFP assistance for watershed management in Pakistan began in 1972, and still continues in the northern, hilly areas abutting the mountains of the western Himalayas and the eastern range of the Hindu Khush (WFP, 1994i, pp. 121–40). Over more than a quarter of a century, $80 million of WFP assistance has been approved to promote more sustainable land-use practices in areas where forests have been depleted as population and livestock have increased. Incentive has been given to farmers to terrace their land and plant fuelwood, fodder, timber and fruit trees on the more steeply sloping terrain. Soil conservation and protection activities have also been undertaken to limit the effects of flood damage and erosion on local infrastructure and reduce the silting of dams that have been constructed at high capital cost for urban water supplies. With experience, the original focus of WFP assistance changed from environmental protection towards sustainable incomes for poor farmers on marginal lands based on fuller community participation, and the more equitable sharing of the resources available and assets created. WFP helped to reduce the risk involved in changing land-use practices and to compensate farmers for the short-term loss of income. The successful demonstration of project activities, and the sustained provision of WFP assistance, led to bilateral aid, the negotiation of loans from the World Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the Asian Development Bank, and to the establishment of community organizations, such as village development committees and local NGOs, to sustain the work undertaken. WFP experience has shown that environmentally sustainable development must also be economically and socially sustainable. This includes a sound understanding of who benefits and who bears the costs involved, which helps to determine the willingness of local people to participate in a way that allows development to be sustained once external resources are no longer provided. Appropriate government policies are also crucial. In particular, people’s rights to whatever benefits accrue should be clearly stated, or local support will wither. Clear ownership, tenure and usufructary rights to land and trees should be established before starting projects as well as access to whatever benefits are derived. In addition, development should meet local needs, and be seen to do so, if it is to be sustainable. Consequently, projects should be designed and

114 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

implemented with due regard to the wishes of the people (Chambers, 1997). Accordingly, WFP has began to use pre-appraisal missions to test local opinions through various techniques, including rapid rural appraisal. Ultimately, WFP experience has shown that sustainable development results from careful consideration of all facets of development, environmental, economic and social. Only when development activities are sustainable in all these ways would they be viable over the long term, sustaining people while not degrading the environment. Structural and sector adjustment programmes During the 1980s, many developing countries faced a world economic recession of unprecedented magnitude since the 1930s. Often encouraged and supported by the IMF and World Bank, they sought to adjust their economies to the realities of their internal and international conditions. Unless far-reaching structural and sectoral adjustments were made, drastic demand-restricting measures would have to be imposed in order to avoid total economic, and perhaps political, collapse. At the same time, particular concern was expressed about the ‘social costs’ of the adjustment process on the poor, and the need for what came to be called ‘adjustment with a human face’ to protect the vulnerable and promote economic growth with equity (Cornia et al., 1987). A number of food aid donors and WFP began to work more closely and systematically with the World Bank in relating their food aid to the Bank’s adjustment lending programme. The issues were complex and the parties involved sought collaboration with different motives in mind. But it was generally understood that mutual benefits could be forthcoming from the association of food aid with adjustment measures (Shaw and Singer, 1988; Singer, 1991). However, conflicting signals were given in WFP’s governing body at its session in June 1986. While many delegations welcomed the use of WFP assistance in structural adjustment programmes, others cautioned against what they thought was a policy of pursuing greater monetization of WFP commodities or various forms of programme aid. The WFP secretariat was therefore asked to prepare a study on the role of food aid in structural and sector adjustment programmes (WFP, 1986c, p. 14). Meetings were held between World Bank and WFP staff in August and December 1986 to clarify the issues involved, and a paper presented to the CFA session in May/June 1987 (WFP, 1987a). Four major roles for food aid were identified: (1) General financial support. Food aid could assist countries undergoing economic adjustment by providing general financial support through savings in foreign exchange or through budgetary support. Food aid could replace food imports that would otherwise be made commercially, thus releasing the equivalent foreign exchange. In special cases, particularly for low-income,

Food and Development 115

food-deficit countries, and especially those with serious debt problems, usual marketing requirements (UMRs) might be waived, or even eliminated, in order to provide the quantities of food aid required. Food aid might also be sold on the local market in a recipient country to generate funds that could be used to support the national budget. In both cases, food aid would normally form part of a total agreement in which the foreign assistance package would be provided conditional upon undertaking specific adjustment measures. (2) Sector reform. A second role for food aid, which could involve partial or full monetization and a multi-year commitment, was in support of reform measures within a particular sector of the economy. The most natural target would be the food and agricultural sector because of concerns regarding the avoidance of disincentives to domestic agricultural production. One approach that had figured prominently in the 1980s was the use of food aid in cereal market restructuring and price policy reform. Market restructuring was often necessary both as a means of stimulating increased production and to achieve a more efficient distribution of food. It often involved reform of high-cost, inefficient parastatal marketing organizations, and a better balance between public and private sector activities in the market place. At the same time, a major dilemma facing many developing countries was how to implement food pricing policies that provided incentives to increase food production without pricing poor consumers out of the market. Food aid, and funds generated from food aid sales, could be used during an interim period of market and price adjustments to take account of both producer and consumer needs. Four key factors that were identified as necessary for success. First, commitment of governments in developing countries to undertake the necessary reforms. Secondly, cohesive support from donors, with a clear understanding of their interrelated roles. Thirdly, the provision of specific technical assistance to advise governments on the intricate measures to be undertaken in order to achieve successful marketing and pricing reforms. And, finally, the appointment of one body by the government and donor community to act as co-ordinator for the supply of food aid and for the creation and monitoring of a common fund generated by food aid sales. WFP was requested to perform these tasks in several countries.

(3) Specific development investments. A third role for food aid was as an investment resource in special development projects and programmes that supported adjustment measures. Conversely, these investments were likely to have greater effect if they were implemented within an improved policy framework brought about by the adjustment process. Such investment could involve either the direct provision of food aid or its full or partial monetization.

116 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

The demand-enhancing effects of employment and income-generating investment activities supported by food aid could make a particularly significant contribution to economic adjustment. Two main types of programmes were identified: public works programmes; and schemes that increased productivity and incomes of low-income groups in the informal sector. Food aid could also help the adjustment process through support for institution building among the large number of small-scale producers who created much of the agricultural and rural output in developing countries. These producers had organized themselves into various types of groups, associations and co-operatives. Food aid could help to provide an impetus, as seed or primer capital, in building up the human and financial resources of these people’s institutions, and in making micro-credit available through the sale of food aid commodities. Finally, food aid could help the adjustment process when it was threatened by emergency situations. This could have strong positive effects on adjustment goals by reducing pressure on unproductive public expenditure, increasing job creation and maintenance in the private sector, and preventing the afflicted population from migrating to camp sites in search of food and work. (4) Compensatory measures. Lastly, and perhaps most obviously, food aid could provide compensation to those adversely affected by the adjustment reform measures. Those who lost their jobs, or those who could not afford price increases in basic food commodities could be compensated with food aid. For each of these groups, the most appropriate compensatory measure would be to provide productive, income-earning employment. However, in the short-run it might also be necessary to provide compensatory nutrition programmes. But compensatory measures also entailed dangers. Unless attention was given to targeting, they would not reach those most in need. And they could be subjected to political pressures and manipulations that could divert them from their original purposes, and significantly increase their cost. The most serious concern was that food-aided compensatory measures could be used to try to make politically and socially palatable adjustment programmes that involved disproportionate costs for the poor. WFP was adamant in its discussions with the World Bank, and later with the IMF, that this should not happen.16

The WFP secretariat suggested that the CFA might wish to record its response to its paper in the form of a resolution, which recommended that: the potential roles of food aid should be given explicit attention from the inception of preparations for structural and sector adjustment programmes, and not as an add-on or after-thought; the CSD should make use of the existing provisions in the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal to waive UMRs for low-income, fooddeficit countries undergoing structural adjustment that were heavily burdened

Food and Development 117

by debt and facing severe balance of payments problems; donors should provide additional food aid to those countries on a multi-year basis with flexible drawing rights; food aid used in compensatory projects should not be automatically subject to suspension if adjustment reforms were not carried out on schedule; and food aid should be used particularly to support the productive capacity and well-being of the poor, promote equitable adjustment with growth, and thereby reduce the social costs and enhance the human dimensions of adjustment (WFP, 1987a). The CFA did not adopt the resolution. Insufficient discussion had taken place prior to the presentation of the paper to the committee. Most delegations could not give definitive views without fuller consideration within their governments. Several delegations interpreted the paper as a call for additional food aid, with increasing monetization, and with conditionality imposed by the World Bank, which they could not accept. However, the committee did agree that ‘the matter would be the subject of continuing discussion over time in the light of practical experience and the Secretariat would submit a report in that regard at a future session’ (WFP, 1987c, p. 13). An evaluation of ten years of World Bank experience at the end of the 1980s concluded that ‘Adjustment lending … is both a potentially high pay-off and high risk instrument. There is, therefore, the need to continue to adapting and improving the policies and procedures of structural lending to increase its effectiveness’ (World Bank, 1988, p. 9). Adjustment programmes were also considered to have a negative effect on food security (FAO, 1989). A history of the World Bank found that both the Bank and its critics were guilty of ‘overkill’ in their assessments of adjustment lending. ‘In many cases, the critics let ideological predilections turn correlations into causality. For the Bank’s part, too much was claimed’ (Kapur et al., 1997, p. 544). Adjustment programmes as supported by the IMF and World Bank have remained controversial. Negative effects of adjustment on the poor have often been certain and immediate, while positive effects have remained uncertain and long-term. They have also tended to be more contractionist, exacerbating inequality of income, rather than expansionist, involving the poor in the development process and contributing to equitable and sustainable development.

Food aid for increased food production Using food aid to increase food and agricultural production in developing countries, while avoiding its potential disincentive effects, has been a central focus of WFP’s developmental work since the inception of its operations. The largest share of WFP’s development resources has been allocated to a range of agricultural development projects throughout the developing world (see Statistical Appendix 1). At the same time, WFP has operated within the framework of the

118 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal and worked closely with the Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal (CSD). WFP has used its development resources to stimulate food production in developing countries in a number of ways (WFP, 1982c): for example, in land development and improvement projects involving irrigation, drainage, flood control and other works; in land settlement or resettlement schemes; and in agricultural adjustment programmes in which small farmers have been supported to transform their traditional, low-yielding farming practices into modern farming systems. There have been other ways, such as: supporting agricultural training programmes, assisting women’s role in agricultural production, and protecting the environment, that have been referred to above, and still others, such as livestock and dairy development, forest, fisheries projects and food reserves and price stabilization schemes, that will be dealt with below. Through this array of different types of projects, WFP has deliberately sought to enhance food production throughout the developing world, and more particularly in the low-income, food-deficit countries, with the aim of progressively phasing out the need for food aid. Two examples may be used to demonstrate WFP’s work in this field. Over the past 30 years, WFP has provided food aid to Egypt for a nationwide land reclamation, development and settlement programme (WFP, 1977a). WFP assistance has been provided: as part-payment of workers engaged on land reclamation and development works, including the installation of subsoil tiled drainage to improve crop yields under irrigation; in support of farm families during their initial years of settlement on the newly developed lands; and, through savings in government land reclamation, labour, and settlers’ subsistence costs. These savings have been used to provide housing and other community facilities, finance training programmes and animal husbandry, and to develop agro-industrial enterprises that have increased settlers’ incomes and employment opportunities. Surveys of the nutritional impact of WFP assistance showed that the health and nutrition of settlers had increased and infant mortality rates decreased. The construction of the High Dam in Egypt caused the flooding of a large area in northern Sudan and resulted in the resettlement of people to another part of the country 800 miles away, where another dam had been built, thereby permitting irrigated agriculture (Shaw, 1967). In 1963, WFP provided food aid for the more than 30,000 displaced people during transportation to their new homes and for the initial years of their resettlement in a new agricultural area, the first WFP-assisted development project to be approved. The availability of food proved to have a number of benefits. It helped ease the political and social tensions of the resettlement programme, which was the result of the construction of dam that was not in the Sudan, and resettlement in an area which was markedly different from the former location. The provision of food in the new

Food and Development 119

settlement area where there were few markets not only helped maintain the health and nutritional status of the settlers but also spared them from having to spend the compensation funds that the government provided on high-price food, retaining them for investment in their farms and for other requirements. Despite the benefits that food aid could bring for increasing food production, WFP was aware of the continuing concern about its potential disincentive effects. There was a voluminous and growing literature on the subject, such that the ‘disincentive effect’ became what was described as the ‘stormcentre’ of the food aid debate (Baribeau and Gerrard, 1984). Detailed studies were, therefore, conducted in selected countries with the co-operation of the governments concerned and the assistance of FAO and consultants. Botswana and Lesotho were prime targets for study. They had received the highest per capita WFP aid of all countries by the mid-1970s, and were also suffering from declining agricultural production. Egypt also provided a suitable case in view of the large amount of WFP aid that had been committed to supporting a major land reclamation, development and settlement programme. WFP assistance was found to have no negative effects in all three countries (WFP, 1976d,e; Government of Botswana, 1974). Subsequently, WFP commissioned further studies in Ethiopia and Senegal, and, later, again in Lesotho.17 In 1982, an FAO team studied the effects of large amounts of food aid in wheat and vegetable oil, supplied by WFP for an extensive FFW programme for soil conservation and reforestation project in Ethiopia, on domestic agricultural production and local and international trade (FAO, 1982). No evidence was found of any disincentive effects on government agricultural policy. Sale of WFP wheat had not has any disincentive effects on domestic market prices and no evidence was found of any shift in consumption habits. And there was no apparent competition between FFW and farm production activities. As part of a WFP consultancy on methodologies for studying the disincentive effects of food aid, another visit was made to Ethiopia in 1986 to update the conclusions of the earlier FAO team, particularly in the light of the large deliveries of emergency food aid in the two years 1984–6 (Maxwell, 1986a). The study concluded that ‘the net effect of food aid in Ethiopia has generally been beneficial. Both emergency food aid and food for work have contributed to saving lives and improving nutritional status, quite apart from the physical achievements of food for work.’ A study in Senegal found that under the government’s policy regime, food aid could not be held responsible for major disincentive effects (Maxwell, 1986b). At the margin, cereal food aid for sale probably had displaced some commercial imports but the government had met its usual marketing requirements (UMRs). The results of the studies in Ethiopia and Senegal were fed into the drafting of guidelines for the avoidance of disincentive, displacement and dependency

120 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

effects of food aid, which were included as part of WFP’s overall project cycle guidelines. A new pragmatic approach was developed which took a broad view of disincentives acting through policies, prices, labour markets and food habits at the macro and micro levels, identifying 19 disincentive scenarios and early warning indicators for systematic monitoring (Maxwell, 1986c; 1991). A further study in Lesotho into the effects of long-standing food aid programmes resulted in the reformulation of WFP assistance to that country, which were also incorporated into WFP project cycle guidelines (Hunt, 1988). This did not prevent the disincentive debate from continuing to be a major element of the food aid literature. Studies have indicated, however, that: the disincentive effects of food aid are not inevitable; food aid was often sucked in by poor agricultural policy rather than itself being responsible for the vacuum it filled; negative impact could be significantly reduced if food aid was distributed in ways that created new demand; and there should be case-by-case analysis, carried out jointly by food aid recipients and donors, which should include the range of factors relevant to the risks and opportunities for the use of food aid in developing countries (Rogers et al., 1972; Isenman and Singer, 1977; Maxwell and Singer, 1979). In 1991, a joint World Bank/WFP study of food aid in Sub-Saharan Africa found that ‘At the national level, aggregate absorptive capacity has not been exceeded and there is no evidence that food aid has led to large-scale disincentives. At the local level, however, there are such cases, mostly as a result of the timing and management of shipments’ (World Bank/WFP, 1991, p. 19). Livestock development Up until the world food crisis of the early 1970s, when a moratorium was placed on this type of assistance, WFP invested a small part (some 6 per cent) of its development resources in the form of feed, as opposed to food, aid for livestock development in developing countries (see Statistical Appendix 1). By 1974, when this form of WFP aid was suspended, about 750,000 tons of feedstuffs (mainly maize, sorghum and barley) was provided at a total cost to WFP of $1.2 billion to 55 development projects in 33 developing countries. This proved to be a controversial form of assistance. It was criticized on the grounds that: it took away resources that could be better used for human consumption; it was an expensive way of producing protein; and, because of deficiencies in project planning and implementation, it often did not lead to sustained improvements in animal production. However, supporters pointed to the important role that livestock played in agricultural development in particular and economic and social development in general in many developing countries. Livestock represented a source of capital, and an important form of draught power in agricultural production, as well as providing a basis for agro-industries, which could be substantially upgraded and improved, thereby

Food and Development 121

contributing to increased output, employment and income. The contribution of livestock to gross agricultural production in many developing countries was small mainly because of the low productivity of animals. Improvements in animal nutrition, together with developments in animal genetics and husbandry techniques, could improve productivity considerably. And projections showed that the demand for livestock products in developing countries was likely to increase significantly as incomes rose. WFP assistance was used in different ways, and in different types of projects, for livestock development (WFP, 1967d, 1973c). Rangeland animal husbandry and management schemes. In the vast semi-arid lands of the developing world, where extensive livestock grazing is the only viable livelihood, increases in population and animal numbers have led to overgrazing and environmental damage. In an attempt to stabilize and develop livestock production in these areas, WFP feed grains were provided at certain times of the year to enable nomads to keep their livestock off the rangeland, thereby enabling it to regenerate, to establish fodder reserves, and to adopt marketing arrangements which would keep livestock numbers within the carrying capacity of the pastures. WFP experience, particularly in North Africa and the Near East, showed the difficulties involved in implementing projects of this type. Success depended on effecting radical changes in the social traditions of poor, nomadic people, and required perseverance and devoted attention over many years. As government resources for such projects were very limited, and extension services were generally weak, WFP assistance in association with technical aid was welcomed. But the difficulties involved were often underestimated. The results of WFP assistance generally did not come up to expectations. The main impact of WFP aid was to reduce livestock mortality during drought years, thereby, in the absence of effective control measures, contributing to an increase in livestock numbers and to overgrazing and environmental destruction. For these reasons, WFP assistance to a project in the north-western coastal zone of Egypt was discontinued. A project in Syria provided an exception to this generally dismal experience. Over a period of eight years (1964–72), WFP assistance and technical support from FAO was provided, during which the project was almost terminated for lack of progress. Eventually contractual arrangements were made between sheep raising and fattening co-operatives, which ensured an adequate offtake of sheep from the rangelands with economic returns to both, a national feed revolving fund established, originally from the sale of WFP feed grains to sheep producers, and an institution built through a FFW programme supported by WFP aid which serves as a primary school for the children of nomads and a training centre for improved livestock and pasture management. At the same time, a special technical and administrative unit was created within the government

122 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

administration through which veterinary, health, credit and extension services were provided. Intensification and expansion of animal production. WFP also provided feed aid for projects designed to intensify and expand animal production. A variety of animal production programmes were supported. Some incorporated the breeding of animals with higher production potential, adequate feeding to realize that higher potential, and protection from animal diseases. Others involved improvement of the quality of young stock through the better feeding of breeding animals, which provided a valuable demonstration of what could be achieved. WFP also assisted in saving part of the animal wealth of a country or region during emergencies caused by drought not only by supplying emergency feed aid but also by encouraging the establishment of emergency feed reserves. Encouraging modern poultry and pig production through WFPassisted development projects showed the potential for rapidly increasing the supply of animal protein for human consumption. Improved feeding of dairy herds also showed how milk yields could be increased significantly, a subject covered below in the section on WFP assistance for dairy development. A number of these projects did not reach their full potential on a sustained basis because they were not formulated or implemented on a sound basis. Failure was often caused by a concentration on improved animal feeding, encouraged by the availability of WFP feed aid, to the neglect of other factors, such as increased local fodder production and improvements in management, health control, genetics, and the housing of animals, all of which required adequate investment, training and credit and extension services. Agricultural diversification and intensification schemes. WFP assistance also helped to transform traditional low-yielding agriculture into more diversified and intensive modern farming systems. This transformation brought a number of potential benefits including: removing the risk associated with monocultural production; increasing land production; reducing environmental damage and seasonal unemployment and under-employment; and raising farmers’ productivity and incomes. In fodder crop development programmes, WFP provided aid in the form of both food and feed commodities. Food aid was supplied to cover part of workers’ wages, and feed for stockmen to learn to use concentrate feeding and modern animal nutrition practices in order to develop more efficient animal production systems. Both forms of aid provided an incentive for farmers to transform their traditional farming systems and compensation for a temporary loss of income during the transformation process when land was taken out of production. Projects of this type were implemented in a number of developing countries but were not always successful. The willingness and capability of farmers to participate were key factors in their implementation. Another prerequisite was a strong extension service with expertise in all aspects of the new farming systems.

Food and Development 123

The manufacture of animal feed. In some projects, WFP feed commodities were supplied to feed manufacturing mills at subsidized prices and mixed with locally produced feedstuffs to increase the supply of balanced animal feed while steps were taken to increase local feed production or to increase imports as incomes rose. The mixed feed containing WFP feed aid was initially sold to farmers at subsidized prices which were gradually increased as their incomes grew. Proceeds from the sale of the mixed feed were placed in a special account and used to help achieve the objectives of the project during and after the termination of WFP aid. These projects faced a number of difficulties. A common problem was that local fodder and feed production did not increase at the rate expected and the feed mills relied to an increasing extent on WFP feed aid. When WFP feed aid came to an end, the feed mills were not able to maintain their supplies. Delays in the supplies of WFP feed aid, or failure of recipient governments to provide counterpart contributions, resulted in idle milling capacity and high production costs. Delays in the construction of milling plants resulted in WFP feed grains being fed directly to livestock instead of through a balanced feed mix with the corresponding loss in efficiency and impact. Project benefits tended disproportionately to go to the larger and better-off farmers who had the ability and income to use the feed mix effectively and efficiently. Smaller and poorer farmers tended to be priced out of the markets as the subsidized prices were raised, and without effective training and extension services were not able to make the best use of the mixed feed. And funds accrued from the sale of the mixed feed were often either spent at a rate well below that originally expected or for purposes other than those agreed with WFP. Associated food-for-work and training programmes. In several livestock development schemes, a wide range of works were carried out, including: the construction of training and demonstration centres, animal accommodation and feed stores; improvement of rural road to increase access to inputs and services and improve the marketing of animal products; the provision of water supplies for livestock; and the planting of fodder crops and shrubs. A number of projects included provision for training in animal husbandry at training centres for which WFP provided food during training programmes, and feed for livestock used for demonstration purposes. During the world food crisis of the early 1970s, the governing body ‘agreed that WFP was at the moment unable to approve new projects for livestock feeding since priority during the present scarcity of grains should be given to human feeding’ (WFP, 1973b, p. 7). However, it also agreed that special attention might be given in the future to cases where WFP could provide small, but well-planned and well-timed, supplies of feed grains to serve as a catalyst for livestock development. This particularly related to situations where livestock mortality was threatened by drought or other disasters in order to safeguard

124 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

the population who depended on livestock for their livelihood. Linking the supply of WFP feed grains to FFW programmes, particularly in arid and semiarid regions, was also endorsed. There has not been a revival of WFP feed aid for livestock development, despite the fact that coarse grains have figured prominently in the cereal stocks of developed countries, and provision of WFP feed aid has remained modest. Dairy development A special aspect of WFP assistance within the livestock sector has been for dairy development. WFP assistance has taken different forms. The most direct approach has been for WFP to provide dried skim milk and butter oil which have been mixed with locally-produced liquid milk through toning and recombining processes to expand milk supplies. Feed grains have also been supplied for supplementary and emergency feeding of milch animals. Proceeds from the sale of the reconstituted milk and WFP feed grains have been invested in various aspects of the dairy industry. Food assistance has also been provided in FFW and training programmes related to dairying. Evaluations of WFP assistance for dairy development were conducted in 1967 and again in 1978 (WFP, 1976f; 1978i). WFP experience underlined the need to evolve long-term, integrated and comprehensive plans for the sound and sustained development of the dairy industry, and to co-ordinate different types of assistance. The full benefits of WFP-assisted dairy development schemes were often not being realized because of the failure to take all aspects into consideration from the production of liquid milk to its marketing on a regular and sustained basis. Furthermore, there was often a long gestation period before investments in dairy development yielded results. Many of the problems encountered were of a human and social, as well as technical and economic, nature. Traditionally, milk was produced in most developing countries by many small-scale farmers dispersed over a wide area, mainly for consumption by the farm family. Despite these problems, WFP aid had the potential to be an effective resource for the development of the dairy industry in developing countries. Its assistance was all the more important because of difficulties of attracting conventional financial aid, particularly on a grant basis, from donors and international financial institutions. However, there were specific problems associated with the use of WFP aid in dairy commodities. One particular problem was that whereas in other types of projects one commodity in short supply might be replaced by another, this was not possible in dairy development projects. Milk plants required dried skim milk and butter oil. Therefore, WFP had no flexibility in commodity management. These commodities could be purchased with WFP’s cash resources in emergency situations but as WFP cash resources were limited this could not be regarded as a long-term solution. Assured and

Food and Development 125

regularity supply of the commodities of the required quality for the total period of WFP assistance were therefore basic prerequisites. These factors were not always guaranteed, with negative effects on project implementation and performance. A critical review of EEC food aid in dairy products, a major source for WFP, called into question whether they should be provided and had the effect of reducing food aid in these commodities (Clay and Mitchell, 1983; Clay, 1987). Another critical factor was the effective use of the funds generated from milk product sale containing WFP commodities. The funds were to be speedily invested in dairy development programmes in ways agreed with WFP. In a number of cases, this was not achieved. A related problem was the value placed on the commodities provided by WFP. In most cases, world market prices prevailing at the time of approval of WFP aid were used. These prices were generally low, reflecting subsidies placed on exports by developed countries. This had three negative effects. It encouraged the milk plants to use readily available low-priced WFP commodities rather locally produced raw milk. It acted as a disincentive for increasing local milk production. And the funds accumulating from milk sales were lower than they should have been, thereby reducing investment in dairy development. This problem was eventually overcome when FAO devised a formula for calculating the value of WFP assistance, which basically reflected the prevailing domestic market price for milk. WFP assistance to the dairy development sector was dominated by one project in India. This was not only WFP’s largest assisted project but one of the biggest and most comprehensive development programmes undertaken anywhere in the developing world. Known as ‘Operation Flood’, the programme aimed at establishing the foundations for a modern Indian dairy industry. By increasing milk production and supply, the organized dairy sector would have a commanding share of the markets in India’s four main cities, Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras. At the time WFP assistance was approved in 1969, these cities had a combined potential milk market of up to 25 million people. At the same time, milk production and procurement would be increased in the rural areas which supplied milk to these cities. The project was implemented by the Indian Dairy Corporation, with technical support from the National Dairy Development Board. WFP’s governing body approved a commitment of 126,000 tons of dried skimmed milk and 42,000 ton of butter oil at a total cost to WFP of $165 million, originally for five years, which, because of operational problems, was extended to 11 years (1970–81). ‘Operation Flood’ was the culmination of earlier WFP experience in India through the execution of four other WFP-assisted projects in dairy development that together involved $12 million of WFP aid. WFP commodities were sold to milk plants at prices equivalent to those paid

126 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

for local-produced liquid milk. This enabled milk supplies to be increased and generated funds that were invested in different parts of India’s dairy industry including: the construction and expansion of dairy plant capacity; storage and long-distance milk transport facilities; the organization of rural milk procurement along co-operative lines; livestock improvement, including the resettlement of city-kept milch animals; and forage and feed production. By the end of WFP assistance, the equivalent of $146 million was generated from the sale of WFP commodities for investment in these activities. An inter-UN agency mission visited India in 1981 at the termination of WFP assistance to evaluate the results obtained (WFP, 1981b). The mission concluded that the success of ‘Operation Flood’ in restructuring the dairy industry in India through the setting up of co-operatives and connecting them with the four major city markets was ‘commendable’. It demonstrated that food aid could be used successfully for dairy development given the right kind of institutional structure coupled with properly planned and integrated programmes for development. The incomes of a large number of poor rural producers had been substantially increased. The social as well as economic impact of the project was considerable: the role of women as tenders of milch animals and their earnings from milk sales were enhanced. The supply of good quality milk at reasonable prices to city consumers was ensured. And a cadre of well-qualified and dedicated staff was built up with expertise in all aspects of the project’s activities. Given the size and complexity of the project, it is not surprising that criticism was made of its operations both within and outside India (Doornbos et al., 1991). However, the foundations of a modern dairy industry had been established for which WFP food aid and its generated funds made a significant contribution. This was demonstrated by a second phase of Operation Flood during which food aid was provided by the European Community and financial assistance from the World Bank (Candler and Kumar, 1998). By 1996, these three sources of assistance had provided $1.7 billion of food and financial aid to the project. By that time, it involved 9.3 million farmer-members supplying an average of 10,900 tons of milk a day through over 55,000 village co-operative societies to 170 milk producers unions who sold it as liquid milk and processed products. Three lessons stand out. First, a well-conceived investment project in support of an already adopted and appropriate policy change can produce results out of all proportion to the investment involved. Secondly, by raising incomes, an apparently simple single-commodity project can have multiple economic and social effects. And thirdly, by focusing on a predominant activity of the poor, self-selection is likely to result in a major portion of the benefits accruing to them. In 1988, in the light of further experience, the WFP secretariat presented another paper to the governing body on future policy in the field of dairy

Food and Development 127

development (WFP, 1988a). The paper emphasized that the main objective of WFP assistance for dairy development was to raise rural incomes and living standards, primarily by increasing milk production of small farmers as an element of an economically viable and self-sustaining dairy sector. Priority was therefore given to dairy development based on small farmers and to supporting dairy schemes in low-income areas. Forestry, agriculture and integrated rural development From its inception, WFP has provided assistance for forestry projects. By the mid-1990s, about $1.3 billion of WFP aid had been provided to 162 projects, accounting for the second largest share of WFP aid for agricultural and rural development (see Statistical Appendix 1). At the time of the world food crisis in the early 1970s, doubts were expressed by some delegations in WFP’s governing body concerning the wisdom of WFP continuing to invest its sharply reduced resources in forestry activities. They felt that emphasis should be given to projects which contributed to increased agricultural production in a shorter period of time. Other delegations gave a counter view. Forestry projects were important because they often combined forestry and food production, played an essential role in protecting the environment, and contributed to restoring timber production, an important source of employment and foreign exchange, particularly in a number of the poorest countries. To help resolve these differences of view, an evaluation of WFP assistance for forestry activities was undertaken in 1976 (WFP, 1976g). The evaluation showed the basic and multifarious contributions WFP-supported forestry activities made not only for agricultural production but also within the wider concept of integrated rural development. Only a few involved new plantations exclusively for timber production. And the concept of ‘social forestry’ was used as a means of addressing the problems of abject poverty. For these reasons, the study argued that WFP support to forestry activities should be seen as an integral part of programmes to increase and sustain food and agricultural production and rural development and not for timber production alone. Forestry activities figured prominently in anti-poverty strategies and accorded well with the priorities established for WFP assistance. They often took place in the most depressed regions of developing countries and provided employment and income for the poorest sections of the population. They could be taken up during periods of emergency or reconstruction following natural or man-made disasters, and could be used to reduce seasonal unemployment and underemployment. Permanent employment could also be created directly through the establishment of a forestry labour force and indirectly through the extension or intensification of tree-protected agricultural production. Food assistance was a particularly appropriate form of aid in that the activities undertaken were mostly labour-intensive, often involving large numbers of workers, in areas of

128 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

subsistence agriculture, where there was a need to improve nutrition, and where such assistance led to additional investment, employment and incomes. The difficulty of obtaining financial assistance in sufficient amounts, and on the appropriate terms and conditions, for forestry programmes made food aid even more attractive, and necessary. WFP assistance was used in a number of ways. Principally, it was provided in the form of family rations as part of the wages of forestry workers. As labour costs were a large component of the total costs of forestry projects, the food aid provided enabled governments to enlarge or expand project activities by employing more workers or investing the savings from the wage bill in other project inputs. In some cases, WFP rations were sold to project workers at subsidized prices. This served to attract labour to work in remote and isolated areas. The funds created were invested in locally produced tools, materials and equipment and in improving working conditions in the project area. As food production and markets were often inadequate in project areas, food aid had no disincentive effects. Food aid was also provided to trainees and their families during training programmes of various kinds. In many cases, WFP assistance was co-ordinated with technical and material aid provided by cooperating United Nations agencies and bilateral aid programmes. An example of WFP assistance to the forestry sector may be taken from India (WFP, 1994i, pp. 103–19). The depletion of India’s forestry resources has left the poorest people, who live in the forest areas, particularly vulnerable. The forest areas are generally remote from markets and benefit less from development programmes and assistance. Alternative sources of income for the forest people are minimal. Food insecurity is chronic and malnutrition common, particularly among women and children. WFP assistance has reached these people through the forestry department of the states of India. Basic WFP rations of cereals, edible oil and pulses have been sold at subsidized rates to forestry department workers. The funds collected have been used by the forestry departments for investment in the forestry workers’ communities, or in additional forestry activities, to the benefit of all concerned. WFP has supported eight projects of this nature with a total aid commitment of $185 million. Total funds generated from the sale of WFP rations are expected to be about the equivalent of $46.5 million. There has been a growing realization, backed by legislation, that effective community involvement is an essential prerequisite for sustainable forestry activities. This concept of social forestry involves strengthening the relationship between the forest departments and forest villages as a way of promoting a participatory approach for a more effective and sustainable forest management partnership. Within this concept, funds generated from the sale of WFP rations have been used to finance village-level plans in carefully selected locations drawn up by village forest protection and management committees, in

Food and Development 129

collaboration with the local forest department. New legislation now guarantees that the village committees have a share of the produce from the forests that they protect. WFP’s governing body agreed with the 1976 study recommendation that WFP should continue to support forestry projects, and especially those activities which contributed toward increasing food and agricultural production and productive and stable employment and welfare for rural people (WFP, 1976g, p. 19). Fisheries development In 1981, at the request of FAO’s Committee on Fisheries, the WFP secretariat carried out an evaluation of the role of its food aid in fisheries development and the use of fish products in food aid (WFP, 1982d). Subsequently, an information paper on this subject was presented to the FAO World Conference on Fisheries Management and Development in Rome in 1984 (WFP, 1984g). In common with other funding programmes and international financial institutions, WFP aid for fisheries development in developing countries has represented a very small part of its total assistance. Only 26 development projects aiming wholly or in part at fisheries development in 20 developing countries were assisted by WFP during the first 20 years of its operations. This reflected the ad hoc approach that characterized fisheries development in Third World countries. Relatively few requests for assistance were received from governments and, with some exceptions, limited attention was given to the development of small-scale fisheries of benefit to poor, rural communities, the focus of WFP’s development assistance. This situation changed, to some extent, with the establishment of 200-mile exclusive economic zones in 1982 by the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, which gave an opportunity for coastal developing countries to utilize more fully their marine resources. The role of inland fisheries and acquaculture as a source of food, employment and income, especially in landlocked countries, has also been more systematically pursued. WFP assistance could help promote fisheries development in two main ways: through support to a variety of different types of projects; and through giving stimulus to the creation and expansion of local markets for fish products. Through FFW programmes in which WFP aid was provided as part payment of wages or as an incentive for community development activities, the physical infrastructure required for integrating aquaculture into rural development, and for inland and marine fisheries, has been constructed or improved, including access roads, wharfs, dams, jetties, and water supply systems. Training programmes have also been supported where WFP rations were provided to trainees and the families to enable them to attend training courses during which new technologies were introduced. These courses were particularly relevant for women who played an important part in fish processing, storage and

130 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

marketing, and where traditional methods resulted in the loss of a high proportion of the fish catch. In settlement and resettlement projects and in dam and lake fisheries development schemes, WFP assistance was provided until a level of self-sufficiency was reached, including fish production. Direct and indirect support was also provided for the establishment of new, or the strengthening of existing, fisheries co-operatives and similar small producer institutions and associations. The sale of WFP commodities to co-operative members at subsidized prices helped to build up the capital strength of co-operatives, create revolving funds, and increase the scale of their activities. In one project in Mali, beneficiaries of WFP aid were required to pay back to a fishing co-operative, fresh fish equivalent to 10 per cent of the weight of the WFP rations they received. The funds generated from the sale of the fish were put in a revolving fund for the continuation of fishing co-operative activities after WFP assistance came to an end. The enlarged scale of economic activities and improved credit-worthiness of WFP-assisted co-operatives gave them better access to other aid agencies, more conventional, development finance and to government credit schemes. Most of WFP assistance for fisheries development has been provided as part of large-scale, multipurpose, integrated rural development projects. In China, for example, three WFP-assisted projects involved the reclamation of tidal lands and the construction of reservoirs and ponds for rice and sugar, but also fish, production. The development of fisheries helped the poor communities in a number of ways. Off-season employment was provided during the agricultural work cycle; incomes, particularly of women, were increased; and school feeding programmes assisted by providing regular supplies of fish at low cost. WFP assistance also attempted to stimulate fish production in developing countries by helping to create or expand local markets for fish products. Many developing countries have the natural resources for a viable fisheries industry. But assurance of an adequate market, with fair prices to producers as well as consumers, is required to provide an incentive to increase fish production. The purchase of fish and fish products for use in food-aided projects over a limited period of time could help. But caution should be exercised to ensure that the industry does not rely solely on a food aid market. In Malawi, for example, WFP arranged to purchase sun dried fish caught in Lake Malawi for distribution in a WFP-assisted forestry development project in another part of the country. These purchases stimulated the development of the local fisheries industry around the lake. The cost of the fish produced and its transport to another part of the country was less than half the costs involved if fish had been brought into the country. Fisheries products have represented a very small proportion of the total volume of WFP food aid. While they have been accepted as food aid by people accustomed to eating fish, fish products have created problems in communities

Food and Development 131

with other consumer preferences. Continuity of supply has provided another difficulty, especially as fish products are not readily interchangeable with other food aid commodities. The high cost of fish products has also limited their use, as their inclusion in food aid rations may result in a reduction in the amount of other commodities that could be supplied. Many developing countries, and especially the poorest among them, do not have the logistical infrastructure to receive, store and distribute fish products. Unhygienic conditions severely hamper the widespread use of fish products in food aid and could lead to high losses and waste. Some of these problems were overcome through the use of triangular transactions, local purchases and exchange arrangements, particularly in emergency operations, but the quantities of fish products involved have generally been very small. An attempt was made to establish minimum food aid targets for non-cereal commodities, including fish products (WFP, 1976i). Some donor countries questioned the need for fixing targets for commodities other than cereals. These are basic food commodities universally produced and consumed, which was not the case with other food commodities. Furthermore, since food aid was a transitional measure, the establishment of targets could work against efforts to increase food production in recipient countries and their export possibilities (WFP, 1976h, pp. 8–10). Food reserves for emergencies and price stabilization The establishment of emergency food reserves in developing countries was identified as one of the types of activities qualifying for WFP assistance from the outset of its operations (WFP, 1963a). The governing body also supported price stabilization schemes and ‘recognized the economic benefits than can result from more stable prices for staple commodities, providing incentive to producers and protection of consumer interests, though the costs of operation may be high’ (WFP. 1966g, p. 9). It therefore approved WFP’s experimentation with the seasonal stabilization of the prices of food grains. Criteria were established for WFP’s assistance, included: the presence of a competent executing agency to manage price stabilization schemes with effective government support; the availability of adequate storage, handling, transport and trading facilities; provision of external technical and material assistance, when required; a government guarantee to compensate for operating losses arising from market intervention; a close balance between domestic grain production and consumption in the recipient country; availability to WFP of commodities fully appropriate to local needs; and assurance that the provision of WFP commodities would not depress local prices to the extent that they would become a disincentive to increased domestic agricultural production. The FAO Committee on Commodity Problems considered that these criteria were ‘acceptable’ but ‘stressed the need to relate them to broad economic, as well as administrative, considerations’ (WFP, 1967e, p. 2).

132 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

After over 30 years of operations, WFP had assisted only 24 food reserve projects with $87 million of aid (see Statistical Appendix 1). Many factors have accounted for this modest level of assistance. Almost all WFP-assisted food reserves have been part of small pilot projects, mainly in the least developed countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Their size was deliberately restricted because of uncertainties in their operation. Experience showed that a number of considerations were generally lacking, including: a clear distinction between the use of reserves for emergency and for price stabilization purposes; appropriate production, pricing and marketing policies; criteria and guidelines for, and management controls over, the use of the reserves; sufficient financial commitment; adequate organizational and management structures and staff; and a scale of operations that enabled reserves to be effective in times of emergency as well as being a price stabilizing factor. Despite this sobering experience, all projects, for which there had been virtually no previous experience, provided valuable lessons as to how these initial small-scale trials might be further developed (WFP, 1979c). An evaluation of WFP-assisted food reserve projects in 1985 confirmed this checkered experience (WFP, 1985b). Reserve projects were found to be too ambitious in concept and design. The resources provided were inadequate to achieve their objectives. The projects themselves were inappropriate given the overall economic realities and the capacities of recipient governments. They were not adequately supported with technical assistance and were insufficiently monitored and controlled. And they lacked flexibility to respond to changing national circumstances. With its limited resources, WFP’s governing body has given precedence to meeting immediate food aid requirements over stock-building measures. And WFP’s resources have been inadequate to assist national food reserve schemes, in addition to supporting priority projects, on the scale required. As a result, they have been usually left to bilateral donors to support. Experience with price stabilization schemes showed that the scale of WFP assistance was often too small to be effective. And few developing countries, especially the poorest among them, had either the policy base, or the financial, organizational, managerial and logistical requirements, to handle them effectively (WFP, 1985b). Extensive discussion has taken place concerning the pre-positioning of food stocks at strategic locations to expedite the delivery of emergency food aid (FAO, 1986). Donors have opposed this practice on grounds of costs, management difficulties, and loss of control once stocks were pre-positioned. Even more debate has taken place over many years concerning the establishment of international reserves at strategic locations or reserves at national, regional or local levels to provide food security in times of emergency and for price stabilization purposes. Yet food aid for the establishment of such reserves has been modest and fraught with difficulties. Problems of location, ownership, storage,

Food and Development 133

stock rotation, conditions for release and replenishment, and above all costs, have been extensively discussed. Given WFP’s experience, the governing body has emphasized that national food reserves should be conceived and operated within national development policies and programmes designed to achieve food security. Their aims and objectives should be clearly understood, and the food reserves used only for the purposes for which they were intended. Food aid is not the only form of aid required: financial and technical assistance is often needed. With these limitations, WFP’s governing body agreed that within its priorities and the constraints of its limited resources ‘higher consideration should be given to requests to WFP for national food reserves when it is clearly demonstrated that such reserves could have a positive effect on food security, production and supplies in the recipient country’ (WFP, 1979c, p. 5). WFP should, in particular, help small or medium-size food reserves schemes, or make small contributions to large reserves, assist in improving storage and other essential food security infrastructure in the poorest countries through FFW programmes, and provide training in food management for national staff in food aid recipient countries. Industrial and mining projects Experimentation took place in the early years of WFP operations to see to what extent food aid could assist industrial and mining projects. With one exception, only small amounts of aid were provided for limited periods of time. A total of 20 projects and project expansions were supported in eight countries with $45 million of aid, representing only a small fraction of total WFP commitments (see Statistical Appendix 1). The one exception was in Ghana where almost $29 million of WFP aid was committed for the rehabilitation of the export sector as part of a World Bank structural adjustment programme. Various types of industrial and mining projects were supported, including the development of infant weaning foods and livestock feed, bauxite and coal mining as well as mineral prospecting and exploration, and the construction of industrial factories. Co-operation was established with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in order to review possible forms of food aid to industrial and mining projects. Certain ‘ground rules’ provided a framework for WFP’s support. At least a third of total project costs should be met internally. A major component of internal costs should be the labour cost of unskilled workers who were prepared to accept part-payment of their wages in kind. These workers should be engaged in labour-intensive activities in the construction or expansion of an industry. And food assistance could be provided during periods of training. More than half of WFP-assisted industrial and mining projects were in Turkey, which provided a kind of ‘laboratory’ for WFP’s experience in this

134 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

field. Public sector projects involving cement production, the nitrogen industry, a pulp and paper factory, an iron and steel works, and coal mining were supported. An evaluation of these projects was conducted in 1967 (WFP, 1968d). In most cases, WFP rations were provided to project workers in order to improve their diet and increase their productivity. Savings accruing to the government enterprises as a result of WFP assistance were invested in improving working conditions, including kitchen and canteen facilities, dormitories, washrooms, and child care centres, and in establishing training and recreational centres. The evaluation mission found that WFP aid had ‘a clear and tangible social impact’ through improving working conditions. The economic impact was ‘probably less marked’. There were many factors affecting output and unit costs from which the provision of WFP assistance could not easily be separated. But improvements in nutrition and working conditions and the provision of training undoubtedly increased workers’ health and efficiency. Some market displacement was caused by WFP aid insofar as it was used to replace foods previously purchased locally for the workers’ canteens. The mission recommended that savings resulting from WFP aid should also be invested in additional productive capacity, thereby creating a permanent increase in employment which, in areas of substantial unemployment and under-employment, would lead to an increase in food consumption. By benefiting local farmers and domestic food industries, this would have multiplier effects on employment and food consumption; thus, the initial market displacement would eventually be more than offset. The basic criterion for determining the way in which savings from WFP aid should be used was that most of the savings reappeared as income for very poor people. Public utilities: housing, transportation and communications A prominent sphere of WFP assistance has been the construction and improvement of public utilities for poor communities in developing countries. During over 30 years of operations, WFP has supported 145 development projects in this field with $540 million of aid. In addition, 68 projects involving assistance to refugees with $148 million of WFP aid, and many of the 130 community development projects supported by WFP with $612 million of assistance, contributed to this sector (see Statistical Appendix 1). On the occasion of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, held in Vancouver, Canada in June 1976, each United Nations body was requested to report on its current and prospective assistance related to this field of development. WFP presented a report first to its governing body and then to the conference, which was prepared with the co-operation of the United Nations Centre for Housing, Building and Planning (WFP, 1976c).18 The report noted that WFP was one of the largest supporters in the United Nations system

Food and Development 135

of human settlement projects for poor communities in the developing world. The activities supported involved: the construction or renovation of low-cost housing in rural and urban areas; the creation of public amenities; slum clearance and urban renewal; the improvement of drinking water supplies and sanitation; multi-purpose community development works; the construction and improvement of transportation and communications systems, including roads, railways and power lines; and public health programmes. Human settlements were constructed as an integral part of agricultural settlement schemes on newly developed land during with WFP assistance. A variety of construction works took place from self-help and sites-and-services projects to the construction of new towns and the development of model villages. WFP also provided assistance for programmes in urban areas involving slum clearance, improvement of squatter settlements and urban renewal. WFP also supported projects, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa, for the settlement or resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. In Tanzania, for example, WFP assisted nine projects for the settlement of refugees from neighbouring countries who were given land by the government and encouraged to integrate with the local population. Schools, health centres and dispensaries, warehouses and workshops were built with WFP food aid. In these public utilities projects, WFP assistance was provided as partpayment of the wages of the workers involved, or as an incentive, or in partial compensation of earning foregone, for self-help, community development activities where no cash wages were paid. An important contribution of WFP aid was that it encouraged, or enabled, recipient governments to adopt a labour-intensive approach to construction activities using local materials. This approach significantly altered the structure, phasing and sequencing of construction costs thereby enabling the expansion of low-cost housing and other public utilities. A high proportion of total investment consisted of labour costs, which could be partly or wholly offset by WFP food aid. Government initial capital costs were thereby reduced and higher maintenance costs were spread over succeeding years. Co-operatives and similar institutions In 1977, a report was submitted to WFP’s governing body on the mutual advantages that could be derived from a close relationship between food aid and the development of co-operative-type organizations in developing countries (WFP, 1977b). A decade later, as a sequel to that report, an international symposium was organized by the Committee for the Promotion and Advancement of Cooperatives (COPAC)19 and WFP, co-sponsored by the Government of Norway, and co-hosted by the United Nations and UNIDO at the Vienna International Centre, Austria (COPAC and WFP, 1988). Co-operative-type institutions were understood to cover formal and informal groups, provided they operated on

136 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

the principle of self-help and popular participation, had social as well as economic objectives, aimed at autonomy, and had some form of legal identity (ILO, 1966). Both the 1977 report and the international symposium were based on the practical experience of food-aided development projects involving co-operative type organizations. At the end of 1976, there were 71 WFP-assisted development projects with a co-operative component, involving a total cost of WFP aid of $512 million. By the end of 1987, that number had increased to 150 projects involving $1.3 billion of WFP aid. They included several projects in which WFP had made its largest aid commitments. Food aid and co-operative-type institutions could help each other in mutually reinforcing ways. Food aid could help the development of co-operative institutions by improving the situation of individual co-operative members; and by expanding the capacity of the co-operatives themselves. Food aid could support members through times of hardship and make them less vulnerable to exploitation. The well-being of members and their co-operatives was closely interlinked. A sound financial standing was crucial for the success of co-operatives. The contribution of food-for-work activities and financial assistance to co-operatives from the funds generated from the sale of food aid commodities to co-operative members at subsidized prices were therefore particularly pertinent. Conversely, co-operatives could assist in making food aid more effective in a number of ways. They could help to: ensure that food aid reached poor communities at low cost; exchange locally grown food for food aid commodities supplied by donors; and provide a source for local purchases of food, for use as food aid. Contractual arrangements could be made with co-operatives, which would ensure that proceeds for food aid commodity purchases went directly to them, thereby stimulating increased production. Better forward planning of food aid would be possible through easier procurement, quality control and reduced costs. And disruption of agricultural production and trade could be avoided. Co-operatives could help solve other problems associated with food-aided development projects such as: reducing the burden and cost of administration; providing infrastructure, such as storage and transport, and personnel for food aid distribution; exercising control and monitoring at the local level; playing an important role in FFW programmes by mobilizing voluntary labour, delivering equipment, providing services of institutionalized credit, processing and marketing, and accelerating the utilization of proceeds from the sale of food aid commodities; and providing an institutional framework through which project activities could be continued after the end of food aid. But experience had also shown that co-operative-type organizations had operated under a number of constraints including: undue government sponsorship

Food and Development 137

and interference and unclear or inconsistent government policies; insufficient training for co-operative leadership, management and members; small size and restricted membership; lack of integration of individual co-operatives into regional unions, thus limiting the range of services available to members; activities confined to short-term objectives, such as the delivery of food aid; financial and economic weakness and the misuse or misappropriation of funds, in turn denying access to development finance; inadequate technical and advisory services; and absence of a conscious policy of using co-operatives as instruments for improving the condition of the poor. Food aid and co-operatives could only interact effectively as part of a package of co-ordinated local and external assistance. Yet co-ordination of aid had often been inadequate. Only in a few cases had other aid organizations which had provided assistance to co-operatives suggested that WFP aid might also be made available. A better understanding was also needed of the potential complementary roles of food aid and co-operatives, for which guidelines were produced as part of the report of the international symposium.

The wider mandate: a forum for all food aid While steps were taken to institutionalize project food aid, the WFP secretariat also endeavoured to service the governing body in carrying out its wider mandate as a forum for intergovernmental discussion on food aid from all sources. An annual review of food aid policies and programmes was submitted to the Committee on Food Aid (CFA), initially as a way of monitoring the steps taken to implement the various elements of the resolution of the 1974 World Food Conference on an improved food aid policy. Later, these annual review were expanded to provide details of changes in donor food aid policies and data on the flow, direction and uses of food aid globally. Sporadic attempts were also made to assess food aid requirements in relation to availabilities for cereal and non-cereal food commodities. Another initiative was to submit papers to the CFA on the national experiences of both recipient and donor countries with their food aid policies and programmes on a selective basis. The reviews were not intended to provide in-depth evaluations but an overview of the experience of each country. The basic objective of examining and discussing these national reviews in the CFA was to share understanding and appreciation of the important issues surrounding food aid and its utilization. It was felt that this process could help in the development of agreed policies arising out of more specific knowledge of the practical experience of individual countries in both the receipt and the provision of food aid. The reviews were conducted on an entirely voluntary basis by the WFP secretariat with the active co-operation of the government concerned. In selecting the countries for review, an attempt was made to include recipient countries

138 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

from each of the developing regions and a range of large and small donors, and to show how food aid had been used to address a variety of developmental problems. In the decade from 1983, 17 national reviews were conducted by the CFA, including nine recipient countries and eight of donors.20 An ‘occasional papers’ series was started in 1985 to give WFP intellectual credibility in food aid issues and concerns.21 The production of an annual ‘hunger report’ was also contemplated by the WFP secretariat as a way of staking out WFP’s territory and heightening its image and identity, as other UN organizations had done. But the resources required to produce such an annual report of the required quality were grossly underestimated and the attempt was abandoned. Despite the secretariat’s attempts to stimulate the governing body actively to take up its wider functions of evolving, co-ordinating and improving food aid policies and programmes, the CFA did not fulfil these roles. The major donors were not prepared to air their differences in a multilateral setting. There remained an ambivalence among governments about food aid itself and the role of WFP. While delegates to WFP’s governing body meetings were prepared to discuss matters pertaining to WFP food aid, they did not have the mandate or background to discuss wider policies issue as they pertained to all food aid. The time allowed for discussion at CFA sessions on global food aid policies issue was inadequate. No attempt was made to set up a sub-committee on policy matters, as was done to consider project requests for WFP assistance, or to hold inter-sessional meetings on global food aid policy issues. Staff and resources in the WFP secretariat devoted to global food aid policy issues were also too small to make a real impact, and the work involved was not integrated into the mainstream of WFP activities.

Thirty years of project food aid: lessons from experience Effectiveness of WFP development aid In 1994, the results of a two-part study conducted by WFP’s evaluation service into the effectiveness of WFP’s development assistance, the only comprehensive assessment of WFP development aid to be undertaken for over 20 years (although many individual project evaluations (see WFP, 1995g) and a number of sectoral evaluations (see above) had been carried out), became known (WFP, 1994l).22 The first part of the study contained the results of a comprehensive survey among WFP staff and others who had been associated with WFP’s development activities to obtain their views on WFP’s successes and weaknesses. School feeding programmes were regarded as the most successful type of WFP-assisted development projects, followed by those involving the construction or improvement of rural infrastructure and soil and water conservation works, especially where they had been conducted on a community

Food and Development 139

development basis. The least successful projects were regarded as dairy development schemes, nutrition-improvement programmes for mothers and preschool children, and forestry projects conducted on a community basis. The most important factors contributing to the success of WFP-assisted development projects were identified as: the WFP food rations provided constituted a good incentive for project beneficiaries; the food aid reached the target groups; and the food aid contributed effectively to solving the problem in hand. Among the principal reasons for failure were that: recipient government did not allocate the necessary resources for the implementation of the project; complementarity between food aid and other resources was not secured; and the national policies of the food aid recipient government were not well defined. The second part of the study involved the screening of all 249 WFP-assisted development projects that were operational in 1994 to identify those which did not meet expectations in terms of either achievements or the rate of implementation, and which immobilized much-needed WFP resources that could be invested in other projects. A project review committee was established, chaired by the chief of WFP’s evaluation service, for this part of the study. The committee found that 21 per cent of on-going projects were performing well and could continue as formulated. Another 50 per cent were potentially good and could continue with some reformulation or reorientation. The remaining 29 per cent were found to be defective and should be terminated. About 70 per cent of the agricultural and rural development projects were found, with some modification, to be able to continue, while 30 per cent were recommended to be discontinued. For human resource development projects, the proportions were 77 per cent and 23 per cent respectively. The highest proportion of projects recommended for termination was in the Latin American and Caribbean region (39 per cent), followed by the North Africa and Middle East region (38 per cent), Sub-Saharan Africa (24 per cent), and the Asia and Pacific region (19 per cent). The most frequent reasons given for terminating projects were: inadequate targeting; non-sustainability and the serious risk of open-ended food aid; and too ambitious project objectives. Some main lessons What were some of the main lessons to emerge from over three decades of experience of WFP project food aid for development? Poor, food-insecure people first The first obvious, but not always followed, message is that the primary focus should be on poor, food-insecure people. They should be at the centre of the project cycle. By assessing the causes of their poverty and food insecurity, and identifying the activities best suited to improving their status, the most effective ways of providing food aid can be determined.

140 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Donor commitment Ambivalence in donor governments about food aid and the role of WFP should be removed in order to provide food aid resources to the Programme in ways that can facilitate their most effective use, enable WFP to fulfil its mandate, and co-ordinate food aid with other forms of assistance.

Recipient government policies, programmes and objectives An important consideration in allocating food aid to eligible countries highlighted in the criteria and guidelines for food aid adopted by the CFA in 1979 was ‘a strong commitment on the part of their governments to development policies for achieving self-reliance, reducing poverty and improving nutritional status, particularly in rural areas’. Where such policies are assured, they create a developmental environment within which food aid, and other forms of external assistance, can effectively contribute toward the reduction of poverty and food insecurity, and equitable and sustainable economic and social development. The process of providing development assistance should therefore start with a dialogue between recipient governments and aid agencies to ensure that these development policies are in place. It is now realized that, as with other forms of external assistance, food aid is best planned and used within country programmes which ensure that: it is fully integrated into the priorities and programmes of the recipient country; it is focused on the most needy areas and people; and it is flexible enough to take account of changing circumstances. This was recognized and advocated in the report of the expert group that led to the foundation of WFP in 1961 (FAO, 1961a). But it was to take a United Nations General Assembly resolution mandating the adoption of the country programming approach for UN development assistance that was passed 30 years later for WFP to implement that approach (UN, 1992). As WFP’s focus is on assisting poor and food-insecure people in the poorest countries, the objectives and targets set in the development projects it supported should be more realistically established to take account of the realities in which they are implemented. Targets can only be achieved incrementally over a longer period of time than originally planned, and are subjected to disruption and diversion in a fragile developmental environment. Many of the WFP-assisted development projects have taken the form of pre-investment activities that have bought beneficiaries time to cope with stresses and shocks, lift themselves out of the cycle of abject poverty, and create or save assets, thereby sustaining their livelihood systems and reducing their vulnerability. WFP-assisted development projects have served to attract other resources and support from government and external sources in a lifting process that has made their activities more attractive for later investments. More could, and

Food and Development 141

should, be done, however, to plan more actively for the next round of support once the pre-investment stage of WFP assistance is completed to ensure that the development process is sustained and the assisted populations can sustainably graduate out of food aid support. Targeting: access and outreach It is axiomatic that development assistance designed to support poor and hungry people must reach them if it is to have any benefit. Food aid has intrinsic advantages over other forms of aid. Project food aid in particular is largely selftargeting. And it responds to one of the most crucial needs – access to adequate food supplies. No other form of development assistance has transferred such a large level of resources directly to the poor. Nevertheless, there is one issue that is common to all types of food-aided development projects as well as emergency operations. Targeting is a key concern in their design and implementation. It is a strategic factor in ensuring access and outreach to the poor and food-insecure (Shaw, 1993). Four considerations have an especially important bearing on the effectiveness or otherwise of targeting: (1) Criteria. A balance should be struck between criteria that focus on the poorest people and the less exacting criteria that address affliction on a community or area basis, without dissipating scarce resources and impact on hunger and poverty, or biasing benefits in favour of any one particular group. Risk assessment and vulnerability mapping can provide useful operational tools for focusing attention on people and areas most in need, and for determining the types and amounts of assistance required. In the absence of reliable data, appropriate rapid appraisal and beneficiary participation techniques can be used to establish the parameters for targeting, which can be more finely defined through the operation of intervention programmes. (2) Administrative feasibility and costs. Targeted interventions might fail because they may be either not feasible, or too costly, to administer on a sustainable basis. The result may be, at best, only intermittent outreach to those most in need, or access only to those who are not so seriously affected. Weak local government capacity or lack of decentralization in decision-making may also impede the successful implementation of intervention programmes. Administrative and other costs might also make interventions unsustainable or non-replicable. These problems may be minimized, or overcome, if the next factor is taken into account. (3) Participation by the target group. Many of the difficulties of poverty-focused development projects may be overcome if the afflicted population itself is involved in their design, implementation and evaluation. This has been recognized as an essential factor for sustained and equitable development (FAO, 1990; Oakley, 1991). However, the rhetoric concerning people’s participation

142 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

still outweighs the practice. ‘Participation’ means different things to decisionmakers. There is no universal model, or single way, of implementing the concept. And to be undertaken thoroughly and well, it requires political commitment and professional understanding. It is not a soft option for solving the problems of governments or aid agencies (Herbinger et al., 1999). (4) Resource Transfer. An immediate object of transferring resources to households whose incomes are low, unstable and exposed to total collapse in times of crisis is to restore incomes at least to their former levels, and assist in reconstruction programmes that can quickly lead to recovery and development. The type, form, level and method of the resource transfer can have significant influence on the realization of those objectives. Decisions on these factors should relate to the specific situation in which poor and food-insecure people find themselves, and the causes of their poverty and hunger. Whatever type of resource transfer is made, a premium should be placed on its prompt provision, as this generally increases both participation and productivity. People and community action As so many of WFP-assisted development projects have basically been about expanding the capabilities and opportunities of abjectly poor people, they have essentially involved the participation of households and communities in the process of improving their own wellbeing. Local leadership has been a key factor. As WFP has supported governments in the implementation of their development projects, until relatively recently, people’s involvement was treated as a given, and considered to be the responsibility of recipient governments. At the same time, WFP pursued a headquarters approach to project planning with relatively little delegation to its country offices. This ‘top-down’ approach was common to most development assistance programmes. With the disappointing results of aid programmes, and the appeal for a ‘human face’ to development, ‘bottom-up’ approaches have been initiated. They have been used both to understand better the needs and aspirations of poor households and communities, and to involve them in development through a process of ‘decentralized empowerment’, local creativity and the building up of national capacity, which were identified as among the fundamental aims of reform of the UN system. In common, and in partnership, with other aid agencies, WFP has therefore embarked on participatory, needs-based programming. Participatory learning and action are still in their infancy (Chambers, 1997). Much will depend on the commitment of governments in recipient and donor countries and the capacity of WFP country offices, in partnership with others, if they are to be successfully implemented. A major challenge for aid agencies, including WFP, will be to adapt their institutional strategies, cultures, and capacities to work with participatory development (World Bank, 1998). New

Food and Development 143

patterns of staffing, recruitment, and personnel performance assessment, new project management approaches, and new criteria for judging success will be required if the process is to be sustained. Markets More attention should be given to the assessment and analysis of food markets in developing countries, and in more diverse ways. In the past, the principal, or only, concern was to avoid disrupting markets with food aid, the focus of attention of the CSD. While this possibility should continue to be avoided, ways in which food aid could positively support market development should more actively be sought. These initiatives could include: stimulating local markets through the procurement of food commodities in developing countries for use as food aid through triangular transactions, local purchases and exchange arrangements; intervening in areas where there is insufficient food available at affordable prices; supplying food aid only during periods of food shortage; assisting countries to implement programmes of market restructuring and food price policy reform that take into account the need to provide incentives to producers while avoiding pricing the poor consumer out of the market; rehabilitating market infrastructure damaged or destroyed by natural and manmade disasters; and using vulnerability analysis and mapping to focus on areas where food inadequacy and poverty co-exist. Transport, logistics and modalities Of special concern to food aid is that transport, handling and distribution systems are in place to ensure that the food provided reach the intended beneficiaries consistently. This has not always been the case. Supplies from donor countries have been subjected to instability and delays. And WFP assistance has been particularly focused on the poorest countries with inadequate infrastructure and management systems. Countries with the greatest need for food aid are often the least able to receive it. An important complementary form of assistance was, therefore, to work with donor countries and other aid agencies to strengthen the capacity of poor countries to absorb food aid by improving the transportation and logistical infrastructure and management systems. This was especially important for emergency operations but the improvements remained in place to contribute to the development process generally. In addition, experience was to show that not only was WFP required to determine whether food aid was required, and what development projects should be supported, but also to assess the best ways to provided it in order to reach the intended beneficiaries with the least transfer costs. The different modalities of food aid transfers have therefore assumed increasing importance, particularly as WFP food and cash resources have decreased. Expertise is therefore required in food purchasing, exchange and triangular transactions in order to procure food

144 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

commodities in developing countries for use as food aid and monetization arrangements that maximize the benefits of food aid for poor and food-insecure people. Ability to carry out these food aid modalities is still being built up among WFP staff and co-ordination with other aid agencies involved in their operation needs to be strengthened in a common code of conduct. Partnership arrangement Food aid has rarely been sufficient alone to support development projects. Financial and technical assistance and non-food inputs are also required for their implementation, which food aid recipient governments have been expected to provide. Where this was not possible, as in the case of WFP priority least-developed and low-income countries, it was envisaged that financial and technical assistance would be provided by other aid agencies. For this reason, from its inception WFP was required to work in close co-operation with other assistance organizations both within and outside the UN system. It was also envisaged that other aid agencies would bring the development projects they were supporting and implementing to WFP’s attention so that they could also benefit from food aid. Although this has occurred, it has taken place to a much lesser extent than originally envisaged. One problem has been that aid agencies have adopted different planning and budgeting cycles, which made it difficult to synchronize the provision of the different types of development assistance. As a result, WFP had to become much more proactive in seeking out and implementing joint or co-funded projects with other aid agencies. This process has been facilitated by UN General Assembly resolutions and reforms in the UN system that have called for co-ordinated country programmes of assistance that integrate all forms of UN development assistance, which, in turn, has required that all UN agencies synchronize their planning and budgetary cycles with those of the national governments in developing countries (see Chapter 9). WFP has also sought to strengthen its co-operation with national and international NGOs both to reach the poor and hungry and to assist governments in poor countries in implementing their development projects and programmes. Therefore, joint and co-funded projects should now be the main channels for WFP assistance.

6 Emergency and Relief Operations

‘The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing’ (Edmund Burke). ‘It is incredibly difficult to do good’ (Shawcross, 2000). This chapter focuses on WFP’s emergency and relief assistance. It traces the trends and directions in its emergency aid over more than three decades; describes the different types of emergencies that have been addressed; examines the main reasons for WFP’s increasing involvement in disaster relief; summarizes the linkages between its relief and development assistance; and draws conclusions and raises issues for future concern.

Overview On 12 November 1968, in his address at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, in the United States, the British scientist and author C. P. Snow made the dire prophesy that ‘many millions of people in poor countries are going to starve to death before our eyes – or, to complete the domestic picture, we shall see them doing so upon our television set’ (Snow, 1968). Snow continued: the rapidity and completeness of human communications are constantly presenting us with the sight of famine, suffering, violent death. We turn away, inside our safe drawing-rooms. It may be that these communications themselves help to make us callous. And yet, perhaps also there is the unadmitted thought that human lives are plentiful beyond belief? He predicted that ‘local famines will spread into a sea of hunger’ by the mid-1970s. Famine in the developing world has been virtually, although not yet exclusively, confined to conflict situations, mainly within developing countries, where 145

146 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

political and logistical difficulties hamper food delivery and access. This containment of famine caused by natural factors, particularly drought, is a real achievement of the process of international negotiations of which the 1974 World Food Conference was the focal point, although the full effects of climate change and global warming have yet to be experienced (Shaw and Clay, 1998). Positive steps have, therefore, been taken. But the international community and the poor countries themselves have not responded fully to the resolutions on the international conferences that have taken place, and the world still remains precariously vulnerable to widespread food insecurity. WFP is now the main international channel for emergency relief food. This has not always been so, as the changing focus of this chapter reveals. To the end of the 1980s, the bulk of WFP assistance went to supporting development projects, with a smaller proportion going for emergency operations. Now the reverse is the case. WFP performs a number of vital tasks in emergencies. It provides emergency relief food aid from its regular resources. It administers the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR). WFP helps to co-ordinate the food aid aspects of large-scale international relief operations and makes its unique transport and logistics services and expertise available to the international community. With the co-operation of donor countries, WFP has helped to improve port, storage and inland transportation systems during relief operations, the benefits of which have remained after emergencies have passed. Services have been provided to donors for the purchase, transportation and monitoring of food commodities for their own bilateral aid programmes. And a WFP International Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS) has been developed that provides information and data for decision-making on food aid operations throughout the world. WFP has the largest global food aid operational network. At the beginning of the 1990s, WFP staff were located in 85 country offices serving 90 developing countries. They assist in the assessment of food aid needs, requisition food, and organize its distribution from borrowed in-country stocks. WFP-hired ships carrying food aid consignments to developing countries can be diverted to provide relief supplies quickly. And to the risk and loss of their lives, WFP staff have played a vital role in getting food through to refugees and displaced persons caught up in war zones in man-made emergencies. These tasks have been built up and consolidated over the past three decades.

Changing focus WFP emergency resources There was one issue that caused much debate from the inception of WFP operations. While the Programme should help in times of emergency as well as assist

Emergency and Relief Operations 147

economic and social development projects, where should the emphasis lie, or to put in terms often discussed, what should be the ‘balance’? The study by the expert group that led to the creation of WFP (FAO, 1961a) focused on the developmental uses of food aid, as did the pioneering FAO food aid study in India before it (FAO, 1955). However, McGovern’s proposal for a multilateral threeyear experimental food aid programme stated that ‘the primary aim of the program in its initial stages should be to meet emergency needs’ (McGovern, 1961) (see appendix to chapter 2 in the present volume). The resolutions formally creating WFP in November/December 1961 called on WFP to pay attention to ‘establishing adequate and orderly procedures on a world basis for meeting emergency food needs and emergencies inherent in chronic malnutrition (this could include the establishment of food reserves)’ (FAO, 1961b; UN, 1961a). This was listed as the first objective of WFP assistance in the general regulations of the newly created organization in 1963 (WFP, 1963a). And WFP’s governing body was to give more attention to emergency operations than to any other single subject. Despite the initial prominence given to responding to emergency situations, only a modest proportion of WFP resources were allocated for providing that purpose. During the first year of WFP operations, up to 25 per cent of the commodities pledged to the Programme were earmarked for use in emergencies, including the establishment of national food reserves. This allocation was later amended in the light of experience. At the beginning of each year, $7 million of WFP’s resources were reserved for emergency food needs. Should that amount prove inadequate, a further $3 million in any one year could be drawn from WFP’s resources for emergencies (WFP, 1966a). That rigid formula was further amended in 1978 when it was decided that for meeting emergency food needs, the amounts to be reserved from WFP’s resources would be determined by WFP’s governing body ‘in accordance with changing circumstances’ (WFP, 1978b). In cases of special need, WFP’s executive director could request additional amounts of emergency food aid to be drawn from the Programme’s regular resources. Any unused balance of emergency food aid allocations were returned to WFP’s general resources at the end of each year. WFP was also permitted in emergencies to arrange for the purchase and transportation of food and related non-food items, and for the monitoring of their distribution, on behalf of bilateral food aid programmes and other UN agencies, so long as reimbursement was received for the services provided.

Responding to emergencies Providing emergency relief is a complex issue, both conceptually and practically. Initially, emergency situations qualifying for WFP assistance were defined as arising out of ‘critical food shortages or famine resulting from sudden or

148 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

unexpected occurrences’ (WFP, 1964a). In the light of experience, that definition was considered to be too general and was amended in 1970 to: urgent situations in which there is clear evidence that an event has occurred which causes human suffering or loss of livestock and which the government concerned has not the means to remedy; and it is a demonstrably abnormal event which produces dislocation in the life of a community on an exceptional scale. (WFP, 1970b, p. 15) Even this expanded definition was to cause problems. Three types of emergencies were identified: (a) sudden, natural calamities, such as earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes; (b) slower-maturing emergencies arising from food shortages caused by drought, crop failures, pests and diseases; and (c) man-made emergencies resulting in refugees and displaced persons. Three problems faced WFP from the outset. The first was the size of resources allocated for emergencies. The second was its inability to provide assistance quickly. And the third were basic operational problems, such as the sustained supply of staple and acceptable foodstuffs, the size and suitability of containers and packaging, and adequate transport, storage and handling facilities in developing countries. It soon became evident that the original allocation of WFP regular resources for meeting emergencies was inadequate. The governing body was regularly requested to increase WFP’s annual emergency allocations from its regular resources until an alternative and additional source became available in the form of the IEFR in 1975. This not only reduced the commodities available for development assistance but increased the demand for scarce cash resources. Food commodities pledged to WFP were not held in storage by the Programme but kept in donor countries around the world. WFP did not have its own transport and logistics facilities but had to purchase them with its limited cash resources. It was initially found, therefore, that the Programme could not function as a quick, short-term source of food relief in emergencies. Evaluating WFP’s experience with emergency operations at the end of the three-year experimental period, the executive director wrote: The conclusion is reluctantly reached that it is important to make clear to countries suffering disasters the inevitable limitations to which the supply of World Food Program emergency food aid is subjected, in order to avoid the raising of hopes which cannot be fulfilled. (WFP, 1965a, p. 30)

Emergency and Relief Operations 149

It took several months to deliver food commodities from donor countries. And more time was often required to synchronize the arrival of consignments of different food commodities from a number of donors. This led to two paths of discussion. The first was to de-emphasize WFP’s role in emergencies and place reliance on bilateral assistance and the League of Red Cross Societies (FitzGerald, 1965, p. 38). The second path was to continue the search for an adequate, assured and readily available international emergency food aid reserve. As described in Chapter 3, attempts were made to convert WFP into a ‘world food bank’, a ‘world food fund’ or a ‘world commodity organization’ in the decade after the Programme began operations. These proposals would have increased multilateral food aid for both relief and development but like other proposals before them came to nothing in a ‘graveyard of aspirations’. At the Second World Food Congress in The Hague in 1970, the government of the Netherlands (FAO, 1970, p. 135) supported by the UN secretary-general (UN, 1971, pp. 22–4), made a proposal to establish an ‘Emergency Food Supply Scheme’, which was later presented to WFP’s governing body (WFP, 1971). The purpose of the scheme was to increase the effectiveness and operational speed of WFP emergency operations and increase the capacity of the world community to cope with disaster situations. The proposed scheme would be on a voluntary basis using resources already pledged to WFP. There was no obligation for donors to incur additional costs in food or storage. Participants would inform WFP of the type and quantity of commodities that could be made immediately available for emergencies. But even this ‘minimalist’ proposal did not receive approval. While emphasis was placed on WFP food aid for development, however, it was recognized that a multilateral organization administering food aid could not stand aside and not move to help countries and people stricken by disasters. The humanitarian impulse of food aid was too strong. In its early years, WFP aid proved to be most effective towards the end of an emergency period, when assistance provided from other sources tended to diminish, but when people affected by the disaster still needed food aid while they undertook reconstruction and rehabilitation work. This experience was to anticipate by almost 30 years the call for linking relief and development assistance in the United Nations system. Another problem, which was to affect WFP to the present day, was its limited cash resources (see Chapter 7). A formula was agreed upon which aimed at providing cash and services, such as shipping, to WFP amounting in the aggregate to at least one-third of total contributions. This formula was related to the operational costs of supporting development projects. No allowance was made for the higher transport and insurance costs of emergency operations, or for the need to purchase food close to where disasters occurred. Some donors did not provide one-third of the pledges to WFP is cash and services. Others tied

150 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

their contributions to their own domestically produced commodities and services and designated them to specific emergency operations, thus reducing the value and flexibility of their use. This also increased the uncertainty of their availability, as they tended to be residual to commercial transactions and, therefore, subject to substantial variation. Criteria and procedures for WFP emergency food aid Originally, responsibility for authorizing WFP emergency food aid was given not to WFP’s executive director but to the director-general of FAO, in accordance with resolutions adopted by ECOSOC and the FAO Conference in 1951. In cases of emergencies requiring international relief assistance, he was authorized to assess the extent of assistance needed to produce prompt, concerted and effective action. For this purpose, he could issue a general appeal for aid to governments and other interested bodies. The creation of WFP, with a specific (if modest) earmarking of resources for emergencies, for the first time placed at the disposal of the FAO director-general a ready source of food supplies to enable him to fulfil his responsibilities. After extensive discussion, arrangements by which FAO’s director-general delegated operational responsibility for emergency operations to the executive director of WFP were approved by WFP’s governing body in 1962. In effect, this made WFP the operational arm of the United Nations system for famine relief and emergency food operations.1 WFP’s executive director would examine requests for emergency aid and give his recommendations to the directorgeneral of FAO before the latter made his decision. This arrangement was to remain in force for 30 years until major changes in WFP’s regulations came into force in 1992 (see Chapter 8). At that time, authority for approval of WFP emergency aid up to a level delegated by WFP’s governing body (currently $3 million) passed to WFP’s executive director. For requests above that level, approval is given jointly by the director-general and the executive director after consultation with other involved bodies to ensure co-ordination of international emergency assistance. Members of the United Nations and members and associate members of any of the UN specialized agencies are eligible to request WFP emergency aid, although requests from non-member countries may also be considered.2 Requests for WFP emergency aid were sent by governments in accordance with a standard proforma. Upon approval, an agreement in the form of a ‘Letter of Understanding’ is concluded between WFP and the recipient government, setting out the terms and conditions of the assistance to be provided. Reports on the progress of emergency operations are submitted to WFP’s governing body for information and discussion. WFP is responsible for monitoring the distribution and use of its emergency food aid. WFP staff or consultants have access to the handling and use of the

Emergency and Relief Operations 151

assistance provided, and evaluate its effectiveness. Detailed evaluations of only a limited number of emergency operations have been carried out. An undertaking has been given by the WFP secretariat, however, that their number will be increased. On completion of an emergency operation, the assisted government is required to submit a final report and audited accounts on the utilization of the WFP emergency food aid provided. WFP country offices must also produce evaluative reports focusing on WFP’s role, the effectiveness of the WFP-assisted emergency operation, and the lessons to be drawn for the future for both the country and WFP. These reports have not always been done as thoroughly and systematically as they deserve. Every disaster has its own characteristics. Strict adherence to a definite set of criteria for WFP emergency assistance was therefore neither possible nor desirable (WFP, 1967a). WFP emergency aid is granted free of charge. Transportation of relief food up to the point of entry of the country concerned, including landlocked countries, and to designated delivery points within recipient countries in special cases, is arranged by WFP. The government of the afflicted country assumes full responsibility for distributing the relief food, which must be provided free of charge3 to the designated beneficiaries, and for meeting distribution costs. In the case of least-developed countries, WFP provides a subsidy to help offset the internal transport, storage and handling costs of the relief food provided. WFP also encourages recipient governments to enlist the help of NGOs in emergency food distribution. WFP emergency aid is provided for a specified period, which is kept to the minimum consistent with the nature of the emergency, and may be extended in special circumstances. The amount of assistance provided is determined by a number of factors including: the nature of the disaster; number of people affected; the likely duration of the emergency; the resources that the government can provide; and assistance provided from other sources. Limiting factors are, obviously, the types of resources available to WFP, and the competing demands for their allocation. Where needs are not large, they may be met in full. Where they are considerable, WFP assistance may be assigned to meet priority needs to mitigate extreme hardship for certain sections of the afflicted population, or WFP may contribute to a larger effort, as in the case of international appeals. Any unused emergency aid is often allocated to approved WFP-assisted development projects in the country concerned in the aftermath of emergencies. WFP shares information with other UN agencies and NGOs in order to obtain a common understanding of the magnitude of the calamity, and the extent and scope of international commitments. In large emergencies, a special mission may be organized, consisting of representatives of the concerned UN agencies and major donor countries, to visit the country and work with the government and country representatives of aid agencies to make estimates of requirements that provide a common basis for international action. To avoid

152 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

delay and, at the same time, safeguard against excessive supplies from limited resources, it has been general practice in cases of large-scale disasters, or where there are factors that call for verification, to approve a first, immediate allocation of emergency supplies for a short period, followed by additional supplies after fuller review of the whole situation has been undertaken. Measures for ensuring speedy emergency food aid Speed of action is crucial in emergency operations. Governments in disasterafflicted countries, governments in donor countries, aid agencies and programmes, and NGOs (national and international) all have a part to play in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of emergency assistance. Deficiencies on the part of any one of these can adversely affect the work of the others, and hence the entire emergency operation (Masefield, 1967; WFP, 1975d, 1978c; 1981a; 1982a). Government responsibility Of prime importance is the responsiveness of governments in disaster-afflicted countries in such matters as: establishing early warning and response systems; giving prompt acknowledgement that an emergency has occurred; providing full and timely information on the nature and magnitude of the disaster; establishing appropriate organizational and managerial arrangements for handling emergency operations; allocating funds and personnel; meeting the internal costs of distributing external aid; requisitioning transport and storage facilities; and giving priority to the handling and movement of relief supplies. WFP experience has shown that deficiencies in these areas are among the main causes of bottlenecks in emergency operations. Governments may require help in removing these deficiencies, which the international community should provide, always with a view to building up national capacity to handle future emergencies. Donor responsibility Donors also have a role to play in providing emergency food and other relief supplies quickly and holding down port, handling, demurrage and internal transport costs of emergency food aid in their own countries as well as in recipient and transit countries. Some donors have insisted on using their own national shipping fleet to carry donated food aid commodities, or have tied and designated their use to certain countries. This has added to transport costs and reduced flexibility and timeliness of delivery. Lack of co-ordination of shipping schedules among donors has resulted in port congestion, increased storage charges and waste. And insufficient attention to port, storage and transport conditions and capacities has resulted in commodities not being provided in the most appropriate containers to facilitate handling and distribution.

Emergency and Relief Operations 153

While improvements have been made, donors could do more to streamline further their administrative and financial procedures in order to make their responses to requests for emergency food aid in a more timely and flexible manner. Protracted delivery times by donor countries have arisen from legal and financial procedures governing the procurement of goods and services for external assistance programmes. There is scope for improvement in a number of areas, some of which have already been applied by several donors, in the spirit that ‘extraordinary events call for extraordinary action’, including special legal and financial provisions and stockholding arrangements for emergency food aid. The switch by a number of donor to providing cash for food purchase in emergencies in recent years has solved many problems. And the development of an international information superhighway, linked to early warning and response systems, should improve future emergency operations considerably. WFP responsibility While the need continues to reform donor procedures for expediting the provision of emergency food aid, WFP has looked for other innovative and pioneering ways of speeding up deliveries, including borrowing, diverting ships, purchasing and exchanging commodities, and establishing stocks of food in strategic locations (Luehe, 1983). Borrowing food commodities from various sources in a disaster-stricken country has considerably increased the timeliness of WFP emergency aid. WFP’s ability to borrow from food stocks in emergencies became more widespread as its assistance for development projects expanded throughout the developing world, giving an early indication of the benefits to be gained from WFP’s dual mandate of providing both development and emergency assistance. WFP is a major user of the world’s shipping fleets. At any one time, WFP has a number of charter vessels on the high seas carrying food aid commodities to recipient countries throughout the developing world, and many more liner vessels transporting smaller consignments. This floating stock of food provides the opportunity to divert ships at sea to emergency situations. Purchasing food from sources close to where an emergency occurs has been another way of speeding up emergency food aid deliveries. In the early years of WFP’s operations, when its cash resources were particularly limited, purchases were restricted to the initial consignments of food in an emergency. More recently, purchases have been made on a larger scale, especially when emergencies have occurred in landlocked countries. WFP assistance in meeting internal transport, storage and handling costs has also expedited food distribution in emergencies. A limited fund has also been earmarked to help least-developed countries construct and hire storage facilities. WFP country offices have been given authority to use modest funds to buy

154 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

food locally as a first immediate response in times of disaster, and to provide NGOs with small amounts of cash to engage in community-based activities within the confines of WFP-approved emergency operations. And a procedure for the quick approval of projects to forestall emergencies, post-emergency projects and ‘quasi-emergency’ projects was approved in 1969 to provide assistance to the victims of disasters from WFP’s development resources through FFW programmes (WFP, 1969b).

Growth and dimensions of WFP emergency operations Emergency operations have grown from a small, but important, component of WFP activities to become the major part of its work (Shaw, 1996). WFP commitments of emergency assistance (at current prices) increased from an annual average of $21 million up to 1975 to almost $900 million in 1992 (Table 6.1). If resources committed for protracted refugee and displaced person operations, which began in 1989, are included, total emergency relief assistance committed by WFP in 1992 reached $1.4 billion (Table 6.2). While WFP development assistance tripled in the 1970s, its emergency aid increased ten-fold. This imbalance continued in the next two decades to such an extent that while two-thirds of WFP assistance went for development projects and one-third for emergencies in the late 1980s, the reverse is the case by the early 1990s. WFP assistance by type of emergency Major changes have taken place in the proportions of WFP assistance going to the three types of emergencies over the past 30 years of WFP operations (Figure 6.1). At the end of the first decade of WFP operations, almost half of WFP emergency assistance went to the victims of drought and crop failures, about one-third to those afflicted by sudden natural disasters, and less than a fifth to refugees and displaced persons, the victims of man-made disasters (WFP, 1973a). At the end of the second decade of WFP operations, over half of WFP emergency commitments went to man-made disasters, 41 per cent to emergencies caused by drought, and only 6 per cent to sudden natural disaster. By the end of the third decade of WFP operations, the bulk of WFP emergency assistance was directed to saving the lives of refugees and displaced persons caught up in wars, civil strife and ethnic and religious conflict. Protracted refugee and displaced person operations WFP commitments for protracted refugee and displaced person projects (PROs) were made from 1989, when a special resource facility for assisting PROs lasting more than one year was established (Table 6.2). This facility has added considerably to WFP’s overall emergency relief assistance. It reached over $557 million in 1991 as man-made disasters not only increased in number and scale,

Table 6.1 Year 1963–75 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

WFP commitments for emergency operations* by type, 1963–95 (values in US$ million) Total commitments** No. Value 21 26 37 57 67 62 53 68 68 63 55 50 79 65 46 32 44 55 54 45 23

209.1 47.7 85.5 90.7 122.5 191.5 178.2 193.2 200.3 233.7 230.4 182.6 271.3 254.0 93.1 131.6 390.8 896.8 737.5 857.9 665.2

Sudden natural disasters No. Value (%)

Drought/crop failures No. Value (%)

Man-made disasters No. Value (%)

80 9 8 19 14 7 8 15 5 4 5 6 6 6 2 5 5 6 4 1 3

79 6 21 14 14 23 16 20 29 35 21 8 16 16 9 10 13 14 5 9 6

60 11 8 24 39 32 29 33 34 24 29 36 57 43 35 17 26 35 45 35 14

73.7 8.6 26.2 37.0 11.7 10.1 7.1 21.5 6.2 17.6 9.4 3.3 8.0 27.5 1.1 4.2 6.7 7.2 5.3 0.7 14.4

35 18 31 41 10 5 4 11 3 8 4 2 3 11 1 3 2 1 1 — 2

86.1 14.5 43.2 22.4 41.1 61.8 39.3 39.2 86.1 96.4 71.6 35.2 76.9 50.1 19.7 29.8 141.2 517.1 31.0 177.2 81.0

41 30 50 25 33 32 22 20 43 41 31 19 28 20 21 23 36 58 4 21 12

49.3 24.6 16.1 31.3 69.7 119.6 131.8 132.5 108.0 119.7 149.4 144.1 186.3 176.4 72.3 97.6 242.9 372.5 701.2 680.0 569.8

24 52 19 34 57 62 74 64 54 51 65 79 69 69 78 74 62 41 95 79 86

** Expansions of emergency operations are counted separately. ** Excludes commitments for protracted refugee and displaced person operations from 1989. % – Share of total commitments in the year. — Less than 1%.

155

Source: World Food Programme.

156

Table 6.2

WFP commitments for protracted refugee and displaced person operations by region, 1989–95 (values in US$ million)

Year

Total commitments

1989* 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

266.4 335.6 557.7 510.2 482.1 256.2 443.9

Sub-Saharan Africa Value (%) 121.0 189.8 425.0 323.9 328.3 138.8 314.2

45 57 76 64 68 54 71

Asia and Pacific Value (%) 122.8 124.1 110.0 87.5 70.0 44.4 48.8

* WFP commitments to this category of operations began in 1989. CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States (ex-Soviet Union). — Less than 1%. % – Share in total commitments in the year. Source: World Food Programme.

46 37 20 17 15 17 11

Latin America and the Caribbean Value (%) 2.5 3.7 2.7 0.7 1.5 1.7 –

1 1 — — — 1 –

Europe, Middle East and CIS Value (%) 20.1 18.0 20.0 98.1 82.3 72.1 80.9

8 5 4 19 17 28 18

Emergency and Relief Operations 157

19 63 -7 5 19 76 19 77 19 78 19 79 19 80 19 81 19 82 19 83 19 84 19 85 19 86 19 87 19 88 19 89 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95

(%) 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Sudden Natural Disasters

Drought / Crop Failures

Man-Made Emergencies

Figure 6.1 WFP commitments for emergency operations by type, 1963–95 Source: World Food Programme.

but also in duration. It has subsequently declined as some of the war situations have been resolved and victims have returned to their homes, increasing the demand for food aid for reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes. In the seven years (1989–95), over four million tons were shipped by WFP to PROs in 31 countries. Over half went to PROs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 28 per cent to those in South and East Asia, 12 per cent to those in North Africa, the Middle East and Europe and Central Asia, and less than one per cent to those in Latin America. Regional distribution of WFP emergency relief assistance The regional distribution of WFP emergency relief assistance has shown dramatic shifts over the past three decades, reflecting significant changes in the need for food aid that have taken place (Table 6.3). These changes have mainly affected three regions, Sub-Saharan Africa, South and East Asia and, more recently, Europe (ex-Yugoslavia) and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. With some exceptions, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean region, and of North Africa and the Middle East, have received only relatively small proportions of WFP emergency relief aid. In the early years of WFP operations, most of WFP emergency aid went to meet disasters in Asia, especially those resulting from drought that affected large numbers of people in South Asia. In the first decade of WFP operations, 38 per cent of WFP emergency aid went to that region. Sub-Saharan Africa received 28 per cent of WFP emergency aid in that period. Although the number of emergency operations that were assisted by WFP in Sub-Saharan Africa was more than double the number in Asia, they were on average smaller in terms of the number of people affected.

WFP commitments for emergency operations* by region, 1963–95 (values in US$ million)

Year

Total commitments** No. Value

1963–75 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

219 26 37 57 67 62 53 68 68 63 55 50 79 65 46 32 44 55 54 45 23

209.1 47.7 85.5 90.7 122.5 191.5 178.3 193.2 200.3 233.7 230.4 182.6 271.3 254.0 93.1 131.6 390.8 896.8 737.5 857.9 665.2

Sub-Saharan Africa No. Value 86 11 18 26 23 33 28 25 42 43 34 24 48 42 29 23 31 34 33 30 12

57.3 15.4 27.0 37.5 31.2 69.6 62.8 47.5 117.6 124.9 129.4 83.6 161.1 164.1 73.6 112.2 277.6 688.7 262.3 608.0 430.3

Asia and Pacific No. Value 46 6 10 22 26 24 19 20 11 8 12 14 15 10 6 3 7 11 9 3 4

84.5 11.6 38.1 42.5 67.5 109.3 100.3 110.8 56.2 82.8 82.8 76.1 71.9 66.4 7.4 2.5 9.2 33.5 24.8 3.5 14.8

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States (ex-Soviet Union). * Excludes commitments for protracted refugee and displaced person operations as from 1989. ** Expansions of the same emergency operation are counted separately. Source: World Food Programme.

Latin America and the Caribbean No. Value 28 3 3 3 9 1 3 11 11 8 6 8 11 6 3 1 – 4 2 2 –

12.7 0.4 1.8 2.4 9.5 1.5 3.8 10.2 21.7 20.8 10.1 14.2 20.9 16.2 2.2 2.8 – 4.4 4.7 3.7 –

158

Table 6.3

Europe, Middle East, and CIS No. Value 59 6 6 6 9 4 3 12 4 4 3 4 5 7 8 5 6 6 10 10 7

54.1 20.3 18.6 8.3 14.3 11.1 11.4 24.7 4.8 5.2 8.1 8.7 17.3 7.2 9.9 14.1 104.0 170.2 445.7 242.7 220.1

Emergency and Relief Operations 159

(%) 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1963- 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 75 Latin America and the Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa

Europe, Middle East, and CIS Asia and Pacific

Figure 6.2 WFP commitments for emergency operations by region, 1963–95

Subsequently, Sub-Saharan Africa has received most of WFP’s emergency aid. Natural disasters have continued to occur in Asia, but over time the countries of that region have taken steps to mitigate them and have become more able to cope without appealing for international emergency aid. The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have been less able to cope with their multiple and pressing problems, and the number of emergencies have increased. Largescale, complex and prolonged catastrophes have occurred in which wars and drought have simultaneously happened, resulting in the biggest share of PRO assistance going to that region (see Figure 6.2). The most recent development has been the provision of emergency aid for countries of the former Yugoslavia and ex-Soviet Union. In 1993, over half of WFP’s emergency aid was committed to those countries, mainly for the victims of man-made disasters caused by war, ethnic cleansing, and the disintegration of the former political order.

Increasing involvement in emergencies Five milestones may be singled out in the inexorable increase in WFP’s involvement in emergency operations.

160 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

The African food crises: the call for co-ordinated action Before the early 1970s, there was virtually no emergency food aid to Africa. Although food shortages occurred, they were mostly localized. But such incidents became increasingly more widespread. While the prolonged drought of the early 1970s occurred mainly in the Sahelian countries of West Africa and Ethiopia, those of the 1980s affected many more countries. These events had a profound effect on WFP. They propelled the Programme’s involvement in emergency operations not only in terms of increasing the amount of emergency food aid it delivered, but also through its role in the co-ordination of emergency food aid from all sources in large-scale international relief operations. The Africa drought of the 1970s Six successive years of drought in the Sahelian countries of West Africa called for a major international relief effort in the three years 1973–5. Seven countries (Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta), with a total population of 25 million people, were particularly affected. When the drought started, no one could predict how long it would last. As the situation worsened into widespread starvation, the immediate priority was to provide relief food quickly. During the three-year emergency operation, over 2.5 million tons of cereals were delivered to the region. Notwithstanding the unprecedented relief effort, it was estimated that 100,000 people died and one million head of cattle perished. WFP staff, along with many others, became inextricably involved in the wider aspects of emergency operations – such as assessing food requirements and monitoring the delivery of food commitments, transport and logistics, and information collection and dissemination – that were to add up to WFP being increasingly called upon by donors and recipients alike to play a co-ordinating role in large-scale international emergency food aid operations in the future. Monitoring relief supplies was a key operation. Transportation by road, rail, river and air, was the biggest bottleneck. Continuous co-operative efforts were necessary to keep, at the peak period, as many as 1,000 trucks operating every day, delivering food, feed for livestock, and other relief supplies. WFP field staff worked with local officials and donor representatives in maintaining the flow of food supplies over long distances to, and within, landlocked countries. Airlift and airdrop operations were necessary in remote areas. A number of donor countries provided the aircraft required, with WFP providing on-the-spot co-ordination and supervision. In 1973, 30 cargo aircraft from nine national air forces took part in the airlift operations. Some 25,000 tons of cereals and other protective foods were airlifted over a period of four months in round-the-clock operations. In 1974, most airlift and airdrop operations were discontinued as it was possible by that time to pre-position food stocks in remote areas prior to

Emergency and Relief Operations 161

the onset of the rainy season. Camel caravans were used to transport food to remote parts of Chad and Niger. WFP also assisted in the design and implementation of a delivery system for the orderly shipment of food to nine West African ports and for inland distribution. Some ports were not organized or equipped to handle the large volume of food required and task forces were set up to solve problems as they arose. Port handling and logistics specialists were assigned by donor countries to work with WFP staff at key locations in the food delivery chain. Average clearance of food at ports and inland transport more than doubled. NGOs from many donor countries played an important role, especially in reaching the afflicted population in remote areas. Expansion of storage facilities became a matter of high priority as food stocks built up with the arrival of food shipments. Emergency measures, such as the provision of portable silos, helped to meet the problem. As in the Sahel, the Ethiopian drought in 1973 was the culmination of several years of subnormal rainfall. In April 1973, the Ethiopian government started a large-scale relief programme, established a National Drought Relief Committee, banned all grain exports, and requested international aid. During 1973, WFP provided 20,000 tons of grain and $200,000 for its internal transportation, handling and distribution. WFP monitored bilateral food aid shipment and assisted in tackling considerable logistical and communications difficulties. Some of the worst affected areas were almost completely inaccessible by surface transport and air drops were organized. Lack of information and communications clouded the real magnitude of the disaster. Only when large numbers of starving people migrated from the interior to the main highways was the full scale of the catastrophe revealed. Aid measures had then to be improvised, concentrating on the provision of food and shelter in relief camps along the roads. Once the real dimensions of the drought were known, action by the Ethiopian government and the international community gained momentum. By May 1974, international donations of food, medical supplies, transport equipment, technical assistance and cash grants amounted to over $80 million. The government’s emphasis shifted to a longer-term rehabilitation programme and an increasing proportion of relief food supplies was used in FFW programmes, particularly for soil conservation, irrigation and reforestation. A number of lessons were learned from the African food crisis of the 1970s. This was the first time that the international community was confronted with a disaster that affected so many countries at the same time and covered such a large geographical area. A combined effort was required by governments in the afflicted countries, UN agencies, the major bilateral donors, and large numbers of NGOs. Many weaknesses had to be overcome, including: the reluctance of the afflicted countries to appeal to the international community for humanitarian assistance until many people and livestock started to die, hence the late recognition of the full magnitude of the disaster; delays in the response

162 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

of donor countries, aid agencies and NGOs, and the resultant late delivery of urgently needed food relief; and the recognition that the international community was simply unprepared to mount quickly a relief operation of this magnitude. Important lessons were learnt in the practical implementation of large-scale relief operations, and what was required to establish and maintain co-ordinated international action. One lasting benefit that was to emerge from the catastrophe was the creation and development of FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System for Food and Agriculture in 1973. This system has subsequently provided vital early warning of impending emergencies caused by drought and crop failures, although more requires to be done to establish and improve response systems to react promptly and effectively to early warning signals (Buchanan-Smith and Davies, 1996). The African food crisis of the 1980s The profound experience gained in tackling the Africa food crisis of the 1970s stood WFP in good stead for facing an even bigger, and more complex, African food crisis of the 1980s. An estimated 30 million people in 21 of the most seriously affected countries faced famine.4 Approximately seven million tons of food were required. Once the full magnitude of the disaster was recognized, the response of the international community to appeals for emergency aid was generous and prompt. Rarely before had so much food been mobilized so quickly and distributed to so many countries in such a short time.5 At the height of the crisis in 1984–5, almost five million tons of cereal food aid were delivered to Sub-Saharan Africa, 40 per cent of global food aid deliveries, half of which was in the form of emergency food aid (World Bank and WFP, 1991). Over a quarter of all food aid provided was channelled through WFP. In these urgent and logistically difficult circumstances, the Programme supplied over two million tons of emergency and development food aid, assisting some 19 million people. As in the African food crisis of the 1970s, WFP played a number of vital roles. It was largest single supplier of emergency food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. It transported, purchased and monitored food aid for bilateral donors. And it was the largest buyer of food produced in the region for use as food aid. Purchases averaged over 200,000 tons a year, including those made on behalf of donor countries. With the co-operation of donors and other aid agencies, WFP was instrumental in strengthening management and logistics capacity in a number of African countries. A special grant of $5 million provided to WFP by the World Bank helped to improve transport and logistics operations and monitor food distribution. Food management units were established as an integral part of government administrative functions with WFP assistance, for which extensive training of national staff was provided with help from UNDP. Shipping and logistics officers seconded from donor countries were deployed at strategic

Emergency and Relief Operations 163

locations to facilitate co-ordination of all food aid deliveries and accelerate port discharge and in-country transportation. They helped to introduce bulk handling arrangements at ports, organized transport to landlocked countries, and were largely responsible for speeding up emergency food aid distribution. Largescale trucking operations were set up funded by donors and by the large public fund-raising programmes ‘Band Aid’ and ‘Live Aid’. In Ethiopia, for example, WFP ran a fleet of over 300 trucks that delivered 33,000 tons of food a month from the ports to the drought-affected areas. In Sudan, WFP assumed responsibility for the co-ordination of all food aid to the country and managed a fleet of 150 vehicles for the in-country transportation of relief food. WFP established an operational task force at its headquarters in November 1983 to assist in the co-ordination of emergency food aid supplies to Africa. A mechanism was set up for the collection and dissemination of information on requirements, pledges and deliveries of emergency food supplies and on port and inland transport capacities and supply systems. In addition to monthly reports, weekly telex statements were issued on the rapidly changing food aid situation and related logistics in the most critically affected countries. This unique information service was later developed into WFP’s international food aid information service (INTERFAIS), which now provides a database for food aid operations worldwide. An evaluation conducted by WFP of its emergency food aid operations in Africa came to the following broad conclusions (WFP, 1986a). Nothing was more important than early warning of an impending crisis. Continuous monitoring of the changing food situation was a basic prerequisite for a timely response. The establishment of appropriate national early warning systems was essential, as were quick response mechanisms (Shaw and Hutchinson, 1993). Speedy mobilization of emergency resources depended on accurate and timely information to donors: it was also strongly influenced by the international media and their projection of the extent of the crisis to the general public. Effective co-ordination of information was essential for a successful emergency response. And NGOs played an important, often vital, role and were invaluable in building up public awareness in donor countries. A catastrophe of unprecedented dimensions had been prevented, but the evaluation raised fundamental issues for the future. Much emergency food aid had a negative effect on efforts for post-emergency rehabilitation by its quantity, regularity, and lack of discrimination between those most seriously affected and those less in need. Free distribution of food, organized on a regular basis over a number of years in the same area, had led to the creation of dependence, and raised the expectation that donor governments would always provide assistance in times of ‘crisis’. Guidelines were set down for the future. Distribution of free food should not be made indiscriminately to everyone in a disaster situation but only to

164 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

those in real need. It was unnecessary, even harmful, to prolong free food distribution after a disaster except to vulnerable groups of mothers and children and those who could not work. Distinction should be made between structural food deficits and food shortages caused by disasters. Emergency food aid should be used, to the extent possible, in support of reconstruction and rehabilitation activities and development projects designed to prevent, prepare for, or mitigate, future emergencies. Conversely, WFP-assisted development projects should be designed in such a way that they could be expanded rapidly to include the victims of disasters, which would reduce the need for free distribution of emergency food aid. Finally, the food crisis of the 1980s demonstrated that the multiple and longer-term developmental problems of Africa should be addressed. The crisis could not be attributed solely to drought. Africa has the potential to feed itself. The region’s vast land and water assets could be harnessed to expand agricultural production. But this transformation would take time. In the interim, external assistance, including food aid, would be required to assist in this transformation and expandfood supplies to poor, hungry and malnourished people, whose numbers were expected to increase. Projections indicate that even with increased agricultural production, food imports would increase significantly. With few exceptions, African countries would not have the necessary foreign exchange for commercial imports. Food aid could help to fill the import gap and build African capacities by investing in people and strengthening infrastructure and the institutional framework required to provide an ‘enabling framework’ for sustained development (World Bank, 1989). The Southern African drought of the early 1990s The experience and lessons of the response to the African food crisis of the 1980s proved invaluable in responding to the Southern African drought of the early 1990s (WFP, 1994a). Early in 1992, it became evident that the ten countries of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) – Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe – were experiencing one of the worst droughts in recent history. An estimated 18 million people faced the spectre of famine and starvation. The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) launched a consolidated appeal on behalf of the UN agencies concerned in May 1992 for over four million tons of food. Relief operations followed almost textbook precision. The drought was identified in its early stages. A regional assessment of needs was promptly carried out jointly by FAO and WFP, followed quickly by an emergency alert and issuance of regional shipping bulletins by WFP, indicating the current situation at all the ports of the sub-region. Co-ordination was established with all the countries concerned through the SADC secretariat and the Republic of South Africa.

Emergency and Relief Operations 165

An overall food aid delivery plan was drawn up and information was disseminated through a joint SADC/WFP Logistics Advisory Centre in Harare, Zimbabwe to governments throughout the region, donors, shipping agents, UN agencies and NGOs. Over $5.5 million was spent from a donor logistics fund to reduce bottlenecks and improve co-ordination. A joint USAID/WFP telecommunications project was set up consisting of a simple telecommunications system using personal computers and telephone lines to link the major agencies involved in the delivery and monitoring of emergency aid, illustrating what could be done to considerably improve the flow of information in future emergencies. As a result, planning and scheduling of shipments were facilitated, port and inland transport congestion avoided, costs reduced, and timely food delivery ensured. Special measures for least-developed countries: meeting internal costs A second factor increasing WFP’s involvement in emergency operations was the approval by WFP’s governing body of special measures to meet certain internal costs of food aid in the least-developed countries (LDCs).6 In 1972, the UN General Assembly acknowledged the limited capacity of LDCs to absorb external aid. The Canadian delegation to WFP’s governing body proposed that WFP should help meet the internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH) costs in LDCs relating to the Programme’s food aid. Subsidizing ITSH costs placed a heavy additional burden on WFP’s limited cash resources, particularly after the steep increase in world food and oil prices of the 1970s (see Chapter 5). To take the pressure off WFP’s limited cash resources, sale of cereals donated to WFP was permitted in the eligible countries to offset ITSH costs in addition to the food aid commodities provided for emergency operations and development projects. This, too, created difficulties as ITSH costs rose and larger volumes of grain were needed for sale (see Chapter 7).

World Food Conference 1974: wider responsibility The World Food Conference of 1974 widened further the responsibilities of WFP’s governing body and secretariat for emergency operations (UN, 1975a). The need to increase the resources of WFP was recognized so as to enable it to play a greater, and more effective, role in emergency operations. Governments were recommended to earmark stocks or funds for meeting international emergency requirements in an International Undertaking on World Food Security that was endorsed at the conference (UN, 1975a, resolution XVII, pp. 14–15). A ‘Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture’ established by FAO was endorsed and governments were requested to participate on a regular and voluntary basis by providing information to FAO on

166 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

their basic food situation. FAO in turn would analyze and disseminate the information to all participating governments (UN, 1975a, resolution XVI, p. 14). Over time, this system has grown to provide vital ‘early warning’ of impending disasters, particularly in times of impending drought. WFP country offices became one of the principal sources of information for this system. The conference also recommended that WFP’s governing body, the Intergovernmental Committee (IGC), be reconstituted as the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA) to provide a forum for intergovernmental consultations on all food aid and for more effective co-ordination of food aid programmes, including emergency food aid (UN, 1975a, resolution XXII). The CFA was established in 1976, increasing the WFP secretariat’s responsibility to service it on matters relating to all food aid, including the international community’s food aid response in large-scale emergencies and the co-ordination of emergency operations.

International emergency food reserve: additional resources Many proposals had been made in the past, particularly by FAO, to establish some form of international facility to respond quickly and efficiently to food emergencies around the world (Chapter 3). The shock of the world food crisis of the early 1970s spurred the international community into taking some form of action and the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR) was created. The IEFR was established by a United Nations General Assembly resolution in 1975 (UN, 1976b). The resolution urged all countries to subscribe to the proposed International Undertaking on World Food Security, and build up and maintain world foodgrain reserves to be held nationally and regionally, and located strategically, large enough to cover foreseeable major food production shortfalls. It was proposed that the wheat and rice components in the reserve should be 30 million tons. Pending the establishment of this world foodgrain reserve, developed countries, and developing countries in a position to do so, were urged to earmark stocks and/or funds to be placed at the disposal of WFP as an emergency reserve to strengthen the capacity of the Programme to deal with crisis situations in developing countries. The aim was a target of not less than 500,000 tons. Modalities of IEFR operations were approved by the CFA in 1976 and revised and enlarged in 1978 (WFP, 1978d). This facility was seen as a continuing reserve with yearly replenishments determined by the CFA. The reserve was originally regarded as a multilateral standby arrangement to provide WFP with an initial, quick-response capability. It did not entail WFP holding food stocks in specific locations. Instead, donors were required to announce their contributions to the IEFR one year in advance, and in addition to their pledges to WFP’s regular resources. They were expected to take measures to ensure that

Emergency and Relief Operations 167

their food contributions were shipped in the most expeditious manner. They were also required to assume responsibility for meeting transport and other related costs. Developing countries not in a position to make contributions to the IEFR could make interest-free loans of commodities to be used by WFP in the initial stages of emergencies, especially where such arrangements could speed up food deliveries. Part of the contributions to the IEFR were to be made in commodities, such as rice and white sorghum, to take account of the food habits of afflicted people. Intensive discussion took place in the CFA between 1980 and 1982 on the FAO director-general’s proposals to convert the IEFR into a ‘legally binding convention’ and to strengthen its operations (WFP, 1981a; 1982a). He also proposed to increase the target of IEFR to two million tons. The proposals were not approved by the governing body. However, to speed up IEFR operations, an Immediate Response Account (IRA) was set up by the CFA in 1991 with an annual target of $30 million in cash, as an integral part of the IEFR. The purpose of the IRA was to enable rapid purchases of food close to where emergencies occurred. And a sub-set of WFP’s development (not emergency) resources was established in 1989 for assistance in protracted refugee and displaced person operations, which relieved pressure on WFP’s emergency food aid resources (see below). While the IEFR has improved and increased WFP’s ability to respond to emergencies, it has not fully lived up to its original expectations. The reserve is not like a bank account readily available for WFP to use. It is not a stock of food kept by WFP to be quickly drawn from in times of emergency. It is a voluntary facility to provide emergency relief from food stocks and budgeted funds kept in donor countries. Donors were not expected to place all their contributions to the reserve at the disposal of WFP, which would have made it a fully multilateral facility. Where contributions to the IEFR are not placed at the disposal of WFP, participating countries are required to keep WFP informed about their use in order to co-ordinate all food assistance provided from the reserve. Donors have not fully respected the IEFR modalities that they approved. Most contributions have not been fully announced in advance. A high proportion of contributions have been tied and designated to specific food commodities and emergencies after they have happened, eroding the multilateral nature of the facility, and making it difficult to respond rapidly and flexibly to emergencies whenever and wherever they occur. Contributions to the reserve have fluctuated considerably. And cash contributions have fallen short of requirements. Consequently, a timely and adequate response to all, and especially less publicized, emergencies has proved to be difficult. Cash contributions to the IRA have also been below the agreed target. WFP’s response have therefore often inadequate in the initial phase of major emergencies owing to lack of cash resources (WFP, 1995a).

168 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Man-made emergencies: WFP/UNHCR co-operation More than any other single factor, it was the escalation of man-made disasters in the 1980s, and the concomitant new working arrangements between WFP and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), that greatly increased WFP’s involvement in emergency operations. One of the most tragic developments of the 1990s was the outbreak of disasters caused not by nature, but by man. The scale, complexity and duration of these man-made disasters increased considerably. In 1970, there were 2.5 million refugees throughout the world; in 1980, 11 million; and in 1993, over 18 million (UNHCR, 1993). In addition, there were 24 million people displaced from their homes in their own countries. In 1997–8, some 50 million people were the victims of forced displacement, of whom 22 million were refugees and 28 million were displaced persons (UNHCR, 1997). Most of the human conflicts now occur not between, but within, countries, resulting in more displaced persons than refugees. Most of the victims are not soldiers, but women and children, the most vulnerable group. The conflicts have occurred in poor countries, or newly created states following the collapse of the previous political order. Few have the resources, administration or logistics to cope without considerable external assistance. Several disasters have been exacerbated by the lethal combination of war and drought. The international community has given generously to come to the aid of the afflicted. Steps have been taken to strengthen co-ordination within the United Nations system to respond to their need. Improvements have been made in getting food and other basic needs quickly to those in distress. But further measures are required to improve and strengthen the response. The UNHCR was set up in 1951 with the specific mandate to protect, and promote durable solutions for, refugees. No single UN or international body has been given the mandate to look after the interests of displaced persons inside their own country. They often need the same protection and assistance as refugees but are ‘nobody’s responsibility’ (Cohen and Deng, 1998). Widespread deprivation is not only leading to international migration but is also worsening the social and political instability that produces them. And confronted with escalating numbers, the established systems of caring for these distressed people have come dangerously close to breaking down (WIHD, 1993). As the food aid organization of the United Nations system, WFP has automatically assumed a major role in providing life-saving food to refugees and displaced persons. Its experience and expertise in transport and logistics has been an added factor in WFP’s involvement. WFP information systems have kept all parties involved fully apprised and have accounted for the actions taken. Another contribution has been in what might be called ‘persuasive diplomacy’, obtaining access to ports or keeping them open, establishing access corridors in zones of conflict to the civilian population caught up in

Emergency and Relief Operations 169

the fighting, and helping to keep the fragile peace in war situations through the provision of food.

Some examples of man-made emergencies The number, scale, duration, and complexity of man-made emergencies have increased in Africa, Asia and, most recently, ex-Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. Each one is a saga of man’s inhumanity to man, the fortitude of the civilian population, particularly women and children, in the face of appalling suffering, and the sacrifice of relief workers (national and international), a number of whom have lost their lives or been seriously injured. Some examples are given below.

Civil war in Nigeria WFP had early experience of what was to come in the civil war in eastern Nigeria in 1968, which resulted in the displacement of an estimated 500,000 people. The Nigerian government requested WFP’s help to solve the problem of port congestion as international food aid arrived in an unco-ordinated way, and internal transport and logistics difficulties that impeded the rapid movement of food into areas of acute need. After the war, WFP assisted nine projects at a total cost of $16 million for a major FFW reconstruction and rehabilitation programme involving over 91,000 workers. About 76,000 dwellings and 1,800 school buildings and teachers’ quarters were rebuilt or repaired and 105,000 workers and their families were fed. Well over half a million people were estimated to have benefited directly from the relief and reconstruction programme.

Kampuchean emergency operation Another profound experience was the international relief operation for Kampuchea (Cambodia), one of the largest, most protracted and complex ever undertaken, following a devastating civil war that affected the entire country (WFP, 1980a). Between 1975 and 1979, the international community watched the internal destruction of an entire nation – immortalized in the film The Killing Fields – during which an estimated 1.5 million people were killed by war, massacre, starvation, lack of medical care, or forced labour. The entire economy of Kampuchea was in ruins. Malnutrition was severe, particularly among children and the elderly. Acute food shortages were reported in many parts of the country following the collapse of agricultural production. There was little transport, no public services or trade, and the government administration had been completely dismantled. In short, the country was on the brink of a total catastrophe (Shawcross, 1984).

170 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Reports in early 1979 indicated that mass starvation would result if immediate action was not taken. In late 1979, the Kampuchean emergency operation began in response to United Nations General Assembly resolution 34/22. An international appeal was made for funds: $102 million were raised for the food component of an international relief programme. For almost a decade, WFP acted as the co-ordinator of the food component of a major international relief operation with the co-operation of many donor countries and NGOs. This entailed managing not only the resources put at its disposal but also the considerable amount of aid made available bilaterally. The political complexity of the international relief operation was added to by the urgent needs of different groups of people, in different locations, that had to be addressed simultaneously. Practically the entire population of five million people required emergency food assistance. In addition, a large migration of people had taken place to the Kampuchean/Thai border, causing dislocation to the Thai villagers in the area. WFP played a number of roles in providing humanitarian assistance. Cereals, mainly rice, vegetable oil, canned fish, pulses, dried skimmed milk and blended foods were supplied. Food purchases were made in Thailand, a major rice exporter. A food processing programme was also carried out to produce bread, biscuits and noodles for the refugee population. Initially, food shipments to Kampuchea were hampered by limited port capacity, the breakdown of harbour facilities, and lack of transport and storage. These obstacles were overcome with the help of financial, technical and material assistance. A central warehouse was established in Bangkok and two sub-stores near railway sidings and major roads to the border area. Trucking fleets were assembled in Kampuchea and Thailand to maintain the flow of food supplies and distribution. A vitally important consequence of relief food aid was that it enabled the growing non-agricultural population to be fed and therefore left the small 1979–80 rice harvest in the hands of the farmers, without imposing a rice tax. This gave the farming community both physical strength and confidence to open the way to agricultural recovery. As the key to the country’s recovery was agriculture, which had to be revived before food aid could be phased out, WFP also assisted that process by helping to transport seed, fertilizer and agricultural equipment along with food aid deliveries and began a food-for-seeds programme to collect rice seed. From 1982, WFP became the lead agency for the delivery and monitoring of all aid provided by the United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) that had been set up to supply assistance to the refugee and displaced people along the Kampuchean/Thai border. UNBRO provided a complete package of relief assistance including water, construction materials, medicines and logistics services as well as food which WFP helped to supply. In 1987, WFP ceased its administration of one of the largest and longest relief operations in its history.

Emergency and Relief Operations 171

More than $180 million of assistance in cash and kind was channelled through WFP and UNBRO, which succeeded in ensuring a continuous supply of basic needs to the afflicted population. Many problems were faced in carrying out this large and complex emergency operation. Transport and logistics difficulties were acute. Conflicting factions attempted to control the distribution of food to needy people for political ends. Food was diverted to the military. Quicker provision of development aid by donors, and in larger amounts, could have reduced the time over which emergency aid was needed. Despite these problems, the operation succeeded in its basic aim of providing humanitarian assistance to a country in extreme distress. With the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in late 1990, WFP was able gradually to transform its relief assistance into aid for development. Total bilateral contributions channelled through WFP by 16 donors and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia amounted to over $70 million, enabling the provision of 167,000 tons of food for five purposes: repatriation of refugees; assistance to internally displaced persons; feeding of vulnerable groups of mothers, children, the sick and elderly; assistance to demobilized soldiers to enable them to return to civilian life; and food-for-work programmes for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country, especially in the agricultural sector. Several factors contributed to the successful transition from relief to development between 1992 and 1994. Flexibility to respond to the changing needs of the people resulted from extensive delegation of authority to the WFP country office in Cambodia. Funds were readily available to meet the costs of non-food inputs and administration. A high proportion of the staff were locally recruited. And extensive consultation was held with the local population in the selection and implementation of development project. One black spot remains. Thousands of land mines were planted throughout Cambodia during the civil war. These mines continue to kill and maim many people, particularly women and children. WFP surveys indicated that some 100,000 returning refugees remained dependent on food aid largely because of the shortage of mine-free agricultural land. WFP has therefore provided assistance for the clearance of mines within the framework of its support for village-based rehabilitation programmes. Afghan refugees in Pakistan The number of the Afghan refugees living in Pakistan in the 1980s was one of the largest refugee populations ever recorded (Shaw and Clay, 1993, pp. 83–4). At its height, there were over 3.5 million in Pakistan, and over 700,000 in Iran. In Pakistan, the registered refugees lived in over 300 camps in various parts of the country. In addition, there was a large unregistered refugee population scattered

172 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

throughout the country. Half the registered refugees were children and a quarter were women. This did not take into account the babies born in refugee camps, estimated by the United Nations at around 700,000 between 1981 and 1989 alone, for whom no special emergency programme was initiated. The original food basket for the Afghan refugees consisted of wheat, edible oil, dried skimmed milk, sugar, tea, dates, and high-nutrient biscuits. This was reduced to only two items, wheat and edible oil, when the other items were no longer forthcoming from donor countries. Wheat was drawn from Pakistan’s national stocks on a replenishment basis but delays and shortfalls in replacing the wheat occurred at a time when Pakistan had two bad wheat harvests due to drought. Imports of up to two million tons had to be bought commercially at considerably higher foreign exchange costs from an already ailing Pakistan economy. In addition, the items no longer supplied in the international food aid programme were provided by Pakistan from its food imports, adding even more to the host country’s costs of supporting the refugee population. The refugees were also supplied with non-food emergency relief items: blankets, quilts, clothes, shelter materials, water and health facilities. The Pakistan government provided small cash grants for the purchase of basic necessities in the local markets, including food items that were not supplied under the aid programme. The infrastructure of the camps was gradually improved and services extended. Other UN agencies and government and non-governmental organizations provided basic needs such as health care and drinking water. WFP assumed operational responsibility for all food aid supplies including purchases, logistics, transport, handling and monitoring. UNHCR handled most of the external assistance in non-food items. Any relief operation of such magnitude is bound to encounter formidable difficulties. This one went through a catalogue of problems. But it is testimony to the value of the overall approach adopted that the relief operation managed to withstand many technical and operational obstacles and succeeded in its basic objective of delivering humanitarian food and other basic needs to the large refugee population. Several factors contributed to the overall success of coping with this massive relief operation. The level of its commitment and material support demonstrated the determination of the government to assume responsibility for the welfare of the refugees. From the outset, priority was assigned to the operation in terms of resources and manpower. Strong administrative and institutional arrangements were set up for the refugee community. The government delegated technical and operational responsibilities to the aid agencies, while using existing administrative and political structures to retain overall control of the operation. And lastly, and particularly significantly, open consultation and coordination fostered by the government, and supported by all concerned, was

Emergency and Relief Operations 173

invaluable not only in resolving conflicts, but also for applying constructive trial-and-error approaches. Unfortunately, the ordeal of the Afghan refugees is far from over. Subsequently, WFP supported a regional project for Afghanistan involving the return of 3.7 million refugees and displaced persons to their homes from Pakistan, Iran and within the country. But the civil war in Afghanistan continues. Relief operations in Rwanda and Burundi Even more difficult to handle, were the large-scale and complex humanitarian relief operations in Rwanda and Burundi, both landlocked countries in central Africa. The crisis that erupted in Rwanda in April 1994 led to the death of almost one million people, the displacement of an estimated two million Rwandese inside the country, and the rapid exodus of around two million refugees to the neighbouring countries of Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and the former Zaire, now the Congo. WFP staff remained in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, throughout the conflict, enabling limited food supplies to be distributed to many thousands of displaced persons unable to flee the city. Although war conditions restricted relief operations, famine was averted. In only three days in July 1994, following weeks of ethnic fighting, more than one million Rwandese fled across the border into what was then Zaire. The magnitude and speed of the exodus, the creation of some of the largest refugee camps ever known, and their location in the most inhospitable and remote areas, presented enormous transport and logistical problems. Large amounts of food needed to be delivered quickly if mass starvation was to be avoided. More than 60,000 tons of food were required every month. Rapid and highly innovative solutions were provided by WFP’s transport and logistics services. Within 48 hours of the refugees’ exodus, WFP began airlift operations. A week after the first relief flight had landed, a land transport pipeline was established moving food from warehouses holding WFP stocks in Uganda to the refugee camps in the former Zaire. A trucking fleet was assembled, including heavy vehicles, from WFP operations in other countries. A WFP food aid co-ordination and information centre was set up in Nairobi, Kenya, to monitor and co-ordinate the flow of relief supplies. Close collaboration was established between WFP and donor countries, which allowed flexible use of the resources provided. Close working relationships were established with other UN agencies, especially UNHCR, and NGOs, and a joint arrangement was signed with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to feed displaced people inside Rwanda. During 1994, WFP committed 400,000 tons of food, at a cost of $242 million, for the Rwanda/Burundi relief operation. Not only was mass starvation averted but the provision of food played an important role in laying the foundation for

174 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

peace and rehabilitation. By the end of 1994, WFP had launched a variety of food-assisted schemes to encourage health and nutrition programmes to restart, and schools to open again, and to provide employment opportunities for the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector. In Burundi, aid packages for refugees consisting of food, seeds and tools helped to re-establish 280,000 displaced people back on the land. Despite these considerable efforts, the basic problems that caused the crisis remain. Similar accounts to those described above could be given for WFP’s protracted and complex relief operations for large numbers of refugees and displaced persons, particularly in Africa, over the seven-year period 1989–95, indicating the scale and disruption of the human tragedy that took place (the list is not exhaustive): Algeria (80,000 refugees from Western Sahara: total cost of WFP assistance $9.5 million); Central Africa Republic (25,000 refugees from Sudan: $4.8 million); Ethiopia (over 800,000 refugees from Somalia and Sudan: $197 million); Kenya (350,000 refugees from Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan: $47.5 million); Liberia (2.5 million displaced people in Liberia, and refugees in Côte D’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone: $270 million); Malawi (960,000 refugees from Mozambique: $214 million); Mauritania (55,000 refugees from Mali: $4.2 million); Mozambique (2.5 million displaced people in Mozambique and returnees from Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe: $161 million); Senegal (55,000 refugees from Mauritania: $15 million); Somalia (600,000 refugees from Ethiopia: $21 million); Sudan (338,000 refugees from Ethiopia and Chad: $76 million); Swaziland (30,000 refugees from Mozambique: $6.7 million); Tanzania (18,000 refugees from Mozambique: $1.7 million); Uganda (230,000 refugees from Sudan and 21,000 from Rwanda: $49 million); Zambia (33,500 refugees from Angola, Mozambique and Namibia: $8.4 million); and Zimbabwe (103,000 refugees from Mozambique: $15 million). In Asia, WFP supported large-scale protracted refugee programmes in: Bangladesh (200,000 refugees from Myanmar: total cost of WFP assistance $41 million); Iran (105,000 Kurds and 720,000 Afghan refugees: $89 million); Philippines (40,000 refugees from Indo-China: $6 million); Indonesia (20,000 refugees from Indo-China: $2.2 million); Nepal (110,000 refugees from IndoChina: $20 million); and Sri Lanka (55,000 displaced persons: $3 million). In Central America, WFP assisted similar programmes in Honduras, Mexico and Costa Rica for 74,000 refugees from neighbouring countries at a total cost to the Programme of $7 million. A new, large and additional dimension was added to WFP emergency operations in 1992 following the breakup of the former political order in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the formation of new republics. Since that time, WFP has been called upon to co-ordinate international food aid operations in complex and critical situations. Civil war in the former Yugoslavia and the process

Emergency and Relief Operations 175

of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the newly formed republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and later in Kosovo, were vividly shown on television screens across the world. Given its experience and expertise in handling man-made emergencies throughout the developing world, WFP was asked to assist with the food aid aspects of large and complex international relief operations. WFP accepted this role on the understanding that it would be financed entirely from contributions additional to its multilateral resources so that the Programme’s assistance to developing countries would not be impaired. Much less in the news, but just as devastating, was the human tragedy that unfolded in the newly created Commonwealth of Independent States in the Caucasus and Central Asian region of the former Soviet Union where WFP helped in what amounted to the reconstruction of the entire food supply system. WFP was also called upon to monitor the food supplies in Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf war, the imposition of economic sanctions, and the implementation of a UN Security Council resolution which allowed the sale of Iraqi oil to pay for food and other essential imports. While no two disasters are the same, these large and complex emergency operations have shared common features. They have been difficult to resource fully and constantly. The warring parties have created serious obstructions to food delivery that have threatened large-scale malnutrition and death. They have often taken on a regional dimension as they straddled the frontiers of several countries, further complicating their operation. Versatility and ingenuity have often had to be deployed in finding solutions to transport and logistics problems in very difficult circumstances in order to get food through to those in dire need. Their costs, particularly of transportation and logistics, are often very high. Relief workers, national and international, have been exposed to considerable risks and tragically to loss of life. Overall administration has been difficult to control as often there has been little government or other capacity to plan and implement these large-scale and complex programmes. Co-ordination among the many government and aid agencies involved has been necessary, but difficult to maintain, not only to provide the food required but also other essential needs including water, fuel, shelter, basic medicines, security and human rights. And the close interplay between peacemaking, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations has caused confusion and resulted in food aid becoming part of the problems rather than the solution. Longer-term needs of refugees and displaced persons A review of protracted refugee and displaced person operations (PROs) conducted by WFP in 1989 revealed several shortcomings in the ways in which these operations were funded and conducted (WFP, 1989b). Not only had the proportion of WFP emergency aid going to man-made emergencies increased

176 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

dramatically, but protracted man-made emergencies (defined as those lasting more than one year) had also increased. As a result, an ever-increasing share of WFP’s emergency aid was being allocated to PROs, leaving less for meeting other types of emergencies. PROs have special characteristics, which set them apart from other emergencies. Solutions to three particular problems had to be found. First, how to provide an assured and continuous supply of food that was not only adequate for good health but also sufficiently varied to avoid monotony, and flexible enough to meet changing needs. Second, how to co-ordinate supplies of food with other non-food basic needs. And third, how to cater for the developmental as well as survival needs of the victims in terms of their nutrition, health, education and training, and, where possible, provide employment and incomeearning opportunities. To meet these problems, WFP’s governing body agreed in 1989 that PROs should no longer be funded from WFP’s emergency aid but from a special sub-set of the Programme’s development resources. Donors were invited to make special contributions over and above their normal pledges to WFP, supplemented by up to $30 million a year from WFP’s regular resources by amounts to be determined by WFP’s governing body. Another step was to agree new working arrangements between WFP and UNHCR. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed between the two organizations in 1985. Later, their joint working arrangements were thoroughly reviewed and revised to contend with the explosion of the refugee problem. A new MOU came into force in January 1994 (WFP, 1994c). The two organizations have undertaken to pool their resources and share their expertise and experience. WFP has also undertaken to consider helping PROs in developed countries on a selective basis, provided additional resources are made available by donors in order not to compete with, or detract from, WFP’s relief assistance to developing countries. WFP will cover ITSH costs up to extended delivery points within afflicted countries. Both organizations will jointly assess needs through field missions, set up common methods for establishing the number of eligible beneficiaries and food rations, and conduct joint training programmes. While these joint working arrangements will strengthen the response of the two organizations, they carry far-reaching implications for WFP. The Programme is now committed to respond to PROs on a priority basis. If WFP’s development resources do not expand proportionately, an increasing share of those resources would go to PROs. Paradoxically, WFP assistance to other types of emergency operations might also suffer from a declining development project portfolio. Not only would this limit the amount of borrowing that could be done from WFP-supported development projects, but there would also be a reduction in WFP support for disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation activities.

Emergency and Relief Operations 177

Linking relief and development In an address to WFP staff in April 1993, the then UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, concisely and graphically described WFP’s contribution to linking relief and development as follows: Emergencies require immediate action. Food security must be a priority. But beyond the urgent demands of the moment, we must look to the longer term. Food for humanitarian assistance must over time become food for development. And this must be followed by self-sustaining food production in time of peace. Understanding this continuum and making it work is one of the most challenging physical and intellectual projects of our time. You who are working on food for development are peacemakers for the future. With its dual function of providing emergency and development assistance, WFP is well placed to play a major role in the ‘continuum’ from emergency relief to development. WFP gives priority to supporting disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation works, and post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction activities, as part of national development programmes. Conversely, emergency assistance is used, to the extent possible, to serve both relief and development purposes. In both cases, the overall aim is to build self-reliance among poor, food-insecure people, and give special attention to the needs of women and children, the most vulnerable group (WFP, 1994d; Shaw, 1998). Pioneering work From the early days of its operations, when it was seen that WFP could not deploy emergency relief food quickly following the outbreak of a disaster, it was recognized that the Programme should use its development assistance for reconstruction and rehabilitation works through food-for-work programmes when relief aid from other sources came to an end, and for works programmes designed to prevent, prepare for, and mitigate disasters. The executive director said to WFP’s governing body in 1963: In meeting emergency food needs … it has been found that for a number of practical reasons the Program could not be looked on as an instantly ready machine for supplying relief to areas affected. It should rather be regarded primarily as a source of longer-term aid to countries in undertaking planned reconstruction and rehabilitation activities once the emergency is over. (WFP, 1963b, p. 7) In 1968, WFP’s governing body recommended that the Programme give priority to assisting development projects designed to prevent or minimize the

178 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

consequences of recurring, or gradually developing, disasters, and to those aimed at early rehabilitation and reconstruction in the wake of disasters. The division of external assistance into ‘emergency’ and ‘development’ aid, each with its separate terms, agenda and operating agencies (even separate units within the same aid agency), has dichotomized what in the real experience of developing countries is not separate, the interrelationship between disasters and development. Attempts are now being made to remove this dichotomy. The interdependence between humanitarian assistance and development, and the need for a ‘continuum’ of action from early warning and prevention of, and preparedness for, disasters to the all-important transition from relief assistance to reconstruction, rehabilitation and development, was emphasized in a United Nations General Assembly resolution in 1991 (UN, 1991a). This linkage is not a linear, but a circular, process in which relief assistance supports and protects development and development mitigates the effects of disasters (Hay, 1986; Singer, 1996; Maxwell and Buchanan-Smith, 1994). Relief-development strategy There is a close and growing link between poverty and vulnerability to recurring emergencies. If the food security of the most vulnerable people could be improved at the household and community levels through development projects that provided employment, income and assets, the continued need for emergency assistance could be considerably reduced. National disaster mitigation and rehabilitation programmes should be supported through labourintensive works that provide simultaneously: (a) immediate employment and income, thereby alleviating poverty and strengthening self-help capacity; and (b) construction and improvement of the infrastructure needed particularly to increase agricultural production, stimulate rural development and strengthen protective measures against drought and other disasters. In addition, targeted food, income and health interventions could improve the well-being of the poor and help them withstand future food shortages (von Braun, 1991; Herbinger, 1994; Shaw, 1995; WFP, 1992a). Much of this is not new. It builds on the experience of countries in Asia, particularly China (WFP, 1994e) and India (Shaw and Clay, 1993, pp. 57–75) and the results of the research work of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (von Braun, 1991; von Braun et al., 1991). From its inception, WFP has supported employment-creation projects for poverty alleviation and food security in such areas as water management, environmental protection, transport infrastructure and market restructuring, price stabilization and food reserves. WFP-assisted development projects have also been designed to be expanded rapidly when emergencies occur to provide additional food and employment when household food production or incomes collapse. Quick-action projects have been approved for disaster reconstruction and

Emergency and Relief Operations 179

rehabilitation activities, subsequently followed by full-fledged development projects. Advance shipments have been made to approved projects following early warning of an impending disaster to facilitate expansion of project activities to accommodate disaster victims, rather than provide emergency assistance after a disaster has struck. Employment has been provided in the agricultural off-season, and in times of emergency, to strengthen local infrastructure in order to sustain economic activities, thereby keeping the household unit intact and removing the necessity for people to migrate from their homes in search of food and employment. Conversely, WFP emergency operations and PROs may be adapted, if the circumstances are right, to facilitate development initiatives. In the Horn of Africa, WFP has collaborated with other agencies so that emergency food aid can be combined with capital and technical assistance to provide disaster victims with employment in food-for-work programmes. Emergency food aid has also been provided through on-going WFP-assisted development projects. And in protracted emergency situations lasting several years, WFP assistance has been provided to refugees and displaced persons who have been engaged in crop production, infrastructure and incomegenerating activities. Another dimension of emergencies relates to returnees, demobilized soldiers and their families. At least 3.5 million Africans voluntarily repatriated themselves in the two decades from 1972 (Allen and Morsink, 1994). Internally displaced persons also return home when fighting subsides. Yet the number of African returnees has been modest compared with the overall increase in the number of refugees and displaced persons. Part of the problem has been that insufficient attention has been paid to the needs of the returning population. Repatriations have taken place after long periods of armed conflict, which can be precarious for the returnees. They have received WFP food rations to tide them over the period of readjustment and resettlement, and to help them engage in reconstruction and rehabilitation works. Some conclusions In summary, relief food aid should, as far as possible, be provided and used in ways that promote self-reliance, attack the root causes of emergencies, support food security measures, and reinforce long-term development efforts. These aims require a considerable measure of organization. They are difficult to pursue under the pressures of sudden emergencies caused either by nature or by man. And they present a formidable challenge for governments in poor countries faced by economic crisis. A key to success is advance preparation (Thimm and Hahn, 1993). Effective disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation activities are immensely helped by a national legislative framework, adequate financial

180 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

provisions, strong local administration and technical services, training programmes for personnel at all levels, and well-designed projects that can be brought to implementation speedily when disasters strike. The importance of these elements has been underlined in the experience of many countries, particularly China and India. The afflicted population can then be quickly employed on construction projects, assisted by food aid, that would provide sustenance and income. People would not have to leave their homes in search of work or relief, health would not be impaired, and household assets would be protected and augmented. This would make it easier and quicker to return to normal life after the disaster had passed. Developing countries, and particularly those subject to recurring emergencies, should be stimulated and assisted to develop national disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation plans and programmes. This could help, among other things, in bringing about important changes in thinking and planning regarding the use of food aid. It could also help to change the image and focus of food aid from a resource thought of mainly for relief feeding to a versatile resource for development. It could avoid the conflicts that have occurred between food aid for emergency relief and food aid for development programmes and projects, as it would be through the latter that the afflicted populations’ food needs would largely be provided. Instead of being used in isolation, the national plans for disaster limitation would provide a framework for food aid to be used in close combination with financial and technical assistance, in mutually fortifying ways. And food aid would be effectively integrated into the national development planning process and not used in ways extraneous to it. Through these effects, the lasting benefits of food aid would be enhanced. Rather than creating a passive sense of dependency, food aid would become a powerful resource for sustained development for very poor people in food insecure areas.

Thirty years of humanitarian aid: conclusions and issues for the future What have been some of the main conclusions to emerge from WFP’s experience in providing humanitarian assistance over the past thirty years (WFP, 1995b)?7 Prevention, preparation and mitigation The first, self-evident, conclusion is that prevention of disasters is better than their cure. The short-term driving operational concerns that are entrenched in the continuing and escalating emergencies in Africa and elsewhere should not divert attention from longer-term developmental concerns, on which crisis prevention can be built.

Emergency and Relief Operations 181

National government responsibility Primary responsibility for responding to disasters, and for building up local and national capacities and capabilities for disaster prevention and preparedness, lies with national governments. Prevention requires initiatives that support not only equitable and sustainable economic growth but also stable, non-discriminatory governance and participation of the poor in all aspects of the development process. The root causes of humanitarian crises will not be solved by external assistance alone, which can best support national and local initiatives pursued for, and by, the people most at risk. The special roles and needs of women should be recognized. Not only are they (and their children) often most affected by emergencies but they play vital, in many cases pivotal, roles in the process of survival and the return to self-reliance. Assisting vulnerable groups to cope Assisting vulnerable groups, especially women, children and the infirm, to cope with disasters should be an essential task of intervention programmes (WFP, 1989a). But this is neither simple nor cheap. It involves, at least: careful identification of households and areas most at risk; establishment of workable information systems that can alert national and local authorities of impending crises; investment of development funds (government and external) in areas of vulnerability to enhance the livelihoods of poor people living there; participation of the vulnerable groups in the design, implementation and evaluation of action programmes; and plans, personnel and funds for rapid intervention in times of disaster. Political and military impartiality Food aid can be a double-edged sword, especially in man-made emergencies. It is a prerequisite for saving lives but it can be a source of power, manipulation and abuse, making it part of the problem of, rather than the solution to, manmade disasters. A major reason for WFP’s success in many conflict emergencies is its recognized political impartiality. But WFP should be aware of the political and military implications of food aid interventions, and of finding ways to keep them out of political and military control. This requires the formulation of a clear policy framework, a code of conduct, and ground-rules to guide WFP operations in times of emergency. Co-ordinated action National governments should take the lead in co-ordinating humanitarian relief, with WFP offering its support when needed. WFP has acted as coordinator of the food aid elements of large international relief operations with the co-operation of other aid agencies and NGOs. While this has improved

182 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

the effectiveness and efficiency of emergency operations, there have been occasions when the respective duties and responsibilities of the different partners have not been clearly understood. Improved contractual arrangements should remove any ambiguity, including the use and impact of the food aid provided and the evaluation of results. Where conflict leads to a breakdown of government and extension of a crisis beyond national boundaries, leading to a request from the UN secretary-general for WFP emergency assistance, the Programme would work closely with the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs and other members of the UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs. Advocacy WFP has a particular role to play in advocating policies that get at the root causes of disasters, and strategies and operations that can directly benefit the poor and hungry in emergency situations (WFP, 1994d). This is all the more important as aid resources are finite and there are rarely quick and easy solutions to the problem caused by emergencies. Partnerships of action are the key to success, based on prevention where possible, sound preparedness where feasible, and rapid and effective response when disaster strikes. Future key issues WFP’s experience has highlighted the need for action on certain key issues (Shaw, 1998). A broadened definition of emergency aid Much would be gained if the definition of emergency aid was expanded from an immediate, short-term response to provide relief to encompass pre- and post-disaster action in the ‘continuum’ between relief and development (Singer, 1994). Conceptually, disasters would then no longer be seen in isolation and their effects on development would be taken into account. Resources and assistance would be provided for disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation measures and would not dry up when required for reconstruction and rehabilitation after disasters have occurred, thereby helping the development process. And planning, design and implementation of assistance for relief and development would be executed by integrated government and aid administrations within common legislative and executive procedures and financial provisions. A global multilateral emergency food aid reserve The world still does not have an adequate multilateral emergency food reserve to respond quickly and effectively to disasters whenever and wherever they occur. Current multilateral arrangements for responding rapidly to emergencies

Emergency and Relief Operations 183

would be largely adequate if donors respected the provisions that they have approved. But donors have increasingly tied and designated their contributions for disaster relief, favouring responses to some emergencies over others. A truly multilateral and fully subscribed emergency reserve at the disposal of WFP is necessary to: take the politics out of emergency aid; avoid the hardship and suffering that afflicted populations might needlessly have to endure; and to limit the costs and diversion of funds for development that might be necessary from late and inadequate responses to emergencies. Improved early warning and response systems Experience has repeatedly shown that accurate, timely, and commonly available information of an impending disaster, coupled with a sound and speedy response, are key factors in mitigating the effects of emergencies. Significant improvements have been made in addressing emergencies caused by drought and crop shortfalls since FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System became operational. There are now good prospects for major improvements in early warning and tracking systems through the application of remote sensing and satellite imagery linked to a worldwide computerized information superhighway. Such systems should have common, multilateral ownership. They would produce common information that would have the confidence of all concerned, and would produce a common response. However, for the full benefits of these systems to be realized, they would need to be backed up by response systems with adequate resources in order to react quickly and effectively to the onset of emergencies. While the United Nations and other organizations have developed, and continue to refine and extend, early warning systems for sudden, natural disasters and slow, maturing disasters caused by drought and food shortages, they have not yet been developed for man-made emergencies. In his Agenda for Peace, the former UN secretary-general pointed to the need for an early warning system with political indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists, and to analyze what action might be taken to alleviate it (BoutrosGhali, 1992, pp. 15–16). The returns from national and donor investment in these early warning and response systems could be considerable. Human and economic suffering and damage could be avoided or mitigated, and enormous costs and diversion of resources in protracted relief programmes and peacemaking and peacekeeping operations avoided. An international aid programme combining financial aid and technology with skills transfer should therefore be given the highest priority. Co-ordinated action in a multilateral framework Multilateral and bilateral aid agencies and NGOs have their comparative advantages, which should be used to maximum effect in each emergency

184 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

situation. But no single donor or aid agency has the resources, competence or capacity to address emergency problems in developing countries alone. A multilateral framework for action would help to fuse the many and diverse contributions made in addressing emergencies, take the politics out, focus on the specific needs of developing countries, and develop their capacities to meet future disasters. Vulnerability to disasters is not a static phenomenon (Crawshaw and Shaw, 1996). Too little attention has been paid to the dynamics of vulnerability, and to addressing causes, not symptoms. New approaches are needed to take account of the changing incidence of vulnerability as national and international situations evolve. New indicators of vulnerability are also required. Mapping populations and areas that are particularly vulnerable would be a useful first step in better targeting assistance (Shaw and Hutchinson, 1993). Operational concerns Attention has focused on key operational concerns in emergency feeding operations (Shoham, 1994).8 (a) Targeting and registration. Targeting is a key concern in the design and implementation of emergency feeding operations. It is a strategic factor in facilitating access and outreach to the afflicted population. As in the case of WFP-supported development projects, four factors have an especially important bearing on the effectiveness or other wise of targeting: the criteria set; administrative feasibility and costs; participation by the afflicted people themselves; and the type, form, level, and method of the resource transfer (see Chapter 5). In addition, absence of, or inadequate, registration of those in need during emergencies has led to donor mistrust of the number of people requiring assistance and of the types and amounts of aid requested. As a result, too much or too little aid has been provided, leading either to waste of scarce resources and corruption, or to unnecessary hardship and suffering, especially among the less-influential and most vulnerable, particularly women and children, who most need help. Steps have been taken to improve registration systems both in terms of the methodologies and of the techniques adopted. As an example, UNHCR and WFP have set up common methods for establishing the number of refugees eligible to receive food assistance as part of their new working relationship. (b) Food rations. Considerable controversy has surrounded what should be an appropriate ration during emergencies. Recent evidence has shown that while generous, the international response to emergencies has been inconsistent, sometimes based more on political consideration than on real need. The

Emergency and Relief Operations 185

avoidance of high malnutrition rates and mortality in certain man-made emergencies, for example, contrasts starkly with the lack of success in others (Seaman and Rivers, 1988; Toole, 1993; Jaspers and Young, 1996). There are real practical constraints. The logistics involved in providing an adequate food ration consistently to food-insecure people in remote regions in Africa and elsewhere are formidable and costly. But innovative and pioneering efforts have been made, such as the use of triangular transactions, local purchases and food exchange arrangement, between and within countries, to expedite the provision of adequate and appropriate food rations. The special problems of providing adequate rations to refugees and displaced persons (including micronutrients and variety in the food basket) have also been recognized.9 A special statement has been issued by the United Nations Administrative Co-ordination Committee (the highest administrative body in the UN system), on the advice of its Subcommittee on Nutrition, which recommends that ‘the protection and promotion of the nutritional well-being of affected populations be fundamental goals of agency policy and programmes concerning refugees and displaced person’ (ACC/SCN, 1993c). UNHCR and WFP have agreed that when refugees have no other resources, food rations should meet all their nutritional requirements.10 (c) Essential non-food items. While access to food is vital in emergencies, other basic needs are also essential, including safe drinking water, basic medicines, shelter, fuel, and human security (for the disaster victims and relief workers). Without these basic needs, morbidity and mortality can occur despite the availability of adequate food. A major problem is that these items are provided by different aid agencies and NGOs. Co-ordinating and synchronizing their provision has been deficient in the past. Attempts are now being made to improve their combined provision. (d) Rapid response teams. Governments in developing countries find it difficult to cope with the many operational concerns during emergencies. WFP has established the facility of a ‘rapid response team’ to assist them. The size and composition of each team will depend upon such factors as the particular characteristics of an emergency, operating conditions in the afflicted country and expertise already in the country concerned. For large and complex emergencies, a team of experienced professional officers may be required. An important role of the teams will be to build up capacity and competence in developing countries to handle future emergencies. Policy framework: understanding emergencies While much operational experience has been gained in addressing emergencies, there remains the need for a clear policy framework based on an understanding

186 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

of the causes of different types of emergencies, how they affect different people, and the best ways to provide external assistance. The process of constructing a policy framework could be assisted if more attention was given to evaluating the results of emergency operations and understanding the lessons learned. The effects of emergencies should be disaggregated both to better understand their full effects and to design and implement intervention programmes that address their causes and impact, especially on poor people. The poor are not a homogeneous group. There are significant differences among them, and in the solutions to their problems. Distinction should also be made between the poor and the poorest – those who have the least assets, are more prone to mortality, illness and low physical performance, often associated with chronic malnutrition and related diseases – who may not be able to respond quickly to assistance and to improved conditions (Wilmshurst et al., 1992). Emergency relief is a highly emotive subject. Provoked by the media, the basic instinct is to dispatch food with the greatest possible speed to people in distress without a precise understanding of what has caused the problem, and whether food aid is the best response. In attempting to solve an immediate problem, more problems may be created later for the process of rehabilitation, reconstruction and subsequent development.11 In the major famines of the past, starvation and death occurred not only, or so much, because food was not available, but because poor people lost access (‘entitlement’) (Sen, 1981).12 Food insecurity can be either chronic or transitory, for which different policies and programmes are required (World Bank, 1986). There are also significant differences between emergencies caused by war and civil conflict and those arising from drought and other natural disasters (Macrea and Zwi, 1994). A concept of ‘human security’ has been developed, which combines two major components: freedom from fear, and freedom from want (UNDP, 1994, pp. 22–40). Food security is a prerequisite to human security along with economic, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. The linkages between providing humanitarian aid and peace-making and peacekeeping operations remain dangerously confused. The role of the UN system in providing relief to those caught up in the fighting in war zones is clear and accepted. But how far should the UN go to contain or mitigate the fighting? Should the UN cross the ‘Mogadishu line’ between peacekeeping and peacemaking, transcend national sovereignty, cut out the political process, and ‘leave it to the military’, even though there may be serious political differences among UN member countries, and a selective application of UN mandates and resolutions? Humanitarian assistance has become closely integrated with the dynamics of violence (Charlton, 1997). This has been difficult territory for the UN system,

Emergency and Relief Operations 187

which has conventionally respected the principle of state sovereignty in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. But the Charter also states that this principle ‘shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Charter VII concerning “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression” ’ (UN, 1945, chapter 1, article 2.7). And two concepts of sovereignty are being redefined (Annan, 1999b). First, states are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their people, and not vice versa. Secondly, individual sovereignty has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. The aim of the UN Charter is therefore to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them. This has cast in stark relief the dilemma of socalled ‘humanitarian interventions’ and forced a re-examination of how the UN system should respond to humanitarian crises. There are as yet no clearly established rules, guidelines and modalities. There are no easy solutions, and much will depend on the nature of the conflict in each emergency. Emergency interventions still remain marked by ad hoc reactions and crisis management, and full identification of responsibilities and areas of collaboration on the ground have yet to be achieved. This may be understandable given the nature and increasing number of emergencies in recent years. But progress should be quickened in implementing the many proposals that have been made.

7 Managing Food Aid Resources

As we saw in Chapters 5 and 6, supporting development projects and emergency operations mainly for the benefit of the neediest people in the poorest countries is a demanding and complex task. That complexity has been compounded by the nature and composition of the resources that WFP has had at its disposal, and the manner in which they have been made available by donors. This chapter describes these resources and what has been done to manage them effectively.

WFP resources: nature and composition Unlike the UN specialized agencies, such as FAO, ILO, UNESCO and WHO, which have assessed financial contributions from member nations, from inception it was agreed that WFP should receive voluntary contributions in the form of appropriate commodities, services such as ocean transport, and cash. The aim was to provide at least one-third of total contributions in cash and services in the aggregate to cover the cost of transporting the food aid commodities provided to recipient countries, WFP’s programme and administrative costs, and, where necessary, the purchase of commodities not available in donors’ contributions for use as food aid. Contributions could be accepted from intergovernmental bodies, other public sources as well as appropriate NGOs, but in reality, until recently, almost all resources have been provided by member states of the United Nations and FAO. Faced with declining resources, a concerted effort was made in the late 1990s to identify new non-traditional funding sources. For the first time, large food commodity contributions were obtained from the private sector. A ‘Friends of WFP-USA’ was launched to encourage private and corporate contributions from the United States. Similar arrangements are to be set up in other countries where the situation permits. And a WFP office has been established in Japan to secure donations from individuals and Japanese NGOs.1 188

Managing Food Aid Resources 189

Discussions between WFP and donors determined what commodities and services were considered to be ‘appropriate’. WFP’s governing body agreed that the value of the commodity contributions would be computed on the basis of world market prices prevailing at the time that they were pledged to WFP. Cash contributions were normally to be made in convertible currencies although, in exceptional circumstances, developing countries could make their contributions in currencies readily usable by WFP. Miscellaneous income derived from donations, interest accruing from investment of WFP funds, insurance claims on commodities, and money paid to WFP for the discharge of WFP consignments ahead of schedule was also credited to WFP’s resources. The nature and composition of WFP resources, and the chosen methods of their deployment, called for complex food aid management arrangements. Although the bulk of commodities made available to WFP consisted of different types of cereals, a wide variety of foods and feedstuffs were provided (see Table 7.1). As preference was given to providing food rations directly to beneficiaries that were calculated on the basis of their nutritional requirements, the delivery of a number of food items from different donor countries had to be synchronized to arrive at the same time in recipient countries. Each consignment had to be appropriately labelled and provided in containers the size and form of which facilitated distribution to beneficiaries. A relatively small number of donors provided the majority of WFP’s resources, but many nations, including developing countries, made small, but symbolically important, contributions (Table 7.2). Over 100 countries have made contributions to WFP at one time or other. While this has added to the strength and diversity of WFP’s resources, it has also called for management skills in co-ordinating these contributions through individual development projects and emergency operations in different parts of the developing world. Although donors undertook to make their pledged commodities readily available to WFP when required, it has often taken a minimum of three months for them to be acquisitioned by tender, packed, marked, labelled and assembled at the dockside ready for shipment, to which must be added the time required to transport them to, and distribute within, recipient countries. A further complicating factor has been that some donors have placed restrictions on which countries they are prepared to allow their commodities to be provided to, or have only agreed to support selected emergency operations after they have occurred. As WFP developed, a series of resource ‘windows’ were opened up to address specific requirements or problems. By the beginning of the 1990s, no less than seven separate resource channels were established, each with their own individual terms and conditions (see Table 7.2). While they provided additional resources for WFP operations, their non-interchangeability added to the complexity of resource management.

190

Table 7.1

WFP food deliveries by commodity category, 1991–5 (in thousand tons)

Commodity category All commodities

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

2,920.5

3,301.9

3,666.8

3,287.7

2,755.3

2,594.0 29.6 306.6 85.6 244.0 77.8 4.6 1,574.4 261.7

2,905.0 20.0 781.0 42.2 268.5 90.4 15.2 1,414.5 256.6

3,163.5 15.3 1,071.5 67.6 292.7 102.7 6.8 1,213.7 478.2

2,805.3 30.2 586.8 128.0 244.4 145.0 20.2 1,040.4 598.0

2,305.9 58.6 553.3 114.3 168.8 89.0 26.2 891.5 399.2

39.4 5.2 10.8 0.2 23.2

35.7 6.1 5.9 2.4 21.3

34.8 6.7 6.1 5.5 16.5

17.3 3.7 1.4 5.6 6.5

15.1 1.8 1.4 3.3 8.6

102.5 9.1 8.6 84.7

124.9 20.2 9.5 95.2

133.2 7.4 7.5 118.2

124.3 10.9 6.1 107.4

109.7 2.0 3.4 104.4

9.1 5.9 1.6 1.4

9.6 7.0 1.6 0.8

8.4 6.9 0.9 0.5

16.4 14.9 0.9 0.6

4.9 3.6 0.6 0.7

Canned/dried fish Canned fish Dried fish

15.6 13.9 1.6

14.2 12.7 1.5

15.8 14.9 0.8

17.2 16.0 1.1

10.3 9.9 0.4

Pulses Beans Lentils Soya beans Soya meal Whole green peas

99.3 67.6 6.3 0.1 0.0 9.8

122.9 88.8 2.6 0.1 0.0 2.7

180.0 136.1 11.3 0.1 0.0 6.7

188.8 110.3 29.1 0.0 0.0 0.0

179.4 109.4 28.1 0.0 0.0 0.0

Mixed/blended foods Corn-soya blend Wheat-soya blend

38.0 28.0 4.5

48.9 32.4 3.0

77.5 47.0 2.8

74.1 60.4 1.3

95.3 76.1 2.2

Miscellaneous Refined sugar

21.8 19.2

37.6 29.6

53.4 36.2

43.8 30.5

33.6 22.7

Beverages

0.4

0.3

0.1

0.3

0.1

Fruits Dried dates

0.3 0.0

2.7 2.0

0.2 0.0

0.2 0.0

1.1 1.0

Lyophilized foods

0.2

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

Seeds

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Cereals Bulgur wheat Maize or corn Maize or corn meal Rice Sorghum Soy-fortified maize meal Wheat Wheat flour Dairy products Cheese Dried skimmed milk Dried whole milk Enriched dried skimmed milk Fast and oils Butter oil Edible oils & fats Vegetable oil Meat Canned beef Canned pork Chicken

Notes: 1. Deliveries refer to the arrival dates and quantities discharged in recipient countries. 2. Individual commodities/groups are listed only when they represent a major value (above an average of one million dollars) in total WFP deliveries. 3. 0.0:less than a thousand tons. Source: World Food Programme.

Managing Food Aid Resources 191

Table 7.2 Major donors to WFP by type of pledge or contribution for biennium 1995–6, as at 31 December 1995 (values in US$ million)

Rank Donor*

Total value

Regular and FAC (value)

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

642.2 220.8 144.5 130.1 112.0 93.7 105.5 54.9 52.3 47.7 42.4 34.0 17.2 15.7 12.4 11.3 9.7 7.5 4.0 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8

126.5 80.6 59.4 64.8 70.9 79.6 16.0 20.9 41.8 5.9 29.9 11.7 2.7 7.3 2.2 1.8 3.8 7.5 4.0 1.2 – 1.1 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8

USA CEC Netherlands Germany Canada Australia Japan Sweden Denmark UK Norway Switzerland France Finland Italy Belgium Austria Saudi Arabia Argentina Spain DHA Ireland China Bangladesh India Cuba

Nonfood IRA PRO IEFR items (value) (value) (value) (value) 3.0 – 6.3 – 2.2 – 1.0 10.0 – 1.0 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

163.1 37.9 20.2 25.3 9.8 – 22.1 12.2 3.0 6.3 4.3 9.0 10.5 4.3 – – – – – – – – – – – –

323.2 78.3 39.7 40.1 1.8 1.1 6.5 4.7 6.7 22.8 4.0 7.0 2.6 2.1 – – – – – 1.5 2.7 1.4 – – – –

– – 2.4 – – – 1.0 3.9 – – 1.6 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Special emergencies Other** (value) (value) 26.4 3.1 15.3 – – 1.7 7.2 2.9 – 6.2 1.5 5.4 – 1.9 – – – – – – – – – – – –

– 20.9 1.2 – 26.3 10.8 51.8 – – 5.5 – – 1.4 – 8.7 9.5 5.9 – – – – – – – – –

FAC – Food Aid Convention. IEFR – International Emergency Food Reserves. IRA – Immediate Response Account. DHA – UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. * All pledges and contributions for donors that pledged or contributed a total of more than one million dollars for the biennium 1995–6. * *Includes Junior Professional Officer contributions for biennium 1995–6, and bilateral contributions to WFP-assisted projects/operations for 1995 only. Source: World Food Programme.

Originally, there was only one channel for contributions to what were called WFP’s ‘regular’ resources. Donors were requested to make their contributions in commodities, services and cash for two years at a time at ‘pledging conferences’, held one year in advance of the biennium during which they were to be used. Pledging targets were set for each biennium by WFP’s governing body. The targets had to be formally approved by ECOSOC and the FAO Council, and

192 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

endorsed by the UN General Assembly and the FAO Conference, although there was no occasion when the targets set by the governing body were not approved. Many donors were unable to announce their full contributions to WFP at the time of the pledging conferences, which were held at UN headquarters in New York, normally in the month of January. A number of donors made their pledges known in monetary terms, which were then converted into commodities, services or cash as their pledges were drawn down. On only three occasions (for the biennia 1969–70, 1973–4 and 1975–6), were the pledging targets surpassed. For all other biennia, the targets were not reached, and in some cases were significantly undermet. The United States, WFP’s biggest donor, made its pledges for the three biennia between 1966 and 1972 on the basis that they should not exceed 50 per cent of the total pledges of all donors, reduced to 40 per cent thereafter. While donors were given an indication by the WFP secretariat of the kinds and amounts of commodities required for WFP operations, a high degree of mutual self-interest was shown in the commodities that each donor actually provided, including high value-added products such as canned meat and fish. United States food aid legislation also required that three-quarters of the commodities it provided should be in the form of bagged, fortified or processed products, thereby restricting the amount of whole cereals that it could supply. And under United States cargo preference legislation, three-quarters of its food aid commodities had to be shipped in United States vessels at shipping rates significantly above the international level. Over time, other channels and facilities were added to WFP regular resources. From 1967, a small proportion of contributions to the Food Aid Convention were made available for WFP’s regular resources. In 1975, the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR) was established. Contributions to the reserve were to be made in additional to those contributed to WFP’s regular resources and placed at the disposal of WFP in such a way that a continuing reserve would be available for quick response when emergencies happened. But as pointed out in Chapter 6, the IEFR has not functioned in accordance with the modalities agreed for its operation by WFP’s governing body, which has impaired WFP’s ability to meet emergency food aid needs. In 1989, a special subset of WFP’s regular resources was set aside to respond to protracted refugee and displaced persons situations lasting one year or more, and an immediate response account (IRA) added to the IEFR to enable WFP to purchase food commodities close to where emergencies occurred to speed up the response to urgent food relief needs. A special emergencies account was also opened to handle contributions to specific large-scale and complex international emergency operations. A non-food items unit was set up in the WFP secretariat in 1973 to act as an intermediary between governments in developing countries and donors

Managing Food Aid Resources 193

prepared to provide assistance in the form of cash or in-kind inputs to provide tools, equipment or materials needed for the implementation of WFP-supported development projects. A special account was established for that purpose. And for the 1995–6 biennium, contributions were received from donors in support of a WFP junior professional officer programme and bilateral contributions made to WFP-assisted development projects and emergency operations. Each of these separate accounts were individually managed by the WFP secretariat whose administrative costs were charged to WFP’s regular resources. Each channel had its own terms and conditions and its own composition of commodities and cash contributions. To the extent that contributions in kind were not accompanied by sufficient cash for their transportation and distribution, the additional cash required was taken from WFP’s regular resources. Finally, to the complexity and difficulties of WFP resource management has been added the Achilles heel of shortage of cash resources. As a food aid organization, WFP has been a unique entity in the United Nations system. The impressive growth in its resources was in large part due to the fact that food aid was at least in part additional to financial aid; there was relatively little competition from other organizations for the kinds of resources that it was designed to deploy; and WFP efficiently performed its function at low financial cost. But the increasing demand for more cash resources has put WFP in direct competition with other UN organizations that operated entirely with financial resources. It was originally estimated that WFP’s cash requirements would be met if at least one-third of total contributions was provided in cash and services. This estimate was made at a time when only a small proportion of WFP resources was devoted to emergency operations. At the same time, a ‘fatal flaw’ was written into WFP’s general regulations relating to the provision of resources. Instead of each donor being required to provide at least one-third of their contributions in cash and services, the phase ‘in the aggregate’ was written into WFP’s general regulations on the understanding that those donors with food surpluses would contribute mainly food commodities while others with no food surpluses would provide cash or services. With few exceptions, such as Saudi Arabia, which provided a cash donation of $50 million for three consecutive pledging periods, this did not happen, with the result that WFP has suffered increasingly from a shortage of cash resources. Several factors contributed to WFP’s increasing cash shortage (WFP, 1992e). While some donors have regularly made one-third or more of their contributions to WFP in cash, others, particularly the larger contributors, have not, with the result that cash and service contributions to WFP in the aggregate have fallen below the one-third required. WFP’s increasing involvement in emergency operations, described in Chapter 6, and the concomitant transformation of the profile of WFP activities, were other major causes.

194 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Until 1991, WFP’s programme and administrative costs for emergency operations were charged to its regular resources without any recovery from donors. At the same time, WFP’s coverage of internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH) cost in the poorest developing countries for the food aid it provided increased considerably. Between 1990 and 1992, for example, annual shipments by WFP (excluding deliveries made on behalf of bilateral donors) more than doubled to 3.6 million tons. Most of this growth was in emergency relief operations, which reached 2.2 million tons. An increasing proportion of WFP shipments went to countries eligible for support by WFP in meeting their ITSH costs. And a higher proportion of those costs were met by WFP. As a result, WFP annual commitments to cover ITSH costs increased more than six times to reach $320 million by 1992 (WFP, 1994b). WFP also undercharged for the services provided to bilateral agencies and NGOs in the shipping, procurement and monitoring of their food aid supplies. An independent cost measurement study conducted in 1993 showed that for all the services provided the fees charged by WFP were less than the actual costs incurred in providing them. The study concluded that ‘with a stable financial base, WFP will be able to continue to provide quality food aid services, but that without the introduction of reliable, flexible revenue sources the quality of performance and the responsiveness of its operations will suffer (WFP, 1994j, p. 14). Throughout the 1990s, a working group of member states endeavoured to develop options for WFP’s long-term resourcing and financing, and cost measurement studies were initiated, including even more cost-effective transport and logistics activities, and the integration of strategic and financial planning.

Transportation and logistics Getting food to poor and hungry people in a timely and cost-efficient manner has been a major objective of WFP. But a fine balance had to be struck between speed and cost of delivery. Ultimately, the more that is spent on delivery, the less is available for providing food. Over the years, WFP has gained a considerable reputation for being able to move large amounts of food commodities, often in difficult circumstances, throughout the developing world. Every effort is made to use the transport services of developing countries. By the early years of the 1990s, WFP managed the annual transportation and delivery of over 4.7 million tons of food to over 90 developing countries at a total cost of over $387 million. About one-third of that tonnage was handled on behalf of bilateral donors and NGOs. Some twothirds of the tonnage moved involved ocean transport from donor to recipient countries. Another one-fifth was moved by inland transport arranged by WFP within recipient countries. About 400,000 tons was delivered by surface

Managing Food Aid Resources 195

transport to landlocked countries. And over 53,000 tons was transported by air both between and within recipient countries in emergency operations. Ocean shipping Ocean shipping has been WFP’s main transportation function and has accounted for the largest proportion of WFP’s cash expenditure. Standard and flexible procedures were developed over many years of experience that can be quickly modified to respond to sudden emergencies. The shipping process begins with a ‘request for shipping instructions’ (RISI) from a WFP country office, which calls forward the needed commodities. This request forms the basis for the issuance of a ‘shipping instruction’ (SI) to a donor to make the required commodities available to WFP at a designated loading port. Over 2,500 SIs were issued annually by the early 1990s. The SI, which provides precise details, including the kind and amount of commodities required, the selected loading port, the delivery period and packaging specifications, serves as a key multipurpose document, which triggers a series of operational and financial operations, and provides simultaneous notification to both donors and WFP country offices. WFP shipping officers use the SIs in their daily dialogue with a network of freight forwarding agents in the capitals of the major donor countries who, in turn, liaise with the donor agencies and commercial commodity suppliers concerned. As a rule, small consignments of food aid commodities are shipped on liner vessels which run on regular schedules and carry cargoes for a number of different shippers. By the early 1990s, WFP booked some 2,000 liner parcels annually for a total freight expenditure of around $85 million. WFP agents in the donor countries keep WFP informed of the sailing times of liner vessels from designated loading ports to intended destinations and of their competitive freight rates. It is often possible to combine shipments from neighbouring donors thereby strengthening WFP’s bargaining position with shipping lines for reduced freight rates and other concessions. For larger consignments (usually above 3,000 tons), it is more cost-effective for WFP to charter an entire ship. A number of small consignments are often consolidated into one shipment in order to benefit from the lower freight rate. Consolidated shipments could be arranged either by combining a number of single consignments from a single donor, by combining cargoes from several donors, or by collaborating with bilateral donors and NGOs, who thereby benefited from WFP’s information network and expertise. By the early 1990s, WFP arranged for about 200 charter vessels a year at an annual freight cost of around $108 million. At any one time, WFP has a number of ships on charter. All concerned are kept informed of the precise position of each ship at the different stages of its journey, from loading to discharge, through a weekly position list which WFP produces and distributes.

196 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Not only has WFP enjoyed significant cost advantage in making use of chartered vessels but there is also strategic importance in having substantial quantities of food afloat at any given time. As chartered vessels are under WFP’s full control, they may be diverted at short notice to respond quickly to a sudden emergency. Food supplies from diverted chartered vessels have often been the first deliveries of relief assistance to reach a stricken country. WFP set up an international panel of chartering brokers in major maritime centres, such as London, New York and Tokyo, to cover the international ship chartering markets. Through this network, WFP has been kept constantly informed of the most competitive charter rates. At the same time, WFP’s experienced chartering officers follow movements in the international freight markets through daily market reports. A contract is drawn up between the ship owner and WFP when a vessel is chartered, which give details of the financial commitments and legal responsibilities. WFP has its own customized contractual arrangement. In the mid-1980s, BIMCO, the world’s largest association of shipowners, and WFP jointly drew up a contractual agreement for exclusive use by WFP. Charter contracts are often subject to dispute but the ratification by such a leading authority as BIMCO has resulted in shipowners unconditionally accepting WFP’s terms, thus reducing the likelihood of time-consuming and costly disputes and litigation. WFP’s special charter contract makes provision for WFP to be responsible for the loading and discharge of charter vessels. For these operations, WFP enters into special stevedoring arrangements and employs a network of ‘charterers’ protecting agents to ensure that charter vessels are turned around in both the ports of loading and discharge with minimum delay and cost. Insurance All commodities shipped by WFP are insured and carefully monitored to detect for damage or loss during transportation. Each consignment is insured to the port of unloading, or frontier station in the case of landlocked countries, where title to the food commodities passes to the recipient government. Insurance is arranged on a global basis through one of the world’s largest multinational brokers. By the early 1990s, the average cost of insurance, on ‘all risk’ terms, was $1.40 a ton. WFP has appointed and supervises a network of superintendents and inspectors at about 150 locations as part of a comprehensive worldwide system at a cost of about $0.60 per ton. They assess the quantity and condition of all WFP consignments at the time they are delivered to recipient governments and report back to WFP. Their reports are used as a basis for any claims against insurers and third parties as well as for WFP accounting records. About 2,400 reports are dealt with every year and have resulted in about 400 claims valued at $3.8 million. In addition, about ten ‘general average’ claims (contributions

Managing Food Aid Resources 197

necessary to complete a voyage after an unexpected incident) per year have been settled by insurers. The superintendents also alert WFP immediately the prospect of large losses or major problems arise so that remedial action might be taken. Losses have been remarkably low over the years of WFP’s operations, amounting to less than one per cent of deliveries in value terms in the early 1990s. As well as cargo insurance, WFP has also arranged insurance to cover its liability as a charterer of ships. Although liabilities could have been very high, claims have in fact been rare. No ship owner has succeeded in claiming against WFP on the basis of charterer’s liability and the premium has been very low – less than $100,000 per year for over 200 vessels in the early 1990s. Logistics A logistics unit was established in the WFP secretariat in 1986 to handle WFP’s increasing involvement with surface transportation within and between developing countries. With WFP’s increasing involvement in emergency and disaster relief operations, the unit took over responsibility for all kinds of new and unconventional transportation and logistics activities including airlifts, parachute drops and water transport operations. In 1986, about 300,000 tons of food were transported within and between developing countries. By the early 1990s, that amount had increased to 1.6 million, mainly as a result of WFP’s increasing involvement in large-scale and complex man-made emergencies. In addition to the staff involved at WFP’s headquarters, 100 expatriate and over 1,000 local staff have been employed to provide logistics support in food aid recipient countries throughout the developing world. In some developing countries, WFP has managed and operated fleets of trucks and trailers at the request of the donor community to transport and distribute food aid provided from all sources. In Ethiopia, for example, WFP operated a fleet of 360 trucks and trailers employing over 800 staff at an annual operating cost of $5 million. WFP also established and operated logistics and transport units for food convoys in Afghanistan and Angola. In Sudan, the international community requested that WFP co-ordinate and handle all food aid provided to the country, which amounted to over 600,000 tons in 1991. From the beginning of the 1990s, WFP became increasingly involved in negotiations with warring parties for the safe passage of relief supplies and personnel across disputed territory. For example, WFP negotiated the reopening of the port of Massawa, which allowed the deliver of relief food to Eritrea and northern Ethiopia. Cross-border transportation was organized from Kenya by a fleet of trucks and a large-scale airlift to deliver emergency relief to southern Ethiopia. And WFP played a role in the rehabilitation and upgrading of facilities at ports destroyed or damaged by war. For example, WFP commissioned a port management team to assess the war damage done to the Eritrean ports of Massawa and Assab. To repair the port of Massawa, WFP purchased

198 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

spare parts and basic equipment and invested some $3 million in a tugboat, a pilot boat and generator sets. To increase Ethiopia’s internal transport capacity, WFP commissioned a feasibility study for the Djibouti–Ethiopia railway, which resulted in the supply of two locomotives plus an assistance package of $4 million for the transportation of food aid. Following the severe drought that affected countries in southern Africa at the beginning of the 1990s, the donor community asked WFP to carry out a review of port and transport infrastructure to ensure that the large amount of food imports, including food aid, that was required could be quickly and efficiently delivered. And following the new working arrangements established between WFP and UNHCR in 1992, WFP assumed responsibility for providing basic commodities and mobilizing funds required for their transport and delivery in all large-scale refugee operations. WFP’s unique experience and expertise in transport and logistics has been recognized by the international community. A study commissioned by the Nordic countries on the United Nations system in 1990 concluded that ‘Over the years the organization (WFP) has developed a supply system that is both professionally managed and appreciated by the recipients’ and recommended that WFP should ‘be formally designated as the UN agency with primary responsibility for matters relating to logistics and transport for both food and non-food items, including assistance to countries in developing their own transport arrangements’ (Nordic UN Project, 1990, pp. 63 and 77). An evaluation of food aid transport costs and options carried out for the EEC in 1992 stated that WFP not only consistently achieved the most competitive freight rates but overall was the most effective agency (TechEcon, 1992). Obtaining the confidence of both donors and recipients has been particularly important in getting food through to afflicted people in man-made emergencies.

Food aid modalities From inception, preference was given by WFP’s governing body to the direct distribution of food aid commodities from donors to beneficiaries. But other modalities were also developed to overcome some of the difficulties facing direct distribution in certain specific situations, adding to the flexibility, but also the complexity, of resource management. Monetization The complex question of monetization came to assume pronounced importance in the food aid debate. Some analysts and practitioners argued that the most efficient use of food aid was to sell (monetize) the food commodities provided in recipient countries and use the proceeds to help finance the development budget or well-designed development programmes and projects.

Managing Food Aid Resources 199

Others reasoned that the hungry poor could be better targeted if food was distributed directly to them, particularly in situations of food insecurity where food markets functioned inefficiently. The debate assumed practical and operational importance. We saw during the experimental years (Chapter 4) that while WFP’s governing body decided that most of the food aid provided by the Programme should be distributed directly in kind to project beneficiaries, monetization was allowed on a small and restricted basis in certain specific cases. Those cases were closely monitored by the governing body and the CSD in accordance with FAO’s Principles of Surplus Disposal, which added yet another dimension to the complexity of the management of WFP food aid resources. Plans of operation between WFP and recipient governing project involving sales specified the amount of commodities to be sold and the use of the proceeds generated, and involved the presentation of audited accounts of the transactions carried out by recipient governments. A number of reports were presented to WFP’s governing body by the WFP secretariat to keep it informed of the number, extent and types of projects involving sales. By 1977, projects with open market sales had involved less than 2 per cent of the quantity of food committed to all operational projects at that time (WFP, 1977c). The CFA: agreed that WFP’s policy of restricting commodity sales on the open market of recipient countries to exceptional cases of need should be continued. However, the sale of limited quantities of food in exceptional circumstances, applied judiciously and with caution, could help recipient governments to raise the necessary local funds and facilitate project implementation … the Committee therefore endorsed the Executive Director’s recommendation that a greater degree of flexibility was justified in the practical application of that policy. (WFP, 1977d, p. 8) By 1986, after 24 years of WFP operations, sales had been permitted in 16 per cent of all WFP-assisted projects, involving 15 per cent of the total quantity of WFP food aid that had been committed by that date. Open market sales were 1.5 per cent of total WFP commitments. The governing body agreed with an executive director’s recommendation to allow monetization to take place where the direct distribution of food aid to the poor was inappropriate. Two examples were given: first, schemes for improving access of the poor to food, such as supplementary feeding, rationing, price subsidy and food coupon programmes targeted on the poor, particularly to mitigate the impact of changes in macro-economic policies undertaken by governments in developing countries; secondly, in small economies heavily dependent on food imports where the

200 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

cost of food aid shipments and internal administration of food aid and transport costs in the recipient country did not warrant direct distribution but where funds generated by the sale of food aid commodities could be used to finance development activities of direct benefit to the poor (WFP, 1987d). At the same time, new guidelines were drawn up on the programming and management of funds generated through WFP-assisted projects (WFP, 1987e). The guidelines stressed: the importance of the monetization process itself, i.e., the ways in which food aid commodities were sold; the valuation of WFP commodities, which should reflect their real market value; the establishment of special, interest-bearing accounts for sales proceeds; and the quick expenditure of sales proceeds on agreed items of expenditure in order to avoid erosion of their value through inflation. WFP experience showed that monetization was not an easy option in bringing the benefits of food aid to poor, food-insecure people. Much depended on whether local conditions were conducive to efficient monetization and whether the funds generated could be effectively channelled to the target group. A number of issues required particular attention (World Bank/WFP, 1991, pp. 24–5). If the exchange rate correctly reflected real scarcity values, food aid commodities sold in the market at the import price would generate funds that reflected the real resource transfer. If, however, the exchange rate was overvalued, which was a constant constraint, the local currency funds would be less than the real value of the food aid commodities. When a general subsidy was placed on food prices, food aid commodities might not be monetized at their full value. The subsidy might be captured by less needy groups, or applied to imported wheat and rice, leading to changes in diets and to dependency (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988). In such cases, the provision of food aid might make it more difficult to reform the food system. The solution might be to use food aid in support of food policy reform, which could include a targeted subsidy to needy groups in place of a general subsidy. Stable currencies and well-functioning local markets, two important factors for efficient monetization, were conspicuously absent in many developing countries. Where a resource transfer to poor households was the primary objective, and where the local currency was reasonably stable and local markets were functioning, providing cash would, as a general rule, be more valuable to the beneficiaries than food commodities. But food-aided projects typically targeted the most needy and food-insecure people, and were therefore often implemented in areas with malfunctioning markets. Transferring cash to them from funds generated from monetized food aid might therefore simply raise local food prices, if food supplies were not increased, in which case delivering food directly would be preferable. Another issue concerned the problem of fungibility. Recipient governments often placed monetized funds in the general budget, which thwarted donors’

Managing Food Aid Resources 201

intention to see them used specifically for the alleviation of hunger and poverty. To the extent that national development policies and plans were already oriented in that direction, however, fungibility was not a problem, and donors could support policies and programmes rather than attempt to direct their aid to specific purposes. Finally, the ways in which food aid commodities were sold could have an important effect on the benefits accruing from monetization. For example, sales through the private sector at full market prices could stimulate both development and the operation of markets, while sales through public sector channels at subsidized prices might support high-cost and inefficient parastatals with a monopoly on the grain trade. Between 1987 and 1996, about 13 per cent of WFP commitments in value terms were monetized (WFP, 1997b). From the beginning of the 1990s, over one-third of the funds generated from the sale of WFP commodities were used to finance project activities, such as the strengthening of market infrastructure in dairy development projects and the purchase of tools and materials. But the most common reason for monetization was to finance ITSH costs. At the same time, monetization was taking place in a markedly changing WFP resource situation. There was a sharp reduction in the volume of food commodities made available by donors. The sale of increasingly scarce food aid commodities on the open market of recipient countries therefore became harder to justify than at a time when WFP had large commodity contributions at its disposal and limited cash resources. The share of WFP resources committed as cash also rose steadily. At the end of the 1980s, about 70 per cent of the total value of WFP commitments was in the form of food commodities. By 1995, more than half was in the form of cash tied in varying degrees to the purchase of food commodities in specified markets. WFP increasingly purchased food, mainly in developing countries, to use as food aid. This implied less need for monetization in order to meet ITSH costs. In addition, the cost of non-food items to implement WFP-assisted development projects was written into project proposals thereby obviating the need for monetization to meet those costs. As a result, it was decided that WFP would not undertake projects involving full open market monetization to fund activities that were not directly related to food aid. However, where some donors do not have the flexibility to provide sufficient or timely cash resources, and where alternative financing was not available, some monetization could still be undertaken. WFP would also continue to use ‘closed-circuit’ monetization to project beneficiaries where it was considered to be the most appropriate modality. In emergency operations, monetization would be a considered option where direct distribution of food aid to disaster victims was not feasible, and where local monetization would help promote a return to normal conditions following the end of an

202 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

emergency. In all cases involving monetization, however, WFP undertook to establish the cost-effectiveness of the monetization process in advance, and to avoid any market displacement, production disincentives, or risk of creating lasting dependency among beneficiaries. Triangular transactions, local purchase and commodity exchanges Faced with the difficulties and costs of direct food aid distribution, and the limitations placed on monetization, WFP looked for other modalities to transfer food aid resources to beneficiaries in developing countries, which might also have additional food aid and developmental benefits. These modalities added further to the flexibility, but also complexity, of WFP resource management. In addition to monetization, three modalities were used:


triangular transactions, whereby a donor bought food in a developing country and shipped it to another developing country, where it was used as food aid;
commodity purchases in a developing country for use as food aid in the same country; and
commodity exchanges, in which a food commodity, say wheat, supplied as food aid to a developing country was exchanged for another commodity produced in that country, say maize, which was used as food aid. The resolution adopted by the World Food Conference in 1974 on ‘An improved policy for food aid’ urged donor countries to ‘provide, as appropriate, to food aid programmes additional cash resources for commodity purchases from developing countries to the maximum extent possible’ (UN, 1975a, p. 16). The guidelines and criteria for food aid unanimously agreed to by WFP’s governing body in 1979 also recommended that: Donor countries should make efforts to provide whenever possible cash resources with a view to financing food aid through triangular transactions between themselves, developing exporting countries and recipient countries, including coverage of the shipping costs wherever applicable, and further diversifying the variety of food provided as aid. Such arrangements would increase the participation of developing exporting countries in providing food aid. (WFP, 1979b) These modalities were perceived as having important potential benefits for food aid, including: reducing transfer costs; increasing the speed and timeliness of food aid deliveries; and providing food commodities more in keeping with the food tastes and habits of recipients than those provided directly by

Managing Food Aid Resources 203

donors. In addition, they could bring wider developmental benefits, including: stimulating increased food production in food aid recipient countries; promoting exports; fostering intra- and inter-country trade; supporting food strategies and food security programmes by helping developing countries manage food surpluses; assisting in the restructuring, revivication or liberalization of domestic food markets; encouraging and assisting the improvement of transport, storage and logistical facilities in food supplying countries, and with neighbouring countries; and strengthening food management and administration capacity in association with technical assistance and training. An opportunity for WFP to engage in triangular transactions on a large scale occurred at the beginning of the 1980s when Zimbabwe had two successive bumper maize crops at a time when many neighbouring countries faced acute food shortages and WFP was called upon to provide food aid to alleviate the precarious food situation. WFP purchased over 250,000 tons of maize not only with its own cash resources but with financial aid provided by 16 donor countries and organizations and some NGOs. The maize was transported to 15 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to support development projects, mainly for agricultural and rural development, and emergency operations. At the same time, and with the co-operation of donor countries, WFP helped in the improvement of transport and logistical facilities both within Zimbabwe and with neighbouring countries (WFP, 1982e; Shaw, 1983). Despite the potential benefits, procuring food commodities in developing countries for use as food aid has remained a modest, if growing, part of total food aid deliveries. In 1998, about 900,000 tons of food were procured in developing countries for food aid. However, as total food aid deliveries have fallen, an increasing share has come from procurement in developing countries. That share was 11 per cent in 1998. Cereals made up over 90 per cent of the food commodities obtained in developing countries. About 51 per cent of food procured came from local purchases and 49 per cent from triangular transactions. More than 60 per cent took place in Sub-Saharan Africa (WFP, 1999e). Ultimately, the amount of food procured in developing countries for use as food aid depends on the cash resources donors are prepared to invest in these food aid modalities. This, in turn, is influenced by donors’ assessments of the opportunity cost of using their limited financial aid for these purposes rather than for other developmental uses. The experience of WFP and donor agencies has also shown that there are formidable barriers to the procurement of food commodities in developing countries (RDI, 1987; RDI, 1990; WFP, 1989h; WFP, 1990h; Clay and Benson, 1990).2 Important differences occurred between ‘regular’ food exporting developing countries and those ‘non-regular’ food exporters with only intermittent food surpluses. These differences arose from such factors as: assurance of the

204 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

availability of the food commodities required; their timely supply through efficient marketing systems; and uncertainties in food aid programming because commodities were not regularly available, which could result in additional costs for WFP and donors. These uncertainties were compounded by such non-tariff barriers as: limited administrative and managerial capacity; transport, storage and logistics bottlenecks; and inadequate quality control. Concern was also expressed about how to manage surplus production in developing countries given the uncertainties of food availabilities and prices on world markets and the undernourished state of a high proportion of their population. The disposal of surpluses above the current level of effective demand could lead to inadequate investment in stocks, storage, and targeted food subsidy programmes. Another major concern was that donors and aid agencies carried out these food aid modalities separately, at different prices and exchange ratios, through different marketing channels, and at different times of the year. Insufficient consideration was given to their potential developmental benefits or to building up capacity in developing countries to undertake them more efficiently, and on a larger scale. The country offices staff of WFP, bilateral donors and NGOs in the developing countries were often inadequately trained to engage in these food aid modalities, were insufficiently informed of market prices and conditions, and their administrative overheads were often underestimated. Two overriding lessons emerged from WFP experience in carrying out these food aid modalities. First, donors and aid agencies should develop a common strategy, based on a common code of conduct, for each developing country in which these modalities are regularly implemented. A common information and market intelligence system should also be established and maintained for individual developing countries on food availabilities and prices for traditional staples as well as cereals and other food commodities that are not so widely traded. Standard guidelines would facilitate co-ordinated purchasing and exchange negotiations and operations, marketing channels, transport and logistics arrangements and monitoring and evaluation systems that would facilitate the assessment and comparison of individual food aid transactions and their aggregate effect. Secondly, the full developmental benefits of these food aid modalities might be achieved if a co-ordinated programme of financial, technical and food aid could be provided to improve the capacity of developing countries to undertake their operation. Such a programme might include technical assistance and training services to strengthen administrative and managerial support; develop trading skills and market analysis; improve grading, handling and storage techniques to improve the quality of food commodities; and financial assistance to improve transport and logistical systems.

8 Constitutional Change: The Byzantine Vortex

‘In pursuing their desire to create a modest, experimental programme that would satisfy the myriad competing political interests of the time, the founders of the WFP created a complex constitutional structure’ (Charlton, 1992, p. 634)1 This chapter gives the details of WFP’s original constitution – one of the most complex of any body in the United Nations system – and describes the saga that took place over almost a decade to unravel its complexities and reform its structure so that it could better serve a growing and maturing operational organization. In the process, the downside of the United Nations system was revealed – the uncontrolled power of an executive head of one of its specialized agencies and the seeming inability of the international community to control his aggrandizement. The reader might be bewildered by the machinations that took place, and dismayed that they should have been allowed to have gone on for so long.

The constitution A joint UN/FAO undertaking The first unique feature of WFP’s original constitution was that the new experimental programme was to be undertaken jointly by two ‘parent bodies’, the United Nations in New York and the FAO in Rome (WFP, 1963a). The rationale given for this unprecedented arrangement was that the United Nations functioned ‘in the general field of economic and social development ‘ while FAO had special responsibilities ‘for securing improvements in nutrition and in the efficiency of food production and distribution’. WFP activities were perceived to be included in the mandates of both parent organizations. There were a mixture of motives for establishing the ‘joint undertaking’. One was to widen the appeal of the new organization among donors, particularly 205

206 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

those in North America, who felt that they had greater influence on decision making in the United Nations in New York than in the FAO in Rome. Another reason, as voiced by the UN secretary-general, U Thant, was to portray the new body as a symbol of co-operation in the UN system and solidarity in the international community in the context of the UN Decade for Development that was launched in 1961 shortly before WFP was established. U Thant referred to ‘well-conceived institutional arrangements’ as being not only essential to the success of WFP but also more generally as contributing to forming ‘the “image” of the United Nations in the minds of the public and of the law-makers … in determining the general propensity to use this Organization (the UN) as an instrument of international action’. He expressed the hope that ‘the administration of the programme (WFP) will provide an outstanding example of concerted action within the United Nations family’ (UN, 1961c). The view had been expressed at the FAO Conference in 1961 that FAO alone should administer the WFP programme and should co-operate with the United Nations only ‘as and when needed’. But FAO director-general Sen had noted that while food surpluses could make a major contribution to rural development and welfare, in order to achieve an accelerated rate of growth, plans for agricultural development must form part of the total plans for economic development in a country. ‘This view was finally endorsed and the FAO Conference unanimously supported joint operation (of WFP) by the United Nations and FAO’ (UN, 1961c).2 It was also expected that the new programme would provide substantial additional resources to support the work of both the UN and FAO. It was for this reason that both organizations wanted to have WFP and that neither would yield to the other. Therefore, as a compromise, WFP was made a joint undertaking of both organization. The checks and balances written into WFP’s constitution were to ensure that neither organization would gain hegemony over the fledging programme. A contrary view was that the political and economic dimensions of food aid required policy, economic and financial controls by the two organizations with the mandates, experience and responsibilities for the wider issues at stake. As a multilateral food aid entity, WFP operations could not be left only to an overseeing body in which donors would tend to have undue influence, but should be subject to intergovernmental authorities with larger and differently balanced memberships. Other parts of WFP’s constitution sprang from this basic framework of a joint UN/FAO undertaking with the constant involvement not only of the executive heads of the two parent bodies but also of their principal committees in a byzantine vortex of controls and balances. Half of WFP’s governing body of 24 members were to be appointed by the UN’s ECOSOC and half by the FAO Council. It was required to report annually to both ECOSOC and

Constitutional Change: The Byzantine Vortex 207

the FAO Council on progress made in the development, administration and operations of WFP. The provisional agenda of governing body sessions were to be prepared by WFP’s executive director in consultation with the UN secretary-general and director-general of FAO. The joint UN/FAO administrative unit or secretariat that was set up to run WFP operations was located at FAO headquarters in Rome. It was required to report to both the UN secretary-general and the FAO director-general. In a letter to U Thant on 20 June 1962, B. R. Sen gave his view of what he regarded as the status of the administrative unit: I am of the opinion that the administrative unit is neither exclusively an integral part of FAO nor of the United Nations. ... [It] is a joint one reporting both to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the DirectorGeneral of FAO. It has its own supervisory and executive organ reporting to the FAO Council and to ECOSOC.3 WFP’s executive director was to be appointed by the UN secretary-general and director-general of FAO, after consultation with WFP’s governing body. WFP senior officials were to be chosen by the executive director in agreement with the UN secretary-general and the director-general of FAO. The executive director was required to present a programme of work (later called a statement or report) once a year to the IGC for its consideration and approval, in consultation with, and with the approval of, the UN secretary-general and the director-general of FAO. In a joint Note Verbale of 11 June 1962, the executive heads of the UN and FAO delegated authority to the WFP executive director to conduct correspondence directly with governments on their behalf. The executive heads of the UN and FAO were made jointly responsible for convening pledging conferences at UN headquarters in New York at which donors announced their voluntary contributions to WFP’s resources. The target levels of resources set for these pledging conferences were proposed by WFP’s executive director, with the approval of the UN secretary-general and the director-general of FAO, agreed to by WFP’s governing body, approved by ECOSOC and the FAO Council, and endorsed by the UN General Assembly and FAO Conference. The executive heads of the UN and FAO were to ensure that any expert studies that were undertaken, which could help in the consideration of the future development of multilateral food programmes, should as much as possible be made as part of the regular activities of their organizations, and of other interested and competent intergovernmental bodies. WFP’s financial arrangements were entrusted to the FAO director-general, rather than to WFP’s executive director of WFP. All contributions to WFP’s regular resources were credited to a special trust fund, called the ‘World Food Programme Fund’, from which the cost of WFP operations and administration

208 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

were met. The fund was administered by the FAO director-general in accordance with FAO financial regulations. FAO’s director-general, and not WFP’s executive director, was therefore called upon to propose additional financial procedures to meet the special needs of WFP for the approval of the Programme’s governing body, which became part of WFP’s Basic Texts. These procedures stated, inter alia, that: FAO’s director-general would act as ‘custodian’ of the special WFP fund; determine the bank(s) in which the fund should be kept; invest any monies not immediately required by WFP, in accordance with established FAO policies, and credit the income gained from investments to the WFP fund; establish and maintain a ‘reserve fund’; and prepare monthly, periodic and annual statements of WFP accounts, and any other supporting statements required by WFP’s governing body. WFP annual accounts were to be submitted to FAO’s external auditors. To add to the complexity, the annual WFP budgets and financial reports were to be reviewed not only by the FAO Finance Committee but also by its UN counterpart, the United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), before they were passed to WFP’s governing body for approval. A co-operative programme The WFP secretariat was not created as a self-contained entity but had to rely on the technical, financial and administrative services of other organizations on a reimbursable basis. The founders of WFP ‘were as much influenced by what they did not want to create as what they intended to do’ (Charlton, 1992, p. 635). They did not want to set up a separate specialized agency with its own closed structure and were determined to create an organization that could be easily dismantled in the event that the WFP experiment was not successful. These arrangements were devised: on account of WFP’s temporary and experimental nature and uncertain future; to avoid duplication of services already available in the UN system; to keep administrative costs as low as possible; and to stress the overriding operational nature of the Programme. Thus, ‘in all stages of the development of its activities’, WFP was required to consult with, and seek the advice and co-operation from, its parent bodies, the United Nations and FAO, and operate in close liaison with appropriate UN agencies and operating programmes, bilateral aid agencies and non-governmental organizations. A major anomaly was that while WFP’s executive director was made responsible for assuring that the development projects supported with WFP assistance were ‘sound, carefully planned and directed toward valid objectives, for assuring the mobilization of the necessary technical and administrative skills, and for assessing the ability of recipient countries to carry out the projects’, and for ‘correction of any inadequacies in project operations’, the expertise required to undertake these tasks were not immediately available to WFP but had to be contracted from other organizations.

Constitutional Change: The Byzantine Vortex 209

Cost-saving measures Every effort was made to keep WFP management and administrative costs to a minimum ‘consistent with the maintenance of efficiency’. Instead of developing its own services, the general financial and administrative service of FAO were called upon on a reimbursable basis. WFP staffing, and the level of their appointment, were kept low and closely monitored, with the governing body micro-managing and approving all new staff at all levels, both professional and general service, and proposals for their upgrading and transfer at WFP headquarters. Rather than appoint its own representatives in countries receiving WFP aid, the representatives of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board (later UNDP) were requested to perform that function in addition to their other responsibilities. WFP field staff stationed in recipient countries formed part of their office, and national staff were appointed and administered under UNDP rules and regulations, the cost of which was reimbursed by WFP. While WFP’s administrative costs were kept to the lowest level of any aid agency, the administrative tasks of the small staff were increased many fold. The two parent bodies had to be consulted and generally kept informed. Communications with the other co-operating UN organizations had to be maintained. The twice-yearly meetings of the governing body had to be serviced and reports on those meetings submitted to both ECOSOC and the FAO Council. Requests for WFP assistance and progress and evaluation reports had to be presented to the governing body for discussion and approval on an individual project, and not a country programme, basis as in many UN bodies. Reliance on UNDP resident representatives to act as WFP representatives in the country of their appointment created one of the strangest paradoxes of all. For WFP staff members to become WFP representatives, they would have to resign their positions in WFP and become staff members of UNDP, although in reality few made that transition.

Emergency food aid WFP’s emergency assistance was to be approved not by WFP’s executive director but by the director-general of FAO (see Chapter 6). Once approved, an agreement was concluded between WFP’s executive director and the recipient government. The executive director was also responsible for submitting reports on emergency operations to WFP’s governing body. Allocation of WFP resources for emergencies was to be reviewed by WFP’s governing body in consultation with FAO’s director-general. In cases of special need, the governing body could, at the request of the executive director, and in consultation with the FAO director-general, allocate further amounts for use by the director-general to meet emergency food needs.

210 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

The gathering storm This complex constitution may have been appropriate for a three-year experimental programme with an uncertain future. However, when WFP grew in size and importance, its constitution became a constraint, even impediment, on its evolution as a large operational programme. It might have been possible to have lived with the elaborate constitution if those involved saw it as a means of supporting, rather than controlling, the emerging and maturing programme. But a series of historical accidents were to prevent this from happening. Missed opportunities There were at least two major opportunities to address the complexities of WFP’s original constitution and introduce changes in an evolutionary manner. The first occasion was at the end of the three-year experimental period in December 1965, when WFP was established on a continuing basis. The other occasion was after the 1974 World Food Conference, when WFP’s original governing body, the Intergovernmental Committee (IGC), was reconstituted into the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA), and its size increased to 30 members, half to be elected by ECOSOC and half by the FAO Council (FAO, 1975; UN, 1975b). The functions of the new committee were widened significantly, adding further to the complexity of WFP’s constitution. On both occasions, no basic changes were made to WFP’s original constitutional structure. There were also no indications as to how the two functions of the CFA – as the supervisor of WFP, and as a forum for discussion and deliberation on all food aid policies and programmes – might interrelate in the ‘rules of procedure’ of the new committee. WFP’s senior management did not taken the lead in proposing such major changes in the functions of the governing body at the World Food Conference in 1974.4 The executive director was made responsible for servicing the new governing body in exercising all its functions. It was therefore uncertain as to how respond to the new mandate, and what steps the WFP secretariat should take to assist the new committee in exercising its broader functions relating to all food aid. Two diametrically opposed views emerged in the WFP secretariat. One view was that a special unit should be established within the office of the executive director to help the CFA undertake its wider functions relating to all food aid. The unit should consist of an adequate number of competent staff as the work to be done was exceedingly important. It would gradually expand in size, in light of its future work programme and the response of governmental and non-governmental organizations, and could grow as large as some of WFP’s other divisions. The second view argued that the work involved did not belong in WFP and would alter the image of the Programme that had developed as an efficient operational organization. Apprehension was also expressed that if the WFP

Constitutional Change: The Byzantine Vortex 211

secretariat did not succeed in effectively carrying out its new proposed functions, there was the danger that WFP’s good reputation as an efficient operational programme would suffer. It was therefore proposed that the servicing the CFA in exercising its wider functions relating to all food aid should be carried out by FAO and other appropriate UN bodies, with the full co-operation and funding of WFP. The WFP secretariat would remain responsible for servicing the CFA in carrying out its functions relating to WFP operations alone. The second view prevailed. Responsibility for servicing the CFA in matters relating to all food aid was ceded to FAO and the cost of the work involved reimbursed by WFP. A small policy unit was established in the office of the executive director in 1978, staffed by a senior economist and a secretary, to prepare policy papers for presentation to the CFA in collaboration with FAO (WFP, 1978f). No attempt was made to obtain additional funding to carry out these wider function, the staffing and associated costs involved being met from within WFP’s existing administrative budget. Hiatus in leadership Changes were to take place in WFP’s senior management in the 1970s and 1980s that created a hiatus in leadership. When the first executive director of WFP, the Dutchman Addeke Boerma, left office to become director-general of FAO in 1967, he fostered strong FAO/WFP co-operation. Tensions began with elections for a new director-general at the end of Boerma’s term of office in 1976. WFP’s second executive director, Francisco Aquino from El Salvador, who had been nominated by Boerma, hoped to emulate him and stood for the director-generalship of FAO. His opponent was Edouard Saouma, a Maronite Christian from the Lebanon who had been director of FAO’s Land and Water Development Division for more than ten years (1965–75). Saouma won the election, and Aquino resigned. At his last meeting of WFP’s governing body, Aquino stated: I believe that the Programme has earned by now the right to exercise a greater degree of autonomy in the day-to-day management of its financial resources and personnel policy, under the budgetary control and general supervision of our inter-governmental body. Of course, WFP should continue to be a United Nations/FAO Programme and should maintain the closest links with its parent organizations in matters of substance … Nevertheless, I feel bound to state unequivocally to the Committee … that the Programme’s regulations need to be revised so as to meet the requirements of efficient management of an operational agency, which is no longer in its experimental phase. (WFP, 1976a, p. 42) Saouma immediately displayed a very different, and more aggressive, style from that of the amiable and co-operative Boerma (Murray, 1989). His leadership

212 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

was ‘perceived by many as self-perpetuating by whatever means, preoccupied with personal prestige, and egocentric toward authority’ (Abbott, 1992, p. ix). He established an unrivalled position that was to create enemies in donor countries but support in the developing world (Pilon, 1988). This strategy was to serve him well in his re-election campaigns, which led to an unprecedented 18 years as executive head of FAO (1976–93). From Aquino’s departure in 1976 to the arrival of James Ingram as executive director in 1982, there was a period of six years when leadership of WFP was in a state of flux. During this period, Saouma effectively used his powers to discourage the emergence of strong executive leadership in WFP. He did this primarily by keeping senior WFP appointees on an interim basis for varying lengths of time, and by making it clear to them that they owed their appointment directly to him and, therefore, expected their full allegiance in return. These tactics were well known to the international community in Rome and elsewhere. But nothing was done to limit or stop him from employing them throughout his long period as director-general. After Aquino’s departure, Thomas Robinson, an American citizen and WFP’s deputy executive director, was made executive director in an interim capacity by Saouma for varying lengths of time before finally being made full executive director in the last months of his career. Robinson was followed by Garson Vogel, former chief commissioner of the Canadian Wheat Board. Vogel, already a sick man, and coming to office late in his career, acquiesced with Saouma’s aggressive style of leadership. He died in office three years after his appointment and was followed by his deputy, Bernardo Brito, again on an interim basis. Brito had good reason to expect that his appointment as WFP executive director would be a formality. He had given strong support to Saouma as the head of the Brazilian delegation to FAO and Saouma had appointed him deputy executive director of WFP. After keeping Brito waiting for several months, Saouma announced that he was proposing the appointment of another person. Brito resigned his post within 24 hours. Saouma appointed Juan Yriat from Uruguay, his special assistant, as caretaker executive director on an interim basis. By the time next WFP executive director arrived in 1982, Saouma had already established a style of management vis-à-vis WFP by which he considered that he had de facto control of the organization. On the abrupt departure of Brito, he summoned WFP’s senior staff to his office and told them in no uncertain terms that he considered WFP to be ‘part of FAO’. Unequal partnership Another cause of friction was the unequal partnership that was born and developed between the UN and FAO, and their executive heads, over the ‘joint undertaking’ of WFP. There was an imbalance in this relationship from the outset. Most of the early conceptual and intellectual work on WFP’s

Constitutional Change: The Byzantine Vortex 213

antecedents had been done in FAO, led by FAO’s directors-general (see Chapter 3). Constitutionally, the executive heads of the UN and FAO were to have equal responsibility for the appointment of WFP’s executive directors, after consultation with WFP’s governing body. In reality, it was FAO’s directors-general who took the initiative of identifying the person to head the WFP secretariat. Apart from two sessions (in Geneva in July 1964, and in New York in April 1970), all sessions of WFP’s governing body have been held in Rome, and until recently at FAO headquarters. Although the FAO directors-general have not attended all sessions of the committee in person, usually appointing their deputies to represent them, the proximity of the WFP governing body sessions gave an advantage to them to follow and influence the proceedings, which the UN secretaries-general located in New York could not do.5 In addition, UN secretaries-general had many other responsibilities. For them, WFP was one of many UN bodies whose business was delegated to other UN senior staff. With the election of Saouma as FAO director-general, the advantage of the proximity of WFP governing body sessions was taken a stage further. He insisted on seeing all policy papers, and the draft reports of WFP’s governing body, before they were submitted to the committee for adoption. He used selected developing country representatives on WFP’s governing body as surrogates or channels to present his views. The reward could be appointment to a senior FAO post. Failure to comply could lead to a request to the government of the country concerned to withdraw their representative from Rome. This practice was well known but allowed to continue throughout Saouma’s long period of office. It became so blatant that eventually WFP’s major donors insisted that basic changes would have to be made to WFP’s constitution if they were to continue their support of the Programme. An early test case came in October 1978 when WFP’s governing body discussed the modalities of operation of the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR). The United Nations General Assembly resolution approving this facility had explicitly noted that resources contributed to the reserve ‘should be placed at the disposal of WFP’ (WFP, 1978d). The WFP secretariat therefore reasoned that WFP should have the authority to approve the use of IEFR resources. Saouma objected to this proposal, arguing that only he should have authority to approve WFP emergency assistance irrespective of the source of funding. Following protracted debate, it was agreed that the modalities of operations of the IEFR should read: The present procedures of WFP for the approval of emergency food aid should also be applied to operations under the reserve. The CFA might consider changes in the existing procedures at a later date in the light of experience. (WFP, 1978d)

214 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

No changes were subsequently proposed. The result was that donors were reluctant to give the FAO director-general unrestricted authority over the potentially much larger emergency resources that were expected to become available under the IEFR. Their contributions to the IEFR were, therefore, much lower than anticipated. They also tied their contributions to emergency operations that they, and not the FAO director-general, chose to support. Not content with the IEFR modalities that were approved by WFP’s governing body, Saouma insisted on presenting a series of papers to the CFA that tried to convert the IEFR into a ‘legally binding convention’. This, too, was not acceptable to the major donors.

The quest for institutional freedom Matters were brought to a head with the arrival of James Ingram as WFP’s executive director in 1982. Both the United States and Canada had shown an interest in the position but Saouma felt somewhat indebted to Australia for continuing its support to FAO. Other major donors had reduced or withheld their assessed financial contributions, which caused a budgetary crisis in FAO. There was also no reason to believe that choosing an Australian would not result in the same level of loyalty that Saouma had received from his predecessor. Selecting a North American or European might have been more risky, especially in the climate of confrontation between Saouma and FAO’s main donors at the time. The influence of the United States in the appointment of senior staff in the Rome-based UN agencies in Rome was also on the wane (Hopkins, 1990). And Australia was a respected donor country that had traditionally been a strong supporter of WFP from its inception. But Ingram was different. As one of his country’s senior diplomats, a representative to a number of UN bodies, and head of Australia’s International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB), he had already had experience in dealing with government officials, and a wide exposure to the intricacies of providing development assistance. He had also had the opportunity to see how various parts of the UN system operated. And as the first Australian to head a UN organization, he arrived with a deep sense of obligation and commitment to make WFP work. (He was awarded one of Australia’s highest civilian decorations shortly before arriving in Rome.) Ingram quickly became aware, however, of the extent to which his actions were circumscribed not so much by the letter of WFP’s constitution but by how it was interpreted by FAO’s director-general. For most of the ten years of his period of office, much of his time, strength and tenacity were to be devoted to seeking the institutional freedom required for WFP to carry out its mandate. Throughout, he was strongly supported by his deputy, Salahuddin Ahmed from Bangladesh, who had had a long and distinguished career in his

Constitutional Change: The Byzantine Vortex 215

government’s administration, and was deputy executive director of the World Food Council prior to his appointment in WFP. Legal basis The first points to clarify were the legal basis within WFP’s constitution regarding the powers and responsibilities of WFP’s executive director and the nature of WFP’s relationship with FAO. He requested a legal opinion from the United Nations (UN, 1983). This opinion stated that, with the exception of approval of requests for emergency food aid, which rested with FAO’s director-general, WFP was not an operational arm of FAO. Instead, it was a joint programme which was to be equally responsive to both parent agencies, while having the autonomous authority to decide upon the disposition of resources approved by WFP’s governing body. Importantly, the UN legal opinion noted that WFP’s general regulations regarding the provisions of services to the Programme by FAO had been introduced to assist WFP in carrying out its functions, and should not be interpreted as a mandate to control WFP’s activities. Saouma also sought a legal opinion from FAO’s legal counsel. It was no surprise when the opinion provided contradicted that of the UN Office of Legal Affairs. WFP’s policy role An early issue that Ingram tackled after receiving the UN’s legal opinion was the role of the WFP secretariat in submitting policy documents to the CFA. It had become established practice for all WFP policy documents to be prepared by, or in co-operation with, FAO staff, and cleared by the FAO director-general. Ingram challenged this historical precedent and, in 1984, presented three policy papers to the CFA without first showing them to the director-general of FAO for clearance. Saouma’s reaction was to present policy papers to the committee on the same subjects. Ingram pointed out that according to WFP general regulations there was no obligation to consult FAO on policy papers in general, but only in respect of certain matters, such as his annual report, the agenda of CFA sessions, and WFP pledging targets. He emphasized that he alone was responsible for servicing the CFA. After prolonged and heated debate, the CFA noted that ‘it would be preferable in future sessions that each item on the agenda should have only one set of documents presented by the Executive Director after appropriate consultation in accordance with the Basic Texts’ (WFP, 1984b, p. 8). WFP personnel problems Ingram had an unexpected ally in his crusade to obtain WFP’s institutional freedom. An inspector of the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit, Maurice Bertrand, prepared a report on personnel problems in WFP on his own initiative

216 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

(Bertrand, 1984; WFP, 1984c).6 The report was highly critical of WFP’s personnel situation. The root of the problem was considered to be WFP’s outmoded constitutional structure, which was found to be ‘neither rational nor workable’. A formula comparable to that of other UN programmes, such as UNDP, UNICEF and UNHCR, was considered desirable. The report found that there were personnel problems, which were ‘practically insoluble within the existing legal framework’, and concluded that: Since the development of a personnel policy is the first, absolutely essential step in enabling WFP to perform its mission properly, changes in the legal framework and the practices followed must be proposed and put into effect. (Bertrand, 1984, p. 3) FAO/WFP relationships: joint UN/FAO task force report The FAO director-general ‘did not accept the tenor of the (JIU) report, its basic premise, analyses, or conclusions’ (WFP, 1984b, p. 10). In their joint comments on the report, the executive heads of the UN and FAO expressed the view that problems had arisen, for the most part, from practices that had evolved over a period of 20 years pursuant to WFP’s basic texts, rather than from the texts themselves. They noted that the institutional relationship between the UN, FAO and WFP went far beyond personnel issues and, therefore, proposed that a full review of all aspects of those relationships should be carried out by a special UN/FAO task force (WFP, 1984d). The CFA welcomed the decision to set up a task force and stressed that WFP should be involved at every stage of its work. It agreed that there was no question of WFP becoming a separate agency and that WFP’s basic relationship with the UN and FAO should be preserved and improved. However, one delegation (Canada) took the debate a stage further. For the first time, it was pointed out that ‘it was for the countries that were members of the Committee to play a decisive part in determining what principles should underlie the solution of those problems’ (WFP, 1985e). The role and responsibility of WFP’s governing body in resolving the institutional problems between FAO and WFP was therefore signalled. The report of the task force was presented to the CFA in May 1985 (UN and FAO, 1985). In transmitting the report, the UN and FAO executive heads ‘recognized the case for change or adjustment in certain personnel practices and administrative procedures’ and considered that ‘These new provisions will give you [WFP’s executive director] greater flexibility and authority to manage the Programme than any of your predecessors have had to date’.7 The report recommended the transfer of responsibility for a number of functions in the areas of finance and audit, personnel, and administrative and other services from FAO to WFP. However, no changes were proposed in other

Constitutional Change: The Byzantine Vortex 217

areas where problems had occurred. Discussion in WFP’s governing body on the joint task force’s report was instructive (WFP, 1985c). Committee members expressed the hope that the report would bring to an end the period of tension between the executive heads of FAO and WFP, and that WFP could now concentrate once more on the implementation of its mandate of serving poor and hungry people in the developing world. However, representatives of some of the major donor countries noted that serious problems still existed concerning the role of WFP’s governing body. They hoped that the FAO director-general would adopt a new approach in fulfilling his responsibilities in relation to WFP in the light of the task force’s report. The models they had in mind were the relationship between the UNDP governing council and its superior bodies, ECOSOC and the UN General Assembly, and the parallel executive relationship between the UNDP administrator and the UN secretary-general. They pointedly noted that their contributions towards meeting the WFP target for resources for the next pledging period would be influenced by progress in implementing the task force report. Costing FAO services provided to WFP Another contentious issue was the costs that FAO charged WFP for the services it provided to the Programme. The principles and methods by which the cost of FAO services were computed were reviewed in a Joint Inspection Unit report in 1970 and applied from 1973, although not in their entirety (Bertrand, 1970). Since that time, the cost of these services had grown ten times from $0.83 million in 1969, to $8.5 million in 1984 (Bertrand, 1984, p. 2). WFP’s governing body called for a joint FAO/WFP examination of the basis of the costing of these reimbursable services and also requested a review of the costs of services provided to WFP by the UN and other UN organizations. No difficulties were encountered in reviewing the cost of services provided to WFP by the UN and other UN organizations, apart from FAO. The services were mainly technical support involving a limited amount of staff time and provision for consultants. The combined cost of $3.3 million for technical support provided to WFP by the UN, ILO, UNESCO and WHO for the twoyears 1984–5 was less than that for technical services provided by FAO alone, reflecting the high proportion of WFP development assistance devoted to supporting projects for agricultural and rural development and nutrition improvement, which were within FAO’s mandate. The basis of costing of their services was considered to be ‘reasonable’. In addition to the staff time directly involved, WFP received substantial technical services from them without charge (WFP, 1984e; 1985d). FAO provided 11 main types of services to WFP. The total cost of these services for the two years 1984–5 was $14.7 million. Over three-quarters of those costs were taken up by three services: technical support ($5.0 million);

218 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

maintenance and general operating expenses ($4.1 million); and documentation ($2.3 million). The services to WFP were provided by many FAO staff, most of whom spent only a part of their time on WFP-related work. A number of revisions to the ‘keys’ used to cost FAO services were made to establish a closer relationship between the services provided to WFP and the costs reimbursed, which resulted in savings to WFP. In 1986, the executive director reported to the CFA that the first renegotiation of cost keys alone had saved WFP about $1 million (WFP, 1986b, p. 33). WFP headquarters agreement Of all the issues clouding FAO/WFP relations, perhaps the most contentious was that of a headquarters agreement for WFP with the host country, Italy. By historical accident, the establishment of WFP as an experimental programme for a limited period of three years prevented WFP from benefiting from the provision of free accommodation by the Italian government that had been given to FAO as an inducement for it to move from the United States to Rome in 1951 and to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), which was established in Rome after the 1974 World Food Conference. No approach had been made to the Italian government at the time the WFP experiment was approved in 1961, or when WFP was established on a continuing basis in 1965. Instead, WFP’s general regulations simply stipulated that the WFP secretariat would be ‘located at FAO Headquarters’, which WFP paid for on the basis of the space occupied. As the WFP secretariat grew in size, it could no longer be accommodated at FAO’s main building. Other premises were occupied at different locations in Rome, together with outposted FAO departments and units. Owing to the limited space made available, a part of WFP’s secretariat had to be accommodated in a separate building some distance from WFP’s headquarters, resulting in additional costs and administrative inconvenience. WFP’s governing body expressed concern about the unsatisfactory accommodation on more than one occasion and raised two related issues: the question of the rent that WFP was paying to FAO; and the need to conclude a headquarters agreement for WFP with the Italian government. FAO had received a subvention from the Italian government towards meeting the rental costs of the building that the WFP secretariat was occupying together with other FAO units. Surprise was expressed that WFP had been reimbursing FAO for rent of its premises while at the same time FAO had received contributions from the Italian government for that purpose (WFP, 1990c). Concerning a WFP headquarters agreement, both the UN and FAO finance committees expressed the hope that the issue would be resolved expeditiously. At the CFA session in May/June 1986, the Italian representative stressed that ‘the problem had arisen because no formal approach had ever been made to his government to provide accommodation for WFP. It had done

Constitutional Change: The Byzantine Vortex 219

so for FAO and IFAD and it could be taken for granted that it would not have treated WFP differently if a request had been made earlier’ (WFP, 1986c, p. 34). In April 1987, the Italian government indicated that it intended to take action to allocate state-owned premises to WFP for its permanent use. Under Italian law, however, conclusion of a headquarters agreement with the United Nations and FAO, WFP’s parent organizations, was an essential condition for the allocation of premises to WFP. It would also facilitate payment by the Italian government of the rent for the leased premises currently occupied by WFP. The text of a draft WFP headquarters agreement was prepared by FAO’s legal office in 1987, cleared by the UN office of legal affairs, and transmitted to the Italian government. The first round of negotiations on the draft agreement took place with the Italian government in early July 1988. Certain proposals and amendments were advanced by the Italian representatives, including some on security matters, which were accepted ad referendum by the FAO representatives. On being referred back to the UN and FAO, the former indicated that, with some minor drafting changes, the proposals and amendments of the Italian government were acceptable. However, the FAO directorgeneral found them unacceptable. Two reasons were advanced for the director-general’s decision to delay conclusion of the WFP headquarters agreement. The first issue concerned security matters, which could have been discussed with the Italian government in July 1988. Instead, it took another two years to refer the matter to the FAO Committee on Constitutional and Legal Matters (CCLM) (WFP, 1990d). The second reason for delay was that the director-general felt that the headquarters agreement could have an impact on the relationship between UN, FAO and WFP. No effect was envisaged when the original draft of the WFP headquarters agreement had been prepared in the FAO legal office, and agreed to by the UN office of legal affairs, in 1987. In October 1990, the Italian government agreed to reimburse WFP for rental payments until the WFP headquarters agreement was ratified by the Italian parliament (WFP, 1990a,f). The WFP headquarters agreement was eventually signed on 15 March 1991, almost four years after the first draft had been drawn up by FAO’s legal counsel. Changing WFP’s general regulations With the delegation of new authorities to the executive director, it was hoped that the contentious issues between FAO and WFP had been resolved, without revision of WFP’s basic constitution (WFP, 1989c). The power struggle seemed to have been resolved, although WFP had not gained the status of an independent agency (Talbot and Moyer, 1987; Talbot, 1990). But this was not so. The ‘abatement of tensions was only temporary and was apparently related more to FAO election politics than to any fundamental resolution of issues between the two organizations’ (Charlton, 1992, p. 645).

220 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

It was during this lull in FAO/WFP tensions that WFP executive director Ingram was reappointed for a second five-year term. There was no item on the agenda of the CFA session of October 1986, the last meeting before Ingram’s term of office came to an end, concerning the appointment of the next executive director. According to WFP’s constitution, that appointment would have to be made jointly by the UN secretary-general and the director-general of FAO in consultation with the CFA. Saouma spoke at the beginning of the CFA session on 20 October 1986, but made no reference to Ingram’s reappointment. Nor did the UN secretary-general in his statement to the CFA, which was delivered by his representative, although he did express his ‘deep appreciation for the able leadership displayed by Executive Director James Ingram who has been instrumental in increasing the delivery capacity and effectiveness of the Programme’ (WFP, 1986d, p. 44). Saouma left the meeting immediately after he had spoken for a visit to the United States. In his absence, the members of the CFA themselves brought up the question of Ingram’s reappointment and in a remarkable show of solidarity ‘expressed unanimous confidence and support for the leadership of Mr. James Ingram and expressed the wish that he be reappointed for a full five-year term’ (WFP, 1986d, p. 6). This support was communicated to the UN secretarygeneral, who supported the CFA’s view. Saouma announced the reappointment of Ingram to CFA members, who were still in session, on his return from the United States on 28 October 1986. He said that the CFA’s support was understandable in view of what he termed ‘the dynamic and effective leadership which Mr. Ingram had shown since his original appointment in 1982’ (sic). He expressed confidence that under Ingram’s leadership WFP would continue to thrive and to provide much-needed assistance to developing countries ‘in an admirably efficient manner’. Speaking for himself, ‘he looked forward to a new era of reinforced cooperation between FAO and the World Food Programme. Each could do a great deal to help the other and it was in a spirit of goodwill that he expressed his very best wishes to Mr. Ingram for his success, and that of the Programme in the years ahead’ (WFP, 1986d, p. 6). Once Saouma was re-elected, however, tensions between FAO and WFP reemerged and escalated further. On this occasion, debate focused on two issues: financial controls that Saouma saw as a threat to his constitutional position as custodian of WFP’s trust fund; and the appointment of an ‘eminent person’ to study and make recommendation concerning the entire scope of UN, FAO and WFP relations. At its session in December 1989, the CFA requested WFP’s external auditor (the UK National Audit Office, which was also the external auditor for FAO) to study the accounting procedures and recommend to the FAO director-general and WFP executive director ‘the documentation which should reasonably be required for the (WFP) accounts to be certified’ (WFP, 1990b). At the same time, the CFA invited the UN and FAO executive heads,

Constitutional Change: The Byzantine Vortex 221

after consultation with the WFP executive director, ‘to engage an eminent person to study the entire scope of the relationships between the United Nations, FAO and WFP and to make recommendations to Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of FAO’ (WFP, 1989d, p. 8). The FAO director-general convened an extraordinary session of FAO’s Finance Committee a few days after receiving the external auditor’s reply. He expressed the view that only the FAO Finance Committee could request the external auditor to perform specific tasks and issue separate reports in accordance with FAO financial regulations. This implied that, although the governing body of WFP, the CFA did not have the authority to submit formal requests directly to the external auditor. The UN finance committee, the ACABQ, took a different view. It found that since WFP accounts, together with the external auditor’s certification, had to be submitted to the CFA, it seemed reasonable that the committee had the authority to request the external auditor to undertake studies that the CFA deemed necessary, the cost of which would be borne by WFP. The intransigence of the FAO director-general over the appointment of an eminent person was perhaps the last straw that forced the CFA to take action. The UN secretary-general wrote to the FAO director-general in February 1990 proposing that they respond positively to the CFA’s invitation to appoint an eminent person and asked the director-general to suggest someone he considered suitable to undertake such a study. The director-general replied that he would not approve the appointment of an eminent person until he could refer the issue to the FAO Council for consideration. But the next meeting of the Council was scheduled for much later in the year, which would have delayed any action. The executive director proposed that two actions should now be taken. The first step was to establish unequivocally that the CFA was the governing body of WFP. The second was to recognize clearly the responsibilities of the executive director for the financial management of WFP. The executive director’s proposals acted as a catalyst for the CFA to seek a comprehensive review of WFP’s general regulations and of FAO/WFP relationships. The pent-up frustrations of CFA members were released to such effect that within a year fundamental changes in WFP’s constitution were agreed upon. The break came at the CFA session in June 1990. The lead was taken by the representative of Canada, strongly supported by representatives of OECDmember countries.8 In a decisive intervention, the Canadian representative called for a fundamental restructuring of the relationship between the UN, FAO and WFP, including a modification of WFP’s constitution, ‘Otherwise, failure to adapt to the changing world about us will simply consign our institution (WFP) to the scrap-heap of irrelevance’ (WFP, 1990e, p. 51). The United States representative reminded CFA members of the congressionally mandated restrictions that had created severe financial crises for certain UN agencies,

222 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

including FAO. There was a danger of WFP ‘being caught up in the downward vortex that may draw this Programme into the same predicament as other UN agencies have found themselves’ (WFP, 1990e, p. 64). Faced with these dire predictions, the CFA agreed to establish a ‘subcommittee on the governance of WFP’, in place of an ‘eminent person’, to review all aspects of the relationship between the UN, FAO and WFP. The CFA reviewed the work of the sub-committee at its session in December 1990 and agreed that a special session of the CFA, the first of its kind since WFP was established, should be held in March 1991 to consider changes in WFP’s constitution. For this purpose, a working group was established to make recommendations to the committee on changes to WFP’s basic documents.9 Thirty years after WFP was first established, an historic landmark was reached. The CFA adopted by consensus the report and recommendations of the working group in their entirety. Far-reaching changes in WFP’s constitution were adopted. While WFP was to remain a joint UN/FAO organ, the CFA was given full powers of oversight of the Programme and WFP was given a ‘legal capacity’. The number of members of the CFA was increased from 30 to 42, with 27 from developing countries and 15 from more ‘economically developed nations’. The location of WFP headquarters was to remain in Rome but no longer at FAO headquarters. And the executive director was given complete responsibility for the operation and administration of the WFP trust fund, approval of emergency assistance up to a level delegated to him by the CFA, and staff appointments up to and including the D-2 level (WFP, 1991a, pp. 12–30). WFP’s new draft general regulations were approved by ECOSOC and the FAO Council, and endorsed by the UN General Assembly and the FAO Conference at the end of 1991, and entered into force on 1 January 1992 (UN, 1991b; FAO, 1991a; WFP, 1991b). So ended the saga of constitutional change that had began almost a decade previously. It had been a sapping and exhausting experience that diverted and took up a large part of the attention of WFP’s governing body and executive management. It also showed the United Nations system in its worst light and highlighted the need for reform of the ways in which UN bodies are led and governed (Cox, 1969; Williams, 1987; Hopkins, 1990; Urquhart and Childers, 1990; 1994). With hindsight, did the saga of constitutional change result in a Pyrrhic victory for WFP? By general agreement, the substantive changes to WFP’s general regulations were essential for the CFA and the executive director to manage the affairs of the Programme and to remove the controls that had been imposed by the FAO director-general. But at what opportunity costs? WFP’s executive director was engaged in this constitutional struggle throughout most of his two terms of office. It is interesting to speculate on what might have happened had he had the choice, and freedom, to take up other causes, such as making WFP a major actor in the formulation of international food aid policies, and forging coalitions with other aid organizations through

Constitutional Change: The Byzantine Vortex 223

which food and other forms of development assistance could be more widely and consistently co-ordinated in jointly funded programmes and projects. It might have been opportune to have taken up either, or both, of these causes when he first took office in 1982, when there was a great deal of goodwill and support for WFP following his appointment. Ingram identified what he considered to be the major policy and programme issues facing WFP at his first two CFA sessions in April 1982 and May 1983, and again at his final CFA session in December 1991 shortly before his retirement, when he said: I find a tremendous ambivalence among governments about food aid itself, and where WFP should stand in relation to the three levels of food security, viz. household, national and global. So long as that ambivalence continues, the international community will be less successful than it could be in the hunger fight. (WFP, 1991e, p. 39) Either avenue would have involved a great deal of work, substantial changes in working practices in the governing body as well as the secretariat, and major changes in WFP staffing and organization. Even then, it was by no means certain that the major food aid donor countries would have been prepared to see a multilateral organization take the lead in a field in which they had been dominant for so long. A special ceremony was held in honour of Ingram at his final CFA session in December 1991 (WFP, 1991e). Tributes were paid by 26 delegates, some on behalf of country regional groups. While a few of the remarks were pro forma, most reflected a genuine feeling of respect and gratitude that the executive director had brought WFP through very stormy seas to a safe haven. In so doing, he had helped to restore the self-respect of both the governing body and the secretariat to face future challenges. It is also interesting to speculate what might have happened if it had been decided to locate WFP in New York instead of Rome. The confrontation between the executive heads of FAO and WFP would have been avoided, probably not to have been replaced with dispute with the UN secretaries-general, as the experiences of UNDP and UNICEF have shown. One notable potential advantage would have been proximity to the central decision-making bodies of the United Nations system, the UN General Assembly and Security Council, and to senior representatives of member nations. Another might have been that closer collaboration, and possible amalgamation, might have occurred between the UN Special Fund, later to become the UNDP, and WFP, resulting in a fusion of assistance provided by the two organizations. Closer cooperation might have been fostered with the World Bank and with UNICEF than was to occur. In the latter case, greater stress might have been placed on

224 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

the use of food aid for women and children and for the development of human resources in the fight against hunger and poverty rather than on agricultural and rural development that FAO encouraged. But this was not to be. Constitutional and other changes did not end with the departure of Ingram in 1992. The remainder of the 1990s were to witness other forces from both within and outside WFP which were to result in a re-examination of almost every aspect of WFP’s work under the leadership of a new executive director, Catherine Bertini, a United States citizen and the first women executive head of the Programme. She had been assistant secretary of agriculture for Food and Consumer Services in the USDA, which involved the management of all US federal food assistance programmes, and displayed a special interest in child nutrition and the advancement of women. She was ably assisted by her deputy, Namanga Ngongi from the Cameroon, who for over ten years previously had held senior posts in the WFP secretariat. The changes that were brought about under her leadership are the subject of the next, and final, chapter.

9 Reform and Renewal: Future Directions

‘Progress, far from consisting of change, depends on retentiveness … those who will not learn from the past are doomed to repeat it’ (Santayana, 1905)

Dramatic changes and events The decade of the 1990s was to witness profound changes in food aid generally and in WFP in particular. No one could have envisaged at the beginning of the decade the extent to which both internal and external pressures would lead to re-examination of almost every aspect of WFP’s activities (WFP, 1996b,c). This final chapter describes the far-reaching reforms and changes that took place and ends with a perspective on WFP’s future roles. Early into the decade, man-made emergencies occurred on an unprecedented scale as states collapsed, civil war proliferated, and genocide and ethnic cleansing raged (Shawcross, 2000). Not only were poor developing countries affected, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, but new countries and regions were to suffer following the political collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. More UN peacekeeping operations were launched in the early years of the 1990s than in the previous forty years (Annan, 1999a). Refugees and displaced persons reached unprecedented numbers leading to an escalation in the need for emergency and relief food aid (UNHCR, 1997). And more food aid was required when these afflicted people eventually returned home to begin the process of rehabilitation, reconstruction and renewed development. The 1990s has been described as a ‘decade of undeclared war on women, adolescents and children as poverty, conflict, chronic social instability and preventable diseases such as HIV/AIDS threaten their human rights and sabotage their development’ (UNICEF, 1999, p. 19). Among the many lessons of development during the second half of the twentieth century are that: political 225

226 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

integrity, leadership and economic stability are essential; economic growth does not usually trickle down; no one policy will trigger development everywhere; and people and their institutions really matter; and ‘what matters most is putting people … at the heart of the development agenda for the 21st century’ (World Bank, 2000). At the same time, a process of reform of the UN system was initiated with the passage of a number of resolutions in the UN General Assembly that related to all UN bodies, including WFP. And a series of UN-sponsored international conferences were held on subjects of global concern that set targets and a framework for international and national action. The WFP secretariat organized three regional seminars to mark the first 30 years of its operations, and to learn from its experience in shaping its future work (WFP, 1994i; 1995b,f). Three major conclusions were drawn from these meetings (Bailey, 1995). First, a great deal had been achieved and learned in development and in saving lives. Secondly, as food aid resources declined, the demand for quality and accountability in food aid activities increased.And thirdly, if the successes of WFP food aid over the past 30 years were to be repeated, some important changes would have to be made in its activities. Like other UN organizations, WFP suffered a sudden and precipitous fall in its resources during the decade of the 1990s. But unlike most of them, this reduction was also accompanied by a marked transfer of resources from development to emergency relief. In the space of five years, global food aid deliveries fell progressively and precipitously from 17.3 million tons in 1993 to 7.3 million tons in 1997. WFP operational expenditure fell from $1.5 billion in 1993 to $1.0 billion in 1997. And while one-third of that expenditure was on development projects, two-thirds went for emergency relief. From an organization that had from inception been mainly concerned with development, the focus was now on complex emergency relief operations, particularly for refugees and displaced persons caught up in man-made disasters, mainly within poor developing countries. The dramatic changes in WFP’s resources and their deployment were to provide a major impetus for a thorough reexamination of the ways in which WFP operated.

The role of WFP in the 1990s At the outset of the 1990s, the CFA began to consider what directions WFP might take in the decade ahead. For this purpose, the WFP secretariat produced a paper which noted that WFP had evolved significantly in size and character since it began operations in 1963 as the economic, social and political environment in which it operated had changed (WFP, 1991c). While the need for food aid was expected to grow, studies by FAO and others had

Reform and Renewal: Future Directions

227

indicated that food aid could become a more scarce resource for development (FAO, 1991b). Three WFP strengths were especially important for the future: its multilateral character; its institutional infrastructure with professional officers experienced in targeting and delivering food aid and field offices serving over 90 developing countries; and its focus on providing assistance to poor and hungry people. But important constraints were also identified that could restrict WFP operations. Increased demand for emergency and refugee operations, and growing requests for bilateral services, were putting pressure on WFP’s limited resources, leaving disproportionately less for development projects. Two options were clear. One was for the major donors to provide WFP with more resources, thus enabling it to restore and continue its historical emphasis on development. Another was to concentrate WFP activities in certain key areas, which would increase the national impact of its assistance, through co-operation with other aid agencies working for similar goals, including NGOs. No single prescription for WFP’s future was offered but two major conclusions were reached. For WFP to continue to meet emergencies and provide services to bilateral food aid programmes, it would have to retain adequate staff both in the field and at headquarters and receive full compensation for its actual expenses incurred. The development work of WFP sustained its capacity to respond to emergencies. A revised formula was needed to support WFP, which should take account of the interdependence of its activities. Otherwise, emergencies and bilateral services might increase constraints on WFP’s development work to the point that they undercut its strengths. The 1990s could be used as a time to shift directions. One possibility would be to emphasize helping national food systems through more focused projects. Moving in that direction would concentrate WFP’s development efforts on food-insecure countries and on activities that had substantial benefit for the food supplies of poor and hungry people. And as a multilateral agency, WFP was in a strong position to help co-ordinate food aid from all sources in that direction.

Food aid policy debate The governing body’s reaction to the secretariat’s paper was to ask for an identification of ‘the most significant issues’ in food aid policies and programmes and the role of WFP in the 1990s for its discussion (WFP, 1991e). Thus began a policy debate that was to take up much of the decade. There was nothing surprising in the list of food aid issues identified by the secretariat (WFP, 1991d). The governing body had referred to them on a number of occasions in the past and accepted the list as providing a useful agenda for discussing food aid and the role of WFP in the 1990s. There was general consensus in the CFA

228 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

that food aid would be needed on an increasing scale in the 1990s, but no agreement was reached to increase the 10 million ton target for food aid in cereals established at the 1974 World Food Conference. The CFA agreed that an appropriate arrangement was necessary to ensure a reliable supply of food aid to poor developing countries and that the GATT Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations that were under-way provided an opportunity for achieving that aim. At the same time, momentous events were taking place with the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The sudden and large increase in the need for food aid in that region could adversely affect food aid flows to poor developing countries unless there was a commensurate increase in food aid supplies (Benson and Clay, 1998). The governing body recognized the benefits of providing food aid multilaterally, as it had done on many other occasions, but did not suggest ways for encouraging a larger share of food aid to be channelled through WFP. Similarly, no discussion took place concerning the reorientation of bilaterallysupplied bulk programme food aid, and the large and expanding food export enhancement and credit programmes, for the benefit of poor, food-insecure people. By their very size, these ‘food aid’ transfers could make a significant contribution to the alleviation of hunger and poverty, if properly focused. They could also be used more often to support policy changes, including food policy that could advance and protect the well-being of the poor, especially during periods of economic and structural adjustment. The food commodities provided, the foreign exchange saved, and the local currency generated could all be used for a wide range of activities to alleviate hunger and poverty. Another difficult and contentious issue was the need to re-examine the criteria used for the allocation of WFP development aid. By the end of the 1980s, more than four-fifths of WFP food aid was allocated to low-income, fooddeficit countries while the smaller, overlapping, group of least-developed countries received more than a third. Increasing the focus on these two groups of countries was controversial, especially as it was seen by some delegations in the governing body as running contrary to the United Nations principal of ‘universality’. Less controversial was the general recognition that WFP should give special priority to Sub-Saharan Africa in view of its serious and pressing problems. The World Bank and WFP had jointly produced an agenda for food aid to that region in the 1990s (World Bank and WFP, 1991). A special programme of assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa was approved by the governing body in 1992, which focused on disaster prevention and mitigation (WFP, 1992a). The issue was also raised concerning whether there should be a sharper focus for WFP development assistance. WFP assistance had been given to 20 different types of development projects (see Statistical Appendix 1). This was not questioned as long as WFP’s resources continued to grow. However, with the ‘double-whammy’ effect of the sharp reduction in WFP’s resources and

Reform and Renewal: Future Directions 229

their diversion to meet emergencies, the WFP secretariat proposed that there might be a gradual move toward a more sharply focused development project portfolio. The basic principle advanced was that WFP should seek the most effective and efficient use of its development assistance in the circumstances of each country in order to have the greatest possible impact on hunger and poverty. In effect, the main underlying criterion for WFP support would be the extent to which it could be expected to improve food security at the household level. This general principle was expected to lead toward greater emphasis on certain kinds of projects. In its deliberations, the CFA gave high priority to employment-intensive projects that increased the poor’s effective demand for food, to safety-nets for vulnerable groups, especially in the context of economic adjustment, and to activities in disaster-prone areas designed to prevent, or prepare for, emergencies and help in the reconstruction process after they had occurred. These programmatic elements fitted into a two-part strategy for poverty alleviation that involved promoting the productive use of the most abundant asset of the poor – their own labour; and providing basic social services, such as primary health care, nutrition and basic education for the poor. But even with such a basic strategy, and a programme of well-targeted resource transfers, safety-nets would be needed for some groups of poor people unable to maintain reasonable living standards (JCGP, 1990, pp. 57–64).

WFP mission statement In October 1993, the CFA decided to conduct a major review of WFP’s policies, objectives and strategies, which led to a new statement of WFP’s mission, the first since the original general regulations of WFP were formulated thirty years previously. The review represented a landmark event in the history of WFP and charted its course into the twenty-first century. The secretariat was requested to prepare a paper reviewing WFP’s policies, objectives and strategies for the CFA’s discussion at its session in May 1994 (WFP, 1994h). Informal consultations were organized with CFA members and drafts of the policy review paper were circulated to them for comment. And a policy seminar was held in February 1994 with the theme ‘Hunger and Social Action’, which brought together eminent persons, academics and practitioners from UN organizations, NGOs and other agencies with CFA members and observers.1 The review also drew on extensive consultations among WFP staff, including a global meeting of WFP country directors, as well as senior staff of other UN agencies. The conclusions of a tripartite evaluation of WFP by three donor countries, Canada, the Netherlands and Norway (see below), as well as the internal evaluations of WFP-assisted development projects and emergency operations, also provided perspectives on many of the issues facing WFP.

230 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Following this process, a draft of a new WFP mission statement was prepared by the WFP secretariat, which was reviewed and finalized by a working group consisting of 14 members of the CFA,2 and was unanimously approved by the CFA in December 1994 (WFP, 1994d). The statement recognized that WFP food aid can help to promote food security and should be oriented toward the objective of eradicating hunger and poverty. WFP’s core policies and strategies were defined as: saving lives in emergency situations; improving the nutrition and quality of life of the most vulnerable people at critical times in their lives; and building assets and promoting the self-reliance of poor people, particularly through labour-intensive works programmes. WFP would concentrate its efforts and resources on the neediest people in the poorest countries. Targets were set that by 1997 at least 90 per cent and 50 per cent of WFP’s development assistance would be provided to low-income, fooddeficit and least-developed countries respectively.3 WFP was described as being ‘well placed’ to play a major role in the continuum from emergency relief to development. WFP activities would be integrated at the country level so that they could respond to urgent needs while retaining core development objectives on the basis of the national plans, policies and programmes of developing countries. WFP would also continue to provide its transport and logistics expertise and assistance to ensure rapid and efficient humanitarian aid. Bilateral service would be provided to donors, UN agencies and NGOs on the basis of full cost recovery. Collaboration with other UN organizations, bilateral agencies and NGOs would be pursued. And WFP would play its part in bringing the issue of hunger to the centre of the international agenda and in advocating policies, strategies and operations that directly benefited the poor and hungry.

UN reform While discussions were going on in the CFA concerning WFP’s future, deliberations were taking place at the United Nations in New York which were to have direct effect on WFP. A series of UN General Assembly resolutions called for reforms in the UN system that were to address two long-standing WFP concerns, namely: the incorporation of food aid into the national plans and programmes of developing countries; and the integration of food aid with financial and technical assistance in country aid programmes. They were also to result in the transformation of WFP’s governing body from the CFA into an Executive Board. Co-ordinating UN emergency aid In 1991, after expressing considerable dissatisfaction with the response of the UN system to emergencies, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for a strengthening of the co-ordination of UN humanitarian assistance

Reform and Renewal: Future Directions

231

(UN, 1991a; WFP, 1994g). The resolution led to the establishment of a UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) to strengthen UN co-ordination, co-operation and leadership in emergency operations, the setting up of a UN inter-agency standing committee for emergencies, of which WFP became a member, and the development of the concept of a ‘continuum’ of action from relief to rehabilitation and development, which became the framework for future UN emergency operations. However, with so many players involved both inside and outside the UN system, a former WFP executive director expressed scepticism that the new co-ordinating arrangements would work and suggested that ‘human suffering arising from internal conflict is in most situations likely to be dealt with best by an internationalized ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross)’ (Ingram, 1993, p. 190). Integration of UN development food aid into national programmes In 1992, WFP responded to a UN General Assembly resolution, which recommended that ‘Non-emergency food aid channelled through the organizations of the United Nations system should be programmed coherently so as to ensure its full integration with the development programmes of governments’ (WFP, 1992d). The UN director-general for development and international economic co-operation also recommended to ECOSOC that within the context of the UN General Assembly resolution, WFP ‘be invited to recommend steps to bring about the greater integration of food aid with other assistance provided by the United Nations system’ (ECOSOC, 1990, paragraph 201). The WFP report presented in a frank and systematic way the factors that had been known for some time to prohibit both the integration of WFP food aid into recipient government development programmes and its co-ordination with other forms of assistance provided by other UN organizations.4 National programmes were not always coherently articulated and co-ordinating the work of government ministries was often weak. The governments which WFP supported faced severe budgetary constraints, and often civil strife, which distorted their development priorities or brought meaningful development initiatives to a halt. Systematic and sustained collaboration between WFP and other UN organizations had been constrained by a number of factors, including lack of appreciation of the comparative advantage of WFP food aid. The system of WFP representation at the country level prohibited WFP aid from being brought into the mainstream of development assistance planning. Proposals were made to counter misconceptions and ignorance about WFP assistance, and to present concrete ideas for its use in World Bank and UNDP-sponsored consultative groups meetings, which cover all aid to developing countries. Other specific proposals were made, including adoption of a country programming approach to the planning and implementation of WFP food aid, which was

232 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

started in 1994 as the ‘cornerstone’ of its strategy for providing assistance to developing countries (WFP, 1994f). A further proposal arose out of one of the findings of the WFP report, which although not completely surprising had been downplayed or largely ignored. It was generally recognized that the arrangement by which WFP was represented in developing countries was inconsistent with the importance WFP assistance had assumed in the totality of UN development aid. It was therefore decided in 1995 to designate WFP staff as WFP representatives in countries where WFP had operational activities. This ensured their dialogue with key government officials and freed UNDP resident representatives to more actively pursue their growing responsibilities as UN resident co-ordinators (WFP, 1995e, p. 11). Co-ordination of UN development assistance In 1992, the UN General Assembly passed a far-reaching resolution concerning the co-ordination of UN development assistance (UN, 1992). The resolution was born out of a sense of frustration that the UN system was not working cohesively to ensure that maximum benefits would be obtained from all the development assistance provided. A major underlining implication of the resolution was that notice was served on the UN system to ‘get its act together’. Failure to respond could have serious consequences for the future level, flow and direction of multilateral development assistance. The centre-piece of the resolution was the call for country strategies for UN development assistance for individual developing countries. For this purpose, a ‘country strategy note’ (CSN) should be formulated by recipient governments, with the assistance of the UN system under the leadership of the UN resident co-ordinator. The CSN would provide a framework for a country programme approach for all UN development assistance, including food aid, in which the various components of aid would be interrelated and linked. The resolution urged that the governing bodies of the UN agencies should ensure that delegation of authority was given to field offices and stressed the importance of supporting national priorities and national execution and building up national capacity in developing countries. This fitted well with the country programme approach that WFP had adopted. Executive boards for UN funds and programmes In 1993, the UN General Assembly passed another resolution which resulted in the transformation of the governing bodies of the UN funds and programmes (UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP) into executive boards of identical size and composition, and with similar functions and responsibilities (UN, 1993). Each executive board would consist of 36 members composed of eight members from African states, seven from Asian states, four from Eastern European states,

Reform and Renewal: Future Directions

233

five from Latin American and Caribbean states, and 12 from Western European and other states. The resolution further established common functions and working methods for the executive boards, under the authority of ECOSOC, although the joint undertaking of WFP as a UN/FAO organ was retained. The functions of the executive boards were to: implement the policies formulated by the UN General Assembly and the co-ordination and guidance received from ECOSOC; receive information from, and give guidance to, the executive head of each organization; ensure that the activities and operational strategies pursued were consistent with the overall policy guidance given by the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC; monitor the performance of each organization; approve programmes of assistance; decide on administrative and financial plans and budgets; recommend new initiatives to ECOSOC and the UN General Assembly; and submit annual reports to ECOSOC, with a common structure, in order to ensure effective interaction between the UN General Assembly, ECOSOC and the individual executive boards. Further UN reform measures The continued call for a comprehensive reform of the UN system led the newly-appointed UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan of Ghana, to propose in 1997 ‘the most extensive and far-reaching reforms in the 52-year history of our Organization’ in order ‘To bring greater unity of purpose, greater coherence of effort, and greater agility in responding to an increasingly dynamic and complex world’ (Annan, 1997). The reform measures focused on the UN secretariat in New York and the UN funds and programmes, and did not include the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and the World Bank) or the UN specialized agencies, thereby weakening their impact. The UN secretary-general emphasized that ‘Reform must enhance our ability to promote development and address the root causes of poverty and conflict’. Five areas were identified that comprised what were referred to as the ‘core missions’ of the UN: peace and security; economic and social affairs; development co-operation; humanitarian affairs; and human rights. Executive committees were established to co-ordinate work in the first four areas, while human rights was designated as a ‘cross-cutting’ concern and therefore included in the work of all four committees. WFP was designated to take part in the UN development group, which leads the reform process in the area of UN development activities (WFP, 1999b). WFP also became a member of the UN executive committee on humanitarian affairs. In addition, WFP takes part in the UN inter-agency standing committee for the co-ordination of humanitarian emergency relief. WFP also participates in the joint meetings of the UN executive committees on peace and security and on economic and social affairs with the UN development group and the executive committee on humanitarian affairs. Through participation

234 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

in these various groups and committees, WFP now has the opportunity to ensure that its food aid is co-ordinated with financial and technical assistance provided by other UN agencies for both development and for emergency operations. The reform proposals also included the establishment of one ‘UN house’ in each developing country to accommodate, and to provide common services, security and safety arrangements for, all UN organizations with aid programmes under a UN resident co-ordinator. After a number of false starts, WFP is now committed to a programme of organizational change involving a fundamental shift of decision-making and functions to its country offices. This includes the installation of an information network to provide e-mail and remote data services to all WFP country offices. By the end of 1998, most WFP country offices had been brought on-line and an enhanced satellite telecommunications network had been developed.

Operational partnerships Steps have also been taken to strengthen operational partnerships with other UN organizations, including the World Bank, and NGOs (WFP, 1999a). Significantly, after many years of encouragement, concrete action has been taken to foster cooperation among the three Rome-based UN agencies, FAO, IFAD and WFP, including regular meetings at the policy and technical levels. In 1997, the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between UNHCR and WFP was revised and joint workshops were held between representatives of both organizations in countries with joint refugee operations. In 1998, another MOU was signed between UNICEF and WFP, which provided an operational framework for emergency interventions in which the two organizations work together. In contrast to the past, WFP now fully appreciates the importance of partnerships with NGOs. A survey conducted in 1998 found that WFP worked with over 1,100 NGOs worldwide, of which over 75 per cent were of national or local origin and the remainder were international NGOs. This was nearly a fourfold increase in the past ten years. WFP has given particular priority to working with national and local NGOs, and helps to improve their managerial and implementing capacity, as this contributes to developing national capacity.

A future food aid regime While the above forces were having their effect in deciding the future shape and form of WFP, other events also took place that could have an influence on a future food aid regime, of which WFP would be a part. Three events were particularly prominent: the GATT Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations; the 1995 US farm bill; and the Food Aid Convention of 1999. The future of food aid for development was also being called into question.

Reform and Renewal: Future Directions

235

The GATT Uruguay Round The conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round in 1994, the signing and ratification of its Final Act, and the setting up of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have provided a major opportunity for establishing a new food aid regime within a liberalizing global economy (Shaw and Singer, 1995). The signatories to the Final Act recognized that during the reform programme leading to greater liberalization in agricultural trade, least-developed countries and net food-importing developing countries ‘may experience negative effects in terms of the availability of adequate supplies of basic foodstuffs from external sources on reasonable terms and conditions, including short-term difficulties in financing normal levels of commercial imports of basic foodstuffs’ (GATT Secretariat, 1994, pp. 448–9). Accordingly, they ‘agreed to establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure that the implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round on trade in agriculture does not adversely affect the availability of food aid at a level which is sufficient to continue to provide assistance in meeting the food needs of developing countries’. To this end, it was agreed to:
review the level of food aid established periodically by the Committee on

Food Aid under the Food Aid Convention 1986 and initiate negotiations in the appropriate form to establish a level of food aid commitments sufficient to meet the legitimate needs of developing countries during the reform programme;
adopt guidelines to ensure that an increasing proportion of basic foodstuffs is provided to least-developed and net food-importing developing countries in fully grant form and/or on appropriate concessional terms in line with Article IV of the Food Aid Convention 1986;5 and
give full consideration in the context of their aid programmes to requests for the provision of technical and financial assistance to least-developed and net food-importing developing countries to improve their agricultural productivity and infrastructure. Donors were also required to ensure that the provision of international food aid was not tied directly or indirectly to commercial exports of agricultural products to recipient countries, and that international food aid transactions, including bilateral food aid that was monetized (sold), should be carried out in accordance with the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal. In essence, the provisions of the Final Act established two major elements for a future food aid regime: an adequate level of food aid to meet the needs of developing countries; and an appropriate mechanism to ensure that food aid did not circumvent disciplines on export subsidies. The provisions of the Final Act create the possibility of defining, once and for all, what constitutes the true level of food aid. A large part of so-called

236 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

food ‘trade’ has not taken place as straight market transactions at international prices, but has been conducted through a labyrinth of various forms of bilateral agreements that provide discounts from the ‘commercial’ international price (itself reduced by overhanging surpluses and domestic production subsidies) in many direct and indirect ways. This makes it difficult to quantify globally the concessional elements of such transactions, and their linkages with other trade concessions, or with financial aid. For the United States alone, the value of its agricultural exports provided through credit, guarantee and export enhancement programmes in the early 1990s was almost three times the value of agricultural exports designated as ‘food aid’, and accounted for 18 per cent of the total value of US agricultural exports (USDA, 1995). The inclusion of these ‘grey area’ forms of food aid within the broader definition and disciplines of food aid as conceived in the Final Act should be one of the necessary outcomes of the GATT Uruguay Round. It could have other significant benefits. Much of the ‘grey area’ food aid has been given mainly for the short-run political and commercial objectives of donors. If this hidden ‘food aid’ is now brought out into the open and properly targeted on the needy, a major step would be taken in dealing with the hunger problem and, by extension, with the eradication of poverty. Cutting the historical link between surpluses and food aid might also be a blessing in disguise. This link has always been a flawed motivation for food aid, leading to major tensions between donors’ domestic agricultural, commercial and political interests and the developmental needs of developing countries, and to the controversy and criticisms surrounding food aid. Much has been made about the possible disincentive effects of food aid on policymakers and producers in food aid recipient countries. Less has been heard about the disincentive effects created by policy-makers in the developed countries through the continuation of harmful agricultural policies on grounds that some of the resulting surpluses could be disposed of as food aid. Two central questions arise concerning a post-Uruguay Round food aid regime: what should be its main features; and how should it be administered? It has been suggested that a future food aid regime should have four main features (Mellor Associates, 1992).6 It should be seen to serve both recipient countries and donors. The food aid provided should be development-enhancing in recipient countries. Adequate provision should be made for food aid for stabilization and emergency purposes through safety-nets in times of disasters and economic adjustment. And close co-ordination should be established with financial and technical assistance. Providing least-developed and net food-importing developing countries with adequate levels of food aid would have benefits for developing and developed countries alike. It would remove a substantial quantity of food from overhanging commercial markets, thereby relieving pressure over a period of

Reform and Renewal: Future Directions

237

time during which agricultural adjustment could take place in developed countries and commercial markets could grow in developing countries. In this way, food aid would help the shift toward market orientation and liberalization, the main objectives of Uruguay Round negotiations, rather than being a hindrance through dumping and surplus disposal practices. It would also serve to prevent market marauding and the wasteful and damaging use of food and cash resources in export-enhancement programmes. And it would help developing countries speed up the implementation of their development programmes, without creating inflationary pressures, thereby increasing food consumption and the demand for commercial food imports. Two essential features of a new food aid regime – the close relationship of food aid with food trade, and the co-ordination of food aid with financial and technical assistance – should be facilitated by the establishment of the WTO. Decision-making on food aid in the WTO should automatically address the first concern. The special relationship envisaged between the WTO, IMF, the World Bank and other UN agencies, outlined in the Marrakesh agreement establishing the WTO (GATT Secretariat, 1994, pp. 6–18) should provide for the second. The desired macroeconomic framework would be established for food aid to have maximum benefit and for financial and food aid to be integrated in the design and implementation of development programmes and projects. The establishment of the WTO could also help in providing an institutional framework for food aid that has hitherto been lacking. A number of bodies are currently concerned with food aid in addition to WFP’s executive board and secretariat. They include: the CSD; the FAO Committee on World Food Security, which discusses food aid in the context of issues in world food security; the Food Aid Committee, a non-UN body which oversees the implementation of the FAC; the executive board of the IMF, which makes decisions concerning the application of the Fund’s special facilities that provide financing in the event that developing countries encounter difficulties in paying for their cereal imports; UNICEF and the UNHCR with interests in food aid in fulfilling their mandates relating to children and refugees respectively; the United Nations ACC Sub-committee on Nutrition, which brings together a number of UN agencies concerned with the improvement of nutrition in developing countries; and now WTO’s Committee on Agriculture, which is responsible for the implementation of the agricultural aspects of the Final Act, including food aid. The work of these bodies is largely unco-ordinated, and sometime conflictive, leading to institutional incoherence and to the danger that, like the issues of improved nutrition and food security, since food aid is ‘everybody’s business’ it will become ‘nobody’s business’. There is no single forum or body through which a major international or national crisis would automatically be considered or overall food aid policy negotiated and reviewed (Maxwell and Shaw, 1995; Shaw and Clay, 1998).

238 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Food aid and related issues will be discussed in WTO’s Committee on Agriculture (COA). In view of the potential size, complexity and importance of food aid, as widely defined above, a sub-committee on food aid might be needed in the COA. The substantive work required to establish and review appropriate levels of food aid and to draw up guidelines for food aid allocations might be given to WFP’s Executive Board, in accordance with the mandate of its predecessor, the CFA, and in accordance with WFP’s focus on the neediest countries. This would require close working relationships with the other bodies concerned with food aid listed above. At the operational level, once guidelines have been established and a priority list of eligible countries drawn up, FAO, IMF, WFP and the World Bank could build assessments of food aid needs into the work of their field missions in preparing policy framework papers, crop and food needs assessments and country strategy outlines, which could be discussed and agreed upon in the WTO. Co-ordination of the work of these field missions would ensure that food aid provisions would be related to other compensatory measures to offset the negative effects of the Uruguay Round, including financial assistance from the IMF facilities, special consideration in any future agreements on export credits and tariff preference schemes, and technical and financial assistance to improve agricultural productivity and infrastructure. WFP could then be given responsibility for co-ordinating food aid supplies from different sources in accordance with agreed levels. Much will depend on how effectively WTO actually works (Kruger, 1998). The fiasco of the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle in December 1999 was a sobering experience. Questions have also been raised concerning the precise working relationships between the WTO, IMF and the World Bank. The leastdeveloped countries have expressed the hope that such collaboration will contribute positively to their development and not lead to increased conditionalities. They have also called for a special unit to be established in the WTO secretariat to monitor progress in the application of special treatment which they should receive under the terms of the Final Act, including food aid (Islam, 1994). Much will also depend on the working relationships established between WTO and other UN organizations, and on how these might be affected by reforms carried out in the UN system. The WTO Committee on Agriculture has agreed on a notification format that will enable it to monitor follow-up action on the compensatory measures for least-developed and net food-importing developing countries. WFP has acquired observer status to the committee. The United States 1995 farm bill The signing into law of the United States 1995 farm bill as the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act in April 1996 marked a major

Reform and Renewal: Future Directions

239

watershed in US farm policy (USDA, 1996; Harvey, 1998). This ‘freedom to farm’ legislation effectively ended a farm management regime started by President Franklin D. Roosevelt under the New Deal of the 1930s to address the economic plight of American farmers brought about by the Great Depression. Responsibility for decision-making on crop selection and stock-holding has been transferred from the federal government to the farmers themselves. While its effects are still unclear, the bill could have significant implications for food aid both in the United States and, by extension, in other major food-producing countries. Adoption of the 1996 legislation sent two conflicting messages to the other main agricultural producing and exporting countries. Some saw it as a clear and unambiguous signal that the United States was committed to full liberalization of farm policy and trade. They interpreted the new policy as releasing and encouraging United States farmers to compete effectively on world markets and to provide generous assistance payments over an extended period to allow them to make the necessary adjustments to greater market orientation with minimum hardship. This, in turn, has given a lead to the European Union in particular, and other protectionist countries in general, to reconsider the future direction of their farm policy reforms. However, a contrary view is that the 1996 legislation released the United States’ full crop productive capacity and marked the effective abdication of US responsibility for stabilizing world markets, which might trigger their collapse in the medium term, consequently renewing pressure for greater levels of protection and subsidized production, leading back to structural surpluses and market marauding. The United States cannot shoulder the burden of stabilizing world agricultural markets on its own. On the other hand, the prospects that world markets might prove less stable than is socially acceptable has also been recognized in the United States through President Clinton’s insistence that safety-net provisions should be examined and that payments to farmers should be made counter-cyclical. In 1998, President Clinton financed a $2 billion food aid programme to help US farmers out of their economic difficulties caused by low commodity prices. And in 1999, an $8.7 billion package of emergency aid was approved for US farmers, as part of a $69 billion agricultural and food programme, who were affected by a combination of low crop prices and bad weather. Other countries, particularly the poorest, net food-importing nations, are also worried about the instability of world markets and that the 1996 US legislation will contribute to making them even less stable. Because of their particular sensitivity to food prices, as the great majority of developing countries are net food importers, two basic questions will need to be answered: are international food prices going to be more or less unstable in the years ahead, and, if so, what should be the appropriate international response? (Konandreas and

240 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

Greenfield, 1996, p. 350). The challenge is to ensure that the weaker members of the world community are not marginalized any further by trade liberalization if they do not have the ability and the means to participate in it (Konandreas and Greenfield, 1998). Finally, much will depend on how the issues raised by the US 1996 legislation, particularly concerning market instability and the legitimate role of government in agriculture, are addressed and resolved in the WTO, and accepted and ascribed to by other major players in the world market. These questions are at the heart of international negotiations and remain to be specified and developed for the opening of the next round of agricultural negotiations under the WTO. Food Aid Convention 1999 For a future food aid regime to be effective, not only is an adequate level of food aid necessary but reliability of its supply should be assured. The availability of food aid in the past has been mainly influenced by market surpluses and food prices. When food production and stocks have fallen in donor countries and food prices have risen, the amount of food aid available has tended to shrink at the time when it is most needed (Rosen, 1989). At present, the Food Aid Convention (FAC) provides the only guaranteed supply of food aid in cereals. Each FAC signatory guarantees to provide a minimum physical amount of food aid in cereals annually, irrespective of changes in the levels of food production, stocks or prices. Aggregate commitments to the 1967 FAC amounted to 4.25 million tons of cereals a year, which was increased to 7.6 million under the 1980 FAC, but was reduced to 5.35 million tons in 1995 when Canada and the United States reduced their commitments by 33 per cent and 45 per cent respectively. FAC signatories have regularly surpassed their minimum annual commitment, however, and annual aggregate shipments have ranged between 8.8 million tons and 13.6 million tons a year since the mid-1980s. The 1999 FAC, which has an initial duration of three years, provides for a guaranteed aggregate minimum annual commitment of 4.9 million tons (in wheat equivalent) (IGC, 1999). In addition, financial aid will be provided for meeting transport and other operational costs and for food purchases in food aid recipient countries.7 Priority will be given to least-developed and lowincome countries. Particular importance is attached to ensuring that food aid is directed toward the alleviation of poverty and hunger of the most vulnerable population groups. Cereals will continue to represent the bulk of the food aid commodities provided. However, the list of products has been broadened to include edible oil, skimmed milk powder, sugar, seeds and products which are a component of the traditional diet of vulnerable groups in developing countries or of supplementary feeding programmes, including micro-nutrients.

Reform and Renewal: Future Directions

241

Although no indication has been given as to how it will actually be done, increased emphasis has been given to the co-ordination of the food aid programmes of FAC member countries, and to the monitoring and evaluation of food aid supplies and their impact. All these measures, if implemented as agreed, could benefit the most needy developing countries. The future of food aid for development Ultimately, much will depend on the outcome of the debate that is now developing on the future of food aid for development, for which there are contradictory signals (Hopkins and Puchala, 1978; Hopkins, 1984; Shaw, 2000). Global food aid, as statistically recorded, fell dramatically between 1993 and 1996 to reach its lowest level for over 20 years, but recovered to 14.5 million tons in 1999. Such declines have occurred in the past, as in the 1960s and early 1970s, calling into question whether the decline was a temporary phenomenon or of a more structural nature. The effects of the US 1995 farm legislation are far from clear. Attempts to reform the CAP of the European Union, which has been largely responsible for generating structural food surpluses, have been postponed and large food surpluses are beginning to re-emerge. Enlargement of the EU by the inclusion of more countries could result in increasing surpluses further. Both the US and EU have recently been involved in a large food aid programme to the Russian Federation, reportedly involving 4.8 million tons of food at a cost of $1.5 billion. A new FAC has been signed committing signatories to at least another three years of food aid. And the WTO has to arrive at a decision for implementing the food aid provisions of the Final Act. While food aid to meet emergencies is not questioned, calls are now being made to end food aid for development purposes to be replaced with ‘aid for food’ (Reutlinger, 1999). But many of the arguments put forward in support of this transformation are spurious.8 Genuinely untied financial aid when used for food imports is preferable to food aid. But most financial aid is tied, explicitly or implicitly. Aid tied to food imports (food aid) is better than financial aid tied to dubiously required high-priced capital goods or to armaments. Some of the advantages of financial aid can be obtained by monetizing food aid. And food aid, if properly targeted, has the advantage of directly addressing the needs of poor, food-insecure people, and of being more genderfriendly to women and their children. Rather than increasing, financial aid has fallen in real terms and as a percentage of donor countries’ national income, and there is little evidence that financial aid has focused increasingly on the alleviation of poverty and hunger, other than rhetorically. A comprehensive policy review of the future of food aid concluded that ‘The balance of evidence is that food aid is no longer an additional resource but must justify itself in competition with other uses of scarce aid funds’

242 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

(Clay et al., 1998, p. 63; ODI, 2000). The review found that food aid (as statistically recorded) had quickly become a marginal and uncertain component of aid globally, making it difficult for food aid to have a significant food security impact at the international level. It had become an increasingly marginal part of ODA – 3–4 per cent, compared with 22 per cent in 1965 and 11 per cent in 1985. The FAC seemed to have been largely ineffective in assuring stability of food aid levels. Links to agricultural surpluses were a major source of uncertainty. And the relationship between international price variability, levels of stocks and donor commitments overall made food aid ‘the most unstable element in ODA’. The review did not take into account, however, that the real level of food aid, including ‘grey area’ food aid referred to above, has been much larger and a more significant part of ODA, with a much larger potential to address problems of poverty and hunger (Shaw and Singer, 1995). There was also an apparent contradiction in the review, which stated that development food aid ‘has proved relatively ineffective as an instrument for combating poverty and improving the food consumption and nutrition and health status of the very poor and vulnerable people’, but that ‘robust evidence for both NGO activities and WFP on impacts of humanitarian and project aid is surprisingly lacking’. In addition, the review did not recognize the considerable constraints that donors have placed on the use of their food aid resources, and the formidable difficulties of reaching and benefiting abjectly poor people in low-income developing countries. The developmental expectations of food aid should, therefore, be tempered accordingly. The review tended to focus on the supply side of future food aid. If the demand side was also examined, a more balanced perspective would emerge. For example, if serious attempts are made to meet the targets set at the various UN international conferences during the 1990s, particularly those relating to the reduction of malnutrition among children in particular and the hungry poor in general, aid in the form of food will need to play an important role. The gender and development benefits of food aid for women and their children might also have been emphasized. And the role of food aid in ‘preventive diplomacy’ in addressing the problems associated with man-made emergencies, and preventing their occurrence, might also have been mentioned. While the ground-rules for the deployment of food aid in such situations remain dangerously confused, food aid could play a strategic role in preventing or limiting the outbreak of war and civil strife, much of which is caused, or exacerbated, by problems of access to adequate food supplies (Messer et al., 1998). The ‘status quo’ food gap between projected food supplies and current per capita consumption is estimated to reach over 18 million tons in 2008, compared with 11 million tons in 1998. The nutrition gap, the difference between projected food supplies and food needed to reach minimum nutritional

Reform and Renewal: Future Directions

243

standards, is estimated to rise to over 28 million tons in 2002, compared with 18 million tons in 1998 (Shapouri and Rosen, 1999). Some 30 million infants are born each year in developing countries with impaired growth due to poor nutrition during foetal life. ‘Population-wide interventions aimed at preventing foetal growth retardation are urgently needed in many countries’ (ACC/SCN, 2000; Smith and Haddad, 2000). Projections indicate that within the next 20 years, more poor and malnourished people will be living in urban areas than in the countryside (IFPRI, 1997). Reducing the number of more than 800 million undernourished people by half by 2015, the target set by the 1996 World Food Summit (FAO, 1996), will require more aid resources, as will the targets set by the UN Millennium Summit of September 2000, including halving by 2015 the proportion of the world’s population (currently 22 per cent) whose income is less than one dollar a day. Food aid alone will not provide the solution but it has a distinctive role to play in combination with other aid resources and measures. Nothing can replace it. And the prospects of gaining food security in future years cannot compensate for inadequate nutrition today (WFP, 1999c). The statement that food aid can be useful ‘in a very limited way’ as targeted assistance to poor, highly food-insecure people in situations of poorly functioning fragile markets and serious institutional weakness is particularly contentious and should be based on more thorough empirical analysis. The review optimistically states that ‘a new consensus on the future of food aid is within grasp, but not yet fully established’. There remain markedly different views between the United Kingdom and other countries of the EU, Scandinavia and especially Canada and the United States as well as the NGO community and the food aid recipient countries themselves. These differences need to be reconciled before consensus on the future of food aid can be achieved.

Future directions There has been no shortage of views and proposals concerning the future directions WFP might take in the wake of the decline in food aid resources, the sharp increase in man-made emergencies, and the process of UN reform measures. Nordic countries’ views The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), in their proposals for reform of the UN system, suggested that ‘In developing countries where famine occurs food aid might increasingly be identified as a useful resource within the UNDP country programmes’ which would ‘necessitate close cooperation between the WFP and the UNDP and underlines the importance of coordinated policy planning for the WFP and the UNDP’ (Nordic UN Project, 1991,

244 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

p. 77). And in recognition of its expertise and experience in transportation and logistics, we saw in Chapter 7 that they also recommended that WFP should be designated as the UN agency responsible for those functions for both food and non-food items, and should help developing countries develop their own transport arrangements (Nordic UN Project, 1990, pp. 63 and 77). A Dutch perspective An evaluation of multilateral organizations as a channel for Dutch aid by the Netherlands government in 1991 was critical of WFP development food aid (Netherlands Government, 1991, pp. 49–53). It was felt that too little consideration was given to the pros and cons of food aid as opposed to other forms of aid in assisting development projects. A more precise definition of the conditions in which food aid was effective and preferable to other types of aid was desirable. And attempts should be made to increase the flexibility of available resources and procedures to strengthen the effectiveness of WFP development assistance. On the other hand, WFP’s achievements in the field of emergency aid and logistical support were viewed positively. These opinions echoed an evaluation of Dutch food aid, especially in SubSaharan Africa, in the 1980s (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991). Supplementary feeding programmes were found to be of minimal development value as they did not remove the structural causes of undernourishment. And in view of the negative findings regarding food-for-work programmes, it was proposed that they should be subjected to a critical review. It was also recommended that contributions to WFP should be made in cash to be used preferably for local food purchases and triangular transactions. Danish food aid commodity changes In 1991, another, but differently focused, independent study was carried out for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1991). The results of the study were subsequently published as a ‘success story’ in 1998 (Colding and Pinstrup-Andersen, 1999). Prior to the 1991 study, Danish food commodity contributions to WFP consisted of canned meat products (pork, beef and chicken), processed cheese and split peas. While these commodities had a high nutritional content, their unit costs in terms of the calories and proteins provided were very high. The choice of these food commodities was strongly influenced by certain interest groups in Danish agriculture who stressed their importance for market development and future commercial exports, domestic employment opportunities and foreign exchange earnings. The study recommended the substitution of the canned meat and cheese products by peas, wheat flour and vegetable oil. From the viewpoint of calorie intake, it was estimated that the cost-effectiveness of Danish food aid to WFP was increased sixfold due to changes in the composition of the food basket

Reform and Renewal: Future Directions

245

alone. The study confirmed what had generally been known concerning the mutual self-interest of donors that have propelled food aid flows in the past, and the infighting that went on in determining the content of their food aid commodities. It also showed that timely policy analysis combined with enlightened, development-oriented decision-making, could produce changes that could lead to large increases in the cost-effectiveness of food aid. Denmark has been a consistent proponent of multilateral development food aid and considers WFP to be an effective poverty-oriented development organization with a strong comparative advantage in procurement and logistics. Tripartite evaluation of WFP Between 1991 and 1993, a comprehensive evaluation of WFP was carried out by three donor countries – Canada, the Netherlands and Norway. WFP staff at headquarters and in selected country offices provided documentation, insight and views throughout the evaluation process. Information and opinions were also sought from senior officers of other UN organizations and from NGOs. The result was perhaps one of the most detailed external assessments of any UN body (Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1994).9 The evaluation did not produce recommendations but ‘shared judgements’ that might be taken into account in discussions and decisions concerning WFP’s future. And its findings were not formally discussed in WFP’s governing body. The evaluation concluded that WFP’s performance in relief and emergencies was ‘impressive’. The ‘judgements’ put forward aimed at incremental improvement rather than radical change and ‘it would be in the interest of all countries, both donors and recipient, to maintain and strengthen WFP as the principal international organization for handling food relief’ (Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1994, abridged version, pp. 27–8). The analysis of WFP’s development activities noted some successes but also identified a number of weaknesses. While WFP performed well in the physical movement of food, it was considered to be less successful in the developmental aspects of the projects it supported. Three alternatives were identified for improving WFP’s development performance: reducing the number of countries in which WFP operated, concentrating on those with the lowest incomes, and especially those which were disaster-prone; keeping the wide spread of countries, but limiting activities to a much narrower band of project types in which food aid functioned well, such as natural resources management and human resource development; and phasing out all types of development projects except for those that were relief-related, such as disaster preparedness, rehabilitation and repatriation activities. The evaluation concluded that: A development programme targeted at the poorest people in the poorest countries, organized by the UN system, based on bringing food to the

246 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

hungry, and aimed at long-term impact as well as short-term benefits should surely be maintained by the donors as long as it can be run effectively and efficiently. The WFP membership should be thinking about improving their effectiveness and efficiency, not about winding up the Programme. (Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1994, abridged version, p. 29) Taking relief and development together, the evaluation concluded that: there is clear value in retaining WFP as a hybrid organization. If relief is accepted as the main focus there is still a strong case for combining – as a minimum development profile – an active programme oriented toward disaster preparedness, mitigation and rehabilitation. (Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1994, abridged version, p. 32) The role of WFP’s governing body as a forum for intergovernmental discussion on all food aid was found to be ‘not impressive’. The lack of performance was partly attributed to the fact that food aid policies had not been high on the international agenda. It was observed that this could change if developed countries succeeded in establishing agricultural policies that led to lower agricultural production, a decline in food surpluses, and a rise in international prices, and if concern over the food security of the poorest countries was more actively pursued (Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1994, abridged version, p. 32). Many of the observations and recommendations of the evaluation took into account the views and opinions of the WFP secretariat. Much of the proposed action had either been implemented by the secretariat before the evaluation was concluded, or was in the process of implementation or active consideration. There were also several points on which the WFP secretariat did not agree, as might be expected in a comprehensive evaluation of this nature. A number of the points of agreement were included in WFP’s new mission statement that was adopted in 1994.

Other views Subsequently, other views have been expressed concerning WFP’s future. As part of the streamlining of international institutional arrangements for food aid, it has been suggested that WFP’s role should be redefined, and given appropriate resources and professional capacity, ‘to become the UN’s humanitarian and rehabilitation, logistics and food support agency’ (Clay et al., 1998, p. 64). Elements of a strategy for the reconstruction of WFP as part of a wider reorganization of the responsibilities of UN agencies were identified (ODI, 1998, p. 4). WFP should continue to be the primary channel for international emergency

Reform and Renewal: Future Directions

247

food aid and have the key role in co-ordinating international relief food operations. Working with other international organizations, WFP should support strategies for post-crisis transition, typically replacing international commodity aid with financial aid. In co-operation with other international agencies and civil society institutions, WFP should focus its support to enable governments in the least-developed countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, develop and implement programmes for poverty reduction, and reduce vulnerability of high food insecurity groups and areas, while phasing out its assistance to other low- and middle-income developing countries. And in streamlining institutional arrangements for food aid, the CSD should be abolished, or transferred to the WTO. In a paper presented to an international workshop on ‘Food Aid and Human Security’ organized by the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI) in Norway in 1998, the view was expressed that ‘The world will need a strong WFP in the future’ and that WFP ‘should remain the foremost United Nations agency that gives succour to poor people who suffer from hunger and undernutrition’ (Faaland et al., 2000). As food aid resources had declined, it was suggested that WFP’s mandate might have to be revised by eliminating reference to it as an agency for using food aid, and instead, emphasizing its role in the alleviation of hunger. Another view was that ‘WFP should be appointed the lead agency for co-ordination and monitoring of government-to-government food transfers in the future’ (Colding and Pinstrup-Andersen, 2000). Emergency and/or development aid Divergent opinions have been held among the major donor countries as to whether WFP should become entirely an emergency and relief agency or whether it should also retain a developmental role (Hopkins, 1984). In presenting its views on the reform measures considered necessary to strengthen the UN system, the United States felt that WFP should ‘retain its primary role in food relief for all humanitarian emergencies and transition programmes from relief to development’ but its role in supporting agricultural development projects ‘should be eliminated’ (US, 1996, p. 24). WFP should also take over from FAO the principal operational role for the provision and funding of seeds and tools for emergency operations or in the transition out of relief programmes. And memoranda of understanding (MOUs) should be developed with other operational humanitarian agencies, using the WFP/UNHCR MOU as a model. To assist the process of arriving at a decision concerning WFP’s future direction, consultations were organized by the WFP secretariat which brought together WFP Executive Board members, other representatives of UN and FAO members states, staff from other UN agencies, NGOs and WFP, and eminent

248 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

academics. A joint WFP/United Nations University seminar on ‘Ending the Inheritance of Hunger’ was held at WFP headquarters in May 1997, which was designed to develop policy directions for WFP’s work in tackling hunger that made poverty an inter-generational phenomenon (WFP and UNU, 1997). The seminar served to reinforce the conviction that tackling malnutrition in the early stages of life was a sound investment of scarce food aid resources. In May 1998, the WFP Executive Board decided to undertake a policy review of WFP development assistance. As an important step in an open review process, the WFP secretariat organized a number of consultations, starting in October 1998, under the theme ‘Time for Change: Food Aid and Development’. The secretariat prepared background papers for the consultations summarizing current thinking and debate on the major issues related to the use of food aid in development.10 The WFP executive director let it be known that she was ‘not willing to concede that development food aid is over. It’s got to be the basis of helping people help themselves out of poverty. If we don’t do that, we are building a world of perpetual emergencies’ (IFPRI, 1998, p. 4). At the end of the long-standing debate, which extended over most of the decade of the 1990s, the WFP secretariat produced a comprehensive paper which summarized its views and proposals concerning the best uses of food aid in support of development to assist the executive board in arriving at its decision concerning WFP’s future directions (WFP, 1999c). This major policy paper firmly committed WFP to introducing new policy directions with a timetable for action and guidelines to implement them. The aim was nothing less than to lay ‘the foundations for a secure and increased flow of development resources to help the hungry poor along the path to sustainable food security’. At its session in May 1999, the Executive Board agreed with the main policy recommendations of the secretariat paper (WFP, 1999d). WFP would limit its development activities to five objectives, which would be selected and combined in country programmes in accordance with the specific circumstances and national strategies of each recipient country. It would be unlikely that any country programme would involve all five objectives, and there was no order of priority among them. The five objectives would be to:
enable young children and expectant and nursing mothers to meet their

special nutritional and nutrition-related health needs;
enable poor households to invest in human capital through education and

training;
make it possible for poor families to gain and preserve assets;
mitigate the effects of natural disasters in areas vulnerable to recurring

crises; and
enable households which depend on degraded natural resources for their

food security to make a shift to more sustainable livelihoods.

Reform and Renewal: Future Directions

249

WFP would only provide assistance when and where food consumption was inadequate for good health and productivity. Every WFP development intervention would be targeted on poor, food-insecure households. They would be designed to encourage investment and leave behind physical assets or improved human capital to help households and communities after food aid came to an end. Urban and peri-urban areas with high concentrations of malnutrition as well as food-insecure rural areas would be targeted. WFP would endeavour to intervene early, and would explicitly take seasonality into account, in areas with wide fluctuations in food security. A greater understanding of beneficiaries’ problems would be sought through participatory approaches. And WFP would be proactive in seeking out partnership arrangements with other aid organizations, in increasing cost-effectiveness, and in developing new approaches in project design.

Prospective co-ordinating roles for WFP Now that WFP’s focus and direction has been decided in using its own resources, what might be some of the crucial co-ordinating roles it should play for food aid from all sources, which in turn would benefit its own programme of assistance (Shaw, 1987)? As an increasing proportion of food aid has been channelled though WFP directly and indirectly on behalf of bilateral food aid programmes and in association with NGOs, the prospects (some might say the obligation) of playing these roles have been enhanced.11 Co-ordinating international humanitarian assistance operations Recent large-scale disasters have shown that the international community is still not organized to respond quickly and effectively. In such situations, WFP has been increasingly asked to play a co-ordinating role. Given its experience and its recognized expertise in transport and logistics, WFP should now be officially recognized as the co-ordinating organization in the UN system for large-scale international humanitarian interventions and be provided with the resources and co-operation of the international community necessary to carry out the task efficiently. Assessment of needs and targeting WFP would provide a considerable service if, together with the donor community and the concerned international aid agencies, it organized a major effort to improve the assessment of food aid needs for relief and development purposes. Through such an effort, communications could play a part in averting emergency situations rather than just discovering them. Perhaps the most obvious lesson of the large-scale and complex emergencies of the 1990s is that intervention is no substitute for prevention. The remote sensing satellite

250 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

systems that are now being developed as part of a global information highway could be linked to ground control arrangements through government agencies and aid organizations working in the field. More systematic collection of local information is a vital part of the solution leading to effective surveillance and response arrangements for food and other forms of aid. In the past, WFP’s governing body strongly supported the proposal that developing countries, especially those vulnerable to recurrent disasters, should develop or improve national early warning systems, related to FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System. Similarly, systems should be created for the effective assessment of needs for development programmes. Donors should be encouraged to invest financial and technical support in such systems. The benefits of this assistance would be considerable in that it would enable all concerned to have a common perception of what is required, when it is needed, and to help determine the most effective ways in which it should be provided. At the same time, WFP’s work in concert with other aid organizations in vulnerability analysis and mapping is providing a common tool to improve the targeting of food and other forms of assistance on those who need it most. Policy dialogue There is general agreement that part of the solution to making food aid an effective resource development resource is a policy dialogue leading to a contractual arrangement with explicit and monitorable commitments on the part of both recipients and donors. WFP can play its part by stimulating this policy dialogue, which could conducted through the existing consortia-type arrangements of the World Bank consultative groups and UNDP round tables. This role would be facilitated if WFP reviewed the guidelines and criteria for food aid approved by the CFA in 1979 and drew up new guidelines to ensure that an increasing proportion of all food aid is provided to the neediest countries, as stipulated in the Final Act of the GATT Uruguay Round (GATT Secretariat, 1994, p. 448). All forms of food aid, from all sources, should ideally be included in the policy dialogue. And food aid could relate to policy issues at various levels. It could be used to support overall plans, policies and strategies. It could assist in the implementation of policies in a particular sector of the economy. It could act as a cushion in the short-term process of economic adjustment. And it could be used through projects in support of policies related to specific target groups and objectives. Coherent development concepts, programmes and projects There have been numerous food-aid supported development projects that have contributed successfully toward the improvement of human development and

Reform and Renewal: Future Directions

251

to increased productivity, employment and incomes, particularly in the rural areas of developing countries. On the other hand, food aid has often been provided in a disparate, disjointed and sometimes conflictive way by different donors and aid organizations under different terms and conditions. These differences should be reconciled within the framework of a recipient country’s development plans and programmes. Donors and aid organizations should work within common developmental concepts to give coherence and consistency to their combined efforts. This has become particularly necessary as food aid resources have sharply declined. WFP’s Executive Board could provide a forum for reaching agreement on the most appropriate uses of food aid in commonly designed and co-ordinated programmes and projects. Nowhere is this more evident than in the ‘continuum’ between relief and development, and in programmes and projects that attempt to prevent, prepare for, or mitigate the effect of, natural and man-made disasters. Co-ordination of operations It is in the area of the delivery of food aid that the need for co-ordinated action among donors and aid agencies is most acutely felt. Co-ordination of development as well as emergency food aid among donors and aid agencies active in a particular country would benefit providers and receivers alike. It would facilitate the work of recipient governments in forming a comprehensive view of the resources available and their optimum deployment. And it could significantly reduce the transfer costs of food aid through the synchronization of supplies and the development of common internal delivery and management systems. A related area in need of attention concerns the development of what might be called ‘common codes of conduct’ for the increased use of the different modalities that are expected to take place in future food aid operations through the procurement of food for food aid in the developing countries themselves – triangular transactions, local purchases and exchange arrangements, and, where appropriate, monetization. These modalities are largely conducted in different and competing ways in developing counties. WFP, with its recognized competence in these and related food aid operations, should be proactive in working with donors and aid agencies in establishing common rules of behaviour both in determining which modality is most appropriate in a specific situation and in implementing them in common and supportive ways. Special focus on Sub-Saharan Africa There is general agreement that countries in Sub-Saharan Africa will require help in meeting their food import requirements in the years ahead. Whether this assistance is provided as food aid or aid for food has to be determined, as well as the modalities of food aid transactions, so that maximum developmental

252 The UN World Food Programme and Food Aid

benefit is obtained for poor and food-insecure people and transfer costs are kept to a minimum. WFP’s Executive Board and secretariat should organize an international conference to reconcile the significant differences in outlook and perspective that exist among donor countries on both sides of the Atlantic with a view to arrive at a comprehensive policy and programme of future food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa as a matter of priority (World Bank and WFP, 1991; Shaw, 2000). In addressing these critical areas, and encouraging co-ordinated action among food aid donors, aid agencies and recipients, WFP’s Executive Board and secretariat would make a vital contribution to improving the effectiveness of food aid both for development and in times of emergency. In doing so, it would be wise to take into account the considerable literature, studies, experience and lessons of history rather than attempt to ‘reinvent the wheel’ and repeat the mistakes of the past. Will WFP take up these and other challenges in partnership with other concerned organizations in order to gain the opportunities that food aid could bring? The forces of inertia are weighty indeed. But there is a strong and growing awareness that ‘business as usual’ is no longer an option if the advances of the past are to be sustained and mistakes and tragedies are not to be repeated. Achieving food security has become a leitmotiv for food aid.12 Yet the complexities of food security as a multi-faceted, multi-sectoral concept has been a major barrier in reaching consensus on how to achieve it (Delisle and Shaw, 1998; Kracht and Schulz, 1999). And there remain wide differences in projections concerning a possible world food security crisis, and what to do about it (Shaw, 1997; 1999). A new and powerful coalition between all who work for justice, freedom and peace for the victims of hunger, fear, injustice and oppression is now needed in order to reach consensus in the international community on how to end the massive and systematic violations of human rights, including the right to food. In that context, food aid or aid for food will have a vital role to play. Ultimately, much could be achieved if the concept of a ‘multilateral framework for bilateral action’ proposed almost forty years ago was adopted and implemented. In this new millennium will there be the political will to take positive action or will we be content to see the unspeakable on our television sets and do nothing? Or will we continue to make token gestures to help the hungry poor in an attempt to assuage our consciences? It is generally accepted that the problems of poverty and food insecurity can be overcome. The division of opinion between the optimists and pessimists remains, but with an important difference. The division now seems to be over not whether it can be done, but whether it will be done: between the optimists of the one-world school and the pessimists of the Malthusian persuasion.

Statistical Appendices Statistical Appendix 1 Regional WFP cumulative commitments for development projects and relief and emergency operations by category and type approved up to 31 December 1995 (values in US$ million) Category/type

Human resource development Mothers and infants Primary schools Secondary schools Training programmes Higher education Literacy programmes Hospitals Public health

Sub-Saharan Africa No. Value

Asia and Pacific No. Value

Latin America and Caribbean No. Value

58 103 34 26 9 3 24 2

303 957 191 51 10 1 73 8

36 16 1 4 7 4 3 1

715 61 9 23 3 135 1 1

50 44 1 11 5 4 13 –

352 461 3 23 2 9 34 –

Economic and social infrastructure Housing/public utilities Transport/communications Community development

12 22 49

28 143 211

15 21 15

71 53 63

5 4 57

15 33 301

Directly productive projects Land development Land settlement Refugee assistance Crop production Animal production Forestry Fisheries Industries/mining Food reserves

48 49 57 37 33 51 – 3 22

299 221 132 166 155 490 – 33 77

137 35 6 2 19 48 11 2 1

1,442 173 9 16 272 488 116 1 1

15 19 4 21 17 18 2 – –

61 34 7 75 165 46 3 – –

382 96 12 218 68

688 1,038 166 1,709 1,625

183 10 1 31 8

414 37 — 106 24

101 5 – 24 8

95 11 – 39 20

1,418

8,775

617

4,234

428

1,789

Relief and emergency operations Sudden natural disasters Drought/crop failure Man-made disasters PRO PDPO Total

253

254

Statistical Appendix 1 Contd. Category/type

Europe, Middle East and CIS No. Value

Total Commitments No. Value

Share in total %

Human resource development Mothers and infants Primary schools Secondary schools Training programmes Higher education Literacy programmes Hospitals Public health

19 37 5 25 15 1 9 3

185 599 39 71 63 — 58 3

163 200 41 66 36 12 49 6

1,555 2,077 241 167 78 145 165 11

7.72 10.31 1.20 0.83 0.39 0.72 0.82 0.06

Economic and social infrastructure Housing/public utilities Transport/communications Community development

28 38 9

61 136 38

60 85 130

175 365 612

0.87 1.81 3.04

Directly productive projects Land development Land settlement Refugee assistance Crop production Animal production Forestry Fisheries Industries/mining Food reserves

50 22 1 20 31 45 4 15 1

428 303 1 184 113 308 20 12 9

250 125 68 80 100 162 17 20 24

2,229 732 148 440 704 1,333 139 45 87

11.06 3.63 0.74 2.19 3.50 6.61 0.69 0.22 0.43

Relief and emergency operations Sudden natural disasters Drought/crop failure Man-made disasters PRO PDPO

168 6 1 65 40

545 8 1 890 1,287

834 117 14 338 124

1,742 1,093 167 2,743 2,955

8.65 5.43 0.83 13.61 14.67

Total

658

5,362

3,121

20,148

100.00

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States (ex-Soviet Union); PRO – Protracted Refugee Operations; PDPO – Protracted Displaced Person Operations; —Less than $1 million; % Share in Total Commitments. Figures rounded. Source: World Food Programme.

255

Statistical Appendix 2 Total WFP commitments and number of development projects and emergency operations by region, 1962–95 (values in US$ million)

Year

Sub-Saharan Africa No. Value

Asia and Pacific No. Value

1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

– 9 15 17 17 27 28 36 43 34 21 17 29 48 42 49 58 49 64 53 48 72 73 49 43 63 61 56 51 57 63 57 40 29

– 5 4 11 17 16 24 94 68 42 34 23 61 71 240 80 174 246 244 232 290 279 430 234 289 344 354 342 456 804 1,055 706 740 764

1 5 17 8 14 18 15 17 23 8 12 24 6 32 27 21 32 39 24 27 31 21 23 24 15 16 19 18 11 14 16 16 11 12

Total

1,418

8,773

Latin America and Caribbean No. Value

Europe, Middle East and CIS No. Value

Total commitments No. Value 3 33 71 39 83 88 89 100 102 68 48 65 63 126 102 100 120 116 115 121 117 129 135 119 99 117 112 110 98 101 106 97 73 56

— 3 7 5 22 22 15 187 89 16 33 47 5 97 181 151 133 352 126 150 146 293 314 277 126 207 266 158 136 123 146 92 156 147

– 8 10 8 12 8 11 17 16 12 6 8 10 13 11 10 13 10 11 13 17 23 24 27 19 21 16 15 18 11 11 7 8 4

– 6 2 6 20 4 7 58 69 15 25 7 15 57 26 55 52 14 72 30 41 127 162 96 110 112 115 93 97 94 84 44 48 27

2 11 29 6 40 35 35 30 20 14 9 16 18 33 22 20 17 18 16 28 21 13 15 19 22 17 16 21 18 19 16 17 14 11

1 11 13 5 42 34 120 142 79 67 41 77 35 182 159 85 115 160 239 163 211 114 195 225 192 140 153 286 244 247 387 603 345 251

617 4,228

428

1,790

658

5,363

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States (ex-Soviet Union); —Less than $1 million. Figures rounded. Source: World Food Programme.

1 24 25 27 101 75 166 481 304 140 133 154 117 408 606 372 474 773 681 575 687 813 1,100 831 718 802 888 878 932 1,267 1,671 1,445 1,289 1,189

3,121 20,147

Notes 2 The Birth of WFP: One Man’s Inspiration 1. Memorandum to President Kennedy from McGovern of 28 March 1961 and attached report on ‘Recommendations for Improvements in the Food for Peace Program’, pp. 35–6 (McGovern Papers, Box TK-5, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University). 2. For what transpired during the Intergovernmental Advisory Committee in Rome, I have drawn from a number of sources, including: the statement by McGovern at the meeting (see appendix to Chapter 2); an interview with George McGovern by John Newhouse on 24 April 1964 for the Oral History Program of the John Fitzgerald Library, Boston; the address of McGovern at WFP’s Twenty-fifth Anniversary Commemorative Meeting in Rome on 30 May 1988, which is recorded in WFP (1988b), pp. 64–8; McGovern (1964), pp. 107–10; Sen (1982), p. 202; personal correspondence from Raymond A. Ioanes, 16 February 1995; personal correspondence from George McGovern, 23 August 1994; and personal interview with George McGovern at the Middle East Policy Council, Washington, DC on 22 April 1997. 3. Memorandum to President Kennedy from McGovern, 11 February 1961 (Presidential Office Files, Box 78, Food for Peace Program 1/61–3/61, John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Boston). 4. Personal interview with McGovern in Washington, DC on 22 April 1997. 5. Personal communication from McGovern, 21 July 1997. 6. Memorandum to President Kennedy from Adlai E. Stevenson, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, 13 November 1961 in The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson: Volume VIII. Ambassador to the United Nations 1961–1965 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979, pp. 148–50), and Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (McGeorge Bundy), 6 December 1961 in Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–63. Volume IX. Foreign Economic Policy. Department of State, Washington, DC. International Investment and Development Policy (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995, pp. 422–3). 7. ‘Annotated Agenda for the Meeting on Use of Surplus Food for Emergency and Development Purposes through Multilateral Channels (FAO and UN)’ with annexes on the two food aid proposals of McGovern and the US representatives at the UN at the State Department, Washington, DC, on 25 October 1961 (Copy in the McGovern Papers, Box TK-3, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University). 8. McGovern Papers, Box TK-2, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 9. McGovern noted that ‘These were the themes I had spoken of for years on countless platforms in South Dakota’ (McGovern, 1977, p. 83). Kennedy had gone to South Dakota to support McGovern in his bid to become senator of that State. When McGovern lost by a tiny margin, it was interpreted that this was due to the ‘religious factor’. Kennedy was a Catholic and South Dakota was predominantly a Protestant state. Kennedy, feeling that he was responsible for McGovern’s defeat, offered him a post in his new administration. McGovern expressed an interest in the position of 256

Notes 257

10.

11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

secretary of agriculture. When that post was given to Orville Freeman, McGovern accepted the directorship of the newly created Office of Food for Peace and special assistant to the president in the White House. Agricultural Policy for the New Frontier by Senator John F. Kennedy (p. 5), Kennedy’s agricultural policy platform for the 1960 presidential campaign (McGovern Papers, Box TK-7, Accession No. 67A1881, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University). Press release, 31 October 1960 (Meyer Feldman Papers, Food for Peace Program (10/60–1/3/61) File, Box 9, John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Boston). Presidential Office Files, File 1T6/Food Conference. John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Boston. Executive Order 10914 ‘Providing for an Expanded Program of Food Distribution to Needy Families’ and Executive Order 10915 ‘Amending Prior Executive Orders to Provide for the Responsibilities of the Director of the Food-for-Peace Programme’ in Code of Federal Regulations Title 3 – The President. 1959–1963 Compilation (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Registrar, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, pp. 443–4). See also Memorandum to Federal Agencies on the Duties of the Director of the Food-for-Peace Program in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. John F. Kennedy, 20 January to 31 December 1961 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1962, p. 6). President Kennedy Speeches. Papers of President Kennedy. Presidential Office Files (91/9/61-5/25/61), Box 34, John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Boston. McGovern Papers, Food for Peace Proposals and Correspondence File, Box TK-2, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. In a personal communication of 17 April 1997, Don Paarlberg, special assistant to the president and Food for Peace co-ordinator in the White House in the last year of the Eisenhower administration, who also worked with Vice President Nixon on a multilateral food aid concept, said that the Food for Peace programme had always had the elements of: surplus disposal; humanitarianism; trade stimulation; economic and social development; and international diplomacy. Nixon and Kissinger ‘stimulated the last element at the expense of the others’.

3 Antecedents: A Tale of Three Cities 1. The expert group consisted of Dr M. R. Benedict, Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of California at Berkeley, USA; Dr J. Figueres, ex-President of the Republic of Costa Rica; Dr V. K. R. V. Rao, Ex-Vice-Chancellor, University of Delhi, India, Director of the New Delhi Institute of Economic Growth, and former Ph. D. student with Singer at Cambridge University, England; Dr P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA; and Dr H. W. Singer, who was designated as Principal Officer, Office of the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York. 2. Writing over 20 years later, Singer recognized that the expert group’s report did not deal with a number of important areas, including: man-made emergencies; nutrition improvement for mothers and pre-school children; and the use of triangular transactions for providing food aid (Singer, 1983, p. 37). 3. Memorandum to President Kennedy from Adlai Stevenson, US ambassador to the United Nations, 31 November 1961, in Adlai E. Stevenson, Ambassador to the United Nations, 1961–65, Vol. VIII (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979), p. 149.

258 Notes

14. Memorandum to US Secretary for Agriculture, Orville Freeman, from Willard W. Cochrane, Director, Agricultural Economic Service, USDA, 21 June 1961 (Secretary’s Records Section, Food for Peace Program, File IX, US Department of Agriculture, National Agriculture Library, Beltsville, Maryland). 15. An additional motivation for Singer’s interest in food aid was that at the time he attended a lecture by Neville Scrimshaw, a leading nutritionist, at MIT in Cambridge, Massachusetts on the devastating effects of undernourishment and malnutrition on the physical and mental development of young children, which led him to recognize an important role for food aid in terms of human resource development (Personal communication, 5 August 1997). 16. US opposition to SUNFED was by no means universal. Hubert Humphrey and others strongly supported it. 17. Singer was given responsibility in the UN secretariat in New York for drafting the Proposals for Action for the decade, which included reference to the roles of WFP both for development and in emergencies (UN, 1962c, pp. 42–3, 47 and 91–2) (Personal communication, 26 January 1996). 18. One of the best accounts of United States food aid up to 1976 is given in Wallerstein (1980). 19. Professor Vernon W. Ruttan of the University of Minnesota in the United States has made an important contribution toward the understanding of food aid issues by not only bringing together in one volume some of the seminal papers on the subject (Ruttan, 1993) but also by analyzing the complex interplay of forces that have dominated United States food aid policies and programmes (Ruttan, 1996, pp. 149–202). 10. Although these views reflected Indian experience, they were of wider relevance. 11. A selective and annotated bibliography on the food aid literature commissioned by WFP in 1964 listed 423 items. In a Foreword to the bibliography, WFP’s executive director noted ‘Ideas on the whole subject (of food aid) … are in a state of flux and evolution. Theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature are appearing so fast that it is sometimes difficult to keep track of them, let alone evaluate them. In these circumstances, an annotated bibliography – the first in this field – would seem to fulfill a useful purpose’ (Henderson, 1964).

4 The Experimental Years: 1963–5 1. The ILO convention of 1949 lays down a number of principles to be observed for the payment of wages in kind, namely, that: allowances in kind be in the form appropriate for the personal use and benefit of the worker; partial payment of wages in kind should be permitted only in those occupations where it is customary or desirable because of the nature of the occupation concerned; payment in kind should also be authorized by national laws or regulations, collective agreements or arbitration awards; and the value attributed to payment in kind should be ‘fair and reasonable’ (ILO, 1949). 2. The studies were prepared by: Professor V. M. Dandekar, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona, India (Study No. 1); G. R. Allen, Agricultural Economics Research Institute, in association with R. G. Smethurst, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, England (Study No. 2); Professor S. Chakravarty and Professor P. N. RosensteinRodan, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA (Study No. 3); Dr D. A. FitzGerald, Brookings Institution, Washington,

Notes 259

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8. 9.

DC, USA (Study No. 4); and Professor J. Dessau, Institute de Science Économique Appliquée, Paris, France (Study No. 5). The FAO Conference adopted a resolution on the ‘Freedom from Hunger Campaign’ (FFHC) in October 1960. For a detailed description of the FFHC, its background and achievements, see Sen (1982), pp. 137–72. Letter to U Thant, UN Secretary-General, of 3 November 1964 and subsequent press release dated 9 November 1964 on ‘An Expanding World Food Program’ (World Food Programme, Series RAG-3/2, Box 468, UN Archives and Records Centre, New York). Communication addressed to ministers of agriculture of member governments by the director-general of FAO in his letter No. 82 of October 1962, paragraphs 14, 16 and 17. The joint views of the UN secretary-general and the FAO director-general were drafted by Hans Singer, who enjoyed the confidence of both (World Food Programme, Series RAG-3/2, Box 468, UN Archives and Records Centre, New York). The study, entitled A New Approach to the World Food Programme, was prepared by E. L. Samuel, counsellor, agrarian affairs at the Embassy of Israel in Rome, and distributed to IGC members in March/April 1965 as document WM/IGC: 7/94. The proposal was submitted to the IGC at its session in March/April 1965 in document WM/IGC: 7/1 Add. 2. Statement by the United States secretary of agriculture, Orville L. Freeman, at the WFP pledging conference at the United Nations, New York, 18 January 1966. Public Statements of Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman. Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

5 Food for Development 1. To the category of ‘least-developed’ (LDC) countries, the UN General Assembly added another category, the ‘most-seriously affected’ (MSA) countries, at the time of the world food crisis of the 1970s. A number of countries were designated both LDCs and MSAs. In addition, countries were also identified ‘as if’ they were LDCs or MSAs as deserving ‘special attention’ in the allocation of aid by donor countries. 2. The original signatory members of the 1967 FAC were Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Commission of the European Communities (for EEC community aid), Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 3. Other relevant documents that were prepared included: FAO, 1968a,b,c; UN, 1969a; WFP, 1969a. 4. This form of emergency food reserve arrangement, which linked national food reserves globally, contained the elements of the International Undertaking on World Food Security, which was later adopted by the FAO Conference in 1973 and the World Food Conference in 1974 (see Chapter 6). 5. The ‘group of seven’ advisers who were appointed by the WFP executive director were: Mr F. Deeleman, director, Agricultural Assistance to Developing Countries, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, The Hague, The Netherlands; Mr F. Ellis, deputy co-ordinator, Food for Peace, Agency for International Development, Department of State, Washington, DC, United States; Mr J. M. Figuerero, director, International Co-operation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires, Argentina; Mr H. J. Kristensen, counsellor, Ministry of Agriculture, Copenhagen, Denmark; Dr A. A. Mourai, under-secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Cairo, United Arab

260 Notes

16. Republic; Dr S. R. Sen, vice-chairman, Irrigation Commission, Ministry, Irrigation and Power, New Delhi, India; and Mr F. Shefrin, director of International Liaison Service, Department of Agriculture, Ottawa, Canada. The group met for three sessions in Rome in July and October 1969 and February 1970 under the chairmanship of WFP’s executive director. Assistance was also provided by the UN and FAO was well as the WFP secretariat. 16. The FAC of 1967 included provision that a part of the cash contributions be used to finance the food aid contributions of developing exporting countries which were members of the Convention. The FAO studies on the scope for including oil seeds and rice in food aid programmes concluded that similar arrangements would be technically feasible for these commodities. (FAO, 1968b,c.) 17. This was similar to the proposal for country programming of UNDP projects contained in the UN study of the capacity of the UN system (UN, 1969b). The approach was adopted by UNDP but uncertainty about WFP resources being made available precluded its involvement. 18. Details of the world food crisis of the 1970s are taken from the documents prepared for the World Food Conference (see UN, 1974a,b) and from personal correspondence and material from Sartaj Aziz. As deputy secretary-general of the conference, he was intimately involved in its preparations and deliberations (Aziz, 1975a,b). 19. These data on food aid do not include the ‘grey area’ between statistically recorded food aid and outright commercial sales (Shaw and Singer, 1995). 10. Much of this assessment of FFW programmes is based on two studies of the food aid literature commissioned by WFP (WFP, 1978a; Clay and Singer, 1985), which were carried out by Hans Singer alone, and by Edward Clay and Hans Singer, respectively, both at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, England, at the time the surveys were conducted, and on individual WFP project evaluation reports. See also Clay, 1986; Costa, 1973; Ingram, 1983; WFP, 1976b. 11. Norton Franklin, then ILO economic adviser, worked with WFP on the study. At the time of the ILO Conference, it was estimated that there were some 300 million people unemployed or under-employed in the developing countries and that by the end of the century almost 800 million people would enter the labour markets of the developing world. 12. Letter to WFP executive director James Ingram from Dr J.-P. Dustin, formerly WHO Liaison Officer to WFP, of 29 April 1988. 13. The UN Administrative Committee on Coordination/Subcommittee on Nutrition (ACC/SCN) was set up in 1977 as the focal point for harmonizing the policies and activities in nutrition of the UN system. Twenty agencies and programmes of the UN system, including WFP, are members. Representatives of bilateral donor agencies also participate. Until recently, the ACC/SCN was assisted by an Advisory Group on Nutrition consisting of experienced individuals drawn from relevant disciplines and coming from a wide geographical background. The ACC/SCN secretariat, which is responsible for organizing meetings and publishing papers and documents, is located at WHO headquarters in Geneva. 14. The consultants who assisted WFP in prepared these reports were Dr Clio Presvelou, then Professor of Sociology at the University of Louvain, Belgium (WFP, 1975c); Dr Scarlett Epstein, Professor of Sociology at the University of Sussex, England (Epstein, 1979); and Dr Ruth Dixon, Professor of Sociology at the University of California at Davis, in the United States (WFP, 1979e).

Notes 261

15. The Refugee Studies Programme at the University of Oxford, England produced a comprehensive document for WFP on improving social and gender planning in emergency operations. 16. The IMF held a seminar at its headquarters in Washington, DC in October 1990 on the ‘Social Aspects of Adjustments Programs’, the first time it had a meeting with the non-Bretton Woods organizations of the UN system, which called for closer co-operation before adjustment programmes were carried out in order to take account of the needs of the poor from the outset and not as a ‘little sweetener’ to make adjustment programmes more palatable. 17. The studies on Ethiopia and Senegal were carried out by Simon Maxwell, then at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, England in connection with his consultancy for WFP on methodologies for studying the disincentive effects of food aid, and on Lesotho by Simon Hunt of the Oxford Food Studies group in England. 18. Wallace J. Campbell, founder member and former president of CARE (Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere), and a pioneer in low-cost, co-operative housing in developing countries, was appointed as a consultant to work with WFP on the report. 19. Members of COPAC, an inter-agency committee, are: UN, ILO, FAO, International Co-operative Alliance, International Federation of Agricultural Producers, International Federation of Plantation, Agricultural and Allied Workers, and the World Council of Credit Unions. 20. The recipient countries included Bangladesh, Benin, China, India, Lesotho, Pakistan, Honduras, Tanzania and Tunisia. The donors included Australia, Canada, the European Community, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Sweden and the United States. With the exception of China, these national reviews were subsequently published (Shaw and Clay, 1993). 21. The list of WFP occasional papers is included in a bibliography of documents presented to WFP’s governing body between 1962 and 1987 (WFP, 1988c). A six-volume computerized record of the decisions and deliberations of WFP’s governing body was produced in 1993 (WFP, 1993d). A list of individual project evaluations up to 1995 is contained in WFP, 1995g. 22. The French government provided two experts to assist with the study.

6 Emergency and Relief Operations 01. The division of responsibility between the two executive heads was laid down in a document entitled ‘International Famine Relief and Emergency Feeding’, document IGC: 62/3, Annex II, 1962. (See WFP, 1962a.) 02. The General Regulations of WFP were amended in September 1978 to allow the Programme to consider requests ‘from liberation movements recognized by the United Nations and the Organization for African Unity, implemented with the agreement of the host country, that are in conformity with specific resolutions of the UN and FAO, that meet the aims of WFP, the implementation being carried out in accordance with criteria and procedures for emergency operations of the Programme, as appropriate’ (Basic Documents of the World Food Programme, fourth edition, September 1978, p. 25). WFP’s General Regulations were further amended with effect from 1 January 1992 so that ‘The Programme may also provide humanitarian

262 Notes

13.

14. 15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

10.

11.

12.

relief assistance at the request of the Secretary-General. WFP assistance in such exceptional cases shall be fully coordinated with the United Nations system and NGO efforts in the area concerned’ (Basic Documents for the World Food Programme, fifth edition, September 1993, p. 36). There is nothing in WFP’s Basic Documents that precludes the sale of emergency food aid commodities provided by the Programme. It was in the criteria and procedures for handling requests for WFP emergency food assistance, drawn up by the director-general of FAO in 1967, that it was stipulated that recipient governments assume ‘full responsibility for distributing the food free to the designated beneficiaries’ (WFP, 1967a, paragraph 14 (A) (vi)). A graphic account of WFP emergency operations during the African food crisis of the 1980s is given in Fraser (1988). The United States ‘Marshall Plan’ was a package of aid to countries in Europe with strong absorptive and administrative capacity. United States food aid shipments to India reached over eight million tons in 1966 but this was from one donor to one recipient country with good administration and logistics and a well-functioning public food distribution system. In 1974, there were 25 LDCs. By 1995, their number had grown to 48 countries. Most (33 countries) were in Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by Asia and the Pacific (12), the Middle East (2) and Central America (1). Neither China nor India are classified as LDCs. These conclusions build on the proceedings of the WFP Africa regional seminar on ‘Food Aid for Humanitarian Assistance’ that was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in February 1995 (WFP, 1995). A provisional handbook of operational procedures providing detailed guidelines for emergency operations for WFP country offices and headquarters staff was issues in April 1993 (WFP, 1993c). A conference on ‘Nutrition in Times of Disasters’, organized by the ACC/SCN and the International Nutrition Planners Forum, was held in Geneva in September 1988 at which it was recommended that for emergency food rations ‘a practical working figure for the minimum energy requirement should be 1,900 kilocalories/person/ day for a sedentary population’. Guidelines for food rations for refugees have been agreed between WFP and UNHCR. When refugees are dependent entirely on external food aid, the total food available to them from all sources should provide an intake of no less than 1,900 kilocalories of energy per person a day, of which at least 8 per cent should be in the form of protein and 10 per cent in the form of fat. The calories of energy can be modified depending on the circumstances of the refugee population. At his first CFA session in April 1982, the Executive Director, James Ingram, stated that ‘while WFP’s main emphasis was on development, its work on emergencies was of great importance’. He laid stress on the humanitarian as well as the developmental aspects of WFP’s activities and underlined that the Programme must, therefore, ‘apply the same high professional and administrative standards in its emergency operations as in its development projects’ (WFP, 1982b, p. 13). Speaking in December 1984, the director of WFP’s Emergency Service at the time, referred to emergency relief operations as ‘the last bastion of unprofessionalism’ (Page, 1985). Sen’s seminal contribution to an understanding of the causes of food insecurity, famines and poverty was recognized when he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1998 (see Devereux and Singer, 1999).

Notes 263

7 Managing Food Aid Resources 1. Relatively small contributions have been made over the years by farmer groups and private individuals. To date, the largest single private contribution has been $500,000 for refugees and displaced persons in Kosovo, Yugoslavia. 2. WFP commissioned studies on triangular transactions and commodity purchases in 1987 (RDI, 1987) and on commodity exchanges in 1990 (RDI, 1990). Both studies were carried out by Edward Clay and Charlotte Benson who were then director and research officer respectively at the Relief and Development Institute in London. The results of both studies were presented to WFP’s governing body (WFP, 1989h, 1990h).

8 Constitutional Change: The Byzantine Vortex 1. I am indebted to Dr Mark W. Charlton, Associate Professor of Political Science, Trinity Western University, Canada, for his work on WFP’s constitutional change (Charlton, 1992; see also Charlton, 1993). 2. U Thant added that ‘it would seem the merest common sense to suggest that the organizational arrangements (for WFP) that are now being made should be considered as quite provisional and subject to thorough review by the General Assembly at an early date’ (UN, 1961c, p. 3), which was not done until 30 years later. B. R. Sen noted that the institutional arrangements for WFP was ‘one of the last important inter-agency questions that Mr Dag Hammarskjöld dealt with before he left on his fateful journal to the Congo’ (UN, 1961c, p. 8). 3. File EC342 (1-1), PT-A, RAG-3/2, Box 468, UN Archives and Records Centre, New York. 4. The statement of WFP’s executive director to the 1974 World Food Conference gave no hint of the proposed changes to WFP’s governing body. The conference organizers were primarily responsible, particularly Sartaj Aziz, who was deputy secretarygeneral of the conference (see Aziz, 1975b). 5. UN secretaries-general have attended only one session of WFP’s governing body in person, when a session was held in New York in April 1970. Usually, they are represented by a senior UN official. 6. The UN Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) is an independent unit in the UN system based in Geneva consisting of experienced officials who can take up any issue relating to the UN system on their own initiative. According to the statutes of the JIU (see United Nations General Assembly resolution 31/192, adopted on 22 December 1976), on receipt of JIU reports, the executive heads of UN bodies must take immediate action to distribute them to all member governments. The statutes also require the executive heads to comment on JIU reports within three months after receipt. 7. Joint letter of the UN secretary-general and FAO director-general to the WFP Executive Director of 10 May 1985, attached to WFP (1985h). 8. The mood and frustration of many members, particularly those of the OECD group, at the June 1990 session of the CFA was reflected in the statement of the Canadian delegate, who said: ‘I believe that we are confronted with a systematic obstruction of the work of this committee. Faced with a compelling and logical case for fundamental change, personal power and prerogative are now being protected with the most transparent and self-serving recourse to extravagant legal procedures which defy all concepts of common sense. The mechanisms that Member States have put in place to reflect the democratic processes of good order and government in which they

264 Notes

believe, are now cold-bloodedly manipulated in a manner to thwart our will by those elected to exercise good stewardship over the affairs of our institution’ (WFP, 1990e, pp. 49–50). 9. The members of the working group were: Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Japan, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and Zambia.

9 Reform and Renewal: Future Directions 11. The seminar was chaired by Professor Paul Streeten, the eminent development economist and former director of the World Development Institute at Boston University in the United States. 12. The CFA working group that finalized the draft of WFP’s new mission statement that was approved by the governing body in December 1994 was composed of representatives from Brazil, Cameroon, China, Cuba, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, the Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia and the United States. The group met four times between July and September 1994 and was chaired by the chairman or vice-chairman of the CFA. 13. In 1998, the target for the least-developed countries was reached and 89 per cent of WFP’s development resources went to the low-income, food-deficit countries (WFP, 1999a). 14. The preparatory work for the WFP report was done by Bhim Mahajan, a former senior FAO official who knew the UN system well. He had extensive discussions with WFP staff in October 1991 and visited WFP’s major partners in the UN system and the country offices of WFP and other agencies in El Salvador, Ghana and India. 15. Article IV of the 1986 Food Aid Convention states ‘sales on credit, with payments to be made in reasonable annual amounts over periods of 20 years or more and with interest at rates which are below commercial rates prevailing in world markets. The credit sales agreement may provide for payment of up to 15 per cent of the principal upon delivery of the grain.’ 16. This study was commissioned by WFP and carried out by Dr John Mellor, former director general of IFPRI, and his consulting firm, J. Mellor Associates, Inc. 17. The signatories (and their annual minimum commitments in wheat equivalent) of the 1999 FAC are: Argentina (35,000 tons); Australia (250,000 tons); Canada (40,000 tons); European Union and member states (1.3 million tons); Japan (300,000 tons); Norway (30,000 tons); Switzerland (40,000 tons); United States (2.5 million tons) (IGC, 1999). 18. Personal communication from Professor Sir Hans Singer, 16 August 1999. 19. The evaluation, which took three years to complete at a cost reported to be over $3 million (excluding the cost of the extensive support and documentation provided by the WFP secretariat), was conducted by 16 international consultants, assisted by national consultants in nine country case studies. The first phase of the evaluation, completed in late 1992, was conducted by the North–South Institute of Canada. The second phase, completed in December 19993, was co-ordinated by the Chr. Michelsen Institute of Bergen, Norway. The evaluation report consisted of an abridged version, a main report, and nine country case studies. 10. At the 1997 WFP/UNU seminar, papers were presented by World Food Prize Laureate Professor Nevin Scrimshaw and Nobel Prize Laureates Professor Robert Fogel and Professor Amartya Sen. Professor Cutberto Garza of the United Nations University

Notes 265

was moderator. The papers of the 1997 seminar and for the 1998 consultations are available on WFP’s web site on the Internet at www.wfp.org. 11. In 1998, 35 per cent of global food aid deliveries were channelled directly through WFP, 26 per cent through NGOs and 39 per cent provided bilaterally (WFP, 1999e). 12. Food security is mentioned as an aim in the food aid legislation or policy objectives of the major food aid donors, Canada, the European Union and the United States and in the new WFP mission statement.

Bibliography Abbott, J. (1992) Politics and Poverty: A Critique of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (London: Routledge). ACC/SCN (1991) Managing Successful Nutrition Programmes, ACC/SCN State-of-the-Art Series, Nutrition Policy Discussion Paper No. 8 (Geneva: UN Administrative Committee on Coordination Subcommittee on Nutrition). ACC/SCN (1993a) Nutritional Issues in Food Aid, ACC/SCN Symposium Report, Nutrition Policy Discussion Paper No. 12 (Geneva: UN Administrative Committee on Coordination Subcommittee on Nutrition). ACC/SCN (1993b) ‘ACC/SCN Statement on the Benefits of Preventing Growth Failure in Early Childhood’, in ACC/SCN (1993a), p. 36. ACC/SCN (1993c) ‘ACC/SCN Statement on Nutrition, Refugees and Displaced Persons’, in ACC/SCN (1993a), p. 86. ACC/SCN (2000) 4th Report on the World Nutrition Situation. Nutrition throughout the Life Cycle (Geneva: UN Administrative Committee on Coordination Subcommittee on Nutrition in collaboration with the International Food Policy Research Institute). Acock, A. M. (1967) ‘The World Food Program – An Experiment in Multilateral Food Aid’, FAO Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, vol. XVI, no. 1, January, pp. 1–7. Adams, D. W. (1968) Marshall Aid: Rebuilding Europe. History of the 20th Century (London: Parnell). Ahmad, Q. K. (1983) ‘The Contribution of Food Aid to Equitable Growth in Bangladesh’, in WFP/Government of the Netherlands, Seminar on Food Aid, The Hague, 3–5 October 1983 (Rome: WFP) pp. 179–90. Ahmed, R. and C. Donovan (1992) Issues of Infrastructural Development. A Synthesis of the Literature (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute). Allen, G. R. with R. G. Smethurst (1965) The Impact of Food Aid on Donor and Other FoodExporting Countries, WFP Study No. 2 (Rome: UN and FAO). Allen, T. and H. Morsink (eds) (1994) When Refugees Go Home (London: James Currey in association with United Nations Institute for Social Development). Annan, K. (1997) Renewing the United Nations. A Programme for Reform (New York: United Nations). Annan, K. (1999a) Preventing War and Disasters. A Growing Global Challenge, 1999 Annual Report on the Work of the Organization (New York: United Nations). Annan, K. (1999b) ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’, The Economist, 18 September, pp. 81–2. Austin, J. E. and M. B. Wallerstein (1978) Toward a Development Food Aid Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT INP Discussion Paper). Aziz, S. (1975a) ‘A World Grain Reserve: History and Prognosis’, in S. Aziz (ed.) (1975b), pp. 47–53. Aziz, S. (ed.) (1975b) Hunger, Politics and Markets. The Real Issues in the World Food Crisis (New York: New York University Press). Bailey, J. (1995) WFP: Thirty Years in Context, Preface to WFP (1995f). Baker, J. E. (1979) Food for Peace, 1954–1978. Major Changes in Legislation, Prepared for the Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Policy, US Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress). 266

Bibliography 267

Baribeau, R. D. and C. D. Gerrard (1984) A Review of the Food Aid Literature (Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency). Beaton, G. (1993) ‘Which Age Group Should be Targeted for Supplementary Feeding?’, in ACC/SCN (1993a), pp. 37–54. Beaton, G. and H. Ghassemi (1979) Supplementary Feeding Programmes for Young Children in Developing Countries. Document SCN/80 (1)-3 (Rome: Administrative Committee on Co-ordination/Subcommittee on Nutrition). Subsequently published in The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, vol. 35, no. 4, 1982, pp. 864–916. Belli, P. (1971) ‘The Economic Implications of Malnutrition: The Dismal Science Revisited’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 1–23. Benedict, M. and E. Bauer (1960) Farm Surpluses: U.S. Burden or World Asset? (Berkeley: University of California Press). Benson, C. and E. Clay (1998) ‘Additionality or Diversion? Food Aid to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Republics and Implications for Developing Countries’, World Development, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 31–44. Berg, A. (1981) Malnourished People. A Policy View, Poverty and Basic Needs Series (Washington, DC: World Bank). Berg, A. (1987) Malnutrition: What Can Be Done? Lessons from World Bank Experience (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank). Bertrand, M. (1970) Report on Method of Computing Reimbursements for Services supplied by FAO to the World Food Program, Document JIU/REP/70/7 (Geneva: United Nations Joint Inspection Unit). Bertrand, M. (1984) Report on Personnel Problems in the World Food Programme, Document JIU/REP/84/8 (Geneva: United Nations Joint Inspection Unit). BIDS and IFPRI (1985) Development Impact of the Food-for-Work Program in Bangladesh (Dhaka and Washington, DC: Submitted to the World Food Programme by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies and the International Food Policy Research Institute). Biswas, M. and P. Pinstrup-Andersen (eds) (1986) Nutrition and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992) An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations). Boyd Orr, J. and D. Lubbock (1953) The White Man’s Dilemma (London: Unwin Books). Braun, J. von (1991) A Policy Agenda for Famine Prevention in Africa, Food Policy Report (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute). Braun, J. von (1993) ‘Labour-Intensive Public Works Programmes Supported by Food Aid as a Nutrition Intervention’, in ACC/SCN (1993a), pp. 23–30. Braun, J. von (ed.) (1995) Employment for Poverty Reduction and Food Security (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute). Braun, J. von, T. Teklu and P. Webb (1991) Labour-Intensive Public Works for Food Security: Experience in Africa, Working Papers on Food Subsidies No. 6 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute). Bryson, J., J. Chidy and J. Pines (1991) Food for Work: A Review of the 1980s and Recommendations for the 1990s (Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development). Buchanan-Smith, M. and S. Davies (1996) Famine Early Warning and Response: The Missing Link? (London: IT Publications). Burgess, A. (1982) Evaluation of Nutrition Interventions: An Annotated Bibliography and Review of Methodologies and Results, FAO Food and Nutrition Paper No. 24, 2nd edn (Rome: FAO).

268 Bibliography

Candler, W. and N. Kumar (1998) India: The Dairy Revolution. The Impact of Dairy Development in India and the World Bank’s Contribution (Washington, DC: World Bank Operations Evaluation Department). Cathie, J. (1997) European Food Aid Policy (Aldershot: Ashgate). Chakravarty, S. and P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan (1965) The Linking of Food Aid with Other Aid, WFP Study No. 3 (Rome: UN and FAO). Chambers, R. (1997) Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last (London: Intermediate Technology Publications). Chambers, R., R. Longhurst and A. Pacey (eds) (1981) Seasonal Dimensions of Rural Poverty (Exeter: Frances Pinter Ltd). Charlton, M. W. (1992) ‘Innovation and Inter-Organizational Politics: The Case of the World Food Programme’, International Journal, vol. XLVII, Summer, pp. 630–65. Charlton, M. W. (1993) The Making of Canadian Food Aid Policy (Montreal and Kingston: McGill–Queen’s University Press). Charlton, M. W. (1997) ‘Famine and the Food Weapon: Implications for the Global Food Aid Regime’, The Journal of Conflict Studies, vol. XVII, no. 1, pp. 28–54. Chr. Michelsen Institute (1994) Evaluation of the World Food Programme (Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute). Clay, E. (1986) ‘Rural Public Works and Food for Work: A Survey’, World Development, vol. 14, no. 10/11, pp. 1237–52. Clay, E. (1987) Poisoned Gift or Resource for Development? Dairy Aid to Developing Countries, Development and Nutritional Issues, IFPRI Workshop on the Economics of Dairy Development in Selected Countries and Policy Implications, Copenhagen, Denmark, January 1987. Clay, E. (1997) Food Security: A Status Review of the Literature (with Special Reference to the Human and Social Dimensions of Food Security since the Mid-1980s, Research Report ODA, ESCOR No. R.5911 (London: Overseas Development Administration, United Kingdom Government). Clay, E. and C. Benson (1990) ‘Acquisition of Commodities in Developing Countries for Food Aid in the 1980s’, Food Policy, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 7–43. Clay, E. and M. Mitchell (1983) ‘Is European Community Food Aid In Dairy Products Cost-Effective?’, European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 10, pp. 97–121. Clay, E. and J. Shaw (eds) (1987) Poverty, Development and Food: Essays in Honour of H. W. Singer on his 75th Birthday (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Clay, E. and H. W. Singer (1985) Food Aid and Development: Issues and Evidence. A Survey of the Literature since 1977 on the Role and Impact of Food Aid in Developing Countries, WFP Occasional Paper No. 3 (Rome: WFP). Clay, E. and O. Stokke (eds) (1991) Food Aid Reconsidered: Assessing the Impact on Third World Countries (London: Frank Cass). Clay, E., N. Pillai and C. Benson (1998) The Future of Food Aid: A Policy Review (London: Overseas Development Institute). Cochrane, W. W. (1959) ‘Farm Technology, Foreign Surplus Disposal, and Domestic Supply Control’, Journal of Farm Economics, vol. 41, no. 5, December, pp. 885–99. Cochrane, W. W. (1962) ‘Contributions of the New Frontier to Agricultural Reform in the United States’, Journal of Farm Economics, vol. 44, no. 5, pp. 1167–79. Cohen, R. and F. Deng (1998) Masses in Flight. The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press). Colding, B. and P. Pinstrup-Andersen (1999) ‘Denmark’s Contribution to the World Food Programme: A Success Story’, Food Policy, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 93–108.

Bibliography 269

Colding, B. and P. Pinstrup-Andersen (2000) ‘Food Aid as an Aid Instrument: Past, Present and Future’, in F. Tarp (ed.), Foreign Aid and Development – Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future (London: Routledge). Coles, A. (1984) The Effects of Food Aid on Dietary Patterns (Rome: FAO). COPAC and WFP (1988) Food Aid and Co-operatives for Development (Rome: Committee for the Promotion and Advancement of Co-operatives and World Food Programme). Cornia, G. A., R. Jolly and F. Stewart (eds) (1987) Adjustment with a Human Face. Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth. A Study by Unicef, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Costa, E. S. (1973) ‘The World Food Programme and Employment: Ten Years of Multilateral Food Aid for Development’, International Labour Review, vol. 107, no. 3, March, pp. 209–21. Costa, E. S. Guha, M. I. Hussain, T. B. Thuy and A. Fardet (1977) Guidelines for the Organization of Special Labour-Intensive Works Programmes (Geneva: World Employment Programme, International Labour Office). Cox, R. W. (1969) ‘The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organizations’, International Organizations, vol. XXIII, no. 2, Spring, pp. 205–30. Crawshaw, B. and D. J. Shaw (1996) ‘Changing Vulnerability to Food Security and the International Response: The Experience of the World Food Programme’, in T. E. Downing (ed.), Climate Change and World Food Security (Berlin: Springer in cooperation with NATO Scientific Affairs Division), pp. 207–26. Dandekar, V. M. (1965) The Demand for Food and Conditions Governing Food Aid during Development, WFP Study No. 1 (Rome: UN and FAO). Dawson, A. (1964) ‘Food for Development: The World Food Programme’, International Labour Review, vol. XC, no. 2, pp. 1–31. Delisle, H. and D. J. Shaw (eds) (1998) ‘The Quest for Food Security in the Twenty-First Century’, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, vol. XIX, Special Issue. Dessau, J. (1965) The Role of Multilateral Food Aid Programs, WFP Study No. 5 (Rome: UN and FAO). Devereux, S. and H. W. Singer (1999) ‘A Tribute to Professor Amartya Sen on the Occasion of his receiving the 1998 Nobel Prize for Economics’, Food Policy, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 1–6. Doornbos, M., L. Gertsch and P. Terhal (1991) ‘Dairy Aid and Development: Current Trends and Long-Term Implications of the Indian Case’, in E. Clay and O. Stokke (eds), Food Aid Reconsidered: Assessing the Impact on Third World Countries (London: Frank Cass), pp. 117–42. Drèze, J. (1988) Famine Prevention in India, Discussion Paper No. 3 (London: The Development Economics Research Programme, London School of Economics). Drèze, J. and A. Sen (1989) Hunger and Public Action (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Dustin, J.-P. (1982) The Relevance of Lactose-Intolerance to WFP Food-Aided Projects, Document WFP/CFA: 14/INF/8 (Rome: WFP). Dustin, J.-P. and G. J. Lavoipierre (1981) ‘Food Aid as a Capital Investment’, World Development Forum, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 106–13. ECOSOC (1990) Operational Activities of the United Nations System, Document E/1990/85, 18 May. Edmundson, W. C. and P. V. Sukhatme (1990) ‘Food and Work: Poverty and Hunger?’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 263–80. Epstein, S. (1979) ‘The Role of Women in WFP’s Supplementary Feeding Projects’ (Rome: WFP, typescript). Epstein, S. B. (1987) Food for Peace, 1954–1986: Major Changes in Legislation (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress).

270 Bibliography

Faaland, J., D. McLean and O. Norbye (1998) ‘The World Food Programme and International Food Aid’, in Clay, E. and O. Stokke (eds) Food and Human Security (London: Frank Cass for European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes). FAO (1946) Proposals for a World Food Board, Prepared for Submission to the Second Session of the FAO Conference, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2 September 1946 (Washington, DC: FAO, 1946). FAO (1953) Report of Group of Experts on the Establishment of an Emergency Famine Reserve, Document CL 17/19 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1954) Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses. Principles Recommended by the FAO (Rome: FAO) (subsequently revised and expanded in five versions). FAO (1955) Uses of Agricultural Surpluses to Finance Economic Development in Under-Developed Countries: A Pilot Study in India, Commodity Policy Studies no. 6 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1956) Functions of a World Food Reserve. Scope and Limitations, Commodity Policy Studies No. 10 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1958) National Food Reserve Policies in Underdeveloped Countries, Commodity Policy Studies No. 11 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1961a) ‘Expanded Program of Surplus Food Utilization’, Report by the Expert Group to the Director General of FAO, in Development through Food: A Strategy for Surplus Utilization, FFHC Basic Study No. 2 (Rome: FAO) pp. 69–117. Republished in FAO (1985), pp. 223–343. FAO (1961b) Utilization of Food Surpluses. World Food Programme, FAO Conference resolution 1/61, adopted on 24 November 1961 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1962a) Nutrition and Working Efficiency, FFHC Basic Study No. 5 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1962b) Education and Training in Nutrition, FFHC Basic Study No. 6 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1962c) ‘Agricultural Commodities – Projections for 1970’, FAO Commodity Review, Special Supplement (Rome: FAO). FAO (1963a) Third World Food Survey, FFHC Basic Study No. 11 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1963b) Possibilities for Increasing World Food Production, FFHC Basic Study No. 10 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1963c) ‘World Food Programme’, Background Papers No. 17, WFC/63/BP/11B/5, 28 January. B. Functions and Forms of External Aid, World Food Congress (Rome: FAO). FAO (1963d) ‘Changing Attitudes toward Agricultural Surpluses’, Document CCP/ CSD/63/27, 12 April, Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal, Committee on Commodity Problems (Rome: FAO). FAO (1964) Food Aid and Other Forms of Utilization of Agricultural Surpluses. A Review of Programs, Principles and Consultations, FAO Commodity Policy Studies No. 15 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1965a) Report of the World Food Congress. Washington, DC, 4 to 18 June 1963, Volume 1 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1965b) Report of the World Food Congress. Washington, DC, 4 to 18 June 1963, Volume 2, Major Addresses and Speeches (Rome: FAO). FAO (1965c) Continuation of the World Food Programme, FAO Conference resolution 4/65, adopted on 6 December 1965. FAO (1967) Study on Food Production Resources in Agricultural Development, Document C67/41 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1968a) Milk Products as Food Aid, Document CCP OF 68/5/4 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1968b) Internationally Financed Food Aid (Rome: FAO). FAO (1968c) The Possible Role of Rice in Food Aid. A Technical Feasibility Study, Document CCP: RI68/4 (Rome: FAO).

Bibliography 271

FAO (1970) ‘Speech delivered at the Closing Ceremony by the Chairman H. E. P. J. Lardinois’, in Report of the Second World Food Congress, vol. 1 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1973) Index. FAO Conference and Council Decisions 1945–1972 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1975) Reconstitution of the United Nations/FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Program as a Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programs, Resolution 22/75 of the FAO Conference adopted on 26 November 1975 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1981) Manual on the Management of Group Feeding Programmes, Food and Nutrition Paper No. 23 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1982) The Impact of WFP Food Aid in Ethiopia (Rome: FAO). FAO (1983) Approaches to Food Security, Economic and Social Development Paper No. 32 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1985) Food for Development, Economic and Social Development Paper No. 34 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1986) Prepositioning of Food Stocks to Expedite Delivery of Emergency Food Aid, Document CFS: 86/5 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1989) The Effects of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programmes on Food Security, Economic and Social Development Paper No. 89 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1990) Participation in Practice. Lessons from the FAO People’s Participation Programme, (Rome: FAO). FAO (1991a) Revision of the General Regulations of WFP and Membership of the WFP Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes, FAO Conference resolution 9/91 adopted on 26 November 1991 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1991b) FAO Study on Prospects for Food Aid and Its Role in the 1990s, CFA: 31/P/5-C. FAO (1992) Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations of Member States, 3rd edn (Rome: FAO). FAO (1993) Food and Nutrition in the Management of Group Feeding Programmes, Food and Nutrition Paper No. 23 Rev. 1 (Rome: FAO). FAO (1996) World Food Summit. Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action (Rome: FAO). FAO (1998) Guidelines for National Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping System (FIVIMS). Background and Principles, Report to the Committee on World Food Security, Twenty-Fourth Session (Rome: FAO). Figa-Talamanca, I. (1985) Nutritional Implications of Food Aid: An Annotated Bibliography, FAO Food and Nutrition Paper No. 33 (Rome: FAO). FitzGerald, D. A. (1965) Operational and Administrative Problems of Food Aid, WFP Studies No. 4. (Rome: FAO). Fraser, C. (1988) Lifelines for Africa Still in Peril (London: Hutchinson). GATT Secretariat (1994) The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The Legal Text (Geneva: GATT Secretariat). Gaude, J. and H. Watzlawick (1992) ‘Employment Creation and Poverty Alleviation through Labour-Intensive Public Works in Least-Developed Countries’, International Labour Review, vol. 131, no. 1, pp. 3–18. Gaude, J., A. Guichasua, B. Martins and S. Miller (1987) ‘Rural Development and Labour-Intensive Schemes’, International Labour Review, vol. 126, no. 4, July/August, pp. 423–46. Gongora, J. and D. J. Shaw (1977) ‘World Food Programme Assistance for Supplementary Feeding Programmes: Review and Recommendations’, FAO Food and Nutrition Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 15–20. Government of Botswana (1974) A Study of Constraints on Agricultural Development in the Republic of Botswana (including an assessment of the role of food aid)

272 Bibliography

(Gaborone: Division of Planning and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Botswana). Greaves, J. P. and D. J. Shaw (eds) (1986) Food Aid and the Well-Being of Children in the Developing World (New York: UNICEF and WFP). Gupta, S., C. MacDonald, C. Schiller, M. Verhoeven, Z. Bogetic and G. Schwartz (1998) Mitigating the Social Costs of the Economic Crisis and the Reform Programs in Asia, IMF Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment 98/7 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund). Guruge, A. (1983) School Feeding Programmes as a Potential Source of Learning (Paris and New Delhi: UNESCO and UNICEF). Gwatkin, D. R., J. R. Wilcox and J. D. Wray (1980) Can Health and Nutrition Interventions Make A Difference?, Monograph No. 13 (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council). Haas, E. B. (1969) Tangle of Hopes. American Commitments and World Order (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.) Hall, D. W. (1965) The Handling and Storage of World Food Programme Commodities in Recipient Countries (London: Tropical Stored Products Centre, Ministry of Overseas Development). Hambridge, G. (1955) The FAO Story (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc.). Hammam, M. and N. Youssef (1986) ‘The Continuum in Women’s Productive and Reproductive Roles: Implications for Food Aid and Children’s Well-Being’, in Greaves and Shaw (1986), pp. 85–104. Also published as WFP Occasional Paper No. 5 (Rome: WFP). Harvey, D. R. (1998) ‘The US Farm Act: “Fair” or “Foul”? An Evolutionary Perspective from East of the Atlantic’, Food Policy, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 111–21. Hay, R. H. (1986) ‘Food Aid and Relief-Development Strategies’, WFP Occasional Paper No. 8 (Rome: WFP, 1986), reproduced in Disasters, vol. 10, no. 4 (1986), pp. 273–87. Hay, R. H. and E. J. Clay (1986) Food Aid and the Development of Human Resources, WFP Occasional Paper No. 7 (Rome: WFP). Henderson, E. (1964) Food Aid: A Selected Annotated Bibliography (Rome: UN and FAO). Herbinger, W. (1994) ‘The World Food Programme’s Response to the Challenge of Linking Relief and Development’, IDS Bulletin, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 96–100. Herbinger, W., B. Crawshaw and D. J. Shaw (1999) ‘Beneficiary Participation in Context: Practical Experience from a Food-Aided Project in Ethiopia’, in J. Mullin (ed.), Rural Poverty, Empowerment and Sustainable Livelihoods (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 1–13. Holt, J. (1995) ‘Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation: The Ethiopia Experience’, in WFP (1995b), pp. 12–31. Hopkins, R. F. (1984) ‘The Evolution of Food Aid. Toward a Development First Regime’, Food Policy, November, pp. 345–62. Hopkins, R. F. (1990) ‘International Food Organizations and the United States: Drifting Leadership and Diverging Interests’, in M. P. Karns and K. A. Mingst (eds), The United States and Multilateral Institutions. Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence (Boston: Unwin Hyman), pp. 177–204. Hopkins, R. F. (1992) ‘Reform in the International Food Aid Regime: The Role of Consensual Knowledge’, International Organization, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 225–64. Hopkins, R. F. and D. Puchala (1978) The Global Political Economy of Food (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press). Horton, S. (1991) ‘Costs of Nutrition Interventions: Unit Costs, Cost Structure and Cost Effectiveness’ (Washington, DC: World Bank, typescript).

Bibliography 273

Hossain, M. and M. M. Akash (1993) Public Rural Works for Relief and Development: A Review of the Bangladesh experience, Work Papers on Food Subsidies No. 7 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute). Humphrey, H. H. (1958) Food and Fiber as a Force for Freedom, Report to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, United States Senate (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office). Hunt, S. (1988) Lesotho: Food Aid, Food Security, Disincentives and Dependency (Oxford: Oxford Food Studies Group). Hyder, M. (1996) ‘From Relief to Development: Food for Work in Bangladesh’, Disasters, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 21–33. IFPRI (1997) Urban Challenge to Food and Nutrition Security (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute). IFPRI (1998) ‘The Changing Outlook of Food Aid’, News and Views, November (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute). IGC (1999) Food Aid Convention, 1999 (London: International Grains Council). ILO (1930) Forced Labour Convention, No. 29 (Geneva: International Labour Office). ILO (1949) Protection of Wages Convention, No. 95 (Geneva: International Labour Office). ILO (1957) Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (Geneva: International Labour Office). ILO (1963) Hunger and Social Policy, FFHC Basic Studies No. 14 (Geneva: International Labour Office). ILO (1966) Recommendations concerning the Role of Co-operatives in the Economic and Social Development of Developing Countries (Geneva: International Labour Office). ILO (1992) ‘Productive Employment of the Poor’, International Labour Review, vol. 131, no. 1, Special Issue. Ingram, J. C. (1983) ‘Food Aid for Employment: 20 Years of the World Food Programme’, International Labour Review, vol. 122, no. 5, September/October, pp. 549–62. Ingram, J. C. (1993) ‘The Future Architecture for International Humanitarian Assistance’, in T. G. Weiss and L. Minear (eds), Humanitarianism Across Borders. Sustaining Civilians in Times of War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers). Isenman P. J. and H. W. Singer (1977) ‘Food Aid: Disincentive Effects and their Policy Implications’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 25, January, pp. 205–37. Islam, M. S. (1994) Statement on Behalf of the Least-Developed Countries. Document MTN. TNC/MIN(94)/ST/7 (Marrakesh: Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The Uruguay Round). Islam, N. (1991) ‘Bangladesh Agriculture: Growth, Stability and Poverty Alleviation’, Journal of International Development, vol. 3, no. 5, pp. 447–65. IWC (1974) International Wheat Agreements. A Historical and Critical Background, Document CL71/8 (London: International Wheat Council). IWC (1988) The Food Aid Convention on the International Wheat Agreement: History (London: International Wheat Council). Jackson, T. (1982) Against the Grain: The Dilemma of Project Food Aid (Oxford: OXFAM). Jaspers, S. and H. Young (1996) General Food Distribution in Emergencies: From Nutritional Needs to Political Priorities (London: Overseas Development Institute). JCGP (1990) Poverty Alleviation. A Global Challenge, Joint Consultative Group on Policy High Level Report (Rome: International Fund on Agricultural Development). Jennings, A. (1987) The World Food Programme and the Recurrent Cost Problem, WFP Occasional Paper No. 9 (Rome: WFP). Jennings, A. and D. J. Shaw (1987) ‘Food Aid and the Recurrent Cost Problem in Developing Countries’, Food Policy, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 213–26. Kahn, R. F. (1931) ‘The Relation of Home Investment to Unemployment’, The Economic Journal, vol. XLI, no. 162, June, pp. 173–98.

274 Bibliography

Kapur, D., J. P. Lewis and R. Webb (1997) The World Bank. Its First Half Century, Vol. 1: History (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press). Katone-Apte, J. (1983) ‘The Significance of Intra-Household Food Distribution Patterns in Food Programmes’, FAO Food and Nutrition Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 35–41. Katone-Apte, J. (1986) ‘Women in Development. A Developmental Perspective’, Food Policy, August, pp. 216–22. Katone-Apte, J. (1993) ‘Issues in Food Aid and Nutrition’, in ACC/SCN (1993), pp. 5–20. Katone-Apte, J. and S. Maxwell (1983) ‘WFP Project Design Review’ (Rome: WFP, typescript). Kern, C. R. (1968) ‘Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: The Economics of Food Aid Programs’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. LIII, no. 1, pp. 59–75. Knock, T. J. (1992) ‘ “Food for Peace”: George McGovern and the New Frontier’s Endeavours to Preclude “Inevitable Revolutions” ’. Paper presented to the Organization of American Historians Annual Convention, April (typescript). Konandreas, P. and J. Greenfield (eds) (1996) ‘Implications of the Uruguay Round for Developing Countries’, Food Policy, vol. 21, nos 4/5, Special Issue, September/November. Konandreas, P. and J. Greenfield (1998) ‘Policy Options for Developing Countries to Support Food in the Post-Uruguay Round Period’, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, vol. XIX, Special Issue, pp. 141–59. Kracht, U. and M. Schulz (eds) (1999) Food Security and Nutrition. The Global Challenge (Münster and New York: Lit Verlag and St. Martin’s Press). Kristenson, T. (1968) The Food Problems of Developing Countries (Paris: OECD). Kruger, A. (ed.) (1998) The WTO as an International Organization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Kust, M. J. (1956) ‘Economic Development and Agricultural Surpluses’, Foreign Affairs, October, pp. 105–15. Leach, L. and C. E. Hanrahan (1994) P.L. 480 Food Aid: History and Legislation, Programs, and Policy Issues, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress). Levinger, B. (1983) School Feeding Programmes in Less Developed Countries: An Analysis of Actual and Potential Impact (Washington, DC: Office of Evaluation, Bureau for Food and Voluntary Aid, Agency for International Development). Levinger, B. (1984) ‘School Feeding Programmes: Myth and Potential’, Prospects, vol. XIV, no. 3, pp. 369–76. Lewis, W. A. (1954) ‘Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour’, The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, vol. XXII, no. 2, pp. 139–91. Luehe, E. (1983) ‘Food Aid in Crisis Situations’, Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture, vol. XXII, pp. 95–107. Macrea, J. and A. Zwi (eds) (1994) War and Hunger. Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies (London: Zed Books with Save the Children (UK)). Marek, T. (1992) Ending Malnutrition: Why Increasing Income is Not Enough, Technical Working Paper No. 5, Population, Health and Nutrition Division, Africa Technical Department (Washington, DC: World Bank). Masefield, G. (1967) Food and Nutrition Procedures in Times of Disaster, FAO Nutritional Studies No. 21 (Rome: FAO). Mason, J. B., J.-P. Habicht and H. Tabatabai (1982) Principles for Evaluation of On-Going Programs, Cornell Nutritional Surveillance Program, Working Paper Series No. 5 (Ithaca: Cornell University). Maxwell, S. (1978a) Food Aid, Food for Work and Public Works, Discussion Paper 17 (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex).

Bibliography 275

Maxwell, S. (1978b) ‘Food Aid for Supplementary Feeding Programmes. An Analysis’, Food Policy, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 289–98. Maxwell, S. (1986a) Food Aid to Ethiopia: Disincentive Effects and Commercial Displacement, IDS Discussion Paper No. 226 (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex). Maxwell, S. (1986b) Food Aid to Senegal: Disincentive Effects and Commercial Displacement, IDS Discussion Paper No. 225 (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex). Maxwell, S. (1986c) Food Aid: Agricultural Disincentives and Commercial Displacement, IDS Discussion Paper No. 224 (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex). Maxwell, S. (1991) ‘The Disincentive Effects of Food Aid: A Programmatic Approach’, in Clay and Stokke (1991), pp. 66–90. Maxwell, S. and M. Buchanan-Smith (eds) (1994) ‘Linking Relief and Development’, IDS Bulletin, vol. 25, no. 4, October. Maxwell, S. and D. J. Shaw (1995) ‘Food, Food Security and UN Reform’, IDS Bulletin, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 41–53. Maxwell, S. and H. W. Singer (1979) ‘Food Aid to Developing Countries: A Survey’, World Development, vol. 7, pp. 225–46. McGovern, G. S. (1961) Statement of the Delegate of the United States of America at the Intergovernmental Advisory Committee, 10 April 1961. In FAO (1961a) p. 121. Republished in FAO (1985), pp. 315–16 and reproduced in annex to Chapter 2. McGovern, G. S. (1964) War Against Want. America’s Food for Peace Program (New York: Walkers and Co.). McGovern, G. S. (ed.) (1967a) Agricultural Thought in the Twentieth Century (New York: Bobbs-Merrill). McGovern, G. S. (1967b) That None Shall Want. Food for Freedom. (McGovern Papers, Box TK-5. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscripts Library, Princeton University.) McGovern, G. S. (1977) Grassroots. The Autobiography of George McGovern (New York: Random House). Meier, G. M. and D. Seers (eds) (1984) Pioneers in Development, a World Bank Publication (New York: Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press). Meinzen-Dick, R. S., L. R. Brown, H. S. Feldstein and A. R. Quisumbing (1997) ‘Gender, Property Rights and Natural Resources’, World Development, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 1299–302. Mellor, J. W. (1980) ‘Food Aid and Nutrition’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 62, no. 5, pp. 979–83. Mellor, J. W. (1983) ‘Food Aid, Equity and Agricultural Growth’, in IFPRI Report 1983 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute), pp. 7–11. Mellor Associates (1992) Food for Development in a Market Oriented World (Washington, DC: Prepared for WFP by John Mellor Associates, Inc.). Messer, E., M. J. Cohen and J. D’Costa (1998) Food From Peace. Breaking the Links Between Conflict and Hunger, Food, Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper 24 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute). Mora, J. (1990) The Effectiveness of Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Supplementary Feeding Programmes. An Analysis of Performance in the 1980s and Potential Role in the 1990s (Washington, DC: Logical Technical Services Corporation for Agency for International Development). Morgan, D. (1979) Merchants of Grain (New York: The Viking Press). Murphy, J. L. (1995) Gender Issues in World Bank Lending (Washington, DC: World Bank).

276 Bibliography

Murray, P. E. (1989) ‘Paradox and Narrative: The Social Construction of Reality within International Secretariats’, Ph.D. dissertation (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America). Musgrove, P. (1993) Feeding Latin America’s Children: An Analytical Study of Food Programs, Latin America and Caribbean Technical Department Regional Studies Program Report No. 11 (Washington, DC: World Bank). Netherlands Government (1991) Policy Document on Multilateral Development Cooperation. An Evaluation of the Multilateral Organizations as a Channel for Dutch Aid (The Hague: Netherlands Government). Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1991) Food Aid and Development. Evaluation of Dutch Food Aid with Special Reference to Sub-Saharan Africa 1980–89 (The Hague: Operations Review Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands Government). Nordic UN Project (1990) Responding to Emergencies: The Role of the UN in Emergencies and Ad Hoc Operations, Report No. 14, in The United Nations. Issues and Options (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International). Nordic UN Project (1991) The United Nations in Development. Reform Issues in the Economic and Social Fields. A Nordic Perspective (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International). Oakley, P. (1991) Projects with People: The Practice of Participation in Rural Development (Geneva: International Labour Organization). ODI (1998) The Future of Food Aid: Summary of Findings and Recommendations (London: Overseas Development Institute). ODI (2000) Reforming Food Aid: Time to Grasp the Nettle?, ODI Briefing Paper No. 1, January (London: Overseas Development Institute). OECD (1962) Food Aid: Its Role in Economic Development (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). O’Hagan, J. P. and T. Lehti (1968) ‘Some Economic and Policy Problems of Food Aid’, FAO Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, vol. 17, no. 2, February, pp. 1–12. Orr, E. (1977) ‘The Contribution of New Food Mixtures to the Relief of Malnutrition’, FAO Food and Nutrition Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 2–10. Page, T. (1985) ‘Issues in Emergency Food Aid: A Personal View’, in E. Clay and E. Everitt (eds), ‘Food Aid and Emergencies: A Report on the Third IDS Food Aid Seminar’, IDS Discussion Paper No. 206, pp. 3–9. Parotte, J. H. (1983) ‘The Food Aid Convention: Its History and Scope’, IDS Bulletin, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 10–15. Payne, P. (1986) ‘Appropriate Indicators for Project Design and Evaluation’, in Greaves and Shaw (1986), pp. 105–42. Payne, P. (1987) ‘Malnutrition and Human Capital: Problems of Theory and Practice’, in Clay and Shaw (1987), pp. 22–41. Pearson, L. (1969) Partners in Development. Report of the Commission on International Development (New York: Praeger). Pena, C., P. Webb and L. Haddad (1996) Women’s Advancement through Agricultural Change: A Review of Donor Experience, Food Consumption and Nutrition Division Discussion Paper No. 10 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute). Pilon, J. G. (1988) ‘The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization: Becoming Part of the Problem’, Society, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 6–10. Pinstrup-Andersen, P. (ed.) (1988) Food Subsidies in Developing Countries. Costs, Benefits and Policy Options (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press for the International Food Policy Research Institute).

Bibliography 277

Pinstrup-Andersen, P. (1991) Food Aid to Promote Economic Growth and Combat Poverty, Food Insecurity and Malnutrition in Developing Countries and Suggestions for How to Increase the Effectiveness of Danish Aid to the World Food Programme (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Denmark). Pollitt, E. (1984) Nutrition and Educational Achievement, Nutrition Education Series Issue 9 (Paris: UNESCO). Pollitt, E. (1990) Malnutrition and Infection in the Classroom (Paris: UNESCO). Quisumbing, A. R., L. R. Brown, H. S. Feldstein, L. Haddad and C. Pena (1995) Women: The Key to Food Security, Food Policy Report (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute). Quisumbing, A. R., L. Haddad, R. Meinzen-Dick and L. R. Brown (1998) ‘Gender Issues for Food Security in Developing Countries: Implications for Project Design and Implementation’, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, vol. XIX (Special Issue), pp. 185–208. RDI (1987) A Study of Triangular Transactions and Local Purchases in Food Aid, WFP Occasional Paper No. 11, Relief and Development Institute, London for WFP (Rome: WFP). RDI (1990) A Study of Commodity Exchanges in WFP and Other Food Aid Operations, WFP Occasional Paper No. 12, Relief and Development Institute, London for WFP (Rome: WFP). Reutlinger, S. (1983) ‘Project Food Aid and Equitable Growth: Income Transfer Efficiency First’, in WFP/Government of the Netherlands (1983), pp. 167–78. Reutlinger, S. (1999) ‘From “Food Aid” to “Aid for Food”: Into the 21st Century’, Food Policy, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 7–15. Reutlinger, S. and J. Katone-Apte (1983) The Nutritional Impact of Food Aid: Criteria for the Selection of Cost-Effective Foods, Discussion Paper No. ARU12 (Washington, DC: World Bank). Rivera, J. (1993) ‘Effects of Supplementary Feeding on the Growth of Children with Infection’, in ACC/SCN (1993), pp. 55–7. Rogers, K. D., U. K. Srivastrava and E. O. Heady (1972) ‘Modified Price, Production, and Income Impacts of Food Aid under Market Differentiated Distribution’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 201–8. Rosen, S. (1989) Consumption Stability and the Potential of Food Aid in Africa, Economic Research Service Staff Report No. AGES 89-29 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture). Ruttan, V. W. (ed.) (1993) Why Food Aid? (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press). Ruttan, V. W. (1996) United States Development Assistance Policy. The Domestic Politics of Foreign Economic Aid (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press). Sahn, D. E. and R. M. Pestronk (1979) Experiences and Methodologies in Nutrition Program Evaluation: A Literature Review (Ann Arbor: Community Systems Foundation for Office of Nutrition, Agency for International Development). Santayana, G. (1905) The Life of Reason; or, The Phases of Human Progress, vol. 1, chapter XII, ‘Flux and Constancy in Human Nature’ (New York and London: Charles Scribner’s Sons and Constable). Sapsford, D. and J. Chen (eds) (1998) Development Economics and Policy: The Conference Volume to Celebrate the 85th Birthday of Professor Sir Hans Singer (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Schuh (1983) ‘Increasing the Effectiveness of Food Aid: Offsetting the Opportunity Cost of Schooling’, in WFP and Government of the Netherlands (1983), pp. 101–6. Schultz, T. W. (1960) ‘Value of US Farm Surpluses to Underdeveloped Countries’, Journal of Farm Economics, vol. 42, no. 5, December, pp. 1019–30.

278 Bibliography

Schultz, T. W. (1964) Transforming Traditional Agriculture (New Haven: Yale University Press). Schultz, T. W. (1993) The Economics of Being Poor (Oxford: Blackwell). Scrimshaw, N. S. (1997) ‘The Lasting Damage of Early Malnutrition’, in WFP/UNU Ending the Inheritance of Hunger (Rome: WFP), pp. 3–14. Seaman, J. and J. Rivers (1988) ‘Strategies for the Distribution of Relief Food’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, vol. 151, no. 3, pp. 464–72. Sen, A. (1981) Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Sen, A. (1983) ‘Food Entitlement and Food Aid Programmes’, in WFP and Government of The Netherlands (1983), pp. 111–22. Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf). Sen, B. R. (1982) Towards a Newer World (Dublin: Tycooly). Sen, S. R. (1960) ‘Impact and Implications of Foreign Surplus Disposal on Underdeveloped Economies – The Indian Perspective’, Journal of Farm Economics, vol. XLII, pp. 1031–42. Sen, S. R. (1965) Implications of the UNCTAD and Argentine Proposals for the Modification of the World Food Program, Document WFP/IGC: 8/15 (Rome: WFP). Shapouri, S. and S. Rosen (1999) Food Security Assessment. Why Countries Are At Risk, an Economic Research Service Report. Agricultural Information Bulletin No. 754 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture). Shaw, D. J. (1967) ‘Resettlement from the Nile in Sudan’, Middle East Journal, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 462–87. Shaw, D. J. (1970a) ‘The Mechanism and Distribution of Food Aid. Multilateral Food Aid for Economic and Social Development’, Journal of World Trade Law, vol. 4, no. 2, March/April, pp. 207–37. Shaw, D. J. (1970b) ‘World Food Programme Assistance for Agricultural Education and Training’, Document RU:AET/24. FAO, UNESCO and ILO World Conference on Agricultural Education and Training. Copenhagen, July/August 1970. Shaw, D. J. (1983) ‘Triangular Transactions in Food Aid: Concept and Practice – The Example of the Zimbabwe Operations’, IDS Bulletin, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 29–31. Shaw, D. J. (1985) ‘The Contribution of the World Food Programme to Nutrition’, Proceedings of the XIII International Congress on Nutrition, pp. 39–44. Shaw, D. J. (1987) ‘Some Future Directions for Food Aid’, Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 219–25. Shaw, D. J. (1993) ‘Poverty-Specific Policy Approached’, in C. Easter (ed.), Strategies for Poverty Reduction (London: Commonwealth Secretariat), pp. 43–63. Shaw, D. J. (1995) ‘Future Directions for Development and Relief with Food Aid’, in J. von Braun (ed.) (1955), pp. 252–74. Shaw, D. J. (1996) ‘The World Food Programme and Emergency Relief’, Advanced Development Management Programme Series No. 20 (Tokyo: Institute of Comparative Culture, Sophia University). Shaw, D. J. (1997) ‘World Food Security: The Impending Crisis?’, Development Policy Review, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 413–20. Shaw, D. J. (1998) ‘The World Food Programme: Linking Relief and Development’, in Sapsford and Chen (1998), pp. 437–84. Shaw, D. J. (1999) ‘Multilateral Development Co-operation for Improved Food Security and Nutrition’, in Kracht and Schulz (1999), pp. 555–80. Shaw, D. J. (2000) ‘Food Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policy Lessons for the Future’, in D. Belshaw and I. Livingstone (eds) Renewing Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Prospects, Policies and Prospects (London: Routledge).

Bibliography 279

Shaw, D. J. and E. Clay (eds) (1993) World Food Aid. Experiences of Recipients and Donors (Rome, London and Portsmouth, New Hampshire: World Food Programme in association with James Currey and Heinemann). Shaw, D. J. and E. J. Clay (1998) ‘Global Hunger and Food Security after the World Food Summit’, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, vol. XIX, Special Issue, pp. 55–76. Shaw, D. J. and B. Hutchinson (eds) (1993) ‘Disaster Mitigation’, special issue of the Arid Lands Newsletter, Fall/Winter, 34 (Tucson: University of Arizona). Shaw, D. J. and H. W. Singer (eds) (1988) ‘Food Policy, Food Aid and Economic Adjustment’, Food Policy, vol. 13, no. 1, February. Shaw, D. J. and H. W. Singer (1995) ‘A Future Food Aid Regime: Implications of the Final Act of the GATT Uruguay Round’, IDS Discussion Paper No. 352 (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies). See different versions of the paper, in Food Policy, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 447–60; and in H. O’Neil and J. Toye (eds), A World Without Hunger? (Basingstoke: Macmillan for the UK Development Studies Association, 1996), pp. 305–34. Shaw, D. J. and H. W. Singer (1998) ‘A Note on Some UN Achievements with Special Reference to the World Food Programme’, in M. Glassner (ed.), The United Nations at Work (London: Praeger), pp. 186–212. Shaw, D. J., B. Crawshaw and F. Fortier (1994) ‘Using Project Food Aid to Help Alleviate Urban Poverty – Experience and Issues’, Fourth International Famine Workshop, Commission on the Geography of Famine and Vulnerable Food Systems, Mexico City, August 1993. GeoJournal, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 305–13. Shawcross, W. (1984) The Quality of Mercy. Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience (New York: Simon & Schuster). Shawcross, W. (2000) Deliver Us from Evil: Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict (London: Bloomsbury). Shoham, J. (1994) Emergency Supplementary Feeding Programmes (London: Overseas Development Institute). SIFAD (1989) Joint Government of Bangladesh/Donor Task Force on Strengthening the Institutions for Food Assisted Development, Final Report, vols 1/2 (Dhaka: Ministry of Planning). Singer, H. W. (1965) ‘External Aid: For Plans or Projects’, The Economic Journal, vol. 75, September, pp. 539–45. Singer, H. W. (1972) Children in the Strategy of Development, Executive Brief Paper No. 6 (New York: United Nations Centre for Economic and Social Information). Singer, H. W. (with the collaboration of S. J. Maxwell) (1983) ‘Development through Food: Twenty Years’ Experience’, in WFP/Government of the Netherlands (1983), pp. 31–46. Singer, H. W. (1984) ‘The Terms of Trade Controversy and the Evolution of Soft Financing: Early Years in the U.N.’, in Meier and Seers (1984), pp. 273–312. Singer, H. W. (1991) ‘Food Aid and Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in Clay and Stokke (1991), pp. 180–90. Singer, H. W. (1994) ‘Two Views of Food Aid’, in R. Prendergast and F. Stewart (eds), Market Forces and World Development (London: Macmillan for the UK Development Studies Association), pp. 207–11. Singer, H. W. (1996) ‘Linking Relief and Development’, Advanced Development Management Programme Series No. 19 (Tokyo: Institute of Comparative Culture, Sophia University). Singer, H. W. and R. Longhurst (1986) ‘The Role of Food Aid in Promoting the Welfare of Children in Developing Countries’, in Greaves and Shaw (1986), pp. 27–66. Singer, H. W., J. Wood and T. Jennings (1987) Food Aid: The Challenge and the Opportunity (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

280 Bibliography

Smethurst, R. G. (1969) ‘Direct Commodity Aid: A Multilateral Experiment’, Journal of Development Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, April, pp. 205–19. Smith, L. and L. Haddad (2000) Overcoming Child Malnutrition in Developing Countries: Past Achievements and Future Choices (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute). Snow, C. P. (1968) The State of Siege, Address at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, United States, 12 November 1968. Reproduced by the Office of the War on Hunger, Agency for International Development, Washington, DC. Stevens, C. (1979) Food Aid and the Developing World. Four African Case Studies (London: Overseas Development Institute). Stewart, F. (1986) ‘Food Aid: Pitfalls and Potential’, in Greaves and Shaw (1986), pp. 67–84. Szal, R. and E. Thorbecke (1985) Food, Nutrition and Employment, a Review of ILO Activities (Geneva: World Employment Programme, International Labour Office). Talbot, R. B. (1990) The Four World Food Agencies in Rome (Ames: Iowa State University Press). Talbot, R. and W. Moyer (1987) ‘Who Governs the Rome Food Agencies?’ Food Policy, vol. 12, November, p.363. TechEcon (1992) Food Aid Transport Costs and Options (London: Economic and Transport Consultants for the Commission of the Economic Communities). The New York Times (1961) ‘Friend of Farmers. George Stanley McGovern’, March 31. The Washington Post (1961) ‘Food for Development’, April 1. Thimm, H.-U. and H. Hahn (eds) (1993) Regional Food Security and Rural Infrastructure, 2 vols (Münster-Hamburg: Lit Verlag). Thomas, J. W. (1985) Food for Work. An Analysis of Current Experience and Recommendations for Future Performance (Cambridge: Harvard Institute for Development). Toole, M. (1993) ‘Protecting Refugees’ Nutrition with Food Aid’, in ACC/SCN, Nutritional Issues in Food Aid, ACC/SCN Symposium Report, Nutrition Policy Discussion Paper No. 12 (Geneva: ACC/SCN), pp. 87–90. UN (1945) Charter of the United Nations (New York: United Nations). UN (1960a) 868th Plenary Meeting. United Nations General Assembly. Fifteenth Session. Official Records (Part 1). Plenary Meetings Vol. 1 Verbatim Records of Meetings 20 September–17 October 1960 (New York: United Nations). UN (1960b) ‘Economic development of under-developed countries. Food surpluses: distribution to under-developed countries’, Second Committee 649th Meeting, 18 October 1960. General Assembly – Fifteenth Session – Second Committee. Summary Records of Meetings. 21 September – 14 December 1960 (New York: United Nations). UN (1960c) Provision of Food Surpluses to Food-Deficit People through the United Nations System, United Nations General Assembly resolution 1496 (XV), adopted at the 908th Plenary Meeting, 27 October 1960 (New York: United Nations). UN (1961a) World Food Programme, General Assembly resolution 1714 (XVI), adopted on 19 December 1961 (New York: United Nations). UN (1961b) Official Records of the General Assembly. Sixteenth Session. Plenary Meetings. Volume 1. Verbatim Records of Meetings 19 September–18 October 1961 (New York: United Nations). UN (1961c) Statements to the Second Committee of the General Assembly on 8 December 1961, Document A/C. 2/L.623-4 (New York: United Nations). UN (1962a) Population and Food Supplies, FFHC Basic Studies No. 7 (New York: United Nations). UN (1962b) Aspects of Economic Development – The Background to Freedom from Hunger, FFHC Basic Studies No. 8 (New York: United Nations).

Bibliography 281

UN (1962c) The United Nations Development Decade: Proposals for Action (New York: United Nations). UN (1963) Official Records of the General Assembly. Eighteenth Session. Plenary Meetings. Volume 1. Verbatim Record of Meetings 17 September–14 October 1963 (New York: United Nations). UN (1965a) Report on the United Nations Interregional Round-Table Conference on World Food Programme Projects, Ankara, Turkey, 17–25 May 1965. UN (1965b) Continuation of the World Food Programme, General Assembly resolution 2095 (XX), adopted on 20 December 1965 (New York: United Nations). UN (1965c) Programme of Studies of Multilateral Food Aid, General Assembly resolution 2096 (XX), adopted on 20 December 1965 (New York: United Nations). UN (1968a) Inter-Agency Study on Multilateral Food Aid, Document E/4538 (New York: United Nations). UN (1968b) Multilateral Food Aid, General Assembly resolution 2462 (XXIII), adopted on 23 December 1968 (New York: United Nations). UN (1969a) International Action to Avert the Impending Protein Crisis, Report of the UN Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development, Document E.68.XIII.2 (New York: United Nations). UN (1969b) Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System (Geneva: United Nations). UN (1971) Comprehensive Report of the Secretary-General on Assistance in Cases of Natural Disasters, Document E/4994 (New York: United Nations). UN (1972) International Women’s Year, General Assembly resolution 3010 (XXVII) adopted on 18 December 1972 (New York: United Nations). UN (1973) World Food Conference, General Assembly resolution 3180 (XXVIII), adopted on 25 November 1973 (New York: United Nations). UN (1974a) United Nations World Food Conference. Assessment of the World Food Situation: Present and Future, Document E/CONF. 65/3 (New York: United Nations). UN (1974b) United Nations World Food Conference. Proposals for National and International Action, Document E/CONF. 65/4 (New York: United Nations). UN (1975a) Report of the World Food Conference, Rome 5–16 November 1974, Document E/CONF. 65/20 (New York: United Nations). UN (1975b) Reconstitution of the United Nations/FAO Intergovernmental Committee as a Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programs, United Nations General Assembly resolution 3404 (XXX), adopted on 28 November 1975 (New York: United Nations). UN (1976a) Report of the World Food Council on the Work of its Second Session, Supplement No. 19 (A/31/19) (New York: United Nations). UN (1976b) Development and International Economic Cooperation, Resolution 3362 (S-VII) adopted by the General Assembly during its Seventh Special Session: 1–16 September. UN General Assembly Official Records, Supplement No. 1 (A/10301) (New York: United Nations). UN (1983) Administrative and Financial Authority of the Executive Director of the WFP: An Opinion of the UN Office of Legal Affairs (New York: United Nations). UN (1991a) Strengthening of the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations, United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/182, adopted on 19 December 1961 (New York: United Nations). UN (1991b) Revision of the General Regulations of the World Food Programme and Enlargement of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes of the World Food Programme, United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/22, adopted on 5 December 1991 (New York: United Nations).

282 Bibliography

UN (1992) Triennial Policy Review of the Operational Activities of the United Nations Development Assistance, United Nations General Assembly resolution 14/199, adopted on 22 December 1992 (New York: United Nations). UN (1993) Further Measures for the Restructuring and Revitalization of the United Nations in the Economic, Social and Related Fields, United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/162, adopted on 20 December 1993 (New York: United Nations). UN and FAO (1965) Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the DirectorGeneral of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations on the Future Development of the World Food Program with reference to General Assembly Resolution 1714 (XVI), Document WM/IGC: 7/4 Add. 8, 1 March (New York and Rome: United Nations and FAO). UN and FAO (1985) Joint Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the DirectorGeneral of the Food and Agriculture Organization on the Deliberations of the UN/FAO Joint Task Force on WFP Relationship Problems (New York and Rome: United Nations and FAO). UNCTAD (1964) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Final Act and Report, Proceedings, Vol. 1, Recommendation World Food Program. No. A. II. 6. Sales No. 64.II.B. 11 (New York: United Nations). UNDP (1994) Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Published for the United Nations Development Programme by Oxford University Press). UNESCO (1963) Education and Agricultural Development, FFHC Basic Studies No. 15 (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). UNESCO (1980) School Feeding as a Service to Children. Guidelines for Planning School Feeding Programmes. Basic Education Series No. 3 (Paris: United Nations Scientific, Cultural and Educational Organization). UNESCO (1983) Workshop on School Feeding and Education, Sri Avinashilingam Home Science College for Women, Coimbatore, India, December 1983, Document WSFE 83/1 (Paris: United Nations Scientific, Cultural and Educational Organization). UNHCR (1993) The State of the World’s Refugees: The Challenge of Protection (London: Penguin Books). UNHCR (1997) The State of the World’s Refugees 1997–98: A Humanitarian Agenda (Oxford: Oxford University Press). UNICEF (1985) The State of the World’s Children, 1985 (New York: Oxford University Press for UNICEF). UNICEF (1999) The State of the World’s Children, 1999 (New York: Oxford University Press for UNICEF). Urquhart, B. and E. Childers (1990) A World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow’s United Nations (Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation). Urquhart, B. and E. Childers (1994) Renewing the United Nations System (New York: The Ford Foundation). US (1961) Congressional Record. Proceedings and Details of the 87th Congress, 1st Session. Volume 107, Part 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). US (1962) Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. John F. Kennedy, 20 January to 31 December 1961(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). US (1963) President Kennedy Speeches (Papers of the President’s Office Files. Box 34, John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Boston, MA). US (1964) Sixteenth Semi-Annual Report on Activities Carried Out Under Public Law 480 (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, Office of Material Resources). US (1996) U.S. Views on Reform Measures Necessary for Strengthening the United Nations System (Washington, DC: United States Department of State).

Bibliography 283

USDA (1995) Agricultural Export Programs. Background for 1995 Farm Legislation, Agricultural Economic Report No. 716 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture). USDA (1996) Provisions of the 1996 Farm Bill, Agricultural Outlook, Special Supplement (Washington, DC: Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture). Wallerstein, M. B. (1980) Food for War – Food for Peace. United States Food Aid in a Global Context (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press). Webb, P. and J. von Braun (1994) Famine and Food Security in Ethiopia: Lessons for Africa (Chichester, England and New York: Wiley & Sons). WFP and Government of the Netherlands (1983) Report of Food Aid Seminar, The Hague, 3–5 October 1983 (Rome: World Food Programme and Government of the Netherlands). WFP and ADB (1987) Food Aid for Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Rome and Abidjan: World Food Programme and African Development Bank). WFP and UNU (1997) Ending the Inheritance of Hunger (Rome: WFP and United Nations University). WHO (1963) Malnutrition and Disease. A Major Problem of the Human Race, FFHC Basic Studies No. 12 (Geneva: World Health Organization). WHO (1976) Vitamin Enrichment of Dried Skim Milk (with Special Reference to Vitamin A). Document WFP/CFA: 2/7-C Add. 1 (Rome: WFP). Wightman, D. R. (1968) ‘Food Aid and Economic Development’, International Conciliation, no. 567 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), March. WIHD (1993) Hunger 1993: Uprooted People (Washington, DC: World Institute on Hunger and Development). Williams, D. (1987) The Specialized Agencies and the United Nations: The System in Crisis (London: Hurst & Co.). Wilmshurst, J., P. Ackroyd and R. Eyben (1992) ‘Implications for U.K. Aid of Current Thinking on Poverty Reduction’, IDS Discussion Paper No. 307 (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex). Witt, L. M. (1964) ‘Development through Food Grants and Concessional Sales’, in C. Eicher and L. Witt (eds) Agriculture in Economic Development (New York: McGrawHill), pp. 334–59. Woodbridge, G. (1950) UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (New York: Columbia University Press). World Bank (1976) Public Works Programs in Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 224 (Washington, DC: World Bank). World Bank (1980) World Development Report, 1980, Part II, Poverty and Human Development (New York: Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press). World Bank (1986) Poverty and Hunger. Issues and Options for Food Security in Developing Countries (Washington, DC: World Bank). World Bank (1988) Adjustment Lending. An Evaluation of Ten Years of Experience. Policy and Research Series No. 1, Country Economics Department (Washington, DC: World Bank). World Bank (1989) Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. A Long-Term Perspective Study (Washington, DC: World Bank). World Bank (1998) Assessing Aid. What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why, A World Bank Policy Research report (New York: Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press). World Bank (2000) Entering the 21st Century. World Development Report 1999/2000 (New York: Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press).

284 Bibliography

World Bank and WFP (1991) Food Aid in Africa. An Agenda for the 1990s (Washington, DC and Rome: World Bank and World Food Programme). Yates, L. P. (1955) So Bold An Aim (Rome: FAO). Yohannes, Y. and P. Webb (1999) Classification and Regression Trees, CART. A User Manual for Identifying Indicators of Vulnerability to Famine and Chronic Food Insecurity, Microcomputers in Policy Research No. 3 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute). Zhu Ling and Jiang Zhongyi (1995) ‘Yigong-Daizhen’ in China: A New Experience with Labour-Intensive Public Works in Poor Areas’, in J. von Braun (1995), pp. 75–107.

WFP Documents (Rome: WFP) (1962a) World Food Programme Intergovernmental Committee, First Session, Report to ECOSOC and FAO Council. WFP/IGC: Report 1/62. (1962b) International Famine Relief and Emergency Feeding. IGC: 62/3, Annex II. (1963a) World Food Program. Basic Documents. General Regulations. Financial Regulations. UN/FAO Intergovernmental Committee Rules of Procedure,1st edn. (1963b) Report of the Third Session of the UN/FAO Intergovernmental Committee. IGC/3/63/REP/2, p. 7. (1963c) Executive Director Circular Letter on Sales Policy. WFP/16, 19 March. (1964a) Synopsis of World Food Programme Policies. FP1/1. (1964b) Report of the Fifth Session of the UN/FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Program. MO/IGC: 5/17. (1965a) Report on the World Food Program by the Executive Director. (1965b) How to Prepare and Present Requests for WFP Assistance to Economic and Social Projects, 1 October. (1965c) Food Aid and Education, WFP Study No. 6. (1965d) Recommendations by the Intergovernmental Committee to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and to the Council of FAO on the Future of the World Food Program. MO/IGC: 7/19, 30 April. (1966a) General Regulations, 3rd edn. (1966b) Criteria for Selection of Projects. WFP/IGC: 9/14. (1966c) Report on the Jamaica Mission (Study on the Feasibility of Multilateral Food Aid for National Development Programs). WFP/IGC: 9/18. (1966d) Comments on the Methodology adopted in the Jamaica Mission Report, Note by the Executive Director. WFP/IGC: 10/17. (1966e) Comments on the Methodology adopted in the Jamaica Mission Report, WFP/IGC: 10/17 Add. 3. (1966f) Summary Records of the Seventh Meeting held at FAO Headquarters, 25 April 1966, Ninth Session of the WFP Intergovernmental Committee. WFP/IGC: 9/SR.7. (1966g) Report of the Ninth Session of the UN/FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Program. WFP/IGC: 9/23. (1967a) Information concerning the Handling of Requests for Emergency Food Assistance, Note by the Director-General of FAO. WFP/IGC: 12/5 Add. 1. See also Further Consideration of Criteria for WFP Emergency Assistance, Note by the Director-General of FAO. WFP/IGC: 14/5 Add. 2, 1968. (1967b) Outline of the Study of the Feasibility of Multilateral Food Aid in Support of National Development Programs, Note by the Executive Director. WFP/IGC: 12/15. (1967c) Calculation of Food Rations for Workers in Self-help Projects. WFP/RR/45.

Bibliography 285

(1967d) Role of WFP in Supporting Animal Husbandry Schemes. WFP/IGC: 12/12 Rev. 1. (1967e) Establishment of Price Stabilization Schemes. WFP/IGC: 11/15 Rev.1. (1968a) Possible Development of WFP. Inclusion of Non-Food Items in WFP Resources. WFP/IGC: 13/13. (1968b) Special Feeding Projects. WFP/CFA: 13/15. (1968c) WFP Assistance to Education in Africa. WFP/IGC: 13/6 Add. 26. (1968d) Five Industrial Development Projects in Turkey. WFP/IGC: 13/7 Add. 22 and Annexes. (1969a) Inclusion of Non-Food Items in WFP Resources. WFP/IGC: 15/14 Rev. 1. (1969b) Projects to Forestall Emergencies, Post-Emergency Projects and Quasi-Emergency Projects. WFP/IGC: 16/5 Add. 1. (1969c) Scope for Expansion of WFP Activities in the Spheres of Improved Nutrition, Education and Training. Development of Human Resources WFP/IGC: 15/16. (1970a) Food Aid and Related Issues during the Second Development Decade, Draft report of the Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Programme in response to resolution 2462 (XXIII) of the United Nations General Assembly. WFP/IGC: 17/5. (1970b) Food Aid and Related Issues during the Second Development Decade, Report of the Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Programme in response to resolution 2462 (XXIII) of the United Nations General Assembly. WFP/IGC: 17/5 Rev. 1. (1970c) Procedures for Approval of Quasi-Emergency Projects. WFP/IGC: 17/11. (1971) Proposal of the Delegation of the Kingdom of The Netherlands to the Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Programme to Establish an Emergency Food Supply Scheme. WFP/IGC: 20/12 Add. 1. (1972a) Proposals of the Governments of Argentina, Lebanon and Uruguay. WFP/IGC: 22/11. (1972b) National Supplementary Feeding Programmes for Nutritionally Vulnerable Groups. WFP/IGC: 22/12-A. (1972c) Food Aid Consortia for Vulnerable Groups. WFP/IGC: 22/12-B. (1973a) Ten Years of World Food Programme Development Aid, 1963–72. (1973b) Report of the Twenty-Fourth Session of the UN/FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Programme. WFP/IGC: 24/20. (1973c) Report by the Executive Director on WFP Assistance for Livestock Development through Animal Feeding Projects. WFP/IGC: 24/10 Add. 2. (1974a) Annual Statement of the Executive Director on the Development of the Programme, 1973. WFP/IGC: 25/4 Corr. 1. (1974b) Review of the Quasi-Emergency Procedure and its Establishment on a Permanent Basis. WFP/IGC: 25/14. (1974c) Report of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the UN/FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Programme. WFP/IGC: 25/18. (1974d) Address of Dr. Francisco Aquino, Executive Director, World Food Programme to the World Food Conference (Rome, 11 November). (1974e) The Approach to Evaluation of WFP Development Aid. WFP/IGC: 25/12 and Adds. 1 to 5. (1975a) The Contribution of Food Aid to the Improvement of Women’s Status. WFP/IGC: 27/15. (1975b) Executive Director’s Statement and Declaration on International Women’s Year. WFP/IGC: 27/INF/5. (1975c) The World Food Programme and Women’s Involvement in Development. WFP/IGC: 28/11 Add. 1. (1975d) Emergency Operations: Experience and Recommendations. WFP/CFA: 28/5-B. (1975e) Report of the Twenty-seventh Session of the United Nations/FAO Intergovernmental Committee. WFP/IGC: 27/19. (1975f) Non-Food Items. WFP/IGC: 28/13.

286 Bibliography

(1976a) Report of the First Session of the United Nations/FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 1/13. (1976b) The World Food Programme and Employment. WFP/CFA: 1/15-A. (1976c) Food Aid and Habitat. World Food Programme Assistance for Human Settlements. WFP/CFA: 1/15-B. (1976d) Studies of the Role of Food Aid in relation to Trade and Agricultural Development in Botswana, Lesotho and the Arab Republic of Egypt. WFP/CFA: 1/10 Add. 1. (1976e) Impact of Food Aid on Domestic Production and Trade in Lesotho. WFP/CFA: 1/10 Add. 1, Annex II. (1976f) WFP Assistance to Dairy Development. WFP/CFA: 2/12-B (i) and Add. 1. (1976g) WFP Assistance for Forestry Activities and their Relation to Agricultural and Food Production. WFP/CFA: 2/12-B (ii). (1976h) Report of the Second Session of the United Nations/FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 2/19. (1976i) Establishment of Minimum Food Aid Targets for Dairy and Fish Products, Oils and Fats. WFP/CFA: 2/7-C. (1977a) WFP Assistance for Land and Water Development Projects. WFP/CFA: 3/INF/1. (1977b) Food Aid and Co-operatives. WFP/CFA: 4/12 Add. 1. (1977c) Sales and Exchanges of Commodities. WFP/CFA: 4/9. (1977d) Report of the Fourth Session of the United Nations/FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 4/26. (1978a) A Survey of the Studies of Food Aid. WFP/CFA: 5/5C. (1978b) Report of the Fifth Session of the United Nations/FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 7/21. (1978c) Study of Emergency Operations. WFP/CFA: 6/6. (1978d) Modalities of Operation of the International Emergency Food Reserve, Report of the Sixth Session of the United Nations/FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 6/21, Annex IV. (1978e) General Regulations, 4th edn. (1978f) Policy Unit in WFP. WFP/CFA: 6/17. (1978g) Report of the Sixth Session of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes, Annex IV. WFP/CFA: 6/21. (1978h) Food Aid and Education. WFP/CFA: 5/9 Add. 1. (1978i) WFP Assistance to Dairy Development. WFP/CFA: 6/7 Add. 1. (1979a) Report of the Seventh Session of the United Nations/FAO Committee. (1979b) Guidelines and Criteria for Food Aid, Report of the Seventh Session of the United Nations/FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes, Annex IV. (1979c) Role of Food Aid in Strengthening Food Security in Developing Countries. WFP/CFA: 8/4-B. (1979d) Report of the Eighth Session of the United Nations/FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 8/20. (1979e) WFP’s Contribution to the United Nations Decade for Women. WFP/CFA: 7/8. (1979f) International Year of the Child. WFP/IGC: 7/9. (1979g) United Nations Decade for Women. Circular Letter from Executive Director to WFP Field Staff. WFP: MISC/79/5. (1980a) Kampuchean Emergency Operation. WFP/CFA: 9/7-B. See also WFP/CFA: 10/5 Add. 1, 1980; WFP/CFA: 8-B, 1981; WFP/CFA: 12/INF/5, 1981; WFP/CFA: 13/INF/5, 1982; WFP/CFA: 14/INF/6, 1982. (1980b) The Contribution of the World Food Programme to the United Nations Decade for Women. WFP/CFA: 9/16.

Bibliography 287

(1981a) Study of WFP Emergency Operations and Improvement of All Aspects related to such Matters. WFP/CFA: 12/5-B. (1981b) Terminal Evaluation Report on Project India 618. Milk Marketing and Dairy Development (Operation Flood I). W/P4590. (1982a) Further Review of Proposals and Recommendations to Improve the Effectiveness of Emergency Operations. WFP/CFA: 13/P/5-B. (1982b) Report of the Thirteenth Session of the United Nations/FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 13/20. (1982c) Statement by Mr. James C. Ingram, Executive Director of the World Food Programme at the Twenty-fifth General Conference of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers, London, 15 June 1982. WFP/PO/78. (1982d) WFP Food Aid: Fish Products and Fisheries Development. WFP/CFA: 13/7. (1982e) WFP Zimbabwe Maize Train Operations. WFP/CFA:13/INF/6. (1983a) Annual Report of the Executive Director on the Development of the Programme. WFP/ CFA: 15/4. (1983b) Food Aid and Training. WFP/CFA: 15/11 Add. 1. (1984a) Implementation of the Resolutions of the World Food Conference relating to Food Aid. WFP/CFA: 17/5 Add. 1. (1984b) Report of the Seventeenth Session of the United Nations/FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 17/21. (1984c) Report on Personnel Problems by the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit. Statement by the Executive Director. WFP/CFA: 18/INF/11. (1984d) Report on WFP Personnel Problems by the UN Joint Inspection Unit. Joint Comments of the Secretary-General and the Director-General. WFP/CFA: 18/4 Add. 2. (1984e) Interim Report on the Review of the Basis of Costing of Services provided by FAO. WFP/CFA: 18/5. (1984f) ‘Food Aid and Rural Employment-Led Equitable Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in Review of Food Aid Policies and Programme. WFP/CFA: 17/5, pp. 12–21. (1984g) World Food Programme Assistance for Fisheries Development in Third World Countries and the Use of Fish Products in Food Aid. WFP/CFA: 18/INF/7. (1984h) Non-Food Items: Ways and Means to Strengthen Resources and Operations. WFP/CFA: 17/7. (1984i) Review of Proposals for Improvement of WFP’s Project Cycle. WFP/CFA: 17/10. (1985a) Measures for Ensuring Speedy Delivery of Emergency Food Aid. WFP/CFA: 19/11. (1985b) Evaluation of Food Aid for Price Stabilization and Emergency Food Reserves, WFP Occasional Paper No. 2. (1985c) Review of United Nations/FAO Task Force Report on WFP’s Institutional Relationships. Final Summary Records of the Seventh Meeting. Nineteenth Session. WFP Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 19/SR. 7. (1985d) Review of the Basis of Costing of Services provided to WFP. WFP/CFA: 20/6. (1985e) Final Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting. Twentieth Session. WFP Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 20/SR.5. (1985f) Breadwinners at Home and at Work: World Food Programme Support for Women during the Decade for Women. WFP/CFA: 20/INF/5. Also published as WFP Occasional Paper No.4. (1985g) WFP’s Role in the Provision of Non-Food Items. WFP/CFA: 19/INF/5. (1985h) UN/FAO Task Force on WFP Relationships. WFP/CFA: 19/8. (1986a) Lessons Learned from the African Food Crisis, Summary Evaluation Report on the WFP Emergency Response. WFP/CFA: 21/22 Add. 1 and 2. (1986b) The Basis of Costing of Services provided by FAO to WFP. WFP/CFA: 21/8.

288 Bibliography

(1986c) Report of the Twenty-first Session of the United Nations/FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 21/24. (1986d) Report of the Twenty-second Session of the United Nations/FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 22/17. (1987a) Roles of Food Aid in Structural and Sector Adjustment. WFP/CFA: 23/5 Add. 1. (1987b) Food Aid Strategies for Women in Development. WFP/CFA: 23/7. (1987c) Report of the Twenty-third Session of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 23/22. (1987d) Monetization of WFP Food Aid. WFP/CFA: 24/5. (1987e) The Management of Funds Generated by Food-Assisted Projects. WFP/CFA: 23/5 Add. 2. (1988a) Food Aid and Dairy Development. WFP/CFA: 25/P/8. (1988b) Report of the Twenty-fifth Session of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 25/18. (1988c) Bibliography – Documents Presented to the Governing Body of the World Food Programme 1962–1987. (1989a) Anti-Hunger Strategies of Poor Households and Communities: Roles of Food Aid. WFP/CFA: 27/P/INF/1 Add. 1. (1989b) Review of Protracted Emergency Operations for Refugees and Displaced Persons. WFP/CFA: 27/P/7. (1989c) Report of the Twenty-seventh Session of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 27/16. (1989d) Report of the Twenty-eighth Session of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 28/8. (1989e) Comparative Review of WFP-Assisted Projects in Latin America Focused on Women. WFP/CFA: 28/SCP/3. (1989f) WFP Sectoral Guidelines on Women in Development: Gender Variables in FoodAssisted Projects. WFP/CFA: 27/P/INF/4. (1989g) Environment and Sustainable Development: WFP Policies and Programmes pursuant to United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 42/186 and 42/187. WFP/CFA: 27/P/INF/2. (1989h) Food Aid Triangular Transactions and Local Purchases: A Review of Experience. WFP/CFA: 27/P/INF/3. (1990a) The Status of the WFP Headquarters Agreement. Report by the Executive Director. WFP/CFA: 29/P/6. (1990b) Exchange of Correspondence between the Director-General of FAO and the Executive Director of the World Food Programme. WFP/CFA: 29/P/7 Add. 3 and 4. (1990c) Exchange of Correspondence between FAO and WFP on Rent for WFP Headquarters. WFP/CFA: 29/P/6 Add. 3 and 4. (1990d) Some Observations on Paper CCLM 54/3: Draft Headquarters Agreement for the World Food Programme. Note by the Executive Director. WFP/CFA: 29/P/6 Add. 1. (1990e) Report of the First and Second Sessions of the Sub-Committee on Governance of the World Food Programme and the Relationship between the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Programme. CFA: 30/3, Annex VIII. (1990f) Report of the Twenty-ninth Session of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. WFP/CFA: 29/13. (1990g) Food Aid for Education. Past Experience and Future Directions. (1990h) A Review of WFP and Bilateral Food Commodity Exchange Arrangements. WFP/CFA: 29/P/INF/2.

Bibliography 289

(1991a) Report of the First Special Session of the CFA. CFA: Special Session/3. (1991b) Basic Documents for the World Food Programme, 5th edn. (1991c) The Role of WFP in the Nineties. CFA: 31/P/5-A. (1991d) Review of Food Aid Policies and Programmes and the Role of WFP in the Nineties. CFA: 32/P/6. (1991e) Report of the Thirty-Second Session of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. CFA: 32/13. (1992a) Disaster Mitigation and Rehabilitation in Africa. CFA: 34/P/7–B. (1992b) Food Aid Working for Women. The World Food Programme and Women in Development. (1992c) Annual Report of the Executive Director: 1991. CFA: 33/P/4. (1992d) Integration of Multilateral Non-Emergency Food Aid with Government Development Programmes. A Report prepared by the World Food Programme pursuant to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 44/211. CFA: 33/P/7. (1992e) Working Group on Long-Term Financing of the Operations and Administration of the World Food Programme. (1992f) Criteria for Country Allocation. CFA: 34/P/7-A. (1993a) Annual Report of the Executive Director, 1992. CFA: 35/P/4. (1993b) Basic Documents for the World Food Programme, 5th edn, General Regulations, Part D. Procedures, Eligibility for Assistance. (1993c) Food Aid in Emergencies, Guidelines for WFP Country Offices and Headquarters Staff. (1993d) World Food Programme Policies and Activities. Governing Body Decisions and Deliberations 1962–1988, 6 vols. (1994a) Emergency Operations in Southern Africa during the Drought of 1992–93, Report of the WFP Evaluation Mission. (1994b) Review of Internal Transport, Storage and Handling Assistance (ITSH). (1994c) WFP/UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding on the Joint Working Arrangements for Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons Feeding Operations. (1994d) WFP Mission Statement. CFA: 38/P/5. (1994e) China’s National Experience with Food Aid Policies and Programmes. CFA: 38/P/4. (1994f) The World Food Programme and the Programme Approach. CFA: 38/P/6. (1994g) Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 48/162 for Consideration by the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programme. CFA: 37/P/6-B. (1994h) Review of WFP Policies, Objectives and Strategies. CFA: 37/P/7. (1994i) Food Aid for Development. World Food Programme Asia and Pacific Regional Seminar, Beijing, China; March 1994 (Beijing: China Agricultural Press). (1994j) Cost Measurement Study. CFA: 37/8/INF. 1. (1994k) Criteria for Project Approval. CFA: 38/P/10. (1994l) Study of the Effectiveness of WFP Aid to Development. CFA: 37/P/7/INF. 1. (1995a) Linking Relief and Development. Annual Report of the Executive Director 1994. CFA: 39/4. (1995b) Food Aid for Humanitarian Assistance, Proceedings of the United Nations World Food Programme African Regional Seminar, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, February 1995. (1995c) WFP Provisional Guidelines. Selective Feeding Programmes: Supplementary and Therapeutic. (1995d) Statement of Catherine Bertini, Executive Director of the World Food Programme, Fourth World Conference on Women, September 6, 1995, Beijing, China. (1995e) Report of the Fortieth Session of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. CFA: 40/15.

290 Bibliography

(1995f) Efficiency in Food Aid: Using Food to Address Hunger and Poverty, World Food Programme Americas Seminar, Cartegena de Indias, Colombia, August 1995. (1995g) Bibliography of Project Documents presented to the Governing Body of the World Food Programme 1962–1995. (1996a) Ending the Inheritance of Hunger. Annual Report of the Executive Director 1995. WFP/EB. A/96/4. (1996b) Reform and Revitalization Measures in the World Food Programmes. WFP/EB. A/96/6 Rev. 1. (1996c) Tackling Hunger in a World Full of Food. Tasks Ahead for Food Aid. (1997a) WFP Support to Countries in Establishing and Managing National Food Assistance Programmes. WFP/EB. 2/97/3-A. (1997b) Policies on the Use of WFP Food Aid in Relief and Development Activities: Monetization. WFP/EB.A/97/5-A. (1998a) Memorandum of Understanding between WFP and UNICEF in Emergency and Rehabilitation Interventions and Technical Agreement on Field Telecommunications. (1998b) Gender Mainstreaming in WFP: An Integrated Assessment. WFP/EB.2/98/9. (1999a) Annual Report of the Executive Director, 1998. WFP/EB. A/99/3-A/1. (1999b) Annual Report of the Executive Director, 1998. Appendix 1. Issues Arising from the Implementation of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Reform Programme. WFP/EB. A/99/3-A/2. (1999c) Enabling Development. WFP/EB. A/99/4-A. (1999d) Decisions and Recommendations of the Annual Session of the Executive Board, 1999. WFP/EB. A/99/10. (1999e) The Food Aid Monitor. 1998 Food Aid Flows, Special Issue, May.

Dramatis Personae WFP executive directors Addeke Hendrik Boerma WFP’s first executive director, May 1962 to December 1967. A Dutch citizen, born in 1912, he graduated in horticulture and agricultural economics from the Agricultural University at Wageningen in 1934. From then almost to the outbreak of the Second World War he was employed by a Dutch farmers’ organization helping to set up agricultural co-operatives and provide advisory and insurance services as well as representing farmers in negotiations with the government on pricing policy. From 1938 he was a government officer in charge of planning food supplies in the event of war. In 1944, during the Second World War, he was smuggled out of enemy-occupied Holland by British agents and flown to London to help plan food relief supplies for the Netherlands, and became one of the commissioners responsible for overseeing the reconstruction of the Dutch agricultural economy after the war. From 1945, he was acting director-general for food for the Netherlands, government commissioner for Foreign Agricultural Relations, and Netherlands representative on the FAO Council. He joined the staff of FAO in 1948 and until 1951 was regional representative for Europe based in Rome. In 1951, when the headquarters of FAO was moved to Rome from Washington, DC, Boerma became director of FAO’s Economics Division. In 1958, he was made head of FAO’s Program and Budget Service and in 1960 was promoted to assistant directorgeneral. He was elected as FAO’s Director-General in 1967. For his services during and after the war, Boerma was made a Knight in the Order of the Dutch Lion, the highest civil order in the Netherlands, a Commander in the Order of Leopold II of Belgium, and Officer du Merit Agricole of France. Sushil K. Dev Acting executive director from January to August 1968 and associate executive director thereafter until his retirement in May 1969. An Indian citizen, born in 1907, he studied in India and at the London School of Economics and entered the Indian Civil Service before becoming deputy director of the Bureau of Social Affairs at the United Nations in New York. He joined FAO in 1957 as special assistant to the director-general and later became director of FAO’s Rural Institutions and Services Division. On the establishment of WFP, he was appointed as director of its Programme Development and Appraisal Division and played a major part in the formulation of WFP’s policies and programmes. Francisco Aquino Executive director, July 1968 to May 1976. A citizen of El Salvador, born in 1919, he studied agronomy in his country and later economics at Harvard University. He was chief of the Grains Section of FAO’s Commodities and Trade Division in Rome, Italy, in the 1950s before returning to El Salvador where he served as minister of agriculture and president of the Central Reserve Bank, and was his country’s representative on the governing bodies of the IMF and various international banks. Before assuming the post of executive director, he was technical manager at the Inter American Development Bank in Washington, DC. He stood unsuccessfully for the post of FAO director-general in the election of 1975 and resigned in May 1976.

291

292 Dramatis Personae

Thomas C. M. Robinson Executive director, July to his retirement in September 1977, acting executive director, May 1976 to June 1977, and deputy executive director March 1969 to May 1976. A citizen of the United States, born in 1912, Robinson studies agricultural economics and statistics before holding a number of posts in the US foreign service Washington, DC and abroad. In the early 1960s, before joining WFP as director of its Resources Management Division from September 1962 to March 1969, he was head of the Foodstuffs Division of the US State Department in which capacity he represented his country at meetings of FAO and other international bodies. Garson N. Vogel Executive director from October 1977 to his death in April 1981. A Canadian citizen, born in 1918, Vogel studied history and economics and, later, law, and was called to the Manitoba Bar after the Second World War. Thereafter, he pursued a career in the grain trade, both in private industry and in government. He joined the Canadian Wheat Board in 1964 and became chief commissioner before joining WFP. Bernado de Azevedo Brito Acting executive director from May 1981 to his resignation in February 1982, and deputy executive director, January 1979 to May 1981. A Brazilian citizen, born in 1935, he trained as a diplomat and served in his country’s embassies in Denmark, Norway and Spain prior to heading the economic section of the Brazilian mission to the United Nations in New York and representing Brazil on the UNDP Council and ECOSOC. From 1975, he was head of the Brazilian permanent mission to the FAO, and represented Brazil on the governing bodies of FAO and WFP. Juan Felipe Yriat Acting executive director from February to April 1982. A citizen of Uruguay, born in 1919, he attended Law School at the University of Montevideo. As a career diplomat, Yriat held senior positions in his country’s embassies in Sweden and Finland and was director-general of the Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1959 to 1962. He was ambassador to the Netherlands in 1963 and to the United States up to December 1968. Yriat’s association with FAO started from its earliest days, when he signed the organization’s constitution on behalf of his country. In 1968, he was appointed as FAO assistant director-general for Latin American Affairs and FAO regional representative for Latin America in Santiago, Chile. In 1972, he became assistant director-general of FAO’s Development Department, and in 1980, special assistant to the director-general of FAO, for whom he undertook a number of high policy missions. He retired in February 1984. James C. Ingram Executive director for two terms of office from April 1982 to his retirement in April 1992. An Australian citizen, born in 1928, studied economics and political science at Melbourne University and began a career in the Australian foreign service in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Served in the Australian representations to the EEC, Indonesia, and the United Nations before being appointed as assistant secretary of the ministry’s Asian and Pacific Department. Appointed ambassador to the Philippines (1970–3), high commissioner to Canada and several Caribbean states (1973–4), and director-general of the Australian Development Assistance Bureau (1975–82), during which he served as Australia’s alternate governor of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and IFAD, and Australian representative at the high-level meetings of OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, a member of the Australian National Commission for UNESCO, and a member of the North–South Round Table and of the Tidewater Group. He was the first Australian to head a United Nations body and, at the time of his appointment as WFP executive director, received Australia’s highest civil honour for his

Dramatis Personae

293

services to his country. He received the Alan Shawn Feinstein World Hunger Award for his work as WFP executive director and served on the governing body of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). On his retirement, he became director of the Australian Institute for International Affairs, has written on arrangements for the provision of international humanitarian assistance, and is writing on Australian policy toward the United Nations at the Australian National University in Canberra. Catherine Bertini Appointed as the first woman executive director in April 1992. A United States citizen, born in 1950, she graduated from New York State University at Albany and was later a fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Ms Bertini worked for ten years in the private sector as a manager with the Container Corporation of America, where she was responsible for the firm’s government and community relations and public affairs. She began her career in public office by holding a variety of positions in the state governments of New York and Illinois. She served for two years with the US Department of Health and Human Services, first as director of the Office of Family Assistance and later as acting assistant secretary of the Family Support Administration. Prior to her appointment to WFP, she was assistant secretary of agriculture for Food and Consumer Services in the US Department of Agriculture in Washington, DC, which involved the management of all US federal food assistance programmes. She displayed a special interest in child nutrition and the advancement of women. Ms Bertini was appointed for a second five-year term as WFP’s executive director in 1997.

WFP deputy executive directors Thomas C. M. Robinson First deputy executive director, March 1969 to May 1976. Feridun M. Ustun Deputy executive director from September 1976 to his retirement in January 1979. A citizen of Turkey, born in 1916, he was previously director of WFP’s Resources Management Division from March 1969 to August 1976. Bernado de Azevedo Brito Deputy executive director, January 1979 to May 1981. Salahuddin Ahmed Deputy executive director from December 1982 to his retirement in April 1994. A citizen of Bangladesh, born in 1932, he graduated from Dhaka University and received training in public administration and development economics at Oxford University, England. He had a long career in his government’s development administration and policy planning, particularly in the agricultural sector. Joining his country’s civil service in 1956, he served as permanent secretary for Agriculture from 1969 to 1973, when he was appointed head of the Bangladesh embassy in Rome and the first permanent representative of Bangladesh to FAO. He served as chairman or vicechairman of several FAO committees. From 1976 to 1978, he was permanent secretary, Home Affairs, in Bangladesh. He was deputy executive director to the UN World Food Council from October 1978 to his appointment to WFP. His name was put forward as his country’s candidate for the election of director-general of FAO in 1993. A. Namanga Ngongi Deputy executive director from June 1994. A citizen of Cameroon, born in 1945, he studied agriculture at the California State Polytechnic University and received a PhD in agronomy at Cornell University in the United States,

294 Dramatis Personae

where he was a research associate from 1978 to 1978 and head of a joint research programme with the Soil Research Institute of Ghana to develop low-cost technologies for the production of basic food crops. Ngongi held various positions in the ministry of agriculture in the Cameroon, including chief of the Service of Projects, before becoming first secretary and counsellor at the Cameroon embassy in Rome, Italy, and in charge of Cameroon’s relations with the Rome-based United Nations agencies. He joined WFP in 1984 and served in a number of positions including: regional bureau manager for the west and central Africa region; head of the External Relations Divisions; associate director of the Operations Department; and director of the Development Division. He is vicepresident of the Rome International Chapter of the Society for International Development (SID) and chairperson of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination Sub-commitee on Nutrition.

Chairpersons/Presidents of WFP’s governing bodies Name

Country

J. Pons A. H. Turner A. Sbihi H. J. Kristensen E. A. Okwuosa W. Lamby J. S. Mongia J. G. McArthur J. M. Figuerero F. Shefrin M. Askin A. Mair R. Soegeng-Amat A. S. Tuinman

Intergovernmental Committee (IGC) Uruguay Canada Morocco Denmark Nigeria Germany (Fed. Rep.) India New Zealand Argentina Canada Turkey United States Indonesia Netherlands

Year

1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA) A. M. Al-Sudeary H. R. A. Granqvist G. Gamo-Kuba P. Griffin P. Masud E. Moore A. Y. Bukhari J. Sonneveld G. Bula-Hoyos H. Hostmark Y. Hamdi A. Santraint W. Rahma D. Joslyn D. D. C. Don Nanjira

Saudi Arabia Sweden Congo (People’s Rep.) Ireland Pakistan United States Saudi Arabia Netherlands Colombia Norway Egypt Belgium Bangladesh United States Kenya

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

Dramatis Personae

Chairpersons/Presidents of WFP’s governing bodies Name

Country

Year

J. Glistrup R. Velazquez Huerta Ms C. Theauvette M. T. H. Beg J. Bailey

Denmark Mexico Canada Bangladesh Australia

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Executive Board Ms B. Damiba L. Dominici Ms M. Eulalia Jimenez Ms L. Tracy

Burkina Faso France El Salvador United States

Source: Reports of the meetings of the WFP governing body.

1996 1997 1998 1999

295

Index ACC/SCN (UN Administrative Committee on Coordination Subcommittee on Nutrition) 101, 185, 237 Afghan refugees in Pakistan (1980s) 171–3 African drought of 1970s 160–2 African food crisis of 1980s 162–4 Ahmed, Salahuddin, WFP Deputy Executive Director (1982–94) 214–15, 293 American Food for Peace Council 14 Annan, Kofi, UN Secretary-General (1997 to present) 225, 233 animal production projects see livestock development Aquino, Francisco, WFP Executive Director (1968–76) 211, 291

Bangladesh gender and development programme 109 national food for work programme 93 Bertini, Catherine, WFP Executive Director (1992 to present) 224, 293 Bertrand, Maurice (JIU Inspector) report on costing of FAO services to WFP 217 report on WFP personnel problems 215–16 bilateral project food aid 57–8 Black, Eugene, World Bank President (1948–62) 28 Boerma, Addeke 211, 291 WFP Executive Director (1962–67) FAO Director-General (1968–75) Botswana disincentive effects study 119 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, UN Secretary-General (1992–6) 177, 183 Boyd Orr, Sir (later Lord) John, FAO Director-General (1945–8) 20 Brito, Bernardo 212, 292, 293 WFP Deputy Executive Director (1979–81)

Acting WFP Executive Director (1981–2) CAP (Common Agricultural Policy), of the European Union 241 CFA (Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes) – wider mandate: a forum for all food aid, performance 137–8 China environmentally sustainable development 112–13 food for work 92 fisheries development 130 relief-development strategy 178, 180 Colombo Plan food aid supplies 58 Common Agricultural Policy, of European Union see CAP Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) man-made emergencies 174–5 community action 142–3 Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal (CSD) 21, 42, 45, 52, 237 changing attitudes to agricultural surpluses 52–3 co-operatives and similar institutions 135–7 costing of FAO services to WFP 217–18 country programme food aid 26, 59, 230 Jamaican study 70–2 dairy development 124–7 development of human resources 95–107 hospitals and public health 106–7 nutrition improvement for mothers and pre-school children 95–101 primary school feeding 101–4 post-primary education, training and literacy 104–6 donors, responsibilities and commitments 152–3 296

Index

effectiveness of WFP development aid see WFP Egypt land reclamation, development and settlement 118 Eisenhower, Dwight D. (US President 1953–61) – multilateral food aid proposal 13–14 emergency food supply scheme proposal (The Netherlands) 149 environmentally sustainable development 111–14 EPTA (United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance) 55 FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) agricultural commodity projections to 1970 52 agricultural surpluses to finance economic development – pilot study in India (1955) 21 an expanded programme of surplus food utilization – study by expert group (1961) 22–7 Committee on Commodity Problems 21 Committee on World Food Security 82, 237 FAO/WFP relationships 216–17 Freedom from Hunger Campaign (1960–70) 22, 50–2 global information and early warning system (1974) 162, 165–6 Intergovernmental Advisory Committee meeting, April 1961 6 international commodity clearing house proposal (1949) 20 International Emergency Food Council (1946) 20 international emergency food reserve proposals (1953 and 1956) 21 International Undertaking on World Food Security (1973) 165 national food reserves study (1958) 21 pioneering work 20–7 Principle of Surplus Disposal (1954) 21, 53, 58–9 world food board proposal (1946) 20 World Food Summit (1996) 243 fisheries development 129–31

297

food aid advantages 35 in second UN development decade 76–9 shortcomings 35 Food Aid Conventions 72–4 Food Aid Committee 237 of 1999 240–1 food aid for development future of 241–3 some main lessons 138–44 food aid for increased food production 117–20 food aid, literacy and education study (1965) 54 food aid modalities commodity exchanges 202–4 commodity purchases 202–4 monetization 198–202 triangular transactions 202–4 food-for-work programmes 88–95 food reserves for emergencies and price stabilization 131–3 forestry projects 127–9 Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, China 1995) 110–11 functions of food aid 86–8 future food aid regime 234–8 GATT Uruguay round – Final Act, food aid provisions of 235–8 gender and development 107–11 WFP commitments to 110–11 guidelines and criteria for food aid (1979) 82 Hammarskjöld, Dag, UN Secretary-General (1953–61) 27 Hoffman, Paul 10 Administrator of the Marshall Plan (1948–52) Managing Director, UN Special Fund (1958–65) UNDP Administrator (1966–72) hospital and public health programmes 106–7 Hot Springs conference (1943) 13, 20 humanitarian aid conclusions and issues 180–7 advocacy 182 assisting vulnerable groups to cope 181

298 Index

humanitarian aid – continued co-ordinated action 181–2 national government responsibility 181 political and military impartiality 181 future issues broadened definition of emergency aid 182 co-ordinated action in a multilateral framework 183–4 global multilateral food aid reserve 182–3 improved early warning and response systems 183 operational concerns essential non-food items 185 food rations 184–5 policy framework – understanding emergencies 185–7 rapid response teams 185 targeting and registration 184 IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development) 218 IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute) 93, 94 ILO (International Labour Organization) 42–3, 44, 89 IMF (International Monetary Fund) 116, 237 India dairy development 125–6 forestry 128 relief and development strategy 178 industrial and mining projects 133–4 Ingram, James, WFP Executive Director (1982–92) 214–16, 220, 223, 231, 292–3 insurance of WFP commodities 196–7 International Decade for Women (1976–85) 108 International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR), origin 166 modalities (1978) 166–7 INTERFAIS (WFP international food aid data system) 163 International Symposium on Food Aid and Co-operatives for Development (1988) 135 International Women’s Year (1975) 108

Ioanes, Raymond, US Dept of Agriculture representative on McGovern delegation to FAO (April 1961) 6 Iraq, food for oil programme 175 Jacques, Sydney, US State Dept representative on McGovern delegation to FAO (April 1961) 6 Jamaica, country programme food aid study 70–2 Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), of the UN 215–16, 217 Kampuchea (Cambodia), emergency operations (1980s) 169–71 Kennedy, John F. (US President 1961–3) acceptance of McGovern’s proposal 9 addresses and speeches inaugural presidential address, 20 January 1961 14 State of the Union address, 30 January 1961 14–15 special message to Congress on agriculture, 16 March 1961 15 special message to Congress on foreign aid, 22 March 1961 15 address to UN General Assembly proposing UN Decade for Development, 25 September 1961 28 State of the Union address, 11 January 1962 16 opening address at World Food Congress, 1963 51 last address to UN General Assembly, 20 September 1963 17 duties and responsibilities of Director, Food for Peace programme 14 multilateral food aid proposal (1960) 13 support for Food for Peace programme 12 why interested in the Food for Peace programme 15 Kissinger, Henry, US Secretary of State (1973–7), proposal for UN World Food Conference 1974 80 Korean war (1950–3) 30 Kosovo, Yugoslavia, man-made emergency 175

Index

land settlement and reform 39 least-developed countries local purchases in 203 priority 83 special measures for emergency aid 165 Lesotho, disincentive study 119 lessons of WFP development aid see WFP linking relief and development 177–80 some conclusions 179–80 literacy programmes 40, 54 livestock development 120–4 logistics 197–8 managing food aid resources 188–203 man-made emergencies 168–75 common feature 175 examples in Africa, Asia, and Central America 169–75 numbers of refugees and displaced persons 174–5 markets 143 Marshall Plan (European Recovery Programme) (1918–52) see US food aid McGovern, George xv first Director, Food for Peace Programme (1961–2) 6 achievements 15–16 Food for Peace resolution (1959) 12 International Food and Nutrition Act (1965) 17 philosophy of life 11 political career 11, 17 proposal to 1974 World Food Conference 17 report to President Kennedy on Food for Peace programme (March 1961) 6 WFP proposal (April 1961) 6–9, 18 modalities of food aid see food aid modalities monetization see food aid modalities multilateral food aid, advantages of 50 origins 20 proposals 9–10, 13 study (1968) 74–6 Ngongi, Namanga, WFP Deputy Executive Director (1994 to present) 224, 293–4 Nigeria, civil war (1968) 169

299

Nixon, Richard M. (US Vice President, 1953–61; US President 1969–74) multilateral food aid proposal 13 non-food aid in kind 79 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), operational partnerships with WFP 234 support for WFP 57 Organization for Economic Development and Co-operation, food aid study (1962) 55–7 Pakistan, Afghan refugees 171–3 watershed management 113 Patton, James G. President of US Farmers Union, support for multilateral food aid programme (1960) 13 post-primary education programmes 104–6 primary school feeding programmes 101–4 project food aid advantages and constraints 40–1 institutionalizing 82–3 proposals for modifying WFP 61–2, 74, 149 Argentine ‘world food bank’ proposal 61 Israel ‘new approach’ proposal 61 Lebanon ‘world commodity organization’ proposal 74 The Netherlands international emergency food aid facility proposal 74, 149 Uruguay ‘world food bank’ proposal 74 protracted refugee and displaced persons operations 154, 175–6 longer-term needs 175–6 public health programmes 106–7 public utilities: housing, transportation and communications 134–5 recipient governments, of food aid, policies, programmes and objectives 140–1 relief-development strategies 178–9 repatriation 179 Robinson, Thomas: Acting WFP Executive Director (1976–7); WFP Deputy Executive Director (1969–76); WFP Executive Director (1977) 12, 292–3

300 Index

Roosevelt, Franklin D. (US President 1933–45) New Deal 239 Hot Springs conference (1943) 13, 20 Rwanda and Burundi relief operations (1994) 173–4 Saouma, Edouard, FAO Director-General (1976–93) 211–3, 220 Sen, Amartya, Nobel Prize for Economics 1998 – entitlement theory 186 Sen, B. R., FAO Director-General (1956–67) 9 Sen, S. R., Planning Commissioner, Government of India, report on Argentine ‘world food fund’ proposal 61 Senegal, disincentive effects study 119 Singer, Hans xiii, xv, 19 action proposals for UN development decade of the 1960s 28–9 chairman of expert group study on an expanded programme of food surpluses utilization (1961) 22 drafting views of UN and FAO executive heads on WFP’s continuation 59–60 early interest in multilateral food aid 22 work on SUNFED proposal 27 Snow, C. P., British scientist and author, state of siege address (1968) 145–6 Sorensen, Theodore, Special Counsel to President Kennedy (1961–3) 15 southern Africa drought emergency of early 1990s 164–5 Soviet Union (former): man-made emergencies 174–5 special feeding programmes 39–40 stringent WFP management measures of early 1970s 69–70 structural and sector adjustment programmes, role of food aid 114–17 Sub-Saharan Africa emergency operations 160–5 food-for-work programmes 93–4 proposal for international conference on future food aid 252 Sudan resettlement project xiii, 118–19 co-ordinating all food aid: transport fleet 163

supplementary feeding programmes 95–101 SUNFED (Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development) 27–8 Symington, James, Deputy Director, US Food for Peace programme (1961) 7 Syria, livestock development project 121–2 targeting, development aid 141–2 emergency aid 184 training programmes 104–6 transportation and logistics 194–8 triangular transactions see food aid modalities tripartite evaluation of WFP by Canada, Netherlands and Norway (1994) see WFP Turkey, industrial projects 133–4 United Nations (UN) first UN development decade (1960s) 8–9, 53–4 second UN development decade (1970s) 76 UN conferences Environment and Development conference, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1992 112 Human Settlements conference, Vancouver, Canada, 1976 134 World Conference on Education for All, Bangkok, Thailand, 1990 103 World Food Conference, Rome, Italy, 1974 80–2, 165–6 UN General Assembly resolutions provision of surpluses to food-deficit people through the UN system (1960) 6, 22 co-ordinating UN development aid (1992) 232 co-ordinating UN emergency aid (1991) 230–1 executive boards for UN funds and programmes (1993) 232–3 integration of UN development food aid into national programmes (1992) 231–2 international women’s year (1975) 108

Index

UN decade for women (1976–85) 108 UN Secretary-General reforms of UN system (1997) 233–4 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 54–5 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) 55 UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) 103, 217 UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) 168, 184, 234 UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) 44, 78, 100, 103, 223 United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency 20 United Nations Relief Administration for Palestinian Refugees 20 UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) 20 United Nations Special Fund 10 United States food aid Commodity Credit Corporation 29 early history 9–31 Export-Import Bank 29 food aid debate 32–5 Grain Stabilization Board 29 legislation Agricultural Act 1949 30 Agricultural Adjustment Act 1933 29–30 Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (PL480) 1954 31–2 European Recovery Programme (Marshall Plan) (1948–52) 30 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act 1996 (farm bill 1995) 238–40 Lend–Lease Act 1941 30 Mutual Security Act 1951 30 Surplus Property Act 1944 30 U Thant, UN Secretary-General (1961–71) 206–7 Vogel, Garson, WFP Executive Director (1977–81) 212, 292 women in food-for-work programmes see Gender and development

301

World Bank IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) 25, 27–8, 44, 75 IDA (International Development Association) 27 public works programmes study 94–5 structural and sector adjustment programmes 114–17 World Food Congress, first, Washington, DC, 1963 51 World Food Congress, second, The Hague, The Netherlands, 1970 149 World Food Conference, Rome, Italy, 1974 80–2 resolution on an improved policy for food aid 80–1 wider WFP responsibility for emergency food aid 165–6 World Food Council 81–2 World Food Programme (WFP) administration 43–5 antecedents 19–20 origins 6–9 policies 40–3 procedures 45–6 resources 67–9, 188–94 study programme (1965) 46–50 potentials and problems of food aid 47–8 operational and administrative problems 48–9 scope for multilateral food aid 49–50 three-year experimental programme (1963–5) 37–66 lessons of 63–6 constitutional change 205–24 a joint UN/FAO undertaking 205–8 co-operative programme 208 cost-saving measures 209 FAO/WFP relationships, legal basis 215 hiatus in WFP leadership 211–12 missed opportunities 210–11 personnel problems 215–16 quest for institutional freedom 214–24 reform of WFP general regulations 219–22 unequal UN/FAO partnership 212–14

302 Index

World Food Programme (WFP) – continued WFP headquarters agreement 218–19 continuation of WFP 58–63 executive director’s recommendations 58 governing body’s recommendation 60–1 UN and FAO resolutions 62 view of UN and FAO executive heads 59–60 development assistance 38–40, 67–144 dimensions and trends 82–7 effectiveness 138–9 lessons learned 139–44 special and sector studies 107–37 types of projects 39–40 emergency and relief operations 38, 145–87 criteria and procedures 150–2, 209 definition of emergencies 147–8 growth and dimensions 154–9 increasing involvement: causes of 159–69 measures for speedy relief 152–4 types of operations 148 WFP roles in emergencies 146 WFP governing bodies chairpersons/presidents 294–5 CFA (Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes) 81 EB (Executive Board) 232–3 IGC (Intergovernmental Committee) 43–4

WFP in the 1990s 226 changing focus: from development to relief 146–7 food aid policy debate 227–9 future directions 243 Danish food aid commodity changes 244–5 Dutch perspective 244 emergency and/or development aid 247–9 Nordic countries views 243–4 other views 246–7 tripartite evaluation of WFP by Canada, the Netherlands and Norway 245–6 WFP, mission statement (1994) 247–9 WFP prospective co-ordinating roles 249–52 WFP wider mandate: a forum for all food aid 137–8 WFP/UNHCR co-operation 168–9 WFP/UNICEF co-operation 44, 78, 100, 103, 23 WHO (World Health Organization) 44, 45, 97, 217 WTO (World Trade Organization) 35, 237–8 Yriat, Juan, Acting WFP Executive Director (1982) 212, 292 Yugoslavia (former), man-made emergencies 174–5 Zimbabwe, triangular transactions 203