The Soviet military power

The Soviet military power

Russia'sWarinAfghanistan

The Land and the People No one since Alexander the Great has conquered Afghanistan. No conqueror could ever extract enough advantage from its occupation, either strategically or economically, to make it worth having to defeat the Afghans. There were about 15.5 million Afghans before the 1979 invasion. The population is divided between the Pashto-speaking Pathans of the east and south (42 per cent of the population) and the Dari-speaking Tadjiks of the north and west (23 per cent), as well as Mongoldescended Hazaras, Kuchi and Aimaq nomads, Persians, Baluchis, Turkic-speaking Uzbeks and Turkomen, many of them refugees or children of refugees from Stalin's Russia, and the Nuristanis— an ancient people of unknown origin. While these peoples have cultures many centuries old, Afghanistan as a nation is young, established in the capital of Kabul only in 1747 by the first Pathan king, Ahmad Shah Durrani. Yet Afghanistan was always politically decentralised, due both to its predominantly mountainous or desert terrain, poor communications (in 1979, there were no railroads and a limited paved road network), and to the wishes of its people. Traditional authority— decision-making by meeting (jirga), and the local khan, malik, or mullah (headman, chief, or religious teacher)—remains strong outside the cities. Religion is the great unifying factor of this diverse nation; Afghanistan is Moslem in religion, culture, and everyday life. The Afghans are devout; but an old proverb states 'Each Afghan has his God and his gun', and he usually resents anyone other than his own kith and kin telling him what he must do with either faith or firearm. Predominantly Sunni, with some Ismailis and a 15—20 per cent Shia minority among the Hazaras, Persians, and some Pathan tribes, Afghanistan has never had a strong, central religious leader.

The Afghan's homeland is green and pleasant only in the memory of exiles. Summers are hot and dry and winters bitter, especially in the high country, and from November to mid-March snow makes travel difficult. The rains, when they come, fall from December to February. The countryside is largely mountain and desert. The Hindu Kush slices across the country, east to west, cresting in the Yefretor—private first class—of Soviet Air Assault troops posing with carefully drilled local children for photo which no doubt appeared over a caption extolling his dedication to his 'internationalist duty'. He wears shined buttons; shoulder boards, collar patches and beret of VDV light blue; the desantnik's striped naval-style undershirt; the Soviet Army cypher and single yellow bar of this rank on his shoulders; and—just visible—the white collar lining which the Soviet soldier has to sew into his tunics at regular intervals. The weapon is the 5.45mm AKS.

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Pamir Mountains of the Wakhan Corridor. North of the Hindu Kush are yet more mountains, fading northwards into the arid steppes of Central Asia. In the west, the Iranian plateau extends to the cities of Herat and Shindand before rising to merge with the fastness of the Hindu Kush, ringing like ramparts the central Hazara Jat area—land of the Hazaras. The south and south-east are largely desolate, rocky deserts. The north and west are mountainous, curving from the Pamirs down to the fringe of the 4

Registan deserts. Agriculture is the primary occupation of the Afghan people, but it requires intensive irrigation to grow anything. Less than 15 per cent of the land was arable even in peacetime, and this was concentrated in the river valleys, as were the cities. Even in the days of peace, Afghanistan was one of the world's 20 poorest nations.

Intrigue and Invasion The roots of the war go back to the early 19th century, when two expanding empires arrived on the borders of Afghanistan—the British and the Russian. For over a century Afghanistan was more than a buffer state, it was the main playing field for the 'Great Game'—the competition between Britain and Russia for domination of southern Asia and, beyond that, the Gulf. The game was one of bluff, diplomacy and deterrence, but war was part of it as well. Three times the British went to war with the Afghans, largely to ensure that the government in Kabul was not pro-Russian. The three Afghan Wars of 1839-42, 1978-80, and 1919 could all be interpreted as British victories of sorts, but all were won at the cost of bloody battlefield setbacks. The Great Game became more serious with the Bolshevik Revolution. Afghanistan became the first neighbouring country to recognise Lenin's regime, and treaties were signed in 1920 and 1926. The relationship soured with the brutal Soviet campaigns of the 1920s-30s against the peoples of Central Asia, which succeeded only after several Soviet incursions into Afghanistan forced the Afghan government to stop aiding their fellow Moslems. The British left India and Pakistan, and thus the borders of Afghanistan, in 1947, and by the 1950s

the country was considered to be in the Soviet sphere of influence. The government, especially the military, was penetrated by the Soviets and their sympathisers. Soviet aid poured in: the Soviets built roads (generously stressing the bridges for 50-ton loads) and airfields. The Afghan Army was trained and re-equipped on Soviet lines. The move from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy started in the 1950s, and political change followed. Two rival underground Communist parties, the Khalq and the Parchim, were formed (to be united only on paper as the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan). A coup on 17 July 1973 made Prince Mohammed Daoud prime minister and ended the Afghan monarchy, King Mohammed Zahir being sent into exile. Daoud came to power with the help of the leftist and Communist parties, but he eventually reasserted traditional Afghan balance-of-power neutrality. To the Soviets and the few (7,000) Afghan Communists, this was not good enough. On 24 April 1978 Daoud was overthrown and killed by a left-wing coup—probably organised by the Soviets, and certainly executed with their knowledge— which left between 1,000 and 2,000 dead. The Khalq party, which took over in a post-coup power Soviet VDV paratroopers man a roadblock near Kabul soon after the invasion of 27 December 1979, supported by a BMD-1 airborne infantry fighting vehicle. Even in this blurred photo they can be seen to wear their leather jump helmets and the fur-collared winter version of their khaki combat uniform— cf.Plate D3. (US Information Agency)

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struggle, received the full support of the Soviets, and a treaty was signed that December. President and Prime Minister Nur Mohammed Taraki set about turning Afghanistan into a model of Stalinist Russia. Every facet of Islamic and Afghan life was to be forced into line with Marxism-Leninism. To the Afghans, each with his God and his gun, such initiatives launched by a regime that now appeared to be a tool of foreign infidels could have but one result. By early 1979 there was armed resistance in 25 of Afghanistan's 28 provinces. The resistance fighters called themselves mujahideen ('fighters for the faith") and their struggle a jihad ('war for the faith'). Open war followed; an antiCommunist uprising in Herat on 21 March 1979 left 5,000 dead. Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin now became the strong man of the Kabul regime. Soviet equipment and advisors arrived in increasing numbers, and the first Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter units went into action, albeit in Afghan markings. The Afghan Army was starting to mutiny or melt away (with its arms and equipment) in the summer of 1979. Refugees started to stream into Pakistan; and 1979 saw pitched battles between the Soviet-advised DRA Army and the guerrillas, including the first Communist use of chemical weapons. Repression and purges continued: over 17,000 Afghans were executed, many in Kabul's notorious Pul-e-Charki prison. The nonCommunist intelligentsia were systematically massacred. The terror claimed Prime Minister Taraki himself—killed on 14 September as his deputy Amin seized power. In autumn 1979 Amin tried a combination of concessions and military offensives, but it was obvious that he could not control Afghanistan, or even Kabul. A Communist government was in danger of falling to its own antiSoviet, Islamic people: for the Soviets, an intolerably dangerous precedent. The Soviets realised that helicopters and advisors were not enough, as a series of high-level visits revealed a deteriorating situation. Deputy Minister of Defence Gen. A. A. Yepishev's July visit coincided with substantial guerrilla victories in battle. On Yepishev's return, the die was cast for invasion: by October 1979 Russia was mobilising. Elements of the 105th Guards Airborne Division had started to fly into Kabul airport in midDecember, joining Soviet Air Force units already 6

there. On 27 December the Soviets struck. The airlift increased and the paratroopers, reinforced to more than divisional strength, moved out from the airport perimeter to seize the capital. The Afghan Army stayed in its barracks, its tanks immobilised by its Soviet advisors. Spetsnaz special forces took headquarters, airfields, communications centres, the Salang Pass tunnel, and other key points. A twobattalion attack by BMD-mounted paratroopers took the Duralamin Palace, and Amin was executed by his erstwhile allies. The Parchimite Babrak Karmal was flown in from East Germany as the new: quisling prime minister. Two motor rifle divisions moved across the border, one on each of the two main routes—Kushka—Herat-Shindand, and Termez-Kabul-Khandahar, through the long and vital Salang Pass tunnel.

TheWar The forces employed by the Soviets seemed to indicate that they envisioned an operation similar to Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968; but 1980 brought the Soviets to the first realisation that they were facing the biggest and most widespread national uprising of the 20th century. The Kabul regime's army, in one year, fell from 80,000 men to 20,000 through desertion alone. The reservists who made up the bulk of the Soviet motor rifle divisions proved to be inept troops: many of them were Moslems from Central Asia, who fraternised with their Afghan brothers. The guerrilla groups had now joined forces with political parties, some dating back to the early 1970s, which set up headquarters in Pakistan among the ever-increasing refugees. Despite Soviet machine-gunnings, popular strikes and demonstrations spread through the cities, especially Kabul, starting on 21 February 1980 with the anti-Soviet uprising of 'The Night of Allah Akbar' (the traditional Moslem warcry). The original Soviet operational plan of securing the cities, airbases and roads, and then clearing out the guerrillas with a series of large sweeps by DRA units, did not work. The winter of 1979—80 was quiet, except in Badakhshan and Takhar; but intense resistance was encountered by offensives into Kunar province in March, May and

September 1980 and in Paktia in March. The Ghazni area was swept in May and June, and Wardak and Nangarhar in November. A Soviet tank regiment was decimated in fighting near Herat and Shindand. In June the Soviets started the systematic destruction of agriculture, beginning near Kabul. The first Soviet offensive into the Panjsher Valley followed in September—a previous (April) offensive used DRA Army troops only. 1980 also saw the Soviet invasion condemned by the United Nations General Assembly, the NonAligned Movement, and the Organisation of Islamic Nations. The Soviets increased the size of their forces, bringing in more motor rifle divisions. 1981 saw a Soviet shift away from the strategy of sweeps using unreliable DRA forces to one built around more frequent, smaller, and airmobile operations using Soviet forces. A drive against Paghman, north of Kabul, in July resulted in a guerrilla victory. The Panjsher III offensive, Panjsher IV in September, and the June offensive in Nangrahar, were all unsuccessful. At the end of the year, then-Deputy Defence Minister Marshal Sokolov went to Afghanistan to see what was happening on the ground. The Soviets sent in yet more troops. In 1982 the Soviets reverted to the large-scale ground sweeps, combined with air raids and helicopter-mobile operations. The biggest offensives included Panjsher V (April-May) and Panjsher VI (September), when the Soviets failed to destroy this key guerrilla stronghold within striking range of both the Salang Pass and Bagram airfield. A series of sweeps were aimed at destroying not so much the guerrillas themselves but rather the areas which could support guerrillas near Kabul or other high-value targets. Two offensives in June and October left Paghman desolate. Large-scale offensives were made in Wardak province, Parwan (January), the Logar Valley south of Kabul (June), the Laghman Valley east of Kabul (November), the Ghorband Valley north of Kabul (May), Ghazni (May;, the foothills of Farah province (April), and Mazar-e-Sharif (April). Guerrilla raids on Kabul and other targets continued throughout the year, cutting power supplies in December. An explosion, possibly accidental, in the Salang Pass tunnel in October caused hundreds of casualties. Combined guerrilla

Map showing eastern Afghanistan, including Kabul, the Salang Pass tunnel, the Panjsher Valley, and the Pakistani border with Nangarhar and Paktia provinces.

action planned by a Camberley-trained ex-DRA officer cut up a Kabul regime division in Paktia province in April. Fighting continued in the west. In 1983 the Soviets adopted an 'air war' approach, with extensive bombing of villages depopulating vital areas, combined with heliborne operations and ground sweeps. A de facto truce was concluded between Soviet forces and the successful and elusive Panjsher Valley resistance in March. In April guerrillas seized much of Herat and the Soviets used heavy bombers as part of the effort to drive them out. Khandahar also saw bombers used, against guerrilla-held urban areas (March). Guerrilla raids on Kabul continued; and their increased tactical sophistication was evident. An Afghan offensive in Paktia and Paktika provinces in the summer and autumn scored victories over DRA forces at Jadji and Khost. The DRA fort at Urgun was besieged in December. In 1984 the Soviets continued their 'air war' strategy. In January they relieved Urgun. A successful large-scale guerrilla ambush on the Salang Pass highway in March was followed, in April, by the Panjsher VII offensive, aimed at desolating the valley. The guerrillas withdrew ahead of a reinforced division-sized Soviet force and the valley was occupied until, after launching the 7

The Panjsher Valley, showing its narrow floor with the towering mountains of the Hindu Kush rising steeply on either side. The difficulty of sending a division-sized mechanised force up the Panjsher is obvious. The valley narrows still further up its length, and there are several side-valleys too narrow for tanks or helicopters to penetrate. (Committee for a Free Afghanistan)

Panjsher VIII offensive in September, DRA troops were left in strongpoints and Soviet forces withdrew. In June multi-division offensives were launched near Herat and Khandahar with heavy air support. In July-August the Logar and Shomali valleys were swept, followed by renewed fighting near Herat. In August—October Soviet forces relieved the besieged fort at Ali Khel in Paktia, and increased their efforts to seal the border with Pakistan. Paghman was destroyed by a Soviet offensive in late 1984. Despite Soviet offensives, the guerrillas continued to strike near Kabul, introducing 107mm and 122mm rockets to the war. Power lines were destroyed in August. SA-7S became rather more available to the resistance, but were still not supplied in adequate numbers. In 1985 the 'air war' approach continued, with Soviet artillery and rocket launchers being used to a 8

greater extent to achieve depopulation through firepower—a sinister phrase indeed. Among the innovations was an increasing emphasis on interdiction: the Soviets continued to try to disrupt supplies coming in from Pakistan. An attempt by DRA units to relieve the besieged garrison at Barikot in Kunar was defeated in JanuaryFebruary, and a Panjsheri attack cut the Salang Pass highway in March; but a strong Soviet push on Barikot in May—June succeeded. An offensive near Herat in the summer may have been aimed at isolating that area from Iran. A Soviet offensive devastated the Helmand Valley in June. The Panjsher IX operation during the summer left the guerrilla commander Massoud in control of much of the main valley. A major Soviet offensive in Paktia province in August-September was sparked off by increased attacks on Khost, but the Soviets failed to raise the siege, though both sides lost heavily. In 1985 the resistance for the first time stood and fought the Soviets, rather than limiting itself to ambushes and hit-and-run tactics. Despite greatly strengthened Soviet defences, attacks on Kabul increased.

Soviet Forces Theatre of Operations (TVD) headquarters, Soviet Strategic Aims Why the Soviets are fighting in Afghanistan is probably at Tashkent, commanded since mid-1985 known only to the men in the Kremlin. They by Gen. Mikhail Zaitsev. Under this comes the obviously do not want a Moscow-approved Turkestan Military District, commanded until Marxist-Leninist government to fall to Islamic 1985 by Army Gen. Yu. Maximov. This is guerrillas. This would not only create a hostile state controlling headquarters for the Limited Conon their border, but would set a bad precedent for tingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan—the Soviet their own Islamic population and for Marxist states operational command, of which the major comworld-wide (although the Soviets have never fully ponent is the 40th Army under, in 1979-84, Lt.Gen. embraced the Kabul regime as a full 'socialist' state, V. Mikhailov—and for forces inside the Soviet thus leaving themselves some propaganda leeway). Union committed to the war. The General Staff in Afghanistan also gives them a base for possible Moscow has direct input on the war, by-passing future political leverage—most important—or TVD level and dispatching high-level repremilitary action against Pakistan, Iran (the key to sentatives to help direct operations, and using a the region, and another traditional Russian Lolos satellite communications terminal in Kabul to objective) and the Persian Gulf. The expansion of pass direct orders. the airfields at Shindand and Khandahar in the south of Afghanistan in 1980-82 allows the Soviets to base missiles or strategic bombers within 400 air Senior DRA Army officers congratulate Soviet tank crewmen. These wear khaki summer coveralls with the yellow Tank miles of the Straits of Hormuz. Another goal may be Troops badge on the right breast; only the NCO, left wears black service dress shoulderboards—the to show other countries that they cannot count on foreground, senior lieutenant at far right wears khaki drab field effective Western aid if they incur the wrath of the shoulderboards, and the others none at all. Standard issue belts with subdued buckles are worn, as are standard issue Soviet Union. leather tankers' helmets, to which some, probably drivers, Command and Control The General Staff in Moscow controls Southern

have added goggles. The DRA officers are in pale khaki drill summer shirtsleeve order; cap crowns are also pale khaki drill, with gold crown seam piping, gold cords, and red bands. The national insignia below one star, worn on red slides on the shoulder straps, indicates brigadier-general (centre).

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Soviet Army and DRA Ground Forces Equipment (See the present authors Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army, London, 1981, for details. * = Soviet use only, ** = DRA use only.)

2**, SA-3, SA-4*, SA-7, SA-9*, SA-13*, SA-6* or SA-8*. Anti-aircraft artillery: 23mm ZSU-23-4 SP3, 23mm ZU-23-2, 14.5mm ZPU-1, -2, -4, and 12.7mm DShKM AAA.

Anti-tank weapons': RPG-7 and RPG-16* rocket Main Battle Tanks: T-34/85**, T-54, T-55, T-62, Tlauncher; SPG-9 73mm AT gun; Sagger ATGM; 72*1. Armoured Personnel Carriers: BTR-152**, BTR- 100mm T-12 AT gun*; 66 mm RPG-18 single-shot 60PB, BTR-70*2. Abn. Assault Gun: ASU-85. rocket launcher*; 85mm SD-44 AT gun. Infantry Fighting Vehicles: BMP-1, BMP-2*, BMD*2. Wheeled Fighting Vehicles: BRDM-2 scout car; gun Infantry weapons: 5.45mm weapons* (AKS, AK-74, trucks*3. AKD, AKSU assault rifles, and RPK-74 LMG.) 7.62mm weapons (AKM, AKMS, AK-47 assault 122mm howitzers: M-30 (M-1938)5, D-30 (M-1963), rifles, RPK, RPD**, RP-46**, DTM**, LMGs, 4 2S1 SP (M-1974)* . 152mm howitzers: 2S3 SP (M- PKMS GPMG, SKS** carbine, PPSh SMG**. 1973)*4, 2S5SP (M-1977)*. 130mm guns: M-46 (M- 7.7mm ZB-36 LMG** (pre-war Czech). Grenade 1954)*6. MRLs: 132mm BM-13**5, 122mm Grad- launchers: 30mm AGS-17* (also vehicle- and P and BM-21*4, 220mm BM-27*. Rockets: Frog- helicopter-mounted versions), 40mm BG-15* 7*6. Mortars: 82mm M-1937 (incl. SP on BMD)*, (mounted under AK-74 barrel). Mines: PFM-1 air82mm Vasilesk (towed and SP)*, 120mm M-1943, dispensed, PMN anti-personnel, and others. 240mm SP M-1977*6. Surface-to-air missiles: SANotes: 1 Soviets began adding applique armour and smoke grenade launchers to tanks from 1983. T-72.S remain rare; T-62S predominate in Soviet units, progressively replacing T-54 and T-55 during 1981-82, although the latter are still seen. DRA T-62S deployed mainly round Kabul: T54s, T-55S serve in DRA armoured units, T-34/85S in infantry units. 2 BTR-6oPB and BTR-70 arc standard vehicles of three motor rifle regiments per motor rifle division: BMPs arc used by one regiment per motor rifle division; BMP-2 first used 1982. by 70th Motor Rifle Bde.; BMDs used by airborne units. Some BMPs have applique armour; BMPs. BTR-60s. BTR-70S have been up-gunned with 30mm grenade launchers. DRA units use BTR-60PB and BTR-152 to transport approx, one third of infantry forces when in field.

The ground forces (see OB chart; are deployed in garrisons of varying sizes, from division down to companies—the chart shows only the HQ location. The units follow in standard Soviet tactical organisations. The Troops Many personnel are sent to their units after initial induction. Paratroopers are jump-trained in the USSR, and NCOs and specialists often go through three- to six-month courses in USSR-based training divisions. However, for much of the war, units in Afghanistan have trained most of their bi-annual intake of conscripts themselves before committing them to combat. When their two years' service is completed, they send them home. The paratroopers 10

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Used for convoy escort. Guntrucks have 23mm AA guns on rear deck high elevation weapons can engage guerrillas on mountain crests. 4 Standard Soviet divisional and regimental artillery pieces: some motor rifle divisions in Afghanistan still use M-30. 5

Standard DRA artillery weapon.

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Heavy artillery was used in early 1980. and returned to action by 1984. Conventional Frog rockets first used 1985. 7

Used to destroy stone houses.

all have complete pre-induction military training, so the airborne units in Afghanistan are in a higher state of readiness. The need to train their own troops is one reason why each Soviet regiment can normally field only a battalion-sized force for operations at any given moment, although at the end of each six-month training period and for special efforts the whole unit will be put into the field. In 1984-85 it was reported that the Soviets gave most combat troops being sent to Afghanistan more extensive training (six months or longer) in the Soviet Union before committing them to battle. Officers, warrant officers and career NCOs do twoyear tours, although they may extend. During the 1979 invasion and in early 1980 most of the men of the motor rifle divisions were recalled

reservists from the Turkestan and Central Asia Military Districts. Often poorly trained and never having been mobilised before as part of these divisions, most were of Moslem stock and had little enthusiasm for killing their brethren. By mid-1980 the reservists had all been replaced by serving conscripts. Aside from labour units—always heavily Asian—Soviet units in Afghanistan seem to have no ethnic group predominating. The Russian soldier has always fought with great bravery, but in Afghanistan small-unit training and tactics, as well as the level of initiative and competence, has often proved wanting. The Soviets have improved since their early set-backs. The Afghans say the Soviets are becoming progressively more adept, especially since early 1984. Service in the Soviet military is harsh whatever the posting, and Afghanistan is no exception, leading to serious morale and drug abuse problems, especially in non-combat units. Operational Approach The initial operational goal of the Soviet invasion was to seize the government and infrastructure of Afghanistan. Since then, they have been moving towards a long-term solution. They do not have to win the war this year, or even in five years. Thus, they are aiming to use as few troops as possible, to

Photographed early in the war, a 14-man combat group of Afghan guerrillas in training. They are well equipped by the standards of that period: each has a bolt-action rifle, either a Lee Enfield or a locally-made Mauser, apart from the second man from the foreground, who has some kind of Martiniaction weapon. This group show a degree of tactical sophistication in having, at right, a separate four-man 'tankkiller' team with an RPG-7 and grenades. The commander is distinguished by perhaps the most important item of equipment—a bullhorn, with which he can invite DRA and Soviet Asian troops to lay down their arms—figuratively—and join their Moslem brothers in fighting the Communists. (US Information Agency)

suffer as few casualties as possible, and to keep Afghanistan at 'an acceptable level of violence'. Tactics The tactics the Soviets are using to accomplish these goals are: large scale depopulation and destruction of agriculture; maximum use of firepower (air and artillery) to accomplish this; emphasis on intelligence (aircraft, ground patrols, agents and informers) to target firepower effectively; use of both large scale combined-arms mechanised forces and smaller light forces, often heliborne. The Soviets are not trying to occupy the countryside of Afghanistan. This is why their troop commitment is smaller than those of the USA in Vietnam or the French in Algeria. They are trying to hold the cities and airfields, and to keep the use of the roads. To prevent the Afghans from interfering with their hold on the infrastructure they are 11

depopulating large areas of countryside, near the roads, in food-producing areas, or along infiltration routes from Pakistan. Mao Tse-tung wrote that 'the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea'; the Soviets are not trying to catch the fish one at a time—they are draining the ocean. In his 1864 campaign in Virginia's Shenandoah Valley, US General Phillip Sheridan gave orders for destruction so thorough that 'a crow flying over this valley will have to carry his own rations'. The Soviets are aiming at the same destruction of the agricultural infrastructure. The aerial bombardments of agricultural areas combine with ground sweeps to burn fields, destroy irrigation systems and granaries, slaughter flocks, and drive farmers out of their fields. This had led to severe food shortages in parts of Afghanistan by the winter of 1984-85, and has the potential to undercut the Afghan ability to resist. The process of depopulating the countryside has continued since mid-1980. Most villages between the paved roads and the first or second line of hills (almost all roads run in valleys except in the few flat Nuristan was one of the first places where organised resistance broke out after the 1978 coup. This DRA Mi-4 Hound helicopter was shot down there in March 1979. Although indistinct, the silhouettes of these Nuristani fighters show two tell-tale details of local winter dress: wrap-around coats worn in preference to the pukhoor blanket, and large red boots. (Wildenberg-Sipa)

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areas) and those within striking range of targets such as cities, airfields, garrisons, and pipelines, have now been destroyed. The area within a day's march of the roads and other targets is the target of most of the bombing and ground sweeps. While guerrillas still operate in these areas, they normally must stay concealed, frequently in caves, whenever they are not on the move. Agriculture is difficult, and most civilians have left. The country anywhere beyond a day's march from what the Soviets value is to them the hinterland, where they bomb and sweep in response to intelligence indications of guerrilla activity or food production. In much of Afghanistan a visitor would not even be aware there is a war going on, since the Afghans continue to live in the way they always have. The Soviets and the DRA have no control over about 85 per cent of the country. Even the major cities are far from pacified. It should be emphasised that the Soviets do not care who occupies the countryside of Afghanistan, or what happens to its people, so long as they control the cities, roads, and airfields. In some remote, mountainous areas such as the Hazara Jat and Nuristan, there has been no attempt to re-impose Communist control since DRA forces were driven out in 1979. Instead, the Soviets try to buy off and divide Afghan groups in these places. The Soviets are fighting the war 'on the cheap

Most DRA militia wear normal civilian dress—the foreground man with the slung 5.45mm AKS (which will probably be taken away again as soon as the photo session is over) wears the wrap-around coat commonly worn in the north-east of Afghanistan, with a DRA Army belt and the ubiquitous puhtee hat. Some urban militias have uniforms of a sort, e.g. greenish grey or blue denims in a variety of styles, and in some cases pale khaki badgeless berets, usually worn flat on the head and pulled forward.

Posed photo of Soviet VDV desantniki wearing the standard camouflage overall in sand on green, and their pale blue berets. In actual combat they would wear either the steel helmet, the pilotka sidecap, or—depending on season—the khaki bush hat or the ushanka fur cap. They would also carry much more equipment—extra pouches for the AKD rifle, grenades, and possibly an RPG-18 light anti-tank weapon for use against houses and drystone sangars. If operating from a helicopter or BMD they would also probably wear body armour, particularly since 1984.

and nasty'. In contrast to the massive US commitment to Vietnam, the US Defense Intelligence Agency has estimated that the Afghanistan War represents a commitment of only 6 per cent of Soviet divisions and 2 per cent of its total defence spending. Other estimates put the annual cost to the Soviets at $2-4 billion. They appear willing to spend 20 years waiting for Afghanistan to be pacified. On the battlefield, the Soviets have had great difficulty in adapting an army equipped, organised, and trained for mechanised, combined-arms combat in Western Europe or Manchuria to fight a guerrilla war in some of the roughest terrain in southern Asia. They have suffered a series of tactical reverses and frustrations. Until 1984 they were unable to take advantage of guerrilla inexperience, and seldom moved on the high ground or practised aggressive small unit tactics. Even allowing for recent Soviet tactical improvements, the majority of their forces—motorised infantry mounted in BTRs or BMPs—remain roadbound, with limited tactical flexibility, although they provide the bulk of the Soviet forces for large-scale ground sweeps and convoy escorts as well as defending key installations. While possessed of heavy firepower and armour protection, combined-arms forces cannot move fast enough to surprise guerrillas, and are dependent on the training level of their troops.

in conjunction with manoeuvre in Afghanistan— firepower supplied by helicopters, fighter-bombers, or artillery. Yet the overall tempo of combat is lower than in Vietnam, a war which showed that firepower alone is indecisive. The use of heliborne forces has given the Soviets additional capabilities, but even these have shown limitations. In both the 1982 Panjsher V and 1984 Panjsher VII offensives, battalion-sized heliborne forces were badly cut up by the Afghans. The troops of the airborne regiments, the air assault brigade, and the one battalion per motor rifle division and brigade which have received special training, are frequently used for heliborne operations. The Soviets have been increasing their use of unconventional warfare and light infantry forces. Extensively and effectively used in the 1979 invasion, they have since been committed to ambush patrols along Afghan infiltration routes and for extended dismounted operations into Afghan-controlled areas. They will sometimes dress in DRA uniforms or Afghan civilian clothes. In 1984—85 the Soviets made greater use of heliborne forces capable of extended dismounted operations. The emergence of specialised counter-insurgency infantry parallels Western experience. Heliborne or dismounted, smaller, faster reacting forces are more likely to maintain the element of surprise, and can operate independently or with other Soviet or DRA forces.

The Soviets have emphasised massive firepower

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Some Soviet motor rifle units have been trained and equipped to some extent for mountain operations; by 1984 85 these troops were becoming notably more proficient. These mountain troops wear drab khaki coveralls with hoods and with sewn-in bands of elastic to keep the cloth from snagging; see also Plate B3, Osprey Elite 5, Soviet Bloc Elite Forces.

Frogfoot, although limited to one squadron until 1983-84. Tu-16 Badger medium bombers and SU-24 Fencer attack aircraft are among the many machines based in the Soviet Union to bomb targets in Afghanistan. The Badgers have been in action since 1980, Fencers since 1982. Badgers heavily bombed Herat in 1983 and the Panjsher in 1984. Even An-12 Cub transports have been used as bombers, rolling bombs down the rear ramp. Particularly vital to the Soviet 'air war' strategy of 1983—85 has been the use of sensor-equipped An12 Cubs and An-26 Curls—four- and twin-engined turboprop transports—for reconnaissance and as 'master bombers'. In 1984 Cub and Il-76 Mainstay radar-equipped aircraft were used as airborne command posts. Airlift is provided by both military and Aeroflot aircraft. Soviet fixed-wing airpower is mainly used to attack villages which could serve as guerrilla bases. Close air support—attacking guerrillas in battle with Communist ground troops—is limited, and almost always performed by helicopters rather than fighter-bombers. There is no sustained air interdiction campaign comparable to the US programme in Vietnam, although there have been repeated local efforts. Soviet fixed-wing airpower has suffered from being unresponsive to changing tactical situations and from inaccurate weapons delivery, although it has become markedly more efficient since early 1984. Its use against villages (especially after an ambush or guerrilla activity in an area) rather than against moving guerrilla forces means that fixed-wing airpower kills a lot of civilians.

Fixed-Wing Air Operations The Soviet Air Force fields a wide variety of fixedwing assets as part of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan. The main in-country air bases are Bagram, Kabul, Shindand, Herat, and Khandahar, supplemented by aircraft operating from bases in the Soviet Union such as Mary, Termez, and Kushka. Other airfields include Ghurian, Farah, Zaranj, Ghazni, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz, and Bazai Gumbaz in the Wakhan Corridor. Soviet fighters totalled, in 1985, about eight to ten 12-15-aircraft squadrons in Helicopter Operations Afghanistan, with an equal number based in the Helicopters are the most important single Soviet Soviet Union for supporting operations. weapon in the war in Afghanistan. The Afghans Soviet fighters include two or three squadrons of hate and fear helicopters—especially the Mi-24 MiG-23 and MiG-27 Floggers, one or two squadrons Hind attack helicopter—more than anything else. of MiG-21 Fishbeds, and two squadrons each of Su- Hinds, which represent about a quarter of the 17 Fitter-Ds, and Su-25 Frogfoots. The MiG-21 Soviets' helicopter strength in Afghanistan, are used Fishbed originally predominated in both air-to-air for close air support, for bombing villages, for and air-to-ground roles; by 1984, these had largely convoy escort, and for patrolling and destroying been replaced by MiG-23 and MiG-27 Flogger whatever they find moving in most of Afghanistan. fighter-bombers. SU-17 and SU-22 Fitter swing- Flying by day and night, Hinds use their under-nose wing fighter-bombers are also extensively used. The 12.7mm machine gun, 57mm rocket pods, HE, most effective fighter-bomber has been the Su-25 white phosphorus, and incendiary bombs, air14

dropped minelet pods, 'liquid fire' delayed-action incendiary pods, cluster bomb units, or chemical canisters—the same ordnance used by other helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. The Hind is heavily armoured and is hard to destroy. While the Hinds have had to adapt to increased Afghan air defences, they have also refined their tactics and target acquisition means since they first entered combat in 1979. The Mi-8/Mi-17 Hip series is the standard transport helicopter, and predominates in Afghanistan. They carry troops and equipment for Soviet heliborne operations. They can also be heavily armed—up to six rocket pods, plus machine guns and 30mm grenade launchers—although they lack the Hind's armour. Hips also act as 'masters of ceremonies' for Hind attacks. Mi-6 Hook and Mi-26 Halo machines provide heavy lift capabilities. Soviet helicopters total at least seven regiments each of 30 to 50 aircraft and several independent flights and squadrons, with 350-plus helicopters based in Afghanistan and probably half as many again in the Soviet Union.

The AGS-17 30mm automatic grenade launcher has seen extensive use in Afghanistan, often in the role posed here: providing a base of fire for an advancing platoon. Soviet troops in combat often, but by no means invariably, shed many of their distinctive insignia—the cap badge, shoulderboards, collar tabs and armshield.

Chemical Weapons There is clear and convincing evidence of the Soviet use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan. These include older gases such as phosgene, CS and CN, as well as standard nerve agents, and new hightechnology agents such as mycotoxins—the deadly 'Yellow Rain', an incapacitant—and 'the Flash', a fast-acting and highly lethal nerve gas. While there have been no confirmed reports of these newer gases being used since 1982. the older types remained in use at least until 1984. Delivery is normally by canister dropped from helicopters or fighterbombers. Other Armed Forces In addition to the Army and the Air Force, the Soviets have reportedly committed units from the KGB Border Guards, MVD Ministry of the Interior Internal Security Troops, and KGB 15

Special Troops or 'Spetsnaz' (who were used in the 1979 invasion and who also guard high-priority objectives). Communist Casualties By 1986 the Soviets were estimated to have lost 12-15,000 killed in action with three times as many wounded. Hepatitis and other diseases have led to further casualties. DRA losses are over three times higher; although this would include desertions, they have lost over 18,000 dead. More than 100 fixedwing aircraft and 700 helicopters (35 per cent of Soviet air/ground co-operation: Mi-24 Hind-D attack helicopthem Hinds) had been lost in combat and in ters circle low over a column of T-62 tanks somewhere in operational accidents, 25 per cent of these in 1985. Afghanistan. See Plate B for typical colour finish. (Jamiat Islami) The money cost may have exceeded $17 billion. Pre-war, the 103rd Guards Air Assault (i.e. Abn. Regt. was part of the 105th Guards Abn. Div., Abn.) Div. was at Vitebsk, Byelorussian Military now disbanded, which was based in Fergana, District; the 5th Guards Motor Rifle Div. was at Turkestan Military District. The 357th and 360th Kizyi Arvat, Turkestan Military District; the 201st Motor Rifle Divs. (whose designations are not Motor Rifle Div. was at Frunze and/or Dushanbe, certain) may be in their prewar garrison positions in Central Asia Military District. The 375th Guards the Turkestan Military District, or they may have Order of Battle, Soviet Army in Afghanistan, Summer 1985 HQ 40th Army 40th Army Forward HQ 103rd Guards Abn. Div. 108th Motor Rifle Div. 201st Motor Rifle Div. 5th Guards Motor Rifle Div. 357th Motor Rifle Div. 360th Motor Rifle Div. 70th Motor Rifle Bde. 66th Motor Rifle Bde. 191st Motor Rifle Regt.

16

. . .

Termez, USSR Kabul, Bala Hisar Fort Kabul, Southwest Camp Kabul, Northeast Camp

. . .

Kunduz

. . .

Shindand

. . . . . .

Kushka, USSR

866th Motor Rifle Regt. 38th Air Assault Bde. 375th Guards Abn. Regt. ? Special Ops. Bde. ? Special Ops. Bde. ? Special Ops. Bde. 40th Airmobile

Feyzabad Gardez Bagram ...

Shindand Kabul ?

Bn.

. . .

Termez, USSR

. . .

Khandahar

. . . . . .

Jalalabad Ghazni

40th Airfield Defence Bn. 40th Artillery Bde. (Heavy) KGB Border Gds. Mobile Gp. KGB Border Gds. Mobile Gp.

Khandahar

...

Bagram Kabul?

. . .

Kabul Herat

replaced units that have deployed into Afghanistan. The 108th Motor Rifle Div. may have been stationed before the war at Termez. In addition to the forces listed, regiments of the 104th Guards Abn. Div. fly in to participate in major offensives. The airfield defences at Jalalabad and Khandahar were each, in 1984, reinforced by a Ranger (Raydoviki) battalion. These may be part of the Special Operations Brigades or they may be independent. The brigades are known as Spetsnaz forces in the Soviet Army. The war in the northern provinces of Afghanistan is conducted by the divisions based inside the Soviet Union. In addition, many of the air and service support forces used in the fighting are based in the Soviet Union. Total Soviet troop strengths are estimated as follows: 115,000 Army troops in Afghanistan 40,000 Army troops fighting in Afghanistan, based in USSR. 10,000 Air Force personnel in Afghanistan and in the USSR. 50,000 support troops in USSR. 2,000 advisors to Kabul regime. In addition, substantial MVD and KGB forces are involved—probably an additional 5,000 troops in total, plus several thousand civilian advisors. In the early stages of the war there were over 100 Cuban advisors, civilian and military, though most of these were withdrawn by 1984-85. There were also over 100 East German police advisors in the early 1980s. Bulgarians, in uncertain numbers, have been involved; and there are persistent though unconfirmed reports of Cuban, Ethiopian, Vietnamese, South Yemeni and Syrian troops serving with Soviet forces.

An exploded PFM-1 'Butterfly' mine. Dropped in vast quantities from helicopters, these surface anti-personnel mines are coloured drab green or sand for concealment, and remain active for months before finally exploding themselves. The charge is large enough to maim horribly—which is highly cost-effective, given the guerrillas' shortage of medical resources. (Author's photo)

weapons squad (seven men, one BTR/BMP, two AGS-17). Weapons squad may have an additional 13 men with a BTR, four Spigot ATGMs, and four 12.7mm machine guns in BTR-equipped units. Motor rifle battalion:

Headquarters (12 men, one BTR or BMP) Three motor rifle companies One tank company (attached if required, three four-tank platoons plus one command tank). One air defence platoon ten men, nine SA-7— Tactical organisation probably not used in Afghanistan). Motor rifle platoon: Two-man HQ plus three squads One mortar battery (eight 120mm mortars, towed each with one BTR-60/-70 or BMP, each of nine by trucks, may be replaced by 82mm Vasilesk men (two/three vehicle crew), one RPG-7/-16, one mortars). or two RPK-74, the rest with AKS assault One anti-tank platoon (not in BMP-equipped rifles. Platoons normally have one sniper with an battalions)—27 men, four BTR-60/70, two SPG-9, SVD rifle; in Afghanistan this is increased to three four Sagger or Spigot A T G M . Batteries or battalions of 122mm howitzers, snipers. Platoons will carry RPG-18 weapons as 122mm BM-21 rocket launchers, and 82mm well as rifles. Motor rifle company: Six-man HQ with one Vasilesk mortars are often attached to motor rifle BTR/BMP; three motorised rifle platoons, plus one battalions in Afghanistan. 17

DRA Armed Forces High Level Command The quisling Prime Minister, Babrak Karmal, presides over a government made up of both his own Parcham and the Khalq Communist parties, although the Soviets have effective control over all governmental actions. Unlike the Taraki regime, Karmal has made a show of respecting Islam and traditional institutions. His government retains its 'banana republic' quality, with intensive violence making a low-level firing pass; this angle shows that it and in-fighting between different factions in the isHind-D finished overall in 'sand and spinach', including the belly, party and the armed forces. Even the pro-Soviet which bears the red star insignia. The outboard AT missile are empty; the inboard pylons carry two 57mm rocket Afghans cannot achieve unity, although the Soviets rails pods and two canisters, probably containing bomblets but dominate the DRA economically as well as possibly poison gas. The radar for its 12.7mm rotary cannon is apparent in silhouette under the left side of the nose. See Plate politically, with natural gas and cotton being B. (US Information Agency) appropriated for Soviet use. The aim is to 'Sovietise' all aspects of the Afghan government. The DRA Army has done the bulk of the fighting whose political reliability is their main on the Communist side, being extensively involved qualification—many DRA junior officers are in every Soviet offensive in 1979-82 and many of illiterate. Despite this, some DRA units will switch those since. The DRA Army is responsible for the sides when given an opportunity. Conscription is by entire war in the eastern provinces, along the press-gang. Mutinies resulted when some conscript Pakistan border, as the Soviets will use the puppet service was extended from three to four years in regime troops to garrison particularly those areas March 1984. away from the cities, roads and airfields. DRA units are all understrength: divisions are normally the size of weak brigades. The paper organisation of DRA units means little; although Command and Control The Army's chain of command runs from Karmal infantry divisions still retain their basically trito the Minister of Defence (Gen. Nazar Moham- angular structure of three three-battalion infantry med), the Chief of the General Staff (Lt. Gen. Shah regiments or brigades (one mechanised in APCs), Nawraz Tanay), and the three geographical corps an artillery regiment, and a tank battalion, the commands and independent divisions and brig- actual divisional strength is governed by the mission ades. Real authority is in the hands of Soviet of each unit and the share of resources it can obtain. advisors, present from the highest to lowest levels in One of the reasons the DRA Army is in such poor the DRA command structure. shape is that the Soviets are afraid of its turning against them en masse. Soviet actions and troop movements suggest that this was their prime The Troops In 1978 the Afghan Army had a nominal strength of concern in the December 1979 invasion. Currently 110,000 and an actual strength of about 80,000; by most of the 103rd Gds. Abn. Div. is always kept the end of 1980, it was down to about 20,000. By literally as a 'palace guard' for the Soviet presence 1986, the Army had an average strength of about in Kabul (as well as, possibly, a power projection 35,000 although there is probably an annual loss of force for Gulf area contingencies). Because the about 10,000 men through desertion, de- DRA military includes many secret guerrilla mobilisation and casualties. Since 1981 the DRA sympathisers, the Soviets tell their allies little of has paid its officers and NCOs well by Afghan planned operations. Despite this, the guerrillas have standards. They have attracted some committed advanced notice of most major Communist Communists and a number of badmashes ('punks') offensives. 18

The DRA had a number of elite units—the 26th Airborne Battalion and the 444th, 37th and 38th Commando Brigades. The Airborne mutinied in 1980. The Commando Brigades were considered politically reliable and so were used as mobile strike forces until they suffered heavy losses. Since then, they have been broken down into independent battalions. DRA elite units have made combat parachute jumps. Weapons The DRA uses older Soviet equipment. Most RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers, SA-7 surface-toair missiles, and anti-tank mines were reclaimed by the Soviets in 1980. They mainly retain their prewar equipment and uniforms. Tactics DRA forces are frequently deployed in static defence missions. Garrisons range in size from division to company, often in old 'Foreign Legion'style forts which are the target of many guerrilla raids and sieges. The DRA emerges from garrison for sweeps or convoy escort. Major offensives may include one or more divisions, either operating in

conjunction with Soviet units or acting independently. DRA units are not mechanised in the Soviet way. DRA infantry normally marches, though it can be lifted by trucks or APCs, usually old BTR-152s. Tanks are dug into static defences, or used for infantry support or as convoy escorts. Armoured brigades have been used as complete formations. The Soviets will use DRA units to defend vulnerable objectives and, on the offensive, to attack guerrilla positions, often with Soviet troops in Overwatch positions to prevent desertions and to minimise Soviet casualties—a prime objective of Soviet tactics. Air and Air Defence Force The DRA Air Force is equipped largely with export models of older Soviet aircraft, although some helicopter units have Hind-Ds and Hip-Es. The Soviets keep tight control over DRA aircraft, which A typical scene of 'Afghan pastoral': 'Landscape, with Hip' . .. The Mi-8 transport helicopter is on final approach at the Communist outpost of Anawa in the Panjsher Valley in 1983. More recently, with the increased threat from SAMs, Soviet helicopters make their approaches in a steep spiral, dropping heat-decoy flares. (Tim Cooper, via Afghan Aid)

19

insurgency operations. While many of these forces are ill-trained and unreliable, they have the potential to involve the population with the Kabul regime, and provide the DRA with forces that can move and act like the guerrillas, while DRA regulars remain largely tied to their forts and the roads. Sarnadoy (Defenders of the Revolution)

Under the Khalqi-controlled Ministry of the Interior, as a counter to the Parchamite forces, this organisation is the successor to the former Gendarmerie. Made up of serving conscripts and organised in provincial regiments, reinforced by militia 'helpers'. A DRA Army lieutenant reads the news to his men—literacy is limited in Afghanistan at the best of times. See Plate E for these winter uniforms in grey drab. They are armed with 7.62mm Kalashnikovs, the middle man with link for his PK GPMG slung round him, where it can gather dirt and distorting knocks. Barely visible, but interesting, are the officer's black, painted or applied cloth insignia of rank on the shoulder strap; and the parachutist's badge on the chest of the man immediately right of the newspaper.

are co-located with Soviet units: all flights include at least one Soviet crew, Soviet-manned aircraft guard against defections, and some missions are flown by all-Soviet aircrew in DRA aircraft. DRA fighters and fighter-bombers number about ten ten- to 12-aircraft squadrons: four with about 50 MiG-17s, three with about 40 MiG-21s, three with about 36 Su-7s and SU-17s—some reports also mention 30 MiG-23s. In June 1985 DRAAF crews destroyed 20 of their own MiGs at Shindand. The helicopters number about six 12- to 15-aircraft squadrons, two of them with Hinds1. DRA SA-2 and SA-3 SAMs are deployed around Kabul and major airfields such as Bagram and Shindand.

Police

Involved in counter-guerrilla and anti-Parchamite fighting, under the Ministry of the Interior. KHAD (Khidamate Aetilaati Daulati—State Information Service)

The DRA secret police is an extension of the KGB, and runs an extensive net of agents and informers, plus assassins and torturers. Parchamite in sympathy, leading to clashes with pro-Khalqi police. KHAD para-military units operate in the field with the Army: effective intelligence is required for success in counter-insurgency conflict. KHAD has attempted to divide and infiltrate many guerrilla groups and has built up an intelligence net which the Soviets are trying to use to target their firepower successfully. Frontier Troops

Transferred to Ministry of Tribes and Frontiers from Defence Ministry control in 1983. Linked to Soviet KGB Border Guards. Tribal Militia

Other Armed Forces The Soviets have built up other local forces to 'shadow' the unreliable DRA Army as a system of checks and balances. These forces probably outnumber the Army in terms of forces in the field. Western experience is that effective indigenous forces are an essential part of successful counter-

Under Ministry of Tribes and Frontiers Control, this consists mainly of Pathan tribesmen temporarily bought off to fight against the guerrillas. Can be tough fighters, but seldom pro-DRA for long. Other Militia organisations include armed PDPA cadres; so-called 'Revolution Defence Groups'; Pioneers; and Youth Wings of the Khalqi and Parchamite parties. Many militia groups function at night as anti-Soviet guerrillas.

1 A report of 12 November 1985 claims that a DRA Air Force MiG-21 was shot down on that date by mujahideen in Kandahar province, and that the pilot was a Soviet general officer serving as senior advisor to the DRAAF. He ejected, and his parachute was recovered, but he had not (at the time of writing) been located alive or dead, and may thus have fallen into the hands of the resistance.

Hearts and Minds The Soviets and the DRA have tried to use the divisions in Afghan society to divide and conquer; they have been largely unsuccessful. The Kabul

20

These Motor Rifle troops armed with the 5.45mm AKS wear winter combat dress of steel helmet, overcoat with upturned collar, boots and gloves. The BMP-is are armed with 73mm cannon; they do not have their Sagger AT missiles mounted, although these have been used in Afghanistan to demolish stone houses. (US Navy) A DRA conscript—the boy who does the dying for Karmal and the Russians. Note the shoddy quality of this grey uniform. The collar patches are light blue, and the left chest strips red. Photographed near Kabul, this combination of insignia is unexplained, but the collar patches have been tentatively identified to Air and Air Defence Force ground personnel.

regime's popularity and legitimacy remains low, even in the major cities. The war remains one against the Soviets, not a civil war. While tribal or local groups have been paid off by the Communists, these have frequently reverted to the guerrillas. Unofficial local truces between guerrillas and DRA garrisons are common, however. The most publicised truce was that between the Soviets (not the DRA) and Ahmad Shah Massoud's forces in the Panjsher Valley in one year, 1983-84. The Soviet attempt to get the Afghans to fight each other has only been a success in the Hazara Jat, where Nasr and Gulbuddin forces1 fought other Hazaras until a truce was arranged in early 1985. The Soviets publicise their civic action and agitprop activities, but these are undercut by the brutality of the Soviet forces. Any guerrilla war is, of 1

See list of major resistance groups and leaders below. 21

necessity, a hard and dirty one, but this one has been particularly bad. Massacres on the Lidice or Oradour-sur-Glane pattern are frequent and well documented: Kerala in Kunar (1979), Rauza, near Ghazni (1983), and Baraki Barak. Logar (1984), are among the better publicised massacres. The

22

Soviets have deported several thousand students, some as young as nine, to the Soviet Union for education and indoctrination as the ruling class of a new Afghanistan. This shows the possible time frame of Soviet planning.

could be put into the field at once, but with more food, weapons, ammunition, and training a higher percentage could be fighting than is now the case. Gerard Challiand, a French expert who has been The Afghan resistance is not an army but rather a people in arms. Their strengths and weaknesses are in the field with many guerrilla movements, wrote in 1981: 'The Afghan insurgents know little of those of Afghan society. The fighting men range from 12-year-olds to modern revolutionary war—its efficiency or organigreybeard veterans of the Third Afghan War. As in sation or careful planning of time and work.' While any guerrilla war, the active or passive partici- the Afghans have greatly improved since then, it pation of those who grow food, provide shelter, and remains a largely pre-modern, pre-literate agrarian pass information is vitally necessary; and the subsistence society, locked in a war of attrition with resistance has the support of the vast majority of the a superpower, and not receiving much outside aid, population. Because today's farmer is often military or political. That is why Afghanistan is not tomorrow's guerrilla, and because there is no the Soviet Union's Vietnam, even though the central Afghan command, a total count of Afghan Afghan farmer can become as good or better a forces is not possible. Estimates range from fighting man than the Vietnamese farmer. Yet the 90-120,000 (US sources, 1980-81) to war is in some respects like Vietnam, minus the 200,000-250,000 (Western analysis, 1983), to North Vietnamese Army or the Viet Cong main 250,000-330,000 (Afghan sources, 1981-82), to force. The Afghans have no divisions or brigades 744,000 (Afghan source, 1984). Total guerrilla which can move from area to area. Regional manpower is probably equal to 10 per cent of the guerrilla commanders have emerged who can population remaining in Afghanistan outside the deploy substantial forces, but they must often put cities—seven to nine million in 1985. Not all of these together a 'coalition' for each operation. The Afghans respect traditional leadership, but a new The parading DRA troops wear dark khaki service dress, generation of leaders has come forward in the white shirts, black ties, and both hat bands and collar patches resistance. While the lack of a central Afghan of bright royal blue; the cap cords are mixed silver and black.

The Afghan Resistance

This combination is tentatively identified with DRA Frontier Troops. Comparison of photos suggests that the soldier accompanying the Soviet private of Traffic Regulator troops at the Salang Pass tunnel is from the same branch of service; these guards seem to retain the blue-banded cap at all times, even with the grey winter battledress uniform. The Salang is one of the world's longest tunnels, and a key choke-point on the direct road between the USSR and Kabul through the Hindu Kush. Convoys are frequently ambushed on its approaches, known to Massoud's guerrillas as 'the Suez Canal'.

23

A T-62A tank of the DRA Army takes part in a Revolution Day parade in Kabul; cf. Plate B for turret markings, and note the added Soviet parade strips on the trackguards. The DRA's T62 force is normally based at Pul-e-Charki near Kabul; on 27 December 1979 they were coincidentally immobilised by Soviet advisors, who removed the batteries 'for winterisation'.

command hurts strategy, planning and use of resources, such a command headquarters would be of limited value if it did exist, because of the guerrillas' minimal long-range communications capabilities. It would also be vulnerable to Soviet attack or infiltration. Major Resistance Groups Mohaz Melli Islami The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, led by Pir Sayid Ahmed Gailani. ProWestern in outlook, NIFA is strongest around Khandahar and among the Pathans of the border areas, from Badakhshan down to Ghazni and west to Wardak and Kabul, based on the Pir's status as a Qadiriya Sufic religious leader. Pro-royalist, this group believes the return of the king (by 1986, an unlikely event) would provide needed unity. Jebhe Milli Nejad The National Liberation Front of Sibghtullah Modjaddidi. Pathan and Naqshbandi Sufic, this traditionalist group, though the smallest of the major parties, is strong in the Jalalabad, Logar, and Khandahar areas. While the leadership was anti-royalist pre-war, there is pro-king sentiment among the rank and file. Harakat-i-Inquilabi-i-Islami The

Islamic

Revolu-

tionary Movement of Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi. Numerically strong, Harakat represents much of the spirit of traditional Afghanistan. Village-based, its leaders are local mullahs. It lacks the Sufi background of other traditionalist parties. 24

Strongest amongst Pathans and Uzbeks, with widespread support, especially in Ghazni, Wardak, Koh-i-Safi, Badakhshan and Kunar. Numbers declined in 1985. Hezbi-i-Islami The Islamic Party of Younis Khalis. Khalis is a moderate fundamentalist, strongest among Pathans. He was formerly associated with the other Hezb party. Kabul, Nangarhar and Paktika provinces have a strong Khalis presence. Khalis himself regularly fights inside Afghanistan. Rapid growth in 1985; this party is known for hard and effective fighting. Jamiat-i-Islami The Islamic Society of Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani. A moderate fundamentalist group, Jamiat is numerically large, and strongest among the Tadjiks, Uzbeks and Turkomen. Making use of the non-tribal nature of Tadjik society—unlike that of the Pathans—Jamiat has benefitted from having the most effective regional commanders in Darispeaking areas. Anti-royalist, but not anti-Western in outlook, Jamiat has been attacked by more extreme fundamentalists, with Khalis being its closest ally. Jamiat has attracted Pathan supporters, especially in Paktia and the Jagdalak Valley of Nangarhar. Active throughout Dari-speaking Afghanistan; Herat Mazar-e-Sharif, Badakhshan, Takhar, Parwan, and Kapisa provinces have Jamiat strongholds. Ittehad-e-Islami The Islamic Alliance of Prof. Abdul Rasoul Sayeff, who in 1982 became chairman of the Fundamentalist Alliance due largely to his access to money and weapons through his links with Moslem Brotherhood and Wahabi groups in the Arab world. He attracted many guerrillas in 1982-84; but because of his lack of a firm, traditional base of authority except in parts of his native Paghman region, many have left with their arms. He also has some influence in Kabul, Nangarhar, Paktika, and Paktia. Hezb-i-Islami The Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The most controversial Peshawarbased party leader, Hekmatyar was one of the first to take up jihad and so had many adherents. He has since been accused of being more concerned with seizing power post-war and of co-operating with the Soviets. Certainly, Hekmatyar's forces blocked the supply routes to the Panjsher in 1982-84 and attacked Panjsheri forces in 1981, and almost every report of inter-Afghan fighting involves them. Yet

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

other Hekmatyar commanders fight hard against the Soviets. Hekmatyar has outside Moslem support, and is less tied to traditional Afghan values than any other party. Fundamentalist, mainly Pathan; widespread, but declining. In the Hazara Jat there are two separate Shia parties. Shura-i-lnquilabi (Revolutionary Council) under Dr. Sayid Ahmed Beheshti, is the 'official' government of the Hazara Jat. Sazmar-i-Nasr (Organisation for Victory) is its Iranian-funded revolutionary opposition. This resulted in tension and some fighting until an agreement was reached in 1985. Nuristan includes an autonomous 'Islamic Republic'. The division between 'traditionalist' and 'fundamentalist' or 'Islamicist' is not clear-cut. However, Islamic revolution and religious fanaticism are alien to Afghan traditions. Resistance Leaders Whatever the Afghans' political differences, the battlefield provides its own unity. Guerrilla groups affiliated to different parties often co-operate in combat; before each operation, a coalition would be

organised. This led to the rise of regional commanders, especially in Dari-speaking areas— Afghan leaders who can control guerrillas over a relatively wide area, including those of other parties. Guerrilla commanders are not appointed or elected, but have come to prominence by their own skill. The best known are: Ahmad Shah

Massoud Tadjik;

Jamiat.

Former

engineering student. The most famous Afghan guerrilla's base is the Panjsher Valley, where he has organised and led forces which the Soviets have not defeated in eight offensives. His 1983—84 ceasefire was controversial, but Massoud's influence remains strong throughout Dari-speaking north-central Afghanistan. The 1984 offensives destroyed much of the valley. Abdul Haq Pathan; Hezb (Khalis). Ex-student; operating around Kabul, his forces include urban guerrillas. His forces used SA-7S and Chinese-made This DRA infantry squad came over to the resistance in the Panjsher Valley in spring 1985, bringing their DPM light machine gun. They wear the summer khaki uniform and a minimum of field equipment. (Mohammed Shuaib, Jamiat lslami)

33

107mm rocket launchers with good effect in 1984—85. A tough, intelligent, charismatic leader. Sayid Jaglan Hazara; Shura. Ex-major, DRA; Commander of Shura forces. Scored several victories in 1979-80, but has not operated outside Hazara

distrust and resentment towards the Peshawarbased leadership has emerged among the guerrillas inside Afgahnistan who are actually doing the fighting, who say they need more support and have become angry at the shortage of outside aid. Despite this, most guerrilla groups remain affiliated to one of the major parties.

Zabioullah Tadjik; Jamiat. Ex-religious teacher. Killed in action, December 1984; was chief commander of resistance around Mazar-e-Sharif. Weapons The Afghan guerrillas are lightly armed, fighting Replaced by Mohammed Alim. Ishmael Khan Tadjik; Jamiat. Ex-major, DRA; the Soviet Army and Air Force with only infantryforemost commander of resistance in and around weapons. The lack of adequate modern weapons and ammunition has been important in limiting the Herat. Shabioullah Pathan; Harakat. Mullah; killed in number of fighting men the Afghans can put into action, April 1985. Had strong guerrilla forces in the field. Koh-i-safi area north-east of Kabul. All Afghan boys learn to shoot, and the rifle Qari Tadj Mohammed Pathan; Harakat. Ex-lawyer; occupies a cherished place in the Afghan heart. Yet guerrilla leader, Ghazni area. the average Afghan did not make much use of Jalulladin Haqani Pathan; Hezbi (Khalis). Religious firearms in peacetime, and they are by no means all teacher; guerrilla leader in south Paktia and natural marksmen. The Afghans are using a wide Paktika provinces. Became foremost area com- variety of rifles. While these range from percussion mander, 1985. jezails and single-shot Martini-Henrys captured at Mohammed Amin Wardak Pathan; NIFA. Ex- Maiwand in 1880, the two most common weapons Ministry of Tourism official; local commander, are .303 Lee Enfields in various versions and a wide range of 7.62mm Kalashnikov assault rifles. The Wardak province. Mohammed Anwar Pathan; Jamiat. Ex-student and first crop of Kalashnikovs came with the massive athlete; local commander, Jagdalak area, Kabul DRA Army desertions of 1979—80, and these have been supplemented by capture and outside aid. Lee and Nangarhar provinces. Enfields remain common—prevalent, in many Abdul Rahim Wardak Pathan; NIFA. Ex-colonel, DRA; staff officer and commander, border areas. The resistance use what weapons they can get, and do not even such museum pieces as this .455 cal. MartiniRamatullah Safi Pathan; NIFA. Ex-colonel, Royal despise Henry; these simple, robust 19th-century weapons are Afghan Army. Training and logistics, combat treasured on the North-West Frontier, where their tremendous man-stopping qualities have been appreciated since the command in Paktia. days of Queen Victoria. Its owner wears Western-style jacket sweater over his pyjamas, and a customised bandolier, In 1980 there was an attempt—one of many and probably supporting cartridge boxes at the waist. (Ed Grazda dating to before 1978—to form a unity of all the via Committee for a Free Afghanistan) major Peshawar-based parties. By 1982 this fell apart into two groupings: one of Gailani, Modjaddidi, and Mohammedi; the other of Rabbani, Khalis, Sayeff, Hekmatyar, and three smaller splinter parties. These groupings were known to the West as the Moderate and Fundamentalist Unities, respectively, although neither label was strictly accurate. Neither grouping evolved a centralised military command or strong political leadership, and both suffered from internal dissension. In May 1985 all the major groups joined in another alliance, with each party head being chairman in turn. Whether this will prove effective is uncertain. The fact remains that considerable 34

areas—and the Afghans appreciate their robustness and long-range sniping capability. In many groups the older guerrillas use the Lee Enfields for long range fire, the younger men the Kalashnikovs at close range. Other infantry weapons used include SKS 7.62mm rifles (Soviet- and Chinese-made); M1891 Moisin-Nagant 7.62mm (supplied on Lenin's orders in 1919!); 7.62mm G3 (ex-Iranian); 9mm Sten guns (often locally made); and a variety of light machine guns, although all are limited in numbers. The 7.62mm RPD and RPK are most common, although the 7.62mm PKM and older Czech-made ZB 36s of the pre-war army are also used. To counter Soviet armour the Afghans must rely on RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launchers, and antitank mines. RPG-7S have been used effectively from the opening days of the war and their numbers have been increasing since late 1982. Afghan mine warfare skills were limited at the start of the war, but have improved; however, because the guerrillas control most of the countryside, mine use is limited to prevent civilian casualties. Ask any Afghan man, woman, or child over the age of six what you can do to help, and the answer will be 'Get us weapons to destroy the helicopters.' The most common anti-aircraft weapons are the Soviet-designed DShK 12.7mm and 14.5mm KPV heavy machine guns, 'Dashika' and 'Ziqriat' respectively to the Afghans. These have always been available in limited numbers; since 1982 more weapons, especially Chinese-made versions, have become more common. The Panjsher Valley was defended by 13 heavy machine guns in 1982, by 200 to 250 two years later. They are of limited effectiveness against Hinds and fighter-bombers, although they have a surprisingly high number of kills and considerable deterrent value. What the Afghans really need is more manportable heat-seeking SA-7 Grail surface-to-air missiles. Small numbers have been in use since 1980: the DRA Army had SA-7s pre-war. Capture and a limited aid flow have provided additional weapons, especially since late 1982, but SA-7S remain few and far between. Those Afghans who receive them do not always use them accurately, for it is by no means a 'soldier-proof weapon, and many of its components are poorly designed or manufactured and

A guerrilla of the Jamiat Islami from the Jagdalak Valley in Nangarhar province; this area has been depopulated by incessant Soviet air attacks, but guerrillas still operate there, with food brought in from Kabul. He carries an RPG-7, and wears 'ChiCom'-style green webbing pouches for Kalashnikov magazines. (Author's photo)

have a limited shelf life. Even an adequate supply of SA-7S would not sweep Afghan skies of Soviet helicopters—the Egyptians and Syrians fired 5,000 SA-7S in the 1973 war to destroy four and damage 28 Israeli aircraft. If a combination of hand-held SAMs and heavy machine guns could defeat Soviet airpower, NATO would not spend billions on sophisticated air defences. However, more SA-7s would make the Soviets less willing to use their airpower offensively, forcing them to attack less accurately from higher altitude and to use evasive action and countermeasures. By spring 1983, Soviet helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft were both routinely dropping decoy flares and altering their tactics as SA-7 countermeasures. 35

The author examining a 7.62mm AKMS folding-stock rifle while in the field with Afghan guerrillas. Note that the weapon is not set on 'safe'—an Afghan habit which disturbed the author's Western sensibilities. The author wears a mixture of Afghan and Western dress in an attempt to appear as simply another 6ft. 4in., 17 stone, blue-eyed Afghan... (Karen McKay)

Tactics Early attempts at fighting pitched battles were successful against some DRA forces, but often disastrous against Soviet firepower. Afghan tactics have become those of guerrilla warfare. Ambushes are the standard method of both offensive and defensive combat; they are the Afghans' means of defence against ground sweeps—although by 1982 some commanders had learned to let mechanised forces roll through their areas, so that they could ambush the supply columns. Afghans will, if forced, fight a defensive battle around a village or other objective, but generally prefer to use ambush tactics. In the border fighting of 1985, in the Soviet Kunar, Herat province, and Paktia offensives, the guerrillas demonstrated the impact of additional training and weapons by standing and fighting Soviet forces rather than engaging in their traditional hit-and-run tactics. They managed to 36

inflict heavy losses on the Soviets, at a high cost to themselves, particularly from air attack. Ambushes are used also to interdict Soviet supply routes. Large convoys run along the major paved road network; although heavily escorted by armoured vehicles and helicopters, these convoys frequently have to fight their way through. Sometimes, the Afghans can inflict substantial losses: in March 1984 a convoy of fuel trucks suffered heavy losses—25 semi-trailers—to an Afghan ambush, causing a fuel shortage in Kabul. The most vulnerable targets for Afghan ambushes are small convoys, which has led to an increase in the Soviet reliance on helicopters and aircraft for re-supplying smaller outposts. The small DRA outposts throughout the country are frequently attacked by the Afghans, and are sometimes taken by assault. Elsewhere, Afghan tactics are dictated by the requirements of their area of operations. Those in major cities operate as urban guerrillas in night-time raids. While the Afghans like to consider themselves natural marksmen, their overall standard of marksmanship is low. The eagle-eyed Pathans of Kiplingesque legend are largely limited to the high country of Paktia and Paktika—one of the reasons why the DRA has had little success in the border areas. Although the Afghans may not have come to grips with guerrilla war strategy and may not be able to use modern weaponry in the most effective way, they have a good grasp of basic guerrilla tactics; but while Afghan tactics have won ambushes, battles, and attacks, these victories cannot by themselves win the war. Training 'More weapons without more training means only more martyrs,' said guerrilla leader Mohammed Amin Wardak. Yet the absence of military rear area support for the guerrillas means that training is limited. In some groups ex-DRA Army soldiers have trained their comrades. In the Panjsher Valley, Massoud set up training programmes for his troops and, starting in 1983, despatched mobile training teams throughout Dari-speaking Afghanistan. Since 1982—83 other groups have set up training camps in the border areas. As recently as 1984 a Jamiat official estimated that only five to ten per cent of the guerrillas' manpower has been

trained; the rest have had to learn how to fight by surviving in battle. Since then, this proportion has apparently increased enough to show an effect on the battlefield. Outside Aid While the Soviet justification for the invasion included the activities of hordes of CIA/ Chinese/Pakistani/Israeli agents and mercenaries, the Afghans claim that they have received insufficient support from outside the country. There is obviously aid reaching the guerrillas—Chineseand Egyptian-made weapons and ammunition are being used in action; but there is little evidence of much-needed training being provided. There have, however, been accusations that money and weapons intended for the guerrillas are being 'siphoned off', either going to Pakistan, being sold by Peshawar-based Afghan leaders, or being retained by some groups for post-war power struggles. Yet it appears that the aid flow did increase, starting in late 1982. The 1983 and 1984 fighting brought these weapons into use, including Chinese-built 107mm rocket launchers and Sovietdesigned 82mm mortars. Press reports have put US aid in the first years of the war in the $20-30 million annual range, with Islamic nations providing about the same. Reportedly US aid has increased to $100 million in fiscal 1985 and to $280 million in fiscal 1986. A group of Afghans during a halt on the inarch in Paktia province. In the centre is Mohammed Gailani, the Englisheducated son of Pir Sayid Ahmad Gailani, head of NIFA; he wears a light field jacket and a leather bandolier over stonegrey pyjamas. Behind him, at right, filling a Kalashnikov magazine, is Wakil Akbarzai. Behind Gailani at left, in white clothing, is Dr. Khalid Akram. Other weapons visible here include a Lee Enfield, a shotgun and an SKS carbine. (Dr. Khalid Akram)

Pakistan, conscious of Soviet pressure, has not become the combination sanctuary and pipeline that successful guerrilla movements in the past have found indispensable. Pakistan officially denies that any military aid is coming into the resistance; and Pakistan-based aid is not decisive to the resistance, as is shown by the extensive guerrilla activity in the west of Afghanistan, which has limited contact with Pakistan. Iran has not provided much help to the Afghans, apparently rating attempts to enlist Soviet help for their war with Iraq over aiding fellow Moslems. Such aid as is given is directed to Shia groups, especially Nasr. Afghan refugees have been conscripted for the Iranian Army. The Ayatollah's Islamic Revolution is alien to the Afghans' way of thinking, and he tends to regard Moslems who do not recognise him as the true imam (spiritual leader) as worse than atheists or infidels. Casualties Estimates of Afghan dead range from 125,000 through 250,000 up to 500,000. Some even estimate 1,000,000 dead. The vast majority have been civilians.

The Future In a guerrilla war, what happens on the battlefield does not always determine ultimate victory or defeat. The US in Vietnam, the Portuguese in Africa, the French in Algeria, and the Rhodesians were all winning militarily, but lost their wars. Thus, an understanding of what will happen in Afghanistan requires looking beyond the fighting men. Refugees The Afghans constitute the largest refugee population in the world. In 1985 there were 2.8—3.2 million in Pakistan, .8—1.7 million in Iran, .2—.4 million elsewhere, and 1—2 million internal refugees. This constitutes half or more of the surviving pre-war population. In Pakistan, in 1983, 75 per cent of the refugees were women or children under 15. The shift of population to the cities may mean that urban insurgency may take on additional importance in the future. 37

opposition is already well-armed by the Soviets and DRA. The Soviets could also try to re-ignite the insurgency in Baluchistan. Pakistan supports the Afghans, but remains vulnerable to a combination of external aggression and internal instability. Negotiations The indirect Geneva talks of 1982-86 between Pakistan and the DRA have not yielded a solution. They are unique among peace negotiations in that the two parties actually fighting—the Soviet Union and the Afghan guerrillas—are not represented. Between sessions of the Geneva talks the special representative of the UN Secretary General has shuttled between various capitals, without success.

Ahmad Shah Massoud, guerrilla leader of the Panjsher Valley, photographed in spring 1985 examining the AKS-74/BG-15 rifle/grenade launcher combination which has been increasingly introduced to Soviet elite units since 1983. See Plate H1. (Mohammed Shuaib, Jamiat Islami)

Famine As early as 1982 30 per cent of farm land had been forced out of cultivation; by 1985 agricultural production was estimated at 25 per cent of pre-war level. In less fertile areas, such as the Hazara Jat and Badakhshan province, there were severe food shortages by 1984-85. If the rains fail or if the cumulative damage done by the Soviets mounts, the risk of mass starvation will increase. The Soviets know famine is an excellent counter-insurgency weapon; they make cheap grain available in the cities to encourage internal refugees away from areas where they could support guerrillas. Pakistan Political upheaval in Pakistan has, along with famine, the greatest potential for crippling the resistance within the next five years. Pakistan has been subjected to Soviet pressure since the start of the war; in 1984-85 the cross-border attacks and threats became more intense. Pakistan has substantial problems of its own, with strong separatist factions, and is in the throes of an attempt to move from military to parliamentary government. The 38

The Soviets The Soviets have withdrawn from countries they have occupied in the past—they withdrew from Austria and bases in Finland in the 1950s. Yet for them to withdraw, the costs of the war will have to be greater than the benefits. The benefits lie in political leverage and military bases against Iran (Russia has invaded Persia eleven times since the 18th century), Pakistan, and the Gulf; in combat training; and in showing the non-aligned nations that the West is not willing to stand up to support one of their number. There have been some costs, not only in troops and helicopters, but also in diplomatic relations with the non-aligned nations, especially those of the Islamic world, and in trade and contacts with the West. Only if the West moves, after over five years of war, to increase all these costs is the calculus likely to shift towards withdrawal. The changes in Soviet leadership do not seem to have altered policies towards Afghanistan. The Soviet model for the future of Afghanistan appears to be Mongolia—nominally independent, but economically and politically completely Soviet controlled. The Soviets, however, always have the option of partition, dividing Afghanistan along the Hindu Kush and having the north hold a plebiscite and ask for admission as the 16th S.S.R. of the Soviet Union. Rumours of this have been current among Afghan groups since early in the war. The Afghans Afghanistan was, even in peacetime, one of the poorest countries on earth. Its people are now

engaged in a prolonged war of attrition. No one has ever won a war of attrition against Russia. But when the Afghans say they are going to fight on, regardless of what the rest of the world may do or say, they really mean it. In 1986 morale is still high among the guerrillas, higher in the field than in Peshawar. There is certainly more aid available, but the Afghans cannot understand why there was not aid four years ago. Even though there may now be enough Kalashnikovs to go around, the Afghans still lack effective unity, organisation, and training. The 1985 attempt at a political coalition may help prevent the increases in aid from being applied in an ineffective way and, more important, may give them a chance to have a voice in world affairs similar to that accorded to the PLO and SWAPO. While the Afghans have certainly improved on the battlefield since the start of the war, so have their opponents. It is probable that only widespread famine or political upheaval in Pakistan could reduce the resistance to the level of being a mere

Guerrillas, wearing as close to uniform clothing as is to be found among the resistance (see Plate G3), man a tripodmounted 12.7mm DShKM heavy machine gun, their standard air defence weapon. The tripod is sand-khaki, probably identifying a Soviet example—Chinese versions have olive green-painted mountings. Some Chinese guns have elaborate mechanical lead-computing sights which are potentially effective against targets flying a straight path, but complex to use. (Author's photo)

annoyance to the Soviets before 1990. After that, no one knows. No one can doubt the bravery and commitment of the Afghans, but ten years of unequal struggle would be a terrible burden. They are only likely to achieve their aim—an Afghanistan without Soviet combat troops—if the West helps them to raise the cost of the war to the Soviets: a cost only partially inflicted on the battlefield. It is not too late for the Afghans. The Vietnamese fought for 30 years. The Afghans, fighting for their homes and way of life, and inspired by the dream of going home again and living as they did before the war, are no less dedicated.

39

The Plates A: Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan: A1: Sergeant, Airborne Forces

Based upon a photograph of the late Sgt. L. Barkandaj, taken from his body after he was shot and killed in the winter of 1983 by a friend of the present author. He was killed while giving orders to his men under fire; and his diary showed that this Ukrainian platoon sergeant had a deep concern for their welfare. It also contained sketches, and verses of poetry. Not all the victims of the Soviet invasion have been Afghans. Sgt. Barkandaj is depicted wearing the khaki drab two-piece uniform of the VDV (Air Assault Force), the collar open to show the striped vest shared with naval personnel by this branch of service. Shoulder boards and collar tabs are in branch-of-service light blue, the former bearing the Soviet Army's cypher and the stripes of this rank. Junior sergeant (two yellow stripes on shoulder straps) of Soviet Motor Rifle troops, wearing the light khaki drab summer shirt-tunic, trousers and bush hat; the cloth has a slightly greenish cast. Buttons are painted olive drab, but a full-colour red and brass star badge is worn on the hat. Field collar patches are of shirt material, with dull metal branch-ofservice badges. The white undercollar can be made out inside the open neck of the shirt-tunic.

Branch-of-service patches are worn on both sleeves. He carries the folding-stock 5.45mm AKSD assault rifle, now the standard weapon of Soviet airborne infantry units, and its associated web equipment; his belt buckle is dulled with drab paint. Note that VDV personnel wear the same high pull-on marching boots as other branches. Camouflage overalls are now apparently being issued as standard combat dress to airborne forces (see Elite 5, Soviet Bloc Elite Forces, for full details of VDV

clothing and equipment). A2: Private. Engineers

The increased use of mines by the Afghan resistance has led to a corresponding increase in the role played by Soviet combat engineers. This soldier wears the hot-weather fatigue bush-hat in pale khaki drill, in use in a number of slightly varying styles since the 1930s. Note applied badge, and chinstrap. The camouflaged overalls, standard issue to combat units throughout Afghanistan, are normally worn with the hood down—the better to hear the click of a mine detonator or a Lee Enfield bolt! The long webbing container is for tin mine marker flags and a mine probe, for use when detecting non-metallic mines; his German Shepherd is a highly trained mine-sniffer, not a pet. His personal weapon is the AK-74 rifle with a wooden stock. A3: Private, KGB Border Guards

Similarly armed is this soldier of a Mobile Group of the Border Guards, deployed for action inside Afghanistan; this branch has also seen service against guerrilla forays on to Soviet territory. The distinctives of this branch are the green cap, shoulder boards (with Cyrillic 'PV' cypher) and collar tabs; the former is worn at all possible times, and always clean and stiff—there are no '50 mission crush1 caps in the KGB. The shoulder and collar insignia are even applied to this camouflage uniform, the kamuflirovanniy kurtki, introduced by the KGB Border Guards in the early 1980s. Of the same material as the standard overall, it is cut like a service dress. A4: Private, Motor Transport troops

A great deal less dedicated to his duty is this transport driver, who never asked to be sent south— 40

or, indeed, to wear a uniform at all—and who has probably been ambushed more than once. He is drably uniformed in the standard khaki Soviet Army summer dress with the pilotka sidecap; its red star badge, and the dull metal branch-of-service badges on his drab-coloured field collar tabs, are the only insignia worn. Like many second-line troops he is still armed with the 7.62mm AKM. Note, just visible, the white collar liner which Soviet conscripts have to sew inside their shirt and tunic collars. B1: Mi-24 'Hind-D' attack helicopter

The Hind has proved the single most powerful Soviet offensive weapons system in Afghanistan, devastatingly effective in carrying out the policy of massive destruction from the air, and so heavily armoured that it is extremely difficult to shoot down with the weapons at the disposal of the resistance. Hind-A versions were used from the opening stages of the war, and remain in service with the DRA; but most DRA and all Soviet attack helicopter units had re-equipped by 1984 with Hind-D and Hind-E models. The Hind-D illustrated was photographed by a British cameraman while it attacked guerrillas near the town of Jagdalak, east of Kabul, early in 1984. It is finished in the standard Soviet helicopter camouflage scheme of 'sand and spinach', and marked with the national insignia on the sides and belly, and with a two-digit individual aircraft serial, in this case '55'. For the missions with which it is tasked in Afghanistan the Hind does not usually carry pairs of AT-2 'Swatter anti-tank missiles on the outer pylons, but relies on the massive destructive potential of its four UV-32 pods each carrying 32 x 57mm rockets, and the chinmounted rotary four-barrel 12.7mm cannon power-aimed by radar and infra-red sensors. A varied combination of bombs and bomblet and chemical weapons dispensers can be carried in the ground-attack role. B2: Soviet Army T-55 Main Battle Tank, 1980

The Motor Rifle divisions initially committed to the invasion of Afghanistan used T-54/T-55 series MBTs in their integral tank regiments and battalions, as do many Soviet units still, particularly in the lower-readiness Military Districts. Since 1979 numbers of T-62S have also been committed; as

This DRA AF Hind-D was flown to Pakistan by its crew in 1985. The box-like structure above the stub wings is an infra-red suppressor for the engine exhausts, to confuse heat-seeking SAMs. This aircraft carries UV-32 rocket pods and 250kg bombs underwing.

have a few T-72S, possibly in divisional reconnaissance battalions. Tank '119' served with a Soviet tank sub-unit which was roughly handled in eastern Afghanistan soon after the invasion, and was one of the casualties. It is marked with the white 'invasion cross' on its upper surfaces, traditionally used when Soviet forces anticipate opposition from similar tank types to their own; first seen during the invasion of the Baltic Republics in 1940, it figured prominently during the Prague invasion of 1968, but was seen infrequently in Afghanistan in 1979-80. B3: T-55A turret markings, DRA Army

DRA tanks are painted in Soviet green drab, with similar turret numbers; for parades the national emblem of the DRA, in the version used since 1980, is added to the turret cheeks. T-55A '517', fully marked in this way, was captured by guerrillas in Paktia Province in 1983 and has seen limited action against the Communists since then. It was one of three captured tanks used in the unsuccessful attack on Urgun in December 1983. C1: Mi-8 'Hip-C helicopter, DRA Air Force

Although an old design with performance limitations, the Hip in its many versions has been the Communist workhorse of this war. It has seen service in the ground-attack role as well as in its more usual character as a troop transport (carrying 28 men, plus crew) and an all-purpose utility and liaison machine. No. '378', finished in faded Soviet camouflage and marked with one of two differing 41

versions of the DRA national insignia, was shot down at the Panjsher Valley town of Rokha during the 'Panjsher V offensive in 1982. When the guerrillas re-occupied the town during the yearlong truce which they forced on the Soviets, they stripped it of everything useful, and then turned the fuselage into an ice-cream parlour. C2: BMP-1 Infantry Fighting Vehicle, 1982

Supplied to the Afghan army before the war, the BMP-1 is apparently limited to service with their armoured brigades. This example was captured from the DRA 7th Armd. Bde. in 1981; since its capture its former crew have occasionally taken it into action against the Communists. The guerrillas have a few captured AFVs in the eastern part of the country, but their use is sporadic, limited by shortage of diesel fuel and by enemy air superiority. This vehicle is finished in standard Soviet and DRA green drab; its turret number seems to be handpainted rather than neatly stencilled in Soviet style. As the DRA insignia is rarely displayed in the field, it is often hard to tell the two armies apart—except by their combat performance. The guerrillas frequently daub captured vehicles with graffiti— both slogans, and the signatures of the victors. D: Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan: D1: Captain, Tank Troops, winter field dress

throughout the war in Afghanistan; guerrillas have reported them being worn in action, and an engagement in Nangarhar province in 1981 yielded Soviet dead wearing these suits. Guerrillas have retained captured masks and suits; while the extent of Soviet use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan is uncertain, that they have been used repeatedly is supported by strong evidence. This soldier, armed with an AKMS, wears the standard-issue Soviet NBC suit and is trying on his gasmask. D3: Paratrooper in winter field dress

He wears the standard Soviet ushanka synthetic fur hat, with the heavy winter version of his khaki drab field dress. The body armour worn by this VDV trooper has become widespread during 1984—85 and is now standard issue for combat operations. He would wear it not only when dismounted, but also inside a BMD personnel carrier; and he would probably sit on it when making a heliborne assault in a Hip. Paratroopers—'desantniki—from the 103rd, 104th and 105th Guards Air Assault Divisions, dressed in this basic uniform though without the armour, played a major role in the 1979 invasion of Kabul. Since then Soviet airborne and motor rifle companies have formed special antisniper squads armed with the SVD sniper's rifle; they have also found that the RPG-7 and RPG-18 anti-tank weapons are an effective, if rather wholesale counter to enemy sniping.

Guerrilla warfare presents junior officers and NCOs with opportunities to take command responsibility; captains often lead reinforced companies used for enveloping operations in the mountains. This officer wears the standard tank crew black winter jacket over black overalls, and the AFV crew helmet. A branch-of-service shield is sometimes applied to the sleeve in felt, or stencilled. The common practice of stencilling the vehicle turret number on the helmet brow is not often seen in Afghanistan. This officer carries the short AKR (AKSU) rifle for self-defence when dismounted; he does not wear the Makarov pistol, whose holster might catch and delay him when 'bailing out' of a 'brewing' T-62. Crews of other categories of AFV, including BMDs and self-propelled howitzers, also wear this uniform.

Standard Soviet Army winter field dress of ushanka and grey greatcoat worn by a senior NCO of motorised infantry. During the initial Soviet invasion some troops were photographed in Afghanistan wearing this uniform complete with full-coloured shoulder boards and collar tabs, and coloured branch-of-service shields on their sleeves. A more subdued field appearance is now the norm; the photo upon which we base this figure shows no insignia apart from the red star on the cap flap, the dull metal branch badges on the field collar tabs, and the broad red stripe of this rank on the khaki drab field shoulder boards. He is armed with both an AKM, and a holstered Makarov pistol.

D2: Soviet soldier in NBC suit

E and F: Army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan:

Soviet troops have carried their NBC suits

(Additional material by Martin Windrow and

42

D4: Starshina, Motor Rifle Troops, winter 1980

Peter Abbott. Although these figures are closely based upon colour photographs, the lack of detailed, authoritative references to the DRA Army's uniform and insignia practices have in some cases made their interpretation somewhat speculative.) E1: Private, Security Troops, urban field dress

The contexts in which these troops have been photographed strongly suggest that the red cap band, collar patches and shoulder strap piping identify security troops—possibly the Tsarnadoy gendarmerie under the Ministry of the Interior, rather than the DRA Army proper. This soft cap, blouse and trousers of shoddy grey drab constitute the DRA Army's winter uniform, for field and service dress alike. Personal equipment is normally of Soviet pattern, and small arms are of the Soviet 7.62mm family. The belt buckle is of Soviet pattern, with the DRA emblem in the centre of the star; equipment belts are often seen worn over two other patterns in the trouser loops—a plain brown leather type with a two-claw frame buckle, and a pre-revolutionary pattern with a circular 'boy scout'-type clasp. The high boots with a double-buckled flap are a fairly new innovation. In the field, no insignia at all are worn in any of the photographs we have located. In pre-revolutionary days the NCO ranks were marked by one to five red chevrons on the shoulder straps, points inwards, the top chevron having a naval-type 'loop' in it. These may still be worn, but cannot be made out in pictures; a few photos of troops in service dress show the branch-of-service collar patches, and the red chest stripes, illustrated on Plate F2—the latter may be NCO insignia. The Soviet steel helmet, usually without a cover or netting, is occasionally seen; and on parade occasions some use is still made of M1918 Austro-Hungarian stahlhelms from a batch bought from Czechoslovakia in the 1930s.

the ankle boots worn with two-buckle canvas gaiters, still by no means fully replaced by the new boot with the built-in buckled flap worn by other figures on these plates. The DRA lacks the Soviet Army's warm, if heavy, winter uniforms; soldiers are often reduced to using local pukhoor blankets for warmth.

E2: Infantryman, winter field dress

E3: Captain 2nd Class, Infantry, winter field dress

Only the Soviet RPD light machine gun and its associated webbing equipment date this hang-dog figure at later than . . . 1914? The poor quality of Afghan government uniforms is emphasised in the original photo of this unhappy conscript. He wears two old-pattern items: the belt with a circular clasp, whose many studs seem a personal affectation; and

The officer's uniform is basically identical to the enlisted men's winter battledress, though apparently of marginally higher quality. The cap is of slightly sharper appearance, and bears an enamelled national emblem (rather smaller than that worn on service dress caps)—see Plate B3 for basic design. The battledress blouse is worn open over a

This DRA trooper, unusually neat and 'squared away' for the photograph, wears summer khaki uniform. His cap—note interesting variation from the norm, a stiff leather peak— bears the red band, and his shoulder straps the red piping, which are thought to identify security troops, since they are often seen on guard duty around Kabul: cf. Plate E1. His DRA Army leather belt and suspenders support standard Soviet Kalashnikov pouches, AKM bayonet and canteen; the buckle, 'subdued' with olive drab paint, is like the Soviet type but has the DRA insignia in the centre of the star rather than the hammer and sickle. Buttons are drab brown; the khaki uniform cloth is noticeably dark in shade.

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khaki drill shirt and a stone-coloured tie. Pocket for company officers, but red now seems to be worn details seem to vary from batch to batch: but several by field officers as well. All officers wear the large photos show officers with three-point flaps on enamelled national emblem on the front of the pleated breast pockets, and a small left sleeve exaggeratedly 'Germanic' cap. Cap cords are gold pocket. Photos show the rank insignia on the for company officers and, apparently, mixed shoulder straps worn in a number of ways—bright gold/red for field officers. Gorget patches follow cap SD insignia, blackened field versions, and this bands in colour; for field officers they bear a stylised black-painted stencilled version marked directly on cornstalk motif in gold on the red backing; the cloth; the insignia here are the star and two bars company officers' green patches arc plain apart of a turan1. Note that the belt in the trouser loops is from the button. Branch-of-service insignia are not the waist part of a conventional 'Sam Browne', with well documented, and are not generally worn. The a soldier's belt worn over it to support the magazine lower lapel badges worn here are unexplained, but pouch for his AKM and the holster of his Makarov may be the silver branch-of-service emblems taken pistol. He has Soviet binoculars and mapcase slung from the now-abandoned 1965 pattern branch-ofservice armshield worn on the right sleeve before the round his neck and shoulder. revolution. E4: Militiaman

The DRA have a variety of militia forces, many of them completely un-uniformed and thus hard to tell apart from the guerrillas—and indeed, militiamen by day are often guerrillas by night. Operating from his home village, this man does not wear any field equipment apart from a magazine pouch for his PPSh-41—a common militia issue—on an old prerevolutionary army belt. His mixture of a turban, an old Western-style suit jacket, and the local tan pyjamas is entirely typical. He is contemplating a TM-46 anti-tank mine: this type was in DRA Army use pre-war, and much of the inventory found its way into guerrilla hands. F1: Major, service dress

This jagran, identified by the shoulder strap insignia of one star above crossed sabres in gold, wears standard DRA Army officer's khaki service dress, with a khaki drill shirt and stone-coloured tie. The colour of the cap band identifies grade; in prerevolutionary days the sequence was red for generals, red-brown for field officers and dark green 1

DRA Army officer ranks are:

Dreyom Baridman Dvahom Baridman Lomri Baridman Turan Jag Turan Jagran Dagarman Dagarwal Brid Jenral Turan Jenral Dagar Jenral Setar Jenral Marshal

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. .. . .. ... . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . ..

1st

Jnr. 2ml Ll. 2nd Lt. Lt. Jnr. Capt. Capt. Major Lt.Col. Col. Brig.Gen. Maj.Gen. Lt.Gen. Gen.

F2: Infantryman (NCO?), summer dress

The hot-weather uniform for all ranks is a khaki drill version of the field cap, and khaki drill shirt and slacks; such details as pockets vary, but most enlisted men seem to wear patch pockets with straight flaps while officers have pointed or threepoint flaps and pleated pockets. Enlisted men have no shoulder straps; officers' shirts do, and display ranking either directly or on khaki drill slip-overs. This enlisted man was photographed on parade; it is thought that the diamond-shaped collar tabs are worn only on such occasions, and certainly never in the field. The enlisted ranks' collar patches, unlike the officers' gorget patches, indicate branch rather than grade; since the old royal army followed Turkish practice, dark green indicates the infantry. Men have been photographed with either one or two red cloth strips sewn permanently to the left breast of the shirt or the grey winter blouse; whether this is a mark of NCO rank is not known, but in the photo on which we base this soldier the front men in four parallel files of parading men each had one strip. The combination of the old webbing pouches for the Simonov carbine clip, and the AK-47 family of weapons, is seen in several photos. Note that the colour of the summer uniform varies greatly; in one group colour photo it ranges from pale golden khaki drill, through a duller mushroom shade, almost to pale grey drab; other photos show a strong mustard-brown cast. A new, green drab uniform has also been observed, particularly in armoured or mechanised units.

F3, F4: Junior lieutenant and radioman, Commandos, c.1981

The exact identity of these elite troops is unknown; since the book in which their colour photos appeared was published in 1983, and the DRA's 26th Airborne Bn. was apparently disbanded for mutiny in 1980, the presumption, at least, must be that these are men of the once-reliable Commando Brigades. Commando units are known to have made combat jumps; and photos show men dressed in both these patterns of camouflage clothing, and all wearing the badgeless maroon beret, wearing (individually) the DRA parachutist's badge displayed here by F3. Whether there is any significance, apart from sheer availability, in the different 'splinter' and 'duckhunter' camouflage clothing is unknown. It is believed that, through attrition, these special uniforms may have become scarce, and that Commando units may now wear either standard DRA field uniform or Soviet camouflage overalls; the parachutist badge is occasionally seen in photos of troops in the normal grey drab outfit. Note that only the officer's version of the 'splinter'-pattern suit has shoulder straps, used here to display slip-overs in company officers' green, bearing the single gold bar of the dreyom baridman (junior lieutenant). The officer wears the waist part of a Sam Browne belt, even with combat dress; and all troops in the relevant photos carry the foldingstock AKMS rifle. G: Mujahideen, Paktia province, 1984: G1: Colonel Ramatullah Safi

A colonel in the Royal Afghan Army, who commanded its Commando Brigade before the war, Safi survived two years in the Kabul regime's prisons. He now works with the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, one of the seven Peshawarbased resistance groups, training guerrillas and engaging in combat in Paktia province. Safi wears a mixture of Afghan and Western gear. The ubiquitous Afghan puhtee hat can be worn in many ways: Safi wears his rolled tightly and pulled to the right in the style of a British beret—he trained with the British Army during his days in the Royal Afghan Army, and remains a great anglophile. His locally-made combat jacket is worn with light tan 'pyjama' trousers and shirt, the local norm, but

DRA Army insignia: (1) Cap badge: gold and white, with green centre, red star, and black, red, green ribbons. (2) General officers' shoulder board and gorget patch styles, here lieutenant-general: red background, gold insignia, full colour national insignia. (3) Field officers' style, here lieutenant-colonel: gold insignia on background officially maroon, but colour photos show red apparently as bright as generals'. (4) Company officers' style, here the second of the three lieutenant grades: gold insignia on dark green. (5) Red pre-revolutionary style NCO chevrons; and branch-of-service colour collar patch for enlisted men. (Peter Abbott)

tailored here in a rather sharper and more military manner than is usual. The jacket conceals an automatic pistol in a shoulder holster. His main personal weapons are either an old Lee Enfield, whose ammunition he carries in one of the ornate local bandolier rigs; or this Chinese-made AK-47, whose forestock he has had decorated with Pathan beadwork. G2: Dr. Khalid Akram

An intern in Kabul before escaping to Pakistan and 45

offering his services as a doctor to the guerrillas, 'Doc Khalid' carries both a medical kit (marked as donated by the Saudi Red Crescent) and a foldingstock AKMS 7.62mm assault rifle—the Soviets do not respect the Geneva Convention, and he has no choice but to go armed in self-defence. (As he himself puts it, nodding towards these two essential items of equipment: 'One is for micro-organisms; the other is for macro-organisms.') He wears the universal Afghan country costume of a long shirt and loose trousers, pyjama-style; chapati sandals; a puhtee hat; and, in cold weather, the local embroidered brown blanket or pukhoor, which can be arranged like a Mexican serape.

chest pouches. He handles a round for the 82mm M-1937 mortar of Soviet design, the guerrillas" standard indirect-fire weapon. Safi has used these weapons to bombard Khost, Urgun, and other Communist outposts in the border area. Simple and reliable, they are well liked, although their threekilometre maximum range puts them within retaliatory range of Communist artillery. H1: Ahmad Shah Massoud; Panjsher Valley, 1984

The most famous of the guerrilla leaders inside Afghanistan, Massoud represents the best of the Afghan resistance. He is a skilled guerrilla organiser and leader who has mastered modern combat tactics while respecting local traditions. He wears here his usual uniform of olive drab field jacket and G3: NIFA guerrilla A Pathan from one of the border tribes, this fighter fatigue trousers over a Western shirt, with the puhtee represents the more effective guerrillas who have and a Panjsheri scarf—the standard 'uniform' of been in action since about 1983. Trained at Safi's Panjsheri forces, which are organised in Westerncamp, he wears a cheap locally-made field jacket style tactical units. Massoud wears Afghan Army loosely patterned on the US M65, and a puhtee, boots and belt, the latter supporting—out of sight together with loose pyjama shirt and trousers in the under the jacket—a Spanish Star automatic in a stone grey shade preferred as a camouflage colour in black leather holster. Here he examines a captured Paktia, and brown boots. He carries an AKMS. AKS-74 assault rifle with an under-barrel BG-15 'personalised' with flowers on the butt, and carries 40mm grenade launcher. ammunition in green drab webbing 'ChiCom'-style H2: Hamid Walid; Wardak province, 1981 DRA elite troops, almost certainly Commandos, wearing a splinter-pattern camouflage uniform in drab sand, light redbrown and sage green, with a badgeless maroon beret; see Plate F3. (In a country as poor as Afghanistan even a simple ball-point pen is prized, and to wear one in the pocket is a proud sign of literacy. The Communists trade on this by leaving booby-trapped ball-points lying around for the guerrillas to find.)

Shown here wearing the Soviet-made aircrew helmet which he always wore in battle, Hamid Walid was one of the best RPG-7 gunners in Central Afghanistan. He is known to have accounted personally for 12 armoured vehicles and numerous trucks. An intelligent, cultured man, Hamid Walid, like Ahmad Shah Massoud, was educated at the French Lycee at Kabul and, like Massoud, spoke fluent French. He fought alongside his friend and classmate Amin Wardak, a guerrilla leader in Wardak province, until killed in action attacking a Soviet convoy on the Ghazni highway on 23 July 1983. Here he wears the ubiquitous pyjama shirt and trousers, chapati sandals, a sweater and a waistcoat, and carries spare RPG rounds in a civilian-made but military-style knapsack. H3: Afghan guerrilla; Panjsher Valley, 1981

A fighter typical of the early war period, before specialised field equipment became available to the men actually doing the fighting. He wears his traditional pyjamas with odds and ends of Western46

style clothing; the turban with a long hanging end is considered fashionable. His legs and sandalled feet are wrapped against the cold in improvised puttees, tied with colourful strings. His similarly-decorated Lee Enfield Mk.III may be a family heirloom captured in the 3rd Afghan War, a purchased weapon, or even locally made—village gunsmiths have displayed astonishing skill for many generations, and can reproduce almost perfect copies of modern weapons with the most basic equipment. His ornate bandolier rig is likely to be his only field equipment, if he has even that. He is probably a fairly bad shot, having never had enough ammunition to expend in practice to become really proficient. In areas where there is no leader like Ahmad Shah Massoud or Amin Wardak such guerrillas would fight with their kinfolk and friends under a local mullah or malik. Not a natural soldier, he is nevertheless stubborn, implacable, and tremendously brave.

A group of guerrillas in the Khost area, 1984. Centre front are Ramatullah Safi and Dr. Khalid Akram: see Plates G1, G2. The man behind and between them holds Safi's personal Lee Enfield, fitted with an elaborate beadwork sling; and Safi wears a leather bandolier rig. This group represents the improved weaponry used by guerrillas since 1984, especially in eastern Afghanistan. In a group of 23 men we can make out 20 weapons: 14 AKMS assault rifles, both Soviet and Chinese patterns; three Lee Enfield and one Mauser bolt-action rifles; and two RPG-7S. (Dr. Khalid Akram)

Also illustrated is a 12.7mm M-1938 DShKM heavy machine gun or 'Dashika'. This Sovietdesigned machine gun is the standard guerrilla antiaircraft weapon; though it cannot penetrate the heavy armour which protects much of the Hind helicopter, hits on more vulnerable spots have brought down many Hinds. It is also used in ambushes, as it will penetrate much of the armour of BMPs and other APCs. Both Soviet- and Chinesemade versions are available to the resistance, some of the latter using a large mechanical gunsight which, though cumbersome, is effective in the hands of a trained crew.

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HEROES OF THE SOVIET UNION 1941-45

INTRODUCTION: THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR T WAS INEVITABLE that the two great 20th-century rivals on the European continent would eventually clash, in what would become known to the Soviets as the Great Patriotic War. When Adolf Hitler became chancellor of Germany in 1933, his goal was to remake the Fatherland into an economic and military powerhouse. His rival, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, who had come to power only five years earlier, was busy implementing his forced Five Year Plan of rapid industrialization for the Motherland. Both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union embarked on a frenzied period of war production. While Hitler thought of future conquests, Stalin was preoccupied with national defense. The Bolshevik leader feared an attack from the West, and believed that in order to win militarily, he had to protect his industrial capacity. His planners worked to decentralize production, establishing factories in the Soviet Far East - a wise strategy, as later events proved. Hitler saw the spread of communism with alarm; likewise, Stalin saw the fascist states of Germany and Italy as equally threatening, and encouraged the spread of communist ideology and supported left-wing coalitions. The two ideologies clashed violently in Spain. In 1936, rebellious Spanish army officers began plotting to overthrow the leftist, pro-Soviet government. The Spanish Civil War erupted in July 1936, and Hitler sided with the anti-government faction (Nationalists), providing military aid. Fearful of losing Spain to fascism, Stalin countered by sending in Soviet "volunteers." Thus, the Germans and the Sonets fought and tested each other's military capabilities in this dress rehearsal for the Great Patriotic War. There were numerous military expeditions by the Germans and the Soviets into their neighboring territories in the late 1930s, giving both sides an opportunity to flex their military muscle. Hitler annexed Austria in March 1938,

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followed by Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland in October. The Soviet Union became involved in an armed incident with the Japanese Kwantung Army in August 1938 near Lake Khassan, on the Soviet-Manchuria border. In May 1939, with tensions still very high, the Soviet and Mongolian military fought a 129-day border skirmish against the Japanese at Khalkin Gol before a peace treaty was signed. Germany signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviets in August 1939, essentially allowing both nations to partition Europe into two spheres of influence. It gave Stalin free rein to grab Estonia, Latvia, Finland, and parts of Poland. He needed these territories as a buffer against Germany. In return, the Soviets allowed Germany free access to Lithuania and Danzig, as well as Polish territory bordering Germany. Soviet Forces invaded Finland in November 1939 (the Winter War), but were unable to conquer the Finns. An armistice was signed in March 1940, by which time the Red Army had lost over a million men, 1,000 aircraft, and 2,300 tanks and armored vehicles. It was almost inconceivable that a third-rate military power could inflict such damage on the Red Army. The failed war with Finland influenced both Hitler and Stalin. Hitler became emboldened against the Soviets, while Stalin realized his weaknesses. The Soviet dictator had depleted the ranks of the officer corps in a series of cruel purges starting in 1935, leaving the military almost leaderless. He quickly moved to reinstate surviving officers. Stalin was taken by surprise by Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Although he never trusted Hitler to honor the non-aggression pact, he did not believe his counterpart would attack so brazenly. Richard Sorge, the Soviet spy in Japan, had warned his superiors about the impending German attack six months prior to the invasion, but his messages had been ignored. Stalin rushed troops from the Soviet Far East to defend Moscow. Thousands of men from penal battalions were used as cannon fodder to thwart the German advance. He decreed that not one man was to step back, and enforced this with his NKVD (internal security) troops bringing up the rear. Any soldier falling back was shot on the spot. Massed land battles involving thousands of tanks and infantry stained the soils of Europe red with blood. To the German soldier being ordered east in 1942 and beyond, the Russian Front conjured up images of a frozen hell. For the Germans, the names of such battlefields as Stalingrad, Leningrad, Smolensk, and Kursk became synonymous with death, while for the Soviets they represented heroism. Gradually, the Germans were pushed back all the way to Berlin. When the war in Europe ended in May 1945, Germany lay in ruins and over 20 million Soviet citizens had become casualties. However, there was unfinished business with the Japanese. The Soviet Union,

"The Motherland Calls You!" reads this poster dating from the start of the Great Patriotic War. Mother Russia was the favorite symbol of Soviet illustrators and she was depicted in many wartime posters.

fresh from victory, declared war against Japan on August 8, 1945. The Japanese were on the verge of collapse, and the Red Army marched through Manchuria and Korea with very little opposition. In about a week, this war too was over. The Soviet victory over Japan allowed the conquerors to take the Kurile Islands from the Japanese. By the end of all hostilities, 11,633 individuals held the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. But for every Hero, there were thousands more who went unrecognized. Today, on Victory Day in Russia and in the former republics of the Soviet Union, all veterans are remembered and honored. The consequences of the Great Patriotic War were far-reaching. Most notably, the Cold War, a period of superpower tension and military build-up, lasted until the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

HERO OF THE SOVIET UNION

Pvt. Alexandr Matrosov was one of over 200 men during the Great Patriotic War who reportedly threw themselves in front of enemy machine guns in an act of extreme sacrifice. Recent research by Russian historians has revealed that Matrosov became a Hero for propaganda purposes.

"Hero of the Soviet Union!" This unique and coveted title was the highest distinction any Soviet citizen or foreigner could receive. It was a non-hereditary title awarded by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on behalf of the Motherland. It was not just a medal to be hung on a person's chest, but a symbol testifying to the recipient's highest contribution to the Soviet state. Even a lowly private wearing the Gold Star Medal was treated with great reverence by general officers. What made the award unique were the many privileges which came with it: union-level personal pension, first priority on a housing list, 50 percent housing rent reduction, 50 percent reduction in taxes, free personal transportation on public buses and trains, annual free pass to a rest home or resort, free medical treatment at a military hospital, and free personal return ticket (first class) for travel every year. Just by waving the red passport-sized Hero's booklet, the recipient was eligible to move to the front of the queue at entertainment, sports, and cultural events. The title also brought employment and educational opportunities. The title of HSU was established by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on April 16, 1934. The honoree was originally given the Order of Lenin, the highest award of the USSR, which was instituted on April 6, 1930 by the Soviet Presidium. However, this decoration was also awarded to individuals who had not been awarded the title of HSU. To separate the Hero from the non-Hero, the Gold Star Medal was established on August 1, 1939. Hence, the Hero received both awards during the investiture, along with a large diploma and a small red Hero's award booklet. In comparison to soldiers of other nations during World War Two, the average Soviet soldier received many medals and continued to receive

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them as veterans long after the war. This is simply a cultural practice put in place after the birth of the Soviet Union. Commemorative and Jubilee medals were practically given away. But a chest full of medals does not a Hero make! The Gold Star Medal was roughly equivalent to the Commonwealth Victoria Cross, the German Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, and the US Congressional Medal of Honor. In order to qualify- for the award, the soldier had to perform a great military feat. Marshals and generals could receive it for a successful campaign, colonels and their subordinates for their units' successes. It is incorrect to believe that this honor was reserved mainly for officers. The ranks of Heroes include enlisted men who fought in hand-to-hand combat, as well as Chilians. Over 90 women won this honor. There was no set rule to qualify for the HSU except in the Red Air Force. In that arm of the military, Stalin issued a directive on August 19, 1941 setting the minimum requirements to receive the HSU title, based upon the number of missions flown and/or aerial victories achieved. A pilot shooting down ten enemy aircraft became eligible. For dangerous daylight ground-attack missions, if a pilot survived 40 missions, he or she could expect to become a Hero. Because of this regulation, Maj. Alexandr Pokryshkin received his third Gold Star Medal on August 19, 1944 after achieving 53 aerial victories. The great Soviet Marshal Georgi Zhukov, whose forces conquered Berlin, was only the second three-times Hero, and he had to wait until June 1, 1945 to receive this honor.

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OPPOSITE The Germans dismissively called Soviet soldiers "Ivan" and depicted them as brutal foes, attired in a fur cap and armed with the ubiquitous PPSh-41 submachine gun. "Ivan" was toughened by constant action and harsh winter conditions, and driven by Stalin's "no step back" decree, with a thirst for revenge. (Paul McDaniel)

Three of the most famous Soviet soldiers of the Great Patriotic War were, left to right, Lt. Col. Alexandr Pokryshkin, Marshal Georgi Zhukov, and Maj. Ivan Kozhedub. The trio became three-time HSU recipients. Pokryshkin gained 59 aerial victories as the second-highest scoring Soviet pilot, while Kozhedub became the top ace with 62 victories. This publicity photo was taken in Moscow in 1945.

Soviets who surrendered or were captured were ineligible for the HSU. Consequently, there were more than a few injustices suffered by deserving individuals. To cite one example, a fighter pilot named Lt. Mikhail Devyataev was shot down and captured in July 1944. In February 1945, he managed to escape by stealing a German bomber. He did not receive his Gold Star Medal until 1957, when he was "politically rehabilitated" and Stalin had been dead for four years. Some soldiers became Heroes for propaganda purposes after they were killed in action. According to official Soviet records, Pvt. Alexandr Matrosov sacrificed his life by rushing a German earth-and-timber machinegun embrasure. By throwing himself in front of the gunport to block the fire, he insured his unit's success. This alleged feat occurred on February 23, 1943, on the 25th anniversary of the Red Army, in a unit named after Stalin. Postwar research revealed that the Matrosov myth was created either to raise morale or to justify the senseless use of troops as "cannon fodder." The Gold Star Medal with its esteemed title has lost considerable luster with the downfall of the Soviet Union. Many governments and citizens of the former republics, freed from the Soviet yoke, no longer give it the respect it once commanded, nor honor the privileges that went with it. The Russian Federation still recognizes it, however. The HSU has now become Hero of the Russian Federation, and the Gold Star Medal is still being awarded to Russian fighting men for actions in Chechnya. Posthumous awards are still awarded on Victory Day to former combatants of the Great Patriotic War.

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HEROES OF THE SOVIET UNION BY ETHNIC GROUP/NATIONALITY

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The majority of Heroes of the Soviet Union were Russians and Ukrainians. The Soviet Union was a huge nation composed of over 100 separate ethnic groups (Jews were considered a separate nationality). Stalin was content to leave his military composed of mostly Slavic (Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian) soldiers, until two wars erupted. The first use of non-Slavic troops proved disastrous. Prior to the Winter War against Finland, Arctic minorities such as the Saami, Komi, and Nenets, who populated the Kola Peninsula, were exempt from military service. This was partly a measure to preserve their culture, but also reflected their inability to communicate in Russian. At the outbreak of the war against Finland, the Soviets decided to use these peoples because of their familiarity with the frigid terrain and their practice of using reindeers, beasts of burden that would prove much more militarily practicable than horses and tanks. These hardy and fiercely independent Arctic minorities resented and sometimes openly resisted the heavy-handed Soviet officers who demanded their participation in the war. These peace-loving nomadic hunters, who knew nothing about the outside world, did not understand the concept of warfare, held no allegiance to the Soviet Union, and wanted to be left alone. The Russians failed to understand their culture and viewed these indigenous people with contempt. The natives, likewise, had no love for the Soviets, and believed that they were being used as cannon fodder. During the Great Patriotic War, the war against the Finns and the Germans on the Arctic Front was slow-paced due to the extremely cold weather conditions. The natives fought battles mostly on their own terms since they realized that their Soviet superiors were incapable of waging war in their territories without their cooperation. Due to the language barrier, orders were sometimes "misunderstood." When the natives were not engaged in fighting the enemy, they expended efforts to let the Soviets know that their presence was not welcome. A Nenets uprising took place between June and December 1943 involving about 250 men. The NKVD (internal security) officers, leading Soviet naval paratroopers, quelled the rebellion, and all the leaders were shot and the rest imprisoned. Not surprisingly, no one from this ethnic group ever became a Hero. When the Arctic Front was finally closed, the Soviet High Command was all too happy to dismiss the troublesome indigenous brigades to reserve status in October 1944. Many units were simply abandoned in the field and told to make their own way home. Despite the dismal relationship, ten Komi became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

Tremendous manpower losses in the first few months of the Great Patriotic War forced Stalin to conscript other non-Slavic minorities from the Soviet Far East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. These new units would be led by Russian officers. The call to arms was a logistical nightmare, and many units were quickly raised, ill-equipped, and poorly trained. There were over 42 national or territorial divisions. Complete integration of Russian and non-Russian units was not possible due to the language barrier and other factors. But despite the handicaps, the various ethnic groups worked well enough together to eventually oust the German forces from the Soviet Motherland. The following are the official statistics of the Awards Department of the Soviet Union concerning the number of HSUs awarded during the Great Patriotic War:

Mikhail Devyataev as a lieutenant in 1942. While the Russian government pays scant attention to their old Heroes, Devyataev's funeral was attended by President Mintimer Shaimiev of the Republic of Tatarstan and his ministers, along with thousands of mourners. (Nat. Museum of Tatarstan)

Total HSU titles awarded: Infantry: Aviation: Navy: Antiaircraft defense: Partisans, spies, and resistance:

11,633 8,447 (44 double winners) 2,332 (61 double winners) 513 (7 double winners) 92 (1 double winner) 249 (2 double winners)

Table 1 shows the ethnic groups that served in the Soviet military during the Great Patriotic War and the number of members of each who became Heroes. There were also foreign nationals who received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union while helping the Soviets. Most notable of these foreigners were the four Frenchmen of the Normandie-Niemen Fighter Regiment, who flew Yak fighters with the Soviets from 1943—45. The regiment was officially credited with 273 enemy aircraft destroyed. Its top ace, Capt. Marcel Albert, claimed 23 victories and received the HSU title on November 27, 1944.

THE HEROES AVIATORS Mikhail Petrovich Devyataev

The amazing prison escape of Mikhail Devyataev from German captivity should have been heralded by his superiors as the epitome of Soviet fighting spirit. Instead, he was punished. His story is one of many injustices suffered by brave fighting men and women under Stalin's rigid "no prisoner" decree. Mikhail Devyataev was born in July 1917 in a settlement in Mordovia, the 13th child in a peasant family of 14 children. His father died in 1919, and the barefoot child knew only hunger and extreme poverty in his youth. In 1932, Devyataev left his village to enter die Kazan Water Transport School, and took up amateur gliding and sports flying in his spare time.

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He graduated from the trade school and became a stoker aboard an oil transport ship. However, his love of flying and adventure led him to change his career. The local Komsomol (communist youth) organization directed him to Orenburg Aviation School in the Urals. In 1940, he finished the two-year course. Within months of the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, Sr. Lt. Devyataev had flown 180 missions, engaged in 16 dogfights, shot down eight enemy aircraft, and received two wounds. His last wound grounded him, but he was determined to fly again. He made his way to Alexandr Pokryshkin's unit and wheedled his way into combat duty. On July 13, 1944, Devyataev's fighter was hit in combat and he was forced to parachute above Lvov. Though captured and tortured, he revealed nothing. After an escape attempt, he was sent to the Zaksenhausen Death Camp. While there, fellow prisoners managed to change his identity to Nikitenko and he escaped the gas chamber. Devyataev eventually wound up at S\inemkonde Death Camp on Uzedom Island where the secret V-l and V-2 rockets were being manufactured. Prisoners were executed once they had fulfilled their tasks. Under such conditions, he had no choice but to put a daring escape plan into action. On February 8, 1945, Devyataev and a group of ten other Soviet prisoners were shoveling snow on the airfield. They overpowered the guards, jumped into a Heinkel bomber and, with Devyataev at the controls, took oft". A FW-I90 fighter was scrambled to shoot them down, but Devyataev evaded his pursuer and finally made it back to the Soviet lines, bringing valuable military information. After interrogation by the NKVD, Devyataev and his comrades were arrested for having been captured. Sent to a gulag, they were released only after the death of Stalin in 1953. The injustice they suffered was a sore point with many comrades, who could do nothing about it. But the new regime strove to right the wrongs of the past. Mikhail Devyataev was "politically rehabilitated," thanks to the intervention of Sergey Korolev, the famed Soviet space scientist. On August 19, 1957, Devyataev became a Hero of the Soviet Union. He worked as a captain of the river fleet and gave talks to youth groups. Mikhail Devyataev died at age 85 on November 24, 2002 in Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan. Thousands of mourners came to his funeral to say farewell to a great role model and living legend. Ivan Grigoryevich Drachenko

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The word "hero" seems inadequate to describe a man whose incredible exploits would have made a dramatic war movie. Ivan Drachenko was one of only four men from the Great Patriotic War who became a Hero of the Soviet Union as well as a Cavalier of the Orders of Glory (equivalent to a HSU). Drachenko was born on November 15, 1922 to a peasant family in the village of Velikaya Sevastyanovka, in the Cherkassy region, central Ukraine. After completing high school, he entered the Leningrad Air Club and joined the army in April 1941. In 1943, Drachenko graduated from the Tambov Military Pilot School and participated in the Battle of Kursk. On August 14, 1943, he was seriously wounded in his right eye and captured with five other

comrades. During the 25 days he spent in captivity, he was offered freedom if he joined Vlasov's Army, a renegade group led by the Soviet traitor Gen. Vlasov, who had defected to the Germans to fight the communists. When the wounded pilot refused, he was tortured and his damaged eye gouged out. While being transferred to a POW camp, he and his comrades strangled a guard and escaped. Upon returning to friendly territory, Drachenko was hospitalized and received a prosthetic eye, a fact he kept hidden (for over seven months) so that he would be allowed to fight on. On June 4, 1944, Guards Jr. Lt. Drachenko, senior pilot in the 140th Guards Ground Attack Air Regiment, flew a photo recon mission in his Sturmovik IL-2 dive-bomber. Over the Romanian town of Tyrgu-Furmos, he discovered a large enemy tank column. During his return flight, he was attacked by nine FW-190s, but he skillfully out maneuvered the enemy and returned to base in his badly damaged aircraft. The following day, he was awarded the Order of Glory 3rd Class. On June 26, Drachenko flew another recon mission. Near the city of Yassy, he strafed and set fire to an enemy train, then shot down an enemy aircraft. For this feat, he was recommended for the Order of Glory 2nd Class. When this award did not materialize, another request was made, and he received the decoration on September 5, 1944. Due to a record error, the original recommendation for the Order of Glory 2nd Class finally came through, and now the recipient held two classes of the same order. In October, Drachenko led a flight of six Sturmoviks which destroyed three Tiger tanks that had been stalling the Soviet advance for days, creating a bottleneck in the Carpathians. By this time, he was recommended for the title of HSU for having flown 157 missions (24 dogfights) and destroying 76 armored cars and tanks, six armored troop trains, 654 automobiles, 122 heavy trucks and wagons, seven supply depots and damaging 18 more, four bridges, and killing over 1,600 enemy troops. In addition, he was officially recognized as having shot down five enemy aircraft and destroying nine planes on the ground. On October 26, 1944, Sr. Lt. Ivan Drachenko received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. His prosthetic eye was finally discovered and the pilot was relieved of front-line duties. In 1947, Drachenko moved to Kiev and graduated from Kiev University with a law degree in 1953. He later became a vocational school director, assistant director of the Ukraine Cultural Entertainment Palace, and deputy chairman of the Council of Studies of Labor Resources of the Ukrainian SSR. On November 26, 1968, Ran Drachenko turned in his duplicate Order of Glory 2nd Class and received the 1st Class award, making him a Cavalier of the Orders of Glory. He died on November 15, 1994.

Ivan Drachenko in an official portrait in 1968 after he became a Cavalier of the Order of Glory. This title was equivalent to HSU, but was reserved solely for the enlisted man. Shown on his suit is the HSU Medal, along with (left to right): Order of Lenin, Order of the Red Banner, and the three classes of the Order of Glory.

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Sultan Amet-Khan

Sultan Amet-Khan continued to fly long after his comrades retired from active duty. He was 50 years old when he died in a flight accident while testing the Tu-16. This official portrait was taken in Moscow in 1945 after receiving his second Gold Star Medal.

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So renowned was this fighter ace and postwar test pilot that both the Tatars and Dagestanians claim him to be their Hero. He was born in October 1920, in the city of Alupka in the Crimean region. His father was a Dagestanian and his mother a Tatar. In 1938, Amet-Khan graduated from a railway industrial school and worked briefly at a locomotive depot as an assistant boilermaker. During this time, he joined an aero club and learned to fly. In 1939, he enlisted in the army. His request for flight training was accepted and he trained at Kachinsk Aviation School, graduating in 1940. When the Great Patriotic War began, Jr. Lt. Amet-Khan was stationed at Odessa with the 4th Fighter Regiment and flew missions in the obsolete I-16 biplane in a ground-support role. His next mount was a British Hurricane, which he quickly mastered. One of Amet-Khan's earliest victories came as a result of taran (intentional ramming). On the night of May 31, 1942, near Yaroslavl, in the northern part of central Russia, the young pilot intercepted a Ju-88 bomber which was on a reconnaissance mission. The skilled German pilot maneuvered his plane around on his opponent's tail and counterattacked. When his guns jammed, Amet-Khan made a spontaneous decision to ram, and sliced off the bomber's wing. He parachuted to safety. Two of the enemy crewmen were captured. In October 1942, Amet-Khan was assigned to the 9th Fighter Regiment and fought over Stalingrad as a squadron leader. He made a name for himself on March 25, 1943 when he led eight fighters to intercept a group of bombers and escorts headed for Bataisk and Rostov. He knocked down the lead bomber, throwing the rest into confusion. Fighters of the neighboring squadrons came to help Amet-Khan's men. He shot down an escort fighter, and the entire German strike force was slaughtered. The Soviet fighters destroyed 26 enemy aircraft and saved the intended targets - railway stations and staging areas loaded with troops and supplies. On August 20, 1943, Guards Capt. Amet-Khan shot down two enemy aircraft during the breakthrough of the fortified defense line on the river Mius. Leading eight Airacobras, he attacked 18 Stukas flying to bomb the Soviet advance. The Soviet pilots destroyed five opponents without loss and thwarted the Germans' mission. Four days after this action, Amet-Khan received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. One of the more interesting experiences concerning the Tatar Hero was an incident involving a small German scout aircraft. "I will try to make the pilot land and capture him!" radioed the squadron leader. He fired on the German to get his attention, and then used hand signals to give instructions. When the plane tried to escape, Amet-Khan fired shots

Capt. Grigori Rechkalov, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, was the third-highest scoring Soviet fighter ace, with 56 victories. He poses by his P-39 Airacobra, adorned with 50 red stars (Soviet pilots never defaced their aircraft by painting Swastikas or German crosses). Maj. Gen. Rechkalov retired from the service in 1959 and died on December 22, 1990.

Maj. Alexei Maresyev broke both of his legs when he crashed during combat on April 4, 1942. He crawled through the snow for 18 days before being rescued. Despite having both legs amputated, he conned his way back into combat and shot down three more planes. He became a HSU on August 24, 1943 and ended the war with 11 victories. This photo, taken c.1957, shows him wearing the early Type 1 HSU Medal.

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across the nose, and the German reluctantly followed orders and landed. His comrade flew guard over the scout while Amet-Khan landed at a nearby base. He quickly returned by car, disarmed and tied up the German, threw him in the back seat, and took off for base. The enemy officer turned out to be a real prize, providing valuable information about German positions. By war's end, Amet-Khan was a major and had recorded 30 aerial \ictories and 19 shared kills on 603 missions and 150 dogfights. He had fought over Briansk, Stalingrad, the South-Western, Southern, 4th Ukrainian and 3rd Belorussian Fronts. He received his second Gold Star Medal on June 29, 1945. He retired from the service in 1946 and began a second distinguished career as a test pilot. Sultan Amet-Khan was killed on February 1, 1971 while testing a Tu-16 and was buried in Moscow. Sergey Danilovich Luganski

An aircraft mechanic turned fighter pilot, Georgi Kuzmin shared two victories with his wingman four days after the war started while flying the I-153 biplane fighter. He rammed a Ju-88 bomber when he ran out of ammunition and brought it down, saving himself by parachuting. He gained 21 victories, became a HSU on April 28, 1943, and was killed in combat on August 18, 1943 when his parachute failed to open when he bailed out.

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Capt. Sergey Luganski, twice HSU, was presented with this fighter plane, inscribed "Hero of the Soviet Union Sergey Luganski from the Komsomol of Alma Ata."

"Never separate from your leader and always maintain your formation!" This sage advice, along with extreme aggressiveness, was the secret to Sergey Luganski's aerial prowess. Luganski, one of the great masters of the dogfight, was born on a farm in Alma Ata in October 1918. Luganski fell in love with aviation as a teenager and entered flight training at Orenburg in 1938. He graduated two years later just in time to participate in the Winter War against Finland in 1940. He flew mostly ground support missions and did not score a victory. In October 1941, Lt. Luganski became squadron leader of the 162nd Fighter Regiment. He had a slow start and it was not until the Battle of Stalingrad that he began to score. He rammed a German fighter on September 14, 1942 while flying a Yak-1, and survived unscathed. In the

summer of 1943 while fighting around Kursk, he was credited with 14 victories in one month. On September 2, 1943, Luganski received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for having achieved 18 victories, followed by a second Gold Star Medal on July 1, 1944. In May 1944, Capt. Luganski became the leader of the 270th Fighter Regiment, which he would command until the end of the war. As a great leader and role model, he was taken off combat duty to run his regiment behind a desk - a task he hated. When the fighting came to an end, Maj. Sergey Luganski had achieved 37 individual and six shared victories in 417 missions and 200 dogfights. He rammed twice and was never wounded. Maj. Gen. Luganski retired in 1964 and resided in Alma Ata. He died on January 16, 1977. Pavel Artemyevich Plotnikov

They called him "Dead Eye Plotnikov," and he was the man his regiment commander called for as the last resort. This remarkable Russian bomber pilot was born in March 1920 in the village of Gonba in the Altai region of the USSR. After dropping out of secondary school, he was employed as a metal worker until he enlisted in the Red Army in 1938. In 1940, he graduated from the Novosibirsk Military Aviation School. Plotnikov received his baptism of fire in October 1941, when the Germans advanced on Moscow. While flying the Pe-2 medium bomber on a reconnaissance mission, he was attacked by two Me-109s. The overconfident Germans flashed past and gave him a thumbs down signal, then circled to finish him off. Plotnikov brought his plane down to zero altitude, skimming over trees. As the two enemy planes closed, he suddenly lowered his flaps, throttled his engines down, and stalled almost to a stop. The pursuers were taken by complete surprise and Plotnikov's gunner shot down one of the 109s; the other fled. Plotnikov was the first bomber pilot in the unit to score a victory over a fighter. During the Battle of Stalingrad in the summer of 1942, Lt. Plotnikov's reputation as an expert bomber pilot came to the attention of the regiment commander. In a desperate attempt to destroy a concealed fuel depot used to fuel Panzer tanks, Plotnikov was ordered to lead three Pe-2s on a daring raid. He found the target and placed four bombs squarely in the center. "They can now fuel their Panzers with water!" he exclaimed as they raced home. In early 1943, a large German supply ship arrived in Taganrog Harbor. The port bristled with antiaircraft batteries and enemy fighters constantly patrolled the perimeters. "If any pilot could sink that ship, it would be Plotnikov," exclaimed Col. Ivan Polbin in a planning session with senior officers. Rather than sending in a large formation, only one plane was to be used, so as to fool the enemy into thinking that it was only

The mark of a veteran bomber pilot was his ability to keep formation during a bombing attack while buffeted by intense flak and tracers. When Pavel Plotnikov flew his first combat mission, he could not bring himself to hold a straight line. He eventually overcame his fears and became one of the greatest dive-bomber pilots of the Red Air Force.

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Lt. Alexandr Pokryshkin prepares to sortie in a MiG-3 in 1942. The MiG-3 was inferior to the German Me-109, and Pokryshkin faulted Soviet aircraft designers for not making better fighters. His candor was deemed "unpatriotic" by his superiors. He then kept his opinions to himself and worked hard within the system to improve fighter tactics. By the end of the war, he had amassed 59 victories in 550 missions and 137 dogfights. After a distinguished postwar military career, Marshal Pokryshkin died in November 1985. (RGAKFD)

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on a recon mission. Plotnikov arrived high over the target, dived down through a hail of flak, and dropped his bombs. The ship disappeared in a thunderous blast and the pilot made good his escape. In November 1943, Lt. Plotnikov amazed his comrades by shooting down another fighter. Two Pe-2s were assigned to destroy the railway station at Smela along the Dnieper River. Due to icing on his aircraft's wings, Plotnikov was forced to fly at 160ft (50m) altitude. He then saw two Me-109s attacking his wingman and went to his aid. Plotnikov entered a cloud, caught one of the enemy from behind and, with four solid bursts, sent the fighter down. When the downed 109's wingman turned to attack him, he flew into clouds. Plotnikov's wingman dropped his bombs on the station. As the German searched for him in vain, Plotnikov dropped his bombs on the burning station for the coup de grace. In 1944, Col. Polbin was leading nine bombers back to base after successfully attacking an enemy armored column. The regiment commander saw nine German bombers and fighters on their way to bomb the Soviet positions. Polbin ordered an attack using the "Plotnikov Method." Plotnikov, flying in the first formation, lit up a fighter with two bursts, achieving his third fighter victory. The Pe-2s shot down five Germans and scattered the rest, preventing the enemy from reaching their target. By May 1944, Sr. Lt. Plotnikov, now an assistant squadron leader of the 82nd Guards Bomber Regiment, had flown 225 missions and was credited with three aerial victories. On August 19, 1944, he received the title of Hero of the Sonet Union. By war's end, Pavel Plotnikov had flown 343 missions, and received his second Gold Star Medal on June 27, 1945. He retired as a majorgeneral in 1975 and now resides in Moscow.

SNIPERS Fyodor Maveyevich Ohlopkov

Fyodor Ohlopkov, shown here shortly after the war, did not become a Hero until 1965, three years before he died. He killed more enemy soldiers than the top sniper Ivan Sidorenko. (National Archives Sakha)

Yakut sniper Fyodor Ohlopkov in snow camouflage, winter 1943, He preferred headshots, claiming they were 100 percent fatal. An expert machine gunner, he slew hundreds of enemy soldiers. (National Archives Sakha)

In the remote snow-covered regions of the Soviet Far East, hardy men became famous for their biggame sharpshooting skills. One such man was a Yakut hunter named Fyodor Ohlopkov, who was born in March 1908 in a remote area of Yakut ASSR. He left the collective farm with his younger brother Vasily, and it took them almost a week to reach the nearest train station. They enlisted in September 1941 and were assigned to the 234th Rifle Regiment. As soon as they arrived in Moscow, they were shipped off to the frontlines. A few days after the two entered battle, Fyodor's brother was cut down by a sniper's bullet and died in his brother's arms. Vowing revenge, Fyodor took up a sniping rifle. As a skilled hunter before the war, he needed no training. By March 14, 1943, his personal score stood at 147. Sgt. Ohlopkov was often called upon to eliminate German snipers, a most dangerous task. It was a human chess game requiring patience, cunning, quick reflexes, and nerves of steel. The loser was rewarded with a bullet and instant death. The Yakut sniper was victorious every time. In the last week of October 1943, he felled 27 Germans. On January 13, 1944, his score reached 309. As his victims continued to mount, Sgt. Ohlopkov's exploits were prominently featured in military newspapers. With his keen hunting sense, Ohlopkov was in a position to instruct young snipers, and he often took one along with him to teach the art of killing from afar. He cautioned the rookies to adopt their own techniques and not imitate others, master the art of camouflage, and never enter an area unless they knew the terrain and had an exit plan.

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Due to the stealthy nature of their craft, snipers found that their kills were difficult to verify. However, Ivan Sidorenko is generally acknowledged to have been the top sniper of the Great Patriotic War, epitomizing the "one shot, one kill" creed. Capt. Sidorenko is pictured here in his official portrait taken in 1944 after he became a Hero. (Kiev War Museum)

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On June 23, 1944, Sgt. Ohlopkov participated in the assault on Vitebsk. He was hit in the chest and nearly killed. This, his twelfth major wound in combat, ended his career. He spent months recovering in hospital and was demobilized at the end of the war. Sgt. Fyodor Ohlopkov's official wartime biography credits him with 429 individual kills. However, he was equally skilled with automatic weapons, and his commander would sometimes send him out alone to repulse enemy attacks: the Yakut cut down the Germans like a farmer cutting grass with a scythe. It would be fair to say that Ohlopkov accounted for well over 1,000 enemy dead. Despite being one of the top Red Army snipers, the highest honor escaped him for some time. However, on May 6, 1965, this oversight was corrected, and he received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. He died on May 28, 1968. Ivan Mikhailovich Sidorenko

The top sniper in the Red Army was born into a peasant family on September 12, 1919 in the village of Chantsovo in the Smolensk region. Sidorenko finished ten grades of school and then studied at the Penza Art College. He dropped out of school in 1939 and was conscripted into the Red Army. He attended the Simferopol Military Infantry School in the Crimea in 1941, and when the war started, he was rushed to Moscow to help defend the nation's capital. Initially attached to a mortar company, Jr. Lt. Sidorenko took it upon himself to go hunting for the enemy. The self-taught sniper bagged so many enemy soldiers that his commanders took notice and ordered him to train others for the task. Men from various units in the division were selected for their keen eyesight, knowledge of weapons, and physical endurance. Sidorenko taught them theory and then took them out in the field for practical lessons. When the sniper trainees had completed their course, they were given a partner and assigned to certain sectors in the defensive positions around Velizh. The Germans immediately felt the impact and rushed their own snipers to the area to counter this menace. As the assistant commander of the Headquarters of the 1122nd Infantry Regiment, Sidorenko fought on the 1st Baltic Front and organized the sniper movement. From 1941 until 1944, he eliminated about 500 enemy soldiers and trained over 250 snipers. Not content to be an instructor, Sidorenko kept in practice by going out in the field, taking a young trainee with him. Using incendiary bullets, he was credited with burning a tank and three tractors. He was wounded three times, seriously on the third occasion in Estonia in 1944. While

convalescing, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on June 4, 1944. Because of his value as a sniper instructor, Capt. Sidorenko was now prohibited from returning to the front. In late 1944, his superiors ordered him to attend the military academy. However, his wound had not healed properly and the war ended while he was still hospitalized. At the end of hostilities, Maj. Sidorenko retired from the military and settled in the Cheliabinsk region in the Urals where he worked as foreman of a coalmine. In 1974, he moved to Dagestan. Vasily Grigoryevich Zaitsev

The most famous Soviet sniper of the Great Patriotic War was Vasily Zaitsev, born in the village of Elino in the Chelyabinsk region in March 1915, the son of a peasant. As a youth, he was a shepherd during the summers and became an expert deer and small-game hunter. Although Zaitsev was not one of the Red Army's top snipers, his name and deeds have become well known through the Hollywood film Enemy at the Gates. Zaitsev joined the Soviet Pacific Fleet in 1936. When the war started, he made his combat debut in September 1942 in the Battle of Stalingrad with the 1047th Rifle Regiment. His superiors took note of his sharpshooting skills after he had killed more than 30 Germans as an ordinary rifleman. Given a sniping rifle, he began to amass an incredible number of kills during a three-month period. For morale purposes, his successes were heavily publicized. When a good sniper began to take a large toll, the opposing side would send in their own sniper to eliminate the menace. Thus, snipers

BELOW LEFT Sgt. Maj. Nikolai llyin, sniper in the 50th Guards Infantry Regiment, was a locksmith before the war. He scored 216 kills at Stalingrad and received the title of HSU on February 8, 1943. He died in action on August 4, 1943. This heavily retouched photograph has an obvious error. His epaulettes show that he is a private, yet at the time of his HSU award, he was a sergeant. (Kiev War Museum) BELOW Vasily Zaitsev's accomplishment in Stalingrad was portrayed in the 2001 action movie Enemy at the Gates. Sniper duels were very common, but the story of Zaitsev's duel with the head instructor of a German sniper school was a myth. (Kiev War Museum)

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The best Soviet sniping rifle of the war was the standard MosinNagant in 7.62 x 54mm caliber. A private takes aim at his intended victim in 1943 in a sunflower patch.

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often had to fight personal duels with counterparts, in a deadly cat-andmouse game. Although these sniper duels were quite common, in the case of Zaitsev, one engagement with a German super sniper took on mythical proportions. The story goes that Zaitsev's successes became known to the Germans. They sent their best sniper, supposedly the top instructor from their sniper school (often identified as a Waffen-SS Colonel Heinz Thorwald or a Major Koenig), to kill Zaitsev. The story, which had mass appeal, ended with Zaitsev killing his opponent, but despite intensive research, the identity of his opponent has never been verified. Jr. Lt. Vasily Zaitsev was credited with 225 kills at Stalingrad between October 10 and December 17, 1942. Among his victims were 11 German snipers. He was seriously wounded in January 1943, with an injury to his shooting eye. A skilled surgeon saved Zaitsev's eyesight, but as far as his career was concerned, he was not allowed to return to his combat specialty. Instead, his skills were put to use as a sniper trainer. He helped train 28 snipers, and wrote two textbooks on the art of sniping, which are still studied today in the Russian military. On February 22, 1943, he became a Hero of the Soviet Union. After finishing the war as Capt. Zaitsev, he was demobilized and went to work at a textile factory in Kiev. He died on December 15, 1991 and is buried in Kiev's Lukyanivski Military Cemetery.

OPPOSITE Although he was a famous tank killer, Dmitri Lavrinenko did not receive his HSU title until May 1990. Such oversights were not uncommon and were due to political machinations and poor record handling.

Soviet snipers in the Great Patriotic War

Table 2 lists the top Soviet Snipers in the Great Patriotic War from official So\iet sources. There are other names with scores, but these are not listed here because the source is unknown. For example, there is an Ivan Nikolayevich Kulbertinov (489) and an Afanasi Gordienko (417); they were not HSUs. The sniper's modus operandi made verifying a kill almost impossible. The kills were usually "confirmed" by the sniper's spotter. TANK DRIVERS/COMMANDERS Dmitri Fiodorovich Lavrinenko

The Soviets - and even the Germans - considered the T-34 the best tank of the Great Patriotic War. (Paul McDaniel)

The most famous Soviet tank killer of the Great Patriotic War was Dmitri Lavrinenko, who was born in October 1914, the son of a peasant from the Krasnodar region. He finished seven grades of secondary school and later became a schoolteacher in a small village. The life of a teacher did not satisfy him, however, so he left to become a cashier at a bank. In 1934, he joined the Red Army and went to tank school. In 1940, the Soviet Union began forcibly to annex Bessarabia, an area that is now largely in the former Soviet republics of Moldova and Ukraine. Lavrinenko participated in the armed expedition as a member of the tank corps. In June 1941 when Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Lt. Lavrinenko was ready. As a member of the 4th Tank Brigade, the T-34 commander's tactic was to close in on the enemy, even when outnumbered, and aggressively hunt them down. Lt. Lavrinenko's tank-killing spree heightened in October in the battles around Orel and Mzensk where his brigade fought furiously against Gen. Heinz Guderian's Panzers. Within four days, Lavrinenko destroyed 16 tanks. In November, Lavrinenko joined with his tank platoon to hold the defensive position of Gen. Ivan Panfilov on the outskirts of Moscow at the small village of Gusenovo. In one fateful battle, Lavrinenko faced down eight Panzers rushing toward his platoon's position. His first shot destroyed the lead tank. He fired six more times, destroying a tank with each shot; only one German tank escaped. In the vicious fighting, most of Panfilov's men were killed, but the Germans never broke through; this was Hitler's first defeat. On December 18, 1941, Lt. Dmitri Lavrinenko died in battle near the village of Goriuny. near

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Moscow. In 28 engagements, he had destroyed 52 enemy tanks, an amazing feat in 1941. For reasons unknown, although recommended for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union shortly after his death, the honor was not conferred upon Lavrinenko until May 5, 1990. He is buried in the village of Denkovo of the Istra area of the Moscow region, and School #28 was named after him at the village/station of Besstrashnaya. Lavrinenko may not have been the Soviet Union's top tank killer. Some believe it was Capt. Konstantin Samokhin, who reportedly had 69 kills, but was not a HSU. Dmitri Malahovich Tsirubin

There were tank battalion commanders who did their fighting behind a desk, and then there was Dmitri Tsirubin, who led his men by example. There was a high mortality rate among the lead tanks, but Tsirubin seemed to live a charmed life. (Igor Moiseyev)

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Absolutely fearless and leading his men by example, Dmitri Tsirubin was the ideal tank commander. The career tank corps officer was born in the ullage of Titovka in the Mogilev region of Belorussia, in May 1916. He finished eight grades of school and went to work as a bookkeeper on a state farm. He joined the army in 1937 and fought against the Finns in the Winter War. At the start of the Great Patriotic War, Tsirubin was a political officer in a tank battalion. It was not until 1944 that he became engaged in heavy fighting, for which he was well decorated. In the summer of 1944, Maj. Tsirubin fought in Operation Bagration in Belorussia. As a battalion commander in the 15th Guards Tank Brigade of the 1st Don Guards Tank Corps, his T-34 was the first to fight its way into the city of Bobruysk. In July, due to heavy casualties among the brigade's officers, he was elevated to battalion commander. Crossing the Svisloch River to establish a bridgehead, Tsirubin's unit came under fierce attack by tanks and infantry of the 12th Panzer Division. Maj. Tsirubin personally destroyed two Panzers and killed nine enemy soldiers. His tankers massacred the enemy infantrymen during the counterattack. As the Germans retreated toward the west, Maj. Tsirubin was right behind them, his battalion being the first to cross the Neva River. The German counterattack failed after Tsirubin's men killed over 120 of them. During his forward advance, the fearless tank commander destroyed two antitank guns while his unit liquidated two infantry companies armed with rocket-propelled antitank grenades (Panzerfausts). In the village of Nestepovo, the Soviet T-34 tanks were forced to stop at an antitank ditch. Tsirubin jumped out of his tank and found a safe passage point. He discovered two Germans in the ditch armed with Panzerfausts and eliminated them. Jumping back into his tank, he led his tankers forward and engaged two enemy tanks, destroying one of them. For his bravery and valor, Maj. Dmitri Tsirubin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on March 24, 1945. After the war, he continued in the tank corps and retired in 1956 as a lieutenant-colonel.

Mikhail Vasilevich Kopitin

Mikhail Kopitin was a career tank officer who made a name for himself in the T-34 tank. He was born in November 1920 in the village of Murom, in the Vladimir region east of Moscow. He joined the army in 1940. Armed with T-34/85 tanks, Sr. Lt. Kopitin, leading the 1st Tank Company of the 229th Tank Regiment, found himself in the middle of the Lvov-Sandomir Offensive in July 1944. The Soviets were pushing the Germans out of Ukraine, into Poland. The following is the citation/ recommendation for Kopitin, which resulted in the award of the title Hero of the Soviet Union: "Comrade Kopitin, the commander of a tank company, has always been at the most important locations in battle. His courage, bravery, and skillfulness always let him win in spite of the superiority of the enemy. Self-sacrifice and willingness to help are the main features of his character. "On August 3-4, 1944, the Mechanized Brigade fought a severe battle for the village of Zheduv against the superior forces of the enemy. The Brigade was able to fend off numerous enemy tank and infantry attacks. It drove a wedge into the entrenched enemy's defense, but together with headquarters staff, became separated from the main force. Comrade Kopitin quickly analyzed the situation, and by his own initiative, decided to help. "Leading five other tank crews, he expended much ammunition and exterminated the enemy soldiers. It was a brave maneuver whereby Kopitin demonstrated his courage and helped unite the headquarters unit to the rest of the force.

ABOVE LEFT Mikhail Kopitin had a long and distinguished career in the Soviet tank corps. In 1972, he retired as a general in the reserves and made Moscow his home. ABOVE The great Soviet tank driver/commander, Lt. Semion Konovalov, was a mailman before the war. On July 13, 1942, as a member of the 15th Tank Brigade, he used his KV tank to destroy 16 tanks, two armored cars, and eight trucks loaded with enemy infantrymen near the village of Nizhnemitiakin in the Tarasov area. He became a Hero on March 3 1 , 1943. Konovalov survived the war and now lives in Kazan.

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Tanks on stone pedestals are frequently seen in Russia and in the former Soviet republics. It was customary to so honor the first tank that broke into a major city. Here, young Pioneers stand under the first tank to enter Donetsk to liberate it from the Germans.

This 1965 postage stamp honors Soviet Navy Seaman Ivan Sivkov, a rifleman of the 2nd Volunteer Detachment of the Northern Fleet. On August 2, 1941, he took his wounded commander to safety and then covered the withdrawal of his comrades alone. He used his last grenade to blow himself up, taking some of the Germans with him. He became a HSU on January 17, 1942.

"In that battle, comrade Kopitin personally destroyed five tanks, to include two Panther tanks, three T-4 tanks, two self-propelled guns, one armored troop carrier, and more than a hundred soldiers and officers. He captured one T-3 tank in good order and his company suffered zero losses. "During the following ten days since that battle, to August 14, 1944, comrade Kopitin has additionally destroyed several more Panthers, four T-4 tanks, three self-propelled guns, five armored troop carriers, and four auto cars. "For his heroic deeds and skillful management of his company, I nominate comrade Kopitin for the government award of Hero of the Soviet Union." On September 23, 1944, Sr. Lt. Mikhail Kopitin received the title of HSU. His unit advanced on Berlin, then turned and strove toward Prague when the war ended. NAVAL TROOPS Viktor Nickolayevich Leonov

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Viktor Leonov was the model of a successful Soviet "buccaneer." A dashing rogue, he battled the Germans and the Japanese, writing some memorable chapters of modern Soviet naval history. He was born in 1916 in the town of Zaraisk of the Moscow region and joined the Soviet Navy in 1937. Lt. Leonov's first combat assignment was with the 181st Special Reconnaissance Detachment of the Northern Navy Headquarters. Leading his men on commando-type raids, he destroyed German ammunition and supply depots, communication centers, and harassed enemy troop

concentrations along the Finnish and Russian coasts. On one occasion, on July 28, 1941, he and his men raided the German strongpoint at Cape Pikshuyev. When a German company came to the rescue, they were ambushed by Leonov's men and fled from the battlefield, leaving over 40 dead. In November 1941, Leonov's detachment smashed the motor transport depot in the settlement of Titovka. In destroying 25 trucks, two fuel storage depots and a storehouse, the Soviets also killed over 100 of the enemy with no loss to their own. On March 7, 1942, in another typical lightning raid, Lt. Leonov led his men to destroy another enemy depot in the region of Zapadnaya Litsa, leaving over 70 Germans dead. In April, another series of successful operations followed. Landing his men from fast torpedo boats, Leonov secured the landing of the 12th

Viktor Leonov detested the useless political officers assigned to his unit and forced them to fight or quit. During the Soviet era, he was well known and respected, but with the passing of the USSR, he was overlooked. His death in 2003 was not even mentioned in the Moscow newspapers.

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Marine Brigade on enemy territory, during which his men killed over 60 Germans. Leonov and his unit spent the month destroying enemy antiaircraft sites, mapping the coastline, and capturing prisoners for interrogation. In one of the more spectacular missions of his career, Lt. Leonov was given the assignment of silencing the four 155mm guns at Cape Krestovyi, which had shut down the entire bay to the Soviets. Leonov landed his men and they force-marched to the rear, intent on taking out the enemy's 88mm gun battery located near their primary target. On the night of October 12, 1944, Leonov and his men overwhelmed the 88mm gun site and captured 20 men. When German reinforcements arrived, the Soviets simply turned the captured guns on the rescuers and destroyed them. A few hours later, Leonov's unit linked up with another recon detachment, and together they assaulted the primary target, forcing the German battery commander to surrender and capturing over 60 Germans in the process. As a result of this operation, the Soviets were able to land their forces and break through to capture the port of Liinahamari on the Finnish coast. On November 5, 1944, Leonov received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. When the European conflict ended, Sr. Lt. Leonov was sent to fight the Japanese. He landed with 140 of his men, under the command of Capt. Kulebyakin, on a Japanese airfield at Port Vonsan, not realizing that they were opposed by over 3,500 enemy soldiers. Knowing that they were in a most unfavorable situation, Kulebyakin asked to meet with the Japanese colonel in charge, and demanded his surrender! When the colonel called their bluff and decided to take the ten Soviets hostage, Leonov broke into the conversation and said forcefully, "We've been fighting in the West throughout the war and understand our situation. We will not allow ourselves to be taken hostage! You will all die like rats when we break out of here!" The colonel backed down and surrendered. Sr. Lt. Viktor Leonov received his second HSU on September 14, 1945. According to his citation, "he took part in the seizure of the ports of Yuka and Raisin where he showed himself as a courageous and firm officer who masterfully guided the battle operations." As a testament to his leadership, Leonov lost only nine men under his direct command - mostly from the assault at Cape Krestovyi (seven killed) - until the end of the war against Japan. Leonov entered the Naval Reserve in 1956 and later retired as a captain 2nd rank. For years he was a popular commentator on Soviet Naval history and a greatly respected role model for communist youth, but with the collapse of the Soviet Union, his importance faded. He died on October 7, 2003 in Moscow. Mikhail Grigoryevich Malik

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While the vast majority of Heroes of the Soviet Union earned their honors on the bloody battlefields of Europe, a few gained Hero status fighting against the Japanese in a war lasting one week. Mikhail Malik was one of them. Mikhail Malik was born in May 1911 in the city of Nikolayesk na Amure in the Khabarovsk region of the Soviet East, across the channel from Sakhalin Island (captured from Japan in 1945 and now a part of Russia).

He joined the Soviet Navy in 1933 and completed the specialized course in the Baltic Flotilla in 1935. He carried out his duties along the coast facing the Sea of Japan and did not participate in the European conflict. When the Soviet Union declared war against Japan on August 8, 1945, Capt. Lt. Malik was ready. As commander of a torpedo boat battalion, he led his men on a lightning raid against the port of Seisin. They succeeded in sinking seven Japanese ships. On August 11, Malik led six boats, crossed the mined area protecting the Korean port of Raisin and, despite the strong counter fire, sank three transports and damaged two. During combat, his battalion transported over 2,000 marines in 21 landing operations at the ports of Yuki, Raisin, Seisin, Odentsin, and Tenzan. Malik was the first to detonate the Japanese acoustic mines lying on the seabed to the entrance of Port Rasin by depth charging them. His innovation allowed others to do the same. On September 14, 1945, Capt. Lt. Mikhail Malik received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the fulfillment of operations without loss of personnel, and for inflicting great damage on the enemy. After the war, Malik lived in Vladivostok and was active in military and youth affairs. He retired from active duty in 1960 with the rank of captain 1st rank and went into the reserves. He died in October 1980. Alexandr Ivanovich Marinesko

Soviet submarines achieved very little success during the war, although they did have their moments. One of the most intriguing and controversial figures in Soviet submarine history was Alexandr Marinesko. Vilified by the Germans as a war criminal, he was arrested and imprisoned by his own government. He eventually became a Hero of the Soviet Union well after his death. Alexandr Marinesko, a Ukrainian from Odessa, was born in 1913 and joined the navy in October 1933. By 1939, he had completed special courses in submarine warfare and was posted to the Baltic Navy. He served aboard the submarine M-96 and later the S-13. Although he saw action from the start of the Great Patriotic War, his first successes did not come until 1945. By that time, Marinesko was in deep trouble with the authorities. His problems began in late 1944 when he was based at Turku, Finland. When S-13 was ready to sail, he was absent without leave for three days. Apparently, he was seeing a woman and drinking heavily. When he did not report for duty, the shore patrol began looking for him, and he returned to his boat on January 3, 1945. The NKVD suspected that he had either defected or had become a spy for the Finns. The navy and the NKVD had a difference of opinion as to his punishment, but first, he had duties to perform and was sent out to sea.

Mikhail Malik became a Hero in the war against Japan, which lasted one week. He spent his entire life in the Soviet Far East.

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ABOVE Alexandr Marinesko was a good submarine officer who was victimized by his own government for alleged political crimes and died a broken man in 1963. Intense lobbying by his comrades finally led to a posthumous HSU award in 1990. ABOVE RIGHT There was no shortage of volunteers for submarine service because of the great food prepared by the boats' cooks. After sinking a 5,000-ton transport in October 1943, the crew of S-31 is treated to a fine feast and serenaded by naval musicians.

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A painting depicts the sinking of the German liner Wilhelm Gustloff on January 30, 1945 by Marinesko's S-13.

On January 30, 1945 near Danzig Harbor, Capt. 3rd Class Marinesko fired three torpedoes into the 25,484-ton German liner Wilhelm Gustloff and sank her. He had disobeyed his superiors and strayed from his assigned sector. The liner carried over 7,000 Chilians and 1,300 German submarine personnel. For many years afterwards, the Sonets denied responsibility for sinking this ship. On February 10, Marinesko intercepted the 14,600-ton German subsidian- cruiser General Steuben of the German Nord Shipping Line and

Petty Officer Alexandr Morukhov joined the navy in 1939. As head machinist mate aboard the submarine M-35, he took part in 34 combat patrols in which eight enemy ships were sunk. During a dive, his submarine suffered damage to the vertical rudder, sending it further down into the crushing depths. He skillfully repaired the controls and regained control of the submarine, saving the lives of the entire crew. He became a HSU on July 22, 1944.

sent her to the bottom. There were more than 3,000 wounded, refugees, and medical personnel aboard. Marinesko had had no idea that his victim was a Chilian ship. In addition to sinking four enemy ships in his career, Marinesko carried out landings of spy and special operations groups behind enemy lines, and covered the flank of advancing Red Army units. Although recommended for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the highest honor was denied, and the severe disappointment and mounting problems with the NKVD caused him to drink excessively. In September 1945, Marinesko was demoted to Sr. Lt. and transferred to a minesweeper. He was arrested for political crimes on trumped-up charges, convicted, and sent to a gulag in Siberia where he spent many years at hard labor. After his release, the disgraced former submarine commander moved to Leningrad and worked for a steamship company. He died in November 1963. On May 5, 1990, Alexandr Marinesko finally received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union from President Mikhail Gorbachev. His record of 52,000 tons of enemy shipping destroyed made him the top Soviet submarine ace of the Great Patriotic War.

Victor Dmitriyevich Kuskov never considered himself to be a Hero and always told others that he was simply doing his job.

Victor Dmitriyevich Kuskov

Many service personnel earned their Hero status not by performing courageous acts during handto-hand fighting, but by inspiring others through their selfless devotion to duty. Victor Kuskov was one such man. Kuskov was born in November 1924 in the Kalinin region. His family were peasants and he finished seven grades of school to become an accountant on a collective farm. He joined the navy in July 1942 and trained with the Northern Fleet. He was then posted to the 1st Naval Guard

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Caesar Lazarevich Kunikov, marine battalion commander of the Azov Motorboat Flotilla, became famous for his daring raids. During the cold night of February 4, 1943, his men landed at Malaya Zemlia and repulsed 18 counterattacks, despite being vastly outnumbered. They successfully held the bridgehead for advancing forces of the Red Army. Kunikov was severely wounded in combat and died on February 12. He became a HSU on April 17, 1943.

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Battalion as the motor mechanic of a torpedo launch. Kuskov fought during the whole war aboard ships on the Baltic Front. The motor launch in which he served took part in 42 battles and sank three enemy ships. In one of the battles, Kuskov was concussed when an enemy shell hit the motor compartment of his boat, damaging an oil pipe. Overcoming pain, he covered the hole in the leaking oil pipe with his hands. The hot oil burned his hands, but he unclasped them only after his boat was able to escape from enemy fire. On July 1, 1944, Kuskov again exhibited heroism when his boat was hit by another enemy shell. Although badly wounded, he stayed in the motor compartment to fight the fire and flooding. When the boat began to sink, he and another comrade worked to put life jackets on the wounded crew and help them into the water. He held the seriously wounded commander of the boat in his arms for over two hours until rescued by a friendly ship. For his courageous conduct and devotion to duty, Victor Kuskov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on July 22, 1944. After the war, Sr. Lt. Kuskov finished the military marine political college and finally retired in 1955. He died on September 25, 1983. SPIES Richard Sorge

"Germany will attack the Soviet Union no earlier than June 15, 1941..." warned the secret report to Joseph Stalin, six months prior to the invasion. Stalin chose to ignore the report from the master spy - with disastrous consequences. To cover his mistake, Stalin made every effort to erase the existence of Dr Richard Sorge. Richard Sorge was born to a Russian mother and a German father in Baku (Russia) in 1895. Educated in the Fatherland, he fought in World War One in the German Army, and was seriously wounded by the Russians. While recovering in hospital, he read the works of Karl Marx, which eventually steered him to communism. Sorge was a scholar who obtained his doctorate in political science at the University of Hamburg in 1920. Upon graduation, he secretly joined the German Communist Party. His first job as a history teacher came to an end when he was fired for promoting communism and trying to recruit members. His next job at a coalmine also ended for the same reason. When the police came looking for him, the communist agitator fled to Moscow, where he was recruited by Soviet intelligence. Sorge returned to Germany, married, and became a journalist. In 1923, the German communists tried to overthrow their government, and Sorge

organized many of their activities. The rebellion was crushed, but Sorge escaped detection. In 1924, he became a Soviet citizen, joining the Soviet Communist Party in the following year, but he still maintained his cover as a German citizen and journalist. In 1930, Sorge was sent to China to spy on the political leaders and the military of the Chinese Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek. The Soviets were interested in overthrowing the Nationalists. While in Shanghai, Sorge established a close relationship with the German Embassy and recruited a number of embassy personnel to help him. So good was his cover that the Japanese in Shanghai thought he was working for German intelligence. The Soviets were very impressed by Sorge's ability to obtain secret information from both the Germans and the Japanese. This "renaissance man" was charming, highly intelligent, and seemed to know just about anyone of importance. His lavish cocktail parties were very popular and he hobnobbed with the rich and influential. He was a keen political scientist who impressed all who met him. Sorge was ordered to Japan to set up a new spy ring. He avoided detection by having no more than four people in his ring, who were all loyal to him. He settled in comfortably and remarried. In 1935, after a militant faction of Japanese Army officers killed some key officers who opposed war with China, Sorge was employed by the German Embassy as a consultant to make sense of the situation. His analysis impressed the officials, including the German ambassador, and he began receiving privileged information, which was duly sent by Sorge to his handlers in Moscow. The double agent correctly predicted the Japanese war with China, which began in July 1937. In December 1940, in one of the greatest coups of Soviet intelligence, Sorge passed along to Moscow the secret German plans for the invasion of the Soviet Union. However, Stalin chose to ignore Sorge's report and relied wholly on his advisors, who did not believe that war was imminent. The Soviets had signed a non-aggression pact with Germany in August 1939. When the Germans attacked on June 22, 1941, Stalin was stunned and his spy in Tokyo devastated. (Sorge had also sent word about the proposed Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but Stalin chose not to alert the Americans.) On October 15, 1941, Sorge sent a message stating that the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria would not be invading the Soviet Union to help Germany. This time his report was believed. Stalin pulled his divisions out of the Soviet Far East to defend Moscow. Sorge's spy ring was eventually discovered after the Japanese caught one operative, who led them to the others. In October 1941, the master spy was arrested along with his Japanese wife, Hanako. Under torture, Sorge confessed and spent the next three years in prison. The Japanese

Richard Sorge, in a photo taken in 1943 while imprisoned by the Japanese. His execution came as a welcome relief to Joseph Stalin. (RGAKFD)

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Richard Sorge's grave in the Tama Cemetery, Tokyo, Japan. It was erected on the orders of Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Stalin tried to erase all evidence of Sorge. (Warrick Barrett)

made three overtures to the Soviets, hoping to trade Sorge for one of their own spies. However, the Soviets rebuffed the offers, maintaining that Sorge was unknown to them. On November 7, 1944, Sorge was hanged in Sugamo Prison in Tokyo. His execution came as a relief to Stalin. In 1964, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev saw the French film Who Are You, Dr. Sorge? and asked the KGB if the story was true. When it was confirmed, he awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to Richard Sorge on November 5, 1964. In addition, his widow Hanako Ishiye, who had been married to Dr Sorge for over ten years, received a Soviet pension. She died of pneumonia in Tokyo in July 2000 at the age of 89. Nikolai Ivanovich Kuznetsov

Nikolai Kuznetsov was to the Soviets as SS Col. Otto Skorzeny was to the Germans; both men had nerves of steel and won fame for their daring exploits behind enemy lines. Kuznetsov was born in 1911 into a peasant family in what is now the Yekaterinburg region of Russia. He graduated from the Ural Polytechnic Institute in 1938, and later from the Institute of Foreign Languages. Before the start of the war, Kuznetsov was recruited to work in counter-espionage due to his fluent German, which he spoke like a native. He introduced himself to German Embassy officials as a native German who came to the Soviet Union with his parents as a young child, and was now working at an aviation factory in Moscow. This attracted the attention of German espionage agents; Kuznetsov, in turn, could finger the agents to his superiors. In addition, Kuznetsov befriended a German in the embassy who was recruited to work for the Soviets. When the Great Patriotic War started, Kuznetsov underwent training to assume the guise of a German officer. He became Oberleutnant Paul Wilhelm Siebert and was parachuted behind German lines to join a detachment of partisans. His secret orders, which no one but the 32

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The Gold Star Medal and the Order of Lenin

A

B

Sniper Fyodor Ohlopkov, Vitebsk, Belorussia, May 1944

Mikhail Gakhokidze, Sevastopol, June 1942

c

D

Spy Robert Klein, Cherkassy, central Ukraine, September 1943

Sailor Nikolai Golubkov, Fuyuan, north-east China, August 1945

E

F

Pilot Alexei Petrovich Maresyev, April 1942

Medic Anatoli Alexandrovich Kokorin, Northern Front, August 1941

G

H

Partisan Marat Kazei, Khorometskoye, Belorussia, May 1944

partisan commander knew about, were to enter the enemy-occupied Ukrainian city of Rovno, and establish a spy network, which he did. Kuznetsov became acquainted with many German officers, who were useful sources of information. On April 20, 1943, Kuznetsov made plans to sacrifice his life in an attempt to assassinate Erich Koch, the Nazi ruler of occupied Ukraine. The plan fell apart, however, and Koch escaped. Through an acquaintance in the German Secret Service, Kuznetsov uncovered a plot to assassinate the "Big Three" (Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill), during their meeting in Tehran in 1943. Although this was a great intelligence coup, the master spy felt unfulfilled and wanted to take a more active approach in fighting the enemy. The partisan commander gave permission to Kuznetsov to kill Paul Dargel, the first assistant to Erich Koch. Kuznetsov's first attempt was unsuccessful: he shot and killed two men at point-blank range, neither of whom was his intended \ictim. On September 30, 1943, ten days after that failed attempt, he tried again by throwing a grenade at Dargel. The explosion wounded his victim, who was sent to Berlin by plane. Kuznetsov managed to escape, but was wounded by shrapnel. The failures to assassinate Koch and his assistant caused Kuznetsov much despair. On November 11, he again tried to kill one of Koch's assistants with submachine gun fire, but he missed and his victim got away. On November 17, Kuznetsov finally succeeded - in a grand way. He entered the home of Oberführer of the SS Alfred Funk and shot him in his study. Flush with success, Kuznetsov helped kidnap Gen. von Ilgen, commander of special troops. Koch's personal driver was also captured. In another successful operation, Kuznetsov provided information on a planned punitive expedition led by Gen. Prizmann. The partisans were waiting for the German expedition and in the ambush killed the general. After this, the Germans retreated from Rovno to Lvov, and Kuznetsov followed. One of Kuznetsov's last successes was the assassination of Gen. Otto Bauer, the vice-governor of Galitsia, in Lvov. Kuznetsov, his driver, and another comrade sprayed the general's car with submachine gun fire and killed him. The three men made for the front lines to meet Soviet troops, but became surrounded in the village of Boratyn by a unit of the Bandera (anti-communist Ukrainian Nationalists). They fought until their ammunition supply was exhausted. The three men then used grenades to blow themselves up - along with the approaching enemy. On November 5, 1944, Nikolai Kuznetsov received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. He is buried in Lvov on the Hill of Glory.

Nikolai Kuznetsov is shown as a senior lieutenant in the Soviet Air Force prior to the war, although he never served with the air force. He assumed various identities to fool the Germans, and had nerves of steel. (Kiev War Museum)

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PARTISANS Sidor Artiomovich Kovpak

One of the best known and most beloved leaders of the partisan movement in Ukraine was Sidor Kovpak, who looked more like a professor than a fierce warrior. He was born into a peasant family in June 1887 in the Ukrainian village of Kotelva. After service in both World War One and the Civil War, he became a teacher and was involved in Communist Party affairs. When the Great Patriotic War began, Kovpak was 54 years old. Due to his administrative skills and tenacity for getting things done, he organized a partisan movement in Ukraine. The Kovpak Partisan Group had over 1,500 personnel, and the old man himself took an active part in the fighting. He received his first title of Hero of the Soviet Union on May 18, 1942 for many successful missions against the enemy. The partisans had a particularly tough time in Ukraine due to the divided loyalties of the citizens there. Seeking to liberate Ukraine from the Soviet Union, thousands of anti-communist Ukrainians joined the UPA, the military arm of the Ukrainian Nationalists. Kovpak's group fought against the UPA in the Carpathian Mountains during 1943. The UPA fought in battalion strength, mostly as irregulars. The Nationalists murdered Jews and pro-Soviet Ukrainians, while Kovpak's unit targeted the Nationalists and Germans. This complex situation resulted in many civilian casualties, victims of German, Nationalist, or Soviet forces. For his successful Carpathian campaign, Kovpak received his second HSU on January 4, 1944. Maj. Gen. Kovpak became commander of the 1st Ukrainian Partisan Division and was credited with liberating the Jews of the Skalat Labor Camp in 1944. When Kovpak made forays into Poland, Lt. Gen. Wilhelm Koppe, senior SS commander of occupied Poland, ordered the formation of special punitive group "Beyersdorf" to destroy Kovpak's partisans. Reinforced by police and other army units, this group was credited with inflicting massive casualties on the partisans. However, by this time, the Germans were in retreat, pursued by the Red Army, and the partisan movement was disbanded. Sidor Kovpak served as a member of the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR in 1944 and held various high political posts after the war. His last position was Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The great partisan general died on December 11, 1967 and was buried in Kiev. His bronze bust was erected in the town of Kotelva, and monuments to him can be seen in Kiev and Putivl. Fyodor Alexeyevich Malyshev

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One of the most famous partisans in Belorussia was Fyodor Malyshev. He was born in April 1914 in the village of Zapolye in the Gomel region of Belorussia, into a peasant family. As a graduate of the Minsk Polytechnic

Sidor Kovpak in an official portrait taken in Kiev, Ukraine, shortly after the war. His guerilla campaign in Ukraine was hampered by divided loyalties; he not only battled the Germans, but also anti-communist Ukrainian Nationalists. OPPOSITE ABOVE Fyodor Malyshev in a postwar photograph. As of 2003, he was one of only 22 Heroes still living in Minsk, the capital of the Belarus Republic.

OPPOSITE This teenage partisan is armed with a rifle, a belt of ammo for the heavy Maxim machine gun, and a grenade. Partisans who were captured could expect torture and death, so they often carried a grenade to commit suicide.

Institute, this mechanical engineer had devoted his life to building labor-saving devices. During the Great Patriotic War, he was asked to use his talents to destroy the enemy. When the war started, Malyshev was working as an engineer at a peat plant near Vitebsk. His fellow workers, including the director of the company, were soon called to duty, but not him. When he tried to enlist, he was told, "Wait your turn, your time will come!" When the Germans captured Vitebsk on July 4, 1941, Malyshev joined a partisan detachment. Later, he was assigned to a commando team. The Germans advanced so rapidly that they had to rush fuel, food, and munitions to the front by train to keep up the momentum. In the opposite direction came ambulance trains loaded with plunder and the wounded. Special trains took Soviet citizens and prisoners to concentration camps. The Brest-Gomel Railway Line was a critical transport artery for German Army Group Center. The Germans had to keep this vital link open; Malyshev's unit worked ceaselessly to destroy it. On August 19, 1942, Malyshev destroyed his first enemy train. The Germans had positioned soldiers, local Belorussian police, and villagers along the tracks to thwart saboteurs. After several trains had passed, Malyshev recognized someone from his village. Assuring his leader that he would not be betrayed, Malyshev hid an explosive mine under his shirt, and mingled with the villagers. When a German guard walked slowly toward him, two villagers blocked the guard's view while he planted the explosive under the tracks. When everyone ran down the embankment at the approach of a train, Malyshev also ran. The resulting explosion was spectacular. In the records of the 125th Partisan Brigade, the event was described: "An enemy troop train consisting of 60 carriages was blown up today. All traffic in that section of the railway was stopped for two days and nights. The Nazis cordoned off the area where the train had been derailed, and were engaged for 36 hours in carrying out their dead, dismantling the smashed carriages, and clearing the track. The train had been carrying an anti-Partisan punitive detachment." By November 1942, Malyshev was responsible for destroying 16 trains, a success rate that led to his appointment as leader of a demolition squad. Desperate to keep the railway lines open, the

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Railroads were favorite targets for partisans. These two men prepare an explosive mine to derail a German supply train. Partisan sabotage in Ukraine and Belorussia caused tremendous supply problems for the Germans.

Valentin Kotik was a hottempered and reckless youth when the war started. Assigned a handler, the boy's energy was channeled to support activities, which he hated. He took extreme risks by organizing his own ambushes and sabotage operations with his friends, often without his superiors' knowledge. (Kiev War Museum)

Germans hunted the partisans day and night, and it became increasing difficult to derail trains. But despite the heavy pressure, Malyshev and his men destroyed their 18th train in April 1943. The constant stress took a toll on Malyshev. Although he was known for his steady nerves, the constant hunger, exposure to the elements, and running from the enemy undermined his health. In the fall of 1943, he was flown to Moscow for treatment. A robust figure before the war, Malyshev now weighed only 901b (40kg). After two months, he was released. He looked forward to action, but his superiors forbade him to return to combat. Eager to restore the local economy after the Gomel region was liberated, Soviet officials appointed Malyshev as director of the peat works there. On April 15, 1944, Fyodor Malyshev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In all, he and his men destroyed 19 heavily guarded supply trains, which caused untold damage to the German war effort in Belorussia. After the war, he worked as head of a laboratory at the Peat Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Belorussian SSR. Valentin Alexandrovich Kotik

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The youngest person ever to win the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was Valentin Kotik. His family lived in the village of Khmeliovka in the Khmelnitski region of western Ukraine, where he was born on February 11, 1930. His father was a carpenter while his mother labored on a collective farm. When the Germans invaded Ukraine at the start of the Great Patriotic War, the 11-year-old Kotik decided to free his pet squirrel in a forest for fear that he would not be able to take care of it. While in the forest, he spied four military men in

This stone monument honors Fyodor Mikhailov in the city of Slavuta, Ukraine. He was a medical doctor who organized an underground network in the region with over 200 participants. On July 22, 1942, he was betrayed by a collaborator and arrested. Dr Mikhailov was executed that day, and became a HSU on May 8,

1965.

strange uniforms, speaking a language he did not understand. He led some Red Army soldiers to the scene. A firefight ensued, and three of the enemy were killed and the other was captured. This incident convinced the fifth-grade student to take an active part in the war effort. His family had a tenant, Ivan Muzaliov, a former captive of the Germans. Young Valia was suspicious of him, and suspected him of working for the Germans. In fact, Muzaliov was helping to organize a resistance group with the director of the local wood plant. Muzaliov noted that Kotik was only 11 years old, hot tempered, and impulsive. The boy had no direction at this time and posed a danger to himself, collecting leaflets dropped by Soviet planes and secretly posting them in public places. The lad made no attempt to conceal his hatred of the enemy. One day Muzaliov found leaflets in the boy's boot and asked if he had been distributing them. 'Yes! And what of it?" shouted Valia defiantly. It was then that the tenant revealed his true identity and his efforts with the local underground. From that day on, Kotik's life took a new course. He organized the local children to collect weapons and ammunition found on the battlefields, and count enemy tanks, vehicles, and troops passing through the area. Kotik soon graduated to armed aggression when he suggested an ambush to two of his friends. He learned that the head of the Shepetovka occupation military police, Oberleutnant Fritz Koenig, was on his way to interrogate some partisans captured in a nearby town. The three boys jumped onto the road and threw grenades at the fastapproaching vehicles, then fled into the forest. The lead vehicle carrying Koenig spun out of control, and a heavy truck following close behind slammed into its rear; it is unknown if Koenig was killed or injured. German soldiers jumped out of the truck and sprayed the area with submachine gun fire, but by then, the three boys had disappeared. The incident provoked severe German retaliation, and many innocent people were arrested and executed. From August 1943, Kotik served as a scout for the Shepetovka Partisan Detachment. In October, he located the underground telephone cable serving the local German headquarters and blew it up. On October 29, while on sentry duty' in the forest, he killed a German officer with a pistol and warned his comrades of the enemy punitive expedition, thus allowing them to fight. On February 11, 1944, the Red Army liberated Shepetovka, the area where Valia Kotik lived and fought. In the dawn hours of the 17th, the partisans attacked the Germans in a surprise raid on the village of Iziaslav. When the ammunition storehouse was seized, Muzaliov ordered the youngster and others to guard it. In the furious battle, Valia Kotik stood at his post and was fatally wounded. He was buried in the garden of the school where he had studied. On June 27, 1958, Valentin Kotik was honored with the title of Hero of the Sonet Union, the youngest ever to be so honored. The 14-year-old became a role model for the Young Pioneer movement, the organization for children operated by the Soviet Communist Party.

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Dmitri Medvedev almost became a casualty of Stalin's purges before the war. "Retired" for political reasons, he was reactivated when the war started. He was a hands-on partisan leader, not only planning missions but also accompanying his group on daring sabotage raids.

Dmitri Nikolaevich Medvedev

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If there was ever a "big fish" in the Soviet partisan war, Dmitri Medvedev was it, and the Germans never caught him. He was born in 1898 in the Bryansk region, joined the Communist Party in 1920, and worked in the intelligence service. He worked abroad for two years (1936-38), probably in Spain, before he was called home by the NKVD to be investigated for political reasons. He survived the purges, but retired due to stress and a bad back in 1939. When the war began, Medvedev's health problems apparently cleared up and he was recalled to active duty. As a skilled organizer, he formed 18 reconnaissance and sabotage units. He formed his own unit, called "Mitya," which operated between September 1941 and January 1942. The unit's first success occurred on September 15, 1941 when they ambushed a German convoy and killed a general. In retaliation, the enemy executed hundreds of innocent Chilians. This ruthless action actually helped Medvedev, whose unit tripled in size in only two weeks. The partisan leaders of Mitya helped form other underground units in the Bryansk, Orel, and Mogilev regions. Troop and supply trains were frequently derailed, causing blockages in the transportation system. Scouts reported this information to the Soviet Air Force, which sent out bombers to demolish the stationary targets.

Not content to stay behind to orchestrate destruction, Medvedev took an active role in the field. He took command of a new partisan unit called "The Victors," which he led between May 1942 and March 1944. He parachuted behind enemy lines in June, aggravating his old back injury in the process. But despite the pain, he carried on. His unit operated around Rovno - where Erich Koch, the Nazi ruler of Ukraine, had his headquarters - and kept Moscow informed of German movements by radio three or four times a day. Medvedev was able to place more than 100 agents among the enemy intelligence units and occupation forces in the city. In more than 120 heavy engagements against the Germans around Rovno, Medvedev's unit killed more than 2,000 of the enemy, including 11 generals and high officials, and destroyed 81 freight trains. Due to his valor and leadership, Dmitri Medvedev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on November 5, 1944. When the war ended, Medvedev turned his energies to social work and writing. He died on December 14, 1954 and is buried in Moscow. Memorial plaques in Bryansk and Moscow honor his memory. Leonid Alexandrovich Golikov

This teenager is revered as one of the Young Pioneer heroes of the Novgorod area. Leonid Golikov was born in the village of Lukino and finished five grades of secondary school before he left to work at a plywood plant in the town of Staraya Russa. In March 1942, Golikov, then aged 15, joined the 67th Partisan Detachment of the 4th Leningrad Partisan Brigade. He started out as a scout and quickly learned to plant explosives. He was personally credited with the destruction of 14 important bridges and nine enemy supply trucks. In addition, Golikov was an expert marksman who killed many enemy soldiers in skirmishes. On January 24, 1943, on the highway near the village of Ostraya Luka in the Pskov region, Golikov's group ambushed the enemy, and then fled. However, Golikov did not hear the order to retreat and stayed at his post all night. Early the next morning, he observed a German car on the road. The young scout killed the driver with a burst of his submachine gun. The passenger jumped out, but Golikov shot him dead too. Golikov seized the dead officer's briefcase and pistol and returned to his unit. Upon examination of the briefcase, it was discovered that young Leonya had killed a general. The seized documents proved to be a treasure trove of valuable information. Later that day, Golikov was killed while taking part in another battle. He was buried in Ostraya Luka. Monuments were dedicated to him in Novgorod and in Moscow, and a street was named after him in Novgorod. On April 12, 1944, Leonid Golikov became a Hero of the Soviet Union.

Leonid Golikov was a teenage partisan whose death was used to inspire the Young Communist movement. His most notable success was when he singlehandedly ambushed a German staff car, killing the driver and his passenger, a general officer, and retrieving valuable documents.

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INFANTRYMEN Piotr Mikhailovich Gavrilov

Piotr Gavrilov's name will forever be associated with the defense of the Brest Fortress. His heroism so impressed his captors that they used him to inspire their own troops! (Belarussian State Museum)

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So heroic was Piotr Gavrilov in combat that the Germans who captured him spared his life to inspire their own comrades! The son of a Tatar peasant family, he was born in June 1900 in the village of Alvedino, Tatarsakaya ASSR, and joined the Soviet Army in 1918, taking an active part in the Civil War. Gavrilov graduated from the M. V. Frunze Military Academy in 1939 and fought against the Finns in the Winter War. When the Germans attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, one of the key strategic targets was Brest, an ancient fortress city situated along the Western Bug River, separating Belorussia from Poland. Spearheading the surprise sledgehammer assault was the German 45th Infantry Division of Army Group Center. Maj. Gavrilov, commander of the 44th Infantry Regiment, was stationed at Brest Fortress when the invasion began. Not only were the defenders outnumbered ten to one, but also many key officers were off duty, spending the weekend in town. Field Marshal von Kluge, commanding the German 4th Army, was determined to vanquish the fortress by dinnertime. After a ferocious artillery barrage, German infantry rushed the outer walls. Maj. Gavrilov's men stood firm and repulsed successive waves of enemy infantry. He organized the medical treatment of the wounded and ran from position to position to assess the rapidly deteriorating defensive situation. Another fierce German barrage from over 500 artillery pieces across the river pounded the fortress. By the end of the day, the enemy had gained a foothold. Disorganized and isolated pockets of Soviet soldiers fought back tenaciously. Gavrilov continued to lead the remnants of his regiment, retreating under fire to various places within the fortress, and fighting on. While hunger and thirst took their toll of the defenders, the Germans still could not capture the fortress. The frustrated Germans issued a final ultimatum to surrender on June 29. When this fell on deaf ears, the Germans attacked with dive bombers and tanks. Hundreds of civilians were captured, along with many wounded soldiers. Maj. Gavrilov went into hiding with his adjutant. Days after the fortress fell, the two men stumbled upon a dozen survivors. They hid during the day and fired on the Germans at night. The exhausted men were surprised one day by an enemy patrol and a brief fight occurred. Only Gavrilov and two others survived. The fort was now completely surrounded and they expected to be hunted down the next morning. That night, the three men made their way to the front gate where the enemy encampment was located. They shook hands, bade farewell, threw grenades at the soldiers huddled around a campfire, and then ran. In the confusion, Gavrilov escaped from the fort, but could not cross the river. He made his way back toward the fort

and found refuge in a horse stable, hiding himself under a pile of horse manure. Crazed with hunger, Gavrilov ate horse feed and drank from the fort's moat. He became violently ill five days later. His groans attracted some Germans, who kicked at the dung heap. Gavrilov fired his pistol and the Germans fled, only to quickly return in force. From his hiding place, Gavrilov shot at the Germans and threw grenades. He was finally captured after a grenade blast knocked him unconscious. Amazed that anyone could survive for so long, the German officers treated their prisoner like a prized trophy. Maj. Gavrilov spent the rest of the war in a prison camp until he was liberated in May 1945. He served in the army until 1946. On January 30, 1957, Piotr Gavrilov was finally awarded the welldeserved title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The award, long denied to former prisoners of war, only became possible after Stalin's death. Gavrilov died on January 26, 1979. He was buried in the cemetery in the grounds of Brest Fortress.

A two-man antitank team in action. Their single-shot weapon is a 14.5mm PTRD-41, which fired an incendiary bullet that could penetrate 1in (25mm) of steel plate.

Mookhudin Umurdinov

The name Mookhudin Umurdinov is still spoken with reverence today in the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan, long after this Hero's death. He was bom on April 10, 1912 in the small farm village of Baistan. Having completed ten years of school, young Mookhudin worked briefly as a fireman in Dagestan before joining the Red Army in 1937. He served until 1939, then returned home. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, he rejoined the military. On January 7, 1942, Umurdinov was shipped off to the SovietManchuria border to help guard against a possible Japanese attack. He

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Mookhudin Umurdinov's HSU medal was purchased by author Henry Sakaida in 1997 from a dealer in Germany. The medal and award booklet were returned to the Hero's son, Rahmatjon Umurdinov, via the US Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on August 9, 2002. The medal had been stolen from his home after a flood when the village was evacuated.

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served as a scout for three months, then was assigned as a cook. When the Germans advanced toward Moscow, his unit was pulled out and thrust into the Orel-Kursk battles. On June 5, 1943, Sgt. Umurdinov of the 1022nd Rifle Regiment crossed a river with his platoon under murderous fire. In the action, the company commanders as well as the platoon leader were killed. Umurdinov took over and led his six surviving comrades forward. Pinned down by heavy machine-gun fire, one of his men created a diversion while he searched for the nest. The Germans were firing from a concealed position behind a haystack. The Uzbek sergeant took a flamethrower and set the haystack on fire. When the enemy tried to escape, he mowed them down with his submachine gun. Sgt. Umurdinov and his men could not advance due to the enemy's superior numbers. "We returned to the trenches and stayed there until nightfall," he later wrote. "In the evening, moving quietly along the edge of the precipice, we hit upon the German trenches. After a fight, we occupied that trench and held it for about 24 hours. We made forays in order to eliminate their snipers up in the trees. After destroying them, we advanced two kilometers [1.2 miles] and killed 104 Fascists. This allowed the seven of us to stop the attack of a large enemy unit. We held our position until relieved." On August 4, Umurdinov, now a platoon leader, led a paratrooper group against the village of Plescheyevo. In hand-to-hand fighting, they killed over 20 of the enemy. On the 14th, Sgt. Umurdinov again exhibited great leadership when his men stormed the village of Krivoshein and routed the enemy. Recommended for the tide of Hero of the Soviet Union, Umurdinov received the Gold Star Medal on June 4, 1944. He was one of only 69 Uzbeks to become a Hero during the war. Umurdinov returned to his village after demobilization and started a family. As a radio technician, he worked to bring electricity to his village. He also served as chairman of a collective farm until he died on May 21, 1981. A street and a school in his native land bear his name. In May 1997, 16 years after Umurdinov's death, his Gold Star Medal was stolen when the family evacuated their home due to flooding. The medal was smuggled out of Uzbekistan and landed in the hands of a German medals dealer. In December of the same year, the author purchased this medal. The serial number on the medal helped locate the family. On August 9, 2002, Rahmatjon Umurdinov, the third son of the Hero, received his father's medal and order booklet from the hands of USMC Gen. Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a ceremony at the Uzbek National Military Museum. The return was orchestrated by the author, US Ambassador John Edward Herbst,

and Assistant Public Affairs Officer Stefanie Altman. The medal's return was hailed as a miraculous tribute to a great Uzbek Hero. Alexandr Andreyevich Divochkin

BELOW Alexandr Divochkin in his official HSU portrait with the collar rank insignia of a senior lieutenant, taken in September 1941. (RGAKFD) BELOW RIGHT This sketch from a 1943 Komsomol book depicts Alexandr Divochkin in combat against advancing German tanks, an action that earned him the Hero's title.

One of the greatest little battles of the Great Patriotic War was won by a man who used his cunning to fool the Germans into thinking that they were up against a formidable opponent. That man was Alexandr Divochkin, who was born in the village of Lopatino in the Moscow region in November 1914. Divochkin worked as a construction worker in a factory, but then opted for a military career. In 1936, he joined the army and took part in the Winter War against the Finns. The young officer was a natural leader, and he joined the Communist Party in 1940. At the start of the Great Patriotic War, Jr. Lt. Divochkin served as commander of a batten' of the 15th Motorized Infantry Regiment of the NKVD troops. In August 1941, on the outskirts of Leningrad, German forces advanced steadily. Their infantry, supported by tanks, met little resistance as they breached the lines held by the Soviets. However, near the village of Petrozavodsk the Germans encountered a mighty obstacle named Alexandr Divochkin. In the furious fighting, nearly all of the artillery teams holding back the Germans were knocked out. The young lieutenant ran from cover to cover to assess the rapidly deteriorating defensive situation. All the while, tank shells exploded on their positions with no end in sight. When the commander was killed. Jr. Lt. Divochkin took over. A shell exploded in the boxes of artillery ammunition, starting a fire. Divochkin

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risked his life to smother the flames with sand, then set about positioning his gun and firing it. Shells exploded close to him, but he continued with this task. He then ran over to another gun and started firing it too, thus giving the illusion that the Soviet position remained intact. For over two hours, Divochkin gave orders and worked the two guns as the Germans came within grenade-throwing distance. By this time, the Soviets had regrouped and started a counterattack. Divochkin continued to fire to support his troops. When the fighting stopped, they counted over 70 dead Germans, many more wounded and left on the battlefield, and many heavy machine guns captured. On August 26, 1941, Jr. Lt. Alexandr Divochkin became a Hero of the Soviet Union, one of the earliest recipients of the war. In 1943, he graduated from the M. V. Frunze Military Academy and commanded a parachute regiment until war's end. He died on August 19, 1946 and is buried in Moscow. The Heroes of Taranovka Station

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The Battle of Taranovka Station became one of the most famous small battles of the Great Patriotic War. It started on March 2, 1943 when the Germans made a determined attack to capture the village and railroad station at Taranovka in the Kharkov region of Ukraine. The 78th Guards Infantry Regiment held the village, but only a 25-man platoon defended the station. Lt. Piotr Shironin and his men found themselves in a precarious situation at the station. They were cut off and on their own. His men positioned themselves around a 45mm field gun they had found; its crew had been killed earlier in an air strike. The Germans threw 35 tanks and armored vehicles at the defenders, but the platoon fought back savagely. Artillery in the \illage gave support to the outnumbered platoon by laying down a carpet of fire; engineers mined the approaches to the area. Sr. Sgt. Sergey Nechipurenko and Pvt. Alexandr Tjurin knocked out three tanks with the field gun, but the enemy's self-propelled gun found their mark. Tjurin was wounded and the gun and his comrade were lost. As this vehicle was about to overrun their position, Pvt. Andrei Skvortsov sacrificed his life by throwing himself under the gun's tracks and destroying the vehicle with an antitank grenade.

OPPOSITE Lt. Piotr Shironin's 25-man platoon faced down 35 German tanks and armored vehicles and defeated them in one of the most heroic actions of the war. Every man in the platoon became a Hero. (Kiev War Museum)

Georgi Gubkin as a major after the war. Besides his HSU Medal, he also wears on his left chest, the Order of Lenin, Order of the Red Banner, Medal for Bravery, and the Medal for Victory over Germany. On his right chest, he wears (left to right) the Order of the Patriotic War 1st Class, Order of Alexander Nevsky, and the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 3rd Class (all awarded for combat leadership). (RGAKFD)

The German advance was stopped cold and the invaders became mired in ferocious fighting. Pvts Piotr Shkodin, Nikolai Subbotin, Vasily Tantsurenko, and Sgt. Ivan Sedih each threw themselves under the approaching tanks with antitank grenades and demolished them. The enemy finally pulled back after failing to take the railway station, losing 16 tanks and armored vehicles. They also suffered over 100 dead and many more wounded. Lt. Shironin was badly wounded, and only five others from his platoon survived. All 25 men under Shironin's command were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on May 18, 1943, see Table 3. This was one of the few instances where the HSU was awarded en masse to an entire unit. A monument to these brave men was erected at Taranovka, and the railroad station was given the name Shironino after the platoon's commander. Georgi Nikitovich Gubkin

Georgi Gubkin gained fame for his "high noon" duel with a German officer during the winter of 1944. He was born in the village of Semidomka (a tiny settlement of only seven houses) in the Amur region in April 1919. He was a teacher before the Great Patriotic War. When the war started, Gubkin joined the army and was sent to the Khabarovsk military school. He entered combat with the 297th Infantry Regiment as a lieutenant in July 1942. A year later, Lt. Gubkin distinguished himself during the vicious Battle of the Kursk Salient. Operation Citadel, the German tank-led offensive designed to take Kursk in three days, was stopped cold. Before the enemy could launch a counterattack, the Soviets delivered a preemptive strike using heavy artillery and rockets. Gubkin led his company to stop the enemy from breaking through and creating a breach in the forward artillery positions. In a desperate attempt to keep the tanks at bay, Gubkin directed his antitank gunners by braving intense enemy fire and jumping from one position to another. As enemy infantrymen advanced, he joined in the hand-tohand fighting. When one of the Panther tanks was about to overrun their position, Gubkin was determined to sacrifice his life to destroy it. He crawled forward to detonate his last antitank grenade beneath the tank. Gubkin hugged the ground as the Panther rolled right over him, then lobbed his grenade after it had cleared. The tremendous explosion destroyed it, saving the company's position. For his heroism, Gubkin was decorated and promoted to captain. On August 17, 1944, the battalion commanded by Capt. Gubkin became the first Soviet

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Heroes after the war were literally grabbed off the streets by grateful citizens who brought them home as honored dinner guests to hear their stories. When Vasily Khantaev came to Moscow to participate in the Victory Parade, he was seized by a beautiful Russian girl named Galina, who brought him home to her family. The couple fell in love, married, and he took her back to Siberia where they started a family. (Ludmila Khantaeva)

unit to break through to the border of Germany. For this feat, he received a congratulatory letter and a decoration from President Roosevelt. During the winter of 1944, in a lull in the fighting, Capt. Gubkin was notified that a German officer had sent a challenge, asking him to meet in no man's land for a duel. After a series of communications with the Germans, the stage was set. The Germans were fully aware of Gubkin by name and that his unit was the first to cross into the Fatherland. The German was a Luftwaffe officer and ace forced to fight as an infantryman, a situation he found most degrading. In a scene reminiscent of a Hollywood Western, the two men walked slowly toward each other as comrades from both sides watched. When they were within killing range, both stopped and stared. Gubkin went for his gun first, followed by his opponent. The Russian emptied his Tokarev and the German fell wounded. As both sides began exchanging fire, the Soviets dragged the wounded Luftwaffe officer to their side, where he was treated and interrogated. Capt. Gubkin led his men further into Germany, advancing close to Konigsburg. In February 1945, he was seriously wounded and did not return to combat. He eventually married the nurse in his unit who helped operate on him. On March 24, 1945, Capt. Georgi Gubkin received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. He was also made Honorary Citizen of the towns of Shakiai and Kudirkos-Naumestis of the Lithuanian SSR. He continued in the military until he retired in 1962. Vasily Kharinaevich Khantaev

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The life story of this ethnic Mongolian (Buryat) was a success in more ways than one. Vasily Khantaev was born in August 1924 in the small village of Baitog in the Irkutsk region of eastern Siberia. In his youth, he helped his parents on the farm and attended school. Upon graduation, he became a bookkeeper in a transportation company. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Khantaev rushed to join the army. He found himself on the frontlines in August 1942 as an artilleryman and fought in the Battle of Kursk. On July 10, 1943, he was wounded and wrote home to his parents: "In the great battle of Kursk, I got a little scratch. Soon, I will get well and return to the front. Very soon we'll drive away the fascist invaders from our land!" After recovers1, he took part in the liberation of cities and villages in Ukraine and Poland. Jr. Sgt. Khantaev arrived on the outskirts of Berlin with the 70th Proskurov Order of the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Mechanized Brigade. A master gunner, he commanded a 76mm antitank team made up of a Buryat, Russian, Uzbek,

Author Henry Sakaida, left, bought and returned the stolen Gold Star Medal of Vasily Khantaev to his daughter Ludmila Khantaeva (second left). The photo was taken in Ulan Ude, the capital of the Buryat Republic, in the government administrative building on August 7, 2003. During the research, he brought together Darima Socktoyeva of Ulan Ude, and Craig Fotheringham of California (right), who were married there on August 9.

Belorussian, and an Armenian. The team set to work, opening fire from an open position and destroying two steam locomotives with six enemy snipers in them. On April 26, 1945, Team Khantaev destroyed 11 enemy machine-gun positions hidden in houses and apartment buildings. During the house-to-house fighting, Khantaev could not use his gun for fear of killing his own troops. Grabbing a submachine gun, he yelled, "Forward! For the Motherland!" and charged toward the enemy stronghold leading his men. He killed nine Germans armed with Panzerfausts (antitank weapons), facilitating the advance of Soviet tanks and infantry. But the day was not over yet. Fierce enemy fire prevented the Soviets from crossing a major square in the city. Khantaev was ordered to destroy the enemy positions. Their first shot destroyed a Panther tank, but the Germans retaliated by showering the gun crew with grenades, killing all but Khantaev. Although wounded in the head, the sergeant carried on alone, and destroyed a tank. When another German tank rounded the corner to attack his position, some Soviet infantrymen ran up and helped him turn his gun around. Facing each other, it was Khantaev who fired first and the third tank was demolished. There was no respite. Two enemy armored cars advanced toward Khantaev while an antiaircraft gun was working feverishly to knock him out. Khantaev loaded and fired while infantrymen brought ammunition. He destroyed the armored

A Hero and his comrades pay their respect to German composer Johann Strauss at his gravesite in Germany in early 1945. (Paul McDaniel)

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cars and antiaircraft gun with his accurate aim, allowing the Soviet tanks to take the square. On May 1, Khantaev moved his gun ahead of the infantry and destroyed an enemy column comprising four armored personnel carriers, nine vehicles loaded with Panzerfausts, and seven motorcycles. During the Battle of Berlin, Khantaev eliminated over three companies of Germans and personally captured 49 men, including the district Volksturm commander. Col. Gen. Rybalko, commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, recommended that the young Buryat sergeant be awarded the title of Hero of the So\iet Union. On June 27, 1945, Vasily Khantaev became one of only five Buryats to win the Gold Star Medal. After the war, Vasily Khantaev worked as a director of a state farm, and later became chief engineer in charge of supplies in the Ulan Ude office of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He died in 1991. The Reichstag Heroes

The storming of the Reichstag was of great symbolic importance to the Soviet Union. It signified the final nail in the coffin of Nazi Germany's "Thousand Year Reich." While most of the Soviet soldiers who fought in the rubble of Berlin cared little about the Reichstag or even knew what it was, to Marshals Georgi Zhukov and Ivan Koniev, it was the prize plum. The honor of taking it fell to Zhukov whose forces beat those of his rival to the enemy capital. Many Soviet commanders wanted to be the first to plant their unit's standard in the Reichstag. For 35-year-old Lt. Col. Naum Peysakhovski, the leader of the 164th Rifle Regiment, it was personal. With revolver in hand, the fearless Jewish officer yelled, "Follow me!" as he led a charge through a hail of gunfire toward the objective, upon reaching the building he continued fighting. His brave charge inspired the troops and led to his becoming a Hero.

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OPPOSITE AND ABOVE Under a hail of machine-gun fire, Soviet troops rush toward the Reichstag to plant the Banner of Victory. The building had been vacant for many years due to fire damage, but it became a symbolic target for the Soviets to capture.

The Red Banner No. 5 of the Military Council of the 3rd Shock Army had been reserved and carefully guarded for hoisting above the Reichstag. However, on April 30, 1945, the building was still being held tenaciously by diehard Waffen-SS troops. Capt. Stepan Neustroyev, leading a company of shock troops of the 756th Rifle Regiment, was ordered to give a report to his superior, Col. Fyodor Zinchenko, to confirm the flag raising. A report had been given to the senior officers, stating that the banner had been raised at 1445 hours over the Reichstag. Assuming that the building had fallen, the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front made a premature announcement and recommended commendations for those involved. Trying to calm his commander, Neustroyev explained that there were quite a few red flags in the building, planted in positions occupied by the various units that had fought their way inside. In reality, Banner No. 5 was still at headquarters nearby, and the troops responsible for hoisting this flag were pinned down in the square in front of the Reichstag. Zinchenko was furious. He issued an order to bring the banner at once. The two appointed standard-bearers of the regiment, Sgt. Mikhail Yegorov and Jr. Sgt. Meliton Kantaria, arrived shortly with the special banner. "This is to be the Banner of Victory! Get up there and hoist it high where it can be seen from all over!" ordered Neustroyev. They saluted and rushed out with the banner, accompanied by their comrades.

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This staged daylight photo of the banner raising was taken a few days after the first red banner was planted at night. Soldiers from various platoons fought their way in and planted small red flags throughout the building before the arrival of the Banner of Victory, but these events were not dramatic enough for propaganda purposes, so they were virtually ignored. When an enlisted man, who was awarded the Order of Glory 1st Class (equivalent to the HSU), came forward in the 1970s to claim that he was the first man to plant the red flag in the building, he was told that the official history would not be rewritten.

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A while later, the two sergeants returned with bad news. Sgt. Yegorov explained to the colonel that it was too dark inside the Reichstag and they didn't have flashlights to find their way to the roof! Zinchenko could barely contain his anger. "The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR, on behalf of our Motherland and the entire Soviet people, has ordered you to hoist the Banner of Victory over Berlin. This historic moment has come, and you have not found the way to the roof!" he hissed incredulously. Col. Zinchenko then ordered Capt. Neustroyev to take personal charge of the assignment. Sgt. Maj. Ilya Syanov's company of machine gunners fought their way into the building and cleared the way to the top amid wild gunfire and grenade explosions. At 2250 hours, Yegorov and Kantaria, climbing on the shoulders of Lt. Alexei Berest, unfurled and secured the Banner of Victory on the roof of the Reichstag. Even while the flag was being positioned, intense fighting continued in the various parts of the huge darkened building. The fanatical defenders contested every floor and room. Sr. Lt. Konstantin Samsonov

led his men to root out the remaining staunch defenders from the cellars in a 30-hour skirmish. Capt. Neustroyev was not through yet. Word was sent that the defenders would negotiate surrender, but not to the 22-year-old captain. The German general insisted on dealing with an officer of equal rank. Not wishing to accommodate their request, the resourceful captain solved this problem by putting a leather coat on Lt. Berest, an imposing man, and ordering him to act like a general. The ruse worked and the Germans surrendered the Reichstag on May 2. On May 8, 1945, the Great Patriotic War finally came to an end. When the fighting was over, Marshal Zhukov found over 20 reports and recommendations for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on his desk. The documents showed different and contradictory accounts of the time and location of hoisting the Banner of Victor)'. Zhukov announced that no one was to receive the HSU title until the confusion was sorted out. For the time being, the men would receive the lesser award of the Order of the Red Banner. Col. Fyodor Zinchenko, commander of the 756th Rifle Regiment, which stormed the Reichstag, was awarded the title of HSU on May 31, 1945, as was Lt. Col. Naum Peysakhovski of the 164th. However, the other men connected with the banner raising did not receive the HSU title until a year later, on the first anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War. On May 8, 1946, Capt. Stepan Neustroyev, Sgt. Mikhail Yegorov, and Jr. Sgt. Meliton Kantaria became Heroes of the Soviet Union, followed by Sgt. Maj. Ilya Syanov a week later. Lt. Alexei Berest, who surely deserved the award, was ignored. In 2002, veterans of Rostov sent a petition to President Putin to recognize Berest with the title of Hero of Russia. Berest had died long before, killed in 1970 while saving a girl from under the wheels of a train.

The men who stormed the Reichstag to raise the Banner of Victory are congratulated by Maj. Gen. F. A. Volkov. They are, left to right: Maj. Stepan Neustroyev (shaking hands with Maj. Gen. Volkov), Capt. Konstantin Samsonov, Sgt. Maj. Ilya Syanov, Sgt. Mikhail Yegorov, and Jr. Sgt. Meliton Kantaria.

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THE PLATES A: The Gold Star Medal and the Order of Lenin

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Hero of the Soviet Union Maj. Dmitri Tsuribin along with his Gold Star Medal. Types 1 through 4 were awarded without a ribbon suspension and were attached to the clothing by a screw post and a circular screw back plate. The Type 5 was hung from a five-sided suspension (ribbon), and this type was awarded from June 19, 1943 until the early 1950s. It is made of 23K solid gold with a portrait of Lenin in platinum attached to a circular field of blue/gray enamel, surrounded by wheatears, with a red enamel banner which has the name "Lenin" on it. The serial number is stamped at the top, while the mint's name (Moscow Mint) is inscribed in raised Cyrillic lettering at the bottom.

The Gold Star Medal (A1 and A2) depicted here is the Type 2 (Late Suspension) variety, which was implemented on June 19, 1943 to replace the Type 1 (Early Suspension). The basic difference is the size of the square suspension. The Type 1's suspension is shorter at 2/3in (15mm) while the Type 2 is longer at 3/4in (19.5mm). Both suspensions are 2/3in (15mm) wide. It is believed that the suspension was elongated to accommodate the heavy weight of the gold star, the suspension on the Type 1 having proved inadequate. Color photographs of the Type 1 Gold Star Medal can be found in Elite 90, Heroines of the Soviet Union. The medal is quite small in comparison to other Soviet medals. From the center of the star to the tip measures 2/3in (15mm). The star is made of 3/4oz (21.5g) of 23K solid gold (950/1000). The reverse is inscribed "Hero USSR" in Cyrillic lettering with the serial number stamped above. These medals were produced at both the Leningrad and Moscow mints. The suspension is made from gold-plated sterling silver. The medal was attached to the clothing by means of a screw post and a screw back plate. The Type 2 variety was last awarded on December 24, 1991 to Leonid Solodkov (serial number 11,664). The Gold Star Medal No. 5500 depicted here was awarded to Soviet tank commander Dmitri Tsirubin (page 22). The Russian Federation, formed after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, still awards the Gold Star Medal. The solid red ribbon was changed to white, blue, and red to reflect the national colors of the Russian Federation.

Sgt. Fyodor Ohlopkov, a native Yakut hunter, prepares to claim his 400th individual victim. Ohlopkov's weapon is a Mosin Nagant 7.62 x 54mm rifle fitted with a compact 3.5power PU scope. Unlike the standard Mosin Nagant, his weapon has a turned-down bolt. The Soviet sniper, when engaged in the hunt, was paired with an observer, who was also a sniper. The observer's task was to scout the terrain for victims, record the kills, and protect his comrade. After a kill, they traded places, the observer becoming the shooter. Each man carried about 120 rounds, some of it armor piercing and incendiary. Snipers' targets were not limited to enemy soldiers. They frequently disabled vehicles by setting their gas tanks on fire or putting a bullet through the engine or radiator. Most sniper engagements were at distances of around 100yd (100m) in urban settings and 400yd (400m) in rural ones.

It may be confusing for the reader to know that the Order of Lenin was the USSR's highest award while the title of HSU was its highest distinction. The Gold Star Medal was not an order and was instituted solely to identify the Hero. There are six types of the Order of Lenin. Depicted here (A3, A4 and A5) is the Type 5 variety (Circular Five-sided Suspension), serial number 32,431, which was awarded to

The two men are wearing summer camouflage clothing, which was first introduced in 1943. They are both wearing the M1940 steel helmet. Yakut snipers aimed for the target's head, whereas the majority of other snipers went for a body shot (chest). Asked why they preferred a headshot, the Yakuts answered that they were used to shooting small game, and that a man's

B: Sniper Fyodor Ohlopkov, Vitebsk, Belorussia, May 1944

On April 20, 1945, Maj. Anatoli Rogozin of the 36th Tank Brigade broke through into Muncheberg. Pursuing the enemy, his tanks were the first to get into the outskirts of Berlin and seize the Silesian Railway Station. In the street fighting, they destroyed ten tanks and armored troop carriers. Maj. Rogozin became a HSU on May 3 1 , 1945.

head was about the size of a squirrel. A shot to the head from a 7.62 x 54 bullet was always fatal.

C: Mikhail Gakhokidze, Sevastopol, June 1942 On June 11, 1942, during the Battle of Sevastopol, a platoon of the 386th Rifle Regiment, holding a strategic position, was about to be overrun by the Germans. Knowing that the fate of his comrades was in his hands, Lt. Mikhail Levanovich Gakhokidze led a four-man team of reinforcements and went to the platoon's rescue. Lt. Gakhokidze was a native of Georgia, which has a reputation for producing warriors with swarthy good looks, hot tempers, and luxurious mustaches. In the illustration, Gakhokidze has just killed a German soldier, taken his MG42 light machine gun, and has turned it on the advancing enemy. Firing from the hip, he would mow down over 40 Germans and turn the tide of battle, saving his platoon. The German MG-42 was a fearsome and very deadly weapon, which fired 1,500 rounds of 7.92mm ammunition per minute. It accounted for about 70 percent of the German Gruppe's firepower. Most of this weapon was pressed from sheet metal and welded. Mikhail Gakhokidze became a HSU on June 20, 1942 and survived the war. He lived and worked in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, until he died on December 31, 1972.

D: Spy Robert Klein, Cherkassy, central Ukraine, September 1943 "Under the Führer's order, not a single vehicle will pass to the right bank of the Dnieper!" thundered Robert Klein, a Soviet officer posing as a colonel of the German General Staff, to thwart the retreat of the German 4th Tank Army. It is a day in September 1943 on a bridge over the Dnieper River at Cherkassy, central Ukraine. "We must keep the bridgehead on the left bank and wait for the approaching reinforcements. According to the Führer's new plan, the offensive is going to start from this point!" When the bridge commander asked to see his written order, Klein's partisan driver, seated in the Kubelwagen, secretly reached for a grenade. Playing his role to the hilt, Klein drew a presentation nickel-plated pistol and screamed, "On the Führer's order!" and shot toward the officer to get his attention. He was now prepared to kill him with a second shot to maintain his cover. Convinced of his special assignment, the commander obeyed. Klein stayed at the bridge for over six hours and directed the removal of explosives wired along the bridge. As a direct result of his ruse, the Germans suffered tremendous losses when the Soviets attacked. On January 4, 1944, Robert Klein, a Soviet citizen of German ancestry, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union; he died in 1990. Klein wears the dress uniform of the German GHQ staff officer. His peaked service cap has red carmine piping to the band and crown. The standard officer field blouse is the M36 pattern with contrasting green collar. To show that he is a member of the General Staff, his shoulder boards have carmine red underlay. The collar patches are of unique design, with elaborate embroidery in fine aluminum handstitched thread on a carmine red rather than the normal dark green underlay. He wears the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross at his throat. The leather belt is a standard army officer's issue. On his left

Lt. Marcel Lefevre was one of four fighter aces of the Normandie-Niemen Regiment of French pilots to become a HSU. He claimed 14 victories (11 confirmed) before being shot down on May 28, 1944 and dying in hospital of his injuries on June 5. He received the title of HSU on June 4, 1945. The Normandie-Niemen unit flew 5,240 missions, claimed 273 victories, lost 46 pilots, and won the eternal gratitude of the Soviet Union. (Normandie-Niemen Museum)

hip is a small leather pistol holster (obscured here). Highranking officers, never expecting to fight in the field, favored the small and light Walther PP and PPK, or the Mauser HsC as a side arm. Klein's breeches have the "Lampassen" stripes of the General Staff (worn by all generals, but also by non-general rank officers on the staff), consisting of two broad red stripes with a narrow red stripe between them. He wears the standard officer's leather jackboots.

E: Sailor Nikolai Golubkov, Fuyuan, north-east China, August 1945 Warrant Officer Nikolai Golubkov was one of very few Heroes who won the title while fighting against the Japanese. On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, which was on the verge of collapse. WO Golubkov, commander of a ship antiaircraft battery of the Amur Flotilla, landed with his men at Fuyuan on the northeastern Chinese coast. As the Soviet marines charged inland, their path was blocked by several machine-gun nests in earth-and-timber emplacements. When the attack began to stall. Golubkov stood up and shouted, "For the Motherland, for Stalin!" and rushed forward. He is wearing a plain naval visored cap with a red star. Sailors wore the traditional blue and white striped cotton

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Capt. (3rd rank) Yaroslav losseliani commanded the M-111 in the Black Sea Navy. He made 11 combat sorties and sank 12 enemy ships. He became a HSU on May 16, 1944. His submarine was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

OPPOSITE The Americans provided the Soviets with Lend Lease equipment such as tanks, vehicles, aircraft, armaments, foodstuffs, and clothing. Jeeps like the one shown here were especially prized for their versatility. (Paul McDaniel)

shirt under a dark blue jumper top, with black trousers. Our Hero is armed with the PPSh-41 submachine gun and stick grenades. He succeeded in lobbing a grenade through the slit opening of a machine-gun nest, but received fatal wounds. The resulting explosion destroyed the target and allowed the marines to overrun the Japanese positions. For his sacrifice, Nikolai Golubkov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on August 14, 1945.

F: Pilot Alexei Petrovich Maresyev, April 1942

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During the war, many determined pilots refused to be sidelined after serious injury - the Luftwaffe's famed Stuka pilot Hans Ulrich Rudel, lost a leg, while Britain's Douglas Bader lost both - and returned to combat. Like Bader, Alexei Maresyev had both legs amputated, and yet went on to fly again.

On April 4, 1942, Lt. Maresyev was flying a mission in a Yak1 when his division engaged a dozen Me-109s. His plane was hit and he tried to make an emergency landing in a forest, which proved impossible. His aircraft plowed into trees and he was catapulted from the cockpit, breaking both legs. In an epic struggle against nature, he crawled through the snow for 18 days on his belly, using the sun as his compass. In this illustration, he is wearing a heavy pile-lined canvas flight suit and a leather flight helmet, which gave protection from the extreme cold. He was eventually discovered by peasants. Surgeons were forced to amputate both legs due to gangrene. After a painful rehabilitation, he flew the LaGG-5 with the 63rd Guards Fighter Regiment and shot down three enemy planes in a short period of time. On August 24, 1943, he became a Hero of the Soviet Union. By war's end, Maj. Maresyev had scored 11 aerial victories in 92 missions.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, he served as first deputy chairman of the Union of Veterans and Disabled People of Russia. He died on May 18, 2001 in Moscow just minutes before an organized celebration of his 85th birthday was about to commence. Hundreds of elderly war veterans and supporters in attendance at the Central Russian Army Theater wept openly at the news. "There is nothing extraordinary in what I did!" remarked Maresyev shortly before his death.

G: Medic Anatoli Alexandrovich Kokorin, Northern Front, August 1941 Young Anatoli Kokorin's goal was to become a doctor. He was born in 1921 in the village of Borovichi in the present Novgorod region. He completed his secondary education and enrolled in a medical university. Having graduated in 1940, the young man joined the Red Army to become a military physician. The Great Patriotic War came suddenly and Pvt. Kokorin found himself in combat immediately. He was assigned to the 14th Motor Infantry Regiment of the 21st Motor Infantry Division of NKVD troops on the Northern Front. During a fierce firefight in a forest on August 8, 1941, with complete disregard for his own life, he saved the lives of six wounded officers and men. He pulled them to safety and administered first aid, then asked his comrades to take them to the rear. The Germans then counterattacked fiercely and Kokorin was hit and wounded. Pvt. Kokorin is shown lying severely wounded against a tree, wearing the M1935 enlisted man's pullover shirt, with khaki breeches and leggings. As a medic, he carries no weapon, only medical supplies. Knowing that he would not survive, he grabbed a grenade and hid it behind his medical bag. Soon, several enemy soldiers came through the woods, checking for their

wounded. When the Germans surrounded him, he detonated the grenade, killing and wounding several of them. On August 26, 1941, Pvt. Anatoli Kokorin was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

H: Partisan Marat Kazei, Khorometskoye, Belorussia, May 1944 The Great Patriotic War was fought not only by Soviet men and women, but also by children. Young teenagers, many of whom were in the Pioneer movement, were idealistic and eager to prove themselves. One such lad was Marat Kazei, who was born in October 1928 in the village of Stankovo in the Minsk region of Belorussia. When the war started, Kazei was just about to enter the fifth grade of school. Because he was just a child, the partisans were not inclined to give him adult responsibilities. Mostly, children were used in support roles such as gathering intelligence, passing leaflets, and acting as couriers. In November 1942, Kazei joined the 25th Anniversary of the October Revolution Partisan Detachment and worked as a scout. On May 11, 1944, in the village of Khorometskoye, Kazei was on a scouting mission when his group was spotted by the Germans. A fierce fight ensued, but the small and lightly armed group was outnumbered. Kazei is depicted here, dressed in civilian clothing. After exhausting his ammunition, he threw one grenade, and then took his own life with the second. Due to the stealthy nature of their activities, the partisans' accomplishments were often unrecorded. In the case of Marat Kazei, he was given the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on May 8, 1965, the 20th anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War. A monument was dedicated to Kazei in Minsk from donations collected by the student Pioneers. He was the second-youngest child to win the HSU.

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